

Water Resources Research

Supporting Information for

Water Governance Contribution to Water and Sanitation Access Equality in Developing

Countries

Tidar Bayu1, Hyungjun Kim1, Taikan Oki1,2,3

1
Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
2
United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan
3
Integrated Research System for Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo,
Japan

Contents of this file

Introduction
Table S1: Basic services definition

Methods
Note S1: Inequality Index Measurement
Figure S1: JMP's Wealth groups' Access to Service Dataset Structure
Figure S2: Structure of GLAAS 2016/2017 cycle
Table S2: Water Governance Indicator Details

Results
Note S2: Varimax Rotated Patterns-Based Identification
Note S3: Subset Analysis
Table S3: Sources of Regulation of Natural Resources
Table S4: Result of GINI Calculation of Access Inequality to Basic Water and Sanitation Service

Discussion
Note S4: Water Governance Dimensions and Access Inequality Nexus

References

1
The data that support this study could be obtained from its respective providers. UNESCO –
WHO Joint Monitoring Programme 2017 datasets,
(https://washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2018-01/JMP-2017-report-
final.pdf). World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016,
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports). UN Water Global Analysis and
Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-water (GLAAS) 2016/2017 cycle,
(http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/investments/glaas-2016-2017-
cycle/en/)

2
Introduction

Table S1

Water Sanitation
Drinking water from an improved Use of improved facilities which are not
source, provided collection time is not shared with other households.
more than 30 minutes for a roundtrip
including queuing.
(Note: Improved drinking water sources are (Note: Improved sanitation facilities are those
those that have the potential to deliver safe designed to hygienically separate excreta from
water by nature of their design and human contact, and include: flush/pour flush
construction, and include: piped water, to piped sewer system, septic tanks or pit
boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, latrines; ventilated improved pit latrines,
protected springs, rainwater, and packaged or composting toilets or pit latrines with slabs)
delivered water)

Basic services definition, (WHO/UNICEF,2017)

3
Methods

Note S1. Inequality Index Measurement

The graphical representation of inequality could be described by Lorentz curve. We
plotted the wealth quintiles (poorest, poor, middle, rich, richest) population on the
x−axis, and the percentage of population access on the y−axis. Thus, in the perfect equal
society, each wealth quintiles could get same proportion of population access to at least
basic service created the 45° straight line, and any departure of this egalitarian line is
representing the degree of inequality and known as concentration curve(Gini 1912;
Giorgi 2005a). %
Pop
ulat
ion
acc
ess
to
basi
c
ser
vice

Wealth quintiles (poorest, poor, middle, rich, richest)

Graphical representation of the concentration curve, modified from Gini,1914 in (Giorgi 2005b).

Gini (1912) defines his index as “the mean difference from all observed quantities” , and
recognized as a measure of inequality when he drew the relationship of his index and
Lorentz curve (Gini 1921; Giorgi 2005a) The concentration ratio, known as Gini index is
the ratio difference between the egalitarian line and the concentration curve to the
triangular area underneath the diagonal line (Sen and Foster 1973) or mathematically
equivalent to twice of relative mean absolute difference (Gini 1921) which is denoted in
the equation below;
n
2
G=
n2 x
∑ i ( x i−x )
i=1

4
Where n is the number of classes observed, xi is an observed value ( % population
access) with rank i. The classification of developing countries is referred to IMF’s World
Economic Outlook Database 2018. Total 82 Developing countries that included in JMP
dataset and inequality analysis are listed below;
code Country Name
AFG Afghanistan
AGO Angola
ARM Armenia
AZE Azerbaijan
BGD Bangladesh
BRB Barbados
BLR Belarus
BLZ Belize
BEN Benin
BTN Bhutan
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BFA Burkina Faso
BDI Burundi
KHM Cambodia
CMR Cameroon
CAF Central African Republic
TCD Chad
COL Colombia
COM Comoros
COG Congo
COD Democratic Republic of the Congo
CRI Costa Rica
CIV Cote d'Ivoire
DOM Dominican Republic
EGY Egypt
SLV El Salvador
ETH Ethiopia
GAB Gabon
GHA Ghana
GIN Guinea
GNB Guinea-Bissau
GUY Guyana
HTI Haiti
HND Honduras
IDN Indonesia
IRQ Iraq
JAM Jamaica
JOR Jordan
KAZ Kazakhstan
KEN Kenya

5
KGZ Kyrgyzstan
LAO Lao People's Democratic Republic
LSO Lesotho
LBR Liberia
The former Yugoslav Republic of
MKD
Macedonia
MDG Madagascar
MWI Malawi
MLI Mali
MRT Mauritania
MDA Republic of Moldova
MNG Mongolia
MNE Montenegro
MOZ Mozambique
NAM Namibia
NPL Nepal
NER Niger
NGA Nigeria
PAK Pakistan
PSE West Bank and Gaza Strip
PAN Panama
PER Peru
PHL Philippines
RWA Rwanda
LCA Saint Lucia
STP Sao Tome and Principe
SEN Senegal
SRB Serbia
SLE Sierra Leone
SDN Sudan
SUR Suriname
SWZ Swaziland
TZA United Republic of Tanzania
THA Thailand
TLS Timor-Leste
TGO Togo
TUN Tunisia
UGA Uganda
UKR Ukraine
VNM Viet Nam
ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe

6
Figure S1
Water Service Sanitation

Wealth Groups Ladder Service Ladder

% Population / wealth group
Poorest Safely Safely
Managed Managed
Poor
Number of population
Basic Basic
Middle
Limited Limited
Rich
Unimproved Unimproved
Richest
Surface Water Open
Defecation

Figure 1 JMP's Wealth groups' Access to Service Dataset structure (WHO/UNICEF,2017)

Figure 1 illustrates the structure of how available data for population access per
wealth quintile group for each specific service ladder is presented in JMP’s datasets
(WHO/UNICEF 2017). The percentage of population access in original datasets was
divided for all the service ladders.

1
 Figure S2

External Support Other data

Country Survey Agency (ESA) Survey sources
• WHO/UNICEF JMP
• 30+ ESAs
• 75 countries • OECD data
• Bilateral donors
• From all WHO regions • World Bank data
• Multilateral donors
• NGOs
•

GLAAS 2016/2017
cycle

Human
Governance Monitoring Financing
resources

Figure 2 Structure of GLAAS 2016/2017 cycle ( modified from (UN Water&WHO 2017))

Table S2: Water Governance Indicators Details

2
 Datasets description World Bank WGI 2016 UN GLAAS 2016/2017 cycle
Total countries covered 229 Countries 75 Countries
Countries with complete value 229 countries 26 countries
Variable Selected 2 Variables 27 Variables (for each water and
sanitation access)
Water Governance Dimensions Political Dimension indicators  2 Political Dimension
and selected Water Governance -Regulatory Quality indicators
Indicators - Government Effectiveness -Level of participation in urban
population
-Level of participation in rural
population
 10 Economic Dimension
indicators

-Existence and level of

implementation of a government-
defined financing plan/budget for
the WASH sector which is published
and agreed (Urban,Rural), 2
indicators.
-Expenditure reports are publicly
available and easily accessible, and
allow comparison of committed

funds to expenditures(U,R), 2
indicators
-Operating and basic maintenance
costs are covered by tariffs(U,R), 2
indicators
-Absorption of external funds (% of
official donor capital commitments
utilized (three-year average)(U,R),
2 indicators
-Absorption of domestic funds (%
of domestic commitments utilized
(three-year average))(U,R)), 2

3
 indicators
 15 Social Dimension
indicators
-Policies and plans have specific
measures to reach vulnerable
population groups (poor, living in
remote areas, people with
disabilities, women, people with
high burden of disease, slums and
informal settlers, indigenous,
refugees/IDP,ethnic minorities ) 7
indicators
-Tracking progress among
vulnerable groups, 1 indicator
-Specific measures in the financing
plan to target resources to seven
vulnerable populations (poor, living
in remote areas, people with
disabilities, women, people with
high burden of disease, slums and
informal settlers, indigenous,
refugees/IDP, ethnic minorities), 7
indicators

Value -2.5 – 2.5 0-1

Countries selected Argentina, Cambodia, Costa
Rica, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Honduras, Madagascar
,Mali, Mexico, Mongolia,
Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia,
South Africa, Tajikistan,
Timor-Leste, United Republic
of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Argentina, Cambodia, Costa Rica,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras,
Madagascar, Mali, Mexico,
Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, South
Africa, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste,
United Republic of Tanzania,
Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe

4
Countries selected for subset
analysis (which have inequality
index produced by the access
inequality analysis)
Results
Cambodia, Costa Rica,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Honduras,
Madagascar
,Mali, Mongolia, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Rwanda,
Serbia, Timor-Leste, United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Honduras, Madagascar
,Mali, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Timor-
Leste, United Republic of Tanzania,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
5
Note S2. Varimax Rotated Patterns-Based Identification
The Identification of principal components based on varimax rotated patterns were
performed qualitatively for all subsets one by one (n=100). The varimax rotated
patterns will show clustering pattern of water governance indicators on each
principal component that indicated what the principal component is representing.
No Water Governance Indicators comp.1 comp.2 comp.3 comp.4 comp.5 comp.6 comp.7 comp.8
1 Level of participation of urban communities in improving water and sanitation management (P-1), -0.1745 -0.56785 -0.05464 -0.34789 0.26144 -0.13978 0.48293 0.17248
2 Level of participation of rural communities in improving water and sanitation management (P-2) -0.19257 -0.89454 -0.00202 0.10844 -0.04813 0.09705 -0.01833 -0.02941
3 Regulatory Quality (P-3), -0.02027 -0.12161 0.04053 -0.03036 -0.1985 -0.88885 -0.08492 -0.03541
4 Government Effectiveness (P-4) -0.12895 0.00878 -0.01799 -0.06977 0.05957 -0.94606 -0.05406 0.16411
Existence and level of implementation of a government-defined financing plan/budget for the WASH sector which is published
5 and agreed Ur P-5 0.16946 0.0588 -0.05055 0.07291 0.28995 -0.17941 0.20835 -0.8138
Existence and level of implementation of a government-defined financing plan/budget for the WASH sector which is published
6 and agreed ru P-6 0.14463 0.00897 -0.07815 -0.05964 0.10108 0.04549 0.0994 -0.87127
Expenditure reports are publicly available and easily accessible, and allow comparison of committed funds to expenditures ur P-
7 7 -0.1948 -0.04432 -0.05167 -0.02692 -0.86288 -0.02948 -0.02207 0.28326
Expenditure reports are publicly available and easily accessible, and allow comparison of committed funds to expenditures ru P-
8 8 -0.12605 -0.14003 -0.06217 -0.02158 -0.91465 -0.02296 -0.03228 0.16353
9 Operating and basic maintenance costs are covered by tariffs ur P-9 0.23966 0.10334 0.20999 0.26924 -0.18659 -0.27709 0.35085 0.62263
10 Operating and basic maintenance costs are covered by tariffs ruP-10 -0.2933 0.40208 0.2338 -0.36963 0.27085 -0.29882 0.36533 0.2401
11 Absorption of external funds (% of official donor capital commitments utilized (three-year average)) urban P-11 0.32255 -0.5014 0.61702 -0.19753 -0.19714 0.12006 -0.07011 -0.10626
12 Absorption of external funds (% of official donor capital commitments utilized (three-year average)) rural P-12 0.12812 -0.37261 0.61397 -0.26393 -0.27959 0.34573 -0.04782 -0.05513
13 Absorption of domestic funds (% of domestic commitments utilized (three-year average)) urban P-13 0.10255 0.12113 0.86553 0.18791 0.08104 -0.14124 0.16068 0.19109
14 Absorption of domestic funds (% of domestic commitments utilized (three-year average)) rural P-14 -0.07826 0.09178 0.92356 0.09889 0.02071 -0.05773 0.14982 0.09911
15 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (Poor populations) P-15 -0.81785 -0.26868 0.00597 0.07849 -0.29653 -0.1148 -0.17859 0.12942
16 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (Populations living in remote areas) P-16 -0.84782 -0.11763 0.07856 -0.0446 -0.12023 -0.10589 -0.31624 -0.00086
17 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (People with disabilities) P-17 -0.65691 0.10094 0.3996 -0.23255 -0.05031 0.16122 -0.28093 0.07946
18 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (woman) P-18 -0.52871 -0.46961 -0.12203 0.21449 -0.43019 -0.1266 -0.19501 0.11401
19 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (informal settlers) P-19 -0.7569 -0.2098 -0.2408 -0.19262 -0.04174 -0.35217 0.04667 0.04793
20 Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (people with high burden of disease ) P-20 -0.62137 -0.42332 -0.07479 -0.2938 0.0548 -0.0451 -0.39759 0.22095
Policies and plans have specific measures to reach vulnerable groups (Indigenous populations
21 ) P-21 -0.83994 0.0848 -0.1658 0.08007 -0.04007 -0.12238 0.09383 -0.05115
22 Tracking progress among vulnerable groups P-22 -0.6074 0.25599 -0.04354 -0.01763 -0.35174 -0.08545 -0.03359 0.19707
Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (poor)
23 P-23 -0.13721 0.09182 0.23751 0.0174 -0.83468 -0.1769 -0.2684 0.00532

Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (Populations living in remote areas)
24 P-24 -0.39082 0.0191 -0.03273 -0.01795 -0.04001 -0.22188 -0.80818 -0.00305
Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (People with disabilities)
25 P-25 -0.07605 -0.03543 0.03386 -0.32014 -0.15689 -0.02477 -0.69839 0.29661
Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (woman)
26 P-26 -0.09909 -0.02308 -0.21233 -0.00101 -0.12023 -0.10679 -0.8807 0.03133
Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (informal settlers)
27 P-27 -0.33051 0.26096 0.13519 -0.1636 -0.44528 -0.55483 -0.17315 -0.06077

Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (people with high burden of disease )
28 P-28 -0.06423 0.08471 -0.22692 -0.69064 -0.09931 -0.22293 -0.41505 -0.26762
Specific measures in the financing plan to target resources to vulnerable populations (Indigenous populations
)
29 P-29 -0.35408 0.3713 -0.06383 0.01539 -0.0322 -0.70936 -0.15091 -0.19558

In addition of varimax rotated patterns, the interpretation was based on the actual
relationship of the water governance indicators and how the indicators might be
correlated. For instance on the particular subset above, the principal component
number 2 is interpreted as “Policy and Regulation Inclusiveness” as the principal
component representing level of participation from communities in making decision
on water and sanitation management both in urban and rural areas.

6
Note S3. Subset Analysis
Every single subset of the water governance dataset will undergo the principal
component analysis and to be identified respectively. After the principal
components from each subset were obtained, the multivariate regression analysis of
the principal components and the access inequality indices would yield regression
models. The initial principal component analysis produced eight principal
components for each water and sanitation inequalities. Due to the limitation of the
data availability, we performed subset analysis by creating subset of data that
consisted of 20 countries per subset for more robust analysis (n = 100 subsets).

The estimated value of inequality index to water and sanitation could be obtained
by the following equation:
I i=∑ a x i
(1)

Where water and sanitation inequality in ith country represented by the sum of
relative contribution coefficient of principal components in that particular country.

Principal components would have respective relative contributions to the inequality

index. For instance, the result of multivariate regression analysis of the initial PCA
and the water and sanitation inequality index will yield;

Water Inequality = 0.1061 + 0.026 X i1 – 0.0453 Xi2 + 0.0547 Xi6 – 0.0118 Xi3 – 0.0171
Xi4 – 0.0454 Xi5 - 0.0048 Xi7 – 0.0270 Xi8 (3)
(R2= 0.474)

Water Inequality: Policies and Plans to target vulnerable populations Xi1 , government effectiveness and
Regulatory quality Xi2, Absorption of Domestic Fund Xi3, Credibility of managing ODA and external fund
Xi4 ,Transparency and credibility of Financial Reporting Xi5 Government effectiveness and Regulatory
quality Xi6, Specific measure in the financing plan to target vulnerable populations Xi7, level of
implementation of government-defined financing plan which is published and agreed Xi8 .

7
 Sanitation Inequality = 0.2111 - 0.0390 Xi1 - 0.0761 Xi2 - 0.0048 Xi3 + 0.0478 Xi4
+ 0.0695 Xi5 + 0.0603 Xi6 + 0.0108 Xi7 + 0.0091 Xi8
(R2= 0.569)
(4)

Sanitation Inequality: Policies and Plans to target vulnerable populations Xi , Government

effectiveness and Regulatory quality Xi2, Specific measure in the financing plan to target vulnerable
populations Xi3, Transparency and credibility of Financial Reporting Xi4 , Credibility of managing
ODA and external fund Xi5 level of implementation of government-defined financing plan and
operating cost Xi6, Policy and Regulation Inclusiveness Xi7, Absorption of Domestic Fund Xi8

The obtained regression models from the subset analysis could be replicated to
estimate the value of access inequality indexes of both water and sanitation. Figures
above show the comparison of the subset regression models output to the actual
value of access inequality indexes (estimated inequality index value from subset
analysis outputs (y axis) versus the actual inequality index value from the inequality
measurement analysis (x axis).

Table S3 Sources of Regulation of Natural Resources

8
 Sources of Regulation of Natural Resources
State
National or Federal
• Legislation, Ministerial Regulation Directives
• Includes sector specific regulation and spatial specific regulation
State or Province
• As above (if applicable) and depends on constitutional division of responsibilities.
Local
• Local byelaws and directives.
• Local government regulation often plays central role in water extraction and
sanitation service provision.
International Law and supranational law
• International treaties enacted and usually enforced through municipal law
Non-State
Non-State Organisations
• Includes organisations specifically designed to govern natural resource use which
may have state recognition or not
• Companies, firms, clubs, societies, religious groups that are not specifically
designed to govern natural resources but can impose regulations that have a direct
effect on the sector.
Social Norms
• Social norms (or rules) can include society wide norms that can affect nexus
sectors or sub-group social norms (e.g. rules concerning appropriate use of daily
water consumption).
• Social norms can be enforced by other members of society

“Source of Regulation of Natural Resources” modified from Gardner and Ostrom (1990) in (Larcom
and van Gevelt 2017)

9
Table S4 Result of GINI Calculation of Access Inequality to Basic Water and
Sanitation Service

Water Sanitation
Access Access
code Country Name
Inequality Inequality
Index Index
AFG Afghanistan 0.1577 0.20579
AGO Angola 0.3119 0.41802
ARM Armenia 0.0037 0.04438
AZE Azerbaijan 0.067 0.06718
BGD Bangladesh 0.0122 0.162406
BRB Barbados 0.00216 0.010518
BLR Belarus 0.00224 0.016348
BLZ Belize 0.00944 0.054
BEN Benin 0.0979 0.57919
BTN Bhutan 0.01831 0.176087
BOL Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.08891 0.30292
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00311 0.027286
BFA Burkina Faso 0.1135 0.51843
BDI Burundi 0.0668 0.0336
KHM Cambodia 0.08511 0.32342
CMR Cameroon 0.20326 0.24409
CAF Central African Republic 0.13456 0.54028
TCD Chad 0.2643 0.5803
COL Colombia 0.0592 0.07804
COM Comoros 0.05199 0.2056
COG Congo 0.2051 0.4356
COD Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.33194 0.09925
CRI Costa Rica 0.00792 0.02179
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 0.1343 0.53417
DOM Dominican Republic 0.010765 0.09451
EGY Egypt 0.0018 0.02323
SLV El Salvador 0.025 0.0736
ETH Ethiopia 0.30833 0.29165
GAB Gabon 0.0908 0.438806
GHA Ghana 0.1638 0.4108
GIN Guinea 0.132911 0.4007
GNB Guinea-Bissau 0.12906 0.2282
GUY Guyana 0.032508 0.0568
HTI Haiti 0.2681 0.3467

10
HND Honduras 0.04229 0.0882
IDN Indonesia 0.0729 0.16928
IRQ Iraq 0.02694 0.0243
JAM Jamaica 0.02338 0.053064
JOR Jordan 0 0.00161
KAZ Kazakhstan 0.017499 0.00574
KEN Kenya 0.20925 0.291768
KGZ Kyrgyzstan 0.0678 0.00526
LAO Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.09746 0.263107
LSO Lesotho 0.1018 0.2562
LBR Liberia 0.09149 0.40896
The former Yugoslav Republic of
MKD 0.00262 0.04786
Macedonia
MDG Madagascar 0.2615 0.48589
MWI Malawi 0.0928 0.11454
MLI Mali 0.148484 0.33296
MRT Mauritania 0.236143 0.42349
MDA Republic of Moldova 0.056928 0.108261
MNG Mongolia 0.07227 0.12798
MNE Montenegro 0.002948 0.02457
MOZ Mozambique 0.3216 0.444621
NAM Namibia 0.13382 0.48955
NPL Nepal 0.04567 0.102988
NER Niger 0.11409 0.531
NGA Nigeria 0.2092 0.168678
PAK Pakistan 0.0418 0.25
PSE West Bank and Gaza Strip 0.00094 0.0054
PAN Panama 0.022022 0.0579
PER Peru 0.0655 0.1518
PHL Philippines 0.038545 0.136
RWA Rwanda 0.095873 0.1126
LCA Saint Lucia 0.004577 0.05822
STP Sao Tome and Principe 0.03341 0.3207
SEN Senegal 0.15581 0.3017
SRB Serbia 0.00402 0.01827
SLE Sierra Leone 0.158603 0.4566
SDN Sudan 0.179516 0.441028
SUR Suriname 0.027633 0.1072
SWZ Swaziland 0.170036 0.1054
TZA United Republic of Tanzania 0.2661 0.569196
THA Thailand 0.006178 0.0093
TLS Timor-Leste 0.1728 0.294449
TGO Togo 0.283847 0.6252
TUN Tunisia 0.034392 0.04193

11
 UGA Uganda 0.15392 0.3537
UKR Ukraine 0.003233 0.00659
VNM Viet Nam 0.040923 0.150422
ZMB Zambia 0.4033 0.4512
ZWE Zimbabwe 0.18463 0.2711

Discussion

Note S4: Water Governance Dimensions and Access Inequality Nexus

Economic dimension. Basic water service and sanitation service provision are
capital intensive(Hutton 2013), the economic dimension of water governance is
expected to be represented as the most influencing factors of water governance to
the inequality of basic water and sanitation services. “Absorption of domestic fund”
refers to how effective is the utilization of domestic capital financing allocated for
water and sanitation service provision. In developing countries, the rigid and
lengthy procurement process in local governance could resulted in delays in
procurement (which cause late release of funds and limited time to spend within
financial year for which funds have been allocated)(UN Water and WHO 2017;
Montgomery and Elimelech 2007). Previously published official reports also showed
that delayed or incomplete release of funds from national or local financing source
worsened the lack of administrative, financial, and technical resource capacity for
advanced water and sanitation planning, as well as designing and managing the
ongoing projects(OECD 2014; UN-WWAP 2006; Global Water Partnership 2006; UN
Water and WHO 2017; World Bank Group 2017).
“Absorption of external funds” refers to how well is the utilization of donor
capital commitments to assist water and sanitation planning in recipient countries.
GLAAS 2016/2017 report showed that 60% of countries surveyed absorb a high

12
percentage (i.e. above 75%) of donor capital commitments across both drinking-
water and sanitation, but riffed with issue like slow or delayed disbursement. How
“absorption of external funds” linked to the inequality of water and sanitation
service could be explained by the reasons of slow or delayed disbursement.
Operational delays, delays in receiving funds, lack of transparent practices and
corruption, as well as the low performance of recipient’s administrative and
financial system capacity are several identified hurdles of absorption of external
funds (UN-WWAP 2006) that in the long run would contribute to the inequality of
water and sanitation service. “Transparency of Financial Reporting and credibility of
managing operational cost” is inextricably linked with absorption of funds. This
water governance factor would directly affect the speed of procurement process
since the degree of transparent financial reporting and credible management of
capital financing would allow how effective the disbursement process is.
“Level of implementation of government-defined financing plan” is
representing how well the execution of the water and sanitation development
planning is actually taking place. The water governance factor also complementary
to the “Government effectiveness and regulatory quality”. High level of
implementation of the defined financing plan would be considered satisfactory if the
financing plan itself could reach the vulnerable populations and able to address the
inequality issue by implementing the sound, and effective financing plan.

Political dimension. “Government effectiveness and regulatory quality” covers

wide aspect of water governance. This governance factor captures perceptions of
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations, and captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011).
In terms of inequality in water and sanitation services, this water governance factor
act as “enabler” to the effective institutional capacity to govern and manage the
water and sanitation system provision.

13
 The government effectiveness especially measured the coverage of basic
water and sanitation service, the quality of bureaucracy as medium to manage the
supply and infrastructure, and broad policy framework. Regulatory quality
measures the regulation performance of giving permit and promote private sector
development. Thus, for instance, in the capital-intensive water and sanitation
service provision, good regulatory quality would be able to bridge the most effective
financing scheme of government, donor countries and the private sector under
Public-Private partnership in water and sanitation development. On the other hand,
poor regulatory quality and government effectiveness could induce inequality by
allowing mismanagement of the entire process of water and sanitation
development. The concentration of contract terminations and non-renewals of
Public-Private Partnerships for water utilities in Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa countries were found to be the results of degradation of partners’
relationship, that could be traced back to difficulties in adapting the contract over
time to changing conditions (Marin 2009). In this regard, the adaptability of the
water governance system to adapt and sustain the PPP schemes and contracts was
predominantly influenced by how good is the Government effectiveness and
regulatory quality.
“Policy and regulation inclusiveness” covers level of participation in the
decision making process of designing, planning, and constructing the water and
sanitation service provision for the people. Many scholars argue that the degree of
participation, is very specific in specific context and region(Whittington et al. 2009).
On some cases, the top-down approach would be more effective and favorable, with
relatively low level of participation, this approach could avoid unnecessary dictation
by local politics that would only benefitting some of project beneficiaries or could
undermine the initial objective (Banerjee et al. 2012). On the other case, more
balanced and even higher level of participation in the water and sanitation service
decision process would yield to more effective and better water and sanitation
development due to more transparent screening process and project bidding (The
World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993; Whittington, Davis, and
McClelland 1998; Whittington et al. 2009). The flexibility of project course that

14
shared with project beneficiaries and all involved stakeholders in the water
governance system was represented in “Policy and regulation inclusiveness”.

Social dimension. “Policies and Plans to target vulnerable populations” is water

governance factor that directly confronting the issue of inequality. The political
intention is specifically designed in order to address the JMP 2015 finding that
stated even though several progress has been made towards achieving MDG target,
in many countries and regions, it did not “significantly reducing inequalities”
(WHO/UNICEF 2015). The water governance factor reflects the motivation to
reduce inequality and providing the basic services for all, thus, considered very
important. The water governance factor has to be in corresponding with “Specific
measure in the financing plan to target vulnerable population” to fully realize the
intention in closing the gap of access equality in developing countries. However, as
“Specific measure in the financing plan to target vulnerable population” indicated,
many countries failed to consistently committing to the initial cause, especially in
lover income group countries(UN Water and WHO 2017; World Bank Group 2017;
Grey 2005). “Specific measure in the financing plan to target vulnerable population”
showed the actual commitment of the country or local water governance system to
pursue the target of equality of basic service to water and sanitation. Countries were
most likely to target poor populations in their policies and plans, but the
commitment in the financing plan to target the vulnerable populations is lacking,
only 19% of the total responding countries actually have specific measures in the
financing plan (UN Water and WHO 2017; WHO/UNICEF 2015).

15
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