Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia

Author(s): MICHAEL DAVIS

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 12-32
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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 Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 24, Number 1, April 2002

Laskar Jihad and the Political

Position of Conservative Islam in
Indonesia

MICHAEL DAVIS

Laskar Jihad introduced itselfto theworld inApril 2000, when

a procession of itsmembers marched to the presidential palace
in Jakartabrandishing sabres. By thefollowingmonth, two to
threethousand of thegroup'smembers had travelled toMaluku
(theMoluccas), in eastern Indonesia, tofight alongside local
Muslims locked in a cycle of communal violence with the
region's Christian population. Their intervention turned the
tables in a conflict inwhich theChristians had previously ap
peared to have the upper hand. Despite widespread criticism of
their response to its activities, the Indonesian authorities have
so far taken little sustained action against Laskar Jihad. The
group's emergence has aroused speculation on whether it
heralds an expansion of the political influence of conservative
Islam among the world's largest Muslim population.

Introduction

The 11 September 2001 terroristattacks in theUnited States have

focused unprecedented attention on militant Muslim groups across the
world and prompted strategists and commentators the alike to scour
globe for possible targets in the Bush Administration's "war against
terrorism". In the case of Indonesia, considerable coverage has been
devoted to the militant conservative Muslim group, Laskar Jihad, and
allegations of links between this organization and Osama bin Laden's
al-Qaeda network.
Laskar Jihad is a Java-basedparamilitarygroupwhich, since April
2000, has intervenedon behalf of localMuslims in thevicious fighting
between Christians and Muslims inMaluku, which is estimated to have

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 13

claimed more than 9,000 lives.1 Laskar Jihad leaders have repeatedly
expressed their intent to eradicate Christians from Ambon island
(Maluku's political and economic hub) and have used murder and
terror in their efforts to achieve these ends.2 In November 2001, the
group carried out its oft-stated threat to enter a conflict between
Christians and Muslim populations in the region of Poso, Sulawesi,
provoking a rapid escalation in the level of violence.
In an interview with York Times on 7 January 2002, U.S.
the New
Deputy Secretary Paul
of Defence,
Wolfowitz, drew attention to the
dangers of ungoverned regions within certain countries which had
become "havens for terrorists". Wolfowitz chose to illustrate his point
with reference to Maluku and central Sulawesi, two areas ravaged by
communal violence where "outside Muslims, not outside Indonesia,
have come in and exacerbated ? a clear reference to the
that situation"
armed interventions of Laskar Jihad. This article examines what can be
ascertained about
the political position of conservative Islam in
Indonesia from the emergence and activities of the Laskar Jihad. As
President George Bush and bin Laden, in different ways, project a
polarizing vision of a world unequivocally divided intofriendly and
hostile forces, how should we view Indonesia? Do groups such as
Laskar Jihad have the capacity to make a difference to whose side, or
which list, or axis Indonesia finds itself on?
Subsequent to a brief examination of the context in which Laskar
Jihad emerged, the article focuses on the activities of the group in
Maluku in eastern Indonesia since April 2000. Laskar Jihad's interven
tion in this region provided the justificationfor its creation, and has
been its primary zone of operation. As such, it provides useful indica
tors as to the possible impact on central Sulawesi, and Indonesia as a
whole, of the Laskar Jihad's recent intervention in Poso. It also offers
substantial evidence for the central contention of this article: that what
Laskar Jihad reveals about conservative Islam in Indonesia is the funda
mental weaknesses in its political position and its lack of support
among the largest Muslim population in the world.

Laskar Jihad: The Context

Laskar Jihad was established in the early months of 2000 at a time when
political gains made by conservative modernist Muslim groups during
the final years of Soeharto's New Order were in danger of being
overturned. Conservative modernist organizations, such as DDII
(Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) and its offshootKISDI
(Indonesian Committee forSolidaritywith the IslamicWorld), which
spent the first two decades of theNew Order set in lonely and

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 14 Michael Davis

dangerous opposition to the regime's pro-Western, secular outlook, had

been co-opted by Soeharto as he sought to establish new sources of
supportoutside the senior ranksof thearmed forcesfromthe late 1980s
onwards.3 This
co-optation saw the Muslim hardliners attacking
Soeharto's opponents in return for state patronage and new freedom to
carry out their activities, which included undermining more moderate
Muslim rivals.4 It broadly coincided with Soeharto's elevation of a so
called "Green" (thecolour symbolizing Islam) tendencywithin theTNI
? officers
(the Indonesian armed forces) distinguished less by personal
piety than by willingness to use Islam as a political tool.5 The
convergence of the "Green" TNI and hardline Muslim organizations
behind Soeharto forgedalliances between these two groupingswhich
were subsequently critical to the launching of Laskar Jihad.
The rising fortunes of conservative modernist Muslims were dealt a
double blow, firstlyby the fall of theirpatron, Soeharto, inMay 1998,
and secondly by the democratic elections in June 1999. None of the
newly formed Islamist parties performedwell at the polls, with the
largest,thePBB (Crescentand Star Party), capturing just 2 per cent of
the vote. The elections, instead, produced an emphatic endorsement of
pluralist parties diametrically opposed to the exclusivist agenda of the
conservative Muslims, with the largest share of the vote (37.4 per cent)
going to the secular nationalist PDI-P ofMegawati Sukarnoputri, and a
significantshare (17.4 per cent) takenby thePKB led byAbdurrahman
Wahid.
This provided the context for the creation of Laskar Jihad. In one
sense, conservative Muslims' worst fears were being realized as the
of a democratic threatened
prospect system directly groups with
minimal electoral support. On the other hand, the uncertain political
climate continued to offer considerable scope forfrustrating a complete
transition to democracy. The opportunities here derived from the
weakness of state institutions, the shattered condition of the Indonesian
economy, and the livelihoods of themajority of thepopulation; while
conversely, much of the New Order fabric, notably the networks of
militant Muslim groups' "Green" military allies, remained largely
intact. At the same time, conservative modernist Muslim groups found
theirpublic campaigns facilitatedby greaterfreedom of expression.
Another factor from which conservatives could derive some comfort
was the overall political disorientation of themodernist ummat
(community of Muslims).8 The election results placed particular
pressure on the putative leader of Indonesian modernist Muslims,
Amien Rais, who had adopted a pluralist political platform forhis
newly created PAN party, which spectacularly failed to deliver.
Following voters' rejection of religious exclusivism, conservative
groupswere leftsearching foropportunities todiscredit pluralism and

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 15

assert their interpretation of Islam. Their tack was to adopt causes with
thepotential tounite andmobilize the ummat against opposing forces;
that by exploiting points of frictionbetween Muslims and non
Muslims, theymight persuade IndonesianMuslims to discard their
electoral allegiances to rally in defence of theirfaith.
Since fightingerupted in Ambon in January1999, conservative
hardliners had attempted to channel IndonesianMuslims' outrage at
the government's failure to protect Maluku's Muslims into action
against their Christian Moluccan antagonists. Their campaign acquired
new impetus followingthemassacre byChristianmilitia of at least 500
Muslims in Halmahera, North Maluku, in December 1999, and culmi
nated in a rally in Jakarta on 7 January 2000, which attracted tens of
thousands.7 This rally was addressed not only by conservative Muslim
activistsandmembers of Islamistparties such as thePBB but also by the
"cornered" Amien Rais and PPP (United Development Party) leader and
current Indonesian Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, who endorsed calls
fora jihad (holywar) inMaluku.8
The rally's conservative Muslim organizers moved rapidly to
harness the momentum it had generated. Activists including Ahmad
Sumargono of KISDI and the PBB and Eggy Sudjana ofHMI-MPO (a
faction of the Indonesian Muslim Students Association, HMI),
channelled their energies via a hitherto obscure group called the
FKAWJ (Sunni Communication Forum) set up one year earlier. The
FKAWJ, which pursues an exclusivist brand of Islam and seeks to
impose Islamic Shariah law in Indonesia, is led by a preacher named
Ja'far Umar Thalib, a former member of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin in
The group formally established on 30 January Laskar
Afghanistan.
Jihad,a forceforthedefence ofMoluccan Muslims against kafirharbi
(belligerentinfidels). In theweeks that followed, an initial trickleof
Muslim fighters made theirway toMaluku. However, the Laskar Jihad's
mobilization began in earnest inApril when it established a military
training camp near Bogor inWest Java.9 The following month, two or
three thousand Laskar Jihad fighters travelled unhindered to Maluku
despite government pledges to prevent them from leaving Java. In the
weeks that followed, allegations began to surface that Laskar Jihad was
engaging in military offensives against Christian communities in the
Moluccas.

Jihad inMaluku
More than three years after it began, there is as yet no authoritative
explanation for the causes of the conflict inMaluku. A range of theories
variously place emphasis on rivalriesbetweenMoluccan Christian and
Muslim communities dating from the colonial era, and recent shifts in

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 16 Michael Davis

the balance of power between them; the destabilizing impact of the

reintroduction of electoral politics as the means of contest between
local elites; and outside interferenceby political elites in Jakartaand
factionsof theTNI. While thereare abundant indications of external
interference, there is compelling evidence pointing to underlying
causes centred in political struggles at a local level.10
of theconflictrelatesnot only to thesame factors
The intractability
which caused it,but also to the changes and new agendas which the
fightinghas wrought in the leadership hierarchies of each community.
The conflict has permittedpreviously peripheral, even disreputable,
figures on each side to attain new positions of power, the preservation
of which is contingent on the conflict's perpetuation.
In assessing the decision to undertake jihad inMaluku, it is
importantnot to lose sight of the fact that the anger expressed by
conservative modernists and Indonesian Muslims generally at the
plight of Moluccan Muslims was sincerely felt. Indonesian Muslims
inside and outside Maluku perceived the conflict to have been
instigatedby theChristians, and believed thatChristian fighterswere
the recipients of assistance, in the form of money and weapons, from
Christian Moluccans in the Netherlands, as well as political and
military figures in Indonesia.11 Outrage was almost certainly fuelled by
the long-standing sense among Muslims that the Christian minority in
Indonesia, through the New Order period, in particular, had built up
levels of political and economic influence vastly out of proportion to its
numbers.12 The issue of high-level Christian influence had long been a
primary focus for the campaigns of conservative Muslim groups such as
DDfl.
In other respects, however, the creation of Laskar Jihad was based
on calculation and opportunism, reflecting the political priorities of
conservative Muslim groups following the 1999 elections. The Maluku
violence presented an opportunity because it was so readily
represented and perceived as a religious war. Whatever its full
complexities, both sides in the conflict have contributed to the
impression that it is based primarily on religion. Moluccan Christians
have portrayed it as part of a wider campaign by militant Muslims to
Islamicize Indonesia.13 Muslims, meanwhile, have attempted to cast
the violence as part of an international Christian
conspiracy against
Islam and Indonesian Muslims in particular.14 In mobilizing against a
Christian enemy, Laskar Jihad attempted to elevate the meaning of the
communal violence in Maluku for the Indonesian ummat; to polarize
Indonesians along religious lines and in theprocess position itselfas a
standard bearer for Islam.
Through mobilization of IndonesianMuslims, Laskar Jihadcould
hope to capture for conservative Muslims a political platform outside

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 17

the nascent democratic system, which threatened to undercut their

influence and to exercise leverage over Indonesia's political transition.
That a stalling or destabilizing rolewas one ofLaskar Jihad'sobjectives
was implicit in Ja'far Umar Thalib's earliest public pronouncements, in
which he demanded President Wahid's resignation.15 Another political
functionof jihad againstMoluccan Christianswas the targetingof a
communitywhich had voted overwhelmingly in the elections for the
secular-oriented PDI-P ofMegawati.
An important facet of the decision to launch jihad was that in
intervening in Maluku, Laskar Jihad could claim the additional
justification of combating the presumed RMS (Republic of South
Moluccas) secessionist movement.16 That opposition to separatism is
strictly a secondary motivation has been admitted by the group's
members, who state, in reference to Aceh, that they will not intervene
in separatist conflicts unless these can be tied to issues of religion.17 In
the case ofMaluku, Laskar Jihad links jihad with separatism via the
argument that East Timor's independence is the first stage in a
conspiracy by Christians in Indonesia and internationally, to amputate
regions in which Christianity predominates in order to weaken
(Muslim) Indonesia.18
In one sense, the anti-separatism rhetoric conveniently underpins
the jihad. Viewed from another angle, however, it implicitly recognizes
thatmany Indonesian Muslims have more sympathy with the Unitarian
nationalist policies identified with Megawati than with the
conservative modernist world-view. The
anti-separatism plank in the
Laskar Jihad manifesto acknowledges that jihad, in the sense of a
struggle based on faith, may not be enough to stir most Indonesian
Muslims and itmust be seen as an essentially defensive device. It is
significant that Laskar Jihad has articulated this objective most
vigorously when under pressure. In the weeks following his arrest on 4
May 2000, Ja'far Umar Thalib took great pains to emphasize Laskar
Jihad's anti-separatist credentials, going so far as to state publicly that
the conflict in Maluku and Laskar Jihad's involvement were brought
about not by religion but by separatism alone.19
There are further aspects to the choice of Maluku as a venue for
intervention, which underline the weaknesses of the Laskar Jihad posi
tion from the outset. Features of the conflict, visible even in early 2000,
suggested that involvement inMaluku did not offer an effective means
of stalling democratic reform and undermining Indonesia's pluralist po
litical leaders. Moreover, the localized nature and scope of the violence
had not encouraged the sense of involvement among Muslims else
where in Indonesia, which might dispose them to answer the call for
jihad. By the timeLaskar Jihadset offfrom Java,theextentof the fight
ing was in fact already contracting, following successful reconciliation

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 18 Michael Davis

initiatives in southeasternMaluku. The potential forbroadening the

conflict to engulfother areas of Indonesia thusappeared limited.
A key featureof theMaluku conflict, both before and after the
creation of Laskar Jihad, has been the reluctance of Indonesian
Governments to expend political capital on attempts to resolve it. The
contribution of the Wahid administration, for example, was largely
confined to fleetingvisits toMaluku by thePresident and his deputy,
Megawati, who was personally chargedwith bringingabout an end to
the fighting.Despite her claims to have been working energetically
behind thescenes,Megawati devoted littleattentiontoMaluku; opting
to go on holiday inHong Kong over themillennium, as thefightingin
the region flared once more.
This neglect to some extent reflects the weakness of the post
Soeharto governments and the magnitude of the challenges they have
faced. It also indicates, however, their hard-headed assessment of
Maluku as being of low political significanceat thenational level. Both
? farfrom Indonesia's
the characteristicsof the region itself political
?
centre-stage and home to less than one per cent of its population and
the local character of its conflict mean that Indonesia's leaders feel that
they can ignore it at relatively low political cost. Unlike Aceh, the
fighting in Maluku does not pose a serious threat to Indonesia's
territorialintegrity.Its lack of political weight, even subsequent to the
involvement of Laskar Jihad, was revealed by the fact that Wahid's
opponents, rather than heeding the demand of Ja'far Umar Thalib to
impeach the President for his failure over Maluku, considered two
tenuous allegations of corruption more compelling grounds for his?
removal in August 2000.
Meanwhile, Megawati's disregard of her responsibility for resolving
theMaluku conflict has proved to have few political repercussions. Her
early disinterest earned her a mild rebuke from PDI-P but
delegates
constituted no obstacle to her assumption of the Indonesian presidency.
Particularly telling is the factthat thePPP and othermodernistMuslim
parties, whose primary concern is the advancement of the position of
Muslims in Indonesia, regarded the Maluku conflict as so peripheral
that they saw no political embarrassment in forming a governing
coalition with the politician who had most conspicuously neglected
this issue.
Recognition by Laskar Jihad that interventioninMaluku was not
the optimum means of advancing its agenda at a national level was
implicit in its threats to launch a jihad in Java if the government
prevented it from travelling to Maluku. This amounted to tacit
admission that action in Java would have a far greater impact
politically. Going toMaluku represented a second-best option, but the

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 19

limitations of the Laskar Jihadposition meant that itwas unable to

undertake a comparable initiative in a more politically significant
region. The choice ofMaluku was furthermoreinformedby Laskar
Jihad'srealization thatitcould only hope toestablish itselfin an area in
which government control had chronically broken down.
It is likely that thebeleagueredWahid governmentwas relatively
content to see Laskar Jihad confined to a remote, politically unimpor
tant region of the country. The lacklustre efforts to prevent the group
from travellingtoMaluku inMay 2000 might, as has been suggested,
have derived from collusion between conservative Muslim groups and
the police.20 An alternative explanation, however, is that the govern
ment, for all its protestations, may have sanctioned the police inaction
in the interestsof gettingLaskar Jihadout of Java.By investingtheir
political and financial resources in the intervention in Maluku, the
hardline Muslim groups behind Laskar Jihadmust have known that
they risked confining themselves to the political margins.

Sources of Support

Laskar Jihad unquestionably has access to substantial funds. It claims to

have offices in all major towns in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and
Kalimantan, while in Maluku it owns a hospital, a radio station and
about ten speedboats, as well as a sizeable military arsenal.21 Spokes
men forLaskar Jihadclaim thatmost of its funds are contributedby
sympathetic members of the Indonesian public.22 Laskar Jihad's leader,
Ja'farUmar Thalib, however, has stated that themajority of its financing
comes from overseas, in particular New Jersey (USA), Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia, and Singapore.23
Since the start of the Maluku conflict, allegations have repeatedly
surfaced that the Soeharto family and their allies are funding groups
such as Laskar Jihad, a suggestion denied vigorously by Ja'far.24 The
presumed motive of Soeharto and his associates was to destabilize post
New Order governments which might be inclined to investigate their
alleged crimes and confiscate their personal fortunes. Whatever the
veracity of these particular claims, the fact that much, if not most, of
Laskar Jihad's budget is covered by overseas benefactors, is enough to
inform us that the organization's affluence should not be interpreted as
a reflection of support from Indonesia's Muslims.
Members of the Indonesian security forces have taken sides in the
fighting inMaluku since the early stages of the conflictand there is
credible evidence of collusion between Laskar Jihad and sections of
both themilitary and thepolice.25Assistance has been provided by the
military from an early stage. Indeed, Laskar Jihad members admit

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20 Michael Davis

readily to receiving training from TNI officers.26 InMaluku, TNI troops

have even been filmed fightingalongside Laskar Jihadparamilitaries.
Umar Thalib boasts of co-operation at thehighest level, and has
Ja'far
claimed to have a hotline to the Indonesian Armed Forces
Commander.27 Laskar Jihad spokesmen contend that their fighters are
equipped only with home-made weapons, guns salvaged fromWorld
War II wrecks and weapons dumps, and firearms captured from
Christian combatants.28 Eyewitness reports, however, suggest that the
group is, in fact, equipped with military-issue weaponry.29
These military connections show thatLaskar Jihadhas been able to
build on alliances forged between conservative Muslims and TNI fac
tions during the last years of the New Order period and exploit areas of
common interest. Like Laskar Jihad, sections of the military wished to
destabilize theWahid government, with a view to preventing reform of
theTNI and the prosecution of officersforcrimes in East Timor and
other areas. Moreover, the disruption inMaluku and Laskar Jihad's con
juring up of a separatist threat justified the expansion of the military's
role in the region, as outbreaks of violence likewise have done in other
areas of Indonesia.30
Unless theTNI factionsworkingwith Laskar Jihadhave a strong
attachment to the group and its ideals, however, they are likely to see no
interest in sustaining its activities once it has outlived its usefulness.
Here one can reflect on a range of precedents for the TNI assembling
and/or co-operating with paramilitary or criminal groups, before later
discarding them.31 A recent example of this phenomenon is offered by
the militia created in East Timor in 1998?99. some of whose redundant
leaders now claim to live in fear of TNI assassination.32
Support from or tolerationby thesecurityforces inMaluku is vital
to Laskar Jihad's capacity to operate. While such support may reflect the
personal sympathies of individual officers concerned, it is not a
sustainable basis for Laskar Jihad's position in the long term. Military
co-operation, moreover, is certainly not a reflection of popular
grassroots support among Indonesian Muslims. In view of the low
credibility of the TNI, the association is, in fact, likely to dissuade many
Indonesian Muslims from supporting Laskar Jihad.
Since its inception,Laskar Jihadhas enjoyed the active support of
other conservative Muslim groups. Organizations such as KISDI, DDII
and FPI (Front for theDefence of Islam) have backed Laskar Jihad's
activities with rallies, demonstrations, and endorsements in media
publications. Prominent conservative Muslim activists act as advisers
to thegroup; forexample, Eggy Sudjana is one of Ja'far
Umar Thalib's
legal representatives. Affiliated conservative Muslim political parties
have also been at the core of Laskar Jihad's support network. Ahmad

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 21

Sumargono, PBB member of theDPR (House of Representatives) and

leader of KISDI, to have acted as an unofficial spokesman on
appears
behalf of the group during theperiod when itwas being convened at
Bogor in April 2000. ImportantPBB links extend toMaluku itself,
where local PBB (and DDI!) leader Ali Fauzi is commander of the
locally-leviedAmbon Mujahidin.
The attitudetowardsLaskar JihadofmainstreammodernistMuslim
parties and associations, however, has been far more equivocal. As
outlined above, in January 2000, conservative activists' exploitation of a

public outcryover thedeath ofMuslims inHalmahera, combined with

the post-election disarray of modernist Muslim politicians, enabled
them to push more mainstream leaders into supporting calls for jihad.
Since then, Laskar Jihad and its supporters have on occasion
used media campaigns to create similar conditions in
successfully
which moderate Muslim leaders have felt forced to choose between
endorsing Laskar Jihad's position (or at least criticizing their enemies)
and being perceived to desert the interests of Indonesian Muslims. Such
on 4 May
episodes have arisen from the arrestof Ja'farUmar Thalib
2001 (forallegedly orderingthepublic stoningof one ofhis followers in
Ambon), and also theYon Gab (TNI combined battalion) attack on
Laskar Jihad in Kota Ambon (Ambon town) on
14 June 2001.33
these events, several Muslim organizations, including the
Following
MUI (Indonesian Council of Preachers), whose Ambon office has
hostile relations with Laskar Jihad, and the youth wing of
Muhammadiyah, were moved to speak out against the arrest and against
Yon Gab.34 Their sentiments were echoed by provincial leaders of
as the PPP and PAN. The
mainstream Muslim parties, such pressure
that Laskar Jihad succeeded in generating, following the Yon Gab
attack, appeared to account for the hasty transfer out ofMaluku of the
battalion's commander, IMade Yasa, just three weeks later.35
These moments are the closest that Laskar Jihad has come to
capturing the position of the rallyingpoint for Indonesian Muslims;
between. Although some junior
however, they have been few and far
of the PPP and PAN have continued to show support for
representatives
Laskar Jihad, securing the wholehearted backing of the leaders of
mainstream modernist Muslim parties and mass-membership
has proved beyond the conservative Muslims since
organizations
of such moments in reflects the
January 2000. The elusiveness part
peripheral position in Indonesia,
both geographically and politically, of
the conflict inMaluku. It is also indicative of the reluctance of
mainstream Muslim to endorse an enterprise launched by
figures
abrasive and unscrupulous conservative Muslim groups which
command little popular support.

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 22 Michael Davis

Thecomposition of Laskar Jihad's 3,000-10,000-strong member

ship has been a source of considerable speculation.36 Some observers
have suggested that as many as 80 per cent of itsmembers are, in fact,
servingmembers of theTNI, while othershave alleged the involvement
of substantial numbers of foreigners in the group's ranks.37 Laskar Jihad
spokesmen state that their membership reflects a genuine cross-section
of Indonesian society, although the organization's website stresses that
its members "mostly are university students in Java, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi and Sumatra".38 The group's spokesmen claim that recruits
come frompesantren (Islamic schools) run by teachers sympathetic to
Laskar Jihad, or have been inspired to join, by conservative Muslim me
dia publications.39 In tapping into such sources of support, Laskar Jihad
is drawing on theeffortsof organizations such as DDII and KISDI, both
of which have long cultivated followings on university campuses and
in pesantren for their campaigns against pluralism and Western
political values, such as liberal democracy and human rights.40
While examining Laskar Jihad'smembership revealsmore about the
kinds of support that conservative Islam in Indonesia can draw on, the
usefulness of such analysis has to be set in the context of the small
numbers the group has succeeded in recruiting. Ultimately, the
mobilization of 3,000-10,000 from a population of around 185 million
Muslims does not amount to a mass movement or signify a
sea-change
in the character of Indonesian Islam. Even Laskar Jihad members drawn
from supposed hotbeds of radical Islam, such as ITB (the Bandung
Institute of Technology) admit that their peers and families were
perplexed by their decision to join the jihad.*1While Laskar Jihad
leaders have claimed that their ranks are expanding, there are grounds
for questioning this assertion. Since closing their training camp in
Bogor in April 2000, Laskar Jihad, has, by its own admission, not held
any further large-scale training and recruiting programmes and state
that training is now only conducted in Ambon itself.42While both the
group and its allies claim that new members are still being recruited,
they are reluctant to give any precise figures.43
The inability of conservative Islam to find broader support can be
traced in part to the position of Islam under theNew Order. Until
Soeharto's final years and his cultivation of conservative modernist
groups, the overtlypolitical brand of Islam promoted by conservative
Muslims was suppressed by the regime,which maintained a resolutely
anti-sectarian stance and heavy on all political activity not
restrictions
under its control. Conversely, the New Order did offer space for other
interpretations of modernist Islam, which promoted the progress of
Muslims outside therealm of politics. This, combinedwith other social
and educational policies of the Soeharto era, stimulated the emergence

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 23

of a self-consciouslyMuslim middle class which had littleaffinity

with
the outlook of conservative hardliners.44
Groups representing conservative modernist Islam, such as the
DDII, continued tomaintain theircore followingamong sections of the
lower-middle and working and networks
classes in pesantren and
universities.45 Since on their activities
restrictions were lifted,
however, they have not expanded their overall popular support among
the ummat. This can partly be explained by conservative groups'
belated alliance with discredited New Order interests. Moreover, they
are promoting an authoritarian and exclusivist form of political Islam at
a time when most indicators suggest that Indonesian Muslims are keen
to consolidate the freedoms they have won since 1998.

Laskar Jihad: Activities, Impact and Prospects

Despite its protestations to the contrary,therecan be littledoubt that

Laskar Jihad's emphasis in Maluku has been on paramilitary activity.
The group's involvement in offensives against Christian communities
reflects Indonesian conservative Muslims' long-held view of
as a threat.More themanner of the attacks and
Christianity specifically,
Laskar Jihad's public pronouncements point to an attempt to displace
and expel Christians from Maluku and thus alter the region's ethno
religious balance.46
Laskar Jihad employs tactics designed to undermine any prospect
of reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. Just one example is
the group's use of snipers in Kota Ambon, who target civilians and thus
reinforce the atmosphere of fear and suspicion which pervades both
communities in the town.47 Such violence forms the major part of a
sustained effort to polarize the two communities ever more completely.
This objective is also pursued via such measures as the severing of
intercommunal commercial relations.48 The desire for communal
segregation derives in part from the hardline modernist antipathy
towards pluralism and secular society.
At another level Laskar Jihad's emphasis on violence derives from
?
basic self-interest: no conflict, no Laskar Jihad only themaintenance
of hostilities legitimates the group's position within Moluccan Muslim
communities. Ensuring that the parameters of life for Moluccan
Muslims are shaped (and narrowed) by constant interreligious violence,
on the part of their local
helps Laskar Jihad to overcome any reluctance
to define their loyalties and responses to the conflict
co-religionists
solely on thebasis of theirfaith. In order to equate identificationas a
Muslim with identificationwith Laskar Jihad,thegroup has takensteps
tobring the symbolsand centresofMuslim worship inAmbon under its
control.49

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 24 Michael Davis

Beyond theuse of violence foraims specific toMaluku itself,ithas

been suggested thatLaskar Jihadhas sought to provoke new outbreaks
of fighting in order to pressure the government, or otherwise create an
impression of democratic reform leading to instability in Indonesia.30
Laskar Jihad's attempts to expel communities of Christians may also be
calculated to create instability and communal tension in other areas of
Indonesia forced to play host to large groups of ChristianMoluccan
refugees.31
While fightingMoluccan Christians is themost importantaspect
of Laskar Jihad's activities, the group has also carried out humanitar
ian and community work inMuslim areas of Maluku ? for example,
in establishing a fully-staffed
hospital in Kota Ambon.32 It has also
sought to impose Shariah law in the zones under its control and to
close down "places of sin".33 Such measures represent a rejection of
the institutions of the secularized state and the creation of an alterna
tive model founded on the principles of conservative modernist Islam.
are also an important means of exercising control over local
They
Muslims. These actions notwithstanding, Laskar Jihad's insistence
that their jihad is based primarily around humanitarian assistance and
dakivah predication cannot be accepted at face value. While Ja'far
Umar Thalib claims thatmembers of the Laskar Jihad are "basically
religious preachers, armed with religious knowledge to preach to lo
cals", more junior spokesmen for his organization admit that few of
their number have sufficient knowledge of Islam to preach to
Moluccan Muslims.34
All observers agree that the intervention inMaluku by Laskar Jihad
has had a very substantial impact on the complexion and intensity of
the conflict. The group's presence has undoubtedly eliminated any
chance thatmay have existed of the Christians scoring a military victory
over their Moluccan Muslim opponents.35 Furthermore, Laskar Jihad
has clearly succeeded in its goal of prolonging and deepening the
conflict.
Among Muslim communities in those areas ofMaluku in which it
operates, Laskar Jihad has succeeded in asserting itself as a symbol of
Islam and pahlawan (champion or hero) for local Muslims, regardless of
their empathy with Laskar Jihad's brand of conservative Islam.36
Observers on all sides, for example, agree that Laskar Jihad very
effectively presented the Yon Gab attacks on its personnel and premises
on 14 June 2001 as an attack on all Moluccan Muslims, and that this
served to entrench the group's position within Maluku.37 Other factors
facilitating this entrenchment include Laskar Jihad's exploitation of
factionalism within the local Muslim leadership, and, above all, its
capacity for defending Moluccan Muslims from Christian attack.
Alongside its alliances with factions of theTNI, the position Laskar

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 25

Jihadhas carved out foritselfwithinMaluku has so farhelped to deter

sustained attemptsby thecentralgovernmenttodislodge it.
Laskar Jihad'sundoubted impact inMaluku, must, however, be put
in context.The scope of thegroup's activities and influencehave only
been made possible by civil war, the almost totalbreakdown of state
control, and the convergence of Laskar Jihad's agenda with that of other
groups.While Laskar Jihadhas succeeded in intensifyingthepolariza
tion of the communities in the region, it has merely exacerbated a
situation which pre-dated its arrival.
Viewed in this perspective, Laskar Jihad's achievements inMaluku
have, in many ways, been strikingly limited. Although the group has
repeatedly attacked Christian settlements, it has had little success in
redrawing communal boundaries, which have changed little since it
arrived in the region.58 Religious segregation has now been effected in
most areas previously inhabited by both Christians and Muslims.59
Even here, however, Laskar Jihad has not been entirely successful, fail
ing to break down themixed Catholic and Muslim community of
Wayame in Ambon, for example.60
Laskar Jihad'szone of operationshas not expanded greatlysince the
weeks following itsarrival inMaluku inApril-May 2001. Although the
trigger for its intervention was atrocities committed against Muslims in
Halmahera, North Maluku, Laskar Jihad has had minimal involvement
in the conflict in the northern areas. The group's commanders were, at
an early stage, informed by their North Moluccan Mujahidin
counterparts that their assistance was surplus to requirements, and they
were subsequently deterred from interfering in the province by North
Maluku's assertive acting governor.61 In the southern regions of
Maluku, meanwhile, a reconciliation process has prevented Laskar
Jihadfrommaking an impact.Even in those areas inwhich it iswell
entrenched, observers note rising tensions between the non-Moluccan
Laskar Jihad and local Muslim communities which resent the group's

domineering behaviour.62 This underlines the impression that the

organization is likely to maintain its position of power only as long as
the violence continues.
In the context of Indonesia as a whole, Laskar Jihad's impact has
been highly localized. Although ithas recently tried to establish itself
in Poso, the general absence of the particular kind of religious strife the
group requires as a precursor for further jihad has made large-scale
expansion of its activities difficult.63 InMaluku, the group has failed to
involve significant numbers of Indonesian Muslims in its campaign.
Whereas circumstances have largely compelled Moluccan Muslims to

accept partisanship based on religion, Laskar Jihad's rhetoric has not

persuaded their co-religionists elsewhere in Indonesia to respond to the

conflict in the same way.

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26 Michael Davis

As noted, therehave been occasions on which Laskar Jihadand its

conservative Muslim backers have been momentarily able to elicit
support from more moderate Muslim groups. However, apart from the
initial rally of 7 January 2000, these rare successes have not come in
the context of Laskar Jihad generating new momentum for its
activities. They have instead occurred in desperate situations in
which the organization has found the need to portray itself as a
victim: notably the arrest of Ja'farUmar Thalib and the Yon Gab
offensive in Kota Ambon. In the latter case, Laskar Jihad's response
suggested that it believed it could not rely on its credibility as an
Islamic organization to bail itself out of trouble. Rather than referring
to theMiddle Eastern ulamas' fatwas that it claims to legitimate its
activities in Maluku, Laskar Jihad has based its robust media
campaign against the "communist" Yon Gab around the same
"Western" values it argues that Indonesian Muslims should reject,
leading with the accusation that Yon Gab's actions constituted gross'
violations of Laskar Jihad members' human rights.64
While the launching of Laskar Jihad has generated forMuslim
hardliners considerable attention, ithas failed tomake a serious impact
on Indonesian politics at the national level. The group's activities have
not afforded conservative Muslims significant political leverage in
As the transferofpresidential officefromWahid toMegawati in
Jakarta.
2000 demonstrated,Laskar Jihadhas been unable to shake thehold on
power of itspluralist political opponents.
The ascendance of Megawati in many ways encapsulates the
increasing difficulties
Laskar Jihad and its conservative supporters are
now facing. Megawati is perceived as representing a range of political
values directly antithetical to those of Laskar Jihad: notably, secular
nationalism, pluralism, and democracy. Moreover, in contrast to the
rickety presidential platform of Abdurrahman Wahid, who acquired the
office via elaborate political horse-trading, Megawati has become
President with a mandate from the electorate, together with
endorsement by the military and modernist Muslim coalition partners
(notably the PPP), who had previously echoed conservative Muslims'
opposition to the idea of a female President. The conservatives are thus
faced with a much stronger President, who has neither use nor
sympathy for groups such as Laskar Jihad, and who has formed
alliances with elite groups (mainstreammodernist Muslim politicians
and theTNI), onwhom Laskar Jihaddepends forsupport.
This inauspicious outlook does not necessarily signal Laskar Jihad's
imminent collapse. In the short-term, the Megawati government faces
several political hurdles itmay wish to clear before turning its attention
to clamping down on Laskar Jihad. Not least of these is securing its

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 27

relationshipwith the army,which could be tested by international

pressure for the prosecution of TNI officers who oversaw the
destruction of East Timor in September 1999. That the government is
choosing to leave theLaskar Jihad issue on theback-burnerreflects in
part the range of complex challenges it faces. It also highlights the
minimal political threatthatthegroup in factposes.
Ifanything,the impactof the 11 September 2001 terroristattacks on
the United States may be to hasten rather than avert government action
against Laskar Jihad. Although the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan caused
considerable disquiet among Muslims in Indonesia, it did not precipi
tate a sudden surge in support for the exclusivist brand of Islam es
poused by theTaliban, nor the internationalterroragenda ofOsama bin
Laden. For Indonesia, the key outcome may prove to be less the imme
diate reaction of the country's Muslim population than the acceleration
of the U.S. government's efforts to see the resumption of ties with the
Indonesianmilitary. Such an eventualitywould offertheTNI a degree
rehabilitation and access to resources farmore valuable
of political than
continued connections with militant Muslim fringe groups. As the com
ments of Paul Wolfowitz and others make clear, a condition of any kind
of U.S. rapprochement with the TNI would undoubtedly be the elimi
nation of Laskar Jihad.
As already observed, Laskar Jihad has been most successful in find
ing support beyond its narrow core constituency when portraying itself,
or those it purports to defend, as victims of aggression. Ironically, the
group's best chance of securing sympathy from the Indonesian ummat
might come through a badly timed or executed government operation
against it,although this can hardly be a scenario Laskar Jihadwould
wish topin itshopes on.
In the aftermath of 11 September, Laskar Jihad has chosen to
concentrate on reigniting the conflict between Christians and Muslims
in the vicinity of Poso, Central Sulawesi, perhaps gambling on greater
popular approval within Indonesia following theU.S. bombing of
Afghanistan. The extent of Laskar Jihad's commitment in the Poso
region is not yet clear. Assessment of the intervention, however,
requires consideration of the limitations on Laskar Jihad's resources
and available manpower. There is little evidence to suggest a sudden
expansion in the group's capacities sufficient to cover two similarly
vigorous campaigns in different parts of Indonesia. If the group has
indeed decided to concentrate its efforts on Sulawesi, this will almost
certainly necessitate a commensurate downsizing of its operations in
Maluku. Needless to say, a withdrawal from Maluku at this stage would
be a significant admission of the failure of the jihad to achieve its
objectives.

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 28 Michael Davis

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can see that the capacity of conservative modernist

Muslims to launch Laskar Jihad in early 2000 reflecteda position of
political influence built up during the last years of Soeharto's
presidency and thebriefperiod ofHabibie's presidency. The stimulus
forLaskar Jihadwas the threatposed to this influenceby Indonesia's
movement towards greater democracy. The jihad project revealed the
ability of hard-lineMuslim groups to takeadvantage of thebreakdown
in state controlwrought by the conditions of political transition.These
groups, moreover, showed themselves adept at using alliances with
other intereststhreatenedby political reform,and skilful in exploiting
the disarray of modernist Muslim rivals. In the context of an
increasingly hostile political environment, Laskar Jihad was an attempt
to shore up the position of conservative Islam and to hamper the
unwelcome democratic transition in whatever way possible. It sought
to overturn the ummat's allegiance to secular or pluralist political
parties in favour of asserting religion as an overriding point of identity.
However, although the creation of Laskar Jihadwas nothing ifnot
audacious, aspects of the venture reveal weaknesses in the conservative
position even at the moment of its inception. The Laskar Jihad
experience highlights the paucity of causes capable of rallying the
Indonesian ummat behind the self-appointed champions of Islam.
Maluku, while in some senses an obvious venue for conservative
Muslim intervention, was in many respects a less than ideal choice,
principally because of its lack of political significance.
The emergence of Laskar Jihad shows how conservative Muslims
have been able to secure backing from powerful sections of the
Indonesian military, as well as a network of foreign hinders. However, it
also reveals the low level of support for their brand of political Islam
among Indonesian Muslims. This limited support reflects the failure of
conservative Muslim groups to convert state patronage during the last
years of the New Order into a significant broadening of their
constituency. Moreover, the uncompromising approach of the
conservatives has hindered their efforts to gain the endorsement of
mainstream Muslim political parties and associations. Critically, the
activities ofLaskar Jihadhave not been of sufficientscope to touch the
lives of most Indonesian Muslims, let alone to persuade them to take
sides in the struggle between the group and its opponents.
To sum up, while the Laskar Jihad venture is spectacular, not to
mention violently destructive, it illuminates fundamental fragilities in
the position of its conservative Muslim architects. For conservative
Islam in Indonesia, Laskar Jihad constitutes less a dramatic advance, so
much as a bloody rear-guard action.

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 29

NOTES
The author is particularlygrateful to JohnSidel foradvice on the preparation of this
articleand toNicola Frost forhelpful comments on an earlierdraft.

1. Kompas, 30 March 2001.

2. JakartaPost, 11 September 2000.
3. Robert W. Hefner, "Co-option, Enmitization and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim
Dilemma in Indonesia" for the conference on "Consolidating Indo
(Paper prepared
nesian Democracy", Ohio State University, 11-13 May 2001), pp. 17-18.
4. Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indone
sianMuslims", Indonesia 64 (October 1997).
5. Robert W. Hefner, Islam (Princeton University
Civil Press, 2000), p.151.
6. Robert W. Hefner, "Cooption, Enmitization and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim
Dilemma in Indonesia", p. 29.
7. Jakarta Post, 10 February 2000.
8. According toMoluccan sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Amien Rais told him
after the 7 Januaryrally thathe had been "cornered" by theMuslim outcryagainst
theHalmahera killings.Political pressure had lefthimwith no choice but toofferhis
endorsement of conservative Muslims' jihad initiative. Interview, 29 June 2001.
9. International Crisis Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos inMaluku,
Group,
ICGAsia ReportNo.10 (19 December 2000), p. 8.
10. For contrasting of the involvement of local and national elites in trig
interpretations
gering theconflict inMaluku, see GeorgeAditjondro, "Guns, Pamphlets and Handie
Talkies: How themilitary exploited local ethno-religious tensions inMaluku topre
serve their political and economic for the Conference on
privileges" (Paper prepared
"Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia", Humboldt University, Berlin, 3-5 July 2000);
and Gerry Van Klinken, "The Maluku wars: Bringing Society Back In", Indonesia 71

(April2001).
11. A Muslim leader fromAmbon claims thathe and otherMuslims discovered at the
startof the conflict thatMoluccans in theNetherlands were shipping guns to the
April 2001.
Christians inAmbon, hidden in coffinswith false bottoms. Interview,
12. John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of
Indonesia's New Order", Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 166-67.
13. JubileeCampaign, UK, Analysis of theSectarian Conflict inMaluku and itsRole in
the Islamicisation of Indonesia (JubileeCampaign, UK, December 1999), pp.3, 7.
14. Interview with Dr Fawzy A.R., Head, Yogyakarta branch of the United Development
Party (PPP), 22 June2001.
15. Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000.
16. Moluccan Muslims allege that Christians have resurrected the RMS (Repubiik
Maluku or Republic
Selatan of South Moluccas) separatist movement. The original
RMS was an unsuccessful attempt by a group of predominantly Christian members
of the Moluccan elite to establish a separate state, outside the nascent Republic of
Indonesia, in the early 1950s.
17. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen. 29 June 2001.
18. Ibid.
19. Antara, 14 June 2001.
20. Aditjondro, op. cit.
21. Interviewwith Laskar Jihadspokesmen, 29 June2001. Interviewwith IchsanMalik,
Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku reconciliation programme, 26 June 2001.
22. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
23. Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000.

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 30Michael Davis

24. Ibid.
25. Anonymous interview with an Indonesian analyst of theMaluku conflict, June 2001.
Chief ofPolice inMaluku,
This analyst claims tohave videotaped footageof former
Firman Gani, to organize a Laskar Jihad operation. See International Crisis
helping
Group, Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos inMaluku, p. 20.
26. Greg Fealy, "Inside theLaskar Jihad",Inside Indonesia (January-March2001). p. 29.
27. Ibid.
28. Interviewwith Laskar Jihadspokesmen, 29 June2001.
29. Personal communication with Jonathan Miller, maker of "A 21st Century War" docu

mentaryfilm forChannel 4 (UK).

30. Such as Aceh and West Kalimantan, as well as Maluku.
31. This trendcan be tracedall theway back to thecreation of theTNI in 1947 and itsco
optation of the first Indonesian paramilitarygroups adopting themoniker lasykar
during the Indonesian Revolution. Another more recent case was the use of crimi
nals during the 1982 elections, who were murdered in the so-called
subsequently
- The
"Petrus" killings. Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries Jakarta People's
Militia and theIndonesian Revolution 1945-1949 (UniversityofHawaii Press, 1991).
32. Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 December 2000.
33. Tempo, 15 May 2001.
34. Interview with Human Moluccan Protestant Church. 27 June
Rights Representative,
2001.
35. to Yogyakarta on 14 June, Yon Gab
According region PPP leader, Dr Fawzy A.R.,

dragged 20 people out of theirhouses inKebun Cengkeh, Kota Ambon, made them
lie down in the street and then ran them over with a truck. Interview, 22 June 2001.
Pikiran Rakyat, 10May 2001; and JakartaPost, 12May 2001.
36. Laskar Jihad spokesmen stated in June2001 that therewere 3,000 Laskar Jihadper
sonnel in Maluku. Other estimates have been as high as 10,000. Interview, 29 June
2001.
37. Ichsan Malik, Facilitator for the Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation Programme, vis
itedLaskar Jihad'sheadquarters in 2000 and estimated thatperhaps as many as 80
per cent of the group's members were TNI Interview, 26 June 2001.
personnel.
This view that a proportion of theLaskar lihad are in fact soldiers is echoed by
other researchers of the conflict, as well as eyewitness accounts of soldiers disguised
in white robes launching attacks on Christian villages. Aditjondro, op. cit.
TNI spokesman Air Rear-Admiral Graito Usodo has admitted that "there are some

troops roaming around and creating chaos outside the chain of command and some
even joined theLaskar Jihadwarriors". JakartaPost, 1March 2001.
It is commonly alleged thatLaskar Jihadforces include foreignfightersfromcoun
tries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Laskar Jihad has admitted that it has received
assistance from a few foreign volunteers, but say that these men have come of their
own volition and only take part in humanitarian activities. Interview with Laskar
Jihadspokesmen, 29 June2001. An assessment of theseclaims is complicated by the
fact that the locally leviedMujahidin forces inMaluku have recruiteda number of
foreignfighterswho have no formalconnection with Laskar Jihad.Philip Hatch
Barnwell, unpublished journalaccount ofworking inMaluku with Kompak, aMus
lim relieforganization affiliatedwith DDII, September toNovember 2000.
38. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. Press release,
laskarjihad.or.id,10May 2001. A Muslim leader inAmbon claims thatLaskar Jihad
has attempted to coerce Muslim villages inMaluku intoproviding itwith recruits.
Interview, 1 April 2001.
39. Interviewwith Laskar Jihadspokesmen, 29 June2001.

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Laskar Jihad and thePolitical Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia 31

40. Robert W. Hefner. Civil Islam, pp.109-10.

41. Interviewwith Laskar Jihadspokesmen, 29 June2001.
42. One of Laskar Jihad's trainingcamps inAmbon is the formerly Christian village of
Waai, which was attacked and largelydestroyedby Laskar Jihadin July2000. Jakarta
Post, 28March 2001.
43. Interviewwith Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001. Interviewwith Dr Fawzy
A.R., leader of the Yogyakarta branch of theUnited Development Party (PPP),
22 June 2001.
44. John T. Sidel, "Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of
Indonesia's New Order". Indonesia 66 (October 1998): 171-72.
45. Robert W. Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Rivalries among Indone
Ideological
sian Muslims", Indonesia 64 (October 1997): 91.
46. Jakarta Post, 11 September 2000.
47. Paul Brass analyses the role played in instigating and sustaining communal violence
in northern India by "fire-tenders" who form part of managed riot networks. Paul R.
Brass,Theftof an Idol: Text and Context in theRepresentation ofCollective Violence
(Princeton University Press, 1997).
48. Interview with a representative of Baileo, a Moluccan non-government organization
(NGO), 27 June2001. FKAWJpress release, 4 May 2001.
49. Interview with a member of a conflict resolution team from Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta, 20 June 2001.
Domination ofMaluku's Islamic institutionsby an outside group led by a preacher
of Arab extraction (Ja'far Umar Thalib is of Yemeni descent) constitutes a somewhat
ironic development in the context of Islam in the region. Richard Chauvel writes that
theerosion of the traditionalreligious authorityofArab preachers inKota Ambon
was a significant element of what he terms the "emancipation of the (Moluccan)
Moslem community" in Ambon during the 1930s. Richard Chauvel, Nationalists,
Soldiers and Separatists (Leiden: KILTV Press, 1990), pp. 163-64.
50. Interview with Human Rights Representative, Moluccan Protestant Church, 18 April
2001.
51. The displacing of communities forstrategicends was carried out within Aceh by
both theTNI and theFree Aceh Movement (GerakanAceh Merdeka), forexample.
52. Interview with Dr Fawzy A.R., leader of the Yogyakarta branch of the United Devel

opmentParty (PPP), 22 June2001.

53. FKAWJ press release, 25 March 2001.
54. Jakarta Post, 15 May 2000. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
55. International Crisis Group, Indonesia, Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku,

p. iii.
56. Interview with Ichsan Malik, Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation

Programme. 26 June 2001.

57. Interview with a member of a conflict resolution team from Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta, 20 June 2001. Interview with Human Rights Representative, Moluccan
Protestant Church, 27 June 2001.
58. Interview with Ichsan Malik, Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation
26 June 2001.
Programme,
59. Ibid.
60. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen, 29 June 2001.
61. Interview with Moluccan sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola, 29 June 2001.
62. Hatch-Barn well, op. cit. Personal communication with Jonathan Miller,
Philip
maker of "A 21stCenturyWar" documentaryfilm forChannel 4 (UK). Interview
with
a member of a conflict resolution teamfromGadjah Mada University,Yogyakarta,

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 32Michael Davis

20 June2001. Interviewwith a Muslim leader fromAmbon, 1 April 2001. Muslim

residents of Hal village were as about the unwanted presence
reported complaining
of Laskar Jihadin theirvillage. JakartaPost, 8 November 2000.
63. Laskar Jihad has also investigated the feasibility of involving itself in the
communal violence in Sampit, Kalimantan. Interview with Laskar Jihad spokesmen.
29 June2001.
64. On 25 June2001, Ja'farUmar Thalib went inperson to theofficeof leading human
rightsNGO YLBHI to complain thathis followers'human rightswere being abused.
Interview with Ichsan Malik. Facilitator, Baku Bae Maluku Reconciliation

Programme, 26 June 2001.

On a previous occasion, following
a Yon Gab raid against a Muslim base in Kota
Ambon. Ja'far lodged similar complaints with the state human rights organization
Komnas HAM. Kompas, 10 February 2001.
This concernwith human rightsmight be contrastedwith thevigorous critique of
theWestern human rightsdoctrineby Laskar JihadsupportersKISDI. RobertHefner,
Civil Islam, p. 110.
The "communist" way of thinking of the Yon Gab is referred to by
www.laskarjihad.or.id. 19 June 2001.

Michael Davis is a Researcher at the International NGO Training and

Research Centre in Oxford, United Kingdom.

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