00 Le Morvan (2019) Skepticism As Vice and Virtue

international journal for the study of skepticism
9 (2019) 238-260
brill.com/skep
Skepticism as Vice and Virtue

Pierre Le Morvan
The College of New Jersey
lemorvan@tcnj.edu
Abstract
I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of

the mean. On it, skepticism is vicious when deficient (as in gullibility) and when exces-
sive (as in closedmindedness). Virtuous skepticism lies as a mean between these two
extremes.
Keywords
skepticism – gullibility – closedmindedness – virtue – vice
1 Introduction
By documenting how a kind of vicious skepticism concerning the harmful

effects of pollutants and carcinogens has been deliberately fostered in fur-
therance of corporate interests, a number of noteworthy social scientists have
recently discussed skepticism’s salience to important matters of public inter-
est such as environmental pollution and degradation.1 As exemplified by the
epistemological literature, contemporary analytic epistemologists have, by
contrast, devoted scant attention to skepticism’s salience to such matters.2
Whatever may be its full explanation, I think this curious lack of attention is
1 See, for instance, Markowitz & Rosner (2003), Jacques (2009), and Oreskes and Conway
(2010).
2 See, for example, the DeRose & Warfield (1999), Greco (2011), and Machuca & Reed (2018) an-
thologies. These volumes do well in representing important work on skepticism in contem-
porary analytic epistemology. None of the fine essays in these volumes, however, addresses
skepticism’s relevance to important matters of public concern.
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Skepticism as Vice and Virtue 239
at least partially explainable in terms of the conceptual duopoly of two over-

arching conceptions of skepticism that have predominated in contemporary
epistemology (cf. Le Morvan 2011; forthcoming).
The first we may call the “Foil Conception.” On it, skepticism’s value—
inasmuch as it is deemed to have one at all—is taken to accrue exclusively
from its role as a foil illuminating by contrast putative requirements for knowl-
edge and justified belief.3 Skepticism is thereby treated not in terms of its
relevance to significant matters of public interest. It is treated rather as a more
or less theoretical problem to be solved, challenge to be met, threat to be par-
ried, or paradox to be imploded.4
The second and more recent conception arose in reaction to the perceived
failure or wrongheadedness of the Foil Conception. Like the latter, it does
not treat skepticism in terms of its relevance to important matters of public
interest; in fact, it tends to treat skepticism as not even very relevant to cen-
tral matters of epistemology itself when (on this view) the latter is properly
pursued naturalistically.5 We may call it the “Distraction Conception,” for on
it skepticism is generally treated as distracting from central epistemological
matters such as the nature of knowledge and justification. While it differs from
the Foil Conception in significant ways, the Distraction Conception also treats
skepticism in a way that renders it generally irrelevant to significant societal
concerns.
Given the dominance these two conceptions have exerted on theorizing
about skepticism in contemporary analytic epistemology, it is no wonder that
such theorizing seems so devoid of relevance to such concerns. I aim in this
article, however, neither to argue against these two conceptions, nor to dispute
that valuable theoretical work can and has been done by working under them.
I aim rather to loosen the grip of their conceptual duopoly by expanding the
3 As Pritchard (2005: 7) notes, “it is in response to the problem of scepticism that most of the
main currents of contemporary epistemology have been motivated.” And as Greco (2007:
2–3) argues: “skeptical arguments are useful and important because they drive progress in
philosophy…by highlighting plausible but mistaken assumptions about knowledge and evi-
dence, and by showing us that those assumptions have consequences that are unacceptable.”
4 As representative examples, skepticism is treated as a problem to be solved by DeRose (1999);
as a challenge to be met by Weintraub (1997); as a threat to be parried in BonJour (2009); and
as a paradox to be imploded in Wright (1991). I thank Aidan McGlynn for the reference to
Wright (1991).
5 Williams (1980: 272) encapsulates the spirit of this conception with his quip “that we get off
the treadmill by overcoming the philosophical obsession with skepticism.” Found primarily
in naturalized epistemology, this conception “simply bypasses skepticism when consistently
pursued” as David Macarthur (2006: 111) has put it.
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240 Le Morvan
set of options by which we conceptualize skepticism. In Le Morvan (2011), I did

some work in that vein by articulating what I called the “Health Approach to
Skepticism,” exploring when skepticism is healthy and when it is not; in so do-
ing, I briefly suggested how skepticism might be conceived of as an epistemic
vice and as an epistemic virtue. In the article before you, I expand on that idea.
Taking skepticism to be the attitude of withholding belief in some claim (or set
of claims), I articulate and defend a conceptual framework that treats skepti-
cism neither as a foil nor as a distraction, but rather as an epistemic vice and
virtue.6 I therefore call it the “Vice/Virtue Conception”—hereafter “the Con-
ception” for short.
I proceed as follows. I clarify some presuppositions central to the Con-
ception in Section 2, articulate it in Section 3, illustrate it with cases in Sec-
tion 4, give reasons for it in Section 5, defend it against some key objections in
Section 6, and conclude with some retrospective and prospective remarks in
Section 7.
2 Some Clarifications
In order to properly understand the Conception, the following seven clarifica-

tions merit attention.
First, vices and virtues will be understood here in broadly Aristotelian (or
neo-Aristotelian) terms to be traits of character manifested in habitual action.
Their differentia is that virtues promote the good, whereas vices undermine it.7
Second, whatever the good may be, I presume that our individual and col-
lective acquisition of important truths about ourselves and the world, and our
avoidance of important errors about them, are integral to it.8
6 See Le Morvan (forthcoming) for a further exploration of the Aristotelian and Pyrrhonian
roots of the conception defended in the present article.
7 Although inspired and influenced by Aristotle’s treatment of moral vices and virtues particu-
larly in Books i to vi of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Conception is mine as one will not find
such a treatment of skepticism in Aristotle’s works.
8 Granting this proviso, the Conception squares with a number of theories of the good. Apart
from the assumptions made here, I shall leave the broader topic of the nature of the good to
another occasion. Moreover, too large to fully address here is how exactly to differentiate be-
tween important and unimportant truths, and between important and unimportant errors.
I take it though that important truths and errors concern (say) the nature of who we are and
of the universe, whereas unimportant truths and errors concern (say) celebrity escapades
and other trivial matters.
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Third, given its connection with the acquisition of important truths and the
avoidance of important errors, skepticism will be understood as an epistemic
rather than as a moral virtue or vice.
Fourth, the Conception presupposes that truth is objective at least in the
minimal sense that simply believing something does not make it so, that some-
thing’s being true does not guarantee that we believe it, and that we are falli-
ble.9 Truth will be understood here in the basic Aristotelian sense that what we
believe (or say) is true if things are as we believe (or say) them to be, and false
if things are not as we believe (or say) them to be (see Metaphysics 1011b25).
Fifth, while skepticism, understood as the attitude of withholding belief in
some claim (or set of claims), can be construed globally (its scope extended to
all claims) or locally (its scope restricted to some subset of claims), I will only
be concerned with local forms of such skepticism.10
9 I recognize that this presupposition is not uncontroversial. For an excellent defense of the
objectivity of truth in the minimal sense presupposed here and why it matters, see Lynch
(2004).
10 I acknowledge that skepticism may take other forms. For instance, one standard way of
conceptualizing skepticism is to take it to involve the denial that some belief meets the
requirements for knowledge; another is to take it as denying that some belief meets the
requirements for being justified. Note that if one withholds from believing that p, then
one cannot know that p or be justified in believing that p insofar as believing that p is nec-
essary (but not sufficient) for both knowing that p and being justified in believing that p.
Thus skepticism understood as an attitude of withholding belief is more fundamental
than knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism (understood in the ways delin-
eated above) in the sense that it entails the latter two without being entailed by them.
Aidan McGlynn has posed to me the question whether skepticism, understood as the atti-
tude of withholding belief in some claim, is more fundamental than knowledge or justifi-
cation skepticism, given epistemic states that do not have belief as a necessary condition.
He gives as examples of such states: considering whether we can know or be in a position
to know that we’re not brains in vats, or considering if we have evidence that we are not
brains in vats (and likewise for other propositions). McGlynn adds: “None of these states
seems to require that one believe the proposition in question, but these are all familiar
skeptical questions about knowledge, evidence, and justification. Focusing on epistemic
states that require belief might be thought to miss the real epistemological issues around
skepticism, insofar as those issues arise just as much for epistemic states which don’t have
belief as a necessary condition.” In response, let me say first off that one important way
in which A can be more fundamental than B or C is if A entails B or C without A being
entailed by B or C. Skepticism understood as the attitude of withholding belief in some
claim is more fundamental in that sense than knowledge and justification skepticism if
knowledge and justification are understood as requiring belief. Second, McGlynn is right
that (i) the epistemic states he mentions, states that involve considering one’s epistemic
status with regard to a proposition, do not require belief, and (ii) skeptical issues can

242 Le Morvan
Sixth, I will presume that skepticism is a vice or virtue only in contexts

where it is possible to believe truths and falsehoods, and I shall only be con-
cerned with such contexts. Thus I will not be concerned with contexts (if any)
where only truths could be believed and where skepticism (were it applicable)
could only be vicious, nor with contexts (if any) where only falsehoods could
be believed and where skepticism (were it applicable) could only be virtuous.11
Seventh, the Conception does not aim to provide responses to timeworn
skeptical challenges to our knowledge of the external world, or of other minds,
or of what have you.12 The Conception openly presupposes that there is much
that we know and have good grounds for believing—for instance, that you are
reading this now, that carbon dioxide and methane are greenhouse gases, that
dioxin is carcinogenic, and so on. But unlike the Distraction Conception and
like the Foil Conception, the Conception does take skepticism to be a focus of
attention.
3 How to Conceive of Skepticism as a Vice and as a Virtue
How then does the Conception conceptualize (or reconceptualize) skepticism

as both a vice and virtue? It does so in a way akin to Aristotle’s treatment of
virtues (or excellences) as means between vices (or extremes) of excess and
deficiency.
Consider, for the sake of comparison, moral virtues such as courage and
temperance.13 Courage requires avoiding the extremes of cowardice (a defi-
ciency of courage) and foolhardiness (an excess of courage). Temperance or
self-control with respect to bodily pleasures requires avoiding the extremes
of self-indulgence (a deficiency of self-control) and insensibility (an excess of
self-control).14
Thinking in Aristotelian terms then of a virtue as a mean between vices
of deficiency and excess, virtuous skepticism involves avoiding the vice of
arise concerning such states. Howbeit, nothing in what I defend here is incompatible with
holding (i) and (ii).
11 For instance, in a context where only necessary truths could be believed, skepticism could
only be vicious, and in a context where only necessary falsehoods could be believed, skep-
ticism could only be virtuous.
12 The providing of such responses, inasmuch as they are needed, it leaves to the Foil
Conception.
13 See in particular Book iii of the Nicomachean Ethics.
14 Even if we suppose that not all virtues are means between vices of deficiency and excess,
we can still argue that some, such as courage and temperance, are.

excessive skepticism (an excess of belief-withholding as in closedmindedness)

and the vice of deficient skepticism (a deficiency of belief-withholding as in
gullibility). Similar to how modeling oneself on, and learning from, paradig-
matic examples of the courageous and temperate may be conducive to be-
coming courageous and temperate oneself, likewise modeling oneself on, and
learning from, paradigmatic examples of virtuous skeptics is conducive to be-
coming virtuously skeptical. Similar to how the guidance of parents, relatives,
friends, communities, and even one’s broader society may be conducive to the
inculcation and fostering of courage and temperance (and the avoidance of
their corresponding vices), so too may such guidance be to the inculcation and
fostering of virtuous skepticism (and the avoidance of its corresponding vices)
(cf. Le Morvan 2011).
Interestingly, virtuous skepticism involves striving to attain a mean be-
tween being too open to believing on the one hand and being too closed to
believing on the other, and striving to balance the desire for truth with the
aversion to falsehood. Believing everything (even if this were psychological-
ly possible, which is doubtful) would result in believing all truths but at the
high cost of also believing all falsehoods. Believing nothing (even if this
were psychologically possible, which is also doubtful) would result in believ-
ing no falsehoods but at the high cost of believing no truths (cf. Le Morvan
forthcoming).
4 Some Paradigmatic Examples of Vicious and Virtuous Skepticism
We have so far considered in general terms how skepticism may be understood

as a vice and a virtue. To deepen our exploration, we turn now to some specific
examples. We begin with what we may take to be some paradigmatic examples
of vicious skepticism.
4.1 Some Cases of Vicious Skepticism

As vices in general can result from excess or deficiency, so too can vicious skep-
ticism result from both excessive and deficient belief-withholding. We may call
the former “viciously excessive skepticism” and the latter “viciously deficient
skepticism.” We attend to cases of each kind below.
4.1.1 Some Cases of Viciously Excessive Skepticism

For the first two cases that follow, I will assume for the sake of argument that
the skeptic is at least sincere, however wrong and/or wrong-headed he may be.
For the last two cases, I will presume that the skeptic lacks such sincerity.

244 Le Morvan
David Irving’s Skepticism about the Holocaust. In the face of overwhelming

historical evidence to the contrary, the historian David Irving has repeatedly
evinced skepticism that the Holocaust ever occurred. He has attempted via
numerous publications and presentations to spread this skeptical attitude to
others, and to promote the idea that it is a myth that the Nazis systematically
murdered Jews (see Evans 2002). He has even gone so far as to write that it is
a hoax to think there were gas chambers at Auschwitz (Van Pelt 2002: 48) and
that those who claim to be Holocaust survivors have “manufactured” memo-
ries of their suffering because “there’s money involved and they can get a good
compensation cash payment out of it” (Evans 2002: 141).
Thabo Mbeki’s Skepticism about hiv and Antiretroviral Drugs. In 1999, Presi-
dent Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, under pressure to provide zidovudine (zdv
or azt) for the prevention of mother-to-child hiv transmission and for the
treatment of aids, announced that the drug was toxic and dangerous to health
and that his government was not going to provide it. In the face of widespread
evidence, he skeptically called into question whether hiv was the cause of
aids and the usefulness of antiretroviral drugs in fighting the aids epidemic
in South Africa. His government restricted the use of freely donated nevirapine
(an antiretroviral drug) and obstructed the acquisition of Global Fund grants
to fight the epidemic. As of 2005, an estimated 334,300 lives were lost as a
result.15
Despite obvious and significant differences in detail and scale in the two
cases above, notice how in each the skeptical attitude comes intertwined with
an agenda (whether conscious or unconscious) antithetical to genuine pur-
suit of the truth and the avoidance of error. This attitude in fact proves to be
an impediment to its pursuit. In such cases, the skeptic disregards or neglects
available evidence that might call into question views he antecedently holds.
A salient characteristic of such cases of viciously excessive skepticism is that
its withholding of belief comes untempered by a genuine desire to know the
truth and to avoid error when such knowledge may threaten antecedently held
views. Viciously excessive skepticism hinders the desire to know the truth and
to avoid error.16
In the cases given above, we have supposed for the sake of argument that
the skeptic is at least sincere (however wrong or wrong-headed). Consider,
however, the following cases:
15 See Chigwedere et al (2008). For a discussion of Mbeki’s motives, see Jones (2002),
Gumede (2005), Dugger (2008).
16 Closedmindedness on my view is a form of such skepticism.

“Manufactured Uncertainty” and “Manufactroversy.” David Michaels (2008a)

and Leah Ceccarelli (2011) respectively have coined these useful terms to re-
fer to the inculcation, fostering, and manipulation of skeptical attitudes to
promote corporate ends by the deliberate manufacture of controversy or un-
certainty in the general public. Take for instance the tobacco industry’s well-
documented use of the strategic plan developed by the mid-1950s by the public
relations firm Hill and Knowlton to create public uncertainty and controversy
about the carcinogenic and other adverse health effects of tobacco. This cam-
paign, imprudently encapsulated in the statement “Doubt is our product” in
a corporate memo, involves the inculcation, fostering, and manipulation in
the public of doubt concerning cause and effect relationships and of statisti-
cal data, the demand for more research no matter how much solid research
has been performed, and the claiming that regulations ought to wait (or be
minimized) until absolute certainty can be reached, an endpoint that science
cannot provide (see Michaels 2008b). This strategy of obfuscation through
manufactured skeptical doubt has been adopted by other industries including
the fossil fuels industry in the face of the accumulating evidence of anthropo-
genic global warming. Industries practicing this obfuscation often fund studies
attempting to controvert other studies calling into question industry practices,
while cloaking their agenda in the disinterested garb of “scientific debate.”17
Cheap Skepticism. Flewelling (1923) pointed how, by trotting out blanket skep-
tical generalizations under the guise of intellectual rigor, it is easy to play the
skeptic in order to appear intellectually sophisticated but without the hard
work involved with carefully understanding and reasoning against positions
one opposes. He derided such faux sophisticates as “loungers whose chief oc-
cupation is to lie in the easy chair of skepticism,” and caustically added:
Now for a man who desires to assume the importance of intellectual su-
periority without paying the price of intellectual superiority, skepticism
offers the easy way. Just why should one take courage of confessed igno-
rance and disbelief has been a conundrum to most of us. Men are ordi-
narily glad to be classed with the knowers and doers, and why any man
should erect his ignorance and laziness and boast of it, is surely past find-
ing out. There is nothing so cheap as skepticism. (Flewelling 1923: 226)
17 For numerous examples of manufactured skepticism, see Markowitz & Rosner (2003),
Jacques (2009), and Oreskes & Conway (2010).

246 Le Morvan
In cases of Manufactured Skepticism and Cheap Skepticism, those profess-

ing skepticism are not sincere, and may in fact even believe what they profess
to deny or reject. They may nonetheless by duplicity (or pretense or bad ex-
ample) induce others into viciously excessive skepticism.
4.1.2 Some Cases of Viciously Deficient Skepticism

We considered above cases involving viciously excessive skepticism, but can
there be cases of a viciously deficient skepticism? In a word: yes. Below we turn
to three such cases.
Madoff’s Credulous Regulators. In her account of how Bernie Madoff pulled
off one of the biggest Ponzi schemes in history, Rodriques (2012) notes how he
was able to deceive regulators with a fraudulent paper trail of “trades.” As she
put it: “This Potemkin village paper trail became so convincing that Madoff
was able to fool dozens of insufficiently skeptical regulators and inadequately
observant lawyers and accountants for years” (2012: 103). Regulators who ought
to have been more doubtful in reviewing Madoff’s activities displayed a vicious
deficiency of skepticism.
The Seduced Physics Professor. In his autobiographical (2014), Paul Howard
Frampton, a professor of physics, relates how he was manipulated by Argen-
tine criminals into smuggling drugs. Divorced for several years and seeking a
suitable companion by using an internet dating service, Frampton came to be-
lieve that he was communicating with a famous Italian model who had fallen
in love with him over the internet. Criminals posing as the model exploited
his deficiency of skepticism, and convinced him to go Argentina to meet her,
where she was nowhere to be found; nonetheless, he agreed to help “her”
smuggle narcotics into the usa where he was arrested for drug-smuggling. The
gullibility manifested by Frampton in this sordid case provides a cautionary
tale of viciously deficient skepticism.
Jill the Nigerian Phishing Scamee. Munir Kotadia18 relates the story of an
Australian named “Jill” who said that in September 2005 she was contacted by
someone pretending to be the Commissioner of Health in Nigeria, who (ap-
parently) was looking for Australian companies to renovate some hospitals in
Lagos. The deal carried a potential profit of $1 million. Since she already ran
a successful interior decorating business and felt savvy in her business deal-
ings, she saw this as a great opportunity. She was assured by the scammers
that she wouldn’t have to part with any money, and, after communicating with
them for a long time, she began to trust them and consider them to be friends.
18 “AusCERT 2013: Nigerian scam victim tells her story,” http://www.zdnet.com/article/

auscert-2013-nigerian-scam-victim-tells-her-story/.

The scammers ended up costing Jill her business and the scam led to her mar-
riage break-up in 2011 because she went public with her experience against
her husband’s wishes. Jill’s failure to doubt the trustworthiness of her Nigerian
contacts exemplified a viciously deficient skepticism.
Despite their differences in detail, the three cases above exemplify how a
deficiency of skepticism can be vicious and thereby impede the good of ac-
quiring important truths and of avoiding important errors.
Worth noting is that, while the cases we have considered above may offer
particularly glaring examples of vicious excesses and deficiencies of skepti-
cism, the manifestation of this attitude can be a matter of degree, with each
of us being more or less susceptible to some forms of it. Also worth noting is
that those who may manifest vicious excess of skepticism with regard to some
matters (e.g., the warming of the planet resulting from anthropogenic carbon)
may also manifest vicious deficiency of skepticism with regard to other mat-
ters (e.g., unsubstantiated claims that the Iraq of Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons in 2003) that appear to confirm their antecedently held views. Guard-
ing against the closedmindedness of viciously excessive skepticism is just as
important as guarding against the gullibility of viciously deficient skepticism.
4.2 Some Cases of Virtuous Skepticism

We considered above cases where skepticism is vicious by excess and by defi-
ciency. We turn now to three examples that, while differing in detail, exemplify
virtuous skepticism.
Galileo on Cosmology and Physics. Developing the first telescope in 1609
which allowed him to magnify objects nine times their size, Galileo saw what
he took to be mountains on the Moon rather than the smooth surface he ex-
pected on the basis of Aristotelian teaching. Turning his telescope to Jupiter,
he saw four moons in its orbit, and this probably appeared to him as a minia-
ture solar system (see Merrill 2010: 116). On the basis of such observations and
others, Galileo became skeptical of Aristotelian cosmology and physics despite
their widespread and long-held acceptance, and this skepticism spurred him
to develop a physics and cosmology more consonant with his observations. His
contributions to physics and cosmology provided an important basis on which
Kepler, Newton, and others subsequently built. Insofar as a deeper and richer
understanding of the physical world and cosmos is conducive to the good of
knowing important truths and avoiding important errors, Galileo’s skepticism
with regard to Aristotelian cosmology proved virtuous.
Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In group decision-making, the de-
sire for consensus, harmony, and the minimization of conflict can result in

248 Le Morvan
a failure to critically evaluate alternative ideas or viewpoints. Coining this

failure “groupthink,” Janis has illustrated its dangers with examples such as
how groupthink led to the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs Invasion (see Janis 1982).
As Janis points out however, President John F. Kennedy, learning the lessons
of this fiasco, sought to avoid the reoccurrence of such groupthink during the
Cuban Missile Crisis by using “vigilant appraisal,” a way of skeptically with-
holding assent on how to proceed until hearing informed dissenting opinions
suggesting alternatives.19 Insofar as avoiding the dangers of groupthink is con-
sequential in key executive decisions, Kennedy’s skepticism in the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis proved virtuous.
Anna Politkovskaya’s Reporting. Given its history of mendacity, the late Anna
Politkovskaya skeptically refused to believe the veracity of the Russian govern-
ment’s assurances that its forces had not committed war crimes in Chechnya,
and courageously and determinedly investigated reports of massacres and at-
tempted cover-ups until her untimely death.20 Inasmuch as discovering and
disseminating the truth about human rights abuses is conducive to the good of
knowing important truths and avoiding important errors, Politkovskaya exem-
plified virtuous skepticism.
Though these three examples differ in obvious and significant details, notice
how a pattern emerges from them: the skeptical attitude manifested in each
case is not intertwined with an agenda antithetical to the pursuit of truth in
question. On the contrary, this attitude serves as a spur, and not as an impedi-
ment, to further inquiry or investigation into the grounds for or against a claim.
A salient characteristic of virtuous skepticism is that its withholding of belief
in some claim comes tempered by a genuine desire to know the truth and an
aversion to falsehood. Insofar as Aristotle was right that all men (or persons
as we now know better to say) by nature desire to know, it is consonant with
the fulfillment of this desire and so promotes the good of knowing important
truths and avoiding important errors. Since virtuous skepticism is presumably
good for our well-being both individually and collectively, we ought to culti-
vate it in ourselves and in others.
19 This involved more than not rushing to judgment, or just waiting to be properly informed
before deciding what to do, but also actively and vigilantly withholding belief until dis-
senting opinions suggesting alternatives could be assessed.
20 On this matter, see her (2011). Her example also illustrates how courage and virtuous skep-
ticism can go hand in hand.

5 Some Grounds for Accepting the Conception
In the sections above, I have articulated and illustrated the Conception. I turn
now to arguing for it. My aim in doing so is not to argue against the Foil and
Distraction conceptions, but to give grounds for why the Conception also pro-
vides a valuable way of conceptualizing skepticism. Below I present four such
grounds.
5.1 Making Skepticism Relevant

Suppose (counterfactually) that ethical theorizing on (say) justice were domi-
nated by two conceptual frameworks, and on both justice had little to no rel-
evance to important matters of public interest. Even if these two conceptions
yielded important theoretical insights about justice, would it not be valuable
to also have a conceptual framework on which justice had such relevance? By
analogy, however valuable the theoretical insights afforded by the Foil and Dis-
traction Conceptions, is it not valuable to also have a conception—such as the
one articulated here—on which skepticism proves so relevant? Take for in-
stance the manipulation and manufacture of skeptical doubt in furtherance of
corporate ends that we noted at the outset of this article. The silence of episte-
mologists on this matter has been deafening.21 By articulating how skepticism
can be vicious and virtuous, the Conception reorients us away from thinking
of skepticism as either a problem or a distraction, and shows its relevance to
important matters of public concern. To the extent that we find such relevance
attractive, we have a ground for accepting the Conception.
5.2 Explanatory Usefulness

Another ground for accepting a conceptual framework is its usefulness in re-
vealing patterns that have explanatory value. With this in mind, consider how
the Conception allows us to discern interesting underlying patterns in how
people act. Cases as different as Irving’s skepticism concerning the Holocaust
and Mbeki’s skepticism concerning aids turn out to share a common under-
lying pattern, namely one of viciously excessive skepticism.22 Cases as differ-
ent as the Seduced Physics Professor, the Phishing Scamee, and Maddoff’s
Credulous Regulators also share a common underlying pattern, namely one of
21 While Cassam (2019) discusses what he calls “vices of the mind” using examples drawn
primarily from the world of politics, it is telling that he does not address how skepticism
can itself be such a vice.
22 “Cheap Skepticism” and “Manufactured Skepticism” while related to such cases are better
characterized as forms of pseudo-skepticism.

250 Le Morvan
viciously deficient skepticism or gullibility (where the latter is understood as a

vicious deficiency of skepticism). And cases as different as Galileo’s skepticism
concerning Aristotelian physics and cosmology, President Kennedy’s skepti-
cism concerning advisory consensus, and Politkovskaya’s skepticism concern-
ing the truthfulness of the Russian government’s claims about Chechnya also
share a common underlying pattern, namely one of skepticism grounded on
good reason and motivated by desire for truth and aversion to falsehood. Inso-
far as the identification of such patterns is of value in terms of applied episte-
mology, we have a ground for accepting the Conception.
5.3 Pedagogical Applications

That a conceptual framework has pedagogical applications is, all other things
considered, a ground in favor of accepting it. There is no doubt that, in the
teaching of epistemology, the Foil Conception has been highly useful in help-
ing students ponder and debate requirements for knowledge and justified
belief.23 But while these pedagogical applications are undoubtedly valuable,
less obvious is how (and even if) they pertain to important societal and public
concerns as opposed to theoretical ones of interest primarily to epistemolo-
gists. This is where the Conception comes into play. With its focus on how,
from an epistemological standpoint, we ought to be (e.g., virtuously skeptical)
and ought not to be (e.g., viciously skeptical), and act (e.g., virtuously skepti-
cally and not viciously skeptically), the Conception lends itself very naturally
to reflecting on cases and examples that concern “real life” in contrast with
the more theoretical and hypothetical concerns of interest primarily to episte-
mologists. The Conception thus bears the promise of pedagogical applications
that pertain to epistemic character and action, applications underemphasized
(or even neglected) by the Foil and Distraction Conceptions.
5.4 Fruitfulness
Kuhn (1962) noted that scientific paradigms invariably require articulation and
thereby provide those working within the conceptual framework valuable av-
enues of further research. A similar point applies to conceptual frameworks
in epistemology.24 Articulating the Foil and Distraction Conceptions has un-
doubtedly opened up important avenues of epistemological research into the
nature of knowledge and justification. Worth noting, however, is that the Con-
ception also opens up valuable, if different, avenues of research. Here are two
23 The pedagogical applications of the Distraction Conception are less obvious.

24 This point is broadly applicable even if we do not regard epistemology as having attained
scientific status.

(of many) examples of such avenues: (i) Even if virtuous skepticism involves
tempering the desire for truth with the aversion to falsehood, are all errors
equally worthy of being avoided? Given constraints on our time and resources,
consider errors that might not be epistemically costly to maintain or those that
would be epistemically costly to avoid. Given such cases, further articulation of
the errors virtuous skeptics strive to avoid (and of the errors to which vicious
skeptics succumb) is worth pursuing. (ii) Insofar as virtuous skeptics ground
their withholding of belief on good reasons, do alternative accounts of justifi-
cation yield different accounts of when skepticism is virtuous and when it is
vicious? I raise such questions not to answer them here, but as an indication of
the Conception’s fruitfulness in terms of interesting areas of further research
to which it lends itself.
6 Some Objections and Replies
Above, I have articulated, illustrated, and argued for the Conception as an

overarching conception of skepticism. In making the case for it, however, some
important objections merit attention. I consider nine such objections below.
6.1 Objection
The Conception proves deeply unsatisfying as a conception of skepticism in
simply assuming or taking for granted that we can know various truths about
the existence of other minds, of an external world, etc. But this is exactly what
skepticism has always called into question!
Reply. Yes, the Conception does assume that we can know such truths, and
it does not provide an answer to perennial skeptical challenges to whether we
can know of the existence of other minds, or of a world external to our mind,
whether we can have knowledge at all, and the like. Consider, however, Wolt-
erstorff’s important distinction between analytic and regulative epistemology:
the former aims to produce an account or theory of knowledge, justification,
rationality, and so on, and offers definitions or analyses of these terms or con-
cepts; the latter, by contrast, aims to offer guidance for epistemic practice, and
thus emphasizes the practical and social as opposed to theoretical challenges
of interest primarily to epistemologists.25 The objection assumes that the only
fruitful conception framework for skepticism is analytic (as exemplified by the
Foil Conception), and fails to consider the possible fruitfulness of a regulative
conceptual framework.
25 See Wolterstorff (1996: xvi). See also Roberts & Woods (2009).

252 Le Morvan
The Conception is clearly a regulative rather than an analytic account in

its emphasis on practical guidance in contrast to the more abstruse theoreti-
cal concerns that have so preoccupied epistemologists—and often only them.
Yes, on the Conception, we assume knowledge about the existence of other
minds, of an external world, and so on, but any position has to start some-
where. The Conception provides a way of conceptualizing skepticism so that
our reflections on it as philosophers can once more be relevant to real life so-
cial concerns. Also worth remembering is we face no forced choice between
the Conception on the one hand and the Foil and Distraction Conceptions on
the other. I do not deny that valuable work can be done using the Foil and
Distraction Conceptions; what I am arguing for, however, is that valuable work
can also be done using the Conception.
6.2 Objection
In criticizing the Foil and Distraction Conceptions, are you not equivocating
between local and global forms of skepticism? Williams (1980), for instance,
regards global skepticism as a distraction, but not necessarily the local forms
you are interested in.26
Reply. My response is three-fold.
First, as I noted earlier, I am not criticizing (at least in the sense of argu-
ing for rejecting) either the Foil or Distraction Conceptions, nor do I dispute
that valuable work can be done using them. I do think it undeniable, however,
that work heretofore done by epistemologists using these conceptions has
been concerned with theoretical concerns of interest primarily to epistemolo-
gists, and not with skepticism’s salience to important matters of public interest
(such as environmental pollution or global warming, for instance).
Second, it is certainly true that global and local forms of skepticism may be
distinguished. In arguing that skepticism in some contexts is vicious and in
other contexts virtuous, I am not arguing for a global form of skepticism nor
equivocating between local and global forms of skepticism, but arguing rather
that skepticism can sometimes be virtuous and sometimes vicious.
Third, on my reading, Williams (1980) regards not just global skepticism as
a distraction, but also traditional forms of local skepticism (e.g., skepticism
about other minds, about a mind-independent world, etc.) as being distrac-
tions as well. Yes, he does not necessarily regard the local forms of skepticism
I am interested in as a distraction, but this is because they are not even on his
“radar screen” if you will; Williams proves far from exceptional in this regard.
26 This objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

6.3 Objection
You characterize Irving’s attitude concerning the Holocaust and Mbeki’s
attitude concerning hiv and antiretroviral drugs as skeptical. But are these re-
ally skeptical attitudes at all given that they seem purely agenda-driven? It’s
doubtful these people believe their own propaganda. If Mbeki had aids, for
instance, would he not want to receive antiretroviral drugs himself? So do
these cases really say something about skepticism or only about corruption
and self-interest?27
Reply. Remember that I am assuming for the sake of argument that Irving
and Mbeki are sincere and genuinely have skeptical attitudes. If they are sin-
cere, both exemplify viciously excessive skepticism. Certainly, both Irving and
Mbeki have repeatedly evinced considerable doubt about the Holocaust and
hiv causing aids respectively. As to whether they really are skeptical as op-
posed to purely agenda-driven, this is difficult for any of us to know for sure. It
is true that being purely agenda-driven (where the agenda is other than seek-
ing the truth and avoiding error) would indeed seem to be incompatible with
a genuine skepticism, a point I illustrated with the Manufactured Skepticism
and Cheap Skepticism examples I provided earlier. Given, however, the litera-
ture on what is known as “motivated skepticism,” it seems pretty clear that
we humans (including Irving and Mbeki) can be both skeptical and at least
partially motivated by non-epistemic agendas.28
6.4 Objection
Coady and Corry (2013) argue that when the term “skepticism” is used to des-
ignate an epistemically virtuous attitude, what is often meant is something
akin to evidentialism, namely that one should believe something only with
adequate evidence. But there is nothing really skeptical about such evidential-
ism. Moreover, it’s dangerous to use “skepticism” for such a reasonable episte-
mological view because it allows climate change denialists to coopt the term
and create disastrous confusion in the climate change debate. While you do
not offer a conception of skepticism on which it is just a form of evidentialism,
are you not courting confusion when using “skepticism” to designate an epis-
temically virtuous attitude?29
Reply. While Coady and Corry make an important point about how “skepti-
cism” has been misused by climate change denialists, I think their worry ac-
tually bolsters rather than detracts from my case. Consider that I do not use
27 This objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

28 See, for instance, Ditto and Lopez (1992), Taber and Lodge (2006), and Friedman (2012).
29 I owe this objection to Aidan McGlynn.

254 Le Morvan
“skepticism” to designate only an epistemically virtuous attitude; I have argued

rather that skepticism can be virtuous but also vicious. Emphasizing how skep-
ticism can be epistemically vicious and how climate change denialism can
serve as a paradigmatic example of such viciousness helps undermine the very
kind of cooptation that concerns Coady and Corry. Furthermore, just because
a term has been misused does not mean it cannot be reclaimed; my project
here can be seen as part of such reclamation.
6.5 Objection
Suppose we accept your examples of virtuous and vicious skepticism. How do
they give us any guidance about hard cases? Take, for instance, parents who re-
fuse to have their children vaccinated for fear that vaccinations cause autism.
Is their skepticism vicious or virtuous? Or take not cranks but those who think
that there are legitimate grounds for doubting that anthropogenic greenhouse
gases are the key cause of global warming. Is their skepticism vicious or virtu-
ous? In general, the Conception fails to give us guidance.
Reply. As a point of comparison, consider the Aristotelian account of cour-
age. We can point to reasonably clear cases of courage, but there will also be
grey cases that are much less clear. Similarly, while there may be reasonably
clear cases of virtuous and vicious skepticism, so too there will be grey cases
that are much less clear. In matters of virtue and vice, we are wise to follow
Aristotle’s counsel to not seek more precision on such matters than there is
to be had.30 Howbeit, in considering clear cases, we can derive some general
principles to offer us guidance in less clear cases. While we must be careful not
to overgeneralize about all cases of parents refusing to vaccinate their children
or about all cases of skepticism concerning anthropogenic sources of global
warming, we can seek to determine in considering such cases whether the
skeptics in question really desire to know the truth and to avoid error and base
their withholding of belief on good grounds or whether they have an agenda
antithetical to these desires. Whether the skepticism is virtuous or vicious may
vary depending on the context in question, just as whether someone is coura-
geous can depend on the context.31
30 As Aristotle noted in Nicomachean Ethics 1094b13: “Our discussion will be adequate if it

has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for
alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.”
31 I understand the context here as including what the facts turn out to be. As Genia Schön-
baumsfeld has noted to me: “If what you were sceptical about turns out to be false, then
the scepticism was virtuous (if based on good grounds).”

6.6 Objection
The Conception does not turn, so you claim, on any particular account of
knowledge or justification and is in principle compatible with a variety of al-
ternative accounts thereof. You offer no new or distinctive account of knowl-
edge or of justification. Contemporary epistemology, however, abounds in
competing and incompatible accounts of knowledge and justification. Take
the debates between Internalists and Externalists, between Foundationalists
and Coherentists, and so on. Unlike what you have done here, do you not, in
defending the Conception, need to take a stand on what is the right or correct
conceptual framework for knowledge and justification?
Reply. Remember that this conceptual framework is regulative and not ana-
lytic and so it does not aim to give us an analysis of knowledge or justifica-
tion, nor does it aim to determine which is the right or correct account thereof.
Whatever knowledge or justification are, the Conception takes the genuine
pursuit of knowledge of important truths and the avoidance of important er-
rors to be central to virtuous skepticism. If it turns out that the right or correct
account of knowledge is (say) externalist or foundationalist or what have you,
then so be it. As a point of comparison, consider how an account of temper-
ance as a virtue is in principle compatible with a variety of different accounts
of the nature of pleasure; similarly our account of skepticism as a virtue is
compatible in principle with a variety of different accounts of the nature of
knowledge or justification.
6.7 Objection
Is the thesis you have argued for really a substantive one? Who, after all, would
disagree with virtuous skepticism or agree with vicious skepticism?
Reply. While I do not think that what I have argued for is obvious and non-
substantive to everyone, for the sake of argument suppose it is to you. Even
so, it would still have value in bringing attention to what should be obvious.
Take, for instance, what should be the pressing social concern of global warm-
ing (and other grave environmental problems). It is very telling that the most
substantive discussions of how skepticism about environmental matters is
being manipulated to promote corporate ends has not come from epistemol-
ogists but from social scientists and others. As we noted earlier, the silence
of epistemologists has been rather deafening. Is it not time for a philosophi-
cal approach to skepticism that yields applications to pressing matters of
public interest? If the thesis I have argued for here is so obvious, perhaps it is
time for epistemologists to spend much more time and effort precisely on the
obvious.

256 Le Morvan
6.8 Objection
On the Conception, virtuous skepticism requires withholding belief in some
claim (or set of claims). But does not this view presuppose voluntary control
over withholding from belief, and is it not psychologically implausible to think
we have such control?
Reply. To be sure, it is psychologically implausible to suppose that we exert
direct voluntary control over withholding from belief in the sense that we can
immediately refrain from belief by an act of will. But nothing in the view de-
fended here requires such direct voluntary control. All it requires is the much
more psychologically plausible notion that we have at least indirect voluntary
control over withholding from belief over time. Suppose for instance that
I come to learn that I have a tendency to jump to conclusions on the basis of
hasty generalizations. Even if I might not be able, by an act of will, to overcome
this tendency immediately, I can still, over time, deliberately take steps to miti-
gate this tendency and to reason and form beliefs more carefully. Similarly, if
I find that I have a tendency toward viciously deficient or excessive skepticism,
then, although I might not be able to overcome this tendency immediately,
there are still steps I can deliberately take to strive over time toward the mean
of virtuous skepticism. I can do so for instance by striving to base my with-
holding of belief on good grounds and by balancing the desire for truth with
the aversion to falsehood. Thus, while the objection rightfully rejects the idea
that we have direct voluntary control over withholding from belief, the view
defended here is compatible with this rejection.
6.9 Objection
You characterize skepticism as both an epistemic vice and virtue, and yet com-
pare it to moral virtues such as courage and temperance. Notice however a
telling difference between them: courage and temperance are not both vices
and virtues, they are only virtues.32
Reply. If the objector presupposes a thesis to the effect that if x is a virtue,
then x can never be a vice, it should be noted that this presupposition begs
the question against the account defended here. For the sake of argument,
however, suppose that courage and temperance cannot be both vices and vir-
tues, but only virtues. In other words, suppose that courage and temperance
are what we may call invariant virtues: character traits that are always virtuous
and never vicious. Since I have argued that skepticism can be virtuous and also
32 A version of this objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

vicious, skepticism so understood cannot be an invariant virtue like courage

and temperance so conceived.
This prompts the question: Are all virtues invariant virtues? I think not.
Consider a character trait such as curiosity. In many, perhaps most, circum-
stances it is virtuous; but it can also be vicious when excessive (as in nosiness
or snoopiness) and when deficient (as in intellectual apathy or listlessness).
Curiosity can usefully be seen as what we may call a variant virtue: a charac-
ter trait that is sometimes virtuous and sometimes vicious depending on the
relevant circumstances. Practical wisdom when it comes to virtuous curiosity
involves navigating between the vices of excessive and deficient curiosity; this
is akin to how practical wisdom when it comes to virtuous skepticism involves
navigating between the vices of excessive and deficient skepticism.
Notice moreover that invariant and variant virtues have in common that
both are means between vices of excess and deficiency. Accordingly, even if we
suppose that courage and temperance are invariant virtues, they can still serve
as helpful (even if partial) analogues for helping us understand how skepti-
cism is virtuous when a mean between vices of deficiency and excess.
7 Conclusion
My aim in this article has been to show how skepticism, when conceived of as
an epistemic vice and virtue, proves relevant to important matters of public in-
terest. In so arguing, I have endeavored to loosen the grip of a “conceptual duo-
poly” that has predominated in contemporary epistemology whereby only two
alternative conceptions of skepticism are considered: one according to which
skepticism is a problem to be solved (or challenge to be met, or threat to be
parried), and the other according to which it is a distraction to be avoided. The
Conception treats it as neither, but rather as virtuous when conducive to the
good of knowing important truths about ourselves and the world, and avoiding
important errors concerning them; otherwise, skepticism is vicious as in the
deficient or excessive withholding of belief.
Skepticism, George Santayana (1955: 69) once sagely said, “is a discipline
fit to purify the mind of prejudice and render it all the more apt, when the
time comes, to believe and to act wisely.” Believing and acting wisely surely
matter. For those willing to adopt it, the Conception provides some guidance
thereon.
To be sure, I have offered here but a sketch of the Conception. I invite
others to articulate it further. In doing so, we return to the ancient Pyrrhonian

258 Le Morvan
insight that skepticism is a practice integral to living a good life.33 Even if

Pyrrhonians went much too far in rejecting all belief, this insight of theirs
deserves preserving.34
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international journal for the study of skepticism

Skepticism as Vice and Virtue

I articulate and defend a conception of skepticism inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of

skepticism – gullibility – closedmindedness – virtue – vice

By documenting how a kind of vicious skepticism concerning the harmful

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 Downloaded

at least partially explainable in terms of the conceptual duopoly of two over-

international journal for the Downloaded

set of options by which we conceptualize skepticism. In Le Morvan (2011), I did

In order to properly understand the Conception, the following seven clarifica-

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

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Sixth, I will presume that skepticism is a vice or virtue only in contexts

3 How to Conceive of Skepticism as a Vice and as a Virtue

How then does the Conception conceptualize (or reconceptualize) skepticism

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

excessive skepticism (an excess of belief-withholding as in closedmindedness)

4 Some Paradigmatic Examples of Vicious and Virtuous Skepticism

We have so far considered in general terms how skepticism may be understood

4.1 Some Cases of Vicious Skepticism

4.1.1 Some Cases of Viciously Excessive Skepticism

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David Irving’s Skepticism about the Holocaust. In the face of overwhelming

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

“Manufactured Uncertainty” and “Manufactroversy.” David Michaels (2008a)

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In cases of Manufactured Skepticism and Cheap Skepticism, those profess-

4.1.2 Some Cases of Viciously Deficient Skepticism

18 “AusCERT 2013: Nigerian scam victim tells her story,” http://www.zdnet.com/article/

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

4.2 Some Cases of Virtuous Skepticism

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a failure to critically evaluate alternative ideas or viewpoints. Coining this

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

5 Some Grounds for Accepting the Conception

5.1 Making Skepticism Relevant

5.2 Explanatory Usefulness

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viciously deficient skepticism or gullibility (where the latter is understood as a

5.3 Pedagogical Applications

23 The pedagogical applications of the Distraction Conception are less obvious.

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

6 Some Objections and Replies

Above, I have articulated, illustrated, and argued for the Conception as an

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The Conception is clearly a regulative rather than an analytic account in

26 This objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

27 This objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

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“skepticism” to designate only an epistemically virtuous attitude; I have argued

30 As Aristotle noted in Nicomachean Ethics 1094b13: “Our discussion will be adequate if it

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

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32 A version of this objection was suggested to me by Genia Schönbaumsfeld.

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

vicious, skepticism so understood cannot be an invariant virtue like courage

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insight that skepticism is a practice integral to living a good life.33 Even if

33 See Le Morvan (forthcoming) for an exploration of this theme.

international journal for the study of skepticism 9 (2019) 238-260

Friedman, J. 2012. “Motivated Skepticism or Inevitable Conviction? Dogmatism and

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