DIZON RIVERA VS DIZON

FACTS: the testatrix, Agripina a widow, died, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs: six legitimate
children and a legitimate granddaughter, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a
pre-deceased legitimate son of Agripina. Agripina left a last will written in Kapangpangan. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren.

Testate proceedings were commenced and by order, the last will and testament was allowed and
admitted to probate; and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix'
estate.

In her will, the Agripina "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties practically the
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.

The executrix filed her project of partition.

the oppositors petitioned that the disposition made by the testatrix be reduced to the amounts set
forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees and divided it among them in seven equal
parts. Court: sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition,

Oppositors invoke A1063, stating that property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the
testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitimes shall in any case remain unimpaired"

ISSUE: Whether Art. 1603 applies?

HELD: No.

RATIO: First off: about the counter-project by oppositors:  The counter-project of partition proposed
by oppositors-appellants wher they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to ½ and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of
the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code.

It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
Second: application of Art. 1603  When the testatrix has not made any previous donations during her
lifetime, nor left merely some properties by will, collation isn’t necessary to determine the legitimes of
each heir.  Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitimes of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for
the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitimes of the
heirs is here determined and undisputed.

AUSTRIA VS. REYES

Facts: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CIF of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners. This opposition was
dismissed and the probate of the will was allowed after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents
all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.

More than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz
was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the
decedent’s will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Finally, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition
alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering
these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that
the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

RULING: Article 850 provides: The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will of the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur: 1.
The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will; 2. The cause must be shown to be false;
and 3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause. The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore
whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution
may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly
would not have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her
will to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no absolute
indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known
that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of
her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored and
doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should
be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it effect.

AZNAR VS DUNCAN

FACTS:Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia
was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the
estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his
daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus,
the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased died intestate.

ISSUE:Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the
legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.

Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a
legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
FACTS • Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the PH, died leaving a will.
The will was admitted to probate by CFI. In that same decision, CFI declared Helen Garcia as a
natural child of the deceased. This was affirmed by SC. o The SC also held in another case that
the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by PH law and remanded the case to
CFI for execution. • The CFI issued an Order approving the project of partition submitted by the
executor o The properties of the estate were divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the
testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had
been judicially declared as such after his death. o This decision was based on the proposition
that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died
intestate, saving only legacies left in favor of other persons in accordance with Art. 854, NCC1 •
Lucy Duncan appeals the CFI decision contending that the applicable provision is Art. 906, NCC
which provides: “Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.”

o Since the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with
Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless, although less than the amount

Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall
be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

of her legitime she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Art. 9182 ISSUES
& HOLDING Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to Lucy Duncan
and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted
heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia (1/4
of estate)Inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to extent necessary to cover legitime of
Helen pursuant to Art. 906, NCC RATIO (note: copy of the will on the last page of this digest)
Preterition • The omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc, by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. No preterition in this case • The
testator did not entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of Php 3, 600 • Since there is no
preterition, Art. 854 does not apply When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less
than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed
the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed (Manresa) • This rule is more in
consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator as may be gathered from the provisions
of his will. o Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter,
and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600 o The fact that she was subsequently declared
judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come
during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and
that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
expressly recognized by him. o The estate of deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of
339 shares of stocks in the Christenses Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. § ¼
of said estate should go to Helen Garcia as her legitime

BALANAY VS MARTINEZ

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died and was survived by Felix Balanay Sr. and their 6 children.

Felix Balanay Jr, one of the 6 children, filed a petition for the probate of their mother’s notarial will. 
Their mother’s will declared that: a. She owned the “southern half” of the conjugal lots. b. Her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in the
will.  Avelina Antonio and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed Balanay Jr’s petition, but an affidavit was filed
where Felix Balanay Sr. withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights over the estate of
his wife.  Avelina contended that the affidavit of renunciation was void.  A new lawyer, Atty. Montana,
appeared in behalf of Felix Balanay Jr, withdrawing the petition for probate of will and requesting for an
intestate proceeding instead. Such was granted by the probate court.  Felix Balanay Jr. with a new
lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that Atty. Montana had no authority to
withdraw the petition.  The probate court denied the motion and the will was declared void because of
the disposition where the mother declared that she owned the “southern half” of the properties.  The
disposition was declared illegal because she cannot declare ownership over the undivided conjugal
properties, as her right as a co-owner was inchoate and pro-indiviso.  The court then ordered for
intestate proceedings to commence instead of testate.

ISSUE: WON mixed succession may occur in this case?

YES HELD: For mixed succession to occur, the invalid disposition must be separable from the valid
dispositions. The invalid disposition must not be a condition to the valid disposition. The probate court
acted correctly in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before establishing its formal validity.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issues. But the probate court erred in declaring that the
will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. The rule is that the
invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
disposition, unless it is presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made. Hence, if there are certain dispositions in a will that are not
valid, it will not render the whole will invalid. The will remains valid, and the valid dispositions should be
followed. The rule is testacy is favored over intestacy. The policy of the State is to give effect to the
wishes of the testator as much as possible. The illegal disposition of Leodegaria declaring that she
owned the “southern half” of the properties can be rendered invalid, but the entire will is not nullified.
Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they
can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries. The statement of the testatrix that
she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-
owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But That illegal declaration does not nullify the
entire will. It may be disregarded. Hence, testacy should be favored over intestacy. The valid dispositions
of Leodegaria in her will should be followed, while the invalid ones shall be effected by operation of law.
(mixed succession)

ACAIN VS IAC

FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided
that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father
of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo
pre-deceased Nemesio.

The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds: that the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of “compulsory heirs in the direct line” thus their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs.

RULING: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as
she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance,
for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
 Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession
the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises
made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in
effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased.

NUGUID VS NUGUID

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, , died o single, without descendants Surviving her were her legitimate parents,
Felix and Paz a Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid (sister) filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid about 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with
the will annexed be issued to her. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father
and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground
therefor, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. CFI, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and
dismissed the petition without costs. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider thwarted hence this appeal

Issue: WON the will is invalid due to preterition Held: YES

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Petitioner contends that what we have is a case of disinheritance rather than preterition. This is not
meritorious, as this argument fails to appreciate the distinction between preterition and disinheritance.
Preterition is the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either by not
mentioning them, or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. The will does not explicitly disinherit the parents. It simply
omits their names altogether. Said will rather than being labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one
in which the forced heir suffers from preterition. The effects of preterition are totally different from
disinheri- tance. Preterition annuls the institution of heirs, except devises and legacies insofar as the
latter are not inofficious. In disinheri- tance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which
the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Considering, however that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is void.

CAYETANO VS LEONIDAS

FACTS: Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes,
he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila
while temporarily residing in Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUEs: Whether or not the will was valid

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD: As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which
governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the
decedent must apply.

As to the issue of jurisdiction --

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had
an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.

VDA DE MAPA VS. CA

FACTS: On January 16, 1965, the petitoners Paz Garcia Vda. de Mapa et. al. instituted a civil case before
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the properties left by Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo
from the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo which is also subject to a special proceedings in the same court.
They claimed that the deceased Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo, in her last will and testament,
instituted Ludovico Hidrosollo as a universal heir with the obligation as a trustee to the residue of her
estate and to hold the same in trust for the petitioners and the private respondents. The respondents, in
their answer, denied the existence of trust and alleged that Ludovico Hidrosollo, as the surviving spouse
of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosllo, became the latter's universal heir when she died without ascendants
or descendants, so that the controverted properties became part of the estate of Ludovico Hidrosollo.
They further alleged that the civil case instituted by the petitioners was barred by an order denying their
motion to intervene in the special proceedings. In disposing the case, the lower court ruled that a trust
was created and the denial order of the petitioner's motion to intervene did not deprive them to
institute a separate civil action to recover what pertains to them in their own right. The respondents
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied prompting them to file an appeal before the Court
of Appeals. Their appeal to the appellate court proved fruitful as the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the lower court and ruled that there is no trust nor fideicommissary substition created in the
will of Concepcion Mapa de Hidrosollo.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not a trust was created.

2. Whether or not the denial order constitutes a bar to the civil case instituted.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was a trust created. Although the word "trust" itself does not
appear in the will, the testatrix intent to create one is nonetheless demonstrated by the stipulations in
her will. In designating her husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as a sole and universal heir with the obligation
to deliver the properties to the petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title
should vest in him and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as beneficiarios,
she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest over the properties should repose in them. Article
1443 of the Civil Code also provides that No particular words are required for the creation of an express
trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. However, the trust created by Concepcion should
be limited only to the free portion of her estate.

RAMIREX VS RAMIREZ

FACTS: The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted
an inventory of the estate as follows: On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of
partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the
widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first
heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III
of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa
Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express
win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its
order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court. ISSUE:
Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case. HELD: Yes. The appellant's do
not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership. They admit that the
testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only
survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And
since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2,
Civil Code.)

It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides
for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled
to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given
under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired
her legitime and tended to favor Wanda. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez. The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the co

urt a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.

CRISOLOGO VS SINSONG

-NOTE

RODRIGUEZ VS. CA

NOTE

RABANILLA VS CA

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix

Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of
land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted states that,
should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead Belleza, the aforementioned property
and the rights which she shall set forth, shall be inherited and
acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla. Also, she
commanded that should she die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already
received the ownership of the said land, and also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall
have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, certain piculs of sugars . Should Jorge Rabadilla die,
his heir to whom he shall give the shall have the obligation to still give
yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
year. If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer,
lessee or transferee shall also have the same obligation to the testator’s
sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to the sister and nearest
relatives. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
Coscolluella filed a case against the transferee bank and the heirs of Dr.
Rabadilla. They were declared in default except Johnny Rabadilla whose
default order was lifted upon filing of an answer. He also entered into a
compromise agreement which he failed to fulfill.
RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed. The petitioner theorizes further
that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted
heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as
“near descendants” without a definite identity or reference as to who are
the “near descendants” and therefore, under Articles 843 and 845 as not
written.

ISSUE:

1. Whether there was a valid substitution.

2. WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal
institution.

RULINGS:

1. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons

to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case
the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance
or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave
 his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

No fideicommissary substitution either. Dr. Rabadilla and his heirs are

allowed to alienate the property. In fideicommissary substitution, the
heir is not allowed to alienate it because his duty is to preserve and
transmit it to the second heir. Also, if Dr. Rabadilla is the fiduciary and
the near descendants of the testator are the second heirs, it violates
the requirement of law that the fiduciary and the fideicommissary
must be within the one-degree relationship. In fact, the near
descendants are not in any way related to Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs.

2. YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. From the provisions of the Codicil litigated
upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela
Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not
make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
 subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.

FRANCISCO VS. FRANCIA

FACTS: Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio

Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners,
on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a
hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of
title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificates
of title from her half-sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the
land to them in, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed
a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She
alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In
their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, the trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint finding that the sale was
valid. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not a legitimate daughter may be deprived of her
share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract.
RULING: NO. Even if the “kasulatan” was not simulated, it still violated the
Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's
legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to
transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his
legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his
death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the
titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code: "The legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and
of the mother. "The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject
to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided." Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If
indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their
father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father's
estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only
legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be
determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the
estate. His compulsory heir cannot be deprived of her share in the estate
save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. Hence, the petition was
denied.

BARITUA VS CA

Facts:

· The tricycle driven by the deceased Bienvenido Nacario figured in an accident with a bus driven by
Bitancor and owned and operated by Baritua.

· No criminal case was ever instituted, but only extra-judicial settlement.

· The petitioners and bus insurer (Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc.) negotiated Nacario's
widow, who received P18,500.00.

· The widow Alicia executed a "Release of Claim" and an affidavit of desistance.

· After more than one year, the respondents, who are the parents of the deceased Nacario, filed a
complaint against the petitioners to be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses
incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle which they (the private respondents)
only loaned to the victim.
· The court a quo dismissed the complaint, but the CA ruled that the release executed by Alicia did
not discharge the liability of the petitioners because she was not the one who suffered these damages
arising from the death of the respondents’ son.

Issue:

WoN Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.

Held:

Yes, the Court holds that Alicia is entitled to the payment for damages because she is among the
persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made as enumerated in Article 1240 of
the Civil Code.

Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The petitioners therefore acted
correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian
of their lone child.

Thus, the petition is DENIED.