Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.

814 (1879)

Stone v. Mississippi

101 U.S. 814

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Syllabus

1. In 1867, the Legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a lottery company for twenty-five years in consideration of a stipulated
sum in cash, an annual payment of a further sum, and a percentage of receipts from the sale of tickets. A provision of the
constitution adopted in 1868 declares that

"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore
authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."

Held:

1. That this provision is not in conflict with sec. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from
"passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts."

2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on the terms
specified, subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal.

2. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, commented upon and explained.

3. The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the will of the people of the state authoritatively expressed, in
relation to the continuance of such business in their midst.

The Legislature of Mississippi passed an Act, approved Feb. 16, 1867, entitled "An Act incorporating the Mississippi Agricultural and
Manufacturing Aid Society." Its provisions, so far as they bear upon the questions involved, are as follows:

"The corporation shall have power to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates of subscriptions which shall entitle
the holders thereof to any articles that may be awarded to them, and the distribution of the awards shall be fairly made in public,
after advertising, by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise, in such manner as shall be directed by the bylaws of said
corporation; . . . and the said corporation shall have power to offer premiums or prizes in money, for the best essays on agriculture,
manufactures, and education, written by a citizen of Mississippi, or to the most deserving works of art executed by citizens of
Mississippi, or the most useful inventions in mechanics, science, or art, mane by citizens of Mississippi."

Sec. 7 provides that the articles to be distributed or awarded may consist of lands, books, paintings, statues, antiques, scientific

Page 101 U. S. 815

instruments or apparatus, or any other property or thing that may be ornamental, valuable, or useful.

Sect. 8 requires the corporation to pay, before the commencement of business, to the treasurer of the state for the use of the
university the sum of $5,000, and to give bond and security for the annual payment of $1,000, together with one-half percent on the
amount of receipts derived from the sale of certificates.

1
Sect. 9 declares that any neglect or refusal to comply with the provisions of the act shall work a forfeiture of all the privileges
granted, and subject any officer or agent failing to carry out its provisions or committing any fraud in selling tickets at drawing of
lottery to indictment, the penalty being a "fine not less than $1,000, and imprisonment not less than six months."

Sect. 11 enacts that as soon as the sum of $100,000 is subscribed and the sum of $25,000 paid into the capital stock, the company
shall go into operation under their charter and not before, and the act of incorporation shall continue and be in force for the space
of twenty-five years from its passage, and that all laws and parts of laws in conflict with its provisions be repealed, and that the act
shall take effect from and after its passage.

The constitution of the state, adopted in convention May 15, 1868, and ratified by the people Dec. 1, 1869, declares that

"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore
authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."

The legislature passed an act, approved July 16, 1870, entitled

"An Act enforcing the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, prohibiting all kinds of lotteries within said State, and
making it unlawful to conduct one in this state."

The Attorney-General of Mississippi filed, March 17, 1874, in the Circuit Court of Warren County in that state, an information in the
nature of a quo warranto, against John B. Stone and others, alleging that, without authority or warrant of law, they were then, and
for the preceding twelve months had been, carrying on a lottery or gift enterprise within said county and state under the name of
"The Mississippi Agricultural, Educational,

Page 101 U. S. 816

and Manufacturing Aid Society." The information alleges that said society obtained from the legislature a charter, but sets up the
aforesaid constitutional provision and the act of July 16, 1870, and avers that the charter was thereby virtually and in effect
repealed.

By their answer the respondents admit that they were carrying on a lottery enterprise under the name mentioned. They aver that in
so doing they were exercising the rights, privileges, and franchises conferred by their charter, and that they have in all things
complied with its provisions. They further aver that their rights and franchises were not impaired by the constitutional provision and
legislative enactment aforesaid.

The state replied to the answer by admitting that the respondents had in every particular conformed to the provisions of their
charter.

The court, holding that the act of incorporation had been abrogated and annulled by the constitution of 1868 and the legislation of
July 16, 1870, adjudged that the respondents be ousted of and from all the liberties and privileges, franchises and emoluments,
exercised by them under and by virtue of the said act.

The judgment was, on error, affirmed by the supreme court, and Stone and others sued out this writ.

MR. CHIEF, JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is now too late to contend that any contract which a state actually enters into when granting a charter to a private corporation is
not within the protection of the clause in the Constitution of the United states that prohibits states from passing laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. Art. 1, sec. 10. The doctrines of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, announced by
this court more than sixty years ago, have become so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United states as to make them to all
intents and purposes a part of the Constitution itself. In this connection, however,

Page 101 U. S. 817

2
it is to be kept in mind that it is not the charter which is protected, but only any contract the charter may contain. If there is no
contract, there is nothing in the grant on which the Constitution can act. Consequently the first inquiry in this class of cases always is,
whether a contract has in fact been entered into, and if so, what its obligations are.

In the present case, the question is whether the State of Mississippi, in its sovereign capacity, did by the charter now under
consideration bind itself irrevocably by a contract to permit "the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid
Society," for twenty-five years, "to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates of subscription which shall entitle the
holders thereof to" "any lands, books, paintings, antiques, scientific instruments or apparatus, or any other property or thing that
may be ornamental, valuable, or useful," "awarded to them" "by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise." There can be no
dispute but that under this form of words the legislature of the state chartered a lottery company, having all the powers incident to
such a corporation, for twenty-five years, and that in consideration thereof the company paid into the state treasury $5,000 for the
use of a university, and agreed to pay, and until the commencement of this suit did pay, an annual tax of $1,000 and "one-half of
one percent on the amount of receipts derived from the sale of certificates or tickets." If the legislature that granted this charter had
the power to bind the people of the state and all succeeding legislatures to allow the corporation to continue its corporate business
during the whole term of its authorized existence, there is no doubt about the sufficiency of the language employed to effect that
object, although there was an evident purpose to conceal the vice of the transaction by the phrases that were used. Whether the
alleged contract exists, therefore, or not depends on the authority of the legislature to bind the state and the people of the state in
that way.

All agree that the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a state.

"Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the supreme authority to make laws for the right
government of the state, but

Page 101 U. S. 818

no legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of police."

Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645. Many attempts have been made in this court and
elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case
comes within the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which will be in all respects
accurate. No one denies, however, that it extends to all matters affecting the public health or the public morals. Beer Company v.
Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501. Neither can it be denied that lotteries are proper subjects for the
exercise of this power. We are aware that formerly, when the sources of public revenue were fewer than now, they were used in
some or all of the states, and even in the District of Columbia, to raise money for the erection of public buildings, making public
improvements, and not unfrequently for educational and religious purposes; but this Court said, more than thirty years ago,
speaking through Mr. Justice Grier, in Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163, 49 U. S. 168, that

"experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the
widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community;
it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple."

Happily, under the influence of restrictive legislation, the evils are not so apparent now, but we very much fear that with the same
opportunities of indulgence the same results would be manifested.

If lotteries are to be tolerated at all, it is no doubt better that they should be regulated by law, so that the people may be protected
as far as possible against the inherent vices of the system; but that they are demoralizing in their effects, no matter how carefully
regulated, cannot admit of a doubt. When the government is untrammeled by any claim of vested rights or chartered privileges, no
one has ever supposed that lotteries could not lawfully be suppressed, and those who manage them punished severely as violators
of the rules of social

Page 101 U. S. 819

morality. From 1822 to 1867, without any constitutional requirement, they were prohibited by law in Mississippi, and those who
conducted them punished as a kind of gamblers. During the provisional government of that state, in 1867, at the close of the late
3
civil war, the present act of incorporation, with more of like character, was passed. The next year, 1868, the people, in adopting a
new constitution with a view to the resumption of their political rights as one of the United states, provided that

"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore
authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."

Art. 12, sec. 15. There is now scarcely a state in the Union where lotteries are tolerated, and Congress has enacted a special statute,
the object of which is to close the mails against them. Rev.Stat., sec. 3894; 19 Stat. 90, sec. 2.

The question is therefore directly presented, whether, in view of these facts, the legislature of a state can, by the charter of a lottery
company, defeat the will of the people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to the further continuance of such business in their
midst. We think it cannot. No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do
it, much less their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and they are to
be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and
cannot divest itself of the power to provide for them. For this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed, and the discretion
cannot be parted with any more than the power itself. Beer Company v. Massachusetts, supra.

In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, it was argued that the contract clause of the Constitution, if given the
effect contended for in respect to corporate franchises,

"would be an unprofitable and vexatious interference with the internal concerns of a state, would unnecessarily and unwisely
embarrass its legislation, and render immutable those civil institutions which are established for the purpose of internal government,
and which, to subserve those purposes, ought

Page 101 U. S. 820

to vary with varying circumstances,"

p. 17 U. S. 628); but Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, when he announced the opinion of the Court, was careful to say (p. 17 U. S. 629),

"that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal
government, and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed."

The present case, we think, comes within this limitation. We have held, not, however, without strong opposition at times, that this
clause protected a corporation in its charter exemptions from taxation. While taxation is in general necessary for the support of
government, it is not part of the government itself. Government was not organized for the purposes of taxation, but taxation may be
necessary for the purposes of government. As such, taxation becomes an incident to the exercise of the legitimate functions of
government, but nothing more. No government dependent on taxation for support can bargain away its whole power of taxation,
for that would be substantially abdication. All that has been determined thus far is, that for a consideration it may, in the exercise of
a reasonable discretion, and for the public good, surrender a part of its powers in this particular.

But the power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away. The
people, in their sovereign capacity, have establish d their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals,
and the protection of public and private rights. These several agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the scope of
their general authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in
respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of things, must "vary with varying circumstances." They may
create corporations, and give them, so to speak, a limited citizenship; but as citizens, limited in their privileges, or otherwise, these
creatures of the government creation are subject to such rules and regulations as may from time to time be ordained and
established for the preservation of health and morality.

The contracts which the Constitution protects are those that relate to property rights, not governmental. It is not always

Page 101 U. S. 821

4
easy to tell on which side of the line which separates governmental from property rights a particular case is to be put, but in respect
to lotteries there can be no difficulty. They are not, in the legal acceptation of the term, mala in se, but, as we have just seen, may
properly be made mala prohibita. They are a species of gambling, and wrong in their influences. They disturb the checks and
balances of a well ordered community. Society built on such a foundation would almost of necessity bring forth a population of
speculators and gamblers, living on the expectation of what, "by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise," might be
"awarded" to them from the accumulations of others. Certainly the right to suppress them is governmental, to be exercised at all
times by those in power, at their discretion. Anyone, therefore, who accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied
understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity and through their properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any
time when the public good shall require, whether it be paid for or not. All that one can get by such a charter is a suspension of
certain governmental rights in his favor, subject to withdrawal at will. He has in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy the
privilege on the terms named for the specified time, unless it be sooner abrogated by the sovereign power of the state. It is a permit,
good as against existing laws, but subject to future legislative and constitutional control or withdrawal.

On the whole, we find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL
BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN
VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and
NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents
Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and
desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's
ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended,
and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents
to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments
in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly
known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong
(18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6,
2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00
P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through
Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014
(Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

5
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In
addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective
and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of
the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions
do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe
or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344,
as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition.
They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors
for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose
them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less
restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of
CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting
children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e.,
mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual
controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

6
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which
the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded
that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of
judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts'
expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for
petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution,
specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim
that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition
of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary
to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive
enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a
direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the
first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.

7
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case
or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36
According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement
is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act." 37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the
parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and
whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be
gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels
this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances
were being implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury
is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have
the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material -
an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute
or ordinance, he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to
freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the
purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the
minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus,
in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of
8
legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which
they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their
children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right
has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have
properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to
travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in court.45 Even
assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who
were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in
view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance
towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and
take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only
is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to
travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including,
among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must first
tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which
leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural
guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age.
They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances
and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the
age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the
child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."48

9
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any
provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the
public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due
process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty
cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory
language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper
standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness
doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes
that are "void-for-vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of
suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit
but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew
Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective
of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that
this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities
to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes
due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective
basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but
rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any
vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is
true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing
principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by
necessary implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew,
may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of
identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a
visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority,
and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.
10
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine
whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their
children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that
parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the
youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood
that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read
to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." 58 "This affirmative process of
teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that
the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as
"primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. 63 The
rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification for state deference to parental
control over children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 65 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation
to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases
in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children." 67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual
who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot
be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

11
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children, 70 and,
thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity
that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled
to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-
being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical
harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to
making detrimental decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's
deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively
given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in
public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or
control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon
a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a
nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to
protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews
may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates
that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify
the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the
liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit
that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from
crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew
Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed
any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth
doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.
12
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that
an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. 82 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at
least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights,
whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression." 87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the
power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they
desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly
rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to move about, such
movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the
law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for
any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk
or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or
drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental rights.
Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987
13
Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their
residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by
law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as
amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential
Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be
warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and
enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the
Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation,
this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive
as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and
the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in
their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113
With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These
limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and
overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors'
exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional
rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and
mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.
The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

14
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most
appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms
arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the
child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford
dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified. 121
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled
out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The
strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications
based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict
scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights
as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level
of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute
whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than
adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,]
indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that
justify the infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional
rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional
rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state
has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a]
lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti
vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the
assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
15
right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of
proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's
welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135
As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on
minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect
and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential
harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the
"whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral
development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal
offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member
of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in
groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in
the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night time by setting
disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to
their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing
number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to
ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of
the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in
Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the
proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-that of
reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records from
Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice,
national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to
conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may
have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a
series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs
may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."
16
Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as
judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community
clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences,
the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime. 138 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their
respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their
respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in·
the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest -
the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the
freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the
ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other
constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in
unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's]
Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from
taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30
(which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many
pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted
[the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or
voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)

17
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the
above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their
parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c)
those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home
during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having
authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these
specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of
the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run
the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to
gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance
and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association,
free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas
Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient
safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or
nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It
bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors'
social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits
minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the
scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is
therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings
to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no
reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the
State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of
criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist
independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors'
constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

18
 (b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or
when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same
place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational,
social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar
private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when
the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es
in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights.
These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of
their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also
covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the
Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the
ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these
numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the
well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in
legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered
as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be
the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State
interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the
parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors
who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and
consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she
is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.153

19
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the
State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the
Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these
exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not
precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the
parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal
provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any
penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to
render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the
fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the
minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in
case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community .
service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as
but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses
and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing,
shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be
brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a
"child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group
activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct
of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of

20
penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without
penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a]
sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the
law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations
are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs,
such as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local government
(such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the
community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their
delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they
give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with
their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely
a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a
"gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as
"[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a
mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."165
Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases
explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to
formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future
conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila
on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild
form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it
as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he
belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to
denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring
individual including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or
violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that
reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on
children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with
the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community
service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

21
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the
State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities,
only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three
which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence,
an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is
declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on
minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the
law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of
the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local
government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued
by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent problems of the people. But even when
government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer
fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold
that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads:

SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.

Dear President Lindo,

Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority
to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street
shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.

In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry and exit on said street.

22
 Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel
who will be directing traffic in the area.

Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President on the matter.

Very truly yours,

PROSPERO I. ORETA

Chairman 1

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No.
96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the
opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
the following day.

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. 2 Respondent questioned the
denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street 3
and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. 4

On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE
and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.

For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in contempt is denied. 5

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 6

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:

HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO
PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?

II

IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF
SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?

III

23
 IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE
MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET?

IV

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE
AFFECTED EEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?

HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?7

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart
of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general
public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune
Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end
intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves
the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the
police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 8 From
the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public. 9

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. 10 The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. 11

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. 12 It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. 13 The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. 14 Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. 15

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs." 16 The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate." 17 — one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory. 18 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 19 They are also the territorial and
political subdivisions of the state. 20

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in
Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants. 21

24
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial
government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal
government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city
municipality] provided under the Code . . . " 22 The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as
may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon." 23

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units — i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5)
municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina,
Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic
Act (R. A.) No. 7924 24 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
25

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising
Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and
sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban
protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following:

(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards,
programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport
system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system
in Metropolitan Manila;" 27

In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and functions:

Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery
of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national
development objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of
projects and presentation to funding institutions;

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks
and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to,
assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;

25
 (f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery
of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of
the local government unit concerned.

The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government
agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself.
For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these
bodies for the delivery of the required services Metro Manila. 28

The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities
and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors'
League. 29 The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As
the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the
necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate
the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These
functions are particularly enumerated as follows:

Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. —

(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the
MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;

(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to be effective during the term of
the succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual
budget thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);

(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-wide application governing the
delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties.

Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and
traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and
goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing
system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install
and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No.
7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare"
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." 30 It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
26
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
the local government units concerning purely local matters. 31

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court 32 where we upheld a zoning ordinance
issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang
decision was on the merits of the petition, 33 while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition
discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. 34

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against
other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the
subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the
subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the
lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the
subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent
Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the
commercial from the residential section of the village. 35

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in
the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village was
indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. 36

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district,
Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said street was
constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said
wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.

We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police power. 37 The power of the
MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common
good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic
congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. 38 The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic
of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of
the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired
the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. 39

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances
passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite
any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the
acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be
interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power.

27
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA,
an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed
of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of
Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan. 40 Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid
growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and
unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently
and economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace
and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reform
measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State." 41

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers:

Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. — There is hereby created a public corporation, to be known as the
Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry
out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission created under this Decree. 42

The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) vested with the following
powers:

Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide services common to the area;

2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and
other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise
modified or repealed by the Commission;

3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;

4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance with the
established policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;

5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities within Metropolitan
Manila;

6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of
P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;

7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;

8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the city and municipal governments in
the metropolitan area;

9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan
area;

10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic activities;

28
 11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential services such as transportation,
flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental services, housing, park
development, and others;

12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and physical planning and development of
the area;

13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their respective local governments and to
propose to the President of the Philippines definite programs and policies for implementation;

14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to the President of the Philippines
and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and

15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the Philippines.

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing
services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the
power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for
the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix
penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,
resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.

P.D. No. 824 further provided:

Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila
shall continue to exist in their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city
and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.

In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances, resolutions or such measures as it may adopt;
Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its approval by the Commission;
and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission.

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the
component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the
President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures.
It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC's approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.

Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative police powers. Whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.

After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro
Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:

29
 Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the existing National Capital Region
but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. 43 Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:

Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in
Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this
subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall
retain their basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
autonomy and their own local executive and legislative assemblies. 44 Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of
the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz:

Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of
the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area. 45

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The
powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. 46 It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and
functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila." 47 The MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the
mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic
services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic
services and the exercise of its rule-making power. 48

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective
political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended
local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance
in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation
proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive
development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." 49

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a
"special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units."
The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez
and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by
Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local government units in the National
Capital Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, 50 and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was first
taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the following debate took place:

THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a long time ago, you know. It's a
special . . . we can create a special metropolitan political subdivision.

Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province,
and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now. . . . .

30
 HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated
by the Constitution.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political
subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and
all governmental powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own
government. It is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, "no, which is not imbued with any
political power.

If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely
coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.

Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the
different basic services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.

There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective . . . as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its
powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise
of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an
authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively
coordinated. All right.

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not
possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was
trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It
coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous.
Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order, we cannot
deny these. It's right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision
that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority,
it's alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.

xxx xxx x x x 51

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila
Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated
in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:

THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was
reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph
"f". . . And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers?
Does the MMDA... because that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.

HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, it's very clear that those
policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be
in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more
teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot
really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now.
You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if
they will not follow it.

THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment.1âwphi1 You are making this
MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid.
I've been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is

31
 created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a
cabinet rank.

HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is . . . . .

THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise, Believe me.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations. That would be . . . it shall also
be enforced.

HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .

HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a
different legal connotation.

HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.

THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.

HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.

HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions. 52

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives. The explanatory note to the
bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government unit." 53
The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or
debates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it was
presented. 54

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made.1âwphi1 These amendments, however, did not affect
the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. 55

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is
not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected." 56 R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In
fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, 57 whereas in local government
units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA
has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA
is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary.

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila.
Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now
crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
people's productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in
the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot

32
justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general
welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.1âwphi1.nêt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG
and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche,
Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F
emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette
C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo
Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana
Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and
on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian
Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
33
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C.
GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY
MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in
his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo,
Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

34
G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO,
M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of
Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY.
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R.
ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

35
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-
SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor,
but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the
general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly
embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As
in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive
liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

36
 (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-

37
 uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that
the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is
an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced
to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would
no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor
as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people)
the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with
their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although

38
 exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes
any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall
well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of
the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie
Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others.
On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the
principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;
2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the
pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9
and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

39
Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device
capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold
to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted
male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on
August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will
be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning
services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all
Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that
policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009,
the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for
comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the
RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of
modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it,
the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior
to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by
40
a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play
in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the
funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
41
The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political
wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian
democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in
view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by
the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.
It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often
sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis
of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down
the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of
the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,

42
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the
chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every
claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has
yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since
no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court
has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law
have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
43
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109
The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied
challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers
in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115

Transcendental Importance

44
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens
and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v.
PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains
no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

45
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products
and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent
pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in
fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

46
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives
that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the
product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH
Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that
various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH
Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of
male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized
the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

47
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the
family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon
that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there
is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific
fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized
ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document
but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to
prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all
reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

48
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human
life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the
decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records
reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x
x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized
ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients
which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a
total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum
is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then,
as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151

49
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of
conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it
to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really
be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to
raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today
are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take
the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to
life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left
to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

50
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the
life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be
assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I
raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to
ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying
"no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the
committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of
conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

51
Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your
Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a
viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes
that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of
the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large
diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of
conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

52
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the
intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165
According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of
life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with
DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in
mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the
implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision
passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not
to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

53
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose
of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including
Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or,"
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that
the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the
RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that
which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is
an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman
suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest.
54
Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life
is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted
in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier.
And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is
not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device
will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds
that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital
pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health
product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized
ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).

55
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily"
will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization
in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of
the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in
a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an
abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be
upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in
the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as
compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued.
Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177
Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners
assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

56
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
(Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives
per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees
with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that
are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

57
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH
Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for
the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and
kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to
plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others,
the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
58
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is
still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the
government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting
from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this
point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up
to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices
are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL
by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the
FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables,
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not,
are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives
but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that
"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-
giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very
thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
59
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another
health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that
compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are
too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects,
mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of
those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality,
non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are
not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of
fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be
used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks
to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In
other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only
the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to
keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7
and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203

60
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing
an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to
Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the
Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in
a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of
the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional
religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church,
and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God
which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its
secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

61
Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this
part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief
and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any
sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has
been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of
two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v.
Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to
the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

62
Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215
In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law,
but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test
continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of
religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided
the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling
state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger"
test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or
"grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom
of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The
Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on
the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would
protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This
right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty
God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise
would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was
the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test,
by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

63
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation
in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in
the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to
education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation
of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with
existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section
3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and
children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and
timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives
64
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot
refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that
one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with
the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state
interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty.
The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH
Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life
health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of
one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom
follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in
the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on
the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be

65
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS
Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of
Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved
in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part
'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to
comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed
this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of
the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every
individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be
free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the
media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept
then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229

66
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative
of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the
RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to:
1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere
to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.
67
Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State
intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to
one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive
use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act
of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being
contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by
the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still
be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation.
Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women,
in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive

68
health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided
with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and
training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment
and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths
per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point
by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

69
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to
48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still
insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle
of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good"
effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both,
provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's
life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never
pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner
in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same
to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood,
family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in
the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its
solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article,
Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

70
 ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family
as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their
common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband
and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population.
This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.
Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as

71
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State,
which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on
the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244
Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will
not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when
the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet
emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

72
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of
parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the
spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal
and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether
or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to
the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to
information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a
person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is
unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not
be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even
if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States
and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-
of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
73
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the
1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the
youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering
that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior,
gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under
the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their
children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health
education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does
not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also
exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same
time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their
plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
74
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally
withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the
assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On
the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to
Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest
and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are
not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right
must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the
guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed
by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
75
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied;
citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to
address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is
to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

76
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider
their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers
to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice
of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even
to the point of revoking such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages
private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

77
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the
FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered
with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may
be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

78
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as
the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the
hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will
provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it
cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law
does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM,
alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State
of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM,
the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all
matters of general concern or common interest.275
79
11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated
from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to
it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law
as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written
law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or
form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant
and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem
of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population
but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have
helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still
struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have
an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population
and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the
lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It
is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for
80
the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and
cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the
judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will
still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

81
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees , Letter of Instructions Nos, General Orders Nos., Proclamation Nos, Executive Orders Nos. Letters of
Implementation Administrative Orders No

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private
or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public
at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

82
 We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper
party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if
under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and
reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is
not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the
law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
83
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have
to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative
fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
84
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

U.S. Supreme Court

Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888)

Powell v. Pennsylvania

No. 914

Argued January 4, 1888

Decided April 9, 1888

127 U.S. 678

Syllabus

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of the police power by the state for
the protection of health, the prevention of fraud, and the preservation of the public morals.

The prohibition of the manufacture out of oleaginous substances, or out of any compound thereof other than that produced from
unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, of an article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from
pure unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, or the prohibition upon the manufacture of any imitation or adulterated
butter or cheese, or upon the selling or offering for sale, or having in possession with intent to sell, the same, as an article of food, is
a lawful exercise by the power to protect, by police regulations, the public health.

Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine or imitation butter of the kind described in the Act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania of
May 21, 1885 (Laws of Penn. of 1885, p. 22, No. 25) is or may be conducted in such a way or with such skill and secrecy as to baffle
ordinary inspection, or whether it involves such danger to the public health as to require, for the protection of the people, the entire
suppression of the business, rather than its regulation in such manner as to permit the manufacture and sale of articles of that class
that do not contain noxious ingredients, are questions of fact and of public policy which belong to the legislative department to
determine .

The statute of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885, "for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy products
and fraud in the sale thereof" neither denies to persons within the jurisdiction of the state the equal protection of the laws nor
deprives persons of their property without that compensation required by law, and is not repugnant in these respects to the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Page 127 U. S. 679

85
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided
for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no
warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information
linked to from this site. Please check official sources.

Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no
guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be,
nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise,
does not create an attorney-client relationship.

G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary, Department of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of
Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners,
vs.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject
to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and
their right to due process of law?

The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857
was issued revising the PPA's charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage
profession,1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-852 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing
Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots
must be holders of pilot licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for
four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments
by the PPA itself5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical
unfitness by the PPA General Manager.6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of
this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by
the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital
before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.

Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-927 on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to
"instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services." This
was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the
Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in
all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C.
Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by
then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body."

Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which laid down the criteria or factors to be
considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors:9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report
and (2) Criteria for Evaluation:10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a
harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
86
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted
on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the
Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.

On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its
answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision
over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was
intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the
appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots
and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No.
857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary
Corona opined that:

The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference
with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the
issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year,
subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance.

PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional
area. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the issuance of the administrative order, Secretary
Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant Government agencies." Since the
PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department
of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic
Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who,
due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently
complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.

Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-
65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment:12

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:

1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious,
whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing
Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;

2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;

3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing
Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

87
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry that
the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect
to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition
against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture
by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated
by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery,
and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

88
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come
before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that
the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise
of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make
the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or
loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the
exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any
exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the
executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter
until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this
rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly
was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee
on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because
due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command
for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances
may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
89
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not
proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land,
they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society.
The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all
rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and
open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion
is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half
must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or
worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as
"the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the
rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade
the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance
per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of
the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of
the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of
the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It
is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests
to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive
Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the

90
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder
for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly
needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and
the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the
registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and
declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are
fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted
either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has
a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic
measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving
those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier
to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant
dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction
that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

91
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his
failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid,
and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate
of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the
trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question
the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity.
We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as

92
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No.
213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado
organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.

93
 4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are
highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-
General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we
deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature,
to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion
of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to
suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares
or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided
that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile
the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it
may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies

94
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298
U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F.
2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the
law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts

95
 material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration
or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise
of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it
is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur

Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

96
Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor
union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was
merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with
the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure
that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.”
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon i

G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

97
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City
and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April
20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the
Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-
stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of
uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of
its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that
the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on
both the sale and export of sugar.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local
Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case
on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance
and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same statutory and
constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale
to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar
produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states:
"It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried
into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities, municipalities and
municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality
of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that
municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated
that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.

98
 The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1],
Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment,
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude
any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company,
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the
same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the
defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs,
MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167
and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL
TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA;
by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of
republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of
government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so.
We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
99
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as
sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The
theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not
expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with
full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or
exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs, including but
not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of
providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous
upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

100
 All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act
No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements
and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of
the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title
would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as
expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the
act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly
connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in
the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and
to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act
embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be
mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and
this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200.
As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the
House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that
Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly
added as an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

101
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is
not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference
bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a
Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9
where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the
same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and
the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the
equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee;
the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the
Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a
more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

102
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This
might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the
Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body?
Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the political
departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its
repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments
would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother
flow of communication between the government and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied
the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the
Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis
precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June
1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office
of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those
coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those
who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an
operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on
the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that
103
Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are
intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it
enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking
privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves,
should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of
the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to
imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of
their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has
the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in
this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept..
As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair
and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28
is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts,
the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144681 June 21, 2004

104
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO
PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R.
POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and
GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D.
SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T.
MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN,
ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO,
VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA.
LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE
E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA
B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG,
DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V.
FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ.
NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA,
respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,1 dated May 16, 2000, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents to take their physician’s
oath and to register as duly licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court
of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of this case are as follows:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.

Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the
two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-
Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-
Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of
those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A
comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the
unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of
the Physician Licensure Examination.

On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima
College of Medicine.4 The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity
marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.

Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics,
and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of
the said examination.

On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the
Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that
the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that
105
there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to
eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy,
etc."5

For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions."6

On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V.
Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.

Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct,
fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima
examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.

On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the
respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in
the rolls of the PRC.

The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.

On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as
follows:

WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court
against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.

SO ORDERED.7

Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23,
1994, we denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530
was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This
was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel.

On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15.
The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.

On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-appearance and
praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of
notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was
notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.

Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the
issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4, 1994.

The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court
dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.

On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:

106
 WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is
GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila,
Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’ counsel to cross-examine the respondents’ witnesses, to allow
petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8

The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.

A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for
the partial reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No.
93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings.

In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and
reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus,
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.

On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the
respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial
was reset to November 28, 1994.

On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28,
1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit
and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision.

On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors (except those with
asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],9 to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians.

It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken
against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of
the Constitution as any other professionals.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.10

As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437,
entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated
with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its
failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.

On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to
the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.

In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.

107
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise
DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M.
Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with accordingly.

SO ORDERED.12

While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza,
Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao,
Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo,
Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L.
Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina
P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were no longer interested in
proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I.
Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G.
Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D.
Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver,
Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply
to them.

On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the
instant appeal.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.13

In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination.
Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,14 they should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be
registered in the rolls of the PRC.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT
OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS. 15

To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court
that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?

108
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the
applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a
discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there
exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this
Court’s Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed
any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment" in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in
G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and executory.

Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to
administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 2016 of Rep.
Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act
No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed the same.
Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and
register them.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified,
which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 17 Section 3 of Rule
6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other
is entitled.

We shall discuss the issues successively.

1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.

For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving
discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the act,20 and the performance of the duty has
been refused.21 Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and
register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?

As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:

It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-
appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed
the same examinations.22

The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take
their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to practice the medical profession23 pursuant to
Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?

The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the
ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in
statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious
whole, not confining construction to only one section.24 The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute
taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be
read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to
administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical
Act of 1959.

109
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with respect to the issuance of
certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners "shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily
complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given
imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is obliged
to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of
1959.

However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr.
Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts
have to be appropriately resolved.

Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and
"disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1 26
thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain
their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 927 of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1,
1997, the Board ruled:

WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[’] examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations
given in February 1993 and further DEBARS them from taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from
the date of the promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled examinations for
physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD.

SO ORDERED.28

Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to
hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus
does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.

The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the following
instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral
turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been
declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in their case.

Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution No. 26,29 dated July 21, 1993, the Board
resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for "immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the
Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations." It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the
examinees from the Fatima College.

Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must
have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be
administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to
meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance."31 Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
authority apparently did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought
to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.

2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians

The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been
violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. 32 There must be
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a
privilege or franchise granted by the government.34

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right35 of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
110
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,
and general welfare of the people.37 Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of
Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in
Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the
examination required by the Philippine Medical Act.38 In another case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade
the selection of applicants into medical schools through admission tests.39

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a
particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions
may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.40 Under the view that the
legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally
strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of
their power.41

In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and
conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the
privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a
definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of
mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus

Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being
premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time
that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we
referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
34506, the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial
court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the petitioners sought to nullify the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our
consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:

Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought
to be resolved in the instant petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the filing of this
petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical consequence.42 There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that
any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.43 It should be recalled that in its decision of 19 December
1994 the trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was received by
petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners filed the instant petition. By
then, the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a
notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.44

The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.

Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to
question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC
ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to

111
ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie
when administrative remedies are still available.46 However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.

As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza,
Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao,
Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo,
Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-
Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-
Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were
concerned. A similar manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma
G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S.
Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J.
Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M.
Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not
apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a
decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.

As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P.
Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B.
Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names
from the suit.

Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael
I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr.,
Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in
Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated
August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2)
the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15,
1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon
112
accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI,
each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Old and Dilapidated Taxis

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public
conveyances;

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and
condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of
phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of
operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his
investments;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be
operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and
thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of
Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation;

2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may
no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and
later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-
year lifetime of taxi, to wit:

1980 — Model 1974

1981 — Model 1975, etc.

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the
last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board
of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in
Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 1

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular
No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the
National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted
for registration as public conveyances. To quote said Circular:

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from
operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically
dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT.
113
 Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused
registration. The following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all concerned:

Year Model Automatic

Phase-Out
Year

1980

1974 1981

1975 1982

1976 1983

1977

etc. etc.

Strict compliance here is desired. 2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of
model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to
stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their
petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same,
and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to
petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3

On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main
Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on
January 1, 1982.

Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the
case could not be located.

On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this
Court:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;

(2) Substantive due process; and

114
 (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:

Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shag
proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and
assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the
support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other
government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board
of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information,
or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any
other suitable means of inquiry.

In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to
submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT
Circular.

It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering
necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this
being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim,
therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not
availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary
sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.

Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As held in
Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):

Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or
vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or
ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct
of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of
taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical
condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every
taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly,
fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no
longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24
hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
requirement of due process has been met.
115
On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced
in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation
outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in
Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. 4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT
in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places,
are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that
the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or
based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What
is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged
Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister
of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and Communications;
and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

116
FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary
restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of
National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of
Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a
highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of
Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be
considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full:
"[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E.
Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access
roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least
one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms.
at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more
on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning
device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or
parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to
be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more
than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement
this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into
effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph
3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every
motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning
device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate
such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent
Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January 25,
1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement
for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed
the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu
issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning
Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have
substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that
every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of
charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate
and official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in
conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it
came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of
the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that
117
they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided,
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of
car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular
void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu,
etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with
writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto within
ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining
order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for
respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating they lacked
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the
allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as
amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its
Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue
delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral
unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of
grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed
Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not
susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and
Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application.
They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna
Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was
duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times
intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot
survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from
meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main
reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against
the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The
broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court
in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in
Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the
past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police
118
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure
challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a
legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view.
Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes even
more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale was clearly set forth in an
excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his
Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter
of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning devices 'are not
too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable
data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case
here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter
of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to
the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well
known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the
Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners
whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because
he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General "There is
nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels
motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners
concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining
the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally
make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter
119
of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of
car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more
subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous
officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same
illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of
the constitutional defects alleged against it.32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a
finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it
at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court, in the language
of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is
not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor.
'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not
they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a
matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise
insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-
settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal,
he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on
the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard
to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice
Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation
"has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He
continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires
the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself
quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic
have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The
Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
120
10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the Part of
Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no
case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v. Far Eastern
Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted
upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit
can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO,
JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.
ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER,
petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO
and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY,
respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after
performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but
Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as
they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his

121
body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining
soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and
women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent
demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform
program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article
XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common
people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of
the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later
by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17,
1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed
on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President
and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result,
after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution,
The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

122
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife
and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also
for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it
does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of
justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 and Manotok v. National Food
Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form
of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights
as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them,
E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel, 7
Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The
determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order
is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the
challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of
7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands
and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They
maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in
Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because
it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who
complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he
had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in
the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation
of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the
123
Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming
that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be
annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY
BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992
which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem
appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose
authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood,
i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6,
thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the
government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but
subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not
be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically,
or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or
approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar
planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent
that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a
membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for
intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted
by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation
is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229
provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized
amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually
available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for
the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount
equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own
valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and
submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the
people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class
and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands
and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.
124
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the
corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law.
Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No.
229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for
just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were
subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and
asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary,
besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory
Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small
parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him
just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the
program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

125
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the
Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were
enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of
agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be
considered amortization payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An
appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned
the validity of the public respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but
are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from
persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not
fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10,
1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular
No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings
under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their
appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done,
involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is
entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than
seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said
measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in
Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have
repealed the presidential decree.

126
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the
judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not
conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this
power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint,
born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and
the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that
before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during
their session en banc.11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question
only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. 12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the
acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common
with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance
to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones
now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this
conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to
use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.

II

127
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of
the several measures involved in these petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in
Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally
convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature
because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any
statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does
not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged
measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20
and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does
provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the
main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not
applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the
House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when
the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it
were, both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its
title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice
if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the
force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the
128
petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of
instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication
as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil
Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474
was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but
is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the
discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to
require action only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly
gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available
from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application
of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law
required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court
held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public
use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism:
"The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for
human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land
over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court
held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that
there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

129
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain,
with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve
a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police
power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different
planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property
for improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other
hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid
opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a
privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need
have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use,
the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent
domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use"
test to match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper
exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain
is clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the
respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct
a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was
held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of
the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While
insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central
Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was
explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring
properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which
would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk
restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the
Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee
sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation
of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.

130
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been
discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in
Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do
not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also
become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also
the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on
the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to
the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and
the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to
those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the
lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular
class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform
have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify
the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping
with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his
property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the
owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
131
 conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount
authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation"
and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public
agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private
agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the
Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural
lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their
discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the
political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes
the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license
for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private
landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public
Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout
its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected
therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under
that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987
Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration
of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as
pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify

132
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, ample. 41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private
lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of
their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned
property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of
taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative
authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the
rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the
matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any
other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President
Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by
the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the
Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the
just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating
the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need
to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a
judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

133
 xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been
presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged
decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested
parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the
determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may
be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares —
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

134
 (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other
qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent
(10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner
choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their
face value, for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including

assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled

corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused
persons, or for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in
a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the land
for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use
of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the
outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed.
In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete

135
 equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45
(Emphasis supplied.)

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of
condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect
that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis
than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the
statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment,
binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and
constant standard of compensation. 48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at
least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for
such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And
so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess
of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond
in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of
Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a
richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the
amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not
even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they
also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical
136
method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there
would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore
assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment
of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27,
which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding
the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being
contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt
that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required
from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general
sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of
the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see
the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing
the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that
the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas
of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment
in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance
in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment
are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As
already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know
they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of
the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it
appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of
registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register
the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law
says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic
jurisdictions. Thus:

137
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent
Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken
remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as
1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition
precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford
v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State
until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the
payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is
complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass
from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance
that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... .
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the
farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of
ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for
must also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228,
are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law
that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office
of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need
138
not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the
subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657,
which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to
the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect;
indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of
the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope
on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we
struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to
the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the
way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the
exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended
forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the
staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes
for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild
in it the music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional
objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177807 October 11, 2011

EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner,

vs.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents.

139
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177933

METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired), Respondent,

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 promulgated on 18 July
2006 and the Resolution2 dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.

The Facts

In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), 3
Quezon City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.

On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of
Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and
Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof."4

An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used
as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.5

Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00
meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard
to the Botocan transmission line.

At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code
passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government
units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the
ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his
wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners
relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were
exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-
4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1 March
1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption
of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from
constructing an arcade on his property.

On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, "subject to
the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade
at his own expense when public interest so demands."6

Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions
along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002. 7 The

140
resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and
other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions."8

On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the
National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code)9 in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco
fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.10

Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the
party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely
clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the
affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.

On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition11 with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the
MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition,12 he alleged that the ordinance
authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade
will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and
discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan
boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of
nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the
court hold the ordinance valid.

The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property
in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and
that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public
nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement
established by Ordinance No. 2904.13

The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco.14 It held that the questioned ordinance was
unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that
because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for
the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to
equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094, 15 Series of 1956 to be
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the
said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing wall of
the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the
appeal.16 The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of
the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the
general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid
classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location.
The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the
property, to wit:

Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial
ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no "taking" for public use which must be subject to just compensation. While the
arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same
still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded
141
sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from accidents and
other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. 17

Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that
Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus
excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare,
prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224,
Quezon City, is MODIFIED, as follows:

1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,18 Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon City, is
UPHELD; and

2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration. 19

On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor offer grounds that would merit
the reconsideration of the Court.20

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for Review before this Court.
The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.

II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

The Court’s Ruling

Estoppel

The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance,
because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby
recognized the power of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings.

To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance "takes"
private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of
rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.

On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or
not the ordinance constitutes a "taking" of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003
when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an
exemption in 1966, there was no "taking" yet to speak of.

Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,21 we held:

142
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions
imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires
or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's
authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is
otherwise null and void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)

Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,22 we likewise held:

We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at
that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot
be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the
subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what it
perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)

Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he
also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the
application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of
the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its
different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.

Zoning and the regulation of the

construction of buildings are valid

exercises of police power .

In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,23 we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by local government units, to wit:

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a valid delegation of police
power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.

It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of
Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,24 which states:

To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

143
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that
the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the
manner of constructing and repairing them.25

With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v.
Atienza.26 In that case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28 November 2001 reclassifying certain
areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no
longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city
government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is
situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a
result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be
permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within
the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be
unjust... (Emphasis supplied)

In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,27 we also held:

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that
they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance
ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity;
and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient
passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the
contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.

Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,28 which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the
enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:

Section 102. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public
welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this
Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their
location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.

Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law
allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their respective jurisdictions.

Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade should be constructed
above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of
the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need not delve into.
144
To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus,
there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and
sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

The "wing walls" of the building are not

nuisances per se.

The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per se.

We disagree.

The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing
walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons
and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else
that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.29

Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the
building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the
MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a
thing is a nuisance. In AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,30 we held:

We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order
its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance
per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use
is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the
manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA illegally demolished

the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco’s
property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further
alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.

However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the
demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:

SECTION 205. Building Officials. — Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the
provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.

Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and
Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.

145
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of Building Official are provided or
unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. — In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily
responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor.
He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.

In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable times to inspect and
determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as
issued.

When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work stopped and
prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order
the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to
the provisions of this Code.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. — When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous,
the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This
is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.31 is applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA,
invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3.
This Court held:

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:

...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory
authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government
units concerning purely local matters.

The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not
apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of
billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT

146
agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it
did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA.
Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.

MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules and
regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus:

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. -

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations
thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the
"Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in
case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of "a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (₱200.00) or by
imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided, that
if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person
charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor." The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the
regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of
Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.

Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the
structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city
government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and
abate a nuisance32 and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the
city at the expense of the owner.33

MMDA’s argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA,
the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,34 the city government stated that
"the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City." Therefore, the
MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancayco’s building.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Petitioner,

vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON'S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS,
INC., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision2 dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

147
G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision3 dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution4 dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the
same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated
(Ayala Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM
Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.

Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations in Metro Manila.
Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial buildings and other structures, among which, are SM City,
Manila; SM Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.

The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of
parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking
spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent
Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed
for the lessor’s account.

Respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of their respective parking facilities. They provide security personnel
to protect the vehicles parked in their parking facilities and maintain order within the area. In turn, they collect the following parking
fees from the persons making use of their parking facilities, regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not:

Respondent Parking Fees

Ayala Land On weekdays, ₱25.00 for the first four hours and ₱10.00 for
every succeeding hour; on weekends, flat rate of ₱25.00 per
day
Robinsons ₱20.00 for the first three hours and ₱10.00 for every
succeeding hour
Shangri-la Flat rate of ₱30.00 per day
SM Prime ₱10.00 to ₱20.00 (depending on whether the parking space is
outdoors or indoors) for the first three hours and 59 minutes,
and ₱10.00 for every succeeding hour or fraction thereof

The parking tickets or cards issued by respondents to vehicle owners contain the stipulation that respondents shall not be
responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in respondents’ parking facilities.

In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation for the
following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming
arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates
charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft,
robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets. Said Senate Committees invited the top
executives of respondents, who operate the major malls in the country; the officials from the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and other local
government officials; and the Philippine Motorists Association (PMA) as representative of the consumers’ group.

After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-mentioned Senate Committees
jointly issued Senate Committee Report No. 2255 on 2 May 2000, in which they concluded:

In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National
Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without
specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the
parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasonable and logical but finds support in the actual practice in other
countries like the United States of America where parking spaces owned and operated by mall owners are free of charge.

148
Figuratively speaking, the Code has "expropriated" the land for parking – something similar to the subdivision law which require
developers to devote so much of the land area for parks.

Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer Act of the Philippines) provides that "it is the policy of the State to protect the
interest of the consumers, promote the general welfare and establish standards of conduct for business and industry." Obviously, a
contrary interpretation (i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) would be going against the declared policy of R.A. 7394.

Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the
Code, including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This set up,
however, is not being carried out in reality.

In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay,
accurately pointed out that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the implementation/enforcement of the National Building
Code. After the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the
regulatory powers of the DPWH. Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/ regulations formulated by the
DPWH relative to all building plans, specifications and designs including parking space requirements. There is, however, no single
national department or agency directly tasked to supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the Code on parking,
notwithstanding the national character of the law.6

Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, contained the following recommendations:

In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade and Commerce and Justice and Human Rights hereby recommend the following:

1. The Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as
to enforce the penal sanction provisions of the National Building Code. The Office of the Solicitor General should likewise
study how refund can be exacted from mall owners who continue to collect parking fees.

2. The Department of Trade and Industry pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer
Act of the Philippines should enforce the provisions of the Code relative to parking. Towards this end, the DTI should
formulate the necessary implementing rules and regulations on parking in shopping malls, with prior consultations with the
local government units where these are located. Furthermore, the DTI, in coordination with the DPWH, should be
empowered to regulate and supervise the construction and maintenance of parking establishments.

3. Finally, Congress should amend and update the National Building Code to expressly prohibit shopping malls from
collecting parking fees by at the same time, prohibit them from invoking the waiver of liability.7

Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and
the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin
respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal
sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building
Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3
October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory Relief8 under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Piñas. Said Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and assigned to the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 138, presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime prayed for
judgment:

a) Declaring Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the National Building Code as ultra vires, hence,
unconstitutional and void;

b) Declaring [herein respondent SM Prime]’s clear legal right to lease parking spaces appurtenant to its department stores,
malls, shopping centers and other commercial establishments; and

c) Declaring the National Building Code of the Philippines Implementing Rules and Regulations as ineffective, not having
been published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, as prescribed by Section
211 of Presidential Decree No. 1096.
149
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises.9

The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)10 against respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1210
and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch 135, presided over by Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed that the RTC:

1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
respondents from collecting parking fees from their customers; and

2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of respondents in charging parking fees is violative of the
National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore invalid, and making permanent any
injunctive writ issued in this case.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.11

On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with
Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.

As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order12 of even date which
limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the following:

1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present proceedings and relative thereto whether
the controversy in the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare.

2. Whether declaratory relief is proper.

3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are obligated to provide parking spaces in their
malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge.

4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.13

On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210.

The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree
No. 478 and the Administrative Code of 1987.14 It also found that all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were present,
to wit:

The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue involved is ripe
for judicial determination.

SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to be affected directly by the position taken by the
government officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building Officials of the local government units where it
operates shopping malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter of public interest and has taken a position adverse to that of
the mall owners whom it sued. The construction of new and bigger malls has been announced, a matter which the Court can take
judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether mall operators should provide parking facilities, free of charge needs to be
resolved.15

As to the third and most contentious issue, the RTC pronounced that:

The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing Rules and Regulations do not impose that parking spaces shall be
provided by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such directive[,] Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM [Prime] are under no
obligation to provide them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:

150
"Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable
and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of
this Book (1090).["]

xxxx

The provision on ratios of parking slots to several variables, like shopping floor area or customer area found in Rule XIX of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot be construed as a directive to provide free parking spaces, because the enabling law,
the Building Code does not so provide. x x x.

To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM [Prime] to provide parking spaces for free can be considered as an unlawful
taking of property right without just compensation.

Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use, the mall operators collect fees. The legal relationship could
be either lease or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners have the right to collect money which translates into income. Should
parking spaces be made free, this right of mall owners shall be gone. This, without just compensation. Further, loss of effective
control over their property will ensue which is frowned upon by law.

The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in another light. They can be looked at as necessary facilities to entice the public to
increase patronage of their malls because without parking spaces, going to their malls will be inconvenient. These are[,] however[,]
business considerations which mall operators will have to decide for themselves. They are not sufficient to justify a legal conclusion,
as the OSG would like the Court to adopt that it is the obligation of the mall owners to provide parking spaces for free. 16

The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for damages.

The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and
SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or public in general,
free of charge.

All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are dismissed.

No pronouncement as to costs.17

CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate appeals of the OSG18 and respondent SM Prime19 filed with the Court of Appeals. The
sole assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellant’s Brief was:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF
CHARGE[;]20

while the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its Appellant’s Brief were:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA VIRES,
HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.

III
151
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSG’S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR FAILURE TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.21

Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground that the lone issue raised therein involved a pure
question of law, not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25 January 2007. The appellate court agreed with
respondent Robinsons that the appeal of the OSG should suffer the fate of dismissal, since "the issue on whether or not the National
Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall operators to provide parking facilities to the public for free" was
evidently a question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 also included the appeal of respondent SM Prime, which raised
issues worthy of consideration, and in order to satisfy the demands of substantial justice, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on
the merits of the case.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG to initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the RTC as the legal
representative of the government,22 and as the one deputized by the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines through Senate
Committee Report No. 225.

The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of respondent SM Prime that the OSG failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
appellate court explained that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.

The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity of the IRR of the National Building Code, as such issue was not among
those the parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210.
Issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the controversy could be settled on
other grounds, without touching on the issue of the validity of the IRR. It referred to the settled rule that courts should refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of a law or implementing rules, because of the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question, unless the resolution thereof is indispensable to the determination of the case.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and needed
no further construction. Said provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and structures. In the
absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents could not be obliged and expected to provide parking slots free of
charge.

The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 23

In its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the
grounds relied upon by the latter had already been carefully considered, evaluated, and passed upon by the appellate court, and
there was no strong and cogent reason to modify much less reverse the assailed judgment.

The OSG now comes before this Court, via the instant Petition for Review, with a single assignment of error:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
OBLIGED TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING SPACES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE PUBLIC. 24

The OSG argues that respondents are mandated to provide free parking by Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of
the IRR.

152
According to Section 803 of the National Building Code:

SECTION 803. Percentage of Site Occupancy

(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use,
area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local zoning requirements and in accordance with
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary.

In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old IRR,25 provides:

RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on
parking and loading space requirements shall be observed:

1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for specific uses/occupancies for
buildings/structures:

1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal
parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of 3.60
meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and
specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for computation of parking
requirements).

xxxx

1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area

The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together with Section 102 of the National Building Code, which
declares:

SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all
buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design,
quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.

The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of safeguarding "life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control." Adequate parking spaces
would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-
charge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures
carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control -- partially or, as in this case, absolutely -- the imposition of such
fees.

The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that
respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces, in accordance with
the minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or
non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term "parking fees" cannot even be found at all in the entire National
Building Code and its IRR.

153
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempt at interpretation.26 Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then
simply, said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of
the New Civil Code, which states:

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of this Book. (Emphasis ours.)

Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within the ambit of the National Building Code and its IRR, the OSG had to resort
to specious and feeble argumentation, in which the Court cannot concur.

The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule
XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the
National Building Code declaring the policy of the State "to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control"; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, "and
to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance." While the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health, property, and
public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and
requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.

Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of
the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the
enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot
be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.27

From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred to Republic v. Gonzales28 and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas29 to
support its position that the State has the power to regulate parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public;
and it is by virtue of said power that respondents may be required to provide free parking facilities. The OSG, though, failed to
consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal backgrounds of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.

In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants of two parcels of land of the public domain to give way to a
road-widening project. It was in this context that the Court pronounced:

Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build up of
traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion
constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by
widening streets and providing adequate parking areas.

The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed with full power to control and regulate its streets for the
purpose of promoting public health, safety and welfare. The City can regulate the time, place, and manner of parking in the streets
and public places; and charge minimal fees for the street parking to cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and control, to
ensure the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market, and for the safety and convenience of the public.

Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets; in contrast, the present case deals with privately owned parking
facilities available for use by the general public. In Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local governments regulated parking
pursuant to their power to control and regulate their streets; in the instant case, the DPWH Secretary and local building officials
regulate parking pursuant to their authority to ensure compliance with the minimum standards and requirements under the

154
National Building Code and its IRR. With the difference in subject matters and the bases for the regulatory powers being invoked,
Republic and City of Ozamis do not constitute precedents for this case.

Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain pronouncements that weaken the position of the OSG in the case at bar. In
Republic, the Court, instead of placing the burden on private persons to provide parking facilities to the general public, mentioned
the trend in other jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments themselves took the initiative to make more parking spaces
available so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:

Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed which
clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at least as
voluminous as here, the provision by municipal governments of parking space is not limited to parking along public streets or
highways. There has been a marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the view to removing parked cars from the
streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks has been commonly undertaken by private enterprise,
municipal governments have been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where private enterprise had failed
to keep up with the growing public demand. American courts have upheld the right of municipal governments to construct off-street
parking facilities as clearly redounding to the public benefit.30

In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the collection by the City of minimal fees for the parking of vehicles along the streets: so why
then should the Court now preclude respondents from collecting from the public a fee for the use of the mall parking facilities?
Undoubtedly, respondents also incur expenses in the maintenance and operation of the mall parking facilities, such as electric
consumption, compensation for parking attendants and security, and upkeep of the physical structures.

It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that "the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and
structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition
of such fees." Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the
undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as
between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society.31 True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to
impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents;
but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the use of privately
owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the
collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.32

Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and propriety of measures or means, the Court notes that Section 803
of the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to regulate site
occupancy to ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation in every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the IRR requires that
a building, depending on its specific use and/or floor area, should provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court,
however, fails to see the connection between regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis-à-
vis regulating the collection by building owners of fees for the use of their parking spaces. Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the
former does not necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation conditions at the
malls could be affected by the fact that parking facilities thereat are free or paid for.

The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:

Under Section 803 of the National Building Code, complimentary parking spaces are required to enhance light and ventilation, that
is, to avoid traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building, which certainly affects the ventilation within the building itself,
which otherwise, the annexed parking spaces would have served. Free-of-charge parking avoids traffic congestion by ensuring quick
and easy access of legitimate shoppers to off-street parking spaces annexed to the malls, and thereby removing the vehicles of these
legitimate shoppers off the busy streets near the commercial establishments.33

The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications and requirements
for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say that the

155
National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic congestion around the buildings so as to ensure that the
said buildings shall have adequate lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has apparently
done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their parking facilities, thus,
forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The Court notes that despite the fees charged by respondents, vehicle owners still
use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only
because there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred by the parking fees charged by
respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may even have the opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more people may
be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking
facilities would become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in the malls and parked in the streets instead,
causing even more traffic congestion.

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such
facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of
police power.

Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. 34

When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer exercising police power, but another
of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.35

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the
owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.36 It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total
destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be
made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation
that deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the
invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the
owner may recover therefor.371avvphi1

Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against
their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their
properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but
is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the
property rights of respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they
are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation
of the required parking facilities.

The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta38 is edifying. Therein, the City Government of Quezon City
passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their total area for charity,
that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to the Court, the ordinance in question was null and void, for it authorized
the taking of private property without just compensation:

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of' health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who

156
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of' building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.

'The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of
the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang panlungsod
may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the
city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law, and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally
invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the
unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said issue was not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial
conference for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the
constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case
it has been, settled on other grounds.39

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution
dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. L-42571-72. July 25, 1983.]

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH
VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN,
DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON
MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL, Petitioners,
v. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-
Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, Respondents.

Federico N. Alday, for Petitioners.

Dakila F. Castro for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER OF THE STATE; POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TO ENACT LEGISLATION
PURSUANT THERETO. — Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: General power of council to
enact ordinances and make regulations.— The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." (Sec.

157
2238, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, (1917).

2. ID; ID.; ID.; WHEN ORDINANCES MAY BE PRONOUNCED INVALID. — An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v Phil. 165 (1913) "is valid, unless contravenes the fundamental
law of the Philippine Island, or an Act of the Philippines Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the
mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a
reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION BY VIRTUE OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE. — The general welfare clause authorizes such ordinances
"as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. "It is a
general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 84 OF BOCAUE BULACAN; TEST OF REASONABLENESS TO UPHOLD IT VALIDITY, NOT MET.
— In two leading cases, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the sate. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restriction rather than by
an absolute prohibition. The admonition in U.S. v. Salavaria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918) should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation ." It is
clear that in the guise of police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investment made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 938; POWER GRANTED TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IS THAT OF REGULATION, NOT
PROHIBITION. — The first Section of R.A. No 938 was amended to include not merely "the power of regulate, but likewise ‘prohibit . .
." The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if
only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council way go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If
that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid if support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any altered. It
was not change one with. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that or regulation, not prohibition. There is
thus Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED TO FREE IT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY. — Since there is no dispute as
the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of
Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise power "to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals." in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all
"the great public needs." to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save
rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 84 CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. — It is clear that
municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business. It would he, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do so is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could
legally open. would he subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners so close their establishments,
the necessary, result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time,
their employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided. it should be. The
law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a
mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If
it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That it to pay lets, very much less, than full deference to the
due process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

158
 DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:

The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid
of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. 2

The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1.— Title of Ordinance. — This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as
the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2.— Definitions of Terms — (a) ‘Night Club’ shall include any
place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b) ‘Cabaret’ or ‘Dance Hall’ shall
include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and
professional dancers are employed. (c) ‘Professional hostesses’ or ‘hospitality girls’ shall include any woman employed by any of the
establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with them. (d) ‘Professional dancer’ shall
include any woman who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by
the operator or by the persons she dances with. (e) ‘Operator’ shall include the owner, manager, administrator or any person who
operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3.— Prohibition in the Issuance and
Renewal of Licenses, Permits. — Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on
this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to
operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls
and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4. —
Revocation of Permits and Licenses. — The licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are
now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked
upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these
establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5. — Penalty in case of violation.— Violation of any
of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or a fine not exceeding
P200.00 or both at the discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person charged with the
management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6. —Separability Clause.— If, for any
reason, any section or provision of this Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be
affected thereby. Section 7.— Repealing Clause.— All ordinance, resolutions, circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Section 8.— Effectivity. — This Ordinance shall take effect
immediately upon its approval; provided, however, that operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation
including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are given a period of thirty days from the approval hereof
within which to wind up their businesses and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4

On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5
The grounds alleged follow: "1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. 2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as
the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No.
189, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night
clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate Justice
Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. The answers were thereafter filed.
It was therein alleged: "1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The
Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are
subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the admission of the following facts as having been established: "1. That
petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, Et. Al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue
— petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner
Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are

159
well-lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not
allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made to
go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit
to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate
there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding
the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of
appeal.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening
paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it
has been by innuendos of sexual titillation, and fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, had no alternative except to order
thru its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This
in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the
current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases are
therefore hereby lifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of the grace period being to enable the petitioners
herein to apply to the proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress." 9 This Court is, however, unable to agree with such
a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.

1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and
make regulations.— The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is practically a
reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal Code. 11 An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland,
speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise
and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the
power, or it will be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v. Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice
Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has
two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this
class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the
council which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.’ It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation,
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be
heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion
of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in
terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is
entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS." 18
Its first section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits,

160
bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . . . 19 Then on
May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit . . ." 20 The title,
however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No, 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the
above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were
all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was
not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus
support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of
night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it
would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, "22 in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs," 23
to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity
and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24

3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code.
25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149
defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows:" (a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein; . . . ."
26 There are in addition provisions that may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang bayan
shall" (rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies,
tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain
under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the
taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage
parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of
entertainment; . . . ." 27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of might clubs. They may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were
sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel
petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an
undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than
sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without
employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the
picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.cralawnad

4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power
legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that character is
deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the weight of its
support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power. Reference is made by respondents
to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension as to what was
decided by this Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection
grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end
to practices which could encourage vice and immorality, This is an entirely different case. What was involved is a measure not
embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the
aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it
was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly is if the
power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and

161
nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No costs.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., reserves his right to file a dissent.

Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on official leave.

De Castro, J., is on sick leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
respondents.
City Fiscal for petitioners.
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area
so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the
application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the
ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling
and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The
respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative
Code.
There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public
use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise
of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."

162
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because
it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if
an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and
summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to
prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower
court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except
the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12,
1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be
revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the
ordinance in question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to-
'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the
council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of
the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon
City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted
in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner.
If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power,
the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the
most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs.
Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs.
Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit
its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being
coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and
illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare
have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or
achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the
general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

163
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation.
It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever challenges the validity of duly
enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every
presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and
general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA 849) the Court speaking through
the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or
ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected representatives
of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ...
municipality and with all the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39
Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in
Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :
... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt
ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community. An property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights
of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power
vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal
with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic
law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually
a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter
of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties
to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment
of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express
provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it
to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary
licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been
impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013

164
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration tiled by petitioner Emmanuel L. Maliksi against the Court's decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013, dismissing his petition for certiorari assailing the resolution dated September 14, 2012 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Bane that sustained the declaration of respondent Homer T. Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
For clarity, we briefly restate the factual antecedents.
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi,
the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and,
based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the
printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the
decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted
because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration.2
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images
without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.1âwphi1
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that
Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by
the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and
printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the
printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots
under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the following arguments, to wit:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION
DESPITE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT
DECRYPTION, PRINTING AND EXAMINATION OF THE DIGITAL IMAGES OF THE BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE ASSAILED 14
SEPTEMBER 2012 RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, WHICH IN TURN AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012 RESOLUTION OF THE
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, WERE DONE INCONSPICUOUSLY UPON A MOTU PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
SANS ANY NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE COMELEC FIRST
DIVISION’S RULING TO DISPENSE WITH THE PHYSICAL BALLOTS AND RESORT TO THEIR DIGITAL IMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE BALLOTS ARE THE BEST AND MOST CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE VOTERS’ WILL, AND THAT BALLOT IMAGES CAN
BE RESORTED TO ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY WAS COMPROMISED AS DETERMINED BY THE
RECOUNT/REVISION COMMITTEE, CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE, AND IN FACT THE INTEGRITY OF THE
BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS WAS PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF TAMPERING WAS ONLY BELATEDLY RAISED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AFTER THE REVISION RESULTS SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
III.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IT IS THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER-MOVANT THAT THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION
ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND THEREFORE OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT,
FOR HAVING BEEN PROMULGATED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HONORABLE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ AT
THE TIME OF THE DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION IN THE INSTANT CASE.3

165
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was
deprived of such rights when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (c) that the
March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not state the date, time,
and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the
decryption proceedings.
Maliksi contends that the First Division’s motu proprio directive for the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images was highly irregular.
In this regard, he asserts: (a) that the decryption, printing, and examination should have taken place during the revision before the trial court and
after the revision committee had determined that the integrity of the official ballots had not been preserved; (b) that the trial court did not make such
determination; (c) that, in fact, Saquilayan did not allege or present any proof in the RTC to show that the ballots or the ballot boxes had been
tampered, and had, in fact, actively participated in the revision proceedings; (d) that the First Division should not have entertained the allegation of
ballot tampering belatedly raised on appeal; (e) that the First Division should have limited itself to reviewing the evidence on record; and (f) that the
First Division did not even explain how it had arrived at the conclusion that the integrity of the ballots had not been preserved.
Maliksi submits that the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and void for having been promulgated despite the absence from the
deliberations and lack of signature of Justice Jose Portugal Perez.
Ruling
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground
that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising
appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings
authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the
exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city
officials.4
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding
the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the
revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted deviation from the
standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to "take such measures as the Presiding Commissioner may deem proper," and even citing
the Court’s minute resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the "COMELEC has
the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so
long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims."
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard
on their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so
lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
should not have upheld the First Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its
failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
I.
Due process requirements
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.6 In
Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by
the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original documents" simply means that both of them are given
equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of
the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re: Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An Automated
Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections), as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, itself requires that "the Recount
Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that
(the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the image of the ballots should be made, to wit:
xxxx

166
(g) Only when the Recount Committee, through its chairman, determines that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved or that no signs of
tampering of the ballots are present, will the recount proceed. In case there are signs that the ballots contained therein are tampered, compromised,
wet or are otherwise in such a condition that it could not be recounted, the Recount Committee shall follow paragraph (l) of this rule.
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and
otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections in the
presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of
the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not substitutes. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxxx
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests, which governs the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Courts exercising original jurisdiction over election protests, provides:
xxxx
(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box have not been preserved, as when proof of
tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in the data storage device for the
precinct. The court shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or
image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only after this determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxxx
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision. – The revision of votes shall be done through the use of appropriate PCOS machines or manually and visually, as
the Tribunal may determine, and according to the following procedures:
xxxx
(q) In the event that the RC determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or
substitution, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the
same precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of the assistance of the COMELEC for the service of a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct
the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or images stored are genuine and not merely substitutes. It is only upon such
determination that the printed picture image can be used for the revision of votes. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots requires a preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose
of determining whether the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitutions, to wit:
Section 10. Revision of Ballots
xxxx
(d) When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the parties or by the Tribunal, that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the
May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitutions, the Tribunal shall direct the printing of the picture
images of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan
technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. It is
only upon such determination that the printed picture image can be used for the revision. (As amended per Resolution of February 10, 2011;
Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place
during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be
conducted. It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are allowed to be represented, with
their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the
Revision/Recount Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become unreliable, the parties are
immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the
finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a
formal notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its reasons
for ordering the printing of the picture images. The parties were formally notified that the First Division had found that the ballots had been tampered

167
only when they received the resolution of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as
the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First Division to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the finding of ballot
box tampering, and did not also particularize how and why the First Division was concluding that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised.
All that the First Division declared as justification was a simple generalization of the same being apparent from the allegations of ballot and ballot box
tampering and upon inspection of the ballot boxes, viz:
xxxx
The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is
apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go over
the digital image of the appealed ballots.8 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution of September 14, 2012 that later on provided the explanation to justify the First Division’s resort
to the picture images of the ballots, by observing that the "unprecedented number of double-votes" exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and
the votes for Saquilayan had led to the belief that the ballots had been tampered. However, that explanation by the COMELEC En Banc did not cure
the First Division’s lapse and did not erase the irregularity that had already invalidated the First Division’s proceedings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio advances the view that the COMELEC’s finding of ballot tampering was a mere surplusage
because there was actually no need for such finding before the ballots’ digital counterparts could be used. He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164, which states:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In case the parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion to be approved by the Division of the
Commission requesting for the printing of ballot images in addition to those mentioned in the second paragraph of item (e). Parties concerned shall
provide the necessary materials in the printing of images such as but not limited to copying papers, toners and printers. Parties may also secure,
upon prior approval by the Division of the Commission, a soft copy of the ballot images contained in a secured/hashed disc on the condition that the
ballot images be first printed, at the expense of the requesting party, and that the printed copies be signed by the parties’ respective revisors or
representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable representative and deposited with the Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with the Director IV, Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD), for the printing of images. Said
director shall in turn designate a personnel who will be responsible in the printing of ballot images.
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files a motion for the printing of the ballots that he or she deems necessary, there is actually no need for a
finding of tampering of the ballots or the ballot boxes before the COMELEC Division may grant the motion. He states that a determination by the
parties that the printing is necessary under Section 3 is a ground separate from Section 6(e), which in turn pertinently states that:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount –
xxxx
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the Recount Committee shall note its condition as well as that of the locks or locking mechanism and record
the condition in the recount report. From its observation, the Recount Committee must also make a determination as to whether the integrity of the
ballot box has been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering or if the ballot box appears to have been compromised, the Recount Committee shall still proceed to
open the ballot box and make a physical inventory of the contents thereof. The committee shall, however, record its general observation of the
ballots and other documents found in the ballot box.
The application of Section 3 to this case is inappropriate, considering that the First Division did not in any way suggest in its decision dated August
15, 2010 that it was resolving Saquilayan’s motion to print the ballot images. Instead, the First Division made therein a finding of tampering, thus:
The COMELEC (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is
apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go over
the digital images of the appealed ballots.
Even the COMELEC En Banc did not indicate in its decision dated September 14, 2012 that the First Division merely resolved Saquilayan’s motion
for the printing of the ballot images; instead, it reinforced the First Division’s finding that there was tampering of the ballots. The non-mention of
Saquilayan’s motion was a clear indication of the COMELEC’s intention to act motu proprio; and also revealed its interpretation of its very own rules,
that there must be justifiable reason, i.e. tampering, before the ballot images could be resorted to.
The application of Section 3 would only highlight the First Division’s denial of Maliksi’s right to due process. For, if the First Division was really only
acting on a motion to allow the printing of the ballot images, there was a greater reason for the First Division to have given the parties notice of its
ruling thereon. But, as herein noted, the First Division did not issue such ruling.
To interpret Section 3 as granting to any one of the parties the right to move for the printing of the ballot images should such party deem it
necessary, and the COMELEC may grant such motion, is contrary to its clear wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in case the parties deem it
necessary, they may file a motion." The provision really envisions a situation in which both parties have agreed that the ballot images should be
printed. Should only one of the parties move for the printing of the ballot images, it is not Section 3 that applies but Section 6(e), which then requires
a finding that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during
the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be

168
exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due process
violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount proceedings that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First
Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or
even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to
assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the printing of the picture images did not
sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due
process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer the factual bases for
the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the
principles of fair play, because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially
prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an
opportunity to be present at such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply
required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount
proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections9 instructs that notice to the parties and their participation are required during the adversarial aspects of the
proceedings. In that case, after the revision of the ballots and after the election protest case was submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes
were transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with a protest case pending in the SET. Mendoza later learned that the
COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had meanwhile conducted proceedings within the SET’s premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right
to due process was violated because he had not been given notice by the COMELEC that it would be conducting further proceedings within the SET
premises. The Court did not sustain his claim, however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s petition and Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET
("contested proceedings") are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the
participation of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioner’s Reply:
"However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of the contested ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with
the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting "further proceedings" requiring notice to the parties. There is no revision or correction of the
ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was already submitted for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is simply resolving the
submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily take no part in said deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual
decision-making process is supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second Division of the public respondent in strict
confidentiality."
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating
the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations
which are considered confidential and privileged. We find it significant that the private respondent’s Comment fully supported the COMELEC’s
position and disavowed any participation in the contested proceeding the petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not
shown that the private respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial election contest.1âwphi1
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the COMELEC’s handling of the Bulacan provincial election
contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET
that would require notice and hearing because of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify
either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of
review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation
on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the proceedings it had conducted as an "appreciation of ballots" like in Mendoza. But unlike in Mendoza, the
proceedings conducted by the First Division were adversarial, in that the proceedings included the decryption and printing of the picture images of
the ballots and the recount of the votes were to be based on the printouts of the picture images. The First Division did not simply review the findings
of the RTC and the Revision Committee, but actually conducted its own recount proceedings using the printouts of the picture image of the ballots.
As such, the First Division was bound to notify the parties to enable them to participate in the proceedings.
Significantly, Section 6(l), Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No, 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, requires the parties’
presence during the printing of the images of the ballots, thus:
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and
otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections in the
presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of
the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not substitutes.
xxxx

169
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision and recount proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital
and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The
parties’ presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed, including the required authentication and certification that
the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and
printing of the picture images of the ballots and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the guidelines that the First
Division had followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of the recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been
followed in the decryption and printing proceeding.
II.
Remand to the COMELEC
We are mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve the election protest because the term of the position involved is about to end. Thus, we
overlook pro hac vice the lack of factual basis for the COMELEC’s decision to use the digital images of the ballots and sustain its decision thereon.
Although a remand of the election protest to the RTC would have been the appropriate procedure, we direct the COMELEC En Banc instead to
conduct the decryption and printing of the digital images of the ballots and to hold recount proceedings, with due notice to all the parties and
opportunity for them to be present and to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves the ideal objective safeguarded by the
Constitution.
In the absence of particular rules to govern its proceedings in accordance with this disposition, the COMELEC is urged to follow and observe Rule 15
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.
The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as
yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.11 After all,
it is the Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-vis government actions, thus:
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people.
But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration
the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still
be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.12
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the
Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013; and DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Bane to conduct proceedings for the decryption of
the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts of the ballot
images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the
position of Chief Justice vis-à-vis the appointing power of the President, the period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight
appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBC’s
composition and membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The
heart of the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power. More
significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to the
Highest Tribunal of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party
respondent.
The Facts
170
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014.
Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the
said vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was
included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals
Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June
5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be
invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014,
during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the
JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting
witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the
JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under
the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to
another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment
thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared
as a resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as
posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as
shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima)
informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He
answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno
execute a sworn statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the
same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that
he wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights.
Jardeleza then put into record a written statement6 expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that
the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its
deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4)
nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5)
votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not
be included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the
President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue."8 The said resolution was
accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the
position taken by the majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to
compel the JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC
and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the
same was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation
by the Court en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated
action on his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.

171
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the
shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own
rules. Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising
objections against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from
the list of nominees.
Jardeleza’s Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardeleza’s arguments, as
follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last
June 30, 2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and
cause thereof and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his
right to due process when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his
integrity would be made known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper
defense against it. Not only did the JBC fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his rights as an
applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion,
the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed
to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio
testified against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief
Justice Sereno. The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair
play and the Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles,
nor does it dispense with the need to honor petitioner’s right to due process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity
requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicant’s
integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking
hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a
situation where all thata member has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without
need for factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule
10 of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of
the JBC. The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is
that a majority of the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the President’s constitutional power to appoint.Jardeleza’s exclusion from
the shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from among four (4)
nominees, when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated
through a process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are
remedied, the petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant
favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a
pending case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the
implementation of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for
mandamus must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right
to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf
of the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question

172
on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case
and his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection
against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to
shed light on the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file
sworn statements so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses;and that the procedure
be done on record and in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior
to the voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a
fact-finding body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of
the accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the
conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the truth
or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the
JBC relies on his or her own appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains
an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an
applicant’s integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the
affirmative vote of all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted.
Even then, he needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the
shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As
to him, the "majority rule" was considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria
persona, all pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest
while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a
situation where his personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of
Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General,
and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs
contrary to the fiduciary relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court
must be filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO
or an injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009, particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject
JBC rule impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009 gives rise to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a majority
vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and full
participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the
collegial nature of the JBC and the very purpose for which it was created— to shield the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further,
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges
to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the
subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In this case, Jardeleza’s allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously
show that he was neither informed ofthe accusations against him nor given the chance to muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be
operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered
inconsequential. In the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where
any JBC member retains their respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule
would necessitate the inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August
15, 2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the
JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the
Integrity Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s Reply consisted only of his arguments against the JBC’s original Comment, as it was filed prior to the
filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply.

173
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S.
Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the
JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the
IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the
JBC and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the
conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule
10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule.
Instead, it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible
unconstitutionality of the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the
bleeding from which the gaping wound presented to the Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY" AS
CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN
OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The Court’s Ruling
I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8
reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s
principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to
act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it
may not becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule
65, a writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer
clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial
function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain

174
the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature."18 It
asserts that in the performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial
functions. Hence, the resort tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule"
on integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court
is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary,
the JBC has been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment
to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as
"competence, integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it
is not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or
Deputy Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A
set of uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses
qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in
writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21
"soundness of physical and mental condition,22 and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-
governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may
even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits
of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s
character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the
moral character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable
consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as
an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all
the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into
operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s
moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to Jardeleza’s case.

175
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the
question on his actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show
his lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza’s
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardeleza’s manner of representing the government in a
legal dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014,
where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required tobe a member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the
Chief Justice shared withthe other JBC members the details of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s position in a case and how
this could have been detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim against Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars
thereof were only supplied to the Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s demand to make
the accusations against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its
significant bearing on the country’s foreign relations and national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in
this disposition. The confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that
may possibly affect the country’s position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question
on Jardeleza’s integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or
implications of immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by
an "act of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the
"disagreement" in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that
preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its
roots to the exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a
treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28 provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer
is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a
clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to
others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be
classified as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was
no clear indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a
different manner of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice
Sereno was not certain that Jardeleza’s acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final
say on the conduct of the country’s advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the
country’s trust and interest. While this point does notentail that only the President may challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical
to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In
fact, the Comment of the Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardeleza’s inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian
Dredging case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent
demonstration of a connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a
showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this
disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time
onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues
had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced
that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General
Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the
applicants," it might as well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid
issues.

176
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion supra. Unlike the first ground which centered onJardeleza’s stance on the tactical
approach in pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral
character. Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful
stain on one’s ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to
the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have
never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which
was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual
matters, but includes conduct inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character,
a person must have the personal characteristic ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in one’s values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor,
not only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in the Judiciary. This
is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market.40 Manipulative devices and deceptive
practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with
unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become
worthless. Given enough of stock marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of
capital. And investors would eventuallyfeel more secure with their money invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider trading involves the
trading of securities based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading
involves the propensity of a person toengage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of
"questions on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not
furnished the basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his
request for an opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to
answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009
is negated by the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates
within which any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and
oppositions to be in writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his comment within five (5) days
from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidate’s right
to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The
JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or
administrative offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the
JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary
or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues,
but instead chose totread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments,
the Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the
finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot
be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with
established rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access tothe rights afforded under the due process
clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work
experience and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to

177
verify an applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an
applicant to become a part of the roster from which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor
purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.44 Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually
aimed to verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal
profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases
where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the
duty of JBC torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capriciousassessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the
parties mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts,
National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and
receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to
cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation
or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010,46 squarely
applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council,"
JBC-010 recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the
positionunder consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall
strictly relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, as well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of
candidates and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of
the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview
for its further consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the dateand place of the interview.

178
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate.
Among other things, the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of
candidates which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases
supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be
gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the
JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the
truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to
an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory,
however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall
be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend nominees nor
proposes thatthe JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the
observance of due process is a part of JBC’s discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it may so rely on "other
means" such as character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications, the
Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to
question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain himself.
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s
deference to the grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per
se, provide that: any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or
opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the
complaint or opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or
opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers
"any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While
JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to
answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardeleza’s Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the
events leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the
fact that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting,
Chief Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council
would like to propound questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not
compatible with public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order
from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When
Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out
that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a
candidate must be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and
translate the objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements would be
made part of the record. After Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief
Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in
Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza
was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting,
these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down
in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the
more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members
themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues.
To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part

179
of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting
that would be held on the same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written
opposition, why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered
to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal
memorandum used in the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume
is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of
the allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be
informed and to explain himself would have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to
instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the
context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to
appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his
extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC
discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances
preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable
opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right
to answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on whether
or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for the
government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have
warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nomineesto
the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his
integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the
"unanimity rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on
the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right
to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights.
To this, the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual
in proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against
Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the
"unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4)
out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for
the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBC’s
Internal Rules
In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired
and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or
abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified.
Any assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other

180
members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the
majority vote ofthe Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has
been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its
precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due
process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be
adopted should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court.1âwphi1 In deference
to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the
shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its
proceedings, particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41,
BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos -or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million -
adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on
the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners.”3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled “An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers,
and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses,
and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case
No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

Private respondent's claims

181
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children,
namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6
years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to
pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the
eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of
their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about
his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts
with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even
the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6- year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because
of his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted
suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her.
Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got
angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is
not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial
support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty
Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast
to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation
only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and
other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of
access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

182
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states “regardless of ownership”), this is to
allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may
be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any
unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31
March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter,
an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under
pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his
threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount
of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the
following additional provisions:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila,
whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that
the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

183
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-
counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of
Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so
that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture,
equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter alia
that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy
resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also
known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended
party;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or
indirectly;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of
the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall
not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise
he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

184
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6,
2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros
Tading;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in,
especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes “I,” “I-1,”
and “I-2,” including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and
are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without
the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five
(5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that
he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that
petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an “exercise in futility.”33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB- SP. No.
01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order35 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in
his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of
R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that –
The Issues

185
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not
be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
authority and jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction

to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least
one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter
law, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass
upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”46 The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,

186
“[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which
a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross- claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is
a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not
a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised
in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is
founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition.
The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the
following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

187
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11- SC
provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days
each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet
the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its
normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be
enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v.
Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be
granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to
rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either
the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa
Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a “synthesized measure”62 – an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the “Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “Anti- Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act”63 – providing protection to
“all family members, leaving no one in isolation” but at the same time giving special attention to women as the “usual victims” of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the
deliberations:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children
or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really
are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to
this kind of observation?

188
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves “WIIR” Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.65

xxxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the
AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam
sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect
women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women
in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would
always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to
be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special
needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence
to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

189
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of

Senator Legarda would be removing the “men and children” in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of
that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa “Loi” Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now
whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather
than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment. The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment? Senator
Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend
to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey
lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to
seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to
find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse
of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66

190
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68

We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the

guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike
by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact
be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed
and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against
women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based
violence”. Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men.”72

191
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate
VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to
be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a
rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama
became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to
inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple
focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda.
They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as “marked underestimates,” because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the
survey is conducted. According to the AMA, “researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the
above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year.”

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their
lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find
temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

192
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on
March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes.” (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the “usual” and “most likely”

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first
semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004
to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74
thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported Cases 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of Lasciviousness 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Physical Injuries 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Sexual Harassment 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction /Kidnapping 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof
are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced
domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men,
who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
193
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of
physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262
invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and
not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city
roads, “but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community.”77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously
than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal
Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or
domestic violence, subjecting them to “double victimization” – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that “(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police
treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter
is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence.”80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as “only a live-in partner” and
presenting her as an “opportunist” and a “mistress” in an “illegitimate relationship.” Judge Amila even called her a “prostitute,” and accused her of
being motivated by “insatiable greed” and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of
gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused
on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,”
“husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women.”84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to
a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

194
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is
a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to
the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality
with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long
as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited
to:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family
Code;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. destroying household property;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

195
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and

dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs
is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet,
petitioner insists92 that phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing mental or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of
spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person”
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari
L. Go- Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's
husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due

process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: “On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened.”95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

“The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.”97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,”99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which
is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose

196
of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only
two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to
his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not
be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an “exercise in futility,” conveniently forgetting
that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said
order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of
law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership
of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent
has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose
of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that “by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to “protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.”109

197
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision
is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by
which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject
for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of judicial

power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the “Supreme Court
and such other lower courts as may be established by law” and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
– Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant
on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs
shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It
is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”114

We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order
to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers.”115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding “whether there is reasonable ground to believe
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,” the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe
that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend
assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal
are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach otor a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner
to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal

198
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most
difficult struggles was the fight against the violence oflaw itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

199