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The Spiral of Violence:

Insurgency and Counter-
Insurgency in Peru
a a
Jorge Nef & J. Vanderkop
a
Department of Political Science University of
Guelph Guelph, Ont. N1G 2W1
Published online: 06 May 2014.

To cite this article: Jorge Nef & J. Vanderkop (1988) The Spiral of Violence: Insurgency
and Counter-Insurgency in Peru, Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean
Studies / Revue canadienne des études latino-américaines et caraïbes, 13:26, 53-72,
DOI: 10.1080/08263663.1988.10816608

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 THE SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE:
INSURGENCY AND
COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN PERU

Jorge Nef and J. Vanderkop

Department of Political Science
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ont. N1G 2W1

Résumé. L'article explore le contexte, les cultures, les structures, les processus
et les effets de la recrudescence actuelle de violence dans le Pérou d'au jou rd 'hui
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(1980-1988). Malgré qu'il se concentre sur les activités des mouvements insur-
rectionnels -le MRTA et principalement aSendero Luminoso"- il place l'esca-
lade de violence du Pérou actuel dans une perspective systémique et historique
beaucoup plus vaste. Il y arrive en regardant la relation dialectique complexe
qui existe entre les formes de violence institutionnelles, répressives et insurrec-
tionnelles ainsi que celles qui existent entre ces formes et les circonstances socio-
économiques et politiques qui contribuent à son émergence et à sa reproduction.
Bien que les manifestations spécifiques des circonstances précitées sont typiques
de la crise profonde que connaît le Pérou d'aujourd'hui, cette étude illustre quel-
ques unes des contraintes qui subsistent dans beaucoup de procédés actuels de
démocratisation et de re-démocratisation sur le continent. L'article peut égale-
ment servir de méthodologie comparative pour une étude similaire d'autres
sociétés.
Abstract. The article explores the context, the cultures, the structures, the
processes and the effects of the current (1980-1988) spate of violence in contem-
porary Peru. Wh ile concentrating on the activities of insurgent movements -
the MRTA and especially aSendero Luminoso"- it places the escalating vio-
lence of present-day Peru in a mu ch broader systemic and historical perspective.
It does so by looking at the complex dialectical relationship among institutional,
repressive and insurrectional forms of violence and between these and the socio-
economic and political circumstanœs contributing toits emergence and reproduc-
tion. Although the specifie manifestations of the above-referred circumstances
are unique to the profound crisis of today 's Peru, this case study illustrates sorne
of the structural constraints extant in many of the current processes of «democrati-
sation" and aredemocratisation" in the Continent. It also offers a comparative
methodology for similar studies in other societies.

Canadian journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (1988), vol. 13, No.26: 53-72.

53
 I. INTRODUCTION
For the casual observer, the nearly ten-year-old spate of violence
in Peru may appear incongruous and exotic. Against a background of
Central America or the Southern Cone, Peru evokes, in the minds of
many, the image of a relatively "peaceful" Latin American society.
It has an elected and progressive social-democratie government un-
der the dynamic and youthfulleadership of Alan Garcia. The govern-
ment has taken a decisively nationalistic stand regarding debt
negotiations. 1 His predecessor, right-wing architect, Fernando Be-
lalinde Terry was also an elected leader who took power after the peace-
ful withdrawal of a unique and fairly reformist "Nasserite" military
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regime. 2 The latter, especially during the rule of General Juan Velas-
co Alvarado (1968-75) had embarked on an ambitious programme of
socio-economic reforms and national integration which counted on the
support of many of the country's poor and numerous left-wing poli-
ticians.3
The reality of present day Peru, however, is one characterised by
an acute state of confrontation and disintegration. While even a cur-
sory look at the historical record of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua
or Colombia would suggest that the current insurgencies there have
well-defined antecedents, Peru's circumstances seem less clear.
However, between 1980, the year in which the current wave of vio-
lence began, and 1987 more than 7,000 people died as a direct conse-
quence of political violence. Of these, 3,800 had been classified by
official sources as "guerrillas" and over 3,000 as "civilians". President
Garcia himself, in his state of the nation speech of July 28, 1988, puts
the figure as high as 15,000. 4 Most of the casualties skyrocketed since
the Belaunde government (1980-85) stepped up its counter-insurgency
campaign in 1982. 5 As of July 1984, over sixteen hundred rebels had
been killed as weil as a similar number of civilians and 160 members
of the security forces. In figures alone, the conflict has intensified: on
a yearly basis, civilian casualties have grown on average 16 per cent
while guerrilla losses have increased by 79 percent. In addition, esti-
mates given by human rights organisations put the figures of the
desaparecidos (disappeared persons) up to 1984 between 1,200 and 1,500.
In 1987 alone, after a brief period of relative calm, there were about
200 unresolved disappearances. In the seven months between Janu-
ary and the end of July, 1988, 190 new disappearances had been
reported6 . For the 1980-84 period, it was calculated that approximate-
ly 1,000 people were held in prison on terrorist charges though not
many had been convicted. 7

54
 The guerrilla threat seems to bt serious enough that the Peruvian
government imposed a state of emergency on February 7, 1986 with
a 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. curfew for the capital of Lima and the port city of
Callao. This has extended the state of emergency which until then co-
vered 19 provinces (administrative districts) in Southeast Peru, to 24
provinces, induding the country' s own heartland. 8 Although the
emergency measures were formally suspended on June 26, 1987, its
effects as well as the growing militarisation of the conflict linger on.
At present 37 out of 172 provinces are emergency zones under mili-
tary rule. Moreover, US President Reagan asked the American Con-
gress to approve military aid to Peru totalling twenty million dollars
for 1986, a comparatively large sum that far surpasses the normal ex-
penditures for military aid to most South American countries. These
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funds were specifically requested to assist the Peruvian government

in its fight against insurgents. This is above and beyond American in-
volvement in assisting the government in its coca-eradication campaign,
which clearly dovetails with counterinsurgency. More recently, Presi-
dent Garda has asked his countrymen to act as "vigilantes" in stamp-
ing out the "terrorist menace". 9
Seen from afar, the Peruvian conflict gives the impression of be-
ing an irrational spiral of both state and guerrilla brutality. It is an on-
going and pitched fight between police and army on the one side, and
two principal although quite different guerrilla organisations - Sen-
dero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the more recent Tupac Amaru Revolu-
tionary Movement (MRTA) -on the other. Those who are caught in
the middle are mostly peasants and it is they who suffer the greatest
losses. This characterisation, while not inaccurate, is rather anecdotal
and incomplete. It fails to portray the roots of the conflict as well as
the impact that it has on Peruvian society. For this reason, a more sys-
tematic - and systemic - approach is called for in order to explore
the circumstances, the ideologies, the actors, the processes and the ef-
fects of the spiral of violence. This analysis may also shed sorne light
on the profound structural constraints surrounding the much discussed
process of "democratisation" of Latin America and the inherent con-
tradictions present in the alleged consolidation of '' restricted
democracies.''lO

II. VIOLENCE AS A SYSTEM

Violence in society can be seen as much more than a form of be-
haviour which radically disorients and disrupts social values and
expectations. 11 In Peru, and for that matter in most of Latin America,
violence is a manifestation of profound conflicts that exist in the sode-

55
 ty, the international system and within the state itself. lt involves the
inability of the contending social forces to reach political consensus -
a lack of legitimation - as well as the incapacity of the government
to exercise effective control. 12 In this context, violence should not be
perceived necessarily as abnormal or irrational, but as a particular form
of conflict management coexisting with other non-violent forms. Nor
does violence occur in isolation. Rather, it is immersed in a socio-
economic setting with its own culture, structures, dynamics and his-
tory. This "system" of violence can be seen as having four major ele-
ments. (1) First, there is the context- social, economie and historical
where violence occurs. This "environment" is made of the fundamen-
tal tensions which affect society at large such as those between eco-
nomie capabilities and social expectations, between "haves" and
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''have-nots'', and between national sovereignty and international de-

pendence. (2) The second set of elements is the organisation of violence,
encompassing bath ideologies and structures (" actors"). Ideologies
refer to cultural representations, purposes, values and justifications
regarding violence and its uses, while the structures of violence in-
elude the political agents and institutions charged with its operation
and delivery. (3) Thirdly, there are the processes or activities through
which agents and institutions pursue the objectives defined in their
ideologies, including their tactics, interactions and modus operandi.
(4) Finally, there are the consequences or effects of violence, that is,
the impact of the processes of violence upon the polity and the rest
of the society. W e will examine these in sorne detail below.

1) The Context of Violence

Although the present escalation began in May 1980 when the
Maoist organisation, Sendero Luminoso declared "war on the state" at
the time of President Belaunde' s inauguration, the historical origins
of the conflict go back much further. For one thing, Peruvian his tory
has been characterised by a conscious exclusion and marginalisation
of the Indians in the sierra, and an overall neglect of the urban and
rural poor. 13 In fact, the Peruvian state and society have turned their
backs on the sizeable native population14 for the sake of the relative-
ly affluent whites and mestizos. lt is these alienated native sectors which
the largely indian-based Sendero pretends to represent. Indian upris-
ings, basically over the issue of land, have occurred intermittently since
colonial times. This has resulted in government repression punctuat-
ed by occasional socio-political adjustments which political scientist,
James Payne has called "democracy by violence". 15 Historically, the
Peruvian elites have been reluctant to institutionalise change and have

56
 ultimately relied on the power of the military to prevent reforms. For
instance, throughout the 1940' s, the 50's and the 60's, the military has
stepped in to black a possible electoral victory by the populist - though
not necessarily radical - APRA (American Popular Revolutionary
Action, now in government).
Exclusionary tactics of this sort, coupled with mass rural poverty
brought about the emergence of militant peasant organisations in the
early 1960's. Indian involvement in radical peasant unions and land
invasions spread throughout the Peruvian sierra and to the greater part
of the coast. 16 In the valleys of La Convenci6n and de Lares in the
Department of Cusco, several nuclei of "autonomous power" were
created. Mass mobilisation generally prevailed with an emphasis on
community organisations and local culture. Government repression
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combined with violent attacks by vigilantes (such as the APRA bufalos

or professional gunmen) drave many peasant organisations under-
ground. They eventually provided the social base for guerrilla move-
ments under the leadership of radical student organisers.17
The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) led by Luis de la
Puente and Guillermo Lobat6n was a splinter group from APRA. It
established guerrilla fronts in opposition to what they saw as their
party' s collaboration with the US and Peruvian gamonales (landown-
ers). Although the movement was mostly made up of intellectuals in-
spired by the Cuban revolution, it quickly expanded to the existing
peasant organisations. The MIR strategy was based on the notion of
a national popular revolution centered on the foco theory advanced by
Ernesto "Che" Guevara and later by Regis Debray .18 Despite initial
notoriety, the movement was quickly "outgunned" by the Peruvian
army, especially by US trained and equipped ranger units. By 1966-67,
the aborted rural uprising had been put dawn with efficiency and
ferocity induding napalm bombings and search-and-destroy operations
in peasant villages.19
Paradoxically however, a significant fraction within the very same
group of officers who had been involved in counter-insurgency and
"civic action" activities concluded that unless urgent socio-economic
reforms were introduced, Peruvian society would fracture. This new-
ly extended definition of the national security doctrine heavily in-
fluenced the decision by a group of younger officers to seize power
in 1968. Their ostensible and most immediate justification was to pre-
vent once again the possibility of another APRA electoral victory in
the corning presidential election. 20 But the putsch involved more than
the usual anti-APRA theme. The unfolding of Plan Inca, under the
leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, entailed a thorough at-
tempt to modernise Peruvian society, especially its traditionalland-

57
 holding structure. 21 In fact, the Velasco regime went faster and fur-
ther than any other government before it in pursuing an agrarian re-
form. ''Radical'' elements within the armed forces (such as Generais
Rodriguez and Mercado Jarrin) led a nationalist, non-aligned and
populist project. These stands attracted the support of many leftist .•'1-
tellectuals, including sorne who had been involved with the very same
guerrillas the military had defeated earlier.
In a sense, the policies of the "revolutionary government of the
armed forces" were more successful in heightening the expectationf'
of Peru' s poor than in changing the objective conditions in which
poverty occurred. In the end, with Velasco's health failing and a some-
what erratic policy orientation, hardline right-wing officers came back
with a vengeance. The regime's reforms were either "undone" or be-
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came idle. 22 Velasco was deposed in an internai coup in 1975. The

rnilitary regime to succeed Velasco - that of General Francisco Morales
Bermudez - was intent on returning Peru to its former social arder
and on providing a peaceful transition to civilian rule under conditions
of "restricted democracy". 23
In 1980, the negotiated peaceful transition to civilian rule was ac-
complished. President Fernando Belaunde, who had been toppled by
the 1968 coup was elected president for the 1980-85 period. Although
a moderate reformer in his younger years, at the time of his second
administration, President Belaunde' s poli tics reflected a coalition of
bankers, landowners, industrialists and other members of Peru' s "good
families'', and had moved well to the right of the political spectrum. 24
His government was much more conservative than that of Generais
Velasco and even Morales. Underneath the civilian façade, the securi-
ty forces, now purged of their most progressive velasquista elements,
constituted a state within a state.
The inauguration of the new administration occurred at a time
when socio-economic conditions were worsening, especially in the
countryside. 25 This was accompanied by a growing awareness of their
oppressed condition among Peruvian marginais - Indians, peasants
and squatters - resulting from earlier attempts at national
mobilisation26 (eg. the ill-fated SINAMOS, National System of Social
Mobilisation). lt was at the time of President Belaunde's inauguration
th at Sendero Luminoso '' went public''. lt is important to notice th at Sen-
dero' s geographical base is to be found in the most deprived regions
of the country such as the department of Ayacucho and especially
among Quechua-speaking Indians. lt is worthwhile to highlight this
relation between Senderista activity and socio-economic deprivation.
In 1986, Sendero broadened its operations to encompass the Puno
region - in the country' s highland are a, though not ne arly as

58
 depressed as Ayacucho - where numerous bombings and deaths have
since taken place. While sorne insurrectional activity has been evident
there since 1982, it never reached the scale or intensity of that in Aya-
cucho. Although Church leaders expressed in 1987 the fear that Puna
could become a second Ayacucho,27 the level of grassroots support for
the insurrection remained minimal. This lack of peasant support in
Puna evolved by 1988 into active opposition to Sendero. This, com-
bined with a government-sponsored rural development programme
(Rimanacuy, or "Hand of Stone") 28 and the so-called rondas campesi-
nas (local defence committees) sponsored by the parties of the left, even-
tually resulted in Sendero' s temporary eradication from the are a.
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2) The Organisation of Violence: Ideologies and Structures

The nature of Peruvian society outlined above has tended to nur-
ture ideologies which justify violence either as a means to bring about
the overthrow of the present system or to maintain it. Theologian
Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Peruvian Jesuit, in his identification of Latin
American violence (which is largely derived from his examination of
Peruvian society) talks about three kinds of violence: 29 institutional,
repressive and insurrectional.
Institutionalised violence is for him the dehumanisation contained
in the practice of social exclusion perpetrated by the society and the
state against the poor. In a racially divided Peruvian society, the Indi-
an in the sierra is considered by coastal whites and mestizos (or cha-
los) as subhuman. 30 The whole structure of modern society - its
educational system, bureaucracy, courts and police- is objectively and
subjectively an alien system '' against'' them.
The second form of violence is "repressive violence". A case in
point is the application of counter-insurgency doctrines such as those
used by the Peruvian military to fight the uprisings of the 1960' s and
today. This cultural and professional orientation is very strong in the
Peruvian (and for that matter in most of Latin America's) police and
military establishments. It is nurtured by a combination of military
hubris, fanatical anti-communism and the white and mestizo socio-
racial prejudices referred to earlier. Such culture explains, at least par-
tially, the present brutality of military and police repression.
Corresponding to, and reciprocating with these two ideologies of
violence, there is also "insurrectional violence": the expression of those
sectors of society which display extreme behaviour to change the socio-
economic inequities created and maintained by institutional and repres-
sive violence.

59
 The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), mentioned
earlier, one of the two main insurrectional ideologies within the Peru-
vian left. It is articulates heir to the MIR which was active in the 1960s.
It originated within the country's urban Marxist parties and largely in
protest against the conciliatory attitude taken by the offidalleft (Izquierda
Unida). It is made up mostly of whites and creoles with university and
middle-class backgrounds who perceive themselves as carrying on the
struggle begun by Luis de la Puente twenty years ago. 31
The other ideology of revolutionary violence - and by far the most
important as well as enigmatic- is that of the Sendero Luminoso. 32 Like
the MRTA, Sendero has its origins in the multiple splits among the
Peruvian Marxist left but it certainly goes beyond any left-wing group
before it. In the 1960' s, the Sino-Soviet split, the Cuban revolution and
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internai quarrelling created an ideological schism in the Peruvian Com-

munist Party. This contributed to bath the emergence of the MIR by
the incorporation of former young Communists to the radical splinter
from APRA (and the unsuccessful guerrilla activities of Béjar, Loba-
ton and de la Puente) as well asto the emergence of the pro-Peking
Communist Party, Bandera Roja (Red Flag). 33 Abimaél Guzman, then
a professor of philosophy at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho,
organised one of these Maoist committees. lt was composed, by and
large, of students and faculty from the university and from a local
teacher training school. In 1970, Guzman founded a new party: the
Communist Party of Peru- Shining Path. The name came from a
phrase by the famous Peruvian Marxist of the 1920' s, José Carlos Mari-
ategui: "Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution."
The organisation was subsequently expanded with the joining in of
numerous Marxist splinter groups.
Unlike the leadership of the Tupac Amaru, whose origins (as with
most of the student radicals of the past) are to be found in the adminis-
trative, professional and even aristocratie classes, Sendero' s leadership
generally cornes from a newly educated provinciallower middle class
of peasant origins. Many of them are the children or grandchildren
of Quechua speaking highland peasants. These were sorne of the
groups who were faced with shrinking opportunities for advancement
as the populist military experiment collapsed in the 1970's and were
th us frustrated in their attempts to "educate their way" into the mid-
dle classes. 34 In this sense the Senderista phenomenon could be seen
as "a political movement born of the massive frustration of modemi-
zation in the Andes". 35
The movement is currently attracting more followers among the
urban poor in Lima and in other cities. Sendero has emphasized that
they are the representatives of what they call the "pariahs", the" out-

60
 casts" or the "undesirables". 36 Its original core, with the exception
of Guzman, has been essentially Indian, rural and regional (largely from
Ayacucho). The organisation has successfully recruited, by example
or by intimidation, a very large number of teenagers from the coun-
tryside. Estimates regarding the size of the movement vary widely.
For instance, it was reported that in early 1985 there were between
1,500 and 2,000 hard-core guerrillas, 37 and a much larger support net-
work. (The present figure is conservatively perhaps twice as large) Most
observers agree however, that Sendero is growing, and growing rapid-
ly. Unlike other Peruvian movements, Sendero appeals to the young,
to poor women38 (domestic servants and peasants) and to Indians as
a whole. This may explain why the movement has been much more
difficult to uproot than previous insurrectional "elite" groups.
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Sendero is an exclusive and secretive movement and rarely makes

public statements on its philosophy or policies. It is divided into small
cells, with the guerrillas rarely having contact with those organising
the individual terrorist campaigns. This, of course, makes it very
difficult for the police to do much more than apprehend individual
members. 39 lt has however, a penchant for theatricality and propagan-
da by deed. 40 Their communications are rather indirect, with war
communiques and spectacular actions oriented to make headlines. Be-
fore the imposition of the state of emergency in 1987, the capital city
of Lima, where nearly one third of the country' s population lives, was
constantly reminded of Sendero' s presence with power blackouts and
bombings. Sorne of these blackouts have been simultaneous and care-
fully coordinated. Often Peru' s major cities had been left in the dark
by the blowing up of power pylons as was the case during the Pope's
visit in 1985. Other symbolic acts such as assassinations of officiais and
"collaborators", bombings of buildings and the dis play of "burning
slogans'' on mountainsides have been carried out to coïncide with offi-
cial visits or special events. Action rather than programmatic appeals
is one of the movement' s striking features. In this sense they are differ-
ent from other Latin American revolutionary movements which attempt
to expand support by publicising their plans and ideas for the future.
The basics of Sendero's ideology however, are quite clear and
explicit from its few published documents and slogans as well as from
its statements. They are orthodox Maoists, rejecting all other Marxist
groups and considering all Peruvian governments as "fascist''. lt is
a vertical Marxist-Leninist organisation which adheres to the Maoist
notion of peasant revolution as a result of a prolonged popular war
in the countryside, eventually encircling the cities. 41 Their explicit
revolutionary agenda contemplates an intensification of violence
through successive stages of armed struggle: the gathering of support

61
 in backward regions, the assault on the symbols of the bourgeois state,
the beginning of the guerrilla war, the expansion of popular insurrec-
tion and finally, the takeover of the cities. According to Guzman, as
of 1985, the revolution had entered into its fourth stage- that of popu-
lar war. In Sendero' s view, the raad to revolution has to go first through
a terrorist phase. This is supposed to create the "objective conditions"
for the popular insurrection which results from the government be-
coming more repressive. 42
Since 1986, Sendero' s doctrine and practice have experienced sig-
nificant changes. One has been the aforementioned expansion, as well
as intensification, of its operations. Another has been a re-evaluation
of Guzman' s "Maoist" view of the peasant popular war against the
cities. Sendero in fact is attempting to organise the mestizo and Indian
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migrants in the cities, to infiltrate associations in the pueblos j6venes

(shantytowns) around Lima and to gain control over labour unions and
grassroots organisations. 43
Another more persistent element in Sendero' s ideology is a notice-
able element of messianism surrounding Guzman himself (referred to
as Comrade Gonzalo). He appears to his followers as the successor
and integrator of all the great Marxist thinkers - the "Fourth Sword
of Marxism", continuing the ideologicallineage created by Marx, Le-
nin and Mao. 44 Moreover, this charismatic tendency has been related
by many Peruvian and foreign analysts such as David Werlich and Cyn-
thia McClintock45 to prophetie ideas linked to the "return of the
Inca". In fact, Guzman himself, is often referred to - in addition to
his nom de guerre, Gonzalo - by the native term, Puka Inti which me-
ans ''Red Sun". 46 It should be remembered that in the pre-Columbian
tradition of Peru, the ward sun and Inca (king) were almost synony-
mous. This vision suggests that the world was turned on its head at
the time of the conquest, the Spaniards gaining control over the Indi-
ans. The old arder, according to this legend, continues to exist in a
latent underworld to eventually go back to its proper balance with the
return of the Inca. This deliverance is to be accomplished by a mes-
sianic figure and has been the basis of several Indian uprisings since
the seventeenth century. In the opinion of Professor Rodrigo Montoya
of the Catholic University of Lima, Sendero' s ideology of class and race
war is geared to make Peruvian society explode.47 Sorne observers-
including the leader of Izquierda Unida and former Mayor of Lima, Al-
fonso Barrantes - have noted a degree of structural and ideological
similarity between Pol Pot' s Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea and the revan-
chista tendencies of the Peruvian Senderista phenomenon. 48 There are
also parallelisms in their sources of support, their recruits, and the ex-
tremity of the ir behaviour.

62
 3) The Processes of Violence
Sendero' s continuous existence and expansion, the amount of ter-
ritory under its control and the relative!y small number of proven mem-
bers of the movement who have been captured indicates that there
is a fairly substantive following and protection, whether voluntary or
by coercion, among the rural population. Needless to say, the organi-
sation has thrived on the dismal and deteriorating living conditions
in the countryside. However, its greatest strength seems to come from
official overreaction. 49 The conditions in Ayacucho have been an im-
portant factor for earlier local support. Guzman and his Senderistas
spent a long time living in the rural communities of Ayacucho before
the guerrilla offensive. Th us, the Puka Inti- Gonzalo identity contains
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more than a revolutionary and charismatic appeal against capitalism.

It possesses a deeper cultural appeal to ethnie nationalism and to the
righting of a long legacy of historical injustice. As Elizabeth Famsworth
comments: "For all its irrationalities, Sendero' s messianic Maoism offers
the desperate and the dispossessed a vehicle for striking back at a society that
has long denied them entry." 50 The long time economie and social mar-
ginalisation of Ayacucho is well known. Located high in the Andes,
it is a predominately Quechua-speaking region where traditional An-
dean life prevails. It is one of the poorest areas in Peru: fifty-five per
cent of the population is illiterate, life expectancy is forty-five years
and infant mortality nearly twenty per cent. 51 Sendero's actions en-
tailed the creation of "liberated zones" where traditional" oppressors"
- landowners, policemen, officiais and teachers - were terrorised.
Their earlier operations were primarily oriented to benefit the
peasants, such as the distribution of spoils of land or money and the
declaration of debt moratoria. Whether through incentives, ideologi-
cal appeals, messianism or simple fear, peasants began to provide Sen-
dero with food, shelter and new members. On the other hand, the
movement has been brutal towards those who refuse to give active
support. "People's trials" of those accused of collaborating have be-
come increasingly common and all kinds of violations of human rights
at the hands of the insurgents have been registered. 52 Economically,
Sendero constitutes a heavy toll on the very poor peasants they at-
tempt to represent: demands for food, shelter, money and the cutting
off the local economy from national markets have resulted in great hard-
ship. The establishment of a war economy in areas under guerrilla con-
trol where peasants are coerced into planting only for their own
consumption has had the effect of reducing Sendero' s support. On
the other hand, as mentioned earlier, government actions have a great
deal to do with the expansion of support which the movement enjoys.

63
 In 1981, a sweeping anti-terrorist law (Decree Law 046)53 allowed for
the arrest of anyone falling under the vague definition of ''supporter
of terrorism". lt also created DIRCOTE (the Antiterrorist Directorate)
with broad powers to coordinate the antiterrorist campaign. 54
In October of the same year, Ayacucho was put under astate of
emergency including a strict curfew and the suspension of constitu-
tional guarantees. Hundreds of people were arrested and torture was
reported. 55 In August 1982, following a black-out in Lima and other
northern coastal cities, a two month state of emergency was declared
in the capital and hundreds of arrests were carried out. In December
1982, after a Senderista campaign of assassinations of local leaders in
the Ayacuchan region, then President Belaûnde declared an extended
state of emergency covering Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavelica.
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The area was also placed under military control. Two thousand soldi-
ers were moved in; villagers were forced to take sides and massacres
by both Senderistas and by the special anti-terrorist squad of the Civil
Guard (Sinchis) took place. 56 Particularly important here was the
murder of eight journalists, allegedly at the hands of local peasants,
in a remote Andean village in January 1983. 57Although the govern-
ment appointed a much publicised commission under the Chairman-
ship of well-known novelist Mario Vargas Llosa to look into the '' ugly''
incident, its findings proved to be inconclusive. Analysts of the report
however, have noted that while the commission raised as many ques-
tions as it answered, it did establish that peasants were being terrorised
by both sides, that the security forces had encouraged peasants to make
war on Sendero and that the collapse of central authority had driven
many into "vigilantism".
Human Rights organisations have reported more continuous and
gruesome violations of human rights. Many of them occurred during
the previous Belaûnde administration. But since 1985, there have been
constant reports of peasant massacres at the hands of the security forces
(such as the one that took place in August 1985 in the village of Ac-
comarca in which 69 peasants were killed). In addition to massacres,
there have been documented cases of torture, disappearances and sum-
mary executions of men, women and children, most of them unpro-
voked. The worst aspect of this has been the conspiracy of silence
among officers to "cover up" the se activities or to otherwise biarne
Sendero for all of the outrages. 58
Following the election of Alan Garda in 1985, the military exer-
cised a measure of constraint as if they were assessing the new govern-
ment' s resolve to bring an end to human rights violations and combat
the insurgency by political rather than military means. Since the se-
cond half of 1986, however, there were increasing signs of the mili-

64
 tary extending its influence and control over civilian life in the coun-
try. 59 In fact, sorne Peruvian military officers are more than willing to
retake power to res tore order and stability. 60
To avoid a confrontation in the short run, the government, besieged
with foreign debt difficulties and external pressures, seems to have
given in to hardline elements in the armed forces. The event which
apparently precipitated the state of emergency in Lima and Callao in
February 1986, was what President Garcia called "a new type of ter-
rorism''. Earlier in that mon th, a new group calling itself Sendero Verde
(Green Path) and claiming to have over 650 members, started a series
of bombings. 61 It was made up of former police officers who had been
forced into retirement as a result of corruption and human rights vio-
lations. State repression was a response to both right-wing vigilantism
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and radical insurgency. In practice, vigilantism and military interven-

tion constituted a new tendency in the Peruvian conflict: an intensifi-
cation of the terror - counterterror spiral.
The strongest manifestation of this tendency occurred on June 18
and 19, 1986 when about two hundred and fifty prisoners at the San
Pedro (formerly Lurigancho), San Juan Bautista (formerly El Fronton)
and Santa Barbara (women's prison of Callao) jails, began a simultane-
ous uprising. This event coincided with a meeting of the Second In-
ternational, of which APRA is a member, being held for the first time
in Lima with the presence of numerous foreign delegations. Although
the Special Units recaptured the prisons with minimalloss of life, most
of the inmate population in San Pedro and San Juan Bautista were sum-
marily executed after they surrendered. 62 Despite the fact that the
government admitted to these events and attempted to punish the per-
petrators, it was clear that sectors of the military were running a parallel
government. This duality of power was dramatically illustrated by the
February 1986-June 1987 state of emergency and curfew in Lima and
Callao. Shortly after midnight, the civilian government ceased to oper-
ate, the capital virtually becoming a war zone under the sole and ar-
bitrary authority of the military. By inducing the state of emergency,
Sendero succeeded in bringing its war to the heart of Peru.
The level of violence and generalised fear has increased during
1986-88. The Senderistas use selective assassinations as part of a cal-
culated strategy to destabilise the government through fear and insecu-
rity. In fact, over 54 APRA party officiais had been killed between 1985,
the date in which Garcia' s apristas came to power63 and 1988. A study
carried out by the Centre for the Study and Promotion of Develop-
ment (DESCO) in Lima reported 1,306 dead from January to October
31, 1986 alone. This included 87 members of the armed and police forces

65
 (such as rear-admiral Carlos Ponce and vice-admirai Geronimo Caffer-
ata), 418 civilians and 801 presumed Senderistas. 64

4) Effects of the Spiral of Violence

Within the first three months of the new state of emergency, nearly
40,000 people were detained and continuous raids and killings have
taken place in the shanty towns. 65 All this has resulted in an erosion
of the once overwhelming popularity of President Alan Garda' s so-
cial democratie government. This, despite his courageous gesture in
admitting errors, his stand on the foreign debt and the rather impres-
sive, albeit temporary, recovery of the Peruvian economy: six percent
in 1985-86 and nine percent growth in 1986-87. 66 Commenting on the
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fluid situation, Rolando Ames, a Peruvian politieal scientist and Sena-

tor, stated: "the president and ministers govern but, parallel to them,
a military system acts on all aspects of social life they believe
relevant''. 67
· This hard approach to insurgency, with its devastating effects on
the fragile democratie structure of Peru, has overshadowed the more
"soft" politieal approaches of the government. With regard to this,
the present economie strietures of the US $14 billion debt have reduced
the possibilities of using rural and regional development programmes
as a way to control social unrest. The government's soft line has been
limited to four policy responses. One has been an attempt at decen-
tralisation through the newly created Ministry of the Presidency along
the lines of similar schemes used in contemporary Spain. So far, this
approach is not only slow going but largely contingent on the financ-
ing of local development projects. The second approach has been the
establishment on September 14, 1985 of an independent Peace Com-
mission to act as an advisory body to the President. This Commission
was to have broad investigatory powers - a sort of super judicial om-
budsman on human rights. However, on January 21, 1986, four months
after its creation, most of its members resigned on grounds of ''lack
of support''. A new and less independent Peace Commission was creat-
ed subsequently with a very limited mandate. After the prison mas-
sacre of June 1986, its members also resigned. In 1987 the Peace
Commission has been replaced by a National Commission on Human
Rights made from both government and local NGOs, but its mandate
seems to be more ambiguous, restrieted and symbolic than that of its
predecessors. 68
The third and most substantive approach was the announcement
made in 1987 of a comprehensive agrarian reform scheme (including
a "dialogue" between peasants and authorities un der the above-
referred Rimanacuy). It was oriented to give land to the peasants as

66
 a means of reactivating the peasant economy. This was part of an over-
all strategy of development, peace and food security. In this sense,
the government has pursued a classieal counterinsurgency strategy by
defusing rural tension much in line with its promises and social
democratie orientation.
These measures were to be accompanied by other reformist and
anti-oligarchieal policies such as the nationalisation of Peruvian owned
banks (foreign banks were excluded) and a subsequent rationalisation
and "democratisation" of credit. At any rate, this structural approach,
besicles its symbolic value, could have effects among peasant producers
only in the long-run. lts most immediate result, however, was a sud-
den erosion of upper and middle-class support for the government and
an unintended politieal and economie backlash. Serious internai con-
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flict within the ruling party, hesitation, policy "flip-flops" and plain
mismanagement combined with clear sabotage and opposition from
the business and professional sectors to produce a catastrophie eco-
nomie situation. Currently inflation has been soaring: 63 percent in
1986, 115 percent in 1987 and over 400 percent in mid-1988. Under-
pinning these tendencies, there is a gigantic public sector debt proba-
bly reaching over 16 percent of the country' s Gross Domestic Product
for 1988. Attempts at economie stabilisation through "orthodox" meas-
ures has not only failed so far, but has eroded the government's
popularity among the hard est hit poor.
The fourth and certainly most controversial approach is the faint
attempt to exercise political control over the armed forces. This was
to be accomplished through the creation of a unified Ministry of Na-
tional Defence to bring the largely autonomous branches under one
common civilian-controlled umbrella. So far, and despite the formai
creation of the new ministry in 1987, the Army and the Navy have
resisted the move. This "professional interference" has the potential
of provoking a military action to neutralise and even topple the govern-
ment.69 Thus, in the short-run and for the time-being, counter-terror
still remains the only available option. As the economie situation wor-
sens and the fears of a confrontation with military hardliners and the
economie right increase, this latter option has become a sort of "poli-
cy of no policy''. This is likely to widen rather than arrest the spiral
of violence. lt could also have the effect of undermining the very refor-
mist and more substantive measures referred to above.
As indicated earlier on, one of the principal factors explaining the
expansion of Sendero is govemment overreaction. In the past, counter-
insurgency activities combined with USAID-sponsored coca-eradication
programmes and an ever more significant, though still small counterin-
surgency advisory involvement by the U.S. Embassy's Military As-

67
 sistance Advisory Group (MAAG), have had the effect of alienating
local peasants and farmers and turned sorne of them into guerrilla sup-
porters. This has been the case especially in the jungle area of the Hu-
allaga Valley, which reportedly produces about one third of all the
cocaine consumption in the U.S .. This augurs an even larger and ex-
panding role of the American government in the Peruvian conflict, with
ominous consequences for regional stability.
A consequence of overkill has been the establishment of a linkage
between cocaine smugglers and the guerrillas70 who provide "protec-
tion" in return for extortion money. This factor has made it possible
for the movement, which does not count on any external support from
international revolutionary groups or countries, to access a significant
source of income to acquire weapons. Moreover, an emerging linkage
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has apparently developed between Sendero and Tupac Amaru. 71

Since early 1986, observers have indicated that despite profound ideo-
logical and strategical differences (i.e. the use of terrorism by Sendero)
between both movements, a tactic of '' attacking jointly and marching
separately" has emerged. This has enhanced Sendero' s accessibility
to urban centres where the smaller Tupac Amaru has had its bases of
operation. Although Sendero Luminoso is the stronger group (with
a membership of well over 5000), the Tupac Amaru (which reportedly
had only about 1000 adherents in early 1988) used what Minister of
Interior, Fernando Yovera called "its Robin Hood-style technique" to
score sorne important successes. The takeover of Juanjui on Novem-
ber 6, 1987 (a town of 18,000, sorne 500 km north of Lima) represented
a real coup for the group. Other than highlighting defects in the Pero-
vian security forces, it also forced the government to redirect scarce
re sources away from the fight against Sendero and Peru' s billion dol-
lar narco-traffic. 72
Despite the acknowledgement that Sendero and the MRTA are ex-
panding, most informed sources think it unlikely that either one or
a combination of the two movements could overthrow the government,
let alone the Peruvian state. It is not unlikely that both movements
may end up fighting each other once a power vacuum is created. They
could however, as is the case right now, produce a situation where
violence breeds more violence: a "Lebanisation" of Peru. Symptoms
of this are already visible. APRA bufalos have reappeared as armed
groups to fight guerrillas and terrorists. Rondas campesinas, with the
support and encouragement of Izquierda Unida have emerged as civilian
self-defence committees to protect peasant villages against both Sen-
dero and the military, but also against the bUfalos. Death-squad activi-
ties, as well increased drug-related, Colombian-style gangsterism have
been reported. In this context, the present social democratie govern-

68
 ment could end up losing control to right-wing elements (as is cur-
rently happening) eager to usher in what would be a thoroughly repres-
sive regime, claiming to combat crime and terrorism". Wh ether such
fi

a scenario would crea te the objective conditions" for the disintegra-

fi

tion of Peruvian society and the creation of a revolutionary state, is

quite a different thing.
As the crucial1990 presidential election approaches, the Peruvian
economy has gone into a dramatic stagflation crisis. Discontent is
mounting and profound deav ages in the ruling party' s structure have
become apparent; there is also a distinct feeling of '' things falling
apart''. With APRA disintegrating and the well-oiled neoconservative
alternative of Mario Vargas Uosa looming afar, there are chances for
a possible Izquierda Unida victory. This is something that the civilian
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and military right would not look forward to. In fact, the real possibil-
ity of a I.U. triumph could precipitate a coup that could plunge the
country into a full-fledged civil war. The guerrillas have certainly taken
advantage of the dismal situation and seem to be fueling the contradic-
tions that could bring about a catastrophic rupture. In response, the
government has been left with little alternative but to re-impose the
state of emergency. Thus the self-fulfilling prophecy of the spiral of
violence gains momentum. Yet, it appears that despite all these en-
tropie symptoms Peru is not quite geared to social revolution. Ex-
perience in Latin America, particularly in Uruguay and Argentina/3
suggests that a far more likely outcome of a catharsis of violence is plain
state terrorism.

References
1. See Robert Seaver, "Pern' s economie resurgence is suspect because of a dearth of new invest-
ment", The Globe and Mail, March 12, 1987, p.B22; also, The Globe and Mail, March 8, 1987, p B13.
In 1986, "Pern recorded a $50 million !rade deficit. .. after posting a $1 billion surplus for the pas!
three years. The steep faU in oil priees in 1986 was mainly responsible for the decline in exports.
Peru's international debt stands at $14 billion". For an analysis of the pre-1985 structural circum-
stances of Peru's debt crisis, see Barbara Stallings, "International Lending and the Relative Autono-
my of the State: A Case Study ofTwentieth Century Pern", Politicsand Society, Vol. 14, No. 31 (1985),
pp 257-288.
2. See Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright, U.tin American Politics. A Developmental Approach,
(Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Co.: 1975), pp. 221-223
3. For a sympathetic discussion on the politics of the "Revolutionary Government of the Armed
Forces", (GRFA) including similarly laudatory analyses by left-wing intellectuals, see Henry Dietz
and David Scott Palmer, "Citizen Participation under Innovative Military Corporatism in Pern",
in John Booth and Mitcheii Seligson (eds.), Political Participation in U.tin America, Vol. 1, (New York:
Holmes and Meier: 1978), pp 172-208.
4. Facts on File, (July 4, 1986), p 474; also Alan Garcia, excerpts from his State of the Nation address
to the National Congress, July 28, 1988, in "On Peru's Future: Alan Garcia Pérez, Mario Vargas
Llosa, Rolando Ames. Three Competing Visions", World Policy Journal, Vol. V, No. 4, (Fall1988),p.
747.
5. See Mike De Mot!, "Pern: Decree Underlies Growing Terrorist Threat", Latin America Press, (Febru-
ary 7, 1986), p. 7.

69
 6. See Elizabeth Farnsworth, "Peru: A Nation in Crisis", World Policy Journal, (Fall1988) pp. 728-729.
7. The figures have been compiled from different sources: Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights
in Latin America, 1986 Annual Report on the Human Rights Situation in Peru, (January 1987), passim,
De Matt, op.cit. and Facts on File, loc.cit.
8. Facts on File, (July 4, 1986), p 474.
9. See Kathryn Leger, "President calls on Peruvians to root out suspicious citizens", The Toronto
Star, February 15, 1987, p H4.
10. For a discussion on these tapies see our'" Political Democracy in Latin America: An Explora-
tion into the Nature of Two Political Projects", in Archibald Ritter and David Pollock, (eds.), Latin
American Prospects for the 1980s. Equity, Demoeratization and Development, (New York: Praeger, 1983),
pp. 161-181; also "Redemocratisation in Latin America or the Modernisation of the Status Quo?",
Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vol. Xl, No. 21, (1986), pp. 43-55 and "The
Trend Toward Democratization and Redemocratization in Latin America: Shadow and Substance",
Latin American Research Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, (1988), pp. 131-153.
11. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp 8-11.
12. The foregoing succinct analysis of the determinants of political violence in Latin America is con-
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tained in our "Violence and ldeology in Latin American Politics: An Overview", in Marcel Daneau,
ed., Violence et conflits en Amérique latine, (Québec: Centre quebecois des relations internationales,
1985), pp 5-34.
13. For an account of the persistent historical conditions of marginalisation, see Marcel Niedergang,
The Twenty Latin Americas, Vol. 2, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1971), pp 87-136.
14. Ibid.
15. James Payne, Laborand Politics in Peru: The System of Political Bargaining, (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1965), p. 268-272.
16. James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Guatemala,
Co lombia and Peru", in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. (1%8), Latin America. Reform or Revo-
lution? A Reader, Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, pp 443-459.
17. Ibid.
18. Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America
(1967), New York: Monthly Review Press, passim.
19. Petras, op.cit., pp 348-349.
20. Julio Cotler, "Military Intervention and 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru" (1986), in Guiller-
mo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.
Prospects for Democracy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, pp 148-172.
21. Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America, (1984), New York: Oxford University
Press, pp 216-221.
22. Cotler, op.cit., pp 160-170.
23. For a characterisation of the mode! of "restricted democracy", see our "Political Democracy in
Latin America: An Exploration into the Nature of Two Political Projects", in Ritter and Pollock, op.
cit., pp. 161-181.
24. Skidmore and Smith, op.cit., pp 221-224.
25. Seaver, loc.cit.
26. Skidmore and Smith, op.cit., p 218. Also, a discussion of SINAMOS is contained in Dietz and
Scott, loc.cit.
27. ICCHRLA, 1986 Annual Report ... , p 5.
28. Latin American Regional Reports. Andean Group, "Progress made in agrarian reform",(29 January
1987), p.6.
29. Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation (1973), Maryknoll: Or-
bis Books, pp. 108-109, 272.
30. Interview with Professor Rodrigo Montoya, Catholic University of Lima, at York University, (May
12, 1986). A good deal of the interpretative material presented here has been derived from this in-
terview.

70
 31. Petras, op.cit., p 346.
32. For an overview of Sendero, see the piece, co-authored by J. Atlin, and myself, "Peru's Shining
Path", International Perspectives, (July-August 1985), pp.25-28. This section is based upon this earlier
study.
33. For an analysis of the origins of Sendero, see Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Lumino-
so and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Feru (1983), University of Liverpool, Centre for Latin
American Studies, Working Paper No. 2, p 7.
34. Jeanne De Quine, "Peru's Enigmatic Killers. The Challenge of Shining Path", The Nation, (De-
cember 8, 1984), pp 610-613. Also William Montalbano, "Rebel Leader holds Peru in thrall", The
Toronto Star, (October 12, 1986).
35. Carlos 1. Degregori quoted by Farnsworth, op.cit., p. 727.
36. Interview with Professor Rodrigo Montoya, May 12, 1986.
37. Wilson Ruiz, "Women spearhead terror campaign in Pern", The Toronto Star, (March 3, 1985).
38. In a February 17, 1985 article in The Toronto Star, Ruiz highlights the role of Guzmân's wife,
Augusta de la Torre, in building a mass appeal among rural and poor women.
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39. Kathryn Leger, "Wave of rebel assassinations terrorizes Peru", The Toronto Star, (October 18,
1987), p H5.
40. Montalbano, loc. cit.
41. Taylor, op.cit., pp 26-39.
42. This is a fundamental tenet of the taches of terrorism. Cf. our piece "Sorne Thoughts on Con-
temporary Terrorism: Domestic and International Perspectives", in J. Carson, ed.(1978), Terrorism
in Theory and Practice, (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, pp 4-21. Similar approaches to "crisis-
making" have been observed in sorne of the European New Left (the German Rote Armee Fraktion,
the French Action Directe and the ltalian Brigatte Rosse) in the 1970s and the anarcho-nihilists of the
la te 19th century.
43. Farnsworth, op.cit., p. 728.
44. Montalbano, loc.cit. He has described the leader of the movement, Abimaél Guzmân, as a self-
proclaimed "fourth sword of Marxism", (the other three being Marx, Lenin and Mao) who also "loves
good literature, classical music and violence". The illegitimate son of a weil to do businessman of
the provincial city of Mollendo, Guzmân had a good classical education at the Jesuit school and
subsequently obtained a university degree in philosophy. He was born in 1934.
45. Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso- Peru's Maoist Guerrillas", Problems ofCommunism
(1983), Vol. 32, No. 4, pp 19-34.
46. De Quine, op.cit., p 610.
47. Interview with Rodrigo Montoya.
48. Montalbano, op.cit.
49. Raul Gonzales, "Gonzalo's Thought, Belaunde's Answer", in NACLA, Report on the Americas.
Garcia's Feru. One Last Chance, (1986), Vol. 20, No. 3, June, pp 34-36.
50. Farnsworth, op.cit., p. 742; emphasis added.
51. These statistics are calculated on the basis of census figures. J.P. Cole and P.M. Mather (1978),
Feru 1940-2000. Performance and Prospects, Vol. 1, Nottingham: The University of Nottingham: pp.
58-67.
52. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, op.cit.
53. Gonzâles, op.cit, pp 34-36.
54. Diego Garcia-Sayan, Feru: Estados de Excepci6n y Régimen Jurfdico, (1986), Lima: Comision Andi-
na de Juristas, April, passim.
55. Gonzâles, op.cit. and José Maria Salcedo, "The Priee of Peace: A Report from the Emergency
Zone", NACLA, op.cit., pp 37-42.
56. Ibid.

71
 57. Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in the Andes", The New York Times Magazine, (July 31, 1980), Cover
story. The report of the Commission of Enquiry headed by Peru's most acclaimed novelist has been
marred by controversy and bitter de bates sin ce its release.
58. America's Watch Committee, Human Rights in Peru After President Garcia's First Year, New York,
September 1986, p 68.
59. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights, op.cit., p 6 and ff 17, p 18.
60. Bradley Graham, "Freedom falters in South America", The Toronto Star, (October 24, 1987), p D4.
61. Ibid., p 7.
62. Facts on File, July 4, 1986, pp 489-490. Also lnter-Church Committee on Human Rights, op.cit.,
pp 12-14.
63. Kathryn Leger, "Wave of rebel... ", loc.cit.
64. DESCO Banco de Datos, published in Caretas, No. 885, Lima. Quoted in the Inter-Church Com-
mittee on Human Rights, p 4.
65. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights, op.cit., p 7.
66. "Peru' s economie resurgence is suspect because of a dearth of new investment", The Globe and
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Mail, (March 12, 1987), p B22.

67. Ricardo Ames quoted in The Miami Herald, (July 1, 1986).
68. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights, op.cit., pp 3-4, 12.
69. Paul Knox, "Peru Showdown: General's firing boosts Garcia", The Globe and Mail, (April 24,
1987), p A9.
70. Norman Webster, "Shining Pa th Perilous for Peru' s Democracy", The Globe and Mail, (January
30, 1985).
71. Mike De Mott, "Peru: decree underlies growing terrorist threat", Latinamerica Press, (February
7, 1986), p 7.
72. Paul Knox, "Peruvian rebels step into spotlight. Marxist group draws notice with attacks", The
Globe and Mail, (November 19, 1987), p A18.
73. J. Nef and David Moore, "The Terrorist Weapon: An Appraisal", Laurentian University Review,
(October 1981), Vol. 14, No. 1, pp 27-39. An analysis of the Argentinian situation is contained in
Richard Gillespie, "Armed Struggle in Argentina", New Scholar (1982), Vol. 8, No. 1 and 2, pp 387-427.

72