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Chemical Based UAV Interdictory System
Concept Outline

2018.
About the Author
Tamas Petkovich is a researcher and doctorate student at the National University of Public
Service, Budapest. He holds both an MBA, MSEM and a master of engineering in the field
of defense. Previously he has served as a reserve officer in the Hungarian Defence Forces.
He is currently working as researcher and lecturer focusing on matters of defense economics.
His main research topics are defense industrial development, defense R&D and innovation in
the defense sphere.
Introduction
This concept outline was prepared for the NATO
Innovation Challenge 2018/2, which called for solution
proposals on anti-swarm technologies and techniques.
The imagined scenario (Appendix I.) was based on
current experiences in asymmetric operational
environments, where insurgent forces are using modified
COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle) systems with IED (improvised explosive device)
payloads to disrupt stabilization efforts of NATO troops.
While this scenario poses a contemporary threat, it is a
well explored phenomenon from a technological
perspective.I Based on a recent report, 235 different
counter UAV solutionsII were already in production or in
a prototype phase. Most of these systems were
specialized in detecting and/or interdicting COTS
drone1 systems, like the ones used in the aforementioned
asymmetric scenario.
However there was a distinctive feature in the challenge
plot, – which can be considered a less explored case –
that the attacking insurgent forces used UAV swarming
techniques against the allied forces. While this might be
an uncommon circumstance, from a counter UAV
perspective – using a dozen of remotely operated COTS
drones with onboard IEDs – should have become recently
an easy to solve problem as well. The numerous
detection and RF (radio frequency) jamming solutions
already available in the marketIII, could provide an
adequate solution.
Nevertheless for the sake of the challenge, I propose a
counter UAV solution which can interdict a massive
number of small drones entering a cloud of dispersed
sediment forming chemical aerosol. This solution is far
from being a demonstrable technology. I consider it
more like an early brainstorming concept, with the goal
to propose a defensive solution for a future high hazard,
high risk operational situation, which yet might be an
imminent threat to allied forces. This outline required me
to arbitrary reformulate the basic scenario with more
future oriented elements, which I will explain in details.
As coming from an academic background, I am bound to
talk more about the problem, than the solution itself. But
I am hopeful, that the problem statement and solution
conceptualization can provide a food-for-thought on
future technological challenges encountered by the
alliance, thus it fits into the goals of the innovation
challenge.
1 In this concept paper I use the term “drone” as a synonym for unmanned vehicles.
2 I consider loitering munitions as a subset of drones.IV,V.
3 Although I am aware of the challenges posed by other types of unmanned vehicles besides UAVs, for instance UGVs or UUV (unmanned underwater
vehicles) in naval domain, I choose to focus on the aerial domain, as these vehicles might pose the highest challenge with their maneuverability.
3
Problem Reformulation
Instead of the asymmetric scenario proposed in the
original call for challenge, I envision a future scenario,
where the opposing forces are affiliated with a peer
adversary, who has the ability and capacity to employ
massive numbers (> 100) of micro sized (< 3kg with
payload) offensive aerial drones. Rather than using
COTS equipment, the altered adversary is operating
military-grade small-scale loitering munitions2, which are
capable to utilize resilient communications and
distributed intelligence based swarm tactics against
allied forces. Other details in the scenario description
are unchanged. This results a very high risk, very
hazardous tactical situation, for which allied forces are
unable to react and defend against. In the following
chapter, I will provide the detailed explanation on the
importance of the reformulated scenario.
Choice of Topic within the Challenge
From the three predefined topics, – namely 1) situation
awareness / ground sensor net 2) Detection and
identification of enemy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) 3) UAV and UGV
Defense – I have chosen the third topic. I assume, that in
the reformulated scenario the most challenging issue is
to defend against the UAVs3. Current or future detection
methods might be still valid and effective against
military-grade micro-UAV-s and loitering munitions. But
no current interdictory systems might be able to defend
against massive numbers of highly maneuverable, EW
(electronic warfare) resilient drones. Present C-UAV
systems can be classified into the following broad
categories, based on function and operationVI:
1. Tracking
2. Jamming
3. Kinetic
4. Hybrid, hijacking, and cyber approaches
From this list, 2-4 can be considered an as interdictory
or defense system. But 2 and 4 heavily rely on RF based
jamming and spoofing methods. These interdictory
approaches can also be called as soft-kill methods, while
type 3 is what we can consider a hard-kill method. I
hypothesize, that soft-kill measures will be much less
effective against UAV systems which employ military
grade communication or/and rely on more autonomy
and distributed intelligence.
COTS vs. military-grade
In the recent years there were numerous incidents, which
involved pack of COTS drones in a non-military type of
operational environment. Among others, the attack
against the Venezuelan head of stateVI or the hampering
of an FBI hostage rescue operation in DenverVII were
prominent examples of the risks involved with easy to
acquire COTS hobby UAVs modified for malicious
intentions. In addition, the numerous cases commercial
UAVs were encountered in the the military environment
of the Middle EastI,IV adds to the intensified attention,
which commercial technology receives. Ultimately „[…]
the lines between commercial, hobbyist drones and
military-grade drone technology have become
increasingly blurry as military non-state actors find ways
to militarise simple, off-the shelf drone technologies, as
evidenced in a number of conflicts around the world.“ IV
These cases can be viewed as being in the intersection
of the set of problems arising in the civilian world of
hobby drones 4 , and the military world of high
performance remote operated UAVs. But I should warn
against associating pure military UAV technologies
exclusively with large and expensive MALE (medium-
altitude, long-endurance) or HALE (high-altitude, long-
endurance) aircrafts. There are plenty of efforts at
leading militaries, to acquire low-cost, micro-sized UAVs
for various combat tasks.IV,V,VIII–XIII Although the creativity
and innovativeness involved by insurgent forces using
cheap COTS equipment effectively on the battlefield
can seem to be astonishingI,IV, we can raise a more
profound question: What if similar equipment would be
used by leading militaries, but with the advancement of
professional design and high scale manufacturing output
by the masses? The subsequent question is, who will have
the manufacturing capacity to mass produce these
systemsIV, which have the potential to disrupt global
power balance?
The Coming Swarm
An important distinction has to be made between the
notion of swarm, simply used for a dozen of remotely
operated UAVs working simultaneously, and the concept
of drones operating with a higher level of autonomy with
the help of a distributed intelligence. The latter notion
carries a much more significant change in the paradigm
of warfare, and poses a highly disruptive threat on the
battlefieldIV,V,XIV,XV, so I will focus on this phenomenon for
the rest of this paper.
4 E.g. the problem of protecting airports, critical infrastructure, corporate assetsIII or personal privacy.
5 Only if these capabilities do not already exist for some military forces, but are hidden from the public. In that case the first operational use of such highly
advanced swarm capability can be imminent and can happen any day from now. The only thing missing, is a motive and opportunity to use such key
advantage.
6 Other media besides RF e.g. light and acoustics, or passive communication, such as stigmergy or peer visibility.
4
There are numerous swarm oriented developments in
progress in the civilianIX,XVI and militaryIX,XVII field as well.
The prospect of autonomous swarms stems from the
recent advances in artificial intelligence, machine
learning and big data analysis. These technologies are
not yet commercially available, however this is not
because the technology is immature, but because the
innovation ecosystem and the industrial background
cannot adapt fast enough to find marketable, civilian
real-life adaptable solutions. The other inhibiting forces
are the fears associated with autonomy and the lag in
legislative control.
However there are numerous non-commercial
applications, which can be easily defined from police
applications to natural disaster management. Among the
most promising ones are the military applications.
Therefore I believe, that leading economies and military
powers have all the possibility to develop highly
autonomous swarm technology almost instantaneously5,
if their security requirements and economic efforts
meetXIV.
Table 1. shows the different forms of swarms, as laid out
by the Defense Science Board in 2016XIV. As they
describe, „The study observes that the current efforts tend
to align towards the left end of the possible range for the
attributes itemized […]. The emphasis of current work is
at odds with the admiration that military proponents of
swarms often express when observing nature’s examples
of swarms, such as hive insects, which are aligned with the
right end of the table’s range of attributes. Hives consists
of massive numbers of genetically identical organisms that
obey very simple rule sets and have limited (or no) direct,
peer-to-peer communication. Nonetheless, they can
demonstrate sufficient coordination to accomplish tasks far
beyond the capability of any individual, and even allow
adaptation to changing environments.“ XIV The important
notion from this difference is, that previously there was
more emphasis on the highly complex, highly expensive
systems. (Type 1) But recently more efforts go toward
cheap, simple, expendable, small and highly
autonomous system, which mimic natural swarmsIX,XVIII.
(Type 2) As a result, current RF based C-UAV
approaches for interdiction might become ineffective as
the Type 2 swarms will tend to minimize RF
communication, and use other means of coordination6.
 1. Table: Forms of robotic swarmsXIV, with countering abilities
Attribute Harder to implement Easier to implement
Most DoD “swarm” efforts Natural examples
Diversity Heterogeneous Homogeneous
e.g., mixed ground and air platforms e.g., standard platform, perhaps
with modular payloads
“Intelligence” High Minimal
e.g., complex reasoning e.g., simple, pre-defined rule sets
C2/decision making Complex Minimal
e.g., highly interactive decisions e.g., implicit C2
Communications bandwidth High Low
e.g., to provide detailed intra- (or extra-) e.g., stigmergy (environmental
swarm updates marking)
Complexity of human High Minimal
interaction e.g., could require advanced human- e.g., limited to human giving “Go”
machine interface command
Ability to counter with Current EW techniques might work, but EW approach ineffective, as
current C-UAV systems less effective due to resilient minimal intra- (or extra- )
communications communication via RF

It is no question, that such a resilient swarm attacking in in our ground based urban environment (in the scenario),
masses of low cost individual units could easily they would just limit the maneuverability, and loose the
overwhelm any currently know defense systems. Besides benefit of countering traditional projectile based
the inability to jam or spoof them in the RF realm, more weapons.
traditional kinetic approaches would became powerless
The payload weight is an obvious design limitation,
as well. With a coordinated attack in an urban
which reduces the UAVs endurance. This can be also
environment – as described in the challenge scenario –
enhanced by using an EFPs (explosively formed
from multiple directions and with numbers of more than
penetrator) payload and nano-explosives.XVIII However
hundreds, no manual or remote operated kinetic or
it is an important characteristic of these drones, that they
directed energy weapon would be able to target and
are operating on the boundaries of their aerodynamic
interdict such swarm, as it would be flooded with a mass
performance, to reach the maximum endurance7, while
of highly maneuverable targets.XV And even more
keeping and effective weight of payload. Thus they are
extreme level of oversaturation could be achieved cost-
limited by the currently available technology for electric
effectively, by diversifying the drone swarm with decoy
motors and energy storage.
units and payload bearing units.IX

Further Considerations Present and Future Technologies

Based to the previous characterization of swarm
Based on the benefits of using such advanced swarm
technologies, I present a possible map (Figure 1.) of
tactics, we can further characterize an anticipated
present and future technologies pertaining to UAV and
offensive swarm attack. First, it is a prerequisite to
interdictory C-UAV efforts.8 The basic idea is, that every
envision a small sized, cheap and expendable drone as
step in some offensive technology requires a step in the
the basic unit of the swarm. It’s basic attack mechanism
corresponding defensive technology for the ability to
relies on proximity self-detonation with a shaped
offset. As we move downwards on the figure, we step
explosive payload, – turning it into a loitering munition
into the realm of future possibilities, and at the same time
– as this is the cheapest and easiest solution to cause
our predictions get more and more vague. As you can
effective damage. This also results in two main design
see, the asymmetric challenges yesterday and today,
goals, 1) high maneuverability and 2) minimal effective
are already countered by the latest advancements in C-
payload to support this maneuverability and cost-
UAV interdictory technologies.
effective manufacturing. High maneuverability and close
proximity engagement also requires these units to use a
rotary wing design, instead of fixed wing designs. While
fixed wing designs can be effective in certain scenarios,

7 The question of how to deliver the swarm close to the area of operation is another issue, but there are numerous options e.g. as missile payload, airdrop,
drone mothership etc.
8 I must emphasize, that this is more of an imagination, than a scientific prognosis. The goal is not to accurately forecast the future state of technology, but

to give an idea about the place of my proposed C-UAV solution.

5
 1. Figure: Balance of evolution between drone and interdictory counter-drone technologies
However, we must prepare for future developments in
UAV technologies, which might tip the balance. The next
step is to anticipate the aforementioned swarm
techniques, which could make current C-UAV
technologies useless. As for possible countermeasures,
one option is to employ swarms against swarms.XIV,XV
While this option seems to be logical conclusion, I do
perceive a certain paradox in that approach on a
strategic level. Whichever leading economy and military
will be able to build the necessary manufacturing
capability and corresponding supply chain, will
dominate in this field of technology. While additive
manufacturing and other new developments in the
industrial sphere might boost the proliferation of novel
drone technology, it cannot negate the crucial
importance of scale-of-economies and supply-chain
control. As previously suggested, these swarm operations
require a massive quantity of units to be effective. Thus,
whoever has the technology to build a few units, does
not mean it that can employ an effective and economic
force. Subsequently in a global economy, only one actor
can effectively employ such technology, and it will be
the country which can sustain its manufacturing capability
6
by ruling the supply chains. I do not think that there can
be second position, – with the ability to defend with the
same technology – besides the winner. The other issue
with defensive swarms might be, that it requires even
more massive swarms and units distributed in multiple
protected areas, than it is required for offensive
operations. So it might be difficult to have the right
amount of units, at the right area, at the right time. Hence
in this case, it could be much more effective to attack,
than defend.
The other possible C-UAV technologies on the horizon,
which may be able to counter swarm forces are low-cost
guided projectiles, and high-energy directed weapons
with phased-array optics. Although there are current
research projects running to employ the former against
UAV swarmsII,XIX, these both technologies seem to be still
in very early stages to reach a combat capability in
time.
The dashed line on Figure 1. represents the possible
place for the chemical aerosol based interdictory system
I propose in the following chapter. It is intended as an
interim technology, until more advanced solutions evolve
into maturity. The technology which might make it
ineffective is indicated as well, – namely high energy
storage solutions which might increase the performance
of micro-sized UAVs to negate the performance
reducing effect of the defensive system. But these kind
of advancements in electrical energy storage9, might still
be far away.
Proposed Solution
I propose an interdiction technique based on sediment
forming chemical aerosols, which are able to immobilize
a massive number of small UAVs entering a cloud of
dispersed material. The high maneuverable rotary-wing
type small UAVs (quad-, hexa- or octocopter designs)
rely on conventional wing designs, which generate lift
based on the pressure difference on the upper a lower
surface of the airfoil. Thus an extensive sediment or
deformation on the smooth airfoil surface will disrupt the
airflow, reduce lift and possibly stall the aircraft.
The main idea behind this solution is to saturate an
airspace with some special material, which will reduce
the aerodynamic performance characteristic of the UAVs
entering. With an effective dispersal procedure, the
drones should not be able to evade this cloud of
material, so they cannot reach their targets without
entering.
The main assumption is, that these UAVs or loitering
munitions are operating on the maximal possible
performance settings, to provide the necessary
endurance and payload delivery at the same time.
Hence any degradation of aerodynamic characteristics
would hinder the ability to reach their targets. A
dispersed fog of polymer or other solution based
chemical mixture is able to form sediments on wing
surfaces, which can disable the incoming aircrafts.
Material Composition
A basic mixture can be composed of some type of
polymer (eg. styrene or acrylic) and its solvent, plus
special additives.
Proposed content for a polymer based mixture:
 Base material: polymer
 Solvent: the corresponding solvent for the
polymer
 Additives:
o disperser
o adhesion increasing agent
9 Other methods of energy storage and propulsion, e.g. based on hydrogen – might negate the cost-effective benefits of such systems.
10A good natural example is the formation of spider silk. These materials can exert incredible mechanical characteristics in proportion to mass. Artificial
spider silk can be a good candidate to form airfoil disrupting tapes.
7
A R&D process can find the right composition, to produce
an adequate dispersion with the optimal size of floating
droplets, good adhesion to wing surfaces and rapid
solidification on surfaces while keeping slow
evaporation rate in a dispersed state.
The main requirements toward the material mixture:
 Easy to disperse
 Slow evaporation
 Attraction and adhesion to moving surfaces
 Irregular sediment formation on surfaces
 Rapid solidification
 Non-hazardous
As there are certain challenges finding a material
composition, which can fulfill these requirements, state of
the art nanotechnology can provide solutions for difficult
prerequisite, e.g. adhesion to surfaces, some bubble or
thread/tape forming 10 effect to increase sediment
surfaces. Other physical approaches can be considered
as well, for example hot melted material dispersion or
electrostatic charged particle dispersion to help with
adhesion to airfoil surfaces. Levitation of the material
can be assisted by using some solute lighter than air gas
in the mixture.
Delivery Methods
For the delivery of the material I propose a number of
different dispersal methods.
Protective dischargers
The chemical mixture can be dispersed in a controlled
manner with explosive canisters (i.e. grenades) with a
directed volumetric shape. This can be based on existing
vehicle based countermeasure discharge equipment
used for generating smoke screens. These discharge
tubes are mounted on the vehicles and they can launch
a grenade in multiple directions, which contains the
defensive material. When the grenade explodes, it
produces a cloud of “fog” of the material. The proposed
grenade should detonate in midair. These grenades are
produced, to pre-determine the volumetric shape of the
dispersed aerosol. So they do not simply produce a
globular shape, but much more like a thick disk shape
perpendicular to the ballistic vector, so if it explodes bit
before the maximal height reached, it will produce a
slanted disk shaped “blanket”, near and above the
vehicle. It is probable, that the proposed grenades have
to be substantially bigger than traditional vehicle
mounted smoke grenades, as a much bigger mass of
material has to be dispersed around the protected
vehicle to produce an aerosol cloud thick enough to be
effective against UAV-s.
Remote operated grenade launcher turrets
A new type of high caliber automatic launcher can be
devised as well, to discharge adequate size of canisters
dispersing the chemical material in a thick layer of
horizontal and/or vertical wall, while keeping a safe
distance from friendly units. This can be a remote
operated or autonomous turret, which launches multiple
canisters in a controlled manner. Based on some
autonomous intelligence, the system could automatically
launch the grenades in multiple directions to thicken the
defensive cloud all around the friendly forces.
High pressure fog generator
The material can be dispersed with a high pressure,
remote or autonomous controlled, wide cone fuming
device. These kind of systems already exist in
firefighting applications based on a high pressure fan
and a sprinkler system. It can disperse massive amounts
of materials in matter of seconds, so provide a floating
aerosol fog effective against UAVs. This solution might
add an additional layer of defense, as a high pressure
vent might prevent incoming UAVs to enclose in a
controlled manner to release ordnance. Compared to
kinetic or directed energy point defenses, a high
pressure nozzle can have a much wider close proximity
engagement cone. As an alternative, other types of vents
(e.g. linear) can be devised.
2. Figure: Artist’s impression on the proposed system
8
Autonomous delivery control
This proposed solution is meant to be a complementary
C-UAV solution, and a last line of defense for close
proximity engagements. It assumes a working early
warning detection and tracking system for the optimal
activation and target engagement. It might be highly
effective with the combination of a longer range
directed energy or kinetic interdictory system.
An advanced artificial intelligence based system can
also enhance the level of effectiveness by coordinating
different subsystems, detection, targeting and delivery.
With the possibility to receive sensory information on
aerial conditions, temperature, wind speed and even an
urban environment layout, the system can devise an
optimized dispersion model which tries to fill the
airspace in all possible engagement directions
homogeneously, by the time the attacking swarm
reaches the protected zone. This models can be used to
control movements of mobile dispersal units, UGVs or
large capacity UAVs to cover a large airspace with the
material effectively.
Risks and Difficulties
The main difficulty in developing this technology is
solving the problem of mass delivery. Advanced aero-
and hydrodynamic models could answer the question of
how much material is required to be dispersed. The
amount of material in an aerosol state has to be
adequate to grow disruptive sedimentation on airfoils.
The most promising solution for this problem is to use
nano-material technologies to create excessive surfaces
from minimal masses – e.g. threads, tapes or leaves. The
other optimization method is to provide electrostatic
charge to the material to attract itself more to surfaces,
so higher density can be accumulated on surfaces with
less dispersed material.
Wind conditions are able to disrupt the dispersed fog
severely, which could lower the density of the fog in
some directions. This can be mitigated with optimized
models for dispersion, based on machine learning
algorithms.
It is important to mention the problem of chemical
hazards. As this material will be dispersed in a broad
environment, it should not have hazardous chemical
properties for troops, local populace and other living
organisms. A desired composition of the material would
contain only inert and safe ingredients, e.g. water as
solvent.

9
References
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Threats, Combating Terrorism Center, USMA, 2018. at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/01/10/pentagon-
launches-103-unit-drone-swarm/.
II Michel, Arthur Holland. Counter-Drone Systems, Center for the Study
of the Drone, Bard College, 2018. XII Snow, Shawn. The Corps wants 15 suicide drones swarming from the
hands of one front-line Marine. Available at
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Available at corps/2018/07/20/the-corps-wants-15-suicide-drones-
https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2018/10/08/hbo-stars- swarming-from-the-hands-of-one-front-line-marine/.
reveal-a-game-of-counter-drones/.
XIII Trevithick, Joseph. Army Buys Small Suicide Drones To Break Up
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emerging military drone markets, PAX, 2018. small-suicide-drones-to-break-up-hostile-swarms-and-potentially-
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development of autonomy in weapon systems, SIPRI, 2017. XIV Summer Study on Autonomy, Defense Science Board, 2016.
VI Watson, Ben. Against the Drones. Available at XV Scharre, Paul. Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,
https://www.defenseone.com/feature/against-the-drones/. Center for a New American Security, 2014.
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2018. Tamás; Eiben, Agoston E.; Vicsek, Tamás. Optimized flocking of
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American Security, 2017. XVII DARPA. DARPA Seeks Proposals for Third OFFSET Swarm Sprint,
IX Kallenborn, Zachary. The Era of the Drone Swarm Is Coming, and Awards Contracts for Second. Available at
We Need to Be Ready for It. Available at https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-10-12.
https://mwi.usma.edu/era-drone-swarm-coming-need-ready/. XVIII Hammes, T. X. Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical
X Atherton, Kelsey. Navy office awards $30 million contract for drone Dominance, Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2016), pp. 76–85.
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Appendix I: Call for Solution Proposals
Background:
A partner nation has been facing unrest fueled by foreign actors. At this nation’s request NATO deployed an
operation to support its stabilization effort.
From the outset, the NATO troops have been targeted by insurgents using guerilla techniques leveraging off-the-
shelf technology to develop weapons such as swarms of unmanned systems.

Scenario:
A NATO patrol drives through a town and stops near the town hall. Soldiers dismount from their vehicles and secure
the area around the town hall. The patrol leader has got a meeting with the mayor to obtain information about the
city and the population.
Suddenly a combined attack by air and ground drones takes place. The swarm conducted previous reconnaissance
to locate and observe the patrol. The drones are equipped with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to attack the
patrol while it is moving or when it stops.
The troops have to defend themselves against the drones without endangering the civilian population.
Therefore they also need to get as much information as early as possible about the attacking drones.

Challenge:
Can you help the troops and provide solutions in the following fields?
solution proposal can address one or more of the following topics
1) Situation awareness / ground sensor net
Collecting and assessing data from various sensors networked together to detect and locate enemy drones. Easy
deployment of low cost sensors shortly before the patrol arrives in the city. Possibility to get video streams from
different points of interest when a sensor triggers an alarm.
Characteristics of the solutions:
 low-cost
 passive infrared, seismic, magnetic, photo, video, audio, radiofrequency (RF), with GPS tracking of the
device,
 ability to display data in a common open geospatial display interface with alerts
 Compute: capable of performing baseline characterization and anomaly detection within and across all
sensor feeds
 Communication: the ability to communicate the presence of an anomaly using low power RF (LoRA, WSPR,
etc)/cellular network and WIFI
2) Detection and identification of enemy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)
Ensuring timely detection, identification and exact position location within secure range in order to immediately
activate counter measures.
Characteristics of the solutions:
 Different types of UAV and UGV should be recognized by RF-signature, seismic actions, KI-powered image
recognition or other characteristics.
 All detection systems need to be highly mobile, should be able to be transported and mounted very fast
and easy (max. 2 persons and 10 min.), and need to be linked with sensors and actuators.
3) UAV and UGV Defense
Enabling quick, secure and successful countermeasures in order to stop, destroy or overtake hostile or unknown
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).

11
Characteristics of the solutions:
 This could be done by kinetic, electronic, hacking or other measures.
 Since the scenario is set in an urban terrain, civilian collateral damages have to be avoided.
 All defense systems need to be highly mobile, should be able to be transported and mounted very fast and
easy, and need to be linked with sensors and detection systems.

12