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Trenton Merricks - Self and Identity-Oxford University Press (2022)
Trenton Merricks - Self and Identity-Oxford University Press (2022)
Trenton Merricks - Self and Identity-Oxford University Press (2022)
TRENTON MERRICKS
CLARENDON PRESS • OX FO RD
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3
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DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.001.0001
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For Laura
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Contents
Introduction 1
1. What Matters in Survival 7
I. Appropriate First-Personal Anticipation and Appropriate
Future-Directed Self-Interested Concern 7
II. My Answer to the What Question 14
III. Consciousness and Survival 20
IV. What Matters to You with Regard to the Future 23
V. Conclusion 28
2. On the Sufficiency of Personal Identity 29
I. My Answer to the Why Question 31
II. More on the Metaphysics of Persistence 35
III. Not the Criterion of Personal Identity over Time 46
IV. An Unanswered Question 54
V. Conclusion 55
3. On the Necessity of Personal Identity 57
I. An Argument for the Necessity of Personal Identity 57
II. Parfit’s Argument against the Necessity of Personal Identity 65
III. Parfit’s Argument, Stage Theory, and Perdurance 71
IV. Parfit’s Argument and Endurance 75
V. Psychological Connectedness and Psychological Continuity 83
VI. Conclusion 85
4. The Same Self 87
I. Three Selfers 87
II. First-Personal Access to a Point of View 94
III. The Same Self and Numerical Identity 101
IV. Growing Up 103
V. Other Transformations 107
VI. Conclusion 111
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viii Contents
5. The Same Self-Narrative 113
I. The Self-Narrative Account 113
II. The Same Self-Narrative and the Same Self 118
III. The Same Self-Narrative and Numerical Identity 120
IV. Growing Up Redux 121
V. Other Changes in Self-Narrative 126
VI. Other Work for Self-Narrative and the Same Self 128
VII. Conclusion 131
6. Agential Continuity and Narrative Continuity 133
I. The Agential Continuity Account 133
II. The Narrative Continuity Account 139
III. Agential Continuity, Narrative Continuity, and Numerical
Identity 142
IV. Some Significant Transformations 145
V. Other Work for Agential Continuity and Narrative
Continuity 150
VI. More on Psychological Connectedness and Psychological
Continuity 151
VII. Conclusion 155
7. The Hope of Glory 157
I. The Hope of Survival 157
II. The Hope of Transformation 160
III. The Hope and Psychological Continuity 163
IV. Survival Does Not Come in Degrees 164
V. The Tedium Objection 167
VI. The Irrationality Objection 171
VII. Conclusion 174
References 177
Index 183
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Acknowledgments
Introduction
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0001
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2 Introduction
Introduction 3
4 Introduction
Introduction 5
young. All this gives us one reason (among others) to reject the
answers to the Why Question considered in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 6 considers an answer to the Why Question that—like the
answer considered in Chapter 5—is in terms of narrative. But unlike
the answer considered in Chapter 5, the answer considered in
Chapter 6 is in terms of narrative continuity, as opposed to narrative
connectedness. In particular, this answer is in terms of overlapping
local narratives, where a ‘local narrative’ is a narrative that characterizes
a single action. Another answer to the Why Question considered in
Chapter 6 is in terms of agential continuity. Agential continuity is
constituted by overlapping instances of ‘agential connectedness’, that
is, overlapping instances of a person’s choosing to act that results in
that person’s having various psychological states.
The answers to the Why Question considered in Chapter 6 have an
advantage over the answers to the Why Question considered in
Chapters 4 and 5. The answers to the Why Question considered in
Chapter 6 are consistent with a person at a future time having (at that
time) what matters in survival for you even if the way you are now is
not at all psychologically like the way that person will be at that time.
So these answers can accommodate transformations being good for
you, at least if those transformations are gradual enough to preserve
agential and narrative continuity.
But we should still reject the answers to the Why Question con-
sidered in Chapter 6. One reason (among others) for rejecting those
answers begins by supposing that you will become an evil person, but
not as a result of your own actions. That is, you will be turned into an
evil person. This would be bad for you. And I argue that this would be
bad for you in a way other than the way that ceasing to exist would
be bad for you. But we shall see that the answers considered in
Chapter 6 imply that this would be bad for you only in the way that
ceasing to exist would be bad for you.
Chapter 6 concludes by showing how the problems with the specific
answers to the Why Question considered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6
should lead us to deny that every good answer to the Why Question
must be in terms of psychological connectedness or psychological
continuity. So the point of Chapters 4–6 is not merely to oppose a
handful of answers to the Why Question that are not consistent with
my answer, which is in terms of numerical identity. Rather, the point
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6 Introduction
1
What Matters in Survival
Consider:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
I begin this chapter by clarifying the ideas that are invoked in my
answer to the What Question. Then I motivate my answer, which is:
its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate the experi-
ences that that person will have at that future time; and if that person
will have good (or bad) experiences at that future time, its being
appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested concern
with regard to those experiences. This chapter also distinguishes the
What Question from other questions with which it might be
conflated.
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0002
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1
The way that Leibniz presents the king of China thought experiment makes it
clear that he rejects a memory criterion of personal identity over time. Moreover,
Leibniz says: ‘So it is not memory that makes the same man’ and ‘ . . . there is a
perfect bond between the future and the past, which is what creates the identity of
the individual. Memory is not necessary for this, however . . . ’ (New Essays on
Human Understanding, Bk II, 115 [1996]).
Here is one argument that Leibniz gives against the memory criterion. There is a
possible situation in which you have a psychological duplicate on another planet.
The memory criterion implies that, in this situation, that extraterrestrial duplicate
is identical with your earlier self. You are identical with your earlier self. So—given
the memory criterion—you are now thereby identical with your extraterrestrial
duplicate. But Leibniz says: ‘that would be a manifest absurdity’ (New Essays on
Human Understanding, Bk II, 245 [1996]).
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experience’s being good (or bad) for you, but also your believing that
that experience will be good (or bad) for you; its being the case that, for
all you know, that experience might (or might not) be good (or bad)
for you; its being the case that you prefer to have (or prefer not to have)
that experience, regardless of whether it will be good (or bad) for you;
and so on. This better account would still imply the above point that
first-personal anticipation is not exactly the same as future-directed
self-interested concern. And that is the main point here. That point is
consistent with my keeping things simple by oversimplifying. So
I shall keep saying that future-directed self-interested concern involves
experiences that will be good (or bad) for you.
First-personal anticipation is not exactly the same as future-directed
self-interested concern. But they are closely related. Having future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to an experience implies
first-personally anticipating that experience. And first personally
anticipating a good (or bad) experience implies having future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to that experience. (Perhaps first-
personal anticipation is a component of future-directed self-interested
concern.)
Many contemporary philosophers are interested in appropriate first-
personal anticipation or in appropriate future-directed self-interested
concern. For example:
David Velleman: ‘What we most want to know about our survival, I believe, is
how much of the future we are in a position to anticipate experiencing.’
(1996, 67)
Marya Schechtman: ‘survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern,
and compensation . . . are indeed linked to facts about personal identity, but
identity in the sense of the characterization question, not the reidentification
question.’ (1996, 2)
Eric Olson: ‘Ultimately it is for ethicists to tell us when prudential concern is
rational, when someone can be held accountable for which past actions, and
who deserves to be treated as whom.’ (1997, 70)
Jennifer Whiting: ‘My general view is that the numerical identity of our
present and future selves . . . is irrelevant to the justification of concern for
our future selves.’ (1986, 548)
Whiting elsewhere talks about ‘the rationality of concern for oneself ’
(1991, 3) and ‘the rationality of prudence’ (1991, 3). And Jeff
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2
Psychological connectedness is constituted by, among other things, remem-
bering an experience or being psychologically alike in some way. Psychological
continuity is constituted by a chain of overlapping instances of psychological
connectedness.
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Prize in Philosophy. She knows that she has won, and she knows that
she is slated to receive the Prize next week at a ceremony in Sweden.
Jones is right now first-personally anticipating—and extending future-
directed self-interested concern to—receiving the Prize next week.
Brown has not won, and is not slated to receive, the Nobel Prize
in philosophy. Nor has Brown encountered (misleading) evidence that
he has won the Prize. Brown has no reason at all to believe that he
will receive the Prize. Brown is not even a philosopher! But Brown, no
less than Jones, is right now first-personally anticipating—and extend-
ing future-directed self-interested concern to—receiving the Prize
next week.3
Let us agree that it is not ‘evidentially appropriate’ for the non-
philosopher Brown to first-personally anticipate, or have future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to, receiving the Nobel
Prize in Philosophy next week. For this to become evidentially appro-
priate, Brown would need some evidence. But evidence of what?
I think that Brown needs evidence that (someone identical with)
Brown will receive the Prize. But Leibniz would disagree with me.
Leibniz might say, instead, that Brown needs evidence that Brown will
have memories of his current life when he receives the Prize.
Velleman, Schechtman, and Whiting would also disagree with
me. They might say, instead, that Brown needs evidence that he will
be relevantly psychologically connected to the Prize recipient.
But there is something we can all agree on. We can all agree that
Brown needs evidence that he will be related to the Prize recipient in
whatever way makes it appropriate—in the non-evidential way at issue
in this section—for him to first-personally anticipate, and have future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to, receiving the Prize.
So the evidential sort of appropriateness pertaining to first-personal
anticipation and future-directed self-interested concern must be
3
Brown can first-personally anticipate receiving the Prize even though he will
not receive the Prize. For it is not a conceptual truth that one first-personally
anticipates experience E only if one will have experience E. To see this, consider
that Jones’s thus anticipating does not guarantee that she will not die tomorrow in a
tragic accident, and so fail to receive the Prize next week. A parallel point holds for
having future-directed self-interested concern.
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4
Of course, it is not now evidentially or otherwise epistemically appropriate for
Jones to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to receiving the
Prize. (The phone has not yet rung.) But the sense of ‘appropriate’ relevant to
answering the What Question is not epistemic. See §I.
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receiving the Prize next week will be a good thing for Jones, that is, for
the Jones of right now.
Again, receiving the Prize next week will be a good thing for
Jones, that is, for the Jones of right now. This suggests an alternative
answer to:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
The alternative answer: that person’s experiences at that future time
will be good (or bad) for you, that is, for the you of right now.
The alternative answer to the What Question is closely related to
my answer. For suppose that a person’s future experiences will be good
(or bad) for the you of right now. Then it is now appropriate for you to
have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to those
experiences. So it is now appropriate for you to first-personally antic-
ipate those experiences. All this brings us back to my answer to the
What Question.
Conversely, my answer to the What Question can lead us right to
the alternative answer, at least when good (or bad) experiences are
involved. For suppose that it is now appropriate for you to first-
personally anticipate the experiences that a person will have at a future
time. Add that those experiences will be good (or bad). Then it is now
appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested concern
with regard to those experiences. So it must be that those experiences
will be good (or bad) for you, that is, for the you of right now. This is
the alternative answer to the What Question.
We have just seen that my answer to the What Question is closely
related to the alternative answer. As a result of how they are related,
you can agree with the most important arguments and conclusions in
this book even if you accept the alternative answer to the What
Question in place of my answer. This should be clear in what follows,
especially because I shall often return to the point that a future
(conscious) person’s good (or bad) experiences will be good (or bad)
for you just in case that person will have what matters in survival for
you. Nevertheless, there are three reasons that I prefer my answer to
the alternative answer.
The first reason is that I think that my answer is more standard
than the alternative answer. For many philosophers take appropriate
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5
For instance, Derek Parfit (1971, 20; 1984, 262) sometimes seems to answer
both (what I call) the What Question and (what I call) the Why Question in terms
of psychological connectedness and/or continuity. This is discussed in Ch. 3 (§II).
As we shall see below (§IV), Parfit sometimes seems to answer the What Question
in a couple of other ways as well.
6
I share this belief. But there is evidence that those in a persistent vegetative
state have conscious experiences (see Cryanoski (2012)).
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7
I reject the second thesis, denying that there are any corpses (as opposed to xs
arranged corpsewise; see Merricks, 2001a, 53).
8
This supposition is controversial. See Windt, Nielsen, and Thompson (2016).
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Return to:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
And recall my answer: its being appropriate for you to first-personally
anticipate the experiences that that person will have at that future time;
and if that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that future
time, its being appropriate for you to have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to those experiences.
I intend the experiences invoked in my answer to the What
Question to be conscious experiences. So take those experiences to
be conscious experiences. Then my answer has the result that a person
at a future time will have, at that time, what matters in survival for you
only if that person will be conscious at that time. As I have argued in
this section, I think that this is the right result.
Recall:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
I shall argue in Chapter 2 that being numerically identical with is a
good answer to the Why Question. And I shall sometimes summarize
the view that numerical identity is a good answer to the Why Question
with the following slogan: identity delivers survival. A less pithy but
more accurate slogan would be: identity with a conscious person
delivers survival.
Pretend that something bad will happen to you while you are
permanently unconscious and comatose. Then I think that it is appro-
priate for you to have self-interested concern with regard to that bad
happening. I say that what makes this appropriate is your being
numerically identical with that comatose person. So I am not claiming
that a future person’s being conscious is necessary for it to be appro-
priate for you to have self-interested concern with regard to what that
person will go through. Instead, I am claiming that a future person’s
being conscious is necessary for that person’s having what matters in
survival for you.
If something bad will happen to you while you are permanently
unconscious and comatose, this will be bad for you, that is, for the you
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of right now. This will be bad for you even though—because you will
not then be conscious—no one will have what matters in survival for
you when this happens. So it is false that something that involves a
person at a future time will be bad (or good) for you only if that person
will have, at that time, what matters in survival for you. But this is false
only because that person might, at that time, fail to be conscious.
Suppose that something good (or bad) will happen to a conscious
person. Then that something will be good (or bad) for you—that is,
for the you of right now—only if that person will have what matters in
survival for you. In what follows, I shall often say of an example
involving a person at a future time that what happens in this example
will be good (or bad) for you only if that person will have, at that time,
what matters in survival for you (see, esp., Ch. 4, §§IV–V; Ch. 5,
§§IV–V). That is fine. For all these examples involve a person who
is conscious at that time.
You might deny that a person at a future time will have, at that time,
what matters in survival for you only if that person will be conscious at
that time. I disagree. But our disagreement on this single point really is
just disagreement on this single point. For even given this disagree-
ment, you can still endorse my answers to the What Question and the
Why Question, as well as my arguments for those answers. But you
should take the experiences invoked in my answer to the What
Question to be all that one goes through, which includes more than
having conscious experiences. And you may drop the parenthetical
‘conscious’ from the Why Question. So you can take the slogan
‘identity delivers survival’ to be as accurate as it is pithy.
So Leibniz would say that a person who will have, at a future time,
what matters in survival for you can be punished at that time. But let us
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add that avoiding punishment at a future time is one of the things that
matters to you with regard to that time.
Suppose that it is appropriate for you both to first-personally antic-
ipate suffering at a future time, and also to have self-interested concern
with regard to that suffering at that time. Then a suffering person will
have, at that time, what matters in survival for you (§II). But let us add
that avoiding suffering at a future time is another thing that matters to
you with regard to that time.
These remarks about future punishment and future suffering illus-
trate the following point: a person at a future time’s having, at that
time, what matters in survival for you is not the same thing as
that person’s having, at that time, all that matters to you with regard
to that future time. This point should be obvious. That is, it should be
obvious that surviving is not the same thing as getting all that you want.
Surviving is not even the same thing as getting part of what you
want. That is, a person at a future time having what matters in survival
for you is not even the same thing as that person’s having, at that time,
part of what matters to you with regard to that time. For suppose that
you have grown tired of life and you want it all to end. That is, suppose
that you do not want there to be, at any future time, a person who will
have, at that time, what now matters in survival for you. This is
depressing. But it is not contradictory.
You probably do want to survive. That is, part of what probably
matters to you with regard to a future time is that there will be
someone who will have, at that time, what matters in survival for
you. But this is a substantive fact about you. This is not a trivial result
of the nature of what matters in survival. For, again, there is nothing
contradictory about your not wanting anyone to have what matters in
survival for you at a future time.
Suppose that it matters to you that the person who will have what
matters in survival for you at a future time will have friends at that
time. Or suppose that it matters to you that the person who will have
what matters in survival for you at a future time will not be in grinding
poverty at that time. These are claims about what matters to you with
regard to that future time. But these claims are not equivalent to the
claim that a person will have what matters in survival for you at that
future time. Rather, these claims are understood partly in terms of a
person’s having what matters in survival for you at that time. Again, a
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person at a future time having, at that time, what matters in survival for
you is not the same thing as that person’s having, at that future time,
what matters to you with regard to that future time.
Derek Parfit makes many claims that he says are about what matters
in survival. And at least some of those claims really are about (what
I am calling) what matters in survival. For example:
An emotion or attitude can be criticized for resting on a false belief or for being
inconsistent. A man who regards [double brain hemisphere transplant] as
death must, I suggest, be open to one of these criticisms. (Parfit, 1971, 9)
I think that Parfit is here claiming that if a man is going to undergo
double brain hemisphere transplant, both of the resulting persons will
have what matters in survival for that man (see Ch. 3, §II).
Moreover, Parfit (1984, 263) claims that if a person at a future time
is the same person as you, then that person will have, at that future
time, what matters in survival for you (see Ch. 3, §II). That is, Parfit
claims that personal identity is sufficient (but not necessary) for what
matters in survival. This too seems to be a claim about what matters in
survival for you, as opposed to a claim about what matters to you with
regard to a future time. For I do not think that Parfit is claiming that
your being the same person as a person at a future time is sufficient for
what matters to you with regard to that time. For example, it would be
silly to say that being the same person as a person at a future time is
sufficient for your having friends at that time.
But some of Parfit’s claims that he says are about ‘what matters in
survival’ are, instead, claims about what matters with regard to a future
time. For example, Parfit claims that not having a doppelgänger
compete for the affection of one’s beloved at a future time ‘matters
in survival’ (Parfit, 1984, 264). But this is surely a claim about what
matters to one with regard to that future time.
And consider the following passage from Parfit, which conflates
what matters in survival for him and what matters to him with regard
to a future time:
Just as division shows that what matters in survival need not take a one-one
form, fusion shows that it can have degrees . . . The value to me of my relation
to a resulting person depends both (1) on my degree of [psychological]
connectedness to this person, and (2) on the value, in my view, of this person’s
physical and psychological features. Suppose that hypnosis causes me to lose
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9
One result of this conflation’s occurring in Parfit’s work is that some objec-
tions to what Parfit says about ‘what matters in survival’ have nothing to do with
what matters in survival. They are instead objections to Parfit’s claims about what
does (or should) matter to one with regard to the future (see, e.g. Wolf, 1986,
714–15).
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experiences at that time, and even more than your having experiences
that you can now appropriately first-personally anticipate (etc.). It
would include your exercising agency. But it would also include your
having friends, not being in grinding poverty, doing meaningful work,
and much more. None of this suggests that an answer to the What
Question should mention friends or money or work. So none of this
suggests that an answer to the What Question should mention
agency.10
I have used ‘survive’ above as shorthand for there being a person at a
future time who will have, at that time, what matters in survival. I shall
continue to do this—but with more frequency—for the rest of the
book.
One reason for using ‘survive’ in this way is that it should help us to
avoid the conflation identified in this section. For example, this false
and conflating sentence might appear, at first glance, to be true: ‘a
person’s having what matters in survival for you at a future time just is
that person’s having what matters to you with regard to that future
time’. On the other hand, I do not think that this false and conflating
sentence will appear, even at first glance, to be true: ‘your surviving as a
person at a future time just is that person’s having at that time what
matters to you with regard to that future time’.
Another reason for using ‘survive’ in this way is concision. For
example, this allows us to replace ‘there will be a person who will
have what matters in survival for you’ with ‘you will survive’. And ‘you
will survive a change’ can replace ‘you will undergo a change and, after
that change, there will be a person who will have what matters in
survival for you’.
But I admit that there is a downside to using ‘survive’ as shorthand
for there being a person at a future time who will have, at that time,
what matters in survival. This downside is the danger of a new
conflation, conflating what matters in survival and persistence. This
10
The What Question should not be answered in terms of agency. But this is
consistent with agency’s having a special role to play in what matters in survival, a
role that is not played by, for example, having friends. For this is consistent with
answering the Why Question in terms of agency. Chapter 6 considers an answer to
the Why Question in terms of agency.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter defended my answer to:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
My answer: its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate
the experiences that that person will have at that future time; and if
that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that future time, its
being appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested con-
cern with regard to those experiences.
Obviously, my answer to the What Question is not that you are
numerically identical with that person at that future time. Moreover,
I never defended my answer to the What Question with any claims
about the metaphysics of persistence. This is because the metaphysics
of persistence is irrelevant to answering the What Question.
The next chapter will defend my answer to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
If I had conflated the What Question and the Why Question, I might
have taken my answer to the What Question to be the answer to the
Why Question. I would have then concluded that the answer to the
Why Question is not that you are numerically identical with that
person at that future time. And I would also have concluded that the
metaphysics of persistence is irrelevant to answering the Why
Question. But those conclusions would have been based on a mistaken
conflation (§II).
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2
On the Sufficiency of
Personal Identity
Let us ask:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
My answer is numerical identity. That is, I say that your being
numerically identical with a (conscious) person at a future time
explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in
survival for you.
This answer is controversial. For this answer implies the claim that
your being numerically identical with a person at a future time explains
why it is appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate, and have
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, the experiences
that that person will have at that time. And many philosophers deny
this claim. For example:
G. W. Leibniz: ‘Thus the immortality required in morality and religion does
not consist merely in this perpetual subsistence common to all substances, for
without the memory of what one has been, there would be nothing desirable
about it.’ (‘Discourse on Metaphysics’, §34 [1989, 66])
Jennifer Whiting: ‘My general view is that the numerical identity of our
present and future selves . . . is irrelevant to the justification of concern for
our future selves.’ (1986, 548)
Marya Schechtman: ‘Most modern personal identity theorists, I charge, con-
flate two significantly different questions, which I call the reidentification
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0003
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1
Because our topic is survival, I am focusing on future-directed self-interested
concern. But let ‘past-directed self-interested concern’ be self-interested concern
with regard to what has already happened. Obviously, past-directed self-interested
concern does not involve first-personal anticipation. For first-personal anticipation
is a matter of looking ahead to future experiences. Past-directed self-interested
concern involves, instead, looking back at past experiences. Past-directed
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But (1) and (2) (and the more general thesis) do not motivate just
any claim to the effect that personal identity explains the appropriate-
ness of future-directed self-interested concern. To see why I say this,
consider, for example:
(4) For all x and all y, x’s being a temporal part of the same person as
is y (but being numerically distinct from y), y’s being located at a
later time than is x, and y’s having good (or bad) experience E both
implies that it is appropriate for x now to have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to E and also explains why this is
appropriate.
Unlike (3), (4) does not make a claim about an entity that has future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to E and is numerically
identical with the entity that will have experience E. So I deny that (1)
and (2) (and the more general thesis) motivate (4). But (4) is a claim to
the effect that personal identity explains the appropriateness of future-
directed self-interested concern. According to (4), the appropriateness
of future-directed self-interested concern is explained by the relevant
temporal parts being parts of one and the same person. (More about
temporal parts in §II.)
If persons endure, then the following are true. First, the relation of
‘identity over time’ is numerical identity. Second, persons are the relata
of identity over time in cases of personal identity over time. Third,
persons have ‘temporary’ properties, that is, properties with regard to
which persons change; in particular, persons have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to experiences, and also have
experiences.
Suppose that you will endure until a future time (and remain a
person). This implies that you are numerically identical with a person
who will exist at that future time. Add that that person will have a
good (or bad) experience at that future time. Invoke:
(3) For all persons x and all persons y, x’s being numerically identical
with y and the fact that y will have good (or bad) experience E both
implies that it is appropriate for x now to have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to E and also explains why this is
appropriate.
Then conclude that it is now appropriate for you to have self-
interested concern with regard to that experience at that future time.
Suppose that you learn that tomorrow you will suffer through a
painful dental procedure. One natural way for you to react to this news
is by extending your self-interested concern to that suffering tomor-
row. In light of (3)—and if you endure—I conclude that your natural
reaction is appropriate, and that its appropriateness is explained by
your being (numerically identical with) the person who will suffer.
Or suppose that you will become a king, but only after you lose all
memories of your current life.2 I think that you endure. So I conclude
that it is appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested
concern with regard to that king’s experiences. So it is appropriate for
you to first-personally anticipate that king’s experiences (Ch. 1, §II).
This is all explained—in light of (3)—by your being numerically
identical with that future king.
More generally, I conclude that being numerically identical with is a
good answer to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
This more general conclusion presupposes my answer to:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
2
Those who endorse a criterion of personal identity over time in terms of
memory connectedness would deny that you could persist as someone who will
have lost all memories of your current life. But endurantists in particular have a
compelling reason to reject that criterion: numerical identity is transitive but being
connected by memory is not.
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3
Others who would take being numerically identical with to be a good answer
to the Wordier Why Question include Roderick Chisholm (1969, 138; 1976, 113)
and Harold Langsam (2001).
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4
Almost all self-described perdurantists would agree with what I have just said
about perduring persons. But not Josh Parsons (2000).
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5
Endurantists deny that persisting objects have temporal parts. So endurantists
cannot avail themselves of the perdurantists’ way of rendering change non-
contradictory. So endurantists need another way. My way is presentism (see
Merricks, 1994; 1995; and 2007, 119–25). So I deny that there are any objects
that exist only at future times. But then how do I make sense of the claim that a
presently existing person x is numerically identical with a person y who exists at a
future time? I say this claim is true just in case person x exists and x = y and y will
exist at a future time (for details, see Merricks, 1994).
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properties that you always have. You may always have the determina-
ble property having some shape or other. But there is no determinate
shape that you always have. More generally, there are no (or hardly
any) determinate physical properties that you always have. Nor are
there any determinate mental properties that you always have. So if
persons perdure, you do not have any (or almost any) determinate
physical properties or any determinate mental properties. So if persons
perdure, then you are unrecognizable, both to yourself and to others.
I myself think this is an absolutely compelling reason to reject
perdurance.
This reason might lead someone who starts out as a perdurantist not
only to reject perdurance, but also to endorse a third and final view
about the metaphysics of the persistence of persons. To see why I say
this, suppose you start out believing that you perdure. But then you
recognize that, given perdurance, the (determinate) physical and men-
tal properties you take yourself to have are had not by you, but instead
are had by your current temporal part. You might then conclude that
you are what you originally thought was merely your current temporal
part. That is, you might conclude that you are an instantaneous stage.
Now you are a stage theorist.6
Stage theory says that each of us is an instantaneous stage. This
implies that each person is instantaneous. Nevertheless, stage theorists
also maintain that persons persist.7 In particular, stage theorists say
that a person (who is a stage) who is located at time t persists until a
later time t* just in case that person (stage) stands in the ‘I-relation’ to a
numerically distinct person (stage) who is located at time t*. Because a
stage can be I-related to a numerically distinct stage, the I-relation is
6
Again, you might go from being a perdurantist to being a stage theorist
because you recognize that if you perdure, then you do not have the determinate
physical properties or the determinate mental properties that you think you have;
whereas you do have those properties if stage theory is true. So I conclude that
perdurance and stage theory differ with regard to what properties you have. This
conclusion is just one reason that I object when the stage theorists Katherine
Hawley (2001, 202 and 208) and Theodore Sider (2001, 191–2) claim that stage
theory and perdurance agree on the metaphysics and differ only semantically (for
other reasons, see Merricks, 2003).
7
But I object that if each of us is instantaneous, then we do not persist (see
Merricks, 2003).
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8
The expression ‘I-relation’ is from Sider (1996). Stage theorists take persist-
ence to be sortal-relative (see Sider, 1996; Hawley, 2001, 156–8). I shall say more
about this sortal-relativity in Ch. 3 (§IV). But for now, just note that the stage
theorists’ account of the persistence of a person described here is their account of
the persistence of a person qua person.
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illustrates that stage theorists should conclude that (ST3a) does not
tell us what explains the appropriateness of actual cases of future-
directed self-interested concern.
Here is the other stage-theoretic disambiguation of (3):
(ST3b) For all persons x and all persons y, x’s being numerically
identical with y and the fact that y has the property will have good (or
bad) experience E both implies that it is appropriate for x now to have
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to E and also
explains why this is appropriate.
Stage theorists can say that a person (stage) who has future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to a future experience
E is numerically identical with a person (stage) who has the property
will have experience E. For this is just to say that the stage that has
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to E is (numerically
identical with a stage that is) I-related to a stage located at a future time
that has E at that future time. So stage theorists who take (3) to amount
to (ST3b) can take (3) to tell us what explains the appropriateness of
actual cases of future-directed self-interested concern.
As we saw in Section I, endurantists should take (3) to lead to the
conclusion that being numerically identical with is a good answer to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
But stage theorists who endorse (3) (understood as (ST3b)) should
instead take (3) to lead to the conclusion that your being I-related to a
person at a future time is a good answer to the Why Question. This is
because stage theorists say that a person (stage) has the property will
have E just in case that person (stage) is I-related to a person (stage)
located at a future time who has E at that future time.
Consider the following three claims: the relation of ‘identity over
time’ is numerical identity; persons are the relata of identity over time
in cases of personal identity over time; and persons have future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to experiences, and have
experiences. The argument in Section I for my answer to the Why
Question both succeeds and also applies to actual cases of survival only
if all three of these claims are true.
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Endurantists accept all three claims. But stage theorists reject the
first claim. And perdurantists should reject the third claim, as I have
argued above. So I think that endurantists—and only endurantists—
should both endorse my argument for numerical identity’s being a
good answer to the Why Question, and also take that answer to apply
to actual cases of survival. So, for the rest of this book, I shall assume
that my argument for my answer to the Why Question, along with
that answer’s applying to actual cases of survival, requires endurance.
Perhaps you endorse some fourth metaphysics of persistence, not
here (or anywhere) examined, that does not imply endurance but does
imply the above three claims. Or perhaps you endorse some non-
standard version of perdurance that implies the above three claims
without leading to contradiction in the face of change. Then, unlike
me, you should conclude that Section I’s argument for answering the
Why Question in terms of numerical identity does not require endur-
ance. So that argument should be endorsed by more than just endur-
antists. That would be great!
for that person to have, at that time, what matters in survival for
you, then your being related to that (conscious) person by the
criterion of personal identity over time explains why that person
will have, at that time, what matters in survival for you.
The Criterion Explains Survival is widely accepted nowadays. In
particular, the Criterion Explains Survival seems to be accepted by
almost every philosopher who takes personal identity over time to be
sufficient for survival. And almost all these philosophers endorse a
more or less Lockean criterion of personal identity over time, that is, a
psychological criterion of personal identity over time.
For example, Derek Parfit (1984) endorses the following three
claims: personal identity over time is sufficient for survival; unbranch-
ing psychological connectedness and/or continuity is the criterion of
personal identity over time; and psychological connectedness and/or
continuity—including unbranching psychological connectedness and/
or continuity—explains survival (see Ch. 3, §II).
Moreover, the Criterion Explains Survival has played a key role in
motivating a psychological criterion of personal identity over time. For
example, David Shoemaker (2016) and also Jens Johansson (2016)
independently argue as follows. Being identical with a person who
exists at a future time is sufficient for that person’s having, at that time,
what matters in survival for you. This implies that your being related to
that person by the criterion of personal identity over time explains why
that person will have what matters in survival for you. (To endorse this
implication is to endorse the Criterion Explains Survival.) Your being
biologically continuous with a person at a future time would not
explain why that person will have what matters in survival for you.
So biological continuity is not the criterion of personal identity over
time. Rather, the correct criterion of personal identity over time is
psychological continuity.
Bernard Williams’s ‘The Self and The Future’ (1970) takes personal
identity to be sufficient for what matters in survival. And Williams
(1970) favors the view that your being ‘bodily continuous’ with a
person at a future time explains why that person will have what matters
in survival for you. And he takes this view to imply that you enjoy
personal identity with a person at a future time just in case that person
is bodily continuous with you. So Williams (1970) might be the
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9
Or perhaps not. For Williams (1970) seems to understand ‘bodily continuity’
as having the numerically same body. And this might not count as a genuine
criterion of personal identity over time. For suppose that having numerically the
same body is necessary and sufficient for personal identity over time only if a person
is a body. Then a future person’s having the numerically same body as you just is
that future person’s being the numerically same body as you. This presupposes that
that person is (a body and is) numerically identical with you. But a genuine
criterion of personal identity over time would not presuppose that that person is
numerically identical with you.
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10
I think that the Criterion Explains Survival is false. I think that it is false
because I endorse its antecedent and reject its consequent. For I take identity (with
a conscious person) to be sufficient for survival; but I deny that there are any criteria
of identity over time at all; a fortiori, I deny that the criterion of personal identity
explains survival. I shall not rely on this denial in the text. But for my reasons for
denying that there are any criteria of identity over time, see Merricks, 1998 and
2001b, 191–5.
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11
This premise is controversial. At least, Mark Johnston (1997) controverts it.
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time. But the relata of personal identity over time are persons.
A person is not the same thing as (and cannot be reduced to) the
way a person is at a time. So the relata of the criterion of personal
identity over time are not (and cannot be reduced to) the relata of
personal identity over time. So I conclude that it is false that personal
identity over time is reduced to being related to a person at another
time by the criterion of personal identity over time.
Here is another reason to draw the same conclusion, but a reason
that has to do with the relation, as opposed to the relata. I think that
you persist by enduring. So your now being the same person as
someone existing at a future time just is your being a person who is
now wholly present and who stands in the relation being numerically
identical with to a person who will be wholly present at that future
time. The relation being numerically identical with is not reduced to
being psychologically continuous with.12 So it is false that your being
the same person as a person existing at a future time is reduced to your
being a person who is now wholly present and who is psychologically
continuous with a person who will be wholly present at that future
time. So if psychological continuity is the criterion of personal identity
over time, it is false that personal identity over time is reduced to being
related to a person at another time by the criterion of personal identity
over time.13
The argument just given focused on psychological continuity. But it
should be clear that—if persons endure—a parallel argument can be
run for the conclusion that personal identity over time is not reduced
to being related to a person at another time by psychological connect-
edness, or by biological continuity, or by any of the other contenders
for being the criterion of personal identity over time. Thus we have my
second reason for concluding that personal identity over time cannot
be reduced to being related to a person at another time by the criterion
of personal identity over time.
12
Everything is numerically identical with itself. But not everything is psycholog-
ically continuous with itself. This is just one reason to conclude that the relation being
numerically identical with is not reduced to being psychologically continuous with.
13
For discussion of what it is to be ‘wholly present’, see Merricks (1994; 1999a;
1999b). For a more detailed version of the argument just given, including replies to
some objections, see Merricks (1999a).
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Add:
(II) Your being numerically identical with a (conscious) person at a
future time explains why you will survive as that person at that time.
Then conclude:
(III) Your being related by the criterion of personal identity over
time to a (conscious) person at a future time explains why you will
survive as that person at that time.
I do not think this argument is sound.14 But suppose that it is sound.
Then premise (II) is true. And if premise (II) is true, then numerical
identity is a good answer to the Why Question. Moreover, if persons
endure, then your being related to a person at a future time by the
criterion of personal identity over time implies that you are numerically
identical with that person. So this argument’s conclusion is consistent
with my claim—defended in Chapter 3 (§I)—that every good answer to
the Why Question implies numerical identity. So even though I do not
think the above argument is sound, I do not need to oppose it. For the
above argument is no threat to anything I say about the Why Question.
Suppose that you take the above argument to be sound. Then you will
conclude that the Criterion Explains Survival is true. Then you cannot
fault the reasoning at the start of this section from Shoemaker,
Johansson, and Olson for presupposing the Criterion Explains
Survival. But you should nevertheless think that their reasoning is faulty.
For if you take the above argument to be sound, then you should
conclude that the criterion of personal identity over time explains
survival no matter what that criterion turns out to be. That criterion
explains survival—according to the above argument—by explaining
personal identity over time, which in turn explains survival. So you
should deny Olson’s (1997) claim that biological continuity is the
criterion of personal identity but does not explain survival.
Moreover, you should conclude that Shoemaker’s (2016) and
Johansson’s (2016) claim that biological continuity does not explain
14
I think this argument’s first premise—(I)—is false; this is because I deny that
there is a criterion of personal identity over time. Some might say that this
argument is not valid, perhaps because they deny that explanation is transitive.
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survival presupposes (and so cannot be used to argue for) the claim that
biological continuity is not the criterion of personal identity over time.
Again, suppose that you endorse the Criterion Explains Survival
because of the above argument. Then you should not only object to
Olson (1997), Shoemaker (2016), and Johansson (2016). You should
also object to the idea that an answer to Why Question in terms of the
criterion of personal identity over time would be ‘deeper’ than such an
answer in terms of numerical identity. You should conclude, instead,
that the ‘deeper’ answer is in terms of numerical identity itself. For—
according to the above argument—being related by the criterion of
personal identity does not explain survival directly, but instead explains
survival only by way of explaining the holding of numerical identity. It
is the holding of numerical identity itself that directly explains survival.
Conclusion 55
V. Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that being numerically identical with is a
good answer to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
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3
On the Necessity of Personal
Identity
1
I read Leibniz as taking personal identity to be necessary (but not sufficient)
for what matters in survival (see Ch. 1, §§I–II). McMahan (2002, 79) also takes
personal identity to be thus necessary. And consider that Schechtman says:
‘reidentifying persons . . . constrains (but does not determine) the kind of psycho-
logical configurations that can constitute a single psychological subject’ (1996, 69)
and ‘For a person to have self-interested concern for the fulfillment of a desire, that
desire must, to be sure, at least be part of his history’ (1996, 85).
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0004
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2
I deny that two persons can have the numerically same token conscious
experience E. So I take ‘(but not x)’ in (1*) through (3*)—which I include for
emphasis—to be strictly speaking redundant. But suppose that the following case is
possible: a person at a future time is numerically identical with you, and that
person’s (that is, your) conscious experiences at that time are numerically identical
with a numerically distinct person’s conscious experiences at that time. Then the
‘(but not x)’ in (3*) is not redundant. And then the combination of (3*) and
endurance is consistent with (but does not imply) the claim that—in the case just
considered—it is appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested con-
cern with regard to the experiences that are had by each of those persons at that
future time. This claim implies that someone who is not numerically identical with
you will have what matters in survival for you. But even given this claim, there is
still a way in which numerical identity is necessary for survival. For even given this
claim, you will survive at a future time as a person who is not numerically identical
with you only if—and only because—you also survive at that time as a person who
is numerically identical with you (and both persons have, at that time, the numer-
ically same conscious experiences). This is definitely not the sort of survival without
identity that Parfit defends. That is one reason that I shall ignore the above case in
what follows. But the main reason is that I think this case is not possible; for, again,
I deny that two persons can have the numerically same token conscious experience E.
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That expression could mean: is located at, and has experience E at, a
later time. Or it could mean: has the property will have experience E.
As a result, (3*) itself is ambiguous, given stage theory. So stage
theorists should not ask what (3*) implies with regard to who will
have what matters in survival for you. Rather, stage theorists should
disambiguate (3*), and then ask what each disambiguation implies
with regard to who will have what matters in survival for you.
Suppose that stage theorists take ‘will have experience E’ in (3*) to
mean: is located at, and has experience E at, a later time. Then they
should take (3*) to amount to:
(ST3*a) For all persons x and all persons y, if x is numerically
distinct from y and y (but not x) is located at, and has experience
E at, a later time, then it is not appropriate for x now to have future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to E.
Let x be an instantaneous stage (person) that now has future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to E; then x is located at, and only
at, the present time. Add that y is located at, and has experience E at, a
later time; then y is located at a later time. So it is false that x is
identical with y. This illustrates that if (ST3*a) is true, it is never
appropriate for a person (stage) to have future-directed self-interested
concern with regard to a future experience. So if (ST3*a) is true, stage
theory precludes survival. I assume that stage theorists will reject
(ST3*a).
Suppose that stage theorists take ‘will have experience E’ in (3*) to
mean: has the property will have experience E. Then they should take
(3*) to amount to:
(ST3*b) For all persons x and all persons y, if x is numerically
distinct from y and y (but not x) has the property will have experience
E, then it is not appropriate for x now to have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to E.
Let x be a person (stage) who now has future-directed self-interested
concern with regard to E; then x is located at the present time. Let z be
a person (stage) who is located at a later time and has E. Stage theory
allows for x to be I-related to z. To have the property will have
experience E just is to be I-related to a stage that is located at, and
has experience E at, a later time (Ch. 2, §II). So stage theory allows for
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3
Perdurantists should not respond to (3**) by analyzing will have experience E
as: is a temporal part of a person who has a later temporal part that has experience
E. This is because an entity that exists right now will have an experience only if that
entity persists into the future. In particular, a temporal part of a person will have an
experience that each later temporal part of that person has only if that temporal part
persists for as long as that person persists. But perdurantists should deny that each
temporal part of a person persists for as long as that person persists. The parallel to
stage theory—which inspires the analysis of will have experience E just suggested
and discarded—is instructive. Stage theorists think that a person (stage) can have
the property will have experience E (analyzed in terms of the I-relation) precisely
because that stage is a persisting person (and persistence is analyzed in terms of the
I-relation).
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claims using the expression ‘what matters in survival’ that are claims
about what matters to you with regard to the future, such as (his
example) being freed of your nicotine addiction at some future time
(Parfit, 1984, 299). Suppose we took Parfit to answer the What
Question in terms of what matters to you with regard to the future.
Then Parfit’s conclusion that personal identity is not necessary for
(what he calls) what matters in survival might not imply that personal
identity is not necessary for (what I call) what matters in survival. This
is because personal identity’s not being necessary for what matters to
you with regard to the future might not imply that personal identity is
not necessary for appropriate future-directed self-interested concern or
appropriate first-personal anticipation.
Parfit can also seem to answer the What Question in terms of
psychological connectedness and/or continuity. Parfit says:
I said earlier that what matters in survival could be provisionally referred
to as ‘psychological continuity’. I must now distinguish this relation from
another, which I shall call ‘psychological connectedness’ . . . ‘Psychological
connectedness’ . . . requires the holding of these direct psychological
relations . . . ‘Psychological continuity’ . . . only requires overlapping chains
of direct psychological relations . . . Now that we have distinguished the
general relations of psychological continuity and psychological connectedness,
I suggest that connectedness is a more important element in survival.
(1971, 20–1; see also Parfit, 1984, 262)
Suppose Parfit answers the What Question in terms of psychological
connectedness and/or continuity. Then it is trivial that psychological
connectedness and/or continuity is sufficient for (what Parfit takes to
be) what matters in survival. This triviality is not relevant to whether
personal identity is necessary for appropriate future-directed self-
interested concern or appropriate first-personal anticipation. So this
triviality is not relevant to the conclusion—as defended and under-
stood in Section I—that personal identity is necessary for what matters
in survival.
I do not claim that Parfit unequivocally answers the What Question
in terms of appropriate future-directed self-interested concern. But
I shall assume for the rest of this section that the most common
reading of Parfit is correct, and that he does answer the What
Question in only this way. This is because, again, this section focuses
on Parfit’s argument for the claim that personal identity is not
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4
What is Parfit’s Reductionism, and how does it undermine appropriate first-
personal anticipation? It is hard to say. Elsewhere (Merricks, 1999c), I look at how
a variety of philosophers understand both Parfit’s Reductionism and also how
Parfit takes Reductionism to bear on what matters in survival. Those philosophers
disagree about what Reductionism is, and also about how Parfit takes
Reductionism to bear on what matters in survival.
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Not only can stage theorists say that you will be same person as each
person who results from psychological fission, this is just what the
leading stage theorists—Theodore Sider (1996; 2001, 201) and
Katherine Hawley—actually do say. For example, Hawley says:
. . . there are puzzle cases which encourage us to think that people could
divide . . . this is most easily accepted by those who believe that personal
persistence is a matter of psychological continuity . . . stage theorists have a
relatively simple strategy: there is but a single person present before fission,
although it may be that she is the same person as two distinct but simultaneous
person-stages at some post-fission moment. (2001, 174–5)
Let me illustrate the stage theorist’s view here with one of Parfit’s
(1971) most important thought experiments (which he borrows from
Wiggins (1967)). Suppose that each hemisphere of your brain is
transplanted into a different body. Parfit insists that you would survive
as each of the hemisphere recipients. Stage theorists can agree. Parfit
thinks this implies that personal identity is not necessary for survival.
Hawley and Sider disagree. They say that you survive as—and are the
same person as—each recipient of each hemisphere. For you are
I-related to each of those recipients.
The leading stage theorists claim that personal identity takes a
branching form in cases of psychological fission. This claim under-
mines Parfit’s reason for taking the criterion of personal identity over
time to include an ‘unbranching’ condition. More to the point, this
claim allows stage theorists to deny premise (IV) of Parfit’s argument.
So this claim allows stage theorists to block Parfit’s argument.
Stage theorists say that your being the same person as a future
person just is your being I-related to that person. Suppose the I-
relation is a psychological relation. Then stage theorists say that your
being the same person as a future person just is your being related to
that person by way of the relevant psychological relation. So stage
theory fits perfectly with Parfit’s (e.g. 1984, 262–3) view that a future
person’s being the same person as you ‘just is’ your being related to
that person by way of the relevant psychological relation. Moreover,
stage theory is the only metaphysics of persistence that fits perfectly
with that view. (Chapter 2 (§III) showed that endurance implies that
that view is false; for perdurance and that view, see below.) So if we
take Parfit completely literally when he says that a future person’s
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being the same person as you ‘just is’ your being related to that person
by way of the relevant psychological relation, we should interpret Parfit
as a (proto-) stage theorist. So Parfit should find the ease with which
stage theorists can block his argument to be particularly troubling.
Suppose that persons perdure. And suppose that perduring persons
enjoy a criterion of personal identity over time in terms of psycholog-
ical connectedness and/or continuity. Then psychological connected-
ness and/or continuity is the ‘glue’ that holds temporal parts together
so that those parts compose a single perduring person. Thus—as noted
in Chapter 2 (§III)—perdurantists such as Lewis (1976) say that the
relata of psychological connectedness and/or continuity are the tem-
poral parts of persons, as opposed to perduring persons themselves.
And this is what all perdurantists should say. For I have argued that
perdurantists should say that only the temporal parts of persons (and not
perduring persons themselves) have (determinate) mental properties
(Ch. 2, §II). Because temporal parts alone have (determinate) mental
properties, temporal parts alone can be psychologically connected to
and/or continuous with each other. So if persons perdure, the relata of
psychological connectedness and/or continuity are the temporal parts of
persons, as opposed to perduring persons themselves.
Perdurantists should take psychological connectedness and/or
continuity—unbranching or otherwise—to hold not between persons,
but instead between the temporal parts of persons. So perdurantists
should deny that you—a person—can be psychologically connected to
and/or continuous with a person at a future time. This is why
perdurance—unlike stage theory—does not fit perfectly with Parfit’s
view that your being the same person as a person at a future time ‘just
is’ your being related to that person by way of the relevant psycholog-
ical relation.
Again, perdurantists should deny that you can be psychologically
connected to and/or continuous with a person at a future time. So
perdurance alone seems to rule out the claim that it is possible for you
to be psychologically connected to and/or continuous with a person at
a future time. A fortiori perdurance alone seems to rule out:
(IV) It is possible for you to be psychologically connected to and/or
continuous with a person at a future time even if that person is not
the same person as you.
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5
Here is another option: there is a single perduring person in a case of
psychological fission, who has a branching structure. This option also renders
cases of fission consistent with the claim that, necessarily, if any temporal part is
psychologically connected to and/or continuous with another temporal part, then
there is a person who has those two temporal parts as parts.
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Perdurantists can deny (IV). That is, perdurantists can deny (IV)
even given the possibility of psychological fission. And they can deny
(IV) even if they interpret (IV) as the perdurantist-friendly (4D-IV).
So perdurantists can join stage theorists in concluding that Parfit’s
argument goes wrong by having a false premise, namely, (IV).
physical properties and physical parts. Then you and that organism
have the same mental properties.
You have the same physical parts and the same physical properties
as the organism associated with you. So I conclude that you are not
only a person, but are also an organism. The organism associated with
you has the same mental properties as do you. So I conclude that that
organism is not only an organism, but is also a person. I do not think
that you and the organism associated with you are an instance of two
organisms and two persons being in the same place at the same time.
So I conclude that you are numerically identical with the human
organism associated with you. (For more, see Merricks, 2001a,
47–53 and 85–7; Olson, 1997, 97–102; Olson, 2003).
Each of us is a human organism. Human organisms can enjoy
identity over time in the absence of psychological connectedness and
continuity. For example, a human organism can persist through the
sort of brain damage that would keep the way it is now from being
psychologically connected to, or continuous with, the way it will be
after that damage. So it is false that unbranching psychological con-
nectedness and/or continuity is necessary and sufficient for the identity
over time of us human organisms. So it is false that unbranching
psychological connectedness and/or continuity is the criterion of per-
sonal identity over time. Parfit’s motivation for premise (I) relies on
this false claim (see §II). So I conclude that Parfit does not successfully
motivate premise (I). This alone is enough to block’s Parfit’s
argument.6
Moreover, I think that premise (I) is false. For I deny that you could
move a cat from Scotland to my pocket by annihilating that cat’s body
and then ‘downloading’ its psychological features onto my phone. So
I deny that unbranching psychological connectedness and/or continu-
ity is sufficient for the persistence of an organism, even an organism
6
The argument in the text relies on the claim that you have the same physical
properties as are had by the human organism associated with you. But suppose you
think, instead, that you have the same physical properties as are had by some other
physical object associated with you (e.g. your brain). Then conclude that you are
numerically identical with that other physical object (e.g. that brain). I deny that
that physical object (e.g. that brain) enjoys a psychological criterion of identity over
time.
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7
You might think that if you are a human organism, then the criterion of
personal identity over time is in terms of biological continuity. You might add that
biological continuity can ‘branch’. So you might think that if you are an organism,
then the criterion of personal identity over time is unbranching biological conti-
nuity. You might then conclude that Parfit-style reasoning delivers the conclusion
that biological continuity is sufficient for what matters in survival, and so personal
identity is not necessary for what matters in survival.
As we shall see below, endurantists can block Parfit’s argument even if they
accept Parfit’s criterion of personal identity over time in terms of unbranching
psychological connectedness and/or continuity. This will show how endurantists
can block Parfit-style reasoning against the necessity of personal identity for
survival even if they accept that the criterion of personal identity over time is
unbranching biological continuity. That is the main point.
But other points are also relevant. I myself deny that there is any criterion of
personal identity over time at all (Merricks, 1998 and 2001b, 191–5); so I deny that
the criterion of personal identity over time is in terms of biological continuity,
unbranching or otherwise. Moreover, it is not at all clear that biological continuity
of the sort that is even prima facie sufficient for the persistence of an organism can
branch. (A dividing cell does not persist.) In particular, biological continuity does
not branch in Parfit’s double brain hemisphere transplant case, since the brain stem
and the original human organism get left behind.
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8
Geach’s (1980, 216) ‘relative identity’ might seem to be a view according to
which numerical identity is sortal-relative. But Geach’s view is really the view that
there is no such thing as numerical identity, but instead a variety of sortal-relative
identity-like relations. For critical discussion of ‘relative identity’, see Hawthorne
(2003).
9
Endurantists who accept (I) should take (I) to be shorthand for something
like: if the way you are now is psychologically connected to and/or continuous with
the way a (conscious) person is at a future time—and only with the way that that
person is at that time—then that person has, at that time, what matters in survival
for you. Something similar goes for premises (II), (III), and (IV). (See Ch. 1, §III
and Ch. 2, §III.)
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To begin to see why I say that endurantists who accept (I) should deny
(II), consider how Parfit motivates (II):
If I will be [psychologically connected to and/or continuous with] some future
person, [whether that continuity and/or connectedness] branches makes no
difference to the intrinsic nature of my relation to this person. And what
matters most must be the intrinsic nature of this relation. (1984, 263)
In one scenario, you are related to a person at a future time by way of
unbranching psychological connectedness and/or continuity. In a sec-
ond scenario, you are related to that person at that time by way of one
branch of branching psychological connectedness and/or continuity.
Parfit assumes that these scenarios differ in how you are related to that
person at that future time only with regard to whether branching
occurs, and so only ‘extrinsically’. And Parfit’s assumption would be
right if stage theory were true.
But if persons endure, Parfit’s assumption is wrong, at least assum-
ing that Parfit’s criterion of personal identity over time is right. For
assuming his criterion, in the first scenario you are related to that
person at that future time by way of being numerically identical with,
and in the second you are not. And this is a crucial difference. For, as
we saw in Chapter 2 (§I), endurantists should say that your being
numerically identical with a person at a future time explains why that
person will have, at that future time, what matters in survival for you.
Again, endurantists say that your being numerically identical with a
person at a future time explains why that person will have, at that
future time, what matters in survival for you. They do not thereby say
that this is explained by your being related to that person by the
criterion of personal identity over time. So even those endurantists
who accept Parfit’s criterion are not thereby saying that survival is
explained by being related by unbranching psychological connected-
ness and/or continuity. Perhaps being related by Parfit’s criterion
might also explain survival. But being related by that criterion would
explain survival—if at all—only by explaining being related by the
‘further fact’ of numerical identity, which is what directly explains
survival (see Ch. 2, §III).
So endurantists who accept Parfit’s criterion of personal identity
over time have no reason to accept:
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Endurantists can join me in denying (I). And those who do not join
me—but who instead endorse (I)—have no reason at all to endorse (II),
and so can deny (II). So all endurantists can block Parfit’s argument for
the conclusion that personal identity is not necessary for survival.
This section and Section III have shown that everyone—regardless
of one’s metaphysics of persistence—can block Parfit’s argument.
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These sections have also shown that the particular way in which one
will block that argument depends on one’s metaphysics of persistence,
as well as one’s view on the criterion of personal identity over time. But
the main point is that everyone can block that argument. So that
argument fails to establish its conclusion. So that argument fails.
Of course, sometimes even a failed argument happens to have a true
conclusion. So neither this section nor Section III shows that the
conclusion of Parfit’s argument is false. Relatedly, neither this section
nor Section III shows that it is false that psychological connectedness
and/or continuity is sufficient for survival, regardless of whether per-
sonal identity holds. But do not forget Section I. In Section I, I argued
for the claim that personal identity is necessary for what matters in
survival. This claim implies that Parfit’s conclusion that personal
identity is not necessary for survival is false. And this claim implies
that it is false that psychological connectedness and/or continuity is
sufficient for survival, regardless of whether personal identity holds.
Conclusion 85
continuity. These ‘specific sorts’ include having the ‘same self ’ (Chs 4
and 5); having the ‘same self-narrative’ (Ch. 5); being continuous with
regard to overlapping ‘local narratives’ (Ch. 6); and being continuous
with regard to overlapping ‘agential connectedness’ (Ch. 6).
I shall show that each of these answers to the Why Question really
does compete with my answer. So my answer competes with each of
these answers. So I conclude that the argument in Chapter 2 (§I) for
my answer to the Why Question is thereby an argument for the falsity
of each of these competing answers. So I conclude that each of these
competing answers is false.
Of course, you might tollens where I ponens. That is, you might
endorse one or another of the answers to the Why Question consid-
ered in Chapters 4–6. Then you might take your answer’s competing
with my answer to be a reason to reject my answer, and so a reason to
conclude that my argument for that answer must somehow go wrong.
I do not want to leave us at this impasse. So Chapters 4–6 will not
only object to competing answers by way of my argument for my
answer to the Why Question. Chapters 4–6 will also object to com-
peting answers in ways that do not presuppose my answer to the Why
Question, or my argument for that answer. Those objections cannot be
blocked simply by rejecting what I say about the Why Question.
Chapters 4–6 are intended to rule out a number of competing
answers to the Why Question that are in terms of—or that imply—
specific sorts of psychological connectedness or psychological conti-
nuity. And I think that the problems with those competing answers
will motivate a general moral. This is the moral that we should reject
any answer to the Why Question that both competes with my answer
and also is in terms of—or implies—psychological connectedness or
psychological continuity, generic or otherwise. I defend this moral at
the end of Chapter 6 (§VI).
VI. Conclusion
Suppose that persons endure. Then—as I have argued (§I)—being
numerically identical with is implied by all good answers to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
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4
The Same Self
Some philosophers say that a person will have, at a future time, what
matters in survival for you only if the way you are now is relevantly
psychologically connected to the way that person will be at that time.
For example, Leibniz says this, taking the relevant sort of psycholog-
ical connectedness to be memory (Ch. 1, §§I–II). This chapter focuses
on others who say this but who, unlike Leibniz, take the relevant sort
of psychological connectedness to be being substantively alike with
regard to values, desires, and projects.
I. Three Selfers
John Perry says:
Most of us have a special and intense interest in what will happen to us. You
learn that someone will be run over by a truck tomorrow; you are saddened,
feel pity, and think reflectively about the frailty of life; one bit of information is
added, that the someone is you, and a whole new set of emotions rise in your
breast. (1976, 67)
‘Special and intense interest in what will happen to us’ is Perry’s way of
describing future-directed self-interested concern.
Perry adds:
I expect to have tomorrow much the same desires, goals, loves, hates—in a
word, projects—as I have today. There is, in the normal case, no one as likely
to work on my article, love my children, vote for my candidates, pay my bills,
and honor my promises, as me. (1976, 75)
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0005
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‘In the normal case’, you and only you will be likely to work on your
current projects. And Perry thinks this is what justifies your having
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to your own future
experiences.
Consider what Perry takes to be an abnormal case. You will con-
tinue to exist but will change in ways that will make you no longer
likely to work on your current projects. Then Perry (1976, 78–80)
denies that there is a ‘justification’ for your having future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to your own future experiences.
Suppose that you will cease to exist and be replaced by—in Perry’s
(1976, 79–80) words—a ‘benign imposter’. That is, you will be
replaced by someone who is not you but who will work on your current
projects. Then Perry thinks that your having future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to this imposter would be justified.
Perry (1976, 80) even adds that your withholding such concern would
be ‘irrational’.
So Perry (1976) would say that it is appropriate for you now to have
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to a person’s
experiences at a future time if and only if that person will be likely,
at that time, to work on your current projects. Perry thinks that a
person will be likely to work on your current projects at a future time if
and only if that person will then have the ‘same desires, goals, loves,
hates’ as you now have. So Perry would say that it is appropriate for you
now to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to a
person’s experiences at a future time if and only if that person will then
have the ‘same desires, goals, loves, hates’ as you now have.
Marya Schechtman (1996, 2) takes your future-directed self-
interested concern to be appropriate if and only if it is directed at a
person at a future time who will have, at that time, the ‘beliefs, values,
desires and other psychological features [that] make [you] the person
[you are]’. As we shall see in Chapter 5 (§I), Schechtman thinks that
the beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features that ‘make
you the person you are’ are those that are included in your self-
narrative. So Schechtman would say that it is appropriate for you
now to have self-interested concern with regard to a person’s experi-
ences at a future time just in case that person will have, at that time, the
beliefs, values, desires, and so on that are now included in your self-
narrative.
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Three Selfers 89
Three Selfers 91
future time. Then each person at the present time is to some degree
psychologically connected to each person at every future time. But
surely Perry, Whiting, and Schechtman deny that each person at every
future time will have, at that time, what matters in survival for you, and
for me, and for every other person who now exists. So the psycholog-
ical connectedness they have in mind must be more substantive than
being alike with regard to a single desire.
I assume that Perry, Whiting, and Schechtman take the psycholog-
ical connectedness that is necessary and sufficient for what matters in
survival to be so substantive that—normally—each person will be thus
psychologically connected to at most one person at a future time. For
I assume that Perry, Whiting, and Schechtman would say that—
normally—at most one person at a future time will have what matters
in survival for you.
One or another of them might think that after each hemisphere of
your brain is transplanted into a new body, then two persons will have
what matters in survival for you; but this surgical procedure is abnor-
mal. Perry might think that if you will continue to exist and pursue
your current projects alongside a benign imposter, then two persons
will have what matters in survival for you; but benign imposters are
abnormal.
Let us stipulate that a person will have, at a future time, the same self
as you now have just in case the way you are now is—with regard to
values, desires, and projects—substantively psychologically connected
to the way that person will be at that future time. How substantive? So
substantive that—abnormal cases aside—at most one person at a
future time will have the same self as you now have. Note that having
the same self—given the above stipulation—does not imply that there
is any such entity as a ‘self ’. Rather, to have the same self just is to be
substantively alike with regard to values, desires, and projects.
Let us also stipulate that you will undergo a change in self if you
persist until a future time but will not have, at that time, the same self
as you have now. In other words, you will undergo a change in self if
the way you are now is not—with regard to values, desires, and
projects—substantively like the way you will be at a future time.
Finally, let us stipulate that to be a Selfer is to be committed to the
view that a person at a future time will have, at that time, what matters
in survival for you only if that person will be substantively like you with
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Three Selfers 93
what matters in survival for you just in case that person will be likely, at
that time, to work on (enough of ) your projects. So Perry must say that
you would not survive becoming a vampire.
I think that becoming a vampire is a paradigm case of changing with
regard to what Schechtman (1996, 2) calls the ‘beliefs, values, desires
and other psychological features [that] make someone the person she is’.
Maybe you disagree. Then add whatever it takes to the above descrip-
tion to make becoming a vampire a paradigm case of such a change.
Schechtman (1996) thinks a future person will have what matters in
survival for you just in case that person will have those features that,
according to Schechtman, ‘make you the person you are’. So
Schechtman must say that you would not survive becoming a vampire.
Whiting thinks that a person will have, at a future time, what
matters in survival for you just in case the way you are now is relevantly
psychologically connected to the way that person will be at that future
time. Whiting’s (1986) examples of such connectedness are your
having the same values and desires as that future person, and that
future person’s acting on your current intentions. Becoming the above
sort of vampire is a paradigm case of changing in values and desires.
And becoming this sort of vampire implies that you would not work
on (enough of ) your current projects, and so you would not act on
(enough of ) your pre-vampire intentions. So Whiting must say that
you would not survive becoming a vampire.
The above Selfers must say that you would not survive becoming the
sort of vampire described above. That is, these Selfers must say that no
such vampire at a future time would have, at that time, what matters in
survival for you. And I think that all Selfers must say this. For
becoming the sort of vampire described above would result in your
no longer being substantively like the way you are now with regard to
values, desires, and projects. That is, to become this sort of vampire is
to undergo a change in self.
The Selfer view implies that you would not survive becoming a
vampire. I think that Selfers will be pleased with this implication.
Again, the Selfer view has the result that even if you will be ‘meta-
physically’ identical with a future vampire, that vampire will not really
‘be you’ in the way that matters. That is, that vampire will not have
what matters in survival for you. I think that Selfers will take this result
to be a benefit of their view.
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1
Velleman (1996, 69–70) also claims that you have first-personal access to a
point of view just in case you can ‘unselfconsciously project’ yourself into that point
of view. I think that Velleman (1996) would say that you can unselfconsciously
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project yourself into a person’s point of view at a future time in virtue of the way you
are now being relevantly psychologically connected to the way that person will be at
that future time.
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You are not a vampire. So you cannot know what it would be like to be
a vampire. So Velleman must deny that you would survive becoming a
vampire.
Here is one reason that I think you cannot know what it would be
like to be a vampire. You cannot know what it would be like to have
values, desires, and projects that differ significantly from your values,
desires, and projects. So you cannot know what it would be like to have
the values, desires, and projects of a vampire. That is, you cannot know
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2
Velleman thinks that memory gives first-personal access to a past point of
view. But Velleman (1996, 74–6) denies that a person at a future time’s remember-
ing your current experiences implies that you now have first-personal access to that
person’s point of view at that future time. His explanation of this asymmetry
involves double brain hemisphere transplant. And we have just seen another way
to explain this asymmetry: you can remember what it was like to have very different
values, desires, and projects at a past time, even if you were, at that past time, unable
to know what it would be like to have your current values, desires, and projects.
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and projects that you have never had before. And all the objections to
the Selfer view to follow will be objections to that thesis.
Velleman says the following in a later work:
. . . the word ‘self ’ does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a
reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his
own mind. This view stands in opposition to the view currently prevailing
among philosophers—that the self is a proper part of a person’s psychology,
comprising those characteristics and attitudes without which the person would
no longer be himself. I do not believe in the existence of the self so conceived.
(2006, 1)
And if the Selfer view is true, then every good answer to the Why
Question both competes with my answer and also implies a sort of
psychological connectedness (see §III). So the Selfer view is a threat to
my answer.
Moreover, the Selfer view is not a merely hypothetical threat to my
answer to the Why Question, present in logical space but not in the
literature. We have seen that Velleman, Perry, Schechtman, and
Whiting all endorse claims and defend strands of argument that
imply the Selfer view. And Velleman says that the ‘view currently
prevailing among philosophers’ is that there are certain ‘characteristics
and attitudes without which the person would no longer be himself ’. If
Velleman is right, then it seems that the Selfer view is not only present
in the literature, but is prevalent.
And Perry (1976) seems to think that you can persist as someone who
will not have the same self as you now have. For he takes the following
supposition quite seriously:
Suppose I believe that tomorrow I will be struck by amnesia incurable in fact,
though not in principle; that my character and personality will suddenly
change. So I will hate what I now love, and work against what I now hope for.
(1976, 84)
3
Exact psychological connectedness is transitive. But no Selfer should take
having the same self to be a matter of having exactly the same values, desires, and
projects. For then the Selfer view would imply that no one can survive even a single
small change with regard to values, desires, or projects. That would be a reductio of
the Selfer view.
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Growing Up 103
IV. Growing Up
Astronauts and professional athletes aside, adults are not likely to work
on the projects they started in kindergarten. Most adults do not act on
the intentions they formed as first-graders. No preschooler’s sense of
self is built around being a philosopher, not even a preschooler who
grows up to be an academic whose sense of self is built around being a
philosopher. Prepubescents cannot know what it will be like to be
postpubescent and, shall we say, restless along a particular dimension.
These few examples illustrate the obvious: the way that someone is
as a child is not—with regard to values, desires, and projects—
substantively psychologically connected to the way that that person
will be as an adult. Indeed, a child’s becoming an adult is as extreme a
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Growing Up 105
4
Jeff McMahan agrees that a future experience will be good for you just in case
whoever will have that future experience will then have what matters in survival for
you. But we draw different conclusions from this. For McMahan (2002, 78) says
that since no adult will have what matters in survival for a late-term fetus, the death
of a fetus (and so the loss of potential goods that would be enjoyed in a long life) is
‘not a terrible tragedy, at least not for the fetus itself ’. McMahan is explicit that the
same goes for infants. I suppose he must say the same about small children, since
his reason for saying what he does about fetuses and infants is that ‘psychological
unity is among the prudential unity relations’ (McMahan, 2002, 78).
5
As Chapter 1 (§II) emphasized, its being appropriate for you to first-
personally anticipate a future experience does not imply that you do in fact first-
personally anticipate that experience. The same goes for its being appropriate for
you to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to an experience.
And, of course, children do not first-personally anticipate, or have future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to, many of the experiences that each will have
as an adult. But the experiences that a child will have as an adult will be good (or
bad) for that child. So it is appropriate for that child to have future-directed self-
interested concern with regard to, and so first-personally anticipate, those
experiences.
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we often survive evolving over the decades in these ways. The Selfer
view implies that no one ever survives any of this. So I conclude that
the Selfer view is false.
This chapter is focused on Selfers. So it is focused on those who take
survival to require the sort of substantive psychological connectedness
that is constituted by having (enough of ) the same values, desires, and
projects. But anyone who takes survival to require substantive psycho-
logical connectedness of any sort is subject to the worries raised in this
section.
For example, recall Leibniz’s view that a future person will have
what matters in survival for you only if that person will have memories
of your current life (Ch. 1, §§I–II). Adults do not remember being
toddlers, at least not typically. So Leibniz’s view implies that, at least
typically, toddlers will not survive becoming adults.
Here is another example, from David Lewis:
Consider Methuselah. At the age of 100 he still remembers his childhood. But
new memories crowd out the old. At the age of 150 he has hardly any
memories that go back before his twentieth year . . . As he grows older he
grows wiser; his callow opinions and character at 90 have vanished almost
without a trace by age 220, but his opinions and character at age 220 also have
vanished almost without a trace by age 350. He soon learns that it is futile to
set goals for himself too far ahead. At age 120 he is still somewhat interested in
fulfilling the ambitions he held at age 40; but at age 170 he cares nothing for
those ambitions, and it is beginning to take an effort of will to summon up an
interest in fulfilling his aspirations at age 80. And so it goes. (1976, 30)
Lewis says that ‘what matters in survival is literally identity’ (1976, 20).6
Lewis (1976) takes substantive psychological connectedness to be nec-
essary for identity. So he takes it to be necessary for survival. So he
concludes that Methuselah at age 80 does not survive as, for example,
Methuselah at age 350.
Lewis wants to draw a distinction here between ‘us short-lived’
creatures and Methuselah. Lewis says:
6
Lewis (1976, 17) also says: ‘what matters in survival is mental continuity and
connectedness’. One of the main points of Lewis (1976) is to argue that these two
claims about what matters in survival are consistent. That argument explicitly
trades on the claim that persons perdure, and so do not endure.
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But I deny that this distinction can be drawn. The reasons Lewis gives
for concluding that Methuselah will not survive for more than one-
and-a-half centuries are equally good—that is, equally bad—reasons
for concluding that no child will survive becoming an adult.
V. Other Transformations
Case One: You learn that someone who is not a Nazi will, over the
next twenty years, gradually become a Nazi. You are disturbed and
saddened. You learn next that that someone is you. Then, as Perry (§I)
would put it, a whole new set of emotions rises within your breast: you
dread becoming a Nazi; you are horrified not just by Nazi values,
desires, and projects, but also by your coming to have those values,
desires, and projects; and so on. You thereby first-personally antici-
pate, and have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to,
experiences that you will have as a Nazi.
I do not think that you can now know what it would be like to be a
Nazi (cf. §II). But in Case One you do first-personally anticipate the
experiences you will have as a Nazi. So I reject Velleman’s character-
ization of first-personal anticipation. For, as we saw in Section II,
Velleman’s characterization implies that you can first-personally antic-
ipate an experience a person will have at a future time only if you can
know what it would be like to be that person, having that experience,
at that time.
Or consider Mary, who has been in a black-and-white room her
whole life (cf. Jackson, 1982). She knows that she will soon leave this
room and have the experience of seeing red for the first time. She is
now looking forward to seeing red, is now feeling excitement about
seeing red, is now wondering what it will be like for her to see red, and
so on. So Mary is now both first-personally anticipating, and also
having future-directed self-interested concern with regard to, seeing
red. This is all consistent with the claim that Mary cannot now know
what it would be like to see red.
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Here is Case Two: You are not a Nazi. You learn that you will be
annihilated twenty years from now. A Nazi will then be created at the
same instant in your place. This is bad news for you. But the bad news
for you is that you will be annihilated. The bad news for you is not that
you will become a Nazi. So you do not dread becoming a Nazi, nor are
you horrified by your coming to have Nazi values, and so on. So you do
not first-personally anticipate, or have future-directed self-interested
concern with regard to, experiences that will be had by the Nazi who
will replace you.
You are not now a Nazi. So the values, desires, and projects that
‘make you the person you are’ are not those of a Nazi. So no future
Nazi will be—with regard to values, desires, and projects—
substantively psychologically connected to the way you are now. So
the Selfer view implies that no future Nazi could have what matters in
survival for you. So the Selfer view implies that it is no more appro-
priate for you to first-personally anticipate, with horror, having the
experiences of a Nazi in Case One than it is to first-personally
anticipate this in Case Two.
If I were to discover that I was going to become a Nazi, this would
horrify me in ways that the discovery that I was going to be annihilated
would not, not even if I also discovered that a Nazi was going to be
created upon my annihilation. And I do not think my being horrified
in this way would be based on a mistake. So I think that in Case One,
it is appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate, and have future-
directed self-interested concern with regard to, the experiences that
you will have as a Nazi. So I think that the Selfer view is false.
Look at it this way. The experiences of a future (conscious) person
will be bad (or good) for you—for the you of right now—just in case
you will survive as that future person (Ch. 1, §§II–III). So it will be
bad for you to have a future Nazi’s values, desires, and projects just in
case you will survive as that Nazi. So Selfers must deny that coming to
have Nazi values, desires, and projects would be bad for you. Indeed,
Selfers must deny that becoming a Nazi would be bad for you. Again,
I think that the Selfer view is false.
The Selfer view is not consistent with the claim that becoming a
Nazi would be bad for you. More carefully, the Selfer view is not
consistent with the claim that becoming a Nazi would be distinctively
bad for you. But the Selfer view is consistent with—and even
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implies—that becoming a Nazi would be bad for you in the way that
being annihilated would be bad for you. For just as Leibniz says that
forgetting all you have been is the practical equivalent of annihilation
(Ch.1, §I), so Selfers should say that undergoing a change in self is the
practical equivalent of annihilation. But I do not think that this helps
the Selfer view. Instead, as we shall see, this is yet another reason to
reject the Selfer view.
Thomas Nagel says:
If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground
that life is a good and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss, bad not
because of any positive features but because of the desirability of what it removes.
(1970, 75) (see also Nagel, 1986, 224; Feldman, 1991;
Bradley, 2009, 47–60; and Broome, 2013)
7
See Epicurus, ‘Letter to Menoeceus’ 124–5 [1926, 85] and Lucretius, On the
Nature of the Universe 3.843–3.862 [1994, 88].
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for you only in the way that being annihilated would be bad (or not) for
you. So, again, I think that the Selfer view is false.
I have focused on a tragic transformation. But transformations can
be beautiful. You are now a Nazi. (Sorry.) But in twenty years you will
not only be a non-Nazi, you will be loving and wise. I think that it will
be good for you—for the you of right now—to become loving and
wise. But Selfers must deny this. Selfers must say that this will be bad
for you to the extent—and in the way—that being annihilated would
be bad for you.
So the Selfer view implies that it would be bad for a Nazi to become
a non-Nazi to the extent—and in the way—that being annihilated
would be bad for that Nazi. And the Selfer view implies that it would
be bad for a non-Nazi to become a Nazi to the extent—and in the
way—that being annihilated would be bad for that non-Nazi. So a
Nazi’s becoming a non-Nazi who is loving and wise is just as bad for
that Nazi as a non-Nazi’s becoming a Nazi is bad for that non-Nazi.
Or so the Selfer view implies. Again, I think that the Selfer view
is false.
In George Orwell’s 1984, Winston Smith has values, desires, and
projects that are not approved of by the Party. So the Party’s Thought
Police forcibly ‘reintegrate’ Smith. They make Smith have (via torture)
the values, desires, and projects that are approved of by the Party.
Reintegration causes a change in self (cf. Barnes, 2015).
The Thought Police harmed Smith by torturing him. But they also
harmed Smith by replacing the values, desires, and projects that Smith
had with worse values, desires, and projects. They harmed him by
making him into a worse sort of person. If you agree that Smith was
harmed in this way, then you should conclude that it was bad for the
‘pre-reintegrated’ Smith to be reintegrated. But then Smith survived
reintegration. So the Selfer view is false.
Or suppose you somehow stunt a child’s psychological growth so
that, over the coming decades, she will not change in values, desires, or
projects. Then you have grievously harmed that child. But the Selfer
view implies that you have, instead, protected that child from the
practical equivalent of annihilation. Again, the Selfer view is false.
The Selfer view manages to be both implausibly optimistic and
implausibly hopeless at the same time. Here are two examples of
implausible Selfer optimism: it is never appropriate for you to
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Conclusion 111
VI. Conclusion
The Selfer view says that a person at a future time will have, at that
time, what matters in survival for you only if the way that person will
be at that time is—with regard to values, desires, and projects—
substantively like the way you are now. That is, the Selfer view says
that you cannot survive a change in self. We have seen that the Selfer
view is false. So any good answer to the following must allow for you to
survive a change in self:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
My answer is being numerically identical with. You can be numerically
identical with a person at a future time even if the way that person will
be at that time is—with regard to values, desires, and projects—not
substantively like the way you are now. So my answer allows for you to
survive a change in self.
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5
The Same Self-Narrative
Consider:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
I shall briefly discuss an answer to this question that is in terms of
narrative, but that does not imply psychological connectedness or
psychological continuity (§IV). But I shall not focus on this sort of
answer. This is because I want to focus on the most serious competi-
tors to my answer to the Why Question. And I take the most serious
competitors to be in terms of—or at least to imply—psychological
connectedness or psychological continuity (Ch. 3, §V).
The narrative-based answers to the Why Question that I shall focus
on are in terms of psychological connectedness, and in terms of
psychological continuity (which is a chain of overlapping instances of
psychological connectedness). Chapter 6 considers an answer in terms
of narrative-based psychological continuity. But this chapter focuses
on an answer in terms of narrative-based psychological connectedness.
In particular, this chapter focuses on an answer in terms of being alike
with regard to ‘self-narrative’. As we shall see, this chapter thereby
continues the discussion of the Selfer view that began in Chapter 4.
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0006
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now have will be had by that person at that future time. And this claim
implies a parallel claim about appropriate first-personal anticipation
(Ch. 1, §II).
Recall:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
The answer: its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate
the experiences that that person will have at that future time; and if
that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that time, its being
appropriate for you to have future-directed self-interested concern
with regard to those experiences (Ch. 1, §II).
So Schechtman is committed to the following two claims. First, a
person at a future time will have, at that time, what matters in survival
for you if and only if that person will then have the self-narrative that
you now have. Second, you survive as that person at that future time
because that person will then have the self-narrative that you now
have; in other words, having the same self-narrative is what explains
your surviving as that person. Let the Self-Narrative Account of survival
be these two claims. That account answers:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
That account’s answer is having the same self-narrative.
In what follows, I shall proceed as if Schechtman takes having the
same self-narrative to be a way of being substantively psychologically
alike. I have two reasons for proceeding in this way. The first reason is
that Schechtman is a Selfer. Schechtman thinks that a person at a
future time will have, at that time, what matters in survival for you only
if that person will then have the values, desires, and projects that now
‘make you the person you are’ (see Ch. 4, §I). And Schechtman thinks
that it is the values, desires, and projects that are included in your self-
narrative that make you the person you are.
Schechtman’s being a Selfer makes perfect sense if having the same
self-narrative is a way of being substantively psychologically alike. For
then Schechtman can say that a person at a future time who will have
the same self-narrative as you have will thereby be like you with regard
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to the values, desires, and projects that make you the person you are.
Moreover, Schechtman can say that you and that person will be alike
in that way because you are alike with regard to having a self-narrative
that ‘includes’ those values, desires, and projects.
On the other hand, suppose—just for the sake of argument—that
having the same self-narrative is not a matter of being substantively
psychologically alike. Then having the same self-narrative does not
imply being substantively psychologically alike, not even with regard to
values, desires, and projects. So then the Self-Narrative Account has
the result that you could survive as a person at a future time—in virtue
of having the same self-narrative as that person—even if that person
will not have the values, desires, and projects that you now have. But
then the Self-Narrative Account is not consistent with the Selfer view.
And then the Self-Narrative Account is not consistent with the
following, which is central to Schechtman’s (1996) narrative self-
constitution view: it is appropriate for you to have future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to a person’s experiences at a future
time just in case that person will have your ‘identity’, that is, will have
the values, desires, and projects that ‘make you the person you are’.
I have a second reason for proceeding as if Schechtman takes having
the same self-narrative to be a way of being substantively psychologi-
cally alike. This reason begins with how Schechtman describes having
a self-narrative. She says:
The way in which we have autobiographical narratives on [the narrative self-
constitution view] is cashed out mostly in terms of the way in which an
implicit understanding of the ongoing course of our lives influences our
experience and deliberation. (2014, 101)
Schechtman (1996, 113) also emphasizes that a self-narrative is the
‘lens through which we filter our experience and plan for actions’. And,
as we saw above, Schechtman (1996, 96) thinks that to have a self-
narrative is to conceive of your life as having the form and the logic of a
story.
But then it seems that your having the same self-narrative as a
person at a future time just is your implicitly understanding the
ongoing course of your life in the way that that person will implicitly
understand, at that future time, the ongoing course of her or his life.
Or it is the ‘lens’ through which you view your experience and plan for
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action being the same as that person’s ‘lens’ at that future time. Or it is
the story you conceive of your life as having being the same as the story
that that person will, at that future time, conceive of his or her life as
having. All this implies that you have the same self-narrative as a
person at a future time just in case the way you are now is psycholog-
ically like the way that person will be in a particular way.
For the above two reasons I shall proceed as if Schechtman says that
having the same self-narrative is a way of being substantively psycho-
logically alike. But I admit that some of what Schechtman says does
not fit with this interpretation. For example, she says:
I call a person’s underlying psychological organization a self-narrative because
it is not simply a static set of facts about him, but rather a dynamic set of
organizing principles, a basic orientation through which, with or without
conscious awareness, an individual understands himself and his world. These
implicitly organizing principles are not simply a collection of features, but a
continually developing interpretation of the course of one’s own trajectory
through the world. (1996, 115–16)
Schechtman here seems to take a self-narrative to be dynamic. That is,
she seems to take a self-narrative to ‘continually develop’ in a way that
is consistent with your having the same self-narrative as a person at a
future time even if you fail to be substantively psychologically like that
person at that time.
But I do not think we should read Schechtman as taking a self-
narrative to be dynamic. This is mainly because of the above two
reasons for taking Schechtman to say that having the same self-
narrative is a way of being substantively psychologically alike. But
there is one other reason. This other reason starts by pointing out
that if a self-narrative is dynamic, then having the same self-narrative
seems to be a species of psychological continuity, as opposed to
psychological connectedness. That is, your having the same self-
narrative as a person at a future time seems to be a matter of your
being related by overlapping instances of psychological connectedness
to that person at that time. (Each such instance of connectedness is
constituted by having a similar ‘interpretation of the course of one’s
own trajectory through the world’.)
Psychological continuity is transitive. So if a self-narrative is
dynamic, then having the same self-narrative is transitive. So if
Schechtman takes a self-narrative to be dynamic, then Schechtman
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lens for filtering experiences and planning for action. So your acquiring
the values, desires, and projects of a vampire would result in your
acquiring a new self-narrative. More generally, it seems that a change
in (enough of ) your values, desires, and projects results in a change in
self-narrative. That is, a change in self results in a change in self-
narrative. So if you cannot survive a change in self-narrative, then you
cannot survive a change in self. The Self-Narrative Account of survival
implies that you cannot survive a change in self-narrative. So that
account implies that you cannot survive a change in self. Again, the
Self-Narrative Account implies the Selfer view.
Some deny that persons in general have self-narratives (see, e.g.
Strawson, 2004). They will deny that a change in self results in a
change in self-narrative. This does not matter. For their denials do not
undermine the following line of reasoning. If the Self-Narrative
Account is true, then having the same self-narrative as a person at a
future time is necessary for surviving as that person. So that account
implies that you can survive only if you have a self-narrative. Persons in
general can survive. So if the Self-Narrative Account is true, then
persons in general have self-narratives. In other words, the Self-
Narrative Account implies that persons in general have self-narratives.
So the Self-Narrative Account implies that a change in self results in a
change in self-narrative. So if the Self-Narrative Account is true, you
cannot survive a change in self. Again, the Self-Narrative Account
implies the Selfer view.
The Self-Narrative Account says that your having the same self-
narrative as a person will have at a future time is sufficient for your
surviving as that person at that time. Defenders of that account will
want their view to be consistent with the fact that, typically, at most
one person at a future time will have, at that time, what matters in
survival for you. (Teletransportation gone awry is atypical.) So they
should say that, typically, at most one person at a future time will have,
at that time, the same self-narrative as you now have. So they should
say that the sort of psychological connectedness that constitutes having
the same self-narrative is substantive. So I take the Self-Narrative
Account to imply not just that persons in general have self-narratives,
but that they have quite detailed self-narratives.
The Self-Narrative Account implies the Selfer view. So any argu-
ment for the falsity of the Selfer view is thereby an argument for the
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decades with regard to how you understand your life is the practical
equivalent of annihilation. On the contrary, it can be just more grow-
ing up. Again, I conclude that the Self-Narrative Account is false.
This concludes this section’s discussion of the Self-Narrative Account
of survival.
The rest of this section considers a different account of survival.
This account invokes self-narrative but is tailor-made to allow a small
child to survive growing up. Considering this account will allow me to
defend the claim that not only is the Self-Narrative Account exactly as
understood above inconsistent with a child’s surviving growing up, but
so is the basic idea that self-narrative is what delivers survival.
David DeGrazia says:
It doesn’t matter that one can’t remember being born and might have trouble
anticipating a state of severe dementia. One knows on the basis of others’
testimony and everyday biological and medical knowledge that one was born
and might someday become demented. Thus the past event is appropriated
into one’s inner story, and the possible future state is appropriated as a possible
continuation of the story. (2005, 83)
Suppose that your self-narrative (your ‘inner story’) includes your
having been a particular person at an earlier time. Add that this implies
that that person at that earlier time has survived as you. Add further
that if your self-narrative includes your being a particular person at a
later time, then you will survive as that person at that later time. All
this constitutes a self-narrative-invoking account of survival. Let this
be the Kid-Friendly Account of survival.
Pretend that it is part of my self-narrative that I was once Emperor
of France, was defeated at Waterloo, and so on. Add the Kid-Friendly
Account of survival. Then it seems that we get the result that
Napoleon has survived as me. This is a bad result. So let us assume
that we can avoid this bad result by taking the Kid-Friendly Account
to include a ‘reality constraint’.
DeGrazia endorses a reality constraint. In particular, DeGrazia
thinks that your including a past (or future) person in your self-
narrative delivers survival only if you are numerically identical with
that past (or future) person (DeGrazia, 2005, 114).
Schechtman also endorses a reality constraint. She says:
. . . the facts with which an identity-constituting narrative must cohere
obviously cannot be facts about persons per se, or the narrative self-constitution
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require more for you to survive as a future vampire than that vampire’s
remembering being the you of today. More generally, to say that
memory delivers survival is not thereby to say that self-narrative is
what delivers survival.
Second example: A new genetic test has revealed that I shall suffer
dementia in twenty years, dementia so severe that I shall no longer
have a self-narrative. Part of my current implicit understanding of the
ongoing course of my life now includes my being someone who will
thus suffer. (That implicit understanding accommodates any reason-
able reality constraint, since it is I who shall suffer.) Schechtman
(1996, 146–50) would deny that the demented me at some future
time will have, at that time, what now matters in survival for me. For
example, Schechtman says:
1
At least, I believe that we get this result. For I say that being numerically
identical with is a good answer to:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious) person at a future
time explains why that person will have (at that time) what matters in survival
for you?
And I think that this is still a good answer (and my defense of that answer is still a
good defense) even if we replace the word ‘person’ with the words ‘human being’ in
the Why Question.
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Conclusion 131
VII. Conclusion
Consider:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
The Self-Narrative Account of survival answers this question in terms
of psychological connectedness that is constituted by having the same
self-narrative. We have seen that this is not a good answer. But you
might still think that the answer to the Why Question should involve
narrative. So perhaps you will say that there is a good answer in terms
of narrative-constituting psychological continuity. Chapter 6 explores
just such an answer, and also explores an answer in terms of agency.
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6
Agential Continuity and
Narrative Continuity
Consider:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
Chapter 5 focused on an answer to the Why Question in terms of a
specific sort of psychological connectedness, namely, having the same
self-narrative. This chapter will consider two more answers to the
Why Question, one of which—like the answer considered in
Chapter 5—involves narrative. But the answers considered in this
chapter are in terms of specific sorts of psychological continuity, as
opposed to psychological connectedness.
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0007
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Korsgaard is not saying: ‘L‘état, c‘est moi.’ That is, she is not claiming
that she persists as a future state—is one and the same entity as that
state—just in case she enjoys ‘unity of agency’ with that future state.
Rather, Korsgaard is making a claim about her having reasons for
‘personal concern’ with regard to that state at a future time.
By the same token, Korsgaard is not claiming that you persist as a
future person—are one and the same entity as that person—just in
case you enjoy ‘unity of agency’ with that future person. Rather, she is
making a claim about your having reasons for ‘personal concern’ with
regard to that person at that future time. So she is making a claim
about your being related to that person at that time in a way that has
‘some special normative force for’ you. So I think that Korsgaard is
claiming (among other things) that it is appropriate for you to have
future-directed self-interested concern with regard to a person’s
experiences at a future time just in case you enjoy ‘unity of agency’
with that person at that time.
You enjoy ‘unity of agency’ with a person at a future time if and only
if you are the same agent as that person at that time. Korsgaard thinks
that you are the same agent as a person at a future time if and only if—
and because—you and that person lead the same ‘one life’. That is,
Korsgaard thinks that you are the same agent as a person at a future
time if and only if—and because—you are agentially continuous with
that person at that time.
So Korsgaard is committed to the view that it is appropriate for you
to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard to a per-
son’s experiences at a future time if and only if—and because—you are
agentially continuous with that person at that time. And if it is
appropriate to have future-directed self-interested concern with regard
to an experience, then it is appropriate to first-personally anticipate
that experience (Ch. 1, §II).
Recall:
The What Question: What is it for a person at a future time to have
(at that time) what matters in survival for you?
The answer: its being appropriate for you to first-personally anticipate
the experiences that that person will have at that future time;
and if that person will have good (or bad) experiences at that time,
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1
The passages quoted in this section all come from Korsgaard (1989). When
returning to similar views in her book Self-Constitution, Korsgaard replaces the
expression ‘personal identity’ with ‘personal or practical identity’ (2009, 19–20).
This replacement reinforces the point that she is not defending a criterion of
personal identity over time.
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2
Do not conflate being one thing and lacking proper parts. That would just be a
mistake. Moreover, this conflation would not help Korsgaard. On the contrary, it
would undermine her practical reason for your regarding yourself as one person
now. For even if ‘the necessity of making deliberative choices’ is a practical reason
for regarding yourself as one person now, it is no reason at all for regarding yourself
as partless.
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3
The Narrative Continuity Account is not supposed to be the Self-Narrative
Account under a different label. So let us explicitly add that a local narrative char-
acterizes less than an entire life. Then a local narrative is not a self-narrative. So the
Narrative Continuity Account is a genuine alternative to the Self-Narrative Account.
MacIntyre’s remarks quoted in the text really do suggest the idea of a local
narrative, which is why I quoted them. But MacIntyre himself seems to deny that
there are local narratives. For MacIntyre seems to take the narratives that render
actions intelligible to characterize an entire life, and even more than an entire life.
MacIntyre says:
. . . in successfully identifying and understanding what someone else is doing we
always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative
histories, histories both of the individual concerned and of the settings in which
they act and suffer. (1984, 211)
Charles Taylor also seems to reject the idea of a local narrative, at least with regard
to characterizing non-trivial actions. He seems to think that characterizing a non-
trivial action requires a self-narrative. Taylor says:
Thus making sense of my present action, when we are not dealing with such trivial
questions as where I shall go in the next five minutes but with the issue of my place
relative to the good, requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense of what
I have become which can only be given in a story. (1989, 48)
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you are also related to that person at that future time by overlapping
instances of choosing to act that result in the having of various
psychological states. So it seems that you are agentially continuous
with that person at that future time. So if you will survive as a person at
a future time by the lights of the Narrative Continuity Account of
survival, then it seems that you will survive as that person at that time
by the lights of the Agential Continuity Account of survival.
I think that defenders of the Narrative Continuity Account should
assume that every action is characterized by a local narrative. Suppose
they are right. And suppose that you are agentially continuous with a
person at a future time. Then you are related to that person at that
future time by overlapping instances of choosing to act that result in
the having of various psychological states. Then it seems that—
because every action is characterized by a local narrative—you are
also related to that person at that future time by overlapping instances
of action-characterizing psychological connectedness. So it seems that
you are related to that person at that future time by local narrative
continuity. So if you will survive as a person at a future time by the
lights of the Agential Continuity Account of survival, then it seems
that you will survive as that person at that time by the lights of the
Narrative Continuity Account of survival.
I think that you are a human organism (Ch. 3, §IV). And I think
that human organisms can endure in the absence of both agential
continuity and also local narrative continuity. So I conclude that you
can be numerically identical with a (conscious) person at a future time
even if you are not agentially continuous with, or locally narratively
continuous with, that person at that time. So I take my answer to the
Why Question to imply that you can survive as a person at a future
time even if you are not agentially continuous with, or locally narra-
tively continuous with, that person at that time. But this implication is
false if either the Agential Continuity Account or the Narrative
Continuity Account is true. This is my second reason for taking
both of those accounts to compete with my answer to the Why
Question.
Suppose that persons endure. Suppose also that the criterion of
personal identity over time is agential continuity. Then agential con-
tinuity might be a good answer to the Why Question because numer-
ical identity is also a good answer to the Why Question (see Ch. 2,
§III). Then we should reject my first reason for taking the Agential
Continuity Account to compete with my answer to the Why
Question. And if the criterion of personal identity over time is local
narrative continuity, we should reject my first reason for taking the
Narrative Continuity Account to compete with my answer to the Why
Question.
Again, suppose that the criterion of personal identity over time is
agential continuity. Then you cannot be numerically identical with a
person at a future time but not agentially continuous with that person
at that time. Then we should reject my second reason for taking the
Agential Continuity Account to compete with my answer to the Why
Question. And if the criterion of personal identity over time is local
narrative continuity, we should reject my second reason for taking the
Narrative Continuity Account to compete with my answer to the Why
Question.
Suppose that agential continuity is the criterion of personal identity
over time. Then we should do more than reject my two reasons for
taking the Agential Continuity Account to compete with my answer
to the Why Question. We should also conclude that the Agential
Continuity Account does not compete with my answer. And if local
narrative continuity is the criterion of personal identity over time, we
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4
One defense of this assumption starts with the claim that each of us is an
organism. Here is another defense: agential continuity and narrative continuity can
branch; since we endure, personal identity over time cannot branch (Ch. 3, §IV); so
neither agential continuity nor local narrative continuity is the criterion of personal
identity over time.
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5
Case One presupposes that you persist as a vampire. If agential continuity is
the criterion of personal identity over time, this presupposition is false. So if you
think that agential continuity is the criterion of personal identity over time,
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you should object to Case One, and to other moves made in this section. But if you
think that agential continuity is the criterion of personal identity over time, you
should not take the Agential Continuity Account to compete with my answer to
the Why Question (§III). So you and I agree on what is most important here: the
Agential Continuity Account is no reason to reject my answer, or to think that
something or other must have gone wrong in my defense of that answer.
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you will not survive becoming an evil vampire in Case Three. So that
account implies that in Case Three, your being an evil vampire at a
future time will not be bad for you. Rather, that account implies that
the events of Case Three will be bad (or not) for you only in the way in
which being annihilated would be bad (or not) for you.
Maybe being annihilated would not be bad for you. But being
transformed into an evil vampire against your will would be bad for
you. Maybe being annihilated would be bad for you only in that it
would deprive you of the goods that come with continued survival. But
it is false that being transformed into an evil vampire would be bad for
you only in that it would deprive you of the goods that come with
continued survival. More generally, being transformed into an evil
vampire, against your will, would be bad for you, and not only in the
way in which being annihilated would be bad (or not) for you
(cf. Ch. 4, §V).
Imagine this scene from a vampire movie. You have just been bitten
by an evil vampire. Your transformation has not yet started. But it soon
will. You would rather cease to exist than become an evil vampire. So
you ask your friends to kill you, and to do so for your sake. They balk,
so you beg. This scene makes sense. But not given the Agential
Continuity Account. For given that account, and as far as self-
interested concern goes, you should be indifferent between ceasing
to exist and becoming an evil vampire against your will. But you are
not indifferent. Hence the begging. I conclude that the Agential
Continuity Account is false.
Consider:
Case Four: You will soon be transformed ‘by wholly external forces’
into a much happier, smarter, wiser, and more loving person. So the
way you are now is not agentially continuous with the way you will
be after transformation.
The Agential Continuity Account implies that the events of Case
Four would be bad (or not) for you in the same way—and to
the same degree—that the events of Case Three would be bad (or
not) for you. For the Agential Continuity Account implies that both
cases would be bad (or not) for you in the way in which being
annihilated would be bad (or not) for you.
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But I deny that Case Three and Case Four are both bad (or not) for
you in the same way and to the same degree. It is worse for you to be
transformed into an evil vampire who will not be agentially continuous
with you than it is for you to be transformed into a much happier,
smarter, wiser, and more loving person who will not be agentially
continuous with you. Again, the Agential Continuity Account is false.
Recall that Winston Smith has values, desires, projects, and a self-
narrative that are not approved of by the Party. The Party’s Thought
Police take note, and forcibly ‘reintegrate’ Smith. That is, they turn
Smith, by wholly external forces, into the sort of person approved of by
the Party. I think that the Thought Police have harmed Smith, but not
in the way that they would have harmed Smith had they annihilated
him. This is another reason to conclude that the Agential Continuity
Account is false (cf. Ch. 4, §V; Ch. 5, §V).
I learn that the Thought Police are coming for me. So I am afraid.
One of the things I am afraid of is being turned, against my will, into
the sort of person approved of by the Party. I fear this in a way that
differs from how I would fear being annihilated. And I fear this in a
way that differs from how I would fear your being turned into the sort
of person approved of by the Party. For the way in which I fear this
involves my first-personally anticipating, and having future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to, the experiences of someone
who will be the way the Party wants people to be. I think my fear is
appropriate. But the Agential Continuity Account implies that it is
not. So I conclude, again, that that account is false.
Perhaps it is possible that the way you are now is agentially contin-
uous with the way you were when you were a child. So perhaps the
Agential Continuity Account of survival does not automatically imply
that no child survives becoming an adult. But going through puberty is
like being bitten by a vampire. Growing up happens to a child. (And if
given a choice, some children would choose not to grow up.) So I think
that the way some children are now is not agentially continuous with
the way that they will be when adults. So the Agential Continuity
Account has the result that those children will not survive growing up
(cf. Ch. 4, §IV; Ch. 5, §IV). More generally, that account has the
result that no one can survive a significant transformation caused
entirely by circumstances beyond his or her control. But this result is
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agentially (or locally narratively) continuous with the way that person
will be at that time (cf. Ch. 5, §VI).
I do not endorse the above account of being the ‘same agent’. Nor
do I endorse Korsgaard’s view of what constitutes being an agent. But
nothing I have said in this chapter rules out that account or that view.
In particular, that account and that view are perfectly consistent with
the falsity of the Agential Continuity Account of survival and with the
fasity of the Narrative Continuity Account of survival.
Suppose, for reductio, that every good answer to the Why Question
must be in terms of—or imply—psychological connectedness. Then
we cannot survive transformations that eventually result in a break in
psychological connectedness. But we can survive some such transfor-
mations. For example, a small child can survive transforming into an
adult (Ch. 4, §IV; Ch. 5, §IV). So it is false that every good answer to
the Why Question must be in terms of—or imply—psychological
connectedness.6
Some transformations that eventually result in a break in psycho-
logical connectedness would be bad for you, but not in the way that
annihilation would be bad for you. And other transformations that
eventually result in a break in psychological connectedness could be
good for you. All this implies—as we saw in Chapters 4 (§V) and 5
(§V)—that you can survive these transformations. So I conclude,
again, that it is false that every good answer to the Why Question
must be in terms of—or imply—psychological connectedness.
This conclusion is important because the answers most commonly
given to the Why Question that compete with my answer are in terms
of—or imply—psychological connectedness. This goes back at least to
Leibniz, who thinks that the answer to the Why Question must imply
being connected by memory (Ch. 1, §§I–II). Moreover, the currently
predominant view seems to be that the answer to the Why Question
must imply being psychologically connected in virtue of being alike
with regard to values, desires, and projects (Ch. 4, §II). And then
there is Parfit:
I said earlier that what matters in survival could be provisionally referred
to as ‘psychological continuity’. I must now distinguish this relation from
another, which I shall call ‘psychological connectedness’ . . . ‘Psychological
connectedness’ . . . requires the holding of these direct psychological
relations . . . . ‘Psychological continuity’ . . . only requires overlapping chains
of direct psychological relations . . . . Now that we have distinguished the
general relations of psychological continuity and psychological connectedness,
I suggest that connectedness is a more important element in survival.
(1971, 20–1, quoted in Ch. 3, §II; see also Parfit, 1984, 262)
6
The sort of psychological connectedness here is supposed to be substantive (cf.
Ch. 4, §I; Ch. 5, §§I–II). So take claims about psychological connectedness here to
be claims about substantive psychological connectedness.
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harmed Smith had they annihilated him. So it is false that every good
answer to the Why Question must be in terms of—or imply—
psychological continuity (cf. Ch. 4, §V; Ch. 5, §V; §IV).
I learn that I am next. The Thought Police are going to reinte-
grate me via a process that involves a break in psychological conti-
nuity. So I am afraid. One of the things I am afraid of is my
becoming the sort of person approved of by the Party. I fear this in
a way that differs from how I would fear being annihilated. And
I fear this in a way that differs from how I would fear your becoming
the sort of person approved of by the Party. For my fear includes
first-personally anticipating, and having future-directed self-interested
concern with regard to, the experiences of someone who will be the way
the Party wants people to be. I think my fear is appropriate. So
I conclude that it is false that every good answer to the Why Question
must be in terms of—or imply—psychological continuity (cf. Ch. 4,
§V; Ch. 5, §V; §IV).
Imagine that a new genetic test has revealed that I shall someday
suffer an abrupt and total break in psychological connectedness, and so
a break in psychological continuity. I think that this will be bad for me,
that is, for the me of right now. Moreover, I do not think that this will
be bad for me in the way that my someday being annihilated would be
bad (or not) for me. So I conclude that I shall survive this break in
psychological continuity (see Ch. 1, §§II–III). So it is false that every
good answer to the Why Question must be in terms of—or imply—
psychological continuity (cf. §IV).
Finally, pretend that every good answer to the Why Question must
be in terms of—or at least imply—psychological continuity. Then
future-directed self-interested concern would be rendered appropriate
only by psychological continuity, or by something that implies psy-
chological continuity. I assume that the way you are now is not
psychologically continuous with the way you will be when perma-
nently unconscious and comatose. So—given what we are
pretending—it is not appropriate for you to have future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to something bad that will happen
to you while you are permanently unconscious and comatose. But
I think this is appropriate (see Ch. 1, §III). This is another reason
that I deny that every good answer to the Why Question must be in
terms of—or imply—psychological continuity.
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Conclusion 155
VII. Conclusion
Consider:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
My answer is your being numerically identical with that person at that
time.
I endorse my answer because of the argument given in Chapter 2
(§I). I do not endorse my answer because I have ruled out every
possible competing answer and my answer is the last one standing.
For I have not ruled out every possible competing answer. I have not
even examined every possible competing answer. I bet there are a lot.
But I have examined—and tried to rule out—what I take to be the
far and away most tempting kind of competing answer. For I have
argued for the conclusion that no one should endorse an answer to the
Why Question that both competes with my answer and also is in terms
of—or implies—psychological connectedness or psychological conti-
nuity. My argument for this conclusion runs from Chapter 3 (§V)
through Section VI above.
Chapter 7 will not oppose new competitors to my answer to the
Why Question. Nor will it offer a new defense of my answer. Nor will
it offer a new defense of my claim that every good answer must imply
numerical identity (Ch. 3, §I). Instead, Chapter 7 puts the claims
defended thus far in this book through their paces by applying them
to a new topic: personal immortality.
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7
The Hope of Glory
Self and Identity. Trenton Merricks, Oxford University Press. © Trenton Merricks 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192843432.003.0008
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1
The Second Council of Constantinople condemned Origen for teaching that
our resurrected bodies will be spherical. Alas, Origen did not really teach this; see
Chadwick (1948) and Ramelli (2019, 172).
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thing as there always being someone who will have what matters in
survival for you.
I do not agree with everything that Leibniz and James say. In
particular, we disagree about how to answer:
The Why Question: What way of being related to a (conscious)
person at a future time explains why that person will have (at that
time) what matters in survival for you?
My answer is in terms of numerical identity (Ch. 2, §I). Leibniz’s answer
seems to be in terms of persistence plus memory (Ch. 1, §§I–II). And
James’s answer seems to be in terms of persistence plus psychological
continuity that is constituted by conscious states. For James says:
The substance must give rise to a stream of consciousness continuous with the
present stream, in order to arouse our hope, but of this the mere persistence of
the substance per se offers no guarantee. (1890, 348)
I said above that personal immortality is the same thing as there always
being someone who will have what matters in survival for you. And
I shall proceed as if personal immortality is the same thing as, at some
point after you die, there always being someone who will have what
matters in survival for you. For this account of personal immortality is
good enough for our purposes. In particular, this account makes it
clear that personal immortality is not the same thing as endless
persistence.
But I do not think that this account of personal immortality is
exactly right. For example—and contrary to this account—I think
that your enjoying personal immortality is consistent with there
being a brief moment a million years from now when no one will
have what matters in survival for you. But I shall not try to get this
account exactly right. For doing so would raise difficult questions that
are not relevant to the points defended in this chapter. Here is just one
such question: can you have personal immortality if you will be in an
unconscious coma—or even fail to exist—for one decade every twenty
years, ad infinitum?
I answer the Why Question in terms of numerical identity. So I take
numerical identity (and being conscious) to be sufficient for survival
(Ch., 1, §III; Ch. 2, §I). I think that every good answer to the Why
Question implies numerical identity. So I take numerical identity to be
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necessary for survival (Ch. 3, §I). So I conclude that you will enjoy
personal immortality if and only if, at some point after you die, there
will always be someone (conscious) who is numerically identical with
you. I myself believe that the hope of glory will be satisfied, and for us
all. So I conclude that at some point after you die there will always be
someone who is numerically identical with you.
Again, you will enjoy personal immortality if and only if there will
always be someone (conscious) who is numerically identical with you.
This is consistent with denying that personal immortality is the same
thing as there always being someone (conscious) who is numerically
identical with you. In particular, this is consistent with my claim that
personal immortality is, instead, the same thing as there always being
someone who will have what matters in survival for you. That is,
personal immortality is the same thing as, at some point after you
die, there always being a person whose experiences it is appropriate for
you to first-personally anticipate and with regard to whose good (or
bad) experiences it is appropriate for you to have future-directed self-
interested concern (cf. Ch. 1, §II–III).
The main points defended in this chapter are independent of my
own particular view about what it would take for there always to be
someone numerically identical with you. But I do think that you are a
human organism, a human animal, a living human body (Ch. 3, §IV).
And, for what it is worth, I think that there will always be someone
numerically identical with you just in case your body (= you) will
always exist at some point after your death. That is, your body
(= you) will be resurrected and then live forever.2
2
Chapter 3 (§IV) gives one argument for the claim that you are a human
organism. Another argument for that claim turns on the idea that our hope for
eternal life goes hand in hand with our hope for the resurrection of the body (see
Merricks, 2009). How can the resurrected body be numerically identical with the
body that died, and (let us add) was cremated and ceased to exist? For my answer,
see Merricks, 2001b.
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that when you are glorified and a billion years old, you will no longer
have many of your current values, desires, and projects, or your current
self-narrative. I think this for two reasons. First, glorification will
presumably be as big a transformation as are the transformations that
often occur in this life, transformations such as learning to read, going
through puberty, and becoming a mother. Second, a billion years
dwarfs the amount of time that has passed since your childhood.
Again, when you are glorified and a billion years old, you will no
longer have many of your current values, desires, and projects, or your
current self-narrative. So both the Selfer view and also the Self-
Narrative Account of survival imply that you could not survive becom-
ing glorified and persisting for a billion years, much less forever. So the
Selfer view and the Self-Narrative Account imply that the hope of
glory is the hope for the impossible. But the Selfer view and the Self-
Narrative Account are both false (Chs 4 and 5). So they give us no
good reason to conclude that the hope of glory is the hope for the
impossible.
Gregory of Nyssa takes glorification to be a process of endless
transformations, transformations that make us more and more like
God (see, e.g. Smith, 2018). With this in mind, consider the following
from Jeff McMahan:
. . . one might imagine the prospect of becoming like a god. Imagine the
possibility of becoming vastly more intelligent and developing a vastly richer
and deeper range of emotions, including emotions of which one cannot now
form any conception. One would be as different from oneself now, in terms of
psychological capacities, as one is now from a dog (or, more to the point, as
different from oneself now as a dog would be from itself if it were to become a
person). One would be, in short, so utterly psychologically remote from oneself
as one is now that one may now have little or no egoistic reason to want to
become that way. Even if the transformation would be identity-preserving and
would lead to a state that would be clearly superior to one’s present state, it
would be too much like becoming someone else—and, of course, losing
oneself in the process—to be very desirable from an egoistic point of view.
(2002, 321–2)
Suppose that glorification involves our acquiring new psychological
capacities, capacities that differ greatly from the ones we now enjoy,
capacities of which we cannot now form any conception. Then
McMahan’s remarks suggest that even if glorification ‘would be
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3
Even Parfit (1984, 298) says: ‘Identity is logically one-one and all or nothing.’
And Gareth Evans’s (1978) and Nathan Salmon’s (1981, 243) argument for the
conclusion that identity cannot be indeterminate can be adapted to show that
identity does not come in degrees. The first premise of this adaptation assumes for
reductio that A is identical with B to some degree (other than 0 or 1).
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concern with regard to the experiences you will have the day after
tomorrow, or in 100 years, or in a billion years. Moreover, that
explanation—your being numerically identical with the person who
will have those experiences—does not come in degrees. So it is just as
appropriate for you to have self-interested concern with regard to your
experiences in a billion years as it is for you to have self-interested
concern with regard to your current experiences.
The degree to which it is appropriate for you to have future-directed
self-interested concern with regard to the experiences that you yourself
will have does not decrease as time passes, or as you change, before
having those experiences. Add that appropriate future-directed self-
interested concern implies appropriate first-personal anticipation.
Then conclude that the degree to which (a person who is identical
with) you will have, at a future time, what matters in survival for you
does not decrease as time passes, or as you change, between now and
that future time (Ch. 1, §II). Moreover, only (a person who is identical
with) you will have, at any future time, what matters in survival for you
at that time (Ch. 3, §I). So survival does not come in degrees.4
4
You survive as a person at a future time only if that person will be conscious at
that time (Ch. 1, §III). I deny that it can be a matter of degree whether a person is
conscious. But suppose I am wrong. Then it can be a matter of degree whether you
survive as a person at a future time in virtue of its being a matter of degree whether
that person is, at that time, conscious. This poses no threat to the hope of glory or
to personal immortality more generally. For believers in personal immortality
should deny that you will—simply as a result of time and change—eventually
cease to be conscious.
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5
For critiques of that argument, see, e.g. Fischer (1994) and Rosati (2013).
6
The relevant episodes of The Good Place allude to Williams (1973). And ‘The
Dream’ might also have been influenced by Williams (1973), since the author’s
brother is the philosopher Jonathan Barnes.
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7
Williams considers one other reply to the Tedium Objection: we find an
activity so absorbing that we are not bored. He responds:
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But if one is totally and perpetually absorbed in such an activity, and loses oneself in
it, then as those words suggest, we come back to the problem of satisfying the
conditions that it should be me who lives forever, and that eternal life should be in
prospect of some interest. (1973, 96)
This response equivocates on ‘loses oneself ’.
8
Williams (1973) seems to deny that we can survive changes in self. This denial
is inconsistent with the view favored in Williams (1970). For, as noted in Ch. 2
(§III), Williams (1970) favors the view that having the numerically same body
delivers survival. And you can have the numerically same body as a person will have
at a future time even if you do not have the same self as that person will have at
that time.
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But I reply to Williams and Kagan that we can survive changes in self
(and we can survive forgetting). This includes not only the changes in
self (and forgetting) that occur as a child becomes an adult (Ch. 4,
§IV), but also the changes in self that occur as you become glorified
and a billion years old (§II).
Perhaps there is a sense in which Teiresias does not continue to be
the ‘same person’. Perhaps there is a sense in which Teiresias
exchanges one ‘identity’ for another, and then for yet another. And
perhaps the hope of glory suggests that eventually each of us will, in
some sense, become a ‘different person’ (maybe over and over again) or
exchange one ‘identity’ for another (maybe ad infinitum). Chapters 5
(§VI) and 6 (§V) provide the resources to reconcile this with our
surviving forever as glorified.
in (for example) a billion years, and a lot that we do not know about
what they will then do. I think that because of this ignorance, it is not
rational for any of us to conclude that the deprivations (if any) that
come with being glorified and (for example) a billion years old would
not be outweighed by the gains. So it is not rational for you to
conclude that being glorified and surviving forever would not be
good for you.
Samuel Scheffler (2016, 83–111) argues that living forever would
not be good for you. His argument is mainly focused on living forever
more or less unchanged, in more or less our current circumstances.
This is not the hope of glory. But Scheffler does make some remarks
that could be applied to the hope of glory. Scheffler says:
If we never died, then we would not live lives structured by the kinds of values
that now structure our own lives or by the kinds of values that have structured
the lives of other human beings now and in the past. Moreover, it is at best
unclear to what extent we would lead value-structured lives at all. What is
clear, in any case, is that we would not live anything resembling what we now
consider to be ‘a life’. (2016, 207)
Let us suppose that to survive forever as glorified is not to live anything
resembling what we now consider to be ‘a life’. Scheffler might take
this to constitute some sort of objection to the hope of glory (see, e.g.
Scheffler, 2016, 98–9). But I say that this just reinforces my conclusion
that none of us now knows enough about surviving forever as glorified,
in communion with God and others, to rationally conclude that this
would not be good for you.
But—you probably saw this coming—my conclusion leads to a new
objection. According to the Irrationality Objection, none of us knows
enough about surviving forever as glorified, in communion with God
and others, to rationally conclude that this would be good for you.
Suppose this objection is right. This does not imply that surviving
forever as glorified, in communion with God and others, would not be
good for you. So the Irrationality Objection is not an objection to
the hope of glory. Again, the target of the Irrationality Objection is not
the hope of glory itself. Rather, the targets of this objection are those of
us who believe that surviving forever as glorified, in communion with
God and others, would be good for you. The Irrationality Objection
says that it is not rational for us to believe this.
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have few details about what we will then do and what features we will
then have.
Compare: A six-year-old child realizes that she will grow up and no
longer want to play with her favorite toy. If she is fairly precocious, she
will also realize that not wanting to play with her favorite toy is just the
tip of the iceberg: as an adult, she will have abandoned many of her
current desires and values and projects. And if she is astonishingly
precocious, this child might say that she is ‘alienated’ from her future
adult self, which she takes to be ‘an alien self ’ (cf. Paul, 2014, 125–31;
2015b).
So the child asks her parent whether being an adult will be good for
her. Suppose the parent says ‘yes’. Or suppose the parent is unusually
candid and says that it will be good for her if she will do meaningful
work, have supportive relationships, be free of constant pain, and so
on. Suppose the child believes her parent. The parent’s speaking
honestly with the child, and the child’s believing the parent, could
partly constitute their having a flourishing parent–child relationship.
And the child’s believing her parent would be an aspect of her trusting
that parent.
The preceding sections responded to objections to the hope of
glory. Those objections could take aim at other versions of personal
immortality. And other versions of personal immortality can avail
themselves of the preceding sections’ responses, or at least those
other versions that, eventually, involve changes in self. But not so for
this section’s response to the Irrationality Objection. Consider, for
example, personal immortality that has a naturalistic cause, such as a
scientifically respectable elixir of youth. For all I say in this section,
it might not be rational to believe that having this sort of immor-
tality would be good for you, and this might not be rational for
reasons akin to the Irrationality Objection: you have no idea what it
would be like to be (for example) a billion years old, or what you
would be doing then, or what sort of people—if any—you would be
surrounded by, and so on.
VII. Conclusion
This chapter responded to various objections to the hope of glory, for
the most part in ways that built on previous chapters. I think that
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Conclusion 175
whether or not you share in the hope of glory, you should conclude
that there is nothing incoherent or internally inconsistent or otherwise
confused about the hope. So you can coherently hope for the good
gift of being glorified and surviving forever, in communion with God
and the best possible versions of those you love, and those you will
come to love.
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Index
Geach, Peter 79n.8 Olson, Eric T. 10, 11, 17, 18, 48, 49,
Gregory of Nyssa 161–2 53–4, 76, 78
growing up 103–107, 121–6, 127–8, Origen 158
149, 162, 169, 174
Parfit, Derek 4, 17, 20n.5, 25–6, 47, 52,
Haslanger, Sally 39 57, 59n.2, 65–83, 84, 86, 134, 138,
Hawley, Katherine 43n.6, 44n.8, 72, 78 141, 152, 157, 164–166
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184 Index
Parsons, Josh 36n.4 Ullmann-Margalit, Edna 94
Paul, the Apostle 157
Paul, L. A. 92, 94, 98–9, 157, 174 Velleman, J. David 10–12, 17, 21, 30, 54,
perdurance, explained 36 94–101, 104, 107
Perkins, Franklin 7
Perry, John 87–93, 100–102, 107 Whiting, Jennifer 10–12, 17, 29, 54,
89–93, 100–101, 102
Ramelli, Ilaria L. E. 158n.1 Wiggins, David 72
Rea, Michael 40 Williams, Bernard 47–8, 167–171
resurrection Windt, Jennifer M. 21n.8
—as hope for eternal life 160n.2 what matters in survival
—as way of becoming spherical 158 —for the nature of what
Rosati, Connie 168n.5 matters in survival, see the What
Question
Salmon, Nathan 166n.3 —for what delivers what
Schechtman, Marya 10–12, 17, 18, 29, matters in survival, see the Why
57n.1, 88–93, 100–102, 113–18, Question
122–5, 129 What Question 1, 7, 14, 16, 18, 22, 26,
Scheffler, Samuel 172 28, 34, 42, 63, 65, 90, 115, 136
Schroer, Jeanine Weekes 140–1 —my answer, defended 14–20
Schroer, Robert 140–1 —other answers 16–18
Self-Narrative Account of survival, Why Question 1, 19, 22, 28, 29, 31–35,
defined 115 45, 48, 54, 55, 59, 67, 83, 85, 101,
Selfer, defined 91–92 111, 113, 115, 120, 130n.1, 131,
Shoemaker, David 18, 47, 49, 53–4 133, 137, 139, 142, 151, 155, 159,
Shoemaker, Sydney 17, 65, 67, 68 162, 164
Sider, Theodore 43n.6, 44, 72, 78 —my answer, defended 31–35, 151–5
Sidgwick, Henry 57 —other answers 2, 46–54, 67–69,
Smith, J. Warren 161 83–85, 101–103, 115–118, 123–6,
stage theory, explained 43–44, 78 133–7, 139–142, 164–5
Strawson, Galen 119 —why every good answer implies
numerical identity 57–64
Taylor, Charles 129, 140n.3 Wordier Why Question 1, 11, 19, 35
Thompson, Evan 21n.8 —my answer, defended 31–35
transformations 92–3, 98–9, 107–111, —other answers 11
118–9, 126–128, 145–150, Wolf, Susan 26n.9
152–154, 160–3, 169–171
see also growing up Zagzebski, Linda 163