The Soviet

Union Under
Gorbachev

EDITED BY
MARTIN MCCAULEY

STUDIES IN RUSSIA AND

EAST EUROPE
STUDIES IN RUSSIA AND EAST EUROPE
jormerly Studies in Russian and East European History
Chainnan of the Editorial Board: M. A. Branch, Director, School of
Slavonic and East European Studies.
This series includes books on general, political, historieal, economic,
social and cultural themes relating to Russia and East Europe written or
edited by members ofthe School ofSlavonic and East European Studies
in the University of London, or by authors working in association with
the School. Titles already published are listed below. Further titIes are in
preparation.

Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg (editors)

BRITISH POLICY TOW ARDS WARTIME RESIST ANCE IN
YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE
Elisabeth Barker
BRITISH POLICY IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE IN THE SECOND
WORLDWAR
Richard Clogg (editor)
THE MOVEMENT FOR GREEK INDEPENDENCE, 1770-1821:
A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS
Olga Crisp
STUDIES IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY BEFORE 1914
D. G. Kirby (editor)
FlNLAND AND RUSSIA, 1808-1920: DOCUMENTS
Martin McCauley
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE SOVIET STATE,
1917-1921: DOCUMENTS (editor)
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET
AGRICULTURE
COMMUNIST POWER IN EUROPE: 1944-1949 (editor)
MARXISM-LENINISM IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC: THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (SED)
THE GERM AN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC SINCE 1945
KHRUSHCHEV AND KHRUSHCHEVISM (editor)
THE SOVIET UNION UNDER GORBACHEV (editor)
Martin McCauley and Stephen Carter (editors)
LEADERSHIP AND SUCCESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION,
EASTERN EUROPE AND CHINA
Evan Mawdsley
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BALTIC FLEET
J. J. Tomiak (editor)
WESTERN PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET EDUCATION IN THE
1980s

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 THE SOVIET UNION
UNDER GORBACHEV

Editedby
Martin McCauley
Senior Lecturer in Soviet and East European Studies
School 0/ Slavonic and East European Studies
University 0/ London

M
MACMILLAN
© School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University ofLondon 1987
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev.-
(Studies in Russia and East Europe)
I. Soviet Union
I. McCauley, Martin 11. University of
London, School of Slavonic and East
European Studies III. Series
947.085'4 DKI7
ISBN 978-0-333-43912-8 ISBN 978-1-349-18648-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18648-8
Contents
List 0/ Tab/es vii
Pre/ace ix
Notes on the Contributors XI

Introduction
Martin McCauley
Gorbachevas Leader 9
Martin McCau/ey
2 State and Ideology 38
Rona/d J. Hili
3 Law and Reform 59
W. E. Butler
4 Nationalities 73
Bohdan Nahay/o
5 The Economy 97
Philip Hanson
6 Agriculture 118
Karl-Eugen Wädekin
7 Foreign Trade 135
A/an H. Smith
8 Labour, Motivation and Productivity 156
David Lane
9 Eastern Europe 171
Michael Shafir
10 Defence and Security 192
Condoleezza Rice
11 Foreign Policy 210
Margot Light

Bibliography 231
Index 242
For Harold Martin McCauley
List ofTables
1.1 Central Party Organs (Central Committee and Revision
Commission): Size ofMembership 20
1.2 Turnover ofMembership (Central Committee and
Revision Commission) 22
1.3 Representation of Functional Groups in Central Party
Organs at the XXVI and XXVII Party Congresses 23
1.4 The Present Party Leadership (July 1986) 28
5.1 Soviet Economic Growth since 1965 100
5.2 Soviet Economic Performance in 1985 and 1981- 5: Main
Official Indicators 101
5.3 Soviet Industrial Sector in 1985: Selected Individual
Product-group Oata 102
5.4 The Soviet Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans: Some
Aggregate Figures 103
5.5 The Soviet Twelfth Five-Year Plan: National Income
Utilised, Accumulation and Consumption 104
5.6 The Soviet Twelfth Five-Year Plan: Selected Production
Targets 105
6.1 Gross Agricultural Production 119
6.2 Percentage Shares ofGrain, Feed Crops and Clean
Fallow 1970-84 122
6.3 Irrigated and Orained Land 1971-90 124
6.4 The Non-Black-Earth Zone 1970-84 125
7.1 Soviet Energy Exports by Value 1972-4 139
7.2 Soviet Oil and Natural-Gas Production and Trade 1972-
83 140
7.3 Soviet Terms ofTrade with Eastern Europe (1974 = 100) 143
7.4 Soviet Trade with the Industrialised West in 1984 and
1985: Quarterly Oata 153
7.5 Soviet Assets and Liabilities with Banks Reporting to the
Bank for International Settlements 153
9.1 00 you believe that Gorbachev's leadership will be good
or bad for the Soviet Union? 177
9.2 00 you believe that Gorbachev's leadership will be good
or bad for your country? 178
VII
Preface
The chapters in this volume were originally delivered at a conference
held on 20 and 21 March 1986 at the School of Slavonic and East
European Studies, University of London. The overall aim was to
examine critically Gorbachev's first year in office. This was approached
from three angles: Gorbachev's legacy: just how serious· were the
problems bequeathed to hirn by the late Brezhnev, Andropov and
Chernenko eras?; an analysis of progress during the first year, paying
particular attention to the debates about policy options in the press and
scholarly journals; and what are the prospects for success? Will it be a
ca se of continuity and little fundamental change or does the Gorbachev
accession mean that the revitalisation of the Soviet Union is under way?
Special thanks are due to those who presented papers at the
conference, but also to those who contributed from the floor to make it
such arewarding and stimulating experience. The Gorbachev era has
already given rise to enormous interest about the evolution ofthe Soviet
Union and the challenge this poses the outside world.
Warrnest thanks are also due to Professor M. A. Branch, Director of
the School, and his administrative staff, especially Philip Robinson and
Mara Hasenstrauch, and to Vera Burger, Alastair Brison and Hugh
Christey. A special vote of thanks is due to Margot Light for her
assistance with the Bibliography and Index.
Finally gratitude is due to the Ford and Nuffield Foundations,
without whose generous financial support the conference could not have
taken place.

MARTIN McCAULEY

ix
Notes on the Contributors
w. E. Butler is Professor of Comparative Law in the University of
London and Director of the Centre for the Study of Socialist Legal
Systems, University College London.

Philip Hanson is Reader in Soviet Economics, University of Birmin-

gham, and the author of many articles and books, including Trade and
Techn%gy in Soviet- Western Re/ations.

Ronald J. Hili is Professor ofPolitical Science at Trinity College, Dublin.

Among his recent publications is The Soviet Union: Po/itics, Eeonomies
and Society.

David Lane is Professor of Sociology in the University of Birmingham

and the author of many studies, including State and Po/ities in the
USSR.

Margot Light is Lecturer in Soviet Studies and International Relations,

University of Surrey. She is the editor (with A. J. R. Groom) of
International Relations: A Handbook 0/ Current Theoryand the author
of The Soviet Theory 0/ International Polities.

Martin McCauley is Senior Lecturer in Soviet and East European

Studies at the School ofSlavonic and East European Studies, University
of London. Among his recent publications is Khrushehev and Khrush-
chevism. which he edited.

Bohdan Nahaylo is on the staff of Radio Liberty, Munich.

Condoleezza Rice is Assistant Director of the Center for International

Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, California.

Michael Shafir is Deputy Director of Audience and Opinion Research,

East European Area, at Radio Free Europe, Munich. Among his
publications is Romania: Po/ities, Eeonomies and Society. Political
Stagnation and Simulated Change.
XI
xii Notes on the Contrihutors

Alan H. Smith is Lecturer in Economic and Social Studies of Eastern

Europe at the School ofSlavonic and East European Studies, University
of London. Among his recent publications is The Planned Economies 0/
Eastern Europe.

Karl-Eugen Wädekin is Professor of Soviet, East European and

International Agrarian Policy at the University of Giessen, West
Germany. His many publications include Agrarian Policies in Commun-
ist Europe.
Introduction
MARTIN McCAULEY

Mikhail Gorbachev has brought a breath of fresh air to the staid

corridors of power in the Kremlin. After a decade of old leaders who
were more concerned about the state of their health than that of the
country, Gorbachev has introduced vitality, change and challenge. He
has made it abundantly plain that he is unhappy with the legacy he
inherited on taking office, as Secretary-General ofthe Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, in March 1985. If the challenge of the scientific-
technical revolution is not met the future ofthe USSR as a superpower is
in doubt. He has set himself a very challenging policy agenda, to
transform the Soviet Union into a scientific and technical giant by the
turn ofthe century. It is no longer sufficient to produce more and more
goods by antiquated methods, Soviet industry must produce goods
which are internationally competitive. Industry and agriculture have to
be re-equipped and labour productivity doubled. lust how are all these
things to be done?
The purpose of this volume is to examine what has been done during
the Secretary-General's first year, from his assumption of office as Party
leader to the XXVII Party Congress in February- March 1986. The
objection could be raised that since Gorbachev expects to be in office
until the turn ofthe century he is unlikely to undertake any fundamental
initiatives in his first year. He can afford to survey the scene before
acting, since time is on his side. However he does not perceive time as
being on his side. He is determined to get the country moving as quickly
as possible since the inertia, corruption, low labour morale and
productivity, alcoholism, bureaucratism and nepotism which he
inherited alarm him deeply. lust as he has introduced a new leadership
style, more democratic and outward-looking than his three predeces-
sors, he favours new bureaucratic, industrial and agricultural styles.
Wh at do these new styles consist of?
Gorbachev deploys certain phrases time and again: \earn to work in a
new way; the unity of word and deed; the acceleration of the scientific-
2 Introduction

technical revolution and socioeconomic progress; social justice and

political stability are interlinked; openness (glasnost) is to be practised
everywhere; a moral revolution is desirable and so on.
As Martin McCauley points out, Gorbachev, in order to effect radical
changes, has to build up his power and authority, place those who share
his vision of the future in leading positions and then convince the top-
and middle-Ievel official that his recipes will work. Gorbachev has been
remarkably successful at moving the Brezhnevite generation of
bureauerats out of office and replacing them with men in their fifties and
sixties. There have been greater changes at the top than at the middle
level. Gorbachev is quite determined to re-establish the primacy of the
department for organisational Party work of the CC Secretariat. The
'stability of cadres' under Brezhnev led to this department losing contact
with local Party changes and this, in turn, permitted local coteries to
develop. Gorbachev is a centrist who believes that ifthe Soviet Union is
to be reformed it has to be reformed from the centre downwards. Such is
the level of inertia prevailing in the country that without adynamie lead
from Moscow littIe will change.
Many of the changes under Gorbachev began during the Andropov
era, especially that against alcoholism and in favour of stricter law and
order. The anti-alcohol campaign is now weil under way, but has met
with a mixed reception. It is not as easy as before to buy vodka, but the
thirst for it has not abated. After the accident at the Chernobyl atomic
energy station on 26 April 1986 a widespread belief developed that
vodka and strong spirit offered the best protection against radio activity!
A mother wrote to Trud, the trade union newspaper, complaining that
the campaign had not done her son, the head of the local anti-alcohol
crusade, any good since he was perpetually drunk! Although Gorba-
chev, as a teetotaller, sets a good personal example, the longer the
campaign lasts the less impact it will have. The moves against corruption
may suffer a similar fate. Just how long can a new leader engage in such a
publicised fight without aspersions being cast on his ability to cope with
this endemie phenomenon? Probably two years, at the most, would be
one estimate.
The anti-corruption campaign has enhanced the standing of the
Committee ofState Security (KGB), and its chairman, General Viktor
Chebrikov. Changes in personnel at the top and middle levels in the
KGB have been minimal, in stark contrast to that ofthe government and
Party. The KGB would also appear to have gained ground on the
military. At the Party Congress it was Chebrikov who was chairing the
session when the military arrived to swear its oath ofloyaIty to the Party.
 Martin McCauley 3

It could be pointed out that sessions can only be chaired by full members
ofthe Politburo andMarshal Sergei Sokolov, the Minister ofDefence, is
only a candidate member. However the symbolism of the occasion
would not have lost on a Soviet audience. Another pointer in the
direction ofless military prominence is that at Chernenko's funeral the
Minister of Defence did not deliver a speech, even though Chernenko
had been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces. Brezhnev
and Andropov, at their funerals, had been praised by the Minister of·
Defence for their military record.
The top political leadership (full and candida te members of the
Politburo and CC secretaries) is not agreed on the policy agenda despite
the fact that it has been radically changed under Gorbachev. Ligachev,
the 'second' secretary, is more conservative than Gorbachev when it
comes to openness and economic reform. Eltsin, the Moscow Party
boss, is very radical when attacking privilege in the Party. Ryzhkov, the
Prime Minister, is very cautious about decIaring his hand on economic
change and appears to be concerned, at present, with increasing the
authority of the government vis-a-vis the CC Secretariat.
There are many tensions in the suggestions advanced by the Secretary-
General so far. He is aiming for a minimum of 4 per cent growth of
national income annually, but simultaneously wants rapid innovation.
He castigates individualism, but envisages more privately provided
services. He favours more enterprise autonomy, but looks forward to
more streamlined central planning. He appears at present to have turned
his back on Hungarian or Chinese economic methods.
He appears to see two nations in the USSR, one wh ich enjoys privilege
and access to consumer goods and other desirables, and the other wh ich
has none of the above. He wants to end privilege and to ensure that all
income is legally earned. Some legislation to this end has appeared, but
the battle is only just beginning. Only a moral revolution will suffice, one
which will change the psychology of the official and the worker making
them keener to take initiative and to work for the common good.
Ronald J. Hill points out that there is scope for the rationalisation
(more professionalism) of the bureaucracy and its democratisation,
largely by extending the role of the soviets as the population's
watchdogs. There are glaring weaknesses in the way the soviets are run.
In the very important sphere ofhousing, for example, there is no agreed
policy since enterprises construct and control an important part of the
building stock. Blatant irregularities occur in local administration and
Andrei Gromyko has called for the raising of the 'legal culture' of the
population, especially its officials.
4 Introduction

Party - state relations will have to be cIarified under Gorbachev. Party

interference has reaehed the point where podmena, substitution, con-
stantly occurs. One solution would be for the Party to step back and
pennit state officials to devise new ways of administrating poliey.
W. E. Butler mentions that Gorbaehev is the first trained lawyer to
head the CPSU since Lenin. Law is now flourishing as never before as
the battle to replace arbitrariness with predictability continues.
However it is going to be a long fight since the level of'legal cuIture', to
eite Gromyko, is very low. An enonnous amount of legislation has
appeared on the statute book lately, but Gorbachev made cIear at the
Party Congress that much more is to come.
Bohdan Nahaylo writes that although Gorbachev comes from the
ethnieally mixed Stavropol krai he is not known as someone who has
taken a keen interest in nationality affairs. He is primarily interested in
the economie dimension and has spoken about nationalities as the 'most
complex area ofsocial relations'. Top ofthe list of outstanding problems
is the 'rational distribution of productive forces and their further
integration into the overall national economic complex'. Just how this is
to be aehieved has, as yet, not been revealed. There is a labour surplus in
Muslim areas and a labour shortage in the European parts ofthe Soviet
Union, especially Siberia. What incentives will entice Muslims from the
wann south to move to the frozen north? The new Party Programme
dropped the term 'fusion' as the goal of nationality policy, but talked
about nations 'steadily drawing together'. The expression 'fonnerly
backward peoples' was also omitted. However all non-Russians are
called upon to master Russian, but Russians are not exhorted to learn
other Soviet languages.
Glasnost, so far, has not extended to the sensitive subject of
nationality relations.
During his first year in office Gorbachev devoted very little attention
to nationality affairs. At the Party Congress he reiterated his point that
all republics should place the interests of the single national economic
complex above their own.
Philip Hanson comes to the concIusion that it would be difficult to
present a serious case for the new leader's positive impact on the
economy in his first year in office. Despite this Gorbachev has advocated
ambitious plan targets over the next five years and beyond. The key 1990
targets for meat, grain and oil production are grossly overambitious,
and overall targets for productivity growth are not plausible, according
to Hanson. It the goals in the present five-year plan are overambitious,
those for produetivity growth in the I 990s, are bizarre. He points again
 Martin McCauley 5

to tbe inconsistencies evident in economic measures and pronoun-

cements that have appeared so far under Gorbachev.
Karl-Eugen Wädekin expects 1986 to he a hetter agricultural year
than 1985, if only for the fact that there are signs that 1985 results were
made to look artificially low. Gorbachev, as CC secretary for agriculture
from 1978, presided over some bleak years. Vast sums were invested in
irrigation, drainage and capital stock, with meagre results. The private
sector probably did better than was reported statistically, but the policy
of encouraging private output while restraining free marketings contin-
ued throughout the period and almost certainly restricted output.
The creation ofUSSR Gosagroprom, under Vsevolod Murakhovsky,
was a bold move and its impact is not evident at present. However the
solution to the agricultural malaise of the Soviet Union lies with the
farms and their labour. Gorbachev has not yet revealed his hand, but
there is evidence of divided counsel at the top.
Alan Smith writes that when Gorbachev took over, the foreign-trade
sector appeared to offer few problems which required urgent attention.
Over the previous three years the Soviet Union had maintained healthy
surpluses in its visible hard-currency trade and this bad led to a steady
decline in net hard-currency indebtedness. The main problem was that
the Soviet export structure was excessively biased towards fuel, energy,
raw materials and precious metals. The terms of trade with its CMEA
partners were positive with oil, for instance, being delivered at weil
below world market prices.
A fairly clear foreign-trade strategy can now be discerned. The goal is
to move away from the raw materials bias of Soviet exports and to
improve the international competitiveness of manufactured goods.
However, it is realised that this will take longer tban the present Five
Year Plan period.
The re-equipping ofSoviet industry is to be effected through domestic
production and import saving is to he consciously pursued. A considera-
ble expansion of economic relations with sociaJist states, in the pursuit of
scientific and technical progress, however, is envisaged.
Falling world oil prices present a far greater problem to the USSR
than falling oil output. A sustained drop in oil prices would cause acute
problems in financing Western imports, but would also affect the terms
of trade with Eastern Europe. These would move back in favour of
Eastern Europe in the I990s. However if these states do not improve the
international competitiveness of their products they will have little real
alternative to co-operating even more closely in CMEA integration
ventures.
6 Introduction

David Lane thinks that labour productivity, in the short term, can be
improved by reducing the age of retirement of capital which will lead to
shorter periods of machine down time and to a reduction in the number
of auxiliary workers. Relatively small improvements in administration
can lead to rises in productivity. These are to do with the delivery of
materials and more effective use of the labour force. None of the
proposals advanced under Gorbachev to increase productivity is new
and all can be traced to views expressed before he assumed office.
Financial incentives, operating through the brigade system, will enhance
motivation, reduce the numbers in the workforce and raise efficiency.
However, in the longer term, work conditions, transport and health care
need to be improved. Lane is of the opinion that the matura ti on of the
Soviet Union may lead to astate where workers' satisfaction with work
are unrealistic and will not be fulfilled by the financial rewards of a
consumer society.
Michael Shafir writes that during the period before Gorbachev
assumed office signals from the Kremlin to its east European allies were
confused. This permitted some states to promote their own self-interest
and to attempt to reduce the damage infticted on them by superpower
squabbling. Besides making c1ear that east European states are in future
to pay their way, Gorbachev has not articulated a coherent policy so far.
Time is on Gorbachev's side as many leaders are nearing retirement. The
less competitive these states become intemationally the greater their
dependence on the Soviet Union will become.
Gorbachev has not had to take si des yet in the debate on nuclear
versus conventional warfare. However this depends to a large extent on
US high-technology military development. As Condoleezza Rice points
out, the Soviets have always tried to restrict the innovative capacity of
US industry when negotiating arms control agreements. The health of
the Soviet economy is ofvital concem to the generals since a much more
efficient economy could provide the hardware necessary at lower cost.
At present there is no evidence that Gorbachev is under pressure from
the military, partly due to the fact that the military is divided against
itself. There is very little evidence available about the team Gorbachev
would like to see take over from Akhromeev, Sokolov and the older
generation.
For the first time there is a Secretary-General who did not see action
or even participate in the Great Fatherland War. Gorbachev has no
military ties and this may make hirn more cautious about planning the
way ahead. It is the military which confers on the Soviet Union the status
ofsuperpower. This is quite a feat given the inertia which is so evident in
 Martin McCauley 7

other sectors of endeavour of Soviet life. Under Brezhnev the military

gained considerable autonomy in the military-technical sphere, but hard
choices are around the corner for the political leadership. The Soviets
cannot satisfy all the needs of the military, revamp industry and
agriculture and increase consumer welfare. Struggles over resource
allocation will become sharper. The generals may be feeling a liule left
out ofthe debate about the modernisation and acceleration ofthe Soviet
economy, but they are sure that their star will rise once again.
The international situation inherited by Gorbachev was as unpromis-
ing as the domestic problems, writes Margot Light. Bogged down in
Afghanistan, detente ended and an arms-control agreement only a
distant prospect, Gorbachev found he had much to do after the weak
leadership of the previous years.
He adopted a high profile in foreign relations, especially after Andrei
Gromyko moved from the Foreign Ministry to the state presidency in
July 1985. The Gorbachev style was especially evident as he launched
initiative after initiative on the arms-control front. However he could
never be certain whether the Americans were serious about negotiating
an agreement and economically the Soviets were the weaker side. They
needed one more than the US Administration. The 'fireside chat' in
Geneva in November 1985 was a success and promised to produce more
contact between the superpowers. Gorbachev cannot be satisfied with
the results so far.
The Soviet Union appears now in aperiod of consolidation when it is
keen to reduce risk-taking. The foreign-policy establishment has been
revamped with greater professionalism in evidence. However the Soviet
Union's aim of ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the end of the·
century cannot be achieved alone and here as elsewhere Soviet policies
will be largely dependent on the reactions of other states. Gorbachev
intends to prosecute vigorously Soviet national interests, but to seek to
achieve the victory of communism by peaceful means. Not since
Khrushchev perambulated around the world has a Soviet leader so
caught the imagination ofthe outside world. Will he be able to transform
this bright beginning into policy successes?
One event marred Gorbachev's good first year, the Chernobyl nuclear
accident. His handling of it was inept, hesitant and revealed a divided
leadership. He waited eighteen days before addressing his people on
television on 14 May 1986. His performance was subdued but effective.
It was the first time the CPSU had made a statement about the event. All
previous communications had either been made by the USSR Council of
Ministers, unsigned, or by TASS. One inference wh ich can be drawn
8 Introduction

from this reticence is concern about the authority of the Communist

Party. It must not be seen to be wrong. Had Gorbachev gone on
television early on, he would have made statements which he would have
had to retract later - simply because Moscow was misinformed about
the gravity ofthe situation. This had to be avoided. It is interesting that
Soviet TV misjudged the public mood. It carried interviews in which
some British students protested strongly about being withdrawn by the
British Embassy from Kiev. Far from allaying fears in Kiev, the
intention of the interviews, many residents there took the opposite view
and began trying to get to Moscow.
A positive outcome of the accident has been the openness of the
reporting, unprecedented since the I 920s. On the other hand it has been
made clear that the civil nuclear energy programme is to go ahead. The
argument is that the Soviet Union has no choice, especially in the energy-
short Ukraine. Economically the accident could not have come at a
worse time. At best it will cost the country less than 5 per cent of its
harvest and at worst, about 10 per cent.
1 Gorbachevas Leader
MARTIN McCAULEY

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev's election as Secretary-General of the

Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) on I1 March 1985 was a watershed in Soviet politics. Not only
was Gorbachev the youngest man to become Party leader since Stalin, he
was the youngest member of the Politburo and he was the first born
under the Soviet ftag. Fortune smiled on hirn: he was the right man in the
right place at the right time. He was fortunate that Leonid Brezhnev
lived until November 1982. Since he was incapable of leading the Party
in his last years those around hirn increased their power and inftuence.
Brezhnev was followed by the mortally iII Yury Andropov and he in turn
by the emphysemic Konstantin Chernenko. Under Chernenko, Gorba-
chev '\ed' the CC Secretariat and chaired sessions ofthe Politburo when
the Secretary-General had been too iII to attend. Due to the stability of
mernbership of the Politburo Gorbachev only had to face two serious
rivals: Grigory Romanov, like hirnself a CC secretary and full member
of the Politburo and Viktor Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow City
Party organisation. However Grishin was greatly handicapped by not
being in the CC Secretariat. Chernenko's death was unexpectedly
sudden and Gorbachev's aIIies, first and foremost Andrei Gromyko,
seized the opportunity to have hirn selected by an incomplete Politburo
and elected by an incomplete Central Committee. Old, frail men chose
hirn as Party leader and thereby ended the rule ofthe gerontocracy. As a
member of the Central Committee (and hirnself a decade older than
Gorbachev) was to put it later: 'After one leader who was half dead,
another who was half alive and another who could hardly speak, the
youthful, energetic Gorbachev was very welcome!'

1.1 KOLKHOZ TO KREMLIN

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born on 2 March 1931 in the village
of Privolnoe in Krasnogvardeisky raion, Stavropol krai, in the north
9
10 Gorbachevas Leader

Caucasus. His parents and grandparents were peasants. His grandfather

was a Party member and became chairman of the first collective farm
(kolkhoz) set up in Privolnoe in 1931. His father was also a communist
and worked as a machine operator in a local Machine Tractor Station
until the German invasion. He served in the army during the war and
afterwards worked as an economist and local Party official. He died in
1976 (Medvedev, 1986: p.22).
Privilnoe was part of the area occupied by the Wehrmacht between
August 1942 and January 1943, but the village did not see any action.
The Gorbachev family probably remained in Privolnoe during hos-
tilities, so Mikhail would have seen German units in the village as they
searched for food, Jews and communists.
In April 1942 a government and Party decree reduced the age at which
rural children had to begin work from 16 to 12 years. Those between 12
and 16 years were obliged to perform 50 trudodni (workday units)
annually, a third ofthe adult quota. Gorbachev resumed his schooling in
September 1943 and from 1945 worked, on a temporary basis, in a
Machine Tractor Station, thus following in his father's footsteps. In
1949 Privolnoe gathered in an excellent harvest and overfulfilled its plan.
Among those decorated was Mikhail Gorbachev, who received the
Order ofthe Red Banner ofLabour for his work as a combine operator.
A member of -the Komsomol (the Young Communist League), he
applied for Party membership in 1950 and was accepted as a candidate
member. The candidate stage lasts at least a year and Gorbachev became
a full member in 1952.
As a candidate member ofthe Party and the holder ofthe Order ofthe
Red Banner of Labour Gorbachev was assured of higher education
when he completed his secondary education in June 1950. He set his
sights high - Moscow University - and chose law, not an agricultural
discipline, as his field of study. Such a choice revealed ambition, self-
confidence and originality. The ambition of every Soviet student was to
enter Moscow University, but why choose law, a discipline which
enjoyed low prestige at that time? Perhaps it was easier to pass the
entrance examination in law since competition for places would not have
been so intense. Since he was active in Komsomol work at university
(September 1950-June 1955) he may already have set his sights on a
Party career before entering university. Law would offer several
advantages, one ofwhich was the training provided in rhetoric. Students
were taught public speaking and to articulate their thoughts in public.
Gorbachev is now the best public speaker among Party leaders since
Lenin (who was also trained as a lawyer). It might be countered that the
 Martin McCauley 11

opposition is undistinguished. Stalin had a decided Georgian accent,

Khrushchev had difficulty with Russian grammar, Brezhnev spoke as if
he had some kasha in his mouth, Andropov was too weak to speak
effectively and Chernenko could hardly get a word out. Even Lenin
spoke with a lisp.
During his university days Gorbachev shared a room with Zdenek
Mlynar, then already a member of the Communist Party of Cze-
choslovakia, and a committed believer in Soviet socialism as a model to
be emulated. Both took the same courses and ended up with the same
degree. Mlynaf's recollections (L 'Unita, 9 Apr 1985) reveal Gorbachev
as intelligent, honest and a natural leader. Their relations were cordial
and this was important for Mlynaf's subsequent career. Gorbachev
would have been required to report on Mlynäf's behaviour and political
beliefs and since Mlynaf's career, when he returned horne, went from
sirength to strength, Gorbachev must have reported positively. Had he
provided damning evidence it would have found its way to the
Czechoslovak Party. Five years' e10se contact with Mlynar must have
left its mark on Gorbachev. Through the Czech he would have gained
access to a world whose culture and thought processes were different to
those of the Soviet Union. By 1955 he was no longer a provincial
Russian.
On graduation Gorbachev does not appear to have been offered a
coveted research post so he should have been allocated to work in the
procuracy, but chose instead to enter Komsomol work. He was made
deputy head of the department of agitation and propaganda of the
Stavropol city Komsomol committee, but in 1956 he became first
secretary. This very rapid promotion was gained on the recommenda-
tion of Vsevolod Murakhovsky, who was leaving the post for work in
the Stavropol city Party committee.
The year 1956 turned out to be a turning-point in Gorbachev's life.
Not only did he become head of the Komsomol in Stavropol, but he
married Raisa Titorenko, whom he had met when she was in the Faculty
of Philosopy at Moscow University. She had graduated that year and
had returned to her native city, Stavropol, Irina, their only child, was
also born in 1956. Mlynäf believes that Raisa's counsel and influence
contributed to Gorbachev's success in Stavropol.
Over the years 1958-60 Gorbachev was head of the propaganda
department ofthe Stavropol krai committee, then second secretary, then
first secretary. In so doing he became a member of the Stavropol krai
Party (kraikom) bureau. The first secretary of the kraikom was Fyodor
Kulakov, who was to exert a formative influence on Gorbachev's future
12 Gorbachevas Leader

career. Mikhail Sergeevich's very rapid promotion over the years 1955-
60 was partly the result of good fortune in coming into contact with
officials who valued his organisational and propagandist skills. His
ability to excel at inter-personal relations was also clearly evident.
In 1962 Khrushchev decided to set up Territorial Production
Associations (TPAs). Each TPA consisted of twenty-five to thirty
kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the First Secretary thought that if a Party
organiser was placed in charge agricultural production would soar.
Gorbachev was appointed one of the sixteen Party organisers in
Stavropol krai. Thereby he abandonded his Komsomol career and also
forfeited his position on the Stavropol kraikom bureau. The new
appointment entailed considerable risk as Gorbachev had no direct
experience of agricultural production and the exact nature of his
responsibilities remained unclear. Each TPA spanned more than one
raion and although it was only responsible for agricultural affairs it was
involuntarily drawn into other 10cal questions. Nevertheless the weather
favoured Stavropol and the harvest turned out to be excellent.
Gorbachev's acute awareness of this need to acquire technical
agricultural expertise led to his enrolling in the department of agricul-
tural economics of the Stavropol agricultural institute in September
1962. Since he could not take time off he had to take the five-year course
by correspondence. He graduated in 1967.
As it turned out, Gorbachev only spent one harvest in the field, being
made head of the department of Party organs of the Stavropol kraikom.
This was a very significant promotion since it gave hirn a major say in all
key appointments in the area. Stavropol krai is not only an agricultural
region, it contains large numbers of spas, sanatoria and rest centres.
Many leading Soviet officials visit the area annually to recharge their
batteries. Gorbachev would have liaised with Moscow and the KGB in
order to ensure that the high personages were afforded the necessary rest
or cure. Here again Mikhail Sergeevich would have deployed his talents
to develop contacts with a wide range of people.
After Khrushchev's removal from office in October 1964 Fyodor
Kulakov was promoted and moved to Moscow as head of the
agricultural department of the ce Secretariat and a year later was made
a ce secretary. Kulakov's successor as first secretary of Stavropol
kraikom turned out to be Leonid Efremov. He had been second secretary
of the RSFSR Party bureau until it was abolished after Khrushchev's
removal. A candidate member of the Party Presidium (renamed
Politburo in 1966) Efremov had clearly been demoted. Zhores
Medvedev rates hirn highly as an agricultural special ist and sees the main
 Martin McCauley 13

reason for his demotion being the fact that he was not a Brezhnev man
(Medvedev, 1986: p. 60). The new First Secretary preferred Kulakov, a
less able man, to the independent-minded Efremov. Brezhnev also
harboured agricultural ambitions and always kept a watchful eye on
that sector.
In 1966 Gorbachev moved up to become first secretary of Stavropol
city Party committee (gorkom) and such was his success that in 1968 he
became second secretary of the kraikom. As second secretary he was
responsible for agricuIture and his agricuItural diploma qualified hirn
for the task. Moreover he was ideally placed to take over as first
secretary when Efremov departed. Despite the fact that 1969 was a poor
agricultural year in Stavropol krai, because of drought and dust storms,
Gorbachev became first secretary in 1970, pushing Efremov into
oblivion. The post qualified Mikhail Sergeevich for CC membership and
he was duly elected at the XXIV Party Congress in 1971. At the age of 40
he had become a member of the Soviet elite.
Gorbachev did weil as kraikom first secretary partly because
Stavropol is a fertile agricultural region and partly because of his
leadership style, democratic rather than authoritarian. Promotion for
Gorbachev meant promotion to Moscow since as the head of a
predominantly agricultural area he could not expect to be selected to
lead a mainly industrial region. In Moscow Mikhail Sergeevich had
so me real and potential allies. Mikhail Suslov had been first secretary of
Stavropol kraikom between \939 and \944; Fyodor Kulakov, CC
secretary for agricuIture and a full member of the Politburo from 1971;
and Yury Andropov, a native of the region, who was wont to take the
waters there.
When Fyodor Kulakov unexpectedly died in 1978 at the age of60 the
man chosen to succeed hirn was Gorbachev. The fact that Kulakov died
in July and Mikhail Sergeevich was appointed CC secretary for
agriculture in November revealed that he was not Brezhnev's first
choice. Nevertheless in 1979 Gorbachev became a candidate member
and in 1980 a full member of the Politburo. His ascent to the top had
been extraordinarily rapid and at 49 he was the youngest man in the
Politburo by far. Indeed Mikhail Sergeevich's promotion went against
the trend in the late Brezhnev era, which was to replace old men with
older men.
Brezhnev c1early favoured Konstantin Chernenko as his successor,
but the transfer ofYury Andropov from the KGB to a ce secretaryship,
taking over the deceased Suslov's post, eventually vitiated the plan.
Gorbachev gained from Andropov's promotion in November 1982 and
14 Gorbachevas Leader

began to spread his wings, taking over responsibility for the economy
and cadres. He shared Andropov's concern about the general air of
laxness and corruption which had pervaded the la te Brezhnev era
(Brown, 1985a: p. 13). Both were puritanical at heart and believed in self
as weil as national discipline. The anti-alcohol and anti-corruption
campaigns got under way and were given sharper teeth later under
Gorbachev. Under Andropov new men were added to the Politburo and
the CC Secretariat and on balance these changes strengthened Gorba-
chev's position (Brown, 1985a: p. 3). Gorbachev seized the opportunity
to remove many Brezhnevites at oblast first secretary level. However
Andropov's dec\ining health haI ted this march towards renewal as
Chernenko and those alarmed by the replacement of Brezhnev's
'stability of cadres' by the 'instability of cadres' made a comeback.
Chernenko, as senior secretary, chaired Politburo meetings as
Andropov slowly expired and was strong enough to be elected the new
Secretary-General in February 1984. Under the new leader Gorbachev
was c\early 'second' secretary and added to his authority by conducting
himselfwith considerable style and aplomb during his visit to Britain in
December 1984. The image he created was so positive that those who
favoured hirn as the next Soviet leader, such as the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, were afraid that academic and media adulation
could harnl his chances in Moscow. The only real danger to Gorbachev
was Viktor Grishin, first secretary of Moscow gorkom, whom Cher-
nenko had been grooming as his successor. Medvedev thinks that
Chernenko planned to announce his retirement at the XXVII Party
Congress, to be brought forward to November 1985, and to hand over to
Grishin (Medvedev, 1986: p. 10).
When Chernenko died suddenlyon 10 March 1985 a Politburo
meeting was convened just over three ho urs later. This meant that
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who was in the USA, Vitaly Vorotnikov, in
Yugoslavia, and Dinmukhamed Kunaev, in Alma Ata (a five-hour
flight from Moscow), could not possibly attend. There is nothing in the
Party Rules or the State Constitution about what constitutes a quorum.
Presumably a majority of the remaining seven fuH members (only they
can vote) was in favour. At the meeting it was rumoured that Romanov
nominated Grishin, but that the latter had been savaged by Viktor
Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB, for not having done anything about
corruption in Moscow (Medvedev, 1986: p. 15; Schmidt-Häuer, 1986:
p. 113). Gromyko nominated Gorbachev and waxed eloquent about his
abilities. The next step was to convene an extraordinary meeting of the
Central Committee, but again it was not a plenary session due to the fact
 Martin McCauley 15

that it was impossible for many members to reach Moscow in time.

According tö the Party Rules it is the Central Committee which elects
the Secretary-General. Gromyko again proposed Gorbachev and
appealed for support. This was not easy to achieve since CC members
had been elected under Brezhnev and so me ofthem had already lost their
posts. Others were convinced that if Gorbachev won he would force
them out. Eventually the CC accepted Gorbachev. However it was
stated that he had been elected edinodushno whereas Andropov and
Chemenko had been chosen edinoglasno. This reveals that, in Gorba-
chev's case, no fonnal vote was taken, merely that it was the general
feeling that he should be accepted. Although little flnn evidence is
available about the extraordinary meeting it is clear that it was hurried
through as quickly as possible. It needed to last a full day to allow all
members to attend, but this is something the Gorbachev faction, led by
Gromyko, set out to prevent. (One estimate is that 'some 200' CC
members - about two-thirds - were present: Schmidt-Häuer, 1986:
p. 163.) Kuneav missed the Politburo meeting, but was present at the CC
session. Shcherbitsky missed both.

1.2 POWER AND AUTHORITY

When the CPSU changes its leader it does not thereby change its policy
or personnel. Since it is the only party, the ruling party, continuity is
stressed. Indeed a British Prime Minister or US President has much
more power to make personnel appointments and alter policy than a
new Soviet Party leader. Gorbachev inherited a Politburo in wh ich two
of the ten full members were strongly antagonistic to hirn: Viktor
Grishin and Grigory Romanov, and so me others who were unenthusias-
tic about his elevation. The role of the Politburo, according to the Party
Rules, is to direct Party work between plenary sessions of the Central
Committee, which take place at least twice ayear. The function of the
CC Secretariat is to direct current work, select cadres and supervise the
execution of Politburo decisions. The Politburo makes policy, but it is
the Secretariat which sees that it is implemented. The Secretary-
General's position is enhanced by the fact that he is head of the
Secretariat, there being no fonnal position of chainnan ofthe Politburo.
Power is derived from holding office. As Party leader Gorbachev
automatically becomes Chainnan ofthe Defence Council and Comman-
der-in-Chief ofthe Soviet Armed Forces. A Party leader's objective is to
become a strong, national leader. In order to attain this it is nonnally
16 Gorbachevas Leader

necessary to occupy one of the great offices of state, President or Prime

Minister. However, according to adecision adopted at the CC Plenum
which removed Khrushchev in October 1964, it is not possible for the
Party leader to be simultaneously Prime Minister (Ponomarev et al.,
1984: p. 581). That leaves the presidency and Brezhnev., Andropov and
Chernenko were aII simultaneously Party leader and President.
Authority is the right to hold office. Hence power is objective but
authority is subjective. It is the perception of coIIeagues and the
population at large that the office-holder is the right man for the job.
Power and authority are mutually reinforcing. The greater a leader's
authority the easier it is for hirn to acquire other offices and to promote
his own candidates for office. It does not follow that power confers
authority. Chernenko was a national leader but enjoyed little authority.
There are four main ways for a Secretary-General to build up his
authority:
(i) personnel changes
(ii) economic, social and foreign policy changes
(iii) ideology
(iv) cult of the personality

Personnel Changes
Gorbachev moved quickly to form his leadership team. At a CC Plenum
on 23 April 1985, Egor Ligachev, CC secretary for organisational Party
work, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, CC secretary for the economy, were
promoted to full membership of the Politburo. General Viktor
Chebrikov, chairman of the KGB, advanced from candidate to full
membership and Marshai Sergei Sokolov, USSR Minister for Defence,
was made a candidate member. The important agricultural portfolio,
the CC secretaryship for agriculture, was given to Viktor Nikonov, who
thereby became Gorbachev's successor in that post. However Nikonov
did not advance to the Politburo.
The rise of Ligachev and Ryzhkov had been meteoric. Brought into
the CC Secretariat under Andropov, they moved into full Politburo
membership without having gone through the candidate membership
stage. Moreover Ligachev became 'second' secretary and Gorbachev's
deputy. Ryzhkov was cIearly being groomed for another high office and
in due course became USSR Prime Minister.
 Martin McCauley 17

Six weeks after taking over Gorbachev had upset the old balance of
power in the Politburo and had brought in men who shared his own
policy preferences. But more dramatic moves were to follow swiftly. On
1 July a CC Plenum removed Grigory Romanov from the Politburo and
the Secretariat, ostensibly for health reasons. Gone was Gorbachev's
most formidable opponent. Eduard Shevardnadze, first secretary of the
Communist Party of Georgia and a candidate member, was elected to
full Politburo membership, and two new CC secretaries made their
appearance: Lev Zaikov, defence industries, and Boris Eltsin, construc-
tion. The latter had been head ofthe construction department since May
1985. Zaikov's promotion was intriguing. He had succeeded Romanov
as Leningrad obkom first secretary when the latter had moved to
Moscow to become a CC secretary under Andropov. With Zaikov gone
Gorbachev could appoint his own candidate to run a very important
region. Under Romanov it had increased its standing as a centre of
engineering and defence industries.
The full significance ofShevardnadze's promotion only became c\ear
on 2 July when the USSR Supreme Soviet appointed hirn USSR Foreign
Minister and Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister since 1957, President.
The choice of Shevardnadze, a Georgian and therefore a non-Slav, as
the Soviet Union's voice in the outside world was, on the face of it,
astonishing. Lacking experience of the non-socialist worId and a
Western language, the Georgian appeared to be at a decided disadvan-
tage. However Gorbachev holds hirn in high regard - he is ODe ofthe few
to address Mikhail Sergeevich with ty, the second person singular - and
he possesses charm and intelligence. Gromyko's removal from the
Foreign Ministry, his power base, to the presidency signalled that his
days as the dominant voice in foreign policy formation were over. It says
much for Gorbachev's skill and charm that he was able to outmanoeuvre
so quickly the man who, more than anyone else, had been responsible for
his election as Secretary-General. In March Gromyko had placed
national ahead ofpersonal interest and had called on everyone else to do
the same. Gorbachev surprised many Western observers by not
becoming President himse\f, thus following in the footsteps of his three
predecessors. Convincing Gromyko that he should become President
was a very astute move. It permitted Gorbachev more leeway in the
formation and articulation of foreign policy, enhanced by Shevardnad-
ze's inexperience. It also allowed Gorbachev to move the locus ofpolicy-
making away from the Foreign Ministry, the government, and concen-
trate it in the CC secretariat. Gromyko remained in the Politburo, but
could only devote part of his energies to foreign affairs. In the run-up to
18 Gorhachevas Leader

the Geneva summit in November 1985 he was in Gorky looking at

industry and farming, for instance. Cut off from the day-to-day
information flow in the Foreign Ministry, Gromyko will gradually lose
contact, restricting his comments in the Politburo to generalities and
reminiscences.
Another member of the Gorbachev team moved into his allotted
position on 27 September 1985 when Nikolai Ryzhkov replaced Nikolai
Tikhonov as USSR Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister's qualifica-
tions were impressive. He had been a successful director ofUralmash, a
huge engineering plant in the Urals; had then become First Deputy
Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building and from there he
had moved to the State Planning Committee, Gosplan, as first deputy
chairman, bi:fore moving into the CC Secretariat.
On 15 October a CC Plenum promoted Nikolai Talyzin to candidate
membership ofthe Politburo. He had taken over Gosplan from Nikolai
Baibakov, who had presided over the dec\ine of the Soviet economy
under Brezhnev. Baibakov and Gorbachev had differing ideas about
how the economy should develop and this led to the Secretary-General
sending back Gosplan's draft ofthe Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90)
because it was not ambitious enough. Talyzin 's promotion upgraded the
role of Gosplan and added to the importance of central planning.
Besides his Party position Talyzin was made First Deputy Prime
Minister, whereas Baibakov had only been Deputy Prime Minister.
Grishin, first secretary ofMoscow gorkom, was removed in December
and replaced by Boris Eltsin. So important was the change that
Gorbachev hirnselfwas present at the meeting. On the eve ofthe XXVII
Party Congress a CC Plenum dropped Grishin from the Politburo, freed
Boris Eltsin from his duties as a CC secretary and promoted hirn to
candidate membership of the Politburo. His appointment ca me as a
surprise since his previous experience had been in construction and he
was new to the Moscow scene (Hill and Frank, 1986). Gorbachev
appears to have chosen hirn because he wanted a trusted associate to run
the capital and the new first secretary's inexperience would make it
easier for Gorbachev to influence developments.
At the XXVII Party Congress Gorbachev made steady rather than
spectacular progress. Only one new full member was elected: Lev
Zaikov, CC secretary for defence industries. Two new candidate
members appeared: Nikolai Slyunkov, first secretary ofthe Communist
Party of Belorussia, and Yury Solovev, first secretary of the Leningrad
obkom. None of these appointments came as a surprise. It was
traditional for holders ofthe posts to be in the Politburo. Two candidate
 Martin McCauley 19

members were dropped: Vasily Kuznetsov, Soviet Vice-President, and

Boris Ponomarev, CC secretary and head of the international depart-
ment. Since both were octogenarians it was time to go, but they retired
honourably since both retained their CC membership. It was in the CC
Secretariat, however, that Gorbachev made his mark. The personnel in
the engine room of the Soviet ship of state was completely recast. Only
Vladimir Dolgikh, Heavy Industry, and Mikhail Zimyanin, Culture and
Propaganda, survived from the Brezhnev era. Five new appointments
were announced: Aleksandra Biryukova was made responsible for
Consumer Affairs, the Family and Trade Unions; Anatoly Dobrynin,
the veteran Soviet Ambassador in Washington, became the new head of
the International Department; Vadim Medvedev took over relations
with the Communist Parties of Socialist States; Georgy Razumovsky
headed the department of organisational Party work (the selection of
cadres); Aleksandr Yakovlev became responsible for propaganda.
These changes reflect the fact that fourteen ofthe twenty-three heads of
department in the CC Secretariat have been replaced under Gorbachev.
These new appointments underline Gorbachev's own policy preferen-
ces. He is much concerned about the gulf which exists in Soviet society
between officials and ordinary people. Biryukova's elevation is sig-
nificant for two reasons. She is the first woman to join the central party
elite since Ekaterina Furtseva lost her Politburo place in 1961 and as a
trade-union official she is weil versed in consumer problems. More
support is to be extended the family and she will advise on and supervise
this. Biryukova 's promotion was a surprise to the delegates - she had not
spoken at the Congress - and it would appear also to Gorbachev. He
read her name out incorrectly, but quickly realised his mi stake!
Dobrynin's advance is of great interest. It affords his views and advice
on foreign affairs, especially US-USSR relations, greater weight.
Razumovsky has the task of reimposing central control over Party
appointments throughout the country. Yakovlev, a former Ambassador
to Canada, has to make the ideological message more penetrating and
relevant.
The top changes have resulted in a mature rather than a young
leadership. The average age offull members ofthe Politburo is 64 years,
that of candida te members 62 years and that of the Secretariat 60 years.
Gorbachev remains the youngest member of the Politburo, but the
youngest member of the elite is Razumovsky, who was born in 1936
(Table 1.4).
Of the 26 members of the elite (full and candidate members of the
Politburo and CC secretaries), 23 are Slavs (20 Russians, 2 Belorussians
 N
o

TABLE 1.1 Cen/ral Party Organs (Cen/ral Commillee and Revision Commission) Size 0/ Membership
CENTRAL CENTRAL
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
Full % Candida/e Revision To/al membership % To/al CPSU %
members increase members Commission 0/ central organs increase membership increase
1961 176 155 65 395 9,716,005
1966 195 11.43 165 79 439 11.14 12,357,308 27.19
1971 241 23.59 155 81 477 8.66 14,372,563 16.31
1976 287 19.09 139 85 511 7.13 15,694,000 9.19
1981 319 11.15 151 75 545 6.65 17,480,000 11.38
Increase of 8.6% Decrease of 11. 7%
1986 307 Decrease 170 83 560 2.75% 19,000,000 8.7
of3.8%
Increase of 12.6% Increase of 10.6%
 Martin McCauley 21

and I Ukranian), I is an Azerbaidzhani, I Georgian and the other a

Kazakh. In a country where about half the population is Russian (52.4
per cent in the 1979 Census) and about two-thirds Slav there is a
considerab1e nationality imbalance in the top leadership. All CC
secretaries, for instance, are Russian. Kunaev is the only representative
of the Communist Parties of the Muslim republics, but his record in
Kazakhstan has been sharply criticised. Sharaf Rashidov, first secretary
of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, was a candidate member until
his death in 1983. At the Party Congress a minut.e's silence was observed
for Politburo members who had died since the previous congress in 1981,
but Rashidov was not mentioned. Gorbachev, in his report, castigated
the Uzbek Party for corruption.
The new Central Committee saw a reduction from 319 to 307 full
members (the first Congress at wh ich this had ever happened), but the
number of candidate members increased (Table 1.1). Most pi aces in the
CC are ex officio. Party officials continue to dominate: 144 full members
(46.9 per cent of the total). On the other hand USSR and RSFSR
governmental representation has declined from 23.8 per cent to 20.5 per
cent ofthe total full membership. The instruments ofcoercion, the KGB
and the military, have remained almost static. In aperiod when so much
stress is being placed on economic management it is somewhat
surprising to find only one full and one candidate member who is an
enterprise director. On the other hand two full members are kolkhoz
chainnen (Table 1.3).
Gorbachev could look back at his first year in office and derive
satisfaction from the fact that the turnover of top and middle level
officials in Party and government was unprecedented. No previous
Party leader has been able to effect such changes after assuming office.
In the USSR Council of Ministers, 39 of the 101 members in office in
March 1985 had departed the scene a year later. Twenty-four first
secretaries of oblast, krai or autonomous republican Party committees
changed in the RSFSR and 23 out of 78 in the non-Russian republics.
Four ofthe 14 first secretaries ofrepublican Communist Parties are new.
The greatest number of changes have occurred in Uzbekistan where over
one-half of the posts on the nomenklatura lists of the CPSU and Uzbek
CC Secretariats have new occupants and the situation in Kirghizia is
similar. The Moscow gorkom, since Grishin's dismissal, has been a
speCial target. Nationwide about one-fifth of all officials of primary
Party organisations have lost their posts and the number of government
officials transferred or dismissed runs into thousands (Gustafson and
Mann, 1986: pp. 2-3).
 N
N

TABLE 1.2 Turnover oJ Membership (Central Committee and Revision Commission)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Juli memhers candida te members Revision Commission
1976 1981 1986 1976 1981 1986 1976 1981 1986
Re-electe<! 201 230 172 68 60 54 30 30 20
Promote<! from candidate to member 46 42· 33t
Promoted from Revision Commission
to member 4 6 8
Promote<! from Revision Commission
to candidate 20 22 13
Demote<! (from Member to
candidate member)
Demote<! (from member to Revision
Commission)
Entirely new entrants 36 41 94 51 68 103 5S 44 62
TOTAL 287 319 307 139 ISI 170 8S 7S 83
• Includes eight promote<! between Congresses.
t Includes ten promote<! between Congresses.
 TABLE 1.3 Representation 0/ Functional Groups in Central Party Organs al lhe XXVI and XXVII Parly Congresses
Overall percenlage
lhroughoul central
Full members Candidale members Revision Commission organs
/98/ /986 /98/ /986 /98/ /986 1981 1986
% % % % % %
Politburo and ce
Secretaries 26 8.2 26 8.5 4.8 4.6
L.eading CPSU
officials 20 6.3 21 6.8 14 9.3 10 5.9 5 6.7 7 8.4 7.2 6.8
Republic CC
secretaries 15 4.7 17 5.5 11 7.3 14 8.2 1.3 5 5.5
Oblast. Krai. ASSR/City
Party Committee
secretaries (RSFSR) 64 20.1 60 19.5 10 6.6 16 9.4 1.3 1.2 13.8 13.7
Oblast. Krai ASSR/City
Party Committee
secretaries (other
republics) 20 6.3 20 6.5 14 9.3 16 9.4 3 4 7 8.4 6.8 7.5
Raikom secretaries 0.7 2 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.5
USSR Supreme Soviet 2 0.6 3 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.7
RSFSR Supreme Soviet 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.2
Supreme Soviet of
other republics 5 1.6 2 0.6 5 3.3 4 2.4 4 5.3 7 8.4 2.6 2.3 IV
loH
 IV
TABLE 1.3 Represenlalion 01 Funclional Groups in Cenlral ParlY Organs al Ihe XXVI and XXVII ParlY Congresses ~

Overall percentage
Ihroughoul cenlral
Full members Candidale members Revision Commission organs
/98/ /986 198/ /986 /98/ /986 /98/ /986
% % % % % %
Local soviets 2 0.6 2 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.5
USSR government 70 21.9 58 18.9 28 18.5 34 20 12 16 9 10.9 20.2 18
RSFSR government 6 1.9 5 1.6 6 4 5 2.9 3 4 4 4.8 2.8 2.5

Government of other
republics 5 1.6 4 1.3 6 4 9 5.3 9 12 5 6 3.7 3.2

KGB 3 0.9 3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 0.6 2 0.6 0.7 3 1.8 1.3 2 2.4 0.7 1.3

Ambassadors 13 4.1 11 3.6 5 3.3 6 3.5 3 4 1.2 3.9 3.2

Military 22 6.9 22 7.2 13 8.6 14 8.2 4 5.3 3 3.6 7.2 6.9

TV 5 1.6 4 1.3 3 1.9 2 1.2 4 5.3 3 3.6 2.2 1.6

Press 4 1.3 3 0.9 7 4.6 7 4.1 6 8 4 4.8 3.1 2.5

Arts 2 0.6 0.3 3 1.9 3 1.8 1.3 2 2.4 1.1 l.l

Workers 16 5 21 6.8 13 8.6 5 2.9 12 16 5 6 7.5 5.5

Factory directors 2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4

Kolkhoz chairmen 2 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.5

 TADLE 1.3 Represenlation 01 Functional Groups in Central Party Organs at the XXVI and XXVII Party Congresses
Overall percenlage
throughout central
Full members Candida te members Revision Commission organs
/98/ /986 /98/ /986 /98/ 1986 /981 /986
% % % % % %

Public organisations 2 0.6 3 0.9 2 2.4 0.4 0.9

Legal system 2 0.6 2 0.6 0.4 0.4
Academy of Sciences 9 2.8 6 1.9 4 2.6 7 4.1 1.3 2.6 2.3
Other specialists 0.3 3 0.9 0.2 0.5
No information 0.3 2 1.3 10 5.9 3 4 19 22.9 0.9 5.4
Retired senior officials 3 0.9 0.5
TOTAL 319 307 151 170 75 83
Note: There is no double counting: e.g. Chebrikov is counted as a member of the Politburo only: hence KGB representation increases to 4.

N
VI
26 Gorbachevos Leader

On the other hand the changes have not been as far-reaching as might
have been expected. Many of the top officials dismissed were over 65
years of age, but others retained their positions, including the astonish-
ing 82-year-old Minister of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Pyotr Lomako.
Over one-third ofCC members have been in their posts for ten years or
longer (ibid. p. 3). Some republics, for example the Ukraine and
Lithuania, have experienced far fewer changes than others. Overall turn-
over rates have been greater at higher levels than at lower, and closer to
the centre than to the periphery (ibid. p.4).
Under Brezhnev the 'stability of cadres' resulted in the same official
remaining in office (few obkom or kraikom first secretaries changed
twice) and this led to greater influence over the appointments of local
cadres. Gradually the department of organisational Party work of the
CC Secretariat, the key Party body dealing with cadres, began to
concern itself less and less with appointments and more and more with
economic affairs. Boris Eltsin, speaking at the Party Congress, was
severely critical:
Tbe department of Organisational Party work is c1early overloaded. What
is it now involved in - railway wagons, fodder and fuel? All these things are
important. of course. Out cadres are more important and it wasjust this work
which was neglected. The department had a limited knowledge of Party
cadres and supervised them poorly .... How else is one to explain the collapse
which occurred in many oblast, krai and republican Party organisations?
(Pravda, 27 Feb 1986).
This was a fierce indictment of Ivan Kapitonov and all his work. He
had been replaced, under Andropov, in April 1983, by Egor Ligachev.
When the latter became a full member of the Politburo in April 1985 he
was succeeeded as head of the department of organisational Party work
by Georgy Razumovsky. He had been first secretary of Krasnodar
kraikom, next door to Stavropol krai, and would appear to have close
career links with Gorbachev. Under Andropov and Chemenko Gorba-
chev probably had overall responsibility for cadres so Ligachev would
have been subordinate to hirn. The relationship between Ligachev and
Gorbachev is a complex one. Ligachev referred, at the Party Congress,
to the leadership as 'collegiate' (the only speaker to do so) and he also
used the expression the 'CC, Politburo and Secretariat, under the
leadership of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev' (Pravda 28 Feb 1986).
Ligachev, judging by his public utterances, appears to be more
conservative and to favour slower change than others in the leadership.
It would appear that Gorbachev now shares responsibility for cadres
with other colleagues (Gustafson and Mann, 1986: p. 6).
 Martin McCauley 27

Tbe CC Secretariat can deploy two main tactics in its struggle to

reassert firm central control of cadres. It can flood the republican Party
apparatus with appointees from the centre, as in the case ofUzbekistan.
(It has also sent young Uzbek officials for special training to higher
Party schools in the RSFSR.) It can also rotate Party cadres, giving them
a tour of duty in Moscow. Over one-half the new first secretaries of
oblast, krai and republican Party committees, appointed under Gorba-
chev, have served a short period in Moscow, usually with the rank of
inspector. Tbe process apparently began under Andropov, but the
officials only began taking up their posts under Gorbachev. Inspectors
would be expected to cast a critical eye over the local Party apparatus
they had been directed to and thus provide the centre with more
information. Also their performance could be monitored and the more
promising earmarked for promotion. When promoted they would retain
their links with Moscow as weil as developing locallinks (ibid. pp. 6- 7).
Very few personnel changes have been effected in the Ukraine despite
criticism of the republic's performance in various fields. This must be
due to the continuing patronage of Vladimir Shcherbitsky, the first
secretary. One explanation of this surprising phenomenon is that
Shcherbitsky went over to the Andropov - Gorbachev camp at an early
stage (ibid: p. 7). On the other hand, in Kazakhstan, criticism has led to
over 500 republican Party officials being removed, against the express
wishes of Kunaev, the first secretary (Pravda, 9 Feb 1986).
Has Gorbachev succeeded in lengthening his own khvost or tail at the
centre? The most noticeable promotions have been Vsevolod Murak-
hovsky, head of USSR Gosagroprom, the super-ministry for agricul-
ture, who succeeded Gorbachevas first secretary in Stavropol krai, and
Georgy Razumovsky. This Kuban group can be expected to grow.
Another group is associated with Sverdlovsk and Andrei Kirilenko, but
they were weil on their way under Andropov. Leningrad has provided
some leading appointments. Ligachev came from Tomsk and so on. It is
a
an oversimplification to state that a Urals or Siberian group has come
into being because many leading officials come from those areas.
However at the Party Congress the Siberians apparently won and the
central Asians apparently lost over the issue of the diversion of the
northern rivers.
The stress on socioeconomic progress and the scientific-technical
revolution favours cadres with technical expertise. Tbe process of
removing the 'generalists', those with limited formal education but long
experience ofParty work, began under Brezhnev, who placed considera-
ble emphasis on formal qualifications. As a rule ministers were career
28 Gorbachevas Leader

specialists who had cIimbed the lad der to first deputy. Obkom and
kraikom first secretaries increasingly emerged from their own area.
Gorbachev is the cIassic example ofthis, spending the years 1955-78 in
Stavropol krai before moving to Moscow. Has this pattern continued
under Gorbachev? It has been weakened but is still in evidence. Of the 29
new ministers and heads of state committees (not in the Presidium) ofthe
USSR Council of Ministers, 10 were formerly first deputy or the
equivalent and another 5 in cIosely related institutions. The minister-
technocrat is still dominant and the Party-generalist is being confined to
fewer and fewer positions.
In the Politburo only Ligachev can be called a Party-general ist,
although Eltsin has been a Party official since the age of 37. The
technocrat is slowly but surely advancing. An analysis of the 24 new
oblast, krai and autonomous republican first Party secretaries appointed
in the RSFSR reveals that only half rose through service in their own

TADLE 1.4 The Presenl Party Leadership (July 1986)

POLITBURO
Name Position Responsibility Age

Gorbachev, Mikhail Secretary-General Leader 55

Aliev, Geidar First Dep. Chairman, 63
USSR Council of Domestic issues
Ministers Communications
Chebrikov, Viktor KGB Chairman Political police 62
Gromyko, Andrei USSR President Head of State 76
Kunaev, Dinmukhamed First sec., CP Party leader 74
of Kazakhstan
Ligachev, Egor CC secretary Party cadres, ideology, 65
("Second' secretary) foreign policy
Ryzhkov, Nikolai Chairman, USSR Head of sta te 56
Council of Min. administration
Shcherbitsky, Vladimir First sec., CP Party leader 67
of Ukraine
Shevardnadze, Eduard USSR Min. of Foreign policy 58
Foreign Alfairs
Solomentsev, Mikhail Chairman, Party 72
Control Commission Party discipline
Vorotnikov, Vitaly Chairman, RSFSR RSFSR government 60
Council of Min.
·Zaikov, Lev CC secretary Defence industries 62

Average age of the members of the Politburo is 64 years.

 Martin McCauley 29

CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Demichev, Pyotr Deputy Chairman, USSR Deputy 68
USSR Supreme President
Soviet
Dolgikh, Vladimir CC secretary Heavy industry, 61
energy, transport
*Eltsin, Boris First sec., Moscow Moscow Party 55
City Party
*Slyunkov, Nikolai First sec., CP Belorussian Party 56
of Belorussia
*Solovev, Yury First sec., Leningrad Party 61
Leningrad oblast
Party
Sokolov, Sergei USSR Minister Military head 74
(Marshai) of Defence
*Talyzin, Nikolai First Deputy Chairman, Chairman, Gosplan 57
USSR Council of Min.

Average age of candidate members of Politburo is 62 years.

ce SECRETARIAT
Gorbachev, Mikhail see above
*Biryukova. Aleksandra ce sccretary consumer goods. family 57
·Dobrynin. Anatoly ee secretary Foreign atfairs (lD dept) 66
Dolgikh. Vladimir see above
Ligachev. Egor see above
·Medvedev, Vadim ee secretary, Ruling CPs 57
Head CC dept.
Relations with
ruling eommunist
Parties
Nikonov. Viktor CC secretary Agriculture 57
·Razumovsky, Georgy CC secretary, Party cadres 50
Head ce dept.
Organisational Party
work
*Yakovlev, Aleksandr ec secretary, Propaganda, Media 62
Hcad, ce dept.
Propaganda
Zaikov. Lcv see above
Zimyanin, Mikhail CC secretary Culture and propaganda 72

·New appointment XXVII Party Congress.

Average age of the CC Secretariat is 60 years.
30 Gorbachevas Leader

area. The percentage under Brezhnev was almost 70, so the pre-1964
situation has reasserted itself. Outside the RSFSR the proportion of
'newcomers' is much higher, most notably in Uzbekistan.
The Moscow Party apparatus, once the springboard for a successful
career, has fared very poorly under Gorbachev. This is largely due to the
legacy ofViktor Grishin and the determination ofBoris Eltsin to restore
discipline. Moscow's loss has been the provincials' gain. They have
provided eleven of the new obkom first secretaries and many of the new
members of the USSR Council of Ministers (Gustafson and Mann,
1986: p. 9). This is evidence of the increasing significance of industry in
Leningrad, the Urals and Siberia, but it is a11 part of a trend which began
under Andropov to break up the Party and government coteries which
had formed in the capital. Gorbachev appears to have taken the view
that his grand strategy to revive the Soviet economy and society can only
succeed ifnew men are brought to Moscow to implement those ideas. In
some ways he is reminiscent of Khrushchev, who set out to undermine
the powerful Moscow government ministries by upgrading the Party
apparatus, his own power base. He succeeded in the short term.
Gorbachev is undermining the Moscow Party and governmental
apparatuses by bringing in provincials. He may succeed where Khrush-
chev failed. A point in his favour is that practica11y a11 the new
appointees are older than he iso Technical competence is a key factor in
their selection and expertise can be measured tangibly whereas it is very
difficult to assess the achievements of those engaged in purely Party
work. This will afford Gorbacheva lever if economic results are not up
to expectations.
The first wave of new appointments is over and as time passes
Gorbachev will find it increasingly difficult to remove incumbent
officials. He has been remarkably successful so far, but circumstances
were in his favour. He ca me to power at a time when many officials were
over or near retirement age; the performance of the economy was so
poor as to demand remedial action; and the fact that a Party Congress
was due a year after he took office permitted hirn to restructure that
body. Had Chernenko lived longer, Grishin might have succeeded hirn
or had Gorbachev come to power after the Party Congress he would
have had to live with a Brezhnev-Chernenko Central Committee for
four years since the CC is only elected once every five years.

(i) Economic, Social and Foreign Policy Changes

At the Party Congress Gorbachev took pride in the fact that the Soviet
 Martin Ml'Cauley 31

Union is a superpower but will it still be one in the year 2000? Only ifthe
scientific-technical revolution accelerates and labour productivity leaps
ahead. The Secretary-General was certain that the USSR could succeed,
but nothing could be taken for gran ted, not even the political stability of
th~ country. Such an admission may have been designed to shock the
delegates and the nation at large, but Gorbachev was serious about
perceiving fundamental weaknesses in the way the CPSU ran its and the
nation's affairs.Economic growth had declined to a level wh ich posed a
threat to the coun.ty's position in the world, its defence and social
stability. Since the legitimacy or authority of the CPSU was contingent,
to a considerable degree, on economic growth, the Party was in danger
of losing authority.
Why had economic performance declined? Gorbachev appears to
believe that the key reason was a drop in discipline, order and morality.
This in turn had permitted corruption, privilege, 'breaches of the law,
bureaucratism, parasitism, drunkenness, prodigality, waste and other
negative phenomena' to run rampant (Pravda, 18 May 1985). Eliminate
these abuses and growth rates would climb again. Gorbachev's target
was an annual increase in national income of at least 4 per cent. But that
was only part of the equation. An 'acceleration of scientific-technical
progress' was also needed. Innovation in industry and agriculture had
correspondingly to be afforded priority. This was going to be very
difficult to achieve since Soviet-type centrally planned economies are
notoriously innovative-shy. Past experience has revealed that managers
caught in the vice ofplan targets or innovation choose the former. Here
is a source of tension in Gorbachev's economic strategy.
Another source of tension is his insistence on consumer welfare, that
housing, food supplies and consumer goods output should grow. At the
same time investment in machine-building and electronics is to rise in
order to provide the industrial equipment needed to re-equip the Soviet
economy.
The race for growth in the past has engendered considerable social
differentiation but this has now reached a level which threatens political
stability. Gorbachev appears to perceive that two nations have come
into being in the Soviet Union. One enjoys privilege, access to desirable
housing, consumer goods, education and all the trappings of the good
life. The ethos of this group is self-betterment and self-enrichment.
Members of this nation include Party and government officials,
enterprise personnel who steal time and products so as to trade them for
other desirables, black-marketeers, workers who are paid bonuses but
do not earn them, and so on. The second nation is made up ofthose who
32 Gorbachevas Leader

enjoy none of the above privileges or advantages and have to end ure
poor housing, food, consumer goods and generally a poor quality oflife.
They sow but they do not reap. Often the product of their labour is
misappropriated by the first nation. Gorbachev views the first nation as
parasitical and only concemed with self at the expense of the commun-
ity. A major reason for the decline ofthe first, or socialist economy, was
the growth of the second, unofficial, economy.
At the Party Congress Gorbachev put the matter quite starkly during
his concluding remarks: 'All revolutionary parties which have hitherto
perished, have done so because they became too self-assured and failed
to perceive the source of their strength and were afraid to speak out
about their weaknesses. But we shall not go under since we are not afraid
to discuss our weaknesses and willleam to overcome them' (Pravda, 6
Mar 1986). What are the weaknesses which the Party must leam to
overcome? Gorbachev gave a long list of them during his opening speech
and other delegates were encouraged to do Iikewise. They had to be
overcome to ensure social justice, an expression used at least nine times
by the Secretary-General during his speech (Frank, 1986: p. 93). What
does social justice entail?

Equal rights to labour and its rewards, to education, medical care and social
security.... Socialist society maintains the unity of the rights and duties of
citizens, the equality of each person before the law and of law for all, a single
discipline, a single morality, and respect for the dignity of the person,
irrespective of social position or nationality.
The social achievements of the land of the Soviets are one of the c\earest
advantages ofthe new social order, of the Soviet way oflife. They comprise an
important factor in the political stability of society (Pravda, 11 Dec 1984).

Hence there can be no political stability without social justice.

The campaign against everything wh ich contravened the norms of
social justice was waged on a broad front and one of the highlights was
an artic1e in Pravda on 13 February 1986. Entitled 'Cleansing' it carried
readers' letters. One called for a periodic cleansing ofthe Party to rid it of
undesirables. Another attacked the 'special buffets, special shops,
special hospitals and so on' wh ich Soviet leaders enjoyed. This
intensified social inequality, it was c1aimed. Since those who 'enjoyed
special benefits' would hardly give them up voluntarily, a law was
needed to abolish them.
At the Party Congress Gorbachev was quite explicit about relation-
ships: 'Striet observance in Iife of the principle of social justice is an
important prerequisite for the unity of the people, for the political
 Martin McCauley 33

stability and dynamic development of society' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986).

Two other speakers at the congress touched on this theme, Boris
Eltsin and Egor Ligachev. Eltsin was scathing about the failures of the
Moscow Party and said: 'We must not demagnetise the continuity of
political stability in the country. How many times can we allow the same
mistakes to be repeated, without drawing the lessons of history?'
(Pravda, 27 Feb 1986.) Ligachev was less radical in his comments than
Eltsin and criticised Pravda for going too far. This was highly unusual
since the Party newspaper is normally beyond criticism. Again, however,
the 'second' secretary did perceive a link between political stability and
social justice: 'One must remember that the political stability of Soviet
society, the progress of our country, to a large extent depends precisely
upon the Party having a correct social policy.' (Pravda, 28 Feb 1986).
Hence Gorbachev, Eltsin and Ligachev broadly argued that political
stability is engendered by social justice. However, Ligachev revealed
that he is much more conservative that Eltsin when it comes to openness
(glasnost). Cutting down on privileged access to housing and consumer
goods by Party and government officials is a very contentious issue.
Another contentious issue is Gorbachev's desire to see an end to
'unearned' income. He would like to restriet income to labour performed
in the first economy, but at the Congress he advocated that enterprises
be permitted to seil off above plan output and unused materials and
equipment, that co-operative and private house construction be
promoted and that individuals be permiued to provide consumer
services. But during his speech he contrasted the virtues of collectivism
to the evils of individualism. He is not against inequality of income
providing it is earned by a collective.
In order to revitalise the first economy a 'radical reform' is necessary.
Gorbachev usually avoids the word 'reform' since it has negative
connotations, mainly acquired during the Khrushchev era. He only used
it once during his congress speech but added that it had to be more than
mere tinkering with the planning mechanism.'Just over a month later in
Tolyatti he stated: 'Can an economy which runs into trillions ofroubles
be run from Moscow? This is absurd, comrades. By the way, this - the fact
that we have tried to manage everything from Moscow until quite
recently - constitutes our common or main mi stake' (Pravda, 9 Apr
1986). There is overt and covert opposition to economic reform.
Gorbachev conceded at the congress that 'unfortunately. . . any change
in the economic mechanism is seen as almost a retreat from the principles
of socialism'. The present centrally planned economy has been in place
for about sixty years and has spawned a very large body of officials
34 Gorbachevas Leader

whose primary function is to intervene and interfere in the production

process. Many reforms in the past have been vitiated by ministries
ignoring provisions in the reforms favouring an increase in enterprise
autonomy. The top leadership is dearly divided over economic reform
with Ligachev appearing to have most reservations.
Gorbachev seizes every opportunity to drive horne the message that
the administration is too large and cumbersome. 'Since the Party
Congress the speed of the adoption of new methods of economic
management has been slowed down, to no small degree, by the size and
ineffectiveness of the administration' (Pravda, 17 June 1986). He
lamented the fact that 'some republics, in seeking to copy the same
structure of administration which prevails at the centre, have proposed
to the USSR Council of Ministers the creation of new ministries and
authorities' (Pravda, 17 June 1986). Clearly Gorbachev is faced with an
uphill task!

(ii) Foreign Policy

The relationship between domestic and foreign policy is now very dose.
as an increase in international tension or sudden jump in military
expenditure would have a negative effect on Gorbachev's efforts to
revitalise the civilian economy and boost consumer welfare. To this end
Gorbachev has maintained a very high profile in foreign policy and has
launched initiative after initiative on arms control. He has sought to
capture the high ground of moral authority and to present the Soviet
Union as a reasonable, reliable, dependable, predictable world power
whose goal is peace and to portray the USA as the exact opposite. At the
congress, however, he stated that 'one must not in world politics restrict
oneself to relations with just one country alone, even if it is a very
important one' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986). He may favour a multi-polar
foreign policy, placing greater emphasis on Western Europe, Japan and
moderate Third World states, for instance. His high profile in foreign
policy enhances his authority at horne and the standing of the Soviet
Union in the international community.

(iii) Ideology

All Soviet leaders have attempted to place their stamp on Marxism-

Leninism and to develop the ideology. Lenin was the founding father;
Stalin ensured the victory of socialism and introduced many innova-
tions; Khrushchev evolved the concept of the state of the whole people
 Martin McCauley 35

and the advance to communism; and Brezhnev is associated with

developed, mature or real socialism. Andropov began to innovate but
Chernenko had no opportunity to introduce changes before he departed
the scene. What will Gorbachev do? He gives the impression of being
basically conservative, of being a politician rat her than an intellectual,
but who is impatient with received wisdom and outmoded practices.
Brezhnev, on many occasions, complained that ideology was boring
and called for life to be injected into it. Just as the doctors could not
revitalise hirn so the propagandists failed to revitalise Marxism-Lenin-
ism. Tbe present socialist phase of Soviet development will remain for
quite some time so Gorbachev could introduce the concept of advanced
socialism which would be more efficient than developed socialism or
even the socialism of the pre-communist era.

(iv) Cult o( the PersonaBty

The cult of Gorbachev's personality is weil under way. Despite the fact
that he instructs newspaper editors to quote Lenin instead ofhim and at
the Party Congress he rebuked one delegate for excessive use ofhis name
('Stop declining Mikhail Sergeevich') a distinctive style is emerging. He
looks, acts and speaks like aleader and after the geriatrics who headed
the Party between the late 1970s and 1985 this is a welcome change for
most of the Soviet population. Soviet leaders are expected to display
gravitas and avoid being nekulturnyi. Speaking in Leningrad, a symbolic
setting, Gorbachev spelled out what he believes the Soviet people look
for in aleader: 'People love leaders who are strict, organised and
demanding, who show concern, who reveal, by personal ex am pie, a
conscientious attitude to state affairs. And they always support such
leaders' (Pravda, 18 May 1986).
The respect which was lacking before 1985 has returned as the Soviet
people take pride from the fact that their leader is cutting a fine figure on
the international stage. Gorbachev's leadership style is democratic
rather than authoritarian as he attempts to convince by argument and
personal contact. He has espoused some of the populism of Khrushchev.

1.3 CONCLUSION

No Soviet leader in his first year of office has presided over such
sweeping changes in the composition of the highest Party and state
organs as Mikhail Gorbachev (Brown, 1986: p. 1048). Only six of the
36 Gorbachevas Leader

twenty-six members of the top leadership hold the same rank and
responsibilities they held when Gorbachev took over. Of these six,
Kunaev and Schcherbitsky cannot be considered secure. A whole new
team have taken over, but changes at the top have been more rapid than
at middle level in Party and state. This makes it easier to engage in policy
innovations, but more difticult to implement those policies. Gorbachev
will continue to sweep away all those left over from the Brezhnev era and
the 'instability of cadres' will continue. However, once in place the
'stability of cadres' will reassert itself.
Gorbachev can point to success in personnel policy, but there have
been no fundamental changes in the way industry or agriculture is run,
as yet. There are divided counsels at the top. Ligachev is cautious and
Ryzhkov is slow at revealing his hand and appears to be concerned to
expand the power of the government vis-a-vis the CC Secretariat.
In the Party Rules, passed at the Congress, Gorbachev did not get his
own way over limiting the period of office of Party officials. However
some changes were agreed. A quorum is specified for the first time for
Party conferences and congresses (rule 22). Applicants up to the age of
25 (instead of 23 as previously) must join the Party through the
Komsomol. Rule 12 states that Party members must bear a dual
responsibility vis-a-vis the state and the Party for violations of the law.
This ends the immunity under wh ich Party members could in practice be
prosecuted for criminal offences only after being expelled from the Party
(White, 1986). Primary Party organisations are to be elected for two or
three years, not one year as at present, and are required to keep members
regularly informed of their activities.
Gorbachev has amassed more power and authority in his first year in
office than any other Soviet leader since Lenin. However there are many
tensions evident between, for example, promoting enterprise autonomy
and streamlining the central planning system; economic growth and
innovation; affording local soviets more autonomy and revitalising the
state and the economy from the centre; increasing individual initiative
and the new stress on collectivism; increasing incentives and eliminating
'private' enrichment; more services to be provided by individuals and
attacks on 'petty-bourgeois psychology'; greater criticism from below
and innovation from the top; more discipline and order and more
criticism and initiative; stress on moral rather than material incentives,
and so on. One can say that Gorbachev thinks dialectically and as a
Marxist-Leninist he sees the solution of the above dilemmas as a
merging ofwhat is positive in both. However the non-Marxist would see
Gorbachev eventually having to choose between the sources oftension.
 Martin McCauley 37

Dialectical thinking may be splendid in theory, but in the real world hard
choices have to be made.
Gorbachev has made an auspicious beginning, but the difficult times
are only just beginning.
2 State and Ideology
RONALD J. HILL

Gorbachev came to power at a time when weaknesses in the Soviet state

institutions, identified for several decades but not successfully tackled,
needed urgent attention if their effectiveness in solving the country's
complex problems were to be raised. It was also a time when, to a
considerable extent, the Soviet leadership's room for manoeuvre on the
ideological front was more restricted than it had been for some years. It
required some ingenuity on the part ofGorbachev's ideological advisers
to establish an appropriate watchword for his administration.
The constraint in Gorbachev's position applied particularly to those
elements in the ideology that identified the current location of Soviet
societyon the road towards communism and the role of the state in the
immediate future. Almost all his predecessors - Konstantin Chernenko
being the exception - had been able to make innovative ideological
statements: Gorbachev, however came to power when new concepts
introduced in the previous quarter of a century had recently been
confirmed as applying not only immediately, but for a considerable
period; moreover, the ideological statements concerning the state had
been enshrined in a basic document, the USSR Constitution, less than
eight years previously - a constitution that, unlike the very much altered
document it replaced, is ostensibly less open to easy amendment. There
was, however, some opportunity offered by the drafting of the new
edition of the third Party Programme, adopted in a mood of ebullient
optimism in 1961 under Nikita Khrushchev, and sent for revision to the
XXVI CPSU Congress in 1981; new Party Rules were also prepared for
the XXVII Congress.
The drafts of both of these basic Party documents were published in
November 1985.
As far as governing the country was concerned Gorbachev inherited a
system that had undergone many modifications over several decades,
but that had remained basically intact since it was designed in the 1930s.
There was perhaps a need and an opportunity to revise certain
38
 Ronald J. Hili 39

institutional arrangements: the division of responsibilities among

various ministries and state eommittees, for example, or more broadly
the ministerial strueture. But more especially there was a need to alter
certain relationships that had grown up among state organs, partieularly
those between ministries and the representative institutions, in order to
raise the effectiveness of the 'organs of popular power'. There was also
an urgent need to rejuvenate the apparatus by bringing in younger, more
dynamie offieals, and to root out the eomplaceney and eorruption that
had become endemie at all levels in the late Brezhnev years. Some ofthe
potential ehanges had implieations for the Communist Party itself,
especially in its relationship with the state; and, more widely, there was a
need to devise and establish an appropriate role for the CPSU in what
has become - thanks to its own policies - a very different society from
what existed half a eentury ago, or even a quarter of a eentury aga when
the last thorough revision ofthe Party Rules and Programme took plaee.
In addition, Gorbaehev faced the immediate task of seeuring and
consolidating his own position at the top of the politieal hierarehy,
simultaneously reinvigorating the stale administration.
All this adds up to a formidable Programme in its own right, quite
apart from the day-to-day task of devising poliey in several pressing
areas: seeurity and foreign affairs, the eeonomy and regional develop-
ment, demography and the nationality question, and social problems
sueh as aleoholism and delinqueney.

2.1 THE STATE IN SOVIET IDEOLOGY

The ideology ofMarxism-Leninism, with its theoretieal analysis ofthe

state and the politieal system of a societyengaged in building eommun-
ism, had undergone a distinet evolution since Marx and Engels
identified the state as 'essentially a maehine for keeping down the
oppressed, exploited class' (Engels, in Marx and Engels, 1969-71:
vol. 21, p. 167; see also Hili, 1984). Although the founding fathers had
put forward the idea of 'withering away' as the ultimate destiny of this
machine, Soviet leaders from Lenin onwards had devised elaborate
theoretical justifieations for its continuing existenee, while tending also
to demonstrate its steady development. On the basis of the Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, Lenin established the 'dietatorship of
the proletariat', in which the Bolshevik Party govemed through People's
Commissariats, linked by the Council of People's Commissars (Sov-
narkom), ehaired by Lenin himself. The nature of these institutions
40 State and Ideology

changed markedly in subsequent decades, and the revolutionary

terminology was abandoned by Stalin in the 1940s. The commissariats
were replaced by a formidable bureaucratic apparatus A r·.1inistries,
supported by a repressive apparatus of unparalleled effectiveness.
Khrushchev, in an anti-Stalin return to Leninist rhetoric (and to some
extent values), undermined the position ofthe central administration by
abolishing the Ministries and attempting to breathe life into the
moribund soviets, while elevating the Communist Party to the position
of central political institution. Brezhnev again reacted to his predeces-
sor's policies and practices, by reinstating the Ministries and promising
stability to the personnel in the apparatus, whose work he attempted to
professionalise, while also continuing attempts to make the represen-
tative institutions more effective; the Party's central role was enshrined
in Article 6 ofthe 1977 Constitution. In effect, policy in the thirty years
before Gorbachev's accession to power was aimed at strengthening the
state on all fronts.
Theoretical developments accompanied these policy changes. Stalin's
1936 Constitution (Article I) declared the Soviet Union to be a 'socialist
state of workers and peasants'. A quarter of a century later the Party's
XXII Congress in 1961 adoped a new Programme wh ich authoritatively
declared that ;t new phase had been entered, cumbersomely named the
'unfolding [or full-scale] building of communism', in wh ich the state was
'of the whole people'. This development was marked by the adoption of
a new constitution in October 1977, under Brezhnev's leadership; this
noted (Article I) that the USSR is a 'socialist state of the whole people,
expressing the will and interests of the workers, peasants and intelligent-
sia, the working people of all the nations and nationalities of the
country'. Khrushchev's terminology had already been abandoned, and
replaced by the more euphonious 'developed socialism' and 'mature
socialism', a conceptual innovation that was Brezhnev's most significant
contribution to ideology (see Evans, 1977, 1986). It emphasised the
Soviet people's achievement in transforming the country's economy and
social structure, and creating an advanced industrial economy, in which
the role of the state in management required enhancement, under the
benevolent guidance ofthe CPSU. As used in the political rhetoric ofthe
late Brezhnev years 'developed socialism' induced a complacent ten-
dency to look back and stress advance from (Stalinist) 'basic' socialism-
in contrast to the Khrushchevian concept which firmly placed the
emphasis on the imminence of communism.
Certain implications accompanied this ideological inheritance. First,
the concept of 'developed socialism' entered the political vocabulary
 Ronald J. H il/ 41

only relatively recently, wh ich might inhibit today's leaders in modifying

it (however, that did not stop Brezhnev swiftly abandoning the
'unfolding building of communism', even though it was incorporated in
the Party Programme). 'Developed socialism' has been much vaunted by
the politicalleaders and widely examined and elaborated in the scholarly
and Party literature. Moreover, unlike Khrushchev's concept,
'developed socialism' follows with apparent logic from the previous
phase, reflecting a natural process - the maturing of'socialism'. It would
be hard to argue that such a stage had already been superseded. Over
forty years elapsed between the adoption of the 1936 Constitution and
its successor: it is too soon to abandon it and replace it with a fresh
concept to reflect different values. Moreover, Gorbachev's two
predecessors, Andropov and Chernenko, had established the principle
that 'developed socialism' was to be a historically long period, only
recently entered by the Soviet Union. While that removes any pressure
to produce evidence of the approach of 'communism' it limits the
opportunity for conceptual innovation in this area. Nevertheless the
concept has lately undergone modification: there has been less emphasis
on material well-being and more on the moral principles ofthe 'socialist
way oflife' (Evans, 1986). That said, however, there was certainly a need
for Gorbachev to infuse new meaning into the concept, in order to lift
the country out of the slough of stagnation into which it had slipped, as
he hirnself indicated.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF 'ACCELERA TION'

It is now cxpressly acknowledged in the Soviet Union that ideology does

not providc answers to aB problems at all times and in aB places
(Sergecv, 1986). In his main report to the XXVII Congress Gorbachev
opcncd thc way for ideological development by averring the 'fidelity to
the Marxist Leninist doctrine lies in creatively developing it on the basis
of the experience that has been accumulated'; he also noted that
'scholasticism, doctrinairism and dogmatism have also been shackles
upon thc genuine addition to knowledge ... [Ieading] to stagnation of
thought .. .' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p.9). The theme of 'creative
development' was taken up in a lengthy artide in Pravda a week after the
dose of the Congress, which quoted liberaBy from Gorbachev's own
statements to argue that the strength of ideology lay not in its value as a
recipe book, but in its 'incessant crcative quest, its constant generalisa-
tion and dialectic interpretation of new facts and phenomena, and the
42 State and Ideology

experience of revolutionary struggle and social transformations' (Ser-

geev, 1986; many ofthe ideas contained in Gorbachev's own speeches
appeared in the utterances of Yury Andropov, notably his important
article in Kommunist, 1983). The author suggested that the concept of
'socio-economic acceleration' - the watchword ofthe Gorbachev era to
date - is the 'greatest attainment of creative Marxism-Leninism'.
This notion - acceleration - is being presented as Gorbachev's major
ideological contribution, hailed as a 'scientific' response to the question
of what should be done ('Krupneishee dostizhenie, I', 1986: p. 2),
although when first used by Gorbachev, at the Central Committee
Plenum of April 1985, it was given no particular prominence: indeed, he
declared that the 'main slogans of the moment, which should keynote
our meetings in the run-up to the Congress and all preparations for the
XXVII Party Congress, are creative work, the unity of word and deed,
initiative and responsibility, and exactingness to oneself and to one's
comrades' (Pravda, 24 Apr 1985: p.2). In subsequent elaboration,
however, including the phraseology of the new version of the Party
Programme, the concept has been identified as comprising elements in
the economic, social, political and cultural spheres, and depending very
heavily on enhancement of the 'human factor' in society's affairs.
There has been, moreover, acknowledgement that ideological
developments are made partly in reaction to errors in earlier interpreta-
tion. The second of aseries of editorial articles in the Party's theoretical
journal Kommunist, under the title 'A Major Accomplishment of
Modern Marxist-Leninist Thought', in May 1986 contained the
following statement:
If the thesis of developed socialism appeared as areaction to the mistaken
position regarding the transfer of the tasks of the unfolding building of
communism on to the plane of direct practical actions, if ... this thesis gained
currency among us as areaction to a simplistic conception ofthe ways and the
time scale of resolving the tasks of attaining the higher phase of communism,
subsequently the emphasis in the treatment of developed socialism gradually
shifted. Frequently it ca me down to simply stating successes, while many
urgent problems connected with the transition of the economy to the track of
intensification, the raising of labour productivity, improving supplies to the
population, and e\iminating negative phenomena were denied the requisite
attention. Some authors, without taking the dialectics of our development
i~to account, interpreted developed socialism as developed all round, which
d.d not correspond to reality, and this served willy-nilly as a kind of
justification for tardiness in resolving urgent tasks, a justification for
redundant tendencies and a lowering of growth rates ('Krupneishee dostiz-
henie, 2', 1986: p.5).
 Ronald J. Hili 43

Tbe article quoted Gorbachev's statement to the October 1985 Central

Committee Plenum, at which he distinguished between socialism and
communism, drawing no clear dividing-line between them, but asserting
that socialism as such is not a distinct socio-economic formation, but a
stage on the way to communism; the development from socialism to
communism must proceed at its own appropriate pace - neither
asserting communist principles before the material and spiritual
maturity of society could sustain them (an attack on Khrushchev's over-
optimism), nor retarding the resolution of urgent tasks (an attack on
Brezhnev's complacency). The theoretical problem ofthe present is not
to establish wh at had been attained, but rather to substantiate the ways
and methods of accelerating socio-economic progress. Acceleration, the
author went on to suggest, is not simply areaction to the difficulties that
had arisen by the early 1980s, but an 'objective attribute of socialist
society' ('Krupneishee dostizhenie, 2', 1986: pp. 5-6). Such formula-
tions clearly have the potential for the identification within Gorbachev's
period in office of another stage on the road to communism, possibly
called 'all-round developed socialism' (vsestoronne razvitoi sotsializm).
There may be other names for a stage beyond 'developed socialism',
however. In the mid-1970s it was explicitly noted that the two terms were
used as synonyms (Babii et al., 1976: p.9, n.3). Condemning that
tendency Professor M. Rutkevich (1985) attempted to draw distinctions
between these two concepts, arguing that developed socialist society,
quite apart from its well-known economic difficuIties, exhibited certain
forms of anti-social behaviour (such as alcohol abuse, bribery and
profiteering) which were certainly not signs of maturity. Hence, even
though it is clearly understood that the Soviet Union is at the beginning
of this long stage of development, 'acceleration' may have the desired
effect of raising 'developed socialist society' to 'mature socialism', a
phrase that sounds far better than 'all-round developed socialism'.
A second implication following from this ideological development
retates to the state: the 'all-people's state' is to remain in existence
indefinitely. This implies that Gorbachev has astate apparatus through
wh ich to administer the increasingly complex Soviet society and
economy: there is no call to hasten its 'withering away' by tinkering with
structures and transferring functions in the Khrushchev fashion. But it is
equally clear that the state structures have found it more and more
difficult to perform their functions adequately, for a variety ofreasons,
some of which have long been recognised, others of which have only
recently been understood. Within an established basic ideological
44 State and Ideology

framework, there are both opportunities and a need for practical

adjustments.
Indeed, Gorbachev made plain in his report to the Party Congress
that Soviet political development was to be within the framework of
Soviet statehood, not outside it, and he employed the concept of
'socialist self-administration' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p.7). This is
distinguished from communist self-administration (which will sup-
posedly take place following the withering away ofthe state) by the very
fact that 'it is realised in conditions ofmaintaining and strengthening the
state, whose role under socialism not only does not diminish but on the
contrary increases'. The application of the concept of 'socialist self-
administration' is an innovation, identified as a 'serious contribution to
Marxist-Leninist theory and to an understanding of the ways of
development ofthe socialist political system' ('Krupneishee dostizhenie,
3', 1986: p. 13).
Yet Gorbachev cannot completely lose sight of the long-term goal of
transferring administrative functions from state institutions to the
people as a whole. He was reminded of this point in an article by
Professor Georgy Barabashev (1986: p. 11), who asserted that the
'development of the soviets is moving in the direction of further
strengthening the unity of state power and popular self-administration,
of socialist statehood and democracy, thereby creating the precondi-
tions for the future social self-administration in communist society'. In
the Central Committee's 'political report' to the Party Congress,
Gorbachev recognised this need in the statement that 'in socialist society
. .. government should not be the privilege of a narrow circle of
professionals' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p. 7). Ther may be no immediate
need to show progress towards communism, but the ultimate goal,
central to the aspirations of all Marxists, must not be overlooked; and,
as Barabashev argues, it has implications for present policy towards the
soviets.

2.3 PROMOTING THE SOVIETS

As already noted, since the mid-1950s the central authorities have

attempted to develop the role of the representative institutions, the
soviets. A stream of new legislation, at the all-Union, republican and
local levels, has extended the formal rights of the soviets within their
territory; efforts have been made to recruit representatives of a higher
calibre; and studies of the effectiveness of the local soviets and their
 Ronald J. Hili 45

deputies, supported by public opinion surveys regarding the work ofthe

soviets and administration, have pinpointed weaknesses and suggested
possible remedies (for a fuller account see Hill, 1983).
The tangible results have been modest, however, and Gorbachev is
obviously aware of this. Only a few days before he attained the pinnacle
of power in the Soviet system the journal Sovety narodnykh deputatov
reported research that revealed low public esteem for the 'organs of state
authority' in their localities, with respondents admitting little active
interest in their work (Maslennikov, 1985). The article repeats a theme
common to the Brezhnev era: the population's low level of political
cultural development is a major cause of the unsatisfactory levels of
involvement (p. 22); but it also reveals a low level of political efficacy,
caused by the local authorities' failure to facilitate etfective participa-
tion. As the author concludes (p. 23), the focus of attention should now
shift to the effectiveness (effektivnost) of the administrative apparatus,
instead of concentrating on numerical indicators: 'The democratisation
of administration is the main-line direction of development of the whole
political system of Soviet society and a necessary condition for
improving the work of the soviets'.
Such sentiments have long been expressed, both by leading experts
and by politicians, including Gorbachev's immediate predecessor. At a
Central Committee Plenum on 10 April 1984, Chernenko roundly
criticised a variety of long-established weaknesses in the functioning of
the state institutions. The plenum adopted a statement urging the need
for further improving the work of the soviets, and Chernenko made
similar points in his speech to the newly convened USSR Supreme Soviet
on the following day ('Postanovlenie', 1984; Chernenko, I 984b).
During 1985, after Gorbachev's election to the supreme Party post,
scholarly artic\es reinforced the perception that there was a need to
enhance the functioning ofthe state institutions, both the representative
institutions ('organs of state authority' or state power) and the
administrative apparatus ('organs of state administration'), with a
significant shift in the relationship between these two sets of organs. As
one such scholar, Piskotin, expressed it, there is scope for both
rationalisation of the bureaucracy (meaning an extension of Brezhnev's
policy of introducing greater professionalism) and its democratisation,
essentially hy devcloping the role of the soviets as representative
watchdogs on hehalf of the public (Piskotin, 1985: p.22).
Piskotin and other writers have produced a long catalogue of
identified weaknesses that inhibit the soviets and their deputies in
pcrforming their constitutional role (see, for example, Sliva, 1985;
46 State and Ideology

Balandin, 1985). And in a speech before a session of the Gorky oblast

soviet, held jointly with Party activists on 13 November 1985, President
Andrei Gromyko declared: 'I want to stress in particular, we are talking
not simply about boosting the soviets' activity, but of a qualitative
turnabout in the content and style of their work, of strengthening
publicity, developing initiative, creativity, and in many respects
innovativeness' (Gromyko, 1985: p. 8). There is certainly much scope for
development, and nowhere more evidently than in inducing the
soviets to make wider use ofthe powers with which recent legislation has
endowed them. This point is repeatedly made by scholars and
politicians, and its very frequency indicates how serious the problem is
(and how ineffectively it has been tackled, despite all the rhetoric). In
addressing this theme at the Party Congress Gorbachev complained of
excessive centralisation, wh ich limited the ability of soviets to tackle
local questions of housing, education, health care, consumer goods,
trade and services, transport and environmental protection - all matters
of direct immediate concern to Soviet citizens (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986:
p.7).
A key element in the problem is the enormous power that has accrued
to Ministries and their apparatus, beginning in Stalin's day, sometimes
inspired by the needs of the economy. A well-attested example concerns
the housing issue - specifically its ownership and control - which lies
symbolically at the heart of the relationship between the economic
Ministries and the local 'organs of state power' that are legally charged
with directing and co-ordinating the development of their respective
territories. In order to attract and retain workers in a labour-scarce
employment market, industrial enterprises, owned by central Ministries,
have found it expedient to build housing for their workers. However,
this has prevented the local administration from developing a general
housing policy, and even ensuring that acceptable housing standards are
maintained. Attempts to persuade the enterprises to hand over their
housing stock to local control have been largely unsuccessful. Similarly,
different industrial plants are expanded on the basis of an industry-wide
rationale, with Iittle or no concern for the impact on local conditions,
frustrating local government attempts to co-ordinate industrial, residen-
tiaI, recreational, educational and other forms of supportive develop-
ment. Such difficulties, long recognised in the West and acknowledged
in the Soviet Union, continue to undermine both the local state
administration, and even more so the local soviets, which supposedly act
to represent the people's interests (see Taubman, 1973; Morton, 1983).
There has been an improvement in the quality of citizens selected to
 Ronald J. Hili 47

serve as deputies (Jacobs, 1983: pp. 78-94); yet it is equally clear that
they still do not, in many cases, command the respect and support of
those they ostensibly represent. These feel that their deputy has been
thrust upon them via a selection process in wh ich the 'discussion' of
candidates' merits turns into a mere show or 'parade' (Barabashev, 1986:
p. 15). Once elected their performance leaves much to be desired. The
'debates' are stereotyped, 'dry and over-edited', mainly because they are
dominated by the members of the apparat, a point made fifteen years aga
by A. A. Bezuglov and others and repeated in 1985, when some 30 per
cent of deputies in one survey never contributed to the debates
(Bezuglov, 1971: pp. 57-9; Balandin, 1985: pp. 18-19). Similarly,
experiments with different ways of organising the discussion, to enable
more deputies to speak, already devised and tried in the 1960s, are still
regarded as novel twenty years later (see Hili, 1977, pp. 99-100;
Balandin, 1985: p. 19; Barabashev, 1986: p. 13). The formal 'decisions'
are vague and expressed in such general terms that it is virtually
impossible to check their implementation (Piskotin, 1985: p. 26; Sliva,
1985: p. 2 I). In any case deputies still lack the confidence and the
oratorical skills to present their case effectively (Chernenko, 1984a:
p. I). In short, too much in the work of the soviets continues in the old
way through what Barabashev (1986: p. 15) calls the 'inertia of habit'.
Given these circumstances - essentially the failure to break away from
the Stalinist way of doing things - it is not surprising that the Soviets of
People's Deputies have failed to have a significant impact on govern-
ment in their localities. Even elementary technical obstacles hinder their
effective development, such as the absence of proper roads Iinking state
and collective farms with the administrative centre, which reflects the
soviets' inability to direct resources into vitally necessary elements in the
infrastructure, and is a factor that inhibits the effectiveness of local
government (Gromyko, 1985: p. 14). EIsewhere co pies of basic legisla-
tion were simply not available for deputies' use in many localities ('Gde
vzyat', 1985); some legislation is imprecise(Sliva, 1985: p.20). Not
surprisingly, blatant illegalities occur in local administration, and
Gromyko has pointed out the need to raise the 'legal culture' of the
population, particularly of officials (Gromyko, 1985: p. 15; Chernenko,
I984a: p. I; see also the works cited in Hili, 1983: pp. 30- 2).
But such statements - including identification of the very same
weaknesses - are by no means new: they recall scholarly studies and
official statements from the 1950s and I 960s (some ofthe literature was
surveyed in Hili, 1980: chs 3-4; also Hili, 1983); so perhaps Soviet
citizens and the outside world may justifiably express scepticism about
48 State and Ideology

the leaders' intentions. The failure to take effective steps following

criticisms is a well-known, entrenched feature of Soviet politics, and in
this case it may reflect real ambivalence: adesire, perhaps genuine, to
give power to the people through their representatives, at the expense of
the administrators, which exists alongside a need to administer the
society as competently as is practicable. Khrushchev emphasised the
former goal, while Brezhnev stressed the latter.
The dilemma was weil expressed almost two decades aga in an artic\e
in Pravda by V. M. Chkhikvadze (1968). Given the technical complexity
of modern government in an advanced society, he asked, how can
effective (meaning professionally competent and efficient) administra-
tion be combined with the 'necessity of furt her developing democracy,
with widening mass participation in government, with raising the level of
activity of the e1ectors, the deputies and the broad masses', at a time
when 'many questions of government are practically within the power
only of specialists'. The author might also have considered that the
'amateur' politicalleader is also at a disadvantage in the modern setting:
few possess the technical competence to evaluate the safety margins of
nuclear power stations, for example. The danger ofthe development of a
'scholocracy' or 'academocracy' has been noted in this connection - and
rejected as impossible in the Soviet context (G. Shakhnazarov, in
Kerimov, 1979: p. 171: the Russian word was uchenokratiya).
This raises the quest ion of the administration's competence, another
source of concern. As arecent editorial in Kommunist put it: 'In present-
day conditions ever more professionalism is demanded in government,
and the role of the organisational and technical factors of managerial
activity is growing' ('Krupneishee dostizhenie, 3', 1986: p. 14).

2.4 PROFESSIONALISING THE ADMINISTRATION

The problems of integrating competent technical advice into decision-

making, and more broadly raising the effectiveness and efficiency of the
government apparatus, were given much emphasis under the leadership
ofLeonid Brezhnev. The problems remain, however, for the Gorbachev
generation to tackle afresh. There are several dimensions, each ofwhich
has been discussed in the Soviet specialist journals, and some in the
popular press.
The first is the sheer scale of the bureaucracy, partly related to the
administrative methods inherited from the past: the so-called 'office'
(kantselyarskii or kabinetnyz) managerial style, which involves the
 Ronald J. Hili 49

holding of countless meetings and the creation of a torrential ftow of

paper from office to office. That method requires large numbers of
extremely 'busy' pen-pushing clerks, who in practice achieve practically
nothing. At the Central Committee Plenum of April 1984 Chemenko
(1984a: p. I) referred to the 'problem of reducing the administrative
apparatus', adding that this applied at all levels, including the top. It was
also a target of Gorbachev's criticism one year later, specifically
referring to the Party, although the same criticism could equally be
levelled at the state apparatus (Gorbachev, 1985c: p. 14), In a revealing
passage he implied a drastic change in the way the country was ron:

The time has come to set about perfecting the organisational structures of
administration, to abolish superftuous links, to simplify the apparatus, and to
raise its efficiency. It is also necessary to do this because some links in the
administration have tumed into an obstac1e, have begun to act as a brake on
our movement. There must be a sharp reduction in the number of
instructions, regulations and systems of management which at times, by
construing Party and govemment decisions in a self-willed manner, constrain
the independence of enterprises' (Gorbachev, 1985c: p.9)

He had earlier spoken ofbeginning the 'practical reconstruction ofwork

in the upper echelons of economic management' (p.9). Gorbachev
c1early seems to recognise a need for a clean sweep in the country's
administration, something leamt at first hand from his own experience
in the provinces and then in the central Party administration, with
responsibility for agriculture and later the economy more broadly.
New thinking is obviously needed in this area. Neither the peremptory
abolition of the central Ministries, nor the guaranteeing of tenure to
raise the morale of the apparatchiki, has solved the problem of
inadequate administration. Khrushchev's constant institutional reor-
ganisations prevented a sustained approach to management, while
severely undermining morale; Brezhnev's alternative approach led to
complacency, to a tendency to grow used to inadequacies, and to stop
seeing new ideas, as Gorbachev noted. In this connection another writer
refers to a need not to be afraid of promoting inexperienced persons,
provided they have the appropriate knowledge and skills (Piskotin,
1985: pp. 25-6) - a specific interpretation ofthe general exhortation to
promote more 'young workers with prospects' (Gorbachev, 1985c: p. 13).
This is, indeed, part of the Party's much-vaunted 'personnel policy',
which aims to root out from the practice of personnel selection such
identified evils as 'favouritism' (protektsionizm), nationalism (zemlya-
cheslvo), nepotism land] personal devotion', such as were identified in
various Party organisations in recent years (Piskotin, 1985: p. 25). In the
50 State and Ideology

case of the Krasnodar kraikom, the first secretary, S. F. Medunov, was

eventually relieved ofhis post and expelled from the Central Committee
and the Party (see White, 1985: p. 122). A further attack on corruption in
Uzbekistan occurred in late January-early February 1986 on the
occasion of the Party Congress in that republic (see Pravda, 2 Feb 1986).
It has been argued that greater openness and publicity in the process of
leadership appointments, inc\uding the wider use of public competition
for posts, would be an effective way of tackling this problem (Piskotin,
1985: pp. 24-5; see also the sources cited in Hili, 1980: p.78).
The well-known problems have been taken up by Gorbachev with
forthrightness and vigour, suggesting that he means business. However,
a measure of scepticism may be in order, since such utterances have
featured in the political rhetoric for a generation - witness a Central
Committee statement of 1967 concerning cadre appointments in
Estonia: this noted 'haste and unscrupulousness' in selection, which led
to the appointment of'poorly prepared workers lacking in initiative, and
weak organisers, in consequence ofwhich there is a significant turnover
of cadres'; the Estonian Komsomol had been staffed occasionally with
'incapable and even chance' individuals, persons who were no doubt
subsequently promoted to responsible administrative positions ('0
rabote', 1972: p. 216). So the problem is certainly not new; neither is its
identification by the country's leaders. When Gorbachev used the Party
Congress to level criticism at former leaders in Uzbekistan, Moscow,
Kirgizia and e1sewhere, and dec\ared a 'determined and relentless war on
bureaucratic practices', he was echoing his predecessors. For all the
oratory, experience demonstrates that changing the functioning of the
system is immensely more difficult than replacing failed officials.
Apart from recruiting a new cohort of cadres, probably from a
younger generation, possessing the vision to identify other ways of
running the country and the energy to act appropriately (men and
women, perhaps, in the mould ofGorbachev himself), there is also scope
for strengthening the administration by building up links with special-
ists. Although no one, not even specialists, is insured against making
mistakes, observes Piskotin, 'it is important to e1ucidate the position of
various branches of science as regards a question requiring resolution,
and various approaches to it' (Piskotin, 1985: pp.21-2).
As already noted, Gorbachev has identified a need to restructure the
administration, which might be achieved by modifying the ministerial
system, by reducing the total number (63 in 1984, plus 19 state
committees) and creating super-Ministries or departments. There is
certainly scope for rationalisation, when several different Ministries can
 Ronald J. Hili 51

be responsible for administering one sector ofthe economy (see Pravda,

13 Apr 1984, for photographs of the ministers and state committee
chairmen appointed by the newly elected USSR Supreme Soviet). A
start was made in November 1985 with thecreation ofa 'super-Ministry'
(USSR Gosagroprom) to replace six bodies concerned with agricultural
management (Pravda, 23 Nov 1985). In Western commentary, this was
seen as the first stage in the abandonment of the highly specialised
ministries favoured by Brezhnev, in an effort to facilitate horizontal
links at the production level; paralle\s were drawn with Khrushchev's
abolition in 1957 of the central ministries and their replacement by
regionally-based councils of the national economy or sovnarkhozy (see
Dhombres, 1985). The inclusion of Murakhovsky, head of USSR
Gosagroprom, in the Politburo, to enhance his political status and
rationalise the policy-making process, would be a further positive
deve\opment. This kind of reform could possibly succeed by swift
action, before vested interests galvanised against it. The reorganisation
ofGosplan, the State Planning Committee, was also identified as ripe for
implementation, to permit it to concentrate on long-range planning and
strategic supervision, rather than devising detailed day-to-day man-
agement directives.
The new leader has been willing to speak his mind about these
problems, bringing a we\come breath of fresh air to the Soviet political
scene. He has also acted to root out the complacent and corrupt.
Following Andropov's example, he quickly began to remove the
incompetent and superannuated from positions of inftuence. The
veteran foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, noted for his dour visage,
was shunted to the powerless post of President and replaced bya suave,
smiling ally, Eduard Shervardnadze; the Prime Minister, Nikolai
Tikhonov, was persuaded to retire, at the age of80, in favour ofthe 57-
year-old former manager of the Uralmash engineering works, Nikolai
Ryzhkov; the retirement of the Moscow gorkom first secretary of
eighteen years' standing, Viktor Grishin, was arranged, again to benefit
a much younger man, Boris Eltsin, recently recruited to the central Party
secretariat (see Pravda, 3 July, 28 Sep and 25 Dec 1985; for an assessment
of the senior personnel changes introduced by Gorbachev in his first
year, see Hili and Frank, 1986). Similar important changes have taken
place at other levels in the administration.
However, the task ofrefashioning the Soviet Union's administration
is gargantuan, and there are several purposes to the exercise: cutting out
dead wood, raising economic performance, widening opportunities for
popular participation, and creating a greater sense of justice in society,
52 State and Ideology

for example. Some of these aims may appear threatening to personnel

whose co-operation is vital to success. In any case, structural modifica-
tions and personnel changes will probably be insufficient to solve the
fundamental problem. In fact, no matter how much energy and
imagination Gorbachev and his advisers bring to this restructuring, the
real need is to change the style of administration, which is not something
to be effected easily or quickly.

2.5 CHANGING THE STYLE OF ADMINISTRATION

A topic widely discussed in the professional press and in the speeches of

top politicians in recent years has been the need to change the style of
'leadership'. The essence of the problem was weIl expressed by A. G.
Velsh, project manager ofthe Urals industrial works Uralelektrotyazh-
mash: 'When any serious situation arises, ... top management prefers to
go by the old ways .... The main difficulties ... are neither organ-
izational nor technical, but purely psychological' (quoted in Cocks,
1980: p. 239). Paul Cocks observes: 'Over a span of more than 40 years,
certain traditions, mutual relations, and simple notions have developed
with respect to the duties and behavior of officials and subordinates.
Accordingly, a kind of "inertia by style" exists that makes it very
difficult to change anything.' In a major speech made two years before
his elevation to the top position, Gorbachev (1983) referred to the need
to improve the style and methods of Party and state leadership.
The word 'culture', with a range of qualifying adjectives (legal,
administrative, political, etc.) was fashionable in the la te 1970s, while
some spoke of developing a 'state service ethic' (HilI, 1980: p. 78, for
some examples; also Hili et al., 1981: p. 210). Brezhnev's speeches in his
last years repeatedly referred to the qualities required of 'leaders' under
deve\oped socialism: tact, responsiveness, professional competence and
similar laudable traits, to supplement (rather than replace) the
traditional demand for parriinosr or ideological reliability and Party
10yalty. In a speech to the Party Central Committee, Brezhnev (1979)
lambasted certain comrades in the foIlowing terms: 'No matter how
much you talk to them, no matter how much you appeal to their
conscience, their sense of duty and responsibility, nothing helps.' Yet,
for all his apparently earnest talk, nothing effective was done to
eradicate the problem.
It fell to Andropov to initiate serious measures against the corrupt
and complacent, a task left unfinished at his death and handed on to
 Ronald J. Hili 53

Gorbachev. He set out to replace the elderly and incompetent with

vigour, and he has been far more willing than his predecessors to use the
weapon of adverse publicity, by allowing the press to name the
incompetent: this is one element in his campaign to introduce more
openness (glasnost), identified as an essential component in any attempt
to democratise the administration (Piskotin, 1985: p. 24; the point was
made in identical terms by Andropov at the lune 1983 Central
Committee plenum: see Pravda, 16 lune 1983). Less than two weeks
before the opening of the Party Congress, an article based on readers'
letters appeared in Pravda, which revealed widespread discontent with
the abuse of office that had been prevalent under Brezhnev (Samolis,
1986: p.3), while speakers at the Congress, including Gorbachev,
pursued the same theme. He obviously runs the risk of inducing a
backlash on the part ofthose in comfortable positions for whom secrecy
was always a fundamental rule ofParty and state life. Hence his repeated
warnings to the effect that 'there will be no reconciliation with the stance
taken by functionaries of that kind', with quotations from Lenin to
support this position (speech at congress, Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p. 5). He
must also feel that he is supported by the Party rank-and-file, and indeed
by the broad public - or he chose such an approach as a means of
winning that support. The frankness of the criticism in the mass media
caused serious doubts on the part of at least one Politburo member, Egor
Ligachev, who in his Congress speech (Pravda, 28 Feb 1986: p.4),
specifically criticised Pravda for 'going too far'. (For examples of
outspoken criticism of various manifestations of abuse of office and the
like, see Samolis, 1986, and the speech by Eltsin to the Congress, Pravda,
27 Feb 1986: pp. 2-3; also Gorbachev's Congress speech, Pravda, 26
Feb 1986).
The task is enorrnous. It is not simply a question of sacking the
incompetent and replacing them with younger individuals possessing
appropriate skills and attitudes. Gorbachev needs to change the whole
approach to government, the whole 'style', which has developed in the
system over several generations: as he expressed it, to 'restructure the
psychology ofthe cadre' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p. 4; see also Vaino, 1986:
p. 27). One problem may weil be to find enough individuals of the new
breed: a few symbolic appointments are hardly enough. And his first
task is to convince those who remain that he means business. Rhetoric
alone is not enough: his predecessors too said all the right things.
Nothing succeeded in the past to correct the situation, and probably the
targets of Gorbachev's actions expected the same to happen again;
alternatively, those not hit in the initial 'purge' might organise to fight
54 State and Ideology

back. Indeed, those who hoped that this campaign would soon be over
and things would quickly return to normal were warned against such
expectations: 'That will not happen, comrades!', Gorbachev declared
(Pravda, 26 Feb 1986: p. 5).
The problem for areformer is that the apparat has an esprit of its own,
and it has more than once succeeded in resisting the centre: this suggests
weakness on the part of Moscow when it comes to controlling the
provinces. Keeping heads down, reporting convincingly that all is weil in
their own territories, and hoping that economic or foreign affairs will
distract the Kremlin leadership, so the campaign will blow over: such
may be the hope of apparatchiki across the country. And, since the
Secretary-General and his colleagues cannot be in all places at once, the
chances must be that soine areas will be left effectively untouched,
despite intentions to the contrary.
Politics, it should be remembered, is about managing people. The
administrative hierarchy exists to serve the needs of the masses, yet
involves relationships of power and subordination (Piskotin, 1985:
p. 22) The theoretical foundation of administration in Soviet society is
itself complex. Finding the appropriate institutional and cultural
framework and successfully applying it is a mammoth undertaking,
further complicated by the fact that Soviet experience is deemed to be the
authentie 'model' of how to build a developed socialist society.
It is not simply a problem of entrenched bureauerats protecting their
own interests, although that is obviously one consideration, as it was
when Khrushchev disrupted careers by splitting the apparatus in 1962
(see Armstrong, 1966). What is required is not just the undermining of
privileged positions, but redefining old assumptions about the sovetskii
poryadok, the Soviet way of doing things. The principles of democratic
centralism, discipline and nomenklatura, and the problem of podmena,
and even what Gorbachev in his Congress speech referred to as the
Party's 'infallibility complex', are more than the ground rules of a
working bureaucracy: they derive from and are part of the Soviet
system's very fabric and history. Some, indeed, have the sanction of
Lenin, which makes it very difficult to abandon them - even though they
have been inherited in a form severely distorted by Stalin.
The process of de-Stalinisation, embarked upon in earnest by
Khrushchev three decades ago, is not complete, and there is so far no
indication that Gorbachev intends to open that particular Pandora's
Box. It would require disavowal of much ofthe Party's and the country's
experience, and the prudent political judgement must be that it can
possibly be avoided. Some ideological reformulation may be devised tc
 Ronald J. Hili 55

suggest that institutional arrangements and behavioural principles and

practices appropriate in a previous phase have outlived their usefulness,
and new principles are appropriate in developed socialist society.
Indeed, in discussing economic reform, Gorbachev criticised the
tendency to view any changes in the economic mechanism as deviations
from the principles of socialism, while commentary observed that
'communists perceive the economic teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin
not as a dogma, but as a living guide to action' (Sergeev, 1986: p. 3). The
extension of such an open-minded approach to the political realm could
open the way for interesting developments.
However, changing the approach tosocietal management means, in
effect, changing the political culture - a very long-term task. There are
no quick solutions. The most Gorbachev can reasonably hope for is to
choose and promote reliable individuals to the second and third layers,
thereby using the force of example to bring about changes lower down.
Much is expected of hirn - perhaps too much. He has made an
impressive beginning in backing up oratory with action to show his
seriousness of purpose, and his performance in confrontation with
Ronald Reagen in Geneva, and with Margaret Thatcher and Fran~ois
Mitterrand over the expulsion of alleged spies, no doubt reinforced his
reputation for firmness. Moreover, his personnel changes during his first
year in office suggest that he possesses both political strength and
imagination to fashion a potentially innovative team (see Hili and
Frank, 1986, for an assessment). There are already some signs of the
possible direction of change.

2.6 POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

The Soviet Union has been seen as an obstacJe to reform among its
Eastern European allies. It led the brutal crushing of a Communist-
Party-Ied reform programme in Czechoslovakia in 1968; twelve years
later it exerted severe pressure upon a Polish communist government
apparently willing to negotiate with a body (Solidarity) that bore many
ofthe characteristics ofthe workers' soviets that inspired the revolution
in Russia. Nevertheless, there has been speculation in the West that the
Soviet Union might turn to an ally, Hungary, for inspiration in the field
of economic reform, by adapting the successful New Economic
Mechanism (NEM) introduced there in 1968 (Berliner, 1983: p.48);
there has been \ittle speculation about other countries as models for
political reform.
56 State and Ideology

In the Soviet Union there have been straws in the wind indicating the
same possible source of innovation. One politcal reform that followed
the Hungarian NEM was a widening of local councils' budgeting
powers. Given the notorious lack of control enjoyed by local Soviets
over their local budget, an article by a research worker in the USSR
Ministry of Finance, commenting favourably on the Hungarian
experiment, may indicate positive interest in the experience of a socialist
neighbour (Demina, 1985).
In the more directly political realm, in Gorbachev's report to the Party
Congress, and also in the Congress Resolution and the new draft of the
Party Programme, reference was made to 'necessary corrections' in
Soviet electoral procedures, where 'quite a number' of outstanding
problems await solution. It is not clear what Gorbachev and the Party
had in mind, although Soviet scholars identified many specific weaknes-
ses over the previous twenty years (see the literature surveyed in Hill,
1980: eh. 2). However, in Hungary an experiment of electoral reform.
with partially contested elections was held in June 1985, which was
commented on in broadly favourable terms by B. Strashun, the USSR's
most enthusiastic student of other socialist systems (Strashun, 1985;
Hill, 1980: p. 27). Perhaps Gorbachev will open the Soviet Union to such
tried and tested experiences of the 'fratemal socia1ist nations' in
response to the demand for democratisation in the Soviet system.
Gorbachev also mentioned the need for legislation empowering the
govemment to hold referenda in conformity with the 1977 Constitution
(although a number oftechnical issues await decision: see the discussion
of points raised by Soviet scholars in Hill, 1980, pp. 100-3).
As far as the Soviet system is concemed, however, a central question
remains unresolved: the Communist Party's position in relation to the
state.

2.7 THE PARTY AND THE STATE

Party-state relations have been seen as one of the most complex

questions of Soviet politicallife, both to define and to regulate: 'one of
the basic and most complex in the theory and practice of socialist
construction' (Sulemov, 1983: p.5; see also Schapiro, 1961: p.lll;
Shakhnazarov, 1972: p. 76; Cocks, 1978: p. 49). Soviet commentators
note that 'anti-socialist elements' identify the Party's role as the central
issue in the political crises in H ungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968)
and Poland (1980-2) (Sulemov, 1983: pp. 5-6). For them also the
 Ronald J. H il/ 57

Party's role is a definitional point in socialism, a 'Iaw [zakonomernostJ of

development of socialist society as a whole, ... a socio-political law'
(Azarov and Slavov, 1984: p. 77). Moreover, this leading role is seen as
vital for further progression towards communism (Belykh, 1982: p. 28).
The state's role appears to be clearly subordinate, but it is
theoretically ambiguous, and this lack of clarity has been a constant
source of confusion, not least in the minds of those, in both Party and
state, whose functiol\ requires them to operate on one side or another of
the institutional relationship. The problems of podmena (substitution, or
the Party's tendency to supplant the state organs), petty supervision and
a command style of 'leadership' are so weil attested that the point needs
no elaboration here. So too is the state officials' response: unwillingness
to perform their proper functions, for fear of encroaching on the Party's
prerogatives, but safe in the knowledge that in the last resort the Party
will step in, take the decisions and give the orders.
The Party's traditional response - which is also part of Gorbachev's
inheritance - has been to extend the Party's rights of supervision
(kontrol). For ex am pie, the XXIV Congress (1971) gave primary Party
organisations the right to monitor the work of ministries and other state
bodies (XXIV sezd, 1971, vol. 2: p. 239; Schapiro, 1971: p. 18). The
practical effect, however, has clearly not been what was intended: far
from guaranteeing that the administration acted properly in fulfilling its
functions, the Party has failed to prevent corruption and the worst kind
of incompetence, as the evidence uncovered in recent years plainly
reveals. Despite this, according to its Programme, the Party still
considers the ideal situation to be one in which, 'acting within the
framework of the Constitution, the CPSU directs and co-ordinates the
work ofthe statc and public organisations and shows concern for each of
them to discharge their functions in full'.
Such a formulation is essentially vague, and the boundary between
guidance and interference is in practice often impossible to locate. 'In life
it is sometimes hard', confessed Gorbachev from the Congress platform,
to 'see the boundary beyond which Party control and the organisation of
the fulfilment of practical tasks spills over into petty tutelage or even
substitution for governmental and economic bodies'. Yet Gorbachev's
explanation and solution are as vague as that boundary (Pravda, 26 Feb
1986: p. 9). Soviet leaders from Lenin on have attacked this problem of
podmena (substitution), petty tutelage and parallelism in relations
between Party and state, yet the problem continues, partly because ofthe
Party's 'infallibility complex' that Gorbachev rightly condemned.
A different - and obvious - approach has not apparently been
58 State and Ideology

seriously considered: making the Party step back from o~erseeing the
everyday management of society, permitting ofticers of the state to
devise their own ways of administering policy· (even if that means they
will occasionally make mi stakes), and restricting the Party's role to one
of general political guidance and leadership. That would indeed be a
radical reform, with profound implications for the way the Soviet Union
is governed. For that very reason, perhaps, it is unlikely to be
contemplated.
One should not, therefore, be too sanguine about the prospects for
serious political change. After all, in its own way the system works. It
muddies through, and given the more urgent strains in the economy and
the pressures of a hostile international arena, that is perhaps seen as the
most that can be hoped for, with a \ittle tinkering with details here and
there. Whatever he decides to do over the medium term, Gorbachev
requires the support of administrators in Party, state and various public
organisations. The risk oflosing their confidence and forfeiting their co-
operation must make his administration pause to think very carefully
before embarking on the unpredictable course of radical political
reform.
3 Law and Reform
W.E.BUTLER

The choice of Mikhail Gorbachevas Secretary-General of the CPSU in

March 1985 brought to the apex of the Soviet leadership for only the
second time an individual trained in the law. V. I. Lenin was the first,
having obtained his law degree externally from St Petersburg University
after his early studies at Kazan were interrupted by expulsion for
revolutionary activities. Whether Gorbachev shared Lenin's conviction
that the law was excellent training for one interested in pursuing a career
of political activism is not a matter of public record, but none the less the
former read law at Moscow State University and received the qualifica-
tion yurist upon graduation. The personal attributes widely ascribed to
legal training Gorbachev seems to possess in abundance: he has
impressed Western observers with his astute grasp of issues, his
restrained assertiveness in argument, his logical and rational approach
to problems and his willingness as appropriate to listen to and absorb
from the other side. And he emerges on the scene when, to an
unprecedented extent, law in the Soviet Union is looked upon as central
to all political and socioeconomic concerns and the 'lawyers' or 'jurists'
appear in so me situations to represent an 'interest group' capable of
articulating and perhaps even promoting policies on the basis of
juridical factors. The present chapter explores how the course of law
reform may proceed in the Gorbachev era.

3.1 THE LEGACY OF THE PAST

'Stability' and 'predictability' became bywords of the Brezhnev era. It

would be premature to attempt a thorough reassessment, but few would
doubt that to a degree unprecedented in Soviet history law and lawyers
were deliberately cultivated as vital instruments in promoting both
objectives. The Khrushchev era, to be sure, produced significant
improvements as part ofthe reaction against Stalinism, among them the
59
60 Law and Reform

first codifications of criminal and civil law for more than four decades
and an emphasis on socialist legality intended to eliminate vestiges ofthe
'cult of personality'. A new era in so many realms of Soviet life,
introduc;ing a range of diversity and originality that many in the
Brezhnev era recalled with nostalgia, it none the less contained elements
antithetical in the short term to the utilisation of law as a major social
regulator. Mostly these elements were associated with the doctrine that
the anticipated transition to communism in 1980 should be preceded by
immediate measures inaugurating the dying out ofstate and law. Social
organisations were revived or reshaped to assume tasks previously the
exclusive preserve of the state (e.g. comrades' courts, people's guards),
and avirulent populism sometimes overrode concern for· due process
and formality. Bt the early 1960s plans were apparently at an advanced
stage to reduce law faculty enrolments and curtail the growth ofthe legal
profession; one can but speculate what the implications may have been
for the planned economy had those policies been pursued.
Khrushchev's departure from office in October 1964 was followed
nearly a year later by the introduction of an approach to economic
reform whose reverberations are still being feit. The emphasis of the
1965 reforms was upon autonomy and accountability for state enterpr-
ises, releasing them to some extent from control by and dependence
upon administrative superiors and planning organs, and transferring the
great majority to the khozraschet or economic accountability, system for
evaluating economic performance. The economic indicators which
measured enterprise performance were reduced in number and altered to
encourage enterprise responsiveness to quality standards, consurrter
appeal, sales, labour productivity and the like. As these 'vertical'
controls were relaxed and revised the legal system and the legal
profession were called upon to assist in guiding and disciplining the
exercise of discretion and autonomy by enterprises in their 'horizontal'
contractual relationships with other enterprises and organisations. The
principal instruments of guidance and discipline were: legislation,
contract, legal personnel and a special tribunal having exclusive
jurisdiction over economic disputes between state enterprises, called
state arbitrazh.
Legislation in this connection meant not merely new laws giving effect
to the reforms, but conserving a fundamental reprocessing of all
enactments at all levels in order to eliminate inconsistent or obsolete
provisions, to promote the consolidation of enactments and, where
necessary, introduce new legislation, and to make the entire corpus of
legislation more accessible to manager, lawyer and layman alike. To this
 W.E. Butler 61

end a programme of law reform and codification unrivalled since the

preparation of the Complete Collective Laws 01 the Russian Empire
(1825-30) and the Digest 01 Laws 01 the Russian Empire (1832) was
instituted at the all-Union and Union republic levels. The role of
contract was enlarged in inter-enterprise relations and much greater
attention given to penalty clauses and other provisions hearing on the
effectiveness of contract. The legal profession, most notably the
jurisconsults, has expanded enormously since 1970, a planned expansion
intended to service the national economy - enterprises, ministries, local
government, agriculture - to a vastly greater extent than at any period of
Soviet history. And state arbitrazh, an institution dating back to the
1920s, was twice reformed (1974 and 1979) to enhance its role in
resolving or preventing economic disputes.
About 1973 - 6 measures were introduced to encourage the formation
ofwhat the West would call 'corporate conglomerates'. Amalgamating
related enterprises together with research and design institutes, repair
shops, service centres and the like would, it was feit, lead to economies of
scale and in management and integrate on an economically accountable
basis facets of production previously treated as discrete or even
unrelated. Called 'economic associations' of various types, these
conglomerates retained their legal autonomy, as did in so me measure
certain of the entities absorhed into them. In 1978 the scheme of
economic accountability was fully extended to Soviet foreign-trade
organisations and in 1982 the formation of agro-industrial associations,
which could include collective farms, was authorised.
While economic calculations assuredly were central to the develop-
ment of Soviet law during the Brezhnev era, economic law was by no
means the sole area of development. Much attention was given in the late
1960s to making middle and lower levels of local government more
responsive to their constituents. The functions of local government
were, on the whole, enlarged and clarified vis-a-vis superior organs. All-
Union Fundamental Principles oflegislation were adopted for nearly all
the basic branches of Soviet legislation and respective union republic
codes or laws in their wake. In 1977 - 8 new constitutions were adopted
for the USSR and Union and autonomous republics, completing at last
areform contemplated by Khrushchev and setting in motion the final
stages of the law-reform processes descrihed above. In a word, by any
standard of legislative accomplishment the Brezhnev legacy must rank
among the more substantial in Soviet legal history.
Nevertheless, by 1982 a loss of vigour and direction was evident in the
inability to cope with the need for and requirements of technological
62 Law and Reform

advancement and the problems of adapting old, sometimes contradic-

tory, policies to new circumstances. Economic growth rates failed to
meet the expectations of the architects of economic and legal reform and
ofthe consumer, acertain inertia and indifference had become evident,
and corruption, materialism, drunkenness and boredom were diagnosed
as pervasive social iIIs. Change of generation, of direction and of style
were called for, although not necessarily simultaneously.
Brezhnev's immediate successor, Yury Andropov, underscored a
determination to deal with shirking, abuse of alcohol and crime. At the
end ofDecember 1982 the Union republic Criminal Codes, in force for
more than two decades, were massively overhauled, about two-thirds of
the Code articles being amended. On the whole those shaping criminal
law policy had opted for a balance: increased penalties for second
offenders and recidivists and a more flexible approach to first offenders.
Almost across the board, however, fines and other financial sanctions
were raised. In 1983 an enactment promised by the 1977 USSR
Constitution - the USSR Law on Labour Collectives - was adopted and
a brigade scheme in enterprises, the object of local experimentation for
several years, encouraged where appropriate. Although partly directed
towards improving labour discipline the labour collective concept is
linked broadly to concepts of representative democracy and to economic
management. Their full implications have yet to unfold. Konstantin
Chemenko's unexpectedly rapid sucCession seems to have brought a
certain marking of time; the same policies were favoured, but without
perhaps the same sense of urgency, purpose or vigour.

3.2 TRANSITION AND ADJUSTMENT

The extent to which Soviet legal policies bear the imprint of an

individual leader, in style or substance, or are the more or less normal
product of the legislative process writ large (including review by Party
bodies) and reflect the consensus of those upon whom the individual is
beholden for support, is not easily determined. Between November 1982
and March 1985 the Soviet Union experienced three changes of
leadership and four leaders, and in the course of doing so passed the
baton of leadership from one generation to the next, a process all the
more evident if the composition of the Politburo and other Party and
state organs is taken into account. Yet viewed from the perspective ofthe
legal system these transitions were not merely smooth but were
accompanied by a level of legislative activity and accomplishment
 W.E. Butler 63

consistent at least with the immediate past. The first year ofGorbachev's
period in office running up to the Party Congress, so far as legislative
policy is concerned, was not aperiod of exceptio na I activity. The
commitment to law reform was at once in evidence with the enactment of
a decree ordering the expeditious completion and continuation of the
Svod Zakonov (Digest of Laws) for the USSR and each Union republic.
In April 1985 furt her amendments were introduced in criminal and in
correctionallabour legislation, not as extensive but in the same spirit as
those made in December 1982 under Andropov. Other amendments to
the criminal law were occasioned a month later when sweeping
legislation intended to curb the abuse of spirits was enacted. In the
popular Western mind the legislation most closely associated with
Gorbachev, it seems to represent a continuity of concern uttered even in
the later Brezhnev period and of determination expressed during the
Andropov period to reduce the incidence of alcoholism and improve the
work ethic.

3.3 LEGAL POLICY AND THE PARTY CONGRESS

When the convocation of the XXVII Party Congress was announced

and it was disclosed that both the Party Programme and the Party Rules
were to be revised, the Congress rapidly assumed the importance of a
benchmark in the development ofSoviet legal history equal to the XXII
Party Congress in 1961. The latter Congress had adopted a Party
Programme widely understood in East and West to constitute a
'blueprint' for the rapid transformation of the Soviet Union into a
communist state. In some measure the exaggerated timetable for
effecting fundamental transformations called for by the 1961 Party
Programme had contributed to the ennui in Soviet life. It soon became
clear that revisions in the Programme would introduce a more realistic
approach, concentrating on shorter-term objectives and empirical
measurements of achievement.
Students of Soviet law are weil aware that the Party Programme,
together with major Party resolutions and decrees, playa significant role
in legislative policy. In so far as the Programme is a 'blueprint', it lays
down orientations and sometimes specific objectives for the legislator.
Major legislative enactments sometimes refer to the Programme in their
preambles. The Programme constitutes part ofthe fabric against which
the legislator operates, a statement of purpose which the legislator is
dedicated to achieving. N. S. Khrushchev had accentuated this facet of
64 Law and Reform

the Programme; the 'state ofthe whole people' proclaimed in the 1961
Programm~ became the leitmotif for the style and substance of
legislative change during 1961-4, a kind of recipe for law reform in that
period aJld, in some measure, beyond.
Given that the Party Programme and attendant policy speeches are of
that character, and that the 1986 revisions in the Programme address
themselves to a shorter time-span, it is reasonable to view the
Programme and especially Gorbachev's Report to the Party Congress as
a legislative agenda. To this should be added the observation that the
USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers have for the
past decade operated on the basis oftheir own 'legislative plan'. Just as
economic plans, the 'legislative plan' was compiled for a five-year term
(1978-82) and renewed for another (1983-7); it was formally adopted
by the respective organ as a normative act, i.e. an enactment containing a
legally binding rule of conduct of general applicability. The plan
contained a list of new or revised enactments to be submitted to the
respective organ, an indication of the Ministries and state committees
responsible for preparing and consulting together on the draft, and a
deadline (expressed in months) for submitting the agreed draft. The
deadlines, it must be said, have not always been met. None the less, some
Sovietjurists have been sufficiently encouraged by the practice to speak
about 'forecasting' and 'planning' the development of the legal system
on a scientifically well-founded basis.
Gorbachev's Political Report to the XXVII Congress amounted to a
recipe for legal change and continued reinforcement for the role of law
throughout the Soviet system as a wh oIe. The tenor and substance ofhis
remarks suggested that the general orientation of legal research during
the preceding decade had been soundly conceived. Priorities in legal
research had included the reorganisation and strengthening of local
govemment, the legislation on labour collectives, the continuation of
reforms in the 'economic mechanism', analysing the etfectiveness of
criminal and of environmental legislation, the interrelationship of law
and technology, and the democratisation ofSoviet society. All ofthese
and others remained on the agenda, and Gorbachev's unusually
straightforward assessment of the problems facing Soviet society and
the ways in which they might be approached make the text ofhis remarks
a veritable primer on the likely development ofSoviet law. The heart of
social, political, economic and cultural processes are affected by law,
and the legal system accordingly offers a unique vantage-point from
whichto comprehend Soviet society, or for that matter any society. A
sound knowledge of Soviet affairs is impossible without some
 W.E. Butler 65

knowledge ofthe legal system and legal developments. Consider. by way

of example. some salient points developed by Gorbachev.
Theoretical Ideas and Concepts Although these days it is virtually
pro /orma for any new political leadership to promise change and new
ideas, this must be considered unusual for the Soviet Union where basic
theories and concepts have been normally held to be axiomatic and
merely their comprehension or execution suspect. While Gorbachev
offered no retraction of Marxist-Leninist precepts, he did suggest a
searching re-examination and perhaps reconceptualisation were in
order, especially with regard to the national economy and property
relationships. He directed attention to the muIti-faceted character of
socialist ownership and its capacity to encompass a wide range of
economic interests. But, he stressed, property relationships are not static
ones; they are in ftux and require constant adjustment and regulation in
order to guide effective decision-making. How precisely concepts of
ownership might be altered was not elaborated, but the experience of
other socialist legal systems is suggestive of possible approaches, among
them an adaptation of'social ownership' as developed in Yugoslavia, a
reconceptualisation of personal property based on its derivation from
social production and labour income, a reconsideration of foreign
ownership, in part or in whole, of means of production on Soviet
territory, or a reform in the principles underlying the allocation of state-
owned assets to the operative management of state enterprises. Par-
ticularly to be noted is the resounding endorsement given to co-
operative ownership, which should augur weil for the short-term future
of collective farms and possibly see further experimentation with forms
of entrepreneurship between collective farms and other entities or even
between collective farms and individuals.
Law and the Economy In one sense nearly all ofGorbachev's Report
to the Party Congress treated various dimensions of the relationship
between the Soviet legal ~ystem and the economy, whether this be
economic organisation and management, social justice or the democrat-
isation of Soviet society. Although the latter will be considered
separately below, they are inextricably linked with the economy in the
strategy for societal development outlined at the Party Congress.
A major shortcoming of the Soviet system, in their perception, has
been the inability to bridge the gap between creativity and invention, on
thp on~ hand. and the practical application of innovation, on the other.
1 ne legal system has been a principal instrument for encouraging the
process by granting various forms of legal protection and providing
financial and other rewards for successful innovation. The introduction
66 Law and Reform

of new technology has become a significant component of economic

plans at all levels. The procedures for processing applications for patents
and authors' certificates have been singled out as cumbersome and slow;
early legislation
, can be expected to simplify and accelerate these, as can
additional incentives and sanctions designed to encourage the
expeditious introduction of new technology.
Strengthening the links between 'academic' research andproduction
is regarded as a key locus for improving the system, however. The
relationship between 'Iaw' and 'life' ,debated since at least the late 1950s,
gave rise to sweeping educational reforms in the early 1960s. Although
later attenuated, an enduring legacy has been the principle that, for
most, postgraduate studies should not be commenced until a minimum
period of practical work experience had been gained. Here is evidence of
what is present in many reforms contemplated in Gorbachev's Party
Congress speech: they are not merely proposals but are actionable
measures at an advanced stage of experimentation and even drafting,
ready in several instances at least for prompt implementation. In this
case the call to strengthen higher education follows as a logical
continuation a year or two after fundamental reforms in primary and
secondary education, and builds upon some of the premises of that
reform. On I June 1986 Izvestiya published the draft of a Party
Resolution entitled the 'Basic Orientations for Restructuring Higher
and Secondary Specialised Education in the Country'. Echoing the
approach outlined at the Party Congress, the draft Resolution ties the
contemplated restructuring to the acceleration of national socioecon-
omic development and seeks to secure this end by 'integrating'
education, production, and science. Research should become a central
feature of higher education from the first year at university under this
scheme.
With regard to foreign trade Gorbachev spoke of a step-by-step
restructuring of the foreign trade system. The essentials of the Soviet
model of the state foreign trade monopoly have not been altered for
more than five decades. A new Statute for the USSR Ministry ofForeign
Trade, expected in 1984-5, doubtless has ben in abeyance pending basic
policy discussions on the restructuring. Given policies in Eastern Europe
whose results are impressive on many counts, the 'restructuring' may
encompass arecasting or even a partial dismantling of the state
monopoly of foreign trade and the possibility of foreign equity
investment. The number of Soviet organs outside the Ministry of
Foreign Trade system who engage in foreign economic relations of
various types already is so vast in practice that the state monopoly has
been fractionated beyond recognition.
 W.E. Butler 67

Economic Management Since the inauguration of reforms in the

management of the national economy of 1965, regarded by all as a
movement in the direction of decentralisation, subsequent adjustments
to the reform have been variously perceived as either a retreat from those
policies (recentralisation) or a continuation, depending on whether one
accentuates the relationship of superior to inferior links and how one
evaluates the processes of amalgamating corporate units. But while the
debate has centred on those issues, the range of adjustments to the
'economic mechanism' introduced in the form oflegislation has been far
more sweeping. It is probably accurate to say that the preponderance of
them has been in the direction of decentralisation, that is, enlarging the
autonomy of production units and reducing the amount of tight control
by planning and ministerial organs. Neither centralisation nor decen-
tralisation, however, are ends in themselves; the objectives are to strike
the optimum balance at all levels so that the economy produces what is
expected in all respects and furthers the values pursued by Soviet society.
Gorbachev's P~rty Congress Report endorses and links both objec-
tives while calling for quite concrete alterations in particular areas. The
concept of autonomy for lower economic units, a corners tone of the
reforms since 1965, is resolutely affirmed and indeed is to be increased.
So too are further measures to be introduced with a view to reducing a
most perplexing feature ofSoviet economic life: interference by superior
agencies in the day-to-day activities oflower economic units. There is no
ready solution, for the very principle of superior-inferior implies the
discretion ofthe former to instruct the latter. Yet in doing so, or in doing
so arbitrarily, significant harm may be infticted upon the economic and
legal integrity of the lower units to the long-term prejudice of the
national economy. A carefully conceived scheme of economic law may
offer the best approach, and it is likely that a draft economic code,
whether enacted or not, will become the focal point of discussions.
Centre and periphery are. but two elements ofthe equation. Within the
enterprise there is the question of the relationship among the directors,
other executive personnei, the labour collective as a whole and
production brigades. Balances must be struck with a view to production
performance and in light of larger social commitments to democratisa-
tion. Since 1983 labour collectives have been formally constituted as
units of representation in the political system, and all indications are that
their role is to be enhanced through amendments to the basic legislation.
On certain issues they have the final decision, and the scope of this
jurisdiction is likely to increase. None the less, directors of enterprises
find their rights expanding too, especially over the size of the enterprise
labour force and the wage fund (Izvestiya, 7 June 1986: p. 2). The brigade
68 Law and Reform

system, introduced experimentally in the early 1980s, is now used in

about half of all industrial enterprises; there is widespread experimenta-
tion with types of economic contracts between the brigades and the
enterprise.
Price; and contract will be relied upon more extensively in other
respects. Whatever the economic role of prices fixed by the state, they
also have a legal role; that is, prices are legally binding normative acts
and they are incorporated by reference in Soviet economic contracts. To
change a price requires an amendment of the law; Gorbachev has
indicated the system of price-formation is to be re-examined and the
taxation system is to be reviewed. Presumably a review ofthe tax system
will concentrate on the turn-over tax and the tax on enterprise profits.
Reforms contemplated in the law of contract seem to be of an
'adjustment' rather than a radical character. In the interests of
stabilising the supply of raw materials and semi-finished products to
state enterprises, long-term (rather than annual) supply contracts are to
be encouraged where appropriate. Consumer goods are to be distributed
increasingly on the basis of contracts with retail trade organisations,
who in turn will contract pursuant to consumer demand for models of
goods on offer. In early June 1986 appropriate legislation was enacted
by the USSR Council of Ministers (Decree 'On the Further Develop-
ment of Firm Trade in the System of Industrial Ministries' , summarised
in Izvestiya, 7 June 1986, p. 2). Inducement to meet consumer demand
will be added in the form of legislation linking the wage fund of
enterprises to sales revenue. In order to release unnecessary assets held
by enterprises, the latter will be given the legal right to dispose of excess
raw materials and of goods produced above and beyond plan indicators
directly to the general public.
Agriculture Six weeks or so after Brezhnev's death, the USSR
Council of Ministers confirmed legislation on agro-industrial associa-
tions, continuing a policy of seeking ways to integrate certain facets of
industrial and agricultural operations and management. It has become
fashionable to speak ofthe 'agro-industrial complex' and increasingly to
conceptualise agrarian law and economy in 'industrial' categories.
Whether that persists or not, legal reforms in agriculture incorporate
many principles drawn from the industrial sector. The autanomy of state
and collective farms is to be increased. Stability in revenues is to be
encouraged through the use of five-year fixed purehase plans, with the
farms at liberty to dispose of any excess production as they may choose
and certain flexibility in deciding wh ich food products are to be used to
meet their plan targets. Various financial inducements will be employed
 W.E. Butler 69

to guide the exercise of discretion and territorial quotas are likely to be

introduced in certain instances to adjust balances among individual
farms. All links in the agro-industrial complex are to operate on the civil-
economic law principle of economic accountability (khozraschet), that
is, earn a profit and be accountable for their liabilities out oftheir assets.
Brigades are operating here as weil, augmented by specially created
'links' and even family units, many of them providing services under
independent-work contracts or on the piece-work principle. On what
seems to be an effective experimental basis such teams are being
allocated means of production (including land) for longer-term contrac-
tual periods in order to perform their respective responsibilities.
Attention is being given in both the industrial and agricultural sectors
to the scheme of contractual penalties. Higher financial benefits on the
part of the contracting parties is likely to ensue in order to encourage
performance of contracts.
Poor crops for several years running led in 1983 to liberalisation of
restrictions on private plots and so-called 'collective gardening' at
institutions and enterprises. This liberalisation, wholly consistent with
Gorbachev's strategy of acceleration, has been expanded in legislation
adopted in June 1986.
Social Justice The 1977 - 8 Soviet Constitutions transformed the
substance, in their perception, of the covenants on political, economic
and social rights into Soviet law. Soviet legal writing and legislation has
been preoccupied since with elaborating those provisions and Gorba-
chev's endorsement of those principles, with the accent on equality
before the law, respect for the individual, equality ofnations and social
welfare, suggests this will continue to be a principal arena of activity.
Concrete measures were not elaborated, and it may be that the basic
principles having been set out in legislation, attention will concentrate
on implementation and interpretation. Something ofthat approach is to
be seen in a sweeping ev~luation of Latvian experience in enforcing
legislation on strengthening the family. Conducted on behalf of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, this type of review often
requires supplementary legislation to eradicate the shortcomings iden-
tified (/zvestiya, 27 May 1986) and has on some occasions led to material
changes in approach to legal regulations of the matter being inves-
tigated.
As Gorbachev is clearly weil aware, economic strategy is in some
respects provo king a searching reassessment of past assumptions about
'justice'. Repeatedly in his remarks to the Party Congress he addressed
the need to increase incentives for excellence of performance, to reward
70 Law and Reform

those who work and penalise economically those who do not produce up
to standard, and to punish those who exist on the proceeds of non-
labour income. Increased incentives will lead to greater differentials in
income llnd in access to the better things oflife; in a way this too is a form
of economic accountability, by making the individual more directly
dependent upon his personal performance instead of being swallowed
up in the 'average'. Accumulation ofwealth derived from labour income
is certainly neither anti-social nor illegal, but some side-effects could be
so. Already the first legitimate millionaires have made their appearance
in Soviet life, a phenomenon much commented upon. Gorbachev has
indicated that a progressive inheritance tax may be introduced to avert
the social consequences of transmitting large estates to the coming
generation. Early experience with brigade and independent work
contracts suggests that the best workers are capable of amassing
substantial revenues in comparison with the ordinary state norms of
productivity.
Implacable warfare has been declared against those who are 'takers'
or who engage in bribery and other nefarious activities. Here Gorbachev
is in the mainstream of his predecessors' rhethoric, but seems to be
taking the matter more seriously. Legislative, executive, and Party
organs at the highest level on 27 May 1986 approved broad measures to
combat non-labour income, partly through stiffer criminal and adminis-
trative penalties against those who derive such income and partly by
increasing the supplies of consumer goods and amenities, reducing
thereby the black market demand for them (/zvestiya, 28 May 1986:
pp. 1- 2). The anti-alcohol campaign is related but independent and
seems to be continuing with undiminished fervour.
Family Welfare On matters of social welfare for families Gorbachev
has been quite explicit. New families are to be aided through increased
provision for newly-weds, including higher priority in the allocation of
housing. Mothers are being given increased allowances and, if
employed, the opportunity for flexible work hours. These reforms are in
the same spirit of 1985 legislation extending state benefits to spouses
whose alimony payments have been interrupted.
Democratisation of Soviet Society A key feature of the Soviet
approach since 1964 to the development of state and law has been the
emphasis upon enlisting greater involvement in state administration on
the part of the general public. This contras ted sharply with Khrush-
chev's philosophy of disbanding state institutions or transferring their
functions to non-state bodies. Under Gorbachev the former process is to
be continued. The power of legislative initiatives accorded to several
 W.E. Butler 71

large social organisations, still not extensively used, is to be augmented

by requirements that the Supreme Soviets devote more time to
discussing such proposals and to the reports submitted on the applica-
ti on of legislation in particular regions or by particular administrative
bodies. In an effort to make local government more responsive further
c1arification can be expected on the relationships of local soviets with
superior soviets. This may include alterations in election procedures.
The range of issues whose resolution requires the participation of
representatives from major social organisations, especially trade unions,
will be enlarged. This is regarded as a means of enhancing citizens'
influence on decision-making, together with expanding the rights of
labour collectives, of the general meetings of administrative organs, of
people's control organs and ofvoluntary trade-union inspectorates. The
same principle is being extended to the brigade level, where brigade
leaders are to be elected and eventually all managerial personnel. A long-
awaited law on the procedure for holding referendums is almost certain
to be introduced.
Democratisation, in short, is associated with enlarged public
involvement in the political system, and for these purposes 'political
system' is now deemed to encompass all types ofproduction entities and
many non-state bodies.
Legal System All of the maUers discussed above go to the heart of
Soviet law and the legal system; they cannot be effectively dealt with
outside the legal system or without the use of law and legal personnel.
Gorbachev's realisation of this incontrovertible circumstance is echoed
in his plea to improve Soviet civil, labour, financial, administrative,
economic and criminallaw in order to help introduce his economic and
management reforms, control the relationship between labour expended
and consumption, and effectuate social justice. Legal services and
personnel are Iikely to continue to expand, particularly law-enforcement
personnel and jurisconsults. Legal education of laymen, and
involvement of laymen in judicial and other activities, is to continue in
its diverse forms. Legislation can be expected authorisingjudicial review
of the unlawful actions of officials, and serious consideration given to
the possibility of introducing more all-union codes of law, including
criminal and criminal procedure codes.

3.4 CONCLUSION
Viewing the major addresses and resolutions of the Party Congress as a
legislative agenda may be an unusual perspective for students of Soviet
72 Law and Reform

affairs, but already post-Congress developments bear out that inter-

pretation. In the short term Gorbachev seems to justify being character-
ised as a moderate reformer, yet the roots of refoCms associated with hirn
in the e')periments of the late 1970s and early 1980s ought not to be
overlooked. The transition has been remarkably smooth, and that may
be attributed perhaps not least to the nature of consensus underlying
much of wh at is proposed. For the moment there is a reluctance to
engage in rash speculation about subsequent phases of societal develop-
ment and the future fate oflaw. And law in the meantime is ftourishing
as never before.
4 Nationalities
BOHDAN NAHA YLO

The Soviet Union is the world's largest multinational state. Its 280
million inhabitants are constantly assured that the 'nationalities
problem' inherited from the Tsarist Empire has long since been solved
and that a harmonious, supranational community, the so-called Soviet
people, has been formed. Despite this rosy official assessment, there is no
shortage of evidence indicating that the management of relations among
the more than 100 nationalities constituting the ethnic mosaic that is the
Soviet Union remains a crucial and intractable issue on the Soviet
political agenda. What are the salient features of the nationalities
question in the ) 980s, and what is likely to be the general direction of
nationalities policy under Gorbachev?

4.1 BACKGROUND

From its very inception the Soviet Union has represented an uneasy
compromise between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Force
alone, as Lenin realised, was not sufficient to weId together the
fragmented Russian Empire and, although the Bolsheviks stood for
large centralised states in which nationalloyalties would be superseded
by an internationalist etho~, he acknowledged the need to win the trust
ofthe non-Russians with temporary concessions, such as federation and
a degree of cultural autonomy. Tact, however, did not become a durable
characteristic of Soviet nationalities policy and, paradoxically, the very
policies of modemisation and social mobilisation which were supposed
to eliminate nationalism in many cases actually strengthened national
sentiment.
National tensions have persisted. They stern from the fact that the
USSR is theoretically based on a 'free and equal partnership' of the
constituent nationalities, yet, despite the federal structure, decision-
making is concentrated in Moscow, and the majority Russian nation is
73
74 Nationalities

perceived by the others as enjoying a position of political and cultural

hegemony. Over the years Moscow has applied the formula 'national in
form and socialist in content' and has placed the stress on integration,
while the national elites have sought to broaden the latitude afforded
their republics by the system. Non-Russians who have overstepped the
mark in asserting their national interests within the federal framework
have been purged, while 'dissident' national rights campaigners have
been given heavy sentences.
Since the Khrushchev period changes in Soviet nationalities policy by
and large have been ones of emphasis rather than substance. Initially, as
part of the process of measured de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev relaxed
controls in the area of nationalities policy and announced areturn to
Leninist principles. In contrast to the line under Stalin, Russian
chauvinism was kept in check, the Party refrained from blatant
Russification, and the non-Russians were assured that their languages
and cultures would be respected. Khrushchev set the new tone at the
historic XX Party Congress by spelling out that although the Party
would 'tirelessly pursue still greater unity ofthe peoples ofthe USSR', it
was nevertheless committed to the 'ftourishing' (rastsvet) of the non-
Russian peoples. 'Far from erasing national differences and
peculiarities', he affirmed, 'socialism, on the contrary, assures the all-
round development of the economy and culture of all the nations and
peoples.' Khrushchev also dec1ared that 'petty tutelage of the Union
republics is impermissible', and that it was necessary to 'enlarge
considerably the powers of the republican ministries' (XX Sezd KPSS,
1956: pp. 87-91). Between 1955 and 1957 there was a modest extension
of the responsibilities of the Union republics. Inadvertently these
measures had the effect of stimulating cultural revivals and the growth
of national assertiveness among the non-Russian nations.
Towards the end of the 1950s the Party's policy began to shift. The
education reform of 1958 - 9 inc1uded provisions designed, in effect, to
promote the study of Russian at the expense of the native languages.
Although the widespread opposition to this move revealed how sensitive
the language issue was, it did not deter the central leadership from
implementing the changes (Bilinsky, 1962). Charges of 'Iocalism'
(mestnichestvo) were increasingly levelled at regional officials, and there
was renewed concern about nationalist tendencies. In Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, for instance, the first secretaries were removed for favour-
ing local nationals in their cadres policy, while in Latvia a major purge of
nationally minded officials was carried out. In the theoreticalliterature,
too, the emphasis moved away from the ftourishing, to the 'drawing
 Bohdan Nahaylo 75

together' (sblizhenie) and ultimate 'fusion' of 'merger' (sliyanie) of the

nationalities.
Tbe Khrushchev leadership's retreat from its relatively liberal posi-
tion of 1956 and its adoption of an assimilationist course was confirmed
at the XXII Party Congress in October 1961 and reftected in the new
Party Programme approved by the delegates. Tbe Party's new
theoretical blueprint was predicated on the utopian notion that
communism would be achieved in the Soviet Union within the near
future. Although the term 'fusion' did not appear in the document, there
was no doubt that the Party's goal was no longer the ftourishing of the
nationalities, but the elimination of national distinctions and the
creation of a Russian-speaking, socially homogeneous, communist
state. Tbe Programme stated: 'The boundaries between the union
republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former sig-
nificance .... Full-scale communist construction signifies a new stage in
the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations
will draw still closer together and their complete unity (polnoe edinstvo)
will be achieved.' While the Programme did in fact refer to the
ftourishing of nations under socialism, it specified that it was the
development ofthe 'socialist content ofthe cultures ofthe peoples ofthe
USSR' that the Party would be encouraging; that is, those elements
which facilitated the development of an 'international culture common
to all the Soviet nations'. Tbe importance ofthe Russian language was
also stressed and it was described as having 'in effect, become the
common medium of intercourse and cooperation among all the peoples
of the USSR' (Saikowsky and Gruliow, 1962: pp. 26-7).
In his report to the Congress on the Party Programme Khrushchev
conceded that the fusion of nations was foreseen for the far-off future
after communism had been built. He made it quite clear though that the
Party intended to accelerate the process of social homogenisation and at
the same time to foster the use of Russian. In response to those 'who
complain about the effaceinent of national distinctions', he declared
bluntly that the Party was not going to 'freeze and perpetuate national
distinctions'. On the contrary, its task was to display 'uncompromising
Bolshevist implacability' in eradicating 'even the slightest manifestation
of nationalist survivals'.
Khrushchev maintained that 'under socialism two interconnected
progressive tendencies operate in the national question': on the one
hand, individual nations undergo all-round development and ftourish;
on the other hand, nations grow ever closer together. He indicated what
the Party now understood by rastsvet by stating that the non-Russian
76 Nationalities

languages would be allowed to develop freely as long as their develop-

ment did not tend to 'reinforce barriers between peoples but to draw
nations c10ser together' (Saikowski and Gruliow, 1962: pp. 103-5).
Khrushchev may have beencertain what the dialectical process of
rastsvet and sblizhenie signified, but for others his melting-pot scheme
had its ambiguities. Proponents of assimilation and the dismantIing of
the federal system were encouraged by the implicit commitment to
sliyanie; defenders of national statehood, however, opposed the prosp-
ect of denationalisation by stressing the importance of the flourishing of
nations as an essential prerequisite for their eventual fusion in the
remote future. The debate about the fate of nations in the USSR has
continued in one form or another ever since (see Rakowska-Harmstone,
1971: pp. 123-8; Hodnett, 1967). Needless to say, the concept offusion
has remained anathema to the non-Russian nationalities and to Russian
patriots concerned about the implications for their own nation.
At the time of his fall in October 1964 Khrushchev had begun to
deprive the republics of their newly-gained powers. The new collective
leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin continued the recentralisation.
Without changing the overall direction of Soviet nationalities policy
Khrushchev's successors nevertheless moderated the language used to
discuss the nationalities question. At the XXIII Party Congress in
March 1966 Brezhnev spoke about the drawing together of the peoples
ofthe USSR, but avoided the charged subject offusion (Pravda, 30 Mar
1966). Although the concept of sliyanie continued to be discussed in the
specialist literature Brezhnev preferred not to mention the term, and also
refrained from reiterating that the disappearance of nations was the
Party's long-term goal.
All the same, the emphasis on the drawing together ofthe nationalities
and cementing the unity of the USSR remained. This was evident at the
XXIV Party Congress in the spring of 1971 at which Brezhnev
announced the emergence of a 'new historical community of people - the
Soviet people' (sovetskii narod) (Pravda, 31 Mar 1971). It was also spelt
out by hirn the following year in his address on the fiftieth anniversary of
the USSR when he warned that the 'Party considers impermissible any
attempts whatsoever to hold back the process ofthe drawing together of
nations ... or [which] artificially reinforce national isolation, as counter
to the general direction of the development of our society, to the
international ideals of communists and the ideology and interests of
communist construction' (Pravda, 22 Dec 1972). The central leader-
ship's determination to ensure that this line was adhered to was
demonstrated by the political and cultural purge in the Ukraine of 1972-
 Bohdan Nahaylo 77

3 which saw the removal of the republic's first secretary and CPSU
Politburo member Pyotr Shelest because of his identification with the
resurgence of Ukrainian national assertiveness (see Tillet, 1975).

4.2 FORGING THE SOVIET PEOPLE

From the early I 970s onwards the crystallisation of the 'Soviet people'
became the dominant theme in official statements dealing with the
nationalities question. This was hardly a new idea: it had been advanced
at the beginning of the 1960s (Voprosy Filosofii, no. 9, 1961: pp. 35-6)
and Khrushchev had referred to it at the XXII Party Congress
(Saikowsky and Gruliow, 1962: p.84). The Brezhnev leadership,
however, adapted the concept to the requirements of aperiod in which
tacit recognition was being given to the realisation that communism was
not just around the corner and that a protracted interim stage of
'developed' or 'mature' socialism would first have to be traversed. With
sliyanie deferred indefinitely by implication, the notion of the Soviet
people provided the Soviet leadership with an expedient formula
whereby the enduring multinational nature of the Soviet state could be
acknowledged but the emphasis placed on a supposedly higher unity
transcending national distinctions and based on shared values.
For all the stress on internationalist ideals it is noteworthy that the
initial promotion of the idea of the Soviet people was accompanied by a
renewed emphasis on the pre-eminence of the Russian nation. For
example, in his address to the XXIV Party Congress, Brezhnev praised
the 'revolutionary energy, diligence and profound internationalism of
the Great Russian people', adding that these qualities 'have rightfully
won them the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist homeland'
(Pravda, 31 Mar 1971).
The idea ofthe Soviet people figured in the preamble to the new Soviet
constitution, promulgated ·in 1977, which retained the federal structure
in its existing form (Pravda, 8 Oct 1977). Introducing the new
constitution Brezhnev revealed that 'some comrades', though apparen-
tly not many, had reached 'incorrect conclusions', about the nature of
the Soviet people. They had proposed 'introducing into the Constitution
the concept of an integral Soviet nation', and 'Iiquidating Union and
autonomous republics orcurtailing sharply the sovereignty ofthe Union
republics. Rejecting these suggestions Brezhnev said that the 'social and
political unity of the Soviet people does not at all imply that national
distinctions have disappeared'. It would be reckless and contrary to
78 Nationalities

Lenin's precept, he warned, artificially to force the 'objective process of

the drawing together of nations' (Pravda, 5 Oct 1977).
When it came to the language issue though, the Brezhnev leadership
did not display such discretion. Already in the mid-1970s the Russian-
language press had been quietly increased while at the same time the
circulation of non-Russian periodieals was gradually restricted
(Szporluk, 1984). Then, in the spring of 1978, the central authorities
provoked considerable resentment by attempting to withdraw the
constitutionally guaranteed status of Georgian, Annenian and Azeri as
state languages in the new constitutions of the three Transcaucasian
republics. In the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, demonstrations broke out
and thousands took to the streets. Faced· with such detennined
opposition, the authorities retreated and the moves were abandoned
(Sheehy, 1978a).
Despite the delicacy ofthe language issue, far-reaching legislation was
introduced in 1978 - 9 to increase the teaching and study of the Russian
language in the non- Russian republics. The new measures covered every
level of the educational system and for the first time extended the
teaching of Russian to kindergartens and nurseries. Aimed ostensibly at
the attainment of complete bilingualism in the Soviet Union, the one-
sided character of the changes was apparent from the fact that no
provision was made to encourage the 23.9 million Russians living in
non-Russian republics in 1979 to learn the local language. Not
surprisingly the renewed emphasis on the Russian language as the
'second native language' for the non-Russians and as an 'effective
accelerator ofthe drawing-together of nations' was perceived in the non-
Russian republics as an intensification of linguistic Russification.
Between 1979 and 1981 there were protests by dissidents in the Baltic
republics and the Ukraine and demonstrations in Georgia and Estonia.
In Lithuania more than 5000 people signed a petition to the authorities
in defence of the mother-tongue, while in Georgia and Estonia 365 and
40 intellectuals respectively signed statements expressing concern about
encroachments on their nations' national rights by Russification
(Solchanyk, 1982a).
The drive to ensure that non-Russians master the Russian language
was evidently a response to complications connected with the nation-
alities question that began to make themselves feit during the 1970s.
Demographie trends in particular brought the Soviet leadership all
manner of headaches. Because of the declining Russian birth-rate and
the very high growth rates of the central Asian peoples it became c1ear
that by the end of the century, on the one hand, the Russians would no
 Bohdan Nahaylo 79

longer be a majority nation, while on the other hand, between one in four
and one in five of all Soviet citizens would probably have a Muslim
background. The 1979 Soviet Census subsequently showed that the
Russians accounted for 52.4 per cent of the total Soviet population of
262 million (down from 53.4 per cent in 1970). According to one Soviet
forecast, if present trends continue, by the year 2000 the share of the
Russians would be down to around 46 per cent. The Census also
revealed that almost 40 per cent of the non-Russians in the USSR had
little or no knowledge of Russian (Solchanyk, 1982a: pp. 23-5).
Apart from whatever psychological and political fears these demogra-
phie developments may have raised there were also serious ramifications
for the economy and the armed forces. The European part of the Soviet
Union and the rich but underdeveloped regions of Siberia and the Far
North are chronically short of manpower. Rural areas of Central Asia
and parts of the Caucasus, however, have large and growing labour
surpluses. Yet the unassimilated Central Asians remain highly reluctant
to leave their homelands and migrate to labour-deficit areas. They also
constitute a rapidly increasing proportion of draftees: today already
approximately every sixth or seventh draftee is a Central Asian.
Together with other non-Russian speakers, they have to be integrated
into multinational units in which Rus·sian is the sole language of
command and instruction (Azrael, 1978; Sheehy, 1978b). These
problems were compounded by the tenacity and complexity of national
consciousness, something which was increasingly recognised in the more
sophisticated specialist literature on the nationalities question which
began appearing in the second half of the 1970s and the recurrence of
national assertiveness among the non-Russians. All these factors
inevitably had implications for cadres policy, economic development
policies and any possible reforms entailing decentralisation.
This predicament seems to have spurred the Brezhnev leadership to
take the sort of decisive action in the sphere of nationalities policy that it
was loath to do in other areas where there were mounting difficulties. In
what appeared to be a race against time it stepped up its efforts to
integrate the Soviet state and to bolster the position of the Russian
language. But the measures adopted by the Brezhnev leadership were by
no means dicta ted solely by cogent and strictly practical considerations.
The evidence suggests that demographie trends put the Russians on the
defensive and that, apart from an ensuing upsurge of Russian national-
ism, measures were taken to safeguard Russian dominance. The
percentage of Russians in the CPSU Central Committee rose from
around 57 per cent in 1966 to 68 per cent in 1981; the CPSU Central
80 Nationalities

Commitee Secretariat remained virtually a Russian preserve; and

Russian representation in the Politburo increased from 6 out of 11 full
members in 1966, to 10 out of 14 in 1981 (Duncan, 1986a: p. 17).
Furthermore, in his final years Brezhnev and those around hirn seemed
to go out of their way to extol the virtues of the 'great Russian people'
and permitted blatant manifestations of Russian nationalism, such as
occurred in 1980 during the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the
defeat ofthe Tatars by the Muscovites at Kulikovo Pole, and in 1981 in
connection with the centenary of Dostoevsky's death (Dunlop, 1985:
chs 1 and 2; and Duncan, forthcoming).
Even more revealing though was the emphasis placed on forging a
Slavic bloc of Russians, Ukrainian and Belorussians to serve as the
nuc1eus of the Soviet people. The Ukrainians and Belorussians, who as
Slavs are linguistically c10sest to the Russians, in 1979 comprised 20 per
cent ofthe Soviet population. With their assimilation the preponderance
of an almost 200-million-strong 'Russian' core within the Soviet people
would be assured. Consequently the pressure on the mother-tongue in
the Ukraine and Belorussia was stepped up and the histories of the two
nations distorted even further in order to emphasise the oneness of the
two nations with the Russians both in the past and in the present. The
means used to promote the cohesion ofthe Ukrainians and Belorussians
with the Russians even inc1uded stressing common blood links and
'genetic affinity', and depicting the ancient state of Kievan-Rus as a
prototype of the USSR (Solchanyk, 1982b).

4.3 THE PARTY ACKNOWLEDGES THE DIFFICULTI ES

At the XXVI Party Congress in February 1981 Brezhnev admitted that

the nationalities question was still troublesome. The 'unity of the Soviet
nations is stronger than ever before' , he said, but 'this does not imply, of
course, that all questions in the sphere of national relations have been
resolved. The dynamics of the development of such a large, multin-
ational state as ours gives rise to a good many problems requiring the
Party's tactful attention.' Specifically Brezhnev raised two themes which
have assumed considerable importance during the 1980s. First, he
mentioned the problem of utilising the growing manpower surplus in
Central Asia and the Caucasus. In what seemed to be an implicit
acknowledgement of the difficulty of persuading members of the
southern nationalities to move to labour-deficit regions, he called on
Party organisations to pay c10ser attention to the 'specific needs in the
 Bohdan Nahaylo 81

fields oflanguage, culture and everyday life' of individuals living outside

their own republics. Presumably, the thinking here was that the
provision of basic cultural facilities would make the idea of migration
more attractive. In retrospect, it seems that the only real follow-up to
these instructions was the announcement in July 1982 that the non-
Russian periodical press would be made available on subscription
throughout the Soviet Union (Sheehy, 1982b).
Second, Brezhnev spoke of the need for due representation in Party
and government organs of all nationalities living in a given republic.
What he was in fact geuing at was the centralleadership's concern about
the consequences of affirmative action policies giving preferential
treatment to representatives of the indigenous population as regards
access to higher education and top-level job opportunities. The result in
some republics was an overrepresentation ofthe titular nationality in the
top Party and government organs. At a time of growing national
assertiveness among the local elites, especially in the Central Asian
republics, Russians and members of other non-indigenous nationalities
had co me to see themselves as victims of exclusionary practices and had
begun to question their prospects in communities where they are
regarded as outsiders. By bringing up this issue Brezhnev indicated that
in certain republies affirmative action had gone too far and that the
situation needed to be rectified. As if to underline the message he also
praised the 'disinterested assistance of the Russian people' to the non-
Russian nationalities (Pravda, 23 Feb 1981).
During the last months of the Brezhnev era and, intriguingly, after
Yury Andropov had moved from the KGB to the Party Secretariat the
debate among Soviet social scientists about aspects of the nationalities
question appeared to sharpen, the focus of attention being the
controversial subject of fusion. At a major all-Union Conference on
'The Development of National Relations in Conditions of Advanced
Socialism' held in Riga in J':lne 1982, the chief editor of Kommunist, R. I.
Kosolapov, attacked certain specialists, including the authoritative head
of the Section for the Theory of Nations and National Relations of the
Party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Mikhail I. Kulichenko, for
'ignoring the Leninist idea of the fusion of nations, or worse still ...
portraying it as an echo of great power chauvinism'. Kosolapov,
however, proposed a novel interpretation of fusion by arguing that it
was not synonymous with the 'destruction of national features and the
effacing of alliinguistic and ethnic differences'. Although he subsequen-
tly re-emphasised the aim of fusion in editorials in Kommunist, it was
c1ear that by no means everyone agreed with his line and that for many,
82 Nationalities

as Kulichenko pointed out, fusion still engendered 'pessimism and

despondency' (Olcott, 1985: pp. 109-11; Sheehy, 1982b).
Nevertheless, soon after Andropov succeeded Brezhnev, he publicly
endorsed the conceptof fusion. Speaking on the occasion of the sixtieth
anniversary ofthe USSR in December 1982 he reaffirmed that: 'Our end
goal is clear. It, to quote Lenin, is not only to bring the nations closer
together but to fuse them.' Andropov sweetened the pill somewhat by
saying that the 'Party is weil aware that the road to this goal is a long
one.' On no account, he continued, 'must there be either any forestalling
of events or any holding back of processes that have already matured'.
Problems in the sphere of national relations would remain as long as
nations and national distinctions survive, and 'these will exist for a long
time to come, much longer than class distinctions'. Significantly
Andropov also acknowledged what Soviet social scientists had been
pointing out in their works, namely that national consciousness among
the heterogeneous population was not weakening and, if anything, was
growing stronger. 'The record shows', he said, 'that the economic and
cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied by the
growth of their national self-awareness.' For these reasons Andropov
stressed that the nationalities question was 'still on the agenda in the
society of developed socialism' and that it was essential that the Party
devised a 'carefully considered, scientific policy' to deal with it.
Showing rather more frankness than his predecessor, Andropov
stated that it would be wrong to blame 'negative phenomena' in the field
ofnational relations solely 'on survivals from the past' when in fact they
were 'sometimes fostered by the mi stakes we make in our work'. In this
sensitive area, he continued, 'everything counts' - the attitude to the
language, to monuments of the past, the interpretation of historical
events, and the way we transform rural and urban areas and inftuence
living and working conditions' (TASS, 21 Dec 1982). This more sober
approach to the nationalities problem, which perhaps reftected
Andropov's intimate knowledge of the grievances of non-Russian
national rightscampaigners from his lengthy tenure as head ofthe KGB,
was also apparent in his remarks on the nationalities question made
three weeks later before the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
(Radio Moscow, 12 Jan 1983). On both occasions the new leader
condemned national conceit and disrespectful attitudes towards other
nations and, in something of an unsual departure, seemed to want to
reassure members of the less numerous peoples of the USSR -
'Germans, Poles, Koreans, Kurds' and others - that they are 'fully-
ftedged Soviet citizens'.
 Bohdan Nahaylo 83

Like Brezhnev at the XXVI Party Congress Andropov emphasised

the economic aspects ofthe nationalities question, particularly the need
for greater economic integration and 'further improvement in the
distribution of the productive forces', and also raised the issue of due
representation. In an oblique way he voiced the central leadership's
concern that the Central Asians are clinging to their traditional way of
li fe and not pulling their weight in the economic sphere. Here Andropov
stressed the positive role of migration and multinational workers'
brigades in fostering the internationalist spirit, and spoke of the
'economic and political' need for the indigenous nationalities to be more
fully represented in the working class in certain republics (TASS, 21 Dec
1982).
Six months later, at a plenum ofthe CPSU Central Committee held on
14-15 June 1983, both Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, who
delivered areport on the Party's ideological work, touched on nation-
alities policy, but made no reference to fusion. It is still unclear why
Andropov revived this concept in the first place, and why it again
vanished from subsequent statements made by members of the Soviet
leadership. An article wh ich appeared during the spring of 1983 in
Kommunist by one of the Soviet Union's leading experts on the
nationalities question, Yulian Bromlei, however, suggested that the idea
of fusion was being restored all the same. The latter proposed a planned
nationalities policy to this end promoting a process of assimilation
which he called 'inter-ethnic integration' (Kommunist, no.5 (1983):
pp. 56-64). At the June plenum Andropov simply stated that nation-
alities policy would 'hold an appropriate place in the new edition of the
CPSU programme', and apart from reiterating that the Party was set on
an 'unswerving course' of drawing together the peoples of the USSR,
was not more forthcoming (Pravda, 16 June 1983).
On that particular occasion it was Chernenko who was more candid.
He also stressed the importance of pursuing a 'well-thought-out
scientific nationalities policy' and added that ideological work in a
multinational state was 'unthinkable without a thorough study' of the
specific interests of all the nationalities and the 'peculiarities of national
mentality and culture'. Maintaining that the key to success lay in the
intensification of internationalist education, he singled out two par-
ticular problems. Not all Soviet citizens, especially those in regions with
surplus manpower, he admitted, were willing to fulfil their international-
ist duty by going to work 'wherever their labour is called for by the
interests of the state as a whole'. The Party, he admitted, was still
searching for a way out of this quandary. The second issue was that of
84 Nationalities

the 'perfect command of Russian as the language of interaction among

nations'. Here Chernenko noted that there were still'quite a few cases' of
Soviet citizens who were handicapped by a poor knowledge of Russian.
Clearly his concern that inadequate progress was being made in
language-planning policies was shared by other members of the Soviet
leadership for in the month preceding the plenum the CPSU Central
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a joint
resolution on supplementary measures to improve the teaching of
Russian in the non-Russian republics (Pravda, 27 May 1983). Moreover
the major school reform initiated by Andropov at the same plenum,
among other things, envisaged proficiency in the Russian language as a
norm for all young people graduating from secondary establishments
(Pravda, 4 Jan 1984).
Ouring Andopov's brief period at the helm there were several other
developments that had a bearing on the nationalities question. For one,
the Party leadership's attitude towards Russian nationalism was
distinctiy cool. Andropov, evidentiy, was among those who feit that
Russian nationalism had been allowed to get out of hand and that its
exponents - the so-called Russian party, had to be brought back into line
(Ounlop, 1985: chs land 2). This did not mean, however, that he was
prepared to make concessions to the non-Russians. In his jubilee speech
of Oecember 1982 he did not fail to include a standard expression of
gratitude to the Russian people for 'their disinterested fraternal
assistance' to the non-Russians and while he was in control permitted no
let-up in the supression of non-Russian national dissent.
For the Central Asians though, Andropov did give some grounds for
encouragement: shortiy after his takeover a controversial and long-
discussed scheme to divert so me of the waters of Siberian rivers
southward to arid areas in Central Asia and Kazakhstan appeared to
receive the go-ahead from the central authorities. Faced with the
prospect of acute water shortages in their republics by the end of the
century arising from economic development and the population
explosion, the elites in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and especially
Uzbekistan, had lobbied for several years for the ambitious project,
known as 'Sibaral', to be approved (Voronitsyn, 1983). This scherne,
and a similar one to divert part ofthe flow ofrivers in the Russian North
to the Volga basin, however, became rallying-points for Russian
nationalists opposed to the projects on cultural and ecological grounds.
Konstantin Chernenko, who took over as Party Secretary-General in
February 1984 did not even last as long as Andropov. Ouring his 13
months in power he made only one noteworthy statement about the
 Bohdan Nahaylo 85

nationalities question. This was in his speech at the plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee in April 1984. He too reiterated that the nationalities
question 'may not be removed from the agenda' and that it needed to be
studied seriously with 'all the fine points of the matter' being taken into
account. Somewhat cryptically, considering that he was speaking at a
time when a new edition of the Party Programme was being prepared,
Chernenko added that 'we do not see relations between nationalities
which have taken shape in our state as something congealed and
unalterable, and not subject to the inftuence of new circumstances and
time' (Pravda, 11 Apr 1984).
The new frankness shown by Soviet leaders from the XXVI Party
Congress onwards in acknowledging and identifying problems in the
sphere ofnational relations was reftected in the more realistic writings of
scholars and Party experts. The Azeri, Afrand Dashmirov, for instance,
called for an end 'to a declarative approach' to nationalities policy
(Literaturnaya Gazeta, no.5 (1984): pp. 33-9), while the Lithuanian,
Genrikhas Zimanas, criticised the 'hushing up of shortcomings and
mi stakes' in this area (Zhurnalist, no. 8 (1984): pp. 22-4). But the most
revealing article to appear, though, was G. T. Tavadov's 'Toward a
Characterisation of the Contemporary Stage of National Relations in
the USSR' (Nauchnyi kommunizm, no.5 (1984): pp. 33-9).
Tavadov pointed out that, in the 1970s and early 1980s, 'a "facile",
simplistic idea about nationalities problems in the period of developed
socialism prevailed in the scientific and propagandistic literature' and
existing difficulties and 'contradictions' had been glossed over. Since the
XXVI Party Congress, with the Party leadership having shifted the
emphasis from highlighting 'our successes' to dealing with the 'problems
that require attention and prompt resolution', there was no longer any
excuse for complacency. Tavadov confirmed, however, that although it
was being increasingly recognised that 'national problems even under
contemporary conditions are complicated and require special attention',
a number ofbasic difficulties had to be contended with: there was no real
consensus among Soviet experts 'on a number of important aspects of
the theory and practice ofnational relations'; there was no unanimity of
views even on the 'essence ofthe nationalities question under socialism';
and, Soviet social scientists had 'not yet sufficiently elaborated the
meaning and content of the principal Party tenets on the nationalities
question'.
Tavadov noted four groups of 'non-antagonistic' contradictions still
troubling the multinational Soviet state. First, the contradictions arising
between the interests of a particular nation and those of the Soviet
86 Nationalities

people as a whole, especially, as he put it, in the economic sphere.

Second, contradictions in relations between the national republics,
particularly over the resolution of regional economic problems. Third,
contradictions in relations between different nationalities within
national republics and, fourth, contradictions occurring in workplaces,
educational and scientific institutions and creative organisations with a
multinational composition. Tavadov also charged that, in their
approach to the officially prescribed formulation of the simultaneous
ftourishing and drawing together of nations, many specialists 'play
down or simply do not notice the complexity of the process and its
contradictory nature'. This particular contradiction, he argued, will be
resolved only when the fusion of nations is completed. All in all tben,
Tavadov's article revealed that the nationalities question in tbe Soviet
Union was more complex and serious than previously admitted, and
that experts were just as much at a loss in proposing solutions as the
Party leadership seemed to be.

4.4 GORBACHEV TAKES OVER

This then was the general situation with respect to the nationalities
question when Mikhail Gorbachev took over in March 1985. Althougb
the new leader came from ethnically mixed Stavropol krai, be was not
known as someone who had been particularly interested in this issue. In
a major speech as ideology chief and heir apparent to Chemenko,
delivered before an all-Union conference on ideology in December 1984,
Gorbachev had made it c1ear that he was primarily interested in the
economic aspects of the nationalities question. Describing the nation-
alities sphere as the 'most complex area of social relations', he placed at
the top of his list of outstanding problems the 'rational distribution of
productive forces and their further integration into tbe overall national
economic complex' (Gorbachev, 1985d: p.3I).
During his first year in power Gorbachev made no major pronoun-
cements on the nationalities question and there was relatively little on
which to base a preliminary assessment ofhis attitude on this issue. The
initial signs did not suggest, however, that the Party's new Secretary-
General was particularly tactful when it came to the sensitivities of the
non-Russians. On 8 May 1985, for instance, in his address on the eve of
the fortieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Gorbachev
echoed Stalin 's famous toast of24 May 1945 eulogising the 'Ieading' role
ofthe Great Russian people during the Second World War, wbicb bad
 Bohdan Nahaylo 87

ushered in a wave of Russian chauvinism (TASS, 8 May 1985). The

following month, during a visit to Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine,
Gorbachev twice referred in an extemporaneous street conversation
shown on Moscow Television to the Soviet Union as 'Russia'. On
realising his mistake he only made matters worse by offering a clumsy
excuse (Nahaylo, 1985).
. Apart from these developments there was also some circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Gorbachev may harbour Russian nationalist
sympathies. It has been noted for example, that while he was responsible
for ideology under Chernenko, the Russian nationalist current in
literature was allowed to reassert itself and guidelines for non-Russian
historians were tightened up. Shortly after Gorbachev's accession the
controversial Russian nationalist painter Ilya Glazunov was appointed
director of a new State Museum situated in a former imperial residence.
During 1985 the commemoration in June of the eightieth anniversary of
the birth of Mikhail Sholokhov and the year-long celebrations of the
800th anniversary of the The Lay 0/ the Host 0/ [gor had a distinct
Russian nationalist ftavour (Nahaylo, 1985, and Tolz, 1985). On the
other hand, while there were no obvious corresponding gestures made
towards the non-Russians. Gorbachev proceeded to appoint Aleksandr
Yakovlev, a known critic ofRussian nationalists, as weil as an expert on
the USA, to head the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central
Committee. So far, there is no evidence that this move was connected
with Yakovlev's antagonism towards Russian nationalism.
If, during his first year in power, Gorbachev stayed clear of the
nationalities question, the Kremlin's new ideology chief and 'second'
secretary, Egor Ligachev, lost no time in so unding a tough note. During
a visit to Armenia in June 1985, he stressed that it was necessary to
'assert Soviet patriotism and internationalism with diverse practical
deeds'. Specifically he mentioned: 'The fulfilment of collaborative
deliveries to other republics, the interrepublic exchange of specialists
and students, mastery o( the Russian language - the language of
interrepublic contacts.' These, Ligachev said, were the questions 'to
which Party committees and public organisations must devote constant
attention'. He also singled out the issue of the 'participation by the
working people of the Union republics in the commercial development
of the productive forces of Siberia and the Far East'. More had to be
done in this area, he stressed. 'This is required by the country and thus,
by each republic too' (Izvestiya, 2 June 1985). Ligachev's comments had
the ring of command rather than the customary exhortation.
88 Nationalities

4.5 THE REVISED PARTY PROGRAMME AND THE XXVII

PARTY CONGRESS

In October 1985 the draft ofthe new Party Programme was published
(Pravda, 26 Oct 1985). The section on the nationalities question (as
indeed the entire document) was only half as long as its 1961
counterpart, and it contained no changes in basic policy. As before, this
was formulated as the promotion of the 'further flourishing of nations
and ethnic groups and their steady drawing together', leading to their
complete unity 'in the remote historical future'. There was no mention of
fusion. Also, as was to be expected, the notion of a 'new social and
international community - the Soviet people' was enshrined in the
revised programme.
The only real surprise was that the new draft did not once single out
the Russian people, who in the 1961 edition had been praised for their
fraternal aid to the non-Russians. Nor did it refer to the 'formerly
backward peoples'. The importance of the Russian language was
reiterated, however, and this time the need for the non-Russians to
'master' Russian in addition to their own language was stressed.
Significantly references to the possible expansion of the rights of the
Union republics in economic management and the creation of inter-
republican economic agencies were dropped, suggesting that no sub-
stantial decentralisation of economic decision-making to the republics
was envisaged. There was also no mention of the inter-republican
boundaries losing their importance as this issue had been defused in the
mid-I970s during the drafting of the new Soviet Constitution.
The Party's 'basic tasks' in the field ofnational relations were broken
down into three groupings. First, the 'all-round consolidation and
development of the multinational Soviet state', involving opposition to
all manifestations of localism and national-narrowmindedness; and the
encouragement of greater participation at all levels by representatives of
all the nationalities in the solution of all-Union tasks and in the work of
government and administration. Next came the economic imperatives
with their emphasis on the rational use of resources and the contribution
of the republics and autonomous units to the good of the 'integral
countrywide economic complex'. Concretely, the draft stated that

It is essential consistently to intensify the division of labour between

republics, level out the conditions of economic management, encourage
active participation by the republics in the economic development of new
regions, promote the inter-republican exchanges of workers and specialists,
 Bohdan Nahaylo 89

and expand and improve the training of qualified personnel from among the
citizens of all nations and nationalities Iiving in the republics (Pravda, 26 Oct.
1985).

The third group of tasks concerned the 'development of the Soviet

people's single culture - socialist in content, diverse in national forms,
and internationalist in spirit'. Included here were the standard
statements about the mutual enrichment of cultures, and the equality
and free development of languages.
For all the recent emphasis on facing up to the complications in the
sphere ofnational relations, the ensuing 'discussion' in the Soviet press
ofthe relevant section ofthe draft Party Programme was very restricted.
Glasnost, at this stage it seems, did not apply to the nationalities
question. For instance, in the letters which appeared in Pravda between
November 1985 and January 1986, there were calls for even more stress
to be placed on the Russian language, for the role ofthe Russian people
towards the non-Russians to be praised, and for an end to affirmative
action practices in higher education. The subject offederalism, or rat her,
the long-term prospects of the federal structure, was disposed of in two
letters. The few proposed amendments reftecting the concerns of the
non-Russians were markedly modest. In the event, none of the
suggestions was incorporated in the final draft.
While much of the discussion appeared to be pro forma, there were
two notable exceptions. First, the topic of fusion was brought up again.
Two Moscow-based Armenian scholars, Tsolak Stepanyan and Eduard
Tadevosyan, proposed in the pages of academic journals that the
concept of fusion be included in the new Party Programme (Voprosy
filosofii, no. 2 (1986): pp. 63-75; and Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 2 (1986):
pp. 64-9). In the Georgian daily, Kommunisti, however, Yury Kat-
charava, denounced the 'irresponsible and frivolous attitude towards
theory' and inclination to 'run ahead' on the part of'certain researchers'
and 'bad propagandists', ~hich, he claimed, had led to erroneous
conclusions about fusion and the solution of the nationalities question
(Kommunisti, 21 Feb 1986, as summarised in the BBC Monitoring
Report, no. 8213,21 Mar 1982).
Second, the draft guidelines for the Twelfth-Five-Year Plan (1986-
90) were also published at the same time as the new draft of the Party
Programme. The guidelines omitted any mention of 'Sibaral', but
included the Northern rivers diversion scheme. This precipitated the
crystallisation of an inftuential lobby group opposed to the Northern
rivers project, and by implication also to 'Sibara\'. In the months
90 Nationalities

preceding the Party Congress it made its objections known in the press.
The letter-writers inc1uded the ecologist and UN environmental expert,
Mikhail Lemeshev (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 Dec 1985); a group ofwell-
known Russian writers, inc1uding Valentin Rasputin, Vasily Be10v and
Sergei Zalygin, as well as the eminent Russian literary scholar Dmitry
Likhachev (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 3 Jan 1986); and the economist Abel
Aganbegyan (Pravda, 12 Feb 1986).
So me ofthe thornier issues that had been evaded during the discussion
of the new edition of the Party Programme were aired at the republican
Party Congresses which preceded the Party Congress. In Estonia, where
the nationalities issue has been especially acute in recent years, the
republican Party's first secretary, Karl Vaino, devoted considerable
attention in his speech to the persistence of nationalism, the apparent
lack ofenthusiasm on the part ofEstonians for Russian immigrants and
the Russian language and the susceptibility ofthe population to Western
influences (Ilves, 1986). In the case of the Central Asian republics, in
Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan, concern was expressed about
the influence of religion and its links with nationalism, as well as the
survival of 'back ward traditions and customs' (Seagram, 1986).
At the Uzbek Party Congress there wereextraordinary developments.
Here the republican Party leader, Imazhon Usmankhodzhaev, deIivered
a scathing attack on his predecessor, Sharaf Rashidov, who was the
Uzbek first Party secretary for twenty-four years until his death in 1983.
Reflecting the continuing drive against corruption in the republic, the
criticism focused primarily on the abuses which Rashidov's style of
leadership had led to: economic mismanagement, falsification of the
volume of raw cotton produced, embezzlement, nepotism and bribery.
But there were also no less sensational disdosures about Rashidov's
approach to nationalities policy. According to Usmankhodzhaev 'major
miscalculations were made in the selection, placement, and education of
ideological cadres'. There was now a serious problem with anti-religious
propaganda: 'religious rites' had 'captivated many people', induding a
significant number of Party and Komsomol members. U nofficial Islam
had not been combated forcefully enough, and there was resistance to
the 'assertion of a socialist way of life and communist morality'.
Usmankhodzhaev went on to warn that it was imperative to increase
counter-propaganda in the republic, as the 'dass enemy' was Feviving
'Iong-obsolete ideas of pan-Islamism' and inflaming 'natiorüilist pas-
sions' (Pravda Vostoka, 31 Jan 1986).
But this was not all. Rashidov had cultivated the reputation ofbeing a
keen promoter of the teaching of Russian and he had daimed enormous
 Bohdan Nahaylo 91

successes in augmenting the number of Uzbeks who were proficient in

Russian. At the Congress, however, it transpired that he had hindered
rather than assisted the process of disseminating the Russian language
and that he had evidently padded the results. His declarations about
internationalist education and the need to know Russian had not been
'backed up by concrete organisational work', and 'in an atmosphere of
lack of contro!', the teaching of Russian had actually deteriorated in
some schools (Pravda Vostoka, 2 Feb 1986).
With an unchanged course in nationalities policy already plotted in
the new edition of the Party Programme, the Party Congress produced
no real surprises. Although Gorbachev specified that the development
of national relations was of 'enormous importance' for the Soviet
multinational state, neither he, nor Ligachev, who was the only other
member of the Soviet leadership to address the nationalities question,
devoted much attention to this issue. Nevertheless, from what they had
to say, it was evident where the emphasis currently lies: Gorbachev again
accentuated the economic element, stressing that 'it is especially
important' to ensure that all the republics put the interests of the single
national economic complex above their own, and that no signs of
'Iocalism' be tolerated; Ligachev, for his part, concentrated on the
problem of due representation.
In his speech Gorbachev adhered to what has become the set formula
in the 1980s in high-level statements on the nationalities question, with
the significant exception that he omitted any reference to the debt of
gratitude supposedly owed by the non-Russians to the Russians. After
rehearsing the usual 'outstanding' achievements in the area of national
relations c1aimed by the Soviet state Gorbachev stressed that this did not
mean that 'national processes are without their problems'. He went on to
admit that the perennial evils of'national exclusiveness, localism' and a
'parasitic' attitude towards others, have not yet been overcome, and that
'reactionary-nationalistic and religious survivals' confticting with the
official ideology are still· being encountered 'in certain works of
literature, the arts and in scientific works'. The Party, he affirmed, is weil
aware of the need to proceed tactfully in everything that concerns
nationalities policy, but it will continue to wage a 'principled struggle
against all manifestations of national narrow-mindedness and
arrogance, nationalism and chauvinism' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986).
In some ways Ligachev was more direct and to the point. The central
theme of his address was the need to improve cadres policy and, in
particular, to strengthen the representation of Russians in the organs of
those non-Russian republics where 'Iocalist, compatriot (zemlyacheskie)
92 Nationalities

attitudes have taken the upper hand'. Needless to say he didnot talk
explicitly about the status of Russian personnel in the non-Russian
republics, but from the context and from what various Soviet specialists
on the nationalities question have said quite openly in recent years, it is
clear that this is what the problem of the 'correct' selection and
placement of cadres boils down to. Ligachev stated that the tendency to
deal with cadres policy purely from the standpoint of local allegiances
had resulted in the violation ofthe principle ofdue representation ofall
nationalities, prevented the inter-republican and interregional exchange
of personnel and, had led, 'in a number of cases, to self-isolation,
stagnation, and other negative phenomena'. It was essential, Ligachev
insisted, that the selection and placement of personnel be carried out in
two ways: 'both from among local comrades and through the transfer of
workers from the centre and from other regions ofthe country' (Pravda,
28 Feb 1986).
Just what this means in practice has been shown in the case of
Uzbekistan where the campaign against corruption has led to a!l
extensive purge of local Party and government personnel and the
dispatch of a considerable number of officials from the RSFSR, as
Usmankhodzhaev put it at the Party Congress, to assist in the 'restoration
of order' (Pravda, 28 Feb 1986). As a result of this 'exchange of
personneI', since the beginning of 1986, the Uzbeks, who in 1979 made
up 68.7 per cent of the population of their republic, no longer constitute
a majority in the republican Party Bureau and Secretariat. Even the post
of first secretary of the Tashkent city Party Committee has been taken
over by a Slav. Such disregard for national sensibilities in the name of
order and economic efficiency is unlikely to improve national relations
in this, the most populous of the Central Asian republics, or for that
matter in other republics with traditionally Muslim populations where
analogous developments have taken place. At a time when the
authorities have also stepped up efforts to contain religion and
nationalism in Central Asia, in Uzbekistan, at any rate, the drive against
corruption has come to be seen by some ofits indigenous inhabitants in
more sinister terms. Usmankhodzhaev himself disclosed at the Uzbek
Party Congress that 'there have been individual, albeit veiled attempts,
to portray the struggle to restore order and justice as an almost anti-
national campaign' (Pravda Vostoka, 31 Jan 1986). Moreover, the fact
that 'Sibaral' appears to have been shelved (Brown, 1985), cannot have
helped matters.
Another indication of the Party leadership's approach to the ques-
tions of due representation and the exchange ofpersonnel is the fact that
 Bohdan Nahaylo 93

there has been no significant improvement in representation for the non-

Russians in the central organs of power. Since Andropov, with the
exceptions of the Azeri, Geidar Aliev, promoted by Andropov to full
membership of the Politburo and made first Deputy Prime Minister,
Eduard Shevardnadze, a Georgian, elevated to full membership of the
Politburo and made foreign minister by Gorbachev, and Nikolai
Slyunkov, the Belorussian Party leader, who has been made a candidate
member ofthe Poltiburo under Gorbachev, all the new appointments to
the Politburo and Party Secretariat have been Russian.
At the Party Congress Ligachev also raised one other important
theme connected with the nationalities question, one which was
somewhat dissonant with the Party's usual warnings about preoccupa-
tion with, or idealisation of, the past. The 'Party', he said, 'highly values
and supports the upsurge in patriotic feeling, ofwhich we are all aware,
and the increased public interest in the homeland and the wealth of our
age-old, multinational culture'. Ligachev, who is known to have played
a role in the preservation ofhistorical sites in the ancient city ofTomsk
(The Guardian, 22 May 1985), praised efforts to preserve 'all that is dear
to the people's memory', and declared that the 'Party must take people
strictly to task for neglect ofnational shrines'. It is unclear to what extent
this is meant to apply equally to all peoples of the Soviet Union. So far,
as the activities of Academician Likhachev would seem to demonstrate,
it seems as ifit is mainly the Russians who are being given more scope for
affirming their past and expressing their concern about the preservation
of historical monuments. Whether this is simply a means of placating
Russian nationalism, and what, if any, repercussions this will have for
the non-Russians, remains to be seen.
On one crucial issue - that of the diversion of the Siberian and
Northern rivers - the clash of interests between Russians concerned with
the protection of the environment and their national heritage in the
Russian North, and Central Asians anxious to secure much-needed
irrigation water for their traditionally Muslim southern republics, has
al ready come to a head. For instance, Academician Likhachev,
appearing on Moscow television on 13 March 1986, protested that the
population of the Russian North was threatened with losing its 'native
country in order to divert water to the south'. On the other hand, at the
Party Congress, speaking as it were, for the Central Asian lobby pressing
for the implementation ofthe Siberian river-diversion project, Usmank-
hodzhaev stressed that the fulfilment of'national economic tasks' in his
republic was being hindered by the 'shortage of water resources'.
Expressing dismay about the continuing 'fruitless' discussions about
94 Nationalities

'Sibaral' , he asked, 'At the end of the day we need an answer. What are
we to doT (Pravda, 28 Feb 1986). This problem does not seem to have
been resolved: although the Northern river-diversion project was
dropped from the final text of the Economic Guidelines adopted by the
Party Congress, several Russian writers complained at the VII Congress
ofthe Writers' Union ofthe USSR that preliminary work on the scheme
was nevertheless continuing (Literaturnaya Gazeta, 2 July 1986).

4.6 SINCE THE PARTY CONGRESS

After the Party Congress there were several signs that, as far as the
nationalities question is concerned, Central Asia has become the
Kremlin's chief headache. In early April 1986 an all-Union scientific
conference on improving national relations was held in Tashkent and it
seems that it focused largely on the Central Asian nationalities (Pravda
Vostoka, 4, 5 and 6 Apr 1986). The following month a two-day
conference on improving the military-patriotic education of young
people and their preparation for military service was convened in
Tashkent by the Central Committees of the Uzbek and Turkmen Parties
(Pravda Vostoka, 16 and 17 May 1986). The problem of integrating
Central Asian conscripts into the armed forces has certainly not been
belittled in recent years. The military has pressed for better Russian-
language training and, from time to time has also emphasised the need
for the basic cuItural needs of non-Russian troops to be respected
(Voennyi Vestnik, nO.9 (Sep 1985): pp. 6-9). Efforts have also been
made to encourage non-Slavs to apply for officer training. Then, shortly
after this particular conference, Kommunist published an authoritative
overview ofthe nationalities question in the light ofthe Party Congress
by Academician Yulian Bromlei. What was particularly striking about
the piece was that most of the problems discussed by the author were
connected primarily with the Central Asian republics (Kommunist, no. 8
(1986): pp. 78-86).
Under Gorbachev the tendency has been to view the nationalities
question from an economic angle. The latest developments, however,
serve as warnings against any narrow approach and indicate that the
problem of national relations is probably more acute today than the
Party is usually prepared to let on. They also reveal the risks for the
authorities inherent in any real opening up of the discussion in this
sensitive sphere. On 25 June 1986, for example, Moscow television broke
a long-standing Soviet taboo by disclosing that racial disturbances had
 Bohdan Nahaylo 95

recently occurred in Yakutsk, involving Yakuts and Russians. This in

itself was remarkable enough. But the admission raises the awkward
questions of what lies hehind the ethnic antagonism, and how have the
Yakuts fared under Soviet rule?
Nations far larger than the Yakuts continue to express their anxieties
about their situation and prospects as part ofthe 'Soviet People'. In the
first half of June the Congress of the Writers' Union of the Ukraine
brought outspoken statements of concern by Ukrainian intellectuals
about the role and status of their mother-tongue and about their
nation's cultural heritage (Literaturna Ukraina, 12 and 19 June 1986).
Later that month, the Ukrainian writer Boris Oliynyk, speaking at the
all-Union Writers' Congress in Moscow, used strong language to
denounce 'home-grown' Russifiers, who in their zeal to implement
'political orthodoxy' in the republics 'in the name ofthe Russian people'
act as 'great-power chauvinists' and violate 'Leninist principles' of
Soviet nationalities policy. Furthermore, he also alluded to the political
aspect of the language issue, stating that: 'The problems of the native
language in the school, in the theatre, in the kindergartens - this is
alreadya question of our Leninist nationalities policy, and the violation
of its principles wounds deeply' (Literaturna Ukraina, 3 July 1986).
The all-Union Writers' Congress, with its considerable glasnost, saw
other revealing developments as regards the nationalities question.
Among other things Georgian writers protested against what they saw
as a Russian nationalist slur on their nation, eliciting apologetic
statements from several Russian authors; the Armenian Vardges
Petrosyan complained about the stereotyping and caricaturing of non-
Russians from the Caucasus and Central Asia in Soviet films; and the
Russian writer, Vasily Belov, proclaimed his rejection of the notion of
nations heing slowly obliterated through 'fusing' them with others
(Literaturnaya Gazeta, 2 July 1986). Ouring a relatively brief period of
greater openness then, so me of the jagged edges of the nationalities
question were exposed.

4.7 CONCLUSION

For Gorbachev, like his predecessors, the significance of the nation-

alities question appears to lie not so much in the potential threat to the
stability of the system, as in the hearing which it has on the Kremlin's
ability to deal with key problems in the socio-political, economic and
military spheres. In recent years both the Party and the specialists have
96 Nationalities

been more ready to acknowledge so me ofthe difficulties in this area, but

have had little to otfer in the way of solutions. In view of the intricacy of
the nationalities question and the unchanging general goals of Soviet
nationalities policy, there is relatively little room for Gorbachev to
manreuvre in. It is therefore likely that the Kremlin's policy will consist
of more of the same, with perhaps even greater urgency about
intensifying political and economic integration accompanied with a
growing, if grudging, recognition of the durability of national identity.
5 The Economy
PHILIP HANSON 1

5.1 INTRODUCTION: GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC

INHERIT ANCE

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev inherited an economy that was

growing too slowly for his, or any other Soviet leader's, comfort. It is this
lack of economic dynamism that is the central issue for Soviet economic
policy.
Gorbachev soon made it cIear that faster growth was not merely
desirable but urgently needed. In several speeches he emphasised the
proposition (which derives from Lenin via Andropov) that the future of
socialism in the world depends on its economic success. He has implied
that, on present trends, the future of socialism - by which is meant the
future ofSoviet power- is injeopardy. In a speech in Leningrad in May
of last year, he said that the recent official national income growth of
about 3 per cent per annum was not good enough: 'Calculations show
that we need a minimum of 4' (Gorbachev, 1985b, p. Il).
The reasons why the sluggish growth of the Soviet economy is a
matter of overriding political importance are weil known. In an
assessment of Gorbachev's policies so far, however, they are worth
repeating.
First, in any comparison with Western countries, the Soviet official
growth figures are too flattering to the USSR. In terms ofWestern-style
GNP, and with concealed inflation properly allowed for, Soviet real
national income has been increasing at 2.0- 2.5 per cent a year so far in
the I 980s, and not at the 3.0-3.5 per cent indicated by Soviet data. That
is roughly equivalent to only 1.0-1.5 per cent growth in GNP per head
ofpopulation. Estimating Soviet GNP in 1982 rouble prices, instead of
the 1970 rouble prices previously used, the CIA in early 1986 produced
an assessment of Soviet growth in 1984-5 of about 1.5 per cent per
annum against about 2 per cent in their previous assessments (CIA/DIA
97
98 TheEconomy

1986, table A-I). That implies a growth ofGNPper head ofpopulation

of only about 0.5 per cent a year.
Second, the very slow growth of the past seven years is part of a long-
run slowdown that goes all the way back to the 1950s. If this tendency
continued the economy would pass through zero growth to absolute
decline (Kontorovich, 1985a; see also Table 6.1).
Third, the Soviet Union is in military competition with the West and
China. It already allocates a much larger share of GNP to military
purposes than Western countries do. Ifit were to have slower economic
growth than the USA over a long period, it would eventually be unable
to maintain its status as one of the two military superpowers.
Fourth, the USSR is also engaged in 'peaceful economic competition'
with the West, China and Japan. The politicalleaders want to exhibit
faster economic growth than their main competitors. They want this·
partly for the sake of the Soviet Union's prestige in the world at large and
partly to support their authority in their own country.
Khrushchev and, in his first years in office, Brezhnev could point to
existing economic trends and say that the future of socialism was bright.
The CIA's estimates of Soviet GNP in 1983 US dollars show it rising
from 47.7 per cent ofUS GNP in 1960 to 57.9 per cent in 1975. By 1983
the gap had widened and the percemage was down to 55.7 (derived from
Handbook 0/ Economic Statistics 1984, pp. 32-3). In 1984, when US
GNP grew by about 7 per cent and Soviet GNP by about 2.0 per cent,
Soviet GNP as a percentage ofthat ofthe USA would have gone below
54. The Soviet failure to narrow the gap in the past decade even shows up
in the Soviet annual statistical handbook, though one has to look
through several different issues to detect it. The official Soviet estimate
ofthe USSR's net material product as a percentage ofthat ofthe USA
has been stuck at 67 since 1975 (Narkhoz /984: p. 67; Narkhoz za 60 let:
p.95). The Soviet Central Statistical Administration is therefore
acknowledging. albeit by implication and in a mufHed whisper, that the
absolute gap in dollars or roubles between the two countries' total
outputs has been increasing.
The final reason why slow growth is of such political importance has
to do with consumption levels. If real GNP per head of population is
growing at 1.0-1.5 per cent a year the competition for resources between
defence. investment and consumption is necessarily severe. It is shar-
pened by the structural problem of the farm sector. Soviet food
production has been barely keeping up with population growth over the
past five years. It is true that some Western observers still believe that
Soviet policy-makers are not concerned about the consumption levels of
 Philip Hanson 99

the Soviet population. If Soviet citizens have to tighten their belts, the
story goes, the Soviet leaders will cheerfully blame imperialism and
order the production ofshorter belts. The evidence ofthe later Brezhnev
years, however, shows that this view is false.
During 1976-82 about one-third of all investment was allocated to
the agro-industrial sector, and up to two-fifths of annual hard-currency
import spending was on food imports. The opportunity cost of these
efforts to prop up food-consumption levels, in non-agricultural develop-
ment and technology imports forgone, was high. Meanwhile the growth
rate of total investment and (apparently) of defence spending slowed
down (see Kaufman, 1985, on the evidence about defence spending).
Whatever the mixture of accident and deli berate policy that produced
this outcome, it is incompatible with a caricature of Soviet economic
policy-making at which, at the margin, consumption counts for nothing.
The economic situation that Gorbachev inherited was, therefore, one
that, for all these reasons, posed momentous political problems. It was
not a crisis: there was no immediate risk of break down of the Soviet
social system. There was, however, a distinct possibility that it would
cease to be feasible simultaneously to maintain military superpower
status, to keep average consumption levels rising and to invest enough to
prevent a further slowdown in the future. Worse still, there were already
reasons to expect a further slowdown. The capital stock was likely, on
unchanged policies, to grow at 5.0-5.5 per cent per year in 1986-90,
compared with 6.3 per cent in the early 1980s. Labour-force growth was
expected, on demographic grounds, to slow from 0.8 per cent a year in
1976-82 to 0.4-0.5 per cent in 1986-90. And the depletion of existing
mines and oil and gas fields was driving natural-resource development
even farther north in Siberia, raising resource exploitation costs still
further (Hanson, I 984b).
In his early speeches Gorbachev spoke with unusual candour about
the seriousness of the situation. (In particular on 8 April 1985 (Radio
Moscow-2, 23 April 1985); "at the Central Committee Plenum in April
1985 (Radio Moscow-2, 23 April 1985); and above all at a meeting under
Central Committee auspices on technology policy on 11 June 1985 (BBC
Summary ofWorld Broadcasts SU/7976/c/l-19 of I3 June 1985.) In the
Pravda versions of these speeches many of the most interesting passages
were cut out. (He began by demanding and, in effect, promising an
acceleration of growth that would be both prompt and dramatic. The
acceleration of national-income growth to at least 4 per cent a year has
already been mentioned. Gorbachev did not specify a deadline for this,
but he gave the impression that the day after tomorrow would be about
100 TheEconomy

right. In April he said that industrial growth would be 50-100 per cent
faster in 1986-90 (Pravda, 24 April 1985). Being a politician he did not
say what it should be 50-100 per cent faster than, but the most natural
interpretation was 50-100 per cent faster than in the first half of the
I980s. That would mean (see Table 5.1) a growth rate of5.6-7.4 per cent
per annum in the industrial sector in 1986-90.

TADLE 5.1 Soviet Economic Growth since 1965: Sectors. inputs und outputs (% p.a.
growth rates)
A. Soviet official measures

1966-701971-5 1976-80 1981-5 1983 1984 1985

NMp· produced 7.7 5.7 4.2 4.2 3.2

NMP utilised 7.1 5.1 3.9 3.2 3.5 2.6 3.1
Gross industrial output 8.5 7.4 4.4 3.6 4.2 4.2 3.9
Gross agricultural output I 3.9 2.4 1.7 l.l 5.1 0.0 0.0
Investment I 7.4 7.2 5.2 3.2 5.7 2.0 3.0
Capital stock 7.5 7.9 6.8 6.3 5.8
Electric power 7.9 7.0 4.5 3.6 3.6 5.3 3.5
Three main fuels' 5.2 5.4 4.2 2.5 2.3 2.7 2.4

B. CIA estimates

GNP I (in 1970 rouble

prices) 5.3 3.8 2.7 2.4 3.5 2.0 2.1
GNP II (in 1982 rouble
prices) 4.9 3.1 2.3 2.2 3.5 1.5 1.6
Industrial output 6.3 5.9 3.2 3.5
Agricultural output 3.9 - 0.4 1.2 3.7
Investment 6.0 5.4 4.0 4.2
Capital stock 7.4 8.0 6.9 6.3
Labour (man-hours) 2.0 1.7 l.l 0.8

·Net Material Product.

General note: All output series and the investment and capital stock series are, in
principle, constant prices, i.e. denote 'real' changes. The Soviet official series, however,
especially for investment, are known to contain an element of hidden inflation, i.e. to be
upward-biased (see Hanson, 1984a). This is also true of the CIA investment series.
Notes: (I) For five-year periods the growth rates shown are those between the total for
the period and the total for the preceding five-year period.
(2) Author's estimates in terms of standard coal fuel units, for oil + gas + coal.
Sourees: Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR (various years); Pravda, 26 Jan 1986; CIA,
Handbook 0/ Economic Statistics 1984; CIA/DIA 1986.
 Philip Hanson 101

Anyone could see why he wanted faster growth. What was less
obvious was how he expected to get it. The production inputs, labour,
capital and natural resources, were virtually doomed to grow more
slowly, up to the early I990s, than they had previously been growing. An
acceleration of labour productivity growth would be required. Various
measures might contribute to such an acceleration for a while - perhaps
up to five years. Only one kind of change, however, seemed capable of
generating a substantial and sustained long-run improvement in
productivity growth: a faster rate of introduction and diffusion of new
products and processes into Soviet production. That in turn was hard to
envisage without large changes in the typical patterns of behaviour of
Soviet production units. For such changes to occur so me sort ofmajor
organisational change was probably needed.

TABLE 5.2 Soviet Economic Performance in 1985 and 1981 5: Main Officiallndicators

(Percentage change aver previous year and average annual percentage change; changes
based on officially 'comparable' prices)

1981-5
1985 1985/1984 average
Absolute Percentage Percentage
amount change change

Population (m. 1.1.86) 278.7 0.87 0.89

National income utilised
(b. current roubles) 567 3.1 3.2
Industrial output (b .r.)· 808 3.9 3.6
Agricultural output
(b. 1983 r.) 208 0.0 2.1
Industrial labour productivity 3.5 3.2
Gross investment (b. r.)· 179 3.0 3.6
Freight transport turn-over
(b. t-km) 1.6 2.7 est.
State and co-operative retail
sales (b. r.)· 324.1 4.2 3.0
Per capita 'real income' 2.5 2.3
State labour force
(m. average annual) 117.5 0.6 0.9

·It is not specified in wh ich year's prices the rouble total for 1985 is given.
Sourees: Derived from Pravda, 26 Jan 1986, and Narkhoz SSSR (various years).

Gorbachev and his associates, meanwhile, could also seek short-to-

medium-term improvement by other means: changes in priorities,
102 TheEconomy

changes in personnel, and tough social control. What has been done
during Gorbachev's first year will be reviewed under each of these
headings in turn, before organisational changes are discussed and an
interim balance-sheet drawn up.

TABLE 5.3 Sovietlndustrial Sector in 1985: Selected Individual Product-group Data

1981-5
1985 198511984 average
Absolute Percentage Percentage
amount change change

Electricity (b. kWh) 1545 3.5 3.6

Oil (m. b/d) 11.9 - 2.9 -0.3
Gas (b. cu. ft/d) 64.3 9.5 8.1
Coal (m. t.) 726 2.0 0.3
Sum, three main primary fuels
(m. t. sef.) 2095.8 2.4 2.5
Steel (m. t.) ISS 0.2 0.9
Timber (m. mJ) 277 -0.8 negl.
Cement (m. t.) 131 0.7 0.9
Mineral fertilisers
(m. t. nutrients) 33.2 7.8 6.0
Tractors (m. h.p.) 52.8 3.7 2.4
Knitwear (b. pieces) 1.7 3.0· 1.2
Cars (m.) 1.3 0.4 negl.

Unweighted average of percentage

changes in non-overlapping items
reported in physical terms in
industry (inc1. food industry).
(n = 50). 1.9

• Comparison with 1984 plan report indicates zero.

Sources: As for Table 5.1.

PRIORITIES

In his June speech on technology policy, Gorbachev called for a change

in investment priorities. He hinted fairly plainly that agriculture's share
of investment should fall: 'We have reached here the rational limits of
building up investment' (DDe SWB SU/7976/C/7). In the same speech
he said that investment in the engineering ('machine-building') sector
 Philip Hanson 103

should rise at the expense of investment in agriculture, light industry,

food processing and chemicals; it should be 80-100 per cent greater in
1986-90 than in 1981-5. The output ofthe engineering sector should be
growing 50-100 per cent faster in the late 1980s than it had been in the
early 1980s. This meant that it should begrowingat 9-12 per cent a year.
This was all part of a general strategy of stepping up investment in
machinery, which would embody new technology and modernise
production. The share of re-equipment in total investment and the rate
of replacement of the capital stock should, Gorbachev announced, rise
substantially.

TABLE 5.4 The Soviet Eleventh and Twelfth Five- Year Plans: Some Aggregate Figures

(Average percentage rate of change per annum)

1981-5 1981-5 1986-90 1991-]000

Plan Actual Plan implied

National income utilised 3.4 3.2 3.5-4.1 5.1-5.3

Labour productivity, total 2.5 est 3.7-4.2 6.5-7.6
Gross industrial output 4.7 3.7 3.9-4.4 4.9-5.2
Industrial labour
productivity 3.6 3.2 4.2-4.6
Gross agricultural output· 2.5 l.l 2.7-3.0
Total investment· 2.0 3.4 3.4-3.9
'Productive' investment 3.0 4.6
Per capita real income 3.1 2.3 2.5 .. 2.8 3.4-4.6
State and co-operative
retail sales 4.2 3.0 3.4-4.0 4.1-4.3
Population 0.89

·Rate of increase between five-year periods.

Sourees: Derived from annual statistical yearbooks and the plan fulfilment report for
1985 (Pral'da, 26 Jan 1986) plus data from Pravda, 5 Mar, 18 and 20 Nov 1981; 9 Nov
1985; and 4 Mar 1986.

The guidelines for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (henceforth XII FYP)
were published in November, and somewhat amplified at the Party
Congress by the Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov (Pravda, 9 Nov 1985
and4 Mar 1986). Thesalient figuresare given in Tables 5.4-6. The sharp
changes called for by Gorbachev in his early speeches as Party leader do
not all emerge clearly in the plan targets. The growth rate targeted for
national income (utilised) in 1986-90 is 3.5 -4 per cent per annum rather
 -
~

TABLE 5.5 The Soviel Twelflh Five- Year Plan: Nalionallncome Ulilised. Accumulalion and Consumplion (bn 1973 roubles and per cenl per annum
growlh rales)

Implied 1985 Implied 1990 plan

level level (a) range (b) poinl Implied growlh (% p.a.)

(a) (b) (a) (b)

National income utilised S08 604-619 614 3.5-4.0 3.9
Accumulation 124 146-161 156 3.3-5.4 4.7
Consumption 384 458 3.6

General nOles: Ryzhkov gave figures for the absolute increment in national income utilised between 1980 and 1985 (actual) and between 1985 and
1990 (planned; range). He also gave absolute increments for the 'fund ofconsumption' for the same periods, but with only a single ('point') target
increment for 1990. In addition he gave a single absolute total figures for 1990 planned level of national income utilised. Given the percentage
increases also mentioned, and the Narkhoz data for 1980, the figures given in the table appear to follow.
Sources:> derived from Narkhoz 1984, p.425, and Ryzhkov, XXVII Congress speech in Izvesliya, 4 Mar 1986, p.2.
 Philip Hanson 105

than the '4 per cent minimum' he had called for in May. The Congress
speech by Ryzhkov made it clear that the share of the so-called agro-
industrial sector in total investment was not, after all, supposed to fall,
but to remain at the very high level of about one-third. Investment in the
'fuel-energy complex' is planned to grow at 8.0 per cent per annum, so
that the extraction and transport of fuel and energy are supposed to
claim an increasing share of investment inputs - and 'extensive' style of
development rather at odds with the general impression Gorbachev had
given of shifting the emphasis to investment in energy conservation.
Similarly, the target growth rate for industrial output is below what
Gorbachev had earlier implied would be necessary. The most ambitious
- indeed, extravagantly ambitious - targets are reserved for the 1990s: at
any rate, for the few and vague numbers implied for that decade (see
Tabe 5.4). One curiosity is the labour productivity targets for the 1990s.
They imply an absolute decline in the numbers employed in material
production. Such a decline is not very plausible. It may be noted, too,
that the standard Soviet productivity measure is per person employed,
not per person-hour. The total Soviet labour force will probably be
growing at about 0.7 per cent per annum in the I 990s, from a 1990 level
of about 158 million. The top-of-range growth rates for national income

T ABLE 5.6 The Soviet Twelfth Five- Year plan: Selected Production Targets

(Annual output in millions of tonnes except where otherwise specified, with average
percentage rates of change per annum over previous five years in parentheses)

/985 Actual /990 Plan

Electricity (b. kWh) 1545 (3.6) 1840-1880 (3.4-3.9)

Oil 595 (- 0.3) 630-640 (1.2-1.5)
Gas (b. cubic meters) 643 (8.1) 835-859 (5.4-5.7)
Total, three main fuels· 2096 (2.5) 2413-2458 (2.9-3.2)
Rolled Steel 108 (1.0) 116-119 (1.4-2.0)
Mineral fertilisers 33.2 (6.0) 41-43 (4.3-5.3)
Graint 190 (0.0) 250-255 (5.6-6.1)
Meat (deadweight) 17.1 (2.5) 21 (4.2)
Milk 98.2 (1.6) 106-110 (\.5-2.3)
Eggs (b.) 77.0 (2.5) 80-82 (0.8-1.3)

·In standard coal fuel equivalent; author's estimates.

tThe 1985 figure is the US Department of Agriculture estimate.
Sourees: As for Table 5.4.
106 TheEconomy

utilised and labour productivity, 1991-2000, in Table 5.4, imply a 1.8

per cent per annum reduction in the labour force in material production,
i.e. at least 20 million less in 2000 than in 1990. The service sector is
hardly likely to expand fast enough to absorb such numbers. Even if
productivity figures are based on national income produced, they are
still very hard to account for. (In 1970-84 national income produced
grew 0.5 per cent per annum faster than national income utilised.)
On the other hand, the XII FYP does bear a Gorbachevian imprint.
Investment in the 'machine-building complex' is supposed to grow at an
amazing 12.5 per cent per annum. Gross productive (i.e. non-social
infrastructure) investment in total is set to grow faster than national
income (Table 5.4). Net fixed and inventory investment (the 'accumula-
tion fund') is set to grow faster than material consumption - though this
has been revealed only in the most surreptitious fashion (Table 5.5). Just
how the composition of investment is being reshaped is not entirely
c1ear; the investment shares of the machine-building and fuel-energy
'complexes' are not available for earlier years. It appears, however, that
the investment shares of light industry, chemicals, timber, paper,
construction materials, construction, housing and social infrastructures
generally (or at any rate urban social infrastructure) are being squeezed:
Understandably the enhanced priority for investment in general,
relatively to consumption in general, is not being blazoned forth in
Soviet public statements, but it is c1early there; this, too, seems in line
with Gorbachev's broad strategy. And it appears that Gorbachev and
Ryzhkov were not able to impose the desired priorities at once, but have
been better able to do so, the longer Gorbachev has been in office.
Hewett has traced a dispute over growth targets between Gorbachev
and Gosplan back to mid-1984; the 1986 annual plan may provide
evidence of another round in this dispute (Hewett, 1986; for the 1986
annual plan see Pravda, 27 Nov 1985). It is possible that Gorbachev
began to get his own way more readily after he had replaced Baibakov
with Talyzin at the head of Gosplan. That was in mid-October - before
the XII FYP guidelines came out, but this was possibly not soon enough
to have them substantially reworked. The subsequent annual plan for
1986, though still perhaps not entirely in accordance with Gorbachev's
recipes, certainly incorporated a drastically higher investment growth
rate of 7.6 per cent, together with a remarkable target of a 30 per cent
increase in investment in engineering.
Despite the launching of a consumer-good!"> programme (Pravda, 9
Oct 1985) which is not in fact very ambitious, Gorbachev has in general
conveyed a c1ear and old-fashioned message about priorities: machinery
 Philip Hanson 107

first. Military requirements have apart to play in this, but the Soviet
figures are not designed to tell us what it iso

5.3 PERSONNEL

There has been a very high turn-over of senior Party and state officials
under Gorbachev. The prime object has been to enhance his security of
tenure as leader. It is reasonable to assume, however, that it has also
served his economic policy aims.
At the level of central economic policy-making there have been
comprehensive changes of personnel. Gorbachev's close associate,
Nikolai Ryzhkov, replaced Nikolai Tikhonov as Prime Minister in
September. This reduced the age of the top economic administrator by
twenty-five years. A similar rejuvenation took place at the top of the
State Planning Committee when Nikolai Talyzin replaced Nikolai
Baibakov in October as the chairman of Gosplan. At the same time
Gosplan's status was enhanced, for Talyzin, unlike his predecessor,
became a First Deputy Prime Minister and a candidate member of the
Politburo.
Earlier, Gorbachev had replaced Arkady Volsky, the personal
assistant on economic matters whom he inherited from Chernenko and
Andropov, with a person or persons unknown. A well-known and, more
or less, liberal economist, Academician Abel Aganbegyan, is not one of
those persons, but may have some influence on policy (Hanson, 1985b).
Other leading positions in the economic policy establishment whose
occupancy has changed under Gorbachev include (in chronological
order of their announcement) the chairmanships of the following: the
State Material-Technical Supply Committee, the Military-Industrial
Commission (in charge of military hardware procurement), the State
Committee for External Economic Relations (in charge of economic and
military aid), the Central Statistical Administration, the State Bank and
the State Committee for Labour and Social Problems (Pravda, 16 Nov
1985; 17 Nov 1985; 24 Nov 1985; 3 Dec 1985; 11 Jan 1986; 13 Jan 1986).
Reshuffies and replacements of economic branch ministers have been
very extensive. Departures include the Minister of Finance (who died in
office) and the veteran Foreign Trade Minister, Nikolai Patolichev.
Finally, the numerous replacements of first secretaries of oblast Party
committees have meant that the Party has many new regional bosses;
economic supervision 100ms large in their duties.
Like a business tycoon taking over an ailing corporation, Gorbachev
108 TheEconomy

has presided over a massive shake-up of the management personnel of

USSR Incorporated. The Brezhnevian 'stability of cadres', al ready
shaken somewhat under Andropov, has been ended - decisively. In part
the purge has been a youth opportunity programme for 55-year-olds,
with men in their 70s and 80s going into retirement. To a smaller extent it
has been areplacement of officials judged to be corrupt by men who
have not yet had their opportunities.
It is wide\y be\ieved in the West that the effects ofthis sort ofshake-up
are inherently short-term. This is not necessarily so. Vladimir Kon-
torovich, in a careful study of Soviet railways, finds that Andropov's
sacking of the Minister for the Railways in late 1982 was followed by a
substantial improvement in economic performance over at least two
years (Kontorovich, 1985b). The arguments and evidence he pro vi des
for the latter being a consequence of the former are persuasive. There
was a ripple of sackings lower down in the railways management, which
probably removed some of the most corrupt and incompetent, and there
was a marked raising of branch assessments of what could be done with
glven resources.
At the same time personnel changes have their limitations. Ifthe new
'instability of cadres' is not in fact a new regime of instability, like a
Maoist cultural revolution, but a once-in-a-generation changing of the
guard, there will eventually be a new stability of cadres. A general sense
of security will return, and the need to look bright and bushy-tailed will
dwindle. That might not be the end of the matter if the new men were
systematically different from those they replace, but it is not c1ear that
they are, except for being younger. It is true that many ofthe new central
economic policy-makers co me from the military production sector. But
so did many of the men they replace. (The Gosplan chairmanship,
admittedly, is an important exception. Talyzin has a military high-
technology background whereas Baibakov was a petroleum engineer.)
On the whole a medium-term impact from these changes (say, over five
years) looks plausible, but a Ion ger-term effect on growth rates seems
doubtful.

5.4 SOCIAL DISCIPLINE

Among rank-and-file workers security of job tenure has not been

disturbed. Gorbachev has, however, maintained and intensified the
discipline campaign associated with Andropov. (For a thorough
analysis see Teague, 1985d.) The chiefnovelty in Gorbachev's campaign
 Philip Hanson 109

has been the drive against alcohol. Its seriousness is impressive. Other
Soviet leaders have taken 'measures' to reduce aIcohol consumption, but
these have not extended to sustained cuts in official production of
aIcoholic drinks or to effective curbs on distiIIing (Vladimir Treml, as
quoted in Time, 23 Sep 1985). This time, however, unless some very large
direct lies are being told, the measures are serious. The (official) output
of wine and vodka in the third quarter of last year was one-third down
from the same period of 1984 (Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 43 (1985):
p. 2); retail sales targets, for bonus purposes, are to be measured net of
aIcohol sales (TASS, 19 Sep 1985); and the output ofvodka and cognac
planned for 1986 is 20 per cent below that planned for 1985. (Budget
report to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Pravda, 27 Nov 1985.) Even first-
hand experience shows that the ban on aIcohol at official meetings is
often observed, and total or regional prohibition is being debated in the
press (Bykov, 1985; Tenson, 1986a). The new leader's persistence with
the aIcohol campaign is not irrelevant to his economic strategy. Other
elements in the discipline campaign are: motivating workers to discipline
one another through the brigade contract system; public condemnation
of'shirkers and parasites' , and the more systematic prosecution ofbribe-
takers and black-market operators. These are not new, but persistence
with them may do something for officially measured economic perfor-
mance by diverting effort from the unofficial to the official sector.

5.5 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Gorbachev's speech in June on technology policy suggested that he and
his advisers share the usual view that a sustained long-run improvement
in Soviet economic growth can only co me from faster technological
change. Just what sort of organisational changes they think wiII bring
about faster technological changeis less c1ear.
Aganbegyan's writings may weil provide c1ues additional to those
contained in leadership speeches. His influence on policy may be
exaggerated in Moscow rumour, but recent articles by hirn do in places
read like the kind of advice that could lie behind Gorbachev's speeches.
In an artic1e published in September 1985, Aganbegyan drew a
distinction between a short- to medium-term productivity boost due to
tighter discipline and a longer-term, more substantial acceleration
through faster technical change (Aganbegyan, 1985). The laUer
requires, according to Aganbegyan, an integrated set of changes in
economic organisation. This set of changes was being elaborated and
would be introduced during 1986-90.
110 TheEconomy

Most Western economists and some Soviet specialists think that a

Hungarian type of market socialist reform is the minimum organ-
isational change needed. There is no evidence that Gorbachev and his
speech-writers and decree-drafters think this. Whether Aganbegyan
thinks it or not is unclear from his writings.
In his article of September 1985 Aganbegyan listed the following six
elements in the complete new system of economic management:
(I) Increased authority for USSR Gosplan.
(2) The creation of new organisations that would manage large
'economic complexes', each covering several traditional branch-
ministry empires.
(3) The devolution of detailed decision-making from ministry to
enterprise (and production association) level, with the abolition
(where they exist) of the intervening industrial associations.
(4) Increased financial autonomy for enterprises and areform of
prices.
(5) The extension of the 'collective contract' from work groups within
enterprises to complete enterprises.
(6) Educational reform.
The first t~o elements of this package were introduced in late 1985.
The upgrading of the status of the new Gosplan chairman has already
been mentioned. The creation of a Bureau for Machine-Building of the
USSR Council ofMinisters was announced in October. (In a Politburo
meeting report, Pravda, 18 Oct 1985, Ivan Silaev, its chairman, gave
so me details about the Bureau in an interview in [zvestiya, 11 Mar 1986:
p.2). Hs coverage may not include the military hardware producing
ministries that report to the Military-Industrial Commission, but its
powers to issue binding instructions to, and reallocate resources among,
the eleven civilian engineering branches (at least) make it a powerful
'superministry'. A month later a USSR State Committee for the Agro-
Industrial Sector (Gosagroprom) was announced (Pravda, 15 Nov 1985
(Politburo report); Pravda, 23 Nov 1985 (decree». It combines five
branch ministries - wh ich are abolished as separate entities - and aState
Committee, plus chunks of other ministerial empires. In March the
creation of a USSR Council of Ministers' Bureau for the Fuel-Energy
complex was announced (lzvestiya, 15 Mar 1986 (Politburo report».
Similar superministries should follow for other sectors: transport,
construction and so on.
The remaining items on Aganbegyan's list look superficially Iike
elements in a market reform. Accompanied by other changes, they could
 Phi/ip Hanson 111

indeed be part ofsuch areform. As they stand, however, they are al1-too-
familiar from earlier attempts to rationalise the central1y administered
system; matters of detail are perennial1y about to be devolved to lower
levels. There is no reference to the ending of centralised supply
al1ocation or of the setting of obligatory enterprise targets in general.
Gorbachev's speeches and the decrees promulgated over the past year
support the view that what is under way is a streamlining ofwhat would
remain a hierarchical system. In a speech in Kiev in late June Gorba~hev
said: 'Not the market, not the anarchic forces of competition, but above
al1 the plan must determine the basic features of development of the
economy' (Gorbachev, 1985a). In his speech a fortnight earlier on
technology policy - though not in the text published in Pravda - he
singled out the organisation ofthe East German economy as instructive.
The Party-state decree of July 1985, on 'The Wide Extension of New
Methods ofManagement .. :, gave every indication ofbeing part ofthe
momentous set of organisational changes that Gorbachev had been
promising since April. Its provisions on quality control and on the
introduction ofnew products assurne the need for state organisations to
attempt to do the work ofmarket forces. In other words they ass urne the
continuation of a hierarchical system of economic administration; as
steps towards market socialism they would make no sense (Hanson,
1985b).
Ouring Gorbachev's first year in office a number of Soviet writers
explicitly endorsed Hungarian-style market socialism as a model for the
USSR to fol1ow; notably Kurashvili (1985). In February 1986 one even
did so in an interview broadcast on British television (Otto Latsis,
interviewed in Moscow for London Weekend Television, ITV, 1200,2
Feb 1986.) In Kontury vozmozhnoi perestroiki Kurashvili refers explicitly
and approvingly to the 'market' as a desirable resource al1ocation
mechanism, and envisages the abolition of nearly al1 branch ministries.
His ideas had earlier been singled out for approval by Academician
Tatyana Zaslavskaya in the so-cal1ed 'Novosibirsk report', a confiden-
tial internal discussion paper leaked to the Western press in 1983:(For
the text of that report see Survey, vol. 28, no. I (Spring 1984).) It seems
that public discussion of economic reform in the Soviet Union has
returned some way towards the semi-openness that prevailed in the late
1950s and early 1960s. None of the people expressing these views,
however, has the status of an institute director or senior Party official.
Gorbachev's Party Congress speech shed some light on the leader-
ship's organisational intentions. On the wh oie the speech indicated a
design in wh ich most of the economy remains under hierarchical,
112 TheEconomy

administrative control from the centre, albeit a more streamlined and

efficient control than at present, while a certain limited decentralisation
is envisaged for agricuIture, light industry and services, together with
some small extensions of private and co-operative economic activity.
That suggests a kind of half-way-house arrangement not far removed
from that which operates in East Germany. This would be consistent
with reports of an unpublished speech by Gorbachev to East European
Central Committee economics secretaries in late 1985, in which he
explicitly warned against market reforms (Bialer and Afferica, 1986).
In assessing the speech from this point of view it is useful to operate
with a check-list ofthe organisational changes which would characterise
a Hungarian-style reform.
The change to a regulated market system would require the abolition
of the centralised allocation of materials and equipment and the ending
of instructions to production units from above about what to produce,
to whom to deli ver output and from whom to obtain supplies of
materials, equipment and components. The central authorities would
retain partial direct control over prices and investment. They would
leave state enterprises free to pursue profits through their own market
deals. There would probably also be changes in regulations to encourage
individuals and small co-operatives to set up in certain lines of business
on their own initiative and at their own risk.
In such a system the economic branch Ministries, of which there are
nearly sixty in the USSR, would not longer have a role. The logical step-
only recently taken in Hungary and publicly proposed in the USSR in
recent times only by Kurashvili - would be to replace them with a single
Ministry for the Economy, plus perhaps additional Ministries for Fuel
and Energy, and for Transport and Communications.
The foreign trade consequences of a market reform could be
significant. The logic of the system would favour a partial decentralisa-
tion of foreign-trade activity, with production enterprises being enabled
to engage in direct deals with foreign companies. The experience of
Hungary suggests that this facilitates industrial co-operation with
Western companies. There would probably be a general increase in
openness to foreign trade, including imports of consumer goods.
In his Congress speech Gorbachev said several things which implied
that a centralised system was assumed to be the framework within which
future changes would occur. There is, for example, to be a precise re-
equipment programme laid down for 'every industry and every enterpr-
ise (Izvest;ya, 26 Feb 1986, p. 4). Branch Ministries were instructed, as
they have been by Soviet leader for decades, to stop interfering in the
 Philip Hanson 113

minor details of enterprise activity, but the continued existence of

numerous ministries appears, as in aIl Gorbachev's pronouncements, to
be taken for gran ted (ibid. p. 5). The number of instructions to be given
to enterprises in light industry is to be reduced. Therefore it is assumed
that enterprises in general will continue to be set compulsory targets
from above, and indeed that there wiIl stiJI be some such targets in the
consumer sector. All this is of a piece with earlier Gorbachev speeches
and with recent organisational changes such as the new arrangements
for monitoring product quality, which presuppose that market forces
will not be doing the job.
At the same time the speech promised several changes which would
upset many Soviet officials, and which might do some good. Whether
these changes justify Gorbachev's use of certain keywords denoting
liberal reform ideas, is a moot point. He used the word 'reform'
(reforma) itself (ibid. p. 4) although it is a word which has generaIly been
avoided in Soviet public discussion ofeconomic policy since the invasion
of Czechoslovakia. He also referred favourably to 'commodity-money
relations' (ibid. p.5), which is Marxist-Leninist for the market.
For the farm sector the Soviet leader came out at last with some ofthe
serious proposals which some commentators had expected earlier. The
state and coIlective farms are to be given five-year delivery targets which
are not to be changed from year to year. They are then supposed to be
free do do what they wish with production over and above these targets,
incJuding seIling it on the peasant markets at uncontroIled prices.
Describing this arrangement Gorbachev referred to a good Leninist
precedent, the food-products tax (prodnalog) (ibid. p. 5). Like the words
for reform and for commodity-money relations, this is a buzz-word
with aIl sorts of liberal connotations. The tax was a key feature of the
semi-market, mixed-ownership economy which operated in the USSR
inl921-8. The chairman of the new USSR State Agro-Industrial
Committee, Gorbachev's ~tavropol crony, V. S. Murakhovsky, in his
speech to the Congress (lzvestiya, 3 Mar 1986) took a similar line, even
referring to the 'socialist market' as something that (Soviet) people
should not be afraid of.
Gorbachev also spoke of further encouragement of the smaIl, semi-
independent work-teams operating on a contract basis within the giant
state and coIlective farms. He referred in particular to family groups.
The reform-minded sociologist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, has found that
family-based contract teams work particularly weIl. (Interview with
Zaslavskaya in lzvestiya, I June 1985.) There are overtones ofa return to
family farming in this arrangement - something wh ich the Soviets,
114 TheEconomy

unlike the Chinese, have so far shown no signs of contemplating.

For the industrial sector in general Gorbachev stressed the impor-
tance of greater self-financing by enterprises. As an example to be
followed, he cited (lzvestiya, 26 Feb 1986: p. 5) two enterprises which are
free to plough back whatever funds are left over after they have met
profit and delivery targets and paid a fixed share of profits to the state
budget. (See Tenson, 1986b, on the experiment at the VAZ (Tolyatti)
Works and in Sumi.) The Frunze association in Sumi hasalready found
trouble obtaining materials, etc., on which to spend its funds - a
characteristic outcome ofthe Kosygin reform. (A. Kleva, 'Kak potratit
milliony', lzvestiya, 21 Feb 1986. On the continuation of detailed target
setting for the Frunze association see A. Sadikov, 'Plan i interes',
lzvestiya, 13 Mar 1986.) And he said that industrial enterprises, like
farms, should be able to dispose as they wished of output over and above
plan targets.
He also spoke of a forthcoming revision of the price system. Among
other things it is supposed to make prices more reflective ofscarcity, and
to include more use of locally determined contract prices. (There is no
reference to the possible raising of food prices wh ich Gorbachev hinted
at in a speech last September, Moscow TV, 10 September 1985. Ifmore
ofthe domestic food-supply were distributed through non-procurement
channels, however, average prices to the population would rise.) At the
same time 'whoiesale trade in producer goods' is supposed to be
developed (lzvestiya, 26 Feb 1986: p. 5).
Prices set by enterprises bargaining among themselves, plus trade in,
rather than centralised rationing of, producer goods, suggests a market
reform. The context makes it c1ear, however, that these arrangements
are planned to apply only to a narrow margin ofindustrial activity, while
factories continue to have targets and allocations covering most of their
output. Exactly similar ideas were incorporated in the 1965 Kosygin
reforms; decentralised resource allocation remained small and incon-
sequential after those reforms. Selyunin (1985) referred at length to the
1965 reforms and their failure, stressing particularly the need for the
shift to market allocation of a large initial mass of producer goods. That
point is repeated by Sadikov (lzvestiya, 13 Mar 1986).
A more flexible approach to private economic activity and small co-
operatives was evident mainly in references to the services sector,
including housing and retail trade (lzvestiya, 26 Feb 1986, pp. 5-6). Co-
operatives, traditionally treated in official Soviet doctrine as 'inferior' to
state enterprises, were said to be worth encouraging in consumer-goods
production and trade. 80th co-operative and individual housing
 Philip Hanson 115

construction are also supposed to be encouraged. All these references,

however, were rather vague and tentative. Gorbachev referred to
pensioners being encouraged to engage in private and small-scale co-
operative work, as though a lifetime of service to the state was a price
that would-be entrepreneurs would have to pay before attempting any
form of entrepreneurship. There were also hints that the lawli penalising
so-called 'parasitism' and non-Iabour incomes would be reviewed, along
with tax arrangements. These could be sensible preparatory measures to
clarify the law before encouraging hitherto frowned-upon forms of
enterprise; they could, however, serve only to impede such experiments.
It is still possible to speculate that Gorbachev and his close associates
could move towards a Hungarian solution at a later stage, perhaps after
more limited changes have failed to produce results. However plausible
or implausible one considers that scenario to be, however, it is hard to
square the evidence of recent speeches and decrees, and of articles by
putative advisers, with the idea that Gorbachev is currently seeking to
move in that direction, even by stealth. (But see Brown, 1985b, for the
contrary view, well-argued).

5.6 CONCLUSION

Soviet economic performance in 1985 and in 1981- 5 as a whole is

portrayed in Tables 5.2-3. There was no clear overall improvement in
1985. The first quarter of 1986 showed strong industrial growth in
relation to the especially difficult first quarter of 1985, but Gorbachev
himself warned against taking this as a sustained improvement (Radio
Moscow, 9 Apr 1986). Thus it would be hard to show a serious case for
the new leader's positive impact on the economy being evident in his first
year in office. In 1985 industria,! output grew slightly faster than the
average for the previous four years. It is also true that industrial growth
accelerated during the year: Apart ofthat acceleration, however, owed
nothing to policy: the first quarter of 1985 was affected by some
exceptionally bad weather and by an unhelpful pattern of public
holidays. Another part of the acceleration owed something to an
extremely short-term kind of policy action - the cancellation of two
public holidays.
The domestic economy was held back, moreover, by the stagnation of
agricultural output. And the hard-currency balance of trade went from a
surplus to a substantial deficit because ofweakening world oil prices and
a drop in the volume ofSoviet oil deliveries enforced, apparently, by a
116 TheEconomy

further fall in Soviet oil output. There was therefore a drastic deteriora-
tion in Soviet current and prospective hard-currency earnings and
therefore import capacity, for reasons beyond the control of the new
leadership.
Against this background, Gorbachev has presided over the setting of
some ambitious plan targets. Even if the new Five-Year Plan is less
ambitious than earlier statements by Gorbachev had suggested it would
be, it is still on the high side. The key 1990 targets for meat, grain and oil
production are grossly overambitious, and overall targets for produc-
tivity growth are not plausible. The targets for productivity growth in
the 1990s, moreover, are positively bizarre. The results, so far as can be
seen, are to be achieved by a combination of discipline campaigns, heavy
industry priority and modest streamlining of the traditional centrally
administered system. In agriculture and services, it is true, somewhat
more flexibility is intended. The main emphasis, however, is on
streamlining a still-centralised system. This (in principle) entails the
abolition of a substantial part of the branch Ministry apparatus - the
sub-branch industrial associations (the old glavki) which were supposed
to be reformed and made more business-like in 1973.
If the Ministry apparatus real\y were weakened (as Zaslavskaya
advocates) some devolution of detailed decision-making to enterprises
and production associations is virtually guaranteed. Where whole
Ministries are abolished, as in the agro-industrial sector, this process is
given more impetus. The lesson of Khrushchev's regional economic
councils in the late 1950s, however, it that the established structure is
powerful and liable to reassert itself. Meanwhile, reports of organ-
isational change in the industrial sector reveal only slow progress in
getting rid of the industrial associations, and the formulation of
organisational plans in terms of the old branch Ministry structures.
(Interview with Silaev, Izvestiya, 11 Mar 1986: p. 2; report of a meeting
ofthe new Commission on Improving Administration, Planning and the
Economic Mechanism, Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta. no. 11 (1986): p. 3\.)
In general there are striking inconsistencies in the economic measures
and pronouncements that have issued so far from the Gorbachev
leadership. The occasional use of phrases hinting at market reform,
among a much larger flow of non-market messages, is one example. The
emphasis on forced growth alongside cal\s for reorganisation is another,
and is probably more important. Inconsistency is inherent in practical
politics, and not by any means a sign that policies wil\ fai\. It does,
however, suggest divided counse\s, and aleadership that is less decisive
than Gorbachev would like the world to believe it iso
 Philip Hanson 117

NOTE

I. The author is indebted to participants in the SSEES Conference, and to

Tamas Bauer for comments on an earlier draft.
6 Agriculture
KARL-EUGEN WÄDEKIN

The year 1985 was not a successful one for Soviet agriculture, the
seventh in a row. The current year will be the first with Mikhail
Gorbachev in office from the beginning and he is eager to make 1986 a
success, not least for agriculture.
There are signs that the results of 1985 were made to look artificially
low. The increase of the gross product of agriculture by 2.1 billion
roubles. as announced at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in
November, was scaled down to zero growth in the annual statistical
report. Similarly the achievement of the livestock sector seems to have
been kept low statistically. According to that report meat output
increased by only 0.1 million tonnes (Iess than 1 per cent) during 1985;
yet the weekly Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (no. 8/1986) announced that
the meat output of January 1986 exceeded that of January 1985 by a full
15 per cent, and then, for January plus February together (ibid. no. 12/
1986). still by 13 per cent - an increase far beyond what had been
recorded for those same months in previous years. One newspaper
report from Omsk Province explicitly mentioned that collective and
state farms there held 1985 meat output lower than necessary in order to
make subsequent 1986 achievements look better.
Not only is 1986 Gorbachev's first full year in supreme office, but also
that of the XXVII Party Congress. A continuing stagnation of
agricultural production would be awkward in such a year. After all,
Gorbachev has been in charge of the agrarian sector for precisely those
seven years of near-stagnation wh ich followed the all-time harvest
record of 1978. At that time things only seemingly went better than
before because oftwo meteorologically favourable years, 1976 and 1978,
wh ich had followed two years of catastrophe, 1972 and 1975.
However. taking into account a longer time span, one finds that those
years merely continued a distinct trend of declining growth rates of gross
agricultural production. By five-year averages they look as follows in the
official Soviel statistics:
118
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 119

TABLE 6.1 Gross Agricullural Produclion

1966-70over 1961-5: + 21 per cent

1971-50ver 1966-70: + 13 per cent
1976-80over 1971-5: + 9 per cent
1981-5 over 1976-80: + 6 per cent

These highly aggregated indices reveal what also emerges from an

examination of many part-indices: Gorbachev's agricultural heritage
was - and still is - in an alarming state. The task that fell to hirn was not
to maintain previous growth, but to turn its trend from decline to
expansion.
It was not in March 1985 that this became Gorbachev's task, but in
1978, when F. O. Kulakov died, and he was made the Central
Committee Secretary responsible for agricuIture. Thus, he played the
leading role in Soviet agrarian policy during Brezhnev's last years and
then under Andropov as weil as under Chernenko. (One might also look
at his activity as Party Secretary in Stavropol krai during 1968 - 78, but
that would take the present analysis too far back.) Ouring those years
the decline in the growth rates of agricultural production was not
reversed. At best, one might hypothesise that had Kulakov's policies
continued it might have deteriorated yet more than it actually did.

6.1 GORBACHEV ANO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OF

AGRICULTURE

For several years after 1978, however, there were no ostentatious

changes in Soviet agrarian policy, except for the attitude towards the
private sector. The story of this change is now weil documented in the
relevant literature: a decree of the Party Central Committee and the
USSR Council ofMinisters in favour ofthe private sector of agriculture
was issued on 14 September 1977, but not published. Even Soviet
scholars did not know its wording, although they knew about its
existence. It was only after Gorbachev had replaced Kulakov that the
typesetting started, in August 1978, in the volume The Leninist Agrarian
Po/iey 0/ the CPSU, wh ich at last contained the text of that decree.
It may be assumed that it took another year or two untillower Party
and state echelons began to act upon the decree in their administrative
areas. Only when a whole series of reinforcing decrees were issued,
120 Agriculture

beginning in January 1981, did some increase in production become

noticeable in the output figures of the private sector of agriculture.
According to the officially estimated Soviet indices its output through-
out the 1970s was less than in 1970 (= 100), with 1976 (94) as the lowest
point. Only beginning in 1982 was the 1970 level exceeded. In fact its
overall gross value, in 'comparable' prices, oscillated around 30-32
billion roubles without amid-term upward or downward trend from the
late 1950s up to and including 1981. The 1982- 5 average exceeded these
by less than 5 per cent, again without a discernible trend of growth above
this new level (Narkhoz 1984: p.229, and earlier editions of Narkhoz
1985: author's estimate.) Thus, a modest improvement may be stated for
the most recent years, but the effect on overall agricultural performance
has been smalI, because the private sector accounts for only about one-
quarter of total Soviet food production.
However, Soviet statistics do not reveal the exchanges between
private and socialist production going on within the farms. Such flows
mainly consist of livestock and livestock products which are sold or
delivered to the collective and state farms, and resold by them to the state
as socialist output. In the reverse direction, feed, including haying and
grazing rights, are granted or sold by collective and state farms to private
producers, i.e. to the farm workers and members, and form also part of
those flows. Such exchanges have existed since collectivisation, but the
1981 decrees permiUed them greater scope.
It seems that they have indeed increased, in legal as weil as in illegal
forms. According to the competent Soviet author G. I. Shmelev
(Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 9/1986: p. 14), collective and state farms
'as a result of contracts with the population' bought 5 million tonnes of
milk in 1984, which was 3.6 times more than in 1981. During these same
years the consumer co-operatives kept their purehases of milk at about
the previous low level, whereas the state reduced its direct purchases by
1.1 million tonnes. On balance there remains an increase of roughly 4
million tonnes, wh ich the official statistics do not show as being
privately produced. For meat a figure of 1.1 million tonnes (slaughter
weight) sold within the farms in 1983 was indicated by a high official (in
Selskaya zhizn, 4 Jan 1984: p. 3) and is likely to have increased since then.
Taking into account these flows of food products Gorbachev's policy
towards the private sector seems to have been more successful than the
statistics reveal. It remains to be seen whether this success will continue;
indirect evidence for 1985 points to the possibility that it is effecting a
shift from collective and state to private animal production rather than
an overall growth of animal production. This may be the reason why the
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 121

decree published on 29 March 1986 (see below) obliges the fanns

separately to account for such purchases on their books and production
reports, although they are now part of their deliveries to the state.
Clearly such intra-fann exchanges remind one ofthe Hungarian system,
but so far they have not been accompanied by a comparable liberalisa-
tion of management and trade in the collective fann sector. Therefore
one may neither consider them a fulI-blown adoption of Hungarian
methods, nor confidently expect similarly great and lasting results.
Without the decrees of 1977 and 1981 private food production might
not have increased at alI, or even have continued decreasing. A number
of factors, mainly socioeconomic and demographic, presaged a decline
of private agricultural production. The measures which encouraged
private food production at the same time discourage its free marketing,
and thereby may have limited the possible positive effects. The policy of
simultaneously encouraging and restraining has been applied consisten-
t1y since 1978 and is linked to Gorbachev.

~2 ACTUALCHANGESUNDERPROCLAIMED
CONTINUITY

The slogan of 'intensification' is now ever-present in Soviet economic

policy statements, but in fact is not new. I t was al ready accorded priority
under Brezhnev. In itself it simply signals the demand für good
management and modern means of production in agriculture and in
other branches of the economy. Without further c1arification it has no
operational significance. Its contents have to be sought in concrete
economic measures, and need not be dealt with in general terms.
When in May 1982 the Food Programme was proclaimed Gorbachev
had been in charge of Soviet agriculture for more than three years, and
must have influenced its formulation. However, the programme's basic
goals had been announced already at the July 1978 plenary session ofthe
Central Committee, i.e. were formulated under Kulakov and Brezhnev.
The Party under Gorbachev's leadership claims to endorse that
Programme, but in actual fact revised it in a number of important
aspects. Among these changes is the revision of the output goals by the
Guidelines for the 1986-90 Plan. The changes in themselves were not
unexpected, but the inconspicuous way of altering the two most
important items, grain and meat, deserves mention. At first glance the
grain figure is the same as in the older Food Programme: 250-5 million
tonnes. Yet previously this quantity was the goal for the 1986-90
122 Agriculture

average, whereas now it is scheduled to be achieved by 1990; the average

had indirectly implied a goal of at least 280 million tonnes for that final
year. A similar change concerns meat. Although the 1990 figure (21
million tonnes) is slightly higher than the previous programme goal for
the 1986-90 average (20-20.5 million tonnes) this had implied about 23
million tonnes for 1990. In contrast the reduction ofthe sugar beet goal
is undisguised. Such scaling down of Plan goals does have importance
because it reduces the strain of plan fulfilment on the farms. For grain
the planned output increase is reduced by roughly one-third, although
the goal is still very optimistic.
No official announcement has been made for another important
change wh ich seems to have been under discussion already in the mid-
1970s, but was actually implemented under Gorbachev when he
succeeded Kulakov. It is the reduction of the total area sown to grain
accompanied by an expansion of clean fallow and of the area sown to
feed crops. After 1970 grain sowings were greatly expanded, and clean
fallow reduced, with the largest grain sown area (130.4 million hectares)
ever in the Soviet Union. With total sown area plus clean fallow taken at
100 the percentage shares were as follows (Narkhoz 1984: p.247):

TADLE 6.2 Percentage Shares 0/ Grain. Feed Crops and

Clean Fallm,· 1970 84

1970 1975 1980 1984

Grain 53.0 55.9 54.8 51.4

Feed crops 27.9 28.7 28.9 30.0
Clean Fallow 8.2 4.9 6.0 8.6

Iffallow is found mainly in dry-farming areas and ifit is applied in the

agro-technically appropriate way for a given locality there can hardly be
any doubt about its rationality. So far it cannot be established with
certainty whether these conditions are being met. In Kazakhstan, which
for the most part is a typical dry-farming area, the percentage of clean
fallow increased less than the all-Union average, from 7.1 (1975) to 11.5
per cent in 1983, without an appreciable decline of the absolute area
sown to grain (Narkhoz Kazakhstana v 1983 g., p. 72). Nor is it clear
whether unpublished guidelines were issued in favour of fallow or if the
farms were simply no longer prevented from adopting it and wanted to
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 123

save on inputs and labour. The consistency of the development over time
is striking, however, and lends plausibility to the view that it is a
conscious policy.
More recently a policy change affecting irrigation has emerged.
Formerly irrigation was considered good in itself under almost any
circumstances. Now Gorbachev, on various occasions, has emphasised
the necessity of utilising existing irrigation systems more efficiently,
implying or sometimes openly saying that this takes precedence over the
construction of new systems. He was rather restrained in such
statements, however, as long as the proponents ofthe big river diversion
plans seemed to have support from the highest quarters, in particular
from Chernenko. The Central Asian lobby in favour of such schemes
was obviously inftuential. Published decrees and other government
measures, including the Party Congress documents, were ambiguously
formulated.
At the CC Plenum in October 1984, when Chernenko implied that it
had been definitely decided to carry on with the river diversions,
Gorbachey kept silent, or at least the media did not report his having
spoken up. The press report on his speech at Tselinograd on 7 September
1985, contained two more-or-Iess contradictory statements. According
to it he mentioned the continuing grandiose melioration programme
with the scope of the corresponding work (it did not state: the area)
increasing 'on the basis of the already elaborated and approved
programmes'. He was further reported as having criticised the 'eksten-
zivchikt who believe in raising production mainly be expanding the
irrigated areas. This came close to speaking directly against their
programmes (Selskaya zhizn, I1 Sep 1985: p. 2).
Things became clearer when the draft Guidelines for the 1986 90
Plan and up to the Year 2000 were published on 9 November. Diversion
ofthe Siberian rivers was no longer mentioned. whereas work diverting
rivers from the north of European Russia was to begin. Yet it was also
necessary to 'refine considerably the scientific case for the regional
redistribution ofwater resources'. The day after, the agricultural daily of
the Party Central Committee published an extremely critical report on
the failure to utilise fully irrigation systems in Astrakhan ohlas! (on the
lower Volga, thus having a bearing on diversion plans for the rivers of
European Russia) and on the continuing emphasis on constructing new
high-cost systems (Selskaya zhizn, 10 Nov 1985: p.2). In the press
'discussion' on the draft Guidelines one ofthe leading specialists in the
field, M. Lemeshev, spoke up strongly against this part ofthe Plan. He
mentioned that USSR Gosplan as weil as RSFSR Gosplan had provided
124 Agriculture

experts' statements against it, and he demanded that the corresponding

sentence be eliminated from the final version of the Guidelines
(Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 Dec 1985). This is what in fact happened.
Moreover it carried a sentence, not included in the draft, 'utilise more
rationally water resources'. The great river-diversion plans had been
shelved for the foreseeable future.
On the whole, irrigated and drained land brought into cultivation in
the Soviet Union, decreased during the early 1980s (Narkhoz 1984:
p. 270). In the Guidelines it is planned (and possibly will not be achieved)
rnerely at the same lower - though still very respectable and increasingly
expensive -level for the current quinquennium. The annual averages are
as folIows:

TADLE 6.3 Irrigaled and Drained Land /97/-90

MiJ/. heclares irrigaled drained

1971- 5 913000 872000

1976-80 759000 729000
1981-4 676000 691000
1986- 90 (Plan) 660000 720000

This is in accordance with the demand to make beuer use of existing

improved land and at the same time reveals more realistic intentions
compared to those of the I 970s, when the Plan figures were higher than
the actual achievements reproduced above. It also reveals a slightly
greater emphasis on drainage than on irrigation.

6.3 CONTINUED EFFORTS AT REVIT ALISING THE NON-

BLACK-EARTH ZONE

The outcome was different for the other great land improvement and
agrarian reconstruction project, the 1974 development programme for
the Russian Non-Black-Earth-Zone, which is largely connected with
drainage work. There is no sign so far that it will be abandoned,
although the results have been disappointing. The gross product of
agriculture in that zone on average over the years 1981-4 was only 7 per
cent more than on the five-year average of 1971- 5, just half the all-
Union growth rate. (These and the subsequent data are from Narkhoz
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 125

RSFSR 1984: pp. 181-4. Fixed assetsare those for direct agricultural
production, investment is 'for the whole complex of works' - po vsemu
kompleksu rabot - i.e. including some, but not all links with agriculture.)
This very modest achievement resulted from a great increase in input,
and the approximate doubling of the area of improved land in the zone:

TADLE 6.4 The Non-Black-Earth Zone 1970-84

/970 /975 /980 /983 /984

Investment, billion roubles, 1983 2.9 5.8 7.9 8.3 8.1

prices
Fixed farm assets, billion roubles '12.3 22.9 35.8 44.5 47.4
Drained farm land, million ha 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.2 3.3
Irrigated farm land, million ha 0.07 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8

Recently the economist and demographer A. Kvasha (Literaturnaya

Gazeta, no. 10/1986: p. 12) maintained that the failure was due to the
outmigration ofrural inhabitants and workers from the zone, which was
not taken into account in the Development Plan. However his point'is
not fully convincing: from the published data (fixed assets in roubles and
per worker) it indirectly emerges that the amount of farm labour applied
in the zone declined by only about I per cent per year over the 1970-84
period (or between 11 and 15 per cent over those fifteen years). This is
not an alarming outflow in view of the capital input increases shown
above, although ageing and feminising of the workforce are likely to
have been an aggravating factor.
Whatever the economic results, the new - just as the previous -
leadership seems determined to continue the effort. (See the decrees of22
May, 16July, 16 October 1979, 12and 19 March, 15and 28 May, 27 and
28 August 1981, 8 October 1983 and the resolution published on 2 July
1985.) Very likely not the least important reason is a strong emotional
aversion to allowing these ancient Russian territories to become
depopula ted.

6.4 PRICES AND THE PRODNALOG

Major increases in agricultural producers' prices were effected three

times under Gorbachev's auspices: in 1979, 1981 and 1983. By 1983 these
126 Agriculture

prices were higher, on overall average, by 54 per cent, than the level of
1973. (That percentage emerges from the difference in total value of
agricultural output in 1973 and in 1983 prices as given in· the annual
statistical report; Pravda, 26 Jan 1986, and during the Party Congress.)
Still faster, however, were the price rises for non-agricultural inputs and
services in agriculture (V. Kufakov, Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistya,
no. 3/1986: pp. 60-3) and the increase in labourcostsdue to risingwages
and only slowly declining labour inputs. If therefore agricuItural
producer prices were further raised now, this would resuIt in a
continuing growth of the already staggering food price subsidy burden
on the state, or else in a rise in state retail prices for food-against all
previous commitments by Soviet leaders.
In his speech at the Party Congress Gorbachev made it clear that
something will be done about solving the dilemma, and he used the term
'tax in kind' (prodnalog), wh ich reminds one of Lenin's New Economic
Policy of 1921. One month later a Party Central Committee and USSR
Council ofMinisters' decree, published in the Soviet press on 29 March,
put an end to the speculation to which this hint had given rise. The
previous premium payments for above-plan deliveries will be preserved,
yet the basic prices for state procurements will be kept stable under the
current Five-Year Plan. The quantities of obligatory sales will either be
kept stable (grain) or increased within previously announced limits and/
or on the basis of regional, not central decisions. Additional grain
deliveries by the farms will be paid for at premium prices, which may be
up to double the basic price in the optimal case that the 1981- 5 level, and
also the current plan of procurements, are surpassed. Counter sales of
farm machinery in short supply and for feed components derived from
industrial processing will be supplied by the state as an incentive for
over-plan farm deliveries of other main crops. Regional authorities
above the raion level will have some room for manreuvre in prices and
quantities of animal products. fruit and vegetables, within overalllimts.
Positive effects of such incentives will very much depend on the
quantitative 'tightness' of plans imposed on the farms either by the
centre or by the regional authorities. If the plans are such that most
farms will not be able to overfulfil them. then the premium prices will be
of little import. Procurement plan figures have not been published, yet
the overall production plan for grain and meat is such that little 'slack' is
to to be expected. Things look similar for other main crops, where the
state equally seems to be bent more on paying premiums than on
renouncing tight procurement plans.
More flexibility might be possible with other animal products, fruit
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 127

and vegetables, in particular, if the private sector can be induced to

increase considerably its output and sales. It is for these same products
that part of the retail sales have now been freed from strict regulations
and prescribed prices, even in state stores. This applies yet more in the
network of consumer co-operatives, which more than hitherto are to
engage in sales on the free kolkhoz markets in competition with private
vendors.
Ifthe system functions as it seems to be envisaged, farms might make
profits from part of their output and thereby compensate for those
products which will continue to cause them losses given basic state
prices. The expression 'tax in kind' would be relevant vis-a-vis man-
datory and unprofitable products.
Tbe consumer, on the other hand, will be able to buy his basic food
ration at the previous low prices. However he will have to cover his
excess demand, in particular for more refined foods, at higher prices.
This is inevitable. at least for the immediate future.

6.5 INTEGRATING THE ADMINISTRATION OF

AGRICULTURE

A central State Committee of the Agro-Industry of the USSR

(Gosagroprom) was formed in November 1985. Five related Ministries,
one state commiuee, those parts ofthe Ministry of Light Industry which
are c10sely concerned with agriculture, the state procurement organisa-
tion and the Ministry of Land Improvement and Water Management
were incorporated into it and thereby ceased to be top agencies in their
own right. Only the Ministry for Grain Products remained outside and
was reorganised. The new super-agency with its branche~ at Union-
Republic and oblast levels is meant to provide an integrated man-
agement of the wh oIe Soviet food economy, freed from the competing
and mutually interfering competences ofthe various former Ministries.
At the same time the administrative and directive functions ofthe former
top Ministries and agencies will be reduced and their staff diminished by
an overall 47 per cent. By May 1986 the process of reorganisation was
still under way.
Such attempts at integration had started experimentally in 1974 at the
lowest, the raion level, through the Raion Agro-Industrial Associations
(in Russian RAPO). During the period 1978-81 numerous decrees and
instructions were issued on the forming of RAPOs throughout the
country. During 1982 the process was basically completed; by mid-1983
128 Agriculture

the system comprised 3 toS RAPOs, consisting of 52020 farms and

47712 other enterprises in the forward and back ward linkages of
agriculture, including forestry (Narkhoz 1983: pp. 204-5).
At the Party Congress Gorbachev, and the final Congress resolution,
pointed out that the new system should ensure the implementation of
truly economic management and an important extension of the
independence and initiative offarms and other enterprises. Incompetent
interferences in the production activities of working collectives and
substitution of management by political organs are to be prevented. It
was emphasised several times that the central authorities should refrain
from petty tutelage of the production enterprises and local administra-
tions and instead should concentrate on the crucial tasks of planning,
financing, price formation and providing the material-technical means
of production.
The harmonious combination of strict macroeconomic management
and efficient microeconomic initiative is an old objective of Soviet
economic administration. The 'only' question is whether this ideal can
be put into practice within the framework of a Soviet-type adminis-
trative system. It cannot be answered from the speeches and resolution
ofthe Party Congress, but only after several years of actual implementa-
tion. For the time being scepticism is in order.

6.5 FARM AUTONOMY

Genuine farm autonomy is indispensable if local initiative is not to be

stifted by administrative orders. The decree of 29 March (see above) is
quite explicit on that account, but also makes it c1ear that farms and
raiony will continue to be given their procurement plans from above. V.
S. Murakhovsky, head of the new USSR Gosagroprom, had gone
further in an interview in January 1986 when he said that farm managers
should have the possibility on their own to decide 'which crops to grow
and over what area, how many and what kind of animals to raise, wh ich
technologies and forms oflabour organisation to choose' (Literaturnaya
Gazeta, no. 4/1986: p. 2). At the same time he had made it c1ear that this
is a thing of the future.
Present-day reality looks different. In spite ofmany previous decrees
to the contrary, most state and Party functionaries up to now have told
farms what to sow, which numbers of animals to raise, where to seil, etc.,
and sent down their emissaries to control the fulfilment of such orders.
(See the complaints of a Lithuanian kolkhoz chairman in Selskaya zhizn
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 129

6 Dec 1985: p.3, and by Zh. D. Fedorova at the Party Congress,

Selskaya zhizn, 1 Mar 1986: p.3.) Soon after the Party Congress an
article, 'Restructuring with a Reservation' (Perestroika s oglyadkoi, in
Selskaya zhizn, 28 Mar 1986: p. 3.), made c1ear that the intended change
will not be easy to effect. Whether an organisational device Iike the
RAPO will of itself do the job is by no means certain. And in view of the
huge size of Soviet kolkhozes and sovkhozes one may weil wonder
whether their management is the optimallocus of autonomous decision-
making and whether farmers' initiative should not rather emanate from
a yet lower level of management.

6.6 THE ASSIGNMENT BRIGADE AND LINK

Most c10sely connected with Gorbachev's name among the initiatives

and measures of agrarian policy during the last seven to eight years has
been the propagation and introduction of the podryadnaya hrigada and/
or beznaryadnoe zveno. Such brigades or links are a form of labour
organisation as weil as ofremuneration, and an explicit part ofthe Food
Programme of 1982. A flood of literature on the subject has appeared in
the West. (On itsearlier, abortive stage see Yanov, 1984: pp. 23--70 and
116-21.) Hence it is sufficient to analyse the essence and most recent
development, including Gorbachev's role, without going into detail.
First of all it should be pointed out that up to now the translation
'contract brigade' has been misleading, as it is not a contract between
more-or-Iess equal partners on which the podryad is based. Rather it is a
production assignment, including a fixed supply of land and other
inputs, to a group of workers, stipulating payment according to the
group's fulfilling or over-fulfilling that assignment in terms of output
quantities and input value and assortment. The kind and amount of
work to be put in also forms part of the assignment (the 'contract') on
the basis of norms. Similarly the smaller zveno (link, or team) has its
assignment, but is often strictly subordinated to a brigade and in practice
receives instructions or orders from it.
Thepodryadunit has - rather should have - two basic features: first, it
is responsible on its own for the success or failure of its production and
as a group receives payment according to quantity and quality of output,
not to work norms fulfilled. This is the element of 'internal self-
accounting' (vnulrennyi khozraschet) as different from the khozraschet of
the whole farm, öfwhich the assignment unit is part. The payment then
is distributed among its members as remuneration for each one's labour
130 Agriculture

contribution. Second, the unit should be autonomous in the way it

organises and schedules the work to be done.
Basically those are the same principles that have always been valid, at
least in theory, for the kolkhoz. Only they are now applied on a higher
technologicallevel and with a guaranteed minimum level of remunera-
tion added, as introduced in the kolkhozes during the 1960s. They are
now being advocated for sovkhozes as weil, so that one mayaIso consider
the issue an effort at reintroducing the collective farm principle to the
state agricultural sector. In terms ofland farmed or animals raised, most
such units are of about the same or even bigger size than the kolkhozes of
pre-amalgamation (pre-1950) days. In terms of the numbers of
operatives, however, they are smaller, which is a logical consequence of
the technical modernisation of agriculture.
Promising as these basic principles may seem, their effect is highly
dependent in practice on implementation. They are already part of the
'piecework-and-premium' wage system introduced under Khrushchev
in the early 1960s. (That system is c\early indicated as the basis of the
podryad payment system in a semi-official instruction artic\e in Ekon-
omika selskogo khozyaistya, no. 12/1986: pp. 64- 73.) At that time, in
most cases, they so on proved impractical and ineffective.
It seems that so me ofthe more or less genuine application ofthe above
principles were found in Stavropol krai when Gorbachev was Second
(1968 -70) and First (1970-8) Party Secretary there (see Pravda, 14 Sep
1971). (They are still in operation today.) Gorbachev himselfmentioned
them in an artic\e he contributed to a book on Socio-economic planning
and ideological work (1976).1 I t has to be added that Gorbachev's
attitude on the issue did not remain free of contradictions, when he
simultaneously favoured the so-called 'Ipatovsky Method' ofharvesting
by specialised detachments under the direction of the raion authorities,
instead ofby the on-farm brigades and links. The method was backed by
the all-Union Party Central Committee, wh ich issued a decree in its
favour on 15 July 1977 (Leninskaya agr. politika, 1978: pp. 620-2).
Gorbachev was obviously (Pravda, 7 Apr 1978, 3 Feb and 11 Apr 1979)
aware of the inherent contradictions between the two organisational
forms soon after the 'broad' introduction ofthe Ipatovsky Method in his
krai in 1977 (V. Volodin, Selskie zori, no. 9( 1984: p. 3), yet he continued
promoting both of them. 2
When Gorbachev was charged with responsibility for all-Union
agrarian affairs in 1978 he apparently took up the issue of the podryad
units again; at least it re-emerged in a decree of 5 February 1980 on wages
in range sheep farming in Kazakhstan. In May 1982 one of the decrees
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 131

paralleling the Food Programme was that 'On Measures for Raising the
Material Interestedness of Those Working in Agriculture .. .', which
made the point that it should serve the 'broad introduction of the
collective podryad' (LRninskaya agr. politika, 1983: p. 135). A number of
decrees and instructions of a similar kind continued until 1984.
Clearly the emphasis in all this was less on raising remuneration as
such. True, the decree of 1982 permitted the increasing of the wage scale
by up to 50 per cent upon introduction of this form of remuneration.
This obviously was meant mainly to diminish income losses, wh ich the
workers were likely to incur as a consequence ofthe production risk they
would have to bear under the new system. (Similarly an increase of 25
per cent had accompanied the introduction of the 'piecework-and-
premium' system in 1961-2.) In fact, average wages actually paid have
not risen faster in recent years than they did before 1978.

6.7 WILL SMALL BE BEAUTIFUL?

A stiII smaller assignment unit, the family, has been mentioned only
occasionally, in most cases for regions with labour-intensive farm
production and/or abundant labour resources. Sometimes this was a
way of circumventing the favoured larger units of a few dozen
permanent and a number of seasonal, unskilled members. From Latvia
it was reported that: 'On some farms, where they do not want to be
considered adversaries ofthe new system, mini-groups of2 - 3 people are
therefore organised. They are assigned the cultivation of potatoes, hemp
and beetroot in small fields. The main part of the work, however, which
directly influences the yield, is executed by those who do not work under
collective podryad' (Selskaya zhizn, 26 Sep 1985: p. 2). There seems to
have been resistance to family links. In some quarters they were more or
less associated with private small-scale production. An interviewer ofV.
S. Murakhovsky, chairman of the newly formed USSR Gosagroprom
referred to such latent opinions: 'A certain, though small part of our
readers regards the development of the sm all side-line production, the
family podryad, as a deviation from the norm ofthe socialist economy.'
The authoritative answer was: 'This is in no way contrary to our
principles. The land belongs to the state, the fertiliser and machinery to
the kolkhoz, the labour itself, however, is supplied by the (individual)
person or his family.' And Murakhovsky's preceding statement read:
'Of the forms of production relationship, this is one which is applied on
the basis of concrete conditions and specifics in one locality or another.
132 Agriculture

It has proven its value in sheep raising and vegetable production. It is

developing in the mountain settlements of Georgia; in Belorussia certain
families grow potatoes and sugar beet, bring in hay; on so me Central
Asian farms they produce vegetables. Also if a person wants to grow
certain quantities of vegetables, feedroots or something else for the
kolkhoz, one should not hinder this, may the man do his work'
(Literaturnaya Gazeta, no. 4/1986: p. 2).
This breakthrough in favour of the family link seems to have come
about only recently. Gorbachev, in his speech at the Party Congress,
explicitly mentioned the family as one of the possible small units of
assignment (podryad).
Without doubt the family or kinship or friendship small group has
great advantages in the branches of production enumerated above, and
in some others under Soviet conditions ofunsatisfactory mechanisation,
e.g. in dairy farming or animal fattening. (For such cases in Estonia see
Selskaya zhizn, 4 Apr 1986: p. 1.) Yet it is hardly a panacea for highly
mechanised production, such as modern grain farming, although one
has to add that the usual grain-growing brigade of 10- 20 'mechanisers'
nowadays seems still rather large.
In Stavropol krai, mainly for grain farming, a combination of the
Ipatovsky Method and assignment brigades was devised in 1980 in the
form of'inter-farm enterprises for mechanisation', where large podryad
units were put under the raion (RAPO) authority, not only for
harvesting but for whole crop rotation cycles. On average they had 27
tractors at their disposal and were assigned 3000- 3600 hectares ofland.
In this way total organisational separation of such machine operators'
units from the rest of the agricultural operatives (although they
probably hired some of them at times) and more or less also from th'!
kolkhozes and sovkhozes seems to be implied. (For details see V.
Volodin, op. cit. pp. 4- 7.)

6.8 CAMPAIGNING AND ALL THAT

One contradiction inherent in the Soviet system has remained unchan-

ged in connection with the podryad: On the one hand it is meant to
promote initiative at the lower level, and, on the other hand, the
remuneration system is imposed from above, and the centralising
element of managing production and labour is not to be interfered with.
Particularly telling is areport (Selskaya zhizn, 14 Feb 1986: p. 2) from
one of the regional agricultural conferences preceding the Party
 Karl-Eugen Wädekin 133

Congress. There it was said that the 'human factor, the creative initiative
and heightened responsibility of men and the determined refutation of
stereotyped approaches are accorded top priority' but at the same time it
was categorically stated that: 'khozraschet based on collective podryad is
the most progressive form of organising and remunerating work, and
there can he no one who douhts that' (emphasis added). Obviously,
'campaigning' for the introduction of a novelty, so characteristic under
Khrushchev, has not yet disappeared. This time the comprehensive
campaign started in 1983 with approval by the Politburo and the
subsequent all-Union conference on the podryadin Belgorod, wh ich was
followed by a number of similar conferences throughout the country. In
early 1984 CC secretary Egor Ligachev demanded in an article
(Partiinaya zhizn, 4/1985: p.23) that the podryad become firmly
entrenched in all kolkhozes and sovkhozes by the beginning of the 1986-
90 quinquennium. Later it was stated that 75 per cent ofthe total arable
area, 40- 50 per cent ofall cows, 80-90 per cent ofbeefcattle, 80 per cent
offattening pigs and 100 per cent ofsheep and fowl in the socialist sector
were to be managed by podryad units by the end of 1986 (Ekonomika
selskogo khozyaistva, no. 1/1986: p. 40).
The numbers of such brigades and links increased fivefold from 1982
to 1984; the number of operatives in them almost quadrupled and by
1984 comprised 23 per cent of crop, and 16.9 per cent of animal
production (Narkhoz 1984: p. 327). As the proportion of arable land and
livestock farmed by these brigades and links is greater than the
proportion oflabour the statistics reveal that, on average, the new form,
at least up to 1984, comprised those units wh ich are better supplied with
capital, i.e. either are economically above average, or are privileged in
obtaining such supplies.
The chairman of a Lithuanian kolkhoz and his economist made the
following pertinent point (Selskaya zhizn, 11 Jan 1986: p.2): 'The
contract presupposes a truly high level of brigade independence.'
Given previous Soviet experience such independence is not likely to
co me about rapidly and everywhere in Soviet agriculture. In a similar
vein the responsible CC secretary for the Ukraine stated: 'Collective
podryad and self-accounting are two connected and mutually dependent
economic categories. In practice, however, frequently one is present but
the other is missing. Then they do not achieve their final goal' (Selskaya
zhizn, 15 Feb 1986, p.2).
The agricultural daily of the Central Committee of the CPSU
reported: 'Often the principle of voluntariness is not adhered to when
collectives are formed, and local conditions are ignored in fixing the
134 Agriculture

normative labour results' (Selskaya zhizn, 31 Jan 1986, p.2). Shortly

afterwards the same daily, in a leading article, stated: 'Often podryad
collectives are formed without adequate preparation and the opinion of
the mechanisers and livestock personnel is not taken into account. No
attention is paid to the size of the brigades, links or detachments, to the
conclusion of contracts with them and to the observance ofthem by both
sides. Damage is caused by imposing numerous indicators of evaluation
and by the complicated form ofremuneration' (Selskaya zhizn, 18 Feb
1986, p. I).
Certainly the mere fact that such criticism is published holds promise
of improvement. Wh ether the promise will come true everywhere and to
a sufficient degree remains an open question. It will decide the outcome
of this central part of Gorbachev's efforts at something approaching a
reform of the Soviet agricultural system within socioeconomic
parameters. As yet the number of podryadbrigades and links, which are
truly 'contracting' and not just assignment units emerging from a
campaign, seems not to be large enough to form the basis for a forecast
of success or failure.

NOTES

I.· I am indebted to Werner G. Hahn for these references.

2. I am again indebted to Werner G. Hahn for these two further references.
7 Foreign Trade
ALAN H. SMITH

7.1 GORBACHEV'S INHERIT ANCE

When Mikhail Gorbachev ca me to power the foreign-trade sector

appeared to offer few problems that required urgent attention. The
USSR had maintained healthy surpluses in its visible trade conducted in
hard currency in the preceding three years and this had permitted a
steady reduction in net hard-currency indebtedness from a peak of$12.4
billion at the end of 1981 to $9.5 billion at the end of 1984, a level which
was considered by Western analysts to be 'modest in relation to the
country's earning capacity' (Gaworzewska, 1986: p.27).
Soviet terms of trade with its CMEA (Comecon) partners had
improved substantially since the first OPEC price increase of 1973, but
the USSR still supplied oil to its East European partners on more
favourable terms than those prevailing on Western markets. Although
this represented an economic cost to the USSR in the short term it has
strengthened East European dependency on Soviet supplies of energy
and raw materials and is a source ofSoviet economic power in CMEA.
Soviet policy towards CMEA was principally directed towards rcducing
these costs and tightening its terms of trade with East European
countries.
The principal problem inherited by Gorbachev was that the Soviet
export structure was excessively biased towards fuel, energy and raw
materials and precious metals, with oil and oil products increasing in
importance. The USSR is faced with exceedingly high costs for
developing mineral and energy deposits in Siberia and has to transport
these over a huge land mass both to meet domestic demand in the
European sector of the country and for export to Eastern and Western
Europe. Export earnings are therefore highly vulnerable to falls in world
market prices for energy and raw materials.
This chapter is principally directed at examining the importance of
135
136 Foreign Trade

energy exports to the Soviet economy and analysing the potential impact
of the dec1ine in world oil prices in the winter of 1985 - 6 on Soviet trade
with Eastern Europe and the industrialised West.

7.2 THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF FOREIGN TRADE AND THE

IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN TRADE TO THE SOVIET
ECONOMY

The Soviet foreign-trade system is highly centralised with astate

monopoly of foreign trade exercised by a central foreign-trade Ministry
operating from Moscow. The state monopoly of foreign trade is
designed to ensure that foreign-trade activities are only conducted
according to plan instructions. The basic principle of the system is that
only the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or its subsidiary agencies, Foreign
Trade Associations, are allowed to participate directly in trade relations
with bodies outside the country. Enterprises wishing to obtain imported
raw materials, components or equipment must pI ace orders with the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, not directly with their potential suppliers.
Similarly individuals cannot purchase consumer goods directly Irom
foreign suppliers. On the export side enterprises cannot choose to sell
their output on foreign markets, but must meet the supply targets
specified in their plan instructions.
Although the rouble is nominally linked to foreign currencies by an
official (and overvalued) exchange rate, entirely separate sy'stems of
pricing operate in the domestic economy and in foreign markets and it is
not possible to compare prices specified in domestic roubles with prices
specified in foreign-exchange (valuta) roubles. The 'valuta' rouble is not
convertible either in the sense that it can be converted into other
currencies or in the sense that it can be used to purchase commodities in
the domestic economy and functions purely as a unit of account. The
Ministry of Foreign Trade operates with entirely different systems of
accounts specified in domestic roubles and valuta roubles.
Soviet foreign-trade priorities are established on the 'imports first'
principle. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) draws up an initial
balance indicating the domestic availability and demand for specific
items. The principal purpose of foreign trade is to equate domestic
supply and demand by importing items that are in deficit supply, while
simultaneously seeking to export items that are in surplus supply
(relative to plan demand) to pay for them.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade is responsible for implementing these
 Alan H. Smith 137

plans and acts as an intermediary between domestic enterprises and

foreign markets. The Ministry ofForeign Trade purehases imports from
foreign suppliers, paying for these in foreign currency and resells them to
domestic enterprises, receiving payment in domestic roubles. The
process is reversed in the case of exports. The Ministry of F oreign Trade
purehases imports from domestic suppliers, paying for these in domestic
roubles and seils the products on foreign markets receiving payment in
foreign currencies.
As a result of the priority attached to meeting import targets the
Ministry of Foreign Trade is principally concerned with achieving fixed
hard-currency targets when drawing up its plans for exports to the West.
As a result the USSR frequently responds to falling world market prices
for specific commodities in the short run by increasing sales in order to
maintain revenue targets. In the longer term, however, the Foreign
Trade Ministry should review its export structure in response to long-
term shifts in world market conditions.
Although the system tends to prevent quick responses to changing
conditions in world markets it can be argued that the high degree of
centralisation is peculiarly suited to Soviet trade flows in which large-
scale purchases and sales of single items (wheat and oil) predominate
and imports ofmanufactures are concentrated on large-scale construc-
tion or 'turnkey' projects. Under these circumstances the benefits
offered by the state monopoly-monopsony position which prevent
domestic consumers and suppliers from competing against one another
in foreign markets may outweigh other disadvantages. This advantage
may disappear in the immediate future ifthe USSR attempts to boost its
exports of manufactures to compensate for declining energy revenues
which will require domestic producers to respond more quickly to
changing conditions on world markets. Similarly a reduced reliance on
imports of turnkey projects in favour of modernising existing factories
may require domestic producers to come into closer contact with
overseas suppliers.
According to most conventional measures the Soviet Union, like
other big countries with a large population and a substantialland mass,
does not appear to be highly dependent on foreign trade, and substantial
changes in world market conditions should not therefore have a large
impact on the domestic economy. Vanous (1982) estimates that Soviet
imports converted into dollars at the official exchange rate. after
allowing for price divergences in intra-CMEA trade, only accounted for
4.1 per cent of the dollar value of Soviet GNP estimated by the CIA.
This view is echoed by Soviet commentators. but has been questioned
138 Foreign Trade

by Treml (Treml, 1983: p.4O), who argues that machinery and

equipment of foreign (including East European) origin accounted for
over 20 per cent ofthe Soviet stock ofmachinery and investment in 1980
and for 20 per cent of new investment in machinery and equipment that
year and that imported consumer goods accounted for 14-15 per cent of
the value of goods sold in state retail stores, while imported foodstuffs
and agricultural raw materials (including animal feedstocks) accounted
for over 20 per cent ofthe Soviet calorie intake in the late I 970s and early
I 980s. Treml (1983; p. 37) also estimates that Soviet imports measured in
domestic prices, which may reftect how Soviet planners view the
importance of imports to the economy more accurately than world
market prices, have risen from 8.6 per cent of Soviet GNP in 1970 to
19.98 per cent of Soviet GNP in 1980, largely as a result of increased
purchasing power following the increase in OPEC oil prices.

7.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY TO SOVIET FOREIGN-

TRADE RELATIONS

(a) In Trade with Non-Socialist Countries

Table 7.1 provides an indication of the growth in value of Soviet energy
and oil exports over the period from 1972 to 1984 which covers the major
increases in world energy prices in 1973-4 and 1979. The extent to which
Gorbachev inherited an export structure that was heavily dependent on
exports of energy and of exports of crude oil and refined oil products in
particular is immediately apparent.
In 1972. the last full year before the first increase in OPEC oil prices,
exports of fuel and energy comprised only 17.7 per cent of the value of
Soviet exports to all parts of the world. while oil revenues amounted to
\.66 billion roubles, equivalent to 13 per cent of total Soviet exports. In
1984 fuel and energy exports comprised 54.4 per cent ofthe total value of
Soviet exports and accounted for 62 per cent of the increase in value in
Soviet exports since 1972. Oil exports to all parts ofthe world amounted
to 30.9 billion roubles and accounted for41.5 per cent ofthe rouble value
of total Soviet exports.
It can be seen from Table 7.2 that the quantity ofSoviet exports rose
from 107 million tonnes in 1972 to 170 million tonnes in 1983, while the
Soviet Union has changed from being a net importer of natural gas in
1972 to becoming a substantial net exporter in 1983. The aggregate value
figures conceal the fact that different methods of pricing and payment
 Alan H. Smith 139

TABLE7.1 Soviet Energy Exports by Value /972-84 (million roub/es)

/972 /975 /980 /982 /984

Energy exports 2254 7545 23279 33035 40065

Proportion of total exports (per 17.7 31.4 46.9 52.3 54.4
cent)
Commodity composition
Dil 1664 5908 18085 25383 30896
Natural gas 68 451 3687 5905 7462
Coal 323 799 1101 1203 1407

Destination o[ Oil exports

Eastem Europe 769 2143 5886 9104 12093
Other socialist countries· 177 575 1826 2642 3415
OECD 647 3060 9223 12031 13418
Deve10ping countries 71 130 1150 1431 1744

Gas Exports
Eastem Europe 49 267 1658 2834 3844
Yugoslavia 173 332 486
OECD 19 184 1856 2738 3131

·Cuba. Mongolia. Vietnam. North Korea and Yugoslavia.

Source: Estimated from Vneshnyaya Torgov/ya za SSSR. various years.

prevail in trade with CMEA countries, other socialist countries and with
OECD and developing countries and that the economic and political
importance of oil trade varies in different regions of the world. Tables
7.1 and 7.2 are also broken down into estimates ofthe value and volume
of oil and gas exports to the different regions of the world to facilitate a
more detailed analysis.
The principal purpose of oil exports to the OECD region is to raise
hard currency to finance imports, predominantly of machinery and
equipment (not necessarily 'high-technology' items), specialised steel
products and foodstuffs. Exports of crude oil and refined oil products
comprised 63.6 per cent of Soviet exports to industrialised market
economies (including Finland) in 1984 and amounted to 13.4 billion
roubles (approximately $17.5 billion). Exports of natural gas (whose
price may be expected to fall if oil prices remain permanently deflated)
accounted for a further 14.7 per cent of Soviet exports to the industrial
West and amounted to 3.1 billion roubles (approximately $4.0 billion).
Exports to Finland are c1eared bilaterally and are not paid for in hard
140 Foreign Trade

currency. Finland is an important source of 'hard goods' for the USSR

(i.e.goods that the USSR would otherwise have to spend hard currency
to acquire) and was the second-Iargest non-socialist exporter of
machinery and equipment (including shipping) to the USSR in 1984. It
appears reasonable, de facto, to consider that the importance to the
TADLE 7.2 Soviet Oil and Natural Gas Production and Trade 1972-83

1972 1975 1980 1982 1983

Oil
(million tonnes)
Production 400 491 603 613 616
Imports 9 8 6 9 12
Total a'/ailability 409 499 609 622 628

Consumption 302 369 447 458 458

Exports 107 130 162 164 170
of which to:
OECD 42 48 57 69 78
Eastern Europe 49 63 80 70 72
Other 16 19 25 25 20
Natural!:as
(billion cubic metres)
Production 289 435 501 536
Imports 11 12 3 3 5
Total availability 301 438 504 541

Consumption 282 380 445 482

Exports 5 19 58 59 59
of which to:
OECD 2 8 26 26 25
Eastern Europe 3 11 30 31 32
Yugoslavia 2 2 2

Sources and notes: Oil and gas production Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, various years. Imports
and exports 1972. 1975 from Vneshnyaya Tor!:ovlya:a SSSR, 1973, 1976. The USSR has
published no da ta relating to the volume ofSoviet oil and gas trade since 1976. Export and
import volumes for 1980, 1982 and 1983 have been based on estimates from partners' data.
OECD oil statistics are taken from OECDjInternational Energy Association, Quarterly
Oil Statistics. OECD gas imports derived from UN Annual Bulletin jor Gas Statistics.
Non-OECD imports and exports derived from volume data in Statisticheskii E:he!:odnik
Stran-Chlenov SEV and from author's estimates based on Soviet value data.
 Alan H. Smith 141

Soviet economy of oil exports to Finland (which amounted to 1.8 billion

roubles in 1984, or 75 per cent of all exports to Finland) is approximately
equivalent to that of oil that is exported directly for hard curreney and
then used to purehase similar items. On this basis oil exports to the
industrialised market economies eontributed directly to the import of
$17.5 billion doIlars worth of hard-eurreney imports in 1984. .
Oil exports also aceounted for 16 per eent of Soviet exports to
developing countries, amounting to $1.9 billion at the official exchange
rate. India accounted for over two-thirds of Soviet oil exports to
deve\oping countries. Soviet trade with India, like that with Finland is
subject to a bilateral clearing agreement and the USSR does not reeeive
hard currency for these exports. This factor is partly otfset by the
practiee of multinational corporations which redireet their exports to
the USSR through India, in order to gain access to the Soviet market. In
addition the USSR imports food items from India. Soviet oil exports to
India are to a limited degree therefore a souree of hard goods.
The majority of the remainder of Soviet oil exports to developing
countries are directed towards countries with a socialist orientation and
do not bring immediate economie benefits to the USSR, aIthough there
appears to be an inereasing volume of Soviet oil exports directed
towards eountries that are food exporters.
More eritically, however, approximately 68 per cent ofSoviet exports
to developing eountries comprise weapons or civilian items with a dual
civil-military use, much ofwhich have been directed towards the newly
rich oil-exporting countries, whose purchasing power will be seriously
atfected by a long-term decline in hard-currency earnings. (It is not
possible to identify recipients of Soviet arms exports accurately from
Soviet trade statisties which, as a resuIt, eonsiderably understate the
volume of exports to OPEC countries.) A substantial proportion of
these arms were delivered on credit and some estimates indicate that the
USSR may have been owed over $30 billion for arms and other deliveries
to Third World eountries by the end of 1983 (see Smith, 1985).
In the short term the USSR may be faced by a slow down in the rate of
repayment of credits which are eurrently believed to be between $2
billion and $3 billion per annum. In the longer term the USSR may
experience difficulties in being repaid for arms that have already been
delivered as weil as losing new markets. Futhermore if a sustained fall in
oil prices resulted in inereased demand in Western Europe at the expense
of the OPEC eountries the USSR would be unable to divert its arms
exports to the newly expanding markets.
142 Foreign Trade

(b) In Trade with Socialist Countries

The value ofSoviet oil exports to East European partners in CMEA rose
from 769 million roubles in 1972 to 12093 million roubles in 1984, while
exports to other socialist countries (principally Cuba and Yugoslavia)
rose from 177 million roubles to 3415 million roubles over the same
period.
Prices in intra-CMEA trade are linked to world market prices with a
time-lag. Prior to the OPEC price increases of 1973--4, intra-CMEA
prices were fixed for the whole of a Five-Year Plan period and were
caJculated on the basis of an average of world market prices in the
preceding Five-Year Plan period. These were then converted into
'transferable roubles' at the official exchange rate.
In practice it is very difficult to identify a 'world market price' for the
vast majority of products and the formula left room for a considerable
degree of bilateral negotiation between trading partners. Prices did,
however, show a considerable degree ofstability over the Five-Year Plan
period which facilitated bilateral clearing arrangements. A number of
East European countries (Hungary in particular) proposed that the
formula be adjusted to allow changes in world market prices to have a
greater influence on intra-CMEA prices.
In 1975 (i.e. the final year ofthe existing agreement for the 1971-5
Plan) the pricing formula was altered so that intra-CMEA prices were
based on the average of the preceding three years' world market prices.
From 1976 onwards this practice has been institutionalised, but based
on a sliding average of the preceding five years' world market prices.
(Thus intra-CMEA prices in 1976 were based on an average of world
market prices in 1971-- 5, and in 1977 were based on an average ofworld
market prices in 1972-6 etc.)
This formula means that the price of Soviet oil delivered to Eastern
Europe has lagged considerably behind the world market price. In the
second half of the 1970s the price of Soviet oil was considerably lower
than the world market price, as the effect of OPEC price increases of
1973-4 was fed slowly into the intra-CMEA price formula. The intra-
CMEA price was starting to catch up with the world market price at the
time of the second major round of OPEC price increases in 1979.
Effectively therefore the process of the late 1970s was repeated in the
early 1980s with the intra-CMEA price catching up with the world
market price in 1985 and actually exceeding it in 1986.
Although the sliding world market price means that the East
European countries have received Soviet oil on far more favourable
 Alan H. Smith 143

terms than they would have paid for oil obtained on world markets,
Soviet terms of trade with Eastern Europe have improved considerably
since 1974, as Table 7.3 shows. This table distinguishes between the 'net
barter terms of trade', the ratio of Soviet export prices to Soviet import
prices in intra-CMEA trade, and the 'gross barter terms of trade', the
ratio of the real volume of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe to the real
volume of Soviet imports from Eastern Europe, measured at compara-
ble prices

TADLE 7.3 Soviel Terms ofTrade with Easlern Europe (/974 = /(0)

/975 /976 /977 /978 /979 /980 /98/ /982 /983 /984

Priee Index
Soviet exports 122 130 140 152 161 174 205 231 257 276
Soviet imports 116 120 124 130 137 145 157 160 171 180
Net barter terms
of trade 105 108 113 117 118 120 131 144 150 153

Real volume index

Soviet exports 112 116 126 127 133 138 136 130 131 135
Soviet imports 113 119 130 153 152 157 156 175 190 199
Gross barter terms
of trade 101 103 103 120 114 114 115 135 145 147

CMEA oil price 185 204 257 306 348 409 520 643 761 863

Noles and sourees: For explanation of terms and methods of calculation see the text.
Rows 1-6 have been estimated from da ta in Vlleshnyaya Torgov(~·a. various years. Row 7
isestimated from Dietz (1986): p.283).

Soviet trade statistics provide a measure ofthe real volume growth of

Soviet trade with CMEA as a whole (i.e. including Eastern Europe and
the three developing countries that are members of CMEA (Cuba,
Mongolia and Vietnam) from which it is possible to estimate the level of
price changes in Soviet exports and imports within CMEA (Table 7.3,
rows land 2). These estimates indicate that Soviet export prices
increased by 176 per cent between 1974 and 1984 while Soviet import
prices rose by 80 per cent over the same period. These price indices have
then been used to deflate the money value of Soviet trade with Eastern
Europe alone over the same period. The estimates in rows 3 and 4 of
Table 7.3 indicate that the real volume ofSoviet imports rose by 99 per
144 Foreign Trade

eent between 1974 and 1984 while the real volume of Soviet exports to
Eastern Europe rose by only 35 per cent over the same period.
Furthermore the real volume of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe
actually decIined in the early 1980s.
The growth in the value of energy exports (15.8 billion roubles)
accounted for two-thirds ofthe increase in the nominal (money) value of
Soviet exports (23.7 billion roubles) to Eastern Europe between 1974
and 1984. The growth in the nominal value of Soviet imports from
Eastern Europe between 1974 and 1984 of 2\.9 billion roubles was
prineipally composed of machinery and equipment amounting to 12.7
billion roubles, industrial consumer goods amounting to 2.9 billion
roubles and trade that cannot be identified by commodity of 3.7 billion
roubles. A rough estimate indicates that Soviet imports of machinery
and equipment from Eastern Europe more than doubled in real terms
over the last ten-year period.
The principal cause of the improvement in Soviet net barter terms of
trade with Eastern Europe since 1984 has been the growth of oil and
related energy prices. Dietz (1986) estimates that the unit value (average
price) of Soviet oil deliveries to Eastern Europe rose from 15.7
transferable roubles a tonne in 1972 to 173.2 transferable roubles a
tonne in 1984, an increase of over 1000 per cent. The unit value figures
do not take into account differences between erude-oil and refined-oil
products, and different types of products over this period. Dietz
estimates that changes in the intra-CM EA price of oil since 1972
contributed to a price gain to the USSR amounting to a total of 47.8
billion roubles in the period from 1973 to 1985 (equivalent to 21 per cent
of Soviet ex ports to Eastern Europe). In 1984 alone this price gain was
equivalent to 9,9 billion roubles, or 31 per cent of Soviet exports to
Eastern Europe.
Intra-CMEA prices were still substantially below world market prices
d uring this period. Dietz estimates that if the USSR had charged Eastern
Europe the full world market priee for oil (measured in dollars and
converted into transferable roubles at the official exchange rate) this
would have resulted in additional price gains to the USSR of31.3 billion
roubles, indicating that approximately 60 per cent of the increase in
world market prices was passed on to Eastern Europe in the period
1973 - 85, by the application of the sliding average-price formula.
Dietz also estimates that when the effect of price increases for Soviet
exports of other forms of energy exports (principally natural gas and to a
lesser extent coal, coke and electricity) are taken into account Soviet
export price gains over 1972 in energy trade with Eastern Europe
 Alan H. Smith 145

amount to 63 billion roubles in the period from 1973 to 1984, or 28 per

cent of Soviet exports over the period, while energy price gains in 1984
amounted to 12.2 billion roubles or 38 per cent of Soviet exports.
Dietz also estimates that price increases in the USSR's non-energy
exports to Eastern Europe were effectively cancelled out by price
increases in Soviet imports from Eastern Europe in the period from 1973
to 1982 and that the USSR's improvement in its net barter terms oftrade
with Eastern Europe over this period can be attributed entirely to
changes in the price of energy.
Dietz calls the price improvements accruing to the USSR over this
period 'terms oftrade income'. Not all this income is actually expended
on currently produced goods and services as the USSR ran balance-of-
trade surpluses with Eastern Europe amounting to 14.5 billion roubles in
the period from 1975 to 1984. The non-convertibility of the CMEA
currency unit, the transferable rouble, means that the USSR cannot
convert these surpluses into other currencies or demand payment in the
form of commodities from East European countries, but purely
accumulates a form of 'claim' against the future output of the countries
concerned. Dietz bases his estimates on the period from 1973 to 1982 and
caIculates that only 73.5 per cent ofthe 'terms oftrade income' had been
recouped in the form of additional goods and services imported from
Eastern Europe. On this basis the net flow of resources to the USSR
from Eastern Europe resulting from price changes can be estimated at
26.3 billion roubles in the period from 1973 to 1982, equivalent to 17.2
per cent of Soviet imports from Eastern Europe over this period. The
measurement and interpretation of Soviet losses incurred through
differences between the intra-CMEA price formula and world market
prices and trade surpluses is the subject of controversy among Western
analysts. Dietz estimates these 'forgone gains' amounted to 32.3 billion
roubles from 1973 to 1982. Marrese and Vanous (1983) have a
substantially higher estimate of Soviet 'forgone gains' in trade with
Eastern Europe which they describe as a deli berate subsidy offered for
security provided by buffer states.
Lavigne (1983), van Brabant (1984) and Dietz (1986) agree that Soviet
trade preferences do not represent deliberate subsidies, but differ slightly
in their interpretation ofSoviet motives for not charging Eastern Europe
the full world market price for oil exports. Lavigne argues that the USSR
did not fully realise the costs the sliding world market price formula
would oblige it to bear when the formula was initially agreed, but
following the second round of OPEC price increases has used the
bargaining potential offered by the difference between world market
146 Foreign Trade

prices and intra~CMEA oil prices to implement proposals for CMEA

integration consistent with its own wishes. The logical corollary of this
argument is that the USSR may experience difficulty in continuing to
stimulate CMEA integration in aperiod offalling world oil prices. Van
Brabant argues that the USSR could not have imposed harder real terms
of trade on its East European partners without stimulating a 'socially
and politically unacceptable recession'. This view also indicates that the
new leadership could experience political resistance to moves to tighten
its terms of trade with Eastern Europe any furt her

7.4 SOVIET FOREIGN-TRADE STRATEGY

Although foreign trade did not receive significant coverage in the Party
Congress speeches of either Mikhail Gorbachev or Nikolai Ryzhkov, a
fairly c1ear trade strategy can be discerned. The major questions
surround the realism of this strategy, and the degree to which it will be
affected by changes in world oil prices.
Ryzhkov indicated that priority should be given to 'changing the raw
materials bias of exports' and stimulating the competitiveness of exports
ofmanufactured goods, but admitted that this would take longer than a
single Five-Year Plan period (Pravda, 4 Mar 1986).
Both Gorbachev and Ryzhkov referred to proposals to improve
economic integration and plan co-ordination in CMEA as a means of
improving technical progress and both speeches stressed the need to
reduce the vulnerability of the economy to external pressures and
economic sanctions. Gorbachev placed the improvement of trade
relations with the Third World ahead ofrelations with capitalist states in
his opening speech to the Congress.
Soviet proposals for economic integration in CMEA are directed at
stimulating bloc self-sufficiency as far as is possible in three main areas,
energy and raw materials, and scientific lind technical progress and the
production of foodstuffs. This implies a renewed emphasis on strength-
ening the world socialist system to 'increase our technical and economic
invulnerability to imperialist actions' (Ryzhkov, Pravda, 4 Mar 1986).
There is no intention of cutting off trade links with the West and the
denunciation of discriminatory trade practices by the USA may be a
tactical ploy to influence divisions in the West, particularly on
restrictions on the sale of technology to communist countries but the
policy also reflects a new confidence in the ability of the socialist
economies to generate technological improvements.
 Alan H. Smith 147

The emphasis on domestic technology and import saving was

reflected in Ryzhkov's speech to the Party Congress. Ryzhkov praised
the 'fine traditions and outstanding achievements of the USSR
Academy of Sciences', but blamed breakdowns in the 'science to
production cyc\e' for the low technological levels of Soviet industrial
equipment. In particular he blamed the 'headlong pursuit of imported
technology' for this state of atfairs. Ministerial officials were frequently
slow to realise the potential benefits of domestic science and technology,
but displayed 'remarkable activity in obtaining machineryand equip-
ment from abroad, wh ich could be quite succesfully produced by our
own etforts', while the 'ease with which equipment can be obtained from
overseas' had a demoralising etfect on Soviet scientists (Pravda, 4 Mar
1986).
The emphasis on the 'solution of the foodstutfs problem' in Gorba-
chev's opening speech to the Congress and the continuation ofthe Food
Programme, initiated under Brezhnev, is also aimed at reducing Soviet
dependence on imported animal feedstocks and hence Soviet vul-
nerability to sanctions from the USA, the world's major exporter of
maize.
The priority given to the technical modernisation and re-equipping of
industry, and the computerisation and robotisation of industry in
particular appears to imply an increase in imports of machinery and
equipment, and has been interpreted by some Western observers as
implying increased dependence on Western technology. Ryzhkov,
however, indicated in his speech to the World Economic Forum at
Davos, on 5 February 1986, that the USSR 'intends to rely firstlyon its
own production potential' to achieve the 'renovation of the production
apparatus, based on new equipment and progressive technologies'
(Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, no. 4fl986). Although he argued at the Party
Congress that the draft Five-Year Plan implied a 'considerable expan-
sion of foreign economic relations ... directed towards scientific and
technical progress', he emphasised that 'co-operation with socialist
states would be the determinant here'.
This strategy reflects a continuation of the policies outlined by
Nikolai Tikhonov in October 1982, shortly be fore Brezhnev's death.
Tikhonov ca lIed for the strengthening ofCMEA co-operation and plan
co-ordination for the 1986-90 plan period and a co-ordinated invest-
ment strategy to guarantee the 'technical-economic independence of the
CMEA countries from the West' in the wake of attempts by the US
Administration to prevent Western participation in the construction of
the Urengoi-Uzhgorod gas pipeline. He also called for policies to
148 Foreign Trade

develop bloc self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and for a co-ordinated energy

policy directed at reducing energy consumption, particularly in Eastern
Europe and for increased joint investments to expand production of
natural gas and atomic energy (Pravda, 15 Oct 1982).
Attempts to stimulate greater integration in CMEA have been
combined with a tightening of the Soviet terms of trade with Eastern
Europe reflected in the trade flows for 1982. The real volume of Soviet
imports from Eastern Europe increased by 14 per cent, largely reflecting
an increase in imports ofmachinery and equipment, while Soviet exports
to Eastern Europe actually declined by 4 per cent as a result of a cut in
Soviet oil exports from 80 million tonnes to 70 million tonnes. As a result
the Soviet 'gross barter terms oftrade' with Eastern Europe improved by
19 per cent in 1982. Soviet imports of machinery and equipment from
Eastern Europe continued to ex pa nd in 1983 and 1984, while Soviet
exports to Eastern Europe levelled out in real terms.
The terms on which the USSR would continue to supply Eastern
Europe with energy (and oil in particular) were clearly indicated at the
summit conference of Party leaders of the CMEA countries held in
Moscow in June 1984. The communique, signed by all of the East
European Party leaders, included the commitment to:

create economic conditions ensuring the implementation and continuation of

deliveries from the Soviet Union of a number of types of raw materials and
energy ... the interested CMEA member countries shall gradually and
consistently develop ... their structure ofproduction and exports ... with
the aim ofsupplying the Soviet Union with the products it needs, in particular
foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods. some types of construction
materials. machines and equipment ofa high quality and world technicallevel
(Vneshnyaya Tor!{ovlya, no. 8(1984).

The working sessions of the CMEA assembly since that date have
largely concentrated on securing proposals to implement the above
agreement. A number of joint construction projects were agreed at the
39th CMEA Session held at Havana in October 1984 for the 1986-90
Plan period, similar to the joint investments implemented in the 1976-
80 Plan, but which were not extended to any significant degree in the
1981-- 5 Plan period. These primarily involve East European contribu-
tions in the form of physical capital for the exploration and extraction of
Soviet energy and mineral deposits and for their transportation to the
Soviet border with Eastern Europe. East European contributions will be
repaid in products from the joint ventures. Projects included in the
1986-90 Plan, and approved at the Party Congress, include agas
 Alan H. Smith 149

pipeline from the Yamburg peninsula to the Soviet western border,

atomic and thermal power plants, proposals to develop oil and gas fields
in the Caspian Depression, the expansion of the CMEA countries'
integrated power grid and the construction of the Krivoi Rog mining
and dressing complex for steel pellets (Basic Guidelines, Pravda, 9 Mar
1986).
The most significant agreement was reached at an extraordinary
CMEA session held in Moscow in December 1985, which produced the
'Comprehensive Programme for Scientific and Technical Progress'
wh ich provides for CMEA technological co-operation until the year
2000 in five priority sectors of the economy: electronics, including
information technology; supercomputers; personal computers; telecom-
munications and fibre optics; the automation and robotisation of
production; atomic energy, concentrating on co-operation in produc-
tion of pressurised light-water cooled reactors (unlike the reactor at
Chernobyl); the use of new industrial materials; and biotechnology for
agriculture, food processing and medicines for human and veterinary
uses.
The methods to be used to implement the Comprehensive Programme
for Scientific and Technical Progress remain hazy and the political
importance of the document implying agreement to co-operate on the
critical problems facing the CMEA economies may prove to be greater
than its economic significance. Critical problems still remain concerning
whether CMEA scientists will be capable of generating solutions to the
problems facing the economies, how these will be diffused throughout
the economies of the region and what will be the sources of investment,
particularly in the short run, given the economic constraints facing the
region as a whole.

7.5 THE FEASIBILITY OF THE STRATEGY

7.5.1 Physical Problems of Energy Supply

The most serious foreign-trade problem facing Gorbachev when he
came to power was the excessive dependence ofthe USSR on oil exports,
both as a source ofhard-currency earnings and as a source of economic
power in Eastern Europe. Soviet anxieties were largely concentrated on
the fear that continued exports at this level would be constrained by
supply problems, a problem that wasgiven added urgency by the fall in
oil output in the first three months of 1985, immediately before
150 Foreign Trade

Gorbachev came to power, wh ich resulted in annual oil output falling

from 613 million tonnes in 1984 to 595 million tonnes in 1985, compared
with a Five-Year Plan target of 620-45 million tonnes. The fall in oil
output in 1985 resulted in a cut in Soviet oil exports of25 million tonnes
from 1984 levels contributing to a fall in Soviet exports to the industrial
West (including Finland) of approximately $3.5 billion over the year.
Soviet long-term strategy has been directed at reducing CMEA oil
consumption by conservation and by substituting other forms of energy
in the CMEA energy balance, particularly in power generation, in order
to preserve oil for export to the West and for use in the petrochemical
sector, a potential source ofhard currency exports. The potential for oil
substitution in East European power generation is limited (although
conservation measures could bring large savings in energy consumption
in general), and electric power-generation plans for 1986-90 rely on the
use of low-quality brown coals and lignite, wh ich carry substantial
pollution hazards, and on the expansion of nuclear capacity. Soviet
power-generation policy is based on meeting demand in the eastern
sector of the country by coal-fired power stations, using the cheaper
open-cast Kazakh and Siberian coalfields in Ekibastuz and Kansk-
Achinsk, while the growth in demand in the industrial European sector
will principaUy be met by nuclear power, thereby reducing the costs
involved in transporting primary energy from the producing regions in
Kazakhstan and Siberia. By-product heat from nuclear power stations is
also to be used as a source of district heating which necessitates the
construction of nuclear power stations close to residential areas. The
major growth in primary fuel output will come from natural gas,
involving CMEA co-operation in developing the deposits in the
Yamburg peninsula in north-west Siberia.
The fall in world oil prices and the Chernobyl nuclear power accident
raise serious questions about the viability ofthis strategy. The shortage
of reliable da ta on the costs of development of the Yamburg peninsula
and of Soviet nuclear power prevent a detailed assessment of the rate of
return on investment in oil substitution to either the USSR and/or its
CMEA partners. So me Western estimates indicate that the cost of
generating nuclear power could remain competitive with oil-firing, even
if oil prices were to fall to $5 a barrel. Coal-firing, however, could
become competitive with oil at prices of around $10 a barrel.
It is not clear how easily these figures can be extrapolated to the
USSR, but they olfer some prima-facie evidence to suggest that
economic planners are likely to press ahead with proposals to increase
nuclear capacity. So me East European leaders may become nervous
 Alan H. Smith 151

about the impact on public opinion of siting nuclear power stations in

residential areas.
Low oil prices may tempt some East European countries to delay or
abandon plans to substitute lignite for oil in power generation, but under
these circumstances it is probable that the USSR would require them to
meet increased demand for oil from non-Soviet sources. The high costs
involved in the exploration and extraction ofnatural gas deposits in the
Yamburg region and their transportation could, however, appear
uneconomic in an era of low oil prices.
The indications are that Soviet planners either anticipate that low oil
prices will be of relatively short duration, or are more concerned with
problems of physical supply than with the costs of domestic production
relative to world market prices. The final version of the 1986- 90 Plan
approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 June 1986 (i.e. after the fall
in world oil prices and the Chernobyl accident) provides for a 10 per cent
increase in investment in the oil industry in addition to the targets
contained in the draft approved at the Party Congress. The final plan
target for oil output in 1990 is increased from 625 million tonnes to 635
million tonnes while natural-gas production is planned to grow from 643
billion cubic metres in 1985 to 850 billion cubic metres in 1990 and coal
productionfrom 726 million tonnes to 795 million tonnes. Nuclear
power targets have not been altered in the light of the Chernobyl
accident and output is planned to grow from 167 billion kWh in 1985 to
390 billion kWh in 1990, accounting for two-thirds of the increase in
Soviet power generation.

7.S.1 The Impact ofFalling on Prices

A sustained fall in world oil prices would present far greater problems to
the USSR than falling output. In practice Soviet oil production
improved in the first five months of 1986 and even if production
stabilised at 615-20 million tonnes and domestic consumption were to
continue to grow by approximately 1.5 per cent per annum in 1986-90,
the volume available for export in 1990 would be approximately eq ual to
that in 1985. This could prove to be uncomfortable, but would not be
disastrous. Successful conservation and substitution measures, or even
rationing measures far less draconian than those introduced in
Romania, could release additional quantities for export if central
authorities chose that course.
Falling world prices present a totally different problem that lies
outside planners' control. At the 1984 levels of exports to OECD nations
152 Foreign Trade

(excluding Finland) of 42 million tonnes, each dollar per barrel fall in the
price obtained for Soviet crude oil will cost approximately $300 million
hard-currency revenues, while equivalent falls in prices of refined oil
products (29 million tonnes) would cost a further $220 million. On the
assumption that in the long term product prices fall in line with crude-oil
prices the effect of a $15 dollar barrel would be to cut annual Soviet
hard-currency earnings from oil exports from $14.4 billion in 1984 to
$8.0 billion. On the same basis a $10 barrel (Urals crude was trading at
$12.60 in April 1986 and prices seem set to fall below $10 a barrel in July
1986) would cut annual Soviet hard-currency oil earnings to $5.3 billion.
In addition related falls in natural-gas prices would also affect Soviet
hard-currency earnings. A fall in Soviet natural-gas prices of just one-
third would cost the USSR over $1 billion in hard-currency earnings
from 1984 levels.
Official Soviet commentators have appeared relatively sanguine
about Soviet carnings prospects over the long term. Leonid Vid, a
deputy chairman of Gosplan, argued in a press conference at the Party
Congress that the USSR would switch its exports to refined oil products
and exports of aviation and diesel fuel in particular, for which prices
remain relatively buoyant, but in the longer term would increase the
level of exports of manufactures. Most Western observers remain
unconvinced. The USSR will face severe market pressures in virtuälly
every export sector, even if domestic supplies can be increased. The
USSR has remained heavily dependent on exports of energy, raw
materials and precious metals for hard-currency earnings. Although the
USSR has expanded its gold sales by about 20 per cent since the
beginning of 1985 and earnings this year could be as high as $3 billion,
the price of gold has remained just- below $350 an ounce and further
increases in sales are likely to have serious cffects on world prices. The
long-term market prospects for sales of other precious metals, including
platinum, appear relatively good, but it is unlikely that the USSR could
realise the volume sal~s required to offset declining oil revenues without
having a serious effect on prices. Under these circumstances Soviet hard-
currency earnings could be best served by a rapid deterioration in the
South African position, resuIting in falls in South African sales of
diamonds and precious metals.
How would Soviet planners react to a loss of hard-currency earnings
on such a scale? Soviet import patterns in 1985 in response to the fall in
oil revenues resulting from declining output may provide so me insights.
In particular a change in Soviet import patterns in the second half ofthe
year following Gorbachev's accession to power can be detected. Table
 Alan H. Smith 153

7.4 shows that Soviet imports from the industrial market economies in
the first and second quarters of 1985 continued to grow despite the faH in
oil revenues, resulting in a visible trade deficit of 2.4 billion roubles ($3
billion). The USSR financed this and other hard currency requirements
by increasing its Iiabilities to Western banks by $2.3 billion and by
reducing its holdings of convertible currencies in Western banks by $1.8
billion, i~creasing its net indebtedness with Western banks by $4.1
billion between January and June 1985 (see Table 7.5). In the third
quarter of 1985 the USSR cut its imports from the West by 33 per cent.
Thiscannot be explained by seasonal factors alone. OECD data confirm
that Western exports to the USSR fell from a monthly peak of $2.3

TADLE 7.4 Soviet Trade with the lndustrialised West in 1984 and 1985: Quarter~v Data
(thousand 'valuta' roubles)

Quarter:
1984 First Second Third Fourth Total

Soviet exports 4632 5661 5498 5558 21349

Soviet imports 4567 5112 4371 5529 19579
Balance +65 +549 + 1127 +29 + 1770
1985
Soviet exports 3339 4928 5118 5194 18579
Soviet imports 5048 5658 3737 4825 19268
Balance -1709 -730 + 1381 +369 -689

Source: Estimated from Vneshnyaya Torgovlya (monthly), various months.

TADLE 7.5 Soviet Assets and Liabilities with Banks Reporting to the Bank for Inter-
national Selliements ($ million)

1983 1984 1985

December December March June September December

Soviet Iiabilities 16222 16640 16029 18875 21150 22627

Soviet assets 10924 11341 8779 9569 11106 13061
Net Iiabilities 5298 5299 7250 9406 10004 9566

Source: BIS data on extern al positions of reporting banks vis-a-vis reporting countries.
(BIS Danks' assets and Iiabilities have been transposed to give Soviet assets and
Iiabilities.) These figures do not include Soviet assets and liabilities with the non-bank sec-
tor.
154 Foreign Trade

billion in May 1985 to $1.4 billion in September 1985. As a result Soviet

visible trade with the West was in surplus in the second half of the year.
Tbe USSR also stabilised its net indebetedness in the second half of the
year by increasing borrowing from Western banks, but simultaneously
building up hard-currency assets in Western banks by $3.7 billion (see
Table 7.5). This willleave the USSR with considerable liquid assets to
cover short-term contingencies.
Thus it appears that in the short run the USSR will pursue a
conservative borrowing strategy and will cover so me trade needs by
borrowing from the West, but will postpone major purchases of
machinery and equipment and will confine hard-currency machinery
purchases to replacement of existing equipment.
How easily coulrl increased imports of foodstuffs, industrial con-
sumer goods and machinery and equipment from Eastern Europe
compensate for reduced imports from the West? A sustained fall in oil
prices would also have a significant impact on Soviet net barter terms of
trade with Eastern Europe. As indicated above Soviet strategy towards
Eastern Europe implies a tightening ofSoviet gross barter terms oftrade
with Eastern Europe, partly by reversing Soviet trade surpluses over the
next Five-Year Plan period and involving an increase in both the quality
and quantity ofSoviet imports ofmachinery and consumer goods from
Eastern Europe. This will in turn require the East European economies
to gear their investment programmes and their imports from the West to
the modernisation of plant to meet Soviet requirements. Western
observers have questioned whether the East European economies will be
physically capable of meeting these new trade requirements without
causing considerable domestic hardship and possibly unrest.
Even if the intra-CMEA price formula remains unchanged over the
next five years, the effect of declining world oil prices, and changes in the
official dollar/rouble exchange rate will be to reduce the intra-CMEA oil
price by approximately 10 per cent per annum from 1987 onwards,
resulting in a progressive reduction of Soviet terms-of-trade income of
approximately 1.33 billion roubles per annum. As a result even if real
trade flows are maintained at their 1985 levels Soviet trade surpulses
with Eastern Europe (excluding Poland) would be turned into deficits
from 1987 onwards. Furthermore Soviet accumulated surpluses in trade
with Eastern Europe (excluding Poland) since 1975 would be virtually
eliminated by the end of the Five-Year-Plan period. Under these
circumstances there would be little scope for the USSR to tighten its real
terms of trade further over 1985 levels in the 1986-90 plan period. If oil
prices were to remain permanently depressed Soviet-East European
 Alan H. Smith 155

terms oftrade would move significantly in East Europe's favour (back to

1973 levels) in the 1990s.
Furthermore this scenario implies that the nominal price ofSoviet oil
would remain above the world market price throughout the remainder
of this decade. Although this could still reftect relatively favourable
terms oftrade for the East European countries when the price of exports
of manufacturers to the USSR is taken into account, the USSR could
face political pressure to bring the intra-CMEA price of oil in line with
world market prices more rapidly, resulting in a faster loss ofterms-of-
trade income.
The fall in oil prices will present considerable obstacles to a further
tightening ofSoviet trade terms with Eastern Europe. On the other hand
it is unlikely that the prospect of lower oil prices will enable the East
European countries to divert a significant volume of their oil imports to
non-Soviet. sources. The level of East European indebtedness and the
difficulties those countries experience in marketing products in the West
(and in the EEC in particular) present a major obstacle to loosening East
European economic ties with the USSR. If East European countries fail
to improve the competitiveness oftheir exports to Western markets they
face little real alternative to co-operating in CM EA integration ventures,
although their negotiating position will be considerably strengthened by
a sustained fall in oil prices.
8 Labour, Motivation and
Prod ucti vi ty
DAVIDLANE

One of the crucial variables for economic development and modern isa-
tion is labour productivity. But 'productivity' is an ambiguous term and
involves the whole gamut offeatures of economic life. In this chapter the
discussion will be Iimited to the labour process: the ways that labour
power is transferred through work into objects (goods and services) of
consumption. Labour productivity is the contribution of labour to
output. From the viewpoint of the economy labour input has three main
aspects: the quantity of labour employed, the quality ofthat labour and
organisation. The quantity of labour refers to the number of people at
work. The quality oflabour has to do with its effectiveness and efficiency
- experience, effort and educational level influence the ability of
employees to perform tasks efficiently. Organisation is concerned with
the labour process, with the ways that labour power is harnessed to
capital.

8.1 THE LEVEL OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY

Labour productivity in the USSR is known to be much lower than in

advanced Western economies. Bergson in an authoritative comparative
study estimated that in 1960 gross material product per employed
worker in the USSR was only 31 per cent of that of the USA. It ranked
lower than other West European countries in this respect: Italy's
comparable output was 34 per cent, the UK 's 49 per cent, West
Germany and France were 51 per cent (Bergson, 1978: p. 93). One of the
major concerns of planners in the Soviet Union in the 1980s is to
improve labour productivity. This is associated with the movement of
the economy from an 'extensive' form of development to an 'intensive'
one. The distinction between 'intensive' and 'extensive' labour produc-
156
 DavidLane 157

tivity hinges on changes in the content or quality of labour rather than

on increasing the amount of labour employed. The traditional Soviet
method of economic growth has adopted an 'extensive' strategy. The
abundant supply of rural peasant labour has been mobilised for
industrial development. Soviet industrialisation has been labour inten-
sive: the am pie labour reserves have been added to the scarce capital
resources. Of the population of working age (Iess those in full-time
education) 35.6 per cent were employed as manual and non-manual
workers in 1939, 54.9 per cent in 1959, 76 per cent in 1970 and 80.3 per
cent in 1982 (Lane, 1987: ch. 2). Taking account of collective farmers the
'economically active' participation rate in 1979 was 88.46 per cent for
men and 88.2 per cent for women l . Reserves of labour supply which
could be utilised for growth have become exhausted and thus the
possibilities of further 'intensive' growth have declined.
The emphasis on intensive growth predates Gorhachev. Nikolai
Tikhonov, when introducing the Five- Year Plan for 1981- 5, declared
that: 'In terms of historical scale, significance and implications, the
regearing of our national economy along the lines of intensive develop-
ment may rightly be placed alongside such a profound change as
socialist industrialisation which radically altered the face of the
country' (Tikhonov, 1981). Soviet writers on the economy constantly
refer to the need to 'maximise' and to 'improve the efficiency' offactors
ofproduction. Tikhonov, in the same speech, referred to improvements
in labour productivity as being the 'principal factor' in economic growth
under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981- 5). It was planned that rises in
productivity oflabour would account for 85-90 per cent ofthe national
income.
Gorbachev, in his discussion of the revision of the Party Programme,
emphasised the switch to the 'intensive track of development' and the
'attainment of a superior level of organisation and efficiency for the
Soviet economy' (Pravda, 16 Oct 1985). The draft Basic Guidelines for
the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986- 90 and in
the period up to the year 2000 calJs for a 'shift [in] production to a
primarily intensive path of development to achieve a cardinal increase in
the productivity of sociallabour. and to accelerate the rates of economic
growth on that basis (Draft Basic Guidelines, 1985: pp. 10 -11). The
increase in national income in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) is
to be achieved 'wholly through increasing labour productivity' (Gorba-
chev, Pravda, 16 Oct 1985). The goal of the present Soviet leadership is
to attain the 'highest level oflabour productivity in the world' (Pravda,
23 Apr 1985). Labour productivity is to rise 130 per cent to 150 per cent
158 Labour, Motivation and Productivity

(Pravda, 15 Oct 1985). The essence of Gorbachev's policy is that

improved productivity is the key to the acceleration of economic change,
and the movement to the 'intensive track' of development (Pravda, 12
June 1985: pp. 1-2).
To achieve these rates of increase the work process has to be more
effectively organised and workers have to be more efficient: either more
must be produced with the same levels of manning or a given level of
production must be achieved with fewer workers. In fact, however, the
rate ofproductivity growth had suffered a long-run dec\ine, much to the
concern of Soviet economists 2 and political leaders. The growth of
productivity oflabour in industry for the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-
70) was 32 per cent , Ninth (1971- 5) 34 per cent, Tenth (\976-80) 17 per
cent, and the four years of the Eleventh (\981-4) was \3 per cent.
Annual national income for manual and non-manual employees has
risen from 1292 roubles in 1960 to 3120 in 1984 (Narkhoz 1984: p. 417),3
but the return on capital assets has dec\ined. The rates of growth of
capital (jondovooruzhennost) per worker employed in industry rose by
146 per cent between 1970 and 1984 and the average level of productivity
in industry increased by 76 per cent. The return on capital therefore has
dec1ined. Caution must be exercised, however, in interpreting such data.
As the capital stock grows it becomes increasingly difficult to increase
the rates of labour productivity and a dec\ine in the rate of growth has
occurred in al1 industrial societies as they mature.
The rate of obsolescence of capital has a direct effect on levels of
labour productivity. The introduction ofnew and better machines raises
the productivity of labour through fewer workers producing a given
output more quickly and with less down-time through breakdowns. The
use of old and obsolescent machinery is not necessarily inefficient.
Scrapping of plant is economical1y desirable when it fails to make a
surplus over operating costs. Abandoning 'outmoded methods' is not
good management iflabour is cheap and capital expensive because new
capital may be more expensive to produce a given output - especial1y if
labour is of poor quality and new equipment needs a high level of skill.
However, as the stock of capital rises, the real price of investment
relative to labour fal1s. In a competitive economy there is a market
compulsion to replace obsolete plant - production in old plants is
costlier than in more modem ones. In the USSR, however, such market
compulsion does not operate. Management has no financial incentive to
innovate, to adopt new plants and methods. Management has no
material advantage to overcome short-term problems (inc\uding labour
displacement) and the rising initial cost ofintroducing new technology.
 David Lane 159

As there is no foreign competition industrial Ministries act as monopol-

ists and retain obsolete plant; this leads to lower output at a higher price
than is economically justifiable and technical progress in the economy as
a whole is retarded. A further obstacle in the USSR is that capital has no
market price and the labour market is imperfect. The price mechanism is
not a constraint on firms either to shed labour or to scrap equipment.
Rule-of-thumb methods and administrative means are utilised to direct
investment. Mistakes at the highest level over the distribution of
investment may be a cause of low productivity as weil as the economic
and political environment in which the economy operates.
These underlying factors act as structurallimits to possible increases
in labour productivity and are the subject of macroeconomic reform.
Here one may turn to consider procedures within the given constraints
of planning which may influence labour productivity. One may
distinguish between the underlying factors promoting the 'quality' of
labour and the organisational methods intended to translate labour
potential into work. Most policy-makers focus on the lauer, as these are
amenable to political decision and should have an immediate positive
effect.

8.2 THE 'QUALlTY' OF LABOUR

The efficiency of a labour force will vary according to its 'quality' and
composition. It is widely accepted that age, industrial experience, sex,
skill and education have direct effects on productivity (PraUen, 1976:
p. I). Gorbachev in a speech on the intensive development of the
economy points out that 'present-day production, with its complicated
and costly equipment, and the very nature of labour are making
incomparably higher demands on everything that is known as the
human factor in the economy: the cultural and technical level,
vocational skills, creativity and the discipline of personnel. Without this
neither labour productivity nor output quality may be raised' (Pravda,
23 Apr 1983).
In the USSR inter-war industrialisation was characterised by a
quantitative growth of the urban working cIass. The peasant stock
constituted a poorly educated and inexperienced industrial working
class. While the massive migrations of the early period of industriali~a­
tion slowed down in the post-Second-World-War period, even in the
1960s 60 per cent of the increase in the urban population was made up of
rural immigrants, the figure falling only to 55 per cent in the 1970s
160 Labour. Motivation and Productivity

(Gordon and Nazimova, 1981: p. 35). This migration was greater in the
small towns; in the large ones, especially those with restrictions on
residence,4 the working class was largely self-generating.
Workers with pre-industrial skills experience frustration in an urban
industrial setting. In the Soviet industrial culture, work habits, disci-
pline, punctuality and initiative are not part of the byt (way ofliving) of
certain strata of the working class. As Gordon and Nazimova have
expressed it: 'Daily experience persuades us that is is precisely this
personality element of occupational and production competence that is
developing most slowly of all' (Gordon and Nazimova, 1981: p. 48). The
low 'quality' of work habits, noted by Lenin when he pointed out that
'The Russian is a poor worker compared to the advanced nations' (ci ted
by Gordon and Nazimova, 1981: pp. 51- 2), is expressed by a lack of
precision and conscientiousness among the contemporary workforce.
Productivity is kept below a level attainable with the equipment
available because of the low quality of labour input. As Gorbachev
again has pointed out: 'Unconscientious work by a person in the sphere
of production or services at any workplace . .. hinders not only the
interests of society but also the worker's own interests in the form of
poor-quality goods and services' (Pravda, 23 Apr 1983).
Type and duration of education affect the level of skill, motivation
and adaptability ofthe workforce. A better qualified workforce is able to
learn about, cope with and use the most efficient technically based
production practices. Also, in periods of rapid change, the better the
educational level of the workforce, the more able it is to respond to
innovation and to take up different work. General educational stan-
dards have undoubtedly risen in recent decades in the USSR. The
proportion of manual workers having more than primary education
rose from 401 (per \000) in 1959, to 760 in 1979 and to 825 in 1984; the
comparable figures for non-manual employees are: 911,982 and 987 and
for collective farmers: 226, 593 and 695 (Narkhoz, 1983: p. 30).5 Though
some reservations will be mentioned below, these advances in
educational levels have led to improvements in productivity. Studies
ha ve demonstrated that workers with higher grades of general education
take less time to master new types of work, and they show more
initiative; they also work more efficiently as witnessed by the fact that
they make less waste and have fewer breakages (Kaydalov and
Suymenko, 1974: p.9l).
While the effects on productivity of longer education have been
positive, some negative influences may be detected. Workers may under-
uti1ise their qualifications by being 'under-employed' on routine work or
 David Lane 161

on jobs wh ich do not require such education (Gloeckner, 1986: ch. 13).
Thus a dissatisfied stratum ofworkers arises wh ich rapidly moves from
one job to another (Kaydalov and Suymenko, 1974: p. 91). The level of
general education has risen, but the vocational aspects have been
neglected. There has been a tendency for students in the general
secondary schools to aspire to non-manual work and for ski11ed manual
jobs to be spurned. 6 Up to the mid-1980s some one-third of school-
leavers had no vocational training and they lacked knowledge of, and
motivation for, the world of work. The educational reforms in the
'Guidelines for the Reform of the General and Vocational Schoo\',
adopted in April 1984, attempt to improve the quality of schooling and
to make it more appropriate to the world of work. In 1984 the numbers
of pupils admitted to PTUs 7 for the first time since 1977 exceeded the
number of planned pi aces (Uchitelskaya Gazeta, 23 Mar 1985; CDSP,
37, no. 12: p.23).

8.3 THE TEMPO OF WORK ACTIVITY

In addition to the suitability and type of a worker's education,

productivity is shaped by the motivation and intensity of activity of the
employee. While the Soviet economy had succeeded (with only some
exceptions) in providing paid employment for a11 who seek it, this has led
to what is now regarded as the inefficient utilisation of labour at the
place of work. There are various forms of under-employment: prin-
cipa11y employees being idle or inefficient for much of the time on the
job. Analyses conducted in the USSR show that Soviet plans have
employed from 30 per cent to 50 per cent more workers than in
comparable factories abroad (Kulagin, 1980: p. 105). The Soviet
economy induces high levels of employed labour. At a11 levels of the
enterprise, from factory manager to foreman, there is no incentive to
reduce manning levels. The object of the enterprise is to fulfil (or
overfulfil) production targets in quantitative terms. The wage fund is
given by higher authority and the larger it is, the easier it becomes for the
enterprise to meet its targets. The 'rational' strategy of enterprise
management is to maximise the size of its wages fund. Labour then is
held in reserve to maintain output given the irregular supplyofmaterials
to cover for machinery breakdowns, i11ness and other absences of staff.
A full-employment labour-shortage economy makes labour 'disci-
pline' difficult to enforce. Workers who lack conscientiousness at work
are able to procure other work if sacked and management is loath to
162 Labour. Motivation and Productivity

exert sanctions for fear of losing workers. It is argued that a 'systemic'

effect of a labour-shortage economy is to create a psychological
atmosphere which encourages slackness in general and a low intensity of
work in particular. Within this context, however, labour productivity
may be improved. Three policies by the Gorbachev leadership towards
labour may be delineated. First, the tightening of labour discipline;
second, improvements in management and administration; and, third,
changes in the labour process itself.

8.4 THE CAMPAIGN FOR LABOUR DISCIPLINE

Many letters have been published in the press decrying the prevalence
and anti-social nature of ill-disciplined workers. 'Violating labour
discipline' is a phrase which is applied to almost any activity which may
reduce output - particularly individual acts of drunkenness, poor time-
keeping and absence, idling on the job, carelessness and poor perfor-
mance in general. Literaturnaya Gazeta's correspondent, G. Popov (13
Apr 1983: p. 13), writes: 'There can be no doubt that labour discipline
and production discipline play an enormous role in everyday life. The
economic welfare of the country as a whole and of each of us depends
... on labour, production, and executive discipline'.8
Impressionistic study of the Soviet press leads one to believe that
labour indiscipline is thought be be rife. This view is substantiated by a
survey of 500 readers of the journal Ekonomiki i organizatsiya promy-
shlennogo proizvodstva and 300 participants in seminars in the Siberian
areas ofthe USSR (Kutyrev, 1981). In answer to the question, 'Have any
changes occurred - for better or for worse - in the state of labour
discipline during your working career?', B. P. Kutyrev reported: 'Most
respondents expressed the view that labour discipline must be steadily
improved and that its present level is too low to satisfy the constantly
growing demands of production and ofsociety.'9
The administration led by Yury Andropov began to tighten up and
enforce measures against loose labour discipline and this has been
carried on by Gorbachev. The Central Committee called for a 'more
resolute struggle against all violations of Party, state, and labour
discipline', and the Soviet press called for a less lenient attitude towards
iII-discipline. 'Labour discipline' refers notjust to the observation ofthe
rules of internal work order, but also to a 'conscientious, creative
attitude to work, high quality work, and productive use of work time'
('Tipovye .. .', 1984: item I). Many resolutions were passed and
 David Lane 163

measures were taken to strengthen order in the workforee. 1o The main

thrust of the drive to improve labour discipline is direeted at reducing
loss ofwork time ineurred through absenteeism - days lost through late
arrivals and early departures from work; also a target is 'intra-shift' loss
ofworktime in the form ofidling, drinking, playing. 'Oiseipline' equally
applies to the administration, whieh is required to provide the neeessary
'organisational and economie eonditions for normal highly produetive
work', the supply of maehinery and materials should promote 'rhyth-
mie' (uninterrupted) work (Tipovye ... items land 2). The administra-
tion is not allowed to distraet workers from these tasks and to transfer
them to earry out 'anything uneonnected with produetion aeitivity'
('Tipovye . . .', 1984: item 19).
The major legal enaetments may be adumbrated here. In Oeeember
1979 a law ll was enaeted whieh deereed that workers who leave a job
twice in the same year for no good reason lose their eontinuous labour
entitlement (stazh). Absentees and those drunk at work lose their
holiday entitlement for uninterrupted work. Workers guilty ofmalicious
infraetions oflabour discipline lose their rights to holidays at enterprise
sanatoriums and rest homes. They also lose their plaee in the queue for
housing.
The CPSU Central Committee, USSR Couneil of Ministers and the
Central Couneil ofTrade Unions on 7 August 1983 passed a eomprehen-
sive resolution on labour discipline (Pravda, 7 Aug 1983, translation,
cited here, COSP 35/32, 1983: pp. 4-7). The 'negative' sanctions will be
summarised first, and then attention will be turned to the ways that
positive administrative encouragement is proposed. For all workers and
employees absent without a valid reason:

their regular vacation time for that year is to be reduced by the number of
days they are absent - however, the vacation must not be less than two
working weeks; [for those absent] for more than three hours during a weekday
without valid reason, the same sanctions are to be applied as those established
for absenteeism; workers and employees who commit violations of labor
discipline, are absent without a valid reason or who show up for work in a
state of intoxication may be transferred to another, lower-paying job for a
period ofup to three months or moved to another, lower-Ievel position for the
same period. A person is not to be released at his own request during this
period, and the time spent onjobs to which workers or office employees have
been transferred for violating labor discipline does not count towards the
period of giving notice; workers and office employees who are dismissed for
the systematic violation of labor discipline, for absenteeism without a valid
reason or for showing up for work in astate ofintoxication are to be paid half
the regular bonus rate for the first six months at their new pi aces ofwork ....
164 Labour. Motivation and Productivity

It has been deemed advisable to increase the materialliability of workers and

office employees for damage they cause to enterprises, organisations or
institutions during the performance of their labor obligations, inc\uding
li ability for the production of defective output (Pravda, 7 Aug 1983).

The worker is required to pay for damage so done, to a limit of one-third

ofhis or her salary. Workers may be sacked on turning up for work in a
state of intoxication.
These are the main lines of legislation and policy which. have been
continued by Gorbachev (see Teague, 1983). Such suppression of
individual manifestations of ill-discipline, however, have to be seen in the
context of poor conditions at work, mismanagement and of the
insufficient or poor training of workers. While reducing infractions of
labour discipline will undoubtedly lead to improvements in morale and
increases in labour productivity some forms of indiscipline must be
considered to be consequences ofthe operation ofthe economic system.
Penal sanctions can only have a limited effect.

8.5 MANAGERIAL AND SYSTEMIC CAUSES OF POOR

LABOUR DISCIPLINE

L. Kostin, M. Sonin, T. I. Zaslavskaya and many others have

emphasised the structural and managerial constraints, which predispose
workers to bad habits. They argue that the full-employment labour-
shortage economy makes it difficult for enterprises to enforce penalties.
Furthermore, managerial and systemic insufficiencies are considered by
many Soviet specialists on labour to be much more important determin-
ants oflabour ill-discipline than individual worker failings. The lack of a
c\ear re\ationship between worker incentive, effort, output and wages is
crucial. Management is confronted with shortages of labour and
breakdowns in the supply ofmaterials and they have insufficient powers
to reward good workers and penalise shirkers (Kutyrov, 1981: p. 45). In
addition then to the stick of 'Iabour discipline' the carrot of material
incentives is also called on to improve productivity.

8.6 MATERIAL INCENTIVES

Material incentives, in the forms of rewarding individual contribution

by monetary payments, is one of the guiding principles of the
organisation of the Soviet workforce. This policy predates the current
 David Lane 165

crop ofleaders and goes back to the time ofStalin. Chernenko reiterated
that the 'principle of socialism, which is sacred to us, [entails] from each
according to his ability, to each according to his work. This is the
foundation of the social justice that our working dass and our people,
for the first time in history, have converted from dreams to living reality .
. . . Those who work at top efficiency should, always and everywhere, be
provided with tangible advantages in earnings and in the distribution of
housing, vacation accommodation and other social benefits ... .'
(Pravda, 60ct 1984.) Gorbachev has also emphasised the role ofsocial
justice in improving the motive to work, he has castigated unearned and
unjustly received income which militate against the principle of remun-
eration in accordance with the quality and quantity ofwork (Pravda, I
Mar 1984: p. 2).
The objective of policy is to use wages as an incentive for greater effort
on the part of the employee. At the same time, to avoid inflation,
planners have to ensure that wages rise less than productivity. Difficul-
ties arise when planners have to reconcile wages paid with the
assumptions (a) that higher levels of skil1 and qualification should be
hetter rewarded, (b) that the provision of incentives for motivation has
to affect the labour force as a wh oie, (c) that an increase in levels of
productivity should rise at rates greater than the increase in wage
payment.
In socialist economic systems the quantity of material inputs and
outputs and their prices are given to enterprises by superior economic
organs. The wage fund is one of these inputs. As noted above, socialist
enterprises have a propensity to employ as many workers as possible, to
spend the wage fund and to make it as large as possible. The wage fund is
relatively weakly constrained. In the early 1980s, in order to control
wage rises, an attempt was made to gear a I per cent increase in labour
productivity to wage increases ofO.35 per cent. This was ineffective and
the ratio was raised to 0.4 per cent in 1984 (Rusanov, 1985a). In 1982
wages rose nearly one-third more quickly than labour productivity
(Rusanov, 1985b). This is often caused by adjusting production plans
downwards without reducing the wage fund (Volkov, 1983). Ministries
and industrial associations redistribute plan assignments, making li fe
easier for those who work poorly and increasing the burden on the more
efficient factories (Karpukhin, 1984: p.5). Prices, however, do not
respond to shortages, and demand cannot be satisfied.
Systemic labour shortage leads to enterprises bidding-up the price of
labour. To keep labour in the factory and to prevent the disruptions of
labour turn-over, wage rates are adjusted and bonuses are paid to bring
166 Labour. Motivation and Productivity

up wages should there be a shortfall. Hence wage levels became

established, not by rational norms, but by 'unwritten rules' about the
standard ofliving a worker should enjoy (Blyakhman and Zlotnitskaya,
1984: p. 40). Thus wages cease to be effective levers of effort.
Economists and planners regularly call for the re-examination and
setting of norms on 'technically-based' criteria on a branch and inter-
branch scale. The objective here is for a given job to be paid identically
wherever it is located, rather than being subject to individual factory
management decision. But the system of individually based norms has
so me intrinsic difficulties. Workers concentrate on their individual tasks
to the detriment of the collective interest. They may show less concern
for equipment. Given the differences in machinery and conditions it is
notoriously difficult to determine 'just' norms. In this area, however,
there is obvious scope for improvement and consequently rises in labour
productivity.

8.7 CHANGES IN THE LABOUR PROCESS

Productivity may rise by control of the number of jobs and the

placement of effective restrictions on the recruitment of employees. At
present the majority of Soviet workers are recruited 'at the factory
gates'; various forms of administrative allocation account for approx-
imately 80 per cent ofhires (Kotlyar, 1984: p. 53). In order to balance the
supply of and demand for labour, employment exchanges were ins-
tituted in 1967. But these, at present, have no power to direct labour. The
Ufa- Kaluga 'experiment' was instituted in 1970 and this scheme made it
mandatory for enterprises to negotiate their labour needs through the
labour exchange. Workers also had to utilise the exchange in order to
changejobs. The process reduced labour turn-over and exercised control
over the number of jobs available. It was not adopted widely for two
main reasons. First, many skilIed workers disliked the changes because it
weakened their own bargaining position and the politicalleadership, in
the interest of political stability, feit unable to push such an unpopular
move. Second, enterprises with 'well-endowed' labour pi aces opposed
control oftheir labour supply by the labour bureaux (Hauslohner, 1984:
pp. 633 - 9). The Brezhnev leadership lacked the will to adopt this
reform.
The current Gorbachev leadership is attempting to control more
firmly the creation of jobs. It has strengthened the 'attestation' of jobs
through local control organs and it may exert penalties against
 DavidLane 167

enterprises which exceed their wage funds. It financially encourages

enterprises to make savings through reducing staffs by making labour
redundant. It has been estimated that rises in productivity planned for
the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) will lead to from 13 to 19 million
people at present employed in the primary and secondary sectors being
made redundant. The numbers of manual workers are planned to fall by
between 15 and 20 per cent (Kostakov, 1986: p.I). At present enterprises
have an obligation to find alternative work for 'displaced' or redundant
workers. In times oflabour 'scarcity' they can normally be absorbed. If
the introduction of machinery leads to a labour surplus, enterprises
alone will be unable to find work for redundant hands. The greater rate
of change of the economy ('acceleration') will lead to more labour
mobility. Enterprises will, therefore, be likely to welcome the transfer of
their job-finding responsibility to labour exchanges.
Reduction in the number of jobs and significant improvements in
work intensity cannot be legislated from above, they can only occur
following changes in the labour process on ths shop floor. The 'brigade
method' of production is one of the chief means that Soviet planners
advocate to achieve reduction in the workforce and a higher intensity of
effort. The brigade system is intended not only to improve labour
productivity (its chief aim), but also to motivate workers, to constrain
the labour policy ofmanagers and to reconcile the interests ofindividual
workers with those ofthe industrial enterprise and society as whole (see
Veller and Daugello, 1983).
In 1979 it was decreed that the brigade form of labour organisation
would become the 'basic' type of labour unit in the Eleventh Five-Year
Plan (Pravda, 29 Aug 1979). The earlier brigade methods were a
collection of individual job specifications with workers having
individually targeted assignments and being paid according to their
personal output. The contemporary system, however, seeks to specify
inputs, output and wages for the brigade as a whole. Members of
brigades work on a given contract (edinyi naryad), rather than on
individually priced tasks.
A distinguishing feature of the contemporary brigade method is that
the brigade is given by management a volume production target and
goals for numbers of workers employed and quality ('Razvitie .. .',
1983: p. 103). It takes responsibility for arranging the organisation of
inputs - use of materials, deployment of labour and the distribution of
wages. The brigade has a yearly subcontract on the basis of which a
monthly assignment for output is given; it also has a wage fund, an
average wage, a given quantitative work force, a labour productivity
168 Labour. Motivation and Productivity

growth quota and expenditure for tools and supplies (Baranenko, 1980:
p. 18)12 This is known as a 'full-accounting' (khozraschetnyi) system,
wh ich is often regarded as the essence of the new-type brigade system
(Solodukha, 1982).
Labour productivity is improved by workers themselves having an
incentive to 'shed suplus labor'. If production is overfulfilled with less
than the assigned number ofworkers, supplementary pay is increased by
1 per cent for every percentage overfulfilled up to a limit of 10 per cent
(Brigadnaya ... 1980: p.221). The wage fund for the brigade is not
reduced if the number of workers falls below that authorised in the
contract.
The brigade system itself has not been fully implemented in practice.
Management has been half-hearted it its introduction. Management
regards the semi-autonomous brigades not just as achallenge to its
authority, but as a potent source of criticism of its own shortcomings.
Well-established workers have opposed its introduction as the system
threatens their status and high pay. Gorbachev, however, has reiterated
the point that the brigade system working on full khozraschet (economic
accountability) (Pravda, 12 June 1985), is to be the main form of work
organisation. In this quest he will succeed only ifhe is able to overcome
the inertia and even opposition offactory administration and industrial
ministry.
Ifthe brigade system should succeed there will be an undoubted rise in
labour productivity with redundancies, wh ich will have to be handled
through strengthened powers of labour exchanges. It seems likely that
there will be a weakening of individual security of employment in the
context of economic planners maintaining full employment at a macro
level. Rather than job security with overful employment, there will be
so me job insecurity with full employment. Another consequence will be
that the basis ofmotivation ofthe worker will become pecuniary. Money
will assume a greater role as an instrument of exchange. But for money
to be an effective motivator it must have value. There must be more
goods and services to buy.

8.8 SOME CONCLUSIONS

Labour productivity and motivation to work are systemtic properties of

a social system. They have to be analysed in a historical, economic and
cultural context. Such structural factors limit the extent to which any
political leadership can raise productivity or change workers' motiva-
 DavidLane 169

tion to work. The Gorbachev administration, however, has inherited an

economic system which will enable labour productivity to rise. From a
social point ofview it will benefit from a population which is much better
educated and is able to adjust to changes in technology. Labour
productivity is low due to overmanning and there is a surplus of
employed labour to meet administrative inefficiencies. In the short run
labour productivity can be improved by reducing the age of retirement
of capital; this will lead to shorter periods of machinery down-time and
to a reduction in the number of auxiliary workers. Relatively small
improvements in administration can lead to rises in productivity. These
are to do with delivery of materials and using the workforce more
effectively. Such changes can be achieved without any significant reform
of the existing 'economic mechanism'. None of the proposals made by
Gorbachev for increases in labour productivity is new and all can be
traced to views expressed prior to his assumption of power. The impact
of the campaign to increase 'labour discipline' is limited to short-term
improvements in labour productivity. Increased motivation to work in
the long run is largely conceived in material terms - of more accurate
payment 'according to one's work'. Financial incentives, operating
through the brigade system, will undoubtedly enhance motivation,
reduce the numbers in the workforce and heighten efficiency. However,
in the longer run, the context of work conditions, transport and health
need to be improved. Also the more intangible features of work - the
expectations of fulfilment in work and the place of employment as a hub
of social and psychological satisfaction - require greater concern with
the process of work. Paradoxically the maturation of the Soviet Union
may lead to astate where workers' expectations of satisfaction in work
are unrealistic and will not be fulfilled by the financial rewards of a
consumer society.

NOTES

I. That is, for the economically active age cohort (16 to 59 years for men, 16 to
54 years for women) divided by the number of people in jobs and here inc\uding
collective farmers.
2. See, for example, A. Aganbegyan (then Director of the Institute of the
Economics and Organisation of Industrial Production), Trud, 12 Dec 1982.
3. Calculated on figures given for income in cash and in kind, exc\uding
collective farmers.
4. A permit is necessary to move to, and settle in, large towns.
5. Data given in the annual statistical handbook combine into one figure,
higher and secondary education, 'incomplete secondary'.
170 Labollr. Motivation and Productivity

6. For a discussion of incompatibilities between school-Ieavers' aspirations

and work opportunities, see Marnie, 1986: p. 12.
7. Prof-tekh uchilishche, vocational-technical schools.
8. Popov contrasts this with other lellers stressing the role of management.
9. No quantitative results were reported, though many responses were cited.
(Ibid. p.24.)
10. A review of changes may be studied in Karlinsky. 1981: pp. 3 -10.
11. '0 dalneyshem ukreplenii trudovoy distsipliny i sokrashchenii tekuchesti
kadrov v narodnom khozyaystve', Sobranie postanovlenii pravitelstva SSSR,
1980: no.3, p. 17. See also the comprehensive regulations on work order, in
'Tipovye pravila vnutrennego rasporyadka dlya rabochikh i sluzhashchikh
predpriyatii, uchrezdenii, organizatsii', Byulleten Goskomtruda, no. 11, 1984.
For a review oflabour discipline and legislation on it between 1979 and 1985 see
Teague, 1985d.
12. Recommendations for the introduction ofthe brigade system in induslry,
as approved by the USSR State Committee on Labour and the sccretariat ofthe
trade unions, were published in Ekonomicheskaya Ga:eta, no. 1/1984: p 19.
9 Eastern Europe
MICHAEL SHAFIR
9.1 INTRODUCTION

As is weil known, international systems do not easily render themselves

to simple definitions. Nevertheless, collective academic wisdom, as weil
as common sense, hold that in any system, developments at the 'centre'
are bound to have an impact on the 'periphery'. If they do not, the
system's boundaries have obviously shrunk to such an extent that the
'periphery' has either escaped the gravity of the 'metropole', becoming
an independent (and possibly riyal) factor on its own, or it has been
incorporated into the boundaries of a competing system. In the
international context 'system maintenance' and 'system management'
imply precisely the avoidance of such centrifugal propensities, and the
Kremlin is no exception to this rule. Consequently political changes in its
East European periphery can be conceived theoretically as a function of
either (a) central inducement or (b) failures in the network of political
communications wh ich links the centre with its peripheral components
or (c) a breakdown in Soviet 'maintenance' and 'management
capabilities'
This statement should, however, be qualified, for as it stands it
assumes that in each East European state the impetus for political
change is universally and constantly present. For a variety of reasons
this is obviously not true. Some communist regimes in the area are
clearly more stable than others and stability is only partially the outcome
of Soviet 'input' into their system. Economic performance, to take but
one example, cannot be explained solely in terms of 'models'. The
difference between the successful performance of the East German
Kombinate and the pitiful results provided by the Romanian economy,
which on paper adopted a similar blueprint for 'partial' reform
(Borenstein, 1977), is more than simply illustrative. It attests, further-
more, to different levels of expectation prevalent in society. For, as J. F.
Brown has put it, 'what is important is never the economic situation but
what people think about it' (Brown, 1975: p. 199). The degree to wh ich
171
172 Eastern Europe

society is or is not inclined to acquiesce to authority is an additional

factor, itself the outcome of a variety of variables which combine to
produce political cultures (Shafir, 1985: pp. 126- 74).
Those East European societies in which, at one time or another, one
could perceive active involvement in the pursuit ofpolitical change never
did benefit from either Soviet central inducement or from a situation of
breakdown in Moscow's system-maintenance capabilities. The latter
should not be understood as a temporary enfeeblement of central
supervision, but rather as its full disappearance. As such it would make
sense to talk about a 'breakdown' only in the event of the practical
dismemberment of the 'empire'. On the other hand, as understood here,
central inducement implies the purposejul pursuit and encouragement of
poIitical change by those Soviet ac tors who are otherwise capable of
forestalling East European 'heresies' via persuasion, threat or actual
deployment of force.
It is true that the situation prevailing in the 'metropole' after Stalin's
death, as weil as in the aftermath of Khrushchev's dismissal and during
Brezhnev's prolonged illness (see below) was read in some East
European countries as one which condoned political change. Yet it
eventually became c1ear that each side had misread the other's
intentions. The Soviets were too preoccupied with the uncertainties of
their 'transitions' to decode the East European message properly (Gati,
1985). For their part the East Europeans (or rather those East
Europeans engaged in pursuing systemic change, regardless of their
position in the respective societies) proved just as incapable of translat-
ing into local practice the limited messages of de-Stalinisation and de-
legitimation ofstate terror, 'different paths to socialist construction', the
'state of all the people', 'peaceful coexistence' and 'detente'. To the
extent that the Soviet Union (or, rather, some Soviet political figures)
can be said to have encouraged political change in the 'periphery', this
was not the outcome·of voluntary policies, but rather the result of a
peculiar combination of Khrushchevianunintentional postures (Shafir,
1987) with flaws in political communication.
However, Soviet incapacity in convey a c1ear message to Eastern
Europe is by no means a mere cyclical experience. At times ofleadership
transition, or during factional struggles for power, the absence of
directional indicators is most obvious. Yet these instances cannot but
intensify Moscow's basic inability in Eastern Europe to implement
coherent policies, which could either encourage political change or nip it
in the budo Consequently such half-measures as K<id<irism could evolve
and establish themselves as halfcway alternatives, even iftheir continued
 Michael Shafir 173

survival is still somewhat precarious. This Soviet inability sterns from

what should be viewed as the basic dilemma of Moscow's policy in the
area since Stalin's death: should the Kremlin pursue policies aimed at
promoting the cohesion of the alliance, which requires ideological
conformity and uniformity in the institutional instruments for
implementing domestic and foreign policies; or should it opt for East
European political viability, wh ich would be aimed at promoting regime
stability entrenched in endogenous legitimacy, respect for national
peculiarities and interests and such economic and political reforms as
would best serve local conditions (Brown, 1975, 1984).
The succession of crises in Eastern Europe since the mid-1950s and
Moscow's handling of these situations have led Western scholars to
assurne implicitly that lasting political change in the region can occur
.only in the event of central inducement (for example, Golan, 1973:
p. 239, and Schöpflin, 1981), resulting from the implementation of
genuine transformations in the Soviet political system itself. With the
onset of the Gorbachev era the question becomes obvious: is the new
Soviet leader the herald ofbetter days for Eastern Europe, or are Soviet
policies likely to continue to swing between the poles of cohesion and
viability, in which case political communication emanating from
Moscow is likely to remain confusing and incoherent.
Thus far Moscow's message is familiarly ambiguous. This may
explain why, during the year that has elapsed since Gorbachev's
ascendancy to Soviet leadership, Western scholars produced precious
Iittle on the subject of Soviet-East European relations. With the
exception oftwo articles (Kusin, 1986 1; Lendvai, 1986), and one section
in a general analysis of Soviet foreign policy (Timmermann, 1986), area
specialists have treated the subject cautiously or, at best, produced what
were only short notes (Renaud, 1985; Dempsey, 1986; Gati, 1986). As it
turned out when Soviet leaders fail to convey a c1ear message, it is not
only the East Europeans who are baffled.

9.1.1 Background
With the notable exception of the GDR, all East European states have
been either showing signs of economic stagnation or have recorded
growth ratios considerably lower than envisaged by their plans for 1985
(see PlanEcon Report, nos. 2-3,5, 11 and 13, and Radio Bucharest, 21
Feb 1986). Of course Moscow's responsibility for this performance is
only partial. Autochtonous mismanagement, the absence of reform due
to either ideological orthodoxy (Czechoslovakia, Romania), or to fear
174 ~astern ~uroJ1e

of its potenital consequences against a background of al ready high1y

explosive societal tensions (Poland), or simply bad implementaion
(Bulgaria), played their role as weil. However there is little doubt that
Eastern Europe's economic deterioration was exacerbated by the
Kremlin's earlier decision to cut subsidies to its East European CMEA
partners and to reverse terms of trade hitherto favourable to them.
Politically the cohesion of the bloc has been affected by the long
transition of power in the Kremlin, one which can be considered to have
lasted from about 1979 to March 1985. F or about six years political
communication between Moscow and the 'periphery' was affected by
the USSR's inability to make coherent statements ofintention. Against
this background members of the alliance could adopt postures wh ich a
firmer Soviet leadership might have been capable of preventing.
The Soviet Union's allies resented not only its economic policies but
were also reluctant to share the costs of the military burden imposed by
Moscow's response to NATO's 'dual-track' decision and the subsequent
deployment of intermediate nuclear forces (Asmus, 1985a: I 986a,
1986b; Smith, 1985: pp. 25 - 36; McAdams, 1985: pp. 161-92). It was
only after considerable pressure that the GDR's Erich Honecker and
Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov cancelled their planned visits to Bonn in the
autumn of 1984- the latter after a harsh encounter in Sofia with
Moscow's envoy, Mikhail Gorbachev (G. S., 1985).
Economics and politics thus combined to foster the incipient forma-
tion of an 'alliance within an alliance' which, although only loosely
interconnected (after all, such disputes as the Romanian-Hungarian
clash over the rights of national minorities weigh more heavily on
balance), threatened bloc cohesion with an intensity unprecedented
since the mid-1950s.
In October 1983 Matyas Szürös, the Hungarian Central Committee
secretary in charge of foreign policy, delivered a lecture on 'The
Reciprocal Effects of the National and the International Deve10pment
of Socialism in H ungary', published the following January in the official
Party month1y Tarsadalmi Szemle. Ironically enough, Szü rös was
making affirmations similar to those uttered by the Romanians in the
past, and wh ich one of his predecessors, Zoltan Kom6csin, had
stigmatised in public in 1966 (Komocsin, 1966). It was now Cze-
choslovakia (perhaps the only truly faithful echo of conservative Soviet
positions in the early 1980s) that was chosen (Rude Pravo, 30 Apr) to
express Moscow's disapprobation of aposture which rejected subordin-
ation of interests in the camp or the existence of a single 'Ieading centre',
calling instead for 'methods that make optimum allowance' for national
 Michael Shafir 175

interests. Furthermore the Hungarian Party official alluded to his

country's 'specific road' to socialist construction, i.e. to the New
Economic Mechanism (NEM) and to its in-built necessity to expand
trade with the West. 'Historical traditions', he indicated, 'do make it
possible for relations between a particular socialist and capitalist
country to flourish', even when 'the general trend is one of deterioration
of East-West relations and of narrowing of contacts.' The GDR Party
organ Neues Deutschland (12 Apr 1984) promptly reprinted Sziirös's
fuH text. Like Budapest East Berlin refused to endanger the expediency
of its 'special relationship' with West Germany, on which GOR
economic success and the accruing legitimacy ofthe regime depend to no
smaH extent (for estimates of the value of West German resource
transfers to the GOR see Dean, 1985, and Boyse, 1985).
Whereas cohesion thus appeared to wither away (even Prague
admitted it was uneasy about the deployment of Soviet missiles on
Czechoslovak soil, see Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal's statements in
Rude Provo, 21 Nov 1983), the viability of East European regimes did
not fare much better.
In Poland Gorbachev inherited a regime unable to pursue its declared
purpose of rebuilding a workable relationship with society at large,
which oscillated between martial intransigence and political pragmat-
ism. He also had to face the necessity ofhandling a Czechoslovak regime
stubborn in its refusal to introduce any reforms resembling those that
had triggered the 'Prague Spring', and yet less and less likely to be
capable of continuing to satisfy society's consumerist appetite, in
exchange für which social passivity had been largely secured. In
Romania the autonomous foreign policies of the Ceau~escu regime were
little more than a nuisance, but social tensions had risen to levels
unknown in the past, due to the daily struggle for mere survival imposed
on a population forced to pay for the leadership's catastrophic mistakes
in the management of the economy. Finally, in Bulgaria the Zhivkov
regime apparently chose to follow in the footsteps of its northern
Romanian neighbour. Whereas in Romania Ceau~escu encouraged an
anti-Hungarian campaign ofunprecedented intensity in order to deflect
the attention of the country's national majority from daily misery,
Zhivkov launched a campaign of'Bulgarisation' ofthe Turkish minority
precisely when Sofia's own version ofNEM reintroduced in 1979, began
to show indications of running into difficulties after some years of initial
success (on the Bulgarian N EM see Bell, 1986: pp. 133 - 7).
In an atmosphere permeated with social, national and religious
tension from one end of Eastern Europe to the other the examples of the
176 Eastern Europe

GOR and Hungary shone brighter than deserved. Both count ries had
been successful in the implementation of economic reform, though
Honecker's regime was considerably more cautious in its pursuit of the
Komhinate's self-managerial and financial independent postures, as weil
as in its attitude toward small trade privatisation. Yet the story of
German successes, as indicated, was actually one of intra-German
collaboration and of East Berlin's 'secret membership' of the EEC,
whose markets can be penetrated due to the absence of customs in intra-
German trade (Boyse, 1985; Lendvai, 1986; p. 100). Albeit Honecker did
succeed in transforming Eastern Europe's most insecure regime into one
enjoying so me measure oflegitimacy, the Berlin Wall, the uninterrupted
flow of 'defectors' and the occasionally brutal treatment of dissidents
stand witness to its limitations.
The reintroduction of NEM in Hungary in 1978-9 (after a lull of
several years caused, among others, by Soviet pressure, see T ö kes, 1984)
was accompanied by so me significant political reforms likely to raise
more than one conservative eyebrow in Moscow or Prague. For the most
part the implementation of NEM and Hungary's political reforms
coincided with the confusion and the uncertainties of the long Soviet
transition. Forces in or behind aspiring elements in the Soviet leader-
ship, who were gradually becoming aware of the necessity to reform the
Soviet economic system beyond mere 'cosmetic' or bureaucratic
reforms, might have supported the publication of some sympathetic
articles on Hungary's reform in professional journals (for example, V.
Sepa and A. Almasi in Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva, no. 1, 1982 or
R. Otsason in Voprosy ekonomiki, no. I, 1983). Yet despite a dose
personal relationship with Andropov, Kadar failed to secure from
Moscow more than a feeble approval of some of NEM's agricultural
facets in 1983 (T ö kes, 1984: p. I). Aside from objections on ideological
grounds, such as over-marketisation and privatisation of the economy,
Moscow was probably genuinely hesitant to endorse such by-products
of the reform as large wage differentiation and inflation. Oue to social
tensions generated by these phenomena the stability of the Hungarian
regime may be less secure than meets the eye. Recently Janos Berecz, a
secretary of the Hungarian Party's Central Committee, admitted that
the 'national consensus' on which the Party's role has been based for the
past decades, has come under serious strain (Tarsadalmi Szemle, Feb
1985).
Against the background of an impending decision to implement
policies of economic reform in the Soviet Union itself, Gorbachev's East
European dilemmas appeared to consist of the following elements: (a)
 Michael Shafir 177

should the Soviet Union endorse the continuation ofreform implemen-

tation? (b) should it establish limits to the content ofthese reforms either
by open statements of dissociation from so me of their aspects or by
choosing to adopt one East European 'model' and reject others? (c)
should it agree to the discontinuation of intra-CMEA practices whose
effect on East European reforms is adverse? (d) would these options
imply the imposition of cohesive intra-bloc policies or would they allow
for continued East European pursuit of 'national interest'? Finally,
bearing in mind that political successions are likely to occur in most East
European countries in the near future (in 1987 Honecker and Kadar will
be 75, Husak 74, Zhivkov 76, while Ceau~escu is 68 and reportedly ill),
how will these be affected by Soviet policy options?

9.2 POLITICALCOMMUNICATION: AMBIGUITY AND

REFLECTION OF PRIORITIES

In a survey conducted by Radio Free Europe's Audience and Public

Opinion Research Department in the second half of 1985 and in early
1986, a representative sam pIe of East Europeans was asked to express its
opinion on the future impact of the Gorbachev leadership. The survey
was conducted by independent public opinion research institutes in
Western Europe among 671 Bulgarian, ·1333 Czechoslovak, 1166
Hungarian, 1547 Polish and 1266 Romanian visitors to the West. Radio
Free Europe's sponsorship was not revealed. The respondents were
asked whether they thought that (a) Gorbachev's leadership was likely
to be good for the Soviet Union and (b) whether in their opinion his
leadership will be good or bad for the respondent's own country. Tables
9.1 and 9.2 reHect the results of this survey.

TABLE9.1 Do you believe Ihal Gorbachev·s leadership will be good or had/or the Soviel
Union?

Bulgarians C::echoslovaks Hungarians Poles Romanians

% % % % %
Good 29 36 40 38 28
Bad 18 8 14 7 15
Neither
21 531
1
Don'( know
1
26 56 29 46 19 55 19 57
No answer 32 30 17 36 / 38 /
178 Eastern Europe

TABLE9.2 Do you helieve that Gorhachev's leadership will he {(ood or had(or your country?

Bulgarians Czechoslol"ab Hungarians Poles Romanians

% 0/0 % % %
Good 17 19 27 9 14
Bad 21 15 24 34 20
Nei!her
Don'! know 25) 62 29) 66 29) 49 23) 57 30) 66
No answer 37 37 20 34 36

Two of these findings strike one as being particularly significant.

First, with the exception of Hungarian respondents, large majorities
chose not to express an opinion on either of the questions. In the
Hungarian case, those who did not reply to the questions were a
substantial minority, close to half of the sampIe. Second, in aIl five
countries expectations for a 'good' Gorbachev leadership diminished
when the question was transferred from the Soviet context to that ofthe
respondent's own country. These two findings iIlustrate, first, uncer-
tainty about the future course of the new leadership in the Kremlin and,
second, the beliefthat 'what is good for General Motors [i.e. the USSR]
is not necessarily good for the United States [i.e. the Eastern bloc]'.
Although it is not possible to produce empirical proof, it is more than
likely that similar perceptions wcrc prcscnt among East European ruling
elites. In their case uncertainty must have been generated by the
ambiguous and contradictory dcclarations of intent vis-a-vis Eastern
Europe emanating from Moscow. Anxiety, on the other hand, must
have reflected reaction to those Soviet statements emphasising cohesion
and, with the possible exception of East Germany and Hungary, to the
gradual unfolding of the Kremlin's reformist priorities. In the Hun-
garian case, however, there was reason eriough to wonder to what extent
reform or pscudo-reform in the USSR hcralded the imposition of
limitations on Kädär's own 'model'.
Those wishing to defend the thesis of a Soviet Union determined to
put an end abruptly to the absence of bloc cohesion are likely to point
to Gorbachev's inaugural dcclarations on the subject, to articles in the
Soviet press indicative of envisaged disciplinary measures against
deviationists from the 'orthodox' model and to the peculiar way of
handling the 'anniversary' of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czecho-
slovakia. After all, did not Gorbachev emphasise in his first speech as
 Michael Shajir 179

CPSU leader that maintenance of cIose ties with members of the 'great
Socialist community' was to be his 'first commandment' (TASS, 11 Mar
1985)? And did he not indicate, in the oration delivered two days later, at
Chernenko's funeral, that the USSR would remain 'faithful to the
principle of socialist internationalism ' (TASS, 13 Mar 1985), wh ich is an
endorsement of the 'Brezhnev Ooctrine'? Furthermore, on 21 J une 1985
Pravda published wh at appeared to be a serious call to order addressed
to East European leaders who in past years had 'deviated' into 'selfish,
nationalist' postures. Authored by a certain 'Oleg Vladimirov', believed
to be the pseudonym ofOleg B. Rakhmanin, the first deputy head ofthe
Oepartment for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of the
Socialist Countries (Teague, 1985d), the articIe warned against such
Hungarian, GOR and Romanian positions as advocating a special role
for 'small countries' in the East- West confrontation; against allowing
national interests to take precedence over the bloc's internationalist (i.e.
Moscow defined) interests; and against domestic 'revisionist' policies,
such as 'advocating a weakening of state levers for the regulation of
economic development, primarily central planning, the introduction of
market competition, and an increase in the size of the private sector'.
The latter 'sin' was said to be 'fraught with serious economic, social and
ideological consequences' and to foster an 'increase in social tension'.
Not surprisingly the Czechoslovak Party daily Rude Pravo and the
Bulgarian Rabotnichesko Delo reprinted the entire text of Rakhmanin's
articIe, but in the GOR, Hungary and Romania it was hardly
mentioned. The Polish press carried a somewhat diluted summary
(Kusin, 1986: p.43).
In early Oecember Prague hosted an international meeting marking
the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of aresolution which had
branded the events of 1968 'counter-revolution', bestowing legitimacy
on the invasion. Vasil Bilak, the would-be ideologue of 'normalisation "
used the opportunity to attack those who 'tell us that we should give up
re\ying on the pillars that support our socialist economy', who would
separate 'economy from politics' and open 'the sluice gates of so-ca lied
free enterprise', to the 'anarchy of market mechanism and the creation of
an army of unemployed'. Claiming to be innocent of wanting to 'force
our views on anyone', the Czechoslovak leader none the less reminded
some unnamed neighbours that the 'struggle for the defence of socialism
transcends national borders and becomes the internationalist compon-
ent of the entire communist and workers' movement' (Radio Prague, 9
Dec 1985). Five days later Pravda carried areport on the Prague
gathering, specifying that the document adopted in 1970 by the
180 Eastern Europe

Czechoslovak Party reflected 'experience wh ich goes beyond what is

specific and national'. In a practical reiteration of the 'Brezhnev
Doctrine' the Soviet paper emphasised the 'international assistance in
the defence of socialist gains', al\egedly granted 'in response to appeals
from communists and true Czechoslovak patriots'. After quoting
Bilak's words on the duty to transcend national boundaries when
coming to the defence of socialist gains the Soviet Party organ indicated
that 'Soviet communists consider their most important cause to
consolidate steadily ... friendship, unity and cohesion ... among al\
fraternal Parties of the community on the basis of the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism'. The 'unity and
cohesion of the ruling Marxist- Leninist Parties' was said to be the
'reliable guarantee that no intrigues by imperialist, anti-socialist or
revisionist forces wil\ be able to undetermine the revolutionary gains in
the fraternal country' (Pravda, 14 Dec 1985).
That these none-too-subtle al\usions were published while the US
Secretary of State George Shultz was visiting Belgrade, Bucharest and
Budapest was no coincidence. But it was in the latter capital that
Pravda's endorsement ofthe proceedings of Prague must have been read
with particular concern. For a second time in six months the NEM
principles were deemed by the Soviet Party organ to be 'revisionist'
(although the 'Hungarian connection' was never mentioned as such).
This is why, when on 22 January 1986 Pravda's special correspondents in
Budapest, I. Vorozheykin and V. Gerasimov, produced an artic1e which
appeared to warn the Hungarians against the ideological dangers posed
by c10se trade links with the West, emphasising that their 'vital interests'
required 'deepening and enriching cooperation with the Soviet Union',
best informed sources on Hungarian developments (Schöpflin in The
Times, 4 Feb 1986) reported the piece to have 'sent cold shivers through
most of the people who were aware of it'. Other Western observers (for
example Die Welt, 23 Jan 1986, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 Jan
1986 or La !ihre Belgique, 24 Jan 1986) interpreted the Vorozheykin and
Gerasimov artic\e as a public criticism of the Hungarian reforms.
There is no reason to doubt that public sensitivity about the issue was
very great in Hungary. After al\, in East European capitals it was an
open secret that at the March 1985 Moscow mini-summit, Gorbachev
had cold-shouldered Kildilr's paternalistic we\coming of hirn into the
family of communist leaders and had dec1ined the invitation to attend
the Hungarian Party congress at the end of the month (Kusin, 1986:
p. 36; Le point, 30 Sep 1985). Moreover, the Sovietenvoy to thecongress,
Grigory Romanov, also appeared to have conditioned contacts with
 Michael Shafir 181

capitalist countries on not allowing 'imperialist forces to use economic

levers as a means of political pressure and interference in the affairs of
socialist states' (Nepszabadsag, 27 Mar 1985). When visiting a plant in
western Hungary, Romanov emphasised the 'socialist' nature of Soviet
attempts to increase enterprise autonomy, while maintaining strong
central management (Nepszabadsag, 28 Mar 1985. Emphasis added).
Closer examination of the Vorozheykin and Gerasimov article,
however, reveals that, on the wh oIe, the dispatch was not unsympathetic
to Hungarian reforms, and that Western interpretations of it had largely
been read out of context (Reisch, 1986). Indeed, the two Soviet authors
displayed understanding for the in-built NEM necessity to expand trade
with the West, stressing that the country's 'dimensions, natural condi-
tions and economic potential . . . dictate its participation in the
international division of labour, while its geographical position in
Central Europe and its existing traditions determine the varied nature of
its foreign relations'. There might have been so me warning against
forgetting what should be the main orientation of Hungary's economic
links, and there certainly was some indication of uneasiness about
'ideological pollution', said to be brought about by Western tourism and
Western broadcasts. Yet the article emphasised that those in charge were
aware ofthese priorities and were acting accordingly. When interviewed
on Radio Budapest on 27 January, Matyas Szurös appeared to be weIl
aware of the uneasy feeling triggered by the Pravda article, emphasising
that it ought to be read in its entirety because, on the whole, the dispatch
spoke highly of Hungary's economic and social conditions and its
particular solutions. He disclosed that the weekly Magyarorszag
planned to publish the piece in full in its next issue, because of the 'great
echo' that it had caused in Hungary.
The Vorozheykin and Gerasimov article of22 January should, in fact,
be read as a seque\ to a dispatch authored by them from Budapest one
month earlier (Pravda, 23 Dec 1985). That article had carried lavish
praise for Hungary's efforts to achieve 'intensification' of economic
development and gave approval to such controversial characteristics of
NEM as encouragement of small-scale private enterprise in the service
sector. Moreover, acknowledging that Hungary's lack of raw materials
made her dependent on imports, Vorozheykin and Gerasimov displayed
understanding of Budapest's needs to diversify trade (see also Teague,
1986a).
In this connection it shou1d be pointed out that when the Soviet
Centra1 Committee Secretary in charge of agriculture, Viktor Nikonov,
visited Hungary in September 1985, he expressed appreciation of
182 Eastern Europe

Hungarian agriculture as being unique in the communist world and

praised its new and efficient methods ofproduction (Radio Budapest, 26
Sept 1985). According to Geza Kotai, the head of the Central
Committee Foreign Relations Oepartment, who accompanied Kädär
on his visit to Moscow in late September, the 'Hungarian experience has
been thoroughly examined by the Soviet political, economic and
financial leadership' , which had concluded that, while 'not everything
can be adopted, we certainly have practices that can be adopted in
household farming or the construction of up-to-date agricultural
complexes' (MTI, 4 Oct 1985). In other words the Soviets were not
disapproving of NEM, though they did not envisage copying it either.
As is weil known a special council was set up in 1983, under Andropov,
to advise the Politburo on the possible relevance of East European
reforms for the Soviet economy. After Chernenko's death this council
was presumably chaired by Gorbachev, although it is quite possible that
he presided over its deliberations when he was Chernenko's powerful
second-in-command.
By the time Kadar visited Moscow in the autumn of 1985, Gorbachev
had already made it abundantly clear that Soviet economic policies were
to undergo a thorough change. In this connection the Secretary-General
mentioned the GOR as a successful model of economic organisation.
Western scholars commented that the drift of Gorbachev's organ-
isational ideas pointed towards a streamlined and more flexible
hierarchical system, rather than to Hungarian-style decentralisation and
marketisation (see the analysis ofGorbachev's speech of II June 1985 in
Hanson, 1985a).
Ooes the option for the GOR version of economic reform (if it ever
materialises) necessarily imply de-Iegitimation ofthe Hungarian model?
The evidence is ambiguous. According to Kotai the 'Hungarian reform
process met with a positive response in the Soviet Union', the more so as
Gorbachev hirnself is said by the Hungarian Party official to have been
pleasantly impressed with what he saw on a visit to Hungarian factories
and farms in autumn 1983. The joint communique published after
Kadar's visit emphasised that in the process of socialist construction one
has to take into consideration not only 'common experiences' and the
'general laws of the building of socialism', but also specific 'national
characteristics' (Nepszahadsag, 26 Sep 1985. Emphasis added). Address-
ing the Party Congress Gorbachev spoke of 'mutual intellectual
enrichment', of 'exchanges of views, ideas and experiences of socialist
construction ... on the hasis 0/ the development 0/ several countries
rather than %ne country' (TASS, 25 Feb 1985. Emphasis added). On
 Michael Shaßr 183

tbe otber band, addressing tbe same forum, Prime Minister Nikolai
Ryzbkov vowed never to 'fulfil tbe bopes of bourgeois ideologues to
depart from tbe fundamental principle' of centralised control of tbe
economy' (TASS, 3 Mar 1986). Here Ryzbkov wasechoing the words of
Ligacbev, tbe powerful 'second' secretary, who, already in June 1985,
had denied any intention of introducing measures that would increase
the role of tbe market or of private enterprise (Tanjug, 28 June 1985,
quoted in Boyse, 1985). To what extent these lalter pronouncements
imply de-Iegitimation of models with a market orientation, and, above
all, of approacbes with so me leeway for private enterprise, remains to be
seen.
It is, bowever, c1ear that in 1985 'Vladimirov'-like voices were by no
means the only tune broadcast from Moscow to Eastern Europe.
Indeed, in July 1985, the authoritative theoretical journal Kommunist
(no. 10) carried two articles dealing with economic problems in Eastern
Europe and witbin CMEA. According to Oleg Bogomolov, the Director
ofthe Institute ofEconomics ofthe World Socialist System, the sum of
international interests of socialist countries could not be idcntical with
particular interests; those who ignored the existence 01' specific national
interests in tbe community did not do service to the cause of its unity.
The argument was very different from that expounded by Rakhmanin in
Pravda only one month before, but quite reminiscent of the line Szlfrös
bad presented in Tarsadalmi Szemle in January 1984. Bogomolov, it
sbould be pointed out, is a member of the advisory council on the
relevance of East European reforms and a CM EA specialisl.
Authoring the second article in Kommunist was none other than the
Deputy Secretary-General of the Hungarian Party, Kiuoly Nemcth.
Frankly admitting that the reintroduction of NEM created serious
economic and social problems which evcn 'put the unity of thc
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to a serious test', Nemeth none the
less emphasised tbat his country's economic problems stcmmed from the
external environment - to be more precise from the 'increasc in
international tension' and 'unfavourable foreign economic conditions'.
Between the lines it was possible to read that Hungary had been afTected
negatively by Moscow's anti-Western foreign-policy postures 01' the
early I980s, but its insistence that Hungary adjust its cconomic
development to suit tbe import needs of the Soviet economy (then:hy
bitting Budapest's trade strategy of selling high-quality products fnr
bard currency in tbe West) and by reduced deliveries of raw materials
(mainly energy carriers). How does one explain the contradiclory
posture of Pravda and Kommunist? Against the background 01' thl~
184 Eastern Europe

prolonged illness of Konstantin Rusakov, the Central Committee

secretary for liaison with the Communist Parties of socialist states, who
retired on health grounds on 18 February 1986 at the age of76, a battle
of minds and positions (perhaps also one for positions) seems to have
been waged among Central Committee departments with responsibility
for international affairs (see also Teague. 1985b). This hypothesis was
confirmed by two further artic\es which appeared to contradict the
'Vladimirov' line. On 23 August Nikolai Shishlin, the Andropov-
appointed head of a group of consultants (apparently attached to
Rusakov's department (see Teague, 1985b)), published, in Novoe
Vremya, an article presenting the bloc as 'a mosaic of many colours'.
This situation, he wrote, called for 'unconditional respect for each
country's sovereignty and scrupulous attention to each other's interests'.
Finally, according to Yury Novopashin. a member of the institute
headed by Bogomolov, the present epoch was characterised by an
increase, rather than a dec\ine, in the 'nationaland state interests' of
socialist nations. Unity was consequently said by Novopashin to
become feasible only when doing away with 'attempts to define the
essence of socialist internationalism in terms of subordination' (Rabo-
chii K/ass i Sovremennyi Mir, Sep-Oct. no. 5. 1985). Tuned to Moscow's
rather unfamiliar disharmony. Mätyäs Szt1r6s quickly reiterated his
well-known positions (Neps::ahadsag. 2 Nov 1985). which Neues
Deutschland (6 Nov 1985) wasjust as quick to reprint. Last but not least,
the Sz6r6s article coincided with an article by Kädär himself, emphasis-
ing the special rule that small countries can play in international
relations (Magyarors::ag, 3 Nov 1985 and New Hungarian Quarterly,
vol. XXVI. 110. 1985).
There is no way oftelling how far up the hierarchical Soviet lad der the
controversy concerning policies vis-a-vis Eastern Europe went. One is
tempted to remember that it was Romanov who addressed the XIII
Congress ofthe Hungarian Party in equivocal terms. One mayaiso recaJl
that it was Viktor Grishin. who went to East Berlin in May 1985, to caJl
Honecker to order in connection with his over-zealous pursuit of
'normal' inter-German relations (Kusin. 1986: p. 48). Both, as is known,
were Gorbachov's adversaries. and both were eventuaJly demoted. But
there is no reason to believe that during their respective missions the two
leaders expressed positions significantly different from consensual
leadership views. To attempt to establish a 'Vladimirov'-Romanov or
Grishin link would be to engage in a futile exercise in 'Kremlinology'.
Wh at is important, however, is to note that throughout 1985 Moscow
 Michael Shajir 185

dir! not speak to Eastern Europe in one unamhiguous voice. Mixed signals
and incoherent central guidance continued to reach East European
capitals even after Gorbachev's 'first commandment'. Political com-
munication at present is seemingly just as incoherent as it was during the
'Iong transition'.
Neither did the proceedings of the XXVII CPSU Congress signify a
significant departure from these practices. As noted, there is ambiguity
concerning future Soviet attitudes towards the Hungariari NEM. A
telling instance can best illustrate its implications. With the exception of
Ceausescu, all East European leaders indicated or implied in their
addr~sses to the Congress that Gorbachev's report had already become
inspirational for their own parties (see Radio Prague, Radio East Berlin,
Radio Budapest, and Radio Warsaw, 26 Feb 1986, Radio Sofia, 27 Feb
1986). Yet when doing so, Kadar was obviously pursuing objectives
other than say, Husak. Soviet recognition of the need for domestic
reform, it was implied, sanctified Hungary's own special road. Con-
sequently he chose to emphasise Gorbachev's words on different
experiences that enriched the 'common treasury of the entire inter-
national communist and workers' movement ideology', adding that his
party equally took into account 'our country's specific conditions and
the experiences of other socialist countries' (Radio Budapest, 26 Feb
1986. Emphasis added. F or a similar statement see the H ungarian Prime
Minister György Läzar's speech in Ulyanovsk, M.T. I. in English, I Mar
1986.) The Hungarians were obviously making a concerted effort
to trap the Soviets into admitting the USSR was implementing genuine
economic reform. In a round-table broadcast by Hungarian television
on the eve of the Congress the Soviet participants (one of whom was
Bogomolov) were asked whether the new policies could encounter
internaiopposition (Hungarian Television B, 24 Feb 1985). On 26
February the same channel interviewed Soviet Gosplan official Stepan
Sytaryan. The interviewer tried to get hirn to admit that the envisaged
reforms would necessitate raising prices and shutting down ofunprofita-
ble factories- but he failed.
These ambiguities notwithstanding, one realm where Soviet policies
were unmistakably coherent was economics. The gist of these policies
was simple: the East Europeans should pay more forwhat they get from
the USSR, should orient their best exports to Soviet, instead ofWestern
markets, and should 'participate' in financing their own investment
needs through participation in developing extractive industries and
infrastructures for raw materials imported from the Soviet Union.
186 Eastern Europe

9.3 IMPACT AND PROSPECTS

Paradoxically enough the new approach may lead to more, rather thai
less interference in East European affairs. Bulgaria's case is revealing
Once considered the Soviet Union's favourite, ever-obliging ally and
echo (Rabotnichesko Defo, The Bulgarian Party organ, is reputed to cost
a few stotinki more than Pravda to cover translation costs!), Zhivkov
was suddenly faced with a different Soviet style in handling hirn. In an
interview with Pogfed, a publication of the Union of Bulgarian
journalists, Moscow's Ambassador to Sofia, Leonid Grekov, com-
plained public\y about the quality of Bulgarian goods exported to the
USSR and criticised Sofia's investment policies. Moreover, he did not
hesitate to attribute these failures to the absence of a 'proletarian
mentality'. Bulgarian workers, Grekov said, displayed lax discipline and
were excessively preoccupied with private pastimes and private enterpr-
ise, such as attending to the needs of their country houses, gardens and
livestock (Pogfed, no.26, I July 1985, quoted in Nikolaev, 1985).
Gorbachev's encounter with Zhivkov (following the Sofia summit
meeting of October 1985) was apparently harsh enough to be candidly
described as 'comradely ... not evading a few sharp edges' (BTA in
English, 24 Oct 1985). Accustomed to previous patterns Zhivkov
initially thought all he needed to do was to copy some of Gorbachey's
'campaigns'. Criticism of corruption and even an anti-alcoholism drive
were duly instituted (Rahotnichesko Defo, 1 Feb 1986). Efficiency, order,
responsibility and the determination to put Bulgaria on the path of the
scientific-technical revolution were, indeed, the gist of Zhivkov's
address to the XIII Bulgarian Party Congress (BTA in English, 2 Apr
1986). These tasks are to be achieved via a 'c\oser interrelation with the
Soviet Union's techno-scientific front',. through 'co-operation and
integration', as weil as by promoting suitable leading cadres and
demoting those 'unable to take over responsibility'.
Zhivkov's message to the Kremlin is c\ear: what has been done under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev will be done under Gorbachev. Bulgaria will
march faithfully to the Soviet tune. Moscow's message to Sofia,
however, is more c\oudy. While initially determined to call the
Bulgarians to order Gorbachev ended by agreeing to an arrangement
wh ich basically consists in a conditional condoning of Zhivkov's
primacy in Bulgaria. The presence of Ryzhkov at the head of the Soviet
delegation at the BCP Congress, his praise for the envisaged Bulgarian
measures combined with an appeal for 'new forms and a higher level of
Soviet-Bulgarian co-operation' (Radio Sofia, 2 Apr 1986) seem to lend
credibility to this interpretation.
 Michael Shafir 187

By the same yardstick Moscow ought to be even less pleased with the
Czechoslovak performance. Indeed, the Soviet delegation to the XVII
Congress of the CSCP was headed by a relatively minor figure in the
Soviet hierarchy, Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev. Secretary-
General Gustav Husak told the Politburo in June that the leadership
observed 'with attention the measures taken in the Soviet Union and
other socialist states' (Radio Prague, 6 June 1985), but during the
preparations for the Congress he emphasised that Czechoslovakia had
no intention oftaking the 'road ofintroducing various market concepts,
ofweakening socialist social ownership and the leading role ofthe Party
in the economy' (Rude Pravo, 20 June 1985). Eventually, however,
Husak indicated that, while remaining true to 'socialist principles', the
Communist Party intended to introduce some decentralisation in the
economy. Like the Bulgarians the Prague leadership proceeded to
institute disciplinary measures against corruption and breaches_of
'socialist discipline' and like them it denounced the evils of alcoholism
(forexample, see Husak's speech of25 January 1986 and Rude Pravo. 21
Feb 1986). But, unlike the Bulgarians, the CSCP made no changes in the
leadership. The emphasis on the need to introduee technological change
and set theeconomy on the right path notwithstanding, Husak's address
to the Congress confirms that he remains the prisoner of what are
regarded as the 'Iessons of'68' (Radio Prague, 24 Mar 1986). The speech
ofPrime Minister Lubomir Strougal, who announced his government's
intention to introduce a number ofmajor economic changes in planning
and management, strongly resembling some of pre-Prague Spring
economic reforms (Radio Prague, 25 Mar 1986), sounded considerably
more promising. Whether these promises will ever be kept remains to be
seen. By refraining from insisting on the removal of the conservative
core ofthe Czechoslovak leadership (whose fear ofreforms Husak took
pains to deny openly, but the advocacy ofwhich he ridiculed by using the
term in quotation marks, see Rude Pravo, 17 Feb 1986), Moscow
demonstrated that it had not forgotten the genesis of OubCek's
'deviation'. Onee more this means that the Kremlin's attempt to have the
cake of doctrinal cohesion and enjoy the fruits of economic viability is
likely to lead to a dead end.
Oisregarding the peculiarities and the intransferability of the GOR
'model' the Kremlin appears to be convinced, none the less, that both
can be achieved. Gorbachev's presenee at the head of the Soviet
delegation to the XI SEO Congress confirmed that 'Moscow is using the
GOR to illustrate to the other CMEA countries that there is still
untapped potential in the old-style of central planning and that the type
188 Eastern Europe

of streamlining developed in the GOR is preferable to ... market-

orientated reforms' (Flow, 1986). In other words, as Honecker himself
put it in his address to this forum, the GOR should be regarded as the
'historical testimony' to the feasibility of constructing a 'politically
stable and economically efficient socialist state' (AON via TASS in
English, 17 Apr 1986). Yet the two leaders' speeches attested to
potentially contradictory differences in emphasis. In contrast to Hon-
ecker's self-congratulationary remarks, allegedly displayed in 'all
modesty', Gorbachev insisted on the (presumably general) need to
introduce 'bold experiments' and called on the bloc to enter a
'momentous period of reform' (TASS in English, 18 Apr 1986). The
Soviet leader's criticism of 'antiquated, stereotyped ways of thinking'
was probably not directed at the SEO, but in a not-too-distant future the
GOR might weil have to reconsider its performance 'self-critically'.
Investment, for instance, lags behind the needs of the economy's
continued successful operation. Moreover, Soviet designs for a radical
improvement ofCMEA's performance through 'integration', 'co-ordin-
ation' and direct contacts between enterprises depend on a joint effort of
all member states. The GOR, however, is obviously less than enthusias-
tic to further 'integrate' its relatively advanced economy with those of
the lesser developed members of the community.
Honecker's identification with the pursuit of a 'constructive dialogue'
with the West appeared to be in tune with Gorbachev's decision to use
the opportunity of his presence in East Berlin in order to advance his
disarmament proposals. Furthermore, the Soviet leader seemed to have
given his blessing to the GOR-FRG 'dialogue' when he mentioned the
necessity to respect the 'autonomy and independence in internat affairs'
of all fraternal parties. As B. V. Flow has pointed out (1986), the
'formula appeared to provide East Berlin with a workable compromise
in the long-standing discussion of "national" and "international"
interests within the bloc and to endorse Honecker's cautious defence at
the Congress of the SEO's "separate responsibilities" and "specific
tasks"'. Yet it is doubtful that such leeway is to be taken for granted. Not
only was Gorbachev's criticism of the FRG at the Congress markedly
more stringent than Honecker's, but the German leader eventually had
to sign a hard-line communique, where the Soviet Union and the GOR
denounced the envisaged participation of West Germany in the
American Strategic Oefense Initiative (AON in German, 22 Apr 1986).
This may pI ace in doubt Honecker's long-planned visit to the FRG, the
promise extended by Horst Sindermann, the GOR's President of the
Volkskammer (Parliament) to his West German hosts in February 1986
 Michael Shafir 189

notwithstanding (West German TV. Second Channel (ZOF), 21 Feb

1986).
So far the Kremlin has stopped short of interfering in personnel
changes at the top of East European leaderships, but whether it will
stand idly by when the expected successions come to the fore remains to
be seen. In the past the USSR is known to have interfered in the internal
affairs of the 'fraternal parties' at times of crises, but also to have let
them solve the succession problem by themselves, whether due to
misreading its significance (e.g. OubCek's replacement ofNovotny) or to
becoming persuaded that aleader initially opposed (e.g. Gomutka) was
actually serving Moscow's best interests (Shafir, 1986: p.204). Gorha-
chev's options seem to be open, but one should not forget that he is still
very much dependent on information channelled to Moscow by the old
apparat in charge of liaison with Eastern Europe (Volgyes, 1986). This
may or may not explain the survival of Zhivkov and Husäk.
In the GOR Honecker's heir apparent at this stage appears to be Egon
Krenz and there is no reason to suppose Moscow would veto his
selection. In Romania, on the other hand, Moscow impatiently awaits
Ceau~scu's exit, whereupon it may encourage the formation of a
rationally-inclined, reform-oriented coalition (see Shafir, 1986).
Poland's Jaruzelski does not seem to be scheduled for departure, but
then Polish leaders never are and yet they do so more often than
anywhere else in Eastern Europe. The country's tardy implementation
of an Hungarian-style economic reform has been long delayed, although
on paper it has existed since 1982. Torn between public mistrust of a
Party-induced measure and bureaucratic fear of losing control, with a
foreign debt officially acknowledged to have risen to more than 31
billion US dollars, Poland is unlikely to find her way out, unless genuine
(i.e. economic and political) reform is reintroduced.
But then this is only partially a Polish problem. One thus returns to
'square one'. One year after Gorbachev's ascent to power it is far from
clear whether Eastern Europe is likely to witness central inducement of
political change. The promotion of technocrats or 'pragmatists' is far.
from being identical to acceptance of a dialogue with society, without
which political change becomes meaningless. At best it may create the
impression that genuine change is envisaged (due to failures in political
communication at both ends) thereby unleashing forces difficult to
subdue. One is still in no position to make statements concerning
Gorbachev's intentions at horne. Should the XXVII Party Congress
turn out to have been just a new version of 'simulated change' (see
Shafir, 1985), its impact on Eastern Europe may be as ultimately tragic
190 Eastern Europe

as that of the XX CPSU Congress: raising expectations, fomenting

society and ending in 'normalisation'. Should it, however, trigger
genuine change in the Soviet Union (which, East European Party elite
experience teaches, may weil be unintentional, witness NovotnY's
admittedly reluctant acceptance of economic reform) its impact may
weil be revolutionary.
A second, though related, problem sterns from Moscow's hitherto
ambiguous message. Against the background of past experience it may
not be entirely iIIegitimate to question some good intentions, for even
the road to socialist hell may be paved with them. In his address to the
Congress Gorbachev spoke ofsocialism as having sprung up in different
conditions, and, consequently, of a situation in which each socialist
country had advanced 'to the new social system along its own way'. This
reaffirmation of the Khrushchevist thesis of 'many roads to socialism',
is, however, of some doubtful practical value when read in connection
with the Soviet leader's reaffirmation of the common necessity to
'resolve social problems on a fundamentally different basis than before,
namelya collectivist one' (TASS, 25 Feb 1986. Emphasis added). Should
this caveat be read to mean that it is imperative to (sooner or later) do
away with any form of private ownership? And what does this entail for
countries such as Hungary of Poland? Furthermore the Secretary-
General defined the CPSU as 'an inalienable component of the
international communist movement', i.e. not its 'vanguard' (emphasis
added). Yet in their addresses to the Congress two East European
leaders, Husäk and Honecker, did employ 'vanguard' when referring to
the Soviet Party (Radio Prague, 26 Feb 1986, Radio East Berlin, 26 Feb
1986). What is more, the CPSU Programme, finalised by the Congress,
makes specific mention-ofthe 'principle ofproletarian internationalism'
(TASS, 6 Mar 1986). As is weil known this basic tenet ofthe 'Brezhnev
Ooctrine' actually confers 'vanguardship' on the USSR in its relations
with countries where 'socialist gains' are 'threatened'. And if one uses
the spectacles of MarshaI Sergei Sokolov, the Soviet Oefence Minister,
then being a 'component' turns out to be similar to the old Soviet
perception of'co-operation' - I operate and you co-operate. The Soviet
armed forces, according to what Sokolov told the XXVII Congress, are
also merely an 'inalienable part of the combat community of armies of
the socialist states of the Warsaw Pact', wh ich must be ever-ready to
'defend the gains of socialism' (Pravda, 2 Mar 1986).
'00 you believe that Gorbachev's leadership will be good or bad for
the Soviet Union?' A wise sam pie of Sovietologists would probably
produce a 100 per cent return of 'Oon't know, No Answer'. 'Do you
 Michael Shafir 191

believe Gorbachev's leadership will be good or bad for Eastem Europe?'

A sampie conducted among wise 'area specialists' would come up with a
similar result. But then we have a sampling problem!

NOTE

I. I am indebted to Dr V. V. Kusin for giving me access to the manuscript

before its publication.
10 Defence and Security
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
When Mikhail Gorbachev first canvassed the Soviet policy agenda, full
of economic, social and political problems, he must have found the
military sphere heartwarming. Sixty-eight years after its birth, the Soviet
Union possessed one of the two most powerful military establishments
in human history. It is ironic that the Boisheviks' successors would find
themselves in this position. A large and terrifyingly powerful standing
anny was certainly not in the ideological forecast. Economic might and
social progress were to have been the Soviets' ticket to leadership of
world revolution and unparalleled inftucnce. History, though, took a
different turn and Soviet military power far outstrips any other
instrument ofinftuence in the international system. The most solid gains
ofSoviet-style socialism are a direct result ofmilitary assistance and, in
the case of Eastern Europe, the victories of the Soviet armed forces. The
Soviet claim to superpower status is, for the most part, based on its
military prowess and attainment of military parity with the USA. The
military instrument is weil prepared to protect the Soviet Union, its aIlies
and to extend cautiously Soviet power in the world.
In Gorbachev's ideal world, with Soviet military strength intact, he
could turn to the domestic agenda; to try and infuse Soviet society with
so me ofthe economic and social vitality that it lacks. Unfortunately for
Gorbachev this military machine, acquired through extraordinary effort
and expenditure of resources, is in some need of attention too. The
maintenance of military power is a dynamic, not a static, process. Thus,
instead of relief and encouragement when he turns to the military
agenda, Gorbachev will face yet another set of problems. It is a bit
difficult to tell, at present, how he views them and what his policy
prescriptions will be. Preoccupied with economic malaise he has been
relatively quiet on matters of military policy. Moreover he seems to
believe, and, as we shall see, a number of his generals agree, that the
military's most fundamental problems can only be solved by the overall
economic recovery of the Soviet Union. This has produced a kind of
holding pattern in military policy. But this hiatus cannot last very long.
192
 Condoleezza Rice 193

10.1 THE BREZHNEV BARGAIN: MILITARY POWER AS A

FIRST PRIORITY

The assets aOJi liabilities ofSoviet military power with which Gorbachev
must now be concerned were already evident when Leonid Brezhnev
died. The decade that spanned 1965-75 will probably go down in
military history as one of the most intensive peacetime build-ups of the
modern age. And Leonid Brezhnev brought more to Soviet military
policy than resources; he brought stability and consistency to Soviet
military decision-making, something that had been soreIy lacking under
Nikita Khrushchev.
Brezhnev was not willing to conduct Soviet foreign policy on the basis
of threats and brinkmanship to cover meagre Soviet military power.
Unlike Khrushchev, who undertook adventurist policies in Berlin and
Cuba with only four vulnerable operational intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) to back hirn up, Brezhnev was determined that the
Soviet military would be an instrument capable of supporting an active
foreign policy. He set out on a course to achieve at least parity with the
USA in nuc\ear weapons and to acquire conventional weapons for any
contingency. Under Brezhnev the Soviet Union attained at least a draw,
and in some cases superiority, in the entire complement of military
forces.
Brezhnev also respected the military's expertise, a matter of con-
siderable importance to generals whose memo ries of the great purges
under Josef Stalin and the haphazard meddling and interference of
Khrushchev were very fresh. Party guidance came to mean precisely that
the professional military was left to debate the military-technical issues
before them and to make recommendations based on their professional
assessment.
The Brezhnev strategy bore fruit. In retrospect the 1970s will probably
go down as the 'Golden Age' for the Soviet Union in international
politics. There were setbacks, like the defection of Egypt, but the Soviet
Union achieved strategic parity with the US, extended its inftuence into
the far corners of Africa and collected c\ients like Nicaragua in Central
America and Vietnam in Asia. US power, post-Vietnam and Watergate,
was in dec\ine. The Soviets themselves saw in the documents of detente
reluctant US resignation to, if not acceptance of, the Soviet Union as an
equal in matters of international policy. They made no secret of their
belief that Soviet military power was largely responsible. As General S.
M. Tyushkevich said, Soviet power was making possible the more rapid
victory of progressive forces throughout the world (Tyushkevich, 1978).
194 Defence and Security

Through constant attention to his military forces Brezhnev had

delivered the status that Khrushchev prematurely proclaimed.
By the time that Brezhnev died, however, this strategy was showing
signs of strain. As economic stagnation took hold in the mid-1970s, the
rate ofincrease in Soviet military spending began to decline, though the
overall rate of spending was still quite high (the controversy over Soviet
military expenditure is summed up in DIA and CIA 1986). Moreover,
strategie parity with the USA was under new strains with the first
Reagan Administration's defence modernisation programme gaining
momentum. Finally the war in Afghanistan" wh ich should have been a
relatively easy police action for a superpower, was driving horne to the
Soviets the lesson that overwhelming military power does not always
bring easy victory. Brezhnev's exasperation with the situation was easy
to see in his final act as Commander-in-Chief ofthe Soviet armed forces.
Assembling all his military leaders before hirn Brezhnev told them that
they were receiving all that they needed and reminded them that the
conduct of military policy was his responsibility (Pravda and Kras-
naya Zvezda. 27 Oet 1982). It was not a very fitting end for this leader
who had brought Soviet military power to its lofty position.
For Gorbachev the situation has not changed essentially since that
extraordinary session in the Kremlin. The dominant problem is how to
attend to military needs among economic priorities in the face of
pressures from the generals at horne and Ronald Reagan abroad.
Secondary problems are apparent too. He must decide how to maintain
the significant but expensive military gains of the Soviet Union in the
Third World and wh at to do about the festering war in Afghanistan. A
tertiary set ofproblems are not unique to the military: wh at to do about
discipline, alcoholism and ethnic problems that threaten the fabric of
society. Finally Gorbachev will eventually have a think about what kind
ofleaders he wants in charge ofthe Soviet army and what role he wants
them to play. It is too early to tell whether the consensual style of
leadership that characterised Brezhnev's relationship with the military,
at least in the early years, can survive the strains described below. But the
long-term issue of leadership of the armed forces may ultimately be the
most important political-military problem that faces hirn.

10.2 RESOURCE ALLOCA nON AND MILITARY

MODERNISATION
Of all the problems that face Gorbachev in this area, military
modemisation and resource allocation are both the most serious and the
 Condoleezza Rice 195

least immediate. Any military spending programme has different

phases. At one end of the spectrum is the rapid acquisition of weapons
systems based on existing technology and current production lines and
facilities. AtJhe other end is investment in basic research which may or
may not pay offmilitarily. In between are a host ofinvestment decisions
for the long and short term.
It appears that in the short term Gorbachev has decided to allow the
modernisation of Soviet military forces to continue on schedule. This
would mean that the growth in military spending would continue to
exceed that of national income (DIA and CIA 1986). Strategic
modernisation continues unabated with the beginning of the
deployment of the eontroversial SS-25, single-warheaded, mobile
missile. The Soviets contend that it is a modernisation ofthe SS-13 while
the Reagan Administration charges that its characteristics are sufficien-
t1y different to constitute a 'new missile', thus violating provisions of the
unratified SALT 11 limits. Additionally, the Soviets have been testing the
multiple-warheaded,.also mobile SS-24, which is not yet being deployed.
Modernisation of Soviet strategie nuclear submarines is moving some-
what more slowly. Three or four additional Typhoon Class subs may
now be under construction, but the Soviets have only deployed three
since the system's appearance in 1981. The bomber forces are being
modernised, but primarily through refurbishing and rearming the Bear
Class bomber rather than deployment of the much awaited but yet to
appear Blackjack, wh ich is roughly equivalent to the US B-1.
Modernisation of conventional forces is also proceeding to date. Two
fighters, the MIG-29 and SU-27, are expected to enter service soon, as
weil as a number of naval vessels, including perhaps a full-sized aircraft-
carrier. The T-80 tank, though, is not making its way to the field very
rapidly, and may represent a less significant upgrade of the T -72 than
was once thought. The Soviets could squeeze some savings out of the
budget by stretching out the acquisition programme, hut it is anticipated
that this round of military modernisation will be completed, close to or
on schedule, by the early 1990s (see IISS, 1985-6; Department of
Defense, 1986; and DIA and CIA, 1986).
Tbe more difficult problem for the Soviets is what to do about the
other phases of a military modernisation programme. The cycle for
major improvements in military technology is roughly ten to fifteen
years according to one Soviel commentator (Cherednichenko, 1971:
pp. 20-8). For revolutionary ehanges in technology which can change
the course ofwarfare completely the time for research and development
to deployment of forces can be much longer. Here, in the longer time-
196 Defence and Security

frame, the success of the programme of economic and technological

modernisation that Gorbachev wishes to undertake is critical.
The Soviet Union has faced challenges to its weak technological and
economic base before. In the I 920s it was the mechanisation offorces, in
1945 the US A-bomb, and in the 1950s and 1960s a race to find means of
delivery for nuclear weapons. Each time, the Soviets successfully met the
challenge against superior technological and economic foes. They did so
through a 'mobilisation' strategy, pouring resources and scientific talent
into the project at hand. Characteristic of all of these efforts was access
to the top leadership and high-level intervention on behalf of those who
managed these high-priority efforts (see, in particular, Holloway, 1981).
The problem is that the contemporary challenge is not nearly so
straightforward. The new military challenges are developing, not along
a single technological frontier, but along several paralleiones. Break-
throughs in high-energy physics, microelectronics and the entire range
ofthe science of computing, from artificial intelligence to real time image
processing, must be pursued simultaneously. It is true, as Defence
Minister MarshaI Sergei Sokolov put it that 'scientific-technical
progress offers colossal opportunities' (Pravda, 3 Mar 1986). The real
question is whether the Soviet Union can take advantage of them
without substantial improvement in the technological base of the
economy. Key military leaders in the Soviet Union now acknowledge
that it cannot; that economic modernisation and the military future of
the Soviet Union are inextricably linked. The code words for this
argument have become improvements in the Soviet economy so that it
can support 'military technical tasks of the highest order' (see, for
example, Gareev, 1985: pp. 242-3).
The question is how long the generals are willing to wait for that
modernisation to take place. There are two important factors in this
regard. First, as noted above, the current modernisation ofSoviet forces
is taking place, more or less on schedule. It is estimated that the current
modernisation can take place without any additional investment in
defence plants and equipment for approximately six to eight years (DIA
and CIA, 1986). Spending on defence. would not decrease and, in fact,
might increase slightly in that period. But there may be some competi-
tion for skilled labour and scarce resources. The Soviet military, even in
this period, may have to get used to competing with other segments of
the economy. Under Gorbachev it may be that their privileged, first
priority status is in danger.
Nevertheless, in the short tenn the generals can afford to be generous
in supporting Gorbachev's modernisation This is especially true since
 Condoleezza Rice 197

many of the production facilities that Gorbachev has targeted for

increased investment and modernisation are those which will support
the technologies that the military deerns promising. In the current
economic pl~n, machine-building, a bulwark of Soviet industrial and
military power, is targeted for extraordinary growth. Production in
those parts of the machine sector c10sely identified with military
modernisation is slated to grow about 1.5 times faster than machine-
building as a whole. The computer industry and robotics are also high-
priority items. This is perfectly in line with the military's investment
agenda. As Major-General M. Yasyukov has stated 'there will be
fundamentally new instruments, computer-controlled machine tools,
robot equipment and the la test generation of computers wh ich will
provide the leading directions of scientific-technical progress and
simultaneously the basic catalysts of military-technical progress' (1985:
p. 20). This list is not unlike that offered by former Chief ofthe General
Staff, Marshai Nikolai Ogarkov in his famous interview in 1984
(Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 May 1984). At present, with current modernisation
proceeding, Gorbachev and the military seem to be of one mind.
Second, military modernisation decisions can be deferred because the
military is divided against itselfabout the course ofthe next revolution in
military affairs. It is doubtful that the General Staff is in a position to
offer recommendations on the next programme of modernisation. The
issue of the future of Soviet military forces has been the subject of a
major debate over doctrine and strategy and, to date, no winner has
emerged. The military would undoubtedly like to be able to do
everything. But a resource-constrained future looms over the debate and
some elements of the Soviet military are fighting for their very Iives.
The issue before the Soviet military is the relative weight that should
be attached to continued modernisation of nuclear forces. At one time,
under Khrushchev, nuclear forces were believed to have made all others
obsolete. Warfare would begin with massive nuclear strikes deep into the
territory ofthe opponent. The war would be over very quickly, perhaps
in a matter of minutes. With the fall of Khrushchev 'one-variant
warfare', as this view was called, lost favour. The Soviet military began
to plan for an entire range of options in the event of war. Slowly the
notion that war would begin with a protracted conventional phase
found its proponents, but nuclear weapons were still accorded the
position of the 'decisive element' in warfare.
Recently there have been those in the Soviet military willing to take
this view considerably further. They argue that in the age of strategic
nuclear parity a kind of paralysis has set in. Neither side will be able
198 Defence and Security

to count on surviving a strategic nuclear exchange and as General M. A.

Gareev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Military Science, a
particularly outspoken proponent of this view states, the 'size of the
arsenals makes even the possibility of fighting a nuclear war questiona-
ble since their use would have catastrophic consequences for each side
(Gareev, 1985: pp. 240-4). This view, of course, tracks nicely with that
of the politicalleadership that a 'nuclear war would have no winners'.
But what is to become of military strategy if nuclear war cannot be won?
A growing number of influential officers of the General Staff argue that
nuclear weapons, even if they are not employed, will govern the course of
warfare. It might be possible to contemplate, not just a conventional
phase of war, but a conventional option in wh ich few if any nuclear
weapons would ever be used.
The implications of this view for Soviet defence procurement are
immense. In his oft-quoted interview of9 May 1984 (Krasnaya Zvezda),
Marshai Nikolai Ogarkov, then Chief ofthe General Staff, seemed to be
making a sufficiency argument about nuclear weapons. 'You do not
have to be a military genius to see that stockpiling ofnuclear weapons is
senseless,' he said. His view was clear. The continued acquisition of
nuclear weapons was a waste. His preferred option appears a few lines
later. 'Now, in contemporary conditions,' he noted, 'there are weapons
based on new physical principles which can achieve yields close to those
of small nuclear weapons.' This view is apparently shared by General
Gareev, who believes that non-nuclear, high-yield weapons hold great
promise in the next war. For these officers the end-product for the
modernised Soviet economy would be high-technology weapons, which,
using miniaturisation and robotics, would make nuclear weapons
obsolete. The new battlefield would also be automated, with real-time
information-processing equipment and artificial intelligence giving the
commander greater access to information in the search for the 'perfect'
battlefield decision. This vision ofwarfare has already had an impact on
Soviet weapons acquishion, for instance in the fielding of increasingly
sophisticated fighter aircraft designed to deny NATO air superiority in a
conventional war.
The General Staff has also directed improvements in command and
control through the creation of intermediate commands and the
unification of arms of services into combined-arms packages devoted to
geographically designated theatres of military operation (TVDs). The
General Staff alm ost seems to see the Third World War as the Second
World War, fought with the benefit of high technology and better
organisation.
 Condoleezza Rice 199

However, this view may still prove to be unpopular in the Soviet

Union. First, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons may be senseless, but it
is eheaper than developing and deploying weapons based on teehnology
as esoteric as, that whieh is being proposed. This is especially true given
the Soviet Union's relative weakness vis-a-vis the USA in the desired
technologies. Second, it appears that those who are promoting the
eonventional option have failed to win the debate to date. A number of
Soviet military offieers, including Marshai Viktor Kulikov, Comman-
der-in-Chief ofthe Warsaw Paet, eontinue to emphasise the potential for
escalation from eonventional to nuclear war (Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 Feb
1984). For them, the range of weaponry must include strategie nuclear
weapons that ean aehieve military signifieant missions. It is not enough
to have strategie nuclear weapons that ean hold the other side at bay.
That this debate has not been resolved ean be seen in the recent speeeh of
Minister of Defenee Sokolov. MarshaI Sokolov aeeorded nuclear
weapons their accustomed leading role in saying: 'The basis of the
military might of the Armed Forees of the Soviet state are the strategie
rocket forces ... which are continually prepared to deliver an immediate
and crushing retaliatory blow.' Sokolov goes on to emphasise the
importance of all other types of forces and to give a special nod in the
direction of the changes taking place in conventional forces (speech to
the Party Congress, Pravda, 3 Mar 1986). Taken together with the
current Soviet modernisation programme that places equal weight on
nuc1ear and non-nuc1ear forces, it appears that no decision about the
future direction of military modernisation has been made.
This should serve Gorbachev weil for the time being. He can be a hero
to the 'high-technology' element in the Soviet military by pursuing the
modernisation of the technological base of society. But at some point
this happy marriage may become strained. This segment ofthe military
is asking the Soviet Union to do something that is has never done
partieularly weIl; development of a broad spectrum of new technologies
and head-on competition with the most sophisticated power in the world
to be the first to deploy these weapons in the field. For these people it is
not longer good enough to substitute quantity for quality and the
strategy that has modernised weaponry in an evolutionary, incremental
manner would have to be scrapped in favour ofthe acquisition oflargely
untried and very expensive technologies. This will be a risky propo-
sition for the Soviet Union and Gorbachev may find that the
temporary alliance, if it can be called that. with this segment of the
military will ultimate\y cost hirn more than the more accustomed
course.
200 Defence and Security

There are many entrenched interests which will not view kindly the
abandonment of nuclear modernisation or the incremental, evolution-
ary approach to weapons acquisition. Just as mechanisation produced a
cavalry lobby that managed to find a mission for horses that allowed
them to far outlive their battlefield usefulness, so it will be with the
conservatives of this age. The job of the current traditionalists will be
easier too. In the absence of warfare it will be difficult to ever prove,
conclusively, as the Second World War did about tanks versus the
cavalry, that massive nuclear arsenals are obsolete. For the time being
the usually iron-clad solidarity of defence industry, the professional
military and heavy industry may be experiencing some strain. Newallies
for the modern ist wing of the" military may actually come from the
Institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Electronics and
other bastions of high technology. The unity forged from the need for
steel during the mechanisation offorces may not hold up. It is likely that
eventually Gorbachev will be told by the General Staff that he must do
everything weil. But in the current fluid state of the debate about just
how revolutionary the new revolution in military affairs is decisions can
probably be postponed.
There is, however, a 'wild-card' that could force decisions about this
issue earlier than Gorbachev would like. MiIitaries compete in their
domestic environment with other social demands. But unlike domestic
constituencies they alsocompete head on in the international system
with other militaries. The threat of a new, fast-paced US defence
modernisation programme hangs over this internat Soviet debate.
Gramm-Rudman and Congressional budget-cutting not withstanding,
the Soviet military must watch carefully the pace of US modernisation.
Foremost in this regard is the future of President Reagan's Strategie
Defense Initiative (SOl).
The fear that the US will begin to race again, imposing force
modernisation and investment decisions on the Soviet Union earlier
explains a great deal about the flurry of Gorbachev proposals in arms
controI. These proposals, some ofthem new, others old and almost all of
them grandiose, probably derive from two sets ofmotives. Certainly the
Soviet leader wishes to reduce the threat of nuclear war, but this, while
laudable, does not explain the urgency with which he has attacked" this
question while remaining mute on other military issues. The urgency is
probably hetter explained by a very old Soviet motive; arms control as a
means of harnessing US technology. The Soviets know that in
competition with the USA they can stay abreast if the pace is not too
fast. Their problem, especially in aperiod ofresource scarcity, is to make
 Condoleezza Rice 201

certain that the USA does not spurt ahead. SOl is a good case in point.
The Soviets have been conducting research on the potential for defensive
technologies in line with the provisions of the ABM treaty. By most
accounts th~y have kept up, more or less, in all of the relevant
technologies (Meyer, 1985). There are specific weaknesses, in comput-
ing, for example, that would put them at a disadvantage should the US
decide to deploy SOL But, for the most part, with the world's only
operation al ABM (the Galosh system around Moscow) they are in
pretty good shape.
The prospect of a mobilised, directed US effort to bring to bear
superior Western technology (perhaps including the J apanese) must be a
frightening one, however. The Soviet General Staff can certainly do all
of the calculations that have convinced broad segments of the US
scientific community that nationwide defence is unfeasible. But the
Soviets also have an almost pathological respect for US technology.
They must at least entertain the possibility that SOl will be successful. In
any case, they will have to take countermeasures, probably including
deployment of further defences themselves and an increase in offensive
warheads to maintain the penetrability of their offensive forces.
Simultaneously on the conventional forces front, technologies
developed for SOl, particularly in supercomputing, might disadvantage
them in that arena as NATO's long-debated modernisation would take
place. The Soviets are thus watching NATO conventional force
modernisation with a wary eye as weil (Gareev, 1985: p. 242). Combined
with current plans for modernisation of US strategic nuclear forces,
including the 0-5 missile wh ich will give the USA survivable, extraor-
dinarily time-urgent hard-kill capability from sea, the Soviets would
probably be in a race that they would rather avoid. Marshai Sokolov's
understated point that an arms race with the USA is 'not our preferred
course' (Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 Mar 1986), probably has greater meaning
for the Soviet political leadership than they would like the world to
know.
Not surprisingly Gorbachev has tried to mobilise world public
opinion and has presented President Reagen with some fairly enticing, if
usually underdeveloped, arms-control options. The most grandiose of
the proposals, the 15 January speech that offered a three-stage plan for
the abolition ofnuclear weapons was not completely sound (New York
Times, 16 Jan 1986; see also the coverage in Pravda, 16 Jan 1986, and
Sokolov's comments, Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 Mar 1986). It did have buried
within it, though, what appeared to be a reasonable offer on inter-
mediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The proposal had a great deal in
202 Defence and Security

common with Reagan's 'zero option' offered as the US starting position

in the 1983 negotiations prior to the deployment of US ground-Iaunched
cruise missiles and Pershing 11 in Europe. The Gorbachev Plan would
have eliminated intermediate-range missiles in Europe, but did not
mention Asia, where America has both strategie interests and an
important ally in Japan. The two sides did not find agreement and when
the USA asked for clarification from negotiators in Geneva on 12
February, the Soviet team was said to be 'vague on the details' (New
York Times, 13 Feb 1986). This has been a pattern under Gorbachev.
Enticing proposals have been made, but there has been little follow up in
private negotiations. This led Secretary ofState George Shultz to accuse
the Soviets of flagrant 'public diplomacy'.
Other Gorbachev proposals, for a chemical weapons ban with on-si te
inspection, conventional-force reductions in Europe ofthe MBFR type
and even a call for limitations on 'weapons based on new physical
principles' have been hard to tie down in negotiations. It is difficult to
know whether Gorbachev is simply outpacing his own bureaucracy's
ability to draft policy positions to support his offers or if this really is a
frantic public diplomacy game. His continual press ure on the US
Administration to join hirn in what is at present a unilateral testing
moratorium is probably designed to bring maximum public pressure on
Reagan for movement in some arms-control sphere. But the last Soviet
offers at Geneva appear to be somewhat more serious. The Soviets, after
saying for months that 'space-strike weapons' (the code words for SDI)
would have to be abandoned and vacillating on whether research should
be allowed, have at last tied their previous offer for deep reductions in
the Soviet offensive arsenal to reaffirmation of the ABM treaty. Since
the ABM treaty does not prohibit research, this package would allow the
Strategie Defense Initiative to continue as a research programme. The
part ofthe Soviet proposal that seeks an agreement to abide by the terms
of the ABM treaty for 12-15 years supports the notion that it is really
the pace of the US programme that troubles them.
Unfortunately for the Soviets, they may have waited too long to
tender this offer. The US Administration, once quite divided about the
desirability of an arms-control treaty with the Soviet Union, now seems
to be united behind a policy that would scrap the SALT 11 limits. A case
has been made that the Soviets have viola ted the ABM treaty through
the construction of a phased-array radar at Ablakova and several ofthe
SALT provisions as weil. It is that case that is being used as justification
for a breakout from the 'no-undercut' policy on SALT. A decision to
revoke or at least unilaterally redefine the ABM treaty is probably not
far behind.
 Condoleezza Rice 203

The Soviets have made it c1ear that they too will begin to exceed the
limits ofthe SALT treaties ifthe USA does. They have a number of'hot'
production lines which could be mobilised to do so and very heavy
missiles whis:h could become carriers for extraordinary numbers of
warheads. The SS-18, for instance, is believed to have sufficient weight
to support fractionation of up to 30 warheads, but it is currently limited
to a total of ten by the SA LT agreements. While the military value of
such countermoves is questionable, the pressure politically on Gorba-
chev to respond to the US moves will be immense. This might force his
hand somewhat sooner than he had hoped on rapid and intensive
investment in the next round ofmilitary modernisation. He would not be
afforded the luxury of investing in the technological base ofthe economy
and hoping that productivity and economic growth would be back on
track when military investment decisions become critical.
All of these decisions are facing Gorbachev, who would rather, it
would seem, ignore the military issue for the time being. But the question
of the devotion of resources to the military is not the only military
problem that faces hirn. The other part of the Brezhnev bargain was that
these military forces would be the basis for an active Soviet foreign
policy abroad. Gorbachev appears to have some doubts about the
wisdom of that strategy as weil. At all of the Party Congresses over
which he presided Leonid Brezhnev paid due respect to the Soviet armed
forces as the sword and shield of'progressive forces' in the world. While
denouncing the export of revolution Brezhnev often noted that 'we will
render military assistance where it IS needed'. And, 'It has been our fa te
to receive the honourable mission of defending and protecting peace'
(see at the XXV Party Congress, Pravda, 28 Feb 1976. Compare this
with Gorbachev at the XXVII Party Congress, Pravda, 25 Feb 1986).
This link between Soviet power, peace and progress in the world is
conspicuously absent from Gorbachev's more sober speech. But this
should not be read necessarily as a call for the Soviet Union to drop from
its position ofworld leadership. Rather the more sober tone may simply
reflect aperiod of retrenchment, when the Soviet Union will not be
anxious to take on new military allies and will be content to stabilise
relations with those that it has. That the policy does not mean
abandonment of important existing allies, however, can be seen in the
promise to rearm Libya (kept at arm's length during its recent tussle with
the Reagan Administration) and continuing arms shipments to Syria
and a host of other c1ients.
This brings us to the most serious involvement of Soviet forces in the
Third World that has ever taken place; the war in Afghanistan. The
Soviets face a very difficult challenge in Afghanistan. They have now
204 Defence and Security

devoted seven years and approximately 20 000 lives to that war. The
most serious military problem continues to be the sanctuary and supply
lines provided to the rebels by Pakistani territory. The Soviets cannot
afford to widen the war since Pakistan is a very tough military power in
its own right and a strategie ally of the USA. They have been forced,
therefore, to confine themselves to harassing and threatening excursions
over the border by air. The job against the rebels mayaiso be made more
difficult by a pending US decision to give advanced weaponry to the
Afghan rebels, who, fighting in terrain and under conditions unfamiliar
to the Soviets, are aleady doing quite weil.
Several months aga there were noises from the Soviets about an
international settlement in Afghanistan, the withdrawal ofSoviet forces
and, in effect, the re-establishment ofthe status quo ante. The decision to
sacrifice Babrak Karmal, the Afghan leader who was an unacceptable
negotiating partner for Pakistan, seemed to support the idea that the
Soviets were seeking a way out. But if they are seeking a way out they
intend to do so from a position of strength. Recent Soviet military
victories, destroying strategie rebe I bases, have put them in a stronger
position. It may be their intention to demonstrate their power and then
seek agreement. Since any agreement would probably have as a
precondition a cessation of Pakistani support for the rebels, it may be
difficult for the parties to find common ground.
While Afghanistan has been a foreign-policy disaster and a military
quagmire, its effect upon the Soviet armed forces may not have been all
that bad. Militaries tend to atrophy without battle to test them and the
Soviet military has certainly been tested. Moreover, the General Staff
finally seems to be learning how to fight a small-scale war. This
experience and the re-evaluation of Soviet weaponry, tactics and
strategy that it is likely to produce will undoubtedly be useful in the
future. The war has also boosted the careers of several Afghanistan
alumni, including the fast-rising Yu. P. Maksimov. Battlefield
experience for the Soviet officer corps, in general, has been gained even if
it has been acquired at high cost. On the other hand, reports of crises of
morale in the armed forces, including reported defections suggest that
this war, from from horne, has not been very popular with Soviet
soldiers. These are problems that face any military, particularly one
fighting not for the homeland, but a war of occupation. As such, their
importance should not be overdrawn.
The war has highlighted a number ofproblems that have deeper roots,
however. The great social problems, noted by Gorbachev himselfin his
Party Congress speech, resonate in the military. Not surprisingly,
 Condoleezza Rice 205

discipline and morale have become central themes in the Soviet military
press. In his speech to the Congress, MarshaI Sokolov, while dutifully
praising the Soviet soldier, found it necessary to add that they 'are of
course youn~ and problems of discipline are not unknown (Krasnaya
Zvezda, 3 Mar 1986). He went on to make a pitch for the armed forces as
a 'school for the development ofSoviet man'. This theme of discipline is
not new, but admission of the problem at this level, in a usually self-
congratulatory speech like this, is new. The Sokolov statement stands in
marked contrast to that of MarshaI Andrei Grechko to the XXIV Party
Congress when he praised, without qualification, the youth ofthe Soviet
Armed Forces (Pravda, 3 Apr 1971).
Finally the military, perhaps more than other segments of Soviet
society, is feeling the press ures ofits multi-ethnic composition. Students
of this issue disagree about the severity of the problem, but all would
agree that the increasing proportion of Central Asian men in the draft
pool will have an effect. (For the view that the problem is very serious see
Wimbush and Alexiev, 1980. For a less alarmist view see Iones, 1985.)
The proportion of Slavs in the military in 1985 was an estimated 63 per
cent, down from about 74 per cent in 1970. This is due to the slowing of
the population growth-rates among the more afHuent Slavs. As a result
the Soviet military faces two particularly serious problems. First, there is
the potential for ethnic conflict, expecially with an officer corps that is
very Slav. Many of the 'defections' in Afghanistan were apparently
young men of Central Asian background. Racism is, according to some
reports, very strong and open as practised by ethnocentric Slavs who
resent their Central Asian counterparts. But two points are worth
making. First, the Soviets and the Russians be fore them have had
considerable experience in dealing with this problem. One means has
always been to discourage identification of the Central Asians as a
group. Since relations among various Central Asian elements are not
always cordial this policy has often been successful. Second, it is
important to put this problem in comparative perspective. Multi-ethnic
tension is a problem that faces many militaries, inc\uding the US one.
The US military was one of the first institutions to integrate in the USA
and has been a vehic\e for upward mobility for thousands of minority
soldiers; nevertheless, tensions are not unknown. as in Vietnam for
instance. Finally the Soviets are actively working to diminish the
problem by encouraging outstanding Central Asian soldiers to seek
officers' careers. In the absence of success here, one option, also
employed in the pre-Second World War US military, is to increase the
minority component of the non-commissioned officers' ranks. The point
206 Defence and Security

is that, while the problem is present and growing more serious, it is by no

means out of hand.
A more potentially troublesome problem, and one not faced by the
US military, is the relative illiteracy ofthe Central Asian recruits in the
Russian language. The Soviets have become so open about this problem
that one suspects that it is really very serious. Even the then Chief oftbe
General Staff, MarshaI Nikolai Ogarkov, admitted that proficiency in
the command language, Russian, had to be improved (Ogarkov, 1982).
The Main Political Administration (MPA) has apparently taken up tbe
call. Several new programmes were initiated after former Chief of the
MPA General Epishev called upon the military commissariats to take
steps to increase these soldiers' proficiency (Epishev, 1983). Both the
educational publishing house and Voenizdat, the military one, publi-
shed Russian language textbooks for soldiers that concentrated on
military terms. There are also special language schools and clubs for
young men who are about to become of draft age. Ironically this strategy
may have unintended side-effects. It is doubtful that the MPA is
concerned with the language proficiency of Central Asian women and
this could serve to make worse the tendency for women to lag behind in
regions that, for religious and cultural reasons, seldom promote their
advancement. Nevertheless this programme appears to have strong
support among the Ministry of Defence hierarchy.

10.3 THE SOVIET MILITARY: THE POLITICAL-MILITARY

BALANCE-SHEET

Gorbachev faces a considerable agenda in the military sphere that will

tax his resources and energy when he turns to it. But it is important not to
overstate the problems in this sphere. The military is still the Soviets'
trump card in international politics and one of society's finest
achievements. The foremost problem facing him, the technological and
economic bealth of the Soviet military, is inextricably Iinked to his
number one priority; putting the Soviet economy back on its feet. He
seems to have the generals' acquiescence in the strategy that he has
adopted.
Very Iittle is known at present about the kind of 'team' that
Gorbachev will turn to for military leadership. He did finally remove a
few very elderly commanders, most importantly, General A. A. Epishev,
the Chief of the Main Political Administration, who died shortly
afterwards, and MarshaI V. F. Tolubko ofthe Strategie Rocket Forces.
 Condoleezza Rice 207

The MPA has since been more active in promoting Party ideology in the
armed forces, but there is little evidence of areal shift in policy. Marshai
Tolubko, on the other hand, was replaced by General Maksimov, one of
the generals to come out of the General Staff-inspired theatre of mi li tary
operations (TVD) commands. It is difficult to say whether he should be
identified with the 'modernists' of the General Staff and their conven-
tional war option or not. If he is in that camp, his selection to head the
rocket forces would have important policy implications for a military
wrestling with the relative importance of strategie nuclear weapons. It
mayaiso be, however, that he was simply a bright star in search of an
appointment and that the rocket forces job was one ofthe first to become
available. Other changes that Gorbachev has made include the removal,
at long last, of Admiral Gorshkov from the Navy's top post. But since he
was very old and was made Inspector-General of the Armed Forces, a
kind of golden parachute, it may be that his time for retirement had just
come. In short, all that is clear at this point is that Gorbachev prefers
younger generals, like himself. more vital and energetic than the old men
who occupied commands weil beyond their usefulness.
He has, moreover. made few moves at the top of the military
hierarchy. Marshai Sergei Akhromeev, who was appointed in 1984,
remains Chief of the General Staff. More importantly, Marshai
Sokolov, a figure apparently so transitional that no attempt has been
made to glorify and reinterpret his contribution to military history,
continues to occupy the top post of Minister of Defence. This is
probably a sign that the generals and Gorbachev have not really come to
agreement about this post and there is a kind of holding pattern
operating here. The military was reportedly unhappy when Dmitri
Ustinov was appointed Minister of Defence in 1976 because he was a
civilian defence industrialist not a soldier. They are probably lobbying to
see that that does not happen again. There are not very many candidates,
but the top one, Marshai V. I. Petrov, currently First Deputy Ministerof
Defence, would be a natural. He is a soldier par excellence, having
commanded the TVD in the Far East and a number of battle actions,
including Ethiopia. IfGorbachev does not want a soldier there are fewer
choices. But one possibility is V. M. Shabanov, currently the Deputy
Minister of Defence (Defence Industries).
Once a Minister is selected it will be important to note whether he
assumes Politburo membership. Sokolov is currently a candidate
member and was not promoted at the Party Congress. Ifthe Minister of
Defence does not become a member it will break a pattern that began
with Marshai Grechko's election to that body in 1973. The military is, as
208 Defence and Security

always, well-represented in key Party bodies. No key military ofticers

lost their Central Committee seats at the Party Congress and a few, like
Admiral Gorshkov, kept them in spite oftheir removal from key offices.
There is one important political-military change that is taking place
as a result of Gorbachev's accession. For the first time there is a
Secretary-General who did not serve in any capacity in the Second
World War. The great event that legitimised the role of the army in the
Soviet Union is thus not apart of his experience. Neither does he have
the patron-dient ties that Khrushchev and Brezhnev enjoyed as a result
of their service with numerous generals in the war; but this is a
generational shift that had to co me some time. The generals too are
increasingly without the Second World War experience. If this means
anything it may mean that professional estimates of merit and suitability
for promotion will be more important than having known someone in
the war. It is likely that this, in itself, bodes weil rather than ill for the
professional soldier in the Soviet Union.
It is just too eariy to tell, then, what the nature of political-military
relations under Gorbachev will be. It is probably derivative of many
other things, induding how weil the generals think their needs, presently
on hold, are being met.But what if the generals become impatient? One
ofthe puzzles facing those who study Soviet political-military relations
is understanding the influence and power of the Soviet military in
internal politics. An institution as proud as the Soviet military, with a
reputation for excellence and vitality in a society sorely lacking in those
virtues, must certainly be very good at protecting its interests internally.
When one tries to find evidence of that, however, it comes primarily
by inference. The devotion to the acquisition of military power is
extraordinary in the Soviet Union. But is this a result of'red militarism'
or consensus at the top that defence is an important social 'good'? It is
weil to note that one ofthe biggest defence build-ups was taken by Josef
Stalin, a man not captive of anyone's interests, least of all the military
that he ruthlessly purged. On the other hand, when Nikita Khrushchev
began slashing away at the military budget, the generals were dearly
unhappy. There is no evidence that they were able to do much about it.
Khrushchev was deposed because he eventually ran foul of a whole set of
interests, the military, heavy industry and agricultural groups, to name a
few. In fact, if any incident stands out in the political-military history of
the Soviet Union it is the 'Zhukov affair'. Marshai Zhukov's standing as
war hero and military genius was probably unparalleled in Soviet
military history (except, perhaps, for Marshai Mikhail Tukhachevsky
who also met with disaster). Yet this powerful general was thrown out of
 Condoleezza Rice 209

the Party by Khrushchev for merely suggesting further Politburo

representation for the military. The point is that the politicalleadership
has time and time again turned on brilliant and powerful military
officers who became too active politically. This must constitute an
effective deterrent to political activity by the military beyond certain
limits.
The military has seemingly won, particularly since Brezhnev, con-
siderable autonomy in the development and debate of key military-
technical issues. The current debate about the next revolution in military
affairs is a case in point. But when it turns to the issue of how much to
spend to acquire the technologies needed for modernisation, it appears
that the politicians have to decide. This is not to say that the Soviet
military fails to lobby, cajole and undoubtedly threaten that the USA is
about to become superior again. They may even win the argument. But
the overwhelming historical evidence is that they win such arguments by
mobilisingeJite opinion behind further strengthening ofthe military, not
by threat to overthrow the Secretary-General or anything ofthe kind. In
short, if Gorbachev is captive of anything, he is captive of the Soviet
Union's own garrison state mentality that emphasises military power
and gives their version of socialist progress a decidedly martial ring.
Gorbachev has made noises to the effect that the Soviet Union's
leadership should be based on other things: economic prowess most
important among them. But that is really an old message. Without
extraordinary economic reform, probably outside the limits allowed by
institutional and political inertia, the Soviet Union will have a difficult
time competing with the great economic giants, the USA and Japan. At
that point the military instrument will probably 100m large again as the
Soviets' primary claim to status and position in the international system.
That forecast more than anything must warm the hearts ofthe generals.
For, at this moment, they made be a bit neglected in the rhetoric about
revitalisation ofthe Soviet Union. They are probably betting, based on
historical experience and a realistic assessment of the future, that it will
not be long before their star rises again.
11 Foreign Policy
MARGOT LIGHT

11.1 THE INHERIT ANCE

The international situation inherited by Gorbachev was as unpromising

as the domestic scene which faced him when he came to power. Neither
ofhis two immediate predecessors had been able to resolve the stalemate
which had followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Detente seemed
irredeemably damaged and arms control no more attainable than when
the Soviet delegation had walked out of the Geneva negotiations in
December 1983. Although new talks were due to begin on 12 March,
they had been preceded by strident accusations from the US President
and the Secretary of Defense that the Soviet Union had habitually
transgressed previous agreements and alarming indications that Reagan
was committed to negotiating from a position of strength (the very term
had long been anathema to successive Soviet leaders). The Strategie
Defense Initiative (SOl) was very firmlyon the US agenda. Ifthere had
been serious hopes that Western Europe and the USA would become
uncoupled, there was very Iittle evidence to suggest that this had or was
likely to occur. Pressure from the European peace movement on the
governments of Western Europe had abated since the deployment of
Pershing 11 and Cruise missiles (on Soviet defence and security, see
Chapter 10). The intractable problem of sovereignty over the Kurile
Islands continued to bedevil Soviet-Japanese relations.)
Relations between socialist states were Iittle better. The situation in
Poland, which had contributed to the deterioration in East-West
relations, had improved but was by no means quiescent and there
seemed to be a general erosion ofSoviet authority in Eastern Europe (see
Chapter 9V The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan had aggravated the Sino-Soviet dispute. In
1978 Vietnam had signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union,
invading Kampuchea a month later. China retaliated in February 1979
by attacking Vietnam. Chinese troops withdrew after seventeen days
210
 Margot Light 211

and the Vietnamese extended their political control over both Kampu-
chea and Laos. The Soviet leadership objected to the Chinese attack, but
did not come to Vietnam's aid. None the less the Chinese held the USSR
responsible for Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampuchea. There
had been intimations in September 1979 that relations might improve,
and talks at Deputy Foreign Minister level had begun. When Soviet
troops invaded Afghanistan in December, however, the Chinese can-
celled the next round of talks, making the normalisation of Sino-Soviet
relations dependent upon three conditions: Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and a reduction
in the number of Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border. A deteriora-
tion in Sino-US relations had renewed Chinese interest in improving
relations with the Soviet Union. Although Brezhnev had responded
positively, nothing had co me of the re-established talks. The Chinese
conditions remained a seemingly insuperable problem. 3
Soviet standing in the Third World had also been severely affected by
the intervention in Afghanistan. Despite strenuous diplomatic efforts
Third World count ries continued voicing their displeasure and the
subject could not be entirely expunged from the agenda of the Non-
Aligned Movement. But this was far from the only difficulty presented
by Soviet Third World policy. Soviet activism in the Third World had
provoked the decline in detente and there had been few compensatory
rewards. Soviet influence in the Middle East had decreased. Socialist-
oriented Third-World states tended to be particularly poor (the famine
in Ethiopia provided embarrassingly visible evidence), unable to defeat
internat and external foes (both Ethiopia and Angola were still fighting
civil wars with Soviet and Cuban aid) and showed few signs of building
socialism. In short the economic, military and political burdens of client
states outweighed the strategic and prestige advantages of the increased
size of the world socialist system. 4 As far as Afghanistan itself was
concerned, Soviet troops had neither been able to quell the rebels nor to
create popular legitimacy for the Babrak Karmal government. The war
against the Mujahedin continued and the UN-sponsored 'proximity'
talks which had begun in 1982 did not promise an early political
solution. 5
Perhaps Gorbachev's only cause for optimism was the enthusiasm
with which his succession was greeted in the West, particularly in those
countries which he had visited. That this did not indicate a volte-face in
Western policy became obvious, however, when it was announced that
President Reagan would not attend Chernenko's funeral. Soviet foreign
policy clearly required as serious an overhaul as the domestic economy.
212 Foreign Policy

11.2 THE CHANGES

Following Gorbachev's promotion to Secretary-General of the CPSU

three immediate changes became evident in Soviet policy in general.
First, younger, more energetic people were appointed to decision-
making and executive positions. Second, a more dynamic style of
presenting policy was adopted with a new consciousness of the
importance ofpublic relations. Finally, there was a subtle change in the
policy itself. The substance remained the same, but the demands and the
tone in which they were couched became less overtly ideological and, at
the same time, more puritanical: the watchwords in domestic policy were
acceleration, incorruptibility and glasnost (openness). Performance was
to be judged by results, not intentions. But the new leadership
understood that domestic modernisation and improvement required the
diversion of human and material resources from the defence to the
civilian sector of the economy, that the pious exhortations of the
leadership would have to be translated into tangible achievements by
ordinary people and that material rewards would prove more efficacious
than the millennial promises that had been the stock -in-trade of previous
leaderships. All these things depended upon a successful foreign policy.
The general policy changes were reflected in foreign policy as weIl,
although new personnel were not appointed immediately. The change in
presentation of foreign policy was dramatic: a more extroverted and
vigorous style was adopted and the range of publics to whom the
presentation was directed was extended. As far as the policy itself was
concerned, the major difference was in tone. Foreign-policy statements
became less ideological and more businesslike. But, perhaps even more
than in domestic policy, change did not depend upon Gorbachev and his
new team alone. The leaders of other countries would have to co-operate
if the changes were to be effective in improving the international
situation and giving the Soviet leadership the opportunity to concen-
trate on domestic economic revival.
There were no foreign-policy appointments in the first round .of
changes at the April 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee and, since
Gorbachev had little foreign-policy experience, it seemed that
Gromyko's influence would remain pre-eminent. 6 Gorbachev was
expected to add the position ofChairman ofthe Presidium ofthe USSR
Supreme Soviet to that of Secretary-General of the CPSU at the next
USSR Supreme Soviet session. The position had remained vacant since
Chernenko's death. He was al ready behaving as de facto President
(meeting foreign guests, signing agreements, etc.) and it was thought
 Margot Light 213

that he would want to legitimise his role (The Times, 2 July 1985). But in
July Eduard Shevardnadze was promoted from eandidate member to
full membership of the Politburo. On the following day Gromyko
became Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and
Shevardnadze was appointed Foreign Minister. Gorbaehev had chosen·
a little-known Foreign Minister who had even less experienee than he
had. 7 Whether this meant that Gromyko's influenee would eontinue
unabated or whether Gorbaehev intended aetively to eonduet his own
poliey remained unclear. The promotion of Aleksandr Yakovlev
(director of the Institute of World Eeonomy and International Rela-
tions) to head the Central Committee Propaganda department brought
new aeademie and diplomati~ expertise to the Central Committee
apparatus. 8
At the XXVII Party Congress Aleksandr Yakovlev, Vadim
Medvedev (previously head of the Central Committee scienee depart-
ment) and Anatoly Dobrynin (veteran Soviet Ambassador in Washing-
ton) were appointed Central Committee seeretaries, Dobrynin to
replaee Boris Ponomarev as head ofthe International department ofthe
Central Committee and Medvedev as head of the department of Liaison
with Communist Parties of Socialist States, in plaee of Konstantin
Rusakov (Teague, 1986b). That Gromyko's influenee over foreign
poliey was finally in eclipse seemed to be confirmed when Gorbachev
criticised Soviet diplomacy at a meeting of ministers, ambassadors and
offieials a few months later (The Guardian, 24 May 1986).9
Shevardnadze's international public debut ca me at the meeting at the
end of July to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the
Helsinki Declaration on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It gave
hirn a useful opportunity ofmeeting thirty-five ofhis opposite numbers
at once and of demonstrating that the Soviet leadership might usurp the
previously unchallenged US position of master of the media and public
relations. From then onwards the Secretary-General, Foreign Minister
and more junior Soviet spokesmen began to use press conferences,
public announcements and interviews to convey the Soviet point ofview.
Courting the media in this way was unprecedented and it was done with
surprising ease. Gorbachev was not the first Soviet leader to extend offer
after unbeatable offer of arms reductions, but his sense of timing, ability
to wrong-foot Western leaders and populist appeal seemed to threaten
Reagan in the very sphere in wh ich he had always excelled. The new-
found Soviet ability to exploit the media was particularly apparent at the
Geneva summit. But Soviet spokesmen had not yet mastered the art of
hiding their irritation when replying to unexpected and unwelcome
214 Foreign Policy

questions about sensitive topics like human rights (The Guardian, 22

Nov 1985). Moreover the initial silence over the accident at Chernobyl
and the subsequent irate accusations of anti-Soviet slander indicated
that the importance of public relations could be forgotten in times of
crisis. lo
The subtle change in the policy itself had less to do with substance
than with the way it was conveyed. Foreign-policy statements became
firmer, as if to indieate that the Soviet Union was not a country with
which to trifte. I I At the same time, however, the tone became less
ideological, less opposed to compromise and more businesslike. For
example, the insistence that there could be no successful arms talks
without abandonment of the Strategic Oefense Initiative (SOl) contin-
ued, but it became less dear whether laboratory research had to be
abandoned and there were more signs of negotiable areas. Moreover
there were indications that US-Soviet relations could improve without
waiting for successful arms reductions and the repudiation of SOL An
example of unambiguous firmness was provided by the tit-for-tat
response to the expulsion of Soviet officials and journalists from Britain
in September 1985. On the other hand statements on the need to improve
East-West relations constantly appealed to political will and common
sense. 12 Moreover it was said that it was 'inadmissible that ideological
differences between the two systems be extended to the sphere of[state-
to-state] relations [based on peaceful coexistence)' (Soviel News, 30 Oct
1985: p.402). Previous interpretations of peaceful coexistence had
specifically maintained that it was a form of dass struggle and that the
ideologieal struggle was an integral part (see, for example, Arbatov,
1973). The concept of interdependence was emphasised (Primakov,
1986: pp. 4- 5) and the idea of creating a 'universal system of inter-
national security' which would deal not only with military and political
matters, but also with economic security and humanitarian concerns,
was mooted (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986).
The new tone of Soviet foreign poliey was reftected to so me extent in
the revised ~arty Programme adopted by the Party Congress (the draft
was published for discussion at the end ofOctober 1985, see Soviel News,
30 Oet 1985). The Programme sets out the orthodox Soviet view of the
world and the long- and medium-term aims ofSoviet foreign policy. The
basic trends in world development, according to the Programme, are the
strengthening of the authority, inftuence and position of real socialism,
the increased role played by the popular masses and, related to this, the
increasing potential strength of those in favour of peace. On the other
hand, those who oppose positive change are also believed to be
 Margot Light 215

becoming stronger. The overall aim ofSoviet foreign policy is to create

the peaceful conditions required for domestic progress and well-being,
by removing the threat of war and achieving universal security and
disarmament. Co-operation with the socialist countries should be
expanded, relations of equality and friendship with developing countries
should be developed and relations with capitalist countries should be
based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and peaceful, busines-
slike, mutually beneficial co-operation.
The following sections give more detail. Economic integration and
other kinds of co-operation are to be enhanced within the socialist
commonwealth. As far as the Third World is concerned, the CPSU will
render what economic and cultural assistance it can to socialist-oriented
countries, but it will also co-operate with capitalist emergent states.
Relations with capitalist countries require co-operation over a wide
range of matters, but primary importance is given to arms-control
proposals which were set out in detail in the draft version published in
Oetober (Soviet News, 30 Oet 1985). The final version adopted at the
Congress incorporates one change: nuclear weapons will be entirely
abolished by the end of the century (Izvestiya, 7 Mar 1986).
It is too soon, of course, to assess what effect the new Programme will
have on foreign policy. Hut the implications of the Programme and the
Congress for the study of international relations have been set out by
Evgeny Primakov (1986: pp. 4-10), Yakovlev's successor as Director of
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. His
agenda suggests quite fundamental changes in the Soviet world view.
Hitherto scholars have concentrated on the contradictions between the
two social systems. They should now pay attention to their unity and
interdependence. They should also develop the concept of international
economic security, not just between centre and periphery, but also
between West and East. The relationship between the capitalist centre
and periphery iso in itself, a subject that should be investigated, and so is
the process by which socialism is built, with particular reference tothe
effect of the level of economic development from which it is begun. With
respect to the scientific and technical revolution, Primakov maintains
that it entails common processes irrespective of type of social system.
Soviet economists can, therefore, learn from certain aspects of capitalist
experience. Moreover the capitalist world has embarked upon a new
phase ofthe revolution with resulting new contradictions wh ich act as a
source of development. One of the consequences is the phenomenon of
transnational monopoly capital, the relationship of which to national
capital must be studied.
216 Foreign Poliey

The agenda listed by Primakov should engender interesting new

Soviet theory, based on concepts wh ich bear an uncanny resemblance to
older Western theoretical concepts (for example, dependency theory,
interdependence and transnationalism, post-industrial society, etc.).
The implied changes, like the changes in personnei, style and tone, are
striking. Translating them into new policies has, however, proved to be
rather difficult.

11.3 THE POLICIES

Gorbachev's succession was accompanied by rumours of imminent

economic innovation and reform. Although there was no suggestion
that there would be equally dramatic change in foreign policy many
people hoped that he would have the temperament and flexibility to
overcome the intransigence of the Reagan Administration. At first he
seemed to be succeeding. In his first year in power several attempts were
made to return East- West relations to a less ideological and more
pragmatic basis or, in Shevardnadze's words, to 'separate carefully
ideological differences from inter-state relations' (Pravda, 31 July 1985).
The Soviet leaders also intended to diversify their foreign policy and to
persuade the world that it was dangerous to view all conflicts 'through
the spectacles of East- West political or ideological confrontation'
(Pravda, 28 Dec 1985). Their success was limited, both in respect of
improving Soviet-US relations and in their efforts to prevent all other
relations being interpreted as a function of East- West conflicL Abrief
examination of Soviet relations with the industrialised capitalist world
(exc\uding defence and security relations wh ich are discussed separately
in Chapter 10), the non-European socialist world (relations with the
European socialist countries are discussed in Chapter 9) and the Third
World will iIIustrate some of the problems faced by Gorbachev.

11.3.1 Soviet Relations with the Industrialised Capitalist World

11.3.1.1 Soviet-American Relations

Despite the insistence that the Soviet leadership would be less obsessed
with Soviet-US relations and concentrate more attention on improving
its relations with the rest of the world (see, for example, Vitaly Kobysh,
Literaturnaya Gazeta, 10 July 1985) the major thrust of Soviet foreign
 Margot Light 217

policy in Gorbachev's first year as Secretary-General was the attempt to

resuscitate detente and revive the arms-control process. The effort and
press coverage given to the campaign against SOl is evidence ofthe latter
concern. The centrality accorded to reviving detente is indicated by the
relative weight given to various aspects offoreign policy in Gorbachev's
political report to the Party Congress (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986). But interest
in negotiating with the Americans itselfmarked a change. Between 1981
and 1983 any attempt to deal with the US Administration (at least until
Reagan ceased to be President) had been abandoned. The decision to go
back to the negotiating table predated Gorbachev's election as
Secretary-General, but he gave it new impetus (Stee1e, 1986: p. 32).
Moreover he defined detente not as an end product, but a 'transitional
stage from a world c1uttered with arms to a reliable and all-embracing
international security system' (Izvestiya, 9 May 1985). But even if a
universal security system was his long-term vision it was the rather more
mundane attempt to get back to the transitional stage which overshad-
owed all other Soviet foreign policy.
The high point of the attempt was the Geneva 'fireside' summit in
November 1985. Although little tangible was accomplished at the
meeting the promise of further summits and the increased activity at
various levels both before and after the summit (for example, meetings
to exchange opinions about Africa, Afghanistan, South-East Asia and
Central America, commercial contacts, exchanges of delegation, etc.)
seemed to bode weil for Gorbachev's hope that 'points of contact, areas
of common and parallel interest can be found' (Time, 28 Aug 1985).
However, the avowed intention to 'practise restraint' in Soviet pronoun-
cements about the USA (Time, 28 Aug 1985) was sorely tried by the
absence of a reciprocal self-control in US spokesmen like Richard Perle,
Caspar Weinberger and Ronald Reagan hirnself (reported, for example,
in The Guardian, 23 Oct 1985, and The Observer, 3 Oct 1985). Reagan 's
pointed listing of conHicts in which the Soviet Union is involved as areas
of global tension requiring urgent attention (for example, in his speech
to the UN, reported in The Guardian, 25 Oct 1985) caused particular
irritation. By the eve of the Party Congress Soviet commentators were
accusing the USA of 'neoglobalism', or the intention to 'employ the
entire arsenal of available means and their preventive use, in order to
prevent the development of situations wh ich are unfavourable to the
USA . . . or to inspire the development of situations which are
favourable to the USA' (Primakov, press conference, 22 Feb 1986,
reported in SWB, Part I, 23 Feb 1986). None the less Gorbachev
declared that the Soviet Union was 'ready to do everything that it could
218 Foreign Policy

to change the international situation radic;tlly' (Pravda, 26 Feb 1986).

He was not optimistic about a change of heart in Washington, where
so me people were afraid of a 'serious and prolonged thaw in Soviet - US
relations and in the international situation in general', and he realised
that the Soviet leadership might, in the end, have no option but to 'siam
the door'. But he had no intention of 'playing into the hands of those
who wanted to make mankind become accustomed to the nuclear threat
and the arms race' (lzvestiya, 7 Mar 1986).
Gorbachev has not yet 'slammed the door', but he must have been
tempted to do so in answer to the snubs regularly offered by Reagan and
his aides and the inconsistency of American policy caused by a
divergence of views about the best way to treat the Soviet Union. One
school of thought prescribes maximum pressure to force concessions
from the Soviet leadership, another a policy of prudence and the
negotiation of agreements (Holloway, 1986: p.20). The timing of
Reagan's response to Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 arms offer so that a
detailed reply could not be included in the political report to the Party
Congress, the passage of two US navy warships through Soviet
territorial waters in the Black Sea in March, American nuclear tests in
March and April in defiance of an urgent appeal for a comprehensive
test ban and the extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on
testing,13 and the demand, also in March, that the size of the Soviet
delegation to the UN be reduced by 40 per cent must all have seemed
calculated to undermine Gorbachev's ability to carry his own more
hard-line colleagues with hirn in his attempt to revive detente. When
Georgy Arbatov, head of the Institute of the USA and Canada and a
prominent spokesman on Soviet-US relations, maintained that the
Americans were 'rapidly dismantling everything positive that was
agreed in Geneva' (The Guardian, I Apr 1986) he spoke on behalf not
only of the Soviet leadership. There was general bewilderment in Europe
that the cosy, fireside spirit of Geneva had disappeared so rapidly. In an
interview with Revolution Africaine Gorbachev remarked bitterly that
'as soon as we take a step in the direction ofthe US stand, the USA takes
a step back from that stand' (Pravda, 3 Apr 1986).
The Soviet leadership interpreted the bomb strikes on Libya on 15
April as 'within the framework of the American administration's neo-
globalist course, with diehard hawks spreading their wings once again'
(Pravda, 16 Apr 1986), warning that the action could not but affect
Soviet - US relations. The planned meeting between Shultz and Shevard-
nadze to discuss the next summit was postponed in response (SWB, Part
I, 17 Apr 1986). But Gorbachev had still not abandoned hope of
 Margot Light 219

reaching some kind of accord with the Reagan Administration. This was
confirmed in the ritual annual address on the anniversary of Lenin's
birth, given in 1986 by Shevardnadze. Dealing primarily with the new
domestic wa~chword of acceleration he said about Soviet foreign policy:
'we are determined patiently and consistently, purposefully and step by
step to implement a course towards the comprehensive development of
international co-operation and towards mature detente (Pravda, 23 Apr
1986).
The difficulty of disentangling Soviet relations with other countries
from those with the USA became dramatically manifest because of the
bombing of Libya. But the European reaction to SDI had already given
some indication that, whether or not the Soviet leadership look at the
world exclusively from the viewpoint ofSoviet-US relations, it is those
relations (as Shevardnadze admitted in an interview on Polish television)
that 'define to a significant degree, and in some spheres decisively, the
general climate ofinternational relations' (SWB, Part I, 22 Mar 1986).
A month later the announcement was made that the USA intended
breaching the SALT 11 treaty (The Guardian, 28 May 1986). The next
summit was cancelled in response, but whether an'd when it would take
place remained in doubt.

11.3.1.2 Western Europe

Improving relations with Western Europe was identified by the new
leadership as a vital part of Soviet foreign policy. As Aleksandr Bovin
expressed it in an interview on Budapest radio, 'Europe is the cradle of
detente and the rebirth of detente will be simpler to attain in Europe than
anywhere else' (SWB, Part I, 4 Sep 1985). This was not, however, a new
policy. East-West detente had begun, not with the Soviet-US negotia-
tions which resulted in the SALT agreements, but with the de Gaulle's
decision to seek friendlier Franco-Soviet relations in the I960s. The
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe wh ich produced
the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 was initially conceived as a pan-European
conference from which the Americans would be excluded and which
would achieve a colleetive security agreement in Europe. Including the
Americans and Canadians was a concession which had to be made to
enable the conference to take place. Gorbachev, however, seemed to
understand that previous Soviet overtures to Europe had failed precisely
because ofthe fear that what the Soviet Union was attempting to do was
to cause divisions within the NATO alliance. He was careful, therefore,
to insist that the 'idea that the USSR is seeking to drive a "wedge"
220 Foreign Policy

between Western Europe and the USA is groundless and absurd'

(Pravda, 17 Oet 1985). The aim, on the contrary, is to 'utilise Western
Europe's potential to make good ... the obvious shortage of common
sense in the present US administration' (Bovin, lzvesliya, 25 Sep 1985).
Gorbachev's first oftkaI visit as Secretary-General to a capitalist
country was to France in October 1985, perhaps in the hope that history
would repeat itself and that cIoser Franco-Soviet relations would be the
harbinger of a better East - West cIimate in genera1. 14 The results were,
perhaps, rather less positive than he expected. For one thing, at a press
conference at the end of the visit Gorbachev lost his temper and refused
to answer questions on human-rights issues (The Guardian, 50ct 1985);
for another, he misjudged the French attitude to their own nucIear
weapons. His unexpected offer to discuss medium-range missile levels
direct1y with France and Britain met with the unambiguous reply from
Fran90is Mitterrand that the Frenchforce defrappe was 'not negotiable'
(The Times, 5 Oct 1985).1 j While in Paris Gorbachev pursued the theme
of a unity ofEuropean interests, reiterating previously made suggestions
that there should be businesslike relations between the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community.
The Soviet Union, he said in an address to the French National
Assembly, was willing to deal with the EEC as a political entity.
Moreover the establishment of organisational contacts between the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion would do much to create 'a modus vivendi which would blunt the
acuteness of the present confrontation' (Pravda, 4 Oct 1985). A new
Franco-Soviet economic agreement was signed during Gorbachev's visit
to France, but he left without the joint communique condemning SOl
for which he had hoped.
It was not that Mitterrand believed that SOl was feasible or that
Reagan held much support for it in Europe. Gorbachev was correct in
his assessment of the ~est European view of SOl, but he was wrong in
thinking that European scepticism would infiuence Reagan's Messianic
belief in it. Many European politicians were quite open in their
disapproval, but when their attempt to dissuade Reagan failed, the US
Administration's gamble that the 'Europeans can be bought on SOl,
even ifthey can't be sold on it' (lohn Newhouse, quoted in The Observer,
29 Sep 1985) paid off. As Western European countries one by one
overcame their distaste and signed on to participate in the research and
development Soviet disillusion increased. The Europeans may have been
more politically sophisticated than the Reagan Administration (as
Gorbachev cIaimed in France), but they were also canny. Whether or
 Margot Light 221

not SOl proved successful. there were technological and material

benefits to be gained from the research which were far more enticing
than Gorbachev's doom-Iaden warning that East and West, like it or
not, 'can only survive or perish together' (Time, 28 Aug 1985) and that
SOl would make the latter prospect the more likely.
Soviet attempts to forge links with Europe that are not dependent on
relations with the USA have continued, but they have been dominated
by the effort to prevent SOL The depiction of Europe as a single
continent with shared interests (as seen, for example, in the new column
in Sovetskaya Rossiya entitled 'Europe, our common horne') was
unexpectedly and tragically confirmed by the nuclear accident at
Chernobyl on 26 April: the deaths from the accident occurred in the
Soviet Union, but all of Europe (and not only Europe) was affected by
radioactive fallout. Whether the Soviet leadership really understood the
implications of this kind of interdependence, however, was called into
question by the immediate response to the disaster. The insistence that
the accident was announced as soon as there was sufficient information
was received with near universal scepticism. 16 It seemed instead a
reversion to Soviet secrecy and an indication that glasnost was no more
than a slogan. And since there was no official Soviet information the
complaints that the Western media sensationalised the accident and
used it to make anti-Soviet propaganda seemed, at best, tactless.
Gorbachev misperceived the situation. He correctly considered the
Western anti-nuclear movement an ally in his attempt to reduce nuclear
arsenals. But he did not make a connection between a nuclear-weapon-
free Europe, and nuclear-free Europe. Nor did he understand how
quickly a fear ofnuclear weapons could become a horror ofthe potential
consequences of all things nucIear. The accident at Chernobyl brought
that horror to the fore.
The politicat fallout from the accident at Chernobyl would probably
have been more severe ifnot for the fact that the governments ofEurope
do, indeed, share a common interest: nucIear power must be perceived to
be safe, since few ofthem can afford to renounce it. Gorbachev remained
silent for over two weeks after the accident and then appeared on
television. He used the disaster to emphasise shared interests. Inter-
national co-operation had become essential. He suggested international
safety measures and a special mechanism for rendering assistance in the
case of accidents, to be introduced at an international conference under
the aegis ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the role
and power of which should be enhanced. He also used the accident as
proof of the danger of all nucIear explosions, reiterating the need for a
222 Foreign Policy

comprehensive test ban and a reduction in nuclear arsenals (Pravda, 15

May 1986). While he did not re-capture the propaganda high ground
with these proposals he deflected some of the dissatisfaction that West
Europeans had been feeling. But his European policy had suffered.

11.3.1.3 Soviet-Japanese relations

In the attempt to diversify Soviet foreign relations and to replace the
bipolar view of the world with a multipolar policy Europe was one
obvious target. But Japan must also have figured prominently in
Gorbachev's strategy. Not only did it have the technology required by
Söviet industry and a need for raw materials, but improved Soviet-
Japanese relations would symbolise the end of 'American dominion
over the industrialised non-communist world' (Hough, 1985: p. 45).
Better relations, however, required a shift by one or the other country on
the issue ofsovereignty ofthe 'Northern Territories' and there has been
no sign that either side has been prepared to compromise. Soviet
analysts continue to insist that Japan's territorial claims are illegitimate
and unfounded (see, for example, Marshai Vasily Petrov, Krasnaya
Zvezda,1 Sep 1985) and the Japanese are equally positive that furt her
improvement requires a peace treaty and, therefore, settlement of the
territorial issue.
Shevardnadze visited Japan in January 1986 and signed agreements
on trade and economic issues, but 'complex problems and some
disagreements' were reported still to exist (SWB, Part I, 21 Jan 1986). In
February talks about fishing rights foundered (SWB, Part I, 15 Feb
1986). In May the Japanese Foreign Minister paid a reciprocal visit to
Moscow. A cultural agreement was signed, but the territorial question
still prevented the further development of relations (SWB, Part I, 2 June
1986).

11.3.2 Relations with the Non-European Socialist World

11.3.2.1 China
Immediately Gorbachev came to power efforts were made to build on
the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations which had begun in 1983. Li
Peng, the Chinese Deputy Premier who attended Chernenko's funeral,
was granted a formal meeting with Gorbachev. In July 1985 a five-year
trade agreement was signed. Apart from the planne~ expansion of trade
 Margot Light 223

(from a turn-over of $1.2 billion in 1984 to over $3 billion in 1990) talks

on normalising relations continued and other contacts increased (The
Guardian, 12 July 1985). In March 1986 the first meeting of a Soviet-
Chinese Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-opera-
tion took place in Beijing (Pravda, II Apr 1986).
However, notwithstanding repeated Soviet statements that there are
no objective reasons for estrangement and no obstacles to normalisation
(lzvestiya, I Oct 1985) and Gorbachev's announcement at the Party
Congress that there have already been significant improvements
(Pravda, 26 Feb 1986), progress has been slow. In January an exchange
offormal visits by Foreign Ministers was agreed, but China rejected the
non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union (The Guardian, 9 Jan
1986). In April Shevardnadze suggested that a summit meeting would
improve political relations (SWB, Part I, 16 Apr 1986). The Chinese,
however, rejected the idea while obstacles remained to normalisation
(The Guardian, 17 Apr 1986). The obstacles were still the three
conditions imposed by the Chinese (withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan; withdrawal ofVietnamese troops from Kampuchea and a
reduction in the number of Soviet military divisions on the Sino-Soviet
border), none ofwhich has yet been met. The putative offer to complete
the gradual withdrawal of'volunteer' Vietnamese troops from Kampu-
chea by 1990 (Izvestiya. 31 Oct 1985) did not seem to convince the
Chinese leadership, and nor did the assurance that Soviet troops would
be withdrawn from Afghanistan at the same time that external
interference ceased. The Soviet plan for a joint security system for Asia
(including China) has not been received with enthusiasm (Nahaylo,
I 986b). Thus while Sino-Soviet relations have not deteriorated, the
breakthrough for which Gorbachev must have been hoping did not
occur. Moreover while China is willing to improve state-to-state
relations, the ideological concessions necessary for the re-establishment
of fraternal inter-Party relations are unlikely to be made by either side.

JJ.3.2.2 Afghanistan
Whether Afghanistan is considered a full member of the socialist world
is doubtful, since references to socialist orientation have been dropped
and the revolution has been labelIed 'national democratic (see, for
example, Pravda, 3 Jan 1986). But socialist or national democratic,
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has remained a major obstacle to
other foreign-policy initiatives.
In a two-track effort to resolve the problem the military campaign
224 Foreign Policy

against the Mujahedin was stepped up, while Soviet spokesmen insisted
that they wished to achieve a political settlement (Khalilzad, 1986). All
that a political solution needed, according to Shevardnadze, was an end
to interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and a recognition ofthe
right ofthe Afghan people to build the life they desired (SWB, Part I, 24
Sep 1985). But the 'proximity talks' (in which a UN under-secretary
shuttled between Pakistan and Afghanistan, devised to overcome the
refusal of Pakistan to deal directly with an Afghan government)
foundered intermittently.
Within Afghanistan there was gradual but perceptible change. In an
effort to gain popular support for the regime non-Party figures were
included in the government at the beginning of 1986 (Pravda, 3 Jan
1986).17 Gorbachev announced at the Party Congress that the Soviet
leadership had agreed a schedule for the phased withdrawal of Soviet
troops as soon as a political settlement had been reached (Pravda, 26 Feb
1986). Babrak Karmal's resignation as Party leader in May (he was
replaced by General Najibullah, former head of the secret police) was
interpreted as a concession to Pakistan and a sign that a political
settlement was close (The Observer, 11 May 1986). A week later there
seemed to be only two unresolved issues: first, the timetable for
withdrawal of Soviet troops and how it would relate to the end of
external interference and, second, how non-compliance would be
assessed (The Guardian, 12 May 1986). The problem of Afghanistan, so
long an intractable item on the Soviet foreign-policy agenda, suddenly
seemed soluble. Whether its solution will have the desired effect on other
aspects of Soviet foreign policy remains to be seen.

11.3.2.3 The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)

In January 1986 conflict within the Party and state leadership of the
PDRY erupted into violence and civil war (Nahaylo, I 986c). The Soviet
leadership attempted to mediate, but did not intervene, blaming the
conflict primarily on 'traditional heterogeneity and tri baI fragmenta-
tion' and secondarily on subversive action by foreign reactionary and
imperialist forces (Pravda, 24 Jan 1986). Whether or not the imperialists
were to blame, the crisis gave rise to unprecedented co-operation
between Soviet and Western diplomats to co-ordinate the evacuation of
foreign nationals from the area (The Guardian, 30 Jan 1986).
Violence was short-lived, but the events in the PDRY probably served
to confirm the growing conviction within the leadership and the
academic community that a change was required in Soviet policy
towards the Third World. 18
 Margot Light 225

1I.4 Soviet Relations with the Third World

A serious reassessment of the Third World had been taking place for a
number of years in the Soviet Union. It had long been apparent tha~
Soviet activism in the Third World had been injurious to higher-priority
foreign-policy goals, most importantly detente. But there were other
important reasons for change. Soviet Third-World allies were becoming
an increasingly heavy economic burden. Moreover self-proclaimed
Marxist-Leninist Third-World states tended to be profoundly under-
developed with little chance of effecting a transition to socialism without
massive and prolonged external aid (Fukuyama, 1986: pp. 715-22). It
was not only that the Soviet leadership was not prepared to pay the cost,
but also that these states were an unappealing advertisement for
Marxism-Leninism and thus could do the international communist
movement more harm than goOd. 19
The result of the reassessment appears to have been a decision that
Soviet policy in the Third World should be redirected towards
industrialising capitalist states (Hough, 1985: pp. 46- 7). The new Party
Programme reflected the decision by according almost equal weight to
co-operation (politieal and eeonomie) with socialist-orieilted countries
and to co-operation (politieal and eeonomie) with capitalist emergent
states (Moscow News, 30 Oet 1985: pp. 401- 2). But Gorbaehev's
politieal report to the Party Congress was even more striking. He neither
discussed the Third World in any detail, nor made reference to particular
Third World allies by name. All he offered was the 'unehanged solidarity
of the CPSU with the forces of national and soeialliberation' (Pravda,
26 Feb 1986). This did not, however mean that present eommitments
would not be honoured.
The new poliey is best demonstrated by the new diplomatie relations
established by the Soviet Union, while the honouring of current
eommitments is evident in the support given to Libya. In the Middle
East Soviet efforts to be included in the peaee-making process made no
headway. The diffieulty of finding solutions to the eonfliet in this area
probably become more apparent to the Soviet leadership when four
Soviet offieials were kidnapped in the Lebanon in October 1985 (one of
whom was murdered). But diplomatie relations were established with
Oman (September 1985) and the United Arab Emirates (November
1985). Rumours that relations were to be re-established wÜh Israel were
scotehed, however, when Gorbaehev said in France that the normalisa-
tion ofthe situation in theNear East was the prerequisite (SWB, Part I, 5
Oet 1985). In Afriea Liberia broke off diplomatie relations, while the
Ivory Coast re-established them after an eighteen-year break.
226 Foreign Policy

Evidence that the Soviet Union will continue to honour foreign-policy

commitments was suggested by the reaction to the US bombing ofLibya
in April 1986. The postponement of the projected meeting between
Shultz and Shevardnadze was a stronger response than had been made
when the USA mined Haiphong harbour on the eve of the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in 1972 (see Steele, 1985: pp. 149-51, for the 1972
reaction). It is less certain, however, that the response indicated
unquestioning support for Gadafy. One US analyst described the
triangular relationship even before the events in the spring of 1986: 'The
Reagan Administration's confrontation with Qadhdafi proved to be as
much a curse as a blessing for the Soviets, for it contributed to cementing
a relationship in which they were reluctant partners' (Anderson, 1985:
p.44).
Gadafy had always been far too independent and unreliable to be a
comfortable friend for the Soviet leadership. He visited Moscow after
Gorbachev's accession to power, and is said to have snubbed the
Kremlin by failing to turn up for a reception in his honour (The
Guardian, 14 Oct 1985). None the less, he signed a long-term co-
operation agreement and was given considerable verbal support when
Libyan-US relations began to deteriorate in March 1986 (Nahaylo,
1986d). Verbal support rose to a crescendo after the US's bombing of
Tripoli and Benghazi in April. The raid was called 'state terrorism' and
said to provide concrete proof of the US's neo-globalist strategy
(Pravda, 16 Apr 1986). At the end ofMay, during a visit by a member of
the Libyan government, Abd al-Salam lallud, Gorbachev promised
further assistance in strengthening Libya's defence capacity, but ca lied
for a 'sense ofprinciple and consistency in condemning ... terrorism'
(SWB, Part I, 29 May 1986). He seemed to be signalling that the Soviet
Union would not renege on its support for Libya, but that there should
be some restraint from Libya in return.
It is too soon to assess the success of Gorbachev's Third-World policy,
but it has already become apparent that there are serious opportunity
costs in continuing to support old friends. It has also become c1ear that
changing theory is rather easier than changing policy, both in respect of
the Third World and of Soviet foreign policy in general. The decision
may have been made not to view all confticts througb the prism ofEast-
West relations, but they tend to impinge on East - West relations all the
same. The difficulties of achieving arms control and of maintaining a
constructive dialogue with the US Administration has continued to
dominate Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, by the middle of 1986
Soviet-US relations were almost as frosty as they had been when
 Margot Light 227

Gorbachev became Secretary-General. Gorbachev may consider it

sensible to diversify Soviet foreign policy, but implementing this new
source is proving far more complex than he perhaps expected.

11.5 The Outlook

Speculating about the future is always hazardous, but nev~r more so
than when the success of a policy depends upon the reactions of other
countries. Khrushchev included optimistic and detailed figures of when
and how communism would be reached in the 1961 version of tbe Party
Programme. His predictions remained unfulfilled and tbe date and
figures became an embarrassment to subsequent Soviet leaders. Tbe new
version of the Programme is more careful, stressing tbat tbe transition to
communism will be gradual. It does, bowever, include one date. Tbe
words 'by the end of tbe XX century were added to tbe section on tbe
abolition of nuclear weapons in tbe final version of tbe Programme
(Izvestiya, 7 Mar 1986). The response from tbe West to tbis and other
arms proposals makes it likely tbat this one date will, like Kbrusbcbev's
dates, be seen to bave been a Utopian pipe dream. Perbaps tbe best that
can be hoped for is tbat the assumption stated in tbe Programme that tbe
'bistorical contention between tbe two opposite social systems ... can
and must be settled by peaceful means' (Moscow News, 30 Oct 1985:
p. 402) proves to be correct, so tb at by tbe year 2000 there will still be
people to consider whether Gorbachev was foolishly optimistic in 1986.

NOTES

I. Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands had been ceded to Russia but were seized
back by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5. Stalin was
promised Sakhalin at the Yalta Conference and in August 1945, the Red Army
occupied both Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The Japanese claim that the islands,
particularly the southern ones, belong to Japan and the issue has prevented the
signing of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty since the end of the Second World
War.
2. See Halliday (1983), Gelman (1985) and Steele (1985) for the deterioration
of detente and Gati (1985) for Soviet relations with its East European alIies.
3. For an account of this phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute see China and lhe
Soviel Union (1985: pp. 162-88).
4. A discussion ofthe relative balance ofadvantage and burden presented by
Soviet Third World clients can be found in Fukuyama (1986: pp. 717-22).
5. See Khalilzad (1986) for the stalemate in Afghanistan and Shulman (1985:
pp. 376-9) for a succinct summary of Soviet foreign-policy problems. .
228 Foreign Policy

6. Gorbachev had bcen a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Permanent

Commission on Foreign Policy. It was in this capacity that he had travelled to
Canada in 1983 and Britain in 1984 (Medvedev, 1986: pp. 124-5, 158-61).
Although this body is not thought to play an active role in foreign-policy
decision-making, as a member of the Politburo since 1978 Gorbachev certainly
participated in considering foreign-policy options. Gromyko, however, had far
more experience in the details of implementing foreign policy and knew all the
other major foreign-policy actors in the worId.
7. An indication of how littIe Shevardnadze was known was the difficulty
with which Western broadcasters pronounced his name. Within the USSR he
had the reputation both of being the police chief who had c1eaned up Georgia
and the man who had introduced interesting changes into the Georgian
economy (Medvedev, 1986: pp. 177-80). He was not, ofcourse, the only new
appointee with Iittle experience of policy-making at the national level. The
problem with Brezhnev's 'gerontocracy' was not only that the country was ruled
by people too old to learn new tricks, but also that the generation wh ich would
inevitably inherit power was deprived of the opportunity to gain experience.
8. Previously Deputy Head ofthe Agitprop department, Yakovlev had been
demo ted to Soviet Ambassador in Canada in 1970 and he accompanied
Gorbachevon his Canadian visit in 1983 (Medvedev, 1986: pp. 214-15). For an
assessment of the significance of the appointment of Shevardnadze and
Yakovlev see Hough (1985: pp. 50-3). Other personnel changes at this time
included the appointment of Boris Aristov, previously Soviet Ambassador in
Poland, as Minister for Foreign Trade (he replaced Nikolai Patolichev, who had
held the post since 1958), and of Konstantin Katushev (Soviet Ambassador in
Cuba) as Chairman of the State Committee on External Economic Affairs
(which deals with trade within the socialist bloc). For these appointments and
the extensive changes at ambassodorial level see Teague (1986b).
9. The conference took place on 23 - 24 May and dealt with the 'tasks of the
central apparatus and the establishments of the USSR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs abroad in implementing the resolutions ofthe XXVII CPSU Congress in
the sphere of foreign policy'. Apart from senior officials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (and the State Committees which deal with external relations)
and ambassadors, the three Central Committee secretaries who deal with foreign
policy, Dobrynin, Medvedev and Yakovlev, are reported to have attended
(SWB, Part I, 27 May 1986). Shortly before the conference two new First Deputy
Ministers (Yuly Vorontsov and Anatoly Kovalev) and two new Deputy
Ministers ofForeign Affairs (Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Boris Chaplin) were
appointed (lzvestiya, 21 May 1986) and a week later there were two further
appointments to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anatoly Adamiskin and
Vladimir Petrovsky (Izvestiya, 30 May 1986).
10. Accusations of anti-Soviet slander have become standard in the Soviet
reporting of Western reactions to Chernobyl. But there are two aspects of the
Soviet response wh ich are even more striking. The first is that an unprecedented
amount of coverage is being given to the disaster and its aftermath in the Soviet
media (see, for only one ofmany examples, Literaturnaya Gazeta, 21 May 1986).
The second is the way in wh ich the accident is being turned to propaganda
advantage and used as evidence of the need for arms control (see, for example,
Georgy Arbatov, Pravda, 9 May 1986).
 Margot Light 229

11. In a press conference in France, for example. Gorbachev said that the
'Soviet Union cannot be spoken to in the way that so me pcople allow themsclves
to speak to dozens of states and governments with no respect for them at all. The
Soviet Union will put anyone in his place ifnecessary' (SWB, Part I, 70ct 1985).
12. See, for example, the leading artic\e in Pravda, 26 May 1985, and
Gromyko's speech in Vienna, 15 May 1985 (SWB, ParlI, 17 May 1985). Steele
(1986) believes that these changes pre-date Gorbachev's appointmenl. What
Gorbachev has done is to bring out into the open adjustments whieh were begun
under Andropov and Chernenko.
13. The unilateral moratorium was ealled otT after the seeond US test,
although testing was not immediately resumed. In the aftermath of the
Chernobyl aeeident Gorbaehev reinstated the moratorium until 6 August
(Pravda, 15 May 1986).
14. This was interpreted by some observers to be a signal that the USA no
longer had priority status in East- West relations. See, for example, Steele (1986:
p. 33). For a diseussion ofthe role ofEurope in Gorbaehev's strategy see Hough
(1985), Asmus (I985b).
15. The British refusal of the otTer was less immediate but equally unam-
biguous. When a group of British parliamentarians visited the Soviet Union in
May 1986 Gorbaehev made another otTer, presumably without any expeetation
that it would be aeeepted: 'If Britain officially decided to serap its nuc\ear
weapons, the Soviet Union would be prepared to make an equivalent reduetion
in its nuc\ear potential. If it simultaneously removed foreign nuclear weapons
from its territory, the Soviet Union woule! guarantee that its nuclear weapons
would not be aimed at British territory and would never be used against Britain'·
(SWB, Part I, 28 May 1986.)
16. In his television address Gorbachev said that 'as soon as we reeeived
reliable initial information, it was made available to Soviet people and was sent
through diplomatie ehannels to the governments of foreign countries' (Pravda,
15 May 1986). This begs the question of why it took so long to get reliable
information. It is also not the ease that the information was made available to
Soviet people immediately. The first news of the disaster was a four-line
announcement in the press on 28 April, followed by equally brief daily reports
until 6 May, when a press eonference was held, after whieh special correspon-
dents published reports from the disaster area.
17. Although this move was greeted with eonsiderable sceptieism (see, for
example, Khalilzad, 1986: p. 9) Jonathan Steelc interpreted it as a sign that the
Kabul government was 'more willing to take independent advice' (The
Guardian, 18 Mar 1986).
18. The PDRY was not the first or the only Third World conflict to confirm
the need for change. The seeming impossibility of mediating the 'senseless, cruel
and endless' Iran-Iraq war and the difficulties ofsupporting Iraq while trying to
improve relations with Iran must also have eontributed (Nahaylo, 1986a).
19. The extreme poverty of soeialist oriented Third World states was nowhere
more dramatically highlighted than in Ethiopia, where the eontinuing famine
and starvation embarrassed the Soviet government and showed up their
inability to otTer sufficient aid or a programme to overcome the disaster.
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Index
ABM Treaty, 201-2 Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr, 228n
Acceleration,41-4 Bezuglov, A. A., 47
Adamiskin, A., 228 Bilak, Vasil, 180
Afghanistan, 7, 194,210-11,217,223-4, Biryukova, Aleksandra, 19,"29
227n Black Sea, 218
Africa, 217 Bogomolov,Oleg, 183-5
Aganbegyan, Abel, 90,107,109-10, 169n Bovin, Aleksandr, 219
Agriculture, 1,5,27, 103, 116, 118-34, 138 Branch, M. A., ix
and family unit, 133-4 'Brezhnev Doctrine', 179-80
andfarmautonomy, 133-4 Brezhnev, Leonid, 2-3, 7, 9,11,15-16,
and lpatovsky method, 130 19,27,30,35-6,39-40,45,48-9,
and Prodnalog, 113, 125- 7 52-3,59-62,98,108,121,147,186,
and RAPO, 127-8, 132 211,228n
brigade (podryadnaya brigada), 129, and agriculture, 13, 147
132-3 and Andropov, 14
drainage, 5,124-5 and Chernenko, 14
FoodProgramme, 121, 131 and Gorbachev, 9, 14
grain,4,121-2 andmilitary, 193-4
irrigation, 5, 123 - 5 Brison, Alastair, ix
link (zveno), 129 British Embassy, 8
livestock, 132 Bromlei, Yulian, 83, 94
meat,4,122 Brown,J. F., 171
Non-Black-Earth Zone, 124- 5 Bucarest, 180
privatesector, 5,119-21 Budapest, 180
sugar beat, 122, 132 Bulgaria, 174-5, 179, 186-7
Akhromeev, Marshai Sergei, 6, 207 Bureau for Fuel-Energy Complex, 110
Alcoholism, 2 Bureau for Machine Building, 110
Aliev, Geidar, 28, 93 Bureaucracy,3
Almasi, A., 176 Bureaucratism, I, 31
Andropov, Yury, 2-3, 9,11,14-17,26-7, Burger, Vera, ix
30,35,42,52,62- 3,96, 107 -8, 119, Butler, W. E., 4
162, 229n
Angola, 211 Canada, 19, 228n
Anti-alcohol campaign, 2, 14,70 Ceausescu, N., 175, 177, 185
Arbatov, Georgy, 218 Cent~al America, 193, 217
Aristov, Boris, 228n Chaplin, Boris, 228n
Arms control, 6- 7 Chebrikov, General Viktor, 2,14,16,28
Chemicals, 103, 106
Baibakov, Nikolai, 18, 106-8 Chernenko, Konstantin, 3, 9, 11, 13 -16,
Barabashev, G., 44, 47 26,30,35,38,45,49, 107, 119, 165,
Bauer, Tamas, 117 179,182,211-12
Belgorod,133 Chernobyl nuclear accident, 2, 7 - 8,214,
Belgrade, 180 221,228n-9n
Belov, Vasily, 90, 95 China, 98, 210
Benghazi,226 Chkhikvadze, V. M., 48
Berecz, Jänos, 176 Christey, Hugh, ix
Berlin wall, 176 CIA, 98

242
 Index 243

CMEA (Comecon), 5,135,137,142- 50, Detente, 7,172,193,210,217-19,225

177,183,187-8,220 Dietz, R., 144-5
Cocks, Paul, 52 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 19,29.213, 228n
Communist Party of Belorussia, 18,29, Dolgikh. Vladimir, 19,29
93 DubCek, A., 187, 189
Communist Party ofCzechoslovakia, II
Communist Party of Georgia, 17 East Berlin, 175-6, 184
Communist Party ofthe Soviel Union Eastern Europe, 55,142-50,171-91
(CPSU) Economy, 3-8
Cadres, 26- 7 Education, 32, 46
Central Committee, 15,21-8 Efremov, Leonid, 12
CC Secretaries, 17 Egypt, 193
Komsomol, 10-11 Eltsin, Boris, 3,17-18,26,29-30,33,51,
Kuban group, 27 53
New Party Rules (1986), 36, 38-9 Energy,5
New Programme (1986),4, 38, 56, 63 -4, Engels, Friedrich, 39, 55
85,88,214,225 Enterprise autonomy, 3
Party Rules, 14-15 Epishev, General A. A., 206
Politburo, 3, 79 Estonia, 50, 90
Secretariat, 2-3, 9,12,15,27,79-80: Ethiopia, 211
Agricultural Oepartment, 12 -13,
16; Oepartment ofOrganisational Finland, 140, 152
Party work, 2, 16,26; Heavy Five-Year-Plan
Industry, 19; International Ilth(1981-85), 100, 103, 148, 157-8,
Department, 19,213; liaison with CPs 167
ofSocialist States, 19. 179.213; 12th (1986-90),100-7,147-8,157-8,
propaganda. 19.87.213 167
Siberian group. 27 Flow, B. V., 188
XX Congress (1956), 74,190 Food processing, 103
XXII Congress (1961), 75, 77 F oreign and Commonwealth Office, 14
XXIIICongress(1966),76 Foreign policy, 34-5
XXIVCongress(l971), 13,57,76-7, and SOl, 210, 214, 217, 219-21
205 relations with Afghanistan. 210-11.
XXV Congress (1976), 203 217. 223-4. 229n
XXVI Congress (1981),38,80,83,85 relations with China, 210, 222 - 3
XXVII Congress(1986), I, 14, 18-36, relations with France. 34. 219- 20. 225.
38,41,63-4,88,118,185,189,203, 229n
213 relations with Great Britain. 220, 229n
Uralsgroup,27 relations with Japan. 34. 210. 222
Communist Party ofTurkmenistan, 94 relations with PDRY, 224. 229n
Communist Party ofUzbekistan, 21, 27, relations with Third World. 34, 211,
30,51,90,94 224-7. 229n
Consumer goods, 31, 46, 106, 138 relations with USA. 34. 210, 216-19.
Corruption, 2, 31, 92 221
Cruise missiles, 202, 210 relations with Western Europe. 34. 215,
Cuba, 193,211 219-22
Cult of the personality, 35 Foreign trade. 5,135-55
Czechoslovakia, 56, 113, 173-4, 178, 180, and Eastern Europe, 5,135.142-50
187 and West. 135. 141
hard currency indebtedness, 5, 154
Dashmirov, Afrand, 85 importanceofenergy.138-46
Oe Gaulle, General Charles, 219 strategy, 146-9
Demichev, Pyotr, 29 France.156,229n
Oemocratisation, 3, 45,56,70-1 Fuel. 5,26. 105-6
Oe-Stalinisation, 54 Furtseva. Ekaterina. 19
244 Index

Gadafy, Colonel, 226 becomes Secretary General, 1,9,14-15,

Gareev, General, M. A., 198 59
Geneva summit (1985), 7,18,217 daughter born, I1
Gerasimov, V., 180-1 enrols in agricultural institute, 12
German Democratic Republic, 174-6, graduates, II
178-9,182,187-9 leadership style, 35
Glasnost, 2-4, 8, 53, 89, 212, 221 legacy, 135
Glazunov, Ilya, 87 marries, I1
Gomulka, W., 189 power and authority, 2, 15- 36
Gorbachev, Mikhail style, 1,7
and administration, 44, 49 Gorbacheva, Irina, II
and Andropov, 2, 9,13-14,26 Gorbacheva, Raisa, II
and Brezhnev, 9,13 Gordon, L. A., 160
and Chernenko, 9, 26 Gorky,46
and Chernobyl, 2, 7 - 8,214, 221 Gorshkov, Marshai, V.I., 207-8
and cult ofpersonality, 35 Gosplan, 18,51,106-8,110,123,136
and Eastern Europe, 177-91 Grain,4,121-2
and economy, 4- 5,30,33,97 -116 Grechko, Marshai Andrei, 205
and Food Programme, 147 Grekov, Leonid, 186
and foreign affairs, 7, 17, 30, 34, 210 - 27 Grishin, Viktor, 9,14-15,18,21,30,51,
and foreign trade, 5,146-55 184
andGDR, 174-6, 178-9, 182, 187-9 Gromyko, Andrei, 3-4, 7, 9,14 -15, 28,
and Hungary, 174, 176, 178-9, 181- 3, 46-7,51,213,228n
185 becomes president, 7, 17,213
and Komsomol, 10-11
and Kulakov, 11, 13 Hahn, Werner G., 134
and labour, 6 Hanson, Philip, 4
andlaw,4 Hasenstrauch, Mara, ix
and military, 6-7 Helsinki Declaration, 213
and Mlynäf, 11 Hewett, E., 106
and moral revolution, 3 Hill, Ronald J., 3
and nationality affairs, 4,86-96 Honecker, Erich, 174,176-7, 188,190
and personnel changes, 16 - 30, 36 Housing, 31,46
and political stability, 31, 33 Hungary, 55-6,112,174,176,178-9,
and private agriculture, 5, 119-21 181-3,185
and reform, 33 NEM,175-6,181-3,185
and socialjustice, 32-3,69-71 Husak,G.,I77,185-6,189-90
and state, 4, 38
and Suslov, 13 Ideology, 34- 5,38 - 58
and two nations, 31 - 2 India, 141
appointed candidate member of Individualism, 3, 33
Politburo, 13 . Inertia, 2, 6, 52
appointed CC secretary for agriculture, Innovation, 3, 31,46
13 International Atomic Energy Agency, 211
appointed Chairman ofDefence Intra-German trade, 176, 189
Council,15 Ipatovsky method, 130
appointed Commander-in-Chief of Italy, 156
Soviet Armed Forces, 15 Ivory Coast, 225
appointed member ofCC, 13
appointed member ofPolitburo, 13 Japan, 98, 202,209, 227n
as CC Secretary for agriculture, 5 Jaruzelski, W., 189
as 'second secretary', 14 Jews,lO
at Moscow University, 10
awarded Order of Red Banner of Kadar,J., 177-8, 180, 182, 184-5
Labour,IO Kadarism, 172
 Index 245

Kampuchea, 210 -11, 223 133.183

Kapitonov, Ivan, 26 Light. Margot. ix. 7
Karmal, Babrak, 204, 211, 224 Likhachev. Dmitry. 90. 93
Katushev, Konstantin, 228n Li Peng.222
KGB,2, 12, 14, 16 Lomako, Pyotr. 26
Khozraschet, 69, 133, 168
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 7,11-12,16,30, McCauley, Martin, 2
33,38,40,51,54,59-60,63,74,98, Machine Tractor Station, 10
116,130,172,186, 190, 193-4,227 Maksimov, General Yu. P., 204, 207
Kiev,8,87 Marrese, M .• 145
Kirgizia,9O Marx. Karl, 39, 55
Kirilenko, Andrei, 27 Marxism-Leninism, 34-5, 39, 42, 44,180
Kleva, A., 114 Meat,4,122
Kobysh, Vitaly, 216 Medunov, S. F., 50
Kolkhozes, 12,21,127,129-30,132-3 Medvedev, Vadim, 19,29,213
Komoscin, Zoltan, 174 Medvedev, Zhores, 12, 14, 228n
Komsomol. see CPSU Military,2,192-209
Kontorovich. Vladimir. 108 and ABM treaty, 201-2
Kosolapov, R. 1.. 81 and Afghanistan, 194,203-5
Kostin, L., 164 and Brezhnev, 7,193-4,203,208-9
Kosygin, A. 1.,76, 114 and conventional war, 199,201
Kotai, Geza, 182 and discipline, 205
Kovalev, Anatoly, 228n and ethnic problems, 205
Krasnogvardeisky raion, 9 and General Staff, 197 - 8, 200-1, 204,
Krenz, Egon, 189 207
Krivoi Rog, 149 and Gorbachev, 6
Kulakov, Fyodor, 11-12, 118, 121-2 and Khrushchev, 193-4, 197,208-9
Kulichenko, Mikhaill., 81-2 and military-technical progress, 197,
Kulikov, MarshaI Viktor, 199 209
Kulikovo, Pole, 80 and modernisation, 194-206,209
Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 14-15,21,27-8, andnudearwar, 197-8,200
36 and parity with USA, 197
Kurashvili, B. P., 112 and SOl, 200-2
Kurile Islands. 210, 227n and Third World, 194,203
Kusin, V. V., 191 and TVDs, 198,207
Kutyrev, B. P., 162 Blackjack, 195
Kuznetsov, Vasily, 19 ICBMs, 193
Kvasha,A., 125 MIG-29,195
SALT 11,195,202-3
Labour, 4, 6, 156-69 SS 13,195
Labour productivity, 4, 6, 156- 59 SS 18,203
Lane, David, 6 SS24,195
Laos, 21 I SS 25,195
Latsis, Otto, 111 SU-27,195
Lavigne, M., 146 T-72tank,195
Layofthe Host oflgor. The,87 T-80tank,195
Läzär, György, 185 Typhoon dass submarines, 195
Lebanon, 225 Mitterrand, Fran~ois, 55, 220
'Legalcuhure', 3-4,47 Mlynäi', Zdenek, 11
Lemeshev, Mikhail, 90,123 Moscow,3,8
Lenin, Vladimir 1., 4,10-11,34,39,55,59, gorkom, 3, 9,14,18,21,30,33,50
96,126,219 University, 10-11,59
Liberia, 225 Mujahedin, 211, 224
Libya, 203, 215. 218-19, 225-6 Murakhovsky, Vsevolod, 5,11,27,51,
Ligachev, Egor. 3,16,26-9,33-4.36,53, 113,128,131
246 Index

Nahaylo, Bohdan, 4 Petrovsky, Vladimir, 228n

Najibullah, General, 224 Piskotin, M., 45, 50
National income, 3, 31 Podmena, 4, 57
Nationalities,4 Poland, 56, 154, 174- 5, 189, 210
and Andropov, 81-2, 93 Political stability, 2
and Brezhnev, 76-7, 79-83 Ponomarev, Boris, 19,213
and Chemenko, 83-7 Power and authority, 2,15-36
and economy, 88-9, 94 Prague, 175, 179, 187
and Gorbachev, 4, 86-96 Precious metals, 5
and Khrushchev, 74 Primakov, Evgeny, 216-16
and Lenin, 78, 82 Prime Minister, 3
and Ligachev, 87, 91-2 Privolnoe, 9-10
and Russian language, 78, 88-9 Prodnalog, 113, 125 - 7
and Russification, 74, 78
Annenians, 78 Rakhmanin, Oleg B., 179, 183
Azeris,78 Rashidov, Sharaf, 21, 90
Belorussians. 80 Rasputin. Valentin, 90
drawing together (sblizhenie), 75 - 6 Raw materials, 5
Estonians, 78 Razumovsky, Georgy, 19,26- 7,29
fusion (sliyanie), 75-6, 81-3, 88 Reagan, Ronald, 55,194,200-2,210-11,
Georgians, 78 213,216-20
Gennans,82 Rice, Condoleezza, 6
Koreans,82 Robinson, Philip, ix
Kurds,82 Romania, 173, 175, 179
Muslims, 4,79 Romanov,Grigory,9, 14-15, 17, 181, 184
Poles, 82 RSFSR Council ofMinisters, 21
racial disturbances, 95 Rusakov, Konstantin, 184,213
Russians, 73-4, 79-80 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, 3,16,18,28,36,51,
Ukrainians, 76- 7.80 103,105-7,146-7,183
Yakuts,95
Nazimova, A. K., 160 Sadikov, A., 114
Nemeth, Karoly, 183 St Petersburg University, 59
Nepotism, I, 90 Sakhalin, 227n
Nicaragua, 193 SALTII,195,202-3
Nikonov, Viktor, 16,29,181 Scientific-technical progress, 5, 27, 31,146
Nomenklatura, 21, 54 Scientific-technical revolution, 1-2,27,31
Novopashin, Yury, 184 Sepa, V., 176
Novotny, A., 189 Shabanov, V. M., 207
Shafir, Michael, 6
OECD, 151, 153 Shcherbitsky, Vladimir, 14-15,27 -8,36
Ogarkov, Marshai Nikolai, 197 - 8,206 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 17,28, 51,93,213,
0i1,4, 135, 138-41, 148, 152 216,219,222-4,226
Oliynyk, Boris, 95 Shishlin, Nikolai, 184
Oman,225 Shme1ev, G.I., 120
Sholokhov, Mikhail, 87
Pakistan, 204, 224 Shultz, George, 180,202,226
Parasitism, 31 'Sibara\', 84, 89, 93,123
Partiinost, 52 Siberia, 4, 30
Party-state relations, 4, 56- 8 Silaev, Ivan, 110
Patolichev, Nikolai, 107, 228n Sindennann, Horst, 188
Peaceful coexistence, 172, 215 Sino-Soviet relations, 210 -li
Perle, Richard,217 Slyunkov, Nikolai. 18,29,93
Pershing 11, 202, 210 Smith, Alan, 5
Petrosyan, Vardges, 95 Socialjustice, 2, 69-71
Petrov. Marshai V.I.. 207, 222 Socialism, 34
 Index 247

Socialism -cont inued Tyushkevich, General S. M., 193

basic,40
developed, 40- 3 Uni ted Arab Emirates, 225
mature, 40-1, 43 United Kingdom, 156, 228n-9n
real,214 United States, 146, 156
Socio-economic progress, 2, 27 Urals, 152
Sokolov, Marshai Sergei, 3, 6,16,29,190, Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline, 147
196,199,201,205,207 Usmankhodzhaev, Imazhon, 90, 92-3
Solomentsev, Mikhail, 28, 187 USSR
Solovev, Yury, 18,29 Constitution, 38, 40, 56, 62
Sonin, M., 164 Council ofMinisters, 21, 28, 30, 34, 64,
Southeast Asia, 217 68,84,163
Soviets, 39,44-8 Gosagroprom, 5,27,51, 110, 113, 127-
Sovkhozes, 12, 129-30, 133 8,131
Sovnarkom, 39 Law on labour collectives, 62
Stability of cadres, 2 USA-USSR relations, 19,209-10,214-
Stalin, J. V., 9,11,34,40,74,165, 227n 19,227
Stalinism, 59 Ustinov, Marshai Dmitry, 207
State, 34-5, 38-58
State arbitrazh, 60 Vaino, Karl, 90
Stavropol Van Brabant, J. M., 146
city Komsomol committee, 11 Vanous, J., 137, 145
city Party committee, 11, 13 Velsh, A.G., 52
krai,4,9, 26,28, 119, 130 Vid, Leonid, 152
kraikom, 11-13,27 Vietnam, 193,210-11,223
Steele, Jonathan, 229n Vladimirov,Oleg, 179, 183-4
Stepanyan, Tsolar, 89 Volsky, Arkady, 107
Strashun, B., 56 Vorontsov, Yuly, 228n
Strategie Defense Initiative (SOl), 188, Vorotnikov, Vitaly, 14,28
210,214,217,220-1 Vorozheykin, 1.,180-1
Strougal, Lubomir, 175, 187 Wädekin, Karl-Eugen, 5
Sumi,114 WarsawPact, 178, 190, 199,220
Suslov, Mikhail, 13 Washington, 218
Svod zakonov (digest oflaws), 62 Watergate, 193
Szürös, Matyas, 174-5, 181, 183-4 Wehrmacht, 10
Weinberger, Ca spar, 217
Tadevosyan, Edvard, 89
West Germany. 156
Tadzhikistan,90 Western Europe, 175
Talyzin, Nikolai, 18,29,106-8 Writers' Union ofthe USSR, VII
Tashkent,90,92,94 Congress,95
Tavadov, G. T., 85-6
Territorial Production Associations Yakovlev, Aleksandr, 19,29,87,213,215,
(TPAs),12 228n
Thatcher, Margaret, 55 Yakutsk,95
Theatre ofMilitary Operation (TVD), 198, Yalta Conference, 227n
207 Yasyukov, Major-General M., 197
Third World, 194 Yugoslavia,139
Tikhonov, Nikolai, 18, 51,107,147,157
Titorenko, Raisa, 11 Zaikov, Lev, 17, 19,28-9
Tolubko, Marshai V. F .. 206 Zalygin, Sergei, 90
Transport, 6 Zaslavskaya, Tatyana, 111, 113, 116, 164
Treml, Vladimir, 109, 138 Zhivkov, Todor, 174-5, 177, 186, 189
Tripoli, 226 Zhukov, Marshai G., 208
Tselinograd, 123 Zimanas, Genrikhas, 85
Tukhachevsky, Marshai Mikhail, 208 Zimyanin, Mikhail, 19,29