Topic: General

CASE: SORIANO vs MTRCB, G.R No. 165785, April 29, 2009 EN BANC
Facts:
 Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano in his program “Ang Dating Daan” made a
following
remark:“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael,
masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana
lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”

 Complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private

respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo.

 Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s

remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.

 MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for
20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII
of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.

 The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive

suspension order, praying that the adjudication board recuse themselves from
hearing the case. Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw his
motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

 On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a
decision finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby
imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program,
"Ang Dating Daan". Hence, the petition.

Issue/s:
1. WON MTRCB under PD 1986 does not expressly authorize it to issue preventive
suspension.

Ruling:
1. No, the contention is untenable.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,

investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the
five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute . They have in fine
only such
powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.
And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be
from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be
liberally
construed.

In Sec. 3 of PD 1986, perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate reveals the

possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the
challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally
from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and
supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the
MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly
under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise,
regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television
broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the
end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the
BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
exhibited and/or broadcast by television."

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s
express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory
and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any
other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.

NOTE:
●Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and
impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person
subject of the complaint.
●In the absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986 as the matter
of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. But the
mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more,
would not work to deprive the MTRCB of a basic disciplinary tool, such as
preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by
statute to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition
or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the afore-quoted Sec. 3 of the IRR
neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the
MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under
the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of
the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there
has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on
MTRCB.

Topic: Administrative Framework

Case: Leveriza vs. IAC, G.R. No-L66614

Facts:
● Involved in this case are three contracts. To wit:
Contract A- a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration and
Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square
metres, for 25 years. Contract B- a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May
21, 1965 between defendant Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines,
Inc. over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25
years; and Contract C- a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant
Civil Aeronautics Administration and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over
the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.

Mobil Oil (plaintiff) in this case seeks the rescission of Contract A and Contract B
on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived has already been
cancelled by the defendant Civil Aeronautics Administration and maintains that
Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar
as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. Defendants
Leverizas' claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been
legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff
and defendant CAA which should be declared void. Defendant CAA asserts that
Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Guillermo
Jurado (Airport Manager) was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A
because of the violation committed by defendant Leveriza in leasing the parcel of
land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of defendant CAA.
Defendant CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the
Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid
● Lower Court decision
- Contract A ceased to have any effect on June 28, 1966
- Contract B ceased to have any effect because of the cancellation of Contract
A.
- Contract C validly entered on June 1, 1968 and is still valid and subsisting.
● CAA filed a Motion Reconsideration, averring that the lot lease was properly
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the
President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could
execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative
Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the
contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between
the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however denied.
● On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court, found no reversible error in the
decision of the lower court dated April 6, 1976, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.
● Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. WON the administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) has the
statutory authority to lease, cancel a lease contract, even without the approval of
the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications, real property belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines.

Ruling:
1. The argument is wrong. Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such
contract of lease must be executed: (1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or (3) by an officer expressly vested
by law. On the other hand, Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, provides for the
Powers and Duties of the Administrator.“(24) To administer, operate, manage,
control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all government
aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including such power and duties as: (b) to enter into, make and
execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private
corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real
property; right of ways, and easements which may be proper or necessary:
Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real property of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the
Philippines.”

There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while
Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of the
lease in Contract "C" is real property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration has the authority to enter into Contracts of
Lease for the government under the third category. Thus, as correctly ruled by the
Court of Appeals, the Civil Aeronautics Administration has the power to
execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, not because it is an entity duly designated by
the President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law
expressly vested in it.
CASE: A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE
ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. (En Banc)

Facts:
● Judge Rodolfo Manzano, the Executive Judge of Branch XIX of Ilocos Norte,
received an appointment offer by virtue of Executive Order RF6-04, as a member of
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to
Presidential Executive Order No. 856.
● Before accepting such designation, Judge Manzao wrote a letter to the SC,
requesting as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the
powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the
second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not
in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge
of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions
of an Executive Judge.

Issue:
1. WON the member of the Judiciary be allowed to to receive designation to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Ruling:
1. No. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees
on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the
Committee are— “3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail
warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge
of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; 3.5
Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.” It is evident that such Provincial/City
Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it
is provided that— Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on
Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Justice. Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be
in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

NOTE:
● Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar,
SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
● This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity
of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as
non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which
they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfilment of their judicial duties.
● While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced
with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.

Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.
CASE: Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102976, October
25, 1995

Facts:
● Petitioner in this case is Iron and Steel Authority “ISA” which was created under
PD No. 272 with the primary objective to promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines.
● Pursuant to the expansion program of the National Steel Corporation "NSC",
subsidiary of National Development Corporation, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued
by the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982 withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land (totalling about 30.25 hectares in area)
located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy
of NSC.
● Certain portions of land subject to Proc No. 2239 were privately owned by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation. A letter of Instruction No. 1277 was issued directing
the NSC to "negotiate with MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land." LOI No.
1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an
agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277,
petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and
to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private
respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and
related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.
● Negotiations failed and the case proceeded to trial. While the trial was
ongoing the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired. MCFC then filed a
motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered
against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its
opposition to this motion.
● The trial court granted the petition to which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
● Hence, in the petition for review the Solicitor General argues that since ISA
initiated and prosecuted the action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Republic, as principal of ISA, is entitled to be
substituted and to be made a party-plaintiff after the agent ISA's term had expired.

Issue:
1. WON ISA is an agent of the government. (This issue must be cleared out to be
able to answer the main issue.)
2. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA
in view of the expiration of ISA's term. (Main issue.)
3. WON the president may exercise the right of eminent domain even without the
enactment of the legislation. (although Consti issue, in case it will be asked.)
Ruling:
1. Yes. ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally
associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No.
272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

2. Yes. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,
duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back
to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution
or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. Since, in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back
into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once
again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

As spelled out in the Rules of Court, the general rule is that an action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Rule 3,
Section 2) Here, ISA was, at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, a
real party in interest, having been explicitly authorized by its enabling statute to
institute expropriation proceedings. The Rules of Court at the same time
expressly recognize the role of representative parties: Sec. 3. Representative
Parties. — A trustee of an expressed trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator,
or a party authorized by statute may sue or be sued without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is presented or defended; but the court may, at any
stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be made a party. In the
instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent
or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under P.D. No. 272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf
of and for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. “Paragraph 7 of the
complaint stated:

The Government, thru the plaintiff ISA, urgently needs the subject parcels of land for
the construction and installation of iron and steel manufacturing facilities that are
indispensable to the integration of the iron and steel making industry which is vital
to the promotion of public interest and welfare.”
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and
not the National Steel Corporation, even though the latter may be an ultimate user
of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of
ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent
domain proceedings.

3. While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the
legislative department of the government, we believe and so hold that no new
legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for
ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.

The 1917 Revised Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time of the of the
present expropriation proceedings before the Iligan Regional Trial Court, provided
that:

Sec. 64. Particular powers and duties of the President of the Philippines. — In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the President of the Philippines
shall have such other specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred
or imposed on him by law, and also, in particular, the powers and duties set
forth in this Chapter.

Among such special powers and duties shall be:

(h) To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of
eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippines; and to direct the
Secretary of Justice, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 currently in force has substantially

reproduced the foregoing provision in the following terms:

Sec. 12. Power of eminent domain. — The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of
the National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the
action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper court.
(Emphasis supplied)
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ASSO. OF LDB EMPLOYEES and GARCIA
G.R. No. 120319
October 6, 1995

FACTS:

Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development

Bank Employees (ALDBE) went to arbitration to settle a dispute about whether
or not the company violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) regarding employee promotions.

During a conference, the parties agreed to submit their respective Position

Papers. However, only ALDBE submitted their Position Paper to Atty. Garcia, who
acted as the Voluntary Arbitrator. LDB failed to submit their Position Paper despite
receiving a letter from Atty. Garcia reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995,
LDB had not filed their Position Paper.

The Voluntary Arbitrator Garcia made a decision without LDB's Position

Paper, concluding that the Bank did not follow the CBA provision or the MOA
regarding promotions.

Therefore, this petition for certiorari and prohibition aims to overturn the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and prevent her from enforcing it.

ISSUE:

WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the CA and not the SC

HELD:

The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals stating that elevating a
decision or award of a Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) to the SC on a petition for certiorari
is in effect equating the VA with the NLRC or the CA. Which in its view is illogical
and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

Instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms

governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that
either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain
government act or function is performed. Since a voluntary arbitrator performs
quasi-judicial functions, he/she performs a state function according to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor
Code. Thus, he/she falls into the contemplation of the term instrumentality.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise that
the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators
determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect
as judgments of a court.

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not

integrated within the department framework vested within special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.

NOTES:

1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an

impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept
the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may be classified,
on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or
voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are

compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled
to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.
The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by
resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the
parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed
by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the

parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective
agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. Ideally,
arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay,
such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be
done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to
have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute.
Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear
and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said
arbitrator’s decision.

2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies.

Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to
exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has
jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar
days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
6. Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas, 59 SCAD 488;

Facts:

the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 94-3710. It merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the
OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office].

In connection with the merging of the two offices, petitioners were reassigned, Salvador C.
Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner
Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission’s Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga.

They filed for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
(“Commission”) and the authority of the Commission to issue the same and asserted that it is
violative of their security of tenure.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then
moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710
and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to these Comments. The
Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated “Comment [on] the Reply”).

Issue:

A.) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-
3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA
[Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form
the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and

B.) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners’ constitutional right to security
of tenure.

Held:
A.) YES. The objectives sought by the Civil Service Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-
3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as “effecting changes in the organization
to streamline the Commission’s operations and improve delivery of service.” These changes in
internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and
devolution of the Commission’s functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional
Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end
that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government
employees that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had been centralized in
the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over
the country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions.
Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices
and the Field Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes
possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office in
Metropolitan Manila. It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite
legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and
implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to
the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de
Lima to the Commission’s Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also
clear to the Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710
— re-naming of existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections
composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel, budget,
etc.) among the re-arranged Offices — are precisely the kind of internal changes which are
referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code), quoted above, as “changes in the organization” of the Commission.

The term “public office” is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public
[Appari vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984); Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974);
Fernandez vs. Ledesma, 117 Phil. 630 (1963); Alba vs. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957)]. This
Court considers that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term
is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the “changes in
organization” introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the
termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its
officers and employees. It is very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code
having mentioned fourteen (14) different “Offices” of the Civil Service Commission, meant to
freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the
Commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of
the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority
had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out “changes in the organization,” “as the
need [for such changes] arises.” Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative
authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-
3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority
was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards
to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in
Section 17 itself (i.e., “as the need arises”), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil
Service Commission “as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career
service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness in the civil service and
that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the
departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed.”

B.) NO. Appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be
appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or
Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the
instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without
specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other
persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission. Section 26(7), Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a
management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any department or
agency of government embraced in the civil service: “Sec. 26. Personnel Actions. — . . . As
used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service
shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment,
demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules,
standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission. . . . (7) Reassignment. An
employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency;
Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and salary.” It
follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous
positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the
Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from
the RDO to the Commission’s Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with
express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows
that such reassignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to
security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would
continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they
had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had
not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission’s Head Office. The
above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in the instant case,
but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different agencies or offices of
government.
7. Eugenio v. CSC, 21 SCRA 145 (1993)

FACTS:

Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and
was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB,
relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service.”

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE:

WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

HELD:

The petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and
set aside

NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot
be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read
together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to

reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.

2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This
is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a
member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

NOTES:

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a
Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary
independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the
need arises.

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

(4) The Office of Planning and Management

(5) The Central Administrative Office.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs

(14) The Office of Retirement

(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

8. Solid Homes, Inc. v Payawal, 177 SCRA 72;

Facts:

The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had
already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and
interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver
the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared
later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The
plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts
paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
the costs of the suit. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957.

Lower court denied the motion. Judgement was given in favor of the plaintiff for the return of
the P38,949.87 plus legal interest and damages.

Solid homes appealed but was denied

In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD
No. 957 itself providing that:

SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129. stresses, additionally,
that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after
PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.
Sec. 1 of PD 957 confers to the NHA the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving Unsound real estate business practices, Claims involving refund and any other
claims and Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations.

Issue:
Whether or not the National Housing Authority was jurisdiction to hear the said case?

Ruling:

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions
Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)

General law (BP 129) must yield to special law (PD1344) regardless of the dates of their
enactment. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication.

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to

enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the
contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the
petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent
court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to
nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

9. Matienzo vs. Abeller, 162 SCRA 1

Facts:

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in
Metro Manila.

The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. Private
respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization of their
unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, "to eradicate the
harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to
become legitimate and responsible operators."

The respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting
applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization
was sought. The petitioners alleged that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. They
argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof had the
power, at the time the petitions were filed, to legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as
such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of
the Decree on January 17, 1973 based on the succeeding issuances of the board. They state
that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO GRANT PROVISIONAL
PERMITS TO OPERATE DESPITE THE BAN THEREON UNDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 379

Held:

Yes. under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade
of clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
ones" In view thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to
"colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101.

A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue
provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the
alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the
expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators
for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium
suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no
impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public
Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which
it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the
legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.

Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates
with the trends of modern life, so must the Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the
dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. ... Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie
its hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise"

As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for
legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is fraud, abuse
of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with
administrative action prior to its completion or finality . It is only after judicial review is no
longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the administrative findings are not
in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find
substantial support from the evidence.

Requisites of Judicial Review

1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest
of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the
case.
10. Sarcos vs. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853;

Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, running as an
independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the November 14, 1967 election, was
charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the
Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur.

The act constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in petitioner
allegedly "conniving with certain private individuals to cut and fell timber and selling the
timber or logs so cut or felled for their own use and benefit, within the communal forest
reserve of the Municipality of Barobo, Province of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and
prejudice of the public and of the government. Citing the provisions of Section 5, of Republic
Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967, the Governor issued a
preventive suspension against the mayor.

The explanation offered by petitioner contained the following: "These logs which I caused to be
hauled sometime within the month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and tumbled down
by the persons abovementioned within the communal forests of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, and
which were seized by the patrolmen of the undersigned. The said logs were sold in order to
raise funds for the purchase of the police uniforms and arms."

It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent Governor, according
to the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension of petitioner from his position as Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur.

Issue:

whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more specifically Section 5 thereof.

Held:
No. Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967
provides that "Within seven days after the charges are preferred, the President, Governor, or
Mayor, as the case may be, or his duly authorized representative, as provided in the preceding
paragraph, shall notify the respondent of such charges.

The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipal Council, as the case may be, shall hear
and investigate the truth or falsity of the charges within ten days after receipt of such notice:
Provided, that no investigation shall commence or continue within ninety days immediately
prior to an election. The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not extend
beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the
suspended officer, shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is
due to the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay
shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however, That if the
suspended officer shall have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty
days, his suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the case is
finally decided by the Provincial Board."

A reading of the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest that it is the provincial
board to which such a power has been granted under conditions therein specified. The
principle, that the deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act is
indicative that a change in the law was intended, calls for application.

Public officials possess powers, not rights. There must be, therefore, a grant of authority
whether express or implied, to justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what
they do as public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To paraphrase a
leading American decision, law is the only supreme power under constitutional government,
and every man who by accepting office participates in its function is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives.

We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, the power of
preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor. To rule otherwise would be at
war with the plain purpose of the law and likewise fraught with consequences far from
desirable. We close with this appropriate excerpt from an opinion of Justice Holmes rendered
on circuit duty: "The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and
if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that should be recognized and obeyed. The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the
enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the
courts to say: We see what you are driving at but you have not said it, and therefore, we shall go
on as before."
11.
Villegas vs Subido
G.R. No. L-26534 November 28, 1969 30 SCRA 498
DOCTRINE:
The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and
enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its
functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied.
FACTS:
The respondent Commissioner of Civil Service directed the Mayor of the City of Manila that
petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as station commanders of the three police precincts
of Manila as their continued employment as such was illegal, the eligibility required being that of an
inspector first class, allegedly not possessed by them.
Petitioner Mayor disregard said directive, it being in excess of the authority vested in the Civil
Service Commission as, in his communication, he claims to be not aware of any provision of law
requiring that Precinct or Station Commanders should be at least a Police or Detective Major or an
Inspector First Class. He reasoned that Paragraph 4, Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service
Act of 1959) which the Commission has invoked, contemplates positions in the competitive or classified
service and obviously cannot cover mere designations or assignments to an area of command.
It was pointed out that the assignment or detail in the case of the other petitioners as precinct or
station commanders did not constitute "appointment to positions in the competitive or classified service.
Such designation or detail was exclusively within the power and jurisdiction of petitioner Mayor
under his specific power of direction, supervision and control vested in him by the Charter and in view of
his responsibility as the chief executive of the City to maintain peace and order therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or, at the very least, with grave
abuse of discretion in directing the mayor to replace the other petitioners (Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro)
as station commanders of the three Manila police precincts,
HELD:
The power of Mayor of Manila to designate the station
commanders of the three Manila police precincts cannot be
negated by authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
promulgate rules and standards dealing specifically with the
supervision, the preparation and rating of all civil service
examinations, the making of investigation and special reports
upon all matters relating to the enforcement of the civil service
law, the authority to pass upon all removal, separation and
suspension of permanent officers and employees in the
competitive and classified service, and the determination of
appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved,
The power of Mayor of Manila to designate the station
commanders of the three Manila police precincts cannot be
negated by authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
promulgate rules and standards dealing specifically with the
supervision, the preparation and rating of all civil service
examinations, the making of investigation and special reports
upon all matters relating to the enforcement of the civil service
law, the authority to pass upon all removal, separation and
suspension of permanent officers and employees in the
competitive and classified service, and the determination of
appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved,
The power of Mayor of Manila to designate the station
commanders of the three Manila police precincts cannot be
negated by authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service to
promulgate rules and standards dealing specifically with the
supervision, the preparation and rating of all civil service
examinations, the making of investigation and special reports
upon all matters relating to the enforcement of the civil service
law, the authority to pass upon all removal, separation and
suspension of permanent officers and employees in the
competitive and classified service, and the determination of
appeals instituted by any person believing himself to be
aggrieved,
YES. There is no dispute that the Mayor of the City of Manila, by virtue of the statutory grant of
authority of “immediate control over the executive functions of the different departments” could pick
police officials to be entrusted with the responsibility of station commanders. Such designation by the
mayor cannot be frustrated by a directive of the Commissioner of Civil Service to replace the police
officials absent any applicable law authorizing him/her to do so.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its
officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As
such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such
authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What
they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. It must be conceded that department zeal may not be permitted
to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the
righteousness of the motive is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise, the rule of law becomes a myth. That
principle cannot be sufficiently stressed.
 Radio Communications vs. Santiago, 58 SCRA 493 (1974);
DOCTINE:
Grant of particular power must be found in the law itself. Where there is nothing in the law that would
suggest that a particular power has been granted, such as the power to decide contractual disputes, the
same cannot be exercised.
Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a
public official must locate in the statute relied upon, a grant of power before he can exercise it.
FACTS:
This case involves two petitions for review decided by the SC jointly.
On July 12, 1966, a telegram was filed with RCPI and the amount of P1.50 was paid for the
transmission of said telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was never transmitted. The
respondent not only give any valid explanation, but did not present any evidence to explain why the said
telegram was not forwarded to the addressee. It is, therefore, a clear case that the respondent, taking
advantage of the rates fixed by the Commission collected the sum of 1.50 and promised to render a
service to the complainant, i.e. the transmission of his telegram.
In another complaint, Jaugan filed a telegram at the branch office of RCPI in Dumaguete City,
addressed to Public Service Commissioner (PSC) Medina in Manila. The telegram was received by an
employee of the respondent and was paid for an amount of 2.64. The telegram advised Commissioner
Medina that it was not necessary for him to go to Dumaguete where he was subpoenaed to testify in the
Land Registration Case. The telegram was never delivered and when Commissioner Medina appeared
before the Dumaguete Court, he was advised that the case was postponed since and that a telegram was
sent to him.
It was the manifest failure in both cases to render the service expected of a responsible operator
that led to the imposition of the penalty (fines) by the PSC. The motions for reconsideration in both
cases having proved futile, the matter was elevated to the SC.
RCPI allegation that PSC was devoid of such competence is based on the express limitation
found in the Public Service Act (PSA) expressly exempting radio companies from the jurisdiction,
supervision and control of such body "except with respect to the fixing of rates.”
ISSUE:
WON the Public Service Commission (no longer in existence by virtue of the PD reorganizing the
executive branch of the national government) had the jurisdiction to act on complaints by dissatisfied
customers of petitioner Radio Communications of the Phil., Inc. and thereafter to penalize it with a fine
HELD:
No. Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental
law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can
exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a
requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. If the act performed cannot meet the
test of validity, it must be set aside.
 There can be no justification for the Public Service Commission in imposing the fines in
these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies, as noted was to the fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or
misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in
these two petitions lacked the impress of validity.
The Public Service Act expressly exempting radio companies from the jurisdiction, supervision
and control of such body "except with respect to the fixing of rates." In the face of the provision itself, it
is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against
petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which impowers it to impose a fine that calls for a
different conclusion.
The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a Presidential Decree, as set
forth at the outset, and a new Board of Communications having been created to take its place, nothing
said in this decision has reference to whatever powers are now lodged in the latter body. It is to be
understood, likewise, that insofar as the complainants are concerned, this decision goes no further than to
rule adversely on the exercise of authority by the Public Service Commission when it took disciplinary
action against petitioner.
The orders of the PSC Commissioner in both petitions was reversed and set aside by the SC.
 Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 79 SCAD 954 (1997);
DOCTRINE: Similarly, a statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be
liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore.
His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding
one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment
was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit
and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to
act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him.
In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant
did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision
sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion
for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.
2. Whether or not Azarcon is a public officer.
HELD:
1. NO. SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as "defined
either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both. Thus, although the appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency
forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary
or fair implication in its enabling act. Hence,an administrative officer, it has been held, has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

Corollary, implied powers "are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser
degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not
incidental thereto." For to so extend the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on
powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.
 Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the
only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or

accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus,
unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged.

2. NO. Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing
the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.
Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had
authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue
Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

Contested case means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or
privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined
after hearing
 Taule vs. Santos, 200 SCRA 512 (1991);
DOCTRINE: An administrative agency cannot grant itself jurisdiction to decide a particular matter by
issuing the appropriate rules and regulations in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power where the
enabling statute does not confer.
Facts:
The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes decided to hold
the election of Katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the
Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary Vicente Avila
Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes
sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of
the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers
of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by respondent Secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming
that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
HELD:
It is the courts and not the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government which has jurisdiction
over election protests for elections of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils.
The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power to
promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. Presidential
power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to
ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government.
 Pimentel vs. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 769 (1994);
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to that effect.
FACTS:
In the aftermath of the May 14, 2007, national elections, 11 senatorial candidates were declared
winners and took their oaths of office. However, the 12th and final post was hotly contested by Pimentel
and Zubiri. Due to irregularities with the Certificates of Canvass, Pimentel questioned the authenticity
and due execution of the documents and requested a new board of canvassers be created for
Maguindanao.

During the proceedings of this new board, Pimentel and his counsel were not allowed to present
evidence or ask questions, and their objections were only noted in the minutes. Pimentel filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin the Commission on Elections from canvassing, annul the
proceedings as unconstitutional and illegal, and allow them to present their evidence. All petitions were
denied, and Zubiri was proclaimed as senator, took his oath of office, and began his term.

Pimentel protested the decision, but Zubiri filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Pimentel should
have filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) to have his proclamation annulled.

ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the case.
2. WON the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in cases of
Senators.

RULING:
1. No. Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases, which involves the
exercise of adjudicatory power, is conferred only by the Constitution or by the statute. It cannot be
conferred by the Rules of Court. Jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute in the
absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect.

According to Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the SET is responsible for
determining the outcome of contests related to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. This means that once a winning candidate has been declared, taken the oath, and started serving
as a senator, the COMELEC no longer has jurisdiction over any election-related disputes. Instead, the
SET becomes the sole authority in such cases.

The term "sole" in Article VI, Section 17 emphasizes the exclusive jurisdiction of electoral
tribunals over disputes related to their members. Therefore, it is clear that this Court cannot entertain a
petition for certiorari and mandamus related to issues that can be resolved through an election contest.
The SET has exclusive jurisdiction to handle Pimentel's complaint regarding Zubiri's election to the
Senate.

2. No. The Supreme Court did not recognize Pimentel's pre-proclamation case because the
SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress or COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, which is responsible for
determining the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass. Pre-proclamation cases related
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are generally prohibited in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Members of the
House of Representatives.

However, there are exceptions to this rule, such as the correction of manifest errors and questions
affecting the board of canvassers' composition or proceedings. The exception regarding the determination
of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass provided in Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, only applies to Congress or the COMELEC en banc
acting as the NBC, not local boards of canvassers who are still covered by the prohibition on pre-
proclamation controversies.