SOVIET STRATEGY AND NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

Author(s): William K. Sullivan

Source: Naval War College Review , July-August 1979, Vol. 32, No. 4 (July-August 1979),
pp. 26-38
Published by: U.S. Naval War College Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641912

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 26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Soviet expansion into the Nordic region may be intended to isolate that
Western influence. Such action would give the Soviets access to the harbor
and strategic geography of Scandinavia. The resolution of this Nort
problem is seen as a naval issue and this paper argues that NATO's respon
come primarily from afloat.

SOVIET STRATEGY AND NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

by

Captain William K. Sullivan, U.S. Navy

Introduction. In the last 3 years, an examine why a limited and isolated

unprecedented buildup of Soviet mili- attack into NATO's Northern Flank
tary forces and supporting facilities has may be a high priority Soviet military
been underway along NATO's Northern option.
Flank. Considering the relative strength
of NATO's presence in the area, the Northwestern Region Defined. From
environmentally hostile Kola Peninsulathe Soviet geographic perspective, the
now hosts an inordinate concentration area of concern might well be desig-
nated the Northwestern Region. For
of Russian naval, ground, and airpower.
The magnitude of this buildup hardly purposes of discussion the Northwestern
seems defensive in nature and may notRegion is that area encompassing the
be aimed at Norway alone. Militarily Kola Peninsula; the White Sea; that part
deterred in Central Europe, the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. west of the White Sea
may be reaching around the continent Canal System connecting with the Gulf
to exert primary pressure on its edges. of Finland; the countries of Finland,
An end run through Scandinavia and the Sweden (including the Island of Got-
adjacent seas to reach the Atlantic land), and Norway (including Jan
Ocean may be the next best alternative Mayen Island and the Svalbard Archi-
to an attack in Central Europe. Hence, pelago); and the surrounding waters of
it is appropriate to examine the reasons the Barents Sea, Greenland Sea, Nor-
why such an incursion into this north- wegian Sea, North Sea, Danish Straits,
ern region would be tempting to Soviet Baltic Sea, Gulf of Bothnia, and Gulf of
military planners. We shall, therefore, Finland.
investigate the significance of this region In Soviet eyes this Northwestern
from the Russian viewpoint and Region is presumably a crucial strategic

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 27

factor in the East/West balance of any action against Denmark would

likely involve an attack in mainland
power. Seizure of key territory by the
Soviets would likely result in the Nordic
Central Europe. Such is not the case in
balance swinging decisively in favor the
of Northwestern Region, where Soviet
the East. Sweden and the Svalbard flanking movements of the land areas
cited above could be made through the
Archipelago may be the only exceptions
in probable Soviet designs on the North-
Norwegian and North Seas on the north-
west and the Baltic Sea on the south-
western Region. Russian military occu-
east, eventually tying the knot at the
pation of Svalbard might further inten-
sify the worldwide political backlashDanish
the Straits. Occupying Denmark is
Soviets would accept as a result ofrecognized
an as necessary to full and
attack on Norway and Finland, for unhindered control of the Baltic exit
Svalbard (including Bear Island, half- chokepoint; however, the Soviets would
way to Norway) is open to economic hold the trump card for exit and en-
exploitation to the 41 nations (in- trance rights by virtue of their over-
cluding the United States and U.S.S.R.) whelming presence if they occupied
who signed the Treaty of Spitsbergen in Norway, Finland, and the surrounding
Paris on 9 February 1920. This treaty seas. This control would be reinforced
further specifies that the Svalbard com- through their use of East German and
plex, even though recognized as sover- Polish naval forces to protect the
eign Norwegian territory, shall not be southern littoral of the Baltic Sea.
militarized. Only the Soviet Union and
Norway are presently exploiting Regional Threat Reviewed. The
Svalbard 's rich coal mines; however, magnitude of the Soviet threat in
offshore oil exploration has been Northern Scandinavia is staggering.
attempted by several international oil Along 100 kilometers of the ice-free
companies with indefinite results.1 In coast of the Kola Peninsula some 800
any case, Soviet occupation of Svalbard ships and submarines of the Soviet
would probably be unnecessary as West- Northern Fleet, based in the Murmansk
ern lines of communication to the area, use the passages off the Nor-
Archipelago could easily be severed wegian
by coast to gain access to the
the interposition of Soviet naval forces oceans. With the Soviet Baltic Fleet
across the Greenland and Norwegian acting as the southern maritime flank
Seas. force, the Russians have extended their
As for Sweden, Russia, in all proba- maritime forward deployment line out
bility, would hesitate to invade this to Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes.
small but relatively powerful neutral. With the development of the Soviet
Instead, the Soviets may count on SS-N-8 Submarine Launched Ballistic
achieving eventual political dominance, Missile (SLBM), with a range in the
or at least the "Finlandization" of order of 4,500 miles, Soviet sub-
Sweden, through complete encircle- marines (in addition to covering targets
ment, thereby isolating the Swedeswithin from the entire NATO landmass) can
their basic Western influences and in- now strike at targets in the United
terests.2 States from protected waters close to
Although considered part of Scandi- the Norwegian coast. Any Western
navia, Denmark is not included in the counteraction against this SLBM threat
Northwestern Region, primarily because must, of necessity, be concentrated on
it is more associated with actions within areas close to the Norwegian coast.
or against Central Europe. Denmark is This threat has transformed the north-
also the only Nordic country belonging ern maritime geographic region into
to the European Community. Hence, one not merely of important transit

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28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and passage but also of potential Kola Peninsula, a force that could be
inter-
national conflict. further reinforced by three divisions
The Soviet Northern Fleet is the most flown in from other Military Districts.
powerful of the four Soviet fleets. Its Within 10 days the Soviet command
greatest strength lies in 180 submarines. could commit 12-14 divisions -com-
Additionally this fleet includes 50 per- pared with the elements of only 3
cent of Soviet Navy cruiser strength and NATO divisions. This is possible because
60 percent of Soviet Navy oceangoing their reinforcement capability is being
escorts and ASW forces. In combination continuously improved by expanded
with the Baltic Fleet, 70 percent of theroad and rail links between Kola, the
Soviet submarine force is concentrated in rear areas of the Leningrad MD and even
the Northwestern Region. the Baltic MD. Integration of the Soviet
The primary naval aviation assets of and Finnish railway networks also
the Northern Fleet are entirely shore- would give the Soviets the capacity to
based (though KA-25 helicopters and transfer a further 12 divisions and com-
YAK-36 aircraft are carried aboard mit them along a westerly axis of
some Soviet surface units). Northern advance.
Fleet naval aviation operates long- and Soviet Air Force units in the area
medium-range bombers in the maritime maintain an air strength of about 300
reconnaissance role and medium aircraft on the Kola Peninsula, including
bombers for antishipping strike mis-
100 all-weather interceptors, 100
sions. Land-based maritime patrol air-20 medium transports and 60
bombers,
craft, amphibians, and helicopters are Sixteen of the local Soviet
helicopters.
used in an antisubmarine/ASW recon- airfields have runways in excess of
naissance role. 2,000 meters and can thus be used for
As for land forces, the Soviet com- flying in reinforcements.3
mand maintains one motorized rifle divi- Aware of the severe geographic con-
sion close to the Norwegian border with a straints imposed by the Baltic Sea, the
second deployed immediately to the Soviets have been transferring more
south of the Finnish border. These divi- ships from the Baltic Fleet to the
sions consist of one tank regiment and Northern Fleet, some through the White
three motorized rifle regiments, with a Sea Canal System. However, the 35
greater than normal allowance of am- submarines and 60 major warships that
phibious and snow-movement vehicles. remain with the Baltic Fleet are a
In addition, a brigade of Soviet Naval formidable force in this region consider-
Infantry is deployed in the area with a ing the supplementary Warsaw Pact
strength of 2,000 men, 30 light am- naval assets of the Baltic nations of
phibious tanks, 10 medium tanks, Poland and East Germany. Also of great
armored personnel carriers, artillery, importance in the Baltic are major
and multiple-rocket launchers. This Soviet naval repair and support facilities
brigade regularly practices assault/ that represent two-thirds of the repair
amphibious landings in the Kola area facilities that would be needed for their
and, when exercises involve additional fleets to operate in the Atlantic.4
Soviet infantry forces, the latter forces The question arises, "Why such a
are moved in merchant marine freighters formidable force?" Certainly it is not
followed by transfer to landing ships/ defensive in nature.
landing craft. Reinforcing these infan-
try/naval infantry units are five divisions
Strategic Significance of the North-
from the southern areas of the Lenin- western Theater. The Norwegian, North,
grad Military District (MD). One Sovietand Barents Seas lie between the bases
airborne division is also stationed on the of the Soviet Northern and Baltic

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 29

Fleets. Control of the Nordic sea and Norway's eight major airfields, many
land areas is essential for these fleets to built with NATO funds, are of major
enjoy unhindered access to and from importance. "In Western hands, they
open seas. Because of its natural geo- threaten Soviet air support in any con-
flict in the vicinity of the GIUK Gap,
graphic constraints, the Soviet Union, in
the event of war with the Westernbut, in Soviet hands, they could greatly
powers, may first want to secure extend
the the reach of Russian land-based
Northwestern Region in order to accom-
air in the Atlantic, perhaps with decisive
results."9 From bases near Murmansk
plish the following objectives: (1) ob-
tain access to the airfields, harbors, and
the unrefueled subsonic combat radius
strategic geography of Scandinavia;5of (2)the Backfire bomber is 2,650 nautical
prevent NATO's aircraft carrier forces miles, allowing it to reach ships trans-
from entering the Norwegian Sea iting and the mid-Atlantic from the United
attacking targets in the Kola PeninsulaStates to Europe. 1 0 Realizing that this
with tactical aircraft; (3) intercept sea-
threat exists, allied ships unaccom-
lift forces resupplying allied forces panied
in by defensive air cover would
Europe; (4) protect, support, and carryhave to transit via southern Atlantic
out amphibious operations to other sealanes in order to stay out of range of
strategically important areas; (5) pre-the Backfire. However, from bases in
Norway the unrefueled range of the
vent amphibious assaults or raids against
northern Russia; (6) prevent NATO Backfire bomber would be extended to
from using Scandinavian countries as further cover these southern Atlantic
forward bases for allied air and sea sealanes.
forces;6 (7) increase Soviet strategicFrom a maritime aspect, Norway,
ballistic missile offensive and defensive with its excellent harbors, is also capa-
capabilities, as the Northeast Atlantic is ble of accommodating all the fleets of
the key to mutual Soviet and American the world in its protected, ice-free
vulnerability from strategic missiles. The waters.11 Use of the easily defended
shortest route for exchange of inter- ports and anchorages in the Norwegian
continental missiles between the super- fjords by the Soviet Navy would signifi-
powers is an extension of the great cantly increase the reaction time for
circle route from Canada and Greenland their ships to enter the North Atlantic
in the West, via Iceland, to the Scandi- Ocean and decrease the length of their
navian countries and return.7 Each of sea logistic lines to supply these ships.
these objectives is examined below: Next in order of strategic significance
is Sweden. Sweden has an impressive
Obtain access to the airfields, har- array of military facilities for a small
bors, and strategic geography of Scandi- neutral nation. Command posts and
navia. In the Northwestern Region, con- naval installations have been built
trol of the seas is a prerequisite for underground, and aircraft and ships are
control of the landmasses of Scandi- sheltered in tunnels blasted from
navia. Recognizing this, the Sovietgranite. Supply dumps, power stations,
factories, and other vital installations
Union has gradually been extending its
pattern of naval operations from the
are in rock caverns, and the great
fleet base areas of the Baltic and Barents majority of military equipment is manu-
Seas to the forward defense zone offactured domestically.12 The Swedish
Western naval strategy in the NorthAir Force deserves special note. It is one
of the best trained and most modern in
Atlantic, the strategic Greenland-Ice-
land- United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap.8 the world, composed of more than 450
The eastern boundary of this ex- combat aircraft, mostly of Swedish
tended sea area is Norway. Northern design and manufacture.13 Many of

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30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

these aircraft constantly patrol the

tion, involving all of the remaining Euro-
Baltic and another segment is pean
main-nations and the United States.
tained on ready alert. The invulner-
ability of many of these military facili- Prevent NATO's aircraft carrier forces
ties and weapons systems and Sweden's from entering the Norwegian Sea and
ability to employ strike aircraft against attacking targets in the Kola Peninsula
major Soviet facilities in Murmansk may area with tactical aircraft. The Barents
deter the Soviets from attempting a Sea, via the Norwegian Sea, offers the
surprise attack directly into Sweden.14 best geographic operating area and the
The third nation in Scandinavia is closest point of approach for carrier
Finland. While Finnish Armed Forces forces to attack the vast complex of
military and industrial targets in north-
pose no threat to the Soviet Union they
are sufficiently strong and well trained western
to Russia, particularly in the Kola
make a conventional attack somewhat Peninsula. The same would be true for
costly for the Soviets.1 5 Yet Finland,ships
in and submarines capable of launch-
ing cruise missiles. Hence, command of
Russian hands, would provide the Soviets
with an occupied Nordic buffer state these
as a seas is essential for the Soviets to
northern extension of the Warsaw Pact protect their own northern flank. Soviet
eastern European alignment. This wouldrealization of this fact was indicated in
their first naval maneuvers conducted on
be a tempting expansion in the tradi-
a worldwide scale, Okean 1970, in which
tional Soviet strategic style of protecting
the homeland from "Western invasions" the entire task force operating in the
through buffer states. Norwegian Sea was committed against a
Regarding Denmark, as previously hostile strike force deployed to this area.
noted, it is questionable whether it would The Soviet naval forces consisted of
be necessary for the Soviets to occupy forces drawn from the Northern, Baltic,
this country in order to secure the and Black Sea Fleets.16 In Exercise
Northwestern Region. Denmark's stra- Okean 1975 the Soviets again under-
tegic importance astride the narrow scored their concern for the Northwest-
Danish Straits certainly exceeds the ern Region by deploying the largest
modest size and strength of its armed number of naval units in this area, "more
forces. While the country is particularly than one hundred in the Baltic and the
vulnerable to amphibious assault, an at- North Seas."1 7
tack on Denmark might be interpreted as
an immediate threat to Central Europe Intercept sealift forces resupplying
and could signal Soviet intentions to allied forces in Europe. The primary
expand a northern thrust beyond its NATO reinforcement supply line from
immediate objective of securing only the the United States traverses the North Sea
Northwestern Region. Possession of Nor- en route to the Benelux countries. With
way would be sufficient to give the hegemony over the Northwestern Re-
Soviets a predominant geographic advan- gion, the Soviets would derive the addi-
tage in gaining quick control of the tional benefit of access to numerous
Danish Straits as the need arises. By not deepwater ports, particularly in Nor-
attacking Denmark, the Soviets would way's ice-free fjords. Those fjords would
gamble that the Western powers may provide safe havens for their submarines
choose to interpret the invasion in the to interdict North Atlantic sealanes.18
Northwestern Region as a limited en- From Norway the Soviets would be in
velopment and, therefore, decide not to optimum position to threaten more di-
come to the aid of the Nordic countries. rectly the already relatively vulnerable
A military response from the West would NATO logistic lifeline. If the Soviets were
certainly escalate into a wider confronta-to occupy only the Northwestern

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 31

Theater, it would remain to be seen if amphibious assaults or raids

Prevent
France would feel sufficiently threatened
against northern Russia. Lest we forget,
to reopen the NATO LOC through her
Germany occupied Norway (and Den-
territory. But the loss of southern mark) Nor-
during World War II ostensibly as a
way would provide the Soviets a more
buffer against seaborne invasion of the
direct invasion route to Britain and homeland on their northern flank.20
would immediately threaten Belgium,
From a strictly military viewpoint, con-
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Westtrol of Norway would also be Soviet
Germany in wartime, thus flanking insurance against any invasion or raid
France. against Russia on their own northern
flank and protection for the vast ship-
Protect, support, and carry out building and merchant marine capacity
amphibious operations to other strategi- located in this area,2 1 particularly in the
cally important areas. Once tactical Baltic, where the primary logistic support
maneuvers associated with occupying facilities for the Soviet maritime
the Northwestern Region were com- establishment are located.2 2
pleted and the region secured, the
Soviets would be in a more optimum
Prevent NATO from using Scandi-
navian countries as forward bases for
position to project amphibious and air-
allied air and sea forces. An analysis of
borne power further west in other stra-
Soviet air capability for the MIG-21 and
tegic roles. In the event of full-scale war,
23 in the Northwestern Region23 indi-
it would be advantageous for the Soviets
cates that allied tactical aircraft with
to control the vital land areas of Green-
similar range characteristics could launch
land, Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Shetland
from bases in Norway, Sweden, and
Islands, and Orkney Islands in order to
Finland and strike against the huge com-
provide protection for their naval forces
plex of military and maritime targets in
entering or leaving the Atlantic Ocean.
the northern parts of Russia, Poland, and
The Soviet amphibious and airborne
East Germany. Additionally, the numer-
forces are well groomed for the mission
ous islands and fjords of Scandinavia
of eliminating the one definite advan-
offer havens for small attack boats capa-
tage NATO now has in the north, its
superior geographical position along the
ble of operating clandestinely against
strategic Greenland-Iceland-United Soviet naval targets. Hence, Soviet con-
trol of the water and land areas in the
Kingdom Gap. Strategically, it would be
advisable for the Soviets to secure both Northwestern Region would also prevent
the use of this area for bases for allied air
ends of the Gap and the intervening
island chain. Soviet control of the GIUK and sea forces to operate against Warsaw
Pact targets.
Gap would provide them excellent base
locations for gaining quick access to Increase Soviet strategic ballistic
many of the world's most vital sea lines missile offensive and defensive capabili-
of communication. Iceland, in particu- ties. The Northwestern Region lies be-
lar, is key to this control, because from neath the shortest missile route between
this country it is possible to maintain Russia and the United States. If the
constant three-dimensional surveillance
Soviets were to occupy this region they
of the Atlantic. It would also be pos-would realize a significant increase in
sible from Iceland to conduct combat their strategic weapons capabilities.
operations against hostile submarine, "Additional warning time, improved
accuracy to targets, defensive missile
air, and surface units that might attempt
to move into the Northwestern Region. screens and tracking stations, launching
sites external to mother Russia, reduced
Thus, occupation of this island is essen-
tial for control of the North Atlantic.1 9
missile flight distances with greater

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32 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

payloads, and greater dispersionFlank. are The political and economic insta-
among the favorable factors the North- bility of the NATO countries of the
western Region affords the occupying Mediterranean littoral, particularly Tur-
»»2 4
power. key and Italy, stands in marked contrast
to the relative durability of those gov-
Underlying Soviet Reasons. There are erned by democratic systems in the
other less obvious reasons that may Northwestern Region. Thus, the Soviets
entice the Soviets to initiate limited may perceive that NATO's Southern
hostilities in the Northwestern Region Flank will eventually crumble without
independent of actions on the Central any military action on their part, while
Front of Europe or into the Southern the Northwestern Region may require
Flank of NATO. The limited, remote more drastic measures in order to alter
area attack scenario in the north appears the Nordic power balance in their favor.
to represent a credible Soviet action • Here also in the Northwestern
from several standpoints. Region, the Soviets would have no
• "Vulnerabilities on NATO's face-to-face confrontation with U.S.
Northern Flank derive not only from
forces. No extraregional NATO ground
the threat, but also from the forces
absenceare located
of in this area because of
regional
geographic cohesion, a logically political considerations.27
inte-
Additionally, deployment of NATO
grated defense concept, and inadequacy
of specific force commitmentsnaval
andforces
re- to this area is extremely
sources."25 In part, these deficiencies
limited, essentially exercise deploy-
ments instead
stem from a lack of intraregional co-of continual presence
operation among Nordic countries inlow priority given to the
because of the
political, economic, and military af-
region compared with such other areas
as the Mediterranean.28
fairs.26 Regional vulnerabilities may The consider-
also be attributable to a limited able distance from the major America-
presence on the part of the United Europe reinforcement and resupply sea
States and other NATO nations by routes29 would inhibit a rapid U.S.
virtue of regional political realities.
naval response to a Soviet attack in the
However, the fact that we are currently
Northwestern Region. It would require
emphasizing the defense of Central
8 to 10 days to deploy a carrier task
Europe may also be contributing to the force to the Norwegian Sea from bases
problem; the Soviets may be tempted on to the eastern seaboard.30 Airfields
take advantage of our tunnel vision on capable of handling U.S. airlift aircraft
the Central Front. An attack in the would likely be seized immediately
north probably would not be blunted uponin a Soviet thrust into the region,
an immediate sense as it might be thereby
on the preventing the United States
Central Front. Here is an area in which from landing troops to impede militarily
Soviet naval forces can best be broughtor politically the Soviet advance. The
to bear in support of a land attack. key consideration, then, is whether
Hence, the Soviets may believe that in NATO, and primarily the United States,
invading this region they could avoid would be able to achieve a presence in
the military and political risks associ- the area prior to the Soviets gaining
ated with a protracted confrontation in control. Considering the distances in-
Central Europe. volved and the lack of a continuous
• While the internal political situa- NATO naval presence, it is unlikely the
tions in the Nordic countries are far West could respond in a timely credible
from optimum, they are models of manner.

stability when compared to the disarray • More important than evading a

that exists along NATO's Southern face-to-face confrontation with U.S.

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 33

troops in the Northwestern Northern

Region Fleet
is ships underway at 30
the avoidance of NATO tactical nuclear knots, the 1,469 nautical miles between
weapons. There are no regionally basedMurmansk and Oslo, Norway can be
nuclear weapons to be encountered im-traversed in 49 hours. Ships of the
Baltic Fleet can complete the encircle-
mediately by the Soviets in a thrust into
the Northwestern Region.31 Therefore, ment and move from Leningrad to Oslo
the Soviets may perceive that there in the same time (the 960 nautical miles
would be no risk that the situation in distance would be covered at slower
this region would escalate to the level of speeds, averaging about 20 knots, while
a general nuclear war as it might on the in the more confined waters of the
Central Front.3 2 Baltic Sea). From the allied viewpoint,
• While a surprise attack against the the actual destination of the Soviet
Central Front by the Warsaw Pact land ships would not be known, and the
forces could be launched with little movement might be interpreted as mas-
warning,33 prudence would dictate that sive naval support for an attack on the
such a move be accompanied by a Central Front. Having diverted their
massive movement of Soviet naval resources for an anticipated attack into
forces to open seas, and particularly
Central Europe the allies would find
themselves unable to respond immedi-
into the mid- Atlantic Ocean, 8-10 days
in advance of the ground thrust. Ifately
thisin Scandinavia. Once the Soviets
did not occur, ships and submarineshadofconsolidated their gains in the
the Northern Fleet might be trappedNorthwestern Region and the situation
north of the GIUK Gap by allied had
naval
stabilized, they would then be in
forces establishing a barrier at thisoptimum
stra- position to project naval and
tegic chokepoint shortly after airpower
the from bases in Norway into the
Soviets initiated hostilities in Central mid-Atlantic in about half the time it
Europe. Ships and submarines of the would take from Murmansk. An
Baltic Fleet, the second largest Sovieteventual attack into Central Europe
fleet, would likely be isolated in the could then be accomplished with less
Baltic Sea by mines implanted in the warning time.
Danish Straits. Realizing that this situa- • In 1 976 Norway started exporting
tion somewhat compromises the con- oil for the first time. Peak production of
cept of a blitzkrieg-style surprise attack 3.5 million barrels a day is expected by
(unless under the disguise of a massive 1985. 3 4 At this time, Western Europe's
fleet exercise), the Soviets might be dependency upon the Middle East for
reluctant to telegraph their intent in oil will decrease significantly.35 North
Central Europe with such high leadtime Sea oil could provide a major portion of
advance deployment of the bulk of the the oil needed for NATO military opera-
Northern and Baltic Fleets. However, a tions by 1980.36 Norway (specifically
thrust into the Northwestern Region Norwegian North Sea oil rigs) under
would not require the same advance Soviet domination would be a severe
fleet deployment measures necessary to economic blow to Western Europe and
support an attack into Central Europe. would also directly affect NATO's com-
Here the Soviets have optimum air cover bat ability.
for their naval forces. Under the disguise • Norway's merchant marine is also
of fleet exercises or from a standing a considerable asset to NATO. Gross
start, the main combat ships of the tonnage is in excess of 47.8 million
Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets, under tons, ranking fourth among world
protective air cover, would be in ideal powers.37 That portion of the Nor-
position in 2 days to support a thrust wegian merchant fleet that would be
into the Northwestern Region. For captured in port by the Soviets would

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34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

not be available to NATO for wartime along the coasts of Norway and Finland
contingency sealift purposes. to secure vital ship and air communica-
• Soviet forces receive intense cold tions facilities and deny their use for
weather training and have weaponsNATO reinforcement. Warsaw Pact
amphibious landings may also play a
systems specifically designed for opera-
tions in arctic climate.38 Additionally,major role in the attack, particularly
Soviet naval forces have more arctic along the Baltic littoral. Their role
experience than U.S. naval forces.39 would
In be to seize major islands and
cold weather climatic conditions, it ports, or take objectives ahead of the
might generally be conceded that the advancing ground forces. "While Soviet
Soviets would have a great advantage in naval infantry and airborne units will
the Northwestern Region if the attack operate against Norway, together with
occurred during the winter months. If ground units from the Leningrad-Kola
this were the case, the allies might be area, the Baltic effort would feature
reluctant to challenge Soviet forces combined and/or independently con-
operating in their natural element. ducted amphibious assaults by specially
trained Soviet, Polish, and East German
Hypothetical Plan of Attack. An amphibious (and airborne) forma-
examination of the geography and tions .... "4 2
demography of the Northwestern Soviet naval infantry may be assigned
Region indicates that any Soviet plan of multiple missions as in past exercises
attack would probably have fairly deep and, if required, withdrawn from
territorial objectives and involve the use secured objectives and recommitted im-
of regional land, sea, and air forces of mediately to other Baltic areas.43 Addi-
Russia, East Germany, and Poland. The tionally, Pact air forces will probably be
use of the forces of these other Warsaw used to attain air superiority and for
Pact Baltic powers would lend a degreeclose air support. Presumably a primary
mission of Pact naval and air forces
of "legitimacy" to an attack into the
Northwestern Region by involving non-
would be to prevent any allied attempt
Soviet national forces in a combined to mine the Danish Straits to impede
the movement of Soviet ships and
effort against the "common threat" on
their northern frontiers. Such a com- amphibious forces. Thus, territory in
bined effort would also be in keepingthe vicinity of the Baltic Sea exits
with "Soviet doctrine, which, while would likely be immediately seized in
emphasizing surprise and deception in order to facilitate an eventual linkup of
order to win the initiative, also insists the Northern and Baltic Fleets in the
on the launching of such an attack with Skagerrak north of Zealand.
superiority of all-arms force and sub- It would be to the Soviet's advantage
stantial reserve."40 Initially, as part of to complete the entire operation with
such an attack, the North Cape area of minimum exchange of fire and as ex-
Norway, which curves over northern peditiously as possible. In order to
Sweden and Finland and accounts for promote allied uncertainty and in-
Norway's short border with the decision the Soviets could, concurrent
U.S.S.R., would likely be outflanked by with the armed attack, proclaim to the
amphibious landings to neutralize Western nations that this action is being
coastal defenses in Norway from Narvik taken on a limited basis within the
south. An accompanying land move- confines of the Northwestern Region,
ment would probably be made through with no intention of invading Central
northern Finland to Narvik.41 Soviet Europe or Sweden for further territorial
airborne forces would likely be landed gains. The announced reasons for the
at key airfields in major cities and ports attack might be: (1) to assure that the

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 35

the basic
Northwestern Region is not used premise of NATO that any
in any
manner inimical to Warsaw Pact security
attack upon the territory of a member
interests; (2) to assure "secure" and of the Alliance shall be deemed an
extended Warsaw Pact maritime fron- attack upon all members.47 Specifi-
tiers along their northern border; (3) tocally, it should be emphasized that this
provide adequate territory along theapplies equally as well in the case of
Norway, despite its near proximity to
Soviet northwestern frontier for greater
"defense in depth"; and (4) to assure the
a U.S.S.R. and the fact that it is
nuclear "free zone" in the north (a within the naval "sphere of influence"
previous Soviet plan revived in 1975).44 of the Soviets. In order to reinforce the
The Soviets would be gambling that the importance of Norway to NATO it
Central European nations may not im- would be appropriate to realign and
mediately unify for a credible military rename the GIUK Gap to establish
response, in conjunction with the Norway rather than the U.K. as the
eastern terminus. Furthermore, the
United States, until after Pact territorial
gains were consolidated. Then it would NATO member nations should more
probably be too late, considering thefirmly support the roles of the Nordic
countries and their contributions to the
overwhelming superiority of Warsaw
Pact forces occupying the region. regional balance, to include:
(1) For Norway (and Den-
Means of Regaining the Regional mark): a willingness to station
Balance. There are certain political, eco- NATO forces and nuclear
nomic, and military moves possible on weapons on Norwegian (and
the part of the Western nations that Danish) territory, if requested. (2)
may assist in offsetting recent Soviet For Finland: an absolute respect
military quantitative gains in the area. for Finnish neutrality and for an
Specifically, the NATO decision- understanding of Finnish pro-
making processes during times of ten- nouncements which perforce sup-
sion or anticipated attack must be up- port for Soviet policies on
held (and preferably streamlined) in occasion. (3) For Sweden: a re-
order to neutralize the Soviet numerical spect for Sweden's nonalignment
advantage in military forces and also to which serves as the fulcrum for
exploit the natural geographic advan- Nordic balance because of
tages NATO has along its Northern Sweden's central geographical and
Flank.45 This is especially true in the political position between NATO
Baltic Sea as a belated decision to mine Denmark and Norway and neutral
the Danish Straits would result in the Finland .... 4 8
Soviet Fleet having unimpeded freedom In the area of economic moves, th
to complete the encirclement of development of Norway's oil resou
Sweden, Norway and Finland on their in the North Sea tend to link her more
southern flank. The time factor involved closely with the European economic
in the politicomilitary decisionmaking community, particularly Britain and
applies not only to mining decisions but West Germany.49 This results in greater
equally well to deployment of forces to Central European economic dependence
battle positions, including general on Norway than in the past. This factor
mobilization and early request for re- should be emphasized, with the im-
inforcements. In this regard it is im- plications of increased security measures
portant to recall that the cornerstone of on the part of NATO in favor of
NATO's deterrent strategy for the Norway. Further north, under the terms
Northern Flank is "Reinforcement."46 of the 1920 Paris Treaty, the Svalbard
It also would be wise to reaffirm often Archipelago provides the United States

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36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

with a means of increasing our eco- dable, there is a commanding case for
nomic presence in the area. We have looking
a anew at this concept.54 Nor-
reserved right to share in the natural wegian authorities recently made it clear
resources of the Archipelago under the that they would be prepared to accept
terms of the Paris Treaty,50 and per- stockpiling of certain types of equip-
haps this is now the time to take ment having a military value for defen-
advantage of that right. Our presence in sive operations.55 They are also now
the Norwegian territory of the Svalbard receptive to the establishment of NATO
may moderate any Soviet designs within training areas in Norway.56 While the
the Northwestern Region. Soviets have taken affront at this move,
Militarily, there is a need for an the Norwegians have cited the steady
increased Western naval presence in the and massive buildup of Soviet forces as
region. justification for similar reinforcement
Such a Western navy would by NATO. The prepositioning at least of
continuously be able, in response military equipment would be a signifi-
to any worldwide Soviet attempt cant step in improving NATO's defense
of power demonstration, to pose a posture as Norway's own capabilities are
threat to the Soviet maritime in- limited by manpower and resources.
fluence in the part of the world's The reinforcements to man this stock-
oceans where Soviet naval piled equipment could be more readily
presence is greatest and mostavailable
im- by increasing the presence of
portant for the Soviet Union NATO
her-marine forces afloat in the Nor-
self-in the Northeast Atlantic.51
wegian and Baltic Seas, perhaps as task
Considering the political and group elements of the proposed NATO
distance
factors that inhibit rapid allied rein-Naval Forces Norwegian and
Standing
forcement of the NATO northern Baltic Seas. Another alternative is to
flank,
it would seem prudent to permanently
increase the flexibility and commitment
of the Allied
deploy "counter pre-emptive" forces in Command Europe Mobile
the area. These forces might beForce to the
ships ofNorthern Flank with access
the West German Navy52 or,toperhaps
this prepositioned equipment. These
measures
more politically sound, Standing NATOwould be more politically
Naval Forces for the Baltic and Nor- acceptable to the Nordic nations in-
wegian Seas. The concept of these naval
forces would be similar to the existing
commands of NATO's Standing Naval
Force Atlantic and Standing Naval BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY
Force Channel. In the Norwegian Sea,
this force might consist of U.S., British, Captain William
Sullivan, a Naval
Danish, and Norwegian ships. In the
Flight Officer, gradu-
Baltic, force representation could in- ated from St. Francis
clude ships from the United States, West College, has done
Germany, Norway, and Denmark. These graduate work at the
NATO naval commands, while some- University of Cali-
what outnumbered in terms of Warsaw fornia, and has an
advanced degree from
Pact opposing forces, would at least Shippensburg State
enhance the deterrent concept inherent College. He commanded TACAIRCONRON
in naval presence in the area, while at 12, was Director of U.S. Navy Forces and
the same time demonstrating increased Systems Studies at the Army War College, and
has just joined the Management faculty of the
NATO unity.5 3
Naval War College.
Although the obstacles to preposi-
tioning men and equipment are formi-

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 SOVIET STRATEGY 37

asmuch as they do not result in an In this regard it would seem that the
increased NATO presence ashore in resolution of the security problem on
Scandinavian territory. NATO's Northern Flank is essentially a
naval issue. The political, economic, and
Conclusion. Until about 1970 NATO military considerations all have mari-
time connotations and are interwoven
could accept regional inferiority of its
land forces within the Northern Flank within the naval geography .of the area.
as long as allied naval forces in this When one considers the political sensi-
area were sufficiently superior to thetivity of increasing Western presence in
Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets. the area, particularly the implications of
While NATO naval superiority reigned
stationing troops ashore in the area
there was a modus vivendi of credibleversus keeping them afloat; the regional
deterrence. Now, however, the ratio of
economic exploitation associated with
opposing forces favors the Soviets. insular resources and offshore oil ex-
Therefore, considering the present ploration; and the geostrategic situation
priority of the U.S. commitment to that is militarily oriented in a naval
NATO it would seem appropriate to sense, onę must also conclude that
raise the level of regional deter- NATO's response should come primarily
rence.57 from afloat.

NOTES

1. Gordon Young, "Norway's Strategic Arctic Island," National Geographic, August 1978,
p. 269, and "A Quiet Norway, Soviet Feud," Christian Science Monitor, 8 June 1976, p. 8.
2. James L. George, ed., Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978).
3. John Erickson, Soviet- Warsaw Pact Force Levels (Washington: United States Strategic
Institute, 1976), USSI Report 76-2, pp. 72-73.
4. Michael Getier, "East Bloc Activity in Baltic," Washington Post, 2 May 1976, p. 16.
5. Gerald Synhorst, "Soviet Strategic Interest in the Maritime Arctic," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 1973, p. 105.
6. Christer Fredholm, "The North Atlantic: The Norwegian Sea, A Scandinavian Security
Problem," Naval War College Review, June 1972, pp. 62-63.
7. Hans Garde, "Where is the Western Navy? The World Wonders," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 1975, p. 21.
8. Ibid.
9. John Norris, "New Strategy for NATO's Northern Flank," Sea Power, December 1
p. 14.
10. William O'Neil, "Backfire: Long Shadow on the Sea-Lanes," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, March 1977, pp. 30-31.
11. John Roush, Jr., "Norway's Significance From a Military Point of View," Military
Review, July 1975, p. 18.
12. Julian Kerr, "Russ Worry Sweden," Omaha World-Herald, 28 April 1976, p. 33.
13. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1978-79 (London:
1978), p. 32.
14. John Fullerton, Scandinavia: The Busy Pivot Between East and West, Defense and
Foreign Affairs Digest, April 1978, p. 6.
15. Albert Romaneski, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
August 1973, p. 36.
16. John Erickson, "The Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," Strategic
Review, Summer 1976, p. 75.
17. Ibid., p. 76.
18. Romaneski, p. 36.
19. Fredholm, pp. 59-60.
20. Cook, p. 1.
21. Oxford Economic Atlas of the World, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1972), p. 86.

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38 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

22. Erwin M. Rau, "Russia and the Baltic Sea," Naval War College Review, Sept
p. 29.
23. Erickson, "Hie Northern Hieater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," p. 77.
24. Romaneski, p. 35.
25. Rodman C. Rainville, et al., "Flank Security Concepts and Forces," Future Trends in
the NATO Alliance (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, n.d.), p. 1.
26. John F. Meehan, "AFNORTH-NATO's Assailable Flank?" Military Review, January
1975, p. 9.
27. "U.S. Forces For Europe: Need for Phased Reduction," Defense Monitor, 12 December
1973, pp. 4-5.
28. Garde, pp. 22-23.
29. Clyde A. Smith, "Constraints of Naval Geography on Soviet Naval Power," Naval War
College Review, September-October 1974, p. 52.
30. Erickson, "Hie Northern Hieater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," p. 79.
31. "16,000 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Abroad," Defense Monitor, February 1975, pp. 6-7.
32. Hans Garde, "Hie Influence of Navies on the European Central Front," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, May 1976, p. 167.
33. White Paper 1975-1976, "Hie Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Development of the Federal Armed Forces" (Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office, 20
January 1976).
34. Arlene Hershman, Oil Crunch for the Next Decade, Dun s Review, October 1978, pp.
76, 81.
35. Richard Bailey, "Unequal Shares in the North Sea," Energy Policy, December 1978, p.
322.
36. George, ed., p. 141.
37. U.S. Lifelines (Washington: Department of the Navy, January 1978), p. 78.
38. Erich Sobik, "Soviet Army Winter Operations," Military Review, June 1973, p. 58.
39. Lawrence Griswold, "Hie Cold Front," Sea Power, December 1977, p. 20.
40. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," Military Review, January 1976,
p. 62.
41. Romaneski, p. 34, modified for author's premise.
42. Graham H. Turbiville, "Warsaw Pact amphib ops in Northern Europe," Marine Corps
Gazette, October 1976, p. 27.
43. Ibid., modified for author's premise.
44. Erickson, "Hie Northern Hieater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts." These reasons are
extracted in part from paaes 72, 73, and 81 and modified to suit the author's hypothesis.
45. Don Cook, "NATO Watches Reds' Baltic Outlet," Los Angeles Times, 10 May 1976, p.
1.
46. Joseph Palmer, "NATO's Tender Watery Flanks," Sea Power, March 1976, p. 37.
47. Desmund Wettern, "NATO's Northern Flank," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July
1969, p. 59.
48. Romaneski, p. 41.
49. Roush, p. 26.
50. Ibid., p. 22.
51. Garde, "Where is the Western Navy? The World Wonders," p. 23.
52. Erickson, "The Northern Hieater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," p. 81.
53. This concept is a modification of that multinational force noted by Edward Wegener in
"A Baltic Squadron for NATO?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1974, p. 70.
54. Erickson, Hie Northern Theater: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts, p. 81.
55. Fullerton.
56. Don Cook, "Norway Offers NATO Chilly Lessons," Los Angeles Times, 10 May 197
P. 1/7.
57. George, ed., pp. 142 and 143, modified for author's premise.

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