LUQUE vs.

KAYANAN
29 SCRA 173

Doctrine:
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for
courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the peoples respect for, and
confidence in, the administration of justice is to be avoided.

FACTS:
Judge Union C. Kayanan presided over Civil Case 4871 in Lucena City in 1965. The case had
several hearing dates reset and a motion to dismiss was denied. The petitioner was held in contempt
of court, but later released. The petitioner filed a petition for impeachment and disqualification of the
judge, but both were dismissed. The petitioner appealed the case to the Supreme Court and a
preliminary injunction was issued, resulting in the cancellation of succeeding hearings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge violated the Canons of Professional Ethics.

RULING:
YES. This case presents an unedifying picture of animosity, hostility and bad blood between
petitioner, a lawyer and party defendant and cross-defendant, and respondent, a judge. From the
events that occurred in the court below, the courtroom had been converted into an arena of
recriminations between the two. Opprobrious language has been employed by both.
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for
courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the people's respect for, and
confidence in the administration of justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have to restrain
pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent is a
sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice. And yet lack thereof is
painfully apparent in the record of this case. It would appear that both petitioner and respondent were
seized by a kind of ennui which immobilizes the sense of proportion of men trapped in situations
where emotion runs loose.
One important judicial norm is that "a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety." A creed to which a judge is hidebound is, in the words of the preamble of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, that: "The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our
maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied."
In the factual environment just presented we hold that respondent judge also committed a grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 4871 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon. He should, therefore, be prohibited from hearing the same.
 IN RE: SOTTO
82 SCRA 595

Doctrine:
CANON 10 - A Lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court.

FACTS:
Atty. Sotto was ordered to explain why he should not be held in contempt over his written statement
on the Supreme Court's decision on Angel Parazo's case, which was published in the Manila Times
and other newspapers in the area. Sotto published false imputations against its members. He
accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders (stupid or careless mistake) and
injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded,
perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were
the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an
intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.
In his response, he claims that he made his statement in the press exercising his freedom of speech
in good faith and with no intention of offending any of the honorable members of the Supreme Court
who, in his view, wrongly decided the Parazo case. He further clarifies that he did not attack, nor
intended to attack, the honesty or integrity of anyone.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Vicente Sotto violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
YES. It is well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken
from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
As a member of the Bar and an officer of the Courts, Atty. Sotto is duty bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of the Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as an
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature of
their functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform effectively their
functions. They function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience
to command is essential to make the commands effective.
Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule 64, He is
correct in calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial legislation in matters
of judicial practice and procedure is expressly authorized by section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution.
As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the press, which includes the
right to criticize judges in court proceedings.
Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said freedom, with which we fully
agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question involved in these proceedings.
No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so, has ever denied
respondent the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize our proceedings, this Court and its
members. Respondent's statement goes much further than mere criticism of our decision and the
majority members of this Court. The statement is an attempt to interfere with the administration of
justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by trammeling the freedom of action of the members of the
Supreme Court, by bullying them with the menace of change, reorganization, and removal, upon the
false accusation that they have been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the
menacing action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by the
freedom of the press or by the freedom to criticize judges and court proceedings, as no one in his
senses has ever conceived that such freedom includes any form of expressed gangsterism, whether
oral or written.
 ROMERO vs. VALLE
147 SCRA 197

FACTS:
In a verified complaint dated November 28, 1984, Atty. Arturo A. Romero charged Judge Gabriel O.
Valle, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch XII with grave misconduct and oppression.
Instead of directing complainant to proceed with the marking of exhibits and to continue the direct
examination, respondent continued to utter embarrassing remarks which hurt complainant and,
therefore, the latter tried to make further explanations on said exhibits and to defend his integrity in a
controlled and respectful manner, but his honor, the respondent judge suddenly banged his gavel
producing such a deafening noise that several persons from the adjoining branches of the Court
came: that without declaring a recess, said respondent judge unceremoniously REMOVED his coat
and told, angrily, herein complainant: "You step out and we will finish the matter"; immediately
thereafter, respondent judge stepped down from the rostrum and left.
That, shaken and stunned by such sudden aggressive behavior of respondent, complainant then
stood by his seat, and as some people in the Courtroom rushed out of the Courtroom, complainant
looked around and then saw respondent judge outside the courtroom holding a gun with his right
hand, in front of him, facing towards complainant, in an angry and menacing manner, and waited for
complainant to go outside; confronted by such alarming and threatening stance of respondent,
complainant could not move for a moment, as complainant was totally unarmed, surprised and
shocked; and when complainant saw respondent Judge briskly walked to and fro still holding a gun,
complainant then asked the Court stenographer: "Please put in the record that the Judge is holding a
gun"; that luckily thereafter, Atty. Isidro Madamba, member of the Sangunian Panlalawigan,
succeeded in pacifying respondent judge and shortly, said respondent returned to the Court; that after
some remarks by respondent judge, complainant moved that the Honorable respondent voluntarily
inhibit himself from further trying the case in the light of the antecedents, but denied it and ordered the
resetting of the case;
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges and branded the same
as "exaggerated, sensationalized, fabricated and inherently improbable and contrary to human
experience and one-sided. Respondent judge likewise explained that he has been issued by the
provincial commander the necessary permit to carry his licensed pistol outside his residence on
account of a threat on his life from the New People's Army. By way of prayer, he asked that
complainant be suspended from the practice of law for a certain period of time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Valle violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

RULING:
YES. Respondent judge's behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a serious violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach”.
The relations between counsel and judge should be based on-mutual respect and on a deep
appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial of officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks
or comment in the furtherance of causes he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another. Certainly, and most especially in our culture, raising one's voice is a sign of
disrespect, improper to one whose "investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior towards the
courts."
Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but such explanation cannot be taken
as carrying a satisfactory. For his having chosen to carry the same in plain view of the complainant
and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he came out of his chambers on his way to the stairs.
Taken in the light of what had just transpired, the actuation of respondent judge was not an innocent
gesture, but one calculated to instill fear in or intimidate complainant. We cannot let this pass
unnoticed.
WHEREFORE, Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. is found guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, without forfeiture of retirement benefits but with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.
Complainant Atty. Arturo A. Romero is required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court, within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
IN RE: ALMACEN
31 SCRA 578

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen represented Victoria Yaptinchay in the case Calero vs. Yaptinchay but lost
in the trial court. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. He then appealed to the
Court of Appeals and later to the Supreme Court but both appeals were denied. Almacen filed a
petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title because he believed that justice was not served
due to the minute resolution. The Supreme Court did not immediately act on the petition and Almacen
did not surrender his certificate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme
Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition, they reject otherwise the High
Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so, there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled
for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a
motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a
mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is
the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
 SHIOJI vs. HARVEY
43 Phil 333

FACTS:
In case No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein S. Shioji was plaintiff, and the
Toyo Kisen Kaisha and the Pacific Mail Steamship Co. were defendants, judgment was rendered on
October 31, 1920, by Judge Concepcion presiding in the second branch of the court, in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally for the sum of P19,533.49, with legal interest
and costs. Thereafter, the defendants duly perfected an appeal by way of bill of exceptions, to the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and the case was docketed as R. G. No. 18592. The date
on which the bill of exceptions was filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court was February
16, 1922, while attorneys for the respective parties received copies of the same on February 17,
1922.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court has the authority to interpret or reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court.

RULING:
NO. The lower court does not have the authority to interpret or reverse the judgment of the Supreme
Court. The only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the
ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to
interfere with the judgment of the higher court. The decision of the Supreme Court must stand and be
enforced until revoked by the Supreme Court of the United States

Ratio:
The lower court is bound by the decree of the higher court and must carry it into execution according
to the mandate. The case of Sibbald vs. United States held that the inferior court cannot vary or
examine the decree of the higher court for any other purpose than execution. The Rules of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, including Rule 24(a), are valid and necessary for orderly
procedure and regulating the conduct of business in the Supreme Court. Rules of court have the
force and effect of law, as long as they are not in conflict with positive law. Rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent delays and ensure the efficient
and orderly discharge of judicial functions. Every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within its jurisdiction.
 TUGADE vs. CA
85 SCRA 227

FACTS:
At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January 4,, 1972, Rodolfo [Rayan- dayan] was driving a
Hodlen Kingswood car (the [Holden] car), plate No. 52-19V (L-Rizal '71) owned by the Sta. Ines Corp.
and assigned for use of its manager, an Ayala Avenue in Makati, Rizal, going northwards. At the
intersection of Ayala Avenue will Mabati Avenue, [Rayan-dayan] was going to turn left on Makati
Avenue but he stopped to wait for the left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a
stop ... While in that sup position, the [Holden] car was bumped from behind by Blue Car Taxi bearing
Plate No. 55-71R (TX-QC '71) and by Inocencio [Tugade] causing damage to the [Holden] car, the
repairs of which cost P778.10 ... Tugade was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property. He pleaded not guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty
brakes of his taxicab, sought to expeculate himself with an explanation that this fault could not and
should not be traced to him.
After trial, the lower court held: '[Accordingly], the court finds that accused Inocencio Tugade guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
hereby sentences him to pay a [fine of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos], with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised,
Penal Code, as amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining Corporation in the amount of P778.10 by
way of actual damages; and to pay the costs.' While [Tugade] admitted the facts of the case as set
out above, he, nevertheless, appealed from the judgment reiterating that 'the malfunctioning of the
brakes at the time of the accident was due to a mechanical defect which even the exercise of due
diligence of a good father of a family cannot have prevented.' As the lower court had found: "this
witness ([Tugade]) testified that after the accident, he admitted that his taxicab bumped the car on his
front because the brakes of his vehicle malfunctioned; and that the document, ..., is the handwritten
statement he prepared to this effect." Respondent Court of Appeals, after stating that upon review of
the record, it agreed with the trial court, its decision affirming in toto their judgment appealed from.

ISSUE:

RULING:
The decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed can stand the test of strict scrutiny. It is this
Tribunal, not respondent Court of Appeals, that speaks authoritatively. Respondent Court of Appeals
really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question
raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to
this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera: "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches
to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining
to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and
rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial heirarchy. They have to defer
and to submit." The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such
a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words:
"Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our
system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December 15, 1977 is affirmed. No
costs.

NIQUE vs. ZAPATOS

219 SCRA 639

FACTS:
The case involves an ejectment case filed by Licerio Nique against Eugene Lim and others regarding
a fishpond. After several motions and appeals, the RTC ordered Judge Felipe G. Zapatos to reinstate
the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and restore Nique in the peaceful possession and
occupation of the fishpond.
Later, Judge Zapatos denied Nique's motion for execution and dissolved the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, which Nique complained against him, alleging that he committed several
offenses. Judge Zapatos justified his actions, citing provisions in the Rules of Court and the issuance
of free patent titles.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent MTCC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos is GUILTY of disobedience of a final
judgment of a superior court, and of obstructing the administration of justice.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent Judge ought to know his place in the judicial ladder. His act of "reversing" the final
judgment of the RTC, instead of complying with his mandatory and ministerial duty of executing the
same, is the height of audacity, arrogance and presumption on his part for if the decision of the RTC
was unacceptable to the defendants, their remedy was to appeal it to a higher court.
A municipal trial judge, figuratively speaking, is "the low man in the totem pole" of the judiciary. He
should, of necessity, defer to orders of the higher courts regardless of his personal opinion in the
case. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." The appellate
jurisdiction of a higher court would be meaningless if a lower court may disregard and disobey with
impunity its final judgment or order.
If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the
Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. Appellate
jurisdiction would be a farce (mockery) if the Supreme Court did not have the power of preventing
inferior courts from meddling with decisions when sent to them for compliance.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent MTCC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos GUILTY of disobedience
of a final judgment of a superior court, and of obstructing the administration of justice. He is ordered
to pay a fine of P1,000.00 to the Cashier of the Supreme Court and warned that a repetition of this
sort of misfeasance in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 USAFFE VETERANS ASSO., INC. vs. TREASURER OF THE PHIL.
18 SCRA 1092

FACTS:
Sometime in October 1954, appellant, for itself and on behalf of more than 30,000 Filipino veterans of
World War II, ex-members of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), commenced
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to declare illegal the so-called Romulo-Snyder
Agreement (1950) and all payments made thereunder, and to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Secretary of Finance and the Auditor General from
disbursing any funds in the National Treasury in pursuance of said agreement.
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment upholding the validity of said agreement. This
judgment was affirmed by us on appeal on June 30, 1959 (G. R. No. L-10500).
After our decision had become final and executory, appellant, on December 28, 1959, filed with the
lower court a motion for new trial based on the following grounds: (1) that the original decision of the
court, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, is contrary to law; (2) that the evidence of record is contrary
to and does not support the affirmed decision of the court; (3) that on October 5, 1959, the Auditor
General filed a manifestation with the Supreme Court sustaining the views of the Treasurer of the
Philippines, which manifestation was a virtual confession of judgment and which, if considered, would
alter the result. On January 19, 1960 the lower court issued the appealed orders. Upon the
undisputed facts stated above, it is manifest that the present appeal is frivolous (thoughtless) and
entirely without merit, and the lower court denied the motion for new trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for new trial, upon the ground that
the decision rendered by Us in G. R. No. L-10500 had become final and executory.

RULING:
NO. It is elementary — so elementary, indeed, that even freshmen law students know it — that an
inferior court has no legal authority to set aside a final and executory decision of this Court and grant
a new trial. In People, Et Al., v. Vera, we said the following:
"As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequent cases, ’if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result.’ A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Wherefore, the orders appealed from are affirmed, with double costs imposed upon Appellant.
 PEOPLE vs. SANTOS
104 SCRA 531

FACTS:
A total of 10 separate Informations were filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, charging the defendants
with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, etc. The amended information filed
followed a common pattern and charged the defendants with the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murders, arson, robberies and physical injuries.
In the course of the hearing, 3 of the defendants pleaded guilty to the crime of simple rebellion after
the information was amended by the Fiscal to charge them with only said offense, and were
sentenced accordingly. Jaime Santos offered to plead guilty of simple rebellion but the Fiscal refused
to amend the information with respect to him. After hearing, the Court rendered judgment against
these defendants.
From this decision, only Jaime Santos appealed and, his counsel maintains that the lower Court erred
in not following the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Geronimo in which appellant has
objected to the information on the ground of the multiplicity of offenses charged therein in violation of
Section 2-(e) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower Court violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in not following the doctrine laid
down by the Highest Court of the Land in the case of People v. Geronimo.

RULING:
YES. As the Supreme Coiurt stated in People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90 (by a voting of 7 against 4)
this crime cannot be complexed with other common crimes, because the latter are either absorbed by
the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance of the aims, purposes and objectives of the rebels
and in furtherance of their intention to overthrow the duly constituted government by force, or are
independent common crimes which had no connection with the rebellion and must be separately
prosecuted in the proper court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the same had been committed.
In the case of People v. Geronimo, the writer of said Decision took pains to indicate, for the benefit of
the Bench and Bar, how each of the members of the Court voted on the particular points involved
therein, and it was evident from the exposition of the individual opinions of the Justices of this Court,
arrived at after a careful, extensive and mature deliberation, that the doctrines then laid down as a
result thereof, were unalterable and final as long as the composition of the Court remain the same as
it was, or unless, of course, the law would be changed.
Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against
his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in
accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted
by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would
unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants.
And if despite of what is here said a Judge, by delicate or acute qualms of conscience, still believes
that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position
that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.
C.) and he has only one legal way to do that.
 BELLENA vs. PERELLO
450 SCRA 122

FACTS:
In a letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Norma C. Perello was
charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and oppression in connection with her
actuations in Civil Case No. 01-268. Complainants alleged that the judge had deliberately delayed the
processing of their appeal.
The Court Administrator directed the respondent judge to submit a comment on a complaint lodged
against her for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The judge submitted her comment,
explaining that the complainants were the losing party in an unlawful detainer case and that she gave
due course to their Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. 01-268.
The respondent judge was found guilty of undue delay in transmitting the records of Civil Case No.
01-268 to the Court of Appeals, and was imposed with a penalty of P20,000. Melecia Bellena and
Zenaida Alfar testified that despite their numerous personal inquiries to the court, it was only in
December 2002 that the branch clerk of court transmitted the records of Civil Case No. 01-268 to the
Court of Appeals.
The Investigating Justice submitted a report to the Supreme Court recommending that the charges
against Judge Norma C. Perello be dismissed for lack of merit, but that she be found guilty of undue
delay and fined P20,000. The judge was also admonished (warned) to observe the Code of Judicial
Conduct and establish an effective system for monitoring and safekeeping of court records.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
YES. Under Rule 3.09, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should organize and
supervise her court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of the business of her court,
and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Sad to say, the
respondent judge did not embody the ideals of a good judge when she failed to take appropriate
measures that would ensure the prompt transmittal of the subject records.
Respondent judge cannot seek refuge in the incompetence of her subordinate since proper and
efficient court management is her own responsibility. She is the master of her own domain and should
take responsibility for the mistakes of those under her. Such display of laxity and inefficiency on the
part of her branch clerk of court, an essential officer performing delicate administrative functions in
the court, militates against the management skills of respondent judge. It indicates that she has not
been meticulous and zealous (devoted) as she should have been in organizing and supervising the
work of her subordinates as required by Canon 3, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Members of the judiciary have always been reminded that undue delays erode the people's faith and
confidence in our justice system and bring it into disrepute.

Note:
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the proper determination of the cause.
It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.

OCA vs. DUQUE

450 SCRA 527

FACTS:
In a letter dated October 3, 2002, complainant Eugenio Taguba, Process Server of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Santiago City, Isabela (MTCC-Br. 2) requested for an investigation on the
alleged anomalies discovered during the implementation of a writ of execution in Crim. Case No. II-
4066 entitled People of the Philippines v. Marirose Valencia.
On November 15, 2002, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez referred the letter to Judge Fe A.
Madrid, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, for discreet
investigation.
In her report dated March 5, 2003, Judge Madrid narrated that on April 24, 2001, respondent Judge
Ruben R. Plata rendered decision in Crim. Case No. II-4066 convicting Marirose Valencia of violation
of BP Blg. 22 and sentencing her to pay P120,000.00 as fine and P100,000.00 representing civil
liability.
Pending reconsideration of the case, Valencia and Atty. Pacifico Capuchino, delivered the amount of
P120,000.00 to respondent Tessie Duque, Clerk IV of the MTCC, Br. 1, Santiago City, for
safekeeping.

Before respondent Judge Plata could resolve the motion for reconsideration, Judge Maxwell Rosete,
the former presiding judge of MTCC-Br. 2, returned and assumed his former office. Respondent
Duque admitted that she received the money but insisted that the same was entrusted for her
safekeeping only. She alleged that she immediately informed respondent Judge Plata upon receipt of
the amount. She thought that by keeping the money, she was rendering service to the litigants.

ISSUE:

RULING:
As Clerk IV, Duque is not authorized to receive money for whatever purpose, more so because she
was detailed to MTCC - Br. 1 and not to Br. 2 where Crim. Case No. II-4066 was pending. Granting
that the exigency of the situation justified her receipt of the money, respondent Duque is still liable
because she failed to turn over its custody to the Clerk of Court of MTCC-Br. 2 as soon as possible.
Instead, she kept the money in her custody for 17 months (from May 9, 2001 to October 4, 2002) and
released the same only after Judge Rosete issued the notice of garnishment divesting her of its
custody.
Thus, when respondent Duque accepted the money, she arrogated to herself the authority to exercise
a function that properly belongs to the Branch Clerk of Court. While the 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court provides that a Clerk IV, such as respondent Duque, may perform other duties that
may be assigned to her in addition to her official functions, it is worthy to note that respondent Judge
Plata did not assign or authorize her to receive, much less keep the money. On the contrary,
respondent Judge Plata immediately instructed her to return the money in order to avoid any
misconception.
We have consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. Everyone in the judiciary, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bears a heavy responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty,
and it behooves each one to steer clear of any situation in which the slightest suspicion might be cast
on his conduct.
As for respondent Judge, while we agree with the OCA that there is no evidence of complicity on his
part with respect to the receipt of the money, nevertheless, he must be advised to be more prudent
and circumspect (careful) in his dealings. A judge's official conduct should be free from any
appearance of impropriety; and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance
of his official duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach.
A judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. He must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of
integrity and justice. Judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the
confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Tessie Duque, Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 1, Santiago City, is found GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for which she
is SUSPENDED without pay for two months. Respondent Judge Ruben R. Plata is ADVISED to be
more prudent and circumspect in his dealings.

BJE
Canon 1 Cases

DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA

112 SCRA 339

FACTS:

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin
(prohibit) the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).

RULING:

YES. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus, it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with
such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.
It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.

No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise
of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it
with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute,
the former is to be preferred.

The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals down,
has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to be
strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation of the
as grieved parties and after due process and hearing.

The constitutional confrontation and conflict may be avoided by holding that since the changes and
provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the "new
courts" therein provided as compared to the "abolished old courts" but provide for procedural
changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of courts for a more effective
and efficient disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges guaranteed security of tenure require
that they be retained in the corresponding "new courts."
BORROMEO vs. MARIANO
41 Phil 322

FACTS:

This case involves a quo warranto proceeding to determine the right to the office of Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District in the Philippines. The plaintiff, Andres
Borromeo, was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District on July 1,
1914, and took possession of the office on that date. On February 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge
of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth
Judicial District. However, Borromeo consistently refused to accept the appointment to the Twenty-
first Judicial District.

ISSUE:

The main issue in this case is whether Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.

RULING:

YES. The court ruled that Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.

The court interpreted the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, which allows for the
appointment of a Judge of First Instance to another district, as requiring the consent of the judge. The
court emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary and the need to protect judges from
arbitrary transfers or removals. The court also noted that the language of the proviso should not be
interpreted in a way that would render the main provisions of the law, particularly those relating to the
removal of judges, ineffective.

The court explained that judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of
the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands, and they hold these positions until they
resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The court also highlighted the
distinction between appointment and qualification to office, stating that appointment is the sole act of
those vested with the power to make it, while acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. The court
concluded that the language of the proviso does not empower the Governor-General to transfer a
judge to another district without their consent.

It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the
defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty fourth Judicial
District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the
Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court.
So ordered.
Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the
office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self respecting human units in a
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other departments of government. We are pleased to
think of judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office
because when asked if in the future he would delay a case at the King's order, he replied: "I will do
what becomes of me as a judge”.

THE LIFE OF A JUDGE

By
Atty. FLORIMOND C. ROUS

§ 1.Introduction, p. 188.
§ 2.Qualifications for Becoming a Judge, p. 189.
§ 3.Judicial Conduct, p. 192.
§ 4.Judicial Liabilities, p. 196.
§ 5.Resume, p, 197.

§ 1. INTRODUCTION

The judicial office exists for one solemn purpose—to promote justice and thus help in securing
happiness and contentment for the people. This purpose alone saddles the judge with tremendous
responsibilities. The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in respect to
his
personal conduct which concern his relation to the State and its inhabitants, the litigants before him,
the principles of law, the practitioners of law in his court, and the witnesses and attendants who aid
him in the administration of its functions. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 1).

A judge is a legal arbiter. People go to him seeking the proper application of the law to their causes;
he
is expected to do it impartially and independently. His admission to the bar, in the first place, and his
appointment to the office is their guarantee that he is mentally and morally capable of passing upon
the
merits of their various cases. To the average layman, he is beholden as a person whose life and way
of thinking has been moulded within the confines of law and justice. He is looked upon as an
individual
gifted with a mature and just disposition. He is expected to be deserving of the trust and confidence
which the public necessarily places in his person, if they are to find the solution to their legal problems
in his office.

A judge siting on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial, and independent.
(Umale
vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84). Thus, a good judge invites the peaceful settlement of disputes in the
community by his office. By his erudition and fairness, he gains public confidence. In turn, people
welcome his judgement in settling their disputes. This is the general public feeling notwithstanding the
occasional passionate outbursts of defeated parties. On the other hand, a bad judge encourages
discontentment, dissension and strife in the community. In view of these actuations, people avoid his
office and instead take the law into their own hands.

To tip the scale in favor of a peaceful and contented constituency, a judge’s character should be
unquestionable. A judge’s conduct should be above reproach (criticism) and in the discharge of his
judicial duties
he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless
of
public clamor, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and
should
deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or
his
private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 31).

§ 2. QUALIFICATIONS FOR BECOMING A JUDGE

To enable the citizens to have confidence in him, a judge must be learned, that is, he must have a
mastery of the principles that underlie the law. This may be quite exacting and too strict a standard
with
which to measure one’s worth as a judge, but the average citizen expects no less if he is to continue
seeking his rights through the courts. Even assuming that the standard is idealistic, it would not in the
least detract from the power of the people to demand an approximation of it from those who would
want to occupy the reversed position of a judge.

However, a judge must not be a genius or exceptionally gifted because if that were so, then very few
could be found to fill the various judicial offices in our country these days. He should be merely
devoted
industriously to the study of the law. Judges of inferior courts, which according to the Constitution
refer
to all those outside the Supreme Court, are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules. (Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78). Having accepted his position,
a judge owes it to the dignity of his court, to the legal profession to which he belongs, and to the
public
who is dependent upon him, to know the law which he is called upon to interpret and to apply. Instead
of spending his leisure time in pursuing pleasure, such time should be devoted to study and research.

He must be abreast (up-to date) with developments in the law, the latest rulings, decisions, and
precedents. As has been mentioned, one can have the capacity to be a judge who is “a man of
learning, who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body
of traditions and the learning of the law.” (Barker, quoted in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p.
209). A judge must be all these in order to merit the position. Indeed, a judge who often quotes legal
provisions in his rulings incorrectly, is not a reliable individual to be trusted with for the answer to the
people’s legal predicaments.

A judge must necessarily have good moral character. He should be gifted with a disposition to do right
and never wrong, to administer justice and not injustices. More than the practitioner, he should have a
strong moral fiber to enable him to resist the temptations that surround his office. An individual with a
perverted thinking of right and wrong is not fit and not safe to sit in judgment of persons who seek his
office, is tendency is to misapply the law and this causes loss of confidence in the judiciary. It is truly
dangerous to allow such an individual to occupy this position with such powers and prerogatives. A
judge with a predisposition towards wrong is bound to commit even minor legal infractions thus
setting a bad example.

A judge should be courageous in his mission to administer justice. He must be above public clamor
and
the considerations of personal popularity. He must be brave enough to displease any man or interest
or power, but should render justice without regard for his personal advantages or safety. Thus, if
evidence warrants it, the conscientious and fearless judge must decide a case against a close relative
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court before which institution the judge’s promotion may be
pending. Nor should he have fear to decide a case against a bosom friend or a close relative, even if
it means incurring their unending condemnation and hatred. As such, a judge should be mindful that
his duty is the application of general law to particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and
not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do
what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general
law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of the law. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 18).
Thus also, while a judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, nevertheless, he should bear in mind that
his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a sever
attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual
circumstances of trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment
of the truth in respect thereto.

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary, but the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants
and
lead to its unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a
controversial (casual or like talking to a friend) tone.

He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
positions, and he should not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or a premature
judgment.
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 14).

§ 3. JUDICIAL CONDUCT

A judge’s personal behavior in his day-to-day life must be beyond reproach (criticism). In his
community, he stands as the legal symbol. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law and he
should be the example for others. He should be very, very careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law. Thus, one important judicial norm is that a judge’s official conduct should be free
from appearance of impropriety. (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165 and reiterated in Jugueta vs.
Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27).

He should abstain from participating in any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved. If
he has personal litigation in the court of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that
account, but he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy. (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 28).

Likewise, he should not accept any presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing before
him. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 29).

A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will
in any way interfere with his devotion of the expeditious and proper administration of his official
functions. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 23).

Thus, while judges are not disqualified from holding executorships or trusteeships, they should not
accept or continue to hold any fiduciary or other position if the holding of it would interfere or seem to
interfere with the proper performance of their judicial duties, or if the business interests of those
represented require investments in enterprises that are apt to come before the court, or to be involved
in questions of law to be determined by it. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 26).

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion (solitude); it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their
work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue
their appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or
prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend
to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 30).

While entitled to entertain his personal views on political questions, and while not required to
surrender
his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will
attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party against
another. A judge should avoid making political speeches, contributions to party funds, the public
endorsement of candidates for political office, or participating in party conventions. (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 27).

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after accession (acquisition) to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without
serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations
which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or
prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. It is highly improper for
a judge to utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for purposes of speculation, and it
detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of his judicial judgment for him
at any time to become a speculative investor upon the hazard of a margin. (Canons of Judicial ethics,
25).

He should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige
of
his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private
business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private
business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the power of
his
office or the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others; he should not solicit for
charities, nor should he enter into any business relations which, in the normal course of events
reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interests into conflict with the impartial
performance of his official duties. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 24).

He should be temperate, patient, attentive, impartial, and, since he is to administer the law and apply
it
to the facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law, diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the
facts. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 4).

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that judges should be temperate and patient, courteous to counsel.
(Delgra Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237).

A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 3).

A judge administers justice. As such, a judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general
law to particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his
duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding
upon
him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should
administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 18).

Judges, in their seal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see
to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as
laid down by the statute and by the rules of procedure. (Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52).

Judges should decide cases promptly (Secretary of Justice vs. Bullecer, 56 SCRA 24); they should
strictly and faithfully observe laws and regulations regarding pursuance of other vocations (Jakosalem
vs. Cordoves, 58 SCRA 11); and their decisions should be faithful to the norms of judicial duty.
(Bondoc vs. De Guzman, 57 SCRA 135).

Justice should not be molded by the individual idiosyncracies of those who administer it. A judge
should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek to be extreme or peculiar
in his judgment, or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court. Though vested with
discretion in the imposition of mild severe sentences, he should not compel persons convicted or to
submit accused to some humiliating act or discipline of his own devising, without authority of law,
because he thinks it will have a beneficial corrective influence. Judges imposing sentence should
endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity either
by exceptional severity or undue leniency. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 19).

He should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him.
(Canons of Judicial Ethics, 5).

His interest in his office should be one “which stops not at the minimum of the day’s labors fixed by
law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on
holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.” (In re impeachment of Judge
Floredeliza, 44 Phil. 608). He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 6).

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 7).

He should organize his court with a view to prompt and convenient dispatch of its business and he
should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, sheriffs, and other assistants who are sometimes
prone to presume too much upon his good-natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association
with
him. (Canons of Judicial Ethics, 8).

He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 9).

Judges should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and
also to all others concerned in the administration of justice in their courts. They should also require,
and, as far as their power extends, enforce on the part of clerks, court officers, and counsel civility
and courtesy to witnesses, litigants, and others having business with the court. (Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 10).

Judges should discourage ex parte (one side only) hearing of applications for injunctions and
receiverships where the order may work detriment to absent parties; they should act upon ex parte
applications only where the necessity for quick action is clearly shown; if this be demonstrated, then
the judge should endeavor to counteract the effect of the absence of opposing counsel by scrupulous
cross-examination and investigation as to the facts and the principles of law upon which the
application is based, granting relief only when fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it. The judge should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action
of the defendants and should not be granted lightly or inadvisedly. One applying for such relief must
sustain the burden of showing clearly its necessity and this burden is increased in the absence of the
party whose freedom of action is to be restrained temporarily. (Canons of judicial Ethics, 15).

§ 4. JUDICIAL LIABILITIES

Under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, a judge who directly or indirectly impedes or impairs the civil
liberties of another person, shall be liable to the latter for damages, provided that the act or omission
of the judges complained of constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or any other penal statute. Any
judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall
be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. (Article 204, Revised Penal
Code).

A judicial officer is not liable criminally for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, and
that he may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgement only if it is shown beyond cavil
(beyond doubt) that the judgment is unjust as being contrary to law or as not supported by evidence,
and that the same was rendered with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Evangelista
vs. Baes, 61 SCRA 475).

Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall render a manifestly unjust
judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and temporary
special disqualification. (Article 205, Revised Penal Code).

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without
malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which
the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. (In re Hon. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107).

In the absence of evidence that the judge decided the cases out of ignorance, partisanship, favoritism
or with intent to violate the law, he cannot be said to have rendered an unjust judgement. (Lampanog
vs. Villarojo, 55 SCRA 304)

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty
of
arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of
inexcusable
neglicence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall
be
suspension. (Article 206, Revised Penal Code).

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of
malicious delay in the administration of justice. (Article 207, Revised Penal Code).

§ 5. RESUME

Since judges hold quite a sensitive position, it is but necessary that they act properly at all times and
that the Supreme Court, which has supervision over them, be ever watchful for judges of inferior
courts, who may sometimes be forgetful of their sworn duties and responsibilities. In a substantial
number of cases filed against judges, quite a number were resolved in their favor. However, the case
subject of annotation is worthy of note because of the actuations of the respondent judge and
because of the somewhat forceful language used in the decision.

In said case, the respondent judge was accused of conniving with the Mayor of Rizal, Cagayan in the
filing of a fictitious criminal case of qualified trespass against Hermogenes Anguluan and other
persons
resulting in the imprisonment of the persons charged for three (3) days and of advising the
complainants
and Aleco Anguluan, Diosdado Gundan and Jose de la Cruz, to sign an affidavit without explaining
the
contents thereof and without allowing them to read said affidavit. The Supreme Court ruled that it is
alleged in the criminal complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police that the crime was committed on
December 10, 1973.

The criminal complaint was filed only on June 18, 1974. The respondent judge should have known
immediately by simply reading the criminal complaint that the crime charged had prescribed. The
respondent judge displayed gross ignorance of the law in giving due course to the criminal complaint
as a result of which the persons accused were detained for three days. Although the preliminary
examination was conducted on August 29, 1974, the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 3,
1976. The failure of the respondent judge to issue the warrant of arrest within a reasonable time is
suspicious. The respondent judge was either ignorant of his duty or he was impelled by an ulterior
motive. And finally, the respondent judge admitted that he did not explain the affidavit to the affiants
before he administered the oath. His excuse that he could not read without his eyeglasses is asinine
(foolish), to say the least. (Anguluan and Anguluan vs. Taguba, Adm. Matter No. 1402-MJ, September
14, 1979).

This case once again showed that the Supreme Court is indeed worthy of public trust. This decision
truly exhibits the statesmanship of the members of that august institution, who are models not only for
judges but also the general public. Said members have manifested themselves as true examples of
what judicial officers should be and they have once again proven that the Supreme Court is the “final
bulwark (barrier) of democracy.” The Life of a Judge, 93 SCRA 188, September 14, 1979

LIBARIOS vs. DABALOS

199 SCRA 48

FACTS:

An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano
Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
the respondent judge against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr. and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of
murder fixing their bail without any prior hearing.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. He should not have allowed himself
to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with
murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law.

It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused.

A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as
to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

The respondent judge is imposed of a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and
WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.

GO vs. CA
206 SCRA 165
FACTS:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s
car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene
of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the
police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations
of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant
because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly
perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness
of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not
apply in respect of petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

RULING:

NO. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they
filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a
preliminary investigation.”

In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary
investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary

investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information
(Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the
validity of the information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an infringement
of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for
release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the
hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be
subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but
should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an
opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner
killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose the need
for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt. The bail hearing may not be
suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the
judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether evidence of
guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond."
RAMIREZ vs. CORPUS- MACANDOG
144 SCRA 462

FACTS:

This case involves the respondent judge, Antonia Corpuz-Macandog, who was accused of various
acts of misconduct. One of the charges against her was the issuance of two orders of arrest in
forcible entry and detainer cases, which were deemed to be improvidently (without adequate
consideration by the court) issued. The judge was also accused of showing favoritism and bias in
deciding a civil case in favor of a certain Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro due to pressure from a
revolutionary government. Additionally, the judge was found to have failed to act with reasonable
dispatch in resolving a motion and in managing her court. The judge argued that the release of the
deputy sheriff from jail and the recall of the order of arrest against another person rendered the
administrative cases against her moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge showed favoritism and bias in deciding a civil case.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the complainant and ordered the dismissal of the
respondent judge from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or its agencies or instrumentalities.

Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her
office. Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. They are
likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to
the scope of their authority. They are duty bound to observe and abide by these rules and
procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus,
confronted with a serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the
reasonableness, if not the wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to
this Court. The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding
Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable request
for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary
sanction.

Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to
take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch 121, suffice it to say that the same was revoked, not
by our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act on January 17, 1983. Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be
mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must perforce be effected.

In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered
under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as
may be warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities.

SABITSANA JR vs. VILLAMOR

202 SCRA 445

FACTS:

The case involves Judge Adriano R. Villamor Jr., the respondent, who was the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Leyte. Judge Adriano R. Villamor Jr. was found guilty of serious
misconduct, inexcusable negligence, and gross inefficiency. The case stemmed from the
respondent's actions of sending a handwritten note to another judge, urging him to acquit the
accused in a pending criminal case. The respondent's actions were deemed improper and showed a
lack of circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge. Here, a complaint filed by Atty. Clemencio
Sabitsana, Jr. alleges that Judge Villamor falsified his monthly Certificates of Service by indicating
that he had resolved all cases within the required 90-day period, when in fact there were 15 cases
that remained undecided for several years. An on-the-spot audit conducted by Deputy Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad confirmed that there were indeed 87 cases that remained unresolved
beyond the 90-day period. As a result, the respondent was dismissed from service and forfeited all his
accrued retirement benefits, leave, and other privileges.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent Judge’s acts constitute a misconduct, untruthful statement in his certificate of
service and mis-management of the courthouse in his Sala.

RULING:

YES. The Court found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct, inexcusable negligence, and
gross inefficiency. Under Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: A judge
should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court
personnel. And also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 that: A judge should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at
all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. The Court emphasized that a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, and interference in
pending suits undermines the people's faith in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court
also found the respondent guilty of making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service,
displaying negligence and inefficiency in connection with missing records in his Sala, and showing a
lack of management capabilities in the dilapidated condition of the courthouse.

The Court based its decision on the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge's
conduct, both private and official, must be free from the appearance of impropriety. The Court
emphasized the importance of a judge's role as the visible representation of the law and justice, and
the need for judges to abide by the law and set an example for others to follow. The Court also cited
previous cases that emphasized the need for judges to avoid impropriety and interference in pending
cases.

Upon the facts and the evidence, we cannot but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful
statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in
connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences to the directives of this Court;
and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over
which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated
condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities
desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its
name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with his membership in the Bench.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued
retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

IN RE: JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA
355 SCRA 366

FACTS:

This Resolves the Motion for Reconsideration dated filed by counsel for respondent Demetrio G.
Demetria (an associate justice). The records show that respondent was found guilty of interceding
(represent) in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, who was charged under R.A. 6425, as
amended, thereby violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Consequently, respondent,
then an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, was dismissed from the service with prejudice to
his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency, or instrumentality, including
government owned or controlled corporation or institution. All his benefits were ordered forfeited.

As found by the Court-appointed investigator, the Honorable Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino,

the Motion for Inhibition against Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
54, the pairing Judge for Branch 53 (then left vacant by the demise of its incumbent Judge) was
heard and thereafter submitted for resolution. Later, upon his arrival in his office, SP Pablo C.
Formaran III, the public prosecutor handling the case, was informed by his secretary that a call from
the Office of Justice Demetria was received and that respondent Justice wanted to speak with him.

Respondent Justice, in the company of Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas went to the office of SP
Formaran III asking the latter to withdraw the Motion for Inhibition he had earlier filed against Judge
Muro. Go Teng Kok pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion while respondent Justice
counseled SP Formaran III that the basis for the motion for inhibition, i.e., the unsigned letter of
"concerned court employees," was "not strong." Respondent also asked SP Formaran III if he could
do something to help Go Teng Kok. Just to put an end to the conversation, SP Formaran III, after
politely declining the request, answered that he would bring the matter to CSP Jovencito R. Zuño.
"Iyon pala," respondent Justice replied, then stood up, bade SP Formaran III good bye, and left with
Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok.

Upon returning to his office in the Court of Appeals, respondent Justice called up CSP Zuño and
requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion for Inhibition so that Judge Muro
could issue an order in the case of Yu Yuk Lai.

ISSUE:

Whether Justice Demetrio Demetria interceded in behalf of the suspected Drug Queen?

RULING:

YES. We reiterate our ruling that "the evidence is clear, if not overwhelming and damning" that
respondent did intercede for suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. While it may be so, as
respondent argues, that "what Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes (to be) is not
evidence" the same is not merely an expression of her opinion. Her pronouncements were
conclusions based on her assessment and appreciation of the evidence presented before her.

Like our view on factual findings of the trial court, we accord great weight and the highest respect to
the evaluation of Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino, a retired but well-respected member of this Court, as
her assessment and appreciation of the evidence are quite competent and convincing. Absent any
showing of bias, partiality, flaw or grave abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb her findings. Indeed,
the conspiracy to clear-suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai has become clearer with the recent
dismissal of Judge Manuel T. Muro for misconduct, being utterly inefficient and manifesting partiality
in favor of Yu Yuk Lai. And respondent Justice has wittingly, perhaps unwittingly, become one of the
co-conspirators.

The independence and integrity of the Judiciary, including those who participate in its work, such as
the prosecution arm of the Government, should be preserved at all times. "Public confidence in the
judicial system is diminished when a judge, instead of preserving the integrity and independence of
the Judiciary, uses his influence as a tool to derail or interfere with the regular course of a judicial
proceeding for the benefit of one of the parties therein.” No discussion on RTC, and CA.

SC: Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, except insofar as the accrued leave credits of respondent
Demetrio G. Demetria were all ordered forfeited, in which case, his accrued leave credits shall be
released to him.
MARCES SR vs. ARCANGEL
258 SCRA 503

FACTS:
This case involves a complaint filed by Marces against Judge Paul T. Arcangel, the Presiding Judge
in Davao City. The complaint alleges serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment, and
immorality on the part of Judge Arcangel.

Ben D. Marces, Sr. and his family were involved in a dispute with their neighbors, Wilfredo and
Flordeliza Cañas. The dispute escalated when Mrs. Cañas had an exchange of words with Mrs.
Marces and their daughter, Lydia, over a minor issue involving a fight between their turkeys. The next
day, Mrs. Cañas orchestrated the arrest of Mr. Marces based on alias warrants of arrest issued by
MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia. Mr. Marces was detained for one night without the knowledge of his
family. It was later revealed that Judge Sarabia had issued the warrants at the request of Judge
Arcangel.

Furthermore, during barangay conciliation proceedings between the Marces and Cañas families,
Judge Arcangel allegedly attended the mediation conferences and tried to intervene in the dispute.
He identified himself as the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, which
was deemed indiscreet and improper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Arcangel's actions constitute serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority,
harassment, and immorality.

RULING:

NO. The court found Judge Arcangel guilty of improper conduct and imposed the penalty of
reprimand with a warning, The court emphasized that a judge should not use the prestige of their
office to advance the private interests of others or create the impression that they can be unduly
influenced.

In this case, Judge Arcangel's attendance and intervention in the mediation conferences between the
Marces and Cañas families were deemed improper. By identifying himself as the Presiding Judge of
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, he created the impression that his presence and
actions carried the weight of his judicial office.

However, the court dismissed the allegations of serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority,
harassment, and immorality against Judge Arcangel. The investigating justice found insufficient
evidence to support the charge of an illicit relationship between Judge Arcangel and Mrs. Cañas.
Testimonies from Mrs. Cañas' husband and parents indicated that the judge was just a family friend
and his visits had no immoral implications. The court also found no evidence to hold Judge Arcangel
administratively liable for the alleged handcuffing of Mr. Marces.

Considering that this was Judge Arcangel's first administrative case and his otherwise exemplary
record, the court imposed the penalty of reprimand with a warning. The court warned Judge Arcangel
that repetition of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely.

OCA vs. JUDGE DE GUZMAN JR

267 SCRA 292

FACTS:
In this administrative case, the Office of the Court Administrator filed against Respondent Judge
Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr., Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, Metro
Manila, for serious misconduct in connection with the lifting of the notice of lis pendens (a lawsuit filed
for a another claim over a property) in the case of Norvic Incorporated, represented by its president.
Norvic filed the subject case which was assigned to the sala of Judge Cosico for the annulment of the
Deed of Conveyance and Exchange dated on the ground that the transfer was fraudulent. Due to the
filing of this case, Norvic caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 167832.

SMIIT and SMIRM, the defendants in this Civil Case No. 91-1123, filed a motion to cancel the notice
of lis pendens. Judge Cosico denied a party’s motion to cancel notice of lis pendens. When case was
re-raffled due to Cosico’s retirement, the annotation of lis pendens was eventually cancelled by Judge
de Guzman, thereby showing keen personal interest on the said case to the prejudice of the
administration of justice.

Upon investigation, Cosico said that while he was hearing the case, Judge de Guzman approached
him and asked him to grant the motion to lift the notice of lis pendens. When the motion was denied,
Judge de Guzman was said to have come back to Cosico’s office asking him (Cosico) to reconsider
the order of denial. The Court found that Judge de Guzman tried to influence the outcome of the
case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge de Guzman violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

YES. The act of interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the sala of
Judge Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and subverts the
people’s faith in our judicial process. Judge de Guzman approached Judge Cosico at least twice
asking him to cancel the notice of lis pendens, thereby, trying to influence the course of the litigation
in the case in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct. His evident misconduct collides with the
established ethical standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to stress
that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other
persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring
honor to the judiciary.

Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would invite suspicion in order to
preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should inspire trust and confidence, and should
bring honor to the judiciary.

The Court finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT for
influencing the course of litigation in evident violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and ordered to
pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more SEVERELY.

DOMINICO vs. CA
122 SCRA 218
FACTS:

Plaintiff inherited a piece of land with an area of approximately 14.0400 hectares together with his co-
heirs from their deceased father. Said piece of land was declared in their names as heirs of Eleuterio
Etcuban under Tax Declaration No. 06837 and was the subject matter in dispute in SP No. 1192-R, of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, a case for the settlement of the estate of the late Eleuterio
Etcuban. In said case, petitioner Dominico Etcuban, the spouse of the decease Demetria Initan, and
Pedro, Vicente, Felicitas, Anastacio, Froilan, Alfonso, Advincula, Anunciaciori Jesus, Aguinaldo,
surnamed Etcuban were declared as co-owners of the property in question. Thereafter the 11 co-heirs
executed in favor of defendants (private respondents herein) 11 deeds of sale of their respective
shares in the co-ownership for the total sum of P26,340.00. It is not disputed that the earliest of the 11
deeds of sale was made on December 9, 1963 and the last one in December 1967.

In his complaint before the trial court, plaintiff alleged that his co-owners leased and/or sold their
respective shares without giving due notice to him as a co-owner notwithstanding (in spite of) his
intimations (indication/hint/statement) to them that he was willing to buy all their respective shares. He
further maintained that even upon inquiry from his co-heirs/co-owners, and also from the alleged
buyers (defendants) he elicited (obtained) nothing from them. Plaintiff discovered for the first time the
existence of these 11 deeds of sale during the hearing on January 31, 1972 of Civil Case No. BN-87,
entitled Jesus C. Songalia vs. Dominico ETCUBAN in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI.
When he verified the supposed sales with his co-owners only 3 of them admitted their respective
sales. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. BN-109 by petitioner for legal redemption.

Defendants (private respondents herein) in denying the material allegations of the complaint, argued
by way of affirmative and special defenses that plaintiff has no cause of petition against them; that the
action is barred by prescription or laches; that the complaint is barred by the pendency of Civil Case
No. BN-87 involving the same parties, same subject matter and same cause of action; that the
provisions of the law pertaining to legal redemption have been fully complied with in respect to the
sale of the disputed land to them; that plaintiff came to know of the sale of the land in question to
them in August, 1968 or sometime prior thereto; that acting on this knowledge, plaintiff thru his
lawyers wrote defendants on August 15, 1968 about the matter; that Jesus Songalia personally went
to the office of Atty. Vicente Faelner or counsel for plaintiff to inform him of the sale of the disputed
land to them; that again another demand letter was received on May 30, 1969 by defendants from the
lawyers of plaintiff but on both occasions, no action was taken by plaintiff despite the information
plaintiff received from defendants thru his counsel and that consequently plaintiff lost his right to
redeem under Art. 1623 of the new Civil Code because the right of redemption may be exercised only
within 30 days from notice of sale and plaintiff was definitely notified of the sale years ago as shown
by the records.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the vendors (his co-heirs) should be the ones to give him written notice and not the
vendees (defendants or private respondents).

RULING:

NO. While it is true that written notice is required by the law (Art. 1623), it is equally true that the
same "Art. 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying the redemptioner. "So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause
to complain. (De Conejero et al v. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 775). In the Conejero case, We
ruled that the furnishing of a copy of the disputed deed of sale to the redemptioner, was equivalent to
the giving of written notice required by law in "a more authentic manner than any other writing could
have done," and that We cannot adopt a stand of having to sacrifice substance to technicality. More
so in the case at bar, where the vendors or co-owners of petitioner stated under oath in the deeds of
sale, (Annexes "1" to "11 ") that notice of sale had been given to prospective redemptioners in
accordance with Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. "A sworn statement or clause in a deed of sale to the
effect that a written notice of sale was given to possible redemptioners or co-owners might be used to
determine whether an offer to redeem was made on or out of time, or whether there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of said Art. 1623.

In resume, We find that petitioner failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Art. 1623 on
legal redemption and We see no reason to reverse the assailed decision of the respondent court.

PEOPLE vs. MUIT

117 SCRA 696
FACTS:

Delfin Muit, the defendant-appellant, heard rumors that his wife and Rodolfo Torrero were having an
illicit affair. Muit invited Torrero to his house for a talk to confront him about the rumors. The
conversation became heated and Torrero stood up and left the house. Muit followed Torrero in the
yard, pulled out his gun, and fired three times at Torrero, hitting him in the nape, chest, and left arm.
Torrero died on the spot and Muit immediately surrendered to the authorities. Muit was charged with
and convicted of Murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation. The Trial
Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. One of the errors raised on appeal was that the judge
was “palpably biased against the accused” owing to the questions he asked the witnesses during the
trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial judge was biased against the accused.

RULING:

NO. The defense faults the Trial Court for having violated the accused's right to remain silent in that
the Court took against the latter his failure to report to the Detachment Commander at the time of his
surrender his plea of self-defense. What the Trial Judge did, however, was merely to draw an
inference (assumption) from the accused's failure to volunteer that information, which would have
been the most natural reaction. It should also be noted that the accused was neither under
investigation nor interrogation so that his right against self-incrimination was never endangered.

It pointed out that: “The alleged bias of the Trial Judge against the accused is without basis. The
clarificatory questions propounded by him during the trial were intended to test the credibility of
witnesses and to extract the truth.” That the Trial Judge had ordered the accused transferred to
Muntinlupa after conviction is no manifestation of bias considering that this Tribunal had upheld said
action in its Resolution dated February 21, 1979.

VALDEZ vs. AQUILIZAN

 133 SCRA 150

FACTS:

This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Fernando Valdez, also known as Wilson Valdez,
against Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan of the Regional Trial Court in Kabacan, North Cotabato. Valdez
is accused of rape in three separate cases, and he seeks to annul the proceedings conducted by
Judge Aquilizan and disqualify him from the case.

The petitioner alleges serious irregularities in the handling of the case by the respondent judge. The
petitioner claims that the respondent judge examined the witness in a direct manner instead of
clarificatory questions during cross-examination. The transcript of the proceedings shows that the
respondent judge asked the private complainant searching questions, which built the case for the
prosecution.

Furthermore, the respondent judge continued the trial in the absence of the accused's counsel and
possibly the accused himself. The respondent judge claimed that he wanted to protect the accused's
right to a speedy trial, but holding a trial without the presence of the accused's counsel does not fulfill
this purpose. The respondent judge should have appointed a temporary counsel for the accused to
expedite the trial.

The respondent judge also failed to manifest the necessary impartiality in hearing the case. During a
hearing, the respondent judge decided to hold the proceedings in his chamber without any request
from the parties. Only the counsel for the accused, the fiscal, and the stenographer were present,
while the accused was not allowed inside the room. The accused had the right to be present during
the hearing, as it concerned his liberty and honor.

Additionally, the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion by deciding the cases and
promulgating his decision while a petition questioning his actions and seeking his disqualification was
pending before the Supreme Court. The respondent judge should have refrained from deciding the
cases or at least held the promulgation of his decision in abeyance until the Supreme Court had acted
on the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge's actuations during the proceedings constituted grave abuse of
discretion and lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. The court granted the petition and set aside the decision of the respondent judge in Criminal
Case Nos. 13, 14, and 15. The court ordered that these cases be transferred to Branch XVII of the
Regional Trial Court in Kidapawan for trial de novo. The court also directed the said court to resolve
the petitioner's motion for release on recognizance under Section 191 of P.D. No. 603. No costs were
imposed.

The court held that the respondent judge's actuations during the proceedings, particularly his lack of
cold impartiality and his decision to proceed with the cases despite the pending petition for his
disqualification, constituted grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized
that the respondent judge should have refrained from deciding the cases or at least held the
promulgation of his decision in abeyance (temporary suspension or hold of action) pending action by
the court. The court found that the respondent judge's actions substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
Therefore, the court set aside the decision and ordered the transfer of the cases to another court for
trial de novo.

As to the explanation of the judge that his questions were merely clarificatory, the High Court argued
that this is “belied (contradicted) by the transcript which shows that he asked the private complainant
searching questions and this is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript. The judge also claimed
that he was protecting the right to speedy trial of the accused, but he held trial even in the absence of
his counsel.” It observed that: “If an accused has a ‘protector’ like the respondent judge, there is no
need for a fiscal or a private prosecutor.” It then concluded that it is obvious that “respondent judge
did not manifest the requisite cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved.”

TABUENA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

 268 SCRA 337

FACTS:

Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from Marcos to pay directly to his
office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to PNCC. He then received Presidential
Memorandum from Fe Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in three withdrawals,
no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement although Gimenez issued a receipt on the third
delivery for the entire amount.

Tabuena was accused and convicted of the crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding
the government, taking and misappropriating money when there is no outstanding obligation between
MIAA and PNCC. Petitioner contended that he was acting in good faith when the office of the
president directed him to deliver the said amount to his office – “person who acts in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of departing from that common
standard of fairness and impartiality?

RULING:

YES. Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the
crime of malversation. The accused raised several errors before the High Court, but it directed most
of its attention to the one they overlooked—the actuation of the members of the Sandiganbayan
during the proceedings. It then ruled that “what appears to be more compelling reason for this
acquittal is the violation of the accused’s basic constitutional right to due process.” It quoted the
declaration of Justice Cruz in a case that: “Respect for the Constitution is more important than
securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.” (People vs. Exala, Dissenting
Opinion, 221 SCRA 494). It also explained that even if this error was not raised by the accused, this is
still reviewable because “an appeal throws the whole case open to reviews.” The High Court noted
the unusual zeal of the members of the Sandiganbayan who asked more questions than that of the
prosecution and defense combined on a particular witness. And as to the main accused, Mr. Tabuena,
the High Court noted he was asked 67 questions on cross-examination by Sandiganbayan while the
prosecutor only asked 14.

It reproduced pertinent records of the proceedings to show the extent of participation of the justices
during the trial. It noted that: “x x x the questions of the court were in the nature of cross-examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.” Thus, the Court came out with the following
admonition: “The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view
to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over
which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking ‘clarificatory’ questions,
the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as
much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial.

Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution
in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses,
their cross-examination supplementing those made by Prosecutor Vierness and far exceeding the
latter’s questions in length. The ‘cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual
role of magistrate and advocate.”
 MERCADO vs. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION
482 SCRA 517

FACTS:

The case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R.
Mercado against Security Bank Corporation. The case also includes contempt proceedings against
Jose Teofilo T. Mercado for a letter he wrote to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., insinuating that the
ponente (the judge who wrote the decision) succumbed to pressure from the Chief Justice in denying
his petition.

On December 12, 2003, the Mercados filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court,
challenging the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment. The
Supreme Court initially denied the petition on January 12, 2004, for failure to show a reversible error.
The Mercados filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Court of Appeals relied on technical
rules of procedure and that their former counsel committed gross negligence. The Supreme Court
granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstated the petition on March 24, 2004. However, the
Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition on June 7, 2004, and dismissed the Mercados' motion
for reconsideration on September 15, 2004.

On one scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel,
appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he wrote. He manifested that
he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him – that his petition was denied for the second time
"because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice." He further manifested that during the
wake of Atty. Villanueva’s mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez, bragging that she is "a very very good, close and long-time friend of his." However, while
stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez.

On October 18, 2004, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado wrote a letter to Chief Justice Davide, Jr., accusing the
ponente of succumbing to pressure from the Chief Justice, insinuating that the respondent bank
financed the ponente's travel to the United States, and alleging that the ponente gave the respondent
bank a "go signal" to sell his property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Mercados' petition for annulment of judgment should be granted.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition should be denied because the Mercados failed to
show a reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The Court also held that an action for
annulment of judgment cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal and that the grounds for
annulment must be either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The Supreme
Court based its decision on the fact that the Mercados failed to demonstrate any reversible error
committed by the Court of Appeals. The Court emphasized that an action for annulment of judgment
cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The grounds for annulment must be
limited to extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or denial of due process. In this case, the Mercados
failed to establish any of these grounds. Therefore, their petition for annulment of judgment was
denied.

We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who
guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to
win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a
cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty. Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not
only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente, could be pressured or influenced.

Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial
officers. Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice
Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.

One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect for
the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and integrity
from assaults of disrespect. One reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is
because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced or bribed.
Such conduct has no place in the legal profession. WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty.
Jose P. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.
ALFONSO vs. ALONZO-LEGASTO
388 SCRA 351

FACTS:

This case involves an administrative complaint filed against respondent Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-
Legasto, Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Quezon City, along with co-
respondents Assistant Clerk of Court Emelita Camaya and Records Officer Remedios Garcia. The
complainants, who were employees of the City Government of Quezon City, were assigned to the
Office of the Clerk of Court-Metropolitan Trial Court (OCC-MeTC) and various branches of the MeTC-
Quezon City to assist the organic staff of the judiciary.

The complaint stemmed from the transfer of the complainants to other offices in the City Government,
which the complainants alleged was a result of a conspiracy between the respondents. They also
accused respondent Garcia of falsifying her daily time records (DTR's) and respondent Camaya of
receiving a bribe from a supplier of court equipment and supplies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Legasto exceeded her authority in transferring the employees and whether
Garcia falsified the DTRs.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge Legasto exceeded her authority in deciding to
return the City Government employees to their respective offices. The Court stated that her authority
was limited to the temporary re-assignment of court employees for a period of three months,
extendable only once for the same period. The permanent transfer of court employees falls under the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Court Administrator, not the Executive Judge. The Court also found that
Judge Legasto failed to initiate a proper investigation when the falsification of DTR's by respondent
Garcia came to light during her term as Executive Judge.

Regarding respondent Garcia, the Court found that she had not satisfactorily explained the entries in
the allegedly falsified DTR's, and therefore, she was responsible for the dishonest act of falsifying
them. The Court held Judge Legasto responsible for Garcia's act of dishonesty for failing to initiate a
proper investigation. The Court emphasized that public office is a public trust, particularly for judges
and court personnel who must adhere to the principles of accountability, responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency. The Court fined respondent Judge Legasto P10,000 and suspended
respondent Garcia from office for one month without pay. If the suspension cannot be imposed, a fine
of P20,000 is imposed on Garcia. The administrative complaint against respondent Camaya was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The court ruled that Judge Legasto indeed exceeded her authority in permanently transferring the
employees. The court found that her decision to return the employees to the City Government
exceeded her authority under the relevant administrative order, which only allows for temporary
reassignment.

Regarding Garcia, the court found her guilty of falsifying the DTRs. The court considered the certified
copies of the falsified DTRs as admissible public documents and presumed Garcia to be the author of
the falsification. Garcia's defense of mere denial was deemed weak, and the court noted the
resemblance between the questioned signatures and her admitted standard signatures. The court
also found Garcia's failure to explain the loss of her genuine DTRs and her lack of effort to locate
them as suspicious.
 SUSPENSION OF CLERK OF COURT JACOBO
294 SCRA 119

FACTS:

This is a series of complaints and counter-complaints between Judge Bonifacio S. Maceda, then
Acting Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16, Naval, Biliran (now RTC Judge in Las
Piñas, Metro Manila) and Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco, then Branch Clerk of Court of the same Regional
Trial Court (now Assistant Prosecutor in Samar).

Judge Maceda charges Atty. Joboco of (1) Infidelity in the Custody of Case Records, (2) Dishonesty,
(3) Sabotaging Judicial Reforms, (4) Grave Misconduct, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Tampering of
Subpoena, (5) Insubordination, (6) Falsification of Accomplishment of Certificate of Service, and (7)
Agitating Workers to go on Mass Leave and Notorious Undesirability.

Atty. Joboco, on the other hand, alleges (1) Oppression, (2) Continuing Oppression, (3) Gross
Ignorance of the Law, (4) Abuse of Position, (5) Gross Abuse of Discretion Using his Position, and (6)
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

This controversy between the judge and the clerk of court began when a suspension order dated
September 3, 1993 1 was issued by Judge Maceda against Atty. Joboco for Infidelity in the Custody of
Case Records. 2 The said order was based on an administrative complaint 3 filed by a certain Atty.
Gabino A. Velasquez against Clerk of Court Joboco following the latter's admission that the records in
certain civil cases were missing and could not be accounted for.

ISSUE:

Wether or not Atty. Joboco liable for the charge of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Usurpation of Judicial
Authority and Tampering of Subpoena.

RULING:

The court find Atty. Rogelio R. Joboco GUILTY of the following charges: Infidelity in the Custody of
Court Records, Usurpation of Judicial Authority, Grave Misconduct and Tampering Subpoena in
Criminal Case, Falsification of Certificates of Service, Misconduct for attempting to utilize the court
employees for the ends of the local IBP and Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL).

He is hereby FINED in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos . The charges against Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, ADMONISHED for having
abused his authority by unjustly refusing to sign the certificates of service of his Clerk of Court which
resulted in the withholding of the latter's salary. He is likewise ADVISED to exert care and
consideration in his dealings with his office staff in order to avert any future repetition of these
administrative misdemeanors. The diversity and multiplicity of Atty. Joboco's transgressions clearly
reflect his defiant demeanor and contumacious character which cannot be countenanced in the
judiciary. Such recalcitrant attitude manifested by Atty. Joboco in his capacity as Branch Clerk of
Court not only diminishes his integrity as an officer of the court but degrades the dignity of the judicial
system as well.
 ARBAN vs. BIRJA
143 SCRA 634

FACTS:

Last February 23, 1985, at about l:10 p.m., at the Cindy's Restaurant in downtown Naga City, in the
presence of people taking their lunch and others, the said respondent, without any justification
whatever, hit with the pistol he was carrying the herein petitioner on the left side of his head, sending
him sprawling to the floor and rendering him momentarily unconscious. Still not satisfied with his
display of violence in public, the respondent also threatened with his said gun the companions of the
petitioner.

Minutes before his pistol-whipping of the petitioner, the respondent fired his gun in the balcony of the
apartment he is lodging in, from where he followed the petitioner to the said restaurant. As soon as it
was possible, the petitioner reported the said incidents to RTC Executive Judge Juan B. Llaguno,
who advised the petitioner to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
avoid the worse scandal of reporting to the police station, which advice was followed. The NBI
investigated the petitioner and his witnesses, copies of whose statements, duly sworn to, on said acts
of respondent are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E & F. The NBI later forwarded the case to
the City Fiscal of Naga, where it is now pending preliminary inquiry, delayed now for 3 weeks due to
repeated requests for postponement by the respondent.

More than the physical injuries suffered by the petitioner was the black eye inflicted by the respondent
on the administration of justice, the judiciary in particular, considering the affront to the public's
sensibility to what the media called acts' 'associated only with hoodlums and hooligans. Precisely
because no judge in Naga City or Camarines Sur has ever been known to have resorted to similar
barbarous acts, the same received much coverage by the print and broadcast media, whose
reactions are best e xemplified by the editorial, editorial cartoon and news story of 'Handiong,' one of
the most respected newspapers in the Bicol region, hereto attached as Annexes G, H & I hereof.' (pp.
16-17, rec.).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

RULING:

Whatever the motive may have been, the violent action of the respondent in a public place constitutes
serious misconduct and the resultant outrage of the community in Naga City is a blow to the image of
the entire judiciary. Judge Borja violated the established norm for judicial behavior that "a judge's
official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach (Sec. 3, Cannon of Judicial Ethics)

This Court ruled in De la Paz v. Inutan (64 SCRA 540), that: The judge is the visible representation of
the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their win and awareness to obey
the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the
station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the
people before anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the
first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously
careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.

While the Investigator-Justice recommended a penalty of suspension for two (2) years, it is the
consensus of this Court that the serious nature of the offense and the best interests of the . judiciary
warrant the penalty of dismissal. Moreover, this Court frowns upon prolonged suspension of judges or
court personnel as a penalty, even assuming that it is deserved.
WHEREFORE, Judge Melecio B. Borja is found guilty of grave misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement
in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. However, he shall be paid
any back salaries or accrued leaves which are due to him as of this date. This decision is immediately
executory.

CABRERA vs. PAJARES

142 SCRA 127

FACTS:

The case involves a complaint filed against Judge James B. Pajares of the Regional Trial Court in
Naga City. The complainant, Enrico Cabrera, alleges that Judge Pajares asked for money in
connection with his case. Cabrera claims that he gave P1,000 to the judge because he had been
strict during the trial. The case involves a land dispute filed by Cabrera's father and half-siblings.
Cabrera states that his lawyer advised him to accommodate any request for money from the judge to
avoid being treated unfairly. Cabrera decided to denounce the judge to the authorities and sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to entrap Judge Pajares.

On January 22, 1985, Cabrera met with Judge Pajares in his chamber, accompanied by an NBI agent
posing as his wife. Cabrera informed the judge that he had decided not to settle the case and instead
proceed with the trial. He mentioned that he had filed a motion for reconsideration of the judge's order
appointing a surveyor. NBI Agent Somera testified that Judge Pajares asked what they should do
now, and Cabrera handed him an envelope containing the marked money. Cabrera then left the
chamber and signaled the waiting NBI agents. The NBI agents found the envelope between the
pages of Judge Pajares' diary. The envelope and the marked bills were examined and confirmed to
be the same ones given to the judge.

ISSUE:

The main issue in this case is whether Judge Pajares accepted the envelope containing the money.

RULING:

The court ruled that the respondent judge is guilty of indirect bribery and dismissed him from service.
The court found that the respondent judge accepted the money and knew that it was being given to
him because of his position as a judge. The court emphasized that members of the judiciary should
display the highest integrity and conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach. The court also
noted that the penalty for indirect bribery under the Revised Penal Code is not equivalent to the
penalty of separation from the judicial service, which is the appropriate administrative penalty for
serious misconduct.

"the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice
between two conflicting interests. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to
avoid even the slightest infraction of the law."

Ratio:
The court distinguished between instigation and entrapment, stating that in instigation, the accused
cannot be held liable because the criminal intent originates from law enforcement officials, while in
entrapment, the accused cannot justify their conduct because the criminal intent originates from the
accused themselves. In this case, the court found that the complainant and the NBI agents did not
instigate the commission of the crime by the respondent judge, but rather, the respondent judge was
the victim of a frame-up. The court concluded that what took place was an entrapment.

But the Court is constrained to disapprove his recommendation as to the first charge of indirect
bribery which is fully supported by the evidence that respondent Judge "be suspended from office for
2 years and 4 months, taking into consideration the penalty prescribed in art. 211 of the Revised
Penal Code." The penalty of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment provided for the criminal offense of
indirect bribery may not be equated with the penalty of separation from the judicial service which is
the proper applicable administrative penalty by virtue of respondent Judge's serious misconduct
prejudicial to the judiciary and the public interest.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to return the ten
P100.00 bills (Exhibits D-1 to D-10) to the complainant Atty. Enrico M. Cabrera. This decision is
immediately executory.
ABAD vs. BLEZA
145 SCRA 1

FACTS:

The case involves two administrative complaints filed against Judge Ildefonso Bleza of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacoor, Cavite. The first complaint was filed by Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Abad,
accusing Judge Bleza of rendering a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, and misconduct as a judge. The second complaint was filed by Crisanto P. Cruz, alleging
that Judge Bleza knowingly rendered a wrong judgment in a case involving damages.

In the first complaint, it is stated that after a cockfight held in Imus, Cavite, Abad had a verbal
altercation with Potenciano Ponce, which resulted in Abad being shot in the chest by Francisco
Sabater, Jr., who was allegedly Ponce's bodyguard. Sabater was charged with frustrated homicide
and Ponce with attempted homicide before the Regional Trial Court where Judge Bleza presides. The
prosecution presented evidence that Abad was shot after a heated argument with Ponce, while the
defense presented a contrary version of the incident.

Judge Bleza acquitted Ponce of attempted homicide due to insufficiency of evidence, but found
Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide. The investigating Justice recommended that Judge Bleza be
reprimanded for his error in appreciating lack of intention to kill as a mitigating circumstance in
Sabater's case. However, it was also noted that Judge Bleza did not act with malice or deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice.

In the second complaint, Cruz alleged that Judge Bleza knowingly rendered a wrong judgment in a
case involving damages filed by Pacifico Ocampo against Cruz. The respondent judge argued that
the decision in question is pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court, and any action
taken by the court would be premature.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Bleza rendered a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, and misconduct as a judge in the first complaint.

RULING:

The court dismissed both administrative cases, stating that the presumption is that judges regularly
perform their duties in accordance with law and ethics. In the first complaint, while it was
acknowledged that Judge Bleza made an error in appreciating lack of intention to kill as a mitigating
circumstance in Sabater's case, it was found that he did not act with malice or deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. In the second complaint, the court considered the fact that the decision in
question is pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court, and any action taken by the court
would be premature.

In the first complaint, the court applied the presumption that judges regularly perform their duties in
accordance with law and ethics. While Judge Bleza made an error in appreciating lack of intention to
kill as a mitigating circumstance in Sabater's case, it was found that he did not act with malice or
deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. The court emphasized that judges are not infallible and
may commit errors in the exercise of their judicial functions, but such errors do not necessarily
amount to misconduct.

In the second complaint, the court considered the fact that the decision in question is pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. It held that any action taken by the court at this stage would
be premature, as it would interfere with the appellate process. The court emphasized the importance
of respecting the hierarchy of courts and allowing the appellate court to review and decide on the
correctness of the judgment.

As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous
(Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619). However, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency
on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant with basic legal principles (Ubongon v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30) They are called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes (Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA
78) and to keep themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings and jurisprudence affecting their
jurisdiction (Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10).

CANON 2 CASES
CATBAGAN vs. BARTE
455 SCRA 1

FACTS:

This is the case of Judge Barte for grave and serious misconduct. Complainant Catbagan was
interested in buying land in Antique. She approached respondent judge and requested him to assist
her in the prospective transaction. Together with certain Abraham Pedriña, the three of them agreed
to divide the commission if they succeeded in brokering the sale of properties to the Church.

Agreement: “the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every sale transaction if the
purchase price exceed One Million Pesos, the two of us will receive a commission of P100,000.00
each while the remaining amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as his commission based on
his agreement with the vendors”.

When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge allegedly answered: "A municipal
trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is the closest in reach to the public he serves
and he must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity." Complainant did
not insist on her request after hearing this. When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid,
she demanded her commission from respondent. However, respondent offered her only P25,000 for
the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic, Antique .

OCA found respondent not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine of P5,000 for
violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 13 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It also warned respondent against
directly engaging in any private business even outside office hours, otherwise a more severe penalty
would be imposed upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Barte is liable for the violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

RULING:

YES. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[a] judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance
of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A
judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of
cases giving grounds for disqualification."

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from "x x x making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court x x x."

As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from participating in the
transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the properties, respondent increased
the possibility of his disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of sale
arose. Moreover, the possibility that the parties in the sale might have appeared before his court was
not remote and his business dealings with them would have then created a doubt about his fairness
and impartiality.

Given these circumstances, respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously consider leaving the
judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker instead. The latter calling appears to have a
special appeal to him. We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990 up to
the present. We find his declaration that no criminal or civil case has ever been filed against him to be
true. However, the present administrative case and an earlier decided case with similar facts are too
glaring to ignore. In that case, we reminded him that judges must not only be "good judges" but must
also "appear to be good persons." In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue; it is a
necessity.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is his second offense, he is hereby SUSPENDED
for six (6) months. He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a penalty beyond
mere suspension from public office.

VITO vs. BUSLON, JR

243 SCRA 519

FACTS:

Alexander Vito filed an administrative complaint against Judge Teofilo Buslon, Jr., Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City. Vito was the defendant in Civil Case No. CEB-10222,
a support case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City.

Furthermore, complainant alleged that during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the
hold order, respondent wrote a letter to Judge De la Victoria, the presiding judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, which caused the denial of the motion. Respondent denied that he wrote an
"influencing letter" to Judge De la Victoria. He claimed that he merely explained to the said judge that
the dating of the questioned order as August 30, 1993 was due to clerical error (Annex "O"; Rollo, p.
40). We find adequate and satisfactory respondent's explanation.

On the charge of breach of judicial ethics, complainant alleged that after the issuance of the Order
dated August 31, 1993, respondent acted as a sponsor at the wedding of one of the plaintiffs'
daughters in the Civil Case No. CEB-10222.

Respondent, for his part, alleged that he stood as one of the sponsors in the said wedding after he
had assumed office as acting presiding judge of another branch of the court (Branch 23). He claimed
that he had accepted the invitation to act as one of the sponsors because he valued the chance to
meet the Vice-Mayor of Cebu City, whose father, as his professor in college.

When Judge Buslon took over the court, the case was pending decision with an unresolved motion
for reconsideration. Vito alleged that Judge Buslon rendered a decision without resolving the motion
for reconsideration.

A timely appeal was made from the decision, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for execution pending
appeal, which was granted by Judge Buslon. Vito filed a motion to quash the order granting execution
pending appeal, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to cite Vito for contempt. Respondent Judge issued
an order finding Vito guilty of contempt and ordering his arrest without bail.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Buslon's actions constitute a breach of judicial ethics.

RULING:

Respondent's act of standing as sponsor violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically Rule 2.01 which states that "a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" (Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239
[1993]). Furthermore, it has been said that a magistrate of the law must conduct himself in a manner
that his acts, whether in the office or in public, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the people that
look up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice (Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is FINED the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00). He is

WARNED that the commission of the same or similar offense in the future will merit a more severe
penalty.
 RE: JUDGE GERONIMO BALDO, MTC CALAUAN, LAGUNA
281 SCRA 523

FACTS:

Judge Geronimo Baldo was accused of serious misconduct after being found present during the
cleaning of a vehicle containing the bodies of murder victims Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez.

The case was referred to the Supreme Court by then Secretary of Justice Franklin N. Drilon based on
a sworn statement given by Luis Corcolon, one of the accused in the rape and murder case.

Corcolon stated that Judge Baldo had ordered the cleaning of the vehicle to destroy evidence of the
crime.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez for investigation.

Initially, Judge Geraldez recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Baldo, but upon
further examination of witnesses, he recommended the dismissal of Judge Baldo for grave
misconduct.
Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis, however, recommended the dismissal of the case
against Judge Baldo.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Geronimo Baldo should be held liable for serious misconduct based on his alleged
involvement in the cleaning of the vehicle containing the murder victims' bodies.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court found Judge Geronimo Baldo guilty of serious misconduct and fined him
P20,000. The Court determined that while there was no direct evidence that Judge Baldo had ordered
the cleaning of the vehicle, the circumstances of the case indicated that he was present during the
cleaning and his presence conveyed his approval to those who cleaned the vehicle.

The Court emphasized that the case was not a criminal prosecution and that the evidence against
Judge Baldo may not be sufficient to establish his guilt in a criminal case.

However, the Court held that the standards of integrity required of members of the Bench are not
satisfied by conduct that barely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.

The Court based its decision on the following circumstances: Judge Baldo's presence at the
municipal building when the vehicle bearing the bodies of the victims arrived, his meeting with the
Chief Inspector after the arrival of the bodies, the probability that he was present when the vehicle
was being cleaned, and his order to remove blood from the gutter but not from the vehicle.

The Court also considered the fact that Judge Baldo did not inquire about who ordered the cleaning
of the vehicle and did not take steps to preserve the evidence of the crime.

The Court emphasized that as a municipal judge, it was Judge Baldo's duty to conduct a preliminary
investigation of crimes cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
The Court concluded that while the evidence may not be sufficient for a criminal case, it was enough
to establish serious misconduct on the part of Judge Baldo.

ACCORDINGLY, Judge Geronimo A. Baldo of the Municipal Trial Court of Calauan, Laguna, is hereby
FINED P20,000.00 for serious misconduct.

PEOPLE vs. BOCAR

97 Phil 398

FACTS:

The case involved the petitioner, the People of the Philippines, against Juan L. Bocar, who was acting
as a vacation judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, and Oscar Castelo, the
respondent.

In Criminal Case No. 3023-P, Castelo and several others were charged with murder.

After a prolonged trial, Judge Emilio Rilloraza found Castelo guilty and sentenced him to death.

Castelo filed a motion for new trial, based on the affidavit of Rogelio Robles, one of the original
accused who had testified against Castelo but later recanted his testimony.

Respondent Judge Bocar, who had been detailed to the court in the absence of Judge Rilloraza,
granted the motion for new trial and set aside the conviction.

The People of the Philippines filed a petition to annul the orders granting bail and new trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Bocar did not gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion for new trial.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court found that Judge Bocar did not gravely abuse his discretion in granting the
motion for new trial. He had conducted a hearing on the motion, considered the evidence presented,
and was convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the recantation testimony. The Supreme Court
expressed some reservations about Judge Bocar conducting the new trial himself, but did not find any
evidence to suggest bias or intent to acquit the defendant.

The trial court has jurisdiction to grant a new trial in a death sentence case. The defendant should be
accorded the same rights and opportunities for acquittal or reduction of sentence as defendants in
ordinary criminal cases.

In justice to respondent Judge, however, we should also say that there is nothing in the record nor in
any incident in relation with his actuations in the case that would reasonably warrant the suspicion,
much less the belief, that he was out to acquit Oscar Castelo. We presume all judges to be honest
and men of integrity unless proven otherwise.

It is said that respondent Judge stated or manifested in the presence of counsel, while considering
the motion for new trial that it were better if the motion had been presented before another judge
because he (Bocar) had very little time for it because of his temporary detail. And as to his seeming
hurry in issuing the order granting the motion for new trial on April 20, 1955, almost immediately after
the termination of the hearing, it should be stated that he as well as the lawyers had the impression
that under Rule 118, section 9, he had only 20 days from the rendition of the judgment within which to
decide the motion for new trial, and April 20th was the last day.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction was
dissolved.

The trial court did have jurisdiction to grant a new trial, as in ordinary criminal cases. The defendant
sentenced to death should be accorded the same rights and opportunities for acquittal or reduction of
sentence as defendants sentenced to lesser penalties.

REPORT AUDIT MTC KORONADAL CITY

457 SCRA 356

FACTS:

This administrative case stems from the Judicial and Financial Audit conducted in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Koronadal City from August 5 to August 9, 2002, by an audit team from the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

Judge Agustin T. Sardido, who presided over the MTCC of Koronadal City, assumed office sometime
in May 1988; and Clerk of Court Maxima Borja, on February 18, 2002. The latter, however, had been
employed therein since 1987, serving as clerk II and stenographer until she was appointed clerk of
court. Prior to Borja's assumption, the clerk of court was Normandie A. Ines, who compulsorily
retired on October 9, 2001.

The audit team found that Judge Sardido usually arrived late for work. On Mondays, he would report
only in the afternoons. Due to his habitual tardiness, court sessions were usually scheduled only in
the afternoons. The audit team also found that Judge Sardido had allowed Rufino Vargas, a non-
employee of the court, to discharge the duties and functions of a court interpreter without the prior
approval of the OCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the OCA erred in its rulings.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Those charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, to all officials and employees, all of
whom are deemed standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon
courts of justice.

The inefficiency of Judge Sardido is evident in his failure to decide seventy-five (75) cases within the
reglementary period, some of which have been submitted for resolution as early as 1994. This Court
has reiterated the need for judges to decide cases promptly and expeditiously. It cannot be gainsaid
that justice delayed is justice denied. The failure of judges to decide cases with dispatch constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Retired Clerk of Court Normandie A. Ines: The role that clerks of court play in the justice system has
repeatedly been stressed by this Court thus: "[T]he clerk of court is an essential officer in any judicial
system. His office is the nucleus of activities, adjudicative and administrative. As such he must be
reminded that his administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. He is charged with the efficient recording, filing and management of court records, besides
having administrative supervision over court personnel. Clerks of Court play a key role in the
complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or
another."

While COC Maxima S. Borja has shown that the cash bond in Criminal Case Nos. 21211-21213 was
issued a corresponding Official Receipt, she has failed to explain satisfactorily why no official receipts
were issued for cash bonds in Criminal Case No. 17076 and No. 19452. Belied by the records of the
case is her averment that the accused in Criminal Case No. 17076 was released without paying the
bail bond. Her allegation that the cash bond in Criminal Case No. 19452 had been filed and the case
dismissed before she assumed office is likewise unsupported by the case records.

Pablito W. Pendilla should be held liable for taking into his custody a 9-mm caliber gun, which was an
exhibit in Criminal Case No. 21550. He claims that he was merely instructed by the judge to get the
gun from the Office of the Provincial Police. This assertion, however, does not validly explain (1) why
Pendilla did not immediately turn the gun over to Borja, and (2) why it took him four days to surrender
it to the audit team.

The dismal state of affairs at the MTCC of Koronadal City during the incumbency of Judge Sardido
and Clerk of Court Ines underscores the need for a more effective and systematic management of
trial courts. Unless the reins of control and supervision over the administrative aspect of the
adjudicatory process are tightened, the swift and efficient delivery of justice would be impeded and
rendered illusory.

WHEREFORE, Judge Agustin T. Sardido is found GUILTY of dishonesty, gross misconduct, and
gross ignorance of the law, for which he is FINED in the maximum amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000) to be deducted from his leave credits. He is further DIRECTED to REMIT five hundred
eighty-two thousand five hundred pesos (P582,500), representing the amount he borrowed from the
CCFF, to be deducted also from his remaining leave benefits, if still adequate.

Retired Clerk of Court Normandie A. Ines is found GUILTY of dishonesty and grave misconduct and is
FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

Maxima Z. Borja is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and FINED five thousand pesos (P5,000).
She is directed to adopt a more efficient system of collecting docket fees and of taking custody of
court exhibits.

Pablito W. Pendilla is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and likewise FINED five thousand
pesos (P5,000). Both are warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
 JACINTO vs. VALLARTA
543 SCRA 83

FACTS:

Spouses Jesus V. Jacinto and Nenita C. Jacinto filed a complaint against Judge Placido V. Vallarta of
the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

The complainants accused Judge Vallarta of gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, issuance
of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and unbecoming conduct. The complainants argued that
the writ of replevin should not have been ordered against them because of the agreements stated in
the Deed of Conditional Sale. They claimed that they did not violate any of the agreements and that
they were cheated by the Magundayao spouses.

The complainants also alleged that Judge Vallarta displayed impatience and rudeness towards them
when they went to his office to settle the problem. They claimed that he made derogatory remarks
and showed a lack of concern for their case. They accused him of issuing the writ without clearance
from the Supreme Court.

The Court Administrator referred the complaint to Judge Vallarta and asked him to file a comment, but
he failed to do so. The Office of the Court Administrator made its report and recommendation without
his comment.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Vallarta should be held liable for gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law,
issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and unbecoming conduct.

RULING:

Judge Vallarta is not liable for gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, and issuance of an unjust
interlocutory order. Judge Vallarta is liable for vulgar and unbecoming conduct.

Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the
will and inclination to obey the law. Thus, the official conduct of judges should be free from
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond
reproach. Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

In this case, respondent displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of
the law. His unguarded utterances, impatience, and undisguised lack of concern bordering on
contempt for the plight of complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help,
constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the judiciary.
From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of members of the bench, a resort to
intemperate language only detracts from the respect due them and becomes self-destructive. The
judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a magistrate and imposes a number of
restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions
in the administration of justice. Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public
confidence in the judiciary. Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to
protect the image and integrity of the judiciary. "Maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the
duty of the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice."

As a result, Judge Vallarta was found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and was fined P5,000.

CAPU vs. JARAMILLO

243 SCRA 213

FACTS:

In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, San Pablo City, is charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to
the administration of justice. Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was referred
to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of Appeals, and Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to
Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
meantime, we directed respondent judge to go on leave. On 27 October 1993, we ordered the
consolidation of the complaints. Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona Ibay-
Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted their reports. We shall deal
with respondent's administrative liability on the basis of the investigators' findings and
recommendations.

I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944:

The complaint in this case was initiated by a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of
complainants Rizalia Capuno and Thelma Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus:
(1) Na si Pedro Calara, Jr. ay nagdemanda ng "writ of possession" laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala
ni Judge Ausberto Jaramillo ng RTC-San Pablo City.
(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng "writ of possession" si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia
Capuno sa nasabing kaso, ay nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at
sinabi kay Rizalia na gusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.
(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang anak na si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa
sala ni Judge Jaramillo, mga alas 10:00 ng umaga at pinapasok sila sa kuwarto ni Judge
Jaramillo.
(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung gustong hindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay
magbigay ng halagang P200,000 cash na kung maa-ari ay puro dadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng
P150,000 na postdated 30 days.
(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo
kay Thelma na subukan na maghanap ng nasabing halaga at bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.
(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si Thelma at si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge
Jaramillo pagkatapos ng dalawang araw, at sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang
maibibigay na halagang takda ni Judge. Sabi ni Judge na kung hindi kaya ni Thelma ang
P200,000 cash ay kahit na P150,000 na cash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng P150,000 na
postdated 60 days, pero dapat ang mga ito ay maibigay ni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng
hapon noong araw na iyon din.
(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi
ni Judge Jaramillo na kung ganoon ay wala na siyang magagawa.
(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay Pedro Calara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang
pagkabenta at pagka-ilit ng kanyang lupa ay bumagsak din sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, kaya siya
ay nakikiusap kay Judge Jaramillo na ilipat ang nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman.

II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959

This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge to disciplinary action or to dismissal
from office for violation of: (1) Sec. 3, pars. (b), (c) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars. (a) and
(d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3) Arts. 206 and 210 of The Revised Penal Code.
Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM Development Corporation and the duly
designated and appointed Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that
on 6 April 1992, a decision was rendered by respondent judge dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92), "IN
THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S. MARINO," for lack of merit; that during the
pendency of the case, respondent ordered Jesus Azores, nephew of Pastor S. Marino, to surrender,
among other properties, a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that after the car had been
surrendered to the court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation
to issue a resolution to have the luxury car at his disposal during weekends and to use it as he
pleased.
In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid cause of action against him. He
explains that the car was in the possession of the court, although on few occasions, he drove it
merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the battery. The car also needed minor repairs and the
expenses were paid for by the corporation which appropriated P10,000.00 for the purpose. However,
he insists, there was not instance that he demanded money, food for valuables from complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge’s acts constitute violations of the Canons of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

YES, respondent judge admitted using the car, he should have immediately inhibited himself once his
objectivity and impartiality were put in question by petitioner (complainant) in line with Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

While respondent judge may not necessarily be held administratively liable for issuing the orders
complained of, he certainly is accountable for violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and of committing a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713.

Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the vehicle but also accepted the offer to
use it. In fact, by his own admission, he drove it several times. In the conference held at Roño's
Place, respondent judge purposely omitted the car in the list of properties belonging to the estate of
Pastor S. Marino. We are not persuaded by his argument that the car was not part of the decedent's
estate. His later testimony revealed that the parties then desired to include all properties even those
which supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the corporation. The car was one such
property, but respondent never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying that the
car was not mentioned in the discussion. Understandably, no one dared to do so as they were fully
aware that respondent was in possession and enjoying the use of the car. Besides, he should have
been the one to call the attention of the parties about the existence of the vehicle as belonging to the
estate. Obviously, he did not want to part with the vehicle.
Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of the car beyond what the duties of
his office would call for. He had the scratches of the car repainted, the tires inflated and the battery
recharged six (6) times.

Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in society cannot be
overemphasized. As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial
system. They are particularly mandated not only to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their actions. For judges
sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse where all other institutions
have failed. Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial norms. Worse, his
acceptance of the Galant Super Saloon for his personal use and convenience as well as his evident
personal interest in it have defiled the "public trust" character of the judicial office. These serious
transgressions cannot be countenanced. By his actions, respondent has clearly demonstrated his
difficulty and inability to keep up with the conduct required of judges. Consequently, he should not be
permitted to stay a minute longer in office. We have repeatedly held that there is no place in the
judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, and his violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent JUDGE AUSBERTO JARAMILLO, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, if any. This dismissal shall be
immediately executory.

MAGSANGCAY vs. AGGABAO

238 SCRA 427

FACTS:

Parties Involved and Accusations:

 Dominga P. Masangcay filed a complaint against Judge Carlos T. Aggabao, Atty. Edwin O.
Betguen, Tanching L. Wee, Elsa V. Manuel, Estrella V. Magat, and Melchor Totto.
 Masangcay accused the respondents of various offenses, including:
 Gambling
 Receiving gifts or fees in exchange for favors
 Discourtesy
 Dishonesty
 Disgraceful and immoral conduct
 Nepotism
 Improper solicitation of contributions

Playing Cards in a Courtroom:

 During the investigation, it was established that Judge Aggabao and Atty. Betguen played
cards during office hours in a courtroom.
 Insufficient evidence to prove gambling, but playing cards in a courtroom was deemed
improper and a violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
 Testimony of witnesses Florentino Satulan and Catalina Senica supported this claim.

Fraternizing with Lawyers in Drinking Sessions:

 It was found that Judge Aggabao occasionally fraternized with lawyers in drinking sessions.
 This was considered a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned acts constitute violations of the judicial conduct.

RULING:

YES. Respondents Judge Carlos T. Aggabao and Atty. Edwin O. Betguen are guilty of playing cards
during office hours in the court premises. However, whether or not they were gambling or playing for
money is not established; and therefore, sense of justice and fairness, leads the undersigned to the
conclusion that they merely engaged in activities that are improper, which officials like them should
not be doing during office hours and in the court premises.

Judge Aggabao failed to comply with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities; and, Rule 2.01
which mandates that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. Atty. Betguen’s conduct is prejudicial to the best interest of the service
(Section 46[27] of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission).
Respondent Judge Carlos T. Aggabao occasionally fraternized with lawyers by having drinking
sessions with them. He is likewise guilty of not complying with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. All other charges against all the respondents are not supported by substantial evidence."

Respondent Judge Carlos T. Aggabao of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Quirino violated
Canons 3 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for
which he is hereby ADMONISHED to be more discreet in his actions, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Edwin O. Betguen, Clerk of Court VI, Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quirino, guilty of malfeasance in office, neglect of duty or inefficiency, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; With respect to
the complaint against respondent Elsa V. Manuel, directing the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quirino to conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation thereon within
thirty (30) days from receipts from the Office of the Court Administrator of certified true copies of the
complaint in this case and the joint comment thereon, as well as of the Addendum Evidence
submitted by respondent Judge Carlos T. Aggabao. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
transmit said documents to the Executive Judge within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
TABAO vs. ASIS
252 SCRA 581

FACTS:

This is a complaint filed by the sisters Azucena and Jesusa Tabao against Judge Enrique Asis
charging him with gross irregularity in the performance of his duties and abuse of authority and
conduct unbecoming of a judge, among others. While acting as MTCC Judge of Tacloban City, Br.1,
respondent notarized a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed in behalf of their aunt
Marquita M. Cinco-Jocson, to sell a parcel of land while the latter was confined in the hospital which
was done, according to respondent judge, as a “gesture of Christian charity and brotherly love for
people in need” considering that the proceeds were used for the payment of the medical expenses.
However, an examination of the SPA negates the professed “gesture of Christian charity and brotherly
love for people in need” since it was already notarized one month and 20 days before.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actuations of respondent judge is violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

Yes. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question
that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of
the Regional Trial Court.

Section 35, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court as well as Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. Specifically,
Sec. 35 of Rule 138 was promulgated pursuant to the constitutional power of the Court to regulate the
practice of law. It is based on sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with
the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a judge of the Regional Trial
Court. This rule makes it obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors for their own private
interests and assure the public of impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote public interest.

Municipal judges may not engage in notarial work except as notaries public ex-officio, in which case
they may only notarize documents connected with the exercise of their official functions. They may
not, as such notaries public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgement of private
documents, contracts and other acts of conveyance, which bear no relation to the performance of
their functions as judges, except in far-flung municipalities which have neither lawyers nor notaries
public, in which case, MTC and MCTC judges assigned to those municipalities or circuits may, in their
capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform any act within the competence of a regular notary
public provided that (a) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned
over to the municipal treasurer, and (b) a certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to
the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. 8 Incidentally, the City of
Tacloban abounds with notaries public, so that respondent Judge cannot qualify as an exception.

ACCORDINGLY, as recommended, respondent JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS is found administratively

liable as charged and is consequently FINED TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) with a warning
that the commission of the same or similar act will warrant a more severe sanction.

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ISSUE:

RULING:
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:
ISSUE:

RULING:

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: