Name: Md.

Ashraful Islam

Serial no: 30

Roll: ZH-821

Question: Critically examine the theoretical background of new liberalism. Analyse three
basic assumptions of the new liberalism as conceived by Andrew Moravcsick.

New liberalism or liberal international theory came as a critique of both realism and classical
liberalism in the 1990s. The theory is mainly developed by Andew Moravcsick and others. The
rise of the theory is very closely related to the end of the cold war. The events of the 1989/1990
gave us a new view about international politics. While the vision of democratic world order was
still cherished, the trends of ethno-national conflict, regional power struggles, international
terrorism also could not be ignored. This has led to an advancement of domestication and
sociation of international politics. New Liberal theory wants to catch this idea and try to provide
a clear view of international politics with “society” as its determinative subject.

Classical liberalism has portrayed its view under the name of “moralism”, “idealism” and
“utopianism”. Although these ideas provided positive view of the word they fall short of real
world. Classical liberal thought is deficient in terms of parsimony and distinctiveness of
positivist criteria of persuasive theory building. This suggests it lacks in basic theoretical
assumptions (parsimony) and compared to other theoretical paradigms (distinctiveness). Besides,
the theory is also burdened with a prescriptive view of action. Theories like idealism want not
only to describe the phenomena of international politics but also to find ways of changing them.

Realism on the other hand failed to predict the outcome of the cold war. The researchers started
to become doubtful about the basic realist assumption that states control and determine
international relations.

To resolve these issues new liberalism or liberal international theory came up with a non-
ideological a non-utopian view of international politics. This is much more appropriate for
empirical social science than idealism. To solve the problem regarding parsimony and
distinctiveness the theory narrows classical liberalism to “a minimalist classical liberalism”. It
also expands the classical liberalism by presenting a more open and less teleological perspective
on progress.1

In arguing about what matters most in world politics Moravcsick disagrees with two schools of
thoughts. Neo-realism suggests that configuration of capabilities matters most. On the other
hand, institutionalists emphasize on the configuration of information and institutions. According
to Moravcsik state preferences matters most in the realm of world politics.

The world politics in the present context is run by the process of globalization. States are not
isolated characters or entities. At the lower level it is run by the domestic society. At an upper
level it is embedded in a transnational society containing many states. These upper and lower
levels engage the state in economic, cultural and social interactions which transcend the state
border. Demands from individual and groups level are transmitted through several institutions.
These shape the state preference. By state preference it means “fundamental substantive social
purposes that give states an underlying stake in the international issues they face”.

The state decision is made with the help of these state preferences. How the state should
implement its foreign policy, in what way it will see the possibilities of conflict and co-operation
etc. all depends on the preferences of the state. These preferences give strong rationales for the
state to engage vast amount of resources for a certain action. Without these preferences states
didn’t need to enter into the complex nature of world politics. They could have easily remained
in isolated existence. These state preferences give policy direction to states. Without these
preferences a state would be like boat without a boatman.

According to the state preferences, their variance, their impact on state behavior three variants of
liberal international theory have been established. They are ideational, commercial and
republican liberalism.2

Ideational liberalism emphasizes on “a set of preferences shared by individuals concerning the

proper scope and nature of public goods provision, which in turn specifies the nature of
legitimate domestic order by stipulating which social actors belong to the polity and what is
owed them”.3
1
Siegfried Schieder, Theories of International Relations, Routledge, 2014, pp107
2
Andrew Morvcsick, Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 234-235
3
Siegfried Schieder, Theories of International Relations, Routledge, 2014, pp112
Commercial liberalism explains, “Individual and collective conduct of states by examining the
market incentives with which domestic and transnational economic actors such as corporations
find themselves confronted. How states behave towards the rest of the world is dependent on the
gains and losses of social actors as a result of transnational economic exchange relations”. 4

Republican liberal theory “emphasizes the ways in which domestic institutions and practices
aggregate such pressures, transforming them into state policy. The key variable in republican
liberalism, which dates back to the theories of Kant, Wilson, and others, is the nature of domestic
political representation, which helps determine whose social preferences dominate state policy.” 5

The new liberal theory stands in the tradition of methodological individualism. This means it
focuses in the action of individuals. These individuals form action capable groups like parties,
religious groups, ethnic groups, trade unions etc. But, these actions of these groups can always
be traced back to individuals. The theory portrays individual as “homo economicus”. This
suggests human beings or individuals are rationally utility maximizers. These individual interests
are aggregated under the states. This means states represent the aggregate interests of the
individuals. These interests might not remain same over the period of time. Also these actions
are not always directed towards material utility. States run by governments try to realize these
demands under the name of state preferences. It is established through states’ internal and
transnational interactions.

So, the theory of new liberalism is a theory that focuses on individual ideas, social interactions of
state those helps a state to establish its preferences. These preferences guide a state towards its
actions and provide a rationale for its actions. These preferences change with events like cold
war, 9/11 and others. Unlike realism it doesn’t hold any particular conception that state will
always go for security and power maximization. It suggests that a state will do along the line of
its preferences. Several states have several preferences. So, their actions will also be different.

Three Basic Assumptions of the New Liberalism:

4
ibid, pp113
5
Available at, https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/smit-snidal.pdf, accessed on 18 May, 2019
Moravcsick suggested three core assumptions which are fundamental to all liberal international
theory. Whether it is ideational liberalism, commercial liberalism or republican liberalism, it will
follow these three basic assumptions. States and its interactions will follow these three concepts.

1. The Procedure of social actor over state: Both neo-liberal and neo-institutional schools of
thoughts emphasize on state as the key actor in decision making process. However,
Moravcsik suggests the importance of automous, action-capable individuals and social
groups. They act in a rational and risk-averse manner. They influence state in its decision
making process. However, all the social groups and individuals don’t have the same
ability to influence the decision making. These groups and individuals share different sets
of demands in international political sphere. When there is different range of interests,
conflict among the groups or individuals take place. These conflicts are more likely to
occur when there is inequality in the sense of social influence. When social power is
equally distributed, the rational cost benefit analysis can be easily internalized. This equal
distribution of social influence can be established through legitimized political
institution6.
2. Representation within the society and the formation of state preferences: According to
Moravcsik, “competition between social actors is determined by state-internal structures
and institutions tasked with mediating between the interests of state and society”. States
are not generally representative of all the groups because the social influences of groups
are not equal. What is different with neorealist thought is that it doesn’t view state as a
coherent actor. Rather it views state as “a representative institution constantly subject to
capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors”.
That means groups are constantly in conflict to influence the state government. The
government generally represents the groups that become more influential. This is why
liberal scholars think that government generally doesn’t want to go for power
maximization. Because. The rational social groups don’t want to engage in power
conflict. Rather, they want to emphasize on welfare goals. However, some social groups
containing the elites often want the state to go for imperialist venture. This will enable

6
Siegfried Schieder, Theories of International Relations, Routledge, 2014, pp110
 these elites to pursue their goals. This is often portrayed by realists as “national interest”.
On the other hand Moravcsick sees it as representation of certain social groups.7
3. International environment and the interdependent ordering of preference: Liberal
international theory is in agreement with the fact that international environment provides
important stimuli for state action. But, it doesn’t share the same idea with neo-realism on
this issue. Neo-realist school suggests that international environment is of anarchy. This
environment determines all the state behavior. On the other hand Moravcsick suggests
that patterns of action in the international politics don’t come from either international
distribution of power as neo-realists suggest or international institutions as the
institutionalists suggest. Rather “what states want is the primary determinant of what they
do”. Moravcsick calls this “policy interdependence”.
Moravcsick distinguishes between three kinds of interdependent preferences.
I. If the preferences among different states are compatible or if they converge it
produces a strong incentive for negotiation and co-operation.
II. If the state preferences are divergent, it brings tensions and conditions of
conflicts. It creates a condition of zero-sum game. There is very little scope of
co-operation because dominant social groups want to establish their preferences at
the cost of others.
III. When the national preferences of states are complementary, it creates sufficient
incentives for international negotiations, concessions and forms of international
policy coordination.8

New Liberal Theory: Explaining world events:

Now we will look at some cases of international politics to get a better understanding of the new
liberal theory.

The US case: The United States didn’t want to meddle in the world politics before the WW1. It
definitely had the capability to engage in power politics. But, it preferred isolation. The same
state has become the center of international power politics after the WW2. The state preferences
have shifted over time.
7
Available at, https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/smit-snidal.pdf, accessed on 18 May, 2019
8
Siegfried Schieder, Theories of International Relations, Routledge, 2014, pp111-112
The rise of Donald Trump suggests the shift in state preference. The US acted as a global leader
for a long time. Now, influential groups in America want America to mind its own business.
That’s why Donald Trump’s policy of “Make America Great Again” got so much attention.
Because of this change in state preference America is moving towards a conservative policy
from a rather liberal policy. Once, America was considered as an effective melting pot. It was a
key proponent of a free world. Now, it is putting restrictions on foreigners. It is even talking
about building wall across Mexico.

The Indian Case: India in the time of Nehru (the first prime minister of India) preferred a rather
peaceful international policy. It was because of the state preference. The influential social groups
were influenced by Gandhian philosophy. It is the indo-China war in 1962 that prompted a
change in state preferences. India pursued a strong military policy from then and moved at a
great speed towards acquiring nuclear power. In the present context, it is more focused on
emerging as a regional power. This has led it to engage in continuous struggle with China and
Pakistan.

The Japanese Case: Japan until WW2 held a strong military policy. It was a fascist state which
had imperial ambitions. It engaged in the WW2 to climb the ladder of international power
politics. But, after the war the state preference had changed. Japan is now one of the most
pacifist countries. It doesn’t pursue any nuclear weapon though having the capability. It has
focused more on trade, economic growth, and international cooperation since the war.

By analyzing the events, we can see the states actions don’t move towards a particular direction.
They don’t always move towards building relative power capabilities as the neo-realist school
suggests. Rather, it is characterized by constant shifts. Different social groups within the country
try to influence the state preference. The state represents the dominant group to formulate its
tactics in the world event. These tactics can both lead to international cooperation or
international conflict.
Bibliography:

1. Schieder Siegfried, Theories of International Relations, Routledge, 2014

2. Morvcsick Andrew, Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2008
3. Available at, https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/smit-snidal.pdf