Niklas Luhmann's Systems Theory as a Challenge for Ethics

Author(s): Hans-Ulrich Dallmann

Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 85-102
Published by: Springer
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 HANS-ULRICH DALLMANN

NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMS THEORY AS A CHALLENGE

FOR ETHICS

ABSTRACT. The author discusses Niklas Luhmann's concept of ethics andmorals. There
fore he sketches the main traits of Luhmann's theory of systems (e.g. the terms autopoiesis,
system and environment, code and programme). From the system-theoretical point of
view, ethics are characterized as the reflexive theory of morals. Morals are described as
the communication of regard or disregard. The author shows which consequences follow
from this concept by discussing problems concerning several subsystems at the same time.
The problems of Luhmann's theory of morals and ethics are demonstrated by analyzing
the concepts of risk and responsibility. Finally, the author demands that ethics should be
understood even more as social ethics which reflect upon their social foundation in a more

consequent way.

KEY WORDS: freedom, rationality, regard, responsibility, risk, systems theory

At first sight, the theory of systems and ethics appear to have nothing to
do with each other. Luhmann's theory of systems is intended to be strictly
descriptive, whereas ethics are understood to be normative. However, a
normative concept of ethics is not the only possible one. And this is the
ethics - ethics as ethics -
challenge for theological such philosophical
raised by Luhmann's theory of systems: Isn't itmore useful to understand
ethics descriptively rather than normatively?
To investigate this I have to go a long way back, since the argument for
this challenge is linked with the place ethics hold in Luhmann's design of
his theory. And that is only plausible against the background of the theory
itself. Therefore, I want to show in the first section how Luhmann con
structs his functional theory of systems. In the second section, I will try to
explain which function ethics and morals fulfill this theory. Subsequently,
I want to answer the question, what is so challenging in this design of
Luhmann's theory? And finally I want to discuss whether the theory of
a
systems is challenge for ethics as a whole, and whether it forces ethics to
a deeper reflection of their own prerequisites and limitations.

Ethical Theory andMoral Practice 1: 85-102,1998.

? 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
*

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 86 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

1. EVERYTHING
MUST CHANGESO THATEVERYTHING
REMAINS AS IT IS: NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMS
THEORY

Niklas Luhmann analyzes modern society as a social system. 'As a social'

means that there are other kinds of systems such as machines, organisms
and psychological systems. Social systems and other systems have in com
mon theirbasic structure.They consist of elementary units which they are
? ?
producing themselves in a recursive process that requires time and
which they are stringing together and linking to each other. Luhmann calls
this basic structure 'autopoiesis*. Systems are characterized by 'staying
alive' in a self-contained process, i.e. in its autopoiesis the system strictly
refers to its own selfmade units. This means that a system is maintaining
itself through a continuous process of reproduction, and thus a process
of change. Everything must change so that everything remains as it is.
'Es geht nicht mehr um eine Einheit mit bestimmten Eigenschaften, ?ber
deren Bestand oder Nichtbestand eine Gesamtentscheidung fallt; sondern
es geht um oder Abbrechen der Reproduktion von Elementen
Fortsetzung
durch ein relationales Arrangieren eben dieser Elemente. Erhaltung ist hier
Erhaltung derGeschlossenheit und derUnaufh?rlichkeit derReproduktion
von Elementen, die im Entstehen schon wieder verschwinden."1
This basic operation conveys an important distinction. The distinction
which element is considered as an own and which one is just not con
sidered as an own. In other words: The autopoiesis of the system is car
rying out continuously the distinction between system and environment.
The making of the autopoiesis is the drawing of the boundary between
inside and outside,between belonging to and not belonging to. This is a
far-reaching step. Luhmann does not assume, in contrast to older assump
tions of a theory of systems, that there is an between
input/output-process
system and environment, but rather that the system is only reacting to
the production of its own conditions. Only what is recognized as an own
condition causes connecting action.
What are these conditions, the elements, social systems made of? Luh
mann describes social systems as communication-systems which are ac
tualizing "Sinn" (meaning) continuously. So Luhmann dismisses an em
phatic concept of meaning. There is nothing like a "loss of meaning" in
1
Luhmann, N., Soziale Systeme. Grundri? einer Theorie.
allgemeinen (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 86. (We are not dealing here with an overall-decision on the existence
or non-existence of a certain entity with distinctive but rather with the ongoing
features,
or aborted of elements a relational of these elements.
reproduction through arrangement
Maintenance means on that score maintenance of the self-containment and continuation of
the reproduction of elements which are vanishing in themoment of their
emergence.)

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 NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMSTHEORY 87

a strict sense, because meaning is a connecting-ability, Meaning emerges

a communication ?
whenever follows another and this is basically always
possible, since one can communicate consent or dissent according to each
communication, which makes connecting communication possible and so
on.

So social systems are self-generating networks or webs of communica

tions. How do systems know which communication does belong to them
and does not belong to the environment?Which criteria do they use to
draw the boundary? Society as the system enclosing all types of meaning
bounded communication has differentiated itself- according to Luhmann
?
in the course of social evolution into functional orientated and special
ized subsystems, e.g. economy, law, religion or arts. These subsystems
crystallize from the utilization of specific codes. Codes are nothing but
rules of distinction. They consist of a positive and a negative value, but
the transitionfrom the one to the other sidemust be possible (even if this
transition needs time, because the positive and the negative value cannot be
actualized at the same time). "Nur unter der Bedingung der Offenheit f?r
positive und fur negative Optionen kann ein soziales System sich selbst mit
einem Code identifizieren.Geschieht das, dann hei?t das, da? das System
alle Operationen, die sich am eigenen Code orientieren, als eigene erkennt
?
und andere nicht. System und Code sind dann fest
gekoppelt. Der Code
ist die Form,mit der das System sich selbst von derUmwelt unterscheidet
und die eigene Geschlossenheit
operative In consequence
organisiert."2
specialized subsystems of society can only ascribe such communications
to the own system which can be presented with this code. Other commu
nications are ascribed
to the environment, to which the other subsystems
belong. The
encoding does exclude criteria of decision not referring to
the system. A loan application is not assessed by the pattern just/unjust,
right/wrong or let's say good/bad. This will have serious consequences
for ethics, as we will see later on. But first of all some discriminations

concerning the concepts used.3

2
Luhmann, N., Soziologie des Risikos. (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1991), p. 89.
(A social system can identify itself with a code only under the condition of openness for
positive or negative If that occurs, then that means that the system all
options. recognizes
operations orientating themselves by their own code as their own ? and not all others. Then

system and code are linked tightly. The code is themeans by which a system differs from
the environment and organizes its own operative unity.)
3 A side-effect
of the increasing differentiation with growing complexity is the forma
tion of side-codes with their function to bridge the gap between code and programme.
With that the code-guided communication is relieved what is worthy of
by pre-selecting
noting. In the system of sciences, is such a side-code. It absolves one from
reputation

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88 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

Whenever systems do operate with their specific code it is in question

which set of rules is applied for the assignation. The system develops pro
grammes to solve this problem. "Der Programmbegriff bezieht sich auf
den des Codes und bezeichnet in der Nachfolge eines
alten Begriffsge
brauchs (kanon, kriterion, regula) diejenigen Bedingungen, unter denen
der positive bzw. negative Wert eines bestimmten Codes auf Sachverhalte
oder Ereignisse richtig zugeteilt werden kann. In sozialen Systemen wird
dies als eine Frage der Entscheidung (deshalb auch Entscheidungspro
gramme) zwischen wahr und unwahr, Recht und Unrecht usw. behandelt."4
Programmes have emerged evolutionary after the codes and under the con
dition of the differentiation of the society into functionally orientated sub
systems. The unity of good and truth was secured previously by religion,
particularly concerning law and politics. Even in the age of enlightenment,
this security survived secularized in the concept of nature. The demor
alization of the codes
started with the emancipation of system-structure
and code of economy from the religious and moral control. So a process
started, which resulted in a greater independence of the special codes and
their specific programmes as well as in the limitation of their range of

validity. Now a programme valid for all the codes could not be formulated.
"First the food and then the morals!", one could conclude. But it is
not a question of one after the other. Morals are not the stock of topics
for conversations by the fireside, when all serious decisions are made -

maybe they are too. Moral communication occurs continuously. But, it

belongs, as it were, to another universe. Specialized subsystems ascribe
moral communication to their environment. Why?

2. REGARD AND DISREGARD: MORALS AND ETHICS AS

VIEWED BY A THEORY OF SYSTEMS

Let us hear Luhmann

in greater detail: "Ich verstehe unter Moral eine
besondere Art von Kommunikation, die Hinweise auf Achtung oder Mi?
achtung mitfuhrt. Dabei geht es nicht um gute oder schlechte Leistungen

assessing scientific communication as a whole, because persons and special institutions

with a reputation are supposed to produce research and results with due attention.
4
Luhmann, N., ?kologische Kommunikation. Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf
?kologische Gef?hrdungen einstellen? (Opladen,Westdeutscher Verlag 1986), p. 268. (The
to the concept -
concept of programme is related of code and refers in succession to an
older use of the term (kanon, kriterion, regula) - to prerequisites under which facts or
events can be assigned in the correct way. In social systems this will be treated as a case of
decision (hence decision-making-programmes) between right or wrong, just or unjust and
so on.)

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 NIKLAS
LUHMANN'S
SYSTEMS
THEORY 89

in spezifischen Hinsichten, und etwa alsAstronaut, Musiker, Forscher oder

Fu?ballspieler, sondern um die ganze Person, soweit sie als Teilnehmer
von Kommunikation gesch?tzt wird. Achtung oderMi?achtung wird typ
isch nur unter besonderen Bedingungen zuerkannt.Moral ist die jeweils
gebrauchsf?hige Gesamtheit solcher Bedingungen. Sie wird keineswegs
laufend eingesetzt, sondern hat etwas leicht Pathologisches an sich. Nur
wenn es brenzlig wird, hat man Anla?, die anzudeuten, unter
Bedingungen
denen man andere achtet oder nicht achtet. Der Bereich der Moral wird
hiermit empirisch eingegrenzt und nicht etwa als Anwendungsbereich bes
timmterNormen oder Regeln oderWerte definiert."5Which implications
does this concept of morals have for a theory of society?
First of all, the above makes clear that morals are provided with a spe
cific code, which is structured by the values regard or disregard. Only what
actualizes this code ismoral communication. The code is used concerning
persons. In moral communications they come into view as a whole, but
not regarding special talents or personal traits. This
abilities, implies that
moral communication is structured symmetrically, i.e. Who communicates
morally commits himself or herself. To communicate shows con
morally
currently, that the same conditions are valid for the person, to whom he
or she gives his or her opinion. Furthermore, Luhmann is assuming that
morals are located at the level of society. In pre-modern societies, the in
clusion of people into society was controlled by morals. morals
Nowadays,
have no specific reference to a subsystem, e.g. knowledge (sciences), faith
(religion) or power (politics). Therefore morals belong to the environment
of all subsystems of the society, morals are equidistant to every subsystem.
The code of morals and the code of the subsystems are not congruent.
"Es darf gerade nicht dahin kommen, da? man die Regierung f?r struk
turell gut, die Opposition f?r strukturell schlecht oder gar b?se erkl?rt. Das
w?re die Todeserkl?rung f?rDemokratie. Dasselbe l??t sich leicht nach
pr?fen am Falle von wahr/unwahr, von guten oder schlechten Zensuren,
von Geldzahlungen oder deren Unterlassen, von f?r
Liebesentscheidungen

5
Luhmann, N., Paradigm lost: ?ber die ethische Reflexion derMoral Rede vonNiklas
Luhmann anl??lich der Verleihung des Hegel-Preises 1989. (Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp 1990),
pp. 17?18. (I interpret morals as a specific way of communication, which conveys refer
ences to regard and disregard. Good or bad are not the
specific performances point, e.g.
as an astronaut, musician, scientist or But the whole is at stake, in
soccer-player. person
so far as the person is appreciated as a in communications.
participant Typically regard
or are ascribed under special conditions. Morals are the usable
disregard entirety of such
conditions. They will not be used continuously, but inherently have
something slightly
pathological. If things are getting too hot, one has occasion to allude to the conditions
inwhich one regards or disregards other persons. The realm of morals is
thereby limited
empirically, but is not defined as a sphere of application of special norms, rules or values.)

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90 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

diesen und keinen anderen Partner. Die Funktionscodes m?ssen auf einer
Ebene h?herer Amoralit?t eingerichtet sein, weil sie ihre Werte fur alle
Operationen des Systems zug?nglich machen m?ssen."6 For Luhmann, it
is not a question of a "sectoral enclosure of morals"7 but of the functional
declosure with the consequence, by the way, that morals no longer have a
special function. Morals only exist because people are incorrigible so that

they are communicating morally and don't stop by economy or politics. At

this point there is no difference compared to other social codes which can
be used universally in spite of their functional specificity.
But ethics? Luhmann describes ethics as a reflexive theory of morals.
In their conventional form ethics have to deal with a rational justification
of moral decisions. This iswhat utilitarian ethics as well as deontological
following Kant have in common. The internal theoretical problems caused
by this venture are sufficiently well known. And the actual attempt to find
a final justification of moral norms in a philosophical way did not show
any generally accepted solutions either in her transcendental-pragmatic
or universal-pragmatic version. If you apply Luhmann's of
understanding
morals and ethics, a justification of norms or value-decisions cannot be the
task of ethical reflection.
The reasonfor this lies in the functional differentiation of modern soci
ety. In the framework of such a theory of functional differentiation it is pos
sible to describe exactly three system-references for each of the subsystems
of the society: the relation to the overarching-system society {function),
the relation to the other
subsystems of the society {service), which
belong
to every other subsystem's environment and finally the relation to itself
{reflection^ E.g. for the religious system,9 the function can be outlined
as the transformation of indeterminate resp. unspecific into determinable
resp. specific contingency. The service can be sketched as "Diakonie" and
the reflection as theology. The strict self-reference of reflection is for the
6 ?
Luhmann, N. Paradigm lost, p. 24. (It just must not happen, that one declares
government as structurally good but the opposition as structurally bad or evil. This would
be democracy's official declaration of death. The same point can be proved in the
easily
case of true /false, good or bad grades, or their omission, decisions for this or
payments
that partner in the case of love. The functional codes have to be established on a sphere of

higher amorality, since they have to open up their values to all of the system.)
operations
7
So Pf?rtner, S., Moralfreie Moraltheorie in der wertpluralen Gesellschaft? Eine Fort
setzung der Diskussion mit Niklas Luhmann, Zeitschrift f?r Evangelische Ethik 24 (1980),
pp. 192-208 (195).
8
Cf. Luhmann, N., Systemtheorie, Evolutionstheorie und Kommunikationstheorie, in
N. Luhmann, Soziologische Aufkl?rung 2. Aufs?tze zur Theorie der
Gesellschaft, (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975), pp. 193-203 (198-199).
9 I refer to
my description in:Die Systemtheorie Niklas Luhmanns und ihre theologische
Rezeption. (Stuttgart, Berlin, K?ln: Kohlhammer, 1994), pp. 93-100.

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 NOCLASLUHMANN'S SYSTEMSTHEORY 91

control of a system's function and service. As Luhmann puts it, reflection

is a third-order-observation by which a system observes its constituting
distinctions, thatmeans itdistinguishes itsdistinctions.10 The indication of
the reflection is the identity of the system. That's no identity in stagnation
but an identity in the operation of observation, thatmeans the distinction of
distinctions. Reflection varies from the observation by others in a central

point. Reflection orientates itself by the code of the system it describes,

while an external observation neither does nor can do so without ascribing
itself to the system.
What follows up with that for ethics and morals? If we understand
ethics as a theory of reflection, ethics only refer to the code-guided com
munication of regard and do not refer to just/unjust or true/false. To be
defeated in a lawsuit is not a question of morals, but a question of law.
To be functional the distinction has to be morally neutral. Furthermore it
follows that reflection is not able to establish the distinction to which it
refers, because it is operating itself with this distinction. The distinction
between good or bad (in amoral sense) isn't itself good or bad, it is neither
of these.
For ethics it follows, according to Luhmann's interpretation, that one
of the main duties has to be to limit the area of application of morals. A
double distinction is at stake: the question inwhich context the distinction
can be used and secondly the question about the criteria for the application
- -
of the distinction. Insofar according to Luhmann "ist es die vielleicht

10 Cf. in
detail Luhmann, N., Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1990), pp. 68-121 for observation and pp. 469-548 for reflection. As a definition, the

following may be sufficient: "Unter Beobachtung soll daher verstanden werden die Be
nutzung einer Unterscheidung zur Bezeichnung der einen (und nicht der anderen Seite),
gleich welche empirische Realit?t diese Operation durchfuhrt, sofern sie nur unterschei
den (also zwei Seiten zugleich sehen) und bezeichnen kann. Mit George Spencer Brown
ist dabei vorauszusetzen, da? Unterscheidung und Bezeichnung eine untrennbare Einheit
bilden, da nur Unterscheidbares bezeichnet werden kann und Unterscheidungen nur zu

Bezeichnungen verwendet werden k?nnen (was dieM?glichkeit einschlie?t, die uns auf die
Spur der Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung setzen wird: die Unterscheidung selbst mit Hilfe
einer anderen zu bezeichnen).A N., des Risikos,
Unterscheidung Luhmann, Soziologie p.
239 (And so observation has to be understood as the use of a distinction for the indication
of the one (and not the other side) no matter which empirical reality is
carrying out that
operation, as long as it is able to distinguish (thus seeing both sides simultaneously) and
to indicate. According to George Spencer Brown there is to assume that distinction and
indication are an inseparable unity, since only something distinguishable can be indicated
and distinctions can be used only as indications (what includes the
possibility which will
us on the track of second-order-observation: to indicate the distinction
put by means of
another distinction).)

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92 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

vordringlichste Aufgabe der Ethik, vor Moral zu warnen."11 Furthermore,

looking after the moral-specific programme has to be assigned to ethics,

if we follow Luhmann's line of argument. That would be the duty of an
ethical methodology which reflects on which conditions and on account
of which distinctions a specific code-value has to be usefully assigned
to a specific behavior. The formal structure is following the version of
Luhmann's concept of programme as a system of norms for the ascription
of the code-values.
At this point one might wonder: Methodology and self-restraint as the
essential duties of ethics? Is itworth the effort?Well, instead of ethics
there is the alternative to do research in ethics, i.e. to change the system's
reference. Research in ethics observes ethics and their distinctions. The
research is located in the system of sciences and is both a historical and
empirical science. It is its topic to do research in ethics but not to do ethics
itself. Actually the problem is that both perspectives coincide. Ethicians
do research in ethics and researchers do ethics ? or are believing
in ethics
to do so. It's the question whether that is so accidentally or whether there
are structural reasons for it. That leads to the next section. Is Luhmann's
description of morals and ethics correct or do we have to start again?

3. THE LIMITEDNESS OF ETHICS AND ETHICIANS. ARE

ETHICS ABLE TO ADJUST TO A SYTEM-THEORETICAL
COMMUNICATION?

No doubt there is moral communication. And there are not many reasons
why we shouldn't describe this communication by the distinction between
regard and disregard or much easier by the distinction between good or
bad. But are the subsystems of the society ? and morals belong to their
?
environment deaf to moral communication? As I see it they are not.
On the contrary: Subsystems of the society react sensibly to moral com
munication. That is not only why a code-unspecific or strange stress is
laid upon them. Indeed they are able to transfer morals into their system
specific code. E.g. they are able to indicate the cost of morals or they
are able to react to moral demands with the distinction between just or
unjust. At the time of the boycott of the Republic of South-Africa, the
banks were an example of the former; for the latter, one can quote the
discussion at the constitutional court about the penal valuation of sit-in
demonstrations in Germany. However, the subsystems of society depend

11
Luhmann, N. Paradigm lost, p. 41. . . it be the main for ethics to
(. may assignment
warn against morals.)

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 NKLA2LUHMANN'S THEORY
SYSTEMS 93

on the ability to change morals into own communication, because the code

guided communication is valid only in the system. That does not mean that
there are no exchange rates, just the contrary. The subsystems are observ

ing each other continuously according to their own code. The economy
is observing politics and changes political decisions into payments and is
that to the political public. The same can be applied to the
communicating
interaction between health-, scientific-, economic- and legal-system, e.g.
the problems with the care-insurance inGermany. The examples could be
easily be multiplied.
-
In addition, issues discussed in the public sphere as ethical or moral
? are not
problems generally specific to only one subsystem, but they are
far-reaching problems spanning the subsystems. This becomes clear in the

question of removing organs for a transplantation. The spheres coincide.

This is not only a question of law, since law is not provided with instru
ments to define the time of death. It is not only a question of medicine,
since medicine depends on the normative provision of that criterion. Be
yond it, sciences (e.g. in the form of philosophy) and politics are involved.
And only naive people believe that serious economic interests are not in
volved. This example makes clear that in complex problems, subsystems
are mutually dependent on each other's services. And it is always possi
ble to transfer these services into their own code, that means to express
them by means of the distinctions just/unjust, true/false, have/have-not.
And furthermore, it becomes clear that no reason can be given why morals
shouldn't play a role in the context of such complex problems.
Well, moral argumentation is tendentiously polemic. But ? from a
?
system-theoretical point of view this doesn't argue against morals. The
same can be considered for the second-order-observationitself, certainly if
it is to be communicated. (E.g. this is not advised in dialogues in personal
relationships. It is not possible to have such dialogues without any quarrel
under the conditions that he or she is observing how he or she ?
observes
and communicates this observation. But exactly that mechanism character
izes the function of morals. Regarding other subsystems, morals raise these
questions which the subsystems are not able to ask themselves,
namely the
question of the universal validity of the code. From the subsystem's point
? ? an
of view this is under specific preconditions immense imposition,
from the point of view of society as a whole it is a necessity, if and when
the coordination of the codes of the involved subsystems does not succeed
in special problematic situations. Therefore, itwould seem that morals will
be actualized, if there is a spanner in the workds of society. It is morals
because morals seem most likely to be able to transcend the interests of
reproduction, hence their independence of the other subsystems.

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94 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

Apart from this, it is now becoming apparent that the subsystems are

trying to install morals and ethics into the reproduction of their own. Nor
mally this happens by establishing a system-specific ethic, e.g. ethics of
sciences or ethics of economy. That this is a modern problem is directly
evident and can be reconstructed system-theoretically. The reason is the
assertion of functional differentiation and the uncoupling of-traditionally
?
limiting institutions such as religion with their specific morals or of

professional or estational ethics covered by the stratification of society.

If the system does not want to expose itself to the disregard or ostracism
of society (which would have dysfunctional consequences for the system),
it has to raise the question how to limit the application of the code at the
moment when the code asserts itself without limitations. That is a problem
both at the sphere of the involved subsystems and at the sphere of subor
dinated entities like firms or other organisations. This reaction to societal
moral demands will be installed, not because of the code itself or because
of the jeopardizing of its values. Moral criticism itself assumes the code
in its bivalence. What is criticized is the universal application of the code.
At the same time, the functional potential of universal application is not at
stake, but concrete affairs in which the application has side-effects for the
system's environment which seem to be unacceptable for various reasons.
Once again, it is nothing like the option not to use the code, but the neces
sity to reflect the limitation of the application. E.g. the Greenpeace-boycott
of Shell: This was not a question of disregarding oil-production and oil
trading, but of economic decisions which are functional from an internal

point of view, but dysfunctional from an external one. The assertion of the
economic code is having no sensor for political consequences in Nigeria
or ecological consequences in the North Sea. Considering the complexity
of these problems, they cannot be shifted into another subsystem e.g. pol
itics. Nor is the political system able to regulate all potential conflicts by
anticipation. Hence require a sensor and communication
the subsystems
about self-restraint. Such are regularly labelled ethics.
situations
It is possible to link this to a system-theoretical point of view. In such
a case, ethics are first of all the
description of the moral communication
of society. At the same time ethics depend on the self-description of the
relevant subsystems. In any case, ethics are not dependent on it, if ethics
do not want to see themselves as a theory of
society in a strict sense which
observes the self-observations of the observers in the relevant subsystems.
Therefore itmakes sense to design ethics as an integrative-science.12

12 So for
theological ethics Huber, W., Anspruch und Beschaffenheit theologischer Ethik
als Integrationswissenschaft, Handbuch der christlichen Ethik, Vol. 1 (Freiburg, Basel,
Wien: Herder, new edition pp. 391-406.
1993),

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 NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMSTHEORY 95

This leads to the point where Luhmann's critique of current ethical

? to the conclusion ?
theory starts. Luhmann's reproach according cul
minates in the observation that ethics do not establish themselves as a
? ?
second-order-observation that means to distinguish distinctions but
instead try to determine the value of the moral code without taking into
account the distinction itself. Put simply: Luhmann reproaches the ethi
cians with the fact that they are trying to determine the good as good and
to present the own project as a good one. Ethics do not try to describe
the difference between good and bad, but to give reasons for the good
in all its varieties. So itwill be doubled what anyway is indicated in the
social communication, a specific behavior
that is to qualify as a morally

good one. Concerningtheological ethics, Luhmann criticises in a certain

case: "Wer so formuliert, kann es ebenso gut auch bleiben lassen. Es reicht
nicht."13 In this way Luhmann estimates the ecological-ethical statements
of a protestant theologian. Luhmann yet attacks the guild of protestant
ethicians on the whole. "Weithin wiederholen sie nur, was ohnehin gedacht
und gemeint wird ohne spezifisch religi?sen Bezug. In konkreten Bildern
und Worten, Mahnungen und Appellen verbergen sich Allgemeinpl?tze,
die sich den wirklichen Problemen nicht stellen."14
Luhmann does not want to show the impossibility of ethics under mod
ern conditions, but he points to the level of abstraction which is obliga
tory and which is defined by the system-theoretical starting point at the
second-order-observation. But obviously ethicians refuse to do as Luh
mann wishes. At this point there is no to assess or to refute
opportunity
this judgement. It is not about apology. Instead Iwant to raise the question:
Which problems follow that system-theoretical perspective on ethics?

4. THE CHALLENGE FOR ETHICS BY THE SYSTEMS

THEORY

Luhmann designs his systems theory as a second-order-observation In this

sense it is a strictly descriptive theory. He tries to show how the autopoiesis
of society comes to pass and he looks for an adequate description. On the
same level there is the system-theoretical reconstruction of moral com
munication and of its reflection in ethics. Put into other words: It's the
13
Luhmann, N., ?kologische Kommunikation, p. 183 (Who formulates in this form, can
just as well leave it. It's not sufficient.).
14
Luhmann, N., "?kologische Kommunikation, pp. 183?184. (To a large extent they
are only repeating what is thought and said anyway without a reference.
specific religious
Platitudes not facing up to the real are hidden in concrete and works,
problems images
admonishments and appeals).

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96 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

will be applied to social

question how and under what conditions morals
communication. Hence it can be explained why morals do not work in
some ways. The reason lies in the limited access into the autopoietical
closeness of the subsystems. This is founded in the fact that during their
social evolution the subsystems had and had to become, emancipated from
moral or religious control to maintain their own structures under the con
ditions of high complexity. In consequence morals have become a private
affair even though again and again people try to fall back on them to
criticize decisions of specific subsystems or to legitimize specific options
inside the subsystems, above all in politics.
From a system-theoretical point of view, but not this alone, this seems
to be at least a dysfunctional if not a hopeless enterprise. This problem can
be formulated as a problem in the relation between ethics and rationality.
Iwant to elucidate this. E.g. on the part of economy, the moral criticism of
economic behavior (trade with China or Iraq) seems to be irrational. That
is why economical communication its own system-specific
has rationality.
A rational economic action is one which (re-)establishes or increases the

ability to pay. The same applies to the opposite. But that is usually ignored,
even by Luhmann. On the part of morals a concrete economic action may
seem to be irrational. That is why moral communication has her own

specific rationality. From a moral perspective, an irrational action is one

which exposes itself to moral disregard. In this context it is important that
economic action as such is not coded morally (for instance, profit is bad
or banking transaction is basically immoral), but as specific describable
actions (e.g. loans to dictatures, arms trade in troublespots, ecocide by
non-controlled production). Only the moral coding of subsystems of so
ciety as such would be morally irrational, hence morals refer to specific
ascribable actions. A concept of freedom just as a concept of action is
constitutive for morals and ethics. A moral coding requires the freedom
of action (in that sense Luhmann describes freedom as the contingency
?
formula of morals). Morals and economy to refer to the example ? are
mutually irrational. But it can be assumed that both are able to see ? if each
of them would observe how the other side communicates morally or eco
? are
nomically that the moral valuation and the economic action rational
in the particular point of view. That means: Morals are not irrational per
se, just the application of moral rationality to economic rationality seems
to be irrational. But isn't this limitation of moral communication irrational
itself?
At the level of society as a whole, the different subsystems limit each
other mutually. On the one hand because the subsystems are offering
only limited services to each other. On the other hand because subsys

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 NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMSTHEORY 97

tem-specific interests can clash. From the economic point of view e.g. a
deal with Iraq is rational; from the political point of view it is extremely
irrational. The mutual relationship between the subsystems prevents the
societal action being coded by the rules and regulations of only one sub
system, i.e. religion (e.g. in theocratic systems), politics (in specific dicta

torships) or economy (in some versions of capitalism). One can say that the
mutual limitation of the systems is preventing the assertion of a particular

rationality. E.g. political limitations are ensuring that in the long run, cur
rent economic decisions prove dysfunctional for the economy itself.Moral
communication can be considered similarly. Hence there is no reason to
exclude morals from this mutual limitation. But to refrain from mutual
limitationwould certainly be irrationalfrom the societal point of view.
Yet the reproach of irrationality is neither new nor original. It is often
linkedwith the diagnosis that the importance of morals is declining, such
as religion or other institutions which are procuring values. Also, Haber
mas and other theorists are assuming that morals are used up and that we
can only operate with a remaining stock running short, but it is foreseeable
that this supply will run down slowly but surely. Against this interpretation
of the vanishing morals, the communitarian critique is the opposite, de
? a ?
manding in less reflective version is the restoration of valid values15
? -
and which in a more sophisticated version tries to provide evidence
that even under modern conditions, moral roots of the self can be found,
which determine the behavior of the individuals as well as society as a
whole.16 Above
all, Charles Taylor tries to give evidence that the talk about
the loss of morals is not an appropriate description of the actual situation.
We should be talking about the change of values rather than about their
loss. Then Taylor emphasizes that this is only a change, and that there are
other values becoming the focus of attention. Nevertheless these are strong
values which have their roots in the history of the occidental culture. It is
not possible to extend this at this point, but Iwant to remark that one can
oppose the diagnosis of a loss of the function of morals - and some do so.
Some further considerations. Luhmann is working on a non-normative
description of the way modern society is functioning. This provokes two
further inquiries. First of all, whether this description really is as norma
abstinent as it to
tively pretends be; and secondly, whether society can
afford ? under the conditions of modernity ?
to reproduce itself without

15
E.g. Maclntyre, A., After Virtue. A Study inMoral Theory, (London, Notre Dame
(111.):University of Notre Dame Press, 2nd ed 1984).
16
E.g. Taylor, Ch., Sources of the Self. TheMaking of theModern Identity. (Cambridge,
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1989).

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98 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

any reference to normative guidance. The latter is discussed in the ethical

debate under the label responsibility or ethics of responsibility.
Firstly, as I see it,we have to assume that Luhmann's description of so
ciety encloses no normative premises.11 The theory remains an observation
of the society as a second-order-observation. It is for society's 'socio
logical enlightenment'. However, the description of the society doesn't
remain external. The knowledge generated by observation will be fed back
into the action-systems, where it helps to orientate to further action.18As
far as this is concerned, the description of the society helps in its
self-orientation. This has consequences for the theory-practice-problem:
"Knowledge claimed by expert observers (in some part, and inmany vary
ingways) rejoins its subjectmatter, thus (in principle, but also normally in
practice) altering it."19 But it couldn't be different. The characteristic trait
of modern society is radical reflexivity. It's only the question, whether the
self-steering by self-orientation supplies enough orientation to cushion the
dysfunctional side-effects of the system's reproduction. On that score not
only ethicians are sceptical. This leads us to the next item.

Secondly, in the actual discussion, the concept of risk is fashionable.

As everybody knows that concept means that the consequences of ac
tions resultingfrom actual decisions can no longer be calculated
rationally.
Particularly in the context of high-technology and of the consumption of
resources, we see that future life will be limited by present behavior ?
maybe made impossible by it. Decisions are increasingly being perceived
as dangers by the persons affected
by them. Irrespective of one's estimate
of theplausibility of the concept of risk-I see it sceptically?responsibility
is demanded by ethicians as a remedy. However, that term is also problem
atical. Therefore, I would like to draw attention to some corresponding
problems.
Following Bayertz, Iwant to distinguish between three versions of the
of Whereas the classical
concept responsibility20 concept had been de
signed for the individual actions of persons who have to answer for the
consequences of their actions, the modern concept is referring to problems
which arise out of mechanization and industrialization. In complex con
texts a responsible person often cannot be found. Moreover, the problem
of so-called system-error emerges. Now is
responsibility delegated (e.g.

17
I reject my assessment inDie Niklas 183-184.
Systemtheorie Luhmanns, pp.
18 Cf.
Giddens, A., The Consequences ofModernity. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
19
Giddens, A., Consequences, p. 45.
20 I refer to
Bayertz, K., Eine kurze Geschichte der Herkunft der Verantwortung, in
K. Bayertz (Ed.), Verantwortung. Prinzip oder Problem? (Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1995), pp. 3-71.

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 NIKLAS LUHMANN'S SYSTEMSTHEORY 99

by hierarchies of decision), in the realm of economy the 'Verschulden

shaftung' (liability of encumbrance) is extended by the 'Gef?hrdungshaf
tung' (liability of endangering). At both attempts there is a three-digit
relation between a subject and an object of responsibility plus a system of
evaluation-standards which enables an evaluation of actions. This means
that responsibility has to be interpreted communicatively and socially.
Therefore, responsibility is theproduct of a construction. The subject is not
responsible always or under all conditions; responsibility is no ontological

reality but an assignment. Given the global threat to the survival of nature
and mankind it is coming to an ontologization and a globalization of re
sponsibility. This global dimension is obtained by the fact that each action
? -
maybe also each neglect may contribute to endangering the survival
- or ?
of future generations. A better the main supporter of this version
is Hans Jonas. The problem ofthat understanding of responsibility is that
principally everybody is responsible for everything. Since men or women
while he or she is living cannot but harm (or better: they cannot not harm)
the question of responsibility concretely is one of a calculation between
risky or less risky behavior, respectively or less responsible
responsible
behavior. But it is the basis of the concept of responsibility thatexactly this
calculation is problematic. One could conclude that responsibility itself is
risky in this extensive sense.
Why this side-stepping of the problematics of the concept of responsi
It can't be denied that the underlying
bility? problem really is important.
But the acceptance of responsibility cannot be reflected appropriately by
Luhmann's theory of systems. If we start from a system-theoretical per
spective, responsibility is an ethical term which controls the moral com
munication of regard by regarding responsible action and disregarding
irresponsible action. But whoever is acting consciously in an irresponsi
ble way? And to whom are we supposed to be responsible? In addition:
There's no non-risky behavior because only the future will tell what would
have been the 'right' decision. There is no righteous life in a world gone
wrong (Adorno). So responsibility is reduced to the challenge to take care
that nothing is going wrong as far as possible. But don't we try this any
way? From the system-theoretical point of view the subsystems of society
are acting in a sphere of because cannot act
'higher irresponsibility' they
differently. But isn't that the approach which led to the problems now
discussed under the key word responsibility?

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 100 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

What can we learn from all of this? Social as ethics of responsi

ethics
'
bility are pleading for a 'self-limitation for freedom (Wolfgang Huber).21
That can be made plausible only by overlapping the subsystems. If and
inasmuch as the concept and the content of responsibility shouldn't be
ethics are coerced to guide a societal discourse, ? un
dismissed, how
der the conditions of the operative limitedness of the subsystems ?
this
self-limitation for freedom can be implemented a
in way that can be recog
-
nized in the perspective of the relevant subsystems ? as limitations of
themselves. This implies that the concept of responsibility is formulated
in a manner that it can be distinguished between responsible and non
responsible persons as well as between spheres of responsibility and spheres
of non-responsibility. This is one of the reasons why the ethical discourse
is dependent on its later form as law. But law cannot
replace ethical com
munication and ethicalagreement, since it is neither to be expected nor to
be desired that legal norms should determine all decisions.
However, this realization of responsibility is based on a specific concept
of freedom which the systems theory does not share. Traditional ethics ?
to Luhmann - as a prerequisite
according grasp freedom of morals and
therefore get into a paradox. On the one hand freedom should be un
derstood as 'good' itself; on the other hand it is a consequence of free
dom that men and women do not act morally but refuse norms and com
mandments. "Eben deshalb ist Freiheit, vor allem als Problem der Ethik,
zum Thema geworden. Dabei mu?te die Ethik etwas was sie
voraussetzen,
nicht guthei?en kann, undmu?te sich folglich auf schwierige Konstruktio
nen einlassen, um diese Paradoxie aufzul?sen."22 These dissolve
problems
if freedom is interpreted as contingency. Then freedom is a side-effect
of communication inwhich there is always the freedom to
accept or to
refuse any comment. "Freiheit hat somit keinerlei
psychisches (geschweige
denn: neurophysiologisches Korrelat. Sie istmit einem strukturdeteminier
ten System durchaus kompatibel. Sie entsteht einfach dadurch, da? diese
Systeme durch Kommunikation dazu gereizt werden, Annahme und Able
hnung zu unterscheiden.23 By contrast the figure of self-limitation for free
dom is assuming the concept of communicative freedom. "Freiheit ver

21
Huber, W., Selbstbegrenzung aus Freiheit. ?ber das ethische Grundproblem des
technischen Zeitalters, Evangelische Theologie 52 (1992), pp. 128-146.
22
Luhmann, N., Paradigm lost, p. 46. (That's why freedom has become a
topic, above
all as a problem of ethics. At the same time ethics had to
require something they cannot
approve of and so let themselves in for a complicated construction to solve this paradox.)
23
Luhmann, N.,Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik 3, p. 439. has got no men
(Freedom
tal (much less neurophysiological) correlative. It is
thoroughly compatible with a structure
determined system. It simply emerges because are irritated to
systems by communications
distinguish between acceptance or refusal.)

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 NIKLAS
LUHMANN'S
SYSTEMS
THEORY 101
wirklicht sich darin, da? der eine den anderen als Bereicherung seiner
selbst und als Aufgabe des eigenen Lebens erfahrt. Sie verwirklicht sich
also als Gemeinschaft und inwechselseitiger Verst?ndigung, in communio
und communicatio; deshalb kann sie 'kommunikative Freiheit' genannt
werden."24 Such a theological concept is solving the paradox of freedom
by describing freedom as constituted by God and so is able towork on her
side-effects in anthropology and the doctrine of sin. If freedom ? from
a system-theoretical point of view - is formulated as contingency, the
philosophical and theological debate on the freedom of choice (cf. Ro
7) is seriously hampered. And this problem reaches much deeper than the
possibility to choose between moral or immoral alternatives.
However, what is the challenge for ethics by the systems theory? First of
all to increase the consideration of ethics as a reflexive theory. That means
to discuss the social conditions, possibilities and limitations ofmoral com
munication. Considering the complexity of the problems, it hardly seems
to be helpful to try to give reasons for the goodness of the good. Further
more, it is the necessity to do ethics and to found ethics as social ethics

consequently. Each ethical theory is, therefore, social ethics from a system
theoretical point of view, since it is the reflection of the social function of
morals, by means of which the question of the orientation of individual
persons can be cleared. Ethics do not become social ethics only by turning
to social facts or institutions. Even the use of the moral code refers to
the society in which this use only makes sense. Ethics as a theory of the
'conduct of one's life'25 (Trutz Rendtorff) also have to be aware of the
social embedding of their topic and to reflect that embedding is the basis
but not the consequence of their theory.
Granted that these aren't basically novel insights. But why should they
be? What's new about Luhmann's systems theory isn't the topic but the
concept of observation. He only wants to describe morals and ethics. And,
however, ethics has to tackle this description. Maybe the ethicians will find
ethics well interpreted; maybe not. In my opinion, ethicians have reasons

24
Huber, W., Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit,
inW. Huber ,Folgen christlicher Freiheit. Ethik und Theorie der Kirche imHorizont
der Barmer Neuhirchener
Theologischen Erkl?rung. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: (NBST Bd. 4),
1983), pp. 113-127 (118). (Freedom is coming true by the awareness of another person
as an expansion of oneself and as an assignment for one's own life. She is coming true
as and in mutual in communio and
community communication, communcatio; therefore
she can be called communicative For the origin of the term 'communicative
freedom.)
freedom' Huber refers to Michael Theunissen.
25
Rendtorff, T., Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen
Theologie. (Stuttgart, Berlin, K?ln: Kohlhammer, 1990, 2 vol., 2nd revised and expanded
edition).

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 102 HANS-ULRICHDALLMANN

for both. If the treatment of the system-theoretical description will force

ethicians to reflect upon the social foundations of ethical theories more
deeply, much is won.

Gartenstra?e 69
D-60596 Frankfurt
Germany

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