Journal of Educational Psychology Copyright 1996 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1996, Vol. 88, No. 3, 397-407 0022-0663/96/S3.00

Children's Beliefs About Intelligence and School Performance

Deborah Stipek J. Heidi Gralinski
University of California, Los Angeles Harvard University

The study was designed, first, to explore associations among children's beliefs about
intelligence and effort, goal orientations, self-reported learning strategies, and academic
achievement. Assessments of all variables were conducted twice over 1 school year on 319
children in Grades 3-6. Results indicated that the belief that intelligence is relatively fixed
was associated with the beliefs that performance is relatively stable and that intelligence is
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global in its effects on performance. This set of beliefs was differentiated from the belief that
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effort has positive effects on intelligence and performance. Children's beliefs in intelligence
as fixed and affecting performance were negatively associated with academic achievement,
but a path analysis provided only modest support for the hypothesis that the effect of such
beliefs would be mediated by a performance goal orientation and accompanying superficial
learning strategies.

Perceptions of the causes of academic performance figure
prominently in theories of achievement motivation and have
important implications for how individuals behave in aca-
demic contexts (Stipek, 1993; Weiner, 1992). The implica-
tions for behavior of various causal factors, such as ability
and effort, are likely to vary, however, depending on their
meaning to individuals. In this study, we explored associa-
tions among various beliefs about school performance and
its causes. We also examined associations between beliefs
about ability, effort, and performance, on the one hand, and
goal orientations, self-reported learning strategies, and aca-
demic achievement, on the other.
Dweck (1986) and her colleagues (Cain & Dweck, 1989;
Dweck & Bempechat, 1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) were
among the first to study individual differences in concep-
tualizations of intelligence. They proposed that individuals
differ in the degree to which they see intelligence as a
capacity or fixed entity, affected only modestly by effort,
versus a set of knowledge and skills that increase incremen-
tally with practice and effort. They referred to the former as
an entity theory and the latter as an incremental theory.
This study extends Dweck's (1986) analysis to explore
more broadly associations among various beliefs about in-
telligence and effort and their effects on academic perfor-
mance. Other theorists have linked the view that intelligence
is relatively fixed (Dweck's entity theory) to other beliefs
about intelligence and performance. Rosenholtz and Simp-
son (1984) proposed the following constellation of beliefs:
that intelligence is stable over time, that it is global (related
Deborah Stipek, Graduate School of Education, University of
California, Los Angeles; J. Heidi Gralinski, Department of Psy-
chiatry, Harvard University.
This study was completed as part of a longitudinal study of the
Galef Institute's "Different Ways of Knowing" Program.
Correspondence concerning mis article should be addressed to
Deborah Stipek, Graduate School of Education, University of
California, Los Angeles, California 90024.
to different domains of activity), and that it underlies (af-
fects) learning and performance. Whether the belief that
ability is fixed is empirically connected to these other be-
liefs about ability and performance has not been examined.
We developed a set of questions, therefore, that included
items related to all of these beliefs and assessed associations
among them.
Although Dweck (1986) referred to an entity theory of
general intelligence, it seemed possible that children think
more in terms of specific domains of performance, at least
for understanding their own and classmates' performance in
school contexts in which intellectual work is divided into
subject areas. To examine this possibility, the present study
considered students' beliefs about, and orientations toward,
two subjects that all children encounter in elementary
school: mathematics and social studies. We expected par-
ticipants to see mathematics ability and performance to be
more stable and less affected by effort compared with social
studies.
This hypothesis is suggested by findings reported by
Parsons et al. (1983) indicating that children tend to view
science and mathematics as difficult subjects that require
higher levels of ability than other subjects. In addition,
Dweck (1986) observed that new units in mathematics tend
to involve new skills and concepts that are progressively
more difficult. In contrast, increases in difficulty level may
be less salient in domains that require primarily verbal
skills. The experience of confusion or difficulty in math
might give rise to a belief that effort does not pay off as
much in mathematics as in a subject requiring verbal abil-
ities, like social studies (see also Licht & Dweck, 1984).
Consistent with this perspective, Stodolsky, Salk, and
Glaessner (1991) found that, compared with social studies,
students were more likely to explain why they liked or did
not like math by referring to its difficulty level, suggesting
that difficulty is a salient dimension for mathematics.
Gottfried (1990) also found a stronger pattern of relation-

397
 398 STIPEK AND GRALINSKI
ships between achievement and intrinsic interest in math
than in other subject areas.
Another question addressed by this study concerned age
differences in children's concepts of intelligence and their
perceptions of the effects of intelligence and effort on
performance. Past research has suggested that children's use
of underlying psychological traits to explain behavior and
performance develops slowly over the elementary school
years (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973). Nicholls and his
colleagues have found that by the age of 8 or 9 years
children have begun to develop a concept of ability as
capacity, but a concept of ability that constrains the effect of
effort is not fully developed until about the age of 11 years
(Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & Miller, 1984). If a concept of
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ability as stable requires the development of a notion of
psychological traits, an age-related increase over the upper
elementary years might be expected in the degree to which
children see ability and performance as stable.
The final set of questions concerned associations between
children's beliefs about intelligence, effort, and perfor-
mance, on the one hand, and their goals, behavior, and
achievement, on the other. Dweck and her colleagues
claimed that theories about the nature of intelligence orient
people toward particular achievement-related goals (Cain &
Dweck, 1989; Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Ni-
cholls, 1983). An entity theory is believed to heighten
evaluative concerns about performance because perfor-
mance is considered diagnostic of intellectual capacity
when capacity is fixed. Thus, individuals holding an entity
theory (or focusing on the capacity component) of intelli-
gence should be primarily concerned about demonstrating
how much they have or avoiding revealing their lack of "it."
In addition, they should be more concerned about "looking
smart" than about acquiring new competencies. Entity the-
orists are, therefore, likely to have a performance or ego
orientation toward learning.
Incremental theorists, in contrast, should seek opportuni-
ties to challenge their current skill levels because this will
enable them to develop their skills or increase their knowl-
edge. When individuals have these learning goals, they are
concerned about developing skills and understanding or
achieving a sense of mastery. By focusing on intelligence as
acquirable, incremental theorists are likely to have a learn-
ing or mastery orientation (see Ames, 1992; Blumenfeld,
1992; Maehr, 1984; Meece, 1991; Nicholls, 1983, 1992).
This proposed link between theories of intelligence and
goal orientations has been demonstrated empirically. For
example, Bempechat, London, and Dweck (1991) found
that elementary school children in an experimentally in-
duced incremental condition were more likely than children
who were in the entity condition to select a learning goal;
they preferred "problems that I'll learn something from,
even if they're so hard that I do worse than the other kids"
over "problems that are fairly easy, so I'll do well" (Bem-
pechat et al., 1991, p. 27; see also Dweck & Bempechat,
1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
Previous research has demonstrated further that perfor-
mance and learning goals have implications for the kind of
tasks students prefer, how students approach tasks, how
they interpret outcomes, and ultimately what they learn
(Ames & Archer, 1988; Duda & Nicholls, 1992; Elliott &
Dweck, 1988; Graham & Golan, 1991; Nicholls, Cobb,
Wood, Yackel, & Patashnick, 1990). The evidence suggests
that a performance goal orientation fosters a failure-avoid-
ing pattern of motivation characterized by an avoidance of
challenging tasks (Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Elliott & Dweck, 1988), marked negative self-evaluations
and affect following failure, positive affect following suc-
cess with little effort (Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984, 1987),
and use of ineffectual problem-solving strategies (Elliott &
Dweck, 1988). In contrast, mastery goals have been asso-
ciated with positive achievement-related activities, includ-
ing persistence in the face of difficulty and use of strategies
likely to lead to problem solution (Elliott & Dweck, 1988).
In the present study, we also examined the cognitive
strategies students use to complete tasks and their relation to
student learning (as reflected in their grades and achieve-
ment test scores). Cognitive strategies refer to the methods
students use to comprehend course material. Weinstein and
Mayer (1986) suggested that active strategies—such as
elaboration, paraphrasing, summarizing, note-taking, and
question-asking—help learners integrate and connect new
information with prior knowledge and thus master new
material. Active approaches to mastering new material
would be expected of students whose primary purpose is to
develop skills and understanding. In contrast, students who
are more concerned about demonstrating their ability (as
opposed to actually acquiring ability) or who are more
interested in gaining social approval would be concerned
with how others evaluate them (Ames, 1984). This self-
focus, in turn, would be expected to be associated with
superficial strategies (e.g., guessing, copying, or focusing
only on material that has to be remembered) that enable
students to complete work but that do not necessarily con-
tribute to their understanding.
Several studies have demonstrated that students' goal
orientations are, in fact, associated with their use of prob-
lem-solving strategies. Meece, Blumenfeld, and Hoyle
(1988), for example, found that students scoring high on a
measure of task orientation in science reported relatively
greater use of active metacognitive strategies (e.g., review-
ing material not understood, asking questions as they
worked, and making connections between current problems
and past problems) and less use of "superficial engagement"
(e.g., copying, guessing, and skipping questions). Children
who were relatively more ego-oriented claimed to use rel-
atively more of both active and superficial strategies (see
also Ames & Archer, 1988; Nolen, 1988).
Although this research suggests that entity theorists are
likely to use superficial strategies, in part, because they are
oriented toward performance goals, studies have not sam-
pled the same students across time or across subject areas,
and they have usually not examined the entire process by
which theories of intelligence are believed to affect student
learning in the context of regular classroom settings. In
addition, previous research has focused primarily on chil-
dren from middle-class families with European American
backgrounds. As a result, it is not known whether previ-
 BELIEFS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE
ously found patterns of associations generalize to non-
White children from poor or working-class families.
In the present study, we addressed some of these limita-
tions by recruiting such a sample and using a longitudinal
design. Our study departs from research conducted by
Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck & Bempechat, 1983;
Dweck & Leggett, 1988) in that it examines the role of an
empirically derived set of coherent beliefs about intelli-
gence, effort, and performance, rather than the more nar-
rowly and theoretically derived entity theory. The study was
designed to examine the entire process by which theories of
intelligence and performance have been proposed to affect
student learning. At the beginning and the end of an aca-
demic year, elementary school-age children (third through
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sixth grade) completed a questionnaire assessing their be-
liefs about intelligence, effort, and performance, the
strength of their performance and mastery goals, and their
use of active and superficial cognitive learning strategies in
the classroom. Grades and achievement test scores served as
an index of their actual learning. It was expected that
children who believed that intelligence was relatively fixed
and global in its effects on performance would be more
performance oriented. As a result, they would use more
superficial and less active problem-solving strategies and
ultimately achieve at a lower level than children who did not
endorse such a view of intelligence and performance.
Method
Participants
The study included 319 children (165 boys and 154 girls); 66
third graders, 119 fourth graders, 75 fifth graders, and 59 sixth
graders. These children were enrolled in 32 schools serving pre-
dominantly poor and working-class, ethnically diverse families in
three different school districts—two in a large, urban area in
southern California and a third in a large, urban area in the
Northeast. Students provided demographic information indicating
that 45% were self-identified as Latino, 15% as European Amer-
ican, 15% as African American, 9% as Asian American, 17% as of
Portuguese descent (all in Grades 3 and 4), and 0.6% were from a
variety of other ethnic backgrounds. All participants who agreed to
participate were included in the study.
Report card grades were taken directiy from school files. Pretest
grades were from the end of the previous year; posttest grades
were from the end of the study year.
California Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) scores or Metropolitan
Achievement Tests (MAT) scores were taken from student records
from the spring of the previous year and again in the spring of the
year the study was conducted.
Testing
Participants were asked to complete a battery of written ques-
tionnaires within the first 4 months of the school year and again
during the months of May and June. The administrator, who was
not known by the children, explained that she was interested in
children's thoughts and feelings about school and some school
subjects. She reassured children that their answers would not be
shown to their teachers, and she encouraged them to respond to the
questions honestly. In the fall, all questions were read aloud by the
399
administrator, and data were collected in three sessions, each
lasting about 20 min. In the spring, students read silently and
answered all questions in one session. The administrator was
available to help if students found a question difficult or confusing.
Motivation Measures
A primary purpose of this study was to explore associations
among beliefs about intelligence, effort, and performance. The
measure originally included 12 items that assessed the beliefs that
(a) ability is stable and unaffected by effort (similar to Dweck's,
1986, entity theory; e.g., "Some kids will never be smart, no matter
how hard they try"); (b) performance is stable and only modestly
affected by effort (e.g., "Some kids can never do well in math,
even if they try hard"); (c) intelligence is a specific and global
cause of academic performance (e.g., "You have to be smart to do
well in math" and "Kids who are not smart don't do well in any
subject"); (d) effort is a cause of academic performance (e.g.,
"Everyone could do well in math if they worked hard"); and (e)
effort increases intelligence (similar to Dweck's incremental the-
ory; e.g., "You can get smarter by working hard in school").
Factor analyses of all 12 items, using maximum likelihood as
the method of estimation and oblique rotations using promax, were
done separately for the fall and spring data. The squared multiple
correlation of each variable to all other variables was used as the
communality estimate. Two interpretable factors emerged with
eigenvalues above l.O.1
The first factor included all of the items that referred to beliefs
about ability and performance, and the second included items that
referred to the positive effects of effort on performance and intel-
ligence (see Table 1 for factor loadings). The correlation between
the two factors was .07 in the fall and - .02 in the spring. Thus,
two scales were created and used in further analyses—one referred
to henceforth as the Ability-Performance Beliefs scale and the
other referred to as Effort-Related Beliefs scale. Although both
scales include items that go beyond Dweck's (1986) two theories
of intelligence, the first contains items similar to her entity theory
and the second contains items that are similar to her incremental
theory.
The items referring to math and social studies loaded on the
same factors, suggesting that children in this sample did not
differentiate between these two subject areas. In addition, results
of analyses examining differences in scores for math and social
studies showed no significant differences for ability-performance
beliefs in the fall, F(l, 301) = 1.61, or spring, F{\, 300) = 1.02,
or for effort-related beliefs in the fall, F(\, 291) = 3.58, or spring,
F(l, 285) = 1.28. Math and social studies items were, therefore,
both included on the Ability-Performance Beliefs and Effort-
Related Beliefs scales.
To ensure that the two scales were reliable for all grade levels,
we computed alphas separately by grade for each scale and for
each testing period. Alphas for the Ability-Performance Beliefs
scale ranged from .77 (fifth and sixth graders, fall) to .86 (third
graders, spring), with a mean of .82. Alphas for the Effort-Related
Beliefs scale were somewhat lower, ranging from .50 (fifth grad-
ers, fall) to .77 (fourth graders, spring), with a mean of .63. There
was no trend for reliability to become either higher or lower with
grade.
Average scores on the Effort-Related Beliefs scale were much
higher than scores on the Ability-Performance Beliefs scale (M =
1
A factor analysis using a varimax rotation and another using
principal axis factoring produced the same two factors, although
loadings varied somewhat across methods.
 400 STIPEK AND GRALINSKI

Table 1
Factor Loadings for Entity-Related Beliefs and Effort Scale Items
Fall Spring
Factor 1 2 1 2
Entity-Related Beliefs"
1. Some kids can never do well in math,
even if they try hard. .66 .70
2. Some kids can never do well in social
studies, even if they try hard. .67 .64
3. Some kids will never be smart, no
matter how hard they try. .69 .53
4. There isn't much you can do to make
yourself smarter. .54 .68
5. Some kids can't do well in any kind
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of school work. .51 .56

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6. You have to be smart to do well in

math. .51 .56
7. You have to be smart to do well in
social studies. .55 .59
8. Kids who are not smart don't do well
in any subject. .58 .60
Effort
9. Anyone who works hard could be one
of the smartest in the class. .48 .53
10. Everyone could do well in math if
they worked hard. .67 .74
11. Everyone could do well in social
studies if they worked hard. .67 .71
12. You can get smarter by working hard
in school. .47 .70
Eigenvalues 4.61 2.27 5.03 3 .82
% variance 66 33 57 43
Note. Loadings under .45 not included.
a
Some items were taken from Stipek and Gralinski (1991).

2.88 and 2.71 for the fall and spring Ability-Performance Beliefs
scale scores, respectively, and M = 4.44 and 4.11 for the fall and
spring Effort-Related Beliefs scores, respectively); the variance for
the two scales was also somewhat different (SD = 1.07 and 1.04
for the fall and spring for Ability-Performance Beliefs scale scores,
respectively, and SD = 0.62 and 0.85 for the fall and spring for
Effort-Related Beliefs scale scores, respectively).
Most of the items used to measure mastery and performance
goal orientations and superficial and active learning strategies
were taken from measures used in previous research. The Appen-
dix gives the items and the alphas for each measure. The questions
related to mastery and performance goal orientation were given
twice—once specifying math and once specifying social studies.
Responses for all questions were given on a scale of 1-5 with
anchors as indicated in the Appendix. Scores used in analyses were
created by computing the mean of the individual items on the
scales.
Grades
Math and social studies grades were coded as follows: A = 4,
B = 3, C = 2, D = l . a n d F = 0.
Achievement Test Scores
Because participants had taken one of two different standardized
achievement tests, national percentile scores for total math (either
CTBS and MAT) and total language (CTBS) scales were used in
the analyses. Language scores were not available for participants
who took the MAT.
Results
Grade Differences in Ability-Performance and
Effort-Related Beliefs
The second question the study was designed to address
concerned age-related changes in children's beliefs about
intelligence, effort, and performance. Scores on the Ability-
Performance Beliefs and Effort-Related Beliefs scales were
submitted to Gender X Grade (2 X 4) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) for the fall and spring separately.
A significant grade main effect was found for the fall
Ability-Performance Beliefs scale scores, F(3, 311) =
20.16, p < .001, but not the spring Ability-Performance
Beliefs scale scores, F(3, 311) = 2.44, p < .06, or the fall,
F(3, 311) = 2.28, p < .08 and spring, F(3, 311) = 0.92, p
< .43 Effort-Related Beliefs scale scores. As can be seen
from the means in Table 2, scores on the Ability-Perfor-
mance Beliefs scale decreased from third to fifth grade.
A significant gender main effect, F(l, 311) = 6.92, p <
.01, was found for spring Ability-Performance Beliefs scale
 BELIEFS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE 401

Table 2
Correlations Among Motivation Variables (N = 319)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Entity .46*** .10 .08 .03 .41*** .40*** .17** .54***
2. Effort .06 .22*** .29*** .32*** .13* .22*** .24*** .10
3. Mastery - M .11* .38*** .47*** .62*** .26*** .21*** 42*** .14*
4. Mastery - S .12* .45*** .69*** _4j*** .22*** .36*** .56*** .18**
5. Perform - M .42*** .24*** .35*** 29*** .48*** .69*** .28*** .32***
6. Perform - S 44*** .28*** .31*** 39*** .79*** .47*** .41*** 44***
7. Active Engage .08 .45*** .54*** .58*** .25*** .35*** .26*** .41***
8. Superficial Engage .43*** .13* 20*** 24*** .43*** 40*** .33*** .40***
Note. Fall data are above the diagonal; spring data are below the diagonal. The correlations in bold type on the diagonal are between
fall and spring scores. M = math; S = social studies.
*/><.05. **/><.01. ***p<.001.
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scores only. Boys (M = 3.05) had higher scores than girls
(M = 2.81), on average.
Associations Among Measures and
Stability Over Time
As can be seen from the Pearson correlation coefficients
in the diagonal of Table 2, scores on the motivation mea-
sures were fairly stable over time. Grades from spring to
spring were also somewhat stable (rs = .34 and .38 for math
and social studies, respectively), as were achievement test
percentile rankings from the previous spring to the spring of
the year the motivation data were collected (rs = .65 and
.67 for math and language percentile scores, respectively).
Correlation coefficients were also computed to assess
associations among the motivation variables. The correla-
tion coefficients in Table 3 reveal that the motivation mea-
sures tended to be strongly associated with each other,
although at varying levels. The hypothesized links between
ability-performance beliefs and a performance orientation
and between a performance orientation and superficial
learning strategies were found for both the fall and spring
testing. Students who believed that intelligence and aca-
demic performance are relatively stable and that intelligence
is important for school performance and increases only to a
degree by effort (i.e., who scored relatively high on the
Ability-Performance Belief scale) claimed to be relatively
performance oriented; they also reported engaging in super-
ficial learning strategies. Consistent with hypotheses, the
correlations between mastery orientation and active strate-
gies were nearly twice as large as the correlations between
mastery orientation and superficial strategies. The differ-
ences in the correlations between mastery orientation and
active strategies and between mastery orientation and su-
perficial strategies were significant, Stieger's t test (Cohen
& Cohen, 1983) for fall social studies, ?(316) = 7.43, p <
.001; fall math, r(316) = 5.02, p < .001; spring social
studies, f(316) = 6.26, p < .001; and spring math, f(316) =

Table 3
Correlations Between Motivation Variables, and Grades and Achievement Test Percentile Scores
Motivation variable
Measure Entity Effort Mastery" Performb Active0 Superficial0
Grades (N = 319)
Pretest
Math -.12* .02 -.05 -.13*
Social studies -.10 -.03 -.12* -.12* -.12* -.09
Posttest
Math _ 20*** .09 .02 -.13*
Social studies -23*** .05 -.09 -.21*** -.08 -.15**
Achievement test percentile
scores (N = 191)
Pretest
Math -.17* .01 -.05 -.09*
Language -.25*** .04 -.12 -.15* -.06 -.31 s 1
Posttest
Math -.14* .07 .02 -.08
Language/reading -23*** .02 -.16* -.22** -.04 — 34***
Note. Motivation variables are from the pretest for pretest grades and achievement percentile scores and from the posttest for posttest
grades and achievement percentiles. Dashes indicate variables not measured.
a
For math grades/tests, math mastery goals scores are used; for social studies grades and language/reading tests, social studies mastery
goals scores are used. b For math grades/tests, math performance goals scores are used; for social studies grades or language/reading
tests, social studies performance goals scores are used. c Assessed for social studies only.
*/?<.O5. **p<m. ***p<.001.
 402
6.18, p < .001. A performance orientation was associated
with use of both types of learning strategies about equally.
Goal orientations assessed separately for math and social
studies were also highly correlated (for mastery goals, rs =
.62 and .69 for fall and spring, respectively; for performance
goals, rs = .69 and .79 for fall and spring, respectively, all
ps < .001). Thus, goal orientations appeared to transcend
subject areas.
We computed separate sets of correlations for third and
fourth graders and fifth and sixth graders to determine
whether the same picture emerged for younger and older
children. The few correlations that were significant for one
but not the other age group are indicated below.
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Ability-performance beliefs were significantly correlated
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with effort for the younger but not the older children for
both the fall and spring assessments. When this analysis was
done separately for third and fourth graders, ability-perfor-
mance beliefs were significantly associated with effort-
related beliefs only for the third graders (r = .41, fall; r =
.36, spring, both ps < .001). Ability-performance beliefs
were also significantly associated with active cognitive en-
gagement for the younger but not the older children. Only
for the younger children were effort-related beliefs signifi-
cantly correlated with math performance orientation (r =
.20, p < .01, fall; r = .30, p < .001, spring), social studies
performance orientation (r = .26 for fall, r = .38 for spring,
ps < .001), and active engagement (r = .31, p < .001).
Mastery orientation for math was significantly correlated
with superficial learning strategies for the older but not the
younger children in the fall (r = .18, p < .05).
Associations Between Motivation Variables and
Academic Performance
One purpose of this study was to examine relationships
between motivation variables and academic performance.
As mentioned earlier, the hypothesized links between abil-
ity-performance beliefs and performance orientation and
between performance orientation and superficial learning
strategies were found in zero-order correlations. Ability-
performance beliefs, performance orientation, and superfi-
cial engagement were also negatively associated with aca-
demic performance (Table 4).
We recomputed the entire set of correlations for third and
Table 4
Mean Entity-Related Beliefs and Effort Scores by Grade
Belief
Entity Effort
Grade Pretest Posttest Pretest
a math and social studies grades. (The use of achievement test
Third 3.63 2.97 4.54
Fourth 2.91" 2.64 4.38
Fifth 2.58C
2.84 4.34
Sixth 2.39° 2.55 4.57
Note. Different subscripts on the vertical indicate that
are significantly different from each other.
STIPEK AND GRALINSKI
fourth graders, and then for fifth and sixth graders, to
determine whether similar patterns would be found for
younger and older children. Although some of the correla-
tions were no longer significant when the smaller sub-
samples were used, there were only a few that yielded
different findings for younger and older children. Pretest
social studies grades were significantly correlated with per-
formance orientation and active and superficial engagement
only for the older children. Posttest social studies grades
were significantly correlated with performance orientation
for younger but not older children and with superficial
engagement for older but not younger children. Language
achievement posttest scores were significantly correlated
with ability-performance beliefs, mastery, and performance
orientations only for the older children.
We used structural equation modeling to test the proposed
chain of links—that a belief that performance is relatively
stable and caused by stable ability (similar to entity beliefs
studied in previous research) lead to strong performance
concerns, which, in turn, lead to superficial strategies for
completing work, and ultimately to less learning. The model
was created by first including the a priori paths of theoret-
ical interest, with all unknown parameters specified accord-
ing to maximum likelihood criteria. Then conceptually rel-
evant and statistically significant paths were added, as
suggested by the Lagrange Multiplier Test (Bentler, 1989);
statistically insignificant (p > .05) paths were deleted. Be-
cause measurement error would be expected to be similar
for Time 1 and Time 2, the error term of each indicator
variable was allowed to covary between the two time
periods.
Goodness of fit was evaluated using three methods: (a)
chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis, (b)
normed fit index (NFI), and (c) comparative fit index (CFI).
In the chi-square distribution, small test statistics relative to
the number of degrees of freedom are desirable. Statistical
power in large data sets increases the chance of rejecting the
null hypothesis because of trivial differences alone. There-
fore, this method was not expected to show a good fitting
model. The NFI (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) and the recently
developed CFI (Bentler, 1990), in contrast, have been de-
veloped to circumvent this shortcoming of the chi-square
statistic. The NFI reflects the proportion of the null model
chi-square eliminated by the constraints of the hypothesized
model. It ranges from zero to one with larger values indic-
ative of better fitting models (e.g., values of .90 or greater
are viewed as adequately fitting the data). The CFI is similar
to the NFI and avoids underestimation of fit that is some-
times characteristic of the NFI (Bentler, 1989).
Because there were some differences in the pattern of
correlations for older and younger children, we conducted
separate analyses for third and fourth graders and for fifth
Posttest and sixth graders. The achievement measure was based on
4.27
4.09 scores would have resulted in the loss of too many partic-
3.98 ipants to be able to do separate analyses for younger and
4.16 older participants.)
the means The resulting models are presented in Figures 1 and 2. As
expected, neither model fit the data according to the chi-
 BELIEFS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE
square statistic, / ( 1 1 8 , N = 169) = 166.17, p < .01, for the
younger children; ^(117, N = 128) = 154.92,/? < .01, for
the older children. However, they fit the data well according
to the fit indices (NFI = .90 and .85; CFI = .97 and .96, for
younger and older children, respectively). Standardized fac-
tor loadings of manifest variables from corresponding latent
constructs ranged from .71 to .90 (for younger children) and
.55 to .95 (for older children), and those estimated were
statistically significant at p < .001.
The significant paths indicated in the figures support
claims for the importance of ability-performance beliefs but
are not entirely consistent with the chain of relationships
among variables described above. Ability-performance be-
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liefs in the fall predicted achievement at the end of the year,
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
but, aside from the path from superficial strategies to
achievement at the end of the year for the older children, the
results suggest that the effect of ability-performance beliefs
was not mediated by students' goal orientation or their
learning strategies. Mastery goals did not figure into any
significant paths.
The results for the younger and older children were re-
markably similar, with only a few deviations. For the
younger but not the older children, performance goals pre-
dicted superficial strategies in the fall. (This path was sig-
nificant for both younger and older children in the spring.)
The path from ability-performance beliefs in the fall to
performance goals in the spring was also significant for the
younger but not the older children. For older but not
younger children, the path from ability-performance beliefs
in the fall to achievement and the path from performance
goals in the fall to performance goals in the spring were
significant.
Discussion
Concepts of Intelligence and Performance
The results revealed a coherent set of beliefs about intel-
ligence and academic performance. Specifically, children
who claimed that one cannot do much about intelligence
(similar to Dweck's, 1986, entity theory) also believed that
.58"
ABILITY-PERFORMANCE BELIEFS 1
.61
ACTIVE 1
ACHIEVE 1
Figure 1. Results of structural equation model for Grades 3 and 4; normed fit index = .90;
comparative fit index = .97; x2 (118, N = 169) = \(sb.\l,p < .01. *p = .05. **p = .01. ***p =
.001.
403
levels of intelligence and performance are stable over time
and that intelligence facilitates or limits success in all aca-
demic subjects. Moreover, their beliefs about intelligence
and performance were themselves relatively stable over the
course of an academic year, and they were associated in
theoretically meaningful and practically important ways
with other motivation variables and achievement.
Contrary to our hypothesis, items referring to two differ-
ent subject areas—social studies and math—loaded on the
same factors, and the means for the four items that were
repeated for both math and social studies were not signifi-
cantly different from each other. Thus, for example, chil-
dren who believed that some kids can never do well in math,
even with effort, and that one has to be smart to do well in
math, held the same set of beliefs for social studies. There
was, therefore, no support for the hypothesis that elemen-
tary school age children have subject-specific beliefs about
ability and performance or think differently about the effect
of intelligence or effort on performance in math and social
studies.
These findings do not, however, preclude the possibility
that children believed that math was more difficult than
social studies. Rather, they suggest that even if the elemen-
tary school-age children in this study perceived math as
more difficult, they did not believe that intelligence was any
more predictive of performance in math than it was in social
studies, nor did they see performance in math as any less
responsive to effort. It is possible that, as children enter
adolescence and begin to engage in higher level mathemat-
ics, their beliefs about ability related to performance in math
and other subjects become more differentiated.
Motivation orientations in the different subject areas were
also relatively consistent. The high correlations between a
mastery orientation in math and social studies and between
a performance orientation in math and social studies are
consistent with Duda and Nicholls's (1992) findings for
sport and schoolwork. In their study, students' orientations
across the two domains were of the same magnitude, and
analyses of their data did not show separate sport or school
factors. Together, the studies suggest that although chil-
dren's motivational orientations vary somewhat, individual
••ABILITY-PERFORMANCE BELIEFS 2
.45"
PERFORMANCE \ .15*
GOALS 2
SUPERFICIAL 2
ACHIEVE 2
 404 STIPEK AND GRALINSKI
ABILITY-PERFORMANCE BELIEFS 1 .41*'
.54
PERFORMANCE
-.40'
GOALS 1
.27*
ACHIEVE 1
Figure 2. Results of structural equation model for Grades 5 and 6; normed fit index = .85;
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
comparative fit index = .96; / ( i n , N = 128) = 154.92, p < .01. *p = .05. **/? = .01. ***p =
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
.001.
styles may develop that transcend domains and subject
areas. This may mean that interventions designed to focus
children's attention on learning and mastery in one subject
or activity will have some effect on their focus in other
subjects.
The view that intelligence is relatively stable and affects
performance in a variety of subject areas apparently did not
preclude children from believing that effort still has positive
effects on intelligence and performance. The positive effort
items loaded on a separate factor, and for children in fourth
through sixth grade, the Ability-Performance Beliefs scale
and the Effort-Related Beliefs scale were unrelated to each
other. The finding of a positive correlation between the two
scales for third graders is discussed below.
Cain and Dweck (1989) proposed that individuals scoring
high on measures of entity beliefs may not define intelli-
gence differently from individuals scoring low. Rather, they
suggested that all individuals include both a stable capacity
and an acquirable knowledge component in their definition
of ability, but entity theorists focused their attention more
on, or weight more highly, the capacity than the knowledge
component. The same analysis may apply to our Ability-
Performance Beliefs scale. Perhaps when children who
claimed that ability and performance were relatively stable
encountered questions about the positive effects of effort in
the present study, they shifted their focus from the stable
capacity component to the knowledge component of intel-
ligence, which is part of their definition of intelligence but
is less salient when the children are answering questions
about stability. Our analysis is supported by evidence that
individuals' attention can be focused, experimentally, on
one or the other component (e.g., Bempechat et al., 1991).
The findings are also consistent with Nicholls's (1990)
claim that change in intelligence can be construed in at least
two different ways: personal improvement or social rank.
He likened the difference to the distinction between mental
age and IQ. All children improve their intelligence in the
sense of mental age, but IQ, or relative standing, might stay
the same or even decrease. Three out of four of the effort
items (e.g., "Everyone could do well in social studies/math
if they worked hard" and "You can get smarter by working
• - ABILITY-PERFORMANCE BELIEFS 2
.25*
PERFORMANCE
GOALS 2
SUPERFICIAL 2
h
ACHIEVE 2
hard in school") lend themselves to the personal improve-
ment interpretation. In contrast, the items referring to
change that loaded on the Ability-Performance Beliefs
Scale may be more likely to evoke a social ranking notion
of change (e.g., "Some kids will never be smart, no matter
how hard they try"). It would be useful in future research to
specify whether questions refer to change in personal level
of competencies or in social standing.
The absence of a significant correlation between the Abil-
ity-Performance Beliefs and Effort-Related Beliefs sub-
scales for fourth through sixth graders suggests that there is
value in differentiating between beliefs about ability and
beliefs in the positive value of effort. Also, ability-perfor-
mance beliefs but not effort-related beliefs were consis-
tently associated with grades and achievement test perfor-
mance. Second, the patterns of associations between these
two sets of beliefs about intelligence and students' reports
of their task behavior were different. The Ability-Perfor-
mance Beliefs scale was consistently and strongly associ-
ated with participants' scores on the Performance-Orienta-
tion scale (rs = .41, .40, .42, .44, for math and social studies
in the fall and spring, respectively) but not with scores on
the Mastery Orientation scale (rs = .08, .03, .11, .12). The
reverse was seen for the Effort-Related Beliefs scale, which
although positively correlated with performance orientation
(rs = .13, .22, .24, .28), tended to be more strongly asso-
ciated with a mastery orientation (rs = .29, .32, .38, .45).
Thus, as predicted, the view that intelligence and school
performance are relatively stable and that intelligence un-
derlies performance appeared to engender in students con-
cerns about demonstrating their intelligence, although it did
not detract from their desire to achieve mastery. A strong
belief in the value of effort seemed to orient children's
attention more toward improving their skills and under-
standing than toward demonstrating their competencies.
The pattern of associations between these two sets of
beliefs and self-reported problem-solving strategies also
differed systematically. Ability-performance beliefs were
strongly associated with superficial (.54 and .42 for fall and
spring, respectively) but not with active problem-solving
strategies (.17 and .07 for fall and spring, respectively);
 BELIEFS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE
effort-related beliefs were strongly associated with active
(.24 and .45) but not with superficial (.10 and .13) strategies.
Although we cannot assume causation from correlational
data, this pattern suggests that if our goal is to decrease
students' concerns about performance, we may need to
focus our efforts on changing their general beliefs about
intelligence (i.e., the degree to which it is fixed and stable
and affects performance). If our goal is to increase their
mastery goals, we may need to convince them of the value
of effort.
Age-Related Differences in Beliefs About
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Intelligence and Performance
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Two findings from this study suggest a rather abrupt
change between third and fourth grade in the meaning of
children's scores on the Ability-Performance Beliefs and
Effort-Related Beliefs scales. First, scores on these scales
were positively correlated for third graders but not for any
other grade. Second, third graders had significantly higher
scores on the ability-performance beliefs measure than the
older children in the sample.
The reliability of the scales was just as high for these
younger children, and their scores on the Ability-Perfor-
mance Beliefs scales showed the same pattern of associa-
tions with other motivation variables that were found for the
older children. But these findings do not necessarily indi-
cate that the items mean the same thing to the younger and
older children.
An examination of the items suggests some illogic to the
positive correlations found for third graders between ability-
performance and effort-related beliefs. Indeed, several of
the items on the two subscales appear to contradict each
other (e.g., "Some kids will never be smart, no matter how
hard they try," on the Ability-Performance Beliefs scale,
and "Anyone who works hard could be one of the smartest
kids in the class," on the Effort-Related Beliefs scale). The
age-related decline on the Ability-Performance Beliefs scale
is also difficult to reconcile with evidence indicating that
children's use of underlying abstract traits to explain behav-
ior increases rather than decreases over the elementary
school years (e.g., Livesley & Bromley, 1973).
We can only speculate about an explanation for these two
surprising findings. One hypothesis we think deserves test-
ing is that the youngest children did not differentiate be-
tween intelligence and performance, and they based their
judgments for the ability-performance beliefs items more on
their observations of consistency in who performed well in
school than on an abstract concept of ability as capacity.
Thus, those who claimed that "you have to be smart to do
well in math" were more or less embracing a tautology:
"you have to do well to do well in math."
Perhaps by fourth grade, children had developed cogni-
tive capacities that enabled them to attend to and process
information that is inconsistent with their theories and with
their typical experiences in school. Children may have
noted variability and inconsistencies in classmates' as well
as their own performance. In middle school or junior high,
405
when grades and social comparison become more salient
and when children begin to be tracked (Eccles, Midgley, &
Adler, 1984), the trajectory found here in beliefs about
intelligence and performance may reverse itself.
Beliefs About Intelligence and Performance
and Learning
The results of the structural equation model suggest that
beliefs about intelligence and performance play an impor-
tant role in children's achievement outcomes, although not
necessarily as predicted. Students who believed that ability
and performance are relatively stable and that intelligence
affects performance were, as mentioned earlier, relatively
more concerned about performance, and students who were
concerned about performance claimed to use more superfi-
cial strategies for completing classroom tasks. All three of
these variables—ability-performance beliefs, performance
orientation, and superficial engagement—were associated
with either grades or performance on achievement tests.
The model, however, showed ability-performance beliefs
at the beginning of the year to be directly associated with
academic performance at the end of the year. There was
support for the prediction that the effects of ability-perfor-
mance beliefs on academic performance would be mediated
by students' goals and type of engagement in school tasks
for older but not for younger children. For older children,
the model is consistent with the notion that students who
believe that ability and performance are stable and that
ability affects performance are more performance oriented,
and therefore use superficial learning strategies that under-
mine their achievement. For the younger children, and to
some degree for the older children, the model suggests a
more direct link between ability and performance beliefs
and achievement.
We are left then with the task of finding an explanation
for how a fixed, stable conceptualization of intelligence and
performance undermines learning. We speculate that the
negative effects of such beliefs on learning and achievement
might be explained in part by children's maladaptive reac-
tions when they encounter difficulty. This interpretation is
supported by Dweck (1986) and colleagues' (Dweck &
Bempechat, 1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Licht & Dweck,
1984) work on learned helplessness. Typically, tasks in
elementary school are somewhat adapted to the skill levels
of students. The positive correlations between ability-per-
formance beliefs and active problem-solving strategies sug-
gest that when children were reporting their problem-solv-
ing strategies they may have been reflecting on the day-to-
day, not-too-difficult tasks. Perhaps as long as children who
focus on the stability of intelligence and performance do not
encounter difficulty, their performance orientation leads
them to use all the strategies they know. This interpretation
is consistent with previous findings that indicate that al-
though a mastery orientation appears to promote active
strategies better than a performance orientation, a perfor-
mance orientation is also sometimes positively associated
with active engagement (Meece et al., 1988). It would be
 406 STIPEK AND GRALINSKI
useful in future research to ask children to report their
problem-solving strategies separately for tasks that are rel-
atively easy and tasks that are difficult.
Examined closely, our own and others' findings on goal
orientations, whether or not they are a consequence of a
belief that intelligence is stable and affects performance,
suggest that although a mastery orientation has advantages,
a performance orientation may be better than no academic
goals at all. We are not promoting instructional environ-
ments that focus students' attention on external evaluations
and their performance in relation to their classmates. It is
worth noting, however, that evidence indicating that a mas-
tery orientation is better cannot be automatically interpreted
as evidence that a performance orientation is bad, at least
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
with regard to the use of active problem solving. Perfor-
mance orientations may, however, have particularly nega-
tive effects for children low in self-confidence, as Dweck
(1986) suggested. In future research, it would be useful to
assess the associations between goals and study strategies
for low and high self-confident children separately, to assess
directly the proposition that performance goals have differ-
ential effects as a function of students' perceptions of
competence.
What is clear from this study is that children's beliefs
about intelligence and performance was a powerful predic-
tor of achievement outcomes over and above their effect on
goal orientation and problem-solving strategies. The results
suggest the importance of further investigation related to
this motivational construct.
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Appendix
Items Used to Measure Mastery and Performance Goal Orientations and Superficial and
Active Learning Strategies
Some items were taken from Meece, Blumenfeld, and Hoyle
(1988).
Mastery Goal Orientation
Stem: "Kids have different reasons for why they do their math/
social studies work. We want to know how true each of these
reasons is for you: I do my math/social studies work . . . " (1 = not
at all true to 5 = very true; as = .74 and .83 for math, .85 and .86
for social studies, fall and spring, respectively):
1. because I want to learn as much as possible
2. because it is important to me that I understand the ideas
3. because I like finding out about new ways to do the work
4. because I like figuring things out
5. because I like learning new things
Performance Goal Orientation
Stem: "I do my math/social studies work . . . " (1 = not at all
true to 5 = very true; as = .74 and .76 for math, .83 and .84 for
social studies):
1. because it is important to me that the teacher thinks I do a
good job
2. because it is important for me to do better than the other
students
3. because I don't want others to think I'm dumb
4. because I don't want to do worse than the other kids in the
class
5. because I want others to think I am smart
Active Cognitive Engagement
Stem: "There are many different ways students do their social
studies work. We want to know how much you usually do each of
407
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these things in social studies" (1 = not at all true to 5 = very true;
as = .76 and .79):
1. I usually try to figure out how the work fits with other things
I have already learned in social studies.
2. I usually ask myself some questions as I go along to make
sure the work makes sense to me.
3. I usually write some things down.
4. I usually explain or write down some things in my own
words.
5. I usually check my book or use other materials like charts
when I'm not sure about things.
6. I usually go back over things I don't understand.
7. I usually try to figure out the hard parts on my own.
Superficial Cognitive Engagement
Stem and anchors: same as for active cognitive engagement
(as = .72 and .65):
1. I usually guess a lot so I can finish quickly.
2. I usually check to see what other kids are doing and then I do
it too.
3. I usually do my work without thinking too hard.
4. I usually pay attention to the things I am supposed to re-
member.
5. I usually skip the hard parts.
6. I usually copy down someone else's answers.
7. I usually just do my work and hope it is right.
Received August 25, 1994
Revision received January 25, 1996
Accepted January 30, 1996