PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. STEPHEN L. YU | AY 2022-2023 | M2

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
REVIEW OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
1. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City (A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
FACTS:
Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into a
Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric
organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against chanthe appropriation of public money or property for
the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. Valenciano further averred that,
among others, the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor
Catholic
litigants.

ISSUE:
WON the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the Constitution - NO

RULING:
NO. Indeed, Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides: The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable. This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of
belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection
of religion.

Free Exercise Clause

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect — freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's beliefs.

Freedom to Believe Freedom to Act on One’s Belief

Absolute as long as the belief is confined within the Subject to regulation where the belief is translated
realm of thought into external acts that affect the public welfare

However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if
they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has
full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be
required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished
for his inability to do so. Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because
he cannot prove what he believes.
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in
acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to
do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.
As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like
all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be
enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of
others.

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In fact, these two
principles are in perfect harmony with each other.
No Compelling State Interest
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest. As there
has been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state interest
compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice.

Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.
As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality: “With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion.”

The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but
merely accommodation.

No Appropriation of Public Money or Property for the Benefit of any Church

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a
particular church. No undue religious bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be
temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people
and for other purposes. Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property
devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its
primary purpose.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
(among the decisions)
● DENY the prayer of Tony Q. Valenciano to prohibit the holding of religious rituals in the QC Hall of Justice
and in all halls of justice in the country; and
● DIRECT the Executive Judges of Quezon City to REGULATE and CLOSELY MONITOR the holding of
masses and other religious practices within the Quezon City Hall of Justice by ensuring, among others,
that: (a) it does not disturb or interrupt court proceedings; (b) it does not adversely affect and interrupt the
delivery of public service; and (c) it does not unduly inconvenience the public.
2. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, November 22, 2016)

FOREWORD: A judge embodies the law; she cannot be above it. She should not use it to advance her personal
convenience, or to oppress others. She should be obedient to the rules and directives enunciated by the
Supreme Court for the effective administration of justice; otherwise, she becomes an arrogant tyrant. Being a
magistrate of the law, she must comport herself in a manner consistent with the dignity of her judicial office, and
must not commit any act that erodes public confidence in the Judiciary.

FACTS:
Respondent Judge Eliza Yu was the Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pasay
City. Various administrative complaints were filed against her for:
●Noncompliance with Administrative Order No. 19-2011 (Establishing Night Courts in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts of Pasay and Makati);
●Refusing to honor the appointments of court personnel;
●Oppressive conduct towards her staff;
●Disrespectful attitude towards her co-judges as well as Supreme Court officers and offices;
●Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court personnel who filed administrative complaints
against her;
●Refusing to sign the application for leave of absence of her staff who was diagnosed with Stage 4 Cancer;
●Assigning the duty of drafting decisions, orders and resolutions to OJTs;
●Designating an OIC who did not possess minimum qualifications for the position and without approval of the
Court;
●Ordering presentation of ex parte evidence before the OCA who was not a member of the Bar;
●Allowing criminal proceedings without the actual participation of the public prosecutor; and
●Sending inappropriate messages with sexual undertones to a fellow female Judge, Hon. Emily San
Gaspar-Gito.

Judge Yu also used the letterhead of Branch 47, MeTC to summon Atty. Reynaldo San Gaspar (the brother of
Judge Emily) to a conference in “our (Judge Yu’s) court”.

Based on these allegations, she was charged with gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross
insubordination, oppression, and conduct unbecoming of a judge. These cases were consolidated and were
resolved by the Supreme Court in one decision.

ISSUE:

I. Whether Judge Eliza Yu’s acts warrant dismissal from service in the judiciary - YES

II. Whether such acts also warrant Judge Yu’s disbarment - YES

RULING:
First Issue:
Judge Eliza Yu’s acts warrant dismissal from service in the judiciary. Judge Yu committed the following
administrative offenses:
1) Insubordination and gross misconduct for her non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011

Judge Yu's expression of her dissent against A.O. No. 19-2011 was misplaced. Regardless of her
reasons for dissenting, she was absolutely bound to follow A.O. No. 19-2011. She did not have the
unbridled freedom to publicly speak against A.O. No. 19-2011 and its implementation, for her being
the Judge that she was differentiated her from the ordinary citizen exercising her freedom of
speech and expression who did not swear obedience to the orders and processes of the Court
without delay.

The Court reminded Judge Yu and other judicial officers that although they may enjoy the
freedoms of speech and expression as citizens of the Republic, they should always conduct
themselves, while exercising such freedoms, in a manner that should preserve the dignity of their
judicial offices and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. As to this duty to observe
self-restraint, Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
is clear and forthright:
Sec. 6, Canon 4. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as
to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

1) Gross insubordination for her unwarranted refusal to honor the appointments of Ms.
Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman.

Although Judge Yu insisted on the irregularity of the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez for lack of
personal endorsement from her as the Presiding Judge, and of the appointment of Ms. Lagman
due to a pending administrative complaint, the appointments of Ms. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman
were valid and regular. As such, Judge Yu had no good reason to reject the appointments.

Ms. Tejero-Lopez and other applicants had undergone scrutiny and processing by the duly
constituted committee, and the OCA had then signed and executed the appointment. The authority
to appoint still emanated from the Court itself. Judge Yu’s objection to Ms. Tejero-Lopez’s
appointment for lack of her personal endorsement was not enough to negate the appointment.
Judge Yu could only recommend an applicant for a vacant position in her court for the
consideration of the SPBLC. She could not impose her recommendee on the SPBLC which was
legally mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the applicants based
on performance, eligibility, education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials.

Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just as unwarranted. Judge Yu’s
administrative complaint had no bearing on Ms. Lagman’s appointment, more so because Ms.
Lagman was held liable only for simple misconduct, a less grave offense that did not merit
termination from public service for the first offense. Further, Judge Yu had no personality to object
to or oppose Ms. Lagman's appointment, considering that only a qualified next-in-rank employee
has been recognized as a party-in-interest to file the protest.

2) Disrespect toward the Court for her intemperate and disrespectful language in
characterizing Ms. Tejero-Lopez's valid appointment as “void ab initio” and a “big joke.”

The use of such language in assailing the Court’s exercise of its absolute power of appointment
was highly offensive and intemperate. She thereby disregarded her obligation to show respect and
deference toward the Court and its officials. She was thereby guilty of another serious
misconduct.

3) Grave abuse of authority and oppression for issuing verbal threats of filing administrative,
civil and criminal charges against Ms. Tejero-Lopez unless the latter withdrew her application.

The making of the verbal threats to compel a subordinate to withdraw her application constitutes
grave abuse of authority. Grave abuse of authority is committed by a public officer, who, under
color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other
injury. It is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. Ms.
Tejero-Lopez felt intimidated enough because she actually withdrew her application, although she
later went on with it. The intimidation exerted upon Ms. Tejero-Lopez amounted to oppression,
which refers to an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.

4) Grave abuse of authority and abuse of court processes for issuing a show-cause order
against her fellow Judges and court personnel;

5) Gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for not
disqualifying herself in acting on the supposedly contumacious conduct of her fellow Judges and
concerned court personnel in copying the records of her court.
Such self-disqualification was required under Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, viz.:
Section 5, Canon 3. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings
in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings
include, but are not limited to, instances where:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; xxx
Section 8, Canon 4. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interest, xxx
By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for contempt of court, Judge
Yu wielded a power that she did not hold.

6) Refusal to perform official functions and oppression for refusing to sign the application
for leave of absence despite the employee having complied with the requirements, and for doing
so in retaliation for the employee’s having joined as signatory of administrative complaint filed
against her;

7) Gross ignorance of the law for:

a. allowing on-the-job trainees and designating an OIC who did not possess the
minimum qualifications for the position and without approval from the Court;

b. ordering the presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC despite his not
being a member of the Bar;

c. allowing criminal proceedings to be conducted without the actual participation of

 the public prosecutor; and

d. authorizing the change of plea by the accused without the assistance of counsel;
and

8) Conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer for sending inappropriate messages with sexual
undertones to a fellow female Judge, and for using the official letterhead of her judicial office in
summoning a lawyer to a conference.
In the letter in question, Judge Yu used the phrase “our court” in issuing the invitation to Atty.
San Gaspar. She was obviously intending to use her authority as an incumbent Judge to advance
her personal interest. Such conduct was reprehensible because she thereby breached Section 4
of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - INDEPENDENCE
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.
CANON 4 - PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
In view of the totality of the serious infractions committed by Judge Yu, the OCA recommended her
dismissal from the service with the following ratiocination:
In all the cases subject of this consolidated administrative matters, the totality of the infractions
committed by Judge Yu, i.e., Gross Ignorance of the Law, Insubordination and Refusal to Perform
Official Functions, Gross Misconduct Amounting to Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, underscores the fact that she is
not fit to occupy the position of a judge. She has done more than enough harm to the reputation of
the judiciary and the administration of justice, exacerbated by the oppression she has inflicted on her
subordinates and her utter disrespect for her superiors.
In similar instances, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to impose upon erring judges the ultimate
penalty of dismissal from service as they have indeed fallen short of the standards required of them
as dispensers of justice. These same standards must be required of respondent Judge Yu, failing
which she must be meted the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation of the OCA. Judge Yu unquestionably committed
several gross and serious administrative offenses ranging from gross misconduct and gross ignorance
to the lesser offense of conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer.
The grossness and severity of her offenses taken together demonstrated Judge Yu's unfitness and
incompetence to further discharge the office and duties of a Judge. Her arrogance and insubordination in
challenging A.O. No. 19-2011, and her unyielding rejection of the appointments of court personnel
constituted gross insubordination and gross misconduct, and warranted her immediate dismissal from
the Judiciary. Her requiring her fellow Judges to submit to her authority by virtue of her show-cause
order, whereby she revealed her utter disrespect towards and disdain for them, as well as her conduct
unbecoming of a judicial officer aggravated her liability. The administration of justice cannot be entrusted
to one like her who would readily ignore and disregard the laws and policies enacted by the Court to
guarantee justice and fairness for all.

Second Issue:
The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some
Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, relevantly states:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges
of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should
not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the ground of gross
misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Given her wanton defiance
of the Court's own directives, her open disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the
powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal
actions to make them submit to her will, the Court should also be imposing the penalty of disbarment.
The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney herself as it is to safeguard the
administration of justice, the courts and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court. Also,
disbarment seeks to remove from the Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's
Oath and thereby proved themselves unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them as
members of the Bar.
The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were also grounds for
disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated as justifiable disciplinary
initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This treatment is explained by the fact that her
membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her qualification for judgeship. Also, her moral and
actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain
as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the basic rules of judicial
conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because she had thereby also violated her Lawyer's
Oath.
Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a breach of the following
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 6 — THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 — A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu’s misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial
officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not
anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession.

NOTE: Disbarment cannot be meted without due process.

The rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set
aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due
process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend
her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her.

FINAL WORD: The Court will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer who has
fallen short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. Any conduct that violates the norms of public
accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system must be condemned. No act
or omission by a Judge or Justice that falls short of the exacting norms of holding the public office of
dispensing justice can be condoned, for the most important thing for every Judge or Justice is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary as well as in the individuals who dispense
justice. The image of the Judiciary must remain unsullied by the misconduct of its officials. The Court
will not shirk from its duty of removing from the Bench any Judge or Justice who has stained the
integrity and dignity of the Judiciary.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order
with FINALITY; DISBARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics; and ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
3. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Eliza B. Yu (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017)

FACTS:

This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order decision
promulgated on November 22, 2016 against Judge Eliza B. Yu. The Court in the previous case rendered the
following decision:

“The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu guilty of gross insubordination; gross
ignorance of the law; gross misconduct; grave abuse of authority; oppression; and conduct unbecoming
of a judicial official; and, dismisses her from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and further disqualifies her from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office or employment.”

In her motion, the Judge Yu repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for which she was held
guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads that the Court
reconsiders based on the following:

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011 – The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency
of her protest against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory
because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-2011 being non-compliant with the
requirements of a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII
which limited the working hours for government officials and employees. There was no law prohibiting her from
writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did
not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011

2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez – The
respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a
judge to question the appointment of the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, she was mandated to bring to the proper
authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments.. She did not also commit any act of cruelty against
Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who went beyond the norms of decency by her
persistent application in my court harassment. Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was
meritorious. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or oppression committed
against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with few words that other
people find objectionable."6

3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges – It was premature to rule that she thereby
abused and committed misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.
She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid – The refusal to sign the application for leave of
absence had factual and legal bases. Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she
misconstrued the rules on approval of application of leave.

5. Allowing on-the-job trainees – The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial
tasks. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers.
Based on what she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that
she allowed the trainees to merely observe proceedings.

6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer – The

respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an
officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately intended to cause public damage.
In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her branch in several letters. There was no proof
that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer
clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No.
35-2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-93.

7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel – The respondent merely
followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.

8. Sending of inappropriate email messages – The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were
hearsay because the certification by the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to
object. Her granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her Lycos
e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not
authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her
full name written in capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts
carried her name with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the decision were not the
same messages that she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not
write on the e-mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style was
different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar"
account. It was wrong to penalize her based on assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic
libel. Her funny and innocent comments were not actionable documents. The certification by the SC MISO was
not an authentication as to the truthfulness of the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of
the sender or author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was no
proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-mails were not printed in the
decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages without her consent as the
sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in writing were guaranteed and
protected by Sections.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Judge Eliza Yu’s MR should be granted.
2. Whether Judge Eliza Yu should be disbarred as a lawyer.

RULING:
1. NO. The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the
Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already exhaustively considered and fully resolved in
the decision of November 22, 2016.

We still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated several canons of the Canon of
Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct.

As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the complaints often
backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by systematically exposing her personal and professional
ineptitude and stilted logic. She was more than aware that the quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings like these was substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination has no basis. As a
judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to
answer incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable.

The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription against
self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right
against self-incrimination. Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be present and to
confront the complainant and her witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by
CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid. At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and
mercy, and vows not to repeat the same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in
her favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules.

Administrative Cases in Civil Service, which provides thus:

1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;
2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;
3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;
4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as to analogous circumstance the
unsubstantiated charge;
5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated
charge;
6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;
7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez and
Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the unsubstantiated charge;
11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the unsubstantiated charge. The
respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.

Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how her having medications for
allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in
Civil Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the provision expressly
recognizes other analogous circumstances, she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it
would be analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of
medications for allergies could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive
conduct that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative complaints. Secondly, the
respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith. Good faith implies the lack of any intention to
commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent
to commit a wrong cannot be probable.

Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016 the following: In
all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance by committing insubordination and gross misconduct. By her
refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the
embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance
of the Court as the duly constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To
tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be
removed from the service because she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.

2. YES. Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent.

The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22,
2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the
Legal Profession through disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show good and sufficient cause why her
actions and actuations should not also be considered grounds for her disbarment.

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

Rule 11.0 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer.
By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to
remain a member of the Law Profession. However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment
does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as
an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her
right to due process.

SANCTION/PENALTY: DISBARRED.

4. Garcia vs. Judge De la Peña (A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, 129 SCRA 767, February 9, 1994)
FACTS:
1. Engineer Edgardo C. Garcia charged Judge Meljohn de la Peña in his capacity as acting judge of
Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte with partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion
in connection with Crimimal Case No. 2577 for grave oral defamation
 a. This case was filed against his wife, Ignacia G. Garcia, a supervising nurse of Naval District
Hospital, by respondent judge's brother, Dr. Melencio de la Peña.
2. Respondent judge, while acting as the presiding judge of the MTC of Naval, Leyte, is the incumbent
presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte.
3. Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia, claimed that respondent judge took cognizance of the
criminal case without the requisite certification from the Lupon Tagapayapa;
a. That he should have inhibited himself from acting on the case because private
complainant Dr. Melencio B. de la Peña is his brother;
b. That he issued a warrant of arrest without the accompanying copy of the complaint
and affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses;
c. Issue on the posting of the cash bail bond
4. Records show that there was a case for grave oral defamation filed by Dr. Melencio B. de la Peña
against Ignacia G. Garcia with the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte.
5. After the preliminary examination was conducted, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Peña issued on
the same date a warrant for the arrest of the accused Ignacia G. Garcia.
6. On the same day, June 8, 1992, Engr. Edgardo Garcia, husband of the accused, posted the cash
bail bond as fixed in the warrant of arrest for the provisional liberty of the accused.
a. Thereafter, herein complainant sought at around 2:40 P.M. the approval of the cash bail
bond and the Order of Release of the accused but respondent judge was not in the office at
that time.
b. It was only the following day, June 9, 1992 at around 10:10 A.M. after complainant secured
a copy of the Order of Release dated June 8, 1992 duly signed by respondent judge that the
accused was released from detention.
c. Complainant was informed that before respondent judge left for Cebu City, he entrusted the
Order of Release to his wife, Lolita de la Peña, whose whereabouts, however, were
unknown in the afternoon of June 8, 1992 despite efforts by the Clerk of Court to look for
her.
d. The delay in the release of his wife from detention by one day because the Order of Release
could not be obtained as respondent judge left for Cebu City despite proper posting of the
cash bond of P2,000.00 for her provisional liberty on the same day of her arrest on June 8,
1992, prompted complainant to file this administrative case against respondent judge.
7. It is at once clear that the administrative charges against respondent judge focused mainly on the
fact of his taking cognizance of the criminal case of grave oral defamation filed by his brother, Dr.
Melencio de la Peña, against complainant's wife, Ignacia Garcia, which, as a consequence, gave
rise to the incidents narrated in the letter-complaint descriptive of the perceived bias and partiality of
respondent judge in the discharge of his official functions in connection with Criminal Case No.
2577.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent Judge in taking cognizance of the criminal case of grave oral defamation filed by his
brother gave rise to bias and partiality of respondent Judge in the discharge of his official functions in
connection with the criminal case

RULING:
Yes.
The charge of partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion as regards respondent judge's
taking cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that private complainant is his brother — a relative
within the second degree of consanguinity — in violation of the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges
under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is a different matter.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:

Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the
respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the
salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent.

The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that
reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of
all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is
related within the second degree of consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation
of the rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The proffered excuse that Criminal
Case No. 2577 has been dragging on for some time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the
non-designation of a presiding judge will not justify the violation of a well-settled rule on compulsory
disqualification of judges to hear a case. Respondent judge should have formally informed the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Leyte if, indeed, the case had been deferred, and thereafter sought the designation of
another MTC judge to take cognizance of the case. He should have foreseen the possibility that his
actuation and motives would have been suspect if he had ruled in favor of the prosecution as his blood
relationship with the private complainant was of general knowledge.

The violation was aggravated when respondent judge thereafter issued a warrant of arrest on June 8,
1992 but at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, left for an alleged pre-scheduled medical
check-up in the nearby province of Cebu, thus depriving the accused of the opportunity to secure an order
for her provisional liberty upon proper posting of a bail bond on the same day of her arrest. As a
consequence, the accused spent her night in the municipal jail of Naval until the following morning of June
9, 1992 after spending almost 20 hours in jail.

To make matters even worse, the excuse given by respondent judge that he left the duly signed order of
release with his wife instead of the Clerk of Court before he left for Cebu exposed his total disregard of, or
indifference to, or even ignorance of, the procedure prescribed by law. Respondent judge's actuation is
unquestionably not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is conduct prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
Realizing perhaps that he has violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 par. (d),
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent judge belatedly issued an order inhibiting
himself from the case on June 15, 1992, or seven (7) days after he caused the arrest and detention
of the accused. Clearly, the damage and intrusion on the liberty of the accused were already fait
accompli.

Respondent judge likewise violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides: "A
judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge."

Respondent judge in the instant case tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and the
obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and worthy of the people's trust. As this Court has had occasion to
declare: "As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law."

If judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall conduct themselves as respondent
did, in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of the accused, then the people, especially those who
have had recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the members of the Bench and the
judiciary itself shall lose the high moral ground from which it draws its power and strength to compel
obedience to the laws.

Worthy of note is the fact that respondent judge had been previously charged in A.M. No. R-48-MTJ
(Ragir v. de la Peña) with ignorance of the law and incompetence, for having taking cognizance of,
and having decided, a case for frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 5926) over which his court has
no jurisdiction.

From all indications, it is clear from the facts on record and, in the absence of evidence to negate the
perceived bias and partiality which resulted in undue prejudice to the accused, that respondent judge,
through his oppressive and vindictive actuations towards the accused arising from his relationship to the
private complainant in the Criminal Case No. 2577, committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He does
not, therefore, deserve to remain in the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Meljohn de la Peña (Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval,
Leyte) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte is hereby DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
5. Lazo vs. Judge Tiong (A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173, December 15, 1998)
FACTS:
This case involves a complaint against Judge Antonio V. Tiong of the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The complainant, Carlitos Lazo, alleged that Judge
Tiong scheduled the arraignment of the accused, Danilo D. Lazo (brother of the complainant), on a day when the
trial prosecutor assigned to his sala was unavailable. Carlitos also claimed that the warrant of arrest was not
served on the accused until the prosecutor called attention to it. Additionally, Carlitos charged that Judge Tiong
did not inhibit himself from the case until after two months, despite being related to the accused within the fourth
degree of affinity, the wife of the accused being the first cousin of the judge.
In his response, Judge Tiong explained that before the court could commence initial proceedings and early
stages, Carlitos, appealed to him for his intercession in the settlement of their case. Judge Tiong claimed that
attempts to settle the case failed, and that the case was set for arraignment based on the clerk of court's
decision, who set the initial proceedings of cases filed and pending before the court. The case was set on
November 14, 1996, but was deferred because the accused's counsel filed a motion to quash. The arraignment
was reset to November 29, 1996, but was later cancelled due to a motion for postponement filed by the accused.

Judge Tiong held that the proceeding of November 14, 1996, had a semblance of propriety and regularity
because the arraignment was deferred due to the absence of the provincial prosecutor, but was represented by
the accused and the complainant who were both present in court and represented by their respective legal
counsels. Furthermore, Judge Tiong explained that he did not inhibit himself before the arraignment because he
believed that he would only be remiss or shrink from the performance of his duties and obligations attached to his
office if he inhibited himself before the arraignment. He issued an order of self-inhibition on January 3, 1997,
before the filing of the much-awaited motion, to put to rest the issue of inhibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge failed to timely inhibit himself from the case.

RULING:
YES. Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rule of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in
writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge
hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing
orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not
only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no
part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice
impartially and without delay.

Contrary to this Rule, Judge Tiong acted in Criminal Case No. 4384 from November 5, 1996 to January 3, 1997.
He inhibited himself from further consideration of the case only on the latter date, despite the fact that the
complainant filed a motion seeking his inhibition on November 14, 1996.

Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he could make
complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the
accused is his first cousin. Respondents efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of
the law. Because there is no showing that respondent's failure to inhibit himself from the case within a reasonable
time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, the Court thinks that reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong is hereby Reprimanded with Warning that repetition of the same or similar
act or omission will be dealt with more severely.

6. Tan vs. Judge Rosete (A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004)

FACTS:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge, MTC-San
Juan, Metro Manila, for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019.
Respondent judge was handling two criminal cases. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly
sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges Decisions in said
Criminal cases, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent
judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded.

The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in one of the Criminal cases.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a very strong
case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge.

Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was
complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to
derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation
of the decisions in Criminal Cases.

Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her
favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. But he politely
declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he had already
turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation.

Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the down payment of a car he was
planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave
complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct and in effect violated the standard for judicial
conduct.

RULING:

YES. After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence
presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity
and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence
supports her allegation that a member of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent
judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge,
that she pays ₱150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. The respondent’s evidence did not
overcome the facts proved by complainant.

We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the dates
when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was
already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims that he met with her.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of
the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected
to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places
his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.12

Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft
decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the
standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct
which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

SANCTION/PENALTY: SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS

7. Spelmans vs. Judge Ocampo (A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010)
FACTS:

Complainant Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans (Spelmans), a Belgian, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao, a complaint for theft and graft and corruption against respondent Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo (Judge Ocampo) of Polomolok, South Cotabato.

In his affidavit, Spelmans alleged that filed a complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio (Rencio) from whom
Spelmans rented a house in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans claimed, however, that this complaint was
but his wife’s scheme for taking out his personal properties from that house. In the course of the investigation of
the complaint, Judge Ocampo, together with the parties, held an ocular inspection of that rented house and
another one where Spelmans kept some of the personal belongings of his late mother. During the ocular
inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique and other properties belonging to Spelmans (marble
bust, flower pot, statue, copper scale of justice, oakwood chairs and its table, champagne glasses, deer horn
chandelier)

Judge Ocampo denied the charge, pointing out that Spelmans’ wife, Villan (the complainant in that theft case),
gave him certain household items for safekeeping before she filed the case of theft against Rencio. However,
after conducting a preliminary investigation in the case, Judge Ocampo dismissed Villan’s complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Ocampo’s taking and keeping of the personal items belonging to Spelmans but supposedly
given to him by the latter’s wife for safekeeping constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING:

Yes.

Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and Section 1 of Canon 4:

SECTION 6 CANON 1 - Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SECTION 1 CANON 2 - Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 1 CANON 4 - Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

First. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in Polomolok, South Cotabato, Spelmans’ wife, Villan,
would entrust to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for safekeeping. This is essentially suspect
because she would subsequently file, according to Judge Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items that Rencio
supposedly took from Spelmans’ houses.

Second. Judge Ocampo does not deny that he conducted an ocular inspection of the houses that Spelmans used
in Polomolok. But the purpose of this ocular inspection is suspect. Judge Ocampo did not explain what justified it.
The charge was not robbery where he might have an interest in personally looking at where and how the break-in
took place. It was a case of theft where it would be sufficient for the complainant to simply state in her
complaint-affidavit where the alleged theft took place.

Third. If Judge Ocampo received the pieces of antique from Villan for safekeeping, this meant that a relation of
trust existed between them. Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every reason to inhibit himself from the case from
the beginning. He of course claims that he dismissed the case against Rencio eventually but this is no excuse
since his ruling could have gone the other way. Besides, Spelmans claims that the complaint was just a scheme
to enable Villan to steal his personal properties from the two houses. This claim seems believable given the
above circumstances.

Fourth. By his admission, Judge Ocampo returned the items only after four years when Spelmans already filed a
complaint against him. He makes no claim that he made a previous effort to return those supposedly entrusted
items either to Villan or to Spelmans. His years of possession obviously went beyond mere safekeeping.

From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a warehouseman for personal properties
of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint
against him.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo GUILTY of gross misconduct and
IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

8. Retired Judge Martonino Marcos vs. Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller (A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24,
2017)
FACTS:

The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei Marcos during the initiation
rites of Lex Leonum Fraternitas (Lex Leonum) at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued its
Resolution recommending the prosecution of several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of The Anti-Hazing
Law.

Thereafter, the Information for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed. Finding probable cause to sustain the
prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Order, dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of
a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the
accused. 10 days after, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by 3 of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued
another Order directing the recall of the warrants of arrest of the three accused which she claimed were issued
inadvertently.

On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable cause and to withhold
issuance of warrants of arrest and extremely urgent motion to quash warrant of arrest filed by the accused, Judge
Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus Order quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and
ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.

According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused. To her, "there were
nagging questions left unanswered by the testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that boggle the
mind and disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and credence."

The order of dismissal prompted Retired Judge Marcos to file this administrative case against Judge
Cabrera-Faller. According to complainant, Judge Cabrera-Faller clearly demonstrated her incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence when the respondent subsequently held that that the warrant of
arrest was inadvertently issued, by dismissing the case against the accused, and by disregarding the testimonies
of the other neophyte witnesses which corroborated the statements of the star witness about the night of the
incident.

Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the accusations and asserted that alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to
the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should
instead be assailed through judicial remedies.

In its report, OCA found Judge Cabrera-Faller liable for gross ignorance of the law for

1. inadvertently issuing the warrants of arrest against the accused;

2. for sending the record of the case to the archives, even prior to the return/report that the accused
could not be apprehended in violation of the six (6)-month period under Administrative Circular (A.C.)
No. 7-A-92; and

3. for precipitately dismissing Criminal Case No. 11862

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent constitute gross ignorance and incompetence

RULING:

YES, without a quibble, Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic
rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.

A. On the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862

Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (enumerates the circumstances when a
judge may order the archiving of a criminal case) when she issued the June 3, 2013 Order directing the
immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, after ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest
 against the accused in the same order. The archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure designed to
shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is expected.

When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case. She, however, did not cite any
ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings. What she did was unprecedented. She did
not even bother to wait for the return of the warrants or wait for the six month period. By doing so, she
exhibited bias, if not incompetence and ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. It could also be that she
knew it, but she opted to completely ignore the law or the regulations. Certainly, it was a case of grave abuse
of discretion as her actuations were not in accord with law or justice.

B. On the recall of the warrants of arrest that were allegedly issued inadvertently

In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge to personally
determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to
personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Judge Cabrera-Faller failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote that the
warrants of arrest were " inadvertently issued" without any explanation why there was such inadvertence in
the issuance. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the judicial function.

It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to personally determine the
existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. As the presiding judge, it
was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. "When the inefficiency springs from failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either
insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

C. On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11862-13

In the present case, the Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that there was haste in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 11862-13. It must be noted that the Information for the said case was instituted on May 10,
2013. Thereafter, on June 3, 2013, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the order finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Barely 10 days had lapsed, however, or on June 13, 2013, she recalled the
warrants of arrest against three (3) accused due to oversight or inadvertence. And on August 15, 2013, in the
Omnibus Order, she lifted the warrants of arrest she issued and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.

Judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all times in a manner free of any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible
or improper conduct of judges. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and
the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. They are likewise mandated to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at
all times. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep
abreast of the laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands for ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon. Her utter disregard of the laws and rules of
procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13, the recall of the warrant of arrest
which she claimed were issued inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the case displayed her lack of
competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority. All these constitute gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence.

GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

SANCTION/PENALTY: DISMISSAL from service with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits,
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including GOCCs.

9. Florita Palma and Filipina Mercado vs. Judge George Omelio, et al. (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30,
2017)
FACTS: Complainants Mercado and Palma sent an email to the PIO email of the SC regarding an alleged
marriage scam [involving, among others, the Echevarria’s] perpetrated by herein respondent Judges Omelio and
Murcia, and CoC Omelio.

In his comment, Judge Omelio narrated that his neighbors (the Echevarrias) went to his office and requested that
he solemnize the marriage of their son in a beach wedding. Considering that the venue is outside his jurisdiction,
he suggested that they see Judge Murcia instead who has jurisdiction over the venue. He further alleged that
after the wedding, the Echevarrias invited him and his wife to have dinner at their house and during the dinner
they requested him to “reenact” the wedding for purposes of picture taking and posterity, to which he acceded.

Judge Murcia, on the other hand, insisted that his name was never mentioned in the complaint; and that he was
impleaded only because his signature appeared in the subject marriage contract. Judge Murcia claimed that he
solemnized the subject marriage on February 28, 2008 at about 5:30 in the afternoon in his courtroom; that the
contracting parties, as well as their witnesses, appeared before him; and, that all the documents in support of
said marriage, as well as the corresponding receipts for the fees, were presented before him.

After investigation, the Investigating Justice found that:

1. Judge Omelio have trifled with marriage as a social institution and held him administratively liable;
2. As regards Judge Murcia, the Investigating Justice found no infraction on his part in solemnizing the
subject marriage. Instead, his liability consisted in failing to collect the necessary solemnization fees; and
3. Similarly, the Investigating Justice found CoC Omelio administratively liable for failing to collect the
solemnization fees.

In the final report of the investigating justice, he manifested that the documents establish the fact that both
respondent Judges solemnized the marriage but only Judge Murcia’s name and signature appeared in the
Certificate of Marriage. While there are only pictures that support the claim that Judge Omelio also solemnized
the marriage.

The investigating justice further stated in his report that Judge Omelio could not be held liable for falsification
since he did not have any participation at all in the execution of the Certificate of Marriage. His re-enactment of
the marriage did not include the act of preparation of the Certificate of Marriage. Without that public document, it
is also difficult to render a finding on whether or not respondent Judge Omelio may be held liable for performing
an illegal marriage ceremony which is punished under Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, it was
unearthed during the proceedings that no solemnization fee was received by the court, no receipt was issued
corresponding therefor, and no remittance to the Judiciary Development Fund pertaining to said solemnization
fee was made.

Meanwhile, the OCA found all three respondents to have violated Administrative Order No. 125-2007 (AO 125-
2007).

TN: CoC Omelio died during the pendency of the administrative case while judge Omeliio was dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except leave credits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of gross misconduct?

RULING: YES, they are guilty of gross misconduct.

AO 125-2007 provided for the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary and
laid down the rules "to enable the solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of
marriage as a social institution." Specifically:

Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges. — As a general rule, a marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court except (b) where both parties submit a written
request to the solemnizing officer that the marriage be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to this effect.

Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the performance of marriage ceremony. — Before performing the
marriage ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the same contracting parties to the marriage;

b. Personally interview the contracting parties and examine the documents submitted to ascertain if there is
compliance with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the Family Code; and

Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriage. — For the performance of marriage ceremony and issuance of
marriage certificate and subject to further provisions of AM No. 04-2-04-SC (16 August 2004) the legal fees in the
following amounts shall be collected:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Shari'a Circuit Courts — Three hundred (P300.00)
pesos.

Sec. 19. Payment of legal fees in Philippine legal tender. — All fees shall be x x x properly officially receipted.

In this case, although both judges were clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, however, they overstepped
the bounds of their authority.

What further militates against Judge Murcia's version was the fact that he claimed in his Comment to have
examined "all x x x document[s] in support for a valid marriage under the Family Code and the corresponding
receipt of payment for marriage solemnization;" he also attested that "all the documents were in place and x x x
the appropriate fees were paid."
On the other hand, Judge Omelio's contention that he merely reenacted the wedding ceremony was similarly
debunked by Julius' admission that it was actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his marriage at their residence.
Interestingly, although Judge Omelio acknowledged said "marriage" as a sham, he insisted that it was not
contrary to law as the same was conducted only for picture-taking purposes. Worse, although he was supposedly
merely doing a reenactment, Judge Omelio claimed to have allowed additional witnesses/godparents to affix their
signatures in the marriage certificate that was issued and signed by Judge Murcia. Finally, all the guests were
deceived into believing that Judge Omelio was solemnizing a real marriage and not just a mere re-enactment.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Thus, respondent:
1. Judge Omelio is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of P40,000.00 to be
deducted from the money value of his accrued leave credits.
2. Respondent Judge Murcia is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of
P40,000.00.
3. The case filed against CoC Omelia is dismissed.

10. Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014)

FACTS: The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to
have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of
the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding
judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

In his verified complaint, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent
committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence,
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming
of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint where he alleged that the respondent committed an act
of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted
her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed
with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except
probably a brassiere.

Respondent’s comment:
In her comment on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the
social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an
"off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She
further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for
having been aesthetically made.

Complainant’s reply:
The complainant filed a reply, insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining
a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
OCA’s recommendation:
on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack
of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s
act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the
Code.

ISSUE: W/N respondent Judge exhibited conducts unbecoming of a judge and of impropriety, and thus violated
the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct? (YES)

RULING: The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a
social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes
that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold
opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."46
Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of
joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the
course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and
made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what
they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and
contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part.
This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close
friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The
nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive
had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very nature of
their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. Judges necessarily
accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

SANCTION/PENALTY: WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

11. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Romeo Atillo, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-21-018, September 29,
2021)
FACTS: This administrative matter concerns the social media posts of Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr. Branch 31,
RTC Agoo, La Union on his Facebook account that may be considered inappropriate under the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and a violation of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 173-2017, or the Proper
Use of Social Media.

The OCA received printed copies of pictures 1 of Judge Atillo, Jr. allegedly posted on his Facebook account
showing him half-dressed and revealing tattoos on his upper body that were used as "cover photos" and "profile
pictures" in his profile page.

In its letter, the OCA required Judge Atillo, Jr. to file his comment as regards the subject pictures that were posted
on his Facebook account in connection with the possible violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as well
as OCA Circular No. 173-2017.

In compliance therewith, Judge Atillo submitted his comment wherein he explained that his Facebook account
was hacked and during which, his account privacy setting was switched from private to public. He asserted that
the subject pictures showing the tattoos on his body were "exclusively meant for his own viewing pleasure and for
his [Facebook] friends only and never posted for public consumption." Moreover, Judge Atillo, Jr. asserted that
the pictures were inadmissible in evidence because they were illegally obtained from his hacked Facebook
account, in violation of his right to privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3, Article III of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Judge Atillo, Jr. is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as OCA Circular
No. 173 - 2017?
2. Whether Judge Atillo., Jr. is administratively liable for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge for his improper
behavior?

RULING:
1. Yes, Judge Atillo, Jr. guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as OCA Circular
No. 173-2017, when he posted the subject pictures on his Facebook account.

The Court has often reminded judges to always conduct themselves irreproachable and in a manner
exemplifying integrity, honesty, and uprightness, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but also
in their personal lives. 13 In other words, "[t]heir conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum
at all times in order to merit and maintain the public's respect for and trust in the Judiciary.”
 In the case of Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, the Supreme Court explained that while judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate — regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties — creates and contributes to the people's opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of
which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by
his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

In this case, Judge Atillo, Jr. had breached his duty to avoid impropriety, or even just the appearance of
impropriety, when he posted the subject pictures showing his half-dressed body and tattooed torso on his
Facebook account that eventually became readily accessible to the general public.

The Court clarifies that the impropriety in this case relates solely on Judge Atillo, Jr.'s act of posting the
subject pictures on social media, and it has absolutely nothing to do with his choice to have tattoos on his
body. Simply put, by posting the pictures on Facebook, Judge Atillo, Jr. placed himself in a situation
where he, and the status he holds as a sitting judge, became the object of the public's criticism and
ridicule. This is easily evinced by the very fact that an anonymous person saw fit to send the pictures to
the OCA for appropriate disciplinary action.

2. Yes, Judge Atillo., Jr. is administratively liable for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge for his
improper behavior. He cannot simply evade administrative liability by relying on the friend only
privacy setting of his Facebook account as a defense.

Under OCA Circular No. 173-2017, which mandates all members of the Judiciary who participate in
social media to be cautious and circumspect in posting photographs, liking posts, and making comments
in public on social networking sites like Facebook.

To exculpate himself from any administrative liability, Judge Atillo, Jr. primarily argues that he did not
intend to share the subject pictures on social media to be viewed by the general public. He also claims
that the pictures are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.

Guided by the ruling in Vivares, Judge Atillo, Jr.'s Facebook account, therefore, cannot be deemed to be
truly private, even assuming arguendo that his account privacy setting was actually changed without his
consent from "friends" only to public when his account was purportedly hacked in 2019.

Indeed, Judge Atillo, Jr. should have known better than to post highly personal content on his Facebook
account that was viewable not only by his family and close friends, but also, by his "regular followers" 29
or, in other words, members of the general public.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Respondent Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr. is found GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge and is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his professional and personal dealings in social
media and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

In case he asks for the Canons:

 CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve
the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

12. In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011)
FACTS: Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in
connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.1

Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission of
plagiarism in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/n the courts, in writing their decision, citing legal articles, allow plagiarism

RULING: No, the Court’s decision in the present case does not set condon plagiarism. The decision
makes this clear, thus:

To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the
writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to
cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to
produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and
general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.4

There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme Court,
not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their
duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis,
judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are
"to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases,
where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."6

And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in
apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up regarding
such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal
writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases.
And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and
tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious
intent, attributions to the originators.

Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it succinctly.
When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively place their ideas,
their language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being
in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or
incurring some liability.

The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain is not
unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her
dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism
even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical
or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever
sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption
applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary
work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges
adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.

If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of
Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion
acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for
many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with
them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100 years
of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

In this case, specifically in the ruling in Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts
as seen by the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core
of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law
relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three
foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they
developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar
facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts
and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but
done an honest work.

The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare
permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges
of plagiarism for honest work done.

This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers
handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule they
receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they render to
clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed
to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from
the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.

True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their works
and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as
found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning
drafts of the decision.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Case dismissed

13. Mary Jane Abanag vs. Nicolas B. Mabute (A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011)

DOCTRINES:
● Immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
● To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
● Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior.
● The conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with
respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This
is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.

FACTS: This is an administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent), Court Stenographer I in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant) for
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.

In her verified letter-complaint, the complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondent’s promise that he would marry her,
she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent
brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree,
the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed resulting in the loss of her
baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered.
In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator, the respondent vehemently
denied the complainant’s allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and
fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation.

Upon investigation, the complainant testified that she met the respondent while she was a member of the
Singles for Christ. They became acquainted and they started dating. The relationship blossomed until they lived
together in a rented room near the respondent’s office.

The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant when he joined the Singles for Christ. He
described their liaison as a dating relationship. He admitted that the complainant would join him at his rented
room three to four times a week; when the complainant became pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with
him. He vehemently denied having brought the complainant to a local "manghihilot" and that he had tried to
force her to abort her baby. He surmised that the complainant’s miscarriage could be related to her epileptic
attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further testified that the complainant’s mother did not approve of
him, but the complainant defied her mother and lived with him. He proposed marriage to the complainant, but
her mother did not like him as a son-in-law and ordered the complainant to return home. The complainant
obeyed her mother. They have separated ways since then, but he pledged his undying love for the complainant.

The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent, reporting that:

Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and has maintained an amorous relation with
a woman equally unmarried has nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is between two
consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was
not forced to live with Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or machination. The fact was, she
freely acceded to cohabit with him. The situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There appears no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of two
unmarried persons. So, the accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was calculated to bring
the act within the ambit of an immoral, disgraceful and gross misconduct. Except however as to the self-serving
assertion that Mary Jane was brought to a local midwife and forced to take the abortifacient, there was no other
evidence to support that it was in fact so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no small way
Mary Jane was also responsible of what befell upon her.

ISSUE/S: WON the acts committed by Mabute was considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct.

RULING: No, the acts committed by Mabute was not considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct.

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents comment, and the findings of the Investigating
Judge, we find that the acts complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. We
find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the respondent were consensual.

The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy
between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry
and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment
or disciplinary action.

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is
not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those
that will affect their and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should
or should not marry. However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more
circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
conduct of court personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect
to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best
way to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute,
Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs

14. Gacad vs. Judge Clapis (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)
FACTS:
Gacad’s brother was murdered. Because of this, Gacad went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, to file criminal charges against the suspect who gunned down her brother
Gregorio Cardenas. They met provincial prosecutor Graciano Arafol, Jr. (Arafol), who advised them not to hire a
private counsel. Thereafter, Arafol informed Gacad that he filed a complaint for murder against the suspect but
the Provincial Governor kept on pressuring him about her brother’s case. Arafol suggested that they see Judge
Clapis so he would deny the Motion for Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused Rodolfo Comania (accused).
Arafol, further, told Gacad to prepare an amount of P50,000 for Judge Clapis.

Subsequently, Gacad met Judge Clapis in a café to discuss about the denial of the reinvestigation to be filed by
the accused. Judge Clapis agreed but with a consideration valued at Php50,000. Pursuant to the agreement,
Gacad paid the amount. Consequently, Judge Clapis issued an order denying the reinvestigation. Subsequently,
Arafol told Gacad that Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000 from her for his mother’s hospitalization. Arafol
handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However,
Gacad failed to produce the P50,000.

Gacad alleged that, from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to "play different hideous schemes" to prejudice
their case.

Firstly, Judge Clapis set hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010, and 1 March 2010. However, the Notices
for Hearings were mailed only on 1 March 2010 and were received by Gacad only on 3 March 2010.

Secondly, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition for bail on 29 March 2010, which Gacad came to know only
inadvertently since she received no notice for the hearing. During the 29 March 2010 hearing, Public Prosecutor
Alona Labtic moved that the petition for bail be put in writing. However, the counsel for the accused manifested
that he was not prepared for a written petition because it was only right before the hearing that the accused
informed him of Arafol’s agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis calendared the case for speedy trial. He set a
continuous hearing for the petition for bail on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.
On 8 April 2010, the accused filed a Petition For Bail while Gacad filed a Motion For Inhibition of Judge Clapis.
On 18 May 2010, Judge Clapis granted the accused’s Petition For Bail. On 24 May 2010, Judge Clapis issued a
Notice of Preliminary Conference set on 2 December 2010. On 1 June 2010, Judge Clapis inhibited himself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Clapis is liable for corruption.
Whether or not Judge Clapis is liable for gross misconduct.

RULING:

As to the allegation of corruption

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden to prove his accusations against respondent with
substantial evidence or such amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. This Court has consistently ruled that charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be
given credence.

In the present case, there is indeed no substantial evidence that Judge Clapis received the P50,000 given by
Gacad to Arafol, and that Judge Clapis tried to borrow another P50,000 from Gacad secured by a check allegedly
signed by Judge Clapis himself. The testimony of Gacad, stating that Judge Clapis received P50,000 and tried to
borrow another P50,000 from her, both through Arafol, cannot be given due weight for being hearsay evidence.
On the other hand, although Baylosis testified based on his personal knowledge, he did not categorically state
that he saw Arafol give the money to Judge Clapis. In addition, the check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis was in
the account name of Arafol as attested by the BPI Business Manager’s Certification. Hence, Gacad fell short of
the required degree of proof needed in an administrative charge of corruption.

As to the allegation of gross misconduct

Yes, Judge Clapis is liable for gross misconduct.

Jurisprudence teaches us that while the respondent judge, in that case, may not be held liable for extortion and
corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made accountable for gross misconduct.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

The following acts give rise to the finding of gross misconduct:

1. Meeting with a litigant
2. Manner of conduct the trial
3. Granting bail

On the meeting with a litigant

Here, the acts of Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a litigant in a case pending before his sala, and telling her,
"Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila" (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.), both favoring
Gacad, constitute gross misconduct.

On the manner of conducting the trial

The subsequent actions of the judge bolster the allegations of gross misconduct. Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention
and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were
mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an
application for bail and granted bail without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set,
patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the
blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in
their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility.

The aforementioned actions give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross
misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly:

CANON 2. INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL
OFFICE BUT ALSO TO THE PERSONAL DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICE. IT

APPLIES NOT ONLY TO THE DECISION ITSELF BUT ALSO TO THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE DECISION
IS TO BE MADE.

Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest
fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue

CANON 4. PROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF PROPRIETY ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE

PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE ACTIVITIES OF A JUDGE.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

On the granting of bail

Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that "at the hearing of an application for bail filed by the person who is in custody
for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. x x x." This rule presupposes that: (1) an application
for bail was filed, and

(2) the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to adduce evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused.

In the present case, the records show that Judge Clapis set the first bail hearing on 29 March 2010 yet the
Petition For Bail was filed only on 8 April 2010. Furthermore, the 12, 13 and 14 April 2010 bail hearings reveal
that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to be heard in court. During the 12 April 2010 hearing, Gacad
appeared by herself because the private prosecutor, who was to appear in her behalf, filed a Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel. Gacad requested for more time to secure a new private counsel. Gacad also manifested that she
already filed a motion for Arafol to inhibit from the case. Judge Clapis allowed her to secure a new private
counsel but the hearing proceeded with the accused alone being given the opportunity to present his evidence. It
was only during the 14 April 2010 hearing, the last day of hearing, that Gacad was represented by another public
prosecutor since she could not secure a new private counsel. But immediately after the defense completed
presenting its evidence in support of its bail application, the petition for bail was submitted for resolution. The
prosecution was not given an opportunity to present evidence to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judge Clapis’ Order granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness
that was submitted earlier. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper procedure in granting bail.

As to penalties
Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or
procedure are both classified as serious charges, for which the imposable penalties are any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Judge Clapis had already been administratively sanctioned in Humol v. Clapis Jr., where he was fined P30,000
for gross ignorance of the law. In this previous case, the Court sanctioned Judge Clapis for his failure to hear and
consider the evidence of the prosecution in granting bail to the accused. His order relied solely on the arguments
of counsel for the accused. In that case, the Court reminded Judge Clapis of the duties of a trial judge when an
application for bail is filed, but in the present case, he ignored the same. Therefore, we now impose upon him the
extreme administrative penalty of dismissal from the service

SANCTION/PENALTY: DISMISSAL of Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley from the service for Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law, with
forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave credits.

15. Tobias vs. Judge Limsiaco (A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011)
FACTS:
In her verified Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Limsiaco, Jr. offers "package deals"
for cases filed in the court where he presides. She stated that sometime in June 2006, she requested her
sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the Fourth MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental about the requirements needed in filing an ejectment case. Court Stenographer Salvacion
Fegidero allegedly proposed to Vollmer that for the sum of ₱30,000.00, the respondent would provide the
lawyer, prepare the necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment case which they
contemplated filing against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Fegidero allegedly required them
to pay the initial amount of ₱10,000.00 and the remaining balance would be paid in the course of the
proceedings. It was made clear that they would not get any judicial relief from their squatter problem unless
they accepted the package deal.

An ejectment case was filed in respondent’s court. Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty. Robert G.
Juanillo to represent the complainant in the ejectment case. Complainant stated that respondent, however,
immediately demanded for an additional payment of ₱10,000.00. She allegedly refused to give the
additional amount and earned the ire of respondent. She asked her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to request Atty.
Robert Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel, which he did on April 16, 2007. Complainant also asked
Vollmer to withdraw the case.

In his Comment, respondent denounced the allegation that he offers "package deals" to prospective litigants
as malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied that he demanded from complainant the additional payment of
₱10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know complainant and she is a total stranger to him.

Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit of Atty. Robert G. Juanillo and Court Stenographer
Salvacion B. Fegidero denying the claims of the complainant. Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the
complainant did not have personal knowledge of the alleged "package deals" to litigants who file cases in
the court of respondent. The allegations in the Complaint were all based on the information relayed to
complainant though telephone by her sister, Lorna Vollmer.

The OCA found respondent’s acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna Vollmer about the ejectment case she
was about to file before his court; (2) recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo as counsel of the complainant in
the ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, to be
violative of the rules on integrity, impartiality, and propriety contained in the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge.

RULING:
Yes.

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor
of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself
but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct. Respondent’s act of preparing the
Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so doing,
respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his court, considering
that the said motion was filed in his own sala and was acted upon by him. 1avvphi1
Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge under Section
8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the sanctions against a
respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the following:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations; Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note that respondent had been found
guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1509 and was fined ₱20,000.00, with a warning against
repetition of the same or similar act. Moreover, per verification from court records, respondent compulsorily
retired from the service on May 17, 2009.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Respondent is GUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is FINED in the amount of
Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct
the fine of ₱25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.

16. Chan vs. Judge Majaducon (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, October 15, 2003)
FACTS:
A "concerned citizen" charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon with during court sessions and with being
habitually not wearing his black tardy. Complainant Eugenio K. Chan also charged respondent judge with
committing "acts of improprieties and irregularities. He also alleged that respondent judge starts his hearings at
10:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:30-3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and does not wear his robe despite the
requirement of the Supreme Court. Chan likewise alleged that respondent judge entertains lawyers of litigants in
his sala despite the absence of the opposing lawyers his refusal to wear the judicial robe during court sessions,
respondent judge alleged that upon his doctor's advice, he stopped wearing the judge's robe during court
sessions because doing so allegedly triggers and aggravates his hypertension. He promised to resume wearing
the robe once his blood pressure had stabilized. On entertaining counsels/litigants in his chambers, respondent
admitted entertaining litigants and their counsels with pending cases in his sala as his "chamber's two doors are
always open." He claimed, however, that he never discussed with his visitors the merits of their cases and that
he has never been "influenced" by them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable for violation of Administrative Circular No. 25 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct - YES

RULING:
On Respondent Judge’s Refusal to Wear the Mandated Judicial Robe
Circular No. 25 dated June 9, 1989, (“Circular No. 25) provides: Pursuant to Section 5 and 6, Article VIII of the
COnstitution and in order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby
directed that beginning Tuesday, August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes
during sessions of their respective Courts.
The Supreme Court found the respondent judge guilty of violating Circular No. 25 dated June 9, 1989, Rules 1.01
and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. According to the Court, while circumstances, such as the
medical condition claimed by the respondent judge, may exempt one from complying with Circular No. 25, he
must first secure the Court’s permission for such exemption. Neither does the fact that the respondent judge, if he
is to be believed, has resumed wearing the robe, exculpates him from liability. Respondent judge’s medical
condition and his subsequent compliance serve only to mitigate his liability. The COurt also found the respondent
judge’s practice of entertaining lawyers and litigants with pending cases in his sala to be highly improper.

On respondent Judge’s Practice of Entertaining Lawyers and LItigants with Pending Cases in his Sala
The Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”) provides: Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01 - A judge should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
CANON 4 - PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Pay a fine of ₱10,000, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he is entitled.
17. Dawa vs. Judge De Asa (A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998)
FACTS:
Presiding Judge Armando De Asa was charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness by Floride
Dawa, Femenina Barreto, and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto were employed as stenographic reporters,
while Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of
the Clerk of Court. They charged De Asa for allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing them on the lips. In
view of the allegations in the Complaint, the Supreme Court placed respondent judge under preventive
suspension and referred the case to retired Justice Romulo Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the Court
Administrator.

A month later, Clerk of Court Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, who assisted the aforementioned complainants, also
filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge De Asa for sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious
misconduct, and violation of the high standard of morals demanded by judicial ethics. The Supreme Court then
resolved to consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and also referred it to Justice Quimbo for inclusion in
his investigation, report, and recommendation.

Complainants and respondent presented their respective witnesses. Two of Judge de Asa’s witnesses were his
court staff, who testified that he was an official who was faithful to his job, observed office hours religiously,
friendly and helpful to his personnel, and very approachable whenever they needed anything. They also testified
that they had not heard of him being guilty of any improper conduct; and that, on the contrary, he was the object
of praise in his work even as a lawyer and as a fiscal.

Respondent: Judge De Asa claimed that all these charges were obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated.
He accused the Clerk of Court, Atty. Buencamino, as the prime mover of this, and that aside from her there were
other people behind the conspiracy who had yet to be uncovered. The complaints were set up, hatched and
designed, to destabilize and destroy his good image. Although known to be strict in fining lawyers, litigants, court
personnel, he had gained respect and admiration for his reasonable, well-balanced, compassionate and
well-meant application of the rule of law.

Justice Quimbo: After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the parties, Justice Quimbo arrived at a
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the acts he is
charged with.

1. The testimonies of the three complainants were not in any manner emasculated by the lengthy and
thorough cross examination personally conducted by the respondent. Incidentally, the investigation had to be
recessed several times to give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke down in tears
as they were required to relate the repeated violations of their persons and their honors by respondent.

2. Complainants’ declarations were fully corroborated by the persuasive testimony of Judge Santiago who
had the opportunity of hearing Dawa’s story soon after it had occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other
complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote a verified letter to the Court Administrator, wherein she
narrated all that she knew of the different incident.

3. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It is highly
improbable that the three complainants would perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who
may have had some real or imagined resentment against respondent. The fact that respondent was strict in
requiring the employees of the court to perform their duties is not enough to motivate the three women into
exposing themselves to ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories
that would also be derogatory to them.

4. Respondent’s denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive assertions of complainants
and their witnesses. Neither were the negative observations of respondent’s witnesses sufficient to belie the
complainants’ declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that they had not seen respondent do anything
obscene to the complainants nor to others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that they did
not occur, especially so because they were all done in the privacy of respondent’s chambers.

Thus, Justice Quimbo recommended that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross misconduct and
immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De Asa violated the Code of Judicial Ethics.

RULING:
Yes. The Court reviewed the entire record of the administrative case and found the findings, conclusion, and
recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence presented by the
parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Court adopted the conclusion and
recommendation of the investigating justice.

The people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge
and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. More than simply projecting an image of probity, a judge must not
only appear to be a “good judge”; he must also appear to be a “good person.” It is towards this sacrosanct goal of
ensuring the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the
following:
CANON 1. A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
RULE 1.01. — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
CANON 2. A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPRORIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his
official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore
paramount that a judge’s personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. For this reason, the Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. This
mandate has special import for municipal and metropolitan trial court judges, like herein respondent, since they
are the “front-liners” of the judiciary who serve more people at the “grass-roots” level of society.

Here, respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court
of which he is an officer. Thus, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge in
subjecting the complainants, who were all his subordinates, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of
the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely
abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment
because they necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees.

In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and official responsibility over the
complainants, who were his subordinates in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Supreme Court
concluded with moral certainty that Judge De Asa acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality, and propriety
and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Therefore, as recommended by Justice Quimbo, respondent Judge de Asa was DISMISSED from the service for
gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
18. Anonymous vs. Judge Achas (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013)

FACTS:

The SC received an anonymous letter-complaint, alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against
respondent Judge Rio C. Achas.

The letter alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a
woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities, the kuratongs; (
4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.

Executive Judge Angot conducted an Investigation. She found that Judge Achas had been separated from his
legal wife and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he would occasionally go out with in public
and it was not a secret around town.

Achas denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for
26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his forefathers.
OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality and that he be ordered to
refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges were recommended to be dismissed for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Achas be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES.

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, “anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they
must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity.” Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of
proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by
indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof
is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense. In the present case, no evidence
was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth
during the investigation. The other charges were properly dismissed by the OCA. The charges that (1) it is of
public knowledge that he is living scandalously with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling are another matter.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides:

“CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

“CANON 4

PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
 SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.”

It is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his
wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary.

Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence. While gamecocks are
bred and kept primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he goes to cockpits and gambles. Judge Achas should
avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting bettors as it impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose
upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.

SANCTION/PENALTY: REPRIMANDED AND FINED in the amount of P5,000, ADMONISHED not to socially
mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

19. Spouses Causin vs. Judge Demecillo (A.M. No. RTJ-04-1860, September 8, 2004)
FACTS:
1. This is an administrative complaint against RTC Judge Leonardo Demecilli (Br 24 of Cagayan
de Oro City)
2. They charged the Judge bias and partiality, violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for
allowing another RTC judge to participate in a case pending before his sala as counsel for the
plaintiff without authority from this Court, and for knowingly, rendering an unjust decision.
3. That the other Judge attended the hearings in the case, cross-examined the witnesses,
interposed objections at the trials, chose the hearing dates and delivered pral arguments in
court
a. All without special authority from the Court
b. When confronted, the other Judge refused to confirm whether he was hired by the
plaintiffs to represent them in said case
4. The respondent Judge allowed the other Judge to actively participate and intervene in the
proceedings although he knew that the latter was not authorized by this Court to do so,
respondent Judge extended unwarranted consideration to the plaintiffs as follows:
a. He would wait for the arrival of the other Judge in court whenever the latter would be
late for a hearing
b. A scheduled hearing in the morning would be transferred by respondent Judge in the
afternoon when he would learn that the other Judge could not make it in the morning
session
c. Respondent Judge would reset the hearings based solely on the convenience of the
other Judge.
d. All the unreasonable objections interposed by the other Judge furing the trial were
sustained by respondent judge
 e. Finally, complainant-spouses charged the respondent Judge knoowingly rendered an
unjust decision in the case when he awarded the disputed portion of the land to plaintiff
Lim without considering the merits of their evidence.
5. Demecillo contended the following:
a. That he allowed Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs as he presumed that
the latter had sought prior authority to do so from this Court.
b. Pointed out that under Sec 21 of Rule 138 of the ROC, an attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears.
c. He also argued that the complainants failed to file a motion questioning the authority of
Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs in said case.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent Judge violated the Code of Judciai Conduct

RULING:
Yes but only as to Canon 2 of the Code which prescribes that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01 provides that a judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. In the case at bar, the records reveal that respondent judge
allowed Judge Lim to actively participate and intervene in the case for quieting of title, without authority
from this Court.

The prohibition for a judge to appear in a case as counsel for one of the parties is based on public
policy. In allowing Judge Lim to actively involve himself in the trial of the case, represent the interests of
the plaintiff therein, cross-examine the witnesses and register his objections during the trial, the
complainants and the public were given the impression that Judge Lim might or could unduly influence
the conduct and outcome of the litigation.

It undermined and compromised in the eyes of the public the integrity and independence of his court. It
was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire from Judge Lim whether he obtained authority from
this Court to appear in said case.

The rule that a lawyer is presumed to be authorized to appear before a court applies only to lawyers,
not judges. Judges are prohibited from being personally involved in a case unless he himself is a party
thereto. Respondent judge transgressed the rule pertaining to the avoidance, not only of actual
impropriety, but even the appearance of impropriety.

Court has stressed in countless cases that judges ought not only to be impartial but should also appear
to be impartial. They should continuously encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
judicial duties to reinforce public confidence in the judicial process which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial integrity

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Respondent Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo is meted the penalty of fine in the amount of one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
with a stern warning that a repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

20. Atty. Seludo vs. Judge Fineza (A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004)
FACTS:
In a complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge
Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The complaint alleged that during a hearing for a complaint for revocation of notarial commission against the
complainant filed by the respondent judge due to the issue of non-compliance of Seludo with the requirements of
notarial duties, the latter insulted the complainant with vulgar and insulting words, calling him, “Putang-ina mo
eh!” because allegedly during the hearing, Atty. Seludo was laughing while respondent judge was speaking.
Furthermore, he also stated that Atty. Seludo “has a moronic attitude”.

Respondent judge alleged that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes since November, 2002,
causing him considerable anxiety and pain which must be the reason why he could not control his outburst. He
further alleged that complainant was unkind and impolite to him and that he kept on interrupting him. In fact, after
his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him.

On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on the ground that he is no longer
interested in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from the judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Fineza has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
YES. The judge's use of vulgar language is a clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct's standard of judicial
temperament. Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:

"Canon 2

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL

ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01. – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

xxx

Canon 3

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND
DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIES

xxx
 Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced,
to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants."

In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid", "if he knows how to read English" and "putang ina mo" to
complainant during the proceeding before the Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming
of a magistrate. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent was suffering
from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse.

We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires that they must at all times be
temperate in their language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting "to the
language of vilification." In the same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos, we held that although, respondent judge may
attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from
him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and in language.

Furthermore, this is not respondent's first offense. We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, this administrative offense is considered serious, punishable under Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and
Section 11, paragraph A(3), thus:

"Sec. 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges include:

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an

appropriate proceeding;

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

x x x."

"Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00."

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
21. Dr. Paderanga, et al. vs. Judge Paderanga, et al. (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, August 17, 2015)
FACTS:

Complainants and Respondent Judge are siblings of full blood being the children of the late Narciso and Rosario
Paderanga in the following order: Complainant Dulce; Complainant Dra. Amor; Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr.
(Narciso Jr.); Respondent Judge; Complainant Carmen; Complainant Patria; and Complainant Dra. Corazon.

The five Complainants present common and separate causes of action against the Respondent Judge. The
allegations in their Complaint after amendments can be summarized as follows:

Complainants aver that Respondent Judge, being a magistrate, failed to exert any effort to mediate the
differences and misunderstandings between his siblings. They refer particularly to those incidents between
Narciso, Jr. and Corazon culminating in the filing of charges and counter-charges against each other as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 2003-325 for Torts and Damages entitled "Spouses Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr. and Alma
Paderanga v. Dr. Corazon D. Paderanga" wherein the latter was enjoined to cease and desist from sending
malicious text messages to the spouses plaintiffs;

2. Criminal Case No. M4-01-255 for Unjust Vexation entitled "People of the Philippines v. Corazon D Paderanga";

3. A criminal case for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr. docketed as I.S. No.
2003-5193 which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor in a Resolution dated November 14, 2003;

4. Complaint for Deportation against Narciso, Jr. filed by Dra. Corazon before the Bureau of Immigration; and

5. Criminal Case Nos. 410737-CR and 410738-CR for Falsification of Public Official Document filed against
Narciso, Jr. and Alma Paderanga, respectively.

The complainants also allege that Respondent Judge compounded the trouble between his siblings when he
instigated, encouraged and advised Narciso, Jr. to file charges against his sister, Dra. Corazon. They likewise
state that being a judge, Respondent has the authority and moral obligation to settle disputes brewing within the
family;

Lastly, they assert that the Respondent Judge abused his power as a judge by continuously trying to harass and
oppress his female siblings by threatening to file Civil and Criminal cases against Carmencita and Dulce for not
giving him his share of the fruits of the land held in common by the three of them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not his issuance of the warrant of arrest against Patria amounted to gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of authority.

RULING:

YES. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disqualifications of judicial officials, including
the Members of the Court itself, provides:cralawlawlibrary

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct reprises the foregoing rule, to wit:alawlawlibrary

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable
to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or
lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to
counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;

The Court has been clear about the compulsory disqualification of judges related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party being a duty designed to free the adjudication of cases from suspicion as to its fairness and integrity.

In Garcia v Dela pena, The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant
case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on
the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a
judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

The respondent's issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an outright violation of the stringent
rules on compulsory disqualification. For him, self-disqualification was absolute and should have been immediate.

The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification, are basic legal guidelines
that must be at the palm of every judge's hands.19 They are as basic as a rule of thumb. That the respondent
disobeyed them should render him fully accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.

The court said that As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and
 awareness to obey the law." If judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold the Constitution, shall conduct
themselves as respondent did, in wanton disregard and violation of the rights of the accused, then the
people, especially those who have had recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the
members of the Bench and the judiciary itself shall lose the high moral ground from which it draws its
power and strength to compel obedience to the laws.

SANCTION/PENALTY: FINE of P40,000.00 to be deducted from the retirement benefits due him.

22. Oktubre vs. Judge Velasco (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, 434 SCRA 636, July 22, 2004)
FACTS:

Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one D'Arcy, a non-resident American. D'Arcy is the widow of Abraham
Paler. The Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew. After Abraham’s death, D'Arcy, through the complainant,
administered the Paler building.

After his appointment to the MTC Maasin, respondent Judge, with DArcys permission, stayed in the Paler
building for a few days. He sought an extension of his stay but DArcy turned down his request since during her
next visit to the country she would use the room respondent Judge then occupied.

Thereafter,Judge Velasco in a surprise move sent letters xxx to the tenants of the building in which he passed
himself off as the administrator of the estate of Gaspar Paler [Abraham's father] and co-heir of Abraham Paler,
and directed said tenants to deposit their monthly rentals to his office at [the] Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

Judge Velasco sent a strongly worded letter to Dr. Darcy with the very obvious purpose of intimidating the
latter.The letter contains categorical declarations that he is taking over possession of the building,
misrepresentation among others of Judge Velasco that he did it in collaboration with his other relatives. Worse,
he used his office's (MTC) letterhead for this personal but threatening 5-page letter.

Judge Velasco without my knowledge and permission moved out from the garage [of the Paler building] the
service jeep owned by DArcy and put it outside of the building causing it to be exposed to the sun and rain.

Judge Velasco destroyed the padlock of my room and changed it with another one including the second floor
entrance padlock to the third floor with the precise purpose of controlling the ingress and egress of the said
building.

The complainant was issued a warrant of arrest which showed that the complainant committed robbery and it was
issued/signed by Judge Velasco (This was supported by the sole affidavit of Judge Velasco). Consequently,
complainant was locked up in jail for 6 hours. (followed by a case of malicious mischief, falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents against complainant)

Because of these events, complainant filed this complaint and prays that the court discipline respondent judge
velasco.

In his defense, respondent judge velasco claimed that he merely acted to protect his maternal co-heirs interest in
the Paler building and in the other properties claimed by DArcy.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10,000 for Grave
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.

ISSUE:

WON respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority.

RULING:

Yes.

Canon 2, Rule 2.03 (Rule 2.03) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) provides:

A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.The prestige
of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Rule 3.12 of the Code (Rule 3.12), which is substantially similar to Rule 137, Section 1 (Rule 137, Section 1) of
the 1964 Rules of Court, mandates that:

A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned.These
cases include, among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy,
or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein;

(c) the judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within
the fourth degree;

(e) the judge knows that the judges spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.

In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

In the case at hand, respondent Judge does not deny sending several letters bearing his salas letterhead on
matters involving an apparent dispute in the administration of the estates of two relatives. Even if he is the
administrator of the estates of Abraham and Gaspar Paler (Gaspar), Abraham's father, and representative of his
maternal co-heirs, respondent Judge has no business using his salas letterhead for private matters. Respondent
Judge should know that a courts letterhead should be used only for official correspondence. Respondent Judge
aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he further required them to pay their rent at the MTC
Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler building.
In accordance with the criminal complaints by respondent judge velasco, although he is the complainant in the
three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Furthermore, respondent
Judge does not deny that he did not conduct a preliminary investigation on the complaint for Robbery where he
issued the warrant of arrest against complainant.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations.However, he
shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this date.

23. Hilado, et al. vs. Judge Reyes, et al. (G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006)
Doctrine:

Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution guarantees a general right - the right to information on matters of “public
concern” and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to “official records.” The right to information on
“matters of public concern or of public interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of
access to public document.

The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts.
It includes the official collection of all papers, records of evidence whether in physical or electronic form exhibits
and pleadings filed by the parties and which are in the possession of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of
rendering court decisions.

GR: Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based.

EXPT: If any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court fees

FACTS:

Private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto, the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed a
petition for issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21
presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes herein public respondent.

Julita Benedicto was, by Order appointed Administratix of the estate of Benedicto. Herein petitioners has during
the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the RTC of Bacolod City two complains for damages or collection of sums of
money against Roberto Benediction, et. al.

From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed
petitioners to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies
thereof. However, by Dec. 2003, they were denied access to the last folder-record of the case which was,
according to court’s clerical staff, could not be located and was probably inside the chambers of Judge Reyes for
safekeeping.
Petitioners' counsel thus requested Judge Reyes, by letter to be allowed to personally check the records of the
case. Acting on the letter, Office-in-Charge of Branch 21 advised petitioners’ counsel in writing that “per
instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge, only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire
or verify the status of the pending case.

Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate’s inventory, petitioners’ counsel sent the Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter requesting to be furnished with the following:

1. certified true copies of the “updated inventory”;

2. certified true copies of the order issued by the court during the hearing; and
3. Transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon.

By order, Judge Reyes indicated that petitioners had no standing to request for certified true copies of the
indicated documents. Thus, Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel Judge Reyes to
allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of nay and all documents forming part of the records of the
case and disqualify public respondent from further presiding thereover.

In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the
right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.

Now, Petitioners filed an administrative complaint against Judge Reyes praying for the imposition of appropriate
disciplinary sanctions against public respondent for, among other things, denying them their right to access the
docket of the case.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in denying the complainants access to the court records.

RULING:

Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right — the right to information on matters of
"public concern" and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the like. The right to
information on "matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the purpose and the limit of the
constitutional right of access to public documents.

The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts.
It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued
and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which
are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court
decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph,
film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in
physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official
business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.

In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it
relates to or affect the public.

Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not
be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which
the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. In thus determining which part or
all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered.

In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their right to a
share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor
before the disposition of the estate.

Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which his
private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the
public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting unrestricted public access
and publicity to personal financial information may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an
individual may have an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination.

In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the
obvious prejudice to any of the parties.

In this case, Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records — to monitor prompt compliance with the
Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and
appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting — appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an
interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, the Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being "interested persons" who have a
legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Mandamus is GRANTED.

—-------------------------------------------

Another issue: Prohibition (petitioners seek to inhibit Judge Reyes)

Ruling: (they cannot inhibit the judge)

Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court which govern disqualification of judges provide:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree,
 computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek
public respondent's inhibition, whether under the first paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes
grounds for mandatory disqualification, or under the second paragraph of the same section on voluntary
disqualification.

24. Sy vs. Judge Dinopol (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011)
FACTS: Metrobank foreclosed a mortgage where herein complainant was one of the mortgagors. At the public
auction, metrobank was the highest bidder and the mortgagors, including complainant, failed to redeem the
mortgaged property within the redemption period.

Thereafter, Sps. Sy and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC in Koronadal,
presided by respondent Judge Dinopol, a Civil Case against Metrobank. Respondent judge, however, later on
inhibited himself from the said civil case on the ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking
officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July
2003) from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid
being charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.

Following this, Metrobank filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land
subject of the foreclosed mortgage against the mortgagors, to which Judge Dinopol granted. [Misc. Case]

Meanwhile, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC in Marawi a petition, entitled In the
Matter of: Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan which was also granted, thus, an order was issued staying the enforcement of all claims
against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor. The same court subsequently
approved the rehabilitation plan. In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the
writ of possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order issued by the
RTC in Marawi.

Consequently, the mortgagors filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and
the approval of the rehabilitation plan by the Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias
and partiality on the part of Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order and directed Deputy
Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the writ of execution.

Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint charging Judge Dinopol of gross ignorance of the
law and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Sy alleged, among others, that while the Civil Case was
pending in Judge Dinopol's sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials to
be used in the construction of the judge's house. The transaction was evidenced by delivery receipt and charge
invoices. Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans from him
on various occasions in the total amount of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki
Multi-cab and returned it after the judge was suspended.

In his defense, Judge Dinopol denied Sy’s allegations and claimed that when he obtained the commodity loans
from Sy he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case. He explained that Misc. Case was filed and
was assigned to his sala later on.

ISSUE: Whether the judge may obtain a loan from a party to a case?

RULING: No, a judge may not obtain a loan from a party to case.

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judge's impartiality provides, inter alia, as follows:

Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.

Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will
be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. These standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the
process by which the decision is made.

In this case, Judge Dinopol committed a serious impropriety in his or his family's financial or business dealings
with Sy. There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from Sy. The
judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy regarding the purchase of materials for his house which was then under
construction, although he claimed that it was his wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to
deliver the materials to his residence.

Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for the building
materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his position as a judge. Although at the
time he and his family had business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the businessman, he
should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The sphere of Sy's business
operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a
case might be filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and
financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case
and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court."

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Thus, Judge Dinopol is GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

25. Catbagan vs. Judge Barte (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, April 6, 2005)

FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint, addressed to the Honorable Chief Justice, through the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), complainant Editha O. Catbagan charged respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte of the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Tobias Fornier, Antique with "grave and serious misconduct." In the first
week of May 1999, complainant received information that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc.
(Church) was interested in buying land in the Province of Antique. She immediately approached respondent
judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective transaction. Together with a certain Abraham Pedriña,
the three agreed that in case they succeeded in brokering the sale of the properties to the Church, their
commission would be divided in this manner:

x x x the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every sale transaction if the purchase price
exceed One Million Pesos, the two of us will receive a commission of P100,000.00 each while the remaining
amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as his commission based on his agreement with the vendors.

When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge allegedly answered: "A municipal trial judge
occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is the closest in reach to the public he serves and he must
accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity." Complainant did not insist on her request
after hearing this.

They offered the parcels of land owned by Bitoon Cezar and Aurea Clarin in Sibalom, Antique. Thereafter, the
Church agreed to purchase lots 336-A and 336-B owned by Bitoon Cezar, Lot 334 owned by Aurea Clarin, and
lot 5555 located in Hamtic, Antique owned by Eleanor M. Checa-Santos. For the first two sales, complainant
claimed she was entitled to a P300,000 commission. Since the Church transacted with respondent only, it paid
the price of the properties to him. Respondent then delivered the amount due to the vendors. When complainant
heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her commission from respondent. However, respondent
offered her only P25,000 for the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic. Complainant later learned that
respondent received a P435,226.55 commission from the Aurea Clarin transaction alone. Complainant reminded
respondent of their agreement but respondent challenged complainant "to go to court." Instead of pursuing her
claim in a civil suit, however, complainant opted to file the present administrative case against respondent.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is administrative liable for his admitted financial and business dealings? (YES)

RULING: In Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte, respondent judge was also charged with
grave and serious misconduct for refusing to give the complainants therein their respective commissions in the
sale of land to the Manila Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. The Court, in that case,
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[a] judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that
tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage
investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification."

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from "x x x making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court x x x."

As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from participating in the transaction. By
allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the properties, respondent increased the possibility of his
disqualification in the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of sale arose. Moreover, the possibility that
the parties in the sale might have appeared before his court was not remote and his business dealings with them
would have then created a doubt about his fairness and impartiality.

SANCTION/PENALTY: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty of violating
Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is his second offense, he is hereby
SUSPENDED for six (6) months. He is hereby warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a penalty
beyond mere suspension from public office.
 26. Atty. Gandeza, Jr. vs. Judge Maria Clarita Tabin (A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, July 25, 2011)

FACTS:

· Atty. Gandeza alleged that his car driven by his driver collided with respondent Judge Tabis’s nephew’s car.

· That when Atty. Gandeza arrived at the accident site, he saw Judge Tabin talking with the police investigator
and that Judge Tabin approached him and in a harsh tone accused Atty. Gandeza’s driver to be the one at
fault and was under the influence of liquor.

· At the hospital, while both drivers were physically examined, Judge Tabin opted to stand closely beside
complainant’s driver and kept suggesting to the examining doctor that his driver was under the influence of
liquor. That when Judge Tabin came to know the “negative” result she protested and demanded another
examination. – Later on, a new medical certificate showing his driver was under the influence of liquor was
issued.

· Aside from that, Atty. Gandeza suspected that Jude Tabin facilitated the filing of the criminal complaint in
court against his driver since the complaint was filed bare a week after the collision.

· He also averred that his wife, who is also a practicing lawyer, saw an employee of the MTC carrying outside
the court premises, the folder of the criminal case against their driver. When asked, the employee said that
she will bring it to the sala of Judge as per her request.

· Lastly, when his wife went to Philippine Mediation Center to move for the postponement of the scheduled
mediation, she was informed by the clerk that Judge Tabin went there and inquired the supposed mediation.

· In her comment, Judge Tabin denied that she exerted undue influence in the conduct of the investigation.

· The investigating Judge recommended the dismissal of complaint due to insufficient evidence to prove her
guilt of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge.

· The OCA however, found that Judge Tabin guilty of violation of Canon 4, Sec. 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The OCA reasoned that there was sufficient evidence showing that respondent Judge is liable for
impropriety

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

RULING:

No, but she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be
free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official
duties, but also in their daily life. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
In this case, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct a second test be conducted on complainant’s
driver when the first test resulted in a “negative”. Judge Tabin cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation.
Judge Tabin should have kept herself free from any appearance of impropriety and should not have disregarded
the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court.

SANCTION/PENALTY: REPRIMAND and WARNED.

27. Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al. (A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010)
FACTS: The complainant filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong, Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan with:
(a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of
the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions
of the Fourth Division held in Davao City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by
himself and Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their
having unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure);
(b) falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in
Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present during
the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not);
(c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority and grave
misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez’s making the following intemperate
and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in
September 2006), to wit:
1. ‘We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined
you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the
Supreme Court.’;
2. ‘You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to
supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing.’;
3. ‘Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that!
Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother’; and
4. Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently
inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had
graduated was better than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater.
(d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that Criminal Case No.
25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the criminal case had never been perfected
 contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the dismissal order being signed by all three
respondents).

ISSUE: W/n Respondents should be held liable for their acts as mentioned in the complaint.
RULING:
A. The court finds that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in
blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including
the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge
on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very
essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
The respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and
procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is
not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the
procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote,
the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the
irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief
objective of judicial trials.
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and
procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to
the "primordial necessity of order in the social life.”

B. The Court approves the finding that there is no evidence to support the complainant's charge that
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made improper statements. However, they admitted to engaging
in casual conversation about their law schools during trial proceedings, which violates the code of
conduct for judges. This behavior reflects a lack of judicial temperament and decorum. Judges must
maintain order and decorum in all proceedings, behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all
who appear before the court, and avoid situations that may give rise to suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality. Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.

We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from
certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations
that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations
with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.

C. The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the
assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."

At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment
only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper
procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

28. Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila vs. Judge Lorenzo Veneracion (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, 488 SCRA
285, April 26, 2006)
DOCTRINES:
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various
sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status,
sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution. Respondent judge was expected to
keep his own record of cases so that he could act thereon without undue delay. He ought to have devised an
efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness could affect the flow of cases and their
speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management was his responsibility. He was the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.

FACTS:
This case is composed of consolidated administrative cases against retired Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, then
presiding judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila

In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, a letter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by the
Ombudsman. It contained allegations of misconduct and tardiness against respondent Judge Veneracion by the
Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila.
● Complainants assailed the apparent reluctance of Judge Veneracion to grant petitions for the declaration
of nullity of marriage despite their alleged merit. Instead, he would lecture litigants in open court that the
declaration of nullity of marriage was not the proper remedy.
● Complainants were often harassed whenever respondent would force them to read and interpret verses
from the Bible.
● There were occasions when he would castigate them for their failure to give the interpretation he wanted.
● The fact that a number of cases for declaration of nullity of marriage assigned to respondent judge’s sala
were later withdrawn allegedly proved complainants’ claim.
● Complainants further assailed respondent judge’s habitual tardiness which caused the delay in the
disposition of cases assigned to him.

Defense of Judge Veneracion

In his comment, Judge Veneracion vehemently denied the allegation that he was against the granting of petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage despite their merit. He alleged that from the time he was designated as
presiding judge of Branch 47, RTC Manila, not more than two such cases filed in his sala were dismissed for lack
of merit. He further denied the allegation that he harassed parties during hearings. On the contrary, the letters he
received from previous litigants showed how much they appreciated the way he shared the words of the Lord with
them and how this practice greatly improved their lives.

Judge Veneracion maintained that the person who sent the letter-complaint did not represent the concerned trial
lawyers of Manila. He only represented himself. The docket books of his sala revealed that only Atty. Simbillo had
consistently withdrawn cases for declaration of nullity of marriage every time these were raffled to his sala.

In A. M. No. RTJ-01-1623, a report on the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted in Branch 47,
Manila RTC challenged the efficiency of respondent Judge Veneracion. The audit report showed:

● Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila has not been submitting the required monthly report of
cases;
● Out of the 60 cases submitted for decision, 41 cases were beyond the 90-day reglementary period;
● Out of the 41 cases undecided beyond the 90-day period, 7 were appealed and 33 cases were fully
 tried by Judge Veneracion and submitted before him for decision;
● There were cases with motions or incidents pending resolution for an unreasonable length of time;
● There were 14 criminal cases and 28 civil cases found with no further action or proceeding or with no
further setting of trial for a considerable length of time;
● In three criminal cases, no warrants of arrest were issued since the filing of the information; and in
two criminal cases, no setting for arraignment despite the arrest of the accused and posting of bail
bond;
● There were 44 civil cases with pending summonses;

● There were cases dismissed for alleged failure of the plaintiff or petitioner to pursue the case despite
the fact that the court has not taken any action on the complaint or petition since the filing thereof
several years ago; that is, no summonses were issued or that the cases were not set for trial; and

● The entries in the separate criminal and docket books were not updated.

In respondent judge’s explanation, he averred that Branch 47 was one of the five branches in the Manila RTC
originally designated to handle and try family relations cases. It was also designated as a special tax court in
Manila as well as a special criminal court to handle heinous crimes and drug cases.

When the Family Code was amended, all cases involving youth offenders pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Courts of Manila were transferred to the special Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts in Manila, which
included Branch 47 and that despite these special assignments and designations, additional personnel
were not assigned to Branch 47. He further contended that he suffered a mild stroke which affected his
handwriting. He could no longer take notes on the proceedings/testimonies in court. He had to rely on the
stenographic notes for the preparation of his resolutions and decisions. Hence, until the branch clerk of court
certified that the stenographic notes had been transcribed, cases were not deemed submitted for decision.

Respondent judge did not deny that he read verses from the Bible during hearings of annulment, adoption and
criminal cases. This was meant to share the word of God with those who came before his court and who were in
a quandary about their purpose in life. He only wished to remind litigants in these cases that God had given them
a manual to serve as a guide in conducting their lives. In his comment, he begged us to allow him to avail of
optional retirement in case we found that his actuation violated his responsibilities as a judge.

ISSUE/s:

1. WON respondent judge is administratively liable for reading Bible verses during hearings NO
2. WON respondent judge is administratively liable for tardiness NO
3. WON respondent judge is administratively liable for gross inefficiency YES
4. WON respondent judge’s retirement rendered his administrative case moot and academic NO

RULING:

1. NO, respondent judge is not administratively liable.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

In this canon, judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as long as it does not interfere with their
judicial functions. Respondent judge’s practice of reading verses from the Bible during hearings was an exercise
of his religious freedom.

Contrary to complainant’s various allegations of harassment, we find that respondent judge observed Section 1 of
Canon 5:

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various
sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status,
sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.

The letters from a number of litigants, attached to the records of this case, belie the claim that respondent judge
inappropriately expressed his beliefs and convictions to the point of harassing or embarrassing litigants and
counsels in his court. The Court cannot ignore the sincere words of appreciation in the numerous letters that have
been sent to respondent judge, all alluding to his practice of reading verses from the Bible. Aside from that, there
was no compulsion involved whenever respondent judge questioned litigants as to whether they read the Bible or
not. He did not impose his religious convictions on them but merely suggested the benefits of reading the Bible.
Surely, this practice alone was not sufficient to hold respondent judge guilty of misconduct.

Nevertheless, this is a most opportune time to remind judges that their actions in court should always be
seen by the public as guided by the law and not by their personal or religious beliefs. This is the only way
to prevent the public from seeing a display of religiosity as an encroachment on or an interference with
our system of justice

2. NO, respondent judge is not administratively liable for tardiness.

As to respondent judge’s alleged tardiness, complainant failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. The Court
cannot therefore impute the delay in the disposition of his cases to his unconfirmed tardiness. Besides,
respondent judge adequately explained the reasons for the delay.

3. YES, respondent judge is administratively liable for gross inefficiency.

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

No less than the 1987 Constitution requires that cases at the trial court level be resolved within three months from
the date they are submitted for decision. Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the
court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. Failure to decide/resolve cases within the period prescribed by law
constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for an administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

The fact that no additional personnel were assigned to Branch 47 despite its additional assignments does not
justify misfiling of case records. A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution.
Respondent judge was expected to keep his own record of cases so that he could act thereon without undue
delay. He ought to have devised an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness
could affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court management was his
responsibility. He was the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.
While serious illness may justify the inability of the respondent judge to perform his official duties and functions,
nevertheless, it is incumbent upon him to request the Honorable Court, thru this Office for additional time within
which to decide/resolve cases which he could not seasonably act upon. Further, a heavy caseload may excuse
the respondent judge’s failure to decide/resolve cases within the reglementary period, but not his failure to
request for extension of time within which to decide/resolve the same.

4. NO, respondent judge’s retirement did not render his administrative case moot and academic.

Cessation from office of respondent judge because of death or retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service or render the said administrative case
moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) DISMISSING for lack of merit the charge of misconduct and tardiness against Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920; and

(2) Finding Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion LIABLE for gross inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 for which he
is hereby FINED P11,000 to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

29. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. (A.M. No. MTJ- 07-1691, April
2, 2013)
FACTS:
The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.

Based on the report they submitted, Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the
judicial audit team.11 The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were
solemnized under Article 3412 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher
number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an
unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.16 The
town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two
(2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.

Based on the affidavits of the witness, the judges in these courts facilitate marriage with incomplete or irregular
requirements.

ISSUE:
Whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of
dismissal from service. (YES)
RULING:
On the liability of the judges

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the
couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of
tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. These
included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the
marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In
Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The
Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected
of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious
in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team
show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was
made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization
fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners
submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity
that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They
should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any
irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34
of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. The audit team cited in their Supplemental Report that there
were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere
submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge
himself or herself.

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no
marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license
on the same day the marriage was solemnized.

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the
marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces
of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded
to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.

The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the
Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as a minority of
a party.

Based on the aforementioned acts, the respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties.
On the liability of the court personnel

Jurisprudence teaches us that court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of
justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or
position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave
in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence
in the Judiciary.

Jurisprudence further provides that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel.
The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any
misconduct.

On Mongaya: Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of
grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the
marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.142

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of ₱3,000. Section 2, Canon I
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or
benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions.

On Rodriguez: She is guilty of gross misconduct because she assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel
Albater, and demanded and accepted ₱4,000 from them. The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced
Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.

On Aranas and Alesna: Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna
are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be
married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other hand,
Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which according to Alesna costs ₱10. As aptly
put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives
the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of judicial transactions.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Dismissal of the aforementioned judges and court personnel. Complaints against those
not mentioned in this digest are dismissed.

30. Jill M. Tormis vs. Judge Paredes (A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015)
FACTS:
In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was
a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, MTCC,
Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in
his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. Judge
Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge
Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict." To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class
under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City. She also averred that on March 13,
2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the
temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio," docketed
as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v.
Tormis, but never Judge Tormis' involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the
investigation conducted by the Court; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases
involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published
in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to
the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge
Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary;
and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail
bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the
approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which allowed
executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paredes violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING:
Yes.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

CANON 4 PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect
for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required
by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes
demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed
in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who
merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges:
in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise
of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he
is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have
been more circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to
speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his
negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of
the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his
professional and private activities as well.

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot
be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as
well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition.

SANCTION/PENALTY: ADMONITION.

31. Atty. Santos vs. Judge Bernardo (A.M. No. MTJ-07-1670, 559 SCRA 310, July 23, 2008)
FACTS:
According to petitioners, respondent is using government resources in the discharge of his functions for his
personal pleasure and convenience. Specifically, among others, he allows his girlfriend, to stay and use as her
lounge the judge’s chamber in violation of his duty under Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain
proper decorum. Also, instead of conducting a preliminary investigation after the filing of the complaint to find
probable cause to hold complainants herein for trial, respondent immediately signed the criminal complaint upon
its filing and ordered that the case be set for "preliminary hearing". Furthermore, complainants alleged that
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he did not conduct a preliminary investigation in a criminal
case.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent complied with the procedural rules so elementary that to digress from them amounts to
ignorance of the law. - YES

RULING:
Yes. SC has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge
is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

As regards the other charges, it was for complainants’ failure to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the
allegations.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Judge LAURO BERNARDO, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and basic
rules of procedure and is hereby FINED in the amount of ₱20,000, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

32. Capuno, et al. vs. Judge Jaramillo (A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, 234 SCRA 212, July 20, 1994)
FACTS:
In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge Jaramillo, of the RTC, Br. 30, San Pablo City, is
charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to the administration of justice.

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944

This case was initiated by a Sinumpaang Salaysay of complainants Rizalia Capuno and Thelma Villanueva. One
Pedro Calara filed a writ of possession against them in the court of Judge Jaramillo. However, Judge Jaramillo
allegedly said that if Pedro Calara wants to evict Rizalia from the house, Pedro must give Judge Jaramillo the
amount of P200,000 in cash and one check in the amount of P150,000, postdated for 30 days. Respondent judge
denied the charges against him. He maintains that the complaint was filed out of pure harassment. Upon
cross-examination, Thelma admitted that her mother went to the respondent judge to know how much more the
complainants were to pay Pedro Calara, Jr. However, the respondent asked if they could pay him P350,000.00
and P200,000.00 in cash. Thelma then informed the judge that they could not afford the amount, thus the judge
reduced the proposal to P150,000.00 in postdated check. When Thelma was unable to comply with the demand,
they were evicted from the premises and her house was demolished. Respondent judge testified that in his effort
to settle the parties’ differences, as per request of Deputy Leonardo Ho, tried to mediate in order to help them
settle for the purchase price.

From the testimonies and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, the court concludes that there was a
color of truth in the complaint. It may not be amiss to stress that 'the courts exist to promote justice; and thus to
aid in securing the contentment and happiness of the people. Their administration should be speedy and careful.
Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of his court so far as he
can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of
mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants. Judge was found guilty of the
charge and was recommended to be suspended for one month without pay, with admonition and reprimand.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge’s conduct violated the judicial conduct?

RULING:
YES.

The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852 allegedly to settle the differences between
complainants and Pedro Calara, Jr., was highly questionable. The mediation was initiated not by the parties but
by the respondent’s sheriff. The meetings were also unrecorded and unattended by counsel of the parties. In the
absence of their lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in issues confronting the parties even on the pretext
of settling their cases. For to do so would compromise the integrity of his office which he is mandated to uphold.
Once more, judges are strongly reminded that the office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is
public trust. A judicial office demands that the incumbent should conduct himself in such a manner as to
merit the respect, reverence and confidence of the people. We have cautioned judges to avoid in chambers
sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to
the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.
These acts of the respondent judge manifest his failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary has undoubtedly
diminished the faith of our people in the administration of justice.

Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959

FACTS: This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge to disciplinary action or to dismissal
from office because of various violations of the law. Complainant Pampolina is the president of a corporation and
the duly designated and appointed executrix of the last will and testament. In a guardianship matter of Pastor
Marino, respondent ordered to surrender, among other properties, a luxury car to the court. Respondent had
custody has custody of the car for one year. The respondent also demanded and received food, money, valuable
properties (jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the late Pastor Marino. Also, in a conference hearing
where they were to discuss a possible settlement of the case, the respondent intentionally omitted to include the
car in the list of properties which he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car. In his answer,
respondent submits that complainant has no valid cause of action against him. He explains that the car was in
the possession of the court, although on few occasions, he drove it merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the
battery.

ISSUE: W/n the respondent judge’s conduct violated the judicial conduct?

RULING:
YES.

Respondent judge is accountable for violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of committing
a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713. Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the
pendency of the guardianship proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice under Sec 7, par. (d), of
R.A. 6713, i.e., acceptance by a public officer of a favor from any person in the course of his official duty.
Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In
fact, by his own admission, he drove it several times. Respondent judge even personally supervised the
maintenance of the car beyond what the duties of his office would call for. He had the scratches of the car
repainted, the tires inflated and the battery recharged 6 times. Another reprehensible conduct of respondent
which distresses us was his availment of the battery recharging service of Cortes Battery Shop free of charge. In
so doing, respondent compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears repeating that integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity.

Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As
the visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. They are particularly mandated not only
to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in their actions. For judges sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse
where all other institutions have failed. Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial
norms.
SANCTION/PENALTY:
Respondent is dismissed from service with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, if
any.
33. Benancillo vs. Judge Amila (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011)

FACTS:
This is a complaint against Judge Amila charging the latter of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, Partiality and Impropriety relative to Civil
Case No. 7268 entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo v. Paul John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and
Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.

Complainant Lydia A. Benancillo was the petitioner in that Civil that was filed in Branch 1 of the RTC Tagbilaran
City, which was then the Family Court. The same court issued the Temporary Protection Order against her live-in
partner, John Belot. The TPO had a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal effects, including properties in
their diving business called the Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc. Belot sought the reconsideration of the TPO.
Meanwhile, their business partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for intervention
with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an opposition to the intervention with prayer
for preliminary injunction.

When Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran, presided by the respondent judge, became the new Family Court in
Tagbilaran City, the case was transferred to that court. Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge
denied both the Belot’s motion for reconsideration and motion for intervention. He also incorporated a
cease-and-desist order prohibiting intervenors from taking possession of the properties of Underworld.

Complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor, but the latter refused to enforce the
TPO.

On October 8, 2007, the complainant claimed that the respondent judge called her and her counsel to a meeting
in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They agreed to the meeting but they did not proceed when they learned that
the intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the respondent judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he issued
an Order dated October 18, 2007 which rescinded his previous Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order
dated October 25, 2007, he denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.

In his comment, the respondent judge used derogatory and irreverent language against the complainant, which
according to the latter caused her to suffer psychological and emotional violence as the respondent judge echoed
Belot’s verbal and psychological abuse to her. In effect, the judge maliciously besmirched the character of
complainant by calling her as “only a live-in partner of Belot” and presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress
in an illegitimate relationship. The judge also called the complainant a prostitute. Further, he also accused that
the complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with the contested property.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Amila is guilty of impropriety?

RULING: YES.

The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger
community as such.
Canon 4 states that, “Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essentail to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

Section 1 of the Code states that, “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.”

Section 6 also states that, “judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.”

The Code enjoins judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts which have the appearance
of impropriety. It emphasizes that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
attorneys and other persons not vested with public trust.

In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors to a
meeting inside his chambers. This act of respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant
that the meeting of the judge with the intervenors would merit favorable decision to the intervenors.

With regards to the derogatory words used by the respondent judge against the complainant, verily, SC hold that
Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language.

“It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant, or witness. The act betrays lack of patience,
prudence, and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose
his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed
for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.”

Accordingly, respondent Judge is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense. It is penalized by any of the ff.:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with a warning.

However, Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law which ordered him to pay a fine
of P20,000. Thus, the court held that the penalty of a fine of P21,000 was deemed appropriate.

SANCTION/PENALTY: GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge. FINE of P21,000.

34. Liwanag vs. Judge Lustre (A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, April 21, 1999)
FACTS:
1. On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court praying that
respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to "gross immorality and
grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession.
2. BP 22 case filed by her husband, 12 counts
3. These cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided by Judge
Paterno Lustre
4. Accused posted bail
 a. Arraignment was postponed several times at the instance of the accused
b. Case was set for hearing then it was the Judge who was not present and so was rest
5. As alleged there were several times that she was molested inside the chamber of the Judge so that
the latter will not reset the case.
6. Judge also took the complainant to an inn so that he could have sexual favors with the complainant.
7. Photographs of them were taken which were used by the complaint as evidence against the
respondent.
8. Respondent denied all the allegations made by the complainant and argued that such charges
hurled against him are products of vindictiveness
a. According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges
against him when he "refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant
demands . . . to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very
short period of time" the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainant's
husband.
b. Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the
morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten
minutes before 8:00 in the morning.
c. Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, "(s)ex is
beyond (his) physical capacity." He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary men
indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt." He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed
against him.
d. In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1)
affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually
arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A.
Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondent's fine work
ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that
respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes
mellitus.
9. In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge Norberto
Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
10. On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing
the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with respondent. The Court,
however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed him to resolve the
case with dispatch.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct

RULING:
Yes

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only
substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
Sec 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the resort himself to
prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of complainant's.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the
photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for the photograph, but this is
obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her
complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainant's charges.

If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent with
complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant and respondent to be
seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent would have wasted no time
explaining where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his
present predicament. This, he failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer
any plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private
room

Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainant's vindictiveness. Again,
this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to undue speculation. Thus, why should
she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated postponements of the hearing of her cases?

Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the
hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get
back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by
revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she
would only be exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from
the exercise, save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.

As for complainant's failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment. Complainant's affidavit stands
in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement
and let the same be adopted as part of complainant's evidence.

He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his
public but in his private life as well. All to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.

The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public's faith and trust in the judiciary.
Respondent's disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1,
1998. For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the
Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.

We are not in accord with the OCA's recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all retirement
benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while directed at respondent, might
adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is
our considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be
sufficient penalty.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, we
hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Further, he is hereby barred from any employment in all branches of the government including
government-owned and -controlled corporations
35. Wilfredo F. Tuvillo vs. Judge Henry Laron (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016)
FACTS:

This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Makati City (MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo (Wilfredo) for immoral
conduct, and the second case from the complaint of Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for unexplained wealth and
immorality.

Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works as a seaman and is out of the country most of
the time. Melissa is a businesswoman with several B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed against her in the MeTC of Makati
City. In her desire to have her cases resolved, she approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron (Judge Laron).
The respondent is married but his wife was in the United States at the time the events of this case transpired.
Due to their frequent interaction with each other, Melissa and Judge Laron became intimate with each other and
their relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.

The Complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo

Wilfredo in his letter-complaint against Judge Laron, alleged that the latter asked money from Melissa and forced
her to produce it whenever he needed it; that they lost all their savings and their two houses and lots because of
Judge Laron's constant requests for money from Melissa; that Judge Laron would physically hurt Melissa when
she could not produce the money he needed; and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and besmirched the
tranquility and sacredness of our marital union and family unity."

The Complaint of Melissa Tuvillo

Melissa Tuvillo wrote a letter to the Court Administrator accusing Judge Leron of unexplained wealth and
immorality. In her letter, she asked that Judge Laron be investigated because based on his salary as a judge, he
could not have acquired their P9 million house. She also claimed that Judge Laron could not have afforded to buy
several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma televisions, expensive furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three
children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission that she was his mistress for three years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Laron violated the ethical standards required of the members of the judiciary.

RULING:

YES. As to respondent’s unexplained wealth, the charge of unexplained wealth was disputed by Judge Laron
who was able to explain the source of the money he used to pay for the construction of his house and the
purchase of his vehicle, televisions and furniture. He also attached copies of the educational plans of his children.
On the other hand, Melissa failed to substantiate her claim that Judge Laron, by his salary, could not afford to buy
those properties and send his children to private schools. For said reason, the Court agrees with the OCA's
recommendation that the complaint for unexplained wealth against Judge Laron be dismissed.

Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.

A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

The conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. Although Judge Laron argued that their
relationship never went “physically intimate,” immorality is not confined to sexual matters. By carrying an affair
with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to noble
ideals and strict standards of morality required of the members of the judiciary.

Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11,
2001 on the discipline of Justices and Judges, is a serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions:
(1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3)
a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

The Court also found Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which provides that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

The illicit relationship started because Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her pending B.P.
Blg. 22 cases; and apparently, he entertained the request for assistance. Judge Laron “aided” Melissa in a case
pending before him and before another judge.

Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money from Melissa who was a litigant in a case
pending before his court. Demanding money from a party-litigant who has a pending case before him corrodes
respect for the law and the courts.

All these conduct and behavior are contrary to the canons of judicial conduct and ethics.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

WHEREFORE, finding Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City,
GUILTY of IMMORALITY and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes him the maximum penalty of
DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is likewise disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 36. King vs. Judge Hontanosas (A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004)
FACTS:

Complainant was the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Attachment 1 pending before the RTC presided over by respondent.

On July 2, 2002, respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment upon
applicant’s filing of a bond in the amount of ₱35,973,600.00. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day,
respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued
sans proper notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s Supreme Court
Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of
₱22,541,463.69. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay
₱250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed
by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein
complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore."

In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his Comment, dated August 22,
2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from the King brothers. He contends that complainant is
merely a dissatisfied litigant which cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders
relative to Civil Case were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial discretion in accordance with the rules
of procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of justice and equity.

Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to squarely meet the issues of the
administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was actually no hearing on the motion to lift the writ of
attachment allegedly conducted on July 5, 2002.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in demanding P250,000.00 from
the complainant.
2. Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown
hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.

RULING:

1. YES. Upon close examination by the court of the testimonies of the King brothers, the testimonies of
Richard and Rafael King and found the same to be very candid, forthright, unwavering, and bereft of any
material or significant inconsistencies. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King, they actually
have nothing to gain from the filing of the present administrative case. Moreover, respondent failed to
present evidence that Richard and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave accusations of
extortion against him. Furthermore, respondent’s admission that he did entertain the King brothers at his
home bolsters the credibility of their averment that he demanded P250,000.00 from them for a favorable
ruling on the motion for reconsideration that they would file. Thus, the King brothers’ testimonies to be
entitled to full faith and credit and sufficient proof that respondent demanded ₱250,000.00 in exchange
for a ruling in their favor.

In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the King brothers meet the required
quantum of evidence which justifies our conclusion that respondent indeed demanded P250,000.00 from
them. Such conduct is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
 conduct, which provide that:
Canon 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary
Rule 1.01. – A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Canon 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities
Rule 2.01. – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

2. YES. The court agrees with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the
three-day notice rule. Although it is true that respondent was able to present a transcript of stenographic
notes14 to prove that a hearing on the motion to lift attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002, the same
only highlighted the fact that respondent failed to give herein complainant, the plaintiff and attaching party
in subject case, due notice and the opportunity to be heard, as mandated by the aforementioned rule.
The transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in fact shows that respondent already had strong
suspicions that the plaintiff had not yet been notified of the filing of the motion when he propounded the
questions to the counsel of defendants in the subject case.

Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift attachment
filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution, and in
issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the
same day of July 5, 2002, without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary,
a judge is subject to disciplinary action.16 The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe
that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant due
notice and the opportunity to be heard on the matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

SANCTION/PENALTY: DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave
credits and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

37. Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose Aspiras vs. Judge Clifton Ganay (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, December 17,
2009)
FACTS:

The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-complaint, filed by the heirs of the late
Reverend Father Jose O. Aspiras addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an investigation be
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of authority of respondent Judge
Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union in connection with Special
Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras."

Respondent judge has been abusing his authority as observed by the Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras
as he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late
Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras for him to purchase law books. Similarly, respondent judge issued an order to the bank
to release certain amounts from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the
written consent of the guardians.

The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and discovered that the issued order (P50,000 in his favor) by
respondent judge was indeed true. The investigation team also discovered that on several occasions, respondent
Judge issued numerous orders4 directing the manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union
Branch, to draw checks from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands of pesos in
the name of the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for
the purpose of purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards, including cellular phones as well.

OCA: It found him guilty of violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct

RULING:

Yes.

After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that respondent Judge Ganay has
indeed violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, of Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to
ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done
in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift,
award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might
not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise
give rise to an appearance of partiality.

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Lower
court judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an important role in the promotion of the people's faith in the
judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid
not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them.

In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr., the Court held:

Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must comport
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of
the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that
not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are
mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code clearly
prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.

Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly
cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of
the court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act of issuing Orders
directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the
account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of
irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings. This Court finds unsatisfactory the explanations propounded by
respondent Judge Ganay for his actuations. He tried justifying his act of receiving cellular phones and monthly
cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the
networking of information about the ward of the court. He likewise rationalized his acceptance of the lawbooks
worth fifty thousand pesos from the property guardians as his way of showing them that he "appreciated their
show of appreciation of his judicial work for the ward and to all other cases." Respondent Judge Ganay explained
that he did not want the property guardians "to feel resentful (‘tampo’), frustrated or shamed (‘mapahiya’) if he
would refuse their generosity.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

WHEREFORE, for violating Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

38. Michael Belen vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2139, August 9, 2010)
FACTS:

Respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant's father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was
dismissed for lack of probable cause by the Assistant City Prosecutor Sunega-Lagman. With such, respondent
judge filed an Omnibus Motion ( For Reconsideration and Disqualification) alleging that Sunega-Lagman was
always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise
filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman.

To refute Judge Belen’s allegation, complainant Belen executed an Affidavit stating that the allegations of
respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were "false"; that Sunega-Lagman was present during the preliminary
investigation hearings and that she was absent only once, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it
was respondent judge who was absent during the hearing.

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing of several
cases against the complainant. Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local
government authorities and employees, requesting information on complainant's piggery and poultry business;
advising them of the alleged violations by complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental
laws. All these letters bore a letterhead indicating respondent judge's official government position, viz.: From the
Chamber of: Medel Arnaldo B. Belen Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36 4th Judicial Region, Calamba City.

OCA submitted its Report finding Judge Belen guilty of violation Sec. 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of Canon 1 and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when he used a letterhead
indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

RULING:

YES.

Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides:

CANON 1

INDEPENDENCE

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
 SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

In this case, Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainant's piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws allegedly
being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government officials or employees
and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judge's
use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City,
Branch 36, and stating that the letter was "from [his] chambers," clearly manifests that respondent judge was
trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with
prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said
letterhead to promote his personal interest.

Verily, these acts are violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

SANCTION/PENALTY: FINE (P11,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

39. Tan vs. Judge Pacuribot (A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982, December 14, 2007)
FACTS: This is a consolidated case filed against Judge Pacuribot who was charged with rape and acts of
lasciviousness by Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.

Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to the bus terminal but instead
brought her to a motel where he ravished her. Following the incident, Ms. Tan did not report to work due to the
noticeable kiss marks on her neck. The situation got worse for Ms. Tan, when the respondent judge indicated his
interest in renting a room in her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tan's house is near the Police
Station and the courthouse. Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is not for rent. She even refused him
in the presence of her office mates who cannot comprehend why she should not allow him to rent the room
considering that it would be an additional income for her. At that time, they were unaware of what she was going
through. Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her because she resists, he would
scold her in his chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her officemates. She would also receive
threats from him as regards her performance rating.

Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan eventually suffered from what doctors call
"chronic fatigue syndrome" and was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr. Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital of
Gingoog City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of a patient could lead to chronic fatigue
syndrome.

Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her believe that they were going to go out for
dinner but instead brought her in a motel in Butuan City where he ravished her and took a nude picture of her.
The respondent used such picture to blackmail Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the event she would
refuse to submit to his lustful desires, he would send the picture to her family. After the incident, the respondent
would order her to bring food at his rented room and would subsequently rape her. Furthermore, the respondent
ordered the complainant to send sweet text messages and write love letters and greeting cards to him and even
ordered her to file an annulment case against her husband.

To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied for leave of absence with their office to
work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribot's] order in People v. Anude and his letter to her superiors have
effectively made her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she left the country for Dubai, UAE to work and
forget her past even if her leave of absence in their office was not yet approved.

On the other hand, Judge Pacuribot, denied the charges by Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca for "lack of factual and
legal bases"; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part
of a comprehensive and sinister plan to drive him out of service. Judge Pacuribot further explained that these
administrative and criminal charges filed against him by Tan and Villafranca were part and parcel of a grand plot
hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed that Waniwan was then
facing four counts of libel in his sala.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pacuribot is guilty of sexual harassment?

RULING: Yes, he is guilty of sexual harassment.

The Code of Judicial Conduct has the following provisions:

Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.

The code of Judicial Ethics further mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not
simply be detached or separated from his personal experience

In this case, the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness were totally unacceptable. Over long periods of time, he
persistently solicited sexual favors from Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors
from any court employee, even from a woman of loose morals. Judge Pacuribots conduct indubitably bears the
marks of impropriety and immorality.

Respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of
which he is an officer. His actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over
whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and
power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over his
subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
SANCTION/PENALTY: Thus, the Court adopts the findings of the investigating justice and hereby DISMISSED
respondent judge from the service for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government, including government owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
earned leave credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering
any order or decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a
copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred
as a member of the Philippine Bar.

40. Atty. Veloso, et al. vs. Judge Caminade (A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655, July 8, 2004)

FACTS: Before this Court is an administrative complaint for sexual harassment separately filed by Atty. Grace
Veloso and Ma. Joeylynn Quiñones against Judge Anacleto M. Caminade. Atty. Veloso, a lawyer of the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) assigned to the RTC branch presided by Judge Caminade, alleged in her affidavit that, on
March 9, 2001, she went to the court to check on her work schedule for the following week. Judge Caminade was
then having a conversation with two men at the lawyer’s table. She was about to leave when Judge Caminade
asked her to join them. She acceded to respondent’s request as she considered him as her superior. After a few
minutes, the two men and Atty. Veloso rose to leave but the judge told her to stay behind because they needed to
discuss a case. Judge Caminade then ushered her to his chambers. She was made to sit on the visitor’s chair
which was just a foot away from where the judge sat.

While discussing the case, she was stunned when Judge Caminade suddenly placed his hand on her right thigh
and squeezed it. He then took her hand and kissed it. She immediately stood up and headed towards the door
leading to the staff room. He, however, caught up with her and placed his hand on her shoulder. Before she could
open the door, Judge Caminade told her "Kiss ko bi" (Let me kiss you). Atty. Veloso, who was so shocked,
retorted "Kalo-od nimo Judge uy" (You are so disgusting, Judge). She then opened the door and went out of his
chambers. Atty. Veloso sent a letter to Judge Caminade informing him of her decision not to appear in his court
again as resident PAO lawyer. She was thereafter assigned to another branch of the court.

In his comment, respondent judge averred that, after the court session on March 9, 2001, Atty. Veloso entered his
chambers to discuss a case she was handling. Inside the chambers were Atty. Myrna Valderrama-Limbaga,
branch clerk of court, and Mr. Othello Capangpangan, a court employee. After discussing her case, she allegedly
reminded respondent judge of the motion filed by her father, Atty. Eustacio Veloso, pertaining to a case pending
before his sala. The judge told her to convey to her father that he could not act on the motion yet since he
needed more time to review the voluminous records of the case. She promised to relay the message to her
father. Purportedly as a gesture of appreciation, Judge Caminade spontaneously placed his hand on her thigh
and pressed it while saying "Thank you" to her. He then playfully took her hand and kissed it. She allegedly did
nothing to protest such action because she knew that he was just teasing her. Further, Judge Caminade
explained that he had a tendency to tease and play pranks on his friends, both male and female, because of his
congenial nature. In fact, even before his appointment to the judiciary, it had been his natural way of
complimenting women for their physical attributes but he never had any malice or lustful designs in his
actuations.

On the other hand, Joeylynn Quiñones, Clerk III in the office of Judge Caminade, claimed that respondent judge
squeezed her hand on three different occasions in February 2001. She noticed that the judge would squeeze her
hand whenever she gave him the case records. Although offended by his actions, Joeylynn opted to remain silent
out of deference to or fear of respondent judge. Judge Caminade filed his comment on May 18, 2001 and
reiterated his earlier defense that he was just being friendly to his staff.

The two administrative complaints were consolidated and referred to then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Morales found Judge
Caminade guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and recommended that respondent be suspended for six months without pay.

ISSUE: W/N Judge Caminade was guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon and Rule of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and therefore, should be suspended for 6 months without
pay? (YES)

RULING: Those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only know the law but must
also possess the highest degree of integrity and probity, and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their
public and private lives.

In this particular case, we are principally concerned with the moral fiber of Judge Caminade. His penchant for
teasing and showing unwelcome affection to women indicates a certain moral depravity and lack of respect
towards his female employees. They were his subordinates and he should have treated them like his own
children. Instead, he took advantage of his superior position.

We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts
greater moral righteousness than a seat in the judiciary. Performing as he does an exalted role in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can weather the most
exacting scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.

Canons 35 and 46 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate, respectively, that "judges shall ensure that not
only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of the reasonable observer" and
that "judges shall avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." These very
stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees of the courts.

Judge Caminade’s behavior must be sanctioned. We are neither amused by his claims of innocent playfulness
nor impressed by his excessive display of congeniality. He acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety. He failed to meet the standard of conduct embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. His abusive and
distasteful acts unmistakably constituted sexual harassment because they resulted in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for his female subordinates.

SANCTION/PENALTY: WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of violating Canons 3 and 4 of the new
Code of Judicial Conduct by committing sexual harassment and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period
of six months without pay effective immediately, with the warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be
punished with dismissal from the service.

41. Perfecto vs. Judge Desales-Esidera (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270, 642 SCRA 1, January 31, 2011)

FACTS:
Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint Respondent explains that when she went to the
which was received at the Office of the Court Prosecutor's office, she was merely following up the
 Administrator (OCA) charges Judge Alma Consuelo
Esidera (respondent), Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Northern Samar of soliciting and receiving at the
Prosecutor's Office the amount of P1,000.00 from
practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma, and the same amount
from Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz, purportedly to
defray expenses for a religious celebration and
barangay fiesta.
To prove her charge, the complainant attached the
Affidavit of Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching
who claimed to have witnessed the first incident,
without respondent issuing any receipt. In the same
Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added that she "heard"
that respondent also solicited the same amount from
Prosecutor Diaz.
pledge of Adelaida Taldo, a member of a Catholic
charismatic group of which she (respondent) belongs,
to donate a Sto. Niño image when Atty. Yruma, who
had received a solicitation letter countersigned by
Father Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San Jose,
overheard her (respondent) and requested her to
receive his donation of P1,000.00 through her.
Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of
Prosecutor Ching who, she opines, is of "dubious
personality" and has a "narcissistic personality
disorder," the details of the bases of which she
narrates in her Comment.

Complainant also questions the conduct of
respondent in Special Proceedings case "for
Cancellation of Birth Registration of Alpha Acibar," in
which she issued an Order directing the therein
petitioner to publish said Order in a newspaper of
general circulation, instead of in the Catarman
Weekly Tribune (of which complainant is the
publisher), the only accredited newspaper in the
province.
Respecting the complaint against her Order of
publication, respondent claims that the Catarman
Weekly Tribune is "not in circulation." Respondent
echoes her Comment in A.M. OCA IPI No.
10-3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by
complainant bearing on his claim that all orders of the
court should be published in Catarman Weekly
Tribune, in which Comment she listed pending cases
the hearing of which had to be reset for failure of the
Catarman Weekly Tribune to publish her orders on
time.

Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies
acts of impropriety — scolding her staff in open court the instances thereof cited by complainant in his
and treating in an "inhuman and hostile" manner complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a
professional relationship with her staff and the
practitioners "who are not her friends." He adds that
lawyers who appear in her court.
respondent even arrogantly treats public prosecutors
assigned to her sala, citing instances of this charge in
his complaint.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Desales-Esidera exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and of impropriety?
RULING: Yes.

Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; date of effectivity: 1 June
2004) explicitly provides that "judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

The fact that she is not the principal author of the solicitation letter or that the solicitation is for a religious cause is
immaterial. Respondent Judge Esidera should have known that going to the Prosecutor's Office to receive
"donations" from a private lawyer and a public prosecutor does not bode well for the image of the judiciary.
Soliciting donations from lawyers is not the only act of impropriety from respondent Judge Esidera. In a 27 May
2010 Comment, respondent Judge Esidera virtually gave Public Prosecutor Atty. Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching a verbal
lashing for the affidavit the latter executed relative to the solicitation incident.

Respondent's act of proceeding to the Prosecutor's Office under the guise of soliciting for a religious cause
betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial
dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all
times. It spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a
private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic
group for religious purposes.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, for Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct,
ORDERED to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

42. Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (A.M.No.
08-8-11-CA, 564 SCRA 365, September 9, 2008)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
SANCTION/PENALTY:

43. Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

FACTS: This is a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void
respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude respondent
therefrom.

On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the
House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for
· culpable violation of the Constitution,
· corruption,
· high crimes, and
· betrayal of public trust.

The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.

During the impeachment hearings of the House, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her
SALNs while she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the
years 1998, 2002 and 2006.

The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the ground that the latter
failed to show that she is person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the
Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. the Republic contends that respondent's failure to
submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being candidate for the position of
Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not proven her integrity which is requirement under the
Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for
lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto. Republic
justifies its resort to the unconventional method of quo warranto by stating that it seeks respondent's ouster, not
on account of commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the position of
Chief Justice.

Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Chief
Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment.

Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that petition
for quo warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the
disqualification. Moreover, respondent stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC
has no bearing on one's integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which
the JBC had required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the
non-filing of SALN is not ground for disqualification unless the same was already the subject of pending criminal
or administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted for criminal offense involving said
failure to file SALNs. In this case, respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012
that respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as U.P. professor and yet none of them invoked Section
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the "integrity rule."

Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief Justice is
person of "proven integrity" is question "constitutionally committed to the JBC" and is therefore political question
which only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative when it included respondent's name in the
shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

The Republic cites respondent's gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of
SALNs was because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALNs. According to the Republic, respondent's
allegation seems to imply that she did file her SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman
state otherwise.

Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law, and the filing of SALN is
qualification implied from the requirement of integrity. The filing of SALN is not an additional requirement unduly
imposed on applicants to positions in the Judiciary. When respondent failed to file her SALN, she did not comply
with the Constitution, laws and appropriate codes of conduct. There is no need to allege or prove graft and
corruption in order to prove an aspiring magistrate's lack of integrity.

Respondent maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity" when she applied for the
position of Chief Justice is political question outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which only the JBC
and the President as the appointing authority could determine. She avers that the application of the political
question doctrine is not confined to the President or Congress, as the Republic supposedly argues, but extends
to other government departments or officers exercising discretionary powers, such as the JBC which uses its
wisdom and discretion in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is person of "proven" integrity.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice
RULING:
1. Respondent is INELIGIBLE as Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice.

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character
of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;
NO. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC

In interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the
Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. Furthermore, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is
determined based on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on
the part of the nominating body. Proceeding from this, qualifications under the Constitution cannot be
waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification is the requirement of possession of
proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also mentioned in administrative cases, in the
Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of Professional
Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules.

b.Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law
and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to person's integrity.

Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a
person’s integrity. Contrary to Respondent’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the
requirement of integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is
rendered even more exacting when the public official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.

Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity. To be of proven
integrity, as required by qualifications under the Constitution, means that the applicant must have
established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. In this line, failure to file the SALN is
clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a
deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the
requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider
him/her disqualified from holding public office. Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not
negate integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent accumulated unexplained wealth is not
in issue at this time, but whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of filing
of SALNs.
 Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to
be a person of proven integrity. Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or
non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Respondent opted to
withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Her defenses do not lie:
1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada was able to present
contrary proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus rendering
inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file SALNs for a number of years, as opposed to the
present case where no proof of existence and filing were presented;
2) Being on leave from government service is not equivalent to separation from service such that
she was still required to submit SALNs during her leave;
3) While Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that she
should have obtained a certification to attest to the fact of filing;
4) That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the
duty to comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for
the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that time;
5) That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of
requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes
into her qualifications which were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should have
been disqualified at the outset.

Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional
and statutory requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent covering her years of government service in
U.P. appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious circumstances; her SALNs filed with the
UPHRDO were either belatedly filed or belatedly notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief Justice were also
attended by irregularities. This puts in question the truthfulness of such SALNs, and would amount to
dishonesty if attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.

Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether
the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;
c.
YES.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. The established and undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the
required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination.
The JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked by
Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already required. There was no indication
that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for
her 20 years as a professor in the U.P. College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial
compliance. Respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to
submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of Law. In the end, it appears
that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from
2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away
with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the
submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed
sufficient. Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-incumbent Justice who was not
determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent, who submitted only
three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do
so. Her justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are old and are
infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having complied with the submission of the SALN
by submitting a Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly
suffice as a substitute for SALNs. Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file
several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and
the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the
Supreme Court. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Respondent for interview
as it already required the submission of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding
10 years up to December 31, 2011.

Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was
not established at the time of her application. Contrary to Respondent’s argument that failure to submit
her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for disqualification, the requirement to submit the SALNs, along with
the waiver of bank deposits, is not an empty requirement that may easily be dispensed with, but was
placed by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on its mandate of
recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be unsusceptible to impeachment
attacks due to inaccuracies in SALNs. Without submission of such requirement, the JBC and the public
are without opportunity to measure the candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or
dishonesty. Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC means that she was not able to prove
her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.
NO. Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution
to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not
qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of
nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications. The
Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of impleading the JBC as
the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the Office of the
Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the circumstances relative to the selection and nomination of
Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify
Respondent. The action of the JBC, particularly which of the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member, is
reflective of the action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and
nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the same mistake and
the President’s subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect. While the
Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is
subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements
are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack. The Court also took into
account, while conceding that the petition is not an administrative case or an inquiry into tax evasion
 against her, that Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating
dishonesty and lack of forthrightness are discordant with any claim of integrity.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found
DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and
EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is
directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof
why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial
Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

44. Uy, et al. vs. Judge Javellana (A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012)
FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross
incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed
by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Erwin3 B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), La Castellana, Negros Occidental.

First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Second, Judge Javellana gave the impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company with a certain Leilani
"Lani" Manunag (Manunag).

Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued
warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine
the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody.

Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even
when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his
rights to remain silent and to have a counsel. Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. Sixth, Judge Javellana
whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws and rules depending on stature of the parties, persons
accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers. Seventh,
Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the "litigants are made for the courts" instead of "courts for the
litigants." Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in airing his complaints against public
attorneys. Judge Javellana rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders he issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Javellana should be held administratively liable. (YES)
RULING:
On his failure to observe the Summary Procedure
Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

● Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of
Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required."
● Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified. The
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of
a criminal case under said Rule.
● Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case
was never previously referred to the Lupong.

The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a
substantial number of civil and criminal cases pending before Judge Javellana’s court. Judge Javellana cannot
claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious
intent as a defense. His repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases so obviously
covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient administration of justice, for which we hold him
administratively liable.

On other court motions

Judge Javellana, by referring the accused who appeared before his court directly to Manunag for processing of
the bail bond of said accused, gave the impression that he favored Manunag and Manunag’s bonding company,
as well as the reasonable suspicion that he benefited financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should
remember that he must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of impropriety" as well.

Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in Granting or denying motions for extension of time
to file pleadings which were signed only by the accused.

On mentioning previous accomplishments

Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his previous accomplishments as counsel in big and
controversial cases, claiming that he only did so to impress upon the parties that he meant business and that he
relied greatly upon God to survive the trials and threats to his life. We are not persuaded.

The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking publicity for personal
vainglory. Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individual’s excessive or ostentatious pride especially in
one’s own achievements. Even no longer explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are still
proscribed from engaging in self-promotion and indulging their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity) and 2
(on Propriety) of the New Code.

For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge Javellana committed gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence provides that gross misconduct as a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.

SUMMARY OF CANONS VIOLATED: CANONS 2,3,4,5, and 6

As to the penalty
Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are
classified as serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule
140, Section 11(a) of the same Rules by:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱ 20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱ 40,000.00

SANCTION/PENALTY: Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a period of three (3) months and
one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his records with this Court.

45. Atty. Correa vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010)
FACTS:
Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special Proceedings
No. 660-01C, entitled "Intestate Estate of Hector Tan." He revealed that during the hearing of the case,
respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the Administrator's Report, including the audited
Financial Report covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant
added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to
sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants

Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was asked by respondent Judge Belen to
stand up while the latter dictated his order on their Administrator's Report. Respondent Judge Belen even
rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it is regrettable "because Atty.
Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher at that." Complainant regrets the actuations and
statements of respondent Judge Belen, especially because the remark was uncalled for, a left-handed
compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse, respondent Judge Belen ousted complainant as
co-administrator of the estate of Hector Tan.

Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for indirect contempt because he had fully
explained to the court that he had done his part as co-administrator in good faith, and that, through his efforts, the
estate was able to meet the deadline for the latest Tax Amnesty Program of the government, consequently saving
the estate the amount of no less than P35 Million.

In his Comment, respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in handling the settlement of
the estate of Hector Tan violated and breached the tenets and standards of the legal profession and of the
Lawyer's Oath. He alleged that, despite the clear tenor of a lawyer-client relationship, complainant associated
himself as corresponding counsel and member of the Ongkiko Law Office, the counsel of the opposing party in
the settlement proceedings.

Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in connivance with Rose Ang Tee, surreptitiously
released millions of pesos for the now deceased Purification Tee Tan and to themselves, in clear violation of
complainant's legal and fiduciary relationship and responsibilities as court-appointed co-administrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

RULING:
Yes.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. More specifically,
Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides —

SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial
to the proper performance of such duties.

The Court noted that the incidents narrated by complainant were never denied by respondent Judge Belen, who
merely offered his justification and asserted counter accusations against complainant. The Court held that
respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is
the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system

A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belen's insulting statements,
tending to project complainant's ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that
the latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable.
Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is
one virtue that members of the bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.

SANCTION/PENALTY: GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him P10,000.00, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

46. Atty. Balayon vs. Judge Dinopol (A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969, 490 SCRA 547, June 15, 2006)
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal City,
Branch 24, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, relative to his issuance of a search warrant. The complainant is Atty.
Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., a private practicing lawyer.
Complainant alleged that Filoteo B. Arcallo, a public school teacher, submitted his sworn statement before SPO2
Carlito Lising accusing Tito Cantor of Illegal Possession of Firearms. Based on the said sworn statement, P/S
Insp. Virgilio Carreon, Intelligence and Investigation Officer of the South Cotabato Police Provincial Office, filed
an application for search warrant against Tito Cantor. The respondent Judge issued the search warrant. In the
evening of the same day, a team of policemen headed by P/Supt. Fred Juan Bartolome implemented the search
warrant. After the search conducted by the raiding team, a written report/information was submitted by P/S Insp.
Virgilio Carreon, where it was stated therein that the search was negative, meaning not a single firearm was
found inside the house of Tito Cantor.

Claiming that the search warrant was issued in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, the instant complaint was filed.

Additionally, complainant reiterated in his reply respondent Judge’s noncompliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court by not conducting and attaching the written searching questions and answers he made
before issuing the search warrant.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its recommendation, that Judge Oscar E. Dinopol be
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

RULING:
Yes. Respondent was ordered to pay a fine and a warning.

The SC upheld the OCA’s findings that respondent Judge professed gross ignorance of the law for his failure to
reduce the examination in writing. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to know it or as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Specifically, respondent Judge failed to conform to the high standards of competence
required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that:
Rule 1.01. - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01- A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.

Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.

Clearly then, the respondent Judge displayed gross ignorance of the law in failing to observe the requirements in
issuing a search warrant. He was ignorant of the basic and simple procedural rules in issuing the said warrant.
Verily, respondent Judge’s actions visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
The Court finds respondent Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 24, Koronadal City, guilty of
gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
47. Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) vs. Judge Ruben Carretas (A.M. No.RTJ-07-2043,
532 SCRA 218, September 5, 2007)
FACTS:
This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a concerned citizen of
Legazpi City, against respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legazpi City, Branch 9 because the latter is fond of making harsh, embarrassing and insulting remarks to
witnesses, litigants, lawyers, prosecutors and PAO lawyers in his sala. In his comment, Judge Carretas denied
the accusation and claimed that he had not insulted anyone and while he may have used harsh word sometimes,
they were made out of exasperation and with the intention merely to right the wrong committed in his presence,
not to insult anyone. The executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi City, conducted a discreet investigation and
concluded that the charges against respondent judge were true. However, he refrained from recommending any
definite action against him and left the matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). The OCA adopted the findings of Judge Dañas and recommended to the Court that Judge Carretas be
advised to observe proper judicial decorum and to conscientiously abide by the mandates of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in the exercise of his official functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Carretas is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

RULING:
Yes.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that integrity is essential not only in the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. They shall also maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Further, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character.

In this case, Judge Carretas has fallen short of the ethics of the judicial office when he humiliated, insulted or
embarrassed lawyers appearing in his sala. It was proven when the lawyers who appeared in his sala were
interviewed during the investigation and all of them have commented the same on his behavior.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
Therefore, Judge Carretas is found guilty and is sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
48. Marcelino Espejon, et al. vs. Judge Jorge Lorredo (A.M. No. MTJ-22-007, March 9, 2022)

FACTS:

This complaint was filed by complainants Marcelino Espejon and Erickson Cabonita, charging Judge Jorge
Emmanuel Lorredo of MeTC Manila Branch 26 for bias and partiality. He demonstrated such conduct in a civil
case for unlawful detainer filed by Myrna Alcantara against the complainants.

Complainants alleged that during the preliminary conference of the civil case, Judge Lorredo made remarks
about their sexual orientation. They further averred that the Judge’s treatment and conduct was heavily
influenced by his religious beliefs. The records show that Lorredo badgered complainants with these questions
about their sexual orientation:

COURT: Mag-ano ba kayo?

M. ESPEJON: Magkasama kami sa bahay.

COURT: Mag pinsan?

M. ESPEJON: Hindi man kami. Magkaibigan po.

E. CABONITA: Magkaibigan po.

COURT: Kayong dalawa?

E. CABONITA: Oo, kasi yung Tita ko po nasa taas po.

COURT: Wala naman kayong relationship na yung bawal sa Bible? Homosexual relationship? Wala bang bading
sa inyong dalawa?

M. ESPEJON: Ay wala po, sir.

COURT: Ba't parang . . . Bading 'to? Bading ka?

M. ESPEJON: Sir siguro po wala namang perpektong tao sa mundo pero. . . .

COURT: Hindi, bading ka?

M. ESPEJON: Hindi po, sir.

COURT: Tinuro ka niya eh.

E. CABONITA: Tinatanong ko nga po siya.

COURT: Teka, teka, hindi kayo mag pinsan. Parang may narinig akong pinsan kanina. Saan nanggaling yun?
May word pinsan. Sa 'yo ba?

E. CABONITA: Hindi po. Yung Tita ko po sa taas nakatira.

COURT: Oh, sige. Wala kayong relationship na homosexual? Kasi ginanun mo siya eh, baka bading.

E. CABONITA: Wala ho sir.

COURT: Baka daw siya. Ikaw. May asawa siya?

E. CABONITA: Wala.

COURT: May bisita parating lalaki?

E. CABONITA: Ah, that I don't know, wala.

COURT: Pareho kayong bahay eh. Pinagtatakpan mo ba?

E. CABONITA: Hindi po.

COURT: Sinasabi ko lang bawal din sa batas yung, ah hindi, bawal sa

diyos yang homosexual ha?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: Eto ano ha. Nililink ko lang yung situation niyo sa situation ko. Ang situation niyo, kasalanan niyo sa
Diyos, kanila yung property, ayaw niyong ibigay.

M. ESPEJON: Opo.

COURT: May anak ka na ba?

M. ESPEJON: Wala pa po, sir.

COURT: Girlfriend?

M. ESPEJON: Wala pa po.

COURT: Nagka -girlfriend ka na?

M. ESPEJON: Nabigo po, sir.

COURT: Oh, tapos yung tinuturo niya ganun, yun tama? May bading ba sa inyo?

M. ESPEJON: Ang masasagot ko, sasagot ho niya, ano, tita niya nakatira sa taas. Mayordoma po ng may-ari.

COURT: Bading ka ba?

M. ESPEJON: Hindi ho.

COURT: Turo niya kasi ganun.

M. ESPEJON: Hindi po.

COURT: Ang point ko lang, sa inyo mali, Thou shall not steal. Pagnanakaw yun. May parusa yan. Xxx

Consequently, the complainants filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition against the Judge to which the latter
denied. Subsequently, he issued the decision against the complainants. The instant case was then filed.

In his comment, Judge Lorredo denied that he had prejudged the case during the preliminary conference and that
he expressed the view that complianants were in a homosexual relationship. He

maintained that as a Christian, he merely tries his best to guide lawyers and litigants who appear before his court
to arrive at a settlement with the help of the Bible. He claimed further that he had, so far, settled 101 cases using
the bible.

Judge Lorredo expounded that the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) would reveal that he was only warning
complainants about God's punishment for those who violate His commandments. Citing Biblical passages, Judge
Lorredo said he explained to complainants that refusing to vacate the property was tantamount to stealing the
property rights of their landlord because they were depriving the latter of the enjoyment of his or her property
rights.

The Judicial Integrity Board’s Evaluation and Recommendation

When Judge Lorredo declared outright that complainants are not the owners of the property and must therefore
vacate the same during the preliminary conference, he virtually prejudged the case in favor of the plaintiffs therein
when he should have only explained the applicable law and directed the parties to make concessions which they
may or may not accept. Worse, according to the JIB, Judge Lorredo admitted using the Bible in deciding cases
when he should have insulated himself from his religious beliefs and acted only on the basis of the evidence and
the law as shown by the records of the case before him. As well, his remarks against homosexuality were
irrelevant to the issue in the case and had no place in the course of a preliminary conference. Therefore, the JIB
found that the acts of Judge Lorredo constituted grave misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Lorredo should be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES, but with modifications (only simple misconduct; not grave misconduct)

(TN: This was not the first time that Judge Lorredo was involved in an administrative case. He was previously
held liable for improper remarks under the Magno vs. Lorredo case.)

The Court agrees with the JIB and resolves that Judge Lorredo has violated Sections 1 and 6 of Canon 4,
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Canon 5, as well as Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.

CANON 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial
office.
 SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences
arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Although Judge Lorredo has denied being averse to gays, his tactless statements during the preliminary
conference and in his Comment to the Complaint reveal otherwise. They are tantamount to homophobic slurs
which have no place in the courts of law. The fact that they were made by no less than a magistrate should
rightfully upset the Court and must perforce be penalized. In the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission
on Elections, it was declared that "as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community." Thus, it should come as a matter of course for all judges to desist from any word or conduct that
would show or suggest anything other than inclusivity for members of the LGBTQIA+ community.

Other than the foregoing canons, Judge Lorredo also violated CSC Resolution No. 01-09440 and committed a
form of work-related sexual harassment. Section 3 (a) (3), Rule III of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides
that work-related sexual harassment may be committed under circumstances wherein "the act or series of acts
might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a
complainant who may be a co-employee, applicant, customer, or ward of the person complained of." More
particularly, Section 53 (B) (3), Rule X classifies as a less grave offense those "derogatory or degrading remarks
or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or one's sexual orientation or used to describe a
person."

The Court reminded judges how they should possess the virtue of gravitas. The Court found the respondent
judge therein administratively liable for conduct unbecoming because of his inappropriate snide comments and
display of arrogance and condescension to lawyers and witnesses appearing before his court. The Court held
that judges should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined and temperate in speech, whether written
or spoken, and virtuous in character. Judges who fall short of these and are, on the contrary, inconsiderate,
discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in their courts commit an impropriety and fail
in their duty to reaffirm the people's faith in the judiciary.

While the Judge may have violated the abovementioned laws, the Court ruled that the acts committed were
not in the nature of a grave misconduct, as well as partial behavior.

On grave misconduct

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful beghavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must manifest before such conduct would be considered as
grave. For all of Lorredo’s faults in this case, the elements oif gross misconduct are absent.

On partiality

In Cabañero v. Cañon, the Court employed the same set of parameters in disqualifying a judge under Section 1
of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in determining whether a judge has been partial. The Court reiterated that:
1. there must be adequate evidence to prove the charge;
2. there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the
case at bar; and
3. the bias and prejudice must have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.

None of these elements are present in this case. Although Judge Lorredo was noticeably quick to brand
complainants as unlawful occupants of the subject property, he ostensibly anchored it on the admissions of
complainants themselves that they were not the owners of the property and were merely renting it. He even cited
jurisprudential support in his Comment.

As regards the imposition of the penalties against Judge Lorredo, Boston Finance and Investment Corporation v.
Gonzalez instructs that if the respondent judge or justice of the lower court is found guilty of multiple offenses
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation. Judge
Lorredo's overbearing demeanor and unwarranted acts during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No.
M-MNL-18-08450-SC and improper foisting of his religious beliefs in the conduct of his judicial functions
constitute simple misconduct. On the other hand, his inappropriate remarks during the same proceedings and in
his Comment in this case constitute conduct unbecoming and work-related sexual harassment under CSC
Resolution No. 01-0940.

SANCTION/PENALTY: GUILTY OF SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for which he is FINED in the amount of P40,000.00;
and of conduct unbecoming of a judge for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000.00. For violation of
sexual harassment under under Section 53 (B) (3), Rule X of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 01-0940,
Judge Lorredo is SUSPENDED for thirty (30) days without pay. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
 49. Dagudag vs. Judge Paderanga (A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008)
FACTS:
1. Region VII PNP Maritime Group received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container
Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to
Cebu
2. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the
DENR.
3. Upon inspection, the crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the Certificate of Origin and other
pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DAO No. 07-94. After
due notice, the illegal forest products were confiscated in favor of the government
4. A complaint was filed before Judge Paderanga
5. A certain Roger Edma prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR,
CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses
6. During the hearing for the writ of replevin, Judge Paderanga showed manifest partiality in favor of
Edma.
7. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Salceda to take possession of the forest
products
8. Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an affidavit-complaint charging Judge
Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a judge

ISSUE:
WON the acts of herein respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law and unbecoming of the judge.

RULING:
Yes

The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies.

In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court
and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review
by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3)
courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari
or prohibition. In Dy, the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the
DENR shall be directed to that agency — not the courts

Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin
constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao, the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover
the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The
prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a
prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take
reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial
duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.

The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is
basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products
were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge
Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright

The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find
respondent’s intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The
utterances are uncalled for."

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall
be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They
should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from
inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language. They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in
speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate,
courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court.

The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga’s third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Paderanga, the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for
unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for
repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,41 the Court held him liable for undue
delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In
both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be
dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge
Paderanga’s arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.

Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one for gross ignorance of the
law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other for gross
misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their
accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and
diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system

SANCTION/PENALTY:
GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

50. Edgar A. Abiog vs. Hon. Evelyn C. Cañete (A.M. No. MTJ-18-1917, October 8, 2018)
FACTS:

On August 2011 and subsequent thereafter up to this day, complainant, Court Stenographer I of the MCTC,
Brooke's Point­-Española, Bataraza, Palawan, alleged that Presiding Judge Evelyn C. Cañete moved by personal
gain, without justifiable reason, in a scandalous manner, and in an act debasing the dignity of the exalted position
of a Municipal Circuit Trial Court Presiding Judge, did then and there stayed and resided at her chambers and the
extension of her chambers which was constructed under her direct supervision utilizing the same as her living
and residential quarters, and from time to time her families' and her visitors' living and residential quarter[s] with
the Municipal Government paying their electric bills and water bills thereby inviting public criticism and criticism
among the employees of the Judiciary.

In her Comment, respondent judge denied the charges against her. She averred that there was no such
extension to her chambers; that the living quarters referred to by complainant was actually occupied at one time
by the public prosecutor, public attorney, and the clerk of court; that when the premises were vacated, the
municipal government had it repaired "as a way of thanking her for the contribution that [she] made in the
community;" that she gave up the apartment she was renting upon her designation as Assisting Judge in Puerto
Princesa City in September 2012 and transferred to the "living quarters assigned to [her] by the Municipal
Government"; that since she normally rendered overtime work, it was "very convenient and safe for [her] to stay
at the quarters"; that prior to the filing of this complaint, she again rented an apartment but "still utilize[d] [her]
quarters in the many instances that [she had] to work overtime;" and, that she would not have been nominated as
Outstanding MCTC Judge if there was any truth in the allegations of complainant.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found substantial evidence to hold respondent judge guilty of
improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service when she
accepted the local government's offer of free use of its facilities ostensibly in recognition of her excellent service
to the community.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the OCA erred in finding the respondent judge guilty of violating SC Administrative Circular No.
3-92.

RULING:

NO. It is beyond cavil that respondent judge occupied a portion of the Halls of Justice at Brooke's Point as her
residential quarters.

This Court has consistently reminded government officials that the Halls of Justice must strictly be used for official
functions only, in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 3-92, which partly states:
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
 purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted
to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on
therein any trade or profession.

xxxx

Also, her denial of having solicited from the local government the provision of a living quarters does not deserve
credence. According to Atty. Mary Jean D. Feliciano, Municipal Mayor of Brooke's Point, Palawan, addressed to
complainant that a verbal agreement was made between the Local Chief Executive and the Presiding Judge,
Hon. Evelyn C. Cañete, that instead of granting the latter an additional Representation Allowance and
Transportation Allowance (RATA), the local government gave her the privilege to use the extension of the said
office, which was constructed by the municipal government, as her living quarters. Such arrangement was made
as the municipal government's way of compensating the services of the Presiding Judge whose presence paved
the way for a speedy decision on complaints filed not only by the residents of Brooke's Point but of the
neighboring municipalities which redound to the convenience and comfort of the transacting public.

Respondent judge ought to have known that the local government was not obligated to pay her additional
allowance or RATA. She was already properly compensated for her services by the Court. Propriety demands
that respondent judge should have refused the offer; she ought to have exhibited enough good sense to decline it
especially since the provision of a residential quarters is not among her privileges as a judge. Neither should
respondent judge expect the local government to "compensate" her for services rendered, particular as regards
the speedy disposition of complaints, since this is the very essence of, and expected from, her office. Moreover,
respondent judge's use of the courthouse as dwelling "brings the court into public contempt and disrepute" "in
addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage."

She ought to have lived up to the standards of judicial excellence by strictly adhering to laws and rules,
directives, and circulars of the Court. Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars is considered a less serious charge punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but
not exceeding P20,000.00. Considering the prevailing circumstances, a fine in the amount of P11,000.00 is
appropriate.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds Judge Evelyn C. Cañete, Municipal Circuit Trial Court-Brooke's Point-Española,
Bataraza, Palawan, GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE
of P11,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or kindred offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

51. Benigno B. Reas vs. Carlos M. Relacion (A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011)
FACTS:

Benigno B. Reas (Reas), Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 23 in Cebu City, charged Carlos M.
Relacion (Relacion), Clerk III of the RTC Branch 15 in Cebu City, with gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Reas alleged in his complaint that by prior arrangement, the Clerk of Court of the RTC (COC) delivered to the
Cebu CFI Community Cooperative (Cooperative) the salary checks of court personnel with outstanding
obligations with the Cooperative to pay for their loans. Reas’ salary check in the amount of P4,280.00 was
delivered by the COC to the Cooperative for the said purpose. When Reas asked for the receipt corresponding to
his payment, the Cooperative informed him that his salary check had been inadvertently surrendered to Relacion
after Relacion had harassed the Cooperative to a point of violence to release Relacion’s own check. Relacion did
not return the salary check to the Cooperative despite repeated demands. When Reas confronted Relacion,
Relacion admitted taking Reas’ salary check. Relacion mauled Reas when Reas refused Relacion’s offer to pay
Reas’ salary check with Relacion’s Judicial Development Fund (JDF) check. It was only after the Cooperative
confronted Relacion that the latter paid Reas’ salary check.

In his comment, Relacion denied harassing or threatening the employees of the Cooperative, explaining that he
went to the COC to get his own salary check, and he expressed his intention to get his own salary check because
he needed the money to which the Cooperative’s representative agreed. After signing the payroll, the
Cooperative’s representative handed to him a salary check. It was later on that Relacion realized that the salary
check handed to him was not his. Relacion further narrated that he informed Reas that he would pay Reas when
they meet at the bundy clock section. However, Reas then punched him but missed. Thus, he dared Reas to a
fistfight outside the building, but the latter refused his dare. Both of them then entered the office of the COC.
While they both sat inside said office, Reas stood up and punched him on the left side of his neck, and he
retaliated by punching Reas.

Upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the complaint was re- docketed as a
regular administrative case before the sala of the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cebu City. RTC Executive Judge
Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. (Judge Dumdum, Jr.) informed the Court that the parties had entered into a compromise
agreement calling for the dismissal of the administrative matter; and that the compromise agreement had been
reached after Relacion had apologized to Reas, and paid the latter the amount of P100.00. Judge Dumdum, Jr.
recommended to the Court the approval of the compromise agreement and the dismissal of the administrative
matter. Subsequently, the Court referred the matter to the OCA. The OCA recommended that Relacion be fined in
the amount of P2,000.00 for simple misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Relacion is guilty of simple misconduct.

RULING:

YES. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that the officials and employees of the Judiciary serve
as sentinels of justice, and declares that any act of impropriety on their part affects the dignity of the Judiciary and
the peoples faith in the Judiciary. Thus, the court personnel must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of their official duties, but also in their private dealings with their
co-employees and with the public. Their professional and personal conduct must be free from any whiff of
impropriety.

In this case, there is no sufficient proof showing that Relacion intentionally took Reas salary check from the
Cooperative. Lucino Q. Garcia, an employee of the Cooperative, admitted in his certification that he had
inadvertently surrendered Reas’ salary check to Relacion when the latter had demanded his own salary check to
a point of violence.

Even so, Relacion could not be exculpated because he did not immediately return the salary check either to Reas
or to the Cooperative upon realizing that the salary check handed to him was not his. Moreover, Relacion’s
excuse for not returning Reas’ check was lame and implausible. Relacion’s failure to immediately return Reas’
salary check was improper and constituted misconduct. That Relacion did not maliciously or deliberately take
Reas’ salary check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct.

Considering that the misconduct was Relacion’s first offense, the penalty imposable on him is suspension for one
month and one day to six months. However, we should note that, firstly, Reas already forgave him and Relacion
indemnified Reas in the amount of P100.00, as evidenced by their compromise agreement; secondly, the amount
of the salary check was only P4,280.00 and was already reimbursed to Reas; and, lastly, Relacion was
contemplating on retiring due to a lingering illness. The penalty of suspension would be too severe under the
circumstances. Instead, the imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 suffice.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Ordered to PAY A FINE OF P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING.

52. Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao
Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al. (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011)
FACTS:

Almost a year later after the tragic incident known as the Maguindanao Massacre, various media entities,
relatives of the victims and members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape
recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be
formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They
principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they
contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and
outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to
the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They
inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and
that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners
allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.

The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge
Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage
should be brought to the Court's attention through appropriate motion." Hence, the present petitions which assert
the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and
to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association,
subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings be allowed

RULING:

Yes.

Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly
explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of
circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment
arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved
party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for
disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases - the private complainants/families of the victims
and other witnesses - inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life
or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come,
sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional
sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings.

Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may observe the proceedings, the
peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of
hundreds of families.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases,
subject to the guidelines herein outlined.

SO ORDERED.

53. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Joselito Villarosa (A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578, January 28,
2020)
FACTS:

The Philippine Daily Inquirer published an article written by Tulfo, one of its columnists, entitled "What's
Happening to Makati Judges?" Allegedly, three Makati judges committed certain irregularities in

the discharge of their judicial functions The said article contains the alleged anomalies and irregularities
committed by the three Makati judges in the discharge of their official functions. According to the said article,
Judge Villarosa favored moneyed litigants in commercial cases even if their cases are unmeritorious. Tulfo further
claimed that Judge Villarosa is part of a syndicate composed of Makati judges who decide big commercial cases
based on money and not on the merits.
The Office of the Court Administrator issued a memorandum and directed a Judicial Supervisor to investigate the
circumstances referred to in Tulfo’s article. In its Report and Recommendation, the OCA found Judge Villarosa
guilty of violation of a Supreme Court directive and four counts of gross ignorance of the law and recommended
the forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reemployment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government.

ISSUE: WON Judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars.

RULING:

YES, Judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. Where the law is
straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. This is considered a serious administrative charge under Section 8(9) Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. Judges are also bound to observe Supreme court rules, directives and circulars for they cannot be
overturned by mere agreement among the judges.

In this case, the Court found that Judge Villarosa committed gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he:
1) transferred cases for Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 149 without conducting the first stage of
judicial proceedings in violation of the Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of
Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution; 2) ordered the consolidation of a civil case pending in
his court with a case pending in Branch 10 of Cebu City, RTC, in violation of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court; 3) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) in a civil case that was effective beyond the 20-day period
prescribed in Section 5, Rule 158 of the Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95; and 4) issued a
TRO against the Department of Transportation and Communication in violation of Section 3 of R.A. 8975.

The Court likewise held Judge Villarosa liable for violating its directive in A.M. No. 03-3- 03-SC issued on July 8,
2014 to transfer all commercial cases pending in his court which have not been tried or have been submitted for
resolution. The records show that Villarosa deliberately failed to transfer eight commercial cases to Makati RTC,
Branch 137 in violation of the said directive.

Therefore, former Judge Joselito C. Villarosa is hereby found guilty of four (4) counts of gross ignorance of the
law, as well as of violation of A.M. 03-3-03-SC dated July 8, 2014.

SANCTION/PENALTY:
1. All his retirement benefits except accrued leave credits are forfeited
2. meted with the accessory penalty of disqualification from reinstatement or appointment from any public
office including GOCCs
3. he is fined, Php140,000 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits and in case the latter is
insufficient, Judge Villarosa is ordered to pay the balance within ten (10) days from notice.
 54. Reynaldo Ngo vs. Atty. Renato Frades (A.M. No. P-21-026, November 9, 2021)
FACTS: Ngo charges respondent Atty. Frades, Clerk of Court of RTC Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, with Falsification
and violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.

In his complaint, he alleges that respondent falsely certified a document submitted in evidence by spouses
Anatalio in their appeal to the RTC from the decision of the MTCC which was an action for Unlawful Detainer filed
by Ngo and his brother against the spouses Anatalio. He further claims that after they won the suit, the
defendants therein filed an appeal to the RTC.

The RTC denied the appeal and accorded greater weight to the Ngos' title over the defendants' unregistered
Deed of Sale denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa." Thus, complainant Ngo sought a certification from respondent
Clerk of Court to determine the existence of said document in the notarial file of Atty. Godofredo M. Linsangan
who purportedly notarized it. However, respondent did not respond to Ngo's letter-request.

In addition, Ngo asserted that upon demands and harassment by respondent, he handed the latter the amount of
P30,000.00 to cover demolition expenses in the execution of the RTC's Decision. While respondent issued a
handwritten acknowledgement receipt, Ngo charged respondent with misappropriation of the amount since the
defendants in Civil Case No. 3624-09 had voluntarily demolished their houses. Consequently, no fees were
expended.

In his defense, respondent denied the charges and contended that he issued the certification in his official
capacity when it was referred to him for appropriate action. According to respondent, at that time, the RTC,
Branch 36 had no Branch Clerk of Court so administrative concerns of the branch, including record certification,
were referred to him. Thus, respondent maintained that he certified the document "Bilihan ng Lupa" as a
"Certified True/Xerox Copy" after referral of the case record of Civil Case No. 3624-09 to him for action.
Respondent insisted that the certification was in performance of his lawful duty as Clerk of Court in the absence
of a Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent further explained that his certification only contemplated certifying the
existence of such a document attached to the record of the case, and did not cover certifying that the copy of the
"Bilihan ng Lupa" was a faithful reproduction of the original document.

As regards the charge of estafa, respondent denied that he misappropriated the amount of P30,000.00 for
demolition expenses or that he used the money for personal gain. Respondent averred that he gave the amount
to defendant Dominador Anatalio to cover his and his co-defendants' voluntary demolition of their houses. The
arrangement was confirmed by Sheriff Ernesto Mendoza, the sheriff assigned to implement the writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be held liable for Serious Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct?

RULING: YES.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.

To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous,
and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also
have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.

Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive,
or betray.

Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the
consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.

A clerk of court’s office is the hub of activities, and he or she is expected to be assiduous in performing official
duties and in supervising and managing the court’s dockets, records, and exhibits. The image of the Judiciary is
the shadow of its officers and employees. A simple misfeasance or nonfeasance may have disastrous
repercussions on that image.

Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty
and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal from service even if the offense
was committed for the first time. Under Section 52 of the same rule, "the penalty of dismissal shall carry
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations." However, recent jurisprudence provides that if
the application of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended, is favorable to the respondent, then it must be applied.
Under the revised Rule 140, if the penalty imposed is dismissal from service and there is forfeiture of
retirement benefits, the accrued leave credits are not included.

In this case, the respondent's actuations constitute acts of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct. But since
the application of Rule 140, as amended, is favorable to herein respondent, then it must be applied in this case.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Thus, respondent lawyer Frades is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty and Dishonesty. Accordingly, he is sanctioned with DISMISSAL from the service, FORFEITURE of all
benefits EXCEPT ACCRUED LEAVE CREDITS, and DISQUALIFICATION from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

55. Ma. Lourdes Galit-Inoy vs. Melvin Inoy (A.M. No. P-22-051, July 20, 2022)
FACTS: Complainant alleged that she is the legal wife of respondent as evidenced by their Certificate of
Marriage. On February 16, 2018, while complainant was browsing their laptop, she saw romantic and intimate
photographs of respondent and his alleged mistress named Mary Ann. Complainant also saw a sex video
involving the two. She suspected that some of the photographs were taken at a motel room. She confronted
respondent about what she saw and the latter allegedly admitted that it was indeed him in the photographs and
video.

Respondent in his Comment denied the charge and asserted that the photographs were taken by complainant
from his Google account without his knowledge and consent. He further asserted that the photographs and
screenshots were inadmissible in evidence as these were obtained in violation of his constitutional right to privacy
of communication and correspondence.

Respondent’s contention: Further, respondent explained that Mary Ann was one of his business partners and
coaches at Unlimited Network of Opportunities, Inc., a networking business which he joined some time in
November 2017. Since he was new in the business, respondent alleged that Mary Ann accompanied him to meet
prospective clients and gain familiarity with the business. Respondent alleged that Mary Ann was only his mentor
and that their relationship was purely professional. He also explained that the photographs attached to the
affidavit-complaint only showed his networking business and did not establish any illicit relationship between him
and Mary Ann. Lastly, respondent alleged that complainant only took the screenshots showing two naked
persons having sexual intercourse from an adult website. Respondent denied that it was him and Mary Ann
appearing in the screenshots.

JIB recommendation: The JIB recommended that: (1) the present complaint against respondent be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter and (2) respondent be found guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and be
suspended from the service for six (6) months without pay, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct?

RULING: Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court: "In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary
for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." To stress, "the burden of substantiating the charges in an
administrative proceeding falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint
with substantial evidence."

In the case, the Court finds that complainant was able to show, through the photographs she submitted, that
respondent has an illicit relationship with Mary Ann. As ruled by the JIB, these photographs of respondent and
Mary Ann undeniably displayed their romantic, passionate, and amorous relationship. The Court does not
subscribe to respondent's defense that his relationship with Mary Ann was purely professional. In fact, a closer
scrutiny of the photographs submitted by complainant contradicted respondent's claims as these photographs
showed a very personal and intimate relationship between respondent and Mary Ann.

The JIB is correct in finding respondent guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct on the ground that it is morally
reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with a person other than his or her
spouse.

Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct has been defined as "act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality
and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society," It is such conduct that is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community, and that
is indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness. Further, the immoral acts may be committed
in a scandalous or discreet manner, within or outside the workplace. As in the case, respondent's immoral acts
were committed outside the confines of his work as an employee of the Judiciary, but this fact does not exempt
him from administrative liability.

However, the Court, in A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, amended the Rules of Court and included the personnel of the
lower courts—such as herein respondent—within the coverage of Rule 140. Under Section 14(i) of the same rule,
as further amended by A.M No. 21-08-09-SC, Gross Immorality is classified as a serious charge.

For an immoral conduct to warrant disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, i.e., "so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree." From the foregoing, the
Court finds respondent guilty of the serious charge of Gross Immorality in having an illicit relationship with a
person other than his spouse.
SANCTION/PENALTY: WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Melvin DC. Inoy, Court
Stenographer III, Branch 266, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City is RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter.

Accordingly, Melvin DC. Inoy is found GUILTY of the serious charge of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED for
six (6) months and one (1) day with STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

56. Republic of the Philippines vs. Judge Ramon Caguioa (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, August 23, 2022)

FACTS: These are three administrative cases against Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding Judge of Branch 74,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City.

A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2063 An administrative complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, alleging that respondent committed gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint stemmed
from respondent's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which enjoined the
implementation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334 that subjected the applicants in a
Civil Case to an action for declaratory relief entitled "Indigo Distribution Corp., Inc. v. The
Hon. Secretary of Finance," to the payment of sin taxes and excise taxes on tobacco and
alcohol products.

A.M. No. The Commissioner of Customs charged the respondent with gross ignorance of the law,
RTJ-07-2064 manifest partiality, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint
stemmed from respondent's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which enjoined the
implementation of a customs personnel order (CPO) issued by the Commissioner of Customs
and approved by the Secretary of Finance. In the subject CPO, the applicant, Andres
Salvacion, then the District Collector of the Port of Subic, was reassigned to the port of
Cagayan de Oro and another customs officer was designated as Acting District Collector of
Subic.

A.M. No. Complainant Charles T. Burns, Jr. (Charles) charged respondent with grave misconduct for
RTJ-07-2066 the latter's issuance of a writ of execution in favor of the adverse party in a Civil Case entitled
"Mary Agnes Burns v. Spouses Juan C. Beltran," for recovery of ownership and possession
over several parcels of land, placing the adverse party in possession of the said properties.

The Court found the respondent guilty in all the above administrative cases and ordered respondent suspended
from office for a period of three months.

After almost 12 years from respondent's dismissal from the judicial service, or on February 9, 2021, respondent
wrote a Letter-Request for Judicial Clemency addressed to then Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta. Attached to
the letter-request were the respective testimonials - In essence, the letters attested to respondent's humility,
professional competence, and his upright and ethical conduct in all the years following his dismissal from the
Bench. Particularly, Justice Quiroz attested to the fact that on several occasions, respondent had represented
several accused on pro bono cases before the Sandiganbayan.

The Court treated respondent's letter-request as a petition for judicial clemency. The Commission ordered the
issuance of a notice to the offended parties and the publication of respondent's petition for judicial clemency, and
required them to file their opposition to the said petition within 10 days from receipt or publication of said notice.
According to the Commission, it did not receive any opposition to the petition for judicial clemency of respondent
within the prescribed 10-day period from the publication of the notice. On January 10, 2022, the Republic, as
represented by the OSG, filed a Comment 33 on the petition for judicial clemency of respondent. Mainly
dissecting what happened in the consolidated administrative cases for which respondent was dismissed from
service, the OSG argued that the injury and damage allegedly sustained by the State for the serious breaches
committed by respondent are too substantial and should not be countenanced. It thus prayed that the petition for
judicial clemency of the respondent be denied.

ISSUE: Whether the request for judicial clemency should be granted.

RULING: The petition for Judicial Clemency is partially granted.

The Court has been conservative in granting petitions for judicial clemency. This stems from the concept that
judicial clemency is neither a right nor a privilege that one can avail of at any time. Its grant must be delicately
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Indeed, as a general rule, a petition for judicial
clemency is not looked upon with favor.

Guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency 47 (Re: Diaz), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges['] associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

Remorse and reformation must reflect how the claimant has redeemed [his or her] moral aptitude by clearly
understanding the gravity and consequences of [his or her] conduct. There is an element of reconciliation in
clemencies. When there is a private offended party, there should be an attempt at reconciliation where the
offender offers an apology and, in turn, the wronged person gives a full and written forgiveness. Only after this
reconciliation can this Court acquire jurisdiction on the plea for clemency. Where there is no private offended
party, the plea for clemency must contain the public apology. This Court has also considered other factors such
as the petitioner's advanced age, deteriorating health, and economic difficulties.
It must also be emphasized that while this Court is mindful of its duty to discipline its officers, concomitant to this
duty is the willingness to extend mercy to those who have rectified their errors and mended their ways. However,
the grant of clemency should not excuse or remove the fault of the offender's past acts, nor should it amount to a
condonation. Clemency is not blind acceptance or tolerance of a wrongful act. Thus, any act of clemency should
not revisit a decision that has already become final. A plea for clemency is not a legal device to reconsider a
judgment and reopen a case.

Degrees of clemency

Further, there are degrees of clemency. Generally, unless for extraordinary reasons, dismissal or disbarment
cannot be the subject of any kind of clemency within five years. There should also be no disruption of the service.
Moreover, the Court clarified which kinds of offenses are subject to various forms of clemency and the equivalent
extraordinary circumstances that should be considered. This Court lifts and modifies penalties if there are
intervening factors that merit mitigation. Penalties are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. Thus, when
an errant officer demonstrates their sincere repentance and remorse for the wrong they committed and the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose, judicial clemency is warranted.

Burden of Proof to establish compliance with the guidelines

Only when these guidelines are strictly adhered to, shall the Court consider whether judicial clemency is
warranted. The burden of proof to establish compliance with these guidelines rests on the movant.

Who determines the merits of a petition for judicial clemency

Notably, to appropriately determine the merits of a petition for judicial clemency, the Court provided the proper
procedure to be undertaken in Re: Ong. It was stated therein that, prospectively, allegations of those who apply
for clemency must first be evaluated by this Court to find whether prima facie circumstances exist to grant the
relief. Should there appear to be so, a commission must be created to receive the evidence, with due notice to
any offended party and the public. The commission will then determine if there is substantial evidence supporting
the allegations.

Standard of proof

Further, in Nuñez, the Court observed that the standard of proof regarding reinstatement in the membership of
the bar and a petition for judicial clemency is "clear and convincing evidence." This standard of proof is less than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but greater than preponderance of evidence. The degree of believability is higher
than that of an ordinary civil case.

Applies to both the bar and the bench

It was underscored in Nuñez that granting judicial clemency lies in the sound discretion of the Court. Accordingly,
the movant has the burden to hurdle this high bar of standard of proof to be granted judicial clemency. While
Nuñez involves a petition for judicial clemency regarding membership of the Bar, the Court observes that this high
standard of proof of "clear and convincing evidence," should be equally applicable in a petition for judicial
clemency regarding membership in the Bench.

Here, The petition presents proof of remorse and reformation on the part of the respondent. In his petition,
respondent expressly stated being remorseful of his past misdeeds, and realized the folly of his ways and his
error in issuing the injunctive writs. He emphasized that in hindsight, he should have been much more cautious
and circumspect of the possible ramifications and logical consequences of his actions, and sincerely regrets the
lapses in his judgment. He also stated that after his dismissal from service, he went back to the practice of law to
earn a modest living, and claimed that he served his clients well with utmost honesty, good faith, and
competence. He likewise had his fair share of pro bono cases for those who could not afford the services of a
lawyer. Respondent's remorse and repentance are attested to by the testimonials submitted.

Further, sufficient time had lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. In
this case, the decision dismissing respondent from service was promulgated on June 26, 2009. Almost 12 years
had passed upon respondent's filing of his letter-request on February 9, 2021, which the Court treated as a
petition for judicial clemency. Coupled with the substantive evidence of respondent's remorsefulness and
reformation, the Court believes that there has been sufficient lapse of time from the imposition of the penalty to
guarantee that respondent is indeed a changed man.

The requisite of reconciliation has been complied with. In this case, there were three administrative cases
filed against respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063 and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064 were instituted by the Republic and
the Commissioner of Customs, both public entities. In said cases, respondent was meted the penalty of
dismissal. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066, Charles was the private offended party, and respondent was meted out
therein the penalty of suspension from service for three months. To comply with the requisite of reconciliation in
clemency, respondent published his letter-request, which consisted of his petition for judicial clemency and his
public apology. The three newspapers containing the same were all published on December 15, 2021.

The Court finds that respondent still has productive years ahead of him which can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself. According to the Commission, respondent is 65 years old and thus,
has five more remaining years in judicial service. As properly held by the Commission, there is sufficient time for
respondent to be a productive member of the legal profession.

Partial grant of the petition for judicial clemency

Nevertheless, even if the Court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that the movant in a petition for
judicial clemency is remorseful, reformed, and has reconciled with the victims or the public, it does not ipso facto
result to the absolute and complete grant of the reliefs sought. To repeat, the grant of judicial clemency must be
delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. 86 In considering the outcome of the
petition for judicial clemency, the Court must also sensitively weigh its implication to the other members of the
Bench, the Bar, and the general public. Due to the painstaking scrutiny undertaken by the Court, the reliefs
prayed for in petitions for judicial clemency may not be granted in full.

Evidently, in evaluating this petition, the Court cannot disregard the lasting impression left by respondent's past
misconducts. His act of granting the injunctive writs demonstrated his gross ignorance of the law. The Court finds
that it shall only partly grant the reliefs prayed for in the petition for judicial clemency of respondent.

SANCTION/PENALTY:

The Petition for Judicial Clemency is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Respondent Ramon S. Caguioa's disqualification
from reemployment in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations is LIFTED.

Respondent's prayers that he be reinstated as a Regional Trial Court Judge, that the whole period of his
dismissal be considered and treated as suspension without pay, and that his retirement benefits as a Judge be
fully restored are DENIED.