CIVPRO CASES -BATCH ___ (Mar.

, 2024)

1. EN BANC
A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014 NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO AND HILDA S. PRESBITERO,
COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., RESPONDENT.

The case you mentioned, A.C. No. 9872, involves a complaint for disbarment filed by Natividad P.
Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline. Let’s delve into the details:
1. Background:
o On April 4, 2006, Atty. Solidum signed a retainer agreement with Hilda S. Presbitero. The
agreement aimed to follow up the release of payment for Presbitero’s 2.7-hectare property in
Bacolod, which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR).
o The agreement also covered the payment of debts owed by Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), the sale of retained areas of the property, and the collection of rentals due from
the property occupants.
o The DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property, but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her
late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000.
o Respondent proposed filing a case for quieting of title against PNB.
2. Issues:
o Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the
sale of the property.
o Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero for case expenses, but no progress was made.
o Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, also engaged respondent’s services to handle the
registration of her 18.85-hectare lot in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros.
o Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Natividad P. Navarro for the registration expenses.
o Navarro later discovered that the registration decree over the property was already issued in the name
of one Teodoro Yulo.
3. Loan Agreement:
o On May 25, 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business.
o They executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) specifying the loan terms.
o The loan was for one year, with 10% monthly interest, secured by a real estate mortgage over a
property in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City.
4. Verdict:
o The Court found Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jrguilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12.

This case highlights the importance of ethical conduct and transparency in legal practice.

A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM: This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro
(Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before he Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for
the latter’s 2.7 -hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late
husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for
the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that
PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter.

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Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by
Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the
expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to handle the
registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan,Negros. Yulo convinced her sister,
Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in
consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro
for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was already issued
in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for the registration of the property if
respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading business.
Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a
period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and(c) shall be secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688.
They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the
interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City
Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro. In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of
₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA.
Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce,
Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias
Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the
real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent
sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch. Presbitero was
dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent
promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-
meter property he mortgaged to Navarro. However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of ₱900,000.
Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September2006, the checks issued
by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn
were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months. In November
2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent
as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in
their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants
also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent. Complainants alleged that
respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the
checks which turned out to be drawn a
gainst his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and
value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he owned.
Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who
convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the
refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate
and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate
mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was
less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because the sale was actually rescinded.
Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth
more than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to continue
paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push
through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to December
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2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were aware that he could no longer
open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that hiwife and son issue the checks. Respondent
further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it could be
completed. A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In
response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his suspension only
in May 2006. After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-CBD
found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero which he
failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents presented
by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either
promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in
accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her husband regarding
the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000
but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for only
₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that
they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro
and Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for his
claim that the price of sugar went down. The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding
the issuance of the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them
that it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection
with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property
which was financed by Navarro. The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as
if they were from his own account;(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;(3)
misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged toher;(4) conspiring with Yulo
to obtain the loans from complainants;(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew
that it was exorbitant; and(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility
when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants .In addition, the IBP-CBD
found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits borrowing
money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected or the client is given independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were not clear whether
the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or
the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
respondent mishandled his cases. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment. In
Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to
suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent to return
the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants. Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the
penalty of disbarment be instead imposed upon respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. The records show
that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan
he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same
MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent
mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000,
showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the
sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of
the property.

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Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan
Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer
open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we
are inclined to agree with the IBP- CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him.
In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent
the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and
complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruledthat conduct, as
used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.
1. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or privatecapacity.
2. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer -client relationship. However,
respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled
Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero,
respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent
drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed
the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that
were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is
nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants. Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide: CANON 16. - A LAWYER
SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HISCLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client.
4 We agree withthe IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out
thatrespondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he couldnot present any
receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the
Surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee,
publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by
the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he
received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who hadsince passed
away. As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP
-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in
liquidating the money he received from Presbitero. Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for
the money he received from his client, Presbitero. 1âwphi1Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his
possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of thetrust reposed in him by, the client.
5 Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client. Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks
he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of
the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable.
Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The
interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all
4
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. 6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took
advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. We modify the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession.
7 Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue
gains for himself
8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’
recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the
expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar .
9 Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability.
10 Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other .
11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose.
12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his
client.
13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount of the
advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16,Rule 16.01, and Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting
to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty
days from finality of this Decision.Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of thePhilippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
disseminationto all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records
ofrespondent.SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9872 –

Legal Ethics –

Duty of Lawyer to Account for Client’s Money

Canon 16 applies sans lawyer-client relationship

In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in the quieting of her title over
a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of
Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of
her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration
expenses. Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from Navarro. The loan was
covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that the
monthly interest shall be 10%.Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again
drafted a MOA containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum
mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero. Nothing happened in the quieting of title case
field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving the acceptance fee. In the land registration case of Yulo
financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land was already registered to someone else. Navarro claims
that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised her of the status of the land. Anent the loans,
Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the terms of the loans as he claimed that the interest rate of said
loans at 10% is unconscionable. Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against Solidum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

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HELD:
Yes. Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3 million from Navarro and
Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his

On August 5, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Philippines rendered a decision in A.C. No. 8000. The case involved a
complaint filed by Chamelyn A. Agot against Atty. Luis P. Rivera. The complaint accused Atty. Rivera of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath. Here are the key details:
1. Background: Chamelyn A. Agot sought Atty. Rivera’s services to facilitate the issuance of her United States
(US) visa. They entered into a Contract of Legal Services, where Atty. Rivera promised to secure the release of
a US immigrant visa for Chamelyn prior to her scheduled wedding in the US. In return, Chamelyn paid him a
downpayment of ₱350,000. The contract stipulated that if Chamelyn’s visa application was denied for reasons
other than her absence during the interview or criminal convictions, Atty. Rivera would return the
downpayment.
2. Failure to Perform: Atty. Rivera failed to fulfill his obligation within the agreed period. Chamelyn was not even
scheduled for an interview at the US Embassy. Despite demands, Atty. Rivera did not return the
downpayment.
3. Deceitful Acts: Atty. Rivera misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, causing undue prejudice to his
client. He claimed that a certain Rico Pineda (whom he believed to be a US Embassy consul) was responsible
for the failure. However, Pineda reneged on commitments, and Atty. Rivera assumed responsibility for
returning the money.
In summary, Atty. Luis P. Rivera not only failed to facilitate Chamelyn’s US visa but also committed deceitful acts. The
Supreme Court found him in violation of professional standards

Supreme Court of the Philippines

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8000, August 05, 2014
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant Chamelyn A. Agot
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her
money despite several demands.
The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend’s wedding on
December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her United States (US) visa,
complainant sought the services of respondent who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on
November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services (Contract),[2] whereby respondent undertook to
facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In
consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to
pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.[3] The parties likewise stipulated that should
complainant’s visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for
records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said
downpayment.[4] However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse,
complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment
was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against
respondent.[5]

In his Comment[6] dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under
the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he had believed to be a consul for
the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had
a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family,
including himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the
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complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract.
Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless,
assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.[7] To buttress his claims, respondent attached
pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly
coming from the latter.[8]

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation[9] dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty
of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer
penalty.[10]

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting
himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning
complainant’s downpayment of P350,000.00. The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to respondent’s
defense anent his purported transactions with Pineda considering that the latter’s identity was not proven and in light
of respondent’s self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.[11]

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of suspension to six (6) months and
ordering respondent to return the amount of P350,000.00[12] to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.[13]

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the
CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.[14] In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant
seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as
downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely
had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him.
However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted
were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value
and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
[15]

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to
facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

7
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the
latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him.[16] Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable,[17] as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of
P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO
HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity
and good faith.[18] The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from his client.[19] Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand
the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.[20]

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected
their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the
Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,[21] the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his
retainership agreement with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,[22] the
Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his
legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of
complainant’s US visa and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an
immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be
imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension from
the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of P350,000.00 he
received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and
not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil
in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.”[23] Hence, since respondent
received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01
and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he received from the
latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with
the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

8
Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.

** Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1743 dated August 4, 2014.

On June 27, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a resolution in A.C. No. 7494. The case involved a
complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Cham against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. Here are the key details:
 Complainant: Wilson Cham
 Respondent: Atty. Eva Paita-Moya
 Allegations: The complainant accused the respondent of deceitfully occupying a leased apartment unit and
subsequently vacating it without paying the rentals due.
 Lease Contract: Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Greenville Realty and Development Corp.
(GRDC) for a residential apartment unit in Quezon City. The lease was initially for one year, but the
respondent requested an extension until June 30, 2000, with a commitment to pay monthly rent during the
extension period.
 Rental Arrears: Respondent stayed at the leased premises until October 2000 without paying rent from July
to October 2000. She also failed to settle her electric bills for September and October 2000.
 Total Accountability: As of October 15, 2004, the respondent’s total accountability was P 71,007.88.
 Respondent’s Defense: The respondent claimed she had paid her rentals and had not vacated the apartment
unit surreptitiously. She transferred to another place because the complainant allegedly asked her to vacate
the premises for repairs and renovations.
 Resolution: The Supreme Court resolved the case, emphasizing that lawyers must uphold the constitution,
obey laws, and promote respect for legal processes1.
Please note that this information is based on the court’s resolution and the allegations made by the parties involved.
For the full details, you can refer to the official court documents here.

Cham vs. Atty. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 74946 – Case Digest • Post published:June 27, 2008 • Reading time:3 mins read

9
FACTS A Complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who he
alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying
the rentals due. Respondent entered into a Contract of lease with Greenville Realty and Development Corp.
(GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit
owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per
month for a term of one year. Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant
that she would no longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay until June 30, 2000 with a
commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension period. Complainant approved
such request but increased the rental rate toP8,650.00 per month for the period beginning October 10, 1999 until
June 30, 2000. While respondent stayed at the leased premises without paying her rentals from July to October 2000,
she also failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September and October 2000. The statement of
Account as of 15 October 2004 shows that respondent’s total accountability is P71,007.88.

Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainant’s office that respondent had secretly vacated the
apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Complainant sent repeated written demands for payment
of her obligations but respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated
the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because she was given
notice by the complainant to vacate the premises. Respondent actually wanted to ask that the complainant may
account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know complainant’s
address or contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to the
vacated apartment unit. ISSUE Whether or not a lawyer’s failure to fulfill an obligation is a ground for
suspension. RULING YES. Respondent’s abandonment of the leased premises to avoid her obligations for the
rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon I and Rule1.01 thereof, which explicitly state: “CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law andlegal processes. <Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.=

The court finds Atty.

Eva Paita-Moya guilty
of gross misconduct
and is hereby
SUSPENDED for one
month from the
practice of
10
law, effective upon her
receipt of this Decision.
She is warned
that a repetition of the
same or a similar act
will be dealt with
more severely.
Lawyers are
instruments for the
administration of
justice. As

11
vanguards of our legal
system, they are
expected to maintain
not only legal
proficiency but also a
high standard of
morality,
honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. Verily,
lawyers must at all
times faithfully
perform their duties
12
to society, to the bar,
to
the courts and to their
clients. As part of those
duties, they must
promptly pay their
financial obligations.
A.C. No. 11078, decided on July 19, 2016, involves a case of professional misconduct by an attorney. Let’s delve into
the details:
1. Complainants: The case was brought by Verlita V. Mercullo and Raymond Vedano against Atty. Marie
Frances E. Ramon1.
2. Background: The National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) had sent demand letters
to Carmelita T. Vedaño regarding her unpaid obligations secured by a mortgage on her residential property in
Novaliches, Caloocan City. To prevent foreclosure, Carmelita authorized her children (Verlita and Raymond) to
inquire about the status of her obligations. They discovered that her arrears amounted to P350,000.00. The
matter was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon1.
3. Deceptive Actions: In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond contacted Atty. Ramon to redeem the property by
paying the redemption price. At the meeting, they handed over the P350,000.00 to her. She issued
acknowledgment receipts and promised to inform them once the redemption documents were ready for
their mother’s signature. However, she failed to fulfill her promise and ceased communication with the
complainants1.
4. Violation of Professional Responsibility: Atty. Ramon’s actions violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath. Her deceitful behavior led to her disbarment1.
5. Verdict: The Supreme Court revoked Atty. Ramon’s license, emphasizing that her actions tarnished the legal
profession and eroded public trust in the judiciary12.
In summary, A.C. No. 11078 serves as a reminder of the ethical standards expected of legal practitioners and the
consequences for breaching them.

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the
substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.
13
14
15
On January 24, 2017, the Supreme Court of the Philippines deliberated on A.C. No. 5582. This case involved several
complaints against Attorney Levi P. Muñoz. Let’s break down the details:
1. Complainants and Allegations:
o Arthur O. Monares accused Muñoz of representing his brother Ludolfo during regular government
hours while employed as the Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.
o Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal, purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), raised
concerns about Muñoz’s engagement as retained counsel for ALECO. Olaybal alleged that Muñoz did
not disclose his employment as Provincial Legal Officer at the time.
o Benjilieh M. Constante, the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation, claimed that Muñoz filed ten cases against Sunwest on Ludolfo’s behalf
while serving as Provincial Legal Officer.
2. Complaints and Prayers:
o All three complaints sought Muñoz’s disbarment for unlawfully engaging in private practice.
o Olaybal specifically accused Muñoz of violating the rule against conflict of interest.
3. Previous Disciplinary Actions:
o The complainants highlighted that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the Ombudsman for
unauthorized practice of profession.

16
 o Muñoz was also convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City for
violating Republic Act No. 6713.
4. Decision:
o The Supreme Court considered Muñoz’s Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or
Clemency.
o The court weighed the allegations and previous disciplinary actions against Muñoz.
In summary, the case revolved around Muñoz’s conduct as a lawyer, his representation of clients, and potential
conflicts of interest. The court’s decision aimed to address these issues

MONARES vs. MUÑOZ

Arthur O. Monares vs. Atty. Levi P. Muñoz
A.C. No. 5582 / A.C. No. 5604 / A.C. No. 5652
January 24, 2017

Facts:
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May
14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the complaints for disbarment filed by
Arthur 0. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March 21, 2002,
respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofLegazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the said case
during regular government hours while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel
sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel
of the NEA-appointed team which took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz
illegally collected payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their
retainer agreement.

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation
(Sunwest). Constante claimed that Mufi oz filed ten ( 10) cases against Sun west on Ludolfo' s behalf before the Office
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as Provincial Legal Officer.

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice. In addition,
Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of interest.

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the Ombudsman for
two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and was meted the penaltyof removal
and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ofLegazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2) in
relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713. Muñoz's conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's
Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C. Bichara
(Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This request was
granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P.
Aguirre granted Mufi oz' s request, under the following conditions:

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic) and that no conflict of
interest with your present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what circumstances you can engage in
private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not impair in any way your
efficiency; and.

17
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of this
authority.

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon Muñoz:

a. You cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;

b. You will be on call and you will have no fix working hours provided that the efficiency of the Provincial Legal
Office shall not be prejudiced;
c. You are exempted in accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the limitation already mentioned above;
and
d. In addition to the above enumeration, you are to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Levi Muñoz may practice privately even though a he is a government employee?

Held
In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002, he engaged
in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the written authority
of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims had never been revoked. Mufi.oz also argued that no conflict
of interest existed between ALECO's old BOD and th'e NBA management team, since he was engaged as retained
counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his DILG authorization. Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing
government time for his private practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules),
requires government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by special laws, to
render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week. The
number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or agency adopts
a flexible work schedule. Notably, Mufi.oz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely alleged
that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office. Court appearances are necessarily made within
regular government working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the aftemoon.

Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer of cases
handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in
clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR. Muñoz should have requested for authority to
engage in private practice from the Secretary of DILG for his second and third terms. Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant
of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have been perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he
believed in good faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites in his Joint Petition, is
clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of one's profession
to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head of the department, in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which provides, in part: Sec.

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties
and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests. Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges,
Inc. v. Pajarillo, the Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus: There is conflict of
interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
18
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Ruling
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation
hereunder shall be dealt with more severely.

In the case of Hosoya vs. Atty. Contado (A.C. No. 10731, October 5, 2021), the Supreme Court addressed an
administrative complaint filed by Crisanta G. Hosoya against Atty. Allan C. Contado1. Here are the key details:
1. Background:
o Crisanta G. Hosoya filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Allan C. Contado.
o The complaint alleged violations of the Lawyers’ Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
o The case arose from their relationship, which began in 2003 when Atty. Contado courted Crisanta.
o Despite knowing that Atty. Contado was cohabiting with other women, Crisanta continued living
with him.
o They had two children together.
o Financial problems and Atty. Contado’s abandonment led to the termination of their relationship.

19
 o Crisanta claimed that Atty. Contado violated several laws, including those related to child
protection and violence against women1.
2. Atty. Contado’s Defense:
o Atty. Contado denied the allegations, stating that they were not supported by evidence.
o He confirmed meeting Crisanta in 2003 and represented that he was separated-in-fact from his
wife.
o They had a mutual relationship where they helped each other.
o Crisanta used a vehicle during Atty. Contado’s unsuccessful campaign for governor.
o Atty. Contado disputed Crisanta’s claims and asserted that they were motivated by revenge1.
3. Supreme Court Decision:
o The Supreme Court found Atty. Contado’s admission of living with Crisanta and having two
children with her as evidence of deceit and immorality.
o Instead of disputing Crisanta’s allegations, Atty. Contado affirmed them, indicating that he
abandoned his wife, family, and cohabited with another woman2.
In summary, the Court disbarred Atty. Allan C. Contado due to his extramarital affairs and violations of professional
conduct3. The case serves as a reminder of the ethical responsibilities lawyers bear in their personal lives and
professional practice.

Hosoya vs. Atty. ContadoABOUT THE CASE: This is a case of disbarment against Atty. Allan Contado filed by Crisanta
Hosaya, his mistress whom he had two children.

FACTS:
Crisanta Hosoya and Atty. Allan Contado met sometime in 2003. Atty. Contado claimed then that he was already
separated from his wife and their marriage was under annulment proceedings. In 2010, Hosoya agreed to live with
Contado. As they were living as husband and wife, they had two daughters. Their relationship did not last so Contado
left Hosoya and their children. Crisanta alleged thatContado failed to give support to their children and that her Ford
Expadition vehicle was in Contado’spossession. Contado admitted that he really told Hosoya that he was separated
with his wife when they met but denied the allegations that he failed to support his children showing proofs of his
remittances. He also admitted that the subject vehicle was with him but unable to return because the vehicle needs
major repair to be transported. The IBP investigated and recommended that he be disbarred for raising two children
out of wedlock and for failing to return the vehicle, violating the Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Allan Contado be disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR.

RULING:
Yes, the court en banc found Atty. Allan Contado guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 & 7.03 of the CPR
and ordered that his name be stricken from the Rolls of Attorneys. It is noted that: *Atty. Contado’s admission of living
with Hosaya whom he had 2 children is an effective admission that he is living a life of deceit and immorality. *Instead
of disputing Hosoya’s Allegations, he affirmed making it clear to the court that he abondoned his wife, family and
cohabit with another woman whom he had 2 children. *The SC also found Contado guilty of “dishonest and deceitful
conduct” for failing to return Hosoya’s vehicle, stressing that “prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the
duties of a lawyer.”*However, it took exception to the IBP’s recommendation that Contado be ordered to return the
vehicle to Hosoya, because the administrative case was “not the proper forum” for that.

A.C. No. 5581, decided on January 14, 2014, involves a Petition for Disbarment filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
Bansig against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera. The case centers around allegations of gross immoral
conduct by the respondent.
Here are the key details from the case:
1. Background:
o On May 8, 1997, the respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan) entered into a contract of
marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila.

20
 o Despite this existing marriage, the respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998, this
time with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
o Complainant Bansig emphasized that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid
and legally in existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba. The first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
2. Allegations:
o Respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba while his marriage with Bunagan was still
subsisting constitutes grossly immoral conduct and is unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
o The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by public officers in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents.
3. Court Proceedings:
o The Court required respondent to file a comment on the complaint, but he failed to do so.
o Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion, requesting that respondent’s failure to file a comment be
deemed a waiver.
o Respondent claimed he did not know the nature or cause of the administrative case against him.
o Ultimately, the Court found respondent’s actions to be grossly immoral and grounds for disbarment.
In summary, the case highlights the importance of upholding integrity and ethical conduct within the legal
profession. The respondent’s second marriage while the first one was still valid led to disciplinary action

CASE DIGEST: BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS CELERA

TOPICS:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

FACTS:
Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract of marriage.
However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage with a
certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage Bansig stressed
that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his
membership in the Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice

HELD:
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the Bar.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

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Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

A.C. No. 9608, decided on November 27, 2012, involves a complaint filed by Maria Victoria B. Ventura against Atty.
Danilo S. Samson for “grossly immoral conduct.” Here are the key details:
1. Background: Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura accused Atty. Danilo S. Samson of committing sexual
intercourse with her when she was only thirteen years old. The incident allegedly occurred in December
2001 and on March 19, 2002. At that time, Atty. Samson was 38 years old and married1.
2. Legal Proceedings:
o Complainant filed a Complaint for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.
o After a preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur dismissed
the charge of rape but found probable cause for the crime of qualified seduction.
o The charge of rape was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence1.
3. Conduct and Discipline:
o The Court emphasized that lawyers must uphold the standards and norms of the legal profession,
including morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
o Atty. Samson’s actions were deemed to constitute “grossly immoral conduct” under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides for a penalty of disbarment or suspension1.
In summary, A.C. No. 9608 highlights the importance of maintaining ethical standards within the legal professio

A.C. No. 9608. November 27, 2012 (Case Brief / Digest)

Feb 29, 2024
– Case Briefs

**Title:** Maria Victoria B. Ventura vs. Atty. Danilo S. Samson: A Disciplinary Action for Gross Immoral Conduct
**Facts:**

On July 29, 2004, Maria Victoria B. Ventura initiated a disbarment or suspension complaint against Atty. Danilo S.
Samson citing “grossly immoral conduct,” particularly alleging rape at two distinct instances while she was a minor.
This was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. The procedural journey
involved a preliminary investigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur which resulted in a
resolution for the crime of qualified seduction instead of rape due to insufficiency of evidence for the latter. Ventura’s
motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting an elevation of the matter to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which upheld the prosecutor’s resolution. Subsequently, Ventura desisted from pursuing both the criminal and
administrative cases, leading to the dismissal of the criminal case. However, the IBP, upon review, recommended
Samson’s suspension for one year, later revised by its Board of Governors to five years due to the gravity of Samson’s
acts. Both parties sought reconsideration of the IBP resolution.

**Issues:**

1. Does the conduct of Atty. Danilo S. Samson, engaging in sexual acts with a minor, constitute grossly immoral
conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility?
2. Is disbarment the appropriate sanction for Atty. Samson given the established facts?

**Court’s Decision:**

The Supreme Court found Atty. Samson’s conduct grossly immoral, flagrantly violative of the standards of morality
expected of the legal profession, and reflective of a disdain for the sanctity of marriage and the dignity of a human
person. The Court held that his actions not only breached professional ethics but also demonstrated a profound
disrespect for the law. Thus, considering the severity of the misconduct and its ramifications on the integrity of the
legal profession and the administration of justice, the Court deemed disbarment as the fitting penalty for Atty.
Samson.
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**Doctrine:**

The Supreme Court reiterates that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions aimed at ensuring
members adhere to the highest standards of morality, integrity, and professionalism. Grossly immoral conduct that
blatantly disregards these standards, especially involving minors and exploiting positions of trust, warrants severe
disciplinary actions including disbarment.

**Class Notes:**

– The Supreme Court’s disciplinary power over lawyers is not only a mechanism for punishment but also serves to
protect the public, preserve the judiciary’s integrity, and ensure the profession’s respectability.
– Immoral conduct definition: Willful, flagrant, or shameless acts showing moral indifference to the community’s
upright standards. Grossly immoral conduct is deeply reprehensible, criminal, or utterly contemptible in societal
standards.
– Disbarment proceedings are quasi-judicial and administrative in nature, aiming to cleanse the legal profession rather
than to award the complaint redress. Thus, even the complainant’s withdrawal does not obviate the proceedings.
– Essential Statutory Provision: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and pertinent provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, notably Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03.

**Historical Background:**

This case underscores the evolving standards of moral and professional accountability expected from members of the
legal profession in the Philippines. It highlights the judiciary’s increasingly stringent approach towards maintaining
ethical conduct among lawyers, reflecting broader societal expectations for moral integrity and professionalism within
the legal community. By reaffirming the conditions attached to the privilege of law practice, the decision serves as a
vital touchstone for ethical behavior expected from lawyers, not just in their professional duties but also in their
private lives.

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