The Historian

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The Case for Applied History in the World of

Business: A Call for Action to Historians

James W. Cortada

To cite this article: James W. Cortada (2000) The Case for Applied History in the World
of Business: A Call for Action to Historians, The Historian, 62:4, 835-847, DOI: 10.1111/
j.1540-6563.2000.tb01462.x

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 THECASEFOR APPLIED HISTORY
I N THE WORLD
OF BUSINESS:
A CALLFOR ACTION TO HISTORIANS
JAMES W. CORTADA

istorians should become more active in helping business managers apply the
H historical methodology and knowledge of the academic. Business managers
want that help, and good reasons exist for historians to offer it. The time is also
ripe for an expanded role for historians because the demand in business and gov-
ernment for applying historical insights is increasing. Throughout 1996 and 1997,
American newspapers carried articles quoting chief executive officers of corpora-
tions lamenting the insufficient supply of employees trained in the humanities and
social sciences. As far back as 1988, Claude Singer, a vice president at Chemical
Bank, published in the New York Times the case for “the historical mode of
thought.”’ While I will briefly comment on applied history in the public sector,
where senior public officials often rely on the historical insight of professional his-
torians, the greatest opportunity lies in the private sector where, though it repre-
sents a larger portion of the economy, history is used least of all. For that reason I
want to concentrate this discussion on applied history in a commercial setting.
The ancient Greek historian Thucydides thought that study of the past would
provide insight for decision makers in the present, the basic definition of applied his-
tory for the past 2000 years. But of course it is more. For our purposes, applied his-
tory is the identification and analysis of previous events and patterns of behavior to
provide perspective on current problems and issues. The key idea is that historical
insight can help business executives, government officials, and others make better
informed decisions and take more effective actions. Applying history does not mean
attempting to replicate actions of the past; most business executives would agree that
history does not repeat itself. As studies on waves of historical phenomena are begin-
ning to suggest, however, historical forces are at work that cannot be totally ignored,
and can even be exploited. Economic historians have led the way with detailed stud-
ies on price waves, followed by those in political history who have examined recur-
ring phases of war, and social historians who have conducted generational studies
within a society to identify long term demographic patterns. Increasingly with wave

lames W Cortada is an executive consultant at the IBM Corporation.

‘Claude Singer, “FactsAre Fine; Historical Reasoning Is Finer,”New York Times, 23 April 1988, 15.
836 THEHISTOEUAN

James W Cortuda
T H C.ut
~ FOK AITLIED I N THE WORLD
HISTOKY OF BUSINESS 837

studies, scholars are beginning to suggest what the future brings and to catalog trig-
ger events one could reasonably expect to sound the alarm bells of change.2
Many examples of applied history exist that are relevant to business managers.
In a seminal 1986 study, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May demonstrated how
U.S. government officials use historical insight to assess issues, define decision
options, and deal with leaders from other cultures. In particular, their case studies
demonstrated how historical and cultural knowledge in Cuban and Iranian affairs
sensitized senior American officials to what had worked in the past and what was
probably on the minds of officials in opposing c ~ u n t r i e sForeign
.~ offices routinely
teach their diplomats history for the same reason and keep experts at the ready to
inform senior government officials about the past and potentialities of an interna-
tional situation. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger-a political scientist by
training-studied, wrote, and used history in his work as a diplomat. The U.S.
Congress calls on the Library of Congress to prepare background reports on the his-
tory of an issue. In 1998, the congressional impeachment committee that deter-
mined whether President William Clinton should be impeached called as its first
witnesses distinguished American historians to comment on precedent.
Thus, insight and background on the one hand and a sense of what might work
or not on the other have long been justifications for historical study. In the United
States we observe history departments under siege from state legislatures and uni-
versity administrators cutting budgets at a time when so many nonhistorians and
business school professors are commenting in print on history. Almost everything
being published by the Harvard Business School Press, for instance, has a solid dose
of history, if not essentially based on historical case studies. Historians are being
preempted, losing “mindshare,” to use a business phrase, in the study of history. To
regain this high ground, historians should look to applied history.
There are four reasons why historians should promote application of history and
develop the necessary intellectual tools needed to do so effe~tively.~
Historians know more history than those who are not historians. History is not
what nonhistorians normally think it is. History is more than names, dates, or
canned reasons for why things happened. History is an iterative probing of issues,

‘Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in theModern Age (New Haven, 1988), 348.76;
Ddvid Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm ofHistory (New York, 19961,
363-508.

’Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in T i m : The Uses of History for Decision Makers
(NewYork, 1986).
4See J. W. Chesser, “How History Contributes to Critical Thinking,” Cornell & Restaurant
Administration Qtiarterly 3 1 (1990): 100-102.
asking open-ended questions for which evidence has to be gathered and analyzed.
Interpreting the causes of events, movements, waves, and trends calls for working
with ambiguity and what otherwise might seem like disparate facts. Historians have
developed a body of research and analytical practices that allow them to deal with
issues at a substantive level. Most nonhistorians are not even aware of these practices.
The insights a historian accumulates is the result of many eclectic yet interrelated
analyses and much complex thought about issues that often are framed in language
too broad to comprise a simple entry in an encyclopedia. One can look up who the
major political figures were in the American Civil War, but you would need a histo-
rian to determine how close the American public came to experiencing another civil
war, or to suggest what might trigger such a catastrophe. In short, historians bring two
assets to the table: historical methodology and knowledge of specific subject matter.
Historians would find their research and teaching agendas altered, even improved,
by examining pestions emerging from the application of history. Left to their own,
research agendas for historians are normally defined by three circumstances. The
first is the major inspiration provided by the evidence, and the questions that
information and thought suggest as they d o research in primary and secondary
materials. A second concerns issues raised in debates by fellow historians, often in
the same subfield of expertise. The third source is the personal interest of the indi-
vidual historian.
A fourth possible source of influence, such as a question put to them by their
nonhistorian employer or some experience outside of their academic world, might
change the topics historians study and the issues they raise. A personal example
illustrates the point. I have a Ph.D. in modern European history, but after being at
IRM for a few years, I began writing books on the history of the business and man-
agement of information technology. The lesson is obvious: Clear ties to the needs
of business would stimulate additional interest and support for specific subfields of
history such as the history of business, labor, economics, and even such related areas
as ethnic studies, which could inform personnel practices.
Historians would find many of their research and teaching topics received with
greater interest 6y larger and newer audiences. History would move closer to main-
stream activities than is currently the case, and as their research interests come
closer to what their audience wants, historians will find others more receptive to
their work. One brief example: Alfred D. Chandler Jr., the noted Pulitzer Prize-win-
ning Harvard historian and winner of a Bancroft Prize, has a great following among
A4mericanbusiness managers because he writes extensively on the history of corpo-
rations, management practices, and business strategy. While his motives and efforts
are those of the historian, business managers and their interest in history have
informed his thinking and writing.
THECASEFOR APPLIED OF BUSINESS
IN THE WORLD
HISTORY 8 39

Historians would find new sources of support for budgets and research grants, new
outlets for publications, and greater opportunities for personal influence and income.
Businesses and government agencies have always been willing to pay for research on
topics of direct relevance to them; in fact, several consulting firms specialize in con-
ducting historical research for corporations in the United States. One of the oldest
is the History Factory in Washington, D.C., which has run a variety of projects from
historical research on complex business problems to the more mundane tasks of
writing corporate histories, putting together exhibits, and managing archives.
Another is the Winthrop Group. Historians who do this kind of work charge just as
much as management consultants, and the pay is far more generous than the tradi-
tional grants historians have long relied upon. Some businesses, including banks
and telecommunications firms, have put historians on staff to continue their work.
Ask executives or senior politicians what they think of history and most often
one will hear, “it teaches us about the past, and what problems to avoid.” Some will
quote Santayana on otherwise being doomed to repeat it. Business managers recog-
nize that understanding patterns of behavior can be useful in assessing risks and
opportunities and the likelihood of failure or success, and in anticipating issues they
will need to address.
In fact, business managers use historical perspective all the time. Accounting and
financial information-the basic language of business performance-is always cast
in historical terms. This month‘s financials are compared to last month‘s and to
those of one year earlier. Annual reports always present trend data, usually a
decade’s worth of financial information. Executives talk to stockholders about past
and present trends. Forecasts of sales are often cast in the form of projections based
on previous activities. Manufacturing and marketing personnel often base future
plans on “run rates,” that is, on how many items have been sold in the past regard-
less of specific sales forecasts.
A recent development is the expanded use of historical studies conducted by
consultants, journalists, and business research institutes, particularly in the United
States. They conduct historical research, draw conclusions, make recommenda-
tions, and sell their studies, and executives act on their advice. IBM, for instance,
has a business research center within the firm doing research with some degree of
historical perspective. Many of the studies coming out of the Brookings Institution
rely more extensively on historical insight. The Conference Board, a leading orga-
nization of business executives, sometimes takes a historical perspective in its
research, while a plethora of lesser known organizations publish h i ~ t o r y The .~
Corporation for National Research Initiatives, for example, has published several

5David Stipp, “The Idols of the Greeks,” Fortune, 3 March 1997,40

840 THEHISTORIAN

scholarly history monographs dealing with computing and telecommunications

that have been read by members of the computer industry. Historians could d o this
work well.
The most popular way business people study an issue today is through case stud-
ies. Leaving aside arguments pro and con about their virtues, case studies reign
supreme. And what are case studies? They are little histories of some specific event,
issue, or organization from which business managers and their consultants draw
lessons. While too many lessons are drawn from too few case studies, they are
nonetheless considered instructive, particularly in defining less obvious influences
on the behavior of some manager. Business managers value case studies because
they assume that some of what happened before influences current situations.
Historians can help by pointing out limits of the case study approach, while not
throwing out the proverbial baby with the bath water. By adding context to case
studies, historians can enhance the value of such studies for business professionals.
Chief executive officers of corporations often are students of their industry’s his-
tory. \%%en IBM CEO Louis V. Gerstner built a new corporate headquarters, he
insisted on including a permanent exhibit on the company’s history on the first
tloor where customers and employees passed to get to meeting rooms and the cafe-
teria. More than simply an orchestrated applause to the glory of IBM, the display
included material on historical patterns of behavior in the information processing
world.
The point is, more business managers appreciate history than might otherwise
be apparent to historians. Business and political leaders welcome insights from his-
torians, and many quietly subscribe to history publications and often buy and read
books on history. The American Historical Association has several hundred mem-
bers who work in business. Historians do not realize this because they d o not rou-
tinely associate either socially or professionally with business managers. Some
overtly disdain the business world. I had an indication of this problem recently
when I published an article on the job market for history graduate students. From
the hundred-plus e-mails I received, it appears that junior faculty are fairly open
to new professional opportunities but senior faculty, to quote one e-mail, “just
doesn’t get it.’lh
While urging historians to be proactive in helping business managers, we need
to recognize the challenges that stand in the way of perfect help. In the business
world, interest centers on anticipating problems and opportunities. The problem, of
course, is that no historian can predict the future. There are three basic approaches

‘Jdnic.\ 14’ Cortddd, “The Historian in the Buainesspldce,” Perspectwes 3 5 , no. 6 (September 1997): 33-
34
THECASEFOR APPLIED OF BUSINESS
IN THE WORLD
HISTORY 841

to using history to predict future behavior, the same three that apply to many other
social sciences and the humanities. All carry drawbacks.
Essentially,the way the problem sifts out is through two forms of prediction. The
first-preferred by social scientists-is to argue that certain trigger events and char-
acteristics or proclivities tend to skew action in one direction or another. There is
value in this kind of discussion, but it is not precise enough for many business man-
agers. Insurance actuarial experts can tell you how many people will die per thou-
sand in a given year, and thus how many we can expect over the next six months.
But they cannot say who-the classic dilemma facing a historian asked to predict
the future based on the experience of the past! At best, actuaries can predict, based
on age and unsafe sports or professions, what kinds of people are likely to die and
thus should not be insured or, if insured, how much more they should be charged.
The second form of prediction-the one used most often in business-is linear
projection, which is the act of saying, “if things continue in the direction they are
headed, then we can expect more or less the same in the future.” For example, if
every month a store sells 1,000 pieces of clothing, one could assume that unless
something out of the ordinary occurs, this store would sell 1,000 pieces of clothing
in each of the next six months. Linear projection frequently works for highly finite
items (e.g., dresses) over a very discrete period of time (e.g., next three months or
for specific categories of professions and ages).
Linear projections only work, however, if existing conditions remain static. If I
were to ask an economist or a historian to predict the sale of dresses two years from
now in northern California, he or she would back off, recognizing that conditions
could change sufficiently to threaten any linear forecast. Changes in the weather-
which created problems in the past-might affect dress purchases in the future dif-
ferently than before. In one year it would be El Niiio, the next year a volcano, global
warming in the third. Historians cannot tell me which one it would be and how bad
would be its effects on sales, though they can inform us about the risks involved and
how these have played out in the past. That information might help the store owner
determine the extent to which he or she should rely on the forecast or how much
inventory to carry.
A variation of the linear approach assumes that characteristics or patterns of
behavior will continue into the future. This approach would seem to have the
advantage of relymg more on the causes of change to be taken into account, thus
avoiding problems presented by the first concern. But this approach is still a quasi-
linear projection into the future of current events. Handed-down values in the cul-
ture of a business, for example, are often seen this way. If a manager normally
believes that customers choose products solely based on price, then one could
expect this manager to base future decisions concerning new products on price
842 THEHISTORIAN

consideration. Yet an economic historian could argue that new managers hired
into the company might bring with them different views on what customers want.
Therefore, would a historian want to predict the future pricing decisions of this
firm?
A third approach involves trying to identify waves of change or patterns of
behavior, an approach studied a great deal these days by scholars. But has anyone
ever seen two waves at the beach which look and act exactly the same? Of course
not; nonetheless, the concept holds out some promise if economists, historians,
political scientists, and business professors can identify and understand waves pre-
cisely enough to make sufficiently accurate predictions upon which managers can
base their decisions.
All three approaches share the fundamental concern about having enough facts
or, to use the language of the economist and statistician, data points with which to
plot out potential scenarios. Scenario planning is an attempt to take a variety of pre-
dictive methodologies such as linear projections and add varied (optimistic, prob-
able, pessimistic) views to carve out rough projections of possible futures. Even with
this approach there is much debate within the business community. It appears that
every few years, a new wave of strategic planning comes along with rises and falls in
the popularity of strategic planning itself. As this is being written (2000), scenario
planning is popular again.
Despite the difficulties in forecasting the future, historians can identify contexts
useful in decision malung. In addition to understanding issues of the past and what
has or has not worked, they can help managers avoid obvious fallacies drawn from
history. A common sin committed by strategists and managers is the inappropriate
use of precedents, such as the false analogy, applying sound analogies incorrectly,
and the ever-popular fallacy of the perfect analogy, in which someone concludes
that an earlier situation is exactly the same as (or very similar to) the current one.
While historians would argue that no two situations are ever the same, business
people often predict by analogy when no other technique or data is available.
Unfortunately, such predictions remain untestable, inconclusive, and ultimately
irrelevant. Historians can point out the weaknesses of analogy in predictions and
suggest instead a rich mosaic of contexts useful for understanding future events.
This mosaic can include political considerations, trends in demographics and tech-
nology, and changing economics (e.g., interest rates, regulatory behavior, availabil-
ity of credit).
While the subject of forecasting is beyond the scope of this essay, the move to sce-
nario-based forecasting by most large corporations at least acknowledges the wiggle
room needed if we are to link new events to previous ones. The approach is also use-
ful because it can help managers identify what are today known as “trigger events,”
THECASE k O K ArPLIEL) H I S T O R Y IN T H E W O R L D OI- BUSINESS 843

that when they occur raise the possibility of recognizing some new circumstance
emerging. Often called “if-then” analysis, this approach is the basis for much of the
work underway to codify patterns of behavior in such activities as personnel prac-
tices, process variation, and evolution and application of technologies. Economists
and economic historians have been hunting for these rules of the road longer than
any other class of scholars.
The conclusion I draw about prediction is that it is fraught with problems, mak-
ing it nearly impossible to be precise. That does not mean, however, that forecast-
ing is out; one just has to avoid some common problems well understood by
historians. Competent historians understand these traps because part of their job is
to identify patterns of behavior to help answer questions that begin with the word
“why.” That is why, for instance, a historian who is asked what are the odds of the
U.S. Antitrust Division getting excited about a company seizing 85 percent of the
television market share might respond that the last 15 times somebody tried that
with any form of telecommunication, the government got upset. That same histo-
rian could then link this observation back to government antitrust policies and
practices dating to 1890 with the original enabling legislation. Case studies of what
happened to telegraph, telephone, computer, and software companies would
inform the discussion.
Historians can be of great value to business managers unaware of these problems
by teaching them some basic rules of historiography through their assessment of
issues immediately confronting a management team. A generation ago a distin-
guished historian, David Hackett Fischer, described most of these problems in clear
and practical language in his Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical
Thought. Translating his messages into terms relevant to business managers makes
very good sense.’
Historians have barely reached out to business executives to demonstrate how his-
tory can add tangible value to the work of firms. That same charge cannot be made
quite so equally against business managers because they do seek out history, just in
ways that seem primitive to a professional historian. Managers think they apply his-
tory; it is up to historians, however, to demonstrate how the historical discipline can
add value to any executive’s work. Greater use of historians in the public sector is
proof of the practicality of turning our attention to business management, suggest-
ing why some of the concerns one might have about applying history in business do
not stand the test of experience.
The objections to historians reaching out to business managers are often evident
and overt. Professors of history may argue that one is “selling out” or that one’s

‘David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic ofHistorical Thought (New York, 1970).
844 THEHISTORIAN

focus should not be diverted from the “real issues” of history to pander to the super-
ficial needs of managers. The “call to action” tone of this essay may lead some to
suggest that my case for working with managers is overstated, but nothing could be
further from the truth. All historians are not needed to help business; however, all
historians could help if they wanted. The issue of selling one’s knowledge might be
offensive, but this is done every time we attempt to persuade an editor to publish
our articles or a publisher to invest in our books. The issues are of style, degree, and
scope, and applied history also needs to be sold in some fashion or another. Grant
providers, editors, publishers, and business managers all agree that preserving one’s
intellectual honesty and personal ethics are essential to providing valued services to
a publication or commissioned research. Applying one’s professional training as a
historian involves no ethical compromise.
b’ho can help managers use history properly? The list is broad in scope: high
school history teachers, professors of history, historians employed by government
agencies and private corporations, and finally, consultants trained in history. The
key is training in the formal discipline of history. The most marketable of this
group, of course, remains the Ph.D. professor at a college or university. College stu-
dents can also help with research issues, much the same way graduate students in
the natural and applied sciences help their professors fulfill terms of a research
grant.
Historians versed in business, economic, and labor history are particularly well
positioned to help business managers. This segment of the historical community
increasingly handles requests for information and analysis, often on short dead-
lines. What if the historian is an expert on the Middle Ages, as opposed to modern
U.S. business history? Does it matter? The answer is yes and no. Yes, it matters if one
cannot find a way to present himself or herself as a historian first and secondly a
specialist on the Middle Ages. No, in that the tools of the historian’s craft are essen-
tially the same for experts on the 1300s as for those working on the 1900s. The key
idea to remember concerns methodology of the historian. Even an expert on a nar-
row topic can do well. A European historian who understands the guild systems can
advise corporations creating certification programs for their services employees.
Knowledge of ancient Egypt carries with it an understanding of contemporary
Egyptian society, even perhaps a working knowledge of modern Arabic and
Egyptian political conditions.
To start with, it would help a historian to understand the evolving role of sci-
entists at their own universities who are shifting from support coming primarily
from government grants to increasing funding from corporations looking for
research-for-hire. A second model to explore is the relationships business schools
craft with corporations, usually firms that hire their graduates or whose alumni are
THECASE FOR AI’PLIED IN THE WORLD OF BUSINESS
HISTORY 845

in significant positions of authority. Over the past 20 years I have asked Ph.D.s in
history working in business if their undergraduate and graduate history depart-
ments ever recruited them in the ways described in this paper. Of the roughly 200 1
spoke with, none said they had. Those with MBA degrees, however, all said they
were continuously contacted by their business schools to help out. From both the
science and business school scenarios, historians can learn how to establish links to
potential users of history. Creating those connections will be for most the toughest
part of getting started; once in a manager’s office, discussing the value of history will
be easier.
Following are some obvious tasks that historians can perform for a corporation:

React to questions and issues raised at very senior staff meetings (e.g., on how
that industry reacted to an issue in the past)
Conduct research and prepare short briefing papers on issues for management
teams preparing to make key strategic decisions (e.g., related to entering new
markets)
Prepare article-length case studies on key issues of concern to management (e.g.,
how a disruptive new technology affects the leading supplier of an established
techno1ogy)
Train students in the history of technology and specific industries so that they
and you can write corporate histories (many today are serious academic works)
Study a corporation’s institutional memory and make recommendations on how
to exploit that in current company operations
Conduct seminars on key issues of concern to management (e.g., history of
inflation and of specific technologies)

University and college historians can also partner with colleagues in science and
business programs to collaborate on proposed projects, initially by injecting histor-
ical research into them and later offering subsequent proposals to managers. Most
business schools have projects underway with corporations, providing a logical
entry point.
This leads to the question of who to contact in corporations. My experience sug-
gests that the kinds of work historians do would appeal most to senior manage-
ment-usually at the level of division presidents and higher-because they deal
with ambiguous issues, take into account the political and economic environment
outside their organizations, and present a corporate position on a wide range of
topics to stockholders, communities, banks, customers, and government regulators.
Communications and public relations offices are also logical entry points because
often they do research and write on historical themes. Additional entry points
846 T w HISTOIUIAN

include strategy or economics departments, business research centers, legal depart-

ments, corporate archives, and contacts made at industry trade associations.
Tapping into alumni would seem to be a prime avenue; it certainly has always
been for business schools. Most colleges and universities know where alumni work,
often by rank, so there is great opportunity to connect with these people to collab-
orate on entering a corporation. Locally in one’s community, calling on senior exec-
utives and participating in public service organizations plays out a similar process.
But networking is not enough. As one performs work for corporations, be sure to
accumulate references to business projects so that with the next potential customer
one can cite good work done elsewhere. This is very important because executives
will ask, “Where have you done this kind of work before?”
Another way to enter the market is to form a work-for-hire relationship with
management consulting firms to conduct research. Candidates, for example, include
A. Andersen, IBM Global Services, Ernst & Young, EDS, and Booze-Allen. All have
experience hiring professors to conduct research linked to specific projects and cor-
porate research agendas8
Relationships with corporations normally begin with projects that have a beginning
and an end, and a specific product such as a report or a meeting to communicate
recommendations and insights. A series of such projects (often called engagements
by business people) can lead to a more permanent relationship either on a board or
as a part-time staff member, even a full-time employee. The range is quite broad.
The extent to which an historian can participate and lead such efforts is normally a
personal decision.
Corporations today are very sensitive about who owns the intellectual capital
generated during the course of a project; they invariably want it to be theirs and
confidential for competitive reasons. While most issues will be fairly similar to what
historians encounter in their institutions, this concern is perhaps the most different
aspect of a historian’s worlung environment. It is therefore important to determine
ahead of time who will own intellectual capital rights, how they will be used, and
what can subsequently be published. We are entering a period when services, and
hence knowledge of markets, technologies, and operating processes, are prized
more than the bricks and mortar of a factory. This development provides historians
the opportunity to apply their knowledge and skills in business, but it is also the
constraining factor on their unlimited use of what they learn on “company time.”
Advising historians to apply history to the needs of corporations would have
been difficult to do a generation ago; managers were not listening to the idea. That

’See T/w Dtrcctorj, ofMonngernent Consttitants, 1997-1998 (Fitzwilliani, N.H., 1997); and Milan Kubr,
cd.. A f m i q m t v i r Comtrlting: A Guide to the Professio~(Geneva, 1992, various editions).
THECASEFOR APPLIED IN THE WORLD
HISTORY OF BUSINESS 847

is why, for instance, the recommendations of such creative thinkers as Neustadt and
May fell on relatively deaf ears in corporations when their book was first published
in 1986. Today, secondhand copies of their book sit on credenzas in corporate
America alongside others on contemporary economic and business history. The
time is propitious for historians to reexamine how they might apply history to con-
temporary issues and problems. Succeeding at this will be crucial for some search-
ing for research funding, for others who want to augment their personal income, or
for those who need to defend the relevance of their department in the face of con-
tinued budget cutbacks. We could be entering another period when both the his-
torical profession and methodologies of history evolve for the better. If history
teaches us anything, it is that history will be applied whether historians want that to
happen or not. Historians should, therefore, take charge of the process to further
invigorate their discipline and their profession.