Handout 4/10: Republic, Book II

Republic, Book II
Glaucon

Glaucon explains what he takes to be the view of the ‘many’ about justice. The many make four
main claims [358c].

(A) Claim # 1 is about the kind of good justice is

Claim: Justice is a kind of good which we desire not for its own sake but for the sake of its
rewards [358a]

Three kinds of goods [357b – 357d]:

(i) Goods we desire for their own sake

(ii) Goods we desire for their own sake as well as for the sake of their rewards
(iii) Goods we desire not for their own sake but for the sake of their rewards

The many think that justice falls under (iii); Socrates thinks that justice falls under (ii).

Q: What are some examples of each kind of good?

(B) Claim # 2 is about the origin and nature of justice

Claim: (a) The origin of justice is the contract people make with each other neither to do
injustice nor suffer it. This contract is the origin of the laws. (b) The nature of justice is whatever
the laws command, and thus fulfill the contract. [359a]

Why do people make the contract in the first place?

“People say, you see, that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad. But the
badness of suffering it far exceeds the goodness of doing it. Hence, those who have done and
suffered injustice and who have tasted both—the ones who lack the power to do it and avoid
suffering it—decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do
injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law
commands, they call lawful and just. That, they say, is the origin and very being of justice. It is
between the best and the worst. The best is to do justice without paying the penalty; the worst is
to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two
extremes. People love it, not because it is a good thing, but because they are too weak to do
injustice with impunity” [358e-359b].

Q: What is the thought here?

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(C) Claim # 3 is about what motivates people to act justly

Claim: People act in a just way unwillingly mostly due to the fear of punishment—in other
words, because they lack the power to do injustice. [359c]

The Ring of Gyges [359d-360d]

Glaucon defends this claim by considering a thought experiment. The thought experiment
involves a shepherd who was the ancestor of Gyges. He found a ring which, when worn in a
particular way, made him invisible. He used the ring to steal and kill people in order to
advantage himself. Let’s suppose that there are two such rings, one worn by a just person the
other by an unjust person. Since the ring provides them impunity, Glaucon thinks that both the
just and the unjust person will act like the shepherd—they will act unjustly in order to advantage
themselves. This shows, according to Glaucon, that everyone would act unjustly when she
thinks she can get away with it without suffering bad consequences. In fact, someone who did
not want to do injustice while wearing the ring would be thought most wretched and foolish.
Something is terribly wrong with her.

Q: What do you think it would be rational to do with the ring of Gyges?

(D) Claim # 4 is about whether an unjust life is better than a just life

Imagine a just person who does not seek any acclaim for her just actions and instead develops a
reputation for being unjust. She will suffer all sorts of punishments and troubles, while being
constrained to act justly. Meanwhile, an unjust person who was skilled enough to hide his unjust
actions and character, and could through manipulation and deceit cultivate a reputation for
justice, would live an amazing life.

Adeimantus
Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother, adds to Glaucon’s argument. Three claims are most important
here:

(E) “When fathers speak to their sons to give them advice, they say that one must be just, as do
all those who have others in their charge. But they do not praise justice itself, only the good
reputation it brings: the inducement they offer is that if we are reputed to be just, then, as a result
of our reputation, we will get political offices, good marriages, and all the things that Glaucon
recently said that the just man would get as a result of having a good reputation” [362e-363a].

Q: What view about the value of justice do we get from this quote? Note it is intimately
connected with point D.

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(F) It may not be easy to hide one’s injustice—but nothing great is easy. One must work for it.
But that doesn’t mean that the life of injustice, if skillfully maintained, isn’t superior to the life
of justice.

(G) An objector might ask: isn’t it impossible to hide from the gods? Won’t they punish you for
injustice?

“If the gods do not exist, or do not concern themselves with human affairs, why should we
worry at all about hiding from them? On the other hand, if they do exist, and do care about us,
we know nothing about them except what we have learned from the laws and from the poets
who give their genealogies. But these are the very people who tell us that gods can be persuaded
and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers, and offerings… if we believe them, we should be
unjust and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our injustice. For if we are just, our only gain is not
to be punished by the gods, but we will lose the profits of our injustice. But if we are unjust, we
will get those profits, and afterwards we will entreat the gods and, persuading them, escape with
our crimes and transgressions unpunished” [365d-366a]

Q: What are the similarities between the three immoralist critiques we have read? What are the
differences?

The ultimate challenge facing Socrates/Plato:

“So do not merely demonstrate to us by argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show
what effect each one itself has, because of itself, on the person who has it—the one for the good,
the others for bad—whether it remains hidden from gods or human beings or not” [367e]

Socrates ultimately responds to this challenge by further developing his arguments from Book I,
in particular the Unity Argument and the Function Argument.

In what follows, he develops an account of justice in both the city and the individual. For
Socrates (or for Plato), justice in a city is a kind of internal unity in which all parts of the city
fulfill their role properly and act in harmony, with the best elements ruling. Justice in the
individual (that is, in the psyche or soul) is the same: it is a matter of the different elements of
the psyche (reason, spirit and appetite) working in harmony, with reason ruling and the other
two elements serving. This kind of unity is produced by just actions and undermined by unjust
ones. It also causes us to act justly. The thought is that justice, as the unity and proper
functioning of the soul or psyche, is good for its own sake and its consequences.