Abstract

In England, the usual rule is that a Civil Servant of the Crown retains office during the
Crown's leisure. This means that, without assigning any justification, the Crown may
terminate a civil servant's services at any time. And if the Crownhas an employment
contract, the Crown is not bound by the latter. This is knownas the Doctrine of Pleasure.
With the advent of the British in India, the same patronage system prevalent in England
was introduced. Public servants could beterminated at the pleasure of the directors of the
English East India Company. This evolved as the doctrine of pleasure in India and found
its place in several colonial legislation enacted in India. Even after the power transfer to the
Crownin 1858, this system continued to be in practice since none of the legislations placed
any restrictions on exercising power under the doctrine. Only in 1919, with the passage of
the Government of India act, changes were made to imposerestrictions on the use of the
doctrine. The doctrine is of English origin and wasadopted in the Indian regime during
British rule. Since the system of government in England and India are contrastingly different
– India being a democratic republic), theoretically, the doctrine would be inapplicable in the
Indian context. Nevertheless, it finds a place in the Indian Constitution under articles 310
and 311.

The extent of applicability and validity will be examined in the paper. Besides, it is also
interesting to see how a doctrine that envisages arbitrary enforcement of the might of the
Executive by terminating services of any civil servant at its will found its way into the
Constitution, a document that upholds the supremacy of the Rule of Law. Therefore, it
becomes pertinent to understandthe true essence in which the drafters of our Constitution
intended to introduce the doctrine of pleasure. This paper attempts to study the same by
analysing several Indian case laws and comparing the working nature of the doctrine in
India and England to examine the relevance and suitability of the doctrine of pleasure in
the modern Indian context.

Keywords: Constitution, Doctrine of Pleasure, Article 310, Article 311.

pg. 1
 I. Introduction:

Civil Services were introduced in India during Colonial rule. Therefore, their laws and regulations
were also applied in India as per the needs of the Country. After the independence of India, civil
services were provided Constitutional Status. The laws of England still have a great influence on
Indian laws. The doctrine of pleasure is one of these concepts introduced in India from Colonial rule.
Under this doctrine, the civil servants were regarded as servants of the Crown, and these civil
servants served at their pleasure. The Crown is considered the Executive Head in England, and the
civil services are considered part of the Executive. The doctrine of pleasure states that the Crown has
the authority to terminate a civil servant's employment at any time without warning the
employee. As a result, civil servants serve at the pleasure of the Crown, which can dismiss them at
any moment. When civil servants are terminated from their positions, they do not have the right to
sue the Crown for wrongful termination. They also do not have the right to seek damages for their
losses due to the wrongful termination. This doctrine is founded on the principle of public policy. It
applies if the Crown believes a civil servant should be reprimanded. To preface this analysis, it is
pertinent to address why a civil servant at the Crown's service should be permitted to be dismissed
at pleasure. Loyalty to the Crown and the public's best interest pervades, primarily to ensure efficient
and effective governance. It is also essential as a corollary that civil servants' disloyal or dishonest
behaviour be hounded out if the public interest is adversely affected.1

II. Position of the Doctrine in India

The doctrine of pleasure is applied in India as well. Since the President of India is the Union's
Executive Head and holds the same rank as the Crown in England, the President has been given the
authority to dismiss a civil servant at any time under this doctrine. Monarchy is India's oldest form
of government, where the King enjoyed absolute power. The doctrine of pleasure in India has been
introduced into Article 3102 of the Indian Constitution. In Britain, the enjoyment doctrine is a
doctrine of common law. Parliament may change it by statute. However, it is a constitutional doctrine
in India and cannot be altered by usual legislation. Applying the doctrine of pleasure in India through
its incorporation into the Constitution has various limitations.

1
Bwana, Ronald, Pleasure Doctrine or Servants of the People Doctrine, Which Way for Kenyan Courts? (May 1, 2022).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4097951 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4097951
2
INDIA CONST. art. 310.
pg. 2
Though this doctrine has been embraced in India, it has not been blindly copied in the same way as
it has been in England, and there are some differences between India's and England's adoptions. In
India, this doctrine is codified in Article 310 of the Indian Constitution.Except as specified by the
Constitution, a civil servant of the Union works at the pleasure of the President, and a civil servant
of a State works at the pleasure of the Governor of that State, according to Article 310.3 This means
that constitutional requirements can restrict the Doctrine of Pleasure's application. The following are
exempt from the application of this doctrine under the Constitution:

 Judges of the Supreme Court;

 Judges of the High Courts;
 Chief Election Commissioner; and
 Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

As a result, this doctrine is not absolute and is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Civil
servants can also be exempted from implementing this doctrine since they are covered by Article
3114, and therefore the doctrine's application can be avoided. Occupying one of the most
controversial areas in Indian constitutional law, the doctrine of pleasure in the quasi-federal structure
of India creates several implications for a symbiotic relationship with the republican form of
government at the Centre. A noteworthy quality of the nature of powers vested in the Governor and
President is the omnipresent dichotomy based on the extent of personal discretion in executing their
respective duties. If the President, in a certain instance, declares the removal of a Governor based on
the council of ministers' aid and advice, the federalist structure would have to undergo judicial review
if reliance is placed wholly on the aid and advice that possesses purely political connotations while
lacking in adherence to due process of law.

3
INDIA CONST. art. 310.
4
INDIA CONST. art. 311.
pg. 3
In performing a similar duty in B. P. Singhal v. Union of India 5, a five-judge bench of the Supreme
Court addressed three main issues comprising the nature of the pleasure doctrine of the President
and the Governor's position and the constitutionality of the President's decisions concerning the
Governor's appointment and removal. There appear to be three distinct variations based on the ambit
of limitations placed upon the prerogative that the doctrine places on the President. A noteworthy
suggestion was that Article 74 curtailed the President's power in such a manner that it falls within
the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution. Nevertheless, since the Governor's appointment falls
under the category of an unrestrained application of the doctrine, the Court debated on reasons for
the execution of discretion concerning such office and its subsequent reliance on the fundamental
constitutional limitations.

The Governor's office, taking the form of a high constitutional position owing to his being vested
with essential state functions and duties, renders him the Head of the state legislature. The Central
government opposed such an argument in saying that the appointment of the Governor is made with
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and that this fact would have important bearings on
his removal and reasons for the same. If the Executive distrusts the Governor of being capable of
occupying his position for lack of sound political ideology, or rather, its dissonance from those of
the central government, such action would suffice to justify his removal.

In contrast, if the Governor is treated as the State's executive Head, the power to deprive him or her
of his or her position by citing the Centre's whims and fancies would cause irreparable harm to the
Constitution's basic structure. It is also essential to consider the repercussions of the possibility of
the Constitution's application of the doctrine of pleasure arbitrarily. In such a case, the opportunity
for judicial review would be restricted. In adopting an outlook like that of the landmark judgment of
the Marbury-Madison case6, the Court interpreted the basic structure and significant values
embedded in the Constitution - namely, the rule of law, fairness, and constitutionality - which must
be present in any power granted by the Constitution to its wielder.

5
B. P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331.
6
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
pg. 4
Suppose the power addressed in the current discourse is infiltrated by previously discussed
principles. In that case, any action concerning the removal of the Governor before the end of his
tenure is prevented by the procedural and substantive aspects of Article 14 of the Constitution. As a
result, the opportunity for judicial review could not be withheld. It was also deemed necessary to
consider that while a decision to remove the Governor ought to have been backed by sound
reasoning, it need not be disclosed as long as Courts were equipped with the power to inquire into
such reasons. Thus, in the case of B. P. Singhal, the Supreme Court did not merely strike down the
rationale behind the reasoning of the Centre but also provided substantial discretion to the Executive
to remove a civil servant (the Governor, in particular) without having to delve into the reasons.
However, in case of any dispute, the courts were granted the power to review such action.7

III. The Interplay Between The Relevant Constitutional Provisions:

As provided by Article 3678 of the Constitution and Section 219 of the General Clauses Act 1897,
the right to create rules granted by Article 309 10of the Constitution or other laws requires the power
to incorporate, change, or modify the rules. As a result, as long as the Constitutional provisions are
not violated, the rules regulating the conditions of service of Government servants may be changed
or amended by the government as required to meet the needs of the public service without the consent
of any Government servant whom the changes will bind. In Grewal Rao's case11, the Supreme Court
also noted that the exigencies of public service might require that various rules relating to conditions
of service be modified from time to time. There is no doubt of the Government servant's permission,
not least because obtaining such consent from anyone will be impossible. It is also possible for the
government to change service regulations retroactively, which could have a negative impact on
current employees. Incumbents, on the other hand, are usually granted immunity to escape
hardship.12 A government employee's privileges under the terms of service are in effect at his
retirement.

7
Editorial, Volume 4, Issue 1, Indian Journal of Constitutional Law (2014),
https://www.nalsar.ac.in/images/IJCL_Vol.4.pdf.
8
INDIA CONST. art. 367.
9
Section 21, The General Clauses Act, 1897 (India).
10
INDIA CONST. art. 309.
11
D.S. Garewal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 512 (India).
12
Abhinav Garg, Doctrine of Pleasure, An Analytical Study, Academike Law Journal (April 8, 2015).
pg. 5
IV. The Unfettered Power Of The Legislature:

In India, the doctrine of enjoyment is enshrined in Article 310 of the Constitution (1). Since the State
has the right to fire a public servant at its discretion under Article 310(1) 13, "except as specifically
given by the Constitution," the Supreme Court has held that any law cannot fetter this power. In
India, the ability to fire a government employee at will is limited to the exceptions set out in the
Constitution. It cannot be taken away or restricted by law, regardless of how it is exercised. Article
310(1) is unaffected by the terms of any contract. As a result, any arrangement that restricts the
President's or Governor's ability to dismiss at will cannot be enforced. Any such agreement would
be unsatisfactory as a "clog'' on enjoyment or a violation of Article 310. When the government's
enjoyment is subject to an explicit constitutional clause, it cannot transgress the Constitution when
it enters into a contract. However, in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India14, the Supreme Court
held that the government might enter into temporary employment contracts and enforce special terms
in each case as long as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution.

V. Restrictions On the Doctrine as Under Article 311:

Article 311 regulates the President's or Governor's enjoyment, so the area protected by Article 311
is exempt from the application of the doctrine of pleasure. The enjoyment must be practiced in
compliance with Article 311's procedural protections. The Doctrine of Pleasure is subject to certain
limitations under the Indian Constitution. They are as follows: The service contract between the
government and the civil servant can be implemented. The fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution limit the pleasure doctrine because they cannot be used with excessive openness and
arbitrariness. Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution limit the pleasure doctrine. Article 14 15
forbids the unconstitutional exercise of authority under the pleasure doctrine in this way. Article 1516
of the Constitution, in addition to article 14, prohibits the exercise of arbitrary power in matters of
services. Article 15 forbids dismissal based on religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any
combination of these factors. Article 16(1), 17 which requires fair treatment and prohibits arbitrary
discrimination, is another restriction.

13
INDIA CONST. art. 310(1).
14
Satish Chandra Anand v. The Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250.
15
INDIA CONST. art. 14.
16
INDIA CONST. art. 15.
17
INDIA CONST. art. 16(1).
pg. 6
Furthermore, the doctrine of enjoyment is subject to a slew of other restrictions, and various posts
have been excluded from the pleasure doctrine's purview. Judges of the High Courts and Supreme
Court, the CAG, and the Chief Electoral Officer's terms are outside the purview of the doctrine.
Thus, the general principle relating to civil services has been laid down under Article 310 of the
Constitution to the effect that government servants hold office during the pleasure of the government,
and Article 311 imposes restrictions on the privilege of dismissal at the pleasure of the form of
safeguards.18

VI. Comparative Analysis With The UK:

The UK's application of the doctrine of pleasure explicitly mentions that the employment term of a
civil servant lasts during the good pleasure of the Crown. In Shenton v. Smith,19 it was indicated that
unless the situation demands, civil servants continue to hold their office due to their engagement
with the Crown and not owing to extraordinary privilege. The doctrine of pleasure was created to
secure reciprocity between civil servants and the government to fuel notions of inherent unity, which
in turn, strengthens decision-making. Nevertheless, if a civil servant has been turned to political
agendas or even violated the law while carrying out a superior's orders, a right to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission has been stipulated as per the Official Secrets Act, 1989. In the Matthews
case20, it was further held that the Crown was responsible for damage occurring through vicarious
common law violations.

Further, if wrongfully discharged, civil servants are entitled to recover any salary arrears, as held in
the Terrel case21. Unless special machinery is applied to security issues, the 1992 Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act permitted civil servants to create and engage in a union to collectively bargain.
However, the Crown's employment right to statutory minimum redundancy pay under the
Employment Rights Act of 1996 is an exception.

18
Adarsh Singh Thakur, The Doctrine of Pleasure,1 IJLAD (2016).
19
Shenton v. Smith, [1895] A.C. 229 (H.L.).
20
Matthews v. Kuwait Bechtel Corp., 126 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1997).
21
Terrell v. Sec'y of State for the Colonies, [1953] Q.B. 482, 499 (Eng.).
pg. 7
Section 193 of the Act allows civil servants protection for their terms. Without probable cause, a
minister cannot certify or dismiss a civil servant unless it is for reasons concerning national security.
Civil servants are also entitled to employment rights that resemble those of private sector employees.
Subsequently, in 2000, the UK's Parliamentary Committee suggested Standards in Public Life
prioritize political neutrality in civil service. An additional recommendation to validate that
appointments adhere to the Recruitment Code of the Civil Service Commission was made in 200422
to reduce political bias. The intent behind the UK's method of application of the pleasure doctrine
demonstrates a strong inclination towards simultaneously incorporating the doctrine of separation of
powers, which has also been reiterated by Indian courts time and again.

On analysing the US's application of the pleasure doctrine, or "patronage," which may be traced back
to the Republics headed by President Washington. In India and the US, civil servants of greater
seniority typically have terms determinable at the pleasure of the President. In Canada, such
appointments and terminations occur at the pleasure of the governing party, with whom the decision
to make partisan appointments is reserved. Furthermore, the threat of politicization of the Australian
Civil Service demanded the introduction of the Country's first Public Service Act.

22
Recruitment Code of the Civil Service Commission, 2004, U.K. Statutory Instruments 2004 No. 2917.
pg. 8
VII. Conclusion:

With so many cases of civil servants and other government officials being implicated in corruption,
it is worth knowing what procedures are in place in India's Constitution to prosecute them. Recent
cases such as the dismissal of Pradeep Sharma, a Mumbai police encounter specialist with links to
the underworld and other corruption charges, demonstrate that civil servants cannot mock the law;
if they are guilty, they will be punished, regardless of their rank. So, the critical reason why Articles
310 and 311 were included in the Constitution by the framers is still in effect today, but it is worth
noting that the framers of the Constitution foresaw corruption shortly, which is why such clauses
were included. The reason for which Articles 310 and 311 were enacted in the Constitution is still
valid considering recent events, such as the case of Pradeep Sharma, a Mumbai Police encounter
specialist who has links to the underworld and faces other corruption charges and was fired from his
post. It must be ensured that civil servants cannot mock the law if they are guilty, and it is precisely
for that reason that the continued use of the Doctrine of Pleasure is required in India.23

23
Law Corner, "Doctrine of Pleasure in Indian Constitution," Law Corner, accessed March 28, 2023,
https://lawcorner.in/doctrine-of-pleasure-in-indian-constitution/.
pg. 9