Why Turkish nationalists voted for President Erdoğan in Turkey’s presidential elections

in 2023 - Understanding their rationality and social emotions

Introduction

In Turkey, there has been a prevailing populism and nationalism for over 20 years with Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan ruling as prime minister and later as president along with the party AKP
(Wilks, 2023; Korkut, Basbugoglu, Sahin, 2023). The country is divided into two sectors,
with those Islamic-conservative, who support Erdoğan, and secular Kemalists (Yavuz, 2023).
This division has notably increased polarization in Turkey. Consequently, Turkey’s
presidential elections in 2023 were also divided among the citizens’ votes, but President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan finally won with 52,18% votes in the second round against
Kılıçdaroğlu, who received 47,82% of the votes. The victory of Erdoğan and his party AKP
has been questioned, because of a worsened economic situation in Turkey, and the aftermath
from the earthquake in early 2023. Inflation in Turkey has been high again since the Second
World War, when an economic crisis hit Turkey in 2001, and as well the financial crisis in
2008. Especially middle-income people have suffered from lowered wages, and a cost of
living crisis (Gokay & Aybak, 2023).

The earthquake in 2023 was devastating for Turkey, being second-strongest in the country.
During Erdoğan's rule with AKP, construction work has really sprung for small construction
businesses, but resulted in poor construction quality. As a consequence, most of the
infrastructure got hit from the earthquake, leading to an even worsened economic situation
for Turkey (Goyak & Aybak, 2023).

Another criticized problem in Turkey, has been Erdoğan’s open border policy to Syria (Tol,
2023). Turkish nationalists regard Syrian refugees in Turkey as an economic and ethnic
burden, and as a security threat to Turkey. Turkish working-class and the Kurds in Turkey
feel they are unfairly treated when Syrian refugees receive aid from the government, they
themselves do not receive. Some also believe that the increase in population from refugees,
give rise to rental costs, lower wages, and results in free-riding on taxes, which Turkish
citizen’s pay to the government.

However, these problems mentioned above did not hinder the victory for President Erdoğan.
Several parts came into play for explaining why half of the Turkish population voted for him.
This paper will analyze what factors contributed for the presidential victory for Erdoğan in
2023. It will discuss Erdoğan’s authoritarian leadership, conservatism and polarization in
Turkey, media control, the failure of the opposition, and nationalists’ fear and anxiety. The
paper studies news articles and research articles about Turkey’s presidential elections in 2023,
and views them through theories about rational choice and sociology of emotions. The
theories explain why individuals make choices based on own interests, and how individual´s
emotions are socially experienced in a society (Coleman, 1986; Hochschild, 2016). Using
these two theories, this paper’s research question will be analyzed, which is the following:

For what reasons did Turkish nationalists vote for Erdoğan in Turkey’s presidential
elections in 2023?
Analysis

President Erdoğan adopts an authoritarian leadership style, which gains attention from
Turkish citizens (Gokay & Aybak, 2023; Michaelson & Barış Narlı, 2023). He has managed
to appear as a strong leader, who can make Turkey great again. During the elections, he
mentioned how the economic hardship will be resolved and how he will burst employment
for the working-class. Erdoğan also promised to rebuild what was destroyed after the
earthquake. People in Turkey really got the idea that he can make things happen fast as such a
decisive leader.

In rational choice theory, individual action is based on one’s own interests, by weighing the
benefits of the outcome over costs (Coleman, 1986). Specifically, he mentioned the theory of
action, where personal interests eventually develop into common ones. In Turkey, most
people have been affected from the inflation and the earthquake. Hearing a leader like
Erdoğan can provide them security in employment and new infrastructure, they believe he is
the right choice. Interests become mutual with other citizens. Moreover, the nationalists
voters believe they can receive a status, such as a better economic situation, from Erdoğan,
who would have all power to give it to them (Kemper, 1990, p. 209). Kemper means that a
social relation can be understood as a power and status dimension, where one part controls,
and the other part receives support and rewards. In simple terms, I therefore conclude that
when Turkish nationalists were given promises from Erdoğan, they felt their status could be
improved with him as President, and therefore they also voted for him.

Being a defender of conservatism and national populism, Erdoğan has clearly created an
attachment with Islamic nationalists in Turkey. He uses discourses, where he portrays his
secular opponents as the enemy, creating a wider polarization in the country. He also pictures
the Western society as a threat to Turkey’s nationality. With religious and cultural symbolism
and rhetorics, he targets specific ethnic and religious groups and their interests. As Tol (2023)
describes: “It is fair to conclude that there are millions of people in the country who put
partisan interests over democratic concerns in the election on Sunday”. He is also known for
anti-LGBTQ+ policies, which conservative followers value (Korkut, Basbugoglu, Sahin,
2023; Yavuz, 2023, p. 86).

According to Coleman (1986, p. 1323), individuals’ interest can differ and shape different
social structures. He calls this the macro-micro-macro relations. Existing structural problems
in Turkey are seen differently depending on if the citizens align with conservative values.
Secular citizens, may want to empower LGBTQ+ communities and connect with the Western
world more, compared to conservative nationalists in Turkey. Erdoğan’s pledges affect
nationalists on an individual level, who then decided to vote for Erdoğan as Turkey’s
President. The nationalist’s actions, their imagined rationality in voting, shape different social
structures and institutions (Coleman, 1986). They do not align with non-religious citizens,
which widens polarization in Turkey.

Furthermore, Erdoğan has concentrated power from a parliamentary system to a presidential

one, resulting in more power for Erdoğan himself to control the government. The judiciary
and law enforcement is corrupted by Erdoğan’s politicization. He has also conducted purges
within state institutions and replaced opposing officials with loyal ones. During Erdoğan’s
past ruling before 2023, he has used his authority to bring down any opponents, imprisoning
opposing journalists, academics and politicians (Gokay & Aybak, 2023, p. 6)

Erdoğan is creating an authority system, in which the involved relations in decision-making

processes create formal organizations or authority structures (Coleman, 1986, p. 1325).
Essentially, one actor have authority over others’ actions, gaining from this hierarchical
structure. Coleman further means, the authority system create problems within the new
institutions such as the agency problem and problems with managerial decision making. He
explains subordinates to the actor in control, have to follow the strict enticements, not
realizing their own interests, while also having trouble in coordinating and organizing their
work. In Turkey’s case, Erdoğan has managed to oversee these institutional problems, by his
politicization and corruption, choosing relevant subordinates. He has taken over the power
solely to himself. For example in a parliamentary system, other governmental decision
makers still had some independent power. But, with Erdoğan pursuing his own goals and
controlling the governmental decisions, nationalist supporters are even more motivated he
can provide the promises he makes for them, without obstacles from opponents.

A part of Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule has also been to control the media in Turkey. Fella
(2023, p. 45), explains how Erdoğan and the governing parties screened pro-government
information in independent media outlets during the elections. They had much more access to
share their campaign with over 30 hours, compared to the opposition who only got
approximately 30 minutes. Erdoğan also used the media to portray the opposition’s candidate
Kılıçdaroğlu as the enemy, showing false videos of the militant Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) supporting Kılıçdaroğlu. Erdoğan alleged Kılıçdaroğlu of releasing the imprisoned
leader of PKK if Kılıçdaroğlu was elected, and portraying him as unrespectful of the Islamic
religion (Fella, 2023, p. 54; Yavuz, 2023, p. 86; Tol, 2023). Korkut, Basbugoglu and Sahin
(2023) also points out how Erdoğan managed to leave out topics related to the economic
crisis and the earthquake, even cutting off live TV, where citizens shared their disappointment
in the governments response to the earthquake.

The electoral information spread to Turkish citizens is uneven, creating an asymmetry of

information in Turkey (Coleman, 1986, p. 1318). Coleman describes that certain actors
pursue their interests by possessing information, also resulting in normative issues of
information rights. Erdoğan’s power over the Turkish media is impacting the information
rights of the opposition, and furthermore what Turkish nationalists are affected by.
Hochschild (2016, p. 126), brings up the impact of media too, but focusing on US citizens'
decisions in voting in the US presidential elections in 2016. Trump winning in those
elections, resemble Turkey’s elections in 2023. Similarly, people were divided in a country
with “partyism”, where conservative citizens were constantly stimulated by Republican Fox
News (Hochschild, 2016, p. 6, 126 ). Hochschild explores how Fox News brings up opinions
and topics about politics and problems such as those in the market. They use an aggressive
language, framing the individuals existing beliefs in the issues in question, much like
Erdoğan did during the elections.
The failure of the opposition with Kılıçdaroğlu and the party CPH in the presidential
elections 2023, contributed to Erdoğan’s victory. The opposition’s candidate for the elections,
Kılıçdaroğlu, who received 47,82% of the votes, did not manage to campaign for the needs of
social reforms for the working-class and the poor in Turkey (Gokay & Aybak, 2023). Other
sources describe how the opposition failed to form a stabile coalition, but instead was made
up of parties with different opinions. This resulted in uncertainty among Turkish citizens, not
knowing what Kılıçdaroğlu actually stood for and what he would do for Turkey´s economy
(Fella, 2023). Furthermore, the opposition did not get much attention in Turkish media
(Korkut, Basbugoglu, Sahin, 2023). Erdoğan also used his authoritarian leadership style and
provoked fear, yet again, by alledging Kılıçdaroğlu for receiving support from PKK and the
Kurds.

In her book, Hochschild (2016), explains how the US citizen’s in Louisiana had also suffered
from social and financial losses, feeling like they are “strangers in their own land”. This
resembles the uncertainty many Turkish citizens are feeling after the long time with high
inflation and after the consequences of the earthquake. Furthermore, Hochschild (2016, p.
225) illustrates how a desperate societal situation in the US, is influenced by an emotionally
evoking leader like Donald Trump. Equivalently, Turkish conservative nationalists, most in
the poorer working-class, are emotionally attached to someone like Erdoğan, who puts their
hopeless feelings first, compared to Kılıçdaroğlu who did not symbolize the same promises.
It’s like a “collective effervescence”; when Turkish nationalists vote for a morally
like-minded leader, they share an emotional excitation, resulting in unity, security and respect
among them all (Hochschild, 2016, p. 225).

Neither did the supporters of the opposition gain attention from the nationalists, when they
clearly have different views, but a possible way would have been to raise their voices in
demonstrations. If Kılıçdaroğlu was hindered from broadcasting his campaign, the supporting
citizens could have demonstrated and vouched for him more, considering they would gain
more from it then to loose (Karklins & Petersen, 1993). But, in the end the nationalists were
not affected by supporters of Kılıçdaroğlu, and we can conclude that demonstration was not
an easy option to begin with, because of the risk of Erdoğan having much control over civil
regime officials like the police and the army (Karklins & Petersen, 1993, p. 597).

Many would argue, a reason for Erdoğan’s success in the elections is the way he provokes
fear and anxiety among Turkish citizens, much with the help of media (Fella, 2023; Yavuz,
2023; Tol, 2023). The way in which Erdoğan frames a security threat of any opponents,
makes people in Turkey believe he is the fixer of all troubles. He uses strong language for
describing the opponents, portraying them as “incompetent, disorganized, out of touch, and
outright dangerous” (Tol, 2023). Voting for the opposition does not make much sense because
of the working-class people’s anxious thoughts about loosing their government aid. The
Syrian refugees, the opposition’s connection to the Western world and Kurds, and the
fabrication of Kılıçdaroğlu’s support from PKK, only heightens the negative emotions of
Turkish nationalists.
Similarly, (Hochshild, 2016, p. 218) illustrates how conservative parties in the US have
informed how Syrian refugees are dangerous and cutting in the lines for governmental aid.
Republicans in the US fear they steal their homeland, and simply want the promised freedom
from taxes and support for their own Christian religion. Protecting ones rights and religion
seems important for conservative people as well in Turkey, otherwise they would also “feel
culturally marginalized” (Hochshild, 2016, p. 221). Erdoğan’s narratives resembles Trump’s,
in the way were Hochschild explains he creates emotional appraisal from his supporters,
instead of clear policy actions, which in Turkey’s case Kılıçdaroğlu focused more on.

As mentioned, the economic situation in Turkey has been worrying for Turkish citizens. Even
though Erdoğan have been in power since many years back, Turkish nationalists still believed
he is the fixer of financial losses and problems. Erdoğan did manage to disregard the negative
sides of the economy in his campaign, but is this reason enough to explain why Turkish
nationalists still believed in him? According to Scheff (1997), Erdoğan’s blaming tactics,
could have impacted the nationalists, believing that Erdoğan have not been responsible for
the societal struggles in Turkey. Scheff explains how a family systems theory sees there is not
a single part responsible for a crisis, but many actors involved in a chain of events. Therefore,
the family systems theory can be applied to how Turkish nationalists regarded the situation in
Turkey. Moreover, Erdoğan’s fear- and anxiety provoking tactics by criticizing the
opposition, can be understood as a social behavior resulting from shame. He has a “fatalistic
temper; the denial of one's own responsibility by projecting it on to the outer world” (Scheff,
1997, p. 140).

Conclusion

Turkey’s presidential elections in 2023 were clearly divided among the citizens. After a
second round, President Erdoğan won the majority of the votes, having conservative Turkish
nationalists on his side. The factors, which nationalists were driven by for their choice of
voting, where Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule, his conservative agenda, his media control, the
failure of the opposition, and finally Erdoğan’s fear- and anxiety provoking tactics. Turkish
nationalists voted for Erdoğan because of his promises of making Turkey great again. They
wanted financial security, and religious respect from their President. According to rational
choice and the theory by Coleman, Turkish nationalists put their own interests in economic
well-being and Islamic religion and symbolism, before secular and liberal interests (Coleman,
1986). They understood the authority of Erdoğan and believed in his words and actions, much
with the help of the media they were stimulated by. Also Karklins and Petersen’s article can
explain how the opposition did not gain attention from any possible demonstrations, neither
from the regime with Erdoğan or from the Turkish nationalists (Karklins & Petersen, 1993).
In the end, over half of the Turkish voters went to Erdoğan, thus any possible protesting by
opponents did not impact the nationalists’ decision in voting for Erdoğan.

Not only can Turkish nationalist’s choices in voting for Erdoğan be explained by their
individual interests, but also in their socially experienced emotions. According to
Hochschild’s research, they were emotionally connected to Erdoğan’s narratives (Hochschild,
2016). They wanted to feel united and secure. On the contrary, the opposition’s candidate
Kılıçdaroğlu, did not emotionally connect with Turkish nationalists, because of his unclear
visions and secular westernized actions. Erdoğan’s similar tactics to the former US President
Donald Trump seemed to have an impact on conservative nationalists in Turkey as well.
Thus, the a sociological theory of emotions is well fit for explaining the choice of Turkish
nationalists voting for President Erdoğan in 2023 elections. They might have acted according
to their own interests, but they were mostly emotionally affected by Erdoğan’s rhetorics,
much through his media control in Turkey. Being in a desperate insecure situation in Turkey,
they wanted safety in regards of economy and religious belonging. According to Kemper’s
text, they wanted a supportive status, only Erdoğan could give with his controlling power
(Kemper, 1990). Erdoğan utilized his power to repress his responsibility and shame over
Turkeys worsened economy (Scheff, 1997). To conclude, Turkish nationalists wanted to feel
the hope they were given by Erdoğan’s promises, even though in reality he has been a big
reason to Turkey’s problems from the first place.

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