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Monthly Newsletter of Oil Industry Safety Directorate,

Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Government of India, New Delhi
Year 10, Issue No. 94 Aug. '08 - Sept. '08

PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS (SAFETY IN OFFSHORE OPERATIONS) RULES, 2008

Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008 has specifying any particular solution to be adopted. The rules will be
been notified vide Gazette Notification-S.0-1502(E) in ]une'2008 and supplemented by guidance notes, wherever required. The guidance notes
Central Government designated "OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY indicate possible solutions for complying with the requirements arising out
DIRECTORATE (OISD)" as the competent authority to exercise of the rules. The operator can choose a solution other than those mentioned
powers and functions as stipulated in Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in in the guidelines as long as it meets the functional requirement. Solution
Offshore Operations) Rules 2008, with effect from 18th June'2008, the date chosen by the operator shall be based on customary practice in the industry,
of publication of this notification in the official gazette. requirements & specifications emerging in other documents such as
Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008 have nationally and internationally recognised industrial standards (e.g standards
been framed under the Oilfields (Regulation & development) Act, 1948 for like API, ISO, OISD), codes and conventions (e.g. MARPOL, SOLAS etc).
regulation of safety in offshore exploration, exploitation, conservation, However, documentation demonstrating that solutions selected by operator
management of petroleum & natural gas and matters connected therewith. fulfil the functional requirements of the rules shall exist at all times.
Existing "Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959" deal with resource In certain cases the rules require that the operator himself shall define
management and regulate grant of licences and mining leases in respect of requirements and specification for his own activities in order to comply with
petroleum & natural gas. functional requirements of the rules. The operator's own requirements shall
be binding and will constitute the basis of the supervision carried out by the
competent authority.
OISD has been notified as competent authority to supervise the
implementation of these rules. Competent authority will carry out
supervision by mekns of consents, investigations, verification and system
audits. Other statutory requirements that are applicable to the petroleum
activities in offshore areas, for example stipulations laid down by the MMD,
MOEF, Indian Navy, Coast Guard, FODAG etc. have not been indicated in
these rules. However competent authority may ask for compliance to other's
stipulations also.

Off-Shore Installation HEERA
These rules follow goal setting approach i.e. what is to be achieved rather
than provide concrete solutions. Functional requirements have been given in
the rules which among other things, refer to safety related issues without
In most of the rules, responsibility is placed on "The licensee, the lessee, or as
the case may be, the operator" whereas in some of the rules it is on "The
operator only" depending upon the requirement of the rule. In the rules / sub
rules where no party is mentioned, the licensee, the lessee, or as the case may
be, the operator shall be responsible.

NEW PETROLEUM SECRETARY

Shri Raghaw Sharan Pandey, an IAS of 1972 batch (Nagaland Cadre), has taken over as the Secretary,
Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India, in August'lOOS from Shri M.S. Srinivasan who
superannuated on 31.07.100S. Prior to this assignment, Shri Pandey was Secretary in the Ministry of Steel.
Shri Pandey is recipient of the Prime Minister's award for excellence in public administration in 1007 and
UN Public Service award in New York in 100S.
OISO team wishes Shri Pandey all success in his new assignment.

• PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS (SAFETY IN OFFSHORE OPERATIONS) RULES, Z008

• NEW PETROLEUM SECRETARY. AMENDMENTS IN OISD STANDARDS. DIFFERENCE
• In this BETWEEN "DESIGN PRESSURE" AND "MAXIMUM ALLOW ABLE WORKING PRESSURE /

Issue MAXIMUM OPERATING

INSTALLATION
• ~ ~ ~
PRESSURE" • CONSENT GIVEN BY OISD
• INCIDENT ALERT. DID YOU KNOW
• OISD STANDARDS -JULY 'Z008 • ~ ~
FOR OFF-SHORE
THAT .........• AUDITS
I
AMENDMENTS IN OISD STANDARDS
In the 26th Safety Council Meeting held on 25th July'2008, • The gas detectors shall be in place and operative all the time
amendments in some OISD standards has been approved, which are including as and when LPG / POL products are being handled.
produced below. • Only approved non-sparking tools and gadgets shall be used in the
A. OISD-STD-116 : Fire Protection facilities for Petroleum Refineries gantry.
and Oil/Gas Processing Plants • The emergency escape routes shall be planned considering the
1. Delete from clause 4.2.3 - "However, in lightning prone area, for available facilities i.e. both at overhead platform and at ground
floating roof tank of diameter 60 meter and above, Automatic rim level.
seal fire extinguishing system shall be provided" • Liquid withdrawal line headers shall be provided with ROV on
B. OISD-STD-117:Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots common exit line from gantry and near vessel to minimise LPG
and Terminals leakage in case of emergency.
1. Add at 2.4 under "Scope" • Fire fighting system shall be in Auto mode for POL gantry with
The fire protection and fire fighting requirement for the combined provision of keeping it in manual mode. The fire fighting facilities
POL and LPG facilities in the same premises shall be based on shall be provided to meet the requirement of independent
following: requirements of both the products as given in respective OISD
standards. Further, water cooling system shall also cover the above
• Each POL / LPG facility shall independently meet the
ground product pipelines.
design, layout & fire protection system requirements of
corresponding OISD standards. • LPG liquid Line shall also be provided with NRV from sphere/
bullet side.
• The fire water storage and pumping requirement can be
considered based on single largest risk of the combined • Each liquid line shall be provided with EFCV.
facility. • The electrical fittings in the gantry shall comply with the
• The fire water system shall ensure availability of pressure of 7 hazardous area classification considering LPG being the product
handled.
kg/ cm2g at the farthest point.
• The entire fire water system shall remain pressurized and • Earthing & Bonding system shall be checked periodically and
records maintained thereof.
kept in auto mode as recommended for LPG installations
• The control of such facility shall remain with dedicated or • Railway traction & insulation joint shall be terminated in line
LPG group. with extant railway / OISD guidelines from the first unloading
point in gantry and sufficient number of buffer wagons shall be
2. Delete from clause 4.2.13 - "located III lightning prone
areas and/or" provided.
• A proper drainage & collection system to be provided in the
C. OISD·STD-118: Layouts for Oil and Gas Installations
gantry to take care of spillage of POL, if any.
1. Clause 8.1.3 (b) : "LPG rail loading/unloading gantry shall be
• The gantry and nearby area to be properly graded to avoid any
located on a separate rail spur and shall not be grouped with other
accumulation of LPG vapours.
petroleum products" shall be replaced with the following clause.
• Only standard fittings to be used in the gantry.
"The loading facilities for LPG and other petroleum products shall
be kept dedicated keeping in view the possibility of mis-charging c. Operations Related
and large scale operations at refineries". • There is no simultaneous unloading operation of LPG and other
2. Add new Clause 8.1.3 (c) as petroleum products.

"The unloading facilities of LPG & other petroleum products of • The operation shall be carried out only by skilled and trained
marketing locations may be combined after complying with personnel under close supervision of officer.
conditions as given in Annexure - I" • All operating personnel shall be trained for both POL & LPG
3. Existing Clause 8.1.3 (c)renamed as Clause 8.1.3 (d) operation and emergency handling.

Annexure - I of Clause 8.1.3(c) • The unloading shall be carried out by following best operating
a. Risk Assessment practices as given in OISD standards.
• In case of any leakage, the complete operation shall be.stopped.
• Risk analysis & Hazop studies shall be carried out for the
combined facilities at the planning stage itself and all • All safety and emergency inter-locks shall be in place and checked
recommendation thereof complied with. before commencing unloading operation.
b. Facilities related • Gantry shall be kept free of spillage. There shall be a check of
spillage / leakage before the start of the operations and during the
• Dedicated unloading arms / hoses shall be used for LPG and POL
operation. Spillage, if any, shall be flushed.
products to avoid any chance of wrong connections or mixing of
POL and LPG. • Passing of valves in LPG unloading lines shall be checked and
rectified, if any.
• The unloading of POL products shall be done from bottom with
• Railway track shall be isolated and checked before commencing
POL headers running on ground / trenches.
the operation.
• The LPG unloading shall be done from the top.

Millions say the apple fell but Newton was the one to ask why Bernard M. Baruch.

2 OISD Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08 Year 10, Issue No. 94
 • The mock drills shall be practiced jointly periodically keeping in
view the presence of both products in gantry i.e. LPG headers and
POL product lines in trenches or at ground level.
• The pressure in LPG headers should be brought to minimum after
completion of unloading.
• All unloading arms/ hoses to be secured properly after use and
ends capped.
Before commencing any unloading operations, an inspection of
facilities by joint team of LPG & POL officers shall be carried out
ensuring compliance to all the above recommendations and to
identify any hazardous situation and also ensure safe condition for
unloading operation. A common checklist shall be developed for
compliance to be signed by POL & LPG officers.
DIFFERENCE BEmEN "DESIGN PRESSURE" AND "MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE WORKING
As per ASME following definitions are given:
Design Pressure : Is the maximum pressure determined by the design
procedures applicable to the materials and location involved.
Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure ( MAOP) : Is the maximum
pressure at any point in a system that may be operated.
Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) :. Is the highest pressure at which a
system is operated during normal operating cycle.
Normally people get confused with the terms "design pressure" and
"Maximum Allowable Working Pressure" (MAWP) or Maximum
Allowable Operating Pressure" (MAOP). The two terms are not related
mathematically; rather, they are related in a practical procedure that takes
place during the actual fabrication of a pressured vessel / piping system.
Those who are in process industry or petroleuin storage and transportation
business, concerned engineers have to deal with a pressure vessel fabrication
or pipeline design & operation, engineering terms employed and the logic of
their application. In dealing with or specifying a pressure vessel, an engineer
must be using a Vessel Specification Sheet that one should be familiar with
and employ in the course of their work.
The "Design" pressure is that pressure which the engineer decides
(considering certain factor of safety) is the value of the pressure at which the
vessel will normally operate (or which it must withstand under operating
conditions). This value must include any normal excess pressure that can
occur during the vessel's operation. This is a discretionary value that depends
on the background and experience of the design engineer. Sometimes the
design value can be 10% over the pressure calculated (as in a simulation) or as
much as 25% more. Good enginee5ing judgment is employed in arriving at
this design figure.
Once the Specification Sheet is received by the vessel fabricator, mechanical
fabrication design takes place in which alloys, fabrication techniques,
available materials, and other - factors are taken into consideration
generate a fabrication drawing. Although the design pressure given is
employed to generate the required vessel physical characteristics, some
The Biggest gap in the world is the gap between the justice of a cause and the motives of the people pushing it
3 0150 Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08
D. OISD-STD-144: LPG Installations
1. Add atthe end ofitem2.0-Scope
The fire protection and fire fighting requirement for the combined
POL and LPG facilities in the same premiseds shall be as given in
OISD-STD-117 under item 2.4.
2. Add at end ofthe para 3 of clause 6.2.2 :
"ROVs for vapour / recirculation lines should be provided at the
ground level with an isolation valve at top. In case, ROV is
provided at top of the vessel, there is no need to provide an
isolation valve".
E. OISD-STD-150: Design and Layout of Liquefied
Petroleum Gas Mounded
Add at end of the para 4 of clause 6.1 :
"ROVs for vapour / recirculation lines should be provided at the
ground level with an isolation valve at top. In case, ROV is provided at
top of the vessel, there is no need to provide an isolation valve".
PRESSURE / MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE"
practical factors - such as available materials, fabrication efficiency factors,
and alloys employed - will result in a vessel, that not only meets the required
design pressure, but often EXCEEDS it. This is a conservative procedure,
because it ensures that the vessel will meet pressure safety expectations.
The Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) is a result of back-
calculating the ultimate resulting fabricated vessel and is the prime factor in
setting the pressure at which the corresponding vessel Safety Relief Devices
should be activated and in no case it should be more than the design pressure.
One should consider the MA WP, the most important pressure value
attached to a vessel or pipe and it should be clearly understood and stamped
on the vessel or pipe for all to clearly read. The MA WP will change with time
(as will the related design value) due to wear, corrosion, and vessel fatigue.
This is why it is so important to keep and maintain current and accurate data
sheets and calculations on all pressure vessels or pipe as they are inspected and
repaired through the years of service.
When it is required to set a PSV on a vessel and one do not have its MA WP
figure, one can employ the "design" pressure value -as long as it can be proven
that the vessel is in as good a physical condition as the day it was fabricated. It
is important to note the condition that define the physical condition of the
vessel at the time of its use or operation. People often neglect to mention that
they are ASSUMING that the physical condition of the vessel doesn't change
from the day it was fabricated. This can be dangerous assumption that don't
necessarily apply. A vessel or pipe can undergo corrosion and wear as well as
other chemical attacks through its use during lifetime. Physical and
meticulous inspections reports are essential to ensure that the vessel can be
safely applied to a process - especially to a high-pressure application. One
should consider any pressure over 50 psig (3.5 Kg/cm2g) as HIGH
PRESSURE. When a vessel explodes, it isn't the pressure that kills a person;
it's the amount of shrapnel and steel pieces that are blown about that do the
damage. A 50 psig pressure can cause a considerable amount of serious
damage if allowed to trigger a vessel failure.
to
The term "Maximum Operating Working Pressure" means the same thing as
MAWP.
John P. Grier.
Year 10, Issue No. 94
 Welcome
to
PETR.TECH-2009
8'h INTERNATIONAL OIL & GAS CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION
11 ·15 January 2009 • New Delhi, India

Theme -
Energy Independence with Global Cooperation:
Challenges and Solutions

Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas

Government of India

Money won't buy happiness, but it will pay the salaries of a large research staff to study the problem Bill Vaughan.

4 OISO Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08 Year 10, Issue No. 94
 CONSENT GIVEN BY OISD FOR OFF-SHORE INSTALLATION
Floating, Production, Storage & Offloading unit (FPSO) DHIRUBHAI-1 operated by Reliance industries limited in D-26 (MA) field of KG -DWN-98/3
block has been given consent for operation in East Coast of India under Rule 16 of Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules,
2008. The FPSO has been hired by RIL f?om 'Aker Contracting FP ASA' for 10years.
INCIDENT ALERT
FIRE AT LPG BOmING
BRIEF
A fire incident took place at one of the Oil Industry's LPG Bottling Plant.
The fire occurred due to leakage of LPG from elbow of filling gun of carousel
causing burn injury to three persons, damage to a few filling hoses, control
cables and some pneumatic circuit accessories. The fire was immediately
controlled by operating emergency push button as well as closing of ROV
(Remote Operated Valve) followed by actuation of deluge valve. The injured
persons were immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY
The bottling plant is having Bulk Storage - 6 Spheres of 1200MT each (total
7200MT) and bottling capacity of -1,44,000 MTPA.
The plant has two carousels and the filling operation was in progress on both
the carousels at the time of incident. The incident took place on one of the
carousel.
At the time of incident, one helper was at introduction unit and one filler was
adjusting tare weight sitting on iron stool next to the helper. The helper was
deployed to prevent toppling of empty cylinder on carousel platform and
ensure their smooth feeding so as to facilitate filler to set tare weight. Another
contract labor was also engaged for shifting cylinders from ejection unit to
other operating area.
DETAILS OFTHE INCIDENT
The fire occurred on cylinder filling gun no: 20 of 24 station carousel during
normal bottling operation. During the process of latching the filling gun
with the cylinder valve, the LPG filling rubber hose snapped off with
metallic elbow from the filling gun. As a result, liquid LPG started coming
out forming vapor cloud which subsequently got ignited. The snapping of
rubber hose from the gun caused breaking of bonding wire of filling gun.
On noticing the LPG leak, the filler in an attempt to get down in haste from
the iron stool fell down and the stool hit the carouser structure. After
snapping off LPG hose, the hose started vibrating and hit the filling gun
structure several times and within no time leaked LPG got ignited into a flash
fire of about 12-15 feet high & 5-6 feet in diameter with a loud sound, which
lasted for about a minute.
Due to the fire, three persons ( two contract labours and one filler) received
first degree burn injuries ranging from 20% to 65%.
The partially burnt contract labor managed to promptly actuate the
emergency push button to shut down LPG facility. In the meantime the field
operator at check scale operated ROV (Remote Operated Valve) to isolate
LPG supply to the carousel. At the same time, another operator working in
the same area on seeing the fire, immediately operated DV (Deluge Valve) to
put off the fire.
The QBs (Quartz Bulbs) were also got activated at the same time to operate
deluge valve automatically. All these simultaneous actions controlled the fire
within 8-10 seconds and avoided a major catastrophe.
The burnt persons were rushed to Hospital for medical treatment. One
contract labor at ejection unit sustained burn injuries on his face, chest and
The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class
5 0150 Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08
PLANT (OLD INCIDENT)
lower as well as upper limbs, the other contract labor suffered burn injuries
on his face, hands and lower legs. The filler received burn injuries on his
cheeks, hands and lower legs.
OBSERVATIONS
1. The filling guns and their fittings were found to be of local make i.e.
original guns of OEM make were replaced with substandard
fittings/spares of local make.
2. The threads of metallic elbow of filling gun no: 20 & filling gun were
found to be worn out/cross threaded and it's copper bonding wire was
found broken.
3. The washer at the worn out threaded joint between elbow of LPG hose
and filling gun was found to be intact.
4. History sheets of filling guns/carousel & hydro-test record of LPG
filling hoses was not available.
5. Paint was damaged and bare metal was seen exposed on the carousel
structure indicating the striking/hitting mark of metallic elbow of LPG
hose of filling gun no: 20 at high pressure.
6. The gun and cylinder placed on filling gun no:20 were unaffected by the
fire.
7. Rubber ring of jaw holder on filling gun no: 21, 22, 23 & 24 and their
pneumatic tubing were found partially burnt.
8. Front fiber covers of filling gun no: 21, 22, 23 & 24 were melted partly
and LPG hoses of filling gun no: 21, 22, 23 & 24 had burn marks on
them.
9. Control cables of vapor extraction blower motor, carousel and
introduction unit were affected by the fire.
10. Burnt marks were observed on overhead duct of vapor extraction
blower, sprinkler lines & lighting cables.
11. Continuity of filling guns, carousel stations and conveyor structure was
checked and found to be OK, except at filling gun no:20.
12. Functioning of vapor extraction unit and it's interlocking with
carousel found not working due to damage in the control cable on
account of fire. However, it was found working with other carousel.
13. GMS was functional but did not show any leakage logging at the time
of incident. However, GMS logging was wrongly appearing on one
day in advance of the incident which could be due to erroneous clock
setting in it's software program.
14. Safety, Security & Automatic Fire Protection System was not in line
with clause no: 4.4 of OISD-STD-144 (Vol-4). Though the fire
emergency was handled immediately with manual intervention, it
could have been handled automatically without any loss of time, had
the above interlocking been in place.
15. Operations officer, was not properly trained to supervise cylinder
bottling operations.
,16. The leakage could not be stopped by the filler immediately either by
closing five port switch or ball valve or main air line valve to actuate gas
stop valve of leaking filling station.
Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.)
Year 10, Issue No. 94
17. PPE i.e. canvas hand gloves were not used by the filler. 2. To strengthen mamtenance & monitoring practices of LPG Plant
18. Two water jel blankets were available at the plant, but could not be used equipment/ facilities as laid down in OISD - STD - 144 & OEM's
on burnt persons as these were positioned at TLD gantry & security Maintenance Manual to ensure reliable operation.
office respectively. 3. Maintain record for hydro-testing of LPG filling hoses, history cards of
ANALYSIS OF INCIDENT filling guns/ carousel and ensure their periodic updation.
A) CAUSE OF LEAKAGE: 4. Rectification of error in software program of GMS to be done for
1. Due to improper / poor maintenance, worn out / damaged correct data logging.
threads on the gun, elbow resulted in snapping of LPG hose 5. Provide Safety, Security & Automatic Fire Protection System as per
causing LPG leakage. clause no: 4.4 of OISD-STD-144 (Vol. 4) as recommended during
2. Use of sub-standard/locally made filling guns and their External Safety Audit by OISD.

fittings/ accessories/ spares parts.

6. Proper training to be imparted to operating personnel on LPG OPS &
B) SOURCE OF IGNITION: HSE prior to it's induction in LPG Bottling Plant and periodic
refresher's training to existing employees to be given to handle
The leaking LPG may have caught fire due to one or more of the
emergency.
following reasons :-
7. Discourage use of iron stool for sitting by filler. In case it is unavoidable,
1. Hitting of vibrating metallic elbow of LPG hose with carousel
the stool, etc. may be constructed from non-sparking & non-
structure at high pressure several times leading to generation of combustible material like aluminum.
spark.
8. Enforce and ensure proper use of PPE i.e. canvas hand gloves by all
2. Static charge accumulation leading to generation of spark due to
employees who are likely to be exposed to leakage of liquid LPG.
breaking of bonding wire of LPG hose & release of LPG at high 9. Conduct safety awareness training program for all employees covering
pressure into atmosphere from the snapped off LPG hose elbow. effective use and making them aware about identified location/ s of first
3. Due to the hitting of falling iron stool (used by filler for sitting) on aid equipment like water jel blankets, first aid boxes, etc. for their
carousel structure, spark could have generated. prompt use during fire emergency.
RECOMMENDATIONS :-
10. Internal Safety Audit by multidisciplinary team to be immediately
1. The vital spares of guns/ carousel to be used after ascertaining their taken up to ensure the compliance of OISD - STD - 144.. Compliance
quality and be preferably of OEM/ standard design/ make. to ESA recommendations and other inspections to be ensured.

FAlLURE OF EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN VALVE

BRIEF DESCRIPTION
Emergency Shut Down Valve (ESDV) on an off-shore platform abroad failed when a command was given to close the ESDV following a minor gas release from the
inlet flangeof an equipment. Production was shutdown, worksite of platform and drilling rig were properly secured. All topside process piping and pipeline to other
platform were de-pressurized to ambient conditions. The ESDV and its manual valve were removed from the platform and sent for inspection.
OBSERVATION
On dismantling and inspection of the valves, it was observed that the "0" rings in the ESDV and accompanying manual valve were not fit for the purpose and that
back up "0" rings were missing from these valves altogether. This is a serious failure in the manufacturing process. Due to non provision of back up "0" rings,
several of the "0" rings had failed as aresult of swelling due to poor manufacture.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Competency level of Design Consultant must be assessed and design specification of ESDV should be taken into account in worst case scenario for
potential production fluid composition.

DID YOU KNOW THAT .

• Entry on floating roof tank's deck when the roof is more than 3 meter
down from the top, requires Confined Space Entry Permit (OISD-
STD-105).
• For LPG Mounded bullets, monitor the settlement of the mound /
vessel throughout the lifetime of the vessel by providing permanent
reference (minimum three) points to ascertain uniform/ differential
settlement and also identify possible vessel bending (OISD- STD-150).
• Overhead power transmission lines shall not pass over the installation
including the parking areas. Horizontal clearance shall be in line with
the Indian Electricity Rules( OISD- STD-118).
• The process hazard analysis should be updated and revalidated by a
team, having requisite background, at least every 5 years after the
completion of initial process hazard analysis as per OISD-GDN-206.
• All Fire water pumps should be identical with respect to capacity and
head characteristics (OISD- STD-116 & 117).
• The Piping connected between Blow Out Preventer (BOP) and Choke
Manifold shall be as straight as practicable and firmly anchored to
prevent excessive whip or vibration as per OISD-STD-174.
• Well control drills should be conducted once a week with each crew as
per OISD-STD-174.
• Under the Furnace, there should not be any trenches or pits which
might hold flammables. Also the connections with underground drain
system should be sealed over an area of 15 meters from the furnace
walls(OISD-STD-118).
• Air intake to the FD fan, should be from a safe location so that no
hydrocarbon can be sucked into them (OISD- STD-112).
• Systems working under vacuum conditions can pull in air through
leaky flanges, pump glands/ seals, left open vents and drains, etc.
Vacuum system shall be tested and checked thoroughly, for leaks and
tightness, before start-up and periodically during operation. Also a
sample point of the exhaust gases from the ejector system shall be
analyzed periodically for oxygen content (OISD-STD-112).
• The flare header shall always be maintained at minimum positive
pressure to prevent entry of air into flare system. Gases entering the
0
flare header, shall not contain oxygen ( ISD-STD-112).

A good storyteller is a person who has a good memory and hopes other people haven't Irvin S. Cobb.

6 OISO Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08. Year 10, Issue No. 94
 AUDITS
EXTERNAL SAFETY AUDIT MARKETING

EXPL RATI N8cPRODU TI N·ON· H RE 29 th August' 200S: IOCL's LPG Bottling Plant, Rangpo

25 ili to 2Sili August' 200S: Mehsana Asset 0f ONGC h as average 01'1

ENGINEERING

production of 2.101 MMT and gas production of 162.S MMSCM during 31 st Jul' 200S to 1st August' 200S : For the first time Safety Inspection of
2007-0S.. The following installations were audited. LPG & Oil facilities of Vizag Port Trust (VPT) was carried out by OISD at
1. Production Installation - GGS-N andasan the request VPT of Vizag Port was commissioned in 1993 with a cargo
ll. Production Installation - EPS-North Lanwa handling capacity of 1.1 Million tonne. Subsequently, the cargo throughput

111. Production Installation - GGS-03-North Kadi increased to 55.8 MMT in 1951-52. Presently the port handles hazardous
substances like LPG, Crude Oil, Naphtha, MSI ATF, SKO, HSD, FO etc.
1V. DrillingRig-CW-700-06
VPT requisitioned OISD's services to identificy loopholes in safety and
v. Work over Rig- UPET-sO-05 DMP.

22nd to 25th September' 200S : Rajahmundry Asset of ONGC has oil

PRE-COMMISSIONING SAFETY AUDIT
production of 0.279 MMT and gas production of 1566.9 MMSCM during
2007-0S. The following installations were audited. MARKETING

1. Production Installation - GCS-Endamuru 1. 3rd April' 2008: BPCL'sPOL Terminal, Kota

ll. Production Installation - GGS-Mori
2. 17th April' 2008 : CNG Dispensing Stations of Haryana City Gas
111. Production Installation - ETP-Kesanapalli Distribition Limited, Gurgaon and Adani Energy limited, Faridabad.

1V. Production installation - EPS-Nandigama 3. 14th to 16th May' 2008 & 26th August' 2008 : IOCL's LPG Bottling

v. DrillingRig - BI-200o-02 plant at Mathura.

V1. Work over Rig - DEEP-lOO-Ol (CardwellKB-500) 4. 18thJuly' 2008: NRL'sPOL Terminal, Siliguri.

25th September' 200S : Raava Onshore Terminal of Cairn Energy 5. 21stJuly' 2008: HPCL'sPOL Terminal at Jaipur.
IndiaLtd
6. 29th to 30th September' 2008 :BPCL's LPG Bottling Plant at Patna.
EXPLORATION 8c PRODUCTION- OFF SHORE
CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINES
15th to 19th September' 200S : Ed Holt '( charted rig hired by ONGC)
lSth to 20th August' 200S: LPG and Propylene transfer pipeline system
Ed Holt rig is owned by Noble Drilling Corporation and hired by Jindal
from Mathura Refinery to New Marketing Installation at Mathura. LPG
Drilling & Industries Limited to drill for ONGC. Built in 19S1 having
Transfer line is of 12.75" OD, 9.53mm wall thickness, ASTM A106 Grade B
Liberian state flag, it is a Cantilever Jack Up rig capable of operating in water
pipe having length of 3.428 km and design flow of 225 kl/hr. Propylene
depths up to 300ft. The rig had a major lay up repair in 2006 at Sharjah. At the
transfer pipeline is of 6" NB, 7.11 mm wall thickness, 3.410 km long with
time of audit, the rig was drilling at Nl1-8 H well in Mumbai High North
design capacity of 42 kl/hr. .
field.
2Sth to 30th August' 200S: GAIL(I) Ltd's Natural Gas pipeline from
PROCESS 8c ENVIRONMENT
Oduru to K. Cheruvu and Oduru to Kakinada . This pipelines consists of
lSth to 23rd September' 200S: 3rd round of ESA of IOCL-Panipat
10.541 Km long, 18" OD, 0.25" 10.344" wall thickness, API 5LX 70 grade,
Refinery. Panipat Refinery is the 7th Refinery of IOCL having the
3 LPE pipe and 19.784 Km long, 18" OD, 0.25"WT 10.344" WT, API5LX
processing capacity of 12 MMTP A with the commissioning of PREP
70 grade, 3 LPE pipe with design capacity of 6 MMSCMD (each pipeline)
expansion project. In addition to this petrochemical complex comprising of
PX-PTA has been commission~d. At present three major projects are in SURPRISE SAFETY AUDITS
process at Panipat and Naphtha cracker project, MS quality up gradation EXPLORATION 8cPRODUCTION- ON- SHORE
project and Refinery capacity augmentation to 15 MMTP A.
27th August, 200S: Mehsana Asset of ONGC - GGS-CTF-North Santhal
25th Setember' 200S : Inspection of OSR tier -1 facility set up by Mis
MARKETING
Hardy explorations at Chennai offshore location was carried out by OISD
and coast guard. 6th August' 200S : IOCL'sPOL Terminal, Vasco.

The advantage of a bad memory is that one enjoys several times the same good things for the first time Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844 - 1900)

7 015D Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08 Year 10, Issue No. 94
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OISD STANDARDS - JULY '2008

OISO Standards updated up to JULY'2008 are now released. These standards are available on payment ofRs. 10,000.00 (Rupees Ten thousand) only for a
single CO containing all standards or Rs. 500.00 (Rupees five hundred) per standard / volume in printed form. The payment can be made to O[SO in cash or by
way of demand draft in favour of "Oil Industry Safety Directorate" payable at New Delhi. For further information please contact.-
Joint Director (Administration)
Oil Industry Safety Directorate,
Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India
7th floor, New Delhi House, 27, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi -110 001.
Tel. : 011-23351679 Email: pkkhurana@yahoo.com

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~) i==E) EDITORIAL BOARD: e=; ,~

S.K.Nandy P. K. Khurana H. C. Taneja Neeraj Bagai
Add!. Dir (Engg) Jt. Dir (Admn.) Jt. Dir (E&P) Jt. Dir (Process)
Visit us at : www.oisd.gov.in
Published by : Oil Industry Safety Directorate, Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas,
Government of India, 7th Floor, New Delhi House, 27, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi-110001
Phone: 23737856,23351679; Fax: 23315270,23315534
8 OISD Newsletter Aug. '08 - Sept. '08 Year 10, Issue No. 94