In The Threshold of Nuclear War - The 1962 Missile Crisis - Diez Acosta, Tomás - 2002 - Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba - Editorial José Martí - 9789590901980 - Anna's Archive

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2021 with funding from

Kahle/Austin Foundation
https://archive.org/details/inthresholdofnucO000diez
IN THE THRESHOLD
OF NUCLEAR WAR
IN THE THRESHOLD
OF NUCLEAR WAR
The 1962 Missile Crisis
Tomas Diez Acosta
Translated by
Ornan José Batista Pefia
EDITORIAL JOSE MARTI

Edition: José Amieva Dalboys and Josefina Ezpeleta Laplace
Design: Enrique Mayol Amador
Inner design and composition: Santiago Ramirez Pérez
Illustrations: Courtesy of Ediciones Verde Olivo
© 2002, Tomas Diez Acosta

© 2002, Ornan José Batista Pena
© 2002, Editorial José Marti
ISBN 959-09-0198-0
INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO

Editorial JOSE MARTI
Publicaciones en Lenguas Extranjeras
Calzada No. 259 e/ J e I, Vedado
Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 9
THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS. SOME CUBAN RE-

FLECTIONS. Tomas Diez Acosta Fe
Operation Mongoose 19
Deployment of Soviet Troops in Cuba Bl
Secrecy of the Operation 41
Spy Flights 50
Cuban Reply 53
Facing Foe Flights 61
Cuban Reflections 71
DOCUMENTS 89
Draft Protocol on Soviet-Cuban Mutual De-
fense and Military Cooperati on Agreement,
August 1962 91
Statement of the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Cuba, September 29, 1962 97
Appearance of the Prime Minister and Com-
mander in Chief Fidel Castro on the Cuban
Radio and Television Broadcasting System,
October 23, 1962 109
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s letter to Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, October 26, 1962 146
Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to Pre-
mier Khrushchev, October 26, 1962 156
Communiqué of the Commander in Chief Fidel
Castro, October 27, 1962 158
Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s message to Act-
ing Secretary General U Thant, October 27,
1962 159
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s communiqué
to President John F. Kennedy, October 27, 1962 161
Président John F. Kennedy s letter tosbre-
mier Nikita S. Khrushchev, October 27, 1962 167
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s communiqué
to President John F. Kennedy, October 28, 1962 169
Statement of the Prime Minister of the Cu-
ban Revolutionary Government Fidel Castro,
October 28, 1962 176
Premier Nikita S. Khrushehev’s letter to Prime
Minister Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962 178
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s letter to Prime
Minister Fidel Castro, October 30, 1962 182
Talks held between the Prime Minister of
the Revolutionary Government of Cuba Fidel
Castro, and Acting Secretary General of the
United Nations U Thant, October 30, 1962 193
Talks held between the Prime Minister of
the Revolutionary Government of Cuba Fidel
Castro, and Acting Secretary General of the
United Nations U Thant, October 31, 1962 ZL
Excerpt of the appearance of the Prime Minis-
ter of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba
Fidel Castro on the Cuban Radio and Televi-
sion Broadcasting System, November 1, 1962 226
Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to Acting
Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant,
November 15, 1962 236
Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to Acting
Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant,
November 19, 1962 241
Statement of the National Directorate of the
Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and
the Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Cuba, November 25, 1962 244
Letter from the Permanent Representative of
Cuba to the Secretary General of the United
Nations U Thant, January 7, 1963 202
TESTIMONY. Commander in Chief Fidel Castro

Ruz 265
Fidel Castro’s words on January 11, 1992
during the Tripartite Conference on the
Cuban Missile Crisis, held on January 9-12,
1992 267
CHRONOLOGY O17
BIBLIOGRAPHY 333
parm pm prea —
ae wus’ War eers A
feypialonh tt Tapa cnn tah coi
tateetT L} apwcieiaaiel Sorc) ome phonepecadl a
Serpe ‘Sci > (ivi BR, BE ag

+ vtec maestro SPEIMIBIES |
nna he 7eee
ee
-
eo
a) art) te
ee
wis) ; Cayeree
ee
- hie ef O@rt en
one” ; 0 ioe Son
wes
Guna,
5 |Pera une <
a ery 7 cal (76,
i renrienr:ie bal) eer AY at

J) ae st BS, on: a.
pebees Ad Ybor Ho <iaedetetaa’ a

: Mat eh ote Moin eae ae, HRD
ele? yaaa. Mp boinal lies pi
va Bite ake sea) TWh Seen ie
Piet Oe Ge Om (Sete Fete i
Vie, S =a = fm, <. 4G Ly % | yoko Si
52 EMTs. in rus
1.54 : 7
ee =
ut “Unite abuatel
= mri
; eae? é 4) ‘ 4 oo. ,
a, Cater ait . tl oS the-

Cintas! (tee y wie TO. rt (a4
Fates Hell boing. Ww Mistinitr el
we Geral ah > eh en al VLaliey Piet
(wien. Td ~ ou - Pore of the
‘et ee ' 7 or ina” i
iw tal ag ay = Vipheae ict
ee e wa wt Cute”
Powe) Cay co Am <0 ne Teele
aa) Gereniarathiig | wera my 226
7 , 7
INTRODUCTION
In the Threshold of Nuclear War is a book that gathers

writings, documents, and the testimony of Com-
mander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz concerning the
October Crisis,! which show the position of principles,
honesty and coherence of Cuba performance in those
difficult and dangerous days of 1962. This event,
also called “The Cuban Missile Crisis,”? has been
considered the most serious episode that mankind
faced in the second half of the past century because
it had never been so close to nuclear war than ever.
The materials compiled in this book expose how,
after the defeat that the United States suffered in
Playa Giron, the idea to destroy the Cuban Revolu-
tion by any means became a stubborn thought for
many high-level authorities and politicians of the
United States, and, in particular, for President John
Kennedy and his brother Robert. With this purpose,
new aggressive plans were elaborated, and covert
and subversive actions against Cuba intensified.
In order to develop this secret war, the United
States Government allotted large human, financial,
1. This testimony was exposed by Fidel Castro during the Tri-

partite Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Havana
on January 9-12, 1992. See pages 267-316.
2. This denomination, collected in the U.S. political and historical
literature, has a rather political than semantic connotation,
because it assumes that the cause which unleashed the Crisis
was rather the deployment of the Soviet MRBMs in the Cuban
territory than the U.S. hostile and aggressive policy against Cuba
since the very beginning of the Revolution in 1959.
9
D OF NUCLEAR WAR
IN THE iTHRESHOL
eNOS) Me rae eeee
and technical resources, used for organizing terror-

ist and sabotage activities, preparing attempts to crime
against main Cuban revolutionary leaders, develop-
ing intense psychological and propaganda war, pro-
‘viding material support to groups of armed resistance
that were acting in different rural regions of the coun-
try, and implementing a tight economic blockade and
diplomatic and political isolation, among other coun-
terrevolutionary activities, which must be used as
steps for direct military intervention of U.S. Armed
Forces (USAF). The Mongoose Operation constitutes
the most obvious example of the above mentioned
assertions.
In front of the counterrevolutionary acting and
the expressed U.S. hostility that predicted direct
military aggression, the Revolutionary Government
took measures to increase defensive capability of
the country and to create a system of national se-
curity, which frustrated imperialist intentions and
made them pay a high political price—and in hu-
man lives—in case they dared undertaking direct
invasion on Cuba.
This occasion was used as frame for the Soviet
proposal of May 29, 1962, in the sense to deploy
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(MRBM and IRBM), with nuclear warheads, in the
Cuban territory.
The proposed initiative was analyzed at the Sec-
retariat of the National Directorate of the Integrated
Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) that made the
decision to respond affirmatively, because it was
convinced that such a measure would be an impor-
tant international contribution of Cuba for defen-
sive strengthening of the Socialist bloc and, in fact,
it would contribute to the defense of the country
dissuading U.S. rulers not to undertake their ag-
gressive plans.
INTRODUCTION
As result of this decision, between late July and

October 1962, a Soviet strong military contingent
that approximately comprised 42,000 men—of all
kind of armaments and forces—was deployed in
Cuba. The arrival of these means in Cuba provoked,
in the United States, an increasing scandal in the
press and in U.S. political circles from the midst
August, which augured the beginning of a crisis.
Precisely, the selection of the compiled documents
begins with the text of the military accord project
between Cuba and the USSR, which had been per-
sonally modified by Fidel. For the Cuban directorate
it was clear the idea that in such a situation it was
necessary to bring a halt to the propaganda cam-
paigns that were being prepared in the United States,
with the immediate publication of that military ac-
cord, because its validity, honesty, and legality were
unquestionable. For that reason, Cuban directorate
sent Commander Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Cap-
tain Emilio Aragonés to Moscow for directly discuss-
ing those viewpoints with Nikita S. Khrushchev. They
had the mission that the Soviets should make the
final decision, because they were considered to have
more experience in those matters. Khrushchev did
not take into account the Cuban warning.’
The stubborn and inappropriate political handling
of keeping, at all cost, the secrecy of the operation of
deploying Soviet troops in Cuba by the Soviet direc-
torate, even appealing to deception, however, was
used by the United States to justify what could not
be justified: the use of a military action such as
the naval blockade to Cuba, in peacetime. The Cuban
performance was quite different. From the beginning,
3. Fidel had directly entrusted Rati Castro to make a first Cuban

warning on this particular matter during the visit of the latter to
Moscow in July.
i
IN THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEAR WAR
it faced foe propaganda and the measures approved

by U.S. Congress, under the concept that Cuba as
sovereign and independent country could make use
of the gear that considered convenient for its de-
fense in front of the threats of aggression. This is
proved in the Statement of the Council of Minis-
ters, dated on September 29, in which Cuban Presi-
dent Osvaldo Dorticés Torrado reaffirmed so in his
speech during the plenary session of the 27th pe-
riod of sessions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations (UN).
On October 14, U.S. reconnaissance plane U-2
undertakes spy flight and discovers the sites of
MRBMs in the western region of Cuba. The day
16th, Kennedy was informed on that finding. U.S.
political and military high-ranking directorate met
for a week to decide the manner to eliminate those
sites. On October 22, the U.S. president announces
his decision to impose a naval blockade to Cuba and
demands inspection of unconditional withdrawal of
Soviet missiles. The crisis had broken out.
Cuba that had maintained attentive to events
and deterioration of military situation in the Car-
ibbean, orders the general mobilization of the coun-
try almost an hour and a half prior Kennedy spoke.
In the evening of October 23, Fidel would appear to
the Cuban radio and television broadcasting sys-
tem to explain the people the existing situation and
to refuse, one by one, all statements exposed the
previous day by the U.S. president. The news arriv-
ing in Cuba that day 23d indicated the Soviet de-
termination of not tolerating the materialization of
U.S. actions.
Those were days of great tension for the whole
mankind. Danger for international peace was im-
minent and humanity was at a short distance from
the threshold of nuclear war. Debates in the heart
12
INTRODUCTION
of the Security Council of the United Nations had

begun. A group of nations, the most of which were
members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,
had met at the United Nations and had spoken to
Acting Secretary General of that international body,
U Thant, to be the intermediary between the coun-
tries directly involved in the conflict. U Thant im-
mediately sent letters to the governments of the
United States, USSR and Cuba, warning them to
search and discuss a pacific solution of the conflict.*
While the progressive world made efforts to pre-
vent the crisis, the United States Government in-
creased its threats of air strike on Cuba, and arro-
gated. as a right, the violation of Cuban air space. On
October 26, President Kennedy personally ordered to
increase low-level flights over the Cuban territory,
from twice a day to twelve.
The increase of low-level flights over Cuba made
the situation more tense. This kind of action could
not be tolerated anymore because it was giving large
possibilities to U.S. Air Force (USAF) to undertake
a surprising air strike, without taking into account
what this meant for the morale of Cuban forces
when accepting that the foe continued violating the
air space with impunity.
Because of the danger that low-level flights over
Cuba meant for defense of the country, the day 26th,
Commander in Chief ordered to open fire, from the
following day, against every foe aircraft flying at low
level, which violated the Cuban air space. In the eve-
ning of October 26, after adopting all measures and
implementing the most minimum details of defense
4, Cuba stance concerning the search of a pacific solution is clearly

expressed in the message of Fidel to U Thant on October 27. See
this document in pages 159-160.
13
IN THE THRESHOLD
BEE 22S SeOF NUCLEAR A
WAR
plan,® Fidel asked himself what else had to be done

and he decided to go to the venue of the Soviet em-
bassy in Havana, to draft a message to Khrushchev
from there aimed at exhorting him to keep a firm
position and not to make irreparable mistakes in
case war broke out. But what neither Fidel nor no
one else knew in Cuba was that from October 25,
Khrushchev and Kennedy were carrying out exchange
of secret correspondence seeking an arrangement
between both superpowers.
Example of this exchange of correspondence between
Khrushchev and Kennedy are letters issued on Octo-
ber 26, 27 and 28.° In the last letter of Khrushchev,
the Soviet leader unilaterally and without consulta-
tion, engaged to remove the armament that the
United States considered offensive, with guarantees
of verification, in return of the pledge that U.S. presi-
dent had made of not invading Cuba and prevent
that its allies gave such a step.
The Cuban Revolutionary Government estimated
that terms of the arrangement between Khrushchev
and Kennedy were not convenient for Cuba. That
same day 28th, in a public statement, Fidel an-
nounced the Revolution position, based on five points
that would make possible the accomplishment of a
truly peace before U.S. aggressions.
This difference of viewpoints for the negotiated
solution of the Crisis between Havana and Moscow
was expressed in letters sent on October 28, 30
and 31 between the Soviet leader and the Chief of
5. The Cuban defense plan, among other measures, comprised

the protection of the Soviet deployed missile sites, by tens of
antiaircraft batteries.
6. The letters of Khrushchev to Kennedy of October 27 and 28,
were openly and hurriedly broadcasted on Radio Moscow;
therefore its content was also known in Cuba. See pages 161-166
and 169-175.
14
INTRODUCTION
the Cuban Revolution. On the one hand, Khrushchev

tried to justify his mediocre performance while on
the other hand Fidel defended his moral and prin-
ciple positions hoisted by Cuba.
In response to an invitation made by the Cuban
Government, and as part of the negotiating process,
a UN delegation, headed by its Acting Secretary
General U Thant, arrived in Havana on October 30.
In the minutes of the talks, held on October 30-31
between the Cuban Government and the UN delega-
tion, the position of principles that the Cuban di-
rectorate assumes before ithe U.S. claim, of de-
manding on-site verification of the withdrawal of
missiles is clearly exposed.
This position of principles of the Cuban Revolu-
tion was also expressed during the whole negotiat-
ing process that, without hampering a pacific solu-
tion of the crisis, defended its viewpoints in front
of U.S. attempts and refusals of not taking them
into account. This honorable stance was clearly
expressed in the letters of Fidel to U Thant on No-
vember 15 and 19.
Special attention must be given to the Statement
of the National Directorate of the ORI and the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, dated on
November 25, 1962 and the Note of the Cuba Gov-
ernment to Secretary General of the UN, on Janu-
ary 7, 1963 because both documents synthesize the
Cuban coherent stance.
There are some documents which have been
taken from sources originally in English, while some
others were translated into English from original
Spanish documents.
Finally, the book contains the testimony given
by Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro, during the
Havana Tripartite Conference held in January 1992.
In his words, Fidel makes a reflection on the cause,
15
ss
development and end of that grave and dangerous

event that took place in the fall of 1962. Likewise,
a brief chronology with the principal facts that took
place from late 1961 to early January 1963 has been
included in this book.
We hope that this work be useful for scholars
and those who are interested in this important
event of the universal history, in general, and of Cu-
ba, in particular.
THE AUTHOR
THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS
SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
Tomas Diez Acosta
peda: plane: tv: tha CalleleA
Mevies ocarncey wiles the pene
7i ;ieEtee: lair ists} coors
%Me
St fo (PEO.
ie a
aN mM St
Foe
wad Pratt id ee Le ’
> yeast the 8 siversal Pipl. $i scotient,

-—
Heal
OPERATION MONGOOSE
After the U.S. defeat at Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Gov-

ernment became fully aware of Washington’s policy
objectives toward Cuba and how they were aimed at
eliminating the socialist system. The conviction that
the White House was seriously considering the mili-
tary option of using its own armed forces in a direct
invasion of the Island prevailed.
This view was corroborated in later months by the
stepping up of internal subversive actions organized
and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
CIA appropriated large financial and technical re-
sources for the organization of terrorist and sabotage
actions against Cuba, the orchestration of assassi-
nation plots against the main leaders of the Revolu-
tion, intense ideological and psychological warfare,
the provision of material support to the pockets of
armed resistance acting in different rural areas of the
country, and other counterrevolutionary activities.
On April 19, 1961 the United States suffered the
defeat of a mercenary army of Cuban exiles who had
been prepared, armed and trained for a year to over-
throw the Cuban Government. In the conclusions of
the investigations ordered by President John F.
Kennedy to General Maxwell Taylor in order to clarify
the causes of such failure, the latter recommended:
In the light of the foregoing considerations,
we are of the opinion that the preparation and
execution of paramilitary operations such as
Zapata are a form of Cold War action in which
19
the country must be prepared to engage... .

Such operations should be planned and ex-
ecuted by a governmental mechanism capable
of bringing into play, in addition to military and
covert techniques, all other political, economic,
ideological and intelligence forces, which can
contribute to its success. No such mechanism
presently exists but should be created to plan,
coordinate and further a national Cold War
strategy capable of including paramilitary op-
erations.'
On November 30 of the same year, by decision of
President Kennedy, the Special Group Augmented
(SGA) was created within the National Security Coun-
cil, presided over by General Taylor and Attorney
General Robert Kennedy to carry out what was then
the biggest subversive operation ever implemented
by the United States for the purpose of overthrow-
ing a foreign government. This operation was given
the code name MONGOOSE, thus fulfilling the recom-
mendations to include the Cuban case in the cold
war Strategy of U.S. policy, which still remains in
place today. Cuba continues to be, now more than
ever, a victim of this policy, which according to theo-
reticians and politicians, ended with the disinte-
gration of the Socialist bloc in Eastern Europe.
Operation Mongoose was a governmental project
that included all forms of possible aggression: eco-
nomic blockade, political and diplomatic isolation,
internal subversion, assassination of Cuban leaders
1. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum No. 3 From the Cuba

Study Group to President Kennedy. Washington, June 13, 1961,”
in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X,
Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1997), 605.
20
THE 1962 MISSILE Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
(particularly Fidel Castro), psychological warfare and

finally, military invasion.
It was really the continuation of an undeclared war
that the United States had been implementing against
Cuba since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959.
It was not the first time that Cuba had denounced
and explained these aggressions. It would be im-
possible to analyze the causes of the well-known
1962 Missile Crisis without bearing in mind those
factors, which are still part of the_U.S. policy with
respect to our country.
We will be citing some fragments from recently
released official documents of the United States, so
that the dimensions of this war can be better under-
stood.
The preamble of “The Cuba Project,” the first
guideline document drafted by the SGA working
group, stated:
The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans over-
throw the Communist regime from within the
country and institute a new government with
which the U.S. can live in peace.
Basically, the operation is to bring about the
revolt of the Cuban people. .
The revolt requires a strongly motivated politi-
cal action movement established within Cuba,
to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-
wards the objective and to capitalize on the
climactic moment. The political actions will be
assisted by economic warfare to induce failure
of the communist regime to supply Cuba’s eco-
nomic needs, psychological operations to turn
the peoples’ resentment increasingly against
the regime, and military-type groups to give the
popular movement an action arm for sabotage
24
IN THE THRESHOLD
PNT US OF NE
NUCLEAR
eeeWAR
and armed resistance in support of political

objectives.
The popular movement will capitalize on this
climactic moment by initiating an open revolt.
Areas will be taken and held. If necessary,
the popular movement will appeal for help to the
free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The
United States, if possible in concert with other
Western Hemisphere nations, will then give
open support to the Cuban peoples’ revolt. Such
support will include military force, as neces-
Saryetern? .7
Mongoose was an operation which included thirty-
three tasks for the various U.S. Government de-
partments and agencies and a timetable of activ-
ities, which would begin in the month of March of
1962 and would end in October of the same year
with the defeat of the Cuban regime. The executive
order signed by President Kennedy in March 1962
very clearly explained the aims pursued:
In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the
target government, the U.S. will make maxi-
mum use of the indigenous resources, inter-
nal and external, but recognizes that final
success will require decisive U.S. military in-
tervention.?
z. U.S. Department of State, “Program Review by the Chief of Ope-

rations, Operation Mongoose (Landsdale). Washington, January
18. The Cuba Project,” in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington: U.S.
Government Pginting Office, 1997), 710-711.
3. U.S. Department of State, “Guidelines for Operation Mongoose.
Washington, March 14, 1962,” in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1997), 771.
22
THE 1962 MissILe Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
Therefore, in March of 1962, even when there were

no missiles in Cuba and the USSR had not even
made that proposal, the U.S. Government had al-
ready decided a priori that in October of that year a
crisis of extraordinary dimensions would break out
in the Caribbean, as they had in mind to attack
Cuba militarily. On the other hand, as history has
shown, the Cubans would defend ourselves, as we
have done throughout all these years.
As it is known, the blockade against Cuba was signed
in February of that year and Cuba was also expelled
from the Organization of American States (OAS) that
same year as part of the anti-Cuban project. After that,
a war of unimaginable dimensions was unleashed,
which even included bacteriological attacks. From
January to August of 1962, a total of 5780 subversive
actions were executed in Cuba, of which 716 were
acts of sabotage aimed at important economic targets
in the country.
An enormous spy and sabotage apparatus was
established in Miami, which became the biggest
CIA operative base that has ever existed in North
America. J. M. Wave, the code name of that abomi-
nation, aside from producing its own operations,
coordinated actions against Cuba with the CIA cen-
ters around the world. More than 400 case officers
and nearly 4000 agents worked on it. J. M. Wave
had so many small boats and mother ships dis-
guised as merchant marine vessels that it came to
be considered the third largest armada of the west-
ern hemisphere.
Two great plots were created to defeat the revo-
lutionary government, one of them precisely in the
month of May, when the Soviet delegation bearing
the missile proposal had not yet arrived in our coun-
try. Dozens of CIA agents and counterrevolutionaries
trained in the United States were infiltrated into
23
the Island, loaded with weapons, explosives and

war supplies aimed at preparing a “popular upris-
ing” through the insurrection of all the counter-
revolutionary groups acting in the country. The main
leaders and agents were arrested and the magni-
tude of the conspiracy became evident. A Cuban
State Security report on that date noted that the
objective of the United States was to subvert the
country and defeat its government by all means,
including a military invasion.* It was therefore evi-
dent that the Cuban leadership had sufficient in-
formation regarding aggressive plans of the United
States when the Soviet delegation arrived in the
country on May 29, 1962. .
In August of that same year, another subversive
plan of equal dimensions was .designed. On this
occasion it was backed by a plan by the Pentagon to
militarily invade Cuba to attempt again a counter-
revolutionary upheaval throughout all the country.
Hundreds of tons of weapons and dozens of CIA
agents were infiltrated into Cuba while, at the same
time, a deceitful press campaign was waged in the
United States and in other parts of Latin America.
All this was in keeping with the SGA agreements
of August 10, 1962, where the group decided to
implement the Plan B plus, that was a generalized
subversion to provoke an internal crisis in Cuba,
which would pave the way for the military aggres-
sion.
The plan failed and was denounced by Cuba before
world public opinion. However, the aggressive esca-
lation had acquired such dimensions that on Sep-
tember 17, 1962 the Foreign Affairs and Armed Serv-
ices Committees of the U.S. Senate met to analyze
4. Cuban State Security Department report regarding the U.S.

plans against Cuba, 1962.
24
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CuBAN REFLECTIONS
the situation in Cuba and the projects presented to

invade the country, invoking the Monroe Doctrine.
Other subversive actions carried out by the United
States in the context of Operation Mongoose included
attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro and activities
related to the ideological poisoning of the Cuban
people by means of psychological warfare.
In April of 1962, the mechanism for the ZR/RIFLE
operation was launched with the objective of elimi-
nating the top Cuban leader to deprive the revolu-
tionary government of its head. Several plans for
such attempts were prepared, one of them becom-
ing public in the United States years later when
the Mafioso John Rosselli was seeking the support
of the U.S. authorities to avoid the extradition he
was facing for his criminal activities.
Thus, a typical CIA operation was uncovered. If
this had not happened, the United States would have
lever admuittediity (hevl975PU,5) Senate Report;
which investigated the CIA plots to assassinate for-
eign political leaders, noted that in early April 1962,
William Harvey testified that he was acting on “ex-
plicit orders” from Richard Helms, the new deputy
director of the CIA, when he requested Colonel
Sheffield Edwards, the Agency’s Director of Secu-
rity to make contact with Rosselli. Through his sub-
ordinate, James O’Connell, Rosselli, the Mafia boss,
was introduced, who gave an explanation about the
possibilities of taking out a contract to kill Fidel
Castro using his Cuban collaborators.
(hes report states; Harvey. toe Suppor. Chiet
[O’Connell] and Rosselli met for a second time in
New York on April 8-9, 1962,” and it continues re-
vealing that “a notation made during this time in
the archives of the Technical Services Division [of
25
THRESHO
IN THE eee LD OF NUCLEAR
eeeWAR
LE ee ee
the CIA] indicates that four poison pills were given to the
Support Chief on April 18, 1962.”°
Days later, on the 21st of that same month, Harvey
and Rosselli met in Miami. Harvey knew that Rosselli
had contacted the same Cuban that had partici-
pated in the previous operation, on the eve of Bay
of Pigs.
Harvey “gave the pills to Rosselli,” the report con-
tinues, “explaining that ‘these would work anywhere,
at any time with anything’. . . Rosselli testified
that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended to
use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara, as well as
Fidel and Ratil Castro. According to Rosselli’s testi-
mony, Harvey approved of the targets, stating, ‘ev-
erything they want to do is all right... .”°
William Harvey was not just an ordinary employee
or the “bad boy” of the CIA. He was in charge of the
Task Force W, code name for the anti-Cuban task
force. He had been appointed in January of 1961 to
lead the ZR/RIFLE program, which, as the U.S.
Senate discovered for themselves, aimed at assas-
sinating the foreign leaders who U.S. policy deemed
unsatisfactory.
For more than thirty-five years, the CIA has or-
ganized and stimulated projects to assassinate Fidel
Castro as a basic premise for defeating the Cuban
Revolution. To get an idea of the dimensions of this
criminal endeavor, suffice it to refer to the more
than six hundred investigations of assassination
plots against the revolutionary leader, carried out by
the Cuban security bodies during the cited period.
5. Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Senado, “Su-

puestas conspiraciones de asesinatos contra dirigentes de otros
paises” (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders),
94 Congreso, lra. sesion, Inf. No. 94-465 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1975), F.15. (Due to the consulted
source is in Spanish, it was necessary to translate it back to
English language. Ed.)
6. Ibid.
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CuBAN REFLECTIONS
Psychological warfare has been and still is one of

the essential weapons that the United States has
used to defeat the Cuban Government. Within the
Operation Mongoose, this activity acquired state di-
mensions. The idea of that purpose was offered by
the director of the United States Information Agency
(USIA), who affirmed during the 50’s that the simple
introduction of doubt in the minds of the people is in
itself a great success.
An idea of the dimensions of this aggression is
offered in the released Mongoose documents. Among
many other objectives, the following are outlined.
They include:
Creating a pathetic climate and motivating forces
to “free” Cuba; showing concern for Cuban refugees,
especially orphaned children; showing failure of the
Cuban Government to fulfill promises made by the
26 of July Movement; depicting intolerable conditions
in Cuba; and publishing that the ordinary citizens
and not only the wealthy have fled from the country.
The document also stated that all the mass me-
dia should be used in order to employ all spiritual
means; to retake the ideology of Marti, making use
of his memory to emphasize the distance between it
and the communists; and to popularize songs through
commercials dealing with these slogans. They noted
that Mrs. Kennedy would be especially efficient in
making visits to refugee children, as suggested by
the impact caused by the recent visits of the Presi-
dents of Venezuela and Colombia to refugee camps;
and called for the dissemination throughout the conti-
nent of documentaries, chronicles, cartoons, etc., all
degrading the Cuban regime.’
7. U.S. Department of State, “Program Review by the Chief of

Operations, Operation Mongoose (Landsdale). Washington,
January 18. The Cuba Project,” in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1997), 710-711.
27
IN THE THRESHO LD OFNUCLEAR WAR
e
NGI ee e
This was the war that the United States launched

against Cuba in 1962. It can be imagined how much
blood, tears, casualties and economic damage Cuba has
suffered for the right to defend its sovereignty and the
right to choose its social system of preference.
What right does a country have to launch a war
of this nature against another nation, only because
it does not accept its policy? It is therefore obvious,
that Mongoose did not spring from “social” conver-
sations as many politicians and specialists in the
United States have tried to make us believe in the last
few years. For all these reasons, we consider that
we cannot analyze the 1962 October Missile Crisis
without bearing in mind that by then the United States
had declared an open war against the government
and the people of Cuba, while Cuba prepared itself
from May of that same year to face a military aggres-
sion by its powerful neighbor. That is also part of the
historical truth.
Mongoose was defeated, as was acknowledged
by its principle leaders. In his book Robert Kennedy
and His Times, Arthur Schlesinger recalled:
In October of 1962, Robert Kennedy pointed out
that, almost a year after Mongoose “there had been
no acts of sabotage and even the one which had
been attempted had failed twice.” The CIA com-
plained during that same year “Policy makers not
only shied away from the military intervention as-
pect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage
proposals.”®
However, this affirmation does not correspond to
the subversive actions, which the CIA indeed imple-
mented during that period and has validity only in re-
lation to the fact that Mongoose did suffer numerous
setbacks.
8. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (New

York: Ballantine, 1978).
28
THe 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CuBAN REFLECTIONS
Precisely during the October Crisis, the CIA was

carrying out one of its most important sabotage ac-
tions planned within the Mongoose project.
On the 20th of that month, one of the heads of
the Special Mission Groups, Miguel A. Orozco Crespo,
accompanied by a group of agents, was able to infil-
trate into the northern coast of Pinar del Rio with
the objective of destroying the facilities of the cop-
per mines in that territory. Several days later, after
this action failed, the Cuban forces arrested Orozco
Crespo and he exposed the operation which, accord-
ing to the Langley experts, was to have lead to the
final solution of the Cuban case.
It was a provocation of enormous magnitude whose
aim was to occupy a cay located to the north of the
province of Camagtiey in the east of Cuba, while at
the same time mercenary troops, dressed in the uni-
forms of the Cuban army, would attack Puerto Cabezas
in Nicaragua, an area from which a year before, the
invasion towards Bay of Pigs had departed.
The idea was to provoke an inter-American con-
flict where Cuba would appear as the invading coun-
try, which would serve as a pretext for the United
States to openly intervene in order to aid the new
provisional government established in the Cuban cays.
Thus the military invasion of Cuba would have
its justification. The revelation of these plans was
a decisive blow for Mongoose and together with the
results of the Missile Crisis, help to the United
States ceased this operation during the first months
of 1963, only to be substituted by another political
strategy, which, in other forms, continued then, as
it still does today, aiming for the destruction of the
Cuban Revolution.
The United States also resorted to measures to
strangle Cuba economically and force its people
to surrender by starvation through an economic and fi-
nancial blockade. In February 1962, President Kennedy
29
OF NUCLEAR WAR
ES D es
IN THE THRESHOL
DINED
signed the trade embargo against Cuba bill into law.

In addition, the U.S. administration pressured its
allies into doing the same, to the extent of banning
the purchase of goods from third countries, which
might contain any Cuban raw material.
Early that year, the United States managed to have
the 8th Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Or-
ganization of American States expel Cuba from that
regional body. Economic blackmail and political pres-
sure, through the Alliance for Progress, were weap-
ons it used strongly to isolate Cuba diplomatically
from the rest of the Latin American countries.
In sum, the U.S. strategy was based on the cre-
ation of a climate of chaos and domestic instabil-
ity, which would foster a social upheaval to over-
throw the Cuban Revolutionary Government. Amid
this situation, a U.S. military intervention would
take place under the cover of the OAS.
All the above was compounded by the U.S. mili-
tary buildup in the Caribbean area. In 1962, the
Atlantic Fleet was reinforced and air and naval land-
ing maneuvers and training increased in the re-
gion, mainly in places like Vieques Island, in Puerto
Rico, which bore a strong resemblance to Cuba.
Thus that year elapsed, and those were the ante-
cedents of the well-known crisis, which set the
world at the brink of a nuclear holocaust. To ana-
lyze that event without bearing them in mind, thus
minimizing them and making them look unimpor-
tant, would be an unpardonable error.
For these reasons, we sustain the thesis that with
missiles or without them, Cuba would have been
attacked in October of 1962, as has been demon-
strated by the U.S. Government in the released docu-
ments and undoubtedly, a crisis in the Caribbean
would have broken out, without the dimensions that
actually took place, but with all the drama of a people
willing to die in defense of their social conquests.
30
DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
Amid the sharpened contradictions that character-

ized U.S.-Cuba relations in the spring of 1962, the
Soviet leadership proposed to the top Cuban politi-
cal authorities the deployment in the country of
nuclear arms capable of deterring the U.S. admin-
istration from launching a direct military aggres-
sion against Cuba to overthrow the Revolution.
On May 29, 1962, a Soviet delegation, headed by
Sharaf Rashidov, alternate member of the Presi-
dium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union
Communist Party, arrived in Havana. The delegation
also comprised several generals, headed by Marshall
Sergei Biryuzov, Chief of the USSR Strategic Mis-
sile Troops, who had been mandated to bring the
proposal before the Cuban leadership. It also included
Aleksandr Alekseev, who shortly after was appointed
ambassador in Cuba.
The Soviet delegation met first with Commander
Raul Castro and later with Commander in Chief Fidel
Castro. Recalling this initial conversation, Fidel ex-
plained that Marshall Biryuzov did not begin by dis-
cussing the missiles.
He began by talking about the international
situation, the situation of Cuba, the risks fac-
ing Cuba and at one point he asked me what
would be required to prevent a U.S. invasion.
That was the question he asked me—and I
immediately answered him. I told him: Well,
if the United States knows that an invasion of
31
R WAR
IN THE
MU sO OF NUCLEA
SN SEs OLD
0) THRESH eS
Cuba would mean a war with the Soviet Union,

that would be, in my opinion, the best way to
prevent an invasion of Cuba. That was my an-
swer.
0/5 [ely ey oe 8 el ee
ae Gog ame hler ie a ome Vet re memreletee Maes (ome) msmne”
Since the man already had his ideas ready, he

said: “But, specifically how? We have to per-
form concrete acts to indicate this.”
He already had the mission to propose the in-
stallation of strategic missiles, and perhaps he
was even afraid that we might refuse. . . . But
we did not have any doubts. . . . we thought
that it was something beneficial to the con-
solidation of the defensive power of the entire
Socialist bloc. . . . We did not want to concen-
trate on our problems.®
Then the Commander in Chief asked what kind of
missiles would be deployed and how many, and re-
quested some time to discuss the issue with the
Secretariat of the National Leadership of the Inte-
grated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI).'° Fidel
went on to explain:
. . . [we] met to analyze this problem and make a
decision. And how was it presented: That in our
opinion it would strengthen the Socialist bloc.
If we held the belief that the Socialist bloc should
be willing to go to war for the sake of any other
socialist country, we did not have any right to —
9. See Testimony: Fidel Castro’s words on January 11, 1992 during

the Tripartite Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, held on
January 9-12, 1992, in pages 275-276.
10. The Secretariat of the ORI was made up at that time by: Fidel
Castro Ruz (First Secretary); Raul Castro Ruz (Second Secretary);
Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, Osvaldo Dortic6s Torrado, Emilio
Aragonés Navarro and Blas Roca Calderio (members).
32
THE 1962 MissILe Crisis. SoME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
consider something that could represent a dan-

ger to us.’
During that meeting, the Cuban leadership exam-
ined the issues related with propaganda and the
actual danger of any crisis that might ensue. But
without any hesitation and honestly considered in
the light of a genuine internationalist spirit, all of
its members agreed to give an immediate affirma-
tive answer.'?
Later on, Cuban leadership did not overlook the fact
that that measure would also contribute to the de-
fense of the country, since it was a strong deter-
rent that the U.S. administration would have to
consider before undertaking any military action
against Cuba.
Neither the negative political influence that de-
cision might exert on Latin America was ignored,
since “. . . the presence of the missiles, in fact,
would turn us into a Soviet military base and that
would have a high political cost for our country’s
image, which we valued so highly.”’®
Fidel went on explaining:
Of course, it was not essential to bring the
missiles here to defend Cuba because we could
have made a military pact with the USSR say-
ing that an attack on Cuba would be equiva-
lent to an attack on the USSR. The United
States has a lot of these pacts throughout the
world, and they are respected, because the word
of nations is respected for the risk involved in
violating the treaties. . .
. we could have had a military agreement
and we could have been able to achieve the
aim of the defense of Cuba without the presence
11. See Testimony, (id. note 9), page 276.
12.:1d:
13. Ibid., page 277.
IN THEtS THRESHOL NUCLEAR WAR
D OFoe
UN OES Se ee
of the missiles. I am absolutely convinced of

this. This is one of the things that reaffirms
the conviction we had at that time and that we
have kept until now. . . .”
In its affirmative answer to the Soviet proposal, the
Cuban leadership posed the need for a military
agreement that would be made public, since this
was not in violation of any international agreement.
From the very first moment, the Cuban leadership
also realized that covert and secret deployment of
the missiles in Cuba would be very difficult. Raul
Castro Ruz, Minister of the Armed Forces; ex-
plained that when Marshall Biryuzov visited Cuba,
they went on a strategic survey of the whole country
and he learned certain details of the operation
the Soviets were planning. In this connection, he
said:
. . . | had already asked him for information,
for we had a little experience: surveillance of
enemy agents and the few things we had re-
ceived in the country, and how many times,
through the work of counterintelligence and
security, we immediately knew they were
sending out information, although it is diffi-
cult for a ship to arrive at any port without an
agent seeing it. So I found out that the mis-
siles were 20 meters long. Once I learned how
many people were coming, I told Fidel. .. .'
The Minister of the FAR Commander Raul Castro
Ruz, traveled to Moscow between July 2 and 16 to
discuss the essential aspects of the operation and
14. Ibid., page 286-287.

15. Proceedings of the meeting of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Cuba held on January 25, 1968. October
Crisis Collection. Archives of the Institute of Cuban History.
34
THE 1962.MissiLe Crisis. Some CUBAN REFLECTIONS
the military agreement, and there he met with

Khrushchev and Marshals Malinovsky and Biryuzov.
The Minister of the FAR had been instructed by
Fidel to ask Khrushchev, during the talks, what would
happen if the operation were uncovered during its
implementation. Fidel had already realized the diffi-
culty implicit in trying to cover up such a large troop
movement, and, from experience, he knew that all
military operations have a critical moment, and, in
this case, the most dangerous period was the lapse
between the enforcement of the agreement and the
deployment of the weapons.'® Moreover, he was al-
ways in favor of making the military agreement pub-
lic, since there was nothing illegal in it. He was of
the view, however, that the Soviets were the ones
called upon to make the final decision, since he con-
sidered them to be more experienced in international
and military affairs and were more familiar with the
existing balance of forces then.
Khrushchev answered that there was no cause for
concern; if the operation were uncovered, they
would send the Baltic Fleet to Cuba. How was this
answer interpreted? On this Fidel commented:
. . we did not think that it was the Baltic Fleet
that would solve the problem. What we were
thinking about was Soviet will and determi-
nation, about Soviet strength. And we got the
statement of the top leader of the Soviet Union
that there was nothing to worry about... . So
what was really protecting us was the global . . .
might of, the USSR: tne}
16. See Testimony (id. note 9), pages 267-316.

17. Fidel Castro’s participation during the Tripartite Conference
on the Cuban Missile Crisis, held on January 9-12, 1992, in
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse,
35
As a result of these talks, the Defense Minister of

the USSR and the Minister of the FAR initialed a
draft military agreement, which would later be re-
viewed by the two parties, to be signed and pub-
lished on the occasion of Khrushchev’s visit to Cuba
in November of that year. On the basis of the ini-
tialed agreement, the Soviet Union transferred to
Cuba, between August and October, most of the
strategic weapons that had been agreed upon and
the forces and equipment to protect them.
Of course, for the deployment of such a large
contingent of weapons and troops, initially esti-
mated at some 51,900 men!'® on Cuban territory,
the Soviets required Cuba’s support. .
On July 12, the operational group of the Soviet
Task Force (ATS) arrived in Havana, under the com-
mand of Army General Issa A. Pliyev. The next day,
the Commander in Chief welcomed them and of-
fered them all the cooperation needed for the suc-
cess of their mission.
Reconnaissance work for the location and de-
ployment of the Soviet units began immediately.'%
Cuban officers participated in these activities, serv-
ing as guides and helping them solve problems.”° A
by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 84.
18. Army General Anatoli I. Gribkov, interview by the author,
Havana, December 1992. October Crisis Collection. Archives of
the Institute of Cuban History.
19. Major General (ret.) Leonid S. Garbuz—Deputy Chief of the
ATS for Combat Preparation and directly in charge of the missile
troops. He is now retired and is Chief of the Cuba Group of the
Soviet Committee of War Veterans and Labor—interview by
the author, Havana, December 1989 and Moscow, May 1990.
20. Vice-Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado—Deputy Minister
of the FAR—and comrades Pedro E. Oropeza del Portal and Franco
Lemus, interview by the autor, Havana, 1990.
36
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. SomE CUBAN REFLECTIONS
group of Cuban speleologists was also involved;?!

they located throughout the country the caves with
the essential conditions needed to be used as am-
munition and weapons depots and for the protec-
tion of the personnel.
In certain selected places it became necessary to
move the local farmers and give them new lands
and housing. Despite the inconveniences that this
might have generated, thanks to the political work
carried out by the National Institute of the Agrarian
Reform (INRA) and the National Association of Small
Farmers (ANAP), the affected families shows a spirit
of cooperation and understanding, and never refused
to comply with the request of the Revolution.
The units of the Soviet Task Force (ATS) arrived
early in August by various ports: Santiago de Cuba,
Nuevitas, Casilda, Havana, Bahia Honda, Cabanas
and Mariel. Once on land, the units were concen-
trated, and during the night they departed in cara-
vans of thirty to forty trucks. To ensure the transfer,
Soviet and Cuban engineering units had to repair or
build roads and prepare fording sites so as to avoid
the use of certain bridges that could not take the
weight.”
For the landing tasks, the Cuban command se-
lected dockworkers organized into FAR and Minis-
try of the Interior detachments to protect the ports
and escort the caravans. They also appointed officers
to serve as guides and coordinate the necessary
tasks. The Dock Workers Trade Union also selected
experienced stevedores who would be in charge of help-
ing handle the cargo.
21. The participation of speleologists is now being investigated

to determine who these comrades were and to be able to increase
the information.
22. Colonel (ret.) Alexander Kovalenko—Chief of the R-14 [NATO
designation SS-5] regiment and later of a similar R-12 unit—
interview by the author, Havana, May 1990.
37
The R-12 [NATO designation SS-4] missiles ar-

rived in Cuba in late September by three ports: Bahia
Honda, Mariel and Casilda. According to the above-
mentioned testimonies, the liquid fuel for the mis-
siles was unloaded at the port of Bahia Honda in
the western region, while the rest of the equipment
and their components came into the country through
Mariel. Transfers to the deployment sites was done
by night, avoiding cities and towns as much as pos-
sible. It was impossible, however, to circumvent cer-
tain urban areas, where it became necessary to
pull down light and telephone posts and to elimi-
nate other obstacles to ensure access. The cara-
vans were organized into columns of vehicles car-
rying five to six missiles, accompanied by a protection
detachinent.->
The perimeter of the area occupied by each group
was surrounded by barbed wire fences. Security in
these areas was in charge of the Soviets, who built
sentry facilities at a given distance and control points
at the entrance. The fences were built far enough
away from the launching positions to prevent direct
fire from infantry weapons from affecting the mis-
siles.** The outer rings of these facilities were zeal-
ously protected by Cuban troops.
The engineering works and ground preparation
in the areas selected for the deployment of missile
units and other troops required mobilizing also
heavy equipment from the Ministry of Public Works.
In early August, A. Alekseev arrived in Havana
as the new Soviet ambassador. Alekseev brought
23. Lieutenant Colonel Kovalenko commanded an R-14 regiment

until October 20, when he replaced Bandilovski.
24. Colonels (ret.) A. M. Burlov and J. N. Schishenko—main
engineer of the R-12 missile regiment and head of the special
brigade for the preparation of missile warheads, respectively—
interview by the author, Havana, December 1989.
38
THe 1962 MissILe Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
with him the proposed text for the military agree-

ment. Commander in Chief Fidel Castro made the
necessary amendments and drafted a new intro-
duction substantiating the political objectives, in
compliance with the standards of international law,
on which the agreement was based. On this sub-
ject, Fidel said:
. . when I received the initial[ed] document,
I found that there were gaps and loopholes in
the treatment of the political context. In my
opinion, the question was essentially politi-
cal: the decision was political, the will had to
be political. . . . This agreement has to be clear,
Drecise.- and "COMmcretc. =). i
The first thing that Fidel amended was the title of the
document. Three variants were proposed, of which
the second was the one that best reflected the very
essence of the military treaty: “Draft Protocol on
Soviet-Cuban Mutual Defense and Military Coop-
eration Agreement.” Since the objective was not
just “the defense of the territory of Cuba” but also
“military cooperation” and “mutual defense” by the
countries, so that the solidarity spirit be reflected.”
Pursuant to article 10 of the agreement, the Soviet
Task Force (ATS) would be directly under the command
of the Soviet Government and would cooperate with
the FAR in defending Cuba in the event of a foreign
aggression. Moreover, the Soviet Government would
25. Fidel Castro's participation during the Tripartite Conference

26. See Document: Draft Protocol on Soviet-Cuban Mutual
Defense and Military Cooperation Agreement, August 1962, pages
91-96. The original Spanish version of this document is in the
Archives of the Office of Historical Affairs of the Council of State.
39
IN THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEARee
DN WAR
defray the expenses incurred by its troops and of

all the support needed by the military contingent.
The Cuban State, for its part, would help in the de-
ployment of those forces, providing the necessary
facilities to select the sites where the various troops
would be stationed.?’
The document also provided that, juridically, the
armed forces of the Soviet Union would undertake
to respect the sovereignty and the legislation of
Cuba; therefore, they acquired no right of occupa-
tion over the territories, nor others not connected
with their functions. The agreement also provided
for a validity of five years, even though either party
being empowered to terminate it by notification a
year in advance. It also established that, after the
withdrawal of the troops, all the facilities that had
been built would revert to the Cuban Government.”®
The text did not mention the type of weapons
that would be deployed in Cuba; its contents did
not reveal any military secret and no one could
object its legality and morality.
Fidel stated:
. . no one should forget for one second that
we are not outlaws, we are not violating any
moral principle. We are acting within the princi-
ples of international law—within moral prin-
ciples—and we have an absolute right to do what
we are doing.’°
2 falbide
28. Ibid.
40
SECRECY OF THE OPERATION
The transportation and deployment of most of the

Soviet forces in Cuba took place between August and
mid-October 1962. Despite the camouflage steps
taken to ensure secrecy and to misinform the en-
emy, U.S. intelligence services began to receive some
reports.
The first data received by U.S. special services
on the Soviet military deployment in Cuba are be-
lieved to have come from the SAMO Cosmic System
and also from West German intelligence, which
reported to them on the movement in the Baltic
Sea of Soviet ships carrying war cargo destined for
Cuba. Another source of information was the cor-
respondence between Cuban émigrés in the United
States and their relatives in Cuba. The latter con-
veyed rumors or attested to having seen long cara-
vans of military trucks moving along various roads
during the night; large vehicles carrying tarpau-
lin-covered missiles; different works done in those
roads to ensure the movement of the caravans, as
well as the transfer of the rural population in some
areas to other locations. The Cubans who, at that
time, left the country—legally or illegally—for the
United States, were questioned at a CIA reception
center in Opalocka, Florida.
This type of data got to U.S. public opinion and the
press. The rumors unleashed a loud campaign against
Cuba and the Soviet Union, which U.S. political circles
manipulated to serve their interests, increasingly
so in the statements of senior government officials,
41
congressmen, party leaders and heads of counterrevo-

lutionary groups established in the United States.
Propaganda on the deployment of Soviet troops in
Cuba gradually became more bellicose. The most reac-
tionary politicians demanded from the administration
of their countries immediate actions against Cuba.
In mid-August, the Secretariat of the National Di-
rectorate of the ORI analyzed the prevailing situation
and noted that the propaganda campaign orchestrated
in the United States was an unambiguous sign of a
serious crisis in the making and, in view of that real-
ity, it considered it was necessary to take the initia-
tive and publish the military agreement concluded with
the Soviet Union, given the sovereign right of the two
nations to enter into such an agreement.
As a result of this analysis, Commander Ernesto
“Che” Guevara and Captain Emilio Aragones Navarro
were instructed to take the text of the military agree-
ment to Moscow and convey this view to Khrushchev
personally, with the recommendation by the Party
Secretariat that the final decision on the issue should
be made by the Soviets, trusting in their experience
in problems of that nature.
Guevara and Aragonés were received by the Soviet
leadership. According to Aragonés’ testimony, during
the exchange of views, Khrushchev agreed with the
amendments introduced by Fidel to the military
agreement protocol. However, he considered that it
was not yet the time to make it public and recom-
mended to the Cubans to keep calm, for, he thought,
it would be one thing for the Americans to hear ru-
mors on the existence of missiles and quite another
to have a confirmation. Khrushchev added that when
the United States found out, they would have no other
option than to live with the situation.*°
30. Emilio Aragonés Navarro, interview by the author, January

V7 1989:
THE 1962 MissILe Crisis. Some CUBAN REFLECTIONS
The Soviet leader also considered that the an-

nouncement of the agreement at that moment would
be an obstacle for Kennedy’s political activities, at a
time when they were campaigning for mid-term elec-
tions in the United States. Another element that may
have influenced Khrushchev was the fact that the
main equipment for the missile division had not yet
arrived in Cuba and he may have considered it more
convenient to make the announcement once the mis-
siles had already been deployed so as to present it as
a fait accompli.
During the talks, Khrushchev once agai referred
to sending the Baltic Fleet to Cuba if everything was
uncovered, to neutralize any action on the part of the
United States. These conversations resulted only in
the inclusion of a paragraph in a joint communique,
signed on September 2, at the end of the visit.
The Cuban-Soviet Joint Communiqué stated:
. an exchange of views on the threats by
aggressive imperialist circles against Cuba. In
light of these threats, the Government of the
Republic of Cuba called upon the Government
of the Soviet Union requesting assistance in
the form of weapons and the relevant technical
experts to train the Cuban military personnel.
The Soviet Government considered this request
and an agreement was reached in this connec-
tion. While threats against Cuba by the afore-
mentioned circles continue, the Republic of Cuba
will have all the grounds to adopt measures to
guarantee its security and the defense of its
sovereignty and independence, and all the
sincere friends of Cuba will enjoy full rights to
comply with those legitimate demands.*!
31. Noticias de Hoy, September 3, 1962.
43
D OF NUCLEAR WAR
cI DD THRESHOL
IN THE NESS NSS eh ee pee
On September 4, President Kennedy revealed that

a reconnaissance flight over Cuba on August 29
had detected surface-to-air missiles and more Soviet
military personnel, and warned Moscow that he
would not allow the deployment of offensive weap-
ons in the Island.
The Revolutionary Government forestalled those
declarations and denounced their aggressive na-
ture in violation of Cuba’s sovereign rights.
On September 10, in a speech during the Third
National Congress of Municipal Education Coun-
cils, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz said,
regarding the pressures on the U.S. administra-
tion to attack the Island, that if that new mistake
was made, they would have to pay for it dearly, and
noted:
The invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces
would place imperialism outside international
law, as common violators of the rights of the
peoples, as genocidal criminals. .
We have said on other occasions that we do
not want imperialism to commit suicide at our
expense. We proclaim our wish to live in peace,
we proclaim our wish that good judgment and
the most elementary common sense prevail
in the destinies of that country. But since their
menacing words against us deserve an answer,
our answer to the threats of the United States
administration and to the hysterical demands
of its senators to attack our country is this:
We the leaders of this Revolution are ready to
die beside our people! We shall not retreat . .
we Shall not hesitate! We shall stand firm! . .
But we do not know if the United States Gov-
ernment, if the Pentagon generals, if those
ES
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. SomME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
senators who proclaim war against our coun-

try are also ready to die.*
Vis-a-vis the campaigns in the United States, the
statements of the Commander in Chief and other
leaders of the Revolution were very clear on Cuba’s
uncompromising position regarding its sovereign
right to take the necessary steps for its defense
and alerted the U.S. governors on the dangerous
consequences that a direct attack against Cuba
would entail for its own country.
On September 11, 1962, TASS News Agency dis-
seminated a statement by the Soviet Government
reaffirming its intention to lend Cuba the neces-
sary assistance in the event of an aggression and
stressed that they would use the weapons only to
defend Cuba’s sovereignty against anyone that
might attack her; it also called upon the United
States to show prudence, not to lose self-control
and to serenely assess what their actions might
lead to if a war broke out.** Paradoxically, the state-
ment affirmed:
. . . the Soviet Union does not need to transfer

to any country, Cuba, for example, the means
at its disposal to repel the aggression, to deal a
counterblow. Our own nuclear resources are
so powerful in their explosive power. . . and our
missiles are so effective for the transportation
of those nuclear warheads, that there is no need
to find a place to deploy them elsewhere, out-
side the boundaries of the Soviet Union... .”
32. Fidel Castro Ruz, “Discurso en el III] Congreso Nacional de Con-

sejos Municipales de Educacion el 10 de setiembre de 1962” (Speech
at the Third National Congress of Municipal Education Councils,
September 10, 1962), Obra Revolucionaria, no. 26 (1962), 24-25.
33. Noticias de Hoy, September 12, 1962, 2.
34. Ibid.
IN THE THRESHO OF
LD e NUCLEAR WAR
e
VINES) e
USI
It is common knowledge that the United States kept

Cuba under constant surveillance.*° On August 29,
aerial photographic surveillance with U-2 planes*®
detected antiaircraft missile sites in the western
region and this led U.S. intelligence services to pay
particular attention to that area.
During that period, President Kennedy approved
the flight of U-2 planes on September 5, 11, 26 and
29 and on October 5 and 7. Bad weather prevented
aerial photographs from revealing new elements in
some of the scanned regions.
Despite the engineering works, U.S. aerial pho-
tographic surveillance detected the missiles sites.
According to Major General Garbuz, these regiments
had carried out operational camouflage procedures
for the construction of the launching sites. How-
ever, these measures failed to prevent them from
being discovered. Meditating on this aspect, Gen-
eral Gribkov noted:
We, of course, considered the possibility of U.S.
intelligence discovering what we were doing.
And the fact was that on the 14th, when the
sites were photographed because we had not
been able to hide them. . . . were . . . white con-
crete slabs which could be very easily detected
from the air. It was very difficult to camouflage
35. Reconnaissance planes flew over each ship coming to Cuba.

U.S. Navy vessels kept constant radio and radar surveillance on
places close to Cuban shores and high-altitude flights for
photographic espionage were stepped up throughout the Cuban
territory.
36. U-2 high-altitude photography reconnaissance planes have
conical wings similar to glider’s, with an average wing span of
24 meters. Their maximum range is 4000 miles; flying altitude
14 miles and carry 1000 gallons of fuel. These machines have seven
cameras covering a strip 125 miles wide over a flight trajectory of
3000 kilometers. The photographs come in 4000 photograms.
46
THE 1962 MissILeE Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
them. Some of our comrades came to their own

conclusions. . . . They said that you could place
the missiles in such a way that they would be
indistinguishable from palm trees. But this was
a rather stupid conclusion, because one has to
prepare the entire site. One has to prepare all
of the command facilities. You've got to lay cables,
communications. You've got to create all the
foundations for the launching platforms. It’s very
complicated in general and, of course, intelli-
gence did discover what was going on because
of this. But the fact is that intelligence disco-
vered it rather late.*’
In the early morning hours of Sunday, October 14,
a U-2 flying a south-north route photographed the
western territory of the Island. The pictures were
studied thoroughly on the 15th and they revealed
the presence of an R-12 missile-launching site in
the region of San Cristobal.
Soviet denials on the deployment of missiles in
Cuba at a time when U.S. exploration had confirmed
the existence of medium-range missiles on Cuban
soil were the arguments wielded by the United
States to justify in the eyes of world public opinion
and its allies what was unjustifiable: the blockade
against Cuba in October of that year. Later it tried to
purport before the world that the major cause of
the crisis had been the Soviet missiles in Cuba,
relegating to the last position what was actually
the main issue: its aggressive policy against the
Cuban Revolution.
37. Anatoli I. Gribkov’s participation during the Tripartite

Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, held on January 9-12,
1992, in Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet
Collapse, by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 76-77.
47
LD OF NUCLEAR WAR
De
LUND SUG) THRESHOle
IN THE ee
Reflecting on this issue, Fidel Castro explained:

The secrecy put us at a political disadvantage
and practical disadvantage. It did both things.
But we should distinguish between secrecy—many
military operations have to be done in secret, the
operation itself, not the basis for an operation—
and the information that was given about it. I think
this is an important point. There was a big mistake
made here, a really big mistake. Not only the mis-
take about the secrecy, which is one thing that
harmed us, but also the information that was given
LO Kenneuyies 26.
Then Fidel analyzed how Khrushchev had, very as-
tutely, started playing at classifying weapons as of-
fensive and defensive. For Kennedy, the definition of
offensive weapons lay in their strategic nature, while
for Khrushchev, it depended on what they would be
used for. Therefore, playing this game was a serious
political error, an extremely dangerous error.
On the basis of this approach, Soviet information
convinced Kennedy that no strategic weapons would
be transferred to Cuba; and this is something more
than shrewdness, it was a deceit. Fidel said:
I think the two things.
The secrecy about the military agreement and
the deception were two facts, two facts that
did harm. Because I think a different approach
should have been adopted, and not the approach
oi deceit”
This enabled Kennedy to portray himself before
public opinion as a man deceived, one who had been
assured of this and that, while things turned out
to be different. That was an advantage he derived,
38. See Testimony (id. note 9), page 289.

48
not just from the secrecy, but also from the secrecy
plus the deceit. But when they finally discovered
the emplacement sites, the United States had an
enormous advantage, for they had the secret in their
hands, they could take the initiative; “the initiative
in the military field was put into the hands of the
United States.”*°
Differently from the Soviets, the Cuban Government
did not go for the game of classifying the weapons and
maintained a principled position on that issue.
We refused to go along with that game and, in
public statements the government made and in
the statements at the United Nations, we always
said that Cuba considered that it had a sover-
eign right to have whatever kind of weapons it
thought appropriate, and no one had any right
to establish what kind of weapons our country
could or could not have. We never went along
with denying the strategic nature of the weap-
ons. We never did! We did not agree to that
game. We did not agree with that approach.
Therefore, we never denied or confirmed the
nature of the weapons; rather, we reaffirmed
our right to have whatever type of weapons we
thought appropriate for our defense.”
That was the way the Revolutionary Government
reacted to the defamatory campaigns launched by
the United States. Cuba maintained an invariable
principled position and never manifested the least
hesitation before the pressures of all kinds that
were brought to bear. Neither did it relinquish its
sovereign right to have the kind of weapons it con-
sidered necessary to stop and confront a direct
military aggression, and it also alerted on the con-
sequences that might derive TOT Ia.
AO. Ibid., page 291.
41. Ibid., page 289-290.
SPY FLIGHTS
Military espionage constituted one of the main activ-

ities contemplated in the anti-Cuban project Opera-
tion Mongoose, since the data obtained from it was
used to pinpoint the contingency plans of the U.S.
Armed Forces destined for a military invasion of Cuba.
In the achievement of this objective, the U.S.
intelligence services used the most modern air and
naval resources at hand; and every ship en route
to Cuba was provocatively buzzed by U.S. recon-
naissance planes.
Specially equipped U.S. Navy ships carried out
SIGINT exploration of places near the Cuban coasts.
As of August 1962, the United States Government
ordered an increase in U-2 photographic reconnais-
sance flights throughout the Cuban archipelago.
The Cuban authorities publicly denounced the
increasingly frequent violations of their country’s
air space. However, at that moment the Cuban
Armed Forces did not have the antiaircraft means
capable of dissuading or downing the most modern
U.S. aircraft, which were illegally overflying the
national territory at great heights with impunity.
These circumstances were known by the Soviet
Government and its high military command.
At that time in Cuba we were all asking our-
selves how and why it was possible, that the Soviets,
who were in the middle of a military operation like
Anadyr, which they wanted to Keep secret at all
costs, did not impede the U-2’s from flying over and
photographing their strategic facilities.
50
On this issue, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro stated:

. . . because one of the questions we might
ask here is, why were the surface-to-air mis-
siles here? What were they doing here? Why
deploy surface-to-air missiles and then allow
the U-2s to fly by? I think that in this case
there was a clear political mistake. I don’t
blame the military for that. . . . But they, of
course, have very strict orders . . . they most
certainly had the order not to shoot, not to fire
on the U-2s. . . . but it is inconceivable to me
that they deployed surface-to-air missiles and
then let the planes fly. Those U-2s should not
have been allowed to fly. . . . Otherwise, why
were the antiaircraft missiles there? . . . So, in
my judgment, there were political mistakes,
there was excessive caution. On the one hand,
Khrushchev had great audacity. This is unde-
niable, and I do not deny it... .
Without a doubt, the decision to send these
forces was audacious. But alongside that au-
dacity there was hesitation. I ask, “What would
have happened if there had been no U-2s?
What would have happened if the U-2s were
shot down and there were no pictures?” If we
had had the surface-to-air missiles, you can
rest assured that the U-2s would not have got-
ten through. That is certain. The other stance
is simplv not understandable.”

51
The presence in Cuba of medium range missiles

was discovered on the 14th of October. The United
States took a week to decide what measure should
be taken to eliminate them from Cuban territory.
At the beginning of the conflict there were four
options: diplomatic negotiations, air-naval blockade,
surprise air attack and invasion.
CUBAN REPLY
In early Autumn, 1962, the military situation in the

Caribbean area was becoming more dangerous. Not
far from Cuba, important U.S. forces of all services
were concentrated, under the pretext of carrying
out various military exercises, such as UNITAS III
and SWEEP CLEAR.
PHIBRIGLEX-62 was the maneuver that employed
the largest amount of soldiers and equipment. It con-
sisted in an amphibious landing of a Marine brigade.
This landing was scheduled to take place between
October 15 and 30, with the participation of twenty
thousand Marines and forty different types of vessels.
In the meantime, in Cuba, the finishing touches
were being put on well-rehearsed mobilization plans
and troop alert. On October 10, 1962, the Minister
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) Commander
Raul Castro Ruz, had signed the Directiva Operacional
No. 1 (Operational Directive No. 1) aimed at insur-
ing the strategic deployment of the FAR in case an
imperialist aggression should occur. The directive
specified the combat missions to be carried out by
each army, and the weapons and type of armed forces
to be used to fight back the enemy’s maritime and
air landings, and counterstrikes and counterattacks
to be used in order to quickly annihilate any attack-
ing forces which might succeed in landing.*
43. Operational Directive No. 1 from the General Staff regarding

instructions in case of an attack against our country. CID-FAR
Archives. Collection UM 1081. Inventory No. 1. File No. 2, Dos-
sier No. 1.
53
The document stated clearly that the military units

would occupy the defensive positions according to two
alternatives: the first, at the signal Caribe, would be
used in the case of a surprise attack; and the sec-
ond, code-named Taino, would be employed if there
was enough time for mobilization and a planned de-
ployment of the troops.**
The Caribe alternative—surprise attack—involved
the permanent troops and the students from mili-
tary schools, organized into combat units, quickly
occupying the coasts to defend the main directions
with the mission of fighting back any naval and air
landing by the enemy, while the country mobilized
itself. It also included the concentration of counter-
landing battalions and small units in different ar-
eas to annihilate any attempted air landings. Fur-
thermore, it was foreseen that as the wartime units
were mobilized, they would take the place of the
permanent troops defending the coast, and the lat-
ter would then occupy the second echelon in the
defense or would go to areas of concentration as re-
serves?
In the October Crisis, the Taino variant was the
one implemented with an echelon combat order in
which the defense of the coast would be carried
out by the wartime divisions from positions pre-
pared in advance. The second echelon would be
occupied by the permanent and reduced divisions,
the armored brigades and the counter-landing bat-
talions with the mission of destroying any airplanes -
attempting to land troops, increasing the reinforce-
ments of the first echelon troops and carrying out
the counterattacks in the different possible naval
landing directions.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
Iz
In addition to updating all the operative documents,

the military intelligence and information services of
the FAR were always on the alert for any unusual U.S.
troop movement, which began to occur as of 16 Octo-
ber. Several infantry and armored divisions started
gathering in Florida and in Texas. On the 21st, the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo began to be reinforced
and it was learned that on the 22d all the civilian per-
sonnel from that military enclave would be evacuated.
During the morning hours of October 22, it was
announced that President Kennedy would speak at
19:00 hours to inform the U.S. population of extraor-
dinary events. Commander in Chief Fidel Castro con-
cluded that this speech was directly related to Cuba
and the presence of the Soviet missiles on the Is-
land. Given the circumstances, at 15:50 hours he
ordered the Revolutionary Armed Forces placed on
alert, and at 17:35 hours he decreed a state of com-
bat alarm for the entire nation, almost an hour and a
half before President Kennedy delivered his speech.
The head of the Revolution explained the situa-
tion to the Cuban people:
. . we had been receiving a series of news... .
strange things that were happening in Wash-
ington, concerning meetings with officials of
the Pentagon . . . with political leaders of both
Parties . . . of its Security Council, aircraft mov-
ing, ships . . . and a whole series of news. We
knew that that had to do with us. . . . We are
not going to be taken in surprise and unpre-
pared. .. . we realized that . . . an action was
imminent—we did not know, specifically what
action was going to be, or where it was going
to start that action by—, then . . . we concluded
that it was necessary to alert our force.*®
46. See Document: Appearance of the Prime Minister and

Commander in Chief Fidel Castro on the Cuban Radio and Tele-
vision Broadcasting System, October 23, 1962, in pages 115-116.
55
Due to all these previous measures and the prompt-

ness with which they were taken, within a short
time a total of fifty-four infantry divisions were
mobilized (five permanent, nine reduced and forty
wartime); as well as four brigades (one tank bri-
gade and three artillery brigades); seventeen in-
dependent battalions (ten counter-landing, one tank
and six obstacle battalions); six reactive artillery
groups (multiple missile launchers) and three in-
dependent 120 mm mortar groups; twenty naval
units of the Revolutionary Navy (MGR), one hun-
dred eighteen antiaircraft batteries (one hundred
cannons and eighteen machine-guns); and forty-
seven fighters.*’
The troop alert functioned efficiently, and the
units were mobilized and transferred to the desig-
nated combat regions as planned.
The report submitted by the Head of the EMG
Operations Directorate Captain Flavio Bravo Pardo,
explained that the permanent infantry divisions had
arrived at their concentration areas within three
hours; the counter-landing battalions reached theirs
in two hours; and the reduced divisions took from
eight to nine hours; while the wartime divisions
took longer, from twelve to thirteen hours, which
was considered in that era to be a short time. The
number of men mobilized reached 269,203; of these
personnel, 169,561 belonged to the reserves and
99,612 to the active service of the FAR according to
personnel payroll.*®
The original Spanish version of this document published in No-

ticias de Hoy, October 24, 1962, 4. ;
47. Draft Report on the Analysis of the Experiences of the Recent
Mobilization. FAR Operation Directorate. Havana, December 19,
1962. CID-FAR Archives. Collection UM 1081. Inventory No. 1.
File No 28. Dossier No. 4.
48. Ibid.
THE 1962 MissiLE Crisis. SomE CUBAN REFLECTIONS
Once these regions had been occupied, the chiefs

fine-tuned the plans for their small units. They or-
ganized observation and firing system and started
the most urgent engineering works. A combat prepa-
ration program was also employed to instruct the
mobilized personnel.
Other measures were simultaneously adopted
such as those aiming to create and deconcentrate
an important material and combat reserve, which
would enable the country to fight under total block-
ade conditions or under partial occupation of the
territory. All resources were mobilized for the de-
fense of the threatened country.
The Peoples’ Defense (DP) during the Crisis, .very
quickly developed its military and special groups.
Beginning on October 25, their members formed
combat battalions and sanitary and repair brigades,
as well as fire fighting brigades. On November 4,
the western and the central part of the Island re-
ported the creation of 260 DP battalions with 432
militiamen and women in each battalion, reaching
a total of 112,320 soldiers. As for the special groups,
the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana and Matanzas
accounted for 3038 sanitary brigades with a total
of 78,988 members.*9
In the eastern region, DP battalions were organ-
ized in the main cities as well as in Gibara, Moa
and Nicaro. Infantry companies were also organized
in important cities and at the sugar mills, totaling
almost 25,000 soldiers. During those days, 17,000
Mauser rifles with three units of fire each were
distributed in that province.
Taking into account the DP militia and the regu-
lar units of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR),
49. Documents of the Peoples’ Defense (DP) related to the

mobilization during the October Crisis. CID-FAR Archives.
Collection UM 1081. Inventory No. 1, File No. 8, Box No. 2.
57,
LD OF NUCLEAR WAR
LIN] SGD, THRESHO
IN THE SEIS BS 2
the number of armed men and women during the

Crisis reached an estimated 400,000 soldiers.
The political and military command of the nation
was established in such a way that the three opera-
tive regions, in three mountain massifs—western,
central and eastern—were led by leaders of great
authority so that each could confront the struggle
and armed resistance in an independent manner.
In accordance with this, the Commander in Chief
Fidel Castro would remain in the capital of the Re-
public to lead the country; Commander Raul Castro
Ruz, Minister of the FAR, would lead the eastern
province, at the head of the Army; Commander Juan
Almeida Bosque would lead the central provinces,
with Santa Clara being his General Staff; and Com-
mander Ernesto Guevara de la Serna would be in
charge in Pinar del Rio.
During the night of October 23, Commander in
Chief Fidel Castro appeared on television and ra-
dio to refute the accusations made the previous
day by the U.S. president. Fidel clearly stated that
he had absolutely no obligation to give an account
to the U.S. Government, affirming that the United
States had no right whatsoever to determine the
amount or type of weapons that Cuba should or
should not have. He also issued an unequivocal
warning:
. . we have taken the appropriate measures
for resisting and—listen well, listen well—, for
repelling any direct aggression. .. .
ol fe; fe) 0) of eo jonfe (ee he eé | 0 fo fey ofra§ sieien a) iene fom jel fe) cede) ce: fe tte. be s/s)
No one can come to inspect our nation, be-

cause we will never give the authorization to
anyone, we will never give up to the sovereign
prerogative that within our borders we are the
58
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CUBAN REFLECTIONS
ones who decide and we are the ones who inspect

and nobody else.®°°
Fidel also refuted one by one the arguments used
by Kennedy to establish the blockade and explained
how the OAS was used to give legal support to such
an illegal action. In the same way, he denounced
the transgressions of the accepted standards of
coexistence among nations, which had been repeat-
edly committed by the U.S. Government, as was
the case of repeated violations of Cuban territorial
waters and air space. In another part of his speech,
he referred to the fact that the Cuban authorities
had always been willing to resolve, in conditions of
equality, their differences with the United States.
At the same time, the head of the Revolution
stated that Cuba was in favor of dismantling all
military bases and having no foreign troops in the
territory of another country.
Do the United States wish disarmament? Great,
let’s go to disarm all of us. Great, let’s go to
support all a policy of dismantling of bases, of
troops, of all the ones that there are in all parts
of the world. Great. With that policy we agree.
But with the policy that we disarm ourselves
in front of aggressors we do not agree.°!
These words made perfectly clear the invariable po-
sition, which the Cuban Government maintained as
the Crisis developed, and the political, moral and
legal justice and legitimacy of the principles of sov-
ereignty, which it defended—the legal basis of which
is recognized by the United Nations Charter.
50. See Document: Appearance of the Prime Minister and

Commander in Chief Fidel Castro on the Cuban Radio and Television
Broadcasting System, October 23, 1962, in page 136.
59
During those critical moments, the Cuban people

showed their traditional patriotic fervor. Thousands
of persons of all ages enrolled in the militia and
mass organizations or went to hospitals and clinics
to voluntarily donate their blood; hundreds of thou-
sands of men, women and young people went to
the factories or the fields to take the places of the
mobilized workers and thus not affect the produc-
tion. The people prepared to face and resist the
blockade, massive air attacks and an invasion. This
attitude was reflected in the national press and in
statements made by political, mass and social or-
ganizations.
On the 23d the newspapers published:
.. . the nation has awakened on a war foot-
ing, ready to repel any attack. Every weapon
is in place, and together with each weapon a
heroic defender of the Revolution and our
Homeland. . . . Throughout the Island, the al-
ready historical and glorious cry of HOME-
LAND OR DEATH! WE SHALL OVERCOME! can
be heard like thunder, reverberating from mil-
lions of voices, with more fervor and cause
than ever*?
52. Noticias de Hoy, October 23, 1962, 1.

FACING FOE FLIGHTS
When the crisis broke out, the U.S. air-photographic

reconnaissance activities increased dangerously,
since they did not only use the U-2 planes but also
low-flying fighters. Between October 22 and Decem-
ber 1, 1962, Cuban radars detected 386 of these flight
missions.
When the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) was
strategically deployed to defend the country, the
Cuban military command and especially Commander
in Chief Fidel Castro paid special attention to the
measures to protect the troops and the population
against possible enemy air attacks.
Each antiaircraft battery was deployed in a stra-
tegic area for the defense of military and civilian
objectives. An antiaircraft reserve was also created,
conveniently concentrated to maneuver quickly to-
wards any threatened site. Antiaircraft ambushes
were also studied and prepared in regions where
low-level enemy flights occurred.
It is known today that the most discussed measure
and the one that was most supported within ExComm
was a “surgical” air strike against the missile sites
and other military locations. However it was not se-
lected as the initial response because the U.S. military
chiefs predicted only a 90% chance of exterminat-
ing the missiles, and thus the option of the blockade
prevailed, but without excluding the possibility of
using an air attack at a later date. The latter can be
attested to by the fact that 579 fighters were pre-
pared for that attack.
61
OLD OF NUCLEAR WAR
S
INN soyTHRESH
IN THE ENS
rs
On the morning of October 24, at the Headquarte
of the Revolutionary Arme d Force s, a meeti ng, pre-
sided over by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz
and the Head of the General Staff Commander
Sergio del Valle Jimenez, was held in which the
heads of the directorates of the General Staff and
the biggest western units of the country also par-
ticipated.
The objective was to analyze the state of the mili-
tary measures implemented for a general mobiliza-
tion of the country and the strategic deployment of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces. One of the main
aspects emphasized was the protection of the coun-
try against any air attack and the air defense activi-
tics.
The head of the Information Directorate Captain
Manuel de Jestis Quinones, explained the essen-
tial elements upon which he based his appraisal
that an air attack would be the most probable action
to be implemented by the United States, without
disregarding the possibility of an invasion of the coun-
tLVas
The head of the Air Defense and the Air Force

(DAAFAR) Captain Raul Curbelo Morales, suggested
that according to the calculations made, there was
enough ammunition and fuel for the aircraft for
four daily missions over a period of twenty days,
and he referred to the need for increasing maneu-
verability of the antiaircraft units.
The Commander in Chief indicated that the reserve —
antiaircraft batteries which were in Havana should
be available for maneuvers whenever necessary; and
53. File concerning the combat alert of October 22, 1962.

Documents from the October 24 meeting. CID-FAR Archives.
Collection UM 1081, Dossier No. 1, Inventory No. 1, File No. 1.
54. Ibid.
62
Tue 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CuBaN REFLECTIONS
———————
that for this purpose at least twenty-four of these

batteries should be concentrated in three differ-
ent places outside the city in such a way that they
could be readily moved to any place.
During the meeting it was reported that on the
previous day several enemy planes had encroached
on national territory. Those aircraft were flying at
one hundred meters high, and once they reached
the coast, they ascended to three thousand meters.
On this aspect Fidel Castro stated that we could
not allow those planes to fly with impunity; and so
he gave instructions to study the places where it
was necessary to strengthen the anti-air defense
and shoot down the planes when they carried out
low flights. Fidel said:
. . we do not have any political reason, of any
kind, any at all, which could hamper us from
downing a plane flying over us at three hun-
dred feet. Perhaps over the sea, at some three
miles away . . . but any plane flying here, we
will down it, but falling down in our territory.
At the end of the meeting, the head of the Revolu-
tion urged the different chiefs to take advantage of
the opportunity of having the troops mobilized and
to work to find and correct any weak points in the
defense without wasting a minute, since every pre-
caution taken is time gained. He also gave instruc-
tions on antiaircraft measures.
In the afternoon, the Commander in Chief vis-
ited a Soviet surface-to-air missile group northeast
of the capital. There he observed the vulnerability of
these units to an attack by low-flying planes® since
55. Ibid.
56. Though ATS had twenty-four antiaircraft missile groups, they
did not have the capability of destroying air targets at altitudes
less than 1000 meters.
63
D OF NUCLEAR WAR
IN THE
UINEUY S1B)THRESHOL
UND he ee he
they had only a single two cannon antiaircraft ma-

chine gun (ZPU-2, 14.5 mm). To this effect, he im-
mediately ordered fifty antiaircraft batteries from
the reserve to be moved into position to protect those
groups and the medium range missile facilities.
From the very beginning, the Cuban leadership
understood the danger implied by allowing the low
flights. The increase of those activities was such
that it became necessary to take quick and effective
measures to put an end to those provocative ac-
tions, since the possibility of a surprise air attack
was increasing. For example, eleven flights took
place between October 22 and 24, but on the 25th
fifteen flights have done.
This is confirmed by a commentary made by
Theodore C. Sorensen, one of Kennedy’s advisers and
member of ExComm, on the results that the U.S.
command expected to achieve with such actions.
.. . these flights would not only provide better
air reconnaissance but also and at the same
time, a means to harass the Russians and hu-
miliate Castro. . . . Routine air vigilance of the
Island could also facilitate at the right moment
the launching of a surprise attack. . . .°’
On the morning of the 26th, the Commander in
Chief made the decision to stop these flights and
ordered the troops as of the 27th to open fire against
any low-flying enemy airplane. In this respect, he
drafted the following communiqué:
Cuba does not accept the vandal-like and pirate-
like privilege of any military plane to violate its
air space because this essentially affects our
57. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, el hombre, el presidente (Bar-

celona: Ediciones Grijalbo S.A., 1966), 1054. (Due to the consulted
source was in Spanish, it was necessary to translate back to
English language. Ed.)
oe
security and facilitates conditions for an attack

on our territory.
Such a legitimate right to defense is irrevocable
and therefore, any fighter invading Cuban air
space, will do so at the risk facing our defensive
Hires
Soviet Army General [Issa] Pliyev was immediately
informed that Fidel wanted to meet with him. The
purpose of that meeting was to inform him of the
decision made by the Cuban leadership to shoot
down the low-flying airplanes. According to the tes-
timony of General Leonid Stepanovich Garbuz, dur-
ing the morning of that same day, General Igor
Demyanovich Statsenko, Head of the Missile Divi-
sion, had proposed to increase the firing capability
of the anti-air defense by using 100 mm cannon
groups from the Soviet Task Force (ATS) in response
to the repeated violations of the Cuban air space.”°
The meeting was held at the ATS headquarters
during the afternoon and into the night, with the
participation of the members of the Military Coun-
cil of the Group. The leader of the Revolution, after
explaining the reason for the decision made by
Cuba, also took this opportunity to persuade the
Soviet chief of the need to incorporate radars from
the anti-air missile groups into the combat guard
in order to detect enemy incursions in time.
Furthermore, Fidel insistently suggested that all
the missiles not be kept in a single place, as a basic
precautionary measure, and stated:
. . . please don’t keep all these missiles in the
same sites. Deploy then in relatively distant
58. Noticias de Hoy, October 28, 1962, 1.

59. Major General (retired) Leonid S. Garbuz, interview by the
author, Havana, December 7, 1989.
65
pI
eee
sites, and preserve them from surprise air at-

tacks, so that in the event of a surprise air
attack, not all the missiles will be destroyed.
. a surprise attack is not successful if at
least on-third of the missiles survive.
In that meeting Fidel said that the Head of the ATS
asked for a report from the different unit chiefs,
and part of that report states:
“Motorized mechanized units in combat readi-
ness, the air force regiment in combat readiness,
antiaircraft units ready, naval units ready, mis-
sile units ready.” That is exactly what he said:
“Missile units ready for combat.” Then, each com-
mander stood up and reported on their units.°!
Both the Cuban and the Soviet Command reached
the conclusion that it was probable that the United
States would carry out an air attack between Octo-
ber 2i7eand 29:
During the early hours of the 27th, when the U.S.
aircraft encroached on Cuban air space, the Cuban
batteries opened fire against them. None of the
planes was downed, although some were hit. Fidel
explained:
We could say that the war started in Cuba on
October the 27th in the morning. Of course,
those fast-flying jet planes, as soon as they
heard the first shots, went higher to evade
our artillery. . . . we couldn’t shoot down any of
the low-flying planes. But we demonstrated our
resistance:©
60. Fidel Castro's participation during the Tripartite Conference

618 Ibidzsi Ils
62. Ibid., 107.
THE 1962 MissILeE Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
On that same day, there was a U-2 flight as usual,

and the Soviet military in a basic spirit of solidar-
ity, decided to shoot it down at the same time that
fire was opened against the enemy.
The will and the decision to stop the low-level
flights bore upon the U.S. command so that on the
successive days, the number of such flights dimin-
ished. However, the order to shoot down the planes
was temporarily rescinded at the request of the
Soviet leadership when negotiations with the United
States started on the 28th.
In this regard, the head of the Cuban Revolution
communicated to Khrushchev, in a message also
written on the 28th, that he agreed that an inci-
dent which could cause great damage to the nego-
tiations should be avoided at this precise moment,
and that he would instruct the Cuban batteries
not to shoot, but only during the process of the
negotiations and without revoking the published
declaration about the decision to defend Cuban air
space. This attitude showed Cuba’s willingness to
not obstruct the steps taken by the Soviets in spite
of its disagreement with the bases on which they
were arranged.°°
During the talks with the Acting Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, held in Havana on Octo-
ber 30 and 31, 1962, Cuba warned of the danger of
violating the Cuban air space, stressing the fact that
it was essential to stop these violations. U Thant
stated his personal views on the events that were
unfolding:
My colleagues and I have the opinion, and thus
I reported the United States that the blockade
63. See Document: Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to

Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, October 28, 1962, pages 180-181.
The original Spanish version was published in Granma daily,
November 23, 1990.
67
was illegal, that no State can tolerate a block-

ade, not only military, not even economic... .
I also told them that air reconnaissance that
was being undertaken over Cuba was illegal
and inadmissible. These three things, economic
blockade, military blockade and air reconnais-
sance was illegal... .®
The United States persistently continued to carry
out low-level flights, which increased in an excep-
tional manner. Suffice to say that after the R-12
missiles were withdrawn from the country, between
November 4 and 8, one hundred and twenty four
such missions were carried out including thirty-
six on one day—November 8.
The aim of those actions was to provoke and try
to humiliate and weaken the morale of the Cu-
bans. Under those circumstances on Tuesday, No-
vember 15, the Commander in Chief sent a letter
to the Acting UN Secretary General protesting such
violations, which were increasing daily at a dra-
matic rate because they were not only photograph-
ing the dismantled facilities but also the whole ter-
ritory, bit by bit and inch by inch.®
Furthermore, Fidel also explained in the letter
addressed to U Thant that those flights were not
only essentially damaging the security of the coun-
try but were also an affront to the dignity of the
people. For such reasons, he said, it was impossible
64. See Document: Talks held between the Prime Minister of

the Revolutionary Government of Cuba Fidel Castro, and Acting
Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant, October 31,
1962, page 213. The original Spanish version is in the October
Crisis Collection, Archives of the Institute of Cuban History.
65. See Document: Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to Acting
Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant, November 15,
1962, pages 236-240.
68
THE 1962. MissILe Crisis. SOME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
to ask Cuba, in the name of the negotiations, to tol-

erate such outrage, and warned the UN Secretary
General that:
. . . to the extent of the fire power of our anti-
aircraft weapons, any war plane which violates
the sovereignty of Cuba, by invading our air
space, can only do so at the risk of being de-
stroyed.°
On the following day, a spokesman from the U.S.
State Department replied to the Cuban protest, in-
sisting that the flights over Cuba would continue,
and affirmed that they were in compliance with
the OAS agreement of October 23. Nevertheless,
the low-level flights did cease, although the U-2
missions at greater altitudes continued.
Thus it was demonstrated that in spite of the
critical situation, which existed, a coherent posi-
tion was maintained, defending with firmness and
dignity the sovereign principles of a nation, which,
though it may be small, had been able to earn pres-
tige and respect in the world for the courage and
determination of its brave people.
For all this we can affirm that—in October of
1962—when the U.S. Government threatened the
nuclear extermination of our country the Cuban
people became the protagonists of an everlasting
example of serenity, decision and bravery which will
always form part of its revolutionary traditions and
of its fighting morale. That attitude made Com-
mander Ernesto Guevara de la Serna exclaim, on
December 7, 1962 in a memorial to Deputy General
of the Liberating Army, Antonio Maceo y Grajales,
on the anniversary of his death in combat:
All our people became Maceo, all our people
contended to be in the first line of defense in

a struggle where the battle lines might not be

clear, in a battle where we would face every-
thing and where we would be attacked from
ais ScananGslanG sya
That is why their words, their most beloved
phrases resound deeply in the hearts of the
Cubans . . . : “Whoever attempts to take hold
of Cuba, if he does not perish in the struggle,
will gather only the dust of its blood-soaked
soil.” That was the spirit of Maceo and that
was the spirit of our people.
We have been worthy of him in these hard
times that we have just gone through, in this
confrontation where we were perhaps but a
millimeter away from an atomic catastrophe.®
67. Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto, “Discurso del 7 de diciemb

re
de 1962 en el Cacahual” (Speech delivered on December
7, 1962
in Cacahual), Obra Revolucionaria, no.33 (1962), 6.
70
CUBAN REFLECTIONS
The priority over the studies carried out has fallen

on the analysis of the way relations between the
two big powers were developed and the teachings
that may be derived to prevent situations which,
like the Missile Crisis, might have had apocalyptic
consequences for humanity. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that the singular experience which meant the
involvement of a small country like Cuba in an event
of such a magnitude, had not been still sufficiently
studied and divulgated throughout the world.
Perhaps due to the magnitude of the danger the
world was involved in and to the fact that the solu-
tion to the crisis was decided upon by the United
States and the USSR, our debates have thus far
focused comparatively less on the impact that the
Crisis had specifically for Cuba and the experience
that this might entail for an understanding of the
dangers implicit in basing international peace and
stability on an order that tends to ignore the rights
and the personality of the less powerful in the so-
lution of the problems that affect them.
We draw attention to this not because we have
an exaggerated view of the importance of our role,
nor out of Chauvinism, but because we believe that
two different, albeit related, problems were present
in the Crisis and in the international post-war policy
as a whole: relations between the big powers and
the relations of these powers with the Third World.
It is precisely in this duality where, in our view,
we may find an explanation to the fact that even if
71
IN THEDaTHRESHOLD
LUNA opES Bi eSOF NUCLEAR
ee WARAS
the solution of the Crisis ushered in a process of

detente between the United States and the Soviet
Union, this did not happen between the United States
and Cuba.
We have been told that the Crisis was the out-
come of insufficient communication and misunder-
standing between the protagonists; these accidents
did happen, but the Missile Crisis was much more
than just this. It was perhaps the most dramatic prog-
eny of the “cold war,” a policy that stereotyped the
world into zones of influence, disregarding the spe-
cific problems of Third World countries and reading
into any attempt by these countries to overcome their
status of dependence as a sign of Soviet expansion.
The theory of “containment” imposed upon us a
world divided into antagonistic blocks from which
it was physically and intellectually impossible to
escape. This scenario, which left no room for other
options, was what ultimately determined the Cu-
ban Government’s acceptance of the deployment of
nuclear weapons on Cuban territory. In this con-
nection, I should like to quote an excerpt from Com-
mander in Chief Fidel Castro’s statements during
the past meeting in Havana:
Iam going to tell the truth about how we
thought. We did not like the missiles. If it was
a matter of our defense, we would not have
accepted the missiles here. But, do not think
that it was because of the dangers that could
come from having the missiles here, but rather
because of the way in which this could dam-
age the image of the Revolution. We were very
committed to the image of the Revolution in
the rest of Latin America, and the presence of
the missiles, in fact, would turn us into a So-
viet military base and that would have a high
political cost for our country’s image, which ©
72
THE 1962.MissILE Crisis. SomME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
we valued so highly. So if it had been for our

defense—and I say this here with all honesty,
Aleksandr knows this—we would not have ac-
cepted the missiles. But we really saw in the
issue of the missile installation something
that would strengthen the Socialist bloc, some-
thing that would help in some way to improve
the so-called correlation of forces.®
The impact of the deployment of the missiles on the
nuclear balance and other spheres of U.S. interna-
tional relations led to a reaction which, trampling
upon the legitimate tenets of international law, im-
posed its terms and conditions by sheer force. This
legal aspect of the problem has also been little dis-
cussed in our meetings. It would seem as if we have
come to accept that force is also a source of law, at
least that is what the standard bearers of “realpolitik”
have tried to make us believe.
Independently of this, however, it is a proven fact
that fear of the missiles was not the determining
factor in the policy of the United States toward
Cuba. U.S. intransigence vis-a-vis the Cuban Revo-
lution antedated the latter’s adoption of its social-
ist character and the establishment of relations
with the USSR. The roots of this attitude must be
found in a doctrinaire component that dates back
long before the “cold war.”
In actual fact, the theory of “containment” always
transcended the conflict between the big powers and
became an excuse to maintain a hegemonic system
that did not disappear with the end of the “cold war,”
and the Cuban case provides clear proof of this: neither
the withdrawal of the missiles nor the disappearance
68. See Testimony: Fidel Castro’s words on January 11, 1992

during the Tripartite Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis,
held on January 9-12, 1992, in page 277.
1S
of the USSR has sufficed to meet U.S. demands on

Cuba.
Thus the familiar five points, which summarized
Cuba’s demands for overcoming the crisis and en-
suring a climate of security in its relations with the
United States, are still, in essence, of as much actu-
ality as they were forty years ago. Allow me to recall
them:
1. Cessation of the economic blockade and of
all the measures of commercial and economic
pressure being carried out by the United States
against our country throughout the world.
2. Cessation of all subversive activities, of the
dropping and landing of weapons and explosives
by air and sea, of the organization of invasions
by mercenaries, and of the infiltration of spies
and saboteurs - all of which activities are be-
ing carried on from the territory of the United
States and certain accomplice countries.
3. Cessation of the piratical attacks being car-
ried out from bases in the United States and
Puerto Rico.
4. Cessation of all violations of our air space

and territorial waters by United States aircraft
and warships.
5. Withdrawal of the naval base of Guantanamo
and return of the Cuban territory occupied by
the United States.®
To put it briefly: respect for our national sovereignty,
an end to aggression and the recovery of our national
territory. At first glance, these are such elementary
69. See Document: Statement of the Prime Minister of the Cuban

Revolutionary Government Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962, in
pages 176-177.
74
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. Some CUBAN REFLECTIONS
rights that the very fact that they are being demand-
ed indicates the prevailing deterioration in interna-tional
law.
How is it that the United States managed to reach
an agreement with its main enemy in 1962 while,
with Cuba, however, they were not ready to take a
single step to settle differences which were seem-
ingly much less complex?
How is it that throughout these years, the United
States improved its relations, even with countries
like Viet Nam, with which it fought a terrible war
that eroded its domestic stability and its interna-
tional prestige, while maintaining a belligerent at-
titude toward Cuba?
These questions might perhaps be answered by
a quotation from Paul Nitze’s:
He [Castro] has provided a working example of
a communist state in the Americas, success-
fully defying the United States. Thus he has
appealed to widespread anti-American feeling,
a feeling often shared by non-communists. His
survival, in the face of persistent U.S. efforts
to unseat him, has unquestionably lowered the
prestige of the United States... .”
So long as Castro thrives, his major threat—the
example and stimulus of a working communist
revolution—will persist.”!
To conclude, as time has proven, Cuba’s five points
were not even considered by the United States be-
cause they reflected a situation that went far beyond
70. U.S. Department of State, “Cuba and Communism in the

Hemisphere. Washington, May 4, 1961,” in Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Was-
hington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 460.
71. Ibid, 463.
75
IN THE
Pa PEE THRESHOLD
a aS OF NUCLEAR
ME ee WAR
AES
the missile crisis and even the conflict with the

USSR. Its origins antedate the revolutionary period
and the existence of the no longer extant European
Socialist bloc, since the Cuban Revolution has been,
quite simply, the exacerbated expression of the con-
tradictions in U.S. relations with Latin America since
James Monroe, in 1823, laid down the doctrinaire
foundations of U.S. policy toward the rest of the con-
tinent.
The Cuban case is an example of the fact that
Third World problems cannot be oversimplified and
regarded solely in the light of relations between
the big powers, and that “peaceful coexistence” and
even the alleged end of the “cold war” were not
and are not, by themselves, sufficient guarantee
to neutralize the destabilizing potential implicit in
underdevelopment and the unequal relations pres-
ently characterizing the international order.
It is a well-known fact that Cuba had great con-
tradictions with the USSR after its agreements with
the United States without considering the Cuban
part. This was without a doubt a reflection of a big-
power attitude that ignores the right of small coun-
tries to participate in the solution of international
conflicts. But even more characteristic of this men-
tality was the way the United States reacted to Cuba’s
involvement in the conflict.
An examination of the enormous volume of docu-
ments released by the United States revealed that
during the Crisis not a single reference was made
to the rights of the Cuban people, there was no in-
tention whatsoever of analyzing the reasons sub-
mitted by the Cuban part and there was never any
doubt about the morality of the policy that had thus
far been implemented and which they intended to
continue implementing toward Cuba during the Cri-
sis. It creates the impression that Cuba is conceived
76
THE 1962 MissiLe Crisis. SomME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
of only as a piece of land on which a few Soviet

missiles were deployed.
The United States did not include in its consid-
erations during the Crisis the fact that at that very
moment Operation Mongoose was under way, an
operation that, as everyone knows, was a veritable
aggressive crusade against Cuba and whose express
aim, as the documents reveal, was to create the
conditions for a military intervention by the United
States in the country.
And since “communications problems” is some-
thing about there is so much writing, I should like
to recall that the United States did not make a single
attempt to communicate with Cuba directly, even at
the risk of that a miscalculation might have un-
leashed a war. Neither did they allow Cuba to par-
ticipate in any way in the negotiations, even to the
point that the Cuban Government had to make a
separate declaration before the UN Security Coun-
cil, in view of the United States’ refusal to work on a
tripartite document reflecting the end of the Octo-
ber Crisis.
One question that might serve to illustrate the
mind-set of the U.S. statesmen that were involved
in the management of the Crisis is that fact that
they regarded Operation Mongoose as a perfectly
legitimate right that created no conscience qualms,
and that not invading Cuba was a concession to
the USSR. Even now, the possibility of such an un-
dertaking is discussed in U.S. power circles in terms
of these same premises.
The treatment dispensed to Cuba during the Mis-
sile Crisis was not an isolated happening. It has
been normal practice with the powerful through-
out history; it is a reflection of a colonialist ideol-
ogy that has not yet been overcome, one that is
rooted in an unfair social order, flagrantly expressed
G76
IN THE THRESHOLD
EE AE ee OFalNUCLEAR
ene WAR
at the political level, particularly during the crisis,

but which is an everyday fact of life in the dependent
economies.
Any analysis of the “cold war,” even in a strictly
academic framework, have to necessarily broach,
given its theoretical and practical connotations, the
element that the Third World means at that mo-
ment in international relations, inter alia, because
all objective foundations for sustaining the theory
of containment to justify the dynamics of interna-
tional relations have subsequently disappeared
bringing the contradictions of underdevelopment
distinctly to the fore and making their impact on in-
ternational tensions more manifest.
Having left behind the historical stage, wherein,
for better or for worse, the world found an unstable
balance in the division between two antagonistic
blocs, it is incumbent upon us to confront the theo-
retical and practical challenge of identifying the
future foundations of international stability, because
the warlike conflicts that had taken place in this
decade show an increasing tendency.
We will have to take into account the following
new variables: the military domination of a super-
power whose main source of wealth is arms pro-
duction, but which no longer has the objective grounds
to substantiate such a monumental undertaking;
the proliferation of nuclear states resulting from the
dismemberment of the USSR and the deteriora-
tion in nuclear arms controls due to the present
instability of these processes; the tendency to es-
tablish big economic blocs which further hinder
access by the underdeveloped countries to the world
market; the social and political conflicts generated
by the revitalization of nationalism and the condi-
tions of extreme poverty in which most of human-
ity lives; environmental problems that affect the
78
THE 1962 MissILE Crisis. SomME CUBAN REFLECTIONS
rich and the poor alike, and the lack of interna-

tional mechanisms capable of settling disputes and
of re-establishing a balance between the parties.
A study of the period that came to be known as the
“cold war,” both in terms of relations between the big
powers and, in turn, their relations with the Third
World, may contribute valuable experiences from
which to derive sensible answers to these ques-
tions and raise an awareness on the need to find
solutions to mitigate many focus of instability in the
present-day world. If not, events will take us unawared
and in many cases, the consequences will be ex-
plosive.
The fact is that, thus far, auguries do not bode
well: military might continues to be used as an
option in the solution of problems rooted in poverty
and marginalization and theories such as “humani-
tarian intervention” and “limited sovereignty” have
been developed in an attempt to make the use of
force a legitimate recourse; international bodies,
governed by anti-democratic and obsolete mecha-
nisms, have, on occasions, become instruments of
intervention; and the international economy, con-
trolled by transnational capital, imposes on the poor
countries neo-liberal schemes that tend to perpetu-
ate dependence and extreme poverty.
The proposal is an international order based on
ideological intransigence redolent of pretended
Medieval religious universality, forgetting that the
small nations also have their own cultures, tradi-
tions and interests that they will defend at all costs
one way or another, as has always been the case,
regardless of how powerful the forces they will have
to confront may be.
Unfortunately, the history of mankind is not al-
ways a good example of the victory of rationality
19
over the determinism of created interests. In spite

of this, the human being has never given up his
conviction that good ideas can influence the behavior
of the rest of mankind. When understanding the
contemporary historical events, as the Missile Crisis
was, we are having a better understanding of the
world we live in and how to improve it.
Fidel and Khrushchev in New York (Theresa Hotel) at the United

Nations, September 1960.
REE ie
* din
pit
:
—
atte Te iI ~ =
Meeting of the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the U.S.

National Security Council during the October Crisis.
Interview of president Kennedy with Andrei Gromyko, Foreign

Minister of the USSR, at the White House on October 18, 1962.
On October 22, Kennedy announces the measures to be taken

against Cuba.
ALAKMA DE COMBATE!
Extra “RE VOLUCION Fp
LA
NACION EN
The country at war footing. PIEDE GUERRA
Ordena elPrimer Ministro Fide!
Castro ante el peligro dela
rate ae eae Kenned) nan warttnaal,iP
yn eecece
‘ iesete
WENCEREMOS
fooree ee ota,ba tire,
ek ai
j PATRIA 0 MU PRTE! |
BLO
FIDEL HABLARA HOY AL PUE
83
To the calling of the fatherland, the Cuban people mobilize to

face the threat of imperialist aggression.
Appearance of Fidel Castro on television on October 23, 1962.
———
es
ee ca |*
OP ee ket:
*
COTE.FIDELCASTRO I
Commander in Chief Fidel Castro visits the Cuban troops.
Types of U.S. combat aircraft used in low-altitude flights over

Cuba.
U.S. planes flying at low altitude.
Antiaircraft piece in the coast of Havana.

Emplacement of a Soviet antiaircraft missile group during the

October Crisis.
U-2 shot down on October 27 in Banes, now a municipality of

Holguin province.
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations visits Cuba

on October 30 & 31. From left to right: Fidel, U Thant, and Osvaldo
Dorticos. Behind: Raul Roa and Carlos Lechuga.
DOCUMENTS
ff:
DRAFT PROTOCOL ON SOVIET-CUBAN
MUTUAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY
COOPERATION AGREEMENT, AUGUST 1962
Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Cuba and the Government of the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics on military cooperation for the de-
fense of the national territory of Cuba in the event of
aggression.
Agreement between the Government of the Republic

of Cuba and the Government of the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics on military cooperation and mutual
uefense.
Agreement between the Government of the Repub-

lic of Cuba and the Government of the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics on military support of the
Soviet Armed Forces in defending the national ter-
ritory of Cuba in the event of aggression.
(Any of the previous three titles is suggested)
The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the

Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics,
Guiding themselves by the principles and objec-
tives of the United Nations Organization Charter.
Reiterating their desire to live in peace with all
states and peoples.
Determined to make all possible efforts to contribute
to the preservation and strengthening of world peace.
ot
Anxious to establish and develop mutual friend-

ship, collaboration and mutual help between all
peoples on the basis of the principle of respecting
the sovereignty and independence of states and of
that of non-intervention in their internal affairs.
Faithful to a policy of principle based on friend-
ship and solidarity between peoples defending a
common cause, of which the fundamental pillars
are the peaceful coexistence between states with
different social systems, the legitimate defense in the
face of aggression, the right of every people to give
itself the form of government it deems appropriate
to its aspirations of well-being and progress and to
live in peace without being perturbed or attacked
from abroad and the recognition of the historic pre-
rogative of every nation, when it so desires, to break
the binds that tie it to any form of dominion or eco-
nomic exploitation.
Decided to take the necessary steps to jointly
defend such legitimate rights of the people of Cuba (if
it is preferred this could read the peoples of Cuba
and of the Soviet Union.)
Also taking into account the urgency of taking
measures to assure mutual defense in the face of
possible aggression against the Republic of Cuba and
the USSR.
Desiring to agree on all questions relating to the
support which the Soviet Armed Forces will provide
in the defense of the national territory of Cuba in
the event of aggression, have agreed to subscribe
to the present agreement.
ARTICLE 1
The Soviet Union will send to the Republic of Cuba

armed forces to reinforce its defenses in the face
of the danger of an external aggression and to con-
tribute to the preservation of world peace.
92
DocuMENTSs
The type of Soviet troops and the areas of their

basing on the territory of the Republic of Cuba will
be set by the representatives named in accordance
with Article 11 of this agreement.
ARTICLE 2
In the event of aggression against the republic of
Cuba or against the Soviet Armed Forces on the terri-
tory of the Republic of Cuba, the Government of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cuba, making use of the right
to individual or collective defense, provided for in Ar-
ticle 51 of the United Nations Organization Charter,
will take all necessary measures to repel the aggres-
sion.
Any information regarding any act of aggression
and the actions taken in fulfillment of this article
will be presented to the Security Council in accord-
ance with the rules of the United Nations Charter.
The above mentioned actions will be suspended
once the Security Council takes the measures nec-
essary to reestablish and preserve world peace.
ARTICLE 3
The Soviet Armed Forces based in the Republic of

Cuba will fully respect its sovereignty.
All personnel attached to the Soviet Armed Forces
and their family members will observe the laws of
the Republic of Cuba.
ARTICLE 4
The Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet

Republics will assume the upkeep costs of the So-
viet Armed Forces based on the territory of the Repub-
lic of Cuba by virtue of this agreement.
93
ARTICLE 5
So as not to affect supplies to the Cuban popula-

tion, consumer goods, various materials, machin-
ery, equipment and other goods destined to the
Soviet Armed Forces will be supplied by the Soviet
Union. Such supplies, the equipment and muni-
tions destined to the Soviet Armed Forces, along
with the ships assigned for their transportation will
have free entry into the territory of Cuba.
ARTICLE 6
The Government of the Republic of Cuba agrees

with the Government of the Union of Socialist So-
viet Republics, to provide its Armed Forces with all
the services necessary for their installation, basing,
communication and mobility.
The transportation of personnel of the Soviet Armed
Forces, the use of electric energy and communi-
cations, along with other public services, provided to
the Soviet Armed Forces will be paid by them, in ac-
cordance with the rates applicable to the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Cuba.
The sites and land for the installation and bas-
ing will be provided, free of charge, by the Republic
of Cuba. Their adaptation and repair will be done
by the Soviet Armed Forces.
ARTICLE 7
In areas assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces, the

construction of buildings, airfields, roads, bridges,
permanent radio-communication facilities and other
types, will be undertaken using means and mate-
rials of the Soviet Armed Forces and with prior coor-
dination with the competent organ of the Republic
of Cuba charged with such matters.
ARTICLE 8
In the event that the Soviet Armed Forces abandon
them, the military barracks, airfields and other
94
DOcUMENTS
constructions, along with permanent installations

will be turned over to the Government of the Republic
of Cuba without any compensation.
ARTICLE 9
Matters of jurisdiction relating to the presence of
Soviet Armed Forces personnel on the territory of the
Republic of Cuba will be governed by separate agree-
ments based on the principles enunciated in Article 3
of this agreement.
ARTICLE 10
Both parties agree that the military units of each
state will be under the command of their respec-
tive governments who will, in coordination, deter-
mine the use of their respective forces to repel ex-
ternal aggression and restore the peace.
ARTICLE 1 1
So as to adequately regulate daily matters deriving

from the presence of Soviet Armed Forces on the
territory of the Republic of Cuba, the Government
of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the
USSR will name their respective representatives.
ARTICLE 12
This agreement will be submitted for ratification
by the respective governments and will enter into
force on the day of the exchange of letters of ratifi-
cation, which will be on.
ARTICLE 13
This agreement is valid for a five year term. Either

party may annul the agreement, notifying the other
party within one year before the expiration date of
this agreement.
95
In the event that the five year term is concluded

this
without either party requesting its annulment,
agreement will be in force for five more years.
ARTICLE 14
After the conclusion of this agreement’s validity

the Soviet Armed Forces will abandon the territory
of the Republic of Cuba.
The Soviet party reserves the right to evacuate
from the territory of the Republic of Cuba materi-
als, munitions, equipment, machinery, mechanisms
and all war materiel and other goods that are the
property of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The Government of the Republic of Cuba will fur-
nish all the aid necessary for the evacuation of the
Soviet Armed Forces from the territory of the Re-
public of Cuba.
This agreement has been drafted on the” of 1962,
in two copies, one in the Spanish language and the
other in the Russian language, each of equal value.
Certifying the above mentioned, the heads of
Government of both states sealed and signed this
agreement.
Prime Minister of President of the

the Republic of Cuba Council of Ministers
of the Union of
Socialist Soviet
Republics
FIDEL Castro Ruz KHRUSHCHEV N. S.
Laurence Chang, and Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Missile Crisis,

1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York:
New Press, 1992), 64-66.
96
STATEMENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA,
SEPTEMBER 29, 1962
The Council of Ministers of the Revolutionary Gov-

ernment of Cuba, met in extraordinary session to
know and consider the Joint Resolution of U.S.
Congress, has agreed to formulate the following
declaration:
Cuba faces, in an international situation burdened
of dramatic tensions, the risks of a direct-armed
attack of the United States Government. To decla-
rations and reiterated pronouncements of Congress-
men and leading figures of U.S. policy, including
the ones of Secretary of State and President Kennedy
himself, and campaigns, interested information and
press-editorials of that country, the Joint Resolu-
tion of the U.S. Congress is added now, with the
official formality that it displays. This Joint Resolu-
tion that resumes, unusually and plainly, all the
policy of aggression and subversion that has char-
acterized the international behavior of the United
States Government concerning Cuba, constitutes,
without dissimulation or scruples, the open procla-
mation of aggression and power line that, violating
the most elementary principles of International Law
and the Chart of the Organization of United Nations,
the United States imperialist Government carries
out against the Republic of Cuba.
In the Resolution of U.S. Congress it is stated that
the United States is determined to prevent by any
means that be necessary, even the use of weapons,
that the Cuban regime expand perforce its assumed
97
D OF NUCLEAR
THRESHOL
IN THEUNS ee WAR
Se OO Oe
aggressive, or subversive activities to any part of this

hemisphere; to prevent in Cuba the establishment,
or use of a military capability with foreign support that
put in danger the security of the United States; and
to cooperate with the Organization of American States
and with Cuban counterrevolutionaries to subversion
in our country.
Before such pronouncements, formulated in the
heat of climate of hysteria that fills to overflowing
and rules in present days the U.S. political sce-
nario and stimulated by the cynical accumulation
of falsehoods, calumnies and misrepresentations
on the Cuban international behavior, the Council of
Ministers wishes to leave clearly established, be-
fore all peoples of the world, the position of the
people and the Revolutionary Government of Cuba
before each of the matters that have been referred
to in the course of that campaign, with which it
has been pretended to prepare psychologically U.S.
public opinion for the aggression that is projected.
Likewise, the Council of Ministers wishes to for-
mulate, categorically and clearly, the response that
the people and the Revolutionary Government of
Cuba offer, with serenity of spirit, but with ener-
getic and irrevocable decision, to the Joint Resolu-
tion of U.S. Congress.
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba declares
one more time that the foreign policy of our country
is based on the non-intervention principle, in the right
to the free determination of nations, in the acknowl-—
edgment of the sovereign equality of the states, in
the freedom of commerce, in the solution by means
of negotiations of international lawsuits and in the
will of living together peacefully with all peoples of
the world. Faithful to those postulates of its interna-
tional policy and to the principles that report the
Chart of the Organization of United Nations, Cuba
98
DocuMENTS
does not constitute any danger for the security of

any country in our continent, neither for any of them
has kept nor keeps aggressive purposes, but the most
absolute respect to the “non-intervention” policy,
convinced, as our own national history teaches, that
corresponds with sovereignty to each country to de-
cide, without strange hateful interference, its own
historic course. Cuba, instead of having violated that
international standard after the triumph of our Revo-
lution, has been, on the contrary, with loss of wealth
and lives as painful consequence, constant victim of
interference in its domestic policy and of aggres-
sions coming from territories of other countries of
the continent, not only the United States, but also
from some Latin American countries whose govern-
ments, with hypocritical or confessed complicity,
have joined, backward to genuine feelings of their
respective peoples, to the chorus of imperialist defa-
mations of the U.S. Government.
That recent history of our continent that in its
itinerary shows the embarrassment of Playa Giron,
whose responsibility officially assumed the U.S.
president and for which territories and submissive
cooperation of governments of other countries of
the continent were used, proves who have been
transgressors of the “non-intervention” principle
and of the obliged respect to the right of self-deter-
mination of peoples. Let proclaimed one more time,
before the dishonor of the implicit false imputation
in the Joint Resolution of U.S. Congress, our doc-
trine of unreserved observance to sovereignty of
the other States of America, as well as declared the
security that Cuba offers that will never pretend to
expand by force aggressive or subversive activities
to any country of this hemisphere.
This Council of Ministers, expressing a truth that
only the evil intention of the United States Gov-
ernment and of its Congress dares to ignore, equally
99
declares that Cuba will never use its legitimate

means of military defense with aggressive purposes
to put in danger the security of the United States.
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba, with its
constant behavior, has proved its peaceful purposes
with the noble yearning to go ahead with its plans
of development and of socialist and revolutionary
creation. It has only aspired, with historical legiti-
mate right, to develop its national life under the
social and political system that its people, in irre-
ducible exercise of their sovereignty, have chosen
by own determination. Instead of having achieved
such an aspiration, Cuba has suffered constant in-
terference in its domestic affairs and the most: cyni-
cal and intolerable aggressions on the part of the
United States Government, which, with obstinate
international delinquency, has uselessly become
stubborn, in antedating it to conditions of servi-
tude, misery, backwardness, theft and oppression
in which it plunged lived during half a century of
fictitious sovereignty and political pseudo-democ-
racy. It is not the Revolutionary Government of Cuba
who threats the security of the United States and
of other countries of the hemisphere. It is the United
States imperialist Government the one that is put-
ting in grave danger the security of Cuba, the whole
hemisphere and the world, with its aggressive, in-
terventionist, and provocative policy carried out with
ostensible complicity of some Latin America satel-
lite regimes and before discordant behavior of other .
Latin America governments, which defend the “non-
intervention” principle and the right of free deter-
mination of nations, living root of our common his-
tory and immortal legacy of Bolivar, Juarez and
Marti.
While the United States Government tries to pre-
sent Cuba as a threat to its security and a danger to
other countries of the hemisphere, it has appealed
100
DOcUMENTS
to all means to overthrow the Revolutionary Gov-

ernment and the political, social and economic or-
der that the Cuban people are building, in use of
inherent power to its self-determination, indepen-
dence and sovereignty. It has used from campaign
of calumnies, suppression of the Cuban sugar quota,
diplomatic conspiracy, suppression of fuel supply,
cane-fields burn, infiltration of CIA agents, support
to counterrevolution, economic embargo, assassina-
tion of labors, countrymen, students, teachers, mi-
litiamen, clandestine introduction of explosives and
weapons, systematic violations of its airspace and
territorial waters, filibuster incursions, sabotage to
production centers and transgression of its own laws
and the international law, until training, organiza-
tion, funding, armed direction and protection of mer-
cenary invaders of Playa Girdn, and also the use of
the Naval Base of Guantanamo as hide-outs of spies,
provokers, terrorists, counterrevolutionaries and fugi-
tives of the Cuban justice.
The United States Government not only perpe-
trated the most brutal economic aggressions against
our country, but also unleashed a policy of pres-
sures in all Latin America capitals to make them
break relations with Cuba and thus isolates it from
nations with similar economic and social problems
to it, affinity of blood, community of language and
culture; it promoted international meetings to con-
demn our country, it forced our exclusion from the
Organization of American States and pretended,
although uselessly, diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions, without realizing that this policy seriously
hurt prestige of governments, anti-interventionist
feeling, independent spirit and principle of self-de-
termination so rooted in our peoples.
The United States has pursued our commercial
exchange in all corners of the world where its influ-
101
ences reach, interfering and sabotaging sales of our

goods and promoting a truly international boycott
against our economy. It is not a secret to anyone
that in these times the United States Government
powerfully exerts pressure to countries that like the
UK, Norway, Greece and others, have made of mari-
time traffic an essential means of living, for that
their ships do not transport merchandises, which
include food and medicines, for Cuba, and that
achieved from the Western Germany Government the
required prohibition. This policy interferes and dis-
turbs standards of international commerce and ac-
tivities that are fundamental for life of countries, in
passing that seriously affects in the economic aspect
mercantile lines of other nations that for maintain-
ing their rights in the international traffic, must have
suffered the competition of the U.S. merchant ma-
rine, strongly subsidized.
U.S. state secretary, taking advantage of the pres-
ence of mission heads at the Assembly of the United
Nations, has dedicated entire weeks exclusively to
promote these purposes against Cuba and to pre-
pare the conference of secret character and frank
conspiracy against our country, which no less than
in the offices of the State Department in Washing-
ton, he will carry out with Latin America chancel-
lors. And he publicly declares the intention of the
United States to enlist Latin American ships and
aircraft to “watch Cuba’s shores.” All this speaking
on behalf of security of the United States, and the
political security of Latin American governments
before the threat of subversion, while in the own
Resolution of the Congress they declare that they
would give support to counterrevolutionaries, that is:
they officially proclaim a subversion policy against
the Government of Cuba and, also proclaim, a policy
of power insinuating military action.
102
DocuMENTS
Who practices subversion and who is the victim of

subversion? Who constitutes a danger for security
of the other country and who can be the victim of
this danger? The United States, which organized
the invasion in April 1961? Guatemala, where mer-
cenaries were trained? Nicaragua, where they came
from? Or Cuba, where they landed?
How can the United States justify its facts, its
threats, and its policy before the eyes of the world?
It is equally absurd the threat to launch a direct
armed attack, if Cuba were militarily strengthened
up to a degree that the United States takes the lib-
erty of determining so.
We do not have the least intention to give an
explanation, or to consult the “illustrious” mem-
bers of the U.S. Senate or House concerning the
weapons that we conveniently esteemed to acquire
and the measures to take for fully defending our
country, as we did not consult, or request authoriza-
tion about the kind of weapons and the measures
that we took when we destroyed the invaders of Playa
Giron.
Don’t we have the assistance of the rights that
standards, laws and international principles rec-
ognize to evety sovereign state of any part of the
world?
We have not appropriated and we do not think to
appropriate in favor of the U.S. Congress any sov-
ereign prerogative.
If the U.S. Government does not foster aggres-
sive intentions against our country, it would not be
interested in quantity, quality or kind of our weap-
ons.
If the United States were capable to giving Cuba
effective and satisfactory guarantees concerning the
integrity of our territory and it ceased in its subver-
sive and counterrevolutionary activities against our
103
people, Cuba would not need to strengthen its de-

fense, it would not even need an army, and all
those resources that it implies would be gladly in-
vested in the economic and cultural development
of the nation.
Cuba has always been willing to discuss with the
United States Government and to do what it were
on its part, if it found in the United States Govern-
ment a reciprocal attitude to diminish tension and
to improve relations.
Last year in April, even after the invading attack,
we publicly reiterated this disposal. The United
States Government paid deaf ears and continued
its policy of hostility and aggression. The Revolu-
tion, however, has not weakened; aggression and
harassment have made it stronger. It is impossible
to crush it. All gold, power and long subversive expe-
rience of Washington have crashed with this firm
reality. It would have been much more intelligent to
understand it that way.
Cuba, even, would have had the possibility to com-
pensate U.S. citizens and interests affected by laws
of the Revolution had not economic aggressions
mediated and had the government of that country
been willing to negotiate at a level of respect to the
will, dignity and sovereignty of our people.
It was the United States Government the one that
chose the ways that dictated arrogance, prepotency,
and disregard to the rights of a small state: hostility,
economic aggression, subversion, terrorism, commer-
cial blockade, indirect attack, political isolation and
the raised knife of direct aggression.
The fruits of that policy could not have been more
disastrous for its prestige. It is the Goliath defeated
by David.
The Joint Resolution of U.S. Congress constitutes
the uncovered confession of relapsing in its fatal
104
DOocUMENTS
policy with shades so serious that obliges today to

the Council of Ministers of the Revolutionary Gov-
ernment of Cuba to this emergent warning to world
consciousness, before danger that criminally threats
peace in the continent and in the world.
Before that painful reality and imminence of the dan-
ger that we denounce, Cuba also proclaims the right
to defend its sovereignty. In order to defend its in-
dependence before imperialist aggression, Cuba has
been seen obliged, with the use of human and mate-
rial resources that would have desired to use for
its social and economic progress, to strengthen its
military capability for defense and the Revolution-
ary Government of Cuba, in fulfillment of its duties,
has taken and will take all measures that were nec-
essary for that strengthening of military defense of
the country.
Before that certain danger of direct military ag-
gression from the United States Government and before
the Joint Resolution of its Congress that authorizes
it, the Cuban people are again willing to face it.
We warn the United States Government, its Con-
gress and its president that they will not find an
unprepared people, but alert, firm in their combat
positions, willing to defend house by house, inch by
inch of our territory, the independence of the na-
tion and the sovereignty of the country.
Cuban people are preparing to fight for their Revo-
lution until the last man, firmly convinced of jus-
tice of the great historical work they are carrying
out. For the Cuban people the reasons that inspire
the grand execution of this work are so powerful
that no threat, or aggression, how powerful it may
be, will ever break their spirit of fight, or diminish
their will of resistance.
The Joint Resolution of U.S. Congress expresses
the lack of responsibility of its leaders, its policy
105
IN THETSTHRESHOLD
UNI SU 2 OF NUCLEAR
Ee WAR
ees
without principles, its reactionary and fascist con-

ception of international relations, symptoms of de-
generation and decline of a system, and of its public
figures who no longer remember in anything the
greatness of the Americans who some day drafted
the historical Declaration of Philadelphia and the
lineage of the one who pronounced the immortal
words of Gettysburg.
The same American politicians and the same
imperialist aggressive circles that compelled Presi-
dent Kennedy to carry out the adventure of Playa
Giron, which the previous administration had pre-
pared, are the ones who relapse now in encourag-
ing him for a new adventure of aggression, for not
serving them of persuasive warning for prudence
the disaster that yesterday engaged him in the fail-
ure and in a ridiculous situation.
U.S. Congress forgets that correlation of forces
in the world has substantially changed and that
today imperialist countries, with pretended impu-
nity, cannot repeat the policy of conquest, of geno-
cide, and of barbarism that Hitler experimented
with delirious ambition of power.
Likewise, they disdain the scope and sincerity
of expressions of solidarity that Cuba counts on,
both for creative work of its people, and for the dra-
matic and glorious time of final fight for their inde-
pendence. They pretend, not only to ignore heroic
decision of the Cuban people and their own capabil-
ity of defense, but they also seem to neglect the
concrete and real content of that solidarity, with-
out adequately estimating the convincing strength
of the declaration of the Soviet Union, stating that
it will give the necessary assistance to Cuba and
to any other peaceful state in case of aggression.
They confuse the value of a policy of principles,
which is the one that inspires the declaration of
106
DocuMENTS
the Soviet Union, with the demagogic stance and

of pure blackmail of imperialist politicians who with
the worst purposes, even of electoral profits, incite
U.S. Government for committing world peace with
aggression to our country.
U.S. rulers also ignore that a new armed ag-
gression to our nation, would not only imply conse-
quences in our territory, but also this time an armed
invasion to Cuba would unleash a fight of catastrophic
results for the United States.
Before the Joint Resolution that we are respond-
ing to, the Council of Ministers of the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba reasserts one more time pur-
poses of peace that encourage the Cuban people and
warns that neither our people nor the Government
of Cuba will be guilty for results of everything that
may happen as consequence of the aggression that is
authorized against our nation.
It is the U.S. president, its Congress, the leaders
of its imperialist policy, military men of the Penta-
gon and international plotters of the CIA, who will
have to assume, before history and the world, the
serious responsibility of everything that may come
as result of the criminal aggression that they ad-
vocate against Cuba. Over their numbed conscious-
ness the burden of that responsibility gravitates
today.
The Cuban people wish coexistence in this con-
tinent, but at the same time, they get ready, alert
and firm, to defend independence of the nation and
to safeguard the integrity of their territory. We re-
spond, then, to the threatening and insolent agree-
ment, that the Cuban people will resist, that they
are prepared to resist, that they will not be alone in
their resistance and that they are willing to use for
resisting, every measures that were necessary.
U.S. Congress may dictate standards within the
borders of its country, but concerning us, its Reso-
107
lution is as valuable as a paper in a wastepaper

basket bound for the garbage collector of history.
Fatherland or Death!
We shall overcome!
Un pueblo invencible (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 1991), 11-18.
108
APPEARANCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO
ON THE CUBAN RADIO AND TELEVISION
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, OCTOBER 23, 1962
Dr. Luis GOMEZ WanGUEMERT: Good evening, viewers:

All Cuban radio and television stations are in chain
this evening to broadcast declarations of the Prime
Minister of the Government and Secretary General of
the ORI Commander Fidel Castro, at a time, particu-
larly difficult in the history of the world.
As you know, the United States has established
the naval blockade of the Cuban Archipelago with the
pretext of weapons acquired by Cuba with the only
goal of ensuring its defense against U.S. aggressions.
Before this aggressive act, Cuba responded giv-
ing the combat alert that put on combat readiness
our people, in few hours.
The Soviet Union replied today Kennedy’s speech
with a moderate and firm declaration in which it
energetically refuses assertions of U.S. president and
denounces danger of war created by U.S. aggression.
The OAS Council, called by the United States, met
in Washington, and also in New York, the Security
Council of the United Nations met, at a request of
Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States.
What can you say. Dr. Castro, to the people of
Cuba concerning this new U.S. aggression?
Dr. Castro: Really all these facts are the culmi-
nation of a policy that the United States has fol-
lowed—not the United States but U.S. imperialists,
warlike-men, and the most reactionary circles—
against our nation since the triumph of the Revolu-
tion.
109
We are not surprised because of these measures.

Measures of this kind and others that we have had
to suffer had to be logically waited from a govern-
ment so reactionary and so disrespectful for the
rights of the other peoples and other nations as
the United States Government is.
But, after all, all the people know this history,
which from the very first day, from the very begin-
ning of the triumph, a triumph that cost so many
sacrifices to our people, could start to see what the
policy of the United States Government with us
going to be. This apart from that, of course, our
people, or a part of our people—that part with more
political consciousness—already knew what the
history of the relations between the United States
and Cuba since late of past century had been. In
fact, our progress, our independence, our sover-
eignty were always seen dimmed by policy of Yan-
kee’ administrations, since intervention—it was an
intervention with imperialist goals—, the Platt Amend-
ment, subsequent interventions, empowering of re-
sources of our nation, support that they gave to the
worst governments—to the most reactionary ones,
to the most thieving ones—and, finally, the support
that they had given to Batista.
Because we cannot forget and we will never for-
get that all bombs they launched on us, that they
launched against the people at the Sierra Maestra
were of U.S. manufacture.
Our people is informed on the whole process un-
til now.
What is the present situation? The present situa-
tion is that all this process of fight, which has been
*. For the majority in the United States this word means “a

native or an inhabitant of the northern United States,” but we,
in Cuba, consider yankee any citizen of that country. Ed.
110
DOCUMENTS
the useless fight of an empire against a small nation, the

useless, fruitless, and really failed fight of an empire
against a revolutionary government, and against a revo-
lution that takes places in a small, underdeveloped,
and exploited nation until recent times.
Why has this situation become more serious?
Why has it become more critical? Simply because
the United States has failed in all its attempts un-
dertaken insofar against us. In two words: They have
been defeated.
Naturally, from defeat to defeat, situation has
become more serious. They had to choose between
two choices: they had to resign themselves and to
leave the Cuban Revolution alone, or to give con-
tinuance to their line of aggression up to conse-
quences that can be very bad for them. So far, they
have been bad, they have been pretty bad for their
prestige. I feel that they have lost a large part of
their prestige in this fruitless fight against us. But
with the all adverse that this has been, that fight
can furthermore be more adverse still.
All attempts failed. U.S. governments are accus-
tomed to resolve Latin America problems by simple
procedures: first of all a coup d’état, by means of
camarillas of reactionary military men that were
manipulated by embassies when they did not re-
solve the problems by simple orders of their am-
bassadors. Later, the procedure of revolutions, pro-
moted uprisings, and interventions. All those things.
Interventions are also a well-known history of our
continent: intervention in Haiti, intervention in Santo
Domingo, intervention in Nicaragua, intervention in
Mexico, where the richest part of minerals and pe-
troleum was robbed, the Yankees stole it.
‘The history of Mexico, for example, is the history
of a nation that wrote it full of heroism, and that
heroism—a large part—was employed in fighting
Lal
for its independence against U.S. invasions. Those

are known stories.
Also tactics that they used to resolve the prob-
lem of Guatemala, which was already a Playa Giron-
type invasion. They also used to employ propaganda,
and promoted subversion. That is, there was not in
Latin America any government which could resist
opposition of the United States Government.
This had happened, exactly that way, until the
Cuban Revolution triumphed. When the Cuban Revo-
lution triumphed, they started to experiment also
those procedures against us. They started with cam-
paigns of defamations, attempts to split the people,
to weaken the Revolution by means of the encour-
aged division with all that tremendous campaign that
they launched inside and outside of our nation. They
started by those useless campaigns. They contin-
ued with maneuvers of political kind at the OAS, in
all those nations. Useless. They continued with ag-
gressions of economic kind. It is too much to say
that those aggressions, which was one of weapons
that I did not mention, was the economic aggres-
sion as weapon of pressure to rule the situation in
any nation.
They continued with aggressions of economic
kind—petroleum, sugar—until unleashing the total
embargo. Aggression of economic kind also failed.
They organized the Guatemala-type invasion: the
invasion of Playa Giron. It also failed. They, then,
organized new maneuvers at the OAS: the breaking
of diplomatic relations with Cuba, Punta del Este
agreements... Because everything that has hap-
pened in Latin America, since the triumph of the
Revolution, has to do precisely with the Cuban Revo-
lution.
It is somehow funny—cannot be funny, because
it is not funny; it is something ridiculous—, but
12,
DocuUMENTS
impression of mental orphanhood of U.S. leaders,

for example, a phrase of Stevenson in his speech of
today at the Security Body, where he says that
what cannot be forgiven to Cuba is neither its Com-
munism, nor its Socialism, nor its Revolution, nor
nothing; what cannot be forgiven is to have intro-
duced these problems in Latin America at the time
when the most extraordinary effort of progress was
undertaken. He referred to the Alliance.
As if nobody absolutely knew that the Alliance
for Progress, that facade, that false policy is nei-
ther Progress nor Alliance, nor is nothing but, in
two words, another pulling of someone’s leg. In short,
with all those agreements, with all those steps,
even with all those credits that they have given.
they have given not enough, but the little bit that they
have given has been after the triumph of the Cuban
Revolution.
Then, we can say that without the Cuban Revo-
lution it would not have been, not even the least
effort of imperialists of disguising its policy of ex-
ploitation. Because the Alliance for Progress is not
more than the way to disguise an exploitation sys-
tem with Latin America. So, for every peso that they
take away they lend one. It is also something com-
pletely failed.
But, finally, all those things emerged—all that
concern for Latin America—after the triumph of
the Cuban Revolution. All those agreements, the
isolation of Cuba, all those fights.
Then, they simultaneously carried out with that
policy more economic aggression, and total block-
ade. Useless. Blockade means total prohibition of
purchases, of buying Cuban products and of selling
products to Cuba, despite all our factories, our trans-
portation, everything had spares coming from the
United States.
113
This was not enough for them. All that was use-
less. They started with a more aggressive policy still;
it was not then to prevent selling our products to the
United States, but to pursue our products all over
the world and, at the same time, to try avoiding that
all capitalist countries sold anything to us.
Later, they started their attempt of a blockade of
another kind already. That is: to exert pressure
with threats of not tolerating arrival in U.S. ports
to those ships that transported products to Cuba.
They tried to impose us a blockade by means of
blackmail to nations, which were even their allies and
their lives depended on merchant way. Because
there are some nations for which merchant marine
is a very important way of life: Greece, Norway, the
UK. There are others like Panama, Nigeria, and
some other nations such as Honduras, which do not
have vessels, but they lend their insignia to alien
ships. Many ships are American that thus brake tax
laws and all that. It is a practice, one of the many
“healthy” practices of the Yankee imperialism.
And what happens? That U.S. merchant marine
is subsidized, one way or another, and it makes a
ruinous competition to ships of all those nations.
Because in U.S. policy there is always a double
purpose: of course, the purpose to attack Cuba, but
also the purpose to eliminate competition from other
marines. Then, let’s go to prohibit them to come to
Cuba. They used to sell stuff to Cuba, and it was
logic that those nations are interested in the trade
of Cuba and the Soviet Union, the trade with the
Socialist bloc. Why? Because the Socialist bloc is
made up of the third part of mankind and an ex-
tremely high percentage of world production.
They threat those nations, the ships of those
nations with not allowing them to arrive in U.S.
_
114
DocUMENTS
ports, with making them a boycott. So, with ruining

them. Useless attempts. Useless. Because it can
be said that they have experienced all weapons, and
all weapons, one by one, have been going to failure.
In this attempt to prevent us to be prepared they
started by La Coubre; with the explosion of the ves-
sel La Coubre that its purpose was to prevent us
from acquiring weapons from Belgium. Later, they
exerted pressure on Belgium.
They wanted us to be disarmed, at their mercy,
to attack us, of course, when they felt liking it.
They felt that with a little Playa Giron-type inva-
sion they were going to resolve the problem if we
were disarmed.
Now, it ends in this effort, in this really danger-
ous adventure for world peace, to even prevent us
from arming with the help of the Socialist bloc.
But, in short, it has been the whole history of
and uninterrupted chain of failures that has been
leading imperialism—that does not give up, which
has not just given up despite it does not have any
other choice than giving up—to a series of steps
increasingly risky, more aggressive with a single
purpose: to destroy the Cuban Revolution.
But in four years of vigorous and healthy life,
the Cuban Revolution has not been really harmed.
If the situation of our nation and our people is ana-
lyzed, it is seen that the Revolution is stronger than
ever at this time.
The failure in the purpose to destroy the Cuban
Revolution, is what has taken us to this last step.
Which is this last step? Well, it is adventure,
undoubtedly one of the most temerarious and dan-
gerous adventures for world peace that has emerged
since the last world war.
The people were already informed of Mr. Kennedy’s
declarations yesterday. During the day, we had been
115
receiving a series of news of strange meetings, strange

things that were happening in Washington, concern-
ing meetings with officials of the Pentagon, meetings
with political leaders of both Parties, meetings of its
Security Council, aircraft moving, ships moving and a
whole series of news. We knew that that had to do
with us. We knew it for all antecedents that operate
in the policy followed since the Revolution; the mili-
tary campaign, hysteria, the Joint Resolution; all those
things. Then, we realized that anything could happen
at any time. We are not going to be taken in surprise
and unprepared, because we have not been taken in
surprise insofar nor they are going to surprise us. When
Giron, they did not surprise us unprepared and they
will not surprise us unprepared at any time. When we
realized that a series of movements were happening
and that an action was imminent—we did not know
specifically what action was going to be, or where it
was going to start that action by—, then, discussing
with the comrades, we concluded that it was neces-
sary to alert our force.
Therefore, yesterday afternoon, at 5:40, order of
combat alert was given. Combat alert is the highest
degree of alert and tension in the Armed Forces.
We had prevented to have to take those meas-
ures, unless before a very evident danger, because,
of course, all our effort, the effort of our country from
many months ago, has been almost completely de-
voted to increase production, to resolve problems of
economic kind. And, in fact, our country had ad-
vanced and has advanced a lot in that terrain.
Of course, whenever a mobilization of this kind
is undertaken, it implies sacrifices in the field of
production no matter how much one tries to con-
ciliate one thing with the other one. And although,
of course, we have much more organization, much
more experience, this affects anyway.
116
DoOcUMENTS
But before this situation, the order was decreed

and, of course, all foreseen instructions for the case
of combat alert, forecasting an aggression and against
danger of an attack by surprise were fulfilled. That
is, at this time we cannot be taken in surprise by
them.
And as we always have to distrust from these
gentlemen, the same could happen, according to
movements undertaken, that the maneuver—as-
sumed maneuver—of landing at Vieques Island, mili-
tary maneuvers in Puerto Rico, were deviated to Cuba,
as they actually did. They suspended maneuvers and
we were attentive because one of the ways that they
can use is to simulate a maneuver and to launch an
attack to try to reach—by means of surprise—the
proposed goals.
Maneuvers were under way and, foreseeing that
something might happen: a sudden attack, by sur-
prise, that order was given.
Later, Kennedy’s declaration appeared published,
which did nothing else but confirming and justify-
ing the measures that we had taken.
Why? Simply because an imperialist adventure
of that kind implies such risks that it is necessary
to be in complete state of alert.
After trying to justify in a preamble, in which all
reasons invoked are absolutely groundless, it is said
that the weapons that Cuba received constitute “an
explicit threat to the peace and security of all the
Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of
the Rio Pact of 1947”!—pact that can have validity
for the ones who remain in the flock of imperial-
ism, but not for us. And it is referred to “traditions
1. Laurence Chang, and Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Missile Crisis,

New Press, 1992), 160.
117
of this Nation and Hemisphere. . . .”* Which are

the traditions of that nation? Which are they? The
traditions of imperialist exploitation, of piratical plun-
dering on our wealth, of exploitation to our workers?
The tradition of obedience and exploitation? Then,
according to him, we violate the traditions of this con-
tinent, the 87th Joint Resolution of the Congress...
We do not care all Resolutions, may be the 87th, or
the 7th, or the 587th of U.S. Congress!
He speaks of the Charter of the United Nations,
precisely at the time when they are going to violate
it. They invoke the Charter of the United Nations
when we have not committed the least violation of
any of its articles, not the least! It does not appear
anywhere, or cannot be proved by anywhere that
we have violated any article. And at the time when
they are going to commit a flagrant and shameless
violation, they invoke the Charter of the United
Nations.
And, finally, they say: “my own public warnings
to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.”
And what do we matter Mr. Kennedy’s warnings?
That may care to him and to its people. We do not
absolutely matter anything.
Those are not less than the law and arguments,
that is, the basis that he takes for adopting a reso-
lution that is as follows:
First: To halt . . . a strict quarantine on all offen-
sive military equipment under shipment to Cuba
is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound
for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if
found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons,
be turned back. This quarantine will be ex-
tended... —Just pay attention!, this quarantine
2. Ibid.
DOocUMENTS
will be extended—, if needed, to other types

of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time,
however, denying the necessities of life as the
Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin block-
ade of 1948.°
But, watch well between lines how it says that “this
quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other
types of cargoes and carriers. We are not at this
time, however, denying,” in this time!
Second: I have directed the continued and in-
creased close surveillance of Cuba and its military
build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS in
their communiqué of October 6, rejected secrecy
on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should these
offensive military preparations continue, thus in-
creasing the threat to the Hemisphere, further
action will be justified—Just pay attention,
further action will be justified—. I have directed...
—He has become a “big man of orders,” this
mister!— the Armed Forces... —the Armed
Forces!—to prepare for any eventualities... —We
are already prepared, just in case—; and I trust
that in the interest of both the Cuban people and
the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards
to all concerned of continuing this threat will be
recognized.
CEE) CR eS Sin LM EIT Se FIO 9) OTR a BOE et
TOL
Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have

reinforced our base at Guantanamo... —They are
shameless—, evacuated today the dependents
of our personnel there, and ordered additional
military units to be on a standby alert basis.
3. Ibid., 162. (Fidel Castro’s comments are between dashes. Ed.)
119
Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate

meeting of the Organ of Consultation under
the Organization of American States, to con-
sider this threat to hemispheric security and
to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in
support of all necessary action. The United
Nations Charter allows for regional security
arrangements -- and the nations of this Hemi-
sphere decided long ago against the military
presence of outside powers. Our other allies
around the world have also been alerted.*
Yes but they were warned after making the deci-
-
sion, they did not previously consult any of them; but

later we can talk about this, and:
Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations,

we are asking tonight that an emergency meet-
ing of the Security Council be convoked without
delay to take action against this latest Soviet
threat to world peace. Our resolution will call
for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of
all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the super-
vision of UN observers, before the quarantine
can be lifted.®
See yourselves that every of these articles contains
an intention like the one I referred to that for the
time being, to weapons, later it can extend to another
thing.
Concerning the matter of Cuba’s surveillance,
its surveillance has consisted of daily violation of
our airspace and our jurisdictional waters. And they
confess themselves so, because now they are talk-
ing about some assumed photographs that their air-
craft have taken. How can their aircraft have taken
4. Ibid., 162-163.
5. Ibid., 163.
120
DocuMENTS
photographs unless they violated the Cuban air-

space?
So every step contains one illegality.
They met the Foreign Ministers of Washington
Chancellorship, behind closed doors, in secret, and
now they talk about that meeting.
Then, they talk of the Base of Guantanamo. Do
they have the right to talk about the Base of
Guantanamo? That is: of a base that they have in
our territory, which they took by force and that they
maintain against the will of our people.
And then, quietly, in a document of this kind
they talk of the Base of Guantanamo, which is in
our territory, and shamelessly they say that they
are using that base, which has been reinforced to
use it against Cuba. That is a great warning that
they make to all nations where they have military
bases at present!
They pose a meeting of the OAS. What for? To
defend a Latin American nation from the aggres-
sion? No! For confirming and supporting aggression
against a Latin American nation.
And, finally, he speaks of the United Nations not
less than for suggesting the sending of observers
to Cuba to supervise the measures that we have
taken for our defense.
Maybe, the most shameless part of all this dec-
laration of Mr. Kennedy be the two paragraphs ad-
dressed to the people of Cuba, and that I will read
you, because it can be seen until where cynicism
goes to and the shame of that mister.
He says: “I speak to you as a friend... .”
He says: “Finally, I want to say a few words to
the captive people of Cuba’—to these people that
are armed and that have hundreds of thousands of
men on arms, and that have very good arms, he
calls “captive people;” he might better say captive
and armed people of Cuba, for which this speech is
121
directly addressed by means of “special facilities.”

Special facilities mean all radio stations broadcast-
ing for over here. He does not need so, because I am
going to read it to you.
I speak to you as a friend... —As a friend!—, a
one who knows of your deep attachment to
your fatherland... —We do not deny it; I imagine
that he is very well informed of our patrio-
tism—and one who shares... —Listen to it—,
and one who shares your aspirations for lib-
erty and justice for all. And I have watched
and the American people have watched with
deep sorrow that your nationalist Revolution
was betrayed... —If it had been betrayed, we
would be the best allies of imperialism all over
the world—and how your fatherland fell un-
der foreign domination. Now your leaders are
no longer Cuban leaders... —They must be
Martians!—, inspired by Cuban ideals. They
are puppets and agents of an international con-
spiracy which has turned Cuba against your
friends and neighbors... —They are the ones
who have forced neighbors to break relations with
us, that is, to become our foes—, against your
friends and neighbors in the Americas — and
turned it into the first Latin American country to
become a target for nuclear war. . . .®
That is, they threat us with nuclear war: the first
Latin American nation that has nuclear weapons in
its soil; those weapons are not good for you, they do
not contribute anything to peace and welfare, they
can just undermine you.
. . . this country has no wish to cause you to
suffer... —Listen carefully—, or to impose any
6. Ibid., 164.
122
DocUMENTS
system upon you. We know that your lives and

land are being used as pawns by those who
deny you freedom. Many times in the past,
the Cuban people have risen to throw out ty-
rants who destroyed their liberty. And I have
no doubt that most Cubans today look forward
to the time when they will be truly free — free
from foreign domination, free to choose their
own leaders... —I don’t know who chose us!—,
free to select their own system, free to own
their own land... .’
Understand this: “to own their own land,” the
lands we have taken the American companies and
landowners away, and have been put in the hands of
the people; the lands by which peasants had to pay
a rent, the third part, the fourth part, the half.
And then, just pay attention... well, I don’t know,
they are things really difficult to understand, this
mister says: “to own their own land’—that is the prom-
ise that he makes—; “free to speak, and write’—What
do you think?—, “free to speak, and write,” this mis-
ter says to a people in which one million of their sons
have learned to read and write in the course of the
Revolution, because the Revolution has taught them,
“and worship without fear or degradation,” it turns
out to be that nobody is prevented from going to
churches, from going anywhere. But it is going be
their God, that is, the golden calf, because those im-
perialist misters do not have more God than gold, “to
the society of free nations and to the associations of
this Hemisphere,” for instance, Guatemala, Nicara-
gua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, the gorillas of Ar-
gentina. That is we are invited to go to the heart of
“free nations:” what nations! “Let no one doubt that
7. Ibid.
123
this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we

have set out,” we don’t doubt it, in any way, that it is
difficult and dangerous; and if he well understood, he
didn’t possibly set out on that “effort.”®
“No one can foresee precisely what course it will
be take or what costs or casualties will be incurred.”°
Will this mister be so shameless that speak of “ca-
sualties” that mankind can suffer? Is it because of
teaching to read and write to our people and for
making peasants be the owners of their lands, or for
making the people be the owner of their lands?
The one who reads this has a strange feeling that,
well, this mister is not informed, or this mister has
lost the last apex of shame, or in fact there is only
one thing: this is for consumption of an opinion whom
all these things have been said; that is, an intoxi-
cated opinion by lie and calumny.
Of course, for our people all those things seem,
in fact, very ridiculous; and what mister Kennedy
does, really, is to make a fool of himself.
There is another aspect in the arguments of these
misters when they say: “Should these offensive
military preparations continue, thus increasing the
threat to the Hemisphere, further action will be
justified.”!°
You will remember how the World War started.
You will remember how the invasion to Poland
started: with a Hitler’s “report,” Hitler gives a “re-
port” that from three—I don’t remember at what
time—or six in the morning, his troops had started
to respond the Polish fire. They were not the ones
who were attacking. Hitler responded the Polish fire.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 162.
124
DOCUMENTS
All campaigns of aggression, all wars of aggres-

sion that Nazism and Fascism started—and the Yan-
kee imperialism is the most complete incarnation of
Fascism in the contemporary world—, were always
started talking about danger of aggression. That is,
alleging pretext of danger of aggression to initiate
this kind of action.
Finally, this mister comes back, at the end, be-
cause he is so “good,” so “saint” that, at the end, after
writing all these perfidies, repeats something that is
a violation of the law and the morale. He says: “Our
goal is not the victory of might, but vindication of right
— not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace
and freedom here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope,
around the world. God willing, that goal will be
achieved.”!! Even, he asks that God bless all misdeeds
that he proposes to commit and is committing.
This is, in synthesis, the declaration of Mister
Kennedy. For me and for our people this is not the
declaration of a statesman, but the declaration of
a pirate.
There is the following fact. The measure that he
takes, as consequence of that, is a violation, com-
pletely undisguisable of the International Law. No
state can do that. No state can stop vessels of other
state in the high seas, no state can blockade an-
other state. It is like if we sent now our ships with
this purpose: No, the United States cannot send
such weapons to Guatemala or Venezuela. Or that
any nation put its warships in front of another na-
tion, and blockaded that nation. That is against
any international law, and it is, also against the
morale of international relations, against the most
elementary right of the peoples.
11. Ibid, 164.
125
That is, first of all, it is a flagrant violation of the

law. Two violations are committed: one against our
sovereignty, by which it tries to blockade our na-
tion, and another one against the right of all the
peoples, because it is said that any ship, from any
nation, can be checked. Where? In American wa-
ters? No! In the high seas, that is, in international
waters! They commit a violation against the right
of all the other nations, not just against Cuba.
And, of course, this is a fact that very soon will
start to have repercussion in the whole world, be-
Cause every nation sees what it means that a na-
tion arrogate the right to blockade another nation.
And the hundreds odd independent nations that
there are, still those less independent, have to see
with justified fear that a country take the preroga-
tive of blockading another, of preventing that that
country can freely acquire and receive the weap-
ons that consider appropriate, or the products that
consider appropriate.
So the United States Government violates the
sovereign right of our country and violates the inter-
national law. That is, it violates the right of all na-
tions and set a precedent that has to be alarming for
all peoples of the world.
That is, in the first place, what this act of mister
Kennedy means.
In the second place, he points out to another se-
ries of measures, which I am going to see how they
are going to execute them, because one thing is to
do one thing, and another thing is to do another
thing. They pose here the support of the OAS: that
is, they seek complicity of Latin America govern-
ments to undertake a crime against a Latin Ameri-
can nation.
And the governments that have allowed them-
selves to be pulled by that policy are unquestionably
126
DocuUMENTS
committing the biggest act of treachery that any gov-

ernment of a Latin American people can have com-
mitted; to offer themselves for an aggression like
the one to our nation, to serve as a customed group
to imperialists to commit that crime against a brother
people of Latin America is the biggest act of treach-
ery that a government can have committed.
Treachery that peoples will never commit. Imperi-
alists want that together with them, Latin American
soldiers come to fight against their Cuban brothers,
to fight against men who have the same problems,
which have the same traditions, the same culture, the
same language.
That is, imperialists do not want to come alone,
and they also want to put peoples of Latin America
as cannon fodder in their adventures, peoples who
will never agree with this aggression.
We, who will defend ourselves in our shores are
not going to be in charge of punishing traitors. The
peoples will do that, because with this, they do noth-
ing but approaching the time of revolution in Latin
America.
With the aggression to Cuba, with serving as
customed group to imperialists against Cuba, the
only thing that they do is to approach the time that
in their respective peoples they are made to give
an account for their actions. And the revolution
comes at least nobody imagines. Above all, while
more miserable, more servile, and more fatherland-
seller a government is.
They attempt so and, also, they ask the United
Nations that we disarm ourselves, of course, with
the sending of observers. Concerning this problem
there is one very curious thing: imperialists have
now invented the terms “offensive weapons” and “de-
fensive weapons.” Which are defensive weapons and
which are offensive weapons? Because rifles that
127
came to Playa Giron were offensive weapons; ba-

zookas, grenades, mortars, bullets, knives that dis-
embarked in Playa Girdn were offensive weapons.
However, rifles, mortars, our tanks, were defensive
tanks, while Sherman tanks that they disembarked
were offensive weapons. Because what determines
the offensive or defensive character of weapons is
not its structure, but its use, its employment.
And as we employ our weapons to defend our-
selves, our rifles, our cannons, our tanks, were
defensive. And rifles, weapons, tanks they brought,
were offensive.
That cannot be discussed anywhere. Imperial-
ists, however, have invented now the category of
“offensive weapons” and “defensive weapons.” It is
a pure invention of them, in the attempt to main-
tain the people disarmed.
What have we said about this? What have we
said in all times? When the Joint Resolution of
U.S. Congress, another Yankee resolution—I say
Yankee because of the contradictory and foolish of
it—, because in this same Resolution of the Con-
gress, it says:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That the United States
is determined—
(a) to prevent by whatever means may be nec-
essary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-
Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force
or the threat of force, its aggressive or subver-
sive activities to any part of this hemisphere:
(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an
externally supported military capability endan-
gering the security of the United States: and
128
DocuMENTS
(c) to work with the Organization of American

States and with freedom-loving Cubans to sup-
port the aspirations of the Cuban people for
self-determination. '!”
So, in the same time when they say that they are
going to take measures by force against subver-
sion, they unshamelessly speak of employing sub-
version against the Cuban Revolution.
But when they made this declaration of prevent-
ing in Cuba the creation or use of a military capabil-
ity of extreme support that put in danger the security
of the United States, we warned that our purpose
was not the one of attacking any nation, or not less
attacking any Latin American nation, or attacking
the United States. That is something absurd. There
is nothing more ridiculous than conferring on our-
selves aggressive purposes against the United States.
This is the limit that, after four years attacking us, it
now turns out to be that we are the ones who have
aggressive purposes against these misters.
But, what did we say on this problem of weap-
ons? We said:
It is . . absurd the threat to launch a direct
armed attack, if Cuba were militarily strength-
ened up to a degree that the United States
takes the liberty of determining so.
bers of the U.S. Senate or House concerning
the weapons that we conveniently esteemed
to acquire and the measures to take for fully
defending our country, as we did not consult, or
request authorization about the kind of weapons
12. Joint Resolution of the 87th United States Congress, 2d.

session, 29 September 1962. (Courtesy of Pathfinder Press. Ed.)
129
and the measures that we took when we de-

stroyed the invaders of Playa Giron.
standards, laws and international principles
recognize to every sovereign state of any part
of the world?
And, to what part of the world, and to what nation
is the right to arm itself denied? And to what part
of the world and to what nation is supervised with
what kind of weapons to arm itself? In what part of
the world, in what nation? And, to the title of what do
imperialists believe that we have to be that only na-
tion in the world? Why, if we are a sovereign state? As
sovereign as they are, and more sovereign than them,
because we are not slaves of exploitation, or of impe-
rialism, or of the warlike policy that they follow!
And we are not sovereign by Yankee concession,
but for our own right. And we are not orally sover-
eign. We are truly sovereign and we are conse-
quent with the facts of our condition of sovereign
nation, and to take that sovereignty away we have
to be swept away from the face of the Earth.
And continue saying our response-declaration to
the Joint Resolution:
We have not appropriated and we do not think
to appropriate in favor of the U.S. Congress
any sovereign prerogative.
If the U.S. Government does not foster aggres-
sive intentions against our country, it would
not be interested in quantity, quality or kind
of our weapons.
If the United States were capable to giving
Cuba effective and satisfactory guarantees con-
cerning the integrity of our territory and it cea-
sed in its subversive and counterrevolutionary
130
DocUMENTS
activities against our people, Cuba would not

need to strengthen its defense, it would not even
need an army, and all those resources that it
implies would be gladly invested in the economic
and cultural development of the nation.
Can it be talked clearer? Who are the ones that
have obliged us to arm ourselves? Ah! They do not
give up to the policy of hostility, they do not give up
to the policy of aggression, of subversion. They state
so. And while state so on the one hand, that its
goal is to destroy the Revolution, they pretend tell-
ing us what measures we must take, what steps
we must take to defend ourselves. Does the victim
have to consult his killers the way he is going to
defend himself? That is, simply, deep down, what
these “extremely-wrong” misters pose. Because,
saying it is one thing, and believing that we are
going to pay attention to them..., if they believe so
they are crazy.
So, we said: “Cuba has always been willing to dis-
cuss with the United States Government and to do
what it were on its part, if it found in the United
States Government a reciprocal attitude to dimin-
ish tension and to improve relations.” That is what,
with all frankness and sincerity, Cuba posed.
At the United Nations, by mouth of our President,
the Cuban Revolution exposed this; that is, the same
point of view.
Cuba has certainly armed itself, it has the
right to arm and to defend itself. And the ques-
tion that matters is this: Why has Cuba armed
itself? It is undeniable that we would have
wished to allot all those human and material
resources, all energies that we have had to
employ in the strengthening of our military
defense, for the development of our economy
and our culture.
131
We have armed ourselves against our wishes

and our aspirations, because we have been
urged to strengthen our military defense, un-
der pain of putting in danger sovereignty of our
nation and independence of our fatherland. We
have armed ourselves, because the people of
Cuba have the legitimate right, which the his-
tory grants them, of defending their sovereign
decisions, of leading their nation through the
historical courses that, in exercise of that sov-
ereignty, our people have chosen.
And I ask you for responding with sincerity
before your own consciousness: What would
have happened if we hadn’t strengthened our
military defense, when an armed and trained
division by the United States Government in-
vaded our country by Playa Gir6n?
It would not have happened—it is clear—, the
defeat of our Revolution or the reversion of
our historical rhythm, but, without a doubt,
that would have been a bloody and long fight
and much more human lives and larger wealth
of the ones that our fatherland lost, would have
been destroyed.
We liquidated that invasion in seventy-two
hours, that unjustified and arrogant aggression
to our nation, in seventy-two hours, because
we exercised on time the right to strengthen
our defensive military capability to safeguard
our sovereignty, our independence and our
Revolution.
Our people will never forget that that “friend” Kennedy
was the one who gave the order of that attack, that
attack that cost so many lives, which left so many
widows and many orphans. And, it is clear, which
cost tens, and maybe hundreds of thousands of lives,
132
DOCUMENTS
by the fact of having been quickly defeated. But,

what would have happened if they had reached tak-
ing control of the Swamp, of that piece of our terri-
tory, to which only one was able to reach through
two narrow roads between marshes, and they would
have put there to operate their bombers, and they
would have attacked our cities all evenings, our
lines of transport, our factories? How much wouldn't
have been misery, destruction, killing, and prob-
lems that this would have created to this nation?
Because that was the intention of that “friend”
Kennedy, as were his intentions in all the other
facts: in the attempt of depriving our nation from
foodstuff, depriving our nation from commerce, de-
priving our nation from spares, from raw materi-
als. That is: With the economic blockade, with sub-
version, with the thousands of weapons that they
dropped in the mountains of our nation to reorganize
mercenary bands, counterrevolutionary bands, with
the piratical attacks that they committed, that have
been of all kinds, from those aircraft that, scarcely
initiated the Revolution, they came to burn our
cane-fields, to drop incendiary bombs over our cane-
fields until that attack to Havana city that, in plain
afternoon, the first year of the Revolution, cost tens
of victims. And then, attacks like that one that they
undertook to the petroleum refinery in Santiago de
Cuba, before Girén invasion, the treacherous bomb-
ing, Pearl Harbor-type, which they undertook on
April 15—two days before the invasion—, where
children and women were wounded, victims of all
kinds.
When seeing documentaries of those days, bodies
of killed women by homicide bullets of those bombers
of our “friend” Kennedy, can be seen. And the pirati-
cal attacks of which they have perpetrated many, among
them the last one, in which a non-artillery small
133
launch was attacked by one of the P-T boats, armed

by the United States. And it was not only attacked,
but also sunk, and two of the wounded crew mem-
bers were captured, and taken to the United States,
revolutionary comrades, relatives of revolutionary
men, and they have them there, cynically and
unshamelessly kidnapped.
All acts and all misdeeds that imperialists have
continually been committing, against our nation, since
the triumph of the Revolution, and long before we
armed ourselves are that way.
Because when CIA agents made exploit the ves-
sel La Coubre, loaded of weapons, which cost al-
most eighty victims for us, we did not even have
relations with the Soviet Union. And we were arm-
ing ourselves, because after the Law of Agrarian
Reform, they started to prepare their expedition in
Guatemala. When? Since the first year of the Revo-
lution, five months after the triumph of the Revolu-
tion, by the mere fact of having decreed the Revolution
an agrarian reform. For that single fact they started to
prepare the expedition, and they started their war
against us.
And intentions, what have they been? To destroy
the Revolution, to subdue the people again to all
miseries and all injustices of the past. Those are
the objectives that, from the first time, they have
been pursuing.
What have we done? Defending us. What have
we done, but defending ourselves, only and exclu-
sively defending ourselves? Or did imperialists pre-
tend that we, from the first hostility that they made
against us, the first action, they would already have
a surrendered people, a surrendered government, and
a legion of revolutionary men raising a white flag?
That were we revolutionary men going to surrender,
that were the people of Cuba going to surrender? Was
134
~ DOCUMENTS
that what they were expecting? It seems that it was

what they were expecting, because what we did was
to defend ourselves. And if they took measure after
measure against us, we took others.
They were the ones who decreed that policy of
aggression, of enmity towards us, of breaking rela-
tions with our nation. They were the ones. If they
have failed, it is their fault. Not ours.
They were the ones who rejected one and ten
times the statements of the Cuban Revolution, the
friendly words of the Cuban Revolution, the reiter-
ated offerings to discuss since the beginning up to
the appearance of the President at the United Na-
tions.
It is clear that they could not respond those
words. Why don’t they want to discuss? Why don't
they respond to the calling of the Government of
Cuba to discuss, posed there before representa-
tions of all nations of the world?
It is clearly defined our position over weapons.
We acquire the weapons we feel like acquiring for
our defense, and we take the measures that we
consider necessary for our defense. That is what
we have done. Which are they? We do not have to
tell imperialists. We do not have to tell them which
those measures are, or we do not have to tell them
what weapons are. Who has said that we have to
give an explanation to imperialists, to aggressors, of
measures and of weapons we have for our defense?
None of our weapons are offensive, as it has not
been so far. Why? Because we have never had ag-
gressive intentions against anyone, we have never
practiced an offensive policy against rights of any
people, of any nation. We will never vary that policy.
We will never be aggressors. We will never be
offenders. Therefore our weapons will never be of-
fensive.
135
We can certainly and clearly declare that any

nation can be quiet, any nation of Latin America,
any nation of America, the United States, because
we will never be aggressors, we will never be of-
fenders. But just as we clearly and honestly de-
clare so, we also declare that we will not be easy
victims of any aggression. And we also declare that,
with the same determination and the same secu-
rity, we will know to defend ourselves and will repel
any aggressor. That is what our weapons are for.
That is what I precisely posed on July 26 in San-
tiago de Cuba, that we knew the intentions of our
enemies, the plans they had, that we had to take
measures, not only for resisting, but also for repelling.
It has simply been that way: We have taken the appro-
priate measures for resisting and—listen well, listen
well—, for repelling any direct aggression of the United
States.
Of course, we definitely reject any attempt of
supervision, every attempt of inspection of our na-
tion. No one inspects our nation. No one can come
to inspect our nation, because we will never give
the authorization to anyone, we will never give up
to the sovereign prerogative that within our bor-
ders we are the ones who decide and we are the
ones who inspect and nobody else.
Therefore, we definitely reject the attempt of all
kind of investigation over our territory, come where
may.
Cuba is not the Congo. The imperialist circles
went to the Congo hoisting the flags of the United
Nations, they killed the leader of the Congo, they
divided it, gaged it, and killed the independent spirit
of that nation. Cuba is not the Congo.
No one can come to inspect our country not even
under that flag, or under any other one. We know
what we do and we know how we must defend our
integrity and our sovereignty.
136
DOCUMENTS
Anyone who try to inspect Cuba must know that

he has to come in full combat gear! That is our
definite response to illusions, to the proposals of
undertaking inspections in our territory.
In the same way that we are not interested in
inspecting nobody’s territory or what nobody does
in his territory, we do not accept inspections of our
territory by no means.
Of course new declarations arose, each times more
aggressive. Here we have the one of mister [Doug]
Dillon. Dillon is the secretary of the treasury who
was in Mexico in a meeting of ministers. This is the
man who makes believe that is going to give money.
It says:
He said today to Housing Ministers of Latin
American nations that a new action will be
broadly justified against Cuba if offensive prepa-
rations in the Island do not stop immediately.
Dillon stated in a speech that he delivered in a
magisterial meeting that he can assure them
that the United States is resolutely determined
to continue in the way that it has planned, until
the offensive weapons that are in Cuba now have
been withdrawn or neutralized in an effective
manner.
He says that he can assure them that the United
States is resolutely determined to continue in the
way that it has planned. That is, they are reso-
lutely determined to commit suicide.
And he continues saying that they have the hope
that this be that way..., see yourselves: they have
the hope that this be that way, by the immediate—that
is: right now, right here— acceptance on the part of
Cuba of the Resolution that they have offered to the
Security Council of the United Nations, requesting
the prompt dismantling of offensive weapons in Cuba,
137
under supervision and inspection of the United

Nations.
This mister poses that we disarm ourselves. We
are so sorry to tell him that his hopes are failed,
because neither now nor at no time will we disarm
ourselves, while the policy of aggression and hos-
tility of the United States towards us persist.
What is our position of principles concerning ar-
mament race and disarmament? We are decided
followers of disarmament. Which is our policy on
military bases? We are decided followers of the dis-
mantling of all the military bases. Which is our
policy on presence of troops in different countries?
We are followers of a policy of peace and that there
is no troops or military personnel of any nation in
another nation. That is our position of principles.
Do the United States wish disarmament? Great,
let’s go to disarm all of us. Great, let’s go to support
all a policy of dismantling of bases, of troops, of all
the ones that there are in all parts of the world.
Great. With that policy we agree. But with the policy
that we disarm ourselves in front of aggressors we
do not agree. That is so fool, so ridiculous, so ab-
surd that it is not worth that they waste more time
thinking in such a foolishness.
In case that it be a foolishness—that can be a fool-
ishness because they believe so, although it is not
possible—, may be a foolishness because they be-
lieve that are going to scare us with that. Here we all
are already cured of fear; and it may be—it is the
most probable thing—, that they do it as pretext. It is
that the whole policy of the United States is vitiated
of contradictions, of lack of reason, of lack of prin-
ciples, and of lack of morale. That is what character-
izes the United States policy. Therefore it can be said
that it is a policy of pirates, a policy of filibusters.
Which is the new step? Well. As result of this
declaration here, there is a cable from AP that says:
138
DOcUMENTS
U.S. President John F. Kennedy proclaimed

today a blockade to Cuba, effective tomorrow
at nine in the morning, and he ordered the
Defense Department to take the appropriate
measures for executing it, including the use
of force, if it were necessary. The U.S. head of
state signed the document in his office, which
is called Prohibition of Delivery of Offensive
Weapons to Cuba. It enumerates as those weap-
ons the surface-to-surface missiles, bombers,
air-to-surface missiles, warheads, electronic
equipments for specific weapons and any other,
which later may be added by the Defense De-
partment. Kennedy conferred the necessary
powers to the Secretary of Defense Robert 5S.
McNamara, for using the army in any manner
that be necessary, as well as any other force
that be supplied by any other American nation.
But he specified that the force must only be
used when is necessary... .
So it says: “. . . as well as any other force that be
supplied by any other American nation. But he
specified that the force must only be used when is
necessary, only in the case that vessels, carrying
cargoes to Cuba refuse fulfillment of orders. The
Defense Department will establish restricted or
prohibited zones, pointing out routes for ships in
the course towards Cuba.” They are already the
owners of the seas. Morgan is the owner of the
seas. I do not say Drake because Drake is a char-
acter who had merits.
“It will be required to any ship—the proclaim
says—, and to stop is necessary. Any ship that re-
fuses to fulfill orders will be taken under custody
of the United States and will be sent to another
destiny. The text of the declaration was not imme-
diately made public. The Secretary of Press of the
139
White House Pierre Slainger, only read the key

passages.”
This is the decree. That is, from tomorrow we
will already have the small U.S. ships. We have
really had them around the Island but now, pos-
sibly, deployment of forces will be more ostensible,
and they, checking ships. With what right? With
no right.
They can search meticulously the archives and
whatever they want to, and unless it be in the his-
tory of piracy, they will not find antecedents of this
anywhere. An act of war in peacetime! Misters, this is
pure Yankee—and they say that are in peace. In the
history of Fascism they can find antecedents of all
these acts.
They cannot deny it, because today the United
States is, unfortunately, refuge of world reaction,
of Fascism, or racism, of all the most retrograde
and reactionary trends that exist in the world. That
is historic.
One day it was a nation of liberty. One day it
was a nation that had the sympathy of the whole
world. But already those Lincoln’s times... From
Lincoln to Kennedy there is a long distance! In that
country the worst and the most reactionary that
exist in the world, for misfortune of mankind, have
refuge today.
Well, this is the situation at this time; threats
and threats of taking new measures. We will see
which they are and how they take them and what
happens, because it is not the same to be with the
small ships in the sea—still in the sea there is
nobody—, than to try to impose those things here
within our territory.
Threats with new measures. It would not be strange
this that they say, here in their first part of the
speech of this mister: “This quarantine will expand,
if needed, to other types of cargoes and carriers.”
140
DocuMENTS
It would not be strange that they tried to expand

it, in a certain moment, to another kind of cargo,
even in a certain moment to foodstuff and to every-
thing. That is to say: that they impose a total block-
ade. We can say that if there is a total blockade we
will know resisting the total blockade.
All those things do nothing but diminish that
nation and enlarge our fatherland. Already in this
time, the wave of repulse, despite the reactionary
press and sensational attempt—because, of course,
these people have tried to redress the puppet, but
the puppet is losing already the dressing and just the
skeleton remains—, there are already some U.S.
embassies that have been assaulted, among them
no less than the one in London. A demonstration of
two thousands people broke a ring of one hundred
policemen and got into the embassy in London.
That is, this nation has provoked—and every day
will be more—, hatred and repulse of the world.
If to the blockade other articles are added and
try to surrender by starvation our nation, that re-
pulse will multiply, and we will see who resists more,
if their shamelessness, or our shame. If their coward-
ice, or Our courage.
If they undertake a blockade they will enlarge
our fatherland, because our fatherland will know
resisting. There is no doubt that we will resist any
coward blockade. What is what can happen? Total
blockade, or direct aggression. Those are the al-
ternatives... They call it quarantine, because they
are so shameless they have said to themselves that
they call it quarantine, but that is a blockade. Two
things remain, then: total blockade or aggression.
Before that, what can we tell the people?
At the right time we will take the necessary meas-
ures and if the case of total blockade presents, we
can resist the total blockade. This would do nothing
but sinking imperialism in the most profound abyss
141
of discredit and raise our nation to unexpected lev-

els of heroism and greatness, and we will not die
of starvation.
If the case is of direct attack, we will repel it!
That is what I can tell you. If there is a direct at-
tack, we will repel it! I feel that is enough. The people
must know that: we have the means to repel the
direct attack. Clearer, water.
Are we threatened to be targets of nuclear at-
tacks? We are not scared. I would like to know if
senators, imperialists, Yankees millionaires have
the courage that our people have, and if they have
serenity our people have, and if they have bravery
our people have. Because it is not the same to de-
fend a just cause and to be fully convinced of that,
than to be pirates. And they are pirates. I would
like to know if they have in this time the same
serenity we have to quietly face everything. They
are not intimidating us.
We are somehow calmed to know that aggres-
sors will not remain unpunished. We are calmed
to know that aggressors would be exterminated.
We are calmed to know so. We take the risk that
we have no more choice than taking. They are risks
that mankind takes. And we, that are part of man-
kind and a very honorable part, by the way, will
know to calmly take those risks. We are comforted
to know that aggressors in a thermonuclear war,
the ones who unleash a thermonuclear war, will
be exterminated. I believe that there is no ambigu-
ity of any kind.
Mankind has to face that danger, it has to fight
for peace. For some reason peace is a fundamental
aspiration of mankind and therefore mankind must
mobilize itself against those who promote war and
aggression, against those who put the world on the
brink of war, against those who undertake that policy
142
DOCUMENTS
to play with fire of war and play with thermonuclear

war, which would cause so horrifying damage to all
mankind. We are part of mankind, we take those
risks, but we are not scared. We have to know living
in the epoch that we have had to live and with the
dignity with which we must know living.
Who are threatening? These misters. But, whom
they are threatening? Those who they can not in-
timidate. It is possible that those who are threaten-
ing, these misters who launch these threats, are
victims of fear. How sad it is, doesn’t it?
How unbelievable! Now it turns out to be that in
their obsession imperialists have ended inventing,
manufacturing a sort of scare to Cuba. The fright-
ened shark calling all the other small sardines to
try to swallow the “ex-small sardine:” Cuba. And
all the others run, some governments are going to
support. So big shame, so big dishonor for them,
and so big glory for our people, for our Revolution,
for us, for all.
When our nation decided to be free and when
our nation decided to undertake a revolution, it
knew that it had to face the consequences and to
face many foes. We were not already a customed
group, we were not already a flock. Flocks go run-
ning behind obedient to the voices and the whip of
the master, and we don’t. And when reactionaries
of this continent gather up completely themselves
against our glorious Revolution and against our he-
roic people, it only serves to enlarge our people, to
raise merit, prestige and heroism of our people that
in this continent faces alone the reactionaries.
We are not worried for those agreements. We
know how they are achieved, how they are de-
manded, how they are obtained, and we know the
endless amount of mud that all that contains of
which we are cleaned. Also, agreements for noth-
143
ing, because for crushing the Revolution they would

have to come and destroy by force, and by force they
cannot destroy it. All the rest are empty talks.
Before that policy of provocation and violence,
our firm and serene attitude to defend ourselves.
The attitude of the Soviet Union, serene and ex-
emplary attitude. The Soviet response has been a
truly lesson to imperialism. Firm, serene, full of
arguments, full of reasons, which leaves undressed
the aggressive policy of Mr. Kennedy. History will
have to consign all this: the attitude of one field
and the other, the attitude of imperialists, and the
attitude of defenders of peace, of the ones who fight
to prevent the tragedy of a war to the world. His-
tory will have to consign that, and mankind must
fight with hope for peace. That hope is based, pre-
cisely, in the fact that imperialists are not today
all-powerful masters and lords of the world, that
imperialists cannot launch to a war without suf-
fering consequences of the war that they provoke:
extermination. That is what can stop them. Since
they are not masters and lords anymore, mankind
must maintain its hope to have peace. With firm-
ness, with resolution, with a policy of principles.
That policy of principles and peace has more sup-
porters in the world every day. And the policy of
provocation and of war, of piracy and of arbitrari-
ness, every day has more repulse in the world. His-
tory will consign responsibility that corresponds to
each one.
If before the most elementary interest of man-
kind, imperialists force things up to the limit to
unleash a war, extremely painful for mankind, his-
toric responsibility will also be theirs. And over their
shoulders—or more specifically, over their ashes—,
they will have to carry the tremendous and crush-
ing responsibility for the damage they can cause to
the world.
144
DocuMENTS
Our policy is of respect to principles, of respect to

international standards and of peace.
We can say it because it is that way. Without
having any second intention, we can talk in that
way. An we can talk that way, because we have
the conviction of the cause we defend, of the whole
justice, and of the whole reason that accompanies
us, and because we know that our people do not
take these risks for being a corrupted people, for
being a degraded people, for being an abject people,
for being a people that live swimming in the quag-
mire of injustice, of exploitation. This is a people
that have hoisted an ideal of justice, a people that
have put vices, depravation, exploitation of moral
and material miseries of the past farther away, and
that they are very convinced of what they are do-
ing. Hence, their strength. They are very convinced
of their historic role that are playing, very convinced
of the prestige that they enjoy, of the faith that
other peoples of the world have put on them. There-
fore, because they are convinced of that, they know
to serenely look face to face. All, men and women,
young and old people, all are one in this time of
danger! And ours—of all: of revolutionaries, of pa-
triots—, will be the same fate. And of all will vic-
>
tory be!
We shall overcome!
145
PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV’S LETTER
TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
OCTOBER 26, 1962
Dear Mr. President: é

I have received your letter of October 25. From
your letter I got the feeling that you have some
understanding of the situation which has devel-
oped and a sense of responsibility. I appreciate this.
By now we have already publicly exchanged our
assessments of the events around Cuba and each
of us has set forth his explanation and his inter-
pretation of these events. Therefore, I would think
that, evidently, continuing to exchange opinions at
such a distance, even in the form of secret letters,
would probably not add anything to what one side
has already said to the other.
I think you will understand me correctly if you
are really concerned for the welfare of the world.
Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have
not lost their reason, and all the more, commu-
nists—people who know how to value not only their
own lives but, above all else, the life of nations. We
communists are against any wars between states
at all, and have been defending the cause of peace
ever Since we came into the world. We have al-
ways regarded war as a calamity, not as a game or
a means for achieving particular purposes, much
less as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the
means of achieving them is work. War is our en-
emy and a calamity for all nations.
146
DocuMENTS
This is how we Soviet people, and together with

us, other peoples as well, interpret questions of war
and peace. I can say this with assurance at least
for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well
as for all progressive people who want peace, hap-
piness, and friendship among nations.
His Excellency
John Kennedy
President of the United States of America
I can see, Mr. President, that you also are not with-
out a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, not
without an understanding and correct assessment
of the nature of modern warfare and what war en-
tails. What good would a war do you? You threaten
us with war. But you well know that the very least
you would get in response would be what you had
given us; you would suffer the same consequences.
And that must be clear to us—people invested with
authority, trust and responsibility. We must not
succumb to light-headedness and petty passions,
regardless of whether elections are forthcoming in
one country or another. These are all transitory
things, but should war indeed break out, it would
not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is
the logic of war. I have taken part in two wars, and
I know that war ends only when it has rolled
through cities and villages, sowing death and de-
struction everywhere.
I assure you on behalf of the Soviet Government
and the Soviet people that your arguments regarding
offensive weapons in Cuba are utterly unfounded.
From what you have written me it is obvious that our
interpretations on this point are different, or rather
147
that we have different definitions for one type of

military means or another. And indeed, the same
types of armaments may in actuality have differ-
ent interpretations.
You are a military man, and I hope you will under-
stand me. Let us take a simple cannon for instance.
What kind of a weapon is it—offensive or defensive?
A cannon is a defensive weapon if it is set up to defend
boundaries or a fortified area. But when artillery is
concentrated and supplemented by an appropriate
number of troops, then the same cannon will have
become an offensive weapon, since they prepare and
clear the way for infantry to advance. The same is
true for nuclear missile weapons, for any type of these
weapons.
You are mistaken if you think that any of our
armaments in Cuba are offensive. However, let us
not argue at this point. Evidently, I shall not be
able to convince you. But I tell you: You, Mr. Presi-
dent, are a military man and you must understand:
How can you possibly launch an offensive even if
you have an enormous number of missiles of vari-
ous ranges and power on your territory, using these
weapons alone? These missiles are a means of an-
nihilation and destruction. But it is impossible to
launch an offensive by means of these missiles, even
nuclear missiles of 100 megaton yield, because it is
only people—troops—who can advance. Without
people any weapons, whatever their power, cannot be
offensive.
How can you, therefore, give this completely
wrong interpretation, which you are now giving, that
some weapons in Cuba are offensive, as you say?
All weapons there—and I assure you of this—are of
a defensive nature; they are in Cuba solely for pur-
poses of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba
at the request of the Cuban Government. And you
say that they are offensive weapons.
148
DOocUMENTS
But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think

that Cuba could launch an offensive upon the
United States and that even we, together with
Cuba, could advance against you from Cuban terri-
tory? Do you really think so? How can that be? We
do not understand. Surely, there has not been any
such new development in military strategy that
would lead one to believe that it is possible to ad-
vance that way. And I mean advance, not destroy;
for those who destroy are barbarians, people who
have lost their sanity.
I hold that you have no grounds to think so. You
may regard us with distrust, but you can at any
rate rest assured that we are of sound mind and
understand perfectly well that if we launch an of-
fensive against you, you will respond in kind. But
you too will get in response whatever you throw at us.
And I think you understand that too. It is our discus-
sion in Vienna that gives me the right to speak this
way.
This indicates that we are sane people, that we
understand and assess the situation correctly. How
could we, then, allow [ourselves] the wrong actions
which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides,
who themselves want to perish and before they die
destroy the world, could do this. But we want to
live and by no means do we want to destroy your
country. We want something quite different: to com-
pete with your country in a peaceful endeavor. We
argue with you; we have differences on ideological
questions. But our concept of the world is that ques-
tions of ideology, as well as economic problems,
should be settled by other than military means;
they must be solved in peaceful contest, or as this
is interpreted in capitalist society—by competition.
Our premise has been and remains that peaceful
coexistence, of two different sociopolitical systems
149
—a reality of our world—is essential, and that it is

essential to ensure lasting peace. These are the
principles to which we adhere.
You have now declared piratical measures, the
kind that were practiced in the Middle Ages when
ships passing through international waters were
attacked, and you have called this a “quarantine”
around Cuba. Our vessels will probably soon enter
the zone patrolled by your Navy. I assure you that the
vessels which are now headed for Cuba are carry-
ing the most innocuous peaceful cargoes. Do you
really think that all we spend our time on is trans-
porting so-called offensive weapons, atomic and
hydrogen bombs? Even though your military people
may possibly imagine that these are some special
kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the
most ordinary kind of peaceful goods.
Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good sense.
I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are car-
rying no armaments at all. The armaments needed
for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not
mean to say that there have been no shipments of
armaments at all. No, there were such shipments.
But now Cuba has already obtained the necessary
weapons for defense.
I do not know whether you can understand me
- and believe me. But I wish you would believe your-
self and agree that one should not give way to one’s
passions; that one should be master of them. And
what direction are events taking now? If you begin
stopping vessels it would be piracy, as you yourself
know. If we should start doing this to your ship you
would be just as indignant as we and the whole world
are now indignant. Such actions cannot be inter-
preted otherwise, because lawlessness cannot be
legalized. Were this allowed to happen then there
would be no peace; nor would there be peaceful
150
DOCUMENTS
coexistence. Then we would be forced to take the

necessary measures of a defensive nature which
would protect our interests in accordance with inter-
national law. Why do this? What would it all lead to?
Let us normalize relations. We have received an
appeal from U Thant, Acting Secretary General of
the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already
answered him. His proposals are to the effect that
our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a cer-
tain period of time while negotiations are being con-
ducted—and we are prepared to enter into such
negotiations—and the other side not undertake any
piratical actions against vessels navigating on the
high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable.
This would be a way out of the situation which has
evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe
easily.
You asked what happened, what prompted weap-
ons to be supplied to Cuba? You spoke of this to our
Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly,
Mr. President, what prompted it.
We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke of this
in Vienna—that a landing was effected and an at-
tack made on Cuba, as a result of which many Cu-
bans were killed. You yourself told me then that
this had been a mistake. I regarded that explana-
tion with respect. You repeated it to me several
times, hinting that not everyone occupying a high
position would acknowledge his mistakes as you
did. I appreciate such frankness. For my part I told
you that we too possess no less courage; we have
also acknowledged the mistakes which have been
made in the history of our state, and have not only
acknowledged them but have sharply condemned
them.
While you really are concerned for peace and for
the welfare of your people—and this is your duty
151
as President—I, as Chairman of the Council of Min-

isters, am concerned for my people. Furthermore,
the preservation of universal peace should be our
joint concern, since if war broke out under modern
conditions, it would not be just a war between the
Soviet Union and the United States, which actually
have no contentions between them, but a world-wide
war, cruel and destructive.
Why have we undertaken to render such mili-
tary and economic aid to Cuba? The answer is: we
have done so only out of humanitarian considerations.
At one time our people accomplished its own revo-
lution, when Russia was still a backward country.
Then we were attacked. We were the target of attack
by many countries. The United States took part in
that affair. This has been documented by the par-
ticipants in aggression against our country. An en-
tire book has been written on this by General
Graves, who commanded the American Expedition-
ary Force at that time. Graves entitled it American
Adventure in Siberia.
We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revo-
lution and how difficult it is to rebuild a country on
new principles. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba
and the Cuban people. But we do not interfere in
questions of internal organization; we are not inter-
fering in their affairs. The Soviet Union wants to
help the Cubans build their life, as they themselves
desire, so that others would leave them alone.
You said once that the United States is not pre-
paring an invasion. But you have also declared that
you sympathize with the Cuban counterrevolution-
ary emigrants, support them, and will help them in
caryring [sic] out their plans against the present
government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone
that the constant threat of armed attack and ag-
gression has hung and continues to hang over Cuba.
152
DocuMENTS
It is only this that has prompted us to respond to

the request of the Cuban Government to extend it our
aid in strengthening the defense capability of that
country.
If the President and Government of the United Sta-
tes would give their assurances that the United
States would itself not take part in an attack upon
Cuba and would restrain others from such action;
if you recall your Navy—this would immediately
change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro,
but I think that he and the Government of Cuba
would, probably, announce a demobilization and would
call upon the people to commence peaceful work.
Then the question of armaments would also be ob-
viated, because when there is no threat, arma-
ments are only a burden for any people. This would
also change the approach to the question of de-
stroying not only the armaments which you call
offensive, but of every other kind of armament.
I have spoken on behalf of the Soviet Government
at the United Nations and introduced a proposal to
disband all armies and to destroy all weapons. How
then can I stake my claims on these weapons now?
Armaments bring only disasters. Accumulating
them damages the economy, and putting them to
use would destroy people on both sides. Therefore,
only a madman can believe that armaments are
the principal means in the life of society. No, they
are a forced waste of human energy, spent, more-
over, on the destruction of man himself. If people
do not display wisdom, they will eventually reach
the point where they will clash, like blind moles,
and then mutual annihilation will commence.
Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom.
I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our
ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any arma-
ments. You will declare that the United States will
153
not invade Cuba with its troops and will not sup-
port any other forces which might intend to invade
Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our
military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.
Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully
what the aggressive, piratical actions which you
have announced the United States intends to carry
out in international waters would lead to. You your-
self know that a sensible person simply cannot
agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such
action.
If you have done this as the first step towards
unleashing war—well then—evidently nothing re-
mains for us to do but to accept this challenge of
yours. If you have not lost command of yourself and
realize clearly what this could lead to, then, Mr.
President, you and I should not now pull on the
ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of
war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter
the knot will become. And a time may come when
this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it
is no longer capable of untying it, and then the
knot will have to be cut. What that would mean I need
not explain to you, because you yourself understand
perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.
Therefore, if there is no intention of tightening
this knot, thereby dooming the world to the catas-
trophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax
the forces straining on the ends of the rope, let us
take measures for untying this knot. We are agree-
able to this.
We welcome all forces which take the position of
peace. Therefore, I both expressed gratitude to Mr.
Bertrand Russell, who shows alarm and concern
for the fate of the world, and readily responded to
the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the
U.N., U Thant.
154
DocuMENTS
These, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if

you should agree with them, could put an end to
the tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.
These thoughts are governed by a sincere desire
to alleviate the situation and remove the threat of
war.
Respectfully,
[s] N. KHRUSHCHEV
N. KHRUSHCHEV

New Press, 1992), 195-198.
155
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO'S
LETTER TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV,
OCTOBER 26, 1962
Dear Comrade Khrushchev:

From an analysis of the situation and the reports
in our possession, I consider that the aggression is
almost imminent within the next 24 or 72 hours.
There are two possible variants: the first and like-
liest one is an air attack against certain targets
with the limited objective of destroying them; the
second, less probable although possible, is invasion.
I understand that this variant would call for a large
number of forces and it is, in addition, the most
repulsive form of aggression, which might inhibit
them.
You can rest assured that we will firmly and reso-
lutely resist attack, whatever it may be.
The morale of the Cuban people is extremely high
and the aggressor will be confronted heroically.
At this time I want to convey to you briefly my
personal opinion.
If the second variant is implemented and the
imperialists invade Cuba with the goal of occupy-
ing it, the danger that that aggressive policy poses
for humanity is so great that following that event
the Soviet Union must never allow the circumstances
in which the imperialists could launch the first
nuclear strike against it.
I tell you this because I believe that the imperi-
alists’ aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and
if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading
Cuba in violation of international law and morality,
that would be the moment to eliminate such danger
156
DocuMENTS
forever through an act of clear legitimate defense,

however harsh and terrible the solution would be, for
there is no other.
It has influenced my opinion to see how this aggres-
sive policy is developing, how the imperialists, dis-
regarding world public opinion and ignoring principles
and the law, are blockading the seas, violating our
airspace and preparing an invasion, while at the
same time frustrating every possibility for talks,
even though they are aware of the seriousness of the
problem.
You have been and continue to be a tireless de-
fender of peace and I realize how bitter these hours
must be, when the outcome of your superhuman
efforts is so seriously threatened. However, up to
the last moment we will maintain the hope that
peace will be safeguarded and we are willing to con-
tribute to this as much as we can. But at the same
time, we are ready to calmly confront a situation
which we view as quite real and quite close.
Once more I convey to you the infinite gratitude
and recognition of our people to the Soviet people
who have been so generous and fraternal with us,
as well as our profound gratitude and admiration
for you, and wish you success in the huge task and
serious responsibilities ahead of you.
Fraternally,
FIDEL CASTRO

New Press, 1992), 199. Reproduced from the international edition
of Granma.
157
COMMUNIQUE OF THE COMMANDER
IN CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO, OCTOBER 27, 1962
For declarations formulated today, the Government

of the United States seeks to officially claim the pre-
rogative of invading our air space.
Cuba does not accept the piratical and vandalis-
tic privilege of any war aircraft to violate its air
space, because this essentially affects its security |
and facilitates conditions for surprise attack on our
territory.
Such a legitimate right of defense can never be
renounced and, therefore, every fighter that in-
vades the Cuban air space will do so under the risk
to face our defensive firing.
We shall overcome!
FIDEL Castro Ruz

Commander in Chief
of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces
Un pueblo invencible (Havana: Editorial José Marti, 1991), 55.
158
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO’S MESSAGE
TO ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT,
OCTOBER 27, 1962
Your Excellency,
On the instructions of the Revolutionary Govern-
ment of Cuba I have the honour to transmit to you
the following message:
“Your Excellency,
I have received your message dated 26 October,
and express my appreciation of your noble concern.
Cuba is prepared to discuss as fully as may be
necessary, its differences with the United States and
to do everything in its power, in co-operation with
the United Nations, to resolve the present crisis. How-
ever, it flatly rejects the violation of the sovereignty
of our country involved in the naval blockade, an act
of force and war committed by the United States
against Cuba. In addition, it flatly rejects the pre-
sumption of the United States. to determine what
actions we are entitled to take within our country,
what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our de-
fense, what relations we are to have with the U.S.S.R.,
and what international policy steps we are entitled to
take, within the rules and laws governing relations
between the peoples of the world and the principles
governing the United Nations, in order to guarantee
our own security and sovereignty.
Cuba is victimizing no one; it has violated no inter-
national law; on the contrary, it is the victim of the
aggressive acts of the United States, such as the na-
val blockade, and its rights have been outraged.
159
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba would be

prepared to accept the compromises that you request
as efforts in favour of peace, provided that at the same
time, while negotiations are in progress, the United
States Government desists from threats and aggres-
sive actions against Cuba, including the naval block-
ade of our country.
At the same time I express to you our willingness to
consider attentively any new suggestion you may put
forward; furthermore, should you consider it useful to
the cause of peace, our Government would be glad
to receive you in our country, as Secretary General of
the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions
on the present crisis, prompted by our common pur-
pose of freeing mankind from the dangers of war.
Unreserved respect for the sovereignty of Cuba is
the essential prerequisite if Cuba is to contribute
with the greatest sincerity and goodwill, grudging
no step towards the solution of the present problem,
and joining forces with all those people who are
struggling to save peace at this dramatic moment in
the life of mankind; Cuba can do whatever is asked
of it, except undertake to be a victim and to renounce
the rights which belong to every sovereign State.
I reiterate the assurances of my highest consideration.
MaJor FIDEL CASTRO Ruz

Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.”
Accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest

consideration.
(s) Dr. Mario GarciA-INCHAUSTEGUI

Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba
to the United Nations
United Nations, Press Release SG/ 1359 (October 27, 1962), 2-3.
160
PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV’S
COMMUNIQUE
TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
OCTOBER 27, 1962
Dear Mr. President,

I have studied with great satisfaction your reply
to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be
taken to avoid contact between our vessels and
thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences.
This reasonable step on your part strengthens my
belief that you are showing concern for the preser-
vation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.
I have already said that our people, our Govern-
ment, and I personally, as Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, are concerned solely with having
our country develop and occupy a worthy place
among all peoples of the world in economic competi-
tion, in the development of culture and the arts, and
in raising the living standard of the people. This is
the most noble and necessary field for competi-
tion, and both the victor and the vanquished wall
derive only benefit from it, because it means peace
and an increase in the means by which man lives and
finds enjoyment.
In your statement you expressed the opinion that
the main aim was not simply to come to an agree-
ment and take measures to prevent contact between
our vessels and consequently a deepening of the
crisis which could, as a result of such contacts,
spark a military conflict, after which all negotia-
tions would be superfluous because other forces
and other laws would then come into play—the laws
161
of war. I agree with you that this is only the first

step. The main thing that must be done is to nor-
malize and stabilize the state of peace among states
and among peoples.
I understand your concern for the security of the
United States, Mr. President, because this is the pri-
mary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed
about these same questions; I bear these same obli-
gations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact
that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to
strengthen its defense capability—precisely defense
capability—because whatever weapons it may pos-
sess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the
difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in
view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has
been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute
the humanity of our motives, which are oriented
toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop
in the way its people desire.
You wish to ensure the security of your country,
and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants
the same thing; all countries want to maintain their
security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our
Government, to assess your actions which are ex-
pressed in the fact that you have surrounded the
Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our al-
lies with military bases; placed military bases liter-
ally around our country; and stationed your missile
armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible
American personages openly declare that it is so.
Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in
Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are
located in Turkey.
You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this
disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the
coast of the United States of America. But Turkey
162
DOCUMENTS
adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and

see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have
the right to demand security for your own country
and the removal of the weapons you call offensive,
but do not accord the same right to us? You have
placed destructive missile weapons, which you call
offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then
can recognition of our equal military capacities be
reconciled with such unequal relations between our
great states. This is irreconcilable.
It is good Mr. President, that you have agreed to
have our representatives meet and begin talks, ap-
parently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting
Secretary General of the United Nations. Conse-
quently, he to some degree has assumed the role
of a mediator and we consider that he will be able
to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of
course, that each party drawn into this controversy
displays good will.
I think it would be possible to end the controversy
quickly and, normalize the situation, and then the
people could breathe more easily, considering that
statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober
mind and have an awareness of their responsibility
combined with the ability to solve complex questions
and not bring things to a military catastrophe.
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to
remove from Cuba the means which you regard as
offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make
this pledge in the United Nations. Your representa-
tives will make a declaration to the effect that the
United States, for its part, considering the uneasi-
ness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its
analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agree-
ment as to the period of time needed by you and by
us to bring this about. And, after that, persons en-
trusted by the United Nations Security Council could
163
inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges

made. Of course, the permission of the Govern-
ments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the
entry into those countries of these representatives
and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge
made by each side. Of course it would be best these
representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Se-
curity Council, as well as yours and mine—both
the United States and the Soviet Union—and also
that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be
difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust
and respect of all parties concerned.
We, in making this pledge, in order to give satis-
faction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey
and to strengthen their confidence in their secu-
rity, will make a statement within the framework
of the Security Council to ‘the effect that the Soviet
Government gives a solemn promise to respect the
inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Tur-
key, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to
invade Turkey, not to make available our territory
as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it
would also restrain those who contemplate com-
mitting aggression against Turkey, either from the
territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of
Turkey’s other neighboring states.
The United States Government will make a simi-
lar statement within the framework of the Secu-
rity Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that
the United States will respect the inviolability of
Cuba’s borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not
to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade
Cuba itself or make its territory available as a
bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also re-
strain those who might contemplate committing
aggression against Cuba, either from the territory
of the United States or from the territory of Cuba’s
other neighboring states.
164
DocuMENTS
Of course, for this we would have to come to an

agreement with you and specify a certain time limit.
Let us agree to some period of time, but without
unnecessary delay—say within two or three weeks,
not longer than a month.
The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak
and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in
the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any acci-
dental use of them to the detriment of the United
States is excluded. These means are situated in
Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and
are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there
is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union
or any of our other allies, then of course these
means are not and will not be a threat to anyone.
For they are not for purposes of attack.
If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. Presi-
dent, then we would send our representatives to
New York, to the United Nations, and would give
them comprehensive instructions in order that an
agreement may be reached more quickly. If you
also select your people and give them the corre-
sponding instructions, then this question can be
quickly resolved.
Why would I like to do this? Because the whole
world is now apprehensive and expects sensible
actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would
be the announcement of our agreement and of the
eradication of the controversy that has arisen. | at-
tach great importance to this agreement in so far as
it could serve as a good beginning and could in par-
ticular make it easier to reach agreement on ban-
ning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests
could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting
one with the other, because these are different issues.
However, it is important that agreement be reached
on both these issues so as to present humanity with
165
a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news

that agreement has been reached on the cessa-
tion of nuclear tests and that consequently the at-
mosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position
and yours on this issue are very close together.
All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus
toward the finding of mutually acceptable agree-
ments on other controversial issues on which you
and I have been exchanging views. These issues
have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting
urgent solution, which would clear up the interna-
tional atmosphere. We are prepared for this.
These are my proposals, Mr. President.
Respectfully yours,
[s] N. KHRUSHCHEV
N. KHRUSHCHEV

New Press, 1992), 207-209.
166
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S LETTER TO
PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV,
OCTOBER 27, 1962
Dear Mr Chairman:
I have read your letter of October 26 with great
care and welcomed the statement of your desire to
seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing
that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease
on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weap-
ons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be
rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations
arrangements.
Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my
representatives in New York instructions that will per-
mit them to work out this week and — in cooperation
with the Acting Secretary General and your repre-
sentative — an arrangement for a permanent solution
to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in
your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key
elements of your proposals — which seem generally
acceptable as I understand them — are as follows:
1. You would agree to remove these weapons sys-
tems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations
observation and supervision; and undertake, with
suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduc-
tion of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2. We, on our part, would agree — upon the estab-
lishment of adequate arrangements through the
United Nations to ensure the carrying out and con-
tinuation of these commitments — (a) to remove
167
promptly the quarantine measures now in effect

and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of
Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the
Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do like-
wise.
If you will give your representative similar instruc-
tions, there is no reason why we should not be able
to complete these arrangements and announce them
to the world within a couple of days. The effect of
such a settlement on easing world tensions would
enable us to work toward a more general arrange-
ment regarding “other armaments”, as proposed in
your second letter which you made public. I would
like to say again that the United States is very much
interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms
race; and if your letter signifies that you are pre-
pared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with
our allies any useful proposals.
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the
cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and meas-
ures to render such weapons inoperable, under ef-
fective inter-national guarantees. The continuation
of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion con-
cerning Cuba by linking these problems to the
broader questions of European and world security,
would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban
crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For
this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the
lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of
October 26.
/S/ Joun F. KENNEDY

New Press, 1992), 233-235.
168
PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV’S
COMMUNIQUE TO PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY, OCTOBER 28, 1962
Esteemed Mr. President: I have received your mes-

sage of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction
and gratitude for the sense of proportion and under-
standing of the responsibility borne by you at present
for the preservation of peace throughout the world
which you have shown. I very well understand your
anxiety and the anxiety of the United States people
in connection with the fact that the weapons which
you describe as “offensive” are, in fact, grim weap-
ons. Both you and I understand what kind of weapon
they are.
In order to complete with greater speed the liqui-
dation of the conflict dangerous to the cause of peace,
to give confidence to all people longing for peace, and to
calm the American people, who, I am certain, want
peace as much as the people of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet Government, in addition to previously issued
instructions on the cessation of further work at build-
ing sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on
the dismantling of the weapons which you describe
as “offensive,” and their crating and return to the
Soviet Union.
Mr. President, I would like to repeat once more
what I had already written to you in my preceding
letters—that the Soviet Government has placed at
the disposal of the Cuban Government economic
aid, as well as arms, inasmuch as Cuba and the
Cuban people have constantly been under the con-
tinuous danger of an invasion.
169
The shelling of Havana took place from a piratic

ship. It is said that irresponsible Cuban emigres
did the shooting. This is possibly the case. How-
ever, the question arises: from where did they fire?
After all, they, these Cubans, have no territory, they
have no private means, and they have no means to
wage military action. Thus somebody put the arms
needed to shell Havana and carry out their piratic
actions in the Caribbean—in.Cuban territorial wa-
ters—in their hands!
It is unthinkable in our time not to notice a pi-
rate ship, particularly if one takes into account such
a saturation of American ships in the Caribbean
from which actually all this is watched and observed.
In such circumstances, piratic ships are freely mov-
ing around Cuba, shelling Cuba, and carrying out
piratic attacks upon peaceful transport vessels! It
is, after all, known that they even shelled a British
freighter!
In short, Cuba has been under the constant threat
of aggressive forces which did not conceal their in-
tentions to invade Cuban territory.
The Cuban people want to build their life in their
own interest without interference from without. You
are right in this, and one cannot blame them be-
cause they want to be masters of their own coun-
try and dispose of the fruits of their labor. The threat
of Cuba’s invasion and all the other ventures aimed
at bringing about tension around Cuba are designed
to engender uncertainty in the Cuban people, in-
timidate them, and hinder them in building their
new life undisturbed.
Mr. President, I want to say clearly again that
we could not be indifferent to this. The Soviet Gov-
ernment decided to help Cuba with means of de-
fense against aggression—and only with means for
purposes of defense.
170
DocuUMENTS
We stationed defense means there which you

call offensive. We stationed them there in order
that no attack should be made against Cuba and that
no rash action should be permitted to take place.
I regard with respect and trust your statement
in your message of October 27, 1962 that no attack
will be made on Cuba—that no invasion will take
place—not only by the United States, but also by
other countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your
message pointed out. Then the motives which pro-
moted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba cease.
They are no longer applicable. Hence we have in-
structed our officers—and these means, as I have
already stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers—to
take necessary measures for stopping the building of
the said projects and their dismantling and return
to the Soviet Union.
As I already told you in my letter of October 27,
we both agree to come to an agreement that United
Nations rapresentative [sic] could verify the disman-
tling of these means.
In this way, if one is to rely on your assurances
which you have made and on our orders to dismantle,
then all necessary conditions for liquidation of the
conflict which has arisen appear to exist.
I note with satisfaction that you have responded
to my wish that the said dangerous situation should
be liquidated and also that conditions should be
created for a more thoughtful appraisal of the inter-
national situation which is fraught with great dan-
gers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocket
technology, spaceships, global rockets, and other
lethal weapons. All people are interested in insur-
ing peace. Therefore, we who are invested with trust
and great responsibility must not permit an exacer-
bation of the situation and must liquidate the breed-
ing grounds where a dangerous situation has been
171
created fraught with serious consequences for the

cause of peace. If we succeed along with you and
with the aid of other people of good will in liquidat-
ing this tense situation, we must also concern our-
selves to see that other dangerous conflicts do not
arise which might lead to a world thermonuclear
catastrophe.
In conclusion, I wish to speak of the regulation
of relation between NATO and states of the War-
saw Treaty, which you mention. We have long ago
spoken of this and are ready to continue an ex-
change of opinions with you on this question and
find a reasonable solution. I also wish to continue
an exchange of opinions on the prohibition of atomic
and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament,
and other questions concerning the lessening of
international tension.
Mr. President, I trust your statement. However,
on the other hand, there are responsible people
who would like to carry out an invasion of Cuba at
this time, and in such a way to spark off a war. If
we take practical steps and announce the disman-
tling and evacuation of the appropriate means from
Cuba, then, doing that, we wish to establish at the
same time the confidence of the Cuban people that
we are with them and are not divesting ourselves
of the responsibility of granting help to them.
We are convinced that the people of all coun-
tries, like yourself, Mr. President, will understand
me correctly. We do not issue threats. We desire
only peace. Our country is now on the upsurge.
Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful
labor. They have achieved tremendous successes
since the October Revolution and created supreme
material and spiritual-cultural treasures. Our coun-
try is making use of these treasures and wants to
develop its successes further and insure further
172
DOCUMENTS
development on the road of peace and social progress

by its steadfast labor.
I should like, Mr. President, to remind you that
military aircraft of a reconnaissance character have
violated the frontier of the Soviet Union in connec-
tion with which we had conflicts with you. An ex-
change of notes took place.
In 1960, we shot down your U-2 aircraft, the re-
connaissance flight of which over the USSR led to
the wrecking of the meeting of the powers in Paris.
You then took a correct position in condemning that
criminal action by the former United States Gov-
ernment. However, during the period of your ten-
ure of office as President, a second instance of the
violation of our frontier by an American U-2 air-
craft took place in the Sakhalin area. We wrote
you about this violation on August 30. You replied
that this violation had taken place as the result of
bad weather and gave an assurance that it would
not be repeated. We gave credence to your assur-
ance because there was indeed bad weather in that
area at that time. However, if your aircraft did not
have the task of flying near our territory, then even
bad weather could not cause an American aircraft
to enter our airspace.
The conclusion follows from this that it is done
with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples
on international practices and violates the fron-
tiers of other states.
An even more dangerous case occurred on Octo-
ber 28 when your reconnaissance aircraft intruded
into the territory of the Soviet Union in the north,
in the area of the Chukotka Peninsula, and flew
over our territory.
One asks, Mr. President, how should we regard
this? What is it? A provocation? Your aircraft vio-
lates our frontier and at times as anxious as those
which we are not experiencing when everything has
173
been placed in a state of combat readiness. For an

intruding American aircraft can easily be taken for
a bomber with nuclear weapons, and this could push
us toward a fatal step—all the more so because both
the United States Government and Pentagon have
long been saying that bombers with atomic bombs
are constantly on duty in your country.
Therefore, you can imagine what kind of respon-
sibility you assume, especially now during the anx-
ious times we are now experiencing.
I would like to ask you to assess this correctly
and take steps accordingly in order that it would
not serve as a provocation for unleashing war.
I would also like to express the following wish, of
course, it is a matter for the Cuban people. You do
not at present maintain any diplomatic relations but
through my officers on Cuba I have reports that flights
of American aircraft over Cuba are being carried
out. We are interested that there should not be any
war at all in the world; and that the Cuban people
should live quietly. However, Mr. President, it is no
secret that we have our people on Cuba. According
to the treaty with the Cuban Government, we have
officers and instructors there who are training the
Cubans. They are mainly ordinary people—experts,
agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigation and soil im-
provement experts, ordinary workers, tractor drivers,
and others. We are concerned about them.
I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to bear in
mind that a violation of Cuban airspace by American
aircraft may also have dangerous consequences. If
you do not want this, then no pretext should be given
for the creation of a dangerous situation. |”
We must be now very cautions and not take such
steps which will be of no use for the defense of the
states involved in the conflict, but which are likely
to arouse only irritation and even prove a provoca-
tion leading to the baneful step. We must, therefore,
174
DOCUMENTS
display sobriety and wisdom and refrain from steps

of this sort.
We value peace, perhaps even more than other
people, because we experienced the terrible war
against Hitler. However, our people will not flinch
in the face of any ordeal. Our people trust their
government, and we assure our people and the world
public that the Soviet Government will not allow it-
self to be provoked.
Should the provocateurs unleash a war, they would
not escape the grave consequences of such a war.
However, we are confident that reason will triumph.
War will not be unleashed and the peace and secu-
rity of people will be insured!
In connection with negotiations in progress ‘be-
tween U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant and
representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States,
and the Cuban republic, the Soviet Government has
sent to New York USSR first Deputy Minister of For-
eign Affairs Kuznetsov with a view to assisting U Thant
in his noble efforts aimed at liquidation of the present
dangerous situation.
With respect for you, Khrushchev. October 28, 1962.

New Press, 1992), 236-239.
175
STATEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT FIDEL CASTRO,
OCTOBER 28, 1962
The guarantees mentioned by President Kennedy

that there will be no aggression against Cuba will
be ineffective unless, in addition to the removal of
the naval blockade which he promises, the follow-
ing measures, inter alia, are adopted:
ie Cessation of the economic blockade and of all
the measures of commercial and economic
pressure being carried out by the United States
against our country throughout the world.
. Cessation of all subversive activities, of the drop-
ping and landing of weapons and explosives by air
and sea, of the organization of invasions by mer-
cenaries, and of the infiltration of spies and
saboteurs - all of which activities are being car-
ried on from the territory of the United States
and certain accomplice countries.
. Cessation of the piratical attacks being carried
out from bases in the United States and Puerto
Rico.
. Cessation of all violations of our air space and
territorial waters by United States aircraft and
warships.
. Withdrawal of the naval base of Guantanamo
and return of the Cuban territory occupied by the
United States.
176
DocuMENTS
Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consid-

eration.
MaJor FIpEL Castro Ruz

Prime Minister of the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba.

New Press, 1992), 251-252.
| G7/
TO PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO,
OCTOBER 28, 1962
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro:

Our October 27 message to President Kennedy
allows for the question to be settled in your favor,
to defend Cuba from an invasion and prevent war
from breaking out. Kennedy’s reply, which you ap-
parently also know, offers assurances that the United
States will not invade Cuba with its own forces, nor
will it permit its allies to carry out an invasion. In this
way the president of the United States has positively
answered my messages of October 26 and 27, 1962.
We have now finished drafting our reply to the
president’s message. I am not going to convey it
here, for you surely know the text, which is now
being broadcast over the radio.
With this motive I would like to recommend to
you now, at this moment of change in the crisis,
not to be carried away by sentiment and to show
firmness. I must say that I understand your feel-
ings of indignation toward the aggressive actions
and violations of elementary norms of international
law on the part of the United States.
But now, rather than law, what prevails is the
senselessness of the militarists at the Pentagon.
Now that an agreement is within sight, the Penta-
gon is searching for a pretext to frustrate this agree-
ment. This is why it is organizing the provocative
flights. Yesterday you shot down one of these, while
earlier you didn’t shoot them down when they overflew
178
DOCUMENTS
your territory. The aggressors will take advantage

of such a step for their own purposes.
Therefore, I would like to advise you in a friendly
manner to show patience, firmness and even more
firmness. Naturally, if there’s an invasion it will be
necessary to repulse it by every means. But we
mustn't allow ourselves to be carried away by provo-
cations, because the Pentagon’s unbridied milita-
rists, now that the solution to the conflict is in
sight and apparently in your favor, creating a guar-
antee against the invasion of Cuba, are trying to
frustrate the agreement and provoke you into ac-
tions that could be used against you. I ask you not
to give them the pretext for doing that.
On our part, we will do everything possible to
stabilize the situation in Cuba, defend Cuba against
invasion and assure you the possibilities for peace-
fully building a socialist society.
I send you greetings, extensive to all your lead-
ership group.
N. KHRUSHCHEV

New Press, 1992), 249. Reprinted from the international edition
of Granma.
179
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO’S LETTER
TO PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV,
OCTOBER 28, 1962
Mr. Nikita Khrushchev

Prime Minister of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSR

I have just received your letter.
The position of our government concerning your
communication to us is embodied in the statement
formulated today, whose text you surely know.
I wish to clear up something concerning the anti-
aircraft measures we adopted. You say: “Yesterday
you shot down one of these [planes], while earlier
you didn’t shoot them down when they overflew your
territory.”
Earlier isolated violations were committed with-
out a determined military purpose or without a real
danger stemming from those flights.
This time that wasn’t the case. There was the
danger of a surprise attack on certain military in-
stallations. We decided not to sit back and wait for
a Surprise attack, with our detection radar turned
off, when the potentially aggressive planes flying
with impunity over the targets could destroy them
totally. We didn’t think we should allow that after
all the efforts and expenses incurred in and, in
addition, because it would weaken us greatly,
militarily and morally. For that reason, on October 24
the Cuban forces mobilized 50 antiaircraft batteries,
180
DocuMENTS
our entire reserve then, to provide support to the

Soviet forces’ positions. If we sought to avoid the
risks of a surprise attack, it was necessary for Cu-
ban artillerymen to have orders to shoot. The Soviet
command can furnish you with additional reports of
what happened to the plane that was shot down.
Earlier, airspace violations were carried out de
facto and furtively. Yesterday the American gov-
ernment tried to make official the privilege of vio-
lating our airspace at any hour of the day and night.
We cannot accept that, as it would be tantamount
to giving up a sovereign prerogative. However, we
agree that we must avoid an incident at this pre-
cise moment that could seriously harm the nego-
tiations, so we will instruct the Cuban batteries not
to open fire, but only for as long as the negotiations
last and without revoking the declaration published
yesterday about the decision to defend our airspace.
If should also be taken into account that under the
current tense conditions incidents can take place
accidentally.
I also wish to inform you that we are in principle
. opposed to an inspection of our territory.
I appreciate extraordinarily the efforts you have
made to keep the peace and we are absolutely in agree-
ment with the need for struggling for that goal. If this
is accomplished in a just, solid and definitive manner,
it will be an inestimable service to humanity.
Fraternally,
FIDEL CASTRO

of Granma.
181
TO PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO,
OCTOBER 30, 1962
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro:

We have received your letter of October 28 and
the reports on the talks that you as well as Presi-
dent Dortic6s have had with our ambassador.
We understand your situation and take into ac-
count the difficulties you now have during the first
transitional stage after the liquidation of maximum
tension that arose due to the threat of attack on
the part of the U.S. imperialists, which you expected
would occur at any moment.
We understand that certain difficulties have been
created for you as a result of our having promised
the U.S. government to withdraw the missile base
from Cuba, since it is viewed as an offensive weapon,
in exchange for the U.S. commitment to abandon
plans for an invasion of Cuba by U.S. troops or those
of its allies in the western hemisphere, and lift the
so-called “quarantine,” that is, bring the blockade of
Cuba to an end. This led to the liquidation of the
conflict in the Caribbean zone which, as you well
realize, was characterized by the clash of two su-
perpowers and the possibility of being transformed
into a thermonuclear world war using missiles.
As we learned from our ambassador, some Cu-
bans have the opinion that the Cuban people want
a declaration of another nature rather than the
declaration of the withdrawal of the missiles. It’s
possible that this kind of feeling exists among the
people. But we, political and government figures,
182
DocuMENTS
are leaders of a people who doesn’t know every-

thing and can’t readily comprehend all that we leaders
must deal with. Therefore, we should march at the
head of the people and then the people will follow us
and respect us.
Had we, yielding to the sentiments prevailing
among the people, allowed ourselves to be carried
away by certain passionate sectors of the popula-
tion and refused to come to a reasonable agree-
ment with the U.S. government, then a war could
have broken out, in the course of which millions of
people would have died and the survivors would
have pinned the blame on the leaders for not hav-
ing taken all the necessary measures to prevent
that war of annihilation.
Preventing the war and an attack on Cuba de-
pended not just on the measures adopted by our
governments but also on an estimate of the actions
of the enemy forces deployed near you. Accordingly,
the overall situation had to be considered.
In addition, there are opinions that you and we, as
they say, failed to engage in consultations concern-
ing these questions before adopting the decision
known to you.
For this reason we believe that we consulted with
you, dear Comrade Fidel Castro, receiving the
cables, each one more alarming than the next, and
finally your cable of October 27, saying you were
nearly certain that an attack on Cuba would be
launched. You believed it was merely a question of
time, that the attack would take place within the
next 24 or 72 hours. Upon receiving this alarming
cable from you and aware of your courage, we viewed
it as a very well-founded alarm.
Wasn't this consultation on your part with us?
I have viewed this cable as a signal of extreme alarm.
Under the conditions created, also bearing in mind
183
the information that the unabated warmongering

group of U.S. militarists wanted to take advantage
of the situation that had been created and launch
an attack on Cuba, if we had continued our consul-
tations, we would have wasted time and this at-
tack would have been carried out.
We came to the conclusion that our strategic
missiles in Cuba became an ominous force for the
imperialists: they were frightened and because of
their fear that our rockets could be launched, they
could have dared to liquidate them by bombing them
or launching an invasion of Cuba. And it must be
said that they could have knocked them all out.
Therefore, I repeat, your alarm was absolutely well-
founded.
In your cable of October 27 you proposed that we
be the first to launch a nuclear strike against the
territory of the enemy. You, of course, realize where
that would have led. Rather than a simple strike,
it would have been the start of a thermonuclear
world war.
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I consider this pro-
posal of yours incorrect, although I understand your
motivation.
We have lived through the most serious moment
when a nuclear world war could have broken out.
Obviously, in that case, the United States would
have sustained huge losses, but the Soviet Union
and the whole socialist camp would have also suf-
fered greatly. As far as Cuba is concerned, it would
be difficult to say even in general terms what this
would have meant for them. In the first place, Cuba
would have been burned in the fire of war. There no
doubt that the Cuban people would have fought cou-
rageous or that they would have died heroically. But
we are not struggling against imperialism in order
to die, but to take advantage of all our possibilities,
184
DocUMENTS
to lose less in the struggle and win more to over-

come and achieve the victory of communism.
Now, as a result of the measures taken, we reached
the goal sought when we agreed with you to send the
missiles to Cuba. We have wrested from the United
States the commitment not to invade Cuba and not
to permit their Latin American allies to do so. We
have wrested all this from them without a nuclear
strike.
We consider that we must take advantage of all
the possibilities to defend Cuba, strengthen its inde-
pendence and sovereignty, defeat military aggression
and prevent a nuclear world war in our time.
And we have accomplished that.
Of course, we made concessions, accepted a com-
mitment, acting according to the principle that a
concession on one side is answered by a conces-
sion on the other side. The United States also made
a concession. It made the commitment before all
the world not to attack Cuba.
That’s why when we compare aggression on the
part of the United States and thermonuclear war
with the commitment of a concession in exchange
for a concession, the upholding of the inviolability
of the Republic of Cuba and the prevention of a
world war, I think that the total outcome of this
reckoning, of this comparison is perfectly clear.
Naturally, in defending Cuba as well as the other
socialist countries, we can’t rely on a U.S. govern-
ment veto. We have adopted and will continue to adopt
in the future all the measures necessary to strengthen
our defense and build up our forces, so that we can
strike back if needed. At present, as a result of our
weapons supplies, Cuba is stronger than ever. Even
after the dismantling of the missile installations you
will have powerful weapons to throw back the enemy,
on land, in the air and on the sea, in the approaches
185
to the island. At the same time, as you will recall,

we have said in our message to the president of the
United States dated October 28, that at the same
time we want to assure the Cuban people that we
stand at their side and we will not forget our re-
sponsibility to help the Cuban people. It is clear to
everyone that this is an extremely serious warning
to the enemy on our part.
You also stated during the rallies that the United
States can’t be trusted. That, of course, is correct.
We also view your statements on the conditions of
the talks with the United States as correct. The
shooting down of a U.S. plane over Cuba turned out
to be a useful measure because this operation ended
without complications. Let it be a lesson for the
imperialists.
Needless to say, our enemies will interpret the
events in their own way. The Cuban counterrevo-
lution will also try to raise its head. But we think
you will completely dominate your domestic en-
emies without our assistance. The main thing we
have secured is preventing aggression on the part
of your foreign enemy at present.
We feel that the aggressor came out the loser.
He made preparations to attack Cuba but we stopped
him and forced him to recognize before world pub-
lic opinion that he won't do it at the current stage.
We view this as a great victory. The imperialists, of
course, will not stop their struggle against commu-
nism. But we also have our plans and we are going
to adopt our measures. This process of struggle will
continue as long as there are two political and so-
cial systems in the world, until one of these — and
we know it will be our communist system — wins
and triumphs throughout the world.
Comrade Fidel Castro, I have decided to send this
reply to you as soon as possible. A more detailed
186
DocuMENTS
analysis of everything that has happened will be

made in the letter I'll send you shortly. In that
letter I will make the broadest analysis of the situa-
tion and give you my evaluation of the outcome of the
end of the conflict.
Now, as the talks to settle the conflict get under-
way, I ask you to send me your considerations. For
our part, we will continue to report to you on the
development of these talks and make all necessary
consultations.
I wish you success, Comrade Fidel Castro. You
will no doubt have success. There will still be machi-
nations against you, but together with you, we will
adopt all the measures necessary to paralyze them
and contribute to the strengthening and develop-
ment of the Cuban Revolution.

of Granma.
187
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO’S LETTER TO
PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV,
OCTOBER 31, 1962
Mr. Nikita S Khrushchev

Prime Minister of the Soviet Union
USSR

I received your letter of October 30. You under-
stand that we indeed were consulted before you
adopted the decision to withdraw the strategic mis-
siles. You base yourself on the alarming news that
you say reached you from Cuba and, finally, my
cable of October 27. I don’t know what news you
received; I can only respond for the message that
I sent you the evening of October 26, which reached
you the 27th.
What we did in the face of the events, Comrade
Khrushchev, was to prepare ourselves and get ready
to fight. In Cuba there was only one kind of alarm,
that of battle stations.
When in our opinion the imperialist attack be-
came imminent I deemed it appropriate to so advise
you and alert both the Soviet Government and com-
mand — since there were Soviet forces committed
to fight at our side to defend the Republic of Cuba
from foreign aggression — about the possibility of an
attack which we could not prevent but could resist.
I told you that the morale of our people was very
high and that the aggression would be heroically
resisted. At the end of the message I reiterated to
you that we awaited the events calmly.
188
DocuMENTS
Danger couldn’t impress us, for danger has been

hanging over our country for a long time now and
in a certain way we have grown used to it.
The Soviet troops which have been at our side
know how admirable the stand of our people was
throughout this crisis and the profound brother-
hood that was created among the troops from both
peoples during the decisive hours. Countless eyes
of Cuban and Soviet men who were willing to die
with supreme dignity shed tears upon learning
about the surprising, sudden and practically un-
conditional decision to wihdraw the weapons.
Perhaps you don’t know the degree to which the
Cuban people was ready to do its duty toward the na-
tion and humanity.
I realized when I wrote them that the words con-
tained in my letter could be misinterpreted by you and
that was what happened, perhaps because you didn’t
read them carefully, perhaps because of the transla-
tion, perhaps because I meant to say so much in too
few lines. However, I didn’t hesitate to do it. Do you
believe, Comrade Khrushchev, that we were selfishly
thinking of ourselves, of our generous people willing to
sacrifice themselves, and not at all in an unconscious
manner but fully assured of the risk they ran?
No, Comrade Khrushchev. Few times in history,
and it could even be said that never before, be-
cause no people had ever faced such a tremendous
danger, was a people so willing to fight and die
with such a universal sense of duty.
We knew, and do not presume that we ignored
it, that we would have been annihilated, as you
insinuate in your letter, in the event of nuclear
war. However, that didn’t prompt us to ask you to
withdraw the missiles, that didn’t prompt us to ask
you to yield. Do you believe that we wanted that
war? But how could we prevent it if the invasion
189
finally took place? The fact is that this event was

possible, that imperialism was obstructing every
solution and that its demands were, from our point
of view, impossible for the USSR and Cuba to ac-
cept
And if war had broken out [what we do] with the
insane people who unleashed the war? You yourself
have said that under current conditions such a war
would inevitably have escalated quickly into a
nuclear war.
I understand that once aggression is unleashed,
one shouldn't concede to the aggressor the privilege
of deciding, moreover, when to use nuclear weap-
ons. The destructive power of this weaponry is so
great and the speed of its delivery so great that the
aggressor would have a considerable initial advan-
tage.
And I did not suggest to you, Comrade Khrushchev,
that the USSR should be the aggressor, because that
would be more than incorrect, it would be immoral
and contemptible on my part. But from the instant
the imperialists attack Cuba and while there are So-
viet armed forces stationed in Cuba to help in our
defense in case of an attack from abroad, the impe-
rialists would by this act become aggressors against
Cuba and against the USSR, and we would respond
with a strike that would annihilate them.
Everyone has his own opinions and I maintain
mine about the dangerousness of the aggressive
circles in the Pentagon and their preference for a
preventive strike. I did not suggest, Comrade
Khrushchev, that in the midst of this crisis the So-
viet Union should attack, which is what your letter
seems to say: rather, that following an imperialist
attack, the USSR should act without vacillation and
should never make the mistake of allowing circum-
stances to develop in which the enemy makes the
190
DocuMENTS
first nuclear strike against the USSR. And in this

sense, Comrade Khrushchev, I maintain my point
of view, because I understand it to be a true and
just evaluation of a specific situation. You may be
able to convince me that I am wrong, but you can’t
tell me that I am wrong without convincing me.
I know that this is a delicate issue that can only
be broached in circumstances such as these and
in a very personal message.
You may wonder what right I have to broach this
topic. I do so without worrying about how thorny it
is, following the dictates of my conscience as a revo-
lutionary duty and inspired by the most unselfish
sentiments of admiration and affection for the
USSR, for what she represents for the future of
humanity and by the concern that she should never
again be the victim of the perfidy and betrayal of
aggressors, as she was in 1941, and which cost so
many lives and so much destruction. Moreover, I spoke
not as a troublemaker but as a combatant from the
most endangered trenches.
I do not see how you can state that that we were
consulted in the decision you took.
I would like nothing more than to be proved wrong
at this moment. I only wish that you were right.
There are not just a few Cubans, as has been
reported to you, but in fact many Cubans who are
experiencing at this moment unspeakable bitter-
ness and sadness.
The imperialists are talking once again of invad-
ing our country, which is proof of how ephemeral
and untrustworthy their promises are. Our people,
however, maintain their indestructible will to resist
the aggressors and perhaps more than ever need to
trust in themselves and in that will to struggle.
We will struggle against adverse circumstances,
we will overcome the current difficulties and we
191
will come out ahead, and nothing can destroy the

ties of friendship and the eternal gratitude we feel
toward the USSR.
Fraternally

of Granma.
192
TALKS HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
OF CUBA FIDEL CASTRO, AND ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS U THANT, OCTOBER 30, 1962
Part ONE
(In these talks also participatedGeneral Rikhye;
President of the Republic Osvaldo Dortic6s; Foreign
Minister of Cuba Dr. Raul Roa; and Cuban ambassa-
dor in Mexico Dr. Carlos Lechuga.)
U Tuant: There is a point that I would like to

mention. In the discussions that I had in New York
with both the representatives of the Soviet Union
and the United States, General Rikhye was always
present, and in my opinion his presence would be
useful in this meeting with the Prime Minister.
Dr. Castro: We do not have inconvenience.
(General Rikhye is called to participate in the
interview.)
U Tuant: First of all, Mr. Minister, I want to thank
you and your government for the invitation that
has been done to me for coming to Cuba, not only for
this mission but for the invitation that you had been
previously made to me.
As I expressed when accepting the invitation, I have
come as soon as possible. I am sure that today and
tomorrow we will have fruitful talks to find a solution
respecting the sovereignty and independence of Cuba.
Dr. Castro: We are ready to discuss all the time
that is necessary, we freely dispose of time for at-
tending you.
U Tuant: As you well know, the problem of Cuba was
presented to the meetings of the Security Council last
193
IN THE
Eee eRTHRESHOLD
SIDS elt AROFeeNUCLEAR
ee WAR
A Ee
week, while meetings of the forty-five non-aligned

nations, essentialy those which had participated
in the Bandung and Belgrade Conferences, held.
Two meetings were held, and they sent represen-
tatives for holding a discussion with me, because
I also belong to a non-aligned nation and I partici-
pated in the two conferences, for asking me to take
the initiative that could contribute to the peaceful
solution of this problem.
On October 24, I decided to take this initiative.
After hearing statements of the three delega-
tions at the Security Council, I concluded that the
immediate problem was to make a call to the three
powers. And I made that call to the Prime Minister
Khrushchev for voluntarily suspending shipments
of weapons to Cuba, for two or three weeks; to Presi-
dent Kennedy for voluntarily suspending the quaran-
tine; and now to you, Your Excellency, for voluntar-
ily suspending the construction of bases for missiles, to
give us an opportunity to discuss quietly the problem.
Dr. Castro: Excuse me, it is not now, it was then...
TRANSLATOR: Indeed. “I appealed to you, Your Ex-
cellency, for voluntarily suspending construction
of bases for missiles...”
U Tuant: Immediately after my request, the Se-
curity Council suspended its meetings to give the
opportunity to undertake my proposals.
The following day I learned that Soviet ships were
approaching to the area of quarantine. I addressed
a second appealing to the Prime Minister Khrushchev
and to President Kennedy, asking them to prevent a
direct confrontation in this matter for which allowed
me the few necessary days in order to deal with this
subject. Also that day I sent you a letter, to which
you responded very kindly asking me for visiting Cuba.
The matter of that letter was the suspension of the
construction of bases for missiles in Cuba.
Since then, there have been communications be-
tween the Prime Minister Khrushchev and I, between
194
DocuMENTS
President Kennedy and I, and also naturally Your

Excellency responded my letter of October 27. The
subject matter of this letter is publicly known al-
ready because it has been printed.
As I see the problem, Excellency, it has two parts:
one immediate and one long-term. For the time
being, the Security Council wants to be in charge
of the solution of the immediate problem.
The purpose of my negotiations with the three
powers that I have talked about only refers to the
immediate problem, naturally; but in the solution
of the long-term one, the United Nations will have
to be somehow involved.
The immediate problem has several factors. The
first of them is that the Prime Minister Khrushchev
has responded my request, giving instructions to
captains of Soviet ships to keep away, for now, from
the area of quarantine, for some days.
President Kennedy responded that he was will-
ing to prevent the direct confrontation with Soviet
ships if not transporting weapons, and the Prime
Minister Khrushchev has told me in a very explicit
way that in these times the Soviet ships are not
transporting weapons. If the two powers agree, for
two or three weeks no weapons will be sent to Cuba,
and in two or three weeks the United States, if there
are no weapons in transports, would suspend the
quarantine.
The United States wants to be sure that the So-
viet ships will not transport weapons. What the
United States wants is a machinery, a UN instru-
ment which could assure it that during this period
of two or three weeks, weapons will not enter Cuba.
The Soviet Republic does not agree with this pro-
posal.
Yesterday the Soviet Government proposed a new
solution, and it is that the Soviet ships would allow
195
an inspection of the Red Cross, a verification on

the part of the Red Cross that they [the Soviets] do
not transport weapons. This response of the Soviet
Government was informed to the United States last
night.
The Red Cross who we contacted with over tele-
phone yesterday, in Geneva, has responded that it
would agree—on behalf of world peace and inter-
national cooperation—to be in charge of this task,
either in the high seas or in the landing ports when-
ever the Government of Cuba agree with that.
My attitude cannot be participatory in any way. I do
not have competence to associate myself to any of the
proposals. I have just said to the Red Cross, to the So-
viet Union, and to the United States, that with the
correspondent consideration to the sovereignty of
Cuba, I would ask this to the Red Cross, whenever
it were subject to the compliance of the Cuban Gov-
ernment.
This was indicated to the three parts, and it was
informed that this would transmitted to the Cuban
Government.
The first point, therefore, Your Excellency, which
would help very much in my work, would be to know
the attitude of the Cuban Government to the idea
that the Red Cross verify the transport of weapons
in the Soviet ships during the two-or-three coming
weeks.
The question is: What attitude would Cuba have on
this proposition?
Mr. PRESIDENT: Do you mean in the high seas or in
Cuba?
U Tuant: Of course, I have informed this proposal
of the Red Cross to the governments of the Soviet
Union and the United States. The Soviet Govern-
ment responded that this is a matter that belongs
to the Cuban sovereignty. I have not had a reply of
U.S. Government on the subject.
196
DOocUMENTS
Your Excellency wants to discuss point by point,

or all together?
Dr. Castro: I prefer you to continue with your
exposition.
U Tuant: The United States tells me, and also it
has told during negotiations and during meetings
of the Security Council, that the matter of concern
for it are the launchers, more than weapons; its
main concern are missile launchers.
As it is known, last Sunday the Prime Minister
Khrushchev instructed Soviet technicians for dis-
mantling missile launchers and returning missiles
to the Soviet Union. He has also said that he would
ask the United Nations to send a team to verify if
really this has been done.
I replied Soviet representatives that before send-
ing a team to verify this, the most important point
was to obtain the previous consent of the Cuban
Government. This subject matter cannot come up
without knowledge and consent of the Cuban Gov-
ernment, and actions that violated its sovereignty
could not be taken. Also I told both the Soviet rep-
resentatives and the United States Government
that I would come to Cuba to present this point of
view to the Prime Minister Castro and his col-
leagues. Of course, both the Soviet and the United
States governments agree in that if missile launch-
ers are withdrawn, tensions will diminish.
What the United States seeks, through myself,
is a temporary accord, before the end of the dis-
mantling of launchers.
Concerning the time that this will take, I have
asked the Soviet representatives, and arranged
asking Moscow, but still this morning no reply had
been received yet.
What the United States seeks is a temporary
accord with the United Nations, subject, of course,
to the authorization and consent of the Cuban Gov-
ernment.
197%
IN THE
soled geTHRESHOLD
BUSES) 2 2 OF NUCLEAR
ee WAR
Nobody knows, naturally, how long time this will

take: one or two weeks, maybe more.
The first proposal of the United States is, there-
fore, that if the Cuban Government accepts, a team
of representatives of the United Nations would be
suggested, made up of persons whose nationalities
were acceptable for the Cuban Government. The sec-
ond proposal would be a plane of air reconaissannce
of the United Nations manned by persons acceptable
for the Cuban, Russian, and American governments.
It has come to suggest a plane manned by a Cuban
representative, one Russian, and one American on
board for a week or two that this can last.
I have replied to the United States that this pro-
posal would also be presented to the Prime Minis-
ter, Fidel Castro.
The United States has told me that when this
system have been put into practice, it would make
a public declaration, and at the Security Council if
necessary, that it would not maintain aggressive
intentions against the Cuban Government and it
will guarantee the territorial integrity of the na-
tion. I have been asked to tell you this.
The most important thing—as I have replied to
the United States and to all—is that all these ac-
cords cannot be taken without the consent of the
Cuban Government. I have been replied that if this
accord is accomplished with the concurrence of the
Cuban Government and the United Nations, not
only it would make these declarations at the Secu-
rity Council, but also will the blockade be lifted.
I asked the United States yesterday that while I were
consulting with the Prime Minister Fidel Castro and
leaders of Cuba, it would not well seen that the block-
ade be maintained and I asked it to be suspended. This
morning the news was announced that the block-
ade had been suspended for forty-eight hours while
my visit to the Republic of Cuba lasted.
198
DocUMENTS
As you know, Your Excellency, I said at the Se-

curity Council that this blockade has been some-
thing extremely uncommon, very unusual, but in
times of war. I said that way to the Security Coun-
cil. This viewpoint is shared by the forty-five na-
tions that met and addressed to me for making
this request. Two of these forty-five—that also have
a seat at the Security Conuncil at this time—that
is, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, made state-
ments concerning this in a meeting at the Security
Council.
Other nations of the forty-five non-aligned na-
tions, specially those which participated at the
Belgrade Conference, will make similar statements
if they are given the opportunity. This is for what it
refers to the immediate problem.
Your Excellency: the Security Council has not
authorized me to deal with the long-term problems,
even though this is something that will have to be
discussed at the Security Council later.
For proposals of this first talk, this is everything
what I have to tell you, Your Excellency.
Dr. Castro: There is a point in which I have some
confusion: it is the one concerning proposals that
you make for inspection. They talk about two points
here: of a team and of a plane. I would like you to
explain me more that. The part in which you refer
to proposals of inspection, that you repeat then to
me, please.
U Tuant: Both proposals would be of the United
Nations, and it would consist of two units: one in
surface and the other one from a plane, for the
period that dismantling of bases last, that is, around
two weeks.
Dr. Castro: I do not understand why they ask us
these things, could you explain yourself a little better?
U Tuant: The explanation that the United States
gives of the reason by which it asks this, is that it
199
wants to make sure that launchers are really be-

ing dismantled and that missiles are being returned
to the Soviet Union.
Dr. Castro: What right does the United States have
to ask this? I mean: if this is based on a real right, or
if it is a demand by force, or it is a position of force.
U Tuant: This is my viewpoint: it is not a right.
One thing like it is only could be undertaken with
the approval and acceptance of the Cuban Govern-
ment.
Dr. Castro: Precisely, we do not understand why
we are asked this, because we have not violated
any right, we have not undertaken aggression ab-
solutely against nobody; all our acts have been
based on the International Law, we have not done
absolutely anything out of standards of International
Law. However, we have been victims, in the first
place, of a blockade that is an illegal act; in the
second place, the claim to determine from another
nation what right we have to do or not to do within
our borders.
We understand that Cuba is a sovereign state
no more no less than any other member state of the
United Nations, and with all attributes that are in-
herent to any of those states.
Also, the United States has been repeatedly vio-
lating our airspace without any right, committing
an act of intolerable aggression against our coun-
try. It has tried to justify it with an agreement of
the OAS, but that agreement has no validity for us.
We were, even, expelled from the OAS.
We can accept anything that fit to the right, that
does not imply reduction in our condition of sover-
eign state. The rights violated by the United States
have not been re-established, and by means of the
force, we do not accept any imposition.
I understand that the inspection is another attempt
to humiliate our nation. Therefore, we do not accept it.
200
DocuUMENTS
That demand of inspection is for authenticating

its claim to violate our right to act within our bor-
ders with entire liberty, to decide what we can or
cannot do within our borders. And this line that is
ours it is not a line of now, it is a viewpoint that we
have always and invariably maintained.
In the reply of the Revolutionary Government to
the Joint Resolution of the United States Govern-
ment, we textually said:
It is . . . absurd the threat to launch a direct
armed attack, if Cuba were militarily strength-
ened up to a degree that the United States
bers of the U.S. Senate or House concerning
the weapons that we conveniently esteemed
to acquire and the measures to take for fully
defending our country, as we did not consult,
or request authorization about the kind of weap-
ons and the measures that we took when we
destroyed the invaders of Playa Giron.
standards, laws and international principles
recognize to every sovereign state of any part
of the world?
That viewpoint was ratified at the United Nations
by the President of the Republic of Cuba, and also,
in numerous public pronouncements made by me, in
my condition of Prime Minister of the Government.
And that is a firm position of the Cuban Government.
All these steps were given for the sake of the
security of the nation, before a systematic policy of
201
hostility and aggression; all of them have been

given according to the Law, and we have not re-
nounced to the decision of defending those rights.
We can negotiate with all sincerity and with all
honesty. We would not be honest if we accepted
negotiating a sovereign right of our nation. For those
rights we are willing to pay the price that is neces-
sary, and it is not a mere formula of words but a
deeply felt attitude of our people.
U Tuant: I understand perfectly well the feelings
of Your Excellency. It is for that reason that I clearly
said to the United States and to the others: “every
action of the United Nations in the Cuban territory
can only be undertaken with the consent of the
people and the Government of Cuba.” I told them
so in the name of peace, which all the world and
all peoples of the world ardently wish, I told the
forty-five nations that I accepted coming to Cuba
without having pledges on the one side or on the
other.
Some press information said last evening and
this morning, before traveling that I was coming to
arrange details of the presence of the United Na-
tions in Cuba. This is completely wrong, this would
constitute a violation to the sovereignty of the Re-
public of Cuba. I have come here only to present
the viewpoints of the other side and to explore the
possibilities of finding a peaceful solution. Also the
forty-five nations, which have asked me to come,
know which position is legal and which one is not.
But in the name of the world peace, and only for
a period of one or two weeks, maybe three weeks,
they have asked me to come to possibly try finding
a solution.
Your Excellency, my consciousness is clear in
this aspect: the United Nations can only under-
take an action of this kind when it has the consent
202
DOocuUMENTS
of the government referred. It is not the first time

that this happens. In Laos, when a situation that
threatened international peace arose, the United
Nations settle down in that territory only after ob-
taining the consent of the Government of Laos. In
1956, in Egypt, in the United Arab Republic a situ-
ation arose, and the United Nations settle down in
Egypt—still they are in Egypt—always with the con-
sent of the government. Similarly, in 1958, another
situation that threatened world peace arose in
Lebanon, and the United Nations only entered there
once the consent of the Government of Lebanon
had been obtained.
One condition is absolutely necesssary, and it is
that for undertaking this kind of action, the consent
of the government referred must be counted on...
Dr. Casrro: Also in the case of Congo...
U Tuant: And in the case of Somalia.
Dr. Castro: In the case of Congo I have under-
stood that they requested this to the United Na-
tions.
U Tuant: In the Congo the request was made by
the Government of Congo.
Dr. Castro: In the Congo, the government that
requested this is buried at this time...
In the first place, our government does not have
the least doubt of the great intention and lack of
interest, and honesty that the present Secretary
General of the United Nations is working with; we
do not have any doubt of your intentions, of your
good faith, of your extraordinary interest of finding
a solution to the problem; we all have a very high
concept of your mission, and of your person. I say
this with all sincerity.
I understand the interest that all must have for
peace, but the path to peace is not the path of sac-
rificing the rights of the peoples, of the violations
203
to the rights of the peoples, because that is pre-

cisely the path that leads to war. The path of peace
is the path of the guarantees to the rights of the
peoples and the willingness of peoples to resist in
defense of those rights.
In all mentioned cases by Mr. Secretary: Laos,
Egypt, Lebanon, the Congo—that I mentioned—, in
all these cases it is seen nothing but a chain of
aggressions against the rights of the peoples. All
has been caused by the same thing.
The path of last world war was the path that
traced the annexation of Austria, the desolation of
Czechoslovakia, tolerated by the German imperial-
ism, and that led to that war. And we are very warn-
ed of those perils, we know the paths that aggressors
like to go through. We guess the path that the United
States wants to go through concerning us.
Therefore, it is really difficult to understand how
it can be talked of immediate solutions, independently
of future solutions, when what interests the most
is not to pay now any price for peace, but definitely
guaranteeing peace, and not to be paying the price
of an ephemeral peace every day.
And, of course, Cuba is not Austria, or the
southeast of Czechoslovakia, or the Congo. We have
the extremely firm intention of defending our rights
above all difficulties, all risks. And it is necessary
that the Secretary of the United Nations know that
willingness of us for you to have success in your
mission, or at least for you can work perfectly in-
formed of these circumstances.
U Than: I realize perfectly well of your feelings and
the viewpoints that Your Excellency have expressed.
Concerning the point of immediate solutions and
long-term solutions, I want to say that the Secu-
rity Council has authorized me to seek the means
for obtaining that there is peace in this area.
204
DocuUMENTS
I understand that the immediate and long-term

solutions are closely linked between them; and for
those long-term solutions we must explore the pos-
sibilities in the light of the situation as it is now.
For that, the Security Council has authorized me.
In practice it is very difficult to split both things.
I feel that if we find an immediate solution for
this, this would lead us to a permanent solution,
not only for the United Nations but for all inter-
ested parties.
When quoting Laos and the other cases where
the United Nations has settle down I agree with
you, but also I want to say that the United Nations
in those places has reached to estrange or to pre-
vent aggression from outside.
Please, consider this: that presence of the United
Nations in Cuba for a period of maybe more than
three weeks, can also estrange or eliminate the
danger of an aggression.
I am the one who thinks that at present times
and for the ones to come, the presence of the United
Nations in some nations will specially serve to es-
trange and prevent aggression.
Mr. Presipent: I would like to say something. I adhere
to the expression of our Prime Minister concerning
our full comprehension of which is the high mis-
sion that with great nobleness the Secretary Gen-
eral is undertaking. That mission is not another,
of course, than seeking the ways to guarantee peace
in this situation of crisis.
It seems that there is a matter to be defined:
where does the danger of war reside: perhaps in
the weapons of one or another nature that Cuba
has, or in the proposals of aggression of the United
States against Cuba?
We think that it is aggression what can gener-
ate war. The weapons that exist in Cuba, whatever
205
these were, will never initiate aggression. Then, we

wonder the following: Why is inspection and admision
to inspection a condition for the guarantee of peace?
It would be enough to guarantee peace that the
United States pledged, with all necessary securi-
ties through the United Nations, not to attack Cuba.
It is for that reason that we have posed—and our
Prime Minister has reiterated it here-with abso-
lute clarity—that matters of long-term solution—if
they can be called that way—are closely linked to
immediate solution of the crisis. The immediate
solution of the crisis would suddenly occur right
after the United States offered guarantees not to
attack Cuba, minimum securities that are con-
tained in the statements that our Prime Minister
made on October 28, and that I am sure the Secre-
tary General knows.
Permanence of the United Nations in Cuba con-
cerning the inspection, which the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba does not accept for the rea-
sons that the Prime Minister has exposed, would
mean at the most the guarantee for two weeks or
three weeks of that peace that he has precisely
qualified as “ephemeral.” Right after the danger of
war would re-start because conditions that propiti-
ate U.S. aggression to Cuba would remain.
Give the United States the securities we are
claiming as the minimal ones, and with that the
problem immediately starts to solve. I would say, as
a last resort, that there are not immediate and long-
term questions to discuss, with the object of achiev-
ing peace. We think that the five points included in
the declarations of our Prime Minister are issues
that are a part of the immediate discussion aimed
at guaranteeing peace.
We understand that these five points do not refer
to a long-term discussion, but circumstances demand
206
DOCUMENTS
that they be part of the immediate discussion, be-

cause it is our judgement that they are minimal
conditions to guarantee peace.
I repeat: peace is not in danger because of our
weapons. Peace is in danger because of the ag-
gressive behavior of the United States. And nego-
tiation and discussion around these five points are
what will immediately make disappear perils of war.
That is our wisdom of the problem.
U Tuant: In the first place I want to thank Your
Excellencies, President and Prime Minister, the
expressions that you have had for my person and for
the post that I occupy. I fully agree with both of you
in which the solution we will find for short-term
agreements must also include negotiations for long-
term agreements. But in terms of the United Na-
tions I feel that the best solution—and in this I feel
that the one hundred member nations agree—is that
through the Security Council the United Nations
should provide representatives of the United Nations
to reach seeking and finding the long-term solu-
tion. But, now, at this time, I do not think that the
United Nations, its Security Council, can arrive at a
positive and acceptable long-term solution, in the
best interests of the whole world and world peace. If
a long-term solution is to be found, it will be in the
best interests of the whole world and world peace,
but I feel that it is difficult to find it at the United
Nations at this time.
Dr. Castro: I understand that if that short-term
solution that Secretary talks about were not achieved,
it would simply be because the United States does
not want it, if it persisted in demanding the inspec-
tion as act of humilliation to Cuba. Because aimed at
that unilateral security that it requires, it must have
been enough for it with the decision of the Soviet
Government of withdrawing strategic-type weapons
207
that they had brought for defending the Republic of

Cuba.
The Cuban Government has not obstructed the
withdrawal of those weapons. And the decision of
the Soviet Government contains in itself a public-
type decision; and the mere fact of being adopted
in that way before the whole opinion has had a
world repercusion. The United States knows that
such a decision was seriously adopted by the So-
viet Union, and that, really, strategic weapons are
being withdrawn.
If what the United States claims, besides that,
is to humilliate our nation, it will not obtain that!
We have not hesitated not even a minute in the
decision of defending our rights. We cannot accept
impositions that can only be implemented to a de-
feated nation. We have not given up of our decision
of defending ourselves, and in such a degree that
it will never impose conditions to us, because be-
fore they will have to destroy us and exterminate
all our people; and in any case it will find nobody
here whom imposing humilliating conditions.
U Tuanr: Concerning the theme of the declaration
of the United States, the United States has said
that it will make a public statement of no aggres-
sion and of respect to the territorial integrity of Cuba,
once the missiles have been dismantled and with-
drawn.
In my opinion there is no disagreement. I fully
agree with Prime Minister that actions of the United
Nations involve an invasion of the rights of a mem-
ber state, and in this case, talking about Cuba, if
you do not agree in accepting action of the United
Nations, then my duty, what I must do is reporting
on this to those who made the proposal.
It is not my intention to make an imposition here.
My duty is simply explaining the possibilities of finding
208
DOocUMENTS
the ways, the manners or the forms in which we

could find a peaceful solution, without making spe-
cific proposals. I will take into account everything
has been said here this afternoon, and I will come
back, I will come back to present my report to those
parties interested in it.
In my opinion, this meeting has been very use-
ful, and if Prime Minister agrees, we can meet again
tomorrow, before leaving. Meanwhile, I can thor-
oughly think in the expressions of President and
Prime Minister on this matter.
Dr. Castro: To conclude, I wanted to respond on
the matter of inspection of the Red Cross. We do
equally oppose to that inspection in our ports, and I
wonder that if the Soviet Union authorizes inspect-
ing their ships in the high seas, what would then be
necessary to inspect them again in Cuban ports for?
In the second place, I see how Secretary focusses
his interest in achieving that the United States make
a public statement, that pledge before the United
Nations, that it will not invade Cuba.
I want, on this, say, in the first place that the
United States has no right to invade Cuba and that
negotiation cannot be undertaken with the promise
of not committing a crime, with the simple promise of
not committing a crime. And that, before the threat
of that danger, we feel more confident in our deci-
sion of defending ourselves than in the words of the
United States Government.
But, also, if the United Nations highly appreci-
ate the value of a public pledge made before it by
the United States as it would be the one of not
invading, why don’t equally appreciate the value of
the public pledge of the Soviet Union before the
United Nations, of withdrawing the strategic weap-
ons that the USSR sent for defending the Republic
of Cuba?; those would be two compromises equally
209
public, and that if one of the two does not need any
additional guarantee, that is, the pledge of the
United States of not invading Cuba, why does the
pledge of the Soviet Union of withdrawing their stra-
tegic weapons require the additional guarantee of
inspecting us?
We will meet again, with pleasure, as many times
as you wish and at the time you wish.
U Tuantr: Thank you very much, Your Excellency.
On the first point I just want to say that when
the Soviet Government declared to be willing to
accept an inspection of the Red Cross in the high
seas, we reported the Red Cross on this, and they
said yes initially even though they had to submit the
subject to its ruling body, they had to vote on this
and to accept it. But they indicated us that it would be
more simple for them to do this at the landing ports
than in the high seas. That is, it was not to inspect
again, it was only once.
Also, I am pleased of having your response of
this matter and having talked on this.
Mr. Presibent: We could reach some arrangement
on the hour to meet tomorrow.
U Tuant: I have some consultations to make here,
particularly with the Brazilian ambassador.
Dr. Castro: Concerning us, at the hour that you
wish. It is not necessary for you to tell us the hour
now, but simply to contact our Chancelorship and
tell the hour to meet.
U Tuant: Tomorrow, not today.
Dr. Castro: Whenever you wish.
210
TALKS HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
OF CUBA FIDEL CASTRO, AND ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS U THANT, OCTOBER 31, 1962
Part Two
(In these talks the President of the Republic Dr. Osvaldo
Dorticés; the Cuban Foreign Minister Dr. Raul Roa,
and the Cuban permanent ambassador before the
United Nations Dr. Carlos Lechuga also participated.)
U Tuant: I want to thank the government and the

people for the hospitality and facilities that I have
been given in this nation.
The motive of this new meeting is to exchange ideas
on some confidential matters that I have in mind.
Of course, I have studied, Your Excellency, your
viewpoints expressed yesterday, and I appreciate
them, I perfectly understand them, concerning Cuba,
as a sovereign nation it cannot tolerate any foreign
interference that affect the independence of Cuba.
I understand this because that is a correct principle
of the rights of sovereign states.
I have understood that Your Excellency is contrary
to any kind of verification on any activity of your na-
tion, that your government opposes to every inspec-
tion according to the rights of a sovereign state.
The first point is the following: I have the respon-
sibility of reporting the Security Council on this diffi-
cult problem, and I want to obtain some clarifications.
211
In the first place I want to inform myself con-

cerning that, as Your Excellency knows, last Sun-
day Khrushchev responded Kennedy a letter in which
he told him that he had instructed the dismantling
of bases in Cuba and the return of missiles to the
Soviet Union; also he said that he accepted the veri-
fication, by observers of the United Nations, of the
dismantling task.
What I want to know, in the virtue of that decla-
ration of the Soviet Union, specifically, what the
Government of Cuba thinks concerning that Soviet
statement made by Khrushchev to Kennedy and to
the Security Council, because the Soviet Union also
belongs to the Security Council, and what Your
Excellency’s viewpoint is.
Dr. Castro: We understand that when the Soviet
Government decided dismantling the bases and it
talked about the verification, it referred to some
kind of inspection outside the national territory of
Cuba, because the Prime Minister of the Soviet
Union could not talk of verification in the Cuban
territory, since that is an attribution that only con-
cerns to the Cuban Revolutionary Government.
Therefore, I think that it did not refer, at any
time, to a verification in the Cuban territory, but to
some kind of verification outside the national ter-
ritory.
U Tuant: Thank you, very much, Prime Minister.
Of course, I have to report this evening in New York
the two parties what the Prime Minister has said,
because I understand that in the negotiations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States that
information must be given, if you consider that Way.
Dr. Castro: We feel that this must be publicly
informed.
Dr. Lecnuca: The Prime Minister will speak tomor-
row to the Cuban people by radio and television.
212
DocuMENTS
U Tuant: My first intention when reporting the

Security Council is to diminish tensions and to re-
turn peace. If this problem is not resolved on time,
the United Nations will suffer a collapse, and that
would affect the future of the United Nations.
My colleagues and I have the opinion, and thus I let
the United States know that the blockade was ille-
gal, that no state can tolerate a blockade, not only
military, not even economic. That is using the impo-
sition of force of a large power against a small nation.
I also told them that air reconnaissance that was
being undertaken over Cuba was illegal and inad-
missible. These three things, economic blockade,
military blockade and air reconnaissance are ille-
gal, and I said to them that way on Friday, privately
of course.
In the United States there are three forces: the
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
State Department. In my opinion, the Pentagon and
the CIA have more power than the State Depart-
ment. If the CIA and the Pentagon continue with
that power, I see the future of the world very bad.
I told the United States that if it did something
drastic, then I would not only report the Security
Council, but I would also accuse the United States
before the Security Council; and that although the
United States has votes and the veto, there can be,
however, a moral sanction.
I also told it that I would renounce to my post;
that if the United Nations cannot stop a large power
in its aggression against a small nation, then I do
not want to be the Secretary General.
I have not taken a single Sunday off, my family
is very discontent because I have too much work. If
I cannot accomplish peace, I have nothing to do in
the post.
I repeated again to the United States on Satur-
day, and I warned it not to commit any aggression
213
Ne
against Cuba, because it would be the end of the

United Nations. The United Nations is the only ac-
ceptable intermediate for all powers. My intention
is accomplishing peace and accomplishing perma-
nence of the United Nations.
Because this is my mission, I would like to soften
the reports before the Security Council for loosen-
ing tensions. In the United States, as you know,
there is much hysteria; the press and the radio are
fostering that climate, and I feel that such a hysteria
has to be loosened.
U.S. press has been reporting that the Secre-
tary General is coming to Cuba for inspecting, but
nothing can be done about it.
My mission is exploring the possibilities for a com-
mon agreement. If the Prime Minister is going to
tell publicly these matters that have been said here,
he would have to wait until I speak to report then.
But I suggest, not meaning that I want to influence
in anything in the speech, but I suggest that the
speech be postponed until I speak with the Soviet
Union and the United States, in the benefit of the
mission that I am undertaking.
Dr. Castro: When will you speak with the United
States and the Soviet Union?
U Tuant: Tomorrow.
Dr. Castro: I will speak in the evening. I have to
speak tomorrow, because I have it announced, and
the situation of the people... it is very interested.
U Tuanr: I understand the thought of the Prime
Minister. Before leaving New York I told the United
States to suspend the blockade, while negotiations
remained; I have news that it suspended air reco-
naissannce last night, but I do not know if this has
been fulfilled.
When I am back I will ask to continue suspen-
sion of the military blockade and suspension of air
214
DocuUMENTS
reconaissannce, but also I will ask suspension of

economic blockade.
I am seeking the long-term solution, not only
the immediate one, because I consider that both
go together. I do not know if I can accomplish a
quick response of the Soviet Union and the United
States, because consultation to Moscow and Washing-
ton has to be made and that always delays. I appeal to
the Prime Minister for not making any statement un-
til I have the response of Moscow and Washington. I do
not know when this will be, but I feel that it will take
more than a day.
Of course, I will be permanently in touch with the
Prime Minister. I appeal again that no statement,
which could deteriorate the situation, be made.
Dr. Castro: I have to talk anyway to the people,
which have been waiting for many days. Precisely,
I did not want to talk until after your travel, after
talking with you.
What pronouncements do you think that could
harm?
U Tuant: I am thinking in the first response that
Khrushchev gave, concerning the dismantling and
inspection accepted by the Soviet Union. As Your
Excellency considers that the Soviet Union referred
that the inspection be undertaken outside Cuba,
I ponder that this could create some division or some
misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and
Cuba.
Dr. Castro: Do you understand that the view-
point expressed by us yesterday would harm?, be-
cause we have the necessity to explain to the people
which our points of view are; this is a matter of fun-
damental need.
There are some questions that if you wish, above
all the ones dealt today, we have the possibility of
not making them known.
215
U Tuant: No, what it was said yesterday does not

tend to create difficulties.
Dr. Castro: In that case, I will explain that in
today’s interview there were some pronouncement
that you made, confidentially, that you asked me
not to make them known.
U Tuant: I feel that it would be useful.
Dr. Castro: I agree.
U Tuant: Thank you. I will neither tell my colleagues
on this talk.
Dr. Castro: No problem. I explain to the people
that some parts of the talk were confidential.
U Tuant: Thank you. My next appeal to Your Ex-
cellency is the following: I perfectly understand that
the feeling of the Cuban people be sour; I would
feel the same if my nation, Burma, were threat-
ened by a great power.
This crisis that we are going through is the larg-
est that has occurred since the World War II. As
well as I have appealed to the United States to stop
its acts with words and with actions in this mo-
ment, to see if something can be accomplished, I also
make an appeal to the Prime Minister, not only for
peace, but also for the future of the United Nations,
although I do not have the competence for recom-
mending what Your Excellency must say in your
speech, for that tomorrow when speaking you do not
express yourself in a way that might create more
problems and frictions.
I know that you are in your legitimate right of
reacting that way, but I do this second appeal for
peace and for the future of the United Nations.
Concerning the common points, I want to say
this. Yesterday I had a long discussion with the
Brazilian ambassador and with the Brazilian Gen-
eral who is here.
I am convinced that the best solution is not only
to focus on the immediate problem, but in the long-
216
DocuMENTS
term problem. I am fully convinced that this is the

only solution: dealing with both problems at the same
time. I will inform the Security Council that way,
and I will tell that if the Security Council also does
not discuss at the same time the long-term prob-
lem, it will not resolve the crisis. That will be one of
my recommendations to the Security Council.
As Your Excellency knows, the long-term discus-
sion will have difficulties at the Security Council,
due to the attitude of the United States. Of course, a
long-term solution will require reciprocal arrange-
ments and concessions from both parties, under-
taken, of course, through the United Nations.
If the United States persists, for example, in the
inspection, logically this will also obstruct the matter.
Dr. Castro: We maintain the viewpoint that there
will be no solution, that is, definite solution, if the
five points of view that Cuba posed, which are very
legitimate, which are of an unquestionable reason,
are not met.
We know, of course, that this imply difficulties;
we know so. But, anyway, there will not be definite
solution without that solution.
We are willing, with all honesty, to seek definite
solutions and to resolve permanently the crisis. But
what we would not accept is the solution of this
crisis in conditions that imply some kind of special
“status” for our nation, or that the Cuban State
come about capitis deminutio.
We cannot accept any solution that do not main-
tain undamaged all prerogatives, absolutely all—sov-
ereign prerogatives of our nation. For us it is easy
an honorable arrangement, because on our part we
do not have conflict with anyone, or aggressive in-
tentions against anyone. We can exercise a policy of
absolute respect to international standards and to the
rights of the other states.
Lich
U Tuant: We would like to know your viewpoint

on the moment I must report the Security Council;
if you have any definite idea on the moment to
report the Security Council on this.
Dr. Castro: On our part, you can report to the
Security Council in the time you consider the most
useful and appropriate according to your arrange-
ments. If this could be, however, in early days of
the coming week, on Wednesday, for example, is it
possible on Wednesday?
U Tuant: I believe so, next Wednesday.
Of course, I consider that if discussions continue
outside the Security Council they will be with my
intervention, but if they do it within the Security
Council, they will be directly undertaken; and,
therefore, they must be done after elections in the
United States because many delegations understand
that large part of this problem is motivated by inter-
nal fights of U.S. elections. Many understand that
that date must be let gone through to have the pos-
sibility to discuss in better conditions.
Dr. Castro: I perfectly understand that all those
things cannot be made public.
U Tuant: This is a thing that is being commented
at the United Nations.
Dr. Castro: Yes, but not in my speech.
U Tuanr: Another point. My visit has been very
satisfactory. I would like to come back to Cuba, but,
of course, this is impossible because I have certain
arrangements of talks with representatives of the
Soviet Union and the United States for tomorrow,
and there are many other things, such as the prob-
lems of Congo, China, and that obliges me to have
many interviews. My duties are so many that I do
not see my family. Therefore, I would like to request
that one or two persons of my confidence might re-
main here as my representatives in Havana to be in
218
DOCUMENTS
direct contact with the Prime Minister and the Presi-

dent.
Dr. Castro: We are very anxious to please you in
everything, and to help you, but we must not acceed
to that request, in this case, because it can be
seen by the people as a kind of officials of inspec-
tion; it could be misinterpreted by the people.
We precisely have decided to send a new Head
of Mission, and if it is necessary to send the For-
eign Minister for him to be in contact with you, for
everything you wish to communicate us you do it
through him; that is, a comrade of the highest level.
With that we save the United Nations, which has
so much work, some staff that can employ in some
of the other tasks.
U Tuant: I respect your viewpoint, and I will take
all the staff.
Dr. Castro: And part of our staff, because ambas-
sador Lechuga is leaving with you!
U Tuant: Ah, yes, I have made the appropriate
arrangements for his visa, and I hope that he will
not have difficulties with it.
Lecuuca: Thank you.
U Tuant: I want to make a personal appeal. The
United States says that one of its planes—that un-
dertook an illegal flight—has been lost. And it an-
nounced over radio and the press that there was
only a man in the plane. | feel that for humanitar-
ian reasons, and also as a way to facilitate nego-
tiations and the peaceful solutions, I would like to
know if the plane is in Cuba, if it fell in the sea, if
the pilot is alive or dead, if there is any possibility
to return the pilot to the United States as an ex-
pression of conciliation of Cuba.
Dr. Castro: For the news we have, the pilot died
when the plane fell. Had the pilot survived, we,
very gladly, would have been willing to have an ex-
pression of this kind.
219
U Tuant: Can I give that news to the United States?

Or has it already been established any kind of means
to report it?
Dr. Castro: The plane was shot down by our anti-
aircraft forces many kilometers within the national
territory. We have not given publicity to that fact,
and now we are reporting it to you. The pilot died
when shooting down; we have the corpse, all of
which we are informing for you to make use of this
news as you wish appropriately estimate.
U Tuant: The United States did not mention me
that fact.
Dr. Castro: That is one of the worst problems: the
one of the violations of the airspace, becasue we can-
not accept the officialization they have made of the
privilege to fly over our airspace. We cannot accept
that. And I understand that it is one of the problems
that can create, in a certain time, an incident; we
are trying to prevent it, but that has a limit.
Provocations are very large, and at any time an-
other one can be shot down. The attitude of the
staff of the antiaircraft batteries is of high indignation
for provocations. We cannot accept that situation
forever, it is one of the most delicate points.
U Tuant: I agree with you, and also the forty-five
non-aligned nations do, in that those flights are
illegal.
Dr. Castro: The blockade takes place in interna-
tional waters; flights take place in our airspace,
over our territory. Besides, we do not have any wish
to tolerate this to imperialists. It is the nearest point
to produce a conflict.
U Tuant: As I said yesterday, I have toid the
United States that that is a violation of the sover-
eignty of Cuba. Last night it reported that flights
had been suspended, but I do not know if they are
going to be re-started.
220
DocuMENTS
Dr. Casrro: I traveled through inland of Havana

province and I ran into U.S. planes twice in one
afternoon. And it is very hard, what costs the most
to the heads of units, is to maintain staffs of anti-
aircraft batteries calm, who are young men, very
passionate.
U Tuanr: As a personal thing of mine, as the flight
is illegal and the plane was shot down in Cuba, I am
going to report to the United States, and with that
motive I am going to appeal not to re-start flights.
Could I ask the Prime Minister his authorization to
transmit to the United States Government that the
Cuban Government can return the body, for humani-
tarian reasons to the family of the pilot?
Dr. Castro: Yes, through your step. I can tell you
that it was a U-2.
U Tuant: It is a very famous plane.
Dr. Roa: Of course, it is, it is very famous; it is
the plane of espionage.
Dr. Castro: He fell with the plane, it seems that
he could not release the parachute.
U Tuant: I hope that after these negotiatons, if
successful, to continue talks with the Foreign Min-
ister, or with the Head of the Diplomatic Mission
in New York for the United Nations to establish a
technical assistance program in Cuba.
Dr. Castro: Thank you.
U Tuant: I understand you wish that discussion
be only on the five points.
Dr. Dorticos: They are the minimal conditions.
Dr. Castro: They are so reasonable that we can-
not renounce to any of those points. It is very logic,
it is elementary that if weapons of our friends are
removed from Cuba, weapons of our enemies do
not remain in the national territory.
The United States says that that Base is in vir-
tue of a treaty. It recognizes that a Government of
22)
Cuba had attributions to make that treaty, why won't

another Government of Cuba have the right, in vir-
tue of treaties, to have bases in the national terri-
tory? Why can’t another Government of Cuba, in
virtue of treaties, accept that friendly weapons be
in the national territory?
U Tuanrt: I attended the Belgrade Conference, not
as Secretary General of the UN, and I signed the
agreement that no nation must have bases in other
nations without the consent of the government and
the people of those nations.
Dr. Dorticos: The Belgrade Conference agreed
the same concerning the Base of Guantanamo.
Dr. Castro: We, for principles, are partisans that
bases in foreign territories desappear.
U Tuant: A last request, without being consid-
ered an interference in what you are going to say
over the radio tomorrow; it is that in that speech
you appeal to the United Nations as an effective
instrument of peace to stop war.
I feel the United Nations must take definite steps
to peacefully resolve this problem, and if the Prime
Minister might say that he would like to see some
strong United Nations, for preventing war, that
would be extremely useful for my step.
Dr. Castro: Even though you had not requested
that to me, in our spirit it was precisely to make
reference to that step, and expressing our confidence
in your step, at the same time I want to express re-
spectfully to the United Nations the recognition of
the role that is playing at this time, because I feel
that at this time the United Nations is playing one of
the most typical roles of that institution, and that it
is successfully playing that role, because at the United
Nations a collective opinion of this case has been
made felt; not a block opinion, but an institutional
opinion.
222
DocuMENTS
U Tuant: Thank you, Prime Minister. I already

finished. If you want to make any question that be
useful for the report...
Dr. Castro: We have no more questions to make.
We feel very satisfied of the way in which you have
posed the issues. Also, we wish you take a great
security that we have a very firm position: that we
are fully willing to defend the sovereignty of our
nation.
I think to use the version of yesterday discussion
for my statement of tomorrow. Do you have any in-
convenience that I can broadly talk about that?
That is the basis I have to keep in secret the part
two, because I can explain to the people that we have
talked some confidential things and that we respond
on that basis. That is, today’s talk is confidential,
but not yesterday’s. Is this your opinion?
U Tuant: Yes, I agree with that. Yesterday’s was
an expression of the viewpoints of Cuba, and I feel
that is very useful to be said. I do not get involved
in the substance of the speech, but I reiterate to
you my appeal concerning the language, in defer-
ence of the success of the step that I have under-
taken.
Dr. Castro: Tomorrow I am going to use, on the
themes that we discussed yesterday, the same words,
which I understand that were the words according
to the level and circumstance of the negotiaton.
Tomorrow we will try to be careful as much as it is
possible.
U Tuant: Thank you, Prime Minister.
Dr. Castro: We wish to give a solution, but as a
small nation we want to be respected and we are
willing to do any sacrifice for keeping our soverignty.
We are not a great power, we are a small nation.
However, with a great honor and prestige to de-
fend, convinced that we are defending the rights of
223
ININTHEspeck
aE THRESHOLD
LDN OFie
NUCLEAR
ee WAR
small peoples and that we are a trench where those

rights are defended. And we will not abandon that
trench: First, we will perish before abandoning that
trench.
U Tuant: I also defend the rights of small na-
tions, because I represent a small nation. The work
of Secretary General is a very ungrateful work. I have
wished to renounce several times, but my friends
have demanded me to continue for the future of
the United Nations. The term of my post expires in
April; unfortunately, so far there is no other candi-
date. Last week I posed again the renounce, but I am
the most accepted candidate by all, by great powers
and non-aligned nations; so far no candidate who
gathers the support of all has emerged.
I have been out of my nation for almost six years.
I was only one time in my nation for ten days. The
government of my nation wants me to work there,
but the future of the world is more important at
this time than the future of one nation.
My wife is not happy in the United States.
DR. "CASTRO: elhere’ are’Several "U.S. icables that
again start to talk about an invasion on Cuba, that the
United States pledge restricts itself this time only,
but that Cuba can be invaded for some other reasons.
Dr. Dorricos: Cables today bring information in
the sense that spokesmen of U.S. Government have
given to understand that the fact of not invading
now, by having dismantled the assumed missile
bases, does not mean that they do not use the force
tomorrow, protected by the OAS, in the Rio Pact.
That clearly explains why it is fundamental for
us to discuss around the five points that we have
Telerrea™tO®
U Tuant: The Pentagon is very strong.
Dr. Castro: And it must have come out strength-
ened from this crisis.
224
DocuMENTS
U Tuant: I am convinced that, of course, neither

the Pentagon, nor the CIA, nor Kennedy, but that
many Americans are against U.S. policy on Cuba,
despite of poisoning of daily press, radio, and propa-
ganda.
The following day of my report to the Security
Council, I received 620 cables from Americans, ask-
ing me that the United Nations peacefully resolve
the problem of Cuba, and out of those, only five asked
to maintain the UN out of the problem for allowing
the United States to invade Cuba.
On Monday I received 200 cables, most of them
asking for a peaceful solution to the Cuban problem.
I thank you again for your hospitality and for these
useful days of exchanging ideas. I understand the
position of the Government of Cuba and, of course,
I assure you that I will do all efforts to arrive at a
peaceful solution of the problem.
The governments of the forty-five nations, par-
ticularly, feel confident in the results of my efforts
to accomplish a peaceful solution of the problem.
If you agree, I will bring my colleagues for them to
pay their respects.
Dr. Castro: With pleasure.
225
EXCERPT OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FIDEL CASTRO
ON THE CUBAN RADIO AND TELEVISION
BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
NOVEMBER 1, 1962
oS teed 2 eee 8 0. ee Ee, ih Rielle: (ela @ 6: <¢. (esie ie ie) |6) imu ie ie) .6. 6). (es eae) oy eRe, tel fe ee
If the United States has put the world on the brink of

the war to demand the withdrawal of those missiles,
what right and morale does it have to refuse to leave
the territory that it occupies in our country?
We are not impediment for a solution of peace,
for a truly solution of peace. We are not a warlike
or bellicose people. We are a peaceful people, but
being peaceful does not mean to allow oneself to be
outraged, far from it, because when abuse comes
we are warriors enough to defend ourselves. And
facts have proved so!
We will never be impediment for a truly solution
of peace. And indispensable conditions for a truly
solution of peace are the guarantees of the five
points established by the Government of Cuba.
Let the United States start giving proof of its good
will, not with promises. Facts and not words! A re-
ally convincing fact would be that the United States
returned us back the territory that it occupies in
the Naval Base of Guantanamo. That would be a
fact much more convincing than any word, than
any promise of the United States.
Doesn't it accede to those guarantees that Cuba
is asking for? Then, there will be no truly solution
of peace, and we will have to keep all living in the
226
DocuMENTS
middle of that tension, which we have lived in so

far. We want solutions of peace, but solutions with
dignity. Moreover, without dignity, there will be no
peace, because when peoples have no dignity, they
are not respected.
We have the right to peace. To one or another
peace. To this peace—that is neither peace nor
war—, simply because we have known to resist,
because we have known to have dignity. We have
right to peace, to a truly solution of peace, and
sooner or later we will reach it because we have
won that right, because of the spirit of our people,
their resistance, their dignity.
And our cause, our right to peace will make its
way in the whole world. Because everybody knows,
also, who are the guilty parties of these problems,
who are the guilty parties of all these tensions. And
the peoples of the world will increasingly be sup-
porting our five points, which are indispensable con-
ditions for peace.
Our people have won, and will increasingly be
winning, the right for an honorable peace and a just
peace.
That it let us work in peace! More than weapons,
we prefer employing working tools. We do not want
to kill and to destroy, but to create. Our people are
not let to create, and constantly are obliged to be
mobilized, to be on a war footing, to defend them-
selves, to get ready. Because they are obliged, not
because we want that policy. It is a policy imposed
by aggressors against our nation and what our na-
tion wants is to work, what it wants is developing
its resources, developing its people, to carry out its
peaceful work.
Some days before this crisis, it was already ob-

served everywhere how the work of the Revolution
had advanced: supplies were considerably improving,
227
IN THEUETHRESHOLD
ea AR OU OeOF Ie
NUCLEAR
ees WAR
production—both agricultural and industrial—,

plans, all creative task of the Revolution quickly made
its way; bodies were devoted to prepare working con-
ditions for the coming year 1963, with the hope to
achieve a jump in the economy and production.
And, however, the crisis came, the threat. Mobi-
lization became necessary, the abandonment of all
those works, of all those tasks, to assume in these
circumstances the most sacred task, the defense
of the fatherland.
We defend the fatherland, because we want a
fatherland where to work. Not a fatherland of para-
sites, but of workers, of creators. We want that fa-
therland to work, to create. And therefore, we first
of all have to defend it. And the ardor with which
the people were willing to fight and to do whatever
it was needed, proves the love that the people in-
creasingly feel for the creative work.
Because, what do they defend in trenches? What
they are doing in the field, what they are doing in
factories, what they are doing at universities, what
they are doing at schools. That is what our people
go to defend in trenches. And the more conscious-
ness they have of what they are doing, the more
they love what they are doing, it is logic that with
more love and courage they go to trenches.
We are not going to be any impediment for any
truly solution of peace. We gladly offer our effort
for that solution, we contribute to the effort that
the United Nations undertake to find that truly so-
lution of peace, to the effort that different non-
aligned countries do to find that solution of peace,
peace with dignity, without absolute decrease, of
any of the sovereign rights of our nation. Because,
if it is with decrease, then we will continue as we
are: We do not accept it!
228
DocuMENTS
How long? As long as is needed. Let us be pa-

tient, with the whole necessary patience for us, as
culmination of this fight, to achieve someday that
peace, with all the attributions of a total and abso-
lutely sovereign state. Because that was always
the aspiration of our people. We must be patient.
We will not accept any petty formula. We accept
any formula of peace, truly honorable. I feel that
with it, we would not only the ones who won, but
all. America would win. The world will win. The
United States would win. That is: the same guilty
parties of all this situation would also win with an
honorable solution of peace for our nation.
We express the thought of our people when we
say that for that peace we are willing to fight and
we are willing to collaborate. We have posed that. We
have said so in all our pronouncements.
Let us see if now, after the crisis that shock the
world for some days, conditions are achieved, or
circumstances are achieved to reach that peace.
There are some issues left to discuss. It must be
said that in the course of this crisis, during the de-
velopment of this crisis, some discrepancies emerged
between the Government of the Soviet Union and
the Government of Cuba. But I want to tell all Cu-
bans one thing: it is not here where we must discuss
those problems; it is not here where this could be
useful to our enemies, who would take advantage of
discussions. We have to discuss this with the Sovi-
ets, at a government level, at a Party level. We have
to sit down and discuss with them all that be neces-
sary in the light of the principles. Because it must be
said that above all we are Marxist-Leninists! And we
are friends of the Soviet Union! Between the Soviet
Union and Cuba there will be no gaps!
We want to say another thing: that we have con-
fidence in the policy of principles of the Soviet Union,
229
IN THE THRESHOLD
IN Se OF NUCLEAR
ee WAR
and that we have confidence in the directorate of

the Soviet Union, that is, in the Government and
in the leading Party of the Soviet Union.
If my compatriots ask me for an opinion at this
time, what must I tell them? What advice must I give
them? In the middle of confusing situations, of is-
sues which have been or are not well understood,
what to do? I would say that what we have to do is to
have confidence, what it must be done is to have
consciousness that these international problems are
extremely complex, extremely delicate, and that our
people, which have proved to have a great maturity,
an extraordinary maturity, prove to have so now.
That is, to be careful when analyzing issues, not
to make premature judges, to be disciplined and, above
all, to have confidence, full confidence in the Revolu-
tionary Government, in the directorate of the Revo-
lutionary Government, to have full confidence that
all the issues are going to be discussed at the right
time. All the problems, all the issues. To have in mind
even, it can lack enough elements of judgment to
understand certain issues and to have in mind, also
—it must not be forgotten—, the dramatic and com-
pelling circumstances in which the events took place.
Now there is time to discuss broadly all that.
And we will discuss that. Preventing, above all pre-
venting that the foe can take advantage of our lack
of patience, of our judgments. Because an honest
revolutionary person can say judgments, he has
the right to make his opinions, but if he expresses the
opinions that he makes at a certain time on certain
issues that he does not understand well, also there
may be the one who is not a revolutionary person,
interested in creating distrust, in creating division,
in creating resentment.
Therefore I advise that we must have confidence, to
have confidence and faith; to let be guided by the
230
DocuMENTS
statement that we have made here this evening is

what must be done in these circumstances.
And, above all, there are things that I want to say
with absolute sincerity at these times in which a
certain discontent may have been taken place, due
to those misunderstandings, or discrepancies: it is
good to remember, above all, what the Soviet Union
has made for us. It is good to remember, above all,
what it has made for us at every difficult time we
have had, before every Yankee pawing: economic
aggression, suppression of the sugar quota, suppres-
sion of petroleum deliveries for our nation. Before
every aggression—one by one—, the aggressions we
have received, how the friendly hand of the Soviet
Union has been next to us. We are grateful, and we
must say that here, in a loud voice.
Also, another more touching thing, yet, which at
least it makes me to have an extraordinary im-
pression: the Soviet men, the Soviet men that we
have met here, technicians of all kind who have
come to work with us in our fields, teachers, pro-
fessors, engineers, planners. The interest and te-
nacity with which they have tried to help us, the
affection with which they have helped us. Also,
military technicians, men who have been willing
to die here with us, who have helped us in the
instruction, training, preparation of our combat
forces, who, for months, for years, have worked with
us teaching our men to fight, to organize that tre-
mendous army that we have at present.
The fundamental weapons of our forces are weap-
ons that the Soviet Union has sent for us, and that
the Soviet Union has not charged.
I must say that some months ago the Soviet Union
decided to cancel every debt of our nation concern-
ing weapons.
There are some of these issues of military na-
ture, which must be dealt with extreme caution.
231
Anyway, I am going to explain, for example, some-

thing: the strategic weapons for our defense did
not belong to Cuba. That is not the case of tanks
and of a whole series of weapons that do belong to
us. The strategic weapons did not belong to us.
In the agreements in virtue of which they were
sent to our nation to strengthen our defenses, be-
fore the threats of attacks, it was agreed that those
strategic weapons, which are too complex and re-
quire a highly specialized personnel, continued
under the direction of the Soviet staff and contin-
ued belonging to the Soviet State. Therefore, when
the Soviet Government decided the withdrawal of
those weapons, which were theirs, we respected
that decision. I explain this to make it be under-
stood why the Soviet Government decided the with-
drawal.
Therefore I said that when we still have some found-
ed reason of discontent with some fact, some detail, we
now must remember more than ever how good and
generous, and noble, and friends the Soviets have been
with us.
And | talked, precisely, of technicians, those men
that we have seen next to us, willing to die, to sacri-
fice their lives for the defense of our nation, who
are great men. And therefore another thing that we
must have, at this time more than ever, is apprecia-
tion, affection, and respect towards those men, and
gratitude to them. I believe that this is the behavior
that corresponds for us to have at this time.
That is what we must expose and, above all, to
behave at the highest level than ever in these times,
with larger morale than ever, and with larger great-
ness than ever.
Don't think that the withdrawal of strategic weap-
ons disarms us. This does not mean that we are
disarmed.
232
DocuMENTS
I can assure you that we have tremendous and

extremely powerful means of defense, with extraor-
dinary resources for defending ourselves. Strate-
gic weapons leave, all the other weapons remain
in our nation. And they are extremely powerful
means of defense, with which we can face any situ-
ation. Don't be confused.
Confusions will pass on little by little.
There is a matter that I want to emphasize today,
an appreciation that I want to express, and it is con-
cerning the people, to the behavior that the people
have had these days. I must say that the attitude of
the people, concerning the decision, bravery and dis-
cipline. has surpassed all that the most optimistic
ones could have ever imagined.
It must be said that thousands of men who were
not militiamen, that in these four years of Revolu-
tion have not been so, have become militiamen dur-
ing this crisis. It must be said that thousands of
persons who were not members of mass organiza-
tions, or of the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution, have become members of these mass
organizations these days. It must be said that the
foe has not had the possibility to count on in the heart
of our fatherland with allies of any kind. It must be
said that in these days of extreme crisis it has not
been necessary to put under arrest absolutely any-
one. That, even those men and women who made
criticisms to the Revolution, in this decisive hour
the patriotic and revolutionary feeling have come
out and they have enlisted. And they have enlisted
for a fight that, according to all perspectives, can
be a serious fight, a fight that can be undertaken
with conventional weapons, or atomic weapons.
The U.S. president tried to intimidate our people.
To this people that he called “captive people” when
he said to them that we could be target of atomic
233
attacks, and the result was that there were more

militiamen, more revolutionary militants than ever.
It must be said that women went to work, re-
tired people went to work to replace men who are
in trenches. And it must be said that despite this
has been the largest mobilization of all, it was the
one that less affected the production. Never under
a mobilization, production had went so well as now!
It was really impressive the discipline of the people, the
ardor of the people, the bravery of the people; impres-
sive the organization acquired by our people and,
above all, by our Revolutionary Armed Forces, the
effectiveness with which the commands worked. And
it proved how the Revolution has been creating a
discipline, has been making a people.
The foe by dint of harassing us has made us to be
disciplined, it has made us to be organized, it has
made us to be brave. The result of these four years of
harassment is a heroic people, a more Spartan people
because it is said that in Sparta mothers saw off to
their sons and said to them: “with the shield, or over
the shield.” Here all the people—women, children,
young people, and old people—, said to themselves:
“with the shield, or over the shield!”
A people like that are an invincible people! A
people like that, which in such a way and so se-
renely, so admirably face so difficult situations, is
a people that have the right to conquer what they
yearn for, which is peace, respect, dignity and pres-
tige. We have far-reach moral missiles, which can-
not be dismantled and will never be dismantled.
That is our most powerful strategic weapon, of
strategic defense, of strategic offensive. Therefore
I want here to leave proof, today more than ever, of
our admiration towards our people. All revolution-
aries must feel obliged two times, from this experi-
ence, to fight for our people, to untiringly work for
234
DOocUMENTS
our people. And from the very bottom of my heart,

to finish, I want to say that today I feel prouder
than ever of being a son of this people!
We shall overcome!
235
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO'S LETTER
TO ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS U THANT,
NOVEMBER 15, 1962
His Excellency U Thant,

Acting Secretary Getieral
The United Nations
Your Excellency,
The conciliatory action which you are conducting
as Acting Secretary General of this world organi-
zation is very closely linked with the latest world
events concerning the crisis in the Caribbean.
There is no need, therefore, to dwell upon each
and every one of the events, circumstances and
incidents which have occurred in these weeks of
extreme tension.
I should like to refer solely to the following mat-
ter: we have given you — and we have also given it
publicly and repeatedly — our refusal to allow uni-
lateral inspection by any body, national or interna-
tional, on Cuban territory. In doing so we have exer-
cised the inalienable right of every sovereign nation
to settle all problems within its own territory in ac-
cordance with the will of its Government and its
people.
The Soviet Government, carrying out its promise
to Mr. Kennedy, has withdrawn its strategic mis-
siles, an action which was verified by United States
officials on the high seas.
We should like to repeat once more that the in-
stallation of these weapons was nothing other than
236
DocUMENTS
act of legitimate self-defense on the part of the

Republic of Cuba against the aggressive policy which
the United States has been pursuing against our
country since the very triumph of the Revolution.
This did not confer any right upon the Government
of the United States with respect to Cuba, since all
our actions have been effected within the frame-
work of international law and in exercise of the
sovereign prerogatives of our state. It was, how-
ever, the pretext used to perpetrate acts of force
which brought the world to the edge of war. The
pretext has now disappeared. Nevertheless officials
of the United States Government declare that they
do not consider themselves bound by any promise,
among other reasons because Cuba has not per-
mitted the inspection of its territory.
The United States, resorting to the law of force,
is constantly violating our territory through the use
of air forces based in various parts of the Carib-
bean and on aircraft carriers which it is employing
against us.
We have given proof that we are ready for a worthy
peace. We have put forward five points as guaran-
tees, the minimum which any sovereign nation can
ask for. We have handed over the body of Major
Anderson who died while carrying out an illegal
flight over Cuban soil. We have warned the Gov-
ernment of the United States that it must stop these
acts of violation of our sovereignty and at the same
time we have done everything possible to prevent
the occurrence of any incidents in connection with
these acts.
What have we obtained in exchange? The viola-
tions have increased in number; every day the in-
cursions of war planes over our territory become
more alarming; military aircraft harass our air bases,
make low-level flights over our military defenses
237
and photograph not only the dismantled strategic

missile installations but in fact our entire territory,
foot by foot and inch by inch.
The capture of the leader of a group of spies
trained by the CIA and directed by it, here in Cuba,
has shown us how the photographs taken by the
spying planes serve for guidance in sabotage and
in their operations and has also revealed, among
other things, a design to cause chaos by provoking
the deaths of 400 workers in one of our industries.
This impairs in its essence the security of our
nation and outrages the dignity of our people. The
object has been not only to secure advantages for
military and subversive purposes through informa-
tion and detailed knowledge of our industrial in-
stallations and defense arrangements, but also in
addition to humiliate and demoralize the Cuban
people.
These are typically Hitlerite methods for soften-
ing the resistance of peoples.
Mr. Acting Secretary General, no sovereign state
can allow its air space to be violated in this man-
ner without feeling an impairment of its dignity. If
in addition this violation is perpetrated by the re-
connaissance aircraft of an enemy which openly
threatens our country, tolerating it means, more
than a lack of dignity, a shameful submission to
the enemy. We cannot be asked to accept this by
virtue of the discussions which are taking place
with regard to the crisis, for the integrity of our
physical space and the sovereignty of Cuba will never
be negotiable.
We for our part have not failed to give constant
warnings to the aggressors.
On 27 October, in the midst of the crisis, the
Cuban Government declared that it would never
acknowledge the vandalic and piratical privilege of
238
DocuMENTS
any war plane to violate our air space since this

was essentially a threat to our security and facili-
tated the conditions for a surprise attack. Cuba’s
right to resist such violations can never be renounced.
Today again through this communication which
we are sending you as Secretary General of the
United Nations, we wish to give warning that to
the extent of the fire power of our anti-aircraft
weapons, any war plane which violates the sover-
eignty of Cuba, by invading our air space, can only
do so at the risk of being destroyed.
If the United States sincerely desires — as we
ourselves desire — to take steps toward the solu-
tion of the present problems, it should begin by re-
specting these elementary rights of our country.
In the history of our Republic, the United States
has more than once intervened in our domestic
affairs, with the use of force. It secured this right
in the first constitution of our Republic, by virtue of
a law adopted by the United States Congress, and
supported by an army of occupation. The present
action of the United States is designed to reinstate,
in fact, these militaristic and imperialist privileges.
The long history of struggle of our country, cul-
minating in full sovereignty and national dignity
after a century-long fight written in blood and hero-
ism, cannot be reversed. A powerful military force
could annihilate us but it could never make us yield
and we should first demand a very high price of
the pirates who dared to invade the soil of the Cu-
ban fatherland. And even if we should die our ban-
ner would fly victoriously because we are defend-
ing something even more sacred than our right as
a sovereign nation in the concert of free nations of
the. earth.
We are sounding the necessary alarm for the
defense of world peace, we are defending the right
239
of the small countries to be considered on a footing of

equality, we are telling all the peoples of the earth
that before the imperialist enemy there can be no
weakening. The path of calm and stern vigilance,
strong in the security of a response commensurate
with the magnitude of the aggression, is the only way
to the salvation of peace.
Our right to live is something which cannot be
discussed by anyone.
But if our right to live is made conditional upon
an obligation to fall to our knees, our reply once
again is that we will not accept it.
We believe in the right to defend the liberty, the
sovereignty and the dignity of this country, and we
shall continue to exercise that right to the last man,
woman or child capable of holding a weapon in this
territory.
May I reiterate to you the expression of my highest
consideration.
(s) FipeL Castro

Prime Minister of the
Revolutionary Government
United Nations, Press Release SG/ 1359 (October 27, 1962), 1-4.
240
PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO’S LETTER
TO ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS U THANT,
NOVEMBER 19, 1962
U Thant,
Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
Your Excellency:
The Government of the United States and the
most reactionary section of the press of that coun-
try are endeavouring to create the impression that
the Government of Cuba wishes to hamper and
sabotage the possibilities for a peaceful solution of
the present crisis.
This attitude is based on two absolutely legiti-
mate decisions of our people:
The first: not to accept the unilateral inspection
of our land whereby the Government of the United
States wishes to decide questions which are en-
tirely within our jurisdiction as a sovereign nations.
The second: not to be prepared to permit inva-
sion of our air space which are injurious to our
security and offensive to our national dignity.
The Government of Cuba has not created the
slightest obstacle to the negotiations which are tak-
ing place. This has been and it is our position. Our
attitude to the threats and insults of the Govern-
ment of the United States in something very dif-
rece:
The United States has now made the IL-28 me-
dium bombers stationed on Cuban territory the crux
of the problem.
241
These planes are the property of the Soviet Gov-

ernment. They were brought to Cuba for the de-
fence of our country when faced with aggression
Owing to their limited speed and low flight ceiling,
their are antiquated equipment in relation to mod-
ern means of anti-aircraft defence.
It is clear that the position of the Government of the
United States in demanding the withdrawal of these
planes merely constitutes a pretext for maintaining
tension, prolonging the crisis and continuing its policy
of force. Nevertheless, if the Soviet Government con-
siders it desirable for the smooth conduct of the
negotiations and the solution of the crisis to with-
draw these planes, the Revolutionary Government
of Cuba will not object to this decision.
At the same time high officials of the Govern-
ment of the United States have declared that mili-
tary aircraft of that country will continue violating
Cuban sovereignty and invading our air space.
These illegal and aggressive acts are in flagrant
contradiction with international law and the United
Nations Charter.
Cuba possesses a legitimate and indisputable
right to defend its territory against such violations
_ and it repeats the warning that to the extent of the
fire power of our anti-aircraft weapons any war
plane which invades Cuban air space can do so
only at the risk of being destroyed.
If during the perpetration of such arbitrary acts
against our country, an incident should occur, the
responsibility will fall wholly upon the Government
of the United States.
We wish to tell you once again, Mr. Secretary-
General, that we are prepared sincerely to consider
a broad solution which will resolve the present ten-
sion once for all. :
We believe that this will be beneficial for all the
peoples affected by the present situation, just as
any conflict would be harmful to all. The moment
242
DocuMENTS
has arrived when it will become clear who wants

peace and who does not want peace. Cuba will never
be an obstacle to a just and decent solution, ac-
ceptable to all. Cuba is simply defending its sover-
eignty, the right of self-determination of its people,
the legal equality of all States, large or small, the
right of every nation to work, to progress and to live
in peace; to respect and be respected.
If the Government of the United States, despite
the sober attitude of the Soviet Union and the readi-
ness of Cuba to promote a worthy and stable peace,
insists on its acts of force against our country, no
one need have any illusions about the inevitable
result of this policy.
Cuba will not give in to a policy of force. Its Revo-
lution will remain firm, its people will resist, cost
what it may. Let our enemies not deceive them-
selves. With the strength born of right and patriotism
we shall make the aggressors, if they attack us,
pay very dearly for their crime.
The United States is constantly threatening our
country with war. It would be a war without glory
and without honor, against a people who will never
admit to defeat.
May I assure you once again of my highest con-
sideration,
FIpEL Castro Ruz

Prime Minister
of the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba
Laurence Chang, and Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Missile Crisis, 1962:
A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press,
1992), 298-299.
243
STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE
OF THE INTEGRATED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC-OF CUBA,
NOVEMBER 25, 1962
The National Directorate of the Integrated Revolu-

tionary Organizations and the Council of Ministers,
meeting in joint session to deal with questions relat-
ing to the so-called Caribbean crisis, hereby resolve
to make known to the people of Cuba and to the world
the position of our Party and the Cuban Government.
In his latest public statement, President Kennedy
announced the lifting of the blockade of Cuba in
return for the withdrawal by the Soviet Union of
the intermediate-range ballistic missiles and IL-28
medium bombers stationed in Cuba. Nevertheless,
the statements by the President of the United States
contain the seeds of a provocative and aggressive
policy against our country, which must be exposed.
In one part of his speech, President Kennedy said:
“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems
are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemi-
sphere in the future, under adequate verification
and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the
export of aggressive communist purposes, there will
be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in Sep-
tember, ‘We shall neither initiate nor permit ag-
gression in this Hemisphere.’ We will not, of course,
abandon the political, economic and other efforts
of this Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba,
nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
244
DocuMENTS
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are

very different from any attempt to launch a mili-
tary invasion of the island.”
The position of strength adopted by the United
States Government is wholly contrary to the rules
of international law. Over and above the outrages
which it has committed against Cuba, and which
brought the world to the brink of war — an out-
come avoided by means of agreements predicated
upon an undertaking by the United States to aban-
don its aggressive and criminal policy against Cu-
ba — it refuses even to give an assurance that it will
not again violate the Charter of the United Nations
and international law by invading the Republic of
Cuba, on the pretext that our country has not
agreed to international inspection.
It is quite evident that Cuba has a sovereign
right, based on the Charter of the United Nations,
to agree or not to agree to inspection of its terri-
tory. At no time has Cuba suggested or agreed to
such verification.
The Soviet Government, for its part, complied with
the verification requirement of which it spoke in its
letter of 28 October, by allowing the United States
to verify the withdrawal of the missiles on the high
seas, and the United States agreed to this form of
verification.
President Kennedy’s claim is without foundation.
It is merely a pretext for not carrying out his part
of the agreement and for persisting in his policy of
aggression against Cuba. As if that were not enough,
even if permission were given for inspection, car-
rying with it all the guarantees which the United
States Government might see fit to demand, the peace
of the Caribbean would still be subject to the condi-
tion that “Cuba is not used for the export of aggres-
sive communist purposes.”
245
This is the same as saying that any effort by the

peoples of Latin America to free themselves from
the imperialist yoke might serve as a pretext for the
United States Government to accuse Cuba, break
the peace and attack our country. Flimsier guaran-
tees would be difficult to imagine.
To all this must be added one further fact in-
dicative of the warmongering and- domineering
policy of the United States Government. In his lat-
est statement, President Kennedy tacitly reasserted
the right — already claimed on several other occa-
sions — for spy planes to fly over the territory of
Cuba and photograph it from one end to the other.
This too is a gross violation of international law.
Respect for international law is an essential
condition if the nations of the earth are to live to-
gether regardless of their social or economic sys-
tems.
The only effective way to guarantee that the rule
of law will be maintained in international affairs
and that the provisions of the law will be complied
with is for all nations to respect the established
rules. At this time of acute rivalry between two
conceptions of society, the United States has arro-
gated to itself the right to break the existing inter-
national rules and to make new rules as it pleases.
It is our view that when such a dangerous situation
is reached, when one country decides, by and for it-
self, how the law is to be applied in its relations with
other countries, there is no choice but firmly to resist
its claims.
The United States is trying to dictate what kind
of arms we should or should not have. The United
States rulers who oblige us to expend vast resources
in order to defend ourselves against the aggres-
sion to which we have been subjected during the
four years of our Revolution’s progress also claim |
246
DOocUMENTS
to be the judges of what limit should be placed on

the armaments with which we defend our freedom.
It was the United States Government which, by
its repeated and overt attacks on our country, made
it necessary for the Cuban people to arm them-
selves. It was President Kennedy himself who or-
dered an army of mercenaries to land at Playa
Giron. It was under his Administration that thou-
sands of United States weapons were dropped by
parachute or landed on our shores with the aim of
encouraging and organizing bands of counter-revo-
lutionaries, who committed the worst possible crimes
against teachers, mass literacy [sic] personnel, peas-
ants and workers.
The Governments of the United States — the
previous one and the present one — not only adopted
criminal economic measures against Cuba, which
confronted our people with severe problems; in ad-
dition their acts of military aggression forced us to
devote great energy and great resources to the de-
fense of our integrity. What would have become of
our country and its Revolution if our people had
not offered stubborn and heroic resistance to the
actions of that powerful and aggressive country?
The United States is guilty of a policy of economic
strangulation and of violence against Cuba, a policy
which has led to the Caribbean crisis with all its
consequences and dangers.
Furthermore, the United States violated the prin-
ciple of freedom of the seas by establishing the block-
ade of Cuba; it violated the Charter of the United
Nations by announcing the adoption of unilateral
measures against our country; and it now takes ref-
uge in the OAS, seeking official sanction for its acts
of piracy in the air. The OAS has no jurisdiction
whatsoever on our soil; its decisions have no valid-
ity for us; to cite them is arbitrary — pure sophistry
on the part of the imperialist aggressor.
247
The United States Government has reiterated its

interventionist intentions. It has stated that it will
in no circumstances abandon its political, economic
“and other” acts of aggression. What is meant by
“other efforts” against Cuba? International subver-
sion, sabotage, acts of terrorism, pirate raids, infil-
tration by CIA agents, the landing and dropping of
weapons in our territory, invasions by mercenaries
— in fact everything which, in Pentagon jargon, is
termed “paramilitary warfare.”
If that is how matters stand, Cuba will have to
defend itself by every available means. It reserves
the right to acquire weapons of all kinds for its
defence and will take such steps as it deems ap-
propriate to strengthen its security in the face of
this open threat. After examining President Kennedy’s
statement, then, it is possible to affirm that armed
conflict has been averted but not that peace has
been achieved. For our people there has been no
peace, but incessant attacks. Many of their sons
have died as a result of armed attacks, sabotage,
murder, subversive acts and raids by pirate air-
craft and ships instigated by the United States Gov-
ernment. President Kennedy’s statement offers, not
peace, but the continuation of such acts.
We therefore reiterate the five points which are
essential to a genuine and final settlement of the
crisis. First: cessation of the economic blockade
and of all measures of commercial and economic
pressure exercised against our country by the
United States in every part of the world.
Second: the cessation of all subversive activities,
of the dropping of weapons and explosives from the
air and their landing from the sea, of the mounting
of invasions by mercenaries, by infiltration by spies
and saboteurs, all of which are being carried out
from the territory of the United States and a few
countries which are its accomplices.
248
DOocuMENTS
Third: cessation of the pirate raids which are car-

ried out from bases in the United States and Puerto
Rico.
Fourth: the cessation of all violations of our air space
and territorial waters by United States aircraft and
warships.
Fifth: withdrawal from Guantanamo naval base
and the restoration of the Cuban territory occu-
pied by the United States.
These are no irrational demands; they do not
conflict with the rights of anyone; they are claims
so legitimate, and so clearly limited to the rights of
the Cuban people, that no one can object to them.
The United States Government demands that the
United Nations should verify in our territory the with-
drawal of strategic weapons. Cuba demands that the
United Nations should verify in the territory of the United
States, in Puerto Rico and in other places where at-
tacks on Cuba are in preparation, the dismantling of
the training camps for mercenaries, spies, saboteurs
and terrorists; of the centres where subversion is
prepared; and of the bases from which pirate vessels
set out for our coasts.
In addition Cuba demands, as one of the required
guarantees, that effective measures of control should
be established to prevent any repetition of such acts
in the future.
If the United States and its accomplices in ag-
gression against Cuba do not agree to such inspec-
tion in their territories by the United Nations, Cuba
will in no circumstances agree to inspection in its
own territory.
Reciprocal concessions and guarantees will af-
ford the only means of reaching a broad and fitting
agreement acceptable to all.
If such an agreement is reached, Cuba will need
no strategic weapons for its defence; the staff of
249
foreign military technicians engaged to instruct our

armed forces would be reduced to the minimum
and the necessary conditions would be created for
the normal development of our relations with the
countries of this hemisphere.
A just and satisfactory settlement of this crisis
would without doubt help towards solving the other
problems awaiting action throughout the world; it
would be a firm step on the true road to peace. And
the world needs peace.
It is a legitimate aspiration of mankind that the
enormous sums now being invested in the manu-
facture of costly and deadly armaments should be
spent on making goods of use to man, especially for
the benefit of the underdeveloped peoples whom the
colonizing and imperialist countries have left im-
mersed in the direst poverty.
War industry and the arms traffic can interest
only the monopolists whose business it is to stifle
the most lawful aspirations of the peoples and to
batten, like birds of prey, on destruction and death.
As Marxist-Leninists, we defend peace by con-
viction and on principle. Weapons are to us a heavy
burden imposed by the imperialists, which divert
energy and resources from the creative tasks of the
Revolution.
Our mission is to defend peace as the supreme
aspiration of mankind. We believe in the possibility
of averting war and we do not believe that war is a
fatal and inexorable necessity. But this does not
mean that the imperialists are entitled to be pirates,
to be aggressors, or to commit acts of genocide against
any people.
The imperialists must not confuse a position on
principle with weakness in the face of their acts of
aggression. It must be made quite clear to them
that they are in no position today to impose their
250
DoOcUMENTS
law on the world and that they will not be permitted

to do so.
Cuba stresses once again that there is no better
way than that of peace and discussion between Gov-
ernments, but at the same time we repeat that we
shall never falter before the imperialists. To their
positions of strength we shall oppose our firmness;
to the intent to humiliate us, our dignity; to aggres-
sion, the resolve to fight to the last man.
We do not believe in mere promises of non-ag-
gression; we need deeds. Those deeds are set forth
in our five points.
We have as little faith in President Kennedy’s
words as we feel fear at his veiled threats.
Fatherland or death! We shall conquer!
Havana, 25 November 1962.
(s) Osvatpo Dorticos

President of the Republic
(s) FipEL CasTRO

Prime Minister and Secretary General
of the Integrated Revolutionary
Organizations
United Nations, Press Release S/5210 (November 26, 1962), 1-6.
2a
LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA
TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS U THANT,
JANUARY 7, 1963
On the instructions of my Government I have the

honour to send you, with the request that they be
forwarded to the President of the Security Council,
copies of the letter which Fidel Castro, Prime Min-
ister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, sent
to you on 28 October 1962! and of the statement
issued on 25 November 1962 by the National Direc-
torate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations
and the Council of Ministers,? so that they may be
included in the Security Council’s documentation
on the Caribbean crisis.
At the same time I should be grateful if you would
request the President of the Security Council to
give instructions for these documents to be circu-
lated to Member States and if you would also ar-
range for the text of this letter to be circulated to
all States Members of the United Nations.
As you know, the negotiations initiated with your
generous assistance have not led to an effective
agreement capable of guaranteeing permanent
peace in the Caribbean and eliminating the existing
tensions.
1. See annex I. [This is a note of the original documen

t. Ed.]
2. See document S/5210. [You can read the whole cited
document
in the pages 244-251 of this book. Ed.]
252
DocuMENTS
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba con-

siders that the basic reason why these negotiations
have not led to agreements acceptable to Cuba is
that the Government of the United States, far from
having renounced its aggressive and intervention-
ist policy towards the Republic of Cuba, has main-
tained the position based on force which it took up
in flagrant violation of the rules of international law.
The Cuban Government has stated - and it wishes
to reiterate this condition on this occasion - that it
cannot regard any agreement as effective unless it
takes into consideration the five points or measures
put forward as minimum guarantees for peace in
the Caribbean by our Prime Minister, Fidel Castro,
in his statement of 28 October 1962, which is at-
tached.
These Cuban requests are based on elementary
principles of international law. They are not irra-
tional demands, and Cuba considers that no one in
the United Nations could validly object to them with-
out disregarding the very foundations of the world
Organization. The Cuban Government therefore
considers that the United States Government’s mere
promise not to invade Cuba, which, moreover, has
never been given formal shape, would not be any
safeguard for our country and would not guarantee
peace in the Caribbean.
We wish to draw attention to the fact that the
United States Government, apart from the acts of
aggression it has committed against Cuba and its
preparations to carry out an armed invasion of our
country, which brought the world to the brink of
war, an outcome avoided by means of agreements
which presupposed a commitment by the United
States to abandon its aggressive and criminal policy
towards Cuba, refuses even to give an assurance that
it will not again violate the United Nations Charter
253
by invading the Republic of Cuba, on the pretext

that our country has not agreed to international
inspection, as has been publicly stated repeatedly
throughout this whole affair.
The Cuban Government considers that it is a
sovereign right of the nation concerned to agree or
not to agree to inspection of its territory and that it
is an absurd piece of insolence to offer an under-
taking not to invade, the equivalent of an undertak-
ing not to commit an international crime, upon the
condition that the country liable to invasion agrees
to inspection of its territory.
The Government of Cuba considers, on the other
hand, that the Soviet Government has fulfilled. the
conditions concerning verification proposed by Chair-
man Nikita Khrushchev in his letter of 28 October
1962 by allowing the withdrawal of intermediate
range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to
be verified on the high seas and by agreeing to similar
methods of verification with regard to IL-28 bombers.
Thus the United States Government’s claim has no
foundation or practical purpose and is merely an
excuse for it not to carry out its part of the agree-
ment and to persist in its policy of aggression against
Cuba.
The Government of Cuba, moreover, categorically
rejects the statement by the United States Gov-
ernment in which it reserves the right to use other
means of inspection and verification on its own ac-
count. For a Power to officially announce its decision
to inspect the territory of another Member State is
truly alarming and amounts to a challenge to the
United Nations. It implies an intolerable violation
of national sovereignty, which Cuba denounces.
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has al-
ready said that it would be ready to agree to the
establishment of a system of multiple verification
254
DocUMENTS
in the countries of the Caribbean region, including

the corresponding parts of the United States, un-
der which the extent of countries’ compliance with
their undertakings could be verified, provided that
the United States, for its part, would agree to the
adoption of the five measures or points requested
by the Cuban Government.
The Cuban Government regrets the fact that the
negotiations carried out with the agreement of the Se-
curity Council, which you yourself nobly and im-
partially set in motion, have not led to a satisfactory
conclusion capable of guaranteeing peace in this
hemisphere and thus throughout the world.
The recent history of this crisis, we repeat, gives
palpable proof that the responsibility for this failure
and for the maintenance of the tensions which dra-
matically aroused the fears of all mankind not long
ago lies exclusively with the United States Govern-
ment.
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba wishes
to state once more on this occasion that there is
no better procedure for solving crises such as this
one than peaceful negotiations and discussion be-
tween the Governments concerned regarding the sov-
ereign rights of each nation and respect for the rules
of international law which govern the coexistence of
nations. This is not the criterion which has deter-
mined the behaviour of the United States Govern-
ment, and its stubborn resistance to any durable,
satisfactory and fitting settlement is the reason why
we are today unable to hail a real solution of the crisis.
Cuba reaffirms its peaceful policy and its desire
for peaceful solutions, but wishes to state once more,
in the words of the attached statement by the Na-
tional Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary
Organizations and the Council of Ministers, that “to
their positions of strength we shall oppose our firmness;
255
to the intent to humiliate us, our dignity; to aggres-

sion, the resolve to fight to the last man.”
The Cuban people, as our Prime Minister said
during the recent ceremonies commemorating the
fourth anniversary of the revolution, “reserve in
full the right when confronted by their imperialist
enemies and imperialist aggressors always to take
any measures and to possess any weapons they con-
sider appropriate.”
We have not renounced this right.
Accept, sir, the assurances of my highest con-
sideration.
(Signed) Carros M. Lecuuca

Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Cuba
to the United Nations
New York, 7 January 1963
United Nations Security Council, Document S/5228 (January 7,

1963), 1-6.
256
Fidel visits a group of antiaircraft artillery in San Antonio de los

Banos military camp.
257
IN THEEETHRESHOLD
pot
ee aeUe OF NUCLEAR WAR
Photograph of the Soviet missile withdrawal in the high seas.
President Kennedy announces during a press conference at the

State Department that the Soviet Premier has ordered the with-
drawal of Soviet bombers IL-28 from Cuba. Hours later, the defense
secretary McNamara decrees the lifting of the naval blockade to
Cuba.
- TAoweriw
wil tel ne
SENSITIVE 20 February i962
Program Review
by Brig. Gen, Lansdale
THE CUBA PROJECT
The Goal, In keeping with the spirit of the Pre sidential memorandum
of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba over-
throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new govern~
ment with which the United States can live in peace,
The Situation, We still know too little about the real situation inside
Cuba. eithough we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However,
= — Yorme salient facts are known, It is known that the Communist regime ts
an active Sine-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist
controle inside Cuba are severe. Also, thers is evidence that the repres~
Sey
sive measures of the Communista, together with disappointments
Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted
in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes &
resistance program & distinct and present pos sibility.
: Time is running against us, The Cuban people feei helpless anc are
- losing hope fast. They need symbole of inside resistance and of outside
interest soon, They need somothing they can join with the hope of starting
we
to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late Hevember,
the U.S.
have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within
joverament and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets
as fas
required for success in our task, —
promises
The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62)
due. Bes aril
to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with
recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project,
goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence
as it
These
collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance.
will be prepared on # periodic basis.
Ra
Premiss of Action. Americans once rang successful revolution, It
and strong
wae fun from within, and succeeded because there was timely
who supported
een political, economic, and military help by nations outside
_ourcause, Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must
their Uberty. ,
ie now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain
to
On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two taske
provide
Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to
capabilities, The Attorney
a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S,
The answers
General and the Special Group were apprised of this action,
received on I$February provided the basis for planning & realistic course
also revealed that the course of action must con-
of action. The answers
tain cantinuing coordination and firm overall guidance.
present opera~
The course of action set forth herein is realistic within
—Honal estimates and intelligence. Actually, it reprogents the maximum
feasible. [t -- a
target timing which the operational people jointly considered
1962. Itisa
zims for a revolt which can take piece in Cuba by October
; ? 5
Pertlaily E2ciessified/Released.onthe Se
aiken ie £758) under provisi ons of £.0.12356
| 12 SITIVE cr ty Ti, Manan, National Security Council
Excluded from bed ce ak
automatic regrading: ~— This document contains Pe
tie DoD Dir 5200,10° T
Copy No. te of /x copie
does not apply.
First page of “The Cuba Project,” February 20, 1962. Source:

National Security Archives (for this and the next four photocopies).
259
ouput eeee
series of target actions and dates, not arigid Hme-table. The target dates
are timed as follows:
< ‘
Phase !, Action, March 1962. Start moving in.
Phase I, Buildvup, April-July 1962, Activating the necesaary opera

tions inside Cubs for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political,
economic, and military-type support from outside Cubs.
ge Phase UW, Readiness. | Auguar 1962, check for final policy decision.
Phase lV, Resistance, Auguat-September 1962, move into guerrilla

operations, Ne
Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Qpen revolt and
overthrow of the Communist regime.
Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new

government, :
“Plan of Action, Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of

the Communit regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cubs, with outside
help from the U,S. and elsewhere, Since this ia an operation to prompt
and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, Hexibility
is & must for success, Decisions on cperstional Mexibility rest with the
= Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy
matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached
Operational plans, which cover:
A, Basic Action Plan Inside Cubs
B, Political Support Plan
©. Economic Support Plan
D,. Psychological Support Plan
E. Millsary Support Plan
F. Sabotage Support Plan
G. Intelligence Support Plan
Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S.

support of a eaten movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist
vegime {s within policy limits already set by the President, A vital decision, |
atill to be mada, is on the use of open U.S, force to aid the Cuban people in
winning thelr Uberty, If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are
achieved in.Cuba, and if U.S, help is required to sustain this condition, will
the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The
contingencies under which such milltary deployment would be needed, and
recommended U.S. responses, are detailed tn a memorandum being prepared
by the Secretaries of State and of Defense, An early decision is required,
prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.
i yesstitl
Second page of “The Cuba Project,” February 20, 1962.
260
om: ar
EONS:"TEEGRAM ney
hy
bok?
ould ba aéliveredas “goon epoiasble tohighear

fore
Hae
“care te welecaed aad ‘gtatement of your destre toseek 8

- ozs
‘proape solution to‘the. areas the first, chine. thet::
‘ %
me to be done,“however
basés-.~
e systensdo. one eupable. of“offensive use, £0‘pe.rendered,

é %e
Neer ois eee 3 * My
snoperable,, under effective ‘Uateed Nations arrangeneats. 2

fae
hev,
First page of President Kennedy's letter to Premier Khrushc
October 27, 1962.
261
UNTEED NATIONS
GENERAL oe
ASSEMBLY ee
EXCLISH
Seventeenth session
LETIER DATED 28 CCTOBER 1962 FRO}: TRE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CUBA

40 THE VALTED NATIONS, ADDRESSED 10 THE SECRETARY-CENERAL
On the instructions of the Revolutionary Government of Cube, I beve the

honour to convey to you the folloving messege: oe
"U Tent,
"acting Secretary-Generel of the United Hetions
3 “With reference to the stetement mede by Mr. John 2. Kennesy,

President of the United Stetes, in a letter addressed to :
Mr. Nikita Knrushehev, Cheircen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
to the effect thet the Unites States would agree, after suiteble arrengesents
bad teen made through the United Nations, to remove the blcckede row in
effect and to give guarantees egeinst an invasion of Cuba, and with
reference to the decision, ennounced by lir. Nikite Karushchey, to
withires stragetic defence weerons facilities from Cuban territory, the
Revclutionery Goverment of Cube wishes to veke the Follewing statement:
"Tae guarentees mentioned ty President Kerredy thet there will te no

egeression egeinss Cube will te ineffecsive wiess, in addition to the
rerovel of the reve dlockeée <iich he promises, the follieving Réesures,
inter elie, are sécoted:
Ths Cersavion of che eccutéaic Slocwste sud of gil the censives

c= comercial end econoxic pressure teing cerried Cuz by the Unites
Steves agains: our country throughout the vorld., ;
so ttt "2. Cessetion of all subversive activities,of the dropping
enc landing of veepons ens explosives by eir and sea, of ‘the
orgsnization of invasions by rercezarics, end of the infiltration of
spies and sctoteurs ~ #1) of which activities are being carried on
fren the territory of the United States ené certain eccomplice
countries. : 2
¥
"3. Cesestion of the piraticel attacks being carried out frem
tases in the United States and Peerto Rice.
€2-23702 : : [se
First page of Prime Minister Castro’s “five points” letter to UN

Secretary General U Thant, October 29, 1962.
262
~~
letter to
Second page of Prime Minister Castro's “five points”
UN Secretary General U Thant, October 29, 1962.
UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY _
Distr.
. §/5228
-
COUNCIL 7 January 3963
ORIGINAL: SPANISH
-
LETTER DATED 7 JANUARY 1963 FROM TEE FERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

OF CUBA ADDFESSED TO TRE SECRETARY-GENERAL
vn the instructions of my Government I have the honour to send you, with the
request that they be forverded to the President of the Security Council, copies of
the letter which.Fidel Castro, Prime iinister of the Revolutionary Government cf Cuba,
gent vo you on 88 Cetober agsel/ and of the statement issued on 25 November 1962
by the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations and the
Counes2. of Ministers ,2/ sc that they may be included in the Security Council's
dcounentation on the Caribbean crisis.
4% the same time I should be grateful if you would request the President of
the Security Council to give instructions for these documents to be circulated
to Memver States and if you would also arrenge for the text of this letter to te
circulated to all States vembers of the United Nations.
as you knov, the negotietions initiated with your generous assistance have
not 78 to an effective agreement capable of guaranteeing permanent peace in the
Cariviean and eliminating the existing tensions.
The Revolutionary Government of Cuba considers that the basic reason why these
“negotiations have not led to agreements acceptable to Cuba is that the Government
of the United States, far from having renounced its aggressive and interventionist
policy towards the Republic of Cuba, hes mainteined the position based on fores
which it took up in flagrant violation of the rules of international law.
The Cuban Government hes stated - and it wishes to reiterate this condition
on this occasion - that it cannot regard any agreement as effective unless it takes
into consideration the five points or measures put forward as minimum guarantees
1/ See annex I.
2/ See document 8/5210.
63-0252 i
First page of the letter from the Permanent Representative of

Cuba to the UN Secretary General U Thant, January 7, 1963.
Source: United Nations Security Council, Document S/5228.
264
TESTIMONY
Commander in Chief
Fidel Castro Ruz
a Lisle vcs 7 yamVe oe
_
\* i 0 4
. inh ovmies
7 aor 7
i Fi = Wht eB en oo
: a. om ema wore ; -
ry & ih.atin |
eaeetaiee
ams
Parer weg @ Gk yawn brome thee | urs ie

Cried. ter Hoe LIBegetics Coeaysl Cf Types._fancery 7. FAAS,
Suatee Lirtieg Rept, here ly Corned: Se Sa
FIDEL CASTRO’S WORDS ON JANUARY 11, 1992
DURING THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE
ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, HELD
ON JANUARY 9-12, 1992
Well, another surprise. I thought that this morning

we were going to discuss a point brought up by the
American delegation, and that my speech might be
in the afternoon. I think I can make an effort, in any
case, if this is what you prefer. In that case, I will
speak. Maybe I will need a little help, some docu-
mentation. I think I have the essential ideas to speak
right now.
If I do not speak long, do not think that it is because
I do not want to provide information, but really be-
cause I do not want to make a traditional two-and-a-
half- or three-hour speech. I want to summarize ideas
as much as possible and to concentrate on those things
that I believe are essential.
I must keep in mind everything that has been
discussed in the two previous days and I do not
want to repeat any of those issues.
In my opinion, many things have been clarified here.
I believe that the meeting has been truly fruitful, at
least for me, since I did not have an opportunity to
participate in the previous meetings. I do not know
everything that has been discussed; I only know it in
very general terms. That is why I think that I should
limit myself to those things that, by their character,
have not been discussed in other meetings.
I should begin by saying that in analyzing a pe-
riod such as this one, it is necessary to analyze the
267
participation in it of several personalities; two of them

were very important personalities of our time:
Khrushchev and Kennedy. They were two people for
whom I have great respect. I respect Khrushchev for his
demonstrations of friendship toward Cuba in ex-
tremely difficult times. I always thought that he was
pleasant. I had the opportunity to get to know him
personally.
I remember at the United Nations when, as a
result of a meeting of heads of state at the United
Nations, Khrushchev came to visit me at the
Theresa Hotel, where I was practically in confine-
ment in those days because of the atmosphere of
intense hostility that I found there, and because I had
been virtually thrown out of the other hotel. I had then
two alternatives, to either set up a tent in the UN yard
or to go to the Theresa Hotel. I was warmly wel-
comed at the Theresa Hotel. I was visited there by
many heads of states, among them Khrushchev, which
really was a great honor.
Khrushchev was extraordinarily good to us. Al-
ways, when we requested something from him, he
made every possible effort at his disposal to ap-
prove our requests. He gave me the impression of
being basically a peasant: that was the impression
he gave me. A clever peasant, and not only a clever
peasant, he was an intelligent, very intelligent man,
a daring and courageous man. Those are the per-
sonal impressions I got from him.
I also have an opinion of Kennedy’s personal qual-
ities, apart from the conflicts that emerged between
his administration and ours. He was a talented man
and also courageous, a man with the ability to rule
his country. He made mistakes but also did things
right. He was the central figure in charge of direct-
ing the United States during the October Crisis. He
had new ideas—some of them were brilliant or at least
268
TESTIMONY
very intelligent—such as the idea of the Alliance

for Progress. And in my opinion, with the authority he
attained precisely after the October Crisis—which
was when he consolidated his leadership in the
United States—he might have been one of the presi-
dents, or maybe the president in the best position
to rectify certain aspects of the U.S. policy toward
Cuba. I had proof of this precisely on the day of his
death.
I was talking that morning with a French reporter,
Jean Daniel, who had interviewed him at length
and whom he asked to come to Cuba to talk with me. In
fact, he conveyed a message to me and, as we were
talking, the news of the attack in Dallas was heard
on the radio. You can see how many coincidences
have occurred in all of this.
From what that reporter told me, I could see a
man who was pondering the possibility of holding
talks, finding some solutions to the problems with
Cuba since he began by asking he conveyed to me
to what degree we had been in danger of a nuclear
war, whether I was aware of this.
He truly wanted, regarding all these issues, an
exchange of opinions that really became unneces-
sary, because we were in the middle of our conver-
sation when the news of his death arrived. I think
Kennedy was a capable man because of his authority,
because of his ability to correct certain aspects of U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
I have explained this and I say it with lots of sin-
cerity, to justify why I feel real respect and admira-
tion for these historic personalities, and because I do
not have the least intention of saying things to hurt
anyone, or to defame anyone’s memory.
In relation to the most immediate antecedents
of the problem that would emerge afterwards, we
have the issue of the Bay of Pigs. I do not blame
269
IN THEUS THRESHOL
PN ZEN Sd EE ee WAR
D OF NUCLEAR
Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs. In fact, Kennedy re-

ceived a legacy from the previous administration;
decisions had already been made; everything was
already prepared. Kennedy was still new in office:
he had just been sworn in. He knew that it was a
very serious problem; he had made certain pledges
regarding Cuba in some speeches during thexelec=
toral campaign. But the impression I have is that
he did not like that operation. It is true that he
had constitutional authority to have stopped it, but
constitutional authority alone is not enough. Some-
times moral authority and a considerable amount
of political authority to solve certain problems is
needed, and U.S. administrations usually do not
have it during the first few weeks of government,
and sometimes do not have even during the entire
first presidential term. You are aware that many
times it is said that a president cannot solve this
or that problem in his first term because the next
elections are still pending, but that he could solve
it during a second term. Therefore, I do not blame
him for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Somehow, we have
to acknowledge that he remained very composed
regarding these events.
As has been stated here the whole thing became
a disaster, a political disaster that, because of its
scope, cannot be compared to a military disaster,
with other military disasters, but from the military
point of view and regarding the scale of the battles,
it also became a disaster. It was a difficult trial for
Kennedy, and I would say that he showed courage
at the time. I have not forgotten what he said when
he assumed total responsibility for the events: Vic-
tory had many fathers, but defeat was an orphan.
He could have made the decision to order U.S.
troops and squadrons to participate. The Bay of Pigs
battles were waged in sight of the U.S. aircraft carri-
270
‘TESTIMONY
ers and warships that were three miles from our

coasts. I saw this personally when we entered Giron
as it was getting dark that April 19, 1961. The
Squadron was out there with all its lights off, in
full combat gear. They witnessed everything and
were ready to enter into action.
The invasion plans even presupposed the inter-
vention of military forces later on. The goal was to
establish a government, recognize it, and support
it with troops. In other words, the invasion plans
included the premise of using military force against
our country, the intervention and invasion of our
country because, naturally, those troops that dis-
embarked, those forces, did not have the support of
our people and could not do anything but maybe
sustain their hold on a piece of territory and cre-
ate in Cuba a sort of Taiwan. But we know that the
plan presupposed a recognition, and after the rec-
ognition, the intervention. The intervention always
occurred within this framework.
In other words, if Kennedy had not been a com-
posed and courageous man at the time, he had not
realized how mistaken the plan was from every point
of view, military and political. Kennedy, undoubtedly,
was very concerned with Latin American public opin-
ion, he did not want to begin his administration with
an event of that nature and he decided not to give
the order for U.S. forces to intervene.
That would have been a very bloody war, and IJ do
not know if the number of Cuban casualties would
have been as high, maybe, as if an intervention
had occurred during the months of the 1962 October
Crisis. There are no doubts that that war would have
had a different character and unpredictable conse-
quences. Despite that, casualty estimates were pre-
pared.
At the time, April 1961, we had hundred of thou-
sands of armed men and women in our country.
271
IN THE THRESHOLD
NU
ee eS OF NUCLEAR WAR
Weapons were distributed throughout the country,

in the mountains, in the plains, in the cities, every-
where. An enormous resistance would have been
put up by the people, who were armed and had just
come out of a war. All the guerrilla traditions were
still fresh. Our people would have had to fight a
well-equipped army that numbered up to 80,000
men in arms, yet by the end of the war we barely
had 3000 battle weapons. At that time, we could
estimate that we had approximately 300,000 men
and women armed or capable of taking up arms, and,
to a certain extent, organized and trained. We also
already had some cannons, artillery, tanks, on which
the soldiers received quick, accelerated training.
I would ask the first advisers—at that time we
already had some specialists teaching us how to
use the weapons, advisers from Czechoslovakia and
the USSR, and there was a large number of can-
nons and antiaircraft artillery guns—and we asked
them whether they could train all the necessary
personnel. The training program would have taken
years, yet we did it in weeks, because what our
comrades would learn in the morning, they would
go and teach in the evening in the other camps
that we organized. There was a great exhilaration
among the population. Maybe, we might still be
fighting if there had been an intervention in 1961.
This may have meant a toll of hundreds of thou-
sands of lives for our country. A prolonged struggle
would have also resulted in considerable losses for
the occupiers of our territory.
This is why I said that, on the contrary, we should
credit Kennedy with the common sense and wis-
dom to have not ordered the intervention of the
U.S. troops at the time. I know of presidents who
would not even think for three minutes about order-
ing the intervention of U.S. troops. I tell you this so
272
‘TESTIMONY
you can understand the reason for our opinion of

the conduct of President Kennedy at the time.
In Giron, we find the antecedents of the October
Crisis because there is no doubt that, for Kennedy,
it meant a severe political blow. He was embittered
by those events, very grieved by those events. And
afterwards, the issue of Cuba had a special mean-
ing for him. This was reflected in the relations be-
tween the two countries.
I am not going to talk about the clandestine op-
erations, acts of sabotage, that were continuous
throughout that period. I am not going to make refer-
ence to the problems related to assassination plots.
Unfortunately, all these things happened in one way
or another during that period, but are not the subject
of our analysis.
But Kennedy was left very bitter about Cuba, de-
termined to end in one way or another the revolu-
tionary process in Cuba. He also used instruments
and political strategies. I cite, as I used to, the ex-
ample of the Alliance for Progress designed to change
objective conditions, because he knew that the ob-
jective conditions in Latin American were, as they
still are nowadays, favorable for social explosions.
He wanted to deal with it from that angle.
We should remember that the Bay of Pigs crisis
was followed by a meeting between Kennedy and
Khrushchev.” According to the news we received,
Khrushchev heard with concern the Kennedy’s state-
ments regarding Cuba. We still need to find out,
through some of the figures that were there, when
the discussion turned to Hungary, or when Kennedy
made reference to Hungary—that they had solved
the problem in Hungary and that the U.S. still had not
been able to solve the problem of Cuba. I do not have
* At Vienna, 3-4 June 1961. Ed.
273
the means to clarify this now, if this was men-

tioned in the Vienna talks. [Oleg] Darusenkov thinks
it was discussed in Vienna. Afterwards, there was
also a version saying that in a conversation of
Khrushchev’s son-in-law, whom I believe was the di-
rector of Izvestiya, [Aleksei] Adzhubei. He was travel-
ing to the United States and had a talk with Kennedy.
I have heard comrades talk about the conversation
between Adzhubei and Kennedy, and the subject of
Hungary was mentioned andthe same problem they
did not know how to solve, and they took it as a warn-
ing, as a firm statement that they were planning to
solve by one means or another the problem of Cuba.
I remember that Adzhuvei visited us, I do not
remember the exact date either, if it was after the
Washington trip. Maybe Oleg [Darusenkov] remem-
bers this. But we have to clarify in which of the
two conversations—or both—the issue of Hungary
was mentioned. I do know, and I am aware of the
great concern that Khrushchev felt after those con-
versations. It was a frequent subject, long before
any idea about deploying the missiles existed.
Of course, we were asking for more weapons.
We were willing to defend ourselves. We asked for
more weapon supplies. We signed certain agreements
on weapon supplies for our Armed Forces. That was
the situation up to May 1962.
Here we have already talked about some of the
antecedents. Aleksandr [Alekseev], for many years
an ambassador in our country, and ambassador
during the crisis, has talked about this, and other
members of the Soviet delegation have provided
details here of the conversations that took place
regarding the missiles when we did not have any
news about it.
We received news of an upcoming visit by [Sharaf]
Rashidov, who was a party leader in Uzbekistan,
274
‘TESTIMONY
and who had already visited us and spent several

months in Cuba providing cooperation in matters of
agriculture, irrigation, etc. He was bringing along
Marshal [Sergei S.] Biryuzov,” undoubtedly a very
smart and energetic man—TI believe that he later
died in an airplane crash in Yugoslavia. He accom-
panied Rashidov, but he was the one basically en-
trusted with the issue of the missiles.
Naturally he did not begin talking about missiles
right at the beginning. We met with him right away.
He began by talking about the international situa-
tion, the situation of Cuba, the risks facing Cuba
and at one point he asked me what would be re-
quired to prevent a U.S. invasion. That was the ques-
tion he asked me—and I immediately answered him.
I told him: Well, if the United States knows that an
invasion of Cuba would mean a war with the Soviet
Union, that would be, in my opinion, the best way to
prevent an invasion of Cuba. That was my answer.
To corroborate this with documentation, you can
see, if you want, the version that I wrote six years
later in a report to the Central Committee in 1968.
I said:
A Soviet military delegation came to visit
around that time, headed by a marshal. He
asked us how we believed the problem of an
invasion could best be prevented. We told him
that by adopting measures that unquestion-
ably expressed to imperialism...—forgive me
for using that word, but that is how it was said
literally—that any aggression against Cuba
would mean not only war with Cuba. Since the
man already had his ideas ready, he said: “But,
specifically how? We have to perform concrete
acts to indicate this.”
* Petrov was his nom de guerre. Ed.
275
He already had the mission to propose the in-

stallation of strategic missiles, and perhaps
he was even afraid that we might refuse. We
might have said: Well, the missiles here could
mean, or could be used as a reason for criti-
cism and campaigns against Cuba and the revo-
lution in the rest of Latin America. But we did
not have any doubts. First of all, when the
issue of the missiles was first brought up, we
thought that it was something beneficial to the
consolidation of the defensive power of the en-
tire Socialist bloc, that it would contribute to
this. We did not want to concentrate on our prob-
lems. Subsequently, it represented our defense.
Subsequently! But really, the comrades who par-
ticipated were the comrades of the directorate, who
met to analyze this problem and make a decision.
And how was it presented: That in our opinion it
would strengthen the Socialist bloc.
If we held the belief that the Socialist bloc should
be willing to go to war for the sake of any other
socialist country, we did not have any right to con-
sider something that could represent a danger to
us. I continue: “The questions of propaganda stayed
within us, but we also saw the real danger of any
crisis that could emerge,” but without any hesita-
tion, and honestly, thinking in a truly internation-
alist manner, all the comrades decided to give an
immediate response, keeping in mind the affirma-
tive answer. And with an enormous trust in a coun-
try that we believed was experienced in many spheres,
even in war, and in international affairs, we stated
to them the usefulness of signing a military agree-
ment. Then, they sent a draft agreement. I already
talked about that.
Here I have what I said, textually, in a private
conversation in 1968, regarding the antecedents of
the October Crisis.
276
‘TESTIMONY
In all truth and summarizing we, from the be-

ginning, saw this as a strategic operation. I am go-
ing to tell the truth about how we thought. We did
not like the missiles. If it was a matter of our de-
fense, we would not have accepted the missiles
here. But do not think that it was because of the
dangers that could come from having the missiles
here, but rather because of the way in which this
could damage the image of the Revolution. We were
very committed to the image of the revolution in
the rest of Latin America, and the presence of the
missiles, in fact, would turn us into a Soviet mili-
tary base would have a high political cost for our
country’s image, which we valued so highly. So if it
had been for our defense—and I say this here with
all honesty, Aleksandr knows this—we would not
have accepted the missiles. But we really saw in
the issue of the missile installation something that
would strengthen the Socialist bloc, something that
would help in some way to improve the so-called
correlation of forces. That was how we perceived it
immediately, instantaneously. We did not argue
about this. It would not have made sense, because
if we had argued about what they were for in fact,
the conclusion we would draw would be that they
should not be brought. In fact, the presence of the
missiles did not was presented in those terms, or
with those aims; it was what we perceived imme-
diately.
Then we asked a few questions about what kind
of missiles and how many. We did not have any
practical knowledge about that issue, and we were
informed that they would deploy forty-two missiles.
From what has been shown here, it seems there were
thirty-six operational missiles and six for testing, but
they told us there would be forty-two missiles.
We asked for time because we had to meet with
the leadership and to inform them about all this
277
before coming to a decision, but we said we would

do this quickly.
In fact, when this meeting was over, we orga-
nized a meeting of the leadership, and we ana-
lyzed the matter in the terms that I have explained.
We said that the presence of the missiles had this
and that significance. We also were not unaware—and
for me it was obvious—that the presence of the mis-
siles was going to give rise to great political tension.
That was obvious. But we saw this matter from the
angle of our moral, political, and internationalist
duties. That was how we understood it.
There was talk about the missiles long time ago,
in a different sense. After the Bay of Pigs invasion,
there had already been talk about missiles. One
would have to review all of Nikita’s statements. He
insinuated more than once that an invasion of Cuba
could be responded to, even with the use of mis-
siles. He insinuated this more than once, publicly,
to such an extent that everyone here was talking
about the Soviet missiles before the crisis, after
the Bay of Pigs, as if they were their property. Many
comrades talked about the missiles in their speeches.
However, I refrained from saying a single word about
missiles, because it did not seem right to me that
our people should place their hopes for defense in
support from abroad. Our population should be totally
ready—as it is today, and today more than ever—to
develop self-confidence and their ability to struggle
and resist without any foreign support. That is why
I did not talk about the Soviet missiles as a pos-
sible aid in any of my speeches, and there are quite
a few in that period. Nikita encouraged this matter
a lot with his public declarations.
As was also acknowledged here yesterday, even
in the United States, even Kennedy said in his cam-
paign that he thought that there was an imbalance
in strategic missiles.
278
TESTIMONY
Throughout the world, people thought there was

an imbalance in strategic missiles. It was known
that the Americans had a very powerful air force,
but that the Soviet Union had made great progress
in the sphere of rocketry. During those days, there
were spectacular technical achievements such as
in the space flights. The first space flight was made
by a Soviet pilot, in a spaceship. All of that had an
enormous effect on world opinion, and from what I can
see, it also had an enormous effect in the United States.
It is not at all strange that we would have more or less
similar ideas about the combat capacity of each of the
two great powers in this sphere of nuclear rocketry.
But even so, and assuming that the USSR had
many more missiles than they had, we perceived that
the presence of these missiles here in Cuba meant a
modification; not a change, we cannot talk about a
change in the correlation of forces, but it was a con-
siderable improvement in the correlation of forces in
favor of the socialist countries that we saw as our
allies, our friends, and our brothers—sharing a com-
mon ideology.
Of course, we never saw the missiles as some-
thing that could one day be used against the United
States, in an attack against the United States, in
an unjustified attack or a first strike. I remember
that Nikita was always repeating that they would
never make a first nuclear strike. This issue was
an obsession of his. He was constantly talking about
that, constantly talking about peace. He was con-
stantly talking about negotiations with the United
States, of ending the Cold War, the arms race, and
so on. So to judge the mood of that time, one should
know what was thought about this and about the
strength of each of the great powers.
We saw that this improved the situation of the
Socialist bloc, and we really saw the issue of Cuba’s
279
defense as a secondary matter, for the reasons I have

explained. So that was how we saw it, and we have
continued to have this perception throughout all these
years. That is why I read this speech twenty-four years
ago.
ae one knew what one knows now concerning the
correlation, one can see the practical military im-
portance these forty-two missiles had, because they
really turned medium-range missiles into strategic
missiles.
When we returned to the meeting with the marshall
and Rashidov, we gave them our answer. Unfortu-
nately, this was not recorded. It should have been
recorded, but recordings were very underdeveloped
at that time. Those little recorders that many people
have now that they can put in their pocket did not
exist. Today every meeting is recorded; this meet-
ing is being recorded. Sometimes we have visits by
heads of state, as is the case of Gorbachev’s. We
asked him, and we agreed that everything we talked
about should be recorded. We ask permission of the
person with whom we are talking as a rule. Of course,
there are those who are more in the habit of record-
ing and those who are less in the habit. But our
meetings were being recorded, and you already see.
The meetings with U Thant were also recorded, by
mutual accord. If one thinks about history, one sees
how many details and things could have been re-
corded and kept.
We answered them with these words: “If it was to
strengthen the Socialist bloc, and also...—and I put
this in second place—if it would contribute to Cuba’s
defense, we are willing to receive all the missiles
that might be needed.” To be more faithful, we said
that we were “willing to receive up to 1000 missiles,
if they wanted to send them.” Those were our words,
verbatim. I used the word: 1000. I said: This is our
280
TESTIMONY
resolution; it has been made Alea iacta est,” as a

Roman general said in ancient times—I think it was
Julius Caesar. If the decision has already been made,
it has already been made. But it was made in that
spirit and with that intention.
This may also explain why we felt so indignant
about the later development of the events, about
what happened; why we practically took an attitude
of rebellion and intransigence, practically immediately
after the crisis.
Then there was the whole process that has been
talked about that has been so clearly explained by
the Soviet military officer—how they organized it.
In a few months, they began a great movement of
weapons and troops. From a logistic point of view,
it was a perfect operation. We can see this, not only
from theoretical considerations, but because we have
also found ourselves forced to send troops abroad, as
we did in Angola, for example.
I remember the first time we sent 36,000 men in
a few weeks with a large part of their weaponry. But
I also remember what we did after Cuito Cuanavale,
when we increased our forces to 53,000 men. We
have some experience in transporting troops in our
ships. There was not a single Soviet ship in this
operation. We transported our troops and weapons
with our fleet. We were all alone in Cuito Cuanavale.
The operation in Angola in 1975 was also like
this. That was a decision of ours, it was an abso-
lutely free and sovereign decision by our country.
The only thing that came from the Soviet Union
was worries. They conveyed them to us.
A crisis situation arose in Cuito Cuanavale that
forced us to send large numbers of troops, and we
did so with decisiveness, because one must do things
* The die is cast. Ed.
281
IN THETEae
LUN THRESHOLD
ES) AC OF NUCLEAR AS
ee a WAR
decisively. Otherwise, one will be defeated. If 20,000

are needed and you send 10,000, the most likely
thing is that you will be defeated. We were facing
the South Africans. They were very powerful, they
manufacture weapons, they had good training, good
equipment, and very good aircraft. We prepared for
battle with the South Africans. To give you an idea,
when our troops advanced, they had 1000 antiair-
craft weapons so that they could have superiority.
So we also have some experience in troop move-
ments, and we know what it means to carry out an
operation. Of course, there were no missiles in this
case, but we did have to send all kinds of heavy
weaponry.
This operation with the missiles was carried out
very efficiently by the Soviet Armed Forces and in
a very short time. They fulfilled completely the mis-
sion that had been assigned to them.
Well, the motivations still need to be clarified.
Here opinions have been given on this point by al-
most all the Soviets. They really have summarized
what was talked about in the Soviet Union, and what
was said in the Soviet Union, and the reasoning
Nikita always used.
I have already said that Nikita was very shrewd,
about how he presented the problem to the other
CPSU leaders, and how he really thought, or if there
was another CPSU leader who knew Nikita’s most
personal intentions.
In the light of the facts we know today about the
true correlation of forces, we can clearly see that
it was a necessity. I am not criticizing Khrushchev.
Really, I am not criticizing him for the fact that he
wanted to improve the correlation of forces. It seems
absolutely legitimate to me, absolutely legal—if we
are going to talk in terms of international law—ab-
solutely moral, to want to improve the correlation of
forces between the Socialist bloc and the United
282
‘TESTIMONY
States. If what they really had was fifty or sixty

missiles, there is no doubt that the presence of
those forty-two missiles significantly improved the
situation. It almost doubled the effective assets.
We have not talked about the submarines here.
You probably also know how many missiles the So-
viets had on the submarines and their ability to
move with their submarines and also carry out
strikes, because I know they had submarines with
nuclear missiles. This information has not come
out here, how many they had at that time. But
there is no doubt that the missiles on land were
doubled.
If we had known that the correlation of forces,
which we did not know—I repeat—perhaps we would
have suggested, if they had talked to us in those
terms, of improving the correlation of forces, perhaps
we would have advised prudence. Because | think, of
course, that if you have fifty missiles, you have to
be more prudent than if you have three hundred.
That is clear. If we had had that information, and if
they had talked to us in strategic terms, we would
surely have advised prudence because I say, and
I repeat, that we were not concerned about defend-
ing the country. If that were not true, what kind of
situation would we be in today? We do not receive
missiles or anything, and here you can see that we
are all unworried. The United States is much more
powerful. I do not know what kinds of conventional
weapons and smart weapons and all those things
that it has, and you can see that we are calm here.
We have confidence in ourselves. We have confidence
in our ability to fight, and we are proud of this confi-
dence and ability to fight.
I say that it will be a mystery, knowing Nikita’s
most personal thoughts. But that was how we under-
stood it, and how the other members of the Soviet
283
IN THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEAR Sy
eae WAR
leadership understood it. As I have said, he was

very shrewd. He could present something in one set
of terms and think in another set. But I could not
find any other explanation and, even today, I cannot find
any other explanation.
Of course, it is true that Nikita loved Cuba and
admired Cuba a lot. He felt special affection for
Cuba. We would say that he was fond of Cuba, in
his feelings, his emotions, and all. Because Nikita
was also a man of political thinking. He had a po-
litical theory and doctrine, and he was consistent
with that doctrine. That is to say, he thought in
those terms between capitalism and socialism. He
had very firm convictions. He even thought, in my
opinion erroneously, that one day socialism would
surpass capitalism by peaceful means. I say that
this is a possibly mistaken concept, because I do
not think that the aim of a socialist society should
be consumerism. I do not think Third World coun-
tries need to imitate capitalism in consumerism.
I always wonder what would happen in the world
if every Chinese family had a car, and every Indian
family also had a car, and every family in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and in all those other places had a car; if
they reached such a level of development, that they
had a car. How much longer would the oil and fuel
last? How much longer would the atmosphere tol-
erate this poisoning and all these phenomena we
know about? That is why I say that there was a
mistake in this concept of socialism. Socialism should
solve people’s basic problems—education, health,
culture, housing, food—, all the essential material
needs, and not the idea that everyone should have
a car or consumer goods. They should have what
they can have, what the environment can tolerate.
We have a different concept of socialism.
But he was a man of profound political convic-
tions. I do not think that Nikita wanted war. The
284
TESTIMONY
farthest thing from his mind was war, especially nu-

clear war. He was very aware of what a nuclear war
would mean for the Soviet Union. He did have an
obsession about reaching some kind of parity. I think
that the words, the reasoning yesterday by Mr.
McNamara was excellent when he said that parity
existed at all times after the first moment when there
was the capacity to make a response that would cause
terrible damage.
But even if all the nuclear weapons were launched
against one country, the world would be annihilated
just the same. Because the contamination and the
problems of all kinds that this would cause would be
such that, even if only 10,000 of the 50,000 war-
heads are used and are used in only one place, the
world will be finished. This reasoning about when
parity really exists seems wise to me, because par-
ity exists as soon as there is the capacity to respond
by doing enough damage so that it would be unac-
ceptable to someone who is thinking about launch-
ing a nuclear attack.
I tried to find out how this was discussed in the
leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet Government
when I traveled to the USSR in 1963. But, in fact, I was
unable to clarify this. I asked a lot of questions to as
many Politburo members as | met with: [Aleksei N.]
Kosygin, [Andrei] Gromyko—I do not remember if
Gromyko was already a Politburo member. I asked
all of them one by one: Tell me, how was that deci-
sion made? What were the arguments that were
used? I really was not able to get a single word out
of them. They often did not answer my question. Of
course, you cannot be impertinent. For all my ques-
tions, I was not able to get a clear answer about
the possibility that the strategic argument had been
used among the Soviet leadership. That was our
perception and our conception of the problem. I should
say this, really.
285
a
The agreement was put into effect immediately,

after the verbal agreement; it was necessary to
formalize it, but it was already in effect. That was
how a draft was drawn up in the USSR; Aleksandr
has spoken about this. This draft was sent to Cuba.
Politically, the draft was erratic, in the sense that
there was no clear foundation established about
the matter.
It did not talk about strategic weapons, of course.
I modified it, using some of the points, some of the
considerations, and I established the political foun-
dation for the agreement, which in my opinion was
unobjectionable. The articles of the agreementwere
not mentioned.
It said: “The Soviet Union will send to the Re-
public of Cuba armed forces to reinforce its defenses
in the face of the danger of an external aggression
and to contribute to the preservation of world peace.
The type of Soviet troops and the areas of their
basing on the territory of the Republic of Cuba will
be set by the representatives named in accordance
with Article 11 of this agreement.” Article 11 refers
to about the representatives of each party. There is
no mention of the kind of strategic weapons, and
this agreement could have been published, and no
one could have objected the legality and morality of
this agreement.
Of course, it was not essential to bring the mis-
siles here to defend Cuba—I missed that argument—
because we could have made a military pact with
the USSR saying that an attack on Cuba would be
equivalent to an attack on the USSR. The United
States has a lot of these pacts throughout the world,
and they are respected, because the word of na-
tions is respected for the risks involved in violating
the treaties or disregarding the treaties; they are
taken into consideration. That is why I say that you
286
‘TESTIMONY
should know this: The USSR could have declared

that an attack on Cuba would be equivalent to an
attack on the USSR, or we could have had a military
agreement and we could have been able to achieve
the aim of the defense of Cuba without the pres-
ence of the missiles. I am absolutely convinced of
this. This is one of the things that reaffirms the
conviction we had at that time and that we have
kept until now, even though there is not a single bit
of proof that a different argument was used. That is
why the comrades in the Soviet delegation—I can
no longer say Soviet, from the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States—, those who participated in the
delegation from the armed forces and the country
that participated in this crisis, have spoken, in my
opinion, with absolute honesty about the reasoning
and concepts that prevailed there in the Soviet Union.
All this gave rise to a great effort in the period
when the missiles were installed, because there
were people living in the places that had been cho-
sen. There were farmers, buildings, and things. We
had to clean them out, rid the places of obstacles.
We appointed a comrade, a Party and government
official, to attend exclusively to everything connected
with the negotiations to free the land to install the
missiles, and it was quite a bit of land. I do not have
the figures fresh in my mind, but hundreds of fami-
lies had to move. We had to arrange this with them,
find land for them, give them benefits. All of this
was negotiated, and all as much in secret as pos-
sible, without being able to explain what it was for.
There were all sorts of leaks. Well, we had to
adopt a measure. All those who knew something
knew that they had the duty to consider themselves
quarantined. So sometimes, groups of officials came
and said: “Listen, I have found something out. I have
come to stay here now. Because in such-and-such
287
a place, and while talking with someone, a Soviet

official often...” Then, you can imagine, there were
a lot of troops, 42,000 men, and they establish re-
lations, and some talk to some people, others talk
to other people, or another person saw something.
So we adopted the method that is used in cases of
severe epidemics, which is to quarantine the in-
fected people. Everyone who knew something was
infected and was quarantined.
Of course, there were large troop movements,
and there began to be talk relatively early that there
might be offensive weapons or missiles.
In addition, when the missiles began to arrive,
those devices are so large—I think the current ones
must be more modern and smaller, maybe they can
be carried in a suitcase. I do not know what the
technology is like; other people know more than
we do about this problem. However, those were such
enormous devices, approximately twenty-five or
thirty meters long, no one knows for sure, it could
occupy an entire block. When such big devices were
unloaded, no matter how hard one tried to hide
and move through in the streets, everyone knew
about it.
That is the best-kept secret in history. I would
say, because several million Cubans knew it. It was
something that really could not be hidden. I imag-
ine that the Central Intelligence Agency must have
received letters, because there were spontaneous
informants here. They were people who were not with
the Revolution, and sympathized with the United
States, or were against the Revolution. There were
these spontaneous informants, but no one knew any-
thing for sure, no one had any proof.
It was a truly intense process, truly intense work.
We had to see to an infinite number of details and
solve an infinite number of issues to keep it a secret.
288
TESTIMONY
All this did not happen, other things happened

that have already been mentioned here and I am
not going to repeat them. Raul’s trip to Moscow [2-6
July 1962], the trip of Che [Guevara] and Aragonés
to the Soviet Union [27 August-2 September 1962]
when he delivered the final draft that was accepted,
just as it was, without adding or deleting acomma.
I have already talked about this.
We should remember that a tremendous atmosphere
was being created, which seemed negative to us.
Therefore, we thought that we should come out
with the law on our side, and simply publish this
military agreement. The secrecy put us at a political
disadvantage and practical disadvantage. It did both
things. But we should distinguish between se-
crecy—many military operations have to be done
in secret, the operation itself, not the basis for an
operation—and the information that was given about
it. I think this is an important point. There was a
big mistake made here, a really big mistake. Not
only the mistake about the secrecy, which is one
thing that harmed us, but also the information that
was given to Kennedy, going along with the game
about the category of the weapons, whether they
were offensive or defensive.
If you want to verify this, you will see that in
none of the Cuban statements—and there were
several—did we ever go along with the game relat-
ing to the category of the weapons. We refused to
go along with that game and, in public statements
the government made and in the statements at the
United Nations, we always said that Cuba consid-
ered that it had a sovereign right to have whatever
kind of weapons it thought appropriate, and no one
had any right to establish what kind of weapons our
country could or could not have. We never went along
with denying the strategic nature of the weapons.
We never did! We did not agree to that game. We
289
did not agree with that approach. Therefore, we

never denied or confirmed the nature of the weap-
ons; rather, we reaffirmed our right to have what-
ever type of weapons we thought convenient for our
defense.
In contrast, to tell the truth, Khrushchev went
along with the game of categorizing the weapons.
He turned it into something intentional. Since he
did not have any intention of using the weapons in
an offensive operation, he believed that it was the
intention that defined the nature of the weapons.
But it was very clear that Kennedy did not under-
stand it that way. Kennedy did not understand the
issue of intentions but rather the issue of kind of
weapons, whether they were strategic weapons or
not. That was the issue. It can be seen very clearly
that Kennedy was convinced that strategic weap-
ons were not going to be brought to Cuba. Because
of this, I would say that there was something more
than shrewdness here. Deception was involved here.
I think the two things.
The secrecy about the military agreement and
the deception were two facts, two facts that did
harm. Because I think a different approach should
have been adopted, and not the approach of deceit.
It did us a lot of harm because, in the first place,
Kennedy had a lot at stake. He had already suf-
fered the setback of the Bay of Pigs, he was enter-
ing his second year, there were elections and
Khrushchev did not want to affect those elections.
That is very clear. Perhaps this was one of the factors
he used in deciding not to publish the agreement. It
is possible that he was counting on not doing any-
thing that would hurt Kennedy in the elections, but
he did the worst thing. It was not anticipated that
what was happening could become known.
In my opinion, Kennedy trusted in what he was
told. This is seen in all his public statements. It
290
TESTIMONY
was like a relief to him to think: Well, they are fill-

ing that country with tanks or cannons or who knows
what, but there are no strategic weapons there. He
thought according to a rationale; he made calcula-
tions according to a rationale. This naturally gave
him, not legal force when crisis broke out, but it
gave him the opportunity to present himself to world
public opinion as one who had been deceived, say-
ing: They have told me this, they have repeated this
to me many times. So in the eyes of world public
opinion, Kennedy gained moral force, not legal force.
But he said: They assured me of this, but it has
turned out otherwise. He was put in a difficult per-
sonal situation—which was something Khrushchev
would not have wanted but that, in fact, happened.
He presented himself as one who had been deceived,
who had been assured of this, that, or the other,
while the truth was something else. That was one of
the advantages he was given, not by the secrecy it-
self but by the secrecy plus the deception.
What other advantage did it give him? That when
the missile sites were finally discovered on Octo-
ber 14, the United States had an enormous advan-
tage because they held the secret in their hands.
They could take the initiative, the initiative in the
military field was put into the hands of the United
States because they knew what was going on and
could afford the luxury of choosing one option or
another, a political option, a quarantine, or a sur-
prise air strike on those installations. | think that
was a very dangerous moment, from the military
point of view, because even though it was illegal,
arbitrary, and unjust from any point of view—even
immoral, because one has to comply with interna-
tional laws, one does not have the right to attack
any country or invade any country—, he had the
choice in his hands. There could have been a sur-
prise strike when no one was expecting it.
291
Of course, the Soviet military officer explained

something here that is extremely important. The
nuclear warheads were not in the same place, they
were a considerable distance away—which was the
right thing, the elementary thing: just as I had told
the Soviet officer not to put all the missiles in the
same place—that was on October 26, already in
the middle of the crisis—so that they would not all
be destroyed and some capability could be kept. It is
unquestionable that the Soviet military took these
elementary measures, but I fear that a large part,
or almost all, of the surface-to-air missile units and
all the installations that were in view could have
been destroyed in a totally surprise attack. Because
those antiaircraft missiles that really fired above
1000 meters, did not have defenses.
The defenses of those installations were strength-
ened against the low-altitude overflights when we
mobilized all our batteries and devoted them to de-
fending those installations. These were conventional
batteries. But at that time, they were very vulner-
able. Of course, things changed later, the situation
improved. But the United States had six days to act
before making this information public. I think this
was an extremely dangerous time, not only from
the political point of view but also militarily: the
way the issue was handled in these two respects, in
my opinion, was negative, but that was how it was
handled.
I have already explained the position we took.
We had our views, but we said: We do not know
about the rest.
The crisis broke out on October 22, but in the
morning we issued a combat alert to all forces.
When we saw the movement and the meeting and
all the information that reached us publicly, we
also realized that it was about the missiles. We did
not lose a single minute, and we issued a maximum
292
‘TESTIMONY
combat alert to all our forces. That same day be-

fore Kennedy spoke, we had already mobilized our
forces. We also warned the Soviets about the situ-
ation.
Essentially, the crisis erupted on the night of
October 22, and defense preparations occupied al-
most all of our time after that. We dedicated our-
selves to feverishly working day and night on the
things that I have already talked about: the mobili-
zation of our forces, the protection of the surface-
to-air missile bases, and also the medium-range
missiles. We assigned to all the Soviet facilities prac-
tically all of our antiaircraft batteries. We thought
that it was the most important thing to defend from
the beginning of the crisis.
What was Khrushchev’s mood once the crisis was
declared? What mood was he in? He was in a very
combative, very determined mood. Therefore, he
sent a letter on October 23. I am declassifying this
also. Does this business of declassifying have any-
thing to do with the theory of class struggles or what’?
Khrushchev said:
Dear Comrade Castro:
The Soviet Government has just received from

U.S. President Kennedy, the following docu-
ment, copy of which is hereto attached.
We consider this declaration of the U.S. Gov-
ernment and Kennedy’s speech on October 22
as an inconceivable interference in the inter-
nal affairs of the Republic of Cuba, and a vio-
lation of the standards of international law,
and of the basic rules that govern relations
between states, and as a blatant act of provo-
cation against the Soviet Union.
The Republic of Cuba has the total right, as
any other sovereign state, to defend itself and
293
to choose allies as it wishes. We reject the

blatant demands of the U.S. Government to
control the shipment of weapons to Cuba and
its aspiration to determine what type of weap-
ons the Republic of Cuba can possess.
The U.S. Government knows quite well that no
sovereign state will permit another state to
meddle in its relations with other states, nor
will it render an account of pending measures
toward the strengthening of its national de-
fense.
In response to Kennedy’s speech, the Soviet
Government states its most emphatic protest
against the piratical actions of the U.S. Gov-
ernment and depicts these actions as treach-
erous and aggressive...—See, this is all in one
paragraph: piratical, treacherous, and aggres-
sive actions—in regards to sovereign states,
and declares its decision to actively fight
against such actions.
We have given instructions to our Security
Council representative to urgently present the
issue of the violation by the United States of
the norms of international law and the UN
Charter at the Council and to state an em-
phatic protest against the aggressive and treach-
erous actions of U.S. imperialism.
As a result of the situation created, we have
instructed the Soviet military representatives
in Cuba on the need to adopt corresponding
measures and to be completely ready.
Ready for combat.
We are sure that the actions undertaken by
the American imperialists with the intention
of taking away the legitimate right of the Re-
public of Cuba to strengthen its defensive
294
‘TESTIMONY
power and the defense of its territory, will pro-

voke the irate protest of all peace-loving coun-
tries...—The truth is that there were really
no great protests because politically adverse
conditions had arisen due to the procedures
used—and will provoke the irate protest of all
peace-loving countries and will move into ac-
tion the widest masses in defense of the just
cause of revolutionary Cuba.
This could have been accomplished, in part, if we
had done things openly. All of this is true because
we were within our most absolute right to do so. And
if we had the right, how were we going to act ina
way that made it seem that we did not have this
right, that made it seem that we were doing some-
thing wrong. It is analyzed in terms of ethics, poli-
tics, legality, not in terms of force, correlations of
force, or in military terms.
We send to you, Comrade Castro, and to all
your comrades in arms, our warmest greet-
ings and express our firm belief that the ag-
gressive plans of the U.S. imperialists will be
thwarted.
The other thing is the declaration.
This is the letter that we received on the 23d,
nothing else. It contained a clear and firm commit-
ment to fight against the piratical, treacherous, and
aggressive actions. I say: What was ahead is com-
bat. I could not imagine any withdrawal. To tell the
truth, the idea of a withdrawal never crossed our
minds. We did not think it was possible.
And Khrushchev, who is the one who knew how
many missiles and nuclear weapons he had available
and all those things, sent us this letter on the 23d.
We, of course, told ourselves: Things are clear,
and we went ahead with our preparations. Then,
the time came when I wrote the letter.
295
When we had already taken all the humanly pos-

sible measures, I met with the Soviet military com-
mand, as I have explained before. It reported that
everything was ready, all the weapons that the So-
viet officer explained here, and with lots of willing-
ness. A truly strange phenomenon occurred among
the Soviet troops in a situation such as that one, in
which the people were in extreme danger and at
the same time remained totally calm. The Soviet
and Cuban troops remained totally calm. There was
total calm among the Cuban people.
If you conducted a poll of the Cuban population
and asked: “Should we return the missiles?” Ninety
percent would have answered no.
Our people maintained a calm and intransigent
position regarding this issue.
That same day, the 26th, we notified the Soviet
officers that low-altitude overflights were unaccept-
able, as I mentioned before and, therefore, our bat-
teries were going to open fire, and we wanted them
to be informed.
According to the agreement, there were two ar-
mies and two commands; we commanded our forces
and our country. We said, well, we cannot continue
to tolerate this. This is extremely dangerous. | al-
ready mentioned this, I should not repeat it. Es-
sentially, on the 27th at dawn, when the U.S. air-
craft arrived—this was a daily occurrence early in
the morning—they faced the fire from our antiaircraft
batteries. The Soviet antiaircraft missile unit shot down
an aircraft in the eastern part of the country.
Naturally, it was a moment of great tension. But in
reality, it is clear, that when we were meeting, or even
before we met, on the 26th, when we met with the
Soviet officers and were sending a message to
Khrushchev, he had already sent a message to Kennedy.
You are well aware of all of this. His message proposed
the basis for a solution, which was the withdrawal of
296
‘TESTIMONY
the missiles in exchange for guarantees not to attack

Cuba.
Later, the next day, he sent another message
and from what I have been told the message on
that second day added to the issue of the guaran-
tee for Cuba the issue of missiles in Turkey. When
this news arrived—the news arrived here on the
28th—it provoked great indignation because we real-
ized that we had become some type of game token.
We not only saw a unilateral decision, a series of
steps that had been taken without including us.
They could have told us about the messages on the
26th and on the 27th. There had been time, but we
heard on the radio on the 28th that an agreement had
taken place. We had to endure the humiliation.
I understood the Soviet officer when he said that
it was the most painful decision that he had to obey
in his life, the issue of the inspection of the ships.
We found out about the agreement on the 28th.
I believe that there was a message on the way,
informing us after the fact. It arrived one or two hours
later through the [Soviet] embassy.
The reaction of all of the people, all of the cad-
res, of all of the comrades was of profound indigna-
tion, it was not a feeling of relief.
Then, the political decision that we immediately
took was to issue the five-point demands on that
same day, the 28th. There were five points, very
simple and easy to remember.
First: Cessation of the economic blockade and
of all measures of commercial and economic
pressure exercised against our country by the
United States in every part of the world.
Second: The cessation of all subversive activities,
of the dropping of weapons and explosives from
the air and their landing from the sea, of the
mounting of invasions by mercenaries, by in-
297
filtration by spies and saboteurs, all of which

are being carried out from the territory of the
United States and a few countries which are
its accomplices.
Third: Cessation of the pirate raids which are
carried out from bases in the United States
and Puerto Rico.
Fourth: The cessation of all violations of our air

space and territorial waters by United States
aircraft and warships.
Fifth: Withdrawal from Guantanamo naval base
and the restoration of the Cuban territory.
oc-
cupied by the United States.
These were the five points that we issued on the 28th
as our demands.
We would not have opposed a solution if there
was a real danger of war, if we would have known
that Nikita was willing to withdraw the missiles
and find a solution on that basis, and on a truly
honorable basis. We would not have refused, logi-
cally, because there was no purpose in insisting on a
situation if there is a solution, but it had to be an
acceptable and honorable solution.
The simple solution of withdrawing the missiles
because the United States had given its word that
it would not attack Cuba is incongruent with all the
steps taken and it was incongruent with the exist-
ence of a situation in our country that had to be
overcome. It would have been enough if Nikita had
said: “We agree to the withdrawal of the missiles if
satisfactory guarantees are given to Cuba.” Cuba
was not a stumbling block to that solution. Cuba would
have helped but would have said that the minimum
guarantees we want are these, not just a guarantee
that they would not invade us.
298
‘TESTIMONY
I believe that the whole world, anyhow, would

have seen with relief the beginning of the solution
of the crisis because the consent by Nikita to with-
draw the missiles would already have produced
relief. The people would have thought that it was
reasonable to find an agreement on a basis related
to Cuba. If Cuba was the motive for the missiles,
Cuba should have been Kept in mind instead of the
missiles in Turkey; but it is evident that the mis-
siles in Turkey were present in Nikita’s mind. He
said that he was in the Black Sea and thought
about those missiles in Turkey—as they say—and
in the end, he ends up also thinking about the mis-
siles in Turkey for whatever reasons, or because
someone might have suggested that they could be
included. But from the political and international
point of view, for the honest people of the world,
the peace-loving people, those people that sympa-
thized with socialism, or with Cuba, or with inde-
pendence, or whatever, it made no sense to pro-
pose an exchange of missiles in Cuba for missiles
in Turkey. If the reason was the defense of Cuba,
what did Turkey have to do with the defense of Cuba?
Absolutely nothing.
The demands that Cuba made were completely
reasonable, a good negotiation could have been
found, and the missiles could have been withdrawn,
if that was the condition required to preserve the
peace because peace was really threatened.
I believe that the procedures used promoted those
actions that endangered peace. I already explained
them. We were already at that point on the 28th,
when another solution was not possible anymore.
A commitment had been made, Cuba had been al-
ready ignored, Turkey had been mentioned: Then
we issued our five points. We have already talked
about U Thant’s trip. The Soviet Government asked
200
us to please not shoot anymore. We agreed, right,

but as long as the negotiations last, only as long as
the negotiations are taking place will we maintain
that cease-fire order, the order to not fire against
the low-altitude overflights.
On the 27th they did not fly anymore that after-
noon, there were no more low-altitude overflights,
nor on the 28th. But later, when our antiaircraft
batteries did not shoot anymore, they began to con-
duct overflights again while the negotiations were
taking place, and it was very humiliating. Given
the frame of mind of our people, to watch those
aircraft flying at 100 meters was extremely irritat-
ing and demoralizing even for the artillery soldiers
and everyone else. You have to really understand
the Cuban character to comprehend the harmful
effect to our morale of events of this nature.
Then U Thant came to visit. I fully explained to
him our position, these five points, and especially
our categorical opposition to the inspections. We
told him that we did not accept—because the USSR is
a sovereign country and so are we—and that no
one could authorize an inspection of our territory if
we did not authorize it. And we told him, there is
not going to be any inspection. That was one of our
reactions because we were in disagreement with
the outcome of the crisis.
When U Thant came, I explained to him all our
positions, that definitely, they don’t wonder off. He
brought proposals. He proposed that we accept a
group of UN representatives, a UN reconnaissance
plane crewed by persons acceptable to the Cuban,
Russian, and American Governments. We really were
not in the mood for overflights in those days.
The United States has told me that when this
system have been put into practice, it would
300
‘TESTIMONY
make a public declaration, and at the Secu-

rity Council if necessary, that it would not main-
tain aggressive intentions against the Cuban
Government and it will guarantee the territo-
rial integrity of the nation.
And so on. [| told him:
Precisely, we do not understand why we are

asked this, because we have not violated any
right, we have not undertaken aggression abso-
lutely against nobody; all our acts have been
based on the International Law. . . . we have
been victims, in the first place, of a blockade
that is an illegal act; in the second place, the
claim to determine from another nation what
right we have to do or not to do within our borders.
. . Cuba is a sovereign state. . .
I am reading the essential things.
. . the United States has been repeatedly
violating our airspace without any right... .
We can accept anything that fit to the right,
that does not imply reduction in our condition
of sovereign state.
I understand that the inspection is another
attempt to humiliate our nation. Therefore,
we do not accept it.
That demand of inspection is for authenticating
its claim to violate our right to act within our
borders with entire liberty, to decide what we
can or cannot do within our borders.
... It is equally absurd the threat to launch a
direct armed attack, if Cuba were militarily
strengthened up to a degree that the United States
301

explanation, or to consult the “illustrious”
members of the U.S. Senate or House con-
cerning the weapons that we conveniently es-
teemed to acquire and the measures to take
for fully defending our country... .
siet lotmal. wtich okie ob fe Nel co top be 0 Cielvle:t ee ey Aa (0 Fa piellenbe) iam 6 Wen le Menge ‘2. 0. 8) 1:
We can negotiate with all sincerity and with

all honesty. We would not be honest if we ac-
cepted negotiating a sovereign right of our
nation.
Then U Thant said: “every action of the United Na-
tions in the Cuban territory can only be under-
taken with the consent of the people and the Gov-
ernment of Cuba.” Here, in essence, are other very
interesting ideas U Thant presented.
I said:
In the first place, our government does not
have the least doubt of the great intention and
lack of interest, and honesty that the present
Secretary General of the United Nations is work-
ing with; we do not have any doubt of your inten-
tions, of your good faith, of your extraordinary
interest of finding a solution to the problem... .
I understand the interest that all must have
for peace, but the path to peace is not the
path of sacrificing the rights of the peoples, of
the violations to the rights of the peoples, be-
cause that is precisely the path that leads to
war. The path of peace is the path of the guar-
antees to the rights of the peoples and the
302
‘TESTIMONY
willingness of peoples to resist in defense of

those rights.
The path of last world war was the path that

traced the annexation of Austria, the desola-
tion of Czechoslovakia...—it should have been
disintegration—, tolerated by the German im-
perialism, and that led to that war. ...
Therefore, it is really difficult to understand how
it can be talked of immediate solutions, inde-
pendently of future solutions, when what inter-
ests the most is not to pay now any price for
peace, but definitely guaranteeing peace... .
And I said: “Cuba is not Austria, or the southeast
of Czechoslovakia, or the Congo. We have the ex-
tremely firm intention of defending our rights above
all difficulties, all risks.”
Here I said:
. . it must have been enough for it with the
decision of the Soviet Government of withdraw-
ing strategic-type weapons that they had
brought for defending the Republic of Cuba.
The Cuban Government has not obstructed the
withdrawal of those weapons. .
If what the United States claims, besides that,
is to humiliate our nation, it will not obtain
that!
We have not hesitated not even a minute in

the decision of defending our rights.
L.added:
We do equally oppose to that inspection in our
ports, and I wonder that if the Soviet Union
authorizes inspecting their ships in the high
303
seas, what would then be necessary to inspect

them again in Cuban ports for?
ai et “ef fot temic Powe: sm le ete beef a: stuep inj “eh e) (és Forte) \ey Fey ‘eo: Fou Jem (og (sis) 6) s 9 0:]'<'
I want, on this, say, in the first place that the

United States has no right to invade Cuba and
that negotiation cannot be undertaken with
the promise of not committing a crime, with the
simple promise of not committing a crime. And
that, before the threat of that danger, we feel
more confident in our decision of defending our-
selves than in the words of the United States
Government.
I said: “. . . why don’t equally appreciate the value
of the public pledge of the Soviet Union before the
United Nations, of withdrawing the strategic weap-
ons that the USSR sent for defending the Republic
of Cuba?”
Those are, in essence, the ideas I presented.
Now, U Thant said some interesting things:
My colleagues and I...—I am also reading the
essential parts—have the opinion, and thus I
let the United States know that the blockade
was illegal, that no state can tolerate a block-
ade, not only military, not even economic. That
is using the imposition of force of a large power
against a small nation.
I also told them that air reconnaissance that
was being undertaken over Cuba was illegal
and inadmissible. These three things, eco-
nomic blockade, military blockade and air re-
connaissance are illegal... .
Here he said: “In the United States there are three
forces: the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the State Department. In my opinion,
304
TESTIMONY
the Pentagon and the CIA have more power than the
State Department. If the CIA and the Pentagon con-
tinue with that power, I see the future of the world
very bad.” That is what U Thant said. He told the
United States that if it did something drastic, then
he would not only report the Security Council, but
he would accuse the United States before the Se-
curity Council; and that although the United States
has votes and the veto, there can be, however, a
moral sanction.
I also told it that I would renounce to my post;
that if the United Nations cannot stop a large
power in its aggression against a small na-
tion, then I do not want to be the Secretary
General
Sk, LS ee CF © oie el OAS Kas. (OL ee Selene gis C8 Rie TO MEO -Sin® 16) Bie 8k-6,
. and I warned it not to commit any aggres-

sion against Cuba, because it would be the
end of the United Nations. . . . My intention is
accomplishing peace and accomplishing per-
manence of the United Nations.
He said:
Inainathinking sina the first response that
Khrushchev gave, concerning the dismantling
and inspection accepted by the Soviet Union.
As your Excellency considers that the Soviet
Union referred that the inspection be under-
taken outside Cuba, I ponder that this could
create some division or some misunderstand-
ing between the Soviet Union and Cuba.
There are other things of interest in my opinion
but in essence, that is what U Thant said. That was
on October 31. There were two meetings, on October 30
and 31. Then Mikoyan visited two or three days af-
ter U Thant.
305
Dou you remember, Aleksandr? (Oleg Darusenkov

answered that he arrived in Cuba on November 2
and the first meeting was on November 4.)
The lengthy negotiations or talks with Mikoyan
began, based on the positions taken by the Soviet
Union and the positions we had taken.
Those negotiations were very difficult, because
first we talked about the missiles, then we talked about
the IL-28’s. Then we talked about other things and
it seemed interminable. I have already talked about this
here, I should not repeat it.
A really unpleasant incident happened when the
talks with Mikoyan started. The news came from
the USSR that his wife had died. They gave him the
choice of returning to the USSR, and he really made
a very generous gesture. He received the news, of
course, it had a great impact on him—they had been
very close, married for a long time—we saw Mikoyan
cry, but he decided to stay in the country and con-
tinue the talks instead of returning to the USSR. It
was also very hard for us to receive that news, at a
time when we were beginning talks that were not
easy at all. He stayed about three weeks, and we
discussed this.
As you have seen and heard in recent days—at
least many of us have, some of you surely knew it
before—the letters have been: published. Here are
the translated letters. On the first day, I was able
to reach my goal of reading eighty-five pages of
them, early in the morning. That is why I was a
little sleepy here in the meeting yesterday. These
letters were really very interesting. Here one can
see when the problem of the IL-28’s came up, the
discussions.
With the same honesty I have spoken with up to
now I should say that I see a difference here be-
tween Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s conduct, in this
306
‘TESTIMONY
correspondence. It must be said that Khrushchev

conducted himself very well, with great dignity. One
can see that he is anxious to solve not only these
problems but also many others. I see here a noble,
thoughtful, capable, intelligent Khrushchev, who
uses profound arguments, not just with respect to
the crisis, but also with respect to world peace. In
contrast, one can see a harsh Kennedy. The same
nobility is not reflected in these letters in Kennedy’s
case. One can see that he squeezes Khrushchev,
squeezes him more and more, and the further away
the missiles were, the more he squeezed him. That
is what I see in these letters. It is not the same
thing to discuss when the missiles were here as
when they have been taken out.
So Kennedy’s language became harsher as the
ships left for the Soviet Union with the missiles
and he presented new demands and talked about
verification, and talked about continued guaran-
tees. He insisted on this. One can see that he was
reluctant to formalize the pledges he had made to
Khrushchev. He used very subtle words. He said
one thing in one place, and then tried to soften it
with other words elsewhere. One can see Khrushchev
struggling so that the pledges Kennedy had been made
would be fulfilled and formalized. It is unquestion-
able that Khrushchev’s position was much weaker at
that stage, from an objective point of view, especially
after November 20, once the missiles were withdrawn.
Naturally, we did not know anything about this
exchange. We did not have any information about
this, but we still had a problem. Days went by, and
the planes continued their overflights. That was in-
tolerable, to such a point that we informed Mikoyan
that we had no alternative but to fire at the planes
flying at low altitudes. We issued the appropriate
instructions about this matter.
307
I knew that there would be a U.S. counterattack,

and since I was responsible for that order, I went to
one of our air bases and spent the morning there.
That was the next day; I do not know if it was on
November 16. I believed it was a moral duty if there
was a reprisal. Two planes passed over that base at
10:00 a.m., and I considered that I had a moral duty,
not to commit suicide there, but to be with the troops
that were going to fire. Because they went to a se-
ries of places, and many places were going to fire.
We had warned Mikoyan, I don’t know if twenty-four
or forty-eight hours before, so that he could inform
the Soviets.
We were waiting for the planes at that antiaircraft
battery that morning, and fortunately the planes
did not come. That was the best thing that could
have happened, that the planes not to fly, because
they would have been shot down. Because there
were so many batteries there that it would have
been impossible not to hit the planes, even though
our gunners were not very expert. Those planes
had been flying very low and relatively slowly, at
the minimum possible speed and at about 100 meters
altitude. They did not come.
I know that in the letter on November15, Kennedy
told Khrushchev—because he mentions me every
once in a while, always trying to cause some fric-
tion between the Soviets and us, to see if the So-
viets punish us in some way. Castro was the bad
guy, the one who wanted war or who knows what
—that he had received news that we were going to
fire against the low-altitude overflights. It is pos-
sible, I imagine that Mikoyan in some way com-
municated to someone, through some channel, that we
had decided to fire.
It seemed stupid to me that the United States
would continue with those flights because Kennedy
308
‘TESTIMONY
really was so pleased with the results he had ob-

tained that he had no reason to complicate that
whole situation by doing something that made no
sense at that time, except to humiliate us. There
were people—Cubans with a sense of humor—
among the antiaircraft troops who made cartoons,
drawing spiderwebs and things.
On November 15, 1962, a letter [from the Prime
Minister Castro] to UN Acting Secretary General
Mr. U Thant says that we will not tolerate further
low-altitude overflights over Cuba, since these serve
U.S. military plans against the Revolution and de-
moralize our national defense. We assert that groups
of sabotage and subversion have been introduced
into Cuba, which proves the military usefulness of
the overflights for the United States.
Yes, we also informed U Thant about this on No-
vember 15.
So, fortunately, I think the attitude adopted by
the administration was reasonable, not to cause a
conflict. They understood that it was unnecessary
and senseless, and that our reaction was natural.
This might have interrupted the withdrawal of the
missiles or something, and made the situation more
complicated.
So they did not use the low-altitude overflights
any more. Then they approached the coasts, and
there were some enormous exchanges of fire be-
cause some came close to the coasts, and all the
batteries fired at them when they got near. But, in
general, the low-altitude overflights ended by mid-
November, and the U-2 remained. People could not
see the U-2. We were not in agreement with the
U-2 overflights, but we could do nothing about them.
It was a long process. Then, they finally turned
over to us those antiaircraft batteries when our
personnel had learned how to use them. We had to
309
take a lot of boys out of the universities, or recent

graduates, to learn to handle all those missiles
which were for targets higher than 1000 meters.
But when the Soviets turned them over to us, they
did it on the condition that we not fire at the U-2.
We found ourselves in the dilemma of either going
without antiaircraft batteries or pledging not to fire
at the U-2. We had to promise not to. It was quite a
while later when they turned those surface-to-air
missiles over to us.
That is the only thing I can say, basically, con-
cerning Cuba in those days. These letters refer to it.
Towards the end, things were a little better; in
December, things got better.
Now, were these the only letters? No. I think these
letters are really very revealing. At that moment
the circumstances had changed. Khrushchev was
one man before the crisis, and a different one after-
wards. Kennedy was one man before the crisis, and
a different one afterwards.
Kennedy behaved with great nobility and el-
egance and believed what they told him, and
Khrushchev fed the deception with the theory that
there were no offensive weapons. He went along
with that game. Afterwards, in the other stage, one
can see a very noble, frank, sincere Khrushchev
and a harsher Kennedy who, in short, squeezes
him—to use an elegant word.
But the effort Khrushchev made was admirable.
He behaved with great elegance. He did not make
concessions concerning Cuba, in the face of all the
proposals. Except that at one time he said that it
was a question of the Spanish character, but he
did not say it in pejorative terms, according to what
I have read there.
On the other hand, he made a rather rude refer-
ence to [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer.
310
‘TESTIMONY
That is the only little part of the letter that I do not

like. It is not that I am an Adenauer sympathizer—not
at all, we are very far apart ideologically—, but the
way he said it, the phrase he used about an old man
who has one foot in the grave should not interfere
with our plans, was not very elegant. It was not an
elegant way of saying it.
Then Kennedy, of course, defends Adenauer,
saying that the two problems have nothing to do
with each other.
But I think public knowledge has been enriched
with this. Now we have to ask the State Department
to continue declassifying things, more letters. Be-
cause the ones from 1963 are still missing. They may
contain interesting things, from what I remember.
Now, three more months had gone by, and on
January 3l—almost four months later—1963,
Khrushchev wrote me a lengthy letter, really a won-
derful letter. It is thirty-one pages long. I am not
going to read it, of course, but it can be handed out
to anyone because it is a beautiful, elegant, friendly,
very friendly letter. Some of its paragraphs are
almost poetic. It invites me to visit the Soviet Union.
He was travelling from Berlin to Moscow by train,
where a conference was taking place, and one can
see the letter was written by him, because he was a
man who knew how to express himself very well,
write very well, and he wrote a persuasive letter.
Tempers had been cooling down by then; they had
been quite hot, and I accepted the trip. You know,
I got there by a miracle, because I had to fly in a Tu-
114 plane. It was a 16-hour flight! I think that is a
kind of bomber they have, but they can’t come back.
We arrived in Murmansk on a direct flight from Ha-
vana in 16 hours, that plane had four propellers. It
shook and vibrated, and we had to land blind. It was
lucky that Khrushchev, who was very concerned
311
about details, had sent the best pilot in the Soviet

Union because he was the only man who would
have been able to land amidst the mountains in
Murmansk with such a fog that you could not see
for five meters. On the third try, we finally landed.
Mikoyan was waiting for me there in Murmansk
with a delegation. I spoke by telephone with
Khrushchev shortly after. That was the first time
I visited the Soviet Union.
I can say that my part in all this could have ended
that day we landed in Murmansk. I said, if this
crashes, we will never even know why. I was sit-
ting with the pilots watching the operation, and
suddenly I said, I will get out of here. I do not want
it to happen that instead of helping, I make things
more complicated. I stayed sitting down until that
monster landed. It was an enormous plane. This is
how I first visited the USSR.
There is an excellent letter. This is why I said
that I know Khrushchev well, he had outstanding
feelings, he was friendly, concerned for Cuba. I ap-
preciated this letter very much.
Then the invitation to visit the USSR was made.
In the USSR, we talked, as I have already told you,
about all these things. I had my theory on what the
goal was. I was trying to find out what had been
discussed, yet not once he did talk about the terms,
he and all the others, as a rule, and I was not able to
clarify the issue.
But for hours he read many messages to me, mes-
sages from President Kennedy, delivered through
Robert Kennedy, and other times through [Llewellyn]
Thompson—that is the name I remember.
There was a translator, and Khrushchev read
and read the letters sent back and forth.
I devoted great interest to find out if any of the
issues touched in those messages were from that
312
‘TESTIMONY
trimester, but they were not, they belong to a later

period. They probably belong to the first quarter of
1963: January, February, March, and April, because
I arrived in the Soviet Union toward the end of April.
And Khrushchev was sitting with me in Zavidovo,
in a remote hunting reserve—he liked hunting very
much, he tried to do so whenever he had a chance,
he did not have much time available, he worked a
lot. We sat in the patio—it was almost spring, and you
can be outside with a coat on in spring in the Soviet
Union. He kept reading the messages, the various
exchange. They continued on and on, discussing the
security of Cuba.
There were two moments of interest to me. There
was a moment when Khrushchev was reading and
the other man was translating, when there was a
phrase in which he [Kennedy] said: Something is
going to happen—in reference to Cuba. Then when
Khrushchev later read his reply, it said—I have
not forgotten the phrase, even though it was not
recorded—that something is going to happen, some-
thing unbelievable. That was the word used by
Khrushchev in his reply. Therefore, it seems that,
at a certain point, the mood was getting heated
again when they told him—regarding Cuba—that
something was going to happen, and he says that
something is going to happen but it will be some-
thing unbelievable, as if to say that there would be
a war if it is not fulfilled. You have seen from his
letters that he writes with dignity, with elegance
but with dignity. I have not forgotten that phrase.
Khrushchev kept on reading and reading. There
was a moment when I believe that he said some-
thing that he did not want me to hear. Anyone can
make a mistake, even me, while reading letters.
But here no one had highlighted for him the es-
sential ideas, and there was a moment when he
313
read a message from the other side: We have ful-

filled all our pledges—take notice of these words—
and we have withdrawn or are withdrawing, or are
going to withdraw the missiles from Turkey and
Italy. I remember it well, that he not only said Tur-
key but also said Italy. I always kept that in my
mind.
Once I asked the Soviets if in the documents or
the papers there was finally something to this ef-
fect. I sent a query to Gromyko, since there was a
new campaign in the United States because we
were going to receive some MiG-23 or some other
planes of that kind. They were always examining
to see if 1962 agreements were being violated. I was
told that the issue of Turkey appeared, but not Italy.
But in that message that Nikita was reading and
the translator was translating it said, we have with-
drawn, are withdrawing, or are going to withdraw—this
refers to the withdrawal—the missiles from Tur-
key and Italy. I told myself, well—this has not been
discussed publicly—this must have been some kind
of gift or concession made. Maybe in this case
Kennedy was helping Khrushchev. There had been
times when Khrushchev had wanted to help Kennedy,
but other times he had wanted to hurt him—or did
not want to but did anyway—and other times it
was Kennedy to Khrushchev. I only know and re-
member that phrase, when I heard that phrase. It
was the last thing that Nikita wanted to, the fact
that I would hear that phrase. He knew my way of
thinking, and that we were completely against be-
ing used as an exchange token, which was contra-
dictory to the theory that the missiles were sent
for the defense of Cuba. Withdrawing missiles from
Turkey had nothing to do with the defense of Cuba.
That is quite clear, it is a matter of simple logic.
Cuba was defended by saying: Please, remove the
314
‘TESTIMONY
naval base; please, stop the economic blockade and

the piratical attacks; no more these and those
things. Withdrawing missiles from Turkey was in
total contradiction to the theory that the essential
goal had been the defense of Cuba.
When this was read, I looked at him and said:
Nikita, please, read that part again. He read that
part again and I said: the missiles in Turkey and
Italy? He laughed that mischievous laugh of his...
I was sure that that was not going to be repeated
again because it was like that old phrase about
talking about rope in the house of a hanged man.
There were two points, and this is why I am go-
ing to leave it to the researchers to investigate this.
We will await with interest the day when this is
declassified, now that everything is being declas-
sified, or as it also is called, the deideologizing of
international relations. It is better if all these docu-
ments come to light once and for all.
Of course, this situation that happened on Octo-
ber 1962, despite efforts by both parts, and we also
tried to completely overcome the incident, tried to
save the relations with the Soviet Union, tried to
stop it from getting any more embittered; the 1962
incidents affected for many years the relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and Cuba.
We are putting all these documents at the dis-
posal of historians and, if you think so, we can make
photocopies of this agreement.
I believe that the text of this agreement has never
been published. I do not know if it is of any interest to
historians. We can have it typed or make photocopies
(They say him they want a photocopy). We will make
copies for the historians. This is now declassified!
This letter also, the one sent on the 23d; someone
might be interested in it. I do not remember any-
thing else that, in my opinion, might be of concrete
and specific interest in relation to the studies that
315
you are doing. If any more papers or anything else

of interest surfaces, we can give them to you. We
do not have anything to hide with respect to this
whole problem of the October Crisis, if it can be
useful or contribute to clarifying the facts and to
drawing the pertinent conclusions.
I am not going to draw conclusions here about
all this. There is a lot of material to study, to mull
over, many things to reflect on, thanks in part to the
constructive efforts made by bringing this to light.
As a Soviet man once said, never has a problem
been so seriously discussed as this one has, from
which important lessons can be derived.
Thank you very much.
They say I talked for two hours and fifteen minutes,
really I exceeded in my plans. I beg you excuse me.
Tripartite Conference on October Crisis, 4th session. Verbatim re-

cord, Council of State. Translated and revised by Editorial José Marti.
316
CHRONOLOGY
1962
FROM LATE 1961 To EaRLy 1962. The United States Govern-
ment implemented the Operation Mongoose against
Cuba, a project that comprised all possible forms of ag-
gression. In fact this was the continuance of an unde-
clared war that the United States had implemented on
the Island since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959.
January 18. General Edward G. Landsdale, appointed Chief
of Operations for Operation Mongoose, delivered to the
high-ranking authorities of the United States Govern-
ment and the Special Group Augmented (SGA) of the
National Security Council (NSC) “The Cuba Project.” This
was a program that comprised thirty-two tasks for the
departments and agencies involved in the Operation
Mongoose. The project contained a whole variety of po-
litical, diplomatic, economic, psychological propaganda,
and espionage actions; execution of different terrorist
and sabotage actions; stimulus and logistic support to
counterrevolutionary-armed bands. In short, the opera-
tion was aimed at provoking an uprising of the Cuban
people, which once initiated, would establish the premises
for direct military intervention of the USAF and its allies
of Latin America.
January 19. Attorney General Robert Kennedy chaired a
meeting to discuss and approve the Cuba Project. In the
document it is posed that Robert Kennedy directed those
present “to address themselves to the ‘thirty-two tasks’
unfailingly.” He also said that a solution to the “Cuban
problem” had at the time “the top priority in the United
States Government—all else is secondary—no time,
money, effort, or manpower is to be spared.” He pointed
out that the U.S. president had indicated to him that
“the final chapter on Cuba has not been written” and
therefore it’s got “to be done and will be done.”
1. U.S. Department of State, “Meeting with the Attorney Gene-

ral of the United States Concerning Cuba,” Foreign Relations of
317
IN THE THRESHOLD OF NUCLEAR
eA
NN ere SE WAR
From January 22 To 31. The 8th Consultation Conference of

Foreign Ministers of the OAS was held at the exclusive
spa of Punta del Este, Uruguay. In that conference the
essential purpose of the United States was to accom-
plish that Cuba were sanctioned and thus justify its
hostile and aggressive policy. For the United States, how-
ever, it was not easy to achieve that goal and collect
enough votes to condemn and sanction the Cuban Gov-
ernment. On January 30 the resolution-on “Exclusion
of the actual Cuba Government of its Participation in
the Inter-American System” was approved, with four-
teen votes in favor, one against, and six abstentions.
Fepruary 3. The U.S. president decrees the Proclamation
3447 that imposed the embargo (blockade) on the com-
merce between the United States and Cuba; he entrusts
the Secretary of Treasure to put it into practice con-
cerning imports, and to the Secretary of Commerce to
give continuance to the embargo previously imposed to
exports. The Secretaries of Commerce and Treasure are
also authorized to manage and modify the blockade. The
Proclamation 3447 would be in force on February 7.
Fesruary 4. The 2d National General Assembly of the Cu-
ban people is held as response to agreements of the OAS
in the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este.
The Second Declaration of Havana is approved.
Fespruary 20. Edward Landsdale exposes a program made up
of six phases for Operation Mongoose, which would end
in October 1962 with a popular uprising and the over-
throw of the communist regime. The main project com-
prises subversive actions of political, psychological, mili-
tary, sabotage and intelligence sort, as well as proposal
of attacks to the infrastructure of the regime, even to
key leaders. Landsdale points out that still it has not
been made a decision concerning direct military inter-
vention of the United States supporting those plans to
overthrow the Castro regime.
the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Was-

hington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 720.
318
CHRONOLOGY
Marcu 13. A document entitled “Pretexts to Justify Direct

Military Intervention of the United States in Cuba” and
prepared by the Joint Chiefs Staff (JCS) was submitted to
consideration at the Defense Department. This document
contained a group of measures of harassment aimed at
creating conditions to justify its direct military action.
Concerning this, the document states:
1. Since it would be desirable to use legitimate provoca-
tion as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a
plan could be executed to provoke Cuban reactions.
Harassment plus other actions to convince the Cubans
of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our mili-
tary posture throughout the execution of the plan will
allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if
Cuban response justifies it.
2. A series of well-coordinated incidents will be planed
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genu-
ine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.”
Marcu 14. The Special Group (Augmented) approved the
guidelines for Operation Mongoose. These guidelines,
drafted by General Maxwell Taylor, stress that the United
States will “make maximum use of indigenous re-
sources” for overthrowing Castro, but it recognizes that
“final success will require decisive U.S. military inter-
vention.” Such indigenous resources will be used to “pre-
pare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to
facilitate and support it.”°
Late Aprit. During a trip of Khrushchev to Crimea Penin-
sula accompanied by Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky, Min-
ister of Defense; the latter pointed to the horizon and
commented the presence of U.S. Jupiter missiles in
Turkish territory. And that those means could strike
the USSR in ten minutes, whereas the Soviet missiles
needed twenty-five minutes to hit targets in the United
2. John Elliston, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S.

Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999).
3. U.S. Department of State, “Guideline for Operation Mongoose,”
in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X,
Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1997), 771.
319
States. Khrushchev then mused “. . . whether the So-

viet Union shouldn’t do the same thing with Cuba, just
over the horizon the United States. The Americans, af-
ter all, had not asked Soviet permission.”*
Upon his return to Moscow, Anastas Mikoyan visited
Khrushchev in the outskirts of the city and, while going
for a walk in the garden, the top Soviet leader told him
that in a few days, he was thinking to propose the Cu-
ban Government the deployment of nuclear missiles in
its territory.
May 20. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei
Gromyko, told that during his return to Moscow from
Bulgaria, Khrushchev privately expressed him the con-
sideration that for saving Cuba as independent state
some amount of nuclear missiles was required to be
installed in the Island. The Soviet leader said that only
this could save her because the failure of invasion at
Playa Giron would not stop Washington. Before Gromyko’s
objections on the perils that such a step could involve
for peace, Khrushchev precisely stated that the Soviet
Union does not want a nuclear war and does not pretend
to fight. In the next days he will pose the issue to the
Presidium of the Central Committee.
May 21. Preliminary decision of installing missiles in Cuba
was made at the Defense Council of the USSR and the
task to the Soviet high-ranking military command was
formulated. From that time began the analysis on as-
pects of military character to make mission feasible.
May 24. The project was subject to debate in the bosom of
the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CC-CPSU), body with
the authority for final approval of the project to install
the missiles in Cuba. Most attendants supported the pro-
posal. Anastas Mikoyan pointed out that Cuban leaders
would not accept the risk for their country and indicated
that operation of missiles could not be secretly under-
taken. Khrushchev proposed immediate departure of
Marshal Biryuzov for Cuba in order to directly transmit-
ting the proposal and, if accepted, two, or three special-
ists should study in the terrain the possibility of building
4. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis

(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings, 1987), 12.
320
CHRONOLOGY
launching pads, without being found out by exploration

pe of the United States. Proposal was approved by
all.
May 29. A Soviet delegation arrived in Havana airport.
Sharaf Rashidov, deputy member of the Presidium of the
Central Committee and General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Uzbekistan,
presided that group. Vice-Minister of Defense and Com-
mander of Strategic Rocket Forces of the USSR Marshal
Sergei Biryuzov, and Aleksandr Alekseev, who shortly
after would occupy a post as USSR ambassador in Cuba,
were in the group. The delegation had the mission from
Nikita Khrushchev, to directly propose the Cuban higher
authorities the installation of nuclear missiles in their
territory to halt U.S. intentions of direct military aggres-
sion to the Island. That same day the delegation met
with Fidel and Raul Castro.
May 30. A meeting of the National Secretariat of the ORI
was held to analyze the Soviet proposal of deploying mis-
siles in Cuba and to take a decision about it. When for-
mulating the problem in the bosom of the high-ranking
leadership of the country, Fidel argued that, in his opinion,
installation of missiles strengthened the Socialist bloc.
And, if the Party held the belief that the bloc should be
willing to go to war for the safe of any socialist country,
we did not have any right to consider something that
could represent a danger for Cuba. Participants in the
meeting did not disregard that the measure would also
contribute to the defense of the country because it was
a strong discourager that would influence on U.S. gov-
ernors before they undertook any military action.
Neither the negative political aspect, that for the Revo-
lution could have such a decision in Latin America,
escaped to the ORI Secretariat. All members of the ORI
Secretariat, however, decided to give an affirmative re-
sponse to the Soviet proposal. That same day, the deci-
sion was informed to Biryuzov.
From May 31 anp JuNE 1. Commander Raul Castro Ruz, Min-
ister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), accom-
panied by Marshal Biryuzov and the other generals who
accompanied the latter, made a strategic exploration to
determine the places where deployment of different So-
viet units was going to be undertaken. In this tour, Raul
knew in details the characteristics of the military means
321
IN THE
NS
ee REA THRESHOLD
ee OF NUCLEAR WAR
to be sent to Cuba and doubted on the real possibility

that the Soviets could move those missiles—20 meters
long—to the country, without being found out by foe in-
telligence service.
June 10. In Moscow, once the positive response given by
the Cuban directorate was known, the Presidium of the
CC-CPSU made the final decision on deployment of
MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. From that moment, in the
Defense Ministry of the USSR it was started to inten-
sively work those plans for the moving and deployment
of the military contingent to be sent for Cuba.
From July 2 To 16. In order to discuss details of the opera-
tion of installing missiles in Cuba and the basis of the
military accord, the Cuban Minister of the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces traveled to Moscow between July 2
and 16. In Moscow he held meetings with Khrushchev
and Marshals Malinovsky and Biryuzov. Commander
Raul Castro was carrying Fidel’s instructions of asking
Khrushchev what would happen if the operation were
discovered while in progress.
Juty 25. In a memorandum from the Chief of Operations of
the Operation Mongoose General Edward G. Landsdale, to the
Special Group (Augmented) (SGA), he informed on results
of actions undertaken in Phase I of the operation. He also
proposed, for Phase II of the operation, to take more ag-
gressive measures and pointed out four options:
a. To cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Com-
munist bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or
b. To exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psycho-
logical and other pressures to overthrow the Castro's
communist regime without overt employment of U.S.
army, or
c. To commit United States to help Cubans overthrow
the Castro’s communist regime, with a step-by-step
phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S.
military force if required at the end, or
d. To use a provocation and overthrow the Castro’s
communist regime by U.S. military force.®
5. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum from the Chief of

Operations, Operation Monggose (Landsdale) to the Special
322
CHRONOLOGY
Late JuLy. Shipment and transfer of Soviet troops and means

bound for Cuba started. The Operation Anadyr initiated
that way and would last until last week of October 1962
when the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out.
FROM FIRST FORNIGHT OF AuGust. Sources of U.S. intelligence
started reporting unusual moving of Soviet ships with
military cargoes bound for Cuba.
Aucust 11. Aleksandr Alekseev arrived in Havana as new
ambassador, who brought the project of military accord.
When Fidel examined the project detected large gaps of
political kind and made appropriate corrections.
Aucust 17. The Chief of the Special Group (Augmented)
General Maxwell Taylor, informed President Kennedy
that the SGA saw no possibility that the Castro govern-
ment were overthrown by internal revolt without direct
military intervention. And that the Group was in favor
of a more aggressive Mongoose program.°®
Aucust 21. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Alexis
Johnson, the Attorney General, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency General Taylor, General Lemnitzer
and McGeorge Bundy met in the office of the State Sec-
retary to analyze informations that were being received
on Soviet military reinforcement in Cuba. An agreement
was taken of immediately reporting that situation to the
President.
Aucustr 23. President Kennedy met with the National Secu-
rity Council (NSC) to analyze the situation created in Cuba
as result of Soviet military reinforcement and through
“National Security Action Memorandum No. 181” he or-
dered realization of different actions and studies “in the
light of evidence of new bloc activities in Cuba.” Concerning
Group (Augmented), Washington July 25, 1962,” in Foreign

Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-
1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997),
884.
6. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum from the Presidents
Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, Was-
hington, August 17, 1962,” in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 944-945.
323
IN THE
NESE eadTHRESHOLD
SN ee OF NUCLEAR
ee WARAS
the Operation Mongoose Kennedy indicated elaboration of

“Plan B Plus,” “as soon as possible.””
Aucust 26. Commander Ermesto “Che” Guevara and Captain
Emilio Aragonés Navarro arrived in the Soviet Union. Both
Cuban leaders had the mission to take the corrected text
of military agreement between the USSR and Cuba. And
to personally express Khrushchev the opinion of the Cu-
ban leadership, to make the agrement public, although it
was recommended that the Soviets should make the final
decision. ‘
Aucust 29. U.S. reconnaissance planes U-2 detected anti-
aircraft missile sites in the western region. Therefore,
U.S. intelligence services paid close special attention
to that zone.
Aucust 30. During a press conference, President Kennedy,
when referring to the world situation, in particular
Cuba’s, said that Doctrine Monroe means for him today
what it has meant since Presidents Monroe and John
Quincy Adams stated it, that is, that they firmly oppose
to all intervention of a foreign power in the western
hemisphere. Therefore, they oppose to what is happen-
ing in Cuba at present. Therefore, they suppressed their
trade with Cuba and, therefore, they collaborate with the
OAS and other forms to isolate the communist threat in
Cuba. Therefore, they continue fighting and paying most
part of their attention and efforts to the matter.
Ear_Ly SEPTEMBER. Troops and combat means of the Soviet
missile regiments R-12 (NATO designation SS-4), be-
longing to the 43d Division of Smoliensk’s Guard—a unit
that belonged to the Strategic Rocket Force of the So-
viet Union under the command of the Major General
Igor D. Statsenko—began to arrive in Cuban ports, first
through Casilda and shortly after through Mariel ports.
SEPTEMBER 2. As results of the talks between the Cuban del-
egation headed by Commander Ernesto “Che” Guevara
and the Soviet high-directorate, a joint communiqué was
signed at the end of the visit. This communiqué states
in one of its paragraphs, “While threats last . . . concerning
7. U.S. Department of State, “National Security Action Memorandum

No. 181, Washington, August 23, 1962,” in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 957-958.
324
(CHRONOLOGY
Cuba, the Cuban Republic will have all foundations for

adopting measures to guarantee its security and defense
of its sovereignty and independence and all sincere
friends of Cuba will enjoy full rights for access to those
legitimate demands.”®
SEPTEMBER 7. President Kennedy requested approval of the
Congress for, if necessary, calling 150,000 reserve men
to active soldiering, aimed at facilitating rapid and ef-
fective responses to challenges elsewhere in the “free
world.” That same day, ambassador of the USSR in Wash-
ington, Anatoli Dobrynin, on behalf of his government
assured U.S. permanent representative at the UN, Adlai
Stevenson, that only defensive weapons were being deliv-
ered to Cuba.
SEPTEMBER 10. During a speech at the 3d National Congress
of Educational Municipal Councils, Fidel Castro warned
concerning pressures over the U.S. administration to
execute an attack against the Island and if this new
mistake was undertaken, it will cost dearly.
SEPTEMBER 11. The Soviet Government broadcasted over TASS
Agency, a statement where it reaffirmed its intentions
to give necessary military assistance to Cuba in case of
aggression and emphasized that only it would use weap-
ons in defense of the Cuban sovereignty against those
who attacked it. Also it asserted, “. . . the Soviet Union
does not need to transfer to any other country, for example
Cuba, the means that it has available to repel the aggres-
sion, to deal a counterblow.”°
SEPTEMBER 25. The U.S. Congress approved the resolution
concerning the request that President Kennedy had
made for calling 150,000 reserve men to soldiering.
From SEPTEMBER 20 To 26. The U.S. Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives approved a resolution authorizing the use of
strength, including invasion on Cuba, to repress subver-
sive and aggressive activity of the Cuban Revolution in
the western hemisphere.
of Cuba
SEPTEMBER 29. The Council of Ministers of the Republic
issued a statement in response to the Joint Resolu tion of
the U.S. Congress, where the Revolutionary Government

325
reaffirmed its peace purpose and the decision of the

people to defend its independence and sovereignty.
OcroBer 1. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
met the JCS to discuss the intensification of the con-
tingency plan elaborated against Cuba. Among decisions
made it was to alert Commander in Chief of the Atlan-
tic Command (CINCLANT) Admiral Robert L. Dennison, to
be ready to implement naval blockade to Cuba.
OcToBER 2. In Washington, the so-called Hemispheric Con-
ference of Latin America Foreign Ministers started,
which Secretary of State Dean Rusk, informally called
in order to reach approval of plan against Cuba.
October 3. In the meeting of Latin America Foreign Minis-
ters, a communique that refused secret military reinforce-
ment of Cuba and called countries members of the OAS
to undertake individual or collective actions to prevent
expansion of communism throughout the hemisphere
was approved.
OcToBerR 8. President Osvaldo Dorticés, head of the Cuban
delegation to the 27th General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, in his speech before the plenary of the Assembly
denounced maneuvers and aggressive actions of the
United States Government and demanded condemnation
before such facts. At the same time he stated, “Cuba,
since early times of the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban re-
lations up to the present, has always been willing to nego-
tiate the existing differences between the United States
and Cuba through normal diplomatic ways or through any
other adequate means.”!°
OcroBer 14. In early morning hours U.S. reconnaissance
plane U-2 took pictures of Cuban western territory in a
south-north route. The following day, the National Photo-
graph Interpretation Center of the CIA, after carefully
studying photographs, detected presence of SS-4 (R-12)
missile launching sites in the San Cristébal region, Pinar
del Rio Province.
OcToBer 16. McGeorge Bundy reported President Kennedy
that strong photographic evidences had been obtained
showing the MRBMs in Cuba. Immediately, Kennedy
called a meeting and read the names of the fourteen ad-
visors to be present. That was the group later known as
10. Noticias de Hoy, October 9, 1962.
326
CHRONOLOGY
Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(ExComm). This body maintained in permanent session
during the whole time the Crisis lasted as advisor council
of President Kennedy.
OcroBeR 17. The ExComm debated on tracks to follow and
new photographic evidences when detecting other mis-
sile sites were known. Concerning this, a document that
exposed variants of actions to be taken was discussed:
Track A - Political action, pressure and warning, fol-
lowed by a military strike if satisfaction is not re-
ceived.
Track B - A military strike without prior warning, pres-
sure, or action, accompanied by messages making
clear the limited nature of this action.
Track C - Political action, pressure and warning, fol-
lowed by a total naval blockade, under the authority
of the Rio Pact and either a Congressional Declara-
tion of War on Cuba or the Cuban Resolution of the
87th Congress.
Track D - Full-scale invasion to “take Cuba away from
Castro.”"!
OcroperR 18. U.S. president received in the White House
the USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko. Among the
topics of the talk, the Cuban situation was approached.
Kennedy classified the Soviet Union and Cuba’s actions
as causes of tensions in the Caribbean, but he did not
show Gromyko photographic evidences of missile instal-
lations that the former had in his power. Gromyko, on
his part, reiterated argument that assistance of his
country to Cuba was only aimed at strengthening Cu-
ban defensive capability and omitted any allusion to
nuclear missiles.
OcroBer 20. The ExComm made the decision of naval block-
ade to Cuba as mean to reach withdrawal of missiles.
Because blockade is an illegal action, it was made the
n,
11. Laurence Chang, and Peter Kornbluh, ed., Theodore Sorense
Facts and Premise s, Possibl e Courses of
“Summary of Agreed
in The Cuban
Action and Unaswered Questions. October 17, 1962”
l Security Archive Docume nts Reader
Missile Crisis, 1962: A Nationa
(New York: New Press, 1992), 124.
327
decision to call it “quarantine” aimed at covering ille-

gality of the measure before public opinion.
OcToBER 21. U.S. Government concentrated planes and war-
ships in the area of Florida, action that world press de-
nounced as preparations of aggression against Cuba.
OcToBER 22. Prime Minister Fidel Castro, as Commander in
Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, gave the order of
combat alarm to all armed forces, at 5:40 p.m., as response
of measures decreed by U.S. Government-and U.S. mili-
tary maneuvers against Cuba. Some hours later, U.S.
president announced the establishment of military and
naval blockade against Cuba.
OcTOBER 23. Soviet Government issued a statement in
which it condemned and refused these acts of power of
the U.S. Government. Likewise, it expressed uncondi-
tional backing and USSR willingness to defend the Cuban
Revolution. The Cuban premier appeared before the Cu-
ban radio and television networks to unmask the state-
ment of the U.S. president and to reiterate willingness
of the Cuban people to defend its independence at the
cost it was necessary.
OcroBer 24. Acting Secretary General of the UN U Thant
urged to undertake negotiations to resolve the Carib-
bean Crisis, provoked by the United States.
OcToBeR 25. The USSR accepted U Thant’s proposal while
the U.S. Government evaded his pronouncement.
OcToBER 26. U.S. Defense Department broadcasted a state-
ment by means of which it arrogated the right to inspect
and to violate the Cuban air space. In response to this
statement, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Fidel Castro issued a communiqué in which he ordered
to open fire against any fighter that violated the Cuban
air space. U Thant, Nikita S. Khrushchev and John F.
Kennedy exchanged messages aimed at preventing con-
frontations between Soviet ships, bound for Cuba, and
Yankee warships. The USSR Government accepted
maintaining its vessels out of control zone in order to
make negotiations possible. The Soviet Premier trans-
mitted a message to his U.S. counterpart where he ex-
pressed the necessity to give a pacific solution to the
crisis; he clarified the defensive character of the exist-
ing weaponry in Cuban land, as well as the causes that
328
CHRONOLOGY
determined the Soviet military assistance to the Cu-

ban Revolution. Likewise, he posed possible withdrawal
of any kind of weaponry from Cuba in exchange for U.S.
public pledge of lifting the blockade and not invading or
promoting military actions against the Cuban territory.
Fidel Castro sent a letter to Nikita S. Khrushchev in
which he warned of a possible air raid to Cuba in forty-
eight or seventy-two hours, and informed the decision
of the Cuban people to face this aggression. He also ex-
posed that if invasion of the Cuban territory was under-
taken, the least probable action, the USSR should not
tolerate that imperialists launched, against Cuba, the
first nuclear strike.
OcroBER 27. Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government
Fidel Castro, sent a response message to U Thant where
he expressed his willingness for a dialog to resolve the
crisis as long as the United States stop—during these
talks—threats, aggressive actions and naval blockade on
Cuba. Nikita S. Khrushchev, in a letter to President John
F. Kennedy, praised response of U.S. president to U Thant,
for his favorable stance towards the adoption of measures
to avoid contacts between U.S. warships and Soviet ships
bound for Cuba. Similarly, the U.S. Government proposed
the withdrawal of weapons from Cuba, considered offen-
sive for the United States, in exchange for that the United
States withdrew Jupiter missiles from Turkey. In re-
sponse to this message, Kennedy offered Khrushchev lift-
ing measures of blockade on Cuba if the USSR withdrew
all weapons, classified as offensive, from Cuba. In morn-
ing hours, the Cuban antiaircraft opened fire against U.S.
planes that flew at low-level over the country. At 10:17 a.m.
a U-2 plane was shot down while undertaking spy flight
over the Cuban territory, in the zone of Banes—Holguin
Province at present—by a Soviet missile antiaircraft po-
sitioned in that region.
OcroBeR 28. Nikita S. Khrushchev accepted John F.
Kennedy’s offer as long as he guaranteed that Cuba would
not be invaded on the part of the United States or any
other country of the western hemisphere. At the same
time, he ordered all Soviet officials the dismantling and
return of weapons to the USSR that U.S. Government
classified as offensive. The Cuban premier proclaimed
a program of five points as guarantees against aggression
to Cuba on the part of the United States. This program
329
comprised cessation of economic blockade, subversive

actions, piratical attacks, violations of air space and the
withdrawal of the Naval Base of Guantanamo.
OcroBeR 29. Acting Secretary General of UN U Thant, ac-
cepted invitation of Fidel Castro to visit Cuba.
OctoBER 30. Talks between Secretary General of UN and
the Cuban prime minister started in Havana as an in-
dispensable way to reach distension in the zone.
OcToBER 31. U Thant’s working visit to Havana ended. In
this last meeting Fidel Castro reaffirmed Cuba’s right
to independence. He ratified the five points as the only
guarantee for a truly and final peace in the area. At the
same time, he refused every Yankee attempt for on-
site inspection of the Cuban territory and reasserted
the decision of the people to defend their sovereignty.
The prime minister of the Revolutionary Government
sent a letter to the Soviet premier expressing bitter-
ness for the manner in which negotiations were under-
taken between the United States and the USSR, exclud-
ing Cuba. Likewise, the Cuban premier made evident
one more time the eternal gratitude and friendship of
the Cuban people towards the Soviet Union.
NovEeMBER 1. Prime minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel
Castro Ruz, appeared before the Cuban radio and televi-
sion network to report the people on results of talks held
between the Revolutionary Government and U Thant.
NOVEMBER 2. First Vice-Prime Minister of the USSR Anastas
Mikoyan, stated in New York that Soviet Government
endorses the fair proposals of Fidel Castro to guarantee
security of Cuba.
NoveMBER 4. Talks between the Cuban Prime Minister
Fidel Castro and First Vice-Prime Minister of the USSR
Anastas Mikoyan, began at the Presidential Palace.
NOVEMBER 10. Secretary General of the UN agreed an agree-
ment with the International Red Cross to inspect So-
viet ships that traded with Cuba.
NovEMBER 15. Fidel Castro sent the Secretary General of the UN
a letter in which he warned the United States Cuba’s will-
ingness to defend the national territory, and that planes
invading the air space could only do at the risk to be de-
stroyed.
NOVEMBER 19. In a new letter to Secretary General of the UN,
Fidel Castro posed that Cuba would never be an obstacle
330
CHRONOLOGY
for an acceptable solution to all, but he pointed out that

Cuba would not yield before the U.S. policy of power.
NOVEMBER 20. President John F. Kennedy ordered cessation
of maritime blockade that had unilaterally established
on Cuba, but confirmed maintenance of political and eco-
nomic measures decreed by his government against the
Cuban Revolution.
NOVEMBER 21. The USSR revoked alert order to all its armed
forces. The United States disposed release of troops that
mobilized in its plans of invading Cuba.
NOVEMBER 25. The National Directorate of the Revolutionary
Integrated Organizations issued a statement in which
unmasked aggressive policy assumed by the United
States against Cuba, reasserted one more time the un-
breakable stance of the Revolutionary Government con-
tained in the five points and specified that it would never
give up before imperialists.
NOVEMBER 29. Vice-Prime Minister of the USSR Anastas Mikoyan
and the U.S. President John F. Kennedy held an interview
in Washington concerning the Caribbean Crisis.
1963
January 7. Cuban permanent representative before the
United Nations sent U Thant a letter where he explained
how negotiations undertaken by that organization con-
cerning the crisis did not reach acceptable agreements
for Cuba. Likewise, he refused statement made by U.S.
Government in which it reserved the right to under-
take on-site inspection of the Cuban territory, in act of
flagrant violation of Cuba sovereignty.
January 15. Congress of Women of All Americas ended in
Havana. When closing that event, the Cuban prime
minister publicly denounced new vandalic acts perpe-
trated by mercenary bands—trained by the CIA—against
the Cuban people and, when referring to the crisis ini-
tiated in October 1962, he concluded asserting that “war
was prevented, but peace was not achieved.””
12. Fidel Castro Ruz, “Discurso de clausura del Congreso de

Mujeres de América el 15 de enero de 1963” (Closing Speech at
the Congress of America’s Women on January 15, 1963). Noti-
cias de Hoy daily, January 16, 1963.
331
Cy —
lv aver Thad a Wa
: f
cw. ue
om);
beer
Sh
20PR Ori a
a
alb xt Prudent ithe. sh etaleu
arf OOD 2th LaF apieert, ite
“brary Leeann oo acmivalieriw: WE aT)18.Onie
pr ij Tee
ithhofitrage Dat atithoay 7h 4,
“staote le walletioctn AMES:
OUT 24 ie
Ret? Raa.
ar aicath 4) 3
Ayrohit (ie: tibet Shyriie>-) rae rbieya
=
~~ip
©, e-2
PMPs)
28y
Shu panies eReLele
Gir sare. fienh ahi’ ¢ retitattitude we hensetitg oe
peso Sette Ye}ig saatSe ANN Ten

pe at abit "eH hae Aa Snort
sgt! weit i Nisa ee iiy ata
CRs
ey estoy ful ean Gri
ae enh tea SAY Baa
Agi t oiil We rsest 1P eet i
iy"vay nied? ait Wy ‘yun sepa Neh
Pet eeogere-siclif 7 satan’
PA Is osimoWw oe sexvQno) .E1 wiaimal
S frre Vat lender Muvaeiter
TGiliv eed) CoonuaesD Yds tea AGS,
wrt
Gr ee i ipl easesbietie Vat
nie
tre’: SH A bhi friS lot reer Cbtiy pr nh he
aggre
aes SPOH ROOT seeto On Pork Go-
vis it WN Soa) Tod /beltaveny anw
Nowra LS, CAG ( motte « he Sewretiny Creeneral of (he LN
a tre TF wrth é 9 eyes Ce Otte Sae t vibea's will-
iniproes=’ Sip Ciegena) (ee swe! i} terilory, anc thal plas
ob eh uly WS sae a wai pic stn
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexeev, A. “La Crisis del Caribe” (in Russian). Ejo Planetoi

(Moscow), (November, 1988).
Arboleya Cervera, Jesus. La contrarrevolucién cubana [Cu-
ban Counterrevolution]. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1997.
Beschloss, R. Michael. The Crisis Years. Kennedy and
Khrushchev 1960-1963. New York: Edward Burlingame
Books, Harper Collins Publishers, 1990.
Blight, G. James and David A Welch. On the Brink: Ameri-
cans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. 1st
ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine
the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Noonday, 1990.
Blight, G. James, Bruce J. Allyn & David A. Welch. Cuba on
the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse.
New York: Pantheon Book, 1993.
Brugioni, Dino A. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Edited by Robert F. McCort. New
York: Random House, 1991.
Castro Ruz, Fidel. “Conferencia en la Universidad Popular
el lro. de diciembre de 1961” [Lecture at the Popular
University on December 1, 1961]. In El Partido Marxista
Leninista y la Revolucién Cubana. Havana, n.p., 1962.
. “Discurso en el Congreso de la Asociacién Nacio-
nal de Agricultores Pequenos el 17 de mayo de 1961”
[Speech at the Congress of the National Association of
Small Farmers on May 17, 1961]. Obra Revolucionaria
(Havana), no. 21 (1962).
. “Discurso en el III Congreso Nacional de Consejos
Municipales de Educacion el 10 de setiembre de 1962”
[Speech at the 3d National Congress of Municipality
Councils of Education on September 10, 1962]. Obra
Revolucionaria (Havana), no. 26 (1962).
333
NUCLEAR
OF boa
D ees WAR
pT IN BeTHRESHOL
IN THE ee eee
. “Mensaje a Jrushov del 26 de octubre de 1962”

[Message to Khrushchev on October 26, 1962]. Granma
(23 November 1990).
. “Informe al pueblo de Cuba sobre las conversacio-
nes con el Secretario General de la ONU el 2 de noviem-
bre de 1962” [Report to Cuban People about the Talks with
the UN Secretary General on November 2, 1962]. Obra
Revolucionaria (Havana), no. 33. (1962).
. “Carta al Secretario General de las Naciones
Unidas 15.11.1962” [Letter to UN Secretary General on
November 15, 1962]. Revista Politica Internacional, no. 1
(1st trimester 1963).
. “Discurso en conmemoracion del IV aniversario
del triunfo de la Revolucion” [Speech Commemorating
4th Anniversary of the Triumph of the Revolution]. Noticias
de Hoy daily (3 January 1963).
. “Discurso de clausura del Congreso de Mujeres
de América el 15 de enero de 1963” [Closing Speech at
the Congress of America’s Women on January 15, 1963].
Noticias de Hoy daily (16 January 1963).
. ‘Discurso pronunciado el 17 de abril de 1963, en
la base aérea de San Antonio” [Speech at San Antonio Air
Base, on April 17, 1963]. Obra Revolucionaria (Havana),
no. 10 (1963).
. “Discurso en el XXX Aniversario de la Victoria de
Playa Giron” [Speech commemorating the 30th Anni-
versary of Playa Gir6n Victory] Granma (special supple-
ment) (19 April 1991).
. Palabras el 11 de Junio de 1992 durante la Confe-
rencia Tripartita sobre la Crisis de Octubre, celebrada los
dias 9 al 12 de Junio de 1992 (cuarta sesion). Versiones
taquigraficas, Consejo de Estado [Words on January 11,
1992 during the Tripartite Conference on the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis, held on January 9-12, 1992 (4th session). Ver-
batim record, Council of State]. October Crisis Collection,
Archives of the Institute of Cuban History.
Castro Ruz, Raul. Defensa de Cuba [Defense of Cuba].
Universidad Popular, Havana: n.p., 1960.
. “Discurso en conmemoracion del III aniversario de
la desaparicion fisica del comandante Camilo Cienfue-
gos” [Speech commemorating the 3d Anniversary of
Physical Dissapearance of Commander Camilo Cienfue-
gos]. N.p., October 28, 1962.
334
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh, ed. The Cuban Mis-

sile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents
Reader. New York: New Press, 1992.
Collective work. Valentia y fraternidad [Bravery and
Fraternity]. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983.
. De Eisenhower a Reagan [From Eisenhower to
Reagan]. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1987.
Con la razon histérica y la moral de Baragud [With the His-
torical Truth and Morale of Baragua]. 1962 Crisis de
Octubre. Havana: Editora Politica, 1990.
Demanda del pueblo de Cuba al Gobierno de los Estados Uni-
dos por danos humanos [Cuba’s People Demand to the U.S.
Government for Human Damage]. Havana: Editora Politica,
1999:
Diez Acosta, Tomas. Peligros y Principios [Dangers and
Principles]. Havana: Ediciones Verde Olivo, 1992.
. La guerra encubierta contra Cuba [The Secret War
against Cuba]. Havana: Editora Politica, 1997.
. La Crisis de los Misiles, 1962 [1962 Missile Cri-
sis]. Havana: Ediciones Verde Olivo, 1997.
. Octubre de 1962, aun paso del holocausto [October
1962, One Step away from the Holocaust]. Havana: Editora
Politica, 2002.
Dorticos Torrado, Osvaldo. “Discurso en la Asamblea General
de la ONU el 8 de octubre de 1962” [Speech at the UN
General Assembly on October 8, 1962]. Obra revolucionaria
(Havana), no. 26, 1962.
Elliston, John. Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of
U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999.
Escalante Font, Fabian. Cuba: la guerra secreta de la CIA
[Cuba: CIA Secret War]. Havana: Editorial Capitan San
Luis, 1993.
Etzold, Th. E., and J. L. Gaddis. Documents on American Policy
and Strategy, 1945-1950. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press,.19738.
Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a
Gamble: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
London: John Murray Albemarle Street, 1997.
Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missiles Cri-
sis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987.
Gribkov, Anatoli I., and William Y. Smith. Operation Anaduyr.
Chicago: N.p., 1994. .
Gromyko, Anatoly. “Caribbean Crisis: About What Is Now Re-
vealed and What Was Covered Then” (in Russian). Izvestiya
(15 April 1989).
335
D OF NUCLEAR WAR
JN TRE THRESHOL
IN THE ES es
Hinckle, Warren, and William W. Turner. The Fish Is Red:

The Story of the Secret War against Castro. New York:
Harper & Row, 1981.
Kennedy, Robert, F. Trece Dias (Thirteen Days: a Memoir of
the Cuban Missile Crisis). Barcelona: Editores Plaza y
Janés S.A., 1968.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Translated and
edited by Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970:
. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes.
Translated and edited by Jerrold L. Schecter, with Vyacheslav
V. Luchkov. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990.
Kissinger, Henry. Mis memorias [My Memoirs]. Buenos Aires:
Editorial Atlantida S.A., 1979.
Lechuga, Carlos M. “Carta al Secretario General de las Nacio-
nes Unidas. Nueva York, 7.1.1963” [Letter to the UN Secre-
tary General on January 1, 1963]. Politica Internacional
(Havana), no. 1, Jan.-March, 1963).
. Enel ojo de la tormenta [In the Eye of the Storm].
Havana: SI-MAR S.A.; Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995.
Leon Cotayo, Nicanor. El bloqueo a Cuba [Blockade to Cuba].
Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983.
Menéndez Tomassevich, Raul. “Ni un minuto de tregua” [Nor
a Minute for a Truce]. Interview by José Cazanas Reyes,
Verde Olivo magazine (Havana), special issue (December
1986).
Miro Cardona, José. Renuncia ante el Consejo Revolucionario
de Cuba [Renounce before the Revolutionary Council of
Cuba]. Havana: n.p., 1963.
Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars. New York: Quill, 1986.
Schlesinger, A. M. Los mil dias de Kennedy (A Thousand
Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House). Havana: Edi-
torial de Ciencias Sociales, 1970.
. Robert Kennedy and his Times. New York: Ballan-
tine, 1978.
Sociedad Cubana de Derecho Internacional. Agresiones de
Estados Unidos a Cuba revolucionaria [U.S. Aggressions
to Revolutionary Cuba]. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1989.
Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy, el hombre, el presidente
[Kennedy, the Man, the President]. Mexico D.F.: Ediciones
Grijalbo S.A., 1966.
Statsenko, Igor D. “Sobre algunos aspectos politico-militares
de la Crisis del Caribe” [On Some Military-Political Aspects
336
BIBLIOGRAPHY
of the Caribbean Crisis]. Latinskaia Amerika (November-

December 1977), 108-117.
Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: Norton,
1972,
Tello, Manuel. México: una posicion internacional [México: An
International Stance]. Ciudad de México: Editorial J oaquin
Muztiz S.A., 1972.
Un pueblo invencible. [An Invincible People] Havana: Editorial
José Marti, 1991.
United Nations. Press Release SG/ 1359 (October 27, 1962).
. Press Release S/5210 (November 26, 1962).
United Nations Security Council, Document S/5228 (January 7,
1963).
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Documents on the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe.
Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Supuestas conspiraciones de asesinatos
contra dirigentes de otros paises. Informe provisional del
comité escogido del Senado de Estados Unidos para estudiar
operaciones gubernamentales relacionadas con las
actividades de inteligencia [Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders: an Interim Report of the Se-
lect Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities]. 94th Cong., 2d sess.,
Report No. 94-465, vol I. Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975.
U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1961, 1962. Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965, 1966.
. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,
Volume X, Cuba 1961-1962. Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1997.
. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,
Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. Washing-
ton D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public
Papers of the Presidents of United States: John F. Kennedy,
1961, 1962. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Wise, D., T.B. Ross. El Gobierno Invisible [The Invisible
Government]. Havana: Ediciones Venceremos, 1965.
337
— +
sper Orme “9 ges ba : a

; we aa.
'*
my 5 : y “>t
af dw Searwt pba seabpsppny tere cence —

‘ i ain - t ee.
peeotntey Tate Lace (chee Oty a MERON ot
eae ee
7 a an wea m asertteet east ats.
bis) a aly ~~ (xan adhe J
aN Semana Moense eae

a . > >
AsERET
aj nim extn unter ghnvend: thet Dae”
rtrd ae MV > luver ake alee biehigtie-
i uae ones Wii? net adakgiiacral
+ ae mpenepament sqund wesmn0D 21S:
qedtray S0be Ween
e ptdiy ates).
i Sema ae WO) Sipebrde as Ai oly poco aTlie> ie
ei heey ae tvttess ©aost mwett furPte ith eatinienegad.
eer sine [HGH peordinaeird ML: ASB brsisen
courte Sete asic goplowtor |
domagnateon A foeatindves? VR 4-ertinnunad Higgs,
eco aRyne gre) Aabvees) tre yitihnig Fiequashor
2'F 30.0 mairanitie ee flay .2Ab-bO 01 +
Miri © SATA. Jet. Fer NE STC PLT eT LE OH
preset A aid hor anh. sere terortenpse 0g
ee. Seen ie eeW Soa 130! 2iewmesd
(ratios: Gaim, Ft wed mei ETO igmaietaiens iq
TY sol eae een

Bs
deesstragha ars\ burdens apne te Balas
Ch orn ake) slheesth rtrd 1% sunulov 7
Te) AAEET eee. cRer ie
eile Acie nn ss Lene
Sch e LEELA lite Avert
fibihaeF nn.) me ST aorgmidenW SORT ORL
n fhcre, 2p castor
eb Impreso por ediciones ponton caribe, s.a.
[:the fall of 1962, humanity was on the brink ofa thert
Forty years later, many continue.to assume that
Cuban Missile Crisis was the deployment of Soviet medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBM) on the Cuban territory and not the hostile and
aggressive policy of the United States Government against Cuba since
the beginning of the Revolution in 1959. This selection, compiled by
Cuban researcher Tomas Diez Acosta to commemorate the 40th anniver-
sary of the October Crisis, presents a vision of this history from the
island, drawn from declassified documents, writings, and the testimony
of Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz during an international con-
ference held in Havana in 1992. The detailed information contained in
this book clarifies Cuba’s stance during those difficult and dangerous
days of the crisis on October 1962, when the world confronted an un-
precedented peril to peace.
TOMAS DIEZ ACOSTA (Bachelor in Political Sciences, 1946) was

professor at the Academy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, General
Maximo Gomez until 1986. He is currently a senior researcher at the
Instituto de Historia de Cuba. In 1992, he was awarded the Cuban
Academy of Sciences Award, and the Political Essay Award during the
July 26th Contest in 2001. His outstanding published works include:
Una tarea impostergable [An Immediate Task] (1987), Peligros y
principios [Dangers and Principles] (1992), La guerra encubierta contra
Cuba [The Covert War against Cuba] (1997), La Crisis de los Misiles,
1962. Algunas reflexiones cubanas {The Missile Crisis, 1962: Some
Cuban Reflections] (1997), and Octubre de 1962, a un paso del holo-
causto [October of 1962, One Step away from the Holocaust] (2002).
Professor Diez Acosta has participated in several United States-Rusia-
Cuba conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis held in Moscow, 1987;
Antigua and Barbuda, 1991; and Havana, 1992.
SBN 959-09-0198-0
V;.
EDITORIAL JOSE MARTI Sere ||l|
Publicaciones en Lenguas Extranjeras

In The Threshold of Nuclear War - The 1962 Missile Crisis - Diez Acosta, Tomás - 2002 - Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba - Editorial José Martí - 9789590901980 - Anna's Archive

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

In The Threshold of Nuclear War - The 1962 Missile Crisis - Diez Acosta, Tomás - 2002 - Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba - Editorial José Martí - 9789590901980 - Anna's Archive

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

In The Threshold of Nuclear War - The 1962 Missile Crisis - Diez Acosta, Tomás - 2002 - Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba - Editorial José Martí - 9789590901980 - Anna's Archive

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2021 with funding from

The 1962 Missile Crisis

Tomas Diez Acosta

EDITORIAL JOSE MARTI

© 2002, Tomas Diez Acosta

INSTITUTO CUBANO DEL LIBRO

THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS. SOME CUBAN RE-

TESTIMONY. Commander in Chief Fidel Castro

Serpe ‘Sci > (ivi BR, BE ag

i renrienr:ie bal) eer AY at

pebees Ad Ybor Ho <iaedetetaa’ a

a, Cater ait . tl oS the-

In the Threshold of Nuclear War is a book that gathers

1. This testimony was exposed by Fidel Castro during the Tri-

and technical resources, used for organizing terror-

As result of this decision, between late July and

3. Fidel had directly entrusted Rati Castro to make a first Cuban

it faced foe propaganda and the measures approved

of the Security Council of the United Nations had

4, Cuba stance concerning the search of a pacific solution is clearly

plan,® Fidel asked himself what else had to be done

5. The Cuban defense plan, among other measures, comprised

the Cuban Revolution. On the one hand, Khrushchev

development and end of that grave and dangerous

> yeast the 8 siversal Pipl. $i scotient,

After the U.S. defeat at Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Gov-

the country must be prepared to engage... .

1. U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum No. 3 From the Cuba

(particularly Fidel Castro), psychological warfare and

and armed resistance in support of political

z. U.S. Department of State, “Program Review by the Chief of Ope-

Therefore, in March of 1962, even when there were

the Island, loaded with weapons, explosives and

4. Cuban State Security Department report regarding the U.S.

the situation in Cuba and the projects presented to

5. Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Senado, “Su-

Psychological warfare has been and still is one of

7. U.S. Department of State, “Program Review by the Chief of

This was the war that the United States launched

8. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (New

Precisely during the October Crisis, the CIA was

signed the trade embargo against Cuba bill into law.

Amid the sharpened contradictions that character-

Cuba would mean a war with the Soviet Union,

Since the man already had his ideas ready, he

9. See Testimony: Fidel Castro’s words on January 11, 1992 during

consider something that could represent a dan-

of the missiles. I am absolutely convinced of

14. Ibid., page 286-287.

the military agreement, and there he met with

16. See Testimony (id. note 9), pages 267-316.

As a result of these talks, the Defense Minister of

by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch (New

group of Cuban speleologists was also involved;?!

21. The participation of speleologists is now being investigated

The R-12 [NATO designation SS-4] missiles ar-

23. Lieutenant Colonel Kovalenko commanded an R-14 regiment