Testimonial Evidence: B.1.
Disqualifications by mental Ruling: Generally, husband and wife cannot testify
incapacity or immaturity B.2. Disqualifications by reason
of Marriage
7.
Northwest Airlines Inc. v Steven Chiong
Summary: Northwest did not issue Choing a boarding
pass despite him having a ticket. Because of this, he
missed his flight and was not able to board M/V Elbia (at
the San Diego port) where he was supposed to be an
Engineer. Chiong sued for breach of contract of carriage,
which the Court granted.
Ruling: “This Court has repeatedly held that a witness’
relationship to the victim does not automatically affect
the veracity of his or her testimony. The legal maxim
“falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not a positive rule
of law, and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
Before this maxim can be applied, it must be shown that
the witness willfully falsified the truth on one or more
material points. This presupposes the existence of a
positive testimony on a material point contrary to
subsequent declarations in the testimony. ITCAB,
Chiong’s testimony did not contain inconsistencies on
what happened on April 1
Alvarez v. Ramirez
Summary: Maximo set fire to the house of Susan when
he knew his wife was inside. Maximo moved to
disqualify his wife as a witness based on Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Ruling: When an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the
exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a
crime committee (by) one against the other.
Ordoño v. Daquigan
Summary: Ordono, on trial for having raped his
daughter, objected to the presentation of his wife as a
prosecution witness invoking the marital disqualification
rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. When the
trial court overruled the objection, he filed the instant
petition.
Ruling: SC held that in the law of evidence, the rape
committed by the husband against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife within the
meaning of the exception found in the marital
disqualification rule.
Lezama v. Rodriguez
Summary: Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent conspiracy
against the spouses, and so the wife was called to testify
as adverse witness to prove said fraud. The SC said this
is not possible without violating the privilege of husband
and wife not testifying against each other.
against each other, except: (1) in a civil case of one
against the other; (2) in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against another; (3) when the
testimony is only for or against one of the spouse; and
(4) when there is no other evidence available.
People v. Castaneda
Summary: Victoria filed a complaint against Benjamin
(her husband) charging him of Falsification of Public
Document for forging her signature in a deed of sale
involving conjugal property without her consent. During
trial, the prosecution called Victoria to the witness stand
but Benjamin objected invoking the rule on
disqualification to testify by reason of marriage. SC held
that the expection to the rule is present in this case which
is when a criminal case was filed for a crime committed
by the husband against the other.
Ruling: The rule that the injury must amount to a
physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that when an offense directly
attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute, that
husband or wife shall not be a witness against the other,
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
(by) one against the other.
People v. Quidato
Summary: Bernardo Jr. was charged with parricide. His
case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against
his co- accused, the Malita brothers. The prosecution
relied the testimony of the wife and the extrajudicial
confession of the Malita brothers. SC held that both are
inadmissible. Jr. timely objected to the wife’s testimony
under the marital disqualification rule while the
affidavits of the Malita brothers are hearsay.
Ruling: The disqualification is between husband and
wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying
when it involves other parties or accused.
AFP-RSBS v. Republic
Summary: AFP-RSBS filed an application for
registration of title. No oppositor appeared, so it was
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. An officer of
the AFP-RSBS was presented to establish that it owned
the parcels of land and that there were no liens or
encumbrances over them. The RTC granted the
application. The OSG filed an MR, and the RTC granted
this MR on the ground that because the AFP-RSBS
failed to show that its witness was duly authorized to
testify on its behalf, AFP-RSBS failed to prosecute its
case.
Ruling: The SC disagreed, because this is not a ground
contemplated by the Rules of Court. The specific
 enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the
operation of causes of disability other than those
mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized
utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an
express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. As a general rule, where there are
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations
on the operation of a statute and no other exception will
be implied. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein.
B.3. Disqualifications by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party- Dead Man’s Statute
Sunga-chan v. Chua
Summary: A complaint was filed against Lilibeth Sunga
Chan and Cecilia Sunga, daughter and wife, respectively
of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga, for "Winding Up of
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and
Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment". The partnership allegedly had
Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of
the wife of the respondent. Upon Jacinto's death,
petitioners took over the operations of the business
without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's
repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting,
inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of his
net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioners led a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The trial court eventually
rendered a judgment in favor of respondent. Petitioners'
appeal and motion for reconsideration were dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners sought recourse before
the Supreme Court. Invoking the "Dead Man's Statute"
or "Survivorship Rule", petitioners contended that the
testimonies of respondent and that of his witness,
Josephine, were inadmissible to prove certain claims
against Jacinto, a deceased person.
Ruling: In denying the petition, the Court held that the
"Dead Man's Statute" was inapplicable to this case. The
"Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party
is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction. But before this rule can be successfully
invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence,
it is necessary that: "1. The witness is a party or assignor
of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased
person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The subject-
matter of the action is a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against person of
unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of
fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Icard v. Masigan
Summary: Joseph Icard, son of George (deceased by the
filing of the case for rescission), settled a case for
rescission of a sale of a mining claims filed by Big
Wedge Mining co. against him and his father (through a
compromise agreement). Pursuant to the compromise,
the court awarded to Joseph (P39k) in settlement of his
and his father’s share in the mining claims, which shall
“be divided as determined by the probate court”. Now
Joseph filed a claim and wanted to testify re amount,
which was allowed by the lower courts. The Sp.
Administrator contends that Joseph can no longer testify
as to any matter which occurred before the death of
George.
Ruling: The SC agreed in general, The rules are
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order
to remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against
the deceased, but allowed Joseph’s testimony in this
case, as the amount he is asking for is just P2k, less than
5% of what was awarded the 2 men.
Fortis v. Hermanos
Summary: Fortis was an employee of Gutierrez
Hermanos. He brought this action to recover a balance
owed to him as salary under a contract entered into
between him and the late Miguel Alonzo Gutierrez,
whereby he was entitled to 5% of the net profits of the
business of Gutierrez Hermanos as salary.
Ruling: The Court ruled that Fortis was able to
sufficiently establish that such contract was executed and
he was entitled to the amount he sought for. The Court
also ruled that Fortis was correctly allowed to testify
since parties to an action against an executor or
administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person cannot testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.
is inapplicable, this action not being one against the
administrator of Miguel nor one brought upon a claim
against Miguel’s estate.
Bordalba v. CA
Summary: This is a dispute over a parcel of land.
Teresita contends that the testimonies given by the
respondents’ witnesses was based on an extrajudicial
partition allegedly executed prior to the death of her
mother and thus can’t be admitted by the trial court, as
the same violated the dead man’s statute.
Ruling: SC ruled that the testimonies may be admissible
since the dead man’s statute does not bar a witness’
testimony as to any matter of fact coming to his
knowledge in any other way than through personal
dealings with the deceased person, or communication
made by the deceased to the witness.
 Garcia v. Caparas
Summary: Petitioners filed a complaint against
respondent’s leasehold rights on the strength of the
landowner’s declaration as to the misrepresentation of
their dead brother in relation to the leasehold agreement
which the landowner was a party to.
Ruling: SC held that such declaration is in violation of
the Dead Man’s Statute and thus inadmissible. If one
party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities,
the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction.
US v. Antipolo
Summary: The trial court refused to admit the
testimony of Ezpeleta, wife of the deceased Dinal,
following the disqualification of one spouse’s testimony
in a case involving his/her spouse, without the latter’s
consent.
Ruling: The Court held that the disqualification is
inapplicable to dying declarations. Disqualification of
testimonial evidence by reason of marriage does not
apply when the statement of one of the spouses was
made as a dying declaration.
Zulueta v. CA
Summary: Cecilia ransacked the office of her husband,
Dr. Martin and forcibly took documents and papers.
Cecilia wanted to use the said documents and papers in
the legal separation and disqualification from the
practice of medicine cases she filed against her husband.
Ruling: The Court said that she is disqualified from
doing so. The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions.
Clark v. State
Summary: Clark was charged with killing his wife.
Several testimonies were given. One of which is that of
Marjorie Bartz (telephone operator) who testified the
conversation between Clark and Jimmy Martin (client-
attorney privilege).
Ruling: Court ruled that her testimony can be admitted
because, since the means of preserving secrecy of
communication are entirely in the client’s hands, and
since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it
would be improper to extend its prohibition to third
person who obtain knowledge of the
communication. Since the means of preserving secrecy
of communication are entirely in the client’s hands, and
since the privilege is a derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it
would be improper to extend its prohibition to third
person who obtain knowledge of the communication.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co.
Summary: Barton was an agent of Leyte Asphalt in
charge of promoting and selling their products abroad.
He claims damages for breach of contract because he
spent a lot of money to do this and Leyte did not deliver
on their obligation to ship products to orders he made. At
one point in the proceedings, Leyte Asphalt presented a
letter (carbon copy) between Barton and his lawyer
speaking about potential profits from a transaction (He
was technically making the orders himself to make
himself richer). This was excluded by the TC for being
privileged communications.
Ruling: The SC ruled that the law protects the client
from the effect of disclosures made by him to his
attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when
such a document, containing admissions of the client,
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Summary: PCGG filed a case against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. They also impleaded Cojuangco’s
lawyers from ACCRA. The ACCRA Partners helped in
the organization and acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where the partners acted as incorporators, or
simply, as stockholders. Stocks in these organizations
are currently being investigated by the PCGG in
Cojuangco’s case. PCGG excluded Atty Roco as a
defendant alleging that he promised to reveal the identity
of the client he held stocks for. The ACCRA Partners
also asked for exclusion but the PCGG gave a condition
that they also had to reveal their clients. ACCRA
Partners objected and was not given the privilege.
Ruling: The SC ruled that the ACCRA Partners could
not
be compelled to reveal the identity of their clients so as
to violate the attorney-client privilege and the situation
also falls under the exceptions as to when the identity of
a client cannot be revealed. The general rule is that the
client’s identity should be known as a matter of public
policy. This is subject to certain exceptions such as:
where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice and
where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

Mercado v. Vitriolo
Summary: Rosa Mercado filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Vitriolo stating that when he
filed a criminal complaint against her, he is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Ruling: SC ruled that the atty-client privilege was not
violated since Rosa did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by Atty.
Vitriolo. Factors: (1) There exists an attorney-client
relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client
made the communication; (2) The client made the
communication in confidence; (3) The legal advice must
be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.