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Counting Carrots… as this cross-section study is entitled studied the distribution of motivation
incentives in Central Stockholm’s banking sector and if it varied for different groups of bank-
employees, according to bank-employees. This variation in the distribution of employee benefits
was examined quantitatively in accordance to three explanatory variables: 1 – Job position, 2 –
Bank size and 3 – the Gender of respondents. On account of the above variables, three hypotheses
were propounded from: the concept of separating firm ownership and control, economies of scale
and experience and the theory on labor market dualism. Concerning Bank size, empirical proof
showed that the distribution of employee incentives in Big banks varied more than it did in Small
banks thanks to cost and resource saving advantages. Nevertheless, this study was unsuccessful in
producing adequate empirical evidence to indicate such variation in motivation incentives when
considering employees’ Job position and Gender. This lack of empirical proof contradicted notions
from relevant theoretical constructs on divorcing firm ownership from control and from the dual
labor market theory. In some respects, conclusions arrived at were not consistent with what
Davydenko et al. (2017) observed in Poznan, Poland on a similar topic about incentives diversity.
In future, more work remains to be done which should include more features of motivation
incentives such as their quality versus quantity or/and their degree of effectiveness in elevating
employee engagement with the intent to improve or complement the produced findings from this
study.
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 4
V: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................. 28
2
5.2. H2: Bank size Analysis...................................................................................................... 29
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 33
3
I: INTRODUCTION
Taken from the context of The Carrot and the Stick Theory of Motivation, carrots in a business
and economics setting are traditionally rewards offered in form of money, recognition and any
other financial or non-financial benefits with the intention of eliciting desired behavior from the
receiver (Friedell, 2012). Isn’t that the puzzle every business-owner seeks to solve? — motivational
devices or carrots that can bring the best out of their employees. In this research paper as it is
entitled, we are strictly Counting Carrots… in central Stockholm with the intention to observe if
the distribution of these devices varies for different groups of bank-employees given Job position,
Bank size and Gender. This Section introduces and equips the reader with some background in-
formation necessary to be able to grasp the content of the thesis. Also, statements on the problem
area, purpose, research question, contribution to research and delimitation are presented and
justified here as follows.
4
is likely to excel financially.
Accruing awareness on the subject has witnessed an increase in the number of dif-
ferent forms of employee motivation incentives in working environments. In spite of what has
been revealed here above, not enough attention has been directed towards exploring any poten-
tial underlying variability in the distribution of motivation incentives in workplaces given dif-
ferent categories of employees.
Yet still, the quantity and quality of incentivizing devices vary a great deal on the
basis of different factors such as culture, country, institutional framework, occupation and in-
dustry etcetera. Among studies exploring the distribution of motivation incentives, Rehu et al.
(2005) recognize distinct dissimilarities in the preferences of employee benefits between USA
and Germany shaped by the difference in culture and in institutions. Davydenko et al. (2017)
too conducted yet another profound research study on HR systems which also explores the
distribution of motivation incentives.
Apart from the diversity of employee incentives from the perspective of bank-em-
ployees in Poznan, Poland, the above research examines in great detail HR components such as
recruitment, forms of employment, motivation, professional education, e-learning, loyalty,
stress, dismissal and outplacement. Davydenko et al. (2017) conclude that the type of bank
(commercial versus cooperative), job position (managerial versus non-managerial) and gender
(male versus female peers) have an effect on the number of incentivizing devices an employee
has access to. That is, the first variable in each of the three categories above experiences greater
incentives diversity than the other.
Inspired by Davydenko et al. (2017), we set out in this cross-section study to ex-
plore the distribution of employee benefits in Central Stockholm systematically basing that on
on the position, size of employer and the gender of bank-employees. That is, we ask ourselves
the question if there is any varying difference in the number of incentivizing benefits that dif-
ferent groups of bank-employees receive?
Concerning the theoretical contextualization to support the conclusions from the
aforementioned study, Davydenko et al. (2017) do not provide very much to go by. To be more
precise, only the dual labor market theory plus the concept of economies of scale are mentioned
which is done in a very implicit and vague manner. This thesis intends therefore not just to
compare what Davydenko et al. (2017) observed in Poznan, Poland to the outcome in Central
Stockholm, but to also substantiate the theoretical deficiency in their article on incentives. This
will be achieved by expanding the theoretical discussion on firm ownership-control separation,
economies of scale and experience and the theory on labor market dualism in order to present
5
an integrated analysis.
Pursuant with all the above, this thesis aims to: (1) investigate and (2) subsequently
identify any underlying distribution variability in the number of motivation incentives for dif-
ferent bank-employees (from an employee perspective) and (3) find out whether such variation
is statistically significant. In so doing, this research makes notable contribution to conceptual
knowledge on incentives as a key element used in boosting employee engagement. Satisfying
this aim will be done by deducing three hypotheses on these variables: Job position, Bank size
and Gender.
The research question is stated as follows: How does the distribution of motivation
incentives for different employee categories in Central Stockholm’s banking sector vary, ac-
cording to bank-employees? In order to be able to address the subject fully, we will use a set of
three hypothetical assumptions which suggest some sort of variation in the distribution of mo-
tivation incentives with respect to the number of benefits offered to different groups of bank-
employees; Managerial employees are motivated with more employee benefits compared to
Non-managerial workers; Big banking corporations offer more motivation incentives to em-
ployees than Small banks; Male employees are offered more motivation incentives than their
female colleagues. In the next Section II, these hypotheses are developed and explained in con-
nection to relevant theory.
This thesis is limited to studying motivation incentives only contrary to all other
HR elements due to very limited time, cost involved and obviously restricted mobility because
of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020). In addition, even
though employers do without doubt affect the distribution of employee engagement benefits,
this research is constrained to only bank-employees in banking corporations of Central Stock-
holm. Banks were chosen as the focus instead of any other sectors owing that to the enormous
role these financial entities play in sustaining modern economies. Besides that, they were cho-
sen in order to allow for comparability between this paper and the section about incentives from
the HR systems in-depth study by Davydenko et al. (2017). Finally, it should be emphasized
that we are not studying the quality and size of specific incentives but rather the number of
different forms of employee benefits that different bank-employees have access to.
6
II: CONCENPTUAL AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK
“The role of research is to test theories and to provide material for the development of law”,
Bryman and Bell (2015, p. 27) hereby the deductive approach. This Section is focused on three
elements of a social-scientific research study: the applied theoretical stance, relevant previous
works and the process of hypotheses-deducing. The introduction sets the premises of looking at
incentives as motivational devices in organizations along with a review on the definition and
significance of such.
7
payment plans, bonuses, company shares, stock options, financial convertibles, pay increase
and collective employee benefits. While completing the questionnaire for Counting Carrots…,
respondents were requested to submit those benefits from the list above that they had access
to at their places of work.
The elementary reason why firms adopt incentives can be reinterpreted as being
able to align employees´ natural self-interest alongside firm objectives (most important of
which is profit maximization). This is done via three means: effort-inducing, effort-directing,
attracting and retaining competent employees using generous incentives. Effort-inducing be-
cause offering generous incentive initiatives can evoke greater effort from employees. Allocat-
ing extra resources to specific activities such as customer services often grabs the attention of
employees by informing and reminding them of where more action is needed hence the term
effort-directing. It is common for corporations to offer incentives that are comparably superior
to those offered by their competitors. By doing so, firms succeed in luring and retaining a higher
quality set of employees thus establishing a solid personnel control strategy (Merchant & Van
der Stede, 2007, pp. 394-398).
Take note however that incentives do not work independent of one another (bonuses
alone would not be effective) but rather in a complementary manner in order to maximize em-
ployee engagement and contribution towards firm goals (Manroop, Singh, & Ezzedeen, 2014).
8
ownership becomes increasingly distributed and diffused subsequently divorcing it from firm
control (Goergen, 2012, p. 9).
To escape the tragedy of too many cooks… due to many entrepreneurs and traders
holding shares in the same firm, shareholders usually delegate the running and managing of the
firm to a group of competent agents (Georgen, 2012). In this study, we refer to all agents with
decision-making authority in a firm irrespective of hierarchical rank as Managers and all other
employees as Non-managers. The preceding delegation means two things: that shareholders are
excluded from issues pertaining firm management and that Managers are entrusted with the
power to make important decisions on behalf of firm owners. From there, the divorce between
firm ownership and control is ultimately materialized. Nevertheless, even though separating
ownership from control solves one problem, the self-serving nature of employees may just as
well lead to another.
In accordance with the words of Adam Smith: “It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest”, (Smith, Raphael & Macfie, 1982). Whilst shareholders aim at maximizing their
profit, Managers by the same token irrespective of the company’s objectives wish to optimize
their own personal gain. This conflict of interest between the principal(s) (shareholders) and
agents (employees) in which one party (usually the employee) tends to put their goals above
the other’s is referred to as the principal-agent problem (Besanko, 2017).
Agency problems thrive in our narrative because shareholders cannot observe the
actions of Managers entirely and because they (Managers) have an information advantage per-
taining firm management, this way fulfilling both conditions of the principal-agent problem:
moral hazard and asymmetric information (Besanko, 2017). In order to make sure that the self-
serving nature of mankind suggested by Adam Smith does not consume Managers thereby lead-
ing them onto the path that forsakes their employer´s goals in pursuit of personal gain, compa-
nies normally offer generous and compelling economic compensation. This way attempting to
align their interests with those of their employees particularly those with decision-making
power (Besanko, 2017).
Ultimately, separating ownership from control leaves Managers in charge of the
firm as the closest form of authority. From conventional wisdom, with authority comes rele-
vance and importance therefore justifying the assertion that Managers have access to more em-
ployee benefits than their subordinates. Purchasing two for the price of one, driven Managers
are expected to keep the firm’s interests at heart especially managing other employees as nec-
essary thus the first propounded hypothesis.
9
H1: Managerial employees are motivated with more employee benefits compared to Non-man-
agerial workers.
Theory asserts scale- and learning economies as advantages in cost that a business
obtains due to expansion in production capacity and accretion in experience over time, respec-
tively (Besanko, 2017). Growth in size and accumulation in experience constitute resource sav-
ing mechanisms that can give a firm competitive advantage over its competitors. The former is
achieved from the ability to spread costs allover a large number of goods while the latter arises
when overall efficiency improves by virtue of know-how build up. The intuitive assumption
implied here is, large companies possess greater resource capacity which can explain why they
are likely to vary employee benefits more than small firms.
Besanko (2017) discusses multiple advantages of scale and learning economies but
considering the purpose of this study, only division of labor and specialization are raised. Divi-
sion of labor occurs when the economic activity of an organization becomes too complex just
so breaking it down into several functions is necessitated if larger return to production is to be
maintained (Besanko, 2017). On top of partitioning performance into several functions such as
capital budgeting, marketing, labor and personnel relations and so on, large companies are usu-
ally organized into diverse decentralized divisions which continues to support the process of
labor division.
In large companies, the subsequent effect of labor division is often reflected by task
specialization which is the contrary scenario in small firms with a few workers performing a
greater variety of tasks that sometimes go beyond their specific roles. Employees in large com-
panies have the opportunity to focus on particular distinct tasks, improve the skillset necessary
to perform those tasks until they specialize. For example, managerial duties are often delegated
to an accounting manager, marketing manager, HR and personnel relations manager or more of
the same. Correspondingly, task specialization is resource saving because it improves the effi-
ciency at which different duties are being performed thereby easing the action of cutting down
on overall costs. In addition, elevated levels of performance efficiency translate into increased
productivity which is very much linked to greater economic compensation (Besanko, 2017).
10
The preceding remarks should not however be interpreted as though they are claim-
ing that small firms cannot realize these scale and learning economies but with respect to or-
ganizational structure, time on the market and operative complexity, big companies acquire
these advantages on a far superior scale (Besanko, 2017).
While employees in small firms may be constrained by limited resources to a few
standard benefits, large companies have the necessary capacity required to be able to vary these
benefits provided labor division and task specialization lead to increased performance effi-
ciency and productivity. Altogether, the joint role of growth in size and greater efficiency re-
sulting from division of labor and specialization mean that big companies can hold much more
resources at their disposal than small firms thus the second propounded hypothesis.
H2: Big banking corporations offer more motivation incentives to employees than Small banks.
Nevertheless, from time to time the bigger they are, the harder they fall attests to
being more than just an expression as the Lehman Brothers have proven historically. Hence,
size should not always be associated with everlasting fortunes because on the other side of scale
economies exists diseconomies of scale.
By Big banks, this research refers to the six biggest banking organizations on the
Swedish banking market today based on their market share. These include in no particular
order: Nordea Bank Abp, Swedbank, Svenska Handelsbanken, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
(SEB), Länsförsäkringar Bank and Danske Bank A/S (Swedish Bankers´ Association, 2019).
These six alone combined take up more than 62% of the entire market that is otherwise made
up of 124 operative firms as of 2018 (Swedish Bankers´ Association, 2019). Conversely, six
firms by virtue of being outside this Big banks bracket were viewed as Small banks namely:
FOREX, Skandia, Avanza, Bluestep, Den Norske Bank (DNB) and Santander Consumer bank.
11
definition clearly highlights an example of labor market failure due to biased treatment of com-
parable individuals with similar achieved productive potential with respect to access to employ-
ment, pay increase, compensation and opportunities to training. Wilkinson (1981, pp. 5-10)
asserts that such balkanization happens to workers seeking employment (pre-market segmen-
tation) just as to those already in the labor market (in-market segmentation). While seeking
clarity regarding the nature of incentives heterogeneity in the banking sector in Central Stock-
holm, the focus was directed upon the latter segment.
Subsidiary to the concept of in-market segmentation, labor market dualism is yet
another form of balkanization. Dualism as the term suggests has two sides to it, a primary sub-
market whose employees (favored workers) have access to more employee motivation benefits
for any given labor quality accompanied by higher returns to increase in labor quality, and a
secondary submarket whose employees (unfavored workers) experience the typical opposite
(Wilkinson, 1981, pp. 8-10). Instinctively, this reasoning reminds us of H1 which assumed that
managerial employees are incentivized more diversely. This could mean that most of these em-
ployees are in the primary submarket contrary to their subordinates.
It is worth stressing that this distinction made by Wilkinson between a primary and
a secondary submarket is not the same as assigning different occupations under different cate-
gories as dictated by social norms i.e. white-collar versus blue-collar jobs. On the contrary,
Wilkinson (1981, pp. 5-7) insists that all sorts of jobs, regardless, be it lower-class or clerical,
all have this duality attribute of distinction. Duality is exposed in form of labor quality hence-
forth the issue of “secondariness in employment is then strictly applicable, too, to any highly
qualified worker who receives significantly lower job reward than comparable members of their
peer group” (Wilkinson, 1981, p. 8).
Furthermore, Doeringer and Piore (1970, p. 360) argue that female workers are
overrepresented, though not exclusive, in the secondary submarket of primary jobs compared
to men ceteris paribus. According to this, female workers should in general then have limited
access to primary employment, economic reward, opportunity to training and promotion com-
pared to men. Why this disparity exists is not the theme of this thesis, nevertheless, it will be
mentioned here that Doeringer and Piore (1970, p. 360) attribute such historically toward polit-
ical attempts by corporations to divide and conquer in order to undermine and weaken labor
unions in the early 1900s.
If we are to follow the aforementioned disparity conviction by Doeringer and Piore
(1970) and Wilkinson’s (1981) reasoning that employees in the secondary submarket are seen
as unfavored or less advantaged workers, it becomes apparent that employees in this submarket
12
are motivated with far less employee motivation benefits in comparison to the primary submar-
ket. Moreover, if the majority of workers in the secondary submarket are female as suggested
by Doeringer and Piore (1970), that implies that the majority of employees in the primary sub-
market are male thus this thesis’ third and final hypothesis.
H3: Male employees are offered more motivation incentives than their female colleagues.
The recent Global Gender Gap Report 2020 carried out by the World Economic
Forum (2020), ranks Sweden the fourth most equal country in the world in terms of gender
whilst Poland lies in the fortieth place. In the same vein, in Sweden, women have generally
surpassed men in attaining higher education (Statistics Sweden, 2015), and this should coun-
teract Doeringer and Piore´s previous argument in the Swedish setting. Considering these two
factors, it is fair to expect that the variation in the distribution of motivation incentives in Cen-
tral Stockholm given gender should be substantially minor than that of Poznan as observed
Davydenko et al. (2017). That is, the nature of the distribution of motivation incentives offered
to female bank-employees should not be significantly different from that of their male col-
leagues.
In order to fully examine the research question stated in Section 1.4, a set of three
hypotheses was put to test: [H1]: Managerial employees receive more motivation incentives
than non-managerial workers. [H2]: Big banking corporations offer more motivation incentives
to employees than Small banks. [H3]: Male employees are offered more motivation incentives
on average than their female colleagues.
Just like studies conducted by Davydenko et al. (2017) and Rehu et al. (2015), these
hypotheses jointly predict that the distribution of employee benefits to different groups of work-
ers varies in number on the basis of position, bank size and gender from the view of bank-
employees. However, there is always the possibility that more economic theories on the subject
that may or may not oppose the assumptions made here definitely exist at large which leaves
room for a range of contrasting hypothetical cases on the topic. Therefore, this is not an exhaus-
tive literature review but a compelling case on the allocation of motivation incentives.
13
II: METHODOLOGY
Relying on Bryman and Bell´s (2015) recommendations, this Section covers a roadmap of the
procedure and the rationale behind decisions taken in the due process of conducting this social
survey. Implications for such just like ethical considerations are discussed. Towards the end,
an examination of the level of credibility of the thesis is presented.
The choice of research design according to Bryman and Bell´s (2015, p. 49) should reflect
decisions about the priority being given to a range of different dimensions of research. Particu-
lar importance attached to the following constructs should be clearly expressed in the choice of
14
design; expressing causal connection between variables; generalizing to larger groups of indi-
viduals than those actually forming parts of the investigation; understanding behavior and its
meaning in a specific social context; having a temporal (i.e. over time) appreciation of social
phenomena and their interconnection (Bryman and Bell, 2015).
On account of the deduced predications and in connection to the above criteria, one
design was adopted from the possible five: experimental, longitudinal, case study, comparative
study and cross-section survey, reviewed by Bryman and Bell (2015, ch. 3).
Considering the lack of interest in: causality, various time periods, a single case
study and twofold populations, this investigation deemed the cross-section design most fitting
to serve its purpose. Re-stating that as being able to draw associations about the heterogeneity
in the distribution of incentives as perceived by bank-employees of Central Stockholm. The
latter and this definition of a social survey design fitted very well: “collection of data on more
than one case and at a single point in time in order to collect quantifiable data in connection
with two or more variables which are examined to detect patterns of association”, (Bryman &
Bell, 2015, p. 62).
15
The final self-completion questionnaire consisted of four open and nine closed
questions. The first part of the questionnaire defines the composition of the sample whilst the
second part is dedicated to the distribution and attitudes on motivation incentives.
The complete self-administered questionnaire (English version) used during this
survey study is present in the Appendix section subsection 8.2.
Deciding on the appropriate site to conduct the survey was based on three factors:
(1) limited time and other resources, (2) convenience and (3) availability of relevant respond-
ents. The allocated time to conduct the research as whole was less than three months (between
March and May 2020). The latter and the cost involved, not leaving out limited mobility due to
the corona virus pandemic (World Health Organization, 2020), restricted this research to Stock-
holm. Because of the coronavirus crisis, most of the small banks such as Citi, Ålandsbanken
and Collector had their offices closed to the general public. This and the former prompted for a
non-probability approach in form of convenience sampling in order to guarantee an acceptable
number of respondents that would satisfy the purpose of the study. These factors together and
a very low response rate to questionnaires at workplaces (Bryman and Bell, 2015), justified
going with a convenience sample despite its lack of representativeness. This implies that even
though this thesis was interested in all bank-employees in Greater Stockholm, the final sample
constitutes only of those that worked in the inner-city, home to the researcher.
If or not the pandemic impacted the allocation of employee benefits was not im-
portant in trying to establish if there exists some sort of disparity in the distribution of motiva-
tion incentives in Central Stockholm´s banking sector. Nevertheless, Dagens Industri, a Swe-
dish business-oriented newspaper reported on June 16, 2020 that overall healthcare insurance
contracts signed by employers had risen by 20% between January and May in comparison to
the same period in 2019 as a result of the ongoing pandemic (Bolander, 2020). Why? Employers
want their employees to receive the necessary healthcare attention as fast as possible without
having to wait forever in the surging queues of the Swedish healthcare system (Bolander, 2020).
That way, employees can get back to work within the shortest period possible following a sick
leave.
Both a printout and an online version via Google Forms of the questionnaire were
available for the convenience of the respondents. The link to the digital version is available on
16
the following webpage: https://forms.gle/56vSWJJmRGNu7Taa6. The survey was adminis-
tered between April and May 2020.
Due to lack of alternative methods, the questionnaire was administered directly via
physical visits to banking offices by the researcher. Besides this and posting, respondents were
approached via social media outlets such as Facebook, LinkedIn and work e-mails. After a few
respondents, the snowball sampling technique proved to be a very practical means of gathering
additional observations.
Snowball sampling refers to collecting data by using colleagues or any other con-
tacts close to the circle of the initial respondents (Bryman & Bell, 2015, 651). It is a relatively
simple and handy method which does not generate high research cost yet it allows the possibil-
ity of reaching a wider population.
Now let us take a closer look at reliability and validity of this quantitative study.
17
3.6.1. Reliability: Internal Consistence & Stability
18
could not be met mostly because of limited mobility due to WHO´s recommendations to assist
in combating the then ongoing pandemic, cost involved, scarce time and other resources to
assist in conducting the study. As a result, weak internal validity has no significant negative
effect to the credibility of the results provided in Section IV.
External validity on the other hand helps to answer the question: to what extent
outside the sampled observations are the drawn generalizations rationally and effectively appli-
cable too, to other subjects as well as time and scenarios? (Bryman & Bell, 2015) A non-random
sample as the one used in this study is viewed as non-representative of a whole population
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). In addition to that, the findings from this study were produced from 58
observations which is equivalent to only 0.2% of all 38 000 bank-employees in Sweden as of
2018 (Swedish Bankers´ Association, 2019).
Expanding the sample would therefore in some cases perhaps sway the findings in
another direction than that presented in Section IV. These two defects lower the confidence of
external validity. However, with regards to corporate structure and the tasks performed by these
entities, the banking sector is not that volatile and this reinforces the confidence of this study’s
external validity. Subsequently, the generalizations generated in this study may not be effec-
tively applicable to the whole of Sweden because of sampling defects but they certainly are to
Greater Stockholm.
19
IV: RESULTS
Concise and brief, this Section is dedicated to presenting the chief findings from this social
survey through tables and charts before any formal explanation or detailed discussion can be
engaged.
The questionnaire was administered to 157 bank offices around central Stockholm:
63 via online and 94 via physical visits, 58 observations have been submitted. The biggest
challenge faced during the phase of data collection was an extremely low response rate towards
the survey.
The complete self-administered questionnaire for this survey is present in the Ap-
pendix section subsection 8.1. Table 1 below contains key numbers about the composition of
the research sample such as gender, highest attained education, job position, branch among
others.
Table1. Summary of the sample structure
Criterion Category Number of observations Percentage … ….
Consent Granted 58 100%
Gender Female 31 53.4%
Male 27 46.6%
Education Elementary 0 0%
Highschool (major in economics) 8 13.8%
Highschool (other) 3 5.2%
Vocational 7 12.1%
University (major in economics) 26 44.8%
University (other) 14 24.1%
Position Managerial position 18 31%
Non-managerial position 40 69%
Unit Headquarters 20 34.5%
Regional office 38 65.6%
Bank size Small bank 26 44.8%
Big bank 32 55.2%
Statistics Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 22 59 28.7 26.5 28.7
Experience in banking 0.25 40 7.4 4 9
Size of employees 4 1500 57.1 19 175.2
Number of incentives 1 20 10.5 10.5 5.9
20
4.2. The incidence of motivation incentives
21
4.3. H1: Job position
22
25
22.2
Percentage of employees
20
17.5 Managers
16.7
15
15 Non-managers
12.5
11.1 11.1 11.1
10 10 10
10
7.5
5.6 5.6 5.6 5.65 5.6
5
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Number of incentives
23
employer.
Considering contentment with the offered benefits, results indicate that 93.75%;
88.46% of Big and Small bank-employees respectively were content. Even with a shy 10%
dominance by Big bank-employees, we see that in conformity with Chart 3 bank size affects
number of employee benefits.
25
Percentage of employees
19.2 19.2
20
18.8
Big banks
15.4 15.6
15 Small banks
12.5
9.4
10
7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7
6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
5 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Number of incentives
24
5 motivational devices which is equivalent to 22.2% of men and 19.4% of female employees.
Female employees dominated this category with a 6.8% margin over men.
In general, Chart 3 follows suit to the trend in the previous two graphs where the
number of recipients for a number of benefits falls markedly after 5 devices. However, beyond
5 incentives the occurrence of both sexes is for the most part uniform.
Equivalent to 90% versus 88.9% of the total share of men and women respectively
felt contended with the number of motivation incentives they had access to. 77.4% of men and
59.3% of women felt that the number of incentives does not matter in their choice of employer
given similar conditions. From Chart 3 and with all results considered, we could not with au-
thority declare that there is in fact an underlying significant variation is number of incentives
when considering gender.
25
22.2
Percentgae of employees
19.4
20
Males
14.8
15 Females
12.9 12.9
11.1 11.1
9.7 9.7 9.7
10
7.4 7.4 7.4
6.5 6.5 6.5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Number of incentives
In order to test for the statistical significance of the above presented results, the
Student Z-test for a two sample average and a p-value were calculated. The Student statistic
test for hypotheses indicates whether the findings from a study are either due to random chance
25
or are in fact plausible within a relevant level of statistical confidence (Bryman & Bell, 2015).
A p-value tells us on the other hand “the probability of observing a sample as extreme as, or
more extreme than, the value observed given that the null hypothesis is true” (Bryman & Bell,
2015).
The null hypotheses proposed that there was no significant or zero difference in the
average number of motivation incentives for each paired group of employees in all three ex-
planatory variables. The alternative hypotheses suggested otherwise that incentives varied in
accordance to what was implied in the study hypotheses in Section II.
Listed below are the null and alternative or research hypotheses:
Null hypothesis for Job position H0: There is no difference in the average distri-
bution of employee benefits between Managers and Non-managers
Research hypothesis for Job position H1: Managers receive more motivation incentives than
Non-managers
Null hypothesis for Bank size H0: There is no difference in the average distribu-
tion of employee benefits between Big banks and Small banks
Research hypothesis for Bank size H1: Big banks offer more employee benefits than Small
banks
Null hypothesis for Gender H0: There is no difference in the average distribution
of employee benefits between Male and Female bank-employees
Research hypothesis for Gender H1: Male bank-employees are motivated with more employee
benefits than Females employees.
Student Z-test: Two sample Managers Non-managers Big banks Small banks Males Females
6.111 6.85 7.563 5.923 6.290 7.481
Known variance 10.34 13.208 15.157 8.634 8.146 15.798
Observations 18 40 32 26 31 27
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
Level of confidence => α 0.05 0.05 0.05
Critical z-value one-tail 1.645 1.645 1.645
P(Z<=z) value one-tail 0.219 0.034 0.098
Calculated z-value -0.777 1.826 -1.294
Source: Data from own survey
26
A one-tailed test was used since this study was testing for the possibility of the
relationship in only one direction thus completely disregarding the possibility of a relationship
in the other direction. That is, if a specific group of employees enjoyed greater variation in the
distribution of motivation incentives or not.
Table 2 reports the test results and p-values for each group of respondents. At the
standard level of confidence: 5%, test results for the explanatory variables: Job position reported
in column 2 and Gender reported in column 6 were none significant statistically (Table 2).
Hence we could not afford to reject their null hypotheses that suggested zero difference in the
distribution of incentives between Manager versus Non-managers, and between Males versus
Females.
In contrast, test results for Bank size indicated a statistically significant difference
for variation in the allocation of employee benefits between Big and Small banks thus allowing
the null hypothesis that stated a zero difference in incentives distribution between these two
groups to be rejected. That is, the calculated z-value 1.826 for Bank size was greater than the
critical value 1.645 and the p-value 0.034 for the same variable above was less than the 0.05
level of confidence.
All results considered, we concluded with authority that in all studied cases, only
bank size had a statistically significant effect on the distribution of employee benefits. Further
statistical evidence at the 10% level of confidence that is consistent with the above conviction
is presented in Table 1 of the Appendix section subsection 8.3.
27
V: DISCUSSION
In this Section, the findings are analyzed with respect to relevant theoretical constructs. No-
ticeable differences between the applied theory and practice on the distribution of employee
benefits are explained objectively and speculatively. Similar subheading from the previous Sec-
tion are used here in order to enable the reader to follow the analysis easily.
The results revealed that employment status had no significant impact on the em-
ployee’s number of incentives which was consistent with neither relevant theory nor the previ-
ous study by Davydenko et al. (2017). It was argued that Managers are relatively more im-
portant (than other workers) in the business operation of any firm because of the divorce be-
tween firm ownership and control. In support of the same assumption, Davydenko et al. (2017)
found out in Polish banks of Poznan that Managers had access to more motivation incentives
than Non-managers. It was therefore very surprising when the results on Job position from this
survey failed to depict the aforementioned conviction in the variation in the distribution of mo-
tivation incentives.
On the other hand, it is hardly any riddle that because of relative relevance as ex-
plained in subsection 2.2, Managers are paid higher wages than their subordinates. The reason
for this has to do with proximity of authority and the decision-making power invested in Man-
agers. To make sure that the decisions made are in the best interest of shareholders, Managers
are therefore normally paid and compensated for generously as a way of aligning their interests
along those of the company; profit maximization. In light of this, Managers may not show
interest in the number of incentivizing devices offered to them henceforth the reason why some
of them submitted a lower number of incentives than Non-managers.
An interesting reflection upon these findings relates to variation in managerial roles
according to department, size of office, nature of employment and the scope of responsibility.
Such factors and more can have an effect on the distribution of motivation incentives. With this
in mind, it could be a mere coincidence that all surveyed Managers had very inferior roles
almost at the same level as all other respondents thus the lack of noticeable variation in the
distribution of employee benefits in this category. Nevertheless, this research overlooked this
28
detail by looking at all sorts of Managers under the same group which may have swayed the
results into the direction revealed in subsection 4.3. Let alone there is always the issue of inter-
pretation where some respondents may have submitted only those incentives they were utiliz-
ing, forgetting that question 10a (questionnaire in subsection 8.2) clearly asked them to choose
all devices that they had access to.
29
in Small banks all employees may have access to the same standardized motivation incentives
due to resource scarcity, Big banks have the necessary resources (know-how and capability) to
afford adapting these devices to the needs of individual groups of employees thus greater dis-
tribution of employee benefits. Davydenko et al. (2017) use the same reasoning and theoretical
stance to substantiate their findings on how big commercial banks in Poznan are able to moti-
vate their employees more diversely than small cooperative banks.
Asserting that female bank-employees experienced less variation regarding the al-
location of motivational devices than men was based on the theory of labor market dualism
under which this particular group of employees was over-represented in the secondary labor
submarket according to Doeringer and Piore (1970). Wilkinson (1981) referred to this submar-
ket unfavored which clearly underscores the assumption that the motivation of its workers is
not as important to firms as that of the primary submarket employees thus access to fewer em-
ployee motivation benefits.
Nevertheless, the inability to find convincing evidence empirically to support this
claim was not very surprising considering that World Economic Forum (2020) ranked Sweden
as the fourth most gender equal country in the world in its recent report on economic equality.
This could mean that improved economic equality is closely linked to better employment op-
portunities, quality and quantity of reward for any given sort of employment.
Furthermore, women in Sweden have generally surpassed men in attaining higher
education (Statistics Sweden, 2015). With this knowledge, we can assume that female employ-
ees are acquiring more employment opportunities in the primary/favored submarket thereby
steadily eliminating the big gap in the distribution of motivation incentives to men that Da-
vydenko et al. (2017) revealed in their results on banks in Poznan.
Subsequently we see to a greater or lesser degree an even distribution of employee
benefits given gender. Furthermore, the theory on dualism according to Doeringer and Piore
(1970) suggested that women were overrepresented in the secondary submarket however it was
not specified anywhere whether this trend is supposed to be homogeneous in all branches. This
conviction overlooks the possibility that the above mentioned tendency may indeed vary in
different sectors with the banking sector as a possible example of that with respect to our results.
30
VI: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
How does the distribution of motivation incentives for different employee categories in Central
Stockholm’s banking sector vary, according to bank-employees? In light of scrutiny, this re-
search question reveals more unturned stones such as: Does bank size matter in connection to
incentives? Is assuming a managerial position always paired with more carrots? And does the
contention that female bank-employees experience far less variation in reward initiatives hold
any water? This Section answers the research question by commenting of such issues. At the
same time, overlooked features of motivation incentives are justified together with further rec-
ommendations.
In the past, HRM has been dominated by discussions about the relationship between
motivation and performance, one that cannot be taken lightly. Even so, it was surprising to find
out that the distribution nature of different employee motivation incentives has/was not been
explored as much. Following Davydenko et al. (2017), this quantitative cross-section study in-
vestigated one of many faces of employee engagement, that is, allocation of employee benefits
according to different groups of bank-employees in Central Stockholm.
It has been concluded with empirical proof that Bank size has a noticeable impact
on the distribution of engagement benefits used to motivate workers. That is, Big banks tend to
vary their incentivizing devices more than Small banks do. The division between what was
viewed as a Big versus a Small bank was determined by the acquired share of the total banking
market in Stockholm. Further research is recommended to explore employee benefits while
differentiating banks based on if they are local versus international or/and commercial, savings,
industrial and cooperative.
Contrary to Bank size, it has been revealed by this research that Job position and
Gender do not with significance affect the distribution of employee benefits in Central Stock-
holm’s banking sector. Statistically this was corroborated at the 5% and 10% levels of confi-
dence. The outcome on Job position was more unexpected than that on Gender. This is so be-
cause we did and still believe in relative importance and relevance of Managers compared to
31
other workers in running a firm which should be factored in the distribution of incentives. An
area of interest to future studies yet not revealed by our results on Job position concerns the
quality and size of specific employee benefits offered to Managers versus Non-mangers.
Answers to which specific incentive initiatives (presented in subsection 4.2) are less
or more efficient at fulfilling the purpose assigned to them considering not only banking but
other sectors too are yet to surface. A combination of improved economic equality and the
forever growing number of more females with higher education than men in Sweden maybe be
the force behind the female emancipation from the secondary labor submarket into the primary
segment. It is recommended further to investigate if there are distinct dissimilarities in prefer-
ence for different motivation incentives on gender grounds.
In the end, findings from this research differ in some cases from the existing used
literature and previous works which may be due to sample un-representability and obviously
the fact that research behind them has been conducted on a varying timeline and in different
countries. Therefore, the answer to the question implied in Counting Carrots… is as follows,
the distribution of motivation incentives for different groups of bank-employees in Central
Stockholm does and can vary from the view of workers when considering Bank size neverthe-
less analysis on Job position and Gender suggests otherwise.
32
VII: REFERENCES
Besanko, D. (2017). Economics of Strategy (7.th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Custom.
Bolander, H. (2020). Ökat sug efter privat vård i coronatider. Dagens Industri, p. 17.
Bryman, A., & Bell, Emma. (2015). Business Research Methods (4.th ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Davydenko, V. A., Kazmierczyk, J., Romashkina, G. F., & Zelichowska, E. (2017). Diversity
5(1), 116-126.
Doeringer, P.B.; Piore, M.J. (1970). Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. Cam-
Exley, S. (2013). Mind the gap between best and worst - it's widening. The Times Educational
Francis, B., Hasan, I., Liu, L., & Wang, H. (2019). Employee treatment and contracting with
Friedell, M. (2012). The carrot and the stick. Journal of Surgical Education, 69(6), 680-686.
Goergen, M. (2012). International Corporate Governance. Harlow, England; New York: Pear-
son.
Kaya, N., Koc, E., & Topcu, D. (2010). An exploratory analysis of the influence of human
21(11), 2031-2051.
Laffont, J., & Martimort, David. (2002). The Theory of Incentives, Vol. 1, The principal-agent
33
Lind, D., Marchal, William G, & Wathen, Samuel A. (2017). Statistical Techniques in Business
Hill/Irwin series operations and decision sciences). New York: McGraw-Hill Ed-
ucation.
Maksimović Vladimir. (2014). International aspect of human resource management: Case study
Manroop, L., Singh, P., & Ezzedeen, S. (2014). Human resource systems and ethical climates:
Martin-Rios, C. (2014). Why do firms seek to share human resource management knowledge?
199.
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2007). Management Control Systems: performance
lan.
Napier, N., & Peterson, R. (1984). Putting human resource management at the line manager
Rehu, M., Lusk, E., & Wolff., E. (2005). Incentive preferences of employees in Germany and
Smith, A., Raphael, D. D. 1., & Macfie, A. L. (1982). The theory of moral sentiments. Indian-
34
Swedish Bankers´ Association. (2019). The Swedish banking market. Swedish Bankers´ Asso-
ciation.
Swedish Companies Registration Office. (2019). Svenska företag. Swedish Companies Regis-
tration Office.
Wilkinson, F. (1981). The Dynamics of Labor Market Segmentation. Harcout Brace Jo-
World Economic Forum. (2020). Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Geneva: World Economic
Forum.
World Health Organization. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID 19) Pandemic. Geneva:
35
VIII: APPENDIX
This Appendix section should act as a collection of supplementary material that were useful
during the research but were not included in the main body.
Hej!
Mitt namn är Frank B. Francisson och jag är student vid Södertörns högskola där jag nu läser
min sista termin av Ekonomikandidatprogrammet, med inriktning på Nationalekonomi. Under
våren 2020 skriver jag mitt kandidatexamensarbete som jag har valt att kalla ”Att räkna moröt-
ter...”. Syftet är att undersöka bankanställdas syn på olika incitamentsinsatser som bankerna
erbjuder sin personal. Av detta skäl vänder jag mig till dig, med frågan om du kan tänka dig att
anonymt besvara denna enkät. Dina svar är oerhört viktiga för studien. Enkäten tar ca 10 minu-
ter att fylla i. Det finns varken rätt eller fel svar.
Har du några frågor till mig eller vill veta mer om studien? Kontakta mig via följande mejla-
dress; Frankbfrancisson@outlook.com
*Obligatorisk
Jag intygar att jag har tagit del av informationen ovan och samtycker till deltagande i studien. *
o Ja
o Nej
36
1. Juridiskt kön. *
o Kvinna
o Man
37
8. Vilken är din yrkesposition? *
o En ledarskapsbefattningspost
o En icke-ledarskapsbefattningspost
38
o Aktier
o Optioner
o Konvertibler
o Löneförhöjning
o Gruppbaseradpersonalförmåner
o Annat
11. Instämmer du eller instämmer du inte med följande påstående: ”ett större utbud
av incitamentinsatser eller personalförmåner på en annan jämbördig arbetsplats skulle kunna
påverka mitt val av anställning”. *
o Instämmer i hög grad
o Instämmer delvis
o Varken instämmer eller inte instämmer
o Instämmer inte helt
o Instämmer inte alls
39
2. What is your age [in whole years]? *
9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "the employee benefits
used to motivate workers at my workplace meet my expectations"? *
o Strongly agree
o Partially agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Partially disagree
o Strongly disagree
40
10a. Which employee motivation benefits do you have access to at your place of
work? Choose all employee benefits you can partake of regardless if you utilize them or not *
o Praise and recognition
o Participating in planning and in decision-making processes
o Promotion opportunities
o Training/Education programs
o Vacation trips
o Flexible working hours
o Recreational acitivities (gym, massage, spa etc.)
o Company events and club memberships
o Food provision
o Transport benefits (parking space, work-vehicle)
o Housing provision
o Vouchers
o Child daycare
o Insurance payment plans
o Retirement payment plans
o Bonus pay
o Company shares
o Financial options
o Convertibles
o Pay increase
o Group-based benefits
o Other(s)
10b. If you submitted "Other(s)" in the previous question (10a), can you provide an
estimation of the number of employee motivation benefits represented by the choice
“Other(s)”?
11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:” a greater range/number
of emplyee motivation benefits at a comparable workplace could affect my choice of employ-
ment/employer”. *
o Strongly agree
o Partially agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Partially disagree
o Strongly disagree
41
8.3. The Student Z-statistic test for α 10%
Table 1. The Z-test and p-vales results at the 10% level of confidence.
Student Z-test: Two sample Managers Non-managers Big banks Small banks Males Females
Mean 6.111 6.85 7.563 5.923 7.481 6.290
Known variance 10.34 13.208 15.157 8.634 15.798 8.146
Observations 18 40 32 26 27 31
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
Level of confidence => α 0.1 0.1 0.1
P(Z<=z) value one-tail 0.219 0.034 0.098
Critical z-value one-tail 1.282 1.282 1.282
Calculated z-value -0.777 1.826 -1.294
Source: Data from own survey
The image below can be seen on the cover page of this paper, retrieved from Istock
(Istock, 2013). It was employed mainly to imaginatively aid the informative aspect of the title;
Counting Carrots…
42