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JOPPA Handbook Ver 3.30
JOPPA Handbook Ver 3.30
(JOPPA)
Handbook
for the
COMAFFOR, JFACC,
and Their Staffs
Foreword ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Joint Operation Planning Process for Air (JOPPA) Handbook is an attempt to provide a
useful summary handbook on the joint air planning process for commanders and senior staff.
In particular, it addresses a methodology for the Component Numbered Air Force (C‐NAF)
AFFOR staff (A‐staff) and Air Operations Center (AOC) to interact during planning. For the
purposes of this handbook, it will be assumed the COMAFFOR has been designated the JFACC
by the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
This handbook is not designed as a substitute for reading and thoroughly understanding
doctrine and the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) associated with the joint air planning
process. Rather, the intent is to complement both doctrine and TTP with a handbook that
commanders and senior staffs may use to assist their thinking and involvement during Crisis
Action Planning.
Joint Publication 5‐0, Joint Operation Planning, provides the overarching joint planning
guidance. Chapters III and IV of that document specifically discuss the Joint Operation Planning
Process and Operational Art and Design, respectively. Another excellent reference for joint
planning TTP is the Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure
CJTFSOP (located on the web and accessible via the .mil NIPRNET). Chapter V, section D, “Tasks,
Functions and Procedures,” provides valuable step‐by‐step information to help work through
the various steps of planning and the estimate process. These documents guide the JFC and
his/her staff in conducting JFC planning.
Joint Publication 3‐30 is the doctrinal publication for joint air operations. It replaced the Joint
Air Estimate Process (JAEP) with the Joint Operation Planning Process for Air (JOPPA). AFTTP 3‐
1.AOC is the tactics, techniques, and procedures document that supports and expands on the
doctrinal documents mentioned above. This booklet extracts key information, tables, and
figures from AFTTP 3‐1.AOC. It adds techniques and best practices that 505 CCW instructors
have observed to be worthwhile. While these publications focus on AOC planning, they are
considered to be the best A‐staff JOPPA planning tools currently available.
This handbook is intended to highlight and summarize key components of the JOPPA of which
the COMAFFOR, JFACC, and both A‐Staff and AOC need to be mindful. We will evolve this
booklet through a continuous improvement process. We solicit your feedback on the utility of
this booklet and welcome your suggestions regarding ways to improve it.
While this Handbook focuses on air component planning, it is important to understand that
both the COMAFFOR staff and the JFACC’s AOC must coordinate all planning with the JFC staff,
the other functional commanders’ staffs, and the other service component commanders’ staffs.
This interaction and coordination is critical to not only ensuring air capabilities are accurately
reflected in their plans, but also that JFC and other component planning is reflected in both the
COMAFFOR and JFACC’s plans.
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JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS FOR AIR (JOPPA)
• The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) provides the construct for planning by JFCs and
their staffs.
• JOPPA is:
o Based upon and consistent with JOPP, so the COMAFFOR, JFACC, A‐Staff, and AOC may
plan effectively in parallel with the JFC and other components.
o A decision‐making process to aid commanders and staffs in planning before and during
operations.
o A process to develop options and make a recommendation for any operational
project/decision.
o Based on TTPs used in the previous Joint Air Estimate Process (JAEP), which was very
similar to JOPPA.
• As a macro‐level process, JOPPA works equally well for the COMAFFOR and JFACC in
developing their respective orders and plans.
o In those instances where the COMAFFOR is not designated as the JFACC (no JFACC in the
joint force or a Service component commander other than the COMAFFOR is designated
as the JFACC), the COMAFFOR would use the JOPPA process to develop the air
component Operations Order (OPORD) addressing the deployment, lodgment,
sustainment, and redeployment of forces under OPCON of the COMAFFOR and
execution of forces over which the COMAFFOR retains TACON.
o When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC, both the A‐Staff and AOC use JOPPA as
the planning method to develop respectively the COMAFFOR’s OPORD and JFACC’s
JAOP. The OPORD addresses the deployments, sustainment, maintenance, and
redeployment of forces under OPCON of the COMAFFOR and the JAOP addresses the
execution of all joint forces made TACON to the JFACC by the JFC.
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• At the TTP level, the question is how the A‐Staff’s JOPPA activities and the AOC JOPPA
activities relate to each other? While each staff has an independent requirement to
develop either an order or plan, the interdependence of their processes makes it clear that
separate, parallel processes are not the answer. Rather, the processes should be
intertwined, each retaining its independence but working together, when appropriate.
(NOTE: In a similar manner, but to a lesser degree, AOC planning must be intertwined and
integrated with the planning of all the other Service and Functional components.)
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Guidance from the COMAFFOR and JFACC is critical to
keeping the JOPPA oriented in the right direction. In some JOPPA steps, COMAFFOR and
JFACC interaction with the A‐staff and AOC needs to take place daily. In other steps, it may
be less frequent. The bottom line is to make a deliberate decision for each step as to the
frequency of the staffs’ interaction with the COMAFFOR, JFACC, and each other.
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JOPPA Inputs, Steps, and Outputs for the JFACC
Key Inputs JOPPA Steps Key Outputs
Tasking from JFC Initial planning time line JFACC’s
Initiation
Guidance from JFACC initial guidance
JFC mission & intent
Mission Analysis brief
Friendly situation
Essential tasks
IPOE Mission Analysis
JFACC mission statement
Facts & assumptions
Guidance & initial intent
JFACC tasks/guidance
JFACC guidance
Friendly air COAs
Enemy COAs
COA Development Operational & tactical objectives
Staff estimates supporting COA
Statements & graphics
Development
Friendly air COAs
Refined, valid air COAs
Enemy most likely/dangerous COAs
COA Analysis & Strengths & weaknesses
Coordinated wargame method
Wargaming Branch / sequel requirements
Coordinated evaluation criteria
JFACC decision points & CCIRs
Coordinated critical events/actions
Coordinated evaluation criteria
Decision matrix
Wargame results COA Comparison
Preferred COAs
Coordinated comparison method
Selected air COA
Decision briefing COA Approval JFACC refinement
JFC‐approved air COA
Approved air COA Plan / Order Refined & approved JFACC JAOP
Staff estimates Development with appropriate annexes
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: The A‐Staff and AOC’s intertwined relationship is discussed
throughout this handbook.
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JOPPA Inputs, Steps, and Outputs for the COMAFFOR
Key Inputs JOPPA Steps Key Outputs
Tasking from JFC Initial planning time line
Initiation
Guidance from COMAFFOR COMAFFOR’s initial guidance
JFC mission & intent
Mission Analysis brief
Friendly situation
Essential tasks
IPOE Mission Analysis
COMAFFOR mission statement
Facts & assumptions
Guidance & initial intent
COMAFFOR tasks/guidance
COMAFFOR guidance
Support concepts to friendly air COAs
Enemy COAs
COA Development COMAFFOR Objectives
Staff estimates supporting JFACC’s
Statements & graphics
COAs
Support concepts to friendly air COAs Refined, valid air COAs with support
Enemy most likely/dangerous COAs concepts
COA Analysis &
Coordinated wargame method Strengths & weaknesses
Wargaming
Coordinated evaluation criteria Branch / sequel requirements
Coordinated critical events/actions COMAFFOR decision points & CCIRs
Coordinated evaluation criteria
Decision matrix
Wargame results COA Comparison
Preferred COAs
Coordinated comparison method
Selected air COA
Decision briefing COA Approval COMAFFOR refinement
JFC‐approved air COA
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JOPPA STEP 1
INITIATION
Planning is an inherent responsibility of command. Thus, the COMAFFOR and JFACC may initiate
JOPPA as they deem appropriate to develop or revise plans or orders to accomplish assigned
missions and tasks.
Whenever the JFC assigns a planning task to his/her Joint Planning Group (JPG), the AOC
Strategy Division and A‐Staff A‐3/5 will normally send one or more representatives. They should
then initiate parallel planning with the JPG and intertwined JOPPA planning with each other.
Initiating a new planning effort during execution is appropriate when there are significant
changes to the current mission or situation or when an assumption proves to be invalid.
Planners should analyze available guidance, assess time available for planning, initiate or
update intelligence and other staff estimates, and consider other factors relevant to the specific
planning situation.
The COMAFFOR and JFACC typically provide initial guidance in the following ways: specify time
constraints; outline initial coordination requirements; authorize operational changes within the
COMAFFOR and JFACC’s authority; direct when to be briefed on results of Mission Analysis; and
direct other actions as necessary. (Note: this “initial guidance” should not be confused with
the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s planning guidance that is a product of Mission Analysis.)
Initiation Steps
1. Alert staff and stand up OPG and Strategy Plans Team
2. Receive and review Higher Headquarters (HHQ) and/or JFACC and
COMAFFOR guidance
3. Initiate/update staff estimates
4. Determine planning resources and time line
5. Issue initial guidance
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: During this step, the A‐Staff and AOC will, when directed,
organize planning teams to include membership both from within and outside their respective
organizations. The A‐Staff planning team is normally called an Operational Planning Group
(OPG) and is led by the A‐3/5. The AOC planning team is led by the Strategy Plans Team and,
while similarly organized as the A‐Staff planning team, is not in practice called an OPG.
In practice, co‐location of the two planning groups has aided coordination and interaction.
Ideally, the two groups would each have separate work spaces, but be located near enough to
allow close coordination.
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JOPPA STEP 2
MISSION ANALYSIS
Executive Summary. MA is arguably the most important step of the JOPPA, as it provides the
foundation for all subsequent actions. However, the involvement of the COMAFFOR and JFACC
in/with the process and how they should guide it is not well documented. Planning is both a
commander and staff process, but what is the balance and required interaction between the
commander and his staff and what should the interaction be between the A‐Staff and the AOC?
This section provides a few guidelines to help the COMAFFOR and JFACC begin to think about
Mission Analysis and how to guide the process with their staffs.
As a COMAFFOR or as a JFACC, it is important to practice this process with your staff.
Guidelines for the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s Mission Analysis Guidance
Conduct own Mission Analysis. As appropriate, provide:
1. Guidance as a result of direct interaction with the JFC
2. Amount of time for the staff to conduct Mission Analysis and the remainder of the
operational planning process
3. Strategic and Operational centers of gravity (friendly and enemy)
4. Any guidance for the IPOE process
5. Any operational concept of operations decisions and associated CCIRs
6. Areas/topics for special emphasis during the staffs’ Mission Analysis
a. Staffs should contribute to the list of issues/tasking that will require the JFC’s
clarification
b. Staffs should examine the HHQ planning documents and advise the COMAFFOR
and JFACC what is missing
c. We must fully understand the PMESII conditions of the strategic end state and
the JFC’s concept for achieving them
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Step 2: Mission Analysis
• Enables the COMAFFOR, JFACC & each of their staffs to understand the problem(s) facing
the JFC & other components, end state conditions desired by JFC and national leaders, and
contributions the COMAFFOR and JFACC could make.
• Typically involves substantial parallel and iterative processing of information by the A‐Staff
and AOC, particularly in a crisis action planning situation.
• Is normally allocated a proportionally larger share of time available because this step is
critical to the rest of JOPPA.
• Should produce a solid understanding of the operational environment and what the
COMAFFOR and JFACC must each accomplish for the JFC. Also important is an
understanding of the end state conditions the COMAFFOR and JFACC must produce that
contribute to the JFC’s military end state. These factors are expressed in the COMAFFOR
and JFACC’s mission and intent statements.
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1. Analyze HHQ mission, intent, and guidance.
Examine all JFC and national level guidance, to include strategic communications, warning
orders, alert orders, draft plans, feedback from JPG, and COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s
conversations with the JFC and staff.
2. Determine known facts, current status, or conditions.
• List the known facts, status, or conditions relevant to the situation and mission, and
submit RFIs where information is needed but lacking
• Address adversary as well as friendly nations and selected non‐aligned nations. As an
example, consider carefully those willing to allow basing, refueling, and/or over‐flight
for the planned operation.
• Relevant data may extend across the areas of political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, and information (PMESII), which may provide a useful construct for
organizing the relevant facts.
• Together the A‐2 and ISRD with other staff sections, conduct intelligence preparation of
the operational environment (IPOE).
• Manage the analysis and development of products that provide a systems
understanding of the operational environment. Provide a perspective of interrelated
political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and other systems
relevant to the specific joint operation.
• Identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning.
• Identify system nodes (the elements of a system that represent a person, place, or
physical thing); system key nodes (nodes that are critical to the functioning of a system);
and system links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes)
• During Mission Analysis, the OPG and Strategy Plans Team leads provide the following
to the rest of the staff:
o Time analysis. Balance the desire for detailed planning against the need for speed
and allocating time for component planning.
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Determine the time available.
Understand the time available until the COMAFFOR and JFACC must each make a
decision, issues orders, and begin to execute the operation.
Develop a timeline reflecting known and assumed operational requirements
(e.g., C‐day, D‐day) to focus the OPG and Strategy Plans Team as they conduct
the planning process.
Post a timeline identifying the time available to complete the steps of planning
based on the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s delivery requirements.
When branch and sequel plans are identified during the COA analysis process,
planning timelines for each also need to be established. As requirements are
identified and assumptions validated, these timelines require updating.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Generally a combined AOC and A‐Staff planning team will
determine known facts, current status, and conditions in addition to analyzing the JFC’s mission,
intent, and guidance. The results will normally be presented in a single product.
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MILITARY
1. What OPLAN/CONPLAN, if any, has been developed for this region or conflict?
2. What US forces are in the region?
3. What additional forces, if any, have been identified in a plan, warning order, or alert order?
4. What is the time required to deploy those forces?
5. Does a TPFDD exist? or is one being developed? What priority and percent of effort is/may
be allocated to deployment of air forces?
6. What are the military capabilities of the “host” nation? Have they trained with US forces?
7. Do host nation forces have similar/compatible equipment, (e.g. for aircraft refueling).
8. What bases, within operational reach of our aircraft, have been/might be offered for use?
9. How many days away are the USAF munitions prepo ships? Which are en route?
10. Where are the nearest land‐based stocks of USAF munitions?
11. What are the air defense capabilities of the host nation?
12. What are the airbase defense capabilities of the host nation?
13. What is the status of JFC planning? Has a joint planning group (JPG) been established at the
JFC level? Are the COMAFFOR and JFACC represented on the JPG?
14. Which JCS orders have been received (warning, planning, alert, execute orders)?
15. What are the potential threats to our forces in each of the beddown countries? Note that
any questions on the threat overlap with the intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (IPOE).
ECONOMIC
1. What are the economic interests of the US in this conflict?
2. If we are not successful in this conflict, how will the US economy be affected?
3. What are the economic interests of the adversary in this conflict?
4. Do economic interests vary among different groups within the adversary nation?
5. What are the economic interests of the host nations in this conflict?
6. What are the economic interests of nations supporting the adversary?
7. What are the economic interests of nations supporting the US?
8. What are the economic interests of other nations in the region?
9. What are the economic interests of third parties outside the region?
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SOCIAL
1. What historically are the views of the US people toward the nations involved in this conflict?
2. What historically are the views of the adversary nation toward the US?
3. What historically are the views of the adversary and host nations in this conflict toward each
other?
4. How supportive are the people of the adversary country of using force to achieve their
interests in this conflict
5. How supportive are the people of the host nations of using force to achieve their interests in
this conflict?
6. What must the adversary leadership do to retain the support of their populace in this
conflict?
7. What must the host nation’s leadership do to retain the support of their populace in this
conflict?
8. What must the US leadership do (or avoid) in order to retain the support of the US people in
this conflict?
INFRASTRUCTURE
1. What ports may be used to offload aircraft munitions and fuel?
2. Is rail transportation available to move munitions and fuel from ports to bases?
3. What is the condition of the roads and bridges to support movement of fuel and munitions?
4. Are there pipelines to support the movement of aircraft fuel?
5. What bases could handle cargo and passenger aircraft to serve as APODs.
6. Are there any hangers or hardened aircraft shelters that might be made available for US
aircraft in any of the host nations?
7. Do the host nations have robust or limited communications infrastructure?
8. Which host nation bases have adequate water resources to support a wing of US aircraft?
9. From what location will the JFC direct joint US operations? Will this also be the location from
which combined operations are directed?
10. Is there a host nation air operations center (AOC) in which the JFACC could integrate the
planning and direction of US joint air operations? If not, where should the AOC be
established?
11. Where should the COMAFFOR’s A‐Staff be established?
INFORMATION
1. What have been the public statements of the US relative to this conflict?
2. What have been the public statements of the adversary relative to this conflict?
3. What have been the public statements of the host nations relative to this conflict?
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3. Determine operational limitations. These are actions required or prohibited by higher
authority and other restrictions that limit the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s freedom of action.
These could include diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected
countries, and host nation issues. Operational limitations include "constraints" and
"restraints." Many operational limitations are commonly expressed as rules of engagement
(ROE) or rules for the use of force (RUF).
• Restraints (things you cannot do): requirements placed on the command by a higher
command that prohibits an action.
○ Example: during the Korean War, air strikes on Chinese targets north of the Yalu
River were prohibited.
• Constraints (things you must do): requirements placed on the command by a higher
command that dictates an action.
○ Example: Army Air Forces in WWII were required to fly an obvious reconnaissance
flight over German ships (whose position was already known via ULTRA) so
subsequent bombing of those ships would not compromise the existence of ULTRA.
○ Do not confuse constraints with specified tasks.
• Limitations can be found in LOAC, ROE, and HHQ commander’s intent.
4. Develop assumptions.
• Assumption: a supposition about the situation or future course of events made in the
absence of necessary facts.
• Assumptions should address gaps in knowledge that are critical for planning to continue.
○ Litmus test: if an assumption proves false, the plan could be invalid; if an issue does
not have this effect, it should not be an assumption.
• Include assumptions made by higher headquarters in subordinate plans; however,
challenge those assumptions that appear unrealistic.
• An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity.
○ Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. Do not “assume away” potential
problems, such as weather or likely adversary capabilities and options.
○ To test for necessity, ask, “If this assumption is not true, will it have a significant
impact on the plan?” See litmus test above.
• Continually review assumptions to ensure validity.
o Goal—replace assumptions with facts as soon as possible.
o When appropriate, build branch plans to address assumptions in case they prove
to be invalid.
• Never assume away adversary capabilities.
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5. Analyze enemy and your own centers of gravity (COGs) and critical factors. A systems
perspective of the operational environment assists identification of adversary COGs and
their critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. In combat
operations, this involves knowing an adversary's physical and psychological strengths and
weaknesses and how the adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions. Moreover,
weaknesses in other operational environment systems (political, social, economic,
infrastructure, informational, etc.) and their interaction with the military system must be
understood.
• Analyze friendly and enemy strategic and operational COGs.
○ An enemy COG should have sufficient strength to affect friendly mission
accomplishment, and a friendly COG should be essential to our mission
accomplishment. If not, they are not COGs in this situation.
○ Technique: limit the number of friendly/enemy COGs to one strategic COG for the
operation and one operational COG per phase.
• Analyze the critical capabilities and requirements of each identified COG to determine
associated critical vulnerabilities (CV) & thereby identify entities/nodes to
target/protect.
○ CV: a critical element of a COG which is vulnerable to attack.
• If the COGs and critical factors are provided by the JFC staff, examine them
○ To confirm their validity,
○ To understand their implications for joint air operations, and
○ If necessary, to expand the analysis to be more applicable to air operations.
• Caution: during Mission Analysis, focus more on COG identification than COG analysis.
○ COG identification will shape what you want to affect/attack as well as what you
need to protect/defend.
○ Significant effort toward COG analysis at this point may lead you out of Mission
Analysis prematurely and inadvertently into COA Development.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Generally, a combined AOC and A‐Staff planning team will
determine operational limitations and assumptions and the analysis and determination of the
enemy’s centers of gravity and critical factors. Normally, this will be presented as a single final
product.
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6. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.
• Specified tasks: Those tasks specifically assigned to the COMAFFOR or JFACC verbally or
in writing by the JFC. In the JFC OPLAN or OPORD, these are normally found in the Tasks
to Subordinates paragraph and/or the coordinating instructions.
• Implied tasks: those tasks that Mission Analysis reveals the COMAFFOR or JFACC must
perform (or prepare to perform), but which are not stated in the JFC’s order.
○ Operational‐level implied tasks should be passed back up to the JFC for confirmation
(as a new specified task) or rejection.
○ Tactical‐level tasks will be useful for COA Development, but are of little value in
Mission Analysis, when the focus is on determining essential tasks and capturing
them in a succinct mission statement.
○ To derive implied tasks, focus primarily on analyzing the JFC mission, intent, concept,
and specified tasks to the other components. As a technique, ask:
“In this situation, what other major (operational‐level) tasks would a COMAFFOR
or a JFACC normally perform?” For example, if air and space superiority are not
specified tasks from the JFC (since they are necessary in most situations), these
could be implied tasks.
“What in the JFC mission, intent, or concept implies a major (but unstated) task
for the COMAFFOR or JFACC?” For example, if the JFC has a mission to deter war
and deterring is not a specified COMAFFOR or JFACC task, then contributing to
deterrence could be an implied task.
“What task to another component is likely to require significant support from
the COMAFFOR or JFACC?” For example, if there is to be an amphibious landing,
the COMAFFOR or JFACC is likely to need to support preparation for and
execution of that landing.
• Essential tasks: A short list of specified or implied tasks the COMAFFOR or JFACC must
accomplish to succeed at the mission, in particular to ensure JFC mission success.
○ Should be included in the COMAFFOR and/or JFACC’s mission statements.
○ Should shape the COMAFFOR and/or JFACC’s operational objectives.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s responsibilities and authorities
are separate and distinct, it is reasonable that their specified, implied, and essential tasks be
separate and distinct. Generally, the A‐Staff and AOC planning teams independently determine
separate COMAFFOR and JFACC specified, implied, and essential tasks. Even with specified
tasks, JFC staffs sometimes confuse task responsibility between the COMAFFOR and JFACC. It is
imperative the A‐staff and AOC determine the appropriate commander for each task and advise
the JFC staff of that determination.
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7. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).
• CCIRs are key elements of information required for anticipated COMAFFOR or JFACC
operational‐level decisions that are related to the COMAFFOR or JFACC’s concept of
operations.
• CCIRs help screen and focus the type and amount of information reported directly to the
commander.
• The initial look in Mission Analysis is the first, broad look at decision points and CCIRs.
Decision points and associated CCIRs should continue to mature throughout the JOPPA.
○ During Mission Analysis, focus initially on those decision points related to the
concept of operations which are apparent at this point, even though COAs have not
yet been determined. Even this early in Mission Analysis, it may be apparent that
there are critical COMAFFOR or JFACC decisions which will be required regardless of
the COA selected.
○ In general, these decision points will be branch or sequel options and/or phase shifts
in the concept of operations.
○ These same decision points may also include latest time information of value (LTIOV)
to indicate time sensitivity.
○ The associated information the COMAFFOR or JFACC needs to make those decisions
are the CCIRs.
• CCIRs are not static. Commanders refine and update both decision points and associated
CCIRs as planning continues and gets more precise and throughout the rest of the
operation based on actionable information they need for decision‐making.
• CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly force information
requirements (FFIR).
○ PIR: those decision requirements that concern both the enemy (including the time
available to the enemy) and the environment (terrain, weather, and some civil
considerations).
○ FFIR: decision requirements that cover friendly forces available for the operation.
Information on the mission, forces, logistics, and time available for friendly forces.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s responsibilities and
authorities are separate and distinct, it is reasonable that the COMAFFOR and JFACC concepts of
operations will be separate and distinct. Therefore, it is reasonable that COMAFFOR and JFACC
decisions and CCIRs will be separate and distinct from each other. The AFFOR Chief of Staff and
AOC Strategy Division Chief should respectively lead determination and management of the
COMAFFOR and JFACC CCIRs.
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8. Conduct initial force structure analysis.
• The primary purposes of force planning are to:
○ Influence COA Development and selection based on force allocations, availability,
and readiness
○ Identify all forces needed to accomplish the COA with some rigor and
○ Effectively phase the forces into and out of the operational area.
• Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase,
mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force
allocation review, major force phasing; integration planning; force list structure
development; followed by force list development.
• This is a “first look” at the anticipated force structure. More specific requirements will
be determined after the COAs are developed and analyzed. Operational requirements
and desired capabilities are determined by the JFACC’s AOC. However, the details of
transportation, lodgment, sustainment, etc are the business of the COMAFFOR staff.
• Determine if air, space, and cyber (to include STO) capabilities to perform all specified
and implied tasks are available. If there are shortfalls, identify additional/alternative
resources needed for mission success, e.g., aerial refueling assets
• Determine the status of follow‐on forces and the times when they will be available.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As this is a macro‐level, “first blush” look at force structure, it
should be a combined effort of both the A‐Staff and AOC. Throughout JOPPA, there will
possibly/probably be tension between the operational requirements of the JFACC and the ability
of the COMAFFOR to effectively deploy, maintain, sustain, and maintain the force. Effective
communication and coordination will provide a solution that balances competing requirements,
but mission effectiveness must always take priority.
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10. Develop mission and intent statements.
• Mission Statements:
○ The COMAFFOR and JFACC mission statements should articulate/summarize the
essential tasks and include who, what, when, where, and why.
Who ‐‐ the COMAFFOR or JFACC
What ‐‐ the essential tasks
When ‐‐ often expressed by ‘when directed’ or ‘on order’ (‘be prepared to’ tasks
are normally not included)
Where ‐‐ may initially be ‘over friendly territory’ but often expands to
‘throughout the JOA’ in later phases
Why ‐‐ the broader purpose for the essential tasks
○ Techniques:
Cover all phases of the operation. Use three sentences – one for the deterrence
phase, one for combat phases, and a third for stabilization and enabling phases.
Use present tense, e.g., “the COMAFFOR or JFACC conducts…and, on order, gains
and maintains...”
At the end of each sentence, express the broader purpose for the essential tasks
addressed, e.g., “… to deter aggression” and “…to compel acceptance of
coalition terms” and “…to contribute to regional peace and economic stability”.
There are no firm rules on what is an essential task; ultimately, it’s the
commander’s call on whether to list the other components he is tasked to
support (e.g., support JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC operations) or to say “support
other component operations.”
COMAFFOR and JFACC Mission Statements.
Example #1: JFACC conducts air, space, and cyber operations in the JOA to deter Califon
aggression. When directed, gains and maintains air and space superiority, supports CFLCC to
halt and then defeat CA ground forces, incapacitates CA political leadership, supports CFMCC
and CFSOCC ops, and on order destroys WMD delivery means to compel CA surrender. JFACC
retains combat capabilities and provides ISR to defeat remaining resistance and enable the
establishment of a non‐belligerent Califon, free of WMD, and peace and stability in the region.
Example #2: When directed, COMAFFOR will: deploy forces; conduct “open the base”
operations; provide force protection, deployment, and beddown operations ISO air, space, and
information operations within the JOA to protect deploying forces, support counter‐insurgency
operations, and deter a Califon conventional attack. COMAFFOR makes forces available to gain
and maintain air, space, and information superiority to enable coalition military operations
throughout the JOA. COMAFFOR provides forces to support a combined counteroffensive to
eliminate Califon’s ability to project offensive combat power. COMAFFOR provides forces to
destroy WMD delivery capability. O/O, COMAFFOR supports civil affairs and humanitarian
operations to enable regional self‐defense and stability. O/O COMAFFOR redeploys forces.
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Example #3: When directed, JFACC will: gain and maintain air and space superiority to enable
joint operations throughout the JOA; integrate joint air operations with JFLCC and JFMCC ops to
defeat Califon forces on land and sea; incapacitate Califon political leadership to compel regime
change; and, on order, destroy WMD capabilities to reduce Califon to a regional defensive
capability free of WMD. JFACC conducts transition ops with ISR, CAS, and airlift to minimize
friendly casualties, eliminate resistance, and enable the resumption of mineral exports from
Pacifica.
• Intent Statements.
○ The COMAFFOR and JFACC’s intent statements should articulate their vision of the
end state and purpose from an air perspective, i.e., the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s
desired end state conditions & purpose for those conditions.
Commander’s intent may be articulated for a phase, particular ATO, or entire
conflict. For Mission Analysis, COMAFFOR or JFACC intent should be articulated
for the overall conflict.
The COMAFFOR and JFACC should personally articulate their intent statements,
but may rely on the A‐staff or AOC for a first draft.
○ The intent statement should include end state and purpose, and may include risk.
Some also include the key tasks required to achieve the end state.
End state is a set of conditions at a point in time, and can be developed for a
campaign, a phase, an operation, an ATO period, or any specified time period.
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EXAMPLE 3 (JFACC):
Purpose
‐ Conduct air, space and info operations in support of JFC campaign to maintain/enable
restoration of the national sovereignty of Nevada
Key Tasks
‐ Maintain a persistent and aggressive deterrent posture toward Califon.
‐ Delay Califon’s I Corps movements toward the Pacifica mineral fields.
‐ Prevent force closure or preclude significant penetration of ground defenses.
‐ Set conditions for and support JFLCC counteroffensive.
‐ Protect friendly forces from air and missile attacks.
‐ Support achievement of maritime superiority.
End State
‐ Califon forces expelled from Nevada.
‐ Political borders reestablished.
‐ Califon military capability degraded to defensive only.
‐ Califon WMD delivery capability eliminated.
EXAMPLE 3 (COMAFFOR):
Purpose: To deploy, beddown, protect, and sustain appropriate air and space forces capable of
conducting limited duration air and space operations that can isolate, attack, and destroy NFM
terrorists’ cells and infrastructure and deter any attack against the Nevidah Government and its
territory. If required, the force will be capable of: conducting air and space operations to
defeat a conventional Califon attack in the PMF or other areas of Nevidah; eliminating the near‐
and mid‐term Califon offensive military threat to Nevidah; and destroying WMD delivery
capability.
Method: I will support the JFC with appropriately trained and positioned air and space forces. I
will protect and sustain these forces and protect the APODs and SPODs critical to deployment
and sustainment. I will provide necessary support to JFSOC forces bedded down on my bases.
After major combat operations, I will maintain a strong defensive posture and assist in the
transition operations to UN/Regional PK/PE forces with ISR and airlift. I will redeploy forces as
required. I will maintain capability to protect CMO and HA activities during peace enforcement.
End State:
• Califon deterred from conventional attacks on Nevidah.
• If deterrence fails:
‐ Nevidah Government secure and territorial integrity restored.
‐ Invading Califon ground forces destroyed, captured or withdrawn.
‐ Califon WMD delivery capability destroyed
‐ Califon incapable of projecting offensive combat power beyond its borders
‐ US and coalition forces transition to international control and redeployed
‐ Opportunities for favorable long‐term relationships with Califon preserved
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As distinct commanders, the COMAFFOR and JFACC should
each have their own mission and intent statements. Therefore, the A‐Staff and AOC should
function independently to support development of these.
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11. Develop Mission Analysis brief.
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A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: The OPG’s brief of the COMAFFOR’s Mission Analysis to the
COMAFFOR and the Strategy Plans Team’s brief of the JFACC’s Mission Analysis could be done
as separate briefs. However, with much of the Mission Analysis developed in a combined
fashion, it makes more sense to consolidate this into one briefing, to avoid the duplication of
briefing topics, to better talk to AOC and A‐Staff planning consistencies, and to better utilize the
COMAFFOR and JFACC’s time.
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• As planning progresses, the OPG and Strategy Plans Team will need frequent planning
guidance. This guidance will give the same focus as initial guidance and keep the
planning process moving. Examples of subsequent guidance include the following:
o Guidance to further amplify initial guidance.
Final/revised mission statement approval.
Final/revised commander’s intent.
Guidance during development of COAs and the concept of operations concerning
the following:
(1) Designation of priority guidance.
(2) Designation of priorities of protection (e.g., "defended assets list" for joint
theater and air missile defense purposes).
(3) Designation of time‐phased force and deployment data priorities of lift
assets.
(4) Continued guidance on IO. Deception, OPSEC, EW, PSYOP, physical
destruction.
(5) Rules of engagement and rules for the use of force guidance.
o Guidance for the planning of branches (options or contingencies based on the
original plan) and sequels (subsequent operations based on the outcomes of current
operations).
o Guidance on the type of briefs and/or rehearsals to be conducted.
o Guidance on the termination of operations. Conditions that describe the end state.
Guidance on priority of force capabilities (e.g., what and when are force capabilities needed)
COA planning guidance should address: feedback to the MA brief; priorities; sequencing; C2
relationships; force deployment concepts; deception plan; and targeting guidance. Other
potential topics include:
1. How many COAs the staffs should develop? Do time and manpower available allow the staff
to develop one, two, or three COAs? What makes sense in terms of the scenario?
2. In what broad ways should the COAs differ? Consider their objectives, their sequencing,
resources available, bed‐down, distribution of effort, coalition participation, and risks to be
minimized.
3. Any criteria that all COAs should meet or by which the COAs will be evaluated.
4. When does the COMAFFOR and JFACC want to be briefed on COAs developed.
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13. Prepare Initial Staff Estimates.
• A staff estimate is an assessment of the situation intended to provide detail useful in
differentiating between COAs during COA Development. Each staff estimate includes an
evaluation of how factors in that section’s functional area may influence each COA. It is
also useful as detailed information to support COA Analysis and COA Comparison.
• Additionally, refined staff estimates provide the basis for the annexes to the JFACC’s
JAOP and the COMAFFOR’s OPORD.
• In their staff estimates, each A‐Staff and AOC staff element:
o Review the mission and situation from its own staff functional perspective.
o Examine the factors and assumptions for which it is responsible.
o Analyze and refine each potential COA to determine its supportability from the
perspective of the staff’s functionality.
o Conclude how to best support each COA’s accomplishment of the mission.
• An example of a staff estimate is the work the A‐staff provides on force structure and
TPFDD development:
o Review the tentative force structure and determine additional lift requirements.
o Inform the JFC staff of the results of the transportation feasibility estimate.
o Identify ports of debarkation (PODs) and the percentage of PODs available for the
operation
o Work to identify capabilities required for the operation and have the components
input the requirements into the plan.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As staff estimates are developed as a result of the specialist’s
functional analysis and recommendation, they must be developed independently by each team
in both the A‐Staff and the AOC. While the combined COMAFFOR and JFACC in practice tends
to issue a single set of guidance, it is important that the A‐Staff and AOC (and the COMAFFOR
and JFACC) understand which elements of guidance are applicable to each commander and staff
and which are applicable to both. To that end, after the COMAFFOR and JFACC provide
planning guidance, the A‐Staff and AOC planners should decide which are applicable to each
staff and publish the two sets of planning guidance as separate documents.
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JOPPA STEP 3
COA DEVELOPMENT
Executive Summary. COA Development is the first time the COMAFFOR, JFACC, and staffs begin
determining “How” they will use joint air, space and cyber power to accomplish the “What”
derived during Mission Analysis.
As in Mission Analysis, COMAFFOR and JFACC individual involvement is critical and provides two
outcomes. It ensures the staffs are working COAs in which the COMAFFOR and JFACC are
interested and that their boss, the JFC, will accept. Second, it saves time by ensuring the staffs
are not developing COAs that do not meet the JFC/COMAFFOR/JFACC’s intent.
The right mix of guidance and involvement depends on the situation. In a crisis situation with
little development time, the COMAFFOR and JFACC may take their lead planners with them to
see the JFC, outlining options on the way. A more ideal method involves a combination of face‐
to‐face informal meetings with the planning and strategy teams, which facilitates time for the
planners and staff to come up with ideas, concepts and depictions that express the broad
guidance the COMAFFOR and JFACC has provided.
The best way to prepare for COA Development is to practice it, again and again.
GUIDELINES for COMAFFOR and JFACC COA Development Guidance
COMAFFOR and JFACC guidance to their staffs for COA Development might include:
1. How many COAs the staff should develop.
2. How they should vary.
3. When are they needed—how often he/she needs updates.
4. Broad guidance/matrix outlining ends/ways/means/risk.
5. Risks to be minimized and risks that may be accepted.
6. COMAFFOR and JFACC support to deterrence.
7. COMAFFOR and JFACC contributions to the military end state.
8. TPFDD: force size and mix, basing, arrival priority, and days of supply with each unit.
9. Friendly and enemy COGs and critical vulnerabilities – to protect or exploit.
10. Amount of focus on capabilities versus will.
11. Use of information operations.
CONCLUSION. COA Development builds naturally on the work begun in Mission Analysis. Like
Mission Analysis, commander involvement with the staffs in this process is vital.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: While the AOC and A‐Staff could each develop 3 COAs, that
would effectively result in 9 COAs when cross‐matrixed with each other. To make this process
manageable, it is suggested the teams combine efforts and develop the desired number of COAs
based on JFACC operations supported by the best possible COMAFFOR options. A suggested
methodology is that the AOC Strategy Team take the lead in developing operational COAs. The
other AOC divisions and teams and all A‐staff directorates and teams develop staff estimates
articulating the best way to design each COA with respect to their functional expertise.
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Step 3: COA Development
• Air COA: the concept for a plan the COMAFFOR and/or JFACC could use to accomplish their
missions.
• Time permitting, develop two or more COAs, each of which can achieve all COMAFFOR and
JFACC essential tasks and produce the end state conditions expressed in the COMAFFOR’s
and JFACC’s overall intent for the operation.
• A critical first decision in COA Development is whether to conduct simultaneous or
sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct advantages and
disadvantages.
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COA Development Steps.
1. Develop initial courses of action
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1. Develop initial courses of action.
• Analyze Mission Analysis data and develop an operational time line.
○ Focus on refining data developed during Mission Analysis to better understand the
conditions the COMAFFOR and JFACC must produce in support of the JFC’s military
end state.
○ If available, reference the JFC campaign plan’s “Operational Time Line” — a sketch
showing the JFC’s phases, the estimated duration of each phase, key component
tasks by phase, and the JFC’s end state conditions for each phase.
○ Start to build a COMAFFOR and JFACC time line by firstly integrating the
COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s end state conditions for each phase as well as the most
significant COMAFFOR and JFACC tasks in each phase. Dashed lines may be used to
indicate flexibility/uncertainty of when the task is to be initiated or completed.
Operational Time Line
• Separately translate the COMAFFOR and JFACC specified and implied tasks into effects‐
based objectives by phase.
○ Derive JFACC operational objectives (OO) from the JFC’s specified tasks to the JFACC
and broad implied tasks.
○ Derive COMAFFOR operational objectives (OO) from the JFC’s specified tasks to the
COMAFFOR and broad implied tasks.
○ Derive or translate the tasks to the extent required to clearly express the desired
effects (conditions) to be produced through accomplishment of each task.
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○ The base plan should include a detailed plan for each phase of the operation. The
strategy‐to‐task methodology (a hierarchy of OOs, TOs, and TTs) provides a useful
framework for developing a coherent plan for each phase of the operation.
○ For phases in which combat operations are expected, the TET will associate selected
targets with appropriate tactical tasks and develop a phase targeting allocation plan
which shows, by objective, how the targets will be serviced across the phase.
○ While the TET is responsible to develop and maintain the phase targeting allocation;
the Strategy Plans Team guides this development and maintenance by prioritizing
TOs and establishing the time by which TOs should be achieved.
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• Develop broad alternative combined COMAFFOR and JFACC COAs.
○ In general, air COAs vary with respect to ends, ways, means, or risk.
Ends: the OOs or the degree to which they are achieved.
Ways: the phase in which an OO is achieved as well as the choice of TOs.
Means: the amount, type, and level of effort of kinetic and non‐kinetic resources
to be brought into the conflict and applied to achieving the objectives.
Risk: the degree of success/failure, force protection, or time utilized.
○ Example: The COMAFFOR and JFACC may vary the COAs based upon attacking or
protecting COGs. They might also consider the following.
One air COA that focuses primarily on disrupting the strategic direction of the
enemy armed forces (enemy strategic COG).
A second that focuses primarily on denying the enemy success in his ground
offensive (enemy operational COG).
A third focused on protecting our ports and forces (our operational COG).
If the COMAFFOR and JFACC does not specify how to vary the air COAs, the
Strategy Plans Team and AFFOR OPG should propose broad alternatives and
obtain the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s direction before proceeding further.
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○ Once broad alternatives are outlined, arrange sequencing (planned beginning &
ending) of operational & tactical objectives within the phases as COA logic dictates.
Some objectives may be accomplished concurrently; others may be sequential.
○ Determine the priority and/or weights of effort for operational objectives by phase.
Technique: use a Gantt chart to depict estimated weights of effort for each OO
by phase. This will only be a rough estimate until analysis is complete of the TTs
and targets that will need to be affected and how the resources required actually
affected them. Detailed analysis is usually not feasible until a COA is selected and
a detailed operational concept for each phase is developed.
Develop sketches depicting where objectives are achieved by phase for each
COA.
For each COA, develop a COA statement—a succinct paragraph that addresses
the six questions a COA should answer: who, what, where, when, why, and how.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: A suggested methodology is to have the AOC Strategy Plans
Team take the lead in developing all operational COAs. The other AOC divisions and teams and
all A‐staff directorates and teams develop staff estimates articulating the best way to design
each COA with respect to their functional expertise.
Validity Criteria.
Per JP 5‐0, a valid course of action is:
Adequate Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance.
Feasible Can accomplish the mission within established time, space, and resource
limitations.
Acceptable Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
Distinguishable Must be sufficiently different from the other COAs.
Complete Must incorporate:
• objectives, effects, and tasks to be performed
• major forces required
• concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment
• time estimates for achieving objectives
• military end state and mission success criteria
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• Integrate staff estimates into COAs.
○ All staff estimates provide important information; however, operations, intelligence,
and logistics estimates normally provide critical data.
○ While the Strategy Plans Team consolidates inputs and develops each COA, the A‐
Staff teams will be developing staff estimates to support force flow, initial supply
capability, sustainment capability, logistics capability, personnel capability, basing
options, etc. in all aspects of the COMAFFOR’s responsibility. The AOC divisions and
teams will develop staff estimates covering all aspects of AOC participation in a COA
if executed.
○ Be sure to pay attention to how the various staff estimates affect each other as they
are integrated and iteratively refined.
○ The time available for integrating and refining the estimates is often limited,
especially in crisis action planning; in such situations it may be necessary to both
present and select COAs which have not been articulated below the TO level of
detail. Nonetheless, when time permits, we can plan down to the level of tactical
tasks and targets.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As staff estimates are developed as a result of the specialist’s
functional analysis and recommendation, they must be developed independently by each team
in both the A‐Staff and the AOC.
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Technique: consider differentiating between COAs by focusing on various combinations of
adversary capabilities and/or will.
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Shown below is a sample worksheet that can help start the COA Development process:
JFACC COA Development Worksheet Air COA __________________________
Recommended steps for use of this worksheet:
1. Modify the operational objectives to reflect the JFC's guidance to the JFACC.
2. Modify the tactical objectives to reflect how the op objectives would be achieved in this COA.
3. Indicate in Columns 3 ‐ 8 the phase(s) in which objectives will be pursued and achieved.
4. Indicate by op objective the priority or level of effort of air & space resources to be applied.
5. Give the COA a name that reflects its most distinctive characteristic; write it at top of page.
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2. Prepare COMAFFOR and JFACC COA statement(s) and sketch(es).
• Air COAs, developed by the AOC Strategy Plans Team, are often depicted and briefed to
the COMAFFOR and JFACC using a combination of Gantt charts, sketches, and
statements.
○ Gantt chart: a refinement of the operational time line that shows the planned time
period over which each OO will be accomplished and how the estimated level of
effort (high, medium, or low) for each OO will vary over time.
○ Consider using a series of sketches to show how air operations will vary by phase
and, if appropriate, how operations may evolve within a given phase.
○ The COA statement or concept of operations
Is usually chronological and addresses all phases of the operation.
Addresses “who” (type of forces) will execute the tasks.
Expands on the "when" and "where" of the COMAFFOR and JFACC mission
statements and adds the "how" and “why”.
The essential tasks of the mission statements are expressed in the OOs, which
are the “whats” of the COA statement.
The "how" is expressed primarily in the choice of TOs (and in some cases the
types of targets) and in the priority or level of effort to be applied to the OOs.
Address both COMAFFOR and JFACC considerations, strengths, and weaknesses
for COA.
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JFACC Air COA Depicted With Sketches, Gantt Chart, and Statement
41
3. Brief commander and staff on COMAFFOR and JFACC COAs under consideration.
• An output of a COA review brief are the COMAFFOR and JFACC providing guidance on
the COAs:
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A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: While most understand the idea of the JFACC’s concept of
operations and tasks, it is less well understood that the COMAFFOR also has a concept of
operations and tasks. In many instances, it is the COMAFFOR’s role to provide combat power to
the JFACC for the JFACC’s execution. However, there are other tasks such as deploying forces,
sustaining forces, protecting forces, training host nation Air Forces, conducting host nation
support, and providing capability to other components, which fall under the responsibility and
authority of the COMAFFOR.
While the AOC and A‐staff could independently develop their COAs, the two staffs are so
dependent on each other it is usually best to develop and brief them as intertwined.
A suggested methodology is to have the AOC Strategy Plans Team take the lead in developing
all operational COAs. The other AOC divisions and teams and all A‐staff directorates and teams
develop staff estimates articulating the best way to design each COA with respect to their
functional expertise.
The A‐Staff’s analysis of the best COMAFFOR support and the best way for the COMAFFOR to
successfully complete his tasks are integrated into each COA. In most instances,
basing/logistics/manpower/force flow, etc., limitations will restrict the COMAFFOR’s options
such that the COMAFFOR’s concept of operations will largely be the same for all COAs. In other
instances, these factors may not be so restrictive and the COMAFFOR’s solution may differ
significantly for each COA.
Bottom line: While it is suggested the A‐Staff and AOC work together developing a single set of
COAs (usually two or three), it is important that the COAs each address the intent,
requirements, and mission success of both commanders, the COMAFFOR and JFACC.
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44
JOPPA STEP 4
COA ANALYSIS & WARGAMING
Executive Summary. Next to Mission Analysis, this is the most important step in the planning
process. COA Analysis is the only time the staffs and commanders have to analyze how their
COAs rack up against the enemy prior to execution.
A common method for analyzing COAs during crisis action planning is to have a dedicated Red
Team role play the enemy against the Blue team(s), using a move, countermove, counter‐
countermove discipline managed by a neutral wargame director.
Three things make wargaming difficult: modeling the enemy, providing enough time, and
dedicating enough resources. Usually wargaming is done manually (often because of limited
models and simulations) and is given less time than needed to fully analyze all phases of
operation.
The COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s personal involvement with wargaming is probably less than the
other steps, but their guidance is critical.
A recommended technique is determining the COA comparison/evaluation criteria (which will
be used later) as part of the preparation for COA Analysis. The COMAFFOR and JFACC should
give careful consideration to providing the criteria prior to wargaming. In fact, it is usually best
that the criteria be given to the staff as soon as they are known.
The best way to prepare for COA Wargaming is to practice it, again and again.
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Step 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming
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1. Gather tools and information for wargaming.
• JFC, COMAFFOR, and JFACC guidance and mission statements.
• JFC, COMAFFOR, and JFACC intent statements.
• Facts, assumptions, and limitations.
• US TPFDD flow, US and Coalition air and space capabilities.
• IPOE data, to include enemy COAs and CVs.
• Friendly forces and friendly air COAs.
• Risk assessments.
• Maps, worksheets, computers, and other material to support the wargame.
• Arrange the area for wargaming.
• An estimate of the time available for completing the COA Analysis and Wargaming step.
• List adversary forces and prepare adversary COAs. The Red Team portrays adversary
reactions in the wargame, provides the adversary order of battle and at least the:
o Most likely adversary COA.
o Most dangerous adversary COA.
2. Define COA evaluation criteria. The advantage of determining the evaluation criteria to be
used in COA Comparison prior to wargaming is that it enables planners to record the
strengths and weaknesses of each air COA during the wargame in relation to the evaluation
criteria. This will provide valuable data & insights for use in the subsequent COA
Comparison step. For further discussion on the determination and selection of COA
evaluation criteria, see Step 5 COA Comparison, paragraph 2, pages 61‐63.
3. Select wargaming and recording methods.
• Select Wargaming Method. The primary purposes of the wargame are to refine and
improve the COAs, identify COA strengths and weaknesses, and help determine which
COA is most likely to succeed.
o Each Blue team must include expertise from both the A‐Staff and the AOC.
o The wargaming method may already be established by unit SOPs or common
practice. Some combatant commands have the resources to conduct computer‐
assisted wargaming, but most components manually wargame.
The most common technique is to organize Blue and Red teams to discuss critical
events and decision points for each friendly COA, with the Red Team addressing
how the enemy might react.
Critical events are those tasks conducted over a period of time that require
detailed analysis (e.g., the series of component tasks required to gain air
superiority over the main battle area).
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Decision points identify (in time and space) decisions that must be made to
ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources. Additional decision
points may become apparent during COA Analysis.
CAUTION: Do not confuse decision points with decisive points (which are keys to
attacking adversary COGs).
The wargame moderator, usually a senior planner, guides the discussion with a
series of leading questions intended to solicit the Blue ‘action’ (in relation to a
critical event), the Red ‘reaction’ to Blue’s action, and a Blue ‘counter‐action.’
NOTE: If an enemy ‘trigger’ event is needed, such as the initiation of hostilities,
then there will be four steps total to get to the ‘Blue counter‐action.’
Following discussion of action, reaction, and counter‐action (for each critical
event), the moderator usually solicits critical information related to timing,
resources, COA strengths and weaknesses, branch and sequel plans, decision
points, and CCIRs. Key points from the discussion should be captured by scribes
to ensure the subsequent refinement of the COAs.
If time allows, separate wargame activities should be conducted for each COA
against both the Red’s most likely and most dangerous COAs.
• Select Recording Method. The recording method will be tailored to the wargaming
method chosen and to the intent of the wargame. For the action, reaction, counter‐
action method, a worksheet such as that shown on the next page has been successfully
used to record the key points from the discussion of each critical event. The results
recorded usually include, but need not be limited to, the following:
o The described Blue action, enemy reaction, and Blue counter‐action.
o Timing issues or time required to achieve objectives.
o Additional resources or effort required and concept improvements.
o COA strengths & weaknesses, especially ones related to evaluation criteria.
o Branch and sequel plan requirements (for later development).
o COMAFFOR and JFACC decision points & CCIRs related to both COMAFFOR and
JFACC’s operational decisions.
• Determine wargaming participants and their roles. Some major roles are:
o Commander/Deputy Commander. Provides guidance and decisions as appropriate.
o Wargame facilitator. The person who is most familiar with the wargaming process.
o Recorder. Records the results of the wargame.
o Other staff sections as appropriate.
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Wargame Critical Event Worksheet
Wargame Critical Event Worksheet
Friendly air COA # Enemy most likely/dangerous COA ‐circle
one
Critical event:
Blue: What are the primary actions of your COA related to this critical event? Action:
Red: How might the enemy react to what Blue plans to do? Reaction:
Blue: How will you counter the enemy’s attempts to defeat your COA? Counter‐action:
Timing:
Resources:
Strengths:
Weaknesses:
Branch/Sequel Plan:
Decision Points:
CCIRs:
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4. Identify Red Team to role‐play enemy COAs.
• The role of the Red Team is to present feasible enemy COAs which will challenge the
Blue COAs and thereby reveal their strengths and weaknesses.
• Having a Red Team that is well prepared to articulate enemy actions throughout the
course of the wargame is essential to effective COA Analysis. The Red Team should be
comprised of both COMAFFOR and JFACC expertise. Additionally, it may be very
valuable to have representation from the other Service and functional components on
the Red Team. Finally, it may be worthwhile searching out someone with cultural
knowledge of the region, perhaps an academic who can bring societal or historical
factors into the wargame that might otherwise go unconsidered.
• It is unwise to believe you can anticipate exactly what any enemy will do; therefore,
normally give the Red Team broad, rather than precise, parameters within which to
develop the details of enemy COAs.
• Some planners may choose to have multiple Blue and Red Teams so that they can
simultaneously wargame the alternative Blue COAs. In this event, it is important to have
the Red Teams work together in developing their description of the Red COAs. The
intent is not to have each Red Team say exactly the same thing; the intent is to be able
to evaluate the Blue COAs, having wargamed them against essentially similar Red COAs.
• An alternative method is to have the same Red Team wargame against all of the Blue
Teams. This ensures Red Team consistence across all the wargaming activities, but
requires significantly more time.
• The Red Team(s) should use an abbreviated JOPPA process to determine an appropriate
Red course of action. To provide sufficient time for the development of a Red COA, the
Red Team(s) should be identified at the beginning of crisis action planning. In most
instances, it is best to have the Red Team(s) do its work in a location separate from the
Blue Team(s) planning.
• The Red Team can prepare for the wargame by listing key elements of each enemy COA
they expect to wargame. In depicting the enemy COAs, the Red Team should
understand they represent all levels and forces of the enemy, from the political
leadership down to the army, navy, SOF, and air forces. Hence, it is desirable to have
representatives from each of the Services participate on the Red Team.
• Given a fixed amount of time for wargaming, simultaneous wargaming may provide a
longer, more through wargaming event for each COA.
• The table on the next page provides an example of the types of actions a Red Team
might prepare to address.
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Example of Red Team’s Summary of Enemy COAs
Elements of Red COA Most Likely Enemy COA Most Dangerous COA
Territorial objective Pacifica Mineral Fields (PMF) All of Nevada
Two: Reno to top of PMF and
Two: Reno to Salt Lake City and
Ground axes of attack West‐to‐East into central
through central PMF to SLC
PMF
Four: one on Reno to SLC axis
Three: one from Reno and 2
Number of CN corps used and two up, one back through
on central axis into PMF
PMF
Begin offensive on day: Blue C+10 Blue C+3
Delayed to complete logistics To preempt most of Blue force
Reason this D‐day chosen
preparations deployment
Red components attack Naval at 2400, space 0200, air
Simultaneously at 0400L
together or sequentially at 0400, and ground at 0600L
Deny Blue ISR coverage of CN Maximize damage to HVAA and
Air‐to‐air desired effects
forces in the PMF air refueling capability
Ensure success of CN ground Degrade C2 of Blue ground
Air‐to‐ground desired effects
forces forces
Laser use—desired effects Disable Blue LEO satellite Disable Blue LEO satellite
Deny use of ports and airbases
SOF desired effects Disrupt Blue LOCs into PMF
south of Grand Canyon
Disrupt C2 of Blue ground Disrupt C2 of Blue air defenses
CNA desired effects
forces and airspace control
Degrade morale of NV Insurrection of NV populace
IO campaign—desired effects
ground forces south of Grand Canyon
Intend to use chemical CN ground forces unable to National leadership is unable to
weapons if... seize PMF control CN ground forces
Degrade Blue ground forces
Desired effects if chemical Significantly degrade use of
to enable CN to restart
weapons are used ports and airfields, esp in S NV
offensive
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5. Identify critical events for each COA.
• To select the critical events, ask: “Which one or two events in each phase are of greatest
significance to the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s missions?”
o If time is limited, suggest wargamers focus on specific critical events that encompass
the essence of the COA.
o If time is particularly limited, focus only on the principal defeat mechanism.
o Technique: During wargaming allow 30‐60 minutes to address the action, reaction,
counter‐action and capture associated data for each critical event.
Example. To facilitate the action‐reaction‐counteraction discussion for each critical event, the
moderator will often pose a series of question to the Red & Blue teams. For example,
1. Deterrence. What will Blue do to deter? From the Red perspective, what must happen for
deterrence is to succeed? Can/will Blue overcome the Red perspective?
2. Outbreak of hostilities. If deterrence fails, what will the outbreak of hostilities look like?
Blue, what is your posture? Red, what actions do you take? Blue, how will you counter?
3. Air & space superiority. To succeed, Blue must gain air & space superiority over critical
areas. Blue, how will you do that? Red, how will you react? Blue, how will you counter?
4. Culminating the enemy ground offensive. What will Blue air do to help halt the Red ground
offensive? Red, how will you react to these Blue air ops to halt your ground offensive? Blue,
how will you counter?
5. Adversary use of chemical weapons. What will Blue do to preclude WMD use by Red?
When, why, and how will Red resort to WMD use? Blue, what will be the effects on your air
ops of Red WMD use? Blue, how will you counter Red’s chemical use?
6. Capitulation. Blue, what will you do to compel Red to capitulate? Red, how will you
respond to Blue’s actions? Blue, how will you counter Red’s failure to capitulate? Red,
under what conditions will you capitulate? Blue, how will you produce those conditions?
7. Stabilization. What key conditions must Blue produce during the stabilization phase? How
will Red resist achievement of these goals? How will Blue counter?
8. Unique critical event. How will the critical event unique to this COA affect the outcome?
How will Red respond? How will Blue counter?
• Typical critical events to consider for guiding a wargame.
o Deterrence of enemy aggression.
o Outbreak of hostilities and first 24 hours thereafter.
o Gaining of air superiority over critical areas of enemy territory.
o Culmination of enemy ground offensive.
o Isolation of enemy command and control from political to division level.
o Adversary use of WMD.
o Compel the enemy to surrender and accept our terms.
o Execution of ISR, CAS, airlift, and information operations to defeat insurgency.
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6. Conduct wargame and record results.
• Remember the goal is to analyze this series of action–reaction–counteraction events in
order to reveal Blue COA strengths and weaknesses and, thereby, facilitate refinement
and improvement.
• Recommended wargame sequence of events:
o Conduct roll call and explain roles. Ensure all participants are present, roles are
filled, and all understand the role(s) of each player.
o Explain the purpose, overall process, and expected results of the wargame.
o Explain the rules of how the participants should conduct themselves. For example:
Remain objective. Do not become defensive or emotional. Talk in terms of facts,
assumptions, and recommendations.
Continually assess the validity (suitability/feasibility/acceptability) of each COA.
Avoid drawing premature conclusions.
Avoid comparing one COA with another during wargaming. Wait until the
comparison phase.
Pay attention and avoid getting bogged down in tactical details during this
operational‐level wargame.
o Introduce tools.
o Introduce technique.
• Suggested guidelines for the moderator:
o Ensure scribes are prepared to capture key points from the discussion.
o Ensure all participants know which Blue COA, Red COA, and critical event are
currently being discussed – and keep them focused on it.
o Have the Blue Team summarize the Blue COA for the current discussion.
o Have the Red Team summarize the Red COA (in particular, the disposition of
adversary forces) for the current discussion.
o Examine each critical event in turn by considering the series of actions, reactions,
and counteractions that comprise each critical event.
Action. The Blue Team Lead identifies the initial friendly action. The staff then
addresses the full range of friendly force operations, across all functional areas,
that comprise the initial action.
Reaction. The Red Team identifies the same scope of the adversary reaction.
Counteraction. The Blue Team Lead then describes the friendly counteraction in
all areas.
o Pose leading questions to the Blue and Red Teams as required to keep the wargame
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focused and making progress.
o Call a ‘knock it off’ to the discussion when Blue has an appreciation of the time,
resources, and challenges relating to their COA for that critical event.
o Following each critical event, solicit observations on timing, resources, strengths,
weaknesses, branch/sequel plan requirements, decision points, CCIRs, and so on.
o Guide the discussion to the next critical event (e.g., Red or Blue COA), as required.
o While the preference is for Blue to have the initiative, some friendly “actions” are in
response to an enemy “action.” In such cases, consider four steps: action – action –
reaction – counteraction, in order to conclude with the Blue counteraction.
• Much of the benefit of COA Analysis will be lost if the following are not accurately
captured by a scribe or notetaker during the wargame:
o Timing issues or time required to achieve objectives
o Additional resources or effort required and concept improvements
o Potential risks and means to mitigate those risks
o COA strengths and weaknesses, especially those related to the evaluation criteria
o Branch and sequel plan requirements (for later development)
o JFACC decision points and CCIRs
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• Thoughts on refinement of functional area:
o Refinement/modification of movement and integration.
Movement requirements. Conduct time‐phased force and deployment data
(TPFDD) refinement based on analysis of each COA. Identify additional
requirements and/or flow modifications. Create a deployment time line that
depicts the deployment.
Integration with other components.
Mobility requirements.
o Refinement/modification of intelligence.
Priority intelligence requirements.
Collection plan requirements.
Other intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance requirements.
o Refinement/modification of fires.
High‐payoff targets (lethal and nonlethal).
The projected measure of effect of adversary defeat and/or destruction.
Combat assessment requirements.
Component synchronization requirements.
o Refinement/modification of sustainment.
Requirements for logistic support (especially sustainment base requirements).
Required support from outside the JFC (combatant command support, host
nation).
Logistic synchronization requirements.
o Refinement/modification of command and control.
Command relationships (operational control, tactical control, and support
relationships).
Synchronization requirements.
Branches and sequels development.
CCIR refinement.
Requirements for rules of engagement or rules for the use of force
modifications.
Information operations requirements.
Multinational requirements.
Support from non‐DOD agencies.
Public affairs requirements.
o Refinement/modification of protection (forces, systems and facilities) concept of
operations.
Air and missile defense requirements.
Noncombatant operations requirements.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection requirements.
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Joint personnel recovery requirements.
Appropriate combat identification criteria.
Combating terrorism.
Security area requirements.
Risk assessment.
1. Identify risks and major events. Information should be developed and
recorded during the wargame.
2. Based on the COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s acceptable level of risk examine
events by location, conditions, and potential magnitude of risk and prepare
risk decision recommendations on the acceptability of risk or necessity of risk
mitigation.
3. Identify ways and means of risk mitigation. Consider such actions as:
a. Increased mass, surprise, or application of other principles of war.
b. Extended time of preparatory actions, such as interdiction.
c. Increased integration of joint fire support.
d. Application of psychological operations and/or civil affairs operations.
e. Different force structure.
9. Report results. If possible, brief the COMAFFOR and JFACC on the following results prior to
COA Comparison:
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Generally, a combined AOC and A‐staff planning team will
conduct COA Analysis and Wargaming with a single final product. The intent of COA Analysis is
improvement of both the COMAFFOR and JFACC elements of each COA. To do that, both
COMAFFOR and JFACC critical events must be taken into consideration. To that end, all COA
teams (Red and Blue) must include both A‐Staff and AOC expertise.
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JOPPA Step 5
COA COMPARISON
Executive Summary. The COA Comparison step provides the COMAFFOR and JFACC and staffs
the opportunity to see how various COAs rate against the evaluation criteria.
Methods used can be very simple – a plus, minus, neutral method; a qualitative advantages and
disadvantages comparison matrix; or a very sophisticated, weighted comparison matrix with
several evaluation criteria.
Whichever method is used, this step is another in the process of trying to determine which COA
best suits the situation and commander.
Key to the success of the step is the commanders’ evaluation criteria and definitions, the
weighting (if used), and the guidance to the staff
The COMAFFOR’s and JFACC’s guidance to their staffs for COA Comparison might include:
1. Guidance on the comparison method: weighted, plus‐minus, words only, etc.
2. Approval (if not previously given) or refinement of the evaluation criteria.
3. Guidance on weighting of the evaluation criteria (if not previously given).
4. Guidance to the staff to summarize (in simple bullet statements) the advantages
and disadvantages of each COA when compared directly against the other COAs.
5. When the staff should brief the COMAFFOR and JFACC on the results of COA
Comparison
CONCLUSION. A decision matrix is an aid to making a decision; it should not make the decision
for us. We use our best professional judgment in choosing which COA to recommend to the
COMAFFOR and JFACC.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: COA Comparison should be conducted as a combined A‐Staff
and AOC activity. While it is not necessary to use both COMAFFOR and JFACC evaluation
criteria, it is a requirement that the most important or significant evaluation criteria be used,
whether generated by the COMAFFOR or JFACC.
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Step 5: COA Comparison
• An objective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and
evaluated against a set of criteria.
• Only after the COAs are independently evaluated against the criteria should the
evaluation of each COA be compared against each other.
• Goal: identify the COA with the highest probability of success
1. Review wargame results. Begin COA Comparison by reviewing the strengths and
weaknesses of each COA. When applicable, account for refinements/improvements made
after wargaming.
2. Define COA evaluation criteria.
• These criteria provide a consistent set of factors against which the staff can assess the
probability of success of each COA.
• There is no established list of criteria for all contingencies; they will vary with the
circumstances. While the COMAFFOR or JFACC may specify some or all of the evaluation
criteria, the staff will most likely play an important role in determining and defining the
criteria. Whatever the case, the criteria must be approved by the COMAFFOR and
JFACC.
• To develop criteria, consider the intent statements and guidance from the JFC,
COMAFFOR, and JFACC, as well as significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need
for speed, security, surprise). Additional sources for developing criteria include:
o Principles of War and of Joint Operations.
o Elements of operational art
o Tenets of air power.
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• It is important to clearly define the criteria in precise terms (e.g., ‘rapid deployment’
may have different meanings to different planners, which may skew comparison
results).
• Additional examples are provided in the table on the next page. This list is not intended
to be all inclusive and the definitions are not etched in stone – they should be tailored
to the situation.
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Evaluation Criteria Examples with Possible Definitions
Evaluation Criteria Possible Definition: What is the degree to which this COA...
Protect CVs protects our CVs and COGs from major harm.
Exploit CVs exploits Califon CVs and thereby enables us to affect Califon operational
or strategic COGs.
Objectives supports JFACC OOs with low risk that one or more will not be achieved.
Defense in Depth exploits extended enemy lines of communication (LOC) and delays and
attrits the enemy such that there is an acceptable force ratio entering
the main battle area.
Deception supports JFC’s deception plan.
Forced entry isolates the area of operations and effectively degrades forces which
threaten our forced entry.
Flexibility provides the ability to shift the priorities, if necessary, without grave risk
that the adversary will achieve its objectives or cause significant
casualties to friendly forces.
Force protection effectively protects forces, population, and key facilities (SPODs, HVAA
airfields, and so forth) from enemy air and missile attack.
Time to surrender supports compelling the enemy to surrender within the time line set by
JFC. NOTE: This criterion may be very valuable, but also very difficult to
estimate accurately for each COA
Culmination contributes effectively to culminating the enemy’s offensive within the
time, space, and casualty parameters set by the JFC.
Offensive Capability degrades enemy ground forces and sustaining stocks to the degree that
they cannot sustain effective division size offensive operations.
Defensive capability degrades enemy ground forces and sustaining stocks to the degree that
they cannot sustain effective division size defensive operations.
• Address only one factor in each evaluation criteria. If the criteria contain two or more
factors, evaluators will be unable to score the criteria when a COA does well on one
factor but poorly on the other. For example, if we define the criteria “objectives” as
“COA achieves objectives quickly with minimal collateral damage,” we would have
difficulty scoring a COA which achieved objectives quickly but with considerable
collateral damage.
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• Write the definition as a one‐sentence statement or question that clearly expresses how
the criteria should be applied to evaluating the COAs. For example, to define “Strategic
COG” we might write, “How likely is the COA to succeed in eliminating the enemy
strategic COG, his/her nuclear weapons?”
• Review/refine evaluation criteria. If evaluation criteria were developed prior to COA
Analysis and made part of that process, they should be refined and reviewed at this time
to ensure they are consistent in both steps.
o Review the evaluation criteria to ensure they still reflect COMAFFOR and JFACC
values and guidance.
o Review the criteria definitions to ensure all participants in the comparison process
still have a common understanding of what each criterion means.
o If any meaning is not clearly stated and commonly understood, refine and review it
until this is achieved.
3. Determine comparison method. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. The
most common technique is the decision matrix.
• Four types of decision matrices are:
o Weighted Numerical Comparison. Values reflect the relative advantages or
disadvantages of each COA for each of the criterion selected. Certain criteria have
been weighted to reflect greater value.
o Non‐Weighted Numerical Comparison. The same as the previous method except the
criteria are not weighted. Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.
o Narrative or Bulletized Descriptive Comparison of strengths and weaknesses.
Review criteria and describe each COA’s strengths and weaknesses.
o Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison. Base this comparison on the broad degree to
which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA. This is typically organized
as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (‐) for a
negative influence.
o Any technique that helps the staff provide the best recommendation and enables
the commander to make the best decision is valid.
• In an “unweighted” matrix, the evaluation criteria all have the same importance;
however, we usually put greater importance on some criteria than others. Therefore, a
weighted decision matrix, similar to the chart on the next page is often used.
o It is suggested the weighted scale be from 1 to no more than 5. A scale of 1 to 10
may not be appropriate because it means that the most important criterion is 10
times more important than the least; should a criterion only one‐tenth as important
as the others even be used in COA selection?
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o Determine the weighting scale for the evaluation criteria.
In the table below, Flexibility and Risk have a weight of 4 and Deception and
Force Protection a weight of 2. This says that Flexibility and Risk are twice as
important as Deception and Force Protection in selecting our air COA.
Technique: ask two questions. First, what are the most and least important
criteria? Second, what is the relative importance (the ratio) of the most
important criteria to the least important criteria? Given these answers, choose a
scale that reflects the relative importance (ratio) and allows other criteria to be
weighted between the most important and least important.
o Determine the raw score scale – is a higher score or lower score better?
One caution with the ‘bigger is better’ technique is that you have to think
carefully when assigning a raw score to “negative” criterion, such as “risk,” which
we want to minimize (i.e., a COA which minimizes “risk” would get a higher
score).
(1) Suggest you use a scoring method similar to golf (lower score wins).
(2) In a joint environment, be sure of the ground rules. If the JFC asks each of
the components to evaluate the joint COAs, it is wise to clarify the scoring
method beforehand.
Weighted Decision Matrix.
Weight COA 1 COA 2 COA 3
Flexibility 4 3 (12) 3 (12) 2 (8)
Risk 4 3 (12) 2 (8) 3 (12)
Deterrence 3 1 (3) 3 (9) 3 (9)
Coalition 3 2 (6) 2 (6) 3 (9)
Deception 2 1 (2) 2 (4) 3 (6)
Force protection 2 3 (6) 1 (2) 1 (2)
Totals (39) (41) (46)
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Weighted Comparison Table with Definitions and Strengths & Weaknesses
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5. Determine a recommended COA. Once all COAs have been objectively scored against all
criteria, summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as compared directly
against the others.
• When evaluating against criteria, we might determine that COA 1 has a low risk of
failure, COA 2 a moderate risk, and COA 3 a significant risk. When compared against one
another, “COA 1 has the least risk of failure."
• A one‐page summary of advantages and disadvantages of each COA in relation to the
others may be the most important output of the COA Comparison process.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Conduct COA Comparison with a combined A‐Staff and AOC
team. It is important that a methodology be determined and used consistently. Also it is
important that the most important or significant comparison criteria be used, whether they are
COMAFFOR or JFACC related. It is also critical that evaluation criteria are accurately defined
before use and the definition of each is provided to each evaluator. Lastly, a written synopsis of
the advantages and disadvantages of each COA is useful when presenting a COA decision in the
next step.
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JOPPA STEP 6
COA APPROVAL
Executive Summary. In this step, the staffs develop and present to the COMAFFOR and JFACC
their COA Decision Briefing, which normally summarizes their work to develop, analyze, and
compare air COAs.
Upon receiving the briefing from their staffs, the COMAFFOR and JFACC may approve the staffs’
recommendation or one of the COAs not recommended. On the other hand, they may choose
to modify the COAs; they might do so by combining the elements they favor from two or more
COAs.
Normally, the COMAFFOR and JFACC will brief the JFC and receive his approval of the selected
air COA.
The approved air COA will be the basis for the concept of operations further expanded in the
COMAFFOR’s OPORD and JFACC’s JAOP.
CONCLUSION. Key to the COA Approval process is the COMAFFOR and JFACC working with
each of their staffs to outline what his expectations are.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: As COA Development, Comparison, and Analysis have largely
been combined A‐Staff and AOC activities, it is logical the COA Approval brief be a combined A‐
Staff and AOC briefing to both the COMAFFOR and JFACC. However, all relevant COMAFFOR
and JFACC elements need to be discussed.
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Step 6: COA Approval
• Modify the brief to fit the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s level of understanding at the time of
the brief.
o If the brief occurs a relatively short time after the COA Development brief, or if a
wargame briefing has been conducted, the COA decision brief may be more
abbreviated than is suggested below.
• Briefing Content. The OPG and Strategy Plans Team should together prepare a briefing
to provide the following to the COMAFOR and JFACC:
Adversary situation
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(6) Time and space factors. The capability to move to and reinforce initial
positions.
(7) Combat efficiency. The state of training, readiness, battle experience,
physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline,
and significant strengths and weaknesses.
Friendly military situation (including status of multinational participation).
Interagency situation (including the status of US agencies (such as the State
Department) and international agencies (such as the United Nations), which the
JFC must support or which are conducting activities in support of the JFC and
combatant command. In particular, what air capabilities are operated by these
agencies?
Status of the joint operations area (infrastructure, terrain, etc.)
o Mission statements
JFC
COMAFFOR and JFACC
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o COA Analysis.
Review of wargaming efforts.
Add considerations from own experience.
o COA Comparison.
Description of comparison criteria and comparison methodology.
Weigh strengths/weaknesses with respect to comparison criteria.
o COA recommendations:
The combined A‐Staff and AOC planning team’s recommendation based on
analysis and comparison results and consideration.
Special considerations from either staff.
o All principal staff directors and division chiefs should attend this briefing or be linked
by video teleconference.
o Typically, the Strategy Plans Team chief and OPG chief brief the COMAFFOR and
JFACC on the process, governing factors and other criteria, and recommended COA.
o If necessary (or the COMAFFOR or JFACC desires), the staffs present any special
considerations that could affect the COMAFFOR and JFACC’s decision.
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2. COMAFFOR and JFACC selects/modifies COA.
• The COMAFFOR and JFACC may approve the staff’s recommendation, as is.
• They may choose to modify the COAs, possibly by combining the best elements of two
or more COAs.
• If they deem it necessary, they may direct the staff to further develop one or more
COAs.
• The COMAFFOR and JFACC should direct the staff how they want the staffs to proceed
with preparing a briefing or message to obtain the JFC’s approval of the air COA and on
developing the approved COA into an OPORD and a JAOP.
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4. Prepare decision briefing, message, or Commander’s Estimate for JFC approval.
• Air planners should be aware of the need to synchronize the air COA with the JFC’s
concept and with the COAs/plans of the other components.
○ Example: In the six months leading up to the execution of OIF, CENTCOM brought
together all of their components, for a week at a time at 4 to 6 week intervals, to
synchronize their evolving plans.
• Each component will submit their selected COA to the JFC for approval.
• The JFC uses this approval process to ensure his/her component commander’s plans are
synchronized with the JFC’s concept and intent.
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: A combined A‐Staff and AOC COA decision brief which
discusses all relevant COMAFFOR and JFACC elements should be presented.
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JOPPA STEP 7
PLAN/ORDER DEVELOPMENT
Executive Summary: Each of the JFC’s component commanders, including both the COMAFFOR
and JFACC, are required to supplement the JFC’s plan or order with a component plan or order.
An Operations Order (OPORD) is the COMAFFOR’s supplement to the JFC’s plan or order. A
Joint Air and Space Operations Plan (JAOP) is the JFACC’s supplement to the JFC’s plan or order.
Use the JOPPA to organize branch and/or sequel planning activities. The Strategy Plans Team
for the JFACC and/or A3/5 for the COMAFFOR can initiate branch and/or sequel planning or be
tasked by a higher authority. Numerous branches and/or sequels may be simultaneously
tasked. Thus, the best solution is to begin branch and/or sequel planning during crisis action
planning.
COMAFFOR OPORD Development Steps
1. Develop paragraphs of base plan/order
• Review approved COMAFFOR COA and JOPPA data
• Finalize intent statement and CONOPS
• Assign production tasks for five‐paragraph plan/order
• Develop detailed plans for each phase
2. Develop appropriate annexes
3. Synchronize COMAFFOR order with other component and supporting plans/orders
4. Publish and disseminate upon approval
A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: The COMAFFOR and JFACC each require their own supporting
plan/order. Therefore, the AOC and A‐Staff should function independently to develop their
commander’s order or plan.
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Step 7: Plan/Order Development
1. Develop paragraphs of the OPORD and JAOP.
• Review the COMAFFOR or JFACC’s COA and JOPPA data as the framework to be
expanded into the OPORD or JAOP.
o Approved Air COA provides the framework on which to develop the concept of
operations.
• Finalize the COMAFFOR’s or JFACC’s intent statements and concept of operations.
o The intent statement should include end state and purpose and may include risk
and/or key tasks.
o An end state is a set of conditions at a point in time. The intent statement expresses
the end state conditions the commander intends to achieve at that point in time and
the “purpose”, that is the reason for achieving those conditions.
o The JFACC and COMAFFOR’s intent for the campaign should articulate the end state
conditions to be produced by joint air power.
o The concept of operations should express “how” the COMAFFOR or JFACC will
accomplish the essential tasks expressed in their mission statement to produce the
end state conditions expressed in the intent statement.
• Assign production tasks for the five‐paragraph plan/order. The Strategy Plans Team
Chief normally has the responsibility to lead production of the JFACC’s JAOP and the A‐
3/5 normally has the responsibility to lead production of the COMAFFOR’s OPORD.
o Use the 5‐paragraph “SMEAC” format.
o See CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES) Volume II for
guidance (Planning Formats and Guidance)
o See further guidance in JP 3‐30.
• Considerations for writing the JAOP or OPORD base plan.
o Paragraph 1: Situation
General/guidance: Summarize theater environment and overall JFC mission,
guidance, intent, prioritized effects, specified tasks for the COMAFFOR or JFACC
and established supporting‐supported relationships among components
Area of concern: AOR boundary, area of interest (AOI), and so forth.
Enemy forces: Overview of the hostile threat, COGs.
Friendly forces: Overview of friendly capabilities, COGs.
Assumptions: List as required.
Legal considerations: List as required.
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o Paragraph 2: Mission
Place the JFACC mission statement in the mission paragraph of the JAOP and the
COMAFFOR mission statement in the mission paragraph of the OPORD.
o Paragraph 3: Execution
CONOPS (air and space operations): COMAFFOR or JFACC’s intent, objectives
and operational employment concepts.
Tasks: Develop detailed plans for each phase to include:
The priority effects and timing the COMAFFOR or JFACC needs from
supporting Components.
COMAFFOR’s OPORD:
• Should include a detailed plan of supporting, deployment,
maintenance, sustainment, and redeployment for each phase of
the operation.
JFACC’s JAOP:
• Should include a detailed plan for each phase of the operation.
The strategy‐to‐task methodology (a hierarchy of objectives and
tasks) provides a useful framework for developing a coherent plan
for each phase of the operation.
• For the phases in which we expect to conduct combat operations,
the TET will associate selected targets with appropriate tactical
tasks and will develop a phase targeting allocation plan. The plan
should show, by objective, how the targets will be serviced over
the length of the phase.
• SPT guides TET’s development and maintenance of the phase
targeting allocation plan primarily by prioritizing TOs and
establishing the time by which TOs should be achieved.
• The Strategy Division guides, but TET is responsible to develop
and maintain the phase targeting apportionment. This phased
targeting has also been referred to as a Joint Air Apportionment
Plan, but is only a macro view of the underlying phase targeting
plan.
Guidance to subordinates when appropriate.
Coordinating instructions: Consider commands to which the COMAFFOR or
JFACC will send LNOs/ACCEs. Include the COMAFFOR’s or JFACC’s CCIRs. Include
DIRLAUTH, where appropriate.
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o Paragraph 4: Administration and Logistics
Concept of support not normally used in JFACC’s JAOP but critical to
COMAFFOR’s OPORD.
Logistics: Broad sustainment concepts for air, space and information operations,
logistics phases synchronized with operations phases.
Other potential sub‐paragraphs include: PA, Civil affairs, Geospatial information,
and Medical services.
o Paragraph 5: Command and Control
Command: Command relationships; Memorandum of understanding (MOU);
Designation and location of all air capable command headquarters; Continuity of
operations.
Command, control, and communications (C3): General overview of C3 systems
and procedures required to support air and space operations.
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2. Develop appropriate annexes.
• OPORD and JAOP annexes are written for a functional domain‐specific audience and
contain technical details necessary to C2 air and space operations across the joint force.
• Ensure OPORD and JAOP annexes provide adequate guidance to air and space capable
component forces.
• Ensure annexes, appendices, and associated pieces comply with general sequential
structure outlined in CJCJM 3122‐03A.
• While CJCJM 3122‐03A suggests a list of Annex topics, use only those appropriate to the
OPORD or JAOP.
(1)
The COMAFFOR OPORD will contain the principal information for these annexes.
o Operations
Include the Strategy‐to‐Task matrix as part of the JAOP operations annex.
o Logistics
In the JFACC’s JAOP, it is a list of broad sustainment concepts for air, space and
information operations, and the broad logistics limitations and phases
synchronized with operations phases for all joint forces which the JFACC
exercises TACON.
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In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is a list of sustainment concepts followed with
detailed information of concept and phasing in the logistics annex for all AF
forces which the COMAFFOR exercises OPCON.
o Personnel
Normally not used in the JFACC’s JAOP.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is list of personnel concepts followed with
detailed information of concept and phasing in the personnel annex.
o Public Affairs
In the JFACC’s JAOP, it is a list of broad public affairs concepts for air, space and
information operations, and the broad public affairs plan synchronized with
operations phases.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is list of public affairs concepts followed with
detailed information of concept and phasing in the public affairs annex.
o Civil Affairs
Normally not used in the JFACC’s JAOP.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is list of civil affairs concepts followed with
detailed information of concept and phasing in the civil affairs annex.
o Weather
In the JFACC’s JAOP, it is a list of broad weather factors effecting air, space and
information operations.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is list of weather concepts followed with detailed
information of concept and phasing to include weather support to all the
COMAFFOR’s units.
o Geospatial information
In the JFACC’s JAOP, it is a list of broad geospatial factors effecting air, space and
information operations.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD, it is list of geospatial concepts followed with
detailed information of concept and phasing in the geospatial annex.
o Medical services
Normally not used in the JFACC’s JAOP.
In the COMAFFOR’s OPORD it is list of medical concepts followed with detailed
information of concept and phasing in the medical annex.
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o Command and Control (C2).
Command considerations:
1. Command relationships.
2. Memorandum of understanding (MOU).
3. Designation and location of all air capable command headquarters.
4. Continuity of operations.
o Command, control, and communications (C3) considerations:
General overview of C3 systems and procedures required to support air and
space operations.
3. Synchronize OPORD and JAOP with other Component and Supporting Plans.
Synchronization is on‐going throughout OPORD and JAOP development. Additionally, it
must continue as components continue to alter plans to address the conditions in the
battlespace.
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A‐STAFF & AOC RELATIONSHIP: Each commander, the COMAFFOR and JFACC, requires a
supplement to the JFC’s order or plan, and each supplement should be limited to aspects of the
operation within that commander’s authority. While the A‐Staff should develop the
COMAFFOR’s OPORD and the AOC Strategy Plans Team should develop the JFACC’s JAOP, both
staffs must ultimately work together and help the other with elements of each plan or order as
appropriate in order to meet the needs of both the COMAFFOR and the JFACC.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Used in This Handbook & As Defined by JP 1‐02
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RFI request for information
ROE rules of engagement
RUF rules for the use of force
SPT Strategy Plans Team (not in JP 1‐02)
STO special technical operations
TET targeting effects team
TO tactical objective (not in JP 1‐02)
TPFDD time‐phased force and deployment data
TSA target system analysis
TT tactical task (not in JP 1‐02)
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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