SL CONTENTS PAGE NO.

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1. ABSTRACT 3

2. FACTS 3

3. ISSUES 5

4. LEGAL 5

5. ANALYSIS & JUDGMENT 6

6. CONCLUSION 9

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CITATION

AIR 1958 SC 532: (1959) SCR 265

NAMES OF PARTIES

Petitioner: Shrimati Shantabai

Respondent: State of Bombay

JUDGES

Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj) Aiyyar

T.L. Venkatarama Das

S.K. Sarkar

A.K. Bose

Vivian

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ABSTRACT

The case of Shantabai v. State of Bombay, decided by the Supreme Court of India, revolves
around the interpretation and application of Section 32P of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Shantabai, the appellant, sought recognition as a protected
tenant under the Act and challenged the decision of the Revenue Tribunal denying her such
status. This case analysis provides a comprehensive examination of the legal principles,
arguments presented, and the court's decision. The impact of the decision on subsequent legal
precedents and legislation pertaining to agricultural land laws and tenancy rights is also
discussed.

Through a thorough examination of the case, this abstract provides valuable insights into the
legal interpretation of land tenure laws and the protection of tenants' interests in India,
contributing to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding agricultural land
disputes and tenancy rights.

FACTS

 The petitioner ’s husband, Shri Balirambhau Doye, was a proprietor of certain forests
in eight several Tehsils. On 26th April, 1948, he executed an unregistered document
that called itself a lease in favour of his wife.
 The lease granted to her the right to take and appropriate all kinds of wood-building
wood, fuel wood and bamboos, etc. - from the said forests for a period from the date
of the document up to December 26, 1960.
 Certain restrictions are put on the cutting, and the felling of certain trees is prohibited.
That is the substance of the right.
 The petitioner has paid Rs. 26,000 as consideration for the rights granted to her.
 The document has not been registered under the Indian Registration Act.
 The petitioner worked the forests till 1950.
 In that year the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals,
Alienated lands) Act, 1950, which came into force on January 26, 1951, was enacted.

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 Under section 3 of that Act, all proprietary rights in the land vest in the State on and
from the date fixed in a notification issued under sub-section (1).
 The date fixed for the vesting in this area was March 31, 1951. After that, the
petitioner was stopped from cutting any more trees.
 She therefore applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Bhandara, under section 6(2) of
the Act for validating the lease.
 The Deputy Commissioner held, on August 16, 1955, that the section did not
apply because it only applied to transfers made after March 16, 1950, whereas the
petitioner’s transfers was made on April 26, 1948. But, despite that, he went on to
hold that the Act did not apply to transfers made before March 16, 1950, and so leases
before that could not be questioned.
 He also held that the lease was genuine and ordered that the petitioner be allowed to
work the forests subject to the conditions set out in her lease and to the rules framed
under section 218(A) of the C.P. Land Revenue Act.
 The petitioner claimed compensation from Government for being ousted from the
forests from 1951 to 1955 but gave up the claim on the understanding that she would
be allowed to work the forests for the remaining period of the term in accordance with
the Deputy Commissioner's order dated August 16, 1955.
 She thereupon went to the Divisional Forest Officer at Bhandara and asked
for permission to work the forests in accordance with the above order.
 She applied twice and, as all the comfort she got was a letter saying that her claim
was being examined, she seems to have taken the law into her own hands, entered the
forests and started cutting the trees; or so the Divisional Forest Officer says.
 The Divisional Forest Officer thereupon took action against her for unlawful cutting
and directed that her name be cancelled and that the cut materials be forfeited. This
was on March 19, 1956.
 Because of this, the petitioner went up to the Government of Madhya Pradesh and
made an application dated September 27, 1956, asking that the Divisional Forest
Officer be directed to give the petitioner immediate possession and not to interfere
with her rights.
 As nothing tangible happened, she made a petition to the Supreme Court under Art. 32
of the Constitution on August 26, 1957, claiming infringement of her fundamental
rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g).

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ISSUES

1. Whether the order of the Forest Officer infringed the fundamental rights of the
petitioner under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
2. What is the distinction between a lease document and profit a prendre
3. Is the tree a immovable property and what is the distinction between trees and
standing timber

LEGAL

1. Indian Registration Act: This Act regulates the registration of various documents,
including leases and agreements, and establishes the legal requirements for their
validity. The validity of the lease agreement executed by Shantabai's husband in her
favor, and its lack of registration under this Act, was a key aspect of the case.

2. Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950: This legislation abolished
proprietary rights in certain lands and vested them in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The application and implications of this Act, particularly regarding the petitioner's
rights as a tenant and the actions of government officials, were central to the case.

3. Constitution of India: The provisions of the Constitution, including Article 32, which
guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental
rights, were relevant to the petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Court seeking relief.

4. Under Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, 1977, it would be considered
"immovable property" because it is a benefit which arises from the land and also
because the trees are attached to the earth.

5. Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that standing wood is not
immovable property for the purposes of that Act and is similarly stated under Section
2 (6) of the Registration Act, 1908.

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ANALYSIS

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, governs various aspects related to the transfer of property
rights, including leases. In the case of Shantabai, the validity and enforceability of a lease
agreement executed by her husband in her favor were central to the dispute.

The case involved considerations of whether the lease agreement met the legal requirements
for validity under the Transfer of Property Act, such as the formality of execution, the
necessity of registration, and compliance with statutory provisions.

In my view, the document grants only the right to access the lands for the purpose of cutting
specific types of trees and removing the wood.

It doesn't constitute a "transfer of a right to enjoy the immovable property" itself, as defined
in section 105 1of the Transfer of Property Act. Rather, it represents a grant of the right to
enter the land and take away a portion of its produce. In a lease, one may enjoy the property
but lacks the right to remove anything from it. However, in a profit a prendre, one is licensed
to enter the land not for enjoyment but for the extraction of something from it, namely, a
portion of its produce.

Following the precedent set in the State of Orissa v. Ananda Behra case The petitioners in this
case were granted a licence to enter the land along with the right to catch and carry away fish,
which was a profit-a pendre. The Court held that the petitioners had been sold the right to
catch and carry away fish in certain areas of the lake for a predetermined future period. The
court then clarified that fish did not fall under the description of property that was not
included in the definition of "immovable property." 2 So the right to enter land for the purpose
of cutting and removing timber from it constitutes a benefit arising from the land. This
principle aligns with both English and Indian law.

1
Lease defined
2
Ananda Behra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 17

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The distinction made in the Transfer of Property Act is solely for "standing timber," not
"timber trees." Standing timber refers to trees that are suitable for use in construction or
industry, and are considered timber even while still standing. Otherwise, if a tree is not in
such a state, it remains just a tree because, unlike timber, it continues to derive sustenance
from the soil. However, the amount of nourishment it extracts, if felled reasonably early, is so
insignificant as to be disregarded.

The case is a significant legal decision that addresses issues related to property rights,
specifically concerning the classification of rights conferred by certain documents and the
requirement of registration under Indian law.

In this case, the petitioner, claimed that her fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and
Article 31 of the Indian Constitution were infringed upon by the State of Bombay. The
dispute centered around a document that granted Shantabai the right to enter certain lands to
cut down trees and carry away wood.

The Supreme Court of India, comprising five judges, examined the nature of the document in
question. Justice Bose, delivering a separate judgment, opined that the document amounted to
a license granting the petitioner the right to enter the land and extract a portion of its produce,
namely, the wood. This characterization aligned with the legal concept of "profit a prendre,"
where one has the license to enter land for the purpose of removing something from it.

Justice Bose emphasized that the document did not involve the transfer of the right to enjoy
the immovable property itself, as in a lease, but rather conferred the right to extract a part of
the produce of the soil. Therefore, it did not require registration as per Section 105 of the
Transfer of Property Act.

Furthermore, the court discussed the distinction between standing timber and timber trees.
Standing timber refers to trees suitable for use in construction or industry, even while they are
still standing. However, the court clarified that if a tree is not in such a state, it remains just a
tree and continues to derive sustenance from the soil. Therefore, the amount of nourishment it
extracts, if felled reasonably early, is negligible and does not affect its classification.

This case is significant as it clarifies the legal principles governing the classification of
property rights and the requirement of registration under Indian law. It also underscores the
importance of understanding the nature of documents and the rights they confer when
addressing disputes related to property rights.

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JUDGMENT

The case involved a petition heard by the Supreme Court with five judges. Justice Bose
delivered a separate judgment while the other four judges gave a separate judgment. The
consensus was that the document in question was not a lease but rather constituted a license
to enter the land to cut certain trees and remove the wood, essentially a profit-a-prendre.
Although some trees qualified as movable property under certain conditions, the remaining
trees were deemed immovable property. Since the document was unregistered and its total
value exceeded a certain threshold, it required registration to pass any title or interest.
Consequently, the petitioner had no fundamental right to enforce and claim. The judges
opined that trees are considered immovable property because they are rooted in the earth.

Issue 1: Justice Das concluded that the document merely constituted a license granted to the
petitioner, conferring rights leading to profit, thus representing a purely personal contractual
right. Similarly, Justice Bose determined that the document was a license granting rights to
cut trees and utilize land assets like wood, indicating a profit a prendre. Consequently, there
was no transfer of title, rendering the petitioner unable to enforce fundamental rights under
Article 19 (1) (g) and 19 (1) (f). Instead, it constituted a breach of a contractual obligation.

Issue 2: Referring to the Easement Act, 1882, section 52, and TP Act section 105, it was
highlighted that in a lease, one can enjoy the property, whereas in a profit a prendre, one can
also make alterations.

Issue 3: The court noted that trees are categorized as immovable property due to their
attachment to the Earth, with exceptions made for standing timber, crops, and grass. Standing
timber denotes trees that, when cut, can be used as timber, while the court emphasized that
trees left uncut continue to derive sustenance from the soil.

Justice Bose's judgment emphasized the distinction between a lease, where one enjoys the
property without the right to take it away, and a profit-a-prendre, where one has a license to
enter the land to remove something. Regardless of whether it was a lease or a license deed,
registration was necessary. As the remaining trees covered by the grant were considered
immovable property, and the total value exceeded a certain threshold, registration was
required. Thus, the petitioner's case could not succeed under any circumstance

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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the case of Shrimati Shantabai vs State Of Bombay, as decided by the Supreme
Court of India, clarified important legal principles regarding property rights and the
requirement of registration under Indian law. The judgment emphasized the distinction
between different types of property rights conferred by documents, specifically distinguishing
between leases and profit a prendre arrangements.

The court's ruling established that documents granting the right to enter land and extract a
portion of its produce, such as the cutting of trees and removal of wood, fall under the
category of profit a prendre rather than lease agreements. Consequently, such documents do
not require registration under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, as they do not
involve the transfer of the right to enjoy the immovable property itself.

Moreover, the court's analysis of the distinction between standing timber and timber trees
provided clarity on the classification of trees as immovable property and underscored the
importance of understanding the legal implications of different types of property rights.

Ultimately, the judgment in Shrimati Shantabai's case reaffirmed the importance of adhering
to legal requirements and principles in determining property rights disputes, ensuring clarity
and consistency in the application of the law.

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