UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-00613

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VERSUS * JUDGE: SHELLY DICK
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PACKAGING CORPORATION OF * MAG. JUDGE: ERIN WILDER-
AMERICA, ET AL. * DOOMES
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PLAINTIFFS’ THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR DAMAGES1

I. PLAINTIFFS

1. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Louisiana.

2. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Louisiana.

3. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in Louisiana.

4. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Louisiana.

5. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Louisiana.

1 The plaintiffs file this Third Amended Petition in compliance with a state-court deadline
(that was established pre-removal) requiring them to do so by June 28, 2018. The
plaintiffs file this amended petition in this Court solely out of an abundance of caution and
to the extent the state court deadline has become a federal court deadline under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1450. The plaintiffs do not waive their contention that this case was improperly removed
and that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
6. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Louisiana.

7. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in

Texas.

8. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides in Texas.

9. Plaintiff is a person of full age and majority that resides

in Louisiana.
II. DEFENDANTS

Packaging Corporation of America

10. Defendant (“PCA”) is an Illinois corporation licensed to do business in the State of

Louisiana. PCA is subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana because it does a substantial

amount of business here and because the claims against PCA arise out of, among other

things, PCA’s acts and omissions in Louisiana and/or which caused

injury in Louisiana. PCA has already been served and has appeared in this suit.

11. Defendant Boise Packaging & Newsprint, LLC (“Boise P&N”) is organized in Delaware

and has a principal office in Illinois. Boise P&N is licensed to do business in the State of

Louisiana. Boise P&N is subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana because it does a

substantial amount of business here and because the claims against Boise P&N arise out

of, among other things, Boise P&N’s acts and omissions in Louisiana and/or which caused

injury in

Louisiana. Boise P&N has been served in this case.

12. Defendant Boise, Inc. is organized in Delaware and has a principal office in Illinois.

Boise, Inc. is subject to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana because it does a substantial

amount of business here and because the claims against Boise, Inc. arise out of, among

other things, Boise,

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Inc.’s acts and omissions in Louisiana and/or which caused injury in Louisiana. Boise,

Inc. has been served in this case.

13. Defendant Eric Snelgrove is an individual of the age of majority who is domiciled

in Louisiana. Snelgrove has been served in this case.

14. Defendant Rick Butterfield is an individual of the age of majority who, upon

information and belief is and/or was at relevant times domiciled in Louisiana. Additionally,

the claims against Butterfield arise out of, among other things, his acts and omissions in

Louisiana

and/or which caused injury in Louisiana. Butterfield has been served in this case.

III. NATURE OF ACTION

15. Plaintiffs bring negligence, gross-negligence, premises-liability, and intentional

tort claims against Defendants related to a plant explosion that occurred in Beauregard

Parish.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. As shown in its contemporaneous motion to remand, the plaintiffs dispute that this

case was properly removed and that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case.

17. To the extent the case was properly removed, which is denied, venue is proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 98(a), because the case was removed from
V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
18. On or around February 8, 2017, Plaintiffs suffered severe and debilitating injuries

while working at a paper and containerboard mill located at 420 Highway 190 West,

DeRidder, Louisiana (“the DeRidder mill”). Upon information and belief, the DeRidder

mill is or was owned by Defendant Boise P&N, and operated by Defendant PCA. Upon

information and belief, Boise, Inc. is the parent company of Boise P&N. Defendants

Snelgrove and Butterfield were employed

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by PCA and/or Boise P&N. Defendant Eric Snelgrove was the mill manager at the time

of the incident, and Defendant Rick Butterfield was the safety manager at the mill on

the date of the explosion. Both Defendant Snelgrove and Defendant Butterfield, in their

respective positions within upper management at the mill, had responsibilities and

duties regarding plant safety in general and with respect to the equipment/operations

at issue in this case.

19. On the date in question, Plaintiffs were working at the DeRidder mill performing

work during a shutdown when a tank violently exploded. Tragically, three individuals were

killed in the blast and many were injured, including Plaintiffs herein.

20. The Defendants owed a duty to provide Plaintiffs a safe workplace but failed to do

so. The Defendants also were responsible for owning, operating, maintaining, and

inspecting the equipment and tank that ultimately exploded and caused harm. To

compound matters, Defendants had previously experienced a similar incident involving an

explosion of one of its tanks in 2008 at the Defendants’ Tomahawk, Wisconsin facility,

which also resulted in serious injuries and deaths. Defendants knew of the hazard, and

proceeded with endangering the health and safety of Plaintiffs, causing the debilitating

injuries for which the Plaintiffs now sue.

A. Negligence and Gross-Negligence (against all Defendants)
VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
21. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation contained above.

22. Plaintiffs were injured because of Defendants’ negligence and gross negligence

when Defendants:

a. failed to properly inspect equipment;

b. failed to provide adequate warning of known and/or potential hazards;

c. failed to provide adequate medical care;

d. failed to implement adequate safety procedures;

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 e. failed to have adequate emergency response procedures in place;

f. failed to ensure the equipment was reasonably safe;

g. failed to properly operate equipment;

h. failed to exercise adequate due diligence in the selection of equipment;

i. failed to exercise adequate due diligence in the placement of equipment;

j. failed to provide proper/safe equipment;

k. failed to properly train;

l. failed to properly eliminate hazards associated with work;

m. failed to act prudently with job tasks;

n. failed to properly supervise its employees and/or subsidiary;

o. failed to provide a safe working environment;

p. violated applicable rules and regulations; and

q. committed other negligent and grossly negligent acts.

23. In addition, Defendants are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their

employees, agents, and/or contractors.

24. Defendants owed a duty consistent with the aforementioned and breached each of

the foregoing duties, through their own acts and omissions and through those for whom Defendants

are responsible. These breaches were the cause in fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. As a

result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries that will affect them every day

of the rest of their lives. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their injuries since they in no part

contributed to these injuries.

25. In addition to the foregoing, Defendant Snelgrove was the mill manager at the

paper mill. According to his testimony, the “buck stop[ped] with him.” The mill owed safety duties

to contractors working onsite, including duties to inform welding contractors of hazards, such as

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working near tanks containing flammables. Snelgrove has testified that he shared in

these duties and responsibilities. These responsibilities manifested themselves in

various ways. As mill manager, Snelgrove had a duty to oversee the mill’s departmental

managers, to ensure that they understood their job duties and were following mill

policies and practices. Snelgrove was also personally involved in mill operations from an

operational and safety standpoint; those departments reported directly to him. He

approved the process for the annual shutdown (which included bringing contractors such

as the plaintiffs’ employer, Elite Welders, on site) that ultimately resulted in the

explosion, a decision that imposed upon him the duty to evaluate safety considerations.

Snelgrove also owed safety duties to mill workers and contract employees. He has

testified that his duties at the mill were not merely administrative; instead, he personally

had responsibilities for the safety of workers at the plant, and he has testified that he

would take action to address any instances of someone not following plant safety

policies.

26. Snelgrove breached his duties at the plant by having knowledge of and failing to

remedy the hazardous conditions that caused injury to the plaintiffs. Snelgrove agreed

that policies and procedures were one way to prevent danger to workers at the mill, and

he had input, along with others, in writing those policies and procedures. And although he

could have, Snelgrove did not put in place a policy that would require testing of a foul

condensate tank (like the one that exploded) before hot work was performed near the

tank. Snelgrove agreed that it would be important, for planning, to know what products

are contained in tanks in an area where hot work was being performed. He acknowledged

that a foul condensate tank, like the one that exploded here, could contain flammable

liquids. But Snelgrove did not confirm the contents of the tank before the incident, he had

not seen any paperwork where someone identified and evaluated the hazards associated

with the products in the tank that exploded, and he did not order anyone to
check the contents of the tank before performing the hot work that resulted in the incident

(though he admits this could have been done). Snelgrove did not know whether his

managers followed policies and procedures on the day of the incident, despite having a

duty to ensure that those policies and procedures were followed. Snelgrove did not

ensure that his managers clearly understood and took charge of their respective

departments; the Chemical Safety Board thus noted that there was confusion as to which

department was in charge of the foul condensate tank that exploded, with the result that

flammable materials inside that tank were never identified or removed before the hot

work above the tank was performed. Snelgrove testified that he works to help lower the

risks so that the mill would not explode, yet despite these supposed efforts, an explosion

still occurred. Snelgrove instructed his leadership team to do the “necessary things” to

accomplish the goal for the shutdown process and make sure the shutdown was done

safely and appropriately. Snelgrove also contributed to and led a team that put together

policies and procedures with a safety objective, including to prevent the mill from

exploding. But these instructions, policies, and procedures were inadequate.

27. These breaches were the cause in fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. As a

result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries that will affect them

every day of the rest of their lives. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their injuries since

they in no part contributed to these injuries

28. In addition to the foregoing, Defendant Butterfield was the safety manager at the

mill, which imposed upon him general safety duties and responsibilities, as well as

duties to implement safety protocols and procedures, and to ensure that others were

following such protocols and procedures. Butterfield was directly responsible for

establishing and implementing

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the hot work permitting system at the mill, which, as Butterfield has testified, is an

essential system with respect to mitigating dangers and hazards at the mill.

29. Butterfield breached his duties by putting the operations department (as opposed to

the safety department) in charge of hot work permitting as of the time of the explosion.

In this setup, Butterfield did not require that operations personnel inform him or his

safety department of proposed hot work being performed at the plant, which resulted

in hot work being performed (allegedly) without the safety department’s knowledge

and without its ability to take necessary steps to mitigate hazards and ensure safety.

Notably, since the explosion at issue in this case, Butterfield has since put the hot work

permitting back under control of the safety department.

30. Butterfield also breached safety duties by not ensuring at relevant times that the

operations department was properly trained to and actually were correctly following

necessary safety aspects of hot work permitting system. This had real and concrete

consequences in this case. Butterfield should have but did not make sure that hot work

permit at issue in this case was correctly filled out, or that all checklist requirements were

actually performed; did not verify that operations personnel checked for and/or attempted

to mitigate hazards in area of explosion before hot work started; and did not make sure

that copies of hot work permits were kept in the field and at plant offices, as required,

which Butterfield has agreed is “concern[ing].” These failures with respect to essential

policies and practices were the direct result of Butterfield’s failure to properly train and

oversee operations personnel, who had in any case been improperly tasked with the hot

work permitting system. Notably, Butterfield, has, since the explosion, ordered additional

training to all managers and their reports regarding hot work permitting, and he has

recognized that better training of operations regarding identification and mitigation of

hazards in connection with hot

work permitting could have made the incident at issue in this case preventable.
 31. These breaches were the cause in fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. As a

result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries that will affect them

every day of the rest of their lives. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their injuries since

they in no part contributed to these injuries.

32. In addition to the foregoing, Defendant Boise, Inc., on information and belief, is

the parent company of Boise P&N. On information and belief, Boise, Inc. was the

employer or one of the employers of personnel responsible for mill operations whose

acts and/or omissions contributed to the explosion. On information and belief, Boise,

Inc. additionally affirmatively undertook safety and other duties at the paper mill,

including duties to provide a safe work environment. On information and belief, Boise,

Inc. breached these duties it undertook, thereby causing and/or contributing to the

explosion at issue in this case, as well as the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.

33. These breaches were the cause in fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries. As a

result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs suffered severe injuries that will affect them

every day of the rest of their lives. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their injuries since

they in no part contributed to these injuries.

B. Premises-Liability Claims (Against the Defendants PCA and Boise P&N)

34. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation contained above.

35. Boise P&N owned, occupied, and/or controlled the area where Plaintiffs were

injured. PCA operated the mill and occupied and/or controlled the area where

Plaintiffs were injured.

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 36. The condition of the area where Plaintiffs were injured posed unreasonable risks of

harm, and Boise P&N and PCA had actual knowledge or reasonably should have known

of the unreasonably dangerous conditions.

37. Plaintiffs did not know of the unreasonably dangerous conditions. Plaintiffs were

invitees who entered the premises for the benefit of Boise P&N and PCA, and with their

knowledge. Boise P&N and PCA each owed a duty to inspect and warn of the

unreasonably dangerous conditions, or make the unreasonably dangerous conditions

reasonably safe. Boise P&N and PCA breached their duties by failing to warn Plaintiffs of

the known, unreasonably dangerous conditions and by failing to make these conditions

reasonably safe, which actions, in the exercise of reasonable care, could have prevented

Plaintiffs’ injuries in whole or in part.

38. Boise P&N’s and PCA’s breaches of the above-mentioned duties were the cause in

fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.

C. Intentional Tort (against the Defendants)
39. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each allegation contained above.

40. Additionally, the Defendants knew the incident sued on herein was substantially

certain to occur given the Defendants’ prior knowledge of hazards related to

flammable and combustible emissions from tanks related to mill operations. The

safety rules and regulations in place created by the various Defendants required that

the tank should have been sealed, and operations that provided a source of ignition

should not have been conducted near tanks full of dangerous and flammable gases.

Further, applicable rules and regulations did not permit these actions to occur.

Despite these rules, regulations, laws, and common sense, the Defendants

consciously disregarded such, and ordered work to occur near tanks containing these

dangerous

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hazards that provided sources of ignition. As such, the Defendants are liable for the

consequences of their actions.

41. Moreover, the Defendants knew that workers were present DeRidder mill, including

those working near the subject tanks that exploded, at the time hot work was being

performed. The Defendants were consciously aware that they were required to clear the

area of potential hazards prior to hot work, as a similar incident occurred at another

facility owned and operated by Defendants in Tomahawk, Wisconsin in 2008. Moreover

the Tomahawk, Wisconsin incident also resulted in serious injuries and deaths of multiple

workers. This was from hot work being performed near tanks that were emitting

dangerous gases. The Defendants were also aware that they were required to ensure no

dangerous gases were being emitted at or near hot work at the DeRidder mill on the date

of the incident with workers located nearby. The Defendants had knowledge that workers

were present at the facility and would be performing hot work near the tanks that

exploded. Despite all of this knowledge, the Defendants proceeded to order the Plaintiffs

and other workers to work, while simultaneously allowing hot work operations to occur

near tanks known to contain and/or emit dangerous gases and that had a history of

emitting gases, without first checking and/or ensuring the area was clear of severe

hazards. Therefore, the Defendants knew the tanks were substantially certain to cause

Plaintiffs to suffer significant and life threatening injuries. As such, the Defendants are

liable for their intentional torts. Further, these

VII. DAMAGES
acts and omissions were the cause in fact and legal cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
42. As a result of the incident sued on herein, Plaintiffs suffered severe and permanent

injuries, including but not limited to burns, orthopedic injuries, posttraumatic stress

disorder, and mental distress, which injuries have caused and will likely cause Plaintiffs

residual disability, past and future disfigurement, past and future scarring, past and future

pain and suffering, past and

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 future mental anguish and distress, past and future loss of enjoyment of life, past and

future medical expenses, past lost earnings, future loss of earning capacity, past and

future physical impairment. 43. Plaintiffs’ damages exceed the amount necessary for a

jury and therefore Plaintiffs

demand a trial by jury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays that Defendants be cited to appear and answer this

petition and that, after due proceedings be had, there be judgment entered herein (1) in

favor of the Plaintiffs and against each of the Defendants, jointly and/or solidarily, and

(2) awarding all special and general damages to which the Plaintiffs are entitled, under

any theory whatsoever, whether or not pleaded, including:

 Past and future medical expenses, care, and/or damages;

 Past and future loss of wages and earning capacity;

 Past and future physical pain and suffering and mental anguish;

 Past and future loss of enjoyment of life;

 Past and future impairment and disability;

 Past and future scarring and disfigurement;

 Costs of Court; and

 Pre and Post Judgment interest.

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Respectfully Submitted,

ARNOLD & ITKIN LLP

/s/ J. Kyle Findley

J. Kyle Findley
Bar Roll No. 34922
kfindley@arnolditkin.com
Kala Sellers
Bar Roll No. 36182
ksellers@arnolditkin.com
Adam Lewis
Bar Roll No. 37492
alewis@arnolditkin.com
6009 Memorial Drive
Houston, TX 77007
Tel: (713) 222-3800
Fax: (713) 222-3850
A. M. “Tony” Clayton (#21191)
Michael P. Frugé (#26287)
Richard J. Ward, III (#32267)
CLAYTON, FRUGÉ & WARD
3741 La. Highway 1 South
Port Allen, LA 70767
Telephone: (225) 344-7000
Facsimile: (225) 383-7631
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon all counsel of record this 28th

day of June, 2018, by e-filing it into the CM/ECF system, which will automatically deliver a copy

to all counsel.

/s/ J. Kyle Findley

Kyle Findley

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