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The two crises in the Netherlands in 1557

Professor Astrid Friis

To cite this article: Professor Astrid Friis (1953) The two crises in the Netherlands in 1557,
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 1:2, 193-217, DOI: 10.1080/03585522.1953.10410060
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 An Inquiry into the Relations between Economic and
Financial Factors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
By PROFESSOR ASTRID FRIIS, COPENHAGEN

I
THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 1557

Introduction
It is an axiom of economists of today that in the treatment of the economic
conditions of a country the financial policy of the government, insofar as it may
possibly react on economic life, must be considered and vice versa, that anybody
undertaking an investigation into the finances of a state cannot pass any judge-
ment on measures taken without having adequate knowledge of the prevailing
economic conditions. In addition the political situation will for an economic
historian form part of the picture. These remarks apply without gainsay I suppose
to any treatment of developments of the present century.
The problem here to be considered is to what extent it is pertinent and
possible to apply this conception of interrelation between the abovenamed factors
to earlier periods of history. In the present article I shall concern myself with a
period four centuries back, i. e. the second half of the sixteenth century. Economic
historians have for many reasons focussed much attention on this half century
for more than fifty years. It is the classical period of the first price revolution of
modern times, of the first bankruptcies of two great European powers and of an
exceptional expansion of sea trade in the Netherlands and England co-eval
with a rapid rise in the imports of Baltic goods, especially grain, into other parts of
Europe.
The bankruptcies do not tally very well with the general picture of economic
progres; insofar as they occurred in the same countries. Although England was not
194 ASTRID FRIIS

marred by bankruptcies the conception of economic progress has been recon-

sidered by English historians during the last years.' I shall, however, here solely
occupy myself with the Netherlands.
Since Richard Ehrenberg in 1896 published his book Das Zeitalter der Fugger
the state finances, financial policy and recurrent bankruptcies of the leading
European powers, Spain-the Netherlands and France - the first occurred in
both these countries in the years 1557-59 - have been very much in the lime-
light. It is quite natural that Ehrenberg, being a German, in his investigations
concentrated on the effects of the bankruptcies on the great banking houses of
Southern Germany, especially on that of the Fuggers. In an admirable way he
told the story of the financial activities of these as also of the Italian bankers.
Without their assistance several of the wars that marred the first half of the
century could not have been carried on.
In his lucid article The European Financial Crisis of 1559 Henri Hauser to
a lesser degree than Ehrenberg considers the ill effects that the extensive loaning
activities had ultimately on the welfare of the house of the Fuggers and
other German houses. Instead he considers the general ill effects of the credit
inflation caused by the incessant floating of loans. He says, that "the credit
inflation which became general indicates that the mechanism of credit had out-
stripped its development". He speaks further of the unfortunate effects of
extensive non-funded loans, largely for consumptive purposes. His fundamental
view is that the credit inflation and bankruptcies caused a general crisis with so
far-reaching effects that it probably hindered the evolution of commercial
capitalism," As will be seen Henri Hauser took no optimistic view of the ensuing
economic development. But as little as Ehrenberg he considers the possibility
of the impact of an economic crisis on the financial situation in the crucial years
of 1557-59.
As is the case with Ehrenberg, Hauser also primarily considers the impact of
a fallacious financial policy on the economic development. Besides pointing to
the disastrous consequences of this to the banking firms he also considers the
detrimental effect on economic activities caused by heavy taxation on the
subjects of the bankrupt kings. It is clear, however, that it is possible to reverse
the problem. We are in our right to question if there was, in the critical year of
1557, an economic depression or at least anomalies in the economic conditions

1 See the articles of F. J. Fisher and Lawrence Stone in the Economic History Reoietu X

(1940), pp. 95-117, and Sec. Ser, II (1949), pp. 3D-58.

il Journal of Economic and Business History II (1929--30), pp. 241-55.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 195

that can possibly have affected the efforts of the government in floating new
loans or renewing old loans ill the negative. That is to say that the root of the
evil development is rather to be found in the prevailing economic conditions
than in the financial policy. Not that I shall bestow any praise on the latter.
Probably a breakdown in the finances of the Netherlands-Spain could not have
been avoided in the long run. But certainly the ability of the inhabitants of the
Netherlands to pay taxes and to advance loans by which the income from taxes
could be anticipated was an important factor in the financial system of the ruler
of the Netherlands. This system has been described by professor Lonchay as
highly developed. His article Etude sur les emprunts des souverains belges au
XVI' et au XVII' siecle3 is very informative. The role that the towns played
is much stressed. It appears that a very large part of the loans was raised by
issuing bonds or selling annuities in the name of some town or other. No other
town raised so many loans as Antwerp- Ultimately the crown guaranteed the
loans. Also the nobility played a part in the loaning activities of the crown as
guarantors.
W. R. Scott who in his book The English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock
Companies from their Beginnings to 172rr has concerned himself much with
the depressions of early modem times especially in England, says that among
simultaneous factors that may have speeded them bad harvests, plagues and
interruptions of commerce by war are too marked to be ignored," Precisely these
three factors can be traced in the Netherlands in the fateful year 1557. There
was a serious interruption of trade caused by the resumption of the war with
France. In some places there was plague" and also the Netherlands suffered
from a most serious penury of grain caused by the bad harvest of 1556.
The years of famine in Italy and in the Iberian peninsula in the 1580's have
riveted the attention of historians for just as long as the bankruptcies of the
Spanish king, and quite recently the problem of grain supply of the Mediter-
ranean countries has been reviewed in an admirable way by professor Braudel."
The problems of grain supply in North Western Europe have not claimed the
same interest from historians with one exception, the early 1560's in the Nether-

3 Bulletins de l'academie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Let/res. 1907, pp. 925-1013.
4 I-III (1910-12).
5 Scott, op.cit. I., p. 468.
6 Meche1n at least was stricken with plague in 1556 and 1557, cr. Stadt accompt 1556/57
fol. 269. Arch. de Ma1ines.
7 Femand Braudel, La Mediterranee et le monde mediterranean a l'epoque de Philippe II
(Paris 1949).
 196 ASTRID FRIIS

lands. The reasons are obvious in both cases. It has generally been believed that
the grain relief from the Baltic countries always was adequate, but believers in
influence from economic factors on religious and political history have with
avidity centered on the years preceding the iconoclastic fury. They have over-
looked that these years were preceded by a winter of more pronounced misery,
the winter of 1556~5 7.

The Political and Financial Situation in 1556.

In October 1555 the emperor Charles V. resigned in the Netherlands. His
dignities as duke of Brabant, count of Flanders, count of Holland and by what
other titles he was ruler of the Netherlands provinces were conferred on his son
Philip II. Charles bequeathed him also his last war with France. It had begun
in 1552 after the ignominous defeat of Charles in Germany. It had to no small
extent had its theatre of war on the Netherlands-French frontier. On the whole
it had not been unsuccessful for Oharles, but had acted as a continuous strain
on his financial ressources. The indebtedness of the crown to foreign bankers
had increased. And the necessity of an early repayment of short-term loans had
made it necessary incessantly to apply to the general states and provincial states
for grants of subsidies. Aid was also required for the consolidation of debt that
could not be liquidated by an early repayment. Matters were complicated by
the lengthy procedure involved before a subsidy was accorded and paid. In
each of the provincial states a request for a subsidy was subject to lengthy
deliberations, and in Holland for instance the representatives of the six towns
had no plenitory powers. Such requests were also a matter of debate in the town
councils. It is easily understood that other expedients were needed to bring a
quicker return of cash from the inhabitants of the Netherlands. An admirable
system had been built up to meet this need. In the three richest provinces the
handling of the finances (the auditing was not included) were in the hands of
general receivers who partly acted as financiers and thus enabled the crown to
anticipate the provincial incomes."
The general receivers also negotiated loans in their own names or on behalf of
the provincial states. These loans were sometimes diverted for provincial purposes,

8 Lonchay, op.cit., pp. 935-939. The general receiver in the province of Holland was Aernt
Coebel. He is mentioned by Guicciardini in his description of the Netherlands, and praised as
an able man and also for his erudition. He was a brother of Philip Coebel who was one of the
privy councillors. L. Guicciardini, Description de tovt le Pais Bas. (Antwerp, 1567), p. 243.
 THE TWO CRIS.ES IN THE NETHERLANDS 197

but they were often auxiliary loans to meet exigencies of the crown. As has been
stated above the intermediary of the towns in raising loans was also a common
expedient. The town seals were employed for these purposes. Whether the loans
were voluntary or must rather be considered to be compulsory two forms were
possible: either bonds running for a short time and at a high rate of interest
could be issued or annuities could be sold. A necessary accessory was confidence
in the security offered and some amount of prosperity and economic stability
that enabled the wealthy citizens to divert ready money for such investments.
The bonds of course also often came into the hands of the foreign bankers at
Antwerp,"
Richard Ehrenberg has painted the financial situation in the Netherlands in the
autumn of 1555, when Philip acceded, in dark colours.i" It is my belief that
he exaggarates. It is true of course that the war had increased the indebtedness of
the crown to the foreign bankers. On the other hand the general states and the
provincial states had willingly furnished large sums of money and from the last
subsidy which had been conceded Charles his son would benefit. Moreover the
treaty ofVaucelles, concluded on February 5.1556, brought about a truce between
France and the Netherlands.P Although it was too early to demobilize the
military expenditure could be reduced in 1556. And the truce opened the way to
freer intercourse with other countries and better facilities for the herring fisheries
in the North Sea.
The hope that the treaty of Vaucelles would either mean the beginning of a
truce of long duration or lead to the conclusion of an actual treaty of peace was
sanguine in the Netherlands.
It was in a spirit of expectancy of a peaceful and untroubled future that
in the beginning of March 1556 Philip II approached the general states assembled
at Brussels and asked for financial support. He, however, made the mistake of
attempting an innovation. He asked for a grant of a one per cent tax upon real
estate and of two per cent upon moveable property." The reasons he gave for
asking for this help were that his revenues were insufficient to meet the expenditure
involved in keeping garrisons in the frontier fortresses and for the payment of
some regiments of mercenary troops which as a precautionary measure he still
desired to retain.

9 Lonchay, op.cit., pp. 939-959, d. Ehrenberg, op.cit., I, p. 35.

:10 Ehrenberg, op.cit., I, pp. 160 ff.
11 Cambro Mod. History, III, p. 184.
l~ Ibid., p. 185.
198 ASTRID FRIIS

To this appeal Philip got an answer in the negative from the provincial states of
Brabant, Flanders and Holland. - For the one year of 1556 it is possible minutely
to follow the discussions of the states of Holland at their meetings at the Hague
as the journal of one of the deputies of Amsterdam is still extant." - We find
that the request of king Philip was discussed at the end of the month of March.
It was turned down immediately for a number of reasons, a.o, it was stated
that it would be unjust and not practicable in execution. The states, however,
decided to offer a subsidy as a recompense. Before they gave an answer, it was
decided to obtain information of the decisions made by the states of Brabant and
Flanders- These proved to be in accordance with that made by the states of
Holland.When later the discussion was resumed it was decided also to get in-
formation about what sums the two older and presumably richer provinces
intended to offer in recompense."
The negative reply of the states of Holland to the request of Philip was not in
the hands of the regent at Brussels until May 30. It was coupled with a proposal
of commuting the one and two per cent tax upon real estate and moveable
property to a fixed sum to be raised in a manner that the states themselves
decided and to be payable on reasonable terms. They begged that it might be
considered that there was at present much poverty in Holland and that prices were
rising. They further stated that there was sickness among the cattle partly owing
to the overwhelming wetness of the preceding year and partly to the great
drought that had now followed. This latter had already caused all victuals to rise
. pnce
m ice f rom d ay to d ay.1 5
After prolonged negotiations the states of Holland finally at the end of
July consented to vote Philip a subsidy amounting to 300,000 gld.s (at 20
stuivers). Philip had first asked for 400,000 gId.s, half the amount voted by
the states of Flanders, and when that was refused, he next asked for 333,333 gld.s
i, e. half the amount granted by the states of Brabant. The terms of payment were
to be as follows: one half was to fall due on May 1. 1557 and the other half on
May I, 1558?6 It may be assumed that the terms of payment were the same in

13 Hague Journal 1556, fol. s. 136-138. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam. I am much indebted to dr.
Simon Hart for putting this interesting journal at my disposal. Cf. ]. ter Gouw, Geschledenis van
Amsterdam VI (Amsterdam 1889), pp. 10 f. Ter Gouws source is the Vroedschaps resolution
v, Amsterdam.
14 Hague Journ. 1556 foI.s 138 v-140, 145 and 149 f. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam.
15 tsu., fol.s 149 f.
16 Ibid., fol.s 153-56, 160-65 and 169-82.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 199

the other provinces. From the three main provinces Philip was thus ensured an
extraordinary revenue for the years of 1557 and 1558 amounting to:
1557 1558
May 1. May 1.
Flanders 400,000 gld.s 400,000 gld.s
Brabant 333,333 " 333,333 "
Holland 150,000 " 150,000 "

883,333 gld.s 883,333 gld.s

The other provinces of course contributed far smaller sums, muth the extra-
ordinary revenue which was at his disposal in each of the years of 1557 and 1558
must have exceeded 1,000,000 gld.s. This was a handsome sum.
It appears from the statements made during the debates in the states at the
Hague in the spring of 1556 that the ordinary subsidy accorded Charles and still
running amounted to 100,000 gld.s annually and that moreover the states of
Holland had taken upon themselves to pay annual interests amounting to
113,000 gld.s This sum was raised partly by an excise on beer and wine and
partly by the levying of ground rents. When the extraordinary subsidy of 100,000
gld.s that the states had voted Charles V, but which did not fall due until 1556,
was added, the liabilities of the states of Holland totalled more than 300,000 gld.s
for the year 1556?7 I am unable to give corresponding information in regard to
the two other main provinces, but it can hardly be doubted that their liabilities
were considerably higher.

The bad Harvest in 1556 and the Crisis of Grain Supply in 1557.
Nature has her own ways. It is still today out of the control of mankind if a
summer's weather will be favourable for growing of grain or if extreme cold and
wetness or heat and drought will ruin the crop." Today a single year of bad
harvest will in most countries involve no catastrophic consequences to the popula-
tion - an exception of course is taken to the Asiatic countries - there are many
ways to mitigate the evils of even widespread crop failure. The remedies were
fewer in the 16'th century. Then, as always when a scarcity set in, the countries
that even in normal years were deficit countries in regard to bread corn supply

17 Hague Journ. 1556 fo1. 156. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam.

18 Cf. Wm. Beveridge, Prices and Wages in England. I. The Mercantile Era (London, 1939),
Preface, p. VII. Lord Beveridge speaks of a climatic cycle affecting the yield of harvests.
 200 ASTRID FRIIS

suffered most. Among the countries of Northern Europe this applies primarily to'
the Netherlands and Norway. I shall here concern myself solely with the Nether-
lands. It has been amply proved by W. S. Unger that the Netherlands were al-
ready during the last centuries of the Middle Ages dependent on supplementary-
imports of grain from foreign parts for the saturation of its population.i" This
applies especially to the province of Holland with its meagre soil, whereas the
soils of Flanders and Brabant were richer. But even in these provinces grain im-
ports were needed. German wheat could easily be supplied by traffic on the Rhine.
From Dordrecht the most southern of the Dutch towns the two southern provinces
were provisioned. Also French and English grain supplied the need of the Nether-
lands, and Ghent in Flanders had a grain market.f"
There was a change in the 16'th century. The increase in the population in
most European countriesf' caused the surplus of grain for exports to dwindle
a.o, less German grain was sent to Dordrecht on Rhenish riverboats. The
incessant wars with France also made this source of supply unstable. Already
before the end of the 15'th century the province of Holland had begun to make
supplementary imports of Baltic grain mostly of Prussian and Estonian origin.
This trade in grain was partly in the hands of the Hanseatics and Easterlings.f"
but from the beginning of the 16'th century the Dutch partook in an ever
increasing degree in the Baltic grain trade as is evidenced by the accounts of
the Sound dues. At the middle of the 16'th century the market for Baltic grain
was firmly established at Amsterdam. It made no difference if the grain imported
belonged to foreign merchants or Amsterdam merchants. From Amsterdam the
grain was redistributed in the Netherlands or reexported abroad as occasion
arose. This does not mean that no other Dutch town imported grain for their
own consumption or even for the purpose of reexportation." but the bulk of
the Baltic grain went to Amsterdam. The grain imported from the Baltic was
mainly rye. The ever increasing imports in the second half of the 16'th century
has probably meant that poor people made a change in their eating habits. Rye

19 De Leuensmiddelenuoorziening der hollandshe Steden in de Mi ddeleeuuien. (Amsterdam

1916), and De hollandsche Graanhandel en Graanhandelspolitiek in de MiddeleeUlwen. De
Economist, 1916, pp, 243-69, 337-86 and 481-86.
20 G. Bigwood, Gand et la circulation des Grains en Flandre, du XIV- au XVIII- siee/e.
Vierteljahrsckr, f. Social- u. Wirtschaftsgesch. IV (1906), pp. 397-460.
n J. Beloch, Die Beoblkerung Europas zur .:ceit der Renaissance in .:ceitschr. f. Socialunssen-
schaft III (1900), pp. 765-86; cf. Beloch, Beublkerungsgeschichte Italiens I-II (1937--40).
~ Vide Unger, Graanhandel en Graanhandelspolitiek, passim and infra pp. 218 f. table 1. a.
23 Aksel E. Christensen, Dutch Trade to the Baltic about 1600 (Copenhagen and the Hague
1942), pp. 221 f. gives particulars of the foreign grain trade of Delft merchants.
 THE TWO CRIS'ES IN THE NETHERLANDS 201
bread that was also cheaper must have taken a larger place in the consumption
than before. Perhaps this was fortunate. The rise in the cost of living was to
some degree curtailed by this substitution.
Excessive and prolonged dryness in the summer of 1556 resulted in one of
the poorest grain crops that has ever been recorded in the Netherlands. The
dearth was not confined to this country. I have been unable to map out the
extent of the area that was scorged by the excessive dryness of the weather with
any certainty, but England'" and Denmark" at least were comprised as well
as North Western Germany." Under these circumstances the Netherlands had
almost wholly to rely on imports from the Baltic in order to avoid famine. It
is regrettable that the number of shiploads of grain from the Baltic during the
summer and autumn of 1556 cannot be ascertained.f" But it is a certainty that
some quantities had been imported to Amsterdam and were stored here with a
later profitable resale in view. This applies equally to Easterlings and Amsterdam
merchants." This grain must have been of the 1555 crop in the Baltic countries.
A summer's crop of grain in Prussia and Polonia seems to have needed three
quarters of a year and sometimes abt. a year before it could be unloaded in
Amsterdam or other ports of Western Europe. This applies in all probability
also to Estonian grain. The procedure must per force be a lengthy one. After
the threshing had taken place the grain must first be brought in carts to the
river banks. That meant in most cases the banks of the feeder rivers of the
Vistula. By means of barges or perhaps during the winter months when the rivers
were icebound by means of sledges the grain was conveyed to the riverbanks of the
Vistula. When the water was open again in the spring the grain was loaded in
larger barges or riverboats and floated to Danzig.
The arrival of the first grainboats on the Vistula before Danzig signalled
the beginning of the activities in the port in regard to seabound traffic. Until
then the custom-house was closed. A precaution taken by the town council
of Danzig to prevent scarcity of grain in Danzig itself during the early spring

24 On October 15. 1556 articles providing for the restraint of grain were issued. No grain
was permitted to be exported from England. Printed by N. S. B. Gras in The Evolution of the
English Corn Market (Cambridge Mass. 1915), (Harv. Econ, Stud. XIII), pp. 448 f., ct. ibid.,
p.234.
~5 On October 20. 1556 a similar restraint of grain. exports was enforced in Denmark.
Already on Sept. 24. all exports from the eastern provinces (Skaane, Halland and Blekinge ) had
been prohibited. Vide Astrid Friis in Dansk Historisk Tidstkrift 10. R. VI. (1942), pp. 100 ff.
~6Vide infra p. 208.
21 The accounts of the Sound dues are not ..extant from 1548 to 1556.
:ZS Vide infra pp. 218 f.
202 ASTRID FRIIS

months. It seems that the larger part of the grain barges very often did not
arrive until June or July.29
Already in the autumn of 1556 it was generally recognized in the Netherlands-
that is was to be feared that there would be a shortage of bread corn before
new supplies could be obtained in the following spring. At the end of October
the lord mayors of Amsterdam decided to make inquiries of how much bread
corn was stored in the town. The inquiry was to comprise both merchants'
stocks and the quantities private people had stored for household usefl O Shortly
after the stadholder and council at the Hague issued a proclamation (placcard)
putting a restraint on exports of grain from the provinces of Holland, Zeeland,
Western Freesland and Utrecht. It was further decided to make a general
inquiry of the stores of grain in each of the towns of the provinces. The result
was not encouraging. The stocks of several towns were insufficient. The fact that
the situation was bad cannot be doubted although it is improbable that the
declarations covered all the grain stored."
In the beginning of November everybody seemed to be panic-stricken. It
was rumoured that 4000 lasts of grain had been shipped to Brabant and
Flanders in the preceding fortnight. The town council of Amsterdam now
decided to take strict measures not to be depleted of grain. 52 On November 4.
it was decided that the town should buy 200 lasts of rye (if possible secretly) to
lay up for the baking of bread to be sold to the poor inhabitants of the town,
who had been unable to store any grain themselves." Such purchases were
continued during the following months and totalled abt. 500 lasts." The price
per last for the purchases made during the first four months (Nov. and Dec.
1556 and Jan. and Febr. 1557) varies within rather narrow limits. The
minimum price is 51.25 goldgld.s'" per last the maximum price 58 goldgld.s
per last. This is probably explained by a maximum price having been fixed by
the provincial government at the Hague varying between 50 and 60 goldgld.s'"

211 Detleff Krannhals, Danzig und der Weichselhandel in seiner BlUtezeit uom 16. zum 17.

'[ahrhun dert (Leipzig, 1942), pp. 100--107.

30 J. ter Gouw, op.cit., VI, p. 14.
31. The monasteries were exempted from the inquiry. Unger, De Leuensmiddelenuoorziening;

p.70.
3'21bid.
33 Vroedschaps resolutien v. Amsterdam 1556, fo1. 150. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam.
34 Vide infra pp. 218 f.
35 The goldgld. was a money of account (1 goldgld. at 28 stuivers). Vide infra p. 218.
36 Cf. Vroedschapsboek Leyden 1554-1564 fo1. 56. Gem. Arch. Leyden; d. C. Ligtenberg,

De Armezorg te Leiden tot het Einde van de 16 e eeuw ('s-Gravenhage, 1908), p. 297. The
price paid by the town council of Leyden in November was 58 goldgld.s per last.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 203
presumably according to quality. The purchases comprise highly varying
quantities. This is a pointer to the anomaly of the market conditions. The
merchants from whom the rye was purchased was a miscellaneous lot. We find
some Amsterdam grain merchants a.o. Jakob Fick, who was one of the richest
merchants of the town." Among the sellers we find also a merchant from
Mecheln in Brabant who had probably intended to provision his own town
with the grain he now unwillingly sold to the benefit of the Amsterdammers.
We find also a few 'Easterlings' among the sellers·3s The inquiry made in
Amsterdam on November 5. had given the result that the total quantity of
grain in merchants' granaries and privately stored amounted to 6000 lasts of
rye and 1000 lasts of wheat besides a small quantity that had not been unloaded
yet. Four days later when the representative of the council at the Hague arrived
the magistrates were of the opinion that considerable quantities of grain had been
exported to adjoining places. It was decided that any quantity of grain that was
henceforward sold to other places in the four provinces should before it was
brought out of Amsterdam be publicly offered for sale for a length of 24 hours.
The inhabitants were free to buy what quantity they wanted of the thus offered
grain to the stated price. The payment should be made immediately and in
cash."
In all the towns of the Netherlands measures were taken to meet the threat of
famine. In Leyden, another of the six great towns of the province of Holland,
which had then many paupers among its inhabitants action was also taken to
provision the town. On November 23. the lord mayors asked the town council
to approve of a purchase of 40 lasts of rye already made. In December and
February supplementary purchases were made.f" Both in Amsterdam and in
Leyden the purchased rye was milled and baked into bread at the expense of
the town and sold to the poor inhabitants at a fixed price. As the purchases
during the spring were made at very much higher prices than the early purchases
- in Amsterdam the last purchase of 'stadte rogge' was made at a price of 82
goldgld.s per lasr" - there was a considerable deficit both in Leyden and in
Amsterdam. This was easily covered by the ordinary income of Amsterdam,"

37 Ter Gouw, op.c,it., p. 15.

as Vide infra pp. 218 f.
39 Unger, Leoensmiddelooorriening, p. 70; Graeswinckel, Placcaet-Boek (Leyden, 1651), pp.
41-45.
4"0 Vroedschapsboek 1554-1564 Col.s 55 and 57-59. Gem. Arch. Leyden.
41 Vide infra pp. 218 f.
42 Thesaurierrekening van Amsterdam 1557. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam.
204 ASTRID FRIIS

but in Leyden this proved impossible and the town council must consent to the
taking up of a loan to cover a deficit amounting to 2900 gld.s." The lord mayors
were left free to issue bonds carrying an interest of 14 to 16 per cent or to sell
annuities yielding an interest of 6 to 7 per cent."
Stringent measures were also taken in other provinces. In the old Hanseatic
town of Deventer in Overijssel the town council likewise in November 1556
decided to provide the poor people of the town with bread to be sold at a fixed
price. But here rye was laid up by the town in case of an emergency. It was
decided to sample the rye in store. In the case it was eatable it was decided
that 20 mud should be baked into bread each week as long as the penury lasted.
This bread was to be sold solely to the poor inhabitants of the town. Neither
the rich citizens nor foreigners were permitted to buy." Other precautions were
taken. On November 19. it was decided that no grain was to be sold to any
merchant that was not a subject of his king's Majesty." And even the King's
subjects were not permitted so convey grain out of the town before it had for
three days been publicly offered to the inhabitants of the town. These were
permitted to buy in accordance with the rules just stated for Amsterdam. It was
further decided that whenever grain was brought into Deventer from another
~place it should also be publicly offered for sale to the inhabitants of Deventer."
Prices do not seem to have risen to quite the same heights as in Amsterdam. A
price of 57 goldgld.s per last of Reval rye is mentioned during the spring." But
the town council found great difficulties in getting supplementary grain, and at
last, like everybody else, wasforced to send to Amsterdam for some small quantity
of meal and rye this being unobtainable elsewhere."
When Deventer, which still carried on an import trade in grain, was reduced
to such straits that it had to apply to Amsterdam for supplies, it is apparent that
the situation in the towns of the southern provinces must have been extremely
difficult. It seems that the towns of Brabant had been quite provident during the
autumn, but the spring was to prove that their providence had been inadequate.
Quite a large quantity of Reval ryeriO had for instance been bought by the

43 1 guilder at 20 stuivers.
44 Vroedschapsboek 1554-1564 fol. 67. 1557 July 23. Gem. Arch. Leyden.
45 Register van Concordatien. Nov. 1556. Gem. Arch. Deventer.
46 In the mss <keys.mat' i. e. the emperor Charles V., but the had then abdicated.
47 Reg. van Concord. 1556 Nov. 19. Gem. Arch. Deventer.
48 2 lasts bought from the lord mayor of Sneck in Freesland. Varia 261. Gem. Arch.

Deventer.
49 Ibid.
:;0 I suspect that <Revalaer' also covered Prussian rye in the southern provinces.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 205

town council of Mecheln. The quarterly accounts of the city mill give the
following particulars:

Quantities of Meal sold by the City Mill of M echeln and Prices per Viertel,
Sept. 1556-Aug. 1557.
(1 gld. at 20 sruivers.)
Wheat Brabant Rye RevalRye
1556 'I. _30/" 99 viert. 3 gld.s 48 viert. 2 glds. 14 st. 356 viert. 2 gld.s
1556 '/,._'8', 55.5" 3 " 12 st. 98 3" 6" 166 " 2 " 12 st.
1557 '/.-"/. 78.5" 4 4 " 36 " 4" 6 " 272 " 3 " 18"
1557 'I. _11/. 83 3" 6"
336 viert. 2 gld.s 18 st. * 51
* The origin is not stated.

In the town accounts it is stated that the city mill was at a standstill for
sixteen days in the third quarter, i.e. in the period between March 1. and Maj 30.
1557.
We shall later return to Mecheln, but now tum to Amsterdam which during
the first months of 1557 riveted the attention of all the Netherlands, because it
was generally understood that relief from the terrible shortage of grain could
only come from there. On January 12. the regent, the duke of Savoy, wrote from
Brussels to the stadholder at the Hague and asked him to institute a new search
in Amsterdam to ascertain what quantity of grain was still in store here. He
explained that his Majesty the king daily received applications from diverse
towns in his other provinces imploring for help in their present difficulties. 52
On January 14. one of the Hague councillors visited Amsterdam and found that
the store on that date amounted to 7181 lasts of wheat and rye.sa This was not
very bad. But during the following month no less than 4306 lasts were exported,
largely to Brabant (the order of restraint must have been temporarily suspended),
and another 500 lasts had been consumed by the inhabitants of Amsterdam and
adjoining places. This is explained in a report from the magistrates of Amsterdam
to the stadholder at the Hague dated February 20. It is further stated that the
residue amounted only to 2375 lasts, and that this in fact was actually not more
than was needed to feed the inhabitants of Amsterdam until the new harvest or
until a grain-fleet from Danzig arrived, but of this there was little hope. Letters
had arrived from Danzig to Amsterdam merchants saying that it was improbably

51 Stadt accompt Mecheln 1/9 1556-3~'8 1557, fol. 17. Arch. de Malines.
52 Pap. d'etat et de l'aud. no. 325, fol. 8. Arch. de Royaume de Belg. Bruxelles.
53 Ibid., fol. 27.
13
206 ASTRID FRIIS

that the custom-house at Danzig and the seabound traffic would open before
the month of May. Perhaps not until Whitsuntide (June 6.). In these circum-
stances the town council of Amsterdam had felt themselves prompted to take
action and had made an arrest of all grain stored within the precints of the
town. The report at last mentions that there seem to be some hope of getting
small quantities of grain from Bremen, Ditmarschen and adjoining places. 54
In a letter dated February 21. the stadholder at the Hague informed the duke
of Savoy of this catastrophic state of affairs and replied in the negative to a
request from the duke that grain should be exported from Amsterdam to the
other provinces. In order to provide the other towns of the province of Holland
an arrest was even made on the grainships that had already left Amsterdam, but
had not still passed the sluice at Gouda." As was to be expected these arrests of
grain including such that had already been sold to and paid by the merchants
of the southern provinces evoked vehement protests. But the stadholder did
not yield. In a letter to the duke of Savoy, dated March 12., he stated that the
requests of Antwerp, Bruges, Mecheln and other towns of the southern provinces
to have more grain sent from Amsterdam ought not to be granted, considering
the small quantity that was now in store there and the great need of Holland
itself and of the adjoining provinces of Gueldern, Freesland and especially
Overijssel. These provinces were not fertile at all, and the inhabitants were
accustomed to market their cheese and butter in Amsterdam and in return to
buy small quantities of rye for their sustenance. To avoid turmoils here as in
Holland itself the stadholder and council of Holland thought it necessary to
employ what surplus Amsterdam could spare for this purpose. The stadholder
added that it was rumoured that at Delft the poor people were reduced to such
straits that they ate the refuse of the breweries."
The stadholder further stated that the towns of the southern provinces would
be able to buy their grain in Dordrecht." Even a request to release some rye
bought through the intermediary of Jakob Fick and intended for the provision of
Antwerp, was not granted."
The arrival of 1000 to 1200 lasts of grain by the middle of March must have
meant an easement. Brabant and Flanders, however, do not seem to have

54 Pap. d'etat et d'aud. no. 325, fol.s 27-29. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles,
55 Ibid., fo1. 25.
56 Ibid., fol.s 78 and 79.
57 Ibid.

58 tsu., fol. 54.

 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 207
benefited at all. Once again they were told from the Hague that they could
easily be supplied from Dordrecht." On April 7. and 8. a new search was made
in Amsterdam. Counting all stores (religious houses included) 1811 lasts of
rye and 312 lasts of wheat were found. Amsterdam was still unwilling to part
with any grain except to provision other places in Holland.~o
Already on March 3. the stadholder at the Hague had advised the duke that
defenceships ought to be fitted out to convoy grainships. He writes that surely
the rumour of the great penury of grain in the Netherlands had reached the
French and that they would probably take advantage by equipping a fleet to
attack the grainships on their return from the Baltic. The ships employed in the
Baltic traffic were never heavily armed. In response to this the regent at Brussels
made a proposal that the town of Amsterdam should find the money needed for
equipping convoyships and for keeping them on sea. The reasons given were
that the merchant of Amsterdam would 'especiallement et singulierement
prouffit' by the imports of Baltic grain. King Philip at least was unable to find
the money needed for this purpose. This proposal was not favoured by the states
of Holland. They argued that the famine was general in all the provinces. The
grain imports, although in the hands of the Amsterdam merchants, would be for
the benefit of all. 61 Prolonged discussions ensued. In the end the states of
Holland conceded to take on themselves the whole financial responsibility of
equipping the convoyships and of the upkeep of them for three months. They
made their conditions: only Dutch ships must be employed with Dutchmen in
command. Amsterdam and the Waterlandsche ports contributed a handsome
sum.-62
Fortunately the Danzig custom-house opened already in the beginning of
May. The news reached Amsterdam by the middle of the month. 53 Already
during the month of April a large number of Dutch ships in ballast had passed
Elsinore eastward bound'" and must have been lying ready in the port to take
in grain. When on June 8. the first fleet counting abt. 100 ships arrived a

50 The stadholder to the duke of Savoy dat. the Hague 1557, March 21. Printed by R. Hapke
in Niederland, Akten u. Urkunden. I (Miinchen 1913), p. 594, no. 811.
60 Hapke, op.cit., I, pp. 59-H., no. 814.

61 Pap. d'etat et d'aud. no. 325, foJ. 84. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles.
tr2 Ter Gouw, op.cit., VI, P- 12.
63 Hapke, Niederl. Akten u. Urk, I, p. 595, no. 821.
640resundstoldregnskab 1557. DRA; N. E. Bang, T'abeller over Skibs/art og V'aretranspori
gennem 0resund 1497-1660. (Tables de la navigation et du transport des merchantises par le
Sund) (Kebenhavn and Leipzig 1906) I, pp. 18-20.
13*
20B ASTRID FRIIS

messenger was sent from Amsterdam to the regents at Brussels to tell the good
news. 65
The intervening months had been a period of growing anxiety. The hopes of
a temporary relief by getting some quantities of grain from Germany down the
Rhine were frustrated, when in the beginning of May it was reported that the
duke of Kleve had ordered his customs officers to hold up most of the grain that
passed his country. Further news came, that if any grain was allowed to pass
here it would be stopped at Nijmegen. In the northern provinces Kampen and
Zwolle had already before the end of April decided to attempt to get grain from
Bremen and if that was impossible from Hamburg. Deventer hesitated still
about taking such a measure." But the towns of Brabant and Flanders were in a
worse plight, the Rhenish grain trade having failed. They do not seem to have
shared the scanty supplies from Bremen and Hamburg.
It is therefore not surprising that the situation in the towns of Brabant became
at last desperate. On June 5. the magistrates of the town of Antwerp found
themselves compelled to unbend their pride completely. In a letter to the regent
at Brussels they stated that they feared turmoils, if they did not soon get at least
one hundred lasts of grain. They entreated the duke to issue a letter patent in
favour of Antwerp, adressed to the customs officers in Amsterdam, Dordrecht
and other Dutch towns, to the effect that notwithstanding any orders of restraint
that might have been made by the council of Holland or by the towns them-
selves, any grain that had already been paid for by merchants of the town of
Antwerp should be allowed to pass unhindered.:" This of course was dooned
to be a futile effort. Even as early as January 1557 the neighbouring town of
Mecheln had refused to comply with such a request. The magistrates of Mecheln
stated in their answer that trouble might be feared, if any grain that had already
arrived was permitted to be brought out of the town again. It made no difference
that the grain belonged to Antwerp merchants, especially as it had been
stored in Mecheln for a very long time. In guarding their own interests they
were only acting as everybody else did. They added that there was very little
grain in Mecheln." The truth of this statement was born out in a dramatic

65 Hapke, op.cit., I, pp. 598 f. cf, Pap. d'etat et d'aud. no. 325, fol.s 226 and 229.
66 Hapke, op.cit, I, p. 595.
67 Pap. d'etat et d'aud, no. 262, fol. 67 reo Arch. Roy. Bruxelles.
68 Lettr. Miss. 1557 Jan. 20. Arch. de Malines. The magistrates of Meche1n got a negative
reply to similar requests they made to Amsterdam and other places. Cf. Ter Gouw, op.cit.,
p. 15 and Iettr. miss. Jan. 28. and April 10. 1557. Arch. de Malines,
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 209
way. On June 5., precisely on the same day that the magistrates of Antwerp send
their letter of appeal to the duke of Savoy, there were turmoils in Mecheln.
Probably rumours of these have reached Antwerp almost immediately, and have
prompted the Antwerpers to write their letter of appeal.
Of the turmoils in Mecheln there is a vivid contemporary account. The
magistrates in Mecheln had been unsuccessful in their attempts to reduce exor-
bitant prices and avoid famine. On June 5. the situation had become critical.
Many people were nearly insane from hunger and when waggons with town-
bread were brought to the market-place and other places to be distributed to the
famishing inhabitants they had to be protected by the city guard armed with
halbards. The distribution was carried through only with great difficulty. On
the following day the town council issued a proclamation to enforce everybody
to declare what stores they still had. The penalty of omission was 100 gld.s. This
effected a temporary relief. Altogether 2600 viertels of rye were declared. Two
days later on June 8. a messenger from Amsterdam arrived in Mecheln at eleven
0' clock in the evening bringing the good news of the arrival of the first grain-

fleet." It was then at once decided to deputy one of the citizens to go to Amster-
dam to buy one or two shiploads of rye for the benefit of the inhabitants of
Meche1n. He succeeded in this and the prices soon began to decline.?" The
grain-fleet from Danzig arrived just in time to save the Netherlands from utter
disaster.

Comparison with other Years of Penury.

In the minds of contemporaries the famine in the Netherlands during the
winter 1556-1557 loomed high. Rumours of the exorbitant prices and the
extreme scarcity of grain travelled far. When at the end of the year 1557 the
customs officer at Elsinore wrote his book of entries he put this memorial on the
front page: in this year there was a great famine in the Netherlands. The price
of one last of rye was 200 goldgld.s, but even at that price the inhabitants were
most often unable to buy any grain at all. He added: God avert his wrath from
us.71 Rumours generally exaggerate. The prices quoted above" do not sub-

69 Stadt accompt 1556/57, £01. 265 ve. Arch. de Malines.

70 Chronijk 1554-1558, 1557 fol, 9. Arch. de Malines.

7l0resundstoldregnskab 1557 (Accounts of the Sound dues 1557). DRA. I presume that the
goldgld. mentioned by the customs officer is the same as that quoted in Dutch records (vide
infra p. 218) and not the Rhenish gld.
"1l! Vide supra pp. 202 f. ; cf', infra pp. 218 f. and 236-39.
210 ASTRID FRIIS

stantiate the statement of the Danish customs officer and even the highest price
quoted in the Utrecht accounts only equals 109 goldgld.s (May 1557).73 It can
hardly be believed that even black market prices reached the level indicated by
the Danish customs officer. But the authentic prices from Utrecht and Amster-
dam need no enhancement. The Utrecht grain prices tabulated by J. A. Sillem'"
give ample evidence that never before was such a price level reached. In the
winter of 1545-1546 which stands out also as a bad year the price level was
abt. two thirds of that of 1556-1557.
It is, however, of greater interest if the opinion of W. S. Unger in De leuens-
middelvoorziening der hollandsche Steden in de Middeleeuiuen." that the
scarcity of grain during the winter of 1556-1557 was the most pronounced
during the whole of the 16'th century holds good. The figures of table III (infra
pp. 236-39) are in favour of this veiw also in regard to the following period.
In no single year between 1558 end 1588 did the Utrecht rye prices reach the
1557 level. Only in the winter of 1596-1597 prices reached the same level.?"
Difficulties in getting sufficient supplies of grain were, however, precisely in these
years common for most European countries.
The Danzig rye prices and the prices in the accounts of the Sound dues (the
latter must be considered representative of wholesale prices in the port of
Danzig and other Baltic ports}," are, as was to be expected, considerably lower
than the Utrecht prices, but the fluctuations tally nicely for the early period.
In the 1580's the successive bad harvests in Italy and years of famine in
Northern Italy are reflected in the Baltic and Sound dues accounts prices. More-
over they distinctly reflect the generally ascending curve of the grain prices. This
can best be seen from the few normal years to be found in this succession of
years of scarcity interspersed with years of abundance.
In the preceding period the interest of historians has quite naturally been
focussed on the Netherlands. It is the years of the beginning of the great upheaval
in this country. In his article Die ddnische Verkehrssperre und der Bilderstrum

73 Vide infra pp. 236-39.

74 In Verbandel; der K onink, akad, u. Wetensch, Afd. Letterk, N. R. III., no. 4. Table IV;
cf. infra pp. 234--39.
75 P. 69, d. C. Ligtenberg, op.cit., p. 297.
76 Sillem, op.cit., Table VIII.
77 It wiIl appear by comparing tables I and II (infr.a pp. 218-31) that in Amsterdam Danzig
rye and Reval rye were sold at identical prices. In the accounts of the Sound dues the Reval
prices are lower than the Danzig prices. This suggests that any purchase that took place in
Reval (and Riga) was at a lower price, but that higher freight costs were added. The quality
of Danzig and Reval rye cannot have differed much.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 211
in den Niederlanden im Jahre 156QTs E. C. G. Brunner has depicted the back-
ground of the iconoclastic fury. The beginning of the 1560's, he writes, was
marked by social unrest caused by the almost incessantly rising prices and penury
of grain. The culmination of the grain penury in 1565-66 he explains as caused
by the closing of the Sound to all traffic in 1565. - This was a temporary
measure taken by the Danish king in his pursuance of the war with Sweden
(1563-70). - I shall not deny that the closing of the Sound during the spring
of 1565 had some effects on rye prices in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the
Netherlands. But the upward tendency of prices seems only to have been slight
insofar as they were reflected in the Utrecht prices. And from June 1., when the
custom-house at Elsinore opened, the traffic at once became very considerable.
On that very date 96 Netherlands ships declared 524.75 lasts of wheat and
4014.25 lasts of rye at Elsinore."
The table on the following page gives evidence of the ample supply of grain
that went from the Baltic countries to Western Europe during the two years of
1565 and 1566.
The arrival of the first grain-fleet from the Baltic at Amsterdam in the
summer of 1565 can be timed a week or a fortnight later than in 1557. But the
situation in 1565 bears no likeness at all to that of 1557. There is no trace of a
serious grain penury in the early summer of 1565 and the prices cannot be said
to be abnormaly high. But during the summer months a change comes. Probably
the harvest in 1565 was poor. In spite of an incessant stream of grain from the
Baltic prices were slowly rising during the autumn and took a sudden upward
tum during the month of November. The explanation seems to be that the
Baltic traffic, as was usual at this time of the year, was ebbing out. Probably
dreading a repetition of the catastrophic winter of 1556-57 the stadholder,
William of Nassau, and the council at the Hague and the town council of
Amsterdam with due assistance from the regent at Brussels, the duchess of Parma,
took the most stringent measures in the Netherlands themselves. They also
applied to the king of Denmark and the town council of Danzig to be granted
facilities for early imports of grain from the Baltic. It was fortunate that the
town council of Danzig permitted the exports of grain very early in 1566. The
custom-house, and consequently the traffic opened already during the month

78 Hansische GeschichtsbliitteT XXXIII (1929), pp. 97-109.

790resundstoldregnskab 1565. DRA.
212 ASTRID FRIIS

Netherlands Ships carrying Wheat and Rye passing Elsinore

and Utrecht Rye Prices 1565 and 1566. 8IJ
Netherl. Wheat Rye Utrecht Rye Prices per Last
.hip. Last Last Silver equivalents"
1565 April 8 25 129 968.18
May 17 27 62.50 1316.02
" June 364 2470 14,215.50 1225.26
" July 355 2383.25 12,921 1213.92
" Aug. 187 1105.25 7,944.25 1321.69
" Sept. 258 1519 10,841
" Oct. n 412 1,899.50 1871.93
" Nov. 2 7.25 2212.28
Dec. 2042.10
" Jan.
1566 1985.38
Febr. 1996.7.2
" March 78 223.75 3,592.25 1479.39
" April 78 360.75 2,955.75 1316.02
May 178 848 7,478.50 1225.26
" June 266 443.75 10,227.25 1061.89
" July 224 346.75 10,030.75 1089.12
" Aug. 360 1425.50 15,248 1139.04
" Sept. 74 502.75 2,781. 75
Oct. 110 642.25 3,350.75 1185.55
" Nov. 3 11 1161.73
Dec. 1111.81 82

of March. 83 Neither did the Danish king hinder traffic in the Sound in the
spring of 1565, and it was this early importation of grain that saved the
inhabitants of the Netherlands in this year from being subject to the same misery
as in the spring of 1557.

Utrecht Rye prices 1556/57. 134

Pet last in silver equivalents

1556 Oct. ................ 1548.59 1557 March . ............ 2232.13

Nov. ............... 1860.58 April ............... 2550.36
Dec. ............... 1866.25 " May . .............. 2773.85
1557 Jan. ................ 2110.17 " June . .............. 2654.73
Febr. ............... 2064.79 " July ................ 1338.71
"
80 Source: 0resundstoldregnskaber 1565 and 1566. DRA. I am much indebted to Mr. Svend
Ellehej for having extracted the figures on which this table is based from the accounts of the
Sound dues.
81 For silver equivalents, vide infra, pp. 234-39.
82 The total of the above figures deviates slightly from the total of Mrs. Bang's figures. Cf.
Tabeller o, Skibs], o, Varetransp, II. A., pp. 16 and 27.
83 Hapke, Niederl, Akt. u. Urk, II (Lubeck 1923), pp. 144-166.
84 Vide infra pp. 236-39.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 213
Dr. Brunner has also made use of Sillem's Utrecht grain price tables. I regret
to say that his quotations are ill some cases misleading and at all events hap-
hazard/" E. Kuttner's tale of the grain supply crisis in the Netherlands in
1565-66 in Het Hongerjaar 15668fJ is tainted by the same lopesidedness as
that of dr. Brunner. Inadvertently, I suppose, they have both overlooked the
misery and exorbitant grain prices in the winter of 1556-1557. As their
departure they have chosen the year 1558. In this year unusually low grain
prices prevailed. It seems to me that the social background for the iconoclastic
fury needs repainting. Religious zeal may have meant more than modern
historians are apt to believe. I shall not, however, deny that there was in all
probability an ever widening gap between wages and the cost of living. Even in
normal years the latter had become higher than before.

The Resumption of the War and the Finances in 1557.

The question to be answered in this chapter is: did the grain penury in the
winter af 1556-57 affect economic conditions in general to such an extent that
a strain was felt in the money market?
A stable money market with easy conditions for raising loans became of
paramount importance to the Spanish-Netherlands crown, when in the begin-
ning of 1557 it became apparent that a resumption of the war was inevitable."
Without cash (silver coins) at the disposal of the government no rearmament
could be carried through.
Lonchay states that coined silver was not abundant in the 16'th century;"
It was an unfortunate coincidence that both for the purpose of rearmament
and for all grain purchases, cash was needed in the winter and spring of 1557.
Grain purchases for speculative purposes cannot have yielded the hoped for profit
nor a quick return of money owing to the restraints made on reexports in all

8.~ E. g. dr. Brunner quotes two wheat prices from Jan. and April 1566 in evidence of the rising
grain prices: 110 stuivers per mud in Jan. and 120 stuivers per mud in April. He has overlooked
that the parallel columns of rye prices evidence a sonsiderable fall in prices of rye during the
same period. (Sillem, op.cit., table IV). The rye prices must be considered as decisive in regard
to the cost of living. Also the quantities of wheat imported from the Baltic countries were in-
considerable as compared with the corresponding quantities of rye. Hans Geschicbtsbl, XXXIII,
pp. 101-108.
86 (Amsterdam, 1949) pp.218-27.
87 Cambro Mod. Hist. III, p. 184.
88 "Comme l'argent monnaye n'etait pas tres abondant, il leur etait permis de recevoir une
partie en vaisselle" (ordinance dat. 1553, July 11.). Lonchay, op.ca., p. 942.
214 ASTRID FRIIS

places." This also applies to purchases made solely for the sake of provision."
A depletion of coined silver seems an inevitable accessory to the suspension of the
ordinary usances in regard to the grain trade. An exception to these remarks
must be taken of course in regard to the province of Holland and especially in
regard to Amsterdam. Into this town a constant influx of coined silver must have
taken place. Here no depletion can have taken place even assuming that very
large quantities of coined silver was conveyed to Danzig and other ports in the
Baltic in payment for the grain imports."
It was unfortunate that the first instalment of the subsidy that the general
states had accorded Philip in 1556 was not payable until May 1. 1557. 92 The
endeavours of the regent at Brussels to raise loans had scanty success. The most
urgent needs were met by a loan which the king's factor Gasper Schetz undertook
to raise among merchants at Antwerp. The loan totalled 100,000 ducats or
abt. 165,000 gld.s." The terms were: repayment to Schetz's servant in Spain
and conveyance to the Netherlands in the first treasure ship the king dispatched.
If this arrangement failed the money should instead be paid by anticipating
subsidies (aids) already granted or to be granted or by the proceeds of sale
of royal demesnes. The proceeds of the loan were to be employed solely for
equipping and paying 3000 horse 'des ordonnances' for 6 months and for the
payment 'en waertghelt' for a certain period of 6000 foreign horse."
Already by the middle of February the regent had applied to all the provincial
governments for help. From an answer from the stadholder at the Hague (dated
February 24.) it is apparent that the duke of Savoy in his letter had been very
explicit about the present difficulties and had stated that it was an urgent

89 Vide supra. pp. 205-8.

90 E. g. on April 23. the duke of Savoy intervened without success on behalf of Mecheln to
the town council of Amsterdam in regard of 44 lasts of grain bought and paid. Pap. d'etat et
d'aud., no. 325, fol. 175. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles.
91 I hope that I shall be able to view the problems discussed by professor Heckscher and dr.
Charles Wilson from a new angle in another article.
92 Vide supra, p. 199. Ehrenberg states (op.cit., I, p. 161 n) that the Fuggers on April 5. 1556
had been given bonds in the names of the general receivers of the provinces totalling 1,265,
237 gld.s to be repaid out of the proceeds of the next subsidy. This was partly to cover a
loan taken up for the purpose of paying arrears to mercenary troops in Spain, which had begun
to become turbulent. The resumption of the war of course meant that this disposition could not
be carried through.
93 1 ducat at 66 gros or grot {"ou a tel prix qu'il pourroit recouvrer entre marchans fre-
quentant la bourse d' Anvers" and 1 gld. at 40 gros or grot. When repaid the ducat was to
be counted at 77.20 gros, Lonchay, op.cit., pp. 998--1004. 1556, March 1., cr. Posthumus,
Nederlandsche Piijsgeschiedenis, p. VI.
94 Lonchay, I, op.cit., pp. 998-1004.
 THE TWO CRISES IN THE NETHERLANDS 215

necessity that the king immediately found money to expend for the defence of
the country. Money must be found in the Netherlands until such could be sent
from Spain.
The principal difficulty proceeded, however, from 'de faulte de credit' in the
Netherlands. In these circumstances the king was compelled to apply to the
towns, the nobility and the religious houses for 'voluntary' loans. The guarantee
-offered was repayment from the proceeds of the first subsidy."
The reaction to this request for immediate financial help differed widely
in the town and provinces. In a letter dated March 16. the magistrates of
Antwerp asked for this once to be excused. They state that in the present
circumstances it would involve 'grosse charge' to everyone to grant a loan. They
add, probably making allusion to Amsterdam that had customary facilities,
that the citizens of Antwerp were not exempted from impositions, excises or
subsidies."
This reply in the negative from Antwerp is in complete accordance with the
previous information of the lack of credit and points to an economic depression
and scarcity of coined silver (argent monnaie). From Utrecht we have direct
evidence of a connection with the grain supply crisis. At the end of March the
stadholder at the Hague visited Utrecht a. o. arrange the business of the
loans. He was soon discouraged. In a letter to the duke of Savoy he explains
that he had found much proverty in the town and that the wealthy citizens whom
he had intended to approach for loans had already depleted themselves of money
(argent) in order to buy grain for the sustenance of the poor inhabitants."
The fact that the slackness in the money market continued in Antwerp can be
gathered by the information given by Ehrenberg that the town of Antwerp took
similar measures as the crown and ordered a postponement of payments that
fell due. Ds
To what desperate ends the Netherlands government was reduced during the
spring of 1557 can be perceived from an application made to all the principal
towns for a loan of some barrels of gunpowder." The employment of such means
to obtain sufficient munitions signals an impending financial breakdown. It seems

115 Pap. d'etat et d'aud. no. 325, fol.s 35-37 dat. the Hague 1557, Febr. 24., Arch. Roy.

Bruxelles.
9C Ibid., no. 262, fol. 11.
97 tus., no. 325, fol., 115 dat, Utrecht 1557, March 25.
98 "Die Messzahlungen wurden ... verschoben", Ehrenberg, op.cit., I, pp. 162 f.
119 Pap. d'etat et d'aud. no. 325, fol. 195. 1557, May. Min. List of 17 towns in the northern
provinces. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles. The town council of Leyden promised to send 15 barrels.
Vroedscapsboek Leyden 1554-1564, 1557, July 10. Gem. Arch. Leyden.
216 ASTRID FRIIS

nearly a miracle that war preparations could at all be carried through. The
victory at St. Quentin on August 10. was the triumphal result. But the coincidence
of war and famine had then done irreparable damage to the already weakened
finances of the Spanish-Netherlands crown.P?
The ease and willingness with which the province of Holland and the town of
Amsterdam contributed to the war effort contrast unmistakably with the bleak
despondency of Antwerp and other parts of the southern provinces. When in
the middle of February the stadholder at the Hague was asked to raise loans
amounting to 200,000 gld.s in his two provinces of Holland and Utrecht, he
never hesitated concerning the possibility of obtaining the money. The duke of
Savoy had proposed that Amsterdam and Dordrecht should each raise 50,000
gld.s and the remainder be raised in diverse ways. The stadholder in his first
answer (February 24.) made an alternate proposal viz. that the states, which
were to meet at the Hague on March 4. should instead raise the full sum 'par
vendition des rentes au denier douze'. It would be a lesser burden to the popu-
lation, which at present had extraordinary expenses owing to the exorbitant
prices on grain and victuals. It would also mean that there was still an ultimate
reserve untouched avaible for the king if things became desperate.t'" The proposal
of the duke was, however, reverted to and before the middle of April it was stated
by the deputies, who were commisioned to handle the loans in the provinces of
Holland and Utrecht, that in spite of the persisting great 'pourete du temps et
estroictesse d'argent' in Utrecht and in Holland aswell the loaning transactions in
the two provinces had been so successful that the total of the loans offered far
exceeded the sum of 100,000 gld.s asked for. Nearly everybody who had been
asked for loans had been found very willing to grant them and even the few who
were unwilling could be dealt with. 1 02 Dordrecht was also able to find the 50,000
gld.s asked for from this town?03 In Amsterdam there was from the very begin-
ning no hesitation at all about the 50,000 gld.s they were asked to raise.i'" The
preceding year they had raised a similar amount.l'"

:100 See Ehrenberg, op.cit., I, p. 365, and II, pp. 153 ff.
WJ. Pap. d'etat et d'aud, no. 325, foI.s 35-37, dat. the Hague 1557, Febr. 24. Arch. Roy.
Bruxelles.
102 I bid., fo!'s 193 f. 1557, April 11. Extract from a letter from M. de Beures to the duke of

Savoy.
1'03 Ibid., fo!' 218. Min. dat. Bruxelles 1557, June 4. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles.
1'04 Vroedschaps res. I, fo!' 164, 1557, April 4. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam; Pap. d'etat et d'aud.
no. 325, fo!' 218. Min., dat. Bruxelles 1557, June 4. and ibid., fo!' 226. The councillor Corn.
Suys to the duke of Savoy, dat. Amsterdam 1557, June 8. Arch. Roy. Bruxelles.
1.05 Ter Gouw, op.clt., VI, p. 11.
 THE TWO CRISEIS IN THE NETHERLANDS 217

From the town accounts some information can be gleaned of the liabilities of
Amsterdam on behalf of the crown. The annual ordinary 'renten' amounted to
61,465 gld.s (10,244 £VI 4 B). This was counterbalanced by the income from
the excise on wine and beer, mill money (molen geldt) and grain excise. These
items constitute abt. one third of the total expense and income. The expenditure
on rye purchases for the two years of 1556 and 1557 is another interesting item.
It totalled: 45,269 gld.s. This was partly balanced by the income from the sale
of bread of 35,583 gld.s.'?"
To date the ascendancy of Amsterdam and the province of Holland and the
beginning of the decline of the southern provinces with any exactitude is of
course out of question.i'" but the general impression which the happenings of the
fatal years of 1557 leaves, seems to point to an early development.

106 Thesaurierrekeningen v. Amsterdam, 1557, fol.s 1, 41 f. and 46. Gem. Arch. Amsterdam.
d. Posthumus, Niederlandsche Prijsgeschienis, p. LV.
107 Cf. J. A. van Houtte, H et economisch Verval van het Zuiden in Algemene Geschiedenis
..JeT Nederlanden V (Utrecht, 1952), pp. 174-209.