Logical reasoning

⁠
⁠Valid ⁠Sound
⁠ ⁠Deductive ⁠ ⁠ ⁠
Unsound
⁠ ⁠ ⁠ ⁠
⁠Invalid ⁠
Unsound
⁠Argument ⁠ ⁠
⁠ ⁠
Cogent
⁠Strong ⁠
⁠ ⁠Non‑deductive ⁠ ⁠
⁠ ⁠ ⁠Uncogent
⁠Weak ⁠
Uncogent
⁠ ⁠
Logical reasoning is concerned with the correctness
of arguments. A key distinction is between
deductive and non-deductive arguments.
Logical reasoning is a ment al act ivit y t hat aims t o arrive at a conclusion in a rigorous way. It
happens in t he form of inferences or argument s by st art ing from a set of premises and reasoning
t o a conclusion support ed by t hese premises. The premises and t he conclusion are proposit ions,
i.e. t rue or false claims about what is t he case. Toget her, t hey form an argument . Logical
reasoning is norm-governed in t he sense t hat it aims t o formulat e correct argument s t hat any
rat ional person would find convincing. The main discipline st udying logical reasoning is logic.

Dist inct t ypes of logical reasoning differ from each ot her concerning t he norms t hey employ and
t he cert aint y of t he conclusion t hey arrive at . Deduct ive reasoning offers t he st rongest support :
t he premises ensure t he conclusion, meaning t hat it is impossible for t he conclusion t o be false
if all t he premises are t rue. Such an argument is called a valid argument , for example: all men are
mort al; Socrat es is a man; t herefore, Socrat es is mort al. For valid argument s, it is not import ant
whet her t he premises are act ually t rue but only t hat , if t hey were t rue, t he conclusion could not
be false. Valid argument s follow a rule of inference, such as modus ponens or modus tollens.
Deduct ive reasoning plays a cent ral role in formal logic and mat hemat ics.

For non-deduct ive logical reasoning, t he premises make t heir conclusion rat ionally convincing
wit hout ensuring it s t rut h. This is oft en underst ood in t erms of probabilit y: t he premises make it
more likely t hat t he conclusion is t rue and st rong inferences make it very likely. Some uncert aint y
remains because t he conclusion int roduces new informat ion not already found in t he premises.
Non-deduct ive reasoning plays a cent ral role in everyday life and in most sciences. Oft en-
discussed t ypes are induct ive, abduct ive, and analogical reasoning. Induct ive reasoning is a form
of generalizat ion t hat infers a universal law from a pat t ern found in many individual cases. It can
be used t o conclude t hat "all ravens are black" based on many individual observat ions of black
ravens. Abduct ive reasoning, also known as "inference t o t he best explanat ion", st art s from an
observat ion and reasons t o t he fact explaining t his observat ion. An example is a doct or who
examines t he sympt oms of t heir pat ient t o make a diagnosis of t he underlying cause. Analogical
reasoning compares t wo similar syst ems. It observes t hat one of t hem has a feat ure and
concludes t hat t he ot her one also has t his feat ure.

Argument s t hat fall short of t he st andards of logical reasoning are called fallacies. For formal
fallacies, like affirming t he consequent , t he error lies in t he logical form of t he argument . For
informal fallacies, like false dilemmas, t he source of t he fault y reasoning is usually found in t he
cont ent or t he cont ext of t he argument . Some t heorist s underst and logical reasoning in a wide
sense t hat is roughly equivalent t o crit ical t hinking. In t his regard, it encompasses cognit ive skills
besides t he abilit y t o draw conclusions from premises. Examples are skills t o generat e and
evaluat e reasons and t o assess t he reliabilit y of informat ion. Furt her fact ors are t o seek new
informat ion, t o avoid inconsist encies, and t o consider t he advant ages and disadvant ages of
different courses of act ion before making a decision.

Definition
Logical reasoning is a form of t hinking t hat is concerned wit h arriving at a
conclusion in a rigorous way.[1] This happens in t he form of inferences by
t ransforming t he informat ion present in a set of premises t o reach a conclusion.[2][3] It can be
defined as "select ing and int erpret ing informat ion from a given cont ext , making connect ions, and
verifying and drawing conclusions based on provided and int erpret ed informat ion and t he
associat ed rules and processes."[4] Logical reasoning is rigorous in t he sense t hat it does not
generat e any conclusion but ensures t hat t he premises support t he conclusion and act as
reasons for believing it .[5][6] One cent ral aspect is t hat t his support is not rest rict ed t o a specific
reasoner but t hat any rat ional person would find t he conclusion convincing based on t he
premises.[6][1] This way, logical reasoning plays a role in expanding knowledge.[7]

The main discipline st udying logical reasoning is called logic. It is divided int o formal and informal
logic, which st udy formal and informal logical reasoning.[8][9][10] Tradit ionally, logical reasoning was
primarily associat ed wit h deduct ive reasoning st udied by formal logic.[11] But in a wider sense, it
also includes forms of non-deduct ive reasoning, such as induct ive, abduct ive, and analogical
reasoning.[12][13][14]

The forms of logical reasoning have in common t hat t hey use premises t o make inferences in a
norm-governed way. As norm-governed pract ices, t hey aim at int er-subject ive agreement about
t he applicat ion of t he norms, i.e. agreement about whet her and t o what degree t he premises
support t heir conclusion. The t ypes of logical reasoning differ concerning t he exact norms t hey
use as well as t he cert aint y of t he conclusion t hey arrive at .[1][15] Deduct ive reasoning offers t he
st rongest support and implies it s conclusion wit h cert aint y, like mat hemat ical proofs. For non-
deduct ive reasoning, t he premises make t he conclusion more likely but do not ensure it . This
support comes in degrees: st rong argument s make t he conclusion very likely, as is t he case for
well-researched issues in t he empirical sciences.[1][16] Some t heorist s give a very wide definit ion
of logical reasoning t hat includes it s role as a cognit ive skill responsible for high-qualit y t hinking.
In t his regard, it has roughly t he same meaning as crit ical t hinking.[13][17]
Basic concepts
A variet y of basic concept s is used in t he st udy and analysis of logical reasoning. Logical
reasoning happens by inferring a conclusion from a set of premises.[3] Premises and conclusions
are normally seen as proposit ions. A proposit ion is a st at ement t hat makes a claim about what is
t he case. In t his regard, proposit ions act as t rut h-bearers: t hey are eit her t rue or false.[18][19][3] For
example, t he sent ence "The wat er is boiling." expresses a proposit ion since it can be t rue or
false. The sent ences "Is t he wat er boiling?" or "Boil t he wat er!", on t he ot her hand, express no
proposit ions since t hey are neit her t rue nor false.[20][3] The proposit ions used as t he st art ing
point of logical reasoning are called t he premises. The proposit ion inferred from t hem is called
t he conclusion.[18][19] For example, in t he argument "all puppies are dogs; all dogs are animals;
t herefore all puppies are animals", t he proposit ions "all puppies are dogs" and "all dogs are
animals" act as premises while t he proposit ion "all puppies are animals" is t he conclusion.[21][22]

A set of premises t oget her wit h a conclusion is called an argument .[23][3] An inference is t he
ment al process of reasoning t hat st art s from t he premises and arrives at t he conclusion.[18][24]
But t he t erms "argument " and "inference" are oft en used int erchangeably in logic. The purpose of
argument s is t o convince a person t hat somet hing is t he case by providing reasons for t his
belief.[25][26] Many argument s in nat ural language do not explicit ly st at e all t he premises. Inst ead,
t he premises are oft en implicit ly assumed, especially if t hey seem obvious and belong t o
common sense.[25][27] Some t heorist s dist inguish bet ween simple and complex argument s. A
complex argument is made up of many sub-argument s. This way, a chain is formed in which t he
conclusions of earlier argument s act as premises for lat er argument s. Each link in t his chain has
t o be successful for a complex argument t o succeed.[18][25]

An argument is correct or incorrect depending on whet her t he premises offer support for t he
conclusion. This is oft en underst ood in t erms of probabilit y: if t he premises of a correct
argument are t rue, it raises t he probabilit y t hat it s conclusion is also t rue. Forms of logical
reasoning can be dist inguished based on how t he premises support t he conclusion. Deduct ive
argument s offer t he st rongest possible support . Non-deduct ive argument s are weaker but are
nonet heless correct forms of reasoning.[28][29] The t erm "proof" is oft en used for deduct ive
argument s or very st rong non-deduct ive argument s.[30] Incorrect argument s offer no or not
sufficient support and are called fallacies,[31][32] alt hough t he use of incorrect argument s does
not mean t heir conclusions are incorrect .[33]

Deductive reasoning
Deduct ive reasoning is t he ment al process of drawing deduct ive inferences. Deduct ively valid
inferences are t he most reliable form of inference: it is impossible for t heir conclusion t o be
false if all t he premises are t rue.[34][35] This means t hat t he t rut h of t he premises ensures t he
t rut h of t he conclusion. A deduct ive argument is sound if it is valid and all it s premises are
t rue.[36] For example, inferring t he conclusion "no cat s are frogs" from t he premises "all frogs are
amphibians" and "no cat s are amphibians" is a sound argument . But even argument s wit h false
premises can be deduct ively valid, like inferring t hat "no cat s are frogs" from t he premises "all
frogs are mammals" and "no cat s are mammals". In t his regard, it only mat t ers t hat t he conclusion
could not be false if t he premises are t rue and not whet her t hey act ually are t rue.[37]

Deduct ively valid argument s follow a rule of inference.[38] A rule of inference is a scheme of
drawing conclusions t hat depends only on t he logical form of t he premises and t he conclusion
but not on t heir specific cont ent .[39][40] The most -discussed rule of inference is t he modus
ponens. It has t he following form: p; if p t hen q; t herefore q. This scheme is deduct ively valid no
mat t er what p and q st and for.[41][5] For example, t he argument "t oday is Sunday; if t oday is
Sunday t hen I don't have t o go t o work t oday; t herefore I don't have t o go t o work t oday" is
deduct ively valid because it has t he form of modus ponens.[42] Ot her popular rules of inference
include modus tollens (not q; if p t hen q; t herefore not p) and t he disjunct ive syllogism (p or q;
not p; t herefore q).[42][43]

The rules governing deduct ive reasoning are oft en expressed formally as logical syst ems for
assessing t he correct ness of deduct ive argument s. Arist ot elian logic is one of t he earliest
syst ems and was t reat ed as t he canon of logic in t he West ern world for over t wo t housand
years. It is based on syllogisms, like concluding t hat "Socrat es is a mort al" from t he premises
"Socrat es is a man" and "all men are mort al".[44][45][46] The current ly dominant syst em is known as
classical logic and covers many addit ional forms of inferences besides syllogisms. So-called
ext ended logics are based on classical logic and int roduce addit ional rules of inference for
specific domains. For example, modal logic can be used t o reason about what is possible and
what is necessary. Temporal logic can be used t o draw inferences about what happened before,
during, and aft er an event .[47][48][49] Classical logic and it s ext ensions rest on a set of basic logical
int uit ions accept ed by most logicians. They include t he law of excluded middle, t he double
negat ion eliminat ion, t he principle of explosion, and t he bivalence of t rut h.[50] So-called deviant
logics reject some of t hese basic int uit ions and propose alt ernat ive rules governing t he validit y
of argument s.[44][51][52] For example, int uit ionist ic logics reject t he law of excluded middle and
t he double negat ion eliminat ion while paraconsist ent logics reject t he principle of
explosion.[52][53][54]

Deduct ive reasoning plays a cent ral role in formal logic and mat hemat ics.[1] In mat hemat ics, it is
used t o prove mat hemat ical t heorems based on a set of premises, usually called axioms. For
example, Peano arit hmet ic is based on a small set of axioms from which all essent ial propert ies
of nat ural numbers can be inferred using deduct ive reasoning.[55][56]

Non-deductive reasoning
Non-deduct ive reasoning is an import ant form of logical reasoning besides deduct ive reasoning.
It happens in t he form of inferences drawn from premises t o reach and support a conclusion, just
like it s deduct ive count erpart . The hallmark of non-deduct ive reasoning is t hat t his support is
fallible. This means t hat if t he premises are t rue, it makes it more likely but not cert ain t hat t he
conclusion is also t rue.[57][58] So for a non-deduct ive argument , it is possible for all it s premises
t o be t rue while it s conclusion is st ill false. There are various t ypes of non-deduct ive reasoning,
like induct ive, abduct ive, and analogical reasoning.[1][59] Non-deduct ive reasoning is more common
in everyday life t han deduct ive reasoning.[60]

Non-deduct ive reasoning is ampliat ive and defeasible.[61][62] Somet imes, t he t erms non-deductive
reasoning, ampliative reasoning, and defeasible reasoning are used synonymously even t hough
t here are slight differences in t heir meaning. Non-deduct ive reasoning is ampliat ive in t he sense
t hat it arrives at informat ion not already present in t he premises. Deduct ive reasoning, by
cont rast , is non-ampliat ive since it only ext ract s informat ion already present in t he premises
wit hout adding any addit ional informat ion.[62][63][59] So wit h non-deduct ive reasoning, one can
learn somet hing new t hat one did not know before. But t he fact t hat new informat ion is added
means t hat t his addit ional informat ion may be false. This is why non-deduct ive reasoning is not
as secure as deduct ive reasoning.[58][64]
A closely relat ed aspect is t hat non-deduct ive reasoning is defeasible or non-monot onic. This
means t hat one may have t o wit hdraw a conclusion upon learning new informat ion. For example, if
all birds a person has seen so far can fly, t his person is just ified in reaching t he induct ive
conclusion t hat all birds fly. This conclusion is defeasible because t he reasoner may have t o
revise it upon learning t hat penguins are birds t hat do not fly.[65][66][67]

Inductive

Based on many individual

observations of black ravens,
inductive reasoning can be
used to infer that all ravens are
black.

Induct ive reasoning st art s from a set of individual inst ances and uses generalizat ion t o arrive at a
universal law governing all cases.[68][69][70] Some t heorist s use t he t erm in a very wide sense t o
include any form of non-deduct ive reasoning, even if no generalizat ion is involved.[69][71][68] In t he
more narrow sense, it can be defined as "t he process of inferring a general law or principle from
t he observat ions of part icular inst ances."[68] For example, st art ing from t he empirical observat ion
t hat "all ravens I have seen so far are black", induct ive reasoning can be used t o infer t hat "all
ravens are black". In a slight ly weaker form, induct ion can also be used t o infer an individual
conclusion about a single case, for example, t hat "t he next raven I will see is black".[69][1]
Induct ive reasoning is closely relat ed t o st at ist ical reasoning and probabilist ic reasoning.[72] Like
ot her forms of non-deduct ive reasoning, induct ion is not cert ain. This means t hat t he premises
support t he conclusion by making it more probable but do not ensure it s t rut h. In t his regard, t he
conclusion of an induct ive inference cont ains new informat ion not already found in t he
premises.[68][60][1]

Various aspect s of t he premises are import ant t o ensure t hat t hey offer significant support t o
t he conclusion. In t his regard, t he sample size should be large t o guarant ee t hat many individual
cases were considered before drawing t he conclusion.[60][73] An int imat ely connect ed fact or is
t hat t he sample is random and represent at ive. This means t hat it includes a fair and balanced
select ion of individuals wit h different key charact erist ics. For example, when making a
generalizat ion about human beings, t he sample should include members of different races,
genders, and age groups.[60][74][75] A lot of reasoning in everyday life is induct ive. For example,
when predict ing how a person will react t o a sit uat ion, induct ive reasoning can be employed
based on how t he person react ed previously in similar circumst ances. It plays an equally cent ral
role in t he sciences, which oft en st art wit h many part icular observat ions and t hen apply t he
process of generalizat ion t o arrive at a universal law.[76][77][1]

A well-known issue in t he field of induct ive reasoning is t he so-called problem of induct ion. It
concerns t he quest ion of whet her or why anyone is just ified in believing t he conclusions of
induct ive inferences. This problem was init ially raised by David Hume, who holds t hat fut ure
event s need not resemble past observat ions. In t his regard, induct ive reasoning about fut ure
event s seems t o rest on t he assumpt ion t hat nat ure remains uniform.[78][79]

Abductive
Abduct ive reasoning is usually underst ood as an inference from an observat ion t o a fact
explaining t his observat ion. Inferring t hat it has rained aft er seeing t hat t he st reet s are wet is
one example. Oft en, t he expression "inference t o t he best explanat ion" is used as a
synonym.[80][81][1] This expression underlines t hat t here are usually many possible explanat ions of
t he same fact and t hat t he reasoner should only infer t he best explanat ion. For example, a
t sunami could also explain why t he st reet s are wet but t his is usually not t he best explanat ion.
As a form of non-deduct ive reasoning, abduct ion does not guarant ee t he t rut h of t he conclusion
even if t he premises are t rue.[80][82]
The more plausible t he explanat ion is, t he st ronger it is support ed by t he premises. In t his regard,
it mat t ers t hat t he explanat ion is simple, i.e. does not include any unnecessary claims, and t hat it
is consist ent wit h est ablished knowledge.[83][81][84] Ot her cent ral crit eria for a good explanat ion
are t hat it fit s observed and commonly known fact s and t hat it is relevant , precise, and not
circular. Ideally, t he explanat ion should be verifiable by empirical evidence. If t he explanat ion
involves ext raordinary claims t hen it requires very st rong evidence.[84]

Doctors use abductive reasoning

when investigating the symptoms of a
patient to determine their underlying
cause.

Abduct ive reasoning plays a cent ral role in science when researchers discover unexplained
phenomena. In t his case, t hey oft en resort t o a form of guessing t o come up wit h general
principles t hat could explain t he observat ions. The hypot heses are t hen t est ed and compared t o
discover which one provides t he best explanat ion.[85][84] This pert ains part icularly t o cases of
causal reasoning t hat t ry t o discover t he relat ion bet ween causes and effect s.[84] Abduct ion is
also very common in everyday life. It is used t here in a similar but less syst emat ic form.[85][84]
This relat es, for example, t o t he t rust people put in what ot her people say. The best explanat ion
of why a person assert s a claim is usually t hat t hey believe it and have evidence for it . This form
of abduct ive reasoning is relevant t o why one normally t rust s what ot her people say even t hough
t his inference is usually not drawn in an explicit way. Somet hing similar happens when t he
speaker's st at ement is ambiguous and t he audience t ries t o discover and explain what t he
speaker could have meant .[85] Abduct ive reasoning is also common in medicine when a doct or
examines t he sympt oms of t heir pat ient in order t o arrive at a diagnosis of t heir underlying
cause.[1]
Analogical

Analogical reasoning can be used to

transfer insights from animal
experiments to humans, like in the
case of research on obesity and
hypertension performed on Zucker
rats.[86][87]

Analogical reasoning involves t he comparison of t wo syst ems in relat ion t o t heir similarit y. It
st art s from informat ion about one syst em and infers informat ion about anot her syst em based on
t he resemblance bet ween t he t wo syst ems.[88][89] Expressed schemat ically, argument s from
analogy have t he following form: (1) a is similar t o b; (2) a has feat ure F; (3) t herefore b probably
also has feat ure F.[89][90] Analogical reasoning can be used, for example, t o infer informat ion
about humans from medical experiment s on animals: (1) rat s are similar t o humans; (2) birt h
cont rol pills affect t he brain development of rat s; (3) t herefore t hey may also affect t he brain
development of humans.[86]

Through analogical reasoning, knowledge can be t ransferred from one sit uat ion or domain t o
anot her. Argument s from analogy provide support for t heir conclusion but do not guarant ee it s
t rut h. Their st rengt h depends on various fact ors. The more similar t he syst ems are, t he more
likely it is t hat a given feat ure of one object also charact erizes t he ot her object . Anot her fact or
concerns not just t he degree of similarit y but also it s relevance. For example, an art ificial
st rawberry made of plast ic may be similar t o a real st rawberry in many respect s, including it s
shape, color, and surface st ruct ure. But t hese similarit ies are irrelevant t o whet her t he art ificial
st rawberry t ast es as sweet as t he real one.[91]

Analogical reasoning plays a cent ral role in problem-solving, decision-making, and learning. It can
be used bot h for simple physical charact erist ics and complex abst ract ideas.[92][93] In science,
analogies are oft en used in models t o underst and complex phenomena in a simple way. For
example, t he Bohr model explains t he int eract ions of sub-at omic part icles in analogy t o how
planet s revolve around t he sun.[94][95]

Fallacies
A fallacy is an incorrect argument or a fault y form of reasoning. This means t hat t he premises
provide no or not sufficient support for t he conclusion. Fallacies oft en appear t o be correct on
t he first impression and t hereby seduce people int o accept ing and using t hem. In logic, t he t erm
"fallacy" does not mean t hat t he conclusion is false. Inst ead, it only means t hat some kind of
error was commit t ed on t he way t o reaching t he conclusion. An argument can be a fallacy even
if, by a fort uit ous accident , t he conclusion is t rue. Out side t he field of logic, t he t erm "fallacy" is
somet imes used in a slight ly different sense for a false belief or t heory and not for an
argument .[32][96][97]

Fallacies are usually divided int o formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies are expressed in a
formal language and usually belong t o deduct ive reasoning. Their fault lies in t he logical form of
t he argument , i.e. t hat it does not follow a valid rule of inference.[98][99] A well-known formal
fallacy is affirming t he consequent . It has t he following form: (1) q; (2) if p t hen q; (3) t herefore p.
This fallacy is commit t ed, for example, when a person argues t hat "t he burglars ent ered by t he
front door" based on t he premises "t he burglars forced t he lock" and "if t he burglars ent ered by
t he front door, t hen t hey forced t he lock".[100] This fallacy is similar t o t he valid rule of inference
known as modus ponens. It is fault y because t he first premise and t he conclusion are swit ched
around. Ot her well-known formal fallacies are denying t he ant ecedent , affirming a disjunct ,
denying a conjunct , and t he fallacy of t he undist ribut ed middle.[32][96][101]

Informal fallacies are expressed in nat ural language. Their main fault usually lies not in t he form
of t he argument but has ot her sources, like it s cont ent or cont ext .[96][99] Some informal fallacies,
like some inst ances of false dilemmas and st rawman fallacies, even involve correct deduct ive
reasoning on t he formal level.[97] The cont ent of an argument is t he idea t hat is expressed in it .
For example, a false dilemma is an informal fallacy t hat is based on an error in one of t he
premises. The fault y premise oversimplifies realit y: it st at es t hat t hings are eit her one way or
anot her way but ignore many ot her viable alt ernat ives.[102][103] False dilemmas are oft en used by
polit icians when t hey claim t hat eit her t heir proposal is accept ed or t here will be dire
consequences. Such claims usually ignore t hat various alt ernat ives exist t o avoid t hose
consequences, i.e. t hat t heir proposal is not t he only viable solut ion.[104]

The st rawman fallacy is anot her informal fallacy. It s error happens on t he level of t he cont ext . It
consist s in misrepresent ing t he view of an opponent and t hen refut ing t his view. The refut at ion
it self is oft en correct but t he error lies in t he false assumpt ion t hat t he opponent act ually
defends t his view. For example, an alcohol lobbyist may respond t o t he suggest ion t o ban alcohol
advert isement s on t elevision by claiming t hat it is impossible t o make people give up drinking
alcohol. This is a st rawman fallacy since t he suggest ion was merely t o ban advert isement s and
not t o st op all alcohol consumpt ion.[105][96][106]

Ambiguous and vague expressions in nat ural language are oft en responsible for t he fault y
reasoning in informal fallacies. For example, t his is t he case for fallacies of ambiguit y, like t he
argument "(1) feat hers are light ; (2) light is opposed t o darkness; (3) t herefore feat hers are
opposed t o darkness". The error is found in t he ambiguous t erm "light ", which has one meaning in
t he first premise ("not heavy") and a different meaning in t he second premise ("visible
elect romagnet ic radiat ion").[107][108][109]

As a skill
Some t heorist s discuss logical reasoning in a very wide sense t hat includes it s role as a broad
skill responsible for high-qualit y t hinking. In t his sense, it is roughly equivalent t o crit ical t hinking
and includes t he capacit y t o select and apply t he appropriat e rules of logic t o specific
sit uat ions.[110] It encompasses a great variet y of abilit ies besides drawing conclusions from
premises. Examples are t o underst and a posit ion, t o generat e and evaluat e reasons for and
against it as well as t o crit ically assess whet her t o accept or reject cert ain informat ion. It is
about making judgment s and drawing conclusions aft er careful evaluat ion and cont rast s in t his
regard wit h uncrit ical snap judgment s and gut feelings.[17] Ot her core skills linked t o logical
reasoning are t o assess reasons before accept ing a claim and t o search for new informat ion if
more is needed t o reach a reliable conclusion. It also includes t he abilit y t o consider different
courses of act ion and compare t he advant ages and disadvant ages of t heir consequences, t o use
common sense, and t o avoid inconsist encies.[111][112] The skills responsible for logical reasoning
can be learned, t rained, and improved.[17][113]
Logical reasoning is relevant bot h on t he t heoret ical and pract ical level.[114][115] On t he
t heoret ical level, it helps decrease t he number of false beliefs. A cent ral aspect concerns t he
abilit ies used t o dist inguish fact s from mere opinions, like t he process of finding and evaluat ing
reasons for and against a posit ion t o come t o one's own conclusion.[114] This includes being able
t o different iat e bet ween reliable and unreliable sources of informat ion. This mat t ers for
effect ive reasoning since it is oft en necessary t o rely on informat ion provided by ot her people
inst ead of checking every single fact for oneself. [116][117] This way, logical reasoning can help
t he person avoid t he effect s of propaganda or being manipulat ed by ot hers.[118][119] When
import ant informat ion is missing, it is oft en bet t er t o suspend judgment t han t o jump t o
conclusions.[118] In t his regard, logical reasoning should be skept ical and open-minded at t he
same t ime.[120]

On t he pract ical level, logical reasoning concerns t he issue of making rat ional and effect ive
decisions.[114][115] For many real-life decisions, various courses of act ion are available t o t he
agent . For each possible act ion, t here can be conflict ing reasons, some in favor of it and ot hers
opposed t o it . In such cases, logical reasoning includes weighing t he pot ent ial benefit s and
drawbacks as well as considering t heir likelihood in order t o arrive at a balanced all-t hings-
considered decision.[121][122] For example, when a person runs out of drinking wat er in t he middle
of a hiking t rip, t hey could employ t he skills associat ed wit h logical reasoning t o decide whet her
t o boil and drink wat er from a st ream t hat might cont ain dangerous microorganisms rat her t han
break off t he t rip and hike back t o t he parking lot . This could include considering fact ors like
assessing how dangerous t he microorganisms are and t he likelihood t hat t hey survive t he boiling
procedure. It may also involve gat hering relevant informat ion t o make t hese assessment s, for
example, by asking ot her hikers.[123]

Time also plays a cent ral role in logical reasoning.[124] If one lacks import ant informat ion, it is
oft en bet t er t o delay a decision and look for new informat ion before coming t o a conclusion.[111]
If t he decision is t ime-sensit ive, on t he ot her hand, logical reasoning may imply making a fast
decision based on t he current ly available evidence even if it is very limit ed. For example, if a
friend yells "Duck!" during a baseball game t he most logical response may be t o blindly t rust
t hem and duck inst ead of demanding an explanat ion or invest igat ing what might have prompt ed
t heir exclamat ion.[124][125] Generally speaking, t he less t ime t here is, t he more significant it is t o
t rust int uit ions and gut feelings. If t here is more t ime, on t he ot her hand, it becomes import ant t o
examine ambiguit ies and assess cont radict ory informat ion.[126]
See also

Argumentation theory
Dialogical logic
Epilogism
List of rules of inference
Transduction (machine learning)
Transduction (psychology)

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