Tony Chafer, Brian Jenkins (Eds.) - France - From The Cold War To The New World Order-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1996)

FRANCE: From the Cold War to the New World Order
Also by Tony Chqfer
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY FRANCE (co-editor)
Also by Brian Jenkins
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY FRANCE (co-editor)
NATIONALISM IN FRANCE: Class and Nation since 1789

France
From the Cold War to the
New World Order
Edited by
Tony Chafer
Principal Lecturer in French Studies
University of Portsmouth
and
Brian Jenkins
Professor of French Area Studies
University of Portsmouth
First published in Great Britain 1996 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-24326-6 ISBN 978-1-349-24324-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-24324-2
First published in the United States of America 1996 by

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-12588-2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
France: from the Cold War to the new world order I edited by Tony
Chafer and Brian Jenkins.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-312-12588-2 (cloth)
I. France-Politics and govemment-1981- 2. Cold War.
3. Peaceful change (International relations) 4. European Union-
-France. 5. National security·-France. 6. Nationalism-France.
7. Post-communism-France. I. Chafer, Tony. II. Jenkins, Brian,
1944- .
DC423.F724 1996
944.083'9-dc20 95-31041
CIP
Selection and editorial matter© A. D. Chafer and B. J. Jenkins 1996
Text © Macmillan Press Ltd 1996
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1996
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96
Contents
List qf Abbreviations vii
Notes on the Contributors IX
Introduction
Brian Jenkins and Tony Chafer
SECTION 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS
France and European Security 1944-94: Re-reading

the Gaullist 'Consensus' 17
Jolyon Howorth
2 French Intellectuals, Neutralism and the Search for
Peace in the Cold War 39
Martyn Cornick
3 The Franco-German Axis since Unification 53
Jean-Marc Trouille
4 The Search for a New Security Strategy in a Shifting
International Arena 65
Dominique David
SECTION 2 DEFENCE AND SECURITY
5 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The

1994 Defence White Paper and Beyond 79
Janet Bryant
6 Conscription Revisited 93
Paule Chicken
7 France, the Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium and
the NPT and CTBT Processes 104
Shaun Gregory
v
Vl Contents
SECTION 3 THE ECONOMY AND THE NEW WORLD

ORDER
8 The French Economy and the End of the Cold War 115
Cliff Gulvin
9 French Aid to Africa: A Changing Agenda? 126
Gordon Cumming
10 France and GATT: The Real Politics ofTrade
Negotiations 137
David Hanley
SECTION 4 POLITICS
11 The 'Consensus' on Defence Policy and the End of

the Cold War: Political Parties and the Limits of
Adaptation 155
Anand Menon
12 From the Cold War to the Present Day: Labour
Unions and the Crisis of 'Models' 169
Guy Groux
13 Gaullism and the New World Order 181
Peter Fysh
14 The Front National and the New World Order 193
Paul Hainsworth
SECTION 5 FRANCE, IMMIGRATION AND

RELATIONS WITH THE MAGHREB
15 Immigration, Ethnicity and Political Orientations in

France 207
Alec G. Hargreaves
16 Franco-Algerian Relations in the Post-Cold War
World 219
Martin Evans
Index 233
List of Abbreviations
CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CAR Central African Republic
CDS Centre des Dcmocrates Sociaux
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CGT Confederation Gcncrale du Travail
CNJA Central National des Jeunes Agriculteurs
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
csu Christian Social Union
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade
Union Federation)
DOM-TOM France's Overseas Departments and Territories
EDC European Defence Community
EEC European Economic Community
EMS European Monetary System
ERM European Exchange-Rate Mechanism
ETUC European Trades Union Confederation
EU European Union
FAR Forces d' Action Rapide
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FFS Front des Forces Socialistes
FIS Front lslamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation
Front)
FLN Front de Liberation Nationale
FN Front National
FNSEA Federation Nationale des Syndicats des
Exploitants Agricoles
FO Force Ouvriere
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR German Democratic Republic
GIA Groupe Islamique Armc
IMF International Monetary Fund
LDC Least Developed Countries
VJI
viii List rif Abbreviations
LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire

MNC Multinational Corporation
MRG Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
MRP Mouvement Rcpublicain Populaire
MSI Italian Social Movement
NACC North Atlantic Coordination Council
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Devclopmen t
PALEN Preparation a Ia Limitation des Essais Nucleaires
PCF Parti Communiste Fran~ais
PECO Pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale (Central and
East European Countries)
PFP Partnership for Peace
PS Parti Socialiste
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty
RDR Rassemblement Dcmocratique Rcvolutionnaire
RPR Rassemblement pour Ia Rcpublique
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
TEU Treaty on European Union
UDF Union pour Ia Democratic Fran~aise
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
WEU Western European Union
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
YFMO Young Frenchmen of Maghreb Origin
Notes on the Contributors
Janet Bryant is Senior Lecturer in French Politics at the

University of Portsmouth. She is currently researching in the area
of contemporary French defence and security policy.
Tony Chafer is Principal Lecturer in French Studies at the
University of Portsmouth. He has published widely on French
colonial history and relations with Black Africa, and is co-editor of
Modern and Contemporary France and the Journal of Area Studies.
Paule Chicken is Senior Lecturer in French Studies at the
University of Birmingham. Her most recent publication is 'La
province de Fran~ois Mitterrand: l'ccrivain au service de l'homme
politique' in France: Nation and Regions (ed. M. Kelly and R. Bock,
1993). She is currently researching on Fran~ois Mitterrand, the
author, politics, and the uses of literature.
Martyn Cornick, of the Department of European Studies at
Loughborough University, is an editor of Modern and Contemporary
France. He has published widely on French intellectual history and
Anglo-French relations.
Gordon Cum.m.ing is Lecturer in French Studies in the School of
European Studies, University of Wales.
Dom.inique David is the official representative of the Director of
the lnstitut Fran~ais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) and
Professor at the Ecole Speciale Militaire at Saint-Cyr.
Martin Evans is Lecturer in French Studies at the University of
Portsmouth. He is currently researching on the relationship
between France and its empire.
Peter Fysh teaches French language and courses on history,
society and politics in France and Spain at Nottingham Trent
U ni versi ty.
Shaun Gregory is Lecturer in Peace Studies at the University of
Bradford. He has just completed Nuclear Command and Control in
NATO 1952-1990 (Macmillan, 1995) and is presently researching
IX
X Notes on the Contributors
for a book on French defence and security policy entitled La

Difense.
Guy Groux is a sociologist, specialising in the history of the
French trade union movement. He is a Researcher at the Centre
National de Ia Recherche Scientifiquc (Centre d'Etudcs de Ia Vic
Politiquc Fran~aise, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques),
Paris.
Cliff Gulvin is Principal Lecturer in Economic History at the
University of Portsmouth. He is currently preparing a book on the
development of the French economy since 1918.
Paul Hainsworth is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University
of Ulster. He has published widely on French and European
politics and is an editor of the Journal of Regional and Federal Studies.
David Hanley is Professor of European Studies at the University
of Wales. His main research interest lies in political parties. His
publications include Contemporary France ( 1978 and 1984) and
Keeping Left ( 1986) .
Alec C. Hargreaves is Professor of French and Francophone
Studies at Loughborough University. He is the author of
numerous publications on immigration and ethnic relations in
France, the most recent of which is the forthcoming study
Immigration, 'Race' and Etlmiciry in Contemporary France ( 1995).
Jolyon Howorth is Professor of French Civilisation at the
University ofBath. Recent publications on French history, politics
and international relations include Europeans on Europe: transna-
tional visions of a new continent (ed. with M. Maclean, Macmillan,
1992). His new book, France and the Security of Europe, will appear in
1996.
Brian Jenkins is Professor of French Area Studies at the
University of Portsmouth. He has written widely on French
history and nationalism, and on contemporary French politics.
He is co-editor of Modern and Contemporary France and the Journal of
Area Studies, and the author of Nationalism in France: Class and
Nation since 1789 ( 1990).
Anand Menon is Lecturer in the Politics of European Integration
at the Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society at the
XI
University of Oxford. He is currently completing a book on

French relations with NATO 1981-94.
Jean-Marc Trouille is Lecturer in German at the University of
Bradford. His main research interests lie in the field of Franco-
German economic and political relations.
Introduction
Brian jenkins and Tony Chafer
From its onset in 1947 until its unexpected conclusion in the East
European revolutions of 1989, the Cold War set the parameters of social
and political life in Europe and beyond. While it varied in intensity,
from moments of war-threatening crisis to periods of relative detente, it
defined international relations and shaped both domestic politics and
popular attitudes. The settlement agreed between the 'Big Three'
victorious powers at Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 provided the framework
for the construction of the 'bloc' architecture of the post-war period -
Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in the 'East', and in the 'West' Bretton-
Woods and GATT, NATO and the emerging structures of West
European 'integration'. While Europe was the cradle and fulcrum of
this great divide, superpower politics increasingly imposed its logic on
the international community at large, inviting states everywhere to align
themselves with one or other of the rival blocs.
France's position in this changed world order was an ambiguous one.
While French forces, both military and civilian, had participated in the
liberation of national territory and in the final defeat of Nazi Germany,
the country's status as a world power was inevitably jeopardised by the
humiliation of 1940 and the experience of occupation and Vichy
collaboration. De Gaulle's difficult wartime relationship with the
American and British authorities, who had been reluctant to recognise
his legitimacy and who had toyed with the idea of imposing an Allied
military government on France during the Liberation,• culminated in
France's exclusion from the conference table at Yalta and Potsdam. This
experience undoubtedly coloured De Gaulle's own foreign-policy
perspectives, and indeed his signature of a mutual-assistance pact with
the Soviet Union in December 1944 confirmed his reluctance to align
France exclusively with the emerging Western bloc. In the immediate
post-war period, however, there was a much wider ambivalence about
France's future role, and the presence of Communist ministers in
French governments until May 1947 was a brake on any definitive
commitment to 'Atlanticism'.
1
2 Introduction
The provision of American 'Marshall Aid' to France, the heightening

of international tension, and the expulsion of the Communist ministers
all contributed in 1947 to drive France into the Western 'camp'.
However, deep ambiguities remained, and the undercurrents of anti-
Americanism which characterised Gaullist foreign policy in the 1960s
were already amply evident under the Fourth Republic. On European
integration for example, the Communists, Gaullists and Left Socialists
who so fiercely opposed and eventually in 1954 defeated proposals for a
European Defence Community were mobilised by the fear that the
EDC was simply a device for sacrificing French national sovereignty to
the imperatives of the bloc system. Even amongst those who supported
the proposal, some were driven by the idea that 'Europe' itself could
become a 'third force' in world politics, in a position of relative non-
alignment between the two blocs. 2 On a different front, anti-
Americanism also surfaced over the USA's condemnation of the 1956
Anglo-French Suez venture and its refusal to back France in the
Algerian War.s
Of course, none of these recurrent flourishes of national self-assertion
ever seriously jeopardised France's ultimate identification with the 'free
world' and the Western Alliance. The economic and ideological logic of
the global confrontation between capitalism and Communism was too
powerful for a medium-ranking power to resist. However, France's
experience of the Cold War was inevitably coloured by the presence,
until 1981 at least, of a powerful Communist Party which has often
identified itself closely with the interests of the Soviet bloc, and which
never succeeded in shedding those associations even when it sought to
do so. The deep roots and loyalties established by the PCF and its
affiliated organisations in French working-class culture ensured that,
especially in the 1950s, the Cold War was not just an 'external' reference
point but a deep internal divide in French society itself.
One of De Gaulle's most remarkable achievements in the 1960s was
therefore to develop a foreign-policy discourse which sought to
'synthesise' previously irreconcilable positions. The pursuit of national
independence and grandeur sacrificed the colonial past to the
ambition ofleading 'Europe', embraced economic modernisation, and
combined an underlying commitment to the 'West' with a highly
critical perspective on American hegemony within the western bloc.
The development of the 'independent' Jorr:e de frappe, removal of France
from the command structures of NATO in 1966, resistance to British
membership of the Common Market, opposition to 'supra-nationalism'
in the EEC, were all calculated to appease voters, including
Brian Jenkins and Tony Chafer 3
Communists, who might otherwise have resisted more forcefully

France's increasing integration into the international mechanisms of
the Western market economy.
Of course, De Gaulle was able to carve out this role for France thanks
largely to the growing relaxation of East-West relations after the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962. His unambiguous support for Kennedy in the
latter confrontation confirmed where France's true allegiance lay, as
indeed some twenty years later did Mitterrand's support for American
deployment of the 'Euromissiles' following a new intensification of the
Cold War. But in the interim, a climate of relative ditente allowed De
Gaulle to lay the foundations of what appeared to be a broad and
durable foreign-policy consensus. 4 While his successors would seldom
push the rhetoric quite so far in the direction of non-alignment or
'equi-distance' between the superpowers, there was still sufficient
leeway for the illusion of a considerable degree of 'national autonomy'
to be sustained.
The Cold War thus provided a framework within which France was
eventually able to establish a niche for itself as a middle-ranking power
with continuing pretensions to world influence. With the status
conferred by nuclear weapons and membership of the Security
Council, with its leading role in the European Community and its
residual spheres of interest in its former empire, France was frequently
able to exploit the available 'space' between the rival power blocs, and
lay claim to a distinctive identity as a player on the world stage.5
Inevitably, therefore, the train of events which culminated in the fall
of the Berlin wall and the wave of revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989, marked a decisive watershed for France. 6 The new thaw in
East-West relations after Gorbachev's accession to power in the USSR
(March 1985) heralded not only the end of the Cold War but also the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The key reference points of French
foreign policy and France's self-image in the world were thus removed.
The 'space' provided by the bloc system effectively disappeared in a
'New World Order' shaped by the victory of the Western market model
and the threatened dominance of a single superpower.
Of course, the collapse of the Communist regimes was itself in part
the consequence of a longer-term process of economic globalisation.
The international market forces which helped generate the pressures
for change in the East had already in France, and elsewhere in Western
Europe, undermined the bases of State-led economic interventionism
and had weakened nation-state autonomy.? The dramatic re-shaping of
the world order since 1989 is thus linked to a wider process of
4 Introduction
ideological upheaval - the crisis of socialism, widespread popular

resistance to the logic of 'victorious' liberal capitalism, the rise of new
nationalisms. France has felt the full weight of this upheaval. The end
of the Cold War with its simplified polarities confirmed the advent of a
new era of uncertainty, marked by a reappraisal of France's position in
the world, fundamental political realignment, and deep-seated popular
fears and anxieties.
FRANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD
This book sets out to explore and analyse the key features of this
transitional process. The opening section seeks to situate the current
dilemmas in the broad historical context of the post-war period. Jolyon
Howorth's overview of French security policy since 1944 challenges the
prevailing orthodoxy by identifying a fundamental continuity of
perspectives between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. According to this
interpretation, there has been a 'quasi-consensus' ever since the war
that France's security depended on the quest for an integrated
European security order. This, it is argued, was as true for De Gaulle as
for anyone else, and the Gaullist themes of national independence and
grandeur should be understood within this broader context. The goal
was that of 'non-dependence' within the Western Alliance rather than
genuine national 'autonomy', and only an integrated European
structure (with France playing a leading role) would be capable of
'holding its own against Washington'. The problem throughout both
Republics has been that this vision of Europe was not shared in London
and Bonn, though in conclusionjolyon Howorth suggests that Fran~,;ois
Mitterrand has arguably succeeded where De Gaulle failed in forging a
distinctive West European defence identity within the Alliance.
Ironically, this achievement coincided with the end of the Cold War
and the disappearance of the Soviet 'threat', which of course raises
fundamental questions about the future of NATO and nuclear
deterrence, and which indeed throws the security agenda of the entire
post-war period into confusion.
This reinterpretation of the so-called 'Gaullist consensus' reminds us
that the vision of a French and European non-dependent 'space' in the
East-West bloc system has long been widely shared across the political
spectrum. In contrast to the Gaullist legacy, Martyn Cornick's chapter
identifies a quite separate and distinctive tradition of 'left-neutralism'
which trod a rather different path between Atlanticism and pro-Soviet
communism. Focusing on the non-communist Left intelligentsia

grouped around Esprit, Le Monde and L'Observateur in the 1947-51
period, Cornick reveals a current of ideas marked by pacifism,
libertarian socialism, and the rejection of the Cold War and bloc
politics. This neutralism fed on widespread public fears of a third world
war, and was later a potent element in the campaign against the EDC,
but as a political force it was squeezed out by other movements, notably
the Communists and the Gaullists, who poached on neutralist territory
from different angles. The fusion of the theme of 'non-alignment' with
socialism and opposition to nuclear weapons eventually proved less
attractive than the Gaullist blend with its more militarist and nationalist
overtones, although, as Cornick reminds us, the tradition has recently
shown signs of revival in response to both the Gulf War and the
Bosnian crisis.
In the event, of course, genuine 'neutralism' was never
a viable option once France was drawn into the emerging structures of
a predominantly Atlanticist European Community. Jean-Marc Trouille
focuses on the Franco-German relationship, which has been so central
to the construction of the 'European pillar' of the Western Alliance,
and whose current malaise is a crucial exemplar of the impact of
geopolitical and geostrategic change.8 The former 'balance' between
French political and German economic power (the 'bomb' and the
'mark') has been disrupted by the emergence of a reunified Germany
as a major world player, as the centre of gravity on the continent, as an
economic model for the new East European states, and as the USA's
main partner in Europe. The anxieties this has awakened in France
have coincided with growing internal opposition to the project of
European integration, and a loss of momentum in French efforts in
this direction. Whilst recognising the new questions and uncertainties
raised by these developments, Trouille nonetheless concludes that the
various advantages each partner derives from the alliance, an4 the lack
of any viable alternative, should be sufficient to secure the
relationship's future.
Finally in this opening section, Dominique David addresses the
impact of new global uncertainties and realignments on French
strategic perspectives, themselves deeply rooted in France's geopolitical
location, in French concepts of citizenship and universalism, and in the
country's colonial past. The East-West system offered France the
opportunity, especially under De Gaulle, to achieve 'a political impact
much greater than the means at its disposal' at the margins of the
international order (sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East} by
6 Introduction
adopting an individualist policy. The disappearance of the East-West

system has effectively removed this option, and has exposed the
logistical limitations of the continuing aspiration to a 'world role'. In
what the author calls the changed 'psychological and political
geography' of the world, France no longer enjoys the same rank on the
global 'power-scale', and this invites a fundamental reappraisal of
strategic and defence policy.
DEFENCE AND SECURTIY
The second section of the book turns specifically to this field of defence
policy, and to the debates which currently surround it. As Janet Bryant
points out, the 1994 Defence White Paper, the first for twenty-two years,
offered France an opportunity to assess its early experience of the New
World Order and to make an appropriate strategic response. While the
White Paper has clearly taken some lessons on board, for example in its
analysis of likely future conflict scenarios, the main problem remains
whether budgetary resources can measure up to the new ambitions.
The commitment to modernise both nuclear and conventional forces
is enormously expensive, and the sharing of costs through the
promotion of a common European defence policy is not an immediate
prospect. Janet Bryant's exposition of this problem inevitably recalls the
question raised by Dominique David, namely whether it has yet been
recognised just how deeply France's traditional strategic perspectives
have been undermined by the recent transformation of the global
environment.
One genuinely fundamental question addressed by the White Paper
was that of recruitment to the armed forces. As Paule Chicken
indicates, the issue was thrown into sharp relief by the GulfWar, where
France's contribution was severely restricted by the impossibility of
deploying conscripts. This underlined the case for a highly trained and
mobile professional army, not least because this kind of regional conflict
is seen as a paradigm for the future. However, the White Paper
vigorously defended the principle of national service, partly on the
grounds that a fully professional force would be too expensive, but
above all on the strength of the classical argument that military service
promotes national identity and social integration. Paule Chicken
questions this idealised image of national service as 'melting pot',
showing that in practice the system is often discriminatory and socially
divisive. Given the cultural, financial and military complexities of the
issue, she sees an ad hoc solution, involving a shift in the balance

between conscripts and regulars, as the most likely in the medium
term.
Equally crucial, of course, is the question of the future balance
between France's conventional and nuclear forces, and here the
historical legacy weighs just as heavily. France's 'independent' nuclear
capability was the lynch-pin of Gaullist grandeur' and is now deeply
embedded in the defence culture. Despite the transformed
international setting, the 1972 'minimum deterrence' doctrine remains
unchanged in the new White Paper, and a quarter of the defence
budget is assigned to modernisation of France's nuclear forces. The
retention of nuclear weapons is thus not an issue, and indeed sections
of the military establishment and of the political Right favour moving
away from (outmoded) 'deterrence' theory towards a more flexible
strategy involving usable battlefield nuclear weapon systems. On the
other hand, as Shaun Gregory's chapter records, France has recently
involved itself for the first time in international treaty processes aimed
at controlling both the testing and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and indeed in 1992 Mitterrand announced a moratorium on
French nuclear weapons tests. The contradictions are all too evident.
While public opinion largely approved the suspension of tests,
Mitterrand's decision attracted considerable military-industrial and
political opposition on the grounds that tests were essential to nuclear
modernisation, and that the linkage between the French and Russian
moratoriums compromised French sovereignty. The debate is clearly
destined to continue in the post-Mitterrand era.
THE ECONOMY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
As already indicated, the development of the global market economy

was both a factor in the disintegration of the communist bloc, and a
defining characteristic of the New World Order. The changed
international environment was thus seen to offer immense new
economic opportunities for advanced capitalist countries. Cliff Gulvin's
chapter examines the impact on French trade and investment patterns
of the potential new markets that have opened up in the former USSR,
in eastern and central Europe, and indeed in communist-controlled
but rapidly-reforming China and Vietnam. The general verdict is that,
despite increasing effort and involvement in these areas, France's
relative position (especially in trading terms) remains weak, except in
8 Introduction
the case of Vietnam and the former East Germany. As regards

explanations for this disappointing performance, overly cautious
business attitudes and comparative macro-economic disadvantages
have, in Gulvin's view, been less significant than the 'clear-cut
intensification of French trade and investment with the European
Union countries in the last decade or so'.
Another area where the impact of global change has had less impact
than might have been expected is that of French aid to sulrSaharan
Africa. Here, Gordon Cumming argues that the traditional constraints
on French policy have proved more influential than the changing
international context, leaving both the scale and structure of aid largely
intact. While France has moved towards advocacy of the World Bank
position, linking aid to sound financial management and free market
forces, the implementation of these principles has been patchy.
Similarly, Mitterrand's 1990 statement that aid would also be
conditional on democratic and human rights reforms has since been
considerably watered down. The advantages France derives from its
relationship with francophone Africa - political, strategic, cultural and
commercial - have so far discouraged any drastic overhaul of the aid
programme.
Both of these chapters illustrate the g-ap between national political
discourse and economic realities, and David Hanley's analysis of the
GAIT negotiations confirms the point by focusing on the growing
impact of economic globalisation. Setting the context of the Uruguay
Round, he notes the declining economic autonomy of national
governments and the consequent narrowing of ideological and
political space. In his words, 'the end of the Cold War simply gave a
boost to these secular trends' by finally discrediting and dismantling
the only alternative economic model. The GAIT negotiations, which
raised the prospect of general tariff cuts in previously immune areas
like cultural production and agriculture, where France has particular
sensitivities, were therefore a stern reminder of the exigencies of
market globalism. Assessing reactions to the process, Hanley identifies
the now well-established fault-line between the 'core parties' (RPR-
UDF, PS), essentially 'globalists' though often out of necessity rather
than conviction, and a variegated critical periphery which challenges
the globalist imperative from an anti-imperialist (PCF-CGT, Greens) or
a cultural-xenophobic (FN) position. 10 This pattern is set against the
wider background of growing public frustration at the dwindling
leverage national politicians have on the economy, and indeed on all
the other policy areas that depend on it.
Brian jenkins and Tony Chafer 9
POUTICS
David Hanley's emphasis on the political rivalries surrounding the

GAIT agreements offers a bridge to the next section, which focuses
specifically on the response of French political organisations to the new
world environment. Anand Menon brings us back to the theme of
defence policy, but considered this time in terms of the constraints
imposed on it by the alleged cross-party 'defence consensus'. This, he
argues, is largely a myth, narrowly based on the Left's endorsement of
the forr:e de frappe in the late 1970s. It has been used ever since the early
1980s to stifle criticism and debate, and to paper over fundamental
disgreements about the role of nuclear and conventional weapons, and
the nature of France's contribution to western and European security
institutions. The Socialists in particular found it useful for political
reasons to don the Gaullist mantle and cultivate the illusion of
consensus, and the consequent immobilisme left crucial issues
unresolved and delayed appropriate responses to the new post-Cold
War strategic environment. Ironically, it is the neo-Gaullist heirs of De
Gaulle in the RPR-led government of Edouard Balladur who have felt
less constrained by the 'consensus', and have begun to develop new
defence policy options stressing the need for cooperc1tion with allies
and with NATO in particular.
This paralysis of the Socialists on defence policy is arguably
symptomatic of a wider crisis of identity on the Left, as analysed by Guy
Groux in his study of French labour unions. 11 Indicating how
profoundly the structure of French unionism was shaped by rival
ideological allegiances, first in the wake of the Russian Revolution and
again in the Cold War, he traces the tortuous process which brought
the Left to power in 1981 equipped with a mdical project of social and
economic change. While from the 1960s onwc1rds, the Soviet 'model'
was losing credibility and appeal, and the advent of consumerism was
displacing the image of the worker as 'the crux of the economic
system', there was nonetheless a genuine and nationally distinctive
'social blueprint' at the heart of the Left's 1981 progmmme. By the end
of the 1980s, with the collapse of the communist regimes and the
French Left's failure in power, 'the two systems of reference that had
shaped ideological perceptions and prc1ctices of revolutionary unionism
and, as an indirect consequence, of the reformist unions, crumbled'. In
conclusion, Guy Groux notes the 'minimalism' of French unions today,
which either seek a 'social accommodation with libemlism' or try to
10 Introduction
sustain 'a form of protest unionism now devoid of any global

perspective'.
The endorsement of economic liberalism by Chirac's RPR in the
early 1980s, though less ideologically traumatic than the Socialists'
conversion, still represented a break with significant features of the
Gaullist past. Acceptance of the global market model diluted not only
the economic interventionism and social populism of traditional
Gaullism, but also its nationalism. This transition inevitably left its scars,
especially on the issue of European integration where, as Peter Fysh
indicates, RPR inconsistencies were thrown into sharper relief by
German reunification and the changes in Eastern Europe. The
Maastricht debate revealed the depth of RPR divisions on this matter,
and there have also been substantial recent disagreements over
American security leadership and French nuclear doctrine. However,
Peter Fysh argues that for a variety of reasons internal conflicts over the
future political shape of Europe and over military strategy already show
signs of abating. A more likely threat to party unity are, in his view, 'the
transfers of sovereignty involved in European economic and monetary
union', and he points to the growing support for the Pasqua-Seguin
challenge to Balladur's liberal economic orthodoxy. The traditional
Gaullist fault-line between liberal pragmatists and populist
interventionists appears to have reasserted itself. 12
Finally in this section, Paul Hainsworth points to a significant
ideological realignment of the Front National in the context of the
'New World Order'. The movement's 1978 espousal of Reaganite
economic liberalism, reaffirmed in 1984, has frequently been
commented on as something of an anomaly, out of kilter both with the
traditions of the French extreme Right and with the profound
illiberalism of the rest of the FN programme. 1 ~ However, the historical
context- the perceived Soviet threat and the arrival of the French Left
in power - clearly made anti-communism and anti-Statism politically
profitable themes, and economic liberalism drew new recruits into Le
Pen's 'ideological hold-all'. The collapse of the communist regimes and
the endorsement of the 'market' by all mainstream French parties has
now opened up space for the FN to reposition itself ideologically, by
bringing its economic arguments more into line with its political and
cultural discourse and traditions. The new protectionist emphasis
corresponds more closely to the instincts of the FN's core clientele, and
seeks to capitalise on the anti-globalist, anti-American and anti-
'European federalist' groundswell discussed earlier by David Hanley.
FRANCE, IMMIGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE MAGHREB
The Front National exemplifies the 'ethnicisation of political discourse'

in France, and it is tempting to see this as somehow linked to a shift in
global issues from an East-West to a North-South axis as the Cold War
came to an end. Alec Hargreaves warns against the dangers of too
simplistic an equation between the two, which may be used to provide a
spurious international rationale for ethnocultural tensions. Instead he
argues that several different processes are involved, each with its own
dynamics and timescale. The demonisation of Islam 14 has its roots in
the oil crises of the 1970s and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, while the
decay of traditional class-based perceptions of Left and Right was the
result above all of the failure of Socialist reflationary policies in the
early 1980s. Both processes were visible in French public opinion well
before the post-1985 thaw in the Cold War. Indeed, in Hargreaves's
view the root causes of the ethnicisation of political debate lie in the
deep social pressures engendered by economic recession and the
radical restructuring of employment patterns. In this context, the Left
bears a considerable measure of responsibility for failing to defend its
traditional principles of class-based solidarity, and for occasionally
exploiting ethnic tensions for electoral purposes.
Martin Evans' chapter on Franco-Algerian relations in the post-Cold
War era offers a rather different perspective on the 'demonisation of
Islam'. He links the contemporary Algerian crisis directly to the deeper
processes which have shaped the 'New World Order', namely the
growing pressure of economic globalisation on Algeria's socialist
command-economy, the irrelevance of 'non-alignment' once the bloc
system collapsed, the failure of the ruling FLN's Western-style political
and economic reforms, and the emergence of fundamentalism as the
main alternative in the shape of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). In
this context, France's response to the brutal repression of the October
1988 strikes, which marked the beginning of the crisis, and to the army
take-over ofjanuary 1992, which annulled the elections that threatened
to bring the FIS to power, has been a muted one. As Evans indicates, for
French governments of both Left and Right the advent of a
fundamentalist government in Algeria 'has been a worst case scenario to
be prevented at all costs', even if this involves tacit acceptance of
undemocratic methods. These fears reflect concerns that the threat to
the West now comes not from eastern Europe but from 'maverick
Third World regimes', that 'Islamic fundamentalism has replaced
communism as the main adversary of Western democracy', that the
12 Introduction
terrorist action of the FIS could destabilise the Algerian community in

France and swell the ranks of Algerian political refugees crossing the
Mediterranean.
This final chapter reminds us of the interdependence of the various
processes involved in the advent of the 'New World Order'. While
earlier chapters on foreign and defence policy inevitably focused on
the new geostrategic environment produced by the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of the bloc system, this event was itself prepared
by the gradual globalisation of market forces which irresistibly
undermined the command economies of the communist bloc. It is, of
course, important to avoid economic reductionism, and to recognise
that the attraction of the Western 'model' also had a 'political'
dimension, but the incapacity of communist regimes to divert resources
to the satisfaction of growing consumerist aspirations was central to
their failure.
France's place in this new world environment often appears,
throughout this volume, to have been shaped more by the effects of
economic globalisation than by the end of the Cold War per se. Even in
the field of foreign and defence policy, France's reduced leverage on
the international system reflects the difficulty of meeting the spiralling
defence costs of a strictly 'national' posture just as much as it reflects
the new political geography of the world. In a whole series of policy
areas global market forces have set firm limits to the scope of
government action, and the political triumph of the liberal capitalist
model has simply intensified a process that was already well underway.
In terms of domestic political realignment too, the end of the Cold
War has been a symbol rather than an agent of change. It is of course
true that the bloc system was a crucial reference point in the French
Left-Right divide, but the process of ideological decay was visible long
before the Wall came down. Political discourses based on the
solidarities of class (the Left) and national self-determination (both the
Left and Gaullism) have long been undermined by fundamental
changes in the country's economic and social structure, and by the
difficulty of enacting programmes that run contrary to the logic of
market globalism. Ideological choices have been reduced, and growing
public frustration at the incapacity of governments to find solutions to
the most pressing social problems threatens to destabilise the party
political system. While the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions in
eastern Europe will mark out 1989 as a watershed year in world history,
the symbolism should not obscure the deeper processes of global
interdependence which increasingly constrain the politics of nation-
states, and not least in the country widely credited with the invention of
the concept of 'national sovereignty'.
Notes
1. H.Footitt and J. Simmonds, France 1943-45 ('The Politics of

Liberation' series, Leicester University Press, 1988).
2. M. Newman, Socialism and European Unity: the Dilemma of the Left
in Britain and France Ounction Books, 1983), pp. 29-30.
3. J.-P. Rioux, The Fourth Republic 1944-58 (Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp. 254-84.
4. For discussion of this 'consensus', see the chapters by J. Howorth and
A Menon below.
5. See, in particular, the chapter by D. David below.
6. For coverage of the post-1989 era, seeP. Gordon, A Certain Idea of
France. French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton
University Press, 1994); R. Tiersky, France in the New Europe
(Wadsworth, 1994); M. Maclean andJ. Howorth (eds), Europeans on
Europe. Transnational Vrsions ofa New Continent (Macmillan, 1992).
7. See, in particular, the chapter by D. Hanley below. For discussion of
external constaints on policy-making, see P. Godt, Policy-Making in
France (Pinter, 1989) and P. Hall, J. Hayward, and H. Machin,
DevefDJmumts in Ftrmch Politics (Macmillan, revised edition, 1994).
8. See J. Friend, The Linchpin. French-German Relations 1950-1990
Praeger, 1991); P. McCarthy (ed.), France-Germany, 1983-1993. The
Struggle to Cooperate (St Martin's Press, 1993) and Modern and
Contemporary France, 49, April 1992 (Special Issue on 'Franco-German
relations').
9. See P. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of De Gaulle's
FOTr!ignPolicy (Cambridge University Press, 1980).
10. For an assessment of the French political party system based on this
'core-periphery' model, see A. Cole (ed.), French Political Parties in
Transition (Dartmouth, 1989).
11. See also G. Groux, 'Industrial relations in Fr.mce: union crisis and the
"French exception" ' in journal of Area Studies, 5, Autumn 1994
(Special Issue on 'Trctde unionism and industrial relations in Europe
in the 1990s'), pp. 80-90.
12. At the time of writing (March 1995), Jacques Chirac's presidential
campaign is making substantial concessions to the Pasqua-Seguin
position on economic and social policy, thus reinforcing Peter Fysh's
prediction that this will become a major source of disunity in the RPR.
13. For a valuable introduction to the study of the Front National, and an
extensive bibliography, see P. Hainsworth, 'The extreme Right in post
war France: the emergence and success of the Front National' in P.
14 Introduction
Hainsworth (ed.), The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA (Pinter,
1992), pp. 2~.
14. See the Special Issue on 'Islam in France' of Modern and Contempurary
France, 45, Aprill991.
Section I
Foreign Relations
1 France and European
Security 1944-94:
Re-reading the Gaullist
'Consensus'
Jolyon Howorth
In the fifty years since the end of the Second World War, the debate on
European security has been at the heart of international relations. At
the heart of that debate has been a succession of French blueprints for a
European security order. At the heart of most of those blueprints has
been the phenomenon known as 'Gaullism'. By the mid-1980s Gaullism
was widely considered to command the respect of a broad consensus
across the political class in France. The approach adopted and the
specific issues addressed by the many authors who have written on the
subject vary considerably and the range of nuance in the interpretation
of what actually constitutes 'Gaullism' is extensive. However, the
received wisdom generated by this literature is aptly summarised in the
most recent contribution to it, which argues that:
the distinctive elements of the Gaullist model for French national

security [are] the absolute need for independence in decision-
making, a refusal to accept subordination to the United States, the
search for grandeur and rang, the primacy of the nation-state, and
the importance of national defence.'
The very titles of the major works generally reflect this 'model' .2 The
present paper, while in no way denying the significance of these factors
connected with national independence, nuclear autonomy and
grandeur, nevertheless offers an alternative- European- interpretation
of what I shall suggest has been the fundamental agenda of French
security policy.~
I shall argue that, ever since 1944, there has been in France a quasi-
consensus in favour of the view that the country's real security could not
be guaranteed unless it were set within the broader context of an
17
18 France and European Security 1944-94
integrated European security order in which, naturally, France would

play a dominant if not the dominant role. But the broad features of that
order involve collective security and a significant element of
interdependence, European autonomy as a counterweight to American
preponderance (but also, in a rather paradoxical way, as the ultimate
guarantee of the Atlantic Alliance's credibility and effectiveness), and a
recognition of the limitations and ultimate fragility of any strictly
national defence. In the first instance, this has been a west European
agenda, involving, over time, slightly different configurations of actors.
It is on this west European agenda that this chapter focuses. That
agenda has, from time to time, co-existed with another, all-European
agenda (best epitomised by de Gaulle's notion of a Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals), but the latter has tended to be spasmodic,
whereas the former has been permanent. France's most persistent
problem in implementing the west European security entity as outlined
above is that she has been alone among European countries in holding it
Most analysts have drawn attention to the existence of this European
dimension, but none (with the partial exception of Stanley Hoffmann)
has presented it as central to French policy, most preferring to regard it
as existing in, at best an ambivalent, at worst a contradictory relationship
to the fundamental notions of national independence and international
grandeur. I shall argue, on the contrary, that French diplomacy stressed
the complenumtarity between grcllldeur and European integration. Seldom
was this better put than by the General himself, as in 1962:
Owing to the fact that, for the first time in history, there are no
longer any quarrels among European neighbours, France must help
to build western Europe into an organised union of states so that,
little by little, we can see the establishment, on either side of the
Rhine, the Alps and perhaps the Channel, of an entity which, in
political, economic, cultural and military terms will be the most
powerful, prosperous and influential the world has ever seen.
This paper therefore challenges the existing 'orthodoxy' on this point. 4
FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY UNDER THE FOURTH

REPUBLIC
From the middle of the nineteenth century, French security policy

constantly oscillated between, on the one hand, the attractions but
jolyon Howorth 19
inconvenience of alliances and, on the other hand, the status but

inadequacy of independence. In 1945, and arguably ever since, the
prospects for meaningful autonomy or independence were objectively
non-existent. Despite de Gaulle's personal stature and the powerful
symbolism of his gestures and rhetoric, nobody seriously imagined that
France was at that point in time (or was likely to become in the
foreseeable future) anything other than a medium-rank power. De
Gaulle himself made clear his vision of the post-war order in a number
of speeches in 1944 in which he conjured up the contours of a 'Western
grouping ... whose main arteries will be the Channel, the Rhine and
the Mediterranean' and which 'seems to constitute a potentially vital
centre within a world organisation of production, exchanges and
security'.5 Scholars have noted that de Gaulle, who referred frequently
to this 'grand design' in the immediate post-war years, was either
uncertain or confused (or both) as to its precise institutional structure.•
But there are abundant indications in these years that the General saw
France's only realistic hope of exercising influence on the emerging
post-war stage as being through its role as a representative of some
grouping or other of the smaller west European states. Such a grouping
would have had the additional advantage of 'containing' in some way or
another whatever emerged of the defeated Germany. This immediate
posing of the 'German problem' in a wider European framework has of
course become a permanent feature of French security policy to this
day.
The Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947, far from being essentially an
example of 'great power' bilateralism, completing the triangular anti-
German neatness of the Anglo-Soviet (1942) and Franco-Soviet (1944)
agreements of the war era, was in fact the first conscious and concrete
step towards the forging of a European defence structure. 7 Opinions at
the time might have differed over the extent to which the treaty dealt
'correctly' with the German problem (i.e. enhanced French claims to
the weakening of Germany), but the fact remains that it locked Britain
into a fifty-year commitment to European security, and, according to
BidauJt,R opened the way towards the more comprehensive treaty of
Brussels the following year. This process, which traces its origins to a
variety of schemes for west European cooperation generated during the
war in both London and Algiers, and which was at the heart of de
Gaulle's own vision of the post-war order, amounted to clear
recognition on both sides of the Channel that genuine European
security would have to involve multinational cooperation and a
substantial measure of interdependence.
An immediate- and highly significant- difference between Britain

and France is worth noting. Whereas the French wanted a commitment
to joint action against even the threat of German aggression, the British
were only prepared to accept such a commitment in the event of actual
aggression. Britain's fear was that too sweeping a European treaty might
encourage American isolationism. Thus, from the very outset was posed
the essential issue which was to bedevil French plans for a European
security order throughout the entire post-war period. While France
expressed confidence in Europe's ability to safeguard her own future,
Britain was convinced that the old continent could never again be
secure without the permanent involvement of the new. 9 The
fundamental issue therefore rapidly became that of the precise balance
of influence and authority, within the new post-war structures, between
France, Britain, Germany and the United States. During the turbulent
early Cold War years, when the quest for a collective security structure
shifted from being targeted against Germany to being directed against
the USSR, the French, including (perhaps above all) de Gaulle, hoped
in the first instance for a close Anglo-French alliance as the basis of a
European security system. De Gaulle had argued frequently during the
war that 'France and Britain have for centuries been both the
heartlands and the champions of human freedom. That freedom will
perish if these two heartlands do not join together and if these
champions do not unite'. But Franco-British concertation, in de Gaulle's
view, was subject to two conditions. First, Britain should not (as many in
France assumed to be likely at the time) be the predominant power. As
de Gaulle himself put it, a European defence 'centred on London is
not the defence of Europe. That defence must be centred on France' .10
This was by no means an unreasonable proposition. On the other
hand, de Gaulle also believed that: 'As soon as we see the emergence,
on the continent, of a solid and resolute system, the insular tendencies
which are imputed to Great Britain will and must disappear. More than
ever, Europe is counting strongly on Great Britain' .11 The second
French caveat concerning the nature of Anglo-French security
cooperation was that it should not become a conduit leading to tk facto
American control, but should, on the contrary, constitute a genuine
European security pillar. Although these may have appeared to be
dangers in the immediate post-war years, by the end of the 1940s the
prospect of Britain emerging as the dominant military power in Europe
had in any case receded, as had the threat of Germany re-emerging as a
unified, centralised Reich. Accordingly, France was able to pay closer
attention to the problem of Franco-German relations.
Jolyon Howorth 21
Here again, there was far more agreement than is generally implied.
Most mainstream politicians in France, and particularly the two
individuals responsible for foreign policy, de Gaulle and Bidault,
believed, in the immediate post-war years, that the primary threat came
from a resurgent Germany and that the answer lay on the one hand in
some element of dismemberment, on the other hand in a European
security order. When, after 1947, that analysis no longer held good, so
the consensus shifted. Both Bidault, who had originally been one of the
most ardent advocates of a punitive approach to Germany, and de
Gaulle, who had been hardly less so, rapidly shifted tack and espoused
the cause of German association with the European security order. The
main difference between the two approaches was probably over the
precise nature of the relationship between that order and the United
States, a question to which I shall return. But on the order itself, such
differences as existed were more methodological and institutional than
to do with basic objectives. The Brussels treaty, which was in large part
the work of Bidault, was far more than a military alliance between
France, Britain and the Benelux countries. In many ways, it was the first
concrete expression of the European Community. 12 Moreover, although
for obvious reasons Germany was excluded in 1948, her inclusion in the
ethos of the treaty (and her eventual inclusion in its terms) was as
inherent in Brussels as, in the famous words of Hubert Beuve-Mery, was
German rearmament in the signature of the Atlantic Pact. By 1949, de
Gaulle was convinced that the new European security order would have
to be underpinned by Franc<rGerman reconciliation: 'Whether or not
Europe actually takes shape depends on whether or not there can be a
direct agreement between Germans and Gauls'. 1 ~ Thereafter, the
precise structures and modalities of that 'direct agreement' were to be
the focus of intense political battles over the European Defence
Community (EDC) and the emerging institutions of NATO. But the
fact remains that, from 1949 onwards, French perceptions of a
European security order devoted a central position to Germany. In the
meantime, however, the far greater problem for French statesmen was
the battle over the relationship between Europe and the United States
which was emerging within NATO.
While a constant vision of Europe, underpinned by a Franco-
German axis, was at the heart of de Gaulle's strategic thinking, a
second, and equally important element of his strategic approach was
his view of the nature of Europe's relations with the United States. Here
again, the emphasis which many commentators have put on his alleged
anti-Americanism, his distaste for alliances as such, his unwillingness to
commit himself, his desire for some ill-defined 'independence' is

misleading. De Gaulle was by no means opposed to alliances, indeed he
saw them as fundamental and indispensable. 14 What he would not accept
in alliances was what he called 'vassalisation'. The essence of Gaullist
'independence' is more connected with non- dependence than with
autonomy. This is notjust a semantic nuance, as he made clear in 1966:
What is independence? Certainly not isolationism or narrow

nationalism. A country can be a member of an alliance, such as the
Atlantic Alliance, and remain independent ... To be independent
means that one is not at the mercy (a Ia discretion) of any foreign
power. 15
His objective seems to have been to minimise dependence within

interdependence, or, in the view of Daniel Colard and Gerard Daille,
the capacity, within an international system, 'freely to choose one's
dependences'. 16 From the outset, de Gaulle argued strongly in favour of
the Atlantic Alliance, but the words he used when referring to the
indispensable coupling of the two sides of the ocean are highly
significant. Early in 1947, he spoke ofEuro-US cooperation and mutual
assistance ( concours), which he conceived primarily in economic and
material terms, referring to the Marshall Plan as 'a far-sighted initiative
... precisely because it forces Europe into mutual solidarity', and
insisting that France should continue to take the lead in pressing for an
Atlantic treaty. 17 On the same occasion, he used the word conjunction to
characterise the relationship, and early in 1948 argued that 'the efforts
of the old continent and of America must be conjugated (se conjugent)
in order to put our poor world back together again'. 18 Time and again
in these years he spoke in favour of a permanent structural relationship
between Europe and the United States. But the cardinal feature of all
his utterances was his refusal of imbalance within the Alliance. It was
only from about 1951, once the integrated structures of NATO had
begun to emerge that de Gaulle began overtly to attack the Alliance,
not per se, but for its lack of internal balance. 19 In November 1953, at the
height of the EDC controversy, he insisted that NATO was a good thing:
'it was right to make and to accept the Alliance, because we were
threatened, but it should have been a real alliance. The inconsistencies
of our regime have turned it in to a protectorate'. 20
On this, he was, of course, being unfair to the leaders of the Fourth
Republic, almost all of whose struggles within the emerging NATO
framework were to do with issues of trans-Atlantic balance. The
Jolyon Howorth 23
underlying strategic objective of Bidault's urgent call for a Haut Conseil

Atlantique pour Ia Paix in April 1950 was to establish an acceptable
division of labour among the different alliance partners, 'to distribute
the different tasks, economic, military and atomic [and] to establish, by
means of this organisation, better collaboration between the
[European] countries and the United States by giving Europe greater
weight in the discussions'. It was in an attempt to provide the
institutional framework for such a European contribution to Atlantic
equilibrium that the French government proposed the EDC in 1950.
The story of the EDC has been told many times, but one salient factor
has perhaps not been given the attention it deserves. The passionate
debates for and against the EDC demonstrate conclusively that France's
security was perceived by both camps as being inextricably tied up with
that of Europe as a whole. The difference between the two camps has
less to do with a distinction between national defence and collective
security, than between two visions of how best to promote the cause of a
stronger Europe and a more balanced alliance. In the case of the pro-
EDC lobby, which was prepared to throw France's entire military
capacity, her armed forces and traditions into this European melting
pot, the argument hardly needs making. 21 But the Gaullists by no means
opposed the EDC in the name of some narrower form of national
defence. In 1951, de Gaulle called for 'a common confederal power
structure to which each of us will delegate a portion of sovereignty.
This, in particular, in economic, defence and cultural matters'. The
General's speeches against the treaty constantly counterpose his own
vision of a confederal European security system, based on inter-
governmental collaboration in a European Council strangely
anticipatory of the institution devised in the 1970s by his great (quasi-
federalist) rival, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. De Gaulle's proposal was for a
genuinely European military alliance, embracing Great Britain and a
sovereign West Germany:
the confederation would have every reason to ensure that the

peoples- including Germany [de Gaulle's italics] -who, together,
would guarantee the defence of Europe should adopt joint strategic
plans and that every possible means should be pooled . . . in
particular infrastructure, airports, ports, communications,
deployment of units, types of armaments, procurement of
equipment, general staffs etc.... everything which would allow for
the association of peoples in a confederated Europe. 22
His opposition to the EDC was not based on any form of 'anti-
Europeanism'. On the contrary, it was based on the fear that, if the
EDC were implemented, Europe as a whole would suffer because the
scheme would not work politically or (ipso facto) militarily. Above all, he
felt that his scheme for a confederal European defence entity would
bring about the necessary balance between the two sides of the Atlantic
which would actually improve relations between them and render the
Alliance itself much stronger. As has often been said, his opposition to
Monnet's vision of a United States of Europe was based on a fear that
such a project would become the Europe of the United States.
The EDC dibacle was to weigh enormously heavily on the future of
France's and Europe's security thinking. The fact that it revealed,
within France, a profound political fissure over the identity of the most
effective structure for European security effectively crippled French
attempts to push through their vision of the post-war world. In parallel,
France's tergiversations over the treaty were to infuriate Washington
and, synchronising as they did with the Indochina catastrophe,
effectively invalidated France, in American eyes, from playing any lead
role in the new security order. Instead - and this was the outcome
France had in fact sought at all costs to avoid - that role was henceforth
reserved for Germany, thus rendering doubly difficult the realisation of
the French vision of trans-Atlantic balance based on a European
Europe. With Britain already cast in the role of America's understudy,
and Germany in that of its principal European ally, the prospects for
the French vision of a European structure which could hold its own
against Washington became slim indeed.
It was in this context that two further events took place in the final
years of the Fourth Republic which made matters even worse. The first
was Suez, which served to confirm Paris's worst fears about the
inadequacies of an 'alliance' between parties which were fundamentally
unequal. The second, directly linked to Suez in many ways, was the
French decision to acquire a nuclear capacity. So much has been
written about that decision (which in fact amounted to a whole series of
decisions between 1944 and 1960) that it is difficult to make one very
important point simply. But there is abundant evidence to suggest that,
in the final debates over nuclear policy in Europe, the factor which
clinched French determination to pursue what is always presented first
and foremost as an independent nuclear force, was the realisation that
any other type of force would be so subject to international restrictions
and controls that Europe as a whole would for ever be subordinated in
Jolyon Howorth 25
this fundamentally important domain to the United States." It would

be a travesty to argue that France's primary purpose in developing her
nuclear arsenal was to reserve that arsenal for a future European role.
But it should be noted that, from as early as 1949, de Gaulle himself, in
commenting on the imbalances in the Atlantic Alliance, highlighted
the nuclear issue (and particularly the recent ending of the US nuclear
monopoly) as evidence that there would have to be strategic revisions
between the two sides of the Atlantic. Frederic Bozo, in listing the range
of Gaullist grievances against the US and NATO, makes the point that it
was 'Europe' (rather than 'France') which was perceived by the
General as the entity which was losing out through the direction of
NATO strategy. 24 Moreover, very early on in the Fifth Republic, leading
government figures were at pains to present France's nuclear policy as
being fundamentally pegged to the interests of Europe- those interests
being identified with the removal of the superpower condominium:
'French nuclear weapons are at the heart of Franco-American
relations', argued Pierre Messmer in 1963.
Later, they will come to the forefront of European politics because
Europe cannot be constructed exclusively around economic and
technical communities, necessary as they may be. For Europe to
exist, she will have to take on the responsibility for her defence and,
to that end, will require nuclear weapons. When we reach that point,
it will be seen that France's possession of national nuclear weapons
will become an essential element in the construction ofEurope. 25
To the extent to which, as practically all commentators have noted,
France has always perceived nuclear weapons in political and diplomatic
terms (rather than in strategic or military terms) this long-term
foresight, particularly when viewed from a post-Cold War perspective,
even begins to look obvious, and it is noteworthy that scholars are now
beginning to pay attention to the degree of compatibility between the
national independence dimension of French nuclear policy and the
European dimension.
Many scholars have noted that de Gaulle's own attempts to castigate
the Fourth Republic for its alleged sycophancy with regard to the
United States were motivated more by domestic political and
constitutional issues than by substantive divergence on security policy.
But in an effort to show that there was far more continuity between the
Fourth and the Fifth Republics than de Gaulle would have admitted
publicly, these same scholars have tended to stress that Fourth Republic
politicians, in their battle against Washington, laid the groundwork for
de Gaulle's independent and nationalistic policies. 26 Yet, as Raymond

Aron has suggested, the fundamental distinction in these years should
not be between the Fourth and Fifth Republics but between Britain and
France. Britain's approach Aron characterises as one of 'follow my
leader'. France, determined to produce a different European security
order, used 'discussion' and 'obstruction', the main difference between
the two Republics being that the Fourth used the 'blackmail of the
weak' whereas the Fifth used 'claims to greatness' .'¥1 But the leaders of
both Republics, as well as de Gaulle himself in the earlier period, were
motivated primarily by a vision of a European security order which
differed radically from that of Washington and of London. This they
put forward on various different occasions and in various different ways
through the course of the Fourth Republic. Therein (at least as much
as in the area of 'national independence') lies the clement of con-
tinuity. France's problem was that neither Britain nor Germany was
prepared to support her in promoting that vision. In large part for this
very reason, the solitary pursuit of it in the mid- 1960s became confused
with an almost obsessive quest for 'national independence'. But that
was by no means the way the Fifth Republic began its term.
FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY UNDER THE FIFTH

REPUBLIC
Analyses of France's security policy after the General's return in 1958

usually begin with the episode of the September 1958 Memorandum in
which de Gaulle proposed to Eisenhower and Macmillan a new
tripartite global command for NATO whereby the US, the UK and
France would be given clearly assigned roles in different theatres. The
Memorandum is traditionally presented as prime evidence of de
Gaulle's desire for French superpower status, as well as being clearly
intended as a marker leading to an eventual withdrawal from the
integrated command structure of NATO. But in between these two
levels, it is legitimate to detect another purpose, which was to offer a
European 28 challenge to what had become Washington's undisputed
hegemony in the old continent. The European dimension is at the
heart of all de Gaulle's speeches on the Alliance in these early years. On
the occasion of the failed four-power summit in Paris in May 1960 (the
U-2 incident), he expressed himself on the dangers of superpower
confrontation in Europe. While taking care to express solidarity with
the Alliance, he nevertheless insisted that the 'free peoples of this
Jolyon Howmth 27
ancient continent' should make use of their current protection to

organise their own increasingly collective security, arguing that the
world was progressively organising itself into large-scale continental
units and that the creation of a Western European unit would in fact
enhance the overall credibility and effectiveness ofNAT0. 29 A year later,
he insisted that NATO's integrated military command structure was in
fact having a debilitating effect on the commitment of the various
European nations to their own defences since each had begun to feel
that, at the end of the day, they could rely on the United States.~0
Michael Harrison suggested twelve years ago that de Gaulle's fun-
damental objective, in these initial years of the Fifth Republic, was
progressively to withdraw continental Europe from American
command within NATO and to place it under a regional European
command, which would (naturally) be dominated by France.~• This
hypothesis is borne out by the facts of Gaullist diplomacy between 1958
and 1963. In discussions with Italian Prime Minister Fanfani as early as 7
August 1958, the General proposed the creation of new structures
among the six existing membars of the European Economic
Community (EEC) through which could be promoted a viable form of
political cooperation; and on 14 September 1958, he discussed a policy
document on European political union with Chancellor Adenauer at
Colombey. 32 In january 1960, de Gaulle's proposals on regular meetings
of European foreign ministers saw the first quasi-institutional step on
the road to political cooperation. Throughout 1960, he pushed
extremely hard for intensive intergovernmental political cooperation
between the Six, particularly where foreign and security issues were
involved. These initiatives led directly to the establishment of the
Fouchet Commission, whose work was to dominate the European
agenda between February 1961 and April1962.
The General's clear intention through Fouchet was to put maximum
pressure on Washington to restructure the Alliance in a more balanced
way. The day before the crucial first meeting of the six leaders in Bonn
on 18July 1961, de Gaulle reiterated his view that:
Europe can have no political existence if it does not exist at the level
of defence ... What is NATO? ... It is not the defence of Europe by
Europe, it is the defence of Europe by the Americans. We need
another NATO. Above all, we need a Europe which has its own
defence. That Europe must be allied to the United States. I propose
that our joint commission put in train proposals for a European
defence: command structure, action plan, means.~3
Anglo-Saxon commentators on Fouchet have tended to suggest that the

breakdown of the proposals stemmed from the General's intransigence
in wishing to separate European security from the US, and from the
unbridgeable gulf between his confederal vision and the federalist
aspirations of the other European states. 54 But a recent French re-
assessment points out that the General actually went to considerable
lengths, and agreed to considerable compromises, in order to secure
his European vision. That vision was not of a cavalier Europe separated
from the USA, but of a powerful Europe capable of balancing and
complementing American influence in a revised Atlantic Alliance.
Certainly, there is nothing in any of the General's proposals which
implies separation of the security systems on the two sides of the
Atlantic. On the contrary, de Gaulle consistently made it clear that a
unified Europe would wish to remain a close ally of the USA. What he
was determined to secure was a structure in which Europe would
acquire effective political and military autonomy over its own security
within the Alliance. That is not the same thing as breaking with or
separation from the alliance. De Gaulle found it intolerable that some
of his European partners, particularly the Dutch Foreign Minister
Joseph Luns (later to become NATO Secretary General), were not
prepared even to brook autonomous European discussion of world
affairs outside the framework of NATO.
The French proved quite willing, in the course of the Fouchet
negotiations, to accept draft proposals specifying that a European
defence identity would not only remain part of the Alliance, but
actually strengthen it. De Gaulle even accepted, in a final round of
compromises with the Italian government, that economic issues would
be regarded as distinct from the other issues discussed at
intergovernmental level (politics, defence and culture) in the sense
that they were already basically covered by the EEC. The Fouchet neg-
otiations ultimately failed, it would seem, not so much because of the
irreconcilable nature of the political differences between France and
the other five nations, but because of a combination of historical
circumstance, incompatible personalities and political misjudgment.
The historical context was inauspicious, with great ambivalence
hanging over the incoming Kennedy administration, the dying Mac-
millan government, the increasingly beleaguered Khrushchev regime
and a number of European capitals as well. The prestige of Adenauer
was neutralised by his lack of political acumen, which meant that de
Gaulle's attempts to forge a privileged personal alliance with the
German leader fell foul both of his partner's weakness and of the
Jolyon Howorth 29
suspicions aroused elsewhere in Europe by the threatening Paris-Bonn

axis. Finally, de Gaulle himself clearly mi~udged the capacity of the
smaller nations such as Belgium and Holland to hold out against a
theoretical Franco-German lead. The Fouchet initiative thus foundered
on a reef of ambivalence and some confusion. But it did not douse de
Gaulle's ardour for a reformed Atlantic Alliance and a new deal for
European security.
His next move was therefore to revert to a form of his 'original'
vision of 1949-52 and concentrate on the construction of a bilateral
Franco-German alliance as the basis of a new European order.
Although the Elysee Treaty ofJanuary 1963 followed hard on the heels
of the collapse of the Fouchet negotiations, it must be borne in mind
that the discussions around a special Franco-German relationship had
been ongoing ever since the first meeting between de Gaulle and
Adenauer at Colombey in September 1959, and that this special
exercise in bilateralism was carried on in parallel with the multilateral
Fouchet negotiations. But the objective of both sets of negotiations was,
for de Gaulle, the same: the creation of a framework for the launching
of an autonomous European foreign and security policy within the
context of a restructured Atlantic Alliance. The Elysee Treaty has been
analysed, assessed and re-assessed many times. In one sense the actual
signing in January 1963 was an accident of history rather than the
consequence of incremental diplomatic progress. Although on
substantive issues the French and the Germans were, in January 1963,
probably further apart from each other than at several earlier stages in
the negotiations, Adenauer was, for a variety of reasons, keen to push
through a deal. The two sides were far from agreed, however, on what,
for de Gaulle, was the most fundamental issue: the construction of a
new European security order which would transcend NATO while at
the same time strengthening the Alliance. Adenauer was personally
committed to de Gaulle and enthusiastic about Franco-German security
cooperation, but at the same time he was politically committed to
Washington and indeed only one week before signing the Elysee Treaty
had agreed to Kennedy's proposals on the Multi-Latercll Force.55
In any case, within months, Adenauer was replaced by the
'Atlanticist' Erhard, Britain had Polaris missiles, the EEC was entering a
decade of crisis, the dead Kennedy had been replaced by the much
more domestic-policy-oriented Johnson, detente was blossoming and the
trouble spots in the world had shifted massively eastwards. In short, the
historic conditions for a major reappraisal of the trans-Atlantic balance
within NATO and for the construction of a European security order (if
they had ever really existed other than in de Gaulle's mind) had
objectively vanished. For most of the remainder of his presidency, de
Gaulle concentrated on challenging the strategic status quo in two ways.
First, by emphasising above all the French nuclear deterrent, France's
refusal of the NATO doctrine of flexible response, and, ultimately, by
flirting with the Ailleret notion of defense tous azimuts. Secondly, by
playing the 'detente card' of'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. The
former challenge, which has been the basis of most of the literature on
French 'national independence and grandeur', was nevertheless, from
the very outset, perceived by many not so much as a direct challenge to
a NATO doctrine increasingly flawed by the eternal problem of
geographic coupling, but as a potential European alternative to the
American deterrent.M Space does not allow for an examination of
French strategic doctrine in these years - itself an enormously complex
politico-technical issue. The one salient fact worth mentioning in this
context, however, is that if France found herself travelling a
diametrically opposite route to that of NATO in emphasising 'le rifus de
la bataille' as opposed to 'flexible response', this was not in the
egotistical hope of sparing French territory from the effects of a
nuclear war (nobody believed that radioactive dust would stop at the
Rhine!) but with the objective of sparing the whole of Europe from
such a catastrophe. The second ·challenge reinforced de Gaulle's
reputation for maverick statesmanship by enhancing his image as the
advocate of 'national independence' and by allowing him to pose an
alternative European vision to that promoted by either Washington or
Brussels; whereas its fundamental objective was once again to challenge
the superpower condominium, this time by manoeuvres towards the
East. The net result was that both these policies sowed the seeds of what
was to become fixed in the international collective consciousness as the
essence of Gaullism: nuclear nationalism, diplomatic exceptionalism
and individual prima-donnaism. But it should never be forgotten that
de Gaulle indulged in these activities for only a few brief years (1964-8)
and only after his considerable efforts to create an alternative west
European security order had come repeatedly to nought Nor should it
be overlooked that, despite de Gaulle's flamboyant 'withdrawal' from
NATO, a whole series of secret protocols subsequently made detailed
arrangements for French participation in the conventional defences of
Europe in the event of an actual NATO-Warsaw Pact military
confrontation." Moreover, as Stanley Hoffmann has suggested, after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the General actually
reverted, for the remaining months of his presidency, to his pre-1964
Jolyon Howorth 31
attempts to prioritise that elusive west European security entity.M When

de Gaulle left the scene in 1969, his 'legacy', precisely because it was so
multiple and so potentially ambivalent, was, for that reason, extremely
difficult either to continue or to modifY. The result has been something
of a fudge in which political and diplomatic simplicity has appeared to
produce continuity of the 'independence' and 'grandeur' type,
whereas, behind the scenes, respective presidents have in fact
continued to promote, in different ways and with more or less dis-
cretion (and success), the cause of a new European security order.
Significantly, the degree of commitment to that order has increased
constantly from Pompidou, via Giscard, to Mitten-and.
'GAULLISM' SINCE DE GAULLE
Georges Pompidou was, by personality and political preference, less

interested in strategic issues than either his predecessor or his two
successors. The historical context, marked by heightened ditente (SALT 1
and disengagement from Vietnam), also de-emphasised security issues.
Anxious to break with 'Gaullism' in the area of European integration,
he was careful to leave defence and security matters to such orthodox
'guardians of the temple' as Michel Debre and Pierre Messmer. Even
so, the 1972 Defence White Paper'9 (the only systematic presentation of
French defence policy ever thus codified) attempts to state as clearly as
possible the nature of France's relationship with the defence of Europe.
The commitment to European defence is stressed on several occasions
and the broad outlines of France's projected participation in that
defence are sketched out. But the basic point is also made very clearly.
The integrated command structure of NATO is seen both as an
unacceptable element of European subordination to the United States,
but also, in some ways more seriously, as a demotivating element which
prevented the various nations of Europe from taking defence as
seriously as they should. However, France's attitude to the Alliance 'is in
no way a refusal to play our part in the organisation of an eventual
European defence'. But that European defence of Europe clearly
depended as much on France's partners as on France herself. For the
moment, France contented herself with the observation that:
for us it is quite clear that the reality of a common European

defence depends on the political will of the various partners and on
the reality of their commitments. It is no use relying on superficial
statements which are not based on an accurate and shared

appreciation of the specific interests and respective efforts of the
various partners. At the present, the diversity of those appreciations
clearly rules out military union. 40
The fact was that France alone could not foster a genuinely European
security order if other countries were determined (or merely content)
to rely on an American 'umbrella'. We now know that Pompidou and
Edward Heath engaged in regular secret discussions about pooling
French and British nuclear capacity, but that the stumbling block, as
always, remained Britain's structural relationship with Washington. This
dilemma was revealed in its rawest state in 1973 during Kissinger's
infamous 'year of Europe' when Micheljobert attempted to challenge
Washington's reductionist view of Europe by reviving the Western
European Union (WEU) as the basis of a genuine European 'super-
power' - only to have his efforts dashed by German and British hostility
and suspicion. 41 Meanwhile, however, further agreements were reached
with NATO on French force participation in a European battle and
highly significant discussions were started between Paris and
Washington on the sharing of nuclear secrets, discussions whose very
existence was not revealed until 1989. 42 The Giscard septennat is subject
to quite diverse interpretations within this framework. The global
context is important to bear in mind: the erosion of detente and the
new Soviet military challenge, post-Vietnam withdrawal symptoms in
the USA, increasing destabilisation in Mrica and the Middle East, and
the economic effects of the oil shock. Giscard's entourage was pro-
European and Atlanticist and by no means wedded to the Gaullist
vision of a European security order as an alternative to NATO. On the
contrary, his advisers, Raymond Aron, Fran~;ois de Rose, Andre Giraud,
Admiral Delahousse and Generals Buis and Mery had all spent the
greater part of their career combating the excessively 'autonomist'
implications of 'Gaullism'. His UDF parties would not have been
unhappy for the new president to reintegrate NATO more or less
immediately. Giscard's security policy in fact falls into two periods and
can be explained by three basic factors. The first period (1974-7) was
marked by a radical shift in defence strategy and declaratory policy,
downplaying the nuclear dimension and reshaping both conventional
forces and their operational doctrines so as to bring them objectively
into line with France's European partners - as well as with NATO. The
second period (1977-81) saw an apparent return to 'doctrinal Gaullism'
alongside the de facto continuation of a policy of priority to
]olyon H(JU)()rlh 33
conventional weapons systems. Thus, the 1977-82 military programme

gave priority to tanks and combat aircraft, while decisions on France's
nuclear force were somewhat fudged, with older systems being
'upgraded' rather than a new generation ordered.45
The explanations are threefold. First, Giscard was hamstrung
politically by his dependence on the Gaullists in parliament. Second,
the collapse of detente and the growing Euromissiles crisis in the
second half of his septennat meant that he was loath to embark on any
major destabilisation of the existing defence orthodoxy. Thirdly,
although his vision of a united Europe was second in both intensity and
comprehensiveness to that of nobody, his method of arriving at that
objective was the opposite of the General's. Whereas de Gaulle felt that
by concentrating on foreign and security policy he could strengthen
and expand intergovernmentalism and thereby arrive at his confederal
solution, Giscard felt that by prioritising technical aspects of economic
and monetary union, he could progressively foster federalism, thereby,
at the end of the day, generating a common foreign and defence policy.
The difference was less in the objective than the method. But clearly,
for Giscard, the objective of a unified European security entity and
policy, primordial though it was, differed from that of de Gaulle in that
it would almost certainly be much more in harmony with 'Atlanticism'.
Ironically, it has been Franc;ois Mitterrand who has been the most
complete and subtle artisan of de Gaulle's original European vision.
Mitterrand has, at one and the same time, used his Atlanticist
credentials to defuse conflict with the United States (particularly over
the Euromissiles crisis) and to bring France ever closer to NATO, while
nevertheless constantly refusing what the General would have called
'vassalisation'; used his Gaullist presidential mantle to preside over a
major modernisation of France's nuclear arsenal and also a
revitalisation of the doctrinal elements of Gaullist defence policy which
had tended to disappear into a trough of ambivalence under Giscard;
and used his European commitment to pick up the Franco-German
baton where the General had left it in 1963 and to turn it (alongside
WEU) into an increasingly credible nucleus of the long-delayed
'European Pillar' of the Alliance, thereby giving a considerable boost to
that elusive west European defence identity which, by 1987, had
emerged in France as a new form of consensus. Ironically, that 'new
consensus' emerged both at precisely the moment when all
commentators were celebrating the consecration of the 'old consensus'
(around the classic image of Gaullism) and just as history was about to
undermine the foundations of both consensuses by ending the Cold
War. Historically, it is far too early to propose any 'definitive'

interpretation ofMitterrand's contribution to European security. I shall
therefore conclude by offering the following tentative pointers.
Firstly, Mitterrand's rapprochement with NATO has been authentic
(his Atlanticist credentials are impeccable), but it has also been both
limited and tactical. It has been limited in that he did not (contrary
both to widespread expectation and to the urging of at least one
defence minister, Pierre Joxe) reintegrate NATO's main committees-
until April 1993 when, under Balladur, France discreetly rejoined
NATO's military committee with full voting rights. 44 The tactical
dimension was twofold: first, to 'compensate' Washington for the
Communist ministers in his first government; and second, to facilitate
Franco-German discussions on European security. Mitterrand has, on
the whole, been successful in agitating for greater balance between the
two sides of the Atlantic.
Secondly, Franco-German dialogue was given the utmost priority
from 1982 onwc1rds (the advent of Helmut Kohl) and the range and
intensity of the numerous discussions has been quite remarkable.
However, prior to 1989, concrete results were limited, largely because
what the Germans actually wanted (conventional solidarity on the
central front} was, apart from the creation of the Force d'Action
Rapide and proposals for the Frc1nco-German brig-clde, not what Paris
was offering, while Frclnce's proposed 'contribution' (a hypothetical
nuclear 'umbrella' over West Germany) was distinctly unattractive to
Bonn. Since 1989, the Franco-German alliance has been the veritable
motor of the revived WEU.
Thirdly, Mitterrand's modernisation of France's nuclear arsenal was
conceived and set in train during the intensification of the Cold War in
the first half of the 1980s. His reaffirmation of 'classic' Gaullist nuclear
doctrine served several purposes. It enhanced his own presidential
image and permitted flattering comparisons with the General; it
avoided the pitfalls of attempting to devise a new doctrine which might
have closed the gap between the requirements of 'national defence'
and those of 'European security'; and it offered a potential, future
European 'alternative' to the American umbrella at a time when trans-
Atlantic tensions over security were becoming less and less manageable.
Finally, his promotion (through the revitalisation of the WEU) of the
'European Pillar' of NATO has been unremitting and relatively
successful. The WEU is now an active forum with an increasingly
credible agenda and - although for the moment falling far short of
operational credibility - constitutes for the first time since 1945 the
Jolyon Howorth 35
embryo of that 'European security identity' which the General and his
successors fought for half a century to establish.
For all these reasons, it can be argued that Mitterrand succeeded
(where the General failed) in promoting in very large measure the
European security agenda which, from 1944 onwards, was in fact that of
de Gaulle. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War has,
however, thrown that agenda into confusion in ways whose outcome is
still open-ended. This poses a number of new questions. Firstly, does
NATO in fact have a future and what does the eventual answer to that
question say about the constant French quest for a balanced
relationship between the security entities on the two sides of the
Atlantic? Secondly, what is the future of nuclear deterrence when the
old threat has all but disappeared and the new threat seems undeterred
by the existence of nuclear arsenals? Thirdly, what is the optimum geo-
strategic framework for a European security structure which is
struggling to exist alongside the emergence or consolidation of various
other international institutions (CSCE, NACC, PFP, EU) all covering
different geographic areas? Finally, given these previous complexities,
what are the prospects for the emergence of a unified European
foreign policy, without which a common security policy is inconceivable
(the Yugoslav problem is a critical test case in this regard, the answer
here too remaining very much open-ended)?
'Gaullism' may still be alive and well and living in Paris, but to all
intents and purposes it has changed beyond recognition. It is time to
adopt new concepts and a new vocabulary.
Notes
I. P. H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French security policy and the GauUist
legacy (Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 3.
2. W. W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World (Syracuse University Press, 1966); P.
Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur (Cambridge University Press, 1980);
Gordon, A Certain Idea ofFrance.
3. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Western Society for
French History in October 1993 and published under the title 'France
and the quest for a West European security entity, 1944-94' in Proceedings
ofthe Wtl'tern Society for French Histury, vol. 21, 1994.
4. The de Gaulle quotation is in Discours et Mtl'sages,III (Pion, 1970), p.384.
There are important distinctions between the way in which the many
scholars who have written on this subject present the finer points of
'Gaullism'. To that extent, there is no such thing as an 'orthodoxy' other

than in the broadest sense as stated in the first paragraph of this paper.
Stanley Hoffmann has consistently drawn attention to this European
agenda in Gaullism, but not, to my knowledge, as the central focus of his
argument See his essay 'De Gaulle's Foreign Policy: the Stage and the
Play, the Power and the Glory' in his Decline or Rmewalr France since the
1930s (Viking, 1974).
5. Text of speech in E. Jouve, Le General de Gaulle et fa construction de l'Europe
(1940-1966) (LGDJ, 1967), II, p.l12.
6. See, for example, A. de Porte's De Gaulle's Foreign Policy 1944-46 (Harvard
University Press, 1968), pp. 192-201: 'A new policy: the western bloc'.
7. See J. W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western AUiance 1944-1949:
French foreign policy and post-war Europe (Leicester University Press, 1990)
pp. 134-9; and J. W. Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe
1945-1951 (Leicester University Press, 1984).
8. G. Bidault, Resistance (Uvres Disponsibles, 1964), p.142.
9. On all these issues, see Young, Britain, France, and the Unity ofEurope, ch. 5.
10. Cited in R Baillet, De Gaulle et l'Europe (L'Hermes, 1979), p. 16.
11. In a press conference on 1 October 1948, he elaborated on these ideas:
A defence centred on London is not the defence of Europe. Such a
defence must be centred in France .... I am not saying for one moment
that England is an island separated from Europe, but I am saying that
England is an island. There is nothing I can do about that- nor, for that
matter, can England herself. What I am saying is that Europe is not an
island, but a continent with some offshore islands, including, first and
foremost, the British Isles. (Discours et Messages, II, pp. 219-22.)
12. Articles One, Two and Three call for harmonisation of economic,
industrial, commercial, social and cultural activities. It is only in article 4
(the shortest one) that military issues are dealt with at all.
13. Speech in Bordeaux, 25 September 1949. Discours et Messages, II, p. 310.
14. See D. Colard and G. Daille, 'Le General de Gaulle et les Alliances', in
[Institut Charles de Gaulle ed.] De Gaulle en son siecle. Tome 4: La Sicurili et
l'irulipendance de fa France (Pion, 1992), pp. 64-5 ('Le role et Ia fonction
des alliances').
15. Lettres, Notes et Garnets, july 196&-April1969 (Pion, 1984), p. 52.
16. Colard and Daille, 'Le General de Gaulle ... ', p. 64. Hoffmann, in 'De
Gaulle's Foreign Policy', pp. 283--4, also insists that the cardinal feature
of Gaullist 'independence' is the absence of binding dependence rather
than any yearning for autonomy for its own sake.
17. Jouve, II, pp.l38, 140, 144.
18. Ibid., p.147.
19. Cfjanuary 1950: the Alliance is 'highly desirable, but we don't want to end
up in [the Americans'] pockets . .. we want friends and allies, but we don't
want overlords and we have no need of vassals', cited in A. Larcan,
'Armees et defense nationale. Concepts constants et dominants de Ia
pensee de Charles de Gaulle' [ICDG ed.], De Gaulle en son siecle. Tome 4, p.
27.
Jolyon Haworth 37
20. Discours et Messages, II, 589; (extracts inJouve,II, 196).

21. See I. Wall, The United States and theMaAingofPost-WarFrance (Cambridge
University Press, 1991), pp. 193-4; G. Elgey, Histoire de la Quatrieme
Ripuhlique: I. La Ripuhlique tks IUusions 1945-1951 (Fayard, 1965), pp.
442-3; F. Bozo, La France et l'OTAN. De Ia guerre froide au nouvel ordre
europkn (Massou, 1991) pp. 36-7; Harrison, The Reluctant AUy: France and
Atlantic Security Oohns Hopkins Press, 1981), p. 17.
22. 1951 speech at Nancy in Discours et Messages, II, p. 482. Press conference
of 12 November 1953 in Discours et Messages, II, 586-600.
23. It was the complexity of the nuclear issue which constituted one of the
most important nails in the coffin of the EDC (details in
B. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Adventure (Pergamon Press, 1964), pp. 29-32).
24. Discours et Messages, II, pp. 307--8; Bozo, La France et l'OTAN, p. 66.
25. P. Messmer, 'Notre Politique militaire', Revue de Dijense Nationale, May
1963, p. 761. Messmer's arguments, as indeed those of many Gaullist
spokespersons at the time, were also intended to reassure the liberal and
MRP elements on the right.
26. Harrison, T'he Reluctant AUy, pp. 2~; Gordon, A Certain Idea of France,
PP· 29-30.
27. R Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Doubleday,
1966), p. 468.
28. It is in the name of Europe's intel"ests that de Gaulle challenges, in article
1, the restricted zone of application of the Atlantic Treaty.
29. Broadcast, 31 May 1960, Discours et Messages, III, p. 220.
30. Press conference, 11 Aprill961, Discours et Messages, III, p. 299.
31. Harrison, TheReluctantAUy, pp. 9S-101.
32. On Fanfani, see Memoires d'Espoir (1'1on, 1970), I, pp. 202-3; on
Adenauer, P. Maillard, De Gaulle et l'Allemagne: Le rive inacluroe (Pion,
1960), ch. 7 ('L'Entrevue de Colombey').
33. Lettres, Notes et Carnets,January 1961-December 1963, Note of 17 July
1961, pp. 107--8.
34. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, p. 104; Kulski, De Gaulle and the World,
p. 229.
35. Seej. Bariety, 'De Gaulle, Adenauer et Ia genese du traite de !'Elysee du
22janvier 1963' and H.-P. Schwarz, 'Le president de Gaulle, le chancelier
federal Adenauer et Ia genese du traite de !'Elysee' in De Gaulle en son
siecle. Tome 5 (Pion, 1992), pp. 352-63 and 364-72.
36. See Messmer quote, n.25 above, and Georges Pompidou speeches on 4
December 1964:
by the very fact that France is in Europe, her strength works fully and
automatically on behalf of Europe, whose defence is physically and
geographically inseparable from her own, which is not the case for
powers, even allied, outside of the European continent.
37. The details of the Ailleret-Lemnitzer, Fourquet-Goodpaster and

Valentin-Ferber agreements are analysed by General F. Maurin,
'L'originalite fran~aise et le commandement', in Dijense Nationale, July
1989, pp. 45-57.
38. Hoffmann, 'De Gaulle's Foreign Policy', pp. 307-12.

39. Ministere de Ia Defense, Livre Bwnc sur Ill Dijense Natinnak, Paris, 1972,
reproduced in D. David (ed.), La Politique ck difense ck Ill France: textes et
documents (FEDN, 1989), pp. 45--63.
40. Ibid., p. 46.
41. On the Pompidou-Heath negotiations, see E. Roussel, Geurgr!s PumpidJlu,
1911-1974 Q. C. Lattes, 1994), pp. 652-9. On the Year of Europe, M.
Jobert, Memoiresd~venir(Grasset, 1974), esp. pp. 268-79.
42. R H. Ullman, 'The covert French connection', Fotf!ign Policy, 75, 1989.
See also Gordon, A Certain lcka ofFrance, pp. 92-3.
43. See Loi ck Programmation 1977-1982 in David, La Politique ck difense ck Ill
France, pp. 190-6.
44. See J. Isnard, Le Montie, 14 May 1993, p. 5.
2 French Intellectuals,
Neutralism and the
Search for Peace in the
Cold War
Martyn Cornick
To many of us neutrality appears as a reasonahk compromise designed to

safeguard the future, and not as a permanent ideal.
I
L 'Ohservateur, 1950
When the Gulf War broke out in January 1991, opinion polls showed
that some two-thirds of the French public supported the allies'
intervention on behalf of the Kuwaitis; yet the press also reported
several instances of vociferous opposition to French involvement in the
war. In particular, at a press conference held on 24January 1991, the
writer Gilles Perrault made an impassioned plea against the war, calling
even for French troops to desert. Such seditious remarks drew
condemnation from several political quarters, but Perrault's action
struck a chord, for a few days later an announcement, entitled 'Avec
Gilles Perrault', signed by 100 intellectuals, artists or writers supporting
his stance, was placed in the press. At another level of debate, in a
forthright exchange of views on France's role on the international stage
and the wisdom or otherwise of intervening in the war, Regis Debray
crossed swords with Jean Daniel and Jacques Julliard in the Nouvel
Observateur.2 In the political history of France, such occurrences are
nothing new. Since the Dreyfus Mfair intellectuals have frequently
intervened in debates about international relations and French status
abroad, particularly when the issues of war and peace are at stake.
Because of their proximity to governing and political classes, historically
French intellectuals constitute an influential conduit of public opinion,
and they have often given voice to sentiments which, at times of crisis or
tension, throw into relief the 'gap between official policy and public
sentiment'.' Intellectuals' utterances in opposition to the Gulf War
carried resonances from an earlier period, the start of the Cold War,
when they mobilised in force. This chapter seeks to provide a case study
39
40 French lntelkctuals, Neutralism and the Search for Peace
of the reaction of a number of French intellectuals to the new

circumstances prevailing after the liberation, reactions which were at
the time labelled 'neutralist'.
In one sense this case-study of French neutralist intellectuals provides
a complement to Jolyon Howorth's re-reading of the Gaullist
'consensus' about French security given elsewhere in this volume. He
warns against attaching too much emphasis to the received view of
French 'independence': 'the essence of Gaullist "independence" ', he
writes, 'is more concerned with non-dependence than with autonomy. ••
Much of de Gaulle's discourse from the Cold War period quoted by
Howorth- 'vassalisation', 'independence', 'we don't want to end up in
the Americans' pockets', etc. - are echoes from the neutralists' canon.
Neutralist intellectuals' arguments for French non-dependence, or
non-alignment, are important because they underscored the gap
between policy and public opinion, since it was felt that French policy
was decided in Washington. Indeed, in the period 1947-54 the
Americans strove to influence French internal politics to such an extent
that one historian using newly accessible archives has written that 'it is
no exaggeration to say that the history of the Fourth Republic needs to
be rewritten to take that influence into account' .5
The collapse of communism in eastern Europe has also revitalised
interest in the activities and allegia~Jces of French intellectuals after the
start of the Cold War. The publication of one work on the 'imperfect
past' (for 'imperfect', read 'Stalinist') of some French intellectuals
sparked controversy because of the author's barely concealed hostility
towards his subject.6 In this context it should not be forgotten that the
specifically French wartime experience of the Occupation bears down
on this period, and, as Georges-Henri Soutou has argued, 'above all, for
the French the Cold War was not so much an outside event as an
internal problem: the question of whether France itself would not
become a kind of popular democracy was often more urgent than the
overall East-West balance'. 7 Precisely because of the unique French
experience of the Occupation, because of the perceived strength of the
French Communist Party, and despite the mystique of Gaullism,
France's position had indeed changed in the new world order, as
reassessed by Dominique David elsewhere in this volume. 8
In the manichean demonology of the Cold War, the American-
backed 'free' West is considered to be a bulwark against the aggressive
expansionism of the 'totalitarian' East. Thus a recent account of post-
war Paris begins a chapter entitled the 'treason of the intellectuals' with
the statement: 'Within the mainly left-wing circles of French intellectual
Martyn Cornick 41
life, a David and Goliath conflict between a handful of libertarians on

one side and a proStalinist majority on the other was starting to make
itself felt'.' Yet if one looks more closely the picture is rather more
complex than this might suggest
Mter the Liberation many French intellectuals, whether they were
communist or not, shared Louis Aragon's view that the prime task was to
continue the suppression of fascism and to maintain peace. At a writers'
congress held at the Salle Pleyel on 29June 1946, Aragon paid homage
to his predecessors Henri Barbusse and Romain Rolland for having
campaigned in the same hall for the Amsterdam-Pleyel peace movement
fourteen years before: their valiant efforts in the antifascist struggle
needed to be continued. 10 As the Cold War gathered momentum during
1947, the urgency of the peace question intensified. How could peace be
maintained in Europe, and what role should France seck to play in the
new order? Intellectuals had already made it clear that Germany should
remain disarmed, 11 and there could be no question of France joining the
Soviet bloc; yet should the French join the western allies in the Atlantic
Treaty? A considerable number of intellectuals insisted that France
should not join either camp, and that an alternative way should be
sought Most of these 'non-aligned' intellectuals, or 'neutralists' as they
called themselves, were grouped primarily around &prit, L8 Mmule and
L'Obseroateur, but there were intersections and exceptions. Because of
their lack of political success they have been treated dismissively, but the
debates generated by their campaigns impacted heavily on public
opinion, and the issue was kept on the political agenda for some time. 12
Debates about how to maintain the peace took place against a
background of war scares which, from 1947 on, were continually
sensationalised in the press. By October 1947 the Soviet Cominform had
enshrined the Cold War in policy. De Gaulle himself confided that war
was 'inevitable'; it was just a matter of when (by Christmas 1947,
according to France-Dimanche). 1' In january 1948 Malraux predicted a
communist coup, something which suddenly seemed all the more likely
after the Prague coup of 24 February 1948. 14 This caused 'panic' in
France because it illustrated vividly what might happen if French
communists wished to stage a coup with Soviet backing; indeed,
immediately after Prague, de Gaulle asserted that they would have
already made their move were it not for him. 15
The first major public statement responding to this dangerous new
climate appeared in Esprit in November 1947. The 'First Appeal to
International Opinion' was signed by intellectuals from a 'wide range of
political tendencies' (including Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone
42 French Intellectuals, Neutralism and the Search for Peace
de Beauvoir, Emmanuel Mounier, Jean-Marie Domenach, David

Rousset, Georges Altman and Claude Bourdet). It criticised the
apparent 'acceptance of a coming third world war' and declared that
the logic of the 'politics of the blocs' could only end in disaster.
'Buffeted between the two camps, causing each side to be manipulated
by the other, the Cold War has disunited us, and this disunion could
lead us to war'. 16 These intellectuals looked to the creation of a united
Europe independent of the US and the USSR in which each member
state would develop its own version of socialism and decolonisation.
One consequence of this appeal was the mobilisation of Sartre and
Rousset to found the Rassemblement Democratique Rcvolutionnaire
(RDR) in February 1948, a short-lived political movement which
aspired to a new, non-<:ommunist, socialism. 17 By the autumn of 1948
international tension had worsened: in successive issues the weekly
paper Carrefuur printed the responses of prominent intellectuals to the
question: 'If the Red Army occupied France, what would you do?'
Several respondents felt that the question was dangerous because it
assumed the inevitability ofwar. 1"Yet the same autumn there occurred a
sequence of events which fired the imagination of intellectuals seeking
a peaceful alternative: this was the Gary Davis affair.
In September 1948 Gary Davis, the ex-combattant son of an
American band leader, tore up his passport, renounced his citizenship
and declared himself a 'citizen of the world'. His movement, in France
entitled Front Humain des Citoyens du Monde, called for global
citizenship, the creation of a People's Assembly and world government.
To publicise his protest he camped out at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris
which, at that time, was being used as temporary accommodation for
the United Nations. On 19 November he was arrested for interrupting
a session and for reading his own declaration. He attracted the support
of many high-profile intellectuals. In addition to Camus, Jean Paulhan,
Andre Breton, Mounier and Bourdet all supported Davis, and on 3
December Vercors helped to organise a meeting of 3,000 people at the
Salle Pleyel; by 9 December the movement was gathering momentum,
since Davis and his friends filled the Velodrome d'Hiver stadium with at
least 20,000 people to hear how the UN had reacted to his protests
(reported as 'David's struggle against Goliath'). Even anti-UN messages
from Gide and Camus were read out. 19 Despite the criticisms levelled at
Davis' movement from the Left (Sartre, Herve) and the Right (Pauwels,
Boutang), those intellectuals who backed him seem to have been
convinced that he personified the alternative path. Esprit kept its
readers extensively informed of the progress of the movement. 20
Martyn Cornick 43
These efforts culminated in the sending of an address to the UN on

the 'folly of a new war'. The signatories were solicited by a letter which
disclaimed that any one group had organised it; stress was laid on the
diversity of the opinions represented. The Address emphasised that the
intellectuals spoke for those who would not or could not articulate their
fears; they spoke for all Europe, and were resolved to 'fight to the end
the madness which threatens to engulf the world'. The text was signed
by a very impressive roll-call of over 500 intellectuals, headed by
Academicians Georges Duhamel, Henri Mondor, Fran~ois Mauriac and
Jules Romains. 11 For Mounier, who spoke for many Christian socialists
and frrogr8ssistes on the non-Stalinist Left, Davis was symbolic of a new
type of pacifism. Mounier insisted that the new anti-war movement was
worth waiting for because it was distinct from the 'blind-alley' of
interwar pacifism, compromised as it had been by defeatism and the
Collaboration. Two imperatives should be obeyed, according to
Mounier. First, the search for peace should be political in the sense that
those who would risk war needed to be identified and criticised, even if
this proved 'indelicate' or 'undiplomatic'. Second, all means had to be
mobilised in the struggle, risks had to be taken, and the appeal made
wide. Davis distilled all this for Mounier; his protests had answered their
prayers.11
This 'revision of pacifism' - the title of a special issue of Esprit
published in February 1949- had evidently come at an appropriate
moment: the simultaneous revelations of the Kravchenko trial
underscored the need to seek another system which did not end up in
a 'world of concentration camps' and the gulag. In Esprit Frank
Emmanuel provided a detailed history of pacifist movements past and
present, while Mounier returned to the problem of 'the ambiguities of
pacifism'. Robert Sarrazac, who was one of Davis' spokesmen and
jointly responsible for organising the Chaillot protest, gave a detailed
account of how calls for a People's Assembly had made a deep impact
on the media and on public opinion!' But however unrealistic and
impracticable these calls might have been, at the time the important
thing for Esprit was to have launched a new, vigorous and unified
campaign against the Cold War which, relayed by the national and
regional press, resonated throughout France.
Raymond Aron rightly stresses that the signing of the Atlantic Pact
on 4 Aprill949 gave French neutralism its momentum.24 It seemed to
many intellectuals that their worst anxieties were being confirmed: the
Cold War was intensifYing and might turn into a 'hot' war. During the
period leading to the signing of the Pact a debate was engaged about
the risks of the policies pursued by Robert Schuman and the Allies.
'The Atlantic Pact will increase our security through US assistance in
case of attack', Schuman was reported as saying on the front page of
Le Monde a month before the Washington meeting. Yet Le Monde (with
its 155,000 circulation among establishment readers) was about to lend
itself as an influential organ of opinion to the 'neutralist' platform
when it launched a series of articles from what on the surface was a
most unlikely source. On 2 March 1949 appeared the first of twenty or
so pieces· by Etienne Gilson. What was remarkable was that Gilson, a
member of the French Academy and College de France who had
served after the war as an MRP representative on the Conseil de Ia
Republique, was far from being a left-winger. He was an eminent
Catholic scholar, a Christian democrat who spent much of his academic
career teaching in North America, where he opened a research centre
into medieval philosophy in Toronto. His first article, significantly
entitled 'L'Alternative', questioned the wisdom of the Atlantic Pact.
There were severcil arguments ag-ainst it: it was militarily ineffective, it
was dangerous, and, above all, the Americans might decide not to
honour its terms, depending on the circumstances of any conflict in
Europe. Quoting a New York Times editorial, Gilson underlined that the
Americans might be 'willing to spend dollars on security', but 'far less
willing to use force to ensure the security of the zone of the Pact'. What
was clear was that these dollars could easily buy another continental war
and 'a third invasion of western Europe which would make the other
two look like child's play'. For Gilson, Europe needed to cultivate a
position of 'armed neutrality': 'European neutrality is not incon-
ceivable, providing it is strongly armed', he argued. 25
The editor of Le Mvnde, Hubert Beuve-Mery, took up Gilson's line,
and just two weeks before the signing of the Atlantic Pact, using his
pen-name 'Sirius', he gave favourable consideration to the neutralist
argument. The Europeans - and especially the French -were tied up in
the contradictions surrounding the question of the Pact. Europe was
unable to do without US aid, but could not submit its destinies to
American will; Europe could not ignore the Stalinist menace, but at the
same time could not prevent a substantial proportion of its population
from being seduced by arguments that this 'menace' was in fact a 'path
to salvation'. Europe was caught between two potential belligerents, but
could not itself suffer further conflict. Beuve-Mery displayed his
Eurocentrism when he argued that for all the vicissitudes it had faced,
the continent was still the 'depository of human civilisation'. Thus it was
to be hoped that Europe would continue to be 'neutral', not in the
Martyn Cornick 45
'pejorative' meaning of that word, but because Europe was ultimately

the fountain-head and defender ofliberty against the combined threats
of unrestrained capitalism and 'socialist totalitarianism': in the end, for
the sake of the future of the planet, these two ideologies would have to
resolve their differences. 26
Drawing lessons from history - in particular the lack of American
participation in the League of Nations, and the alleged mi!!iudgements
of Clemenceau and Pichon regarding Woodrow Wilson's proposals
after World War I - Gilson reiterated his message:
Every French person must from now on be aware that a treaty with
the US does not involve them one iota beyond the commitments
which they themselves have signed ... If these commitments are
inadequate for us, then we should say so before signing them.
Mterwards will be too late. 27
The consequences of these uncertain commitments, as Gilson himself

pointed out just after the Pact was signed, were that French communists
would score a propaganda victory through their 'orchestration' of the
peace movement, just as they had 'orchestrated' the Resistance. 2"
Unfolding events bore out Gilson's prognostication: later that April, the
World Congress of the Partisans for Peace opened at the Salle Pleyel,
ending eight days later with a huge demonstration at the Buffalo
Stadium. This would culminate in the famous Stockholm Appeal of
March 1950, when a world petition for peace was launched which
attracted 9.5 million signatures in France alone, a figure double that of
the communists' electorate.29 Finally, the intellectuals of Esprit went into
superlative mode: as they argued in a collective editorial (which usefully
outlines all the issues as they saw them), the A-bomb had raised the
stakes to unprecedented levels; it was their duty (as intellectuals) to
subject the issue to detailed 'political analysis', and to strive ceaselessly
for peace and unity.M
The neutralist campaign reached a peak in April 1950, at the time of
discussions surrounding refinements to be made to the Atlantic Pact
Gilson published further articles in Le Monde, and the first issue
appeared of Claude Bourdet's new weekly, L'Observateur. Now, Gilson
answered his numerous critics, including Aron, strenuously denying
that neutralism was defeatist in his view France should not disarm. The
problem derived from the stalemate between the two opposing blocs:
the Soviets wanted and needed peace, and their aggressiveness was a
myth. They wanted socialism, not war, and to them the Atlantic Pact was
46 French Intellectuals, Neutralism and the Search Jar Peace
provocative. 51 Yet at the same Gilson did not intend to promote

anti-Americanism; rather he ardently extolled the ties of friendship
between the American people and France, and praised generous US
aid. In the present order of things, however, France should strive for
'independence' and pursue a policy of 'benevolent neutrality' towards
the US. 52 In the words of one American historian writing a few years
after these events, 'here was a rare example of the urge to have one's
cake and eat it'."'
Gilson's campaign ended rather ignominiously as an affaire. Having
applied to take early retirement from the College de France in order to
concentrate on his work in Toronto, in early 1951 a press campaign was
waged against him by the Maurrassian and Catholic press (including
LeFigaro). Accused ofbeing a 'traitor' and a 'deserter', there were calls
from right-wing intellectuals (including Jean Paulhan, Gabriel Marcel
and Daniel Halevy) to expel him from the French Academy.
Commenting on the whole sorry episode for Esjnit, Albert Beguin
concluded that the attacks on Gilson were symptomatic of a right-wing
Catholic anti<ommunist 'crusade' aimed at the Soviets and their allies
in western Europe, the effect of which was to escalate the Cold War.M
The first weekly issue of L'Observateur (the ancestor of Le Nouvel
Obscrvateur) appeared on 13 April1950. Although its beginnings under
Claude Bourdet and Roger Stephane were relatively modest, with its
weekly printing of 15,000 copies it soon became established as a leading
organ of the non-Stalinist, but Marxist-inclined, Left, sympathetic to
Tito's socialism in Yugoslavia, and hostile to the pro-Atlantic stance of
the SFIO. Significantly it brought together both neutralist politicians
and intellectuals under the same banner. The opening page set the
tone. According to Hector de Galard, the logic of American policy in
Europe would lead only to military escalation and war.!\.~ Paul Rivet, an
independent Socialist depute, reiterated his conviction that a neutralist
position for France, in view of the anti-Communist forces mobilised
against it within the country, was potentially far less dangerous for
French interests than the Atlantic Pact.~ The main contribution of
L'Observateur to the neutralist campaign consisted of a wide-ranging
survey which set out to sound opinion on the question.s7 The responses
appeared over a number of weeks, and it would be interesting to give a
wider sample of the range of opinions than is possible here. The quality
of the replies and the sophistication of the arguments deployed reflect
how profoundly the issue had penetrated the political and intellectual
world. For Charles d'Aragon, depute for the Hautes-Pyrenees, the
principal hope was for a 'pooling of pacifist will' to prevent the shores
Martyn Cornick 47
of the continent from becoming 'landing beaches' again; jean Cassou

placed his hopes in the structures of the UN to enable France and
other powers to operate independently of the blocs; Pierre Cot was
highly sceptical about the ability of the Pact to protect France, and
urged the pursuit of a strictly 'independent' foreign policy; Louis
Martin-Chauffier, a prominent left-wing Catholic, saw the Pact as
intensifying the risks of war. In an explicit reference to the Occupation,
he rejected solely French neutrality if it meant 'France alone - Ia France
seuli, and argued for united European neutrality; finally, Jean-Paul
Sartre, seeing the Pact as a 'political manoeuvre' by the US, wrote that it
gave the Americans carte blancl/8 to intervene on the continent: 'from
now on, Pearl Harbor is everywhere in Europe'.M
Neutralism in France during the first years of the Cold War may be
assessed on a number of levels. Firstly, it should be considered in the
context offears about a third world war and the generally felt desire for
peace. As a 'political' force neutralism has been dismissed as ineffectual
because 'electorally it all proved a complete failure' at the elections of
1951.59 Candidates presented themselves only in Paris, and there, for
example, Claude Bourdet gained only 8,000 votes. Yet the force of
neutralist argument should not be under-estimated. On one level, it
represented 'a rationalisation ... of the sentiment prevalent among an
immense number of people in France - their plague-on-
both-your-houses attitude, their qu oo now foote Ia paix~ for although the
French needed and wanted to accept American aid, they were wMy of
its counterpart, the Atlantic Pact. As Werth observed, echoing Gilson,
'To have Americans established at Bordeaux, and La Rochelle and even
Chateauroux - no Frenchmen could like it' .40 Even at cabinet level, for a
while at least in 1950, the implications of Gilson's articles were
pondered by politicians anxious about public opinion. 41 Georges-Henri
Soutou best contextualises the importance of neutralist debate in his
assessment of the French contribution to the Cold War:
In particular the Communist Party was both an incentive to do

something to prevent an internal disaster and thus to build up a
European and Atlantic security system as a guarantee of French
stability, and at the same time a brdke that prevented France from
waging the Cold War as wholeheartedly as the British or the
Americans. But up to a point the same could be said of the Gaullists,
who were simultaneously anticommunist and also careful not to
waste the chance, one day, of using the Soviet Union, as in 1944, as a
counter-weight to the United States, in order to follow a very
48 French Intellectuals, Neutralism and the Search Jar Peace
independent line. And national-neutralist ideas, which were in

content very different, did often pull in the same direction. The
curious cocktail of communist, Gaullist and national-neutralist
influences could be extremely potent, as was evident through the
EDC crisis. 42
Secondly, neutralism exercised the talents of opposing intellectuals, if

only because they sought to refute its arguments: Aron's attacks in u
Figaro are a case in point, and Liherti de l'espri.t followed L'Observateurs
survey with its own entitled 'La bombe et Ia liberte'. 4~ In june 1950 the
Atlanticists fought back with their Congres pour Ia Liberte de Ia Culture,
held in Berlin, out of which the French review Preuveswas born. 44
Thirdly, the neutralists' campaigns may be viewed in the problematic
context of the recent history of French pacifism. In an illuminating
account Sudhir Hazareesingh explains why there has not been any
lasting organised peace movement in France. In a way similar to that
identified by Soutou, the 'constraints of history' (here, the Cold War)
determined that the French Communist Party would with some success
build a 'mass peace organisation which could act as a "transmission
belt" for the party', leading Hazareesingh toward the conclusion that:
From an institutional perspective the political and ideological

influence of the Communist Party severely damaged prospects for
the emergence of a unified peace movement. Because the
Mouvement de Ia Paix remained under the thumb of the PCF, the
most successful form of organised pacificism in France was tarred
with the brush of Stalinism!~
Indeed, when the startling revelations of the Rajk show-trial (16-24

September 1949) and news of other such repression reached France,
many former fellow-travellers, such as Jean Cassou and Louis Martin-
Chauffier, publicly and noisily distanced themselves from Stalinism. 46
Their moves could only vindicate the neutralist cause.
Finally, on balance neutralism was more critical of the Americans
than it was of the Soviets: it certainly strengthened the arguments of
those with anti-American axes to grind. If, in retrospect, Bourdet and
his supporters appeared to be politically ineffectual, at the time
neutralists were recognised as representing just as much of a problem
to the Americans as the communists. This was readily acknowledged,
with some exaggeration perhaps, in American diplomatic circles:
Martyn Cornick 49
Of all the things in France that worried the State Department during
those years, Le Morulewas about the worst; it was 'neutralising' much of
the American propaganda, and was 'poisoning the mind of France', as
a US embassy official told me one day in a moment of candour. And
he added: 'It worries us far more than the Communists do' ! 7
Mter the outbreak of the 'hot' Korean war in june 1950, many French
intellectuals slipped increasingly towards distrust and fear of the US,
and material critical of the Americans featured often in their reviews.
Esprit, for instance, devoted thirty pages to a revealing 'Controversy
about America' in June 1951. The cold wind of McCarthyism blew
strong in France, and later the Rosenberg Affair whipped up a violent
storm of protest. oil! In pro-American eyes neutralism might well have
been 'having one's cake and eating it'; but in a battered France, viewed
against the war in Korea and rising anti-communism in the US, Britain
and France, it seems indeed to have represented a 'reasonable
compromise' in a very dangerous world. Roger Stephane sums up:
The idea of neutrality is not represented only by a few articles in
Le Monde or by a few French intellectuals who chose communism
simply because they disapproved of Coca-Cola. The articles which
have been published are, in fact, the expression of a very deep
unease in public opinion, and of its desire to analyse the situation it
finds itself in without having had the luxury of being able to weigh
up all the risks. If the word 'neutrality' is now on everyone's lips, this
is certainly not because the French people envy the neutral status of
Sweden or Switzerland: it is simply because they somehow know that
the great conflict between civilisations being daily conjured up is
undoubtedly to do with more than just 'spiritual' problems; they
know that France is no longer able to cope with such a conflict - a
conflict in which France would have everything to lose and nothing
to gain. 49
Ultimately, in some ways neutralism may well have prefigured the
nationalistic 'independent' foreign policy of Gaullism.r.o Yet it may also
be a manifestation of a reflex peculiar to the longer-term and often
turbulent history of Franco-American relations, especially where
defence and security matters are concerned: as evidenced by the
protests against the Gulf War we mentioned at the beginning, French
suspicion of perceived US domination of international security policy
in general, and of NATO in particular, did not appear greatly to have
abated. 5 1
Notes
1. 'Six questions sur Ia neutralite, L'Observateur, I June 1950, p. 1.

2. See Le Monde, 27-8 January and 9 February 1991, and Le Nouvel
Observateur, 14-20 February and 7-13 March 1991.
3. The phrase is Alexander Werth's; see his Ji'rance 1940-55 (Robert Hale,
1957), part IV, ch. 1. See also S.Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in
Modem France (Oxford University Press, 1994), ch. 2.
4. See above,J. Howorth, pp. 17-38.
5. I. M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Post-war France, 1945-1954
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 6.
6. See T. Judt, Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (University of
California Press, 1992) and the critical review by D. Lindenberg in
Esprit, May 1993, pp. 167-70.
7. G.-H. Soutou, 'France' in D. Reynolds (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War
in Europe (Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 96-120 (quote from p. 97f.)
8. See D. David, above, pp. 65-75.
9. A. Beevor and A. Cooper, Paris after the Liberation Hamish
Hamilton, 1994), p. 400.
10. Aragon's speech is reported in Les Lettres Frant;aises, 5 July 1946.
11. See the manifesto 'Pour le desarmement de I'Allemagne' signed by
dozens of prominent intellectuals, reported in Les Lettres Frant;aises, 17
January 1947, and France d 'abord, 30 January 1947.
12. See Werth's testimony, andJ. T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in
France (Bookman Associates, 1958).
13. C. Mauriac, Un Autre de Gaulle (Hachette, 1970), pp. 293, 296.
14. J. Galtier-Boissiere, Mon]ournal dans Ia Grande Pagafe (LaJeune Parque,
1951), pp. 198fT.
15. See Wall, The United States and the Making of Post-war France, p. 133, and
Mauriac, Un Autre de Gaulle, p. 307.
16. Esprit, November 1947, pp. 794-6.
17. See A. Cohen-Sola), Sartre 1905-1980 (Gallimard, 1985), pp. 390-404.
When the RDR-inspired Entretiens sur Ia politique appeared, Sartre's
position was criticised by Michel Collinet for being old-fashioned and
no different from that of the communist opposition in 1934 (Paru,
September 1949); Collinet later joined the Atlanticist review Preuves.
18. See P.-M. de Ia Gorce, L'Apres-Guerre 1944-1952 (Grasset, 1978), pp. 359-60.
19. Action and Combat, 30 November 1948; Le Figaro, 4 and 10 December
1948; see also S. de Beauvoir, LaForce des Glioses (Gallimard, 1963).
20. E.g. 'Gary Davis: Ia paix est-elle dcclaree?', Esprit, January 1949,
pp. 96-109.
21. 'Les intellectuels fran~;ais s'adressent a I'ONU', Esprit, January 1949,
pp.l41-6.
22. Esprit, January 1919, pp. 101-6.
23. 'La revision du pacifisme', Esprit, February 1949, pp. 161-96, and
R. Sarrazac, 'A propos de I'assemblce des peuples', ibid., pp. 235-41.
24. R. Aron, 'French public opinion and the Atlantic treaty', International
Affairs, 28 1952, pp. 1-8.
Martyn Cornick 51
25. E. Gilson, 'L'alternative', Le Monde, 2 March 1949.

26. 'Sirius' [H. Beuve-Mery). 'Le pacte atlantique et Ia paix', Le Monde,
17March 1949.
27. E. Gilson, 'Le pacte et le senat americain', LeMonde, 26 March 1949.
28. E. Gilson, 'Le communisme et Ia paix', Le Monde, 8 Apri11949.
29. For details see 0. Le Cour Grandmaison, 'Le mouvement de Ia paix
pendant Ia guerre froide: le cas fr.m.;:ais', Communisme, 18-19, 1988, pp.
120-38.
30. 'Le pacte atlantique', rupri~ May 1949, pp. 577-90.
31. This is the same argument used by the eminent veteran socialist
intellectual Paul Rivet, in his 'Testament politique', Les Temps
Modernes, May 1950, pp. 2080-1.
32. E. Gilson, 'I. Defaitisme et neutralisme', Le Monde, 28 April 1949; 'II.
La neutralite vers I' est' 29 April 1949; 'III. La neutralite vers !'ouest',
30April-2 May 1949.
33. Marcus, Neutralism and Natiunalism in France, p. 39.
34. A Beguin, 'L'affaire Gilson', Esprit, April1951, pp. 590-6.
35. H. de Galard, 'Aux vents de !'Atlantique', L'Observateur, 13 April
1950, p. 1.
36. P. Rivet, 'Neutralite europeenne', L'Observateur, 4 May 1950, p. 3.
37. 'Six questions surla neutralite', L'Observateur, 1June 1950.
38. All these examples are taken from L'Observateur, 8June 1950.
39. Werth, France 1940-1955, p. 533; A. Chebel d'Appollonia, Histoire
politique des intellectuels en France (Complexe, 1990), vol. 11, p. 135f.
40. Werth, France 1940-1955, p. 392.
41. L'Observateur, 11 May and 8June 1950.
42. Soutou, 'France', p. 120.
43. Liberte de ['esprit, September 1950, and R. Aron, 'Impostures de Ia
neutralite' in ibid., pp. 151-5.
44. See P. Gremion (ed.), Preuves. Une revue europeenne a Paris Uulliard,
1989).
45. Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, pp. 198, 204.
46. See the remarkable article by F. Fejto, 'L'affaire Rajk est une affaire
Dreyfus internationale', Esprit, November 1949, pp. 690-751; also C.
Bourdet, 'Voyage a Ia deuxieme URSS', ibid., pp. 752-65; J. Cassou
and Vercors, 'II ne faut pas tromper le peuple', ibid., December 1949,
pp. 943-53; F. Fejto, 'L'affaire Rajk a !'affaire Kostov', ibid., January
1950, pp. 143-50.
47. Werth, France 1940-1955, p. 394.
48. See M. Einaudi and A. Beguin, 'Controverse sur !'Amerique', ruprit,
June 1951, pp. 861- 90; R. B. Glynn, 'L'affaire Rosenberg in France',
PoliticalScimce Qy,arterly, 70 (4), 1955, pp. 498-521.
49. R. Stephane, 'Naissance et evolution de !'idee de neutralite en
France', L'Observateur, 8June 1950, p. 3 [emphasis in original).
50. E.g. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France, ch. 3, 'Gaullism: the
development of a nationalist neutralism'.
51. 'NATO's problems "all begin and end with France", a journalist
reported after interviewing NATO officials'; quoted in F. Costigliola,
France and the United States. The cold aUiance since World War II (Twayne
Publishers, 1992), p. 243.
All translations from the French are my own.

3 The Franco-German Axis
since Unification
Jean-Marc Trouille
For over three decades, France and Germany have maintained a

privileged relationship which was regarded by both parties, and also by
others, as the cornerstone in the construction of an integrated Europe.
Any new step forward in Europe has always been to a large extent
conditional upon Franco-German cooperation; conversely, any cooling
of this co-operation has generally resulted in a stagnation of Europe.
The Franco-German 'alliance within the alliance', even in the current
climate of Eur~cepticism, remains as essential as ever for the future of
the European Union.
Today, four years after German unification, the geopolitical situation
in Europe has changed radically: the European continent is no longer
split into two antagonistic blocs by the Iron Curtain, Germany is united,
the end of Communism has been accompanied by the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact and the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Within this new
geopolitical and geostrategic framework, the Franco-German axis has
been frequently subjected to new pressures and severely tested for the
first time: there has been a malaise within the axis since German
unification and Germany's subsequent ambition to play an
international role more suited to her new dimensions. It is appropriate
to revisit the overall context of Franco-German relations in the light of
the new balance of powers in Europe.
This analysis will, therefore, examine the current (November 1994)
state of the couple franco-alkmand, looking closely, firstly1 into the
institutional framework which originally produced the 'marriage';
secondly, into the new balance of power between the two countries.
Thirdly, the elements of divergence and the potential for convergence
and co-operation between these partners on Europe will be examined.
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The bilateral Franco-German relationship functions as a network of

institutional structures which facilitates frequent consultations among
53
54 The Franco-German Axis since Unification
political leaders and intense C()-()peration at all levels. Regular meetings

occur between heads of state or governments, ministers, the heads of
the Bundesbank and the Banque de France; numerous joint
commissions of experts and civil servants abound. Alongside these
official relations, there are very many industrial, academic and cultural
contacts; and Franco-German friendship is evidenced also by the
Franco-German Youth Organisation: a bi-national institution that has
organised or subsidised no fewer than 150,000 exchange programmes
in both countries since 1963, the year it was founded, catering for some
4.5 million French and German participants. The renowned specialist
on Franco-German affairs, Joseph Rovan, described this impressive
figure as 'the largest peaceful migration ever'.
This wide-ranging and unique framework of bilateral ties was defined
in the Elysee Treaty of 1963, which provided the foundation for Franco-
German relations in numerous domains. In 1988, to mark the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Treaty, the spheres of cooperation were
extended still further with the setting up of several new bi-national
institutions: 1 the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, to meet
twice a year; the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council, to
meet four times a year; the Franco-German Cultural Council, sitting twice
a year; the Franco-German College of Higher Education, whose role is to
develop courses involving institutions in both countries; the Franco-
German Council for the Environment; and the Franco-German Brigade,
a joint army corps now integrated within the Eurocorps.
The main purpose of such large-scale bilateral tics is to promote
endeavours to reach common decisions in a variety of areas. Obviously,
the institutionalisation of such a high degree of c()-()peration would not
have been possible without a strong political will on both sides of the
Rhine. It is, of course, important to note that just as government summits
take place at regular intervals between French political leaders and their
German counterparts, similar intergovernmental meetings take place
each year also between London and Paris, London and Bonn, Rome and
Paris, Paris and Madrid - to give just a few examples. However, none of
these is stipulated or required by a treaty; and the degree of
interconnection between Paris and Bonn is second to none in the world.
NEW BAlANCE OF POWERS
Despite this deep interpenetration between Bonn and Paris, mutual

understanding between the French and the Germans is still difficult to
Jean-Marc Trouille 55
achieve: even between the best partners, there is always a potential for
rivalry. However, until the end of the 1980s, the Franco-German
partnership was a relationship of complementarity, in which West
Germany was the dominant economic power and France the dominant
political power. This situation was referred to by Dominique Moisi,
French specialist in international relations, as 'the balance of the bomb
and the Mark' .2 France benefited from undeniable political advantages:
she was an independent nuclear power endowed with a permanent seat
in the UN Security Council. She enjoyed the status of being one of the
victors of the Second World War with certain consequent rights in
Germany, as well as the military status of an occupying force in Berlin.
At the same time, her former enemy had been weakened following its
dismemberment. Thanks to a favourable geopolitical position, De
Gaulle's France, whilst claiming to protect Germany, could also afford
to withdraw from NATO and play the cavalier seut in fact, the Federal
Republic, situated between France and the Warsaw Pact countries,
served as a buffer for France that would have been defended by an
allied coalition in the event of an attack.~
As far as West Germany was concerned, reconciliation and rap-
prochement with France formed an integral part of her external
policies, the fundamental aim of which was to regain respectability and
acceptance on the international stage. In addition, close co-operation
with Paris allowed Germany to gain a higher political profile in Europe.
Even after the official ending of the Occupation and the granting of
full sovereignty in 1955, West Germany's room for manoeuvre in
foreign affairs remained limited by her integration into the Western
Alliance, itself a necessary response to the partition of Germany into
two separate states in hostile military blocs. She had to rely upon her
Western partners to guarantee her security. No other country in the
world had so many foreign armies based on its soil.
West Germany's great strength lay in her powerful economy, her
strong industrial production, her position by the end of the 1980s as
the world export champion, accumulating ever increasing annual
surpluses. The remarkable stability of her currency had led to the
creation of a DM-zone in the European Community, and the European
Monetary System (EMS), originally the product of a Franco-German
initiative, reinforced the impact of the Bundesbank's monetary policies
on European partners.
Thus, prior to the unprecedented turning-point of 1989 and the
implosion of the Communist bloc, the Franco-German relationship WclS
stable and well-balanced. Each country was able to dntw great benefits
from the alliance. Now, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and German
unification less than a year later, the long-standing equilibrium in the
axis has been called into question. A certain redistribution of powers
has taken place: the balance of powers has shifted at France's expense;
Franco-German relations will suffer from the relative imbalance that
this implies.
The last Russian troops based in the East German Lander left for
good on 31 August 1994, and on 8 September the Allied Western forces
departed· from Berlin. These irreversible steps in the removal of the
final remnant of the Occupation together with election of the first all-
German President in Berlin have imparted new qualities to German
sovereignty in a united country. Germany no longer has to rely on
others to guarantee her security. What is more, the effective relocation
of Germany in the heart of Mitleleuropa makes her the centre of gravity
on the continent; at the same time, she remains one of the main pillars
of European union. The end of the Soviet Empire and the demise of
the Warsaw Pact have created a zone of considerable political,
economic and social instability, exposed to ethnic conflicts and
increased social frustration. However, the young democracies have their
eyes focused on Germany's model social market economy, allowing her
to become the dominant economic and political influence also in
central and eastern Europe. As such, Germany has ceased being 'always
the bridesmaid' to the USA or, on the continent, to France. While it is
true that she is probably exposed to more instability in the East than
was previously the case, her overall position has been enhanced at all
levels.
Within the EU, she was already the 'heavyweight'. Her demographic
size now justifies the largest representation within the European
Parliament with ninety-nine seats. The enlargement northwards of the
EU, with the accession of Finland, Sweden and Austria, countries
culturally and economically close to Germany, to be followed in a few
years by another expansion towards eastern Europe, defended
vigorously by Chancellor Kohl, will reinforce even further Germany's
dominant position on the continent. In a Europe of fifteen, twenty, or
even more members, it will not be France, but clearly Germany, which
will become the centre of gravity.
On the international stage, Germany can rely on the USA as an ally,
which, like Russia, henceforth sees Germany as her main European
negotiating partner: a 'special link' has developed between Bonn and
Washington, raising certain worries both in Britain, anxious about the
special relationship with the USA, and in France, which fears a
Jean-Marc Trouil/e 57
weakening both of its own international role and of that of the Franco-
German axis. It is precisely in the context of this new dimension in the
transatlantic dialogue that President Clinton, on his state visit to Berlin
on 12 July 1994, unambiguously called on Germany to play her inter-
national role fully. And on the same day, effectively removing a last
hurdle to this, the German Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe
published a judgement allowing the intervention of German soldiers in
international conflicts, subject to a vote at the Bundestag. Nothing
would now seem to prevent Germany from being granted a permanent
seat in the UN Security Council. Moreover, the reduction of her armed
forces to 370,000 by 1995, a precondition imposed in 1990 by the
former Soviet Union for its agreement to German unification, should
not seriously handicap Germany on a military level at a time when all
Western powers are reducing their military budgets and personnel;
indeed, a decision was taken in 1993 to limit the size of the Bundeswehr
to 340,000, an even lower figure.
The new Germany's major asset is her economic size, with which
none of the national economies of her partners in the EU can
compare. Already the third economic power worldwide, she is now
building up considerable economic potential in her eastern regions:
about 260 billion deutschmarks' worth of public investment has been
injected there in the past four years!• Even though this tremendous
financial effort has tended to weaken her economic performance,
Germany continues to exert a decisive influence on the monetary
policies of her European partners, especially on those who, like France,
have come to take the 'German model' of the 1970s and 1980s as their
example and who have joined the EMS. It is also revealing to note that
the planned European Bank will be a true replica of the Bundesbank:
independent of the political powers and based in Frankfurt.
As we can see, the new Germany is no longer 'an economic giant,
but a political dwarf, as Willy Brandt once described his country. On
the contrary, a new economic and political power has emerged on the
international stage. However, it remains true that she is a dwarf on a
military level, given the strong, widely-felt opposition to any military
action coupled with the temptation to follow the Swiss path of
neutrality. 5 Roman Herzog, elected Federal President in April 1994,
used his maiden speech to invite this new Germany to be 'less strained'
and 'more relaxed' in her international relations. Why, then, should we
be surprised by the concern expressed in political circles in France and
by Germany's other European partners in the face of such deve-
lopments? In 1992, Edouard Balladur quite clearly summed up both
58 The Franco-Gennan Axis since Unification
France's political handicap on the international stage when compared

with Germany and the anxieties of French political leaders at the
political rise of their neighbour across the Rhine:
Germany has several policies at her disposal: a European policy based
on the Franco-German axis, a policy of close relationships with the
United States, a policy based on a strong presence in the East.
Depending on the circumstances, she makes use of one or the other
without omitting to reassure each of her partners about her intentions.
France has only one policy: her European policy. She needs to regain a
level of flexibility comparable to the one Germany enjoys.6
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE ON EUROPE?
Diverging views are not, in themselves, anything new within the couple
franco-allemand, even though they sometimes look rather like domestic
quarrels. However, reciprocal accusations have become more frequent
since unification, albeit based on pure assumptions: in Paris, Germany
is often suspected of looking towards the East to the detriment of
European integration, whereas Bonn is concerned about the real
motivations of French leaders, whose European commitment is
perceived simply as a good way to 'bridle' her cumbersome neighbour.
'Will France ever stop travelling first class with a second-class ticket?' the
German Social-Democrat Gerhard Schroder was once heard to ask. 7
Such prejudices arc not unassociatcd with the fact that each of the
partners is experiencing a real identity crisis. Each sees itself forced to
reassess its relations with the other as well as its own international role.
France, for instance, whose diplomats had been literally caught on the
hop by the accelerated speed of the unification process for which she had
been utterly unprepared, has had to resign herself to taking the back seat
on the Franco-German tandem, and to seeing her influence in Europe
reduced. More and more, the idea of grandeur that had so long been
taken for granted, was being qucstioned.R As far as the new Germany is
concerned, she is still in the process of redefining her new role and her
own identity. Unification has been carried out on a political level, it is
true; however, time will be required for it to become reality at the
economic, social, and cultural levels, if a new German nation is to be
forged out of a social climate marked by moroseness, and where national
solidarity appears to be far weaker than the solidarity prevailing among
the different occupational groups.
Crisis of society or crisis of identity? The fact remains that Franco-

German relations have reached a turning point. Nevertheless, several
recent examples tend to indicate that close Franco-German co-
operation can turn out to be efficient and successful precisely when the
obstacles appear most numerous. Thus, during the EMS crisis in the
summer of 1993, while international speculation was aiming at
breaking the franc fart policy, the Bundesbank intervened massively on
the financial markets in order to defend the French currency; on 2
August, a compromise was reached in Brussels in order to save the
EMS: the bands within which the various currencies could fluctuate
were enlarged from 2.25 to 15 per cent. Another example of successful
Franco-German co-operation can be found in the positive outcome of
the delicate GAIT negotiations in December 1993, made possible
thanks to a Franco-German consensus, whereby they were able to reach
a mutual understanding of their respective interests and agree on a
common approach to trade issues within Europe as well as with regard
to the USA 9 In both cases, the institutionalised mechanisms of mutual
consultations have proved to be decisive in overcoming what would
otherwise have degenerated into serious international crises, in the first
case preserving the future of European construction and, in the
second, avoiding an outright trade war.
In any event, both examples illustrate quite clearly that in recent years
the axis has only been able to function efficiently when the situation
would otherwise have been completely desperate - the time it is most
needed. It is, of course, often easier to make symbolic declarations about
the great friendship and conviviality binding both partners, or even to
take symbolic initiatives, such as the Franco-German Youth Festival on 8
June in Heidelberg, where Mitterrand and Kohl met only two days after
the celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy landings,
to which the Federal Chancellor had pointedly not been invited. An
even more symbolic measure was the inclusion of German soldiers in
the Eurocorps in the traditional military parade on 14July 1994 on the
Champs-Elysees. We may ask ourselves whether it was really necessary at
this point to emulate past symbolic events such as the celebration of
mass in the Cathedral of Reims, to which De Gaulle had invited
Adenauer in 1962, or more recently, in 1984, when Mitterrand and Kohl
had meditated hand in hand in Verdun. Why this urge to insist on a
great and long-standing friendship if not because it is to some extent
vulnerable? Or do such symbolic gestures merely hide an effort made by
these leaders to compensate for the loss of dynamism in the axis and the
difficulties currently encountered by both partners in the EU?
60 The Franco-Gennan Axis since Unification
Clearly, it must be acknowledged that it has become awkward at this

stage to manage the Franco-German axis within a Europe prey to
doubt Germany, which had always formed the backbone of European
economic and monetary organisation, was placed under severe
pressure by the adjustments required by unification - coupled, in 1992
and 1993, with the worst economic recession of the post-war period.
These circumstances forced her to give priority to her unification to the
detriment of European construction - this is reflected in the high
interest rate policy pursued remorselessly by the Bundesbank for the
last three years. As far as the French are concerned, they are paying the
full price for the policy of the franc fort and of anti-inflationary
disinflation competitive implemented by Beregovoy and continued by
Balladur: indeed, interest rates have not boosted the economy, nor have
they contained the rising tide of unemployment.
And yet, one cannot deny that the French have reaped great benefits
from this economic policy: inflation has been curbed to the extent that
France has currently one of the lowest rates among the industrial
nations; since 1991, the chronic deficit of France's trade balance has
been reversed, to reach 89.6 billion francs in 1993;10 and even Franco-
German trade figures were more positive for France than for Germany
in 1993. 11 Indeed, in recent years successive French governments have
shown their commitment to the EMS and economic and monetary
union. This policy has become a genuine national strategy, whose
prime aim is to harness Germany to western Europe. The new status of
the Banque de France, which is intended to safeguard its independence
from central political power, thus facilitating the switch to the
European Currency Union in a few years, has not enabled French
monetary policy to gain some leeway in setting up interest rates so far.
Once again, the Bundesbank is omnipotent; the German weekly Die Zeit
recently ran as a headline: 'Bundesbanque de France', 12 to show how
French monetary policies adhere to German ones. Indeed, the virtuous
Modell Deutschland of the 1970s and 1980s has long been an obsession
among French political and economic circles - the matching of
German economic performance being an idie fixe that turned out to be
wishful thinking.
Nevertheless, those in France who criticise European economic
policy based on the convergence of national economies, as stipulated in
the Maastricht Treaty, are becoming more and more numerous: the
culture of stability so dear to the Germans has not yet become an
everyday feature of life among the French. The European election
results ofjune 1994 reflected the internal opposition to Europe, as well
Jean-Marc Trouilk 61
as divisions into clans: the wide range of political tendencies

represented has rendered France unable to speak with one voice in
Strasbourg; consequently her influence in Europe has been weakened.
The contrast with Germany, where pro-European parties have a clear
majority, is blatant. With the departure of Jacques Delors from his
position as President of the European Commission and the end of
Fran~ois Mitterrand's term of office as President, France has lost the
voices of two unconditional advocates of European integration. Since
the awkward Maastricht referendum in September 1992, France seems
to be less and less in a position to play her traditionally innovative role
in Europe. In fact, apart from security issues and the Bosnian problem,
she seems to be on the defensive. In the face of this loss of influence
and self-confidence on the part of France, Germany is increasingly
emerging as the major European leader: she is the one who pushed for
the membership of Austria and the Scandinavian countries in the EU,
and it was she who proposed opening up the Union to eastern Europe
at the European summit in Copenhagen in June 1993. Germany
certainly does not underestimate the significance of France's
indecisiveness and flagging commitment towards Europe: a change of
course· in economic policy by Germany's main trading partner would
have serious consequences for German economic recovery, which
depends heavily on foreign demand. If the French government were to
give up its anti-inflationary franc fort policy, this would undermine
Franco-German relations and jeopardise the implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty.
Apart from such uncertainties concerning economic and monetary
policy, the issue of enlarging EU membership is a real source of
concern among French political circles. For, if stability in eastern
Europe is crucial for Germany's security, then France fears the
advantages that her partner could draw from it. Besides, allowing free
trade between the Union and eastern Europe could well upset Franco-
German relations, especially as far as agricultural issues are concerned.
A compromise has of course been reached, albeit reluctantly on the
part of the French, as a recent declaration by A. Juppe indicates:•~
France 'is not fundamentally opposed to the principle' of enlarging the
Union to include eastern Europe. However, France would certainly
have preferred to deepen the EU prior to greeting new members; the
enlargement is perceived as carrying a risk of weakening - if not
paralysing - a Europe in which Germany would no longer be properly
harnessed and her pivotal role reinforced. Some are concerned not
only about the influence of Germany in a Europe of fifteen or more
62 The Franca-Gennan Axis since Unification
member states, but also about the role France could play at her side.
The spectre of a Germany turning once more towards her natural
space in central and eastern Europe to the detriment of her Western
partners still looms large in the minds of many in France - even though
the risk of isolation it would imply for Germany makes it a most unlikely
scenario.
Even the planned re-establishment of Berlin less than a hundred
kilometres from the Polish border as capital city, which appears to show
Germany shifting her political centre, does not justify French fears.
One can hardly imagine today's Germans, desperate for stability and
security, obsessed by comfort and life-assurance policies, sacrificing the
ties to the West which have brought them so much in half a century.
The French familiar with contemporary Germany realise that she is not
looking for adventure: what matters beyond the Rhine is continuity and
stability. It is natural that Germany will want to play an appropriate role
in the east; and besides, what the French see as a shift of the EU's
centre of gravity to the north and the east is, in German eyes, nothing
more than a righting of the balance following the expansion
southwards, with the membership of Spain, Portugal and Greece.
FUTURE PERSPECfiVES
The (inevitable) opening up of the Union towards the east will

necessitate a reform of European institutions. There will have to be new
structures: initially designed for six, they must now provide for fifteen
and soon more member states. France has made discussion of this
reform, which will aim to endow Europe with a more stable presidency
and a stronger parliament, the pre-condition for further European
enlargement. These discussions are due to take place in 1996 and are
likely to prove difficult. However, there is no lack of important support
for a revival of the Franco-German pact - for example, in Germany,
Karl Lamers, 14 member of the Bundestag and foreign affairs spokesman
of the German Christian Democrat party, and, in France,Jean-Fran~ois
Poncet, 15 formerly minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter has even
suggested a revision of the Elysee Treaty.
Whatever the case, discussion about tomorrow's Europe has already
begun. In what appears to be the first unilateral German initiative on
Europe, on 2 September 1994 Chancellor Kohl's CDU-CSU presented
an action plan to reinforce European cohesion, which envisages a hard
core of only five economically viable countries racing ahead to
monetary union at the heart of a multi-speed Europe. This

controversial document appears, nonetheless, in some respects, to hold
out a friendly hand towards an indecisive France and makes clear that it
would be out of the question for Germany to neglect her closest
partner.
Many similarly crucial steps are expected to take place by the end of
the century; by 1997, or 1999 at the latest, for example, those countries
fulfilling the criteria for economic convergence stipulated by the
Maastricht Treaty will perhaps have committed themselves to a single
currency. The security of the continent and the development of a true
European defence policy are further issues on the future European
agenda. Thus, four years after German unification, Franco-German
relations are characterised by questions rather than answers. Just how
far will the expansion towards the east go? Will we see the emergence of
a hard core at the centre of a multi-speed Europe, which will be ever
broader, ever more disparate? Will the Franco-German axis form the
heart of this hard core? Will it be able to survive the political accession
of Germany to the rank of world power? Will French leaders know how
to manage co-operation with an ever more confident Germany
increasingly asserting herself? Or will they simply seek to preserve the
status quo by resorting to superficial declarations of friendship based
on the memories of thirty-two years past? Will France have any option
but to follow Germany, in order to stop her simply 'going it alone'? Or
can some kind of new European co-operation be proposed, which
could integrate Germany without inhibiting her? And will Germany, for
her part, be content to accommodate a partner who has often been
very useful and whom she, perhaps, still needs? In any event, it is in the
interests of the two partners separately to promote a politically,
economically and militarily strong Europe, and even if the Franco-
German axis now has to prove itself again in a new international
context, it is hard to imagine, given the probable configuration of
Europe in future, how either partner could manage without the other.
It is a question still, perhaps even more than in the past, of a marriage
of convenience, an irreversible and forced alliance, through lack of any
other valid choice.
Notes
1. Deutschland-Frankreich: 1948-1963-1993, Dokumente (Europa Union

Verlag, 1993), pp. 150-67.
2. S. Kramer, The French Question, Washington Quarterly, autumn 1991.
3. A.-M. Legloannec, France, Germany and the New Europe (Westview Press,
1993).
4. Le Nouvel Observateur, 8 September 1994.
5. See Janet Bryant's chapter on implications for European defence
identity, pp. 79-92.
6. E. Balladur, Dictionnaire de la Riforme (Fayard, 1992).
7. G. Valance, LeretourdeBismarck (Flammarion, 1990).
8. For a discussion of the problems confronting France as she struggles
to redefine her strategic priorities in the new international context,
see above, D. David, pp. 65-75.
9. For a discussion of this question, see below, D. Hanley, pp. 137-51.
10. Le Monde, 25 Apri11994.
11. See chapter by C. Gulvin, below, pp. 115-25.
12. L. Siegele, Die Zeit, 19 February 1993.
13. Le Monde, 6 September 1994.
14. LeMonde, 9June 1994.
15. Le Point, 7 May 1994.
The author wishes to thank Mr Arthur Williams for his valuable advice in
editing this contribution.
4 The Search for a New
Security Strategy in a
Shifting International Arena
Dominique David
There is no pride in being French, just a lot of trouble and hard worlt; a mal
chom.
Georges Bernanos
The choices and strategies made by the principal actors in the world
states-system have become difficult to decipher; their main elements
(identifYing objectives, staking out operational space, assessing power
potential) have been overturned by the pace of developments in recent
years. France is no exception. It is not good enough to interpret this
strategic inscrutability as a mere transitional difficulty or a crisis in
adapting to a misunderstood environment. For France as for others, it is
not just a matter of finding its bearings in a passing fog, but of coming to
terms both with the loss of formerly reliable landmarks, and with the
need to find others. The question here therefore is one of a profound
crisis in French strategic culture, where strategic culture is defined as the
way in which a country views its relations with others on the world stage.
This view derives from a country's history, from its geography and its
instincts, and builds on the power of a nation's self-assessment to both
influence and explain its strategies.
It is always a complex task to define strategic culture, not least when it
is in a state of flux. In the case of France, it is pointless to approach it
other than via two basic reference points: territory, and extension
beyond this territory: home and away, in a sense. The physical
geography of France's territory explains why an obsession with its
security within borders secured by nature or by defence systems has
been the subtext of all its strategic arguments over the last few centuries
and has determined the size and shape of its armies.
France in the last few centuries has been difficult to defend: at the
edge of the great northern European plain; faced with different
concentrations of power in central Europe, and invaded on several
different occasions, it has sought to make its territory impregnable in
65
66 The Search fur New Security Stratelfj in a Shifting International Anma
diplomatic or physical terms. This desire constitutes one major

explanation for maintaining a conscript army since the nineteenth
century; only force of numbers was considered capable of countering
an adversary's penetrative power in an area which has scarcely any
natural barriers. 1
Beyond the geographic interpretation of this relation with territory,
we should remember the French idea of citizenship. Defining the latter
as both a statement of fact - being together - and as a demonstration
of will - wanting to live together - can only lead to a fencing-()ff of the
political space: the republic is the area of identifiable wills, and this area
is inevitably defined geographically. To speak about the creation of
French citizenship by land-right (droit du sol) is by extension to define a
particular relationship with this land as territory to be defended against
outside forces. The fact that the great men of French military history
were land-war strategists may be explained not only by accidents of
history, but by the fact that the idea of the nation favours geographic
categories - a space divided up into heterogeneous units - which is a
concept that must also be borne in mind when analysing French
stances on the current process of European restructuring. France is on
the side of a Europe which is clearly drawn and represented, and not
on the side of a flabby, fluid, single Europe, without limits and so
without clearly defined territory.
In only apparent contrast, French thinking also gives point to
France's presence abroad, its projection onto one or more axes beyond
the nation's territory. The open geographical situation of the country
in at least one respect, its position as the western isthmus of Europe,
halfway between land and sea, between northern and Latin Europe and
more generally between north and south, and the variety of its coastal
fronts: all this explains why France has an exceptional mix of
populations - and from this springs the integratory concept of
citizenship which gives it a special relationship with the rest of the
world. During the last few centuries therefore, French national power
has been projected beyond Europe, in several strategic directions
overseas. Awareness of its presence over large areas far from home is a
major element in the self-definition of the French national entity, all
the more so when this awareness of an actual presence was mixed with
the awareness of an intellectual and moral duty to expand.
The French people are certainly not the only ones who believe they
produce values which are applicable to all humanity: but they have
implanted this universalism at the very heart of their national ideology.
The French revolution, while defending the territory of the Republic,
Dominique David 67
also meant bringing Enlightenment to the world. The expression,

'France, home of the rights of man' does not imply that the rights of
man flourish only in France, but rather that France reaffirms itself as
the homeland of everyone who has rights, of every citizen. Closer to us
today, de Gaulle laid claim to the greatness of France in the service of
world freedom. And the concept of the right or obligation of
humanitarian intervention promulgated in recent years is evidence in
itself that French universalism is not a thing of the past.
More concretely, the legacy of France's history, particularly its colonial
history, has established its presence over a wide-ranging geographical
area, from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, via the Caribbean basin and
Latin America, the Mediterranean, and Africa. Mere confetti of Empire?
Perhaps. But it is clear that black Africa plays a major role in France's
diplomatic outlook. And perceptions of the very large extent of French
commitments have deeply influenced French discourse both about its
own strategy (see for example the 'three circles' model which marked out
France's areas for intervention during the 1960s and 1970s) and the
organisation of its military capabilities, in spite of the limitations imposed
by its status as a medium-sized power.
The formalisation of diplomatic and defence options - highly
rational, highly national and to be frank very French - exercised by the
Fifth Republic followed faithfully these two scales of reference in the
strategic culture of the country. At the end of the 1950s, the priority was
recovery from two terrible decades. Defeat in 1940 undermined the
national being in its profoundest sense. The crime of Petainism, as
Bernanos reiterated throughout the Second World War, was to have
made the acceptance of defeat and the disappearance of France an
integral part of the new public psyche. The false French victory of 1945
negated France as a power; for the first time in several centuries, even if
France kept its place among the greatest countries, she was no longer
counted even in the European context amongst those powers which
could determine their own destiny. The vigour of the Fourth Republic's
economic rebirth was bought at the cost of a low diplomatic profile,
which forced it to tag along behind the dominant power of the West,
and prevented it from laying proper claim to autonomy in its own
affairs. The genius of de Gaulle was without doubt to have chosen to
erase this triple setback by returning to the two scales of reference
mentioned above in order to define French power.
Paradoxically, the means of reaffirming the inviolability of the
national territory and its importance in French strategic thinking was
the atom bomb, the quintessentially abstract and 'de- territorialised'
68 The Searr:h fur New Security Strategy in a Shifting International Awna
weapon. De Gaulle did not invent France's nuclear capability, but he

laid claim to it and placed it at the heart of its power-generating
machinery. If French nuclear strategy was original in its rationale, it was
not unique in its function: its principal strands were quite close to
British reasoning, for example. But it emphasised certain ideas: the
protective umbrella; independence in nuclear decision-making, which
implied independence in arms production; French exceptionality
defined by the theory of proportional deterrence (du faihle au furt); all
of which confirmed the uniqueness of the French position, and the
specific nature of France's strategic space. Of course, the list of vital
interests which would involve nuclear intervention in response to a
threat has not been made public, and it has never been explicitly linked
with the defence of metropolitan France. But of all the nuclear powers,
France is the one which has done most to develop the sanctuary theory.
This was its crowning achievement and represented the completion of a
long historical process of securing the national territory; in a sense, it
was the Maginot fantasy being realised in practice.
There is a second axis to this reaffirmation of French power at the
end of the 1950s: this was the extra-European presence as an integral
part of a 'non-aligned' diplomacy, in a policy sometimes characterised
as 'third-worldist'. Between the two blocs, which in truth never
reorganised the world between them, but sought to provide a means of
decoding it, Paris relied on the existence worldwide of French
possessions, on the intelligent dismantling of Empire in black Africa,
and on the image of de Gaulle as a rebel against the dominant powers,
in an effort to develop a distinct policy, of which Mexico (1964),
Phnom Penh (1969), and Cancun (1981) constitute its most famous
public manifestations. Politically, through the declaration of choices
opposed to the division of the world, which the Gaullist myth traced
symbolically back to Yalta, and legally, through the network of
agreements established between Paris and African states, France
established itself in its own sphere of influence. Moreover, it is
interesting to note that none of the great keynote speeches of the Fifth
Republic on the subject were made on the African continent; it is as if
there existed an invisible gulf between the zone of actual influence
(Africa) and the zone of its public expression (Asia or Latin America).
The machinery of French defence has also been organised along
these two axes. One major axis was Europe. The centre piece here was
nuclear weapons, which were supported by their usual accompaniments:
the need to protect the weapons themselves, and the crisis management
strategy which lays the groundwork for actual deterrence; provision for
Dominique David 69
mobilisation alongside allies in the area surrounding the national

territory; and possible defence of the national territory if deterrence fuiled.
The minor axis was maintenance of the capacity to project forces
beyond Europe, on a limited scale, a standard practice in terms of the
security needs of those Mrican countries linked to France by defence
agreements. In short, the core of defence capacity was mobilised for the
task of territorial defence in Europe, in the traditional sense of the term,
even if the means themselves were not traditional (i.e. nuclear); France
meanwhile kept a reserve of forces for rapid intervention outside Europe.
In reality, this strategic concept was more deeply embedded in, or at
the edge of, the much-maligned bipolar system, than it was in opposition
to it. This can be seen more dearly today. Perhaps it was even an integral,
working part of the East-West system, even if this was not readily
recognised either by France or by the leader of the Western camp, the
United States. Nonetheless, in Ottawa in 1974, the Alliance hailed the
role fulfilled by second-rank nuclear states which benefited all the Allied
powers; and in Africa, France played the role of regional controller which,
until the 1980s, was generally sufficient to guarantee a Western presence.
In Europe, it was precisely because of the system's stability that an
individualist policy (of openness to the East and a distancing from the
full machinery of the Alliance) WdS possible. When the stability of the
East-West axis was attacked, France reasserted its place in the system:
the Cuban crisis in the 1960s and the Euro-missiles affair in the 1980s
come to mind. In the south, France's limited powers prevented it from
applying its universalist discourse to policy. That does not imply that
France never got beyond the declaratory stage - although this stage,
eminently diplomatic in nature, was fundamental - but that its
principal global involvement (combining economic, cultural and
military aspects among others) was confined to sub-Saharan Mrica2 and
the Middle East. These were areas in which France pursued a policy
which was effective in cementing over the cracks or failings of the
superpower system. This does not, however, mean that when, rightly or
wrongly, the situation appeared serious to the USA, it would not take
charge, albeit with varying degrees of success. In this context, one could
mention, for example, US interventions in Mrica under Reagan, or the
securing of the Middle East.
France's skill here resides in the fact that it understood two essential
points. Firstly, in an East-West system of which the equation was
quintessentially zero-sum, any talk of a break from this caused
significant ripples. There was a major difference, in terms of strategic
options, with Great Britain. For the French, London's basic mistake was
70 The Search for New Security Strategy in a Shifling International Anma
its failure to understand that, in the half of the system controlled by

Washington, the supernumary voice which went along with the majority
carried no significant weight and that it was necessary to adopt a
distinctive stance. Furthermore, on the edge of the system, in those
areas where the stakes were inevitably low for the big powers, and where
local actors were weak, the distribution of power allowed France to have
a political impact much greater than the means at its disposal.
The dissolving of the East-West system thus overturned the
framework in which France's strategy developed. In Europe, its military
standpoint on the fringes of the Alliance and the autonomy of its policy
towards the Soviet bloc are now meaningless. Western European
construction assumes an entirely different significance: it is one thing
to build an area of economic and political cooperation in a world
dominated by the superpowers, but it is another to try to create a new
strategic actor on the back of a decayed Europe. The Maastricht process
is revealing both of the consistency of France's choices- the decision to
build European autonomy and eventually self-sufficiency - and of the
problems involved in bringing them to fruition (ratification difficulties,
growth of Euro-scepticism, etc.)
Elsewhere, both close to home and farther afield, two crises are
symptomatic of the new world, and remind us that France, like others,
has so far failed to find a secure place in it. The aim of French
participation in the second Gulf War was twofold: to assert the existence
of a supra-state apparatus, the UN, which establishes law, or at least the
basic rules of international conduct; and on a more political level, to
establish a presence in a situation where France could have some
influence at an international level. For a variety of reasons (particularly,
the weakness of the UN as an autonomous decision-making body and
the enormous weight of American politico-military power in the
region), French participation ended in a political failure, although this
does not, in itself, prove that France should not have participated in the
coalition. The lesson for Paris is clear: there are crises in which French
participation is not significant in terms of its interests and in which
France can no longer make an impact on its own. This does not refer
solely to the limitations of France's military capabilities. The United
Kingdom, which intervened in the Gulf with a considerably larger force
than the French, did not have any greater political influence on the
diplomatic outcome of the war.
Closer to home, the explosion of Yugoslavia has certainly called for
European diplomatic intervention. This has sometimes been opposed
by contradictory national tensions but, all things considered, the
Dominique David 71
approach has been fairly united. Yet events have shown clearly that we
shall have to wait a long time before a European entity exists which enjoys
both diplomatic and military power, the former being meaningless
without the latter. For several years we have recognised the inability of
national forces, acting alone, to make a decisive impact in important
crises; and we have also learned than there can be no collective solution
as a replacement in the short term. European Union will take much
more time to build; the CSCE is powerless, and NATO is only a collection of
forces over which American political will, and hence power of veto, hovers.
Developments in recent years have thus fractured the logic, the
accepted analyses and the application of French military strategy. For
the first time in several centuries, French national territory is no longer
threatened with invasion; the defence of Frc1nce, defined as defence of
a territorial body on or beyond the north-eastern border, is now
meaningless. If there were a threat to the national territory, it could
doubtless be met with a classic deployment (albeit lighter), or by
nuclear deterrence. Therefore it is difficult to imagine any situation in
which the current large-scale army could act in a defensive role.
Nuclear weapons, even if kept in reserve for unforeseen eventualities,
have from now on only a limited role in defining French power.
Outside Europe, and in that Europe beyond France's immediate allies
and neighbours, purely national military operations are still possible,
but only in a very limited way and certainly with questionable global
effectiveness. France has thus just watched the simultaneous
disappearance of the psyclwlogical and political geography within which it
operated, the puwer scale on which it positioned itself, and the definition of
its defence forces' missions. At the same time, western Europe has so far
shown itself unable to take over from individual nations the role of
defining power and strc1tegy and the means of achieving it.
In the absence of a completely unified Europe, the geogrc1phy of
France's presence in the world could well change entirely. Is it so bold
to imagine a world in which the United States possessed a sort of mono-
poly of high-power diplomacy, distinguishing between, on the one
hand, areas where they feel they have concerns and operate by the logic
of their supreme power, and on the other, areas abandoned by them,
rendered strategically void by virtue of their absence and of the
impotence of the medium-sized states? The Rwandan affair in 1994 is
characteristic of the paradoxes of the French position. France
intervened to assert a responsibility (both in the legal and the moral
sense, it could be said); and to show political will- what would France's
presence in Mrica be worth if its peoples could die without France lifting
72 The Search for New Security Strategy in a Shifting International Anna
a finger? But France's intervention was presented as a beginning, a

preparation, a waiting period for the decisions of an international
community represented by the UN. Perhaps this was a sign of political
11Ullaise. But it indicated above all the limitations of France's capabilities.
France's military machine, scattered amongst multiple UN operations as
well as its own deployments, is today stretched to the limit The seemingly
contradictory indicators of France's Mrican policy - devaluation of the
CFA franc, intervention in Rwanda- only serve to underline the sense of
bewilderment in Paris. France maintains a presence despite everything,
but within a strategic geography of which it is no longer the master, and
with a frame of reference inherited from a vmished era.
France cannot be blamed for failing to define a new position when
faced with a situation which is still fluid and difficult to quantify. But
perhaps it could be blamed for failing to be aware of the consequences
of the ongoing revolutions on its very definition of a strategic actor. This
would be both fair and unfair. Fair because there persists, it is true, a
simplifYing, voluntarist discourse of which there are echoes in the 1994
Defence White Paper: France is a great power, it must maintain its
position, it will do so politically through the construction of Europe.!
This also manifests itself at a military level, in the system of force
deployment and interventions, which is becoming central and actually
replacing the priority given to nuclear weapons. In fact, the idea of
France as a great power remains relatively abstract, insofar as it does not
involve any revision of French interests, nor of their geographical
location. The proclamation of France's world power is universally
applicable, and takes no account of the means necessary for a policy of
power projection in today's world. The military structure proposed by
the White Paper- 140,000 men ready to be deployed, and the possibility
of simultaneous interventions, as part of a coalition, in a high-intensity
regional conflict, in an overseas possession [DOM-TOM], through the
provisions of a defence treaty, or, lastly, in a peace-keeping operation on
behalf of the UN - is not in itself perverse. But it is purely technical, in
the sense that the political framework which will determine France's
choice to intervene has not been seriously studied. For this structure to
attain a true political meaning, it would be necessary to overcome the
desire to tell France's politicians and soldiers what they, naturally, want
to hear: the former that France has a position and that acknowledging
this is enough to define its place on the world chessboard, and the latter
that they are going to be able finally to forget tl1e nuclear prohibition
and ply their traditional trade: intervening by using tl1eir weapons.
Alongside official utterances, a multi-faceted debate is developing
Dominique David 73
nonetheless, even if, as always in France, it is kept muffled and encoded.

There is, first of all, the nuclear question. The 1994 White Paper is tilted
officially in favour of the maintenance of the nuclear status quo. But
there is an ongoing debate about the possible adaptation of the concept
for the situation of nuclear proliferation in the Third World: is it
necessary to conceive of a more flexible nuclear capability, more readily
employable against a regional actor who does not fear the threat of
massive reprisals? This in reality is what is principally at stake in the
debate on nuclear testing, since if France intends to develop new types
of nuclear weapons, it will have to test them. 4 Even if the nuclear status
quo is maintained, the explanatory discourse of French nuclear strategy
will still require restructuring, henceforth 'faible sans fort'. The position
may be a position of waiting; but that assumes that it is possible to define
precisely how this position ofwctiting, both at a technical and declaratory
level, will find expression.
The second issue is that of intervention. Seemingly set up as the
'white man's burden', intervention will appear henceforth at the heart
of arguments about defence capabilities. Voices are rctised, including the
most authoritative, to explain that the concept of intervention has no
strategic meaning in itself, and only attains one in relation to France's
way of dealing with its interests and intentions, with the geographic
context in which it can demonstrate both, and the means it can put at
their disposal. All these are factors which cannot simply be transplanted
from the past The debate focuses therefore on how 'intervention' fits
within the general strategy of the country; on the hierarchy of areas in
which France could be induced to intervene; and on the actual
combination of capabilities of different nations which would make such
an intervention effective: is there a common reference point for France,
or several? And if so, what are they? The Western European Union,
NATO or, in expectation of better, whatever springs from the current
Eurocorps? It is in only in the context of a genuine reconstitution of
France's strategic geography that the more political debates on the
future of European security identity or on France's position with regard
to the Atlantic Alliance make sense.
Finally, there is the question of the future shape of the military.
Official texts and declarations today reaffirm the combined nature of
the professional/conscript army. But perhaps in reality they are
advocating a two-tier army: one level made up of professionals for use
abroad, the other of conscripts for territorial defence. This
schizophrenia risks becoming all the more apparent as the concrete
tasks required for territorial defence become fewer. Everyone knows
74 The Search for New Security Strategy in a Shifting International Arena
that, political considerations notwithstanding, the professional

effectiveness and the political meaning of the popular army are not
easily reconcilable. It will, in fact, soon be necessary to work out a new
sort of army, which corresponds to the expectations of French society,
the role it wants to play in the world, and to a radically changed
international environment. A smaller, completely professional army, a
mixed army with redefined tasks, or an army of officers able rapidly to
increase the power at its disposal if needs be: such are the broad terms
of the debate. Although for long put off or marginalised, this debate
must develop openly over the next few years, since the current reforms
will, by then, no longer be applicable. 5
France has for decades had a strategy corresponding to its legacy as a
nation haunted by the power of the state, the threat of the Other at its
border, and imbued with its vocation as a people long in the vanguard
of international action. The break must be, and is already, radical.
France no longer has enemies on its doorstep. This undermines the
way in which it has, for several centuries, envisaged its military
strategies. The geography of French power in the world is gravely
affected by the increasingly rapid realignments of the other powers.
The tools France has used over thirty years to redefine itself, in a world
which was new even then, are not now useless, but out of step with
reality. The foundations on which not just France but the whole world
rests, are being changed for the second time in fifty years. It is not only
the technical apparatus of France's defence which is in question, but a
large part of its culture. The world has, perhaps momentarily, become
inscrutable; and France may seem invisible because the French can no
longer clearly see their place in this new order of things. The French
'Great Nation,' is, like all the others, at a turning point: it must now
rethink itself and the world, both at the same time.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the conscription issue, sec below, P. Chicken, pp.

93-103.
2. For a discussion of French aid policy towards West Africa, see below, G.
Cumming, pp. 126--36.
3. See above, J. Howorth, pp. 17-38. For a more detailed discussion of the
Defence White Paper and its context, see below,]. Bryant, pp. 79-92.
4. See below, S. Gregory, pp. 104-11.
Dominique David 75
5. For more on these issues, see L. Poirier, La crise des fondemenl.s (Economica,
1994); P.-M. Gallois, Li'IJTl! noir sur Ia difense (Payot, 1994); G. Fricaud-
Chagnaud andj.:J. Patry, MourirpourleroidePrusse7 (Publisud, 1994).
This chapter was translated from the French by Mel McNulty.
Section 2
Defence and Security
5 Changing Circumstances,
Changing Policies?
The 1994 Defence White
Paper and Beyond
Janet Bryant
Even before the Wall came down and German unification was achieved,
French defence policy was fast approaching domestic crisis point. This
crisis was further exacerbated by the unprecedented succession of events
between 1989 and 1994, which left all states struggling to find
appropriate responses to them but posed especially acute problems for
France. On the one hand, it could only welcome the collapse of
Communism; its critique ofbipolarism (although a rather self-interested
critique) is longstanding. On the other hand, the changes which
accompanied the eclipse of the Yalta Order disturbed France since they
undermined equally longstanding assumptions concerning the very
bases of French defence and security policy.
These established assumptions or truths - although not all publicly
acknowledged - have directly or indirectly shaped French policy since
de Gaulle. They can be summarised as follows. First, that American
nuclear and conventional forces stationed in Europe (and particularly in
West Germany) have guaranteed France a protective 'forward glacis'.
Second, that a generally predictable and largely stable pattern of Cold
War East-West relations has allowed France to maintain her peculiar
status within the Alliance and NATO. These international and strategic
circumstances help explain the independence and relative autonomy of
action France has enjoyed over the years.' Third, that central to French
objectives has been the maintenance of West Germany firmly within the
Western orbit (and thus locked into NATO), and equally committed to
cooperation with France over Western European economic and political
integration.
Thus, the opening of a new chapter in European history in the late
1980s and early 1990s excited but at the same time greatly disturbed
France. The collapse of communism in the East, the revolutions in the
former Soviet satellites, German unification, the disintegration of the
79
80 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies?
Warsaw Pact, and corresponding questions about the future role of

NATO, political and ethnic chaos in the former Soviet Union itself, the
expectation of large scale withdrawals of US and Soviet forces from the
European theatre, new definitions of what constituted security threats -
all of these things, by their very nature, demanded a revision of the key
assumptions which have just been outlined.
The period 1989-94 has therefore been a difficult period of
adaptation and challenge in French defence policy and thinking.
France has had to come to terms with German unification. She has had
to consider the political and strategic contours of the new Europe and
address, amongst other things, the implications this has for her
deterrent. She has had to - or has chosen to - experience at first hand
some of the New World disorders in the shape of the Gulf conflict and
the war in the former Yugoslavia. She has had to consider how all these
new circumstances affect the advancement of the common foreign and
security policy for Europe (CFSP). She has had to calculate whether a
peace dividend is justifiable, warranted or possible in these changing
conditions. Finally, France has prepared important documents which
map out funding and procurement priorities from now until the
beginning of the next century.
These documents, and in particular the February 1994 Defence
White Paper2 and the current loi de programmation militaire (LPM),
provide answers to some of the questions about how France proposes to
meet the new challenges. They will be the focus of this chapter and
issues concerning the domestic political consensus, or lack of one, on
defence policy, will not therefore be treated here.' However, to put these
documents into context, we need to review Franco-German relations,
France and the European security dimension including France's
changing relationship with NATO, and French involvement in the Gulf.
THE CURRENT FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP
France was unsettled by the speed of German unification. 4 Following

reunification, France's principal objective was to ensure that the new
Germany remained linked to the West. In that objective, at least, she
has been successful. But the Franco-German partnership has been
subjected to stresses and strains as both states have jostled for position
in the New Order. This explains the awkwardness between Paris and
Bonn at various points between 1989-91. In 1993-4, Juppe
acknowledged 'objective difficulties', 'fissures' and a 'deterioration' in
Janet Bryant 81
Franco-German understanding over monetary issues (read interest

rates and the crisis in the European Monetary System), commercial
issues (read GATT) and political issues (read Bosnia and the en-
largement of the EU).
However, despite these niggles, Franco-German cooperation is
essential for the continuing development of Europe, and both states
realise this. So indispensable is agreement between them that Paris and
Bonn are almost condemned to compromise and hence to apply short
term policies to recurrent problems. Given the nature of the
relationship, and given the 1989-94 context, crises and attacks of
mutual mistrust and reconciliation are bound to occur, and recur,
regularly. 5 However, France and Germany have found common ground
in their shared vision of the future Europe.
FRANCE, EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND NATO
Moves to develop a viable European security identity are recognised as a

largely Franco-German initiative and are central to an understanding of
French thinking about the new Europe. This thinking has undergone a
convoluted although not inconsistent evolution over the years. During
the 1980s broad levels of support grew up in France around the notion
that a more militarily autonomous western Europe was required either
to counter American attempts to maintain its hegemony over NATO
and European security provision, or to prepare Europe for the eventual
withdrawal of the US from the continent. In 1984, the reactivated
Western European Union (WEU) became Frc1nce's chosen vehicle -
along with the developing Franco-German defence relationship - for
an emerging European defence identity. Progress has been slow but
steady, particularly after 1987. The WEU's Hague platform, agreed in
1987, stated, for example, that a more united Europe would make a
stronger contribution to European security, thus helping to provide the
basis for a more balanced partnership across the Atlantic. In the late
1980s the WEU gained new members with the adhesion of Spain and
Portugal, and displayed its readiness to accept global responsibilities by
coordinating naval operations in the Gulf in 1987 and again in 1990.
However, the collapse of communism and its aftermath have lent
more focus to France's understanding of the shape of security in the
new Europe. Initially, the new situation in the East appeared to France
to offer the possibility of a far more grandiose and romantic vision of
security. Mitterrand's 1990 New Year message referred to a rather ill-
82 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies1
defined 'transcontinental confederation' which 'by linking every state

on our continent in a joint and permanent organisation for exchanges,
peace and security' would allow it to recover its true 'history and
geography'. This is somewhat reminiscent of de Gaulle's vision of a
Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals and thus moved
beyond a mere strengthening of the European arm of NAT0.6
The important thing to note about this wider vision, however, is that
Mitterrand was using it precisely as a vision - a long-term objective
which would not and could not be realised overnight. In the interim,
France calculated, the bolstering of western European political and
monetary union (including defence) remained imperative for France,
the European Union and the Franco-German axis. This conclusion
reflected the new complexities surrounding the identification of, and
planning for, future security threats. Mitterrand was unambiguous in
his conclusion that the West must not be any less vigilant than before.
This position (which has hardly been modified, given the uncertainties
which have arrived with the end of the old order) has led France into
an interesting re-evaluation of the usefulness ofNATO.
The collapse of the Yalta order meant that many, if not all, of the
conditions which France used to point to in order to explain her special
treatment within the Alliance disappeared. Hence for some,
particularly sections of opinion in the UK, the US and Germany, it
seemed logical that France should return to NATO's integrated
military command structure. But proposals to this end since 1990 have
continued to meet with the standard French response: in February
1994, Defence Minister Franc;:ois Leotard indicated that a 'cultural
revolution' would be necessary before this could happen. But the truth
is that France has been building bridges with NATO over the past few
years, and never before has France been so public in her appreciation
of NATO and the US. 7 The bottom line is that France realises that
Europe still needs both. Granted, the Mitterrand-Kohl October 1991
plan restarted the process of establishing a firm Western European
defence profile and this plan then became the basis of the proposals for
a common European defence and foreign policy included in the
Maastricht Treaty. But post-Maastricht euphoria has been still-born: the
malheurs of the New World Order have led France to acknowledge that
the European defence persona is not yet strong or defined enough to
face these varied challenges alone.
Janet Bryant 83
FRANCE AND THE GULF
France's involvement in the Gulf crisis is a complex issue, which cannot

be envisaged in detail here,8 but it is illustrative of serious shortfalls in
French intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and tracking
capabilities, and in some elements of the airforce and navy. The
Jaguars, the Mirage FC1s, the Mirage 2000 and the AMX-30s (heavy
tanks) were all, for different reasons, badly equipped for their allotted
missions in the Middle East. The relatively low-key French naval
presence is also indicative of another problem: if the carriers Clemenceau
or Foch had been used during the conflict, Mitterrand would have
broken his promise not to send conscripts to the Gulf. This 'manpower'
difficulty is significant because of the questions the Gulf War raised
about France's real ability to deploy her forces. The French army
numbered 285,000 in 1991, yet the Gulf war revealed 12,000 men to be
the limit of what France could effectively deploy. Although the Force
d'Action Rapide's (FAR) total of 47,000 men is quite impressive, half
are conscripts who could not have left France without a special vote in
the National Assembly. Calls for an annie de metier were thus increased in
the aftermath of the war. 9
The last area of French weakness was in satellite and other
information/reconnaissance gathering technologies. The French
commander in the Gulf admitted that he would have been virtually
blind had it not been for information coming from the US. France has
of course been working on the Helois observation satellite with Spain
and Italy, but delays mean that it could not be launched until late in
1994. Even then, a second satellite is really required because it will take
Helois four days to complete a single orbit. France's concern about her
weaknesses in this area were addressed in the 1992 defence budget, in
which resources allocated to space research were increased by 17.5 per
cent. In 1992 France also reorganised her four former intelligence
services into the single Direction du Renscignement in an effort to
improve her intelligence-gathering capabilities.
THE 1994 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER
Changes in the international system and mounting pressure for

budgetary realism in 1989-94 did not lead France into any immediate
reassessments of her defence policy. Although Hades was eventually
mothballed in late 1991 and the delivery times for certain other
84 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies 7
programmes extended, no 'peace dividend' was really forthcoming.

The report by the Commissariat General du Plan in December 1993
gave a taster of what was likely to follow in the White Paper. It
condemned the arms industry for its inflexibility and its lack of interest
in collaboration with European partners, and reiterated concerns
about the real ability of France to project her forces. The 1994 Defence
White Paper and LPM were therefore set to make that year a crucial
one in French defence policy planning and definition. The last
Defence White Paper dated back to 1972. This alone meant that the
new version was likely to be a key document, given the profound
changes which had occurred in between times, and the Paper was
supposed to synthesise French responses to the experiences she had so
far had in the New World Order. The White Paper itself, presented to
the National Assembly in February 1994, did not involve explicit
military choices- these were left for the LPM presented in April -but it
does map out the way forward for France into the next century.
A number of important observations can be made about the content
of the White Paper. As expected, the nuclear deterrent is safeguarded
and the document stresses that France will 'maintain her efforts' to
upgrade and/or replace her main systems until well into the next
century, despite the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear testing
which dates back to Mitterrand's then unilateral April 1992 initiative. 10
The promise to pursue continued modernisation has left France as the
only major western country to increase spending on military equipment
this year. Secondly, the Paper indicates that, for the first time in recent
history, there is no direct threat to French borders. However, it quashes
any lingering talk of a peace dividend by outlining the real (but more
diffuse) dangers affecting the security of Europe as a whole today.
A third observation concerns France's relationship with NATO.
Reintegration is again rejected. Two of the main props of the Gaullist
legacy are thus preserved: the sanctity of the deterrent and a formal
separateness from NATO. However, the paper underlines the need for
real and extensive cooperation with NATO: France praises the US as
the only current military giant and identifies the Alliance/NATO as the
'principal organisation of defence'. It states also that French defence
ministers and chiefs of staff will attend NATO meetings on a case- by-
case basis, especially when peacekeeping (or, as NATO has begun to
label them, peace support) operations are under discussion. Thus,
Leotard attended a NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Seville at the
end of September 1994 - the first time since 1966 that a French
Defence Minister has done so.
Janet Bryant 85
A fourth conclusion which can be drawn from the White Paper is the
seriousness with which France views her European role and the
European security dimension. The French desire to play a major role -
the leading role, even - in future European defence arrangements is
very clear. Leotard indicates in the preamble that FrcUlce must 'set an
example' and Balladur stresses that France must play a 'm<Uor role in
building a common European defence'. Germany and the UK are
identified as key partners in this task. The UK is again criticised for its
reluctance to cooperate and its insular attitude. Clearly, therefore,
France does not see the link with NATO as an excuse for Europe to
'leave its defence to others'. The Paper goes on to map out a future
where key European interests, 'identified as such by Europeans and
others', might culminate in the espousal of a European nuclear
doctrine. In the ways outlined above, Gaullist doctrine is therefore
updated to catch up with and legitimise recent practices.
It may also be possible to identify some of the lessons from the Gulf
War contained in the paper's recommendations. For example, the
paper calls for improvements in French conventional forces,
particularly in some of the areas of greatest French weakness: air
transport, logistics and intelligence gathering. One of the goals the
paper sets, for instance, is for France to be able to transport up to
130,000 men and their equipment to troublespots overseas quickly and
effectively. Considering the efforts which were required to move 12,000
to the Gulf, this is some recommendation! Finally, the paper
encourages France in her efforts to develop an autonomous capability
in the most modern technologies, such as electronic warfare and
stealth weaponry.
What is immediately obvious is that recent defence budgets will not
measure up to all that is being advocated here. A way round this (which
was pointed to in the December 1993 report by the Commissariat
General du Plan and the White Paper) is via a sizeable increase in
French arms cooperation with European partners. The paper
encourages the institutionalisation of European cooperation via the
future European Armaments Agency, which is supported by France and
Germany. This - and what is implied by more industrial cooperation in
arms manufacture with her partners- could prove to be an acid test for
France's 'Europeanism'. If the previous behaviour of Dassault is
anything to go by, then the right of other European companies to
tender for French defence contracts or to acquire equity in French
companies will run into spirited resistance.
In an effort to assess France's strategic priorities from now until
2010, the paper ranks in order of probability six possible conflict

scenarios which might directly involve French forces. The first is in
operations to restore peace and international law: here France would
act alongside her Alliance allies, the EU or some other international
coalition to police borders, oversee ceasefires and undertake
humanitarian missions. Examples of this could be Bosnia, Cambodia,
Somalia, or Rwanda. France sees this scenario as very likely. The second
scenario involves actions to honour bilateral defensive accords or
agreements, which could include restoring the territorial integrity of an
ally, protecting the local population, or evacuating French or European
nationals. Black Mrica is highlighted as the most likely arena for this
probabl£ call to action. The third scenario which France considers as a
reasonably high risk in the short to medium term involves action in a
regional conflict which does not immediately implicate France's vital
interests. This might imply action in the Mediterranean or the Middle
East in a showdown similar to the Gulf War. Fourthly, France identifies
as 'ITWderately possibl£ the development over the next twenty years of a
regional conflict which would directly implicate French interests: this
might take a variety of forms, such as nuclear blackmail, international
terrorism or air attacks. Penultimately, the Paper flags up the possibility
- although it is considered unlikely- of an attack on French sovereignty
overseas in some kind of French equivalent of the Falklands. Finally,
France identifies the resurgence of a major threat to western Europe,
possibly in the shape of Russia or a coalition of nuclear states. Whilst
this is seen as an unlikely scenario in the medium term, it is still
nevertheless a source of potential threat which cannot be ignored.
In the event, the Defence White Paper was not as exciting as some had
hoped. This, of course, is partly explained by the domestic context:
cohabitation is not really conducive to major fluctuations in defence and
Balladur himself is a pure cohabitationist. In this sense, therefore, the
White Paper must be seen as provisional in that it might very well be
redrawn after 1995. The U>M for 1995-2000 puts more detail into the
picture, pledging a total of 613 billion francs (a little under £76 billion)
for the period. This goes against budgetary rigour elsewhere in the
economy and makes France the only country in western Europe not
reducing defence expenditure. The plan is for France to increase the
defence budget by a steady 0.5 per cent per year from 1995 until 1997,
when a date has been set for a review. Mter 1998, each subsequent
budget is set to rise by 1.5 per cent per year, provided that this is a viable
economic option.
Janet Bryant 87
CURRENT PROGRAMMES AND FORCE LEVELS
The LPM safeguards all the major current programmes, although

delivery times for certain programmes have been extended and in
some cases, the original number has been cut (the new M5 missile for
the submarine fleet will not appear until 2003 instead of 2000; the
delivery of the first 20 Rafale aircraft will not be before mid-2002
instead of 2001, etc.). Programmes which are still en cou~ de definition
will only be brought forward after 1998 if the state of public finance
allows it. The only new programme to be firmly established at the
planning stage before the 1997 review is a French Tomahawk-type
cruise missile. (France was particularly impressed with the performance
of American cruise missiles during the Gulf conflict.) The levels of
manpower in the three services are also laid down in the LPM. The
army will comprise eight divisions, which means the dissolution of one
division, and will stand at a total of227,000 men (down from 241,000).
The navy will number 62,200 men plus just over 100 surface ships. The
air force will number 84,000 personnel and will comprise twenty
squadrons (380 planes of all descriptions). Finally, the LPM stipulates
that the Gendarmerie will total 95,000. Military service is set at ten
months, but the new emphasis on a 'mixed army' (part conscript, part
professional) is evidenced by the inclusion of 7,000 'professionals'.
These figures will mean cuts over the next six years, with some 29,300
military and 12,800 civilian jobs likely to face the compulsory axe. The
only sector which is preserved (other than the Gendarmerie) is military
intelligence, where 500 new jobs are planned.
The LPM makes reference to the major armament and
procurement programmes which France currently has on the order
books. The list is impressive - although some might say the result of
indecision and failure to make choices as much as anything else. The
new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Charles de Caulk, was 'launched' in
May 1994, although construction will continue until1997 and'it will not
become operational until 1999. The French navy will be the second in
the world (after the US) to have such a carrier. The carrier alone,
without its complement of forty planes, will cost 17.2 billion francs. The
current Super Etendard planes will be progressively phased out and
replaced by the new Rafale fighters (cost: 580 million francs). Both
types of plane can be armed conventionally or with air to ground
medium range missiles. Charles de Gaulle will also carry four US
Hawkeye surveillance planes (total cost five million francs). With its
crew of 2,000, its advanced tracking and detection capabilities and the
new surface to air antimissile system being perfected by Aerospatiale,

Charles de Gaulle is certainly a glittering replacement for France's
antiquated carriers, C/emenceau and Foch. Clemenceau will be retired in
1999, but Foch will limp on until 2005. The navy is pressing hard for a
second new carrier to succeed Foch, pointing out that the Charles de
Gaulle will have to spend time in dry dock, and arguing that a second
would not be as costly - around 11 billion francs- because of the R&D
already invested in the production of the first. Any decision on a second
carrier will not be made before the 1997 LPM review.
The new generation of nuclear-powered submarines of the
'Triomphant' class represents another major outlay. The first of four,
built by DCN, is due to become operational in the summer of 1996.
The other three are still being built and are due to come into service
early next century. The total cost of this programme is a handsome 82
billion francs. France plans to divide the Dassault-built Rafales between
the air force, which will receive 234, and the navy, which will receive
eighty-six. Original numbers have been revised downwards and the
programme has picked up delays. The Leclerc tank programme has
also fallen victim to a dramatic downscaling. Giat (the Groupement
lndustriel de l'Armee de Terre) originally had an order for 1,400,
which was first revised to 640 but this figure is likely to be scaled down
again to a little under 400. The cost of this programme is 48 billion
francs. The M5 strategic ballistic missile programme continues. The
system is being built by Aerospatiale and is designed to replace the
M4.5. There are currently sixty-four on the order books at a cost of 50
billion francs. The future of this programme looks questionable given
the uncertainty surrounding the future composition of the deterrent.
Also safeguarded in the LPM are projects or programmes which
involve cooperation with European partners. The Horizon frigate
programme with the UK and Italy is a good example. The accord
signed in London in July 1994 (which gives the green light to the
development phase) is for a 70 billion franc deal for the production of
at least twenty-two new frigates, due to start coming into service in 2002.
The Horizon programme is the largest cooperation programme of its
kind to date, and the most important naval cooperation programme
ever signed by France, the UK and Italy. The Netherlands, Germany
and Spain are currently negotiating another frig-ate project, but this is
not as ambitious as Horizon. The UK will initially order twelve, Italy six
and Frmce four of these frig-ates, which are designed to protect combat
ships, carriers and merchant shipping. However, given the reductions
in most European defence budgets, it seems unlikely that the total of
Janet Bryant 89
twenty-two frigates will be adhered to. In reality, the UK will probably

have only eight, and Italy only four. Significantly, also, France's four
frigates have been 'calculated' with two aircraft carriers in mind.
Another example of cooperation is the Tigre-Gerfault anti-tank
helicopter project between France and Germany. The French side of
the order is for 275 at a cost of 42 billion francs. There are signs,
however, that Germany may be less committed to the project than
France, which could raise question marks over its realisation. A second
Franco-German deal which is looking more healthy is for a jointly
produced armoured car called the VBM-GTK. Finally, the LPM
identifies a series of programmes which it recommends should only be
brought forward after 1998 if the economy can support them. These
projects include the second aircraft carrier, as we have already seen;
other programmes in this category are the ANS anti-warship missile
and, very significantly, two other collaborative projects, the NH-90
transport helicopter and the F1.A European transport plane. The NH-
90 helicopter is being built by the same Aerospatiale-Dassa consortium
(Eurocopter) which is building the anti-tank helicopter. The 220
transport helicopters France has ordered at a cost of 41 billion francs
are earmarked for the army and the navy. The F1.A European transport
plane is seen as the replacement for France's forty-eight ageing Transall
transport planes, which are due to be retired between 2003 and 2005.
The FLA is vigorously supported by the French Air Force and is a
project which includes Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and
possibly Belgium. If France wishes to achieve her avowed objectives of
mobility, rapid deployment and distance projection of her forces, her
continued participation in this type of project is critical.
Messages from the government have been confusing. Balladur has
indicated that conventional capabilities must be prioritised, but at the
same time has pledged funds for the major nuclear programmes and
'continued modernisation' of the deterrent. Clearly, the collapse of the
Wall and the appearance of new types of threat has complicated
defence planning. Equally clearly, the government must forward plan
for any number of eventualities, but this must not be used as an excuse
for immobilism or vacillation over choices. Experts agree that the costs
of the programmes outlined above come to an unsustainable total. It is
equally the case that the strcltegic environment has changed radically
since many of these programmes were begun. 11 Sooner or later, the
government will have to make choices, not only for budgetary reasons
but also so that capabilities marry with the most likely scenarios for
future military action as laid down in the White Paper. Mobility,
projectability and performance at distance appear to be a series of

agreed principles between all shades of opinion -left, right, civilian and
military. But the aim of moving 30,000 men several thousand
kilometres in two days is a different concept to that of the FAR and
requires heavier strategic capabilities (carriers, transport planes,
helicopters etc.). Similarly, the Leclerc tank would seem to be badly
placed to take part in these 'exotic' missions.
What conclusions can be drawn from this overview of French
experiences of the new world order and her responses to them? In the
wider context of French and European security provision, France is still
seeking to move forward the concept of a common European foreign
and defence policy based on the WEU, but success is limited. In the
interim, her relationship with NATO and the US has become more
flexible and constructive. For instance, the Franco-German Eurocorps
was integrated into NATO in January 1993; since April 1993 French
military officials have been participating with voting rights in
discussions of NATO's Adriatic and Balkan engagements; France has
indicated her support of NATO assuming security responsibilities in
central and eastern Europe (although this does not mean that Paris
supports membership for these states.); and France has given a positive
response to NATO's January 1994 Partnership for Peace programme,
considering it a worthwhile addition to the Balladur plan for stability in
Europe. The Defence White Paper also praises the US and NATO, as
we have seen.
The explanations for this pro-Atlantic reorientation are complex. It
is partly to do with the favourable attitude of the Clinton administration
to greater western European independence in defence and security.
Practical measures to this end - like the delegation of responsibility for
(or control of) peace enforcement to sources other than the NATO
integrated staffs, which would allow Europe to act where the US cannot
or will not, have been welcomed by Paris. Thus, France has concluded
that 'the realisation of the European defence identity in the framework
of the WEU will be made easier by using NATO's existing military
capabilities' }2
Ironically, the other explanation for this pro-US/NATO position is
linked to current French concerns about the direction of German
policy. Firstly, questions have been raised about how far the Paris-Bonn
axis can be used as the basis for a common European defence policy,
given the Franco-German differences over the ex-Yugoslavia. Secondly,
the rationale behind the creation of the Eurocorps (i.e., the negation of
potential conflicts of interest and moving forward of discussions of the
Janet Bryant 91
CFSP) has not been realised. Thirdly, the ongoing domestic debate in
Germany over out-of-area uses of the Bundeswehr have led to real
concerns in France that the Eurocorps might remain effectively
impotent. Finally, France has grave reservations about the strong
backing Bonn is giving to the broadening of the EU. Paris is running
scared of its old bogeyman: the fear that via enlargement the EU may
become fragmented and less cohesive, that a strong Germany may
move to loosen its ties with the EU and begin acting independent1y, 15
and that an isolated France may be left to face increasing instability
along the southern and eastern frontiers. All of these things, therefore,
have encouraged a modification in France's NATO-US line.
The domestic context of defence policy sees France struggling to
continue development of both her nuclear and conventional
capabilities, with the emphasis increasingly on European cooperative
ventures. However, official discourse about mobility, projectability and
penetrability must be seen alongside budgetary constraints and the
continuing fluidity of the system itself. France is seeking to adapt and
redefine her role in the new world order: she will continue to try to
pursue a global role via visible participation in humanitarian and UN
missions, and through Europe. However, the realisation of these
objectives may be undermined by a g-c1p between the political will to
provide France with the necessary military means and the actual volume
of credits. A 300-page Senate report by centrist Jacques Genton,
published in June 1994, underlines that France's stated aims, whilst
wholly necessary, are 'particularly ambitious and difficult . . . to
attain'. 14
Many parliamentarians share this view. The report also underlines
concerns that R&D (vital for the future) is not being funded to the
extent that it should be. Later in June 1994, the government
announced a 2.5 billion franc freeze of the defence budget. Jacques
Boyon (RPR), President of the Defence Commission of the National
Assembly, expressed major disquiet to Balladur over the erosion of 1.3
per cent of the recent credits voted by parliament. So, whilst France has
apparently mapped out a course for herself in the New World Order, its
realisation is far from guaranteed. Thus, the future of French defence
policy remains characteristically uncertain and problematic.
92 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies?
Notes
I. For a discussion of this issue, see D. David, above, pp. 65-75.

2. Livre Blanc sur Ia difense 1994, Collection des rapports officicls, 1994.
3. See below, A. Menon, pp. 155-68.
4. See above,J.-M. Trouille, pp. 53-64.
5. See D. Berry and M. Cornick,. 'French responses to German unification'
in Modem and Contemporary France, 49, Aprill992, pp. 42-57.
6. See u Montie, 2 November 1990.
7. See above,J. Howorth, pp. 17-38.
8. See J. Howorth, 'France and the Gulf War', in Modern and Contemporary
France, 46,July 1991, pp. 3-17.
9. See below, P. Chicken, pp. 93-103 and passim.
10. See below, S. Gregory, pp. 101-11.
11. See above, David, pp. 65-75.
12. See u Montie, 25 February 1994.
13. See above, Trouille, pp. 53-64.
14. SeeuMonde,15junc1994.
6 Conscription Revisited
Paule Chicken
One issue addressed by the 1994 Defence White Paper was that of
recruitment to the armed forces. Although the repeated claim that a
consensus existed had been used to preclude any real debate on defence
policy, the Gulf War turned the limelight on a hitherto muted debate on
the desirability of a changeover from a largely conscript force to a wholly
professional one. The issue was discussed in the National Assembly in
October 1991, and the Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale
organised a workshop on the subject in February of the same year. The
debate was extensively reported in the press. Some military cadres and
politicians openly voiced their doubts about conscription and raised a
closely related issue: that of giving financial priority to nuclear
deterrence to the detriment of other arms. The White Paper implicitly
acknowledged the underlying lack of consensus inasmuch as it devoted
thirteen pages to refuting the arguments of those opposed to national
service and a chapter to the balance to be achieved between nuclear
capability and conventional arms.' To justifY its choice it put forward
strategic and financial considerations, which we shall analyse. It
reaffirmed that national service was the token of a deep-seated concern
felt by the nation and the citizens about their defence and was part of
the fabric of the Republic. We shall query this assumption in the light of
the evidence available regarding current recruitment practice and
service conditions.
The French strategic doctrine regarding nuclear deterrence is
unchanged and the 1994 Defence White Paper quoted verbatim that of
1972. Minimum deterrence is still the basic strategic concept on the
international scene, which means that France 'experiences a reversal of
the situation obtaining over the centuries since its borders appear no
longer to be under any direct threat'. 2 As Dominique David remarks
elsewhere in this volume/ France has lost its bearings and needs to
reassess the way in which it relates to the world around it, which in turn
implies a change in its military culture. However,Jean-Pauljoubert notes
that, in so doing, it shook the very foundations on which its defence
system was built These foundations comprise the three components of
its nuclear deterrent, on the one hand, and, on the other, the large
mechanised army destined to direct confrontation on the battlefield
93
with enemy forces. 4 Yet, a cursory glance does not reveal any structural
change, since France is still endeavouring to maintain its nuclear
capability and currently devotes a quarter of the overall defence budget
to its modernisation. Together with the current controversy about the
nuclear test moratorium/ it indicates a high level of commitment to
constant updating which, in some eyes, is rendered necessary by
nuclear proliferation. The change which the 1994 White Paper details
is concerned not with the nature of the military assignments of the
armed services but with the perception of their symbolic and
diplomatic value. The fundamental change stems from the awareness
that France will no longer hold its rank as one of the most powerful
countries because she is a nuclear power, since proliferation means that
there will be numerous such powers. Prestige will be attached to
operational conventional task forces which are available for immediate
dispatch wherever and whenever French interests require.
Non-nuclear forces with sophisticated weaponry, readily deployable
in sufficient numbers are a prerequisite to the international role to
which France aspires. This was made abundantly clear during the Gulf
War. When Jaguar aircraft could not participate in night raids because
of lack of night vision devices, many shared the feelings expressed by
Retired General Jean Salvan:
We managed as best we could. We must give thanks to Admiral

Lanxade, General Schmitt and General Roquejoffre. They
succeeded in our being assigned the only mission we could fulfil
with glamour. It worked out because we had ten months in which to
prepare ourselves. How can one rest assured that there will always be
American planes and surveillance satellites, the artillery of the
Marine Corps?6
Attention focused equally on the recruitment of the forces dispatched

to the Middle East since the posting of conscripts outside Europe or to
French overseas departments and territories requires Parliamentary
approval. On 9 January 1991, Franr;ois Mitterrand went on the air to
inform the nation that he would not allow either serving conscripts or
reservists to be sent to the Gulf. Public opinion approved unreservedly.
However, given that conscripts composed 45 per cent of the Force
d'Action Rapide (FAR), 30 per cent of the navy and 38 per cent of the
air force/ ad hoc arrangements had to be made, such as canvassing
drafted men to enlist voluntarily for the remainder of their period of
service. As a consequence, France could not deploy more than 12,000
Paule Chicken 95
men, a third of the number provided by the United Kingdom. The

1994 White Paper listed measures to remedy this situation, all of which
are costly since they aim at developing a more sophisticated
conventional panoply and at enlisting an ever-increasing number of
regulars into the rapid action task force. The White Paper stated that
such improvements were within France's means since she, alone
amongst western countries of a similar size, was not anxious to cash in
on the peace dividend. She could afford it because she was devoting
half her defence budget to military modernisation programmes. It
further stated: 'If our country is in a position to devote such a large part
of its budget to investing, this is due, largely, to our choice of a mixed
army of volunteers and conscripts'."
Thus the White Paper put conscription at the very heart of French
defence, in order to minimise the cost of human resources and
maximise expenditure on military modernisation programmes. The
underlying assumption is that the cost of a professional force would
soar as a career in the forces would have to be made financially
attractive to overcome the expected difficulties of recruitment. Yet
there are uncertainties about the genuine cost to the nation of military
service. Some will argue that the French economy loses out on the
wealth that the conscripts otherwise would have produced. Others will
question the economic or military sense of training men who are
discharged at the end of ten months, just as they become operational.
One could therefore argue that it is difficult to establish with any
degree of certainty the advisability of conscription in purely financial
terms.9 As noted, the White Paper correctly diagnosed the source of the
manpower shortage suffered during the Gulf War that has been
perceived as the paradigm of future warfare. However, rather than take
its findings to their logical conclusion by asserting that tomorrow's
defence is best assured by a professional force, it argued that
conscription was best adapted to the levels of forces required, to the
missions to be carried out and to the resources set aside for the purpose
by the nation.
Interestingly, the ultimate argument put forward by the White Paper
is a cultural assumption about the nature of French identity. It reads:
Finally, each of us is fully aware of the part played by military service

in creating our national identity and defending our Republican
State. Military service must remain an integrating melting-pot, a
school for good citizenship, a paradigm of the Frenchmen's
allegiance to France. 10
Such value-laden expressions assert as a truth that the Republic is

predicated on the Nation-in-Arms. Since the battle of Valmy, in 1792,
encapsulates this symbiotic relationship, a commemoration of it was
included in the Bicentenary celebrations of the French Revolution in
1989. At Valmy, President Mitterrand stated that the principle of
conscription is 'the principle of total participation of the Nation in its
defence alongside professional soldiers. Such is still the meaning of and
the reason for conscription to this day.' 11 Moreover, the identification of
national service with Republican democracy is reinforced for most
people by the selective memory of French history, which, for instance,
ascribes the failure of the attempted coup in Algiers in April 1961 solely
to the presence of the draft 12 One can therefore contend that cultural
assumptions about what goes into the making of Republican France
were part and parcel of the decision to maintain the traditional mixed
recruitment of French forces. In examining the discrepancies between
the ideal representation of national service and its contemporary
implementation, we may be tempted to consider those cultural
assumptions as so many myths.
CONSCRIPTION: MYfH AND REAI.J'IY
The two main assumptions about conscription are that there is equality
of treatment for all and that it results in greater social cohesion. The
latest form of conscription, compulsory national service, was endorsed
when a new organisational framework for the armed services was
created by the Ordinance of 7 January 1959. It comprised two parts.
The first one was le service militaire as such, the military object of which is
clear. The second was le service civi~ established by Genercll de Gaulle,
who conceived of defence as having civil, economic, social and cultural
dimensions. The 1994 White Paper reaffirmed this global concept,
stating that furtherance of the non-military str.md of national service
was one objective for the coming years. As from October 1991, men
called up for military service spend ten months in the army, the air
force, the navy or the Gendarmerie, having during this period the
option of 'volunteering for longer service' (of twenty months'
duration). There are five forms of service civil available, which account
for up to 12 per cent of the dr.uted men. 1' The fact that service civil
makes use of a conscript's existing professional skills and is therefore
less taxing than its military counterpart is offset by a longer stay under
the colours. Whilst duty with the police (controlling traffic or patrolling
Paule Chicken 97
inner cities) or with community service (with ambulance, fire or

environmental protection services) lasts for ten months, that in
overseas cooperation lasts for sixteen months. Its diverse activities vary,
for example, from technological aid, teaching or research, to working
as a junior executive in a foreign firm. Conscientious ol?jectors serve for
twenty months in the social services or the administration. Such is the
law for males. Female exemption does not contravene this principle
because 'a female national service has never been deemed necessary' .14
This approach reflects accurately the approach of French society to
gender issues, in the same way as stating that there must be 'a genuinely
universal conscription' 15 implicitly admits that current implementation
falls short of the expected criteria of equality.
We need to ask whether the extent of draft evasion or privileged
posting, with which the French public is well acquainted, challenges the
assertion that conscription is the symbol of Frenchmen's allegiance to
France. About a third of each age group eV'ades national service leg-ally:
the exemption rate was 27 per cent in 1991. Of these, 4 or 5 per cent
were exempted on compassionate srounds or were inV'dlided out of the
services. No observer finds fault with this. This is not true of the
remaining 18 to 22 per cent exemptions, which were granted on
medical grounds, for they result from norms which are, according to
Fram;ois Cailleteau, ContrOieur General des Armces, 'excessively
sensitive to small health defects imperceptible to the average mortal. In
consequence, approximately 15,000 bacheliers are exempted, thus
depriving the forces of men with education and ability and leading the
public to believe that it is all underhand' ,.6 Phoney medical certificates
and simulated illness come to mind but, in effect, exemptions are of a
structural nature because the number of men eligible for service
exceeds the human resources needed. However, the situation will
change from 1995 onward, with the rate of exemptions falling to
approximately 18 per cent by virtue of the low birthrate and its
consequent reduction of potential conscripts. The principal
beneficiaries of exemptions are the student population (rate of
exemption: 20 per cent) and the educational low achievers with a rate
of 62 per cent. 17 The resulting impact on the social cohesion of the
country will be examined later.
Conscription fails the acid test of equality before the law as the result
of another structural inequality. This results from some of the forms of
le service civi~ which by their very nature skim off the better-qualified
men. The status of cooperants conjures up images of devotion to duty in
poor working conditions in far-away developing countries. However,
from the White Paper's own admission, 'the three countries that
welcome the largest number of coopirants are the United States of
America, Great Britain and Germany' .18 Moreover, if they are working
for a foreign firm as young executives, their employer will pay them as
such, whereas those doing their military service will get a bare 477
francs a month and, depending on their duties, may or may not gain
valuable work experience. It can be felt all the more inequitable as
military training as such often proves a disappointment. Retired
General Jean Salvan explains:
You are no doubt aware of the poor quality of our military service ...
There are not enough manoeuvres because we lack exercise-fields,
money, petrol. There is even a wish to save on the wear and tear of
materials! Poorly-trained conscripts can parade impeccably. But the
skills required in combat are of a totally different nature. 19
The White Paper, in stating that 'the attractiveness of military service

should be enhanced through a more intensive teaching of skills and
training, which alone can prepare for operational missions' 20 confirmed
implicitly that this was not an exaggeration. Since the sons of the better-
off have opted with a vengeance for the various forms of service civi~
General Salvan comments: 'Is it acceptable that only the most deprived
and the poorest do their military service? The system is all the more
perverse as in an emergency only those who have undergone military
training would be recalled or mobilised'. 21 This flagrant injusti<:e, which
in itself would suffice to explain why the White Paper felt a need to
insist on equality before the law, is compounded by the well-known
'pull' system of which Jacques Julliard g-ave an example on the air, in
June 1989, before the fall of the Berlin wall. He explained:
The children of underprivileged or immigrant parentage are posted

to the Second Army Corps with the French forces in Germany,
whereas the offspring of the privileged go back home at night just as
they might from the office. One knows of a conscript living in the
16th arrondissement- a social outcast as you can see!- who was posted
to Vincennes and who wanted to be transferred to a better location
to avoid having to change trains in the underground. So much for
social mixingl 22
Is it a caricature of reality, a gross distortion of what could be

considered statistically insignificant? Apparently not, since Pascal
Paule Chicken 99
Boniface, Director of the Institut des Relations lnternationales et

Strategiques, explains that:
there exists a special division of the Defence Minister's staff whose

thirty members work under the supervision of a lieutenant-colonel
assisted by a major ... Each year they process around 20,000 lAPs
[Individual Application for Posting] coming from members of
Parliament or politicians.n
Although their outcome is not necessarily successful, prevailing

assumptions about favours are not without foundation. Yet the White
Paper did not relate the somewhat parlous state of the military service
and the privileged conditions of the service civil to a possible
malfunctioning of national service as France's melting-pot. Far from it,
conscription is unhesitatingly posited throughout the document as
contributing to the fight against social exclusion and as an antidote to
the difficulties 'inherent in the urban polarisation occurring within
France and the breakdown of social cohesion'. 24
NATIONAL SERVICE AS FRANCE'S MELTING POT?
That 22 per cent of men with higher education qualifications should

not be drafted into the armed services runs counter to one's sense of
equality, but does not signal problems as far as their future integration
into the social fabric is concerned. That 62 per cent of those at the
lower end of the educational scale should not be deemed fit for service
should, however, be a source of concern for the White Paper, since it
posits that conscription offers the deprived a second chance in life.
They miss out on the vocational training that the forces provide,
although we lack statistics indicating its extent. On the other hand, we
know that 10,000 conscripts benefit yearly from the forces' successful
fight against illiteracy. Surveys confirm that 70 per cent of those who
failed in school feel that they benefited from their period of service
(whereas for 60 per cent of graduates, it is a sheer waste of time). 25
Indeed, in some cases, it would appear that national service was a
turning-point in the lives of youths living in city suburbs in conditions
similar to those prevalent in British inner cities. Fran~ois Dubet, in a
study of jobless school drop-outs, found that youths genemlly do not
join or remain in gangs once they have served in the forces. This is a
crucial point, but there is little data collected about it as yet. 26 Lack of
100 Cunscription Revisited
available data prevents the drawing of any firm conclusion regarding

the efficiency of the French melting-pot. Yet 'the achievement of social
mixing, that prerequisite of national cohesion, the beginning for some
of true integration' 27 is a fundamental and frequently stressed aim
ascribed to national service in the White Paper.
Who 'some' are can be worked out without too much difficulty.
According to official terminology, they are the Young Frenchmen of
Maghreb Origin (YFMO) and they were the subject of a report which
Colonel Biville was requested to present to Jean-Pierre Chevenement in
April 1990. It is well-researched and documented and prompted the
Defence Minister to issue a directive in May 1990. The number of
YFMO eligible for service is statistically difficult to assess because French
law precludes any mention of origin or religion on census returns. In
1989, 35 per cent of the 20,000 YFMO who stated their desire to serve
with the French armed forces were ~xempted on medical grounds,
which was 15 per cent higher than the national average. 2R Those who
joined had a poor school record, no particular professional
qualifications and their scores in the general aptitude test, which all
conscripts take on induction, dropped below the national average by
two to four points. It is therefore not surprising to find them assigned
military duties of a general and less gratifying nature. They were over-
represented in the army, where they constituted 2.9 per cent of the
workforce but represented only 2.3 per cent of their draft. (Only 1.5
per cent were to be found in the navy, 0.9 per cent in the Gendarmerie
and 0.65 per cent in the air force.) The Biville Report suggested that
there should be a fairer distribution ofYFMOs across the four services,
since it is known that generally conditions of life are harshest in the
army and the ratio of army cadres to rank and file the lowest. However,
their fate in this respect was similar to that of others with deprived
backgrounds, and they reacted to it in a similar manner, with only 17
per cent viewing their time of service as a waste of time. 29 Nevertheless,
it had not been as rewarding as was expected. In order to know what
went wrong, one needs to read between the lines of the Biville report.
The report contained fifty-six proposals for action. The section
entitled Religion started with a reminder that 'public worship is free in
the armed forces'. It then went on to recommend that now was the
time 'to consider translating into practice the fact that Islam ranks as
the second religion in France. Any suggestion that Islam and
fundamentalism are one and the same thing must be stopped
altogether' .30 The Minister's directive of 23 May 1990 adopted proposals
24 to 26. Consequently, Muslims are allowed to observe Ramadan, to
Paule Chicken 101
obtain halal meals and to share with other religions access to premises
for the observation of worship. Proposal 51, however, was ignored. It
suggested:
The rules and regulations concerning general discipline in the

armed forces should, within the category of 'Offences against the
Military Code of Honour, Probity and General Duties', contain a
new paragraph punishing racial discrimination and abuse
throughout the hierarchy . . . This would allow clarification of some
situations and would play a preventive role likely to limit the use of
dubious expressions about which YFMO, or broadly speaking, of
overseas origin, feel strongly.~ 1
Evidence collected indicated that racial discrimination was no worse in

the services than in the polity, but it was precisely because they had
implicitly trusted the Republican motto that YFMOs expressed
disappointment at not experiencing the fraternity they expected.
Therefore they tended to detect discriminatory prejudice on the part of
the legislator when there was none. A case in point involved the driving
test, which conscripts could take if their results in the general aptitude
test were satisfactory. As already mentioned, this was not often the case
with YFMOs. Acute, uncomprehending frustration at their being
debarred led Colonel Biville to suggest lowering the threshold required
ofYFMOs. This is an interesting example of what Martin Schain
describes as the growing recognition, in France, of ethnicity, in practice
if not in theory.~~ This proposal gave rise to numerous articles published
on the issue in the 'Free Comments' section of the magazine Armees
d'Aujourd'hui. This was a characteristic reaction:
How can it ever be explained to our non-YFMO conscripts that with

identical results in their General Aptitude tests and identical school
qualifications they cannot obtain the same driving licence as the
YFMO conscripts, and this because criteria ofrace obtain solely. '!I.'
The lieutenant who penned these remarks addressed a fundamental

question, namely whether there can be a multicultural France that can
conceive of positive discrimination, or whether this is a concept alien to
Republican thinking. In 1990, the Republican approach was epitomised
by the Minister for Social Affairs and Solidarity. He stated:
Because France is a secular state, equality of rights - which is law -

demands that in the public sphere, ethnic, linguistic, cultural,

religious specificities should be set aside. On the other hand, these
specificities, in the private sphere, are protected by law if necessary
in the name of freedom of conscience which the secular state
guarantees. 54
Whether incorporation into French society can still be brought

about through school and national service, as was the case in the early
twentieth· century, remains to be seen. Both the Islamic headscarf affair
and the Biville report show how France is still groping for an answer. Yet
its nature will determine the extent to which national service is the true
melting-pot of the nation. Insofar as cultural reasons appear to be the
overriding factor in the choice of a mixed force, the ability of such a
force to weld the Nation together will militate strongly in favour of
conscription. However, if it came to be felt that no such 'welding' was
being achieved, the case against conscription would be reopened.
General Schmitt, the former Chief of Staff and one of the authors of
the White Paper, maintains that increasing the number of regular
soldiers while retaining national service was what General de Gaulle
had in mind for strategic reasons when he wrote Vers liirmk de mitier.115
In 1994, it would seem that this constitutes the best ad hoc solution,
pending an answer to the question of the constitution of French
Republican identity, and it also vindicates the White Paper when it
describes the armed forces as at one with the nation 'whose prism and
mirror they are.·~
Notes
1. Livre Blanc sur Ia Difense 1994, Collection des n1pports officiels, 1994, pp.
75-100,126-8,131-3,183-9.
2. Livre Blanc, p.11.
3. See above, D. David, p. 65 and passim.
4. J. P.Joubert, 'Libres propos sur Ia defense fr.mvlise', Ar/5, XIV/3, 1993, p.9.
5. For a discussion of this issue, see below, S. Gregory, pp. 101-11.
6. F. Pons, 'Entretien avec le genemlj. Salvan', Valeun actuelles, 7 October
1991.
7. J. Fontanel, 'Armee de metier ct economic nationale, in B. Bocne and
M. L. Martin (eds), Conscription el armie de metier (Fondation pour les
Etudes de Defense Nationale, La Documentation Fran~aise, 1991),
pp. 234-51.
Paule Chicken 103

9. Fontanel, 'Armee de metier et economic nationale', p.236.
11. F. Mitterrand, 'Allocution du President de Ia Republique a !'occasion de
Ia commemoration de Ia bataille de Valmy', Propos surlaDejense, II, 1989,
pp.30-l.
12. See P. Dabezies, 'Impact politique: les relations armee-nation et
armee-Etat sous le regime de l'armee de metier', in Hoene and Martin,
Conscription et Annie de mitier, pp.29&-301; j. Planchais, 'L'armee et le
tournant de 1958', Pouvairs, 38, 1986, pp. 5-12.
14. Ibid., p.128.
15. Ibid., p.l26.
16. F. Cailleteau, 'La conscription: les elements du probleme', Defense
nationale,January 1990, p.17.
17. F. Cailleteau, 'Le recrutement d'une armee de metier', in Bocne and
Martin, Conscription et Annie ck mitier, p.235.
19. F. Pons, 'Entretien avec le general jean Salvan', Valeurs actUI!Iks, 7 October
1991.
20. Livre Blanc, p.l38.
21. j. Salvan, LaPaix etlaguerre (Criterion, I992), p.530.
22. J.Julliard, Europe I, 3June I989.
23. P. Boniface, L'armie. Enquite sur 300,000 soldnts inconnus (Edition no. I,
I990), p.181.
24. Livre Blanc, p.I27.
25. Colonel Biville, 'Armees et populations a problemes d'inu!gration'
[Rilpport Biville)(Paris, April I990), quoted in M. Faivre, 'Le service
militaire des bi-nationaux', Homw.s & Migmtions,ll38, 1990, p.IO.
26. F. Dubet, La Gal£re: jeums en survie (Fayard, I987).
28. Faivre, Le service militaire des bi-nationaux' p.33.
29. Rllpport Biville, p.75 and p.I 0 as quoted in Faivre.
30. Ibid., p.79.
31. Ibid., p.97.
32. M. Schain, 'Policy and policy-making in Frclllce and the United States:
models of incorporation and the dynamics of change', Modern &
Contemporary JiTance, Vol. NS 3, 4, October I995 (forthcoming).
33. Lieutenantj. P. Steinhofer, 'Beur ou ordinaire', Amliu d'Aujourd'hu~ I63,
I99I, pp.II-III.
34. C. Evin, 'La France,l'Europe et "leurs modeles d'integration" ',Hommes
& Migrations, 1137, I990, p.6.
35. General M. Schmitt, De Dihl Biin Pliu a Kowei1 City (Grasset,l992), pp.
294-5.
7 France, the Nuclear
Weapons Test Moratorium
and the NPT and CTBT
Processes
Shaun Gregory
The end of the Cold War has signalled a shift in French attitudes
towards multinational fora for the control of nuclear arms. Throughout
the Cold War France stayed outside the principal treaty processes -such
as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 1967 Nuclear
Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -citing US-Soviet domination
of the negotiations and an unwillingness to compromise French
independence as amongst the key reasons for non-participation.• In the
changed context of the post-Cold War era France has become acutely
sensitive to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly
amongst Third World states which have the potential to menace France
herself and French interests in Africa and around the world. This threat
has motivated France to abandon thirty years of policy continuity and to
decide that it is from within treaty fora that French interests can best be
pursued and French influence best exercised. Thus France signed the
NPT in 1992, in time to play a pivotal role in the renegotiation of the
treaty in April/May 1995, and came into the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CI'BT) framework in order to participate in the negotations
which began injanuary 1994 to end all nuclear weapons testing.
In addition President Mitterrand played a central role in creating an
improved climate for the treaty negotiations by committing France on 8
April19922 to a nuclear weapons test moratorium, which he linked to the
Russian Federation moratorium announced on 26 October 1991, and
which led to an informal morc1torium of all five of the acknowledged
nuclear powers.' Despite general agreement that Mitterrand's test
moratorium decision was motivated largely by domestic factors,
including an opportunity to deflate growing electoral support for the
Green movement by assuming part of the Green agenda and an
opportunity to wrong-foot the political opposition (the RPR and UDF
being forced to address their positions on the issue),t the international
104
Shaun Gregory 105
implications of the decision remain paramount. As a result Mitterrand

came under criticism for compromising French independence by
linking French policy to that of other states through his use of the
formula that France would not be the first state to resume nuclear
weapons testings
The French presence in the NPT and CTBT processes greatly
complicates the negotiations for at least two reasons. Firstly, there is a
lack of agreement between France and the mcyority of the treaty
participants on the question of linkage between the NJ.Yf and CTBT
and between the CTBT and the nuclear weapons test moratorium. 6
Secondly, the French presidential elections (23 April and 7 May 1995)
are, at the time of writing (December 1994), due to take place at the
same time as the NPT negotiations ( 17 April to 12 May 1995) and there
is consequent uncertainty about French decision-making. 7 In order to
make sense of these complications and identify trends in French
thinking it is necessary to examine the debates which shaped French
attitudes to the moratorium and to the relationship between the
moratorium and the treaties.
Mitterrand faced strong opposition to his moratorium decision,
opposition which was most vocal from the expected quarters: the
military (which is understood not to have been consulted about the
decision); the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA), which did
not wish to see its weapons development and verification plans
interrupted; and political opponents, who saw a stick with which to beat
the French President. Between them, they advanced a set of technical,
strategic, political, and economic arguments against the decision.
These included: the loss of French independence in decision-making
on the issue; the technical limitations of alternatives to physical testing;
the need to ensure the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile; the
urgent need to verifY the performance of the new M-45 missile warhead
and the development of the M-5 and ASLP missile warheads; the need
to maintain the technical capabilities (in terms of equipment and
personnel) at the South Pacific sites; the risk of undermining the
credibility of the dissuasion force; and even the damage to the French
Polynesian economy which would result from test inactivity.8
To these arguments was added the further critique that the test
suspension did not help either the process of denuclearisation or
non-proliferation because, paradoxically, it was the existing nuclear
powers which needed to test weapons (for reasons of stockpile safety
and reliability) while, as Iraq, Pakistan and South Africa had shown, an
inability to test (whether because of technical limitations or because of
106 France and the Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium
an international moratorium or treaty) was no bar to the spread of

nuclear weapons.9 This critique offers insight into RPR-UDF thinking,
which clearly sees the CfBT as a peripheral consideration and one
which is contrary to the need for a resumption of testing.
Mitterrand subsequently found himself even more isolated on the
moratorium issue when - following legislative elections on 21 and 28
March 1993 - his ruling Socialist party was defeated and replaced by an
uneasy alliance of centre-right parties under the Union Pour Ia France
(UPF) umbrella which, inter alia, had campaigned on a commitment to
French nuclear forces and had been critical of Mitterrand's
moratorium decision. 10
The new government initially confined itself publicly to comments
about the delicacy of the nuclear test issue, 11 but when the US, UK and
Russia extended their test moratoria into 1994, France was pushed into
clarifYing its position.t 2 On 4 July Mitterrand and Balladur issued in
effect a joint communication which extended the French moratorium
and announced the setting up of a seven-man team of high-level
military and scientific experts (the Lanxade group) charged with
assessing the effects of the test suspension on the French nuclear
weapons programme and with reviewing the test suspension decision
and due to report in October 1993.t'
The deliberations of the group g-ave some political breathing space
to Mitterrand and Balladur, but its eventual findings were never in real
doubt. As Le Monde wryly observed when the names of the group
members were announced: 'without prejudging the results of their
reflection ... none of these experts are known to be against the
modernisation of the French nuclear deterrent ... and the majority -
beginning with the CEA- are advocates of a resumption of testing' .14
In the period that followed both Mitterrand and senior government
figures sought to clarity their views. Mitterrand seems to have bowed a
little to the prevailing pressure by refusing in several interviews to rule
out a resumption of testing during his term of office 15 and speaking at
one point of France's intention to resume testing if any other country
did so, to avoid France being in a position of weakness.t 6 For his part
Defence Minister Fran~ois Leotard sought to uncouple French policy
from Mitterrand's statement of linkage by insisting in July that France
had 'total autonomy of decision-making' on the testing issuet and by
September that the testing of French nuclear weapons would resume
'irrespective of the international situation' if the seven-man team
reported a threat to the credibility of the French deterrent force as a
consequence of the test moralorium. 18
Shaun Gregary 107
On 4 October the Lanxade group reported in secret to Balladur.

The contents of the report were not made public. It is, however,
understood to have argued that the French moratorium could
continue without prejudicing the efficacy of the French deterrent until
the presidential elections in May 1995, but that thereafter it would
become imperative that a number of tests, perhaps as many as twenty,
should be conducted. 19
The following day the Chinese conducted a nuclear test, ending
their informal compliance with the moratorium. Mitterrand was no
longer bound by the formulation that France would not be the first to
abrogate the moratorium and came under renewed pressure to rethink
his decision. 20 In the event, after sounding out the other nuclear
powers, he decided, in line with Russia, the United States and Britain,
to continue with the test suspension. 21
On 28 October the National Assembly established a defence
commission, under the direction of Rene Galy-Dejean, comprising six
senior deputies (three RPR, two UDF, and one PS) to investigate
perhaps the key issue dominating the testing impasse: whether France
was yet in a position to rely fully on computer simulation as a substitute
to physical testing. 22 The report of the group set out a strong defence
of past French testing activity, and concluded that a resumption of
testing remained essential to provide the data necessary for the PALEN
programme/~ which it argued should be strongly supported. The
PALEN programme was first mooted in 1991, though at the time was
given no financial backing, and was intended to enable France to
develop the technology necessary to rely largely (though not entirely)
on simulation for nuclear weapons testing. The report thus offered the
paradox that France needed to resume physical testing in order to assist
in the development of simulation technology, which would eventually
enable France to ensure the development, safety and reliability of her
nuclear weapons with far fewer physical tests.
On 5 May 1994 Mitterrand issued a long statement on the future of
the French deterrent in which he closed the door firmly on any
resumption of testing during the remaining period of his term of office,
and sought to hamstring his successor by arguing that the next French
President would not be able to resume testing because of international
pressure, not least from the NPT and CTBT processes and from regional
opposition in the South Pacific which had so warmly welcomed his 1992
decision. 24 The President may also have had in mind the results of
opinion polls which through the previous year had shown domestic
opposition to a resumption of testing to be as high as 51 per cent. 25
108 France and the Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium
In addition Mitterrand pressed the government and military to

rethink their approach to nuclear weapons testing. In particular he
called for the PALEN project to be reorientated from a project aimed at
reducing reliance on physical testing to one aimed at completely
ending reliance on physical testing. To this end, Mitterrand asserted 10
billion francs would be made available over the 1995-2000 period for
the improvement of simulation capabilities.26
Mitterrand's statement provoked a sharp response from government
ministers. Prime Minister Balladur, Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and
Defence Minister Leotard were each quick to attack the Mitterrand
statement, arguing that no French President could be bound by the
words of his predecessor, and that the new President would make his
own choices in light of the prevailing circumstances.27 To some extent
these assertions reflected the need for ministers to distance themselves
publicly from Mitterrand's pronouncements. However, Mitterrand's
conviction that the international context after the 1995 presidential
election would make a unilateral French resumption of testing
problematic is rather more difficult to dispute.
The eventual decision about the French test moratorium will be
shaped by a number of factors including, most importantly, the
outcome of the presidential election and the state of the NPT and
CfBT negotiations. Of the two most likely presidential contenders -
Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur - Chirac is presently firmly
committed to a resumption, irrespective of the international context 28
Balladur's position is more complex. Within the confines of a coalition
government and an RPR party still largely dominated by the presence
of Chirac, Balladur has argued that a testing resumption is necessary
but that France must take into account the behaviour of the other
• 29
moratonum powers.
With respect to the NPT and CfBT processes the debates are now
clarifYing. There is broad and cross-party political support in France for
agreeing an indefinite extension of the NPT.~ Because of this, France
can be expected to sign up for the treaty extension irrespective of the
outcome of the presidential elections and subject to agreement on
adequate terms and conditions of treaty observation.
In relation to the CTBT the position is less straightfoward. The
Balladur government noted that France - in contrast to many treaty
participant states - had at no time agreed a linkage between either the
CTBT and the test moratorium or between the CTBT and NPT.
Furthermore, in direct contradiction to states which argued that the
CfBT must be agreed before an NPT could be signed Balladur has
Shaun Gregory 109
argued that only an agreed and indefinite extension of the NPT can
provide the necessary context for French agreement on the CTBT.
Balladur has gone on to argue that France will not sign a GfBT until all
the countries believed to have nuclear weapons or the capacity to
produce them have also agreed to sign and until France has in place
the means to ensure the credibility of the French deterrent without the
need for physical testing.~~
The logic of the French position seems to be gaining adherents in
the CfBT negotiations. It is becoming clear that a GfBT is unlikely to
be agreed before the NPT treaty is renegotiated and US pressure on
the French to reach an agreement before April 1995 seems to have
waned.~2
The door thus opens to a continuation of the debate within France
on the CfBT and moratorium issues after the presidential elections of
1995. With an NPT extension agreed, the new French President will still
have to respond to the findings of the Lanxade group and the
Galy-Dejean defence commission, both of which point to the urgent
need to resume testing after May 1995 to support the maintenance of
the French deterrent force, and to assist in the development of
computer simulation technology, which could eventually replace
physical testing. French agreement on the GfBT will be shaped by the
resolution of these issues and by the behaviour of other states. If an
NPT extension agreement is not reached, the French will consider the
international context even less conducive to a permanent cessation of
testing and accession to a CTBT agreement.
A further issue informing post-presidential election debates about
the test moratorium and CTBT will be the future of French nuclear
strategy. Yost outlines a division between a 'more operational' and 'less
operational' strategy debate which relates to whether France moves
towards more useable nuclear forces (i.e. for warfighting) or adheres to
the present general deterrence approach, a debate which broadly
reflects the right-left divide in Fr.mce.~~
110 France and the Nucli!ar Weapons Test Moratorium
Notes
I. C. Grand, 'La politique fran~aise de non-prolifercltion nucleaire', Difense

Natiunale, August/September I994, pp. 99-II2.
2. P. -H. Desaubliaux, Le Figaro, 9 April 1992.
3. B. Barrillot, 'French finesse nuclear future', Bulletin of the Atomic &ientists,
September 1992, pp. 2~.
4. T. Portes, Le Figaro, 9 April 1992 and A. Carton, 'Un deal avec les
ecologistes', La Croix, 10 April 1992, p. 1.
5. SeeP. Lellouche, LeFigaro, 16 Apri1I992.
6. 'Achieving a comprehensive test ban', Arms Control Today, June 1994, pp.
3-7.
7. W. Epstein, 'CTB: two paths, one goal', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
October I993, pp. 3-5.
8. J. Betermier, 'Essais nucleaires et Ia dissuasion', Difense Nationale,
February 1993, pp. 29-30. See also Le Monde, 4 May 1993; and 0.
Debouzy, Le Figaro, 3 November 1993. Not all, however, were so critical.
The green and peace movements gave Mitterrclnd's decision warm, if
qualified, support. See: J-B. Cramer, 'Le nucleaire en sursis', Alerte
Atomique, 15January 1994, pp. 28-3I; and Liberation, 14 May 1993.
9. Betermier, 'Essais nucleaires et Ia dissuasion', pp. 29-38.
10. LeMonde,16 May I993 and M. Tatu, LeMonde, 6July 1993.
11. J. Isnard, Le Monde, 10 April 1993 and 13 May 1993.
12. P. Beaumont and C. Smith, The Observer, 4July 1993.
13. Le Monde, 6 July 1993. The seven were: Admii"cil Jacques Lanxade (Armed
Forces Chief of Staff and group president), Hubert Curien (former
Minister for Research), Jean Teillac (Chief Administrator of Atomic
Energy), Henri Conze (Delegate General for armaments), General
Phillipe Vougny (former Commander of the French stmtegic airforce
and then adviser to Mitterrand on nuclear weapons and space
programmes), Roger Baleras (director of military programmes at the
CEA), and Robert Dautrcly (scientific director at the CEA).
14. Ibid., p. 9.
15. LeMonde, I6July I993. See also]. lsnard and M. Tatu, LeMonde, I4July
1993 various articles.
I6. P.-H. Desaubliaux, LeFigaro, 15July 1993.
17. LeMonde,l4July 1993.
18. Interview on 'L'heure de verite' (FI"clnce 2), reported in Le Monde, 14
September 1993.
19. L'Express, 7/13 October 1993.
20. J. Baumel, Le Figaro, 13 October 1993 and P. Lellouche, Le Figaro, 13
October 1993.
21. D. Garmud, Liberation, 8 October 1993.
22. The six were: Rene Galy-Dejean (RPR), Jacques Baumel (RPR), Pierre
Lellouche (RPR), Daniel Colin (UDF), Pierre Favre (UDF) and Michel
Boucheron (PS). See R. Galy-Dejean et al., La Simulation des Essais
Nucliaires, Rapport d'information No 847, Commission de Ia Defense,
Assemblee Nationale, I5 December I993.
Shaun Gregory lll
23. PALEN stands for Preparation a Ia Limitation des Essais Nucleaires. The
programme is explained in G. Chambost, 'Vers des essais sans bombe',
Science et Vie, 919, April 1994, pp. 96-9. See also Galy-Dejean et al., La
Simulation tks Essais Nucfiaires, pp. 52--8.
24. Intervention de M. Frantois Mitterrand President dele Repuh!Upu sur le Thbne de
Ia Dissuasion, Service de Presse, Palais de I'Eiysee, 5 May 1994, pp. 9-14.
For useful analysis of the Mitterrand statement see D. Garraud, Liheration,
6 May 1994, and, P.-H. Desaubliaux, Le Figaro, 6 May 1994.
25. See, for example, Les I'Yanfais et les essais nucliaires, Institut d'Etudes de
Marches et d'Opinion, Apri11993.
26. Intervention de M. Frantois Mitterrand President de Ia Repuhlique sur le Thbne
de Ia Dissuasion, pp. 12-13.
27. Discours de Monsieur Edouard Balladur, Premier Ministre, devant l'/HEDN,
Service de Presse, 10 May 1994, p. 3.
28. See Le Figaro, 8 October 1993, and F. Varcnne, Le Figaro, 10 October
1993.
29. P.-H. Desaubliaux, Le Figaro, 11 May 1994.
30. D. Yost, 'Nuclear debates in France', Survival, Winter 1994, p. 122.
31. Discours de Monsieur Edouard Balladur, Premier Minis Ire devanll'IHEDN, p. 3.
32. Yost, 'Nuclear debates in France', p. 124.
33. Ibid., pp. 113-39.
Section 3
The Econom y and the
New World Order
8 The French Economy and
the End of the Cold War
Cliff Gulvin
The ending of the Cold War has clear economic as well as political
implications for France. The opening up of the ex-USSR and the
countries of eastern and central Europe, as well as China and Vietnam,
which remain under communist rule, offers great opportunities for
increased trade and investment by the industrial economies of the
OECD, and of western Europe in particular.
The object of this chapter is to investigate the impact of the end of the
Cold War on French patterns of trade and investment in these countries,
which comprise a huge potential market for French business.We first
look at trade and then at investment in eastern and central Europe
(including Russia). A further section briefly reviews developments in
China and Vietnam. Some broad conclusions are offered in the final
section.
FRENCH TRADE IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE
The French share of OECD trdde with 'PECO' countries1 in 1992 was a
modest 6.9 per cent, far outweighed by Germany's 37 per cent, and by
Austria and Italy with 9.4 per cent and 11.7 per cent respectively. Only
the UK among the major western economies had a smaller overall share
(4.2 per cent). Only in Romania had France a sizeable share of the
market (15.2 per cent) but still well behind Germany's 27 per cent share,
and also inferior to ltaly. 2 Indeed, French exports to all PECO countries
in 1992 accounted for only 1 per cent of France's world export trade.
Expressed differently, the value ofFranco-PECO trade was about equal to
that with Portugal, one of the poorest countries in the European Union
(EU), and containing only one-tenth of the population of the PECO
region.~
Before the Second World War most of the PECO countries were
integrated into the economy of western Europe. Today the majority wish
to resume this pattern by eventual integration into the EU. Most of the
40 per cent increase in PECO-OECD trade between 1988 and 1991 was
115
116 The French Eamomy and the End of the Cold War
conducted with the EU countries. In 1992 48.2 per cent of PECO

exports were sold in the EU.• The PECO countries currently represent
an area of low-cost production and, in some cases, high-skilled labour.
They are well-placed to compete on the west European market,
especially in energy products, traditional manufactures, and primary
produce. This, in conjunction with France's lacklustre export
performance, helps to explain her persistent balance of trade deficit
there. Her trade deficit with the pays de I 'est (a definition which includes
the ex-USSR), almost quadrupled between 1985 and 1991 when it
reached 16.8 billion francs. 5
However, the years after 1991 saw a sharp increase in French exports
to PECO countries, which grew nearly 19 per cent between April and
September 1993, compared with the same period in 1992. This helped
to narrow the trade deficit with these countries from 7.8 (in 1991) to
2. 7 billion francs in 1993.6 French exports to Poland, for example, grew
by 91 per cent in 1991-2 and those to the Czech Republic by 74 per
cent, although this improvement was based upon low absolute values. 7
Recent indications, however, suggest that this surge has not been
maintained in 1994. Other competing countries have also done well; in
Hungary the French market share fell from 5.6 per cent in 1988 to 4.7
per cent in 1992 compared with Germany's 37.4 per cent.8 Indeed,
Romania and Bulgaria are the only PECO countries where France has
increased her market share since the end of the Cold War. Her overall
share of the OECD-PECO trade increased by a mere 0.3 per cent
between 1988 and 1992.9 If all the ex-COMECON countries are
considered, France's market share has fallen from 11 per cent in 1986
to 8.3 per cent in 1993. 10
A consideration of Franco-Russian trade since the beginning of
'openness' in 1988 only serves to emphasise these trends. Between 1988
and 1991 French exports to Russia fell by 31 per cent while imports
rose by 3 per cent. This caused the bi-lateral trade deficit to double to 9
billion francs in 199l.That year French exports to Russia accounted for
only 0. 7 per cent of her total exports. 11 Overall, Franco-Russian trade is
about equal to Franco-PECO trade, which again places it on a par with
French trade with Portugal. Her trade with other parts of the ex-USSR
is negligible. Estimates for 1993 suggest a further decline in trade
between the two countries; thus the poor performance of French
exports to Russia has tended to cancel out any modest progress made
in some PECO countries already discussed. Since 1989 France has lost
market share in Russia to Germany, Finland and Italy, largely due to a
steep drop in industrial exports. Currently France eftioys a market
Cliff Gulvin 117
share of about 3.7 per cent, compared with Germany's 19.2 per cent In
1991 Russia was France's twentieth most important export market 12
FRENCH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN EASTERN

AND CENTRAL EUROPE
The second half of the 1980s witnessed an explosion of total French

FDI which rose from an annual flow of 18.5 billion francs in 1980-5, to
88 billion francs in 1986-90, reaching a record 147.6 billion francs in
1990. 15 Since then, in common with other West European economies, it
has declined, falling to about 65 billion francs in 1993. However, France
has retained her second rank behind the USA, gained in 1990. 14 Over
the 1980s the French share of world FDI almost doubled from 4.5 per
cent to 8.4 per cent, without, it seems, adversely affecting domestic
investment which rose by 69 per cent. 15 Closer inspection, however,
reveals that French non-OECD FDI averaged only 5 per cent of the
total from 1986 to 1991 compared with 28 per cent in 1980-5. 16 Thus
non-OECD FDI, which of course includes that in eastern and central
Europe, has been marginalised in recent years. Despite this, PECO
countries have seen the fastest rate of growth since 1991. 17 By early 1993
France was established as the fifth largest investor there with 1.2 billion
francs of realised or pledged investment. Nonetheless, this compares
poorly with the USA (8 billion francs) and Italy (7.6 billion francs).
Even Germany, despite investing heavily in her own eastern states, has
invested twice as much as France in the PECO region. 18
The bulk of French FDI has been targeted at Poland, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, with Romania also receiving considerable attention.
Nonetheless, again France's relative position remains modest. In April
1993 France accounted for only 6.4 per cent of FDI in Poland, well
behind the USA (46 per cent) and Germany (24 per cent). This was
despite important joint- ventures being formed between Thomson and
Polkolor, and France-Telecom's acquisition of the right to develop
Poland's cellular phone network. 19 In Hung-ary, which has attracted the
bulk (60 per cent) of world FDI in PECO countries since 1989, France
has only a 7 per cent share compared with Germany's 30 per cent and
Austria's 24 per cent. 20 The main French companies investing there
include Total, Rhone-Poulenc, Ciments Fran~ais and Alcatel. One of
Hungary's largest joint-ventures is that between SANOFI of France and
Hungary's Chinoin in pharmaceuticals. Other Franco-Hungarian
partnerships include Buii-Videoton and Schlumberger-Ganz. Moreover
118 The French Economy and the End of the Cold War
French banks, including BNP, Credit Lyonnais, CCF, and Indosuez,

have been active in Hungary's privatisation programme. In 1991 a
Franco-Hungarian bilateral Chamber of Commerce was opened in
Budapest, the first mixed consular organisation to be established in the
PECO region. 11
In the Czech Republic France holds third position with a significant
13.8 per cent share of FDI, but is still eclipsed by Germany (32 per
cent) and the USA (29 per cent). Here BSN-Danone, Lafarge, Air
France, and Pechiney are among the leading French investors." In
Slovakia the strong presence of Matra and Alsthom helped to give
France a 9.4 per cent share of FDI in mid-1993. By contrast France's
11.4 per cent share of FDI in Romania exceeds that of Germany and
the USA, but is less than that of Italy and the UK. Here French
representation is chiefly in the hands of Bouygues, Alcatel, and Credit
Lyonnais. Only nine companies account for 88 per cent of all French
investment in Romania. 2' Turning to Russia, we witness an even smaller
French presence, both absolutely and relatively. By April 1993 only
ninety French companies had invested there, securing a French share
of 3.2 per cent which again compares unfavoumbly with Germany ( 13.6
per cent) and Italy (7.2 per cent), making Fmnce the eighth largest
foreign investor. As with trade, French FDI in other states of the ex-
USSR is negligible.24
FRENCH TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA AND VIETNAM
South-east Asia contains the world's most rapidly growing economies,

including China and Vietnam. While not having formally divested
themselves of communism, these countries are nevertheless rapidly
reforming along capitalist lines. However, the evidence again suggests
that the French economic presence in the region is very modest. In
1992 the French share of world exports to the whole of the south-east
Asia region amounted to only 3.3 per cent, compared with Germany's
7.3 per cent. Overall, this market contributed only 0.5 per cent to
French export growth in 1992.25
Until1994 Franco-Chinese relations were seriously strained, partly by
the 1989 Beijing massacres, but particularly by the sale of sixty 'Mirage'
fighter aircraft to the Taiwan government in 1991-2, a deal which led to
sanctions against French companies bidding for contracts and seeking
investment opportunities in China. As a result French exports there
dipped while imports from China continued to grow, leading to a
Cliff Gulvin 119
widening of the already sizeable trade deficit In 1990 France possessed

a 3 per cent share of the Chinese market but, following the cooling of
relations, this fell to only 1.9 per cent by 1993, when Germany
possessed a 5.8 per cent share. 26 In terms of Chinese-OECD trade,
France held a 4.2 per cent share in 1993 against Germany's 10.9 per cent27
Thus France desperately needs export growth in China to maintain a
foothold in this burgeoning market, and to narrow the growing
bilateral trade deficit, as Chinese exports continue to make deep
inroads into the French domestic market. For example, her share of toy
imports into France rose from 4 per cent in 1986 to 27 per cent in
1992, while her share of radio and 1V imports grew from 3 per cent to
15 per cent over the same period. Imports of Chinese watches, shoes
and bicycles have soared since the mid-1980s. Thus a trade surplus with
China in the early 1980s was transformed into a deficit of 12 billion
francs by 1993, representing France's third largest bilateral trade
deficit. 28 French direct investment in China, though growing, remains
modest Between 1979 and 1992 it represented only 1 per cent of total
inward FDI, compared with a 6 per cent share for EU countries as a
whole.29
Not surprisingly, therefore, the French government has recently
endeavoured to mend its fences with the Chinese authorities. In April
1994 the French Prime Minister visited Peking, followed by a 120-strong
trade mission headed by the Industry Minister. In September, 1994,
these overtures were reciprocated by the Chinese President and Trade
Minister. As a result some 18 billion francs worth of contracts were
agreed, ranging from nuclear power stations and communications
equipment, to civil engineering and foodstuffs. Alcatel, with a presence
in eighteen of China's thirty provinces, has become the principal
supplier of telecommunications equipment to China. The resumption
of cereal exports, suspended in 1992, will be worth 500,000 tons to the
French farm sector in 1994. For its part the French government signed
a multi-million franc protocole financier (soft loan agreement) to help
lubricate the negotiations, worth 600 million francs in I 994. Three
postes d'expansion economique are to be established in Peking, Canton,
and Shanghai, where a French trade exhibition is scheduled for 1995.M
Vietnam is also rapidly transforming its economy away from central
planning towards market principles and free trade. As an ex-colonial
power, France has strong historical, cultural and linguistic ties with
Vietnam which have probably worked in her favour. France is the
leading non-Asiatic investor there, but is eclipsed by Taiwan and Hong
Kong. 51 French FDI is mainly centred on public works, energy, banking
120 France, the Nuclear Weapons Test Moratorium
and tourism. Total is active in oil exploration and refining. Alcatel has
combined with Fujitsu of Japan to establish an international cable
network linking Thailand, Vietnam and Hong Kong, while France-
Telecom has a $500 million contract to erect 500,000 new telephone
lines to develop cellular and package switching networks. Accor is
building a chain of hotels to tap the burgeoning tourist trade, much of
it centred on sites of military significance, such as Dien Bien Phu and
Da Nang. On the manufacturing front, Peugeot-Citroen is to establish
an assembly line, while Elf-Atochem is to build a major PVC factory. In
financial services the Credit Lyonnais is one of only seven foreign banks
represented in Vietnam and was responsible for $25 million of the $76
million issued by foreign banks there by April 1994.~2 On the trading
front, France had achieved a 7.1 per cent market share by 1992, fourth
overall. In some sectors she is particularly strong, supplying 96 per cent
of the aeronautics market and 15 per cent of telecommunications in
1992.''
These developments again owe their success, at least partially, to
active intervention by the French government. The Economy Minister
visited Hanoi in July 1994 and agreed soft loans valued at 425 million
francs, in 1994-5, and cancelled 1.2 billion francs of debt. S4 More
broadly, the French government was largely instrumental in getting the
US.inspired Vietnam trade embargo lifted in February 1994, partly by
paying off some ofVietnam's debt arrears with the IMF.
FRANCE LAGS BEHIND ITS MAJOR EU PARTNERS
This brief description of the nature and degree of French involvement

in the PECO economies, China, and Vietnam, reveals that in both
absolute and relative terms French trade and investment often lags well
behind that of her major partners in the EU. The contrast between the
French and German presence in these countries (except in Vietnam) is
especially striking. It is clear that the end of the Cold War has had no
significant impact on France's established levels and patterns of trade
there, again excepting Vietnam. For example, the share of French
exports going to eastern Europe in 1986 (before the Cold War had
terminated) was 2.9 per cent; for imports the figure was 3.9 per cent.
The respective figures for 1992 were 2.8 per cent and 3.8 per cent.~5
Moreover, French trade with the ex-USSR is significantly down on pre-
glasnost years, even in nominal terms. The impression is therefore one
of continuity or even decline, rather than of a major positive response
QiffGulvin 121
to changing circumstances and opportunities. In both relative and

absolute terms France has been consistently outperformed not only by
Germany, but often by Austria and Italy as well. This is as true for FDI as
it is for trade. Indeed, only 1.4 per cent of all employment created
abroad by French companies is in eastern Europe, even though 30 per
cent of such employment is located in non.OECD countries.116
What reasons can be mustered to explain this situation? Firstly, it
must be emphasised that the relatively weak showing of French business
in the markets freed up by the end of the Cold War is not due to any
lack of official support in France at the local, regional or national levels.
A whole panoply of agencies exists to provide information, guidance,
contacts, financial support, and insurclnce facilities for firms wishing to
engage in these areas. It has even been suggested that there are too
many support organisations and that making use of them is
complicated and excessively bureaucratic.'7 The numerous Chambres
de Commerce et d'Industrie, many of which have formed strong links
with certain specific countries, regions, or cities in eastern Europe, play
an important role. Their efforts are co-ordinated at national level by the
Association des Chambres Franf;aises de Commerce et d'Industrie
(L'ACFCI). In 1990 the French government created the Mission
Interministerielle pour l'Europe Centrclle et Orientale (MICECO) to
coordinate all the various privclte and public initiatives, but the signs are
that this has developed into a separate and competing organisation
with an agenda of its own. M
Secondly, it must be admitted that the countries of eastern Europe
have found the transition from a planned to a market-based economy a
difficult and protracted process, sparking a debate about whether
political reform should precede or succeed economic restructuring.
Thus several of the eastern European states have been in recession
since 1989-90, hit by low or even negative growth, unemployment and
inflation. Such is the disillusionment that ousted communists have
been voted back (under different names) in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Romania. Only in the Czech Republic and Albania are they actually
in opposition in 1994.39 But this does not explain France's weak relative
position.
Political factors have played a part in determining the success or
otherwise of French penetration in these countries. The effect of
Chinese-Taiwanese political rivalry on France's economic relations with
China has already been noted. In the ex-USSR decentralising
tendencies have meant that Moscow no longer controls orders for the
Union states as in the past. This, plus general political uncertainty, has
122 France, the Nuckar Weapons Test Moratorium
been blamed for the 50 per cent fall in French industrial exports to
Russia between 1988 and 1991.40 However, while these developments
may assist in explaining the absolute level of French trade and
investment, they throw little light on France's weak relative position.
It can of course be argued that France is naturally disadvantaged in
eastern Europe vis a vis her competitors. It is hardly surprising that
Austria is dominant in Hungary, or that Germany is well-placed in
countries with whom she shares a common border. Moreover, Germany
benefits from the strong links built by her eastern states with eastern
Europe under Cold War conditions. Linguistically, too, Austria and
Germany have the edge over France; in Hungary, for example, French
is the third foreign language after English and German. Italy, however,
which often exceeds the French presence in the region, possesses no
linguistic advantage. Moreover France is not completely bereft of
'natural' advantages. Many Romanians are educated in France and arc
thus well versed in French; sizeable patriotic communities of Poles
reside in France. These are factors of potential benefit to French
enterprise in eastern Europe.
The generally lacklustre performance of French businessmen there
may be better explained by their relatively cautious approach to trade
and investment when compared to their German or Italian
counterparts. French companies, it has been suggested, are more likely
to demand a reformed and stable political, fiscal, and juridical
environment before committing themselves. This attitude may stem
from the French preference for a marketing, rather than a
manufacturing, approach in eastern Europe, as exemplified by their
vehicle firms, and in contrast to Germany. For example, a marketing
approach will give a high priority to the lowering of trade barriers
before investment in dealer networks occurs, whereas firms investing in
manufacturing capacity may see high tariffs as a way of protecting such
investment, and thus may not seek prior concessions in this regard.
French producers are also seen as wishing to lean more on financial
supports, such as export insurance agencies and bilateral credit
arrangements brokered by government. 41
Any explanation of French economic performance in the new
markets under consideration must also take account of French
macroeconomic policy in the 1990s, which is itself largely a product of
the ending of the Cold War, in particular the re-unification of Germany.
The latter event forced the German authorities to adopt tight monetary
policies, which led to high interest rates not only in Germany but also
in a France anxious to maintain the franc's exchange parities within the
Cliff Gulvin 123
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In fact, the franc has

been effectively revalued by the devaluation of sterling, the lira and the
peseta. Thus French exporters have been hard hit while French
imports have been cheaper. The French share of world trade has fallen
slightly in recent years, suggesting that French exports have become less
competitive. 42 Furthermore, it is widely accepted that the relatively non-
specialised commodity composition of French exports makes them very
price-sensitive in many sectors and thus more vulnerable to competition
from low-cost countries.
Again, however, this can only be a partial explanation of French
performance. The franc furt policy predates the ending of the Cold War,
and a strong currency does not appear to have had serious adverse
effects on German or Austrian exports in PECO countries since 1989. A
more convincing reason is the clear-cut intensification of French trade
and investment with the European Union countries in the last decade
or so. In 1980, for example, about 49 per cent of French exports were
sold in the EU. In 1985 the figure was 52 per cent, and 63 per cent by
1992, while about 59 per cent of her imports derived from this region. 4s
Put differently, in 1993 only 22 per cent of French overseas trade was
conducted with non-OECD states, compared with 30 per cent in 1980. 44
This growing Euro-centricity in trade is mirrored in the field of
foreign investment. In the period 1980-5 about one-quarter of French
FDI was directed to the European Community. This rose to 60 per cent
in 198&90 and to 68 per cent in 1991. In 1992 no less than 80 per cent
of new French FDI was directed to the countries of the EU. By contrast,
French non-OECD investment averaged only 5 per cent of the total
between 1986 and 1991, compared with about 28 per cent in 1980-5. By
1990 65 per cent of the French stock (as opposed to flow) of foreign
investment was located in the EU compared with 42 per cent for
Germany and 25 per cent for the UK 45
This renewed emphasis on western Europe is consistent with the fact
that the one area of former communist control where France is the
predominant foreign player is the eastern states of Germany, the
former CDR This region also provides some of the important criteria
discussed above, such as a settled political and juridical environment.
French investments in eastern Germany currently total around 30
billion francs, well ahead of the USA's 9 billion and the UK's 4 billion
francs. Much of this has taken the form of purchasing companies
offered by the German Treuhandanstalt privatisation agency. On the
trade front, Peugeot-Citroen and Renault have a 16 per cent market
share in the east German states, compared with 8 per cent in western
124 TheFrench&onomy and the End of the Cold War
Germany - one reason for France returning her first balance of

payments surplus with Germany for twenty-eight years in 1993.46
In sum, therefore, while not ignoring the new economic situation
created by the opening up of states formerly frozen into Cold War
structures, France has nonetheless concentrated in recent years on
preparing herself for the creation of the European Single Market in
1993. It is in these higher per capita income countries that she
perceives her greatest opportunities, especially as significant
enlargement is in prospect Moreover, just as the Cold War economies
began to launch themselves into restructuring and privatisation
programmes open to foreign capital, rich pickings began to present
themselves in western Europe as state interventionism became
outmoded and governments sought to cut their budget deficits by
privatising public sector assets.
Finally, taking a longer, historical perspective, the recent re-centring
of French trade and investment on western Europe appears to be a
reversion to the norm. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, the high-income countries of the world were France's chief
outlets, with up to 70 per cent of her trade centred there. It is perhaps
significant that it was only in periods of severe economic disruption,
such as between the wars and in the 1970s to 1980s, when francophone
territories and the OPEC countries increased their relative importance,
that France's essentially European stance was shaken. In short, the
evidence of recent years suggests that, while France is increasingly
involved in the new markets of eastern Europe and south-east Asia, she is
more concerned with developing her old hunting grounds in the west.
Notes
1. (P)ays d'(E)urope (C)entrale et (O)rientale, excluding the ex-USSR,

the Baltics and eastern Germany.
2. C. Bayou, 'La presence economique franc;:aise en Europe centrale et
orientale au seuil de 1993', Le Comrier des pays tk l'Est, 379, May 1993, p.8.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. L'Expansion, 477, May/June 1994, p. 63.
5. INSEE, Tableaux tk l'economie .fram;aise, 1994/95 (lnstitut National de Ia
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques [INSEE], 1994), p.179.
6. INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1993 (INSEE, 1993); INSEE,
'Note de conjoncture', March, 1994.
Cliff Gulvin 125
7. AnnuaiR Staiistique, 1993.

8. Bayou, 'La presence .. .', pp. 7, 10.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. INSEE, !Wu/Jats, 1994 (INSEE, 1994), p.l22.
11. C. Bayou, 'Les echanges de Ia France avec les pays de l'ex-URSS en
1992-93', Le Courrier des pays de l'Est, 387, March 1994, pp.33-42; Les
echanges commerciaux de la France, 1991 (Direction des Relations
Economiques Exterieures [DREE), 1991) p. 83.
12. DREE, Analyse5 et provisioru, 1991 (DREE, 1991), pp. 83-4.
13. Y. Detapes et al., 'Les implantations industrielles fran~aises a l'etranger',
SESSI: Les Q)latre PlliJr!S, 1992, p. 1.
14. INSEE, Etudes, 1993 (INSEE, 1993), pp. 125-6.
15. Detapes et al., 'Les implantations ... ', p.1.
16. Etudes, p.l19.
17. INSEE, Infos, 52, june 1994, p. 1.
18. Bayou, 'La presence .. .', p. 15.
19. C. Hammid, 'Les investissements directs etrangers dans les pays d'Europe
centrale et orientale', SEEF: Caisse des Depots et Consignations, January
1994, p. 24.
20. Ibid.; Bayou, 'La presence ... , p. 16.
22. Hammid, 'Les investissements directs .. .', p. 27.
23. Bayou, 'La presence .. .' p. 19.
24. Hammid, 'Les investissements directs .. .', pp. 65-8.
25. INSEE, Etudes, 1993, p. 182.
26. Lihiration, 4July 1994.
27. DREE, !Wullats, 12,July 1993.
28. Annuaire statistique, 1989, 1993, Table 0.01-04; L'Expansion, 484, 10
October 1994, p.94.
29. INSEE, Premiere, 315, April1994.
30. Liberation, 5July; lljuly; 7 August 1994; LeMonde, 13 September 1994.
31. Vretnam: A Deuelopment Perspective, September 1993, p.54.
32. Vretnam Investment Review, 25 April 1994, p. 11.
33. Financial Times, 30 November 1993; L'Expansion, 476,5-18 May 1994, p.92.
34. Vretnam Investment Review, September 1993, p. 54.
35. INSEE, Etudes, 1993, p.l19.
36. Ibid.
37. Bayou, 'La presence ... , pp. 21-4.
38. Ibid., p.28
39. LeMoruk, 14June 1994.
40. Bayou, 'Les echanges ... ', p. 34.
42. Regards sur l'Actualite, 191, May 1993, p. 29.
43. INSEE, Tableaux . .. 1994-95, p. 181.
44. Regards sur l'Actualite, 191, May 1993, p. 47ff.
45. INSEE, Etudes, 1993, p.l19.
46. OEaJ Survey: France, 1994.
9 French Aid to Mrica:
A Changing Agenda?
Gordon Cumming
The end of the Cold War has transformed world politics and led
western countries to re-evaluate their foreign and economic policies
towards the Third World. Against this background, it is hardly
surprising that analysts have looked for changes in French-Mrican
relations. 1 What is more surprising is that an important aspect of
those relations, namely the recent evolution of France's substantial
aid programme to black Mrica, has attracted so little attention from
academics. 2
In this chapter, we shall aim to fill this gap by examining the
French aid agenda during the Cold War, its relative continuity since
1989, the reasons for this lack of change, and some likely future
developments. We shall begin by explaining the term 'aid agenda'.
We shall take 'aid' to refer to official transfers of concessional
resources with development as its main purpose. We shall focus
particularly on French bilateral development assistance (or
cooperation) to sub-Saharan Mrica since this provides the best guide to
donors' motives.' By 'agenda', we shall understand the pressures and
constraints that determine policy.
THE AID AGENDA PRE-1989
There is some consensus on the forces shaping French assistance

during the Cold War period, 4 and we shall provide here only a brief
qualitative assessment of the relative weight of each in driving the aid
programme. At the risk of over-simplification, and without wishing to
suggest that this is a clear-cut distinction, we shall distinguish
between 'contextual' and 'shaping' factors, the former setting the
framework within which development policy is made and the latter
having a more direct influence over that policy. We shall concentrate
on two contextual factors, namely Cold War concerns and pressures
from the donor community.
It would be wrong to suggest that French aid was primarily
126
Gordon Cumming 127
designed to help either superpower win the Cold War in Mrica.~ As

an ex-colonial power, France's assistance was concentrated on
former colonies, some of which were nominally Marxist (Benin,
Congo, Madagascar) or socialist (Mali, Guinea).
That said, France's foreign and development policies were
defined against a Cold War background. They were therefore 'non-
aligned' in the sense that they acknowledged the need to offer an
alternative to superpower rivalry and to prevent Soviet or American
intervention in France's sphere of influence. However, French aid
arguably reflected the Soviet threat more closely, as it sought to
ensure that poverty-stricken Mrican countries were not lured into
the communist camp. The neutrality of the programme came under
threat when the USSR tried to extend her influence to lusophone
Mrica as it decolonised in the mid-1970s but was reasserted again by
Mitterrand, who concluded cultural and technical agreements with
Mozambique in December 1981 and Angola in july 1982 as well as a
development agreement with Zimbabwe in May 1982.
French policy-makers were, however, also concerned that the
Americans should not supplant them in, or bring the Cold War to,
francophone Mrica. They challenged US policy over interventions
in Zaire (1977 and 1978) and the role of Libya in Chad. Indeed, in
some ways, they saw America as more of a problem than the Soviet
Union (whose aid was military, inferior and sporadic) since the most
potent threat wielded by Mrican countries was invariably that of
'defecting to the West'.
Turning to the pressures from the donor community, we shall
concentrate on the development strategies enunciated by the World
Bank. These were supposed to set out the dominant thinking on
how donors should proceed with their aid programmes. But they
only really began to establish the parameters for bilateral assistance
with the introduction, in the 1980s, of structural adjustment (a
strategy aimed at holding down Third World government
expenditure). 6 Even then, however, France remained unenthusiastic
and her programme continued to follow its own distinctive course.
CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGE
Having suggested that the above pressures set the context in which
development policy was made, we now need to consider the factors
which directly shaped that policy and which ensured that the
128 Fnmch Aid to Africa
assistance programme remained essentially unchanged throughout

most of the Cold War period.
If we assume that altruistic motives were insufficient in
themselves to sustain a large aid budget, then the main forces for
continuity were (1) political/strategic: by underpinning France's
power in Africa, a large development programme helped her to
justify her permanent seat at the UN, her central position within
Europe, her strategic role in NATO and - according to Marxist
analysts .... to create political and economic dependency on the
Hexagon; 7 (2) cultura~ by enabling France to diffuse her language
and values, development monies were deemed to serve her besoin de
rayonnement, (3) economic/commercial: by affording privileged access
to raw materials and markets, aid was believed to benefit domestic
employment; 8 ( 4) ideological (in the sense of party political): by
attracting bipartisan support in the National Assembly, development
assistance was spared drastic cuts or reforms; 9 and (5) historical/
institutiona~ as African leaders were given a sympathetic hearing by
the various ministries and bodies responsible for development, most
new initiatives on aid were quickly stifled. 10
As a result of these shaping factors, the assistance programme
tended to be large, bilateral, concentrated on black Africa,
distinctive and visible, with grand projects, singularly large technical
and military assistance components and currency support
arrangements (the franc zone). It was also marked by remarkable
continuity and a near-total lack of political conditionality (i.e. tying
of aid to political reforms). Indeed, France was not above using
force to support rulers who had shown loyalty to Paris though little
respect for democracy or human rights. 11
WHAT CHANGE SINCE 1989?
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, shifts have taken place in
the development agenda, 12 the most significant of which being
France's new position on conditionality. Hitherto, Paris had hidden
behind, or criticised, the economic conditions imposed under
structural adjustment programmes. Now, however, French policy-
makers are advocating loudly the need for sound public financial
management and free market forces. Moreover, they have
announced, in September 1993, that France would refuse further
balance of payments support to African countries which did not sign
Gordon Cumming 129
agreements with the IMF/World Bank; and, in January 1994 a 50

per cent devaluation of the CFA franc was announced."
But more significant than this belated 'conversion' to structural
adjustment was France's decision- in line with other donors- to
make aid conditional on political reforms. Although Paris'
enthusiasm for political conditionality has since evaporated and a
policy reversal is under way, this did begin as a promising initiative.
The central tenet of this new approach, democratic condition-
ality, was announced by the President at the Franco-Mrican summit
at La Bau1e in June 1990. Mitterrand stated that France would
thenceforward link her aid to democratic reform and respect for
human rights and be 'lukewarm' towards countries that did not
strive towards 'institutions based on free elections' . 14 The
government subsequently promised debt reduction for middle-
income countries on 'condition that they are engaged in the
processs of democratisation'; 15 provided logistical support for
elections in Benin (1990), Niger (1993) and CAR (1992); 16 suspended
aid to Zaire in October 1991 and Togo in February 1993 for their
refusal to undertake reforms; and chose not to intervene, as in the past,
to protect old-friend dictators such as Hissene Habrc! in Chad
(December 1990) and Moussa Trclore in Mali (March 1991).
Despite these measures, however, Mitterrand's declaration at La
Baule that there would be 'no development without democracy' has
since been watered down, with the President suggesting, at the 1991
francophonie summit, that 'each country' should 'set ... the terms
and pace of its own reform'. French politicians have also begun to
drop their rhetoric on democracy and link aid, as in the 1980s, more
with economic conditionality. This may have been the implication
when ex-Prime Minister Beregovoy told leaders at the 1992 Franco-
Mrican summit: 'Whenever your countries commit themselves ... to
the path of economic reform, they can count on France's full
support'. 17
France has, moreover, failed to offer any obvious rewards to
democratic reformers at the expense of recalcitrant leaders 18 or any
clear evidence of support for Mrican opposition parties: a case in point
being Paris' failure to respond following the massacre in Madagascar of
protestors demanding the resignation of President Ratskira in August
1991. The French government has also been reluctant to impose
penalties on non-reformers: recommencing aid to Kenya and
promising renewed assistance to Zaire ahead of the international
community; not cutting assistance where elections have been
130 French Aid to Africa
suspect (e.g. Cameroon, October 1992) or where former autocrats

have held on to or come back to power (e.g. Gabon, December
1993); and preferring stability to the chaos that transition to
democracy can bring (e.g. Madagascar). 19
As for the other elements of conditionality, these include linking
aid to environmental concerns and reduced military expenditure.
The French have, like other donors, impressed on Mrican nations
the need for development projects to be environmentally friendly
and, at the 1992 Earth Summit, President Mitterrand committed
France to meeting the UN 0. 7 per cent of GNP aid target by the year
2000. Although this undertaking met the bottom-line demand of
developing countries, France has made similar promises before and
failed to deliver.
As regards military conditionality, the former Prime Minister
Beregovoy broached this subject tentatively, urging Mrican leaders
at the October 1992 Libreville summit to keep 'small disciplined,
law-abiding armies' but accepting that democracy, development and
security were 'inextricably linked' - a remark taken by some as a
green light to use force to maintain order. France has since failed to
practise what she preaches by refusing to reduce her own military
spending; increasing arms sales to developing countries to
compensate for falling domestic demand; 20 neglecting to revise
Franco-Mrican defence agreements; and maintaining her military
presence21 and the same ambiguity in her motives for intervention
in Mrica. 22
THE POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT
It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to seek to prove

empirically any direct correlation between this lack of fundamental
change in French aid policy and our contextual or shaping forces.
It would, however, seem logical to look for some explanation in the
two factors - Cold War concerns and international donor pressures
- that have themselves been subject to the most radical trans-
formation: the Cold War has of course ended and structural
a<ljustment has been joined by a new strategy, 'good governance' or
'good government' (essentially, a remedy to make austerity
measures work by creating a supportive political environment).
These contextual factors did provide the impetus for some initial
modifications to the development agenda.
Gordon Cumming 131
Firstly, the end of the Cold War created a new international

environment in which changes in aid policy became both possible
and desirable. Some of these may have been inevitable for economic
reasons (the failure of structural adjustment; the worsening
performance of the franc zone from the mid-1980s; the recession at
home and in France's traditional markets) but others may have
been more directly the result of the collapse of the old world order.
Thus, the tough new rhetoric on conditionality would have been
unthinkable at times of East-West tension, when France would have
been wary of Africa falling under Soviet or American influence.
Now, however, as the biggest single donor in a stagnating Western
programme,l!~ Paris has been free to express concern about despotic
regimes; to create new assistance programmes to former communist
countries in eastern Europe and south-east Asia; to integrate trouble
spots such as Angola, Namibia and Mozambique into her privileged
aid fold (the champ, essentially francophone black Mrica); and to
adopt, in the climate of optimism created by the revolutionary
events of 1989, a bold new World Bank strategy.
Secondly, given France's reticence in the past to be associated
with World Bank policies, her initial enthusiasm for good
government seemed, on the face of it, to suggest that new priorities
might at last be driving the aid agenda. To begin with, good
government appealed as a means of enabling the Hexagon to get
her relations with Africa onto a sounder footing, now that some of
the old corrupt leaders had been replaced by elected represen-
tatives, such as Benin's Nicephore Soglo and Gabon's Casimir Oye-
Mba, more amenable to World Bank thinking. Thirdly, it seemed to
allow France to concentrate more resources on eastern Europe,
which had willingly democratised and which posed a more
immediate threat to French security. Fourthly, it appeared to offer
savings in assistance to Africa, where regimes had refused to
undertake reforms. Fifthly, it promised to offer protection against
donor fatigue, as it had won wide public and crossparty support. 24
Finally, as a strategy to make structural adjustment work, it was
expected to be easy to introduce within existing aid structures.
Ultimately, however, neither the end of the Cold War nor good
government was enough in itself radically to transform the
development agenda. This would seem to confirm our earlier
assertion that neither of these factors played a central role in
shaping French policy. If they had, we might have expected changes
in the programme more commensurate with those occurring
132 French Aid to Africa
elsewhere in the international political economy or with those

taking place in other donors' programmes, many of which are
turning away from Africa. 25 If, on the other hand, the changes in our
contextual factors had been mirrored by an easing of the constraints
that determined aid policy during the Cold War period, then we
might have anticipated a more consistent application of the new
World Bank strategy.
The French government's patchy implementation of good
government and its general resistance to change could be blamed
on President Mitterrand's reluctance to alter the Africa agenda or
Prime Minister Balladur's refusal to rock the boat over foreign
policy. But the truth is that it is too early for Paris to risk losing hard-
earned advantages in Africa over a tough new World Bank strategy
that may fail like others before it. Africa remains important
politically as a source of prestige for France, as its position in the
Bretton Woods institutions is increasingly challenged; strategically, as
a supplier of raw materials such as uranium;H culturally, as the only
region that is still within France's means for linguistic assimilation
(hence the recent policy of installing French telecommunication
networks across the continent); and commercially, as an area where
France already has substantial trade and investment (and powerful
business lobbies calling for continued subsidies) and where the
need to preserve market share against foreign competition27 has
taken precedence over the desire to create new markets in former
communist countries (where the risk of failure remains high and
France has no obvious historical or linguistic advantage) .28
For ideological reasons too, France has been reluctant to apply
good government consistently in Africa. In particular, it is World
Bank and hence US-led, and French parties have remained
reluctant to follow this lead. It also runs counter to their professed
aim not to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and
has met with dissenting voices in the RPR, notably Jacques Chirac's.
This, in turn, has meant that no government has had to push
African leaders too hard on reform or define explicitly what France
means by good governance.
Finally, historical and institutional constraints have also militated
against the full implementation of 'better government'. These
include the continued conservatism, clientelism and fragmentation
of the ministries and bodies involved in aid policy, and the strong
ties between African and French leaders that have been maintained
for masonic, business and religious reasons; 29 on account of African
Gordon Cumming 133
contributions to French electoral campaigns; and as a result of the

President's decision to retain the Mrica cell of the Elysee and to
keep the Mrica agenda within his domaine reseroe.
WHITHER NOW?
Clearly a shift - towards political conditionality - did take place in

the French development agenda in the early 1990s and this seems to
have been more than coincidentally related to the end of the Cold
War and the introduction of good government. Ultimately, however,
as neither of these factors was really central to aid decision-making,
they were not enough in themselves to bring about a drastic over-
haul in the assistance programme or even to undermine
significantly the forces for continuity shaping that programme
during the Cold War period.
But what, if anything, can we infer from the above about France's
attitude towards reform of her aid agenda? It could perhaps be
argued, firstly, that, as the changes have had more to do with the
rhetoric than the substance of policy, France (like other donors) was
to some extent only using the collapse of the Soviet bloc as a pretext
to make cuts in her sprawling aid programme. Secondly, it could be
argued that France, having espoused 'better government' amidst
the triumphalism that followed the lifting of the Iron Curtain, was
soon forced to tone down her policy when faced with the scale of
Mrican 'democratisation', with the expectations that this aroused
(the French had promised to reward states which democratised)
and with the instability that multiparty politics might bring to Paris'
sphere of influence. However, it could also be argued that, as good
government is about promoting self-help and the pre-1989 aid
programme was largely about creating dependency, the new strategy
could not in fact be implemented without sabotaging the whole
basis of the old development agenda.
As to the future of French development policy, this is likely to be
closely linked to the success or failure of good government. If
successful - and this will be difficult to judge - there may be
increasing pressure on Paris to apply it more consistently. There
may also be rapid growth in eastern European countries, returning
them to donor status, increasing demand for Mrican raw materials
and reducing France's aid burden in Mrica.l!O If unsuccessful- or if
it is considered detrimental to French long-term interests - good
134 Frrmch Aid to Africa
government may be dropped entirely, irrespective of the

determination of the international community to make it work. 51
Whatever happens, France's aid relations cannot now, after
conditionality and African 'democratisation', return to the status quo
ante. The policy environment has itself changed and future shifts in
the programme to satisfy a Treasury and public increasingly
concerned with cost-effectiveness may include: a re-evaluation of the
role of the Elysee in development-policy making (a single
bureaucracy, as advocated initially by Cot in 1981, may however be a
long way off); a dismantling of the franc zone as other European
countries refuse to see the CFA franc pegged to their Eurocurrency;
increases in aid to regional (anglophone) powers such as South
Africa, Nigeria and Kenya; a breakdown in the distinction between
the champ and the hors champ; and increasing reliance on non-
governmental aid organisations as a more effective way of alleviating
poverty.
For the foreseeable future, however, there seems little prospect
that France will follow donors such as the United Kingdom and end
the 'additionality' of assistance to ex-COMECON countries (i.e. blur
the budgetary distinction between the eastern European and
African programmes). There are few signs that Paris intends to
switch her allegiance away from Africa, or that the latter could
afford to turn her back on France. Given the uncertainty
surrounding the Hexagon's future role in Europe and on the inter-
national stage and given the absence of any alternative to her Africa
mission, it seems unlikely that Paris will jeopardise this one constant
in her changing relations with the rest of the world. It remains to be
seen whether France's aid agenda in Africa will be one of the few
areas of her foreign policy not to be radically transformed by the
end of the Cold War.
Gordon Cumming 135
Notes
1. See, for example, T. Chafer, 'French African policy: towards change',

African Affairs, 14 (53), 1992, pp. 37-51;]. A. McKesson, 'France and
Africa: the evolving saga', French Politics and Society, 11 (2), 1993, pp.
55-67.
2. Most analysts have continued to focus on aid effectiveness rather than
on the evolution of development policy: S. Brunei, Le Gaspillage de
l'Aide Puhlique (Seuil, 1993); S. Michailof (ed.), La France et L'Afrique:
vade-mecum pour un nouveau voyage (Karthala, 1993). For a brief but
informative analysis of recent developments in the donor
programmes of eleven western countries, including France, see A.
Hewitt (ed.), Crisis or Transition in Foreign Aid (ODI, 1994).
3. That bilateral aid reflects donor motivation more closely than
multilateral has been shown empirically by A. Maizels and M. K.
Nissanke, 'Motivations for aid to developing countries', World
Development, 12 (9), 1984, pp. 879-900.
4. These were originally set out in J.-M. Jeanneney, Rapport sur la
Politique de Cooperation (Documentation Fran~aise, 1963).
5. R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, 'The French aid relationship: a foreign
policy model of the distribution of French bilateral aid, 1964-70',
Development and Change, 9, 1978, pp. 459- 78.
6. The increasing regulation of the aid scene by the World Bank is
examined in P. Gibbon, 'The World Bank and the new politics of aid',
European journal ofDevelopment ll£search, 5 (I), 1993, pp. 34-83.
7. For a study of the motives underpinning French African policy, see J.
Chipman, French Power in Africa (Basil Blackwell, 1989); and for a
Marxist analysis, G. Martin, 'The historical, economic and political
bases of France's African policy', journal of Modern African Studies, 23
(2), 1985,pp. 189-208.
8. Doubts have been expressed about the macroeconomic benefits of
aid to France. See for example J. Adda and M.-C. Smouts, La France
face au sud (Karthala, 1989), pp. 61-103.
9. The Socialists' 1981 manifesto promises on aid and their subsequent
failure to deliver are examined in S. Hessel, 'Socialist France and
developing countries', French Politics and Society, 9 (3-4), 1991, pp.
130-40.
10. Numerous official reports were commissioned, then shelved.
Development Minister Jean-Pierre Cot was also 'forced' to resign
after offending African leaders with his plans to link aid with human
rights concerns.
11. See, for example, J. Guillemin, 'L'intervention extcrieure dans Ia
politique militaire de Ia France', Le Mois de CAfrique,July 1988, pp.
43-58.
12. These include reductions in technical assistance; increased support
for non-governmental organisations; and some dramatic debt
cancellations and loan-to-grdnt conversions.
13. France softened the blow, however, with a 300 million franc
136 Fnmch Aid to Africa
compensation package, an increase in budgetary aid, and a 25 billion

franc write-off of CFA debt.
14. LeMondeDiplomatique, 4July 1990.
15. 'Communique du Conseil des Ministres, Assemblee Generate du
FMI', cited in Le Monde, 9 May 1991.
16. Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1994, p. 28.
17. Le Monde, 9 October 1992.
18. Benin received 580 million francs of aid in 1989, but in 1990- after
democratising - 300 million. Togo, Cameroon and Zaire, which had
remained authoritarian regimes, saw their aid increased from 628 to
923, from 305 to 519 and from 669 to 1002 million francs respectively.
(Le MondeDiplomatique, 4 March 1992, p. 4.)
19. Allegations have been made in Le Monde (20 January 1992) that
France has helped governments to hold on in Zaire, Togo (August
1993) and elsewhere. It is hard to see how two of the most recalcitrant
despots (Mobutu and Eyadema) could have survived otherwise.
20. N. Ball, Pressing for Peace: can aid induce reform 7 (Overseas
Development Council, Washington DC, 1992), pp. 22 and 67.
21. According to Courrier International, 181, 21-7 April 1994, p. 31),
10,500 military personnel remain in seven African bases.
22. These include protection of French nationals (e.g. Zaire),
humanitarian concerns (arguably Rwanda), external aggression (e.g.
Chad), internal unrest (Gabon, Djibouti), Le Monde Diplomatique,
October 1992.
23. Total official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa fell from
$18,350 million in 1992 to $18,268 million in 1991: OECD, 11te DAC
1993 Report (OECD,I•aris, 1994), p. 209.
24. Survey by ]eune Afrique, 20 June 1990.
25. Sec C. Stevens and J. Kennan, Reform in Eastern Europe and the
Developing Country Dimension (ODI, 1992), p. 67.
26. G. Martin, 'Uranium: a case study in Franco-African affairs', journal
of Modem African Studies, 27 (4), 1989, pp. 625-40.
27. France is competing for control over West African oil and gas
reserves, New York Times, 11 September 1994, p. 9.
28. See chapter by C. Gulvin, above, pp. 115-25. French official aid to the
former Soviet bloc fell considerably from $457.5 million in 1992 to
$365.5 million in 1991, whereas her aid to Africa dropped only
marginally, from $2,956 to $2,856 million. (OECD, The 1993 DAC
Report, pp. 133 and 209.)
29. See S. Smith and A. Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique, Le Paris-Village du
Continent Noir (Calmann-Levy, 1992).
30. ODI, Eastern Europe and the Developing Countries (ODI, 1991).
31. The evidence suggests that there is no guaranteed link between
political liberalism and faster growth. See J. Healey and M. Robinson,
Governance and Economic Policy: sub-Saharan Africa in comparative
perspective (ODI,l992).
I wish to thank Kenny Meechan and David Hanley for their comments on
an earlier draft of this chapter.
10 France and GAIT:
The Real Politics of Trade
Negotiations
David Hanley
We all want to amclude an agreerrumt on GAIT, France first and furcnwst

because it :r in her interest. She is the wurld :r fourth exporting country.
G. Longuet, Tribune Difosses, 20 September 1993
The modem-day equivalent of the philcsophers stone in the OCDE countries is

knoum as GATT ... But GATT stands fur a wurld urder that is unfair to
poor countries and to whole areas of the economy of many others, simply to
make profits fur multinational companies.
Y. Cachet, Les Verts
The importance of GATT and its latest manifestation the Uruguay

Round (1986-94) for French politics can only be understood in the light
of very broad tendencies at work in the international political economy
over the last two decades or so. By this is meant the process of economic
globalisation, which seems to go hand in hand to a large extent with a
narrowing of ideological and political space. Taken together, these two
trends have set down a highly constraining context in which political
forces must operate. This chapter attempts to define that context before
analysing the responses of the major French political forces to the GATT
process and judging what lessons can be learned about the state of
French politics from this episode.
By globalisation is meant simply the movement towards an ever larger
and ever more simplified international economy; the end-point of such
a movement would be, logically, a state of affairs when the whole planet
constituted effectively one marketplace with virtually no internal
restrictions upon production and exchange. Such a free-trader's dream
would be at the antipodes of the traditional concept of a national
economy, where a combination of naturc1l restrictions and governmental
regulation (tariff and non-tariff barriers) insulate the national market to
varying extents from foreign producers and traders. While such a goal is
obviously an ideal archetype, it is nevertheless clear that substantial
137
138 JiTance and GAIT
progress has been made along the globalist trajectory since the Second
World War. The incremental effects of sucessive GATI rounds and the
constitution and then deepening integration of trading blocs (EEC,
NAFI'A) are obvious signs. 1 Supporters of globalism assume that it is
inevitable and generally beneficial, believing that long-term effects on
growth and jobs overrule any short-term losses.
But globalisation can be apprehended also at a more subjective or
conscious level, through the study of government policy. In France in
particular, the evidence from the 1980s suggests increasingly that
governments, whatever their political colour, are increasingly given to
globalist assumptions. The early 1980s saw the last attempt to fashion an
independent economic policy making maximum use of state
machinery, with the famous 'Keynesianism in one country' of the first
Mitterrand presidency.2 Within less than two years this policy had to be
abandoned, essentially owing to supranational pressures (devaluation,
import penetration, failure of partner economies to reflate). Since
then, governments seem to have accepted that they have comparatively
little autonomy in the economic sphere. Not only have they pursued
policies dictated by the international markets (expenditure cuts,
privatisations, streamlining, deregulation especially in the field of social
protection, faith in supply-side measures in the hope of boosting
competitivity) but they have also sought, proactively, supranational
responses to globalist pressures. The most characteristic of these was
the Single European Market, for which France pushed particularly
hard; clearly policymakers felt that the best way to ride the globalist tide
was to be part of a larger but more integrated trade bloc, within which
France might better withstand pressure from other big blocs (US,
Japan, new Asian dragons). In a word, they have responded to globalist
pressures by seeking regional not national sites of resistance and
adaptation (region is taken in its larger meaning as a group of
neighbouring states). No mainstream political force which governed
France during this period dissented signficantly from this logic.
The same was true of the parallel process going on during this
period, namely a narrowing of ideological space. Without wishing to
espouse the theories of Fukuyama, one may claim that the 1980s saw a
feeling among mainstream politicians that their options were being
closed down. In economic policy they were condemned to work in a
market economy where national policy tools had less and less purchase;
competition loomed ever stronger on international markets and all
policy had to be geared towards readying national firms for this
challenge. The implications of this for any transformative strcltegies in
David Hanley 139
other policy spheres (such as welfare and education) were severe. Little
wonder then that politicians seemed increasingly less ambitious in their
programmes and increasingly similar. To be sure there were still
differences of emphasis between left and right, and indeed within
either camp (how much tax to finance what sort of social expenditure?
how much political integration within the EU and at what levels?); but
agreement on fundamentals seemed shared. Even very testing issues
such as the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) in 1992 or a fortimi the referendum on the Maastricht treaty in
September of that year did not really dent the consensus among the
major players of the political class. Certainly voters noticed this, as a
stream of studies from the middle of the decade showed; old instinctive
behavioural patterns of left and right were beginning noticeably to
fragment.' It was not yet the 'end of ideology' or the ubiquitousness of
the 'new voters', to use Ysmal and Habert's phrase, in some all-
pervading republique du centre. But a lot of French voters did seem to be
becoming Downsian shoppers in an electoral supermarket where the
only goods on offer had the seal of approval of market liberalism.
The end of the Cold War simply gave a boost to these secular trends.
The collapse of the command economies as the one functioning
alternative to market liberalism and the ousting of the ruling
communist parties in favour of a largely chaotic programme of political
democratisation and the brusque introduction of a market economy
could only reinforce the triumph of liberal globalism. Eastern Europe
was no longer a rival model, but simply another market to conquer for
Western companies.
This is the context in which the Uruguay Round reached its
conclusion from Blair House to Marrakesh. Clearly it WdS always likely
to provide a hard examination for the certainties of the politicians,
posing a number of direct challenges to parts of the French economy.
In addition to the general requirements to cut tariff barriers, the
Uruguay Round aimed particularly at sensitive sectors such as steel and
avionics. But it also introduced new areas previously left to the devices
of governments or the EU- not just intellectual property and services,
with their huge cultural as well as economic implications, but also
agriculture, which is at the centre of much of French life. The GATT
negotiators had very precise demands to make in all these sectors.
Clearly, the whole process would be a litmus test of how far mainstream
politicians were prepared to go in pursuit of the liberal paradigm, and
whether alternative strategies might have any impact.
We shall now examine the responses of the m.Yor political forces in
140 France and GAIT
France so as to explore this question. Our postulate is that there are two
types of response to globalism. The majoritarian one comes from what
we term core parties, viz. those that are or have recently been in
government, or that may expect to be there soon. Nuances apart, these
groups are globalists. Against them is ranged a coalition of peripheral
groups, condemned to opposition (willingly in some cases) and thus
able to articulate bolder and more ambitious critiques of globalism.
COREPOLnnCALFORCES
Parties of the Right
The RPR/UDF coalition saw the start of negotiations for the Uruguay
Round in 1986 and was back in office when they were concluded in
Marrakesh in April 1994. Much of the French input into the
negotiations via the Council of Ministers was thus made by the socialist
governments which sat from 1988 to 1993, especially that of Ben!govoy
who was in office when the Blair House pre-agreement was initialled by
the EU negotiators in November 1992. This means that some of the
Right's positions are drawn up from an opposition standpoint, which
might imply a certain degree of exaggeration. Nevertheless there seems
to be a fairly consistent bottom line, whether the Right is governing or
opposing. Within this basic parameter, there are however a certain
number of nuances between different components of the Right
One of the most succinct versions of the Right's position came from
Gerard Longuet, Trade Minister in the Balladur government from
March 1993 until his resignation in 1994; as president of the Parti
Republicain (PR), direct descendant of the old liberal or 'Orleanist'
family of the Right, it is historically appropriate that Longuet speak on
this issue. Longuet made it clear that as fourth exporter in the world,
France had to get a deal. For him there is a clear link also between a
GAIT deal and growth, and therefore an increase in jobs; though the
Minister was honest enough to point out that this link is hard to
demonstrate. 4 When one adds to this the need for a technologically
innovative nation like France to secure guarantees of patents, and when
one assesses the possibilities for French financial services to expand
into new non-European fields via a GATT deal, then it is obvious that
France has a huge interest in making a success of the Uruguay Round.
The Balladur government identified a number of obstacles to a
French signature, however. The first of these was agriculture,
David Hanley 141
particularly the Blair House package. This was agreed (by virtually all
political forces, but for different reasons) to be 'unacceptable as it
stood'. In addition to its demands for reduction of subsidised exports,
no-one was sure how compatible it would be with the CAP, which had
just undergone a revision painful to French farmers via the MacSharry
reforms of 1992.5 The government was worried about the possibility of
more land being set aside. Also the US was only willing to sign a 'peace
clause', that is to stop challenging the very existence of the CAP, for six
years.
The second mcyor issue was cultural products, which meant media
and cinema. Anxiety here centred on the possibility of France no
longer being allowed to subsidise her cultural industries or discriminate
against foreign products and as a result being overrun by cheap US
movies.
Other French objections centred on the need to keep special
treatment for certain industrial sectors deemed vital for the national
economy - aluminium, semi-conductors, avionics. There was also a
general dislike for the whole GATT mechanism, felt to be too narrowly
focused on purely tariff matters and hence incapable of dealing with
other hindrances to trade; these included not just environmental or
social aspects (rates of pay, health and safety protection, etc), but the
whole question of currency fluctuation. The main culprit here WdS the
US dollar. French demands thus increasingly focused on the setting up
of a World Trade Organisation in the hope (pious surely) that it might
be able to address such questions meaningfully. These objections were
accompanied ritualistically by demands for greater European access to
other markets - a coded way of attacking US unilater.Uism as evidenced
by use of the Trade Act and section 301.
These demands influenced the Right's tactics both before and after
its return to office. While still in opposition the RPR took a tough line,
especially on agriculture. Pasty, their agriculture spokesman andjuppe,
then general secretary of the RPR, demanded a pause in negotiations
until the new CAP reforms could be put into place, also calling for
retaliation against cheap US food imports. 6 This was clearly both a bid
for the farming vote as well as a delaying tactic. In November 1992 the
RPR actually called for use of a French veto, invoking the General and
the Luxembourg compromise of 1965.7 There were demands for
counter-measures against US unilateralism. Even Balladur, soon to be
prime minister, attempted to place the dispute on a higher political
level by implying that the 'only remaining super-power' was bullying
smaller states.8 Thus the Right was able to vote ag-ainst Beregovoy en
142 French and GAIT
masse when he reported to the National Assembly on the Blair House

deal in November 1992.9
This fa~ade of unity did conceal differences of emphasis however.
Generally the RPR talked tougher than its UDF allies. Thus in reply to
Juppe's call for an early veto, Alain Lamassoure reminded him that
such weapons were only a last resort. 10 The CDS was obviously disposed
not to vote against the deal which it saw as sensible, but eventually went
along with its allies for the sake of unity, elections obligent. 11 The Gaullists
seemed more ready to use grand philosophical and emotional
arguments, as when Chirac linked the question of preserving cultural
autonomy to that of national identity itself. Pasty did the same for
farming. This contrasted with the drier, more business-like language of
Barre and Giscard, which drew RPR ire. 12
At the end of the day, however, when a vote was taken on the final
package in December 1993, all the Right supported the government.
They must then have agreed with Balladur's claim that by and large
France had salvaged most of what she wanted since Blair House and
therefore repaired the damage left by the Socialists.•~ What Balladur saw
as his victories were: cultural autonomy (this area was quite simply
excluded from the accord); revision of the agricultural position
(essentially a twelve-year peace clause and an increase in the subsidised
exports allowable); and improved access to non-EU markets. Finally
there was the setting up of a World Trade Organisation, but what its
powers would be was still unknown at the end of 1993. Despite some
outstanding issues such as steel and aircraft (on which stalemates were
eventually agreed) and while leaving on the table his objections to
wider factors such as currency movements and environmental consider-
ations, Balladur felt able to present the deal as a good one for Frcillce.
That it was somewhat better than the position in late 1992 was
undeniable; whether the final package was qualitatively different (or
whether indeed the Socialists would have obtained anything less) is
highly questionable. 14 The two really big issues have simply been
adjourned (cultural products) or made the object of fairly slight
adjustments which were always likely to be agreed by the US as a last-
minute negotiating ploy anyway (agriculture). In short, Balladur had
helped the EU obtain the most realistic deal available; it may just be
that his tough talking had influenced some marginal percentages. But
he always knew that a deal had to be struck and probably had from the
start a fairly good idea of what its parameters were. So had his party and
its allies, for all the talk of veto, which in fact decreased once the Right
took office. Their disagreements have to be seen within this context as
David Hanley 143
so much jockeying for electoral position. Despite their talk, they were
all at bottom globalists.
THE FARMERS
The Federation Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles

(FNSEA) might be regarded as a litmus for the GATT talks; known for
its considerable power in the sphere of farming policy, which some
have seen in the context of neo-corporatism, 15 it has also shown
remarkable cleverness at keeping quite disparate interests together.
Analysts often see two wings: on the one hand the large agribusinesses
of northern France (cereals, beet and rapeseed), competitive and very
oriented towards exports; on the other, the smaller family farm, often
pluricultural and not competitive on international (or domestic?)
markets, relying on subsidy and with an incerasing tendency for its
operators to be regarded as managers of rural space rather than
capitalist producers. The contrast is enshrined in the physical presence
of the two vice-presidents, Benoist of the cereal growers and Teyssedou
of the small farmers. The FNSEA is traditionally pro-government,
especially when the Right is in power; it was expected that Guyau, the
president, who owed his seat to the big farmers, would try and sell the
GATT deal to his union at its April 1994 conference. 1r' This would
require a balancing act between big and small, and was complicated by
the fact that Guyau broadly supported the MacSharry package,
accepting for instance that the number of farmers would drop from
900,000 to 700,000 by the end of the decade. 17 Guy.m squared the circle
by proposing successfully a motion that spoke of the need for farmers
to compete on the export markets while retaining environmentally
sound farms; he also made noises about EU preference and the need
for a just overall organisation of world trade. More concretely, he
withdrew a proposal to recycle cereal subsidies towards the smaller
farms, setting limits to his distance from agribusiness.' 8 The
government came to his rescue with some measures designed to case
the transition for smaller farms, so violent debate was avoided. 19
By these means Guyau succeeded in his aim of keeping farmers
united (except for the dissidents in the small unions) and thereby a
part of the corporatist policy-making structure. He accepted the
fundamental thrust of globalist economics, but was able to persuade his
followers that this was unavoidable and that the state would pick up the
tab. In this way a possible source of radical oppositon was neutered.
144 France and GAIT
THE SOCIAI1STS
Much of the above applies to the Parti Socialiste (PS), with some
nuances. The PS too objected to the cultural clauses, seeing culture as
vital to French civilisation and thus justifYing subsidies to cinema and
TV.10 It also objected to Blair House in the name of defending EU
preference; but here its perspective was slightly different from that of
the Right in that it felt impelled to defend the CAP reforms, put
through by Mermaz with the aim of obtaining greater control over the
amount of production as well as the pricing. This was seen as vital in
order to make French and EU farmers internationally competitive - a
globalist perspective if ever there was one. The Right had always
attacked this, but at heart may well have been grateful to the PS for
having done a job that was necessary but difficult (60 per cent of
FNSEA farmers are said to vote RPR/UDF compared to 20 per cent for
the PS). But there were no concessions to the idea of further
weakening the CAP, as Agriculture Minister Soisson made perfectly
clear. The Socialist government reiterated much of the Right's critique
of US unilateralism (sometimes in quite harsh language, as when
Soisson accused them of wanting to destroy the CAP) and of the newly-
industrialised states for their undercutting made possible by sweated
labour. 21 Beregovoy even mentioned a veto, albeit very prudentially.~
Given all this, it might come as a surprise to hear that the PS
eventually voted against the government in December 1993. Fabius
presented the deal as a sell-out, arguing that the agricultural chapters
did nothing to prevent floods of corn gluten imports and that they
were incompatible with the CAP. The weakness of the World Trade
Organisation and the absence of monetary and social chapters were
also cited as grounds for voting ag-ainst. This should deceive no-one
however. PS opposition needs to be seen as a gesture by a party
struggling to exist after one of the worst beatings in its history. The
agricultural dispute is magnified considerably here by the PS and it
knows perfectly well that the wider issues it cites were simply not
capable of being addressed in GATT instances. The cultural argument
was of course already won. In fact the PS would have done little
different had it been in on the final phase of the negotiations; its
perspective is basically a globalist one, albeit tinged with sour grapes.
For a critical line we must turn elsewhere.
David Hanley 145
PERIPHERAL CRITIQUES
Appropriately in an organisation with a radically new approach to

politics, Green critiques of GATT are uncompromising and holistic. In
a series of witty pamphlets, the Greens analyse the GA Trastrophe.
Refusing liberal approaches to international political economy, they see
the latest round as an attempt to impose US hegemony in the face of
Japan and the EU bloc, thereby introducing a new specialisation in the
international division of labour (sheep to Australia, cars to Japan,
etc.). 25 The main beneficiaries are likely to be multinational companies
(MNCs), not the peoples of the world; developing countries (LDCs)
will in fact lose out badly. Far from bringing economic benefits, the new
deal will give rise to unemployment, environmental degradation (not
least because increased trade means increased use of transport) and
rural desertification. The deal has in any case been stitched up in an
undemocratic way, with no consultation of interested parties. It should
therefore be vetoed, and the government should work with EU
partners to build a Europe which makes its own economic and
environmental rules and sets its own levels of social protection.
Particular attention is paid to agriculture. GATT simply magnifies
the tendency to increase quantity at the expense of quality; what France
needs is less intensive farming with more manpower and less chemical
inputs, devoted to organic and biological products of high quality. This
should be supported with interventionist pricing policies, on the
assumption that it is cheaper to pay people to manage the countryside
than to repair it. The Greens point out that this differentiates them
from what they contemptuously refer to as the bino11U! FNSEA/CN]A
which has accepted the productivist logic enshrined in the CAP and
GATT. But despite their sympathy for the wildcats of the Coordination
Paysanne they warn that there can be no return to the cosy days of the
old CAP which underwrote unlimited production. 24
By its refusal of globalist market logic, its democrcttic critiques and its
privileging of new economic and environmental logic, the Green
alternative flies in the face of received capitalist wisdom. So does the
argument of the Parti Communiste Fran~ais (PCF) which on many
points is close to the Greens.
We shall consider the PCF and the CGT union (Confederation
Generale du Travail) together, so closely do their critiques intermesh.
Similar types of approach can be found from marxist socialists like
Chevenement, no longer in the PS; which in a curious way shows how
far GATT cuts across traditional party lines, since many of these
146 France and GAIT
criticisms are echoed in this country by such an avowed anti-marxist as

John Gray, worried that the juggernaut of the market might be veering
out of the control even of conservatives. 25 Using classical marxist
analysis, PCF and CGT see the GATT process as driven mainly by MNCs
in search of higher profits. 26 But a related political factor is the chronic
trade imbalances of the US state, to which GATT is only a partial
response alongside initiatives such as the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA). Such moves are part of an 'economic war', in which the
'food weapon' is being readied for possible use against both Europe
and the Third World. Much is made of the pronouncements of John
Block, Reagan's agriculture secretary, about making nations politically
dependent by establishing monopolistic control of their food supplies. 27
Moreover the GATT deal has been negotiated in secret by 'unelected
Brussels technocrats', as L 'Humanite put it. 28
The PCF and CGT go into detail about the effects of GATT. Denying
that free trade has necessarily brought the benefits claimed in the past
(they cite the multiple recessions since the 1970s), they identify
problems for French agriculture, steel and aviation. For LDCs,
especially growing Third-World economies like India or BrciZil who rely
on protecting intellectual property in certain sectors, they see increased
exploitation. They share the universal perception of a threat to French
culture and identity; indeed, Francis Wurtz believes there will still be a
danger in the future, as in his reading cultural subsidies may well be
challenged under the new agreement. 29 They are aware of US
unilateralism, hidden subsidies and use of devaluation. But in addition
to these standard critiques they set out quite a detailed model of the
sort of international organisation they wish to see. Taking UNCTAD as
a model, it would insist on: a social chapter to avoid undercutting;
guaranteed raw material prices for LDCs; cancelling of Third World
debts, and strict environmental standards. Significantly the PCF and
CGT see the French effort as being part of a coordinated European
one, denying that they are protectionist; if the EU preference tariff is to be
used, it must be to help small farms and be linked to overseas aid policy.110
This Left critique of GATT starts from an anti-imperialist stance, but
it picks up a part of the ecological critique and it does not hesitate to
use nationalist appeals either. It does involve a radical refusal of GATT
and suggests an alternative strategy, stressing that this has to begin very
much at a European level, however. This is not a point of view shared by
the last major source of opposition, the Front National (FN) .~•
The FN sees the economy very much as subordinate to its general
cultural and ideological goals (it reproaches the major parties with
David Hanley 147
being economistic, in fact). Thus its views often emerge in the context
of discussions of 'high policy' .~2 The FN clearly resents US dominance,
economic, military and cultural (the latter especially, as it is such an
explicitly multicultural nation); it does take the precaution of warning
against 'primary anti-Americanism', however. It dislikes 'ultra-
liberalism' and the 'fiction' of generalised free trade. It agrees that
French farmers are particularly threatened and goes even further than
the rest in highlighting the dangers to French identity from 'American
sub-culture'. But it dislikes the EU as a site of resistance, blaming
European integration for the loss of the French Empire as well as for
threats to its steel and agriculture and soon its currency and
sovereignty. The FN favours a weak confederal Europe of variable
geometry; it protests the need for protection against 'unfair
competition' (Japanese? American? non-industrialised states?) but has
few positive proposals to make, other than summoning yet another
international instance which would somehow put 'non-commercial
considerations' on the international trade agenda. One priority that
comes through clearly is the need .to protect small farmers, not just in
the name of employment or environmentalism but because their
activity symbolises in some way 'the roots of the French people'.:t'
This last phrase is the key to the FN's attitude. Its fundamental
preoccupation is the stimulation of a sense of national identity among
the French; as such its task is ideological. It seems therefore that
economic issues - how people get their daily living - belong as it were
to a lower order of things and that they have somehow to be fitted into
the equation as an afterthought. This explains the remarkable lack of
specificity of FN proposals about GAIT or other economic issues. One
is tempted to conclude by saying that if it's foreign they're against it.
THE REAL POliTICS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
What then arc the real political lessons that emerge from this study of
the GATT negotiations? It seems clear that there is a broad consensus
among what might be described as core political actors (RPR/UDF, PS,
FNSEA and unions such as the CFDT). This holds that a GATT deal is
vital for expansion of the export-led French economy and thus for
employment. It also involves setting a certain number of restrictions to
free trade, however, particularly in the cultural sphere and to a lesser
extent in agriculture. And it sees close EU cooperation as the only way
of guaranteeing this position. Within this consensus there are clearly
148 France and GAIT
nuances, explicable by historical and ideological tradition as well as

jockeying for position vis a vis certain electorates. We term this line
globalist, while fully agreeing with larry Elliott that it falls far short of
total deregulation and might well be seen as a cynical carve-up of the
market between big trading blocs at the expense of smaller nations and
thus even as a triumph for managed trade. 54 Nevertheless this is a visible
consensus, which reflects the view of large parts of the political class
that there is really no alternative to globalist tendencies and that
national states have to band together ever more closely at regional level
if they are to survive. The different parties dearly have their own views
about the precise relationship of national economic policy to the
European level. But in our view the evidence suggests that these
differences are not as great as is implied.
Against this core position are pitted the different peripheral
challenges. The communists and left-socialists still argue from a classical
anti-imperialist perspective, and so, albeit from a slightly different
angle, do the Greens. The FN is harder to chamcterise because quite
simply it does not really believe at bottom that economics matters.
With the exception of the latter, all the oppositionists believe that the
EU again is the natural site of resistance to globalism. But all seem
relatively pessimistic about influencing the Union to move in the
direction they seek; for the moment they are shouting their radical
refusal of globalist logic into the wind.
If this suggests that the French electorate is increasingly fragmented,
such a view is indeed borne out by the evidence of recent consultations,
which have all been dominated by the fundamental question: what
influence can governments have over the economy, acting on their own
and in partnership? The answers given by voters suggest much confusion
over this. The Maastricht referendum was won by 51 per cent to 49 per
cent; in the European elections of 1994, parties espousing the core
positions outlined above only totalled 53 per cent compared to 62 per
cent in the 1993 elections, itself not an impressive figure. The FN
regularly scores 10 per cent or above, the Greens a similar figure and the
PCF hangs on; recently the success of de Villiers' list in the European
elections suggests that the classical Right is having increasing difficulty in
keeping many of its traditional supporters (especially farmers and other
independents) on board. Both voters and politicians look to a European
response to the problems of economic management, but the question
remains: which Europe? Here the quarrel between integmtionists and
intergovernmentalists remains as sharp as ever.
French politics in 1995 could not escape being dominated by a
David Hanley 149
divisive and angry presidential election. Voters and politicians remain

perplexed by the difficulty of coping with an economy on which
national politicians have less and less leverage and are increasingly
unable to conceal the fact. Thus the GAIT episode is another illustr-
ation of the so-called 'crisis of representation' in France; it shows that
the wishes of large parts of the electorate are not really being arti-
culated adequately by the parties. On reflection, however, perhaps this
is a harsh view to take of the failings of the political class. The fact is that
governments today are, for all their talk of sovereignty, increasingly
powerless in a world economy driven by MNQ; and banks. Given this, it
is not really surprising if the gap between their rhetoric and their
achievements continues to grow and if voters continue to get annoyed
about this. Such are the real politics of GAIT negotiations.
Notes
1. M. Rainelli, Le GA 1T (Editions La Decouverte, 1993).

2. M. Beaud, Le Mirage de In, croissance (Syros, 1983); P. Hall, Gooerning the
Economy (Polity, 1986); H. Machin and V. Wright, Economic Policy and
Policymaking under the Mitterrand Presidency (Pin tcr, 1985).
3. A Duhamel, Les Habits neufs de In, politique (F1ammarion, 1989); F. Furct,
J. Julliard and P. Rosanvallon, La Ripublique du centre: fin de ['exception
frant;aise (Calmann-Uvy, 1988); A Lancelot, 'L'electorat fran,;ais s'est-il
recentre?,' in P. Habert and C. Ysmal (eds), Elections ligislatives 1988
(Figaro/Etudes J>oJitiques, 1988), pp. 40-4; J>. Habert and A. Lancclot,
'L'emergence d'un nouvel electeur' in ibid., pp. 16-23.
4. G. Longuet, Tribune Difosses, 20 September 1993; Liberation, 6 October
1993; 'GATT: l'optimisme et Ia prudence', journal des Debats, 5
December 1993.
5. On the MacSharry reforms and their effects sec, from a rather Gaulllist
viewpoint, D. Arthaud, 'L'Amerique de Clinton, Ia CEE et les crises
agricoles', Difense nationale, October 1993, pp. 73-92. A less sceptical
view is A. Swinbank, 'CAJ> Reform',]oumal of Common Market Studies, 31
(3), September 1993, pp. 359-72.
6. For the RPR line see La Lettre de In, nation- In, politique ce malin, 904, 9
September 1993; 924, 14 October 1993; 935, 25 November 1993. See
also La Lettre de In, nation magazine, 212, 21 May 1993, pp. 8-10;].-C.
J>asty, AFP press release 4 November 1992.
7. P. Oilier (agriculture spokesman), AFP press release, 8 October 1992;
RPR press release, 18 November 1992.
8. AFP press release, 13 December 1992.
9. LeFigaro, 26 November 1992.
150 France and GAIT
10. RPR, Bulletin quotidien, 25 November 1992, 'Evenements et perspectives',

p.6.
11. Ibid.
12. AFP press release, 25 October 1993. 'I am one of those people who
believe that France and Europe must continue to open up', said
Giscard, regretting that the image of France had 'deteriorated badly in
Europe and in the world'. Chirac defended 'the French territorial
exception' and said that 'you can't bargain your identity as if it were any
other product'. These remarks conceal broad agreement between them.
13. Premier Ministre, Service de Presse, L 'accord du cycle d'Uruguay, 13
December 1993; Le Volet agricole du GATT, 15 December 1993.
Communique du Conseil des Ministres, 9 February 1994.
14. J.-M. Helvig, Liberation, 16 December 1993.
15. J. Keeler, 1'he Politics of Neocorporatism (Oxford University Press, 1987).
16. On the rapports de force within FNSEA, see S. Polack 'Agriculture,
querelle de farnille', Le Point, 26 March 1994.
17. La Eclws, 22 March 1994.
18. 'Une agriculture performante sur un territoire equilibre' was the exact
formula, TribuneDifosses, 25 March 1994.
19. LeFigaro, 25 March 1994.
20. PS Info -special GA11: 557, 11 December 1993; Parti socialiste, Nouvelles
Internationales, 120, 9 September 1993; 121, 16 September 1993; 122, 23
September 1993; 128, 9 December 1993. Parti Socialiste, Questions
d'actualite-le GA11: 1 October 1993.
21. Declaration du gouvernement sur les negociations du GATT par P.
Beregovoy etj.-P. Soisson, senat- annexe du proces verbal de Ia seance
du 26 novembre 1992, p. 10.
22. Ibid., p. 4.
23. See press releases by Les Verts: ]uyeuse PAC, 27 May 1992; GATT- resister
a la pression amCricaine, 16 October 1992; Lettre ouverte aux presidents des
groupes de l'Assemhlie Nationale (from Green MEPs), 24 November 1992;
GATT et Agriculture, 1 December 1992; GAlT- l'espoir de l'humanite ne
repose pas sur l'evolution des droits de douane, 21 June 1993; Blair House: le
vrai probt.eme, c'est le GA1T, 21 September 1993.
24. A. Upietz, 'Ni PAC ni GATT', Vert Contact, 269,28 November 1992.
25. J.-P. Chevenement, Le TemjJs des cituyens (Editions du Rocher, 1993), pp.
217-82;J. Gray, Guardian, 9 November 1993; Guardian, 4January 1994.
26. For the CGT sec Le Peuple, 1381, 9 December 1993, p. 50; 1382, 13
January 1994, p. 39. 'Le GATT- enjeux et problemes', Courrier
confidCra~ 35, 3 November 1993;].-C. Le Duigou, 'Les Suites de l'accord
du GATT, Ia conference de Marrakech et )'emergence d'un debat social
a I' echelon international', paper for Centre Confederal d'Etudes
Economiques et Sociales, 21 March 1994. For the PCF seeP. Le Hy.tric,
La Pensie, 292, March-April 1993, pp. 11-22; G. Hermier, Revolution,
719, 9 December 1993, pp. 6-7; A. Bocquet, L'Humaniti, 16 December
1993; A propos du GATT ( 17 pp., ron eo), Section economique du PCF,
23 November 1992.
27. Le Hyaric, 'L'enjeu agricole .. .', p. 17.
28. L 'Humaniti, 8 December 1993.
David Hanley 151
29. Interview with Humanit8-Dimanche, 197,23-9 December 1993.

30. CFDT reactions are much less hostile than those of the CGT, CIDT
Maga%ine,191, March 1994, pp. 22-5. Its line might be characterised as
reluctant globalism.
31. See below, P. Hainsworth, pp. 193-203, for a detailed analysis of the FN's
reaction to the New World Order.
32. Front National, 300 Mesures pour Ia renaissance de Ia France (Editions
Nationales, 1993), cap. 15.
33. LaLettredeJ-M. LePen, 169,January 1993, pp. 10-11.
34. L. Elliott, Guardian, 14 April 1994.
Section 4
Politics
11 The 'Consensus' on
Defence Policy and the
End of the Cold War:
Political Parties and the
Limits of Adaptation
Anand Menon
Consensus is the process of abandoning aU beliefs, principles, values and

policies . . . avoiding the very issues that have got to be solved, merely to get
people to come to an agreement on the way ahead.
Margaret Thatcher•
[Le] consensus national indispensable en matiere de defense.

Livre Blanc sur Ia Defense, 19942
Accounts of French defence and security policy are replete with

references to the so-called internal consensus on defence policy. Few
scholars, however, have attempted to investigate in detail its nature or its
impact on defence policy. Yet whilst academic analyses of the nature and
especially the impact of consensus have been scarce, French officials
have repeatedly stated not only that a high degree of consensus exists on
French defence policy/ but also that it acts as a device which reinforces
French international standing, allowing France to be 'heard and
respected on the international scene', 4 increasing the freedom of
manoeuvre enjoyed by the President of the Republic in formulating his
own defence policies. 5
However, close examination of this elusive phenomenon reveals that
its very existence was questionable during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Moreover, the myth of its existence, paradoxically, actually denied
French political and military leaders the very 'independence', the need
for which the notional consensus was claimed to be based around. The
myth of consensus affected the ability of French political leaders to
reform defence policy. During the Cold War period, this was not as
serious a failing as it might have been. France, as I have argued
155
156 The 'Consensus' on Defence Policy and the End of the Cold War
elsewhere, gained a degree of international prestige as a result of its

(declaratory) hostility to the bipolar world order. Once the Cold War
came to an end however, traditional defence policies proved in-
creasingly unable to provide the benefits they once had.6 As adaptation
became increasingly imperative, the insidious influence of 'consensus'
was rendered all the more damaging.
THE NATURE OF 'CONSENSUS'
The Gaullist legacy
'Consensus' was claimed to exist around a set of policies associated with

de Gaulle. Yet, as Jolyon Howorth has indicated in the first chapter of
this volume, his legacy WdS both multiple and potentially ambivalent.
Interpretations concerning its nature hinged on which of the policies
of the General were taken to be representative of his views. The varied
interpretations possible are evident in the historiography. Whilst early
American and British analyses focused on the narrowly nationalist
motivations of the General, and sometimes verged on the polemic/
subsequent studies have attempted to show that de Gaulle was a far-
sighted visionary, who, although none but himself realised it at the
time, was forging the bases for a more independent and self-sufficient
Europe. 8 Of crucial importance is the fact that one's position on
defence and foreign policy debates in France depended to a large
extent on which version of the history one subscribed to.
In a sense, the Gaullist legacy thus presented French policy-makers
with a great deal of room for manoeuvre, as long as policy initiatives
were presented in general terms reconcilable with most interpretations
of it. On the other hand, crucial themes associated with Gaullism had
to be retained. Thus, the notions of national independence and of
grandeur were necessarily stressed by the General's successors,
representing, as they did, leitmotifs associated with his policies. A
corollary of this was that a policy based on a quest for grandeur
required a degree of domestic agreement on policy, as a proactive and
often aggressive stance abroad could not be undermined by indecision
and division at home. 9 Hence, maintenance of the General's (per-
ceived) policy legacy went hand in hand with assertions of domestic
unity.
Anand Menon 157
The myth of consensus
Claims regarding 'consensus' began to proliferate towards the end of

the 1970s, especially following the acceptance by both the PCF and PS
of the necessity of maintaining France's nuclear force. From a situation
in which Gaullist policies were the subject of fierce dispute within the
French political class, it appeared to many that, by the time Mitterrand
acceded to the Elysee in 1981, opposition to these policies had
dissipated and been replaced by consensus. 10 However, although most
political leaders - ranging from the Communists to (less surprisingly)
the RPR and UDF- paid lip-service to the Genercil, the lessons they had
learnt from him were often very different. Disagreement, in fact,
existed from the beginning of the 1980s over several major issues
related to European security, notably the role of nuclear and
conventional weapons, and attitudes towards security institutions. 11
France's nuclear deterrent force, the epitome of its policy of a
nationally-oriented defence, was claimed to represent the noyau dur of
the consensus since its acceptance \>y the Socialists and Communists in
the latter half of the 1970s. Yet during the 1980s several voices were
raised amongst the military which questioned the premises of French
nuclear strategy, 12 whilst the Secretary-General of the UDF, Michel
Pinton, delivered a stinging critique of the tout ou rien of French
doctrine in an article in Le Montie. 13 Whilst the Socialist leadership
stressed the centrcility of the force de frappe, 14 the PS moved increasingly,
along with the UDF, in the direction of a relative increase in the priority
accorded to conventional weapons, and hence the possibility of France
displaying increased solidarity with its allies.
More far-reaching than squabbles over the strategic nuclear force
were those in evidence over French possession of tactical nuclear
weapons. The official French line on these was that they were central to
French defence policy, reserved for the use of French vital interests
(never defined), and would remain under strictly national control.
Such views were not universally shared, however. Some political leaders
questioned the very notion of French possession of such weapons, 15
whilst political parties produced documents at variance with Gaullist
orthodoxy. Indeed the UDF insisted on the automatic use of tactical
nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against the 'forward
frontiers of Europe', necessitating close consultation both with
European partners and allies in NATO with a view to arriving at
common conceptions of the use of tactical weapons. 16 The PS also
moved from governmental orthodoxy, stressing the need both for
progress towards a 'regional deterrent', and for the reinforcement of

conventional deterrence in order to raise the nuclear threshold. 17
Whilst both the PS and the UDF, in contrdSt with the administration,
thus moved closer to positions adopted by NATO allies, and whilst even
the RPR proposed a watering-down of the purely national role of
tactical weapons, 18 the PCF angrily denounced any such policy initiatives
as representing a 'rampant' reintegration into NAT0. 19
Closely connected with such issues was that of France's attitude
towards European security structures. Although integration into
NATO's military command remained a taboo subject during the 1980s,
all the major political groupings expressed a strong interest in the idea
of enhanced European defence cooperation. In October 1983 Jacques
Chirac raised the possibility of West German participation in the setting
up of a Euro-American deterrent force, 20 and some years later, was still
proposing the creation of a 'European defence personality'. 21 Others
stressed both the anachronism of purely national defence 22 and the
consequent need for not only cooperation but also an integrated
European command.u Chirac, typically, was willing to contradict his
earlier strictures concerning the need for wide-ranging nuclear
collaboration and, in 1990, underlined the necessity of maintaining
France's autonomy in defence matters. 24
Such widely differing opinions, usually masked by the protective
cover of a few simplistic 'catch-phrases' concerning France's autonomy
and its rang, revealed the largely illusory nature of 'consensus'. On all
the crucial issues there existed profound disagreement amongst
political and military elites. Ironically, however, the very fact that
'consensus' was tarnished heightened its importance for policy output.
The operation of the 'consensus'
Although somewhat illusory, the claimed existence of consensus

impacted in several respects on the way in which defence policy choices
were made. In the first place, 'consensus' came, during the 1980s, to be
seen very much as an end in itself. The repeated protestations of the
manner in which it reinforced France's standing and independence
resulted in it coming to be seen as an integral part of defence policy.
Hence, in certain instances, specific decisions or policy adaptations
were aborted explicitly because of a perceived need to maintain
'consensus'. Thus, in 1985, Defence Minister Paul Quiles warned that
the American Strategic Defense Initiative programme could cause a
'conceptual destabilisation' that could break the 'consensus' in France
Anand Menon 159
around nuclear deterrence. 25 Pierre Joxe, speaking at a seminar entitled

(ironically) 'Un nouveau dihat stratigiljue', stated that one reason for not
challenging the principle of French non-integration into NATO was
that 'the autonomy achieved by the decision of 1966 is the object in
France of a political consensus and is part of the basis of national
attachment to our defence system'. 26
Yet perhaps the most insidious consequence of a desire to maintain
'consensus' was the stifling of debate on policy options. French political
leaders, desperate to maintain an appear.mce of consensus, went out of
their way to inhibit criticism of defence policy. The dearest illustration
of this was the reaction to the article written by the then Secretary-
General of the UDF, Michel Pin ton, which questioned the validity and
utility of the French nuclear deterrent. 27 Political leaders were less
interested in the content than in the fact that one of their number had
dared to question the basis of cross-party support for trctditional Gaullist
policies. Pierre Mauroy, the Prime Minister, attacked Pinton for
'undermining the coherence of our deterrence' - to undermine
'consensus' was to undermine deterrence. 2s Exchanges of opinion on
matters related to defence were not to be encouraged. Hence
Mitterrand's decision to remove Charles Hernu's book Nous, les Grands
from circulation in 1981 because of the views it expounded on
supposed Soviet military superiority. Military leaders were happy to
lend support to the idea that criticism implied a lack of patriotism. The
military authorities were not averse to quashing dissent within their
own ranks, especially when such dissent touched on the nature of
French strategy.29
That the political and military elites reacted in such a way is perhaps
understandable. Politicians have a habit of using any available
argument to support their policies, whilst armed forces are not noted
for their encouragement of debate. More surprisingly, such arguments
were repeated by academic observers. The close links that existed
between many scholars and the policy making elite did much to stifle
academic criticism of prevailing policy.~ Far from attempting to
stimulate debate, some members of the intellectual elite went so far as
to support the argument that questioning deterrence undermined its
utility." The fact that such rationales for conventionality emanated from
those whom one would expect to provoke discussion necessarily acted
as a constraint on debate, as did the fact that the French press failed to
act as a forum for the exchange of ideas. ~2
The upshot of this was that, whilst lively budgetary debates involving
not only political but also military leaders were commonplace during
the 1980s, no such crossing of swords characterised discussion of the

bases of defence policy. As Prime Minister Rocard pointed out, despite
Socialist opposition to some of the spending priorities contained within
the 1987 lui de programmation militaire, 'a negative vote by the Socialist
Party would have been interpreted by the opposition, at the time, as a
disagreement on the French deterrent doctrine'. 55 The fact that
'consensus' appeared to be crumbling towards the end of the 1980s
meant that the requirements of continuity and of avoiding discussion of
tendentious issues were heightened: the very insistence of Chirac and
Mitterrand, during cohabitation, on stressing their agreement and
underlining the good health of 'consensus' was indicative of the
necessity felt to preserve a crumbling structure. An illusory 'consensus',
then, acted as a more powerful constraint than a real one: 'N'y touclu!z.
pas: il est brise. ~
THE IMPACT OF THE 'CONSENSUS' ON FRENCH DEFENCE

POUCY 1989-1994
Socialist immobilisme after the Cold War
Socialist governments towards the e.nd of the 1980s repeatedly affirmed

their support for shifts in defence policy. In particular, ministers began
to exhibit a greater commitment to the notion of increasing solidarity
with allies. Pierre Joxe spoke out in favour of tightening relations with
NATO allies, whilst France pushed for enhanced intra-European
defence cooperation, in particular by means of revitalising the Western
European Union (WEU) and making it the defence arm of the EU.
Despite such declaratory ambitions, however, France failed to resolve
any of these issues decisively.
As the Cold War drew to a close and Gaullist defence policy was
increasingly called into question by a rapidly evolving European
security landscape, 'consensus' affected policy in several ways. In the
first place, the lack of debate that had resulted from a desire not to
open the Pandora's box of wide-ranging disagreement over policy
options was continued. Although political leaders, including Defence
Minister Joxe, increasingly came to emphasise the need for an open
and wide-ranging debate on defence policy options after the Cold War,
this never materialised. The parliamentary debate on defence policy in
June 1991 turned out to be something of a sham, providing deputi5with
no real opportunity to influence policy. Indicative of the continued
Anand Menon 161
closed nature of any defence debate that existed was the decision taken
by Joxe to allow major arms firms to fund the Fondation pour les
Etudes de Defense Nationale, thereby compromising its ability to act as
an effective critic of policy.M The stifling of debate clearly had wide-
ranging implications for policy, inhibiting the formulation of
alternative strategies and the identification of policy anomalies.
The desire to maintain the vestiges of claimed consensus was
heightened by the precarious political position of the Socialists. Rocard,
Cresson, and Ben!govoy all headed minority governments, dependent
on the support of other parties for successful legislative action. Socialist
weakness resulted in the decision by the Bercgovoy government not to
present its loi de programmation militaire to Parliament. Moreover, the
Socialists were weakened by the presence of influential party grandees
out of office. This was particularly the case with Jean-Pierre Chevene-
ment, who had resigned from the Rue Saint Dominique during the
Gulf war, and who continued to insist on France maintaining its
independence from the Americans and defining its own path towards
international prestige.
The 'consensus' thus worked against attempts to alter traditional
policy. Aware of the profound domestic disputes that would be
engendered by an overt challenging of Gaullist policy options, Socialist
officials had to tread warily when attempting to redefine those policy
choices. Given the necessity of preserving continuity of political
rhetoric, new initiatives were often carried out most discreetly
(reminiscent of the way in which de Gaulle had authorised the signing
of cooperation agreements with NATO in 1966-7): witness the
tremendous secrecy of the negotiations surrounding France's decision
to join the NATO Air Command and Control System.ll6 Such initiatives,
moreover, were invariably followed by stark declarations of the
immutability of French policy. Hence, official sources referred to the
landmarkjanuary 1993 agreements with NATO (the text of~hich was
itself classified at French insistence), which made provision for the
Eurocorps to be placed under NATO operational command, as a
change in the 'modalities', rather than in the nature of relations with
allies, stressing that it in no way implied a change of attitude towards
NAT0. 37
Crucially, the disjuncture between, on the one hand, declarations
concerning the necessity of increased French cooperation with allies
and, on the other, desperate attempts to preserve the impression of
continuity with the past through stark assertions of continuity with
traditional policies, affected perceptions of French policy abroad. The
Americans in particular were incensed by the distinction between what

the French would say in private, and what they would subscribe to in
public, Secretary of State George Shultz going so far as to characterise
their negotiating style as 'aggravating'.M Such annoyance was wont to
transform itself into outright distrust. As one American official put it, 'if
it wasn't for the French, we might be able to accept the assurances that
a new European security entity would be part of a trans-Atlantic
partnership, but on this issue, we don't trust the Frcnch'.59
Apparent inconsistencies in the stance adopted by Paris led to
doubts concerning French commitment to solidarity, and annoyance at
apparent French 'free-loading', fostered bY. incomprehension in the
face of often contradictory French rhetoric. 40 The need felt to accom-
pany gestures towards allies with harsh rhetoric refuting the possibility
of reintegration in any form undeniably lessened French influence
within the European security debate, in that French allies found
themselves unable to discern actual French intentions, and were
therefore increasingly driven into adopting 'Atlanticist' alternatives to
meet new security challenges. This is not to disagree with the notion
that French officials genuinely desired to see the creation of a more
'European' security structure (though my own personal belief is that
such notions were for the most part confused, and that genuine
tensions existed between independence on the one hand and the
European option on the othe~ 1 ); n1ther, the claim is that, whatever the
real designs of these officials, tl1eir efforts were frustrated by domestic
pressures.
The Balladur government: only Nixon •••
The election of the Balladur government led to the first signs of a

profound revision of traditional defence policy options. The 1994
Defence White Paper challenged many of the lignes directrices of Gaullist
policy. Whilst toning down traditional notions of national military
independence, the government has increasingly come to stress the
need for cooperation with allies, and, in the light of the ever more
arduous peace-keeping operations, has increasingly stressed NATO in
this regard.•2
'Consensus' did not prove to be such a tight constraint on the new
government for several reasons. First, during its period in opposition,
the Right had become increasingly frustrated with the immobilisme of
the Left in power, and willing to exploit the obvious problems Socialist
governments faced in reconciling a policy increasingly aimed at
Anand Menon 163
placating domestic opinion through affirmations of policy continuity

with the increasing dysfuntionality of that policy in the 'new Europe'.
Unhindered by the constraints of wielding power, influential individuals
began questioning traditional policy, in favour of closer ties with NATO
decision-making organisations,45 and a possible 'European-isation' of
French nuclear policy, entailing a French nuclear guarantee for western
Europe. 41 Think tanks such as the Forum du Futur and Renouveau
Defense published documents calling into question French defence
policy and developed strong links with senior right-wing politicians.45
Once in power, the government rendered its more conciliatory
attitude towards allies more palatable to defenders of the Gaullist faith
by combining it with an increased emphasis on strength. Military
independence had traditionally been viewed as indicative of military
strength, which in turn acted as a springboard for the achievement of
grandeur. Balladur's government combined its rapprochement with
allies with a commitment to restarting nuclear testing,4 6 increasing
nuclear budgets, and constructing an additional French aircraft carrier.
The outrage manifested by the RPR in the face of Leotard's military
restructuring programme underlined the importance of a policy of
strength in overcoming domestic opposition. 47
Further scope for a redefinition of relations with NATO was
provided by the fact that the government was confronted with
situations unlike any which had characterised the Cold War. In
particular, France's extensive peace-keeping role necessitated a degree
of co-ordination with allies. Policy adaptation proved possible because it
occurred in a sphere which had not been part of the Gaullist model.
Regional conflicts free from the ideological overlay that the superpower
confrontation had conferred on all struggles were not subject to
Gaullist strictures concerning the dangers of being dragged into an all-
out global conflict by American adventurism. More important was the
fact that, in handling peace-keeping, the government was dealing with
French lives, and not questions of abstrdct doctrine. It soon became
clear to French officials that Frdnce would need to sit on those NATO
committees where the fate of its soldiers serving on such missions was
decided. 411 Paris thus consented, from April 1993, to participate fully in
NATO's military committee for discussions related to NATO's peace-
keeping role.
A final factor facilitating policy adaptation was the ideological hue of
the new government. Writing in Le Monde on 4 March 1994, Andre
Fontaine commented wryly:
Who would have imagined, when de Gaulle withdrew France from
the unified command structure of NATO, that twenty-eight years

after a Prime Minister and Defence Minister elected under his
colours would press that same NATO to intervene for the first time
outside the area it is intended to defend?
Yet who could have expected such a mpprochement with NATO to come
from any other quarter? If only Nixon could go to China, only a Gaullist
could question the Gaullist legacy. For a Socialist government to gain
domestic credibility in the sphere of defence, it needed to illustr.lte its
fidelity to the traditional Gaullist model: hence, for example, the
recruitment of Lucien Poirier, one of the architects of Gaullist deterrent
strategy, to justifY the creation of the Force d'Action Rapide in 1983. The
Balladur government, on the other hand, headed, as it was, by a Gaullist
party grandee, had, within limits, the freedom to attempt to redefine key
aspects of Gaullism. Thus, whilst rejecting the notion of 'breaking with
Gaullism', Alain Juppe not only maintained that one of the greatest
characteristics of Gaullism was the ability to adapt to one's times, 49 but
also attacked the slavish archiogaullismeof the Socialists.
For all this, however, the government did not find itself completely
at liberty to do as it pleased. In the first place, Mitternmd remained in
the Elysee and open disagreement at the pinnacle of the French state
was to be avoided at all costs. Hence, despite differences in emphases
between the President and Prime Minister on numerous issues,
including the momtorium on nuclear testing, Balladur insisted that
France 'speaks to the outside world with a single voice' ,r.o Secondly, the
Right found itself internally divided. Given the proximity of a
presidential election, abrupt policy shifts risked antagonising influential
figures within the RPR, notably the Gaullist right.
Hence policy exhibited a certain coyness, and again two str.lnds of
policy coexisted. On the one hand, a rhetoric of reconciliation and of
the need to participate more fully within NATO existed. On the other
hand, the government proved unwilling to move too quickly, which
explains its last-minute decision to prevent the attendance of Chief of
Staff Jacques Lanxade at a meeting of the NATO military committee.&~
Whilst calling into question some aspects of the Gaullist legacy, Juppe
was careful to point out that 'it's not a question of France going back on
what it did in 1966'.52 Similarly, Leotard, despite his exhortation in the
White Paper on the need to overcome the traditional European
reliance on the balance of power in favour of a 'mutualisation of
power', stated that the 'major lesson I learnt from General de Gaulle is
Anarul Menon 165
that, only the leaders of a country can tell where its vital interests lie and
when they are threatened. At the moment of truth, a nation has nofriends. •s'
Thus, although the Balladur government enjoyed several advantages
over its Socialist predecessors in terms of its ability to overcome the
constraint on policy adaptation that 'consensus' represented, notional
consensus continued to hamper a revision of French defence policy.
Despite the claims amongst the political elite that 'consensus'
represented an irreplaceable element of strength in French defence
policy, the ultimate irony resided in the fact that it actually prevented
policy from maximising French influence in the security debate that
occurred in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Although its
influence has waned, it may already be the case that the 'consensus'
around a Gaullist policy based on maintaining French freedom of
manoeuvre and influence in world affairs succeeded merely in
undermining French ability to achieve precisely these ends.
Notes
1. D. Kavanagh and P. Morris, Consensus Politics: from Attlee to Tllatclier

(Blackwell, 1989), p. 119.
2. Livre Blanc sur la defense 1994, Collection des rapports officiels (La
Documentation franr;aise, 1994), p. 75.
3. See, for instance, J.-P. Chevenement, interview before the Grand Jury
RTL, Le Monde, 15 January 1989, p. 26.
4. J. Chirac, Discours devant l'lnstitut des Hautes Etudes de Ia Difense NatUmale,
12 December 1987, text in D. David, La politique de difense de Ia France:
textes et documents (Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale,
1989), pp. 296-7.
5. G. Robin, La Diplonudie de Mil/errand ou le triomplle des apparnu:es (Editions
de Ia Bievre, 1985), p. 18. Robin claims that Mitten-and benefited from
more such freedom than his predecessors, as the consensus during his
presidency was stronger than before.
6. A. Menon, 'From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and
European security', International Affairs, January 1995. .
7. See, for example, J. Newhouse, De Gaulle and tile Anglo-Saxons (Viking
Press, 1970).
8. See, for instance, J. Paolini, 'The Gaullist model revisited: long-range
strategic vision and short-term political implementation in French
defence policy', French Politics and Society, 7, Autumn 1989, pp. 16-23.
9. See M. Schuman, 'Cohabitation pacifique ou coexistence belliqueuse?',
Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1993, pp. 84-92.
10. SeeP. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, La Decennnie Mitterrand, Vol. 1: Les
Ruptures (Seuil, 1990), pp. 223-4.
11. A plethora of publications dealing with defence were released by the

various parties during the 1980s. Of especial interest are: Union pour Ia
Democratic Fram;aise, L'A.ffaire des Euromissiles (UDF, 1983); Difendre
l'Europe (UDF, 1984); Redresser Ia Difense de Ia France (UDF, 1985). Parti
Socialiste, La Sicurite de l'Europe. Texte adDpte par fe Bureau Executif du Parli
Socialiste le 26 juin 1985 (Fiammarion). Rassemblement pour Ia
Republique, Libres et Responsahles. Un projet pour Ia France (Paris, 1984).
12. See, for example, E. Cope!, Vaincre Ia Guerre. Une autre difense, une autre
armie (Lieu Commun, 1984) and P. Debas, 'Tout ou Rien', Le Matin de
Paris, 7January 1982.
13. 'La nouvelle ligne Maginot', Le Monde, 16June 1983.
14. See the excerpts of the President's speech at the Caylus military camp in
Le Monde, 15 October 1986. Indeed, Hernu had stated that increasing the
strength of conventional forces would make a potential foe believe that
France's nuclear deterrent was a sham: C. Hernu, 'La politique et Ia
volonte de defense', Politique Internationafe, 16, Summer 1982, p. 14.
15. See, for example, F. Filion, 'A quoi sert !'Armament nuclcaire tactique?',
Le Monde, 10 November 1984.]. Amalric, 'Les Tentations Strategiques de
M. Mitterrand', Le Monde, 22 October 1987, claims Mitterrand himself
always believed the development of tactical weapons was a mistake.
16. Redresser Ia defense, p. 5. Sec also the preface to the document by Giscard
d'Estaing, pp. xiv-xv.
17. PS, La Securite de l'Europe, pp. 8, 12.
18. P. Buffotot, 'Forces politiqucs ct dCfcnse', Ares, 3, 1986, p. 62. Chirac had
even gone so far as to propose (or so it seemed) the extension of French
nuclear protection to the Federal Republic, though he subsequently
modified his proposals, owing to the storm of protests his original
scheme elicited. See J. Howorth, 'Of budgets and strategic choices:
defence policy under Fran~;ois Mitterrand', in G. Ross, S. Hoffmann and
S. Malzacher (eds), 1'he Miu.errand Experiment (Peity Press, 1987), p. 321,
n.36.
19. Le Monde, 10--11 November 1985.
20. Cited in J. Klein, 'Le de bat en France sur Ia defense europeenne',
Strategique, 4e Trimestre, p. 27.
21. Le Monde, 28 February 1986.
22. G. Fuchs, 'Une chance aRaisir', Le Monde, 14 March 1987.
23. See the comments of UDF deputy Arthur Paecht in the National
Assembly on 13 November 1991, cited in P. Gordon, French Security Policy
after the Cold War: continuity, change and implications for the United States,
paper prepared for the United States army, RAND, R-4229-A,
p.48.
24. Chirac, for instance, stated that the French must 'conserve in our own
hands the mainstays of the mastery of our destiny, with all the necessary
instruments for doing so', see Le Monde, 12 Apri11990.
25. Le Monde, 18 December 1985.
26. Ministere 'de Ia Defense, Un Nouveau dibat strategique (La Documentation
Fran~se, 1993), p. 8.
27. Perhaps the ultimate irony resides in the fact that Mitterrand himself,
during the debates over the motion of confidence arising from French
Anand Menon 167
withdrawal from NATO, had used exactly the same phrase to characterise
France's nascent defence posture. See Journal Officrel Dibats, Assemblee
Nationale, 14April,1966, pp.672-7.
28. See LeMcmde, 19-20June 1983.
29. Sc;e J. Guisnel, Les Generaux: enquete sur le pouvoir militaire en France
(Editions de Ia Decouverte, 1990), pp. 170-1. See also the article by
General Dubroca in Le Fzgaro, 19 September 1989. An interesting aspect
of this question of the complicity of certain groups with regard to
preserving the myth of 'consensus' is the degree to which such
complicity resulted from the very similar educational and social
backgrounds of France's elite, formed through the system of grandes
ecoles. For a discussion of this, see 'France' in S. McLean (ed.), How
Nuclear Weapom Decisions are Mad£ (Macmillan, 1987), pp. 155-7, p. 184;
F. Cailletuax, 'Elite selection in the French army officer corps', Armed
Forces and Society, 8 (2), Winter, 1982, pp. 257-74.
30. The tight links that existed between academic experts and policymakers
led to a certain loss of objectivity on the part of the former. See, for
instance, the amazing preface by P. Boniface and F. Hcisbourg, which is
simply a eulogy of Defence Minister Charles Hernu, in their La Puce, le.s
Hommes et Ia Bombe. L 'Europe face aux nouveaux difis technologiques
(Hachette, 1986). Both men had worked in the minister's cabineL
31. Ibid., pp. 234-5.
32. See Guisnel, Les Generaux, p. 173; D. Moisi and G. Flynn, 'Between
adjustment and ambition: Fr.tnco-Soviet relations and French foreign
policy', in G. F1ynn and R. Greene (eds), Tire Wl!ft and tire Suvia Union:
Polilics and Policy (Macmillan, 1990), p. 73; J. Howorth, 'The President
and Foreign and Defence policy' in J. Hayward (ed.), De Gaulle to
Mitterrand: presulential pawer in France (Hunt, 1993), pp. 182-3.
33. Michel Rocard, paraphrased in J .-M. Boucheron, RafJjxnt fait au nom de Ia
commission de Ia Difense Nationale et dl!5 forcl!f annks sur le projet de loi de
programmation (no. 733) relatif a lequijJe11Umt militaire 1990-1993, no. 897,
annexe au proces-verbal de Ia seance du 2 octcbre 1989, p. 721. In a similar
vein, Gaullist spokesman Fmm;:ois Filion accused the government of the
ultimate crime- risking a disintcgmtion of the 'consensus' by sacrificing
the coherence of French defence policy in order to make financial
savings. See ibid, p. 719.
34. P. Hassner, 'Un chef d'oeuvre en peril': le "consensus" fmn~ais 'sur Ia
defense', Esprit, 3-4, March-April1988, p. 74.
35. See Le Mcmde, 27-8 December 1992; 13 January 1993.
36. Liberation, 8 February 1989; Defence News, 13 February 1989. See also
T. R. Posner, Current French Security Policy: tire Gaullistlegacy (Greenwood
Press, 1991), p. 136.
37. Le Monde, 12 March 1993. Sec alsoP. Hassncr, 'Un chef-d'oeuvre en
peril', p. 78.
38. Shultz remarked at the end of a Nato meeting in 1983 that 'you are
constantly in the process of saying "the allies think such and such", and
then the French say "We agree with t11at, so tlmt's no problem, but that's
something the unified command did and we can't touch that." And t11en
you struggle around ... to weaken the point, and at the same time,
168 Tlw 'D.msensus' on Defence Policy and tlw End oftlw Cold War
protect the precision of the French view.' Cited in the New York Times, 12
June 1983.
39. lrukpendent, 28 November 1991.
40. Thierry de Montbrial, in his preface to F. Bozo, La France et l'OTAN: de la
guerrejroide au nouvel urdre europeen (Masson, 1991), p. 12.
41. For a different view on this question, see above,J. Howorth, pp. 17-38
42. See A Menon, 'From independence to cooperation'; J. Bryant, above,
pp. 79-92.
43. Le Mln'llk, 26 March 1993; 1 April 1993.
44. F. Filion, 'Dissuasion nucleaire et elargissement', in Ministere de la
Defense, Un NQUveau dihat, pp. 63-4.
45. On the links between the latter group and Jacques Chirac, see Guisnel,
Les Geniraux, pp. 60-1.
46. See above, S. Gregory, pp. 104-11.
47. Quotidien de Paris, 28 May 1993, 1 June 1993, 2June 1993; lndeperulmt, 31
May 1993.
48. Hence, Leotard declared that 'The Alliance must take on new missions.
France must understand this change and not allow others to define it', Le
Monde, 13 May 1993. In contrast, Roland Dumas, Foreign Minister
between 1988 and 1993, intimated that the Oslo meeting did not confer
new missions on the Alliance, reflecting the reluctance of the Socialists to
consider or ~ccept change. Sec 'Conscil Atlan~que, Intervention du
Ministre d'Etat', in Ministerc des Affaires Etrangeres, Questions
Politicos-Milililires: Prises de Positions Ricemts et Documents, 1992, p. 221.
49. Le Montie, 6 March 1993.
50. Le Montie, 3 September 1994.
51. Le Montie, 28 April 1994.
52. Le Montie, 6 March 1993.
53. Le Quotidien, 6 March 1994, my italics.
12 From the Cold War to
the Present Day: Labour
Unions and the Crisis of
'Models'
GuyGroux
That the Cold War deeply affected French trade unionism is undeniable.
Its effects in the 1950s and 1960s were all the more obvious since they
proceeded from a lasting historical situation related to the influence of
the 1917 Russian Revolution on the French labour movement. But with
the passing of time - from the start of the Cold War to the collapse of
the Eastern bloc - the imprint of th.e Soviet model on the various union
tendencies diminished in force, though it endured to varying degrees
through the 1980s. With the thawing of international relations and the
'peaceful coexistence' that came about during the 1960s, the French
labour movement - particularly its largest organisation, the
Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) -was inclined to search for
new directions, whether in the form of a 'specifically French socialist
model', Eurocommunism or the formation of a 'Europe of Labour
based on the dual principle of socialism and democracy'. Today, the
implosion of Soviet-style communism and the failure of the French Left
in the exercise of power from 1981 to 1993 have deeply unsettled labour
union orientations and the place they might occupy in the new world
order taking shape. In order to assess the current state of the labour
movement, its current problems must be resituated in a historical
perspective.
A FOUNDING HERITAGE: THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
A particularity of French trade unionism is that it is deeply divided.

Union pluralism is mainly ideological in origin. It relates to the
enormous reverberation, following the First World War, that the Soviet
Revolution had on European labour movements and more specifically
to the very keen interest certain Bolshevik leaders showed in French
169
170 From the Cold War to the Prosent Day
unionism.• The French labour movement had been founded on a

charter - the Charter of Amiens - that postulated its independence
with respect to political parties and established it as a sole
organisational entity. Until the First World War, the original CGT
represented the entire political spectrum - anarchist, reformist,
socialist-revolutionary and Marxist - that existed within the worker
movement As early as 1921, Leon Trotsky, in a letter addressed to CGT
official Pierre Monatte, challenged the wisdom of the Charter of
Amiens. To him:
the value of this document is historically limited. Since then there

has been the war; the Russia of the Soviets has been founded. An
immense revolutionary wave has swept over all of Europe; the Third
International has grown and developed; former unionists and
former social-democrats have split into three antagonistic factions.
Enormous new questions stand before us ... The Charter of Amiens
does not contain the answers. 2
In September, a manifesto was published in favour of creating a

revolutionary new body, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT)
and affiliating it to the Red International of Labour Unions headed by
Losovski. Ten trade or industry federations and sixteen local unions
joined. The reformists condemned the initiative. At its 1920 Congress
in Tours, the French Socialist Party split and the Communist current
emerged as the dominant force. Not wanting to undergo a similar fate,
the reformist trend broke away from the organisations within the CGT
that advocated a revolutionary trade unionism. From then on, except
for brief periods of reunification, two CGTs coexisted: a social-democrat
CGT and a Marxist CGT.
The 1921-2 division of the CGT is not the only illustration of the
effects of the Bolshevik Revolution on trade unionism. The years 1919-20
were marked by serious social strife. The strike movement - one of the
largest ever known in France - spread and grew more radical,
sporadically taking on political and revolutionary aspects. It is in
this context that the Confederation Frant;:aise des Travailleurs Chretiens
(CITC) was founded. It promoted a policy of class collaboration, and
drew its inspiration from the principle of social Catholicism and the
Rerum Nooarum encyclical, so as to distinguish itself from the secular -
reformist and Marxist - currents dominated by the CGT. Above all, it
was opposed to any idea of socialism, for good reason: the rise of
Guy Groux 171
Christian unionism was intended mainly to counter the Bolshevik

Revolution and its political as well as ideological influence on workers.
Thus the Bolshevik Revolution remains at the origin of union
pluralism and the underlying ideological divisions that subsist today.
THE COLD WAR PERIOD

With the Cold War, the tensions within French labour unionism
reached an unprecedented pitch. During the German occupation,
Communists and reformists in the CGT, driven underground, once
again drew closer: the Perreux accord of 17 April 1943 marked the
rebirth of a unified CGT. But once France was liberated, and after a
period during which all unions participated together in the 'National
Reconstruction Effort', and the movement of political union
encouraged by General de Gaulle, crisis again brewed. Strikes began to
break out in 1946, gaining momentum in 1947 and spreading
considerably. In France this strike movement coincided with the
profound upheavals shaking all of central Europe (Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Hungary, the Greek civil war, etc.), and hence the beginning of
the Cold War. Called mainly by revolutionary unionists, the conflicts
were long ones and often characterised by violence. Jules Mach,
Socialist Interior Minister, consequently saw the movement as having
insurrectional motives, aiming to overthrow the government by illegal
means. Former labour union official Pierre Monatte referred to them
as 'Molotov strikes' .5
Whatever the real political intentions of the strike movement
initiated by the revolutionary activists( the situation led to another
union split. Reformists opposed to the direction taken by the 1947
strikes united in a new organisation, Force Ouvriere (FO). Unionists
close to the French Communist Party (PCF) maintained their
ascendancy over the CGT. The beginnings of the Cold War and the
1947 split thus basically moulded the contemporary union spectrum.
But the war of 1939-45 had transformed the distribution of power
among the main labour movement tendencies. The role played by the
Communists in the struggle against Nazi occupation considerably
strengthened their influence on labour unionism. 5 Until the end of the
1930s, the Marxist current had remained a minority alongside the
reformists led by Leon Jouhaux. After the Liberation, revolutionary
unionism grouped a large majority of org-,misations - federations and
unions alike - involved in protest actions. And its weight was reinforced
by the part it played in the industrial nationalisation policies devised
172 From the Cold War to the Present Day
after the war. The newly nationalised enterprises in key industrial

sectors - automobiles, energy and electricity, coal, mining and railways
-often served as strongholds for revolutionary unionism.
In reality, the tendency sympathetic to the PCF was not only in the
majority, the CGT being by far and for a long time the most firmly
established organisation in industry, with the most structured network
of militants and the union that scored the most votes among
wage-earners in company elections; it also assumed a hegemonic role on an
ideological leveL It was a hegemony in the sense intended by Antonio
Gramsci, the positions of the CGT constituting, within the labour
movement, a central axis with respect to which the reformist
organisations - FO or the Christian unions - were often obliged to
position themselves. The revolutionary CGT exercised its hegemony in
the realm of the most classic marxist postulates, such as the primacy of
conflict over negotiation, the identification of capitalistic exploitation
as a vector of union action, the necessity of political outlets for union
battles, the affirmation of the basic nature of class struggle or the
relation between unions and political parties as they were decreed by
Lenin.6 International or more (purely) ideological matters hinging on
the existence of the USSR, also affected the positions of the
revolutionary CGT. 7 These had to do with union organisation on a
supranational level, the CGT having begun to play a crucial role in the
World Federation ofTrade Unions (WFTU) which, after the departure
of Anglo-Saxon labour unions, had emerged as the central labour
authority in eastern Europe. They promoted opposition by all
revolutionary unionists to any Western initiative, including the Marshall
Plan, the building of NATO or the creation of the Federal Republic of
Germany. For CGT members, they also implied, early on, a resolute
struggle in support of anti-colonial wars that erupted as early as 1948 in
Indochina and later North Africa, particularly in Algeria. Regarding the
premises on which the European Economic Community was to be built
- the European Coal and Steel Community was formed in the early
1950s- the CGT leadership adopted a severely critical stance, and
regarded the building of a 'Western Europe' as an attempt to foster
'German revanchism' and form a bloc on the continent that was meant
to challenge the economic, political and military balances reached at
the Yalta Conference.
Last, the USSR's existence was not only viewed as simply a fact of
international politics. It also embodied a political and indeed a
theoretical model. For the CGT, the USSR was the most accomplished
form of socialism and displayed its various attributes such as planning,
Guy Groux 173
nationalisations, the central role of the State and the party, 'the
scientific and technical revolution'. The Soviet model especially proved
all the more momentous, since for revolutionary union activists, a
universal experiment with socialism was underway involving not only
eastern Europe, but China, Yugoslavia, Cuba - and France next? - that
sprung entirely from the guidelines and principles set forth by the
October Revolution.
Thus during the Cold War, the themes dealt with by the CGT were
particularly wide- ranging. Reaching beyond the exploitation of capital
and labour, it also opposed the military and political dimensions of the
Western bloc. It adopted positions on North-South relations, colonial
struggles and the creation of a new geopolitical entity in western
Europe (the European Economic Community (EEC)). It participated
in international labour organisation based on the state labour unions in
Communist countries and thereby contributed to the project of
building international socialism. The CGT's positions were not merely
rhetorical and mobilised large numbers of people. For example, the
work stoppages against 'the risks of counter-revolution in Czecho-
slovakia' that occurred at the end of the 1940s in certain major
nationalised companiesR were only the beginning of a long series of
struggles, such as the demonstrations against General Ridgway,9 the
Indochina independence movements, then the movement for peace in
Algeria and later Vietnam. 10
In reaction to the CGT initiatives, the reformist unions adopted
positions that were often purely defensive. They rarely anticipated a
situation. For example, following the CGT's decision to join the WFTU,
the reformists of FO, playing follow-my-leader to the British and
American labour unions, joined the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions. 11 In reaction to the CGT's denunciation of the
Marshall Plan, the reformist unions took part in the 'productivity
missions' (missions de productivite1 in the United States. These grew out
of a political desire for economic cooperation but were n~t a union
initiative. Many reformist unions were also content to view anticlerical
struggles and national liberation movements as an example of the
Communist International stronghold, thereby compromising the
future of relations between the North and the newly independent
countries of the South. Faced with the CGT's hostility toward building
the EEC, FO and the CFTC advocated a stance founded more on
humanist and economic considerations - maintaining peace and
cooperation in western Europe - than on authentically political and
historical principles.
The hegemony of the CGT was therefore particularly strong on a

number of levels and was thus instrumental in shaping the ideological
mindset specific to the working class.
'TilE 1WO IRONS IN THE FIRE' AND THE FRENCH LEFT'S BID
FOR AUTONOMY
The overdetermination of the Soviet model on French labour

unionism obviously persisted a long time. In the 1980s, the CGT's
positions regarding the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan or 'Solidarity'
in Poland still echoed attitudes of the past, even if their expression was
more muted. For CGT activists, the world was still split into two blocs.
As a Spring 1980 publication emanating from the CGT leadership
explained: 'Basically, class struggle on a global scale ... pits the forces of
progress, the working class in various capitalist countries, socialism as it
currently exists and national liberation movements, [against]
imperialism' .1 2
Yet reference to the Soviet model had lost much of its impact several
years before. In the late 1960s to early 1970s, the prospect of the Left
coming to power modified the ideological representations of
revolutionary unionism. Though solidarity with existing socialist
countries did not waver, the search for a specific French version, a
'French-style socialism', was gradually taking shape. This was due to
several factors. On the international level, the return to power of
Gaullism was characterised by a policy rejecting the two blocs that
quickly gained popularity, even among the categories usually most
influenced by unionism. Among the working class the USSR was losing
its attraction. Economic and other shortages that in many respects were
characteristic of it resulted in a serious deterioration in the Soviet
model. French society had reached the stage of mass consumerism.
Capitalism could no longer be defined merely as the exploitation of
capital gains in the labour sphere alone. The worker was no longer at
the crux of the economic system but had become a consumer as well.
From that moment on, every political project thus had to take into
account not only the sphere of production but also the market sphere."
Lastly, the May 1968 movement in its own way rehabilitated a certain
utopian vision specific to French socialism in the nineteenth century,
and provided a radical critique of any overly centralised process in the
march toward socialism.
It was in this context that a major reshuffling of the forces of the Left
Guy Growe 175
occurred, which also affected the main labour organisations. The

Confederation Franr;aise Democratique du Travail (CFDT), which was
born of a split with the CFTC in 1964, began to promote a project
advocating socialism, democracy and autogestion (self-management). A
common programme of government was signed by the Socialist Party,
the PCF, and the Left Radical Movement (MRG) in 1972. It placed the
primacy, legitimacy and incontrovertible nature of universal suffrage at
the very centre of political change. In the mid-1970s, the French, Italian
and Spanish Communist parties founded a EuroCommunist project,
the particular feature of which was a move away from the Soviet model
by the definition of roads to achieve socialism which were specific to
developed capitalist countries and which would function according to
democratic principles. The CGT WdS also affected, as it broke away from
the centralising vision that had characterised its social blueprint and its
vision for socialism, and in 1977 adopted the principle of autogestion,
thus moving closer to the CFDT.
At the time, the CGT's support for various restructurings of the
French Left, as well as its support for autogestion, was part of a long
movement that shaped the evolution of revolutionary unionist thought
in France and, more generally, the development of Communist
ideology, to which it is linked. Until the mid-1930s, the takeover of
political power by progressive forces rested on the principle of class
struggle and implied - almost necessarily - a direct confrontation with
the bourgeoisie, in other words, civil war. During the Second World
War, visions of accession to power altered. The fall of the French
bourgeoisie did not have to (or no longer had to) come about
necessarily through civil war. Rather, it would occur with the advance of
Soviet troops, the Red Army, in its fight against nazism and the various
national regimes - including Vichy - that supported it. 14 In the 1960s,
exporting the Soviet model by military means or by the Cold War was
no longer fashionable; socialism was to be achieved -after the example
of Allende's Chile, which deeply affected the French Left, Communist
or not - through democratic means. Behind the idea of French-style
socialism there thus emerged a movement emphasising the need for a
profound transformation in social relations based on the Plan, the
acceptance of market mechanisms, the role of the welfare state and the
respect of democratic law. Certainly the ideological reshuffling of the
French Left ran into occasionally serious handicaps. In 1977, a rift in
the Socialist Party-PCF common programme was already apparent.
Eurocommunism was no more than a memory of an ephemeral
moment in history. And yet, it was in the name of the same principles
that had guided the renovation of the Left that a Socialist Party-PCF
coalition came to power with the election of Franf;ois Mitterrand to the
presidency in 1981.
THE USSR AND THE FRENCH LEFT: A DOUBLE FAILURE
At the end of the 1980s, the two systems of reference that had shaped
the ideological perceptions and practices of revolutionary unionism
and, as an indirect consequence, of the reformist unions, crumbled. In
1989, the collapse of the Berlin wall and its consequences in eastern
Europe were not sufficient to conceal the French Left's failure in power
(1981-93). This was not only a failure at the polls, but was also a failure
regarding substantive aspects of the Left's programme. Faithful to its
tradition, the Left based itself on an economic policy of recovery
through consumption to boost employment. In 1983-4, in a move
unheard of since the end of the Second World War, the Left put an end
to wage and price controls. In 1981, nearly 1.5 million were
unemployed; in 1993, the Left was removed from power leaving over 3
million unemployed, while forms of temporary employment continued
to develop on a large scale. Both the Socialist Party and the PCF sought
to create an enterprising citizenry within which unions would gain
greater legitimacy. However, the vc1rious Auroux laws15 were unable to
check the decline of union membership which beg-an in the mid-1970s.
Between the mid-1920s and the mid-1990s, the main labour
org-misations lost between 50 and 70 per cent of their members. As to
union rights, they were subjected to the full effects of the economic
crisis; in 1978, under Raymond Barre's conservative government, the
number of major union representatives dismissed on economic
grounds was 3,254 (of whom 2,351 were CGT representatives); in 1988,
the year of Franf;ois Mitterrand's reelection, the figure reached 3,465
(including 1,851 CGT members). As to certain highly symbolic
measures such as 'workers' rights to free speech in the company', they
have now either become obsolete or - less frequently - have been
incorporated into the company's management policy (quality circles,
for instance).
From 1981 to 1993, the welfare state also experienced a serious
decline. It has become increasingly incentive-oriented and its role has
reduced considerably from a juridical standpoint, with the state at times
simply standing on the sidelines during the bargaining process. 16 In
addition to the decline of government regulation in social matters,
Guy Groux 177
there were also threats to the various social protection systems involving
unemployment, health and retirement All in all, the Left's practices -
especially from 1988-9 on - led to a form of monetarism akin to the
most classic liberal policies. Cutbacks in programmes to maintain
employment and in policies to uphold purchasing power and the role
of the welfare state, practices favouring capital gains and an incapacity
to strengthen the role of labour unions in business are thus all features
of the Left's experience in power.
In sum, against the background of the latent crisis that for years
affected Soviet-style socialism, the French Left attempted to invent an
alternative that would link tradition and modernity. It is this very
alternative that today seems to be in crisis, leaving considerable latitude
for what some term, rightly or wrongly, the New World Order.
THE PRESENT DAY: THE END OF POLITICAL UNIONISM?
It is in a dual context- the failure of the French Left in power and the
failure of the Eastern bloc - that the attempts to reconstruct labour
unionism can be understood today. These endeavours nevertheless
have major obstacles to overcome. The weakness of the labour unions -
altogether the main organisations amount to only 8 to 10 per cent of
the work force - hinders any attempt to redesign a programme.
Moreover, for a large proportion of public opinion, the unions are still
seen as having been a party to the failures of the Left, as their demands
inspired many of the Socialist Party's and the PCF's social programmes
in the early 1970s to the 1980s (programmes of industrial revival,
democratisation ofindustrial relations, etc.).
The CGT is perhaps the union that has suffered the most in the
current economic crisis, though it is still the most powerful
organisation. Doubtless it remains faithful to a critical appraisal of
capitalism, but its discourse has lost much of the doctrinal and political
substance that characterised it in the past. Less and less reference is
made to a social blueprint. The CGT denounces the excesses of
liberalism rather than the nature of the system. In reaction to the
masses being excluded from the labour market (due to unemployment
or unstable employment), the CGT proposes a return to state
intervention. The Marxist postulates that inspired it until the fall of the
Berlin wall no longer dictate its positions and discourse as clearly. Often
it confines itself to defending basic Keynesian principles and - as
though nothing had happened during the 1980s- calls for a
178 F'f'Om tluJ Cold War to tluJ Pmsent Day
full-employment policy through wage increases, increased

consumption, greater government regulation and a more broadly·
based system of social protection.
For a long time FO was motivated by virulent anti-communism, its
leaders positioning themselves as the guarantors of free labour
unionism in the face of threats from the East or from the PCF and the
CGT in France. Having been dispossessed of one of its main historical
functions, FO now restricts itself to defending rights achieved, and the
issues it emphasises seem faintly to echo the CGT's Keynesian
approach.
Regarding the CFDT, the changes are more clear-cut. Derived from
Christian unionism, the CFDT became secular in 1964, then grew
radical with the May 1968 movement. As previously noted, it adopted
autogrtstion at its 1970 Congress, espousing the notion of class struggle.
Having taken stock of the Left's various failures at the polls during the
1970s, the CFDT shifted toward the 'centre' at its 1979 Congress in
Brest. For the CFDT, it was a matter of reviving union practices that
were more remote from the political sphere, giving primacy to
negotiation over conflict, basing their demands on economic realism
even if the ideological postulates that guided it in the post-1968 era -
socialism, autogestion - were still on the agenda. With the crisis of
socialism, the CFDT made a major ideological shift. In 1988, at the
Strasbourg Congress, it renounced the notion of autogestion as a
cornerstone of a social blueprint. Later in the same year it also
abandoned all reference to socialism, and, at the 1992 Congress, it
explicitly accepted the market economy. The CFDT did not of course
rally unconditionally to pure economic liberalism. It supports the
emergence of capitalism with a 'social face', a 'social market economy,'
a notion it shares with Jacques Moreau, who assisted Jacques Delors at
the head of the European Commission, but also with certain currents
of the Socialist Party. Furthermore, the CFDT is heavily committed to
the building of Europe, and its role in the European Trades Union
Confederation (ETUC), in favour of implementing a social dimension
within the EU that could counterbalance the 'single market', is
well-known. In fact, the CFDT's orientation - shared partly by
organisations like the German DGB - lead to a form of labour
unionism that accompanies rather than challenges the economic
system. It implies a social accommodation with liberalism, rather than a
demand for in-depth reform of economic structures.
The dual crisis of socialism - socialism in eastern Europe, socialism
in France - was thus accompanied by a profound crisis in union
Guy Growe 179
ideologies. The programmes drawn up by labour organisations are

remarkable for their minimalism, whether they aspire to a form of
accommodation, or strive against all odds to perpetuate a form of
protest unionism now devoid of any global perspective. With the notion
of socialism in crisis, this may be one of the distinctive features of
French industrial relations that has gradually vanished, the
politicisation of union practices having long been a feature of
'l'exception fran~aise'. In the context of the Cold War, the CGT was
able to play a prominent role in France and on the international stage.
In the present context, with a 'New World Order' in the making,
French unions have lost out, both politically and ideologically.
Notes
1. The interest the first Soviet leaders had in France lay in the fact that they
saw the French Revolution of 1789, the 1818 insurrection, and later the
Paris Commune in 1871 as constituting major historical events. Marx had
already attached great importance to the 'class struggle' in
nineteenth-century Fr.mce.
2. G. Lefranc, Le mouvement syndical sous Ia me Republique (l'ayot, 1967),
p.253.
3. P. Monatte, Trois scissions syndicates (Editions ouvrii:res, 1958), p. 176.
4. Some, such as Lefranc, do not believe that the 1947 strikes aimed directly
at violently overthrowing the government.
5. S. Courtois, Le PQi' dans Ia guerre. De Gaulle, Ia Resistance, Staline (Ramsay,
1980).
6. G. Groux, 'French industrial relations from crisis to today', in]. Howorth
and G. Ross (eds), ContemfJOrary France (Pinter, 1989), pp. 52-70.
7. Describing the evolution of Communist unionism from the Liberation to
the beginning of the Cold War, A. Rossi notes:
The triumphant march of Communist unionism was able to start afresh

first by rallying behind the French tricolour, replacing the red flags that
had been momentarily stored away. Then, around 1946, with a new
watershed in Soviet foreign policy, red flags were ag-.tin brought out and
hoisted, once the benefits of the first substitution tactic had been fully
exhausted.
A Rossi, Les cahiers du bokheuisme pendant Ia campag;TU~l939-1940. Molotov,
Dimitruv, Thmez, Marty (Editions Dominique Wapler, 1951), p. L.
8. G. Groux and R. Mouriaux, La CG1; Crises et alternatives (Economica,
1992), p. 187.
9. General Ridgway was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of NATO in
1952. His arrival in Rome to take up his post was greeted with large-scale
demonstrations, one of which resulted in the imprisonment of Jacques
Duclos, the leader of the PCF.
10. In 1961, a demonstrcttion for peace in Algeria was organised in Paris; it
was severely put down in the working·dass district of Charonne. All of the
nine demonstrators killed belonged either to the CGT or PCF.
11. The Christian unions at the time stayed with the World Labour
Confederation.
12. CCN report, 16June 1980.
13. Of all the established political forces, it was the Parti Socialist Unifie
(PSU) which went the furthest in the 1960s in exploring the implications
linking 'socialism and consumption'. Originally the situationists were the
most innovative in this field, but on a much more critical, theoretical,
even abstract level.
14. S. Courtois, LePC.Fdans laguerre, pp.460-l.
15. Named after Labour Minister Jean Auroux, who served in the first
Socialist and Communist cabinet under Pierre Mauroy (1981-4).
16. G. Groux, 'De l'interventionnisme etatique au "nouvel echange
politique" ', paper given at conference on 'A France of pluralism and
consensus? Changing balances in state and society' at Columbia and New
York Universities, October 1987.
13 Gaullism and the New
World Order
Peter Fysh
The attraction of the Gaullists• as a subject of study in this context is

obvious; they lay claim to the heritage of a statesman whose philosophy
seems to have been strikingly vindicated by recent upheavals, who
regarded nations as the motor force of history and refused to believe in
the permanence of ideological systems which ignored them, who would
not allow French diplomacy to be shaped entirely by East-West
confrontation and who insisted on an intergovernmental rather than a
supranational pattern of decision-making in the European Community.
At times in the last six years various Gaullists have tried to revive
different parts of this tradition, revealing how it clashed with the
constraints of domestic politics accumulated during thirty years of the
Cold War. But not all of the internal conflict of the period 1989-95 is
based on genuine policy differences. From the second half of 1994
onwards, there was an unholy row within the party about whether the
sitting Prime Minister or the party president should be its candidate in
the 1995 presidential election (which occurred after this book went to
press). In this paper it will be argued that although the range of choices
and challenges opened up in foreign and defence policy by the collapse
of Stalinism initially met with multiple and apparently contradictory
Gaullist responses, this source of disunity has now been largely
overcome. Instead, Prime Minister Edouard Balladur came increasingly
under attack on economic and social policies, at first from Philippe
SCguin, speaker of the National Assembly, then more and more openly
by the party leader Jacques Chirac. Ambition, misunderstanding,
betrayal played their usual parts in the protagonists' determination to
disagree with each other, but the 'New World Order' provides a useful
analytical framework for their ideas here also, given the degree to which
domestic policy is constrained by the issue of progress towards ever
closer European Union, and given Seguin's call for a completely new set
of rules governing international trade.
181
182 Gaullism and the New World Order
GEOPOUTICAL ISSUES: CONFUSION AND DISAGREEMENT
In the geopolitical dimension there were four main issues on which the
Gaullists had to reassess or update their policies in view of the new
strategic context: the Franco-German relationship progress towards
European Union, American security leadership and French nuclear
doctrine. Although all of them provoked a degree of confusion and
disagreement, it is suggested here that a number of factors - among
them the convergence of American and Gaullist policy towards Europe
-are likely to contribute to a muting of party disputes on foreign policy
in the next few years.
German reunification stimulated the RPR president jacques Chirac's
unfortunate tendency to rush into print before events had matured.
After Honecker had fallen from power in the CDR, but while Krenz was
still clinging to it, he argued that rapid progress towards European
political union was more necessary than ever in order to 'tie in'
Germany and head off the danger that she might seek a closer
relationship with the newly independent countries of central Europe. 2
With a perhaps sharper perception of the fact that the EC had been
conceived in and structured by the Cold War, former Finance Minister
Edouard Balladur believed that German unity 'changed completely'
the options for the Europe of Twelve, implying slower than envisaged
moves towards political union, just as alliance strategy would probably
require France to move closer to the USA and UK~ Former ministers
Charles Pasqua and Philippe Seguin drew even more dramatic
conclusions from the upheaval in the east. Arguing that 'the political
rationality for a Europe of Twelve collapsed along with the Berlin Wall',
Pasqua sketched his own dr.Ut political architecture of the new Europe:
immediate admission of Czechoslavakia and Hungary to the EC and
signature of a new treaty creating a 'European Confederation' by all the
European nations which had broken with totalitarianism. In defence of
his vision he cited the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, for whom
the criterion of economic preparedness alone would not have g-.aincd
entry to the EC club. However, their economics had made the
necessary adjustments, which showed that 'political will-power' could
'precede and induce' economic dcvelopment. 4 For Seguin, more
prosaically, it was 'perfectly natural that Germany, in her position and
with the means at her disposal, will not renounce her sovereignty unless
she dominates the new (European) structures and certainly not if she is
to be made subordinate to them'. France ought therefore to strengthen
her links with southern Europe and the UK or risk being reduced to a
PeterPjsh 183
supporting role in a Europe dominated economically by Germany and

militarily by the USSR. 5
By 1991-2, Chirac and Balladur had swallowed their misgivings and
were addressing the debate on progress to European Union which had
always been planned to follow the completion of the internal market
since before the Wall came crashing down. With general-secretary Alain
Juppe they approached the Maastricht debate with a shopping list of
demands reflecting traditional Gaullist intergovernmentalism. They
opposed the single currency, allegedly likely to destroy French
sovereignty in economic affairs, but endorsed a 'common' currency,
which could circulate throughout the Community alongside national
ones.6 They favoured increasing the Parliament's powers of control over
the Community budget and expenditure, and suggested a second
chamber made up of delegations from national parliaments. To
improve the speed and quality of decision-making the party wanted to
boost the status and authority of the European Council, the
Community's 'embryo government', by abandoning the rotating
six-month presidency in favour of an elective two-year one.
Unfortunately for party unity, the reforms proposed in the draft treaty
met none of the Gaullist demands, reflecting instead the federalist
leaning of Commission Presidentjacques Delors. Although most of the
treaty was unacceptable to them, the Gaullist leaders were mindful of
the need to preserve a common front with the pro-European UDF.
Playing down the 'historic' billing given it by more ardent europhiles,
they defended the treaty as 1ust another step' along a familiar road: the
pursuit of French interests by means of the progressive pooling of
sovereignty as changing world conditions made it desirable and
possible.'
As is now well known, seguin and Pasqua led the national campaign
against ratification and against their own leaders, stressing the threat to
French sovereignty posed by the single currency and scorning the
notions of common diplomacy and common defence.8 Their campaign
produced the most serious split in the party for twenty years. Fifty-eight
of the 126-strong parliamentary party supported seguin's attempt to
have the treaty ruled unconstitutional. Many others - including even
Chirac and Juppe - agreed with him privately but preferred not to say
so for fear of jeopardising the carefully-nurtured common front with
theUDF.
Party unity was under rather less strain during the Gulf War. The
former president's son, Admiral Philippe de Gaulle - an RPR Senator
- and his long-time Foreign Secretary, Couve de Murville, protested at
184 GauUism and the New World Order
the deployment of French troops under American command. Both

Michel Jobert, Pompidou's former foreign minister, and Alain
Carignon the RPR mayor of Grenoble, denounced the hypocrisy of the
United Nations' refusal to back up by force a string of previous
resolutions against Israeli cross-border incursions. Others bemoaned
the liquidation of traditional Gaullist friendship with the Arab world.
But these were isolated voices; the Gaullist parliamentarians, including
Pasqua and SCguin, supported the government almost without demur,
reflecting both the extent to which they had abandoned de Gaulle's
anti-Americanism and their belief that the United Nations is an
appropriate body to legitimise such international police actions.
Nevertheless the Gulf War stimulated a serious rethink on the
French Right about national defence policy. Military operations
themselves revealed the parlous state of French non-nuclear forces; 9
this, combined with the replacement of the Soviet threat by the
apparent emergence of other kinds of threat from 'the South' rather
than the East, induced leading Gaullists, among others, to begin
arguing for a re-orientation of defence resources towards conventional
rearmament and away from the nuclear deterrent, for three decades
the symbolic guarantee of both French and Gaullist identity. As long as
the only serious threat to French citizens had seemed to come from the
overrunning of western Europe by Soviet conventional forces, there was
some logic in placing ultimate reliance on the unilateral nuclear
deterrent. Saddam Hussein's tactics in the Gulf war, however, now
demonstrated that the nuclear option might not be an adequate
defence against the unaccountable head of an undemocratic regime
armed with ballistic missiles and possibly chemical warheads who was
unmoved by the suffering which could be inflicted on his own civilian
population. 10 Effective defence of French interests might in future
require the ability to deploy highly trained conventional forces large
distances at short notice to deal with such threats.
From this realisation, three ideas rapidly became almost
axiomatic within the RPR, while three points of controversy remained.
Firstly, it was accepted that the French nuclear deterrent no longer
required three means of delivery (land, sea and air); in future, only two
would be enough. Secondly, urgent attention needed to be given to the
systems which can guarantee rapid intervention overseas:
intelligence-gathering hardware (preferably in space) and command
and communications systems. 11 Thirdly, France needed a smaller and
more economical professional army, with retention of national service
mainly for social tasks or civil defence. 12 Argument continued over
Peter]ijsh 185
three questions; which missile delivery system should be retained

alongside the submarines - air-launched or ground-launched? Should
France develop a space-based anti-missile defence system? Should
nuclear tests- suspended by Mitterrand in April 1992- be resumed? 15
For Chirac, all this has meant a reversal of policies he had only
recently defended. In May 1990, in a speech to defence experts, he put
the accent on nuclear updating, calling for the development of a new
ground-ground mobile missile to replace existing fixed silos, as well as a
new long-range air-ground system which he hoped would be developed
with the UK. When the Gulf crisis blew up a few weeks later he switched
emphasis, calling for the speeding up of work on a new aircraft carrier
and for more long-range air-transport capacity. 14 Seguin and Pasqua
were here again in the vanguard of new thinking. Ever the iconoclast,
Pasqua foresaw an army of 'several tens of thousands', conscription
replaced by a national guard of young men and women, and a halt in
the development of new missile delivery systems, too often driven
simply by technical progress,.5
The Gulf crisis had also convinced many that it was time once and
for all to clear up France's ambiguous position within NATO- not part
of the military command structure but fully accepting her partners'
political goals. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war
confirmed, however, that there was no credible common institution
through which France and her European allies could co-ordinate a
European military response to such crises. The scene of operations was
outside the NATO theatre; not all of the Twelve were members of the
Western European Union (WEU), a possible alternative umbrella;
Germany, a WEU member, could not operate outside the NATO area.
While maintaining commitment to NATO Gaullist leaders repeatedly
called for the creation of a vaguely defined 'European pole' of defence;
Chirac usually implied that such a pole, of which the embryo was the
WEU, would somehow eventually replace NATO as the organisation
responsible at least for defending Europe! 6 Balladur and party defence
spokesman Fran~ois Filion more realistically pointed to the strength of
the other European members' attachment to NAT0,. 7 For about two
years the party seemed to skirt round the question without resolving it.
Since March 1993, however, the internal conflict and uncertainty which
dogged the RPR in these matters immediately after the collapse of the
Soviet bloc has largely dissipated.
186 Gaullism and th£ New World Order
MARCH 1993- TOWARDS FOREIGN POUCY UNI1Y
The first reason for this is electoral victory and the return to power.
Accepting the post of Interior Minister offered him by Balladur, Pasqua
turned his attention to new legislation on immigration, citizenship, the
right of asylum and regional development, speaking out less on
European or defence issues. Fr.m~;ois Filion published his last article in
Le Monde calling for defence reforms on 5 March, 1993, two weeks
before he was installed as Minister for Higher Education. seguin did
not seek a place in government; instead he had himself elected as
Speaker of the National Assembly- a position from which he continues
to make speeches on Europe, but these are of far less concern to Prime
Minister Balladur than his attacks on government economic policy. The
turn taken in the development of the European Union itself is another
reason why we should expect less tension between RPR members of
slightly divergent views. The currency crisis of August 1993, while it left
the EMS technically intact and did not prevent the opening of the
European Monetary Institute on schedule on 1 January 1994,
nevertheless dented the credibility of the Delors timetable towards
monetary union by 1997-9. Delors himself has been suggesting with
increasing pessimism that the European Union is tending to become
more and more just a free tmde zone, with no spirit and no sense of
solidarity. The choice of a political lightweight, Jacques Santer, as his
successor as Commission President, is taken as a sign of the likely
effacement of the supranational character of the Union's institutions.
All these developments will of course be welcomed by Pasqua and
seguin, but they are not a great source of displeasure either to Balladur
or to Chirac, whose initial position in the Maastricht debate was one of
hostility to a single currency and supranationalism. Opinion polls and
the result of the 1994 European elections in France have confirmed
that opinion has swung against a closer union - a factor which should
weaken the position of the UDF and make it easier for the RPR to
defend its own positions in coalition barg-aining.
The inner-party discussion on the size, structure and 'posture' of
French armed forces was adjourned for a mixture of institutional and
political reasons. In a situation of institutional cohabitation, in which
Prime Minister Balladur shares responsibility for foreign policy with a
Socialist President, it is more or less impossible for any RPR member to
attack either the government, under pain of the accusation of letting
his own side down, or the President, for fear of provoking a
constitutional 'incident' which might also risk rebounding against his
PeterFysh 187
own party. Politically, the debate was halted by Balladur's decision to

appoint a commission of experts whose White Paper, published in
February 1994, was passed as a loi tk programmation militaire (LPM) in
the summer. 18 The chief Gaullist objections raised in parliamentary
debate related to the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear
testing, which some deputies criticised as inevitably casting doubt over
the efficiency and the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. 19 For the rest,
the White Paper and LPM, by 'officially' recognising a new
international situation in which there is no longer a direct threat to vital
French interests close to France's own borders, but in which there is a
high risk of more distant conflicts which might jeopardise her
'strategic' interests, has given satisfaction to those party members who
were calling for a reorientation of resources from nuclear to
conventional. But that is not all, for the White Paper has also achieved a
small revolution by taking a clear view on the nagging question of the
future role of NATO and French participation in its command
structures. While accepting that the Alliance and the American
presence in Europe should remain, the document speaks of a new
strategic context and new missions which might involve peace-keeping
or humanitarian tasks; given the French policy of active participation in
such missions, it is now accepted that France will participate in NATO
committees when French forces and interests are involved.
It would be somewhat against the spirit of the Fifth Republic for a
future Gaullist president to reverse a bipartisan policy largely based on
the report of a prestigious committee of experts. Even without this
constraint, however, there are grounds for assuming a long-term
convergence of Gaullist and American policy in respect of the Euro-
pean security framework. The fundamental doctrinal incompatibility
between Gaullist 'immediate maximum retaliation' and NATO
'graduated response' which fuelled much of the Franco-American
conflict within the Alliance has disappeared with the threat of Soviet
conventional attack which the graduated response was intended to
meet. 20 Commentators have noted that the Clinton administration, with
its plan to reduce troop levels in Europe to 100,000, is willing to give
more scope to a clearer European identity within NATO councils than
the Bush team which it replaced. French and American recognition of
the future variegated tasks of the Alliance have also led them to start
planning the sort of Combined Task Forces which could carry them
out, as often as not under European command. 21 Finally, regarding the
enlargement of NATO, the 1994 White Paper specifically recommends
avoiding the reconstitution of antagonistic blocs, favouring instead the
development of a security fmmework including Russia. The desire not

to exclude Russia is one of the key reasons given by the USA at present
for its unwillingness simply to move the old bloc-demarcation line to
the East by opening NATO membership immediately to all the
countries of central Europe which want to join. A Gaullist partisan of
'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' could hardly disagree. Even if it
is still not clear when new members could join, American and French
strategic policy for Europe seems for the moment to be on a
convergent track.
A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER?
The New World Order has seen senior Gaullists more or less
unanimously accept the limitations on sovereignty implied by
participation in multinational military planning and deployment, yet
the transfers of sovereignty involved in European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) have been much more damaging to party
unity. The discipline imposed by shadowing West German monetary
policy seemed unproblematic as long as the Federal Republic's
economy was a model of low inflation but impossibly irksome - to some
at least - when the inflationary pressures arising from unification led
the Bundesbank to mise interest mtes. Other constraints on national
sovereignty in economic policy-making have become more apparent
simultaneously. One author has linked intensified competition in world
markets with the disappearance of the Soviet bloc, arguing that Cold
War rivalry with the USSR led the West sometimes to suppress its own
internal conflicts- which are now given freer reign. 22 More concretely,
an inevitable shrinking of non-economic trade barriers is implied by
the extension in scope of a number of international economic
organisations: virtually all countries now belong to the IMF and the
World Bank; the OECD, so long the rich nations' 'club', is admitting
Mexico, and may admit central European applicants; and a score of
developing and central European countries have joined the GATT
since the start of the Uruguay Round in 1987;2~ while this latter did not
directly affect the issues at stake in the acrimonious Franco-American
confrontation during 1993 in the final stages of the Round, their
adhesion left the principal actors in no doubt of the more intense
competition to be expected in all markets.
While it has recently become fashionable to use the term
'globalisation' in order to stress the shrinking purchase of national
PeterFysh 189
government policies on economic and social developments within a

given territory, some suggest that globalisation has simply been growing
in intensity since Marx and Engels identified it in the Communist
Manifesto 150 years ago. 24 Whatever the authentic novelty of the
present international economic order, these issues, together with their
most visible result, mass unemployment, have given Philippe Seguin
scope to extend his dissidence since the Maastricht referendum from
European policy to economic and social policy generally. He and
Pasqua followed a number of other commentators in interpreting the
very narrow victory for the 'yes' in 1992 as evidence of a serious threat
to social cohesion, with poorer regions and classes instinctively clinging
to the state in the face of unknown dangers. In a joint newspaper article
they called for an end to the high interest-rate policy which kept the
franc pegged to the mark and condemned in apocalyptic tones a
'two-speed' society in which the social fabric had been ripped apart by
'more than fifteen years of bland and unimaginative problem-solving'
(curieuse et constante orthodoxie gestionnaire). 25 While retaining their
membership of the RPR, they formed an association, Demain Ia Fr,mce,
to develop their own policies. But its first pamphlet, reclaiming
'priority' for social policy, included a number of recipes- wages linked
to merit and to the economic fortunes of the employer, education
vouchers, private health-care provided by American-style 'Health
Maintenance Organisations' - which dovetailed with the RPR's own
liberal thinking of the early 1980s. From this it appeared that they had
not then gone as far as reviving the interventionist strand in the Gaullist
tradition.
Since then Pasqua and SCguin have taken a few steps further back to
state involvement in economic affairs. Pasqua has used his position as
Minister of the Interior and Regional Development to launch a call for
more infrastructural investment financed by borrowing. 26 Seguin,
bound to formal discretion by his position as President of the National
Assembly, has seized every opportunity to make speeches outlining his
ideas on European, social and economic policy at a number of study
circles, taking care to ensure maximum publicity as he did so. He has
identified unemployment as the number one problem of the day,
denounced inadequate (RPR-UDF) government policy to deal with it as
a Munich social, and called for a complete revolution in thinking leading
to what he has termed une autre politique. Some of his more concrete
proposals may be regarded as sensible reforms with no particular
partisan slant. Transferring the financing of unemployment insurance
from the present mutual system to taxation and amalgamating all the
190 Gaullism and the New World Order
existing job-substitution schemes with the Agence National pour

l'Emploi fall into this category. More controversially, seguin has called
for a massive cut in the working week and for a reversal of key macro-
economic policies on the exchange rate and government spending.
The speech which provoked the sharpest reaction was probably the one
in which he suggested that the GAIT should be purely and simply
abolished, with a revamped Europe defending its position in world
trade by the construction of a regional preference zone. 27
Attacked by the UDF, welcomed as a convert by the National Front
and part of the Left,18 Seguin has been tartly dismissed by Balladu~but
has spread his influence among RPR colleagues, some of whom have
signed articles in the press either borrowing directly from his ideas or
renouncing in other ways the liberal orthodoxy so uniform in the first
half of the 1980s. Jerome Monod, a key industrialist, long-time Chirac
ally and former party general secretary, has argued for public spending
on infrastructure as one possible way out of the crisis.~ 0 Lucien
Neuwirth, a senior backbencher, has taken up Seguin's call for money
to be spent on jobs in personal social services, (seroices de proximite),
considered an underdeveloped sector in France.~• More surprisingly
still, Albin Chalandon, one of the most ultra of the liberalisers in the
mid-1980s,3x has endorsed Seguin's ideas on regional preference zones.
Alain Peyrefitte, a key opinion-former in his position as political
editorialist in Le Figaro has joined the swelling chorus of those asking
Balladur to reconsider his franc fort policy. s.•
By the end of 1994 there were strong signs that the party leader
himself was swinging away from the Thatcherite liberalism in the name
of which he had briefly occupied power in 1986/8 back to the populist
and nationalist tones with which he had led his party to ignominious
defeat in the 1979 European elections. In June 1994 Jacques Chirac
brought out a book of 'reflections'll4 largely based on Seguin's ideas,
the first intimation of the programme on which he was preparing to
contest the presidential election. Unemployment was singled out as the
most serious problem facing France; fiscalisation of unemployment
insurance was mentioned, along with services de proximite, so was
Community preference and the reorganisation of world trade. High
foreign policy was absent (perhaps reserved for a later volume). The
references to exchange rates and the European monetary system were
deliberately non-committal, but by November Chirac had given a
further sign of his move towards Seguin's positions by announcing that
there ought to be a new referendum on EMU. Even if he was not yet
ready to admit ag-ain that the state may have a role to play in improving
PeterFysh 191
the quality of French people's lives, Jacques Chirac had apparently

decided that the piecemeal abandonment of French sovereignty
implied by European Union had gone far enough. Having more or less
successfully smoothed over previously important differences with its
Atlanticist coalition partners in the UDF by updating its foreign and
defence policies in a new global context, the Gaullist party was getting
ready once again to tread the perilous path between populism and
pragmatism in Europe.
Notes
1. For the purposes of this chapter 'Gaullism' is defined broadly as the ideas
and actions of the RPR and its main representatives. Lack of space
precludes giving much attention to the output of the numerous
associations and study~oups devoted to reworking their interpretations
of de Gaulle's philosophy.
2. Le Monde, 21 October 1989. For further discussion of this issue, seeJ.-M.
Trouille, above, pp. 53fT.
3. LeMonde, 1 December 1989; Guardian, 1 December 1994.
4. LeMonde, 4January 1990; 14 November 1990.
5. P. SCguin, Discours pour La France (GrdSSet, 1992), p. 103.
6. Le Monde, 7 Apri11990 (Juppe) and 26 May 1990 (Balladur).
7. LeMonde, 21 December 1991.
8. P. Fysh, 'Gaullism today', ParfimrumlmyAffairs, 46 (3),July 1993, pp. 399-414.
9. J. Howorth, 'France and the Gulf War: from pre-war crisis to post-war
crisis', Modem & Contemparary France, 46,July 1991, pp. 3-16. See alsoP.
Chicken, above, pp. 94-5.
10. M. Blunden, 'Is this really the end of the defence consensus?', Modem &
Contemparary France, 51, October 1992, pp. 32-8.
11. See J. Bryant, above, p. 83.
12. SeeP. Chicken, above, pp. 93-103.
13. For a discussion of this issue, sec above, S. Gregory, pp. 104-11.
14. Le Monde, 25 May 1990 and 7 September 1990.
15. On Pasqua's views, Le Monde, 18 May 1992; Seguin, Le Monde, 6 June
1991. Other Gaullist deputies who have come to similar conclusions are
Fram,;ois Filion, the party defence spokesman until March 1993; and
Jacques Baumel. For Filion see Le Monde, 3 October 1991; Baumel, see Le
Monde, 1 May 1993 and Le Point, 10 October 1992.
16. Le Monde, 25 September 1990, 27 February 1991, 3July 1991, 28 August
1991.
17. Balladur, Le Monde, 6 March 1991; Filion, 'Entre l'OTAN et !'Europe des
Chi meres', Le Monde, 19 April 1991.
18. SecJ. Bryant, above, pp. 83-6.
19. Le Monde, 26 May 1994, and see above, S. Gregory, p. 108.

20. Jacques Baumel, Gaullist deputy, Le Monde, 1 May 1993.
21. LeMonde, 12January 1994 and 13January 1994.
22. N. Bayne, 'International economic relations after the Cold War',
Government and oppositiun., 29 (l),january 1994, pp. 3-21.
23. Ibid., p. 10. For a discussion of France's position on GATI, see above, D.
Hanley, pp. 137-51.
24. A Gamble, 'Shaping a New World Order: political capacities and policy
challenges', Government and Dpposilion, 28(3), Summer 1993, pp. 325-38.
25. Le Monde, 29 October 1992.
26. Le Monde, 18 February 1994; see also C. Pasqua, P. Seguin, Demain Ia
l+ance. 2. La reconquite du territoire (Demain Ia Fr.mce, 1993).
27. LeMund£, 18june 1993.
28. Le Monde, 19June 1993; 20-1June 1993; 22June 1993.
29. LeMund£, 20-1June 1993.
30. Le Mande, 3 December 1992.
31. Le Monde, 24 February 1994.
32. A Chalandon, Q}litteQUDouble (GrdSSet, 1986).
33. LeFigaro, 3 September 1994.
34. J. Chirac, Une NQUvel/e France (Nil, 1994).
I would like to thank Helene Laanest for her assistance in the preparation of
this chapter.
14 The Front National and
the New World Order
Paul Hainsworth
The ascent of the French Front National (FN) over the past decade
derives from the party's successful campaigning on several key issues
accorded more weight by the electorate in recent years, notably
immigration, unemployment and law and order. In this respect the FN is
clearly a product of the times. However, the party's origins lay in certain
French historical traditions and the birth of the FN constituted also a
response to some of the cleavages thrown up by the old post-war order.
Founded in 1972, the FN could be seen in part as a reaction to the anti-
authoritarian leftism of the 1960s and the new-found left-wing unity
initiatives drawing together the French Communist Party (PCF) and the
Parti Socialiste (PS). From the outset, the FN boasted a primary anti-
communism and looked initially to the model of the Italian Social
Movement (MSI) as a modestly successful example of anti-communist
resistance. At the same time, many of the FN's founder members and
supporters had participated actively in wars - in Indochina and Algeria -
against alleged communist influence.
INSIDE THE FRONT NATIONAL
While anti-communism was a distinct characteristic of, and unifying

theme within, the FN, this did not preclude the cohabitation inside the
party of forces sceptical of capitalism. Indeed, the young FN was a
coalition of various elements, each representing different facets of the
party's make-up. According to one FN member and notable:
In the Front, one finds former Poujadists who joined simply because
of fiscal or economic reasons, traditional Catholics ... as well as
Algerian veterans disgusted with the failure of Gaullist policy in
Algeria ... monarchists ... (pre) second world war currents ... 1
This picture is validated by other insider views of the party which

pointed to different currents united around Le Pen's leadership: for
193
194 The Front National and the New World Order
instance, old-style nationalists, revolutionary nationalists, Catholic

fundamentalists, agnostics, partisans of the liberal economy and
proponents of an anti-trust dirigisme.' This view of the FN in 1979 comes
from the 'third way' (anti-communist and anti-capitalist) militant
tendency which vacated the party at this time, in part as a reaction
against the adoption of the 1978 liberal economic programme, Droite et
Democratie Economique. About the same time ( 1978-80), significant
recruits to the FN included Jean-Pierre Stirbois' solidariste forces
(national-populist, anti-third-world immigration, militant, with some
corporatist leanings) and Bernard Antony's Catholic fundamentalists
(centred around the Chretiente-Solidarite movement and the daily
newspaper, Present). As the FN became more successful electorally, the
party also enjoyed membership boosts from disillusioned right-wing
voters and from the New Right. While each of these currents boasts its
own agenda within the FN, the onset of the New World Order since the
late 1980s has opened up much common ground as the party moves
away from flirtation with economic liberalism to champion a new
protectionism.
Via the 1978 economic programme, the FN purported to be
Reaganite before Reagan - free market liberals even before the
established French right oscillated away from post-war Gaullist dirigiste
ideas. The programme WclS reissued in 1984 with the FN claiming that
it was necessary 'to undertake a liberal revolution to assure the
renovation of capitalism in France'.~ Similarly, the 1985 FN programme,
Pour la France, praised Margaret Thatcher's economics and privatisation
of the public sector! Writing in 1992, Le Pen applauded these
documents for exposing the failings of communism and socialism and
upholding the virtues of private ownership plus the separation of the
economy from the state.5 However, Le Pen also alluded to the necessity
of preparing for the 1993 legislative elections with a programme
appropriate to the times. Indeed, 1993 witnessed the publication of the
FN's most extensive programmatic offering, devoid of Reaganomics,
and strongly critical of the New World Order.6
In fact, the FN's liberal flushes sat uncomfortably with the party's
otherwise protectionist policies supporting a national or European
preference. However, as Rollat explains, the party functions as 'an
ideological hold all'/ while Vaughan contends that: 'The image [Le
Pen] projects and the skills he displays are as significant as the often
contradictory messages he conveys'. 8 Still, FN voters come from cohorts
more favourable to protectionist policies than to ultra-liberalism, and
the 1993 programme came down firmly on the side of the small and
Paul Hainswurth 195
medium entrepreneurs against the ravages of unbridled free trade and

'big cosmopolitan capital'. National-populism and national capitalism
were opposed to the economic ideology of the New World Order.
TilE NEW WORLD ORDER AND TilE FN
In recent years, the FN has reaffirmed its nationalist credentials within

the context of the evolution of global and European politics, criticising
the emerging New World Order, and singling out American
predominance as a threat to French sovereignty and identity on
economic, cultural and military levels. Resistance to perceived USA
hegemony has come through a panoply of FN channels: the 1993
programme, in-house press (Present, National Hebdo, ldentite), speeches
to party conferences and the European Parliament, anti-GATT
demonstrations, the campaign against Eurodisneyland's location close
to Paris, the 1993 campaign for a new protectionism and so on. While
welcoming the demise of communism, the collapse of the ex-USSR and
the reassertion of nationalism in east European states, the FN's
assessment is that the pendulum has swung too far towards the USA,
enhancing greatly the latter's roles as economic policy-maker, cultural
imperialist and world policeman. The result has been an increasingly
critical discourse vis..Q-.vis the USA, evident during the Gulf War, the
latter stages of the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations9 and recent
cultural debate. One indicator of FN policy WclS the altercation between
Le Pen and the MSI following the failure to ratify group links in the
European Parliament after the 1989 Euro-elections. According to Le
Pen, the MSI was too pro-American in attitude whereas the MSI's
leader, Pino Rauti, accused the former of an incoherent analysis over
the Gulf War (see below) and of retreating from being 'a notoriously
hyperatlanticist pro-American' .10
To what extent, then, and for what reasons has the FN become anti-
American in recent years? The authoritative 1993 FN programme
explains: 'France will remain the loyal friend of the United States without
accepting, however, the dictat of the pretended "New World Order" '. 11 In
a long section on sovereignty, the programme recognises American
supremacy but sees attempts to further a New World Order as detrimental
to (French) national independence. Moreover, the FN refuses to be
associated with certain interventions deemed to render the USA de facto
world policeman. The New World Order is viewed by the FN as a recipe
for American domination in the guise of UN sponsored universalism.
Essentially, the 1993 programme serves as a justification for Le Pen's

Gulf War posture, which contrasted somewhat with his support for USA
bombing of Libya in the 1980s and criticism of the French government
for denying domestic air space to Atlantic allies. In the Gulf War build-
up, Le Pen adopted a strikingly 'dovish' position, even returning from
Baghdad with a clutch of released hostages. The stance caused some
ripples within the FN, whose voters largely sympathised with President
Mitterrand's conduct of the war. 12 While much speculation surrounded
Le Pen's Gulf War policy various (sometimes conflicting) reasons have
been put forward by way of explanation. These may be summarised as
follows. Firstly, Le Pen desired to enhance his stature by posing as a
reflective, peace-seeking statesman, unlike more bellicose rivals.
Secondly, Le Pen wanted also to counter the consensus of France's
established political parties and divert potentially useful media
attention onto his personage. Thirdly, Le Pen interpreted France's
national interest as opting out of other countries' business and resisting
the lure of forces (the USA, UN, NATO) undermining French
sovereignty in the era of the New World Order. Fourthly, Le Pen
considered that France's security forces could be better employed at
home - rooting out clandestine immigrants - rather than responding
to American pressures. Finally, Le Pen viewed Iranian-sponsored
Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as greater threats to world order
than France's former ally and arms purchaser.
Any weakening of Iraq, therefore, was interpreted as a bonus for
Iran. Supporting Le Pen in the European Parliament, then, Martine
Lehideux (FN) likened the USA to a bull in a china shop, ignorant of
the Gulf region and destroying the one force able to resist Iranian
militancy.'~ Other FN critics accused Mitterrand of sacrificing French
sovereignty (via reintegration into NATO) and soldiers. According to
regular National Hebdo columnist, Fran~;ois Brigneau, America was
prepared to sacrifice France's best troops alongside their own negroes. 14
Moreover, Jean Bourdier saw Mitterrand as 'playing the harki' to
President Bush while the USA waged economic, agricultural and
cultural war on France. u
Arguably the most virulent attacks came from FN journalist Jean
Mabire : 'obsessed by Soviet ideological and military power we have not
realised that we were already colonised by American political and
"cultural" power'. 16 Again, in a long rambling critique, Mabire
catalogues American evils: the USA is a country-cum-melting pot
constructed upon uprooted (deracini) immigrants, black slavery and
the genocide of Indians; it tends to dominate and impose upon the
Paul Hainsworth 197
world its 'mercantile and infantile' conception of life via 'the medias,
industrialists, generals, politicians'; the 'American way oflife ... begins
with music and ends with drugs'; it is 'shamefully racist'; and the peace
imposed by the USA is often much worse than the war prosecuted. 17
As evident from the above, the FN's critique of the New World Order
extends to cultural matters. Again rejecting any basic anti-Americanism,
the 1993 programme opposes 'the invasion of our country by American
sul>-culture': fashion, radio, television, cinema, leisure, eating patterns
and so on. The FN blames French politicians at least as much as
American imperialism for this situation. Americanisation is alleged to
have begun in the 1960s only to intensifY later with French complicity
and encouragement, as exemplified by the alleged vacillations of neo-
Gaullist (RPR) ministers at the Uruguay Round in 1986 and the
welcoming of Eurodisneyland to France. The FN sees the USA as
promoting a homogeneous, levelling world view of culture (Batman,
Ninja Turtles, etc), destined to serve American interests. Consequently,
'it is only by affirmation of our identity that we are able to struggle
victoriously against culture of American import'.'"
The FN counter-cultural policy would include the promotion
(protection) of French cinema and the banning of Anglo-Saxon
expressions from the media. The party aspires to liberate culture from
perceived ideological conformity and favour artistic creativity which
respects national identity rather than support uprooted, cosmopolitan
or Marxist cultural products. Writing in the pointedly labelled FN
cultural review, Identite, Damien Barriller argues for a cultural
protectionism against :Jurassic GATT' (a sketch of a Spielbergian
dinosaur devouring a tricolore), that is, the penetration, 'dumping' and
'invasion' of low cost images on French screens, at the expense of
thousands of lost job opportunities. 19 For Barriller (and the FN),
culture is not a merchandise but a question of survival, 'the being and
soul of a people'.
The New World Order for the FN is principally a euphemism for
cultural and economic uniformity and anti-nationalism under the
guises of free trade, prosperity creation, peace and universalism. Didier
Lefranc even depicts it as 'a totalitarian enterprise', 'deeply subversive'
of nations, 'an absurd utopia' less stable than the old world preceding
it. Universalising, levelling, cosmopolitan institutions (GAIT, 110 UN),
processes (free trade) and concepts ('the end of history', the melting-
pot model) serve to erode the sovereignty and identity ofnations. 21 The
1993 programme describes globalising trends ( mondialisme) as the most
serious threat to the French nation since they destroy nations, reduce
differences, erode frontiers and dilute cultures. Martin too notes the
suqjugation of nations to international organisations: 'When [nations]
will have been totally deprived of their "sovereign power", states will be
no more than empty shells in the hands of ideological lobbies and
world financiers. The "New World Order" will be definitive' .22
Consequently, in recent years, much effort inside the FN has gone
into putting some flesh on the bones of the party's protectionist
leanings and exposing the alleged failings of the new world economic
order. At the forefront of this endeavour is the party's delegate-general
and 'number two', Bruno Megret, who has risen to prominence after
relatively successful management of Le Pen's 1988 presidential
campaign. Supported by fellow ex-Gaullists and New Right ideologues
such as Jean-Yves Le Gallou and Yvan Blot, Megret's influence in the FN
has increased steadily, not least on the elected central committee
during the 1994 party conference.
Megret's discourse exhibits a preoccupation with the effects of free
trade upon France's sovereignty and economic well-being. According to
Megret, free trade has been a catastrophe for France and Europe,
prompting a considerable transfer of economic power towards other
regions of the world. 2~ Instead of serving the nation, economics has
allegedly become the ideological tool of financial milieux and the
proponents of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, Megret aspires to liberate
politics from economics and 'the sacrosanct law of international free
trade' in order to recuperate a protectionist space in which the nation-
state might exercise its sovereignty. Martin, too, contends that free trade
has become more than economic doctrine, acquiring a religious status
for 'the French political class' .24 Included critically in 'the political class'
of course, are the heirs of Gaullism, hitherto associated with the
defence of national sovereignty ag-ainst would-be threats, but now seen
as recruits to free trade scenarios.
Le Pen also defines 'mondialist hegemony' as 'the new Moloch'
ranged against nationalism and, hence, the duty of peoples is to resist
the New World Order. 15 For the FN president, 'politics is the art of
assuring the survival of the nation' .26 Imperative, therefore, is
confrontation with the proponents of 'international utopias': 'There is
no compatibility between their values and ours. It's very much a war to
the death between internationalists and nationalists'. 27
Paul Hainsworth 199
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
For the FN, an integral and critical cog in the New World Order is the
current phase of European integration incorporating the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union (TEU). According to Megret, for instance,
writing at the time of the Maastricht summit : 'The EEC is ... a vehicle
of ... penetration into European nations, assisting in the process of
globalisation via Americanisation, rock-cola sub culture and third world
immigration'. 211 The kind of Euro-feder.uism deemed to be on offer in
the TEU is tantamount, suggests Le Pen, to a Europe of euthanasia in
which nation states are the victims. 29 European Union is therefore
rejected by the FN as a stepping-stone to global decision-making with
the Commission acting as a willing accomplice. Instead, the FN favours
a confederal Europe of nation-states, a Europe des patries.
Undoubtedly, there are strong tones of Gaullism in recent FN
discourse on Europe with the 1989 European elections fought under
the slogan of Europe et Patrie and party publications even alluding
favourably to De Gaulle's 'certain idea ofFrance'.MWith the conversion
of Gaullist elites to a more pro-European perspective, the FN has tried
to capture the nationalist vacuum by posing as the best exponent of
traditional Gaullist values vis-li-vis European integration.
The 1993 programme warns that Europe has been built upon
artificial bases denying the reality of nations.~• The document calls for a
redefinition of the nature of European integration with a confederal
'Europe of fatherlands' based upon 'the principle of the identity and
power of nations, on their necessary co-operation and on the principle
of national and European preference'.~2 The FN's European policy
revolves around the key question of identity - 'a French France in a
European Europe' -with strong reservations about too much opening-
up of frontiers. While not against the idea of European co-operation,
notably on defence and collective security matters, Le Pen opposes the
deepening of the integrative process as a serious threat to national
sovereignty. Maastricht (like the New World Order) is equated with 'the
end of France, the French people, its language and its culture'.:t'
When Mitterrand called a referendum on Maastricht for 20
September 1992, the FN could draw some encouragement from the
prospect of campaigning on its own ideological agenda: nationalism,
sovereignty, protectionism and identity. Moreover, since questioning of
Maastricht was prevalent across France and Europe, this conferred a
certain legitimacy on the FN's discourse. Opinion polls also revealed
loss of sovereignty, technocracy, bureaucracy and potential economic
costs as the main concerns of French voters. In short, the Maastricht

issue was tailor-made for the FN to play the national card against the
pro-European consensus of France's political establishment. In the
event, however, influential politicians broke ranks from their own
parties to identify with and lead the anti-Maastricht campaign. Most
significant here were the two Gaullist 'heavyweights', Phillippe SCguin
and Charles Pasqua, although right-wing Catholic traditionalists
Phillippe de Villiers (UDF and Combat pour les Valeurs animator) and
the left-wing socialistJean-Pierre Chevenement also contributed to
what Michel Charzat interpreted as a revival of national-populist
demagogy. 54
Seguin's role was crucial in recuperating the Gaullist heritage by
appealing to traditional theories such as a Europe of nation-states.
Serge July pinpointed Seguin's main anti-Maastricht speech in the
National Assembly as the dominant intervention in the campaign,
helping greatly to turn the tide against the TEU.~5 By addressing such
themes as sovereignty and citizenship from a nationalist perspective,
Seguin and others circumvented the FN's appropriation of Gaullism
and thereby ensured that two thirds of RPR voters went against the
advice of party leader Jacques Chirac. Le Pen hoped to limit the
impact of Pasqua and Seguin by suggesting that the FN as a party was
clearly and unanimously against Maastricht whereas other fellow
nationalists remained attached to pro-Maastricht parties.r.c; However, this
strategy enjoyed only limited success, for post-referendum polls showed
Pasqua (30 per cent) and SCguin (29 per cent) to be the most effective
defenders of the national cause with Le Pen trailing third.~7 A similar
pattern emerged in the 1994 Euro-elections when the FN performed
well enough (with 10.52 per cent) but attention again focused upon
maverick coalitions led by de Villiers (La Majorite pour !'autre Europe)
- 12.33 per cent -and Bernard Tapie (Energie radicale) - 12.03 per
cent.
The effect of the 1992 referendum and 1994 Euro-clections,
therefore, was to marginalise the FN and limit the amount of political
capital derived from the anti-Maastricht campaign. There was some
consolation that rivals were mobilising around FN themes - not only
Maastricht but also immigration control and defence of traditional
values- with the possibility of alliances (albeit unlikely) along the lines
of Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia- National Alliance formula in Italy.
Paul Hainsworth 201
EASTERN EUROPE
Some Gaullist nationalist echoes are also apparent in the FN's ostpolitik,
although while de Gaulle sought to accommodate the USSR as part of
his quest to assert an independent French policy against the
bipolarising effects of the old world order, Le Pen's approach has been
more openly subversive, fiercely encouraging the accelerated break up
of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, de Gaulle's famous call for 'a
Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' is not paralleled by any FN
sympathy for Gorbachev's 'common European home'. Instead, the
party calls for a Nuremberg-style inquiry into the balance sheet of
international communism. President Gorbachev was viewed primarily
as a product of the system which produced Stalin and the West was
therefore encouraged to be vigilant against the false lures of perestroika
and glasnost. Interviewed in Moscow in 1990, Le Pen recognised the
former Soviet leader as 'a man who has changed the face of this
century and, whatever happens to his reforms, will continue to
symbolise the liberation of a people from its dogmas' .M The FN has also
condemned Western politicians for ieting communist leaders, such as
Romania's Ceausescu, over the years and for courting Gorbachev
against the nationalist leader, Boris Yeltsin.
The FN claims to be the only French party to have consistently stood
up to communism and there is an unsurprising air of triumphalism
about recent years' in-house coverage of communist decline. The
occasion has been used to revive a number of party bite-noires such as
PCF leader Georges Marchais' wartime role (allegedly 'colla-
borationist') and his party's dependence on 'Moscow's gold'. Similarly,
ex-PS leader Pierre Mauroy has been criticised for his 'globally positive'
assessment of the USSR, at the time of the PCF-PS Common
Programme adoption in 1972. More contemporaneously, the FN
accuses Western leaders of insufficiently sponsoring the liberation of
Soviet satellite states. For instance, in line with the party's discourse on
national identity, the FN strongly supported independence for the
Baltic states - with regular visits of FN elites to President Landbergis in
Lithuania.
Particularly active in the above matters has been the Catholic
traditionalist wing of the FN led by Bernard Antony. Antony and his
allies have extended their support- including aid convoys- to Catholic
Croatia against Serbian aggression, with Serbia described in a
resolution from FN MEPs as 'one of the last countries in Europe to
submit to a communist dictatorship' ,!1!1 Antony questions the logic of
Western support for Kuwait against vacillations over defending an old

European nation such as Croatia. The break up ofYugoslavia is seen to
carry lessons for other federal designs- EU, USA, USSR, UN. The
problem with these melanges, according to Le Pen, is that they have no
'destiny' : they are artificial creations and melting pots which lack the
roots, character and identity of nations.
CONCLUSION
In sum, for the FN, the New World Order carried mixed blessings,
meriting ambivalent - albeit largely critical - responses. First,
triumphalism and self-satisfaction greeted the decline of communism,
break up of the USSR and concomitant release of east European
nationalism- tempered by vigilance towards any premature dismissal of a
Soviet threat Second, the FN's loose flirtations with economic liberalism
have been overtaken by an increasingly systematic critique of the
homogenising forces seen to underpin the New World Order. Third,
with the retreat from Cold War politics and East-West confrontations, the
FN points to intensified North-South conflict - around issues such as
immigration, wealth distribution, Islamic fundamentalism and
international terrorism - as the future danger. Fourth, while the FN's
agenda has found some resonance within France, political rivals have
stolen the nationalist limelight as opinion polls continue to confirm
strong suspicions of the party's democratic pretensions.40
Notes
I. E. Declair, 'The development of the French National Front: a

consider.ttion of the political and institutional facilitators from an elite
perspective', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University,
1992.
2. Quoted in R. Monzat, Enquetes sur Ia droite extreme (Le Monde-Editions,
1992), p. 292.
3. See Le Manijeste contre le Front National (weekly newspaper), Paris, 4June
1993.
4. J.-M. Le Pen, Pour IaFrance (Aibatros, 1985), pp. 6~9.
5. ldentite (FN review), 17, Autumn, 1992, p. 3.
6. Front National, 300 Mesures pour Ia Renaissance de Ia France: Front National
Programme de Gouvernement (J>aris, 1993).
Paul Hainsworth 203
7. A. Rollat, Les hommes de l'extrime droite: Le Ptm, Marie, Ortiz elles autres
(Calmann-Uvy, 1985), p. 57.
8. M. Vaughan, 'The extreme Right in France: "Lepenisme" or the politics
of fear', in L. Cheles et al. (cds), Neo-Fascism in Europe (Longman, 1991),
p. 217.
9. See D. Hanley, above, pp. 137-51.
10. Liberation, 11 September 1990.
11. Front National, 300 Mesures, p.341.
12. See the SOFRES poll in Le Monde, 6 October 1990.
13. Official Journal of the European Communities. Debates of the European
Parliament, 10 March 1993,3-429/95-96.
14. NationalHehdn, 14-20 February 1991.
15. Ibid., 21-7 March 1991.
16. Ibid., 7-13 March 1991.
17. Ibid., 21-7 February 1991.
18. Front National, 300 Mesures, p. 88.
19. ldentili, 20, Autumn 1993, p. 16.
20. See D. Hanley, above, pp. 137-51.
21. Identili, 18, Spring 1993.
22. Ibid., 20, Autumn 1993, p. 8.
23. Ibid., 20, pp. 9-12.
24. Ibid., 20, pp. 5-B.
25. Ibid., 16, Spring 1992, p. 3.
26. Ibid., 17, Autumn 1992, p.3.
27. Liberation, 7 February 1992.
28. Le Q)mtidien de Paris, I 0 Decem her 1991.
29. Liberation, 27 Aprill994.
30. ldentili, 16, Spring 1992, p. 17.
31. Front National, 300 Mesures, p.356.
32. Ibid., p. 89.
33. Le Pen in ibid., pp. 366-7.
35. Ibid. For P. SCguin 's speech see his Discours pour Ia France (GrclSSct, 1992).
36. LaLettrede]ean-MarieLePm,160,Ju1y 1992.
38. Ibid., 3 August 1990.
39. Y. Blot and B. Antony in Present, 9 October 1991.
40. See, for example, tlte opinion polls in Le Montie, 6 October 1990 and 4
February 1994.
Section 5
France, Immigration
and Relations with the
Maghreb
15 Immigration, Ethnicity
and Political
Orientations in France
Alec G. Hargreaves
The end of the Cold War has come at a time when the traditional
cleavage between Right and Left in French party politics appears to have
been eroded by a number of forces, prominent among which has been a
marked trend towards the ethnicisation of political debate. Instead of
hinging on the competing interests of capital and labour, many of the
election campaigns of the 1980s and early 1990s have focused on the
question of immigration and the status of minority ethnic groups within
French society. At the same time, fears among the French public
engendered by the international. rivalry between communism and
capitalism have been to a large extent replaced by anxieties over real or
supposed threats associated with the Islamic world. As most of the
minority ethnic groups highlighted in party political debate also
originate in mainly Islamic countries, it is tempting to draw a causal
connection between these shifting preoccupations at the domestic and
international levels.
There certainly was an organic connection between the Left-Right
split in French politics and the Cold War rivalry between East and West.
The Left in France was broadly sympathetic to at least the aspirations, if
not the practical realities, of the Soviet bloc, and the French Communist
Party had close links with Moscow, while the Centre and Right clearly
identified with the Western camp, even if they were reluctant formally to
align themselves behind American leadership. It is far more difficult to
establish connections of this kind between the current fault lines in
domestic political debate and the shift from an East-West to a
North-South focus in the international arena.• In the analysis which
follows, I will argue that several different dynamics are involved,
operating to a large extent independently of each other. It is important
to disentangle these processes analytically not only for reasons of
scholarly clarity but also because their unwarranted and sometimes
wilful confusion has in my view been a pernicious influence on political
debate and mass opinion in France.
In considering the shifting contours of political discourse, public
207
208 Immigration, Ethnicity and Political Orientations in France
opinion and media representations of domestic and foreign

developments, which act as a vital conduit between political elites and
the nation at large, I will focus first of all on the international arena,
and then examine changes which have taken place within France. In
the course of my analysis, I will suggest that the ethnicisation of political
discourse has been conditioned by socio-economic factors which are
less distant than is sometimes thought from those underlying more
familiar forms of class conflict.
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
According to an opinion poll conducted in May 1994, Iraq and Iran are
now perceived in France as the most serious threats to the country's
international security. 2 The level of concern aroused by those states is
between two and three times as high as fear of Russia. These findings
are not entirely surprising, granted that it is only a few years since
France was engaged in the Gulf War against Iraq, and that in the
meantime the long-standing confrontation between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact has ev-aporated with the implosion of the former Soviet
Union. It should not be forgotten, however, that Russia, unlike Iraq, still
possesses a large nuclear arsenal which until very recently was targeted
on the West and it has not since 1917 suffered a military defeat by
Western forces. It is significant, moreover, that well before both the
Gulf War and the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe, fear of
Islamic states exceeded that inspired by the Soviet Union.
In a poll conducted in May 1989 - six months before the fall of the
Berlin Wall and almost two years before the Gulf War - respondents
who saw Arab countries and Iran as potential military threats to France
were almost twice as numerous as those taking a similar view of the
USSR 5 As the survey was carried out at the height of media coverage of
the Rushdie affair, this was undoubtedly a potent factor contributing to
the high level of anxiety expressed in relation to Iran, where the
Ayatollah Khomeiny had issued his Jatwa against the Indian-born writer.
Out of almost forty countries listed in another poll conducted the same
month, Iran ranked at the very bottom as the most disliked, well
behind the Soviet Union. 4
It had ranked in the same place in a similar survey carried out two
years earlier. Here again, we can find conjunctural factors contributing
to this low esteem. The 1987 poll came in the aftermath of a series of
bombings carried out in Paris the previous year by terrorists working
Alec G. Hargreaves 209
for the Iranian-backed Hezbollah organisation in the hope of

influencing events in the Middle East, where French and other Western
hostages were being held by Hezbollah and other Islamic groups.
During the three years that Jean-Paul Kaufmann and other French
hostages were held in Lebanon, France's second television channel,
Antenne 2, reminded its viewers every night of the number of days
which had elapsed since the beginning of their ordeal in 1985. The
impact which daily media coverage of this kind had on public opinion
was already apparent in the autumn of 1985, when Iran was held to
constitute a greater threat to world peace than any other country,
including the Soviet Union. As Gorbachev had only just acceded to
power in the USSR, this poll WdS conducted well before his overtures
towards the West began to break down decades of Cold War suspicions. 5
Gorbachev's influence is clearly visible in a similar poll conducted in
1987, showing a sharp decline in the view that the USSR was a serious
threat to peace, while fears of Iran had grown still stronger. The 1985
poll shows, however, that the demonisation of Iran and other Islamic
countries cannot be explained as a sudden post-Cold War pheno-
menon, blowing up to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the West's
old adversary.
The real turning-point came a full ten years before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, with the Iranian revolution of 1979. The new regime
established in Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeiny was feared in the West
not simply because it was Islamic - many other states in the Middle East
and elsewhere are also committed to Islam - but because its religious
convictions were combined with vehement anti-Westernism and the
material resources necessary to give it muscle in the international
arena. The siege of the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979-80 was a
foretaste of the Khomeiny regime's assertiveness both within and
beyond its national borders. During the 1980s, its links with Hezbollah
and other anti-Western terrorist organisations active in the Middle East
and beyond made Iran public enemy number one in France and many
other countries.
The resource base which has enabled Iran and other Islamic
countries such as Libya and Iraq to take a far more assertive role than in
the past in international affairs is, of course, oil. Oil and Islam do not
automatically correlate. Some predominantly Muslim countries have no
significant oil reserves, while a number of important oil-producing
states lie beyond the Islamic world. In the Middle East and North
Mrica, however, all the main oil-producing countries share a long
history of Islamic culture. This has not prevented them from fighting
each other over oil reserves, witness the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait. For much of the last twenty years, oil has also
been a major source of discord in their dealings with the West. During
the Middle East War of 1973 and again in 1979, oil-rich states which
until only a decade or two earlier had been colonised or controlled by
the European powers played the oil card in the hope of forcing
Western governments to show greater support for the Palestinian cause.
While the price rises through which the OPEC countries attempted to
exert this leverage brought few if any benefits to the Palestinians, they
brought huge windfalls to the oil-producing states and dealt a severe
blow to the economies of many Western countries. The channelling of
oil revenues by countries such as Libya and Iran into political projects
inimical to Western interests added insult to injury.
Summing up on the international front, the resource implications of
the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 are one of three key elements which
have contributed to the growth of French anxieties over the power of
certain Islamic countries. The two others are the Iranian revolution of
1979, which injected a radical Islamic dimension into international
politics, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s,
which has cleared the international arena of the old ideological rivalry
between communism and capitalism and turned the spotlight squarely
onto more ethnically-based conflicts in many parts of Eurasia and
beyond.
DOMESTIC POLffiCS
Within France, the dominant axis around which political rivalry has
been traditionally organised appears to have suffered a similar eclipse.
Since 1981, when the Socialists and their Communist partners came to
power under the presidency of Fnmc;:ois Mitterrand, there has been a
sharp decline in the importance attached by the French public to the
political distinction between Left and Right. Some 43 per cent of those
questioned in a 1981 poll regarded this distinction as a valid framework
for understanding French politics, while 33 per cent considered it
out-of-date. Ten years later, only 33 per cent felt the distinction was still
valid, compared with 55 per cent who thought it out-of-date.6
While the end of the Cold War has no doubt served to consolidate
this trend, the major part of this shift in opinion was accomplished
before Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Between 1981 and 1984, the
proportion of respondents who regarded the distinction between Left
Akc G. Hargreaves 211
and Right as valid fell from 43 to 37 per cent, while those who thought
it out-of-date grew from 33 to 49 per cent of the total. The early 1980s
were marked by one of the bleakest phases of the Cold War, with the US
and the USSR engaged in intense rivalry over the deployment of
medium-range nuclear weapons. An international context of this kind
hardly pointed towards the 'end of ideology'. Disaffection with
traditional political labels within France clearly owed more to the
failure of the Left to break out of economic recession, despite the
promises of radical change which had brought it to power after almost
a quarter of a century of centre-right rule. Within two years of taking
office, the Left had abandoned its reflationary policies in favour of
orthodox austerity measures. In 1984, the Communists quit the
government, leaving the Socialists to pursue their revised project of
managing capitalism rather than breaking with it. By the late 1980s, a
large majority of survey interviewees felt that in practically every policy
field there were few differences between Left and Right. Immigration
had become - and in the 1990s still remains - the only policy issue
where a majority consider the Left and the Right to be divided by major
differences. 7
When respondents were asked in 1991 to rank key words indicating
the ideas most commonly associated with the Left, welfare protection
topped the list. By contrast, when the same respondents were asked
about 'the reality of the Left during the last ten years', anti-racism
emerged at the top of the list, ahead of the construction of Europe and
social welfare, in second and third places respectively.• The
identification of the Left's policies with the protection of a relatively
small minority of the population (that of immigr.mt origin) more than
with its classic role as the guarantor of welfare protection for all in need
is a striking development. It tells us much about the ethnicisation of
political debate but relatively little about the substance of public policy.
Patrick Weil has convincingly argued that since 1984, when the
Socialists adopted more restrictive policies after an early wave of liberal
measures benefiting the immigrant population, there have been
relatively few policy changes in this field despite the alternation of
Socialist and centre-right governments accompanied by vigorous
displays of seemingly divisive rhetoric. 9 Even the reform of French
nationality laws rushed through Parliament by the incoming
centre-right government of Edouard Balladur in 199310 is likely to prove
more symbolic than substantive in the differences which it makes to the
number of immigrant-born people acquiring French citizenship. These
and other measures calculated to produce a display of firmness in the
immigration field were nevertheless by far the most popular initiatives

taken during the early months of the new government. 11 The Left, by
contrast, remains tarnished in the eyes of a large part of the electorate by
the image- which has not always been the reality- of its anti-racist stance.
How, then, are we to explain this preoccupation with ethnic
differences? At least three overlapping sets of factors are involved:
economic, demographic and social. Firstly, and most importantly, since
the mid-1970s France, in common with other advanced capitalist
countries, has been going through a period of profound economic
change marked by the radical restructuring of employment patterns,
growing job insecurity and exceptionally high levels of unemployment.
In the wake of the first oil crisis of 1973, which sparked widespread fears
of growing unemployment, one of the first acts of the centre-right
government formed the following year under the presidency of Valery
Giscard d'Estaing was the suspension of inward labour migration from
non-EC countries. The final years of Giscard's septennat brought a
concerted onslaught ag-ainst non-EC migrants resident in France, with
government plans to force the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of
Maghrebians conceived directly as a remedy for native unemployment,
which had by now become the major concern of the French
electorate. 12
Research on media representations of immigrants in France has
shown that a sea change occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Until then, immigrants were seen primarily as units of economic
production ( travailleurs immigres). Now the focus moved to their
juridical status as foreigners (etrangers) and their ethnocultural
distinctiveness, particularly in the case of those originating in Islamic
countries ( musulmans). Simone Bonnafous has pinpointed 1979 as the
decisive moment in this reorientation,l 5 It will be recalled that the
Iranian revolution also made that year of crucial importance in
the international arena. Yet the return to Teheran of the Ayatollah
Khomeiny - albeit on an Air France flight from Paris, where he had
been living in exile - is no more than coincidental with developments
relating to the immigrant population in France, where the political
agenda was driven by quite separate concerns. National attention was
focused on the status of foreign residents at this time because the Barre
government was attempting to push through Parliament legislation
designed to reduce unemployment by the mass expulsion of non-EC
nationals. Immigrants who had previously been reg-arded as a necessary
part of the labour force were now defined first and foremost as
foreigners whose presence was inimical to French interests.
By the early 1980s, a further dimension had been brought to the

fore. As Constant Hames has shown, politicians and journalists became
increasingly preoccupied with the fact that the majority of France's
non-European immigrants were Muslims. 14 While this new preoccup-
ation was certainly connected with the stridently anti-Western posture
adopted by Iran's newly installed Islamic regime, it also reflected
long-term demographic changes which have been a second factor
within France contributing to the ethnicisation of political debate. Not
only did the governments presided over by Giscard d'Estaing fail to
reduce the population of immigrant origin; ironically, his presidency
coincided with the growing visibility of minority ethnic groups. Until
the early 1970s, immigrant workers from Third World countries had
tended to live apart from their families, who had generally remained
behind in the country of oribYin. By the time Giscard left office in 1981,
there had been an unmistakable and irreversible shift to permanent
family settlement in France. At the same time, the marks of cultural
differences associated with these groups became far more visible.
In the mid-1970s, there were fewer than fifty places of Islamic
worship in France. A decade later, the figure had leapt to well over a
thousand.u This exponential growth has often been mistakenly
interpreted as a sign of the awesome power of Islam. In fact, it is first
and foremost a reflection of the extremely weak organisational
infrastructure from which Muslims in France had long suffered. Only
with the shift to permanent family settlement did Muslim immigrants
begin a catching-up process which is still very limited in its resources
and outreach. There is now a mass of survey evidence to show that
second-generation members of immigrant families originating in
Muslim countries are far less attached than their parents to Islam: 6 This
has not prevented journalists, politicians and the public at large from
drawing a blanket equation between the increased visibility of people
originating in the Islamic world, the supposed strength of their
religious convictions and the influence upon them attributed to Iran
and other oil-rich states. During the Gulf War of 1991, for example,
there was widespread media speculation about the possibility of
Muslims in France serving as a fifth column for Saddam Hussein in his
struggle against the Western-led coalition forces. In fact, most Muslims
questioned in opinion surveys said they opposed the Iraqi leader's
policies, and the only violence that occurred wthin France was a spate
of racist attacks by French nationals directed against minority ethnic
groups! 7
It is certainly true that oil revenues directed by Saudi Arabia in
particular towards Muslim minorities in France and other countries

gave a major boost to the construction of Islamic places of worship
during the 1970s. These activities were essentially devotional in nature;
the Saudis have never championed anti-Western political initiatives in
the way that Iran has done since 1979. Compared with Saudi Arabia,
Iran has channelled far less money into France, and its influence
among the Muslim population there is negligible. In all, there are no
more than about 15,000 Iranians in France, compared with a total
foreign population of 3.6 million, 18 and an estimated Muslim
population (foreigners and French nationals combined) of about 3
million. About four fifths of France's Muslims arc of Maghrcbian
origin. All but a tiny fr.action follow the Sunni br.anch of Islam, whereas
Iranians are mainly Shiites. During the early 1980s, a handful of
Ir.anians in France, mainly students, attempted to mobilise support for
the Khomeiny revolution among the Muslim population at large; these
efforts were almost entirely unsuccessful. 19
Strikes by immigrant workers in the French car industry in 1982-3
were nevertheless blamed by Socialist ministers on Islamic
fundamentalists, despite the fact that there w.as not a shred of evidence
to support this. Those strikes arose directly from the economic
restructuring which tore through the French car industry after the
second oil crisis of 1979, leading to massive job losses among unskilled
workers, where the immigrant labour force (mainly from Islamic
countries) was concentrated. Against all the evidence, Prime Minister
Pierre Mauroy claimed that immigr.ants striking to protect their jobs or
secure better redundancy payments were being 'stirred up by religious
and political groups motivated by factors which have little to do with
labour relations'. 20 Interior Minister Gaston Defferre and Labour
Minister Jean Auroux echoed this view, claiming that the culprits were
Shiite (for which read Ir.anian) fundamentalists. 21
This grotesque misrepresentation of a classic conflict between capital
and labour as a struggle between ethnocultural groups was perpetr.ated,
it should be noted, not by right-wing nationalists but by Socialist
ministers. Their communist partners had already trodden a similar
path several years earlier. As Martin Schain has shown, from the
mid-1970s onwards disputes over resource allocation at the local level
were recast by a number of communist-run municipalities around the
division between immigrant and native inhabitants instead of class
divisions based on the conflict between capital and labour. 22 The PCF's
national leadership made a determined attempt to exploit ethnic
divisions in its campaign for the 1981 presidential elections, most
notoriously by lending its support to the demolition of a hostel housing

Malian immigrant workers (most, if not all, of whom were Muslims) in the
Communist-<:ontroUed municipality ofVitry-sur.SCine in December 1980.
Communist complaints that excessive numbers of immigrants were
being funnelled into public housing in localities where the PCF held
political control were clearly motivated by electoral considerations. As
foreigners, first-generation members of minority ethnic groups held no
political rights; an increase in their share of the local population
therefore brought no political advantage to the PCF. It was feared that
they might, on the contrary, constitute an electoral liability, since at a
time of growing unemployment native workers anxious about their own
economic security might look unkindly on housing and other resource
allocations benefiting people of immigrant origin. There is a
particularly cruel irony here. Immigrant workers were and still are
more concentrated than any other part of the labour force in manual
jobs, which traditionally form the bedrock of the working class. Yet the
PCF, which through its trade union allies in the Confederation
Generale du Travail (CGT) had previously welcomed the incorporation
of immigrants into the ranks of organised labour/~ was now
championing one part of the working class against another.
This and other changes in French social structures leading to the
fragmentation of political solidarity among people of working class
origin together constitute a third set of factors pushing against a
bi-polar model of party politics based on the opposition between the
working class on the one hand and its capitalist exploiters on the other.
The electoral base which made the PCF Fr.mce's largest single party in
the early post-war period rested on the centrality of manufacturing
industry within the French economy. Blue-<:ollar workers in industries
with relatively high levels of unionisation lay at the core of the PCF's
political strength. During the last twenty years, the clectoml weight of
that base has been steadily eroded not only by the settlement of
immigrant families in Communist-<:ontrolled municipalities but also by
the overall decline of smokestack industries and the growing
importance of white-collar jobs, often within corporate structures which
are inimical to trade union org-anisation.
While the Socialists have expanded their base among white-collar
workers and managers in both the public and private sectors, the
communists remain more dependent than any other party on
blue-collar workers in declining industries. At the same time, the
unprecedented duration of record unemployment levels combined
with the growth of insecure, part-time and often undocumented
employment means that a growing part of the labour force lies beyond
the reach of trade unions and their party political allies. Since the
mid-1980s, campaigning on a vigorously anti-immigrant platform, the
Front National (FN) has established particularly strong support among
this part of the electorate, further weakening political solidarity based
on class lines. The FN now enjoys a larger share of the vote than the
PCF among the young, among manual workers, and among the
unemployed. 24 Fran<;ois Platone and Henri Rey have shown that there is
little evidence to support the theory that large numbers of former
Communist voters have defected to the FN.u What seems to have
happened is that the PCF has by and large retained the support of
voters who entered the Communist fold before the mid-1970s, but as
these have advanced in years it has failed to replenish its electoral base
by recruiting among young people of modest social origins who in
earlier decades might have been its natuml supporters and who are
instead voting for the FN.
While the FN has been by the far the greatest beneficiary of the
politics of ethnicity, the ground which it has so successfully exploited
was laid by the other main parties well before its electoral
breakthrough. Only after the anti-immigrant initiatives launched by the
Communists in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Centre-Right's
attempt to legislate foreigners out of the country in the closing years of
Giscard's presidency and the Socialists' ethnicised distortions of labour
disputes in the early 1980s did the FN achieve its first electoral
successes. It is well known that FN voters are more preoccupied with
immigration than the electomte at large, for whom unemployment has
long ranked as the single most important issue. It should not be
assumed, however, that this fixation upon immigration is unconnected
with economic insecurity. On the contrary, opinion surveys have
regularly shown that FN voters feel more insecure in numerous respects
than the supporters of any other party/6 and while it is clear that that
economic concerns are only part of a much wider complex of personal
and national anxieties, unemployment is certainly a significant
element. Like the electorate as a whole, FN voters have been deeply
troubled by economic restructuring. While inclined to perceive
economic problems as the symptoms rather than the causes of a wider
national malaise, they nevertheless see a close connection between
immigration and unemployment. In the eyes of FN supporters, ethnic
differences are both the cause and - if migratory flows were to be
reversed- the potential solution to practically every difficulty facing the
nation, including unemployment.
While political debate has become increasingly ethnicised since the

late 1970s, it is important to note that this has been an essentially
Franco-French affair rather than a struggle between minority and
majority ethnocultural groups. For electoral purposes, parties on both
the Right and the Left have focused on alleged differences between
native and immigrant groups, often implying- with little or no
substantiation - that they are linked to wider international threats to
French security. Despite claims of irreconcitable cultural differences,
the forces driving this internal debate are at root socio-economic rather
than ethnocultural in nature. It is above all economic insecurity,
encapsulated in the seemingly unending rise of unemployment during
the last twenty years, which has fuelled the search for scapegoats in the
shape of disempowered minority groups. The social tensions that might
have stimulated class-based alliances have instead been deflected into
ethnic rivalries. While the end of the Cold War may well have driven
another nail into the coffin of class-based solidarity, the casket-makers
were at work long before that.
Notes
1. For an examination of this question, see M. Evans, below, pp. 219-32.

2. IFOP poll, Le Monde, 31 May 1994.
3. CSA poll, Le Monde, 23 May 1989.
4. SOFRES, L'Etm del'opinion, 1990 (Scuil, 1990), p. 143.
5. SOFRES, L'Etmdel'opinion, 1994 (Seuil, 1994), p.I07.
6. SOFRES, L'Etat de /'opinion, 1992 (Scuil, 1992), p. 59.
7. 1988 and 1989 polls in SOFRES, L'E.'tat de l'opinion, 1990 (Seuil, 1990),
p. 18; 1992 poll in SOFRES, L'Etat del'ojJinion, 1993 (Scuil, 1993), p.223.
8. SOFRES, L 'E.'Iat de l'opinion, 1992 (Seuil, 1992), p. 68, emphasis in the
original.
9. P. Weil, La France et ses etrangm: L'aventure d'une politique de /'immigration
(Calmann-Levy, 1991), pp. 187-204.
10. P. Courbe, Le Nouveau Droit de Ia nationalite (Dalloz, 1994).
11. Louis-Harris poll, Liberation, 16-17 October 1993.
12. Weil, LaFrance ... , pp. 107-38.
13. S. Bonnafous, L 'Immigration prise aux mots: ks immigres dans Ia presse au
tournant desannees 80 (Kime, 1991), pp. 263,269.
14. C. Hames, 'La construction de !'Islam en France: du cote de Ia presse',
Archives en sciences sociaiR.s des religions, 68 (l),July-Scptember 1989, pp. 79-92.
15. G. Kepel, Les Banlieues de I'Islam (Scuil, 1987), p. 229.
16. A G. Hargreaves and T. G. Stenhouse, 'Islamic beliefs amongst youths of
north Mrican origin in France', Modem & Contemporary France, 45, April
1991, pp. 27-35.
17. A. G. Hargreaves and T. G. Stenhouse, 'The Gulf War and the
Maghrebian community in France', Maghreb Review, 17 (1-2), 1992,
pp. 42-54.
18. Recensement fk Ia population fk 1990: Nationalilis- resullats du sondage au
quart (INSEE, 1992), Table 10.
19. Kepel, Les Banlieues .. ., pp. 225-312.
20. Interview in Nor~Eclair, 27 january 1983.
21. Kepel, Les banlieues . .. , pp. 253-4.
22. M. Schain, French Communism and Local Power: urban politics and political
change (Pinter, 1985), pp. 78-83.
23. G. Noiriel, Longwy: immigres et proli.taires, 1880-1980 (PUF, 1984); R.
Mouriaux and C. Withol de Wenden, 'Syndicalisme fr.m~;ais et Islam', in
R. Leveau and G. Kepcl (eds), Les Musulmans dans Ia sociitifran,aise
(FNSP,1988), pp. 39-64.
24. BVA poll, Liberation, 23 March 1993; CSA poll, Le Parisien, 22 March 1993;
SOFRES poll in SOFRES, L 'Etal de l'opinion, 1994, p. 144.
25. F. Platone and H. Rey, 'Le FN en terre communiste' in N. Mayer and P.
Perrineau (eds), Le Hont National adecouvert (FNSP, 1989), pp. 2~3.
26. N. Mayer, 'Ethnocentrism and the Front National vote in the 1988
French presidential elections', in A G. Hargreaves andj. Leaman (cds),
Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in We5tern Europe (Edward Elg-ar, 1995), pp.
9&-116.
16 Franco-Algerian Relations
in the Post-Cold
War World
Martin Evans
Close examination of recent events in Algeria has led political

commentators to one inescapable conclusion: since October 1988 the
country has been living through its gravest crisis since independence in
1962. Economically, politically, socially, the unfolding story has been of
conflict, rupture and inexorable disintegration. The immediate starting-
point for the present crisis was the anti-government riots of October
1988 when the army repression led to the death of between 150 and
1,000 people. The widespread anger and revulsion which the
government violence produced served only to reinforce demands for
fundamental change, and in an effort to placate public opinion the FLN
was obliged to make far-reaching concessions, including, most
significantly, an agreement to introduce a multiparty system. The
consequent democratisation saw the rapid ascent of Islamic
fundamentalism as the primary contestant of the status quo, with the
result that in January 1992, when the fundamentalists were poised for
victory in the second round of national elections, the army moved in to
annul the ballot and set up its own regime.• Since then, as radical
elements within the fundamentalist movement have moved into open
rebellion, the civil war aspect of Algerian political life has become more
and more manifest. In the spiral of violence and counter-violence both
sides have been unyielding. Indeed by the beginning of September 1994
the conflict, according to official figures, had cost 10,000 lives. 2
Within this chapter I will focus on two inter-related issues. Firstly I will
outline why the demise of the FLN state must be viewed within the
context of the emergent New World Order; then, following on from
that, I will consider the nature of tl1e French response. Here it will be
emphasised that the French reaction must be seen in terms of the
reorientation of foreign policy priorities brought on by the demise of
the Cold War, in particular the manner in which the East-West divide
has been replaced by a new faultline along a North-Soutll axis. In this
sense, it will be argued, the nature of Franco-Algerian relations since
219
220 Franco-Algerian Relations in the Post-Cold War World
October 1988 is emblematic of wider tensions within the New World

Order.
There are three reasons why the Algerian crisis must be seen in
terms of the New World Order. Firstly, it is part of the global collapse of
socialism; secondly, it is a powerful example of the failure of
non-alignment; and thirdly, it reveals how, in north Africa and the
Middle East, fundamentalism has emerged as the primary rival to the
Western model.
THE FAILURE OF ALGERIAN SOCIAUSM
The dominant event at the heart of the end of the Cold War has been
the collapse of the socialist model throughout the world and the
seeming ascendency of American-led liberal capitalism. The
disintegration of the one-party state in Algeria was an integral part of
this global crisis. In fact, in many ways what took place in Algeria in
autumn 1988 anticipated subsequent events in eastern Europe a year
later.
The roots of the present crisis are to be found in the harsh economic
climate of the 1980s.~ The spectacular collapse of the crude oil market
hit the Algerian economy very hard, with prices falling from $30 per
barrel in 1985 to below $10 per barrel in 1986. Immediately, the
percentage of foreign earnings needed to service the national debt
mushroomed, rising from 51 per cent in 1986 to 87 per cent in 1988,
and to cope with the crisis the government resorted to economic
austerity. In the first instance it introduced import cutting, a policy
which led to a severe shortage of basic commodities; then, when these
measures failed to produce positive results, it was forced to turn to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Under the advice of the latter
Algeria began to implement a free market economy in autumn 1987.
Key elements of the command economy, most notably the Ministry of
Planning, were abolished, and the socialist sector within agriculture was
dismantled. However, instead of alleviating economic hardship these
reforms only served to fuel a rising mood of rebellion, exacerbating
social tensions and heightening resentment. Shortages of basic
commodities became endemic and unemployment rose to 25 per cent.
Amongst the swelling ranks of the poor and unemployed there was
hostility towards entrepreneurs who who were profiting from the
economic liberalisation, coupled with a mounting disgust at the
corruption of the FLN bureaucracy. Increasing antagonism towards the
Martin Evans 221
system, which first began with rioting in Constantine in November

1986, exploded dramatically in autumn 1988 when widespread strikes
culminated in rioting and looting in Algiers on 5 October. 4 The brutal
repression carried out by the army merely accentuated the paralysis of
the regime, revealing the failure of the one-party state; the failure of
Algerian socialism; and the failure of the command economy to reform
itself. Significantly too, the events of October 1988 left the army totally
discredited. Henceforth the FLN regime was unsustainable; the only
option was to break with the status quo.
Mter initial hesitations President Chadli Benjedid intervened in an
attempt to regain the political initiative. On 10 October, in a televised
address to the nation, he promised far-reaching economic, educational
and political reforms, and in the ensuing months Chadli became a
forceful exponent of democracy and pluralism. At the FLN party
congress in late November and early December he overcame
opponents of change to win the nomination for a third presidential
term. Three weeks later, on 22 December, he was duly elected by 81 per
cent of 88 per cent of registered voters who went to the polls, thereby
giving him a clear mandate to implement his reform programme.5
Chadli was the moving force behind the new constitution,
overwhelmingly approved by voters in February 1989. 6 Heavily
influenced by the Western model, the constitution guaranteed freedom
of expression, association and meeting. No mention was made of the
FLN and the army was strictly limited to a military role. More
significantly still, while the Islamic nature of the Algerian state and
society was reaffirmed, there was no mention of socialism, indicative of
how the influence of a word dominant in Algerian political discourse
since 1962 was rapidly receding. Finally, the constitution opened the
way to democracy by recognising the right of citizens to organise
political parties.
In pursuing this strategy Chadli did not wish to marginalise the FLN.
On the contrary, he believed that it would rejeuvenate the FLN as an
activist political force. His hope was that the FLN, using its strong
organisational bases, would be in a position to dominate the other
parties, thereby retaining its pivotal position within Algerian politics. In
this way Chadli's thinking has clear parallels with the policies of glasnost
and perestroika followed by Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union.
However, like Gorbachev, Chadli lost control of events, as rivc1l political
forces emerged to overtake the FLN.
222 Franci}-Algerian Relations in the Post-Cold War World
THE COlLAPSE OF NON-AliGNMENT
One aspect of the New World Order which has been given insufficient
attention is the demise of the non-aligned movement. As a coherent
identity the latter was a product of the Cold War. Forged by Yugoslavia,
Egypt and India in the early 1950s, and building upon the shared sense
of disadvantage amongst the developing countries, it set out to find an
alternative to Soviet communism and Western capitalism. The most
visible expression of the new movement was the Bandung conference
in Indonesia in April 1955, the first inter-continental conference of
Asian and African peoples. Comprising twenty-nine African and Asian
countries, Bandung was heralded as a powerful example of the Third
World acting in unison. It generated the hope that the Third World
would exercise a collective power in world politics, above all through
the United Nations.
After independence in 1962 Algeria played a key role in
reinvigorating the non-aligned movement just when the latter seemed
to be losing direction. Under Algerian leadership the non-aligned
movement was instrumental in calling for a new international
economic order, which would end the North's exploitation of the
South and lead to a fairer distribution of the global income. This
non-aligned position also reflected the domestic political and economic
priorities of the FLN regime. In this respect the aims of Algerian
socialism were twofold: to break with colonialism and capitalism; and
then, no less importantly, to achieve genuine economic independence
from the Cold War blocs. In an effort to formulate a clear set of
demands Algeria hosted the Group of 77's first meeting in October
1967, followed by a major conference of the non-aligned movement in
September 1973, the most significant congress of the Third World since
Bandung. 7 Symbolically, in 1974 it was the Algerian leader, Hourai
Boumedienne, who gave the opening address to the special session of
the United Nations which passed the declaration for the establishment
of a New International Economic Order." Undoubtedly this was the
high water mark for Algeria and the countries of the South in their
crusade to restructure the global system. However, the disintegration of
the Soviet bloc - the Second World - has destroyed the old three-bloc
matrix. The collapse of communism and the domination of American-
led liberal capitalism has made non-alignment a meaningless identity.
With the globalisation of the free market, everybody is in the same
camp; all are part of an inter-connected world to which, it would seem,
there is no alternative.
Martin Evans 223
There is no starker example of the dominance of globalisation and

the incapacity of the non-aligned movement to strike an independent
course than Algeria since the mid-1980s. In this respect, the role of the
IMF and the World Bank, as disciplinary mechanisms determining
economic policy, is the clearest symbol of Algeria's failure to develop a
different model of development. 9 In April 1994, in return for a
rescheduling of the foreign debt which would allow Algeria to seek
greater Western aid, the ruling council had little option but to follow
the lines of action prescribed by the IMF, involving strict deflationary
targets, deregulation and a further extension of the free market. 10 The
dinar was devalued by 40 per cent and interest rates were forced to rise
dramatically. According to Michel Camdessus, the managing director of
the IMF, the devaluation was designed to have a positive impact on the
Algerian economy. Devaluation, he claimed, would reduce the
budgetary deficit, thereby putting Algeria in a position to 'achieve high
growth, particularly in housing and industry, renew job creation, and
bring down the rate of inflation'. 11 In contrast, the ruling council was
more realistic. It admitted that, given that imports of basic essentials
would now be more expensive, these measures were going to impose a
heavy burden, although the ruling council stressed that this would be
felt by all social strata. Thus, following on from the price rises of
anything up to 100 per cent on bread, flour and milk in March, the
ruling council knew that devaluation would be unpopular. The fact that
it could not put forward any alternative demonstrates the subservience
of the Algerian government to international institutions, a subservience
which would have been unthinkable twenty years earlier.
THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Initially at least, the end of the Cold War was trumpeted as the end of
history and the final triumph of liberal democracy. The most fervent
propagandist of this view was Francis Fukuyama. In Tlw End of History
and the Last Man, first published in 1992, he claimed that the most
remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century
has been the bankruptcy of the world's seeming strong dictatorships,
whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the
communist-totalitarian Left. 12 As Fukuyama put it:
From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to

the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over
the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases to
stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only
coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and
cultures across the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics
- the 'free market' - have spread, and have succeeded in producing
unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in the industrially
developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of
World War II, part of the impoverished Third World. 1!
For Fukuyama it is possible to discern a larger pattern emerging in

world history. Put simply, this pattern lies in the fact that the apparent
number of choices which countries face in determining how they will
organise themselves politically and socially has been diminishing. From
monarchies and aristocracies, through to fascism and communism, the
only form of government which has survived intact to the end of the
twentieth century has been liberal democracy. For large parts of the
world, Fukuyama argues, there is no rival ideology in a position to
challenge the dominance of liberal democracy.
Fukuyama's optimism reflected the positive connotation originally
accorded to the concept of the New World Order. Putting the peace
dividend from the end of the Cold War to creative use, it was widely
believed that the globalisation of the free market and liberal democracy
had the potential to diminish conflict and open up a new period of
prosperity. However when, instead of reducing tension, the New World
Order ushered in new uncertainties and instabilities, doubts about
Fukuyama's vision of the end of history became more and more
pronounced. Events in Algeria provided a poignant example of this.
There, as the transition to the free market further intensified division
and dislocation, Islamic fundamentalism emerged to challenge the
Western model and present an alternative vision of society.
At the beginning of the 1980s a small number of Islamic dissidents,
frustrated at what they saw as the pro-Western and anti-Muslim nature
of the FLN regime, moved into open opposition. Formed around
Sheikhs Sahnoun and Sultani, as well as Abassi Madani, a lecturer at
Algiers University, this movement created an embryonic Islamist society
based upon a network of semi-clandestine street mosques, 14 which drew
on the example of both the Iranian revolution and Mghan resistance to
the Soviet invasion. It made considerable inroads. 400,000 attended the
funeral of Sheikh Sultani in March 1984, laying the org-anisational basis
for the emergence of the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) as a mass
political force after October 1988.
Martin Evans 225
Formed in February 1989, the philosophy of revolt embodied by the

FIS outstripped all rival doctrines of change. 15 The two FIS leaders,
Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, were vitriolic in their denunciation of
the incumbent regime. Both drew a bitter picture of gross corruption
and hypocrisy which connected up with the lived experience of their
growing audience. What Madani and Benhadj1 6 called for was a return
to traditional values where Islam would have a concrete role in
organising all aspects of Algerian life. Anti-FLN rhetoric was closely
linked to a rejection of western, and above all French, values. The laicist
francophone elites were stigmatised as agents of the former colonial
power. Intent on holding onto their privileges, little concerned with the
plight of the masses, their foreign ideologies, the FIS argued, had
failed. Why, therefore, should the Ambic speaking majority be the ones
made to bear the brunt of their economic failure? Emotive and
uncompromising language of this nature tapped into deep-seated
grievances, especially amongst the younger generation. By 1990 70 per
cent of the Algerian population were under 25 and for this section of
the population unemployment was as high as 30 per cent. 17
Disillusioned at the failure of the FLN system to deliver a better life,
they were increasingly dismissive of the older generation, attacked as
out of touch and stuck in the past. For this younger gener.ttion support
for the FIS now became a powerful way of rejecting the status quo.
The FIS rapidly emerged as the main focus of opposition to the
FLN. In comparison the other major secular parties failed to genemte
mass support. 18 At local elections in june 1990 the FIS won 850 out of
1,500 councils; then in the first round of the general election on
December 26 1991 it won, although in each case the very high
abstention rate, sometimes as high as 50 per cent, must be noted.
At the heart of FIS rhetoric was the issue of what Algerian identity
could or should be in the face of the New World Order. For the FIS, the
concept of Algerian identity is predicated upon the notion of a return
to an Arabo-lslamic state which in their view WdS destroyed by the arriv.tl
of the French in 1830. In this scheme of things secular ideas within the
struggle against colonialism are rejected in favour of an interpretation
which sees the war of liberation as the affirmation of a separ.tte Muslim
identity. As a result all French influence must be rejected, and it is for
this reason that many of the mdical elements within the FIS began to
talk in terms of a second w.tr of Iibemtion which would finally purge
Algeria, not only of socialism and Marxism, but also feminism,
secularism and Iiberalism. 19 Such a struggle, it was argued, would
complete the process of decolonisation and lead the way to a powerful
reassertion of an Arabo-lslamic state. Thus the concept of Algerian

nationalism promulgated by the FIS was highly exclusivist. The idea
that Algeria was the complex product of numerous cultural and
linguistic influences, Roman,Jewish and French, all of which had a role
to play in Algerian life, was repudiated, while the question of a separate
Berber identity was completely ignored.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, followed shortly afterwards by
the Gulf War, the divide between the rich North and the poor South
became the primary faultline of the New World Order. Capitalising on
the acute sense of economic exclusion felt by masses of Algerians, the
rise of the FIS must be seen as a product of this division. It is one
mechanism by which those at the economic margins have come to
resist the imposition of the New World Order. Rejecting French and
Western influence, Islamic fundamentalism has become the focus of a
counter-identity to globalisation.
With the annulment of elections on 11 January 1992, followed by
the dissolution of the FIS, Algeria has slid into a protracted civil war. On
the one side there is the army; while on the other radical elements of
the FIS have splintered off into the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA)
which began a guerilla campaign, not only awainst the forces of law and
order, but also against francophone intellectuals and foreigners. By the
end of 1994 all attempts at dialogue had failed. As such the Algerian
crisis can be seen as symptomatic of the instability and violence which
has characterised the New World Order.
FRANCO-ALGERIAN RElATIONS 1962-79
Inevitably, given the legacy of colonial domination, successive French

governments found the establishment of normal relations with Algeria
a difficult process. The first major source of tension was the Evian
agreement, which brought an end to the Franco-Algerian conflict in
March 1962. Both sides accused the other of reneging on key aspects of
the treaty. France attacked the Algerian government for its failure to
guarantee the safety of French settlers. It was for this reason, French
officials argued, that so many left after independence. Acrimonious
exchanges of this nature were followed by further disagreements over
the continuing importance of France within key areas of the Algerian
economy. Between 1966 and 1971, Boumedienne set out to end all
economic dependency on the former metropole. Progressively all
French assets were nationalised, culminating, in 1971, in the acquisition
Martin Evans 227
of 51 per cent of the oil sector and 100 per cent of the gas sector, a
move which provoked protests from the Pompidou government
In December 1975 there was another war of words, this time over the
Western Sahara. At this point Giscard, motivated by a Cold War
mentality which led him to the conclusion that the FLN regime was
dangerously pro-Soviet, set out to insulate the Maghreb from the
Algerian revolution. He took a clear pro-Moroccan and pro-Tunisian
stance, for example supporting the Moroccan occupation of the
Spanish Sahara in autumn 1975. 20 This enraged the Algerian
government, which backed the Polisario guerillas and denounced
Giscard as a pawn of American imperialism. Parallel to this was the
ongoing argument about immigration. Whether it be immigrant
numbers, the status of the second generation, or the question of
repatriation, immigmtion became a constant source of friction. The
clearest example of this was the summer of 1973 when widespread
mcist attacks against Algerians led Boumedienne to call an immediate
halt to immigmtion.
The cumulative effect of these events, added to the memory of the
Algerian war, meant that until the mid-1970s Fmnco-Aigerian relations
were marked by mutual suspicion. In contrast, the period after that
witnessed a redefinition of attitudes, as both sides attempted to
overcome differences and establish closer diplomatic ties. The thaw
began in April 1975, when Giscard became the first French head of
state to visit Algeria since independence, and WdS accelerated under the
Socialists. For the socialist regime, economic and diplomatic
cooperation with Algeria WclS ~>J'mbolic of their geneml desire to strike a
new relationship with the Third World, and in November 1981 and
October 1984 President Mittemmd made two official visits to Algeria,
whilst President Chadli came to France in November 1983. The
conciliatory attitude taken towards the FLN regime reflected the way in
which the latter WclS increasingly perceived as the mainstay of French
interests. Stronger ties with the Algerian government were seen as a way
of maintaining French influence and insulating the region from
growing American penetration. They were also regarded as a way of
ensuring stability within North Africa generally, increasingly threatened
in French eyes by the pro-Libyan stance ofMorocco. 21 At the same time,
with three million Muslims and 800,000 Algerians living on French soil
by the end of the 1980s, French governments were mindful of the large
repercussions upheaval in Algeria could have on the French mainland.
More and more, therefore, French foreign policy discourse underlined
the need to strengthen the status quo in Algeria. This re-evaluation of
the FLN regime was closely connected to the changing international

climate brought about by the accession to power of Gorbachev in 1985.
As the threat of Soviet expansionism receded the FLN regime was no
longer perceived as a threat, but as an important bulwark against
burgeoning religious extremism in the region.
After his accession to the presidency in 1979 the French adopted a
markedly pro-Chadli Benjedid stance. The extent of French support
was demonstrated by its muted reaction to the events of October 1988.
In official communiques the French government refrained from any
condemnation of the FLN regime. Instead it talked about army
repression as an internal affair in which, it was emphasised, France
must not interfere. In comparison with events in eastern Europe,
viewed positively as the triumph of democracy, the disintegration of
Algerian socialism and the concomitant rise of the FIS were reg-arded
with thinly disguised dismay. For both the Left until March 1993, and
the Right thereafter, the advent of a fundamentalist government has
been a worst<ase scenario to be prevented at all costs. Concerns of this
nature are reflective of the contours of the New World Order, above all
the way in which potential threats to France and the West are no longer
as seen as emanating from eastern Europe, now welcomed into the
Western camp, but from maverick Third World regimes, and in this
respect Algeria has been the focus of mounting unease. There is the
suspicion, not only in France, but also Britain and the United States,
that Algeria, with Chinese help, is in the process of acquiring a nuclear
bomb. What would be the consequences, many French defence
strategists argue, if a nuclear capability fell into the hands of a
fundamentalist regime? Added to this have been two further related
fears. Firstly, there is the notion that Islamic fundamentalism has
replaced communism as the main adversary of Western democracy. In
this respect there is concern not only about the influence of the FIS
within the Algerian community in France, but also about its capacity to
inspire similar movements in Morocco and Tunisia, thereby affecting
the stability of the whole of north Mrica. Secondly, there is the fear that
fundamentalism could produce a boat people effect, with hundreds of
thousands of Algerians, unwilling to live under an Islamist regime,
seeking political refuge in France. Vibrilance of this nature is indicative of
a fortress mentality which, although clearly discernable since 1974 when
Giscard halted all primary immigration, has undoubtedly intensified
with the end of the Cold War. In this sense the end of communism has
produced a different mindset where the Berlin wall has been supplanted
by a new imaginary border across the Mediterranean.
Martin Evans 229
The dominant issue for the French has been how to contain
Algerian fundamentalism and this has led to a tacit acceptance of
anti-democratic methods. The extent of this acceptance was most
clearly demonstrated by the reaction to the annulment of elections by
the army in January 1992. Although the response of Mitterrand was
prudent, it was possible to discern relief that the FIS had not come to
power. Indeed, there is evidence that the Algerian Prime Minister, Sid
Ahmed Ghozali, sought, and received, French approval for the coup.
Official declarations voiced intense concern, but refused to pass
judgement on what, after all, was a flagrant breach of democratic
principles. In Liberatim Christophe Boltanski pointed out what he saw
as the discrepancies of the Mittemmd position.22 At the Franco-Mrican
summit at La Baule in June 1990 the French President, influenced by
the end of communism in eastern Europe, had declared that all
subsequent aid would be linked to democratisation. Why then,
Boltanski argued, was this principle not being applied to Algeria? The
accession of the Right to power in March 1993 did not lead to a
reorientation of policy. In many ways it heralded a hardening of
attitudes. Thus, although the new foreign minister, Alainjuppe, made it
clear that in his view the status quo was no longer sustainable, the
Balladur government played a key role both in getting French banks to
extend $1 billion in export credits, and in negotiations with the IMF to
reschedule Algeria's foreign debt. Likewise, as the violence worsened,
the Balladur government underlined that it Wc:lS ready to carry out a
military air lift to protect the French community.
The question of French attitudes to the Algerian crisis was brought
sharply into relief by events at the beginning of August 1994, when
three French policemen and two consular officials were murdered by
Islamist hardliners in Algiers. The French response, led by the Minister
of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, was dramatic and uncompromising.
There was an immediate security clampdown in Paris and the
provinces in a show of force designed to intimidate. Special police
patrols combed immigrant areas, leading to the arrest of seventeen
Algerians, accused of being the organisational basis of clandestine FIS
networks in France. Incarcerctted in disused barracks at Folembray on
the outskirts of Paris, they were all deported to Burkina Faso shortly
after. Pasqua also attacked Britain, Germany and America for being
soft on the FIS. In granting prominent FIS leaders asylum, notably
Anwar Haddam and Rabah Kebir, who live in exile in America and
Germany respectively, Pasqua accused them of undermining French
foreign policy interests.n At the same time, other countries, such as
Spain and Italy, were voicing disquiet at the way in which France was
framing policy over Algeria.
Soon it was possible to distinguish two lines of action emanating
from the French government. Alainjuppe, obviously irked at the way in
which Pasqua had taken over foreign policy, called on the ruling
council to seek dialogue with all opposition forces. In contrast, Pasqua
reiterated that France was confronted with a stark choice: either
support the military regime or face the consequences of a
fundamentalist regime. The idea of a viable third force, such as Ait
Ahmed's FFS, he condemned as illusory. Uncompromising attitudes
such as these have harmed perceptions of France within north Mrica
and the Middle East. The Iranian President, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, in an
interview with Le Figaro, warned that, if France continued to support
the ruling council, it was in danger of being alienated in the same way
as America was after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. 2• In the eyes of
many fundamentalists, he argued, France was replacing America as the
primary target of hatred.
Algeria is at a crossroads where it is difficult to predict the outcome
of events. At present it is possible to envisage three scenarios: victory for
the fundamentalists; power-sharing between the army, FIS and other
democratic forces; or disintegration into civil war. Whichever scenario
wins out one thing is certain: the impossibility for the army regime,
given its total lack of legitimacy, to carry through major political and
economic reforms. For this reason it is clear that, for future French
governments of whatever political hue, the worsening Algerian crisis
will continue to loom large on the horizon.
Notes
1. The ruling council, known as the Haut Comite d'Etat, WdS made up of
five members, Ali Kafi, Khaled Nezzar, Ali Haroun, Mohamed Boudiaf
and Tedjini Haddam. Initially at least, it saw itself as ruling for a
transitional period.
2. These figures need to be treated with caution. In the past it would seem
that the ruling council has massaged the figures in order to reassure the
international community that it has the situation under control. The cost
of the violence has been put at £1.3 billion.
3. For a detailed analysis of this see John Ruedy, Modem Algeria (Indiana
University Press, 1992), ch. 8.
Martin Evans 231
4. For an account of the events of October 1988 see Liberation, 12 October

1988, as well as L'Express, 'Algerie: Ia faillante sanglante', 14 October 1988,
and I.e Nouvel Obseroall!ur, 'Algerie: Ia sanglante faillite', 14 October 1988.
5. Chadli was first elected president in 1979 and then re-<:lected in I984.
6. For an analysis of the new constitution see F. Soudan, 'Algerie: !'adieu au
socialisme' ,]eune Afiique, I March I989.
7. Next to the non-aligned movement developing countries formed the
Group of77 (later increased to 120) within the UN, and the Group of24
within the IMF and the World Bank.
8. Boumedienne explicitly called for higher prices for primary goods from
the Third World, as well as easier credit terms.
9. For an analysis of the role of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund within the Third World sec W. Hutton, Guardian, I8 July
1994. For an analysis of the role of these two institutions in sub-Saharan
Mrica see G. Hawthorn, 'Sub-Saharan Mrica', in D. Held (ed.), Prospects
for DI!ITWCracy (Polity Press, I993).
10. As things stood Algeria would not have earnt enough foreign currency in
1994 to meet the interest payment of $9.I billion.
11. Quoted from the Guardian editorial, I3Aprili994.
I2. F. Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (Penguin, 1992).
13. Ibid., p.xiii.
14. The roots of the current fundamentalist upsurge can be traced to the
Oulema movement of the 1930s. Led by Sheikh Abdulhamid Ben Badis,
this was a cultural movement which underlined that Algeria possessed a
distinctive identity with a separate religion, Islam, and a separate
language, Arabic. Mter independence the Oulema exerted a powerful
influence within the Ministry of Education.
15 The FIS was formed out of the fusion of four existing groups, Ahl
al-Tahia, Jamaat-al:Jihad, AI-Dawa and Jamaat-al-Tabligh. Its opponents
argued that Chadli could have intervened to dissolve the FIS on the
ground that it was a religious party. Under the terms of the new
constitution such groupings were prohibited. For an analysis of the
history of the FIS sec I.e Nouvel Observateur, 11 August 1994.
I6. Born in the Aures in 1931, educated within a koranic school, Abassi
Madani was a member of the FLN during the war of liberation. Arrested
in I954, he spent the duration of the war in prison. Mter completing a
doctorate Madani became a lecturer at Algiers University, where he
vehemently opposed what he termed secular, anti-Muslim influences
within the curriculum. In I982 he was arrested and imprisoned for a
year by the authorities. Ali Benhadj is much younger, born I954, and is
characterised as the more extremist of the two. He told Algerians that
they must understand the earthquake at Tipasa in November 1990 as
punishment from God.
I7. Algeria has the fastest growing population in the world. In I966 the
population was I2 million; by I978 this had grown to 18 million. It is
estimated that it will be 35 million in 2000.
IS. Apart from the FLN, the other major parties are the Front des Forces
Socialistcs and the Rasscmblement pour Ia Culture et Ia Democratic,
whose electoral bases are both primarily Kabyle.
19. In the wake of the annulment of the second round the FIS described the
confrontation that was going to follow as 'a w.rr between the people and
its religion on the one hand, and colonialism and its agents on the
other', Liberaliun., 14January 1992, p.2.
20. Spain ceded the Spanish Saharc1 to Morocco in 1975. This was vigorously
opposed by Algeria, leading to border clashes with Moroccan troops in
February and March 1976, as the latter supported the nationalist
guerillas who formally proclaimed the Saharan Arab Democratic
Republic in February 1976.
21. In 1984 Morocco entered into a 'union of states' with Libyc1 which fell
apart two years later.
22. On this point see C. Boltanski, Libbatiun., 14 January 1992.
23. On the position of Pasqua sec P.Jarrcau, Le Monde, 12 August1994.
24. On this point see A. Gumbel, Guardum, 13 September 1994.
Index
Academic Fran~aise see French Anthony, Bernard 194, 201

Academy Arab world 184, 208
Accor 120 Arabic 225
Adenaue~Konrad 27,28,29,59 Aragon, Louis 41,50
Adriatic 90 Annies d'Aujourd'hui 101
Aerospatiale 88 Aron,Raymond 26,32,43,45,48
Aerospatiale-Dassa 89 Asia 68, 139, 223
Mghanistan 174, 224 ASLP warheads 105
Mrica 5,8,32,67,68,69,71-2,86, Association des Chambres
104, 126-34 Fran,.aises de Commerce et
Cold War in d'lndustrie (L'ACFCI) 21
relations with France 68-9, Atlantic 19, 25, 30, 34, 35, 46, 47,
71-2, 126 81,82,90, 162,188,196,201
Agence Nationale pour I'Emploi 189 Atlantic Alliance 19, 22, 23, 25,
Ahmed, General Charles 30, 37 26,27,28,29,33,36fn,69, 70,
Air France 118, 212 73,79,82,84,86,168, 187
Albania 121 see also Atlantic Pact, Atlantic
Alcatel 117, 118, 119, 120 Treaty
Algeria 18,172,173,180,219-23, Atlantic Pact 21, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47
224-30 Atlantic Treaty 37, 41
Algerian war 2, 193, 227 Atlanticism 1, 4, 5, 29, 32, 33, 34,
crisis 219-21, 223, 226, 229, 48,50, 162,191,195
230 Auroux,Jean 176, 214
fundamentalism in 11, 220, Australia 145
224-6,228,229,230 Ausbia 56,61, 115,116,121,122,123
relations with France 11, 219,
226-30 Balkans 90, 124
Algerians 12,100,226,227,228, Balladur, Edouard 9, 10, 34, 57,
229 60,85,86,89,90,91, 106-9,
Algiers 18, 96, 221, 224 132, 140, 141, 142, 162-5,
Allende, Salvador 175 181-5, 186, 187, 190,.211, 229
Alps 19 Bandun Conference 222
Alsthom 118 Banque de France 54, 60
Altman, Georges 42 Banque Nationale de Paris 118
America see United States Barbusse, Henri 41
American Embassy 209 Barre, Raymond 176, 212
AMX-30 83 BarriJler, Damien 197
Anglo-Saxon 172, 197 Beguin, Albert 46
Anglo-Soviet agreement 18 Belgium 29, 89
Benelux 21
Angola 127, 130 Benhadj, Ali 225
ANS missile 89 Benin 127, 129, 131, 136
Antenne 2 209 Berber 226
233
234 Index
Beregevoy, Pierre 60, I29, I30, Buffalo Stadium 45

141, I44,I6I Buis, General 32
Berlin 48, 55, 56, 57, 62, 79 Bulgaria II6
Berlin Wall 3, I2, 35, 56, 89, 98, Bull 117
I28, I76, I77, I82, 183,208, Bundesbank 54,55,57,60,188
209,226,228 Bundestag 57, 62
Berlusconi, Silvio 200 Bundeswehr 57, 91
Bernanos, Georges 65, 67 Burkina Faso 229
Beuve-Mery, Hubert 2I, 44 Bush, George 196
Bidault, G. I8, 2I, 23
Biville, Colonel IOO, IOI, 102 Cailleteau, Fran~ois 97
Blair House I39, I40, I41, 142, Cambodia 86
144 Camdessus, Michel 223
Block,John I46 Cameroon I30, I36
Blot, Yvan I98 Camus, Albert 41, 42
BNP 118 Cancun 68
Bolshevik 169 Canton 119
Revolution I69, 170, I7I CAP see Common Agricultural
see also Russia, USSR Policy
Boltanski, Christophe 229 Caribbean 67
Boniface, Pascal 98-9 Carignon, Alain 184
Bonn 4,27,29,34,54,56,80,90, Carrefour 42
9I Cassou,Jean 47, 48
Bonnafous, Simone 212 CCF 118
Bordeaux 36, 47 CDS see Centre des Democrats
Bosnia 5, 81, 86 Sociaux
Boumedienne, Hourai 22, 226, CDU-CSU see Christian
227 Democratic Union (Germany)
Bourdet, Claude 42, 45, 46, 47, 48 Ceausescu, Nikolae 20I
Bourdier,Jean 196 Central African Republic
Boutang, Pierre 42 (CAR) I29
Bouygues I18 Centre 207, 2I6
Boyon,Jacques 9I Centre des Democrats Sociaux
Bozo, Frederic 25 (CDS) I42
Brandt, Willy 57 Centre National desjeunes
Brazil 146 Agriculteurs (CNJA) 145
Breton, Andre 42 CFA franc 72, I29, I3I, I34
Bretton Woods I, I32 CFDT see Confederation
Brigneau, Fran~ois I96 Fran~aise Democratique du
Britain I, 20, 29, 47, 49, 68, 82, Travail
95,98,99, I07, II5, I23, I34, CFSP see Common Foreign and
I56, I73, I82,228,229 Security Policy
and European security 4, I8, Chad I27, 12
20-1,23,36,82,85,88-9,185 Chadli Benjedid, President 221, 227,
and USA 24, 26, 32, 47, 56,70 228
Brussels 30, 59, I46 Chaillot, Palais de 42, 43
Treaty of I8, 2I, 86 Chalandon, Albin I90
BSN-Danone II8 Chambers of Commerce 118, 121
Budapest II7 Channel, English 18, 19
Index 235
Charzat, Michel 200 Commissariat General de Plan 84,
Chiiteauroux 47 85
Champs-Elyses, Paris 59 Common Agricultural Policy 139,
Charles de Caulk, The 87, 88 I41, 144, I45
Chevenement,Jean-Pierre IOO, Common Foreign and Security Policy
146,161,165,200 (CFSP) 9I
Chile 175 Common Market 2
China 7, 107, 115, 118, 119, I2I, see also European Community,
164,173,228 European Economic Community,
Chinion 117 European Union
Chirac,jacques 10, 13, 108, 132, Communist Party see Parti
142, 150, I58, 160, I66, 168, Communist Francais
181-3, 185, 186, 190, 191, Communist International see
200 Third International
Chretiente-Solidarite I94 Communist Manifesto 189
Christian Democratic Union Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(Germany) 62 (CTBT) 104-9
Ciments Fran~ais 117 Confederation Fran~aise
Clemenceau, Georges 45 Democratique du Travail
Clemenceau, The 83, 88 (CFDT) 147, 15In,175, 178
Clinton, Bill 57, 90, I87 Confederation Fran~aise des
CNJA see Centre National des Travailleurs Chretiens
Jeunes Agriculteurs (CFTC) I70, I73, I75
Coca-Cola 49 Confederation Generale du Travail
Cochet, Y. I37 (CGT) 8,145-6,I69, I70,
Colard, Daniel 22 I7I-7, I78, I79,I80n,215
Cold War 1-4,20, 34, 39, 40, 41, Conference on Security and
43,46,47, 122, I26, I27, I28, Cooper.ttion in Europe (CSCE) 35,
I30-2, I33, I55, 163, I69, 175, 71
182, I88,207,209,222 Congo I27
end of 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, I2, 34, 35, Congres pour Ia Liberte de Ia
I04, 115,120,121,122,123, Culture 48
I24, I26, I30, I3I, I33, I34, Conseil de Ia Republique 44
I39, 156, I60, I65, I79,202, Constantine 22I
207,210,2I9,220,228 Coordination Paysanne I45
impact of 1, 4, 5, 9, 40, 4I, 47, Copenhagen 6I
79, 131-2, 169, I7I-4, 179, Cot,Jean-Pierre 47, I34, 135n
I79n, I81,2I7,223,224 Council of Ministers I40
rejection of 5, 42 Couve de Murville, Maurice I83
thawin 1,3,I1,29,3I,32,33 Credit Lyonnais 118, 120
College de France 44, 46 Cresson, Edith I6I
Colombey 27,29 Croatia 20I, 202
Combat pour les Valeurs 200 CSCE see Conference on Security
Combined Task Forces 187 and Cooperation in Europe
Comecon I Cuba 173
former 116, I34 missile crisis 3, 69
Cominform 4I Czechoslovakia 30, I71, I73, I82
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique Czech Republic 116, 117, ll8,
(CEA) I05, I06 121
236 Index
Daille, Gerard 22 Egypt 222

DaNang 120 Eisenhower, Dwight 26
Daniel,Jean 39 Elf-Atochem 120
d'Aragon, Charles 46 Elliot, Larry 148
Dassault 85, 88 Elysee 133, 134, 157, 164
Davis, Gary 42-3 Elysee Treaty 29, 54, 62
DCN 88 Energie Radicale 200
de Beauvoir, Simone 41-2 Engels, Frederich 189
Debre, Michel 31 Englilsh 122
Debray, Regis 39 Erhard, Ludwig 29
Defence White Paper Esprit 5, 41, 42, 43, 45,46, 49, 50,51
1972 31,84,93 Eurasia 210
1994 6,7,72,73,74,79,80,83-6, Eurocommunism 169, 175
89,90,93-5,98, 100,102,162, Eurocopter 89
164,187 Eurocorps 54,59,73,90,91, 161
Defferre, Gaston 214 Eurodisney 195
de Ga1ard, Hector 46 Euro-missiles 2, 69
de Gaulle, General Charles 1, 2, 3, 4, Europe 1,37,41,43,44,45,53,56,
5,9,18-31,33,34,35,37n,40, 58,60,61,63,65-6,67,68,69,
41,55,59,67,68,79,82,96, 70,71,85,86,94, 134,147,
102, 156, 157, 161, 164, 171, 150,182,189,200
184, 19ln, 199,201 construction of 53, 55, 72, 82,
see also Gaullism 145, 172, 182, 211
de Gaulle, Admiral Philippe 183 Eastern I, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 40, 56,
Delahousse, Admiral 32 61,62,115-18,120-4,131,
De1ors,Jacques 61, 178, 183, 186 134,139,176,178,208,220,
Demain Ia France 189 223,228,229
de Rose, Fran~ois 32 economy of 3, 59, 60, 115-17,
de Villiers, Philipe 148 200 120-4,139,145-7,188,198
Deutscher Gerwerkschafts Bund and French defence policy 6, 69,
(DGB) 178 70-1,88,90-1,160,163,185
Dien Bien Phu 120 independent of blocs 2, 42, 43-6,
DieZiet 60 68,69,156
DGB see Deutscher Gerwekschafts new 80-1,163
Bund European
Domenach,Jean-Marie 42 integration 2, 10, 19, 23, 24, 31,
DOM-TOM 72, 94 53,58,61,79,82, 139,147,
Dreyfus affair 39 199-200,4,17, 18-35,36n,
Droite et Dhnocratie Economique 194 37n,44,47,80,81-2,84,85,
Dubet, Fran~ois 99 86,90, 158,162,165,185,187
Duhamel, Georges 43 European Armaments Agency 85
Dunkirk Treaty 18 European Bank 57
European Commission 61, 178, 183,
Earth Summit (1992) 130 186, 199
East Germany see German European Community (EC) 3, 5, 21,
Democratic Republic 36n,55, 123,144,181,182,
EC see European Community 183,190,212
EEC see European Economic see also European Economic
Community Community, European Union
Index 237
'European Confederation' 182 Fondation pour les Etudes de

European Council 23, 183 Defense Nationale 93, 161
European Currency Union 60,134, 183 Fontaine, Andre 163
European Defence Community 2, 5, Force d'Action Rapide 34, 83, 90, 94,
21,22,23-4,37n,48 164
European Economic Force de frappe 2, 9, 157
Community (EEC) 2, 27, 28, Force Ouvriere 171, 172, 173, 178
29, 138, 172, 173, 199 Forum du Futur 163
see also European Community, Forza Italia-National Alliance 200
European Union Fouchet Commission 27-9
European Economic and Monetary Fourth Republic 2, 4, 19-26,40,67
Union (EMU) 10,. 188, 190 France-Dimanche 41
European Exchange Rate France-Telecom 117, 120
Mechanism 123 Franco-Mrican summits 129, 130
European Monetary Institute 186 Franco-German Brigade 54
European Monetary System 55, 57, Franco-German Cultuntl Council 54
59, 60, 81, 186 Franco-German College of Higher
European Parliament 56, 62, 183, Education 54
195, 196 Franco-German Council for the
European Single Market 124, 138 Environment 54
European Steel and Coal Franco-German Cultural Council 54
Community 172 Franco-German Defence and
European Trades Union Security Council 54
Confeder.ttion (ETUC) 178 Franco-German Youth Festival 59
European Union (EU) 35, 53, 56, Fnmco-German Youth
57, 59, 61, 62, 71, 81, 82, 86, Organisation 54
91, 115, 116, 118, 120, 123, Franco-Soviet agreement 18
138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, Frankfurt 57
145, 146, 147, 147, 178, 181, French Academy 43, 44,46
182, 183, 186, I90, 195, 199, French empire 2, 3, 5, 67, 68, 119,
202 127, 147
Evian agreement 226 French language 122
French Revolution 66-7
Fabius, Laurent 144 Front des Forces Socialiststes
Falkland Islands 86 (FFS) 230
Fanfani, Amintore 27, 37n Front Humain des Citoyens du
Federation Nationale des Syndicats Monde 42
d'Exploitants Agricoles Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 11,
(FNSEA) 143, 144, 145, 147, 12,224-6,228,229,230
150n Front de Liberation National
FFS see Front des Forces Socialistes (FLN) 11, 219-21, 222, 224,
Fifth Republic 4, 25, 26-31, 67, 68, 225,227,228
187 Front National (FN) 8, 10, 11, 13m,
Filion, Fran~ois 167n, 185, 186, 191n 147,190,193-202,216
Finland 56, 116 Fuijitsu 120
First World War 169, 170 Fukuyama, Francis 138, 223-4
FLA aircraft 89
Foch, The 83, 88 Gabon 130, 131, 136n
Folembray 229 Galy-Dcjean, Rene 107, 109, 110fn
238 Index
GA11f 1,8,59,81, 137-49,188,190, Giscard d'Estaing, Valery 23, 31,

195, 197 32-3,142, 150n,212,213,216,
Gaullism 10, 12, 30, 31-5, 36n, 68, 227,228
84,85, 149m, 174, 19ln, 193, Gorbachev, Mikhail 3,
194, 199 201,209,210,221,228
and consensus 3, 4, 9, 17, 19, Gramsci, Antonio 172
31-4,40, 15!Hi5 Gray,John 146
and grandeur 2, 4, 7, 10, 17, 19, Great Britain see Britain
22,30, 156,158 Greece 62, 171,182
and independence 2,4, 17, 19, Green movement 104, llOfn,
22,30,30,36n,40,49, 156, 145,148
158 Green Party 8
see also de Gaulle Grenoble 184
Gaullists 2, 5, 23, 33, 37n, 47-8, 142, Group of 77 222
160, 163, 164, 167n, 181-91, Groupe Islamique Arme
191n, 197,198,200 (G/A) 226
Gauls 21 Groupement lndustriel de
GDR see German Democratic l'Armee de Terre
Republic (Giat) 88
General Agreement on Trade and Guinea 127
Tariffs see GATT Gulf War 5, 6, 39, 49, 70, 80, 81, 83,
Gendarmerie 87, 96, 100 85,86, 87, 93, 95, 161, 183, 185,
Genton,Jacques 91 195,196,208,213,226
German Democratic Republic Guyau, Luc 143
(GDR) 56, 182
former 8, 123, 124, 124n Habert, P. 139
see also Germany, Soviet bloc Hahn!, Hissene 129
German Federal Constitutional Haddam, Anwar 229
Court 57 Hades 83
German language 122 Hague, The 81
Germany 1, 4, 32, 57, 58, 79, 88, 89, Halevy, Daniel 46
90,91,98, 124, 166n, 171,172, Hames, Constant 213
185,188,229 Hanoi 120
economic performance 54, Harrison, Michael 27
115-24, 183 Haut Conseil pour Ia Paix 23
military alliance with 23, 26, 85 Hautes-Pyrenees 46
90, 158 Hawkeye aircraft 87
relations with France 5, 20, 21, Hazareesingh, Sudhir 48
28-9,33,34,53-63,80-1,82, Health Maintenance Organisations
182 189
role in Europe 58-62 Heath, Edward 32, 38n
threat from 18, 20-1, 50n Heidelberg 59
unification of 3, 5, 10, 53, 56, 57, Helois satellite 83
58,60,79,80, 122,182 Hemu, Charles 159, 166n, 167n
US alliance with 24, 58, 79 Herve, Edouard 42
Ghozali, Sid Ahmed 229 Herzog, Roman 57
Gide, Andre, 42 Hexagon 131, 134
Gilson, Etienne 44-6, 47 Hezbollah 209
Giraud, Andre 32 Hoffman, Stanley 19, 30, 36n
Index 239
Holland 29 July, Serge 200

see also Netherlands Juppe, Alain 61, 80, 108, 141, 142,
Honecker, Erich 182 164,183,229,230
Hong Kong 119-20
Horizon frigate 88 Karlsruhe 57
Hungary 117, 118,121, 122, 171, Kaufmann,Jean-Paul 209
182 Kebir, Rabah 229
Hussain, Saddam 184, 213 Kennedy, John F. 3, 28,29
Kenya 130, 134
ldentiti 195, 196 Keynesianism 138, 177, 178
IMF see International Monetary Khomeiny, Ayatollah 208, 209, 212,
Fund 214
India 146,208,222 Khrushchev, Nikita 28
Indian Ocean 67 Kissinger, Henry 32
Indochina 24, 172, 173, 193 Kohl, Helmut 34, 56, 59, 62, 82
Indosuez, Banque d' 117 Korea, war in 49
Institut des Relations Kravchenko,Yevgeny 43
Internationales et Krenz, Ergon 182
Strategiques 99 Kuwait 39, 185, 202, 210
International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions La Baule 129, 229
(ICFTU) 173 Lafarge 118
International Monetary Fund La Majorite pour !'autre Europe 200
(LMF) 120, 129, 188,220, 223, Lamassoure, Alain 142
229 Lamers, Karl 62
Iran 11, 196, 208, 209, 212, 214, Lander 56
224, 230 Lanxade, Admiral Jacques La 94,
Iraq 105,285,196,208,209,210, 106,107,109, 110fn, 164
213 La Rochelle 47
Ireland 182 Latin America 67, 68,223
Iron Curtain 53, 133 League of Nations 45
Islam 11, 100, 102, 196, 202, 207, Lebanon 209
209, 210, 212-5, 219, 220, 221, Leclerc tank 88,90
224-6, 227, 228, 229 Le Figaro 46, 48, 190
seealsoAlgeria Lefrdnc, Didier 179n, 197
Israel 184 Left 9, 10, 11,43,46, 109, 139,
Italy 27, 28, 54, 83, 88, 89, 115, 144~. 162,169,174,175,176, 177,
116,117,121,122,175,200,230, 207,210,211,212,217,223,228
Italian Social Movement see MSl Left Radical Movement see
Mouvement des Radicaux de
Jaguar 83, 94 Gauche
Japan 120, 138, 145, 147 Left Socialists 2, 148
Jobert, Michel 32, 184 Le Gallou,Jean-Yves 198
Johnson, Lyndon B. 29 Lehideux, Martine 196
Joubert,Jean-Paul 93 Le Monde 5, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 106,
Jouhaux,Leon 171 157, 163, 186
Joxe, Pierre 34, 159, 160, 161 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich 172
Judaism 226 Leotard, Fran~ois 82,84,85,106,
Juillard,Jacques 39, 98 108,163,164,168n
240 Index
Le Pen, jean-Marie 10, 193, 194, 171,172,177,197,225

195,196,198,200,201,202 Matra 118
Les Verts 137 Maurras, Charles 46
L'Humaniti 146 Mauriac, Fran~ois 43
Liberation 229 Mauroy, Pierre 159, 180n, 201, 204
Liberation, the 40, 41, 171, 179n Mediterranean 12, 18, 67, 86, 228
Liberti de l'esprit 48 Megret, Bruno 198
Libreville 130 Mermaz, Louis 144
Libya 127,196,209,227 Mery, General 32
L'Observateur Loi de Programmation Messmer, Pierre 25, 31, 37n
Militaire (LPM) 80, 83, 85, 86, Mexico 68, 188
87,88,89, 160,187 Middle East 5, 32, 69, 83, 86, 94,
London 4,18,20,26,36n,54,70,88 209,210,220,223,230
see also: Britain Ministry of Defence (France) 161
Longuet, Gerard. 137, 140 Mirage aircraft 83, 117
Losovski 50, 170 Mission Interministcrielle pour
LPM see Loi de Programmation )'Europe Centrale et Orientale
Militaire (MICECO) 121
Luns,Joseph 28 Mitteleuropa 56
Luxembourg, compromise of 141 Mitterrand, Fran~ois 3, 4, 8, 31,
33-5, 59, 61, 81, 82, 83, 94, 96,
M4.5 missile 88, 105 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 127.
M5 missile 87, 88, 105 130, 132, 138,157,160, 164, 176,
Maastricht 10, 60, 61, 70, 148, 183, 185,196,199,210,227,229
186, 188, 199, 200 Moch,jules 171
Treaty 60,61,63,82, 139,199 Modell Deutschland 60
Mabire,Jean 196 Moisi, Dominique 55
Macmillan, Harold 26, 28 Molloch 198
MacSharryreforms 139,141, 143,149n Molotov, Vyachevslav 171
McCarthyism 49 Monatte, Pierre170, 171,
Madagascar 127, 129, 130 Mondor, Henri 43
Madani, Abassi 224, 225 Monnet,Jean 24
Madrid 54 Monod,Jerome 190
see also Spain Morcau,Jacques 178
Maghreb 11,100,212,214,227 Morocco 227,228
see also North Mrica Moscow 121, 201, 207
Maginot line 68 see also Russia, USSR
Mali 127, 215 Mounier, Emmanuel 42, 43
Malraux, Andre 41 Mouvemcnt de Ia Paix 48
Marcel, Gabriel 46 Mouvement des Radicaux de
Marchais, Georges 201 Gauche 175
Marine Corps (US) 94 Mouvement Rcpublicain
Marrakesh 139, 140 Populaire (MRP) 37n, 44
Marshall Mozambique 127, 131
Aid 2 MRG see Mouvemcnt des Radicaux
Plan 22, 172, 173 de Gauche
Martin-Chauffier, Louis 47, 48 MRP see Mouvemcnt Republicain
Marx, Karl 179n, 189 Populaire
Marxism 127, 128, 135n, 145, 170, MSI 193, 195
Index 241
Multi-Lateral Force 29 Nouvelk Observateur, k 39,46

Munich 189 Nuclear Weapons Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
NACC see North Atlantic 104,105,107,108,109
Coordinating Council Nuremberg 201
NAFI'A see North American Free
Trade Area Occupation
Namibia 131 ofFrance 40, 47, 171
National Assembly 83, 84, 91, 93, of Germany 55, 56
107, 128, 142, 181, 186 OCDE see Organisation for
National Hebdo 195, 196 Economic Cooperation and
National Reconstruction Effort 17 Development
NATO 1, 4, 29, 30, 35, 51n, 71, 73, OECD see Organisation for
79, 80,81-2,85, 128, 172, 185, Economic Cooperation and
187, 188, 196, 208 Development
French cooperation with 9, 30, October Revolution 173
32, 33, 34, 82, 84, 90-1, 157, 160, see also Bolshevik, Russia
161-4, 185 OPEC 124, 210
French withdrawal 2, 26, 30, 55, Organisation for Economic
84, 158, 159, 164 Coopemtion and Development
and de Gaulle 21, 22, 25,27-8 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123,
and USA 31, 49, 71, 81, 188 137, 188
see also Atlantic Alliance, Atlantic Organisation of Petroleum
Pact, Atlanticism Exporting Countries see OPEC
Netherlands 28, 88 Odeanist 140
see also Holland Ottawa 69
Neuwirth, Lucien Oye-Mba, Casimir 131
New International Economic Order
222 Pacific 67, 105
New World Order 3, 6,7, 10, 11, Paecht, Arthur 166fn
12,40,80,82,84,90,91, 177, Pakistan 105
179, 181-8, 193-9,201,219,220, PALEN see Preparation a Ia
221,224,225,226,228 Limitation des Essais Nuclliires
New York Times 44 Palestinians 210
NH-90 helicopter 89 Paris 26, 29, 32, 34, 40, 42, 47, 54, 55
Niger 129 58,59,68,70,72,80,90, 128,
Nigeria 134 129, 130, 132, 134, 163, 180n,
Nixon, Richard 162, 164 195,208,212,229
Ninja Turtles 197 Parti Communist Francais (PCF)
Normandy, landings 59 1,2,3,5,8,34,40,45,47,48,49,
North Mrica 172, 209, 220, 145-6, 148, 157, 158, 171, 172,
227,228,230 175, 176, 177, 178, 180n, 193,
see also Maghreb 201,211,214,215,216
North American Free Trade Area Parti Republicain (PR) 140
138,146 Parti Socialist (PS) 8, 9, 10, 11, 106,
North Atlantic Coordinating 107, liOn, 135n, 142,144, 146,
Council (NACC) 35 147, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162,
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 164, 165, 168n, 170, 171, 175,
see NATO 176,177,178, 180n, 193,201,
242 Index
Parti Socialist cont. Quiles, Paul 158

210,211,213,215,216,227
Parti Socialist Unifie (PSU) 180n Rafales aircraft 87, 88
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 104 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar 230
Partnership for Peace (PFP) 35, 90 Rajk show trial 48
Pasqua, Charles 10, 13n, 182, 183, Rassemblement Democratique
184,185,186,189,200,229,230 Revolutionnaire(RDR) 42, 50n
Pasty,J.-C. 141, 142 Rassemblement Pour Ia
Paulhan,Jean 42, 46 Republique (RJ>R) 8, 9, 10, 13n,
Pauwels, Louis 42 91,104,106,107, 108,110n,
Pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale 132, 14, 141, 142,144, 147,
(PECO) 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 149n, 157,158,163,164,182,
123, 124n 183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191n,
PCF see Parti Communist Fran~ais 197,200
Pearl Harbor 47 Ratskira, President 129
Pechiney 118 Rauti, J>ino 195
Peking 119 RDR see Rassemblement
Perrault, Giles 39 Democratique Revolutionnaire
Perreux accord 171 Reagan, Ronald 10, 69, 146, 194
Petainism 67 RedArmy 175
Peugeot-Citroen 120, 123 Red International of
Peyrefitte, Alain 190 Labour Unions 170
PFP see Partnership for Peace Rcims, Cathedral 59
Phnom Penh 68 Renault 123
Pichon, Stephen 45 Renouveau Defense 163
Pinton, Michel 157, 159 Rerum Novarum 170
Platone, Fran~ois 216 Resistance, the 44
Poirier, Lucien 164 Rhine 18, 19, 30, 54, 58, 62
Poland 62,116,117,121, 122, 171, Rhone-Poulenc 117
174 Ridgway, General 173, 179n
Polaris missiles 29 Right 7,8, 10, 11, 12,42,46, 109,
Polisario Front 227 140-3, 144, 147, 148, 162, 164,
Polkolor 117 184,207,210,211,216,217,223,
Polynesia 105 228,229
Pompidou, Georges 31, 32, 37n, New 194, 198
38n, 184,227 see also individual parties
Poncet,Jean-Fran~ois 62 Rivet, Paul 46, 5In
Portugal 81, 89, 115, 116, 182 Rocard, Michel 160, 161, 167n
Potsdam 1 Rolland, Romain 41
Poujadists 193 Rollat, Alain 194
Pour la France 194 Romains,Jules 43
Prague 41 Romania 115, 116, 117, 118, 121,
Present 194, 195 122,201
Preparation a Ia Limitation des Rome 54, 180n
Essais Nucleaires (PALEN) 107, ancient 226
108,111n see also Italy
Preuves 48, 50n Roquejoffre, General 94
PS see Parti Socialist Rosenberg affair 49
PSU see Parti Socialist Unifie Rousset, David 42
Index 243
Rovan,joseph 54 Soglo, Nicephore 131

RPR see Rassemblement Pour Ia Solidarity 174
Republique Somalia 86
Rushdie, Salman 208 South Mrica 105, 134
Russia 7, 9, 56, 86, 104, 107,115, South-east Asia 118, 124, 131
116,117,118,122,170,188,208 South Pacific 105, 107
Revolution 9, 169, 173 Soutou, Georges-Henri 40, 47, 48
see also Bolshevik, Soviet, USSR Soviet bloc 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 40, 42,
Rwanda 71-2, 86,136fn 55,70, 133, 136n, 139,177,185,
188,201,207,210,222
Sahnoun, Sheikh 224 see also Europe, Eastern, USSR
Salle Pleyel 41,42,45 Spain 62,81,83,88,89,175,230
SANOFI 117 Spanish Sahara 227
SALT see Strategic Arms Limitation SPD see Social Democratic Party
Talks Spielberg, Stephen 197
Salvan, General jean 94, 98 Stalin,josef 201
Santer,Jacques 186 Stalinism 40, 41, 44, 46, 48, 181
Saudi Arabia 214 Stephane, Robert 46, 49
Sarrazac, Robert 43 Stirbois,Jean-Pierre 194
Sartre,Jean-Paul 41, 47, 50n Stockholm, Appeal 45
Scandinavia 61 Strasbourg 61
Schain, Martin 101,214 Congress of 178
Schlumberger-Ganz 118 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Schmitt, General 94, 102 (SALT) 31
Schroder, Gerhard 58 Strategic Defense Initiative
Schuman, Robert 44 (SDI) 158
Second Army Corps 98 Suez affair 2, 24
Second World 222 Super Entendard aircraft 87
see also Russia, USSR Sultani, Sheikh 224
Second World War 17, 55, 67,115, Sweden 49,56
139,175,176,224 Switzerland 49
Section Fran~aise de
l'lnternationale Ouvriere Taiwan 118, 119, 121
(SFIO) 46 Tapie, Bernard 200
Seguin, Philippe 10, 13n,l81,182, Teheran 209, 212
183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, Thailand 120
191n, 200 Thatcher, Margaret 155, 190, 194
Senate (French) 91 Third International 170,173
Serbia 201 Third World 73, 127, 146, 213,
Seville 84 222, 224, 227,228
SFIO see Section Fran~aise de Thomson 117
l'lnternationale Ouvriere Tigre-Gcrfault project 89
Shah, oflran 230 Tito,Josip Broz 46
Shanghai 119 Togo 129, 136n
Shultz, George 162, 167n Tomahawk missile 87
Single European Market see Toronto 44, 46
European Single Market Total 117, 120
Slovakia 118, 121 Tours 170
Social Democratic Party (Germany) 58 Tr.tnsall aircraft 89
244 Index
Traore, Moussa I29 Uruguay Round 8, I37, I39, 140,

Treuhandanstalt I23 I88,I95, I97
7tibune Dejosses I37 see also GAIT
Triomphant class submarines 88 USA see United States of America
Trotsky, Leon I70 USSR 3, 20, 30, 4I, 42, 43, 46, 47,
Tunisia 227, 228 48,80,I04, I27, I69, I70,
Turkey 89 172,I74, I75, I83, 188, I95, 20I,
202,223,
UDF see Union Democratique former 7, 53, 56, 57, 79, 80, I04,
Fran~aise 115, II6, 117,118,120,122,188,
UK see Britain 195,201,208,22I
UN see United Nations French relations with 1, 7, 18,
Union Democratique Frc~.n~aise 116, 117, 118, 201
(UDF)8, 32, 104, I06, I07, 110n, influence 2, 127, I31,172,227
I40, I42, I44, I47, I57, I58, I59, model 9, 169, I70, I72-3, 174,
I66n, I83, I86, I89, I90, I9I, 175, 177
200 threat 10,20,32, I27, I84,208,
Union Pour Ia France (UPF) I06 209
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see also Russia, Soviet bloc
see USSR
United Nations (UN) 42, 43, 47, Valmy, battle of 96
70, 72,9I,I30,I79n, I84, I95, Vaughan, M. I94
I96, I97, 202, 222 VBM-GTK armoured car 89
Security Council 3, 55, 57, I28 Velodrome d'Hiver 42
United States of America I, 4, 25, Verdun 59
44, 46, 47, 48,49, 69, 80,82, 84, Vercors 42
87, 90, 9I,98, I07, 109, I27, I4I, Vichy I, I75
156,I58,I62,I73,I82, 184, I87, Videotron 117
I97,I99, 202, 209, 228, 229, 230 Vietnam 7, 8, 3I, 32, 115, 118, 119,
aid 2,22,46, I27, I72, I73 I20, I73
domination 2, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, Vincennes 98
2'1, 47, 49, 70, 7I, 84, 104, I32, Vitry-sur-Seine 2I5
145, I95,220,222
economy 56, 59,117, 118, I39, Warsaw Pact I, 30, 53, 55, 56, 80,
I4I,142,I45,I46,I47,220,222 208
hostility to 2, IO, 2I, 46, 48, I47, I95 Washington 4, 24, 26, 29,30, 32, 34,
I97, I99 40,43,56, 70
independence from 2, I7, 20, 22, see also United States of America
24-5, 26, 33, 36n, 4I, 42, 44, 46 Weil, Patrick 211
influence 20, I27, I3I, 227 Werth, Alexander 47, 50n, 5In
isolationism 20, 45 Western Alliance 4, 5, 55
and NATO 25,26-8,44, 45, 47, Western Economic Union
49, '11, 81, 187, I88 (WEU) I60
relations with I, 21, 22, 25,32, Western European Union 32, 33,
33,49,56,82,90, I62, I82 34,73,8I,90, 185
reliance on 27, 32, 34, 44, 79, Western Sahara 227
83, 94 Wilson, Woodrow 45
see also Washington World Bank 8, 127,I29,I3I,I32,
Urc~.ls I9,30,82,I88,20I I88, 223
Index 245
World Congress of the Partisans for Yeltsin, Boris 201

Peace 45 Yost, D. 109
World Federation of Trade Unions Ysmal, C. 139
(WFTU) 172, 173 Yugoslavia 35, 46, 70, 80, 90, 173,
World Labour Confederation 180n 202,222
World Trade Organisation 140,
142, 144
Wurtz, Francis 146 Zwre 127,129,130,136 n
Yalta 1, 68, 79, 82, 172 Zimbabwe 127

Tony Chafer, Brian Jenkins (Eds.) - France - From The Cold War To The New World Order-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1996)

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Tony Chafer, Brian Jenkins (Eds.) - France - From The Cold War To The New World Order-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1996)

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FRANCE: From the Cold War to the New World Order

Also by Tony Chqfer

MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY FRANCE (co-editor)

Also by Brian Jenkins

MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY FRANCE (co-editor)

NATIONALISM IN FRANCE: Class and Nation since 1789

First published in the United States of America 1996 by

List qf Abbreviations vii

Notes on the Contributors IX

SECTION 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS

France and European Security 1944-94: Re-reading

SECTION 2 DEFENCE AND SECURITY

5 Changing Circumstances, Changing Policies? The

SECTION 3 THE ECONOMY AND THE NEW WORLD

11 The 'Consensus' on Defence Policy and the End of

SECTION 5 FRANCE, IMMIGRATION AND

15 Immigration, Ethnicity and Political Orientations in

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire

Janet Bryant is Senior Lecturer in French Politics at the

for a book on French defence and security policy entitled La

University of Oxford. He is currently completing a book on

The provision of American 'Marshall Aid' to France, the heightening

Communists, who might otherwise have resisted more forcefully

ideological upheaval - the crisis of socialism, widespread popular

FRANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD

communism. Focusing on the non-communist Left intelligentsia

adopting an individualist policy. The disappearance of the East-West

DEFENCE AND SECURTIY

issue, she sees an ad hoc solution, involving a shift in the balance

THE ECONOMY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

As already indicated, the development of the global market economy

the case of Vietnam and the former East Germany. As regards

David Hanley's emphasis on the political rivalries surrounding the

sustain 'a form of protest unionism now devoid of any global

FRANCE, IMMIGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE MAGHREB

The Front National exemplifies the 'ethnicisation of political discourse'

terrorist action of the FIS could destabilise the Algerian community in

1. H.Footitt and J. Simmonds, France 1943-45 ('The Politics of

the distinctive elements of the Gaullist model for French national

integrated European security order in which, naturally, France would

This paper therefore challenges the existing 'orthodoxy' on this point. 4

FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY UNDER THE FOURTH

From the middle of the nineteenth century, French security policy

inconvenience of alliances and, on the other hand, the status but

An immediate- and highly significant- difference between Britain

commit himself, his desire for some ill-defined 'independence' is

What is independence? Certainly not isolationism or narrow

His objective seems to have been to minimise dependence within

underlying strategic objective of Bidault's urgent call for a Haut Conseil

the confederation would have every reason to ensure that the

this fundamentally important domain to the United States." It would

de Gaulle's independent and nationalistic policies. 26 Yet, as Raymond

FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY UNDER THE FIFTH

Analyses of France's security policy after the General's return in 1958

ancient continent' should make use of their current protection to

Anglo-Saxon commentators on Fouchet have tended to suggest that the

suspicions aroused elsewhere in Europe by the threatening Paris-Bonn

attempts to prioritise that elusive west European security entity.M When

'GAULLISM' SINCE DE GAULLE

Georges Pompidou was, by personality and political preference, less

for us it is quite clear that the reality of a common European

statements which are not based on an accurate and shared