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and Sharia 2022 Vol. 1

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The Refugee Law and Obtaining The Citizenship

of The Ex-Terrorist

Abdullah Raden Aji Haqqi SH, MH,.

Dr.Rohmad Adi Yulianto, Lc., LLM
Universitas Islam As Syafiiyah
radendul@gmail.com;

Abstract
Depriving someone of citizenship is not tantamount to preventing them (or their close associates) from
perpetrating an attack. First, in a technologically interconnected world, physical presence is no longer
necessary to orchestrate criminal acts. Therefore, even if countries could seal their borders against the re-
entry of persons whose citizenship had been rescinded, this would not necessarily inoculate them against a
threat that is by definition transnational, and could be perpetrated from abroad. Second, individuals
determined to re-enter the country will still be able to find ways to do so, including through illegal means.
Depriving someone of citizenship could push them further underground, or for those who are not the most
serious offenders, prevent them from cooperating with law enforcement.
The main objective of such laws is to prevent terrorism and radicalization, either by barring a potential
perpetrator from returning from a training camp or fighting abroad or deterring those who may wish to do
so in the future. In both regards, evidence is lacking, and in fact some analysts have suggested that these
laws may increase the threat, while others argue the opposite.
to find the law and regulation of Obtaining the citizenship again after the government revoked it from Ex-
terrorist and does the refugee law protect the ex-terrorist from being statelessness.
The research is limited in the refugee law and is there a relationship with the issue of revoking citizenship
from the ex-terrorist especially Indonesia acknowledging one citizenship therefore the question here where
should he go?
many countries could not solve and prevent their citizens from having the basic human rights. when their
citizenship was revoked due to a membership of a particular terrorist group. if the terrorist repented thus
who can protect his legal status with his family.

Keywords: Refugee, Obtaining, Citizenship, revoke, ex-terrorist

I. INTRODUCTION
The Definition of The Refugee
The selectivity inherent in the refugee definition is reinforced by its very structure, which is composed
of three different levels of requirements, commonly labelled as the inclusion, exclusion, and cessation
clauses. Inclusion criteria in the refugee definition are cautiously spelled out in Article 1(A)(2) of the
Geneva Convention on the basis of four cumulative conditions: first, a refugee is outside his/her country of
origin; second, he/she is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of his/her country;

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third, such inability or unwillingness is attributable to a well-founded fear of persecution; and fourth, the
persecution is based on five limitative grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social
group, and political opinion).
Such a composite definition highlights the two essential specificities of international refugee law. On
the one hand, it reveals the primary function of refugee law as a protection of substitution when the state of
origin fails to fulfil its duty of protection towards its own citizens. As notably acknowledged by the House
of Lords, ‘the general purpose of the convention is to enable the person who no longer has the benefit of
protection against persecution for a convention reason in his own country to turn for protection to the
international community’i. On the other hand, such a principle of surrogacy was not conceived to obviate
any failure of protection from the state of origin.ii The cumulative effect of the various conditions required
by Article 1(A)(2) underlines the selective nature of the refugee definition, which is not bound to cover all
causes of forced migration. Such a (p.25) restrictive stance was clearly premeditated, for states were aware
that the definition under the Geneva Convention would not include every refugee.
The human rights-based approach to the refugee definition has resumed in turn with the underlying
purpose of the Geneva Convention. The first paragraph of its preamble recalls in emphatic terms that ‘the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…have affirmed the principle
that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination’. This evasive but
symbolic reference to human rights has been retrospectively interpreted by domestic jurisdictions as
informing the whole rationale of the Geneva Convention: ‘[u]nderlying the Convention is the international
community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimination’.iii41
This human rights unction is not limited to the notion of persecution; it also shapes many other
distinctive features of the refugee definition. As acknowledged by several domestic courts, the term
‘refugee’ is ‘to be understood as written against the background of international human rights law, including
as reflected or expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights’.iv
The grounds of persecution provide one of the most obvious instances of the human rights filiation: the
grounds of religion and political opinion are clearly based on freedom of thoughtv and that of opinion and
expression,vi while the other ones—race, nationality, and membership of a particular social group—are
anchored within the principle of nondiscrimination.vii

The principle of non-refoulement

The cornerstone of international refugee law The principle of non-refoulement is commonly regarded
as ‘the cornerstone of international refugee law’.viii Its origins go back to extradition treaties concluded
during the nineteenth century,ix before it was explicitly endorsed for the first time in the 1933 Convention
relating to the International Status of Refugees. Under contemporary refugee law, its primary source is
Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. The
cardinal importance of such an elementary principle is further endorsed by Article 42 which prohibits any
reservation to Article 33.
Since then, this founding principle of refugee law has been restated in a large body of interstate
instruments,x to such an extent that it is now considered a customary norm of international law.xi Whatever

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its legal nature under general international law, the scope of the non-refoulement duty is relatively broad.
The inclusive language of Article 33—through the generic expression ‘in any manner whatsoever’—clearly
indicates that the prohibition of refoulement applies to any act of forcible removal or rejection that puts the
person concerned at risk of persecution. The legal nature of the act (expulsion, deportation, extradition,
non-admission at the border, interception, transfer, or rendition) is therefore not relevant. The decisive
consideration is the consequence of this act, namely whether one’s life or liberty would be threatened on
account of a Convention reason. Following that stance, the principle of nonrefoulement covers equally both
asylum seekers and recognized refugees, provided that they are under the jurisdiction of a state party.
Contrary to many other provisions of the Geneva Convention, Article 33 is not dependent on the presence—
whether lawful or unlawful—of asylum seekers within the territory of a state party. It thus applies regardless
of whether they enter the territory legally or illegally.
From a conceptual and legal perspective, non-refoulement must be distinguished from asylum. At the
conceptual level, non-refoulement is a negative notion, prohibiting states from sending back refugees to a
country of persecution. As underlined during the drafting of the Geneva Convention, ‘[i]t imposed a
negative duty (p.31) forbidding the expulsion of any refugee to certain territories but did not impose the
obligation to allow a refugee to take up residence’.xii By contrast, asylum is a positive concept, which entails
admission to residence and lasting protection against the jurisdiction of another state. This conceptual
distinction between asylum and non-refoulement is further grounded on their respective legal natures:
nonrefoulement is an obligation of states, whereas asylum is a right of states. As evidenced by a large body
of law, ‘it has long been recognised that, according to customary international law, the right of asylum is a
right of States, not of the individual’.xiii
By contrast, the principle of non-refoulement under the Geneva Convention is accompanied and
finalized by the granting of refugee status. Such an attribute has been commonly heralded by commentators
as establishing the Geneva Convention as the primary source of refugee protection, relegating human rights
law to a secondary role. Following a similar assumption (but with clearly different objectives in mind),
states have established at the regional and domestic levels more malleable and precarious regimes under
the label of so-called complementary protection. This self-referential dialogue between states and refugee
lawyers is arguably grounded on false premises. Indeed, closer examination of the content of the protection
granted by the Geneva Convention and the ICCPR reveals a completely different picture. From this angle,
human rights law is not only broader than refugee law with regard to both its personal and material scope,
but more fundamentally, the former supplants the latter even when their respective norms overlap.
Refugee status and the conditionality of protection
Compared to human rights law, the content of international protection provided by refugee status
presents significant specificities. Although the Geneva Convention is commonly presented as ‘an
extraordinary “Bill of Rights” for refugees’,xiv it substantially differs from the phraseology of human rights.
Formally speaking, the Refugee Convention is framed on the mode of interstate obligations rather than
those of individual rights. It primarily addresses contracting states by spelling out their obligations, while
the term ‘rights’ directly pertaining to refugees is rarely mentioned as such in the text of the Geneva
Convention.xv Thus the refugee is not conceived of as a subject of law in his or her own right but rather as
a beneficiary of common standards regulating the conduct of states. Technically speaking, therefore, the
Geneva Convention cannot be labelled as a human rights treaty as is so frequently asserted by the doctrine.xvi
In other words, it is a duty-based rather than a human rights-based instrument.xvii

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II. METHOD
This article uses a Qualitative Research: Qualitative research is used to gain an understanding of human
behaviour, intentions, attitudes, experience, etc., based on the observation and the interpretation of the
people. It is an unstructured and exploratory technique that deals with the highly complex phenomena which
are not possible. This kind of research is usually done to understand the topic in-depth. It is carried out by
taking the interview with the open-ended questions, observations which are described in words, and so on.
On the other hand a Quantitative Research: Quantitative research method relies on the methods of natural
sciences, that develops hard facts and numerical data. it establishes the cause and effect relationship
between two variables using different statistical, computational, and statistical methods. As the results are
accurately and precisely measured, this research method is also termed as “Empirical Research”. This type
of research is generally used to establish the generalised facts about the particular topic. This type of
research is usually done by using surveys, experiments, and so on. Finally this article takes Data Analysis
research as well.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

COUNTER TERRORISM PROGRAM IN INDONESIA
Indirectly influenced by 9/11 WTC bombing in New York and directly influenced by Bali Bombing
2002, Indonesian government started ‘a war against terrorism’ by 2002. Indonesian President Joko Widodo
mentioned that “In dealing with terrorists, the state must win!”. Special police unit designated to combat
terrorism, namely Special Detachment 88 was formed. The number of 88 was choosen for specific reasons
: eighty eight means a tireless efforts to combat terrorism, a never ending efforts, however some people
believed that the number of ‘88’ is taken from the number of Australian casualties in Bali Bombing 2002.
Australia financially and technically supported the foundation of this special detachment. Many terrorism
suspects were immediately hunted, arrested, tortured, jailed and convicted. Since then, terrorism issues have
been widely exposed by the media. Coincidently, at that period was also media booming period. Many TV
stations were founded and aired. However, media booming, to some extent, did not bring positive impact
for family of terrorist suspects. In many cases the media even investigate to the place where the person
suspected as terrorists used to live, exposed their family and even the face of children of the terrorist.
Definitely, the family was subsequently being socially isolated, even being rejected from public As part of
efforts to counter violent extremist narratives, Indonesia continued to amplify the voices of victims of
terrorism as well as former terrorists who have renounced violence. Numerous NGOs and religious
organizations sponsored workshops and conferences, emphasizing the need to respect diversity and foster
greater tolerance. Indonesia also invited religious leaders, in coordination with civil society and faith-based
organizations, to be part of outreach efforts to violent extremists. Although domestic counterterrorism
efforts are civilian-led, the Indonesian military maintains counterterrorism units that could be mobilized to
support domestic operations if needed. These units train regularly with law enforcement to ensure greater
capability and coordination for potential domestic counterterrorism operations. However, the Indonesian
military and its counterterrorism units are primarily responsible for external terrorist threats to the
archipelago and in certain other specific situations. The latest military efforts to combat terrorism took place
in Poso, Central Sulawesi on 30-31 March 2015. However, since the Indonesian Military (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia or TNI) has no legal mandate to enforce domestic security, thus they pretend as if only conducting

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a military training. Yet, actually the ‘military training’ lead to massive manhunt to target terrorism
suspects.xviii In 2014, Poso, the northeastern coast of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, remained the epicenter
of terrorism in Indonesia this year, followed by Bima in West Nusa Tenggara. The Mujahidin Indonesia
Timur (Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia), or MIT, led by Santoso, was allegedly behind a series of terrorist
attacks targeting the police. In general, the Indonesian police remained key targets of terrorist attacks
throughout 2014 reflecting the continuity in the shift from the “far enemy” to the “near enemy” – a trend
that has manifested more intensively since the dismantling of the Aceh terrorist training camp in 2010. At
the same time, police’s antiterror unit -Detachment 88 - foiled several terrorist plots during raids conducted
across the country and captured at least 54 terrorist suspects – a majority of whom were linked to the MIT.xix
In 2014, Detachment 88 successfully foiled several plots and arrested dozens including those involved in
the attacks. It also seized up to 93 motorcycles that were allegedly robbed by MIT members in Central
Sulawesi. In early August 2014, the Indonesian government banned Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria
(ISIS). However, despite the ban, existing legal regime in Indonesia does not give authorities the power to
arrest supporters of ISIS unless there is evidence of their involvement in terrorist acts. According to official
estimates, the number of Indonesians joining ISIS has soared from 56 in mid-year to over 110 by the end
of 2014. A number of individuals who were openly displaying ISIS paraphernalia in their vehicles or house
windows have been arrested but they were eventually released. xx

DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM
Broadly speaking, the word "radicalization" can be used to describe a process whereby individuals (and
even groups) develop, over time a mindset that can under the right circumstances and opportunities increase
the risk that he or she will engage in violent extremism or terrorism. It therefore follows that the word
"deradicalization" should only be used to refer to the methods and techniques used to undermine and reverse
the completed radicalization process, thereby reducing the potential risk to society from terrorism.
However, confusion can arise as the term deradicalization is also erroneously used as a broad, catch all to
encompass other, different but related methods and techniques aimed at reducing society's risk from
terrorism, including counter-radicalization the term used to describe methods to stop or control
radicalization as it is occurring) and anti - radicalization (the term used to describe methods to deter and
prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place).xxi Through Presidential Decree No. 46/ 2010 the
government created BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme) or National Agency for Terrorism
Countermeasures. The mandates of BNPT is as follows (article 2 of President Regulation No. 46/ 2010.):
Creating policies, strategies and national program in terrorism countermeasures; namely in prevention,
protection, deradicalization, action and preparation of national preparedness. Coordinating related
government agencies in executing policies in terrorism countermeasures; Creating related task forces’
Instead of repressive measures, counter terrorism program also enforce deradicalization program.
According to Agus Surya Bakti, the objectives of deradicalization program are: (1) Counter terrorism; (2)
Preventing radicalism process; (3) Preventing provocation, spreading hatred, inter-religious hostilities; (4)
Preventing community from indoctrination; (5) Enlighten people’s knowledge on terrorism; and (6)
Learning to understand different ideologies/ school of thoughts.xxii At the end of 2013, BNPT developed a
de-radicalization blueprint. As envisioned, de-radicalization efforts would include efforts of the Indonesian
government in coordination with civil society organizations and selected academic institutions. The BNPT
opened six additional branches of the Terrorism Prevention Communication Forum, which is now present

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in the capital cities of 21 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces. Members of each Forum include civic and religious
leaders who coordinate outreach, facilitate communication among key stakeholders at the local level, and
work closely with communities and families on reintegration programs for released terrorist prisoners. xxiii
In dealing with radicalism, the deradicalization program initiated by the Indonesian National
Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has been included in Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy, particularly
after the Bali Bombing incident of 2002. At least 700 suspects of JI members have been arrested and some
of them are involved within the program. xxiv However, the success of a deradicalization program is unlikely
due to several implemental hindrances such as rejection of such programs by some Muslim communities.
The Muslim communities argue that such programs are targeted to suppress Muslims and eradicate the
principles of Sharia Law.xxv The BNPT and the police start to use ‘soft’ strategy and put more concern on
how to stop the spread of the group’s radical ideology. The ‘soft’ approach is based on trust between the
terrorist prisoners and the converted JI terrorists who have renounced radical ideology to influence other
members to abandon violence and leave their radicalism. Most famous successful story is Nasir Abbas, a
former Afghan militant who trained the Bali bombers. After his 2004 release from prison, he has been
involved in the police’s deradicalization program and helped to track down and arrested several of his
former companions. Nasir Abbas has travelled to several Indonesian prisons to visit his former colleagues
serving imprisonment for terrorist offences and convinced them to stop violence. xxvi

Draft resolution
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls its Resolution 1989 (2014) on access to nationality and the
effective implementation of the European Convention on Nationality, Resolution 1840 (2011) on human
rights and the fight against terrorism, Resolution 2091 (2016) on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq,
Resolution 2090 (2016) on combating international terrorism while protecting Council of Europe standards
and values and Resolution 2190 (2017) on prosecuting and punishing the crimes against humanity or even
possible genocide committed by Daesh.
2. The Assembly recalls that Council of Europe member States possess a legitimate sovereign right to
guarantee security on their territory, but that our democratic societies can only be protected effectively by
ensuring that such anti-terrorism measures abide by the rule of law. As the deprivation of nationality in the
context of counter-terrorism strategies is a drastic measure which can be extremely socially divisive, the
measure may be at odds with human rights. In any case, the deprivation of nationality should not be
politically motivated.
3. The Assembly recalls that the right to a nationality has been recognised as the “right to have rights”
and is enshrined in international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Nationality (ETS No.
166). Although the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, hereinafter “the Convention”) does
not guarantee it as such, the recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights shows that some
aspects of this right are protected under Article 8 of the Convention enshrining the right to respect for
private and family life.
4. The Assembly notes that although, under international law, statelessness should be prevented and
eliminated, and arbitrary deprivation of nationality should be prohibited, States retain a wide discretion in
deciding to whom they can grant nationality and who may be deprived of it. The 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which so far has been ratified by 32 member States of the

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Council of Europe, sets out criteria under which a State may provide for the deprivation of nationality. The
1997 European Convention on Nationality further limits the circumstances in which deprivation of
nationality may occur; however, this latter convention has so far been ratified by only 21 member States of
the Council of Europe.

The right to a nationality

The power of a State to withdraw citizenship needs to be examined in light of the right to a
nationalityxxvii. Although rules on nationality belong primarily to the domestic legal order, several
international legal instruments impose legal obligations aiming to safeguard the right to a nationality. This
is, in particular, the case for Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20 of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the European Convention on Nationality (ECN).
Moreover, a series of international human rights instruments affirm the right of access to a nationality
without discrimination and/or the right of children to acquire a nationality: the 1965 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. 6. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that everyone has the right to a nationality and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Article
4.a) to 4.c) of the European Convention on
Nationality of 1997, which has so far been ratified by twenty-one member States of the Council of
Europe,xxviii repeats the message of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as follows: “The rules on
nationality of each State Party shall be based on the following principles: a. everyone has the right to a
nationality; b. statelessness shall be avoided; c. no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality”.

Procedure and safeguards for deprivation of nationality .

A person may lose his/her nationality either ex lege, at the initiative of the individual involved, or at the
initiative of the State.xxix According to the UN Secretary General’s reports to the Human Rights Council, a
measure of citizenship deprivation taken by a State must meet standards of necessity, proportionality, and
reasonableness in order not to be seen as arbitrary. It must be provided by law, serve a legitimate purpose,
be proportionate, be the least intrusive measure possible to achieve its legitimate aim, and respect
procedural standards of justice that allow for it to be challenged.xxx In this regard, as a corollary to the right
to determine the conditions for the acquisition of nationality, States are duty-bound to avoid statelessness
through legislative, administrative and other measuresxxxi.
More importantly, Article 8 (4) of the 1961 Convention states that a State shall not exercise a power of
deprivation except in accordance with law, which shall provide for the person concerned the right to a fair
hearing by a court or other independent body. Similarly, according to the ECN, States shall ensure that
decisions relating to the loss of nationality include reasons in writing (Article 11 ECN) and are open to
administrative or judicial review in conformity with internal law (Article 12 ECN).
Problems concerning involuntary loss of citizenship, especially in relation to undesirable behaviour,
have recently been examined by various experts and in different fora, resulting in certain valuable
recommendations. For example, the EU-funded Involuntary Loss of European Citizenship project drafted
Guidelines in 2015 (“ILEC Guidelines 2015”). These Guidelines recommend that loss of nationality due to
undesirable behavior (e.g. acts seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State or foreign military

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service) may only occur if the following conditions are fulfilled: a) the person would not become stateless;
b) there has been an explicit decision by competent authorities; c) “the unacceptable character of the
undesirable behaviour of the person involved should be proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Such behavior
should constitute a crime and a criminal court should have imposed a sanction” (Guideline IV.3).
According to a 2013 report of the UN Secretary General, many States allow deprivation of nationality
in response to acts seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of State, but the way in which this ground is
expressed in domestic law varies significantly. Some States require a criminal conviction for a crime or
offence which endangers the security of the State, while others “allow nationality to be withdrawn if this is
deemed to be in the public interest, conducive to the public good or justified by national security
considerations”.xxxii Due to the growing concern about terrorism, some States have expanded the powers of
deprivation of nationality for crimes against nationality or in the public interest, or have made more active
use of existing powers. States’ broad discretion in determining when to deprive a person of their nationality
entails a risk that the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality may not be respected. 12. Article 9
of the 1961 Convention forbids deprivation from any person or group of persons of their nationality on
racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. Similarly, Article 5 ECN provides that states’ rules on
nationality “shall not contain distinctions or include any practice which amount to discrimination on the
grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin” (paragraph 1) and that states parties “shall
be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth
or have acquired its nationality subsequently” (paragraph 2).

The prohibition on causing statelessness

The main international legal instruments against statelessness are the 1954 Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The latter is binding
on 71 States, including 32 Council of Europe member Statesxxxiii. The Council of Europe has a strong track
record in this field, in particular, the European Convention on Nationality and the Convention on the
Avoidance of Statelessness in relation to State Successionxxxiv. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention has
established the definition of statelessness, which, according to the International Commission of Law, should
be considered as definition of customary international law. Member States are therefore obliged to use the
definition of a stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its law”.
It is important to note that citizenship deprivation leading to statelessness is not per se arbitrary and
contrary to international lawxxxv, despite the prohibition included in Article 8 (1) of the 1961 Convention
and the provisions of Articles 4 b) and 7 (3) ECN. In particular, a person may be deprived of nationality if
the latter has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud (Article 8 (2) b). Moreover, some Contracting
States declared their retention of the right to deprive of nationality already existing in national law at the
time of signature, ratification or accession to the 1961 Convention, on one or more of the three additional
grounds. Article 8 paragraph 3a) allows this in situations where, “inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to
the Contracting State” the person has rendered services to or received emoluments from another State, in
disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State (sub-paragraph (i)) or has conducted himself
in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State (sub-paragraph (ii)) xxxvi. Article 8 (3) b)
also allows the deprivation of nationality if “the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of
allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the

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Contracting State”. 15. Article 7 (1) ECN provides grounds for involuntary deprivation of nationality,
including acquisition of nationality by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of
any relevant fact attributable to the application (sub-paragraph (b)), voluntary service in a foreign military
force (sub-paragraph (c)), conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State Party (sub-
paragraph (d)) or lack of genuine link between the State Party and a national habitually residing abroad
(sub-paragraph (e)). Article 7 (2) ECN regulates the situation of children, who may lose nationality if their
parents lose it except in cases covered by subparagraphs c) and d) of paragraph 1. If one of their parents
retains the nationality, the child shall not lose it. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and, in
particular, its Article 8 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, can be read as restricting any deprivation of
nationality from children as a result of the behavior of the parents, whether a parent retains the nationality
or not.
According to Article 7 (3) ECN, it is possible to deprive a person of his citizenship with the result that
he/she would become stateless only in cases where the nationality has been acquired through fraud. In other
cases, withdrawal of citizenship is not allowed, if the person would become stateless. Deprivation of
citizenship in cases of dual or multiple nationals is only allowed if the conduct is seriously prejudicial to
the vital interests of the State Party. Below this threshold, revoking nationality is not allowed. The referral
to ‘conduct’ clarifies that an individual assessment must take place and that application to categories of
persons is prohibited. cannot lead to withdrawal of citizenship, if the person would become stateless. In
such cases, it may be invoked only in cases of dual or multiple nationals. The Explanatory report to the
ECN (paragraph 67) furthermore suggests that this ground for deprivation of nationality is not automatically
established in cases relating to terrorism. It explains that the wording “conduct seriously prejudicial to the
vital interests of the State Party” includes treason and other activities directed against the vital interests of
the State concerned (for example work for a foreign secret service) but would not include criminal offences
of a general nature, however serious they might be. Despite these limitations, terrorist acts as provided for
by domestic legislation of some EU Member States take many different forms. xxxvii Interestingly, the ECN
does not include two grounds mentioned in Article 8 (3)(a)(i) and 8(3)(b) of the 1961 Convention, i.e.
receiving prohibited emoluments from another State and taking an oath or making a formal declaration of
allegiance to another State, and the Explanatory Report to the ECN remains silent on this point. This may
be interpreted as excluding these two types of behaviour from the scope of “a conduct seriously prejudicial
to the vital interests of the State Party”. According to Professor de Groot, national legislation allows for
deprivation of citizenship on the latter ground in 22 Council of Europe member States, including seven
States which have ratified the ECN.

Case law of the European Court of Human Rights

Although the right to a nationality is not as such guaranteed by the European Convention on Human
Rights (“the Convention” or “ECHR”) or its Protocols, the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”)
has observed that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under
Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual. xxxviii
In the judgment Mennesson v. France, the Court recalled that nationality is an element of a person’s identity
and the worrying uncertainty faced by the two of the four applicants (who were children born from a cross-
border surrogacy) as to the possibility of obtaining recognition of French nationality was liable to have
negative repercussions on the definition of their personal identityxxxix. In the case of Ramadan v. Maltaxl,

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concerning the loss of nationality acquired via marriage, the Court stressed that an arbitrary revocation of
citizenship could raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention. However, in this case the deprivation of
nationality was not considered arbitrary since it had a legal basis, respected procedural grounds and its
effects were not deemed serious enough, since the applicant continued his life in Malta despite losing
nationality. In the case of K2 v. United Kingdom, the Court examined the issue of citizenship deprivation
in the context of terrorism and nationality security considerations. It declared the application inadmissible
as being manifestly illfounded, since the measures in question had respected the procedural safeguards
required under Article 8. It also noted that the applicant would not be left stateless by the loss of UK
citizenship, as he subsequently acquired Sudanese citizenship. It is also worth mentioning the elements of
the due process ‘test’ that the Court set out, e.g. in para. 50 of the K2 judgment: “In determining
arbitrariness, the Court has had regard to whether the revocation was in accordance with the law; whether
it was accompanied by the necessary procedural safeguards, including whether the person deprived of
citizenship was allowed the opportunity to challenge the decision before courts affording the relevant
guarantees; and whether the authorities acted diligently and swiftly (see Ramadan v. Malta, cited above, §§
86-89)”.The Court is now examining cases concerning revocation of French citizenship in April 2015 of a
few individuals who had been convicted for terrorism-related acts.xli

Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Whereas the rules for the acquisition of nationality do not fall under the scope of European Union law,
the rules on the withdrawal of the Union citizenship do. In its judgment of 2 March 2010 in the case of
Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayernxlii, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) specified that the
situation of a citizen of the European Union becoming stateless as a result of withdrawal of his nationality
comes within the ambit of European Union law. In fact, the person concerned would thus lose the status of
citizen of the European Union, conferred by Article 20 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union, which is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member States. Concerning the
examination of the criterion of proportionality, the CJEU ruled that it is for the national court to taken into
consideration the potential consequences that such a decision entails for the person concerned and, if
relevant, for his family, with regard to the loss of the rights inherent in citizenship of the European Union.
In this respect, it is necessary to establish, in particular, whether this decision is justified in relation to the
gravity of the offence committed, to the lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the
withdrawal decision and to whether it is possible for that person to recover his origin al nationality.

National legislation on citizenship withdrawal, with focus on withdrawal for terrorist offences
In order to collect additional information on the deprivation of nationality as a measure to combat
terrorism, I sent a questionnaire to national parliaments delegations through the European Parliament
Research Service (EPRS) and to national human rights institutions (NHRI) thanks to the help of the
European Network of NHRI (ENNHRI). I have received replies from twenty-seven members States:
Albania, Andorra, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Four NHRI also replied to my questionnaire: the French National Consultative Commission on Human

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Rights, the Greek National Commission for Human Rights, the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights
and the Ombudsman of Ukraine.

The questionnaire consisted of the following questions: i. In what situation(s) does your legislation
permit the withdrawal of citizenship? ii. Does the decision to withdraw a person’s citizenship depend on
how long he/she has been a citizen or how (i.e. by birth, naturalisation, marriage, etc.) the citizenship was
acquired? If so, what arguments have been given for the different treatment between different categories of
citizens? iii. Is it possible to withdraw a person’s citizenship if that person would become stateless as a
result? iv. If your legislation permits the withdrawal of citizenship for terrorism-related offences or other
serious offences, what is the procedure for withdrawal? Please specify the role of the criminal procedure,
if applicable. v. If your legislation does not currently permit the withdrawal of citizenship for the above
reasons, is there any pending legislative amendment that would allow such a withdrawal?
Concerning the first question, it appears from the answers to the questionnaire that some States do not
allow the withdrawal of citizenship if it is against a person's will. Hence, it is only possible to lose
citizenship by renunciation and/or by right of choice (in Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, in Slovak
Republic – with some exceptions, in Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, to some
extent, in Portugal). The Constitutions of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic
clearly stipulate that a citizen can lose his/her citizenship only upon his/her request.
Other member States allow involuntary withdrawal of citizenship for various reasons foreseen in their
legislation such as: acquisition of another State’s citizenship (Austria, Andorra, Estonia, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Ukraine, as well as Spain
under certain circumstances), residence abroad (Greece and the Netherlands); servicing voluntarily in the
armed forces or military organisation of another State and/or carrying out services for a foreign country
against the interest of the State of nationality (Andorra, Austria, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine), refusal to service in the
State’s military forces (France) or intentionally providing false information or concealing the facts that
apply to the conditions for the acquisition of citizenship when certifying or during naturalisation (Belgium,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain and Ukraine). Some States also allow deprivation of citizenship for other acts prejudicial to
State security: Cyprus, in cases of “showing disloyalty”, “disgracing the Republic” or engaging in illegal
trade with the enemy in times of war, and Latvia and Slovenia, in cases of activities aimed at reversing the
constitutional order.
In a few member States, it is possible to withdraw citizenship because of a person’s criminal offence: in
Cyprus, for “hideous crimes, involving moral obscenity”; or in Slovenia, if the person is a “persistent
perpetrator of criminal offences prosecuted ex officio and of offences against the public order”. In the
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland and Turkey withdrawal of citizenship may occur if the person
has committed a serious offence, including a terrorist one.
In Norway, following a recent amendment to the Nationality Act, as of January 2019, it will be possible
to withdraw the nationality of a citizen who “has conducted himself or herself in a manner seriously
prejudicial to the vital interests of the state”, i.e. has been convicted of crimes such as genocide, crime
against humanity, war crimes, violation of national interests or terrorist or terrorism related acts, if those
offences are punishable by more than six years imprisonment.

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Acquiring Indonesian nationality

Nationality can be acquired in Indonesia through adoption, birth, marriage, or naturalization.

1. By adoption
Children under five years old who have been adopted by at least one parent who is an Indonesian national
are eligible for Indonesian nationality. Indonesian children adopted by foreign parents are also considered
to be Indonesian until they reach legal majority and choose a nationalityxliii.
2. By birth
Individuals who are eligible to be considered Indonesian by birth include:

• Persons born within the bounds of the territory or abroad to one Indonesian parentxliv
• Foundlings born within Indonesia to unknown parents;
• Persons born in the territory to parents who are stateless; or
• Persons who would have become Indonesian, but for the death of the parent.
3. By marriage
Foreign spouses of Indonesian nationals are eligible to choose Indonesian nationality by declaration
before the authorities. Five continuous, or ten cumulative years residence in the country is required and the
spouse must renounce their nationality of origin or obtain a permit to stay in Indonesia with dual nationality.
4. By naturalization
There are two types of naturalization in Indonesia. Ordinary naturalization requires that an applicant be
of legal majority and full capacity. Application fees and documentation are submitted to the Minister of
Law and Human Rights.xlv Establishment of a five-year residency, or ten years of intermittent cumulative
residence, prior to application is required. Applicants must be in good physical and mental health; be
financially self-sufficient; and prove that they have no criminal record which resulted in a jail sentence of
one or more years. They must also confirm that they can speak the Indonesian language and provide proof
of a basic knowledge of Indonesian civics. Applications are approved at the discretion of the President of
Indonesia and if approved, require the applicant to renounce other nationality.
The other type of naturalization is for exceptional merit, including contributions to culture, the
environment, humanity, science, sport, or technology, which have enhanced the nation. Public or private
organizations can propose a candidate to the Minister of Law and Human Rights for their extraordinary
contributions. Parliament must consider the application and final approval rests with the President of
Indonesia.

Loss of Indonesian nationality

Indonesians may voluntarily renounce their nationality if they have reached legal majority, have full
capacity and will not be rendered stateless by such renunciation. Those who have lost their nationality may
generally reacquire it through Ministerial approval or applying for naturalization.xlvi Persons may be
denaturalized for:

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• Voluntarily obtaining another nationality or taking an oath of allegiance to another country;xlvii

• Refusing to renounce other nationality when there is an opportunity to do so;
• Participating in the election processes of another country;
• Possessing a passport or other official nationality document issued by a foreign nation;
• Establishing a residence abroad for five or more consecutive years without being in service to the
government of Indonesia or failing to declare a desire to retain Indonesian nationality every five years
to proper authorities; or
• Serving in a foreign military or government administrative post without approval of Indonesian
authorities.xlviii In 2020, the Indonesian government declared that all nationals who had joined the
terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) would automatically lose their Indonesian
nationality and be rendered stateless upon joining the group. The revocation of ISIL fighters' nationality
was accompanied by a refusal to repatriate captured combatants and included family members residing
abroad with fighters, with the exception of children under the age of eighteen.xlix

IV. CONCLUSION

Countries urged not to strip terror suspects of citizenship,THE HAGUE (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
- Stripping terror suspects of citizenship does not increase national security and may even make it worse,
legal experts told a conference on ending statelessness.They are particularly concerned over the increasing
use of the measure by Britain which this year revoked the nationality of “Jihadi bride” Shamima Begum
who left London to join Islamic State (IS) in 2015 at the age of 15. Britain is also considering the case of
British-Canadian Muslim convert Jack Letts who joined IS as a teenager and is now being held in a Kurdish-
run jail in northern Syria. “Stripping nationality is a completely ineffective measure – and an arbitrary
measure,” said Amal de Chickera, co-founder of the Institute on Statelessness, which is hosting the
conference in The Hague. He said countries should retain responsibility for nationals accused of supporting
IS and ensure they are prosecuted. “Stripping nationality when people are abroad merely exports the
problem to other countries,” he said, adding such measures were also likely to have a serious impact on
families back home. Countries should recognize that women married to IS fighters, and their children, may
have been victimized, he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation on Friday. The conference heard that Britain
stripped nationality from more than 100 people in 2017, compared to a total of 12 people between 1950 and
2002, but most cases were done quietly. De Chickera said it was crucial that all countries’ counter-terrorism
policies should not result in more people becoming stateless – which means someone is not recognized as
a national by any country in the world. To avoid making people stateless, Britain has focused on dual
nationals. But Audrey Macklin, a human rights law professor at the University of Toronto, said if all
countries had laws to revoke citizenship from dual nationals then you would get a race to see who could do
it first “and to the loser goes the citizen”. “Is this a policy that makes sense as a global practice directed at
making the world more secure, at reducing the risk of terrorism? To my mind, not so much,” she said. She
said citizenship was a right rather than a privilege, and described citizenship deprivation followed by
expulsion as the “political equivalent of the death penalty”. The conference comes midway through a U.N.
campaign to end statelessness in a decade. An estimated 10 to 15 million people are stateless worldwide,
often deprived of basic rightsJawad Fairooz, a former Bahraini MP who was rendered stateless after being

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stripped of his nationality in 2012, said revoking citizenship should never be used as a political tool or a
punishment. Bahrain has stripped hundreds of people of nationality since a 2011 uprising although many
have since regained citizenship. “If you lose (citizenship) you lose the rest of your rights,” said Fairooz,
chairman of Salam for Democracy & Human Rights. “If you are born in a country and serve the country
and you (are) part of it and quite suddenly your name is deleted from that country it is really heartbreaking.”

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to give sincere thanks for Universitas Islam As-Syafi’iyah for the opportunity and
support for authors to finish this paper well.

REFERENCES
i
Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489, 497 (Lord Hope of
Craighead).
ii
Canada v. Ward [1993] 103 DLR 4th 1, 67–8.
iii
Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689, 733 (Laforest J). The House of Lords
acknowledges in the same vein: ‘The relevance of the preambles is twofold. First, they expressly show that
a premise of the Convention was that all human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms.
Secondly, and more pertinently, they show that counteracting discrimination, which is referred to in the
first preamble, was a fundamental purpose of the Convention’. Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629, at 639 (Steyn
LJ).
iv
Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1997] 190 CLR 225, 296–7 (Kirby
J). See also Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Multicultural Affairs)
[1998] 1 SCR 982 1024 (Bastarache J).
v
Arts 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR.
vi
Arts 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR.
vii
Arts 2 of the UDHR and ICCPR.
viii
San Remo Declaration on the Principle of Non-Refoulement (September 2001). For an overview of
the principle of non-refoulement, see W. Kälin, M. Caroni, and L. Heim, ‘Article 33, para. 1 (Prohibition
of Expulsion or Return (“Refoulement”)/Défense d’expulsion et de refoulement)’, in A. Zimmermann (ed.),
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A Commentary (2011)
1327; Wouters (n 5); J.-Y. Carlier, ‘Droit d’asile et des réfugiés: de la protection aux droits’, 332 RCADI
(2008) 76; G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007) 201–84;
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (n 7) at 278–369; E. Lauterpacht and D.
Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’, in E. Feller, V. Türk,
and F. Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law, UNHCR’s Global Consultations on

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International Protection (2003) 87; V. Chetail, ‘Le principe de non refoulement et le statut de réfugié en
droit international’, in Chetail and Flauss (n 7) at 3.
ix
V. Chetail, ‘Théorie et pratique de l’asile en droit international classique: étude sur les origines
conceptuelles et normatives du droit international des réfugiés’, 114 RGDIP (2011) 625, at 634–50.
x
See in particular: Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen, 23 November 1957, completed by the
Protocol to the Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen of 12 June 1973, Art. 10; Organization of African
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, Art.
II(3); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000,
Art. 14(1); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000; 2004 Qualification
Directive, Recital 2 and Art. 21; Council Directive 2005/85/EC, OJ 2005 L 326/13 of 1 December 2005 on
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Recital
2 and Art. 20(2); Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 16 May
2005, Art. 40(4). Among soft law instruments, besides a wide number of resolutions from the General
Assembly and the UNHCR ExCom, see, most notably, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December
1967, Art. 3(1); Resolution (67) 14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Asylum to
persons in Danger of Persecution, 1967; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 22 November 1984.
xi
Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, UN Doc HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (2002), para. 4.
xii
Statement of Mr Weis of the International Refugee Organization, E/AC.32/SR40 (1950), 33. For a
recent acknowledgement, see: M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs [2003] FCAGC 131, para. 39.
xiii
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar [2002] HCA 14, para. 42 (McHugh
and Gummow JJ). See also among many other similar judicial statements: R v. Immigration Officer at
Prague Airport and another ex parte Roma Rights Centre and others [2004] UKHL 55, paras 11–17 (Lord
Bingham of Cornhill).
xiv
Gorlick (n 7) at 122.
xv
The vast majority of its provisions are worded in the following manner: ‘The Contracting States shall
accord to refugees…’. Among the rare examples of true rights or freedoms directly bestowed on refugees
by the Geneva Convention, see Art. 12 referring to the ‘rights previously acquired by a refugee and
dependent on personal status’ and Art. 26 on ‘the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely
within [contracting states’] territory’. Even Art. 15, although entitled ‘right of association’, is not written
in the mode of an individual right but as a treatment accorded by contracting states.
xvi
Among the plethora of authors already referred to in n 9, Edwards considers that ‘the United Nations
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees is a rights-based and rightsgranting instrument. Its coverage
in Articles 3 to 34 is of the same nature as some rights granted under various human rights instruments’,
Edwards (n 7) at 306. This (mis)perception has also found an increasing echo among domestic courts. See
Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 71684/99 [2000] INLR 165, para. 61.

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Among the very rare authors acknowledging this distinctive feature, Goodwin-Gill recalls that ‘the
xvii

formal scheme of the Convention, however, remains one of obligations between states. The refugee is a
beneficiary, beholden to the state, with a status to which certain standards of treatment and certain
guarantees attach’. He adds that ‘a number of key obligations nevertheless rapidly made the transition into
the doctrine and into the developing and strengthening discourse of individual rights’. G. S. Goodwin-Gill,
Refugees and their Human Rights (2004) 7. See also M. G. Wachenfeld and H. Christensen, ‘Note: An
Introduction to Refugees and Human Rights’, 59 Nordic JIL (1990) 178, at 180.

xviii
(Jakarta Post, 2015, Military exercise aids terrorist hunt,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/05/military-exercise-aids-terrorist-hunt.html).
xix
(Arianti, 2015: 9-12)
xx
(Arianti, 2015: 9-12)
xxi
(Clutterbuck, Deradicalization Program and Counterterrorism: A Perspective on the Challenges
and Benefit, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/Clutterbuck.pdf).
xxii
(Bakti, 2014)
xxiii
(US Department of State, Narcotics Control Reports, 2013,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).
xxiv
(Hadi in Istiqomah, 2011)
xxv
(Muslimdaily.net in Istiqomah, 2011)
xxvi
(Harding in Istiqomah, 2011).
The terms “citizenship” and “nationality” will be used interchangeably in this report, despite the
xxvii

distinction between the two motions made in certain legal traditions; see, for example, G.-R. de Groot and
O. W. Vonk, International Standards on Nationality Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, Wolf Legal
Publishers, 2015, pp. 3-4.
xxviii
These are: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Republic
of Moldova, Romania, Slovak republic, Sweden, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and United
Kingdom, see at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/166/signatures?p_auth=zOKcPPeJ
xxix
The terminology used to name the act or conditions under which a person would cease to be a national
of a given State varies. For the purposes of this report, the term “deprivation” will be used to refer to acts
of State authorities by which a person is stripped of his/her nationality. It covers both ex lege loss and an
active decision to withdraw
xxx
The terminology used to name the act or conditions under which a person would cease to be a national
of a given State varies. For the purposes of this report, the term “deprivation” will be used to refer to acts
of State authorities by which a person is stripped of his/her nationality. It covers both ex lege loss and an
active decision to withdraw
xxxi
See Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: The United Nations and Statelessness of 28 June 2011,
p. 3.
xxxii
A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013, paragraph 13.

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xxxiii
These are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
xxxiv
ETS No. 200.

S. Mantru, ‘Terrorist’ citizens and the human right to nationality, Journal of Contemporary European
xxxv

Studies 2018, vol. 26, no 1, p. 30

xxxvi
Austria, Belgium, Georgia, Ireland Lithuania and the United Kingdom have made reservations
concerning Article 8 (3) of the 1961 Convention.
xxxvii
University of Amsterdam, Migration Law Clinic, The legality of revocation of Dutch nationality of
dual nationals involved in terrorist organisations, July 2018, p. 27. The report refers inter alia to the UK
Terrorism Act of 2006.
xxxviii
Karassev v. Finland, application no. 31414/96, decision of 12 January 1999 and Genovese v. Malta,
application no. 53124/09, judgment of 11 October 2011.
xxxix
Mennesson v. France, application no. 65192/11 judgment of 26 June 2014
xl
Ramadan v. Malta, application no. 76136/12, judgment of 21 June 2016.
xli
Ghoumid v. France, application no. 52273 and four other similar applications, communicated on 23
May 2017.
xlii
Case C-135/08, paragraphs 55 and 56.

xliii
Harijanti, Susi Dwi (February 2017). "Report On Citizenship Law: Indonesia" (PDF). cadmus.eui.eu. Badia
Fiesolana: European University Institute. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 11
May 2021.

xliv
Harijanti, Susi Dwi (February 2017). "Report On Citizenship Law: Indonesia" (PDF). cadmus.eui.eu. Badia
Fiesolana: European University Institute. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 11
May 2021.

xlv
Harijanti, Susi Dwi (February 2017). "Report On Citizenship Law: Indonesia" (PDF). cadmus.eui.eu. Badia
Fiesolana: European University Institute. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 11
May 2021.

xlvi
Idem
xlvii
Idem
xlviii
Idem
xlix
Hussein, Rikar; Intan, Ghita (29 February 2020). "Hundreds of Indonesian Former IS Members, Families
Could Become Stateless". Voice of America News. Washington, D.C. Archived from the original on 10 June
2020. Retrieved 14 May 2021

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