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MODERNIZING REPRESSION

A volume in the series


Culture, Politics, and the Cold War
Edited by Christian G. Appy
Other titles in the Series
James T. Fisher, Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927-1961
Daniel Horowitz, Betty Friedan and the Making of “The Feminine Mystique”:
The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism
Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning
of a Generation
Christian G. Appy, ed., Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States
Imperialism, 1945-1966
H. Bruce Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies
Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy
Lee Bernstein, The Greatest Menace: Organized Crime in Cold War America
David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds.,
Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War
Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War
James Peck, Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the
Origins of Globalism
Edwin A. Martini, Invisible Enemies: The American War on Vietnam, 1975-2000
Tony Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War
Maureen Ryan, The Other Side of Grief: The Home Front and the Aftermath in American
Narratives of the Vietnam War
David Hunt, Vietnam’s Southern Revolution: From Peasant Insurrection to Total War
Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the
Politics of Healing
Jeremy Kuzmarov, The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs
Robert Surbrug Jr., Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974-1990
Larry Grubbs, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s
Robert A. Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age
Andrew J. Falk, Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960
Jerry Lembcke, Hanoi Jane: War, Sex, and Fantasies of Betrayal
Anna G. Creadick, Perfectly Average: The Pursuit of Normality in Postwar America
Kathleen Donohue, ed., Liberty and Justice for All? Rethinking Politics in Cold War America
Roger Peace, A Call to Conscience: The Anti-Contra War Campaign
Modernizing
Repression
Police Training and Nation-Building
in the American Century

JEREMY KUZMAROV

6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT t "NIFSTUBOE#PTUPO
Copyright © 2012 by University of Massachusetts Press
All rights reserved
1SJOUFEJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTPG"NFSJDB
LC 2012007996
ISBN 978-1-55849-917-1 (paper); 916-4 (hardcover)

Designed by Jack Harrison


4FUJO"EPCF.JOJPO1SPXJUI'PSNBUBEJTQMBZ

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data


,V[NBSPW +FSFNZ Ŵżźżo
.PEFSOJ[JOHSFQSFTTJPOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHBOEOBUJPOCVJMEJOHJOUIF"NFSJDBODFOUVSZ
+FSFNZ,V[NBSPW
 QDN‰ $VMUVSF QPMJUJDT BOEUIFDPMEXBS
Includes bibliographical references and index.
*4#/żźŻŴŸŸŻŷżżŴźŴ QCLBMLQBQFS ‰*4#/żźŻŴŸŸŻŷżżŴŹŷ MJCSBSZDMPUIBMLQBQFS 
Ŵ1PMJDF‰1PMJUJDBMBTQFDUT‰)JTUPSZ ŵ1PMJDFUSBJOJOH‰%FWFMPQJOHDPVOUSJFT‰)JTUPSZ
Ŷ.JMJUBSZQMBOOJOH‰6OJUFE4UBUFT‰)JTUPSZ ŷ6OJUFE4UBUFT‰'PSFJHOSFMBUJPOT‰%FWFMPQJOHDPVOUSJFT
Ÿ%FWFMPQJOHDPVOUSJFT‰'PSFJHOSFMBUJPOT‰6OJUFE4UBUFT Ź*NQFSJBMJTN
I. Title.
HV7903.K89 2012
ŶŹŶŵhŵ‰EDŵŶ
2012007996

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data are available.


To Ngosa and Chanda
“This page intentionally left blank”
Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations Used in Text xi
Introduction 1

Part I
Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”
Imperial Policing in the Philippines and the Caribbean 17
1. The First Operation Phoenix: U.S. Colonial Policing in the
  1IJMJQQJOFTBOEUIF#MPPEPG&NQJSF ŵŴ
2. “Popping Off ” Sandinistas and Cacos: Police Training in Occupied
  )BJUJ UIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD BOE/JDBSBHVB Ŷź

Part II
Under the Facade of Benevolence
Police Training and the Cold War in Southeast Asia from the
“Reverse Course” to Operation Phoenix 53
3. “Their Goal Was Nothing Less than Total Knowledge”: Policing in
Occupied Japan and the Rise of the National Security Doctrine 57
ŷi-BXJO8IPTF/BNF 0SEFSGPS8IPTF#FOFĕU w1PMJDF5SBJOJOH i/BUJPO
Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 79
Ÿi'SFF(PWFSONFOU$BOOPU&YJTUXJUIPVU4BGFHVBSETBHBJOTU4VCWFSTJPOw 
The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 99
ŹćF4FDSFU8BSJO-BPTBOE0UIFS7JFUOBN4JEFTIPXTćF$MBOEFTUJOF 
Cold War in Southeast Asia II 121
7. “As I Recall the Many Tortures”: Michigan State University, Operation
  1IPFOJY BOEUIF.BLJOHPGB1PMJDF4UBUFJO4PVUI7JFUOBN ŴŷŴ

vii
Part III
The Cold War on the Periphery
Police Training and the Hunt for Subversives in Africa, Latin America,
and the Middle East 163
Ż"SNJOH5ZSBOUT*"NFSJDBO1PMJDF5SBJOJOHBOEUIF1PTUDPMPOJBM
  /JHIUNBSFJO"GSJDB ŴŹŸ
ż"SNJOH5ZSBOUT**1PMJDF5SBJOJOHBOE/FPDPMPOJBMJTNJOUIF
Mediterranean and Middle East 188
10. The Dark Side of the Alliance for Progress: Police Training and State
  5FSSPSJO-BUJO"NFSJDBEVSJOHUIF$PME8BS ŵųŻ
$PODMVTJPOćF7JPMFODF$PNFT'VMM$JSDMF‰'SPNUIF$PME8BSUP
the War on Terror 232

Abbreviations Used in Notes 253


Notes 257
Index 369

viii Contents
Acknowledgments

.BOZQFPQMFIBWFBTTJTUFENFPWFSUIFZFBSTJOXSJUJOHUIJTCPPL'JSTU *UIBOL
the archivists and staff of the libraries I visited, including the National Archives;
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Johnson presidential libraries; and Carlisle Barracks Military Archives; and
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NBUFSJBMPO64;BNCJBOSFMBUJPOTEVSJOHBWJTJUUPUIFDPVOUSZOPUQSJNBSJMZ
related to the research. Second, I thank Sergeant Tony Sanders of the Kansas
$JUZ 1PMJDF %FQBSUNFOU GPS QSPWJEJOH NF XJUI EPDVNFOUT PO #ZSPO &OHMFT
UFOVSF XJUI UIF EFQBSUNFOU (BSZ 8JMLJOTPO PG UIF *OEJBOB 4UBUF 1PMJDF GPS
QSPWJEJOHEPDVNFOUTPOBOVNCFSPGUIF*OEJBOBUSPPQFSTXIPTFSWFEXJUIUIF
0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZBOE1BUSJDJB)BSSJOHUPOPG3JDINPOE 7JSHJOJB GPSUBL-
JOHUIFUJNFUPQVUUPHFUIFSNBUFSJBMTGPSNFBCPVUIFSGBUIFS +FUFS8JMMJBNTPO 
XIPTFSWFEGPSPWFSBEFDBEFJOUIFHMPCBMQPMJDFQSPHSBNT
*BMTPXJTIUPUIBOLUPUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG5VMTBBOEUIF0LMBIPNB$PVODJM
PG)VNBOJUJFTGPSTVQQPSUJOHNZSFTFBSDIXJUIBOVNCFSPGHSBOUTBOE%FBO
5PN#FOFEJLUTPOBOEEFQBSUNFOUDIBJS5PN#VPZFGPSUIFJSFODPVSBHFNFOU
BOEGPSBTTJTUJOHNFUPPCUBJOBTVCWFOUJPOUPIFMQDPWFSQSPEVDUJPODPTUT.Z
DPMMFBHVFTJOUIFIJTUPSZEFQBSUNFOUBMTPEFTFSWFUIBOLT BTEP"OEZ-VQBSEVT 
5BNSB4UBOTĕFME BOETUBČTBUUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG5VMTBMJCSBSZBOEUIF#VDLOFMM
6OJWFSTJUZMJCSBSZ XIPBTTJTUFENFJOUSBDLJOHEPXOSBSFEPDVNFOUTBOECPPLT
#SFUU 3FJMMZ  XIP XFOU PO UP CFDPNF B 1I% TUVEFOU BU UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG
8JTDPOTJOo.BEJTPO TFSWFEBTNZSFTFBSDIBTTJTUBOUXIJMF*XBTBU#VDLOFMM
BOE XBT WFSZ IFMQGVM JO MPDBUJOH NBUFSJBMT BU UIF ,FOOFEZ -JCSBSZ  /BUJPOBM
"SDIJWFT BOE$BSMJTMF#BSSBDLT4BN3FENPOEBOE.BUUIFX1FNCMFUPOQSP-
vided valuable research assistance in Berkeley and in College Park, Maryland,
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EPDVNFOUT,JSTUFO8FMEBOE4JOBF)ZVOBTTJTUFENFXJUINBUFSJBMGSPNUIFJS
PXOSFTFBSDIPO(VBUFNBMBBOEćBJMBOE(FPSHJOB4JODMBJSQSPWJEFENBUFSJBM
PO"GHIBOJTUBO BOE.BSJFLF#MPFNCFSHFOQSPWJEFEJOGPSNBUJPOPO*OEPOF-
TJB4IFBMTPJOWJUFENFUPBQBOFMBUUIF"TTPDJBUJPOPG"TJBO4UVEJFTDPOGFS-
FODFJO)BXBJJJOŵųŴŴ XIJDITUJNVMBUFEBOVNCFSPGUIFJEFBTFYQSFTTFEJOUIF
book.

ix
4BN#SBXBOE BOE +JMM0HMFTCFF BTTJTUFEXJUIUIF NBOVTDSJQUQSFQBSBUJPO
Clark Dougan, senior editor at the University of Massachusetts Press, helped to
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ESBęT*BNHSBUFGVMGPSIJTTVQQPSUGPSNZXPSL$BSPM#FUTDIBOEUIFTUBČBU
the University of Massachusetts Press were as usual a great pleasure to work
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UIFXSJUJOHBOEDBUDIJOHNBOZTNBMMFSSPSTćFQFFSSFWJFXFSTGPSUIJTTUVEZ 
+FOOJGFS'SPOD "MGSFE8.D$PZ BOE.BSUIB,)VHHJOT PČFSFEFYUSFNFMZ
WBMVBCMFJOTJHIUTUIBUIFMQFENFCSPBEFONZBOBMZTJTBOEJNQSPWFUIFCPPL
Christian G. Appy was an additional reader who provided excellent feedback.
*BNWFSZHSBUFGVMUPIBWFIBEUIFBTTJTUBODFPGTVDIBHJęFEHSPVQ*HJWFFYUSB
thanks to McCoy for reiterating his advice in various conversations. His richly
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Many other outstanding scholars, including Mark Selden and Michael
4DIXBSU[ UPPLBOJOUFSFTUJONZCPPLBOEQSPWJEFEJOWBMVBCMFDPNNFOUBSZ
POBSUJDMFTBOEDIBQUFSTXIJDIMFEUPJUTJNQSPWFNFOU'VSUIFSUIBOLTHPUP
%BWJE$&OHFSNBO .JDIBFM8JMMSJDI ,ZMF-POHMFZ +FSSZ-FNCDLF )BOOBI
(VSNBO  .VSSBZ 1PMOFS  #SBE 4JNQTPO  3JDIBSE 8BMMFS  -FTMJF 1BUSJDL  'SFE
#SBOGNBO /PBN$IPNTLZ XIPQSPNQUMZBOTXFSFETFWFSBMFNBJMJORVJSJFT
BOENBEFEFUBJMFEBOEJOTJHIUGVMDPNNFOUTPOBSUJDMFTPGNJOFSFMBUFEUPUIJT
book), and Jack Tobin, who provided valuable editing at an early stage.
'JOBMMZ  * UIBOL .BSHBSFU ,BMVĕBOZB GPS IFS XBSN IPTQJUBMJUZ EVSJOH NZ
extended visits to Silver Springs, Maryland, to work at the National Archives,
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daughter Chanda.

x Left Running Foot


Abbreviations Used in Text

".( "NFSJDBO.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOU 4PVUI,PSFB


"/$ $POHPMFTF"SNZ
ANP Afghan National Police
"37/ "SNZPGUIF3FQVCMJDPG7JFUOBN
BPP Border Patrol Police, Thailand
$*$ $PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF$PSQT 64"SNZ
$0*/5&-130 $PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF1SPHSBN '#*
$1" $PBMJUJPO1SPWJTJPOBM"VUIPSJUZ *SBR
%"4 %FQBSUBNFOUP"ENJOJTUSBUJWPEF4FHVSJEBE $PMPNCJB
%&" %SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO
EAM National Liberation Front of Greece
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
&-/ &KÏSDJUPEF-JCFSBDJPO/BDJPOBM $PMPNCJB
'"3 3FCFM"SNFE'PSDFT (VBUFNBMB
'"3$ 'VFS[BT"SNBEBT3FWPMVDJPOBSJBTEF$PMPNCJB
FBN Federal Bureau of Narcotics
FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, El Salvador
FSLN Sandinista Liberation Front
()2 (FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST
(.% (VPNJOEBOH $IJOB
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*$" *OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPO
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 1SPHSBN
*/1 *SBRJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDF
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IPS Internal Defense and Public Safety
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan
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,,& $PNNVOJTU1BSUZPG(SFFDF
KNP Korean National Police
-%1 -JCFSBM%FNPDSBUJD1BSUZ +BQBO

xi
LNP Lao National Police
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MSU Michigan State University
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OSS Office of Strategic Services
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PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
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PSD Public Safety Division
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ROK Republic of Korea
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SAVAK National Security and Intelligence Unit, Iran
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SKLP South Korean Labor Party
TNP Thai National Police
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USMAGIK United States Military Advisory Group in Korea
USOM United States Operations Mission
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VC Vietcong
VCI Vietcong infrastructure

xii Left Running Foot


MODERNIZING REPRESSION
“This page intentionally left blank”
Introduction
Through the activities of the OPS, the notion of the US as world policeman is
transformed from a metaphor to a reality.
‰+oe Stork i8PSME$PQ)PX"NFSJDB#VJMETUIF(MPCBM1PMJDF4UBUF w

In history, the man in the ruffled shirt and gold-laced waistcoat somehow levi-
tates above the blood he has ordered to be spilled by dirty-handed underlings.
—Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune,

In a March 19, 2010, cover story, “The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot Straight,” News-
week reported that although the United States had spent $6 billion trying to
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RVPUFEBTTBZJOHi8FBSFTUJMMBU[FSP<3FDSVJUT>EPOUMJTUFO BSFVOEJTDJQMJOFE 
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UPŵųųŻ BEEFEi"MPUPGUIFQPMJDFPďDFSTXBOUFEUPCFBCMFUPFYUPSUNPOFZ
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While critical of U.S. policy, the NewsweekBSUJDMF BTUIFTFDPNNFOUTTVH-
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sight by the United States has often been catastrophic for the subject society,
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1
In his essay “Shooting an Elephant,” George Orwell recounts his experi-
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felt despised everywhere he went. Toward the end of his tenure, he was called
on to shoot a stray elephant that had encroached on public space. Although
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the colonialists were trying to convey. And so, against his better conscience, he
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oners huddling in the stinking cages of the lock-ups, the grey cowed faces of
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but no less hated.
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evolving with new strategies and weapons innovations but always retaining
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BT B DPTUFČFDUJWF  DPWFSU NFDIBOJTN GPS TVQQSFTTJOH SBEJDBM BOE OBUJPOBMJTU
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likely to arouse public opposition, or enabling the drawdown of troops. With
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nal defense, which allowed the suppression of dissident groups across a wide
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IFMQFE UP NPEFSOJ[F JOUFMMJHFODFHBUIFSJOH BOE QPMJUJDBMQPMJDJOH PQFSBUJPOT
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ćF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBXBTBXBUFSTIFEJOUIFFWPMVUJPOPG"NFSJDBOJNQFSJBM
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QSJWJMFHF BOEMPDBMQPXFSCZFYQBOEJOHUIFSFBDIPGUIFGFEFSBMHPWFSONFOU

2 Introduction
*UT QSPQPOFOUT WJFXFE UIF SFGPSN PG UIF DSJNJOBM KVTUJDF TZTUFN  JODMVEJOH
UIF DSFBUJPO PG KVWFOJMF DPVSUT  VOJGPSN TFOUFODJOH  BOE IVNBOF QSJTPOT  BT
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PGSFTUSBJOJOHUIFBOBSDIZPGBSBQJEMZFYQBOEJOHDBQJUBMJTNBOEFTUBCMJTIJOH
internal security and order in an age of increasing social agitation and unrest.5
"T 8JMMJBN & -FVDIUFOCVSH OPUFE PWFS B IBMG DFOUVSZ BHP  JNQFSJBMJTN
XBTBMPHJDBMFYUFOTJPOPGQSPHSFTTJWJTNćFOFXUFDIOPDSBUJDFMJUFUIBUJUGPT-
tered believed in their own capacity not only to regulate social life within the
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colonial enclaves abroad. In their view, Third World peoples could be uplifted
UISPVHI UIF JNQPSUBUJPO PG NPEFSO UFDIOPMPHZ BOE 8FTUFSO BENJOJTUSBUJWF
TZTUFNT  PG XIJDI QPMJDJOH XBT TFFO BT B DPSOFSTUPOF6 Local hostility and
resistance, however, and a political context unlike that of the United States,
UIXBSUFE UIFJS EFTJHOT 0ďDJBMT BQQSPQSJBUFE "NFSJDBO BTTJTUBODF GPS UIFJS
PXOQVSQPTFTBOEIFMEEJČFSFOUWJTJPOTPGIPXUPNBOBHFTPDJFUZćF6OJUFE
4UBUFT XBT ĕYBUFE  GVSUIFSNPSF  PO TUBNQJOH PVU SFTJTUBODF HSPVQT BOE UIVT
NPCJMJ[FEQPMJDFBMPOHQPMJUJDBMBOENJMJUBSZMJOFT XIJDISFTVMUFEJOUIFTQSFBE
PGBNQMFWJPMFODFBOEUFSSPS*EFPMPHJDBMJNQFSBUJWFTVMUJNBUFMZDPNCJOFEXJUI
BOJNQFSJBMESJWFGPSIFHFNPOZBOEDPOUSPMUPFODPVSBHFUIFHSPXUIPGIJHIMZ
DPFSDJWFQPMJDJOHBOETVSWFJMMBODFOFUXPSLT XIJDIXFSFMBUFSSFJNQPSUFECBDL
IPNFUPTJNJMBSMZSFQSFTTJWFFČFDU7
-JCFSBMDPNNFOUBUPSTIBWFPęFOIFSBMEFEUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBSFGPSNTBOE
SJTFPGUIFiBENJOJTUSBUJWFTUBUFwBTBQPTJUJWFTUFQJOUIFFWPMVUJPOPGEFNPDSBUJD
HPWFSOBODFJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT8JUISFHBSEUPDSJNJOBMKVTUJDF UIFTFDMBJNT
BSFOPUUPUBMMZNJTQMBDFE%VSJOHUIF(JMEFE"HF QPMJDFXFSFOPUPSJPVTMZDPS-
SVQUBOECFIPMEFOUPXFBMUIZJOEVTUSJBMJTUTBOEQPMJUJDBMNBDIJOFT*OTUFBEPG
going on patrol, officers often spent their shifts drinking in a local bar.8 They
JOUJNJEBUFEWPUFSTEVSJOHFMFDUJPOT TQJFEPOSBEJDBMTPDJBMPSHBOJ[BUJPOT BOE
WJDJPVTMZ CSPLF VQ XPSLFS EFNPOTUSBUJPOT BOE TUSJLFT  PęFO JO DPOKVODUJPO
with the antiunion Pinkerton Detective Agency. Police were further prone to
excessive force, including the use of billy clubs to bludgeon suspects, a procliv-
JUZ NBHOJĕFE CZ SBNQBOU OBUJWJTN BOE BOUJJNNJHSBOU TFOUJNFOU9 Lincoln
4UFČFOT UIFGBNPVTNVDLSBLFS BOEBGPSNFSQPMJDFSFQPSUFS SFDBMMFEJOIJT
BVUPCJPHSBQIZ i.BOZBNPSOJOHXIFO*IBEOPUIJOHFMTFUPEP*TUPPEBOE
saw the police bring in and kick out their bandaged, bloody prisoners, not only
TUSJLFSTBOEGPSFJHOFST CVUUIJFWFTUPP BOEPUIFSTPGUIFNJTFSBCMF GSJFOEMFTT 
USPVCMFTPNFQPPSw10
1SPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNFST JODMVEJOHćFPEPSF3PPTFWFMU IFBEPGUIF/FX:PSL
$JUZ1PMJDF$PNNJTTJPOGSPNŴŻżŸUPŴŻżź FNQIBTJ[FEUIBUQPMJDFTIPVMECF
DPNNJUUFEUPBOJEFBMPGQVCMJDTFSWJDFćFZTPVHIUUPJODSFBTFBENJOJTUSBUJWF
FďDJFODZBDDPSEJOHUPUIFQSJODJQMFTPGUIFNBOBHFSJBMSFWPMVUJPO TUBOEBSEJ[F

Introduction 3
XFBQPOT BOEQSPNPUFEVFQSPDFTT TQFFEZTFOUFODJOH BOEUIFQSPUFDUJPOPG
DJWJMMJCFSUJFT5PNJOJNJ[FDPSSVQUJPO QBZXBTJODSFBTFE BOEDIJFGTXFSFQSP-
NPUFEPOUIFCBTJTPGUIFJSSFDPSEPGTFSWJDFSBUIFSUIBOQPMJUJDBMDPOOFDUJPOT
5SBJOJOHXBTTZTUFNBUJ[FEUISPVHIUIFVTFPGUFYUCPPLTBOEUIFEFWFMPQNFOU
PG QPMJDF BDBEFNJFT 1SPHSFTTJWFT DPODFJWFE PG NPEFSO QPMJDJOH BT B TDJFODF
BOEUPPLQBJOTUPJODPSQPSBUFOFXUFDIOPMPHJFTćFBVUPNPCJMFBOEUXPXBZ
SBEJP IFMQFE USBOTGPSN UIF OBUVSF PG QPMJDF XPSL  BMMPXJOH GPS XJEFS QBUSPM
networks and coordination between units. Advances in photography led to the
GBNFE NVH TIPU BOE XBOUFE QPTUFST ćF BEWFOU PG UIF #FSUJMMPO QSPDFEVSF 
VTJOH QIZTJDBM NFBTVSFNFOUT BOE ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH  FOIBODFE UIF FďDJFODZ PG
SFDPSEHBUIFSJOHTZTUFNT WJUBMUPNPEFSOQPMJDJOH11
%JQMPNBUJDPďDJBMTTPVHIUUPSFQSPEVDFUIFTFJOOPWBUJPOTHMPCBMMZBTQBSU
PG UIF BUUFNQU UP JOUFSOBUJPOBMJ[F UIF "NFSJDBO DSJNJOBM KVTUJDF TZTUFN BOE
QSPNPUFiOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwBOEQSPHSFTTUISPVHIUIFJNQPSUBUJPOPG8FTUFSO
JOTUJUVUJPOTBOEHPWFSOJOHTZTUFNT"DPNNJUNFOUUPMFHBMQSPDFEVSFBOEEVF
QSPDFTTXBTQFSDFJWFEBTBEFĕOJOHGFBUVSFPG8FTUFSOTPDJFUJFTBOEBNBSLFSPG
their civility, to be replicated in colonial enclaves. Paradoxically, the Progressive
&SBSFGPSNTXFSFEFDJEFEMZMJNJUFEJOUIFJSFČFDUBOECPSFEBNBHJOHDPOTF-
RVFODFTJOUIFFČPSUUPTUBCJMJ[FUIFFYJTUJOHQPMJUJDBMBOEFDPOPNJDTUSVDUVSF
Police brutality continued to proliferate, especially against working-class
JNNJHSBOUTBOE"GSJDBO"NFSJDBOTi3FETRVBETwVTFETPQIJTUJDBUFETVSWFJM-
MBODFUFDIOPMPHJFTUPNPOJUPSBOEIBSBTTVOJPOBDUJWJTUTBOEMFęJTUT12 The 1931
8JDLFSTIBNSFQPSU DPBVUIPSFECZ"VHVTU7PMMNFS UIFiGBUIFSPGNPEFSOMBX
FOGPSDFNFOU wLOPXOGPSIJTJOOPWBUJPOTBTQPMJDFDIJFGJO#FSLFMFZ $BMJGPS-
OJB  QPJOUFE UP UIF QFSQFUVBUJPO PG iĘBHSBOU DPSSVQUJPOw BOE iUIJSE EFHSFFw
NFUIPETPGUPSUVSF DPODMVEJOHUIBUiMBXFOGPSDFNFOUBHFODJFTBSFVTVBMMZIFME
JODPOUFNQUBOEMBXFOGPSDFNFOUJTPOFPGPVSOBUJPOBMKPLFTw0WFSUJNF BO
BDDFMFSBUJOHFNQIBTJTPOUSBJOJOHBOEQBSBNJMJUBSZQPMJDJOHMFENBOZEFQBSU-
NFOUTUPCFDPNFiQPXFSGVM JOEFQFOEFOUQPMJUJDBMFOUJUJFT wJOUIFXPSETPG-PT
"OHFMFT1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUIJTUPSJBO+PF%PNBOJDL BOEIFMQFEUSBOTGPSNUIF
DSJNJOBMKVTUJDFTZTUFNJOUPBWBTUiDSJNJOBMKVTUJDFJOEVTUSZw13
ćF NPEFSOJ[BUJPO PG QPMJDF JOTUJUVUJPOT JO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT EVSJOH UIF
1SPHSFTTJWFBOE/FX%FBMFSBTXBTBDDPNQBOJFECZBUUFNQUTUPVQHSBEFUIF
QSJTPOTZTUFN JODMVEJOHFČPSUTUPJNQSPWFTBOJUBUJPOBOEQSPNPUFSFIBCJMJUB-
UJPO XIJDIQPMJDZNBLFSTBHBJOTPVHIUUPEVQMJDBUFXPSMEXJEF$POWJDUMFBT-
JOH XBT PVUMBXFE  BOE MJUFSBDZ  SFDSFBUJPO  BOE WPDBUJPOBM USBJOJOH QSPHSBNT
XFSFFTUBCMJTIFE BMPOHXJUIKVWFOJMFGBDJMJUJFTBOEBQBSPMFTZTUFN JOQBSUJO
SFTQPOTFUPJONBUFBDUJWJTNćFSFXFSFFWFOFYQFSJNFOUTJOTFMGHPWFSOBODF14
"T XJUI UIF QPMJDF  UIF SFGPSNT XFSF SFTUSJDUJWF JO UIFJS FČFDUT BOE OPU VOJ-
GPSNMZ JNQMFNFOUFE " DPOUJOVFE FNQIBTJT PO PSEFS BOE EJTDJQMJOF UPPL
precedence over the idealistic vision of progressive penologists. The conditions
JONPTUQSJTPOTSFNBJOFEIBSTIBOE BDDPSEJOHUPMFBEJOHTPDJPMPHJDBMTUVEJFT 

4 Introduction
DSFBUFECSFFEJOHHSPVOETGPSDSJNF#FBUJOHTCZHVBSETBOEESBDPOJBOTPMJUBSZ
DPOĕOFNFOUQSBDUJDFTSFNBJOFEDPNNPOQMBDF3FBEJOHNBUFSJBMXBTVTVBMMZ
SFTUSJDUFE MBCPSSFHJNFOTSFNBJOFEFYQMPJUBUJWF BOESBDJBMTFHSFHBUJPOXBTUIF
OPSN15ćFDSJNJOPMPHJTU+PIO-(JMMJOXSPUFJOBŴżŶŴTUVEZi.POVNFOUTUP
stupidity are these institutions we have built. . . . How silly of us to think that we
DBOQSFQBSFNFOGPSTPDJBMMJGFCZSFWFSTJOHUIFPSEJOBSZQSPDFTTPGTPDJBMJ[B-
UJPO‰TJMFODFGPSUIFPOMZBOJNBMXJUITQFFDISFQSFTTJWFSFHJNFOUBUJPOPGNFO
‫ڀڀ‬PVUXBSEDPOGPSNJUZUPSVMFTXIJDISFQSFTTBMMFČPSUTBUDPOTUSVDUJWFFYQSFT-
TJPOXPSLXJUIPVUUIFPQFSBUJPOPGFDPOPNJDNPUJWFTNPUJWBUJPOCZGFBSPG
QVOJTINFOUSBUIFSUIBOCZIPQFPGSFXBSEPSBQQFBMUPUIFJSIJHIFSNPUJWFTw16
ćFNPTUĘBHSBOUBCVTFTPDDVSSFEJOTPVUIFSOQSJTPOTTVDIBT1BSDINBO
'BSN JO .JTTJTTJQQJ  XIFSF NPTUMZ CMBDL JONBUFT XFSF GPSDFE UP MBCPS GSPN
dawn to dusk in the hot sun, fed wretched food, and subjected to electroshocks
BOEXIJQQJOHTCZUSVTUJFT QSJWJMFHFEJONBUFTSFTQPOTJCMFGPSEJTDJQMJOF17 Con-
EJUJPOTJOUIFSFTUPGUIFDPVOUSZXFSFPęFOOPUNVDICFUUFS*OIFSŴżŵŶNFN-
oir, the socialist Kate O’Hare, who was incarcerated in Missouri for speaking
out against U.S. entry in World War I, recounted being ordered to bathe after a
XPNBOJOGFDUFEXJUITZQIJMJTBOEPQFOTPSFT XIPIBEESJQQJOHQVTBOENBH-
HPUTTUSFBNJOHPVUPGĕMUIZCBOEBHFT4IFXSPUFUIBUDFMMBSFBTXFSFiWFSZEJSUZ
. . . shabby and unsanitary” and “every crack and crevice of the cellhouse was
GVMMPGWFSNJO‫ڀڀ‬3BUTPWFSSBOUIFQMBDFJOTXBSNT TDBNQFSFEPWFSUIFEJOJOH
UBCMFT OJCCMFE<BUUIFGPPE>‫ڀڀ‬BOEDSFQUJOUPCFEXJUIVTw18
*O TQJUF PG SFQFBUFE FČPSUT BU SFGPSN  JOKVTUJDFT DPOUJOVFE UISPVHI UIF
FOTVJOH EFDBEFT (FPSHF +BDLTPOT NFNPJS Soledad Brother sheds light on
UIFTZTUFNBUJDSBDJBMEJTDSJNJOBUJPOJO$BMJGPSOJBQSJTPOTMFBEJOHUPWJPMFODF
and rebellion during the 1960s.19 In 1970 Attorney General John A. Mitchell
EFTDSJCFEUIFQFOBMTZTUFNUPBWashington PostSFQPSUFSBTBiOBUJPOBMTIBNFw
ćFSFQPSUFSFEJUPSJBMJ[FEUIBUQSJTPOFSTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXFSFiNPSFDBSF-
MFTTMZIBOEMFEUIBOBOJNBMTJOPVS[PPT‫(ڀڀ‬VBSETBSFOUFWFOQBJEBTNVDI
as zookeepers.”20 $POEJUJPOTPOMZXPSTFOFEUIFSFBęFSXJUIUIFBCBOEPONFOU
PG UIF HPBM PG SFIBCJMJUBUJPO BOE SBNQBOU PWFSDSPXEJOH TQBXOFE CZ UPVHI
PODSJNFQPMJDJFTTVDIBTUIFi8BSPO%SVHTw*O+VOFŵųųŻ ŵ ŶŴų żŻŷQSJTPO-
ers were being held in federal or state prisons or local jails, by far the highest
JODBSDFSBUJPOSBUFJOUIFXPSME4VQFSNBYGBDJMJUJFTIBWFCFDPNFJODSFBTJOHMZ
QSFWBMFOU JOXIJDIJONBUFTBSFMPDLFEVQGPSUXFOUZUISFFIPVSTBEBZVOEFS
JOUFOTFFMFDUSPOJDTVSWFJMMBODF XJUIBMNPTUOPTPDJBMJOUFSBDUJPO.VNJB"CV
+BNBMXSPUFJOLive from Death Row of the “profound horror . . . in the day-to-
day banal occurrences in prison . . . a second-by-second assault on the soul.”21
ćFIBSTISFBMJUZDVUTEFFQJOUPNZUITPGOBUJPOBMFYDFQUJPOBMJTNBOEWJSUVF
FNCSBDFECZUIPTFXIPIBWFTPVHIUUPSFNBLFPUIFSDPVOUSJFTJOUIF"NFSJDBO
JNBHFBOEFYQPSUUIFNPEFMPG"NFSJDBODSJNJOBMKVTUJDFćF6OJUFE4UBUFT
TZTUFNIBTOFWFSCFFOJEFBM

Introduction 5
ćFBCVTFTTQBXOFECZJOUFSOBUJPOBMUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTUIFSFGPSF EJEOPU
FWPMWF BT TPNF LJOE PG BCFSSBUJPO CVU XFSF SBUIFS BO FYUFOTJPO PG EPNFTUJD
practice. Anthony Russo of the RAND Corporation, indicted with Daniel
&MMTCFSH JO UIF 1FOUBHPO 1BQFST DBTF  SFNBSLFE JO B Ŵżźŵ Harper’s NBHB[JOF
JOUFSWJFX UIBU IF ĕOBMMZ VOEFSTUPPE iXIZ XF UPSUVSF QFPQMF JO 7JFUOBN‰
because we torture people herećF"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTUPUIFQFPQMFXIPSVO
UIFQSJTPOTJO7JFUOBNBSFSFUJSFEXBSEFOT SFUJSFEQPMJDFNFO SFUJSFEIJHIXBZ
QBUSPMNFO QFPQMFXIPXPSLJOUIFTPDBMMFEMBXBOEPSEFSĕFMEIFSFJOUIF
United States.” Russo went on:
*LOFXBNBOXIPXPSLFEGPS64"*%QVCMJDTBGFUZXIPIBECFFOBXBSEFOIFSF
JOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT*VTFEUPUSZBOEUBMLUPIJNBOEUSZUPHFUTPNFSFBTPOPVU
PGIJNDPODFSOJOHUIFDPOEJUJPOTPGQSJTPOTJO7JFUOBN)FVTFEUPBMXBZTDPNF
back to his experience with prisons here in the United States. . . . He was trying to
HFUBDSPTTUPNFUIBUDPOWJDUTBSFTDVN)FTBJE i8FHPUPBMMUIJTUSPVCMFUPLFFQ
UIFNJOQSJTPOXIFOXFTIPVMEUBLFUIFNPVUJOBTIJQBOEESPQUIFNPVUBUTFB 
KVTUUISPXUIFNPWFSCPBSEćFZSFXPSUIMFTTIVNBOCFJOHTćFSFTOPSFBTPOUP
LFFQUIFNBMJWFćFZSFOPHPPEUPBOZCPEZw22

ćFTFDPNNFOUTDPOWFZUIFBUUJUVEFTUIBUNBOZBEWJTFSTCSPVHIUXJUIUIFN
GSPNUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT XIJDIMFEUPBCVTFćFQPMJUJDBMDPOUFYUJOXIJDIUIFZ
PQFSBUFEBOEUIFSBDJTUTFOUJNFOUTUIFZFYIJCJUFEUPXBSEćJSE8PSMEQFPQMFT
CSPVHIUPVUUIFJSNPTUSFQSFTTJWFRVBMJUJFT.BOZTVCTDSJCFEUPUIFXPSMEWJFX
PGUIF/FX3JHIU XIJDIXBTEFEJDBUFEUP"NFSJDBTJOUFSOBUJPOBMQSFFNJOFODF
UISPVHI TVQFSJPS BSNBNFOUT BOE JOUFSWFOUJPO BOE TBX QFBDF BOE SFGPSN
NPWFNFOUTBTGSPOUTGPSDPNNVOJTUTVCWFSTJPO BWJFXQPJOUUIBUSFTVMUFEJO
intolerance for dissent of any kind.23
&NCPEZJOHB64JNQFSJBMTUZMFHSPVOEFEJOTIPSUUFSNEVUZBOEUIFRVFTU
GPS TFSWJDFBCMF JOGPSNBUJPO CVU OPU EFFQ LOPXMFEHF PG UIF TVCKFDU TPDJFUZ 
QPMJDFBEWJTFSTUPPLQSJEFJOUIFJSBCJMJUZUPTFSWFBTiNJTTJPOBSJFTPGNPEFSO-
J[BUJPO wBTPOFIJTUPSJBOUFSNFEJU BOETPVHIUUPCPMTUFSPSHBOJ[BUJPOBMFď-
DJFODZBOEQPMJDFQSPGFTTJPOBMJTNJOUBSHFUJOHCPUIDSJNJOBMTBOEiTVCWFSTJWFTw
8IJMFUIFSFXFSFTPNFTPMEJFSTPGGPSUVOFBNPOHUIFN NBOZIBEFYQFSJFODF
XJUIQPMJUJDBMJOUFMMJHFODFVOJUT iSFETRVBETw XFSFTLJMMFEUFDIOJDJBOT PSIBE
DPNQJMFE EJTUJOHVJTIFE SFDPSET QSPNPUJOH QSPHSFTTJWF SFGPSNT JO EPNFTUJD
police institutions which they sought to extend internationally.24 Language and
DVMUVSBM CBSSJFST  IPXFWFS  IBNQFSFE UIFTF FČPSUT ćFJS MBCPS XBT EJSFDUFE 
GVSUIFSNPSF UPXBSEMBSHFSHFPTUSBUFHJDFOET JODMVEJOHUIFGPSUJĕDBUJPOPGDMJ-
FOUSFHJNFT XIJDIQSFWFOUFEUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGHFOVJOFMZEFNPDSBUJDQPMJD-
JOHTUBOEBSETDIBSBDUFSJ[FECZBSFTQFDUGPSEVFQSPDFTTBOEBDPNNJUNFOUUP
BCPMJTIJOHUPSUVSFBOEPUIFSGPSNTPGCSVUBMJUZ25
6OEFSUIFCBOOFSPGUIFBOUJDPNNVOJTUDSVTBEF SBEJDBMMFęJTUBOEOBUJPOBM-
JTUPSHBOJ[BUJPOTXFSFEFNPOJ[FEUPTVDIBOFYUFOUUIBUUIFJSQSPQPOFOUTXFSF
considered not to have any rights, even when engaging in lawful activity, and

6 Introduction
were subjected to surveillance, arrest, and torture. The architects of the police
QSPHSBNT CFMJFWFE UIF TVQQSFTTJPO PG MFęXJOH HSPVQT  JODMVEJOH UISPVHI
QBSBNJMJUBSZ QPMJDF SBJET  UP CF MFHJUJNBUF JO QSFTFSWJOH UIF HPWFSONFOUT
BVUIPSJUZBOENBJOUBJOJOHMBXBOEPSEFS BTJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZXBTUIPVHIUUPCF
BQSJNBSZSFTQPOTJCJMJUZPGUIFQPMJDF.BOZPGUIFWJPMFOUFYDFTTFTUIBUFOTVFE
were tacitly sanctioned or covered up as part of a counterterror doctrine which
IFMEUIBUTJODFJOTVSHFOUTEJEOPUUZQJDBMMZBCJEFCZ8FTUFSOMFHBMOPSNT OFJ-
UIFSTIPVMEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTPSJUTQSPYJFTJOEFBMJOHXJUIUIFN26
%VSJOH UIF ŴżŸųT BOE ŴżŹųT  QPMJDF GSPN BSPVOE UIF XPSME XFSF TFOU UP
PCTFSWF UIF XPSLJOHT PG UIF '#*  XIPTF NFUIPET JU XBT IPQFE UIFZ XPVME
FNVMBUF(JWFOUIFBHFODZTDIFDLFSFEQBTU UIJTCPEFEJMMGPS DJWJMMJCFSUJFT
'PVOEFE JO ŴżųŻ XJUIJO UIF %FQBSUNFOU PG +VTUJDF  UIF 'FEFSBM #VSFBV PG
*OWFTUJHBUJPOXBTBRVJOUFTTFOUJBMMZQSPHSFTTJWFJOTUJUVUJPOEFTJHOFEUPFYQBOE
UIFHPWFSONFOUTTPDJBMDPOUSPMDBQBCJMJUJFTBOEDFOUSBMJ[FBOUJSBEJDBMBOEBOUJ-
VOJPOQVSTVJUTćPVHIJUCFDBNFJOWPMWFEJODPNCBUJOHPSHBOJ[FEDSJNFBOE
QSPTUJUVUJPO JUTPWFSSJEJOHGPDVTXBTJOUIFSFBMNPGQPMJUJDBMJOUFMMJHFODFBOE
the suppression of groups that threatened the existing power structure, such
as the anarcho-syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World. In August 1919,
BęFSUIFCPNCJOHPGIJTIPNF "UUPSOFZ(FOFSBM".JUDIFMM1BMNFSDSFBUFE
a Radical Division headed by a young J. Edgar Hoover, who saw in the unrest
PG UIF QFSJPE B iWBTU BOE NPOTUSPVT DPOTQJSBDZw UP EFTUSPZ UIF iSFMJHJPOT 
HPWFSONFOUT BOEJOTUJUVUJPOTPGUIF+VEFP$ISJTUJBOXPSMEw27 With Hoover’s
TVQQPSU 1BMNFSJOJUJBUFEBTFSJFTPGSBJETMFBEJOHUPUIFCFBUJOHBOEBSSFTUPG
PWFSUFOUIPVTBOETVTQFDUFESBEJDBMT UIFSBOTBDLJOHPGPďDFTBOEIPNFT BOE
UIFEFQPSUBUJPOPGŸŸŹQFPQMF JODMVEJOHUIFBOBSDIJTU&NNB(PMENBO28
#FHJOOJOHJOUIFMBUFŴżŶųT UIF'#*VOEFSUPPLJUTĕSTUJOUFSOBUJPOBMPQFSB-
UJPOT USBJOJOHUIFTFDSFUQPMJDFPGUIF$IJOFTF(VPNJOEBOHJOUIFVTFPGMJF
detectors, police dogs, weaponry, and electronic surveillance, and during
8PSME8BS**XPSLFEXJUIQPMJDFBHFODJFTJO-BUJO"NFSJDBUPUSBDLEPXO"YJT
QPXFSTZNQBUIJ[FST0XJOHUPGBVMUZJOUFMMJHFODFBOEQBSBOPJEGFBSTPGTVCWFS-
TJPO NBOZSPVOEFEVQJOUIFTFDBNQBJHOTXFSFSJWBMTPG64CBDLFEEJDUBUPST
PS(FSNBO+FXJTISFGVHFFTGPSDJCMZJOUFSOFEBMPOHTJEFBGFXHFOVJOF/B[JTJO
UIF5FYBTEFTFSU*OTQJUFPGJUTĘBXT BTUIFTPDJPMPHJTUT$FDJMJB.FOKÓWBSBOE
/ÏTUPS3PESÓHVF[QPJOUPVU UIFQSPHSBNXBTTJHOJĕDBOUJOUIFFWPMVUJPOPGUIF
Bureau’s practices. It put in place a “new science and technology of surveillance
BOE TPDJBM DPOUSPM  B CVSFBVDSBUJD NFUIPE PG GPMMPXJOH ATVTQFDUT  HBUIFSJOH
JOGPSNBUJPO GSPN AJOGPSNBOUT PS AJOUFSSPHBUJPOT  LFFQJOH ĕMFT  DPOTUSVDUJOH
AMJTUT BOEDFOUSBMJ[JOHAEBUBBUIJHIBENJOJTUSBUJWFMFWFMT wXIJDIXBTGPVOEB-
UJPOBMUPUIFHMPCBMQPMJDFQSPHSBNT29
ćF '#* FYQFSJFODFE JUT NPTU FYQMPTJWF HSPXUI JO UIF ŴżŸųT EVSJOH UIF
McCarthy era, when it was called upon to enforce loyalty oaths, carry out secu-
SJUZDIFDLT BOEFNQMPZJOWFTUJHBUJWFUFDIOJRVFTTVDIBTXJSFUBQQJOH CSFBLJOT 

Introduction 7
BOENBJMJOUFSDFQUT#VJMEJOHPO8PSME8BS*oFSBBOEDPMPOJBMQPMJDJOHQSBD-
UJDFTJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBOEUIF$BSJCCFBO NVDIPGJUTTVSWFJMMBODFXBTDBS-
SJFEPVUVOEFSUIFBVTQJDFTPG$0*/5&-130 $PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF1SPHSBN 
FTUBCMJTIFE JO ŴżŸŹ XJUI UIF BJN PG iEJTSVQUJOH  IBSBTTJOH  BOE EJTDSFEJUJOHw
UIF"NFSJDBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZBOEPUIFSiTVCWFSTJWFwPSHBOJ[BUJPOTUISPVHI
iDSFBUJWFw BOE iBHHSFTTJWFw NFUIPET  JODMVEJOH UIF EJTTFNJOBUJPO PG iCMBDLw
QSPQBHBOEB NJTJOGPSNBUJPO 30ćFUBSHFUTPG$0*/5&-130DBNFUPJODMVEF
BXJEFTQFDUSVNPGUIF"NFSJDBOMFę JODMVEJOHDJWJMSJHIUTBDUJWJTUTTVDIBT
1BVM3PCFTPOBOE.BSUJO-VUIFS,JOH+S UIFBOUJXBSBOETUVEFOUNPWFNFOUT 
UIF#MBDL1BOUIFS1BSUZ BOEUIF"NFSJDBO*OEJBO.PWFNFOUćF'#*XBTQBS-
UJDVMBSMZFČFDUJWFBUVTJOHTBCPUFVSTUPJOĕMUSBUFBOEGPNFOUEJTTFOTJPOXJUIJO
UIF/FX-FęBOEFODPVSBHFEDPVOUFSQSPEVDUJWFGPSNTPGQSPUFTU DPOUSJCVUJOH
UPJUTFWFOUVBMJNQMPTJPO3PCFSU)BSEZ BO'#*JOGPSNBOU UFTUJĕFEUIBUIFMFE
UIJSUZBOUJXBSBDUJWJTUTJOBSBJEPOB$BNEFO /FX+FSTFZ ESBęCPBSEJOŴżźŴ 
UFBDIJOHUIFNiIPXUPDVUHMBTTBOEPQFOXJOEPXTXJUIPVUNBLJOHBOPJTF‫ڀڀ‬
IPXUPPQFOĕMFDBCJOFUTXJUIPVUBLFZw31
"TUIFTFBDUJPOTJMMVTUSBUF $0*/5&-130SFTVMUFEJONZSJBEDPOTUJUVUJPOBM
WJPMBUJPOT JODMVEJOHJMMFHBMTVSWFJMMBODF CMBDLNBJM BOEDPMMVTJPOXJUIQPMJDF 
BTJOUIFNVSEFSPG$IJDBHP#MBDL1BOUIFSBDUJWJTUT'SFE)BNQUPOBOE.BSL
$MBSLćF"NFSJDBO*OEJBO.PWFNFOUBOEUIF1BOUIFSTXFSFTVCKFDUFEUPUIF
HSFBUFTUSFQSFTTJPO BOENBOZPGUIFJSNFNCFSTXFSFJNQSJTPOFEPSLJMMFE32
COINTELPRO was exposed in 1971 after a break-in at FBI offices in Pennsylva-
OJBBOEXBTSFQVEJBUFECZUIF"NFSJDBOQVCMJDćFSFQPSUPGUIFJOWFTUJHBUJOH
DPNNJUUFFIFBEFECZ4FOBUPS'SBOL$IVSDI BO*EBIP%FNPDSBU DIBSBDUFS-
J[FEJUBTBiWJHJMBOUFPQFSBUJPOwJOWPMWJOHGVOEBNFOUBMMZVOEFNPDSBUJDUFDI-
OJRVFT/FWFSUIFMFTT JUQSPWJEFEBNPEFMGPSQPMJUJDBMQPMJDJOHPQFSBUJPOTJO
the developing world.33#FDBVTFPGJOBEFRVBUFKVEJDJBMPWFSTJHIUBOEDPOTUJUV-
UJPOBMDIFDLTPXJOHUPBEJČFSFOUQPMJUJDBMDMJNBUF UIFIVNBODPTUTPGUIFTF
operations were usually far worse. The United States created vast policing appa-
ratuses where none had existed before and strengthened local powerbrokers,
XIPVTFEQPMJDFBJEUPSFQSFTTUIFJSQPMJUJDBMPQQPTJUJPO)JHIMZEBNBHJOHXBT
UIFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFBOEUIFJODVMDBUJPOPGBOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZJEFPM-
PHZUIBUBMMPXFEGPSUIFSBUJPOBMJ[BUJPOPGHSPTTIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTBOE
DSVFMUJFT BTQPMJDFUPSUVSFSTBOENVSEFSFSTIBWFUIFNTFMWFTBDLOPXMFEHFE34
0QFSBUJOHVOEFSUIFQSFNJTFUIBUHPPEQPMJDJOHJTBQJWPUBMDIBSBDUFSJTUJDPG
BNPEFSOOBUJPO "NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJOUSPEVDFEUFDIOJDBMJOOPWB-
UJPOTBOETPVHIUUPQSPWJEFGPSFJHOQPMJDFXJUITLJMMTJONBOBHFNFOU ĕOHFS-
QSJOUJOH  JOUFMMJHFODF HBUIFSJOH  DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDT  BOE DPVOUFSUFSSPSJTN  BT
XFMMBTNPSFNVOEBOFUBTLTMJLFUSBďDDPOUSPMćFZQSPNPUFEQFOBMSFGPSN
BOETFUVQUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFTUPJOTUJUVUJPOBMJ[FQSPGFTTJPOBMTUBOEBSET*OUFS-
OBMJ[JOHCSPBEFSTPDJFUBMOPSNTJOWJFXJOHUFDIOPMPHZBTBNBSLFSPGBEWBODF-
NFOUBOEBQBUIXBZUPTPDJBMQSPHSFTT "NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTXFSFDPNNJUUFEUP

8 Introduction
JNQPSUJOHUIFTDJFOUJĕDQPMJDJOHNPEFMQSFWBMFOUJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUP
NPEFSOJ[JOH QPMJDF BENJOJTUSBUJPO ćFZ TUSFTTFE UIF JNQPSUBODF PG SFDPSE
LFFQJOH BT B NFBOT PG FMFWBUJOH BSSFTU BOE QSPTFDVUJPO SBUFT BOE QSPWJEFE
GVOET UP VQHSBEF QPMJDF QBZ BOE CFOFĕUT JO PSEFS UP MJNJU DPSSVQUJPO ćFZ
GVSUIFSTVQQMJFETUBUFPGUIFBSUFRVJQNFOU JODMVEJOHSBEJPTBOEUFMFDPNNV-
OJDBUJPOHFBS ĕOHFSQSJOULJUT SFWPMWFST IBOEDVČT BOEMBCPSBUPSZNBUFSJBMT JO
BEEJUJPOUPQPMJDFDSVJTFSTBOEWFIJDMFT IBOEHSFOBEFT HBTNBTLT BOETIJFMET
for riot control.35
*U XBT OPU QPMJDF NPEFSOJ[BUJPO JO JUTFMG  IPXFWFS  CVU UIF QPMJUJDBM DPO-
UFYUJOXIJDIUIFQSPHSBNTXFSFJNQMFNFOUFEUIBUSFTVMUFEJOUIFTQSFBEPG
NBKPS IVNBO SJHIUT BCVTFT#FDBVTFQPMJDFUSBJOFE CZ UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT GSF-
RVFOUMZTFSWFEBTUIFFOGPSDFNFOUBSNPGVOEFNPDSBUJDSFHJNFTWBMVFECZUIF
"NFSJDBOTGPSQSPNPUJOHGSFFUSBEFBOEBOUJDPNNVOJTNBOEPSJFOUFEUPXBSE
JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ BOE TPDJBM DPOUSPM  UIF OFX FRVJQNFOU GSFRVFOUMZ BJEFE BO
JOUFOTJĕDBUJPO PG TUBUF SFQSFTTJPO  JO FČFDU NPEFSOJ[JOH JU ćF DSFBUJPO PG
elaborate intelligence infrastructures allowing for better coordination in track-
ing down “subversives,” who often represented popular aspirations for social
KVTUJDFBOEDIBOHF BDDFMFSBUFEUIJTEFWFMPQNFOU
Although in theory trainees were supposed to be apolitical, when “all the
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conservative, owing in part to the ideological conditioning they underwent. An
internal blueprint stated that “political orientation should be subtly included
JOUIFPWFSBMMJOTUSVDUJPOwBOEUIBUiUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBTTPNFUIJOHUPTFMMB
GBWPSBCMFJNQSFTTJPOPGEFNPDSBDZw$PNJOHGSPNBTPDJBMTFDUPSEFTDSJCFECZ
Los Angeles police chief Willie Parker in the early 1960s as “conservative, ultra-
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JNQBSUBOPCTFTTJPOXJUITFDVSJUZ SFTVMUJOHJOUIFDSFBUJPOPGNBTTTVSWFJMMBODF
TUBUFT BOE UIF EFWBMVJOH PG QFSTPOBM MJCFSUJFT "NFSJDBO QPMJDF XFSF UIFN-
TFMWFTPSHBOJ[FEBMPOHBVUIPSJUBSJBOBOEQSFEPNJOBOUMZNJMJUBSZMJOFT JOQBSU
CFDBVTFMFBEJOHQSPQPOFOUTPGQPMJDFQSPGFTTJPOBMJTNXFSFNJMJUBSZWFUFSBOT 
which was not conducive to the spread of enlightened practice.36
"ęFS8PSME8BS** QPMJDFQSPHSBNTFNFSHFEBTBDSVDJBMEJNFOTJPOPGUIF
U.S. occupation of South Korea and in Japan, where they were designed to con-
TPMJEBUFUIFQPXFSPGUIFQSP8FTU-JCFSBM%FNPDSBUJD1BSUZBOEDSBDLEPXO
PO UIF +BQBOFTF $PNNVOJTU 1BSUZ BOE MBCPS NPWFNFOU %VSJOH UIF &JTFO-
hower presidency, police training was institutionalized under what was known
BTUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN MBUFSUIF0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBN 0*41 
SVOPVUPGUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU XIPTFDFOUSBMNJTTJPOXBTUPEFWFMPQMPDBM
police and security forces to “provide internal security in countries vulnerable
UPDPNNVOJTUTVCWFSTJPOwBOEUPiBJEJOUIFEFUFDUJPOPGDPNNVOJTUBHFOUTBOE
GFMMPXUSBWFMFSTwBOEiTVQQSFTTMPDBMEJTTJEFODFCFGPSFNJMJUBSZUZQFBDUJPOXBT
OFDFTTBSZw ćF QMBOOJOH CPBSE JODMVEFE IBSEMJOFST GSPN UIF 1FOUBHPO BOE

Introduction 9
$*"XIPXFSFPCTFTTFEXJUIiUIFUFDIOJRVFTPGJOUFSOBUJPOBMDPNNVOJTNw*U
XBTJOJUJBMMZIFBEFECZ%PVHMBT.BD"SUIVS** BGPSNFS044 0ďDFPG4USBUFHJD
4FSWJDFT PQFSBUJWFBOEOFQIFXPGUIFGBNPVTHFOFSBM XIPMBUFSTFSWFEBTUIF
BNCBTTBEPSUP+BQBOBOE*SBO)FXBTTVDDFFEFECZ)FOSZ7JMMBSE BPOFUJNF
TJMFOUNPWJFBDUPSBOEHSBOETPOPGUIFBCPMJUJPOJTU8JMMJBN-MPZE(BSSJTPO 
XIPIBECFFOUIFĕSTUDIJFGPGUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUT"GSJDBO"ČBJST%JWJTJPO
EVSJOH8PSME8BS**BOEBNCBTTBEPSUP-JCZBJOUIFFBSMZŴżŸųT37
"O JOUFSOBM PVUMJOF PG UIF ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN XSJUUFO CZ $PMPOFM "MCFSU 3
Haney, CIA station chief in Seoul during the Korean War and an architect
PGUIFŴżŸŷ(VBUFNBMBODPVQ TUBUFT i"OFďDJFOUJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZTZTUFNJT
BGVOEBNFOUBMBTQFDUPGBOZHSPXJOHTPDJFUZBOEDPOUSJCVUFTTVCTUBOUJBMMZUP
JUTPSEFSMZQSPHSFTTBOEEFWFMPQNFOUw*O)BOFZTWJFX "NFSJDBOTVQQPSUGPS
EJTUBTUFGVMQPMJUJDBMSFHJNFT JODMVEJOHEJDUBUPSTIJQTBOEKVOUBT XBTOFDFTTBSZ
UPQSFWFOUUIFMPTTPGBOBMMZUPOFVUSBMJTNPSDPNNVOJTUDPOUSPM
$POGSPOUFE BT XF BSF BHBJOTU B EFBEMZ FOFNZ XIP JT IJHIMZ EJTDJQMJOFE BOE
PSHBOJ[FE BOE EFEJDBUFE UP PVS DBQJUVMBUJPO  UIF 64 DBOOPU BČPSE UIF NPSBM
MVYVSZPGIFMQJOHPOMZUIPTFSFHJNFTJOUIFGSFFXPSMEUIBUNFFUPVSJEFBMTPGTFMG
HPWFSONFOU‫'ڀڀ‬PSUIPTFXIPEFDSZFČPSUTUPNBLFPWFSPUIFSTJOPVSMJLFOFTT
BOEUIPTFXIPPQQPTFIFMQJOHVOEFNPDSBUJDSFHJNFTUPFOUSFODIUIFNTFMWFTJO
QPXFS MFUJUCFTBJEUIBU"NFSJDBONFUIPETare in fact superiorUPNPTUPUIFST
JOUIFXPSMEBOEJGXFBSFUPIFMQUIFNDPNCBUDPNNVOJTNXFDBODPOUSJCVUF
HSFBUMZUPUIFBEPQUJPOPG"NFSJDBOEFNPDSBUJDXBZTJOBDIJFWJOHUIJTFOE38

ćFTFDPNNFOUTFYFNQMJGZUIFFYUSFNFOBUJPOBMJTNBOEBOUJDPNNVOJTN
DIBSBDUFSJTUJDPGUIFQPTUXBSFSBBOEUIFLJOEPGNPSBMMPHJDVTFEUPSBUJPOBM-
J[FTVQQPSUGPSXJEFTDBMFSFQSFTTJPO4UBČFEXJUINFOPGMJLFNJOE UIF,FO-
OFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOFYQBOEFEUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTUPOFXIFJHIUTJOBMBSHFS
JOGBUVBUJPOXJUIVODPOWFOUJPOBMXBSGBSF$POUSBSZUPUIFIVNBOJUBSJBOJNBHF
QSPNPUFE JO QPQVMBS DVMUVSF BOE GBXOJOH NFNPJST XSJUUFO CZ GPSNFS BJEFT 
,FOOFEZXBTB$PME8BSSJPSXIPFNCSBDFEWJPMFODFBTBNFBOTPGFYQBOE-
JOH"NFSJDBOHMPCBMIFHFNPOZ39 0QQPTFEUP&JTFOIPXFSTDPNNJUNFOUUPB
OVDMFBSBSNTCVJMEVQ IFQSPNPUFEBĘFYJCMFSFTQPOTFEPDUSJOFDBMMJOHGPSOFX
DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZTUSBUFHJFTJOUIFGBDFPGSBEJDBMOBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOUTJOUIF
developing world.
*OŴżŹŴ JOUIFBęFSNBUIPGUIF#BZPG1JHTEFCBDMF ,FOOFEZDPOWFOFEB
cabinet-level Special Group on Counter-Insurgency, headed by his brother
3PCFSU BOE ĕWFTUBS HFOFSBM .BYXFMM 5BZMPS  XIJDI DIBNQJPOFE UIF USBJO-
ing of indigenous security forces in unconventional warfare and the creation
PG iIVOUFSLJMMFSw UFBNT 3PCFSU 8 ,PNFS PG UIF /BUJPOBM 4FDVSJUZ $PVODJM
BEWJTFEDPMMFBHVFTUIBUiXIJMFUSFBUZBSSBOHFNFOUTBOEJOUFSOBUJPOBMMBXwXFSF
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BDUJPOXIFOPWFSSJEJOHOBUJPOBMJOUFSFTUTQSFWBJM‫<ڀڀ‬8>IFOBHPWFSONFOU
UIBUJTJOJNJDBMUP64JOUFSFTUTFNFSHFT SJTLTTIPVMECFFWBMVBUFEJOFODPVSBH-
JOHBOETVQQPSUJOHUIFPWFSUISPXPGUIBUHPWFSONFOUw40

10 Introduction
ćFTF SFNBSLT SFWFBM UIF FNCSBDF PG UFSSPSJTU NFUIPET CZ 8BTIJOHUPOT
iCFTUBOEUIFCSJHIUFTU wXIPBSHVFEUIFOFFEUPNBYJNJ[FQPMJDFUSBJOJOHXJUI-
PVUEBNBHJOHUIFQVCMJDJNBHFPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT iXJUIEVFSFDPHOJUJPOUIBU
TQFDJĕDDPVOUSZQSPHSBNTXJMMPęFOGBMMTIPSUPGUIJTJEFBMwPXJOHUPiMPDBMMJN-
itations.”41 In 1962 Kennedy established the Office of Public Safety (OPS) within
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UIF DJWJMJBO QPMJDF DPNQPOFOU PG JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ GPSDFT JO VOEFSEFWFMPQFE
TUBUFT ‫  ڀ ڀ‬JEFOUJGZ FBSMZ UIF TZNQUPNT PG BO JODJQJFOU TVCWFSTJWF TJUVBUJPO w
BOE iNBJOUBJO MBX BOE PSEFS XJUIPVU VOOFDFTTBSZ CMPPETIFE BOE BO PCUSV-
sive display of the bayonet.”42 Until it was disbanded in 1974, the OPS supplied
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toward these ends. The Philippines constabulary developed at the turn of the
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BOEJUTSPMFJODPNCBUJOHNFTTJBOJDQFBTBOUSFWPMUTUIBUUISFBUFOFE"NFSJDBO
DPMPOJBMEPNJOBUJPO
The OPS director, Byron Engle, was a Kansas City police captain and a CIA
operative who ran police operations in Japan and Turkey after World War II.
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J[FSwIFXBTDPNNJUUFEUPJNQSPWJOHQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPO DPNNVOJDBUJPOT 
surveillance, and record keeping in the countries in which he operated world-
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NFFUJOHTPGUIF4QFDJBM(SPVQBOEFTUBCMJTIFEBDMPTFDPOOFDUJPOCFUXFFOUIF
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PGEFFQDPNNJUNFOUUPDJWJMJBOQPMJDFXPSLBTBOJNQPSUBOUBOEXPSUIXIJMF
occupation in society and an appreciation for the darker areas of political police
intelligence.”43
Under Engle’s oversight, hundreds of foreign police were brought each year
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DPOTJEFSFEUIF8FTU1PJOUPGMBXFOGPSDFNFOU)FBEFECZ.JDIBFM.D$BOO 
an FBI agent and Indiana state trooper who trained the Shah’s security appa-
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QSPWJEFEJOTUSVDUJPOJOQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPO TDJFOUJĕDNFUIPET DPVOUFSJO-
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DPNNVOJTN‰BUXIBUFWFSIVNBODPTU
.PTUDPOUSPWFSTJBMXBTBTFDSFUCPNCNBLJOHDPVSTFJO-PT'SFTOPT 5FYBT 
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.D$BOOUPME&OHMFJOBQSJWBUFNFFUJOHUIBUiUIFPČFOTJWFVTFPGFYQMPTJWFT

Introduction 11
would be vital in order to inculcate an understanding of the capabilities
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UFDIOJRVFTw"TXJUINJMJUBSZBDBEFNJFTTVDIBTUIF4DIPPMPGUIF"NFSJDBT B
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NBUJPOBOEBTTJTUBODFUP"NFSJDBOJOUFMMJHFODF QBWJOHUIFXBZGPSHSFBUFS64
QPMJUJDBM JOĘVFODF BOE DPOUSPM 0DDBTJPOBMMZ BO PWFSTFBT DPSQPSBUJPO XPVME
send a private security officer to the IPA, as did Gulf Oil, Firestone Rubber of
-JCFSJB BOEUIF"SBCJBO"NFSJDBO0JM$PNQBOZ44
3PCFSU,PNFS B$*"WFUFSBOXIPTFSWFEBTEJSFDUPSPGQBDJĕDBUJPOJO7JFU-
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#VOEZ  UIF QSFTJEFOUT TQFDJBM BTTJTUBOU GPS OBUJPOBM TFDVSJUZ BČBJST  ,PNFS
TUSFTTFEUIBUUIFQPMJDFXFSFiNPSFWBMVBCMFUIBO4QFDJBM'PSDFTJOPVSHMPCBM
DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZFČPSUTwBOEQBSUJDVMBSMZVTFGVMJOĕHIUJOHVSCBOJOTVSSFD-
UJPOT i8F HFU NPSF GSPN UIF QPMJDF JO UFSNT PG QSFWFOUBUJWF NFEJDJOF UIBO
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PGIBOE BTJO4PVUI7JFUOBN EPFTUIFNJMJUBSZIBWFUPCFDBMMFEJOw46
.JSSPSJOH UIF UIJOLJOH PG #SJUJTI JNQFSJBM TUSBUFHJTUT TVDI BT 8JOTUPO
Churchill, who wrote in 1954 that an “efficient police force and intelligence
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BOE NBZ TBWF IFBWZ FYQFOEJUVSFT PO NJMJUBSZ SFJOGPSDFNFOUT w UIFTF DPN-
NFOUTJMMVNJOBUFUIFVOEFSMZJOHHFPTUSBUFHJDJNQFSBUJWFTTIBQJOHUIFHSPXUI
PGUIFQSPHSBNTBOEUIFNPCJMJ[BUJPOPGQPMJDFGPSQPMJUJDBMBOENJMJUBSZFOET 
XIJDIBDDPVOUFEGPSUIFTQSFBEPGIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFT$IBSMFT.BFDIMJOH
Jr., staff director of the Special Group on Counter-Insurgency, acknowledged
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OBMKVTUJDFBOEDJWJMSJHIUT UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFESFHJNFTIBWJOHPOMZB
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JO QBSUJDVMBS XBT JNNFEJBUFMZ QVU UP VTF JO USBDLJOH EPXO TUVEFOU SBEJDBMT
and union organizers.”47
.BFDIMJOHT SFNBSLT DPOTUJUVUF B TUSJLJOH BENJTTJPO BOE VOEFSTDPSF UIF

12 Introduction
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QPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTBTBNFBOTPGQSPWJEJOHUIFTFDVSJUZEFFNFEOFDFT-
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NPEFSOJ[BUJPOUIFPSJTUTBOEB4QFDJBM(SPVQNFNCFS XBTUIBUDPNNVOJTN
was a “disease of the transition”; it prospered when the need for savings reduced
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GPSEFWFMPQNFOUBOEGPSBUUSBDUJOHGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU49
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QPXFSUIBOBMJCFSBMHPWFSONFOUJGJUJTJOEVMHFOUBOESFMBYFEBOEQFOFUSBUFE
CZDPNNVOJTUTw50ćFTFSFNBSLTIFMQFYQMBJOUIFTUSBUFHJDDBMDVMBUJPOTVOEFS-
MZJOH "NFSJDBO TVQQPSU GPS SJHIUXJOH EJDUBUPST EVSJOH UIF $PME 8BS BOE
UIFJNQPSUBODFBUUBDIFEUPQPMJDFUSBJOJOHJOCPMTUFSJOHUIFJSQPXFS,FOOBO
SFGFSSFEUPIVNBOSJHIUTJOUIF'BS&BTUBTBOVOSFBMJTUJDPCKFDUJWFUPQVSTVF 
owing to the region’s perceived backwardness and need to deal in “straight
QPXFS DPODFQUTw ćF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU BUUSJCVUFE IVNBO SJHIUT BCVTFT JO
-BUJO "NFSJDB  NFBOXIJMF  UP iQFSWBTJWF DVMUVSBM BOE MFHBM BUUJUVEFT UZQJDBM
PGMFTTFSEFWFMPQFEDPVOUSJFT wXIJDI JUQSFEJDUFE XPVMEiCFPWFSDPNFBTUIF
DPVOUSZHSBEVBMMZNPEFSOJ[FTw51
/PU DPJODJEFOUBMMZ  HJWFO TVDI BUUJUVEFT  "NOFTUZ *OUFSOBUJPOBM EPDV-
NFOUFEXJEFTQSFBEQIZTJDBMBOEQTZDIPMPHJDBMUPSUVSFCZQPMJDFJOUXFOUZGPVS
PGUIFGPSUZOJOFOBUJPOTUIBUIPTUFEQPMJDFUSBJOJOHUFBNT%FDMBTTJĕFEJOUFS-
SPHBUJPONBOVBMTVTFEBUUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZTIPXBQBSUJDVMBS
FNQIBTJTPOTFOTPSZEFQSJWBUJPOBOEPUIFSQTZDIPMPHJDBMUPSUVSFUFDIOJRVFT
EFSJWFE GSPN $*"GVOEFE NJOEDPOUSPM FYQFSJNFOUT  XIJDI XFSF XJEFMZ
adopted across the so-called Third World. Special Forces officer Donald Dun-
DBOUFTUJĕFECFGPSFUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM8BS$SJNFT5SJCVOBM PSHBOJ[FEJOŴżŹŹ
CZUIFQIJMPTPQIFS#FSUSBOE3VTTFMM UIBU"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTSBSFMZQBSUJDJQBUFE
UIFNTFMWFT JO UPSUVSF TFTTJPOT  EFGFSSJOH UP UIFJS QSPUÏHÏT MBSHFMZ GPS UBDUJDBM
SFBTPOT ćFZ EJE OPU XBOU UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT UP CF JEFOUJĕFE XJUI QPMJUJDBM
SFQSFTTJPOBOEDPVMEDMBJNQMBVTJCMFEFOJBCJMJUZXIFOBCVTFTHPUPGIBOE BT
XJUIUIFDPWFSU1IPFOJYQSPHSBN XIJDIBJNFEUPXJQFPVUUIFMFBEFSTIJQPG
UIFSFWPMVUJPOBSZNPWFNFOUJO4PVUI7JFUOBNUISPVHIDPPSEJOBUFEQPMJDJOH
and targeted assassination.52
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTVMUJNBUFMZFYFNQMJGZUIFEBOHFSTPGTPDJBMFOHJOFFSJOH
FČPSUTCZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUIFIJEEFOBOEDPFSDJWFBTQFDUTPG"NFSJDBO
QPXFS 6OMJLF UIF TQFDUBDVMBS CVU FQIFNFSBM QZSPUFDIOJDT PG UIF CBUUMFĕFME 
UIFTF USBJOJOH QSPHSBNT VTVBMMZ IBE MPOHUFSN DPOTFRVFODFT GPS UIF TVCKFDU

Introduction 13
TPDJFUZ‰GPTUFSJOHOFXFMJUFT DSFBUJOHBMBTUJOHBQQBSBUVTPGTPDJBMDPOUSPM BOE
PęFOJOUSPEVDJOHBQPUFOUNFDIBOJTNGPSUIFTVQQSFTTJPOPGTPDJBMSFGPSN*O
UIJTMBTUSFTQFDU UIFZQSPWFEFČFDUJWFJOBEWBODJOH"NFSJDBOJNQFSJBMBNCJ-
tions, which were rooted in part in the desire to integrate countries of the devel-
PQJOHXPSMEJOUPUIFHMPCBMDBQJUBMJTUFDPOPNZBOEDSFBUFBTUBCMFFOWJSPONFOU
GPSJOWFTUNFOUBOEUSBEF53ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTDPVMEBMTPCBDLĕSF IPXFWFS 
and breed uncontrollable violence, instability, and resistance in a “blowback
FČFDUw*OOVNFSPVTDBTFTUIFZGVFMFEUIFSJTFPGSPHVFPQFSBUPSTXIPVTFEUIF
QPMJDJOHBQQBSBUVTCVJMUVQCZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUPDBSWFPVUQFSTPOBMĕFGTBOE
XJQFPVUSJWBMT XBSQJOHEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQNFOU
0XJOH UP DVMUVSBM CBSSJFST BOE BO VOEFSMZJOH QBUFSOBMJTN  QPMJDF DPN-
NBOEFSTPęFOIBEMJUUMFSFTQFDUGPS64BEWJTFSTCVUBDDFQUFEXFBQPOSZPVU
PGTFMGJOUFSFTU"MBSHFEFHSFFPGDZOJDJTNDPOTFRVFOUMZBDDPNQBOJFEUIFQSP-
HSBNT&OHMFHSVNCMFEUPDPMMFBHVFTUIBUXIBUiBMMUIFTFDPVOUSJFTXBOUFEXBT
BOAFRVJQNFOUESPQBOEOPUPVSBEWJDFw#VUBTB64"*%PďDJBMSFDPHOJ[FE 
iUPIBWFBGPSNFSEFTLTFSHFBOUJOTPNFUXPCJUUPXOXIFSFIFXBTSFTQPOTJCMF
GPSUXFOUZQPMJDFNFOHJWFBEWJDFUPBXFMMFEVDBUFEQPMJDFHFOFSBMXIPDPNFT
GSPNUIFTPDJBMFMJUFPGIJTDPVOUSZBOEDPNNBOETMJUFSBMMZUIPVTBOETPGNFOJT
an insult.”54
While differing political contexts have ensured different results historically,
UIFSFBSFTPNFQBUUFSOTUIBUFNFSHFBTVOJWFSTBM JOQBSUJDVMBSUIFSPMFPGUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTJOQSPWJEJOHTPQIJTUJDBUFEQPMJDJOHFRVJQNFOUBOEUSZJOHUPQSP-
GFTTJPOBMJ[FUIFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVTPGDMJFOUSFHJNFTBTBNFBOTPGGPS-
UJGZJOHUIFJSQPXFS/FXUFDIOPMPHJFTXFSFEFWFMPQFEJOBOBUUFNQUUPBEWBODF
UIFFďDJFODZPGUIJTMBUUFSUBTL UIPVHIUIFPWFSSJEJOHHPBMSFNBJOFEUIFTBNF 
GSPNUIF1IJMJQQJOFTPDDVQBUJPOPOEPXO
ćJT CPPL CSFBLT OFX HSPVOE JO QSPWJEJOH B DPNQBSBUJWF BOBMZTJT PG UIF
QPMJDFQSPHSBNTTQPOTPSFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUIFJSMJOLUPUIFTQSFBE
PGQPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPOćFUPQJDIBTCFFOJHOPSFEJONPTUTUBOEBSEIJTUPSJFT
Martha K. Huggins’s Political Policing offers a notable exception in detailing the
IJTUPSZPGQPMJDFUSBJOJOHBOEUIFMJOLUPNBKPSIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTJO#SB-
zil. A. J. Langguth’s Hidden Terrors is a revealing journalistic exposé of police
USBJOJOHBOETUBUFTQPOTPSFEUFSSPSJTNJO-BUJO"NFSJDBEVSJOHUIF$PME8BS
ćPNBT -PCFT EJTTFSUBUJPO DPWFST UIF JNQBDU PG UIF QSPHSBNT JO ćBJMBOE
Michael T. Klare’s War without End and Michael McClintock’s Instruments of
Statecraft and The American ConnectionTIPXUIFDFOUSBMJUZPGUIFQSPHSBNTUP
HMPCBMDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZTUSBUFHJFT/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO
in The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism and Gabriel Kolko
in Confronting the Third World DPOUFYUVBMJ[FUIFNBTQBSUPGBMBSHFSQBUUFSO
PG TVCWFSTJPO JO UIF ćJSE 8PSME  ESJWFO CZ FDPOPNJD BOE PUIFS JNQFSJBMJTU
NPUJWFT XIJMF"MGSFE8.D$PZJOA Question of Torture shows their contri-
bution to the spread of torture. More recently, in Policing America’s Empire,

14 Introduction
McCoy chronicles the history of the Philippines constabulary and its adoption
PG BEWBODFE NFUIPET PG TVSWFJMMBODF  JOUJNJEBUJPO  BOE WJPMFODF UP TFDVSF
JNQFSJBMEPNJOBUJPOćFTFNFUIPETXFSFMBUFSBQQSPQSJBUFECZQPMJDJOHJOTUJ-
tutions in the United States, contributing to an erosion of civil liberties.55
Building on these invaluable works, Modernizing Repression incorporates
OFXMZ EFDMBTTJĕFE EPDVNFOUT  JODMVEJOH UIF ĕFME SFQPSUT PG QPMJDF BEWJTFST 
UP QSPWJEF B DPNQBSBUJWF BOBMZTJT PG UIF QPMJDF USBJOJOH QSPHSBNT BOE UIFJS
IBSNGVMFČFDUT*ONZWJFX UIFQSPHSBNTFODBQTVMBUFIPXUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
SFTFNCMFTPUIFSFNQJSFTJOCFJOHTVTUBJOFECZWJPMFODFBOEDPFSDJPO56 Much
SFDFOUTDIPMBSTIJQJO"NFSJDBOEJQMPNBUJDIJTUPSZIBTGPDVTFEPONPEFSOJ[B-
UJPOUIFPSZBOEBOUJDPNNVOJTUiOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwBTUIFLFZNPUJWBUJOHGBDUPST
ESJWJOH"NFSJDBOGPSFJHOQPMJDZEVSJOHUIF$PME8BS57 Police training can be
seen as central to both processes. It served key political and ideological func-
UJPOTJOFTUBCMJTIJOHUIFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZEFFNFEOFDFTTBSZGPSMJCFSBMDBQJUBMJTU
EFWFMPQNFOUBOEJUXBTDSVDJBMBTXFMMJOVQHSBEJOHUIFTVSWFJMMBODFDBQBD-
JUZPGTUBUFTJOUIFEFWFMPQJOHXPSME UIVTBMMPXJOHGPSNPSFFYUFOTJWFTPDJBM
DPOUSPM‰UIF VMUJNBUF NBSLFS PG NPEFSOJUZ JO UIF QPTU&OMJHIUFONFOU FSB58
Therein lay its dark side.
ćFĕSTUTFDUJPOPGUIFCPPL i5BLJOH6QUIFA8IJUF.BOT#VSEFO wEJT-
DVTTFTUIFQJPOFFSJOHFČPSUTCZUIF64NJMJUBSZUPDSFBUFQPMJDFDPOTUBCVMBSJFT
in the Philippines and the Caribbean in order to solidify colonial occupations
JOUIFĕSTUIBMGPGUIFUXFOUJFUIDFOUVSZ%SBXJOHPOUIFEPNFTUJDJOOPWBUJPOT
PGUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SB "NFSJDBODPNNBOEFSTJNQBSUFETPQIJTUJDBUFEQPMJDF
UFDIOPMPHJFTBOEQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFUFDIOJRVFTXJUIUIFBJNPGTVQQSFTTJOH
OBUJPOBMJTUBOENFTTJBOJDQFBTBOUNPWFNFOUTćF6OJUFE4UBUFTJOUVSOIFMQFE
UPFTUBCMJTITPNFPGUIFĕSTUNPEFSOQPMJDFTUBUFT XIJDIQSPWJEFEBNPEFMGPS
TVCTFRVFOUJOUFSWFOUJPOT
ćFTFDPOETFDUJPO i6OEFSUIF'BDBEFPG#FOFWPMFODF wFYBNJOFTUIFFWP-
MVUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTEVSJOHUIF$PME8BSQFSJPEBOEUIFJSDFOUSBMJUZ
UP PQFSBUJPOT NFBOU UP iSPMM CBDLw UIF QSPHSFTT PG DPNNVOJTN JO 4PVUIFBTU
Asia. The “reverse course” in Japan was a watershed in that, fearing the loss of
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USPM JODMVEJOHUIFVTFPGUFBSHBTUPRVFMMVSCBOEFNPOTUSBUJPOT XIJDICFDBNF
BGFBUVSFPGUIFQSPHSBNT*O4PVUI7JFUOBN XIFSFJUIBEUIFMBSHFTUCVEHFU 
the OPS laid the groundwork for Operation Phoenix, though it spiraled out of
DPOUSPM CSFFEJOHJOEJTDSJNJOBUFWJPMFODF
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JODPSQPSBUFEBTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB CZNBOZPGUIFTBNFQFSTPOOFM BOEXJUIB

Introduction 15
TJNJMBSPVUDPNF*O-BUJO"NFSJDB UIFUSBEJUJPOBMXPSLTIPQPGFNQJSF QVCMJD
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little attention to historical precedent, and, predictably, history repeated itself.
1SPCMFNT XFSF BHHSBWBUFE CZ B SFMJBODF PO QSJWBUF TFDVSJUZ DPSQPSBUJPOT BOE
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Despite its preponderant power, the United States has often failed to assert its
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USJCVUFEUPUIFTQSFBEPGQPMJUJDBMWJPMFODFEVSJOHBOFSBPG"NFSJDBOHMPCBM
IFHFNPOZJTUIFTVCKFDUPGUIJTCPPL

16 Introduction
Part I
Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”
Imperial Policing in the Philippines and
the Caribbean
Do his orders come at one a.m.,
He’s on his way by two.
Tho’ lacking rations for his men,
He’ll stay till he gets through.
He may be gone a week or month.
To Samar or to—well,
The daily papers never learn
What this young man could tell.
‰i$POTUBCVMBSZ.BO wQPQVMBSTPOH

We were all imbued with the fact that we were trustees of a huge estate that
belonged to minors.
‰(eneral Smedley Butler )BJUJ 

From the Philippine Islands in 1901 to Afghanistan in 2012, police training,


through a cadre of technical specialists, has been a central facet of Washington’s
foreign interventions. The programs evolved in distinctive ways and have been
carried out by different bureaucratic agencies, including the military, the State
Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and, more recently, private merce-
nary firms such as DynCorp and Xe ( formerly Blackwater). The primary motive,
consistent across time and space, has been to fortify and gain leverage over the
internal security apparatus of client regimes and to root out groups resisting U.S.
power. In addition, the programs have provided an opportunity for exporting new
policing technologies and administrative techniques, as well as modern weaponry
and equipment which has all too often been used for repressive ends.
American imperialism has been driven by a yearning for commercial trade
and growth as well as a missionary-like zeal to export American institutions and
ideologies abroad. The Progressive Era was a watershed moment, owing to the
maturation of an industrial economy with a productive capacity outstripping
domestic demand, the flowering of social Darwinian philosophies, and the devel-
opment of a modern military and government bureaucracy. The new American

17
empire required an infrastructure of shipping lanes, naval bases, treaty ports, and
coaling stations, which fueled the conquest of the Philippines, and that of Haiti
and Nicaragua following the construction of the Panama Canal.1
The creation of indigenous constabularies provided a key, cost-effective mecha-
nism for projecting American power. The organizations were conceived in the
belief that the centralization of state authority and regulation of social life were
conducive to the development of a modern nation-state, and that a professional
police force could ensure the domestic stability needed to spur foreign investment
and allow for economic development. In the eyes of policymakers, the United
States was at once helping to uplift the native population by aiding in the creation
of a modern administrative state while advancing American strategic interests.
The architects of the programs could thus always feel good about what they were
doing, even if the forces under their command acted cruelly.
Local elites welcomed the programs because they shared a similar worldview,
and they used the technical aid and weapons to strengthen their authority.
Trained in counter-guerrilla warfare and espionage, the constabularies assisted
the U.S. Marines in pacification and sought to ensure a smooth transition from
direct to indirect colonial rule. Many of the tactics developed, including training
academies, the novel data management and fingerprinting techniques, penal
reforms, and psychological warfare, were foundational to the global police pro-
grams. They contributed to the growth of modern surveillance states, supple in
their omnipresence, as the historian Alfred W. McCoy notes, yet suffocating in
their omniscience.2
Like their European counterparts, the first wave of U.S. advisers came from
military backgrounds and endured harsh jungle conditions while carrying out
clandestine intelligence operations. Many devoted years of service and learned
local languages, which helped them in recruiting native forces, penetrating enemy
encampments, and winning over sectors of the population. Colorful figures such
as “Black Jack” Pershing, Lewis “Chesty” Puller, and Smedley Butler earned public
fame through their exploits and went on to decorated military careers. Constabu-
lary officers saw themselves as contributing to the advancement of civilization
through the spread of Western technology and were endowed with enormous
powers compared to their successors, becoming district and provincial governors.
The opportunities for private enrichment and corruption were consequently rife,
and many took advantage. Wide-scale violence was rationalized by demon-
izing opponents, who were characterized as “bandits,” “savages,” “ladrones,” and
“gugus,” among other refrains.
True to Orwell’s observations, American police officials embodied the repres-
sive underpinnings of the American empire. In taking the call of Rudyard Kipling’s
“White Man’s Burden” to heart, they tortured those who did not acquiesce to their
whims, provided intelligence for bombing attacks, oversaw forced labor projects,
and were implicated in massacres, such as the slaughter of over six hundred

18 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


people in the Moro province of the Philippines. After American troops were with-
drawn, the police institutions they created remained the all-powerful instrument
of authoritarian leaders. The United States left not only a legacy of violence and
social division but also sophisticated apparatuses of social control, which paved
the way for continued governmental repression over the long term.

Imperial Policing in the Philippines and the Caribbean 19


“This page intentionally left blank”
Chapter 1
The First Operation Phoenix
U.S. Colonial Policing in the Philippines and the
Blood of Empire
To be outnumbered, always, to be outfought, never.
‰1IJMJQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZTMPHBO FBSMZT

The history of the American occupation of the Philippines is in large measure


the history of the Philippines constabulary—for it was this force of native infan-
try that applied the finishing touches of civilization to a jungle land that had
known no law.
‰7ic Hurley, Jungle Patrol 

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of fortune John R. White in Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine
Islands, his 1928 account of his tenure with the Philippines constabulary. Writ-
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After invading the islands in 1899 shortly after the Philippines declared itself
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Foreshadowing by nearly seventy years the Nixon doctrine strategy of “using
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initiated, and a surveillance apparatus was developed, using new technologies
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21
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preserved.3
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MBT CVUXJUIMJUUMFTVDDFTT wIFXSPUF iUIFFOFNZGBEFEJOUPUIFKVOHMF BOEUIF
VOXJFMEZSFHVMBSVOJUTXFSFUPPCVSEFOFEXJUIFRVJQNFOU UPPTMPXy'JOBMMZ 
UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT GPVOE UIF TPMVUJPOy SFDSVJUJOH OBUJWF 'JMJQJOPT  NFO XJTF
UPKVOHMFXBZTXIPLOFXUIFNPVOUBJOTBOEUSBJMTMJLFUIFJSPXOCBDLZBSEw5
ćFTFDPNNFOUTQSPWJEFBDMFBSFYQMBOBUJPOPGUIFQVSQPTFCFIJOEUIFQPMJDF
QSPHSBNT XIJDISFNBJOFEVODIBOHFEBDSPTTUIFEFDBEFTćFZBMTPTVHHFTUB
TFMFDUJWFNFNPSZJOJHOPSJOHUIFWJPMFODFBTTPDJBUFEXJUIUIFDPOTUBCVMBSZT
FYQMPJUT SFQMJDBUFEBHBJOBOEBHBJOBNPOHJUTPČTQSJOH

Creating a Modern Surveillance State: Police Training, Nation-Building,


and the “Civilizing Mission” in the Philippines

"MUIPVHIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBECFFOBOFYQBOTJPOJTUFNQJSFGSPNJUTGPVOEJOH 
the colonization of the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century was a
QJWPUBMQPJOU NBSLJOHUIFCFHJOOJOHPGUIFOBUJPOTSJTFUPHMPCBMEPNJOBODF
#VJMEJOHPOUIFGPVOEBUJPOPGJUTTFJ[VSFPG)BXBJJ UIFDPORVFTUPGUIF1IJMJQ-
QJOFTXBTUPQSPWJEFBCFBDIIFBEJOUIF"TJB1BDJĕDBOEBTUFQQJOHTUPOFUPUIF
GBCMFE$IJOBNBSLFU4FOBUPS"MCFSU#FWFSJEHFBTTFSUFECFGPSF$POHSFTTićF
QPXFSUIBUSVMFTUIF1BDJĕD‫ڀڀ‬JTUIFQPXFSUIBUSVMFTUIFXPSME"OE XJUIUIF
1IJMJQQJOFT UIBUQPXFSJTBOEXJMMGPSFWFSCFUIF"NFSJDBO3FQVCMJDw6
Relying on the collaboration of Westernized elites (the illustrados), the gov-
FSOJOHDPNNJTTJPO IFBEFECZGVUVSFQSFTJEFOU8JMMJBN)PXBSE5Bę QSFTJEFE
PWFSBHSBOEOBUJPOCVJMEJOHFYQFSJNFOUEFTJHOFEUPMFHJUJNBUFDPMPOJBMSVMF
Technical advisers worked to extend Western technology, built roads, infra-
TUSVDUVSF  BOE TDIPPMT  BOE QSPNPUFE CFUUFS IZHJFOJD TUBOEBSET BOE QVCMJD
IFBMUI#ZTVQQPSUJOHGSFFUSBEFBOESFNPWJOHMFHBMCBSSJFSTUPDPSQPSBUFMBOE-
PXOFSTIJQ UIFDPNNJTTJPOBMTPTPVHIUUPTUJNVMBUFGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOUćF
VMUJNBUFBJNXBTUPMJęUIF'JMJQJOPTVQGSPNUIFJSiQSJNJUJWFOFTTwUISPVHIUIF
JNQPSUPG8FTUFSONPSFTBOE$ISJTUJBOJ[BUJPO7
8IJMFJOĘVFODFECZQSPHSFTTJWJTNBOEJUTFNQIBTJTPOUFDIOJDBMFďDJFODZ 
BOEWJFXJOHUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBTBMBCPSBUPSZPGSFGPSN DPNNJTTJPONFNCFST 
as the historian Glen May notes, were politically conservative. They sought to

22 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


restrict suffrage and attract foreign investors without concern for corporate
SFHVMBUJPOPSUIFQPPS'FXBOUJQPWFSUZQSPHSBNTXFSFFWFSDPOUFNQMBUFE8 The
IFBWZ FNQIBTJT PO QPMJDJOH BDDPSEFE XJUI UIF DPOTFSWBUJWF QIJMPTPQIZ BOE
TIPXTUIBUUIFNBKPSBJNPGUIFPDDVQBUJPOXBTUPTFDVSF"NFSJDBOJOUFSFTUT
and power on the islands.
On August 8, 1901, upon the urging of Vice Governor Luke E. Wright, a
$POGFEFSBUFXBSIFSPBOEEFTJHOFSPGBOFMFDUSJDTUSFFUDBSTZTUFNJO.FNQIJT 
the constabulary was established with the goal of stabilizing the country to
BMMPXGPSFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOU5BęDPNQMBJOFEUIBUVOEFS(FOFSBM"SUIVS
.BD"SUIVS GBUIFSPG%PVHMBT UIF64NJMJUBSZMBDLFEiEJTDSFUJPOwJOBSSFTU-
JOH QFPQMF TVTQFDUFE PG EJTMPZBMUZ  XIJDI DPVME CF CFUUFS BDDPNQMJTIFE CZ
JOEJHFOPVTQPMJDF8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT BHSBOETPOPGUIFQIJMPTPQIFS
3BMQI8BMEP&NFSTPO XIPXBTDPNNJTTJPOFSPGDPNNFSDFBOEQPMJDFJO
UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT GSPN Ŵżųŷ UP ŴżųŻ BOE HPWFSOPSHFOFSBM GSPN Ŵżųż UP ŴżŴŶ 
TUBUFEUIBUGPVS'JMJQJOPTDPVMECFNBJOUBJOFEGPSMFTTUIBOUIFQSJDFPGPOF
"NFSJDBO TPMEJFS9 ćF DPOTUBCVMBSZ HSFX UP TJY UIPVTBOE JO UIF ĕSTU GFX
years. Many recruits had served in the Spanish colonial Guardia Civil or as
OBUJWF TDPVUT ćF DPNNJTTJPO SFQPSUFE  ićF DBMMT VQPO UIFN GPS UIF TVQ-
QSFTTJPOPGMBESPOJTN<CBOEJUSZ>BOEPUIFSEJTUVSCBODFTIBWFCFFOTPOVNFS-
PVTUIBUUIFSFIBTOPUCFFOUJNFPSPQQPSUVOJUZ<UPGPDVTPOJNQSPWJOHUIFJS
DJWJMGVODUJPO>‫<ڀڀ‬4>JYZFBSTPGXBSIBTDSFBUFEBSFTUMFTTDMBTTPGNFOMBDLJOH
in the habits of industry” and prone to disrupt occupational initiatives.10 The
police thus developed into an overtly politicized force, which accounted for
their repressive character.
4FUUJOHBOJNQPSUBOUCFODINBSL UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTPSHBOJ[FEBTFDSFUTFS-
WJDFCVSFBVXIPTFQSJNBSZBJNXBTUPEFUFDUBOEGSVTUSBUFQMPUTBHBJOTUUIF
HPWFSONFOU BOE DBQUVSF UIF SFDPSET BOE NVOJUJPOT PG JOTVSHFOUT .JMJUBSZ
JOUFMMJHFODF PďDFST JNQBSUFE OFX NFUIPET PG EBUB NBOBHFNFOU BOE TVS-
WFJMMBODF ćF SFDSVJUNFOU PG FYJOTVSHFOUT BOE PUIFST MPZBM UP FYJMFE MFBEFS
&NJMJP"HVJOBMEPXBTQJWPUBMJOQFOFUSBUJOHQSJWBUFTQBDFBOEDPPQUJOHUIF
OBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOU11 In 1907, after Harry H. Bandholtz, a West Point gradu-
BUFSFTQPOTJCMFGPSDSVTIJOHBDPBMNJOFSTTUSJLFJO8FTU7JSHJOJB UPPLPWFS
UIFDPOTUBCVMBSZ NFNCFSTPGUIFTFDSFUTFSWJDFBEPQUFEOPWFMQTZDIPMPHJDBM
XBSGBSFUFDIOJRVFT TVDIBTXFBSJOHEJTHVJTFT GBCSJDBUJOHEJTJOGPSNBUJPO BOE
SFDSVJUJOHQBJEJOGPSNBOUTBOE TBCPUFVSTJO UIFJS FČPSUT UP iCSFBLVQCBOET
PG QPMJUJDBM QMPUUFSTw ćFZ NPOJUPSFE UIF QSFTT  CSPLF VQ SBEJDBMT TUSFFU SBM-
MJFT DBSSJFEPVUQFSJPEJDBTTBTTJOBUJPOT BOEDPNQJMFEEPTTJFSTPOUIPVTBOET
PG JOEJWJEVBMT BT XFMM BT JOGPSNBUJPO PO UIF DPSSVQUJPO PG LFZ HPWFSONFOU
MFBEFST XIJDIXBTVTFEBTMFWFSBHFUPLFFQUIFNMPZBMUPUIFPDDVQBUJPOćF
EFDMBSBUJPOPGNBSUJBMMBXFOBCMFEUIFTFDSFUTFSWJDFUPDBSSZPVUTVSWFJMMBODF
BOENBLFBSSFTUTXJUIPVUUIFBQQMJDBUJPOPGEVFQSPDFTT12
ćFFďDJFODZPGUIFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVTXBTFOIBODFECZUIFJNQPS-

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 23


UBUJPOPGUIFNPTUBEWBODFEDSJNFDPOUSPMUFDIOPMPHZ JODMVEJOHBDFOUSBMJ[FE
UFMFQIPOFOFUXPSL FMFDUSJDTUSFFUMJHIUT BOEUIF#FSUJMMPOQIPUPJEFOUJĕDBUJPO
BOE MBUFS ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH TZTUFN  XIJDI FOBCMFE QPMJDF UP FTUBCMJTI BO iBMM
FNCSBDJOHJOEFYĕMFwPOUIFQPMJUJDBMCFMJFGTPGOFBSMZźųQFSDFOUPG.BOJMBT
population. Through these initiatives the United States helped to create one of
UIFĕSTUNPEFSOTVSWFJMMBODFTUBUFT BGFBUVSFPGDPMPOJBMSVMFTFFOBTBNBSLFS
PGJUTNPEFSOJUZ13 The reach of the constabulary was so deep that it was able
UP JOĕMUSBUF BOE TPX EJTTFOTJPO XJUIJO SBEJDBM PSHBOJ[BUJPOT  JODMVEJOH BO
JODJQJFOUMBCPSNPWFNFOU BOEFWFOQMBZFEBSPMFJOBQPTUPMJDTVDDFTTJPOCZ
VOEFSNJOJOH #JTIPQ (SFHPSJP "HMJQBZ UISPVHI UIF TQSFBE PG EJTJOGPSNB-
UJPO"HMJQBZXBTBOBUJPOBMJTUXJUITPDJBMJTUTZNQBUIJFTXIPTFTFSWJDFTXFSF
attended by thousands of the urban poor.14
0OF PG UIF DSPXOJOH UFDIOJDBM BDIJFWFNFOUT XBT UIF JOTUBMMBUJPO PG B
(BNFXFMMQPMJDFBOEĕSFBMBSNTZTUFNJO.BOJMBUPDVSCEFQFOEFODZPOUIF
QVCMJD UFMFQIPOF TZTUFN ćF 1IJMJQQJOFT DPNNJTTJPO QSPVEMZ SFQPSUFE UIBU
UIJTiQVUUIFDJUZPOFRVBMGPPUJOHXJUIBOZJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTw15 In 1902 the
DPNNJTTJPOQBTTFEBTFEJUJPOMBXXIJDIJNQPTFEUIFEFBUIQFOBMUZPSBMPOH
QSJTPO UFSN PO UIPTF BEWPDBUJOH JOEFQFOEFODF BOE B CSJHBOEBHF BDU DMBT-
sifying guerrilla resistance as banditry. The constabulary was given the task
PGFOGPSDJOHUIFTFMBXT8JFMEJOHJNNFOTFQPXFST GBSHSFBUFSUIBOUIPTFPG
police forces in the United States, it also oversaw forced labor codes designed to
CVJMEUIFDPVOUSZTSPBEJOGSBTUSVDUVSF SBOUBYDPMMFDUJPOBOERVBSBOUJOFQSP-
HSBNT IFMQFEEFWFMPQIFBMUIDMJOJDTBOETDIPPMT BOEIBEJUTPďDFSTBQQPJOUFE
as governors in districts inhabited by rural people such as the Bontoc, Ifugao,
and Kalinga whose head-hunting practices they sought to curtail. In addition,
DPOTUBCVMBSZ PďDFST QSPUFDUFE UFMFHSBQI MJOFT VTFE UP DPPSEJOBUF NJMJUBSZ
PQFSBUJPOTBOEDPNNFSDJBMEFWFMPQNFOUBOEFOGPSDFEMBXTBHBJOTUWBHSBODZ 
HBNCMJOH BOEPQJVNQSPNPUFECZ1SPUFTUBOUNJTTJPOBSJFT16 Owing to deep-
rooted cultural acceptance, the reception of kickbacks by police, and the inge-
OVJUZPG$IJOFTFTNVHHMFST UIFTFMBXTXFSFQSFEPNJOBOUMZVOTVDDFTTGVMBOE
DPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFHSPXUIPGPSHBOJ[FEDSJNJOBMOFUXPSLT%FTQJUFUIFTFJ[VSF
PGMBSHFBNPVOUTPGDPOUSBCBOEJOSBJET BTMBUFBTŴżŶų"NFSJDBOJOWFTUJHBUPST
GPVOEUIBUPQJVNXBTFBTJMZPCUBJOBCMFBOEUIBUUIFUSBEFXBTTPMVDSBUJWFUIBU
JUIBEDPSSVQUFEFMFNFOUTPGUIFQPMJUJDBMFMJUFćFIJTUPSJBO"MGSFE8.D$PZ
DPODMVEFEUIBUJO.BOJMB iQPMJDFJOFČFDUCFDBNFQBSUOFSTJODSJNF BDDFQUJOH
CSJCFTUPQSPUFDUPQJVNEFOTBOEHBNCMJOHIPVTFTwBTXFMMBTCSPUIFMTXIJDI
TQSBOHVQUPTFSWJDF"NFSJDBOT1FSJPEJDFYQPTVSFTFSWFEUPVOEFSNJOFUIF
MFHJUJNBDZPGUIFDPMPOJBMPSEFS TQBSLJOHTFWFSBMIJHIMZQVCMJDJ[FEUIPVHIVMUJ-
NBUFMZMJNJUFEFČPSUTBUSFGPSN17
*O ŴżųŹ UIF HPWFSOJOH DPNNJTTJPO BQQSPWFE UIF DSFBUJPO PG B OBUJPOBM
QPMJDFTDIPPMBU#BHVJP XIFSFDPVSTFTXFSFPČFSFEJONBSLTNBOTIJQ QPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUJPO  BOE HVFSSJMMB XBSGBSF $POTUBCVMBSZ PďDFST XFSF SFRVJSFE

24 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


UP XFBS OFX VOJGPSNT JO LIBLJ BOE SFE BOE XFSF FRVJQQFE XJUI NPEFSO
XFBQPOSZ JODMVEJOH3FNJOHUPOBOE$PMUSFWPMWFSTBOE4QSJOHĕFMEDBSCJOFT
1PMJDF IFBERVBSUFST XFSF SFQBJSFE BOE OFX POFT CVJMU UP FODPVSBHF B NPSF
QSPGFTTJPOBMBUNPTQIFSF0ďDFSTXFSFSFRVJSFEUPUBLFGPVSIPVSTPGXFFLMZ
instruction in the law related to arrests, search warrants, and processing evi-
EFODF .FEJDBM DBSF XBT QSPWJEFE  BOE QIZTJDBM ĕUOFTT XBT FNQIBTJ[FE JO
USBJOJOH"UUFNQUTXFSFNBEFUPTUBOEBSEJ[FQBZBOEFOTVSFUIBUVQQFSMFWFM
BQQPJOUNFOUT XFSF NBEF GSPN XJUIJO UIF SBOLT " QFOTJPO BOE SFUJSFNFOU
GVOEXBTFTUBCMJTIFEUPQSPNPUFMPZBMUZBOEBMMPXDPOTUBCVMBSZNFNCFSTUP
view policing as a career.18
ćFTF NFBTVSFT XFSF BMM DPOTJTUFOU XJUI QSPHSFTTJWFTUZMF SFGPSNT JNQMF-
NFOUFEBTQBSUPGUIFNBOBHFSJBMSFWPMVUJPOJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTćFZFYFNQMJ-
ĕFEUIFEFTJSFPG"NFSJDBODPMPOJBMPďDJBMTUPSFNBLFUIF1IJMJQQJOFTJOUIF
"NFSJDBOJNBHFBOEUPQSPNPUFQSPHSFTTUISPVHIUIFJNQPSUBUJPOPG8FTU-
FSOJOTUJUVUJPOTBOEHPWFSOJOHTZTUFNT19"T.D$PZEPDVNFOUT JOOPWBUJPOT
pioneered in the Philippines further contributed to the evolution of policing
QSBDUJDFTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT JODMVEJOHUIFBEWFOUPGBGPSNJEBCMFTVSWFJMMBODF
BQQBSBUVTTFUJOQMBDFEVSJOHUIFĕSTU3FE4DBSF$POTUBCVMBSZWFUFSBOTTVDI
BT3BMQI7BO%FNBO LOPXOBTUIFiGBUIFSPG64NJMJUBSZJOUFMMJHFODFwBOEPG
UIFi"NFSJDBOCMBDLMJTU wQMBZFEBDSVDJBMSPMFJOBQQMZJOHUIFJSFYQFSUJTFJOUIF
DMBOEFTUJOFBSUTUPTQZPOBOESFQSFTTSBEJDBMPSHBOJ[BUJPOTTVDIBTUIF"NFSJ-
DBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZBOEUIF*OEVTUSJBM8PSLFSTPGUIF8PSME DPOUSJCVUJOH
UPUIFJSEFNJTF"NFSJDBO$JWJM-JCFSUJFT6OJPOBUUPSOFZ'SBOL%POOFSDIBS-
BDUFSJ[FE7BO%FNBOBTiPOFPGUIFHJBOUTPGBOUJDPNNVOJTN BTVQFSIBXL
. . . a phobic nativist red-hunter” whose “undercover network penetrated not
POMZUIF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZCVUBXIPMFTQFDUSVNPGMJCFSBMUBSHFUT JODMVEJOH
religious, civil rights, and labor organizations.”20
.PTUDPOTUBCVMBSZPďDFSTDBNFGSPNNJMJUBSZCBDLHSPVOETBOEXFSFTPM-
EJFSTPGGPSUVOFBOEPSWFUFSBOTPGUIF*OEJBO8BSTćFIJTUPSJBOćPNBT"
3FQQFUUPDIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIFNBTBiXJMECVODI wFQJUPNJ[FECZ8JOĕFME4DPUU
Grove, chief of detectives in Manila, who beat up the governor of Laguna
PVUTJEF BO PďDJBM SFDFQUJPO  BOE +FTTF (BSXPPE  B XFTUFSO HVOĕHIUFS XIP
seduced local officers’ wives, shot apples off the head of his houseboy, and
PČFSFECPVOUJFTGPSDVUUJOHPČFOFNZIFBET)BSEFOFECZUIFJSUJNFPOUIF
GSPOUJFS UIFZDMBJNFEUPiVOEFSTUBOEUIFXBZTPGXJMEQFPQMF wBOEGFMUJUXBT
UIFJS SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ UP iNFOE B DPVOUSZ XSBDLFE CZ XBS BOE OPX TVCKFDU UP
SBJET  QJSBUFT  QMVOEFSFST  BOE NVSEFSFSTw 0OF NFNCFS PG UIF DPOTUBCVMBSZ 
)BSPME)&MBSUI MBUFSDPNNFOUFE i8FCFHBOUPMJWF,JQMJOHGPSPVSTFMWFTw21
"OVNCFSPGUIFPďDFSTMFBSOFEMPDBMEJBMFDUTBOEEFWPUFEZFBSTPGTFSWJDF 
HBJOJOHBTFOTFPGBUUBDINFOUUPUIFDPVOUSZUIBUXBTMBDLJOHBNPOHUIFJSIFJST
JO MBUFS JOUFSWFOUJPOT 4PNF CVJMU TDIPPMT BOE GPTUFSFE BHSJDVMUVSBM EFWFMPQ-
NFOU  UIPVHI NBOZ BCVTFE UIFJS QPXFS  JNQPTJOH GPSDFE MBCPS SFHJNFOT UP

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 25


FYQBOEUIFIJHIMBOEUSBJMOFUXPSLBOEDPNQJMJOHGPSUVOFTJOTIBEZCVTJOFTT
EFBMJOHTBOETQFDVMBUJPOJONJOJOHBOEHPME8IFOTPNFPOFDPNQMBJOFEUIBU
8BMUFS')BMF MJFVUFOBOUHPWFSOPSJOUIF,BMJOHBTVCQSPWJODF XBTiNPOPQP-
MJ[JOHUIFSJDFUSBEFwBOEVOEFSNJOJOHMPDBMQSPEVDUJPO )BMFSFTQPOEFEi6Q
IFSF*BN(PE:PVEPXIBU*UFMMZPVw22
6OUJMŴżŴź XIFO$PMPOFM3BGBFM$SBNF #BOEIPMU[TQSPUÏHÏ CFDBNFDIJFGPG
UIFDPOTUBCVMBSZ 'JMJQJOPTDPVMEOPUCFOBNFEUPDPNNBOEQPTJUJPOT'PSCFT 
BO JOWFTUNFOU CBOLFS XIP DPBDIFE UIF )BSWBSE GPPUCBMM UFBN  XSPUF JO IJT
EJBSZUIBU"NFSJDBOMFBEFSTIJQXBTDSVDJBMJOiNBLJOHUIFQPMJDFPCTFSWFUIF
rules of civilized warfare. . . . The native, when given authority, is very brutal to
IJTPXOQFPQMFBOEXPVMEUSFBUUIFNUPBMJUUMF4QBOJTIEFWJMUSZJGVODIFDLFEw
*GUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXJUIESFX IFBEEFE UIFDPVOUSZXPVMECFDPNFFONFTIFE
JOiIPQFMFTTBOBSDIZwBOEFWFSZWBMMFZXPVMECFDPNFiSFEXJUICMPPEw23 Epito-
NJ[JOHUIFFUIOPDFOUSJTNVOEFSMZJOH64QPMJDZ 7JD)VSMFZJODMVEFEJOIJT
NFNPJSJungle Patrol the photo of a longhaired Filipino wearing nothing but
BTUSJOHBSPVOEIJTXBJTU/FYUUPUIJTXBTBNPSFSFDFOUQJDUVSFPGUIFNBO
ESFTTFEJOIJTDPOTUBCVMBSZVOJGPSN)FXBTOPXDMFBOMZTIBWFOBOEIBETIPSU
hair. The caption reads, “Exposed to civilization.”24

With Us or Against Us: Misperceptions of a Dehumanized Enemy

ćF ĕSTU DIJFG PG UIF DPOTUBCVMBSZ  )FOSZ 5 "MMFO  FNCPEJFE UIF EPNJOBOU
NBSUJBM BOE JNQFSJBMJTU TQJSJU PG UIF BHF #PSO JOUP BO BOUFCFMMVN ,FOUVDLZ
IPVTFIPMEXJUIFMFWFOTMBWFT "MMFOHSBEVBUFEGSPN8FTU1PJOUJOŴŻŻŵ MFEBO
FYQMPSBUJPONJTTJPOJO"MBTLB BOEUIFOKPJOFEUIFNJMJUBSZTOFXJOGPSNBUJPO
EJWJTJPOJO4U1FUFSTCVSHBTBTQZPOCFIBMGPGUIFUTBSJTUSFHJNF)JTTVQFSJPST
faulted his reports for being “too political.” Allen went on to serve in the Span-
JTI"NFSJDBO8BSJO$VCBBOEXJUIUIF'PSUZUIJSE*OGBOUSZEJWJTJPOJOUIF
1IJMJQQJOFT DBNQBJHO JO 4BNBS  XIFSF IF DPOEFNOFE (FOFSBM +BDPC 4NJUIT
TDPSDIFEFBSUIQPMJDZBTBiEJTHSBDFw)FVSHFEIJTTVCPSEJOBUFTUPNBTUFSUIF
MPDBMMBOHVBHFBOEVOEFSTUBOEUIFOBUJWFTJOPSEFSUPHBJOiUIFDPOĕEFODFPG
UIF QFPQMF w PS BT IJT TVDDFTTPST XPVME QVU JU  XJO UIFJS iIFBSUT BOE NJOETw
"MMFOBUUIFTBNFUJNFTBODUJPOFENFSDJMFTTUBDUJDTBHBJOTUSFTJTUBOU'JMJQJOPT 
XIPNIFDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTTVČFSJOHGSPNiJOUFOTFJHOPSBODFwBOEUIFiGBOBUJ-
DBMwDIBSBDUFSJTUJDTPGiTFNJTBWBHFSZw25"ęFSIJTBQQPJOUNFOUBTDPOTUBCVMBSZ
DIJFG IFXSPUFUP(FOFSBM3PCFSU1)VHIFTi$POTJEFSBCMFLJMMJOHTUJMMSFNBJOT
to be done. I suspect that we will have a lot of trouble in Negros before all the
ladronesBOEPUIFSTFRVBMMZEFTFSWJOHBSFLJMMFEUIFSFw26*OBTVCTFRVFOUMFUUFS
UP5Bę "MMFOSFNBSLFEi&EVDBUJPOBOESPBETXJMMFČFDUXIBUJTEFTJSFE CVU
XIJMFBXBJUJOHUIFTF ESBTUJDNFBTVSFTBSFPCMJHBUPSZ‫ڀڀ‬ćFPOMZSFNFEZJT
LJMMJOHBOEGPSUIFTBNFSFBTPOUIBUBSBCJEEPHNVTUCFEJTQPTFEPGw27
ćFTF DPNNFOUT SFWFBM UIF EFIVNBOJ[JOH MBOHVBHF VTFE UP SBUJPOBMJ[F

26 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


wide-scale violence. Writing to the secretary of the province of Leyte, Allen
DPNNFOUFE i*U JT BCTPMVUFMZ JNQPSUBOU UIBU UIF CBOET PG ladrones infesting
DFSUBJOQBSUTPGUIFQSPWJODFCFFYUFSNJOBUFEćFGVUVSFPG-FZUF‫<ڀڀ‬JODMVE-
JOH>UIFOFFEFEDBQJUBMUPDPOTUSVDUSBJMXBZTBOETUBSUVQPUIFSFOUFSQSJTFT‫ڀڀ‬
depends on this.”281SFTBHJOHUIFPVUMPPLPGNPEFSOJ[BUJPOUIFPSJTUTEVSJOHUIF
Cold War, Allen saw the opponents of the United States as a barrier to the pro-
HSFTTJWFTPDJBMDIBOHFUIBUUIFJNQPSUPGOFXUFDIOPMPHJFTPTUFOTJCMZPČFSFE
)FQPSUSBZFEUIFNBTSFMJDTPGBOFBSMJFSQIBTFPGDJWJMJ[BUJPOXIPTFSFNPWBM
XPVME DMFBS UIF XBZ GPS OBUJPOBM EFWFMPQNFOU ćF MPHJD JT OPU EJTTJNJMBS UP
UIBUPGPUIFSTXIPIBWFDPNNJUUFEHFOPDJEFPSTFFOUIFLJMMJOHPGMBSHFHSPVQT
BTĕUUJOHJOUPBCSPBEFSTPDJBMPSIVNBOJUBSJBOEFTJHO*UBMTPĕUUIFQBUUFSOPG
SBDJBMWJPMFODFDIBSBDUFSJTUJDPG8FTUFSOJNQFSJBMJTNBOE"NFSJDBOMJGFJOUIF
early twentieth century.29
Most individuals pursued by the constabulary were nationalists who served
JOUIFMJCFSBUJPOBSNJFT"MMFOBDLOPXMFEHFEJOŴżųŵUIBUiGPVSZFBSTPGĕHIUJOH
BJEFECZUIFMPTTPGMJGFCZDIPMFSBBOE<UIF>QMBHVFPGBOJNBMTCZSJOEFSQFTU
BOEPGDSPQTJONBOZQMBDFTCZMPDVTUTIBTCFFOEFNPSBMJ[JOHUPUIFQFPQMFBOE
GBWPSBCMFUPUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGMBESPOJTNw30 San Miguel was declared an out-
law after he helped to revive the anticolonial Katipunan Party. He had ties with
UIFMBCPSNPWFNFOU BDPOTUBOUUBSHFUPGDPOTUBCVMBSZTVSWFJMMBODFBOEIBSBTT-
NFOU  XIJDI XBT FWFOUVBMMZ DPPQUFE GSPN XJUIJO31 General Macario Sakay
XBTQSFTJEFOUPGUIF/FX,BUJQVOBONPWFNFOU XIJDI"MMFOSFGFSSFEUPBTB
iEJTFBTFPGUIF5BHBMPHNJOEw(SFFUFEBTBIFSPJO.BOJMB IFQSPNPUFEDMBTT
consciousness and sought to establish a breakaway Tagalog republic. In 1907 his
TFDPOEJODPNNBOE $PSOFMJP'FMJ[BSEP XBTBNCVTIFEBOEIBDLFEUPEFBUI
XIJMFVSJOBUJOH BOE4BLBZXBTCFUSBZFECZJOGPSNBOUT4UBOEJOHPOUIFFYFDV-
UJPOQMBUGPSNJOUIF#JMJCJEQSJTPOQMB[B 4BLBZEFDMBSFEi%FBUIDPNFTUPBMM
PGVTTPPOFSPSMBUFS TP*XJMMGBDFUIFMPSE"MNJHIUZDBMNMZ#VU*XBOUUPUFMM
ZPVUIBUXFBSFOPUCBOEJUTBOESPCCFST BTUIF"NFSJDBOTIBWFBDDVTFEVT 
CVUNFNCFSTPGUIFSFWPMVUJPOBSZGPSDFUIBUEFGFOEFEPVSNPUIFSDPVOUSZ UIF
1IJMJQQJOFT 'BSFXFMM -POH MJWF UIF 3FQVCMJD BOE NBZ PVS JOEFQFOEFODF CF
born in the future!”32
.BOZDPOTUBCVMBSZUBSHFUTTVDIBTUIFTPDJBMJTU'FMJQF4BMWBEPSQSPNPUFEB
NFTTJBOJDJEFPMPHZNJYJOHGPMLSFMJHJPOBOEQPQVMJTUOBUJPOBMJTN*O/FHSPT
province, Dionisio Sigobela (known as “Papa Isio”), a displaced sugar laborer,
QSFBDIFEBEPDUSJOFPGGSFFMPWFBOEQSPNJTFEGPMMPXFSTJNNVOJUZGSPNEJT-
eases bred by the ravages of war. He was arrested by Colonel John R. White,
a veteran of the Greek Foreign Legion, who gained great repute through his
exploits. Forbes referred in his journals to Papa Isio’s death in February 1905
BU TJYUZTFWFO BT VOUJNFMZ CFDBVTF iJU TIPVME IBWF PDDVSSFE ŴŹ ZFBST BHPw33
7JPMFOU TDPSDIFE FBSUI DBNQBJHOT BHBJOTU SFCFM GPSDFT  XIJDI JO TPNF DBTFT
SFTVMUFEJOUIFUBLJOHPGIVNBOĘFTIBTBUSPQIZ DPOUJOVFEUISPVHINVDIPGUIF

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 27


ŴżŴųT&MBSUIXSPUFJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUBęFSUIFMBTUFNCFSTPGUIFJOTVSSFDUJPO
died down in 1911, it took another ten years of “strenuous patrolling” by the
DPOTUBCVMBSZCFGPSFiQFBDFDPOEJUJPOTwFNFSHFE34
1BDJĕDBUJPOJOUIF.PSPQSPWJODFTPG.JOEBOBPBOE4VMVUPPLFWFOMPOHFS
and was never fully achieved. In 1903 the United States abrogated the agree-
NFOUQSPNJTJOHBVUPOPNZUPUIF.PSPT .VTMJNTXIPIBEOFWFSBDRVJFTDFE
to Spanish rule either, and appointed General Leonard Wood head of the
QSPWJODF " GPSNFS DPMPOJBM HPWFSOPS PG $VCB BOE EFDPSBUFE WFUFSBO PG UIF
DBNQBJHOBHBJOTU(FSPOJNPT"QBDIFT 8PPEBOEIJTBTTPDJBUFTTIPXFEMJUUMF
SFTQFDUGPS.PSPUSBEJUJPOTBOEDVMUVSFBOECFMJFWFE MJLFUXFOUZĕSTUDFOUVSZ
OFPDPOTFSWBUJWFT UIBU.VTMJNTDPVMEPOMZVOEFSTUBOEGPSDF$FOUSBMUPUIFJS
TUSBUFHZXBTUIFDSFBUJPOPGBOBUJWFDPOTUBCVMBSZUPiUBNFwUIPTFXIPSFTJTUFE
"NFSJDBOIFHFNPOZBOE BTPOFPG8PPETCJPHSBQIFSTQVUJU IFMQiQMBOUUIF
TFFETPGDJWJMJ[BUJPOJOUIFJSNJOEw35
.VDICMPPEXBTTQJMMFEJOUIFBUUFNQUUPBDIJFWFUIFTFBJNT1FBTBOUTXFSF
ESJWFO JOUP HPWFSONFOUDPOUSPMMFE FODMBWFT PWFSTFFO CZ UIF DPOTUBCVMBSZ 
XIFSFUIJODIJMESFOXJUICMPBUFEBCEPNFOTSFNJOEFEPCTFSWFSTPGiUIFQJDUVSFT
PGSFDPODFOUSBUJPOJO$VCBBOEGBNJOFJO*OEJBw36 John White, who served in
'SBODFJO8PSME8BS* SFDPVOUTIPXNFOVOEFSIJTDPNNBOECVSOFEIPVTFT 
MPBEFEUIFNTFMWFTEPXOXJUIMPPU BOEEFTUSPZFETVHBSBOEPUIFSGPPETUVČT
JOUIFBUUFNQUUPJTPMBUFBOETUBSWFUIFFOFNZćFZMFęiUIFQSFUUZQMBUFBVB
burned and scarred sore.” This “was hard,” he wrote, “but necessary, for we did
OPUXBOUUIFKPCPGUBLJOH.BOTBMBOBP<.JOEBOBP>BHBJOw37
*O ŴżųŹ 64 "SNZ BOE DPOTUBCVMBSZ VOJUT NBTTBDSFE PWFS TJY IVOESFE
.PSPT JODMVEJOHXPNFOBOEDIJMESFO BUBWPMDBOJDDSBUFSJO#VE%BKPBęFS
they refused to pay a head tax. Theodore Roosevelt congratulated Wood for
iVQIPMEJOHUIFIPOPSPGUIF"NFSJDBOĘBHw"DDPSEJOHUPUIFBOUISPQPMPHJTU
%FBO8PSDFTUFS JUiXBTOPNPSFQPTTJCMFUPBWPJELJMMJOHXPNFOBOEDIJMESFO
<UIFSF>UIBOJUXBT‫ڀڀ‬JOUIF8PVOEFE,OFFĕHIUw38 In another atrocity seven
ZFBSTMBUFSPO.PVOU#BHTBL DPOTUBCVMBSZNFOVOEFS+PIO+1FSTIJOH BWFU-
FSBOPGUIF4JPVYBOE"QBDIFDBNQBJHOT iFYUFSNJOBUFEBMMUIF.PSPTXIPIBE
taken their stand,” as Forbes put it favorably. According to Pershing, who was
QSPNPUFE GSPN DBQUBJO UP CSJHBEJFS HFOFSBM  B iTFWFSF UIPVHI XFMMEFTFSWFE
QVOJTINFOUwXBTBENJOJTUFSFE39 Warfare continued until as late as 1935. Much
BTUIFZXPVMEXJUIUIFi7JFUDPOHwEFDBEFTMBUFS "NFSJDBOTEFWFMPQFEBHSVEH-
JOHSFTQFDUGPSUIFĕHIUJOHDBQBCJMJUZPGUIF.PSPT CVUSFGFSSFEUPUIFNJOSBD-
JTUUFSNTBTi.PIBNNFEBOGBOBUJDT wiNFEJFWBMTBWBHFT wBOEBLJOUPBiTXBSN
of hornets.”40
3FCFMDPNNBOEFSTPęFOJNQPTFEFTQFDJBMMZIBSTIQFOBMUJFTGPSDPMMBCPSB-
tion with the occupying forces, including the cutting of tendons and feet, and
FYUPSUFE GPPE GSPN WJMMBHFST XIFO QPQVMBS TVQQPSU XBOFE41 One realistic
aspect of White’s Bullets and Bolos is the hardship experienced by constabulary

28 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


PďDFSTGBDJOHUIFUISFBUPGTQJLFĕMMFEQJUTBOETVSQSJTFCPMP TQFBS BUUBDLT
XIJMFUSFLLJOHUISPVHIIBSTIKVOHMFUFSSBJO8IJUFXBTIJNTFMGTIPUJOUIFLOFF
CZ.PSPSFCFMTJO4VMV.BOZPGIJTDPMMFBHVFTEJFEJOUIFĕFMEGSPNEZTFOUFSZ 
NBMBSJB BOEUZQIPJEBTXFMMBTGSPNDSPDPEJMFBUUBDLTBOEESPXOJOH42

“Capturing and Destroying Ladrones”: The Constabulary and the


First Operation Phoenix

ćFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPGUIFQPMJDJOHQSPHSBNTXBTBNBKPSGBDUPSBDDPVOUJOHGPS
UIFIJHIMFWFMTPGBCVTF4FUUJOHUIFQSFDFEFOUGPSUIFBOUJ)VLDBNQBJHOPGUIF
1950s in the Philippines (to be discussed in chapter 5) and the Phoenix pro-
HSBN XIJDIBJNFEUPXJQFPVUUIFMFBEFSTIJQPGUIF7JFUOBNFTFSFWPMVUJPOBSZ
NPWFNFOU DPOTUBCVMBSZVOJUTNFBTVSFEUIFJSTVDDFTTCZUIFOVNCFSPGFOFNZ
DBQUVSFEPSLJMMFEćFPCKFDUJWFXBTMBJEPVUJOUIFUSBJOJOHNBOVBMi$BQUVSF
PSEFTUSPZMBESPOFTw"OPUIFSQBTTBHFSFDPNNFOEFEi0ODFBMBESPOFDBNQJT
MPDBUFE UIFSFNVTUCFOPIFTJUBODZJOBUUBDLJOHWJHPSPVTMZćFCFTUUJNFGPS
attack is at or before daylight and during rainy weather.”43
Field reports provide a good indication of the high casualty rates. Henry
,OBVCFSSFQPSUFE GPSFYBNQMF PO+VOFŴŴ ŴżųŶ UIBUIJTVOJUIBEiLJMMFEŻPVU-
MBXTwBOETFJ[FEiŶSJĘFT ŴSFWPMWFS TFWFSBMCPMPTBOEPOFUSVNQFUXIJMFMPTJOH
only one horse.”44)FOSZ"MMFOCPBTUFEUPUIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPNNJTTJPOUIBUPOB
IBSSPXJOHFYQFEJUJPOIJTNFOiLJMMFEŵMBESPOFT DBQUVSFEŵŶJODMVEJOHŴ$PN-
NBOEBOUF wBEEJOHUIBUiżŶTVSSFOEFSFEVODPOEJUJPOBMMZ ŹżDPOEJUJPOBMMZ BOE
UIBUżŹSJĘFTBOEŶŹSFWPMWFSTXFSFDBQUVSFEw0OFNPOUIMBUFS"MMFOXSPUFUP
Senator Albert Beveridge that because of recent successes, he believed “within
a couple of years practically every band of ladrones in the island (Moro country
OPUJODMVEFE DPVMECFFYUFSNJOBUFEw45
8IJUFT NFNPJS Bullets and Bolos JT SFQMFUF XJUI TUPSJFT  NBOZ PG UIFN
FNCFMMJTIFE PGIJTQSPXFTTJODBQUVSJOHBOELJMMJOHPVUMBXGPSDFT)FXSPUF 
i8IJMFMJWJOHUIFTIFMUFSFEMJGF JUTFFNTBSBUIFSBXGVMUIJOHUPĕOETQPSUJO
UBLJOHIVNBOMJGF‫ڀڀ‬ZFU‫ڀڀ‬JUXBTFJUIFSLJMMPSCFLJMMFEBOEJUNVTUCFFNQIB-
TJ[FEUIBUUIFFOFNZIBEFWFSZBEWBOUBHFw46ćFTFDPNNFOUTEFNPOTUSBUFUIF
NJOETFUPGTPMEJFSTJOUIFĕFME XIP JOUIFGBDFPGDPOTUBOUEBOHFSBOEBIPTUJMF
population, did what they felt was necessary to protect their own lives. Fur-
UIFSNPSF UIFZXFSFTFFLJOHUPVQIPMEBOJEFBMPGNBTDVMJOJUZUIBUXBTEFFQMZ
SPPUFE JO "NFSJDBO DVMUVSF BOE DPOUJOHFOU PO UIF BDIJFWFNFOU PG NJMJUBSZ
prowess and the ability to project strength in the face of adversity.47
8IJUF BOE IJT DPOUFNQPSBSJFT XFSF IPOPSFE XJUI NFEBMT PG WBMPS GPS
LJMMJOH JOTVSHFOUT  BOE UIFZ SPTF JO UIF NJMJUBSZ IJFSBSDIZ )BSSZ #BOEIPMU[
CFDBNF QSPWPTU NBSTIBM BOE XFOU PO UP GPVOE UIF 64 .JMJUBSZ 1PMJDF EVS-
ing World War I. “Black Jack” Pershing led the punitive expedition against the
Mexican revolutionary Francisco “Pancho” Villa alongside Henry Allen and

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 29


CFDBNF DPNNBOEJOH HFOFSBM BU UIF FOE PG UIF (SFBU 8BS48 +BNFT )BSCPSE 
UIF DPOTUBCVMBSZT UIJSE DPNNBOEFS  TFSWFE BT 1FSTIJOHT DIJFG PG TUBČ BOE
UIFOQSFTJEFOUPGUIF3BEJP$PSQPSBUJPOPG"NFSJDB 3$" GSPNŴżŵŶUPŴżŷź
0UIFSWFUFSBOTXFOUPOUPIBWFEJTUJOHVJTIFEMBXFOGPSDFNFOUDBSFFSTJOUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUPIFBEDPOTUBCVMBSZGPSDFTJOUIF$BSJCCFBO JNQBSUJOHUIF
skills they had developed while chasing Filipino rebels. Rough Rider George
R. Shanton headed the Insular Police in Puerto Rico and oversaw policing of
UIF1BOBNB$BOBM;POF XIFSFIFPSHBOJ[FEUIFQMBJODMPUIFTTVSWFJMMBODFPG
workers and the blacklisting and deportation of radicals.49
ćFBCVTFTPGUIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZ MJLFUIPTFPGJUTOVNFSPVTTQJO
PČT XFSFTZOPOZNPVTXJUIJUTTPDJBMDPOUSPMGVODUJPO*OBŴżŶŶTUVEZ .BKPS
&NNBOVFM#BKBSFQPSUFEUIBUJUSFQFBUFEMZDBSSJFEPVUUIFiXBUFSUPSUVSFwBOE
PUIFS IBSTI JOUFSSPHBUJPO NFUIPET  JODMVEJOH CFBUJOH TVTQFDUT XJUI TOBLFT
UP FYUSBDU JOGPSNBUJPO i(FU ZPVS NBOw XBT UIF TMPHBO PG QBUSPMT  SFTVMUJOH
JOFYDFTTJWFGPSDFBOECSVUBMJUZ0ďDFSTFOHBHFEJOCMBDLNBJM UFSSPSJTN BOE
FYUPSUJPOBOETUPMFGPPEGSPNUIFQFBTBOUSZćFZTFYVBMMZBTTBVMUFEXPNFO 
BOEJO.JOEBOBPXFSFBVUIPSJ[FEUPUBLFUIFNBTDPODVCJOFT JSPOJD HJWFO
UIBU.VTMJNTMBWFSZXBTBEPQUFEBTNPSBMKVTUJĕDBUJPOGPSUIFDPORVFTUPGUIF
Moro).507JPMFOUQPMJUJDBMQPMJDJOHPQFSBUJPOTXFSFHFOFSBMMZTFFOBTDPNQBU-
JCMFXJUIEFNPDSBUJ[BUJPOJOWJFXPGUIFOFFEGPSPSEFSBOETUBCJMJUZBTBQSF-
DPOEJUJPOGPSEFWFMPQNFOU"ęFSUIFTVTQFOTJPOPGUIFXSJUPGIBCFBTDPSQVTJO
Cavite and Batangas due to heavy guerrilla activity, Forbes noted in his journal
that the constabulary was now “free to run in the suspects. . . . A lot of innocent
QFPQMFXJMMCFQVUJOKBJMGPSBXIJMF CVUJUXJMMBMTPNFBOUIBUTPNFHVJMUZPOFT
will catch it and the whole cancer will be cut out.”51ćJTDPNNFOUFYFNQMJĕFT
UIFQIJMPTPQIZPGiUIFFOEKVTUJĕFTUIFNFBOTwXIJDIVOEFSMBZUIFWJPMBUJPOPG
IVNBOSJHIUT TFUUJOHUIFTUBOEBSEGPSUIFi"NFSJDBODFOUVSZw

“Total Institutions”: The Philippine Penal Apparatus as an Instrument


of Social Control

*OBOJNQPSUBOUQSFDFEFOU "NFSJDBODPMPOJBMPďDJBMTCVJMUVQUIF1IJMJQQJOFT
QFOBM BQQBSBUVT BMPOHTJEF UIF QPMJDF BT BO JNQPSUBOU NFDIBOJTN PG TUBUF
building and social control. The prison was seen as a pivotal institution not just
GPSQVOJTIJOHPČFOEFSTCVUGPSNPMEJOHUIFNJOUPEJTDJQMJOFEDPMPOJBMTVCKFDUT
BOEJOEVTUSJPVTDJUJ[FOT*HOBDJP7JMMBNPS UIFĕSTU'JMJQJOPEJSFDUPSPGQSJTPOT 
DPNNFOUFE JO ŴżŴų ićF QFOJUFOUJBSZ TZTUFN PG UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT GPMMPXT UIF
MBUFTUSFGPSNTBEPQUFECZUIFNPTUDJWJMJ[FEDPVOUSJFTPG&VSPQFBOE"NFSJDB
in the sense of securing the protection of society by correction as well as the
SFGPSNBUJPOPGUIFDSJNJOBM‫ڀڀ‬ćFQSJODJQMFPGTVDIBTZTUFNJTTVNNBSJ[FE
as follows: isolation, work, and education.”52
Studies on colonial prisons have generally shown that regardless of the pro-

30 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


GFTTFEJEFBMT SBDJTNPOUIFQBSUPGDPMPOJBMPďDJBMTBOESBNQBOUPWFSDSPXEJOH
DBVTFECZIFJHIUFOFEQPMJDJOHMFEUPUIFCSFBLEPXOPGSFGPSNBOEUIFQSPMJGFS-
ation of barbaric abuses.53ćF"NFSJDBOFYQFSJFODFJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBOEMBUFS
JOUFSWFOUJPOTTVDIBTJO7JFUOBNĕUXJUIUIJTOPSN#FDBVTFPGUIFQFSTJTUFODF
PGXBSBOEIJHIDSJNFSBUFTCSFECZUIFSBWBHFTPGUIFPDDVQBUJPO 1IJMJQQJOF
QSJTPOTCFDBNFĕMMFEUPPWFSDBQBDJUZ SFTVMUJOHJOiIFMMJTIDPOEJUJPOT wBTFZF-
XJUOFTTFTEFTDSJCFEUIFN.BOZQSJTPOFSTEJFEPGVOEFSOPVSJTINFOU DIPMFSB 
PSCFSJCFSJ DBVTFECZBEFĕDJFODZPGWJUBNJO# 
*O.BOJMBT#JMJCJEQSJTPO CVJMUCZ4QBJOJOŴŻŹŹBTBNPEFM#FOUIBNJUFQBO-
PQUJDPOXJUIBDFOUSBMUPXFSGSPNXIJDIHVBSETDPVMETFFJOTJEFBMMSBEJBUJOH
DFMMCMPDLT UIFEFBUISBUFSPTFGSPNźŵQFSŴ ųųųJOŴżųŵUPŷŶŻQFSŴ ųųųJOŴżųŸ
)PTQJUBMGBDJMJUJFTXFSFJOBEFRVBUFćFGPPEXBTVTVBMMZSPUUFOBOE BDDPSEJOH
UPPOFDPNNJTTJPOSFQPSU iUPPBHFEUPCFQBMBUBCMFw54 The dilapidated build-
JOHTIBEIPMFTJOUIFSPPĕOHBOEXBMMT XIJDIMFęJONBUFTVOQSPUFDUFEGSPN
CBE XFBUIFS CVU BMTP FOBCMFE TPNF UP FTDBQF ćF EFBUI QFOBMUZ XBT XJEFMZ
applied, particularly for political offenders. Colonial officials introduced the
HSVFTPNFBQQBSBUVTPGUIFFMFDUSJDDIBJS UZQJGZJOHUIF64SPMFJONPEFSOJ[JOH
SFQSFTTJPOUISPVHIUIFJNQPSUBUJPOPGOFXUFDIOPMPHJFT55
0O %FDFNCFS ź  Ŵżųŷ  B SJPU CSPLF PVU JO XIJDI OJOFUFFO QSJTPOFST XFSF
killed and forty wounded before order was restored. Forbes boasted that
iQSPNQU VTF PG B HBUMJOH HVO JO UIF UPXFS BOE UIF SJPU HVOT XJUI XIJDI UIF
HVBSET PO UIF XBMMT XFSF BSNFE FOEFE UIF USPVCMF JO FJHIU NJOVUFTw "ęFS
BOPUIFSSFCFMMJPOBUUIFDPOWJDUMBCPSDBNQBU"MCBZ 'PSCFTQVUBSNFETDPVUT
JOUIFUIJDLMZQMBOUFEIFNQĕFMETUPLFFQJONBUFTGFBSGVMBOEPCFEJFOU56
0WFSUJNF UIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPNNJTTJPOBUUFNQUFEUPJNQSPWFQSJTPODPO-
ditions, largely to advance political reeducation efforts. In an extension of the
QSPHSFTTJWF SFGPSNT JO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT  GBDJMJUJFT XFSF SFOPWBUFE  KVWFOJMFT
BOEUIFJOTBOFXFSFSFNPWFEUPTFQBSBUFJOTUJUVUJPOT BOEBMFQFSDPMPOZXBT
FTUBCMJTIFEPOUIFJTMBOEPG$VMJPO1SJTPOSFDPSETXFSFTZTUFNBUJ[FE BOEXBS-
EFOTXFSFUSBJOFEJOBENJOJTUSBUJWFNFUIPET"SFXBSETTZTUFNXBTJOJUJBUFE B
MJCSBSZXBTFTUBCMJTIFE BOEDMBTTFTXFSFPČFSFEJOSFBEJOH XSJUJOH BOENBUI-
FNBUJDT 3FMJHJPVT TFSWJDFT BOE SFDSFBUJPOBM QSPHSBNT XFSF BMTP PSHBOJ[FE 
JODMVEJOHCBTFCBMMHBNFTBOEUIFBUSJDBMQFSGPSNBODFTPOXFFLFOET TPNFMFE
CZBOJONBUFCBOE'MZQSPPGIPTQJUBMGBDJMJUJFTXFSFCVJMUPOQSJTPOHSPVOET 
BOETJDLQSJTPOFSTXFSFHJWFOBDDFTTUPNFEJDBMDBSFBOEESVHUSFBUNFOUBOE
cleansed of intestinal parasites.57 These practices resulted in a decline in overall
NPSUBMJUZSBUFT UIPVHIJOBEPQUJOHQVCMJDIFBMUIJOOPWBUJPOT PďDJBMTTPNF-
UJNFTUSFBUFEQSJTPOFSTBTPCKFDUTPGTDJFOUJĕDTUVEZBOEHVJOFBQJHTGPSOFX
WBDDJOFT*OŴżųŹ UFOQSJTPOFSTEJFEGSPNUIFCVCPOJDQMBHVFXIFO%S3JDI-
ard P. Strong injected subjects with the virulent plague bacillus.58
#FZPOETVDINFEJDBMFYQFSJNFOUBUJPO UIFQFOBMSFGPSNTXFSFMJNJUFECZ
UIFDPSSVQUJPOPGHVBSET XIPTNVHHMFEJOESVHTBOETZSJOHFTGPSNPSQIJOF

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 31


JOKFDUJPOT BOECZDISPOJDPWFSDSPXEJOHSFTVMUJOHGSPNUIFSPVOEVQPGQPMJUJDBM
QSJTPOFST*OŴżŵŶ #JMJCJEIPVTFEź żŻŹJONBUFTXIFOJUXBTJOUFOEFEGPSŶ ŷųų
%FUBJOFFTXFSFDSBNNFEJOUPQPPSMZWFOUJMBUFEDFMMTMBDLJOHQSPQFSUPJMFUT BOE
UIFZFOEVSFEGPPETIPSUBHFTBOEĘPPEJOH*OŴżŵŶ UIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPNNJT-
TJPOSFDPSEFEUIBUPWFSUISFFEP[FOQSJTPOFSTIBEEJFEGSPNUVCFSDVMPTJTBOE
BOPUIFS UIJSUZTFWFO GSPN QOFVNPOJB ćF SBUFT JODSFBTFE TJHOJĕDBOUMZ PWFS
the next four years. The 1928 annual report of the director of prisons acknowl-
FEHFEUIBUUIFTQSFBEPGEJTFBTFTXBTiUIFOBUVSBMTFRVFODFPGUIFDPOHFTUFE
conditions of the prison.”59
" DFOUSBM BJN PG UIF OFX QFOPMPHZ XBT UP JODVMDBUF BO JOEVTUSJPVT TQJSJU
BNPOHJONBUFTXJUIPVUBMMPXJOHUIFJSMBCPSUPCFFYQMPJUFECZQSJWBUFJOUFSFTUT 
BT VOEFS UIF DPOWJDUMFBTJOH TZTUFN JO UIF +JN $SPX 4PVUI 1SJTPOFST XFSF
USFBUFEMJLFTPMEJFST MJWJOHJOCBSSBDLTBOEGPSDFEUPVOEFSHPESJMMGPSNBUJPOT
They worked on labor projects; were instructed in trades such as woodworking,
DBSQFOUSZ QMVNCJOH BOECMBDLTNJUIJOHBOEQSPEVDFEGVSOJUVSFPGBQQBSFOUMZ
IJHIRVBMJUZ*OTUSVDUPSTXFSFBMTPTFOUJOUPXPNFOTQSJTPOTUPUFBDIIBOEJ-
crafts, including needlework and sewing, as well as stenography. Repair of
BVUPNPCJMFTBOENBDIJOFSZXBTQFSGPSNFEPOTJUFGPSBTNBMMSFNVOFSBUJPO60
Colonial officials took pride in the latest innovations and sought to por-
USBZUIFNBTBNBSLFSPGQSPHSFTTćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTQPOTPSFEBNPUJPO
QJDUVSFUSBWFMPHVFCZ#VSUPO)PMNFT BQJPOFFSPGUIFHFOSF UJUMFEGoing to
Jail in Manila,XIJDIGFBUVSFEJONBUFTCFJOHUSBJOFEBU#JMJCJEJOTJMWFSTNJUI-
ing and wicker-working. The advent of a Taylorized routine resulted in the
efficient production of goods. The director of the prison stated, “Our objec-
UJWFJTUPUSBOTGPSNUIFIVNBOCFJOHJOUPBNBO‰UPDIBOHFXFBLTIJęMFTTOFTT
into active responsibility.”61ćJTDPNNFOUTVNNFEVQUIFJEFPMPHZPGUIFOFX
QFOPMPHZ  XIJDI BďSNFE B GBJUI JO JOEJWJEVBMJTN BOE BDIJFWFNFOU UISPVHI
work and discipline.
*O BDUVBMJUZ  IPXFWFS  BCVTJWF QSBDUJDFT DPOUJOVFE 3FDBMDJUSBOU JONBUFT
XFSFUISPXOJOUPTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOUBOEGPSDFEUPXFBSMFHJSPOTKPJOFECZ
BDIBJO BNFUIPEDPOEFNOFECZ8FTUFSOQFOPMPHJTUTBTSFTFNCMJOHNFEJFWBM
UPSUVSF 8IFO RVFTUJPOFE BCPVU UIFJS VTF CZ B WJTJUJOH BDBEFNJD PCTFSWFS 
John L. Gillin, the director of Bilibid responded, “We have to deal here with
BQFPQMFJOBEJČFSFOUTUBHFPGTPDJBMEFWFMPQNFOUUIBOUIPTFZPVEFBMXJUIJO
the United States.”62 The adoption of racist stereotypes to rationalize draconian
NFBTVSFTFYFNQMJĕFEUIFDPOUJOVJUZGSPNUIF4QBOJTIFSB GSPNXIJDITPNFPG
UIFUPSUVSFBSUJGBDUTXFSFJSPOJDBMMZLFQUPOEJTQMBZJOBOPOTJUFNVTFVN
1BSUPGUIFQSPCMFNXBTUIFBUUFNQUUPFNVMBUF"NFSJDBOQFOBMQSBDUJDF 
XIJDIXBTNBSSFECZSBDJBMWJPMFODF PWFSDSPXEJOH BOEIBSTIQVOJUJWFQPMJ-
DJFT"DDPSEJOHUP(JMMJO UIFDPOEJUJPOTJO#JMJCJEXFSFDPNQBSBCMFUPUIPTFJO
iOJOFUFOUITPG"NFSJDBOQSJTPOTJOUFSNTPGUIFEJTDJQMJOFDBSSJFEPVU wBQPX-
FSGVMDPNNFOUBSZPOUIFSFQSFTTJWFDIBSBDUFSPGUIF"NFSJDBOQFOBMTZTUFN63

32 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


*OTQJUFPGUIFMPęZSIFUPSJD 'JMJQJOPQSJTPOTVMUJNBUFMZTFSWFEBTBNPSFFČFD-
UJWFJOTUSVNFOUPGTPDJBMDPOUSPMUIBOJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTćFZFNFSHFEBTB
QPXFSGVMiUPUBMJOTUJUVUJPO wJOUIFBOBMPHZPGUIFTPDJPMPHJTU&SWJOH(PČNBO 
EFTJHOFEUPJODVMDBUFDPOGPSNJUZXJUIIFHFNPOJDTPDJFUBMOPSNTQSPNPUFECZ
DPMPOJBMFMJUFT XIJMFNBSHJOBMJ[JOHUSBEJUJPOBMQSBDUJDFTBOERVBTIJOHEJTTFOU64
4PNFPGUIFXPSTUDPOEJUJPOTXFSFJOQSPWJODJBMMZSVOGBDJMJUJFTPQFSBUJOH
CFZPOE UIF DPOUSPM PG DFOUSBM HPWFSONFOU BENJOJTUSBUPST *OTQFDUJPO UPVST
SFWFBMFE NBMBENJOJTUSBUJPO  DPSSVQUJPO  iXPFGVM IFBMUI DBSF w UIF MBDL PG
BEFRVBUFBJSBOEGPPE BOEUPSUVSFXJUIXIJQTBOEIFBWZDIBJOT0OFQSJTPOFS 
GPSDFEUPDMJNCBUBMMDPDPOVUUSFFXIJMFJODIBJOT GFMMPČBOEIBEUPIBWFB
MFHBNQVUBUFE*ONBUFTBXBJUFEUSJBMGPSMPOHQFSJPET BOETPNFXFSFESJWFO
JOTBOF XJUIDBSFPGUIFJOTBOFHFOFSBMMZDPOTJEFSFEUPCFNFEJFWBM 8PNFO
XFSFQMBDFEJOUIFTBNFDFMMTBTNFO MFBWJOHUIFNTVTDFQUJCMFUPTFYVBMBCVTF65
While an edict outlawing torture was issued prior to 1910, it was not until 1926
UIBU UIF #VSFBV PG 1SJTPOT UPPL BOZ TUFQT UP FOGPSDF JU "U UIF TBNF UJNF  JU
organized a convention for provincial wardens where, in accord with the new
professional standards in the United States, lectures were given on recordkeep-
JOH DPNQJMJOHNPOUIMZSFQPSUT BOEJOTUJMMJOHBUJHIUMZEJTDJQMJOFETUSVDUVSF
During a 1928 inspection tour colonial officials nevertheless found prisons
to be badly run (including an instance in which the gun rack was within reach
PG UIF JONBUFT  BOE MBDLJOH JO TBOJUBUJPO 8BSEFOT XFSF JODPNQFUFOU QPMJUJ-
cal appointees who took vengeance upon prisoners belonging to a rival party.
Guards were poorly trained and did not have “the slightest conception of prison
NBOBHFNFOUPSQFOPMPHZw66 In the province of Rizal, a seedbed of resistance,
DPOEJUJPOTXFSFiFOUJSFMZVOTBUJTGBDUPSZwJOTQFDUPS&ENVOE'SJU[XSPUFUPUIF
#VSFBVPG1SJTPOTćFDFMMTXFSFiEJSUZ‫ڀڀ‬UIPTFPGUIFXPNFOQSJTPOFSTIBWF
BQBSUJDVMBSMZPCOPYJPVTTNFMM‫ڀڀ‬%JTDJQMJOFJTQPPSBOEJONBUFTDPNQMBJO
BCPVUUIFRVBMJUZ RVBOUJUZ BOEDIBSBDUFSPGUIFGPPEGVSOJTIFEw*O#BUBOBHBT 
'SJU[BOEUXP'JMJQJOPJOTQFDUPSTDPNQBSFEBNVOJDJQBMKBJMUPBiDIJDLFOSPPTUw
*O$BWJUF UIFZMBNFOUFEUIBUJONBUFTTBUBSPVOETNPLJOHDJHBSFUUFTBOEDJHBST
all day without being forced to work. In addition, “the cells have obnoxious
TNFMMTBOEBSFĕMMFEXJUIDJHBSBOEDJHBSFUUFTUVCTBOEEJSUZDMPUIFTćFEJOJOH
SPPNTNFMMFEMJLFBTUBCMFw67
ćFTF DPNNFOUT DBQUVSF UIF ĕYBUJPO PG DPMPOJBM PďDJBMT XJUI PSEFS BOE
EJTDJQMJOFBOETIFEMJHIUPOUIFPQQSFTTJWFFOWJSPONFOUQFSWBEJOHUIFQSJTPO
TZTUFN"ęFSSFBEJOHUIFSFQPSUT 'PSCFTSFDPNNFOEFEBDSBDLEPXOPOQPMJUJ-
cal patronage and the construction of new facilities to relieve congestion. There
JTMJUUMFJOEJDBUJPO IPXFWFS PGNVDIGPMMPXUISPVHIPSJNQSPWFNFOU JOQBSU
CFDBVTF VOEFS UIF 'JMJQJOJ[BUJPO QSPHSBN  UIF HPWFSOJOH DPNNJTTJPO TVQ-
QPSUFENBOZPGUIFTBNFDPSSVQUPďDJBMTDSJUJDJ[FEJOUIFSFQPSUTBOE BUUIF
FOEPGUIFEBZ EJEOPUDBSFFOPVHIBCPVUUIFXFMMCFJOHPGJONBUFTMBDLJOHJO
political capital.68

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 33


ćFNPTUBNCJUJPVTQFOBMJOJUJBUJWFXBTBOBHSJDVMUVSBMDPPQFSBUJWFPOUIF
JTMBOEPG1BMBXBOBU*XBIJHBOEBU4BO3BNPOJOUIFQSPWJODFPG;BNCPBOHB 
XIFSFQSJTPOFSTFOHBHFEJOTFMGNBOBHFNFOUBOEQPMJDJOHBOEHSFXUIFJSPXO
GPPEPOPWFSŴųų ųųųBDSFTPGMBOEćFZBMTPQBSUJDJQBUFEJOMVNCFSJOHBOE
ĕTIJOH IBEBQJHBOEQPVMUSZIPVTF BOEQSPEVDFEIBOEJDSBęTGPSTBMF JODMVE-
ing hats, raincoats, and furniture.69 If they behaved well, prisoners could own
MJUUMFGBSNTBOEMJWFJOBIVUXJUIUIFJSGBNJMJFTćFOFYUTUFQXBTBGVMMQBSEPO
ćFJOTUJUVUJPOTXFSFNPEFMFEBęFSUIF(FPSHF+VOJPS3FQVCMJD BSFGPSNBUPSZ
TDIPPMJOVQTUBUF/FX:PSLXIFSFEFMJORVFOUDIJMESFOMJWFEJOGBNJMZDPUUBHFT
BOEXFSFUBVHIUUPCFDPNFQSPEVDUJWF TFMGHPWFSOJOHDJUJ[FOT70
*XBIJHJOQBSUJDVMBSXBTIFSBMEFEBTBNPEFMPGQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNBOEJOĘV-
FODFEUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPG"NFSJDBOQFOBMGBSNT8IJUF XIPXBTBQQPJOUFE
XBSEFO XSPUFJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBU'PSCFTXBTiBOJEFBMJTUwXIPCFMJFWFEUIBU
iNFOJOUIFQFOBMDPMPOJFTXFSFSFEFFNBCMFw‫)ڀڀ‬JTWJTJPOXBTUPiBQQMZUP
'JMJQJOPPVUMBXT‫ڀڀ‬BOEGBOBUJDT NVSEFSFSTBOEDBUUMFUIJFWFT JOTVSHFOUTBOE
QPMJUJDBM JOUSJHVFST UIF TBNF NFEJDJOF UIBU IBE DVSFE <EFMJORVFOU> "NFSJ-
can boys.”718IFO*XBIJHXBTĕSTUFTUBCMJTIFEJOŴżųŷ 8IJUFOPUFEUIBUUIF
EFBUISBUFXBTPWFSŵŸųQFSŴ ųųųiNFOEJFEMJLFĘJFTPGCFSJCFSJ NBMBSJB BOE
EZTFOUFSZ BOEXBMMPXFEJOUIFJSPXOĕMUIVOUJMUIFSFNBJOEFSSPTFJOSFWPMU 
OFBSMZLJMMJOHUIFOFHMFDUGVMTVQFSJOUFOEFOU.BOZPGUIFDPOWJDUTĘFEUPUIF
XJMENPVOUBJOJOUFSJPSPGUIFJTMBOEXIFSFUIFZMJWFEXJUIUIFQBHBO5BHCBOVB
tribes.”72
&WFOUVBMMZUIFJONBUFTDMFBSFEUIFMBOEBOEEFWFMPQFEUIFOFDFTTBSZJOGSB-
TUSVDUVSF UP BMMPX GPS JUT TVTUBJOBCJMJUZ  BMUIPVHI NBMBSJB SFNBJOFE FOEFNJD
and cases of beriberi were still recorded. Progressives took pride in the fact
that while Bastille-type prisons were being built in the United States, Iwahig
XBTCPSOXJUIPVUQSJTPOXBMMTPSHVBSETBOEHBWFJONBUFTUIFPQQPSUVOJUZUP
SFHBJOUIFJSTFMGSFTQFDUćF8PPE'PSCFTNJTTJPOJOŴżŵŴDIBSBDUFSJ[FEJUBT
BNPOHUIFNPTUTVDDFTTGVMJOTUJUVUJPOTDSFBUFECZUIFDPMPOJBMPDDVQBUJPOBTB
SFTVMUPGUIFBEPQUJPOPGiBEWBODFESFGPSNBUPSZNFUIPET wXIJDIZJFMEFEMPX
SFDJEJWJTNSBUFT737JDF(PWFSOPS/FXUPO8(JMCFSUXBTRVPUFEJOUIFManila
Times as saying that he had observed convicts living and working together in
IBSNPOZBTQSBDUJDBMMZGSFFNFOXJUIUIFBCTFODFPGWJPMFODFBOEiOPUBTJOHMF
HVOPOUIFJTMBOE‫ڀڀ‬ćFIVNBOJUBSJBOTQJSJUXIJDIFOHFOEFSFEUIFJEFBPGB
QFOBMDPMPOZNBZOPXCFTBJEUPIBWFCFFOGVMMZKVTUJĕFEćFTVDDFTTPGUIF
FYQFSJNFOUJTXPOEFSGVMw74
In 1931, after visiting penitentiaries throughout the United States and the
XPSME UIFDSJNJOPMPHJTU+PIO(JMMJOGPVOE*XBIJHUPCFUIFNPTUSFNBSLBCMF
FYQFSJNFOU JO QFOBM SFGPSN UIFO JO FYJTUFODF75 While Iwahig was indeed
JOOPWBUJWFJONBOZPGJUTJEFBMT DPOEJUJPOTXFSFOFWFSUIFMFTTGBSGSPNVUPQJBO
.BOZ PG UIF JONBUFT XFSF QPMJUJDBM QSJTPOFST  JODMVEJOH DBQUVSFE MFBEFST PG
UIFNFTTJBOJDQFBTBOUNPWFNFOUTBOEUIF.PSPSFTJTUBODF%JTDJQMJOFDPVME

34 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


CF TFWFSF  BOE 8IJUF  XIP IBE PWFSTFFO UIF NBTTBDSF BU #VE %BKP  SFGFSSFE
UPIJNTFMGBTBiD[BSw)JTTVDDFTTPS$BSSPMM)-BNCXBTGPSDFEUPSFTJHOGPS
BMMFHFEMZNJTBQQSPQSJBUJOHQVCMJDGVOETJOGSBVEVMFOUDBUUMFQVSDIBTFT-BUFS
'JMJQJOP BENJOJTUSBUPST BMTP TUPPE USJBM GPS HSBę BOE DPSSVQUJPO76 The death
SBUF SFNBJOFE IJHI 'JęFFO JONBUFT EJFE GSPN UVCFSDVMPTJT  GPS FYBNQMF  JO
1928. Scattered violence and rebellions were further recorded. In 1914, twenty-
POFFTDBQFFTDPNNJUUFESPCCFSZBOENVSEFSFEBO"NFSJDBOTDIPPMUFBDIFSJO
EFĕBODFPGUIFPDDVQBUJPO77 Public officials tellingly referred to Iwahig not as a
QFOBMGBSNCVUBTBiQMBOUBUJPOwPSiSFTFSWBUJPOwćFTFBOBMPHJFT BTUIFIJTUP-
SJBO.JDIBFM4BMNBOIBTQPJOUFEPVU VOEFSTDPSFQBSBMMFMTXJUIUIFUSFBUNFOU
PG"GSJDBO"NFSJDBOTBOE/BUJWF"NFSJDBOTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT$PMPOJBMJTUT
TBXQFOBMSFGPSNBTBCFOFWPMFOUNFBOTPGVQMJęJOHUIPTFPGBTVQQPTFEMZJOGF-
SJPSSBDFUISPVHIUIFJODVMDBUJPOPGBTQJSJUPGJOEVTUSJPVTOFTT4FFOGSPNBEJG-
ferent vantage point, however, it was part of a racist and authoritarian structure
DFOUFSFEPOFDPOPNJDFYQMPJUBUJPO78
In response to the wave of neoconservative pundits extolling the virtues
PGDPMPOJBMJTNPOUIFFWFPGUIFŵųųŵ*SBRXBS UIFIJTUPSJBO&SJD'POFSDPN-
NFOUFEUIBUiUIFCFOFWPMFODFPGCFOFWPMFOUJNQFSJBMJTNMJFTJOUIFFZFTPGUIF
CFIPMEFSwćFQPMJUJDBMTDJFOUJTU$IBMNFST+PIOTPOPCTFSWFEJONemesis: The
Last Days of the American Republic, “The idea of forcing thousands of people
UPCFGSFFCZTMBVHIUFSJOHUIFN‰XJUI.BYJNNBDIJOFHVOTJOUIFOJOFUFFOUI
DFOUVSZ XJUIAQSFDJTJPONVOJUJPOTUPEBZ‰TFFNTUPSFĘFDUBEFFQMZGFMUOFFE
BT XFMM BT B TUSJLJOH JOBCJMJUZ UP JNBHJOF UIF MJWFT BOE WJFXQPJOUT PG PUIFSTw
+PIOTPOBTTFSUFEGVSUIFSUIBUiBMMFNQJSFTSFRVJSFNZUITPGEJWJOFSJHIU SBDJBM
QSFFNJOFODF  NBOJGFTU EFTUJOZ  PS B ADJWJMJ[JOH NJTTJPO UP DPWFS UIFJS PęFO
barbarous behavior in other people’s countries.”79ćFTFDPNNFOUTBSFDMFBSMZ
relevant to the United States’ colonization efforts in the Philippines. In the face
PG QPQVMBS SFTJTUBODF  "NFSJDBO PďDJBMT SFTQPOEFE XJUI TBWBHF SFQSFTTJPO 
DBSSJFEPVUMBSHFMZUISPVHIUIFGPSNJEBCMFQPMJDJOHBQQBSBUVTUIFZEFWFMPQFE 
FYFNQMJGZJOHUIFDPFSDJWFVOEFSQJOOJOHTPG"NFSJDBOQPXFS
In Policing America’s Empire "MGSFE8.D$PZDPODMVEFEUIBUUIFBSNZT
iBQQMJDBUJPOPGNJMJUBSZTDJFODFUPNVOJDJQBMBENJOJTUSBUJPODSFBUFETPNFUIJOH
PG B SFWPMVUJPO JO QPMJDJOH $PNCJOJOH NJMJUBSJ[FE DPFSDJPO  JOGPSNBUJPO
NBOBHFNFOU BOEDPWFSUPQFSBUJPOT UIFBSNZDSFBUFEBQPMJDFGPSDFGBSNPSF
BEWBODFEUIBOFJUIFSJUT4QBOJTIBOUFDFEFOUTPSJUT"NFSJDBODPOUFNQPSBSJFTw
"TBDPOTFRVFODF UIFOBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOUXBTTVQQSFTTFE BOEUIF1IJMJQ-
QJOFTFWPMWFEBTBO"NFSJDBOOFPDPMPOZ QMBHVFECZSBNQBOUJOFRVBMJUZ QPMJU-
JDBMSFQSFTTJPO BOEDPSSVQUJPO0WFSUIFDPNJOHEFDBEFT UIFDPOTUBCVMBSZBOE
its successor organizations continued to receive lavish subsidies, particularly
JO QFSJPET XIFO BSNFE JOTVSHFODJFT EFWFMPQFE BNPOH NBSHJOBMJ[FE TPDJBM
groups against the Westernized elite.80"NFSJDBODPOTUBCVMBSZWFUFSBOTNFBO-
XIJMFSFDFJWFEDBSFFSQSPNPUJPOTBOEXFSFDPOUSBDUFEUPEFWFMPQDPVOUFSQBSU

The Philippines and the Blood of Empire 35


PSHBOJ[BUJPOT JO $FOUSBM "NFSJDB BOE UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT .BOZ PG UIF UFDI-
OJRVFT UIBU UIFZ QJPOFFSFE  JODMVEJOH UIF JNQPSUBUJPO PG ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH BOE
DPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOU UIFFTUBCMJTINFOUPGUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFT BOEUIF
BEWFOUPGQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFNFUIPETCFDBNFBTUBQMFPGUIFHMPCBMQPMJDF
QSPHSBNT%VSJOHUIF7JFUOBN8BS UIF1FOUBHPOTUVEJFEUIFIJTUPSZPGUIF
DPOTUBCVMBSZ BOE TPVHIU UP FNVMBUF JUT FYQMPJUT JO DPNCBUJOH B EFUFSNJOFE
OBUJPOBMJTU NPWFNFOU TLJMMFE JO UIF BSU PG KVOHMF XBSGBSF The continuity in
QPMJDJFTXBTUIVTFYQMJDJU BTUIFWJPMFODFPGFNQJSFDBNFGVMMDJSDMF

36 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


Chapter 2
“Popping Off” Sandinistas and Cacos
Police Training in Occupied Haiti, the Dominican
Republic, and Nicaragua

Who are We?


We are Tigers!
What do Tigers eat?
Blood!
Whose Blood?
The Blood of the People!
‰/JDBSBHVBO(VBSEJBDIBOU T

It seems funny as hell to me, every once in a while some misguided fool up in
the States, who knows nothing of the trouble here sets up a howl over a few
black bandits being knocked off.
‰-ewis B. “Chesty” Puller  MFUUFSUPGFMMPXNBSJOF+PIO1VMMFO

I know of no inhumane action and crimes greater than those committed by


the U.S. against the defenseless peoples of Latin America through its legally
authorized agents and representatives.
‰). H. Knowles GPSNFSNJOJTUFSPG/JDBSBHVB FBSMZT

*OŴżŴź UXPZFBSTBęFSUIFNBSJOFTMBOEFEJO)BJUJUPQSPUFDU"NFSJDBOCVTJ-
OFTT JOUFSFTUT UIFSF  (FOFSBM 4NFEMFZ % #VUMFS  POF PG UIF NPTU EFDPSBUFE
NBSJOFTJO"NFSJDBOIJTUPSZ XBTTFOUUP)BJUJUPDSFBUFBQPMJDF(FOEBSNFSJF
UIBUXPVMETFSWFUIFTBNFQVSQPTF.VDIMJLFIJTDPVOUFSQBSUTJOUIF1IJMJQ-
pines, where he had spent a year battling nationalist forces in Cavite, Butler and
IJTNFOTPVHIUUPNPMEUIFGPSDFJOUIFMFBUIFSOFDLJNBHF)FEFDMBSFEJOIJT
autobiography that “with shoes and buttons shining and hats cocked over one
FZF UIFZTUSVUUFEXJUIBTXBHHFSBOECBTLFEJOUIFBENJSJOHHMBODFTPGTUSBQ-
QJOH/FHSPXPNFOw1*OSFBMJUZ UIF(FOEBSNFSJFDPNNJUUFEOVNFSPVTBUSPDJ-
ties in suppressing the resistance of the rebels known as Cacos (for the type
PGDMPUIJOHXPSOCZQFBTBOUTJOUIFOPSUIFSONPVOUBJOT BT)BJUJVOEFS64
PDDVQBUJPOXBTUVSOFEJOUPBMBCPSBUPSZGPSUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGOFXQPMJDJOH
UFDIOPMPHJFTBOENFUIPETPGDPFSDJPO#VUMFSBDLOPXMFEHFEZFBSTMBUFSXIJMF
CBSOTUPSNJOHBSPVOEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUIBUIFIBECFFOBiIJHIDMBTTNVTDMF

37
NBOGPSCJHCVTJOFTTBOEUIFCBOLFSTwBOEUIBUNFOVOEFSIJTDPNNBOEiXFSF
NBEFUPSFHBSENVSEFSBTUIFPSEFSPGUIFEBZ‫ڀڀ‬8FVTFEUIFNGPSBDPVQMFPG
ZFBSTBOEUSBJOFEUIFNUPUIJOLOPUIJOHBUBMMPGLJMMJOHPSCFJOHLJMMFEw2
64GPSFJHOQPMJDZJO-BUJO"NFSJDBEVSJOHUIFFBSMZUXFOUJFUIDFOUVSZXBT
guided by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted that
the United States had the right to function as a police power to “protect” nations
JOUIFIFNJTQIFSFGSPNFODSPBDINFOUCZ&VSPQFBOQPXFST"NBJOJNQFUVT
XBTUIFEFTJSFUPTFDVSFBTUBCMFJOWFTUNFOUDMJNBUFBOEBDDFTTUPUIF1BOBNB
Canal. In 1905, Secretary of State Elihu Root argued that the United States’ trad-
ing partners needed professional police forces that could “repress subversive
disorder and preserve the public peace.”3 Dana G. Munro, U.S. chargé d’affaires
JO/JDBSBHVBBOENJOJTUFSUP)BJUJ DPNNFOUFE
ćFFTUBCMJTINFOUPGOPOQBSUJTBODPOTUBCVMBSJFTJOUIF$BSJCCFBOTUBUFTXBTPOF
PGUIFDIJFGPCKFDUJWFTPGPVSQPMJDZ‫ڀڀ‬ćFPMEBSNJFTXFSFPSTFFNFEUPCFPOF
PGUIFQSJODJQBMDBVTFTPGEJTPSEFSBOEĕOBODJBMEJTPSHBOJ[BUJPOćFZDPOTVNFE
NPTUPGUIFHPWFSONFOUTSFWFOVF DIJFĘZJOHSBę BOEUIFZHBWFOPUIJOHCVUEJT-
order and oppression in return. We thought that a disciplined force, trained by
"NFSJDBOT XPVMEEPBXBZXJUIUIFQFUUZMPDBMPQQSFTTJPOUIBUXBTSFTQPOTJCMF
GPSNVDIPGUIFEJTPSEFSUIBUPDDVSSFEBOEXPVMECFBOJNQPSUBOUTUFQUPXBSET
CFUUFSĕOBODJBMBENJOJTUSBUJPOBOEFDPOPNJDQSPHSFTTHFOFSBMMZ4

ćFTFSFNBSLTTVHHFTUUIFJNQPSUBODFBUUSJCVUFEUPQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJO
FOHFOEFSJOHTUBCJMJUZ FDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOU BOENPSFFďDJFOUHPWFSONFOU
BENJOJTUSBUJPOćFZBMTPEJTQMBZBDPOĕEFODFJOUIFBCJMJUZPG"NFSJDBOTUP
SFNBLFGPSFJHOTPDJFUJFTBOETPMWFEFFQMZSPPUFETPDJBMQSPCMFNTXJUIPVUDPO-
sidering cultural barriers, the political context, or local reaction. In practice, the
"NFSJDBOUSBJOFE DPOTUBCVMBSJFT FWPMWFE JOUP JOTUSVNFOUT PG SFQSFTTJPO BOE
WFIJDMFTGPSUIFSJTFPGEJDUBUPSTXIPVQIFME"NFSJDBOSFHJPOBMJOUFSFTUT1PMJDF
USBJOJOHJOUVSOMBJEBOJNQPSUBOUGPVOEBUJPOGPS$PME8BSoFSBQSPHSBNTUIBU
XFSFTJNJMBSMZEFTJHOFEUPTVQQSFTTSBEJDBMOBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOUTUISFBUFOJOH
U.S. power.

Progeny of FDR and Smedley Butler: The Haitian Gendarmerie and


the U.S. Occupation, 1915–1934

4JODFUIFŴŻųŷSFWPMVUJPOPWFSUISPXJOH'SFODIEPNJOBUJPO UIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
IBEIPQFEUPJODPSQPSBUF)BJUJJOUPUIF"NFSJDBOPSCJUBOEUBNFUIFDPVOUSZT
SBEJDBMBOEEFĕBOUTQJSJU*O+VMZŴżŴŸ UIF8JMTPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOWBEFEVOEFS
UIFQSFUFYUPGSFTUPSJOHTUBCJMJUZBęFSTFWFSBMDPVQTEÏUBU"NFSJDBODPSQPSB-
UJPOTUPPLDPOUSPMPGUIFCBOLJOHTZTUFN BOEUIFNBSJOFTCMPDLFE%S3PTBMWP
#PCP BOiJEFBMJTUwBOEiESFBNFSwLOPXOGPSUSFBUJOHUIFQPPSXJUIPVUDIBSHF 
GSPN UBLJOH QPXFS *O IJT QMBDF  UIFZ JOTFSUFE 1IJMJQ 4VESF %VBSUJHJOBWF 
XIPN#VUMFSDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTBOiPMESPHVF wBOEUIFO-PVJT#PSOP BOBENJSFS
PG#FOJUP.VTTPMJOJXIPN8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFTEFTDSJCFEBTiUIJO UBMM 

38 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


UPPUIZBOENPTUEJTBHSFFBCMF‫*ڀڀ‬UKVTUEJEOPUTFFNQPTTJCMFUIBUBOZNBO
should be so patent a stage villain.”5
*O %FDFNCFS ŴżŴŸ  4FDSFUBSZ PG UIF /BWZ 'SBOLMJO % 3PPTFWFMU USBOTNJU-
UFEBQMBOGPSB(FOEBSNFSJFXIPTFGVODUJPOXBTUPFOBCMFUIFESBXEPXOPG
"NFSJDBOUSPPQTXIJMFQSFTFSWJOH64TUSBUFHJDJOUFSFTUTJO)BJUJćFTVNPG
$508,234 was appropriated for the force, headed by Butler, which consisted
PGŵ ŷųų)BJUJBOTBOEŴųųXIJUFNBSJOFT BOVNCFSPGXIPNXPVMEHPPOUP
TUPSJFE NJMJUBSZ DBSFFST -FXJT . i$IFTUZw 1VMMFS  GPS FYBNQMF  XPVME FBSO
EFDPSBUJPOTJO/JDBSBHVBBOEUIF1BDJĕD XIJMF-FNVFM$4IFQIFSE+S XIP
TFSWFEJO)BJUJBęFS8PSME8BS*BOEXBTBTTJTUBOUDIJFGPGTUBČGSPNŴżŵŻUP
ŴżŶŴ XPVMEMFBEUIF4JYUI.BSJOF%JWJTJPOUPWJDUPSZJO0LJOBXBBOECFDPNF
DPNNBOEBOUPGUIF.BSJOF$PSQTGSPNŴżŸŵUPŴżŸŸ-JLFOJOHUIFXBSBHBJOTU
UIF $BDPT SFCFMT UP iGSPOUJFS ĕHIUJOH w 4IFQIFSE DPNNFOUFE SFUSPTQFDUJWFMZ
i8FEJEBHSFBUEFBMUP *UIJOL CSJOH)BJUJVQGSPNXIBUJUIBECFFOUPBHPPE
country. It didn’t last too long after we left, but still that’s another story.”6
&RVJQQFEXJUI4QSJOHĕFMESJĘFTBOEDBSCJOFT UIF(FOEBSNFSJFXBTNPE-
eled after the Philippines constabulary and the New Jersey and Pennsylvania
state constabularies, which were developed by Philippines constabulary vet-
erans (including Sergeant Jesse Garwood) and were known for suppressing
TUSJLFT BOE iCFBUJOH EPXO GPSFJHOFSTw 'PMMPXJOH UIF NPEFM PG QSPHSFTTJWF
SFGPSNT "NFSJDBOPďDFSTJOTUJUVUFEBQMBUPPOTZTUFNBOEUSBďDQPMJDFBOE
FODPVSBHFE UIF TZTUFNJ[BUJPO PG SFDPSET BOE UIF BEPQUJPO PG BO JOEFY DBSE
ĕMJOHTZTUFNPOBSSFTUFEQFSTPOTUPJNQSPWFBENJOJTUSBUJWFFďDJFODZ7 These
innovations were consistent with the prevailing viewpoint that a professional
police organization should play a vital function in regulating social life, thus
MBZJOHUIFGPVOEBUJPOPGBNPEFSOOBUJPO
*OXIBUXPVMECFDPNFBGBNJMJBSDZDMFPGFYQPSUBUJPOBOESFJNQPSUBUJPO 
JOJUJBUJWFTQJPOFFSFEJO)BJUJBOEPUIFSDPMPOJBMFODMBWFTIFMQFEUPUSBOTGPSN
EPNFTUJDQPMJDJOHJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT SFĘFDUFEJOUIFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPGQPMJDF
institutions and foreshadowing the era of SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics)
UFBNT&YFNQMJGZJOHUIJTUSFOE XIJMFPOMFBWFGSPNUIFBSNZJOŴżŵŷ #VUMFS
TFSWFEBTUJOUBTQPMJDFDIJFGJO1IJMBEFMQIJB BQQPJOUFECZ3FQVCMJDBONBZPS
8 'SFFMBOE ,FOESJDL  XIP QSPNJTFE BO BENJOJTUSBUJPO PG TPVOE CVTJOFTT
principles and law and order. The wiry Butler took the oath of office in his
NBSJOFVOJGPSN)FTPVHIUUPJOTUJMMEJTDJQMJOFJOIJTNFOJOUIFNBOOFSJO
XIJDI IF IBE USBJOFE UIF )BJUJBO (FOEBSNFSJF ,OPXO GPS IJT ĕFSZ UFNQFS
BOE CMVOU TQFFDI  #VUMFS DSBDLFE EPXO PO DPSSVQUJPO  QSPNPUFE UIF VTF PG
IJHITQFFEDBSTBOEOFXSBEJPUFDIOPMPHZ TFUVQBOJSPOSJOHPGTFNJNJMJUBSZ
QPTUTBSPVOEUIFDJUZ BOEGPMMPXFEXIBUIFDBMMFEBiQPVOEQPMJDZw‰PSEFS-
JOHIJTNFO BSNFEXJUITBXFEPČTIPUHVOT UPSBJETQFBLFBTJFTBOETVTQFDUFE
bootlegging institutions suddenly and repeatedly if necessary. During his ten-
VSF QPMJDFDMPTFEŵ ŸŹŹTQFBLFBTJFTJO1IJMBEFMQIJB JODPNQBSJTPOXJUIPOMZ
220 in the preceding year, though the conviction rate was low, in part because

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 39


PGQPMJDFDBSFMFTTOFTTJOTFDVSJOHFWJEFODF$MBJNJOHUIBUUIFCFTUXBZUPTUPQ
DSJNFXBTUPTIPPUDSJNJOBMTBOENBLFKBJMTVOCFBSBCMF #VUMFSXBTSFQMBDFE
BęFSIFTUPSNFEUIF3JU[$BSMUPOIPUFM TIVUUJOHEPXOBEFCVUBOUFCBMM0OF
BOHSZDJUJ[FODPNQBSFEIJNUPBNJMJUBSZEJDUBUPS XIJMFBOPUIFSDPNQMBJOFE
UIBUiNJMJUBSZUBDUJDTXIJDINJHIUEPJO.FYJDPBOEPUIFSQMBDFT‫ڀڀ‬IBTOP
QMBDFJOUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPGDJWJMBČBJSTw8
In Haiti, given the colonial context and the lack of constitutional safeguards,
UIF(FOEBSNFSJFXBTFWFONPSFCSVUBM"DSJUJDOPUFEUIBUUIFHFOEBSNFTXFSF
BiNFOBDF‫ڀڀ‬SFDSVJUFEGSPNUIFMPXFTUFMFNFOUT‫ڀڀ‬ćFUSBJOJOHUIFZBSF
HJWJOHNBLFTTPMEJFST OPUQPMJDFwćFZDPNNJUUFENBOZFYDFTTFTJOEJSFDUJOH
UIFJOUFSONFOUPGSFTJEFOU(FSNBOTEVSJOH8PSME8BS*BOEFOGPSDJOHBOJMM
BEWJTFEBOUJWPPEPPDBNQBJHOJOXIJDIQFPQMFXFSFBSSFTUFEGPSTVDIDSJNFT
BTiQSFQBSJOHGPPEGPSUIFTBJOUTwćFKPVSOBMJTU4BNVFM(*ONBOPCTFSWFE
UIBU UIF (FOEBSNFSJF FOKPZFE QSBDUJDBMMZ iVOMJNJUFE QPXFSw JO UIF EJTUSJDUT
XIFSFJUTFSWFE DSFBUJOHPQQPSUVOJUJFTGPSFYUPSUJPOBOELJDLCBDLTi)F<UIF
(FOEBSNFSJFPďDFS>JTUIFKVEHFPGQSBDUJDBMMZBMMDJWJMBOEDSJNJOBMDBTFT‫ڀڀ‬
UIF QBZNBTUFS GPS BMM GVOET GSPN UIF DFOUSBM HPWFSONFOU ‫  ڀ ڀ‬BOE FYPďDJP
EJSFDUPSPGUIFTDIPPMTJOBTNVDIBTIFQBZTUIFUFBDIFST)FDPOUSPMTUIFNBZPS
and city council, since they cannot spend funds without his ok. As collector of
UBYFT IFFYFSDJTFTBTUSPOHJOĘVFODFPOBMMJOEJWJEVBMTJOUIFDPNNVOJUZw9
-JFVUFOBOU 'BVTUJO & 8JSLVT  XIP FOMJTUFE JO UIF NBSJOFT BU TFWFOUFFO
UP FTDBQF UIF 1JUUTUPXO  1FOOTZMWBOJB  DPBM NJOFT  XBT FWFO DSPXOFE UIF
iXIJUF,JOHwPG-B(POBWF BOJTMBOEUISFFIPVSTGSPN1PSUBV1SJODF XIJDI
IFSVMFEBTBQFSTPOBMĕFG)JTTUPSZXBTQPQVMBSJ[FEJO8JMMJBN4FBCSPPLT
1929 book The Magic Island,XIJDIQPSUSBZFEIJNBTBOFNCPEJNFOUPGUIF
CFOFWPMFOUQBUFSOBMJTNPGUIF64PDDVQBUJPO&NCSBDJOHWPPEPPSJUVBMTBOE
native dress and dance, the blond-haired Wirkus lived in a concrete house
PWFSMPPLJOH UIF TFB  XIJDI 4FBCSPPL EFTDSJCFE BT B i,JQMJOHFTRVF PVUQPTU
POUIFFEHFPGUIFKVOHMFw)FXBTDPOTJEFSFEBHPECZNBOZMPDBMTCFDBVTF
PG IJT JNQPSUBUJPO PG RVJOJOF BOE PUIFS NPEFSO NFEJDJOFT BOE CFDBVTF IF
IFMQFEGBSNFSTJSSJHBUFUIFJSMBOE"UUIFTBNFUJNF 8JSLVTNFUFEPVUCSVUBM
KVTUJDFUPUIPTFXIPXFSFOPUPCFEJFOUUPIJTXIJNT SFDBMMJOHJOIJTNFNPJST
IPXLJMMJOHSFCFMTXBTMJLFQMBZJOHiIJUUIFOJHHFSBOEHFUBDJHBSHBNFTwBU
BNVTFNFOUQBSLTCBDLIPNF"MPUPGLJMMJOH IFTBJE XBTOFDFTTBSZCFGPSF
one could start reasoning with the peasant whose hunger and poverty drove
IJNUPKPJOUIF$BDPT10
Wirkus’s career recalls Joseph Conrad’s observation in Heart of Darkness
UIBUiUIFDPORVFTUPGUIFFBSUI XIJDINPTUMZNFBOTUBLJOHJUBXBZGSPNUIPTF
XIPIBWFBEJČFSFOUDPNQMFYJPOPSTMJHIUMZĘBUUFSOPTFTUIBOPVSTFMWFT JTOPU
BQSFUUZUIJOHXIFOZPVMPPLJOUPJUNVDIw5FSSJCMFBCVTFTUPPLQMBDFXJUIJO
UIFQSJTPOTZTUFNPWFSTFFOCZUIF(FOEBSNFSJF6OEFSUIFXBUDIPGi$IFTUZw
1VMMFS XIPUPMEBWJTJUJOHPďDFSUIBUIFiNBZHPUPIFMMGPSUIJT wJONBUFTBU

40 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


4U.BSDTQSJTPOJO1PSUBV1SJODFMBCPSFEVOEFSTFWFSFDPOEJUJPOTRVBSSZJOH
TUPOFUPNBLFOFXCBSSBDLTGPSUIF(FOEBSNFSJF DBVTJOHTPNFUPCSFBLEPXO
BOEEJF-5PO&WBOT B#BQUJTUNJTTJPOBSZKBJMFEBU4U.BSDTGPSDSJUJDJ[JOH
"NFSJDBOQPMJDZ SFQPSUFEUIBUIFDPVMEIFBSUIFiHSPBOJOHPGQSJTPOFSTXIP
XFSFCFJOHDSVFMMZQPVOEFEBOECFBUFOwCZHFOEBSNFPďDFSTBOEUIBUEFBE
CPEJFTDPWFSFEXJUIWFSNJOSFNBJOFEFYQPTFEJOUIFQSJTPOZBSE11 Even after
SFGPSNT XFSF FOBDUFE  UIF QSJTPOT SFNBJOFE FYQMPJUBUJWF #VUMFST TVDDFTTPS 
-JFVUFOBOU"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNT SFQPSUFEUIBUUIFQSJTPOBU+BDNFM IFSBMEFE
BTBNPEFMPGQSPHSFTTJWFQFOPMPHZ XBTiUPPIBSE wBEEJOH i*UJTPOFPGPVS
CFTU‰JUJTTBOJUBSZ DPNGPSUBCMFBOEUIFGPPEBNQMF‰CVU<BTBUBMMQSJTPOT>UIF
QSJTPOFSTBSFSFRVJSFEUPXPSLBOEUPXPSLIBSEw12
"DBSFFSTPMEJFSXIPTFSWFEVOEFS+BDPC4NJUIJO4BNBSBOEXJUIUIF1IJM-
JQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZ 8JMMJBNTXBTUIFTPOPG"MFYBOEFS4i$MVCCFSw8JMMJBNT 
BOPUPSJPVTMZDSVFMDPQJO/FX:PSLTWJDFEJTUSJDU XIJDIIFDPJOFEiUIF5FO-
EFSMPJOwBęFSUFMMJOHBGSJFOEUIBUIFIBEFBUFOiDIVDL<TUFBL>GPSBMPOHUJNFw
and was now “going to eat tenderloin.” Characterized by the New York Times as
BiCVMMZw$MVCCFS8JMMJBNTPODFUPMEBSFQPSUFSUIBUiUIFSFJTNPSFMBXJOUIF
FOEPGBOJHIUTUJDLUIBOJOBEFDJTJPOPGUIF4VQSFNF$PVSUw%VSJOHUIFŴŻżŷ
-FYPX $PNNJUUFF JOWFTUJHBUJPOT  B /FX :PSL 4UBUF 4FOBUF QSPCF JOUP QPMJDF
DPSSVQUJPOJO/FX:PSL$JUZ IFBENJUUFEUPPXOJOHFYUFOTJWFQSPQFSUZBOE
BZBDIU XIJDIIFECPVHIUXJUIUIFQSPDFFETGSPNHBNCMJOHBOEQSPTUJUVUJPO
payoffs. Although there is no evidence that Alexander Junior was corrupt like
IJTGBUIFS IFXBTVOEPVCUFEMZJOĘVFODFECZIJNJOIJTIBSEFEHFEBQQSPBDI
UPXBSEQPMJDJOHBOEIJTOBUJWJTUBOEBOUJSBEJDBMWJFXT)FNFUBTBEEFNJTF 
driving his car off the pier in San Francisco in 1926 after having been court-
NBSUJBMFEGPSQSFTTJOHDPDLUBJMTPOIJTNFOUPS #VUMFS BUBEJOOFSQBSUZXIJDI
IFIPTUFEJOWJPMBUJPOPGBSNZ1SPIJCJUJPOTUBUVUFT13
"DSJUJDBMGVODUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO)BJUJXBTUPFOIBODF"NFSJ-
can intelligence-gathering capabilities through close collaboration with local
policing agents. In August 1920 the United States established an intelligence
CSBODIVOEFS.BKPS8(&NFSZXIJDIEFWFMPQFEPSHBOJ[FEĕMFTPOJOTVS-
HFOUTBOENBQQFEPVUFOFNZUFSSJUPSZ BMMPXJOHGPSCFUUFSCBUUMFĕFMEQMBOOJOH
1TZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFUBDUJDTXFSFXJEFMZQSPNPUFE14 ćF(FOEBSNFSJFDVMUJ-
WBUFEJOGPSNBOUTCZQSFTJEJOHPWFSDPNNVOJUZEFWFMPQNFOUBOEDPDLĕHIUJOH
FWFOUT  DSFBUJOH DFOUFST GPS MPDBM HPTTJQ BOE JOGPSNBUJPO FYDIBOHF 4IBSJOH
JOGPSNBUJPO PO #PMTIFWJL BHFOUT BOE SBEJDBMT GSPN PUIFS DPVOUSJFT  JU USJFE
to censor the Haitian press, which, according to a February 1921 intelligence
report, “poisoned inhabitants by circulating anti-occupation propaganda to all
parts of Haiti which is read to ignorant Haitians who cannot read.”15 The editor
of the CourieurOFXTQBQFSXBTDIBSBDUFSJTUJDBMMZJNQSJTPOFEPWFSUFOUJNFTJO
ĕWFZFBST UIPVHIIFXBTCSPVHIUUPDPVSUGPSUSJBMPOMZUXJDF4PNFUJNFTBT
NBOZBTTFWFOFEJUPSTXFSFJOKBJMBUUIFTBNFUJNF16

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 41


*O Ŵżŵŷ  BT B NBSLFS PG QSJEF  UXP HFOEBSNFT XPO TJMWFS NFEBMT JO SJĘF
TIPPUJOHBUUIF0MZNQJDT8JMMJBNTSFQPSUFE IPXFWFS UIBUUSBJOFFTHFOFSBMMZ
GBSFEQPPSMZPOĕSJOHUFTUTi*OIVOUJOHCBOEJUT UIFGBJMVSFUPTIPPUTUSBJHIU
SFTVMUT JO UIF FTDBQF PG NBOZw17 Colonel Frederic M. Wise, who took charge
BęFS8JMMJBNT OPUFEUIBUNBSJOFTEFMJCFSBUFMZiEJTDPVSBHFEUBSHFUQSBDUJDFPO
UIFUIFPSZUIBUJUXBTEBOHFSPVTUPUFBDIUIFOBUJWFIPXUPTIPPU4PNFEBZ
UIFZNJHIUQPTTJCMZUVSOBHBJOTUVTw18*OSJPUDPOUSPMUSBJOJOH HFOEBSNFTXFSF
UBVHIUUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBBQQSPBDIPGVTJOHiĕTUTBOEDMVCTwSBUIFSUIBOĕSF-
BSNTTPBTUPMFTTFODBTVBMUJFT"NFSJDBOTEJEOPUVTVBMMZPCKFDU UIPVHI XIFO
EFNPOTUSBUPSTXFSFCFBUFOBOEDMVCCFE TPNFUJNFTUPEFBUI
3BDJTN VOEFSNJOFE BOZ FČPSU UP QSPNPUF IVNBOF TUBOEBSET 0O SVSBM
TFBSDIBOEEFTUSPZNJTTJPOT iQPQQJOHPČ w$BDPTXBTMJLFOFEUPBTQPSU NVDI
as with the “pulajanes” and “ladrones” in the Philippines, and later the “gooks”
JO7JFUOBN19ćF(FOEBSNFSJFBEPQUFEBTJUTBOUIFNBOBEBQUBUJPOPGUIFSBD-
JTUUVOFi%BNOUIF'JMJQJOP DJWJMJ[FIJNXJUIBLSBH wJOXIJDIUIFZSFGFSSFEUP
Cacos as “voodoo-dancing drones.” Marine Colonel Robert Denig noted in his
EJBSZUIBUiMJGFUPUIFNJTDIFBQ NVSEFSJTOPUIJOHwćFNBSJOF+PIO)$SBJHF
CFMJFWFEUIBUżųQFSDFOUPGUIF)BJUJBOQFBTBOUSZQPTTFTTFEBiTFNJBQFTCSBJO w
BSFNOBOUGSPNUIFi4UPOF"HFw20
&YFNQMJGZJOHUIFQSPHSFTTJWFĕYBUJPOXJUITUBUJTUJDBMEBUBBOERVBOUJĕDBUJPO 
NPOUIMZ SFQPSUT GSPN )BJUJ SFTFNCMF UIPTF GSPN UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT JO KVEHJOH
TVDDFTTPOUIFCBTJTPGUIFOVNCFSPGFOFNZDBQUVSFE iOFVUSBMJ[FE wPSLJMMFE
8JMMJBNTTSFQPSUPG/PWFNCFSŹ ŴżŴŻ XBTUZQJDBMJOQSBJTJOHUIF(FOEBSNFSJF
for dispersing rebels and killing six “bandits” in the Hinche district. A subse-
RVFOUEJTQBUDISFQPSUFEUIFLJMMJOHPGFJHIUZĕWFCBOEJUT UIFDBQUVSFPGOJOFUZ
UXP BOEUIFTFJ[VSFPGŸźżSJĘFT GPSUZĕWFCBZPOFUT BOEGPSUZPOFNBDIFUFT21
1SFTTVSFGPSSFTVMUTMFEUPUIFFNQMPZNFOUPGFYDFTTJWFĕSFQPXFSBOEDJWJMJBO
DBTVBMUJFT " žŵ ųųų CPVOUZ XBT PČFSFE GPS $BDP DPNNBOEFS $IBSMFNBHOF
Peralte, an ally of the deposed leader Bobo who had attacked a police post in
)JODIFJOSFUBMJBUJPOGPSUIFJNQSJTPONFOUPGBMPDBMDIJFG22"ęFSBOBNCVTI
PG1FSBMUFTGPSDFTOFBSUIFUPXOPG(SBOEF3JWJÒSF NBSJOF$BQUBJO)FSNBO)
)BOOFLFO CMBDLFOFEIJTTLJO EJTHVJTFEIJNTFMGBTB$BDP BOECSJCFEPOFPG
1FSBMUFTCPEZHVBSETUPHBJOBDDFTTUPUIFSFCFMDBNQ)FUIFOTIPU1FSBMUFBU
QPJOUCMBOLSBOHF FBSOJOHBDPNNFOEBUJPOGSPN1SFTJEFOU8JMTPOGPSiPOFPG
UIFNPTUTJOHVMBSMZJNQPSUBOUBDUTPGIFSPJTNJONZUJNFw23
ćF NBSJOFT TVCTFRVFOUMZ EJTTFNJOBUFE B QIPUP PG 1FSBMUFT CPEZ UIBU
SFTFNCMFE$ISJTUIBOHJOHGSPNUIFDSPTT JOTQJSJOHDPOUJOVFESFTJTUBODF Min-
JTUFS PG 3FWPMVUJPO #FOPÔU #BUSBWJMMF DBQUVSFE BOE EFDBQJUBUFE UIF "NFSJDBO
HFOFSBM-BXSFODF.VSUI UFMMJOHIJNCFGPSFIBOEi:PVSQPMJUJDJBOTTBZUIBUZPV
DBNFUPCSJOHVTDJWJMJ[BUJPO8FEPOPUXBOUDJWJMJ[BUJPO:PVSDIJFGTTBZUIBU
XFNVTUTUPQĕHIUJOH8FEPOPUXBOUUPTUPQ8F$BDPTIBWFCFFOĕHIUJOH
since longtemps, longtemps <BMPOHUJNF>ćFSFJTOPUIJOHFMTFUIBUXFXBOUUP

42 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


do. We do not believe your politicians. Our own politicians have lied to us. We
UIJOLZPVIBWFDPNFUPUBLFPVSDPVOUSZBOENBLFVTZPVSTMBWFT8FXBOUUP
LFFQPVSDPVOUSZBOEPVSGSFFEPN8FJOUFOEUPESJWFUIFblancs<XIJUFT>JOUP
the sea.”24ćFTFDPNNFOUTQSPWJEFJOTJHIUJOUPUIFNPUJWFTPGUIF$BDPNPWF-
NFOUJOWJFXPGUIFJSMPOHIJTUPSZPGPQQSFTTJPOCZXIJUFT
.BLJOH VTF PG DBQUVSFE EPDVNFOUT BOE TQJFT  UIF (FOEBSNFSJF FWFOUV-
BMMZ USBDLFE EPXO #BUSBWJMMF  LJMMJOH IJN BOE EP[FOT PG IJT NFO  EFBMJOH B
deathblow to the insurgency. Jungle patrols continued into the early 1920s to
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&TUSBWJMMF +FBO+BDRVFT"MCFSU BOE"MDJVT+FBO XIPWPXFEUPSFTJTUVOUJMUIF
end. Monthly intelligence reports in 1921 noted that Estraville was sick with
TNBMMQPY BOE "MDJVTT GPMMPXFST XFSF TVSWJWJOH iNBJOMZ PO GSVJUw BOE XPSF
iQPPSMZQSPWJEFEDMPUIFT wEFNPOTUSBUJOHUIFJSXFBLFOFETUBUFćPVHIiCBO-
EJUTTUJMMSPBNFEUIFDPVOUSZTJEF< >BMMBSFFYIBVTUFEBOEJOQPPSIFBMUI‫ڀڀ‬
ćFZ FOHBHF JO GFX EFQSFEBUJPOT FYDFQU UIF JMMFHBM QSPDVSFNFOU PG GPPE CZ
PDDBTJPOBMGPSBHJOHwćF+VMZSFQPSUSFDPSEFEUIFEFBUIPGPOFPG"MDJVTTNFO
XIPIBECFFOiTFWFSFMZNBDIFUFECZBOBUJWFHVJEFwBęFSIJTDBQUVSFOFBSUIF
CPSEFSPGUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD#Z0DUPCFS NPTUPGUIFSFNBJOJOHDIJFGT
IBECFFODBQUVSFEBOELJMMFE"OUJPDDVQBUJPOTFOUJNFOUSFNBJOFEQFSWBTJWF
OFWFSUIFMFTT BOE64JOUFMMJHFODFGFBSFEUIFSFUVSOPG%S#PCPGSPNFYJMFJO
+BNBJDB25
ćF(FOEBSNFSJFTiTVDDFTTwBUQBDJĕDBUJPOXBTBJEFECZJNQSPWFNFOUTJO
SBEJPUFDIOPMPHZBOEDPNNVOJDBUJPOT*OBUBTLMBUFSQFSGPSNFECZ64"*% 
BSNZFOHJOFFSTDPOTUSVDUFEBOEPWFSTBXUIFSFQBJSPGUFMFHSBQIMJOFT BMMPX-
ing for better coordination in pursuit of guerrillas. Introducing the use of air-
QMBOFT JO TFBSDIJOH PVU SFNPUF NPVOUBJO DBNQT XBT BOPUIFS UVSOJOH QPJOU
0O"VHVTUŷ Ŵżŵų 8JMMJBNTSFQPSUFEUIBUUXP(FOEBSNFSJFQMBOFTIBEĕSFE
Ŵ ŵųųNBDIJOFHVOSPVOETBUBCBOEJUDBNQ DPOUSJCVUJOHUPJUTEFTUSVDUJPO*O
BSBEJPHSBNUPUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU $PMPOFM++.FBEFTUBUFEićFQMBOFT
NBOFVWFSFEFYDFMMFOUMZBOEEJSFDUFEUIFJSĕSFXJUIBQQBSFOUMZHPPEFČFDU UBL-
JOHCBOEJUTGSPNUIFJSIJEJOHQMBDFT‫ڀڀ‬ćJTEFNPOTUSBUFTUIBUBJSQMBOFTBSF
a success in such affairs. Bandits thought they were safe but found out there is
OPQMBDFUIBUXJMMQSPUFDUUIFNw26 The adoption of aerial technology helped to
usher in a new age of “total war” in which people could be killed without ever
TFFJOHUIFGBDFPGUIFJSBUUBDLFS'PS)BJUJBOTPOUIFHSPVOE UIFDPOTFRVFODFT
were terrifying.

“Like Being Back in the Days of Boss Tweed”: Further Misconduct


and the McCormick Commission

A lack of legal regulations broadened the scope of police abuses throughout


UIFPDDVQBUJPO5PSUVSF PSUIFiUIJSEEFHSFF wXBTDPOTJEFSFEiKVTUJĕBCMFVOEFS

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 43


ĕFMEDPOEJUJPOTwBOECFDBVTFPGUIFiVODJWJMJ[FEwOBUVSFPGUIF)BJUJBOQFP-
ple.27 ćF DPVSU TZTUFN XBT OPUPSJPVTMZ JOFďDJFOU BOE NBSSFE CZ QBUSPOBHF
BOEHSBę QSPCMFNTUIBUDPOTVMBSPďDJBMTEJEOPUUSZUPDPOGSPOU6OMFTTUIFZ
had political connections, prisoners were usually held for long periods without
USJBM 4QFBLJOH GSPN QFSTPOBM LOPXMFEHF  8JMMJBNT UFTUJĕFE CFGPSF $POHSFTT
UIBUiUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPGKVTUJDFJO)BJUJXPVMECFBGBSDFJGJUXFSFOPUBUSBH-
FEZ‫*ڀڀ‬UXBTMJLFCFJOHCBDLJOUIFEBZTPG#PTT5XFFEJO/FX:PSLw28 Most
HFOEBSNFTDPVMEOFJUIFSSFBEOPSXSJUFBOEXFSFJMMBDRVBJOUFEXJUIUIFMBX
8JMMJBNT XIPTFNJMJUBSZTFSWJDFJODMVEFEUPVSTJO1BOBNB $VCB BOE.FYJDP 
DPNQMBJOFEUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF3PCFSU-BOTJOHUIBUiUIF<(FOEBSNFSJF>DBO-
OPUQSFTFOUUIFJSDBTFJODPVSU XIJDIJTBNBKPSIJOESBODFUPUIFQSPQFSQPMJD-
JOHPGUIFDPVOUSZw)FBEEFEUIBUNPTUHFOEBSNFTXFSFiMBDLJOHJOFUIJDBMPS
DJWJMTUBOEBSETBOEMBDLFETZNQBUIZGPSUIFQFPQMFw29
*OŴżŵŴ BNJETUBOPVUDSZCZSFNOBOUTPGUIF"OUJ*NQFSJBMJTU-FBHVFBOEUIF
/BUJPOBM"TTPDJBUJPOGPSUIF"EWBODFNFOUPG$PMPSFE1FPQMF 4FOBUPS+PTFQI
.FEJMM .D$PSNJDL  BO *MMJOPJT 3FQVCMJDBO  DIBJSFE IFBSJOHT UIBU SFWFBMFE
TJDLFOJOHDSVFMUZCZUIF(FOEBSNFSJF JODMVEJOHUIFCVSOJOHPGIVUTBOEUIF
rape and shooting of prisoners.30#VUMFSUFTUJĕFEUIBUPďDFSTXFSFJOUPYJDBUFE
CZUIFJSOFXGPVOEBVUIPSJUZBOEHJWFOUPFYDFTTJWFESJOLJOHPGOBUJWFMJRVPS
(taffia), which led to “unnecessarily harsh and brutal” conduct. He rationalized
their behavior on the grounds that while 99 percent of the people of Haiti are
UIFiNPTULJOEMZ HFOFSPVT IPTQJUBCMF BOEQMFBTVSFMPWJOHQFPQMF wUIFPUIFS
Ŵ QFSDFOU  XIFO TUJSSFE VQ CZ MJRVPS BOE WPPEPP  XFSF iDBQBCMF PG UIF NPTU
horrible atrocities; they are cannibals.”31
These views paralleled racial attitudes in the United States, where paternal-
JTUJDBČFDUJPOXBTPęFOEJTQMBZFEUPXBSE"GSJDBO"NFSJDBOTBTMPOHBTUIFZ
“stayed in their place.”32 The institution of forced labor (corvée) brought out the
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DPMPOJBMJTN-5PO&WBOTOPUFEUIBUUIFHFOEBSNFGVODUJPOFEBTiBOJOTUSV-
NFOUPGPQQSFTTJPOBOEUPSUVSFwJOFOGPSDJOHUIFiCBSCBSJDwNBSDIJOHPGNFO
iMJLFBQBDLPGTMBWFTwVOEFSUIFDPSWÏFTZTUFN XIJDISFNJOEFEIJNPGiUIF
CSVUBM TMBWFSZ BOE TBWBHF USFBUNFOUw NFUFE PVU CZ UIF #FMHJBOT B iGFX ZFBST
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PG UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG 1FOOTZMWBOJB  IBE PCTFSWFE TFWFSFMZ NBMOPVSJTIFE NFO
iNBOBDMFEVOEFSUIFDIBSHFPGUIF(FOEBSNFSJFTFWFSBMEBZTKPVSOFZPOGPPU
GSPNUIFJSIPNFw)FBOEPUIFSTUFTUJGZJOHBUUIFIFBSJOHTOFWFSUIFMFTTBSHVFE
JOGBWPSPGDPOUJOVJOHUIFPDDVQBUJPO DMBJNJOHUIBUJUXBTIBWJOHBDJWJMJ[JOH
FČFDU 4FOBUPS .D$PSNJDL VMUJNBUFMZ SFDPNNFOEFE UIBU UIF PDDVQBUJPO CF
TVTUBJOFEGPSUXFOUZNPSFZFBSTBOEUIBUUIF(FOEBSNFSJFDPOUJOVFUPSFDFJWF
choice funding lest Haiti be thrust into anarchy and revolution, which was what
"NFSJDBOPďDJBMTGFBSFEUIFNPTU33

44 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


“Pursuing an Active Campaign of Harassment”: The Duvalier Era
and Legacies of Colonialism

"NFSJDBODPMPOJBMSVMFXBTPOUIFXIPMFBEJTBTUFSGPS)BJUJćF6OJUFE4UBUFT
failed to develop viable social institutions, including in public health and edu-
DBUJPO  BOE UIF SPBE JOGSBTUSVDUVSF XBT QSJNBSJMZ EFTJHOFE UP JNQSPWF BSNZ
USBOTQPSUBUJPO BOE FYQFEJUF USBEF UP UIF CFOFĕU PG "NFSJDBO DPSQPSBUJPOT
The police constabulary served as one of the few enduring institutions, and its
MFHBDZXBTPWFSXIFMNJOHMZOFHBUJWF &NJMZ#BMDI BQSPGFTTPSPGFDPOPNJDTBU
Wellesley College who traveled to Haiti in 1927 with a peace delegation, warned
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KFDUPOMZUPUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGBTJUVBUJPOXIFSF MJLFUIF1SFUPSJBOHVBSE UIF
TPMEJFSTTFMMUIFNTFMWFTUPUIFIJHIFTUCJEEFSw34 This is exactly what transpired.
1SJPSUPUIFXJUIESBXBMPGUIFNBSJOFTJOŴżŶŷ UIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPG'SBOL-
MJO 3PPTFWFMU TUFQQFE VQ SJPU DPOUSPM USBJOJOH BOE TFMFDUFE QSP"NFSJDBO
$PMPOFM%FNPTUIÒOF$BMJYUFUPIFBEUIF(FOEBSNFSJF)FVTFEIJTQPTJUJPOUP
MBVODIBDPVQ XIJDIXBTTVQQSFTTFECZ4UFOJP7JODFOU BNPEFSBUFOBUJPOBM-
ist who, along with his corrupt and autocratic successor Elie Lescot, intensi-
ĕFEUIFQPMJUJDJ[BUJPOPGUIFGPSDF QMBDJOHJUĕSNMZVOEFSIJTDPOUSPM35 Then,
BęFSBTDFOEJOHUPQPXFSJOŴżŸźGPMMPXJOHBQFSJPEPGNJMJUBSZSVMF 'SBOÎPJT
“Papa Doc” Duvalier used the policing apparatus built by the United States
UPCSVUBMJ[FPQQPOFOUTPGIJTSFHJNF)JT5POUPO.BDPVUFT PSTFDSFUQPMJDF 
XFSF EFTDSJCFE BTiUIVHT UIJFWFTBOE NVSEFSFSTw" .BZŴżŸż 4UBUF %FQBSU-
NFOU SFQPSU NFOUJPOFE B UZQJDBM JODJEFOU JO XIJDI B TUVEFOU XIP DSJUJDJ[FE
UIFHPWFSONFOUXBTLJEOBQQFECZ5POUPO.BDPVUFT XIPCVSOFEPČIJTCFBSE
with a lighter. The report concluded that the “regular and secret police pursue
BOBDUJWFDBNQBJHOPGIBSBTTNFOUBOEUFSSPSJTNBMMPWFSUIFDPVOUSZw36
ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTUPMFSBUFEUIFTFNFUIPETCFDBVTFPG%VWBMJFSTBOUJDPN-
NVOJTNBOEPQFOOFTTUPGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU"TTimeNBHB[JOFFEJUPSJBMJ[FE 
i8JUIDPNNVOJTU$VCBPOMZŸųNJMFTBXBZ UIF64DBOOPUDVUĘBUCSPLF)BJUJ
off the dole without risking a red takeover.”37 The bulk of police aid was pro-
WJEFEUISPVHIBNJMJUBSZBTTJTUBODFQSPHSBNIFBEFECZ$PMPOFM3PCFSU)FJOM
Jr., whose own son was arrested, allegedly for asking why peasants had nothing
UPFBU3FUBJOJOHPMEDPOUBDUT JODMVEJOHBSNZDIJFGPGTUBČ"OUPOJP,ÏCSFBV 
XIPMPPLFEVQPOIJNBTBGBUIFSĕHVSF -FNVFM4IFQIFSE+S GPSNFSDPNNBO-
EBOUPGUIF.BSJOF$PSQT XBTJOĘVFOUJBMJOBEWPDBUJOHGPSUIFDPOUJOVBUJPOPG
QPMJDFUSBJOJOHGPSJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZQVSQPTFT"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTXPSLFEXJUI
the presidential guard, who in turn trained the Tonton Macoutes in order to
iLFFQ%VWBMJFSJOQPXFSTPIFDPVMEGVMĕMMIJTGVMMUFSNJOPďDFBOENBZCF
longer,” as Heinl put it.38ćF64BNCBTTBEPSBSHVFE ićPVHIDSJUJDTXPVME
DIBSHFXFBSFBCFUUJOHSFQSFTTJPO UIFFNCBTTZGFFMTUIBUBOZSFBTPOBCMFQFSTPO 
FWFOJGDSJUJDBMPGUIF%VWBMJFSSFHJNF XPVMEBENJUUPUIFOFDFTTJUZPGUIFQPMJDF

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 45


CFJOHBEFRVBUFMZFRVJQQFEw39ćFTFDPNNFOUTJMMVTUSBUFUIFNJOETFUPGNBOZ
JOUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU CFOUPONPEFSOJ[JOHJOTUJUVUJPOTTVDIBTUIFQPMJDF
SFHBSEMFTTPGUIFIVNBOJNQMJDBUJPOT*OUIFFOE UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTIFMQFEUP
prolong the agonies of the occupation and inhibited the growth of political
liberty. The seeds were being planted all the while for the global expansion of
QPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT

“If He Has Political Aspirations They Are Not Apparent”:


The Dominican Guardia and the Ascendancy of Trujillo

1PMJDFBJEJOUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD )BJUJTOFJHICPSPOUIFJTMBOEPG)JT-
QBOJPMB ZJFMEFEBTJNJMBSPVUDPNFUPUIBUJO)BJUJ*O"QSJMŴżŴź BZFBSBęFSUIF
NBSJOFTJOWBEFE BOPQFSBUJPOEFTJHOFEUPTIPSFVQ"NFSJDBTSFHJPOBMQPXFS
and protect its sugar interests), governor Harry S. Knapp issued an executive
PSEFS BQQSPQSJBUJOH žŸųų ųųų GPS iPSHBOJ[JOH  FRVJQQJOH  BOE NBJOUBJOJOH B
OBUJPOBM%PNJOJDBOQPMJDFGPSDF wUIF(VBSEJB/BDJPOBM XIJDIXBTDPOTJEFSFE
CZUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUUIFiNPTUTPMFNOPCMJHBUJPOXFIBWFBTTVNFEXJUIJO
UIJTSFQVCMJDw"NBJOQVSQPTFXBTUPĕHIUJOTVSHFOUTJOUIFFBTUFSOQSPWJODFT 
XIPXFSFBQSPEVDUPGUIFEJTFNQPXFSNFOUPGMPDBMDBVEJMMPTBOEUIFVQSPPU-
JOHPGUIFQFBTBOUSZDBVTFECZUIFFDPOPNJDSFPSJFOUBUJPOUPXBSEDBTIDSPQ
exports.40
"SHVJOH UIBU JOUFSWFOUJPO XBT OFDFTTBSZ UP UFBDI UIF %PNJOJDBOT UIF
advantages of industry and provide education, which was lacking in even
iSVEJNFOUBSZGPSN wNJOJTUFS8JMMJBN83VTTFMMSFDSVJUFE1VFSUP3JDBOPď-
DFSTFYQFSJFODFEJOFOGPSDJOHDPMPOJBMPDDVQBUJPO%PNJOJDBOT  IFCFMJFWFE 
iXPVMEOPUCFBTFďDJFOUBT"NFSJDBOPďDFSTXIPTFQMBDFTUIFZXJMMUBLFw41
ćFGPSDFXBTDPNNBOEFECZ$PMPOFM(FPSHF34IBOUPO DIJFGPGUIF*OTVMBS
1PMJDFPG1VFSUP3JDPBOEBGPSNFS3PVHI3JEFSXIPXBTTBJEUPiLOPXUIF
OBUJWFTXFMMw*UXBTQMBHVFE IPXFWFS CZQPPSEJTDJQMJOFBOEMPXNPSBMF IBW-
JOHBOBCOPSNBMMZIJHISBUFPGDPVSUTNBSUJBM"WJTJUPSPCTFSWFEUIBUPďDFST
IBEBiDPDLZBOEJOTPMFOUBJSwBOEUIFJSOVNCFSTiJODMVEFETPNFPGUIFXPSTU
rascals, thieves, and assassins in the country,” who used their position to “vent
private hates.”42
*O %FDFNCFS Ŵżŵŷ  BęFS UIF XJUIESBXBM PG UIF NBSJOFT  3VTTFMM MBNFOUFE
UIBU iQPMJUJDT JT GBTU EFTUSPZJOH UIF FďDBDZ PG UIF %PNJOJDBO QPMJDFw ćF
TFDPOEJODPNNBOEXBTGPSDFEUPSFTJHOCFDBVTFIFGBJMFEUPCBDL1SFTJEFOU
)PSBDJP7ÈTRVF[FOUIVTJBTUJDBMMZ)JTSFQMBDFNFOU 3BGBFM-5SVKJMMP BGBJUIGVM
Horacista, rose to lieutenant colonel owing to his expertise as an interrogator
BOEJOGPSNBOU435SVKJMMPTBMMFHFENFOUPS $BQUBJO$IBSMFT.FSLFM DPNNJUUFE
TVJDJEFPOUIFFWFPGIJTUSJBMGPSXIBUUIFEJQMPNBU4VNOFS8FMMFTSFGFSSFEUP
BTiUIFNPTUSFWPMUJOHBDUTPGCBSCBSJTNDIBSHFEBHBJOTUUIFGPSDFTPGPDDVQB-
UJPOJOUIF&BTUFSO1SPWJODFTw5SVKJMMPIJNTFMGIBECFFOJOEJDUFEJOŴżŵųPO

46 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


DIBSHFT PG IPMEJOH B NBO GPS SBOTPN BOE SBQJOH B TFWFOUFFOZFBSPME HJSM
He was nevertheless seen as a loyal soldier capable of avoiding the pitfalls of
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*OGBDU 5SVKJMMPVTFEIJTDPOUSPMPWFSUIF(VBSEJBUPVOTFBU7ÈTRVF[JOŴżŶų 
establishing a thirty-one-year dictatorship. Sadistic tortures, including screw-
ing electrical devices into people’s skulls, were carried out under his oversight.
*O 0DUPCFS ŴżŶź  (VBSEJB VOJUT NBTTBDSFE ŴŸ ųųų UP ŵų ųųų )BJUJBO NJHSBOU
workers.45 ćF TDBMF PG WJPMFODF XBT NBEF QPTTJCMF CZ UIF JOĘVY PG NPEFSO
XFBQPOT BOE JOGPSNBUJPO UFDIOPMPHJFT  B DPSOFSTUPOF PG UIF QPMJDF USBJOJOH
QSPHSBNTXIJDIDPOUSJCVUFETJHOJĕDBOUMZUP5SVKJMMPTSJTF

Imperial Gendarmes: The Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua

-JLFUIPTFJO)BJUJBOEUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD UIFQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT
JO/JDBSBHVBBJNFEUPJOTUJUVUFQSPHSFTTJWFTUZMFJOOPWBUJPOTBOENPEFSOJ[F
QPMJDFJOTUJUVUJPOT UIPVHIUIFZMFEUPNBOZFYDFTTFTBTBSFTVMUPGUIFJSNJMJ-
tarization and the larger geopolitical designs to which they were attached. In
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Zelaya after he resisted overtures to build a canal, installing as president Adolfo
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BOEQVTIFEUISPVHIUIF#SZBO$IBNPSSP5SFBUZ XIJDIHBWFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
the right in perpetuity to build a canal on Nicaraguan territory. When a rebel-
MJPO MFE CZ UIF MJCFSBM HFOFSBM #FOKBNJO ;FMFEØO CSPLF PVU  #VUMFS BOE UIF
NBSJOFTXFSFDBMMFEVQPOUPQVUJUEPXO46
8SJUJOHUPIJTXJGFBCPVUUIFDSBTTFDPOPNJDNPUJWFTVOEFSMZJOH"NFSJDBO
QPMJDZ WJFXTIFNBEFQVCMJDBęFSSFUJSJOHGSPNUIFBSNZ #VUMFSQSPQPTFE
creating a police constabulary to ensure law and order after the departure of
UIFNBSJOFT*OŴżŴŵUIF#VSFBVPG*OTVMBS"ČBJSTBQQPJOUFEBTJOTQFDUPSPGUIF
.BOBHVBQPMJDF(VZ4DVMM BUIJSUZTJYZFBSPME)BSWBSEHSBEVBUFBOEGPSNFS
3PVHI3JEFSXIPIBEQSFWJPVTMZTFSWFEXJUIUIF/FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU
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TVSWFZFE UIF QPMJDF TUBUJPOT BOE BJNFE UP FTUBCMJTI NPSF QSPGFTTJPOBM TUBO-
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TJEFTBHBJOTUIJNXIFOIFBUUFNQUFEUPDMPTFEPXOBDBGÏUIBUXBTBCBTFPG
political agitation.47 ćJT JODJEFOU FYFNQMJĕFT UIF EFFQ NJTUSVTU BNPOH MPDBM
PďDJBMTGPSUIFNPUJWFTPG"NFSJDBOT XIJDIXBTOPUVOJRVFUP/JDBSBHVB
'SPN ŴżŴŵ UP ŴżŶŶ  UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT LFQU B DPOUJOHFOU NJMJUBSZ GPSDF JO
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%FDFNCFSŴżŵŷ BęFSBOFJHIUNPOUITUVEZ .BKPS3BMQI,FZTFS EJSFDUPSPG

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 47


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GPSB/JDBSBHVBODPOTUBCVMBSZJODPSQPSBUJOHUIFOBUJPOBMQPMJDF DVTUPNT BOE
prison guard, which functioned as a “tool to gain political advantage by partisan
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FSONFOUw#VJMEJOHPO#VUMFSTFBSMJFSQSPQPTBM ,FZTFSBJNFEUPQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[F
USBJOJOH JNQSPWFQBZ BOEFRVJQUIFOFXGPSDFXJUIUPQPGUIFMJOFXFBQPOT
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State Robert Olds envisioned that it would be the “cornerstone of stability for
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NFBOTPGHJWJOHDBQJUBMTVďDJFOUBTTVSBODFUPVOEFSUBLFBMBSHFBOEQFSNB-
OFOU JOWFTUNFOU JO /JDBSBHVB  BO VOEFSMZJOH NPUJWF CFIJOE BMM UIF USBJOJOH
QSPHSBNT50 In May 1925, just before the revival of civil war, the Nicaraguan
Congress approved the creation of a Guardia at a budget of $689,132. The
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-FXJTNBDIJOFHVOT BOESFDSVJUFE4QBOJTITQFBLJOHPďDFSTXJUIFYQFSJFODF
JOUIF1IJMJQQJOFT UIF1BOBNB$BOBM;POF BOE)BJUJ51 Major Calvin Carter,
BWFUFSBOPGUIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZGSPN&MHJO 5FYBT SFQPSUFEUIBUUIF
MPDBMTPGEJČFSFOUQBSUZBďMJBUJPOTXFSFQSPWJEJOHUIF"NFSJDBOTiXJUIWBMV-
BCMFJOGPSNBUJPOPOUIFQMBOTBOENPWFNFOUXJUIJOUIFJSGPSNFSQBSUJFTw"
OVNCFSIBECFFOFNQMPZFEBTTFDVSJUZDPOUSBDUPSTGPS"NFSJDBODPNQBOJFT
TVDI BT 7BDDBSP #SPUIFST 'SVJU + "OUPOJP -PQF[  GPSNFS .BOBHVB DIJFG PG
QPMJDF  XBT IFSBMEFE CZ 64 JOUFMMJHFODF GPS iMPPLJOH MJLF BO "NFSJDBO BT B
white and blond” and “saving a banana plantation during the revolution.”52
"DDPSEJOHUPUIFBSNZT(ŵJOUFMMJHFODFTFDUJPO UIF(VBSEJBBDUFEiXJUI
HSFBUBSSPHBODFBOEFWFOJOKVTUJDFUPXBSETUIFQPQVMBUJPO wDPNNJUUJOHiTFSJ-
PVT DSJNFT w TVDI BT CFBUJOH UIF QSFTJEFOU PG UIF 4VQSFNF $PVSU  SFTVMUJOH
iGSPNUIFBCVTFPGMJRVPSw*OŴżŶų XIFOUIFWJTJUJOHQBDJĕTU$IBSMFTćPNTPO
XBTBSSFTUFE B/PSUI"NFSJDBOPďDJBMEFDMBSFE ićF/BUJPOBM(VBSEJTUIF
DPOTUJUVUJPOPGUIJTDPVOUSZwJNQMZJOHUIBUJUPQFSBUFEBCPWFUIFMBXćF4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUQSPUFTUFEMJCFSBMQSFTJEFOU+PTÏ.BSJB.PODBEBTVTFPGUIFQPMJDF
UPiBSSFTUBOEEFQPSUGPSQPMJUJDBMSFBTPOTNFNCFSTPGUIFDPOTFSWBUJWFQBSUZw
which went against the pledge of nonpartisanship.53
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DMBTT  BOE UIFZ TVCKFDUFE MBOEPXOJOH FMJUFT UP IVNJMJBUJOH BSSFTUT GPS QFUUZ
PČFOTFT  FBSOJOH UIFJS FONJUZ -PDBM KVEHFT TIPXFE UIFJS PQQPTJUJPO UP UIF
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QPMJDFJO.BOBHVBBSSFTUFEŴ ųżźQFPQMF PGXIPNPOMZUISFFXFSFDPOWJDUFE

48 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


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BDSPTTUIFDMBTTTQFDUSVN54
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population.554VSWFJMMBODFXBTFOIBODFECZNPEFSOJ[JOHUSBOTQPSUBOESBEJP
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DJUZXBTiGVMMPGVOEFSDPWFSBHFOUTPG$VZBNFMBOE6OJUFE'SVJU$PNQBOZw
who worked with local police.56
Based in the Nueva Segovia district of Nicaragua, rich in coffee, bananas,
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"NFSJDBO PDDVQBUJPO  QSPNPUJOH MBOE SFGPSN  UFSSJUPSJBM TPWFSFJHOUZ  BOE
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GPSDFT TBCPUBHFE "NFSJDBO CVTJOFTTFT  TVDI BT -B -V[ .JOJOH $PNQBOZ  PG
which Secretary of State Philander Knox was a shareholder.57 The journal-
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4FOBUPSćPNBT+)FĘJO BO"MBCBNB%FNPDSBU MJLFOFEIJNUPUIF"NFSJDBO
founding fathers.58ćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU IPXFWFS EFOPVODFEIJNBTBiCBO-
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BOESVUIMFTTUBDUJDTXIJDIDIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIFTBWBHFTXIPGFMMVQPO"NFSJDBO
settlers in our country 150 years ago.”59ćF(VBSEJBXBTEFQMPZFEUPIVOUIJN
down, adopting search and destroy tactics which, in the words of the historian
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age, never desperation. He would go anywhere without support, knowing that
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that kind of work.”62

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 49


Distinguished by his barrel chest, gruff voice, and propensity to speak his
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during the Progressive Era which produced Theodore Roosevelt as president.
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the young “Chesty” was fascinated by the stories of old Civil War veterans in his
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John Puller’s grandson. Flesh and blood. It’s neck or nothing with you Pullers.”
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for his fearlessness in battle and his lack of pretense, Puller ended his decorated
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defense of Sergeant Matthew McKeon, a Marine Corps drill instructor at Parris
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he had to live again, he would “like to be an engineer and get a chance to build
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Jinotega. The discrepancies testify to the superior technology of the Guardia
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BU0DBUB TUSBĕOHCZ"NFSJDBOQMBOFTLJMMFEIVOESFETPGDJWJMJBOT QSPNQUJOH

50 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


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the president’s palace after agreeing to a truce. The following day, the Guardia
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suppress dissent, shooting officers at the slightest hint of insubordination.
In June 1941 J. Edgar Hoover warned Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle
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4PNP[BTQBMBDF SFQPSUFEJOŴżŸŻUIBU-VJT4PNP[B BOPUIFSTPOXIPTVDDFFEFE

Occupied Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 51


Anastasio Sr. in 1956 after the latter’s assassination by a young poet, “rules with
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disrupt the opposition.”70ćFTFDPNNFOUTQSPWJEFBĕUUJOHFQJUBQIGPSEFDBEFT
PG"NFSJDBOGPSFJHOQPMJDZ XIJDIIFMQFEDSFBUFBOETVTUBJOBSFQSFTTJWFQPMJDF
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to root out their political rivals.71
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QPMJDZ  IPXFWFS  EJE OPU GPSFTFF UIF MPOHUFSN EBOHFS BTTPDJBUFE XJUI DSFBU-
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Goldwert notes with regard to Nicaragua: “What the United States failed to see
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its side.”72
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ing rise to a new breed of authoritarian leader who supplanted the old oligar-
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with reference to Nicaraguans, that “they are real uncivilized . . . in a backwards
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lence was a product of deep-rooted sociopolitical and historical contingencies
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long and dark shadow that still haunts the region today.

52 Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


Part II
Under the Facade of Benevolence
Police Training and the Cold War in Southeast
Asia from the “Reverse Course” to Operation
Phoenix
Humanitarianism is laudable if one can afford it. The greatest act on behalf
of all humanity however is for the U.S. to help others from falling under the
control of communism.
‰$olonel Albert R. Haney 0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBNQMBOOJOH
EPDVNFOU 

They called me a red bitch. Any red was not considered human. . . . They
looked at me as if I was a beast or a bug. . . . Because we weren’t human, we
had no rights.
‰1ak Wan-so 4PVUI,PSFBOXSJUFSXIPGBDFEJNQSJTPONFOUBOEUPSUVSFCZ
U.S.-trained police

Though separated by less than fifteen years from the withdrawal of U.S. troops
from the Caribbean, the post–World War II American occupation of Japan and
the onset of the Cold War marked the opening of an entirely new era, one in which
the United States emerged as the preeminent global power. Amidst a flowering
of nationalist sentiment—what Tom Engelhardt referred to as the postwar “vic-
tory culture”—the United States was bent more than ever before on projecting its
power and exporting its institutions to all corners of the globe, partly as a means
of countering the influence of its Cold War rivals, the Soviet Union and China.
The United States intensified its pursuit, furthermore, of a coherent global strategy
designed, in the words of Noam Chomsky, to carve out a system of “open societies”
in which American capital could operate more or less freely.1 While the scope of
American interventions consequently increased, they changed in character and
became, with some exceptions, more informal than in the past and reliant on
indirect mechanisms of social control. The old approach toward colonialism had
become discredited as a result of the dying of the British and French empires and
the waning of social Darwinian philosophies in the wake of the Nazi holocaust.
No longer could policymakers rationalize their actions by claiming to be “taking

53
up the white man’s burden.” Nor could they justify the long-term administration
of colonies. Instead they focused on developing pliable proxy regimes that ruled in
accord with U.S. interests.
Police training became especially important in this context. Kept largely hidden
from the public, it was designed to promote the social stability deemed necessary
for liberal capitalist development and to suppress radical nationalist and commu-
nist movements, which had become increasingly popular and well organized as a
result of sociohistorical circumstances.2 A new generation of police advisers, now
culled from the Office of Strategic Service, the FBI, and state police organizations,
embraced the Cold War mission and worked to professionalize the police and
improve their capacity to serve as the “first line of defense” against subversion.
Believing in the universality of American institutions, they operated predomi-
nantly in the shadows from one Cold War trouble spot to the next, providing tech-
nical advice and equipment and lectures at American-financed police academies,
usually by translation. They received little public acclaim; few Americans even
knew that they existed. Many of the police whom they trained, however, rose to
positions of prominence in their own countries, owing in part to the stockpiles of
weapons they received from their generous patron.
Throughout the Cold War, the budget for police programs was highest in
Southeast Asia. The United States had always prized the region as one of the
richest and most strategically located in the world, hoping to convert it into what
General Douglas MacArthur characterized as an “Anglo-Saxon lake.” In a March
1955 Foreign Affairs article, William Henderson of the Council on American
Foreign Relations (which Laurence Shoup and William Minter aptly termed the
“imperial brain trust”) wrote: “As one of the earth’s great storehouses of natural
resources Southeast Asia is a prize worth fighting for. Five-sixths of the world’s
natural rubber, and more than half of its tin are produced here. . . . [It] accounts
for two-thirds of the world output of coconut, one-third of the palm oil, and sig-
nificant proportions of tungsten and chromium. . . . No less important than the
natural wealth is Southeast Asia’s key strategic position astride the main lines of
communication between Europe and the Far East.” 3
Envisioning Chinese Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) as one
of the four great policemen of the postwar order, American advisers from the OSS,
FBI, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), and the New York Police Department
began instructing his secret police, commanded by Dai Li, in the late 1930s. The
focus, OSS agent Milton Miles wrote, was on “political crimes and means of effec-
tive repression” against the communist movement, adding that the Americans
were never able to “separate police activities from guerrilla activities.” Tied to
the Green Gang underworld, Dai Li’s forces developed a reputation as a “Chi-
nese Gestapo,” running mass surveillance and a network of concentration camps
in which Jiang’s opponents faced torture, starvation, or death by firing squad. A
museum of one of the sites contains a photograph of a pit in which ninety-four

54 Under the Facade of Benevolence


dead bodies were found bound with handcuffs made in Springfield, Massachu-
setts, a testament to the complicity of the United States in the reign of terror.4
The brutality of the secret police contributed to the triumph of the Chinese
revolution, which aimed to extract China from dependency on Western trade
and promote rapid industrialization and land reform for poor peasants. Accord-
ing to the historian William Neumann, the Maoist victory represented “an even
greater disaster for American policy than Pearl Harbor. For proponents of the
Open Door—a program of state-supported penetration of world markets by U.S.
businesses—the loss of the fabled China market nullified the purpose of the Pacific
War.” 5 The United States subsequently intensified efforts to “roll back” left-leaning
and communist regimes, relying on clandestine police programs in an attempt
to avoid military entanglement in the wake of the Korean War, which had been
waged at a high price in terms of blood and treasure. Police advisers provided
training in riot control, set up modern communications and record-collection
systems, and trained paramilitary units in jungle warfare. They helped amass
thousands of dossiers on alleged communists, weaving information into a dark
tapestry of “threat” where sober analysis might have found none.6
Many advisers in these later programs, including Byron Engle, first gained
international experience during the postwar occupation of Japan, where they
inaugurated techniques honed on the periphery of the Cold War. Following World
War II, the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) adopted a new con-
stitution in Japan with provisions to protect civil liberties. Nevertheless, under the
“reverse course,” aimed at rolling back the progress of the left, police were orga-
nized to monitor and suppress the labor movement and the Japanese Communist
Party, resulting in human rights violations, including torture, which set the pat-
tern for the Cold War, an era in which the use of torture by American-backed
forces was systematic and the United States repeatedly violated international law.7
During the Vietnam War, which saw the “cresting of America’s westward
drive,” the State Department spent close to half a billion dollars on police training
in the attempt to subdue the Southern-based National Liberation Front (NLF).
Sir Robert Thompson, a RAND Corporation analyst who helped Britain sup-
press a Chinese-backed uprising in Malaya, was influential in arguing that police
were effective at gathering intelligence and guarding strategic hamlets and more
capable than the military in implementing public works projects designed to win
the political war for “hearts and minds.” 8 Michigan State University and USAID
advisers developed a far-reaching surveillance apparatus and expanded the
prison system, in which torture and other abuses proliferated. Operation Phoenix
used advanced computer data management systems in the attempt to “neutralize”
the NLF leadership, breeding wide-scale violence in the absence of institutional
correctives for false identification and inflated statistics. The government of
Nguyen Van Thieu and the U.S. war effort were in turn undermined, having lost a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Police Training and the Cold War in Southeast Asia 55


Operation Phoenix represents a fitting symbol of the excesses associated with
the police programs, which contributed to significant human rights violations
through the importation of advanced weapons and social control mechanisms.
Under the facade of benevolence, the Office of Public Safety (OPS) and its pre-
decessors were instrumental in creating modern policing apparatuses designed
to fortify client regimes and root out oppositionist movements, with varying yet
frequently deadly consequences.

56 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Chapter 3
“Their Goal Was Nothing Less than
Total Knowledge”
Policing in Occupied Japan and the Rise of the National
Security Doctrine
Despite the fact that SCAP has ordered the . . . Home Ministry to democratize
its police force . . . the average Japanese lives today in just as great a fear of
the police as he did before the occupation. He knows that the police are sup-
ported by the occupation troops.
‰"rthur D. Bouterse DIJFGQVCMJDXFMGBSFTVCTFDUJPO()2 4VQSFNF$PNNBOEFS
GPSUIF"MMJFE1PXFST -U$PM1IJMJQ)5BZMPS (8BS%FQBSUNFOU BOE"SUIVS.BBTT 
.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUQPTUMJBJTPOPďDFSGPS,BOBHBXBQSFGFDUVSF 

You Americans are very difficult. We had all the Communists in jail when you
occupied the country in 1945. Then you told us to release them. Now you ask
us to find them and put them in jail again. A very cumbersome process.
‰+BQBOFTFMFBEFS:oshida ShigeruUPBO"NFSJDBOSFQPSUFSGPMMPXJOHUIF
iSFWFSTFDPVSTF w

If we do not stop the communist hordes in this area now, it is quite possible
for them to be in the USA a few years hence.
‰$olonel Howard E. PulliamUP$IBJSNBOPGUIF#PBSE 1PMJDF$PNNJTTJPO ,BOTBT
$JUZ .JTTPVSJ 4FQUFNCFS 

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policing standards titled Midnight in a Great City. The story centered on a
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UP USBEJUJPOBM NFUIPET  BOE IJT TPO  XIP XBT TDIPPMFE JO NPEFSO TDJFOUJĕD
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technologies and forensic science, the son is able to bring the culprit to justice.
ćFGBUIFSDPNFTUPSFDPHOJ[FEFGFDUTJOUIFPMETZTUFNBOEBęFSIJTSFDPWFSZ
CFDPNFTBNBKPSQSPQPOFOUPGOFXTDJFOUJĕDNFUIPET1
ćJT ĕMN DBQUVSFE UIF JEFPMPHJDBM VOEFSQJOOJOHT PG UIF "NFSJDBO QPMJDF
QSPHSBNT JO +BQBO  XIJDI XFSF EFTJHOFE UP JODVMDBUF OFX UFDIOPMPHJFT BOE

57
professional standards to heighten police efficiency. U.S. officials envisioned
UIBUUIFQPMJDFXPVMECFUIFCVMXBSLPGBOFXEFNPDSBUJDTPDJFUZBOEQSPWJEF
UIFTFDVSJUZOFDFTTBSZGPSMJCFSBMDBQJUBMJTUEFWFMPQNFOU"TUIFIJTUPSJBO+PIO
%PXFS OPUFT  +BQBO XBT DPOTJEFSFE UIF iTVQFSEPNJOPw PG UIF DPOUBJONFOU
EPDUSJOFJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB XIJDIQPMJDZNBLFSTEFTQFSBUFMZIPQFEUPJODPSQP-
SBUFJOUPUIF8FTUFSOPSCJUćF1BDJĕD8BSIBECFFOGPVHIUBOEBUPNJDCPNC
ESPQQFE JOQBSUUPQSFWFOU+BQBOTBDDPNNPEBUJPOUPBNBJOMBOEDPNNVOJTU
CMPDBOEJUTCFDPNJOHUIFJOEVTUSJBMIFBSUMBOEPGBOFXPSEFSGSPNXIJDIUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTNJHIUCFFYDMVEFE2
ćF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT UPPL PO TQFDJBM JNQPSUBODF JO UIJT DPOUFYU /FX
%FBMFSTXJUIJOUIF4VQSFNF$PNNBOEPGUIF"MMJFE1PXFST 4$"1 JOJUJBMMZ
QSFTTFEGPSQPMJDFEFDFOUSBMJ[BUJPO UIFQVSHJOHPGNJMJUBSJTUT BOEUIFQSPUFD-
UJPOPGDJWJMMJCFSUJFTUIFQPTTJCJMJUZPGBNPSFQSPHSFTTJWFGPSFJHOQPMJDZ IPX-
FWFS XBTCMJHIUFECZUIFFOUSFODINFOUPGUIF$PME8BS'PMMPXJOHUIFiSFWFSTF
DPVSTFwQPMJDZBJNFEBUVOEFSNJOJOHMFęJTUBEWBODFT QPMJDFBEWJTFSTGPDVTFE
NPSFFYDMVTJWFMZPODPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFBOESJPUDPOUSPMUSBJOJOH NPCJMJ[JOH
QPMJDFUPDSBDLEPXOPOUIF+BQBOFTF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ +$1 BOEUIFQPMJUJ-
DBMMFę XIJDIQSPNPUFEJOEFQFOEFOUEFWFMPQNFOUPVUTJEF"NFSJDBODPOUSPM3
/PWFMUFDIOJRVFTJOQPQVMBUJPODPOUSPMCFDBNFJOTUJUVUJPOBMJ[FE#ZUIFFBSMZ
ŴżŸųT UIF5SVNBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOXBTQSPWJEJOHĘBNFUISPXFSTBOEUBOLTUP
UIFQPMJDFSFTFSWF DBVTJOHQFPQMFUPRVFTUJPOXIFUIFSUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXBT
BCBOEPOJOHJUTQMFEHFUPCSJOHBCPVUEFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPO#VUQPMJDFNPEFSOJ[B-
tion was on the whole tied to a larger strategic design centered on advancing
64IFHFNPOZJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB XIJDIQSFDMVEFETVQQPSUGPSIVNBOSJHIUT

Exporting the New Deal? Police Modernization and the Limits


of Reform

ćF IJTUPSZ PG NPEFSO QPMJDJOH JO +BQBO EBUFT UP UIF ŴŻŹŻ .FJKJSFTUPSBUJPO 
XIFOBOBUJPOBMQPMJDFCVSFBVXBTFTUBCMJTIFEBOETBNVSBJGSPNUIFXBSSJPS
DMBTT XFSF USBJOFE BT VSCBO DPOTUBCMFT .FJKJ SFGPSNFST USBWFMFE BCSPBE UP
TVSWFZ8FTUFSOQPMJDFTZTUFNT XIJDIUIFZTPVHIUUPFNVMBUFBTUIFDPVOUSZ
VOEFSXFOUBQSPDFTTPGNPEFSOJ[BUJPOBOEVSCBOJ[BUJPO.BOZPGUIFJOOPWB-
UJPOTXFSFMBUFSFYQPSUFEUP+BQBOTDPMPOJFTJOUIFBUUFNQUUPJODSFBTFJOUFSOBM
security. During World War II, Japanese police were indoctrinated in the belief
UIBUiBMMDPNNVOJTUT TPDJBMJTUT BOEMJCFSBMTBTXFMMBTUIPTFPQQPTFEUPUIFXBS
TIPVME CF SFHBSEFE BT B OBUJPOBM FOFNZw ćF 4QFDJBM )JHIFS 1PMJDF 5PLLÙ 
presided over a vast surveillance apparatus, tortured suspects, and purged
NFNCFSTPGUIF)PNF.JOJTUSZUIPVHIUUPCFEJTMPZBM4
"ęFSUIFXBS UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJOJUJBUFEQPMJDFSFGPSNBTBOJOUFHSBMEJNFO-
TJPOPGJUTEFNPDSBUJ[BUJPOQSPHSBNBOEXJUIUIFHPBMPGFTUBCMJTIJOHMBXBOE
PSEFSJOUIFXBLFPG+BQBOTEFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOćFTFUXJOBJNTPęFOFYJTUFEBU

58 Under the Facade of Benevolence


PEETXJUIFBDIPUIFS"NFSJDBOPďDJBMTXFSFEJWJEFECFUXFFOMJCFSBMSFGPSN-
FSTJOUIFDJWJMJBOCSBODIFTXIPXFSFDPNNJUUFEUPVQIPMEJOHIVNBOSJHIUT 
BOEDPOTFSWBUJWFTDPODFOUSBUFEJOUIFNJMJUBSZBOEJOUFMMJHFODFTFDUJPOTXIP
DIBNQJPOFE UIF QPMJDF BT BO JOTUSVNFOU PG TPDJBM DPOUSPM 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU
QMBOOFST DPNNJUUFEUPSFCVJMEJOH+BQBOTFDPOPNZTPBTUPQSFWFOUUIFTQSFBE
PG DPNNVOJTN BOE GPTUFS UIF DPVOUSZT SFFNFSHFODF BT B SFHJPOBM QPXFS 
sought to revive the Open Door policy in the Far East, guaranteeing U.S. and
+BQBOFTFBDDFTTUPUIFSFTPVSDFTBOENBSLFUTPGPUIFS"TJBODPVOUSJFT BLFZ
NPUJWFVOEFSMZJOHUIF,PSFBOBOE7JFUOBNXBST5
The New Deal lawyer Charles Kades was representative of the liberal ide-
BMJTUTXIPWJFXFE+BQBOBTBMBCPSBUPSZPGQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSN XBSOJOHBCPVU
UIFEBOHFSTQPTFECZBTUSPOH DFOUSBMJ[FEQPMJDFGPSDF‰OBNFMZ UIFiSVUIMFTT
MJRVJEBUJPO PG PQQPTJOH FMFNFOUTw (FOFSBM $IBSMFT 8JMMPVHICZ  IFBE PG UIF
64 "SNZT (ŵ JOUFMMJHFODF VOJU  XBT BO PQQPOFOU PG QPMJDF SFGPSN BOE BO
BENJSFSPG#FOJUP.VTTPMJOJBOE'SBODJTDP'SBODPJOUIFXPSETPGUIFIJTUP-
SJBO.JDIBFM4DIBMMFS 8JMMPVHICZiTBXDPNNVOJTUTBOE+FXJTIDPOTQJSBDJFTBU
IPNF BCSPBE BOEFTQFDJBMMZJO4$"1TSBOLTw6
$PNNJUUFEUPQSPNPUJOHEFNPDSBDZiGSPNBCPWFw‰JOPUIFSXPSET XJUI-
PVU JOQVU GSPN UIF +BQBOFTF QFPQMF  XIPN IF MJLFOFE UP B iCPZ PG UXFMWFw
DPNQBSFEUP"NFSJDBOTGPSUZĕWF‰(FOFSBM%PVHMBT.BD"SUIVSWJFXFEUIF
rebuilding of police institutions as crucial to larger state-building efforts and the
DPOTPMJEBUJPOPGBTUBCMFQSPYZSFHJNF)FSFRVFTUFEUIBUTJYQPMJDFBENJOJTUSB-
tors be assigned to the G-2 Public Safety Division (PSD), headed by Colonel
)&1VMMJBN BWFUFSBOPGUIF#FSLFMFZ $BMJGPSOJB QPMJDFEFQBSUNFOULOPXO
GPS QSPHSFTTJWF JOOPWBUJPOT TVDI BT VTJOH CJDZDMF BOE NPUPSJ[FE QBUSPMT BOE
FTUBCMJTIJOHBĕOHFSQSJOUĕMJOHTZTUFN8BSOJOHBCPVUUVSOJOHPWFSUIFOBUJPO
UPiQJOLTBOESFET wUIFBOUJVOJPO1VMMJBNCFMJFWFEUIBUKVTUBTi(IFOHJT,IBO
JO$IJOB UIF)PVTFPG)BQTCVSHVOEFS$IBSMFT7< >‫ڀڀ‬/BQPMFPO< >‫ڀڀ‬-FOJO 
.VTTPMJOJ BOE)JUMFSJOUIFJSNBSDIUPQPXFSSFMJFEVQPOBDFOUSBMJ[FEQPMJDF w
+BQBOTIPVMEEPMJLFXJTFi.BXLJTITFOUJNFOUBMJUZPWFSUIFJOEJWJEVBMSJHIUT
PGNBOwDPVMEOPUTJUFBTJMZBMPOHTJEFQSBDUJDBMDPOTJEFSBUJPOTJOBiXPSMEPG
FUFSOBMDPOĘJDUw7
1VMMJBNT TVDDFTTPS #ZSPO &OHMF CFMJFWFE TJNJMBSMZ JO UIF OFDFTTJUZ PG B
strong central state and police power as a bulwark against revolution. Born in
ŴżŴųJO#VČBMP .JTTPVSJ &OHMFXBTPOFPGUIFZPVOHFTUQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUPST
JOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT)FXBTLOPXOGPSIFMQJOHUPTUBNQPVUDPSSVQUJPOJOUIF
,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU BWJUBMDPHJOUIFQPMJUJDBMNBDIJOFPGi#PTT
5PNw1FOEFSHBTU#FHJOOJOHIJTDBSFFSBTBQBUSPMNBOEVSJOHUIFEFQSFTTJPO 
IF TFSWFE BU OFBSMZ FWFSZ MFWFM PG MBX FOGPSDFNFOU  JODMVEJOH BT EJSFDUPS PG
SFDSVJUNFOUBOEUSBJOJOHBęFSUBLJOHBUISFFNPOUIDPVSTFBUUIF'#*TQPMJDF
BDBEFNZJOŴżŷŶ)FXBTNFOUPSFECZ$IJFG-FBS3FFE BNBSJOFDBQUBJOXIP
warned in Human Wolves: Seventeen Years of War on CrimePGUIFNFOBDFPG

Policing in Occupied Japan 59


DPNNVOJTN ESVHT BOESBDJBMJOUFHSBUJPOBOECSBHHFEBCPVUQVODIJOHPOFPG
his subordinates in the face and knocking out his front teeth after being offered
B CSJCF " EFWPUFF PG + &EHBS )PPWFS XIP CFDBNF $*" TUBUJPO DIJFG JO UIF
%PNJOJDBO 3FQVCMJD  3FFE BEWPDBUFE QVUUJOH DPNNVOJTUT JO DPODFOUSBUJPO
DBNQT)FSBOBOJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZVOJUUIBUTIBSFEJOGPSNBUJPOXJUIUIF'#*
POUIPVTBOETPGTVTQFDUFESBEJDBMT NBOZPGUIFNDJWJMSJHIUT IVNBOSJHIUT 
BOEQFBDFBDUJWJTUTBOEMBCPSPSHBOJ[FST XIPN3FFEDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTiBMJFO
NJOEFENPOHSFMTwXIPiCMBTQIFNF"NFSJDBOJTNw8
%FTDSJCFECZBDPOUFNQPSBSZBTBTUJDLMFSGPSEFUBJMXIPTFFNFEOFWFSUP
GPSHFUBGBDFPSBOBNF HPPERVBMJUJFTUPIBWFJOIJTMJOFPGXPSL &OHMFDPO-
TJEFSFEUIFQPMJDFBDSJUJDBMQPJOUPGDPOUBDUCFUXFFOUIFHPWFSONFOUBOEUIF
QFPQMF )F CFMJFWFE UIBU JUT FČFDUJWFOFTT DPVME CF BVHNFOUFE CZ EFWFMPQJOH
TLJMMFEJOUFMMJHFODFBOEQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUT XIJDIIFXPSLFEUPEPJO+BQBOBOE
UIFOXPSMEXJEFBTEJSFDUPSPGŴŵżųEBOEUIF0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ*UXBTGSPN
Reed and Hoover that Engle developed the idea that police should serve as the
iĕSTUMJOFPGEFGFOTFwBHBJOTUTVCWFSTJPO BQSJODJQBMTMPHBOPGUIF0149
In 1950 Engle was recruited by the CIA to inaugurate police training in
Turkey. His position was taken over by Captain Harold Mulbar, head of a
QPMJDFJOWFTUJHBUJPOTVOJU iSFETRVBEw XJUIUIF.JDIJHBO4UBUF1PMJDF XIJDI
DPNQJMFEEPTTJFSTPONPSFUIBOUXFMWFUIPVTBOESFTJEFOUTBOEJOĕMUSBUFEEP[-
ens of radical and labor organizations. Through the war years, Mulbar spoke
each week on the radio in Michigan, enlisting voluntary reports on suspected
foreign agents. During the 1937 sit-down strike at the General Motors plant
JO'MJOU IFMFEBUFBNPGQMBJODMPUIFTPďDFSTTFFLJOHUPHBJOJOGPSNBUJPOPO
SBEJDBMBOEDPNNVOJTUFMFNFOUTJOUIF6OJUFE"VUP8PSLFSTBOE$POHSFTTPG
*OEVTUSJBM0SHBOJ[BUJPOTBOEUFTUJĕFEBCPVUUIFJSBDUJWJUJFTCFGPSFUIF)PVTF
6O"NFSJDBO"DUJWJUJFT$PNNJUUFF*OĘVFODFECZUIFQSPGFTTJPOBMFUIJDPGUIF
1SPHSFTTJWF&SB .VMCBSXBTBQSPQPOFOUPGTDJFOUJĕDNFUIPET JODMVEJOHUIF
use of lie detector tests, and wrote a book on the art of interrogation in which
IFDPOEFNOFEUPSUVSFBTiBGVUJMF VOFUIJDBM BOECBSCBSJBOQSBDUJDFw10
.VMCBS BOE &OHMF FYFNQMJGZ UIF FČPSU UP BQQMZ UIF TUBOEBSET PG 1SPHSFT-
sive Era policing internationally and to expand the role of police surveillance
BOEFTQJPOBHFJOUIFBOUJSBEJDBMQPMJUJDBMBHFOEBTIBSFECZCPUINBKPSQBSUJFT11
'SPNŴżŷŸUPŴżŸŵ 4$"1QSPWJEFEPWFSŻųCJMMJPOZFO SPVHIMZžŵųųNJMMJPO 
GPSQPMJDFTBMBSJFT USBJOJOH BOEFRVJQNFOUJO+BQBO GSPNBSNPSFEDBST SBEJPT 
BOEUFMFUZQFNBDIJOFT GPSEJTTFNJOBUJOHJOGPSNBUJPO UPĘBTIMJHIUT IPMTUFST 
BOE$PMUSFWPMWFST1VUUJOHPVUEFUBJMFETVSWFZTBOENBQT UIF14%TPVHIUUP
JOTUJMM"NFSJDBODPODFQUTPGQPMJDJOH JODMVEJOHPSHBOJ[BUJPOBMQBUUFSOTBOEBO
FNQIBTJT PO TDJFOUJĕD JOWFTUJHBUJPO BOE DPNNVOJUZ SFMBUJPOT  BOE QSPWJEFE
USBJOJOH JO VOEFSDPWFS XPSL *O )JSPTIJNB  XIFSF QPMJDF XFSF LJMMFE CZ UIF
BUPNJDBUUBDLTBOEQPMJDFCVJMEJOHTXFSFHVUUFE UIF14%SFCVJMUBOFXGPSDF
GSPNTDSBUDI123FGPSNTXFSFTMPXUPHFUPČUIFHSPVOE JOQBSUCFDBVTFPGUIFJS

60 Under the Facade of Benevolence


JNQMFNFOUBUJPOUISPVHIDPOTFSWBUJWF+BQBOFTFMFBEFST JODMVEJOHUIFFNQFSPS
"MGSFE0QQMFS IFBEPGUIF$PVSUTBOE-BX%JWJTJPOPG4$"1 DMBJNFEUIBUUIF
calls for police decentralization were “ideologically sound but unrealistic.”13
0OFJNQPSUBOUNFBTVSFGBWPSFECZ.BD"SUIVS XIPEFTDSJCFE+BQBOBTUIF
iXFTUFSONPTU PVUQPTU PG PVS EFGFOTF w XBT UIF TVCTUJUVUJPO PG XPPEFO DMVCT
GPSUSBEJUJPOBMTIPSUTXPSETGPS+BQBOFTFQPMJDF JOQBSUGPSTZNCPMJDFČFDU0O
October 11, 1945, SCAP issued a directive authorizing a reduction of police
TUSFOHUI UP żŶ żŶŸ GSPN PWFS Ŵŵų ųųų "T QBSU PG UIF QVSHJOH PG VMUSBOBUJPO-
BMJTUT PďDFSTMJOLFEUPQBTUBCVTFTXFSFEJTNJTTFE JODMVEJOHUXPQSFGFDUVSBM
DIJFGTBOEŷ żųųNFNCFSTPGUIFiUIPVHIUDPOUSPMwTFDUJPO XIJDI.BD"SUIVS
TBX BT iUIF TUSPOHFTU XFBQPO PG UIF NJMJUBSZ DMJRVFw 'PSUZGPVS QFSDFOU PG
police officers left voluntarily. To keep watch over purged officials, MacArthur
established a special investigations bureau, which evolved into a reincarnation
PGUIF5PLLÙCZNBJOUBJOJOHTVSWFJMMBODFPWFSTVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUT14
*O+VOFŴżŷŹ VOEFS&OHMFTMFBEFSTIJQ UIF14%FTUBCMJTIFEBOBDBEFNZJO
Osaka for 2,200 police, who in turn trained the rest of the force. The acad-
FNZXBTFRVJQQFEXJUIBOJOEPPSSJĘFBOEQJTUPMSBOHFDPVSTFTXFSFUBVHIU
JONBSLTNBOTIJQ BSSFTUUFDIOJRVFT i"OHMP4BYPOwKVSJTQSVEFODF KVEP BOE
TDJFOUJĕDQPMJDJOHNFUIPET JODMVEJOHĕOHFSQSJOUJOHBOEGPSFOTJDT15 Instruc-
UJPONBOVBMTGSPNUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXSJUUFOCZMFBEJOHQPMJDFUIFPSJTUTTVDI
BT"VHVTU7PMMNFS DIJFGPGQPMJDFJO#FSLFMFZGSPNŴżųŸUPŴżŶŴBOEGPVOE-
JOH EFBO PG UIF %FQBSUNFOU PG $SJNJOPMPHZ BU UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG $BMJGPSOJB
BU#FSLFMFZ XFSFUSBOTMBUFEJOUP+BQBOFTFćFĕMNMidnight in a Great City,
QSPNPUJOHUIFVTFPGNPEFSOTDJFOUJĕDUFDIOJRVFT XBTBTUBQMFPGUIFDPVSTF
0WFS UJNF  BU MFBTU ĕęZ USBJOJOH TDIPPMT XFSF FTUBCMJTIFE  BOE QPMJDF FYFDV-
UJWFT XFSF TFOU UP TUVEZ UIF "NFSJDBO QPMJDF TZTUFN  JODMVEJOH JO #FSLFMFZ
VOEFS7PMMNFSTTVDDFTTPS+PIO%)PMTUSPN MBUFSBDPOTVMUBOUUPŴŵżųE*O
SFUJSFNFOU 7PMMNFSDPSSFTQPOEFEXJUINFNCFSTPGUIF.FUSPQPMJUBO1PMJDF
JO0TBLBBOEUIFSFGPSNFS:VTBJ5BLBIBTIJ XIPXSPUFBUFYUCPPLPOQBUSPM-
MJOH XIJDI BEWPDBUFE UIF #FSLFMFZ TZTUFN BOE JUT FNQIBTJT PO DPNNVOJUZ
relations.16
4FUUJOHUIFTUBOEBSEGPSUIFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJO+BQBO 7PMMNFSIBECFFO
BNPOHUIFĕSTU"NFSJDBOQPMJDFDIJFGTUPHPBCSPBEUPQSPNPUFQPMJDFSFGPSN
*OŴżŵŹ BęFSCFJOHFMFDUFEDIBJSNBOPGUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM"TTPDJBUJPOPG$IJFGT
PG1PMJDF XIJDITPVHIUUPQSPNPUFQSPGFTTJPOBMTUBOEBSETXPSMEXJEF IFTQFOU
UXPNPOUITTFUUJOHVQBQPMJDFUSBJOJOHTDIPPMBOEUFMFUZQFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
TZTUFNPOCFIBMGPG$VCBOEJDUBUPS(FSBSEP.BDIBEP*OUIFFBSMZŴżŶųT BU
UIF SFRVFTU PG UIF $IJOFTF /BUJPOBMJTU HPWFSONFOU  7PMMNFS TFOU IJT EFQVUZ
"SUIVS ( 8PPET UP NPEFSOJ[F UIF QPMJDF VOEFS (FOFSBMJTTJNP +JBOH +JFTIJ
$IJBOH,BJTIFL 5XPPG7PMMNFST$IJOFTFTUVEFOUTBU#FSLFMFZ 'FOH:VLVO
BOE'SBOL:FF XFOUCBDLUP$IJOBBęFSHSBEVBUJPOUPTFUVQQPMJDFBDBEFNJFT 
XIJDIJODPSQPSBUFEIJTUFBDIJOHTPONPEFSONBOBHFSJBMBOETDJFOUJĕDUFDI-

Policing in Occupied Japan 61


OJRVFTćFMBSHFTUPGUIFTFBDBEFNJFT BU;IFKJBOH USBJOFEUIFTFDSFUQPMJDFPG
%BJ-J XIPN044PQFSBUJWF0MJWFS+$BMEXFMMSFGFSSFEUPJOIJTNFNPJSTBTB
i$IJOFTF)JNNMFSw17
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO+BQBOCVJMUPOUIFTFEVCJPVTQSFDFEFOUT XJUIUIF
HPWFSONFOUOPXJOTUJUVUJPOBMJ[JOHUIFFČPSUUPFYQPSUUIF"NFSJDBOQSPGFT-
TJPOBMQPMJDJOHNPEFM14%BEWJTFSTTVDIBTSFUJSFE-"1%EFQVUZDIJFG)FOSZ
4 &BUPO  "SUIVS ,JNCFSMJOH QPMJDF DIJFG JO -PVJTWJMMF  ,FOUVDLZ  XIP MBUFS
DPNBOBHFEŴŵżųE BOE$MZEF1IFMQT DIJFGPGQPMJDFJO4QPLBOF 8BTIJOH-
UPO XIPXFOUPOUP*SBR #SB[JM 4PNBMJB BOE1FSV HBWFMFDUVSFTBUUIFQPMJDF
BDBEFNZ BOE TFU VQ B EFUFDUJWF CVSFBV  JNNJHSBUJPO BHFODZ  BOE MJDFOTJOH
TZTUFNGPSQSJWBUFEFUFDUJWFBHFODJFTTUBČFEQSJNBSJMZCZGPSNFSQPMJDFPďDFST
who had been dishonorably discharged. They tried to recruit better-educated
QFSTPOOFM BIBMMNBSLPG7PMMNFSTUFOVSFJO#FSLFMFZ QSPNPUFEIJHIFSXBHF
TUBOEBSET BOEBJEFEJOUIFTZTUFNBUJ[BUJPOPGSFDPSET QSPWJEJOHOFXTUFFMĕMF
cabinets.18ćF14%GVSUIFSBVUIPSJ[FEUIFIJSJOHPGGFNBMFQPMJDFPďDFSTBOE
TFU VQ B DSJNJOBM JOWFTUJHBUJPOT MBCPSBUPSZ JO 5PLZP EJSFDUFE CZ -JFVUFOBOU
$BMWJO)(PEEBSE BĕSFBSNTJEFOUJĕDBUJPO CBMMJTUJDT FYQFSUXIPXBTQSPGFT-
TPSPGQPMJDFTDJFODFBOEUIFĕSTUEJSFDUPSPGUIF/PSUIXFTUFSO4DJFOUJĕD$SJNF
%FUFDUJPO-BCPSBUPSZ XIJDICSPVHIUUPHFUIFSTQFDJBMJTUTJODIFNJTUSZ UPYJDPM-
PHZ NJDSPTDPQFJEFOUJĕDBUJPO BOEQIPUPHSBQIZ
"NFEJDBMEPDUPSCZUSBJOJOHXIPTFSWFEXJUIUIF"SNZ.FEJDBM$PSQTJO
8PSME8BS* (PEEBSEUFTUJĕFEGPSUIFQSPTFDVUJPOBUUIF4BDDPBOE7BO[FUUJ
USJBMBOEIFMQFEUPMPDBUFUXPPGUIFTVCNBDIJOFHVOTVTFEJOUIFHBOHMBOE4U
Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago.19 His background was typical of the expe-
SJFODFPGNBOZPGUIFBEWJTFST XIPXFSFQJPOFFSTJOUIFQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPO
PG"NFSJDBOMBXFOGPSDFNFOUBOETPVHIUUPFYUFOEUIFJSUFDIOJDBMFYQFSUJTF
BCSPBE MBSHFMZUPIFMQDPOTPMJEBUF"NFSJDBTTUSBUFHJDQPTJUJPOJOUIF'BS&BTU
0OFPGUIFDFOUSBMUBTLTPGUIF14%XBTUPSFTUPSFUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOOFU-
works ravaged during the war. At the beginning of the occupation, the phones
worked only sporadically. By the early 1950s, reports boasted that technical
BEWJTFST IBE FTUBCMJTIFE B SBEJP OFUXPSL BMMPXJOH GPS FBTZ DPNNVOJDBUJPO
BNPOHQPMJDFBHFODJFTBDSPTTUIFDPVOUSZ20
*OBOPUIFSJNQPSUBOUJOOPWBUJPO UIF14%XPSLFEXJUIMBXZFSTUPQSPNPUF
MFHJTMBUJWFBOEKVEJDJBMSFGPSNTHVBSBOUFFJOHTVTQFDUTUIFSJHIUUPIBCFBTDPS-
QVT TQFFEZTFOUFODJOH BOEBQQFBMćJTXBTDSVDJBMJOUIFBUUFNQUUPFOTVSF
BOJOTUJUVUJPOBMDPNNJUNFOUUPEVFQSPDFTT MBDLJOHBNPOHQBTUGPSDFTCVJMUVQ
by the United States. To get around a reliance on forced confessions, instruc-
tion was provided in evidence collection. In 1946, coinciding with progressive
MBCPS SFGPSN  4$"1 QBTTFE B MBX HVBSBOUFFJOH QPMJUJDBM SJHIUT PG BTTFNCMZ
BOEQSPUFTU BOEBVUIPSJ[JOHUIFSFMFBTFPGDPNNVOJTUBOEMFęXJOHBDUJWJTUT
JNQSJTPOFEEVSJOHUIFXBS21
"OVNCFSPGBEWJTFSTFYQSFTTFEGSVTUSBUJPOUIBUUIFQPMJDFSFNBJOFEVOEFS

62 Under the Facade of Benevolence


FRVJQQFE BOE XFSF VOSFDFQUJWF UP MFBSOJOH OFX BQQSPBDIFT 1PJOUJOH UP UIF
QFSTJTUFODFPGIJHIDSJNFSBUFTBOEUIFWJPMFOUTVQQSFTTJPOPGSJPUTJO0TBLB 
POF SFQPSUFE UIBU iNPEFSOJ[BUJPO PG QPMJDF NFUIPET NVTU CF QSFDFEFE CZ B
DIBOHFJOUIFNFOUBMJUZPGQPMJDFPďDFSTUPBNPSFTDJFOUJĕDXBZPGUIJOLJOH
‫ڀڀ‬1PMJDFXJUIPMEJEFBTIBOEMJOHNBDIJOFTBSFMJLFNPOLFZTSJEJOHCJDZDMFTw22
ćFTF DPNNFOUT JMMVTUSBUF UIF ĕYBUJPO PO UFDIOPMPHZ BOE NPEFSOJ[BUJPO BT
a pathway to progress, which was not always shared by the local people and
QPMJDFXIPNUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXPSLFEXJUI

Overcoming the “Oriental Psychology”: The Valentine and


Olander Reports

*O +BOVBSZ ŴżŷŹ  BT SFPSHBOJ[BUJPO BOE SFGPSN XFSF CFHJOOJOH UP UBLF SPPU 
(FOFSBM .BD"SUIVS SFRVFTUFE UIBU BO FNJOFOU QPMJDF FYQFSU DPNF UP +BQBO
UPPWFSTFFUIFQSPDFTTćF14%DIPTF0TDBS(0MBOEFS DPNNJTTJPOFSPGUIF
.JDIJHBO4UBUF1PMJDF XIPTPMJDJUFEUIFBTTJTUBODFPGIJTGPSNFSDPMMFBHVF)BS-
PME.VMCBS BOE-FXJT7BMFOUJOF DPNNJTTJPOFSPGUIF/FX:PSL$JUZ1PMJDF
%FQBSUNFOU XIPCSPVHIUXJUIIJNTFWFSBMPGIJTBTTPDJBUFT
#PUI0MBOEFSBOE7BMFOUJOFXFSFBNPOHUIFUPQQSPGFTTJPOBMTJOUIFJSĕFME
8PSLJOH IJTXBZVQGSPNBTTJTUBOU SFDPSET DMFSL JO UIFFBSMZ ŴżŵųT  0MBOEFS
developed an excellent reputation for reorganizing the Michigan detective
CVSFBV BOE DPOTUBCVMBSZ  BEPQUJOH OFX TDJFOUJĕD JOOPWBUJPOT  LFFQJOH UIF
QPMJDFGSFFGSPNNBDIJOFQPMJUJDTCZQSPNPUJOHGSPNXJUIJO BOEJNQSPWJOH
training, encouraging officers to take courses at Michigan State University,
XIJDIXBTEFWFMPQJOHPOFPGUIFCFTUDSJNJOBMKVTUJDFQSPHSBNTJOUIFDPVOUSZ
Characterizing the Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the World, or IWW) as
iFOFNJFTPGUIFDPVOUSZBOEMBXBOEPSEFSw0MBOEFSBMTPPWFSTBXTUSJLFCSFBL-
JOHBOELFQUBĕMFPGiEBOHFSPVTBOEVO"NFSJDBOSFTJEFOUTwXIJDIIFTIBSFE
with the FBI. His organization was known for its close relationship with busi-
OFTTFMJUFTBOEGPSUIFTUSFOHUIPGJUTSFETRVBET23
ćFTPOPGBGSVJUTUPSFPXOFSGSPN*UBMZXIPCFHBOIJTDBSFFSBTBQBUSPMNBO
JOŴżųŶ 7BMFOUJOFXBTSFDPHOJ[FEGPSCSJOHJOHEJTDJQMJOFBOEQSPGFTTJPOBMJTN
UPUIF/FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOEXBTIBJMFECZUIFNew York Times as
UIFiCFTUQPMJDFDPNNJTTJPOFSJODJUZIJTUPSZw0QFSBUJOHPOUIFQSFNJTFUIBU
residents have the right to “expect courtesy and service in return for their tax
EPMMBST wIFEJTNJTTFENPSFUIBOUISFFIVOESFEDPSSVQUPďDFSTBOEĕOFEŻ Ÿųų
JOIJTĕSTUTJYZFBST ŴżŶŷoŴżŷų "GBWPSJUFPGMJCFSBMNBZPS'JPSFMMP-B(VBSEJB
BOEBMJGFMPOH%FNPDSBU IFBEPQUFEBNPSFUPMFSBOUQPMJDZUPXBSETUSJLFTBOE
QVCMJDEFNPOTUSBUJPOTUIBOIJTQSFEFDFTTPS UIPVHIBTUIFIJTUPSJBO.BSJMZOO
4+PIOTPOOPUFT IFIBEMJUUMFTZNQBUIZGPSDPNNVOJTUTBOEVOJPOiBHJUBUPSTw
BOE SFMJFE PO TPQIJTUJDBUFE GPSNT PG DMBOEFTUJOF TVSWFJMMBODF BOE SFQSFTTJPO
BOE UIF VOEFSDPWFS SFE TRVBE *O IJT USFBUNFOU PG DSJNJOBMT  7BMFOUJOF XBT

Policing in Occupied Japan 63


LOPXO UP CF CSVUBM  QSPNJTJOH QSPNPUJPOT UP DPQT XIP iLJDLFE UIF HPSJMMBT
BSPVOEw8IFOBTUJDLVQNBOXBTCSPVHIUJODPWFSFEXJUICSVJTFTBOEEJFEJO
DVTUPEZ 7BMFOUJOFEJTNJTTFEUIFBČBJSBTiKVTUBOPUIFSEFBEDSJNJOBMw#BMLJOH
BUUIFTJHIUPGBXFMMESFTTFETVTQFDUJOBMJOFVQ IFBUBOPUIFSUJNFUPMEPOFPG
IJTTVCPSEJOBUFTićBUWFMWFUDPMMBSTIPVMECFTNFBSFEXJUICMPPE‫*ڀڀ‬EPOU
XBOU UIFTF IPPEMVNT DPNJOH JO MPPLJOH BT JG UIFZ TUFQQFE PVU PG B CBSCFST
DIBJS'SPNOPXPO CSJOHFNJONFTTFEVQw24
ćFTF DPNNFOUT UZQJGZ UIF MBDL PG SFHBSE GPS DJWJM MJCFSUJFT JO "NFSJDBO
QPMJDFJOTUJUVUJPOT XIJDIFYUFOEFEJOUPUIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMQSPHSBNT "/FX
:PSL $JUZ QPMJDF PďDFS XPSLJOH XJUI %BJ -J XBT OP EPVCU TJODFSF JO DPN-
NFOUJOH  i)F EPFT OPUIJOH <JO JOUFSSPHBUJPO> UIBU UIF /FX :PSL ADPOGFTTJPO
EFQBSUNFOUXPVMEOUEPw 4VQQPSUJWFPG64GPSFJHOQPMJDZPCKFDUJWFT BTXFSF
TP NBOZ PG UIFJS HFOFSBUJPO  0MBOEFS BOE 7BMFOUJOF DPODMVEFE BęFS WJTJUJOH
QPMJDFQSFDJODUTUIBUUIF+BQBOFTFQPMJDFTZTUFNXBTPSHBOJ[FEOPUUPTFSWFUIF
QVCMJDCVUUPBEWBODFUIFQPMJUJDBMBNCJUJPOTPGUIPTFJODPOUSPMBOEOFFEFEUP
CFUSBOTGPSNFE0MBOEFSTVHHFTUFEUIBUBOBUJPOBMSVSBMQPMJDFTZTUFNCFFTUBC-
lished under the direction of an appointed head who would be responsible to
BOFMFDUFEHPWFSONFOUPďDJBM)FBEWPDBUFEJNQSPWJOHUIFQIZTJDBMGBDJMJUJFT
PGQPMJDFTUBUJPOTBOEKBJMTBOEQSPWJEJOHNPEFSOFRVJQNFOUBOEXFBQPOSZ*O
IJTWJFX DIBOHFIBEUPCFBDDPNQMJTIFEHSBEVBMMZCFDBVTFPGJOHSBJOFEDVM-
tural traditions and the peculiar “oriental psychology,” which was resistant to
NPEFSOJ[BUJPO25
7BMFOUJOF XIPTUFQQFEEPXOGSPNBžŷŸ ųųųBZFBSKPCBTBDPNNFOUBUPS
on the popular Gang BustersSBEJPQSPHSBNUPIFBEUIFQPMJDFSFPSHBOJ[BUJPO
GPSXIJDIIFXBTQBJEžŴų ųųų SFDPNNFOEFEUIBUXPSLJOHIPVSTCFSFEVDFE
BOEQBZTZTUFNBUJ[FEUPJNQSPWFQSPGFTTJPOBMTUBOEBSETBOEUIBU4$"1TVQ-
QMZ QBUSPM DBST  SBEJPT  BOE UFDIOJDBM BTTJTUBODF UP VQHSBEF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT
)FDBMMFEGPSCFUUFSVOJGPSNTBOETQFFEJFSDPVSUQSPDFEVSFT UIFFSBEJDBUJPO
of binding (a practice whereby arrested persons were bound with cord or rope
CFGPSFCFJOHUBLFOUPEFUFOUJPO BOEUIFFMJNJOBUJPOPGQPMJDFDPOUSPMPGUIF
IFBMUIBOEXFMGBSFTZTUFNT
3FGFSSJOHUPUIFDVSSFOUTZTUFNBTiNFEJFWBM w7BMFOUJOFGVSUIFSBEWPDBUFE
GPSUIFFOGPSDFNFOUPGBOUJWJDFMBXT UIFTUBOEBSEJ[BUJPOPGUSBJOJOHBUQPMJDF
BDBEFNJFT  BOE HSBEVBM EFDFOUSBMJ[BUJPO UISPVHI DPNNJTTJPOFST UP FOTVSF
FČFDUJWF BENJOJTUSBUJWF DPOUSPM BOE GBJSFS QSPNPUJPO TUBOEBSET )F TBX UIF
/FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBTBNPEFMGPS+BQBOFTFDJUJFTBOESFDPNNFOEFE
FYUFOTJWFPWFSTJHIUCZ"NFSJDBO14%PďDJBMT*OIJTWJFX BEBQUJOHBO"NFSJ-
DBOQPMJDFTZTUFNUP+BQBOIBEBEVBMQVSQPTFUPSBJTFUIFNPSBMFBOEFď-
ciency of the new police force and to secure the respect of the general public.
i/FX:PSLFSTEPOUGFBSUIFJSQPMJDFNFO UIFZSFTQFDUUIFNBOEUSVTUUIFNBOE
EPOUSVOGSPNUIFN wIFUPMESFQPSUFSTićFSFJTOPSFBTPOXIZUIF+BQBOFTF
QPMJDFDBOUCFUIFTBNFw26

64 Under the Facade of Benevolence


On February 28, 1947, the Japanese cabinet presented a draft plan based
PO UIF SFDPNNFOEBUJPOT PG UIF 7BMFOUJOF BOE 0MBOEFS SFQPSUT  XIJDI DPEJ-
ĕFEFYJTUJOHSFGPSNTJUXBTQVUJOUPFČFDUBZFBSMBUFSćFMFHBMGPVOEBUJPOT
GPS WJDJPVT QPMJDF QSBDUJDFT  JODMVEJOH iUIJSE EFHSFF w NFUIPET XFSF GPSNBMMZ
SFNPWFE BOEUIFSJHIUUPIBCFBTDPSQVTXBTFOTVSFE1SFJOEJDUNFOUEFUFO-
UJPOXBTMJNJUFEUPBQFSJPEPGUFOEBZT BOEBSSFTUTDPVMECFNBEFPOMZBęFS
UIFJTTVBODFPGKVEJDJBMXBSSBOUT*OBCSFBLGSPNQSFWJPVTJOUFSWFOUJPOT QPMJDF
BDUJWJUJFTSFMBUFEUPTBOJUBUJPO TVCQPFOBT QVCMJDIFBMUI ĕSFT DFOTVTFOVNFSB-
UJPO FDPOPNJDDPOUSPMT DPOTFSWBUJPOPGOBUVSBMSFTPVSDFT BOENBSJOFBČBJST
XFSFUSBOTGFSSFEUPPUIFSBHFODJFTJOPSEFSUPMJNJUUIFQPXFSTPGUIFQPMJDF"
QVCMJDTBGFUZDPNNJTTJPOXBTBMTPFTUBCMJTIFEBUUIFOBUJPOBMBOENVOJDJQBM
levels to ensure citizen control.27
ćF NPTU DPOUSPWFSTJBM QSPWJTJPO XBT UIF SFUFOUJPO PG UIF 3VSBM (VBSE 
XIJDI4$"1TVQQMJFEXJUIXFBQPOTBOETIPSUXBWFSBEJPFRVJQNFOU8PSL-
ing with G-2 intelligence, the Guard, which could be activated in the case of a
OBUJPOBMFNFSHFODZ XBTDPOTJEFSFEiOFDFTTBSZJOBDPVOUSZXJUIPVUFYQFSJ-
FODFJOEFNPDSBDZw28ćJTSFNBSLFYFNQMJĕFTUIFDPOUSBEJDUJPOTPG64QPMJDZ 
XIJDI QSPNPUFE EFNPDSBDZ JO QSJODJQMF CVU EJE OPU USVTU UIF JOEJHFOPVT
DBQBDJUZ GPS TFMGHPWFSONFOU 0SEFS BOE TUBCJMJUZ UPPL QSFDFEFODF PWFS DJWJM
liberties, particularly as social unrest increased.

“There Comes a Time When Patience Ceases to Be a Virtue”:


Penal Reform and Its Limits

0MBOEFSBOE7BMFOUJOFQSPNPUFEBNFBTVSFJNQPSUBOUUPUIFJSSFDPNNFOEB-
UJPOTBOPWFSIBVMPGUIFQSJTPOTZTUFNPOUIFNPEFMPGQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNT
6OCFLOPXOTUUPNBOZ4$"1PďDJBMT XIPVOEFSFTUJNBUFEUIFBCJMJUZPGUIF
Japanese to advance progressive social change on their own accord, Japa-
OFTFPďDJBMTIBETUVEJFE&VSPQFBOQSJTPOTZTUFNTEVSJOHUIF.FJKJFSBBOE
FNCSBDFENBOZBTQFDUTPG8FTUFSOQFOPMPHZ JODMVEJOHUIFTFQBSBUFDMBTTJĕDB-
UJPOPGNBMFBOEGFNBMFQSJTPOFSTBOEKVWFOJMFT PVUMBXJOHUPSUVSF UIFJNQP-
TJUJPOPGMBCPSSFHJNFOTBOEBSFXBSETTZTUFN BOETVQQPSUGPSSFIBCJMJUBUJPO
through vocational training and education. After touring penal facilities in the
MBUFŴżŵųT UIF6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJODSJNJOPMPHJTU+PIO-(JMMJOXSPUFUIBU
+BQBOIBETPNFUIJOHUPUFBDI"NFSJDBOTJOiUIFDBSFXJUIXIJDITIFTFMFDUT
IFS QSJTPO XBSEFOT  UIF USBJOJOH PG QSJTPO PďDJBMT  BOE JO UIF USFBUNFOU PG
offenders.”29
3FĘFDUJOHUIFEFUFSJPSBUJOHDPOEJUJPOTEVSJOH8PSME8BS** 14%JOTQFD-
UJPOTBUUIFCFHJOOJOHPGUIFPDDVQBUJPOGPVOEiBQQBMMJOHQSJWBUJPOTwBNPOH
EFUBJOFFT NBOZPGXIPNXFSFIFMEGPSMFOHUIZQFSJPETXJUIPVUUSJBM$IJMESFO
BOE QSFHOBOU XPNFO XFSF DPOĕOFE XJUI UIF HFOFSBM QPQVMBUJPO  UIFSF XBT
JOTVďDJFOUMJHIUBOEWFOUJMBUJPO BOEJONBUFTXFSFEFQSJWFEPGQIZTJDBMFYFS-

Policing in Occupied Japan 65


DJTFBOENFEJDBMDBSF4BOJUBUJPOTUBOEBSETXFSFiVOEFTJSBCMF wBOEiPCOPYJPVT
TNFMMTwBOEiNVTUJOFTTwXFSFSFQPSUFEJONBOZPGUIFPWFSDSPXEFEDFMMT XIJDI
SFTFNCMFEiEVOHFPOTw1SJTPOFSTXJUIDPNNVOJDBCMFEJTFBTFTJODMVEJOHTDB-
CJFTXFSFNJYFEJOXJUIUIFPUIFST DPSQPSBMQVOJTINFOUXBTDPNNPO BOE
death rates were excessive.30
ćF14%QSJTPOCSBODI IFBEFECZ#VSEFUU-FXJT GPSNFSDPNNJTTJPOFSPG
DPSSFDUJPOTJO/FX:PSL$JUZBOEBOBENJSFSPGUIFMFHFOEBSZQSJTPOSFGPSNFST
;FCVMPO#SPDLXBZBOEćPNBT.PUU0TCPSOF XPSLFEUPSFDUJGZUIFTFQSPC-
MFNTBTBOJOUFHSBMBTQFDUPGUIFDJWJMMJCFSUJFTEJSFDUJWF*OĘVFODFECZTPDJBMTDJ-
FOUJĕDSFTFBSDIPOUIFFOWJSPONFOUBMSPPUTPGIVNBOCFIBWJPS -FXJTJOBŴżŵŴ
CPPLBEWPDBUFEiLJOE ĕSN BOEJOUFMMJHFOUwUSFBUNFOUPGUIFDSJNJOBMPČFOEFS 
XIPTFiCMPPETIPVMEOPUCFDPOUBNJOBUFE IJTCPEZEFTUSPZFEBOEIJTTQJSJU
broken and brutalized. . . . He should be trained as a child in school, treated as a
QBUJFOUJOBIPTQJUBM NPMEFEBTBOBQQSFOUJDFJOIJTUSBEFTPUIBUIFNBZCFBCMF
UPUBLFIJTQMBDFBTBTFMGTVQQPSUJOHNFNCFSPGTPDJFUZw31
'PMMPXJOHUIFTFQSJODJQMFT -FXJTBOEIJTTUBȉJODMVEJOH"ENJSBM-MPZE8
.D$PSLMF BTPDJPMPHZQSPGFTTPSXJUIB1I%GSPN/FX:PSL6OJWFSTJUZ8JM-
CVS#VSLF BOJOUFMMJHFODFPďDFSXJUIBMBXEFHSFFGSPN*OEJBOB6OJWFSTJUZ
BOE(FPSHF'JU[HJCCPO B)BSWBSE1I%‰QSPNPUFEJNQSPWFETBOJUBUJPOBOE
IFBMUIDBSF SFPSHBOJ[FEUIFQSJTPOFSDMBTTJĕDBUJPOQSPDFEVSF TFUVQBQBSPMF
BOE JOEFUFSNJOBUF TFOUFODJOH TZTUFN  BOE TFQBSBUFE XPNFO BOE KVWFOJMF
JONBUFTGSPNUIFNFOćFQSPGFTTJPOBMUSBJOJOHPGHVBSETJONPEFSOQFOPM-
PHZCFDBNFPCMJHBUPSZ#BJMXBTNBEFBNBUUFSPGMBX BOEJONBUFTXFSFUPCF
DPOTJEFSFEJOOPDFOUVOUJMQSPWFOHVJMUZ4DIPPMTXFSFPQFOFEGPSJONBUFT BOE
the PSD encouraged wardens to allow even recalcitrant prisoners daily exer-
cise and regular baths.32 -POHUFSN TPMJUBSZ DPOĕOFNFOU XBT BCPMJTIFE  BOE
psychologists were brought in to assist in rehabilitation. Recreational facilities
XFSFBMTPFTUBCMJTIFE BOETQPSUJOHUFBNT OPUBCMZCBTFCBMM BOETVNPXSFTUMJOH
DPNQFUJUJPOT XFSF PSHBOJ[FE ćF 14% BEEJUJPOBMMZ IFMQFE TFU VQ JOEVTUSJBM
USBJOJOH TIPQT BOEQFOBMGBSNTNPEFMFEBęFSUIF*XBIJHDPMPOZJOUIF1IJMJQ-
pines and the George Junior Republic.33
"MUIPVHI-FXJTBDLOPXMFEHFEiMJNJUBUJPOTwCFDBVTFPGUIFTVQQPTFEMZEJG-
ferent Japanese attitude toward the “worth of the individual,” PSD inspection
SFQPSUT TIPX JNQSPWFNFOU JO B OVNCFS PG UIF GBDJMJUJFT UBSHFUFE VOEFS UIF
SFGPSNT"OJONBUFBUUIF"NPSJQSJTPODPNNFOUFEJOŴżŷźUIBUiTJODFUIFXBS 
UIFGPPEJTXPSTFCVUIBOEMJOHQSJTPOFSTJTNVDICFUUFSXJUIOPNJMJUBSZPSEFST
CFJOHHJWFOBOEQTZDIPMPHJDBMIBOEMJOHNPSFDPOTJEFSBUFw34 Public safety offi-
DJBMTXFSFFTQFDJBMMZJNQSFTTFEXJUIUIFSVOOJOHPGUIF4BQQPSPQSJTPOCZ+
,VTPNPUP"QSJTPOSFQPSUDIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIFMBXTDIPPMHSBEVBUFBTBIJHIMZ
JOUFMMJHFOUBOEDVMUVSFENBOXIPMJLFEUPEJTDVTTQIJMPTPQIZBOEXBTJOiTZN-
pathy with the spirit of rehabilitation which is the basis of the ordinance set up
VOEFSUIFOFXAQSPHSFTTJWFTZTUFNw"DDPSEJOHUPUIFJOTQFDUPS ,VTPNPUPIBE

66 Under the Facade of Benevolence


worked vigorously to haul snow out of the prison yard to allow for recreation,
JOJUJBUFE DPVOTFMJOH QSPHSBNT  BOE LFQU UIF QSJTPOFST QSPEVDUJWF UISPVHI
XPSLJOWBSJPVTJOEVTUSJFTBOEPOBOBEKBDFOUGBSNUIBUIFIFMQFEEFWFMPQ35
ćFBEVMBUJPOGPS,VTPNPUPFYFNQMJĕFTUIFTQJSJUPGQSPHSFTTJWFTUZMFSFGPSN
QSPNPUFE CZ "NFSJDBO PďDJBMT BOE UIFJS CFMJFG JO UIF DBQBDJUZ PG UIF QFOBM
TZTUFNUPSFIBCJMJUBUFJONBUFTBOENPMEUIFNJOUPQSPEVDUJWFDJUJ[FOT
The Fuchu prison outside Tokyo, whose warden had been injured in the
BUPNJDCMBTU XBTIFSBMEFEBTBOPUIFSNPEFMPGSFGPSN1PJOUJOHUPEFDMJOJOH
UVCFSDVMPTJTSBUFT BTRVFBLZDMFBONFTTIBMM BOEUIFNBOVGBDUVSFCZQSJTPOFST
of pins, bike parts, cigarette lighters, and locks, a laudatory article in Japan News
QSPDMBJNFE 'VDIV iBO JOTUJUVUJPO PG XIJDI BOZ DPVOUSZ DPVME CF KVTUJĕBCMZ
QSPVE#ZOPTUSFUDIPGJNBHJOBUJPODPVMEUIFQSJTPOCFEFTDSJCFEBTDPNGPSU-
BCMF ZFUUIFDPOEJUJPOTVOEFSXIJDIQSJTPOFSTMJWFDPVMEIBSEMZCFJNQSPWFE
XIJMFTUJMMLFFQJOHJUBQMBDFPGQVOJTINFOUćFBUNPTQIFSFJTUIBUPGBNPEFSO
GBDUPSZJOXIJDIUIFXPSLFSTBSFHFUUJOHBGBJSEFBMGSPNNBOBHFNFOUw36
#FOFBUIUIFSBEBSPG4$"1TQVCMJDSFMBUJPOTNBDIJOF IPXFWFS QSPCMFNT
MVSLFE"GPSNFSHVBSEBUUIFQSJTPO .VSBJ,B[VP DPNQMBJOFEBCPVUJMMFHBM
GPPEEJTUSJCVUJPO UIFBQQSPQSJBUJPOPGHPWFSONFOUTVQQMJFTCZHVBSETGPSQFS-
TPOBMVTF BOEUIFDSVFMUZPGUIFDIJFGKBJMFS XIPESPWFBUMFBTUPOFJONBUFUP
IBOHIJNTFMG"QSJTPOFSIFJOUFSWJFXFETUBUFE i*UTFFNTBTJGXFIBWFDPNFUP
UIFQSJTPOOPUUPCFHJWFONPSBMUSBJOJOHCVUUPTUVEZIPXXFDBOSBUJPOBMJ[F
UIFNFUIPETPGSPCCJOHUIFQSJTPOFSTw37
ćFTFDPNNFOUTQPJOUUPUIFQFSTJTUFODFPGTFSJPVTBCVTFTJOFWFOUIFCFTU
of Japan’s prisons, which PSD officials tried to keep under wraps. Inspection
SFQPSUTEFUBJMDPOUJOVFEQPPSTBOJUBUJPOBOENFEJDBMDBSFBTXFMMBTPWFSDSPXE-
JOHJONBOZGBDJMJUJFT XIJDI-FXJTTUFBNXBTVOBCMFUPDVSC PXJOHJOQBSUUP
DVMUVSBMBOEMPHJTUJDBMCBSSJFSTBTXFMMBTJOEJČFSFODFPOUIFQBSUPGUIF"NFSJ-
DBOTTUFNNJOHGSPNUIFSBDJBMJ[FECFMJFGUIBU+BQBOFTFEJEOPUWBMVFUIFiXPSUI
PGUIFJOEJWJEVBMw*O)VFOP XIFSFNFBMTXFSFQSPWJEFECZBMPDBMSFTUBVSBOU
CVU POMZ JG JONBUFT DPVME QBZ  -JFVUFOBOU $PMPOFM 3PCFSU ' .BMCVSH  B -PT
"OHFMFTQPMJDFPďDFSXIPXPVMEHPPOUPCFDPNFQPMJDFDIJFGJO-BT7FHBT 
SFQPSUFEUIBUĕęFFOZFBSPMETXFSFJODBSDFSBUFEXJUIBEVMUTJOBiEJSUZTUJOLJOH
DPOEJUJPOPGTMPWFOMJOFTTXJUIUIFDFMMTPTNBMMUIBUBMM<JODMVEJOHTFNJOBLFE
XPNFO>IBEUPTMFFQCPEZUPCPEZJOBTUJĘJOHIFBUwćF)JSPTIJNBQSJTPO
NFBOXIJMFXBTOFWFSQSPQFSMZSFCVJMUBęFSCFJOHSBWBHFECZUIFBUPNJDCPNC
Lieutenant George Cornelius reported that rats pervaded the facility and that
JONBUFTDPVMEXBTIUIFJSVOEFSXFBSPOMZPODFFWFSZUFOEBZT38
*O"QSJMŴżŷż 14%DIJFG)&1VMMJBNFYQSFTTFEDPODFSOUP-FXJTBCPVUUIF
QPPSNPSBMFBOEFTQSJUEFDPSQTBNPOHUIFQSJTPOCSBODIBOEDPNQMBJOFEUIBU
“the stars” were not pulling together, notably Fitzgibbon and McCorkle.39 The
iSFWFSTFDPVSTFwBOEIBSEFOJOHBOUJDPNNVOJTUTFOUJNFOUTXFSFMFBEJOHUPB
HFOFSBMTIJęBXBZGSPNUIFHPBMPGSFIBCJMJUBUJPO4UBSUJOHJOŴżŷż SFQPSUTTIPX

Policing in Occupied Japan 67


JODSFBTFEEFUFOUJPOPGDPNNVOJTUTBOEPUIFSTPDJBMiBHJUBUPSTwEVFUPQPMJDF
SPVOEVQTćFQSPCMFNPGPWFSDSPXEJOH DBVTFEJOQBSUCZIJHIDSJNFSBUFT 
CFDBNFNPSFBDVUF BOETVTQFDUTXFSFIFMEGPSMFOHUIZQFSJPETXJUIPVUUSJBM
*ONBUFTEFTJHOBUFEBTiDPNNJFTwXFSFTFHSFHBUFEBOEUSFBUFEJOBEFIVNBO-
J[JOHBOEBCVTJWFXBZ.BOZXFSFQVUJOTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOUGPSMPOHQFSJ-
ods for causing “disturbances” and “ranting about their rights.” Following the
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TVTQFDU B MBX CPPL BOE VSHJOH IJN UP EFNBOE B MFHBM IFBSJOH UP DMBSJGZ UIF
reasons for his arrest.40
"ęFS UIF SFTJHOBUJPO PG .D$PSLMF  BO BEWPDBUF PG FEVDBUJPO QSPHSBNT
and group therapy, the PSD brought in Alfred Dowd, warden of the Indiana
TUBUFQSJTPOJO.JDIJHBO$JUZ XIPXBTLOPXOGPSCFJOHiUPVHIBOETRVBSFw
BOEGPSIJTFYQFSUJTFJOQSFWFOUJOHBOERVFMMJOHQSJTPOSJPUT41 A supporter of
DBQJUBMQVOJTINFOU %PXEDBMMFEGPSBTFQBSBUFQFOBMGBDJMJUZBU)PLLBJEPGPS
iNBMDPOUFOUT wXSJUJOHUP1VMMJBNJO'FCSVBSZŴżŷż i*BQQSFDJBUFUIBUOPPOF
wants publicity of an unfavorable nature but this is the kind of situation call-
JOHGPSTUSPOH<BOESFBMJTUJD>NFBTVSFTw)FBEEFEUIBUTPNFQSJTPOFSTXFSFBT
iTUVCCPSOBTNVMFTwXIPPOMZVOEFSTUBOEBiQJTTFMNDMVCCFUXFFOUIFFZFTw
Although, he conceded, the “general trend nowadays is to conduct prisons in a
IVNBOFGBTIJPO UIFSFDPNFTBUJNFXIFOQBUJFODFDFBTFTUPCFBWJSUVFw42
ćFTFSFNBSLTFNCPEZUIFNJOETFU TJNJMBSUPUIBUPGMBXBOEPSEFSIBXLT
JO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT  VOEFSQJOOJOH UIF SFUSFODINFOU PG SFGPSN #FDBVTF PG
UIFQFSDFJWFEUISFBUPGDPNNVOJTN %PXEBOEIJTDPMMFBHVFTBCBOEPOFEUIF
FNQIBTJTPODJWJMMJCFSUJFT XIJDIXBTMJHIUBUUJNFTUPCFHJOXJUIćJTSFTVMUFE
in greater guard brutality and the restoration of a repressive penal order as real-
QPMJUJLUSJVNQIFEPWFSQSPHSFTTJWFJEFBMJTN43

Going after the Reds: The “Reverse Course” and Revival of the
Tokkô Spirit?

(FPSHF',FOOBO UIFBSDIJUFDUPGUIFDPOUBJONFOUEPDUSJOF XBTBLFZĕHVSF


TQFBSIFBEJOHUIFiSFWFSTFDPVSTFw)FBSHVFEUIBUQPMJDFBOEQSJTPOSFGPSNT
went too far in weakening the state’s ability to control the population and
DSJUJDJ[FEUIFQVSHJOHPGiXBSDSJNJOBMTwBOEUIFBEPQUJPOPGiMFOJFOUQPMJDJFTw
UPXBSEUIF+BQBOFTFDPNNVOJTUT XIP BTIFXSPUFJOIJTNFNPJST XFSFiCFJOH
HJWFOBGSFFĕFMEGPSQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUZBOEXFSFJODSFBTJOHUIFJSTUSFOHUISBQJEMZw
ćFMBDLPGBOFČFDUJWFDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFGPSDF BSNZ BOENBSJUJNFQPMJDFJO
IJTWJFXDSFBUFEBiTFUVQ‫ڀڀ‬GBWPSBCMF‫ڀڀ‬GPSBDPNNVOJTUUBLFPWFSw44
,FOOBOT DPVOUFSQBSUT JO UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU QSPDMBJNFE UIF OFFE UP
achieve a balance capable of avoiding “the excesses of the pre-surrender Japa-
OFTF QPMJDF TZTUFNw BOE iZFU OPU MFBWF UIF QPMJDF JNQPUFOU UP FYFDVUF UIFJS
responsibility for public order and safety.” They feared that new laws were

68 Under the Facade of Benevolence


iTXJOHJOHUIFQFOEVMVNUPUIFPUIFSFYUSFNF wSFTVMUJOHJOUIFOFFEGPSSFWJ-
TJPOTUPiTUSFOHUIFOBOEOPUXFBLFOUIF+BQBOFTFQPMJDF wXIJMFBMMPXJOHUIFN
UPiNBJOUBJOQVCMJDQFBDFBOEPSEFSXJUIPVUJOGSJOHJOHVQPODJWJMMJCFSUJFTw45
1SJNF.JOJTUFS4IJHFSV:PTIJEB ŴżŷŻoŴżŸŷ BGPSNFSBNCBTTBEPSUP3PNF
BOEQSPQPOFOUPGFYQBOTJPOJO$IJOB DPNQMBJOFEUIBUQPMJDFEFDFOUSBMJ[BUJPO
QSFWFOUFEFČFDUJWFBDUJPOBHBJOTUiDPNNVOJTUTJOTNBMMUPXOTBOEWJMMBHFTXIP
UPPLQPTTFTTJPOPGQPMJDFTUBUJPOTBOEPDDVQJFENVOJDJQBMPďDFT‫ڀڀ‬4USJLFST
PDDVQJFEGBDUPSJFTJOUIFTBNFXBZBOECFHBOPQFSBUJOHUIFNGPSUIFJSPXO
QSPĕUćFQPMJDFIBEJOUSVUIDFBTFEUPNFBONVDIw46*O5BJSB JO'VLVTIJNB
QSFGFDUVSF BęFSUIFĕSJOHPGŴŷŶNFNCFSTPGUIF$PBM.JOF8PSLFST6OJPO 
JODMVEJOH UIF DIBJSNBO BOE WJDF DIBJSNBO  XIP CFMPOHFE UP UIF $PNNV-
OJTU1BSUZ BNPCPDDVQJFEQPMJDFIFBERVBSUFSTGPSFJHIUIPVSTBOEIVOHSFE
CBOOFSTGSPNUIFCVJMEJOHćFTDIPMBS$IBMNFST+PIOTPODIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIJT
incident as “the closest thing to actual insurrection that occurred in Japan in
Ŵżŷżw *U EFNPOTUSBUFE UIBU UIF iEVBM QPMJDF TZTUFN XBT JODBQBCMF PG DPQJOH
XJUI PSHBOJ[FE TVCWFSTJWF FMFNFOUT w BT SJHIUJTU DJUJ[FOT PSHBOJ[FE B CPEZ PG
1,300 vigilantes.47
'FBSJOHUIFEBXOPGSFWPMVUJPO :PTIJEBQSPQPTFEBSFWJTJPOPGQPMJDFMBXT
QMBDJOHUIFQPMJDFCBDLVOEFSDFOUSBMHPWFSONFOUDPOUSPM4PDJBMJTUTJOQBSMJB-
NFOUGFSWFOUMZPQQPTFEUIFJEFB XIJDIUIFZTBXBTBTUFQUPXBSESFWJWJOHBOUJ-
EFNPDSBUJDQSBDUJDFT48.BOZPGUIFQVCMJDGFMUTJNJMBSMZ*OTQJUFPGUIFFNCSBDF
of defeat by a war-weary population, Japan was rife with protest throughout
UIFQPTUXBSPDDVQBUJPO PXJOHMBSHFMZUPUIFTPDJBMBOEFDPOPNJDEJTMPDBUJPO
and poverty gripping the country. Tokyo and other cities had been reduced to
SVCCMF CZ "NFSJDBO CPNCJOH  XIJDI DSJQQMFE UIF FDPOPNJD JOGSBTUSVDUVSF
$PSSVQUJPOBOEHSBęBNPOHBVUIPSJUJFTBOEUIFTJQIPOJOHPČPGSFMJFGBJEPO
UIF CMBDL NBSLFU POMZ NBEF UIJOHT XPSTF49 Police records refer to constant
TUSJLFTBOEEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBNPOHXPSLFST QFBTBOUT BOETUVEFOUT XIPDBMMFE
GPSMBSHFSGPPEBMMPDBUJPOT XBHFJODSFBTFT KPCDSFBUJPOQSPHSBNT QVOJTINFOU
PGXBSDSJNJOBMT UIFSFTJHOBUJPOPGUIF:PTIJEBHPWFSONFOU BOEBOFOEUPUIF
occupation.50
ćFMBCPSNPWFNFOU XIJDIJOUIFXPSETPGUIF"NFSJDBOKPVSOBMJTU3PC-
FSU5FYUPSIBEBiSFDPSEGPSPSEFSMZCFIBWJPSUIBUXPVMEQVUUPTIBNFTJNJMBS
NPWFNFOUTJOUIFIJTUPSZPGNBOZBAEFNPDSBUJD8FTUFSODPVOUSZ JODMVEJOH
our own,” was strong despite being subjected to surveillance, co-optation,
BOEIBSBTTNFOUCZQPMJDFDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFVOJUT FWFOUVBMMZDBVTJOHVOJPO
NFNCFSTIJQUPEFDMJOF 51ćF+$1PSHBOJ[FENBTTEFNPOTUSBUJPOTJO5PLZP
and other big cities during May Day celebrations and on the anniversary of VJ
%BZ.FNCFSTIJQQFBLFEJOTQSJOHŴżŷż GPMMPXJOHUIFJNQPTJUJPOPGFDPOPNJD
BVTUFSJUZNFBTVSFTSFDPNNFOEFECZUIF%FUSPJUCBOLFS+PTFQI%PEHFUPDVU
EPXOPOJOĘBUJPO&OEPSTFECZUIF8BMM4USFFUoDPOOFDUFE+BQBOMPCCZ XIJDI
TPVHIUUPLFFQUIF'BS&BTUPQFOUP"NFSJDBOHPPETBOEJOWFTUNFOU UIF%PEHF

Policing in Occupied Japan 69


SFGPSNTSFTVMUFEJONBTTMBZPČTBOEXBHFSFEVDUJPOT DVSUBJMNFOUPGXPSLFST
rights to strike and to bargain collectively, an increase in food costs because of
UIFSFEVDUJPOPGHPWFSONFOUTVCTJEJFT BOEUIFDVUUJOHPGWJUBMTPDJBMTFSWJDFT
Theodore Cohen of SCAP tellingly described the new policies as having been
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%FTQJUF"NFSJDBODMBJNTUIBUJUXBT3VTTJBOEPNJOBUFEBOEBiDPOTQJSBDZ
GSPN XJUIJO w UIF +$1 XPSLFE JOEFQFOEFOUMZ PG UIF 4PWJFU $PNJOUFSO BOE
FNCSBDFE OPOWJPMFOU NFBOT PG QSPUFTU JO DIBMMFOHJOH FDPOPNJD JOKVTUJDFT
BOEUIFQPMJUJDBMTUBUVTRVP-FBEFSTTVDIBT/PTBLB4BO[ʪ 0LBOP4VTVNV 
,ZʷJDIJ5PLVEB BOE:PTIJP4IJHBXFSFTLJMMFEPSHBOJ[FSTXIPIBECFFOFYJMFE
PSJNQSJTPOFEEVSJOH8PSME8BS**GPSUIFJSQBDJĕTN8JOOJOHUIJSUZĕWF%JFU
TFBUTJOUIF+BOVBSZŴżŷżFMFDUJPOT UIF+$1MFHJTMBUPSTXFSFQBSMJBNFOUBSJBOT
PQQPTFEUPUIFSFJOTUBMMBUJPOPGUIFFNQFSPS XIPNUIFZWJFXFEBTBXBSDSJNJ-
nal and despot. They sought a united front with the Socialist Party, pursuing
B iEFNPDSBUJD SFWPMVUJPOw XJUIJO B DBQJUBMJTU GSBNFXPSL  JODMVEJOH XPSLFST
DPOUSPMPGGBDUPSJFTćFZDBMMFEGPSUIFEFTUSVDUJPOOPUPGDBQJUBMJTNQFSTFCVU
SBUIFSPGUIFTZTUFNPGiNPOPQPMJTUJDDBQJUBMJTNwEPNJOBUFECZUIF;BJCBUTV 
PSDPSQPSBUFDMJRVF XIJDICFDBNFFOUSFODIFEBTBSFTVMUPGUIF%PEHFSFGPSNT
and the “reverse course.”53
"T)FOSZ0JOBT,VLLPOFOEPDVNFOUT "NFSJDBOQPMJDZUPXBSEVOSFTUJO
+BQBODIBOHFEGSPNPOFPGHSVEHJOHUPMFSBUJPOJOŴżŷŸUPJODSFBTJOHTVTQJDJPO
in 1946 to outright hostility and repression by the end of the decade. In May
ŴżŷŹ .BD"SUIVSJTTVFEBXBSOJOHBHBJOTUUIFiHSPXJOHBOEEBOHFSPVTNPWF-
NFOUUPXBSETPSHBOJ[FEHSPVQWJPMFODF wBOEDIBSBDUFSJ[FEQVCMJDEFNPOTUSB-
UJPOT BT B iNFOBDF UP UIF TFDVSJUZ PG UIF PDDVQBUJPOw "U UIF TBNF UJNF UIBU
XBSDSJNJOBMTXFSFCFJOHSFTUPSFEUPQPTJUJPOTPGQSPNJOFODF IFQSFTTFEGPS
UIFCBOOJOHPGDPNNVOJTUMJUFSBUVSFBOEUIFFYQVMTJPOPGDPNNVOJTUTGSPN
VOJWFSTJUJFT BOEFOBDUFEFEVDBUJPOBMSFGPSNTUPFOTVSFUIBUDPNNVOJTNXBT
QPSUSBZFEJOUIFDMBTTSPPNBTUIFFRVJWBMFOUPGGBTDJTN54
0O"QSJMŷ Ŵżŷż JOSFTQPOTFUPUIF+$1TFMFDUPSBMHBJOT NPVOUJOHQSPUFTU
BHBJOTUUIF%PEHFSFGPSNT BOEJTPMBUFEBDUTPGJOEVTUSJBMTBCPUBHF XIJDIHPW-
FSONFOUBVUIPSJUJFTUSJFEUPMJOLUPBDPPSEJOBUFEQMPU .BD"SUIVSFYUFOEFE
*NQFSJBM0SEJOBODFŴųŴ QSPWJEJOHBMFHBMCBTJTGPSUIFTVSWFJMMBODFBOEJOWFT-
UJHBUJPO PG DPNNVOJTUT  FOBCMJOH QPMJDF UP HBJO B iUIPSPVHI BOE JOUJNBUF
LOPXMFEHFPGQBSUZBDUJWJUJFTw0WFSUXFOUZUIPVTBOEDPNNVOJTUTBOEiGFMMPX
USBWFMFSTwMPTUUIFJSKPCT JODMVEJOHBOVNCFSPGQPMJDF XIPXFSFGPSDFEUPUBLF
MPZBMUZ PBUIT +$1 MFBEFST XFSF UISVTU iVOEFSHSPVOE w JNQSJTPOFE  PS FYJMFE 
UIFJSIPNFTTVCKFDUFEUPQSFEBXOSBJET1SJNF.JOJTUFS:PTIJEBIFMQFEQBTT
a “subversive activities prevention law” and created an organization under the
BUUPSOFZHFOFSBMUPFOGPSDFMFHJTMBUJPOBHBJOTUDPNNVOJTUTBOEBTTVNFDPOUSPM
of the police in the event of a revolutionary insurrection.55
ćFiMPTTPG$IJOBwBOEUIFPVUCSFBLPGUIF,PSFBO8BSJOŴżŸųJOUFOTJĕFE

70 Under the Facade of Benevolence


GFBSTBCPVUUIFXBOJOHPG"NFSJDBOIFHFNPOZBOECPMTUFSFEUIFNPWFNFOU
toward expanded police authority. MacArthur told the Nippon Times that “the
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UIFQMBOOJOHPGMBXMFTTNJOPSJUJFTBSFćFBVHNFOUBUJPOPGQPMJDFTUSFOHUIJT
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XBSOFEPGUIFOFFEUPQBZBUUFOUJPOUPUIFiTMJQQJOHPGSJHIUJTUTBNPOHUIFN
who have a hallucination to take the current international situation for the
revival of a past golden age.”56ćFTFDPNNFOUTDPOWFZ.BD"SUIVSTEFTJSFUP
JOUJNJEBUFUIF+$1 XIJDIIFDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTUIFiTBUFMMJUFPGBOJOUFSOBUJPOBM
QSFEBUPSZ GPSDF w XJUIPVU HJWJOH UIF JNQSFTTJPO UIBU IF XBT BDDPNNPEBUJOH
SJHIUXJOH VMUSBOBUJPOBMJTUT /FWFSUIFMFTT  IF XBT DPNNJUUFE UP VTJOH UIF
QPMJDFUPDSBDLEPXOPONBOZPGUIFTBNFGPSDFTUIBUPQQPTFENJMJUBSZSVMFBOE
TVQQPSUFENBOZPGUIFTBNFUBDUJDT
The PSD worked increasingly to enhance police surveillance and espionage
DBQBCJMJUJFT XIJDI.VMCBSBOE&OHMFXFSFXFMMFRVJQQFEUPEP8JUIDPMMFBHVFT
such as Arthur M. Thurston, an FBI agent with the national defense division
who had headed the OSS counterespionage branch in China during World
8BS **  BOE -JFVUFOBOU -FF &DIPMT  B iEZOBNJD  FYUSPWFSUFE FHPUJTU w BDDPSE-
JOHUPIJT044QFSTPOBMJUZTLFUDI iQPTTFTTJOHGFBSMFTTDPVSBHFBOETUBNJOBCVU
WFSZMJUUMFJOUFMMFDUVBMBCJMJUZwUIFZQSPWJEFEFMFDUSPOJDCVHHJOHFRVJQNFOUBOE
TPVOESFDPSEJOH NBDIJOFT ĕSTU EFWFMPQFE CZ B $IJDBHP TDJFOUJTU JO ŴżŶŹ GPS
eavesdropping. They also assisted the special investigations bureau headed by
GPSNFS5PLLÙPďDFS.JUTVTBEB:PTIJLBXBJODVMUJWBUJOHJOGPSNBOUTBOEDPN-
QJMJOHEBUBCBOLTPOiDPNNVOJTUBHJUBUPSTwBOEiTVCWFSTJWFTw57 Orrin DeFor-
est, a CIA counterintelligence specialist and national police liaison who later
TPVHIUUPBQQMZ+BQBOFTFQSPDFEVSFJO7JFUOBN XSPUFJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUUIF
+BQBOFTFXFSFiGBOBUJDDPMMFDUPSTPGJOGPSNBUJPO BMXBZTFYFSUJOHUIFNTFMWFTUP
BDIJFWFBDPNQSFIFOTJWFVOEFSTUBOEJOHPGBQFSTPOBOEIJTBDUJWJUJFTCFGPSF
NBLJOHBOZPWFSUNPWFTBHBJOTUIJN‫ڀڀ‬ćFJSHPBMXBTOPUIJOHMFTTUIBOUPUBM
knowledge.”58
ćFTFDPNNFOUTSBJTFRVFTUJPOTBCPVUXIPXBTBEWJTJOHXIPNBOEQPJOU
UPUIFTUSJWJOHPG"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTGPSUPUBMJOGPSNBUJPODPOUSPM XIJDIXBT
BQQMJFEJOMBUFSJOUFSWFOUJPOT BOEBUIPNFVOEFSUIF'#*T$0*/5&-130 "
Z Special Unit attached to the PSD’s Special Operations Branch kidnapped left-
XJOHEJTTJEFOUT TVDIBTUIFDPNNVOJTUJOUFMMFDUVBM8BUBSV,BKJ XIPIBECFFO
JOWPMWFEJOFČPSUTUPSFFEVDBUF+BQBOFTF*NQFSJBM"SNZ108TJO$IJOB BOE
plotted secret operations against North Korea and possibly the Soviet Union.
'SPN0LJOBXB XIFSFPOFPGUIFBENJOJTUSBUPST 1BVM)4LVTF MBUFSSFDSVJUFE
)NPOH USJCBM MFBEFST GPS UIF $*" JO -BPT  TPNF EFUBJOFE DPNNVOJTUT XFSF
TIJQQFEUP#PMJWJB"UUIFCFIFTUPG$IBSMFT8JMMPVHICZ XIPSFDSVJUFE*NQF-
SJBM"SNZHFOFSBMTMBUFSMJOLFEUPBŴżŸŵDPVQQMPUJOUP(ŵTIJTUPSJDBMCSBODI 
police spied on SCAP officials and Japanese politicians suspected of having

Policing in Occupied Japan 71


DPNNVOJTUTZNQBUIJFT DPNQJMJOHWPMVNJOPVTEPTTJFSTUPCFVTFEGPSQPUFO-
UJBMCMBDLNBJMJOHQVSQPTFTćFEPTTJFSTMBUFSCFDBNFUIFCBTJTGPSTFOTBUJPOBM
NFEJBFYQPTÏTPOUIFOJHIUMJGFPGIJHIQMBDFEPDDVQBUJPOPďDJBMT59
Foreshadowing the CIA’s legacy of ashes, counterintelligence operations
XFSFNBSSFECZDPOTJEFSBCMFJOFQUJUVEF"TPOFBHFOUTUBUFEi8FXFSFTVQ-
QPSUJOHFWFSZSJHIUXJOHKFSLXIPDBNFBMPOH*UXBTTPDIBPUJD‫ڀڀ‬UIBU"NFSJ-
DBOBHFOUTXFSFTUVNCMJOHPWFSFBDIPUIFS'JWFEJČFSFOUHVZTXFSFSVOOJOH
POF+BQBOFTFBOEUIF+BQBOFTFXFSFDPMMFDUJOHNPOFZGSPNFBDIPGUIFN.PTU
PGUIFN<+BQBOFTFSJHIUJTUT>IBEUIFJSPXOBHFOEBTBOZXBZT*UXBTIBSEUPTBZ
who was running who.”60
*O+VOFŴżŷź JOPOFPGJUTNBKPSTVDDFTTFT 8JMMPVHICZTTUBČMFBLFETFDSFU
JOGPSNBUJPOUIBUIJHISBOLJOHPďDJBMTIBEUBLFOCSJCFTGSPN4IPXB%FOLB 
+BQBOTMBSHFTUNBOVGBDUVSFSPGGFSUJMJ[FS JOSFUVSOGPSDIBOOFMJOH3FDPOTUSVD-
UJPO'JOBODF#BOLGVOETJOUPDPNQBOZDPČFSTćFTDBOEBMJNQMJDBUFE1SJNF
.JOJTUFS )JUPTIJ "TIJEB BOE LFZ NFNCFST PG IJT DPBMJUJPO PG %FNPDSBUJD 
Socialist, and People’s Cooperative parties, helping to precipitate the downfall
PGUIFHPWFSONFOU UIFMBTUJOXIJDITPDJBMJTUTXPVMEQBSUJDJQBUFGPSPWFSGPVS
decades.61
#FTJEFTTVSWFJMMBODFBOETQZPQT BDFOUSBMGPDVTPG"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJO-
JOHXBTSJPUDPOUSPMVTJOHUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBTUBOEBSEPGĕTUTBOEDMVCTSBUIFS
UIBOĕSFBSNTTPBTUPMFTTFODBTVBMUJFTBOEBWPJECBEQVCMJDJUZ*OBOJOĘVFO-
tial 1937 article which provided a blueprint for the Public Safety Division and
MBUFSUIF0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ -FXJT7BMFOUJOFXSPUFUIBUiCSVUBMNFBTVSFT
‫ڀڀ‬UFOEUPGVSUIFSJOUFOTJGZBOBMSFBEZTFSJPVTTJUVBUJPOCZTPNFUJNFTNBL-
JOHNBSUZSTPGQSPGFTTJPOBMBHJUBUPSTBOEUSPVCMFNBLFSTw62 Paradoxically, the
PSD supplied police with tear gas, a weapon developed during World War I to
clear crowds, which causes burning in the eyes, dizziness, and nausea. It was
ĕSTUXJEFMZVTFEJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJOŴżŶŵCZQPMJDFBOEBSNZVOJUTIFBEFE
CZ%PVHMBT.BD"SUIVSJOTVQQSFTTJOHUIF#POVT"SNZNBSDIFST DBVTJOHUIF
asphyxiation death of two children and partial blinding of an eight-year-old
CPZ*UCFDBNFUIFSFBęFSBTUBQMFPGFČPSUTUPCSFBLVQEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBOEPG
UIFHMPCBMQPMJDFQSPHSBNT63 The PSD set another precedent by providing riot
DPOUSPMQVNQTIPUHVOTDBQBCMFPGQFOFUSBUJOHBUISFFRVBSUFSJODIQJOFCPBSE
GSPN TJYUZ ZBSET BXBZ 4$"1 BVUIPSJUJFT JOWPLFE UIF DMFBS BOE QSFTFOU EBO-
ger rule in the U.S. Constitution to argue that liberties are not absolute under
UIF'JSTU"NFOENFOUCVUTVCKFDUUPMJNJUFESFTUSBJOUBNJEUISFBUTUPOBUJPOBM
security.64
%VSJOH UIF TVQQSFTTJPO PG ŴżŸŵ .BZ %BZ EFNPOTUSBUJPOT  QPMJDF BUUBDLFE
BDSPXEXJUIUFBSHBTBOEQJTUPMTBOECFBUIVOESFETPGQFPQMFBTUIFZĘFE"
VOJWFSTJUZTUVEFOUBOEBNVOJDJQBMFNQMPZFFXFSFLJMMFE BOENPSFUIBOŵ Ŷųų
QFPQMFXFSFJOKVSFE&OHMFDMBJNFEJOBŴżźŹJOUFSWJFXUIBUUIFTDPQFPGWJP-
lence would have been even worse if the tactics of the World War II era had

72 Under the Facade of Benevolence


CFFOFNQMPZFE*OIJTWJFX "NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHIBEiQBJEPČBOEBUISFBUUP
JOUFSOBMPSEFSXBTSJHIUFEXJUIUIFNJOJNBMBNPVOUPGDBTVBMUJFT wEFNPOTUSBU-
JOHUIFJNQPSUBODFPGUIFQPMJDFUPJOUFSOBMEFGFOTF65 This is the idea he would
QSPNPUFBTIFBEPGUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNBOE014 XIJDIFWPMWFEJOUIFTBNF
TQJSJUBTUIFQSPHSBNTJO+BQBOBOECVJMUPONBOZPGUIFJSJOJUJBUJWFT
+BQBOFTFQPMJDFXFSFGBSGSPNBNPEFMPGFďDJFODZ IPXFWFSćF.BUTVLBXB
incident, involving a case of railway sabotage in Taira in which three people
XFSFLJMMFE UVSOFEBOBUJPOBMTQPUMJHIUPOUIFJSPęFOTMJQTIPENFUIPET*OB
DBTFFRVJWBMFOUUPUIF3PTFOCFSHBOE)JTTDBTFTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT UXFOUZ
MPDBMDPNNVOJTUTXFSFDIBSHFEXJUIBDPOTQJSBDZUPEFSBJMBUSBJOJOSFTQPOTF
UPUIFĕSJOHPGXPSLFSTVOEFSUIF%PEHFSFGPSNT*OUIFDPVSTFPGUIFJOWFTUJHB-
UJPO QPMJDFSFQFBUFEMZNJTIBOEMFEFWJEFODF LFQUTIPEEZSFDPSET BOEGPSDFE
DPOGFTTJPOTPVUPGUIFEFGFOEBOUT XIPXFSFBMMFWFOUVBMMZBDRVJUUFE4QFDVMB-
UJPOBCPVOETBTUPXIFUIFSUIFZXFSFGSBNFEBTBNFBOTPGEJTDSFEJUJOHUIF
JCP.66
0WFSBMM UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTFYBDFSCBUFEIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTCZQSP-
viding advanced surveillance and crowd control technologies and instilling
B GFSWFOU BOUJDPNNVOJTN UIBU CSFE JOUPMFSBODF UPXBSE EJTTFOU PG BOZ LJOE
Under PSD oversight, police attacked youths protesting the dropping of the
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DBNQBJHOFEGPSUIFQFBDFGVMVTFPGBUPNJDFOFSHZ TQJFEPOTUVEFOUTJO,PSFBO
TDIPPMTDPOTJEFSFECSFFEJOHHSPVOETGPSDPNNVOJTN BOESBJEFEVOJWFSTJUZ
DBNQVTFT67 As Robert Textor described it: “Groups of cops pounce down upon
TPNF IPMFJOUIFXBMM  TIPWF UIF LJET BSPVOE XJUI OJHIUTUJDLT  TUVČ UIFJS
<QPMJDF>USVDLTXJUIQBSUZMJUFSBUVSF QBNQIMFUT FUD IBVMBGFXLJETUPKBJMćJT
JTFNCBSSBTTJOHUPUIFPDDVQBUJPOXIPDBOUHJWFUIFQPMJDF)FMMGPSEPJOHJO
UIFJSPXOXBZXIBU<(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST>XBOUTEPOFJOJUTPXOXBZw68
&YFNQMJGZJOHUIFXJEFTDBMFPGCSVUBMJUZ ćFPEPSF$PIFO DIJFGPG4$"1T
MBCPSEJWJTJPOBOEIJNTFMGBUBSHFUPG(ŵTVSWFJMMBODF PCTFSWFEXPSLFSTGSPN
Japan’s third-largest newspaper, Yomiuri Shinbun, being subjected to “unneces-
TBSJMZIBSTIUSFBUNFOU‫ڀڀ‬IFMEJODPNNVOJDBEPGPSBXFFL POFIBEBCBEDIFTU
CSVJTFBOEOPXUIFZIBETIPXOVQNBOBDMFEMJLFBDIBJOHBOHw14%BENJO-
JTUSBUPS1BVM)BSSJTPO BO'#*BHFOUGSPN-PT"OHFMFT SFQPSUFEUIBUXBSSBOUT
were often not issued. In Kyoto, police arrested speakers at an antifascist youth
rally and beat up participants trying to take their pictures. Borrowing a page
GSPNUIF'#*QMBZCPPL UIFNVOJDJQBMQPMJDFJO"TBIJHBXBFWFOIJSFEBQSP-
GFTTJPOBMCVSHMBSJOBOBUUFNQUUPPCUBJOFWJEFODFBHBJOTUB+$1NFNCFSXIP
BMMFHFEMZNBEFBOUJPDDVQBUJPOSFNBSLT69
To protest police brutality, prisoners conducted hunger strikes, and young
+$1 BEIFSFOUT CFHBO UISPXJOH .PMPUPW DPDLUBJM CPNCT BU QPMJDF CPYFT BOE
PSHBOJ[FEiBDUJWJTUVOJUTwJOTFMFDUNPVOUBJOWJMMBHFTUIBUDPVMECFEFWFMPQFE
JOUPHVFSSJMMBCBTFTBMPOHUIF$IJOFTF:FOOBONPEFM70 In Tokyo, after police

Policing in Occupied Japan 73


IBSBTTFEMBCPSMFBEFST CFBUEFNPOTUSBUPST BOENJTUSFBUFEUIFNJOEFUFOUJPO 
UIFWJDUJNTQSPDMBJNFEi8FBSFIVNBOCFJOHTBOEOPUEPHT*T<sic>OPUTVDI
BDUTPGWJPMFODFVOEFNPDSBUJD w71"NFSJDBOPďDJBMTXFSFVONPWFE"ęFSUIF
BSSFTUPGUXFOUZOJOFMBCPSMFBEFSTGPSJOTUJHBUJOHBTUSJLFJO*LFHBNJ +PIOTPO
'.POSPF B14%DPNNVOJDBUJPOTTQFDJBMJTUXIPIBEIBOEMFEQVCMJDSFMBUJPOT
GPSUIF/BTIWJMMF1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU XSPUFUP)BSPME.VMCBSUIBUUIFQPMJDF
DIJFGIBECFFOiTUSJDUMZPOUIFCBMM wBEEJOH i*EMJLFUPNFFUIJNTPPOUPDPO-
HSBUVMBUFIJNPOUIFHPPEXPSLIFJTEPJOHw72 In this way the PSD supported
SFQSFTTJWFNFUIPET QBSUJDVMBSMZXIFOEJSFDUFEBHBJOTUUIPTFXIPXFSFXPSL-
JOHUPUSBOTGPSNUIFFYJTUJOHTPDJBMPSEFS
*OTQSJOHŴżŸŴ QBSUMZBTBNFBOTPGDSJQQMJOHBDIJFGTPVSDFPG+$1JODPNF 
QPMJDFDPOĕTDBUFEŴŵŸ ųųųDPQJFTPGUIFMFęJTUOFXTQBQFS Heiwa-no-kee for its
iTVCWFSTJWFw DPOUFOU BOE BSSFTUFE UFO FNQMPZFFT 1MBJODMPUIFT PďDFST SBJEFE
UIF IPNF PG UIF FEJUPS  TFJ[JOH NPSF BSUJDMFT TMBUFE GPS QVCMJDBUJPO73 Harold
.VMCBSVSHFEQPMJDFUPDPOEVDUUIFJSJOWFTUJHBUJPOTTNPPUIMZBOEUPiQBZTQF-
cial attention to persons going in and going out of the police stations where
UIFTVTQFDUTBSFFYBNJOFEMFTUUIFTFDSFUTCFMFBLFEPVUUPUIFPVUTJEFw74 These
DPNNFOUTSFWFBMUIF14%TPWFSTJHIUPGDMBOEFTUJOFJOUFSSPHBUJPOVOEFSUBLFO
in violation of constitutional statutes, which officials were careful to cover up.
5PNBLFSPPNGPSQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST &OHMFPWFSTBXDPOTUSVDUJPOPGQPMJDF
JOUFSSPHBUJPO GBDJMJUJFT XIFSF iUIJSE EFHSFFw NFUIPET EFDSJFE CZ EPNFTUJD
SFGPSNFSTXFSFSPVUJOFMZDBSSJFEPVU"DVTUPNBSZQSBDUJDFXBTUPGPSDFQSJT-
POFSTUPTJUDSPTTMFHHFEGPSEBZTJODPODSFUFDFMMTBOEQFSJPEJDBMMZCFBUUIFN
to force a confession. Journalists found evidence of police assaulting suspects
and breaking their legs. In the Ishikawa prefecture, a local paper reported that
BGPSUZZFBSPMEGBSNFSXBTBCEVDUFECZUIFSVSBMQPMJDFBOESFUVSOFEIPNF
several days later “half dead” after enduring barbarous beatings and torture.
"UPXFMUIBUIFDBSSJFEXBTTUBJOFEXJUICMPPE)FTVCTFRVFOUMZDPNNJUUFE
TVJDJEF*O4BJUBNBQSFGFDUVSF BUXFOUZFJHIUZFBSPMETVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTU
was kidnapped, strapped to a chair naked, choked with a belt, and beaten with
FMFDUSPTIPDL EFWJDFT ćF EPDUPS PG IJT WJMMBHF UPME IJN UIBU POMZ IJT TUSPOH
DPOTUJUVUJPOTBWFEIJTMJGF GPSiBOPSEJOBSZNBOXPVMEOPUIBWFTVSWJWFEw75
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TZNQBUIJFT CZ GPSDJOH IJN UP iDSBXM JOUP IJT DFMM MJLF B EPH PO BMM GPVST BOE
sit in a convoluted position for hours.” The journalist Takeo Takagi wrote in
the Nippon Times: “One could go on forever listing brutalities and injustices
of this kind. Many incidents go unreported out of fear of reprisal. The Tokkô
TQJSJUSFNBJOTWFSZNVDIBMJWFJODFSUBJORVBSUFSTPGUIFEFNPDSBUJ[FEQPMJDF
force.”76 ćF 14% CPSF TJHOJĕDBOU SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ GPS UIJT BCVTF  PXJOH UP JUT
BCBOEPONFOUPGUIFDJWJMMJCFSUJFTEJSFDUJWFBOEJUTSFNPCJMJ[BUJPOPGUIFQPMJDF
for political ends. Thus did the “reverse course” help to usher in a revival of
ESBDPOJBONFUIPETUIBUXFSFBSFNOBOUPG+BQBOTEBSLFTUIPVS

74 Under the Facade of Benevolence


“In Bed with Racketeers”: Police Corruption and the Failed
War on Narcotics

1PMJDFDPSSVQUJPO GVFMFEJOQBSUCZNFBHFSQBZ XBTBOPUIFSQSPCMFNUISPVHI-


PVUUIFPDDVQBUJPO1PTUXBSOPVWFBVYSJDIFTXJUIDSJNJOBMCBDLHSPVOETDPO-
TUSVDUFEEPSNJUPSJFTBOETUBUJPOTGPSUIFQPMJDFJOSFUVSOGPSJNNVOJUZGSPN
QSPTFDVUJPO*OTPNFDBTFT QPMJDFVTFEUIFJSBVUIPSJUZUPEFNBOEQSPUFDUJPO
GFFTGSPNMPDBMCVTJOFTTPXOFSTBOEUPDPNQFMUIFNUPWPUFGPSGBWPSFEDBO-
EJEBUFTJONVOJDJQBMPSOBUJPOBMFMFDUJPOT14%SFQPSUTQPJOUUPGSBVEXJUIJO
UIFQVCMJDTBGFUZDPNNJTTJPOTBOEUPQPMJDFCFJOHiJOCFEXJUISBDLFUFFSTwBOE
oyabunHBOHTUFSTXIPDPOUSPMMFEUIFCMBDLNBSLFUFDPOPNZ77
1FSJPEJD DSBDLEPXOT XFSF VOEFSNJOFE CZ ()2 (FOFSBM )FBERVBSUFST 
intelligence’s hiring of gangsters such as Hisayuki (“the Violent Bull”) Machii to
ĕHIUDPNNVOJTUTBOECSFBLMBCPSTUSJLFT%FTQJUFJOEJDUNFOUTGPSNBOTMBVHI-
ter (with his bare hands), extortion, and assault, the Korean-born Machii and
PUIFSNBĕBCPTTFTTVDIBT0[V,JOPTVLF i5PLZPT"M$BQPOF wOFWFSTFSWFE
BOZQSJTPOUJNFCFDBVTFPGUIFJSQPMJUJDBMDPOOFDUJPOTBOETVQQPSUGPSSJHIU
XJOHDBVTFTćF5PLZPDIJFGQSPTFDVUPSDPNNFOUFEi&WFSZUJNFXFUSJFEUP
HFUIJN<.BDIJJ XIPIFMQFE64EJQMPNBUTOPSNBMJ[F+BQBOFTFSFMBUJPOTXJUI
UIF3FQVCMJDPG,PSFB> XFXFSFBMXBZTQVMMFECBDL8FECSJOHIJNJO CVUFBDI
UJNFUIFSFXFSFQSFTTVSFTGSPNBCPWFBOEIFEXJOEVQCFJOHSFMFBTFEw78
SCAP’s double standards helped to perpetuate a tide of lawlessness and cor-
SVQUJPOJO+BQBOXIJDITVSWJWFEUIFPDDVQBUJPO*OPOFJODJEFOU HBOHNFN-
CFSTUSJFEUPJOUJNJEBUF+$1%JFUNFNCFS,BUTVNJ,JLVOBNJJOUPDBMMJOHPČ
a strike by slashing his forehead with a dagger.7964HPWFSONFOUPďDJBMTBOE
TPMEJFST XFSF UIFNTFMWFT JOWPMWFE JO DSJNJOBM FOUFSQSJTFT TVDI BT HBNCMJOH 
TMPUNBDIJOFTDBNT QSPTUJUVUJPO BOEUIFTBMFPGQJSBUFEHPPET GPSXIJDIUIFZ
were investigated though rarely punished.80 Further exposing the underside of
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FEJDUT*O,ZPUP PďDFSTFOUFSFEUIFIPNFTPGXPNFOTVTQFDUFEPGUSBOTNJUUJOH
WFOFSFBMEJTFBTFUP"NFSJDBOUSPPQTBUOJHIUXJUIPVUXBSSBOUT BOEJO5PLZP
UIFZTVCKFDUFEXPNFOBSSFTUFEPČUIFTUSFFUUPIVNJMJBUJOHHFOJUBMJOTQFDUJPOT
4PNFXFSFSBQFE81
*OMJOFXJUIUIFHSPXJOHJOUFSOBUJPOBMJ[BUJPOPG"NFSJDBODSJNJOBMKVTUJDF 
UIF14%NPCJMJ[FEQPMJDFUPQSFWFOUUIFEFBMJOHJOPQJBUFT QBSUJDVMBSMZOFBS
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IVOESFEZFO žŶ QFSWJBMUP(*TTFFLJOHBOFTDBQFGSPNUIFNPOPUPOZPGUIFJS
daily existence, often by prostitutes who hung around the bases. SCAP authori-
UJFTBOEUIFBSNZCSBTTDPOTJEFSFEESVHTBUISFBUUPNJMJUBSZQSFQBSFEOFTTBOE
BXFBQPOPGDPNNVOJTUBHFOUT82
ćF BOUJESVH DBNQBJHO  IPXFWFS  GBJMFE UP SFEVDF UIF TVQQMZ XIJMF DPO-
tributing to the violation of civil liberties by giving police greater powers of

Policing in Occupied Japan 75


TFBSDIBOETFJ[VSF"MUIPVHIŸ ŸųųBSSFTUTXFSFNBEFPWFSBUISFFZFBSQFSJPE 
GFXFSUIBOĕWFIVOESFEPČFOEFSTTQFOUNPSFUIBOBDPVQMFPGNPOUITJOKBJM
*O "QSJM ŴżŸŴ DPNQMBJOUT XFSF MPEHFE XIFO QPMJDF PSEFSFE ŸźŴ $IJOFTF SFTJ-
dents of Tokyo out of their beds and into the streets late at night during a raid.
According to witnesses, the police were hostile and insulted and abused the
XPNFO /BSDPUJDT BHFOU 8BZMBOE 4QFFS DMBJNFE UIBU WBMVBCMF JOGPSNBUJPO
XBTPCUBJOFEBCPVUOBSDPUJDTTBMFTCZ$IJOFTFDPNNVOJTUBHFOUTBOEUIBUPOF
BQBSUNFOUUIBUXBTSBJEFEXBTBIJEFPVUGPSQFEEMFSTXIPXFSFTFMMJOHPQJVN
UPQSPTUJUVUFT XIPJOUVSOTPMEJUUPNJMJUBSZQFSTPOOFMTUBUJPOFEBUBJSCBTFTJO
the vicinity.83
Many police officers refused to cooperate with the narcotics drive because
"NFSJDBOTFSWJDFNFOXFSFUIFPOFTGVFMJOHUIFEFNBOE BOEPQJVNFOUFSJOH
Japan was arriving by way of the CIA-subsidized airline Civil Air Transport
MBUFSOJDLOBNFEi"JS"NFSJDBw BU64CBTFTOPUPQFOUP+BQBOFTFDVTUPNT
JOTQFDUJPOTćFBJSMJOFXBTLOPXOGPSIBVMJOHESVHTGPS$IJOFTF(VPNJOEBOH
SFCFMTXIPPDDVQJFEUIFPQJVNHSPXJOH(PMEFO5SJBOHMFSFHJPOJO#VSNBBT
they plotted to reinvade the People’s Republic of China with CIA support.84
"NFSJDBTSFHJPOBMBMMJFTXFSFPOUIFXIPMFEFFQMZJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFOBSDPUJDT
USBEF BOEUIJTIBNQFSFEQSPIJCJUJPO"ęFSIFCPVHIUIJTXBZPVUPGQSJTPOJO
ŴżŷŻ UIF$*"SFDSVJUFE:PTIJP,PEBNB B$MBTT"XBSDSJNJOBMBOE:BLV[B
+BQBOFTF NBĕB  HPEGBUIFS XIP USBEFE PQJVN BOE IFSPJO PO CFIBMG PG UIF
+BQBOFTFOBWZGPSTDBSDFSBXNBUFSJBMT/JDLOBNFEi-JUUMF/BQPMFPOwGPSIJT
TIPSUTUBUVSFBOESVUIMFTTRVBMJUJFT IFXBTWBMVFECZUIF"NFSJDBOTCFDBVTF
PGIJTJOĘVFODFXJUIJOUIFEPNJOBOU-JCFSBM%FNPDSBUJD1BSUZ -%1 BOEBT
DPGPVOEFS PG UIF "TJBO 1FPQMFT "OUJ$PNNVOJTU -FBHVF )F XBT QBJE žŴų
NJMMJPOCZUIF1FOUBHPOGPSTNVHHMFEUVOHTUFO VTFEGPSIBSEFOJOHNJTTJMFT85

“It Isn’t a Tank, It’s a Special Vehicle”: Toward Full-Scale


Remilitarization

%FTQJUFBMMUIFQSPCMFNTXJUIUIFQPMJDF UIF$PME8BSBOEUIFPVUCSFBLPGUIF
,PSFBO8BSDPOWJODFEPDDVQBUJPOMFBEFSTPGUIFJNQPSUBODFPGNBJOUBJOJOH
B TUSPOH QPMJDF QSFTFODF " CJMM XBT QBTTFE QFSNJUUJOH UPXOT BOE WJMMBHFT UP
integrate local forces into the National Police. G-2 intelligence continued its
DPMMBCPSBUJPOXJUIUIF3VSBM(VBSE*OMJOFXJUI,FOOBOTSFDPNNFOEBUJPO B
NBSJUJNFQPMJDFGPSDFXBTEFWFMPQFEćF/BUJPOBM1VCMJD4BGFUZ$PNNJTTJPO
XBTFWFOUVBMMZQMBDFEVOEFSUIFDPOUSPMPGUIFQSJNFNJOJTUFS QBWJOHUIFXBZ
for gradual recentralization.
.PTUJNQPSUBOU 4$"1FTUBCMJTIFEBOBUJPOBMQPMJDFSFTFSWFPGźŸ ųųųNFO 
TUPDLFEXJUIPWFSžŴNJMMJPOJOXFBQPOT JODMVEJOHNPSUBST CB[PPLBT ĘBNF-
throwers, and tanks.860WFSIBMGPGUIFFOMJTUFENFOXFSF*NQFSJBM"SNZWFUFS-
BOT JODMVEJOHFJHIUIVOESFEVOQVSHFEPďDFSTPGUIF.BODIVLVPBSNZWBMVFE
GPS UIFJS BOUJDPNNVOJTN *O PSEFS UP NBJOUBJO UIF ĕDUJPO UIBU UIF 6OJUFE

76 Under the Facade of Benevolence


4UBUFTXBTOPUWJPMBUJOHDPOTUJUVUJPOBMQSPWJTJPOTNBOEBUJOHEFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPO 
"NFSJDBOBEWJTFST BT$PMPOFM'SBOL,PXBMTLJOPUFEJOIJTNFNPJST XFSFUPME
iOPUUPDBMMUIFJSNFOTPMEJFSTPSPďDFSTCZNJMJUBSZSBOLT*GZPVFWFSTFFB
tank, it isn’t a tank, it’s a special vehicle.”87 ,PXBMTLJIBEQMBZFEBNBKPSSPMFJO
USBJOJOHUIFGPSDF :PTIJEBFWFOUVBMMZSBJTFEUIFSFTFSWFUPPWFSŴųų ųųųNFO 
QSPNQUJOHUIF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZUPJTTVFBMFBĘFUUIBUEFDMBSFE i)BWJOHGBJMFE
JOUIFJSBUUFNQUUPJOWBEF,PSFB UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJOUFOETUPTUSFOHUIFOUIF
QPMJDF SFTFSWF BOE FOBDU B DPOTDSJQUJPO TZTUFN UP NBLF UIF +BQBOFTF QFPQMF
JOUP B TIJFME UP QSPUFDU "NFSJDBO TPMEJFST BOE UVSO +BQBO JOUP BO "NFSJDBO
foothold and staging base for her aggression in Asia.”88
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and
ĕWFTUBS HFOFSBM 0NBS #SBEMFZ XFSF JOĘVFOUJBM JO DIBNQJPOJOH UIF SFTFSWF 
XIJDIXBTUSBJOFEJODPNCBUBOESJPUDPOUSPMBTBNFBOTPGEFGFOEJOH+BQBO
GSPNBUUBDL UIPVHIJUXBTSFDPHOJ[FEUIBUUIFSFXBTiOPSFMJBCMFJOGPSNBUJPOw
UPJOEJDBUFUIBUUIJTNJHIUDPNFUPQBTT89 In 1954, after the occupation ended,
UIFSFTFSWFCFDBNFUIF4FMG%FGFOTF'PSDF XIJDIIBTTJODFHSPXOJOUPBGPS-
NJEBCMFNJMJUBSZPSHBOJ[BUJPO CVUIBTCFFOVTFETQBSJOHMZ ćSPVHIUIFMBUF
ŴżŸųT  DPJODJEJOH XJUI JMMJDJU ĕOBODJOH PG -%1 FMFDUJPO DBNQBJHOT  UIF 4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUTQFOUPWFSžŴNJMMJPOPOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHBOENJMJUBSZUZQFXFBQPOT
VOEFSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN XJUIBDPOUJOVFEFNQIBTJTPODPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF
and riot control.90"ęFSBTUJOUJO5VSLFZ #ZSPO&OHMFDBNFCBDLBTBQPMJDF
MJBJTPO)JTQSFTFODFVOEFSTDPSFTUIFJNQPSUBODFPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTUP$*"
PQFSBUJPOT XIPTFBJNXBTUPLFFQUBCTPOUIFDPNNVOJTUNPWFNFOU DPOUSPM
VOSFTU BOETPMJEJGZ"NFSJDBOUJFTXJUIMFBEJOHĕHVSFTJOUIFOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZ
CVSFBVDSBDZ SVOGPSNBOZZFBSTCZUIFDPOWJDUFEXBSDSJNJOBM0LJOPSJ,BZB91
In 1957 the Japanese scholar Suichi Sugai concluded that the “bureaucratic
QPMJDFNFOUBMJUZwBOEJUTiQPXFSDPNQMFYwXFSFNVDIUIFTBNFBTCFGPSFUIF
XBSBOEUIBUUIFQPMJDFIBEOFBSMZSFWFSUFEUPUIFQSFXBSTZTUFNJOBiCBDL-
TXJOHPGUIFQFOEVMVNw92ćFTFDPNNFOUTFODBQTVMBUFUIFTIPSUDPNJOHTPG
"NFSJDBOSFGPSNFČPSUT XIJDIXFSFTVCPSEJOBUFEUPMBSHFSHFPTUSBUFHJDHPBMT
+BQBOXBTBMXBZTBLFZUPUIFJOGPSNBMFNQJSFUIBUUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTTPVHIU
UPGPSHFJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBJOUIFBęFSNBUIPG8PSME8BS**4FFJOHUIFNBTB
CVMXBSLBHBJOTUDPNNVOJTU$IJOB "NFSJDBOQPMJDZNBLFSTQMBDFEBQSFNJVN
POTBGFHVBSEJOHUIFQPXFSPG:PTIJEBBOEUIF-%1 XIJDIQSPNPUFEFYQPSU
ESJWFO FDPOPNJD HSPXUI BOE GPSFJHO JOWFTUNFOU BOE QSFTFSWFE UIF OFUXPSL
PG NJMJUBSZ CBTFT PO 0LJOBXB  MBUFS VTFE BT B TUBHJOH HSPVOE GPS CPNCJOH
7JFUOBN3FNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOBOEUIFCSFFDIPGDPOTUJUVUJPOBMHVBSBOUFFTPGDJWJM
MJCFSUJFTXFSFWJFXFEBTBTNBMMQSJDFUPQBZJOLFFQJOHUIFQPMJUJDBMMFęJODIFDL
and ensuring Japan’s role as a junior partner in the Cold War. So was the revival
PGTPNFPGUIFWJDJPVTQPMJDFQSBDUJDFTGSPNUIFJNQFSJBMFSB93
*OBŵųųŶTVSWFZPGiOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwQSPHSBNTTJODF8PSME8BS** +BNFT
Dobbins, a RAND Corporation analyst and special envoy to Afghanistan,
IFSBMEFE +BQBOFTF QPMJDF SFGPSNT JO DPOUSJCVUJOH UP B TUBCMF BOE QSPTQFSPVT

Policing in Occupied Japan 77


EFNPDSBDZ94 Barely glancing beneath the surface, his interpretation was used
UPMFHJUJNJ[FNJMJUBSZJOUFSWFOUJPOJOUIF.JEEMF&BTUBOECJMMJPOEPMMBSQPMJDF
USBJOJOH PQFSBUJPOT " NPSF DSJUJDBMMZ PSJFOUFE CPEZ PG TDIPMBSTIJQ SPPUFE JO
QSJNBSZEPDVNFOUTBOE+BQBOFTFTPVSDFTUFMMTBEJČFSFOUTUPSZ+PIO%PXFST
NBHJTUFSJBMEmbracing DefeatEFNPOTUSBUFTIPX XIJMFUIFXBSXFBSJOFTTPGUIF
QPQVMBUJPOMJNJUFEEJTTFOUBHBJOTU.BD"SUIVSTJNQPTJUJPOPGiEFNPDSBDZGSPN
above,” unrest existed below the surface but was curtailed through police repres-
TJPO $ISJTUPQIFS "MEPVTT XPSL TJNJMBSMZ TIPXT IPX 4$"1 TVQQPSUFE WJPMB-
tions of civil liberties against leftists who threatened occupational authority.95
.Z PXO SFTFBSDI DPOĕSNT UIBU BMUIPVHI "NFSJDBO QPMJDZ TQBXOFE
JNQSPWFNFOUTBęFS8PSME8BS** BOE+BQBOOFWFSFWPMWFEJOUPBGVMMĘFEHFE
QPMJDF TUBUF  UIF QPMJDF XFSF TUJMM CVJMU VQ BT BO JOTUSVNFOU PG TPDJBM DPOUSPM
4$"1JOJUJBMMZFODPVSBHFEQSPHSFTTJWFJOOPWBUJPOT JODMVEJOHJOUIFSFBMNPG
QFOPMPHZUIFiSFWFSTFDPVSTF wIPXFWFS IFSBMEFEUIFUSJVNQIPGNPSFBOUJ-
EFNPDSBUJDJEFBMT1PMJDFQSPHSBNTDBNFUPQMBZBLFZSPMFJOTVQQSFTTJOHMFę
XJOHNPWFNFOUT FOTVSJOHUIFUSJVNQIPGDPOTFSWBUJWFIFHFNPOZBOE+BQBOT
FNFSHFODFBTBO"NFSJDBODMJFOUTUBUF FYBDUMZBTQMBOOFSTTVDIBT(FPSHF'
Kennan envisioned.96
"ęFSŴżŷź 14%BEWJTFSTNPCJMJ[FEQPMJDFQSJNBSJMZUPGFSSFUPVUTVCWFSTJPO
BOEFNQIBTJ[FEQPMJUJDBMJOUFMMJHFODFBOENJMJUBSZTUZMFUSBJOJOH XIJDITFUB
QSFDFEFOUGPSGVUVSFJOUFSWFOUJPOTćFDBSSZPWFSPGQFSTPOOFMXBTTJHOJĕDBOU 
XJUI#ZSPO&OHMFTFSWJOHBTBLFZCSJEHFĕHVSF)FXFOUPOUPJNQBSUNBOZPG
UIFUFDIOJRVFTIFIPOFEJO+BQBOBTIFBEPGUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNBOEUIF014 
ESBXJOH PO MFTTPOT GSPN IJT FYQFSJFODF BOE UIF VTF PG OFXMZ BEBQUFE UFDI-
OPMPHJFTTVDIBTUFBSHBTćF+BQBOFTFQPMJDFXFSFFTQFDJBMMZBENJSFEGPSUIFJS
JOUFMMJHFODFHBUIFSJOHDBQBCJMJUJFTBOEQSPWJEFEBNPEFMGPSGPSDFTUSBJOFECZ
&OHMFBOEIJTBTTPDJBUFT JODMVEJOHUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTF%VSJOHUIFŴżŸųT 
+BQBOTQPMJUJDBMTUBCJMJUZ FDPOPNJDHSPXUI DPOUJOHFOUJOMBSHFQBSUPOUIFTVQ-
QMZPGFRVJQNFOUGPSUIF,PSFBO8BS QSP8FTUFSOPSJFOUBUJPO BOETVDDFTTGVM
JOUFHSBUJPOJOUPUIFHMPCBMDBQJUBMJTUFDPOPNZDSZTUBMMJ[FEUIFWJFXGPS"NFSJ-
can Cold Warriors that a nation’s police force was the critical factor needed to
QSPWJEFGPSJUTJOUFSOBMEFGFOTF'SPNUIJTSFBMJ[BUJPO UIFQVCMJDTBGFUZQSPHSBN
evolved.

78 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Chapter 4
“Law in Whose Name, Order for
Whose Benefit?”
Police Training, “Nation-Building,” and Political
Repression in Postcolonial South Korea
Beautiful land, Korea our country,
covered with flowers of hibiscus in full bloom,
That’s where our noble brethren live staunchly,
That’s where the democratic police stand resolutely,
with a glorious mission on their shoulders.
‰,PSFBO/BUJPOBM1PMJDFTPOH MBUFT

Are you not from the Korean nation? Have you not the same blood and bone?
Why do you fire on Koreans?
‰1FPQMFT$PNNJUUFFQBNQIMFU $IJOKV 

The tragedy of the liberation period and the depth of American responsibility
are most evident in the history of the Korean National Police (KNP) during
[the] occupation.
‰#ruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,

*O +VMZ ŴżŷŹ  BT QBSU PG BO JOWFTUJHBUJPO CZ UIF "NFSJDBO .JMJUBSZ (PWFSO-
NFOU ".(  JO 4PVUI ,PSFB  BO BEWJTFS BTLFE UIF QPMJDF DIJFG JO ,POHKV JG
he believed that left-wing leaders should be suppressed. The chief hesitated
BOEBTLFE i"TBQPMJDFNBOPSFDIPJOHUIFPQJOJPOPGUIFQFPQMF w"ęFSUIF
BEWJTFSSFTQPOEFE iBTBQPMJDFNBO wUIFDIJFGSFQMJFEXJUIBXJOLi*DBOOPU
say because we are ordered not to express any opinions. Ninety per cent of the
QFPQMF XPVME MJLF UP FMJNJOBUF MFęJTUTw1 This conversation sheds light on the
political function of the police, which was built up as an integral part of the
"NFSJDBOPDDVQBUJPO ŴżŷŸoŴżŷŻ BOEFČPSUTUPTUBCJMJ[FUIFSVMFPG4ZOHNBO
3IFF BO044MJBJTPOFYJMFEGPSBMNPTUGPSUZZFBSTVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTF BOEĕSTU
president of the Republic of Korea (ROK).
'PMMPXJOH8PSME8BS** ,PSFBFNFSHFEBTBDSVDJBMUIFBUFSPGDPNQFUJUJPO
with China and with the Soviet Union, which, after the three-year occupation,
CBDLFE3IFFTSJWBM,JN*M4VOH BOBOUJDPMPOJBMĕHIUFSXIPBEWPDBUFETXFFQ-

79
JOHMBOESFGPSN TUBUFTPDJBMJTN BOEFDPOPNJDTFMGTVďDJFODZ juche).2 Seek-
JOHUPDPVOUFS,JNTSBEJDBMOBUJPOBMJTN 64QPMJDZBJNFEUPPQFOVQ,PSFBT
FDPOPNZ MBSHFMZUPFOBCMF+BQBOUPFYUSBDUSBXNBUFSJBMTDBQBCMFPGTVTUBJOJOH
JUTFDPOPNJDSFDPWFSZ UIVTQSFWFOUJOHUIFSJTFPGMFęJTUNPWFNFOUTUIFSFBOE
keeping Japan in the Western orbit. In January 1947, Secretary of State George
Marshall scribbled a note to Dean Acheson: “Please have plan drafted of policy
UP PSHBOJ[F B EFĕOJUF HPWFSONFOU PG 4P ,PSFB BOE connect up JUT FDPOPNZ
with that of Japan.”35PBDIJFWFUIJTPCKFDUJWF UIF5SVNBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOQSP-
NPUFEUIFDPOTUSVDUJPOPGBQPMJDFTVSWFJMMBODFBQQBSBUVTNPCJMJ[FEUPQSPUFDU
,PSFB GSPN iGPSFJHO BHHSFTTJPOw BOE iJOUFSOBM TVCWFSTJPOw .JMJUBSZ BEWJTFST
EFWFMPQFEBŵŷ ųųųNBODPOTUBCVMBSZXIPTFSFDPSEXPVMEQSPWFMJUUMFEJČFS-
FOUGSPNUIBUPGJUT1IJMJQQJOFBOE)BJUJBODPVOUFSQBSUTJOTVQQSFTTJOHQPQV-
MBSSFWPMUT%FTQJUFDPOUSJCVUJOHUPFYUFOTJWFIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFT UIFQPMJDF
QSPHSBNTXFSFTFFOBTFČFDUJWFCFDBVTFUIF30,SFNBJOFEQSP8FTUBOEMBUFS
FYQFSJFODFESBQJEFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOU DPOTJEFSFEJOFMJUFTFDUPSTBTWBMJEB-
UJPOPG8BMU3PTUPXTJOĘVFOUJBMNPEFSOJ[BUJPOUIFPSZćFJOUFSWFOUJPOUIVT
FOUSFODIFEUIFWJFXUIBUBNPEFSOJ[FEQPMJDFGPSDFXBTDSVDJBMUPBOBUJPOT
internal security, setting the standard for the Cold War.

Conscience and Convenience: The Korean National Police and


Consolidation of a U.S. Sphere

"T#SVDF$VNJOHTOPUFTJOThe Origins of the Korean War UIF30,XBTNPSF


PGBO"NFSJDBODSFBUJPOUIBOBOZPUIFSQPTUXBS"TJBOSFHJNFćF$*"QSF-
EJDUFEUIBUJUTFDPOPNZXPVMEDPMMBQTFJOBNBUUFSPGXFFLTJG 64BJEXFSF
UFSNJOBUFE4"TXJUI+JBOH+JFTIJJO$IJOBBOE/HP%JOI%JFNJO4PVUI7JFU-
OBN  64 EJQMPNBUT UJSFE PG 3IFFT PCTUJOBDZ BOE VOXJMMJOHOFTT UP QSPNPUF
CBTJDMBOESFGPSN UIPVHIUIFZTUPPECZIJNBTBCVMXBSLBHBJOTUDPNNVOJTN
ćF$*"DPOTJEFSFEUIF1SJODFUPO1I%BiEFNBHPHVFCFOUPOBVUPDSBUJDSVMFw
XIPTFTVQQPSUXBTNBJOUBJOFECZUIBUiOVNFSJDBMMZTNBMMDMBTTXIJDIWJSUVBMMZ
NPOPQPMJ[FTUIFOBUJWFXFBMUIw5
ćF"NFSJDBOPDDVQBUJPOXBTIFBEFECZ(FOFSBM+PIO3FFE)PEHF BO*MMJ-
OPJTGBSNFSLOPXOBTUIFi1BUUPOPGUIF1BDJĕD wXIPLOFXMJUUMFBCPVU,PSFB
He worked to build a professional police force, which he believed to be pivotal
UPiOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwFČPSUTJUTDFOUSBMBJNXBTUPTUBNQPVUUIFQPMJUJDBMMFę
and bolster Rhee’s power. A secret history of the Korean National Police (KNP)
BSHVFE  i/P POF DBO BOUJDJQBUF XIBU JOTJEJPVT JOĕMUSBUJPO NBZ EFWFMPQ  BOE
<TP>UIFQPMJDFNVTUCFHJWFOMBUJUVEFUPDBSSZPVUUIFEFTJSFTPGUIFOFXHPW-
FSONFOUNPSFTPUIBOXPVMECFOFDFTTBSZJOOPSNBMUJNFTw6 The KNP con-
TFRVFOUMZFWPMWFEBTBQPMJUJDJ[FEBOEFTTFOUJBMMZDPVOUFSSFWPMVUJPOBSZGPSDF 
QMBDFE JO UIF IBOET PG NBOZ XIP IBE TFSWFE JO UIF +BQBOFTF PDDVQBUJPO PG
,PSFB XIJDIMBTUFEGSPNŴżŴųUPŴżŷŸ BOETBXBMNPTUBMMPQQPTJUJPOBTDPN-

80 Under the Facade of Benevolence


NVOJTUESJWFOćF$*"CMVOUMZOPUFEUIBUiFYUSFNF3JHIUJTUTDPOUSPMUIFPWFSU
QPMJUJDBMTUSVDUVSFJOUIF64[POFNBJOMZUISPVHIUIFBHFODZPGUIFOBUJPOBM
QPMJDF w XIJDI IBT CFFO iSVUIMFTTMZ CSVUBM JO TVQQSFTTJOH EJTPSEFS ‫<  ڀ ڀ‬5>IF
QPMJDFHFOFSBMMZSFHBSEUIF$PNNVOJTUTBTSFCFMTBOEUSBJUPSTXIPTIPVMECF
TFJ[FE JNQSJTPOFE BOETIPU TPNFUJNFTPOUIFTMJHIUFTUQSPWPDBUJPOw7
During the period of Japanese colonization, the national police presided
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BDUJWJUZwBDDPSEJOHUPUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU UISPVHIiUFSSPS JOUJNJEBUJPO BOE
QSBDUJDFTJODPODFJWBCMFUPUIF"NFSJDBOw8"TNVDIBTUIF"NFSJDBOTDPOTJE-
FSFE UIFJS OBUJPO FYDFQUJPOBM  64 SVMF XBT NBSSFE CZ DPMPOJBM DPOUJOVJUJFT 
including a blatant carryover of personnel. In principle, occupation officials
TPVHIUUPQVSHFDPMMBCPSBUPSTBOEXJQFPVUUIFWFTUJHFTPGUIFPMETZTUFNCZ
USBJOJOHQPMJDFJOEFNPDSBUJDNFUIPET JOTUJMMJOHJOUIFNUIFNBYJNUIBUUIFZ
XFSFiTFSWBOUTBOEOPUNBTUFSTPGUIFQFPQMFwćFOFXQPMJDFTMPHBO BDDPSE-
JOHUPUIF"NFSJDBOT XBTiJNQBSUJBMBOEOPOQBSUJTBOw9 In practice, however,
political exigencies and the fear of a leftist takeover resulted in the abandon-
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The AMG retained 80 percent of pro-Japanese officers above the rank of
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MPOJBMVOEFSHSPVOE"T$PMPOFM8JMMJBN.BHMJO UIFĕSTUEJSFDUPSPGUIF,/1 
DPNNFOUFE i8FGFMUUIBUJGUIF,PSFBOFMFNFOUPGUIF,/1EJEBHPPEKPCGPS
UIF+BQBOFTF UIFZXPVMEEPBHPPEKPCGPSVTw"+VOFŴżŷźTVSWFZEFUFSNJOFE
that eight of ten provincial police chiefs and 60 percent of the lower-ranking
lieutenants were Japanese-trained, a crucial factor triggering opposition to the
police.10 To head the organization, Hodge appointed Chang T’aek-Sang and
$IPVHI1ZPOH0L LOPXOGPSUIFJSiIBSTIQPMJDFNFUIPETEJSFDUFESVUIMFTTMZ
BHBJOTU,PSFBOMFęJTUTw$IBOH BXFBMUIZCVTJOFTTNBOXJUIUJFTUPUIFNJTTJPO-
BSZDPNNVOJUZ IBEQSPTQFSFEVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTFćF.BSJOF$PSQTIJTUPSJBO
)BSPME-BSTFOSFGFSSFEUPIJNBTiBSVUIMFTTBOEDSBTTDIBSBDUFSXJUIUIFGBDFPG
/FSPBOEUIFNBOOFSTPG(PFSJOHw11
*OUIFĕSTUEBZTPGUIF64PDDVQBUJPO DIBPTQSFWBJMFE1SJTPOEPPSTXFSF
UISPXO PQFO  QPMJDF SFDPSET XFSF EFTUSPZFE  BOE ,PSFBOT DPOĕTDBUFE +BQB-
OFTFQSPQFSUZ XIJDIMFEUPWJPMFODF*OTPNFQMBDFT MFęJTUTTFJ[FEQPXFSBOE
JOTUBMMFEUIFJSPXOHPWFSONFOUTćFQPMJDFXFSFEFNPSBMJ[FEBOEIBEUPCF
BDDPNQBOJFE PO SPVOET CZ "NFSJDBO NJMJUBSZ PďDFST12 A reorganization
QMBOXBTESBXOVQCZ.BKPS"SUIVS'#SBOETUBUUFS XIPXBTĘPXOJOGSPN
.BOJMB XIFSFIFIBETFSWFEXJUIUIFNJMJUBSZQPMJDF"CSVJTJOHGVMMCBDLXJUI
UIF.JDIJHBO4UBUFGPPUCBMMUFBNJOUIFNJEŴżŶųT LOPXOGPSTJOHMFIBOEFEMZ
FOHJOFFSJOH B GPVSUIRVBSUFS DPNFCBDL BHBJOTU BO VOEFGFBUFE 5FNQMF UFBN
coached by Glenn “Pop” Warner, Brandstatter was a veteran of the Detroit
ŴżŶŻoŴżŷŴ  BOE &BTU -BOTJOH QPMJDF DIJFG ŴżŷŹ  BOE QSPGFTTPS PG QPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUJPO BU .JDIJHBO 4UBUF 6OJWFSTJUZ )F FNQIBTJ[FE UIF JNQPSUBODF

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 81


PGDSFBUJOHTUBOEBSEVOJGPSNTGPSUIF,/1 JNQSPWJOHDPNNVOJDBUJPOT BOE
BCPMJTIJOHUIFUIPVHIUDPOUSPMQPMJDF XIPIBEBNBTTFEżųų ųųųĕOHFSQSJOU
ĕMFTBOEXFSFLOPXOUPJOTQFDUIPNFTUPTFFJGUIF+BQBOFTFFNQFSPSTQJDUVSF
occupied a place of honor.
The United States Military Advisory Group in Korea (USMAGIK) responded
to Brandstatter’s report by providing sixty-three police advisers, who devel-
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UFMFQIPOFMJOFT SFTVMUJOHJOUIFVQHSBEJOHPGDPNNVOJDBUJPOTGBDJMJUJFTGSPN
“fair” to “good.” Manpower was stabilized at twenty thousand, and swords and
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QPMJDFDIJFGTJOFWFSZQSPWJODF XJUIUIFNBOEBUFPGHSPPNJOHB,PSFBOTVDDFT-
sor. Typical was the background of Lieutenant Colonel Earle Miller, stationed
in Kyonggi-do province, a twenty-six-year veteran of the Chicago police and
TVQFSWJTPS PG NJMJUBSZ QPMJDF EFUBDINFOUT BOE 108 DBNQT13 Brandstatter
DPNNFOUFEJOB%FDFNCFSŴżŷŸJOUFSWJFXUIBUUIF,PSFBOTXFSFiĕęZZFBST
behind us in their thinking on justice and police powers” and advocated a
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)FBEEFEUIBUIJHIUVSOPWFSBNPOHUIF"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTXBTIBNQFSJOHUIF
QPMJDF QSPHSBN BOE QSFEJDUFE UIBU  SFHBSEMFTT PG UIF BNPVOU PG 64 BJE  UIF
QPMJDFCVSFBVXPVMECFDPNFBiQPMJUJDBMQMVNwCFMPOHJOHUPiBCJHTIPUJOUIF
OFXHPWFSONFOUw BQSFEJDUJPOUIBUQSPWFEBDDVSBUF 14
4UBSUJOHBUBCVEHFUPGŴŸCJMMJPOXPOQFSBOOVN PWFSžŴNJMMJPO64 UIF
1VCMJD 4BGFUZ %JWJTJPO SFCVJMU QPMJDF IFBERVBSUFST  BEPQUFE B VOJGPSN QBU-
UFSOFEBęFSUIBUPGUIF/FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU BOEFMJNJOBUFEUIFTZTUFN
XIFSFCZPďDFSTXFSFPODBMMGPSUXFOUZGPVSIPVST*UJNQSPWFESFDPSEDPMMFD-
UJPOCZJNQPSUJOHĕMJOHDBCJOFUTBOEPWFSTBXUIFPQFOJOHPGBNPEFSODSJNF
laboratory in Seoul staffed by eight Korean technicians trained in ballistics,
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SPVUJOF QBUSPMT UP GPTUFS JNQSPWFE DPNNVOJUZ SFMBUJPOT  BOE FTUBCMJTIFE
provincial training centers and, under Lewis Valentine’s oversight, a national
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JODMVEFE GPSUZĕWF QPMJDFXPNFO  SFQPSUFEMZ XFOU PO UP iEJTUJOHVJTI UIFN-
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1945, USMAGIK opened a school for detectives in Seoul and established a spe-
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82 Under the Facade of Benevolence


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in light of the threats of subversion and insurgency, creating a trend toward
NJMJUBSJ[BUJPO16
In January 1946, USMAGIK began developing the police constabulary,
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FYFDVUJPOPSUPBMMPXCMBNFUPCFQMBDFEPOUIFDPNNVOJTUT%PVHMBT.BD"S-
UIVS GPSFTUBMMFE UIF EFMJWFSZ PG ŸųDBMJCFS NBDIJOF HVOT BOE IPXJU[FST iJO
PSEFSUPNBJOUBJO<UIF>BQQFBSBODF<PGUIFDPOTUBCVMBSZ>‫ڀڀ‬BTBQPMJDFUZQF
SFTFSWFGPSDFw.PTUPGUIFPďDFSTXFSF+BQBOFTFBSNZWFUFSBOT"MUIPVHIUIFZ
XFSFOPUBVUIPSJ[FEUPNBLFBSSFTUT UIFZDPOTJTUFOUMZJHOPSFEiUIJTMBDLPGMFHBM
right.” The constabulary gained valuable guerrilla experience suppressing rebel-
MJPOTJO$IFKVEPBOE:PTV DPNNJUUJOHOVNFSPVTBUSPDJUJFTJOUIFQSPDFTT*U
CFDBNFJOĕMUSBUFECZMFęJTUT XIPJOTUJHBUFETFWFSBMNVUJOJFT17 Characterizing
,PSFBOT BT iCSVUBM CBTUBSET  XPSTF UIBO UIF +BQBOFTF w )BVTNBO XPSLFE UP
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"U UIFTF UBTLT IF XBT QSFEPNJOBOUMZ TVDDFTTGVM  FTQFDJBMMZ JO DPNQBSJTPO UP
"NFSJDBOBEWJTPSZFČPSUTJO4PVUI7JFUOBN18 Like the Philippines constabu-
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*UXBTBMTPSFOPXOFEGPSJUTCSVUBMJUZ IPXFWFS BOECFDBNFBTQSJOHCPBSEUP
QPMJUJDBMQPXFS UIVTIJOEFSJOHEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQNFOU

“The Gooks Only Understood Force”: The Evolution of a Police State

ćSPVHIPVU UIF MBUF ŴżŷųT  4PVUI ,PSFB SFTFNCMFE XIBU QPMJUJDBM BEWJTFS )
Merrell Benninghoff referred to as a “powder keg ready to explode.” An AMG
poll revealed that 49 percent of the population preferred the Japanese occupa-
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BOE UIF PMEFTU $PNNVOJTU 1BSUZ JO "TJB  XJUI FYQFSJFODFE MFBEFST XIP IBE
MFEUIFTUSVHHMFBHBJOTU+BQBO8IJMFGPPEJNQPSUTBOEQVCMJDIFBMUIJOJUJBUJWFT
CSPVHIUTPNFCFOFĕUT MBOEJOFRVBMJUJFT QPWFSUZ BOEUIFEFTJSFGPSVOJĕDBUJPO
XJUIUIF/PSUINBEFDJSDVNTUBODFTSJQFGPSSFWPMVUJPO BTEJEPďDJBMDPSSVQ-
tion and heavy-handed rice collection policies enforced by the KNP. Hodge
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TJUVBUJPOMFęiGFSUJMFHSPVOEGPSUIFTQSFBEPGDPNNVOJTNw20
*OB'FCSVBSZŴżŷżTUVEZUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUOPUFE i-BCPS TPDJBMTFDVSJUZ 
MBOESFGPSN BOETFYFRVBMJUZMBXTIBWFCFFOQPQVMBSJOUIF/PSUIBOEBQQFBM
UP4PVUI,PSFBOTBTXFMMw&NQIBTJ[JOHUIBUBMUIPVHIJODSFBTFESFHJNFOUBUJPO 
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UIF TFFET PG EJTDPOUFOU  UIF OPSUIFSO SFHJNF TUJMM FOKPZFE HSFBUFS QPQVMBSJUZ

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 83


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GFFMJOH PG QBSUJDJQBUJPO JO HPWFSONFOUw UIBU XBT BCTFOU JO UIF 4PVUI21 This
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which could survive only through force.
3FTJTUBODF XBT MFE CZ MBCPS BOE GBSNFST BTTPDJBUJPOT BOE 1FPQMFT $PN-
NJUUFFT  XIJDI PSHBOJ[FE EFNPDSBUJD HPWFSOBODF BOE TPDJBM SFGPSN BU UIF
MPDBMMFWFMćFNBTTCBTFE4PVUI,PSFBO-BCPS1BSUZ 4,-1 IFBEFECZ1BL
)PO:POH BWFUFSBOPGBOUJ+BQBOFTFQSPUFTUXJUIDPNNVOJTUUJFT MFETUSJLFT
BOEDBSSJFEPVUBDUTPGJOEVTUSJBMTBCPUBHF FWFOUVBMMZCFDPNJOHJOĕMUSBUFECZ
BHFOUTPGUIF64"SNZ$PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODFDPSQT $*$ 22 Trained in sophis-
UJDBUFE NFUIPET PG JOGPSNBUJPO HBUIFSJOH BOE QPQVMBUJPO DPOUSPM  UIF ,/1
NBJOUBJOFEBOiPCTFSWBUJPOTFDUJPOwGPDVTFEPOQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUZ XIJDIQSP-
WJEFEJOGPSNBUJPOUP64JOUFMMJHFODFBOEBUUJNFTFWFOTQJFEPO"NFSJDBOT
"NCBTTBEPS+PIO.VDDJPSFQPSUFEUIBUUIF1VTBOFNCBTTZXBTVOEFSDPO-
TUBOUTVSWFJMMBODFCZiMJUUMFNFOXJUIOPUFCPPLTw 8JUIHPWFSONFOUBVUIPSJ-
UJFTBDDVTJOHBMNPTUBOZPOFPQQPTFEUPUIFJSQPMJDJFTPGCFJOHDPNNVOJTUTBOE
USBJUPST QPMJDFSBJEFEIPNFT BSSFTUFEOFXTQBQFSFEJUPSTGPSQSJOUJOHiJOĘBN-
NBUPSZBSUJDMFT wBOEJOUJNJEBUFEWPUFSTEVSJOHGSBVEVMFOUFMFDUJPOT TVDIBTUIF
one in May 1948 that brought Rhee to power. In the countryside, they extracted
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USFBUNFOU wBOEJODJUJFTKBJMFETUVEFOUBOEMBCPSMFBEFSTBOEFWFOTDIPPMUFBDI-
FSTGPSNFSFMZNFOUJPOJOHDPNNVOJTNJOUIFJSDMBTTSPPNT23
0ODFJODVTUPEZ TVTQFDUTXFSFUPSUVSFEUISPVHITVDINFUIPETBTLJEOFZ
QVODIJOH  IBOHJOH CZ UIF UIVNCOBJMT  GPSDFE FBUJOH PG IPU QFQQFST  BOE
FMFDUSPTIPDLTJOUIFBUUFNQUUPFYUSBDUDPOGFTTJPOT"TUBOEBSEFOUSZJOUIF
police registry was “died under torture” and “died of heart failure.” One prison
report referred to a young girl whose face was covered because she had been
TUSVDLXJUIBSJĘFCVUUBOEBOPUIFSBNBOXIPIBEHPOFEFBGGSPNCFBUJOHT
4PNF,/1VOJUTNPSQIFEJOUPEFBUITRVBET TVDIBTUIFi#MBDL5JHFS(BOH w
IFBEFECZ$IBOH5BFLTBOH BOEBTTBTTJOBUFEPQQPTJUJPOĕHVSFT JODMVEJOH 
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North and South.24 "NFSJDBO NJMJUBSZ DPNNBOEFST PęFO QSPNPUFE CSVUBM
UBDUJDT$*$BHFOU%POBME/JDIPMSFQPSUFEJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUUIF,/1XFSF
BEWJTFEUPiEVNQ<VOUSVTUXPSUIZBHFOUT>PČUIFCBDLPGBCPBU JOUIFOVEF 
BUIJHITQFFEPSHJWFIJNGBMTFJOGPSNBUJPOQMBOUT‰BOEMFUUIFFOFNZEPJU
for you.”
%FTQJUFBUUFNQUTUPEFWFMPQHSFBUFSQSPGFTTJPOBMJTN TBMBSJFTXFSFTPJOBE-
FRVBUF  BDDPSEJOH UP POF BSNZ SFQPSU  UIBU QPMJDF XFSF iGPSDFE UP CFH  CVZ 
PSTUFBMPUIFSJUFNTCFTJEFTSJDFXIJDIHPXJUIUIFNBLJOHPGBSFHVMBSEJFUw
"OPUIFSSFQPSUTUBUFEUIBUUIF,/1iMBDLFEFOUIVTJBTNwJODPPQFSBUJOHXJUI
UIFBSNZT$SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJPO%JWJTJPOJOIBMUJOHUIFJMMJDJUTBMFPGTDSBQ
NFUBMBOEPUIFS"NFSJDBOQSPEVDUT BTUIFZiPęFOUPPLBTIBSFPGUIFDVUw25

84 Under the Facade of Benevolence


ćFMFWFSBHFPGUIF"NFSJDBOTUPDVSUBJMTVDIQSPCMFNTXBTPęFOMJNJUFE BT
SFMBUJPOTXJUI,PSFBOPďDJBMTXFSFNBSSFECZNVUVBMNJTUSVTU1PMJDFBEWJTFS
%BWJE 'BZ UPME (FOFSBM "MCFSU 8FEFNFZFS UIBU JO IJT QSPWJODF  iOPU POF
QSPCMFN PG QPMJDF BENJOJTUSBUJPO IBE CFFO QSFTFOUFE UP UIF "NFSJDBOT GPS
discussion.”26
In July 1946, Captain Richard D. Robinson, assistant head of the AMG’s
Bureau of Public Opinion, conducted an investigation which found police
NFUIPETUPCFiFYUSFNFMZIBSTIwBOEJOUJNJEBUJPOTVDIUIBUQFPQMFXFSFBGSBJE
UPUBMLUP"NFSJDBOT#FMJFWJOHUIBUPQQSFTTJWFNFUIPETXFSFESJWJOHNPEFS-
BUFTJOUPUIFDPNNVOJTUDBNQ 3PCJOTPOXBTPVUSBHFEXIFOIFXJUOFTTFE8V
)BO $IBJ  B GPSNFS NBDIJOF HVOOFS JO UIF +BQBOFTF BSNZ  VTJOH UIF iXBUFS
USFBUNFOUwUPHFUBTVTQFDUFEQJDLQPDLFUUPDPOGFTTBOEIBEIJTBSNTGPSDFE
CBDL CZ NFBOT PG B TUPDL JOTFSUFE CFIJOE IJT CBDL BOE JO UIF DSPPLT PG IJT
elbow. When confronted, Wu said he did not believe he had done anything
XSPOH  XIJDI BQQFBSFE UP 3PCJOTPO UP SFĘFDU B EFĕDJFODZ JO IJT USBJOJOH
3PCJOTPOXBTMBUFSUISFBUFOFEXJUIDPVSUNBSUJBMCZ)PEHFTBTTJTUBOU (FOFSBM
"SDIFS-FSDI BOEXBTIBSBTTFECZUIF'#* FYBNQMFTPGUIFNJMJUBSZTBUUFNQU
to silence internal critics.27
In October 1946, at a conference to address public grievances, witnesses tes-
UJĕFEUIBUUIF,/1XBTCBZPOFUJOHTUVEFOUTBOEFYUPSUJOHGSPNQFBTBOUTJOUIF
BENJOJTUSBUJPOPGHSBJODPMMFDUJPO%VFQSPDFTT UIFZTBJE XBTSBSFMZBCJEFECZ 
BOEXBSSBOUTXFSFSBSFMZJTTVFE1PMJDFMPPUFEBOESPCCFEUIFIPNFTPGMFęJTUT
BOEVTFENPOFZHBJOFEGSPNTIBLFEPXOTUPFOUFSUBJOUIFNTFMWFTJOi,BFTPOH
IPVTFTwBOEGBODZESJOLJOHBOEFBUJOHFTUBCMJTINFOUTćFIFBEPGUIFZPVUI
TFDUJPOPGUIF'BSNFST(VJMEJO,B1ZVOHUFTUJĕFEUIBUIFIBECFFOBSSFTUFEJO
UIFNJEEMFPGUIFOJHIUBOEIFMEJOBEJSUZDFMMGPSĕWFEBZT
0UIFS MFęJTUT  JODMVEJOH KVWFOJMFT BOE XPNFO  TQPLF BCPVU CFJOH CFBUFO
to the point where gangrene set in and pus seeped out of their legs. Cho Sing
$IJLPG4VOH+VSFDPVOUFEIJTFYQFSJFODFVOEFSEFUFOUJPOPGTFFJOHBSPPN
GVMM PG QFPQMF XIP IBE CFFO DSJQQMFE CZ NJTUSFBUNFOU )F TUBUFE UIBU NBOZ
PGUIFXPSTUBCVTFTXFSFDPNNJUUFECZĕSFNFOPSHBOJ[FEJOUPBOFNFSHFODZ
DPNNJUUFF UP TVQQPSU UIF QPMJDF BOE DPMMFDU NPOFZ GPS UIFN ićF QPMJDF< >
OPUCFJOHBCMFUPUIFNTFMWFTCFBUUIFQFPQMF< >UVSOUIFNPWFSUPUIFĕSFNFO
BOE UIF ĕSFNFO XPSL PO UIFN w IF EFDMBSFE "OPUIFS XJUOFTT UFTUJĕFE UIBU
UIFQPMJDFXFSFiXPSTFUIBOVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTF< >XIPXFSFBGSBJEUPEPTVDI
UIJOHT<BTUPSUVSF>‫ڀڀ‬/PXUIFZIBWFOPSFTQFDUGPSUIFJSTVQFSJPSTw28
%JSFDUPS $IPVHI 1ZPOH0L  B $PMVNCJB 6OJWFSTJUZ 1I% XIP NBEF BO
FTUJNBUFEŵųNJMMJPOZFO BCPVUžŵųų ųųų JOCSJCFTEVSJOHUIFĕSTUUXPZFBST
PGUIFPDDVQBUJPO BENJUUFEUIBUUIF,/1XFSFiQBSUJBMUPUIFJEFBTPGUIFSJHIU-
JTUT wUIPVHIIFJOTJTUFEUIBUiBMMUIPTFBSSFTUFEIBWFDPNNJUUFEBDUVBMDSJNFT w
a lie given that the CIA reported in 1948 that the police were taking action
BHBJOTULOPXOPSTVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUTiXJUIPVUSFDPVSTFUPKVEJDJBMQSPDFTTw

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 85


4USFTTJOH UIF JNQPSUBODF PG TQFFEZ DPVSU QSPDFEVSF BOE KVEJDJBM SFGPSN JO
TUSFOHUIFOJOHUIFMFHJUJNBDZPGUIFQPMJDF 3PCJOTPOSFDPNNFOEFEUP)PEHF
UIBUIFSFNPWFUIPTFXIPIBEIFMEUIFSBOLPGMJFVUFOBOUVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTF
BOEXIPTFBDUJPOTXFSFiJODPNQBUJCMFXJUIUIF‫ڀڀ‬QSJODJQMFTPGEFNPDSBDZ
JOUIFQPMJDFTZTUFNw293PHFS#BMEXJO BGPVOEFSPGUIF"NFSJDBO$JWJM-JC-
FSUJFT6OJPO TFUVQBCSBODIJO,PSFBJOUIFBUUFNQUUPBCPMJTIUPSUVSFćF
FYJHFODJFTPGNBJOUBJOJOHQPXFSBOEEFTUSPZJOHTPDJBMTVCWFSTJPOGSPNCFMPX 
IPXFWFS UPPLQSFDFEFODFćPTFCSBOEFEBTDPNNVOJTUTXFSFEFIVNBOJ[FE
to the extent that they were seen as unworthy of legal protection. Pak Wan-so,
B4PVUI,PSFBOXSJUFSXIPIBECFFOJNQSJTPOFEBOEUPSUVSFECZUIFQPMJDF 
DIBSHFEićFZDBMMFENFBSFECJUDI"OZSFEXBTOPUDPOTJEFSFEIVNBO‫ڀڀ‬
ćFZMPPLFEBUNFBTJG*XBTBCFBTUPSBCVH‫ڀڀ‬#FDBVTFXFXFSFOUIVNBO XF
had no rights.”30
ćF ,/1 NBJOUBJOFE B TZNCJPUJD SFMBUJPOTIJQ XJUI SJHIUXJOH WJHJMBOUFT 
XIPTFIFBERVBSUFSTXFSFMPDBUFEOFYUUPPSJOTJEFQPMJDFTUBUJPOTćFZXFSF
EFTDSJCFECZUIFKPVSOBMJTU.BSL(BZOBTSFTFNCMJOHi)PMMZXPPEVOEFSXPSME
LJMMFSTw ćFJS SBOLT XFSF TXFMMFE CZ BO JOĘVY PG /PSUIFSO SFGVHFFT CFBSJOH
EFFQHSJFWBODFTBHBJOTUDPNNVOJTN$IBOH5BFL4BOH XIPCFDBNFQSJNF
NJOJTUFS XBTPOUIFCPBSEPGUIF/BUJPOBM:PVUI"TTPDJBUJPO XIJDIUIF$*"
DIBSBDUFSJ[FE BT B iUFSSPSJTU HSPVQ JO TVQQPSU PG FYUSFNF SJHIUXJOH QPMJUJ-
DJBOTw*UTIFBE :J1PN4PL XBTB%BJ-JQSPUÏHÏBOE044MJBJTPOSFDSVJUFEJO
ŴżŷŸCZ1BVM)FMMJXFMMBOE8JMMJBN%POPWBO EJTDVTTFEJOUIFOFYUDIBQUFS 
-BUFS BQQPJOUFE BT EFGFOTF NJOJTUFS  IF SFDFJWFE žŶŶŶ ųųų JO FRVJQNFOU BOE
BTTJTUBODFGSPN$PMPOFM&SOFTU7PTTPGUIFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZEFQBSUNFOUUPTFU
VQBiMFBEFSTIJQBDBEFNZwXJUIDPVSTFTJODPNCBUJOHTUSJLFTBOEUIFIJTUPSZPG
UIF)JUMFSKVHFOE )JUMFS:PVUI XIPN:JBENJSFE31 Opposed to the very idea
PGBMBCPSVOJPO IJTNFOCFBUMFęJTUTBOE JOWJPMBUJPOPG6OJUFE/BUJPOTQSPWJ-
sions, conducted surveillance and forays across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, with
$*$TVQQPSUćFSFXFSFFWFOBUUFNQUTUPBTTBTTJOBUF,JN*M4VOH OPEPVCU
BGBDUPSBDDPVOUJOHGPSUIFPSJHJOTPGUIF,PSFBO8BS XIJDIXBTOPUTJNQMZB
NBUUFSPG/PSUIFSOBHHSFTTJPOBTUIFTUBOEBSEJOUFSQSFUBUJPOTVHHFTUT32
*OUIFSBSFJOTUBODFTXIFOSJHIUXJOHQBSBNJMJUBSJFTXFSFQSPTFDVUFE UIFZ
XFSF PęFO HJWFO SFE DBSQFU USFBUNFOU *O .BZ ŴżŷŹ JO 5BFKPO  GPS FYBNQMF 
GPVSUFFO SJHIUJTUT XFSF BSSFTUFE BęFS BUUBDLJOH TVTQFDUFE DPNNVOJTUT BOE
TUFBMJOHSJDFGSPNGBSNFST8IJMFUBLJOHUIFNUPDPVSU ,/1PďDFSTTUPQQFE
at the house of one of the prisoners and, according to internal records, enjoyed
a “drunken picnic” arranged by relatives of the prisoners. In another case, the
SJHIUJTUHBOHTUFS,JN5VIBOHPUPČXJUIBTNBMMĕOFGPSUPSUVSJOHUPEFBUI
UXPMFęJTUZPVUIBTTPDJBUJPONFNCFSTBOETFSJPVTMZJOKVSJOHFJHIUPUIFST POF
PGXIPNXBTFNBTDVMBUFE "UUIFUSJBM UIFKVEHFSFGVTFEUPDBMMBTXJUOFTTFT
counterintelligence officers who had taken photographs and supervised the
BVUPQTJFT4VDIEPVCMFTUBOEBSETXFSFQSFEPNJOBOUMZTVQQPSUFECZ"NFSJDBO
authorities owing to larger power considerations.33

86 Under the Facade of Benevolence


"DDPSEJOHUPJOGPSNBUJPOPďDFS+PIO$BMEXFMM XIPXBTBSEFOUMZBOUJDPN-
NVOJTUBOEQSP3IFF BNBKPSJUZPGUIF"NFSJDBOTJO,PSFBPQFSBUFEVOEFSUIF
QSFNJTFUIBUiUIFAHPPLTPOMZVOEFSTUPPEGPSDF wBLFZGBDUPSBDDPVOUJOHGPSUIF
FNCSBDFPGSFQSFTTJWFNFUIPET34 A 1948 report by the lawyers Roy C. Stiles and
"MCFSU-ZNBOPOUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPGKVTUJDFBTTFSUFEUIBUiBDUTDPOTJEFSFEUP
CFDSVFMCZXFTUFSOTUBOEBSETXFSFPOMZQBSUPGUIFUFTUFEPSJFOUBMNPEVTPQF-
SBOEJ-PXFWBMVBUJPOPGMJGFSFTVMUTJOUIFBDDFQUBODFPGIVNBODSVFMUZw1PMJDF
BEWJTFS3PCFSU'FSHVTPO BCFBUDPQGSPN4U-PVJT DPNNFOUFE i0SJFOUBMTBSF
BDDVTUPNFEUPCSVUBMJUZTVDIBTXPVMEEJTHVTUBXIJUFNBOw:FUBOPUIFSSFQPSU
SFNBSLFEUIBUiDPODFQUTPGJOEJWJEVBMSJHIUTXFSFJODPNQSFIFOTJCMFUPUIFPSJ-
FOUBM*UXPVMEUBLFNVDIWJHPSPVTUSBJOJOHCBDLFECZQSPNQUQVOJTINFOUUP
change their thinking.”354VDIDPNNFOUTSFWFBMUIFSBDJTNUIBUVOEFSMBZUIF
USBNQMJOHPGDJWJMMJCFSUJFTBOEBCBOEPONFOUPGUIFQSPHSFTTJWFQPMJDJOHNPEFM
*O'FCSVBSZŴżŷŻUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPEVDFEBSFQPSU i4PVUIFSO,PSFB
"1PMJDF4UBUF wBDLOPXMFEHJOHUIBUUIF,/1IBEBXFMMLOPXOiSJHIUJTUCJBT w
XIJDI MFE QPMJDF UP BTTVNF UIF GVODUJPO PG B QPMJUJDBM GPSDF GPS UIF TVQQSFT-
TJPOPGMFęJTUFMFNFOUT"MUIPVHIUIFBVUIPSTBENJUUFEUIBUUIFiDIBSHFTUIBU
UIF 64 JT NBJOUBJOJOH B QPMJDF TUBUF UISPVHI JUT NJMJUBSZ HPWFSONFOU JT OPU
TVCKFDU UP ĘBU SFGVUBUJPO w UIFZ BSHVFE UIBU "NFSJDBO QPMJDZ XBT OPU BU GBVMU
BOEUIBUUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTTPVHIUUPJODVMDBUFEFNPDSBUJDQSJODJQMFT XIJDI
are “the antithesis of a police state.” Native agencies, however, were not able
to “achieve a full understanding of these principles,” owing to a “heritage of
+BQBOFTFPQQSFTTJPOwBOEiUIFGBDUPGPDDVQBUJPO‰UIFFYDFTTFT EJTPSEFST BOE
HSPXJOH QBJOT BDDPNQBOZJOH UIF EFWFMPQNFOU PG B TFMGHPWFSOJOHTPDJFUZw36
ćFTFSFNBSLTQSPWJEFBTUSJLJOHBENJTTJPOPGUIFMBDLPGEFNPDSBUJDTUBOEBSET
BOEEFNPOTUSBUFUIFLJOETPGBSHVNFOUTBEPQUFECZQVCMJDPďDJBMTUPBCTPMWF
UIFNTFMWFTPGSFTQPOTJCJMJUZGPSUIFVOGPMEJOHWJPMFODFJOUIF30,

“We’re Having a Civil War Down Here”: The October 1946 Revolts
and Prison Overcrowding

"DDPSEJOH UP UIF 64 "SNZT PďDJBM IJTUPSZ PG UIF ,PSFBO PDDVQBUJPO  UIF
“public’s ill feeling toward the police, which police abuse had engendered,
CFDBNFBQPUFOUGBDUPSJOUIFSJPUTBOERVBTJSFWPMUTXIJDITXFQU4PVUI,PSFB
in October 1946.”37 In South Cholla province, after the KNP killed a labor
MFBEFS /KVH+V.ZVO BOEKBJMFEVOFNQMPZFEDPBMNJOFSTDFMFCSBUJOHUIFĕSTU
BOOJWFSTBSZ PG ,PSFBT MJCFSBUJPO GSPN +BQBO  BOHSZ QFBTBOUT EZOBNJUFE B
QPMJDFCPYBOEBNCVTIFEBQSJTPOFSDPOWPZCZUISPXJOHTUPOFT$POTUBCVMBSZ
EFUBDINFOUTIVOUFEUIPTFEFFNFESFTQPOTJCMFXJUIUIFBTTJTUBODFPG"NFSJDBO
USPPQT ĕSJOHJOUPDSPXET)VOESFETEJFEPSXFSFJOKVSFE"OFEJUPSJBMQSP-
DMBJNFE i8F DBOOPU UBLF UIF IVNJMJBUJPO BOZ MPOHFS BOE NVTU ĕHIU BHBJOTU
JNQFSJBMJTNBOEUIFCBSCBSJUZPGUIF64"SNZ‫*ڀڀ‬O/PSUI,PSFB +BQBOFTF
exploitation was abolished and land was given back to the people through the

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 87


BHSBSJBOBOEMBCPSMBXT*O4PVUI,PSFB UIFQSPQFSUZPGUIF+BQBOFTFJNQFSJBM-
JTUTXBTUBLFOPWFSCZUIF"NFSJDBOTBOE,PSFBOSFBDUJPOBSZFMFNFOUT‫ڀڀ‬ćF
QFPQMFBSFTVČFSJOHGSPNPQQSFTTJPOBOEFYQMPJUBUJPOćJTJTEFNPDSBDZ w38
4VDITFOUJNFOUTMBZBUUIFSPPUPGNPVOUJOHDJWJMTUSJGFBDSPTTUIFDPVOUSZ 
UPXIJDIBVUIPSJUJFTSFTQPOEFEUIFPOMZXBZUIFZLOFXIPX‰UISPVHIGVSUIFS
QPMJDFSFQSFTTJPOBOEWJPMFODF*O5BFHV NBSUJBMMBXXBTEFDMBSFEBęFSSJPUT
precipitated by police suppression of a railroad strike left thirty-nine civilians
EFBE  IVOESFET XPVOEFE  BOE UIJSUZFJHIU NJTTJOH 'JęFFO IVOESFE XFSF
arrested, and forty were given death sentences, including SKLP leader Pak,
XIPĘFEUPUIF/PSUI0WFSŴųų ųųųTUVEFOUTXBMLFEPVUJOTPMJEBSJUZXJUIUIF
XPSLFST XIJMFNPCTSBOTBDLFEQPMJDFQPTUT CVSJFEPďDFSTBMJWF BOETMBTIFE
the face of the police chief, in a pattern replicated in neighboring cities and
towns. (In Waegwon, rioters cut the police chief ’s eyes and tongue.)39#MBNJOH
the violence on “outside agitators” (none were ever found) and the “idiocy” of
UIFQFBTBOUT UIF"NFSJDBONJMJUBSZDBMMFEJOSFJOGPSDFNFOUTUPSFTUPSFPSEFS
$PMPOFM3BZNPOE(1FFLFQSPDMBJNFE i8FSFIBWJOHBDJWJMXBSEPXOIFSFw
ćFEJSFDUPSPGUIFBSNZT%FQBSUNFOUPG5SBOTQPSUBUJPOBEEFEi8FIBEBCBU-
UMFNFOUBMJUZ8FEJEOUIBWFUPXPSSZUPPNVDIJGJOOPDFOUQFPQMFHPUIVSU8F
TFUVQDPODFOUSBUJPODBNQTPVUTJEFPGUPXOBOEIFMETUSJLFSTUIFSFXIFOUIF
jails got too full. . . . It was war. We recognized it as war and fought it as such.”40
#Z NJEŴżŷź  BęFS UIF ".( QBTTFE B OBUJPOBM TFDVSJUZ MBX FYQBOEJOH
QPMJDFQPXFST UIFSFXFSFBMNPTUŵŵ ųųųQFPQMFJOKBJM OFBSMZUXJDFBTNBOZ
BTVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTF,/1EJSFDUPS8JMMJBN.BHMJOMBUFSBDLOPXMFEHFEJOB
ŴżżżBSUJDMFUIBUiJOUIFJSSFUBMJBUJPOGPSNVSEFSTBOEJOEJHOJUJFT<EVSJOHUIF
ŴżŷŹSJPUT>QPMJDFXFOUUPPGBSJOBSSFTUJOHMBSHFOVNCFSTPGDPNNVOJTUT MFę-
JTUT BOEMFęJTUTZNQBUIJ[FSTw.BOZXFSFTFOUFODFECZNJMJUBSZUSJCVOBM XIJMF
others languished in prison without counsel. Thousands were held in outlying
DBNQT JODMVEJOHTFWFONFNCFSTPGUIF/BUJPOBM"TTFNCMZDIBSHFEXJUIMFBE-
JOHBiDPNNVOJTUDPOTQJSBDZw41
During an inspection of Wanju jail, Captain Richard D. Robinson found six
QSJTPOFST TIBSJOH B NPTRVJUPJOGFTUFE UXFMWFGPPUCZUXFMWFGPPU DFMM BDDFT-
TJCMFPOMZUISPVHIBTNBMMUSBQEPPSBOEUVOOFM*OPUIFSGBDJMJUJFT JONBUFTXFSF
CFBUFO BOE TUSJQQFE OBLFE UP LFFQ UIFN GSPN DPNNJUUJOH TVJDJEF #MBOLFUT
were shared and never cleaned, and washing facilities were nonexistent. The
MBUSJOFXBTVTVBMMZOPUIJOHCVUBIPMFJOUIFĘPPS'PPEXBTJOBEFRVBUF XJOUFS
UFNQFSBUVSFTXFSFTVC[FSP BOENFEJDBMDBSF XBT TDBOU 1SJTPOFST XFSFOPU
BMMPXFE UP XSJUF MFUUFST PS IBWF PVUTJEF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT BOE VTVBMMZ IBE UP
TMFFQTUBOEJOHVQ*O4VXBO JONBUFTXFSFGPSDFEUPTMFFQJOQJUDFMMTXJUIPVU
IFBUćFJSXBUFSXBTESBXOGSPNBXFMMMPDBUFEOFYUUPBEFQPTJUPSZGPSSBX
TFXBHF DBVTJOHSBNQBOUEJTFBTF JODMVEJOHBTDBCJFTFQJEFNJD42
*O"QSJMŴżŷŻ UPSFMJFWFPWFSDSPXEJOH .BKPS8JMMJBN'%FBO BPOFUJNF
#FSLFMFZ QBUSPMNBO  SFDPNNFOEFE UIF SFMFBTF PG Ŷ Ŵŷų QPMJUJDBM QSJTPOFST

88 Under the Facade of Benevolence


XIPTFPČFOTFDPOTJTUFEPOMZPGiQBSUJDJQBUJPOJOJMMFHBMNFFUJOHTBOEEFNPO-
strations and distributing handbills.”43"VUIPSJUJFTFTUBCMJTIFEXPSLDBNQTJO
PSEFSUPiVUJMJ[FUIFDBQBCJMJUJFTPGUIFJONBUFTJOVTFGVMPDDVQBUJPOT wXIJDI
PęFOFOUBJMFEQFSGPSNJOHEVUJFTGPSUIF"NFSJDBONJMJUBSZ&OBDUJOHUIFJEFBMT
PGUIFQSPHSFTTJWFNPWFNFOU 64BEWJTFSTJOUSPEVDFEWPDBUJPOBMUSBJOJOH B
SFXBSET TZTUFN  QSJTPO JOEVTUSJFT  BOE NPWJFT BOE SFDSFBUJPO ćFZ CSPVHIU
in chaplains, constructed juvenile facilities, and established a guard training
TDIPPMXJUIDPVSTFTJONPEFSOQFOPMPHZ ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH BOEXFBQPOT44
8IBU FČFDU UIF SFGPSNT IBE JT VODMFBS  BT QSJTPOT SFNBJOFE SJEEMFE XJUI
BCVTF "DDPSEJOH UP UIF 64 "SNZ  HVBSET EJTQMBZFE B iIBSTIOFTT UIBU XBT
SFQVHOBOUUP%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDFMFHBMBEWJTFSTw"UUIF*ODIPO#PZT1SJTPO 
JONBUFT XFSF EFQSJWFE PG FYFSDJTF BOE GPSDFE UP XPSL BU NBLJOH TUSBX SPQF
without sufficient light. Prisoners engaged in hunger strikes and led jailbreaks.
*O ,BOHKV PO "VHVTU ŶŴ  Ŵżŷź  Ŵźŵ JONBUFT PWFSQPXFSFE HVBSET  BOE TFWFO
ESJMMFEUIFJSXBZUPGSFFEPN5XPZFBSTMBUFSJO.PLQP OFBS4FPVM ŵŶźHVFS-
SJMMBTGSPN$IFKVEP*TMBOEXFSFLJMMFECZQPMJDFBOE64"SNZTPMEJFSTBęFS
CSFBLJOH GSFF JOUP UIF OFJHICPSJOH IJMMT BOPUIFS FJHIUZĕWF XFSF DBQUVSFE
alive.450OUIFXIPMF UIFQSJTPODPOEJUJPOTDPOUSBEJDUUIFNZUIUIBUUIF"NFS-
JDBOJOĘVFODFJO4PVUI,PSFBXBTTPNFIPXCFOJHO"TJOMBUFSJOUFSWFOUJPOT 
UIFSFQSFTTJWFDMJNBUFDBUBMZ[FEUIFPQQPTJUJPOBOEIBTUFOFEBSNFESFTJTUBODF

“A Cloud of Terror”: The Cheju-do Massacre and Korean War Atrocities

4PNFPGUIFXPSTUQPMJDFDSJNFTPDDVSSFEJOTVQQSFTTJOHUIFVQSJTJOHPOUIF
island of Cheju-do at the southern tip of the country. The source of the upheaval
XBTVOFRVBMMBOEEJTUSJCVUJPOBOEQPMJDFCSVUBMJUZ BTUIF$*"BDLOPXMFEHFE
)PEHF JSPOJDBMMZ UPME B HSPVQ PG DPOHSFTTNFO UIBU $IFKVEP XBT B USVMZ
iDPNNVOBM BSFB ‫  ڀ ڀ‬QFBDFGVMMZ DPOUSPMMFE CZ UIF 1FPQMFT $PNNJUUFF w XIP
QSPNPUFE B DPMMFDUJWJTU BOE TPDJBMJTU QIJMPTPQIZ iXJUIPVU NVDI $PNJOUFSO
JOĘVFODFw46 In March 1947, as the AMG tried to assert its authority, the KNP
ĕSFE JOUPBDSPXE BOE LJMMFEFJHIUQFBDFGVMEFNPOTUSBUPST UIFO JNQSJTPOFE
BOPUIFSGPVSIVOESFE(PWFSOPS1BL,ZPOHKVOXBTEJTNJTTFEGPSCFJOHiUPP
SFEwBOESFQMBDFECZ:V)BFKJO BOFYUSFNFSJHIUJTUEFTDSJCFEBTiSVUIMFTTBOE
dictatorial in his dealing with the opposing political parties.”47 KNP units and
SJHIUXJOHZPVUIHSPVQTUFSSPSJ[FEUIF1FPQMFT$PNNJUUFFBOEDVUPČUIFĘPX
of food and construction supplies, turning the island into an open-air prison.
In response, the Cheju-do branch of the SKLP, long known for its anticolo-
OJBMEFĕBODF FTUBCMJTIFEHVFSSJMMBVOJUTJOUIF)BMMB.PVOUBJOTTVQQPSUFECZ
BOFTUJNBUFEŻųQFSDFOUPGUIFQPQVMBUJPO48 In April 1948 the rebellion spread
to the west coast of the island, where guerrillas attacked twenty-four police
TUBUJPOT ,/1 BOE DPOTUBCVMBSZ VOJUT PQFSBUJOH VOEFS 64 NJMJUBSZ DPN-
NBOEBOEBJEFECZBFSJBMSFJOGPSDFNFOUTBOETQZQMBOFTTXFQUUIFNPVOUBJOT 

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 89


XBHJOHiBOBMMPVUHVFSSJMMBFYUFSNJOBUJPODBNQBJHO wBT&WFSFUU%SVNXSJHIU
PG UIF "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ DIBSBDUFSJ[FE JU  NBTTBDSJOH QFPQMF XJUI CBNCPP
TQFBSTBOEUPSDIJOHIPNFT0OFSFQPSUTUBUFE i'SVTUSBUFECZOPULOPXJOHUIF
JEFOUJUZPGUIFTFFMVTJWFNFO<UIFHVFSSJMMBT> UIFQPMJDFJOTPNFDBTFTDBSSJFE
PVUJOEJTDSJNJOBUFXBSGBSFBHBJOTUFOUJSFWJMMBHFTw#FUXFFOŶų ųųųBOEŹų ųųų
people were killed out of a population of 300,000, including the guerrilla leader
:J5ÙLLV BOEBOPUIFSŷų ųųųXFSFFYJMFEćFGFSPDJUZPGUIFWJPMFODFXBTJO
QBSUBUUSJCVUFEUPSBDJTNEJSFDUFEBHBJOTU$IFKVOT XIPXFSFTFFOBTCBDLXBSE
DPNQBSFEUPUIF,PSFBONBJOMBOEFST49
1PMJDF BUSPDJUJFT XFSF POMZ TMJHIUMZ MFTT NBSLFE JO UIF TVQQSFTTJPO PG UIF
JOTVSSFDUJPOJO:PTV XIJDIMFęUIBUQPSUUPXOJOBTIFT"ęFSUIFEFDMBSBUJPO
PGNBSUJBMMBXPO0DUPCFSŵŵ ŴżŷŻ DPOTUBCVMBSZVOJUTVOEFS$BQUBJO+BNFT
)BVTNBOSPVOEFEVQTVTQFDUFESFCFMT TUSJQQFEUIFNUPUIFJSVOEFSXFBSJO
TDIPPMZBSET  BOE CFBU UIFN XJUI CBST  JSPO DIBJOT  BOE SJĘF CVUUT $VSTPSZ
screenings were undertaken, and several thousand were executed in plain sight
of their wives and children in revenge for attacks on police stations. The corpses
PGNBOZPGUIFEFBEXFSFQMBDFEJODJUZTUSFFUTXJUIBSFEIBNNFSBOETJDLMF
insignia covering the chest for propaganda purposes. Order was restored only
BęFSQVSHFTXFSFFOBDUFEJODPOTUBCVMBSZSFHJNFOUTUIBUIBENVUJOJFEJOTVQ-
QPSUPGUIFSFCFMDBVTF BOEUIFQFSQFUSBUPSTFYFDVUFECZĕSJOHTRVBE50
ćF:PTVBOE$IFKVEPNBTTBDSFTDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFEFDJNBUJPOPGUIFMFęJTU
NPWFNFOUT XIJDIEFQSJWFE,JN*M4VOHTBSNJFTPGUIFTVQQPSUUIFZFYQFDUFE
after crossing into South Korea on June 25, 1950, precipitating the Korean War.
8IFOĕHIUJOHCSPLFPVU UIF,/1 FYQBOEFEUPTFWFOUZUIPVTBOENFO KPJOFE
JO DPNCBU PQFSBUJPOT  MBUFS SFDFJWJOH EFDPSBUJPOT GPS iSVUIMFTT DBNQBJHOT
BHBJOTUHVFSSJMMBGPSDFTw.BOZPďDFSTXFSFSFDSVJUFEGPSTFDSFUNJTTJPOTJOUP
North Korea by the CIA’s Seoul station chief, Albert Haney, a key architect of
UIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN BOE)BOT5PęF BIFSPPGUIF%BOJTIVOEFSHSPVOEXIP
MBUFSTFSWFEVOEFS014DPWFSJO$PMPNCJB"MBSHFOVNCFSXFSFLJMMFE PXJOH
UPUIFJOĕMUSBUJPOPGUIFTFDSFUUFBNTCZEPVCMFBHFOUT UIPVHI)BOFZEPDUPSFE
the intelligence reports to cover up their fate.51
*OUIFTVNNFSPGŴżŸų UPLFFQ4PVUIFSOMFęJTUTGSPNSFJOGPSDJOHUIF/PSUI-
FSOFST ,/1BOE30,"VOJUTFNQUJFEUIFQSJTPOTBOETIPUBTNBOZBTŴųų ųųų
EFUBJOFFT  EVNQJOH UIF CPEJFT JOUP IBTUJMZ EVH USFODIFT  BCBOEPOFE NJOFT 
PSUIFTFB"DDPSEJOHUPBSDIJWBMSFWFMBUJPOTBOEUIFĕOEJOHTPGB5SVUIBOE
3FDPODJMJBUJPO$PNNJTTJPO XPNFOBOEDIJMESFOXFSFBNPOHUIPTFLJMMFE52
ćF#SJUJTIKPVSOBMJTU+BNFT$BNFSPOFODPVOUFSFEQSJTPOFSTPOUIFJSXBZUP
FYFDVUJPOPOMZZBSETGSPN64"SNZIFBERVBSUFSTBOEĕWFNJOVUFTGSPNUIF
6/$PNNJTTJPOCVJMEJOHJO1VTBOićFZXFSFTLFMFUPOTBOEUIFZDSJOHFEMJLF
EPHT wIFXSPUFićFZXFSFNBOBDMFEXJUIDIBJOTBOE‫ڀڀ‬DPNQFMMFEUPDSPVDI
JOUIFDMBTTJDBM0SJFOUBMBUUJUVEFPGTVCKFDUJPO4PNFUJNFTUIFZNPWFEFOPVHI
UPTDPPQBIBOEGVMPGXBUFSGSPNUIFCMBDLQVEEMFTBSPVOEUIFN‫"ڀڀ‬OZEFWJB-
UJPOGSPN<UIF0SJFOUBMBUUJUVEF>CSPVHIUBHVOUPUIFJSIFBETw53

90 Under the Facade of Benevolence


ćFNPTUDPODFOUSBUFELJMMJOHPDDVSSFEJOUIFDJUZPG5BFKPO XIFSFUIF,/1
TMBVHIUFSFEUIPVTBOETPGMFęJTUTVOEFS"NFSJDBOPWFSTJHIU0ďDJBMIJTUPSJFT
MPOHUSJFEUPQJOUIFBUSPDJUZPOUIFDPNNVOJTUTćFDPOEVDUPGUIF,/1XBT
not an aberration, however, but the result of ideological conditioning, training
JOWJPMFOUDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZNFUIPETCZUIF"NFSJDBOTBOE+BQBOFTF BOEUIF
CSFBLEPXOPGTPDJBMNPSFTJOUIFXBS"DDPSEJOHUPUIFIJTUPSJBO,JN%POH
$IPPO UIFQPMJDFLJMMJOHTSFQSFTFOUFEBNPOHUIFiNPTUUSBHJDBOECSVUBMDIBQ-
UFSTwPGBDPOĘJDUUIBUDMBJNFEUIFMJWFTPGŶNJMMJPOQFPQMFBOEMFęNJMMJPOT
NPSFBTSFGVHFFT54

Managing the Counterrevolution: Police Training and “Nation-Building”


in South Korea in the War’s Aftermath

ćF,PSFBO8BSFOEFEJOTUBMFNBUFJOŴżŸŶ4ZOHNBO3IFFSFNBJOFEMFBEFS
of the ROK until his death in 1960, when, after a brief power struggle, he was
SFQMBDFECZ(FOFSBM1BSL$IVOH)FFćSPVHIPVUUIFŴżŸųTBOEŴżŹųT "NFSJ-
DBOQPMJDZFMJUFTDPODFJWFEPG4PVUI,PSFBBTBMBCPSBUPSZGPSUIFQSPNPUJPOPG
GSFFNBSLFUDBQJUBMJTNBOENPEFSOJ[JOHSFGPSNT4USBUFHJDQMBOOFSTIPQFEUIBU
South Korea could surpass its Northern rival in achieving political stability and
FDPOPNJDUBLFPČBOECFOFĕU+BQBOTFDPOPNZCZTFSWJOHBTJUTUSBEJOHQBSUOFS
BOETPVSDFPGSBXNBUFSJBMT UIVTIFMQJOHUPLFFQJUJOUIF8FTUFSODBNQćF
success of South Korea and Japan could then be used for propaganda purposes
UP VOEFSDVU UIF BQQFBM PG UIF OPOBMJHOFE NPWFNFOU BOE PG TPDJBMJTU FYQFSJ-
NFOUTJOUIFEFWFMPQJOHXPSMEXIJDI8BTIJOHUPOXBTXPSLJOHUPTVCWFSU55
0QFSBUJOHPOBCVEHFUPGžżųų ųųųQFSZFBS QPMJDFQSPHSBNTXFSFEFTJHOFE
UPXJQFPVUUIFMBTUWFTUJHFTPGHVFSSJMMBSFTJTUBODFBOEQSPNPUFUIFTUBCJMJUZPO
XIJDI FDPOPNJD EFWFMPQNFOU DPVME UBLF SPPU $PODFSOFE BCPVU QPMJDF DPS-
SVQUJPO BOE PVUEBUFE UFDIOJDBM FRVJQNFOU  UIF $*" OPUFE UIBU 4PVUI ,PSFB
IBE FNFSHFE GSPN UIF XBS XJUI B iSJHJE BOUJDPNNVOJTU OBUJPOBM BUUJUVEF
BOEWJHJMBOU‫ڀڀ‬SFQSFTTJWFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZTZTUFN‫ڀڀ‬XIJDIIBTSFTVMUFEJO
UIFWJSUVBMFMJNJOBUJPOPGBMMCVUUIFNPTUDPWFSUBOEDMBOEFTUJOFDPNNVOJTU
operators.”567BSJPVTSFWFOHFSFHJNFOUTXFSFJOFYJTUFODF XIPTFNJTTJPOXBT
UPIVOUEPXO/PSUIFSODPMMBCPSBUPST"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHGPDVTFEPOCVJMEJOH
up espionage and “counter-subversive” capabilities, creating a central records
TZTUFN BOEMFDUVSJOHPOUIFTFWFSJUZPGUIFiDPNNVOJTUUISFBUw
64 NJMJUBSZ BEWJTFST PWFSTBX QPMJDF VOJUT DBSSZJOH PVU iNPQVQw EFBUI
TRVBE  PQFSBUJPOT BHBJOTU iCBOEJUTw BOE TQJFT  JO XIJDI DJWJMJBO EFBUIT XFSF
XJEFMZSFQPSUFE*OBQSFDVSTPSUPUIF7JFUOBN1IPFOJYQSPHSBN FďDJFODZXBT
NFBTVSFECZUIFOVNCFSPGXFBQPOTTFJ[FEBOEHVFSSJMMBTDBQUVSFEBOEiBOOJ-
IJMBUFE wVTVBMMZBUMFBTUGPVSUJNFTNPSFUIBOUIFOVNCFSPGQPMJDFXPVOEFE
or killed.57 Typical was a report in February 1954 in which adviser Edward J.
$MBTTPOMBVEFEUIFEJTDPWFSZBOEEFTUSVDUJPOPGBOFOFNZIJEFPVUJO4POBN
JO XIJDI UIJSUZPOF iCBOEJUTw XFSF LJMMFE BOE ĕęZGPVS DBQUVSFE58 Another

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 91


SFQPSUSFGFSSFEUPBQPMJDFESJWFJO%FDFNCFSŴżŸŶ 0QFSBUJPO5SBNQMF XIJDI
iSFEVDFEUIFOVNCFSPGACBOEJUTGSPNŹżŴUPPOMZŴŶŴ<JOUIF4PVUIFSO4FDVSJUZ
$PNNBOE> wUIFSFNBJOEFSPGXIPNXFSFOPXiXJEFMZTDBUUFSFEwBOEiSFQSF-
sented little danger to the population.”59
*OUIFGBDFPGSFQSFTTJPOBOEXBOJOHTVQQPSUBNPOHBXBSXFBSZQPQVMB-
UJPO HVFSSJMMBTSFTPSUFEUPLJEOBQQJOHBOEFYUPSUJPOJOBOBUUFNQUUPTVSWJWF
"QPMJDFSFQPSUEBUFE.BZŴ ŴżŸŷ OPUFEUIBUĕWFiCBOEJUTwVOEFSUIFDPWFSPG
EBSLOFTTSBJEFEUIFIPNFTPGUXPGBSNFST UJFEVQUIFJSGBNJMJFT BOEEFNBOEFE
NJMMFU TBMU QPUBUPFT BOEDMPUIJOH XIJDIHJWFTBHPPETFOTFPGUIFJSEFTQFSB-
tion.60*O%FDFNCFSŴżŸŹ QVCMJDBVUIPSJUJFTBOOPVODFEUIFTVDDFTTPGQBDJĕ-
DBUJPOFČPSUTćFZDMBJNFEUPIBWFBSSFTUFEUIFMBTULOPXOiHVFSJMMBCBOEJUTw
PG UIF BOUJ"NFSJDBO SFHJNFOU  B TFWFOUFFOZFBSPME HJSM  ,PPO +B ,JN  BOE
FJHIUFFOZFBSPME4BN+JO,PI JOBNPQVQDBNQBJHOJO$IVMMP1VLUPQSPW-
JODF4FWFOTVCWFSTJWFTXFSFTIPU JODMVEJOHDPNNBOEFS,BVO4PP1BL BHF
UIJSUZUISFFćFQIPUPTPG,PPOBOE4BNVOEFSQPMJDFBSSFTUXFSFCSPBEDBTU
in the Korea Times in order to publicize the KNP’s strength in reestablishing
law and order.61 The Korean War had been a long drawn-out affair, and as the
JNBHFTSFWFBM 4PVUI,PSFBOTPDJFUZSFNBJOFECJUUFSMZEJWJEFEJOJUTBęFSNBUI
and, like the North, subjected to continued state repression. The country could
be stabilized only by force.
ćSPVHIPVUUIFEVSBUJPOPG3IFFTSVMF UIFQPMJDFSFNBJOFENPCJMJ[FEGPS
QBSBNJMJUBSZPQFSBUJPOT*OUFSGFSFODFJOFMFDUJPOTBOECBMMPUTUVďOHSFNBJOFE
QSFWBMFOU BTEJEDVTUPNBSZQSBDUJDFTTVDIBTTVSWFJMMBODF CMBDLQSPQBHBOEB 
and torture.62 1PMJDF BEWJTFS 8JMMJBN .BYĕFME DPNQMBJOFE BCPVU POEVUZ
QBUSPMNFO GPVOE TMFFQJOH  ESJOLJOH  PS BXBZ GSPN UIFJS QPTU "DDPSEJOH UP
4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUEPDVNFOUT UIF,/1XBTFTQFDJBMMZiCSVUBMJOFYBDUJOHQVO-
JTINFOUBOESFWFOHFwBHBJOTUUIPTFXIPIBEDPPQFSBUFEXJUIUIF/PSUI,PSFBO
NJMJUBSZ  TPNFUJNFT iTMBVHIUFSJOH UIFNw 3IFF VTFE UIF QPMJDF UP VOEFSUBLF
“extralegal and violent tactics” against opponents. In April 1960, police opened
ĕSFPOTUVEFOUEFNPOTUSBUPSTQSPUFTUJOHUIFSFDFOUGSBVEVMFOUFMFDUJPOT LJMMJOH
or wounding several hundred. Koreans in the United States picketed the White
)PVTF  EFNBOEJOH UIBU "NFSJDB UBLF B TUBOE BHBJOTU iUIF CSVUBM  EFHSBEJOH
butchery.”63
The Korea TimesSFQPSUFEPOUIFBSSFTUBOECFBUJOHPG,JN4VO5BF BO.1 
BęFS IF QSPUFTUFE TUBHFE FMFDUJPOT JO ŴżŸŹ -FF *L)FVOH  NJOJTUFS PG IPNF
BČBJST BOE,JN$IPOH8PO IFBEPGUIFQVCMJDTFDVSJUZCVSFBV XIPXPSLFE
DMPTFMZXJUI$BQUBJO8BSSFO40MJO BDBSFFSBSNZPďDFS PSEFSFEUSPPQFSTUP
iOBCUIFCBTUBSEwBOELFQUIJNJOEFUFOUJPOGPSĕWFEBZT EVSJOHXIJDIUJNF
he was “treated like a dog.” The newspaper editorialized, “There can never be a
SFQSFTFOUBUJWFEFNPDSBDZXJUINFOMJLF-FFBOE,JNJOQPTJUJPOTPGQPXFSw64
#PSOUPBQPPS,PSFBOGBNJMZJO+BQBO ,JNXBTUSBJOFEJOUIFŴżŶųTJO+BQB-
OFTFNJMJUBSZBDBEFNJFT XIPTFSJHPSPVTJEFPMPHJDBMDPOEJUJPOJOHBOEIBSTI 

92 Under the Facade of Benevolence


EFIVNBOJ[JOH NFUIPET TFU UIF DPVSTF GPS IJT DBSFFS ,OPXO BT UIF i1BFLUV
Mountain Tiger,” he decapitated suspected guerrilla collaborators during the
TVQQSFTTJPO PG UIF :PTV SFCFMMJPO XJUI B +BQBOFTFTUZMF TXPSE BOE NBDIJOF
HVOOFEUIJSUZPOFEFUBJOFFTJOUIF:POHEPLQPMJDFTUBUJPOXIPXFSFTVTQFDUFE
PGCFJOHiDPOUBNJOBUFEFMFNFOUTw*O:POHIBFNZPO ,JNTNFOBSSFTUFEDJWJM-
JBOTBęFSĕOEJOHQSPQBHBOEBMFBĘFUTBUBOFBSCZTDIPPMBOETIPUUIFNJOGSPOU
PGWJMMBHFST PQFOJOHĕSFPOXPNFOBOEDIJMESFOXIPSBOGSPNUIFTDFOF0WFS
ĕWFIVOESFEXFSFLJMMFEJOUIFNBTTBDSF GPSXIJDI,JNXBTTFOUFODFEUPUISFF
ZFBSTJOQSJTPO UIPVHIIFXBTBNOFTUJFECZ3IFF65
%SJWFOCZBOPCTFTTJWFBOUJDPNNVOJTNBOEUIFSBQBDJPVTQVSTVJUPGQPXFS 
i5JHFSw,JNQSFTJEFEPWFSGVSUIFSBUSPDJUJFTBTWJDFDPNNBOEFSPGUIFNJMJUBSZ
QPMJDFJO1VTBOEVSJOHUIF,PSFBO8BS)JTBQQPJOUNFOUBTIFBEPGUIFQVCMJD
TFDVSJUZCVSFBVXBTBSFXBSEGPSIJTMPZBMUZUP3IFFBOESFĘFDUFEUIF,/1T
DPOUJOVFE FNQIBTJT PO DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ BOE VUUFS EJTSFHBSE GPS IVNBO
SJHIUT"NCBTTBEPS+PIO.VDDJP XIPMBUFSPWFSTBXBOPUIFSEJSUZXBSJO(VB-
UFNBMB DIBSBDUFSJ[FE,JNTNFUIPETBTiSVUIMFTTZFUFČFDUJWF wUZQJGZJOH64
TVQQPSUGPSCSVUBMUBDUJDT BTMPOHBTUIFZXFSFEJSFDUFEBHBJOTUiDPNNVOJTUTw66
7JFXJOHUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTBTBHSFBUTVDDFTT UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTPVHIU
UP SFQMJDBUF UIFN JO 7JFUOBN  XIFSF UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT BOE UIF 'SFODI GBDFE
B TJNJMBS QSPCMFN PG DPNNVOJTU JOĕMUSBUJPO BOE BO iJOBCJMJUZ UP EJTUJOHVJTI
GSJFOEGSPNGPFw$PMPOFM"MCFSU)BOFZ JOIJTJOUFSOBMPVUMJOFPGUIFŴŵżųE
QSPHSBN  CPBTUFE UIBU i64 FČPSUT CFIJOE UIF 30, JO TVCEVJOH DPNNVOJTU
guerrillas in South Korea, while not generally known, were exceptionally effec-
UJWF BU B UJNF XIFO UIF 'SFODI XFSF TQFDUBDVMBSMZ JOFČFDUJWF JO *OEPDIJOBw
0O.BZŵź ŴżŸŷ -JFVUFOBOU$PMPOFM1IJMJQQF.JMPOPGUIF'SFODIBSNZXBT
CSJFGFECZ"NFSJDBOPďDJBMTPO,/1UFDIOJRVFTPGTVSWFJMMBODFBOEQPQVMB-
UJPODPOUSPM.JMPOXBTJNQSFTTFECZUIFFČFDUJWFOFTTPGQPMJDFJOBOUJHVFSSJMMB
DBNQBJHOT XIJDIIFTPVHIUUPJODPSQPSBUFBTBNPEFM67
*O ŴżŸŸ  BęFS USBOTGFSSJOH QPMJDF USBJOJOH UP UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU VOEFS
ŴŵżųE UIF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOQSPWJEFEPWFSžŴNJMMJPOJODPNNPEJ-
UJFTUPUIF,/1 JODMVEJOHSBEJPUSBOTNJUUFST TUFFMĕMJOHDBCJOFUT BžŸųų ųųų
TXJUDICPBSE BOEĕSFUSVDLT-BVSFOi+BDLw(PJO BOBJSGPSDFPďDFSXJUI#"
BOE.4EFHSFFTJODSJNJOPMPHZGSPNUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJBBU#FSLFMFZ
BOEEJSFDUPSPGUIF"MMFHIFOZ$SJNF-BCJO1JUUTCVSHI TFUVQBTDJFOUJĕDDSJNF
MBCFRVJQQFEXJUIĕOHFSQSJOUJOHQPXEFSTBOEUIFMBUFTUGPSFOTJDUFDIOPMPHZ
)FMBUFSEJEUIFTBNFJO7JFUOBN *OEPOFTJB %PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD BOE#SB-
zil.)68 "EWJTFST GSPN .JDIJHBO 4UBUF 6OJWFSTJUZT 7JFUOBN QSPKFDU  JODMVEJOH
Jack Ryan, Ralph Turner, and Howard Hoyt (whose backgrounds are discussed
JODIBQUFSź TFSWFEBTDPOTVMUBOUTBOEIFMQFETFUVQBDPNNVOJDBUJPOTZTUFN
They then went on to Taipei, where, on a visit sponsored by the CIA-fronted
"TJB'PVOEBUJPO UIFZJOTUSVDUFEQPMJDFMFECZUIF(FOFSBMJTTJNPTTPO$IJBOH
$IJOHLVPJOSPPUJOHPVU.BPJTUJOĕMUSBUJPO69

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 93


ćF ŴŵżųE QPMJDF USBJOJOH QSPHSBN JO 4PVUI ,PSFB XBT IFBEFE CZ 3BZ
Foreaker, retired chief of police in Oakland, and a twenty-seven-year veteran
PGUIF#FSLFMFZQPMJDFGPSDF XIFSFIFIBECFFONFOUPSFECZ"VHVTU7PMMNFS 
UIFiGBUIFSPGNPEFSOMBXFOGPSDFNFOUw%VSJOHIJTUFOVSFBT#FSLFMFZDIJFG 
7PMMNFS QJPOFFSFE NBOZ JOOPWBUJPOT  JODMVEJOH UIF VTF PG ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH 
patrol cars, and lie detector tests, illustrating, according to his biographers, his
iMPWFPGHBEHFUT PGTDJFOUJĕDCSFBLUISPVHITUIBUIFIPQFEDPVMENBLFUIFQSP-
DFTTPGEFUFDUJOHBOETPMWJOHDSJNFTFOPSNPVTMZNPSFFďDJFOUw"WFUFSBOPG
UIF4QBOJTI"NFSJDBO8BSXIPDVUIJTUFFUIUSBJOJOHQPMJDFJO.BOJMB 7PMMNFS
XBTNPSFMJCFSBMUIBONBOZPGIJTDPOUFNQPSBSJFTJOEFGFOEJOHDPNNVOJTUT
SJHIUUPGSFFBTTFNCMZBOETQFFDIBOEJODSJUJDJ[JOHESVHQSPIJCJUJPOMBXT)F
XPSLFEUPDVSUBJMUIFiUIJSEEFHSFFwBOEFNCSBDFEBTPDJBMXPSLBQQSPBDIUP
QPMJDJOH WJTJUJOHMPDBMKBJMTFBDINPSOJOHUPUBMLUPJONBUFTBOEVSHJOHIJTPď-
DFSTUPJOUFSBDUXJUINFNCFSTPGUIFDPNNVOJUZPOUIFJSCFBU70
"QBSUGSPNJOIJTBUUJUVEFUPXBSEDPNNVOJTN UIFTFBSFUIFLJOETPGJEF-
BMT UIBU 'PSFBLFS  B TQFDJBMJTU JO DSJNJOBM BOE TFDVSJUZ JOWFTUJHBUJPOT  TPVHIU
UPQSPNPUFJO4PVUI,PSFB BOEMBUFSJO*OEPOFTJB &UIJPQJB (VBUFNBMB BOE
7JFUOBN)FDPNNFOUFE i0VSXPSLIFSF<JOUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN>JTJOUIF
UPUBMĕFMEPGQVCMJDTBGFUZSBUIFSUIBOJOQPMJDFXPSLBMPOFw71 Foreaker’s succes-
TPSBT0BLMBOEQPMJDFDIJFG 8ZNBO87FSOPO XBTQBSUPGUIFBEWJTPSZUFBN 
MBUFSTFSWJOHJO7JFUOBNBOE1BLJTUBO-JLF'PSFBLFS IFIBEBSFQVUBUJPOBTBO
JODPSSVQUJCMFSFGPSNFS IBWJOHFTUBCMJTIFEBTQFDJBMQMBOOJOHBOESFTFBSDIVOJU
JO0BLMBOETUBČFECZ#FSLFMFZTUVEFOUTUPBOBMZ[FBOEBEESFTTQPMJDFQSPCMFNT 
JODMVEJOHQPPSSFMBUJPOTXJUINJOPSJUJFTćF0BLMBOEQPMJDFOFWFSUIFMFTTDPO-
UJOVFEUPCFWJFXFEBTBOBSNZPGPDDVQBUJPOJOUIFCMBDLDPNNVOJUZ UIFJS
CSVUBMJ[BUJPO PG BOUJXBS EFNPOTUSBUPST BOE #MBDL 1BOUIFST EVSJOH UIF ŴżŹųT
FYFNQMJGZJOHUIFMJNJUTPGUIF#FSLFMFZQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPONPEFM72 Shaped by
UIFDPOTFSWBUJWF IJFSBSDIJDBM BOEMJMZXIJUFJOTUJUVUJPOBMNJMJFVGSPNXIJDI
UIFZ DBNF  'PSFBLFS BOE 7FSOPO XFSF HFOFSBMMZ JMMFRVJQQFE UP CSJOH BCPVU
enlightened police practice in South Korea, where they faced an alien cultural
FOWJSPONFOUBOEBXBSDMJNBUFUIBUCSPVHIUPVUUIFNPTUWJPMFOUUFOEFODJFTPG
the police.
*OUIFBUUFNQUUPJOTUJMMHSFBUFSQSPGFTTJPOBMJTN UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTFOU
twenty top-ranking KNP, including General Hak Sung Wang, head of the
OBUJPOBM QPMJDF DPMMFHF  BOE $IJ )XBO $IPJ  DIJFG PG UIF VOJGPSNFE QPMJDF 
USBJOFECZUIF"NFSJDBOTJOUIFŴżŷųT GPSDPVSTFTBUUIF'#*"DBEFNZBOEBU
MFBEJOHDSJNJOPMPHZJOTUJUVUFTTVDIBTBU#FSLFMFZ .JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ 
and the Northwestern Traffic Institute.73"EP[FONPSFXFSFTFOUUPUIF-PT
"OHFMFT1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU IFBEFECZ$IJFG8JMMJF1BSLFS ŴżŸųoŴżŹŹ XIP
was known for cleaning up corruption and for his right-wing politics and insen-
TJUJWJUZUPXBSESBDJBMNJOPSJUJFTBOEUIFQPPS4VCTDSJCJOHUP+&EHBS)PPWFST
CSBOEPGUIFPMPHJDBMBOUJDPNNVOJTN UIF$*"DPOOFDUFE1BSLFSIFMQFEUPTFU

94 Under the Facade of Benevolence


VQ"NFSJDBOTUZMFQPMJDFTZTUFNTJO'SBOLGVSUBOE.VOJDIBęFS8PSME8BS**
BOE JOBĕUUJOHHFTUVSF XBTOBNFEBOIPOPSBSZDIJFGPGUIF,/174
,PSFBOPďDFSTUSBJOFEJOQSJTPONBOBHFNFOUBU(FPSHF8BTIJOHUPO6OJ-
WFSTJUZSFUVSOFEIPNFUPSFGPSNUIF30,QFOBMTZTUFN%SBXJOHPOUIFJEFBMT
of progressive penology, they revived efforts to establish rewards and parole,
QSPNPUFE JOEVTUSJBM USBJOJOH  BOE DSFBUFE KVWFOJMF SFGPSNBUPSJFT UP BEESFTT
TLZSPDLFUJOHEFMJORVFODZSBUFTSFTVMUJOHGSPNBQSPGVTJPOPGXBSPSQIBOTćF
14%QMFEHFEžŸŸŶ ŹŻŻBOEBTTJTUFEJOEFWFMPQJOHBXPSLGBSNPVUTJEF4FPVM
based on the Boys Town juvenile detention center in Nebraska.75
$PJODJEJOHXJUIUIFQBTTBHFPGNBOEBUPSZNJOJNVNTFOUFODJOHGPSESVH
PČFOTFT JO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT  UIF *OUFSOBUJPOBM $PPQFSBUJPO "ENJOJTUSBUJPO
FTUBCMJTIFE QPMJDF DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDT VOJUT  XIJDI SBJEFE PQJVN EFOT BOE
MBVODIFE0QFSBUJPO1PQQZ EFQMPZJOHBSNZBWJBUJPOVOJUTUPEFUFDUBOEEFTUSPZ
QPQQZĕFMET76ćFTFDBNQBJHOTXFSFVOEFSNJOFECZQPMJDFBOEHPWFSONFOUBM
DPSSVQUJPO " SFQPSU GSPN UIF 64 "SNZT $SJNJOBM *OWFTUJHBUJPO %JWJTJPO
pointed to ties between Japanese gangster Hisayuki Machii (known in Korea
BT,P:VOH.PL BOE30,OBWBMJOUFMMJHFODF TUBUJOHUIBUIFXBTiUPPTUSPOH
QPMJUJDBMMZ UP CF UPVDIFE CZ UIF QPMJDF w EFTQJUF IBWJOH NVSEFSFE B ,PSFBO
CPYFS "NFSJDBO USPPQT BMTP QBSUJDJQBUFE JO UIF CMBDL NBSLFU  XPSLJOH XJUI
their Korean girlfriends and local “slickie” boys to sell drugs, cigarettes, and
QJSBUFEDPOTVNFSHPPETTVDIBTXBUDIFT DBNFSBT BOESBEJPT77 Their involve-
NFOU JO DSJNFT  JODMVEJOH WFIJDVMBS NBOTMBVHIUFS  BSTPO  SBQF  BOE NVSEFS 
EPNJOBUFQPMJDFSFQPSUTPGUIFQFSJPE78
*O UIF MBUF ŴżŸųT  UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU TVTQFOEFE UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT 
BDLOPXMFEHJOHUIFJSDPOUSJCVUJPOUPXJEFTQSFBEIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTćF
United States was integral in creating a repressive internal security apparatus
UIBU NBEF FWFO IBSEFOFE $PME 8BSSJPST CMBODI " ŴżŹŴ DBCJOFUMFWFM SFQPSU
UFMMJOHMZSFGFSSFEUPUIF,/1BTUIFiIBUFEJOTUSVNFOUPGUIF3IFFSFHJNFw79
ćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOOFWFSUIFMFTTSFWJWFEQPMJDFUSBJOJOHVOEFS3IFFT
TVDDFTTPS 1BSL$IVOH)FF BNBTUFSPGQPMJUJDBMNVTJDBMDIBJSTXIPXBTPODF
B NFNCFS PG UIF 4PVUI ,PSFBO $PNNVOJTU 1BSUZ BOE XIP IBE BMTP IVOUFE
,PSFBOSFTJTUBODFĕHIUFSTJO.BODIVSJBEVSJOH8PSME8BS**XJUIUIF+BQBOFTF
*NQFSJBM"SNZ"ęFSNVUJOZJOHEVSJOHUIFŴżŷŻ:PTVSFCFMMJPO (FOFSBM1BSL
FTDBQFEFYFDVUJPOCZJOGPSNJOHPOPOFUJNFBTTPDJBUFT BMMFHFEMZJODMVEJOHIJT
PXO CSPUIFS  BOE TVCTFRVFOUMZ SPTF UISPVHI UIF NJMJUBSZ IJFSBSDIZ XJUI UIF
BTTJTUBODF PG $BQUBJO )BVTNBO  XIP SFNBJOFE JO DPVOUSZ BT B MJBJTPO XJUI
the ROKA. After the 1961 coup in which Park seized power, he presided over
BQFSJPEPGTQFDUBDVMBSFDPOPNJDHSPXUI SFTVMUJOHGSPNWJTJPOBSZTUBUFQMBO-
OJOH UFDIOPMPHJDBMEFWFMPQNFOU XBSQSPĕUFFSJOH BOEBNBTTJWFJOUFSKFDUJPO
of foreign capital.80
ćF30,4VQSFNF$PVODJMNFBOXIJMFQBTTFEBMBXNBOEBUJOHUIFQVSJĕDB-
UJPOPGQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUJFT DSFBUJOHBTFWFONBODPNNJUUFFUPJEFOUJGZQFSTPOT

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 95


IPMEJOHiSPUUFOQPMJUJDTwBOEEFEJDBUFEUPiBOUJEFNPDSBUJDBDUTw-JWJOHDPOEJ-
UJPOTSFNBJOFEEJďDVMUGPSUIFNBKPSJUZ BT1BSLDPMMBCPSBUFEXJUIUIFNBO-
BHFNFOUPGMBSHFchaebol DPOHMPNFSBUFT JOVTJOHQPMJDFBOEIJSFEHPPOTUP
suppress strikes, and in keeping wages low in order to attract foreign invest-
NFOUForbes NBHB[JOFHMPXJOHMZBEWFSUJTFE4PVUI,PSFBJOUIJTQFSJPEBTB
great place to do business because laborers worked sixty hours per week for
very low pay.81
$IBSBDUFSJ[FEBTBRVBTJNJMJUBSZGPSDF UIF,/1SFUBJOFEBDSVDJBMSPMFJO
TVQQSFTTJOHXPSLJOHDMBTTNPCJMJ[BUJPOBOENPOJUPSJOHQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUZ4VS-
veillance was coordinated with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency which
was developed out of police intelligence units trained by the United States. OPS
BEWJTFSTJOUIF$*"‰JODMVEJOH"SUIVS.ćVSTUPO XIPMFęIJTPďDJBMKPCBT
DIBJSNBOPGUIFCPBSEPGUIF'BSNFST/BUJPOBM#BOLJO4IFMCZWJMMF *OEJBOB GPS
NPOUITBUBUJNF UFMMJOHGSJFOETBOEGBNJMZIFXBTHPJOHUP&VSPQF‰IFMQFETFU
VQJOUFMMJHFODFTDIPPMTBOEBTJUVBUJPOSPPNGBDJMJUZFRVJQQFEXJUINBQTBOE
UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOU#ZUIFNJEŴżŹųT ,PSFBO$FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF
IBE ŶŸų ųųų BHFOUT  PVU PG B QPQVMBUJPO PG Ŷų NJMMJPO  EXBSĕOH UIF 3VTTJBO
/,7%BUJUTIFJHIU$*"BUUBDIÏ1FFS%F4JMWBSBUJPOBMJ[FEJUTSVUIMFTTNFUIPET
CZDMBJNJOH ićFSFBSFUJHFSTSPBNJOHUIFXPSME BOEXFNVTUSFDPHOJ[FUIJT
or perish.”82
'SPNŴżŹźUPŴżźųUIF014UFBNJO,PSFBXBTIFBEFECZ'SBOL+FTTVQ B
3FQVCMJDBOBQQPJOUFFBTTVQFSJOUFOEFOUPGUIF*OEJBOB4UBUF1PMJDFJOUIFNJE
ŴżŸųTBOEWFUFSBOPGQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO(SFFDF -JCFSJB (VBUFNBMB BOE*SBO
A sergeant with the Marine Corps Third Division who served in counterintel-
MJHFODFEVSJOHUIF1BDJĕDXBSBOEBTDIJFGPGDJWJMEFGFOTFXJUIUIF64GFEFSBM
QPMJDF +FTTVQXBTBOBUJPOBMPďDFSPGUIFVMUSBDPOTFSWBUJWF"NFSJDBO-FHJPO
He received the Gold Star for Valor after having been shot while apprehend-
ing the killer of an FBI agent. Lacking any real knowledge of Korean affairs, he
TVCTDSJCFEUPUIFXPSMEWJFXPGUIF"NFSJDBO/FX3JHIU XJUIJUTDPNNJUNFOU
UP TPDJBM PSEFS  NJMJUBSZ QSFQBSFEOFTT  BOE DPVOUFSSFWPMVUJPOBSZ BDUJWJTN BU
IPNFBOEBCSPBE)JTQPMJUJDTXFSFDIBSBDUFSJTUJDPGUIFBEWJTPSZHSPVQ XIJDI
JODMVEFE8JMMJBN+4JNNMFS DIJFGPGEFUFDUJWFTJO1IJMBEFMQIJB XJUIFYQFSJ-
ence in the Philippines; Peter Costello, a twenty-four-year veteran of the New
:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU XIPIFMQFESVOUIFEJSUZXBSJO(VBUFNBMBBOE)BS-
PMEi4DPUUZw$BQMBOPGUIF1FOOTZMWBOJB4UBUF1PMJDF XIPNBJOUBJOFEDPOUBDUT
with the KNP until his death in 1998.
1FBLJOHBUBCVEHFUPGžŸŶNJMMJPOJOŴżŹŻ UIF014PSHBOJ[FEDPNCBUQPMJDF
brigades and village surveillance and oversaw the interrogation of captured
BHFOUTBOEEFGFDUPST*UBMTPJNQSPWFESFDPSETNBOBHFNFOU USBJOFEJOEVTUSJBM
security guards, oversaw the delivery of 886 vehicles (35 percent of the KNP
ĘFFU  BOE QSPWJEFE QPMZHSBQI NBDIJOFT BOE XFBQPOSZ TVDI BT HBT NBTLT
and grenade launchers.83 ćF ,/1 DMBJNFE UP IBWF BQQSFIFOEFE Żų QFSDFOU

96 Under the Facade of Benevolence


PG/PSUI,PSFBOJOĕMUSBUPSTBTBSFTVMUPG"NFSJDBOBTTJTUBODF*OŴżżų+FTTVQ 
$BQMBO BOEi+BDLw(PJOXFSFJOWJUFECBDLGPSBSFDFQUJPOCZUIF30,NJOJTUFS
PGUIFJOUFSJPS BHSBEVBUFPGUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZJO8BTIJOHUPO 
%$ JOBSBSFQVCMJDSFDPHOJUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT84
4XFFQJOHVOEFSUIFSVHUIFUZSBOOJDBMBTQFDUTPG1BSLTSVMF NPEFSOJ[BUJPO
UIFPSJTUTJO8BTIJOHUPODPOTJEFSFE64QPMJDZJO4PVUI,PSFBUPCFBQIFOPN-
FOBMTVDDFTTCFDBVTFPGUIFTDBMFPGFDPOPNJDHSPXUI XIJDIXBTDPOUJOHFOUJO
QBSUPONBOVGBDUVSJOHWJUBMFRVJQNFOUGPSUIF"NFSJDBOBSNZJO7JFUOBNćF
United States was especially grateful to Park for sending 312,000 ROK soldiers
UP 7JFUOBN  XIFSF UIFZ DPNNJUUFE EP[FOT PG .Z -BJoTUZMF NBTTBDSFT BOE 
according to a RAND Corporation study, burned, destroyed, and killed anyone
who stood in their path.85ćFQBSUJDJQBUJPOPGQPMJDFJOEPNFTUJDTVSWFJMMBODF
BOEBDUTPGTUBUFUFSSPSJTNXBTKVTUJĕFEBTDSFBUJOHBDMJNBUFPGTUBCJMJUZ BMMPX-
JOHGPSFDPOPNJDiUBLFPČw5PHFUIFSXJUI+BQBO 4PVUI,PSFBIFMQFEDSZTUBM-
lize the view that a nation’s police force was the critical factor needed to provide
for its internal defense.86
*O+BOVBSZŴżźŷ 1SFTJEFOU1BSLQBTTFEBOFNFSHFODZNFBTVSFHJWJOHIJN
VOUSBNNFMFE QPXFS UP DSBDL EPXO PO EJTTFOUFST "NOFTUZ *OUFSOBUJPOBM
TVCTFRVFOUMZSFQPSUFEBOBQQBMMJOHSFDPSEPGQPMJDFEFUFOUJPOT CFBUJOHT BOE
UPSUVSF PG KPVSOBMJTUT  DIVSDINFO  BDBEFNJDT  BOE PUIFS SFHJNF PQQPOFOUT
Leftists (dubbed chwaiksu  DPOĕOFE JO PWFSDSPXEFE QSJTPOT XFSF GPSDFE UP
XFBSSFECBEHFTBOESFDFJWFEUIFIBSTIFTUUSFBUNFOU87 In May 1980, KNP and
30," PďDFST  B OVNCFS PG UIFN 7JFUOBN 8BS WFUFSBOT  LJMMFE VQ UP UISFF
UIPVTBOEQFPQMFJOTVQQSFTTJOHUIF,XBOKVQSPEFNPDSBUJDVQSJTJOH‰4PVUI
,PSFBT FRVJWBMFOU UP 5JBOBONFO 4RVBSF 4UVEFOUT XFSF CVSOFE BMJWF XJUI
ĘBNFUISPXFSTBTUIFPďDFSTMBJETJFHFUPUIFDJUZ"QPQVMBSTMPHBOGSPNUIF
QFSJPEQSPDMBJNFE i&WFOUIF+BQBOFTFQPMJDFPďDFSTBOEUIFDPNNVOJTUTEVS-
JOHUIF,PSFBO8BSXFSFOUUIJTDSVFMwćFTFXPSETQSPWJEFBĕUUJOHFQJUBQIUP
UIF"NFSJDBOQPMJDFQSPHSBNT XIJDI PWFSBUIJSUZĕWFZFBSQFSJPE USBJOFE
TPNFPGUIFGPSDFTJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFNBTTBDSFBOEQSPWJEFEUIF,/1XJUINPE-
FSOXFBQPOSZBOEFRVJQNFOUVTFEGPSSFQSFTTJWFFOET88
*OBTUVEZPGQPMJDFUPSUVSFSTJOUIF4PVUIFSO$POFPG-BUJO"NFSJDB .BS-
UIB,)VHHJOTBOEBUFBNPGSFTFBSDIFSTDPODMVEFEUIBUJEFPMPHJDBMDPOEJUJPO-
JOHBOEUIFQPMJUJDBMDMJNBUFPGUIF$PME8BSIFMQFETIBQFUIFJSCFIBWJPSBOE
BMMPXFEGPSUIFSBUJPOBMJ[BUJPOPGBDUJPOTUIBUUIFQFSQFUSBUPSTXPVMEOPSNBMMZ
have considered abhorrent, and now do in the clear light of day.89 Their insights
BSF FRVBMMZ BQQMJDBCMF UP 4PVUI ,PSFB  XIFSF QPMJDF WJPMFODF XBT KVTUJĕFE BT
TBWJOHUIFDPVOUSZGSPNBEBOHFSPVTFOFNZ$PODFJWJOHPGQPMJDFBTDSVDJBMUP
CSPBEFSTUBUFCVJMEJOHFČPSUT UIF"NFSJDBOQSPHSBNTXFSFEFTJHOFEJOUIFPSZ
to professionalize police standards and incorporate the kinds of progressive-
TUZMF SFGPSNT UIBU XFSF QSFWBMFOU JO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT 0XJOH UP QPMJUJDBM
DJSDVNTUBODFT IPXFWFS UIFZCFDBNFIFBWJMZNJMJUBSJ[FEBOEGPDVTFEPOUIF

“Nation-Building” and Political Repression in Postcolonial South Korea 97


TVQQSFTTJPOPGMFęXJOHBDUJWJTN SFTVMUJOHJOTJHOJĕDBOUIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMB-
UJPOT"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPOFNQPXFSFEBVUIPSJUBSJBOMFBEFSTBOEQSPWJEFE
TFDVSJUZGPSDFTXJUINPEFSOTVSWFJMMBODFFRVJQNFOU GPSFOTJDTUFDIOPMPHZ BOE
weapons which heightened their social control capabilities. The vibrancy of the
MBCPSNPWFNFOUBOEQPMJUJDBMMFęXBTDVSUBJMFE UIVTDPOUSJCVUJOHUPBXFBL-
ening of civil society. The working classes were largely left out of the Park-era
FDPOPNJDCPPN BOE/PSUI4PVUISBQQSPDIFNFOUXBTNBEFJNQPTTJCMF
ćSPVHIPVUUIF$PME8BS QFPQMFXIPDIBMMFOHFEUIFTUBUVTRVPXFSFTVC-
KFDUFEUPJNQSJTPONFOU UPSUVSF BOEUPPPęFOEFBUIćFJSQMJHIUIBTMBSHFMZ
been suppressed in the West, along with the buried history of U.S.-ROK atroci-
ties in the Korean War. Undisturbed by all the bloodshed, the practitioners of
realpolitik in Washington viewed the intervention in South Korea, like that in
+BQBO BTBOFČFDUJWFBQQMJDBUJPOPGUIFDPOUBJONFOUEPDUSJOF1PMJDFBEWJTFST
XFSFDPOTFRVFOUMZDBMMFEVQPOUPQBTTBMPOHUIFJSUFDIOJDBMFYQFSUJTFTPBTUP
GFOEPČSFWPMVUJPOJOPUIFSMPDBMFT JODMVEJOH4PVUI7JFUOBN BHBJOXJUIDBUB-
DMZTNJDSFTVMUT

98 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Chapter 5
“Free Government Cannot Exist without
Safeguards against Subversion”
The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I
Local security forces must be trained in clandestine operations and sabotage
techniques particularly for the penetration of enemy forces and the gaining of
operational intelligence. Pinpointing of enemy concentrations and hideouts
can permit effective use of trained “hunter-killer” teams. [In spite of] political
inhibitions and UN or other control commissions and treaty arrangements,
there should not be any long-standing iron-clad bar to such action when over-
riding national security interests prevail.
‰3obert W. Komer OBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZBEWJTFS 

If we had our druthers to relive bygone days, wouldn’t we look for more Nel-
son Miles to replace George Custer, strengthen the cadre of civilian agencies
with a more select group of men and train assigned personnel for the realities
of the frontier?
‰&dward G. LansdaleUP8BMU83PTUPX 4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ 

'SPN ŴżŸŹ UP ŴżŸż +FUFS 8JMMJBNTPO  UIF QPMJDF DIJFG JO (SFFOTCPSP  /PSUI
$BSPMJOB  TQFOU NVDI PG IJT UJNF JO UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT KVOHMFT  USBJOJOH SVSBM
QPMJDFBOEDPOTUBCVMBSZVOJUTUPTVQQSFTTSFNOBOUTPGUIF)VLHVFSSJMMBNPWF-
NFOU-JLFUIFDPOTUBCVMBSZPďDFSTPGZFTUFSZFBS 8JMMJBNTPOXBTXJMMJOHUP
FOEVSFEJďDVMUĕFMEDPOEJUJPOTJOBOFČPSUUPFYQPSUQSPGFTTJPOBM"NFSJDBO
TUBOEBSETBOEJNQSPWFQPMJDFFďDJFODZ OPXJOUIFTFSWJDFPGUIF$PME8BS
/P 6HMZ "NFSJDBO IFUPPLQBJOTUPMFBSO 5BHBMPH BOEPUIFS EJBMFDUT JOUIF
countries where he served, and he ate local foods. In Thailand, where he went
BęFS MFBWJOH UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT  8JMMJBNTPO FBSOFE B DPNNFOEBUJPO GSPN UIF
king for helping to secure the border through his work with the Border Patrol
Police (BPP).1
A throwback to an earlier era of colonialists who believed deeply in the vir-
UVFTPG"NFSJDBODBQJUBMJTNBOEEFNPDSBDZ 8JMMJBNTPOXBTBDPOUFNQPSBSZ
PG $*" BHFOU &EXBSE -BOTEBMF  B NBO GPOE PG RVPUJOH 5PN 1BJOFT EJDUVN
i8IFSFMJCFSUZEXFMMTOPU UIFSFJTNZDPVOUSZw6QPOFOUFSJOHNBJOMBOE$IJOB
JOŴżŸŸ 8JMMJBNTPODPNNFOUFEUIBUIFXBTiTUBOEJOHBUUIFFOEPGUIFGSFF

99
world.”2*OTQJUFPGUIFJSSPNBOUJDJMMVTJPOT "NFSJDBTDMBOEFTUJOF$PME8BS-
riors in reality fought on the side of political reaction, opposing nationalist
NPWFNFOUT UIBUXFSFTPDJBMJTUPSDPNNVOJTUJO PSJFOUBUJPOPXJOH MBSHFMZ UP
IJTUPSJDBMDJSDVNTUBODFBOEUIFJSSPMFJOTQFBSIFBEJOHPQQPTJUJPOUP+BQBOFTF
DPMPOJBMJTN
4PVUIFBTU"TJBFNFSHFEBTBLFZ$PME8BSUIFBUFSGPMMPXJOHUIFUSJVNQIPG
the Chinese revolution in 1949, which threatened the Open Door policy and
"NFSJDBTGPPUIPMEPOUIFDPOUJOFOUćFEBOHFSPGUIFSFWPMVUJPOGPS"NFSJDBO
QMBOOFST /PBN$IPNTLZQPJOUTPVU XBTOPUUIFUISFBUPGNJMJUBSZBHHSFTTJPO 
which was nonexistent, but what Walt Rostow writing in 1955 called the “ideo-
MPHJDBMUISFBU wTQFDJĕDBMMZiUIFQPTTJCJMJUZUIBUUIF$IJOFTF $PNNVOJTUTDBO
QSPWFUP"TJBOTCZQSPHSFTTJO$IJOBUIBU$PNNVOJTUNFUIPETBSFCFUUFSBOE
GBTUFS UIBO EFNPDSBUJD NFUIPETw3 4VDDFTTJWF BENJOJTUSBUJPOT DPOTFRVFOUMZ
CFDBNFDPNNJUUFEUPBDPOUJOFOUBMSPMMCBDLTUSBUFHZ IBMUJOHUIFQSPHSFTTPG
TPDJBMJTNBDSPTT"TJB PGXIJDIQPMJDFUSBJOJOHXBTBDSJUJDBMEJNFOTJPO"EWJT-
FSTMJLF8JMMJBNTPOUSBJOFETFDVSJUZGPSDFTJOSJPUDPOUSPMBOEDPVOUFSJOUFMMJ-
HFODF TFUVQDPNNVOJDBUJPOTOFUXPSLTUPBJEJOUIFUSBDLJOHPGTVCWFSTJWFT 
BOEPWFSTBXWBSJPVTEFTUBCJMJ[BUJPODBNQBJHOT4 These in turn contributed to a
SJTJOHUJEFPGWJPMFODFBOEUIFTUJĘJOHPGEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQNFOUćFDBTFTPG
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines are instructive in this respect. In these
UISFFDPVOUSJFT "NFSJDBOQSPHSBNTXFSFJOUFSNFTIFEBMNPTUDPNQMFUFMZXJUI
CIA operations and designed to prevent the rise of socialist or left-leaning
SFHJNFTDMPTFMZUJFEUP$IJOBćFZTVDDFFEFEBUUIJTUBTL UIPVHIBUBUFSSJCMF
IVNBODPTU

An “Unorthodox Project”: Police Aid in Indonesia and the Overthrow


of Sukarno

Indonesia was the site of one of the largest and longest-running police pro-
HSBNT"T(FPSHF.D5,BIJOEPDVNFOUTJOIJTHSPVOECSFBLJOHTUVEZSubver-
sion as Foreign Policy  "NFSJDBO QPMJDZNBLFST WBMVFE UIF DPVOUSZ BMNPTU BT
NVDIBT+BQBOCFDBVTFPGJUTPJMBOENJOFSBMXFBMUI4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF%FBO
"DIFTPOXBSOFE1SFTJEFOU5SVNBOJO+BOVBSZŴżŸųUIBUiCFDBVTFPGJUTHSFBU
XFBMUI BOE UIF EZOBNJD DIBSBDUFS PG JUT OBUJPOBMJTU NPWFNFOU  <*OEPOFTJBT>
political orientation has a profound effect on the political orientation of the rest
PG"TJB‫*ڀڀ‬U<BMTP>MJFTBUIXBSUUIFQSJODJQBMMJOFTPGDPNNVOJDBUJPOCFUXFFO
UIF1BDJĕDBOE*OEJBO0DFBOTw5
After World War II, the United States supported the Dutch in retaining their
colonial rule over Indonesia under the Marshall Plan. When the Dutch sent
USPPQTUPDSVTIUIFOBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOUJOŴżŷŻ UIF5SVNBOBENJOJTUSBUJPO
DIBOHFEJUTQPTJUJPO MBSHFMZCFDBVTFUIFNPWFNFOUTLFZMFBEFST .PIBNNFE
)BUUBBOE"DINFE4VLBSOP VTFEUIFJSMFWFSBHFPWFSUIFQPMJDFNPCJMFCSJHBEF

100 Under the Facade of Benevolence


NPCSJH UPQVUEPXOBSFCFMMJPOCZUIF*OEPOFTJBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ 1,* JO
$FOUSBM+BWB‰UIF.BEJVOSFCFMMJPO)PQJOHUPTFDVSFJOĘVFODFBęFSJOEFQFO-
EFODF UIF$*"TFOUBTFOJPSBHFOUUP:PHZBLBSUBUPJOUFSWJFXNPCSJHPďDFST
BOENBEFBSSBOHFNFOUTUPĘZUIFNPTUQSPNJTJOHUISPVHIUIF%VUDICMPDLBEF
GPSUSBJOJOHBU"NFSJDBONJMJUBSZGBDJMJUJFT3BEFO4BÕE4PFLBOUP UIFiGBUIFSw
PGUIFNPEFSO*OEPOFTJBOQPMJDF XIPTFTUBUVFTUBOETPVUTJEFUIFQPMJDFIJT-
UPSZ NVTFVN JO +BLBSUB  XBT BNPOH UIPTF SFDSVJUFE *OTUJMMFE XJUI GFSWFOUMZ
BOUJDPNNVOJTUWJFXTCZUIF%VUDI IFCFDBNFBLFZ$*"iBTTFU wSFGFSSFEUPJO
JOUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTBTBNBOPGiIJHIQFSTPOBMJOUFHSJUZw6
ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTNBJOHPBMXBTUPDSFBUFBQSP8FTUFSOGPSDFUPDIFDLUIF
QPXFSPG5BO.BMBLB BOBUJPOBMJTUDPNNVOJTUMFBEFSXIPQSPQPTFEBSBEJDBM
TPDJPFDPOPNJD QSPHSBN TUJQVMBUJOH UIF OBUJPOBMJ[BUJPO PG LFZ SFTPVSDFT BOE
IJHIUBSJČTUPGPTUFSMPDBMEFWFMPQNFOU7.BMBLBXBTBSJWBMUP1SJNF.JOJTUFS
.PIBNNFE)BUUB XIP UISPVHI$*"MJBJTPO-PVJTF1BHF.PSSJT‰BGBTIJPO
NPEFMGSPNB#PTUPO#SBINJOGBNJMZXIPSBOTFDSFUPQFSBUJPOTGPS+BZ-PWF-
TUPOFBOE+BNFT+FTVT"OHMFUPO‰SFRVFTUFEUFDIOJDBMBEWJTFSTUPTPMJEJGZIJT
QPXFS 8JMMJBN -BDFZ  *OEPOFTJBO EFTL PďDFS BU UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU  XBT
TLFQUJDBM UFMMJOH.PSSJTUIBUQSPWJEJOHBSNTXJUIPVUUIFDPOTFOUPG$POHSFTT
was “unworkable and undesirable.”8
.BUUIFX'PY IPXFWFS EJSFDUPSPGUIF"NFSJDBO*OEPOFTJBO$PSQPSBUJPO 
B$*"GSPOU DBCMFEUIFFNCBTTZJO.BZŴżŷżi8FLOPXUIBUXFDBOOPUSVO
any risks in Southeast Asia and have got to support this group around Hatta.
‫ڀڀ‬8FIBWFFRVJQNFOUJO.BMBZBUIBUDBOCFTFOUUPBTTJTU4PFLBOUP<XIPBMTP
IBEUJFTXJUI#SJUJTIJOUFMMJHFODFBOETUVEJFEJO*UBMZVOEFSUIF$BSBCJOJFSJ>
8FIBWFUFDIOJDBMNFOXIPNXFDBOQVUBUIJTEJTQPTBMJNNFEJBUFMZ8IJMF
XFBSFNBLJOHVQPVSNJOE UIFDPNNVOJTUTBSFHFUUJOHTUSPOHFSw9&NQIB-
TJ[JOH*OEPOFTJBTJNQPSUBODFBTBQSPEVDFSPGDPNNPEJUJFTWJUBMUP"NFSJDBO
JOEVTUSZ BOE UIF TFSJPVTOFTT PG UIF DPNNVOJTU UISFBU  XIJDI XBT iJOUFSOBM
rather than external,” Acheson issued a directive to strengthen the twenty thou-
TBOEoNBONPCSJHDPOTUBCVMBSZBOEQSPWJEFJUXJUIžŴŵNJMMJPOJOFRVJQNFOU 
JODMVEJOHUFBSHBTCPNCT XIJDIDPVMECFVTFEJOiKVOHMFDPVOUSZwBOEJODPN-
NBOEPPQFSBUJPOTBHBJOTUMFęJTUT10ćPVTBOETPGTNBMMBSNT BTXFMMBTDBNFSBT
BOENJNFPHSBQINBDIJOFT XFSFTFOUUISPVHIBTFDSFUGVOE PGUIF0ďDFPG
1PMJDZ $PPSEJOBUJPO  GSPOUFE UISPVHI 'PYT "NFSJDBO*OEPOFTJBO $PSQPSB-
UJPOBOEBEVNNZEFQPTJUJOUIF$IBTF.BOIBUUBO#BOL3BZNPOE&.VSQIZ 
B$*"BOBMZTUIJSFEUPTUVEZUIFDPNNVOJTUNPWFNFOUJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB IBE
SFDPNNFOEFEUIBUiTJODFUIFQSPKFDUJTVOPSUIPEPYBOEVOQSFDFEFOUFEGPSUIF
EFQBSUNFOUJUTIPVMEIBWFUIFBQQFBSBODFPGTQPOTPSTIJQCZQSJWBUFPSHBOJ[B-
tions or individuals.”11
Livingstone Merchant, later undersecretary of state for political affairs,
XSPUFUP+PIO1FVSJGPZ BSDIJUFDUPGUIFŴżŸŷ64DPVQJO(VBUFNBMB UIBUUIF
USBJOJOHPGBOiFMJUFDPSQTPGQPMJDFJO"NFSJDBONFUIPET wJODMVEJOHDPVOUFSJO-

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 101


UFMMJHFODF XBTFTTFOUJBMCFDBVTFPGUIFiJNQPSUBODFPG*OEPOFTJBUPPVSPWFSBMM
QMBOTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBwćFNJTTJPOPGUIFQPMJDFXBTUPiSFDPHOJ[FBOEMJR-
VJEBUFDPNNVOJTUJOĕMUSBUJPOwBOEiSFTJTUTVCWFSTJPOFČPSUTPGDPNNVOJTUTUP
take over the country.”124JY*OEPOFTJBOQPMJDFNFOXFSFTFOUGPSUSBJOJOHBU'#*
IFBERVBSUFSTJOĕOHFSQSJOUJOH QIPUPHSBQIZ FTQJPOBHF BOEFYQMPTJWFT1BSUPG
UIFBJNXBTGPSUIFNUPTFFiNPSFBCPVUUIF"NFSJDBOXBZPGMJGFwćF$*"
FWFOUPPLUIFNUPMPDBMCSPUIFMTUPGVMĕMMUIFJSGBOUBTZPGTMFFQJOHXJUIBXIJUF
XPNBOćFZSFUVSOFEIPNFUPQSPWJEFUIFiOVDMFJ wJO4PFLBOUPTXPSET GPS
BQBSBNJMJUBSZQPMJDFGPSDFPGTFWFOUZUIPVTBOENFOEFEJDBUFEUPXBHJOHUIF
Cold War.13
In April 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Louis E. Kubler was hired as a technical
adviser to the Indonesian police. He had experience as a ballistics and explo-
TJWFTTQFDJBMJTUBOEBQBUSPMNBOXJUIUIF/FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOE/FX
Jersey State Police and had won a Bronze Star for gallantry while with the OSS
as a security officer in China. Higher-ups noted that Kubler’s correct agency
BďMJBUJPO  UIF $*"  iTIPVME OPU CF NBEF LOPXOw ,VCMFS TFU VQ IJT PďDF BU
(FOFSBM 4PFLBOUPT IPVTF  XPSLJOH XJUI IJN UP DSFBUF CMBDLMJTUT BOE FYQBOE
training in advanced weaponry, counterinsurgency, and espionage.14
U.S. relations with Indonesia soured when President Sukarno took up lead-
FSTIJQPGUIFOPOBMJHOFENPWFNFOUBOEMFHBMJ[FEUIF1,* XIJDIHBSOFSFEź
NJMMJPOWPUFT ŴŻQFSDFOUPGUIFUPUBM JOUIFŴżŸŸFMFDUJPOTćPVHIBDLOPXM-
edging his “outstanding oratorical ability” and status as a “national hero,” the
4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDSJUJDJ[FE4VLBSOPGPSCFJOHiJSSFTQPOTJCMFJOIJTĕOBODJBM
NBOBHFNFOUwBOEiUBLFOJOCZSFWPMVUJPOBSZEPHNB wFYFNQMJĕFECZIJTDBMMT
UP OBUJPOBMJ[F GPSFJHOPXOFE JOEVTUSZ UIJT XBT iMBNFOUBCMFw CFDBVTF iUIF
DPVOUSZIBTiNVDIOBUJPOBMXFBMUI‫<ڀڀ‬QBSUJDVMBSMZ>PJMSFTPVSDFT‫ڀڀ‬XIJDI
the Indonesians believe belongs to Indonesia.”15 The popularity of the PKI was
BUUSJCVUFE UP iXJEFTQSFBE JMMJUFSBDZ BOE QPMJUJDBM BOE FDPOPNJD JHOPSBODF w
XIJDIiMFęUIFNBTTFTTVCKFDUUPEFNBHPHJDOBUJPOBMJTUBQQFBMTw16
*OPSEFSUPLFFQUIF1,*VOEFSDMPTFXBUDI EFTQJUFJUTMFHBMTUBUVT BOENFFU
threats in the “pre-insurrection phase,” in June 1955 Secretary of State John Fos-
UFS%VMMFTJODSFBTFEUIFQPMJDFCVEHFUUPžŹNJMMJPOBOEPSEFSFETPVOEUSVDLT
BOE DSPXEDPOUSPM EFWJDFT GPS UIF VTF PG UIF QPMJDF  XSJUJOH UP "NCBTTBEPS
)VHI$VNNJOH +SUIBUXIJMFUIFiDVSSFOUHPWFSONFOUEPFTOPUTVQQPSUUIF
police build-up, perhaps as a hedge against their present policy of cooperating
with the PKI . . . the desirability of providing assistance to the . . . police as an
JNQPSUBOUBOUJDPNNVOJTUGPSDF<JT>XFMMLOPXOw17
ćF*OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPO *$" QSPWJEFESJPUDPOUSPM
USBJOJOH TVQQMJFEKFFQT QBUSPMCPBUT BOEBJSDSBę BOETFUVQUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFT
XIFSF$*"NBOVBMTTVDIBTCovert Paramilitary Training Course (1952) and The
Sabotage Manual (1954) were used. Advisers with experience in Greece, the
1IJMJQQJOFT BOE,PSFBDPOTUSVDUFEBDPNNVOJDBUJPOTDFOUFSJO+BLBSUB BSBEJP

102 Under the Facade of Benevolence


UFMFUZQF TZTUFN  BOE B TFDVSF NFTTBHF DFOUFS BOE DPEF SPPN BU UIF /BUJPOBM
1PMJDF IFBERVBSUFST UP PSHBOJ[F UIF ĘPX PG JOGPSNBUJPO PO UIF 1,* 3PCFSU
Janus, a Coast Guard adviser with experience in Japan, furnished advice to the
TFBQPMJDFBOENBJOUBJOFETNBMMQBUSPMDSBęPOMPBOGSPNUIF64/BWZ18
ŴŵżųEQMBOOFSTDPNQMBJOFEUIBUXIJMFUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFIBEEFWFMPQFE
FYUFOTJWFLOPXMFEHFPGDPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUJFT UIBOLTJOMBSHFQBSUUP64USBJO-
JOH  UIF iMBX BCJEJOH BOE VOJUFE GSPOU UBDUJDT PG UIF DPNNVOJTUT DPNCJOFE
XJUI UIF BUUJUVEF PG UIF HPWFSONFOU QSFDMVEFE SFQSFTTJWF NFBTVSFTw19 These
DPNNFOUTUZQJGZUIFOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZFTUBCMJTINFOUTQSFGFSFODFGPSSFQSFTTJPO
PWFSMFHBMDPNQSPNJTF1PMJDFTVSWFJMMBODFFYUFOEFEUP4VLBSOPIJNTFMG XIPTF
XPNBOJ[JOH UFOEFODJFT UIF $*" USJFE UP FYQMPJU CZ NBOVGBDUVSJOH B QPSOP-
HSBQIJDĕMNTUBSSJOHBOJNQFSTPOBUPSXFBSJOHB4VLBSOPGBDFNBTL20
ICA staffers inspecting Indonesia’s prisons, including the Tjilatjap “devil’s
JTMBOE wCVJMUBNJETUTIBSLJOGFTUFEXBUFST XFSFJSPOJDBMMZJNQSFTTFEXJUIUIF
FNQIBTJTPOSFIBCJMJUBUJPOBOEUIFiMBDLPGQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST PSEFSMZQIZTJDBM
appearance, success of agricultural and industrial endeavors, and the profes-
TJPOBMSFTQPOTJCJMJUZPGQSJTPOTFSWJDFTUBČw4VLBSOPTIVNBOSJHIUTSFDPSEXBT
JOEFFEGBSCFUUFSUIBOUIBUPGNBOZ"NFSJDBOCBDLFESFHJNFTNBSSFECZCSVUBM
QFOBMTZTUFNT21
"LFZDPNQPOFOUPGUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNXBTUPCVJMEVQUIFNPCJMFCSJHBEF
BTBDPVOUFSXFJHIUUPUIFNJMJUBSZ XIJDIXBTDPOTJEFSFEUPCFiJOĕMUSBUFEXJUI
pinks and reds.”22 Major Melville “Buck” Fruit of the U.S. Air Force reported
UIBUIBWJOHXPSLFEXJUIBOVNCFSPG"TJBOQPMJDFGPSDFT IFXBTiJNQSFTTFE
CFZPOE IJT FYQFDUBUJPO CZ UIF MFWFM PG USBJOJOH  NPSBMF  FČFDUJWFOFTT <PG UIF
NPCSJH> wXIJDIiIBEJUTPXOJOUFMMJHFODFPSHBOJ[BUJPOGPSUIFNBJOQVSQPTFPG
JEFOUJGZJOHDPNNVOJTUTwBOEiDPVMEEFBMFČFDUJWFMZXJUIBOBUUFNQUFEVQSJTJOH
or coup d’état.” Fruit, who served with the Air Police during the Korean War
BOE USBJOFE UIF QBSBNJMJUBSZ DJWJM HVBSE JO 7JFUOBN  XBT IJHI PO 4PFLBOUP 
who, according to Fruit, had “threaded his way through various controversies
UPNBJOUBJOBTUBCMFQPTJUJPOQPMJUJDBMMZwćFTDIPPMGPSQBSBNJMJUBSZUSBJOJOHBU
4VSBCBZB JOIJTFTUJNBUJPO NFUUIFiIJHIFTUTUBOEBSETPGFďDJFODZBOEQSP-
EVDFEUIFNPTUEFNPDSBUJDBUUJUVEFBNPOHQPMJDFZFUTFFOJOUIF0SJFOUw23
ćSPVHI UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT  UIF %VMMFT CSPUIFST "MMFO XBT UIFO $*"
EJSFDUPSBOE+PIO'PTUFSTFDSFUBSZPGTUBUF GVOOFMFEXFBQPOTUP*TMBNJDGVO-
EBNFOUBMJTUT BOE EJTTJEFOU HFOFSBMT MFBEJOH TFQBSBUJTU SFWPMUT JO UIF PJM BOE
SVCCFSSJDISFHJPOTPG4VNBUSBBOE4VMBXFTJ XIFSF$BMUFYBOEPUIFS64ĕSNT
IBEMBSHFJOWFTUNFOUT4PFLBOUPBSPVTFE4VLBSOPTTVTQJDJPOTXIFOIFSFGVTFE
UPMFOETFBWFTTFMTUPUIF*OEPOFTJBOBSNZ XIJDIIBECFFONPCJMJ[FEVOEFS
General A. H. Nasution to suppress the rebellion.24 The CIA cover was blown
when Allen Pope, a Civil Air Transport pilot on contract with the agency, was
shot down and taken prisoner after shelling an Indonesian village and allegedly
CPNCJOHBDIVSDI DBVTJOHUIFEFBUITPGEP[FOTPGDJWJMJBOT25

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 103


*O %FDFNCFS ŴżŸż 4VLBSOP QMBDFE (FOFSBM 4PFLBOUP PO JOBDUJWF EVUZ GPS
JOTVCPSEJOBUJPO SFQMBDJOHIJNXJUI4PFLBSOP%KPKPOFHPSP DPNNJTTJPOFSPG
QPMJDFJO&BTU+BWB XIPIBECFFOUSBJOFEJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXJUINPCSJHIFBE
4PFUKJQUP +PFEPEJIBSEKP 64 BNCBTTBEPS )PXBSE 1 +POFT XBT EJTNBZFE CZ
4PFLBOUPTEJTNJTTBM XSJUJOHJOBNFNPUIBUiUIFUVSOPWFSDFSFNPOZJOXIJDI
4PFLBOUPSFMJORVJTIFEBVUIPSJUZUP4VLBSOPXBTBTBEPDDBTJPOBTBSFTVMUPG
UIFMPTTPGBSFTQFDUFEMFBEFS*UJTUPPFBSMZUPQSFEJDUUIFVMUJNBUFPVUDPNFPG
UIFTUSVHHMFGPSDPOUSPMPGUIFQPMJDFFYDFQUJUBQQFBSTUIBU4PFLBOUPJTEFĕOJUFMZ
out.”26
ćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOFYQBOEFEUIFCVEHFUGPSUIF*OEPOFTJBOQPMJDF
QSPHSBNUPžŴųNJMMJPOJOŴżŹŵBOEŴżŹŶ TFDPOEPOMZUPUIBUGPS4PVUI7JFU-
OBN"ęFSBWJTJUCZ3PCFSU,FOOFEZ JOXIJDIIFNBEFDPOUBDUXJUIGVUVSF
QSFTJEFOU4VIBSUP UIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOT4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ
BEWPDBUFESBNQJOHVQUSBJOJOHUPUIFNPCSJH XIJDIOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZBEWJTFS
3PCFSU ,PNFS IPQFE DPVME iMBZ UIF HSPVOEXPSL GPS PVS SFUVSOJOH BOE
FYQBOEJOHJOĘVFODFJO*OEPOFTJBJOUIFZFBSTBOEEFDBEFTUPDPNFw27 Byron
&OHMFSFDFJWFESFBTTVSBODFGSPNUIFNJOJTUFSPGQPMJDFUIBUJOUIFFWFOUUIBU
UIFDPNNVOJTUTJMMFHBMMZUSJFEUPTFJ[FQPXFS UIFNPCSJHXPVMEiĕHIUUPUIF
MBTUNBOw*OUIFFWFOUPGBMFHBMUBLFPWFS IFBEEFE UIFZXPVMESFTJTUCZiBOZ
NFBOTBWBJMBCMF JODMVEJOHVOEFSHSPVOEPQFSBUJPOTw28
#VJMEJOHVQJUTiDPVOUFSTVCWFSTJWFwDBQBCJMJUJFT UIF014QSPWJEFEBSNPSFE
DBST TUFFMIFMNFUT .ŴDBSCJOFTXJUIiFYDFMMFOULJMMJOHQPXFSwBOEUISFFUIPV-
TBOE UFBS HBT DBOJTUFST BOE TFU VQ B NPCJMF CSJHBEF BDBEFNZ GPS USBJOJOH JO
SBOHFSPQFSBUJPOT'JęFFOBEWJTFSTXPSLFEGVMMUJNF JODMVEJOH3PCFSU-PXF 
BGPSNFS044BHFOUGSPN5VOJDB .JTTJTTJQQJ XIPTFSWFEJOUIF,VONJOHTUB-
UJPOJO$IJOBBOEXJUIUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO+BQBO ćBJMBOE -JCFSJB BOE
7JFUOBN1BVM)4LVTF XIPXFOUPOUP7JFUOBNBOE-BPTBOE+BDL(PJO 
XIPXPVMESFQMBDF&OHMFBT014EJSFDUPSJOŴżźŵ)FOSZ4BNPSJTLJ BOPUIFS
$PME 8BSSJPS  SFDPNNFOEFE FTUBCMJTIJOH iHPPO TRVBETw DPOTJTUJOH PG VOJ-
GPSNFEDJWJMJBOTXIPDPVMECFiQVUJOUPBDUJPOBUBNPNFOUTOPUJDFw0SEFST
XFSFHJWFOUPEFBMĕSNMZXJUIQSPDPNNVOJTUEFNPOTUSBUPSTBOEUPQSPUFDU
64PXOFESVCCFSQMBOUBUJPOTBOEPJMDPNQBOJFT XIJDIJUXBTGFBSFE4VLBSOP
was bent on expropriating.29

The Anticommunist Bloodbath and Suharto’s Long Reign of Terror

In October 1965, General Suharto, who had served in the police under the
Japanese occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War, took power
JOBDPVQEÏUBUVOEFSUIFQSFUFYUUIBUIFXBTTBWJOHUIFDPVOUSZGSPNUBLFPWFS
by the PKI, which was allegedly behind the brief seizure of power by Colonel
6OUVOH BNFNCFSPG4VLBSOPTQBMBDFHVBSE)FGPSNFEBSNZBOEQPMJDFEFBUI
TRVBETUPMJRVJEBUF1,*NFNCFSTJEFOUJĕFEUISPVHIMJTUTQSPEVDFECZ$*"BOE

104 Under the Facade of Benevolence


police intelligence. Time NBHB[JOFSFQPSUFEUIBUUIFLJMMJOHXBTPOiTVDIBTDBMF
UIBUUIFEJTQPTBMPGUIFDPSQTFT‫ڀڀ‬DSFBUFEBTFSJPVTTBOJUBUJPOQSPCMFNJO&BTU
+BWBBOE/PSUIFSO4VNBUSB XIFSFUIFIVNJEBJSCFBSTUIFSFFLPGEFDBZJOH
ĘFTI5SBWFMFSTGSPNUIFTFBSFBTUFMMPGTNBMMSJWFSTBOETUSFBNTUIBUIBWFCFFO
literally clogged with bodies.”30
"TUIFHFOPDJEFXBTVOGPMEJOH "NCBTTBEPS+POFTXSPUFUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF
%FBO3VTLUIBUiUIF<QVCMJDTBGFUZ>NJTTJPOSFRVJSFTOPGVSUIFSDPNNPEJUJFT
CFTIJQQFEUP+BLBSUBCFDBVTFPGUIFTFOTJUJWJUZPGGBDUPSTJOWPMWFE4IJQNFOUPG
gas grenades brings the possibility of discovery in spite of precautions. Suggest
SFUVSOUPNJMJUBSZTUPDLTw31ćFTFDPNNFOUTIJOUBUEJSFDU"NFSJDBODPNQMJD-
JUZ XIJDIUIF8IJUF)PVTFUPPLQBJOTUPDPWFSVQ3PCFSU"NPSZ+S EFQVUZ
EJSFDUPSPGUIF$*"GSPNŴżŸŵUPŴżŹŵ DPNNFOUFEUIBUiUIFHSPVOEXPSLEPOF
UIFSF <XJUI QPMJDF USBJOJOH> JO *OEPOFTJB NBZ IBWF CFFO SFTQPOTJCMF GPS UIF
TQFFEXJUIXIJDI<UIF4VIBSUPDPVQ>‫ڀڀ‬XBTXSBQQFEVQw32
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNBMTPIFMQFEBDDFMFSBUFUIFTDPQFPGUIFLJMMJOHT OVNCFS-
ing in the hundreds of thousands. The blacklists it created were used to target
EJTTJEFOUT  XIJMF JNQSPWFE DPNNVOJDBUJPO BMMPXFE GPS CFUUFS DPPSEJOBUJPO
BNPOHTFDVSJUZGPSDFT1PMJDFBOENPCSJHPďDFSTSBOQSJTPODBNQT XIFSFPWFS
BNJMMJPOQFPQMFTVTQFDUFEPGDPNNVOJTUTZNQBUIJFTXFSFTVCKFDUFEUPGPSDFE
labor and torture.33 A lack of legal constraints resulted in extraordinary judicial
DPSSVQUJPO FOTVSJOHUIBUNBOZXFSFEFUBJOFEJOEFĕOJUFMZXJUIPVUDIBSHFBOE
POMZUIPTFXJUIQPMJUJDBMDPOOFDUJPOTXFSFGSFFEćFBOHVJTIPGJONBUFTXBT
captured in a popular song written by a political prisoner in Tangerrang prison
OFBS+BLBSUBi1SJTPOMJGFTMJLFTFMGUPSNFOU FOUFSJOHUIJDL MFBWJOHTMJN GPSDFE
labor and underfed, still alive but nearly dead.”34
*NQFSWJPVTUPUIFIVNBOTVČFSJOH 4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTUBČFS3PC#BSOFUU
wrote to Charles Mann of USAID in April 1966 that since the coup, “the trend
PG*OEPOFTJBOQPMJUJDBMEFWFMPQNFOUIBTCFFOESBTUJDBMMZBMUFSFEJOBEJSFDUJPO
GBWPSBCMFUP6OJUFE4UBUFTJOUFSFTUTJOUIF'BS&BTUćF1,*IBTCFFOFMJNJOBUFE
as an effective political force. . . . The new leaders are trying to integrate the
DPVOUSZJOUPUIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMDPNNVOJUZ*OWFTUNFOUTIPVMECFFODPVSBHFE
‫ڀڀ‬$BMUFYJTPQUJNJTUJDw*OUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTTJNJMBSMZHVTIFEUIBUUIF1,*IBE
iTVČFSFEBNBTTJWFEFGFBUwBOEUIBUiSFWFSFODFGPS4VLBSOPwXBTĕOBMMZiCSP-
LFO‫ڀڀ‬4VIBSUPJTOPXJOWJUJOHUIF*.'<*OUFSOBUJPOBM.POFUBSZ'VOE>UPIFMQ
EFWFMPQQPMJDJFTBOESFTUPSJOHUPGPSFJHOPXOFSTTPNFQMBOUBUJPOTBOENJOFT
taken over by Sukarno.”35
To help consolidate the new order, USAID gradually revived old police
DPOUBDUT*O+BOVBSZŴżźŴ +BNFT.D.BIPO EJSFDUPSPG014UFDIOJDBMTFSWJDFT 
wrote to Brigadier General “Benny” Soebianto, chief of police in Jakarta, agree-
JOH UP IJT SFRVFTU GPS BTTJTUBODF *O XBSN QFSTPOBM UFSNT  .D.BIPO BTLFE
BCPVU4PFCJBOUPTXJGFBOEUPMEIJNUIBUUIFJSSFDFOUNFFUJOHJO8BTIJOHUPO
IBE CSPVHIU CBDL GPOE NFNPSJFT PG UIFJS BTTPDJBUJPO JO *OEPOFTJB JO ŴżŸŷ

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 105


McMahon then noted that the United States would ship a lock-picking gun and
a supply of .38 Special revolvers through Fargo International and would help
4PFCJBOUPMPDBUFBSNTEFBMFSTJOXFTUFSO&VSPQFBOE+BQBO36
ćJTSFWFBMJOHMFUUFSEFNPOTUSBUFTIPXUIF$*"XBTDPOUJOVJOHUPBSNQPMJDF
JOUPUIFŴżźųTBOEIPXUIFQSPHSBNTQBJEEJWJEFOETCZDSFBUJOHMPZBMiBTTFUTw
who achieved positions of power years after being trained by the United States.
*OBOPUIFSFYBNQMF "NFSJDBOUSBJOFE(FOFSBM"OUPO4VEKBSXP BOBEKVUBOU
UP4PFLBOUPJOUIFNJEŴżŸųTBOEDPNNBOEFSPGUIFNPCSJHTSBOHFSDPNQBOZ
and scout battalion, was appointed by Suharto as head of the Jakarta police, then
as director of the National Police in the early 1980s, where he worked vigorously
to ferret out subversives. In 1961 he had been sent to study policing operations
JO"UIFOT (FPSHJB BOECFDBNFUIFSFBęFSB$*"iBTTFUw37 On the whole, the
QPMJDFQSPHSBNTDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPG*OEPOFTJBOTPDJFUZBOEUIF
HSPXUIPGBNPEFSOTVSWFJMMBODFBQQBSBUVT XIJDI4VIBSUPVUJMJ[FEUPMJRVJEBUF
UIF1,*BOEBOZPUIFSUISFBUTUPIJTQPXFS'SPNŴżŹźVOUJMŴżżŻIFQSFTJEFE
PWFSPOFPGUIFNPTUCSVUBMBOEDPSSVQUEJDUBUPSTIJQTPGUIFUXFOUJFUIDFOUVSZ 
XIJDIMJLFMZXPVMEOPUIBWFDPNFUPQBTTXJUIPVUUIF8BTIJOHUPODPOOFDUJPO

Playground of the CIA: Police Training and the Militarization


of Thailand

*O ćBJMBOE  QPMJDF QSPHSBNT XFSF TJNJMBSMZ JOUFSUXJOFE XJUI DMBOEFTUJOF


PQFSBUJPOTBOEDSFBUFEBOJOGSBTUSVDUVSFQSJNFEGPSQPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPOćF
DPVOUSZ XBT TUSBUFHJDBMMZ JNQPSUBOU BT B MBVODIJOH QBE GPS DPWFSU XBSGBSF
UISPVHIPVU4PVUIFBTU"TJBBOEBWFOVFGPSUIFFYQBOTJPOPG"NFSJDBOPJMJOUFS-
FTUTBOEJOWFTUNFOUPQQPSUVOJUJFT38 The United States began providing police
BJEJOUIFMBUFŴżŷųTUPVOEFSNJOFUIFMFęMFBOJOH1SJEJ1IBOPNZPOH IFBEPG
UIFBOUJ+BQBOFTF'SFFćBJNPWFNFOUEVSJOH8PSME8BS** BOEUPQSPQVQ
1IJCVO4POHLISBN B+BQBOFTFDPMMBCPSBUPSXIPQSFTJEFEPWFSBiHPWFSONFOU
PGGPSDFwMFECZiTUSPOHNFOwJOUIFBSNZBOEQPMJDF39
*OŴżŷŻ UXPZFBSTCFGPSF)BSSZ5SVNBOBQQSPWFEžŸNJMMJPOGPSUIFDSFBUJPO
PGBDPOTUBCVMBSZJOćBJMBOE UIF$*"JOJUJBUFEBžŶŸNJMMJPOQPMJDFQSPHSBN
UISPVHIBGSPOUDPSQPSBUJPO 4FB4VQQMZ XIJDITQFDJBMJ[FEJOJNQPSUJOHGSVJU
BOEEBJSZQSPEVDUTBTXFMMBTUFBSHBTGPSUIFNJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDF#BTFEPVU
PG.JBNJ 4FB4VQQMZXBTIFBEFECZ-JFVUFOBOU$PMPOFM8JMMJT#JSE EFQVUZ
chief of OSS operations in China and an ordnance specialist characterized by
DPMMFBHVFTBTBiDPONBO wBOECZ$PMPOFM1BVM)FMMJXFMM IFBEPG044TQFDJBM
JOUFMMJHFODFJO$IJOB XIPXPSLFEXJUIUIF(VPNJOEBOH (.% TFDSFUQPMJDF
)FMMJXFMMBMMFHFEMZCSJCFEB7JFUOBNFTFOBUJPOBMJTUXJUIBQPVDIPGPQJVNUP
secure a dossier on Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary background.
-JLF$MBJSF$IFOOBVMU GBNFE8PSME8BS**BJSNBOBOEPSJHJOBMPXOFSPG
UIF$*"DPOOFDUFE$JWJM"JS5SBOTQPSU‰LOPXOBTUIF'MZJOH5JHFST‰#JSEBOE

106 Under the Facade of Benevolence


)FMMJXFMMDPNCJOFENPOFZNBLJOHPGBOPęFOJMMFHBMWBSJFUZXJUIBOUJDPNNV-
OJTN".JBNJBUUPSOFZBOENPWFSBOETIBLFSJOUIF3FQVCMJDBO1BSUZMBUFS
involved with the Bay of Pigs operation, Helliwell had connections with orga-
OJ[FEDSJNFBOEIFMQFEćBJPďDJBMTJOWFTUUIFJSESVHQSPĕUTJO'MPSJEBMBOE
deals. Bird, a graduate of the Wharton School of Business and a top executive
at Sears, Roebuck who helped establish the Thai stock exchange in 1961, was
DBVHIUTNVHHMJOHPQJVNBOEXBTJOEJDUFECZUIFBUUPSOFZHFOFSBMTPďDFGPS
bribing ICA officials in Laos.40
The pair worked closely with Thai chief of police Phao Sinyanon, who used
"NFSJDBOBJEUPUSBOTGPSNUIFQPMJDFEFQBSUNFOUJOUPBRVBTJNJMJUBSZGPSDF
PWFSŶŸ ųųųTUSPOHXJUIJUTPXONPVOUFE NFDIBOJ[FE UBOL BOETFBCPSOFEJWJ-
TJPOT*O/PWFNCFSŴżŸŴ DIBSHÏEBČBJSFT8JMMJBN5VSOFSDPNQMBJOFEUPUIF
4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUBCPVU#JSEi"DIBSBDUFSXIPIBOEFEPWFSBMPUPGNJMJUBSZ
FRVJQNFOUUPUIFQPMJDFXJUIPVUBOZBVUIPSJ[BUJPOBTGBSBT*DBOEFUFSNJOFBOE
XIPTFTUBUVTJOUIF$*"JTBNCJHVPVTUPTBZUIFMFBTU‫<ڀڀ‬8>IZJT<IF>BMMPXFE
UPEFBMXJUIUIFQPMJDFDIJFGJOTVDINBUUFST w41 There is no recorded answer to
UIFRVFSZ"TQBSUPGUIFRVJEQSPRVP 1IBPFTUBCMJTIFEBiTQFDJBMPQFSBUJPOT
VOJUwJO#VSNBUPUSBOTGFSBSNTUP(.%DPNNBOEFS-J.JGPSBOJOWBTJPO
PG:VOOBOQSPWJODFJOTPVUIFSO$IJOB"DDPSEJOHUP"NCBTTBEPS%BWJE,FZ 
XIPSFTJHOFEJOQSPUFTU UIFPQFSBUJPO DPEFOBNFE1BQFS CSPVHIUiDIBPTUP
UIF4IBOTUBUFTwPG#VSNBBOEXBTDPOEVDUFEJOiĘBHSBOUEJTSFHBSEGPS#VS-
NFTFTPWFSFJHOUZw*UFOEFEXJUIUIFSPVUJOHPG-J.JTGPSDFTCZUIF$IJOFTF
3FE"SNZ BTGFXJOTPVUIFSO$IJOBSBMMJFEUPUIFJSDBVTF42
0QFSBUJPO1BQFSJMMVTUSBUFTUIFJOUFSTFDUJPOCFUXFFO"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJO-
JOHBOEDPWFSUPQFSBUJPOTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB)FJSUPUIFIFSPJDJNBHFPGUIF
044  UIF $*" QPTTFTTFE B NZTUJRVF JO ćBJMBOE UIBU JU XPVME OFWFS FOUJSFMZ
MPTF"DDPSEJOHUPUIFIJTUPSJBO%BOJFM'JOFNBO i<JU>IBEUIFQPXFSUPUVSOUP
gold anyone it touched.”434PMJEMZCVJMUXJUIJOUFOTF VOTNJMJOHFZFT 1IBPXBT
QBSUPGBZPVOHFSHFOFSBUJPOPGNJMJUBSZPďDFSTXIPIBEIFMQFEPSDIFTUSBUF
the 1947 coup that brought Phibun to power. He was characterized by Free Thai
MFBEFS 4FOJ 1SBNPK BT UIF iXPSTU NBOw JO UIF IJTUPSZ PG UIF DPVOUSZ BOE CZ
C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times as a “superlative crook.”44 Allied with the
QSP(.%CVTJOFTTFMJUF 1IBPDPNNBOEFEQPMJDFUPiUBLFUIFTUFSOFTUBDUJPO
BHBJOTUBMMQFSTPOTTVTQFDUFEPGBJEJOHUIFDPNNVOJTUDBVTFw)FXBTMJOLFE
UPUIFNVSEFSPGUIFDIJFGPGEFUFDUJWFTBOEGPVSDBCJOFUNJOJTUFSTXIPXFSF
accused of supporting an abortive coup against Phibun in February 1949. Tak-
ing advantage of draconian national security laws granting sweeping powers of
detention, Phao’s lieutenants arrested and tortured intellectuals, peace activists,
and Free Thai veterans who supported Pridi, creating “terror and bitter resent-
NFOUwBNPOHUIFQVCMJD45
1IBPTQPXFSEFSJWFEJOQBSUGSPNIJTDPOUSPMPGUIFSBJM CBOLJOH BOEUSVDL-
JOHJOEVTUSJFTBOEUIFHPMEFYDIBOHFBOEPQJVNUSBEF XIJDINBEFIJNPOFPG

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 107


UIFSJDIFTUNFOJOUIFXPSME*OŴżŸŹBOEŴżŸźUIF#BOHLPLQSFTTBOEUIFSat-
urday Evening PostQVCMJTIFEFYQPTÏTPOUIFQPMJDFNPOPQPMZPWFSTNVHHMJOH
under Phao.46 ćF FNCBTTZ SFQPSUFE UIBU BT B SFTVMU PG JOTUJUVUJPOBMJ[FE DPS-
SVQUJPO #BOHLPLIBECFDPNFBNBKPSUSBOTTIJQNFOUQPJOUGPSPQJVN XIJDI
represented a danger to the “free world,” but there was “little likelihood of the
traffic being suppressed so long as officials in power like Phao continued to reap
NBKPS ĕOBODJBM SFXBSEw47 (BSMBOE 8JMMJBNT PG UIF BSNZ DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF
corps and Federal Bureau of Narcotics concluded in another secret report that
ćBJMBOEXBTUIFiHSFBUFTUTPVSDFPGJMMJDJUPQJVNJOUIFXPSMEwCFDBVTFPGUIF
iJOWPMWFNFOUwPG(.%JSSFHVMBSTBOEićBJPďDJBMT‫ڀڀ‬PGHSFBUQSPNJOFODF w
BOEUIBUiTPNF"NFSJDBOT<MJLFMZSFGFSSJOHUP)FMMJXFMMBOE#JSE>XFSFLOPXO
UPFOUFSUIFDMBOEFTUJOFPQJVNCVTJOFTTJO#BOHLPL‫ڀڀ‬1VCMJDTBGFUZPďDFST
IBWFNVDIJOGPSNBUJPO CVUMJUUMFIBTCFFOQMBDFEJOXSJUUFOSFQPSUTw48
ćFSFBTPOGPSUIFTJMFODFXBTUIBU1IBPXBTBOJNQPSUBOUTUSBUFHJDBTTFUBOE
PQJVNBNFBOTPGGVOEJOHSPMMCBDLPQFSBUJPOT"NFSJDBOPďDJBMTDPOTJEFSFE
UIFQPMJDFiNPSFĘFYJCMFBOEPQFOUPOFXSPMFT‫ڀڀ‬UIBOUIFCVSFBVDSBUJDBMMZ
FOUSFODIFE BSNZw BOE 1IBPT XBZ PG EFBMJOH XJUI PQQPOFOUT XBT iSVUIMFTT
ZFUFČFDUJWF wNVDIMJLFi5JHFSw,JNTJO4PVUI,PSFB1IBPXBTBXBSEFEUIF
64-FHJPOPG.FSJUGPSiFYDFQUJPOBMMZNFSJUPSJPVTTFSWJDF wPOFPGUXPNBKPS
PQJVNEFBMFSTUPSFDFJWFUIFEJTUJODUJPO (FOFSBM-J.JPGUIF(.%XBTUIF
other. Bird and Helliwell won the award too.)49
5XPIVOESFE64BEWJTFSTUSBJOFE1IBPTNFO QSPWJEJOHUIFNXJUICB[PP-
kas, artillery, tanks, and helicopters. A paratrooper base was established at Lop-
CVSJ MBUFSNPWFEUP)VB)JO XIFSF$*"PQFSBUJWFTBUF TMFQU BOENBSDIFE
XJUIUIFJSQSPUÏHÏT USBJOJOHUIFNJOTNBMMVOJUXBSGBSF"GFXXFSFLJMMFEJO
action.50*OŴżŸŵUIF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOTBODUJPOFEBUPQTFDSFU QSP-
HSBN 14#%ŵŶ XIJDIFOHBHFEBOUISPQPMPHJTUTUPTUVEZćBJMBOETEJWFSHFOU
FUIOJDHSPVQT XJUIUIFBJNPGSFDSVJUJOHUIFNUPiEFWFMPQ FYQBOE BOEBDDFM-
FSBUFTPVOEQSPHSBNTGPSUIFDSFBUJPOBOEFNQMPZNFOUPGJOEJHFOPVTHVFSSJMMB
BOE QBSBNJMJUBSZ GPSDFTw "EPQUJOH TXFFQJOH HFOFSBMJ[BUJPOT BCPVU UIF ćBJ
national character, an internal blueprint contended that the Thais were “incor-
SJHJCMF JOEJWJEVBMJTUT  HFOUMF BOE MJHIUNJOEFE BOE OPU HJWFO UP QPOEFSPVT
QIJMPTPQIJDUIPVHIUPSXBSMJLFBOENJMJUBSZBNCJUJPOT wUSBJUTUIBUNBEFUIFN
iCFUUFSTVJUFEUPHVFSSJMMBBDUJWJUJFTUIBOUPUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPOBMBSHFTDBMFPG
DPOWFOUJPOBMNJMJUBSZGPSDFTw51
5PJNQMFNFOU14#%ŵŶ &JTFOIPXFSBQQPJOUFE044EJSFDUPS8JMMJBNi8JME
#JMMw%POPWBOBNCBTTBEPSUPćBJMBOEJOUIFTVNNFSPGŴżŸŶ"8BMM4USFFU
MBXZFSXIPĕSTUCFDPNFJOWPMWFEJODMBOEFTUJOFBDUJWJUJFTCZGVOOFMJOHBSNTUP
QSPD[BSJTUHFOFSBMTEVSJOHUIF3VTTJBODJWJMXBS %POPWBOXBTBOJOUJNBUFPG
CIA director Allen Dulles and, according to his biographer, “a fanatic believer
in the value of covert operations and guerrilla struggle.”52#ZUIJTUJNFJOIJT
NJETFWFOUJFT  IF XBT HJWFO JOTUSVDUJPOT UP CVJME VQ UIF iPWFSU BOE DPWFSUw
capabilities of Phao’s police and “intensify . . . the efficiency of psychological

108 Under the Facade of Benevolence


XBSGBSFwBHBJOTUUIFDPNNVOJTUQPMJUJDBMVOEFSHSPVOEGPSUIFQVSQPTFPGDPO-
TUSVDUJOHiBCBTUJPOJOćBJMBOEGSPNXIJDIWBSJPVTPQFSBUJPOTDBOCFJOJUJBUFE
into adjoining areas.”53
%VSJOH8PSME8BS** %POPWBOIBENBEFDPOUBDUTXJUI)P$IJ.JOIBOE
XBTJNQSFTTFECZUIFPSHBOJ[BUJPOBMDBQBCJMJUJFTPGUIF7JFUNJOI)FVSHFEUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTUPNPMEJOUIFJSJNBHFHVFSSJMMBGPSDFTDBQBCMFPGSVUIMFTTBDUJPO
when necessary and of winning over the peasantry through civic engage-
NFOU JOGSBTUSVDUVSFEFWFMPQNFOU BOEIFBMUIBOEFEVDBUJPOQSPKFDUT%VSJOH
IJT BNCBTTBEPSTIJQ  %POPWBO QSFTJEFE PWFS UIF HSPXUI PG BO JOUFMMJHFODF
PSHBOJ[BUJPO UIF,SPN1SBNVBO3BUDIBLBO1IBFOEJO XIJDIGPMMPXFEEJT-
TJEFOUBDUJWJUZ DPNNVOJTUBOEOPODPNNVOJTU JOćBJMBOEBOEOFJHICPSJOH
DPVOUSJFT  BOE FODPVSBHFE UIF 1FOUBHPO UP BTTVNF iJODSFBTFE SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ
GPSDPOTUBCVMBSZUSBJOJOHwBOEUPTVQQPSUBOiVOBUUSJCVUFEQSPHSBNPGTJNJMBS
OBUVSFGPS$BNCPEJBw54
0OF PG IJT DFOUSBM QSFPDDVQBUJPOT XBT FYQBOEJOH UIF ŷ ŸųųNBO #PSEFS
1BUSPM 1PMJDF #11  XIJDI XBT HJWFO SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ GPS SFGVHFF SFTFUUMFNFOU
and security along Thailand’s loosely policed frontiers, conducting area and
QPQVMBUJPOTVSWFZT BOEFMJDJUJOHJOGPSNBUJPOPODPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUZ.PEFMFE
BęFSUIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZ UIF#11XBTBSNFEXJUINBDIJOFHVOTBOE
rocket launchers and trained in crowd control and jungle warfare.55 The Police
Aerial Reconnaissance Unit was another unconventional force built up under
Donovan’s oversight, which specialized in parachuting into isolated areas.
)FBEFECZ+BNFTi#JMMw-BJSGSPN5FYBT BDBQUBJOJOUIFćBJQPMJDF IFTUBUFE
JOBŵųųŴJOUFSWJFX i*NOPUTVSFUIBU+FTVT$ISJTUXBTOUQSFUUZDMPTFUPBDPN-
NVOJTUXIFOZPVUIJOLBCPVUUIFGBDUUIBUIFTBJESJDIQFPQMFPVHIUUPHJWF
BMMUIFJSNPOFZUPUIFQPPSw UIF VOJUXBTGBTIJPOFEBęFS DPNNBOEP VOJUT
developed by the CIA in eastern Europe to carry out ill-fated rollback opera-
tions behind the Iron Curtain.56
*SPOJDBMMZ  UIF ŴŵżųE QMBOOJOH HSPVQ DPODMVEFE JO ŴżŸŸ UIBU iDPNNVOJTU
QSFTTVSFTBSFTNBMMBOEEPOPUTFFNUPKVTUJGZIFBWZIBOEFEQPMJDFNFUIPETw
BOEUIBUUIFiSVMJOHHSPVQEPFTOPUGBDFBOZTJHOJĕDBOUDIBMMFOHFUPJUTBVUIPS-
JUZ‫<ڀڀ‬5>IFOVNCFSBOEDIBSBDUFSPGćBJJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZGPSDFTFYDFFEUIF
OPSNTGPSFČFDUJWFNBJOUFOBODFPGJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBHBJOTUDVSSFOUBOEGPSF-
TFFBCMF SFRVJSFNFOUTw57 ćF DPXCPZT JO UIF &JTFOIPXFS BENJOJTUSBUJPO IBE
HPOFXBZPWFSCPBSE"HJOHBOEJOĕOBODJBMUSPVCMF %POPWBOXBTSFDBMMFEUP
8BTIJOHUPO XIFSFIFXBTQBJEžŴųų ųųųBTBMPCCZJTUGPSUIFćBJHPWFSONFOU
)FMMJXFMM TFSWFE JO UIF TBNF DBQBDJUZ  "NFSJDBO QPMJDJFT EVSJOH IJT UFOVSF
DPOUSJCVUFE  JG BOZUIJOH  UP UIF HSPXUI PG BSNFE JOTVSHFODZ  QBSUJDVMBSMZ JO
northern Thailand, where the hill tribes resented the violent disruption of their
XBZPGMJGFBOEFODSPBDINFOUPOUIFJSTPWFSFJHOUZCSFECZUIFFYQBOTJPOPG
state authority.58
In 1954, CIA operative Edward G. Lansdale was sent to northeast Thailand
UP PSHBOJ[F IJMM USJCFTQFPQMF JOUP QBSBNJMJUBSZ NJMJUJBT UP TFSWF BT TDPVUT GPS

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 109


UIF#11BOENPVOUBSNFEJODVSTJPOTJOUP/PSUI7JFUOBNBOE-BPT'JOBOD-
JOHXBTPCUBJOFEJOQBSUUISPVHIUIFTBMFPGPQJVNćF$*"FODPVSBHFEUIF
#11UPSFGSBJOGSPNFOGPSDJOHBOUJPQJVNFEJDUTCFDBVTFJUXPVMEEFOZUIFIJMM
tribes, which the United States was trying to win over, their traditional source
PGJODPNF BOECFDBVTFPQJVNXBTCFJOHVTFEUPQVSDIBTFJOUFMMJHFODF59
-BOTEBMFBOEIJTBTTPDJBUFTPSHBOJ[FEDJWJDBDUJPOUFBNTXIJDIQSPNPUFE
QPMJUJDBMFEVDBUJPO TFUVQTDIPPMTBOENFEJDBMDMJOJDT BOEUSJFEUPJNQSPWFWJM-
MBHFJOGSBTUSVDUVSFBTBNFBOTPGiXJOOJOHIFBSUTBOENJOETw"NBJOQVSQPTF
was to collect intelligence through close contact with the population.60 Schools
XFSFTVQQMJFEXJUISBEJPFRVJQNFOUBOETUBČFEXJUI#11XIPTQJFEPOGBDVMUZ
BOETUVEFOUT0OF$*"BEWJTFSDPNNFOUFEUIBUiTDIPPMDIJMESFOBSFKVTUBCPVU
UIFCFTUTPVSDFTPGJOGPSNBUJPOBSPVOEw"OPUIFSHVTIFEUPUIFBNCBTTBEPS
UIBUiTUVEFOUTUFMMUIFJSUFBDIFSTXIFOUIFJSSFMBUJWFTBSFNBLJOHUSJQTUP#VSNB
UPDPOUFTUUIFDPNNVOJTUTw61
8IJMFZJFMEJOHTPNFCFOFĕU UIFDJWJDBDUJPOQSPHSBNTXFSFIBNQFSFECZ
what one adviser characterized as the “historic clash between the people and
PďDJBMEPN wXIJDIXBTiIBSEUPPWFSDPNFw4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUPďDJBMTDIBSBD-
UFSJ[FEUIFIJMMUSJCFTNFOBTBiQSJNJUJWFNJOPSJUZwFRVJWBMFOUUPUIF"NFSJDBO
*OEJBOTBOEBiUIPSOJOUIFTJEFPGCSPBEFSNPEFSOJ[BUJPOFČPSUT wPSEFSJOH
OBQBMNBUUBDLTBOEUIFCVSOJOHPGWJMMBHFTXIFOUIFZSFTJTUFESFTFUUMFNFOU62
.BOZTDIPPMTXFSFĘJNTJMZCVJMUCFDBVTFPGVOEFSGVOEJOHBOEHSBęćF#11
took bribes, used drugs, enforced unpopular laws against brewing alcohol and
XPPEDVUUJOHXJUIPVUBQFSNJU BOEHFOFSBMMZBDUFEJOBOiBSCJUSBSZBOEBVUIPS-
JUBSJBONBOOFSwEPMJOHPVUiWJPMFODFUPUIPTFOPUPCFEJFOUUPUIFJSXJTIFTw63
"64"*%PďDJBMDPNNFOUFEUIBUUISPVHIUIFDJWJDBDUJPOQSPHSBN
QPMJDFXFSF‫ڀڀ‬SFRVJSFEUPQFSGPSNBMMLJOETPGTFSWJDFTOPQPMJDFNBOXPVMEFWFS
QFSGPSN CFLJOEUPEJSUZ TNFMMZ JOGFSJPSQFBTBOUT<BTUIFZTBXUIFN>BOENBZCF
HFULJMMFECZUIFDPNNVOJTUTćFZXFSFUPMECZVTOPUUPTUFBMBGFXDIJDLFOTPS
SBQFBWJMMBHFHJSMOPXBOEBHBJO‫ڀڀ‬8FUPMEUIFNUPXPSLIBSE QBUSPMUIFSJDF
QBEEJFT BOECFVQSJHIU#VUUIFćBJTEPOUCFDPNFQPMJDFNFOGPSUIFTFSFBTPOT
BDPQJTBHVZXIPXBOUTUP‫ڀڀ‬ĘBVOUIJTQPXFSBOETUBUVT UPTIPXPČIJTVOJGPSN
UPUIFHJSMT BOENBLFMPUTPGNPOFZCZIPPLPSCZDSPPL64

ćFTFDPNNFOUTTIFEMJHIUPOBDFOUSBMQSPCMFNPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT XIJDI
FNQPXFSFE NFO PG MJNJUFE FEVDBUJPO QSPOF UP BCVTJOH UIFJS QPXFST ćF
QPMJUJDBMUISVTUPGUIFUSBJOJOHBOEJUTNPMEJOHPGUIFQPMJDFJOUPB$PME8BS
JOTUSVNFOUGVSUIFSBDDFMFSBUFEIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT

“Keeping the Reds under Close Watch”: Police Aid in the Era of
Marshal Sarit and General Thanom

In 1957, Marshal Sarit Thanarat seized power in a coup, forcing Phao into exile
JO4XJU[FSMBOE'PSHJOHBOBMMJBODFXJUIUIFLJOHJOBOBUUFNQUUPDFNFOUIJT

110 Under the Facade of Benevolence


MFHJUJNBDZ 4BSJUMPPUFEćBJMBOETDPČFSTPGŶCJMMJPOCBIU‰SPVHIMZžżųNJM-
MJPO ćF &JTFOIPXFS BOE ,FOOFEZ BENJOJTUSBUJPOT WBMVFE IJN  BT UIFZ EJE
NBOZ PUIFS ćJSE 8PSME EFTQPUT  BT B TUBVODI BOUJDPNNVOJTU BOE iNJMJUBSZ
NPEFSOJ[FSwBOEGPSIJTPQFOOFTTUPXBSEGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU XIJDIJODSFBTFE
ĕWFGPMEEVSJOHIJTUFOVSF MBSHFMZCFDBVTFIFLFQUXBHFTMPXBOETVQQSFTTFE
dissent by arresting over two hundred labor leaders.65
6OEFS UIF ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN  UXFOUZ BEWJTFST  JODMVEJOH $*" BHFOU "MCFSU
%V#PJT GPSNFSQPMJDFDPNNJTTJPOFSJO1IJMBEFMQIJB XFSFTFOUUPEFWFMPQB
TDJFOUJĕD DSJNF MBC  FTUBCMJTI NPEFSO ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH NFUIPET  BOE EFMJWFS
MBNJOBUJPONBDIJOFTGPSUIFJOJUJBUJPOPGBOJEFOUJUZDBSETZTUFNćFZGVSUIFS
created a Tactical Operations Center to collect data and analyze intelligence
PODPNNVOJTUPSHBOJ[BUJPOBMBDUJWJUJFT CFFGFEVQUIFJNNJHSBUJPOEJWJTJPOPG
UIFćBJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDF 5/1 DPOTUSVDUFEBUXFMWFDIBOOFMDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
TZTUFNMJOLJOHSFNPUFWJMMBHFBSFBTUPNBKPSUPXOT BOECVJMUVQUIFQPMJDFTQF-
cial branch, which was responsible for “detecting and apprehending subversive
FMFNFOUTXIPXPVMEEFTUSPZUIFGSFFEPNPGćBJMBOEw66"QBNQIMFUGSPNUIF
6OJUFE 4UBUFT 0QFSBUJPOT .JTTJPO 640.  QSPDMBJNFE UIBU iGBSNFST DBOOPU
till their land if an area is overrun by bandit groups; industrialists are reluctant
UPJOWFTUJOQSPQFSUZWVMOFSBCMFUPDSJNJOBMBUUBDL‫ڀڀ‬GSFFHPWFSONFOUDBOOPU
exist without safeguards against subversion.”67
ćFTFDPNNFOUTJMMVTUSBUFUIFFTTFOUJBMMJOLCFUXFFOTFDVSJUZ GPSFJHOJOWFTU-
NFOU BOEEFWFMPQNFOUGPSHFECZQPMJDZNBLFST XIJDINBEFQPMJDFUSBJOJOH
B DSVDJBM DPNQPOFOU PG HMPCBM DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ FČPSUT *OUFSOBM SFQPSUT
NFBOXIJMFQPJOUFEUPUIFWFOBMJUZPGQVCMJDPďDJBMTBOEDVNCFSTPNFUSJBMQSP-
cedures, and criticized the TNP special branch for keeping an “unnecessarily
MBSHFHSPVQPGQFPQMFJOQSJTPOGPSQPMJUJDBMDSJNFTXIJDIEPOPUJOWPMWFBDUVBM
subversion.”68"TBLFZDPOTFRVFODFPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT UIFQSJTPOQPQVMB-
UJPOJODSFBTFEGSPNŴŹ ŸŸŸJOŴżŸųUPŶŸ ųųųJOŴżŸż4PNFPGUIPTFBSSFTUFE
XFSFFYFDVUFEPVUSJHIUCZSPWJOHEFBUITRVBET"640.CSPDIVSFSFWFBMJOHMZ
EFQJDUFEBTQFDJBMCSBODIPďDFSTFBSDIJOHUIFTNBMMUIBUDIFEIPNFPGBćBJ
NBOBOEEJTDPWFSJOHFWJEFODFPGDPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUZCFIJOEBUSBQEPPSćF
DBQUJPOOPUFEXJUIBQQSPWBMUIBUUIFNBOXBTMBUFSFYFDVUFE69
'SPNŴżŸżUPŴżŹŹ UIF014JOćBJMBOEXBTIFBEFECZ+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO 
DIJFG PG UIF (SFFOTCPSP  /PSUI $BSPMJOB  QPMJDF EFQBSUNFOU  XIJDI FWPMWFE
EVSJOH IJT UFOVSF ŴżŸŴoŴżŸŸ  JOUP POF PG UIF iNPTU QSPGFTTJPOBM BOE CFTU
SVOMBXFOGPSDFNFOUBHFODJFTJOUIF4PVUI‰BNPEFMGPSPUIFSEFQBSUNFOUT w
according to the journalist Jerry Bledsoe. A graduate of the University of Rich-
NPOET5$.JMMFS4DIPPMPG-BXBOEUIF'#*TUSBJOJOHBDBEFNZ XIFSFIF
XBTDMBTTQSFTJEFOU POFPGIJTDMBTTNBUFTXBTUIFCPEZHVBSEPG&HZQUT,JOH
'BSPVL  8JMMJBNTPO JOUSPEVDFE ĕYFE QBZ HSBEFT BOE JODFOUJWFT GPS QSPNP-
UJPOBTXFMMBTOFXVOJGPSNTBOETRVBEDBST SBJTFEBENJOJTUSBUJWFBOEUSBJOJOH
TUBOEBSET BOEDVMUJWBUFEUJFTXJUICVTJOFTTBOEDPNNVOJUZMFBEFSTUPCPMTUFS

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 111


UIFQVCMJDJNBHFPGUIFQPMJDF)FBMTPDMFBOFEVQDPSSVQUJPOJOUIFBMMXIJUF
PSHBOJ[BUJPO CZ QVSHJOH PďDFST JNQMJDBUFE JO JMMFHBM HBNCMJOH BOE MPUUFSZ
SBDLFUT JNQPTFETUSJDUSFHVMBUJPOTPOUIFVTFPGGPSDF TFUVQBTFQBSBUFKVWFOJMF
division, and according to colleague Walter “Sticky” Burch, was known for his
“honesty, integrity, and handling of the law as it was written.”70
5BMMBOEBUIMFUJDXJUIUIFMPPLTPGBNPWJFTUBS 8JMMJBNTPOXBTBTFMGNBEF
NBOPGUIFEFQSFTTJPOFSBXIPDBNFUP(SFFOTCPSPGSPN3JDINPOE 7JSHJOJB 
XIFSF IF IBE XPO UISFF (PMEFO (MPWFT CPYJOH DIBNQJPOTIJQT )F CFDBNF
LOPXOBTBi$JOEFSFMMBNBOwBęFSCFJOHQSPNPUFEGSPNQBUSPMNBOUPDBQUBJO
JOŴżŷźVQPOBDJOHBNFSJUFYBN%VSJOH8PSME8BS** IFTFSWFEXJUIBSNZ
JOUFMMJHFODF JO #FSMJO BOE FBSOFE B DPNNFOEBUJPO GPS VODPWFSJOH B CMBDL
NBSLFU SJOH TUSFUDIJOH BDSPTT UISFF DPVOUSJFT $POTFSWBUJWF QPMJUJDBMMZ BOE
QPTTFTTJOHBOFYDFQUJPOBMXPSLFUIJD 8JMMJBNTPOXBTSFDSVJUFEJOUPUIF'PS-
eign Service by O. W. Wilson an authority on policing and an ICA consultant,
XIPUIPVHIUIJHIMZPG8JMMJBNTPOTXPSL)FXBTDBMMFEVQPOUPSFQMJDBUFUIF
SFGPSNTIFIBEJOUSPEVDFEJO(SFFOTCPSPJOćBJMBOEBOEUIF1IJMJQQJOFT BOE
later other Cold War “hot spots” such as the Congo, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
4PVUI,PSFB BOE7JFUOBN)FBMTPDPPSEJOBUFEQBSBNJMJUBSZPQFSBUJPOT GPS
which the police were specially trained.
"ęFS8JMMJBNTPOTEFBUIJOŵųųŸ #VSDIUPMESFQPSUFST i+FUFSTBJEIFXBTOU
involved in covert operations but . . . I think he was.” Tellingly, while on leave
JOŴżŹŸ 8JMMJBNTPONFOUJPOFEUPUIF Greensboro Daily News an incident in
which police under his oversight had “dispersed” a group of three hundred
JOTVSHFOUTXIPIBETFUVQBCBTFJOTPVUIFSOćBJMBOEDPNQMFUFXJUIUSFODIFT 
NBDIJOFHVOFNQMBDFNFOUT BOEiBCBTLFUCBMMDPVSU‰UIBUDBQJUBMJTUJDHBNF w
DBQUVSJOHBOELJMMJOHBGFX)FTUBUFE i8FWFNBOBHFEUPLFFQUIFSFETPČCBM-
BODFBOEEJTPSHBOJ[FEw8JMMJBNTPOEJTDMPTFEUPBOPUIFSSFQPSUFSUIBUIJTKPC
XBTUPiXPSLXJUIQPMJDFGPSDFTJODPNCBUJOHDPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUJFT wBEEJOHi*G
UIF$IJDPNT<$IJOFTF$PNNVOJTUT>UBLFBMMPG7JFUOBN UIFOUIFZXJMMIBWF
BOPQFOEPPSDPSSJEPSUPćBJMBOE*GUIFZDBQUVSFćBJMBOE UIFO#VSNB -BPT 
$BNCPEJB BOE.BMBZTJBXJMMGBMMBOEUIF3FETXJMMIBWF"TJB*EPOPUTFFIPX
we can afford to get out of Asia.”71
8JMMJBNTPOTDBSFFSJTJOTUSVDUJWFBTUPUIFNPUJWFTPGQVCMJDTBGFUZPďDFST 
XIPTPVHIUUPNPEFSOJ[FQPMJDFJOTUJUVUJPOTJOPSEFSUPGBDJMJUBUFQPTUDPMPOJBM
iOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwBOEXJOUIF$PME8BS)JTFYQFSJFODFJOUVSOEFNPOTUSBUFT
UIFEJďDVMUZPGUSZJOHUPFYQPSUEPNFTUJDJOOPWBUJPOTJOBGPSFJHODVMUVSBMTFU-
ting, particularly when these efforts are connected to an underlying political
BHFOEBUIBUJTBOUJUIFUJDBMUPUIFĘPXFSJOHPGEFNPDSBDZBOEIVNBOSJHIUT
*O+BOVBSZŴżŸżUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTFOUPOFPG8JMMJBNTPOTDPOUFNQP-
SBSJFT +BNFT7#FOOFUU UIFMJCFSBMEJSFDUPSPGUIF'FEFSBM#VSFBVPG1SJTPOT 
UPTVSWFZBOEPWFSIBVMćBJQSJTPOT"WFUFSBOPGUIF"SNZ"JS$PSQTBOEB
graduate of George Washington Law School eager to advance the ideals of the

112 Under the Facade of Benevolence


OFXQFOPMPHZ #FOOFUUIBEBVUIPSFEBOJOĘVFOUJBMSFQPSUJOŴżŵŻQSPQPTJOH
UIF DFOUSBMJ[BUJPO PG UIF 64 QSJTPO TZTUFN )F DSFBUFE B DPSQPSBUJPO  'FE-
FSBM1SJTPO*OEVTUSJFT *OD UPSFEVDFJONBUFJEMFOFTT"ęFSCFJOHBQQPJOUFE
EJSFDUPSPGUIFQSJTPOCVSFBVJOŴżŶź IFTUSPWFUPFMJNJOBUFQPMJUJDBMQBUSPOBHF
BOE DPSSVQUJPO BOE JNQMFNFOUFE QSPHSFTTJWF SFGPSNT  JODMVEJOH BCPMJTIJOH
DPSQPSBMQVOJTINFOU JNQSPWJOHJONBUFDMBTTJĕDBUJPO BOEEFWFMPQJOHCFUUFS
FEVDBUJPOBMBOEWPDBUJPOBMUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT OFXKVWFOJMFGBDJMJUJFT BQSJTPO
IPTQJUBM BOEMJCFSBMJ[FENBJMBOEHSJFWBODFQSPDFEVSFT XIJDIUIF*$"TPVHIU
to extend internationally.
#FOOFUUXBTBOBENJSFSPGUIFQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNFSćPNBT.PUU0TCPSOF 
who spent a week undercover in the Auburn, Pennsylvania, penitentiary in the
ŴżŴųT UP HBJO B CFUUFS VOEFSTUBOEJOH PG UIF FYQFSJFODF PG JONBUFT )F XBT B
vigorous proponent of the rehabilitative ideal, though he also served as a “tal-
ent scout” for the notorious Alcatraz prison, where incorrigibles were sent.72
After World War II, Bennett IFMQFEUPSFPSHBOJ[FUIFDJWJMQSJTPOTJO(FSNBOZ
BOE SFNBJOFE UIFSFBęFS B DPOTVMUBOU GPS UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU )F GPVOE
UIBUGBDJMJUJFTJOćBJMBOEXFSFiPWFSDSPXEFEwBOEUIBUJONBUFTXFSFIFMEGPS
iDPOTJEFSBCMFBNPVOUTPGUJNFXJUIPVUDIBSHF wPęFODPOĕOFEJOiMFHDIBJOTw73
)F SFDPNNFOEFE FYQBOEJOH FEVDBUJPO BOE QSJTPO XPSL  TQFFEJOH VQ DPVSU
QSPDFEVSFT BOEFTUBCMJTIJOHBQSPCBUJPOTZTUFN#FDBVTFDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ
DBNFUPBTTVNFUPQQSJPSJUZ UIFSFJTTDBOUFWJEFODFUIBUUIFTFJOJUJBUJWFTXFSF
FWFSJNQMFNFOUFE
#FOFBUIUIFQSPHSFTTJWFWFOFFS "NFSJDBOQSJTPOTXFSFUIFNTFMWFTPQQSFT-
TJWF  DIBSBDUFSJ[FE CZ IBSTI SFHJNFOUBUJPO  SBDJTN  BOE WJPMFODF 8IFO UIF
MFHFOEBSZBDUJWJTU%BWJE%FMMJOHFS JNQSJTPOFEJO%BOCVSZ $POOFDUJDVU BTB
conscientious objector during World War II, led a work stoppage in support of
*OUFSOBUJPOBM4UVEFOU1FBDF%BZ #FOOFUUDBNFGSPN8BTIJOHUPOUPUFMMIJN 
i%FMMJOHFS  UIF "NFSJDBO QSJTPO TZTUFN JT UIF NPTU BVUIPSJUBSJBO JOTUJUVUJPO
JOUIFXPSME BOEJGZPVEPOUTUSBJHIUFOVQ UIFGVMMXFJHIUPGUIFTZTUFNXJMM
DPNF EPXO PO ZPVw "T UIFTF DPNNFOUT JOEJDBUF  UIF BCVTFT UIBUFOTVFE JO
UIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMQSPHSBNTXFSFOPUBOBOPNBMZCVUBOFYUFOTJPOPGEPNFTUJD
QSBDUJDF NBEFXPSTFCZUIFEFNBOETPGUIF$PME8BS74
*OŴżŹŴBO*$"TUVEZSFDPNNFOEFEUIBUUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTCFUFSNJOBUFE
because Thailand had evolved into a “police state.” National security adviser
3PCFSU,PNFS OPUJOHUIBUUIFNJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDFTFSWFEBTiDPVOUFSQBSUTUP
FBDIPUIFSJOBOJOUFSOBMCBMBODFPGQPMJUJDBMQPXFSwXBSOFE i0VSBJEQSPHSBNT
IBWF CFDPNF VOBWPJEBCMZ JOWPMWFE JO UIF DPNQMFYJUJFT PG EPNFTUJD QPMJUJDT w
which went against official stipulations.75ćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOOFWFS-
UIFMFTTFYQBOEFEQPMJDFBJEUPPWFSžŵNJMMJPOJOŴżŹŵBOEžŶNJMMJPOJOŴżŹŶ VQ
GSPNžŸųų ųųųJOŴżŸŻBOEžŹųų ųųųJOŴżŸżćF014QSPWJEFEXFBQPOTBOE
FRVJQNFOU JODMVEJOHBOUJQFSTPOOFMNJOFT BOEDPOUSBDUFEB1FOOTZMWBOJBDBS-
USJEHFDPNQBOZUPTVQQMZPWFSŻųų ųųųSPVOETPGBNNVOJUJPO(FOFSBM1PUF

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 113


1FLBOBOEPGUIFćBJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDFCPBTUFEUPSFQPSUFSTUIBUIJTNFOXFSF
“keeping the reds under close surveillance” and that “tracking, destruction, and
apprehension” were being “perseveringly conducted.”76
*OŴżŹŷ GPMMPXJOHUIFBDDFTTJPOPG(FOFSBMćBOPN,JUUJLBDIPSOBTQSJNF
NJOJTUFS QPMJDFBJEXBTFYQBOEFEUPžŴŵNJMMJPO QFBLJOHBUžŴźNJMMJPOJOŴżŹź
0WFS ĕWF IVOESFE PďDFST XFSF TFOU UP UIF *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1PMJDF "DBEFNZ JO
8BTIJOHUPO %$ TFDPOEPOMZUPUIFOVNCFSGSPN4PVUI7JFUOBN BOEĕWF
OFXQPMJDFDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZTDIPPMTXFSFFTUBCMJTIFE.BOQPXFSSPTFGSPN
51,000 to 74,000, and the BPP was increased by 70 percent. Mass arrests of dissi-
EFOUTXFSFDBSSJFEPVU FTQFDJBMMZJOUIFOPSUIFBTU XIFSFBWJMMBHFBMBSNTZTUFN
XBTEFWFMPQFEUPJNQSPWFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT77ćFFDPOPNJTU1FUFS#FMMOPUFE
UIBUćBJMBOEIBEDPNFUPSFTFNCMFBOiPDDVQJFEDPVOUSZwXJUIUFOTPGUIPV-
TBOETPGNJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDFPďDFSTUSBJOFEJOPSSFDFJWJOHFRVJQNFOUGSPNUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFT BOEĕęZUIPVTBOE64USPPQTTUBUJPOFEBUTFWFONBKPSBJSCBTFT
“There were U.S. advisers everywhere; they occupied choice residences in the
CFTUEJTUSJDUTPG#BOHLPL VTVBMMZXJUIGPVSPSĕWFTFSWBOUT TBUJOIJHIQPTJ-
UJPOTJOćBJHPWFSONFOUNJOJTUSJFT‫<ڀڀ‬BOE>XFSFTFFOBUUIFCFTUHPMGBOE
country clubs.”78
1PMJDFBJEXBTHFBSFEJOQBSUUPXBSEGPSNJOHEFGFOTFQFSJNFUFSTBSPVOEUIF
BJSCBTFTVTFEGPSCPNCJOHSBJETJOUP*OEPDIJOB UPQSFWFOUBUUBDLTBHBJOTUUIFN
CZ JOTVSHFOUT  BOE UP BMMPX GPS UIF GSFF NPWFNFOU PG DBSHP "TTJTUBOU 1PMJDF
$IJFG (FOFSBM 7JUIPPO :BTBXBTEJ BENJUUFE UIBU IF SBO QBSBNJMJUBSZ PQFSB-
tions into Laos in cooperation with the CIA. Police were supplied with M-16
SJĘFT UIPVHIUIF4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZUPME64"*%JO.BSDI
1966 that they were “inappropriate as a police weapon” and should be procured
UISPVHIUIFNJMJUBSZ*O"VHVTUŴżŹźUIF/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJMBQQSPWFE
TIJQNFOUUPUIFQPMJDFBWJBUJPOEJWJTJPOPGFMFWFO)VFZIFMJDPQUFSTFRVJQQFE
XJUINBDIJOFHVOT79ćFJSGVODUJPOXBTUPBJEUIFOJOFUIPVTBOEoNBO#11
JOTVSWFJMMBODFBOEUSBDLJOHEPXOJOTVSHFOUTJOSFNPUFWJMMBHFTOPUSFBDIFECZ
SPBETZTUFNTćFIFMJDPQUFSTXFSFTFFOBTFTQFDJBMMZWBMVBCMFEVSJOHNPOTPPO
TFBTPO XIFOHSPVOENPCJMJUZXBTMJNJUFE1JMPUTXFSFBNPOHUIFIVOESFETPG
Thai police trained in the United States.80
*O0DUPCFSŴżźŹ GPMMPXJOHBEFNPDSBUJDJOUFSMVEF BDPVQMFEUPUIFSJTFPG
(FOFSBM,SJBOHTBL$IBNBOBOE B(.%DMJFOUIFBWJMZJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFESVH
USBEF#11VOJUTBMPOHXJUIQBSBNJMJUBSZ3FE(BVSTNBTTBDSFEBUMFBTUGPSUZ
UISFF QSPEFNPDSBDZ BEWPDBUFT BOE BSSFTUFE IVOESFET NPSF BęFS TUPSNJOH
ćBNNBTBU6OJWFSTJUZJO#BOHLPL.BOZPGUIFXFBQPOTXFSFTVQQMJFEBOE
police trained by the OPS, including General Vithoon, who controlled the Red
Gaurs. BPP officers were contracted by wealthy landowners protected by local
PďDJBMTUPBTTBTTJOBUFSBEJDBMTUVEFOUTBOENFNCFSTPGUIF'BSNFST'FEFSBUJPO
of Thailand, which organized against unjust land distribution practices.81
0O4FQUFNCFSŵŻ ŴżźŴ "NCBTTBEPS-FPOBSE6OHBSCSPLFSFEBQBDUUPTFOE

114 Under the Facade of Benevolence


)VFZIFMJDPQUFSTUPCPMTUFSQPMJDFESVHFOGPSDFNFOU#ZŴżźŷ UIF5/1XFSF
SFDFJWJOH VQXBSET PG žŴŵ NJMMJPO QFS ZFBS GPS UIFTF QVSQPTFT  UIPVHI QPMJDF
DPSSVQUJPO XBT TP XJEFTQSFBE  BO BSNZ DSJNJOBM JOWFTUJHBUJPO SFQPSU DPO-
DMVEFEUIBUFČPSUTUPDVUUIFTVQQMZXFSFMJLFiUSZJOHUPJNQSJTPOUIFNPSOJOH
NJTUw82/BUJPOBM1PMJDFEJSFDUPS1SBNVBM7BOJHCBOEIV XIPIBETUVEJFEQPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUJPO BU UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG 5FOOFTTFF BOE XIP PXOFE B MVYVSJPVT
#BOHLPLWJMMBXJUINBOJDVSFEHBSEFOTBOEBTXJNNJOHQPPMEFTQJUFBTBMBSZ
PGžŵŸųBNPOUI XBTTFOUFODFEUPUXFOUZĕWFZFBSTJOQSJTPOGPSESVHSFMBUFE
extortion. (He later bought his way out.) Another CIA “asset” in the police,
1VUUBQPSO,ISBNLISVBO XIPXBTBSSFTUFEBU+',BJSQPSUJO/FX:PSLXJUI
ĕęZOJOFQPVOETPGIFSPJO IBEIJTDBTFEJTNJTTFE83
ćFTFJODJEFOUTFQJUPNJ[FUIFGBJMVSFPGUIF8BSPO%SVHTBOEQPMJDFQSP-
HSBNT XIJDIFNQPXFSFEDPSSVQUGPSDFTXIPDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFEFHSBEBUJPO
PG ćBJ TPDJFUZ "DDPSEJOH UP UIF IJTUPSJBO "MGSFE 8 .D$PZ  "NFSJDBO BJE
VOXJUUJOHMZ BJEFE UIF iNPEFSOJ[BUJPOw PG UIF ESVH JOEVTUSZ BT iNPEFSO BJS-
DSBęSFQMBDFENVMFT OBWBMWFTTFMTSFQMBDFETBNQBOT BOEXFMMUSBJOFENJMJUBSZ
PSHBOJ[BUJPOTFYQSPQSJBUFEUIFUSBďDGSPNCBOETPGJMMJUFSBUFNPVOUBJOUSBE-
FSTwćBJMBOEXBTMFęKVTUBOPUIFSWJDUJNPGUIF$PME8BSBNJMJUBSJ[FEZFU
VOEFSEFWFMPQFE TUBUF EFFQMZ QPMBSJ[FE BOE NBSSFE CZ QPMJDF SFQSFTTJPO BOE
corruption.84

Reviving the Powers of the Constabulary: Police Aid and


Neocolonialism in the Philippines

1PMJDF USBJOJOH CPSF B TJNJMBS PVUDPNF JO UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT  XIFSF UIF 4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUSFPSHBOJ[FEUIF.BOJMBQPMJDFBęFS8PSME8BS**UPLFFQUBCTPO
UIF)VLCBMBIBQ BOBNBMHBNBUJPOPGVOJPOJTUTBOESBEJDBMQBSUJFTBEWPDBUJOH
MBOESFGPSNBOEJOEFQFOEFODFGSPNOFPDPMPOJBMDPOUSPM-JFVUFOBOU$BMWJO)
Goddard, police adviser in Tokyo and director of the Northwestern University
TDJFOUJĕDDSJNFMBC QSPWJEFEMFDUVSFTJOGPSFOTJDTBOEUFDIOJDBMJOWFTUJHBUJPOT 
XIJMFPUIFSTGPDVTFEPOSJPUDPOUSPM$PSSVQUJPOSFNBJOFEFOEFNJD BTQPMJDF
XFSFCFIPMEFOUPiVOTDSVQVMPVTQPMJUJDJBOT wQBSUPPLJOHBNCMJOH BOEBEPQUFE
iUIJSEEFHSFFwNFUIPETUPFYUSBDUDPOGFTTJPOT QSPNQUJOHUIFManila Chronicle
UPSFGFSUPUIFNBTBiMPDBM(FTUBQPw85
ćF)VLCBMBIBQ PS)VLT ESFXQPQVMBSTVQQPSUGSPNUIFJSSFTJTUBODFUPUIF
+BQBOFTFJOWBTJPOJO8PSME8BS**BOEBIJTUPSJDBMMZJOFRVJUBCMFMBOEUFOVSF
TZTUFNSFTVMUJOHJOXJEFTDBMFQPWFSUZćFZBEPQUFEUIFTMPHBOi#VMMFUTOPU
#BMMPUTw BęFS MFBEFS -VJT 5BSVD BOE OJOF PUIFST XFSF QSFWFOUFE GSPN UBLJOH
UIFJSDPOHSFTTJPOBMTFBUT"DDPSEJOHUPUIF$*" UIF)VLTXFSFiDIBNQJPOTPG
UIF QFPQMF VOUJM ŴżŸų  XIFO UIF BSNFE GPSDFT TFJ[FE UIF QFPQMFT DBVTF BXBZ
GSPNUIFFOFNZw86 "IJEEFONPUJWFGPSUIFXBSXBTSFWFBMFEJOBŴżŸŶ4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUSFQPSUFYQSFTTJOHPQUJNJTNPWFSQMBOTCZ$BMUFYUPDPOTUSVDUBO

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 115


PJMSFĕOFSZOFBS.BOJMBBOEUIF*NQPSU&YQPSU#BOLTĕOBODJOHBTUFFMESVN
GBDUPSZ  XIJDI XBT NBEF QPTTJCMF CZ UIF GSJFOEMJOFTT PG UIF HPWFSONFOU PG
1SFTJEFOU3BNPO.BHTBZTBZUPXBSEGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU87
5PBTTJTUUIFBOUJ)VLDBNQBJHO UIF5SVNBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOSFWJWFEUSBJO-
JOHPGUIFQPMJDFDPOTUBCVMBSZ BIPMEPWFSGSPNUIF+BQBOFTFPDDVQBUJPOEVSJOH
8PSME8BS** QSBJTFEGPSJUTiMPOHBOEEJTUJOHVJTIFEĕHIUJOHSFDPSEw88ćFNJT-
sion was led by Edward Lansdale, an advertising executive working under CIA
cover, who was the inspiration for two Cold War novels, The Ugly American and
The Quiet American$PNQBSJOHUIF$PME8BSUPUIFiXJOOJOHPGUIF8FTU w
IFEFWFMPQFEBDMPTFSFMBUJPOTIJQXJUI.BHTBZTBZBOEQSPNPUFEDJWJDBDUJPO
BOEQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFNFUIPETSFNJOJTDFOUPGUIFDPMPOJBMFSB JODMVEJOH
UIFEJTTFNJOBUJPOPGCMBDLQSPQBHBOEB EJTJOGPSNBUJPO BOEUIFFYQMPJUBUJPO
of native superstitions.89*OBQSFDVSTPSUPUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNJO7JFUOBN 
Lansdale and associates such as Danish resistance hero Hans Tofte oversaw
/FOJUBIVOUFSLJMMFSUFBNTXJUIJOUIFDPOTUBCVMBSZXIJDITPVHIUUPiOFVUSBM-
ize” the Huk leadership. Headed by Napoleon Valeriano, who later served as a
guest lecturer at the IPA, the Nenita practiced the “water cure,” broke bones,
cordoned off areas, and stacked Huk corpses along the highways beneath warn-
JOH QMBDBSET UP JOUJNJEBUF UIF QPQVMBUJPO "O JOUFSOBM TUVEZ DPODMVEFE UIBU
UIBUUIFZiJOĘJDUFEUFSSPSBOEPQQSFTTJPOPOUIFQFPQMFPG$FOUSBM-V[POw90
4FWFSBMNFNCFSTPG-BOTEBMFTDPVOUSZUFBN JODMVEJOH3PCFSU8IJUNFS B
#FSLFMFZQPMJDFPďDFSXIPIFME#"BOE."EFHSFFTJODSJNJOPMPHZGSPN
the University of California at Berkeley, aided in the growth of the Philippine
National Bureau of Investigation, which specialized in population control
and intelligence.91"U.BHTBZTBZTSFRVFTU UIF*$"BDRVJSFECMPPEIPVOETGPS
apprehending Huk dissidents and trained Filipino officers in the use of the
BOJNBMT/BQBMNTUSJLFTXFSFDBMMFEUPSFJOGPSDFWJPMFOUTXFFQT XIJDIDVMNJ-
nated, according to an official history, with the “burning of barrio after barrio.”
Military intelligence noted that “civilians within the vicinity of the operations
BMXBZTTVČFSFENPSFUIBOUIFEJTTJEFOUTw92
*O B %FDFNCFS ŴżŸŸ  XPSLJOH VOEFS B .JDIJHBO 4UBUF 6OJWFSTJUZ QVCMJD
BENJOJTUSBUJPODPOUSBDU +FUFS8JMMJBNTPODPOEVDUFEBTVSWFZPGUIFOBUJPOBM
QPMJDF WJTJUJOHQPMJDFQSFDJODUTBOEHPJOHVOEFSDPWFSJOTFFEZCBSTBOEBNPOH
PSHBOJ[FE DSJNJOBMT )F GPVOE UIBU UIF CVEHFU XBT JOBEFRVBUF  UIFSF XBT B
TIPSUBHF PG ĕSFBSNT  POMZ ŴŸ QFSDFOU PG PďDFST IBE USBJOJOH  BOE QBUSPMNFO
XFSFGPSDFEUPDPNNVOJDBUFWJBDPNNFSDJBMMPOHEJTUBODFUFMFQIPOFT XIJDI
XFSFGSFRVFOUMZPVUPGPSEFS8JMMJBNTPOOPUFEGVSUIFSUIBUUIFNJMJUBSZXBT
VTFE GPS DJWJM QPMJDF GVODUJPOT UIBU TBMBSJFT XFSF CFMPX UIF NJOJNVN XBHF 
DSFBUJOHiUIFPCWJPVTOFDFTTJUZPGJODPNFGSPNPUIFSTPVSDFTwBOEUIBUQSP-
NPUJPOT XFSF HJWFOBTB SFXBSE GPS QPMJUJDBMTFSWJUVEF QBSBMMFMJOHUIFiNPTU
EJTHSBDFGVMQFSJPEJO"NFSJDBOQPMJDFIJTUPSZGSPNUIFUVSOPGUIFUXFOUJFUI
century through the 1920s.”93

116 Under the Facade of Benevolence


ćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUXPSLFEPWFSUIFOFYUEFDBEFBOEBIBMGUPUSZUPSFD-
UJGZUIFTFQSPCMFNT SFNOBOUTGSPNUIFDPMPOJBMFSB8JMMJBNTPOUPPLQPMJDF
PďDFSTUP(SFFOTCPSPUPTUVEZUIFBENJOJTUSBUJWFSFGPSNTIFIBEQVUJOQMBDF
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XIFSFIFIBECFFOBQBSUUJNFGBDVMUZNFNCFS$IBSMFT.8JMTPO EJSFDUPS
PG UIF 8JTDPOTJO TUBUF DSJNJOBM MBC BOE GPSNFS EJSFDUPS PG UIF -PT "OHFMFT
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64"*% TFOU UFDIOJDJBOT UP JNQSPWF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT BOE SJPU DPOUSPM "O
JEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBNXBTJOJUJBUFECZ'SBOL&8BMUPO EFQVUZDIJFGPGUIF-PT
"OHFMFT1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU XIPUBVHIUQPMJDFQMBOOJOHBU-PT"OHFMFT4UBUF
College and was an intelligence officer under Greg “Pappy” Boyington with the
#MBDL4IFFQ"WJBUJPO4RVBESPOJOUIF4PMPNPO*TMBOETJO8PSME8BS**BOEB
Marine Corps staff officer in Korea.
" NFNCFS PG UIF ŴżŷŻ 0MZNQJD XBUFS QPMP UFBN  UIF SFEIBJSFE 8BMUPO
JOGVTFE UIF -PT "OHFMFT 1PMJDF %FQBSUNFOUT USBJOJOH XJUI B NJMJUBSZ FUIJD
EVSJOH IJT UXFOUZZFBS DBSFFS  JNQPTJOH CPPU DBNQ ESJMMT )F IFBEFE UIF
%FQBSUNFOUPG$PSSFDUJPOTBOEUIFQBUSPMEJWJTJPOBOEPWFSTBXUIFQPMJUJDBM
JOUFMMJHFODFVOJU XIJDIDPNQJMFEUIPVTBOETPGEPTTJFSTPOSBEJDBMTBOENPOJ-
UPSFEUIFMJCFSBMMFęTFDUPSJO)PMMZXPPE3FDSVJUFEUPHPUP7JFUOBNJOŴżŸż
BUUIFBHFPGĕęZBęFSBTUJOUPWFSIBVMJOHUIF$IJDBHP1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU 8BM-
ton worked closely with Los Angeles chief of police Willie Parker, who railed
BHBJOTUUIFiĘBCCJOFTTwBOEiQFSNJTTJWFOFTTwPG"NFSJDBOTPDJFUZ XIJDIJOIJT
WJFXXBTQPJTFEUPCFPWFSUBLFOCZiHPEMFTT EJTDJQMJOFEDPNNVOJTUTw4IBSJOH
BTJNJMBSXPSMEWJFXXJUI1BSLFS UIF+PIO#JSDI4PDJFUZIFSP 8BMUPOHBJOFE
OPUPSJFUZGPSPWFSTFFJOHUIFiUJHFSDBHFTwJO4PVUI7JFUOBNT$PO4POQSJTPO 
XIFSFJONBUFTXFSFTIBDLMFEUPUIFĘPPSBOEGFETUBSWBUJPOEJFUT"DDPSEJOH
UP 4FOBUPS "VHVTUVT )BXLJOT  B $BMJGPSOJB %FNPDSBU XIP LOFX IJN GSPN
IJTQPMJDFEBZT 8BMUPOIBEBSFQVUBUJPOGPSCFJOHiUPVHIPONJOPSJUJFTwBOE
iVOTZNQBUIFUJD UP IVNBO SJHIUT BOE DJWJM MJCFSUJFT w BO BUUJUVEF UIBU DBSSJFE
over into his overseas service.95
Walton and his colleagues worked closely with the Manila police and con-
stabulary, which were deployed to suppress regional rebellions that persisted
MPOHBęFSUIF)VLTXFSFEJTCBOEFE PXJOHUPDPOUJOVFETPDJBMJOFRVBMJUJFTBOE
UIFNBSHJOBMJ[BUJPOPGQPPSGBSNFST96 One of the rebel leaders of the late 1950s,
1FESP#PSKB DPOTJEFSFEUPCFBi1IJMJQQJOFT$BTUSP wQSPNPUFEMBOESFGPSN 
XIJMF-FPOBSEP.BOFDJP BMTPDBMMFE/BSEPOH1VUJL XBTNPSFPGBDSJNJOBM
CBOEJULOPXOBTBi3PCJO)PPEw)FXBTLJMMFEJOBOBNCVTICZUIF/BUJPOBM
Bureau of Investigation and the constabulary, as was populist Prudencio Opini-
anzo of Leyte, who carried on the Huk legacy by setting up an organization
DBMMFEćF1IJMJQQJOFTGPS1PPS'BSNFST97
The character of the people targeted illustrates how the technical expertise
BOE QSPGFTTJPOBM TUBOEBSET QSPNPUFE CZ "NFSJDBO BEWJTFST XFSF VTFE GPS

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 117


repressive political ends. The better they did their job, the worse off the popula-
UJPOPęFOXBTćFIJTUPSJBO+BNFT$4DPUUOPUFTUIBUBOZDMBTTTZTUFNQSP-
duces a “dissonant subculture” of subordinate groups that expresses itself not
KVTUJOSFWPMUCVUJOEFWJBOUWBMVFT NBOJGFTUJOKPLFT TPOHT PSJMMJDJUBDUJWJUZ
TVDIBTOBSDPUJDTBOEHBNCMJOH XIJDIUIFQPMJDFXFSFEFQMPZFEUPTVQQSFTTBMM
UIF TBNF 1PQVMBS EJTBČFDUJPO FTDBMBUFE EVSJOH UIF QSFTJEFODZ PG 'FSEJOBOE
.BSDPT ŴżŹŸoŴżŻŹ XIJDIXBTNBSSFECZBVUIPSJUBSJBOJTNBOEDPSSVQUJPO98
7BMVFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTGPSBMMPXJOH1IJMJQQJOFNJMJUBSZCBTFTUPCFVTFE
GPSCPNCJOHBUUBDLTPO7JFUOBNBOEPQFOJOHVQUIFDPVOUSZUPGPSFJHOJOWFTU-
NFOU .BSDPTXPOBCMBUBOUMZSJHHFEFMFDUJPOJOŴżŹżBOEUISFFZFBSTMBUFSTVT-
pended the writ of habeas corpus.99
)VNBO SJHIUT PSHBOJ[BUJPOT FTUJNBUFE UIBU PWFS ŸŶ ųųų QFPQMF XFSF
detained under draconian national security laws and upwards of 3,257 killed.
ćF TDBSSFE SFNBJOT PG WJDUJNT XFSF EVNQFE JO DJUZ TUSFFUT GPS QVSQPTFT PG
JOUJNJEBUJPO100 "DLOPXMFEHJOH UIBU QPMJDF XFSF DIBSHFE XJUI NVSEFS  SBQF 
SPCCFSZ BOETNVHHMJOH BOEUIBUĕSFNFOFOHBHFEJOTIBLFEPXOTBOEMPPUJOH
BUUIFTDFOFPGĕSFT QVCMJDTBGFUZSFQPSUTOFWFSUIFMFTTQSBJTFEUIFNBSUJBMMBX
QSPHSBNTGPSDPOUSJCVUJOHUPBOiBCSVQUIBMUJOUIFDSJNFSBUFT wEVFUPUIFTVS-
SFOEFSPGPWFSIBMGBNJMMJPOMPPTFĕSFBSNT BOEBQQMBVEFE.BSDPTGPSDVSCJOH
iEBOHFSPVTw EFNPOTUSBUJPOT BOE XFBLFOJOH UIF .BPJTU /FX 1FPQMFT "SNZ
ićF JNBHFT PG CBSCFE XJSF BOE UBOLT JO UIF TUSFFUT BSF VOUSVF w POF SFQPSU
EFDMBSFEi.BOJMBBOEJUTFOWJSPONFOUOFWFSBQQFBSFETPQFBDFGVM OPSTPDMFBO
and prosperous.”101
'SPNŴżŹŹUPŴżźŶ UIF014QSPWJEFEPWFSžŶżNJMMJPOJOQPMJDFBJE"NFSJ-
DBOBEWJTFSTTVDIBT*OEJBOBTUBUFUSPPQFS4UBOMFZ(VUI +BNFT.D(SFHPSPG
UIF,BMBNB[PPQPMJDF i4DPUUZw$BQMBO BOE1BVM,BU[ XIPXPSLFEXJUI.PO-
UBHOBSEVOJUTJO4PVUI7JFUOBN PWFSTBXUIFSFGVSCJTIJOHPGQPMJDFCVJMEJOHT 
UIF EFWFMPQNFOU PG DSPXE DPOUSPM VOJUT  BOE UIF TZTUFNBUJ[BUJPO PG SFDPSET
ćFZUBVHIUĕOHFSQSJOUJOHBOEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTUFDIOPMPHZ JODMVEJOHJO
.JOEBOBP  XIFSF UIF .PSP FOHBHFE JO BSNFE SFTJTUBODF JO UIF GBDF PG TUBUF
SFQSFTTJPOBOEUIFFODSPBDINFOUPOUIFJSMBOETCZBHSJCVTJOFTTDPSQPSBUJPOT
Hundreds of police were trained at the IPA and went back to head local police
BDBEFNJFT XIFSF8JMMJBNTPOBOEDPMMFBHVFTQSPWJEFEMFDUVSFT102
"DDPSEJOH UP EFDMBTTJĕFE EPDVNFOUT  UIF 014 FODPVSBHFE iBHHSFTTJWF
JOUFSSPHBUJPOPGTVTQFDUTwBOETNVHHMFEJOFMFDUSJDUSBOTDFJWFSTVTFEJOUPSUVSF
sessions. In a 1976 report, The Logistics of Repression BHSPVQPGBDBEFNJDTDPO-
DMVEFEUIBUUIF014DPVMEUBLFiDSFEJUGPSIFMQJOHUPJOTUJUVUJPOBMJ[FUIFNPTU
BEWBODFEUFDIOJRVFTPGJOGPSNBUJPOBOEDPOGFTTJPOFYUSBDUJPOGSPNQPMJUJDBM
TVTQFDUT MJLFUIFDPNNPOVTFPGFMFDUSJDTIPDLT TVCUMFQTZDIPMPHJDBMUPSUVSF 
BOETFMFDUJWFCFBUJOHT‰NFUIPETSFNBSLBCMZTJNJMBSUPUIPTFFNQMPZFEJO#SB-
[JM ,PSFB 7JFUOBN *SBO BOE6SVHVBZ BMMPGXIJDIIBWFSFDFJWFETJHOJĕDBOU
BNPVOUTPG014BTTJTUBODFBOEUSBJOJOHw103

118 Under the Facade of Benevolence


#FUXFFOŴżźŵBOEŴżźŹ PXJOHJOQBSUUPDPODFSOTBCPVUESVHBCVTFBNPOH
GIs at the Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines, USAID and the Drug
&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPOQSPWJEFEPWFSžŴŵŻNJMMJPOJOOBSDPUJDTDPOUSPM
BTTJTUBODF  FTUBCMJTIJOH B USBJOJOH DPVSTF  BOUJTNVHHMJOH DFOUFS  BOE BOUJ
narcotics unit within the constabulary.104 While contributing to the arrest and
FYFDVUJPO PG IFSPJO USBďDLFS -JN 4FOH  UIF (PWFSONFOU "DDPVOUJOH 0ďDF
FYQSFTTFE DPODFSO UIBU FRVJQNFOU XBT CFJOH EJWFSUFE GPS OPOOBSDPUJDT
SFMBUFE QVSQPTFT BOE UIBU iOBSDPUJDT BEWJTFST QFSGPSN FTTFOUJBMMZ UIF TBNF
GVODUJPO UIBU QVCMJD TBGFUZ BEWJTFST VTFE UP QFSGPSNw BOE XFSF iUSBJOJOH UIF
TBNFVOJUTw014SFQPSUTBMTPQPJOUFEUPMPOHTUBOEJOHDPSSVQUJPOJOUIFBSNZ
BOEQPMJDF BDDPVOUJOHGPSUIFiUSFNFOEPVTWPMVNFPGTNVHHMJOHw4ZOEJDBUF
CPTTFT TVDI BT %PO +PTÏ i1FQFw 0ZTPO  B NFUIBNQIFUBNJOF USBďDLFS  XFSF
used by Marcos to control the poor.105
*O ŴżźŶ UIF $POTUBCVMBSZ "OUJ/BSDPUJDT 6OJU SBJEFE UIF IPNF PG -JMJPTB
Hilao, a suspected radical, and tortured her to death. Even Secretary of Defense
+VBO 1PODF &OSJMF  XIP BENJUUFE UP TUBHJOH IJT PXO BTTBTTJOBUJPO BUUFNQU
UPQSPWJEF.BSDPTXJUIBĕOBMQSFUFYUGPSUIFEFDMBSBUJPOPGNBSUJBMMBX GFMU
PCMJHFEUPEJTTPDJBUFIJNTFMGGSPNUIFNThe Logistics of Repression concluded
UIBU VOEFS UIF OBSDPUJDT QSPHSBN  iTPQIJTUJDBUFE QPMJDF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT
FRVJQNFOU WFIJDMFT BOEMJHIUXFBQPOSZIBWFCFFODIBOOFMFEUPTVDICPEJFT
BTUIF1IJMJQQJOFDPOTUBCVMBSZwXIJDIXFSFSFTQPOTJCMFGPSTFSJBMIVNBOSJHIUT
BCVTFT ćFTF DPNNFOUT EFNPOTUSBUF UIF DPOUJOVJUZ PG "NFSJDBO QSPHSBNT
UIBU  XIJMF NBTLFE CZ B SIFUPSJD PG IVNBOJUBSJBO SFGPSN  DPOUSJCVUFE UIF
growth of a draconian national security apparatus, Orwellian in scale.106
8SJUJOH BCPVU "NFSJDBT TVQQPSU GPS UIF ESVH USBďD JO ćBJMBOE UIBU JU
QVSQPSUFEUPCFDPNCBUJOH RampartsNBHB[JOFFEJUPSJBMJ[FEJOUIFMBUFŴżŹųT
UIBUiXFSF<UIFTUPSZ>UPBQQFBSJOBO*BO'MFNJOHQMPU XFXPVMEQBTTJUPČBT
UPSUVSJOHUIFDSFEJCJMJUZPGUISJMMFSĕDUJPOw107 This is no doubt true for all the
QPMJDFQSPHSBNTBOEUIFFOUJSFDMBOEFTUJOF$PME8BSJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB XIJDI
SFNBJOTMBSHFMZVOLOPXOUPUIF"NFSJDBOQVCMJDćFFČFDUT IPXFWFS XFSF
BMMUPPSFBMGPSUIFQFPQMFPGUIFSFHJPO&NCPEZJOHUIFDPOUSBEJDUJPOCFUXFFO
"NFSJDBT SFQVCMJDBO TFMGJEFOUJUZ BOE HMPCBM BNCJUJPOT  QPMJDF USBJOJOH XBT
QJWPUBM JO UIF FČPSUT UP TVQQSFTT MFęXJOH NPWFNFOUT  SFDSVJU MPDBM iBTTFUT w
BOEPSDIFTUSBUFSFHJNFDIBOHFPOUIFTVCDPOUJOFOU BLFZTUSBUFHJDQSJ[F
*O UIF UISFF DBTFT TVSWFZFE  UIF QSPHSBNT XFSF FČFDUJWF JO TFSWJOH UIF
JOUFSFTUT PG UIF "NFSJDBO TUBUF  CVU UIFZ DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF DPOTPMJEBUJPO PG
EJDUBUPSTIJQ .PEFSOJ[BUJPO XBT QSPNPUFE UP FOIBODF FďDJFODZ JO DBSSZJOH
out political operations. Due process and civil liberties were little prioritized,
which accounted for the lawless character of the forces operating under
"NFSJDBOPWFSTJHIUćFQPMJUJDBMTUBCJMJUZWBMVFECZQPMJDZFMJUFTXBTFWFOUV-
BMMZBDIJFWFE BUMFBTUJO*OEPOFTJB CVUBUUIFFYQFOTFPGNBKPSIVNBOSJHIUT
WJPMBUJPOTBOEUIFEFDJNBUJPOPGDJWJMTPDJFUZ XIJDIXBTPGMJUUMFDPOTFRVFODF

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia I 119


JO8BTIJOHUPO3BMQI.D(FIFF BTFOJPS$*"NBOBHFSEVSJOHUIFZFBSTPGUIF
DPVQ OPUFEUIBU*OEPOFTJBXBTWJFXFEBTBiNPEFMPQFSBUJPO‫ڀڀ‬:PVDBOUSBDF
CBDLBMMNBKPS CMPPEZFWFOUTSVOGSPN8BTIJOHUPOUPUIFXBZ4VIBSUPDBNFUP
QPXFSćFTVDDFTTPGUIBUNFBOUUIBUJUXPVMECFSFQFBUFE BHBJOBOEBHBJOw108
$SJUJDBMUPUIFPQFSBUJPO UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTXFSFJOEFFESFQFBUFEBHBJOBOE
BHBJOBDSPTTUIFHMPCF MFBEJOHUPNVDIBEEJUJPOBMCMPPETIFEćFPVUDPNF 
however, was often less favorable for the United States, as the terror spiraled
PVUPGDPOUSPMBOEQSPEVDFEDJWJMXBST GBJMFETUBUFT PSSFHJNFTEFEJDBUFEUP
SFTJTUJOH"NFSJDBOHMPCBMIFHFNPOZ109

120 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Chapter 6
The Secret War in Laos and Other
Vietnam Sideshows
The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II
No grand TV exposures, no detailed reporting on the scene by journalists and
TV crews, none of the exposure in the media that has plagued the similar
American effort in Vietnam. The murder and destruction [in Laos] have been
carried out in delightful obscurity.
‰/oam Chomsky, Laos: War and Revolution 

The Laotian people are killing each other—and the Americans are pulling the
strings.
‰#anning Garret, Ramparts, 1970

In the spring of 1959, Paul H. Skuse, a CIA operative working undercover in


-BPTBTBQPMJDFBEWJTFSXJUIUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUT*OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO
"ENJOJTUSBUJPO *$" JOWJUFEUXP)NPOHDIJFGT 5PVCZ-ZGPVOHBOE5PVMJB
-ZGPOH UPIJT'SFODITUZMFWJMMBPVUTJEF7JFOUJBOFGPSEJOOFSXJUIUIFBJNPG
securing their cooperation in the escalating war against the Pathet Lao.1 A
EFQVUZJOUIFOBUJPOBMBTTFNCMZ 5PVMJBXBTPQFOMZTZNQBUIFUJDUPUIF1BUIFU
-BP BOEIBEVSHFEUIF)NPOHOPUUPĕHIUUIFJSGFMMPXUSJCFTNFO5PVCZXBT
NPSFGFSWFOUMZBOUJDPNNVOJTUBOEBNFOBCMFUPBDDFQUJOHBJEGSPNUIF6OJUFE
States, in part out of a desire to bolster the power of his clan against the rival Lo.
-JUUMFEJE5PVCZSFBMJ[FBUUIFUJNFUIBUJOGPSHJOHBOBMMJBODFXJUIUIF6OJUFE
4UBUFT  IF XBT TPXJOH UIF TFFET PG EJTBTUFS GPS UIF )NPOH QFPQMF BT XFMM BT
UIFDPVOUSZBTBXIPMF XIJDICFDBNFFONFTIFEJOBEFTUSVDUJWFDJWJMXBS*O
effect, he was handing his people over to a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Skuse was
FNQMPZJOHBDMBTTJDDPMPOJBMTUSBUFHZPGNBOJQVMBUJOHUSJCBMNJOPSJUJFTUPTFSWF
broader political ends.
-Fę PVU PG QSFWJPVT TDIPMBSMZ BDDPVOUT CFDBVTF UIF EPDVNFOUT IBWF POMZ
SFDFOUMZCFFOEFDMBTTJĕFE 4LVTFTSPMFJOCSPLFSJOHUIF64BMMJBODFXJUIUIF
)NPOH FYFNQMJĕFT UIF DFOUSBMJUZ PG QPMJDF USBJOJOH QSPHSBNT UP "NFSJDBO
BOUJDPNNVOJTU SPMMCBDL PQFSBUJPOT  JODMVEJOH UIFJS GVODUJPO JO SFDSVJUJOH
intelligence “assets.” As Alfred W. McCoy has noted, the secret war in Laos
SFQSFTFOUT POF PG UIF MFBTU VOEFSTUPPE ZFU NPTU DBUBDMZTNJD EFWFMPQNFOUT

121
PG UIF *OEPDIJOB XBST .BOZ QPMJDZNBLFST WJFXFE JU BT B TVDDFTT CFDBVTF JU
XBTXBHFEBMNPTUFOUJSFMZCZQSPYZBOEXJUIPVUDPTUUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT6
Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, considered the
PQFSBUJPOiTPNFUIJOHPGXIJDIXFDBOCFQSPVEBT"NFSJDBOT*UIBTJOWPMWFE
WJSUVBMMZOP"NFSJDBODBTVBMUJFT8IBUXFSFHFUUJOHGPSPVSNPOFZPVUUIFSF
‫ڀڀ‬JT *UIJOL< >UPVTFUIFPMEQISBTF WFSZDPTUFČFDUJWFw2ćFDPOTFRVFODFT 
IPXFWFS XFSFEFWBTUBUJOHGPSUIF-BPQPQVMBUJPOBTBOFTUJNBUFEŶ ŸųųWJMMBHFT
XFSFEFTUSPZFE ŶŸų ųųųQFPQMFLJMMFE BOEBOPUIFSNJMMJPOSFOEFSFESFGVHFFT
8IJMFMPDBMBDUPSTESPWFUIFDPOĘJDU UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQMBZFEBOJNQPSUBOU
role behind the scenes, pulling the strings. Triggering the onset of civil war,
UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFENPEFSOXFBQPOTUPTFDVSJUZGPSDFTVOEFSUIFQPMJDF
QSPHSBNT XJUI UIF HPBM PG GPSUJGZJOH UIF 3PZBM -BP (PWFSONFOU 3-(  BOE
USBJOFE)NPOHNJMJUJBTJNQMJDBUFEJOTJHOJĕDBOUIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT*O
UIFPSZ DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZFYQFSUTBJNFEUPNJOJNJ[FiDPMMBUFSBMEBNBHFwCZ
cultivating effective intelligence networks and building local forces to pinpoint
UIFMPDBUJPOPGUIFFOFNZ*OQSBDUJDF IPXFWFS MFWFMTPGWJPMFODFBSFJNQPT-
TJCMFUPNBOBHFJOBXBS[POFćFDBNQBJHOXBTXBHFECFZPOEUIFSFBDIPG
public scrutiny and international law and served as a laboratory for testing new
XFBQPOT BOE QTZDIPMPHJDBM XBSGBSF UFDIOJRVFT " 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU PďDJBM
DPNNFOUFE BCPVU -BPT ićJT JT <UIF> FOE PG OPXIFSF 8F DBO EP BOZUIJOH
XFXBOUIFSFCFDBVTF8BTIJOHUPOEPFTOUTFFNUPLOPXUIBUJUFYJTUTw3 This
BUUJUVEFNPSFUIBOBOZUIJOHFMTFBDDPVOUFEGPSUIFDBSOBHFPOUIFHSPVOE

Combating “Communist Subversion”: Police Training and Foreign


Assistance in Laos

"NFSJDBTJOWPMWFNFOUJO-BPTPSJHJOBUFEJOUIFNJEŴżŸųTBęFSUIF1BUIFU-BP 
BOBUJPOBMJTUBOEQSPDPNNVOJTUPSHBOJ[BUJPOIFBEFECZ1SJODF4PVQIBOPV-
WPOH BJEFEUIF7JFUNJOIJOEFGFBUJOHUIF'SFODIBUUIFCBUUMFPG%JFO#JFO1IV
ćF(FOFWB"DDPSETBTTJHOFEJUUFNQPSBSZDPOUSPMPWFSUIFOPSUIFSOQSPWJODFT
PG4BN/FVBBOE1IPOH4BMZVOUJMTDIFEVMFEFMFDUJPOTJOŴżŸŻBOEDBMMFEGPS
JOUFHSBUJPO PG 1BUIFU -BP VOJUT JOUP UIF -BPUJBO BSNFE GPSDFT ćJT XPSSJFE
UIF &JTFOIPXFS BENJOJTUSBUJPO XIJDI IBE SFGVTFE UP TJHO UIF BDDPSET  "
CMVFQSJOUGPSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNXBSOFEUIBUiUISPVHIQFBDFGVMMFHBMNFBOT 
1BUIFU-BPEJTTJEFOUTXJMMUBLFQPTJUJPOTXJUIJOUIF-BP$BCJOFU BSNZ BOEDJWJM
TFSWJDFFOBCMJOHUIFNUPTVCWFSUUIFFOUJSFDPVOUSZw4
On January 1, 1955, a United States Operations Mission headed by Daly
-BWFSHOFXBTFTUBCMJTIFEJOUIFDBQJUBM 7JFOUJBOF+VTUJĕFEGPSiQPMJUJDBMQVS-
QPTFTBOEOPUUPBTTJTU-BPTJOMPOHSBOHFTPDJBMBOEFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOU w
JUXBTNFBOUUPQSFWFOUB1BUIFU-BPUBLFPWFSBOEFTUBCMJTI-BPTBTBTUBCMF
QSP8FTUFSOCVČFSCFUXFFO/PSUI7JFUOBNBOE$IJOBUPUIFOPSUIBOEFBTU
BOEćBJMBOEUPUIFXFTU1PMJDZNBLFSTGFBSFEUIFFNFSHFODFPGBOJOEFQFO-

122 Under the Facade of Benevolence


EFOUTPDJBMJTUCMPDJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBDBQBCMFPGVOEFSDVUUJOH64JOĘVFODFBOE
JOWFTUNFOU JO B SFHJPO UIFZ IPQFE UP DPOWFSU JOUP BO i"OHMP4BYPO MBLFw "
TVDDFTTGVMTPDJBMJTUFYQFSJNFOUJO-BPTDPVMEQSPWJEFBNPEFMGPSTVSSPVOEJOH
countries, notably Indonesia and Japan, which U.S. planners were desperate to
retain in the Western orbit in the wake of the Chinese revolution.5
In order to avert this possibility, the United States propped up the Royal Lao
(PWFSONFOU XIJDIXBTEPNJOBUFECZBTNBMMDMJRVFPGGBNJMJFTXIPPXOFE
NPTU PG UIF DPVOUSZT NBKPS CVTJOFTTFT BOE NPTUMZ DPMMBCPSBUFE XJUI UIF
'SFODI"DDPSEJOHUPUIF$*" 1SJNF.JOJTUFS,BUBZ%PO4BTPSJUI QSFTJEFOU
PGUIF-BPćBJ#BOLBOEPXOFSPG"JS-BPT IBEIJTiĕOHFSTJOFWFSZMBSHF
pie in the country” and was an uncouth person, disliked for his rudeness and a
IBCJUPGJOTVMUJOHQFPQMF"GPSNFSMFBEFSPGUIF-BP*TTBSB BOUJ'SFODINPWF-
NFOU IFXBTBGBWPSJUFPG+PIO'PTUFS%VMMFTCFDBVTFPGIJTCPPLLaos: Ideal
Cornerstone in the Anticommunist Struggle in Southeast Asia"NCBTTBEPS(SB-
IBN1BSTPOT BMPZBM%VMMFTEJTDJQMF XPSLFEUPVOEFSNJOFOFHPUJBUJPOTXJUI
UIF1BUIFU-BP XIPQSPNPUFEMBOESFEJTUSJCVUJPO MJUFSBDZ BOEQVCMJDIFBMUI
QSPHSBNTBOE BDDPSEJOHUPBMFBEJOHIJTUPSJBOPG-BPT XPSLFEXJUIUIFQFPQMF
BUUIFMPDBMMFWFMUPiNFFUUIFJSOFFETw6
ćF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU DIBSBDUFSJ[FE 4PVQIBOPVWPOH  XIP CFDBNF JOUFS-
FTUFEJO.BSYJTNXIJMFTUVEZJOHDJWJMFOHJOFFSJOHJO'SBODF BTBOiPVUTUBOE-
JOHMZBCMFBOEFOFSHFUJDMFBEFSwNVDIMJLFUIF7JFUOBNFTFSFWPMVUJPOBSZ)P
$IJ.JOI XIPN044BHFOU'SBOL8IJUFEFTDSJCFEBTBOiBXGVMMZTXFFUNBOw
BOEUIFiMFBTUTPSUPGNFHBMPNBOJBDBMMFBEFSwIFIBEFWFSNFU7"NFSJDBTBMMJFT 
by contrast, as Newsweek reported, represented “the traditional ruling class and
IBEMJUUMFJOUFSFTUJOSFGPSNćFQPMJUJDBMNFUIPETUIFZVTFE‰TUVďOHCBMMPU
CPYFTBOEJOUJNJEBUJOHOFVUSBMJTUWPUFST‰TVDDFFEFEPOMZJOESJWJOHUIFNPE-
erates to the left.”8
ćFJOĘVYPG"NFSJDBOBJEDPVQMFEXJUIBOJOĘBUFEDVSSFODZFYBDFSCBUFE
UIFDMJNBUFPGDPSSVQUJPO"DPOHSFTTJPOBMJORVJSZGPVOENJTNBOBHFNFOUJO
DVTUPNT CBOLJOH BOEGPSFJHOUSBEF BTXFMMBTCSJCFSZJOUIFBXBSEJOHPGDPO-
USBDUT UP "NFSJDBO DPOTUSVDUJPO ĕSNT  JODMVEJOH UIF 7JSHJOJBCBTFE 7JOOFMM
$PSQPSBUJPOBOE6OJWFSTBM$POTUSVDUJPO$PNQBOZ B$*"GSPOU9 The United
4UBUFTTQFOUPWFSžŴŷųNJMMJPO PSŻųQFSDFOUPGUIFGPSFJHOBJECVEHFU DSFBU-
JOH B ŵŸ ųųųNBO BSNZ EFTJHOFE UP TFSWF  JO %VMMFTT XPSET  BT BO iBHFOU PG
NPEFSOJ[BUJPOwBOEBiUSJQXJSFUPIBMUDPNNVOJTUBHHSFTTJPOw5SBJOJOHXBT
DBSSJFEPVUCZ"NFSJDBO4QFDJBM'PSDFTBOEUIF$*" XJUIUIFBTTJTUBODFPGćBJ
USBOTMBUPST QBSBDPNNBOEPT BOETVQQPSUTUBČ7JFOUJBOFXBTTXJNNJOHXJUI
iTQPPLT wBT-BPTCFDBNFUIFPOMZDPVOUSZJOUIFXPSMEXIFSFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
VOEFSXSPUFUIFFOUJSFNJMJUBSZCVEHFU10
In spite of its being supplied with planes, tanks, helicopters, and guns, intel-
MJHFODFSFQPSUTOPUFEEFĕDJFODJFTJOUIF3PZBM-BP"SNZ 3-" XBSOJOHUIBU
JUXBTiUPPXFBLUPDPNCBUUIFXFMMPSHBOJ[FEDPNNVOJTUBSNZwNFBOJOHUIF

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 123


1BUIFU -BP 0ďDFST XFSF DPSSVQU BOE iVQ UP UIFJS FBST JO UIF PQJVN USBEFw
DPOTDSJQUTiSFGVTFEUPĕHIUw$*"EJSFDUPS"MMFO%VMMFTMBNFOUFEUIBUXIJMFUIF
3-"FNQMPZFEiIJUBOESVOUBDUJDTBHBJOTUUIFDPNNVOJTUT JUXBTOPUDMFBS
XIFUIFSUIFSFXBTNPSFIJUPSSVOw11 The New York TimesNPDLFEUIFQBDJĕTU
UFOEFODJFTPGJUTTPMEJFST XIPiBCIPSSFELJMMJOHBOENPWFEUPUIFGSPOUPęFO
XJUIBQMVDLFEĘPXFSTUJDLJOHPVUPGUIFNV[[MFPGUIFJSJMMLFQUSJĘFw3PHFS
)JMTNBO  BTTJTUBOU TFDSFUBSZ PG TUBUF GPS 'BS &BTUFSO BČBJST VOEFS 1SFTJEFOU
,FOOFEZ SFQPSUFEJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUUIF3-"XBTiNPSFQPMJUJDBMUIBOBOZ-
UIJOHFMTF‰BGPDBMQPJOUGPSHSBę UIFQSJODJQBMMFWFSGPSBNCJUJPVTNFOQMPU-
UJOHDPVQT BOEBTZNCPMPGHPWFSONFOUSFQSFTTJPOJOUIPTFWJMMBHFTUPXIJDIJU
EJE JOUFSNJUUFOUMZ QFOFUSBUFw12
Because of these tendencies, the USOM channeled aid to the Lao National
1PMJDF -/1  XIJDI BQQFBSFE CFUUFS FRVJQQFE UIBO UIF 3-" UP FTUBCMJTI
EPNFTUJDTFDVSJUZ DPMMFDUJOUFMMJHFODF DPOUSPMBSNTTNVHHMJOH BOEXJOQPQV-
lar support through civic action. A 1961 cabinet-level report noted that “police
XFSFBCMFUPPQFSBUFXJUIPVUJOUFSGFSFODFJO1BUIFU-BPoDPOUSPMMFEBSFBTBOE
FBSOFE SFTQFDU GSPN UIF QPQVMBUJPO UISPVHI DMPTF DPOUBDU ‫  ڀ ڀ‬ćF -BPUJBO
BSNZ<NFBOXIJMF>XBTBNCVTIFEJOUIFTFBSFBTCFDBVTFJUMJWFEPČUIFMBOE 
burned villages, and had aroused widespread hatred.”131BVM4LVTF BQBUSPMNBO
JOUIF#PTUPO1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUXIP BęFSBTUJOUJOUIFOBWZ TFSWFEBTBQPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUPSJO0LJOBXB DPNNFOUFEJOBOPUIFSSFQPSUUIBUXIJMFiTPMEJFST
BOEQPMJDFCPUIXFBSVOJGPSNTBOEDBSSZĕSFBSNTyUIFSFUIFTJNJMBSJUZTUPQT
"TPMEJFSJTJOEPDUSJOBUFEBOEUSBJOFEUP‫ڀڀ‬LJMMBOEEFTUSPZćFQPMJDFNBOT
KPCJTUPQSPUFDUMJGFBOEQSPQFSUZ QSFWFOUDSJNF JOTUJMMJOUIFQFPQMFBSFTQFDU
for the law, and to assist those in need. Their basic training is entirely different.
ćFĕSTUJTDPODFSOFENBJOMZXJUIĕHIUJOHBOENBJOUFOBODFPGIJTXFBQPOT‫ڀڀ‬
UIFMBUUFSyXJUIMFBSOJOHUIFDPOTUJUVUJPOBOEMBXTPGUIFMBOE UIFSJHIUTPGBO
JOEJWJEVBM< >‫ڀڀ‬BOEQSPQFSQVCMJDSFMBUJPOTw14
-BPTXBTBQFBDFGVM OPONBUFSJBMJTUJDTPDJFUZ BOEDSJNFSBUFTXFSFFYUSBPS-
dinarily low.155SBJOJOHXBTDPOTFRVFOUMZEFTJHOFEGPSQVSFMZQPMJUJDBMPCKFD-
UJWFT VOEFS UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOUT ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN  XIJDI PQFSBUFE BU B
žŶż NJMMJPO CVEHFU BNPOHUIFIJHIFTUJOUIFXPSME*UT DFOUSBM HPBM XBT UP
strengthen the internal security apparatus of the RLG while avoiding costly
NJMJUBSZJOUFSWFOUJPO1SJPSJUZXBTHJWFOUPUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODIćF-/1
XFSF USBJOFE JO NPEFSO SFDPSET NBOBHFNFOU BOE DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF UFDI-
OJRVFTEFTJHOFEUPiGBDJMJUBUFUIFFBSMZEFUFDUJPOPGDPNNVOJTUQFOFUSBUJPOPG
the civilian population.”16 64 BEWJTFST GVSUIFS XPSLFE UP DVMUJWBUF BOUJDPN-
NVOJTUTPMJEBSJUZBNPOH$*"iBTTFUTwJOUIFQPMJDF XIPXFSFLFQUPOHVBSEGPS
BQPTTJCMFDPVQJODBTFBQPMJUJDBMTFUUMFNFOUXBTCSPLFSFEBMMPXJOHGPS1BUIFU
-BPQBSUJDJQBUJPOJOHPWFSONFOUBOEUIFOBUJPOBMBSNZ XIJDIUIF"NFSJDBOT
EFFNFEVOBDDFQUBCMF17
The LNP, which had been established by the French in 1949 to control

124 Under the Facade of Benevolence


TVCWFSTJPO  JODMVEFE B QBSBNJMJUBSZ XJOH *O DPOUSBTU UP UIF BSNFE GPSDFT 
SFDSVJUTXFSFNPTUMZMJUFSBUFBOEIBEUPQBTTBXSJUUFOFYBN*O"QSJMŴżŸŸ UXP
"NFSJDBOQPMJDFFYQFSUTXJUI$*"DPOOFDUJPOT #ZSPO&OHMFBOE-PVJTF1BHF 
conducted a survey of police organizations. In their report, they advocated
FTUBCMJTIJOH B 64 BTTJTUBODF QSPHSBN CBTFE PO UIF QSPHSBN JO *OEPOFTJB
%SBXJOHPO&OHMFTFYQFSJFODFJO+BQBO UIFZBTTFSUFEUIBUiDPNCBUJOHDPNNV-
OJTUJOĕMUSBUJPOBOETVCWFSTJPOBOEUIFNBJOUFOBODFPGQVCMJDTBGFUZJO-BPTw
XFSF FTTFOUJBMMZ B iQPMJDF QSPCMFN  BOE OPU B NJMJUBSZ POF ‫*  ڀ ڀ‬G UIF QFPQMF
BSFUPIBWFDPOĕEFODFJOUIFJSHPWFSONFOUBOEHJWFJUUIFJSTVQQPSU UIFOJU
NVTUCFDBQBCMFPGFTUBCMJTIJOHMBXBOEPSEFSBOEBČPSEJOHUIFNQSPUFDUJPOw
ćFSFQPSUXFOUPOUPSFDPNNFOEUIBUUIFQPMJDFBOE(FOEBSNFSJFCFDPN-
CJOFEVOEFSBTJOHMFNJOJTUSZBOEUIBUQPMJDFJOUFMMJHFODFTIPVMECFCPMTUFSFE
BOEWJMMBHFQBUSPMTFTUBCMJTIFEJOUIFDPVOUSZTJEF XIFSFiTNBMMCBOEJUHBOHT
QSFZFEPOUIFQPQVMBUJPOwBOEiDPNNVOJTUBHFOUTFOHBHFEJOQSPQBHBOEBBOE
IBSBTTNFOUBDUJWJUJFTw&OHMFBOE.PSSJTTUSFTTFEUIBUUIF-/1XFSFTFSJPVTMZ
IBOEJDBQQFECZUIFMBDLPGBEFRVBUFGBDJMJUJFTBOEFRVJQNFOUBOEUIBUSFNFEZ-
JOHUIJTQSPCMFNTIPVMECFBDFOUSBMQSJPSJUZ3PBECVJMEJOH UPP XBTWJUBMUP
JNQSPWF USBOTQPSUBUJPO BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPO  XIJDI XFSF OFFEFE UP JEFOUJGZ
and track down subversives.18
ćF3-(BOEUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUSFTQPOEFEGBWPSBCMZUP&OHMFBOE1BHFT
SFQPSUćF3PZBM(FOEBSNFSJF ŸŷųNFOTUSPOH XBTNFSHFEXJUIUIF-/1
ŸŻųNFOTUSPOH JOUIF.JOJTUSZPGUIF*OUFSJPS BOENBOQPXFSXBTJODSFBTFE
to 2,800. The ICA contracted nine police advisers, including Jack Ellis, superin-
UFOEFOUPGUIF,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU BOEGPVSUIJSEDPVOUSZUFDIOJ-
DJBOTBOETVQQMJFEUIF-/1XJUIPWFSŴ ŸųųDBSCJOFT Ŵ ųųųSFWPMWFST VOJGPSNT 
boots, saddles, jeeps, and radios provisioned by airlift to the director-general
PGUIF(FOEBSNFSJF 5JBP4PNTBOJUIUIFCSPUIFSPGiSFEw1SJODF4PVQIBOPV-
vong.19"QIPUPMBCXBTDPOTUSVDUFEGPSJNQSPWJOHDMBTTJĕDBUJPOPGEFUBJOFFT 
BMPOHXJUIBNPEFSOSBEJPDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFNMJOLJOHSFNPUFBSFBTXJUI
7JFOUJBOF.BOVGBDUVSFECZ#BSSPXBOE#SPXO -UE PG#BOHLPL UIFTZTUFN
JODMVEFEUIJSUZTFWFOUSBOTNJUUFSTUBUJPOTBOEŴŻźPQFSBUPSTBOEXBTDPOTJE-
FSFE POF PG UIF CFTU NFBOT PG iFOTVSJOH JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZw20 These initiatives
JMMVTUSBUF IPX NPEFSO JOGPSNBUJPO UFDIOPMPHZ BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPOT UFDI-
OJRVFTXFSFCFJOHFYQPSUFEJOPSEFSUPIFJHIUFOTPDJBMDPOUSPM
*$"TUBČOFWFSUIFMFTTGFMUIBNQFSFECZUIFMBDLPGRVBMJĕFEQFSTPOOFMMFę
PWFSGSPNUIF'SFODIDPMPOJBMBENJOJTUSBUJPO BTXFMMBTCZEJMBQJEBUFEQPMJDF
stations, the reliance on vehicles of World War II vintage, and the absence of
QBWFE SPBET  XIJDI NBEF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT EJďDVMU21 Starting in 1956, LNP
CFJOHHSPPNFEGPSMFBEFSTIJQQPTJUJPOT JODMVEJOH5JBP4PNTBOJUIBOEIJTTVD-
cessor Soukan Vilayrsarn, a protégé of Katay Don Sasorith, were sent to take
DPVSTFT BU .JDIJHBO 4UBUF 6OJWFSTJUZ  XIPTF %FQBSUNFOU PG 1PMJDF "ENJOJT-
USBUJPOXBTBNPOHUIFCFTUJOUIFDPVOUSZ221BSUPGUIFBJNXBTUPDVMUJWBUF

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 125


UIFJSMPZBMUZUPUIFBOUJDPNNVOJTUDBVTFćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTFOUQPMJDFGPS
additional instruction in Malaya and Thailand, where they attended a radio
technician school at Korat and studied under Colonel Chai Sevikul, chief of
UIFĕOHFSQSJOUBOEDFOUSBMSFDPSETPďDFJOUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFIFBERVBSUFSTJO
#BOHLPL)FXBTDPOTJEFSFEiNPSFFČFDUJWFUIBO"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTCFDBVTF
PGIJTĘVFODZJOUIF-BPMBOHVBHFTw-/1PďDFSTBMTPUSBJOFEXJUIUIF$*"
subsidized Border Patrol Police in jungle warfare. In June 1957, ninety officers
were sent to the constabulary school in Manila, where they were taught by
WFUFSBOT PG UIF BOUJ)VL DBNQBJHO23 The nature of the training reveals the
QPMJUJDBMGVODUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTBOEUIFQVTIGPSNJMJUBSJ[BUJPO XIJDI
SFTVMUFEJOBQSPMJGFSBUJPOPGIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT
*O PSEFS UP GPTUFS JODSFBTFE QSPGFTTJPOBMJTN  B QPMJDF USBJOJOH DFOUFS XBT
TFUVQBU%POF/PVOF UXFMWFLJMPNFUFSTGSPN7JFOUJBOF XJUIUIFBTTJTUBODF
PG+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO#FDBVTFPGBMBDLPGQSPQFSDMBTTSPPNFRVJQNFOU XBUFS 
and electricity, it never proved functional. Supplies intended for construction
XFSFSFTPMEPOUIFCMBDLNBSLFUćFMJWJOHDPOEJUJPOTXFSFTPQPPSUIBUQVCMJD
TBGFUZPďDFSTGFBSFEUIFPVUCSFBLPGEJTFBTFTUIFZMBNFOUFEUIBUTUVEFOUTIBE
UPIJUDIIJLFPSXBMLUXFMWFUPGPVSUFFOLJMPNFUFST BUSJQPGBUMFBTUUXPUPUISFF
IPVST UPUIFOFBSFTUSJWFSJOPSEFSUPCBUIFćFDMBTTSPPNIBEOPCMBDLCPBSE 
and students couldn’t even hear their instructors’ lectures. One short course in
QBSBNJMJUBSZUBDUJDTBOEDSJNJOBMJOWFTUJHBUJPOXBTHJWFOBUUIFDFOUFSJOFBSMZ
ŴżŸź*UXBTPUIFSXJTFVTFEBTBTUPSBHFEFQPUGPSEPOBUFEFRVJQNFOU24
ćF BDBEFNZ QSPWJEFT B ĕUUJOH TZNCPM PG UIF TIPSUDPNJOHT PG UIF QPMJDF
QSPHSBNćF(FOFSBM"DDPVOUJOH0ďDFDPODMVEFEJOTQSJOHŴżŸżUIBUiMJUUMF
QSPHSFTTw IBE CFFO NBEF BOE UIBU UIFSF XBT B iTFSJPVT MBDL PG DPOUSPM PWFS
counterpart fund expenditures with evidence pointing to the possible diversion
PG TVCTUBOUJBM TVNT GPS VOBVUIPSJ[FE QVSQPTFTw25 The corruption resulted in
QBSUGSPNUIFSJTJOHDPTUPGMJWJOH PXJOHUPBOJOĘVYPGGPSFJHODBQJUBMPOB
IPMMPXFDPOPNJDCBTFBOEUIFOFXBWBJMBCJMJUZPGMVYVSZHPPET$POTUSVDUJPO
QSPKFDUTEFTJHOFEUPJNQSPWFQPMJDFGBDJMJUJFTOFWFSHPUPČUIFHSPVOECFDBVTF
UIFNBUFSJBMTXFSFQJMGFSFEBOETPMEPOUIFCMBDLNBSLFU3FQPSUTDPNQMBJOFE
UIBUQPMJDFXBTUFEUIFJSHBTPMJOFSBUJPOTUBLJOHUIFJSGBNJMJFTPODPVOUSZQJD-
nics, rendering their vehicles unusable for part of the year.26 Vincent Cillis, an
BSNZ DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF TQFDJBMJTU XJUI B EFHSFF GSPN -B4BMMF 6OJWFSTJUZ JO
$IJDBHP OPUFEUIBUQSPWJODJBMDPNNBOEFSTXFSFNPSFJOUFSFTUFEJOUIFiTVD-
DFTTPGQSJWBUFFOUFSQSJTFTJOXIJDIUIFZIBWFJOWFTUNFOUTUIBOQPMJDFXPSLw
"O"NFSJDBONJTTJPOBSZ (FPSHF5VCCT UPMEUIFFNCBTTZUIBUUIF(.%BOE
MPDBMNFSDIBOUTXFSFTNVHHMJOHPQJVNGSPNćBJMBOEBOEJO4BZBCPVSZQSPW-
JODF XIFSFUIFQPMJDFDIJFGXBTBMFBEJOHPQJVNQSPEVDFSBOEIJTPďDFSTXFSF
iBGSBJEUPJOUFSGFSFwPSXFSFiUIFNTFMWFTJOWPMWFEw27
The chain of corruption extended to top police executives who used their
TUBUVT UP FOSJDI UIFNTFMWFT UISPVHI FYUPSUJPO BOE CZ EFNBOEJOH LJDLCBDLT
GSPN$IJOFTFNFSDIBOUTJOSFUVSOGPSXPSLQFSNJUT*$"SFQPSUTOPUFEUIBU

126 Under the Facade of Benevolence


.BKPS7BUUBI1IBOLIBN IFBEPGUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODI CVJMUBNBOTJPO
UIBUDPTUPWFSŵNJMMJPOLJQ UIFFRVJWBMFOUPGžŷŻŻ ŷųų 1VCMJDTBGFUZBEWJTFST
XPOEFSFEXIFSFIFHPUUIFNPOFZ$PMPOFM-FWBO7JMBZIPO DPNNJTTJPOFSPG
UIF QSPWJODJBM QPMJDF  JOWFTUFE JO DPNNFSDJBM FOUFSQSJTFT BOE CPVHIU B IVHF
IPVTFOFYUEPPSUPQPMJDFDIJFG5JBP4PNTBOJUIBOEBCJH$IFWSPMFU%FMVYF
5JBPTSFQMBDFNFOU (FOFSBM4PVLBO7JMBZSTBSO XIPIBETUVEJFEMBXJO'SBODF
BOE XBT WBMVFE GPS IJT TUSPOH BOUJDPNNVOJTN  VTFE IJT QPTJUJPO UP QBZ PČ
QPMJUJDBMDBOEJEBUFTBOEUPQVSDIBTFUISFF.FSDFEFT#FO[FTBOEĕWF3FOBVMU
%BVQIJOFT )F XBT TVCTFRVFOUMZ QSPNPUFE UP TFDSFUBSZ PG TUBUF GPS WFUFSBO
BČBJST 5JBP CFDBNF TFDSFUBSZ PG TUBUF GPS UIF JOUFSJPS  "DDPSEJOH UP 4LVTF 
4PVLBOXBTBiHPPEQPMJDFPďDFSCVULFFQTCBEDPNQBOZ‫)ڀڀ‬FJTCFJOHNJT-
HVJEFECZ<BTTPDJBUJPOXJUI>7BUUBI XIJDIXJMMCSJOHIJTSVJOw28
'BJMJOH UP BDLOPXMFEHF UIF SPPUT PG UIF QSPCMFN  QVCMJD TBGFUZ BEWJTFST
SBUJPOBMJ[FE UIF MBDL PG QSPGFTTJPOBMJTN BOE HSBę BT B QSPEVDU PG DVMUVSBM
CBDLXBSEOFTT7JODFOU$JMMJTDPNNFOUFEJOBSFQPSUUIBUUIFi-BPJTCZOBUVSF
VOBNCJUJPVT BOE JOEPMFOU  QFSIBQT EVF UP UIF FOFSWBUJOH DMJNBUF  XIJDI
SFEVDFTNFOUBMBOEQIZTJDBMWJHPSBOEQSPEVDFTBANBOOBQIJMPTPQIZw5BL-
JOHBQBHFGSPNUIF1PSUVHVFTFUIFPSZPG-VTPUSPQJDBMJTN UIFTFSFNBSLTUZQJGZ
UIF FUIOPDFOUSJTN VOEFSMZJOH UIF "NFSJDBO BJE QSPHSBNT -BP QFPQMF XFSF
GSFRVFOUMZEJTQBSBHFECZHPWFSONFOUPďDJBMTBOEUIFNFEJBGPSCFJOHVOBN-
CJUJPVT  VOJOUFMMJHFOU  MB[Z  BOE QBDJĕTU $*" TUBUJPO DIJFG )FOSZ )FDLTIFS
BUUSJCVUFEUIFGBJMVSFPG64QSPHSBNTUPUIFGBDUUIBUiPVSQSPQBHBOEBJTUPP
TPQIJTUJDBUFEwUPBOTXFSUIBUPGUIF1BUIFU-BPiJOUIFNJOEPGUIFWJMMBHFSw29
Owing to such attitudes, Lao police did not often respect their advisers and
were suspected of being double agents. The ICA’s Nikolas Perazic reported
UPUIF64FNCBTTZUIBUUIFQPMJDFDPNNJTTJPOFSJO4BN/FVBiXFBSTBOPME
BOETIBCCZĕFMEPVUĕUBOEOPUBQPMJDFVOJGPSN wBEEJOH i.ZTFOTFJTUIBUIF
JTOPUBNBOUPCFUSVTUFEw30ćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDPOUJOVFEUPCBDLGPSDFT
they acknowledged to be corrupt out of geopolitical expediency, pressing for
DJWJDBDUJPO JODMVEJOHUIFCVJMEJOHBOETUBďOHPGSVSBMTDIPPMT UPJNQSPWFUIF
-/1TJNBHF*O.BSDIŴżŸżUIF"NFSJDBOBNCBTTBEPSVSHFE4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF
for the Interior Khoranhok Souvannavong to tighten control over the police
BOE ĕHIU DPSSVQUJPO  XIJDI 4PVWBOOBWPOH BENJUUFE IBE iUBLFO SPPU MJLF B
plague.”31 Little changed, however, because of the institutionalization of corrup-
UJPOBUUIFIJHIFTUMFWFMTBOEUIFXFBLOFTTPGUIFMFHBMTZTUFNBOEKVEJDJBSZ BOE
CFDBVTFUIFQSPCMFNXBTQBSUJBMMZBQSPEVDUPG"NFSJDBOGPSFJHOBJEQSPHSBNT
BOEUIFDVMUVSFPGNBUFSJBMJTNBOEHSFFEUIBUUIFZGPTUFSFE

“A Youthful Prank”: Subversion of Elections and Growth of a Dirty War

ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO-BPTSFDFJWFEBEEFEQSJPSJUZGPMMPXJOHUIFŴżŸŻFMFD-
UJPOT JOXIJDIUIFQPMJUJDBMBSNPGUIF1BUIFU-BP UIF/FP-BP)BL9BU -BP-
UJBO 1BUSJPUJD 'SPOU  FODPNQBTTJOH B XJEF DPBMJUJPO PG MFęJTUT  XPO OJOF PG

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 127


UXFOUZPOFDPOUFTUFETFBUTćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU UIPVHIBDLOPXMFEHJOHUIBU
the Patriotic Front was a “well organized and disciplined legal political party”
BOEiUIPSPVHIMZQSPEFNPDSBUJDBOEQSP-BPUJBOBUIFBSU wTPVHIUUPVOEFS-
NJOFJUCZFOBDUJOHBSVSBMEFWFMPQNFOUQSPHSBN 0QFSBUJPO#PPTUFS4IPU BOE
CZ GVOEJOH BOUJDPNNVOJTU DBOEJEBUFT 4FJ[JOH VQPO UIF DPSSVQUJPO CSFE CZ
UIF"NFSJDBOBJEQSPHSBN 1SJODF4PVQIBOPVWPOHXPOUIFMBSHFTUOVNCFSPG
WPUFT/FVUSBMJTU4PVWBOOB1IPVNB 4PVQIBOPVWPOHTIBMGCSPUIFS FNFSHFE
BT UIF IFBE PG TUBUF )F TVQQPSUFE B DPBMJUJPO HPWFSONFOU  XIJDI JODMVEFE
the integration of Pathet Lao units into the RLA. Disappointed by the results,
"NCBTTBEPS1BSTPOTCBDLFEUIF-BPUJBOSJHIUXJOHJOGPSNJOHUIF$PNNJU-
tee for the Defense of National Interests, which sponsored police surveillance
BOEIBSBTTNFOUPGUIFFMFDUFE1BUSJPUJD'SPOUEFQVUJFTBOEGPSDFE4PVWBOOBUP
resign.32
" OFX DBCJOFU XBT TVCTFRVFOUMZ GPSNFE  IFBEFE CZ $*" iBTTFUw 1IPVJ
4BOBOJLPOF XIPIBEQSFWJPVTMZTFSWFEVOEFSUIF'SFODIBOEXBTJNQMJDBUFEJO
BĕOBODJBMTDBOEBMXIJMFEJSFDUPSPGUIF-BP7JFOH#BOL33 The Pathet Lao was
DSJNJOBMJ[FEBOEUISVTUVOEFSHSPVOE TQBSLJOHUIFPOTFUPGDJWJMXBS5PKVTUJGZ
UIF JOJUJBUJPO PG TFBSDI BOE EFTUSPZ PQFSBUJPOT  UIF 3-( DMBJNFE UIBU /PSUI
7JFUOBNIBEJOWBEFEUIFDPVOUSZJOWJPMBUJPOPGUIF(FOFWBOFVUSBMJUZQMFEHF
(which the United States itself had repeatedly violated), a line the press swal-
lowed. A United Nations investigation concluded, however, that while North
7JFUOBNIBEQSPWJEFENBUFSJBMBTTJTUBODF iUIFSFXBTOPDPODMVTJWFQSPPGUIBU
/PSUI7JFUOBNFTF"SNZVOJUTIBEDSPTTFEUIFCPSEFSwXIJDIXPVMEIBWFCFFO
JNQPTTJCMFBOZXBZEVSJOHUIFSBJOZTFBTPO&WFO0VEPOF4BOBOJLPOF BĕSNMZ
BOUJDPNNVOJTUHFOFSBMSFMBUFEUP1IPVJ OPUFEJOIJTBDDPVOUPGUIFDPOĘJDU
UIBUUIF-BPUJBOHPWFSONFOUIBEQSFDJQJUBUFEUIFDSJTJT8JMMJBN-FEFSFSXSPUF
in his book A Nation of Sheep: “The people of the United States were led to
CFMJFWFUIBU-BPTQIZTJDBMMZIBECFFOJOWBEFECZGPSFJHO$PNNVOJTUUSPPQT
GSPNBDSPTTJUTOPSUIFSOCPSEFS‫ڀڀ‬ćFFOUJSFBČBJSXBTBGSBVE/PNJMJUBSZ
invasion of Laos had taken place.”34 According to the Australian journalist Wil-
fred Burchett, once the war began, the repression directed against the Pathet
Lao and its supporters was especially savage. Troops and police killed any cadre
UIFZDPVMEHFUUIFJSIBOETPO JODMVEJOHTPNFNFNCFSTPGQBSMJBNFOUćFZ
BMMFHFEMZTUVDLUIFEFDBQJUBUFEIFBETPGTPNFWJDUJNTVQPOTUBLFTJOEJTUSJDU
BOEQSPWJODJBMDFOUFSTGPSQVSQPTFTPGJOUJNJEBUJPO35
*OTQJUFPGUIFWJSVMFODFPGUIFDBNQBJHOT "NFSJDBOBOE3-(IBSEMJOFST
TPVHIUUIFSFNPWBMPG1IPVJCFDBVTFIFEJEOPUiQSPTFDVUFUIFXBSBHBJOTUUIF
1BUIFU-BPXJUIFOPVHIWJHPSwPSUBLFUIFBEWJDFPG"NCBTTBEPS)PSBDF4NJUI
BOE $*" TUBUJPO DIJFG )FOSZ )FDLTIFS iUP FMJNJOBUF UIF MFęJTU PQQPTJUJPO
entirely.”36ćF$*"TVCTFRVFOUMZCBDLFEBDPVQEÏUBUMFECZ$PMPOFM1IPVNJ
Nosavan, a cousin of Thai dictator Marshal Sarit Thanarat who had studied
at the École Supérieure de Guerre in France. Described by the CIA as “cocky

128 Under the Facade of Benevolence


SFHBSEJOH NJMJUBSZ BDUJPO w UIF QPSUMZ NBO  XIP IBE ćBJ BOE (.% USPPQT
PQFSBUJOHVOEFSIJTDPNNBOE VTFEIJTQPXFSUPBNBTTBGPSUVOFPGžŴŶźNJM-
MJPOUISPVHIDPOUSPMPGDBTJOPT BQPSLNPOPQPMZ BOEUIFUSBďDJOHPMEBOE
PQJVN&WFOBOUJDPNNVOJTU-BPSFGFSSFEUPIJNBTBiDSPPLw37
"ęFS UIF DPVQ  CMBDLTIJSUFE TPMEJFST MPZBM UP 1IPVNJ TVSSPVOEFE 1IPVJT
IPNF XJUI UBOLT BOE KPLFE BCPVU BTTBTTJOBUJPO JG IF iEJE OPU CFIBWFw &MFD-
UJPOTIFMEJO"QSJMŴżŹųXFSFDSVEFMZSJHHFEJO1IPVNJTGBWPS XJUIiJOOVNFS-
BCMFFYBNQMFTwPGCSJCFSZ WPUFSGSBVE BOEJOUJNJEBUJPO"64FNCBTTZPďDFS
SFQPSUFEUIBUIFIBETFFO$*"BHFOUTEJTUSJCVUFCBHTGVMPGNPOFZUPWJMMBHFIFBE-
NFOćF1BUIFU-BPPďDJBMMZSFDPSEFEŴ żŵźWPUFT BĕHVSFBSCJUSBSJMZEFSJWFE
GSPNUIFZFBSJOXIJDI$*"BHFOU4UVBSU.FUIWFOXBTCPSO$*"EJSFDUPS%VMMFT
considered the fraud a “youthful prank.” All leftists were defeated, and even loyal
NPEFSBUFTXFSFFYDMVEFEGSPNUIFBTTFNCMZ38ćFSFNBJOJOH1BUIFU-BPBSNZ
VOJUTXFSFEJTBSNFE BOE4PVQIBOPVWPOHXBTDPOEFNOFEUPEFBUIGPSUSFBTPO
%VSJOHUIFIFJHIUPGBSBJOTUPSN IPXFWFS IFFTDBQFEGSPNQSJTPO XIFSFUIF
wretched conditions were likened by one observer to those of a horse stable.
According to a fellow prisoner, Souphanouvong won over the guards through
QPMJUJDBMFEVDBUJPOBOEQFSTVBEFEUIFNUPKPJOUIFOBUJPOBMJTUDBVTF39
ćF 1BUIFU -BP GPSDFT  MFE CZ USPPQT GSPN UIF ćBJTQFBLJOH -BP -PVN
NBKPSJUZ  TVCTFRVFOUMZ UPPL UP UIF NPVOUBJOT BOE SFDBQUVSFE NVDI PG UIF
1MBJOPG+BST DPOTJTUJOHPG4BN/FVBBOE1IPOH4BMZQSPWJODFTćFZSFDFJWFE
BTTJTUBODFGSPNUIF/PSUI7JFUOBNFTF UIPVHIUIF64FNCBTTZSFQPSUFEBęFS
B DPNQSFIFOTJWF FČPSU UP BDDVNVMBUF FWJEFODF UISPVHI QIPUPT  EPDVNFOUT 
BOEFZFXJUOFTTFT UIBUiBMMFHBUJPOTPG7JFUNJOIBDUJWJUZwJO-BPTXFSFiFYBH-
gerated.”4064"SNZ(SFFO#FSFUT VOEFSUIFDPEFOBNF&SBXBO CFHBOUSBJO-
JOHOBUJWFGPSDFTJODPVOUFSHVFSSJMMBXBSGBSFBTTFDSFUNPOJFTXFSFEJTQFOTFE
to secure political loyalties.414DPSDIFEFBSUIUBDUJDTBOESFMPDBUJPOQSPHSBNT
EFTJHOFEUPJTPMBUFUIFHVFSSJMMBTGSPNUIFJSCBTFXFSFBEPQUFE BOE4FDSFUBSZ
PG4UBUF%FBO3VTLTBODUJPOFEUIFVTFPG3PZBM-BP"JS'PSDF5ŵŻTNBOOFE
CZ FNQMPZFFT PG UIF $*" TVCTJEJBSZ "JS "NFSJDB BOE -BP BOE ćBJ QJMPUT
GPS CPNCJOH NJTTJPOT BMPOH XJUI UIF VTF PG OBQBMN BU UIF EJTDSFUJPO PG UIF
BNCBTTBEPS42
1SFWJPVTMZ JO"VHVTUŴżŸż 1BVM4LVTFIBEDBCMFE%BMZ-BWFSHOFSFRVFTU-
JOHBOJODSFBTFJOQPMJDFNBOQPXFSBOEBNNVOJUJPOUPBEESFTTUIFiEJTUVSCFE
QPMJUJDBM TJUVBUJPO BOE FNFSHFODZ UIBU OPX FYJTUTw 3FDFOUMZ  IF OPUFE  iB Ŵŵ
NBOCPSEFSQBUSPMUFBNXBTTFOUPOBŴŷEBZQBUSPMXJUIPOMZUXPSFWPMWFST
BOEĕWFDBSCJOFTw43 At the behest of the National Security Council, Lavergne in
UVSODPOUSBDUFE$JWJM"JS5SBOTQPSU MBUFS"JS"NFSJDB UPĘZJOBNNVOJUJPO 
SFWPMWFST .PUPSPMBSBEJPT HFOFSBUPST DBSCJOFT BOESJĘFTGSPNćBJMBOEBOE
UIF1IJMJQQJOFT1BUSPMCPBUTXFSFTFOUGPSBNBSJOFCSBODIUPiDPOUSPMTVCWFS-
TJWFJOĕMUSBUJPOUISPVHIUIFSJWFSwBOEHBTPMJOFXBTQSPWJEFEGPS-/1WFIJDMFT
through a local Caltex dealer.44

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 129


ćF*$"GVSUIFSFBSNBSLFEPWFSžŹųų ųųųUPCVJMEBDFOUSBMJOUFSSPHBUJPO
DFOUFSBOEOFXQSPWJODJBMIFBERVBSUFST EFTJHOFEUPiHJWFQSFTUJHFUPUIFQPMJDF
BOETFSWFBTBTZNCPMPG3PZBM-BPBVUIPSJUZw45"EWJTFSTXPSLFEUPJNQSPWF
record collection and accounting, set up a national registry and identity card
TZTUFNUPNPOJUPSQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUZ BOEUSBJOFECPSEFSQBUSPMPďDJBMTUPSFHV-
MBUFUIFFOUSZPGćBJBOE$IJOFTFJNNJHSBOUTTVTQFDUFEPGDPNNVOJTUTZNQB-
UIJFT .BOZXFSFEFUBJOFEJOEJTDSJNJOBUFMZPOUIFTFDIBSHFT 46
4FWFSBMBEWJTFSTXJUIFYQFSJFODFUSBJOJOH/HP%JOI%JFNTQPMJDFBHFOUTJO
4PVUI7JFUOBN JODMVEJOH"JS'PSDFDBQUBJO+BDL3ZBO XIPIBECFFOBO'#*
BHFOUJO&BTU-BOTJOH .JDIJHBO GSPNŴżŷŻUPŴżŸŶ TVQQMJFEJOTUSVDUJPOUPUIF
4QFDJBM#SBODI XIJDISFDFJWFETFDSFUTMVTIGVOETGSPNUIF640.UPCVJMEVQ
JUTJOUFMMJHFODFHBUIFSJOHDBQBCJMJUJFTVOEFS(FOFSBM7BUUBI1IBOLIBN3ZBO
drafted a plan to create an elite civil police organization capable of efficiently
IBOEMJOHiTVCWFSTJPO UFSSPSJTN BOEDSJNF wBOEXIJDIDPNNBOEFESFTQFDU
GSPNUIFQPQVMBUJPOTPBTUPiQFSNJUUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGOFDFTTBSZTPVSDFTPG
JOGPSNBUJPOw47 Working with a French intelligence officer, Major Jean Deuve,
IF UBVHIU SFWPMWFS USBJOJOH  XFBQPOT NBJOUFOBODF  BOE NFUIPET PG DPVOUFS
HVFSSJMMBXBSGBSF JODMVEJOHJOUFSSPHBUJPOJOXIJDIUIFBJNXBTUPUSZUPiCSFBLw
UIFTVTQFDUćFTFBDUJWJUJFTSFTVMUFEJOUIFTQSFBEPGHSPTTIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMB-
UJPOTBOEBOJOUFOTJĕDBUJPOPGUIFXBS

“Brutal, Corrupt Activity”: Arming Phoumi and His Hatchet Man,


General Siho

*O"VHVTUŴżŹų ,POH-F B-BPUJBONJMJUBSZPďDFSDIBSBDUFSJ[FECZUIF$*"BT


BiIJHIMZDPNQFUFOUBOEQSPGFTTJPOBMTPMEJFSBOECPSOMFBEFSwMBVODIFEBDPVQ
EÏUBUXJUIUIFBJNPGSPPUJOHPVUDPSSVQUJPOBOEiTVQQSFTTJOHUIPTFXIPXFSF
NBLJOHUIFJSIBSWFTUTPČUIFCBDLPGQFPQMFw48 Paul Skuse, who had survived
UIFXBSJOUIF1BDJĕD XBTTIPUBOEXPVOEFEXIJMFDPPSEJOBUJOHQVCMJDTBGFUZ
operations in Vientiane after several civilian advisers were taken hostage. The
$*"BOE(SBIBN1BSTPOT OPXBTTJTUBOUTFDSFUBSZPGTUBUFGPS'BS&BTUFSOBČBJST 
CBDLFEUIFTUSPOHNBO1IPVNJ XIPSFDMBJNFEUIFDBQJUBMćPVHIBDLOPXM-
edging his corruption and the fact that his son had caused public disturbances
CZUISPXJOHXJME ESVOLFOQBSUJFTBUIJTNBOTJPOJO4BWBOOBLIFU UIFZGFMUUIBU
iXJUIPVUIJN UIFKFBMPVT WJDJPVT BOEJOFČFDUJWFCJDLFSJOHPGMFTTFSNJMJUBSZ
ĕHVSFTJO7JFOUJBOFXPVMEDBVTFDIBPT wUIVTCFOFĕUJOHUIF1BUIFU-BP49
8JUI"NFSJDBOCBDLJOH 1IPVNJTFUVQBQBSBNJMJUBSZPSHBOJ[BUJPOLOPXO
as the Directorate of National Coordination in the Ministry of Defense under
UIFDPNNBOEPG(FOFSBM4JIP-BNQIPVUIBDPVM B$*"iBTTFUwXIPQMBZFEB
WJUBM SPMF SJHHJOH UIF ŴżŹų FMFDUJPO PO 1IPVNJT CFIBMG ćF %JSFDUPSBUF XBT
PWFSTFFOCZUISFFGVMMUJNF$*"PďDFSTBOEUXP4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFJOUFMMJHFODF
BHFOUTXIPXPSLFEDMPTFMZXJUI4JIP7JFXJOHOFVUSBMJUZBTTZOPOZNPVTXJUI

130 Under the Facade of Benevolence


DPNNVOJTN JUDPOEVDUFETVSWFJMMBODFPQFSBUJPOTJOUIFDBQJUBMPG7JFOUJBOF 
BTXFMMBTTBCPUBHF LJEOBQQJOHT BOEDPNNBOEPTUZMFSBJET4JYIVOESFEOFV-
USBMJTU QPMJUJDJBOT XFSF BNPOH UIPTF EFUBJOFE  JODMVEJOH 4PVWBOOB 1IPVNB
BOEGPSNFSQPMJDFDIJFG5JBP4PNTBOJUI50
" TUPDLZ NBO PG NJYFE $IJOFTF-BPUJBO QBSFOUBHF BOE IVNCMF CBDL-
ground, the thirty-year-old Siho had spent a year in France and attended the
(FOFSBM 4UBČ 4DIPPMJO 5BJXBO  XIFSF IFGFMMVOEFS UIFJOĘVFODFPG$IJBOH
Ching-kuo, chief of Taiwan’s secret police and son of dictator Chiang Kai-shek
+JBOH +JFTIJ  XIP IBE DMPTF UJFT UP "NFSJDBO JOUFMMJHFODF "QSPUÏHÏ PG %BJ
-J $IJBOHSBOBSVUIMFTTJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVTQFSNFBUJOHBMMBTQFDUTPG
Taiwanese society. Described by the New York Times as “rough and tenacious”
BOECZIJT$*"DBTFPďDFSBTiWBJOwBOEiEBOHFSPVT<MJLF1IPVNJ>JGJOBĘBTI
PGIPUUFNQFSw4JIPTJNJMBSMZIFBEFEBNJMJUBSJ[FEGPSDFXIJDIBEPQUFEiHBOH-
TUFSNFUIPETwUPFMJNJOBUFUIFPQQPTJUJPO BDDPSEJOHUP64SFQPSUT JODMVEJOH
UIFVTFPGiUXJTUFEDPSEJOJOUFSSPHBUJOHSFDBMDJUSBOUTVCKFDUTw)JTNFOBCVTFE
UIFJSQPXFS FYUPSUFENPOFZ XFSFJOWPMWFEJOHBNCMJOHBOEQSPTUJUVUJPO BOE
DPOEVDUFEUIFNTFMWFT JOUIFXPSETPGPOFPG1IPVNJTTVQQPSUFST iJOBOBCTP-
MVUFMZJSSFTQPOTJCMFNBOOFSw51
*O+BOVBSZŴżŹŴUIF-/1XBTSFNPWFEGSPNUIFDPOUSPMPGUIF.JOJTUSZPGUIF
*OUFSJPSBOEJUTNFNCFSTBCTPSCFECZUIF%JSFDUPSBUFPG/BUJPOBM$PPSEJOB-
tion.52-BPUJBOQPMJUJDTXFSFNBSSFEJOUIJTQFSJPECZDPOTUBOUGBDUJPOBMJTNPWFS
UIFTQPJMTPGQPXFSćF4BOBOJLPOFDMBONBJOUBJOFEJUTSJWBMSZXJUI1IPVNJ 
XIJMF4JIPTGPSDFTRVBSSFMFEXJUI(FOFSBM,PVQSBTJUI"CIBZPWFSDPOUSPMPG
NFEJDJOFJNQPSUTBOEGFFTGSPNPQJVNBOEHBNCMJOH,POH-FDPOUJOVFEUP
SFTJTUXJUIBTVQQMZPG4PWJFUBSNT4JIPTQPMJDFBOE,PVQSBTJUITTPMEJFST MFE
CZIJTDPVTJO1IBP GPVHIUBOEBSSFTUFEFBDIPUIFS XJUIUIFBSNZBOEQPMJDF
engaged in a rivalry for power. Dead bodies were left to rot in the streets with
UIFJSHVUTIBOHJOHPVU4JIPMBVODIFEBDPVQBOECSJFĘZDPOUSPMMFELFZQBSUTPG
Vientiane, including the National Bank, causing considerable destruction.53 His
QVUTDIFYFNQMJĕFEUIFEBOHFSPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJOFNQPXFSJOHGBSSJHIU
FMFNFOUT XIJDIVTFEUIFJOĘVYPGXFBQPOSZUPUSZUPGVMĕMMUIFJSBNCJUJPOTGPS
power.
"ŴżŹŸ014SFQPSUCZ'SBOL8BMUPO 1BVM4LVTF BOEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
TQFDJBMJTU8FOEFMM.PUUFSMBNFOUFEUIBU"NFSJDBOBJEIBEDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIF
QPMJDFFWPMWJOHJOUPBiQSJWBUFBSNZwPG(FOFSBM4JIPBOE1IPVNJ XIPPSHB-
OJ[FEWJDFBOEUIFiDPOTJEFSBCMFUSBďDJOTNVHHMJOHJOUPćBJMBOEwBTBNFBOT
PGSBJTJOHNPOFZGPSBiXBWFPGSFQSFTTJPOBHBJOTUQPMJUJDBMPQQPOFOUT wJODMVE-
JOHiNBTTKBJMJOHBOEFYFDVUJPOTw544JIPTNFO BDDPSEJOHUPUIFSFQPSU FOHBHFE
in “Gestapo”-like tactics, carrying out operations that “rivaled anything ever
IFBSEPGJOUFSNTPGCSVUBM DPSSVQUBDUJWJUZw55
0O 'FCSVBSZ Ŷ  ŴżŹŸ  (FOFSBM 4JIP BOE 1IPVNJ MBVODIFE B GBJMFE DPVQ
EÏUBUBOEĘFEUPćBJMBOE4IPSUPGGVOETXJUIXIJDIUPiCVZTVQQPSUFSTwBT

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 131


a result of the death of Marshal Sarit, they were tried in absentia for corrup-
UJPO BOE NJTDPOEVDU JO PďDF 4JIP EFDJEFE UP SFUVSO BęFS CFJOH UPME CZ B
TPPUITBZFS UIBU IF DPVME SFFOUFS -BPT VOIBSNFE 6QPO DSPTTJOH UIF CPSEFS 
IFXBTJNQSJTPOFEBOEiTIPUXIJMFUSZJOHUPFTDBQFw MFHFOEIBTJUUIBU(FO-
FSBM,PVQSBTJUIUISFXIJNPVUPGBIFMJDPQUFSXJUIPVUBQBSBDIVUF 56 Colonel
4PVLBO 7JMBZSTBSO OPUFE UIBU 1IPVNJ BOE 4JIP XFSF MJLF iJEJPUJD DIJMESFO
XJUIOPKVEHNFOUBOEOPGPSFTJHIUXIPBDUFEXJUIPVUUIPVHIUUPJOUFSOBUJPOBM
repercussions or the future of Laos.” Though disassociating itself at the end, the
6OJUFE4UBUFTIBEIFMQFEUPTQVSUIFNPOćF$*"DPODMVEFEUIBU1IPVNJBOE
4JIPXFSFBUUFNQUJOHUPFNVMBUF(FOFSBM/HVZFO,IBOITDPVQJO4PVUI7JFU-
OBNBOEUIBUUIFiQPMJUJDBMMZVOTPQIJTUJDBUFEw4JIPIBETPVHIUUPXJOPWFSUIF
"NFSJDBOTCZEFNPOTUSBUJOHIJTWJHPSPVTPQQPTJUJPOUPDPNNVOJTN57 These
DPNNFOUTBHBJOSFWFBMUIFJEFPMPHJDBMJOĘVFODFPGUIF"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHQSP-
HSBNT XIJDIXBTPęFOKVTUBTQPXFSGVMBTUIFJSNBUFSJBMJOĘVFODF
After Siho’s death, the LNP was returned to civilian control, and two hun-
ESFE4JIPMPZBMJTUTXFSFQVSHFEGSPNLFZQPTJUJPOTćF,FOOFEZBOE+PIOTPO
BENJOJTUSBUJPOTCBDLFE4PVWBOOB1IPVNBBęFSIFGPSHFEUJFTXJUISJHIUXJOH
generals and allowed for air strikes on zones controlled by the Pathet Lao.
Souvanna was favored because, according to national security adviser Michael
'PSSFTUBMM XIJMFiOPUBSPDLPG(JCSBMUBS XFEPOPUUIJOLIFJTDPNNVOJTUw58
"CPWFBMMFMTF IFXBTTFFOUPQSPNPUFTUBCJMJUZBUUIFUPQ XIJDIIBECFFOMBDL-
JOHVOEFSUIFNPSFĘBNCPZBOUZFUWFOBM1IPVNJ"NFSJDBOMFBEFSTIBETFFN-
ingly found a reliable client, or so they thought.

“A Precious Collection of Killers”: Auto-Defense Units and the Hmong


Clandestine Army

As Machiavellian political intrigues played out in Vientiane, the USOM fun-


OFMFENJMJUBSZFRVJQNFOUVOEFSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNUPSVSBMDPNNBOEPT PS
BVUPEFGFOTFVOJUT XIPTFSWFEBTBOBSNPGUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODI'JSTU
organized by Special Forces in 1954, they were viewed as crucial to the pres-
FSWBUJPOPG3PZBM-BPBVUIPSJUZJOUIFGBDFPGiTFSJPVTBSNFEUISFBUTwBOEUIF
1BUIFU-BPSFCFMMJPOBJNFEBUiPWFSUISPXJOHUIFMFHBMMZFTUBCMJTIFEBENJOJTUSB-
UJPOCZNFBOTPGBHFOFSBMVQSJTJOHPGUIF-BPQFPQMF wXIJDIXPVMEiUBLFUIF
GPSNPGBTPDJBMBOEEFNPDSBUJDSFWPMVUJPOw59
Following a classic colonial strategy, the Special Group on Counter-Insur-
HFODZDIBNQJPOFEUIFUSBJOJOHPGiUSJCBMHSPVQTXJUIFOFYQMPJUBCMFQBSBNJMJ-
tary capability” throughout the developing world, including the Montagnards
JO 4PVUI 7JFUOBN BOE FUIOJD DMBOT JO ćBJMBOE  $PMPNCJB  7FOF[VFMB  BOE
Iran.60 Building upon the precedent established by Dean Worcester in the
Philippines, anthropological studies were contracted to assist in these efforts.
ćFBVUPEFGFOTFVOJUTXFSFQSJNBSJMZESBXOGSPNUIF)NPOHCBTFEJO9JFOH

132 Under the Facade of Benevolence


,IPVBOHQSPWJODFBOEPUIFSiQSJNJUJWFwNJOPSJUJFT BTUIFZXFSFDBMMFE XIP
joined because of grievances against the Pathet Lao or because their chiefs had
been bought off through patronage.
ćF USBJOJOH XBT PWFSTFFO CZ "EPMQIF #POOFĕM  B .JDIJHBO 4UBUF QPMJDF
PďDFS XIP IBE TFSWFE BT BO JOTUSVDUPS BU UIF )BJUJBO NJMJUBSZ BDBEFNZ 
BOE GPS B UJNF CZ 3BMQI +PIOTPO  B WFUFSBO PG UIF 'MZJOH 5JHFST "NFSJDBO
aviators who fought in China in World War II), described by colleagues as
B iHPPEMPPLJOH  GBTUUBMLJOH TOBLFPJM TBMFTNBOw ćF DPNNBOEPT DBSSJFE
PVUBSNFEQSPQBHBOEB TFSWFEBTTDPVUTGPSUIF3-" QFOFUSBUFE1BUIFU-BP
FODBNQNFOUT BOEKPJOFEJODPNCBUNJTTJPOT0QFSBUJOHPOCPUITJEFTPGUIF
-BPUJBO7JFUOBNFTFCPSEFSJOMJBJTPOXJUI4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFVOJUT UIFZXFSF
JOTUSVDUFE JO TQZDSBę BOE TBCPUBHF  HJWFO TXFFQJOH QPXFST PG EFUBJONFOU 
and authorized to assassinate Pathet Lao leaders, a pattern consistent with the
EFTJHOTPG8FTUFSODPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZUIFPSJTUTUPĕHIUUFSSPSXJUIUFSSPSBOE
FNVMBUFUIFNFUIPETPGHVFSSJMMBTXIPTFMFDUJWFMZBTTBTTJOBUFEIBUFEHPWFSO-
NFOUPďDJBMTBOEQPMJDF'JUUJOHBDVMUVSBMUSBEJUJPOEBUJOHUPUIF*OEJBO8BST 
UIFiTBWBHFSZwPGUIFFOFNZXBTVTFEUPKVTUJGZQBSBMMFMPSFWFOHSFBUFSCBSCBS-
ity by U.S. troops and their proxies bringing “liberty” and “civilization” to all
XIPXPVMEFNCSBDFJU61
3FNJOJTDFOUPGUIF'JMJQJOPDPOTUBCVMBSZBOEi$IFTUZw1VMMFSTVOJUTJO/JDB-
ragua and Haiti, the auto-defense units dressed in black and were recruited on
UIFCBTJTPGUIFJSLOPXMFEHFPGUIFMPDBMQPQVMBUJPOBOESVHHFENPVOUBJOUFS-
SBJO&RVJQQFEXJUIDBSCJOFT HSFOBEFMBVODIFST CPMPLOJWFT BOEBOUJQFSTPOOFM
NJOFT  BT XFMM BT BNNVOJUJPO CFMUT  DPNQBTTFT  CJOPDVMBST  BOE TIPWFMT  UIFZ
XFSFDPODFJWFEBTBOBMUFSOBUJWFUPUIFBSNZ XIPTFQPTUTXFSFCFJOHPWFSQPX-
FSFECZUIF1BUIFU-BP BOEXIPTFPďDFSTSBSFMZUPPLUIFĕFMEXJUIUIFJSNFOPS
even left the luxury of their expensive villas and air-conditioned offices. Ruben
Tucker, head of the Military Advisory Assistance Group, referred to the RLA as
iHVUMFTTw#POOFĕMOPUFEJOBNFNPUIBUUIFDPNNBOEPT CZDPOUSBTU XPVME
BMXBZTiCFJONPUJPOJOUIFKVOHMF‫ڀڀ‬#JMMFUJOHPSSFTUBOESFDVQFSBUJPOJOJOTF-
DVSFPSTVTQJDJPVTWJMMBHFTXJMMCFBCTPMVUFMZGPSCJEEFO<UPQSFWFOUEFGFDUJPOT>w62
4VCTFRVFOU SFQPSUT  IPXFWFS  OPUFE B MBDL PG JEFPMPHJDBM NPUJWBUJPO BOE
PCTFSWFEUIBUJOUIFGBDFPGCBUUMFUIFBVUPEFGFOTFVOJUTXFSFQSPOFUPĘFFPS
iUVSOUIFJSXFBQPOTPWFSUPUIF1BUIFU-BPBOE7JFUNJOIw8JMMBSE0#SPXO 
IFBEPGUIF640. DPNQMBJOFEUIBUJOBDBNQBJHOPOUIF1MBJOPG+BST UIFNFO
OFWFS SFDFJWFE UIFJS CPOVT NPOFZ GSPN UIFJS DPNNBOEFS  XIP QPDLFUFE JU 
ESJWJOHUIFNUPNVUJOZ63"QBSUGSPNUBDUJDBMDPODFSOT BGFX"NFSJDBOBEWJT-
FSTXFSFVOFBTZBCPVUUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTSPMFJOTVQQPSUJOHNJMJUBSZTUZMF
QPMJDFPSHBOJ[BUJPOT*OBNFNPUP-#4XJDL DIBJSPGUIF0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM
4FDVSJUZ 1SPHSBN GPSNFSMZ UIF ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN  4LVTF WPJDFE EJTNBZ UIBU
UIFCSPBEQPXFSTPGUIFBVUPEFGFOTFVOJUTXFSFMFOEJOHUIFNTFMWFTUPBCVTF 
JODMVEJOH UIF iBSSFTU PG BOZPOF CFMJFWFE UP CF JOJNJDBM UP UIF 3-(w 4XJDL

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 133


SFQMJFE i8FOFFEUPFOTVSF<UIBU>QPMJDFPSDPOTUBCVMBSZVOJUTPQFSBUFXJUIJO
BMFHBMGSBNFXPSLEFTJHOFEUPTBGFHVBSEUIFSJHIUTPGJOEJWJEVBMTwćPVHIIF
BHSFFEXJUIUIFQSPHSBNJOQSJODJQMF IFSFDPNNFOEFEUIBUUIFDPVOUSZUFBN
PCUBJOBTTVSBODFTUIBUQFSTPOTBSSFTUFEXPVMECFiUVSOFEPWFSQSPNQUMZUPDJWJM
authorities for investigations and trial in accordance with the law.”64
These suggestions accorded with the liberal Skuse’s concern for civil liberties
BOEEVFQSPDFTT"TBQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUPSJO0LJOBXBJOUIFŴżŷųT IFIBEDSJU-
JDJ[FEWJMMBHFSBJETCZNJMJUBSZQPMJDFUPDPOĕTDBUF64QSPQFSUJFTBTBOiBCVTF
PGQPMJDFQPXFSTwDIBSBDUFSJTUJDPGUIFi/,7% ,FNQF5BJ BOEPUIFSGFBSFE
PSHBOJ[BUJPOT PG GBTDJTU BOE DPNNVOJTUJD TUBUFTw65 Paradoxically, the USOM
JO-BPTTUSFOHUIFOFEIBSEMJOFFMFNFOUTXJUIJOUIF3-( ĕYFEFMFDUJPOT BOE
DSFBUFENPCJMFQBSBNJMJUBSJFTUSBJOFEJOWJPMFOUQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFUBDUJDT
ćFCFMJFGUIBUUIFTFGPSDFTDPVMEPQFSBUFXJUIJOBOZTPSUPGMFHBMPSIVNBOF
GSBNFXPSL HJWFO UIF DPOUFYU XBT OBÕWF BOE SFĘFDUFE UIF NPSBM DPOUSBEJD-
UJPOTDPNNPOUPMJCFSBM$PME8BSSJPST XIPGBJMFEUPVOEFSTUBOEUIBUIVNBO
SJHIUT BUSPDJUJFT BSF JOFWJUBCMF JO XBS *O QSBDUJDF  4XJDLT SFDPNNFOEBUJPOT
XFSFOPUQVSTVFE BOE"NFSJDBOCBDLFEGPSDFTDPOUJOVFEUPPQFSBUFPVUTJEF
UIFMBX1VCMJDTBGFUZSFQPSUTSFGFSSFEUP(FOFSBM7BUUBI1IBOLIBNTGPSDFTBT
BiNFSDJMFTTCBOEPGUFSSPSJTUTwUSBJOFEJOTFDSFUQPMJDFNFUIPET8JMGSFE#VS-
DIFUUDIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIFDPNNBOEPTBTBiQSFDJPVTDPMMFDUJPOPGLJMMFST UIVHT
BOECBOEJUT wPXJOHUPUIFJSFYQFSUJTFJOUIFCMBDLDMBOEFTUJOFBSUT"NPOHUIF
WJDUJNTPGBTTBTTJOBUJPOXBTUIFTPOPG1SJODF4PVQIBOPVWPOH66
The auto-defense units served as the forerunner of the CIA’s clandestine
)NPOH BSNZ  XIJDI XBT HSBEVBMMZ JOUFHSBUFE JOUP UIF 3-" BOE CFDBNF UIF
QSJODJQBMNFBOTCZXIJDIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTGPVHIUUIF1BUIFU-BPćFFNCBTTZ
BOE $*" TPVHIU UP FYQMPJU TQMJUT XJUIJO UIF )NPOH CFUXFFO UIF -Z BOE -P
DMBOT-P'BZEBOHXBTBGPVOEJOHNFNCFSPGUIF1BUIFU-BP XIJMFIJTDPVTJO
5PVCZ-ZGPVOHIBEJOJUJBUFESFTJTUBODFBDUJWJUJFTJOUIFDPNNVOJTUDPOUSPMMFE
QSPWJODFTPG4BN/FVBBOE1IPOH4BMZTUBSUJOHJOŴżŸŹ XIFOUIF$*"CFHBO
BSNJOH USJCBM FMFNFOUT VOEFS UIF DPWFS PG ŴŵżųE67 With the escalation of
DJWJMXBS UIF$*"TPVHIUUPDFNFOUJUTBMMJBODFXJUI$PNNBOEBOU7BOH1BP 
B)NPOHDIJFGXIPWPMVOUFFSFEUIFTFSWJDFTPGGPVSUPĕWFIVOESFE)NPOHBT
CPEZHVBSETGPSUIFBVUPEFGFOTFVOJUT'PSIJN BMMJBODFXJUIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
QSPWJEFEHVOTBOEGPPE XIJDIXPVMEFOBCMFIJNUPTPMJEJGZIJTQPXFS
"TLJMMFEDPNNBOEFSSFTQFDUFECZIJTNFO 7BOH1BPIBETFSWFEJOUIF3-"
JODIBSHFPGBTDIPPMGPSOPODPNNJTTJPOFEPďDFSTOFBS1IPOBTBWBOBOEIBE
GPVHIUXJUIUIF'SFODIBHBJOTUUIF7JFUNJOI#FDBVTFPGBOJOUJNBUFLOPXM-
edge of the jungle terrain and effective intelligence, his troops proved difficult
UPTVCEVFEFFQJOTJEF1BUIFU-BPoDPOUSPMMFEUFSSJUPSZ68 Known for his dedica-
UJPOUPIJTQFPQMFBOESVUIMFTTOFTTUPXBSEIJTFOFNJFT 7BOHIBESFQMBDFEUIF
QSFWJPVTDIJFG 5PVCZ-ZGPVOH UIFQSFTJEFOUPGUIFOBUJPOBMBTTFNCMZ XIPTF
CSPUIFS 5PVMJB  B EFQVUZ  XBT QSPDPNNVOJTU #PUI XFSF DPVSUFE CZ 4LVTF 

134 Under the Facade of Benevolence


XIPJOWJUFEUIFNGPSEJOOFS XIFSFUIFZSFDPVOUFEUIFIJTUPSZPGUIF)NPOH
BOEUIFJSNJHSBUJPOTGSPN$IJOBTTPVUIFSO:VOOBOQSPWJODF5PVMJBIBEVSHFE
UIF)NPOHOPUUPĕHIUUIFJSGFMMPXUSJCFTNFOJOUIFDPNNVOJTUDBNQ)FEJE
OPUUIJOLUIBUUIF3-(XBTTUSPOHFOPVHIUPEFGFOEUIFDPVOUSZGSPNUIF7JFU-
NJOI")NPOHJOGPSNBOUTVCTFRVFOUMZXFOUUPUIF3-"HFOFSBMJODPNNBOE
of the province and suggested that Toulia be arrested. Vang Pao, said the infor-
NBOU XBTiDBQBCMFPGNBOBHJOHUIF)NPOH‫)ڀڀ‬FIBTUIFDPOĕEFODFPGUIF
USJCFTNFOXIPBSFXJMMJOHUPĕHIUVOEFSIJTMFBEFSTIJQw69 Vang Pao accepted
UIFEFBMBOECFDBNFUIFIFBEPGUIF$*"TDMBOEFTUJOFBSNZ
ćF 640. FTUBCMJTIFE B DMPTF SFMBUJPOTIJQ XJUI (FOFSBM 7BOH GSPN UIJT
QPJOU GPSXBSE $*" BHFOU 4UVBSU .FUIWFO CSPVHIU IJN B HPPEXJMM HJę PG
blankets, sweaters, and radios.70 In 1962 the United States signed the Geneva
"DDPSET XIJDIDBMMFEGPSBOFOEUPGPSFJHOJOUFSGFSFODFBOEUIFGPSNBUJPOPGB
DPBMJUJPOHPWFSONFOUJODMVEJOHUIF1BUIFU-BP UIPVHIUIF"NFSJDBOTIBEOP
JOUFOUJPOPGBCJEJOHCZJUćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOTVCTFRVFOUMZFYQBOEFE
the training of guerrilla irregulars, relying on the CIA to allow for plausible
EFOJBCJMJUZ*UTDPWFSXBTCMPXOJO4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŷ XIFO$IBSMFT',MVTNBO 
BO"JS"NFSJDBQJMPU XBTTIPUEPXOPWFS3PVUFźJO-BPT)FTQFOUĕęZEBZT
JOTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOUCVUXBTXFMMUSFBUFECZIJTDBQUPST XIPHBWFIJNGSFTI
GPPE SFHVMBSNFEJDBMDIFDLVQT BOEFWFOWJUBNJOT71
ćF$*"TBMMJBODFXJUIUIF)NPOHCVJMUPOUIFQSFDFEFOUPGUIF'SFODIBOE
XBTEFTJHOFEUPHFUBSPVOEUIFiXPFGVMQFSGPSNBODFwPGUIFSFHVMBSBSNZ BT
$*"TUBUJPODIJFG%PVHMBT#MBVGBSCOPUFEJOIJTNFNPJST BOEUPDJSDVNWFOU
UIF (FOFWB "DDPSET QSPIJCJUJPO PO EJSFDU NJMJUBSZ BTTJTUBODF72 Since the
)NPOHXFSFBUSJCFBOEOPUBOBUJPO UIF$*"DPVMEOFHPUJBUFXJUI)NPOH
MFBEFSTXJUIPVUJODVSSJOHBOZGPSNBMEJQMPNBUJDPCMJHBUJPOT.BOZPGUIF$*"
PQFSBUJWFTBOEDBCJOFUMFWFMPďDJBMTTVDIBT3PHFSi5FYw)JMTNBOIBEFYQFSJ-
FODFUSBJOJOHUSJCBMHSPVQTJO#VSNBEVSJOH8PSME8BS**BOE BDDPSEJOHUPUIF
PďDJBMIJTUPSZPGUIF$*" FOUFSUBJOFEGBOUBTJFTGSPNUIFJS044EBZTPGSPVTJOH
UIFUSJCBMQPQVMBUJPOUPPWFSUISPXBDPNNVOJTUSFHJNFćFZXBOUFEUPEFGFBU
UIFHVFSSJMMBTBUUIFJSPXOHBNF73
ćFDPOTFRVFODFTXFSFEFWBTUBUJOHGPSUIF-BPQPQVMBUJPOćF$*"TPď-
DJBMIJTUPSJBOOPUFTUIBUJODPNCBUPQFSBUJPOT )NPOHHVFSSJMMBTNBEFVTFPG
walkie-talkies and Gatling guns supplied by public safety advisers to “obliterate
FWFSZUIJOHJOUIFJSQBUIw/BQBMNXBTEFQMPZFECZ5ŵŻSFJOGPSDFNFOUTBOE
U.S. planes in clearing operations.74"OEXIJMFUIF1BUIFU-BPDPNNJUUFEUIFJS
TIBSFPGBUSPDJUJFT XIFOUIF)NPOHCSJFĘZDPORVFSFEUIF1MBJOPG+BSTJOŴżŹż 
UIFZUPPLSFWFOHFPOUIFWJMMBHFSTBOE BDDPSEJOHUPUIFUFTUJNPOZPGWJDUJNT 
iCVSOFEXIBUFWFSTIFMUFSTBOECFMPOHJOHTSFNBJOFE BOEFJUIFSTUPMFPSTMBVHI-
tered their water buffalo, cows, pigs and chickens.”75
-JLF 044 PQFSBUJPOT XJUI UIF ,BDIJO FUIOJD NJOPSJUZ JO #VSNB EVSJOH
8PSME8BS** UIFXBSJO-BPTXBTGVOEFEJOQBSUUISPVHIUIFPQJVNUSBEFćF

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 135


)NPOHIBEHSPXOPQJVNGPSDFOUVSJFTBOEVTFEJUGPSNFEJDJOBMBOETQJSJUVBM
QVSQPTFTBTXFMMBTUPGVOENJMJUBSZDBNQBJHOT7BOH1BPEFWFMPQFEBQJQFMJOF
for heroin with international connections. As Victor Marchetti, a fourteen-year
$*"WFUFSBO PCTFSWFEi8FXFSFPďDJBMMZTQFOEJOHžŵźNJMMJPOBZFBSPOUIF
XBSJO-BPTćFXBSXBTDPTUJOHUFOUJNFTUIBUBNPVOU*UXBTOPTFDSFUIPX
UIFZXFSFEPJOHJUUIFZĕOBODFEJUXJUIESVHTćFZHBWF<$*"TUBUJPODIJFG
ćFPEPSF>4IBDLMFZBNFEBMGPSJUw76
0QJVNGVOEFE NJMJUBSZ DBNQBJHOT XFSF BDDPNQBOJFE CZ UIF FTDBMBUJPO
PG UIF BJS XBS 'SPN MBVODIJOH QBET JO ćBJMBOE  UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT ESPQQFE
PWFS ŵŴ NJMMJPO UPOT PG CPNCT  JODMVEJOH XIJUF QIPTQIPSVT  QSFEPNJOBOUMZ
BMPOHUIF)P$IJ.JOI5SBJMBOEPOUIFOPSUIFSO1MBJOPG+BST XJUIUIFBJNPG
JOUFSEJDUJOHTVQQMZSPVUFTBOECSFBLJOHFOFNZNPSBMF77 As one of their central
GVODUJPOT $*"USBJOFEDPNNBOEPVOJUTQSPWJEFEJOUFMMJHFODFGPSUIFCPNCJOH
BUUBDLTBOEQSFQBSFEMJTUTPGUBSHFUT$POUSBEJDUJOHHPWFSONFOUDMBJNTPGTVSHJ-
DBMQSFDJTJPO JOUFSOBMSFQPSUTEFNPOTUSBUFUIBUOVNFSPVTTUSJLFTIJUUIFXSPOH
UBSHFU0O.BZŴŶ ŴżŹŷ JOTQJUFPGiDMFBSXFBUIFSBOECSJMMJBOUTVOTIJOF wCPNCT
dropped by U.S. planes struck two civilian buses west of Muang Phalane, killing
GPVSUFFOQFPQMF NPTUMZXPNFOBOEDIJMESFO BOEXPVOEJOHGPSUZPOFPUIFST
*O+BOVBSZŴżŹŸ FSSBOUCPNCTIJUBiGSJFOEMZw,IB -BPćVOH WJMMBHF SFTVMU-
JOHJOUIFXPVOEJOHPGĕWFDJWJMJBOT EFDJNBUJPOPGĕWFIPVTFT BOELJMMJOHPG
XBUFSCVČBMPJO/PWFNCFSUIBUZFBS 64CPNCTBDDJEFOUBMMZIJUUIFUPXOPG
Khang Khay, causing “considerable destruction.”78
On the Plain of Jars, countless villages were leveled and thousands of civil-
ians were wounded or killed. Their livestock and cattle depleted, peasants sur-
WJWFECZMJWJOHJOVOEFSHSPVOEDBWFTBOEGBSNJOHUIFJSĕFMETBUOJHIU0WFS
B RVBSUFS PG UIF QPQVMBUJPO XBT GPSDFE UP ĘFF UP SFGVHFF DBNQT  XIFSF NBM-
OVUSJUJPOBOEEJTFBTFXFSFSBNQBOU79&YQSFTTJOHIJNTFMGJOWFSTF POFSFGVHFF
MBNFOUFE  i8IBU UFSSJCMF TBEOFTT  TP NBOZ MPWFE POFT LJMMFE  CFDBVTF PG UIF
IVHFCPNCTUIFBJSQMBOFTSBJOFEEPXOVQPOVT TPNBOZMPWFEPOFTGPSDFEUP
MFBWFUIFJSOBUJWFWJMMBHFT MFBWJOHCFIJOETQBDJPVTSJDFĕFMETBOEHBSEFOTOPX
turned to dust.”80
#ZUIFFOEPGUIFXBS NVDIPGUIFOPSUIFBTUFSOQBSUPGUIFDPVOUSZTJEFIBE
CFFOUVSOFEJOUPBiXBTUFMBOEwSFNJOJTDFOUPGiUIFQPDLFE DIVSOFEFBSUIJO
TUPSNIJUBSFBTPGUIF/PSUI"GSJDBOEFTFSU wBDDPSEJOHUPUIFKPVSOBMJTU5%
"MMNBO'SFE#SBOGNBO BO*OUFSOBUJPOBM7PMVOUBSZ4FSWJDFFNQMPZFF XIPTF
book Voices from the Plain of JarsJTPOFPGUIFGFXXSJUUFOGSPNUIFQFSTQFDUJWF
of the Lao peasants, characterized it as a “lake of blood” where “after a recorded
history of 700 years, civilized society had ceased to exist.” He added that “a new
UZQFPGXBSGBSFIBECFFOEFWFMPQFEGPVHIUOPUCZNFOCVUNBDIJOFTBOEXIJDI
could erase distant and unseen societies clandestinely, unknown to and even
unsuspected by the world outside.”81
'PSBMMUIFEFWBTUBUJPO UIFCPNCJOHBUUBDLTEJEMJUUMFUPEJNJOJTIUIFTUSFOHUI

136 Under the Facade of Benevolence


PGUIFSFWPMVUJPOBSZNPWFNFOU XIPTFDBESFTIJEEFFQJOUIFGPSFTUBOENBEF
use of effective spying networks.82ćF$*"TDMBOEFTUJOFBSNZNFBOXIJMFXBT
EFDJNBUFE BOE XBT GPSDFE UP SFDSVJU DIJME TPMEJFST GPS B iPOFXBZ IFMJDPQUFS
SJEFUPEFBUI wBT"MMNBODIBSBDUFSJ[FEJU$*"PQFSBUJWF&EHBSi1PQw#VFMMUPME
DPSSFTQPOEFOU3PCFSU4IBQMFOi)FSFXFSFUIFTFMJUUMFLJETJOUIFJSDBNPVĘBHF
VOJGPSNT‫<ڀڀ‬XIP>MPPLFESFBMOFBU‫ڀڀ‬#VU71<7BOH1BP>BOE*LOFXCFUUFS
They were too young and they weren’t trained and in a few weeks 90 percent of
UIFNXJMMCFLJMMFEw83
ćSPVHIPVU UIF MPOH ZFBST PG ĕHIUJOH  QPMJDF QSPHSBNT SFNBJOFE BO
JNQPSUBOUFMFNFOUPG"NFSJDBOTUSBUFHZBOEBTJHOJĕDBOUNFBOTPGGVOOFMJOH
BSNTUPUIF3-"BOE)NPOH.BOZ$*"BHFOUTVTFEUIFQSPHSBNTBTBDPWFS 
JODMVEJOH ćPNBT - "IFSO +S  XIP XPVME MBUFS CF EFUBJOFE JO UIF *SBOJBO
IPTUBHFDSJTJT.BKPS OPUBNJMJUBSZSBOLCVUBOVOVTVBMĕSTUOBNF .D#FF 
B$BMJGPSOJBOBSDPUJDTBHFOUXJUIFYQFSJFODFJO&DVBEPS 7JFUOBN BOE*SBO
BOE(PSEPO:PVOH B-BIVUSBOTMBUPSJO#VSNBT4IBOTUBUFTXIPUSBJOFEćBJ
#11 'SPN ŴżŹŴ UP ŴżŹŸ  QPMJDF USBJOJOH XBT UFNQPSBSJMZ DVU CFDBVTF PG UIF
DIBPTFOHVMĕOHUIFDPVOUSZBOECFDBVTF1IPVNJBOE4JIPXFSFBQQSPQSJBUJOH
"NFSJDBOBJEUPDSFBUFQSJWBUFBSNJFT84 According to an OPS survey, the LNP
XBTMFęJOBTUBUFPGiDPNQMFUFEJTPSHBOJ[BUJPO‰TUSJQQFEPGJUTFRVJQNFOU JUT
SFDPSET BOE GBDJMJUJFT EFTUSPZFE  QSFFNQUFE PS EFUFSJPSBUFE BOE IBWJOH IBE
practically no police training in four years.” Walton, Skuse, and Motter sug-
HFTUFESFOFXFEUFDIOJDBMBOEDPNNPEJUZBTTJTUBODFBOEBSFWJWBMPGUIFJEFO-
UJUZDBSEQSPHSBNXIJDIIBECFFOJOTUJUVUFEJOUIFŴżŸųTUPNPOJUPSQPMJUJDBM
activity.85
ćF FNCBTTZ BQQSPWFE UIF SFDPNNFOEBUJPOT  XJUI UIF -/1 OPX IFBEFE
CZ (FOFSBM 7BUUBI BOE $PMPOFM #PVOLIPOH 1SBEJDIJU  B GPSNFS TUBČ PďDFS
of air force general Ouane Rattikone, the country’s leading heroin trafficker,
BOEMJBJTPOUPUIF64NJMJUBSZNJTTJPOJO4BJHPO XIPXBTDPOTJEFSFEiNPSF
aggressive and energetic than the usual Southeast Asian” and hence capable
of revitalizing the force.86 Operating on a budget of $900,000 in 1965 and $1.1
NJMMJPOJOŴżŹŹ UIF014DSFBUFEBOUFOOBCBTFEQSPWJODJBMTUBUJPOTBOEQSP-
WJEFE FMFDUSPOJD TVSWFJMMBODF FRVJQNFOU  JODMVEJOH TQZ DBNFSBT  SFWPMWFST 
4NJUI  8FTTPO IBOEDVČT  BOE ŹŶ Źųų SPVOET PG DBSCJOF BNNVOJUJPO QSP-
DVSFEUISPVHIB64"*%XBSFIPVTFJO#BOHLPL"EWJTFSTGSPN7JFUOBNTVDI
BT%FMNBS4QJFSPGUIF"VSPSB$PVOUZ $PMPSBEP 1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOE3BZ
-BOEHSFOPG-B(SBOHF1BSL *MMJOPJT EFWFMPQFEBTDJFOUJĕDMBC BTTJTUFEXJUI
NBJMJOUFSDFQUT BOEUSJFEUPSFCVJMEUIFUSBJOJOHTDIPPM XIJDIXBTOFWFSJOUIF
FOE DPNQMFUFE87 Eleven Laotian police were sent to the International Police
"DBEFNZJO8BTIJOHUPO*O%FDFNCFSŴżŹŻ %FBO3VTLBQQSPWFETIJQNFOU
PGQSPKFDUJMFTBOEUFBSHBTiPGUIFCVSOJOHUZQF wEFTJHOFEUPRVFMMVSCBOSJPUT
"HBJOXFTFFUIFSFQSFTTJWFDIBSBDUFSPGUIFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT88
ćF014PQFSBUFEVOUJMJUXBTEJTCBOEFEJOŴżźŷ QSPWJEJOHTFWFSBMNJMMJPO

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 137


EPMMBSTUPQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJOJUTMBTUZFBSTVOEFSUIF8BSPO%SVHT
ćF QSPHSBNT XFSF FTQFDJBMMZ WBMVFE GPS DSFBUJOH BHFOU OFUXPSLT  MFBEJOH UP
intelligence breakthroughs such as forewarning of Pathet Lao sapper attacks
PONVOJUJPOTEVNQT89"ęFSUIF1BUIFU-BPWJDUPSZ NBOZ-/1NJHSBUFEUPUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTBMPOHTJEFUIF)NPOHUPFTDBQFSFUSJCVUJPO"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFO-
tion had played a key role in triggering the civil war and fueling violence by
USBJOJOHBOEFRVJQQJOHQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUTXJUIBEWBODFEXFBQPOTBOEDPN-
NVOJDBUJPOT"ĕYBUJPOXJUITUBNQJOHPVUiDPNNVOJTUwTVCWFSTJPOUSVNQFE
BOZDPNNJUNFOUUPIVNBOSJHIUTćFHSFBUFTUUSBHFEZXBTUIBUPQQPSUVOJUJFT
GPSQFBDFGVMSBQQSPDIFNFOUXFSFOPUQVSTVFE)BEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBDDFQUFE
UIFŴżŸŻFMFDUJPOSFTVMUTBOEBOFVUSBMJTUHPWFSONFOUUIBUJODMVEFEUIF1BUIFU
-BP UIFDPOĘJDUMJLFMZDPVMEIBWFCFFOBWPJEFEBOENBOZMJWFTTBWFE

“Pollyana Approach to Subversion”: Police Aid in Another Secret War

Police aid contributed to deepening violence in another “sideshow” to Viet-


OBN $BNCPEJB90 *O UIF NJEŴżŸųT  #ZSPO &OHMF BOE -PVJTF 1BHF TVSWFZFE
UIFDPVOUSZTJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZGPSDFTBOEPWFSTBXUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGBžŵNJM-
MJPOQFSZFBSQSPHSBNIFBEFECZi+BDLw.POSPFBOE3PZ$BSMTPO BWFUFSBO
of the Washington State Police who went on to the Congo, Jordan, and Haiti.
"DLOPXMFEHJOH UIBU JO $BNCPEJB BT JO -BPT DSJNF XBT NJOJNBM  &OHMF BOE
1BHFPCTFSWFEUIBUUIFNBJOBJNPGQPMJDFUSBJOJOHXBTUPEFWFMPQQBSBNJMJUBSZ
VOJUTDBQBCMFPGiFČFDUJWFMZDPNCBUJOHDPNNVOJTUJOĕMUSBUJPOw"OBUJPOBMJTU
UJMUJOH UPXBSE $IJOB BOE UIF OPOBMJHOFE NPWFNFOU  1SJODF /PSPEPN 4JIB-
OPVLPTDJMMBUFECFUXFFOBDDFQUBODFBOESFQSFTTJPOPGUIF.BPJTU,INFS3PVHF 
FBSOJOH UIF DPOEFNOBUJPO PG ŴŵżųE QMBOOFST GPS IJT iQPMMZBOB BQQSPBDI UP
TVCWFSTJPOw BOE iMBDL PG HVUTw JO DPOGSPOUJOH UIF iDPNNVOJTU UISFBUw91 (By
DPOUSBTU  UIF 64 DMJFOU JO 4PVUI 7JFUOBN  /HP %JOI %JFN  XBT QSBJTFE GPS
iBDUVBMMZEPJOHTPNFUIJOHwBCPVUJU
*O "VHVTU ŴżŹŶ  BęFS 4JIBOPVL BHSFFE UP KBJM ,INFS 3PVHF MFBEFST  UIF
014 QSPWJEFE žŻųź ųųų GPS DPOTUSVDUJPO PG B 3PZBM 1PMJDF "DBEFNZ BOE B
QIPUPHSBQIZBOETDJFOUJĕDDSJNFMBCBOETFOUBIBMGEP[FOQPMJDFPďDFSTUP
Washington for courses at the IPA.924PNFGVOETXFSFDIBOOFMFEUP(FOFSBM
/F8JOPG#VSNB DPOTJEFSFEMBUFSUIFi"TJBO/PSJFHB wUPSFQSFTTUIF#VSNFTF
$PNNVOJTU1BSUZBOEBTTPSUFEFUIOJDNJOPSJUJFT7BMVJOHUIFDPVOUSZGPSJUT
tungsten, a CIA report spoke favorably of the ability of the police to establish
WJMMBHF TVSWFJMMBODF  OPUJOH iJO <#VSNBT> 5FOBTTFSJN EJTUSJDU  BMNPTU UPUBMMZ
EPNJOBUFECZDPNNVOJTUT BQPMJDFEFUBDINFOUBSSFTUFEBOECSPVHIUPVUUISFF
DPNNVOJTUMFBEFST‫*ڀڀ‬OHVBSEQBUSPMEVUZ QPMJDFVOJUTBSFOPXJOEBJMZBSNFE
DPOĘJDUXJUIDPNNVOJTUJOTVSHFOUTw93
*O UIF NJEŴżŹųT  4JIBOPVL IBMUFE QPMJDF BJE BęFS MFBSOJOH UIBU UIF $*"
XBTPSHBOJ[JOHDPNNBOEPTMFECZ4PO/HPDćBOIUPPWFSUISPXIJN4FWFSBM

138 Under the Facade of Benevolence


014 BEWJTFST XFSF $*" BHFOUT  JODMVEJOH 3BZNPOE #BCJOFBV  XIP USBJOFE
%JFNTTFDSFUQPMJDFJO4PVUI7JFUOBN94*OŴżźų UIFQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBN
XBTSFTVTDJUBUFEBęFS4JIBOPVLXBTUPQQMFEJOBDPVQEÏUBUCZ1SJNF.JOJTUFS
-PO/PM BIBSEMJOFSXIPTQPLFGBWPSBCMZBCPVUUIFBOUJDPNNVOJTUCMPPE-
CBUIJO*OEPOFTJBBOETJHOFEBOPJMFYQMPSBUJPOBHSFFNFOUXJUI6OPDBMBOE
Chevron.954PNFPGUIFUSBJOJOHXBTDPOEVDUFEVOEFSUIFQSFUFYUPGOBSDPU-
JDTDPOUSPM PXJOHUP$BNCPEJBTJNQPSUBODFBTBTVQQMZSPVUFGPSPQJVN*O
May 1972, with USAID funding, President Sirik Matak established a narcotics
FOGPSDFNFOU VOJU IFBEFE CZ 7BO )PVUI  XIJDI JOTQFDUFE BJSDSBę EFQBSUJOH
1PDIUPOH BJSQPSU JO 1IOPN 1FOI  FOHJOFFSFE IJHIQSPĕMF SBJET PO PQJVN
dens, and shut down clandestine heroin labs. The corruption of high-level
PďDJBMT IPXFWFS JODMVEJOH-PO/PMTCSPUIFS -PO/PO XIPSBOQBSBNJMJUBSZ
USBJOJOHDBNQTBMPOHUIF-BPCPSEFSVTFEGPSTNVHHMJOHQVSQPTFT MJNJUFEUIF
unit’s effectiveness.96
0OUIFXIPMF "NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPOJOUIFiTJEFTIPXTwPG7JFUOBNCPSF
BIFBWZDPTU SFTVMUJOHJOBOFYBDFSCBUJPOPGMPDBMDPOĘJDUBOEJNNFBTVSBCMF
IVNBOTVČFSJOHćFTFDSFUXBSJO-BPTXBTDIBSBDUFSJ[FECZNew York Times
SFQPSUFS "OUIPOZ -FXJT BT UIF iNPTU BQQBMMJOH FQJTPEF PG MBXMFTT DSVFMUZ JO
"NFSJDBO IJTUPSZw97 ćF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT XFSF POF DPNQPOFOU PG B MBSHFS
TUSBUFHZUPGVOOFMJOBSNTBOEUSBJODPVOUFSJOTVSHFOUGPSDFTJOUIFBUUFNQUUP
DSFBUFBDMJFOUSFHJNF*OUIFGBDFPGDPODFSUFESFTJTUBODF EFNPDSBUJDQPMJDJOH
TUBOEBSETXFSFUISVTUBTJEFBOEUSBJOJOHXBTIFBWJMZNJMJUBSJ[FE BDDPVOUJOH
GPSXJEFTQSFBEIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFTćFQSJNBSZMFHBDZXBTUIFDSFBUJPOPG
SPHVFQBSBNJMJUBSZPSHBOJ[BUJPOTCFIPMEFOUPVOTDSVQVMPVTXBSMPSET OPUBCMZ
(FOFSBM4JIPBOE7BOH1BP XIPVTFEDPOUSPMPWFSDSJNJOBMSBDLFUTMJLF1IBP
in Thailand to consolidate their power ruthlessly, which proved unsustainable
PWFSUIFMPOHUFSN
E. L. Godkin, editor of The Nation XSPUFPOUIFFWFPGUIF4QBOJTI"NFS-
JDBO1IJMJQQJOFT 8BS UIBU iBO JNNFOTF EFNPDSBDZ  NPTUMZ JHOPSBOU  BOE
DPNQMFUFMZTFDMVEFEGSPNGPSFJHOJOĘVFODF< >‫ڀڀ‬XJUIHSFBUDPOUFNQUGPSIJT-
UPSZBOEFYQFSJFODF ĕOETJUTFMGJOQPTTFTTJPOPGFOPSNPVTQPXFSBOEJTFBHFS
UPVTFJUJOCSVUBMGBTIJPOBHBJOTUBOZPOFXIPDPNFTBMPOH without knowing
how to do it,BOEJTUIFSFGPSFDPOTUBOUMZPOUIFCSJOLPGTPNFGSJHIUGVMDBUBT-
trophe.”98)JTDPNNFOUJTBQSPQPTJOSFMBUJPOUPUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO-BPT
and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Eager to advance its interests and roll back
UIFTQSFBEPGDPNNVOJTN UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFETPQIJTUJDBUFEXFBQPOT
BOEUFDIOPMPHJFTBOEUSBJOFEQBSBNJMJUBSZGPSDFTXJUIPVUBQSPQFSVOEFSTUBOE-
JOHPGUIFMPDBMQPMJUJDBMEZOBNJDćJTJOUVSOIFMQFEUPVOMFBTIWJPMFOUTPDJBM
forces beyond its control, which tore apart the societal fabric. Disregarding the
IVNBODPTUT "NFSJDBOJNQFSJBMTUSBUFHJTUTWJFXFEDPWFSUQPMJDJOHPQFSBUJPOT
BTBTVDDFTTCFDBVTFUIFZXFSFDPTUFČFDUJWF UIFSFXFSFGFX"NFSJDBODBTVBM-
UJFT BOEMJNJUFEQSPUFTUXBTBSPVTFE BTFWFODPNNJUUFEBOUJXBSBDUJWJTUTLOFX

The Clandestine Cold War in Southeast Asia II 139


MJUUMFPGXIBUXBTHPJOHPO *OUIFŴżŻŶ1#4UFMFWJTJPOIJTUPSZPGUIF7JFUOBN
8BS 8JMMJBN$PMCZ $*"EJSFDUPSGSPNŴżźŶUPŴżźŹ QSBJTFEUIFUFOBDJUZPGUIF
)NPOHJOIPMEJOHPVUBHBJOTUUIF1BUIFU-BPGPSPWFSUFOZFBST"DDPSEJOHMZ 
UIFTUSBUFHZPGNPMEJOHDMJFOUBSNJFTBOEUSBJOJOHQBSBNJMJUBSZQPMJDFVOJUTJO
QTZDIPMPHJDBM XBSGBSF CFDBNF B NPEFM GPS TVCTFRVFOU GPSFJHO QPMJDJFT  XJUI
DPOUJOVFEEFMFUFSJPVTFČFDUTGPSBMNPTUFWFSZPOFJOWPMWFE99

140 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Chapter 7
“As I Recall the Many Tortures”
Michigan State University, Operation Phoenix, and the
Making of a Police State in South Vietnam
. . . the dreary wall of the Vietnamese Sureté that seemed to smell of urine and
injustice.
‰(raham Greene, The Quiet American, 1955

As I recall the many tortures they tried on me, I remember the perverse inhu-
man joy in their shouts.
‰7JFUOBNFTFQSJTPOEFUBJOFF 

The whole thing was a lie. We weren’t preserving freedom in South Vietnam.
There was no freedom to preserve. Opposition to the government meant jail or
death.
‰.aster Sergeant Donald Duncan 64"SNZ 

0O"QSJMŴż ŴżŹŸ BTFWFOUFFOZFBSPMETVJDJEFCPNCFSXBMLFEJOUPUIF'MPXFS


OJHIUDMVCJO%BMBU 7JFUOBN TFFLJOHUPFNVMBUFiIFSPFTwXIPIBEHJWFOUIFJS
MJWFT GPS UIF BOUJJNQFSJBMJTU DBVTF  JODMVEJOH /HVZFO 7BO 5SPJ  B MFHFOEBSZ
HVFSSJMMBFYFDVUFEBęFSBUUFNQUJOHUPBTTBTTJOBUF4FDSFUBSZPG%FGFOTF3PCFSU
4.D/BNBSBBOE"NCBTTBEPS)FOSZ$BCPU-PEHFćFUFFOBHFSEFUPOBUFEB
CPNCUIBULJMMFEUIJSUFFOQFPQMF JODMVEJOHIJNTFMG BOEJOKVSFEGPSUZUXP*O
BCSJFGTVJDJEFOPUFIFDPOEFNOFEUIFXBSBOE7JFUOBNFTFXIPDPMMBCPSBUFE
XJUIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTćFHSFBUFTUUSBHFEZ IFXSPUF XBTUIBUi64JNQFSJBM-
JTNIBENBEF7JFUOBNFTFLJMM7JFUOBNFTFw1ćFZPVOHTVJDJEFCPNCFSNBZ
WFSZXFMMIBWFIBEUIF"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJONJOEJODPN-
QPTJOHIJT ĕOBM XPSET'PMMPXJOHUIFNPEFMPG QSFWJPVTPQFSBUJPOT JO +BQBO
BOE4PVUI,PSFB BEWJTFSTGSPN.JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZBOE64"*%USBJOFE
UIPVTBOETPG4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFQPMJDFJOSJPUDPOUSPMBOEDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ 
DPOUSJCVUJOHUPFYUFOTJWFIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT*OJNQPSUJOHOFXUFDIOPMP-
gies and Western policing standards, they felt that they were helping to create
BNPEFSOBENJOJTUSBUJWFTUBUFDBQBCMFPGDPOUSPMMJOHJUTQPQVMBUJPOFďDJFOUMZ
BOEĕHIUJOHDPNNVOJTN*OQSBDUJDF UIFZNPEFSOJ[FESFQSFTTJPOCZQSPWJE-
JOH UIF NFDIBOJTNT XJUI XIJDI TUBUF TFDVSJUZ GPSDFT DPVME DPPSEJOBUF UIFJS

141
BDUJWJUJFTNPSFTZTUFNBUJDBMMZBOEPOBXJEFSTDBMFJOUIFTFSWJDFPGBOBVUIPSJ-
UBSJBOSFHJNF8PSTUPGBMM BTUIFTVJDJEFCPNCFSSFDPHOJ[FE "NFSJDBOUSBJO-
JOHQSPHSBNTIFMQFEUPTUPLFDJWJMDPOĘJDUBOEWJPMFODFBOEUVSOFE7JFUOBNFTF
BHBJOTUPOFBOPUIFS GPSFWFSUSBOTGPSNJOHUIFDPVOUSZ

University on the Make: The Military-Academic Complex and


Consolidation of the Diem Dictatorship

*O "QSJM ŴżŹŹ  UIF MFęXJOH NBHB[JOF Ramparts published an exposé on the
USBJOJOHPG4PVUI7JFUOBNTQPMJDFCZ.JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZQSPGFTTPSTBOE
JOĕMUSBUJPOPGUIFQSPHSBNCZUIF$*"*MMVTUSBUFECZBDPWFSGFBUVSJOH4PVUI
7JFUOBNT ĕSTU MBEZ  .BEBNF /IV  BT B CVYPN .46 DIFFSMFBEFS  UIF BSUJDMF
chronicled the role of political scientist Wesley Fishel as a key adviser to Pre-
NJFS/HP%JOI%JFN EFTDSJCJOHIPXIFBOEUXFFEKBDLFUFEDPMMFBHVFTIBE
XPSLFEUPCVJMEVQBSFQSFTTJWFQPMJDFBQQBSBUVTUPMJRVJEBUFUIFQSPDPNNV-
OJTU7JFUNJOIćFBVUIPST 8BSSFO)JODLMF 3PCFSU4DIFFS BOE4PM4UFSO GFMU
UIBU 'JTIFM BOE IJT BTTPDJBUFT IBE TBDSJĕDFE UIFJS JOUFHSJUZ BT BDBEFNJDT BOE
FQJUPNJ[FEUIFHSPXUIPGBEBOHFSPVTNJMJUBSZBDBEFNJDDPNQMFYJOXIJDIUIF
CSBJOQPXFSBOESFTPVSDFTPG"NFSJDBTNBKPSVOJWFSTJUJFTXFSFCFJOHQVUJOUIF
TFSWJDFPG64JNQFSJBMJOUFSFTUT2
Although MSU president John Hannah denounced the article as “grossly
JOBDDVSBUF wUIFQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTXFSFJOEFFEBCVMXBSLPG"NFSJDBO
FČPSUTUPDSFBUFBDMJFOUSFHJNFCFMPXUIF4FWFOUFFOUI1BSBMMFMBęFSUIFUFN-
QPSBSZ EJWJTJPO PG 7JFUOBN VOEFS UIF ŴżŸŷ (FOFWB "DDPSET3 Regarding the
BDDPSETBTBiEJTBTUFSwUIF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOSFGVTFEUPBMMPXFMFDUJPOT
to reunify the country, knowing that Ho Chi Minh, who had led the libera-
UJPONPWFNFOUBHBJOTU'SBODF XPVMEXJO#FOUPOTUBNQJOHPVUUIFiWJSVTwPG
JOEFQFOEFOUOBUJPOBMJTN XIJDIJUGFBSFEXPVMETQSFBEUISPVHIPVU4PVUIFBTU
"TJB UIF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOTUFBEBUUFNQUFEUPDPOTPMJEBUF%JFNT
SVMFJOUIF4PVUI%JFNIBEMJUUMFQPQVMBSCBDLJOHBOEXBTEFTDSJCFECZIJT
PXOBEWJTFSTBTiFHPUJTUJDBMyOFVSPUJDBMMZTVTQJDJPVT TUVCCPSO TFMGSJHIUFPVT 
BOEBDPNQMFUFTUSBOHFSUPDPNQSPNJTFw"DDPSEJOHUPUIF$*" %JFNXBTTP
EFQFOEFOUPO"NFSJDBOTVQQPSU iIFXPVMEIBWFGBMMFOJOBEBZXJUIPVUJUw4
"$BUIPMJDBOUJDPNNVOJTUXIPSFGVTFEBQPTJUJPOJO)P$IJ.JOITDBCJOFU
BęFSUIF"VHVTUŴżŷŹSFWPMVUJPOCFDBVTFUIF7JFUNJOIIBELJMMFEIJTCSPUIFS 
%JFNXBTDIBNQJPOFECZ$POHSFTT BDBEFNJB BOEUIF$BUIPMJD$IVSDIBTB
iUIJSE GPSDFw BMUFSOBUJWF UP DPNNVOJTN BOE DPMPOJBMJTN CFDBVTF IF IBE OPU
collaborated with France.5*O.BZŴżŸŸUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDPOUSBDUFEXJUI
UIF.464DIPPMPG1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPOBUBCVEHFUPGžŵŸNJMMJPOUPQSPWJEF
UFDIOJDBMBTTJTUBODFBOEUSBJOJOHUPUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFQPMJDF XJUIUIFBJN
of “facilitating law and order so as to create the conditions necessary for eco-
OPNJDBOETPDJBMEFWFMPQNFOUBOEUIFFOMBSHFNFOUPGGSFFEPNBOEQSPTQFS-

142 Under the Facade of Benevolence


ity.”6 Much like their forerunners in the Philippines and Haiti, Fishel and his
DPIPSUTTUSFTTFEUIFOFFEGPSNBTTTVSWFJMMBODFDBQBCMFPGNPOJUPSJOHTVCWFS-
TJPOBOEEJTNBOUMJOHUIFQPMJUJDBMPQQPTJUJPOUP%JFN JODMVEJOH#JOI9VZFO
gangsters and the Hoa-Hao and Cao Dai religious sects). New technologies
FYQBOEFEUIFTDBMFPGWJPMFODFBTTPDJBUFEXJUIUIFTFFČPSUT PWFSTFFOCZ%JFNT
CSPUIFS /HP%JOI/IV BOPQJVNBEEJDUXIP BDDPSEJOHUPUIF#SJUJTIBNCBT-
TBEPS BUUBDIFEiFWFSZCJUBTNVDIJNQPSUBODFUPUIFBQQBSBUVTPGBQPMJDFTUBUF
BTUIFNPTUFOUIVTJBTUJDBEWPDBUFPGUIFTPDJBMPSEFSPGAŴżŻŷw7
ćFDPOUSBDUXJUI.46XBTVOJRVF UIPVHIJUQSFTFOUFEMJNJUBUJPOTGSPN
UIFWBOUBHFQPJOUPGUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUiCFDBVTFPGUIFTFOTJUJWFTFDVSJUZ
BTQFDUT PG UIF QSPHSBNw " QSFDFEFOU IBE CFFO FTUBCMJTIFE TJY ZFBST FBSMJFS
when, at the behest of Arthur Brandstatter, a public safety consultant to U.S.
)JHI$PNNJTTJPOFS+PIO+.D$MPZ UIF.464DIPPMPG1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSB-
UJPOCSPVHIU(FSNBOQPMJDF JODMVEJOHFY/B[JTPMEJFST BOE4PVUI,PSFBOT
POUPDBNQVTGPSBOFJHIUXFFLDPVSTFBOEBSSBOHFEGPSUIFNUPPCTFSWFMPDBM
MBXFOGPSDFNFOU7JFUOBNCFDBNFBMPHJDBMOFYUVOEFSUBLJOH JOQBSUCFDBVTF
PG UIF DMPTF SFMBUJPOTIJQ 'JTIFM IBE EFWFMPQFE XJUI %JFN EBUJOH GSPN UIFJS
NFFUJOHJO+BQBOJOŴżŸų8#SBOETUBUUFS B-FHJPOPG.FSJUXJOOFSBOEGPSNFS
.46 GPPUCBMM TUBS  DPNNFOUFE UIBU UIF .46 HSPVQ XBT UIF iPOMZ POF XIP
could have provided the technical skills. . . . We never found worse conditions.
ćF DPVOUSZ IBE CFFO TPME PVU UP HBOHTUFS IPPEMVNT w NFBOJOH UIF #JOI
9VZFO HBOH  XIJDI DPOUSPMMFE UIF QPMJDF GPS B QFSJPE VOEFS 'SFODI QVQQFU
Bao Dai.9
5BLJOHDIBSHFPGNPTUPGUIFBENJOJTUSBUJWFEFUBJMT #SBOETUBUUFSBQQPJOUFE
)PXBSE8)PZU UIFDIJFGPGQPMJDFJO,BMBNB[PP .JDIJHBO BOEBWJTJUJOH
.46MFDUVSFS BTUIFĕSTUJODPVOUSZEJSFDUPSPGUIF7JFUOBNQSPKFDU"GPSNFS
director of police training at Purdue and the University of Minnesota, Hoyt
IBEXPSLFEXJUI#SBOETUBUUFSBTBQPMJDFDPOTVMUBOUJO(FSNBOZBOETQFOUUIF
ĕSTUFMFWFOZFBSTPGIJTDBSFFSJO8JDIJUB ,BOTBT XIFSFIFXBTNFOUPSFECZ
Orlando W. Wilson, a leading advocate of police professionalization, who suc-
DFFEFE"VHVTU7PMMNFSBTEFBOPGUIF#FSLFMFZ4DIPPMPG$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF10
ćF .JDIJHBO 4UBUF 6OJWFSTJUZ (SPVQ .46(  USBJOFE UIF 7JFUOBNFTF
Bureau of Investigation (VBI or Cong An), an off-shoot of the French Sureté
DPNNBOEFECZ(FOFSBM/HVZFO/HPD-F BUXFOUZZFBS'SFODIBSNZWFUFSBO
)JTTVDDFTTPST1IBN9VBO$IJFVBOE/HVZFO7BO-B iBSBOLOPWJDFJOQPMJDF
XPSL wBDDPSEJOHUP)PZU XFSFBMTPNJMJUBSZNFOUSBJOFECZUIF'SFODI11 Culti-
WBUJOHOFUXPSLTPGJOGPSNBOUT UIF7#*PQFSBUFEJOQMBJODMPUIFTBOEGVODUJPOFE
principally as a “political police” and “political repression organization.” Its
NJTTJPOXBTUPiDPSSFMBUFJOGPSNBUJPOSFHBSEJOHUIFTFDVSJUZPGUIFTUBUF NBO-
BHFQPMJUJDBMJOGPSNBUJPOTFSWJDFT wBOEiEJTDPWFSQMPUTBOEBDUJWJUJFTDBQBCMFPG
DPNQSPNJTJOHQVCMJDPSEFSw12*OŵųųŸ /HP7JOI-POH BMFBEJOH7JFUOBNFTF
TDIPMBS UFTUJĕFEUIBUIFIBEXPSLFEVOEFSDPWFSGPSUIF7#*BTBiQVCMJDIFBMUI

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 143


TQFDJBMJTUwJONBMBSJBFSBEJDBUJPOJOPSEFSUPFOUFSQFPQMFTIPNFTBOETFBSDI
GPSJOGPSNBUJPOPOUIFJSQPMJUJDBMBďMJBUJPOT13
ćF ŴŵżųE QMBOOJOH HSPVQ FNQIBTJ[FE UIF OFDFTTJUZ PG CPMTUFSJOH UIF
iDPVOUFSTVCWFSTJPOw DBQBCJMJUJFT PG UIF QPMJDF BOE UIFJS QSPĕDJFODZ JO JOUFM-
MJHFODFBOEQBDJĕDBUJPOBHBJOTUUIF7JFUNJOI XIPSFTFUUMFEJOUIF4PVUIBęFS
the victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu and established shadow govern-
NFOUT JO UIF WJMMBHFT  FYUFOEJOH iUIFJS JOĘVFODF UP NBOZ XIP BSF OPU DPN-
NVOJTU QBSUZ NFNCFST UISPVHI B TVCTUBOUJBM OFUXPSL PG GSPOU PSHBOJ[BUJPOT
covering all sectors of the population,” according to the CIA, which warned that
“internal security was at present poor” and there appeared to be “little capabil-
JUZPGPQQPTJUJPOUP7JFUNJOIFČPSUTUPGVSUIFSJOUFSOBMDIBPTBOEFWFOUVBMMZ
DPNQMFUFUBLFPWFSQSPCBCMZUISPVHIEFNPDSBUJDNFBOTPGGSFFFMFDUJPOT‫ڀڀ‬
ćFHPWFSONFOUTTVSWJWBMXJMMCFEFUFSNJOFEJOMBSHFNFBTVSFCZUIFEFHSFFPG
protection foreign sources will provide in guaranteeing its future.”14
ćFTF DPNNFOUT QSPWJEF B TUSJLJOH BDLOPXMFEHNFOU PG UIF XFBLOFTT PG
%JFNBOEIJTSFMJBODFPOGPSFJHOFST BOEPGUIFTUSFOHUIPGUIF7JFUNJOI XIJDI
XBTUBSHFUFEGPSMJRVJEBUJPO15 Most of the MSU advisers were retired beat cops,
including Gil Shelby, a Detroit police inspector; Robert Gollings of the Cali-
fornia Highway Patrol; and Charles Sloane, chief of police in Cortland, New
:PSL BOEBUUIF64/BWBM5SBJOJOH4UBUJPO$*"BHFOUTPQFSBUJOHVOEFS.46
cover, such as George Boudrias, a Canadian with investigative experience in
8BTIJOHUPO BOEBSNZWFUFSBO3BZNPOE#BCJOFBV XPSLFEXJUIUIFDPVOUFS-
espionage section of the VBI.16
Jack Ryan, who ran covert operations in Laos, the Congo, and Indonesia and
XIPTVDDFFEFE)PZUBTQSPKFDUEJSFDUPS UPMESFQPSUFST i:PVOFFEUPEFWFMPQ
QSPTUPDPNCBUUFSSPSJTNEJSFDUFECZQSPT wJOPUIFSXPSET UIFTPDBMMFE7JFU-
DPOH)FBOE#PVESJBT XIPXBTDMPTFUP(FOFSBM-F FTUBCMJTIFEBOJOGPSNB-
UJPO DMFBSJOHIPVTF FRVJQQFE XJUI B QPMZHSBQI BOE NJDSPĕMN BOE PSHBOJ[FE
BOFTQJPOBHFBOEKVOHMFXBSGBSFDPVSTFBUBOPME'SFODIBSNZJOTUBMMBUJPOOFBS
4BJHPO8JUI+PIO.BOPQPMJ BUXFOUZUXPZFBSWFUFSBOPGUIF/FX:PSL4UBUF
1PMJDF XIP IBE iSFE TRVBEw FYQFSJFODF  3ZBO BMTP JOTQFDUFE JOUFSSPHBUJPO
facilities and coordinated construction of a VBI detention center next to the
Chi Hoa prison.17
Richard W. Rogers, police chief in Midland, Michigan, who later served with
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USPPQFSXIPEFWFMPQFEBTFSJPVTESJOLJOHQSPCMFNBOEXBTBDDVTFEPGGBMTJGZ-
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"O%PBO XIJDIXBTNPEFMFEBęFSUIF1IJMJQQJOFTDPOTUBCVMBSZBOEGPDVTFE
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VQJOFYQMJDJUWJPMBUJPOPGUIF(FOFWBBHSFFNFOUT XIJDIMJNJUFEUIFTUSFOHUIPG
UIFBSNFEGPSDFTUPŴŸų ųųų.PSBMFXBTQPPSBOEEFTFSUJPOSBUFTIJHI ŵ Żźų

144 Under the Facade of Benevolence


in August 1957 alone). According to the Pentagon Papers, the Guard’s “brutal-
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PQFOSFWPMUBHBJOTUUIF(7/<HPWFSONFOUPG7JFUOBN>w5SBJOJOHXBTFWFO-
tually taken over by “Buck” Fruit and by Frank Walton of the USOM’s Public
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*O/PWFNCFSŴżŸŸ.46(JOBVHVSBUFEBOBUJPOBMQPMJDFBDBEFNZJO4BJHPO 
XIJDIQSPWJEFEDPVSTFTJOQBUSPMUFDIOJRVFT EJTBSNJOHDSJNJOBMT IBOEDVČ-
JOH ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH VOEFSDPWFSTVSWFJMMBODF BOEĕSFBSNT5PQHSBEVBUFTXFSF
TFOUGPSGVSUIFSUSBJOJOHJO&BTU-BOTJOHBOEBU$BNQ$SBNFOFBS.BOJMB-BO-
HVBHFBOEDVMUVSBMCBSSJFSTXFSFGPSNJEBCMF0OMZ#PVESJBTBOE3ZBOTQPLF
even French. Advisers found it difficult to teach through interpreters: “One
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$PSSFTQPOEFODFCFUXFFO#SBOETUBUUFSBOEQSPKFDUEJSFDUPSTJODMVEFENVDI
EJTDVTTJPOBCPVUUIF.JDIJHBO4UBUFGPPUCBMMUFBN XIJDI"SU+SQMBZFEGPS CVU
MJUUMFPGTVCTUBODFPOQPMJUJDBMEFWFMPQNFOUTPS7JFUOBNTIJTUPSZBOEDVMUVSF
'FX TFDPOE UIPVHIUT XFSF HJWFO UP UIF NPSBM JNQMJDBUJPOT PG UIF QSPHSBN
)PZU  B QSPUPUZQJDBM iVHMZ "NFSJDBO w XBT NPTU FOUIVTJBTUJD BCPVU XFFLFOE
hunting expeditions and a trip to Bangkok hosted by General Phao, where he
BOEIJTXJGFTUBZFEJOBĕWFTUPSZIPVTFXJUITJYTFSWBOUTBOEXFSFXJOFEBOE
dined.20
*OUFSBDUJOHNBJOMZXJUIHPWFSONFOUPSQPMJDFPďDJBMT NPTUPGUIFBEWJTFST
EJTQMBZFEBUCFTUBQBUFSOBMJTUJDBOEBUXPSTUBDPOUFNQUVPVTBUUJUVEFUPXBSE
UIF7JFUOBNFTF0OFSFQPSUOPUFEUIBUPOSPBEUSJQT 7FSOF%BHFO BUIJSUZ
year veteran of the Michigan State Police who worked with the Civil Guard,
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with natives.”21*OĕHIUJOHBNPOHUIF.46(HSPVQXBTBQSPCMFN)PZUWFS-
CBMMZBCVTFETPNFPGUIFNFO JODMVEJOH$BSM3VNQG UIFGPSNFSDIJFGPGQPMJDF
JO3PTFCVSH 0SFHPO XIPNIFDIBTUJTFEBTBiŵŸųQPVOENBOXJUIUIFCSBJO
PGBŴŵZFBSPMEw)JTBCSBTJWFNBOOFSCPEFEJMMGPSFČPSUTUPQSPNPUFBOZLJOE
PGIVNBOFQPMJDJOHTZTUFNBOEMFEUPIJTCFJOHEFOJFEBOBDBEFNJDBQQPJOU-
NFOUXIJDIIFDPWFUFE22
0OFPGUIFDFOUSBMUBTLTPG.46(XBTUPEFWFMPQBDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFN
BOEQSPWJEFSBEJPBOEUFMFHSBQIFRVJQNFOUUPDPOOFDUSVSBMIFBERVBSUFSTUP
4BJHPOBOEPUIFSDJUJFT"TDBOEBMFSVQUFEXIFO.46BEWJTFS-ZNBO3VOEMFUU
was found to have worked for Motorola, which received bidding contracts.
.46(TVQQMJFEUIF7#*XJUIPWFSžŴųNJMMJPOJOKFFQT SFWPMWFST IBOEDVČT 
UFBSHBTXFBQPOT QSPKFDUJMFT DSZTUBMNJDSPQIPOFTVTFEGPSXJSFUBQQJOH TVC-
NBDIJOFHVOT BOEIBOEHSFOBEFT*OUFSOBMSFQPSUTMBNFOUFEUIBUNBOZQPMJDF
DPOEVDUFE JOWFTUJHBUJPOT PO CJDZDMF  GPPU  PS IPSTF DBSU BOE VTFE iBOUJRVF
XFBQPOTwBOEBNNVOJUJPOQSFEBUJOH8PSME8BS** XIJDITPNFUJNFTGBJMFE
UPĕSF*OPOFJOTUBODF UIFZMBDLFEFOPVHIQBQFSUPĕMFSFQPSUT BOEJO/JOI
Tuan, police had to transport prisoners on the public bus.23

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 145


4FFLJOHUPSFDUJGZUIFTFTIPSUDPNJOHT "NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTVQHSBEFEPďDF
GBDJMJUJFT  DFOUSBMJ[FE SFDPSET  BOE FTUBCMJTIFE TDJFOUJĕD DSJNF MBCT FRVJQQFE
XJUI NPEFSO ĕOHFSQSJOU QPXEFST BOE GPSFOTJD UFDIOPMPHZ 5SBďD FOHJOFFST
with the Michigan State Police painted parking lines and crosswalks in an
BUUFNQU UP SFMJFWF DPOHFTUJPO PO 4BJHPOT TUSFFUT $PSZ %ZNPOE  B DSJNJOBM
SFDPSET BOE JEFOUJĕDBUJPO TQFDJBMJTU XJUI UXFOUZĕWF ZFBST FYQFSJFODF JO
.JDIJHBO UBVHIUUIF)FOSZDMBTTJĕDBUJPOTZTUFNBOEJNQSPWFEUIFĕMJOHTZT-
UFN NBOZĕMFTIBECFDPNFNPMEZGSPNCBEWFOUJMBUJPO 24 He was succeeded
CZ&MNFS)"ELJOT+S BOJEFOUJĕDBUJPOTQFDJBMJTUXJUIUIF.JBNJ#FBDI1PMJDF
%FQBSUNFOU BOE UIF '#* XIP MBUFS TFSWFE JO 4BVEJ "SBCJB  UIF $POHP  BOE
UIF %PNJOJDBO 3FQVCMJD  BOE 3BMQI 5VSOFS  B QSPGFTTPS PG DSJNJOBMJTUJDT BU
.46XIPPWFSTBXBTDJFOUJĕDMBCPSBUPSZPO4BJHPOT1IJMJQJOJ4USFFU UIF7#*T
SFDPSETEJWJTJPO BOEBOJEFOUJUZDBSETZTUFNUPNPOJUPSQPMJUJDBMBDUJWJUZ
5SBJOFEBTBDIFNJTUBUUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJO 5VSOFSXBTBXPSME
SFOPXOFE GPSFOTJD TDJFOUJTU XIP BQQFBSFE SFHVMBSMZ BT B XJUOFTT JO DSJNJOBM
cases; after the assassination of Robert Kennedy, he was selected to review
UIF ĕSFBSNT FWJEFODF 5VSOFS CFHBO IJT DBSFFS JO UIF ŴżŶųT BT B MBCPSBUPSZ
TVQFSWJTPS GPS UIF ,BOTBT $JUZ 1PMJDF %FQBSUNFOU  XIFSF IF EFWFMPQFE UIF
iESVOLPNFUFSwBGPSFSVOOFSPGNPEFSOEBZCSFBUIBMZ[FSUFTUTGPSJOUPYJDBUJPO
"DIBJOTNPLFSPGDJHBSTXJUIBMPWFPG4IFSMPDL)PMNFTOPWFMT IFPODFHPU
NPOFZ GSPN UIF VOJWFSTJUZ UP QVSDIBTF OJOFUZ CPUUMFT PG ,FOUVDLZ CPVSCPO
GPSBTUVEZPOUIFFČFDUTPGBMDPIPM5VSOFSTJOWPMWFNFOUXJUI.46(JTPOF
FYBNQMF PG UIF FČPSUT NBEF UP FYQPSU DVUUJOHFEHF TDJFOUJĕD UFDIOJRVFT JO
order to professionalize the GVN police and internal security services. Point-
JOHUPUIFQSPKFDUTGBJMVSF IFDPNNFOUFEZFBSTMBUFS i8FIBEOPFYQFSJFODF
EFBMJOH XJUI 'BS&BTUFSO HPWFSONFOUT ‫  ڀ ڀ‬EJEOU LOPX BOZUIJOH BCPVU UIFJS
culture and couldn’t deal with guerrilla warfare.”25
'PSBMMUIFPVUSBHFPWFSBDUTPGiUFSSPSJTNwCZUIFi7JFUDPOHw PSi7$ wBT
UIF "NFSJDBOT DBMMFE /-' DBESFT  .46( SFQPSUT TIPX UIBU GPS FWFSZ 7#*
or province chief assassinated, at least six suspected “VC” were killed by state
TFDVSJUZ GPSDFT BOE IVOESFET NPSF BSSFTUFE iGPS CSFFDIFT PG TFDVSJUZw BOE
“purely political violations.” (Later the kill discrepancy would be far higher.)26
3FMBUJWFT PG iEJTTJEFOUTw BOE QPMJUJDJBOT PQQPTFE UP %JFN XFSF BNPOH UIPTF
JNQSJTPOFE UPSUVSFE BOETPNFUJNFTFYFDVUFECZSPWJOHHVJMMPUJOF8JUIOP
apparent objection, one MSU professor interviewed a local police chief in his
IFBERVBSUFST XIFSFBUXFOUZZFBSPMEQFBTBOUMBZiDVSMFEVQ IJTGFFUJONBO-
acles, the left side of his face swollen, and his eye and cheek badly bruised.”27 In
UIFTVNNFSPGŴżŸŹ BO.46PďDJBMQBSLFEBDSPTTGSPN7#*IFBERVBSUFSTJO
Saigon witnessed an escaped prisoner being shot. A report stated that there was
PęFOOPUFOPVHIGPPEUPGFFEQSJTPOFSTPSDFMMTUPIPMEUIFNBOETPUIFZXFSF
iUIFSFGPSFFMJNJOBUFEBęFSJOUFSSPHBUJPOw28
ćPVTBOETEJFEJOUIFBOUJDPNNVOJTUDBNQBJHO XIJDI BDDPSEJOHUP1BVM

146 Under the Facade of Benevolence


Harwood, head of covert action in the CIA’s Saigon station, was infused with a
iUPUBMJUBSJBOTQJSJUw%JFNTDIJFGPGTUBČ5SBO7BO%POEFSJEFEUIFi(FTUBQP
like police raids and torture.” Jack Ryan wrote privately about the “heavy-
IBOEFEUBDUJDTPGQPMJDFBOENJMJUBSZVOJUT SJHHFEDPVSUT TUBDLFEFMFDUJPOT‫ڀڀ‬
and the virtual extinction of a free and nationalist opposition.” Joseph Starr of
UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUSBUJPOBMJ[FEUIFBCVTFT TBZJOH i8FNVTUSFNFNCFSUIBU
7JFUOBNJTOPUBDPVOUSZPG"OHMP4BYPOUSBEJUJPOPGQFSTPOBMMJCFSUZw29
*OŴżŸż%JFNQBTTFEBMBXBMMPXJOHGPSUIFFYFDVUJPOPGPQQPOFOUTXJUIJO
UISFF EBZT PG UIFJS BSSFTU ćJT MFE UP UIF GPSNBUJPO PG UIF /BUJPOBM -JCFSB-
UJPO'SPOU BOBNBMHBNBUJPOPGPQQPTJUJPOHSPVQTCFOUPOPWFSUISPXJOHIJT
SFHJNFBOEFYQFMMJOH"NFSJDBOBEWJTFST-FECZB4BJHPOMBXZFS /HVZFO)VV
ćP XIPXBTTVCKFDUFEUPZFBSTPGUPSUVSFJO%JFNTHVMBH UIF/-'EFSJWFE
QSPOPVODFETVQQPSUBTBSFTVMUPGXJEFTQSFBEHSJFWBODFTBOEJUTQSPNPUJPOPG
MBOE SFGPSN BOE MJUFSBDZ DBNQBJHOT ćF $*"T PďDJBM IJTUPSZ BDLOPXMFEHFE
that villagers paid the NLF a rice tax without coercion. According to the jour-
nalist Joseph Buttinger, the organization enlisted people “willing to serve their
DPVOUSZJOUIFUFOTPGUIPVTBOETBOEFYUSBDUFEGSPNUIFNTVQFSIVNBOFČPSUT
BOETBDSJĕDFTJOUIFTUSVHHMFGPSJOEFQFOEFODFwćFHPWFSONFOU NFBOXIJMF 
BUUSBDUFEiPďDJBMTXJUIUIFMPXFTUQPTTJCMFNPUJWBUJPOGPSQVCMJDTFSWJDF UIF
POMZPOFTĕUUPTFSWFJOBDPSSVQU JOFďDJFOU BOEEFTQJTFEQPMJDFTUBUFw30
#ZQSPWJEJOHNPEFSOXFBQPOTBOEUFDIOJDBMTVQQPSUUPQPMJDFBOEQSPNPU-
JOHQPMJUJDBMPQFSBUJPOT .46(XBTQJWPUBMJODPOUSJCVUJOHUPUIFDMJNBUFPG
repression that gave rise to the NLF. Brandstatter wrote to Turner in 1961 to
TBZ UIBU IF TVQQPSUFE %JFNT QPTJUJPO SFHBSEJOH UIF SPMF PG UIF $JWJM (VBSE
in “neutralizing VC activity” and had never agreed with the position that the
"NFSJDBOTiTIPVMEUSZUPIFMQEFWFMPQBAEFNPDSBUJDQPMJDFGPSDFVOEFSDPOEJ-
tions of instability and insurgency. . . . The responsibility for internal security
belongs to the police.”31ćFTFDPNNFOUTJMMVTUSBUFIPXBDPNNJUNFOUUPDJWJM
MJCFSUJFTBOEIVNBOFQSJODJQMFTXBTTVCPSEJOBUFEUPUIFHPBMPGĕHIUJOHDPN-
NVOJTNBOETFDVSJOHXIBUXFSFQFSDFJWFEBT"NFSJDBOTUSBUFHJDJOUFSFTUTćF
7JFUOBNFTFQFPQMFTVČFSFEHSJFWPVTMZBTBSFTVMU

The Police in the Counterinsurgency Era: Public Safety Takes Over

"TUIFXBSFYQBOEFE QPMJDFUSBJOJOHCFDBNFFWFONPSFDFOUSBMUP"NFSJDBO
iQBDJĕDBUJPOw FČPSUT BOE DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF UPSUVSF BOE LJMMJOH PG UIPVTBOET
PGSFWPMVUJPOBSZĕHIUFSTBOEDJWJMJBOT*OŴżŹŵ BTOBQBMNBOECPNCJOHBUUBDLT
XFSFMBVODIFE UIF014UPPLPWFSGSPN.46("GFXBEWJTFSTTUBZFEPOćF
,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOWJFXFE7JFUOBNBTBMBCPSBUPSZGPSOFXDPVOUFSJOTVS-
HFODZTUSBUFHJFTBOEWBMVFEUIFQPMJDFBTBTVCTUJUVUFGPSUIF7JFUOBNFTFBSNZ 
XIJDI 3PCFSU)+PIOTPOPGUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUXSPUFUP8BMU83PTUPX 
“steals, rapes, and treats the population in a very callous fashion. . . . There are

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 147


TJHOT BDSPTT UIF DPVOUSZTJEF AXIZ EPFT UIF HPWFSONFOU TIPPU PVS QFPQMFw
*UXBTIPQFEUIBUXJUI"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOH UIFQPMJDFXPVMECFUUFSJOHSBUJBUF
UIFNTFMWFTXJUIUIFQVCMJDUISPVHIQBSUJDJQBUJPOJODJWJDBDUJPOXIJMFQSPWJE-
JOH FČFDUJWF TFDVSJUZ BMPOHTJEF $*"USBJOFE NJMJUJBT 'VSUIFSNPSF  BT +FUFS
8JMMJBNTPO IFBEPGQPMJDFUSBJOJOHJO%BOBOHEVSJOHUIFMBUFŴżŹųTBOEFBSMZ
ŴżźųT OPUFE iPOFPSUXPQPMJDFNFOJOFBDIWJMMBHFDPVMEHFUGBSNPSFJOUFM-
MJHFODFBOEJOGPSNBUJPOUIBOBOFOUJSF<BSNZ>CBUUBMJPOw32
'SPN ŴżŹŵ UP ŴżźŸ  XPSLJOH XJUI TFWFSBM #SJUJTI WFUFSBOT PG UIF .BMBZBO
DBNQBJHO  UIF 014 QSPWJEFE PWFS UISFF IVOESFE BEWJTFST BOE žŶųų NJMMJPO
JODMVEJOHžŵŹżNJMMJPOJOŴżŹŹBMPOF JOUIFBUUFNQUUPEJTNBOUMFUIF/-'
1PMJDFXFSFFYQBOEFEGSPNŴŹ ųųųNFOUPPWFSŴŵŵ ųųųćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU
GVOEFEFJHIUUSBJOJOHTDIPPMTBOECVJMUĕWFIVOESFESVSBMQPMJDFTUBUJPOTBOE
IJHIUFDIVSCBOIFBERVBSUFSTFRVJQQFEXJUIĕSFBSNTSBOHFT *#.DPNQVUFST 
BOEQBEEFEJOUFSSPHBUJPOSPPNT33*UPVUĕUUFEUIFQPMJDFXJUIHSBZBOEXIJUF
VOJGPSNT FBSOJOHUIFNUIFOJDLOBNFiUIFXIJUFNJDFw GVSOJTIFETIPUHVOT 
grenades, and radios; and expanded training in explosives and psychologi-
cal warfare.34 Police chiefs received two thousand piasters (roughly $25) per
NPOUIUPQBZGPSJOGPSNBUJPO
1FSGPSNJOHEVUJFTUIBUXPVMECFTVCDPOUSBDUFEUPNFSDFOBSJFTJOMBUFSXBST 
UIF014EFWFMPQFEi5JHFS#BUUBMJPOTwUPFTDPSULFZHPWFSONFOUPďDJBMTBOE
QSPWJEFTFDVSJUZPO"NFSJDBOJOTUBMMBUJPOTćFZBMTPNPCJMJ[FEQPMJDFUPQSP-
UFDUUIF.JDIFMJOSVCCFSQMBOUBUJPOGSPNTBCPUBHFBOEUPDPOUSPMMBCPSVOSFTU
against contractors such as the Morrison Knudsen Corporation, which under-
UPPLNBTTJWFJOGSBTUSVDUVSBMEFWFMPQNFOUBOEFOHJOFFSJOHQSPKFDUTSFMJBOUPO
DIFBQ 7JFUOBNFTF MBCPS35 1PMJDF XFSF JOTUSVDUFE JO NPEFSO DSPXE DPOUSPM
UFDIOJRVFTUPIFMQRVFMMDJWJMEJTUVSCBODFT XIJDIHSFXJOTDPQFBT4PVUI7JFU-
OBNFTFDJUJFTCFDBNFĘPPEFEXJUISFGVHFFTGSPNDBSQFUCPNCJOHBUUBDLT36
Field reports describe the role of the police in crushing student and Buddhist
QSPUFTUTBOEEFNPOTUSBUJPOTCZEJTBCMFEWFUFSBOTBHBJOTUUIF(7/37 In May
ŴżŹŶ BTPQQPTJUJPOUP%JFNTSVMFJOUFOTJĕFE QPMJDFLJMMFEOJOFNPOLT UISFF
XPNFO BOEUXPDIJMESFOBUBSBMMZBHBJOTUSFMJHJPVTQFSTFDVUJPOBOEHPWFSO-
NFOUWJPMFODF*O+VMZ BDDPSEJOHUP014BEWJTFS3BZ-BOEHSFO JOTQJUFPGUIF
iBNB[JOHSFTVMUTwZJFMEFECZSJPUDPOUSPMDPVSTFT QPMJDFEJTQMBZFEiVOOFDFTTBSZ
brutality” in suppressing a peaceful Buddhist rally against repeated injustices,
CFBUJOHNPOLTBOEPUIFSDJWJMJBOTćFZUIFOBSSFTUFEUIFNBOEIFSEFEUIFN
into trucks, which backed into the crowd, running several people over. Police
MBUFSTDVĒFEXJUIOFXTNFOUSZJOHUPSFQPSUUIFFWFOUT38 Buddhists responded
CZFOHBHJOHJOTFMGJNNPMBUJPO CSJOHJOHJOUFSOBUJPOBMBUUFOUJPOUPUIFJSQMJHIU
and the crisis enveloping the country.39
"ęFS%JFNXBTBTTBTTJOBUFEJO/PWFNCFSŴżŹŶJOB$*"CBDLFEDPVQ UIF
OPS tried to rebuild the police intelligence apparatus and reinvigorate coun-
terinsurgency efforts. The director-general of the National Police, Tran Thanh

148 Under the Facade of Benevolence


#FO XBTMBUFSJNQMJDBUFEJOBOBCPSUJWFDPVQBHBJOTU/HVZFO,IBOI POFPG
%JFNTTVDDFTTPST XIPTFJOOFSDJSDMFXBTiQSFPDDVQJFEXJUIQFSTPOBMWFOEFU-
UBTBOETMBOEFSDBNQBJHOTwćF/-'XJEFMZJOĕMUSBUFEUIFHPWFSONFOUBQQB-
SBUVTBOEDPOUSPMMFENVDIPGUIFDPVOUSZTJEF 0OFSFQPSUTUBUFEUIBUBMMSVSBM
BSFBTXFSFDPOTJEFSFEiQSPCMFNBSFBTCFDBVTFOPOFBSFTFDVSFw0ODFBOBSFB
XBTDMFBSFE iUIF7$KVTUNPWFEJOBHBJOw 40
8PSLJOHXJUIQBJEBHFOUTBOEEFGFDUPST XIPTFSFDSVJUNFOUXBTPęFODPO-
tingent on the fear of being turned over to police, constabulary units launched
TFBSDI BOE DPSEPOT PQFSBUJPOT  OJHIU BNCVTIFT  BOE IFMJDPQUFS NJTTJPOT JO
BEPQUJOHXIBUDIJFGBEWJTFS3PCFSU,PNFSUFSNFEiBOPQFSBUJPOBMBOEJOUFM-
MJHFODFSPMFBHBJOTUUIF7$BQQBSBUVTw8JMMJBNi1BQQZw(SJFWFT IFBEPGUIF
.JMJUBSZ"TTJTUBODF"EWJTPSZ(SPVQ .""( JO(SFFDFJOUIFNJEŴżŸųTXIP
USBJOFEUIFQBSBNJMJUBSZ/BUJPOBM1PMJDF'JFME'PSDF UPMESFQPSUFSTUIBUJO7JFU-
OBN iJOPSEFSUPXBMLBCFBU‫ڀڀ‬ZPVIBEUPVTFNJMJUBSZUBDUJDTBOEUFDIOJRVFT
BOEGPSNBUJPOTKVTUGPSUIFQPMJDFNBOUPTVSWJWF‫ڀڀ‬4PZPVXBMLBCFBUCZ
TRVBETBOEQMBUPPOTw41
.VDI BT JO -BPT BOE ,PSFB  UIF NJMJUBSJ[BUJPO PG 64 QPMJDF USBJOJOH
spawned high levels of abuse. CIA station chief Douglas Blaufarb rationalized
UIBUiJUXBTGVUJMFUPIBWFFYQFDUFEJOUIFDJSDVNTUBODFTBQVODUJMJPVTSFHBSE
in all cases for the niceties of the civil rights of suspected insurgents.”42 John
Manopoli and several associates worked with chief of police Nguyen Ngoc
Loan, who gained notoriety after being photographed shooting an NLF pris-
POFS JO UIF IFBE 5SBJOFE BU UIF 'SFODI 4BJOU$ZS NJMJUBSZ BDBEFNZ  IF XBT
UIFQPXFSCSPLFSGPS7JDF1SFNJFS/HVZFO$BP,Z B)JUMFSBENJSFSQSFWJPVTMZ
SFNPWFEGSPNB$*"NJTTJPOGPSTNVHHMJOHESVHT"O014SFQPSUQPJOUFEUP
-PBOTiDPOUFNQUGPSJOEJWJEVBMMFHBMSJHIUTwBęFSIFIBEBNFNCFSPGUIF$PO-
TUJUVFOU"TTFNCMZBTTBTTJOBUFEUPCSFBLBMFHJTMBUJWFMPHKBN'PVSTUBSHFOFSBM
8JMMJBN $PSTPO XSPUF JO The Betrayal UIBU i-PBOT /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF NFUIPET
UPFOGPSDFUIFAMBXTNBLF)JNNMFST(FTUBQPMPPLMJLFUIFCPBSEPGPWFSTFFST
in a Quaker church.”43 -PBO FQJUPNJ[FE UIF EBOHFS PG UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT
JO FNQPXFSJOH XBSMPSET PG VOTBWPSZ DIBSBDUFS ćF "NFSJDBOT QVU VQ XJUI
IJTFYDFTTFT BTUIFZIBEXJUIi5JHFS,JNwJO4PVUI,PSFBBOE(FOFSBMT4JIP
BOE1IBPJO-BPTBOEćBJMBOE CFDBVTFIFXBTTFFOBTFČFDUJWFJODPNCBU-
JOHiDPNNVOJTUUFSSPSJTUTwBOECFDBVTFIFXBTJOMBSHFQBSUBDSFBUJPOPGUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUIFGPSNJEBCMFQPMJDJOHBQQBSBUVTJUIBECVJMU

“Arresting Anyone under the Suspicion of Being Left-Wing”:


Agents of Social Control

4FFLJOH UP NBYJNJ[F TPDJBM DPOUSPM JO UIF GBDF PG NPVOUJOH QPQVMBS SFTJT-
UBODF  UIF 014 FYQBOEFE UIF JEFOUJUZ DBSE QSPHSBN JOJUJBUFE CZ .46( BOE
EFWFMPQFEB'BNJMZ$FOTVT1SPHSBN XIJDIFOBCMFEQPMJDFUPBNBTTBTFUPG

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 149


ĕOHFSQSJOUT  IPVTJOH JOGPSNBUJPO  BOE EBUB PO UIF QPMJUJDBM CFMJFGT PG OFBSMZ
ŴŵNJMMJPOQFPQMF440ODFEJTTJEFOUTXFSFJEFOUJĕFE UIFQPMJDFVOEFSUPPLWJM-
lage sweeps, usually late at night to catch suspects off guard, “arresting anyone
VOEFSUIFSFNPUFTUTVTQJDJPOPGCFJOHMFęXJOH wBTPOFXJUOFTTQVUJUićF
HPWFSONFOUIBTBCMBDLMJTUPGTVTQFDUT CVU*VOEFSTUBOEUIBUXJWFT NPUIFST
BOEGBUIFST‰BOZPOFXJUIUIFTMJNNFTUBTTPDJBUJPOXJUIUIPTFPOJUBSFCFJOH
caught in the net.”45.BOZPGUIPTFUBLFOJOXFSFQFBDFBDUJWJTUT NFNCFSTPG
the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, students, or politicians. They were
FBTJFSUPBQQSFIFOEUIBO/-'DBESFT XIPBNBTTFEUIFSFTPVSDFTUPĕHIUCBDL
BOETBCPUBHFEUIFJEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBNUISPVHIDPVOUFSGFJUJOHBOECZTFJ[JOH
hundreds of thousands of cards.46 .PPSF#VTJOFTT'PSNTPG(SFFO#BZ 8JT-
DPOTJO TVCTFRVFOUMZDPMMBCPSBUFEXJUIUIF014JOEFWFMPQJOHiUIF$BEJMMBDwPG
JEFOUJUZDBSET XIJDIXBTUBNQFSQSPPG
"TQBSUPGJUTSFTPVSDFDPOUSPMNBOEBUF UIF014FTUBCMJTIFEPWFSŹŸųQPMJDF
DIFDLQPJOUT UP NPOJUPS NPWFNFOU BOE JOUFSDFQU HVFSSJMMB TVQQMJFT *U DSF-
BUFEBSJWFSCPBUQBUSPMTRVBEPOUIF.FLPOH%FMUBBSNFEXJUIBTTBVMUSJĘFT 
which the NLF got around by using rafts capable of going through rapids that
the police boats could not handle.47'SPNŴżŹŸUPŴżŹż QPMJDFDPOĕTDBUFEPWFS
ŵŵNJMMJPOLJMPTPGDPOUSBCBOE JODMVEJOHGPPETUVČT NFEJDJOF  ĕSFBSNT BOE
BNNVOJUJPO BOEDMBJNFEUPIBWFEFUBJOFEŷŸŻ ųųų/-'DPMMBCPSBUPST.BOZ
of those arrested were draft dodgers and ARVN deserters.48 OPS reports noted
that police often stayed by the side of the road to avoid the hot sun and accepted
CSJCFTBOEFYUPSUFENPOFZGSPNQBTTFSTCZUPBVHNFOUUIFJSNFBHFSTBMBSJFT*O
one incident in Cu Chi, police searched passengers on a bus twice and forced
UIFN UP XBJU GPS IPVST PO UIF SPBETJEF GPS MJUUMF BQQBSFOU SFBTPO #FDBVTF JU
FSPEFE UIF HPWFSONFOUT MFHJUJNBDZ  UIF 014 USJFE UP DVSUBJM TVDI QSBDUJDFT
UISPVHIJOTUSVDUJPOJOQVCMJDSFMBUJPOT CVUXJUIPVUNVDIFČFDU49
5FTUJGZJOHUPBMBDLPGDPIFTJPOXJUIJOUIF(7/ ĕHIUTCSPLFPVUCFUXFFO
UIFQPMJDFBOE"37/PďDFST XIPDPNNJUUFENBOZDSJNFT JODMVEJOHJOEJT-
DSJNJOBUF ĕSJOH PG XFBQPOT  TNVHHMJOH  SPCCFSZ  TUBCCJOHT  BOE SVOOJOH
QFPQMFPWFSXJUIUSVDLT"NFSJDBOUSPPQTXFSFMJUUMFCFUUFSJOUIFJSDPOEVDU BT
QPMJDFSFQPSUTSFWFBM BOEJOPOFJOTUBODFTIPUBNFNCFSPGUIFOBUJPOBMQPMJDF
PWFSDBCGBSF*OBTJHOPGUIFEFTUSVDUJWFOFTTPGUIFXBS 64KFUTNJTUBLFOMZ
CPNCFETFWFSBMQPMJDFIFBERVBSUFST JODMVEJOHJO#BO)BJ LJMMJOHUXFOUZUXP
PďDFST BOEPVUTJEF)VÏ XIFSFBGPSNFSQPMJDFDPNNBOEFSBOEIJTQSFHOBOU
wife and three children were killed.50
#FUXFFOŴżŹźBOEŴżźŴ BTBSFTVMUPGDPODFSOTBCPVUESVHBEEJDUJPOBNPOH
"NFSJDBO TPMEJFST  UIF 014 QSPWJEFE PWFS Ŵ ŵųų QPMJDF XJUI BO FJHIUZIPVS
DPVSTFJOOBSDPUJDTFOGPSDFNFOUBOEFTUBCMJTIFEBOBSDPUJDTCVSFBVFRVJQQFE
XJUICPBUTPČTIPSF'PSNFS*1"EJSFDUPS.JDIBFM.D$BOOSBOUIFžŵNJMMJPO
QSPHSBN XIJDISFTVMUFEJOBźųQFSDFOUJODSFBTFJOBSSFTUSBUFTBTXFMMBTDPO-
siderable violations of civil liberties.51 $PSSVQUJPO XBT QFSWBTJWF BNPOH DVT-

150 Under the Facade of Benevolence


UPNTBHFOUT QPMJDF QSJTPOXBSEFOT BOEFWFOUIFIFBEPGUIFOBSDPUJDTCVSFBV
The New York TimesUFMMJOHMZSFGFSSFEUP5BO4PO/IVUBJSQPSUBTBiESVHTNVH-
glers’ paradise.”52
"TXJUICSPBEFSNPEFSOJ[BUJPOQSPHSBNT MPDBMOPODPPQFSBUJPOXJUIBOE
SFTJTUBODFUP"NFSJDBOESVHQPMJDJFTXFSFFYBDFSCBUFECZUIFBUUFNQUUPJNQPTF
8FTUFSO TPDJFUBM TUBOEBSET UIBU XFSF OPU VOJWFSTBM ćF NBTTJWF EJTMPDBUJPO
CSFECZUIFXBSBOEUIFQSPĕUBCJMJUZPGUIFCMBDLNBSLFUFDPOPNZBNJETUBO
JOĘVYPGMVYVSZHPPET BTXFMMBTMPXNPSBMFBOEQPPSQBZBOESFDSVJUNFOU
standards, lay at the root of the “legendary” corruption of police, who stole
SFGVHFFSFMJFGTVQQMJFT TIPPLEPXOCVTJOFTTNFOBOEGBSNFST JOUJNJEBUFEWPU-
FSTJOTUBHFEFMFDUJPOT BOEEFNBOEFETFYGSPNQFBTBOUHJSMTBOEQSPTUJUVUFT
(One girl was told the way to avoid trouble was to take a police officer as her
lover.)53"WJMMBHFDIJFGDPNNFOUFE ićFQPMJDFAQSPUFDUUIFQPQVMBDFUIFTBNF
XBZUIBUHBOHTUFSTAQSPUFDUFECVTJOFTTFTGSPNXIJDIUIFZXBOUFEUPTRVFF[FB
QSPĕUw54
ćF FOPSNPVT TDPQF PG QPMJDF DPSSVQUJPO JT JMMVNJOBUFE JO UIF 014
CVSFBVDSBUJDĕMFTBUUIF/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFT"ęFSUIFQSFTTCFDBNFĕMMFEXJUI
TFOTBUJPOBMBSUJDMFTBOE"MGSFE8.D$PZQVCMJTIFEBDPNQSFIFOTJWFFYQPTÏ 
"NFSJDBO PďDJBMT QSFTTFE UIF (7/ UP DSBDL EPXO PO UIF QSPCMFN  UIPVHI
XJUI MJNJUFE GPMMPXUISPVHI ćF QPMJDF JO DPODFSU XJUI MPDBM NBZPST DPO-
USPMMFEHBNCMJOHBTXFMMBTPQJVNEFOTBOECSPUIFMTXIJDITQSBOHVQUPTFSWJDF
"NFSJDBOT OPUBCMZJOUIFSFTPSUUPXOPG7VOH5BV55 Because of the pilfering of
DPOTUSVDUJPONBUFSJBMT DPOEJUJPOTJOQPMJDFQSFDJODUTBOEKBJMTXFSFEFTDSJCFE
BTiNJTFSBCMFwBOEiDMPTFUPCBSCBSJDw1PMJDFQPTJUJPOTXFSFSFHVMBSMZTPME VTV-
ally for one-third of the graft value of the job. In Quang Tri, police chiefs were
DIBSHFE XJUI TFMMJOH IFSPJO ćFZ NBEF EFUBJOFFT QFSGPSN NBOVBM MBCPS JO
UIFJSIPNFTGPSEBZTXJUIPVUTMFFQBTBQSFDPOEJUJPOGPSSFMFBTF GPSDJOHUIFN
UPCVJMENBOTJPOTGPSUIFJSDPODVCJOFTVTJOHTUPMFOHPWFSONFOUDPOTUSVDUJPO
NBUFSJBMBOEMVNCFS56
ćFIJTUPSJBO(BCSJFM,PMLPQSPWJEFTBNPOHUIFCFTUFYQMBOBUJPOTGPSUIF
source of corruption and brutality, writing, “The functions, actions, and values
PGPďDFSTBOETPMEJFSTBSFUIFJOFWJUBCMFDPOTFRVFODFPGUIFLJOETPGTPDJFUZ
UIFZBSFTFFLJOHUPDSFBUFPSEFGFOEw'PS7JFUOBNFTF 014BEWJTFSTSFQSFTFOUFE
foreign coercion and were therefore the target of guerrilla attacks, with the NLF
FNFSHJOHBTiIFSPFTwGPSCMPXJOHVQQPMJDFQSFDJODUTBOETIFMMJOHDPSSFDUJPOBM
DFOUFST  UIVT iQSPUFDUJOH UIF QFPQMF GSPN QPMJDF BCVTFTw57Dolph Owens was
UIFĕSTU64BEWJTFSUPCFLJMMFE XIFOIJTDPOWPZXBTBNCVTIFEFOSPVUFUP
UIF$PVOUFS(VFSSJMMB5SBJOJOH"DBEFNZBU$BU-PPO/PWFNCFSŸ ŴżŹų%VS-
ing the 1968 Tet offensive, where they played a key role in suppressing the joint
VQSJTJOHPGUIF/-'BOEUIF/PSUI7JFUOBNFTFBSNZ ĕFMEQPMJDFTVTUBJOFEPWFS
three thousand casualties and one thousand deaths. Three U.S. advisers also
EJFE"UMFBTUUXFOUZĕWFBEWJTFSTUPUIFQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNMPTUUIFJSMJWFT

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 151


EVSJOHUIFDPVSTFPGUIFXBS JODMVEJOHĕSFBSNTFYQFSU/PSNBO$MPXFSTPGUIF
.46 QSPHSBN BOE %FUSPJU QPMJDFNBO $IBSMJF 0#SJFO  XIP IBE BMTP TFSWFE
in Turkey and Liberia.58 Rather than fostering order and stability, the training
QSPHSBNTGVFMFEJOUFSOFDJOFIBUSFEBOEWJPMFODFBOEUIFFTDBMBUJPOPGDPOĘJDU

Quantity of “Neutralizations” High but Quality Low:


The Phoenix Program

"NFSJDBOUSBJOFEQPMJDFDPOUSJCVUFEUPTPNFPGUIFXPSTUBUSPDJUJFTJO7JFU-
OBN VOEFS UIF 1IPFOJY QSPHSBN  XIJDI XBT GPSNBMMZ JOBVHVSBUFE BęFS UIF
1968 Tet offensive in response to the failure of police and intelligence agents to
XBSOPGUIFNPWFNFOUPGSFWPMVUJPOBSZGPSDFTJOUP4BJHPOćFDFOUSBMBJNPG
1IPFOJYXBTUPFMJNJOBUFUIFi7JFUDPOHwJOGSBTUSVDUVSF 7$* UISPVHIUIFVTF
PG TPQIJTUJDBUFE DPNQVUFS UFDIOPMPHZ BOE JOUFMMJHFODFHBUIFSJOH UFDIOJRVFT 
BOEJNQSPWFEDPPSEJOBUJPOCFUXFFONJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDFJOUFMMJHFODFBHFODJFT
/BNFE BęFS B NZUIJDBM BMMTFFJOH CJSE UIBU TFMFDUJWFMZ TOBUDIFT JUT QSFZ 
1IPFOJY IBE JUT SPPUT JO UIF %JFNJTU BOUJDPNNVOJTU DBNQBJHO PWFSTFFO CZ
.46( ćF QSPHSBN FNQMPZFE NFUIPET TVDI BT UIF VTF PG XBOUFE QPTUFST 
blacklists, and disguises. Third-country nationals were used for the dirtiest
UBTLT JODMVEJOH4PVUI,PSFBOBOE'JMJQJOPNFSDFOBSJFTXJMMJOH JOUIFXPSET
PGPOF$*"PďDFS UPiTMJUUIFJSHSBOENPUIFSTUISPBUGPSBEPMMBSFJHIUZĕWFw59
1IPFOJY XBT IFBEFE PO UIF 7JFUOBNFTF TJEF CZ (FOFSBM 5SBO ćJFO ,IJFN 
-PBOTTVDDFTTPS XIPNBEFBGPSUVOFJOUIFOBSDPUJDTUSBEF)FXBTMPZBMUP
Nguyen Van Thieu, who had ousted Nguyen Cao Ky in a power struggle, cen-
UFSFEJOQBSUPODPOUSPMPGUIFžŻŻNJMMJPOIFSPJOUSBEF60
*O /PWFNCFS ŴżŹź  'SBOL "SNCSVTUFS PG UIF )VETPO *OTUJUVUF ESBęFE B
policy brief which provided a blueprint for Phoenix. Written in cold, antiseptic
language, the report included a favorable reference to a RAND Corporation
study by Chong Sik-Lee on Japanese counterinsurgency during World War II
BOE UIF 64MFE BOUJ)VL DBNQBJHOT JO UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT "SNCSVTUFS BSHVFE
that current police operations were too lenient and too poorly organized to
TVDDFFEBUJOĕMUSBUJOHUIF7$BQQBSBUVT XIJDIIBEFTUBCMJTIFETIBEPXHPWFSO-
NFOUTJOWJMMBHFTBOEUPXOTUPSJWBMUIF(7/
*OIJTWJFX UIFQPMJDFTIPVMEQFSGPSNBTJNJMBSGVODUJPOUPUIFNJMJUBSZJO
EFQMFUJOHFOFNZGPSDFTBOEXFFEJOHPVUUIFHVFSSJMMBJOGSBTUSVDUVSFUISPVHI
effective intelligence collection, roundups, and interrogations, allowing for a
TZTUFNBUJDDMBTTJĕDBUJPOPGFOFNZPQFSBUJWFT1IPUPHSBQIZ *%DBSET BOEĕO-
HFSQSJOUJOH BTXFMMBTQBJEJOGPSNBOUT XFSFDSVDJBMUPUIFJEFOUJĕDBUJPOPG7$
cadres, who blended easily into the civilian population. Defectors were needed
to ensure the success of bounty hunter operations. Effective counterinsurgents
XFSFCFTUSFDSVJUFEGSPNBNPOHUIFOBUJWFQPQVMBUJPOCFDBVTFUIFZLOFXUIF
UFSSBJO 0ODF JEFOUJĕFE  IF CFMJFWFE  IBSEDPSF 7$ TIPVME CF JTPMBUFE BOE

152 Under the Facade of Benevolence


OFWFSBMMPXFEUPSFUVSOUPUIFJSDPNNVOJUJFT PSFMTFUIFZTIPVMECFFYFDVUFE
outright. The rest of those detained could be won over through political indoc-
trination built around a counter-ideology.61
"SNCSVTUFSTFTTBZSFĘFDUTUIFFNCSBDFPGUFSSPSJTUNFUIPETCZ"NFSJDBO
DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZTQFDJBMJTUTXIPDPODFJWFEPG1IPFOJYBTBDMJOJDBMMZNBO-
BHFEPQFSBUJPODBQBCMFPGEJTNBOUMJOHUIF7$*6OMJLFNJMJUBSZBDUJPOTSFTVMU-
JOHJOUIFEFDJNBUJPOPGUIFDPVOUSZTJEF 1IPFOJY JGDBSSJFEPVUDPSSFDUMZ DPVME
NJOJNJ[FiDPMMBUFSBMEBNBHFwćF6OJUFE4UBUFTDPVMEGVSUIFSDMBJNQMBVTJCMF
deniability because of the reliance on local Provincial Reconnaissance Units
136 PSIVOUFSLJMMFSUFBNT BTXJUIUIFNBTTBDSFTJO*OEPOFTJBGPMMPXJOHUIF
1965 coup.62
*OQSBDUJDF 1IPFOJYXBTBOZUIJOHCVUNFUIPEJDBMBOEQSFDJTFJOJUTBQQMJDB-
UJPOPGWJPMFODF FSPEJOHBOZTFNCMBODFPGHPWFSONFOUMFHJUJNBDZćFPEPSF
4IBDLMFZ  $*" TUBUJPO DIJFG JO UIF MBUF ŴżŹųT  XSPUF JO IJT NFNPJS UIBU $*"
officers “found the activity repugnant. They felt that the dossiers were based on
EVCJPVTJOGPSNBUJPO‫"ڀڀ‬MMUPPGSFRVFOUMZ BSSFTUFČPSUTUVSOFEJOUPĕSFĕHIUT
BOE NPSF TPDBMMFE 7$ XFSF LJMMFE UIBO EFUBJOFE GPS QSPDFTTJOHw63 Though
JOJUJBMDPNNVOJDBUJPOTHMPXFEXJUIPQUJNJTN DMBJNJOHUIBU1IPFOJYXBTDPO-
USJCVUJOHUPUIFiSPVOEJOHVQPGMBSHFUFSSPSJTUOFUT wćJFVVTFEUIFQSPHSBN
UP FMJNJOBUF QPMJUJDBM SJWBMT  JODMVEJOH UIF OPODPNNVOJTU PQQPTJUJPO 4PNF
targets were selected by the NLF, which widely penetrated the state security
apparatus. Field reports pointed to the corruption of PRU cadres who used
their positions for revenge and extortion, threatening to kill people and count
UIFNBT7$JGUIFZEJEOPUQBZUIFNIVHFTVNT"USPDJUJFTXFSFDPNNJUUFECZ
i7$BWFOHFSVOJUTwQSPOFUPSBQF QJMMBHF BOENVUJMBUJPO64
8IJMF UIF RVBOUJUZ PG iOFVUSBMJ[BUJPOTw XBT SFQPSUFE UP CF IJHI JO NBOZ
EJTUSJDUT  UIF RVBMJUZ XBT iQPPSw65 Public Safety adviser Charles N. Phillips
MBNFOUFE UIF MBSHF OVNCFS PG iQIBOUPN LJMMT w XIJDI DPVME IBNQFS HPPE
i1IVOH )PBOHw i1IPFOJY QSPHSBNw JO 7JFUOBNFTF  TUBUJTUJDT ćFSF XFSF
BMTPiĘBHSBOUwDBTFTPGSFQPSUQBEEJOH NPTUFHSFHJPVTMZJO-POH"OQSPWJODF 
XIFSF$*"PQFSBUJWF&WBO1BSLFS+SSFQPSUFEUIBUiUIFOVNCFSTKVTUEPOUBEE
VQw%FBECPEJFTXFSFCFJOHJEFOUJĕFEBT7$ SJHIUMZPSXSPOHMZ JOUIFBUUFNQU
UPBUMFBTUBQQSPBDIBOVOSFBMJTUJDRVPUBćFDBUBMPHVFPGBHFOUTMJTUFEBTLJMMFE
JODMVEFE BO JOPSEJOBUF OVNCFSPG iOVSTFT wB DPOWFOJFOUXBZUP BDDPVOU GPS
XPNFOLJMMFEJOSBJETPOTVTQFDUFE7$IJEFPVUT136EJTHVJTFEBTi7JFUDPOHw
engaged in search operations in which air support and defoliation were called
in to wipe out villages. They also assassinated people in their sleep using silenc-
FST PO UIFJS XFBQPOT " $*" BHFOU DPNNFOUFE UIBU XIFO IF BSSJWFE JO IJT
EJTUSJDU IFXBTHJWFOBMJTUPGŵųųQFPQMFXIPXFSFUPCFLJMMFETJYNPOUITMBUFS
ŵŹųIBECFFOLJMMFE‰CVUOPOFPGUIPTFPOUIFMJTU66
A 1971 Pentagon study found that only 3 percent of “Vietcong” killed, cap-
UVSFE  PS SBMMJFE XFSF GVMM PS QSPCBUJPOBSZ QBSUZ NFNCFST BCPWF UIF EJTUSJDU

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 153


MFWFM1VCMJDTBGFUZBEWJTFSTDPNQMBJOFEUIBUUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODIMBDLFE
UIF iNPUJWBUJPO BOE FYQFSUJTF UP QSPQFSMZ UBSHFU BDUVBM 7$* NFNCFST w UIBU
MPDBMWJMMBHFDIJFGTPOMZQBJEiMJQTFSWJDFwUPUIFQSPHSBN BOEUIBUQPMJDFGBDJMJ-
UJFTBOEFRVJQNFOUSFNBJOFEJOBEFRVBUF67 Ralph McGehee, CIA chief in Gia
%JOI QSPWJODF  XIP XBT OFBSMZ ESJWFO UP DPNNJU TVJDJEF GSPN HVJMU  TUBUFE
JOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUiOFWFSJOUIFIJTUPSZPGPVSXPSLJO7JFUOBNEJEXFHFU
one clear-cut, high-ranking Vietcong agent.”68 A key reason for the failure of
Phoenix was the wide popular backing for the NLF and fact that PRU were
SFDSVJUFEGSPNBNPOHVOTBWPSZFMFNFOUT"1IPFOJYPQFSBUJWFOPUFEUIBUUIFZ
XFSFiBDPNCJOBUJPOPG"37/EFTFSUFST 7$UVSODPBUT BOECBENPUIFSGVDLFS
DSJNJOBMTUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFDPVMEOUEFBMXJUIJOQSJTPO TPUIFZUVSOFE
UIFNPWFSUPVT4PNFBDUVBMMZIBEBOJODFOUJWFQMBO*GUIFZLJMMFE9OVNCFSPG
$PNNJFT UIFZHPU9OVNCFSPGZFBSTPČUIFJSQSJTPOUFSNw69
*OPOFXFMMQVCMJDJ[FEDBTF BEFUBJOFFXBTLFQUJOBOBJSDPOEJUJPOFESPPN
GPSGPVSZFBSTUPFYQMPJUIJTGFBSPGUIFDPME)FXBTMBUFSUISPXOGSPNBIFMJ-
DPQUFSJOUPUIF4PVUI$IJOB4FBGSPNUFOUIPVTBOEGFFU70 Military intelligence
specialist K. Barton Osborn told Congress that he had witnessed prisoners
CFJOH TUBSWFE PS UISPXO PVU PG IFMJDPQUFST POF XPNBO XBT QSPEEFE JO UIF
brain with a six-inch dowel through her ear until she died. In his year and a half
with Phoenix, he did not see “a single suspect survive interrogation.”71Despite
MBUFS BUUFNQUT CZ DPOTFSWBUJWFT UP EJTDSFEJU 0TCPSOT DIBSBDUFS  $*" EJSFDUPS
8JMMJBN$PMCZ BHSBEVBUFPG1SJODFUPOBOE$PMVNCJB-BX4DIPPM DPODFEFE
UIBUNVDIPGXIBU0TCPSOTBJEXBTMJLFMZUSVF72*OUFTUJNPOZCFGPSF$POHSFTT 
$PMCZBENJUUFEUIBU1IPFOJY XIJDIIFEFĕOFEBTBOiBUUFNQUUPJEFOUJGZUIF
TUSVDUVSFPGUIFDPNNVOJTUQBSUZBOEHPPVUBOEDBQUVSFPSTIPPUUIFNw IBE
MFEUPiVOKVTUJĕBCMFBCVTFTwBOEUIFEFBUIPGPWFSUXFOUZUIPVTBOEQFPQMFćF
(7/QMBDFEUIFUPUBMBUPWFSGPSUZUIPVTBOE BOENBOZIJTUPSJBOTCFMJFWFFWFO
UIBUUPCFBOVOEFSFTUJNBUJPO"1IPFOJYPQFSBUJWFXIPTFSWFEJO$[FDIPTMP-
WBLJBEVSJOH8PSME8BS**DPNNFOUFE ićFSFQPSUT*TFOUJOGSPNNZQSPW-
JODFPOUIFOVNCFSPGDPNNVOJTUTUIBUXFSFOFVUSBMJ[FESFNJOEFENFPGUIF
SFQPSUT)JUMFSTDPODFOUSBUJPODBNQDPNNBOEFSTTFOUJOPOIPXNBOZJONBUFT
UIFZIBEFYUFSNJOBUFE FBDIDPNNBOEFSMZJOHUIBUIFIBELJMMFENPSFUIBOUIF
PUIFSTUPQMFBTF)JNNMFSw73
1IPFOJY FQJUPNJ[FT UIF XBZ "NFSJDBO QPMJDF USBJOJOH QSPHSBNT IBWF
helped facilitate state repression and terror under the rubric of internal security
BOE NPEFSOJ[BUJPO ćF BUUFNQU BU TPDJBM DPOUSPM UISPVHI JNQPTJUJPO PG BO
0SXFMMJBOSFHJNFPGNBTTTVSWFJMMBODFBOEUPSUVSFMFEJOFWJUBCMZUPIVNBOJ-
UBSJBO BCVTFT *O QSJODJQMF  UIF TVQQSFTTJPO DBNQBJHOT XFSF EFTJHOFE UP CF
TVSHJDBMMZQSFDJTF BMMPXJOHGPSBNFUIPEJDBMEJTNBOUMJOHPGUIF7$*BOEQSFT-
FSWBUJPOPGWJMMBHFTFDVSJUZ'BJMJOHUPMJWFVQUPUIFTFBJNT 1IPFOJYPOMZBEEFE
UPUIFDMJNBUFPGUFSSPSFYQFSJFODFECZUIF7JFUOBNFTF74

154 Under the Facade of Benevolence


“The Rats Are as Large as Cats”: The OPS and the South Vietnamese
Penal Order

ćFCSVUBMFČFDUTPGUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNXFSFDPNQPVOEFECZUIFESBDPOJBO
DIBSBDUFSPG4PVUI7JFUOBNTQFOBMTZTUFN/FHMFDUFECZ.46( UIF014XBT
HJWFO UIF UBTL PG BENJOJTUFSJOH BOE NPEFSOJ[JOH UIF QSJTPOT  XIJDI XFSF
seen as venues for winning political converts through reeducation. The State
%FQBSUNFOUTFOUBEWJTFSTUPJNQSPWFTBOJUBUJPO JOTUJMMBEJTDJQMJOFESFHJNFO 
and oversee vocational training, reading, and recreation as well as work assign-
NFOUBOESFMFBTFQSPHSBNT NPEFMFEBęFSQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNT"DPSSFDUJPOBM
BDBEFNZXBTFTUBCMJTIFEJO4BJHPOGPSUSBJOJOHHVBSET
.BOZ PG UIF BEWJTFST IBE FYQFSJFODF BT DPSSFDUJPOBM PďDFST JO "NFSJDBO
prisons, cauldrons of racial violence and rebellion.75 ćF IBSTI FOWJSPONFOU
DBSSJFE PWFS JOUP 7JFUOBN  XIFSF UIF QPMJUJDBM DPOUFYU VOEFSDVU UIF SFGPSN
QSPDFTTGVSUIFS0XJOHUPNBTTJWFPWFSDSPXEJOH DPOEJUJPOTJONPTUQSJTPOT
BDDPSEJOHUP014TVSWFZTXFSFiOJHIUNBSJTI wiBQQBMMJOH wBOEBLJOUPiIFMMPO
earth.” Much as in the prisons of the colonial Philippines, garbage was scattered
BDSPTTUIFĘPPS BOEJONBUFTTVČFSFEGSPNNBMOVUSJUJPO EJBSSIFB BOEEJTFBTFT
TVDIBTCFSJCFSJDBVTFECZBMBDLPGQSPQFSTBOJUBUJPOBOEEJFU*MMNBJOUBJOFE
LJUDIFO GBDJMJUJFT XFSF JOGFTUFE XJUI WFSNJO BOE ĘJFT 0OF SFQPSU OPUFE UIBU
GPPEXBTQSFQBSFEPOiQSJNJUJWFTUPWFTwBOEiDMFBOMJOFTTXBTVOIFBSEPGw76
"NPOHPUIFSJOEJHOJUJFT QSJTPOFSTXFSFGPSDFEUPVTFBiIPOFZCVDLFUwBT
a toilet. Often the only bathing facilities were outdoor wells. CIA agent Orrin
%F'PSFTU XSPUF JO IJT NFNPJST UIBU JO POF IVOESFEoEFHSFF IFBU  UIF DFMMT
“stank of urine, feces, and the odor of unwashed bodies.” Ventilation was poor,
BOE QSJTPOFST XFSF EFQSJWFE PG NFEJDJOF BOE EPDUPST 3PPNT XFSF TP PWFS-
crowded that prisoners had to sleep standing up or in shifts, and so overrun
CZDPDLSPBDIFTBOESBUTBTUPMFBWFPCTFSWFSTXJUIUIFJNQSFTTJPOUIBUJONBUFT
were raising pets.77"U,JFO5VPOHQSPWJODJBMQSJTPO KVTUUFOLJMPNFUFSTGSPN
UIFTFBUPGHPWFSONFOU 014TUBČFS8JMMJBN$#FOTPOSFQPSUFEJO'FCSVBSZ
ŴżŹŵ UIBU UIF DFMMT XFSF iFYUSFNFMZ EJSUZ BOE UIF TUFODI TP OBVTFBUJOHw UIBU
JUNBEFIJNTJDL'PVSZFBSTMBUFSBOPUIFSTUBČFS &MNFS)$SBJO FYQSFTTFE
concern about the radicalizing potential of the Binh Duong provincial prison,
XIFSFNPTUPGUIFQSJTPOFSTIBETLJODPOEJUJPOTSBOHJOHGSPNSFETPSFTUPMBSHF
DZTUTCFDBVTFPGBMBDLPGTPBQXJUIXIJDIUPCBUIFBOENJOJNBMBDDFTTUPNFEJ-
cal care.78
"T VOEFS UIF 'SFODI PDDVQBUJPO  UPSUVSF PG FWFSZ JNBHJOBCMF UFDIOJRVF
XBT XJEFMZ SFQPSUFE  JODMVEJOH TFYVBM BCVTF "NFSJDBO BEWJTFST JOTUSVDUFE
UIFJS QSPUÏHÏT JO TPQIJTUJDBUFE QTZDIPMPHJDBM NFUIPET CBTFE PO $*"GVOEFE
NJOEDPOUSPMFYQFSJNFOUTEFTJHOFEUPFNQIBTJ[FUIFQSJTPOFSTIFMQMFTTOFTT
and dependence on their captors.79 One public safety report acknowledged
UIBUUIFSFXFSFiTBEJTUJDQFPQMFJOBVUIPSJUZwXIPTPNFUJNFTiCFBUQSJTPOFST

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 155


UPEFBUIw"7JFUOBNFTFXPNBOSFDBMMFEi8IFOZPVXFSFCFJOHJOUFSSPHBUFE 
ZPVDPVMEIFBSUIFTDSFBNTPGQFPQMFCFJOHUPSUVSFEćFSFXBTBQPQVMBSTBZ-
JOHBNPOHUIFQPMJDF‰kong danh do co‰*GUIFZBSFJOOPDFOU CFBUUIFNVOUJM
UIFZ CFDPNF HVJMUZw80 A Mennonite volunteer told the Washington Post that
prisoners faced “electroshocks, beatings with pins, water torture and burnings
with cigarettes. . . . Of the prisoners I talked with, none had ever had a trial and
NBOZIBEOFWFSIBEBIFBSJOHBOEOPOFLOFXIPXMPOHUIFJSTFOUFODFXBTw81
Forbidden to sing or talk loudly, prisoners were forced to work long hours
NBLJOH VOJGPSNT GPS UIF "37/ PS XFSF FNQMPZFE PO MBCPS QSPKFDUT VOEFS
UIF TVSWFJMMBODF PG BSNFE HVBSET %PO #PSEFOLJSDIFS  BO 014 BEWJTFS XIP
had served as a correctional officer at San Quentin penitentiary in California,
TUBUFEJOIJTNFNPJSTUIBUJONBUFTSFNBOEFEUPXPSLEVUZSFDFJWFEMJUUMFPS
OP QBZ ćFZ XFSF BMTP HJWFO DPVSTFT‰PS iCSBJOXBTIFE w BT 014 QFSTPOOFM
DPODFEFE‰JO BOUJDPNNVOJTU JEFPMPHZ82 i)BSEIFBEFE JONBUFTw BOE iDPN-
NVOJTU DSJNJOBMT w BT UIF NPTU SFDBMDJUSBOU XFSF DBMMFE  GBDFE SFTUSJDUJPOT PO
FYFSDJTFBOEUIFSJHIUUPWJTJUPSTćFZXFSFUISPXOJOUPTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOU
GPSJOGSBDUJPOTBTCBTJDBTSFGVTJOHUPTBMVUFUIF(7/ĘBHBOEXFSFIBOEDVČFE
QFSNBOFOUMZ iCPMUFEUPUIFĘPPSwPSJNNPCJMJ[FECZiMFHJSPOT wXIJDINBOZ
BEWJTFSTDMBJNFEXBTOFDFTTBSZUPQSFWFOUSJPUJOHBOEFTDBQF83
*O TQJUF PG BENJOJTUSBUJWF EFDMBSBUJPOT PG JNQSPWFNFOU  QSJTPO DPOEJUJPOT
POMZXPSTFOFEPWFSUJNF"4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŹQVCMJDTBGFUZSFQPSUGPS$V$IJEJT-
USJDU )BV/HIJB1SPWJODFMBNFOUFEUIBUTJODFUIFBQQFBSBODFPGUIF5XFOUZ
ĕęI *OGBOUSZ %JWJTJPO  UIF iJOĘVY PG 7$ QSJTPOFST IBT NVTISPPNFE PVU PG
QSPQPSUJPO UP UIF QSPWJODJBM BCJMJUZ UP IBOEMF UIFN ćF QSPCMFN IBT CFFO
EVNQFEPOUIFOBUJPOBMQPMJDFXIPBSFOPUFRVJQQFEPSUSBJOFEUPIBOEMFXIBU
BNPVOUTUPBQSJTPOFSPGXBSDBNQwćFSFQPSUBEEFE i8FIBWFŸźųQSJTPOFST
QBDLFEJOUPGBDJMJUJFTUIBUXFSFPWFSĘPXJOHXIFOUIFZIBEPOMZŴŵųQSJTPOFST
*UJTBOFYQMPTJWFTJUVBUJPOUIBUOFFETJNNFEJBUFBUUFOUJPOw84 Another prisoner
surge occurred following the 1968 Tet offensive and again with the growth of the
1IPFOJYQSPHSBN SFTVMUJOHJOTFSJPVTGPPETIPSUBHFTBOEBiMBDLPGBEFRVBUF
DPOĕOFNFOUTQBDFGPSDBQUVSFEQSJTPOFSTw85 Many facilities were operating at
TFWFOPSFJHIUUJNFTDBQBDJUZćF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTF$PNNJUUFFUP3FGPSNUIF
1SJTPOTDBMDVMBUFEUIBUCZUIFFBSMZŴżźųTUIFTZTUFNIBSCPSFEŵųŵ ųųųQPMJUJDBM
QSJTPOFST‰TJYUJNFTUIFOVNCFS"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBMFTUJNBUFEXFSFIFMEJO
UIF4PWJFU6OJPO &BTU(FSNBOZ 4PVUI"GSJDB BOEBIBMGEP[FOPUIFSBVUIPSJ-
UBSJBOTUBUFTDPNCJOFE86
"MUIPVHI UIJT ĕHVSF JT IBSE UP DPSSPCPSBUF  "NFSJDBO PďDJBMT DPODFEFE
UIBUVQXBSETPGźųQFSDFOUPGJONBUFTXFSFQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFSTEFUBJOFEVOEFS
the An Tri or national security laws outlawing dissent.87The lack of legal rep-
SFTFOUBUJPOBOEUIFTIPSUBHFPGMBXZFSTNBEFFČPSUTUPQSPNPUFEVFQSPDFTT
JNQPTTJCMFćFQBSPMFTZTUFNXBTTUZNJFECFDBVTFNBOZQSJTPOFSTSFNBJOFE
VODMBTTJĕFE4FDSFUSFQPSUTEJTDMPTFEUIBUBUNPTUUISFFPVUPGUFOJONBUFTIBE

156 Under the Facade of Benevolence


access to a trial. When they did take place, legal proceedings were held in closed
RVBSUFSTCZUIFNJMJUBSZ#BJMXBTSBSFMZHSBOUFE$IJFGKBJMFSTFTUJNBUFEUIBUŹŴ
percent of detainees were innocent.88
"ęFSBUPVSPGUIFQSJTPOJO$IBV%PDJO/PWFNCFSŴżŹŻ #PSEFOLJSDIFS 
who joined the Foreign Service to avoid sending his kids to school in Cali-
GPSOJBXJUIiĘPXFSDIJMESFO wOPUFEUPIJTCPTT3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZUIBUPGUIF
457 prisoners, only twenty-seven had been sentenced and that eleven children
under the age of eighteen were currently detained. In Kien Hoa, 606 out of 764
JONBUFT JODMVEJOHUXFOUZFJHIUDIJMESFO XFSFCFJOHIFMEXJUIPVUUSJBM XIJMF
at Phan Ding the total was 2,550 prisoners out of 2,903 in a facility intended for
POMZŷŷų*ONBUFTIBEUPCBUIFJOTIJęTBOECFHBODPPLJOHTVQQFSBUŷBN
UPNBLFVQGPSUIFPWFSDSPXEJOH89 Public safety officials like Bordenkircher,
who three decades later would be appointed to head the Abu Ghraib prison
JO*SBR GPVOEUIFTJUVBUJPOSFQSFIFOTJCMFCVUXFSFQPXFSMFTTUPDIBOHFJUćF
HPBMPGQSPNPUJOHBUJHIUMZEJTDJQMJOFEBOEFďDJFOUMZNBOBHFEQFOBMTZTUFN
XBTJNQPTTJCMFJOUIFXBSDMJNBUF
0OB/PWFNCFSŴżŹŻJOTQFDUJPOUPVS #PSEFOLJSDIFSGPVOEUIBUQSPWJODJBM
QSJTPOTMBDLFECBTJDIZHJFOFBOEXFSFTPDPOHFTUFEUIBUTPNFQSJTPOFSTIBEUP
TMFFQJOĘJNTZUFOUTPOQSJTPOHSPVOET)FDPNNFOUFEJSBUFMZUPIJTTVQFSJPST
UIBUiQPMJUJDBMSFFEVDBUJPODBOOPUPDDVSVOUJMZPVFOBCMFBNBOUPTMFFQBXBZ
GSPNIJTPXOVSJOFBOEGFDFT HJWFIJNXIPMFTPNFGPPEBOEUIFPQQPSUVOJUZ
for rehabilitation.”90*O#BD-JFV #PSEFOLJSDIFSSFDPNNFOEFEUIFSFQMBDFNFOU
of the entire facility. He observed that prisoners were forced to urinate in jars
and that sewage ran loose, even into the parking lot of the Military Assistance
$PNNBOEDPNQPVOEBDSPTTUIFTUSFFU*O1IBOH%JOI UIFPWFSĘPXPGJONBUFT
SFTVMUFEJOBXBUFSTIPSUBHFćFMBUSJOFTXFSFFNQUJFEJOUPUXPEJUDIFTBOEB
pond in which prisoners were forced to bathe, and drained into a canal where
FYUSBESJOLJOHXBUFSXBTPCUBJOFE%JTFBTF OPUTVSQSJTJOHMZ SBOSBNQBOUćF
TUBOEBSETJO"O9VZFOXFSFFWFONPSFESFBEGVM#PSEFOLJSDIFSSFQPSUFEUIBU
UIFLJUDIFOXBTBiTIFEXJUIGPVSTUPWFTUIBUXBTBMTPVTFEBTBUSBTIEVNQw
ćFTFXBHFTZTUFNXBTCSPLFO BOEUIFLJUDIFOXBTTVSSPVOEFECZiHSJNZTFX-
BHFUIBUQSPNPUFTBWFSZPČFOTJWFTNFMMUISPVHIPVUUIFDFOUFSwćFLJUDIFO
ĘPPSXBTEJSU BOEUIFĘPPSTQBDFXBTTIBSFECZUIFDFOUFSTBOJNBMTićFSBUT
JOUIFLJUDIFO wIFQSPDMBJNFE iBSFBTMBSHFBTDBUTw91
ćFTFDPNNFOUTQSPWJEFBWJWJEJOEJDBUJPOPGUIFNPSBMEFDBZCSFECZUIF
64 JOUFSWFOUJPO JO 7JFUOBN BOE JMMVTUSBUF IPX CBTJD TUBOEBSET PG IVNBO
EFDFODZCSFBLEPXOJOXBS#FUXFFOŴżŹźBOEŴżźŶ UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUTQFOU
BUMFBTUžŹŸNJMMJPOGPSUIFNBJOUFOBODFBOESFOPWBUJPOPGUIFGPSUZUXPNBJO
prisons run by the GVN and built three additional facilities as well as a juvenile
SFGPSNBUPSZBU%BMBU*UQSPWJEFEHFOFSBUPSTBOEIBOEDVČT CVJMUTQFDJBMJTPMB-
tion cells for hardcore “Vietcong,” and oversaw the construction of over thirty
TUBUFPGUIFBSUEFUFOUJPODFOUFST5ZQJDBMPGUIFXJEFTQSFBEDPSSVQUJPO NBOZ

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 157


PG UIF TVQQMJFT XFSF SFTPME PO UIF CMBDL NBSLFU CZ MPDBM BVUIPSJUJFT  VTVBMMZ
DSPOJFTPG,ZPSćJFV PSLFQUVOUJMXBSEFOTQBJEBCSJCF8JMMJBN$PMCZXSPUF
UP UIF EJSFDUPS PG UIF BHFODZ SFTQPOTJCMF GPS QBDJĕDBUJPO UIBU DPNNPEJUJFT
BOENPOFZEFTUJOFEGPSDPSSFDUJPOBMDFOUFSTXFSFiIFMEJO4BJHPOVOUJMMPDBM
authorities were presented with gifts or proper wining and dining.” Nguyen
Van Thuc, deputy chief jailer of the Kien Phong correctional center, reported
UIBU IF IBE IBE UP UBLF iUIF SJHIU QFPQMFw PVU UP B UXFOUZ UIPVTBOEoQJBTUFS
žŵŸų NFBMBOEQSPWJEFUIFNXJUIXIJTLFZBOEDBTIHJęTUPTFDVSFBDDFTTUP
a generator. Other wardens had to pay two thousand piasters for the use of a
GPSLMJęBOEUISFFUIPVTBOEGPSBEVNQUSVDL92/PXPOEFSNPTUPGUIFSFOPWB-
UJPOTXFSFOFWFSDPNQMFUFE
ćF*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FE$SPTTEJTDPWFSFEJONBUFTTVČFSJOHGSPNTDBCJFTBOE
other diseases, as well as food and water shortages, overcrowded and decaying
GBDJMJUJFT ESJOLJOHXBUFSDPOUBNJOBUFECZFYDSFNFOUGSPNUIFMBUSJOFT TIBDL-
MJOH PG QSJTPOFST  BOE UIF iSPVHIJOH VQw PG XPNFO JO JOUFSSPHBUJPO93 OPS
advisers described the living conditions of prison staff in at least one institution
BTCFJOHUISFFUJNFTXPSTFUIBOUIPTFPGUIFJONBUFTćFMBDLPGPWFSTJHIUCZ
DIJFGKBJMFST XIPQSFEPNJOBOUMZDBNFGSPNNJMJUBSZCBDLHSPVOETBOEPXFE
UIFJS QPTJUJPOT UP QPMJUJDBM GBWPSJUJTN  XBT BOPUIFS GBDUPS BDDPVOUJOH GPS UIF
high level of brutality, as was the internecine hatred engendered by the war and
often whipped up by the United States.94
3BDJTNBOEUIFQFSDFJWFEJOGFSJPSJUZPG"TJBOTQSPWJEFEBSBUJPOBMJ[BUJPO
GPS IVNBO SJHIUT WJPMBUJPOT 014 SFQPSUT OPUFE UIBU GPS DVMUVSBM SFBTPOT 
iBDDFQUBCMFTUBOEBSETGPSQSJTPOIBCJUBUJPOXFSFGBSMPXFSJO4PVUI7JFUOBN
than in the U.S.,” and so the conditions were acceptable.95 Randolph Berkeley,
XIPSFGFSSFEUPUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFBTiCBCFTJOUIFXPPETwXIFOJUDBNFUP
BQQSFDJBUJOHUIFUISFBUQPTFECZUIF7$ XSPUFUP"NCBTTBEPS8JMMJBN$PMCZ
JO4FQUFNCFSŴżźŴUIBUUIFBUNPTQIFSFXBTBDUVBMMZiGBSNPSFSFMBYFEUIBOJO
"NFSJDBOQFOBMJOTUJUVUJPOT‫ڀڀ‬/PQSJTPOJO7JFUOBNIBTCFDPNFBEJTBT-
ter such as San Quentin or Attica.”96ćFTFDPNNFOUTSFWFBMUIFWBMVFQMBDFE
PO TPDJBM DPOUSPM SBUIFS UIBO IVNBO SJHIUT BT B NBSLFS PG TVDDFTT  CPUI JO
7JFUOBNBOEJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT$POUSBSZUP#FSLFMFZTEFQJDUJPO 014TUBČ
DPODFEFEUIBUCFDBVTFPGBSCJUSBSZEFUFOUJPOBOEUIFEFHSBEJOHUSFBUNFOUPG
XPNFO UIFQSJTPOTXFSFDPOTJEFSFEUIFi7JFUOBNFTFFRVJWBMFOUPG%BDIBV
BOE#FMTFOw(FOFSBM8JMMJBN$PSTPODPNQBSFEUIFNUP#VDIFOXBME NJOVT
UIFHBTDIBNCFST97
After a tour of penal facilities in the Mekong Delta, U.S. adviser John Paul
7BOODPNNFOUFE i*HPUUIFEJTUJODUJNQSFTTJPOUIBUBOZEFUBJOFFTOPUQSFWJ-
PVTMZ 7$ PS 7$ TZNQBUIJ[FST XPVME BMNPTU BTTVSFEMZ CFDPNF TP BęFS UIFJS
period of incarceration.”98 3BUIFS UIBO TVCNJU UP BVUIPSJUZ  JONBUFT GPVOE
DPNNVOJUZJONVUVBMTVČFSJOHBOETUJČFOFEUIFJSSFTJTUBODF*OBOPEFUPGSFF-
EPNĕHIUFSTTVCKFDUFEUPUPSUVSF POFJODBSDFSBUFEXPNBOXSPUF i#VUJGUIFSF

158 Under the Facade of Benevolence


XFSFOPOFMJLFZPV UPCFBSUIFTVČFSJOHUPBTLGPSJOEFQFOEFODF UPEFNBOE
UIF7JFUOBNFTFTSJHIUUPMJWFBIVNBOMJGF IPXNVDIMPOHFSXPVMEPVSQFPQMF
IBWFUPTVČFS w"OPUIFSXPNBO /HVZFOćJ.BO JNQSJTPOFEBUTJYUFFOXIJMF
IFMQJOHUPDBSFGPSXBSPSQIBOT XSPUFUPBGSJFOEi&WFOJG*NVTUEJFJOQSJTPO
JOUIFFOEJUXJMMCFXPSUIXIJMF"MMIVNBOCFJOHTNVTUEJFPODF#VUJGXF
have the chance to die for an ideal, I think that we would all choose this kind of
death.”99
*OTQJUFPGBMMUIFQVCMJDJUZJUMBUFSDPNNBOEFE UIFUPSUVSFJO/PSUI7JFU-
OBN EJE OPU BQQSPBDI UIF TDBMF VOEFSUBLFO CZ "NFSJDBOCBDLFE GPSDFT
JO UIF 4PVUI ćF PďDF PG UIF BSNZ DIJFG PG TUBČ BDLOPXMFEHFE JO ŴżŹż UIF
BEPQUJPOCZUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTFPGiDSVFM TPQIJTUJDBUFE DBMDVMBUFEUPSUVSF
GPSJOGPSNBUJPO wXIJDISFOEFSFEiIZQPDSJUJDBMUIFQJPVTTUBUFNFOUTBCPVUUIF
USFBUNFOUPG108TCZUIF1SFTJEFOUwćFFar Eastern Review pointed out that
“U.S. POW’s who talked of oriental torture were all able to stand up and speak
JOUPNJDSPQIPOFT TIPXJOHTDBSTIFSFBOEUIFSF XIFSFBTUIPTFSFMFBTFEGSPN
64SVOKBJMTJO4BJHPOXFSFBMMJODVSBCMZDSJQQMFE1SPMPOHFENBMOVUSJUJPOIBE
UVSOFEUIFNJOUPHSPUFTRVFQBSPEJFTPGIVNBOJUZw100
4PNFPGUIFXPSTUBCVTFTPDDVSSFEJO$PO4POQSJTPO MPDBUFEPOBOBSDIJ-
QFMBHP ŴŻų LJMPNFUFST PČ UIF TPVUIFSO 7JFUOBNFTF DPBTU  XIFSF IBSEDPSF
iDPNNVOJTUDSJNJOBMTwXFSFTFOU1SJTPOFSćFQ9BOIXSPUFPGIJTFYQFSJFODF
i%FFQ JO NZ IFBSU * SFNFNCFS OJHIUT BU $PO 4PO  UIF FDIP PG UIF DSFBLJOH
EPPS UIFCFBUJOHT UIFDSZJOHPVUBUNJEOJHIU UIFTIPVUJOHPGHVBSET ZPVBTL
NFXIFSFJTIFMMXIFSFPOFBSUIQFPQMFDBOOPUMJWFBTIVNBOCFJOHT XIFSF
people with heart and soul live like beasts.”101 Con Son, which had been founded
as a penal colony by the French in 1862, was plagued, according to the histo-
SJBO1FUFS;JOPNBO CZFYUSFNFMZIJHISBUFTPGNBMBSJB DIPMFSB CFSJCFSJ BOE
EZTFOUFSZQIZTJDBMCSVUBMJUZXBTSBNQBOU BOEBOOVBMNPSUBMJUZSBUFTSBOBT
high as 13 percent.102ćFDPOEJUJPOTEVSJOHUIF"NFSJDBOXBSXFSFMJUUMFCFUUFS
*ONBUFTSFQPSUFECFJOHXPSLFEOFBSMZUPEFBUIJOUIFĕFMET TFWFSFMZCFBUFOCZ
USVTUJFT BOEMFęPOUIFWFSHFPGTUBSWBUJPO.BOZSFTPSUFEUPRVFODIJOHUIFJS
thirst by drinking their own urine.103
" %FDFNCFS ŴżŹż 3FE $SPTT JOTQFDUJPO IJHIMJHIUFE JOBEFRVBUF TBOJUBSZ
DPOEJUJPOTBOENFEJDBMDBSFBOEGPVOEUIBUUIFSFIBECFFOUFOSFDFOUFTDBQF
BUUFNQUTBOEBNVUJOZDSVTIFECZ(SJFWFTTQPMJDFĕFMEGPSDF104 In 1970, after
WFFSJOHGSPNUIFJUJOFSBSZEVSJOHBDPOHSFTTJPOBMUPVS *OUFSOBUJPOBM7PMVOUBSZ
4FSWJDFFNQMPZFF%PO-VDFGPVOEEFUBJOFFTDSBNNFEJOUPTJYGPPUXJOEPX-
less pits, or “tiger cages,” where they were forced to subsist on three handfuls of
NJMMFEXIJUFSJDFBOEUISFFTXBMMPXTPGXBUFSQFSEBZ(VBSETXPVMEUISPXMJNF
into their faces, causing lung disease and tuberculosis. Frank Walton, director
PGQVCMJDTBGFUZJO7JFUOBNGSPNŴżŸżUPŴżŹŴBOEŴżŹżUPŴżźŴ TBODUJPOFEB
SFQPSUTUBUJOHUIBUVODPPQFSBUJWFQSJTPOFST XIPNIFSFGFSSFEUPBTiSFETXIP
LFFQQSFBDIJOHUIFDPNNJFMJOF wXFSFiJTPMBUFEJOUIFJSDFMMTGPSNPOUITwBOE

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 159


iCPMUFEUPUIFĘPPSPSIBOEDVČFEUPMFHJSPOTw105%S+PIO$IBNQMJOPGUIFBJS
GPSDFUFTUJĕFECFGPSF$POHSFTTUIBUIFIBEPCTFSWFEQBSBMZTJTPOBMBSHFTDBMF 
SFTVMUJOHGSPNiTFWFSFOVUSJUJPOBMEFĕDJFODZDPVQMFEXJUIQSPMPOHFEJNNPCJ-
MJ[BUJPOyVOJRVFJOUIFIJTUPSZPGNPEFSOXBSGBSF‫"ڀڀ‬DPNQVUFSSFWJFXPG
ŴŵųųNFEJDBMKPVSOBMTBOEBQFSTPOBMTFBSDIUISPVHINFEJDBMMJUFSBUVSFPOUIF
health of POW’s produced noTJNJMBSEFTDSJQUJPOTw106
Time NBHB[JOFSFQPSUFEUIBUIBWJOHCFFOGPSDFEJOUPBQFSNBOFOUQSFU[FM
MJLF DSPVDI  UJHFS DBHF TVSWJWPST SFTFNCMFE iHSPUFTRVF TDVMQUVSFT PG TDBSSFE
ĘFTIBOEHOBSMFEMJNCT‫ڀڀ‬ćFZNPWFMJLFDSBCT TLJUUFSJOHBDSPTTUIFĘPPSPO
CVUUPDLTBOEQBMNTw*OBCJEUPEFĘFDUOFHBUJWFQVCMJDJUZ UIF%FQBSUNFOUPG
the Navy gave Morrison Knudson a $400,000 contract to build 384 new isola-
UJPO DFMMT  EVCCFE iDPX DBHFTw CFDBVTF PG UIFJS QSPYJNJUZ UP B DBUUMFGFFEJOH
TIFE'SPNUIFBWBJMBCMFFWJEFODF UIFDPOEJUJPOTBQQFBSUPIBWFCFFOMJUUMFCFU-
UFSBOE BTUIFOBNFTVHHFTUT NPSFĕUGPSBOJNBMT107
0OUIFXIPMF DPOEJUJPOTJO4PVUI7JFUOBNTQSJTPOTFYFNQMJGZUIFWJPMFOU
DPOTFRVFODFTPGUIF"NFSJDBOJOWBTJPO1SJTPOFSTEJBSJFTBOEXSJUJOHTQSPWJEF
BUFTUBNFOUUPUIFIBSETIJQUIBUJONBUFTFOEVSFEBOEUPUIFUSJVNQIPGUIF
IVNBOXJMMJOUIFGBDFPGTUBUFBUSPDJUJFT/HVZFO-BD-F BSSFTUFEJO/PWFNCFS
1968 with his wife, two sisters, and a brother, wrote, “Prison is a place, where
XFUSBJOPVSXJMMT JUJTBCBUUMFĕFME XIFSFXFOFFEOPXFBQPOT PVSIFBSUTBSF
NBEFPGTUFFMXIJDICFBUEPXOUIFCFUSBZFS PVSCMPPEJTPGCSPO[F UIFCMPPE
XFTIFEUPEBZ XJMMNBLFUPNPSSPXCSJHIUw108-FTDPNNFOUTEFNPOTUSBUFUIF
EFEJDBUJPOPGUIF7JFUOBNFTFSFWPMVUJPOBSJFTBOEUIFSPMFPGUIFQSJTPOJOTUJČ-
FOJOHUIFTQJSJUPGSFTJTUBODF BTVOEFSUIF'SFODIPDDVQBUJPO ćJT NPSFUIBO
BOZUIJOHFMTF DPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFPVUDPNFPGUIFXBS
*OUIFŴżźż"DBEFNZ"XBSEoXJOOJOHĕMNThe Deer Hunter, the character
QMBZFECZ3PCFSU%F/JSPBOEUXPQMBUPPONBUFTBSFUPSUVSFEJOBNBLFTIJę
108DBNQ4VCNFSHFEVOEFSXBUFS UIFZBSFTVCKFDUFEUPUIFiXBUFSDVSFwBOE
GPSDFEUPQMBZ3VTTJBOSPVMFUUFCFGPSFUIF%F/JSPDIBSBDUFSFOHJOFFSTBNJSBD-
VMPVTFTDBQF"IPTUPGTVCTFRVFOU#HSBEFNPWJFTGPDVTFEBEOBVTFBNPOUIF
QMJHIU PG "NFSJDBO 108T  FOUJSFMZ JHOPSJOH UIF DPOUFYU JO XIJDI UIFZ XFSF
EFUBJOFEBOEUIFQSFEJDBNFOUPG7JFUOBNFTFQSJTPOFST.BSSFECZBOVOEFS-
MZJOHSBDJTUi3FE1FSJMwTVCUFYU UIFZDPODFBMFEUIFESFBEGVMDPOTFRVFODFTPG
"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOH QSJTPODPOTUSVDUJPOQSPHSBNT BOE1IPFOJYEFBUI
TRVBEPQFSBUJPOT XIJDIXFSFTVQQSFTTFEJOUIFQVCMJDDPOTDJPVTOFTT109
*OŴżźŶ4FOBUPS"MBO$SBOTUPO B$BMJGPSOJB%FNPDSBU UPMETime that USAID
IBECPMTUFSFEiBDSVFMBOESFQSFTTJWFQPMJDFBQQBSBUVTJO4PVUI7JFUOBN"WBTU
TVSWFJMMBODFTZTUFNJTJOFČFDU BJEFECZ6OJUFE4UBUFTDPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQ-
NFOU BOE QFSTPOOFM 1PMJDF UPSUVSF BOE JOIVNBO KBJM DPOEJUJPOT  JODMVEJOH
UIFOPUPSJPVTUJHFSDBHFT BXBJUUIPTFXIPDSJUJDJ[FUIFHPWFSONFOUTQPMJDJFT
ćBUUIF"NFSJDBOUBYQBZFSTIPVMETVCTJEJ[FUPSUVSFJTBOPVUSBHFw110 Within
BHFOFSBUJPO UIJTSFBMJUZIBECFFOMBSHFMZGPSHPUUFOJOUIFNBJOTUSFBN3FJO-

160 Under the Facade of Benevolence


GPSDJOHUIF)PMMZXPPESFWJTJPOJTN 1SFTJEFOU+JNNZ$BSUFSEFDMBSFEJOŴżźź 
i8FPXF)BOPJOPEFCUCFDBVTFUIFEFTUSVDUJPOGSPNUIFXBSXBTNVUVBMw111
Ronald Reagan went further in asserting, “Ours was in truth a noble cause.” By
evading responsibility for the atrocities, both leaders helped to pave the way
GPSBSFWJWBMPG"NFSJDBONJMJUBSJTN JODMVEJOHUIFBEPQUJPOPG1IPFOJYTUZMF
PQFSBUJPOTBOEUPSUVSFPOBCSPBETDBMFJO$FOUSBM"NFSJDBBOEMBUFS*SBRćF
DZDMFPGJNQFSJBMNBOJQVMBUJPOBOEWJPMFODFUIBUUIFTFWFOUFFOZFBSPMETVJ-
DJEFCPNCFSBUUIF%BMBUOJHIUDMVCXBSOFEBCPVUXPVMEUIVTDPOUJOVFUISPVHI
the ensuing decades.112

MSU and the Making of a Police State in South Vietnam 161


“This page intentionally left blank”
Part III
The Cold War on the Periphery
Police Training and the Hunt for Subversives in
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East
There are two governments in the United States today. One is visible. The other
is invisible. The first is the government that citizens read about in their newspa-
pers and children study about in their civics class. The second is the interlock-
ing, hidden machinery that carries out the policies of the United States in the
Cold War. The second invisible government gathers intelligence, conducts
espionage, and plans and executes secret operations all over the globe.
‰David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government,

In 1974, CIA operative Philip Agee published an exposé, *OTJEF UIF $PNQBOZ,
which rocked the American foreign policy establishment. The book detailed Agee’s
role in funneling money to centrist, anticommunist candidates in Ecuador and
Uruguay, in infiltrating labor unions, and in collaborating with the military and
secret police through USAID’s Public Safety Division to gain information on leftist
groups and contribute to their dismantling. Agee concluded: “American capital-
ism, based on its exploitation of the poor, with its fundamental motivation in
personal greed, cannot survive without force—a secret police force. . . . Now more
than ever, exposure of CIA methods could help American people understand how
we got into Vietnam and how our other Vietnams are germinating wherever the
CIA is at work.”1
In Agee’s view, the Cold War provided an important pretext for the United
States to expand its hegemony, as the “threat” of communism could be invoked to
drum up support for intervention. The methods he outlined were employed world-
wide, with police training serving as a key means of projecting American power.
Staffed by true believers in the American mission, the OPS and its predecessors
worked to penetrate and professionalize the internal security apparatus of client
regimes as far afield as Africa and the Middle East. CIA agents used the programs
to establish police and intelligence liaisons and contributed to the development of
mass surveillance states known for terrorizing their own citizens.
After a visit to the Guatemalan police archives, filled with thousands of dos-
siers on political activists, detailed organizational charts, and information on

163
torture victims and police spies, researcher Kate Doyle commented: “The National
Police weren’t interested in fighting crime and the files were not organized to
support prosecutions. What was important was the hunt for subversives.”2 This
emphasis bore the unmistakable stamp of the American training programs, which
were designed to expand police intelligence and counterinsurgency capabilities.
The architects of U.S. policy were obsessed with countering radical nationalist and
guerrilla movements worldwide, the central purpose behind the 1290-d program
and the OPS. The hunt for subversives was not unique to Guatemala but part of a
global initiative, which spawned myriad abuses and wrought much havoc across
the so-called Third World.

164 The Cold War on the Periphery


Chapter 8
Arming Tyrants I
American Police Training and the Postcolonial
Nightmare in Africa
The neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its
most dangerous stage.
‰,wame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism,

Power corrupts, and power corrupts army officers faster than others.
‰1VCMJDTBGFUZSFWJFX 64&NCBTTZ 3XBOEB 

*OŴżŹŴUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUJTTVFEBSFQPSUPVUMJOJOHUIFJNQPSUBODFPGUIF
QPMJDF UP QPTUDPMPOJBM EFWFMPQNFOU JO "GSJDB *U QSPDMBJNFE UIBU JO NBOZ
OBUJPOT UIFQPMJDFi<BSF>PSHBOJ[FEVOEFSSJHJEDFOUSBMDPOUSPM MJWFJOCBSSBDLT 
PQFSBUFJOMBSHFHSPVQT BOENBLFQPMJDFTUBUJPOTJOUPTVDIGPSNJEBCMFTQPUT
UIBUBOZTBOFDJUJ[FOXBOUTUPBWPJEUIFN‫ڀڀ‬1VCMJD4BGFUZPďDJBMTCFMJFWFXF
should use whatever leverage we have to induce these countries to establish
civilian-oriented, western-style police forces. They recognize that this will be a
long and difficult process, but the states of Africa that seek our help are prob-
BCMZ NPSF BNFOBCMF UP DIBOHF UIBO UIF USBEJUJPOCPVOE -BUJO "NFSJDBOTw1
ćFTFDPNNFOUTSFWFBMBHSFBUEFBMBCPVUUIFJEFPMPHZVOEFSMZJOHUIFQPMJDF
QSPHSBNT "NFSJDBOT GVODUJPOJOH BT TFDVMBS NJTTJPOBSJFT PG NPEFSOJ[BUJPO
XFSFEFUFSNJOFEUPDSFBUF8FTUFSOTUZMFQPMJDFGPSDFT EFFNFEDSVDJBMUPQPTU-
colonial “nation-building.” The only barrier they saw was “traditional” attitudes
BOEDVTUPNT XIJDIUIFZGFMUDPVMECFPWFSDPNFUISPVHIQSPQFSUVUFMBHFBOE
guidance.2
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJOQSBDUJDFTIPXFENVDIDPOUJOVJUZGSPNUIFDPMPOJBM
period, when the European powers built up indigenous police forces, often
BMPOHUSJCBMMJOFT BTQBSUPGBTUSBUFHZPGEJWJEFBOEDPORVFS UPDPOUSPMVOSFTU
BOE QSPUFDU WJUBM FDPOPNJD SFTPVSDFT GPS UIF QVSQPTF PG FYQMPJUJOH UIFN3
"O JNQPSUBOU VOEFSMZJOH JOUFSFTU XBT UIF DPOUBJONFOU PG SBEJDBM OBUJPOBMJTU
NPWFNFOUT UISFBUFOJOH UIF 8FTUFSO GPPUIPME PO UIF DPOUJOFOU ćFSF XBT
MJUUMFTFSJPVTFČPSUUPQSPNPUFMFHJTMBUJWFSFGPSNTDBQBCMFPGJNQSPWJOHQPMJDF
QSPGFTTJPOBMJTNBOEMJUUMFDPNNJUNFOUUPIVNBOSJHIUT BTUIFSFIBECFFOJO
Japan prior to the “reverse course”).4

165
For all the violence associated with their efforts, European colonial offi-
DFSTPęFOUPPLQSJEFJOUIFQSPGFTTJPOBMEFWFMPQNFOUPGUIFNFOVOEFSUIFJS
DIBSHF XJUIXIPNUIFZGPSHFEDMPTFCPOETPWFSUIFZFBST5"NFSJDBOQVCMJD
TBGFUZ BEWJTFST  CZ DPOUSBTU  XFSF GSFRVFOUMZ SPUBUFE JO BOE PVU PG DPVOUSJFT
BOEIBEMJUUMFLOPXMFEHFPGUIFMPDBMMBOHVBHFTBOEDVTUPNTBOEMJUUMFUJNFUP
EFWFMPQUIFTBNFLJOETPGSFMBUJPOTIJQT"MBSHFEFHSFFPGDZOJDJTNBOEGSVTUSB-
UJPODPOTFRVFOUMZBDDPNQBOJFEUIFQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT POCPUITJEFT*O
UIFPOFTDIPMBSMZTUVEZPGUIFQSPHSBNTJO"GSJDB UIFQPMJUJDBMTDJFOUJTU0UXJO
Marenin concludes that police were “not known for their civility” in countries
XIFSFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXBTNPTUBDUJWF6ćFNBJOSFBTPOXBTUIFFNQIBTJTPO
internal security and social control rather than the protection of civil liberties,
BOE"NFSJDBTBMMJBODFXJUIEJDUBUPSJBMSVMFSTXIPNBJOUBJOFEQPXFSUISPVHI
police repression.

Training the Emperor’s Legions: American Police Training and State


Repression in Ethiopia

#FUXFFOŴżŸŶBOEŴżŹż UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFEžŶŶNJMMJPOJOQPMJDFBJEBOE
žŴŷźJONJMJUBSZBJE‰NPSFUIBOJOBOZPUIFSDPVOUSZJO"GSJDB‰UP&UIJPQJB 
XJUIUIFBJNPGGPSUJGZJOH&NQFSPS)BJMF4FMBTTJF BMTPLOPXOBT3BT5BGBSJ "
IFSPGPSIBWJOHNPCJMJ[FEPQQPTJUJPOUPUIFŴżŶųT*UBMJBOJOWBTJPO 4FMBTTJFIBE
CFDPNFNFHBMPNBOJBDBM TRVBOEFSJOHGPSFJHOBJEPOQFSTPOBMNPOVNFOUTBT
QFPQMFJOUIFDPVOUSZTJEFTUBSWFE/FWFSUIFMFTT "NFSJDBOQPMJDZNBLFSTWBM-
VFE4FMBTTJFBTBCVMXBSLBHBJOTUQBO"SBCOBUJPOBMJTNBOEGPSFOTVSJOHBDDFTT
UPUIF,BHOFXDPNNVOJDBUJPOTGBDJMJUZPVUTJEFUIF&SJUSFBOUPXOPG"TNBSB 
XIJDIUSBOTNJUUFESBEJPTJHOBMTGSPNUIF.JEEMF&BTUUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT7
6OEFSUIF0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBN 0*41 GPSNFSMZŴŵżųE UIF
4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPWJEFEQPMJDFXJUIPWFSžŵųų ųųųJOFRVJQNFOU JODMVE-
JOH -BOE 3PWFST  SJĘFT  BOE SBEJPT  BOE DPOUSBDUFE UFDIOJDJBOT UP EFWFMPQ B
NPEFSO DSJNF MBC BOE SFDPSEDPMMFDUJPO TZTUFN  BMMPXJOH GPS UIF DFOUSBMJ[B-
tion of data on dissidents. Dozens of officers were trained in the United States,
returning to lead counter-subversive units with several veterans of the Greek
civil war.8 The OISP was headed by Colonel Ralph Selby of the Los Angeles
1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOE$PMPOFM(BSMBOE8JMMJBNT B'FEFSBM#VSFBVPG/BSDPU-
JDT '#/ BHFOUXIPIBEBQQSFIFOEFEUIF+FXJTINPCTUFS:BTIB,BU[FOCFSHJO
the 1930s and organized the El Paso border patrol in Texas. A native of Prentiss,
.JTTJTTJQQJ 8JMMJBNTXBTDIJFGPGTBCPUBHFUSBJOJOHXJUIUIF044EVSJOH8PSME
8BS**BOEIFMQFEGPSN%FUBDINFOUŴųŴJO#VSNB LOPXOGPSUSBEJOHPQJVNUP
ĕOBODFHVFSSJMMBBDUJWJUJFT)FBMTPTFSWFEXJUIUIFTFDSFU:'PSDFJO,VONJOH 
$IJOB CBTFPGUIF'MZJOH5JHFST XIPGVOOFMFEBSNTUPUIF(.%BOESBOTFDSFU
NJTTJPOT JOUP /PSUI ,PSFB EVSJOH UIF ,PSFBO 8BS  TVQFSWJTJOH 108 JOUFS-
SPHBUJPOUFBNT9

166 The Cold War on the Periphery


*O"EEJT"CBCB 8JMMJBNTXPSLFEXJUI$PMPOFM8PSLOFI(FCFZFIV IFBE
PGUIFTFDSFUQPMJDF XIPDPNNJUUFETVJDJEFBęFSCFJOHJNQMJDBUFEJOBGBJMFE
ŴżŹųDPVQQMPU8IJMFTUJMMMPZBMUPUIFFNQFSPS IFXBTJOWPMWFEiOPUXJUITPMW-
JOHDSJNF wBOJOUFSOBMSFQPSUOPUFE iCVUXJUIQPMJUJDBMJOUFMMJHFODFPGUIFUZQF
TPVHIUBęFSCZQPMJDFJOFWFSZOPOEFNPDSBUJDSFHJNF wBTUSJLJOHBDLOPXMFEH-
NFOUPGUIFDPOOFDUJPOCFUXFFO"NFSJDBOQSPHSBNTBOEQPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPO
8JMMJBNT BOE 4FMCZ BTTJTUFE 8PSLOFI (FCFZFIV JO DVMUJWBUJOH OFUXPSLT PG
JOGPSNBOUT ćPVTBOET XFSF QMBDFE VOEFS TVSWFJMMBODF  JODMVEJOH PQQPTJOH
QPMJUJDJBOTćFFNCBTTZFYQSFTTFETBUJTGBDUJPOBUUIFFČFDUJWFOFTTPGUIFQPMJDF
JOUIFĕFMEPGQPMJUJDBMJOUFMMJHFODF DPNNFOUJOHGBWPSBCMZUIBUUIFiFNQFSPS
keeps opponents under close watch.”10
"TUIFTFSFNBSLTJOEJDBUF UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFHSPXUIPG
BNPEFSOQPMJDFTUBUFJO&UIJPQJB SFTVMUJOHJOBOJOĘVYPGQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST
*OTQFDUJPOTSFWFBMFEUIBUQSJTPOBDDPNNPEBUJPOTXFSFQPPSJOQBSUCFDBVTF
PGUIFMBDLPGBNFEJDBMCVEHFU NJOJNBMTUBOEBSETPGEVFQSPDFTT BOEUIFMPX
DBMJCFSPGHVBSET3FGPSNTXFSFQSPQPTFE JODMVEJOHUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGJOEVT-
USJBMTIPQTBTBNFDIBOJTNPGSFIBCJMJUBUJPO UIPVHIUIFTFXFSFTMPXUPHFUPČ
UIF HSPVOE 'MPHHJOH XBT DPOUJOVPVTMZ QSBDUJDFE JO NBOZ GBDJMJUJFT  IBWJOH
been retained in the 1957 penal code.11
ćF ,FOOFEZ BENJOJTUSBUJPO FYQBOEFE QPMJDF BJE UP žŴŶŶŸ NJMMJPO QFS
ZFBS BOE MBVODIFE B $*" QSPHSBN UP JOĕMUSBUF UIF MBCPS NPWFNFOU  TJNJMBS
UP UIF POF PWFSTFFO CZ "NCBTTBEPS &EXBSE ,PSSZ JO *UBMZ BOE  MBUFS  $IJMF
0WFSBIBMGEP[FO*TSBFMJTXFSFTVCDPOUSBDUFEUPUSBJOTUSJLFGPSDFVOJUTNPE-
eled after the Israeli frontier police. Undersecretary of State George Ball feared
UIBU MBCPS PSHBOJ[FST  .VTMJN EJTTJEFOUT  BOE EJTBČFDUFE VOJWFSTJUZ TUVEFOUT
XPVMEVOJGZUPPWFSUISPXUIFFNQFSPS QMBZJOHJOUP.PTDPXTIBOET12 To pre-
WFOUUIJTPVUDPNF ,FOOFEZT4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZTVQQMJFE
UIFQPMJDFXJUITJYUZĕWF(FOFSBM.PUPSTTFEBOT BTXFMMBTNJMJUBSZIFMNFUT 
NBDIJOFHVOT .ŴSJĘFT BOEMBCPSBUPSZFRVJQNFOU JODMVEJOHQPMZHSBQIBOE
ĕOHFSQSJOUVOJUTćF014GVOEFEBOBUJPOBMQPMJDFBDBEFNZBOEUSBJOFETUBČ
PGUIF"CB%JO*NQFSJBM4UBČ$PMMFHF XIPTFDVSSJDVMVNXBTCBTFEPOUIBUPG
"NFSJDBOQPMJDFBDBEFNJFT13
0OFPGUIFJOTUSVDUPST 3BZ'PSFBLFS DMBJNFEUIBUUIF"CB%JO$PMMFHFXBT
DSVDJBM JO DPOUSJCVUJOH UP JNQSPWFE QSPGFTTJPOBM TUBOEBSET 'PVSUFFO HSBEV-
BUFT IPXFWFS XFSFJOEJDUFEGPSCVSHMBSZBOEBSNFESPCCFSZ TVHHFTUJOHUIF
broad scale of corruption. A report stated that poor pay left police susceptible
to bribery.14$MFBSMZUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBQPMJDJOHQBSBEJHN UIFSFGFSFODFQPJOU
GPSJOTUSVDUPSTBUUIFBDBEFNZ XBTOPUFBTJMZUSBOTGFSBCMF QBSUJDVMBSMZJOUIF
QPMJUJDBMDMJNBUFPGUIF$PME8BS JOXIJDI"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHXBTEFTJHOFEUP
GPSUJGZSFQSFTTJWFSFHJNFT
*O ŴżŹŻ BO 014USBJOFE VOJU QSPUFDUFE 7JDF 1SFTJEFOU )VCFSU )VNQISFZ
XIFOTUVEFOUTBUUBDLFEUIF"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZXJUITUPOFTEVSJOHIJTWJTJUUP

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 167


&UIJPQJB1PMJDFTVCTFRVFOUMZLJMMFEUISFFTUVEFOUTXIPXFSFQSPUFTUJOHBęFS
VOJPOTXFSFCBOOFEBUUIFNBJOVOJWFSTJUZJO"EEJT"CBCB&QJUPNJ[JOHUIF
MBDLPGSFHBSEGPSIVNBOSJHIUT 014BEWJTFS)PSUPO84UFFMFDPOHSBUVMBUFE
colleague Mitchell Mabardy “on a job well done” in overseeing the suppression
PGUIFEFNPOTUSBUJPOT15
ćF014DIBOOFMFETPNFPGJUTFRVJQNFOUUPUIFNJMJUBSZ JODMVEJOHGSBH-
NFOUBUJPOCPNCT DPOTJEFSFEiJEFBMGPSVTFBHBJOTUEJTTJEFOUCBOET wOBNFMZ 
4PNBMJCBDLFE SFCFMT MFE CZ .VLUBM %BIJS TFFLJOH JOEFQFOEFODF JO UIF
0HBEFOSFHJPOPGTPVUIFSO4PNBMJB*O.BSDIŴżŹŷ BMPOHTJEFUIF#SJUJTIBOE
*UBMJBOT UIF014FYQBOEFEBEWJTPSZTVQQPSUUPQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUT XIJDIJOTUJ-
tuted “very severe repressive activity” against the Ogaden Liberation Front,
CVSOJOH WJMMBHFT  LJMMJOH VOBSNFE DJWJMJBOT  BOE EFTUSPZJOH DSPQT16 Selassie
also used police brigades to put down a northern uprising by the Eritrean Lib-
FSBUJPO'SPOU &-' $VMUJWBUJOHDMPTFUJFTXJUI#SJHBEJFS(FOFSBM;FSFNBSJBO
"[B[[J  DPNNJTTJPOFS PG QPMJDF GPS &SJUSFB  'PSFBLFS  8JMMJBNT  BOE 3PCFSU
8IJUNFS BWFUFSBOPGUIFBOUJ)VLDBNQBJHOJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFT EFWFMPQFE
BCPSEFSDPOUSPMTFSWJDFBOEPWFSTBXiUJNFMZBOEIBSEIJUUJOHwSBJETJO&-'
territory.17 "JSQMBOFT XFSF EFMJWFSFE UISPVHI B $*" JOUFSNFEJBSZ UP DPVOUFS
UIF4PWJFUEFMJWFSZPG.J(TUP4PNBMJB XIJDICBDLFEUIF&-'ćF"NFSJDBO
QMBOFTXFSFVTFEUPTUSBGFWJMMBHFTBOENBDIJOFHVOQFBTBOUTBOEUIFJSMJWF-
TUPDL SFTVMUJOHJONBTTLJMMJOHTBOEEJTQMBDFNFOU18 In these and other ways,
"NFSJDBOQPMJDFBJEXBTVTFEGPSSFQSFTTJWFQVSQPTFTBOEIFMQFEUPBHHSBWBUF
MPDBMFUIOJDDPOĘJDUT
ćFHVFSSJMMBNPWFNFOUTJO&SJUSFBBOE0HBEFOBTXFMMBTJOUIF5JHSBZMBOET
DPOUJOVFESFTJTUJOH&UIJPQJBOFODSPBDINFOU SFDFJWJOHTVQQPSUGSPN4PNBMJB
and other Arab states. In 1974 Selassie was overthrown by the Marxist Mengistu
)BJMF.BSJBN19*OIFMQJOHQSPMPOHUIFEFDBZJOHSFHJNFPGUIFFNQFSPS "NFSJ-
DBOQPMJDFBOENJMJUBSZQSPHSBNTSBEJDBMJ[FEUIFSFWPMVUJPOBSZNPWFNFOUBOE
left a legacy of violence.
*O4PNBMJB UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPGUIFQPMJDF
XIJMFQMBZJOHCPUITJEFTJOUIF&UIJPQJB4PNBMJBSJWBMSZ*OUIFMBUFŴżŸųT PO
UIFFWFPG4PNBMJJOEFQFOEFODF PXJOHUPGFBSTUIBUBi/BTTFSMJLFwMFBEFSMPZBM
UPUIF4PWJFU6OJPONJHIUFNFSHF UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTCFHBOQSPWJEJOH4PNB-
MJBXJUIQPMJDFBJEBMPOHTJEFJUTGPSNFSDPMPOJBMPWFSMPSE *UBMZ*OB+VMZŴżŸŻ
QPMJDF TVSWFZ  -JFVUFOBOU $PMPOFM 3VTTFMM " 4OPPL  GPSNFS TVQFSJOUFOEFOU
of the New Jersey State Police who had headed police training operations in
Italy designed to stabilize the Allied occupation in World War II, concluded
UIBU iUISFBUT PG USJCBM DPOĘJDU BOE GPSFJHO TVCWFSTJPO NBLF UIF NBJOUFOBODF
PG QFBDF BOE PSEFS FTTFOUJBM UP UIF EFWFMPQNFOU PG UIF DPVOUSZ ćF 4PNBMJ
HPWFSONFOUXJMMUVSOFMTFXIFSFGPSBJEJGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTEPFTOPUQSPWJEF
assistance.”20 0WFS UIF OFYU EFDBEF  UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU XPVME TQFOE PWFS
žŷNJMMJPO GVSOJTIJOHIFMJDPQUFSTBOESJPUDPOUSPMFRVJQNFOUBOEĕOBODJOHB

168 The Cold War on the Periphery


USBJOJOHBDBEFNZ XIFSFBEWJTFSTMFECZ#FSZFM1BDF GPSNFSJOTQFDUPSPGUIF
%FUSPJU1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOEBQBSUJDJQBOUJOUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBN TFSWFE
as instructors.
3PHFS )JMTNBO  EJSFDUPS PG UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOUT #VSFBV PG *OUFMMJHFODF
BOE3FTFBSDIEVSJOHUIF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPO DSFEJUFEUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT
with preventing the spread of a “pseudo populist” revolt thanks to the creation
PGBTNBMMCVUFďDJFOU8FTUFSOUSBJOFEDJWJMJBOGPSDF21ćFTFDPNNFOUTSFWFBM
UIFBOUJEFNPDSBUJDGVODUJPOPGUIF014BOEUIFFMJUJTNPG,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSB-
tion officials (including the “doves”). In July 1967, coinciding with a $200,000
QPMJUJDBMBDUJPOQSPHSBNUPGPTUFSUIFFMFDUJPOPGQSP8FTUFSOPďDJBMT UIF014
QSPWJEFE 4PNBMJB XJUI FNFSHFODZ DPNNVOJDBUJPOT  TNBMM BSNT  BOE UISFF
$FTTOBBJSDSBęJOSFTQPOTFUPCPSEFSWJPMBUJPOTCZ&UIJPQJBOUSPPQT4PNFPG
UIFFRVJQNFOUXBTVTFEJOGBNJOFSFMJFGPQFSBUJPOT XIJDIIBEBiTBMVUBSZFČFDU
on police relationships with the people.”22ćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUBOEUIF1FOUB-
HPONBJOUBJOFEPQFSBUJPOTJO4PNBMJBVOUJMŴżźŵ XIFOEJDUBUPS4JBE#BSSFQVU
UIFDPVOUSZJOUIF4PWJFUDBNQ UIPVHIUIFZXPVMETVQQPSU#BSSFEVSJOHUIF
QFSJPEPGIJTNPTUCSVUBMSFQSFTTJPOJOUIFŴżŻųT23

Containing Pan-Arabism and Qaddafi: Police Aid in Northern Africa


1PMJDFQSPHSBNTXFSFJNQPSUBOUUP"NFSJDBOOFPDPMPOJBMTUSBUFHZUISPVHIPVU
North Africa, which strategic planners viewed as a “rear area for support for
NJMJUBSZ JOUFSWFOUJPO JO UIF .JEEMF &BTU BOE 1FSTJBO (VMGw24 In Libya, after
1290-d architect Henry Villard negotiated a treaty securing base rights in return
for technical assistance, advisers such as Frank Walton, Arthur Thurston, and
3BZ'PSFBLFSEFWFMPQFEBDSJNFMBCBOEQSPWJEFEžŻųų ųųųJOBSNT BSNPSFE
DBST IBOEDVČT BOEIFMJDPQUFSTXJUINBDIJOFHVONPVOUTUPUIFDJWJMEFGFOTF
forces of the pro-Western King Idris, before he was overthrown in a 1969 revo-
MVUJPOMFECZ$PMPOFM.VBNNBS2VBEEBĕ1PMJDFXFSFUSBJOFEUPQSPUFDUWJUBM
JOEVTUSJBMNBDIJOFSZBOEUIFDPVOUSZTPJMJOTUBMMBUJPOT QVNQJOHTUBUJPOT BOE
pipelines.25
&MMJPU#)FOTFM BGPSFOTJDDIFNJTUJO7FOUVSB$PVOUZ $BMJGPSOJB XIPMBUFS
worked in the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia, wrote in his end-of-tour
report:

*UIBTCFFOBĕOFFYQFSJFODFUPTUBSUXJUIQSBDUJDBMMZOPUIJOHBOECVJMEBOPQFSB-
tion entirely with a good future potential. This is particularly satisfying to a law
FOGPSDFNFOU PďDFS  GPS JO IJT VTVBM TUBUFTJEF SPVUJOF  IF PęFO GFFMT UIBU IF JT
DBVHIUJOBSFWPMWJOHEPPSćFTBNFESVOLESJWFST JEFOUJDBMCVSHMBST BOEUIFPME
GBNJMJBSEPQFQFEEMFSTQBTTUISPVHIIJTMBCPSBUPSZXJUINPOTUSPVTSFHVMBSJUZIJT
QBJOTUBLJOHXPSLXJUIUFTUUVCFBOENJDSPTDPQFTJTGSFRVFOUMZSFKFDUFECZDMFWFS
lawyers and disbelieving juries. . . . The adviser departs Libya with regret at leaving
OFXGSJFOETBOEDPMMFBHVFTCVUXJUIUIFQMFBTVSFJOIBWJOHNBEFBTNBMMDPOUSJCV-
tion to another country.26

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 169


ćFTFDPNNFOUTQSPWJEFBXJOEPXJOUPUIFNPUJWFTPGQVCMJDTBGFUZPďDJBMT
XIJMFQMBZJOHEPXOUIFMBSHFSTUSBUFHJDQVSQPTFTGPSXIJDIUIFQSPHSBNTXFSF
designed.
2BEEBĕT SJTF UP QPXFS XBT WJFXFE XJUI BMBSN JO 8BTIJOHUPO  XIJDI
BEPQUFE B DPOUBJONFOU TUSBUFHZ BHBJOTU IJN DFOUFSFE PO FČPSUT UP TIPSF VQ
regional allies.27 As with the Soviet Union, this approach bore unforeseen costs,
QBSUJDVMBSMZJOOFJHICPSJOH$IBE XIFSF"NFSJDBOQSPHSBNTIFMQFEUPQSPMPOH
UIFSVMFPG'SBOÎPJT5PNCBMCBZF XIPSFNBJOFEJOQPXFSGSPN"VHVTUŴżŹų
until he was overthrown and killed in a coup d’état in April 1975. The United
4UBUFT WJFXFE $IBE BT BO JNQPSUBOU iDSPTTSPBET CFUXFFO &BTU BOE 5SPQJDBM
"GSJDBwBOEBQPUFOUJBMCBTFGPSUIFTQSFBEPGQBO"SBCJTUJEFBMT5PNCBMCBZF
dissolved opposing parties, favored his own Sara tribe, and was ruthless in
QSPNPUJOHBTUSPOHDFOUSBMHPWFSONFOU XIJDIJOUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTDPOTJEFSFE
one of his strengths. He was also valued by Washington because he was anti-
Arab and pro-French.28*OŴżŹŵ BTSJPUTHSJQQFEUIFDBQJUBM 'PSU-BNZ MBUFS
/%KBNFOB 64BEWJTFS3PHFS3PCJOTPOXBSOFE&OHMFBCPVUUIFJOBCJMJUZPG
UIF'SFODICBDLFETFDVSJUZGPSDFTUPNFFUUIFJSiSFTQPOTJCJMJUZGPSDPOUSPMMJOH
EJTTJEFOUFMFNFOUTBOEUPQSPUFDU<$IBET>GSPOUJFSTBHBJOTUJMMFHBMDSPTTJOHTw
)FFYQSFTTFEGVSUIFSDPODFSOUIBUUIFBEPQUJPOPGiGPSDFGVMNFBTVSFTwBHBJOTU
.VTMJNTBOEPQQPTJUJPOMFBEFSTXBTDSFBUJOHBQPMJUJDBMCBDLMBTIBOESFDPN-
NFOEFEQSPWJEJOHJNNFEJBUFUFDIOJDBMBTTJTUBODFBOEXFBQPOSZ29
ćF"NFSJDBOBNCBTTBEPSUP$IBE +PIO$BMIPVO WJFXFEBOBEWJTPSZQSP-
HSBNBTBDSVDJBMXBZUPiSFEVDFQSFTTVSFDPNJOHGSPNBOUJ'SFODIFMFNFOUT
BOEZPVOHJOUFMMFDUVBMTwXIPXBOUFEUIFDPVOUSZUPCFiNPSFJOEFQFOEFOUw
0QFSBUJOHBUBCVEHFUPGžŸŵź ųųųQFSZFBS UIF014QSPWJEFENPEFSOXFBQ-
POT  UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT  BOE SJPU DPOUSPM HFBS BOE IFMQFE UP FTUBCMJTI BO
JEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBNGPSTPDJBMDPOUSPMQVSQPTFT*UBMTPDPOTUSVDUFEĕSFBSNT
SBOHFTBOEDSFBUFEBQPMJDFNPCJMFTUSJLFVOJUMFECZB'SFODIJOUFMMJHFODFPď-
DFS 1JFSSF(BCSJFM BĕęFFOZFBSWFUFSBOPGUIF*OEPDIJOBXBS30
014SFQPSUTMBNFOUFEUIBU PXJOHUPBMBDLPGJEFPMPHJDBMNPUJWBUJPOBOEUIF
corruption of the officer class, in the face of battle the police were “afraid and
JODPNQFUFOU MBDLFEDPVSBHF BOEXFSFQSPOFUPEFGFDUJPOw&EXBSE#JTIPQ BO
BSNZMJFVUFOBOUGSPNSVSBM8JTDPOTJOXJUIFYQFSJFODFJO$BNCPEJB #VSNB 
7JFUOBN 5VSLFZ BOE+BQBO QSPQPTFETUFQQJOHVQiJOEPDUSJOBUJPONFBTVSFTw
to “alleviate these difficulties.”31"TJONBOZPUIFSJOUFSWFOUJPOT UIFQSPCMFN
QFSTJTUFE IPXFWFS BTJUXBTDPOUJOHFOUPOQPMJUJDBMDJSDVNTUBODF*OTQJUFPG
NBOZTIPSUDPNJOHT UIF014DPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFQSPMPOHBUJPOPG5PNCBMCBZFT
repressive rule and to a vicious cycle of state and anti-state violence which
spilled over into neighboring Sudan and exacerbated the war in Darfur. Few
QFPQMFJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT NFBOXIJMF DPVMEFWFOMPDBUF$IBEPOBNBQ
%VSJOH UIF FBSMZ ŴżŻųT  XIJMF VOEFSNJOJOH QFBDFLFFQJOH FČPSUT CZ UIF
0SHBOJ[BUJPO PG "GSJDBO 6OJUZ  UIF 3FBHBO BENJOJTUSBUJPO GVOOFMFE 4UJOHFS

170 The Cold War on the Periphery


NJTTJMFTUPPOFPG5PNCBMCBZFTNBJOPQQPOFOUT )JTTÒOF)BCSÏ JOPSEFSUP
DPVOUFS-JCZBOBOE'SFODIJOĘVFODF BOECFDBVTFIFTVQQPSUFEBUUBDLTBHBJOTU
2BEEBĕ )BCSÏ XBT MBUFS BDDVTFE PG TPNF GPSUZ UIPVTBOE QPMJUJDBM NVSEFST
BOEBDUTPGTZTUFNBUJDUPSUVSF NBJOMZDBSSJFEPVUCZIJTQPMJUJDBMQPMJDF XIPTF
EJSFDUPSTBMMDBNFGSPN)BCSÏTTNBMM(PSBOFFUIOJDHSPVQ32 Here again we see
the shortsightedness of U.S. policy, which showered weaponry on leaders on
UIF CBTJT PG JNNFEJBUF DPOUJOHFODJFT  XJUIPVU DPODFSO GPS UIF MPOHUFSN PS
IVNBODPOTFRVFODFT

Propping Up Dictatorship: American Police Training and


Neocolonialism in West Africa

*O -JCFSJB  GPVOEFE BT B RVBTJDPMPOZ PG UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT  QPMJDF QSPHSBNT
XFSF EFTJHOFE UP VQIPME UIF QPXFS PG UIF "GSJDBO "NFSJDBO NJOPSJUZ BOE
QSPUFDUUIFQSPQFSUZPGUIF'JSFTUPOFSVCCFSDPSQPSBUJPO XIJDIEPNJOBUFEUIF
FDPOPNZ-JCFSJBBMTPQPTTFTTFEWJUBMDPNNVOJDBUJPOTGBDJMJUJFTPČUIFQPSUPG
.POSPWJB"NFSJDBOJOWFTUNFOUTJO-JCFSJBUPUBMFEPWFSžŶŸųNJMMJPO TFDPOE
PO UIF DPOUJOFOU POMZ UP UIPTF JO 4PVUI "GSJDB 1SFTJEFOU 8JMMJBN 5VCNBO
ŴżŷŶoŴżźŴ XBTMPPLFEPOBTBiTQFDJBMGSJFOEwCFDBVTFPGIJTiDPNNJUNFOUUP
GSFFFOUFSQSJTFBOEBOPQFOEPPSFDPOPNJDQPMJDZw'JSFTUPOFFYFDVUJWF#ZSPO
)-BSBCFFWJFXFEIJNBTUIFiCFTUMFBEFSPOUIF"GSJDBOTDFOFw33
In 1912 the United States had aided in the creation of Liberia’s National
(VBSE'PSUZUISFFZFBSTMBUFS JO/PWFNCFSŴżŸŸ UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUT*OUFS-
OBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPODPOUSBDUFE3JDIBSE-)PMDPNC DIJFGPG
the Bureau of Police Science at the State University of Iowa, to study the six
IVOESFEoNBOQPMJDFGPSDF*NQSFTTFECZ'JSFTUPOFTUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTBOE
the growth of the capital city, Monrovia, where “people who had never seen
B USVDL UISFF ZFBST BHP DPVME OPX PQFSBUF DPNQMFY FRVJQNFOU w )PMDPNC
TUSFTTFEUIBUUIFQPMJDFOFFEFEUPCFNPEFSOJ[FE FNQIBTJ[JOHUIBUUIFTBMBSJFT
XFSFMPXBOEUIBUUIFGPSDFXBTFRVJQQFEXJUIPOMZBGFXTIPUHVOTBOESFWPMW-
FST)FBEWPDBUFEFTUBCMJTIJOHBSBEJPTZTUFNBOEBTFDVSJUZEFUBJMGPSUIFQSFTJ-
EFOU XIPIBECFFOUIFUBSHFUPGBSFDFOUBTTBTTJOBUJPOBUUFNQU34
#FUXFFO ŴżŸŸ BOE ŴżźŴ  UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU TQFOU PWFS žŶŷ NJMMJPO UP
JNQMFNFOU UIFTF HPBMT ćF QSPHSBN XBT IFBEFE GPS B UJNF CZ ćFPEPSF
Brown, chief of police in Eugene, Oregon, and director of public safety in
(VBN  XIP XPVME CFDPNF 014 EJSFDUPS JO -BUJO "NFSJDB +PIO .BOPQPMJ
BOE3JDIBSE3PEHFSTPGUIF.467JFUOBNQSPKFDU &EXBSE1BZOF BUXFOUZ
POFZFBSWFUFSBOPGUIF1IJMBEFMQIJBQPMJDF BOE8JMMJBN$BOUSFMM XIPIFMQFE
CVJME BO JOUFMMJHFODF BHFODZ JO 6SVHVBZ LOPXO GPS UPSUVSF  XFSF BNPOH UIF
PUIFSBEWJTFSTćFZQSPWJEFEUFDIOJDBMBJEBOEFRVJQNFOU JODMVEJOHBJSQPSU
XFBQPOTEFUFDUPST NJMJUBSZIFMNFUT HSFOBEFT BOEUFBSHBTNBTLT BOEEFWFM-
PQFESBEJPDPNNVOJDBUJPOT BQPMJDFBDBEFNZ BOEBEFUFDUJWFCVSFBV35 Over

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 171


BIVOESFE-JCFSJBOTXFSFTFOUGPSUSBJOJOHBUUIF*1"BOEUIF/FX:PSL1PMJDF
%FQBSUNFOU CVU OPU JO TPVUIFSO QPMJDF JOTUJUVUJPOT  XIFSF "GSJDBOT XFSF
barred). Israeli Mossad and CIA agents such as Cantrell, Brown, and Robert
Lowe developed the national intelligence and security services, whose assistant
director was an IPA graduate.36
%PNJOBUFE CZ UIF .FOEFT USJCF  NBOZ PG UIF QPMJDF XFSF BDUVBM TFDVSJUZ
FNQMPZFFTPG'JSFTUPOFBOETFSWFEBTJOEVTUSJBMTQJFT1SJPSJUJ[JOHQVCMJDTFDV-
SJUZPWFSIVNBOSJHIUT UIF014BDLOPXMFEHFEUIFJOFRVJUBCMFDPOEJUJPOTBU
'JSFTUPOFCVUUSBJOFETQFDJBMSJPUDPOUSPMTRVBET XIJDIJO'FCSVBSZŴżŹŹLJMMFE
BMBCPSPSHBOJ[FSBOEXPVOEFETFWFSBMNPSF*OIJTFOEPGUPVSSFQPSU 3JDI-
BSE4VUUPOMBNFOUFEUIBUUIFHPWFSONFOUIBEBOiBQBUIFUJDBUUJUVEFwUPXBSE
curbing social unrest and would wait until a “situation arises.” U.S. advisers
QSFGFSSFE MFBEFST XIP QSPNPUFE BHHSFTTJWF QPMJDF UBDUJDT BOE DSBDLFE EPXO
harshly on the left.37
ćF QPPS IVNBO SJHIUT DMJNBUF QFSWBEJOH -JCFSJB XBT FQJUPNJ[FE CZ
XSFUDIFEQSJTPODPOEJUJPOT%FTQJUF1SFTJEFOU5VCNBOTQSPWJTJPOPGžŸųų ųųų
GPS NPEFSOJ[BUJPO  JOTQFDUJPOT PG UIF .POSPWJB KBJM GPVOE UIBU UIF JONBUFT
diet consisted of one pound of rice per day and an occasional piece of dried
ĕTI"TJO014SVOGBDJMJUJFTJO7JFUOBN UIFDFMMTXFSFPOMZUXPGFFUCZĕWF
GFFU BOEQMVNCJOHXBTOPOFYJTUFOU1SJTPOFSTTMFQUPOUIFĘPPST XIJDIXFSF
BMTPVTFEBTUPJMFUT0UIFSGBDJMJUJFTXFSFTNBMMIVUTMBDLJOHGPPEEJTUSJCVUJPOPS
JOEVTUSZ XJUICFBUJOHTFOEFNJD383FGPSNXBTNBEFJNQPTTJCMFCZPWFSDSPXE-
JOHDBVTFECZBOJOĘVYPGQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST SFTVMUJOHGSPNFOIBODFEQPMJDF
TVSWFJMMBODFćF014SFQPSUFEUIBUQFSTPOTXIPNBEFiEFSPHBUPSZSFNBSLT
BHBJOTU UIF TUBUFw XFSF BNPOH UIPTF MJBCMF UP CF BSSFTUFE "O FNCBTTZ DBCMF
TUBUFEUIBU1SFTJEFOU5VCNBOiSVMFTQBUFSOBMJTUJDBMMZXJUIIFBWZBQQMJDBUJPOTPG
police power and has indicated a readiness to arrest those suspected of subver-
sion on weak evidence, probably because of his concern that any weakening
PGIJTHSBTQNJHIUQSPWPLFBOBUUFNQUUPXSFTUIJTQPXFSGSPNIJNw39 These
DPNNFOUTQSPWJEFBDMFBSJOEJDBUJPOPGUIFSFQSFTTJWFFOETUPXIJDIUIF014
QSPHSBNTDPOUSJCVUFE
*OUIF*WPSZ$PBTU XIJDIBDIJFWFEJOEFQFOEFODFJOŴżŸŻ "NFSJDBOUSBJO-
ing helped to solidify the rule of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a conservative auto-
DSBUMJLF4FMBTTJFXIPQSPNPUFEFDPOPNJDQSJWBUJ[BUJPOBOEXFMDPNFE'SFODI
engineers in developing the country’s infrastructure. Houphouët-Boigny was
precisely the type of postcolonial leader Frantz Fanon warned about in Black
Skin, White Masks‰POFXIPTPVHIUUPFNVMBUF&VSPQFBONPSFT EFOJHSBUFE
African culture, and essentially kowtowed to Western interests.40 He was
EFTQJTFECZQBO"GSJDBOJTUTMJLF(IBOBT,XBNF/LSVNBIBOE4ÏLPV5PVSÏ
of Guinea but was popular in the Western capitals. Public safety reports noted
UIBUBTBDIBNQJPOPGNPEFSBUF"GSJDBODBVTFTBOEBTUSPOHBOUJDPNNVOJTU 
Houphouët-Boigny provided “strong and acceptable leadership for internal

172 The Cold War on the Periphery


TUBCJMJUZwBOEXBSOFEPGUIFUISFBUPGTVCWFSTJWFQSFTTVSFGSPNiSBEJDBM(IBOB-
JBOTBOE(VJOFBOT‫ڀڀ‬TVCKFDUFEUP$IJDPN<$IJOFTFDPNNVOJTU>JOĘVFODFw
%JTNJTTJOHUIFJEFBUIBUUIFTFiSBEJDBMTwXFSFNPUJWBUFECZJEFBMJTNBOEEJTJM-
MVTJPONFOUXJUIXJEFTDBMFJOKVTUJDF UIFSFQPSUTDMBJNFEUIBUUIFPQQPTJUJPO
PGTUVEFOUT MBCPSBDUJWJTUT BOEDJWJMTFSWBOUTXBTiGBOOFECZBOUJHPWFSONFOU
QSPQBHBOEBQVUPVUCZQSPDPNNVOJTUFMFNFOUTw41
ćFTFSFNBSLTFYFNQMJGZUIFDPOTQJSBUPSJBMUIFPSZIFMECZ014PďDJBMTBOE
UIF"NFSJDBOOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZCVSFBVDSBDZ XIJDIWJFXFEBMMQPQVMBSVOSFTU 
SFHBSEMFTTPGUIFDJSDVNTUBODFT BTCFJOHNBOJQVMBUFECZDPNNVOJTUBHFOUT
As a result, they were able to rationalize heavy-handed police actions even
XIJMFBDLOPXMFEHJOHUIBUNBOZPGUIFHPWFSONFOUTUIFZXFSFTVQQPSUJOHXFSF
autocratic. Through the late 1960s, the OPS provided $389,000 in assistance
to the Ivory Coast, supplying Houphouët-Boigny’s internal security forces
XJUIUIJSUZTJYUSBOTQPSUWFIJDMFTBTXFMMBTSFWPMWFST BNNVOJUJPO BOEIBOE
cranked generators for use in police precincts. Aided by French advisers in
4FOFHBM +PIO.BOPQPMJ (BSMBOE8JMMJBNT BOE3FOÏ5FUB[DSFBUFEBSJPUDPO-
USPMGPSDF DPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFN BOEQPMJDFMJCSBSZTUPDLFEXJUIUFYUTVTFE
JO"NFSJDBOQPMJDFBDBEFNJFTTVDIBT088JMTPOTPolice Administration and
J. Edgar Hoover’s Masters of DeceitPONFUIPETPGDPNNVOJTUTVCWFSTJPOćFZ
also provided training in counterintelligence and FBI-style surveillance.42 In
UIJTSFHBSE "NFSJDBOBJEDPOUSJCVUFEUPBNQMFIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFTBOEUIF
preservation of Houphouët-Boigny’s power, which endured into the early 1990s
BęFSIFFOBDUFEBEFDSFFNBLJOHIJNQSFTJEFOUGPSMJGF
*O (IBOB UIF 014 JOJUJBUFE B žŷųų ųųų QSPHSBN BęFS B ŴżŹŹ $*"CBDLFE
DPVQ PWFSUISFX ,XBNF /LSVNBI  UIF DPVOUSZT ĕSTU QPTUJOEFQFOEFODF
MFBEFS"VUIPSPGBOJOĘVFOUJBMCPPLPOOFPDPMPOJBMJTN /LSVNBIUPPLNFB-
sures beginning in the late 1950s to nationalize key industries, resources, and
DSPQT JODMVEJOHDPDPB BOEEFNBOEFEUIBUGPSFJHOĕSNTSFJOWFTUŹųQFSDFOU
PGUIFJSQSPĕUTJO(IBOBćF$*"TVCTFRVFOUMZDIBSBDUFSJ[FEIJNBTBiWBJO
PQQPSUVOJTUBOETIPXCPZwBOEBDDVTFEIJNPGSVOOJOHVQGPSFJHOEFCUTGPS
iVOTPVOETUBUFFOUFSQSJTFTBOEQPMJUJDBMBOEEJQMPNBUJDBDUJWJUJFTEFTJHOFEUP
GVSUIFSIJTPXODPOUJOFOUBMBNCJUJPOTw43
ćFQVCMJDTBGFUZQSPHSBNXBTEFTJHOFEUPTIPSFVQUIFOFXNJMJUBSZQPMJDF
KVOUB  EPNJOBUFE CZ FUIOJD &XF BOE "TIBOUJ  XIJDI BCBOEPOFE /LSVNBIT
WJTJPOPGJOEFQFOEFOUFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOUJOGBWPSPGUIFNPEFMPGFYQPSU
MFE HSPXUI GBWPSFE CZ UIF 8FTU 0OF PG UIF NBJO DPVQ QMPUUFST  +PIO 8 ,
)BSMMFZ  IBE CFFO QPMJDF DPNNJTTJPOFS PG(IBOB  TVCTFRVFOUMZ QSPNPUFE UP
inspector general of the Ghana national police. His rise, according to the histo-
SJBO3JDIBSE3BUICPOF DBOCFBUUSJCVUFEUPIJT+&EHBS)PPWFSoMJLFDPOUSPMPG
UIJDLĕMFTPOQPMJUJDBMMVNJOBSJFT44
ćPNBT'JOO BO'#*BHFOUGSPN1SPWJEFODF 3IPEF*TMBOE XIPBMTPTFSWFE
JOćBJMBOEBOE7JFUOBN BOE)BSPMEi4DPUUZw$BQMBO XIPIBEFYQFSJFODFPO

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 173


GPVSDPOUJOFOUT USBJOFE)BSMMFZTNFOJOSJPUDPOUSPMBOEDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF
BOE JNQSPWFE SFDPSET DPMMFDUJPO BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPOT 4NBMM BSNT BOE PWFS
UXPIVOESFEDBNFSBTBOEEJFDVUUFSTXFSFTIJQQFEJOUPBJEJOFTUBCMJTIJOHBO
JEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBN BOEBEP[FO(IBOBJBOQPMJDFPďDFSTXFSFTFOUUPUIF
IPA.45 0OF NBKPS EFĕDJFODZ  OPUFE CZ UIF (IBOBJBO DSJNJOBM KVTUJDF FYQFSU
3BZNPOE "UVHVCB  XBT UIBU UIFSF XBT OP TFSJPVT FČPSU UP QSPNPUF CBEMZ
OFFEFEMFHJTMBUJWFBOEKVEJDJBMSFGPSNTćFQPMJDFXFSFNPCJMJ[FEQSJODJQBMMZ
BMPOHQPMJUJDBMMJOFTUPTVQQSFTTQSP/LSVNBIFMFNFOUTBOEBHSPXJOHMBCPS
NPWFNFOU"TJOUIF#SJUJTIDPMPOJBMFSB UIFZTFSWFEiOPUUIFNBKPSJUZPGUIF
rural and urban poor, but the elites of the day. . . . They were powerful, brutal
and corrupt.”46 Once again, the OPS thus contributed to the spread of consider-
BCMFSFQSFTTJPO BT(IBOBCFDBNFNBSSFECZJOTUBCJMJUZ
In Nigeria, where police were authorized to shoot robbers on sight, the OPS
TQFOUžŶŷNJMMJPOGSPNŴżźųUPŴżźŵCVJMEJOHBQPMJDFTUBČDPMMFHFBU+PT(SBE-
VBUFTDBSSJFEPVUTVSWFJMMBODFPOCFIBMGPGUIFSFJHOJOHNJMJUBSZPMJHBSDIZBOE
SFQSJTBMTBHBJOTUUIF#JBGSBOJOEFQFOEFODFNPWFNFOU8IJMFQSPWJEJOHFNFS-
HFODZSFMJFGUPGBNJOFWJDUJNTXIPDBQUVSFEUIFXPSMETBUUFOUJPO UIF/JYPO
BENJOJTUSBUJPOSFGVTFEUPSFDPHOJ[FUIFJOEFQFOEFODFNPWFNFOUJOPSEFSUP
QSPUFDUJUTBMMJBODFXJUI(SFBU#SJUBJOBOECFDBVTFPGMPCCZJOHCZDPNQBOJFT
TVDIBT(VMG0JM XIJDIFOKPZFEGBWPSBCMFSFMBUJPOTXJUIUIF/JHFSJBONJMJUBSZ47
ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTXBTSFTQPOTJCMFGPSBCFUUJOHSFQSFTTJPOJOTFWFSBMTNBMMFS
8FTU "GSJDBO OBUJPOT  JODMVEJOH %BIPNFZ OPX #FOJO  UIF DPVQ DBQJUBM PG
Africa in the 1960s, where the OPS provided $266,000 to help reinforce a series
PG NJMJUBSZ KVOUBT +PIOTPO i+BDLw .POSPF EFWFMPQFE B UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
TZTUFNXJUI'SFODIBEWJTFSTBOEBTTJTUFEUIF4VSFUÏJOHBUIFSJOHJOUFMMJHFODF
PO PQQPTJUJPO QBSUZ NFNCFST  QPUFOUJBM DPVQ QMPUUFST  GPSFJHOFST  BOE MBCPS
BDUJWJTUT "NFSJDBOUSBJOFE PďDFST BMTP FOGPSDFE UIF DFOTPSTIJQT PG CPPLT 
OFXTQBQFST BOENPWJFTBOESPVOEFEVQTVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUTJOBDBNQBJHO
XIPTFFďDJFODZXBTFOIBODFECZUIFJNQPSUBUJPOPGNPEFSOTVSWFJMMBODFBOE
QIPUPHSBQIZFRVJQNFOU48
*O /JHFS  XIFSF UIF 'SFODI )JHI $PNNBOE XPSLFE UP TVCWFSU UIF ŴżŸŻ
FMFDUJPOT JO GBWPS PG QSP'SFODI DBOEJEBUF )BNBOB %JPSJ  XIP GBWPSFE UIF
%KFSNB BOE 4POHIBZ FUIOJDJUJFT  UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT QSPWJEFE PWFS žŹųų ųųų
in police aid. Much of it went to the French-controlled Sureté, whose agents
SPVOEFE VQ NFNCFST PG UIF MFęJTU 4BXBCB 1BSUZ  CBOOFE BęFS MFBEFS %KJCP
#BLBSZVOMFBTIFEBOUJSFHJNFQSPQBHBOEBBOEQMBOOFEDSPTTCPSEFSBTTBVMUT
GSPNFYJMFJO(IBOB4PNFPG#BLBSZTTVQQPSUFSTXFSFBSSFTUFEBOEIBOHFE
in public executions. Field reports noted that through effective cultivation of
JOGPSNBOUT UIF4VSFUÏLFQUBCSFBTUPGBDUJWJUJFTXJUIJOUIFMBCPSVOJPOT XIJDI
QSFEPNJOBOUMZTVQQPSUFEUIF4BXBCB1BSUZ"SNTXFSFGVOOFMFEUISPVHI"CJ-
djan in the Ivory Coast with Houphouët-Boigny’s collaboration. Respect for
civil liberties was not a priority.49"ęFSNFFUJOHXJUI1SFTJEFOU%JPSJJO+VOF

174 The Cold War on the Periphery


ŴżŹŸ ćPNBT'JOOBOEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTQFDJBMJTU1BVM,BU[SFDPNNFOEFE
FYQBOEJOHTVQQPSUGPSQBSBNJMJUBSZDPNNBOEPVOJUT XIJDIXFSFTFFOBTFČFD-
UJWFJODPQJOHXJUI4BXBCJMUESJWFOTVCWFSTJPOBOEPVUTJEFJOĕMUSBUPST50 The
VOJUT  USBJOFE JO DPVOUFSHVFSSJMMB UBDUJDT  XFSF JNQMJDBUFE JO TFSJPVT IVNBO
rights violations in another dirty war backed by the United States.
In the Central Africa Republic, the OPS provided $241,000 to stabilize the
authoritarian rule of David Dacko and his successor Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who
EFDMBSFEIJNTFMGFNQFSPSGPSMJGFJOŴżŹŹ*OUFSOBMSFQPSUTOPUFEUIBU#PLBTTB
XBTiNFOUBMMZVOTUBCMF QSPOFUPFSSBUJDCFIBWJPS wBOEIBEBSPVTFEiFMJUFBOE
QPQVMBS EJTDPOUFOU XJUI IJT FYUSBWBHBODFw CVU QSBJTFE IJN GPS PQQPTJOH BMM
UIJOHT *TMBNJD BOE QBO"SBCJTU BOE GPS GFOEJOH PČ DPNNVOJTU JOĕMUSBUPST
GSPN$IBEBOE4VEBO51"EPMQIF#POOFĕMBOE(BSMBOE8JMMJBNTXFSFDPO-
tracted to help solidify his power. Working with French agents, the clandestine
Cold Warriors expanded the radio network to aid in intelligence gathering,
JNQPSUFEĕOHFSQSJOUJOHUFDIOPMPHJFTGPSBOJEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBN BOEEFWFM-
PQFEQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUTDPOTJTUJOHPGUSJCBMNJOPSJUJFTUPSFQSFTTUIFPQQPTJ-
UJPOćFTFVOJUTXFSFNPEFMFEBęFSUIF)NPOHTFDSFUBSNZBOEUIF*SBOJBO
(FOEBSNFSJF XIJDI CPUI NFO IBE USBJOFE  BOE XFSF TJNJMBSMZ LOPXO GPS
their brutality.
In 1962 an OPS survey declared that “only 14 years ago, ordinary police were
JMMJUFSBUF QFPQMF XJUI TBDL DMPUIJOH BOE BSNFE XJUI TQFBSTw52 ćFTF SFNBSLT
QSPWJEFBXJOEPXJOUPUIFJEFPMPHJDBMVOEFSQJOOJOHPGUIFQSPHSBNTBOEUIF
8FTUFSOiDJWJMJ[JOHNJTTJPOwUPVQMJęTVQQPTFEMZCBDLXBSE"GSJDBOJOTUJUVUJPOT
BOEQFPQMFTUISPVHIUIFFYQPSUPGNPEFSOUFDIOPMPHZ0UIFSSFQPSUTFNQIB-
TJ[FEUIFOFFEUPNBJOUBJOBTUSPOHBEWJTPSZQSFTFODFCFDBVTFPGUIFDBSFMFTT
BOE TIBNFGVM USFBUNFOU PG iĕOF OFX "NFSJDBO NBUFSJBMw CZ MPDBM PďDJBMT
i&YQFSJFODFJOPUIFS"GSJDBODPVOUSJFT 6QQFS7PMUB /JHFS TIPXTUIBUNPE-
FSO "NFSJDBO FRVJQNFOU XJMM OPU CF VTFE DPSSFDUMZ PS XFMMNBJOUBJOFE BOE
XJMM OPU CFOFĕU BOZPOF JG UIFSF BSF OP AFYQFSUT UP BEWJTF ‫  ڀ ڀ‬ćF BTTJTUBODF
QSPHSBNTIPVMEUIVTOPUTJNQMZQSPWJEFFRVJQNFOUCVUNVTUJODMVEFBEWJTPSZ
and participant aid.”53 "T UIFTF DPNNFOUT JOEJDBUF  "NFSJDBOT GFMU UIBU UIFZ
were the only ones capable of ensuring the viability of state-building efforts and
EFOJHSBUFEMPDBMTGPSUIFJSVOGBNJMJBSJUZXJUI8FTUFSOXFBQPOTBOEUFDIOPMPHZ
#PLBTTB NFBOXIJMF VTFE UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT UP CVJME VQ IJT JOUFSOBM TFDV-
SJUZBQQBSBUVTBOEDPNQJMFEBOBUSPDJPVTIVNBOSJHIUTSFDPSE GPSXIJDIUIF
United States bore partial responsibility. The Ngaragba prison functioned as an
“open air theatre,” according to historian Florence Bernault, “where torturers
BOEQSJTPOFSTFOBDUFEUSBHJDTDFOFTPGQPXFSBOETVCNJTTJPOUIBUDFMFCSBUFE
Bokassa’s personal will and grandeur.”54

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 175


Arming Mobutu’s Killers: The OPS and the Postcolonial Nightmare in
the Congo

1PMJDFUSBJOJOHDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFIJHIFTUMFWFMTPGWJPMFODFJOUIF%FNPDSBUJD
Republic of the Congo (Zaire), where it helped consolidate the power of the
OPUPSJPVTEJDUBUPS+PTFQI%FTJSÏ.PCVUVćFNPUJWFGPSUIFQSPHSBNMBZJO
UIF$POHPTSJDINJOFSBMXFBMUIBOEOBUVSBMSFTPVSDFT XIJDIXFSFIJTUPSJDBMMZ
exploited by Western powers.550OFPGUIFĕSTUQVCMJDTBGFUZSFQPSUTQPJOUFEUP
UIF$POHPTiUSFNFOEPVTQPTTJCJMJUJFTGPSUIFGVUVSFBOEJOFDPOPNJDHSPXUI
BTBQSPEVDFSPGDPQQFS UJO VSBOJVN EJBNPOET QBMNPJM NBOHBOFTF HSFBU
OBUVSBMXFBMUIw*UXFOUPOUPTUBUF IPXFWFS UIBUiBDPNQSFIFOTJWFDJWJMQPMJDF
BTTJTUBODFQSPHSBNXBTWJUBMMZOFFEFEXJUIFNQIBTJTPOJODSFBTJOHEJTDJQMJO-
ary standards and riot control capabilities.”56
After the Congo achieved its independence in 1960, the United States col-
MBCPSBUFE XJUI #FMHJVN JO BTTBTTJOBUJOH UIF DPVOUSZT ĕSTU QSJNF NJOJTUFS 
1BUSJDF-VNVNCB BQBO"GSJDBOJTUBOETPDJBMJTUDIBSBDUFSJ[FECZ+PIO'PTUFS
%VMMFT BT B i$BTUSP PS XPSTFw -VNVNCBT EFNJTF XBT QSFEJDBUFE JO QBSU PO
his inability to control the Sureté, built up by the Belgians for internal security
QVSQPTFTćF$*"IFMQFEEFMJWFSIJNUPSJWBM.PÕTF5TIPNCF BXBSMPSEPWFS
EJBNPOESJDI,BUBOHBQSPWJODF XIPTFNFOUPSUVSFEBOELJMMFEIJN57
3FCFMMJPOTTVCTFRVFOUMZCSPLFPVU MFECZUIF4JNCBT iMJPOTwJO4XBIJMJ B
NJYPG-VNVNCBTVQQPSUFSTBOEEJTBČFDUFEFUIOJDHSPVQTCBDLFECZBEFMFHB-
tion of Cuban revolutionaries led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara and by Algerian
BOE &HZQUJBO ĕHIUFST BOE PUIFS SBEJDBM "GSJDBO TUBUFT TVDI BT (IBOB ćF
"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZTPVHIUUPDSVTIUIFSFCFMTXIPNJUDPOTJEFSFEiQSJNJUJWF
USJCFTNFO w BOE QSPWJEFE MPHJTUJDBM TVQQPSU BOE XFBQPOSZ UP UIF $POHPMFTF
"SNZ "/$ JODMVEJOHOBQBMNCPNCTćF$*"USBJOFEUFBNTPGSJHIUXJOH
$VCBOBOE4PVUI"GSJDBONFSDFOBSJFTIFBEFECZ.JLF)PBSF XIPXBTNBEF
BMJFVUFOBOUJOUIF"/$"NFSJDBOQJMPUTĘFX5ŵŻCPNCFSNJTTJPOT XIJDI
the Special Group on Counter-Insurgency praised for “doing an excellent job
JOCSFBLJOHVQSFCFMBUUBDLTPO"/$QPTJUJPOTw%FDMBTTJĕFE$*"SFQPSUT IPX-
FWFS TIPXUIBUUIFZNJTTFEUIFJSUBSHFUPONPSFUIBOPOFPDDBTJPO JODMVEJOH
JO.BSDIŴżŹŸ XIFOUIFZCPNCFEBQBSJTIDIVSDIPOUIF6HBOEBOCPSEFSBOE
attacked a school, gunning down children.58
3PCFSU8,PNFSEFTDSJCFEUIFDPWFSUPQFSBUJPOBTBiHSFBUMJUUMFFYFSDJTF
JO TPNF QSFUUZ GBODZ EJQMPNBDZ BOE VOEFSDPWFS XPSL UP QSFWFOU UIF $POHP
GSPNHPJOHTPVSw59ćF$*" IPXFWFS EFTDSJCFEUPXOTSBWBHFECZUIFĕHIU-
JOHBTiTQFDUBDMFTPGNJTFSZw"OEXIJMFUIF4JNCBTUPPL8FTUFSONJTTJPOBSJFT
IPTUBHFBOEXFSFLOPXOGPSQSBDUJDJOHSJUVBMDBOOJCBMJTN "NFSJDBOCBDLFE
GPSDFT DBSSJFE PVU IPSSJĕD BUSPDJUJFT  JODMVEJOH TQPU FYFDVUJPOT BOE DIBJOJOH
UPHFUIFSTVTQFDUFEHVFSSJMMBT"O*UBMJBOKPVSOBMJTUPCTFSWFEPGUIFNJOŴżŹŷ
UIBUiPDDVQZJOHBUPXONFBOUCMPXJOHPVUUIFEPPSTXJUISPVOETPGCB[PPLB

176 The Cold War on the Periphery


ĕSF HPJOHJOUPTIPQTBOEUBLJOHBOZUIJOHUIFZXBOUFE‫"ڀڀ‬ęFSUIFMPPUJOH
DBNFUIFLJMMJOHćFTIPPUJOHMBTUFEGPSUISFFEBZTćSFFEBZTPGFYFDVUJPOT 
PGMZODIJOHT PGUPSUVSFT PGTDSFBNT BOEPGUFSSPSwćFLondon Observer added
UIBUUIFNFSDFOBSJFTOPUPOMZiTIPPUBOEIBOHUIFJSQSJTPOFSTBęFSUPSUVSJOH
UIFN CVUVTFUIFNGPSUBSHFUQSBDUJDFBOEHBNCMFPWFSUIFOVNCFSPGTIPUT
OFFEFEUPLJMMUIFNw60
ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTFWFOUVBMMZDPOTPMJEBUFEUIFQPXFSPG.PCVUV BGPSNFS
#FMHJBO HFOEBSNF BOE "/$ DIJFG PG TUBČ DIBSBDUFSJ[FE CZ UIF 64 BSNZ
BUUBDIÏBTiWBJOBOEMB[ZwBOECZUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUBTiDIJMEJTIBOEFBT-
JMZCPVHIUPČw"-JOHBMBTQFBLFSGSPN&RVBUFVS .PCVUVXFOUPOUPSVMFGPS
UIJSUZZFBST EFWFMPQJOHBDVMUPGQFSTPOBMJUZUISPVHIUIFNFEJBBOETUFBMJOHBO
FTUJNBUFEžŸCJMMJPOGSPNUIFUSFBTVSZ"NFSJDBOQPMJDZNBLFSTGBWPSFETUSPOH
BSNFEMFBEFSTMJLF.PCVUVUISPVHIPVUUIFćJSE8PSMECFDBVTFUIFZXFSFTFFO
BTDBQBCMFPGDPOUBJOJOHUIFUISFBUPGSFHJPOBMGSBHNFOUBUJPOBOEUSJCBMJTNBOE
QSPNPUJOHUIFTUBCJMJUZOFFEFEUPTBGFHVBSE8FTUFSOJOUFSFTUTBOEJOWFTUNFOU61
*O 4FQUFNCFS ŴżŹŶ UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT JOJUJBUFE UIF QVCMJD TBGFUZ QSPHSBN 
IFBEFE CZ +PIO .BOPQPMJ ćF UJNJOH XBT PQQPSUVOF JO QSPWJEJOH B DIBO-
OFM GPS GVOOFMJOH FRVJQNFOU UP UIF .PCVUV SFHJNF JO UIF DMBOEFTUJOF XBS
BHBJOTUUIF4JNCBT1BSUPGUIFBJNXBTUPSFMJFWFUIF"/$GSPNQPMJDFEVUZ
because it was thought to be near collapse as an organized force. Intelligence
SFQPSUTEFTDSJCFEJUBTUIFFRVJWBMFOUPGBOiVOXBOUFEGPSFJHOBSNZwNBOOFE
CZ TPMEJFST XIP iSFHBSEFE UIFJS SJĘFT BT NFBM UJDLFUTw BOE XFSF SFTQPOTJCMF
GPSXJEFTQSFBEiSBQJOHBOEQJMMBHJOH wTNVHHMJOHEJBNPOETBOEHPME BOEUIF
iDPMECMPPEFENVSEFSwPG&VSPQFBOTćFMFBEFSTIJQXBTiJNNBUVSFBOEEJT-
honest” and “thoroughly disliked.”62
ćFQPMJDFGPSUIFNPTUQBSUQSPWFEUPCFMJUUMFCFUUFS$IBNQJPOFECZ4FDSF-
UBSZPG4UBUF%FBO3VTL "NCBTTBEPS(.D.VSUSJF(PEMFZ BOE"UUPSOFZ(FO-
FSBM3PCFSU,FOOFEZ UIF014QSPHSBNXBTUIFMBSHFTUJO"GSJDBBUBOBOOVBM
CVEHFUPGžŹųų ųųų PWFSžŸNJMMJPOJOUPUBM XJUIBTUBČPGFMFWFOBEWJTFSTBU
JUTQFBL$FOUSBMJ[FEVOEFS.PCVUVTDPNNBOE QPMJDFXFSFNPCJMJ[FEBMPOH
NJMJUBSZMJOFTUPRVFMMiVOSFTU MBXMFTTOFTT BOECBOEJUSZwJOiQSPCMFNBSFBTw
BęFS UIF XJUIESBXBM PG 6/ GPSDFT 3FQPSUT MBNFOUFE JUT TUBďOH XJUI iBOZ
XBSNCPEZXIPQPTTFTTFEUIFSFRVJSFEQPMJUJDBMPSUSJCBMBďMJBUJPO wBTXFMM
BTJUTQPPSEJTDJQMJOFBOEJUTMBDLPGFTQSJUEFDPSQT*OWFTUJHBUJPOPGDSJNFTXBT
DPOTJEFSFEBiGBSDF wBOEUIFBUUJUVEFPGUIFBWFSBHFQPMJDFNBOXBTiQJUJGVMw63
5PQSPNPUFQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPO UIF014QSPWJEFEVOJGPSNTBOEDPNNV-
OJDBUJPOTBOESJPUDPOUSPMFRVJQNFOU USJFEUPTDSFFOOFXSFDSVJUT BOEFTUBC-
MJTIFEBDFOUSBMJEFOUJĕDBUJPOCVSFBV"$PBTUBMBOE3JWFS-BLF(VBSEBOEB
QPMJDFNPUPSDZDMFTRVBEXFSFEFWFMPQFE BOEPWFSŴŹųPďDFSTXFSFTFOUUPUIF
*1" POFPGXIPN #FNPOBUV.QBOHB XSPUFJOBSFWFBMJOHFTTBZićFVTFPG
force or threats during an investigation can be seen as one of our police tactics.
‫"ڀڀ‬CPWFBMM UIFQSFTTTIPVMEOPUIBWFUIFTMJHIUFTUJOGPSNBUJPOBCPVUPVS

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 177


NFUIPETPGQSPDFEVSFwćFTFDPNNFOUTTVNVQUIFVOEFNPDSBUJDNFUIPET
of the police, which U.S. advisers did little to discourage. CIA agents trained
UIF4QFDJBM#SBODI iBQPXFSVOUPUIFNTFMWFTwIFBEFECZ7JDUPS/FOEBLB B
NFNCFSPG.PCVUVTJOOFSDJSDMF LOPXOBTUIF#JO[BHSPVQ XIPLFQUUIJDL
ĕMFTPOQPMJUJDBMĕHVSFT JODMVEJOHPGUIFJSEVCJPVTĕOBODJBMUSBOTBDUJPOT BOE
EFQMPZFE QSJWBUF CBOET BHBJOTU SJWBMT ćF 014 BMTP EFWFMPQFE QBSBNJMJUBSZ
NPCJMFCSJHBEFTJO,JOTIBTBBOE-VCVNCBTIJNPEFMFEBęFSUIFPOFJO*OEPOF-
sia, the pride of the Special Group on Counter-Insurgency.64
#FDBVTFPGUIFFOPSNPVTUBTLPGJOTUJUVUJPOCVJMEJOH UIF014XPSLFEBMPOH-
TJEF6/BOE#FMHJBOBEWJTFSTBOEOJOF*TSBFMJTXIPUSBJOFEUIFBSNZ JODMVEJOH
.PCVUVIJNTFMG JOQBSBUSPPQFSTLJMMTćFZSFCVJMUUIFOBUJPOBMQPMJDFTDIPPM
JO,JOTIBTBBOEEFWFMPQFESFHJPOBMBDBEFNJFTXJUIDPVSTFTJOBENJOJTUSBUJPO 
ĕSFBSNT BOUJDPNNVOJTN BOEKVOHMFXBSGBSF"/JHFSJBOHSPVQIFMETFTTJPOT
in riot control, and Kenyan advisers were sent to Kivi province.65 In October
1968, after Mobutu passed a law outlawing labor unions, the OPS rushed a ship-
NFOUPGUFBSHBTUPRVFMMUIFQSPUFTUTUIBUCSPLFPVU"ZFBSMBUFS QPMJDFLJMMFE
TFWFSBMIVOESFEEFNPOTUSBUPSTBUUIFOBUJPOBMVOJWFSTJUZJO,JOTIBTBBOEJO
,JTBOHBOJBęFSUIF014TVQQMJFENPSFFRVJQNFOU66
A substantial proportion of police assistance was directed toward protecting
8FTUFSOPXOFE CVTJOFTTFT BOE TFDVSJOH BDDFTT UP $POHPT MVDSBUJWF NJOFSBM
wealth. One report advised that because the police were at present incapable
PGNBJOUBJOJOHPSEFS iQPMJDJOHPGUIFEJBNPOENJOFTCZQSJWBUFTFDVSJUZGPSDFT
trained by the Belgians was necessary.”67 The OPS devoted considerable energy
UPSFPSHBOJ[JOHUIFQPMJDFJO,BUBOHBQSPWJODF XIFSF5TIPNCFIFBEFEBESJWF
GPSTFDFTTJPO,OPXOBTBiXBMLJOHNVTFVNPGDPMPOJBMJTNwCFDBVTFPGIJTUJFT
UP NPTU PG UIF JNQFSJBM QPXFST  5TIPNCF IBE CFFO TVQQPSUFE CZ UIF &JTFO-
IPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOIJTDPOĘJDUXJUI-VNVNCBBOESFDFJWFECBDLJOHGSPN
XIJUFNFSDFOBSJFTBTXFMMBTGSPN64"*%BOEUIF$*"8JMMJBN'#VDLMFZBOE
UIFDPOTFSWBUJWF:PVOH"NFSJDBOTGPS'SFFEPNXFSFWJHPSPVTDIBNQJPOTPG
his cause in the United States. They were part of the so-called Katanga lobby,
IFBEFECZBOUJDPNNVOJTU4FOBUPSćPNBT+%PEE B$POOFDUJDVU%FNPDSBU 
BOEUIF3PDLFGFMMFSGBNJMZ XIJDIPXOFEBQPSUJPOPG6OJPO.JOJÒSF ,BUBOHBT
MBSHFTU NJOJOH DPSQPSBUJPO  TQFDJBMJ[JOH JO UIF QSPEVDUJPO PG DPQQFS  DPCBMU 
and zinc.68
During the chaos of the post-independence period, OPS reports noted the
EJTJOUFHSBUJPO BOE DPSSVQUJPO PG UIF ,BUBOHBO QPMJDF  MFE CZ B #FMHJBO NFS-
DFOBSZ  +BDL 4DISBNNF  XIP EJTQPTFE PG -VNVNCBT CPEZ BOE XFSF VOEJT-
ciplined and staffed with ex-convicts. Venal officers were accused of stealing
VOJGPSNT GSPN UIF 64"*% XBSFIPVTF BOE PG LJMMJOH UIFJS DPODVCJOFT JG UIF
XPNFOSFGVTFEUPBDDPNQBOZUIFNXIFOUIFZXFSFGPSDFEUPĘFF014TUBČ
XPSLFEUPNPMEBOFXQSPYZQBSBNJMJUBSZGPSDFDBQBCMFPGTFSWJOHBTBDPVO-
UFSXFJHIU UP UIF NJMJUBSZ BOE BOZ BOUJ8FTUFSO GBDUJPOT UIBU NJHIU FWPMWF69

178 The Cold War on the Periphery


5TIPNCFFWFOUVBMMZNBEFDPNNPODBVTFXJUI.PCVUVBOEVTFEUIF(FOEBS-
NFSJFUPIFMQDSVTIQPMJUJDBMPQQPOFOUT UIPVHI5TIPNCFBOESFHJPOBMTFQB-
SBUJTUTNPVOUFEBOPUIFSSFCFMMJPO XIJDIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXBTDBMMFEVQPOUP
IFMQTVQQSFTT5TIPNCFTVCTFRVFOUMZEJFEPGBIFBSUBUUBDLJOFYJMF70
"OFNCBTTZDBCMFUFMMJOHMZSFGFSSFEUPUIFiSFQVMTJWFCSVUBMJUZwPG"NFSJDBO
CBDLFEDPNNBOEPVOJUT JO-VCVNCBTIJ DBQJUBMPG,BUBOHB XIJDIDSFBUFE
BiEJďDVMUNPSBM IVNBO BOEQVCMJDSFMBUJPOTQPTJUJPOJOXIJDIUIF64HPW-
FSONFOU IBT CFFO QMBDFEw PO BDDPVOU PG JUT BTTJTUBODF ‰DPNNFOUT UIBU HP
BMPOHXBZUPXBSEFYQMBJOJOHXIZUIFQSPHSBNTXFSFLFQUTFDSFU71 Police aid
was on the whole designed to fortify Mobutu’s rule and help crush regional
SFWPMUTMJOLFEUPUIF4JNCBTćFMBSHFTUXBTJOFBTUFSO,XJMVQSPWJODF MFECZ
1JFSSF.VMFMF BNJOJTUFSJO-VNVNCBTEFQPTFEHPWFSONFOUXIPTFGPMMPXFST 
DPOTJTUJOHQSJNBSJMZPGFUIOJD.CVOEVBOE1FOEFUBSHFUFECZ"/$SFQSFTTJPO 
FNCSBDFEBCMFOEPGMFęJTUJEFPMPHZBOE"GSJDBONBHJD(BJOJOHJUTJOGPSNB-
UJPO GSPN UIF 64 FNCBTTZ  Time NBHB[JOF SFGFSSFE UP .VMFMFT SFCFMMJPO BT
iCJ[BSSFwBOECMBNFEIJNGPSXSFBLJOHWJPMFODFBDSPTTUIFDPVOUSZ GBJMJOHUP
DPOUFYUVBMJ[F UIF SFCFMMJPO XJUIJO UIF MBSHFS $*" TVCWFSTJPO DBNQBJHO BOE
the violent takeover of the state by Mobutu. Arguing for expanded support
UP5TIPNCFJOUIFL.A. Times, the conservative political theorist Russell Kirk
DMBJNFEUIBU.VMFMFTGPMMPXFSTXFSFiXJUDIEPDUPSTJOEPDUSJOBUFEJO.BSYJTN
CZUIF$PNNVOJTU$IJOFTFwBOEXFSFiGFEIFNQBUCSFBLGBTUBOEESVHHFEXJUI
Chinese narcotics.”72
Using psychological warfare tactics developed in the colonial laboratories
PGUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBOE)BJUJBOESFĕOFEJOUIFKVOHMFTPG7JFUOBNBOE-BPT 
64BEWJTFSTTPVHIUUPJOUJNJEBUFBOEJOEVDFEFGFDUJPOTBNPOHUIF.VMFMJTUT 
NBOZPGXIPNXFSFGPSDFEUPTFFLBTZMVNJOOFJHICPSJOHDPVOUSJFTćF014
provided C-130 helicopters, beefed up border interdiction and worked with the
*TSBFMJ .PTTBE JO USBJOJOH DPNNBOEPT  XIP VOEFSUPPL TFBSDIBOEEFTUSPZ
operations in which they burned villages and shot suspected guerrilla col-
MBCPSBUPST GBDUTUIBUXFOUVONFOUJPOFEJOUIFNBJOTUSFBNQSFTT*O.VHJOEB 
QPMJDFPSHBOJ[FEBQVOJUJWFFYQFEJUJPOUPBWFOHFUIFEFBUIPGUXPDPNSBEFT 
killing eighty-seven prisoners through asphyxiation. The CIA reported that
iJOIBCJUBOUT GBWPSFE UIF SFCFMTw FWFO BęFS HPWFSONFOU GPSDFT UPPL PWFS73 In
May 1966 the OPS enthused over the capture in Opala of a leader of the “peo-
QMFTBSNZwXIPXBTUPSUVSFEBOEFYFDVUFE-VNVNCBTUZMF*OUIF4UBOMFZWJMMF
,JTBOHBOJ BSFB NJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDFVOJUTPQFOFEBESJWFUPTFBMPČDPNNFSDF
JOGPPETUVČTCFUXFFOUIFQPQVMBUJPOBOESFCFMT XIPTUJMMiJOGFTU<FE>UIFFOWJ-
SPOTPGUIFDJUZwDBVTJOHNVDIIBSETIJQćFSFCFMMJPOFWFOUVBMMZEJFEEPXO
BęFS.VMFMFXBTMVSFECBDLGSPNFYJMFCZ.PCVUVBOE BęFSCFJOHGÐUFEXJUIB
DBWJBSEJOOFS FYFDVUFECZBĕSJOHTRVBE74
.BOZ014QFSTPOOFMJOUIF$POHP JODMVEJOH.BOPQPMJ +BDL3ZBO &MNFS
"ELJOT 3BZ-BOEHSFO -FJHI#SJMMJBOU %PO#FOOFUU 3PZ)BUFN BOE$IBSMFT

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 179


Leister) had served in Indochina, where they had also trained police along
QBSBNJMJUBSZ MJOFT *O CPUI TFUUJOHT UIFZ DPOUSJCVUFE UP FYUFOTJWF WJPMFODF 
though they were never fully in control of the forces under their guidance. Field
SFQPSUTDPNQMBJOFEBCPVUUIFNJTVTFPGWFIJDMFT UIFEFQMPSBCMFDPOEJUJPOPG
QPMJDF BDBEFNJFT  BOE UIF QFSQFUVBUJPO PG iUSJCBMJTN  OFQPUJTN  BOE HSBęw
BNPOH "NFSJDBOUSBJOFE VOJUT 1PMJDF BEWJTFS 3PCFSU 0#MBLF UPME UIF 4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUJOFYBTQFSBUJPOi8FEPOPUIBWFNVDIMFWFSBHFUPDVSUBJMUIFTF
QSPCMFNT EJSFDUMZ $POHPT .JOJTUFS PG UIF *OUFSJPS  &UJFOOF 5TIJTFLFEJ  EPFT
not want the advice of foreigners on how to run the police. He is anti-white
BOEUPTPNFFYUFOUBOUJ"NFSJDBO BOEQPMJUJDBMMZBNCJUJPVTćFXIPMFUFBN
VOEFS.PCVUVJTEFUFSNJOFEUPMFUUIF$POHPMFTFSVOUIFJSPXOCVTJOFTTw75
ćFTF DPNNFOUT EJTQMBZ UIF NJTUSVTU IBNQFSJOH BEWJTPSZ FČPSUT JO UIF
$POHPBOEUIFUFOEFODZPGMPDBMPďDJBMTUPBQQSPQSJBUFFRVJQNFOUGPSUIFJS
PXOFOET XJUIPVUDPOTJEFSJOHUIFJOQVUPG"NFSJDBOTćFSFMBUJPOTIJQXBT
POFQVSFMZPGDPOWFOJFODF OPUNVUVBMSFTQFDU SFNJOJTDFOUPGUIFDPMPOJBMFSB
Mitchell Mabardy, an air force colonel with the OPS (and CIA), told Byron
&OHMFUIBUUIFiDISPOJDJODPNQFUFODFPGUIFQPMJUJDBMMFBEFSTIJQXBTBNBKPS
barrier to progress.”76 Few would have disagreed, though Mabardy evaded the
RVFTUJPOPGIJTPXOSFTQPOTJCJMJUZCZGBJMJOHUPNFOUJPOUIBUIFBOEIJTBTTPDJ-
ates had played a key role in solidifying Mobutu’s power.
*O B +VMZ ŴżźŶ SFQPSU XIJDI FODBQTVMBUFE UIF TIPSUDPNJOHT PG "NFSJDBO
USBJOJOH  +FUFS 8JMMJBNTPO FYQSFTTFE EJTBQQPJOUNFOU BU B MBDL PG VOJGPSNFE
QBUSPMTBOEFNQIBTJ[FEIJTSFDPNNFOEBUJPOUIBUUIFQPMJDFEFWFMPQXBMLJOH
beats or patrol urban areas by bike. Upbeat about the deterioration of rebel
BDUJWJUZ JO UIF FBTUFSO QSPWJODFT  8JMMJBNTPO BMTP QVTIFE GPS UIF EFMJWFSZ PG
FRVJQNFOUUPQPMJDFJOUIF4IBCBQSPWJODFPG,BUBOHB XIFSFPSHBOJ[FESFTJT-
tance to Mobutu’s rule had developed. He warned that new hydroelectric facili-
UJFT BOE NJOFT SFRVJSFE JOUFOTJĕFE TFDVSJUZ CFDBVTF UIFZ XFSF WVMOFSBCMF UP
TBCPUBHFDBNQBJHOTEFTJHOFEUPCSJOHEPXOUIFHPWFSONFOUBOEXFSFBUUSBDU-
JOHUIFBUUFOUJPOPGDSJNJOBMHBOHT77
8JMMJBNTPOT SFNBSLT TVHHFTU UIBU UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT DPOUJOVFE XJUI UIF
QSPHSBNT GPS QPMJUJDBM  FDPOPNJD  BOE HFPTUSBUFHJD SFBTPOT 'PS BMM IJT ĘBXT 
Mobutu was valued for pacifying the leftist insurgency and for giving West-
FSO DPSQPSBUJPOT BDDFTT UP UIF $POHPT SJDI NJOFSBM SFTPVSDFTćF 014 XBT
FTQFDJBMMZJOĘVFOUJBMJOQSPWJEJOHNPEFSOFRVJQNFOUUPUIFQPMJDF XIPPQFS-
BUFEXJUIBTFOTFPGJNQVOJUZEFSJWFEGSPNBMBDLPGKVEJDJBMDIFDLT78 Mobutu’s
own actions set the tone. He was prone to “frivolous expenditures,” the CIA
reported, including the purchase of a luxury villa on the French Riviera. Police
SPVUJOFMZFOSJDIFEUIFNTFMWFTUISPVHIQBUSPOBHFBOEHSBęBOEVTFEBTZTUFN
of ratissage  PS ESBHOFU PQFSBUJPOT  UP iFYUPSU NPOFZ GSPN BOE UFSSPSJ[F UIF
population.”79
*O JUT Ŵżźŷ UFSNJOBUJPO SFQPSU  UIF 014 DMBJNFE UIBU JUT FČPSUT IBE DPO-

180 The Cold War on the Periphery


tributed to the “beginning of an efficient and accountable police force.” A
NPSF SFBMJTUJD BTTFTTNFOU XBT QSPWJEFE CZ UIF TDIPMBS ćPNBT . $BMMBHIZ 
XIP PCTFSWFE JO ŴżŻŸ UIBU UIF NPEFSOJ[FE $POHPMFTF QPMJDF SFNBJOFE iJMM
EJTDJQMJOFEBOEJMMQBJEwBOEIBEDPNNJUUFEBiIPSSPSMJTUPGDSJNFT wJODMVEJOH
BSNFE SPCCFSZ  TFUUJOH VQ VOBVUIPSJ[FE CBSSJDBEFT  LJEOBQQJOHT  CFBUJOHT 
rape, forced labor, physical attacks, and extortion in villages and open-air
NBSLFUTUIFZXFSFHVJMUZPGTDBWFOHJOHBOEQJMMBHJOHDSPQT GSVJU HPBUT BOE
DIJDLFOT BOE FWFO EFTUSPZJOH MPDBM ĕTIJOH HSPVOET XJUI EZOBNJUF $BMMBHIZ
XFOUPOUPTVHHFTUUIBUUIF(FOEBSNFSJF POFPGUIFDSFBUJPOTPGUIF6OJUFE
4UBUFTSFPSHBOJ[BUJPOQSPHSBNT DPOTUJUVUFEBOiPDDVQZJOHGPSDFXIJDIMJWFTPO
UIFCBDLPGUIFQPQVMBUJPOBOEIBTBTJUTNBKPSUBTLUIFNV[[MJOHPGUIFQFPQMF
. . . They consistently leave disorder, unrest, and abused citizens in their wake.
ćFZ BSF BO PSHBOJ[FE  GSFFĘPBUJOH TPVSDF PG DPFSDJPO JO UIF DPVOUSZTJEFw
2VPUJOH B SFHJPOBM TVCDPNNBOEFS  IF BEEFE i8IFO UIF QPQVMBUJPO TFFT B
(FOEBSNFJUOPMPOHFSGFFMTTBGF*OGBDURVJUFUIFDPOUSBSZw80
ćF 014 IFMQFE UP BSN .PCVUVT LJMMFST XJUI žŵŹ NJMMJPO JO BEWBODFE
weaponry and training, which facilitated the expansion of state terror. Prod-
VDUTPGUIF.D$BSUIZFSB NPTUPGUIFBEWJTFSTWJFXFEUIFXPSMEJONPOPMJUIJD
UFSNT  JOUFSBDUFE NBJOMZ XJUI TPDJFUBM FMJUFT  BOE  BT XJUI UIF .JDIJHBOEFST
JO 4PVUI 7JFUOBN  XFSF JMMBUUVOFE UP UIF TPDJBM BOE QPMJUJDBM SFBMJUJFT PG UIF
DPVOUSZćFZTBXUIFNTFMWFTBTFYQPSUJOHUIFJSUFDIOJDBMFYQFSUJTFBOEEJEOPU
always recognize how their work exacerbated Mobutu’s repression, which was
gargantuan in scope.

The OPS in the Great Lakes: Support for “Hutu Power” in Rwanda and
“Tutsi Power” in Burundi

ćFXBSJOUIF$POHPMFEUPIFJHIUFOFE"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPOUISPVHIPVUUIF
(SFBU-BLFTSFHJPOPG&BTU"GSJDBBOEUPUIFJOUFOTJĕDBUJPOPGFUIOJDWJPMFODF
*OŴżŹŸBOBEWJTPSZNJTTJPOMFECZ+PIO.BOPQPMJBOE"EPMQIF#POOFĕMCFHBO
QSPWJEJOHUSBOTDFJWFSTBOEDPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOUUPUIF3XBOEFTFQPMJDF
BOE/BUJPOBM(VBSEćFNBJOBJNXBTUPiCFFGVQw3XBOEBTQSFEPNJOBOUMZ
)VUV TFDVSJUZ GPSDFT CFDBVTF iSVNPST PG BO JOWBTJPO CZ $IJDPN TVQQPSUFE
5VUTJ FMFNFOUT JO #VSVOEJ TUJMM QFSTJTU w BOE CFDBVTF .VMFMJTU SFCFMT JO UIF
Congo were using Rwanda as a base to try to overthrow Mobutu. The CIA fur-
UIFSXBSOFEUIBUBOJOĘVYPGSFGVHFFTGSPNUIF$POHPĘFFJOHUIFiEFQSFEBUJPOT
of the ANC” were creating instability and food shortages, resulting in explosive
DPOEJUJPOTUIBUNBEFUIFDPVOUSZSJQFGPSSFWPMVUJPO81
"ęFS BDIJFWJOH JOEFQFOEFODF GSPN #FMHJVN JO ŴżŸż  3XBOEB XBT MFE CZ
Grégoire Kayabinda, architect of a social revolution bent on reversing the exist-
JOHDMBTTTUSVDUVSF EPNJOBUFECZUIF5VUTJBSJTUPDSBDZ%VSJOHUIFDPMPOJBMFSB 
the Belgians had stoked ethnic tensions by elevating the Tutsi to a privileged

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 181


QPTJUJPO TQBSLJOHBCBDLMBTIBNPOHUIFNBKPSJUZ)VUV XIPIBECFFOSFEVDFE
UPWJSUVBMTFSGEPNBOEXFSFĕHIUJOHUPPCUBJOQPMJUJDBMBVUIPSJUZVOEFS,BZBCJ-
OEBBOEUIF1BSNFIVUV1BSUZ0WFSŴŸų ųųų5VUTJTVCTFRVFOUMZĘFEUP5BO[B-
OJB #VSVOEJ UIF$POHP BOE6HBOEB XIFSFEJFIBSEFMFNFOUT BTUIFFNCBTTZ
SFGFSSFEUPUIFN XFSFPSHBOJ[JOHGPSSFJOWBTJPO NBLJOHJODVSTJPOTCBDLJOUP
3XBOEBJOUIFIPQFPGSFHBJOJOHQPXFSćFZXFSFJOUVSOUIFWJDUJNTPGSFQSJ-
TBMLJMMJOHT*O%FDFNCFSŴżŹŶBOEBHBJOJOŴżŹŹ BęFSBTFSJFTPGDSPTTCPSEFS
SBJET  UIF 1BSNFIVUVDPOUSPMMFE /BUJPOBM (VBSE BOE QPMJDF TIFMMFE SFGVHFF
IVUTXJUINPSUBSTBOENBTTBDSFEBTNBOZBTUFOUIPVTBOE5VUTJSFTJEFOUT TFU-
UJOHBQSFDFEFOUGPSUIFNBTTLJMMJOHTUIBUXPVMEUBLFQMBDFJOŴżżŷ82
Despite the brutality and pervasive corruption of the Kayabinda govern-
NFOU UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTTVQQPSUFEUIFSFHJNFCFDBVTFJUXBTiDPPQFSBUJWFJO
UIF$POHPNFTT wBMMPXJOHUIF"NFSJDBOTUPVTFUIFBJSĕFMEBU,BNFNCFGPS
BJSNJTTJPOTBHBJOTUQSP-VNVNCBSFCFMTJOUIFUPXOPG#BLVWVBOEGPSĘZ-
ing in supplies. The Tutsi were considered to be left-leaning and were alleg-
FEMZTVQQPSUFECZ$VCBOBEWJTFSTBOE$IJOFTFDPNNVOJTUTTFFLJOHUPNBLF
inroads into the Great Lakes, although the CIA concluded that there was “no
hard evidence of this.”83 The grounds for their rebellion were their political
NBSHJOBMJ[BUJPOBOEQFSTFDVUJPO BOEBEFTJSFUPSFDMBJNUIFJSGPSNFSTUBUVT
Revealing the ignorance of U.S. officials, public safety reports referred to Tutsi
guerrillas as inyenzi ,JOZBSXBOEBOGPSiDPDLSPBDI wBUFSNVTFECZ)VUVIBSE
MJOFST XIPNUIFZXFSFSFMZJOHPOGPSJOUFMMJHFODF UPEFNPOJ[FBOESBMMZIBUSFE
against the Tutsi.84
'FBSJOHUIBU5VUTJTMJWJOHJO,JHBMJNJHIUBTTJTUUIFiJOWBEFSTCZBUUFNQUJOH
UPEJTSVQUUIFGVODUJPOJOHPGUIFHPWFSONFOUUISPVHIEFNPOTUSBUJPOT TUSJLFT 
BOEBUUBDLTPOLFZVUJMJUJFTBOETFSWJDFJOTUBMMBUJPOT wUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSP-
WJEFEžŷżŸ ųųųJOUFDIOJDBMBTTJTUBODFBOESJPUDPOUSPMFRVJQNFOUUP+VWFOBM
)BCZBSJNBOB UIFQPMJDFNJOJTUFSVOEFS,BZBCJOEB.BOPQPMJUPME)BCZBSJ-
NBOBUIBUUIFi64JTTZNQBUIFUJDUPUIFOFFETPGUIFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZGPSDFT w
HJWJOHUIFNBHSFFOMJHIUUPDBSSZPVUUIFJSSFQSFTTJPO"ĕFMESFQPSUMBNFOUFE
UIBUiUIFBCTFODFPGQPMJDFGPPUPSNPUPSJ[FEQBUSPMTJO3XBOEBBęFSEBSLMFBWFT
UIF QPQVMBUJPO UP JUT PXO EFWJDFT GPS QSPUFDUJPO GSPN ESVOLFO NBTLFST BOE
CBOEJUT‫"ڀڀ‬TBSFTVMU UIFNBKPSJUZPGUIFTFOTJCMFDJUJ[FOSZXJMMSBSFMZHPGPSUI
after dark.”854FFLJOHUPSFDUJGZUIJTQSPCMFN BOEWJFXJOHUIF4VSFUÏBTBSFMJBCMF
TPVSDFPGJOGPSNBUJPO UIF014XPSLFEXJUI(FSNBOBOE#FMHJBOUFDIOJDJBOT
UPFTUBCMJTIBUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFNBOEUSBJOJOHDFOUFSBU3VIFOHFSJBOE
EFMJWFSFEKFFQT SBEJPT DBSHPQMBOFT BOEUXPMJHIUPCTFSWFSBJSDSBęFRVJQQFE
XJUIBQVCMJDSFMBUJPOTDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFNUPFBTFJOUIFUSBDLJOHPGEJT-
TJEFOUT  CPUI 5VUTJ SFCFMT BOE .VMFMJTUT 014 BHFOUT USBJOFE )BCZBSJNBOBT
NFOJODPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF CPSEFSQBUSPM BOEQTZXBS5FBSHBTHSFOBEFTXFSF
TIJQQFE BOE*TSBFMJBEWJTFSTXFSFTVCDPOUSBDUFEUPUSBJOBQBSBNJMJUBSZZPVUI
organization.86

182 The Cold War on the Periphery


Thanks in part to U.S. and Belgian largesse, Rwanda evolved into a one-
QBSUZQPMJDFTUBUFEPNJOBUFECZUIF)VUVDBTUF"O014SFQPSUOPUFEUIBUXIJMF
UIF4VSFUÏiJOWFTUJHBUFEwBOEiĘPHHFEUIFIBQMFTT5VUTJBSPVOEUIFDPVOUSZwJU
never “investigated the shady dealings of Rwandan officials,” including Isidore
4FCB[VOHV  BO PMEHVBSE 1BSNFIVUV XIP XBT FYUSFNFMZ DPSSVQU BOE iESPWF
PVU UIF 5VUTJ CZ XJEFTQSFBE JOUJNJEBUJPO BOE LJMMJOHw *O ŴżŹź "NCBTTBEPS
-FP$ZSQPJOUFEUPiUIFVOGPSUVOBUFQSPDFTTPGNFHBMPNBOJBDSFFQJOHVQPO
)BCZBSJNBOB wXIPTJYZFBSTMBUFSXPVMETFJ[FQPXFSJODPVQEÏUBUćJTXBT
BOBUVSBMPVUDPNFPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT XIJDIIFMQFEDSFBUFBWBTUQPMJDJOH
BQQBSBUVTUIBUHBWFHSFBUBVUIPSJUZUPXIPFWFSXBTJODPNNBOE BTJONBOZ
PUIFSDBTFT ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTHFOFSBMMZIFMQFEUPXBSQEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQ-
NFOUJO3XBOEBCZĘPPEJOHUIFDPVOUSZXJUIBEWBODFEXFBQPOTBOETVSWFJM-
MBODFUFDIOPMPHJFT UPUIFOFHMFDUPGOFFEFEEFWFMPQNFOUBJE87
In neighboring Burundi, where power relations were the reverse of those
in Rwanda, the United States again allied with the oppressor rather than the
PQQSFTTFE#FUXFFOŴżŹŷBOEŴżŹź UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPWJEFEžżŷ ųųųJO
QPMJDFBJEUPUIF5VUTJEPNJOBUFESFHJNF XIJDI JOUIFXBLFPGBDPVQBUUFNQU
CZ)VUVJOŴżŹŸ LJMMFEBOFTUJNBUFEĕWFUIPVTBOEDJWJMJBOT TFUUJOHUIFQSFD-
edent for the slaughter of 100,000 Hutu and Tutsi-Banyarunguru in 1972. (The
QSFTJEFOU  .JDIFM .JDPNCFSP  XBT B 5VUTJ)JNB  .BOPQPMJ  #POOFĕM  BOE
Alston Staley worked alongside sixteen Belgians to professionalize the Burun-
EJBO(FOEBSNFSJFBOECVJMEVQJUTJOUFMMJHFODFDBQBCJMJUJFT*O+VOFŴżŹŷUIFZ
MBVEFEJUTSPMFJOEJTBSNJOHŴ ŻųųTQFBSDBSSZJOH5VUTJSFGVHFFTDPOHSFHBUJOH
OFBS UIF 3XBOEBO CPSEFS BOE FTDPSUJOH UIFN CBDL UP UIFJS DBNQT ćF 64
FNCBTTZ XIJDIIBETPVHIUUPEJTDPVSBHFSBJETJOUP3XBOEB DMBJNFEUIBUUIF
Tutsi were supported by the Mulelists and also by the Chinese, who were alleg-
FEMZGVOOFMJOHXFBQPOTUISPVHIBNJMJUBSZBUUBDIÏ ,BO.BJ BęFSSFPQFOJOH
UIFJS FNCBTTZ  BOE XFSF CFIJOE B OFXMZ GPSNFE USBEF VOJPO JO UIF DBQJUBM 
#VKVNCVSB .BP;FEPOHJTSFQPSUFEUPIBWFTUBUFE i#VSVOEJJTUIFXBZUP
the Congo and when the Congo falls the whole of Africa will fall.”)88"NFSJDBO
QPMJDZJOUIFFOEPOMZIFMQFEUPBHHSBWBUFMPDBMSJWBMSJFTBOEFNQPXFSFEUIF
SFHJNFJO#VSVOEJ XIJDIDPNNJUUFEIPSSJĕDDSJNFTBHBJOTUJUTQFPQMF

The OPS in East Africa: Support for Idi Amin and Resistance by
the Socialists

0XJOHJOMBSHFQBSUUP,FOZBTNJOFSBMXFBMUIBOEQSPYJNJUZUPUIF)PSOPG
"GSJDB JUXBTUIFSFUIBU"NFSJDBOPQFSBUJPOTJO&BTU"GSJDBXFSFIFBERVBS-
UFSFE BOEXIFSFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTFOBDUFEBžŹżź ųųųQSPHSBNGSPNŴżŹŸUP
ŴżźŴ*UTNBJOBJNXBTUPHBJOMFWFSBHFBNPOHUIFTFDVSJUZGPSDFTBOETFDVSF
UIFSVMFPG+PNP,FOZBUUB BOBOUJDPNNVOJTU BOEMBUFSPGUIFNPSFBVUPDSBUJD
Daniel arap Moi. In May 1964 the Special Group on Counter-Insurgency

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 183


FYQSFTTFE GFBS UIBU UIF i$IJDPNTw XFSF BUUFNQUJOH UP BTTFSU QPXFS UISPVHI
0HJOHB0EJOHB ,FOZBUUBTĕSTUWJDFQSFTJEFOUBOEBTPDJBMJTUXJUIUJFTUPUIF
Eastern bloc. Kenyatta placed Odinga under house arrest, fearing a coup plot
BęFSEJTDPWFSJOHBDBDIFPG$[FDIBOE#VMHBSJBOBSNTJO0EJOHBTQPTTFTTJPO
0EJOHBXBTTVCTFRVFOUMZSFMFBTFECVUSFQMBDFECZUIFQSP8FTUFSO.PJ 8BTI-
ington’s favorite.89
In 1962, after Byron Engle and Mitchell Mabardy surveyed police opera-
UJPOT  BO 014 UFBN DPOTJTUJOH PG TFWFSBM WFUFSBOT PG UIF 7JFUOBN QSPHSBN
FTUBCMJTIFE B DPNNVOJDBUJPOT DFOUFS  DPPSEJOBUFE JOUFMMJHFODF BDUJWJUJFT  BOE
set up a police college. Motor vehicles, weapons, and aircraft were provided to
UIFTFNJNJMJUBSZGPSDF BMFHBDZPGUIFDPMPOJBMFSB XIFOJUIBECFFONPCJMJ[FE
UPDSVTI.BV.BVSFCFMT TUBČFECZBMBSHFOVNCFSPG#SJUJTIFYQBUSJBUFT90
ćFHPWFSONFOUTJOUFSFTUTMBZJOJODSFBTJOHUIFBCJMJUZPGUIFQPMJDFUPDSBDL
down on radical agitation at the University of Nairobi, keep tabs on the political
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XFSF TQJMMJOH JO CFDBVTF PG POHPJOH XBST ćF QPMJDF XFSF BMTP NPCJMJ[FE UP
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"TJBOXPSLFSTBOEGPSDFEUIFSFNPWBMPGTRVBUUFSTPSHBOJ[JOHGPSUIFJSSJHIUT
adjacent to the capital. Paying little heed to the underlying structural roots of
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XPVMECFiDBQUVSFECZUSBJOFEBHJUBUPSTXIFOUIFZSFUVSOGSPNUIFJSTUVEJFT
in Eastern bloc countries.”91ćFZJOUVSOQSJPSJUJ[FEQBSBNJMJUBSZTUZMFQPMJDF
USBJOJOHPWFSBOUJQPWFSUZQSPHSBNTDBQBCMFPGFBTJOHUIFTRVBUUFSTQMJHIU
In Tanzania, the United States sold police helicopters and trained Ranger
GPSDFTBOEBSJPUDPOUSPMVOJUVQPOUIFSFRVFTUPGTPDJBMJTUMFBEFS+VMJVT/ZFS-
ere, who, after leading the independence struggle against Britain in 1964, had
IFMQFEUPQVUEPXOBOBSNZBOEQPMJDFNVUJOZXJUIUIFBJEPG#SJUJTISFJOGPSDF-
NFOUT TVCTFRVFOUMZNBLJOHJUBSFRVJSFNFOUGPSPďDFSTUPCFNFNCFSTPGIJT
own Tanganyika African National Union Party, known as TANU. The Johnson
BENJOJTUSBUJPO XBT JOUFSFTUFE JO DVMUJWBUJOH /ZFSFSF BT BO BMMZ BOE XPSSJFE
BCPVUUIFSBEJDBMJTNJOOFJHICPSJOH;BO[JCBS BUSBEFDFOUFSDPOTJEFSFEUPCF
iDPNNVOJTUJOGFTUFEw"TEJQMPNBUTCSPLFSFEUIFNFSHFSPGUIFUXPDPVOUSJFT 
MBSHFMZ BT B NFBOT PG VOEFSNJOJOH ;BO[JCBST MFęJTU GPSFJHO NJOJTUFS "CEVM
3BINBO #BCV  UIF 014 QSPWJEFE PWFS žŹŷų ųųų JO DPNNPEJUJFT  JODMVEJOH
QSPKFDUJMFT  HVOT  XBMLJFUBMLJFT  BOE UFBS HBT HSFOBEFT "NFSJDBO GVOET BMTP
IFMQFETFUVQBOBUJPOBMQPMJDFBDBEFNZ IFBEFECZ*1"HSBEVBUF&QISBJN1
5FNV0WFSUJNF BT/ZFSFSFCFDBNFNPSFSBEJDBMBOECFHBOUPTVQQPSUBHSJ-
DVMUVSBMDPMMFDUJWJ[BUJPO 6KBNBB BOEMJCFSBUJPOTUSVHHMFTUISPVHIPVUUIFDPO-
UJOFOU SFMBUJPOTTPVSFE BOE"NFSJDBOBTTJTUBODFXBTDVSUBJMFE92
"TJNJMBSQBUUFSOXBTTFFOJO;BNCJB XIFSFQPMJDFBJEXBTFYUFOEFEBMPOH-
side British aid to post-independence leader Kenneth Kaunda, a socialist who
SFRVFTUFE TVQQPSU JO QVUUJOH EPXO B TFSJFT PG SFHJPOBM SFCFMMJPOT BOE MBCPS

184 The Cold War on the Periphery


EJTQVUFTJOUIFDPQQFSCFMU$POTJEFSJOHUIFNUIFiĕSTUMJOFPGEFGFOTFwBHBJOTU
TVCWFSTJPO 64BEWJTFS+PIO-JOERVJTU XIPIFMEB1I%JODSJNJOPMPHZGSPN
6$#FSLFMFZ QSPWJEFEHVOT USBOTDFJWFST BOEXBMLJFUBMLJFTUPTFNJNJMJUBSZ
forces in Lusaka, helped refurbish precincts, and worked with the intelligence
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BNPOH"GSJDBO/BUJPOBM$POHSFTTFYJMFTGSPN4PVUI"GSJDBXIPNUIF$*"XBT
NPOJUPSJOH DPOTJEFSJOHJUBi.BSYJTUUFSSPSJTUwPSHBOJ[BUJPO BOEMFęJTUGSFF-
EPNĕHIUFSTGSPN"OHPMBBOE.P[BNCJRVF93
*OUIFMBUFŴżŹųT BęFSUBLJOHTUFQTUPOBUJPOBMJ[FUIFDPQQFSNJOFT ,BVOEB
DBNFUPTVTQFDUUIBU$*"BHFOUTXFSFVTJOHUIFQSPHSBNUPBTTJTU4PVUI"GSJDBO
security forces in repressing the African National Congress and to coordinate
BUUBDLTPO'SFMJNP UIF-JCFSBUJPO'SPOUPG.P[BNCJRVF XIPTFTBODUVBSJFTJO
UIFWJMMBHFPG$IJQBUBMBXFSFEFDJNBUFECZ1PSUVHVFTFQMBOFTBOE"NFSJDBO
NBEFXFBQPOT94 Kaunda also believed that the CIA was plotting a coup against
IJN)FUPMEPOFPGIJTBEWJTFSTi8FJO;BNCJBIBWFTPDJBMJTUUFOEFODJFT UIBU
JT XFXPSLGPSUIFJOUFSFTUTPGUIFDPNNPONBO BOETPDJBMJTNJOBOZGPSN
JTMPPLFEPO<CZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT>BTUIFOFBSFTUFWJMUPDPNNVOJTN-PPLBU
UIF GBUF PG /LSVNBI BOE <"MHFSJBO SFWPMVUJPOBSZ "INFE> #FO #FMMB  XIPTF
EPXOGBMMXBTEJSFDUMZBUUSJCVUFEUPUIFXPSLPG"NFSJDBOTFDSFUBHFOUTXPSLJOH
with the Peace Corps, USIS, CIA and USAID.”95
,BVOEBT DPNNFOUT DBQUVSF UIF TVTQJDJPO BOE EJTUSVTU PG UIF NPUJWFT
VOEFSMZJOH"NFSJDBOUFDIOJDBMBJEQSPHSBNTXJEFMZGFMUBDSPTTUIFEFWFMPQJOH
XPSMEćF;BNCJBODBCJOFUCFMJFWFEUIBU64TVQQPSUGPSUIFBQBSUIFJESFHJNF
JO4PVUI"GSJDBBOE4PVUIFSO3IPEFTJB OPX;JNCBCXF BOE$*"TVCWFSTJPO
DBNQBJHOT JO $IJMF  7JFUOBN  -BPT  BOE *OEPOFTJB FQJUPNJ[FE UIF CVMMZJOH
DIBSBDUFSPG"NFSJDBOGPSFJHOQPMJDZ"ENJSJOHUIF#MBDL1PXFSNPWFNFOU 
UIFZOPUFEUIBU"GSJDBO"NFSJDBOTXFSFUSFBUFEBTiTFDPOEDMBTTDJUJ[FOTwJO
UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOEUIPVHIUUIBUUIFHPWFSONFOUXBTCFIJOEUIFBTTBTTJOB-
UJPOPG.BSUJO-VUIFS,JOH+SćF/JYPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOXBTTFFOBTFTQFDJBMMZ
JOTFOTJUJWFUPUIFQMJHIUPGNJOPSJUJFTBOEUIFQPPS*OŴżŹż,BVOEBDVUCBDLPO
SFMBUJPOTXJUIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOECBSSFEUIF014)FCFDBNFBMFBEFSPGUIF
OPOBMJHOFENPWFNFOUBOETUSVDLBEFBMXJUI.BPJTU$IJOBGPSUIFDPOTUSVD-
UJPOPGBSBJMXBZUP5BO[BOJB64BNCBTTBEPS0MJWFS-5SPYFMUPMEEFQBSUJOH
BEWJTFSTUIBUi;BNCJBEJEOPUEFTFSWFPSBQQSFDJBUF6OJUFE4UBUFTBTTJTUBODF w
DPNNFOUT UZQJDBM PG UIF QBUSPOJ[JOH BUUJUVEF NBSSJOH "NFSJDBO BEWJTPSZ
efforts in sub-Saharan Africa.96
"NFSJDBOQSPHSBNTJO&BTU"GSJDBXFSFNPTUEBNBHJOHJO6HBOEB XIFSF
UIFZDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFUZSBOOZPG*EJ"NJO"T.BINPPE.BNEBOJSFDPVOUT
in his insightful study Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda, sensational popular
culture and journalistic depictions have obscured the international context in
XIJDI"NJOTSVMFUPPLSPPU5SBJOFECZ#SJUJTIBEWJTFSTXIPDPOTJEFSFEIJN
iĕSTUSBUFwBOEBiHPPE"GSJDBO4FSHFBOUwXJUIBiUPVDIPGSVUIMFTTOFTT wIFXBT

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 185


JOJUJBMMZ TVQQPSUFE CZ UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT CFDBVTF IF XBT BOUJDPNNVOJTU BOE
PQFOUPGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU JODPOUSBTUUPIJTQSFEFDFTTPS.JMUPO0CPUF XIP
IBETPDJBMJTUMFBOJOHTBOEXBTDSJUJDBMPG"NFSJDBTIFBWZIBOEFEJOUFSWFOUJPO
in the Congo.97
During the late 1960s, the OPS conducted surveys of the Ugandan police,
XIJDIIBEEFWFMPQFEBGPSFOTJDT ĕOHFSQSJOU BOEQIPUPHSBQIJDCVSFBVVOEFS
the British, and trained officers at the IPA. The Israeli Mossad worked with a
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LJOTNFOBOEEJSFDUFEBHBJOTUUIFJSQPMJUJDBMPQQPOFOUT4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQMBO-
ners feared the rise of John Kakonge, secretary-general of the ruling Uganda
1FPQMFT$POHSFTTQBSUZBOEiBOBWPXFE.BSYJTUwXIPXBTBUUFNQUJOHUPXSFTU
MFBEFSTIJQ GSPN 0CPUF98 "ęFS "NJO UPPL QPXFS JO ŴżźŴ  UIF 1FOUBHPO TPME
IJNTJY#FMMIFMJDPQUFSTGPSƂźųų ųųų XIJDIXFSFVTFEGPSDIBTJOHEJTTJEFOUT
BOEXIJTLJOHLJEOBQWJDUJNTUPBOEGSPNUPSUVSFTJUFT ćF#SJUJTIQSPWJEFEƂŴ
NJMMJPOJOWFIJDMFTBOEFRVJQNFOUBOETFOUTFWFOUZ6HBOEBOQPMJDFGPSUSBJO-
ing in Britain.)99
8IFOBJEXBTDVUJO.BZŴżźŶ UXPJOTUSVDUPSTGSPNUIF#FMM)FMJDPQUFS$PN-
QBOZ POFPGXIPNXBTB$*"BHFOU DPOUJOVFEUPCFBUUBDIFEUPUIF6HBOEB
police air wing.100 As late as August 1975, the United States provided $287,000
XPSUIPGIFMJDPQUFSFOHJOFTUPUIFSFHJNF6HBOEBOQJMPUTXFSFUSBJOFEJOUIF
United States along with the chief of intelligence of the Entebbe airport, whose
KPCXBTUPJOUFSDFQUJOEJWJEVBMT"NJOEJEOPUXBOUUPMFBWF6HBOEB101 At least
UFOPG"NJOTTFDSFUTFSWJDFNFO DPOTJTUJOHQSJNBSJMZPGFUIOJD/VCJ SFDFJWFE
training at the IPA. Three took a postgraduate course at International Police
4FSWJDFT  *OD  B $*"GVOEFE BDBEFNZ IJEEFO BXBZ JO B 8BTIJOHUPO CSPXO-
TUPOFNBOTJPO8IFOBTLFEBCPVUUIFVTFGVMOFTTPGUSBJOJOH"NJOTBHFOUT B
CIA official explained to the Washington Posti#ZUSBJOJOH"NJOTNFO XFXFSF
BCMFUPIBWFTPNFJOĘVFODFPWFS"NJO‫*ڀڀ‬UXBTBMTPBQPTTJCJMJUZUIBUXFDPVME
go back to the trainees later for intelligence operations.”102
ćFTF DPNNFOUT SFWFBM BO JNQPSUBOU SBUJPOBMF VOEFSQJOOJOH UIF QPMJDF
QSPHSBNT  OBNFMZ  UIF DVMUJWBUJPO PG SFMJBCMF JOUFMMJHFODF iBTTFUTw ćF TDPQF
PG 8BTIJOHUPOT DPNQMJDJUZ JO "NJOT SFJHO PG UFSSPS XFOU GVSUIFS UIBO UIBU 
IPXFWFS"DPOĕEFOUJBMJOWFTUJHBUJPOCZ3FQSFTFOUBUJWF%POBME1FBTF BO0IJP
%FNPDSBU VODPWFSFEBžŷNJMMJPOHPWFSONFOUDPOUSBDUXJUIUIF$MFWFMBOE
CBTFE )BSSJT $PSQPSBUJPO UP USBJO 6HBOEBO UFDIOJDJBOT BOE QSPWJEF "NJO
XJUIBTBUFMMJUFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTTZTUFNćFTFBDUJWJUJFT PGBLJOEQSFWJPVTMZ
VOEFSUBLFOCZUIF014 SFĘFDUUIFQSJWBUJ[BUJPOPGQPMJDFQSPHSBNTBęFSUIF
014XBTBCPMJTIFECFDBVTFPGUIFMJOLUPFYUFOTJWFIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT103
64TVQQPSUGPS"NJOXBTBOFHSFHJPVTFYBNQMFPGUIJTDPOOFDUJPO UIPVHI
PUIFSFYBNQMFTBCPVOE
*O DPSSFTQPOEFODF XJUI UIF EJQMPNBU 3VCFO ,BNBOHB  XIP DBSFGVMMZ
NPOJUPSFEQPMJUJDBMEFWFMPQNFOUTXIJMFTUBUJPOFEBUUIF;BNCJBOFNCBTTZJO

186 The Cold War on the Periphery


8BTIJOHUPO %$ ;BNCJBOQSFTJEFOU,FOOFUI % ,BVOEB MBNFOUFE UIF WBTU
"NFSJDBOJOWFTUNFOUTJO4PVUI"GSJDBBOEUIFQSPWJTJPOPGBSNTUP1PSUVHBM
CZ UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT UP TVQQSFTT OBUJPOBM MJCFSBUJPO NPWFNFOUT 8FJHIJOH
XIFUIFS IJT BENJOJTUSBUJPO TIPVME BDDFQU GPSFJHO BJE  IF DPNNFOUFE ićF
"NFSJDBOTQPTTFTTUFDIOJDBMLOPXIPX CVUXPVMEOPUHJWFJUVQXJUIPVUBOZ-
thing in return.”104,BVOEBTDPNNFOUTTVNVQUIFCJOEJOXIJDINBOZ"GSJDBO
MFBEFSTGPVOEUIFNTFMWFT0OPOFIBOE UIFZSFDPHOJ[FEUIFOFFEGPSUFDIOJDBM
FYQFSUJTF UP BJE JO FDPOPNJD EFWFMPQNFOU BOE UIF NPEFSOJ[BUJPO PG DSVDJBM
institutions like the police. On the other hand, they understood the threat to
UIFJSTPWFSFJHOUZUIBUTVDIBJESFQSFTFOUFEBOEUIFQPUFOUJBMQFSJMTUIBUBDDPN-
panied it.
%SJWFOJOQBSUCZBOJEFPMPHZPGNPEFSOJ[BUJPO "NFSJDBOBJEJOEFFEVTV-
BMMZDBNFXJUITUSJOHTBUUBDIFE*UXBTVTFEUPBEWBODFBOFYQMJDJUMZQPMJUJDBM
agenda, including the desire to access strategic resources, prop up right-wing
EJDUBUPSTIJQT PSHBJOMFWFSBHFBNPOHTFDVSJUZGPSDFTJODBTFBMFBEFSTUFQQFE
out of line. Writing about British intervention in the Gold Coast (Ghana), the
historian David Killingray notes that “throughout the colonial period, policing
XBTJNQPTFEPOUIFQFPQMFBOEOFWFSFOKPZFEUIFJSDPOTFOU‫*<ڀڀ‬U>IBEMJUUMF
UPEPXJUITFSWJOHUIFDPNNVOJUZBOEFWFSZUIJOHUPEPXJUIVQIPMEJOHUIF
authority of the colonial state.”105,JMMJOHSBZTDPNNFOUTBSFFRVBMMZBQQMJDBCMF
UP UIF QPTUDPMPOJBM QFSJPE  XIFO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT FNQPXFSFE GPSDFT NPCJ-
MJ[FEUPTVQQSFTTFUIOJDBOESFHJPOBMVQSJTJOHTBOETPDJBMNPWFNFOUTPOCFIBMG
PGMFBEFSTXIPXFSFFJUIFSJNQPTFEGSPNUIFPVUTJEFPSSFMJBOUPOGPSFJHOBJE
3BUIFS UIBO DPOUSJCVUJOH UP EFNPDSBUJD OBUJPOCVJMEJOH  UIF 014 IFMQFE UP
NPEFSOJ[FSFQSFTTJPOUISPVHIUIFJNQPSUBUJPOPGTPQIJTUJDBUFEQPMJDJOHUFDI-
OPMPHJFTBOENFDIBOJTNTPGTPDJBMDPOUSPM
%VSJOHUIF$PME8BS UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJTFTUJNBUFEUPIBWFQSPWJEFEPWFS
žŴŸųCJMMJPOJOBSNTUP"GSJDBOOBUJPOT NBOZPGXIJDIDPVMEOPUNFFUUIFCBTJD
needs of their people.1061PJOUJOHUPUIF3FBHBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOTQSPWJTJPOPG
žŸųų NJMMJPO UP UIF -JCFSJBO EJDUBUPS 4BNVFM , %PF  XIPTF NJTSVMF IFMQFE
to precipitate a devastating civil war, the political scientist George Klay Kieh
+SXSPUFUIBUUIFCFIBWJPSPGUIF64HPWFSONFOUXBTiBOBMPHPVTUPUIBUPGB
DPMMBCPSBUPSXIPTVQQMJFTBHSPVQPGBSTPOJTUTXJUINBUDIFTBOEHBTPMJOFBOE
UIFOQSFUFOETUPCFJOOPDFOUBęFSUIFĕSFJTTFUBOETVCTFRVFOUMZEFTUSPZTMJGF
and property.”107ćJTNFUBQIPSBQQMJFTKVTUBTXFMMUPUIF"NFSJDBOQPMJDFQSP-
HSBNT  XIJDI XSPVHIU NVDI EBNBHF CVU SFNBJOFE IJEEFO GSPN UIF QVCMJD 
IFODFFOTVSJOHQMBVTJCMFEFOJBCJMJUZ"OEXIFOUIFĕSFCSPLFPVU UIFBSTPOJTUT
DPMMBCPSBUPSTNBJOUBJOFEUIFJSQPTUVSFPGJOOPDFODFBOESJHIUFPVTOFTT FWFO
DMBJNJOHUIFEVUZPGiIVNBOJUBSJBOJOUFSWFOUJPOwJOPSEFSUPiTBWFUIFiCBDL-
XBSEwOBUJWFTGSPNUIFWJPMFODFBOEDIBPTUIFZIBEIFMQFEUPTPX108

The Postcolonial Nightmare in Africa 187


Chapter 9
Arming Tyrants II
Police Training and Neocolonialism in
the Mediterranean and Middle East
We were so obsessed with the communists that we were willing to get into
bed with anyone who claimed to be anti-communist and this included Nazi
collaborators, extreme right-wingers, crooks, inept people, etc.
‰+ames Kellis 64JOWFTUJHBUPS RVPUFEJO,BUJ.BSUPO The Polk Conspiracy,

*O UIF NJEŴżŸųT B SFQPSUFS BTLFE B NFNCFS PG UIF *SBOJBO (FOEBSNFSJF
why he was shooting at fellow Iranians. “They are your brothers,” said the
SFQPSUFSćFPďDFSSFQMJFE i0VSTIPFTBSF"NFSJDBO PVSDMPUIFTBSFHJWFOCZ
"NFSJDBOT BOEPVSTBMBSJFTBSFQBJECZUIFNćFZJOTUSVDUFEVTUPĕSFw1 The
SFTQPOTFTVNTVQUIFEFWJMTCBSHBJOMPDBMPďDJBMTXPSMEXJEFNBEFJOBMMZJOH
XJUIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT*OSFUVSOGPSNPEFSOFRVJQNFOUBOEXFBQPOTDBQBCMF
of securing their power, they in effect gave up their sovereignty and helped to
TPXJOUFSOFDJOFDPOĘJDU
As the reconstruction of western Europe proceeded after World War II and
UIF"NFSJDBOXBSNBDIJOFHSFXFWFSNPSFEFQFOEFOUPOPJM BMFWFSPGHMPCBM
EPNJOBUJPO 4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQMBOOFSTDIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIF.JEEMF&BTUBTBiTUV-
QFOEPVTTPVSDFPGTUSBUFHJDQPXFSwBOEiPOFPGUIFHSFBUFTUNBUFSJBMQSJ[FTJO
history.” Their greatest fear besides the Soviet Union was that the rise of social-
JTU BOE QBO"SBCJTU NPWFNFOUT XPVME UISFBUFO OBUJPOBMJ[BUJPO2 Alongside
$*"PQFSBUJPOT QPMJDFNPEFSOJ[BUJPOBOEUFDIOJDBMBJEQSPKFDUTXFSFDSVDJBM
JO 64 FČPSUT UP UIXBSU UIFTF NPWFNFOUT BOE JO DPOTPMJEBUJOH QSP8FTUFSO
SFHJNFTPQFOUPGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU"4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUFOWPZTUBUFEJOBŴżŸŴ
DBCMFUIBUiTUSPOHFSQPMJDFDPOUSPMTDPVMETPMWFNPTUPGUIFJOUFSOBMDPNNVOJTU
QSPCMFNTwBDSPTTUIFSFHJPOBOEUIVTFOTVSF"NFSJDBTBDDFTTUPPJM XIJDIIF
DBMMFEiUIFTJOHMFNPTUJNQPSUBOUGBDUPSJO"NFSJDBOSFMBUJPOTXJUIUIFBSFBw3
ćF6OJUFE4UBUFTCFHBOJNQMFNFOUJOHUIJTTUSBUFHZBUGVMMTUSFOHUIJOŴżŸŶ
BęFSUIFPWFSUISPXPGUIFTFDVMBSOBUJPOBMJTU.PIBNNBE.PTTBEFHIJO*SBO
ćSPVHIUIFVTFPGUFDIOJRVFTSFĕOFEJOPUIFS$PME8BSIPUTQPUT JODMVEJOH
UIFDSFBUJPOPGBEWBODFEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTBOEEBUBNBOBHFNFOUTZTUFNT 
QPMJDF XFSF USBJOFE JO DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF BOE NPCJMJ[FE GPS iJOUFSOBM TFDV-

188
SJUZwQVSQPTFT&YUFOTJWFIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTFOTVFE*OUIFTIPSUUFSN 
UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTTFSWFE8BTIJOHUPOTJOUFSFTUTJOIFMQJOHUPGPSUJGZDMJFOU
SFHJNFTTVDIBTUIBUPGUIF4IBIBOEJOTFDVSJOHBDDFTTUPPJM0WFSUIFMPOH
UFSN  IPXFWFS  UIFZ GPTUFSFE B WJHPSPVT QPMJUJDBM CBDLMBTI BOE B iCMPXCBDLw
FČFDU CPUIPGXIJDIIBWFQSPWFEUPCFDBUBDMZTNJD

“Stern Measures to Defeat the Guerrillas”: Police Training and


the Greek Civil War

-JLFUIF64PDDVQBUJPOTPG+BQBOBOE,PSFB UIF"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPOJOUIF
(SFFLDJWJMXBSPGŴżŷŹoŴżŷżTFUBQSFDFEFOUGPSUIFSFTUPGUIF$PME8BS%VSJOH
UIFMBUFŴżŷųT UIF5SVNBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOUSJFEUPLFFQJOEJHFOPVTDPNNVOJTU
NPWFNFOUT UISPVHIPVU XFTUFSO &VSPQF JO DIFDL CZ NFBOT PG UIF .BSTIBMM
1MBOBTXFMMBTDPWFSUNFUIPETTVDIBTUIFJOĕMUSBUJPOPGMBCPSVOJPOT*O*UBMZ 
UIF NJMJUBSZ BOE UIF $*" FRVJQQFE UIF QBSBNJMJUBSZ $BSBCJOJFSJ UP TVQQSFTT
DPNNVOJTU EFNPOTUSBUJPOT BOE UP TQZ PO 1BMNJSP 5PHMJBUUJ  UIF IFBE PG UIF
*UBMJBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ BOEIJTBTTPDJBUFT*OPDDVQJFE(FSNBOZ "NFSJDBO
BEWJTFSTSFPSHBOJ[FENVOJDJQBMQPMJDFBOEFTUBCMJTIFEBDPOTUBCVMBSZSFTQPO-
TJCMFGPSQBUSPMMJOHUIFCPSEFS NBJOUBJOJOHPSEFSJOEJTQMBDFEQFSTPOTDBNQT 
PWFSTFFJOHEFOB[JĕDBUJPO BOEDVSUBJMJOHUIFCMBDLNBSLFU4"NFSJDBOBEWJTFST
BMTPPWFSTBXUIFQFOBMTZTUFN BOEBDDPSEJOHUPBTFDSFUSFQPSU $PVOUFS*OUFM-
MJHFODF$PSQT $*$ BHFOUTJOTPNFJOTUBODFTPCTUSVDUFEQSJTPONBOBHFNFOU
BOEiJOUFSGFSFEXJUIUIFSFTQPOTJCJMJUZPGQSJTPOXBSEFOTCZNBLJOHEFNBOET
for the release of prisoners,” notably Nazi scientists and intelligence agents as
part of Operation Paperclip, “contrary to the due process of law.”5
%FOB[JĕDBUJPO  BT UIF IJTUPSJBO $BSPMZO &JTFOCFSH OPUFT  XBT HFOFSBMMZ
carried out differently in different occupied zones, with U.S. policy contribut-
JOH UP UIF SFWJWBM PG UIF PME FDPOPNJD PSEFS JO UIF CFMJFG UIBU UIF NBOBHFST
of capital would be capable of restoring the country’s productivity. Rebuilding
the police apparatus was crucial in this context in controlling labor unrest and
MFęJTUBDUJWJTUT XIP GSFFEGSPN)JUMFSTDPODFOUSBUJPODBNQT XFSFTFFLJOHUP
FOHFOEFSBNPSFTXFFQJOHTPDJFUBMUSBOTGPSNBUJPO6 The head of the U.S. police
NJTTJPOJO(FSNBOZ $PMPOFM0SMBOEP88JMTPO IBECFFODIJFGPGQPMJDFJO
8JDIJUB ,BOTBT GSPNŴżŵŻUPŴżŶż"QSPUÏHÏPG"VHVTU7PMMNFS JOUIFŴżŸųT 
IF XSPUF BO JOĘVFOUJBM UFYUCPPL TZOUIFTJ[JOH NBOZ PG UIF QSPHSFTTJWF JEFBMT
JOMBXFOGPSDFNFOU*UXBTVTFEBTBCMVFQSJOUGPSUIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMQPMJDFQSP-
HSBNTBOEEJTTFNJOBUFEJOUIFUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFTUIBUXFSFTFUVQXPSMEXJEF
ćFDFOUSBMBSHVNFOU EFSJWFEGSPNIJTFYQFSJFODFTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOE
(FSNBOZ XBTUIBUUIFFďDJFODZPGUIFQPMJDFDPVMECFNBYJNJ[FEUISPVHIUIF
VTFPGVQUPEBUFUBDUJDBMFRVJQNFOUUIFTDJFOUJĕDEFQMPZNFOUPGNPCJMF XFMM
USBJOFEUSPPQTPSHBOJ[FEBMPOHBIJFSBSDIJDBMNJMJUBSZNPEFMBOEUIFJOTUBMMB-
UJPO PG BO BEWBODFE DPNNVOJDBUJPOT TZTUFN  DPNQSFIFOTJWF SFDPSELFFQJOH 

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 189


BOE BO POHPJOH QVCMJD SFMBUJPOT QSPHSBN 4VQQPSUJOH UIF BJN PG UIF ŴŵżųE
QSPHSBNUPiTUSFOHUIFOUIFSFTJTUBODFPGHPWFSONFOUTBHBJOTUTVCWFSTJPO w8JM-
TPOSFDPODJMFEUIFBEPQUJPOPGQPMJUJDBMQPMJDJOHPQFSBUJPOTXJUIBEFNPDSBUJD
QPMJDJOHNPEFM XIBUIFDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTi"OHMP4BYPODPODFQUTw TUBUJOHUIBU
the “effectiveness of police in dealing with outright subversion and guerrilla
BDUJWJUZJTEJSFDUMZSFMBUFEUPJUTFČFDUJWFOFTTJONBJOUBJOJOHMBXBOEPSEFSw7
"NFSJDBOQPMJDZQMBOOFSTWJFXFE(SFFDFBTBOJNQPSUBOUCFBDIIFBEUPUIF
.JEEMF&BTUBOEJUTWBTUPJMSFTFSWFTBOEUIVTBTBLFZWFOVFGPSJNQMFNFOUJOH
Wilson’s ideals.8 During World War II, the principal resistance to Nazi occupa-
tion had been carried out by the National Liberation Front (better known by
JUT (SFFL BDSPOZN &".  B DPBMJUJPO PG MFęJTU BOE SFQVCMJDBO QBSUJFT MFE CZ
"SFT7FMPVDIJPUJTBOE7BQIJBEJT.BSLPT PGXIJDIUIFDPNNVOJTUT ,,& PS
$PNNVOJTU1BSUZPG(SFFDF XFSFUIFEPNJOBOUCVUOPUUIFFYDMVTJWFFMFNFOU
&NFSHJOHBTBMFBEJOHQPMJUJDBMGPSDF UIF&".JOJUJBUFEFYQFSJNFOUTJODPN-
NVOBMMJWJOHBOEXPSLFSDPOUSPMMFEJOEVTUSZ JNQMFNFOUFESBEJDBMMBOESFGPSN
BOE MJUFSBDZ DBNQBJHOT  BOE QSPNPUFE XPNFOT SJHIUT9 *O %FDFNCFS Ŵżŷŷ 
8JOTUPO$IVSDIJMMPSEFSFEUIFTUSBĕOHPG"UIFOTCZ3"'TQJUĕSFTGPMMPXJOH
an incident in which police were besieged after killing at least ten people and
JOKVSJOHEP[FOTNPSFXIPXFSFQSPUFTUJOHUIFSFTUPSBUJPOPG(FSNBODPMMBCP-
SBUPSTJOUIF/BUJPOBM(VBSE#SJUBJOTVCTFRVFOUMZCBDLFESPZBMJTUGPSDFTJOB
DBNQBJHOPGiXIJUFUFSSPSwBHBJOTUUIF&". XIJDIXBTBDDVTFEPGJOTUJHBUJOH
the unrest.10
4IBSJOH$IVSDIJMMTGFBSPGSBEJDBMTPDJBMNPWFNFOUT UIF5SVNBOBENJO-
JTUSBUJPO DIBOOFMFE OFBSMZ žŴ CJMMJPO JO FNFSHFODZ BJE  JODMVEJOH XBSQMBOFT
BOE TUPDLT PG OBQBMN  UP GPSUJGZ UIF (SFFL HPWFSONFOU VOEFS $POTUBOUJO
5TBMEBSJT XIPIBECFFOBTQZGPSUIF/B[JSFHJNFJO)VOHBSZćF"NFSJDBO
NJTTJPOVOEFS%XJHIU(SJTXPME BGPSNFS3FQVCMJDBOHPWFSOPSPG/FCSBTLB
dubbed by the New York TimesiUIFNPTUQPXFSGVMNBOJO(SFFDF wUSBJOFE
UIFBSNZBOEQPMJDF XIJDIXFSFBDLOPXMFEHFEUPCFiTFNJGBTDJTUw4FDSFUBSZ
of State George C. Marshall, architect of the European recovery plan, wrote to
(SJTXPMEi8FBSFBXBSFPGUIFGBDUUIBUJOJUTFČPSUTUPDPNCBUUIFTVCWFSTJWF
NPWFNFOU UIFSFJTBUFOEFODZPOUIFQBSUPGDFSUBJOFMFNFOUTJOUIF(SFFL
HPWFSONFOUUPFNQMPZTUSPOHNFBTVSFT‫ڀڀ‬4UFSOBOEEFUFSNJOFENFBTVSFT
NBZCFOFDFTTBSZUPFČFDUUIFUFSNJOBUJPOPGUIFBDUJWJUJFTPGUIFHVFSJMMBTBOE
their supporters as speedily as possible.”11 .BSTIBMMT PVUMPPL  BT UIFTF DPN-
NFOUT SFWFBM  XBT MJUUMF EJČFSFOU GSPN UIBU PG IJT DPMPOJBM FSB QSFEFDFTTPST
JO TVCPSEJOBUJOH IVNBO SJHIUT UP CSPBEFS HFPQPMJUJDBM EFTJHOT ćPTF XIP
PQQPTFE"NFSJDBOQPXFSXFSFUPCFDSVTIFE KVTUMJLFUIFNFTTJBOJDQFBTBOU
leaders in the Philippines.
"NFSJDBOBSNZBEWJTFSTXPSLFEXJUIUIF#SJUJTIQPMJDFNJTTJPOMFECZ4JS
$IBSMFT8JDLIBN UIFĕSTUJOTQFDUPSHFOFSBMPGUIF3PZBM6MTUFS$POTUBCVMBSZ
(a force associated with acts of brutality in Northern Ireland), who trained

190 The Cold War on the Periphery


MBXFOGPSDFNFOUBHFOUTUISPVHIPVUUIFFNQJSF JODMVEJOHQBSBNJMJUBSZGPSDFT
JO1BMFTUJOF"DDPSEJOHUPUIFIJTUPSJBO(FPSHJOB4JODMBJS XIJMFTZNQBUIFUJD
UPUIFOPUJPOPGiQPMJDJOHwSBUIFSUIBOiTPMEJFSJOH w8JDLIBNGFMUUIBUJUXBT
BSFTQPOTJCJMJUZPGUIFQPMJDFUPĕHIUBOZPOFTVTQFDUFEPGCFJOHBDPNNVOJTU
iCZBOJOUFOTJĕDBUJPOPGUIFOPSNBMQSPDFEVSFPGPQFSBUJPO wBWJFXTIBSFECZ
IJT "NFSJDBO DPVOUFSQBSUT12 $IBSHÏ EBČBJSFT +BNFT ) ,FFMFZ +S  XIP LFQU
EFUBJMFEĕMFTPGTVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUTXIJMFTFSWJOHBT64DPOTVMJO4BMPOJLB
GSPNŴżŶŹUPŴżŶż QSBJTFE8JDLIBNTFČPSUT XSJUJOHUP.BSTIBMMUIBUUIF#SJU-
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NFSJF wIFTBJE iCVUUIJTJTEVFUPDJSDVNTUBODFTCFZPOEJUTDPOUSPM OBNFMZUIF
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GSPNJUTOPSNBMQFBDFUJNFEVUZPGNBJOUBJOJOHMBXBOEPSEFSUPUIBUPGBDU-
JOHBTBOBVYJMJBSZUPUIF"SNZJODPNCBUBHBJOTUQPMJUJDBMCBOEJUSZw,FFMFZ
BEEFEUIBUXJUIPVU#SJUJTITVQFSWJTJPO iBCVTFCZUIF(FOEBSNFSJFXPVMEIBWF
SFBDIFEGBSNPSFTFSJPVTQSPQPSUJPOT wBOEQSJTPODPOEJUJPOT iCBEBTUIFZBSF
BUQSFTFOU XPVMEIBWFCFFOJOĕOJUFMZXPSTFw13
%VSJOHUIFSFJHOPGQSPUPGBTDJTU(FOFSBM*PBOOJT.FUBYBTGSPNŴżŶŹUPŴżŷŴ 
UIF(FOEBSNFSJFIBECFFONPCJMJ[FEUPEJTNBOUMFUIF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZXJUI
the aid of U.S. intelligence (as Keeley’s activities reveal) and, during World War
**  SBO EFBUI TRVBE PQFSBUJPOT BHBJOTU &". QBSUJTBOT JO DPMMBCPSBUJPO XJUI
UIFQSP/B[JSFHJNF14"ęFSXBSET NBOZPGUIFTBNFJOEJWJEVBMTDPOUJOVFEUP
DPNNBOE UIF GPSDF  JODMVEJOH (FOFSBM /BQPMFPO ;FSWBT  NJOJTUFS PG QVCMJD
PSEFS  XIP WPXFE UP BOTXFS UIF UFSSPSJTN PG UIF HVFSSJMMBT XJUI iUFSSPSJTN
UFOUJNFTBTTUSPOHBOETMBVHIUFSUFOUJNFTBTHSFBUw%FTQJUFTPNFEJTDPNGPSU
XJUIIJTiWJPMFOUMZBOUJDPNNVOJTUQPTJUJPO wUIF"NFSJDBOTBOEUIF#SJUJTIEJE
OPUQVSHF;FSWBT BTUIFZIBEEPOFXJUIXBSDSJNJOBMTSFDSVJUFECZ3FJOIBSE
(FIMFOT OFUXPSL JO (FSNBOZ  CFDBVTF PG IJT DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF TLJMMT BOE
effectiveness against the EAM, and they looked the other way as additional
8FISNBDIUDPMMBCPSBUPSTXFSFSFMFBTFEGSPNQSJTPOBOESFTUPSFEUPQPTJUJPOT
PGQSPNJOFODF15
*OUIFBUUFNQUUPCVJMEBOFČFDUJWFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVT "NFSJDBOBOE
#SJUJTIBEWJTFSTJNQBSUFEUFDIOJRVFTPGEBUBNBOBHFNFOUBOEQPQVMBUJPODPO-
USPMBOETVQQMJFE;FSWBTTNFOXJUIVOJGPSNT 4UFOHVOT NPSUBST BOESBEJPTUP
coordinate patrols. Though conscious of the potential for “right-wing excesses,”
XIJDIXFSFDPOTJEFSFEUPIBWFQSPWPLFEUIFDJWJMXBS UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU
FYQBOEFEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFTNBOQPXFSBOEFODPVSBHFEJUUPBUUBDLUIFHVFS-
rillas “aggressively.”16 Soldiers carried out sweep operations, forcibly relocated
QFBTBOUT  BOE TFU VQ DIFDLQPJOUT GPS SFTPVSDF DPOUSPM QVSQPTFT  DPNNJUUJOH
BCVTFTTVDIBTCVSOJOHIPVTFTBTBQVOJUJWFNFBTVSF1FBTBOUTBDDVTFEPGTVQ-
QMZJOHGPPEUPHVFSSJMMBT BTXFMMBTMBCPSBOEXPNFOTSJHIUTBDUJWJTUTBOEPUIFS
PG5TBMEBSJTTPQQPOFOUT XFSFBNPOHUIPTFUPSUVSFEJOVOEFSHSPVOEEVOHFPOT

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 191


PSFYFDVUFECZĕSJOHTRVBE17'JFMEDPNNBOEFSTQSBJTFEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFGPS
“cleaning up the bandit” situation and countering the “bolshi” presence in
Kahenia, Cephalonia, and on the island of Crete. Griswold, who also oversaw
QPMJDFPQFSBUJPOTJOPDDVQJFE(FSNBOZ UPMEUIFQSFTTUIBUUIPTFXIPIBECFFO
FYFDVUFEXFSFiNVSEFSFSTTFOUFODFECZKVEJDJBMUSJCVOBM wXIJMFUIFEJQMPNBU
-PZ)FOEFSTPODMBJNFEUIBUUIFFMJNJOBUJPOPGHVFSSJMMBXBSGBSFXBTOFDFTTBSZ
for reconstruction.18
$SVDJBMUP"OHMP"NFSJDBOTUSBUFHZ BEWJTFSTXPSLFEUPNPEFSOJ[FVSCBO
police forces, including in Athens, where the chief worked closely with the Brit-
JTITFDSFUTFSWJDFćFZHBWFMFDUVSFTBUQPMJDFBDBEFNJFT JODMVEJOHJOOPOMFUIBM
riot control and the use of tear gas, distributed literature about the FBI, helped
VQHSBEFSFDPSETDPMMFDUJOHBOEĕOHFSQSJOUJOH BOEJOJUJBUFEBDSJNFSFQPSUJOH
TZTUFNNPEFMFEBęFSUIFVOJGPSNDSJNFSFQPSU XIJDIXBTĕSTUBEPQUFEJOUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTJOŴżŶųBOEFYFNQMJĕFEUIFJOGBUVBUJPOPGQSPHSFTTJWFSFGPSNFST
XJUITUBUJTUJDBMEBUBJOUIFJSRVFTUUPRVBOUJGZBOEUIFODPOGSPOUTPDJBMQSPC-
MFNT"ęFSUIFGPSNBUJPOPGUIF$*"JOŴżŷź UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTEFWFMPQFEBO
intelligence agency in Greece, which carried out photo surveillance, cultivated
OFUXPSLTPGJOGPSNBOUT BOECFDBNFLOPXOGPSiTIBEPXJOHw(SFFLQPMJUJDBM
QFSTPOBMJUJFT BNBTTJOHPWFSŴŹNJMMJPOQPMJUJDBMĕMFT19
"NPOH UIF DJWJMJBOT XPSLJOH XJUI (SFFL TFDVSJUZ GPSDFT XBT ćFP )BMM 
BENJOJTUSBUJWFPďDFSGPSUIFFNCBTTZBOEGPSNFSDIJFGPGQPMJDFJO8JMNFUUF 
*MMJOPJT )BMM IBE DPBVUIPSFE BO JOĘVFOUJBM UFYU PO QPMJDJOH DJWJM EJTPSEFST
BOENJOPSJUZSFMBUJPOTXIJDIBEWPDBUFEGPSNPSFiQSFWFOUBUJWFQPMJDFXPSLw
BOEiDPOTUBOUQPMJDFWJHJMBODFPWFSUSPVCMFEBSFBTw XIJDICFDBNFBCBTJTGPS
SBDJBMQSPĕMJOH "MJCFSBMJOUFSOBUJPOBMJTUXIPMBNFOUFEUIBUUIFŴżŷŶ%FUSPJU
SBDFSJPUTIBETBQQFEXBSQSPEVDUJPOBOEiVOEFSNJOFEDPOĕEFODFBNPOHPVS
OPOXIJUFBMMJFT w)BMMIBECFFOBQSPUÏHÏPG088JMTPOGSPNIJTEBZTBT
B CFBU DPQ JO 8JDIJUB BOE TFSWFE BT IJT BTTJTUBOU JO (FSNBOZ JO SFPSHBOJ[-
JOHUIFQPMJDFBOEEJSFDUJOHEFOB[JĕDBUJPOFČPSUT QSFQBSJOHUIFXBZGPSIJT
UFOVSFJO(SFFDF)FIBEEPOFBENJOJTUSBUJWFXPSLBMPOHTJEF8JMTPOGPSUIF
/VSFNCFSH$PVODJMQSPDFFEJOHTBOEXFOUPOUPSVO014PQFSBUJPOTJO(VB-
UFNBMB #PMJWJB &UIJPQJB BOECSJFĘZ7JFUOBNBęFSBTUJOUBTIFBEPGUIFŴŵżųE
QSPHSBN20
)BMMTJOĘVFODFJO(SFFDFBOEUIBUPGIJTDPOUFNQPSBSJFTXBTIBSEMZQPTJUJWF
ćFDPVOUSZCFDBNFUIFNPTUIFBWJMZQPMJDFEJO&VSPQFBUBGPSDFPGPWFSĕęZ
UIPVTBOE  XJUI B OVNCFS PG NVTFVNT DPOWFSUFE JOUP QSJTPOT 1PMJDZNBLFST
WJFXFE BT UIFJS HSFBUFTU BDDPNQMJTINFOU UIF SFCVJMEJOH PG UIF (FOEBSNFSJF 
which was crucial to winning the “bandit war.” The EAM was gradually deci-
NBUFE BTNBOZPGJUTMFBEFSTXFSFFYJMFEPSCBOJTIFEJOUPDPODFOUSBUJPODBNQT
TVDIBTPOUIFQSJTPOJTMBOEPG.BLSPOJTJT XIFSFDPOEJUJPOTSFTFNCMFEUIPTF
of the Siberian gulag.21
ćFDPVOUSZTBVUIPSJUBSJBOJTNXBTBQQBSFOUJOUIFJOWFTUJHBUJPOPGUIFNVS-

192 The Cold War on the Periphery


der of CBS correspondent George Polk, who had published articles critical of
UIF5SVNBOEPDUSJOFBOEUIF5TBMEBSJTHPWFSONFOU*OBIJHIMFWFMDPOTQJSBDZ 
QPMJDFEPDUPSFEFWJEFODF BDDVTFEBEFBENBOPGIBWJOHDPNNJUUFEUIFDSJNF 
IBSBTTFE1PMLTXJGF BOELJEOBQQFEBOEUPSUVSFETVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUSJOH-
leader Gregory Stakopolous to force a half-baked confession, even arresting his
BHFENPUIFSćFSFBMLJMMFS .JDIBFM,PVSUFTTJT XBTIFBEPGBTFDSFUSJHIUXJOH
organization that collaborated with the police in political operations and likely
XBTBDUJOHVOEFSPSEFSTGSPN5TBMEBSJT22
ćSPVHIUIFŴżŸųT BTJOWFTUNFOUDBQJUBMGSPN&TTP %PX$IFNJDBM $ISZT-
MFSBOEPUIFS64DPSQPSBUJPOTQPVSFEJO "NFSJDBOTXFSFDPOUJOVPVTMZQMBDFE
XJUI (SFFL DPNCBU VOJUT JO QSFQBSBUJPO GPS UIF SFWJWBM PG DJWJM XBS *OUFSOBM
SFQPSUTFYQSFTTFEDPODFSOTUIBUUIF,,&NJHIUCFSFTUPSFEUPMFHBMJUZ BCPVU
UIFSFQBUSJBUJPOPGSFGVHFFTGSPNUIF&BTUFSOCMPD BOECZUIFGBDUUIBU,,&
GSPOU PSHBOJ[BUJPOT XPO Ŵų QFSDFOU PG UIF WPUF JO QBSMJBNFOUBSZ FMFDUJPOT JO
1952.230QFSBUJOHBUBOBWFSBHFZFBSMZCVEHFUPGžŶųų ųųų UIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN
FRVJQQFEUIF"UIFOTQPMJDFXJUINPUPSWFIJDMFT SBEJPFRVJQNFOU *#.DPN-
puters, and tear gas grenades, which were used to suppress worker and student
EFNPOTUSBUJPOT"EWJTFSTTVDIBT.JMFT'VSMPOHPGUIF%FUSPJU1PMJDF%FQBSU-
NFOUBOEćFPEPSF#SPXO XIPXFOUPOUPEJSFDUUIFJOUFS"NFSJDBOQPMJDF
BDBEFNZJO1BOBNB BQSFDVSTPSUPUIF*1" BOEIFBEUIF014JO$PMPNCJB 
&M4BMWBEPS BOE#SB[JM XPSLFEUPFTUBCMJTIBDFOUSBMSFDPSETĕMFBOEOBUJPOBM
JEFOUJĕDBUJPOTZTUFN DPOUSJCVUJOHUPUIFHSPXUIPGBNBTTTVSWFJMMBODFTUBUF
.PEFSOJOUFSSPHBUJPOBOEXJSFUBQQJOHUFDIOJRVFTXFSFUBVHIU1PMJDFBSSFTUFE
QFPQMFGPSPČFOTFTTVDIBTEJTUSJCVUJOHMFBĘFUTPQQPTJOHUIFFTUBCMJTINFOUPG
NJMJUBSZCBTFTBOEBUPNJDXFBQPOTUFTUJOH24
*OŴżŹŶ PďDFSTJO4BMPOJLBXFSFBDDVTFEPGDPMMBCPSBUJOHJOUIFNVSEFSPG
a left-wing deputy, an act that provided the basis for Constantin Costa-Gavras’s
DMBTTJDĕMNZ. Political repression peaked during the reign of the colonels, who
were later put on trial.250WFSBMM (SFFDFFYQFSJFODFETJHOJĕDBOUEJTPSEFSJOUIF
QPTUXBSQFSJPE XIJDIXBTFYBDFSCBUFECZ"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT
#FDBVTFJUFWPMWFEBTBDMJFOUTUBUF UIFDPVOUSZCFDBNFBNPEFMGPS64QPMJDZ
in the Middle East and the Third World, with Defense Secretary Walt W. Ros-
UPXDBMMJOHGPSBi(SFFLTPMVUJPOwJO7JFUOBN

“Paid For by the USA”: Police Aid and the Building of a Client State
in Iran

*O*SBO QPMJDFUSBJOJOHXBTJOUFHSBMJOTUBCJMJ[JOHUIFQPXFSPG4IBI.PIBN-
NBE3F[B1BIMBWJBęFSBŴżŸŶ$*"CBDLFEDPVQPWFSUISFXUIFEFNPDSBUJDBMMZ
FMFDUFEHPWFSONFOUPG1SJNF.JOJTUFS.PIBNNBE.PTTBEFHIćFHSPVOE-
XPSLIBECFFOJOJUJBUFEBEFDBEFFBSMJFSXJUIUIFBEWFOUPGBNJMJUBSZNJTTJPO
IFBEFECZ$PMPOFM)/PSNBO4DIXBS[LPQG TVQFSJOUFOEFOUPGUIF/FX+FSTFZ

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 193


4UBUF1PMJDF XIJDINPEFSOJ[FEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFVOEFSUIF4IBITGBUIFS 3F[B
,IBO B/B[JTZNQBUIJ[FSXIP BDDPSEJOHUP64JOUFMMJHFODF iDPOUSPMMFEBMM
QIBTFTPGQVCMJDBOEQSJWBUFMJGFCZJOTUJMMJOHGFBSBNPOHUIFQFPQMFw26 Schwar-
[LPQG GBUIFSPG(FOFSBMi4UPSNJO/PSNBOw4DIXBS[LPQGPG1FSTJBO(VMGXBS
GBNF TFUVQUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFTBOETVQQMJFEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFXJUIDPNNV-
OJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOUBOEXFBQPOT )JTUFBN XIJDIJODMVEFE044BHFOU1BVM
)FMMJXFMM  NPCJMJ[FE UIF (FOEBSNFSJF UP QSPUFDU UIF HPWFSONFOU BHBJOTU JUT
FOFNJFTBOETFUVQBOJOUFMMJHFODFTZTUFNUPLFFQXBUDIPOWBSJPVTQPMJUJDBM
DMJRVFT27
In April 1946 the leftist Rahbar newspaper, organ of the working-class Tudeh
.BTTFT 1BSUZ DIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFBTBiUPPMJOUIFIBOETPGUIF
FOFNJFT PG GSFFEPN w XIJDI iTUSBOHMFE GSFFEPN MPWJOH NPWFNFOUTw28 After
HFOEBSNFT LJMMFE POF XPSLFS BOE XPVOEFE PUIFST XIP XFSF EFNPOTUSBUJOH
GPSFRVBMXBHFTPVUTJEFBGBDUPSZPOUIFCPSEFSPG"[FSCBJKBO BOBSUJDMFQPTJUFE
UIBUUIFiBHFOUTPG.S4DIXBS[LPQG wXFSFTFFLJOHUPiIFMQUIFJSGPSFJHONBT-
UFSTSVOUIFDPVOUSZPOUIFQSJODJQMFTPGDBQJUBMJTNBOEPCUBJOOFX[POFTPG
JOĘVFODFGPSPCUBJOJOHNBSLFUTBOEPJMwćFBVUIPS "SNBO&.FMMJ TUSFTTFE
UIBUiUIFFYJTUFODFPGBOBEWJTFSJOUIFBSNFEGPSDFTwPGBDPVOUSZJTUIFiCFHJO-
ning of colonization.”29
6TJOH IJT DPOUBDUT JO UIF (FOEBSNFSJF  4DIXBS[LPQG BOE QPTTJCMZ )FMMJ-
XFMM CFDBNFQBSUPGUIFHSPVQUIBUDPOTQJSFEUPPWFSUISPX.PTTBEFHI BOiPME
GBTIJPOFEMJCFSBM‫ڀڀ‬BOECFMPWFEĕHVSFPG‫ڀڀ‬FOPSNPVTDIBSJTNBUP*SBOJBOT
PG BMM TPDJBM DMBTTFT w BDDPSEJOH UP UIF QPMJUJDBM TDJFOUJTU +BNFT #JMM ćF ĕSTU
*SBOJBO UP SFDFJWF B 1I% JO MBX GSPN UIF 4PSCPOOF  .PTTBEFHIIBE EFĕFE
"NFSJDBOBOE#SJUJTIJOUFSFTUTJOOBUJPOBMJ[JOH*SBOTPJMBęFSIJTFMFDUJPOJO
ŴżŸų8JUIUIFGBMMPG.PTTBEFHI UIF4IBI GPSNFSMZBDPOTUJUVUJPOBMNPOBSDI 
CFDBNF*SBOTBCTPMVUFSVMFS$IBSBDUFSJ[FECZUIF$*"BTBiEFWJPVTQPMJUJDBM
QSBDUJUJPOFSwBOEBiEBOHFSPVTNFHBMPNBOJBD wUIF4IBIHSBOUFEDPODFTTJPOT
UPUIF"SBCJBO"NFSJDBO0JM$PNQBOZ "SBNDP BOEiSVUIMFTTMZFMJNJOBUFE
BMNPTUBMMHFOVJOFPQQPTJUJPO FWFOPGBGBJSMZDPOTFSWBUJWFOBUVSFw3FQSJTBMT
XFSFUBLFOBHBJOTU.PTTBEFHITTVQQPSUFSTBOEUIFNBTTCBTFE5VEFI1BSUZ 
XIPTFTUSVDUVSFXBTiEJTSVQUFECZUIFSFQSFTTJWFDBNQBJHOwBOEXIPTFMFBEFST
XFSFTFOUJOUPIJEJOH QSJTPO PSFYJMF.PTTBEFHIIJNTFMG TQFOUUISFFZFBSTJO
QSJTPO UIFOSFNBJOFEVOEFSIPVTFBSSFTUVOUJMIJTEFBUIJOŴżŹź30
5PDPOTPMJEBUFUIF4IBITSVMF UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFEPWFSžŵŷųNJMMJPO
JONJMJUBSZFRVJQNFOU JODMVEJOH'ŻŷĕHIUFSQMBOFTćF/JYPOBENJOJTUSB-
UJPOBMMPXFEUIF4IBIUPQVSDIBTF.BWFSJDLNJTTJMFTBOEBžŸųųNJMMJPO*#&9
FMFDUSPOJDTVSWFJMMBODFTZTUFNBTQBSUPGXIBUPOFTUVEZIBTDBMMFEiUIFNPTU
SBQJECVJMEVQPGNJMJUBSZQPXFSVOEFSQFBDFUJNFDPOEJUJPOTPGBOZOBUJPOJO
the history of the world.”31*OTQJUFPGBMMUIFSFTPVSDFT UIF*SBOJBONJMJUBSZXBT
WJFXFE BT BO JOFďDJFOU JOTUSVNFOU PG TPDJBM DPOUSPM "ęFS ĕWF PďDFST XFSF
USJFEGPSNVSEFS UIF64FNCBTTZSFQPSUFEUIBUUIFNJMJUBSZXBTIBUFECZUIF

194 The Cold War on the Periphery


QVCMJD BGBDUPSUIBUDPVMECFDPNFiTJHOJĕDBOUJGJOTUBCJMJUZTIPVMEPODFBHBJO
DPNFUP*SBOPSWBSJPVTEFNBHPHVFTPCUBJODPOUSPMPGUIFHPWFSONFOUw32
6OEFSŴŵżųE UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPWJEFEPWFSžŴNJMMJPOQFSZFBSGPSQPMJDF
USBJOJOH XIPTFBJNXBTUPSFEVDFUIFiOFDFTTJUZGPSSFMZJOHPOUIFBSNFEGPSDFT
to uphold internal security” and to help the Shah cope with “foreseeable distur-
bances.”33ćFQSPHSBNXBTIFBEFECZ'SBOL+FTTVQBOE.JDIBFM.D$BOOPGUIF
*OEJBOB4UBUF1PMJDF BLFZSFDSVJUJOHHSPVOEGPSUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTCFDBVTFPG
UIFDMPTFSFMBUJPOTIJQCFUXFFO#ZSPO&OHMFBOE"SUIVS.ćVSTUPO DIBJSNBO
PGUIF'BSNFST/BUJPOBM#BOLJO4IFMCZWJMMF XIPIBECFFOTVQFSJOUFOEFOUPG
UIF*OEJBOBQPMJDFGSPNŴżŷżUPŴżŸŵ34
ćF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU DPOUSBDUFE XJUI QSPGFTTPST GSPN UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG
4PVUIFSO$BMJGPSOJBT4DIPPMPG1VCMJD"ENJOJTUSBUJPO MFECZ+PIO1,FOOFZ 
BGPSNFS#FSLFMFZQBUSPMNBOBOE*$"DPOTVMUBOU UPQSPWJEFDPVSTFTJOQPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUJPOBUUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG5FISBO'#*BHFOUT$BSM#FUTDIBOEćPNBT
'JOOBOE3JDIBSE3PHFSTPGUIF.467JFUOBNQSPKFDUSPVOEFEPVUUIF*SBOJBO
BEWJTPSZUFBN XIJDIFTUBCMJTIFEBOBUJPOXJEFUFMFQIPOFBOESBEJPOFUXPSL 
TFUVQUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFT EFWFMPQFENPEFSOQIPUPHSBQIZBOEDSJNFMBCT BOE
CSPVHIUJO*#.DPNQVUFSTGPSUIFDSFBUJPOPGBSFDPSETNBOBHFNFOUTZTUFN
ćF*$"JNQPSUFEUFBSHBT QSPKFDUJMFT BOEMFHJSPOTUISPVHIUIFFNCBTTZJO
,BCVM JOUFOTJGZJOHUIFTDPQFPGIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT35
ćFOBUJPOBMQPMJDFDIJFGGSPNŴżŸŶUPŴżŹų "MBWJ.PHIBEEBO XBTBSSFTUFE
GPSFYUPSUJPOBOEGSBVE UIFOCSJFĘZQSPNPUFEUPNJOJTUFSPGUIFJOUFSJPS)F
XBT SFQMBDFE CZ (FOFSBM /FNBUUPMMBI /BTJSJ  UIF GPSNFS IFBE PG UIF BSNFE
GPSDFT XIPĕSTUDBNFUPQSPNJOFODFXIFOIFQFOFUSBUFEUIFHVBSEMJOFTBOE
TFSWFE .PTTBEFHI UIF 4IBIT PSEFS PG EJTNJTTBM "DDPSEJOH UP JOUFMMJHFODF
SFQPSUT UIFQIZTJDBMMZMBSHFVONBSSJFENBOTMFQUBUUIF4IBITQBMBDFBOEXBT
IJTDMPTFDPOĕEBOU)JTTFMFDUJPOQSPWJEFTBOFYBNQMFPGUIFEJSFDUSPZBMDPO-
USPMPWFSUIFOBUJPOBMQPMJDFBOEJUTPWFSUQPMJUJDBMBOENJMJUBSZPSJFOUBUJPO36
*O4FQUFNCFSŴżŸŶB$PMPOFM(JSPVY XIPIBEBCBDLHSPVOEJOQPMJDFBOE
detective work and had participated in the brutal suppression of a 1932 coal
NJOFSTTUSJLFJO)BSMBO$PVOUZ ,FOUVDLZ CFHBOPSHBOJ[JOHBOBUJPOBMTFDV-
SJUZBOEJOUFMMJHFODFVOJU 4"7", DPNNBOEFECZ(FOFSBM5FJNVS#BLIUJBS 
XIPUSBWFMFEUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUPUBLFDPVSTFTGSPNUIF'#*BOEUIF$*"
4"7", XBT NPEFMFE BęFS UIF 5VSLJTI JOUFMMJHFODF BHFODZ UIBU XBT CVJMU VQ
VOEFSŴŵżųE*UTNJTTJPOXBTUPTFFLPVUBOEOFVUSBMJ[FUISFBUTUPUIF4IBI 
NBJOUBJOEPTTJFSTPOTVTQJDJPVTJOEJWJEVBMT BOEBOBMZ[FJOGPSNBUJPOQSPWJEFE
CZ JOGPSNBOUT37 ,FSNJU 3PPTFWFMU  BSDIJUFDU PG UIF ŴżŸŶ DPVQ  BOE -VDJFO
Conein, an associate of Edward G. Lansdale who played a key role in over-
UISPXJOHUIF/HPCSPUIFSTJO4PVUI7JFUOBN XPSLFEUPEFWFMPQ4"7",JOUP
BNPEFSOJOUFMMJHFODFBHFODZ0ďDFSTXFSFUBVHIUUIFUPPMTPGTQZDSBęTVDI
BTBHFOUSFDSVJUNFOUBOEUIFVTFPGNFTTBHFESPQTBOETBGFIPVTFTBOEXFSF
USBJOFEJOQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFBOEUIFVTFPGDPNQVUFSTUPDSFBUFEBUBCBTFT

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 195


on “subversives.” The Israeli Mossad gradually took over training, though the
$*" NBJOUBJOFE DMPTF DPOUBDUT UISPVHI UIF ŴżźųT  XIFO 4"7", XBT DPN-
NBOEFECZ/BTJSJ XIPN3PPTFWFMUUFMMJOHMZDBMMFEiPVS(FOFSBMw38
"NFSJDBO QPMJDF QSPHSBNT PO UIF XIPMF DPOUSJCVUFE UP BO FYQBOTJPO PG
the Shah’s social control apparatus and the advent of an Orwellian police state,
XIJDINBOZBEWJTFSTWJFXFEBTBNBSLFSPG*SBOJBOQSPHSFTT*OIJTFOEPGUPVS
report, Frank Jessup recalled that in “the early days, the Shah did not possess
UIFDBQBCJMJUZPGDPOUSPMMJOHDJWJMEJTUVSCBODFTXJUIPVUUIFVTFPGNJMJUBSZGPSDFw
BOEIBEPOMZBMPPTFIPMEPOQPXFS XIJDI UIBOLTUPUIF"NFSJDBOT IBEOPX
CFDPNFNPSFFOUSFODIFE/FWFSUIFMFTT .JDIBFM.D$BOO BQSPGFTTPSPGQPMJDF
BENJOJTUSBUJPO BU *OEJBOB 6OJWFSTJUZ XIP XPVME HP PO UP IFBE UIF *OUFSOB-
UJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZJO8BTIJOHUPO OPUFEUIBUQSPCMFNTQFSTJTUFECFDBVTF
iDPOEJUJPOTGPSSBQJENPEFSOJ[BUJPOJOUIFDPVOUSZXFSFOPUGBWPSBCMFw1PMJDF
FČFDUJWFOFTTXBTIJOEFSFECZOFQPUJTN JMMJUFSBDZ JOBEFRVBUFFRVJQNFOU BOE
poor pay, which McCann and others felt they could do little to curtail, owing to
their being “engrained in Iranian culture.”398IJMFBDLOPXMFEHJOHUIFMJNJUTPG
"NFSJDBOQPXFS .D$BOOBEPQUFEBO0SJFOUBMJTUEJTDPVSTFJOMJOLJOHQPMJDF
TIPSUDPNJOHTUPDVMUVSBMCBDLXBSEOFTT)FPWFSMPPLFEUIFDPSSVQUJOHQPMJUJDBM
DMJNBUFCSFECZUIFŴżŸŶDPVQBOEUIFNJTSVMFPGUIF4IBI XIPTFUUIFCFODI-
NBSLBUUIFUPQ
#FTJEFT NPMEJOH 4"7",  UXFOUZ 64 BEWJTFST  TPNF B SFNOBOU GSPN UIF
4DIXBS[LPQGFSB BTTJTUFEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFJOCSFBLJOHVQBOUJ4IBISJPUTBOE
QBDJGZJOHSFCFMMJPOTCZUIF#BMVDI 2BTIRBJ BOE,VSEJTIFUIOJDHSPVQT6OEFS
UIFEJSFDUJPOPG$PMPOFM$IBSMFT1FFLF BGPSNFSNJMJUBSZBUUBDIÏJO"OLBSB UIF
ICA developed an intelligence branch and a special strike unit and delivered
FYUFOTJWF DPNNPEJUJFT  JODMVEJOH ŴŻŸ BJSDSBę  ŴŹ $FTTOB ĕHIUFST  BOE $)*
reconnaissance helicopters.40 ćF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU BDLOPXMFEHFE UIBU UIF
(FOEBSNFSJFXBTiSFHBSEFECZUIFQFBTBOUTBTPQQSFTTPST wIBWJOHDBSSJFEPVU
FYFDVUJPOT FYUPSUJPO BOEUIFFOGPSDFNFOUPGNBSUJBMMBX UIPVHIJUTPVHIUUP
DIBOHFJUTJNBHFUISPVHIDJWJDBDUJPOBOESVSBMEFWFMPQNFOUQSPHSBNT41
.FNPSBOEVNT GSPN $IBSMFT 4UFMMF  UIF FNCBTTZT DPVOTFMPS GPS QPMJUJDBM
BČBJST  UP UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU QSPWJEF JOTJHIU JOUP UIF DBNQBJHO UP iIVOU
EPXOw%BETIBI B#BMVDIMFBEFSTFFLJOHUPQSPUFDUUSJCBMMBOETGSPNFODSPBDI-
NFOU$IBSBDUFSJ[FECZUIF$*"BTBiQPDLFUTJ[FENJMJUBSZHFOJVTwBOEi3PCJO
)PPEUZQF w%BETIBIBOETFWFSBMDPNSBEFTXFSFLJMMFEJOBTLJSNJTIBęFSIF
UPPLEPXOĕWFHFOEBSNFTBOEGPVSQSPHPWFSONFOU#BMVDIJ4UFMMF BQSPGFTTPS
PG0SJFOUBMTUVEJFTBU)BSWBSEBOEGPSNFSMJBJTPOUP%BJ-J BOEBEWJTFSTTVDI
BTćPNBT'JOO XIPUSBJOFEQBSBNJMJUBSZGPSDFTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBBOE$FOUSBM
"GSJDB JOTUSVDUFEUIF(FOEBSNFSJFJOTVSWFJMMBODFBOEQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSF
tactics, leading to Dadshah’s downfall. Additional battles were fought in the
TPVUIXFTU BHBJOTU BOUJHPWFSONFOU GPSDFT DIBSBDUFSJ[FE CZ 4UFMMF BT iCBOEJUTw
and “religious fanatics.”42

196 The Cold War on the Periphery


*OUIFMBUFŴżŸųTUIF(FOEBSNFSJFBCTPSCFEUIF$VTUPNT(VBSEBOETQFBS-
IFBEFEPQJVNTVQQSFTTJPODBNQBJHOTJO,IPSBTBNQSPWJODFBOE"[FSCBJKBO
"EFDBEFFBSMJFS UIFXJEPXPGBOUJESVHDSVTBEFS)BNJMUPO8SJHIUDMBJNFE
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NPOPQPMZ"O"NFSJDBOFDPOPNJDNJTTJPOIFBEFECZ"SUIVS.JMMTQBVHIFWFO
DPMMFDUFE PQJVN SFWFOVFT BOE EJSFDUFE UIF SPZBM PQJVN GBDUPSZ  QSPNQUJOH
critics to call Millspaugh and his associates “drug sellers.”436OEFS"NFSJDBO
QSFTTVSF UIF4IBIQBTTFEUIFĕSTUGFEFSBMBOUJPQJVNMBXJOŴżŸŸBTQBSUPGB
ESJWFUPDMFBOVQWJDFBOEMFHJUJNBUFIJTQPXFS5XP'#/BHFOUT (BSMBOE8JM-
MJBNTBOE.BKPS.D#FF DSFBUFEOBSDPUJDTTRVBET XIJDISBJEFEPQJVNEFOT
BOE NBEF VTF PG MJHIU BJSDSBę UP DBSSZ PVU TFBSDIBOEEFTUSPZ DBNQBJHOT JO
NPVOUBJOUFSSBJO4FSWJOHBUUJNFTBTBDPWFSGPSDMBOEFTUJOFPQFSBUJPOT CPUI
8JMMJBNTBOE.D#FFIBE$*"UJFT UIFTFJOJUJBUJWFTSFTVMUFEJOXJEFMZQVCMJ-
DJ[FETFJ[VSFTPGPQJVNBOEUIFEFTUSVDUJPOPGUIPVTBOETPGQPQQZQMBOUTCVU
BMTPDBVTFEUIFEJTQMBDFNFOUPGGBSNFST44
8JMMJBNTBOE.D#FFGPVOEUIBUPQJVNEFOTDPOUJOVFEUPPQFSBUFDMBOEFT-
UJOFMZBęFSUIFDSBDLEPXOBOEXFSFBTiEJďDVMUUPMPDBUFBT/FX:PSLTQFBLFBT-
ies during prohibition.”45ćF4IBIBMMFHFEMZSFUBJOFEBNPOPQPMZPOBMMPQJVN
QMBOUBUJPOT'BNJMZNFNCFSTMJOFEUIFJSQPDLFUTXJUINPOFZGSPNUIFTBMFPG
heroin, which was virtually unknown in Iran prior to the 1953 coup. The Shah’s
sister Princess Ashraf was arrested by Swiss police for transporting suitcases
GVMMPGIFSPJO BOEIJTZPVOHFSCSPUIFS.BINPVE XIPIBEBSFQVUBUJPOBTB
QMBZCPZ USBďDLFEJOOBSDPUJDTCFUXFFO5FISBO 1BSJT /FX:PSL BOE%FUSPJU
Described by the CIA as possessing a “penchant for danger and cruelty,” SAVAK
DIJFG5FJNVS#BLIUJBSCVJMUBGPVSUFFOTUPSZBQBSUNFOUJO5FISBO XIJDI5FI-
SBOJTEVCCFEUIFiIFSPJOQBMBDFw)JTTPOXBTJOWPMWFEJOBTDIFNFUPJNQPSU
heroin into the United States, ostensibly to fund political policing operations.
"TXJUI$*"iBTTFUTwJO$VCBBOEćBJMBOEXIPXFSFJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFESVH
USBEF UIF'#*BOE64$VTUPNTXFSFJOTUSVDUFEUPCBDLPČUIFJSJOWFTUJHBUJPOT
because the Shah served broader strategic interests, and the United States did
OPUXBOUCBEQVCMJDJUZ8IFO8JMMJBNTSBJTFEUIFTVCKFDUJOBSFQPSU IFXBT
chewed out by his superiors for “over-stepping his boundaries.”46
"TJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB UIFDVMUVSBMBDDFQUBODFPGPQJVNMBZBUUIFSPPUPGUIF
GBJMVSFPGESVHQSPIJCJUJPO*OUIFDPVOUSZTJEF FYDFTTPQJVNXBTVTFEJOUIF
DVMUJWBUJPOPGXIFBU BOEQFBTBOUTVTFEJUUPĕHIUNBMBSJB*ODJUZTMVNT PQJVN
EFOT TFSWFE BT TPDJBM DMVCT XIFSF  BDDPSEJOH UP 8JMMJBNT  iNFO BOE XPNFO
TBU BSPVOE PO UIF EJSUZ ĘPPS BOE UBMLFE PS MJTUFOFE UP TUPSZUFMMFST SFDBMM UIF
ancient glories of Persia.” *OUIFDBQJUBMTHSFBUIPNFT NFBOXIJMF UIFSJDILFQU
FYQFOTJWFBOEUSFBTVSFEPQJVNQJQFTGPSGBNJMZNFNCFSTBOEHVFTUT47 As with
PUIFSBUUFNQUTUPJNQPTF8FTUFSONPSFT NPTU*SBOJBOTWJFXFEUIFOFXMBXT
BTDPFSDJWF$SJNJOBMJ[BUJPOPGPQJVNESPWFQSJDFTVQBOEGVFMFEDPSSVQUJPO
BNPOHMBXFOGPSDFNFOUQFSTPOOFM

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 197


3PCFSU 3 4DIPUU PG UIF "NFSJDBO DPOTVMBUF JO 5FISBO XSPUF UP UIF 4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOUJO"VHVTUŴżŸźUIBUTNVHHMJOHBDSPTTUIFCPSEFSXJUI"GHIBOJTUBO
XBTDPOUJOVJOHCFDBVTFCPSEFSHVBSETXFSFUBLJOHBDVUGSPNUIFUSBEFćF
QPMJDFDIJFGJO*TGBIBOBENJUUFEUP8JMMJBNTi8FWFCFFOBDDFQUJOHCSJCFTGPS
TPNBOZZFBSTUIBUJUXPVMECFJNQPTTJCMFGPSVTUPSFBMMZFOGPSDFBMBXMJLF
UIBU*BNBUIJFGBOENPTUPGNZNFOBSFUIJFWFTw483PCFSU%SFFTFO "NFSJDBO
DPOTVMJO"[FSCBJKBOSFQPSUFEUPUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUUIBUUIFQPMJDFXFSFOPU
FWFOUBLJOHiQFSGVODUPSZBDUJPOwBHBJOTUUIFPQJVNIPVTFTJO5BCSJ[ićFSFJT
TFSJPVTEJďDVMUZFODPVOUFSFEJODVSUBJMJOHUIFDPOTVNQUJPOPGPQJVNCFDBVTF
the police force probably has a higher proportion of addicts than any other
CSBODI PG HPWFSONFOU TFSWJDF w IF FYQMBJOFE  BEEJOH UIBU UIF QPMJDF DIJFG JO
5BCSJ[ XBT IJNTFMG iSVNPSFE UP CF BO BEEJDU ‫)  ڀ ڀ‬F DPOTUBOUMZ XFBST EBSL
glasses, even when indoors, probably to conceal the dilation of his pupils.”49
ćFTFDPNNFOUTBMMJMMVTUSBUFUIFQBSBEPYPGUIFESVHXBSJO*SBO XIJDIXBT
BGPSNPGOFPDPMPOJBMJTNJOUIBUJUXBTJNQPTFEGSPNUIFPVUTJEFBOEJUTBJNT
XFSFOFWFSFNCSBDFECZMPDBMFOGPSDFNFOUPďDJBMTPSUIFDJWJMJBOQPQVMBUJPO50
*O0DUPCFSŴżŹŵ 3PCFSU8,PNFS BTFOJPSTUBČFSPOUIF/BUJPOBM4FDV-
SJUZ$PVODJMBOEPOFUJNFBNCBTTBEPSUP*SBR ESBęFEBOJOUFSOBMEFGFOTFQMBO
DBMMJOHGPSJODSFBTFEBTTJTUBODFUPUIF(FOEBSNFSJF 4"7", BOEUIFOBUJPOBM
QPMJDF QBSUMZUPPCWJBUFUIFiOFDFTTJUZUPVTFNJMJUBSZVOJUTUPRVFMMEFNPOTUSB-
UJPOTPSSJPUTw,PNFSPCTFSWFEUIBU*SBOSFNBJOFEQPPSVOEFSUIF4IBIEFTQJUF
MBSHFGPSFJHOFYDIBOHFSFWFOVFTGSPNPJMćJT IFXSPUF XBTCSFFEJOHQVCMJD
opposition, and the West would be adversely affected by the loss of access to
.JEEMF &BTUFSO PJM JG *SBO CFDBNF EPNJOBUFE CZ UIF 4PWJFU CMPD $BMMJOH GPS
a “white revolution” to counteract the “red revolution,” he expressed concern
about the disaffection of students and intellectuals and noted that the loyalty
PGUIF,VSEJTIQPQVMBUJPO XIPNUIF$*"XPVMEMBUFSSFDSVJUUPJUTDBVTFUIFO
abandon, was “tenuous.”51
0OUIFCBTJTPG,PNFSTSFDPNNFOEBUJPOT UIF014CVEHFUXBTFYQBOEFE
UP žźųų ųųų "EWJTFST TVDI BT GPSNFS *OEJBOB TUBUF USPPQFS 8BMUFS 8FZMBOE
PWFSTBXUIFDSFBUJPOPGBĕSFBSNTSBOHFBUUIFQPMJDFBDBEFNZBOEBOBUJPOBM
JEFOUJUZCVSFBVBTXFMMBTQIPUPHSBQIZBOEDSJNFMBCTBOENPCDPOUSPMVOJUT
FRVJQQFE XJUI XBUFS UBOL TQSBZFST TPNF TQSBZFE DPMPSFE XBUFS  QSPDVSFE
GSPN3PNFCZ(BSMBOE8JMMJBNT ;PSJT8JMLJOT TIFSJČPG3JWFSTJEF$PVOUZ 
$BMJGPSOJB JOTUBMMFEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOUMJOLJOHSFNPUFQPMJDFPVU-
QPTUTUP5FISBO,PNFSXSPUFFOUIVTJBTUJDBMMZUPUFMM.BYXFMM5BZMPS i8FWF
ĕOBMMZHPUUFO<UIF>*SBOTQFDJBMQPMJDFQSPHSBNPVUPGUIFCVSFBVDSBUJDRVJDL-
sand.”52*O+VOFŴżŹŶ BęFSEFNPOTUSBUJPOTFSVQUFEJO5FISBOBTBSFTVMUPGIJHI
VOFNQMPZNFOU UIF014QSPWJEFEBOFNFSHFODZTIJQNFOUPGUFBSHBT QPMJDF
CBUPOT BOEIFMNFUTUPNJMJUBSJ[FESJPUDPOUSPMVOJUTCVUUVSOFEEPXOBSFRVFTU
GPSNPVOUFEQPMJDFBEWJTFSTCFDBVTFJUXBTGFMUUIBUiIPSTFTXPVMECFBMJBCJMJUZ
VOEFSDPOEJUJPOTPGWJPMFODFwćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUFYQSFTTFEJUTHSBUJĕDBUJPO

198 The Cold War on the Periphery


UPQPMJDFDPMPOFM"CEVMMBI7BTJRGPSDSVTIJOHUIFQSPUFTUTFWFOUIPVHIBUMFBTU
POFNBKPSNVMMBIIBECFFOLJMMFE*OPUIFSJODJEFOUT UIF014BDLOPXMFEHFE
the police role in shooting striking teachers and causing “cracked skulls” in
suppressing anti-Shah riots.53
1PMJDFCSVUBMJUZVMUJNBUFMZIFMQFEUPFOHFOEFSTVQQPSUGPS*TMBNJTUPQQPTJ-
UJPOBMGPSDFTMFECZ"ZBUPMMBI3VIPMMBI,IPNFJOJ XIPFNFSHFEBUUIFGPSF-
GSPOUPGUIFSFTJTUBODFXJUIUIFEJTNBOUMJOHPGUIF5VEFI1BSUZ$POUSBEJDUJOH
JUT IVNBO SJHIUT SIFUPSJD  UIF $BSUFS BENJOJTUSBUJPO FYQBOEFE BSNT TBMFT
PO UIF FWF PG UIF Ŵżźż *TMBNJD SFWPMVUJPO BOE QSPWJEFE SJPU TUJDLT  UFBS HBT 
IFMNFUT  BOE TIJFMET  BT UIF 4IBIT SFQSFTTJPO JOUFOTJĕFE54 *O ŴżźŸ  "NOFTUZ
International had reported that Iran was holding between 25,000 and 100,000
QPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST.BSUJO&OOBMT TFDSFUBSZHFOFSBMPG"NOFTUZ OPUFEićF
4IBISFUBJOTIJTCFOFWPMFOUJNBHFEFTQJUFUIFIJHIFTUSBUFPGEFBUIQFOBMUJFTJO
UIFXPSME OPWBMJETZTUFNPGDJWJMJBODPVSUT BOEBIJTUPSZPGUPSUVSFXIJDIJT
CFZPOECFMJFG‫ڀڀ‬/PDPVOUSZJOUIFXPSMEIBTBXPSTFSFDPSEJOIVNBOSJHIUT
than Iran.”55
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTQMBZFEBTJHOJĕDBOUSPMFJOGBDJMJUBUJOHUIJTTPSSZTUBUFPG
BČBJST.BLJOHVTFPGTPQIJTUJDBUFEUFDIOPMPHZGSPNUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT 4"7",
DVMUJWBUFEOFUXPSLTPGJOGPSNBOUT TQSFBECMBDLQSPQBHBOEB BOE JODPOKVOD-
tion with other police units, raided labor and university organizations and
kidnapped the Shah’s opponents. Many dissidents were hunted down in exile,
JODMVEJOH 5FJNVS #BLIUJBS  XIP XBT BDDVTFE PG FNCF[[MJOH žŸ NJMMJPO GSPN
HPWFSONFOU DPČFST BOE QMPUUJOH UIF SFHJNFT PWFSUISPX GSPN *SBR 4"7",
JOĕMUSBUFEPOFIVOESFEBHFOUTJOUPIJTOFUXPSL DBSSJFEPVUBGBLFIJKBDLJOH
UPHJWFIJNBCBEOBNF BOEUIFOBTTBTTJOBUFEIJNJOŴżźųXIJMFIFXBTPOB
hunting trip.56
8JUIJO *SBO  EJTTJEFOUT XFSF DPOEFNOFE CZ NJMJUBSZ USJCVOBMT BOE IFME
JO #BHIF.FISBO BOE &WJO QSJTPOT  XIJDI DPOUBJOFE UPSUVSF DIBNCFST BOE
execution yards. According to CIA analyst Jesse Leaf, agency officials trained
4"7", PďDFST JO JOUFSSPHBUJPO NFUIPET DPQJFE GSPN UIF /B[JT "MUIPVHI
"NFSJDBOTSBSFMZQBSUJDJQBUFEJOUPSUVSF TBJE-FBG iQFPQMFXIPXFSFUIFSFTBX
UIFSPPNTBOEXFSFUPMEPGUPSUVSF"OE*LOPXUIBUUIFUPSUVSFSPPNTXFSF
toured and it was all paid for by the USA.”57
ćF *SBOJBO QPFU 3F[B #BSBIFOJ  POF PG NBOZ JOUFMMFDUVBMT EFUBJOFE CZ
the Shah, wrote in The Nation UIBU BU MFBTU iIBMG B NJMMJPO QFPQMF IBWF CFFO
CFBUFO XIJQQFE PSUPSUVSFECZ4"7", wBDSVFMUZIFJMMVTUSBUFEXJUIHSVFTPNF
autopsy photos. In his 1977 book The Crowned Cannibals, Baraheni recounted
CFJOH QJDLFE VQ CZ 4"7", HPPO TRVBET BOE QMBDFE JO B EBSL TPMJUBSZ DPO-
ĕOFNFOUDFMM GPVSCZFJHIUGFFU XJUIOPUIJOHCVUBEJSUZCMBOLFUBOEOPCFE
#BSBIFOJOPUFEUIFUSBHFEZPGTDIPPMUFBDIFSTBOEEPDUPSTCFJOHDPOĕOFEXIFO
there were shortages of these professionals across the country. Many of his fel-
MPXQSJTPOFSTTVČFSFEGSPNEZTFOUFSZBOEPUIFSEJTFBTFTBOEDPVMEOPUTUBOE

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 199


because of torture injuries such as sore feet, burned backs, or pulled-out toe-
nails. Baraheni’s beard was ripped out by the head torturer, Hosseinzadeh, and
he witnessed others being tortured with snakes.58
8IFOUIF4IBIXBTĕOBMMZPWFSUISPXOJOŴżźż QPMJDFBOE4"7",BHFOUT
XFSF QVU PO USJBM  JODMVEJOH $PMPOFM 7BTJR BOE (FOFSBM /FNBUPMMBI /BTTJSJ 
who was paraded about on television and subjected to torture before being
FYFDVUFECZĕSJOHTRVBEćFTFBDUTPGSFUSJCVUJPOBUUFTUUPUIFEFQUIPGQVCMJD
hatred for the policing apparatus built up by the United States, which served
BTBTZNCPMPGUIF4IBITPQQSFTTJPOćFUSJVNQIPGUIF*TMBNJDSFWPMVUJPOJO
UVSOFYQPTFEUIFGPMMZPGUIFNPEFSOJ[BUJPOUIFPSJTUTBOEUIFJSCFMJFGUIBUUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTDPVMENBOJQVMBUF*SBOJBOQPMJUJDTUPJUTMJLJOH

Modernizing Repression in Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, and Afghanistan

"NFSJDBTIFBWZIBOEFEJOĘVFODFXBTXJEFMZGFMUBDSPTTUIF.JEEMF&BTU*O
*SBR UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUSBJOFEQPMJDFEVSJOHUIFSFJHOPGUIFQSP8FTUFSOEJDUB-
UPS/VSJBM4BJE XIPXBTPWFSUISPXOJOBŴżŸŻSFWPMVUJPOMFECZ"CEVM,BSJN
2BTJNćF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOUFSWFOFEPVUPGBEFTJSFUPUBQJOUP
UIFDPVOUSZTPJMSFTFSWFT EFWFMPQFECZ#SJUJTIDPNQBOJFTSFDFJWJOHMVDSBUJWF
DPODFTTJPOTGSPNBM4BJE59 He presided over what British intelligence officers
DIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTBOiPMJHBSDIZPGSBDLFUFFSTwXIPFOHBHFEJOiTIBNFMFTTMBOE
grabbing” and “tolerated dishonesty and corruption in the police,” breeding a
XJEFOJOHHVMGCFUXFFOUIFBVUIPSJUJFTBOEUIFNBKPSJUZPGUIFQPQVMBUJPO60
In 1957, fearful that increasing urban discontent, peasant agitation, and
NJMJUBSZJNQBUJFODFXFSFHFOFSBUJOHSFWPMVUJPOBSZDPOEJUJPOT UIF*$"DPN-
NJTTJPOFE B SFQPSU PO UIF DJWJM QPMJDF GPSDFT PG *SBR  XIJDI XFSF BU UIF UJNF
IFBWJMZTVCTJEJ[FECZUIF#SJUJTI6OEFSŴŵżųE UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQMFEHFE
žŴNJMMJPOJOUFDIOJDBMBJEBOEFRVJQNFOUUPIFMQUSBOTGPSNUIFDPVOUSZGSPNB
iTFNJGFVEBMwUPBiNPEFSODJWJMJ[FETUBUFwJOXIJDIUIFQPMJDFXPVMECFDBQB-
ble of controlling social unrest driven by “hyper-nationalist” and “anti-colonial
FMFNFOUTwPQQPTFEUPUIFQSP)BTIFNJUFNPOBSDIZćFNJTTJPOPGUIFQPMJDF
XPVMECFUPQSPUFDUPJMQJQFMJOFTBOE8FTUFSOPXOFESFĕOFSJFTGSPNTBCPUBHF 
UPJOĕMUSBUFUIFDPNNVOJTUNPWFNFOU BOEUPDVSUBJM,VSEJTIVQSJTJOHT61
5XFMWF *SBRJ PďDFST XFSF TFOU UP UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT GPS USBJOJOH $MZEF
1IFMQT  WFUFSBO PG UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT JO +BQBO  XBT HJWFO BO PďDF JO UIF
OBUJPOBMQPMJDFIFBERVBSUFST)FJOUSPEVDFEUIFVTFPGUFBSHBTBOESJPUCBUPOT
UP IFMQ DPOUSPM EFNPOTUSBUJPOT UISFBUFOJOH UP CSJOH EPXO BM4BJET SFHJNF
1PMJDFXFSFJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFUPSUVSFBOEBTTBTTJOBUJPOPGNFNCFSTPGUIF*SBRJ
$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ XIJDIXBTPVUMBXFEGSPNJUTJODFQUJPO BOEUIFNBDIJOF
gunning of civilians, causing the death of hundreds, including teenage girls.
*OUFSOBMSFQPSUTNFBOXIJMFCPBTUFEPGQPMJDFTVDDFTTJOIBOEMJOHEFNPOTUSB-
tions against British and French plans to seize the Suez Canal and lauded the

200 The Cold War on the Periphery


SFHJNFGPSUBLJOHiTUSPOHNFBTVSFTUPSFQSFTTBOEFMJNJOBUFDPNNVOJTUTVC-
versive activities.”62
*O%FDFNCFSŴżŸź ćFP)BMMDPOUSBDUFEXJUIUIFĕSNPG-JUDIĕFME 8IJUJOH 
Panero, Severud and Associates to draw up plans for a proposed central civil jail
BU"CV(ISBJCJO#BHIEBE8FTUBUBDPTUPGžźNJMMJPO63ćFEFBMFYFNQMJĕFT
UIFHSPXUIPGBQPMJDFJOEVTUSJBMDPNQMFY JOXIJDIUIFQSJWBUFTFDUPSQSPĕUFE
JNNFOTFMZGSPNUIFFYQBOTJPOPGQPMJDFBJE$POTUSVDUJPOCFHBOSJHIUBXBZPO
UIFGBDJMJUZBOEXBTDPNQMFUFEBęFSUIFŴżŸŻSFWPMVUJPO JOXIJDIBM4BJEXBT
LJMMFEXIJMFUSZJOHUPĘFFUIFDPVOUSZEJTHVJTFEBTBXPNBOćFQVCMJDTBGFUZ
QSPHSBNXBTDMPTFEEPXOBUUIJTUJNFCFDBVTFPGIPTUJMFSFMBUJPOTXJUIUIFOFX
SFHJNF IFBEFECZ2BTJN XIPQSPNPUFEBQSPHSBNPGFDPOPNJDOBUJPOBMJTN
In 1963 the Ba’ath Party took power “riding on a CIA train,” according to the
JOUFSJPSNJOJTUFS FOBDUJOHQPHSPNTBHBJOTUTVTQFDUFEDPNNVOJTUTXJUIUIFBJE
PGMJTUTQSPWJEFECZ64NJMJUBSZJOUFMMJHFODF"LFZTPVSDFPGJOGPSNBUJPOXBT
a high-ranking officer of the Baghdad police who served under al-Said and was
SFDSVJUFEBTB$*"iBTTFUwUISPVHIUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT64 The 1290-d initiative
IBEQBJEEJWJEFOETJOUIJTSFTQFDU.BOZ#BBUIWJDUJNTXFSFUPSUVSFEBU"CV
(ISBJC MBUFSUIFTJUFPGNBKPSIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTEVSJOHUIFSFJHOPG4BE-
EBN)VTTFJOBOEVOEFS"NFSJDBONJMJUBSZPDDVQBUJPO65 The central legacy of
UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTXBTUIVTUIFDSFBUJPOPGBNPEFSOQPMJDFTUBUFBQQBSBUVT
VTFECZEJČFSFOUSFHJNFT FBDIGPSJUTPXOFOET
*O -FCBOPO  XIFSF UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT GFBSFE UIF HSPXUI PG QBO"SBCJTN 
JOŴżŸźBO*$"UFBNIFBEFECZ"MCFSU%V#PJTQSPWJEFEžŴNJMMJPOJORVBTJ
NJMJUBSZ FRVJQNFOU BOE UFDIOJDBM BJE UP UIF 'SFODIDSFBUFE (FOEBSNFSJF UP
CPMTUFS UIF QSP8FTUFSO SFHJNF PG $BNJMMF $IBNPVO  B .BSPOJUF $ISJTUJBO
XIPXBTUIFTVCKFDUPGB.VTMJNSFCFMMJPOBęFSIFUSJFEUPQBTTBDPOTUJUVUJPOBM
BNFOENFOUBMMPXJOHIJNUPHBJOSFFMFDUJPOBUUIFFOEPGIJTTJYZFBSUFSNćF
NBSJOFTXFSFFWFOUVBMMZTFOUJOUPSFTUPSFPSEFS BOE$IBNPVOXBTSFQMBDFE
CZ (FOFSBM 'PVBE $IFIBC  BO BOUJDPNNVOJTU MFBEFS EFFNFE BDDFQUBCMF UP
"NFSJDBOJOUFSFTUT661PMJDFUSBJOJOHXJUIBIFBWZFNQIBTJTPOSJPUDPOUSPMXBT
DPODFJWFEPGBTBOBMUFSOBUJWFUPNJMJUBSZGPSDF XIJDIXBTBQQMJFEXIFODPWFSU
NFUIPETGBJMFEUPFOHFOEFSUIFEFTJSFESFTVMUT
5VSLFZBMTPSFDFJWFEPWFSžŴNJMMJPOJOQPMJDFBTTJTUBODFEVSJOHUIFŴżŸųT
*OUFSOBMSFQPSUTTUSFTTFEUIFiBVUIPSJUBSJBOJTNwPG1SJNF.JOJTUFS"EOBO.FO-
deres, a wealthy landowner who pushed for the privatization of state industries,
and noted that the police were “principally political,” which was seen as ben-
FĕDJBMJOTUBNQJOHPVUDPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUZćFNJTTJPOXBTIFBEFECZ$IBSMJF
0#SJFOPGUIF%FUSPJU1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU XIPMBUFSEJFEJO7JFUOBN i+BDLw
(PJO BOE#ZSPO&OHMF XIPJNQPSUFEUFDIOJRVFTGSPN+BQBOBTEJSFDUPSPGUIF
national police for a year. Working directly for the CIA, they set up training
BDBEFNJFT FOIBODFETVSWFJMMBODF BOEJOTUSVDUFEUIFQBSBNJMJUBSZ+BOEBSNB
in riot control. Station wagons, jeeps, and light aircraft were provided, and a

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 201


SBEJPDPNNVOJDBUJPOBOESFDPSETTZTUFNXBTTFUVQ BMPOHXJUIBDSJNFMBC
FRVJQQFEXJUINJDSPTDPQFTBOEĕFMEUFTUFRVJQNFOU JOBOFČPSUUPNPEFSOJ[F
UIF SFQSFTTJWF TUBUF TFDVSJUZ BQQBSBUVT 4PNF $*" iBTTFUTw JO UIF QPMJDF XFSF
SFDSVJUFE JOUP TFDSFU BOUJDPNNVOJTU BSNJFT  XIJDI DBSSJFE PVU iCMBDL ĘBH
operations” and terrorized leftists.67
'#/BHFOUT'SBOL4PKBUBOE(BSMBOE8JMMJBNTXFSFBUUBDIFEUPUIFQPMJDF
BEWJTPSZ DPNNJTTJPO  UIPVHI UIFJS JOWFTUJHBUJPOT XFSF PCTUSVDUFE CZ QPMJDF
QSPUFDUJOHHPWFSONFOUPďDJBMTXIPTPMEIFSPJO1PJOUJOHUPUIFDBTFPG*ITBO
4FLCBO BQSPTQFSPVTIFSPJONBOVGBDUVSFSBOEHBOHMFBEFSXIPIBENFOJO
HPWFSONFOU NJOJTUSJFT BOE UIF QPMJDF  4PKBU SFQPSUFE UP '#/ DIJFG )BSSZ +
"OTMJOHFS UIBU iJNQPSUBOU OBSDPUJDT WJPMBUPST BSF WFSZ XFBMUIZ BOE QPXFSGVM
enough to avoid prosecution and arrest through bribery.” Police operations
ĘPVOEFSFEJOUIFFBSMZŴżŹųTBęFSBNJMJUBSZDPVQSFTVMUFEJOUIFIBOHJOHPG
.FOEFSFTBOEUIFBSSFTUPG,FNBM"ZHVO *TUBOCVMQPMJDFDIJFG XIPXPSLFE
DMPTFMZ XJUI "NFSJDBO JOUFMMJHFODF ćF VOQPQVMBSJUZ PG UIF QSPHSBN XBT
SFĘFDUFEJOB5VSLJTIOFXTQBQFSSFQPSUXIJDIEFDMBSFEUIBU"NFSJDBOQPMJDF
XFSF UFBDIJOH UIFJS QSPUÏHÏT iHBOHTUFS NFUIPET  CSVUBMJUZ  BOE PQQSFTTJPO PG
the people.”68
ćF ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN JO "GHIBOJTUBO  B LFZ $PME 8BS CBUUMFHSPVOE BOE B
TFNJQPMJDFTUBUF BDDPSEJOHUP64JOUFMMJHFODF EFNPOTUSBUFTUIFTUBSLMJNJUTPG
"NFSJDBOQPXFSJOUIF.JEEMF&BTUćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPWJEFEžŶųų ųųų
JOQPMJDFFRVJQNFOUJOPSEFSUPHBJOMFWFSBHFBNPOHTFDVSJUZGPSDFT EPNJOBUFE
CZFUIOJD1BTIUVOT BOEIFMQTVQQSFTTEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBHBJOTU,JOH;BIJS4IBI
BOE1SJNF.JOJTUFS.PIBNNFE%BPVEMFECZQSPDPNNVOJTUFMFNFOUTBOE
iSFMJHJPVTGBOBUJDTwGSPN,BOEBIBS XIPN JSPOJDBMMZ UIF$*"XPVMESFDSVJU
UXFOUZZFBSTMBUFSUPĕHIUUIF4PWJFUT 69
The principal adviser, Albert Riedel, was a polygraph specialist with the
#FSLFMFZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUXIPTFFYQFSJFODFJO,BCVMXBTGBSGSPNQMFBTBOU
)FDPVMECBSFMZDPNNVOJDBUFXJUIPďDFSTXIPEJEOPUTQFBL&OHMJTIBOEIBE
EJďDVMUZ ĕOEJOH B RVBMJĕFE JOUFSQSFUFS 8IJMF BDDFQUJOH "NFSJDBO TVQQMJFT 
JODMVEJOH XBMLJFUBMLJFT  DBNFSBT  QPMZHSBQI FRVJQNFOU  UFBS HBT  BOE MFH
irons, the Afghan police barely acknowledged Riedel’s presence and refused to
UBLFBOZBEWJDFPOIPXUPNBOBHFUIFQPMJDFGPSDF3JFEFMOPUFEUPIJTTVQFSJ-
ors that he was not even allowed to tag along with police on their patrols and
XBTNBEFUPGFFMMJLFBOiPMEDPMPSFEHFOUMFNBOwIFPODFJOUFSSPHBUFECBDLJO
0SFHPO iMFęUPTJUJEMZ DPNQMFUFMZ CVUIPXFWFSQPMJUFMZJHOPSFEw3JFEFMBEEFE
UIBUUIFi1SJNF.JOJTUFSOFWFSXBOUFEBQPMJDFBEWJTFS:FT IFXPVMEUBLFBOZ
GSFFEPOBUJPOTPGFRVJQNFOU CVUUIFZXPVMEVTFJUUIFXBZUIFZXBOUFEw*OIJT
WJFX UIFHPWFSONFOUEJEOPUXBOUUPCFFYQPTFEUPBOZOFXJEFBT BOEUIFLJOH
“could not tolerate any change.”70
#FTJEFT QSPWJEJOH JOTJHIU JOUP FYJTUJOH SBDJBM NPSFT  3JFEFMT DPNNFOUT
JMMVTUSBUFUIFEJďDVMUZPGUSZJOHUPJNQPTF8FTUFSOOPSNTJOBDPVOUSZXIFSF

202 The Cold War on the Periphery


strong nationalist sensibilities prevail and foreigners are viewed with suspicion
PXJOHUPIJTUPSJDBMDJSDVNTUBODFćFZBMTPIJHIMJHIUUIFEBOHFSTPGUIFQPMJDF
QSPHSBNTJOQSPWJEJOHXFBQPOSZUPUIFTFDVSJUZGPSDFTPGBVUIPSJUBSJBOMFBE-
FSTXIPJOWBSJBCMZBQQSPQSJBUFUIFNGPSUIFJSPXOFOET6OMJLFNBOZPGUIFJS
counterparts in the developing world desperate for foreign aid, Afghan officials
EJEOPUQBZUIFVTVBMMJQTFSWJDFUPUIFTVHHFTUJPOTPG"NFSJDBOBEWJTFST BO
attitude resulting in the cutoff of aid and the straining of bilateral relations. The
NPTUTBMJFOUMFHBDZPGUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNJO"GHIBOJTUBOXBTUIFJEFOUJĕDBUJPO
PGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXJUIQPMJDFSFQSFTTJPO*OBŴżŸżNFNP "SUIVS-BOHPGUIF
640.XBSOFEUIF"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZJO5FISBOUIBUJUJTOPUiHPPEBEWFSUJTJOH
for the U.S.” when prisoners subjected to torture look down at the leg irons and
iTFFUIF*$"FNCMFNw71*OEFFE "GHIBOTIBWFSFNBJOFEEJTUSVTUGVMPG"NFSJ-
DBONPUJWFTFWFSTJODF BTXFIBWFTFFOJOUIFTDPQFPGSFTJTUBODFUPUIFSFDFOU
occupation.

Executive Mercenaries: The OPS in Riyadh, Karachi, and Jordan

In Saudi Arabia, where, in the words of CIA agent Robert Baer, Washington sold
JUTTPVMGPSBDDFTTUPUIFDPVOUSZTSJDIPJMĕFMET QPMJDFUSBJOJOHXBTEFTJHOFEUP
fortify the Ibn Saud dynasty, which upheld sharia law and was notorious for
BEPQUJOHTUSJDUDPOUSPMTPOGSFFEPNPGFYQSFTTJPO SFQSFTTJOHXPNFOTSJHIUT 
QVCMJDMZCFIFBEJOHDSJNJOBMT BOENBJOUBJOJOHBĕFSDFMZBOUJDPNNVOJTU QSP
U.S. foreign policy.72
"NFSJDBTBMMJBODFXJUI*CO4BVEEBUFEUPUIFŴżŶųT XIFOUIFLJOHHSBOUFE
oil concessions in return for aid and security assistance. A 1948 CIA report
OPUFEUIBU*CO4BVETQPXFSXBTiTPBCTPMVUF‫ڀڀ‬UIBUOPQSPCMFNPGJOUFSOBM
security really exists. The backwardness of the people precludes organized
disaffection.”73 In the late 1950s, the CIA began warning of a growing alliance
CFUXFFODPNNVOJTUT /BTTFSJTUT #BBUIJTUT BOEOBUJPOBMJTUTXIJDIUISFBUFOFE
$SPXO 1SJODF 'BJTBM  B WJDJPVT BOUJ4FNJUF XIP XBT TFFO  BDDPSEJOH UP POF
SFQPSU BTUIFiCFTUSFQSFTFOUBUJWFPGPVSJOUFSFTUTJOUIFFDPOPNJDTQIFSFwćF
&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOQSPWJEFEBNJMJUBSZHSBOUPGžŷŸNJMMJPOBOETPME
UIF4BVEJTžŴŴųNJMMJPOXPSUIPGIJHIUFDIIBSEXBSFJOSFUVSOGPSBDDFTTUPUIF
%IBISBOBJSĕFME1PMJDFXFSFCSPVHIUUP.JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZGPSUSBJO-
JOH BOEBQPMJDFBDBEFNZXBTDPOTUSVDUFEJO.FDDB(SFBUQSPNJTFXBTTFFO
JOUIFSPMFPGUIFQPMJDFJOTVQQSFTTJOHBTUSJLFPWFSTFHSFHBUFEMJWJOHRVBSUFSTBU
UIF"SBNDPPJMDPOHMPNFSBUFJOŴżŸŹ EFTQJUFUIFGBDUUIBUJUSFTVMUFEJOQVCMJD
whippings and at least two deaths.74
In the early 1960s, after a brief thaw in relations, Faisal sought an increase in
NJMJUBSZBJEPXJOHUPIJTTVQQPSUGPSUIFSPZBMJTUTJOUIFDJWJMXBSJO:FNFO$BCJ-
net-level officials were receptive, as they feared that growing internal strife would
CFBOiJOWJUBUJPOwGPS&HZQUJBOQSFTJEFOU(BNBM"CEFM/BTTFSiUPSFJOTUJHBUF

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 203


IJTBDUJWJUZwPOUIF"SBCJBOQFOJOTVMB IFODFiUISFBUFOJOH"NFSJDBOFDPOPNJD
interests.” Saudi Arabia was seen as “key to the entire peninsula,” and poten-
UJBMMZBiHPPEFYBNQMFGPSUIFSFTUPGUIF"SBCXPSMEJOJUTQSPNPUJPOPGGSFF
enterprise.”75ćF+PIOTPOBENJOJTUSBUJPODPOUSBDUFEXJUI-PDLIFFE.BSUJOUP
QSPWJEFUISFFTRVBESPOTPGTVQFSTPOJDBJSDSBęBOETVSGBDFUPTVSGBDFNJTTJMFT
BOETFOUB$*"MBCPSBUUBDIÏUPJOĕMUSBUFPJMXPSLFSVOJPOTćF"NFSJDBOTBMTP
built up the intelligence services, the Istikhbarat, whose activities in under-
NJOJOH/BTTFSJTUBOETPDJBMJTUPSHBOJ[BUJPOTFYUFOEFEJOUP&HZQU XIFSFUIFZ
TQPOTPSFEUIF.VTMJN#SPUIFSIPPE76
#FUXFFO ŴżŹŻ BOE ŴżźŸ  4BVEJ "SBCJB EFQPTJUFE žŶŶ NJMMJPO JO B USVTU
fund with the USAID to pay for police assistance.77ćFQSPHSBNXBTIFBWJMZ
HVBSEFE GSPN UIF "NFSJDBO QVCMJD BOE VOJRVF JO CFJOH FOUJSFMZ GVOEFE CZ
the Saudis. Several dozen officers were sent to the IPA and to International
1PMJDF4FSWJDFT *OD B$*"GSPOUJO8BTIJOHUPO*OŴżźŴ‰DPJODJEJOHXJUIUIF
repression of the Marxist-oriented “Sons of the Arabian Peninsula” allegedly
CFIJOEBDPVQBUUFNQU‰BO014UFBNIFBEFECZ+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO XIPXBT
later presented with a sword and gold scabbard by Faisal’s brother) reviewed
UIFTVSWFJMMBODFBOEQSPUFDUJPOPGPJMĕFMETGPSUIF.JOJTUSZPGUIF*OUFSJPS)F
DBMMFE GPS JNQSPWFE QPMJDF DPPSEJOBUJPO BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPOT UP FOTVSF UIF
TFDVSJUZPGUIF"SBCJBO"NFSJDBOBOE(FUUZPJMDPNQBOJFT5SBJOJOHBOEDPN-
NPEJUJFTXFSFTVQQMJFEUPIFMQGVMĕMMUIFTFFOET JODMVEJOHSBEJPUSBOTDFJWFST 
UFMFQIPOFT  WFIJDMFT  TXJUDICPBSET  QIPUPHSBQIJD JOL  DIFNJDBM DSZTUBMT  BOE
PUIFSMBCFRVJQNFOU78
"NBKPSGPDVTPG"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHXBTJOSJPUDPOUSPM UIFBNCBTTBEPSIBW-
ing lauded the role of the National Guard in suppressing a June 1967 riot outside
UIFIFBERVBSUFSTPG"SBNDP XIJDIFBSOFESFDPSEQSPĕUTEVSJOH'BJTBMTSFJHO
and expanded its exploration activities. OPS adviser Edward Bishop, however,
MBNFOUFEUIFMBDLPGiFOUIVTJBTNwPGMPDBMPďDJBMTBOEUIFJSiJOEJČFSFODFwUP
UFDIOJDBMBJEQSPKFDUT XIJDIIFGFMUXFSFCFJOHTFUCBDLCZBMBDLPGRVBMJĕFE
QFSTPOOFMćFQSPHSBNTOFWFSUIFMFTTNBEFTJHOJĕDBOUBDIJFWFNFOUTJOGSPO-
tier defense and in strengthening the security apparatus of the ruling dynasty.
ćPVTBOETPG4"1NFNCFSTXFSFFYFDVUFEPSEFUBJOFEJOTQFDJBMHVBSEDBNQT
VOEFS UIF NPTU JOIVNBO DPOEJUJPOT79 In 1975, after the OPS disbanded, the
4BVEJ HPWFSONFOU DPNNJTTJPOFE B TUVEZ PG JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ PSHBOJ[BUJPOT
BOEUIFQFOBMTZTUFNćFTUVEZXBTEJSFDUFECZ)FSCFSU)BSEJO GPSNFSDIJFG
PG PQFSBUJPOT JO -BUJO "NFSJDB  BOE i+BDLw (PJO  CPUI PG XIPN XFSF QBJE
through private channels. The Vinnell Corporation of Virginia, an engineering
ĕSNBOENFSDFOBSZPVUĕUUIBUCVJMUNJMJUBSZCBTFTJO0LJOBXBEVSJOH8PSME
8BS** XBTTVCTFRVFOUMZHJWFOBžźźNJMMJPODPOUSBDUUPDPOUJOVFUSBJOJOHUIF
4BVEJQPMJDFBOE/BUJPOBM(VBSE BDSJUJDBMJOTUSVNFOUPGTPDJBMDPOUSPMDBQBCMF
PGOFVUSBMJ[JOHUIFBSNFEGPSDFTJOUIFDBTFPGBDPVQ
4UBČFEQSFEPNJOBOUMZCZGPSNFS(SFFO#FSFUTBOE014PďDFST 7JOOFMMIBE
a history of serving as a CIA cover. One Pentagon official referred to it as “our

204 The Cold War on the Periphery


PXOMJUUMFNFSDFOBSZBSNZJO7JFUOBNw4PNFPGJUTNFOXFSFIJSFEEJSFDUMZ
CZGPSFJHOPJMDPNQBOJFT"7JOOFMMTUBČFSBOEGPSNFSBSNZPďDFSUPMENews-
weeki8FBSFOPUNFSDFOBSJFTCFDBVTFXFBSFOPUQVMMJOHUSJHHFST8FUSBJO
QFPQMFUPQVMMUSJHHFSTw0OFPGIJTDPMMFBHVFTBEEFEXSZMZ i.BZCFUIBUNBLFT
VT FYFDVUJWF NFSDFOBSJFTw80 The use of private security contractors enabled
the executive branch to get around congressional censure in propping up the
)PVTFPG4BVEBOETFDVSJOHBDDFTTUPUIFPJMĕFMETBęFSJUCSPLFSFEBTFDSFUEFBM
GPSSFDZDMJOHQFUSPEPMMBSTCBDLJOUPUIF"NFSJDBOFDPOPNZJOUIFXBLFPGUIF
OPEC boycotts.81 In 2003, Vinnell staffers were targeted in a terrorist attack. By
UIBUQPJOUUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBEMPOHCFFOJEFOUJĕFEXJUIQPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPO
BOEDPSSVQUJPOJOUIFDPVOUSZ‰XJUINVDIHPPESFBTPO VOGPSUVOBUFMZ
*O+PSEBO UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBEPQUFEBQVCMJDTBGFUZQSPHSBNUPGPSUJGZ,JOH
Hussein and to counter the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After the
&JTFOIPXFS BENJOJTUSBUJPO FTUBCMJTIFE SFMBUJPOT XJUI )VTTFJO JO UIF ŴżŸųT 
UIF$*"QSPWJEFEDBTIQBZNFOUTBOEIFMQFECVJMEIJTJOUFMMJHFODFTFSWJDFćF
BSSJWBMPGQPMJDFBEWJTFSTTVDIBTĕSFBSNTTQFDJBMJTU&MNFS3BENFS XIPIBE
QSFWJPVTMZTFSWFEJO$BNCPEJB DPJODJEFEXJUI)VTTFJOTJNQPTJUJPOPGNBS-
UJBMMBX SFTVMUJOHJOUIFPVUMBXJOHPGUSBEFVOJPOTBOETVQQSFTTJPOPGGSFFEPN
PGTQFFDIćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPWJEFESFWPMWFST SJPUDPOUSPMCBUPOT BOE
shields by way of Lebanon, as well as two DC-3 aircraft. It instructed Jordanians
JOĕOHFSQSJOUUFDIOPMPHZBOETUSFOHUIFOFEUIFDVSSJDVMVNBUUIF3PZBM1PMJDF
$PMMFHF TUSFTTJOHUIFGVODUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFBTUIFiĕSTUMJOFPGEFGFOTFwBHBJOTU
subversion.82
'PMMPXJOHUIFŴżŹź4JY%BZ8BSXJUI*TSBFM UIF014GFSSFUFEPVUžŴŴNJM-
MJPO JO FNFSHFODZ FRVJQNFOU UP IFMQ +PSEBO DPOGSPOU 1BMFTUJOJBO HVFSSJM-
las and rioters. CIA agents worked with the secret police in enacting a drive
BHBJOTU UIPTF XIP XFSF JOWPMWFE JO iQPMJUJDBM TDIFNJOH w SFTVMUJOH JO B MBSHF
JOĘVYPGQPMJUJDBMQSJTPOFST833BZNPOE8.FJFSXBTBTTJHOFEUPPWFSTFFBOE
SFGPSNUIFQSJTPOTZTUFNTPUIBUiUIF)BTIFNJUFLJOHEPNPG+PSEBOVOEFSUIF
MFBEFSTIJQPG,JOH)VTTFJODBOTIPXUIFXBZJOUIFDPSSFDUJPOBMĕFMEw.FJFS
JOTQFDUFEKBJMTUISPVHIPVUUIFDPVOUSZ XIJDIIFGPVOEMBDLFEQMVNCJOH CFET 
GVSOJUVSF BOEQSPQFSCBUIJOHGBDJMJUJFT *OUIF#FUIMFIFNKBJM JONBUFTIBEUP
CBUIFJOUIFJSUPJMFUT $FMMEPPSTXFSFPęFOPOMZĕWFGFFUIJHI BOEUIFSFXFSF
GFXPQQPSUVOJUJFTGPSXPSL.FJFSMPCCJFEGPSGVOEJOHUPJNQSPWFUIFQIZTJDBM
infrastructure and sought to introduce the kinds of correctional innovations
that were prevalent in the United States, including juvenile facilities, probation,
SFNPWBMPGUIFNFOUBMMZJMMGSPNUIFQSJTPOQPQVMBUJPO BOEWPDBUJPOBMUSBJOJOH
and recreation.
*OQSBDUJDF UIFSFJTMJUUMFFWJEFODFPGJNQSPWFNFOUćFQSJTPOJO"NNBO 
GPSFYBNQMF DPOUJOVFEUPIPVTFQPMJUJDBMPČFOEFSTBOESFNBJOFEJOiWFSZCBE
TIBQF wBDDPSEJOHUPJOUFSOBMSFQPSUT*ONBUFTXFSFLFQUJOVOEFSHSPVOEDFMMT 
BOEUIFQSJTPOXBTTUBČFECZPďDJBMTXIPiLOFXIPXUPNBLFQFPQMFUBML w
JNQMZJOHBQSPMJGFSBUJPOPGUPSUVSFćFWJDUJNTPGQPMJDFBCVTFTXFSFDIBSBDUFS-

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 205


J[FEBTDPNNVOJTUT CVUBDDPSEJOHUP.FJFS iPUIFSJOGPSNBUJPOJOEJDBUFTUIFSF
XFSFQFPQMFGSPNTFWFSBMPUIFSQPMJUJDBMHSPVQTBOETUVEFOUTQMVTUIF1-0w84
ćFTFDPNNFOUTQPJOUUPUIFTIPSUDPNJOHTPGQFOBMSFGPSNBOEUIFDPOUSJCV-
UJPOTPGUIF014UPUIFTVQQSFTTJPOPGSBEJDBMOBUJPOBMJTUNPWFNFOUT XIJDI
XBTBQSJNBSZBJNPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT
Pakistan, valued as a listening post and landing pad for U-2 spy planes, was
BOPUIFSBVUIPSJUBSJBOTUBUFSFDFJWJOHQPMJDFBJE žŴŶ NJMMJPO JO UIJT DBTF ćF
QSPHSBNTXFSFVTFEUPGVOOFMXFBQPOTUP1VOKBCJHFOFSBM"ZVC,IBOBOEIJT
CSVUBM TVDDFTTPS :BIZB ,IBO  XIP DPVSUFE 64 TVQQPSU JO 1BLJTUBOT SJWBMSZ
with India.85"NFSJDBOQPMJDZNBLFSTBDLOPXMFEHFEUIFQPPSQVCMJDJNBHFPG
UIFQPMJDF XIPTFSWFEBTiJOTUSVNFOUTPGUIFSFHJNFJOQPXFSwćFZDMBJNFE 
IPXFWFS UIBU$IJOFTFBOE"GHIBODPNNVOJTUTXFSFCFIJOEUIFHSPXJOHMBCPS
BOE TUVEFOU VOSFTU BOE SFCFMMJPOT JO UIF OPSUIXFTU BNPOH UIF #BMVDIJ BOE
Pashtuns, necessitating U.S. training for “internal security.”86
"ęFS CFJOH USBOTGFSSFE GSPN 7JFUOBN  0SWBM 8PPOFS  XIP IBE TFSWFE BT
QPMJDF DIJFG JO #BLFSTĕFME BOE )VOUJOHUPO #FBDI  $BMJGPSOJB  SFXSPUF UIF
EFUFDUJWF USBJOJOH BOE USBďD TDIPPM DVSSJDVMVNT BOE EJTDPVSBHFE UIF iDJSDMF
PGEFBUIQSBDUJDF wJOXIJDIQPMJDFĕSFEUIFJSSJĘFTJOUPBDSPXE DBVTJOHQFPQMF
UPCFLJMMFEJOUIFTUBNQFEF5FBSHBTHSFOBEFTXFSFTIJQQFEUP1BLJTUBO BOE
Pakistani officers were sent to the IPA, the University of Southern California,
BOE"NFSJDBOGVOEFEBDBEFNJFTJO*SBO871FBLJOHBUBCVEHFUPGžŴźNJMMJPO
in 1963, OPS training extended into East Pakistan, where police were involved
JOTVQQSFTTJOHUIF#BOHMBEFTIJJOEFQFOEFODFNPWFNFOUBOEDPPQFSBUFEXJUI
BSNZVOJUTXIP BDDPSEJOHUPPOFXJUOFTT FOHBHFEJOTPNFPGUIFiNPTUDBM-
DVMBUFETBWBHFSZ‫ڀڀ‬WJTJUFEPOBDJWJMQPQVMBUJPOJOSFDFOUUJNFTwćF4QFDJBM
(SPVQ PO $PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ  GFBSJOH UIBU iDPNNVOJTU BOE FYUSFNF MFęJTU
FMFNFOUTXFSFFYQMPJUJOHUIFMPXFDPOPNJDTUBUVTPGUIFNBKPSJUZPGUIFQPQV-
lation,” sent Wooner and CIA agents Robert Janus and Robert Nate Bush to
%BDDBUPUSBJOQPMJDFBOEQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUT88
$*"BHFOUTPQFSBUJOHVOEFSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBNBOE014IFMQFEEFWFMPQ
*OUFS4FSWJDFT*OUFMMJHFODF *4* XIJDISBOBNBTTTVSWFJMMBODFOFUXPSLSJWBM-
ing SAVAK. “Jack” Monroe and Charlie Nesbitt, a San Francisco beat cop who
served in Indonesia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, created an anti-narcotics unit
XPSLJOHBMPOHUIF"GHIBOCPSEFS*UTFČFDUJWFOFTTXBTIBNQFSFECZCSJCFSZ
and the corruption of the ISI, which sold heroin to fund clandestine operations.
0WFSUJNF UIFQPMJDFDPOUJOVFEUPTVČFSGSPNiMPXNPSBMFBOEEJTDJQMJOFw89
8JUI BO FNQIBTJT PO JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ  "NFSJDBO USBJOJOH DPOUSJCVUFE UP
QPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPOBOEJOUFOTJĕFEFUIOJDEJWJTJPOTUIBUXFSFBMFHBDZPG#SJUJTI
DPMPOJBMJTNBOEMBZBUUIFTPVSDFPGUIFDPVOUSZTEZTGVODUJPOBMJUZ
In his book Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the
Middle East 3BTIJE,IBMJEJUSBDFTUIFJNQBDUPGUIF$PME8BSJOFYBDFSCBU-
JOHJOUFSOFDJOFDPOĘJDUBOEGBDJMJUBUJOHUIFTQSFBEPGQPMJUJDBMBVUIPSJUBSJBOJTN

206 The Cold War on the Periphery


and repression in the Middle East. The two superpowers, especially the United
4UBUFT XIJDIFOKPZFEPWFSXIFMNJOHNJMJUBSZTVQFSJPSJUZ GPDVTFEPOBDIJFWJOH
strategic advantage and gaining control over vital energy supplies. The region’s
QFPQMFCFDBNFQBXOTJOBMBSHFSHBNFPGHMPCBMDPNQFUJUJPO90 The police train-
JOHQSPHSBNTXFSFCVUPOFXBZJOXIJDIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTFYIJCJUFEJUTJOĘV-
FODF+VTUJĕFEVOEFSUIFHVJTFPGUIF$PME8BS UIFZTUSFOHUIFOFEQSP8FTUFSO
despots such as the Shah of Iran and enabled privileged elites to crack down
NPSF FďDJFOUMZ PO SFHJPOBM NJOPSJUJFT BOE TPDJBM NPWFNFOUT QSFTTJOH GPS
CBEMZOFFEFETPDJBMDIBOHF"NFSJDBOQPMJDZNBLFSTGFBSFEUIFTQSFBEPG"SBC
OBUJPOBMJTNBOETPDJBMJTN XIJDIUISFBUFOFE8FTUFSOBDDFTTUPUIFSFHJPOTPJM
ćFZFNQIBTJ[FEUIFTPDJBMDPOUSPMGVODUJPOPGUIFQPMJDFBOEXFSFJOĘVFOUJBM
JO JNQPSUJOH NPEFSO XFBQPOT BOE QPMJDJOH UFDIOPMPHJFT  XIJDI FOIBODFE
coordination in the hunt for subversives.
%VSJOHUIFCVJMEVQUPUIF*SBRXBSBOEBęFS 8FTUFSODPNNFOUBUPSTDPO-
TUBOUMZ FNQIBTJ[FE B USBEJUJPO PG QPMJUJDBM BVUIPSJUBSJBOJTN BOE DPSSVQUJPO
JOUIF"SBCTUBUFTBTBNBSLFSPGUIFJSTVQQPTFECBDLXBSEOFTTBOEOFFEGPS
foreign guidance. Rarely have they acknowledged the role of the United States
in propping up dictatorships and contributing to the growth of powerful state
TFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVTFTNPCJMJ[FEGPSSFQSFTTJPO%PJOHTPXPVMETFSWFUPDIBM-
MFOHFUIFDPNGPSUJOH0SJFOUBMJTUOBSSBUJWFTVTFEUPSBUJPOBMJ[FXBHJOHUIFi8BS
PO5FSSPSwBOENJHIUQSPWJEFUIFĕSTUTUFQUPXBSEFTUBCMJTIJOHNPSFIBSNPOJ-
ous bilateral relations and a peaceful future.

Neocolonialism in the Meditteranean and Middle East 207


Chapter 10
The Dark Side of the Alliance for Progress
Police Training and State Terror in Latin America during
the Cold War
Only in an atmosphere of public order can the goals of the Alliance be
achieved.
‰1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPOCSJFĕOH (VBUFNBMB 

They [police and state security agents] are “trained” to combat “Castro-
communist infiltration,” as expressed by the hypocritical alienizing language
made fashionable by the pro-imperialist dissemination media of the continent.
‰$IJMFBOTUVEFOU "QSJM

Murder, torture and mutilation are alright so long as our side is doing it and
the victims are communists.
‰7iron Vaky 64%FQVUZ$IJFGPG.JTTJPO (VBUFNBMB 

*OGBMMŴżŸŸ-FF&DIPMT BOBUJPOBMQJTUPMTIPPUJOHDIBNQJPOBOEWFUFSBOPGUIF
QPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO+BQBO SFDFJWFEBDBMMGSPNIJTGSJFOE#ZSPO&OHMFBTLJOH
IJN UP HP UP #PMJWJB BT QBSU PG UIF ŴŵżųE QSPHSBN 8JUIPVU IFTJUBUJPO  UIF
GPSUZOJOFZFBSPME DVTUPNT PďDFS GSPN $BMFYJUP  $BMJGPSOJB  BDDFQUFE BOE
began work setting up training schools and pistol ranges and instructing the
TFDSFUQPMJDFJOBEWBODFENFUIPETPGTVSWFJMMBODF JOUFSSPHBUJPO BOEJOĕMUSB-
UJPO'MVFOUJO4QBOJTI &DIPMTTVCTFRVFOUMZXFOU PO UP 6SVHVBZ BOE $VCB 
XIFSF IF DSFBUFE B TQFDJBM iUSBďD TRVBEw FWJEFOUMZ B DPWFS GPS NPSF TFDSFU
police operations) under Hernando Hernandez Hernandez, Fulgencio Batista’s
DIJFGPGQPMJDF XIPXBTMBUFSFYFDVUFECZ'JEFM$BTUSPGPSBMMFHFEDSJNFTBHBJOTU
IVNBOJUZ"ęFSBTUJOUBTTIFSJČPG:VNB$PVOUZ "SJ[POB &DIPMTSPVOEFEPVU
IJT'PSFJHO4FSWJDFDBSFFSJOUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJDXJUIUIF014 XIFSFIF
coordinated an elite jungle warfare battalion that was thrust into action in the
NPOUITQSFDFEJOHUIFŴżŹŸNBSJOFJOWBTJPO
Heir to “Chesty” Puller and other Banana War veterans, Echols provides a
XJOEPXJOUPUIFTFDSFUIJTUPSZPG"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPOJO-BUJO"NFSJDBEVS-
JOHUIF$PME8BS"ęFSUIFŴżŸż$VCBOSFWPMVUJPO QPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNT
FNFSHFEBTBDSVDJBMEJNFOTJPOPGUIF"MMJBODFGPS1SPHSFTT B.BSTIBMM1MBOo

208
UZQFQSPHSBNEFTJHOFEUPGPTUFSFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOUBOEVOEFSDVUTVQQPSU
for the radical left. The architect of the Alliance, John F. Kennedy, criticized
Eisenhower’s backing of dictators, which, he said, left the continent ripe for
TPDJBMSFWPMVUJPO*OQSBDUJDF IPXFWFS IJTQPMJDJFTEJTQMBZFENPSFDPOUJOVJUZ
than discontinuity.
-BUJO"NFSJDBOOBUJPOBMJTUTSFDPHOJ[FEUIBUBOVOEFSMZJOHHPBMPGUIF"MMJ-
BODFXBTUPBEWBODFUIFFDPOPNJDJOUFSFTUTPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTCZTVCTJEJ[JOH
"NFSJDBODPOUSBDUPSTBOEJNQSPWJOHMPDBMJOGSBTUSVDUVSFBOEUSBOTQPSUBUJPO
UPBMMPXGPSUIFNPSFFďDJFOUFYUSBDUJPOPGSBXNBUFSJBMT XIJMFTBEEMJOHUIFJS
nations with debt.1"MUIPVHIUIF"MMJBODFCSPVHIUTPNFCFOFĕUT QPWFSUZBOE
JOFRVBMJUZ JODSFBTFE EVSJOH UIF ŴżŹųT  UIF iEFDBEF PG EFWFMPQNFOUw 'FBST
BCPVU UIF TQSFBE PG $VCBOTUZMF TPDJBMJTN BOE BO BSEFOU EFTJSF UP XJO UIF
$PME8BSNBEF,FOOFEZTVTQJDJPVTPGFWFONPEFSBUFMFęJTUSFGPSNFST2 The
NBKPSJUZPG"MMJBODFGVOETXFSFDPOTFRVFOUMZDIBOOFMFEUISPVHIUIF$*"UP
TVCWFSU EFNPDSBUJD SFHJNFT BOE NPVOU DPVOUFSHVFSSJMMB PQFSBUJPOT "SUIVS
4DIMFTJOHFS+S B)BSWBSEIJTUPSJBOBOETFOJPS,FOOFEZBJEF MBUFSMBNFOUFE
that “counterinsurgency was a ghastly illusion which was used cruelly in the
hands of its user and distorted and perverted the Alliance’s goals.”3
ćF0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZFNCPEJFEUIFJNQFSJBMJTUJDDIBSBDUFSPGUIF"MMJ-
BODF #FOFBUI UIF IVNBOJUBSJBO SIFUPSJD XBT B DPOUJOVFE EFTJSF PO UIF QBSU
PG64PďDJBMTUPNPME-BUJO"NFSJDBOTPDJFUJFTUPUIFJSMJLJOHBOEUPDPOUSPM
QPMJUJDBMEFWFMPQNFOUT1PMJDZNBLFSTTBXBTBUFDIOJDBMQSPCMFNUIFOFFEUP
EFNJMJUBSJ[FBOEEFDFOUSBMJ[FUIFQPMJDFXIJMFBUUIFTBNFUJNFNPCJMJ[JOHUIFN
UPDPOUBJOTPDJBMVOSFTUćFZBDLOPXMFEHFEUIBU-BUJO"NFSJDBOQPMJDFGPSDFT
XFSFSFQSFTTJWFCVUGFMUUIJTDPVMECFPWFSDPNFUISPVHIBEWJTPSZBTTJTUBODFBOE
USBJOJOH"T3PHFS)JMTNBOOPUFEJOBOJOUFSOBMTUVEZi1PMJDFDBESFT<JONBOZ
-BUJO"NFSJDBODPVOUSJFT>DPNFGSPNUIF"SNZBOEPQFSBUFBTTNBMMBSNJFT
‫ڀڀ‬ćFZPęFOGVODUJPOBTBNFBOTPGDPOUSPMMJOHUIFQPQVMBDFJOUIFJOUFSFTUTPG
UIFSVMJOHDMBTT4VTQFDUTBSFBEESFTTFEJNQFSJPVTMZBOECSVTRVFMZćFQPMJDF
BSF LFQU JO CBSSBDLT XJUI MBSHF OVNCFST PO BMFSU TUBUVT 8IFO EJTUVSCBODFT
PDDVS UIFZSVTIPVUJOMBSHFTRVBET$SPXETBSFNFUMJLFNJMJUBSZPQQPOFOUT
XJUIHVOĕSF.BTTJWFGBUBMJUJFTDBOSFTVMUw4
)JMTNBOBOEIJTDPMMFBHVFTWJFXFEUIFUBTLPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBTPOFPG
DVSCJOHUIFPWFSUMZPQQSFTTJWFDIBSBDUFSPGUIFQPMJDFXIJMFNBJOUBJOJOHUIFJS
QPMJUJDBMPSJFOUBUJPO3JPUDPOUSPMBOEUIFTVQQSFTTJPOPGMFęJTUNPWFNFOUTXFSF
UPCFBDDPNQMJTIFEJOBNPSFPSHBOJ[FEBOETZTUFNBUJDZFUIVNBOFXBZćFTF
BJNTQSPWFEUPCFDPOUSBEJDUPSZBOEVOUFOBCMF"EWJTFSTDPVMEOPUDPOUSPMPS
NPOJUPS UIF XBZ XFBQPOT BOE USBJOJOH XFSF BEPQUFE "T JO PUIFS BSFBT  UIF
FNQIBTJTQMBDFEPODPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFBOETUBNQJOHPVUTVCWFSTJPOCSPVHIU
PVUUIFNPTUCSVUBMUFOEFODJFTPGUIFQPMJDF XIJMFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSFTTFEGPS
the passage of national security laws easing legal constraints on police activity.
"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTVMUJNBUFMZDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFTQSFBEPGFYUFOTJWF

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 209


political violence, which generated resistance and instability rather than stabil-
JUZ JODPOUSBWFOUJPOPGUIF"MMJBODFTBOOPVODFEBJNTćFZIJOEFSFEEFWFM-
PQNFOUBOEMFEUPBWFSJUBCMF%BSL"HFJO-BUJO"NFSJDBOIJTUPSZ SJGFXJUI
UPSUVSFBOEEFBUITRVBET

“The Cops Were Out-Killing the Communists”: Police Training and State
Terror in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic

7FOF[VFMBFYFNQMJĕFTUIFEJWFSTJPOPG"MMJBODFSFTPVSDFTGPSUIFQVSQPTFTPG
WJPMFOUTPDJBMDPOUSPMćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOMBWJTIFEPWFSžŴųųNJMMJPO
JO"MMJBODFGVOETUP1SFTJEFOU3ØNVMP#FUBODPVSU ŴżŸŻoŴżŹŷ BMJCFSBMNPE-
FSOJ[FSXIPSFQMBDFEEJDUBUPS.BSDPT1ÏSF[+JNÏOF[ BGBWPSJUFPGUIF&JTFO-
IPXFS BENJOJTUSBUJPO )F QSPNPUFE UFDIOJDBM BTTJTUBODF UP JOEVTUSZ  QVCMJD
IPVTJOH  BOE NPEFSBUF MBOE SFGPSN XIJMF BDDFQUJOH UIF QSFTFODF PG GPSFJHO
corporations, including Standard Oil, which controlled 95 percent of Ven-
F[VFMBTMBSHFTUPJMDPNQBOZ $SFPMF1FUSPMFVN"MUIPVHI#FUBODPVSUXBTMPOH
WJFXFECZUIF$*"BTBQSPHSFTTJWFDBQBCMFPGQSFWFOUJOHUIFSJTFPGDPNNV-
OJTN IJTNPEFSBUJPOBOEBDRVJFTDFODFUPGPSFJHOPJMJOUFSFTUTBOHFSFEZPVOH
Venezuelans inspired by the Cuban revolution. He cracked down harshly on
UIFMFę XIJDISFTVMUFEJOUIFHSPXUIPGPSHBOJ[BUJPOTTVDIBTUIF.PWFNFOUPG
UIF3FWPMVUJPOBSZ-FęBOEUIF"SNFE'PSDFTPG/BUJPOBM-JCFSBUJPO MFECZUIF
BOUJJNQFSJBMJTU%PVHMBT#SBWP5
Peaking BUBCVEHFUPGžŷŹų ųųųJOŴżŹŸ QPMJDFQSPHSBNTXFSFDSVDJBM BMPOH
XJUINJMJUBSZBJE JOUIFFČPSUUPEFTUSPZUIFTFPSHBOJ[BUJPOT1SJPSUPUIFŴżŹŵ
FMFDUJPOTJO7FOF[VFMB BUXIJDIUJNFIBMGUIFDPOHSFTTXBTJOQSJTPO UIF014
TFOU +PIO -POHBO  BO 0LMBIPNB $JUZ QPMJDF PďDFS BOE 5FYBT #PSEFS 1BUSPM
BHFOU UPUSBJOUIF$BSBDBTQPMJDFJO"NFSJDBOTUZMFQBUSPMTBOEJOUIFVTFPG
.BDFBOEDPVOUFSUFSSPSJTNUFDIOJRVFTTVDIBTEJTBSNJOHBTOJQFSJOBCVJMEJOH
XJUIPVUIBSNJOHSFTJEFOUT%SBXJOHPOPďDJBM014JEFPMPHZ -POHBOFNQIB-
TJ[FEUIFVTFPGTVSHJDBMCVUOPOMFUIBMNFUIPETPGSJPUDPOUSPM JODMVEJOHUIF
VTFPGUFBSHBTBTBOBMUFSOBUJWFUPTVCNBDIJOFHVOT TPUIBUiOPNBSUZSTXFSF
DSFBUFEBOEUIF$PNNVOJTUTIBEOPUIJOHUPFYQMPJUw6
1BSBEPYJDBMMZ  UIF 014 TVQQPSUFE B NFBTVSF FMJNJOBUJOH UIF SFRVJSFNFOU
UIBUBQPMJDFNBOXIPLJMMFEBTVTQFDUCFBSSFTUFE XIJDIUIFOTQBXOFEEFBUI
TRVBEBDUJWJUZćFVQQFSDMBTTGBUIFSPGBUPSUVSFWJDUJNXSPUFUIFNJOJTUFSPG
KVTUJDFUIBUiUIFHPBMPGEFGFBUJOHDPNNVOJTNJTOPUPCUBJOFECZBQQMZJOHUP
DPNNVOJTUT DPOUSBSZUP$ISJTUJBOFUIJDT JOIVNBONFUIPETPGWJPMFODFXIJDI
NBLFVTFRVBMUPCFBTUTwćF"NFSJDBOTTBXUIJOHTEJČFSFOUMZćFLos Angeles
Times reported approvingly that as a result of OPS assistance, the “tide of the
CBUUMFIBEUVSOFEBOE‫ڀڀ‬UIFDPQTXFSFPVULJMMJOHUIFDPNNVOJTUT‫>&<ڀڀ‬OFNZ
DBTVBMUJFTJODMVEFEBOVNCFSPGSFETUVEFOUTXIPIJUIFSUPIBESPBNFEUIFDJUZ
JOTQPSUTDBSTBOEDBSSJFEPOUIFJSNBSBVEJOHBMNPTUXJUIPVUIJOESBODFw7

210 The Cold War on the Periphery


4IPXJOHXIFSFUIFJSQSJPSJUJFTSFTUFE UIF014NFUNPOUIMZXJUITFDVSJUZ
PďDFSTPG$SFPMF1FUSPMFVNBOEUIFNBKPSNJOJOHDPNQBOJFTUPEJTDVTTJOTVS-
HFODZQSPCMFNT1VCMJDTBGFUZBEWJTFS$MJęPO.POSPF MBUFSDIJFGTVSWFJMMBODF
PďDFSXJUIUIFCPSEFSQBUSPMJO1BOBNB IBETFSWFEGPSUFOZFBSTBTB$SFPMF
TVQFSWJTPSJO$BSBDBT0UIFSTTVDIBTUIF3VTTJBO/JDL:BOUTJOXFSFBďMJBUFE
XJUIUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNJO7JFUOBN#SJFĕOHTTFOUUPUIFFNCBTTZFYQSFTTFE
TBUJTGBDUJPO UIBU UIF BQQSFIFOTJPO PG UPQ iUFSSPSJTU DPNNBOEFSTw XBT BMMPX-
JOHUIF014NJTTJPOUPDIBOHFGSPNIFMQJOHUPiQVUPVUFNFSHFODZĕSFTwUP
UIFiMPOH IBSECVTJOFTTPGBTTJTUJOHUIF7FOF[VFMBOHPWFSONFOUVQHSBEFJUT
police forces.”8ćFŴżźŷQIBTFPVUSFQPSU DPBVUIPSFECZGPSNFS*OEJBOBTUBUF
USPPQFS4UBOMFZ(VUI IBJMFEUIFQSPHSBNTGPSiNFFUJOHUIFDIBMMFOHFTPGUIF
ŴżŹųTwCZDPOGSPOUJOHiVSCBOUFSSPSJTNBOEFYUSFNJTNwBOEDVSUBJMJOHUISFBUT
UPJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZćFMFę IPXFWFS XPVMESFFNFSHFJOUIFŴżżųTXJUIUIF
revolution of )VHP $IÈWF[  PXJOH UP MJOHFSJOH TUSVDUVSBM JOFRVBMJUJFT BOE
SFTFOUNFOUBHBJOTUUIFCSVUBMJUZPG64CBDLFESFHJNFT9
*OUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD XIFSFUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUQSPWJEFEPWFSžŷ
NJMMJPOJOQPMJDFBJE UIF"MMJBODFQVUBTJNJMBSMZCFOJHOGBDFPODMBTTJDJNQFSJBM
policies. In 1962, following the assassination of Rafael Trujillo and the advent
PGBOFXHPWFSONFOUIFBEFECZUIFDPOTFSWBUJWF+PBRVÓO#BMBHVFS "UUPSOFZ
(FOFSBM 3PCFSU ,FOOFEZ TFOU UXP EFUFDUJWFT GSPN UIF -PT "OHFMFT 1PMJDF
%FQBSUNFOUTi.FYJDBOTRVBEwUPUSBJOBOFMJUFVOJU UIF$BTDPT#MBODPT XIJDI
IFMQFEUIFHPWFSONFOUSFDMBJNUIFTUSFFUTPG4BOUP%PNJOHPGSPNUIFSFWP-
MVUJPOBSZ+VOFŴŷUINPWFNFOU&RVJQQFEXJUIUFBSHBT NBTLT BOEUIFXIJUF
IFMNFUTUIBUQSPWJEFEJUTOBNF UIF$BTDPT#MBODPTCFDBNFTPIBUFEUIBUJO
1965, according to OPS reports, it was the subject of “severe and concentrated
BUUBDL wFČFDUJWFMZiFMJNJOBUJOHJUBTBSJPUDPOUSPMGPSDFw10
*O"QSJMŴżŹŸ FNFSHFODZQPMJDFBJEXBTEFMJWFSFEUPCPMTUFSUIFJOWBTJPOCZ
64.BSJOFT XIJDIXBTEFTJHOFEUPLFFQPVUPGQPXFSUIFTPDJBMEFNPDSBU
+VBO#PTDI XIPXBTTFFOBTBUISFBUUP"NFSJDBOTVHBSJOUFSFTUTGPSQSPNPUJOH
progressive labor codes.11"EWJTFSTTVDIBT&MNFSi5PNNZw"ELJOTBOE,OVUF
ćPSQF XFSF TFOU GSPN 7JFUOBN UP EFWFMPQ UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT  NPEFSO
SFDPSE LFFQJOH  BOE SVSBM QBUSPM OFUXPSLT ćF $*" QSPWJEFE žŶŵŹ NJMMJPO
under USAID cover for police intelligence and oversaw “subversive investiga-
tions” by the FBI-trained director of national security services and creation of
an elite jungle warfare unit. The OPS further subsidized an expansion of the
/BUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZBU#PDB$IJDB CVJMUBMJCSBSZTQFDJBMJ[JOHJOXPSLT
PODPNNVOJTNBOEDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ BOEJNQPSUFESJĘFTBTXFMMBTĕOHFS-
QSJOUJOHBOECBMMJTUJDTUFDIOPMPHJFTUPBJEJODSPXEDPOUSPM*O/PWFNCFSŴżŹŹ
Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted with approval the effective use by Santo
%PNJOHP QPMJDF DIJFG (FOFSBM +PTÏ .PSJMMP -ØQF[ PG iIJHI QSFTTVSF XBUFS
vehicles for controlling angry crowds.”12
"T 3VTLT DPNNFOUT JMMVTUSBUF  UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT XBT TBODUJPOJOH QPMJDF

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 211


QSBDUJDFTSFNJOJTDFOUPGUIF+JN$SPX4PVUI%FNPDSBU8BZOF.PSTFPG0SF-
gon, one of only two senators to dissent against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution
BVUIPSJ[JOHNJMJUBSZJOUFSWFOUJPOJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB XBTBMPOFWPJDFPGPQQP-
TJUJPO EFNBOEJOHCFGPSFUIF4FOBUF i+VTUXIPBSFXFUPUIJOLXFDBOUFBDI
UIF%PNJOJDBOQPMJDFBOZUIJOHUIBUUIFZEJEOPUMFBSOJO5SVKJMMPTEBZTw8JUI
Belaguer safely reensconced in power, OPS-trained units rounded up sugar
VOJPOBDUJWJTUT TMVNDPNNVOJUZPSHBOJ[FST BOE#PTDITVQQPSUFSTBOELFQU
UBCTPOUIF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ)FDUPS"SJTUZ MFBEFSPGBDPOTUJUVUJPOBMJTUQBSUZ
EFGFBUFEJOGSBVEVMFOUŴżŹŹFMFDUJPOT XBTBNPOHUIPTFJNQSJTPOFE BOEUXPPG
his bodyguards were killed.13"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBMDBMMFEBUUFOUJPOUPQPMJUJ-
cal assassinations, the kidnapping of youth leaders, and the torture of political
QSJTPOFSTi+BDLw.POSPF BWFUFSBOPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB
BOE"GSJDB MBNFOUFEUIBUiJG<UIFSVNPSTBSF>FWFOIBMGUSVF JUJTBTBEDPN-
NFOUBSZPOUIF%PNJOJDBOQPMJDFUIBUUIFZBSFJOWPMWFEJOPďDJBMUFSSPSJTN 
assassination, and corruption.”14.POSPFTDPNNFOUTJNQMJFEUIBUUIFTFQSPC-
MFNTXFSFJOOBUFUPUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD GBJMJOHUPBDLOPXMFEHFUIFXBZT
JOXIJDI"NFSJDBOUSBJOJOHIBEDPOUSJCVUFEUPTVDICFIBWJPSXPSMEXJEF

“Neutralizing” the ELN and FARC: Police Aid and Violence in Colombia

*O$PMPNCJB "NFSJDBOQPMJDFQSPHSBNTFYBDFSCBUFEUIFHSPXUIPGBWJDJPVT
DJWJMXBSSPPUFEJOSBNQBOUTPDJBMJOFRVBMJUJFTBOEUIFQPMJUJDBMNBSHJOBMJ[BUJPO
PGUIFQPPS%VSJOHUIFCMPPEZQFSJPEPG-B7JPMFODJB ŴżŷŻoŴżŸŻ UIFDPO-
servative power structure institutionalized repression and crushed the popular
VQSJTJOHTQBXOFECZUIFBTTBTTJOBUJPOPGSFGPSNJTUQSFTJEFOUJBMDBOEJEBUF+PSHF
&MJFDFS(BJUBOćF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOCBDLFE(FOFSBM(VTUBWP3PKBT
Pinilla, who was favored by the landowning elite.156OEFSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN 
the National Police were trained in forensics, investigations, and anti-sabotage
UFDIOJRVFT " ŴżŸŻ SFQPSU CZ )FSCFSU )BSEJO  B HSBEVBUF PG UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ
PG$BMJGPSOJBBU#FSLFMFZ4DIPPMPG$SJNJOPMPHZBOEQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUPSJO
"MCVRVFSRVF /FX.FYJDP BDLOPXMFEHFEUIBUUIFZXFSFBiSFQSFTTJWFUZQFPG
police organization.”16
6OEFUFSSFE  JO ŴżŸż  BęFS B /BUJPOBM 'SPOU HPWFSONFOU MFE CZ UIF MJCFSBM
"MCFSUP-MFSBT$BNBSHPUPPLQPXFS B$*"BEWJTPSZUFBNIFBEFECZ)BOT5PęF
BOEPUIFSWFUFSBOTPGUIFBOUJ)VLDBNQBJHOJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFTIFMQFECVJMEBO
JOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZJOGSBTUSVDUVSF FODPVSBHJOHJNQSPWFEDPPSEJOBUJPOCFUXFFO
UIFQPMJDFBOENJMJUBSZBOEUIFFTUBCMJTINFOUPGiIVOUFSLJMMFSUFBNTwUPEFGFBU
MPPTFMZPSHBOJ[FEQFBTBOUTTFFLJOHSFHJPOBMBVUPOPNZ*OUIFFBSMZŴżŹųT BSNZ
and police units launched Plan Lazo (“snare” or “noose”), a clandestine opera-
tion to destroy independent self-governing republics. Plan Lazo was followed
VQCZ0QFSBUJPO.BSRVFUFMJB BOBHHSFTTJWFBTTBVMUPOHVFSSJMMBDPOUSPMMFEUFS-
SJUPSZVTJOHQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSF IFBWZBSUJMMFSZ BOEOBQBMN17 Reports noted
UIBUUIFDBTVBMUZSBUFGPSTFDVSJUZGPSDFTXFOUGSPNDMPTFUPFWFOUPBSBUJPPG

212 The Cold War on the Periphery


TFWFOUPUXPćFHVFSSJMMBTJOUVSOGPSNFEUIF'VFS[BT"SNBEBT3FWPMVDJP-
OBSJBTEF$PMPNCJB '"3$ XIPTFMFBEFS.BOVFM.BSVMBOEB LOPXOBT5JSP
'JKP i4VSF4IPUw EFDMBSFEUIFQFBTBOUSZUPCFiWJDUJNTPGBQPMJDZPGĕSFBOE
sword carried out by oligarchic usurpers of power.”18
3PPUFE JO QFBTBOUT TFMGEFGFOTF NJMJUJBT  '"3$ BJNFE UP QSPNPUF MBOE
SFGPSN BOE OBUJPOBMJ[F SFTPVSDFT DPOUSPMMFE CZ NVMUJOBUJPOBM DPSQPSBUJPOT
The Ejército Liberacion Nacional (ELN) was another guerrilla organization
TVQQPSUFE CZ UIF PJM XPSLFST VOJPO BOE NJEEMFDMBTT TUVEFOUT EJTJMMVTJPOFE
by the failure of the National Front of liberals and conservatives to engender
TVTUBJOBCMFFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOUPSBEPQUTPDJBMQSPHSBNTGPSUIFQPPS*UT
NPTU GBNPVT SFDSVJU XBT 'BUIFS $BNJMP 5PSSFT 3FTUSFQP  TDJPO PG B EJTUJO-
HVJTIFE$PMPNCJBOGBNJMZXIPCFMJFWFEUIBU$ISJTUJBOTIBEBEVUZUPTUSVHHMF
on behalf of social justice. Speaking to packed crowds about the necessity of
expropriating the latifundios, nationalizing natural resources, and forging a
QFPQMFTHPWFSONFOU IFGVTFEBTFDVMBSSFWPMVUJPOBSZ.BSYJTNXJUIBOJOUFOTF
3PNBO$BUIPMJDGBJUIJOBOJEFPMPHZUIBUQSPWJEFEJOTQJSBUJPOGPSMJCFSBUJPO
theology.19
*O0DUPCFSŴżŹŶ BTEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBOETUSJLFTBHBJOTUDPOTFSWBUJWFQSFTJ-
EFOU(VJMMFSNP-FØO7BMFODJB.V×Ø[ ŴżŹŵoŴżŹŻ HSJQQFEUIFDBQJUBM UIF014
FTUBCMJTIFEUSBJOJOHTDIPPMT TFUVQDSJNFMBCT BOECSPVHIUJOBOJOUFMMJHFODF
specialist with experience in Malaya. The police, according to one report,
iMJLFEUPQBSUJDJQBUFJODPVOUFSCBOEJUPQFSBUJPOTXJUI<UIF>BSNZCFDBVTFPG
the prospect of better rations, sleeping bags, and raincoats and the issuance of
BNNVOJUJPOBOEHSFOBEFTw"OPUIFSSFQPSU DPBVUIPSFECZ)FSCFSU)BSEJO 
DPNQMBJOFE UIBU QPMJDF XFSF IBOEJDBQQFE CZ UIF KVEJDJBM TZTUFN BOE VSHFE
that “bandit gangs are beyond any hope of rehabilitation and therefore should
CF IVOUFE EPXO UISPVHI JOWFTUJHBUJWF NFUIPET XJUI SFMFOUMFTT EFUFSNJOB-
UJPOwćFTFDPNNFOUTUZQJGZUIFBUUJUVEFPG014QFSTPOOFM XIPQSPNPUFEBO
BHHSFTTJWF%JSUZ)BSSZBQQSPBDIUPQPMJDJOHUIBUXBTEJTNJTTJWFPGMFHBMDPO-
USPMTBOEMFEUPUIFTQSFBEPGIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT20
ćSPVHIUIFFBSMZŴżźųT UIF014QSPWJEFEžźŻNJMMJPOJOQPMJDFBJEBOE
TFOUPWFSŷŸų$PMPNCJBOTUPUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ"EWJTFSTMFECZ
David Laughlin, a retired captain in the Indiana State Police, Theodore Brown,
XIPMBUFSEFGFOEFEUIF014CFGPSF$POHSFTT BOE+PIO/FFMFZ BGPSNFS'#*
BOE $*" BHFOU XIP IBE IFBEFE UIF QSPHSBN JO 1BOBNB  QSPWJEFE DBOJOF
USBJOJOHBOEFTUBCMJTIFEBDJWJMJBOSFHJTUSBUJPOBOEJEFOUJUZDBSEQSPHSBNćFZ
JNQPSUFEDPNQVUFSTUPTZTUFNBUJ[FUIFDPMMFDUJPOPGJOGPSNBUJPOPOHVFSSJMMBT 
DSFBUFEBDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTCSJHBEF XIPTFFOUJSFDPNNBOEXBTJNQMJDBUFEJO
ESVHDSJNFTJOŴżźŹ BOEBŴŴųNBOSFHJNFOUUPQSPUFDUPJMJOTUBMMBUJPOTWVMOFS-
able to sabotage, and provided training in industrial security.21
"NFSJDBO JOUFSWFOUJPO XBT NPUJWBUFE MBSHFMZ CZ HFPQPMJUJDBM BNCJUJPOT 
JEFPMPHZ BOEFDPOPNJDT"NFSJDBOQSJWBUFJOWFTUNFOUUPUBMFEPWFSžźųųNJM-
MJPO IBMGPGJUJOQFUSPMFVN BOE64FYQPSUTBDDPVOUFEGPSŷŸQFSDFOUPGUIF

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 213


DPVOUSZTJNQPSUT"ŴżŹŶQMBOOJOHEPDVNFOUQSPDMBJNFEUIBUJUTSJDIOBUVSBM
SFTPVSDFT  HFPHSBQIJD MPDBUJPO  BOE GFSUJMF MBOE NBEF $PMPNCJB iGBWPSBCMF
GPSSBQJEFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQNFOU‫*ڀڀ‬G<GPSFJHOBJEQSPHSBNT>TVDDFFE UIFO
<$PMPNCJB>XJMMTFSWFBTBOPVUTUBOEJOHFYBNQMFGPSPUIFSDPVOUSJFTBOEUIVT
EFNPOTUSBUFUIBUĕSNBTTPDJBUJPOXJUIUIF8FTUFSOXPSMEDBOPČFSBQBUIUP
rapidly increasing living standards.”22
"DDPSEJOHUPUIFJOWFTUJHBUJWFSFQPSUFS(FSBSE$PMCZ $PMPNCJBTFSWFEBT
B iQSF7JFUOBN FYQFSJNFOU JO <3PCFSU> .D/BNBSBT ATZTUFNT BQQSPBDI UP
JOUFHSBUJOH DPNNVOJDBUJPOT  SBQJE BJS NPCJMJUZ  DPODFOUSBUFE ĕSFQPXFS  BOE
DPNQVUFSBTTJTUFEJOUFMMJHFODFGPSĕOEJOHBOEUSBDLJOHBOFOFNZw23 The police
QSPHSBNTXFSFFTQFDJBMMZWBMVFEJOUIJTMBTUDPOUFYU3FQPSUTQSPVEMZEPDVNFOU
the role of the police in “neutralizing leftist and terrorist groups” as a result of
FYQBOEFEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOTBOEiFMJNJOBUJOHCBOEJUTwMPZBMUPUIF&-/BOE
FARC. In January 1966 Theodore Brown noted that the “National Police scored
XFMMPOOVNCFSPGCBOEJUTLJMMFE XPVOEFE BOEDBQUVSFE wBOENFOUJPOFEBO
incident in which police entered a bar and killed three guerrilla supporters as
XFMMBTBGFNBMFFNQMPZFF24
*O'FCSVBSZŴżŹŹ'BUIFS5PSSFTXBTLJMMFECZUIFQPMJDF TFWFSBMNPOUITBęFS
CFJOHĕSFEBTDIBQMBJOPGUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG#PHPUÈGPSQPMJUJDBMPVUTQPLFOOFTT
)F IBE QSPDMBJNFE ićF QFPQMF BSF EFTQFSBUF BOE SFBEZ UP TUBLFUIFJS MJWFT
JO PSEFS UIBU UIF OFYU HFOFSBUJPO NBZ OPU LOPX TMBWFSZ  JO PSEFS UIBU UIFJS
DIJMESFO ‫  ڀ ڀ‬NBZ CF FEVDBUFE  IPVTFE  GFE  DMPUIFE  BOE BCPWF BMM UIBU UIFZ
NBZIBWFEJHOJUZ*OPSEFSUIBUUIFZNBZCFJOEFQFOEFOUPG"NFSJDBOQPXFSw
"DDPSEJOHUPBO014SFQPSU 5PSSFTXBTTMBJOJOBKVOHMFĕSFĕHIUBMPOHXJUIB
GFNBMFHVFSSJMMB .POB.BSJFMMB BTIFXBTCBZPOFUJOHBGFMMFEQPMJDFNBOXIP
IBETUVNCMFEVQPOIJTCBOEXIJMFMPTU25
4ZNQBUIFUJDTPVSDFTDMBJNFEUIBU5PSSFTTCBOEXBTBNCVTIFEBOEUIBUIF
XBT BTTBTTJOBUFE XIJMF UFOEJOH UP B XPVOEFE DPNSBEF26 ćF FYBDU DJSDVN-
TUBODFTBSFEJďDVMUUPEFUFSNJOFCFDBVTFPGUIFQPMJUJDBMJNQMJDBUJPOTćF014
SFQPSUTBSFIJHIMZSFWFBMJOH OFWFSUIFMFTT PGUIFJOUJNBUFDPOOFDUJPOCFUXFFO
SVSBM TFDVSJUZ BEWJTFST BOE UIF /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF BOE UIFJS NPOJUPSJOH PG BOE
EJSFDU QBSUJDJQBUJPO JO DPVOUFSHVFSSJMMB PQFSBUJPOT 5PSSFT CFDBNF B NBSUZS
to the revolutionary cause, second only to Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the pan-
UIFPOPGMFęJTUIFSPFTPGUIFŴżŹųT)JTEFBUIJHOJUFEEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBDSPTTUIF
country, which the authorities worked to suppress. Days after his funeral, the
014FTUBCMJTIFEBUBTLGPSDFPOSJPUDPOUSPMBOETIJQQFEźųųTIJFMETBOEĕęZ
NFHBQIPOFTBTXFMMBTUIPVTBOETPGUFBSHBTHSFOBEFTBOEDBSCJOFTUISPVHIUIF
BSNZEFQPU27
*O 0DUPCFS ŴżŹŻ TUFQQFEVQ BDUJPO CZ QPMJDF JO SVSBM BSFBT EFBMU EBNBH-
JOHCMPXTUP'"3$ JODMVEJOHUIFEFBUIPGTFDPOEJODPNNBOE$JSP5SVKJMMP
$BTUBOPBOEBIJHIMFWFMDBESF $IPOFEF)VNP NFBOJOHi1VČPG4NPLFw 
By May 1970 a full-scale state of siege was in effect, enabling police to justify

214 The Cold War on the Periphery


UIFBCSPHBUJPOPGEVFQSPDFTTJOUIFOBNFPGiOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZw28 Public safety
SFQPSUT OPUFE JOUFOTJĕFE DMBTIFT CFUXFFO HVFSSJMMBT BOE QPMJDF  JODMVEJOH
NFNCFSTPGUIF&-/T$BNJMP5PSSFT'SPOUCBTFEJO4BOUBOEFS BTXFMMBTIJHI
SBUFT PG DJWJMJBO DBTVBMUJFT BOE EFBUIT UPUBMJOH PWFS POF IVOESFE QFS NPOUI
#PNCJOHT BOE LJEOBQQJOHT JO UIF DBQJUBM BMTP JODSFBTFE  BT EJE EFBUI TRVBE
activity and torture by state security forces.29
%VSJOHUIFNJEŴżŹųT #ZSPO&OHMFPWFSTBXUIFSFPSHBOJ[BUJPOPG$PMPN-
CJBT QPMJDF JOUFMMJHFODF PSHBOJ[BUJPO  UIF %FQBSUBNFOUP "ENJOJTUSBUJWP
EF 4FHVSJEBE %"4  "O BWJE IVOUFS BOE DPNQFUJUJWF SJĘF BOE QJTUPM UBSHFU
TIPPUFS XIPTF BUUFOUJPO UP EFUBJM FQJUPNJ[FE UIF QSPGFTTJPOBM FUIJD UIBU UIF
OPS sought to instill in its protégés, Engle had extensive experience working
XJUI JOUFMMJHFODF TFSWJDFT EBUJOH GSPN IJT UJNF JO +BQBO BOE XBT GBOBUJDBMMZ
DPNNJUUFEUPUIFEFTUSVDUJPOPGi.BSYJTUUFSSPSJTUwPSHBOJ[BUJPOTXPSMEXJEF
Believing that an effective police force should serve as the “eyes and ears of the
HPWFSONFOU wIFFOWJTJPOFEUIBUUIF%"4XPVMETQFBSIFBEUIFHPWFSONFOUT
DPVOUFSHVFSSJMMBXBS FOBCMJOHUIFQPMJDFUPGPDVTPODJWJMJBODSJNFT30
8JUIUIJTHPBMJONJOE UIF014QSPWJEFEIVOESFETPGUIPVTBOETPGEPM-
MBSTJOBSNTBOEDPNNVOJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOUBOEEFWJTFEJOEFYĕMFTZTUFNT 
UBVHIUXJSFUBQQJOHUFDIOJRVFT BOEEFWFMPQFEJOGPSNBOUTJOMBCPSBOETUVEFOU
circles. Leader grants were awarded to DAS chiefs to take courses at the FBI
BOE$*" JODMVEJOH(FOFSBM+PSHF0SEØ×F[7BMEFSSBNB XIPXBTMBUFSJOEJDUFE
PO FNCF[[MFNFOU BOE ESVH USBďDLJOH DIBSHFT31 Public safety reports noted
B HSBEVBM JNQSPWFNFOU JO FďDJFODZ BOE NPSBMF BU UIF %"4 XIPTF PďDFST
CFDBNF LOPXO GPS SPCCJOH DPDBJOF EFBMFST BOE SFTFMMJOH UIFJS TUBTIFT  BOE
IFSBMEFE JUT SPMF JO iĕOHFSJOHw '"3$ MFBEFST TVDI BT $POSBEP 4BMB[BS BMJBT
i;BSQB[Pw GPSUIFBSNZUPLJMM%VSJOHFMFDUJPOT UIF%"4XBTEFWPUFEUPJOUFS-
OBMTFDVSJUZJOWFTUJHBUJPOTJO#PHPUÈ XIFSFJUFČFDUJWFMZiOFVUSBMJ[FE<DPEFGPS
MPOHUJNFDPOĕOFNFOUPSFYFDVUJPO>BOVNCFSPGJOEJWJEVBMTBDUJWFJOUIFMFę-
ist and terrorist organizations.”32
"TJOPUIFS$PME8BSiUSPVCMFTQPUT w014TUBČJNQBSUFEOPWFMJOUFSSPHB-
UJPONFUIPETEFSJWFEGSPN$*"NJOEDPOUSPMFYQFSJNFOUT JODMVEJOHUIFVTF
PGTPEJVNQFOUPUIBMBOEUIFQPMZHSBQIUPiFMJDJUFWFSZTISFEPGJOGPSNBUJPOw
ćFZCSPVHIUJOUFMFQIPOFXJSFT FMFDUSPTIPDL BOEQPMZHSBQIFRVJQNFOUVTFE
JOUPSUVSFBOETFUVQQBEEFEJOUFSSPHBUJPOSPPNT XIJDIXFSFiQSPWJOHUIFJS
worth.” One public safety report noted that “in Bogotá and certain other cities
UISPVHIPVU$PMPNCJB UIFOFDFTTBSZJOUFSSPHBUJPOFRVJQNFOUJTCFJOHJOTUBMMFE
UPQSPWJEFGPSNPEFSOJOUFSSPHBUJPOQSPDFEVSFTw8IBUXBTNFBOUCZUIFUFSN
iNPEFSOwJTVODMFBS CVUJUMJLFMZJNQMJFTFMFDUSPOJDBQQBSBUVTBOETPQIJTUJDBUFE
NFUIPET PG QTZDIPMPHJDBM DPFSDJPO EFTJHOFE UP GBDJMJUBUF UIF FYUSBDUJPO PG
JOGPSNBUJPO33
ćF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT PO UIF XIPMF DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF NJMJUBSJ[BUJPO PG
$PMPNCJBOTPDJFUZBOEUIFTQSFBEPGWJDJPVTDZDMFTPGWJPMFODF-BCPS IVNBO

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 215


SJHIUT BOEQFBTBOUBDUJWJTUTXFSFBNPOHUIPTFSPVOEFEVQBOELJMMFEJOQPMJDF
sweeps. CIA reports acknowledged that the DAS and other security forces
USBJOFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTFNQMPZFEiEFBUITRVBEUBDUJDTwBOEIBEBiIJTUPSZ
of assassinating civilians in guerrilla areas,” cooperating with narcotics-related
QBSBNJMJUBSZ HSPVQT JO BUUBDLT BHBJOTU TVTQFDUFE HVFSSJMMB TZNQBUIJ[FST  BOE
LJMMJOH DBQUVSFE DPNCBUBOUT34 They nevertheless continued to receive lavish
GVOEJOH JOUP UIF UXFOUZĕSTU DFOUVSZ  IFMQJOH UP DPOTPMJEBUF UIF OFPMJCFSBM
order.

“A Counterinsurgency Running Wild”: The OPS and Dirty War


in Guatemala

"TJO$PMPNCJB "NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHJO(VBUFNBMBQMBZFEBLFZSPMFJO
DPOWFSUJOH UIF OBUJPOBM QPMJDF iGSPN B SBNTIBDLMF BTTPSUNFOU PG UIVHT w BT
UIFIJTUPSJBO,JSTUFO8FMEQVUTJU iJOUPBTUSFBNMJOFE QSPGFTTJPOBMDPVOUFS
JOTVSHFODZ BQQBSBUVTw 7BMVFE GPS JUT TUSBUFHJD MPDBUJPO BOE QSPYJNJUZ UP UIF
1BOBNB$BOBM (VBUFNBMBXBTIFSBMEFEBTBOPUIFSTIPXQJFDFGPSUIF"MMJBODF
BOEXBTUIFTJUFPGUIFMBSHFTU014QSPHSBNJO$FOUSBM"NFSJDB BUBCVEHFU
PWFSžŹNJMMJPO"NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTUSBJOFEŶŵ ųųųQPMJDF JODMVEJOHBUMFBTUŶźų
at the IPA, as part of the effort to roll back the 1944 revolution, which overthrew
the dictator Jorge Ubico. The revolutionary leaders were seen as dangerously
SBEJDBM QSFTTJOHMBOESFGPSNJOJUJBUJWFTUIBUUISFBUFOFEUIFQSPĕUTPGUIF6OJUFE
'SVJU $PNQBOZ ćF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT TJEFE XJUI UIF DPOTFSWBUJWF PMJHBSDIZ  UIF
DMFSHZ UIFNJMJUBSZ BOESBCJEMZBOUJDPNNVOJTUTUVEFOUTXIPTIBSFEJOUIFHPBM
PGTUBNQJOHPVUUIFQPMJUJDBMMFęBOESFTUPSJOHUIFPMETPDJBMPSEFS35
1PMJDFBJEXBTĕSTUJOJUJBUFEBęFSUIFŴżŸŷ$*"CBDLFEDPVQBHBJOTU1SFTJ-
EFOU+BDPCP«SCFO[ BTPDJBMEFNPDSBUXIPJOUSPEVDFEUIFNPTUQSPHSFTTJWF
MBCPSBOEMBOESFGPSNMBXTJO(VBUFNBMBTIJTUPSZ*OUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTDIBSBD-
UFSJ[FEIJNBTiCSJMMJBOUBOEDVMUVSFEwBOEIJTMBOESFGPSNQPMJDZBTiNPEFS-
BUF DPOTUSVDUJWFBOEEFNPDSBUJDJOJUTBJNTwćF%VMMFTCSPUIFSTOFWFSUIFMFTT
CSBOEFEIJNBDPNNVOJTUEFTQJUFUIFGBDUUIBUIJTUJFTUPUIF&BTUFSOCMPDXFSF
MJNJUFEUPBDDFQUJOHBSNTGSPN$[FDIPTMPWBLJBafter IJTSFHJNFDBNFVOEFSUIF
UISFBUPGBUUBDLćF$*"BEPQUFEBDBNQBJHOPGQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFUPDSFBUF
the illusion of widespread opposition and installed in power Carlos Castillo
"SNBT BSJHIUXJOHNJMJUBSZPďDFSXIPIBECFFOJOFYJMFJO)POEVSBT36
0ODF JO QPXFS  iUIF MJCFSBUPSw "SNBT BOOVMMFE UIF QSPHSFTTJWF MBCPS MFH-
islation, gave back expropriated land, and allowed plantation owners to cut
wages by 30 percent. He jailed Árbenz’s supporters, cleaned up the “red-led”
unions, in the words of TimeNBHB[JOF BOEBEPQUFETUSPOHBSNUBDUJDTUPDMPTF
EPXO OFXTQBQFST BOE TNBTI TUVEFOU EFNPOTUSBUJPOT 6Q UP OJOF UIPVTBOE
(VBUFNBMBOT XFSF EFUBJOFE BOE UPSUVSFE37 *O B TJHO PG DPOUJOVJUZ GSPN UIF
QBTU "SNBTBQQPJOUFE+PTÏ#FSOBCÏ-JOBSFTUPDPPSEJOBUFQPMJDJOHBDUJWJUJFT

216 The Cold War on the Periphery


and suppress pro- Árbenz activists. Under Ubico during the 1930s, Linares had
headed the dreaded secret police, which U.S. intelligence reports had praised
GPSiOJQQJOHJOUIFCVEwUIFDPNNVOJTUPVUCSFBLJOUIFDPVOUSZBUUIBUUJNF38
"ŴżŸŹ*$"SFQPSUCZ'SFE'JNCSFT DBQUBJOPGUIFWJDFBOEOBSDPUJDTTRVBET
JO-PT"OHFMFT OPUFEUIBUUIFPQFSBUJPOTPGUIF(VBUFNBMBOQPMJDF DPOUSPMMFE
CZ NJMJUBSZ NFO MPZBM UP "SNBT  XFSF iTJOHVMBSMZ EJSFDUFE UPXBSET BMFSUOFTT
BOEQSFQBSFEOFTTBHBJOTUUIFUISFBUPGDPNNVOJTNw‰BGPDVTCPSEFSJOHPOUIF
“obsessive and neurotic.”39&NCBTTZDBCMFTSFMBZFESFQPSUTUIBUUIFQPMJDFXFSF
iUSJHHFS IBQQZw XJUI UIFJS SJĘFT BOE TVCNBDIJOF HVOT BOE DPNNJUUFE NBOZ
iFYDFTTFT wJODMVEJOHJODJEFOUTJOXIJDIUIFZCFBUQSJTPOJONBUFTXJUISVCCFS
IPTFT QFSTFDVUFE+FXT BOEĕSFEPODSPXET$IJFGEFUFDUJWF3PTFSEP1FSF[XBT
a “butcher” notorious for torture, while the chief of special investigations, Jorge
$PSEPWB.PMJOB GPVOEFSPGUIF.BOP#MBODPEFBUITRVBE XBTEFTDSJCFEBT
B iDPNNPO UIVH BOE BTTBTTJOw40 ćF QPMJDF BT B XIPMF TVČFSFE GSPN iRVFT-
UJPOBCMF MFBEFSTIJQ BOEBENJOJTUSBUJPO w BOE XFSF VTJOH FRVJQNFOU UIBU XBT
“barely serviceable.” Upon paying a visit to one precinct, advisers were appalled
UPĕOEQPMJDFSFBEJOHDPNJDCPPLTBOEOFXTQBQFSTPSSFTUJOHXJUIUIFJSIFBET
on the table.41
0QFSBUJOHBUBCVEHFUPGžŹųų ųųų UIF*$"IBEBNBOEBUFUPSFTDVFQPMJDF
GSPNUIFJSiIPQFMFTTOFTTwCZSFJOJOHJOFHSFHJPVTBCVTFTXIJMFFOBCMJOHUIFN
UPDPOUSPMTVCWFSTJPONPSFTZTUFNBUJDBMMZ6OEFSUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN %BWJE
-BVHIMJO 3FY.PSSJT ćFP)BMM BOE%FTJEFSJP$SJTPTUPNP BQPMJDFBEWJTFSJO
-BPTXJUITJYZFBSTFYQFSJFODFJO(VBN PWFSTBXUIFSFOPWBUJPOPGQPMJDFQSF-
DJODUT EFWFMPQFEDSJNFMBCTBOEBĕMJOHBOEJEFOUJUZDBSETZTUFN BOEUBVHIU
UIF)FOSZĕOHFSQSJOUJOHNFUIPE"ęFSJOTQFDUJPOTCZ+BNFT7#FOOFUU EJSFD-
UPSPGUIF'FEFSBM#VSFBVPG1SJTPOT UIF*$"BUUFNQUFEUPJNQSPWFQSPDFEVSFT
JOUIFDFOUSBMQSJTPOCZUSBJOJOHHVBSET TFHSFHBUJOHXPNFOBOEKVWFOJMFT BOE
QSPNPUJOHSFIBCJMJUBUJPO"OJOWFTUJHBUJPOTCVSFBVXBTTFUVQVOEFSUIFHVJE-
BODFPG$*"BHFOU+PIO1PQQBUPDPNQJMFBCMBDLMJTUPGiTVCWFSTJWFTwUBSHFUFE
GPSBSSFTUPSBTTBTTJOBUJPOćFOBNFTXFSFDVMMFEGSPNUIFNFNCFSTIJQSPMMTPG
QSP«SCFO[QBSUJFT UFBDIFSTBOEQFBTBOUVOJPOT BOEUIF(VBUFNBMBO$PN-
NVOJTU1BSUZ 1(5 MFęCFIJOEBęFSUIFŴżŸŷDPVQ42
"MUIPVHI UIFZ XFSF IBQQZ UP BDDFQU FRVJQNFOU  (VBUFNBMBO PďDJBMT 
BDDPSEJOH UP JOUFSOBM SFQPSUT  SFTFOUFE 64 BEWJTFST iTIPXJOH UIFN XIBU UP
EPBOEXIFOUPEPJUwćFŴŵżųEQMBOOJOHHSPVQMBNFOUFEUIBUCVSFBVDSBUJD
EFMBZT XFSF DBVTJOH UIF (VBUFNBMBOT UP MPPL UP PUIFS DPVOUSJFT  JODMVEJOH
France, for police and intelligence training and technical guidance, which it was
GFBSFEDPVMEiMBZUIFHSPVOEXPSLGPSQFOFUSBUJPOPGUIF(VBUFNBMBOTFDVSJUZ
TFSWJDFTCZ<UIFTF>PUIFSDPVOUSJFTw43ćFTFDPNNFOUTHJWFBHPPEJOEJDBUJPO
PGUIFJNQFSJBMSJWBMSJFTESJWJOH"NFSJDBOQPMJDJFT MJUUMFEJČFSFOUGSPNUIPTFPG
UIFFSBPGUIFiHSFBUHBNF wBOESFWFBMIPXUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTXFSFEFTJHOFE
to enhance U.S. control over subject countries.

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 217


In 1955 the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which helped run
UIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN OBNFE"SNBTBOIPOPSBSZQPMJDFDIJFGGPSIJTiVOTFMĕTI
MBCPSGPSUIFHPPEPGEFNPDSBUJDMBXFOGPSDFNFOUJO(VBUFNBMBw5XPZFBST
MBUFSIFXBTBTTBTTJOBUFECZBNFNCFSPGIJTQBMBDFHVBSE XIPNUIFFNCBTTZ
DIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTBiDPNNVOJTUJOTQJSFEGBOBUJDwUPKVTUJGZBIFJHIUFOFEDSBDL-
down on dissent.44 +PIO 1 -POHBO  MBUFS B DPVOUFSUFSSPSJTN DPOTVMUBOU UP
UIF 3FBHBO BENJOJTUSBUJPO  DMBJNFE UIBU BT B SFTVMU PG 64 BTTJTUBODF  QPMJDF
TVQQSFTTJOHEFNPOTUSBUJPOTJO(VBUFNBMB$JUZiEJEBXPOEFSGVMKPC<JONPC
DPOUSPM> VTJOH UFBS HBT BOE ĕSF IPTFT BOE HBJOFE QSFTUJHF JO UIFJS FČPSUT UP
avoid violence. . . . They should not be held responsible for the death of six
protestors.”45ćFGBNJMJFTPGWJDUJNTMJLFMZGFMUPUIFSXJTF
*O ŴżŸŻ .JHVFM :EÓHPSBT 'VFOUFT  B GPSNFS NJOJTUFS JO UIF 6CJDP SFHJNF 
CFDBNF QSFTJEFOU ćF $*" DPNQBSFE IJN UP 4PVUI ,PSFBO QSFTJEFOU 4ZOH-
NBO3IFFJOIJTBVUIPSJUBSJBOJTN OPUJOHUIBUIFVTFEUIFQPMJDFGPSiQFSTPOBM
QPMJUJDBMBEWBOUBHFwćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOOFWFSUIFMFTTQSPWJEFEPWFS
žŵźNJMMJPOJO"MMJBODFGVOETCFDBVTFPGIJTiMPOHSFDPSEPGPQQPTJUJPOUPDPN-
NVOJTNw BOE CFDBVTF IF QSPWJEFE CBTFT GPS UIF #BZ PG 1JHT BOE .POHPPTF
attacks on Cuba.46*OUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTXBSOFEBCPVUUIFSFUVSOGSPNFYJMFPG
DPNNVOJTUiCJHMFBHVFSTw$BSMPT.BOVFM1FMMFDFSBOE7JDUPS.BOVFM(VUJÏS-
SF[ XIPJUXBTSVNPSFEXFSFQMBOOJOHPOBMMZJOHXJUI«SCFO[BOEGPSNFS1(5
associates such as José Manuel Fortuny and Che Guevara, a witness to the 1954
DPVQ UPPWFSUISPX:EÓHPSBT"DDPSEJOHUPUIFFNCBTTZ UIFiJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZ
TJUVBUJPOMFęMJUUMFSPPNGPSDPNQMBDFODZwBTiSFUSPHSBEFFDPOPNJDBOETPDJBM
conditions” were placing the “stability of the country in jeopardy.”47
*O UIF BUUFNQU UP TBWF :EÓHPSBTT SVMF  UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU FTUBCMJTIFE B
DPNNPEJUJFT QJQFMJOF BOE JOUFOTJĕFE USBJOJOH JO TVSWFJMMBODF BOE JOĕMUSB-
UJPOUBDUJDT JOBVHVSBUJOHBOJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZTFNJOBSBUUIF /BUJPOBM1PMJDF
"DBEFNZ )VOESFET XFSF TFOU UP UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT  JODMVEJOH UFO NFNCFST
PG UIF KVEJDJBM QPMJDF  XIP  JO UIF XPSET PG UIF BNCBTTBEPS  XFSF iFNQMPZFE
CZUIFQSFTJEFOUBOEPUIFSIJHIPďDJBMTJOUIFJOWFTUJHBUJPOBOEIBSBTTNFOU
PG QPMJUJDBM PQQPOFOUT BOE DBSSJFE PVU VOTBWPSZ BTTJHONFOUT ‫  ڀ ڀ‬ćJT CPEZ
JTGFBSFEBOEEFTQJTFECZWJSUVBMMZFWFSZPOFJO(VBUFNBMBFYDFQUUIPTFXIPN
they serve.”48
1BSUPGUIFSFBTPOGPSUIFCVJMEVQXBTUIBUUIFQPMJDFXFSFNPSFMPZBMUP
:EÓHPSBTUIBOUIFBSNZ XIJDIXBTHSJQQFECZBSFCFMMJPOMFECZMFęJTUDPMP-
OFM.BSD"OUPOJP:PO4PTB)FGPVOETBODUVBSZJO)POEVSBT XIFSFUIF014
XBT BENJOJTUFSJOH B žŴŶŶ ųųų QFS ZFBS QSPHSBN  BOE XBT BMMFHFEMZ UFBNJOH
VQ XJUI MJCFSBM EJTTJEFOUT UP DSFBUF B QPXFSGVM iQPQVMBS GSPOUw NPWFNFOU
"TTJTUBOU4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF&EXJO..BSUJOUFTUJĕFEJO'FCSVBSZŴżŹŶCFGPSF
UIF)PVTF'PSFJHO"ČBJST$PNNJUUFFUIBUUIF014XBTDSVDJBMUPQSFTFSWJOH
JOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZJO-BUJO"NFSJDB49"NPOUIMBUFS XJUI64CBDLJOH NJMJUBSZ
PďDFSTIFBEFECZ&OSJRVF1FSBMUB"[VSEJBPWFSUISFX:EÓHPSBT)FIBEDPNF

218 The Cold War on the Periphery


UPCFTFFOBTJOTVďDJFOUMZBOUJDPNNVOJTUBęFSJOWJUJOH+VBO+PTÏ"SÏWBMPCBDL
into the country to run for election. Arévalo was the author of The Shark and
the Sardines,BCPPLDSJUJDBMPG64QPMJDZJO-BUJO"NFSJDB*O"QSJMUIF014
FYQFEJUFEUIFTIJQNFOUPGPWFSUISFFUIPVTBOECBUPOTBOEIBOEHSFOBEFTUP
BTTJTUJOTVQQSFTTJOHSJPUFSTUISFBUFOJOHUPCSJOHEPXO1FSBMUBTOFXSFHJNF50
ćSPVHIUIFDVMUJWBUJPOPGJOGPSNBOUTBOEUIFUBQQJOHPGUFMFQIPOFTBOEDFO-
TPSTIJQ PG NBJM  UIPVTBOET PG EPTTJFST XFSF DPNQJMFE PO TVTQFDUFE SBEJDBMT
&WFO64DJUJ[FOTXFSFTQJFEPO4VTQJDJPOCFDBNFTVďDJFOUDBVTFGPSBSSFTU
PSFYJMF BOEDBTISFXBSETXFSFQSPWJEFEGPSUIFEFBUIPSBSSFTUPGiDPNNVOJTU
DSJNJOBMTw64"*% SFQPSUT SFGFSSFEUP1FSBMUB XIP IBE MPOHSVOOJOHUJFTUP
"NFSJDBOJOUFMMJHFODF BTBiEJDUBUPSwBOEUIFTFDSFUQPMJDFBTiMJUUMFCFUUFSUIBO
IPPEMVNT wUIFiMPXFTUESFHTJOTPDJFUZXIPNFWFOUIFBSNZIBESFKFDUFEw51
8IFOTUVEFOUTQMBOOFEEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBU4BO$BSMPT6OJWFSTJUZ BIPUCFEPG
MFęJTU BDUJWJTN  QPMJDF XFSF HJWFO JOTUSVDUJPOT  XJUI OP BQQBSFOU PCKFDUJPOT
GSPNUIF014 UPiTIPPUJGOFDFTTBSZwUIFSFXBTUPCFiOPNFSDZwGPSUIPTFXIP
tried to subvert the public order.52 %FNPDSBUJD QPMJDJOH TUBOEBSET XFSF UIVT
TVCPSEJOBUFEUPUIFCSPBEFS$PME8BSĕHIU
*O /PWFNCFS ŴżŹŸ  JO SFBDUJPO UP UIF HSPXUI PG UIF 3FCFM "SNFE 'PSDFT
'"3  BOE UIF /PWFNCFS ŴŶ 3FWPMVUJPOBSZ .PWFNFOU  BT XFMM BT B TFSJFT PG
CPNCJOHTXIJDI BDDPSEJOHUP014SFQPSUT XFSFQSFEPNJOBOUMZTFUCZTUBUF
TFDVSJUZGPSDFTCVUCMBNFEPOUIFHVFSSJMMBTJOPSEFSUPQSFTFSWFBiDMJNBUFPG
tension” needed to expand “counter-terror” operations, Longan was brought
CBDL GSPN ćBJMBOE UP TFU VQ B SBQJE SFTQPOTF TFDVSJUZ VOJU53 Within three
NPOUITJUDPOEVDUFEFJHIUZSBJETBOEUPSUVSFEBOEFYFDVUFEUIJSUZQSPNJOFOU
opposition leaders, including Victor Manuel Gutiérrez and Leonard Castillo
'MPSFT  MFBEFST PG (VBUFNBMBT MBCPS BOE QFBTBOU GFEFSBUJPOT EVSJOH «SCFO[T
QSFTJEFODZćFJSCPEJFTXFSFEVNQFEBUTFB-POHBOUPMEBOJOUFSWJFXFSJOUIF
ŴżŻųTUIBUXIJMFTVQQPSUJWFPGUIFDBNQBJHOUPSJEUIFDPVOUSZPGiUFSSPSJTUT wIF
IBEMJUUMFDPOUSPMPWFSUIFNFUIPETFNQMPZFECZQPMJDF XIJDIIFTBXBTDPVO-
UFSQSPEVDUJWF)FIBE IPXFWFS QSPWJEFEUIFLJMMFSTXJUIIJHIUFDIFRVJQNFOU
BTXFMMBTJEFPMPHJDBMKVTUJĕDBUJPOBOEMFHBMDPWFS TPIFXBTEFFQMZDPNQMJDJU54
0QFSBUJPO-JNQJF[BTFSWFEBTUIFPQFOJOHTBMWPJOBDBNQBJHOPGi8IJUF
5FSSPSwBTHPWFSONFOUSFQPSUTDIBSBDUFSJ[FEJU JOXIJDIUIPVTBOETPGSFHJNF
opponents, including labor and peasant organizers and intellectuals, were
SPVOEFEVQ UPSUVSFE BOEiEJTBQQFBSFEw&YFNQMJGZJOHUIFDMBTTEJNFOTJPOPG
UIFTUSVHHMF UIFPXOFSTBOEBENJOJTUSBUPSTPGMBSHFQMBOUBUJPOTXFSFDPNNJT-
TJPOFE BT NFNCFST PG UIF /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF55 "SNZ DPNNBOEP VOJUT BOE UIF
Fourth Corps of the National Police carried out village sweeps under Director-
(FOFSBM .BOVFM 'SBODJTDP 4PTB «WJMB  XIPN UIF $*" QSBJTFE GPS iGPSNJOH
DPVOUFSUFSSPSJTU TRVBETw XIJDI iPQFSBUF DMBOEFTUJOFMZ BHBJOTU MFęJTU JOTVS-
HFOUTw ćJT XBT DPEF GPS EFBUI TRVBE BDUJWJUZ DBSSJFE PVU CZ PČEVUZ QPMJDF
officers belonging to front organizations (such as the so-called New Anti-

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 219


$PNNVOJTU 0SHBOJ[BUJPO  XIJDI IBE UIFJS IFBERVBSUFST JO QPMJDF QSFDJODUT
BOEXFSFUBDJUMZTVQQPSUFECZUIFFNCBTTZ56
In 1967 and 1968 the OPS expanded aid to counterinsurgency operations
through contingency funds and funneled weapons in aboard United Fruit
$PNQBOZWFTTFMT0WFSBUIPVTBOE(SFFO#FSFUTQBSUJDJQBUFEJODPNCBU BOE
UXFOUZFJHIUXFSFLJMMFE"$*"TUVEZOPUFEUIBUiUIFEBJMZTQFDUFSPGNVUJMBUFE
CPEJFTIBEDSFBUFEBOBUNPTQIFSFPGUFSSPSUISPVHIPVUUIFDPVOUSZw"EWJTFS
Mark Seaton was shot at by guerrillas in retaliation for police abuses. A FAR
DPNNVOJRVÏSFGFSSFEUPUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFBTUIFiEFOPGSFBDUJPOXIFSFNPTU
PGUIFŹ ųųųWJDUJNTPGSFBDUJPOBSZWJPMFODFJO(VBUFNBMBIBWFCFFOUPSUVSFE
BOE NVSEFSFEw57 "MGSFE /BVSPDLJ PG UIF 014 TFU VQ B UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
center in the presidential palace, which was used to coordinate policing opera-
UJPOTBOETUPSFJOGPSNBUJPOEFSJWFEGSPNJOUFSSPHBUJPOćFQPMJDFDPNNBOE
TUSVDUVSF XBT NJMJUBSJ[FE  CFDPNJOH BO BEKVODU PG UIF BSNFE GPSDFT  XIJDI
GVODUJPOFE JOUFSOBMSFQPSUTDPODFEFE BTiBOBSNZPGPDDVQBUJPOw58
*O4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŻUIF'"3BTTBTTJOBUFE$PMPOFM+PIO8FCCFS IFBEPGUIF
64NJMJUBSZNJTTJPO JOSFUBMJBUJPOGPSUIFNVSEFSPG3PHFMJB$SV[ BUXFOUZ
TJYZFBSPMECFBVUZRVFFOXJUIMFęXJOHTZNQBUIJFT8FCCFSIBEEFGFOEFEUIF
(VBUFNBMBOBSNZTDVMUJWBUJPOPGIVOUFSLJMMFSTRVBESPOT UFMMJOHTime before
IJTEFBUIi<ćJTJT>UIFXBZUIFDPVOUSZJTćFDPNNVOJTUTBSFVTJOHFWFSZ-
UIJOHUIFZIBWF JODMVEJOHUFSSPS BOEJUNVTUCFNFUw*OŴżźŴ$PMPOFM$BSMPT
"SBOB0TPSJPEFDMBSFEBOPUIFSTUBUFPGTJFHF WPXJOHUPFMJNJOBUFUIFHVFSSJMMBT
FWFOJGJUNFBOUiUVSOJOHUIFDPVOUSZJOUPBDFNFUFSZw"NFSJDBOUSBJOFEGPSDFT
QSPDFFEFEUPLJMMIVOESFETPGiUFSSPSJTUTwBOEiCBOEJUT wNBJOMZJOUIFJOUFSJPS
PGUIFDPVOUSZ XIJMFDPOUJOVJOHSBJETPOQSJWBUFCVTJOFTTFT IPNFT TDIPPMT 
and even the public zoo.59
In a breach of congressional legislation, U.S. advisers participated directly in
iBOUJIJQQJFQBUSPMTwJO(VBUFNBMB$JUZ JOXIJDIBUMFBTUUIJSUZ1(5NFNCFST
were “disappeared.”603FQPSUTDMBJNFEUIBU"NFSJDBOBTTJTUBODFFOBCMFEQPMJDF
to “take the guerrillas by surprise,” which led to the “break-up of the FAR,
UIPVHI OPU BT ZFU FMJNJOBUJPO PG JUw ćF EJTTFNJOBUJPO PG CMBDL QSPQBHBOEB
BOESFDSVJUNFOUPGEFGFDUPSTUPQFOFUSBUFUIFPSHBOJ[BUJPOXBTFTQFDJBMMZFČFD-
UJWFćF/JYPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOJUJBUFEBDSBTIQMBOUPJOUFOTJGZQBUSPMTBOE
JNQSPWF QPMJDF DPNNVOJDBUJPOT 7JDF 1SFTJEFOU 4QJSP "HOFX HBWF B TQFDJBM
gift of police vehicles to Colonel Arana (the “Butcher of Zacapa”), including
Ford Broncos used to transport prisoners.61
"NFSJDBO PďDJBMT SBUJPOBMJ[FE BDUT PG TUBUF UFSSPSJTN PO UIF HSPVOET PG
UIF (VBUFNBMBOT BMMFHFE DVMUVSBM CBDLXBSEOFTT BOE JOOBUF QSPDMJWJUZ GPS
DSVFMUZ'PSNFSBNCBTTBEPSUP7FOF[VFMB$"MMBO4UFXBSUDMBJNFEUIBUQPMJDF
WJHJMBOUJTNXBTQBUUFSOFEBęFSi64'BS8FTUGSPOUJFSKVTUJDFJOUIFEBZTXIFO
DPVSUSPPNTXFSFGFXBOEGBSCFUXFFOw62 Longan, who, according to the histo-
rian Greg Grandin, displayed a “law and order, counter-subversive sensibility

220 The Cold War on the Periphery


TJNJMBSUPUIBUXIJDIGVFMFEUIFHSPXUIPGEPNFTUJDBOUJDPNNVOJTN wCMBNFE
UIFNVSEFSTPOi(VBUFNBMBTVOEFSMZJOHWFJOPGWJPMFODF‫*ڀڀ‬UTJOCSFEJO<UIF
QFPQMF>BOEUIFZIBUFQSFUUZEFFQMZw4IPXJOHBQPPSHSBTQPGIJTUPSZ IFMBUFS
UPMEBOJOUFSWJFXFSUIBUiVOEFS"SCFO[‰UIBUXBTUIFDPNNVOJTUSFHJNF‰UIFZ
DVUPČUIFIBOETPGUIJFWFT TPJUXBTUSBEJUJPOBM *HVFTTGSPNUIFUJNFPGUIF
4QBOJTIDPORVFTU GPSTPNFPGUIFTFDPVOUSJFTUPSFBDUMJLFUIBUUPDSJNJOBMTBOE
WJPMFODF‰PSPWFSSFBDU *ETBZw-POHBOBEEFEUIBUIJTKPCXBTUIBUPGiBUFDIOJ-
DJBOVQHSBEJOHUIFQPMJDFTDBQBCJMJUJFTBOEJNQMFNFOUJOHUIFQPMJDJFTPGPVS
HPWFSONFOUBUUIBUUJNF‫*ڀڀ‬GJUXBTUPVQHSBEFUIJTPSVQHSBEFUIBU *EJEOU
BTLXIZ*GZPVIBEBDPSSVQUHPWFSONFOUPSTPNFUIJOHMJLFUIBU BTMPOHBTUIFZ
were our crooks there wasn’t anything I could do about it.”63ćFTFDPNNFOUT
TIFEMJHIUPOUIFNFOUBMJUZPGQPMJDFBEWJTFSTUPXBSEUIFBCVTFPGIVNBOSJHIUT
$PHTJOUIFNBDIJOFPGFNQJSF UIFZXFSFGVMĕMMJOHXIBUUIFZTBXBTUIFJSQBUSJ-
otic duty by exporting their technical expertise and professional skills.
Deputy Chief of Mission Viron Vaky provided a lone voice of internal dis-
TFOU*OBNFNPUPIJHIFSVQT IFBSHVFEi<8F>IBWFDPOEPOFECSVUBMDPVO-
UFSUFSSPSPQFSBUJPOTUIBUMFEUPTJHOJĕDBOUBUSPDJUJFTBOEFODPVSBHFEBOEFWFO
CMFTTFEUIFN‫ڀڀ‬8FTVTQFDUFEUIBUBTMPOHBTDPNNVOJTUTBSFCFJOHLJMMFEJU
JTBMSJHIU‫"ڀڀ‬ęFSBMM IBTOUNBOCFFOBTBWBHFGSPNUIFCFHJOOJOHPGUJNF
TPMFUVTOPUCFUPPRVFBTZBCPVUUFSSPS*IBWFMJUFSBMMZIFBSEUIFTFBSHVNFOUT
GSPNQFPQMFw64ćPNBT.FMWJMMF BQSJFTUFYQFMMFEGPSTZNQBUIJ[JOHXJUIUIF
guerrillas and later indicted with Daniel Berrigan for burning draft cards in
QSPUFTUPGUIF7JFUOBN8BS FYDPSJBUFEUIFSPMFPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJOLFFQJOH
UIFDPVOUSZiUFSSPSJ[FEwBOEFNQPXFSJOHBOPMJHBSDIZJOXIJDIŵQFSDFOUPG
UIF(VBUFNBMBOQFPQMFDPOUSPMMFEŻųQFSDFOUPGUIFMBOEBOEXFBMUI65
ćFŴżźŸQIBTFPVUSFQPSUFYQSFTTFEQSJEFUIBUUIF014IBEIFMQFEJNQSPWF
VSCBOQBUSPMBOEUFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT DSFBUFEBEJTQBUDIDPOUSPMDFOUFS BOE
strengthened riot control capabilities, enabling the police to confront the insur-
gent threat. Another report concluded that the OPS had helped to “increase
QPMJDF DPNQFUFODF BOE TLJMM JO EFBMJOH XJUI UFSSPSJTUT CZ JNQSPWJOH NPCJM-
JUZ BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPOTw " 4FOBUF JOWFTUJHBUJWF UFBN GPVOE  IPXFWFS  UIBU
iUIF UFBDIJOH IBTOU CFFO BCTPSCFE BOE UIF 64 JT QPMJUJDBMMZ JEFOUJĕFE XJUI
QPMJDFUFSSPSJTNćF(VBUFNBMBOQPMJDFPQFSBUFXJUIPVUBOZFČFDUJWFKVEJDJBM
restraints.”66
)VNBOSJHIUTBDUJWJTU)PMMZ+#VSLIBMUFSXSPUFJOUIFNew York Times that
UIFHSFBUFTUDPOUSJCVUJPOPGUIF014XBTUPiJNQSPWFNJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDFJOUFM-
MJHFODF‫<ڀڀ‬8>JUIPVSIFMQ UIF(VBUFNBMBOTFDVSJUZGPSDFTCFDBNFBHJBOU
DPNQVUFSJ[FEEFBUITRVBEw67 The parallels with Operation Phoenix are strik-
JOH%VSJOHUIFŴżŷųT QFBTBOUBOEMBCPSPSHBOJ[BUJPOTJO(VBUFNBMBQMBZFEB
LFZSPMFJOVTIFSJOHJOUIFSFWPMVUJPOBOEDSFBUJOHBDMJNBUFDPOEVDJWFUPUIF
BEWFOUPGTPDJBMEFNPDSBDZ8JUIUIFEFDJNBUJPOPGUIFTFPSHBOJ[BUJPOT PXJOH
JOOPTNBMMNFBTVSFUPUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT (VBUFNBMBTGVUVSFXBTJSSFWPDBCMZ

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 221


BMUFSFE8IFOUIFGPSNBMTUSVDUVSFPGEFNPDSBDZSFFNFSHFEJOUIFŴżżųTBęFS
EFDBEFTPGTUBUFUFSSPS JUXBTBQBMFTIBEPXPGJUTGPSNFSTFMG68

“They See the Motions but Can’t Hear the Music”: Expanding the
Central American Graveyard

ćFWJPMFODFBOEDPSSVQUJPOBTTPDJBUFEXJUI"NFSJDBOUSBJOFEGPSDFTJO(VB-
UFNBMBĕUBXJEFSSFHJPOBMQBUUFSO*O.FYJDPBOE1BOBNB XIFSFQPMJDFXFSF
LOPXOGPSSFQSFTTJPO UIF014QSPWJEFEWPNJUJOHHBT ĘBNFUISPXFST IFMJDPQ-
UFST BOEBJSQMBOFT BOECVJMUVQUIFJOUFMMJHFODFTFSWJDFT IFBEFEJO1BOBNBCZ
ESVH USBďDLFS .BOVFM /PSJFHB XIP XBT NFOUPSFE CZ 014 BEWJTFS "EPMQI
Saenz).69*O/JDBSBHVB UIFQSPHSBNTXFSFJOJUJBUFEUPIFMQDSVTIUIFMFęJTU4BO-
EJOJTUB-JCFSBUJPO'SPOU '4-/ XIJDIESFXPOUIFBOUJJNQFSJBMJTUMFHBDZPG
Augusto César Sandino and the Cuban revolution.
ćF,FOOFEZBOE+PIOTPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOTLFQUNVDIPGUIFTVQQPSUTFDSFU 
training Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional officers clandestinely in El Salvador.70
ćF/JYPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOXBTNPSFPQFOJOBCFUUJOHUIFUZSBOOZPG1SFTJEFOU
"OBTUBTJP 4PNP[B  QFSIBQT JO SFUVSO GPS SFDFJWJOH žŴ NJMMJPO JO DBNQBJHO
DPOUSJCVUJPOT 'SPNŴżźŴUP Ŵżźŷ VOEFSUIFBNCBTTBEPSTIJQ PG 5VSOFS 4IFM-
UPO 64"*%QSPWJEFE4PNP[BTSFHJNFXJUIPWFSžŻŴ ųųųJOWFIJDMFT SBEJPT 
BOE DPNNVOJDBUJPOT BOE ĕOHFSQSJOU FRVJQNFOU UP JNQSPWF DPPSEJOBUJPO JO
tracking down “subversives.”71 Advisers John Manopoli and Gunther Wagner,
UIFMBUUFSBGPSNFS/B[JTPMEJFSBOE1IPFOJYQSPHSBNWFUFSBOXIPTUBZFEPO
afterwards in Nicaragua under private contract, helped rebuild the Guardia
GPMMPXJOHUIFEFWBTUBUJOHŴżźŵFBSUIRVBLF EVSJOHXIJDIUJNFUIFGPSDFEJTJOUF-
HSBUFEJOUPBDPMMFDUJPOPGNPCTJOUFOUPOMPPUJOHXIBUSFNBJOFEPGUIFDBQJUBM 
.BOBHVB6OUJMUIF4BOEJOJTUBTŴżźżSFWPMVUJPOBSZUSJVNQIPWFS4PNP[B UIF
(VBSEJB DPOUJOVFE UP DPNQJMF BO BUSPDJPVT IVNBO SJHIUT SFDPSE  SPVOEJOH
VQBOEUPSUVSJOH4BOEJOJTUBTZNQBUIJ[FST FYUPSUJOHNPOFZGSPNDBNQFTJOPT
GBSNFST BOETNBTIJOHTBGFIPVTFT4PNFPGUIFiEJTBQQFBSFEwXFSFESPQQFE
GSPNIFMJDPQUFSTJOUPMJWFWPMDBOPFT72
1PMJDFQSPHSBNTJO&M4BMWBEPSSFTFNCMFEUIPTFJO(VBUFNBMBJODPOUSJCVU-
JOHUPUIFHSPXUIPGBEFTUSVDUJWFDJWJMXBS*O/PWFNCFSŴżŸŹ VOEFS$PMPOFM
+PTÏ.BSJB-FNVT BSFQSFTFOUBUJWFPGUIFPMJHBSDIJDFMJUFXIPXPOżŶQFSDFOUPG
UIFWPUFJOĕYFEFMFDUJPOT UIF*$"JOJUJBUFEBQSPHSBNIFBEFECZ3PMBOE,FM-
ley, retired chief of police in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Characterized as “egotis-
UJDBM BMPPG BOEPCTUJOBUF w-FNVTXBTHJWFOBUJDLFSUBQFQBSBEFJO.BOIBUUBO
XIJMFIJTHPPOTRVBETUFSSPSJ[FEPQQPOFOUTBOESBJEFEUIFVOJWFSTJUZJO4BO
Salvador.73
ćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOFODPVSBHFE-FNVTTTVDDFTTPS $PMPOFM+VMJP
"EBMCFSUP 3JWFSB  UP JNQMFNFOU BOUJDPNNVOJTU MBXT NBOEBUJOH TXFFQJOH
BSSFTUTFWFOUIPVHIJUXBTBDLOPXMFEHFEUIBUiJOĘVFOUJBMDPOTFSWBUJWFTJOHPW-

222 The Cold War on the Periphery


FSONFOUDJSDMFTXFSFVOXJMMJOHUPEJTUJOHVJTICFUXFFONFNCFSTPGUIFTNBMM 
JMMFHBMDPNNVOJTUQBSUZBOEMFTTSBEJDBMMFęJTU SFGPSNJTU BOEPQQPTJUJPOFMF-
NFOUTw'JFMESFQPSUTFNQIBTJ[FEUIFOFFEGPSiBDDVSBDZJOJEFOUJGZJOHUBSHFUT w
XIJDISFRVJSFEVQHSBEFEJOUFMMJHFODFTPBTUPBWPJEQPQVMBSEJTDSFEJUJOHPGUIF
SFHJNF3FQPSUTBMTPQSFTTFEGPSQPMJDFJOWPMWFNFOUJODJWJDBDUJPOQSPHSBNT 
JODMVEJOHUIFQSPWJTJPOPGNFEJDBMTFSWJDFTUPIFMQXJOUIFXBSGPSiIFBSUTBOE
NJOETw74
"4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŸ014SFQPSUOPUFEUIBUUIFTQFFDIFTBUBVOJPONFFUJOH
JO4BO4BMWBEPSXFSFBOUJ"NFSJDBOBOEUIBUB64ĘBHXBTQVMMFEEPXOBOE
CVSOFE SFNBSLTTIPXJOHIPXUIF$*"VTFEUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTUPJOĕMUSBUF
BOE HBJO JOGPSNBUJPO PO DJWJD PSHBOJ[BUJPOT 1SPWJEJOH OFBSMZ žŵ NJMMJPO JO
assistance, the OPS constructed a national police school, provided weaponry
BOESJPUDPOUSPMUSBJOJOH BOECVJMUBDPNNVOJDBUJPOTDFOUFSJOQPMJDFIFBE-
RVBSUFST JO 4BO 4BMWBEPS XIJDI IPVTFE DPNQVUFSJ[FE EBUBCBOLT PG iTVC-
versives.”75 Advisers such as Theodore Brown helped to professionalize the
JNNJHSBUJPOTFSWJDFBOECVJMUVQQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUT UIF4BMWBEPSBO/BUJPOBM
4FDVSJUZ "HFODZ  BOE UIF /BUJPOBM %FNPDSBUJD 0SHBOJ[BUJPO  XIJDI FWPMWFE
JOUP EFBUI TRVBET " SFTVMU XBT UIF EFWFMPQNFOU PG UIF 'BSBCVOEP .BSUÓ
/BUJPOBM-JCFSBUJPO'SPOU '.-/ BOBNBMHBNBUJPOPGPQQPTJUJPOHSPVQTMFE
CZ$BZUBOP$BSQJP LOPXOBTUIF)P$IJ.JOIPG$FOUSBM"NFSJDB76
ćFŴżźŷQIBTFPVUSFQPSUDMBJNFEUIBUBTBSFTVMUPG"NFSJDBOUVUFMBHF UIF
QPMJDFIBEBEWBODFEGSPNBiOPOEFTDSJQUHSPVQPGQPPSMZUSBJOFENFOUPB
XFMMEJTDJQMJOFE BOE SFTQFDUFE VOJGPSNFE DPSQT XJUI HPPE SJPU DPOUSPM BOE
JOWFTUJHBUJWFDBQBCJMJUJFT HPPESFDPSET BOEGBJSDPNNVOJDBUJPOTBOENPCJM-
ity.”77"6/USVUIDPNNJTTJPO IPXFWFS GPVOEUIBUżųQFSDFOUPGIVNBOSJHIUT
DSJNFTJOUIFŴżŻųTXFSFDPNNJUUFECZTUBUFTFDVSJUZGPSDFT NBOZPGUIFNCFO-
FĕDJBSJFTPG014USBJOJOHPSHSBEVBUFTPG64NJMJUBSZBDBEFNJFTTVDIBTUIF
4DIPPMPGUIF"NFSJDBT3PCFSUP%"VCVJTTPO BO*1"HSBEVBUFXIPIFBEFEUIF
QSPUPGBTDJTU"3&/"QBSUZ XBTMJOLFEUPUIFŴżŻųNVSEFSPGGPVS"NFSJDBO
OVOTBOE"SDICJTIPQ»TDBS3PNFSP BMJCFSBUJPOUIFPMPHJBOXIPIBETQPLFO
out against societal injustice.78
"NFSJDBO PďDJBMT HFOFSBMMZ TVQQPSUFE B EPDUSJOF PG DPVOUFSUFSSPS XIJDI
IFME UIBU TJODF HVFSSJMMBT EJE OPU UZQJDBMMZ BCJEF CZ 8FTUFSO MFHBM OPSNT 
OFJUIFSTIPVMEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTPSJUTQSPYJFTJOEFBMJOHXJUIUIFN7JPMFOU
QTZDIPMPHJDBM XBSGBSF UFDIOJRVFT XFSF TFFO UP CF FČFDUJWF  GVSUIFSNPSF  JO
GPTUFSJOH TVCNJTTJPO UP HPWFSONFOUBM BVUIPSJUZ79 In practice, state terror
produced a popular counterreaction that could be curtailed only through
FWFO HSFBUFS MFWFMT PG GPSDF $PVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ UIFPSJTUT VOEFSFTUJNBUFE UIF
BQQFBM PG MFęXJOH HVFSSJMMB NPWFNFOUT  XIPTF TUSFOHUI XBT DPOUJOHFOU PO
EFFQSPPUFEHSJFWBODFTBOEMPOHTUBOEJOHTPDJBMJOFRVBMJUJFTBOESFQSFTTJPO 
OPUNBOJQVMBUJPOCZBOPVUTJEFQPXFS80 The iconoclastic journalist I. F. Stone
DPNNFOUFEBTUVUFMZ

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 223


*OSFBEJOHUIFNJMJUBSZMJUFSBUVSFPOHVFSSJMMBXBSGBSFOPXTPGBTIJPOBCMFBUUIF
1FOUBHPO POFGFFMTUIBUUIFTFXSJUFSTBSFMJLFNFOXBUDIJOHBEBODFGSPNPVUTJEF
UISPVHIIFBWZQMBUFHMBTTXJOEPXTćFZTFFUIFNPUJPOTCVUDBOUIFBSUIFNVTJD
ćFZQVUUIFNFDIBOJDBMHFTUVSFTEPXOPOQBQFSXJUIQFEBOUJDĕEFMJUZ#VUXIBU
SBSFMZDPNFTUISPVHIUPUIFNBSFUIFJOKVSFESBDJBMGFFMJOHT UIFNJTFSZ UIFSBO-
LMJOHTMJHIUT‫ڀڀ‬UIFEFTQFSBUJPO4PUIFZEPOPUSFBMMZVOEFSTUBOEXIBUMFBETNFO
UPBCBOEPOXJGF DIJMESFO IPNF DBSFFS GSJFOETUPUBLFUPUIFCVTIBOEMJWFHVOJO
IBOEMJLFBIVOUFEBOJNBMUPDIBMMFOHFPWFSXIFMNJOHNJMJUBSZPEETSBUIFSUIBO
BDRVJFTDFBOZMPOHFSJOIVNJMJBUJPO JOKVTUJDF PSQPWFSUZ81

ćF014BEWJTFSTOPEPVCUĕUUIJTQBSBEJHN4VCTDSJCJOHUPUIFTJNQMJĕFEJEF-
PMPHJFTPGUIF$PME8BS UIFZMBDLFEFNQBUIZGPSUIFQMJHIUPGPSEJOBSZQFPQMF
UIBU XBT CSFFEJOH B DMJNBUF PG SFCFMMJPO BOE GBJMFE UP VOEFSTUBOE UIF DBVTFT
VOEFSMZJOHUIFHSPXUIPGMFęJTUNPWFNFOUTćFZXFSFGVSUIFSEJTDPOOFDUFE
GSPNUIFIVNBODPOTFRVFODFTPGUIFJSXPSL

Costa Rica: An Exception to the Rule?


$PTUB3JDBXBTBOFYDFQUJPOJOUIBU"NFSJDBOBJEEJEOPUDPOUSJCVUFUPUIF
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QPMJUJDT BOE UIF MFBEFSTIJQ PG +PTÏ i%PO 1FQFw 'JHVFSFT  BO BOUJDPNNVOJTU
PG TPDJBMEFNPDSBUJD MFBOJOHT XIP NBJOUBJOFE B EFMJDBUF CBMBODF CFUXFFO
BDDPNNPEBUJPOBOESFTJTUBODFUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT"ęFSDPNJOHUPQPXFSJO
UIFMBUFŴżŷųT 'JHVFSFTPVUMBXFEUIF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ BCPMJTIFEUIFBSNFE
GPSDFT BOEJOTUJUVUFEMBOESFGPSN XFMGBSF BOEBSFMBUJWFMZQSPHSFTTJWFMBCPS
DPEFUIBUSFTVMUFEJOJNQSPWFEMJWJOHTUBOEBSETCVUXBTOPUTPSBEJDBMBTUP
UISFBUFO 64 CVTJOFTT JOUFSFTUT ćPVHI QSFTTJOH IJN UP DSBDL EPXO NPSF
TUSJOHFOUMZ PO DPNNVOJTN  "NFSJDBO PďDJBMT WJFXFE 'JHVFSFT GBWPSBCMZ
BOEEJEOPUBQQMZUIFTBNFTUFSFPUZQFTUIBUUIFZEJEJOPUIFS-BUJO"NFSJDBO
DPVOUSJFT JOQBSUCFDBVTFPG$PTUB3JDBTSBDJBMIPNPHFOFJUZ JODMVEJOHUIF
MBDLPGBO*OEJBOQPQVMBUJPO JUTQBSMJBNFOUBSZEFNPDSBDZ BOEUIFBCTFODF
PGWJPMFOUDMBTTDPOĘJDU82
ćF014JOBVHVSBUFEBUFDIOJDBMBJEQSPHSBNXJUIBCVEHFUPGžżż ųųųJO
ŴżŹŸBOEžŶŵź ųųųJOŴżŹŹ"DFOUSBMQVSQPTFXBTUPHBJOMFWFSBHFBNPOHTFDV-
SJUZGPSDFT BQBUIXBZUPXBSEHSFBUFSQPMJUJDBMDPOUSPMćFQPMJDFXFSFNPCJ-
MJ[FEUPDPOUBJOMBCPSVOSFTUPOCBOBOBQMBOUBUJPOT XIFSFNJOJNVNXBHFMBXT
XFSFOPUFOGPSDFE BOEUPTVQQSFTTVSCBOEFNPOTUSBUJPOT8PSLFSTBOETUV-
EFOUTDBSSJFENBTTJWF$IF(VFWBSBCBOOFSTQSPUFTUJOHSJTJOHDPTUTPGMJWJOHBOE
UIFTQSFBEPG"NFSJDBODPSQPSBUFJOĘVFODF83014TUBČMFECZ+BDL&MMJT GPSNFS
superintendent of the Kansas City police, trained border patrol units to keep
4BOEJOJTUBHVFSSJMMBTPVUPGUIFDPVOUSZ'4-/GPVOEFS$BSMPT'POTFDB"NBEPS
XBTBSSFTUFEGPSDSPTTJOHUIFCPSEFSJMMFHBMMZGSPN/JDBSBHVBBOEQPTTFTTJOH
XFBQPOTBOENBQT)FXBTEFUBJOFEBUUIF"MBKFVMBKBJM XIFSFIFTQFBSIFBEFE
BSJPUUIBUXBTTVQQSFTTFEXJUIUIFBJEPG"NFSJDBOJNQPSUFEUFBSHBT

224 The Cold War on the Periphery


1PMJDF TVCTFRVFOUMZ BSSFTUFE EP[FOT PG TUVEFOUT QSPUFTUJOH 'POTFDBT DPO-
ĕOFNFOU BOE GPJMFE BO BUUFNQU CZ BTTBJMBOUT UP MJCFSBUF UIF iUFSSPSJTU DPN-
NBOEFSwBTIFXBTDIBSBDUFSJ[FE JOXIJDIBQSJTPOHVBSEXBTLJMMFE"ęFSIF
IBEFTDBQFEGSPNBQSJTPOCBUISPPN 014SFQPSUTSFWFBM QPMJDFJOUFSDFQUFE
Fonseca’s escape car on the outskirts of San José and shot and wounded his
DPNSBEF )VNCFSUP0SUFHB.ST'POTFDB )BZEFF.BSJB XBTBMTPBSSFTUFE
GPSTVQQPSUJOHIFSIVTCBOE XIPXBTSFUVSOFEUPQSJTPOUPTFSWFPVUIJTUFSN
Fonseca was later killed by the Nicaraguan National Guard.84
Thus even in a relatively peaceful country the OPS contributed to the spread
PGQPMJUJDBMSFQSFTTJPOBOEJOFRVBMJUZćFEFHSFFPGQPMJDFWJPMFODFXBTNPEFS-
BUFECZUIFQPMJUJDBMMFBEFSTIJQJO$PTUB3JDB XIJDIXBTMBSHFMZTZNQBUIFUJDUP
UIF BOUJ4PNP[BO TUSVHHMF JO OFJHICPSJOH /JDBSBHVB BOE NBJOUBJOFE B SFMB-
UJWFMZFďDJFOUMFHBMTZTUFNPGDIFDLTBOECBMBODFTćFQPMJUJDBMDPOUFYUBOE
TDBMFJOXIJDI014PQFSBUJPOTXFSFBEPQUFEXBTVMUJNBUFMZUIFNPTUEFDJTJWF
GBDUPSJOEFUFSNJOJOHUIFJSPVUDPNF

State Terror in the Southern Cone: Toward Operation Condor

ćF014HBJOFEUIFHSFBUFTUOPUPSJFUZJOCPMTUFSJOHBOBTTPSUNFOUPGNJMJUBSZ
EJDUBUPSTIJQTJOUIF4PVUIFSO$POFPG-BUJO"NFSJDB QBSUJDVMBSMZ#SB[JM XIFSF
JUXBTMJOLFEUPUPSUVSFBOEEFBUITRVBET0SJHJOBUJOHJOUIFŴżŸųT UIFQSPHSBN
HSFX UP B CVEHFU PG PWFS žŴ NJMMJPO QFS ZFBS CZ ŴżŹŷ  XIFO UIF $*" CBDLFE
BDPVQBHBJOTUEFNPDSBUJDBMMZFMFDUFEQSFTJEFOU+PÍP(PVMBSU XIPQSPNPUFE
MBOESFEJTUSJCVUJPOBOEIJHIFSXBHFTBOEEFWFMPQFEBQMBOUPGPSDFNVMUJOB-
UJPOBMTUPJOWFTUBQPSUJPOPGUIFJSQSPĕUTCBDLJOUPUIF#SB[JMJBOFDPOPNZ85
4QFOEJOHPWFSžŻNJMMJPO UIF014QSPHSBNJO#SB[JMXBTIFBEFECZi+BDLw
Goin, a forensics expert with long experience in Southeast Asia; Frank Jessup,
BDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFTQFDJBMJTUXIPIBEUSBJOFEJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZGPSDFTPOĕWF
DPOUJOFOUTBOEćFPEPSF#SPXO XIPIBEIFMQFESVOUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBN
JO7JFUOBNćFUISFFFQJUPNJ[FUIFDPOUJOVJUZJO014QSPHSBNTBOEUIFXBZ
OPWFM UFDIOJRVFT XFSF CFJOH SFĕOFE JO POF QMBDF BOE UIFO SFEFQMPZFE FMTF-
XIFSF JO UIF XPSME 0UIFS BEWJTFST JODMVEFE :BMF HSBEVBUF /PSNBO 3PTOFS
BOE*OEJBOBTUBUFUSPPQFS"MCFSU#SZBOU CPUI7JFUOBNWFUFSBOT'SFE;VNXBMU
PGUIF1IPFOJY1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUBOE3PCFSU-#BSOFT B64#PSEFS1BUSPM
agent and police legal affairs officer during the occupation of Japan.86
Collectively they helped to set up Brazil’s intelligence service and oversaw
0QFSBUJPO #BOEFJSBOUFT  B NPEFM GPS UIF 1IPFOJY QSPHSBN JO JUT TUSBUFHZ PG
EJTNBOUMJOHUIFMFęJTUPQQPTJUJPOUISPVHITLJMMFEJOUFMMJHFODFXPSLBOETFMFD-
UJWFBTTBTTJOBUJPO4VQQPSUFECZUIF64FNCBTTZ #BOEFJSBOUFTXBTQBSUJBMMZ
GVOEFECZQSPNJOFOUCVTJOFTTNFO JODMVEJOH)FOOJOH#PJMFTPO QSFTJEFOUPG
6MUSBHBT XIPTBUJOPOTPNFPGUIFUPSUVSFTFTTJPOTBOEXBTMBUFSHVOOFEEPXO
CZHVFSSJMMBTćF014XPSLFEJOUJNBUFMZXJUIEFBUITRVBEPQFSBUJWFT JODMVE-

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 225


JOH "NBVSZ ,SVFM  XIP ĕSTU WJTJUFE 8BTIJOHUPO JO ŴżŸŻ  BOE 4FSHJP 'MFVSZ 
IFBEPGUIFTFDSFUQPMJDFJO4ÍP1BVMP BTBEJTUXIPUPSUVSFEWJDUJNTXIJMFIJHI
on drugs.87
64"*%DMBJNFEUIBU64USBJOJOHIBEBiDJWJMJ[JOHFČFDU wFTQFDJBMMZPOPď-
DFSTGSPNBO*OEJBOCBDLHSPVOE%FDMBTTJĕFESFQPSUTBDLOPXMFEHF IPXFWFS 
UIBUiQPMJDFSVMFENPSFUISPVHIGFBSUIBOSFTQFDUwBOEXFSFJNQMJDBUFEJOPČ
EVUZLJMMJOHTJOXIJDIUIFDPSQTFTPGWJDUJNTXFSFCVSJFEJOTBOEPSEVNQFE
at sea. Investigative scholarship has found that recruits were socialized into a
WJPMFOU NBTDVMJOF TVCDVMUVSF JO "NFSJDBOGVOEFE QPMJDF BDBEFNJFT  XIFSF
they endured ritualized hazing, accounting in part for the wide scope of bru-
UBMJUZćF#SB[JMJBOQPMJDFSFUBJOBSFQVUBUJPOFWFOUPEBZBTPOFPGUIFNPTU
WJPMFOUBOENJMJUBSJ[FEQPMJDFGPSDFTJOUIF8FTUFSO)FNJTQIFSF XIJDIJTUP
TPNFFYUFOUBMFHBDZPGUIF01488
.BOZPGUIFXPSTUBCVTFTUPPLQMBDFBęFSUIFEFDMBSBUJPOPGNBSUJBMMBXJO
ŴżŹŻCZ(FOFSBM"SUVSEB$PTUBF4JMWBBOEIJTTVDDFTTPS&NJMJP(BSSBTUB[V
.FEJDJ XIP/JYPOTBJEIFXJTIFEXFSFiSVOOJOHUIFXIPMFDPOUJOFOUw"NFSJ-
DBOUSBJOFEVOJUTĕSFEPOTUVEFOUEFNPOTUSBUPST TFJ[FEiTVCWFSTJWFMJUFSBUVSF w
JOĕMUSBUFETUVEFOUBOEMBCPSPSHBOJ[BUJPOT BOEIVOUFEEPXOMFęJTUT JODMVEJOH
GVUVSFQSFTJEFOUT-VJ[*OÈDJPi-VMBwEB4JMWBBOE%JMNB3PVTTFČBOESFWPMV-
tionary theorist Carlos Marighella, who was killed in a police trap. Deploying
UIFLJOEPGSIFUPSJDUIBUXBTVTFEUPKVTUJGZNBKPSIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFT UIF
014 QSBJTFE UIF QPMJDF GPS iDPOUSJCVUJOH UP UIF SFEVDUJPO PG UFSSPSJTNw BOE
“driving subversives underground.”89
ćF 014 XBT FTQFDJBMMZ JOĘVFOUJBM JO QSPWJEJOH SJPU DPOUSPM USBJOJOH BOE
DPOTUSVDUJOH UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT OFUXPSLT BOE DPNQVUFSJ[FE EBUBCBOLT
BJEFECZUIFEFMJWFSZPG*#.FRVJQNFOU*UUBVHIUQTZXBSNFUIPETEFTJHOFEUP
TQSFBEEJTJOGPSNBUJPOBOETPXEJTTFOTJPOXJUIJOUIFSBOLTPGUIFMFęJTUNPWF-
NFOUT BOE PWFSTBX UIF QFOBM TZTUFN  JO XIJDI DPOEJUJPOT XFSF VOTBOJUBSZ 
EVFQSPDFTTXBTMBDLJOH BOEUPSUVSF JODMVEJOHPGXPNFOBOEDIJMESFO XBT
SPVUJOF0OFPGUIFWJDUJNT 'MBWJP5BWBSFT'SFJUBT BKPVSOBMJTUBOE$ISJTUJBO
OBUJPOBMJTU  UFTUJĕFE UIBU XIFO IJT KBJMFST KBNNFE FMFDUSJD XJSFT JO IJT FBST 
teeth, and anus, he saw that the generator producing the shocks had on its side
UIFSFE XIJUF BOECMVFTIJFMEPG64"*% SFWFBMJOHUIFEFFQDPNQMJDJUZPGUIF
United States in the reign of violence being carried out.90
*O1FSV BęFSBŴżŹŵNJMJUBSZDPVQPWFSUISFXUIFFMFDUFEMFBEFSTIJQ "NFSJ-
can advisers Dave Laughlin, Clyde Phelps, Cornell graduate Ernest Lancina,
and Pennsylvania state trooper George Miller trained rural strike forces in
KVOHMF XBSGBSF BOE QSPWJEFE XBUFS DBOOPO USVDLT BOE UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
FRVJQNFOUUPQPMJDFćFQPMJDFJOUVSOBTTJTUFEUIFBSNZJODSVTIJOHBSFWP-
lutionary insurrection led by Trotskyite peasant organizer Hugo Blanco and
-VJTEFMB1VFOUF6DFEB BMFęJTUJOUFMMFDUVBMXIPQSPNPUFEMBOESFGPSNBOE
MJUFSBDZDBNQBJHOTPOCFIBMGPGUIFNBSHJOBMJ[FE2VFDIVBQPQVMBUJPO1PMJDF

226 The Cold War on the Periphery


BJE TQJLFE UP žźųų ųųų JO ŴżŹŸ BOE žŴŴ NJMMJPO JO ŴżŹŹ BT UIF 014 PWFSTBX
SPVOEVQDBNQBJHOTBOE#MBODPTDBQUVSFJO$IBVQJNBZP"TJO(VBUFNBMB 
QPMJDFCSVUBMJUZ JODMVEJOHUPSUVSFBOEUIFNBTTBDSFPG*OEJBOTPDDVQZJOHMBSHF
QMBOUBUJPOT  XBT NBHOJĕFE CZ UIF SBDJTN PG NFTUJ[P PďDFST XIP TJEFE XJUI
MBOEPXOFSTJOMBCPSEJTQVUFT8IJMFBGFXPGUIFBEWJTFSTXFSFTZNQBUIFUJDUP
the plight of the Indians, the OPS helped foster their subjugation.91
*O #PMJWJB  XIJDI 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOU QMBOOFST WJFXFE BT WVMOFSBCMF UP UIF
i$PNNVOJTU EJTFBTF CPUI 4UBMJOJTU BOE 5SPUTLZJUFw CFDBVTF PG IJHI QPWFSUZ
SBUFT UIF&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOJOUSPEVDFEQPMJDFBJEJOŴżŸŹBUBCVE-
HFUPGžŴźŸNJMMJPO UIFIJHIFTUBUUIFUJNFJO-BUJO"NFSJDBćFPQFSBUJPO
was run by Lee Echols, who had provided training to OSS operatives during
8PSME8BS**JOUIFVTFPGUJNFEFUPOBUPST FYQMPEJOHQFODJMT CSJFGDBTFTXJUI
GBMTFCPUUPNT BOETVCNBDIJOFHVOTXJUITJMFODFSTTLJMMTXIJDINBEFIJNB
WBMVBCMFBTTFUUPUIFŴŵżųEQSPHSBN#PMJWJBOJOUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTXBSOFEUIBU
iFYUSFNFMFęJTUTwNJHIUUBLFDPOUSPMPGUIFHPWFSONFOU XIJDI BęFSUIFŴżŸŵ
SFWPMVUJPO XBTJOUIFIBOETPGNPEFSBUFMFęJTUTXIP iEFTQJUFUIFJSTIPSUDPN-
ings,” were seen to offer the best hope for “stability and friendship.” A central
GPDVTPGŴŵżųEXBTJOFTQJPOBHFBOESJPUDPOUSPMUSBJOJOH EFTJHOFEUPRVFMM
BiNJOJSFWPMVUJPOwPGĕęFFOUIPVTBOEMBJEPČUJONJOFSTJO4BOUB$SV[XIP
XFSFVOEFSUIFiTXBZPGMFęJTUBHJUBUPSTwćF6OJUFE4UBUFTGVSUIFSBJNFEUP
FMJNJOBUFUIFiFYUSFNFMFęXJOHJOĘVFODFwJOUIFDJWJMNJMJUJB GPSNFEUPTVQ-
QPSUUIFŴżŸŵSFWPMVUJPO CZQSPWJEJOHJOEPDUSJOBUJPOJOUIFEBOHFSTPGDPN-
NVOJTN BOEUPCSJOHJUVOEFSHPWFSONFOUDPOUSPM92
ćF,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPONBJOUBJOFEBCVEHFUPGžŷųų ųųųQFSZFBSGPS
UIFQSPHSBNBOEQSPWJEFEUFBSHBTUPIFMQ1SFTJEFOU1B[&TUFOTTPSPBOEIJT
3FWPMVUJPOBSZ/BUJPOBMJTU.PWFNFOUDSVTIEFNPOTUSBUJPOTCZUJONJOFSTBOE
GBDUPSZXPSLFSTVOTBUJTĕFEXJUIUIFTMPXQBDFPGSFGPSN+BLF+BDLTPO BGPSNFS
*OEJBOBTUBUFUSPPQFSBOEEJSFDUPSPG.JBNJDJWJMEFGFOTFXIPBMTPTFSWFEJO
Brazil, was shot in the back by guerrillas and paralyzed while trying to establish
BQPMJDFQPTUJOBSFNPUFKVOHMFBSFBXIJMFBDDPNQBOJFECZUIFBNCBTTBEPS
'JWFMPDBMQPMJDFXFSFBMTPLJMMFEJOUIFBNCVTI93
"ęFSBŴżŹŷDPVQ XIJDISFTVMUFEJOQBSUGSPNUIFTUSFOHUIFOJOHPGUIFBSNZ
through the Alliance for Progress, OPS operations were expanded to counter
an insurgency led by Che Guevara. Jake Longan and Adolph Saenz were sent to
USBJOQPMJDFFRVJQQFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXJUINBDIJOFHVOT SBEJPT UFBSHBT 
BOETIJFMET'JFMESFQPSUTOPUFEUIBUUIFQPMJDFGVODUJPOFEBTBiQBSBNJMJUBSZ
force” acting to “suppress the population” and that “violence to control civil
EJTUVSCBODFTMFęNBOZEFBEw-POHBOBOE4BFO[TNFODBSSJFEPVUKPJOUPQFSB-
UJPOTXJUIBSNZSBOHFSTJOIVOUJOHEPXO$IF DVMNJOBUJOHJOIJTTDIPPMIPVTF
assassination in October 1967.94 In an illustration of the way the War on Drugs
XBTVTFEBTBDPWFSGPSDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFXPSL (VFWBSBTUSBJOJOHDBNQXBT
EJTDPWFSFECZQPMJDFDMBJNJOHUPCFMPPLJOHGPSBDPDBJOFQSPDFTTJOHQMBOU8BMU

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 227


83PTUPXWJFXFE$IFTEFBUIBTFNCPEZJOHUIFiTPVOEOFTTPGPVSQSFWFOUB-
UJWFNFEJDJOFBTTJTUBODFUPDPVOUSJFTGBDJOHJODJQJFOUJOTVSHFODJFTw95
In Bolivia, during the 1970s the OPS helped bolster the power of Hugo
#BO[FS BHSBEVBUFPGUIF4DIPPMPGUIF"NFSJDBT XIPJTDPOTJEFSFEUIFNPTU
SFQSFTTJWFMFBEFSJOIJTDPVOUSZTIJTUPSZ UIPVHIIFSFDFJWFEQSBJTFGSPN64
BEWJTFSTGPSiEFBMJOHĕSNMZXJUIMFęJTUSFWPMVUJPOBSJFTwćF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU
created a narcotics brigade, which developed a reputation for corruption and
DSVFMUZ*UTĕSTUDPNNBOEFSUPPLQBZPČTGSPNDPDBJOFUSBďDLFSTBOEUSJFEUP
PWFSUISPXUIFHPWFSONFOU96
*O6SVHVBZ UIF014DPOUSJCVUFEžŵNJMMJPOUPUIFHPWFSONFOUTiEJSUZXBSw
BHBJOTU UIF /BUJPOBM -JCFSBUJPO .PWFNFOU  PS 5VQBNBSPT  IFBEFE CZ GBSN
labor organizer Raúl Sendic, who, according to the New York Times OPSNBMMZ
BWPJEFECMPPETIFECVUXBTTFFLJOHUPDSFBUFFNCBSSBTTNFOUGPSUIFHPWFSO-
NFOUBOEHFOFSBMEJTPSEFS97*OB+VOFŴżŹźSFQPSU "NCBTTBEPS)FOSZ")PZU
MBNFOUFEUIFiSFMBYFEBUUJUVEFwPG6SVHVBZBOQPMJUJDJBOTUPXBSEDPNNVOJTUT 
UIF iBSN PG B XFMMPSHBOJ[FE JOUFSOBUJPOBM TVCWFSTJWF NPWFNFOUw UIBU JO IJT
WJFXTIPVMECFTZTUFNBUJDBMMZEJTNBOUMFE5PIFMQBDIJFWFUIJTUBTL UIF014
JNQPSUFETVSWFJMMBODFUFDIOPMPHJFTBOETVCNBDIJOFHVOTBOEDVMUJWBUFEiQFO-
FUSBUJPOBHFOUT wXIPJOĕMUSBUFEUIF5VQBNBSPTBOEQSPWJEFEEFUBJMFEJOGPSNB-
tion on their leaders, including the writer Eduardo Galeano and José Mujica,
who endured over a decade in prison but went on to be elected president of
Uruguay in 2009.98
1PMJDF SFQSFTTJPO FTDBMBUFE BęFS +PSHF 1BDIFDP "SFDP  XIP CFDBNF QSFTJ-
EFOUJOŴżŹź TVTQFOEFEDPOTUJUVUJPOBMSJHIUTJOSFTQPOTFUPBHSPXJOHOVNCFS
of kidnappings and bank robberies. The country that had been known as the
i4XJU[FSMBOEPG-BUJO"NFSJDBwDBNFUPDMBJNUIFIJHIFTUSBUJPPGQPMJUJDBMQSJT-
POFST QFS DBQJUB JO UIF XPSME "T JO 7JFUOBN  QSJTPO BENJOJTUSBUPST XPSLFE
XJUI CFIBWJPSBM QTZDIPMPHJTUT UP EFTJHO UPSUVSF UFDIOJRVFT UBJMPSFE UP FBDI
JOEJWJEVBMT QTZDIPMPHJDBM QSPĕMF‰B NFUIPE MBUFS VTFE BU UIF 64 NJMJUBSZ
QSJTPOJO(VBOUÈOBNP#BZ.BVSJDJP3PTFODPG XIPTBXTVOMJHIUGPSBUPUBMPG
eight hours over the eleven years he spent in prison, wrote, “We were beginning
to think we were dead, that our cells weren’t cells but rather graves, that the
PVUTJEFXPSMEEJEOUFYJTU UIBUUIFTVOXBTBNZUIw99
1VCMJD TBGFUZ SFQPSUT CPBTUFE UIBU "NFSJDBO USBJOJOH DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF
JOUFOTJĕDBUJPOiPGTUBLFPVUPQFSBUJPOTBOESBJETSFTVMUJOHJOUIFBSSFTUPGMBSHF
OVNCFSTPG5VQBNBSPUFSSPSJTUTw-FF&DIPMTBOE8JMMJBN$BOUSFMM XIPXBT
EFTDSJCFECZUIFKPVSOBMJTU"+-BOHHVUIBTiBOPSEFSMZ QJQFTNPLJOHNBO
EFWPUFEUPIJTGBNJMZwIFMQFEEFWFMPQUIFESFBEFE%FQBSUNFOUPG*OGPSNBUJPO
BOE*OUFMMJHFODF XIJDIQSPWJEFEBDPWFSGPSEFBUITRVBET BNPOHJUTWJDUJNT
was Fernando Pucurull, the “Uruguayan Che Guevara”) and supplied police
XJUIWPMUNFUFSTVTFEGPSUPSUVSF1IJMJQ"HFF B$*"MJBJTPOXJUIUIF.POUFWJ-
EFPQPMJDF SFTJHOFEGSPNUIFBHFODZBOEXSPUFIJTFYQPTÏInside the Company

228 The Cold War on the Periphery


BęFSIFBSJOHUIFTDSFBNTPGBUPSUVSFWJDUJNJOQPMJDFIFBERVBSUFSTXIFSFUIF
014NBJOUBJOFEJUTPďDFT)FIBEHJWFOUIFWJDUJNTOBNFUPQPMJDFGPSiQSF-
ventive detention.”100
*O"VHVTUŴżźų JOSFUBMJBUJPOGPSQPMJDFBCVTFT UIF5VQBNBSPTLJEOBQQFE
and killed Dan Mitrione, head of the OPS in Uruguay. Eulogized in the press as
BGBNJMZNBOBOEBWJDUJNPGDPNNVOJTUUFSSPS .JUSJPOFMFESJPUDPOUSPMVOJUT
JO#SB[JMBOEUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJDUIBUXFSFSFTQPOTJCMFGPSTFSJPVTIVNBO
rights violations. The director of the Uruguayan police stated that he snatched
beggars off the streets for Mitrione to use as subjects for teaching interrogation
NFUIPET.JUSJPOFCSVUBMJ[FEUIFNCFGPSFIJTTUVEFOUT UPSUVSJOHGPVSUPEFBUI
0OFPGUIFBUUFOEFFTDPNNFOUFEUIBUUIFTQFDJBMIPSSPSPGUIFDPVSTFXBTiJUT
BDBEFNJD BMNPTUDMJOJDBMBUNPTQIFSF.JUSJPOFTNPUUPXBTUIFSJHIUQBJOJO
UIFSJHIUQMBDFBUUIFSJHIUUJNFw101
"DDPSEJOH UP -BOHHVUI  XIP JOUFSWJFXFE NFNCFST PG IJT GBNJMZ  .JUSJ-
POF KPJOFE UIF 014 UP FTDBQF TNBMMUPXO *OEJBOB CVU BMTP CFDBVTF IF IBE
nine children to support and the salary was 10 percent higher than what he
SFDFJWFEBTBCFBUDPQćFTPOPG*UBMJBOJNNJHSBOUT .JUSJPOFXBTBNFEJPDSF
but disciplined student at his Catholic high school, where he starred on the
GPPUCBMMUFBN)JTXPSMEWJFXXBTTJNJMBSUPUIBUPGTPNBOZPGIJTHFOFSBUJPO 
XIPFNCSBDFEXIBU5PN&OHFMIBSEUIBTDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTUIFQPTUXBSWJDUPSZ
DVMUVSF‰BOBCJEJOHCFMJFGJOUIFFYDFQUJPOBMOBUVSFPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTBOE
JOJUTPWFSTFBTNJTTJPOUPFYQPSUMJCFSBMDBQJUBMJTNBDSPTTUIFTPDBMMFEćJSE
World.102 *U XBT UIJT CFMJFG  DPNCJOFE XJUI UIF DPOTFSWBUJTN BOE BOUJDPN-
NVOJTNJOTUJMMFECZIJTTNBMMUPXOVQCSJOHJOHBOEDVMUJWBUFEJOTUJUVUJPOBMMZ
XJUIJOUIF014 XIJDIBDDPVOUFEGPSUIFWJPMFOUNFUIPETUIBU.JUSJPOFBOEIJT
DPOUFNQPSBSJFTFNQMPZFE'PSUSVFCFMJFWFSTJOUIF$PME8BS UIFFOETKVTUJĕFE
UIFNFBOT
OPS operations in the Southern Cone paved the way for the rise of Opera-
tion Condor, a transnational intelligence operation based in Santiago, Chile,
UPFMJNJOBUFMFęJTUEJTTJEFOUT XIJDIMFEUPUIFLJEOBQQJOHBOEEFBUIPGUIPV-
sands.103 Beginning in 1955, the United States helped build the Chilean police
BOEJOUFMMJHFODFBQQBSBUVTVOEFSŴŵżųEćFDFOUSBMBJNXBTUPDPOTUSBJOUIF
HSPXUIPGTPDJBMJTUBOEDPNNVOJTUQBSUJFTBOEUPTVQQSFTTMBCPSVOSFTU XIJDI
XBTTQSFBEJOHBTBSFTVMUPGVODIFDLFEJOĘBUJPOBOEBVTUFSJUZNFBTVSFTJNQPTFE
CZUIFDPOTFSWBUJWFNJMJUBSZEJDUBUPS(FOFSBM$BSMPT*CÈ×F[EFM$BNQPBOEIJT
TVDDFTTPS+PSHF"MFTTBOESJ&RVJQQFEXJUIPCTPMFUF&VSPQFBOBSNTBOETVČFS-
JOHGSPNQPPSNPSBMF JOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZGPSDFTEJEOPUBQQFBSDBQBCMFPGQVUUJOH
EPXOBSFCFMMJPOCZBXPSLFSTNJMJUJBTFFLJOHUPJOTUBMMBSFHJNFPGiFYUSFNF
leftist tendencies.” Police were trained in riot control, contra-sabotage, and the
QSPUFDUJPOPGTUSBUFHJDJOEVTUSJBMJOTUBMMBUJPOT JODMVEJOH"NFSJDBOSVODPQQFS
SFĕOFSJFT ćF EJSFDUPSHFOFSBM PG UIF QBSBNJMJUBSZ $BSBCJOFSPT XBT TFOU GPS
JOTUSVDUJPOBUUIF'#*BOEUIFOFODPVSBHFEUPUSBWFMUPPUIFS-BUJO"NFSJDBO

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 229


countries to professionalize their internal security forces. In a sign of continuity
GSPNUIFQBTU .JMUPO.JMFT XIPUSBJOFE%BJ-JTTFDSFUQPMJDFJO$IJOBEVSJOH
UIFŴżŷųT PWFSTBXUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJOIJTDBQBDJUZBTBiOBWBMBUUBDIÏw0OF
NBOPOXIPNIFTUBSUFEBEPTTJFSXBTBiQSPNJTJOHZPVOHTPDJBMJTUQPMJUJDJBO w
Salvador Allende.104
After the 1962 election of Eduardo Frei, the OPS sent in Reginald Davis,
B $*" BHFOU XJUI FYQFSJFODF JO *OEPOFTJB BOE 7JFUOBN  BOE +PTFQI -JOHP 
director of public safety in Indiana who had served in a half-dozen countries,
including Brazil. Forces under their oversight used water hoses and tear gas in
TVQQSFTTJOHXPSLFSBOETUVEFOUEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBOEFNQPXFSFEUIFDFOUSJTU
$ISJTUJBO %FNPDSBUT  XIP  BDDPSEJOH UP POF SFQPSU  iIBE UIF QPMJDF JO UIFJS
CPTPNw105 ćF 014 QSPHSBN XBT SFTDJOEFE BęFS "MMFOEFT FMFDUJPO JO Ŵżźų
XJUI"MMFOEFEJTNJTTJOHIJHISBOLJOHQPMJDFPďDJBMTUSBJOFEBUUIF*1"BOE
EJTCBOEJOHUIFQBSBNJMJUBSZSJPUTRVBE UIPVHIUIF$*"DPOUJOVFEUPDVMUJWBUF
iBTTFUTwJOUIF$BSBCJOFSPTBTQBSUPGJUTEFTUBCJMJ[BUJPODBNQBJHO1PMJDFBJE
XBTSFWJWFEXIFO"VHVTUP1JOPDIFUUPPLQPXFSJOB4FQUFNCFSŴżźŶDPVQJO
XIJDI"MMFOEFXBTLJMMFE1JOPDIFUSFNPCJMJ[FEUIFQPMJDFUPEJTNBOUMFUIFMFę-
JTUPQQPTJUJPOJOBDBNQBJHOUIBUXBTFYUFOEFEUPOFJHICPSJOHDPVOUSJFTVOEFS
Operation Condor.106"TVCTUBOUJBMOVNCFSPGPďDFSTJNQMJDBUFEJOUPSUVSFBOE
NVSEFSXFSFUSBJOFECZUIF014ćF$*"QSPWJEFEDPNQVUFSTUP$IJMFT%JSFD-
UPSBUF PG *OUFMMJHFODF  B QJWPUBM JOTUSVNFOU PG TUBUF UFSSPS IFBEFE CZ .BOVFM
$POUSFSBT BDPOĕEBOUPG$*"EFQVUZEJSFDUPS7FSOPO8BMUFSTćFEJSFDUPSBUF
XBTNPEFMFEBęFSUIF$PMPNCJBO%FQBSUBNFOUP"ENJOJTUSBUJWPEF4FHVSJEBE
BOEUIF#VSØEF3FQSFTJØOEF"DUJWJEBEFT$PNNVOJTUBT UIFTFDSFUQPMJDFPG
Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista, established by the CIA in 1955.107
The United States played a key role in Condor by providing technical train-
ing to police and intelligence services in participant nations, including Argen-
tina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay, which cooperated in hunting down left-wing
EJTTJEFOUT ćF PQFSBUJPO CFOFĕUFE GSPN BEWBODFE UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
FRVJQNFOUBOEDPNQVUFSJ[FEEBUBCBOLTTVQQMJFECZUIF014*OBOJNQPSUBOU
QBSBMMFM  UIF 014 FODPVSBHFE DPPSEJOBUJPO BNPOH $FOUSBM "NFSJDBO QPMJDF
and intelligence agencies in targeting subversives beginning in the early 1960s.
"NFSJDBO EJQMPNBUT  $*" BHFOUT  BOE 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF )FOSZ ,JTTJOHFS BMM
NBJOUBJOFEDMPTFDPOUBDUXJUITFDVSJUZGPSDFTJNQMJDBUFEJOUFSSPSJTUPQFSBUJPOT
and tacitly condoned and helped cover up their actions.108.BOZWJDUJNTXFSF
GPSNFSHPWFSONFOUPďDJBMTBOEQSPQPOFOUTPGUIFQSPEFNPDSBDZMFę$PO-
EPSXBTFYQPTFEJOUIFMBUFŴżźųTBęFSBDBSCPNCLJMMFEGPSNFS$IJMFBOGPSFJHO
NJOJTUFS0SMBOEP-FUFMJFSJO8BTIJOHUPO %$ BNPOUIBęFSIFQVCMJTIFEB
EFWBTUBUJOHBDDPVOUPGUIFGSFFNBSLFUDBQJUBMJTNCFJOHJNQPTFEPO$IJMFCZ
UIF NJMJUBSZ KVOUB ćF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT BU UIJT QPJOU USJFE UP EJTBTTPDJBUF JUTFMG
GSPNUIFPQFSBUJPO XIJDIXBTGVOEFEBUMFBTUJOQBSUCZOBSDPUJDT109
-JLFUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBN $POEPSFQJUPNJ[FEUIFVTFPG"NFSJDBOQPMJDF

230 The Cold War on the Periphery


training to facilitate state repression under the rubric of internal security and
NPEFSOJ[BUJPO ćF QSPWJTJPO PG UFDIOJDBM FRVJQNFOU UP BJE JO UIF IVOU GPS
TVCWFSTJWFTMFEUPDPOTJEFSBCMFBCVTFTBDSPTT-BUJO"NFSJDB BTEJEUIFJODVMDB-
UJPOPGBOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZJEFPMPHZJOXIJDIESBDPOJBONFUIPETXFSFDPOTJE-
FSFEOFDFTTBSZUPTBWF+VEFP$ISJTUJBODJWJMJ[BUJPOGSPNJUTJOUFSOBMFOFNJFT
-VJHJ3&JOBVEJ B-BUJO"NFSJDBOFYQFSUXJUIUIF3"/%$PSQPSBUJPO DPN-
NFOUFEUIBUiBNBKPSHPBMPGNPTU‰JGOPUBMM‰"NFSJDBOTQPOTPSFEUSBJOJOHJT
UPDPOUSJCVUFUPBDUJWFMZBOUJDPNNVOJTUBOEPQFOMZQSP"NFSJDBOBUUJUVEFTw110
ćJTGPDVTXBTQFSIBQTNPTUEBNBHJOHGSPNBIVNBOSJHIUTWBOUBHFQPJOU BTJU
MFEUPUIFEFNPOJ[JOHPGTPDJBMNPWFNFOUT XIJDIXFSFTVCKFDUFEUPTZTUFNBUJD
DBNQBJHOTPGIBSBTTNFOUBOEUFSSPS
In Political Policing, Martha K. Huggins argues persuasively that the police
QSPHSBNT TUSFOHUIFOFE B IPTU PG CVSFBVDSBUJD BVUIPSJUBSJBO SFHJNFT  XIPTF
JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ BQQBSBUVT HBJOFE UIF DBQBDJUZ UP QFOFUSBUF NPSF EFFQMZ
UIBOFWFSCFGPSFJOUPDJWJMTPDJFUZBOEUIFSFCZTUJĘFDJUJ[FOQBSUJDJQBUJPOćF
ratcheting up of repression was rationalized by technocratic elites and their
"NFSJDBOCBDLFSTBTQBSUPGBOJEFPMPHZMJOLJOHOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZUPFDPOPNJD
EFWFMPQNFOU111 For all the lofty rhetoric, the Alliance for Progress played a key
SPMFJOTUJĘJOHEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQNFOUBOETVQQSFTTJOHTPDJBMSFGPSN-FęJTU
NPWFNFOUT UIFCBDLCPOFPGDJWJMTPDJFUZ XIJDIESFXTUSFOHUIGSPNPQQSFTTFE
sectors, were driven underground, resulting in vicious cycles of terror and
counterterror. The abuses spawned by the OPS were rational in that they
DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF FNQPXFSNFOU PG SFHJNFT UIBU TFSWFE "NFSJDBOJOUFSFTUT 
OPU MFBTU JO QSPWJEJOH B GBWPSBCMF JOWFTUNFOU DMJNBUF DPOUJOHFOU PO LFFQJOH
organized labor in check.112 But the legacy of surveillance, torture, and violence
XPVME JOUIFFOE CFEJďDVMUUPPWFSDPNF

State Terror in Latin America during the Cold War 231


Conclusion
The Violence Comes Full Circle—From the Cold War
to the War on Terror

*O IJT USJMPHZ PO UIF "NFSJDBO FNQJSF  $IBMNFST +PIOTPO EFNPOTUSBUFT
how the United States has historically projected its power through a variety
PG NFBOT  JODMVEJOH FDPOPNJD CMBDLNBJM BOE UIF NBOJQVMBUJPO PG ĕOBODJBM
JOTUJUVUJPOT DPWFSUPQFSBUJPOT QSPQBHBOEB BSNTTBMFT BOE NPTUJNQPSUBOU 
UIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGBOFUXPSLPGNJMJUBSZCBTFTXIPTFTDBMFEXBSGTUIBUPGBMM
QSFWJPVTFNQJSFT JODMVEJOH3PNF1ćJTCPPLIBTTPVHIUUPFYBNJOFBOPUIFS
JNQPSUBOUTUSVDUVSBMEJNFOTJPOPG64QPXFS OBNFMZ UIFUSBJOJOHPGQPMJDF
BOEQBSBNJMJUBSZVOJUTVOEFSUIFHVJTFPGIVNBOJUBSJBOBTTJTUBODF XIJDIQSF-
DFEFEBOEDPOUJOVFEUISPVHIUIFFSBPGHMPCBMNJMJUBSZCBTFTćFDFOUSBMBJN
PGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTXBTUPQSPNPUFUIFTPDJBMTUBCJMJUZEFFNFEOFDFTTBSZGPS
MJCFSBMDBQJUBMJTUEFWFMPQNFOUBOEUPTUSFOHUIFOUIFQPXFSPGMPDBMFMJUFTTFSW-
JOH"NFSJDBOHFPTUSBUFHJDJOUFSFTUT%SJWFOCZUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBFNQIBTJTPO
QSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPOBOENPEFSOJ[BUJPO UIFQSPHSBNTXFSFDSJUJDBMJOSFDSVJU-
ing local intelligence “assets” and in establishing sophisticated surveillance
BQQBSBUVTFTUPNPOJUPSBOEEFTUSPZTPDJBMNPWFNFOUTEFFNFEUISFBUFOJOHUP
UIF6OJUFE4UBUFT1PMJDFXFSFWBMVFENPSFUIBOUIFNJMJUBSZBTUIFiĕSTUMJOF
PGEFGFOTFwBHBJOTUTVCWFSTJPOBOEXFSFTFFOBTCFTUDBQBCMFPGJNQMFNFOUJOH
iDJWJDBDUJPOwQSPHSBNTEFTJHOFEUPiXJOIFBSUTBOENJOETwćFZXFSFUSBJOFE
JOSJPUDPOUSPMBOEDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZBOEFWFOUBVHIUCPNCNBLJOH
#FDBVTF PG UIF FNQIBTJT PO QPMJUJDBM QPMJDJOH BOE NJMJUBSJ[BUJPO BOE
"NFSJDBTQFODIBOUGPSTVQQPSUJOHSJHIUXJOHEJDUBUPSTPVUPGHFPQPMJUJDBMBOE
FDPOPNJDFYQFEJFODZ UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFHSPXUIPGSFQSFT-
sion and violence. They helped to perpetuate and even create particular types of
BVUIPSJUBSJBOSFHJNFTUIBUXFSFEFQFOEFOUPOGPSFJHOBJEGPSUIFJSTVSWJWBMBOE
EFWFMPQFE SFQSFTTJWF TVSWFJMMBODF BOE JOUFSOBM TFDVSJUZ BQQBSBUVTFT UP RVBTI
EJTTFOUćFQPMJUJDBMTDJFOUJTUćPNBT-PCFDPODMVEFEJOBŴżźźTUVEZUIBUUIF
BDIJFWFNFOUTPGUIF014XFSFiMJLFNBTTBHFQBSMPSUSBOTBDUJPOT‰TFFEZBOE
EFHSBEJOH‫ڀڀ‬GPSFCPEJOHJMMGPSDJWJMMJCFSUJFTBOEIVNBOSJHIUTw2 The OPS and
JUTQSFEFDFTTPSBHFODJFTXFSFFTQFDJBMMZJOĘVFOUJBMJOQSPWJEJOHNPEFSOXFBQ-
POT  CVJMEJOH BEWBODFE UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT OFUXPSLT UP BJE JO UIF USBDLJOH

232
of subversives, and providing ideological conditioning to state security forces
XIJDIFTUBCMJTIFEBSBUJPOBMFGPSNBKPSIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTćFFNQPXFS-
NFOUPGQBSBNJMJUBSZGPSDFTTLJMMFEJOUIFCMBDLBSUTPGQTZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSF
GVFMFE UIF HSPXUI PG EFBEMZ JOUFSOFDJOF DPOĘJDU BOE EFBUI TRVBE BDUJWJUZ 
XIJDIUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTTVQQPSUFEVOEFSQSPHSBNTMJLF1IPFOJYBOE0QFSB-
tion Bandeirantes.
.BOZPGUIFPSJHJOBUPSTPGUIF014SFDPHOJ[FEUIBUQPMJDFNPEFSOJ[BUJPO
DPVMEDPOUSJCVUFUPUIFXBSQJOHPGEFNPDSBUJDEFWFMPQNFOUJODPVOUSJFTMBDL-
JOHBOJOEFQFOEFOUMFHBMTZTUFNBOEBKVEJDJBSZDBQBCMFPGSFJHOJOHJOBCVTFT
3PHFS)JMTNBOXSPUFJOBTFDSFUSFQPSUUIBUJO"TJB iUIFEBOHFSPGDPVOUFS
HVFSSJMMBQPMJDFCFDPNJOHBAQPDLFUBSNZJTXFMMSFDPHOJ[FE0ODFBQPMJDFVOJU
BUUBJOTBTFQBSBUFJEFOUJUZ<GSPNUIFQPMJDFDIBJOPGDPNNBOE>BOEBENJOJTUSB-
UJWFBVUPOPNZ UIFQSPCMFNPGNJMJUBSJ[BUJPOBSJTFTw1PJOUJOHUPUIFHSPXUIPG
BSFQSFTTJWFJOUFSOBMTFDVSJUZBQQBSBUVTJO4PVUI7JFUOBNVOEFS%JFNBOEUIF
BEWFOUPGBDPVQEÏUBUJO)POEVSBTPXJOHUP64USBJOJOHPGUIFQBSBNJMJUBSZ
civil guard, General Maxwell Taylor cautioned that the OPS was creating rival
QPXFSDFOUFSTUPUIFBSNZ JOJNJDBMBUUJNFTUP"NFSJDBOJOUFSFTUT3 Hell-bent
PO TUPQQJOH DPNNVOJTN BOE BTTFSUJOH 64 IFHFNPOZ  UIF iCFTU BOE UIF
brightest” in Washington did not heed their own warnings, with profound con-
TFRVFODFT
ćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTFYFNQMJGZUIFEBSLTJEFPG"NFSJDBOFNQJSF"T"MGSFE
W. McCoy has noted, while previous colonial powers developed elaborate
GPSFJHO TFSWJDFT BOE DVMUJWBUFE 0SJFOUBMJTU JOUFMMFDUVBMT UP IFMQ UIFN CFUUFS
understand the cultures they were bent on subordinating, the United States
EVSJOHUIFMPOH"NFSJDBODFOUVSZQMBDFETQFDJBMFNQIBTJTPOFYQPSUJOHOFX
UFDIOPMPHJFTUPHBJOBOETZTUFNJ[FTUBUJTUJDBMJOGPSNBUJPOGPSQVSQPTFTPGTPDJBM
control, an inclination that grew out of corporate, bureaucratic culture and the
EPNFTUJDJOJUJBUJWFTPGUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SBBOEBDDPVOUFEJOMBSHFQBSUGPSUIF
JNQPSUBODFPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTćFWBTUTUBUJTUJDBMDIBSUTBOENBTTPGSBX
EBUB NVDIPGJUJOBDDVSBUF POUIF/-'IJFSBSDIZJO7JFUOBNBOEUIFOVNCFST
PGFOFNJFTSFQPSUFEMZDBQUVSFEBOELJMMFEVOEFS0QFSBUJPO1IPFOJYUPPLUIJT
JODMJOBUJPOUPBCTVSEMFWFMT UIPVHIJUIBENBOZQSFDFEFOUT4
ćF PCTFTTJPO BNPOH MFBEJOH JOUFMMFDUVBMT XJUI PSEFS BOE TUBCJMJUZ BT B
QSFDPOEJUJPOGPSEFWFMPQNFOUXBTBOPUIFSLFZGBDUPSVOEFSMZJOHUIFHSPXUI
PGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT3PPUFE BHBJO JO1SPHSFTTJWF&SBJEFPMPHJFT JUMFEUIF
6OJUFE 4UBUFT UP FNCSBDF EFTQPUJD MFBEFST XIP  JSPOJDBMMZ  QSPWPLFE UIF SJTF
of insurgency and thus the very instability that threatened the ability of their
DPVOUSJFTUPJOUFHSBUFJOUPUIFHMPCBMFDPOPNZ XIJDIUIFiOFXNBOEBSJOTwTBX
BTDSVDJBMUPUIFJSQSPHSFTT'SPNUIFDPORVFTUPGUIF1IJMJQQJOFTUISPVHIUIF
$PME8BSFSB UIPTFBUUIFXSPOHFOEPG64HVOTXFSFQSJNBSJMZTVQQPSUFSTPG
SBEJDBM OBUJPOBMJTU  TPDJBMJTU  BOE SFGPSNJTU NPWFNFOUT TFFLJOH CBEMZ OFFEFE
TPDJBMDIBOHF"DPOTJTUFOUHPBMPG"NFSJDBOGPSFJHOQPMJDZXBTUPHBJOBDDFTT

The Violence Comes Full Circle 233


UPTUSBUFHJDSFTPVSDFTBOENJMJUBSZCBTFTBOEUPFNQPXFSQSPYZSFHJNFTFBHFS
UPPQFOVQUIFJSFDPOPNJFTUPGPSFJHOJOWFTUNFOU UIVTFOTVSJOHDPMMBCPSBUJPO
with illiberal forces dedicated to keeping organized labor and the political left
JODIFDLćPTFXIPSFTJTUFE64JOUFSWFOUJPOXFSFUIPSPVHIMZEFIVNBOJ[FE 
and this paved the way for their violent repression.5
%FTQJUFJUTGPSDFGVMSFBDI "NFSJDBOQPXFSJTOPUPNOJQPUFOU$VMUVSBMBSSP-
HBODFBOEBOJOBCJMJUZUPVOEFSTUBOEUIFDPNQMFYJUJFTPGMPDBMQPMJUJDTIBNQFSFE
FČPSUTUPFYQBOE"NFSJDBOJOĘVFODFBOENBOJQVMBUFQPMJUJDBMEFWFMPQNFOUT
"MUIPVHIQPMJDZNBLFSTXFSFDPOWJODFEUIBUUIFBQQMJDBUJPOPGOFXUFDIOPMP-
HJFTDPVMEGBDJMJUBUFUIFDPOUSPMPGQPQVMBUJPOT JOOVNFSPVTJOUFSWFOUJPOTUIJT
QSPWFEUPCFBDIJNFSBćFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTPęFOFNQPXFSFETUSPOHBSNFE
leaders and corrupt police chiefs who used the weaponry to advance their own
BHFOEBTBOEUPXJQFPVUQFSTPOBMFOFNJFTćFZGVSUIFSTQBXOFEFOEMFTTDZDMFT
PGWJPMFODFBOEDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFEFMFHJUJNJ[JOHPG"NFSJDBODMJFOUSFHJNFT
BOE UIF TUSFOHUIFOJOH PG SFTJTUBODF NPWFNFOUT CFDBVTF PG UIF BCVTFT UIFZ
JOĘJDUFE*OUIJTSFTQFDU UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTFQJUPNJ[FUIFMJNJUTPG"NFSJDBO
social engineering efforts and power.6
"ęFS8PSME8BS** "NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTXFSFJNQMFNFOUFE
BMNPTU FYDMVTJWFMZ CZ QSPYZ  FYQPTJOH UIF HBQ CFUXFFO UIF SIFUPSJDBM BOUJ
JNQFSJBMJTN FNQMPZFE CZ HPWFSONFOU PďDJBMT BOE UIF SFBMJUZ PG "NFSJDBO
HMPCBM BNCJUJPOT ćF QPXFS PG UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT XBT BEWBODFE JO B NPSF
DMBOEFTUJOFCVUOPMFTTIFBWZIBOEFEGBTIJPOUIBOJOUIFQBTUBOEJODPNQBSJ-
TPOUPUIBUPGJUT&VSPQFBOQSFEFDFTTPSTćFTFDSFUGBSNJOHPVUPGQPMJDFBOE
security work was politically expedient and cost effective, and could allow for
QMBVTJCMFEFOJBCJMJUZJGWJPMFODFHPUPVUPGIBOE*OUIJTSFTQFDU UIFQSPHSBNT
FNCPEZXIBU/PBN$IPNTLZIBTDIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTUIFiEFNPDSBUJDEFĕDJUwJO
the United States, and what Johnson calls the dangerous growth of unchecked
executive power.7 The public was constantly deceived about the functions of
UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT XIJDIXFSFSBSFMZEJTDVTTFEJOUIFQSFTT BOEIBEMJUUMF
way of knowing that their tax dollars were contributing to police repression
BSPVOEUIFXPSME&WFO$POHSFTTXBTBUUJNFTLFQUJOUIFEBSL QBSUJDVMBSMZ
with regard to the clandestine cold war in Southeast Asia, which was funded
partially through the trade in narcotics.8
ćF014XBTBCPMJTIFEJOŴżźŷPXJOHUPQSFTTVSFGSPNQFBDFBOEIVNBO
SJHIUT BDUJWJTUT 4FOBUPS +BNFT "CPVSF[L  B 4PVUI %BLPUB %FNPDSBU  TQFBS-
IFBEFEQBTTBHFPGUIFCJMMDVUUJOHPČQPMJDFBJEBęFSSFDFJWJOHBWJTJUGSPNB
#SB[JMJBOEFMFHBUJPOEFUBJMJOHUIFSPMFPG"NFSJDBOBTTJTUBODFJODPOUSJCVUJOH
UP iEJTBQQFBSBODFTw BOE UPSUVSF PO B CSPBE TDBMF )F QSPDMBJNFE CFGPSF UIF
4FOBUFUIBUJOQSPWJEJOHNJMMJPOTPGEPMMBSTXPSUIPGGSBHNFOUBUJPOHSFOBEFT 
NBDIJOFHVOT SJPUCBUPOT SPDLFUNPSUBST BOEBOUJQFSTPOOFMNJOFTUPSFQSFT-
sive police forces, the United States had “helped consolidate the power of dicta-
UPSTwBOEFOBCMFEUIFNUPiTRVBTIUIFJSPQQPTJUJPO‫ڀڀ‬0OFXPVMECFIBSE

234 Conclusion
QSFTTFEUPĕOEUIF"NFSJDBOIVNBOJUBSJBOTQJSJUJOGVSOJTIJOHHSFOBEFTBOE
isolation cells.”9
"MUIPVHIQBSUJDJQBOUTTUBVODIMZEFGFOEFEJUTSFDPSEBOEDMBJNFEUIBUIPTU
DPVOUSZ MFBEFST CFHHFE UIFN UP TUBZ PO  UIF 014 BOE UIF XPSMEWJFX GSPN
which it derived were publicly repudiated. The legacy of the organization,
IPXFWFS  XPVME MJWF PO  FNCPEZJOH UIF SFTJMJFODF PG UIF "NFSJDBO DPNNJU-
NFOUUPFNQJSF(PWFSONFOUTIBECFDPNFEFQFOEFOUPOJNQPSUFEQPMJDJOH
UFDIOPMPHJFT XIJDIUIFZDPOUJOVFEUPFNQMPZFWFOBęFS64BEWJTPSZTVQQPSU
was cut. Many OPS staffers, including John P. Longan in Venezuela, stayed on
BTQSJWBUFDPOTVMUBOUT$PNNFSDJBMBSNTTBMFTUPUSBEJUJPOBM64DMJFOUTDPO-
UJOVFEVOBCBUFEJOTQJUFPG1SFTJEFOU$BSUFSTIVNBOSJHIUTSIFUPSJD#FUXFFO
ŴżźŹBOEŴżźż "NFSJDBOĕSNTBDRVJSFEFYQPSUMJDFOTFTGPSUIFTBMFUPćJSE
8PSME QPMJDF PG ŴŵŹ Źŵŵ QJTUPMT BOE SFWPMWFST  ŸŴ żųŹ SJĘFT BOE TVCNBDIJOF
HVOT ŹŴŸ ŹŴŵUFBSHBTHSFOBEFT Ż ŻźųDBOJTUFSTPGDIFNJDBM.BDF BOEŸŸŻNJM-
MJPOSPVOETPGTNBMMBNNVOJUJPO XIJDIXFSFPęFOVTFEUPTVQQSFTTEJTTFOU
BOETVQQPSUBVUIPSJUBSJBOSFHJNFTTVDIBTUIPTFJO$IJMFBOE4PVUI"GSJDB10
"TUIFTFĕHVSFTTVHHFTU UIF014TQBXOFEUIFHSPXUIPGBGPSNJEBCMFQPMJDF
JOEVTUSJBM DPNQMFY  XIJDI DPOUSJCVUFE UP UIF TQSFBE PG QPMJUJDBM SFQSFTTJPO
HMPCBMMZ"ŴżźųSFQPSUCPBTUFEUIBUUIF014IBECFFOJOTUSVNFOUBMJOiTUJNV-
MBUJOH64JOEVTUSZUPEFWFMPQOFXBOEJNQSPWFEQPMJDFFRVJQNFOUwTVDIBT
UFBSHBT NVOJUJPOTXJUIBOJOFZFBSTIFMGMJGF BQPMJDFCBUPOXJUIBNBSLJOH
EZFGFBUVSF BSJPUIFMNFUXJUIBCVJMUJOSBEJPSFDFJWFS MJHIUXFJHIUCPEZBSNPS
UIBUĘPBUT BOEDPNNVOJDBUJPOEFWJDFTPQFSBUJOHPOTPMBSDFMMTJOTUFBEPGCBU-
teries. George Orwell’s 1984OJHIUNBSFXBTDPNJOHUPQBTTBTOFXUFDIOPMPHJFT
BMMPXFEGPSFWFSHSFBUFSTPQIJTUJDBUJPOJOTPDJBMDPOUSPMUFDIOJRVFTBMMPWFSUIF
world.11
*O "VHVTU Ŵżźų UIF "TTPDJBUFE 1SFTT SFQPSUFE UIBU UIF /FX :PSL 1PMJDF
%FQBSUNFOUIBECFFOBCMFUPDBUDIKFXFMUIJFWFTCZVTJOHBOFMFDUSPOJDEFWJDF
EFWFMPQFEGPSOJHIUĕHIUJOHJO7JFUOBNXIJDINBHOJĕFTMJHIUNPSFUIBOPOF
IVOESFE UJNFT 3FNPUFDPOUSPMMFE BJSQMBOFT SFDFJWJOH TJHOBMT GSPN HSPVOE
sensors used in Operation Igloo-White in Laos were adopted for narcotics
JOUFSEJDUJPO BMPOH UIF .FYJDBO CPSEFS #ZSPO &OHMF  XIP CFDBNF B QSJWBUF
consultant to police organizations after the OPS disbanded, as well as director
PGUIF/BUJPOBM3JĘF"TTPDJBUJPO UFTUJĕFECFGPSFUIF,FSOFS$PNNJTTJPOPO
civilian disorder in the 1960s: “In working with the police in various countries
XFIBWFBDRVJSFEBHSFBUEFBMPGFYQFSJFODFJOEFBMJOHXJUIWJPMFODFSBOHJOH
GSPNEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBOESJPUTUPHVFSSJMMBXBSGBSF.VDIPGUIJTFYQFSJFODF
NBZCFVTFGVMJOUIF64w12
ćVTUIFOBUJPOBMTFDVSJUZFTUBCMJTINFOUTPVHIUUPSFJNQPSUUIFOPWFMQPMJDF
UFDIOJRVFTQSPNPUFECZUIF014CBDLJOUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUPDPOUBJOTPDJ-
FUBM VOSFTU "NFSJDBO QPMJDF DPOTFRVFOUMZ CFDBNF NPSF NJMJUBSJ[FE  BT XJUI
UIF DSFBUJPO PG 48"5 UFBNT  BOE NPSF TPQIJTUJDBUFE JO VTJOH DPNQVUFSJ[FE

The Violence Comes Full Circle 235


EBUBCBOLT UFBSHBT BOEXJSFUBQT1SJTPOFOWJSPONFOUTCFDBNFIBSTIFS BOE
UIFCMBDLSBEJDBMNPWFNFOUBOEUIFTUVEFOUMFęXFSFFČFDUJWFMZQBDJĕFEBTUIF
FNQJSFTUFDIOJRVFTXFSFUVSOFEBHBJOTUJUTPXODJUJ[FOT13
.BOZ ŴŵżųE BOE 014 WFUFSBOT XFSF BQQPJOUFE UP IFBE MBX FOGPSDFNFOU
PSHBOJ[BUJPOT XIFSFUIFZDPOUJOVFEUPBEWBODFNFUIPETIPOFEPOUIFQFSJQI-
eries of the Cold War. While dodging protesters outside his office at MSU
XIJDI NVTU IBWF CFFO B TUSBOHF FYQFSJFODF GPS B GPSNFS GPPUCBMM TUBS  "SU
#SBOETUBUUFSBEWJTFEUIF%FUSPJU1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUPOSJPUDPOUSPMGPSNBUJPO
during the 1967 ghetto uprising, in which rioters were treated as “insurgents”;
IFMBUFSCFDBNFEJSFDUPSPGUIF'FEFSBM-BX&OGPSDFNFOU$FOUFSJO'PSU(MZOO 
Georgia. In 1980 Adolph Saenz, who had helped track Che Guevara in Bolivia
and was Dan Mitrione’s predecessor in Uruguay, was appointed director of cor-
SFDUJPOTJOIJTIPNFTUBUFPG/FX.FYJDP XIFSFUIFQSJTPOTXFSFDIBSBDUFSJ[FE
CZB%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDFSFQPSUBTBNPOHUIFIBSTIFTUBOENPTUQVOJUJWFJO
UIF OBUJPO 5XP EBZT JOUP IJT UFOVSF IF IFMQFE TVQQSFTT BO JONBUF UBLFPWFS
JO 4BOUB 'F BOE LFQU B WFJM PG TFDSFDZ PWFS UIF QFOJUFOUJBSZ JO JUT BęFSNBUI 
branding critical journalists “Marxists.” He was soon forced to resign when the
conditions underlying the riot, including kitchens full of rat droppings and a
culture of violence in which gang rape was routine, did not change.14
*O"VHVTUŴżŹż BęFS1FPQMFT1BSLEFNPOTUSBUPSTJO#FSLFMFZXFSFTVCKFDUFE
UPCFBUJOHTBOEUPSUVSF UIFTIFSJČPG"MBNFEB$PVOUZEFGFOEFEUIFCSVUBMJUZ
JOBUFMMJOHTUBUFNFOUi8FIBWFBCVODIPGZPVOHEFQVUJFTCBDLGSPN7JFUOBN
who tend to treat prisoners like Vietcong.”154VDISFNBSLTSFWFBMUIFEJSFDUMJOL
CFUXFFOSFQSFTTJPOPWFSTFBTBOEBUIPNF*Oŵųųż $IJDBHPQPMJDFPďDFS+PO
Burge was accused of hundreds of acts of torture, including the use of electro-
TIPDL BOE DBUUMF QSPET  QMBDJOH CBHT PWFS TVTQFDUT IFBET  BOETUBHJOH NPDL
FYFDVUJPOTUPFYUPSUDPOGFTTJPOT UBDUJDTIFMFBSOFEBTBNJMJUBSZQPMJDFPďDFSJO
7JFUOBNBOEUISPVHIUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBN16
"CPMJTIJOHUIF014EJEOPUNFBOUIFFOEPGUIFHMPCBMQPMJDFQSPHSBNT"T
USBEJUJPOBMFMJUFTBOEOFPDPOTFSWBUJWFTNPCJMJ[FEUPSFTUPSF"NFSJDBOQPXFS
JOUIFXBLFPG7JFUOBN UIF'PSE $BSUFS BOE3FBHBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOTTVCDPO-
USBDUFEQPMJDFUSBJOJOHBOEPUIFSTFDVSJUZBTTJTUBODFUPQSJWBUFĕSNTTVDIBTUIF
Vinnell Corporation, which secretly worked with the Saudi National Guard.17
ćFZ BMTP GBSNFE PVU UIFTF UBTLT UP GPSFJHO JOUFMMJHFODF TFSWJDFT TVDI BT UIF
*TSBFMJ.PTTBE XIJDIQSPWJEFEXFBQPOTBOEUSBJOJOHUPUIFNJMJUBSZBOEQPMJDF
PGBOVNCFSPGSFQSFTTJWFSFHJNFT JODMVEJOHBQBSUIFJE4PVUI"GSJDB UIF$POHP
VOEFS.PCVUV BOE*SBOVOEFSUIF4IBI*O(VBUFNBMB BęFS1SFTJEFOU$BSUFS
DVUBJEPOIVNBOSJHIUTHSPVOET *TSBFMJBEWJTFSTXPSLFEXJUIUIFGFBSFE(ŵ
JOUFMMJHFODF BOE TPME QPMJDF FRVJQNFOU  JODMVEJOH FMFDUSPOJD UFDIOPMPHZ BOE
DPNQVUFSTVTFEJOBWJDJPVTDBNQBJHOBHBJOTUUIFMFęJTU(VFSSJMMB"SNZPGUIF
Poor and the Mayan Indian population.18
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 included a stipulation allowing for the

236 Conclusion
continuation of police aid for counter-narcotics purposes. Many OPS and
CIA agents, including Lucien Conein, Edward Lansdale’s top assistant (or
DPOTJHMJFSF  BT TPNF IJTUPSJBOT DIBSBDUFSJ[F IJN CFDBVTF PG UIF NBĕBTUZMF
UBDUJDT IF FNQMPZFE  GPVOE KPCT XJUI UIF 4UBUF %FQBSUNFOUT *OUFSOBUJPOBM
/BSDPUJDT.BUUFST%JWJTJPOBOEUIF%SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO %&" 
XIJDIQSPWJEFEUSBJOJOHBOEFRVJQNFOUUPQPMJDFBMPOHUIF014NPEFM19 In
Argentina, between 1973 and 1974 President Richard M. Nixon increased the
DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDT CVEHFU GSPN žŶ ųųų UP žŶŷź ųųų‰UIF TBNF BNPVOU  OPU
DPJODJEFOUBMMZ UIBU$POHSFTTDVUGSPNQPMJDFQSPHSBNTCFDBVTFPGUIFJSTVQQPSU
GPSNFUIPETPGiTFMFDUJWFUPSUVSFwBOEiBTTBTTJOBUJPOw4PDJBM8FMGBSF.JOJTUFS
+PTÏ -ØQF[ 3FHB XIP XBTMBUFSDIBSHFEXJUIGVOEJOHEFBUI TRVBET UISPVHI
DPDBJOFUSBďDLJOH QSPDMBJNFEPOUFMFWJTJPOUIBUESVHXBSBJEXPVMEiCFVTFE
JOUIFBOUJHVFSSJMMBDBNQBJHOBTXFMMw20 Stan Goff, a Special Forces officer in
$PMPNCJBXIPIFBEFEBDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTUFBN SFNBSLFEUIBUUIFUSBJOJOHIF
DPOEVDUFEXBTBOZUIJOHCVUDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTi*UXBT‫ڀڀ‬VQEBUFE7JFUOBN
style counter-insurgency, but we were advised to refer to it as counter-narcotics
should anyone ask.”21
#FHJOOJOHJOŴżŻŶ UIF3FBHBOBENJOJTUSBUJPOVSHFE$POHSFTTUPGPSNBMMZ
SFJOTUJUVUF 014TUZMF USBJOJOH &MMJPU "CSBNT  BTTJTUBOU TFDSFUBSZ PG TUBUF GPS
IVNBOSJHIUTBOEIVNBOJUBSJBOBČBJST BSHVFEićFSFBSFTUJMMBMBSHFOVNCFS
PGQPMJDFGPSDFTJOUIFXPSMEXIFSFUIFZTJNQMZEPOUVOEFSTUBOEUIBUUIFZDBO
FČFDUJWFMZEPUIFJSXPSLXJUIPVUJOEJTDSJNJOBUFWJPMFODFBOECSVUBMJUZ1FSIBQT
JGUIFZMFBSOFEBMJUUMFCJUNPSFBCPVUNPEFSOQSPGFTTJPOBMQPMJDFUBDUJDT UIFZ
XPVME CF NPSF FČFDUJWF BOE NPSF DPNQBTTJPOBUFw22 $POHSFTT TVCTFRVFOUMZ
FOBDUFEXBJWFSTBMMPXJOHGPSUIFUSBJOJOHPGGPSFJHOQPMJDFJODPVOUFSUFSSPSJTN
CZUIF'#*BOE$*" TQFDJĕDBMMZJO$FOUSBM"NFSJDB XIFSFJUDPOUSJCVUFEUP
DPOTJEFSBCMFSFQSFTTJPO*O&M4BMWBEPS UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU '#* BOE64"*%
DSFBUFE B GPSFOTJDT MBCPSBUPSZ BOE QPMJDF JOWFTUJHBUJWF VOJU XIPTF NFNCFST
XFSFJNQMJDBUFEJOQPMJUJDBMNVSEFST BOEJO(VBUFNBMBUIFZQSPWJEFEWFIJDMFT
BOENPCJMFSBEJPTBOEDSFBUFEBOFMJUFDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTCSJHBEFMJOLFEUPTFSJ-
PVTIVNBOSJHIUTBCVTFT23
*O +BOVBSZ ŴżŻŹ UIF %FQBSUNFOU PG +VTUJDF FTUBCMJTIFE UIF *OUFSOBUJPOBM
$SJNJOBM *OWFTUJHBUJWF 5SBJOJOH "TTJTUBODF 1SPHSBN *$*5"1  IFBEFE CZ
GPSNFS'#*JOTQFDUPS%BWJE+,SJTLPWJDI XIJDIBTTVNFENBOZPGUIFGPSNFS
GVODUJPOTPGUIF014 UIPVHIXJUITUSJDUFSMJNJUBUJPOT*UTNJTTJPOXBTUPBTTJTU
JOUIFEFWFMPQNFOUPGUIFJOWFTUJHBUJWFBOEGPSFOTJDTGVODUJPOTPGQPMJDF BDB-
EFNJDDVSSJDVMB BOEBENJOJTUSBUJWFBOENBOBHFNFOUDBQBCJMJUJFT*UXBTOPU
BVUIPSJ[FEUPQSPWJEFMFUIBMFRVJQNFOUPSBTTJTUBODFUIBUSFMBUFEUPBSSFTUPSUIF
use of force.24
*O%FDFNCFSŴżŻż BęFSUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPG(FPSHF)8#VTIPWFSUISFX
1BOBNBOJBOTUSPOHNBO.BOVFM/PSJFHB BPOFUJNFQSPUÏHÏPG"EPMQI4BFO[ 
the ICITAP provided training in counterintelligence and riot control with the

The Violence Comes Full Circle 237


BJNPGTVQQSFTTJOHBMPXMFWFMJOTVSHFODZBHBJOTUIJTSFQMBDFNFOU (VJMMFSNP
Endara, a neoliberal banker who was nearly as corrupt.25 Operating on a bud-
HFUPGžŴŶŵNJMMJPO "NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTDSFBUFEUXPQPMJDFUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFT 
VQHSBEFEDSJNFMBCPSBUPSZFRVJQNFOUBOEGPSFOTJDTDBQBCJMJUJFT BOETVQQMJFE
OFXVOJGPSNT1TZDIPMPHJDBMXBSGBSFUFDIOJRVFTXFSFQSPNPUFEGPSVTFBHBJOTU
resistance forces as union leaders and newspaper editors were detained and the
offices of politicians opposed to the invasion were ransacked.26
ćFIFBEPGUIFQPMJDFPQFSBUJPO +BNFT4UFFMF XBTB1VSQMF)FBSUSFDJQJFOU
XIPIBETFSWFEVOEFS(FPSHF1BUUPO+SJO7JFUOBNBOEDPPSEJOBUFEUIF64
NJMJUBSZ BEWJTPSZ HSPVQ JO &M 4BMWBEPS  TVQFSWJTJOH IVOUFSLJMMFS DPNNBOEP
TRVBETXIJDICBUUMFEUIFMFęJTU'.-/"ęFSBOBMMOJHIUIPTUBHFTUBOEPČ IF
helped thwart a coup plot by chief of police Colonel Eduardo Herrera Hassan, a
4DIPPMPGUIF"NFSJDBTHSBEVBUFLOPXOGPSEJSFDUJOHUIFSFQSFTTJPOPGEFNPO-
strators under Noriega.27ćJTJODJEFOUFYFNQMJĕFTUIFMPOHTUBOEJOHUFOEFODZ
PG "NFSJDBO QSPHSBNT UP GPTUFS B DMJNBUF PG JOTUBCJMJUZ BOE WJPMFODF  PXJOH
MBSHFMZUPUIFNJMJUBSZUISVTUPGUIFUSBJOJOH )BTTBOIBEJOJUJBMMZCFFOFNQPX-
FSFE VOEFS UIF *$*5"1 QSPHSBNT  " ZFBS BęFS UIF JOWBTJPO  QPMMT SFWFBMFE
UIBU Źŷ QFSDFOU PG 1BOBNBOJBOT EJTUSVTUFE UIF QPMJDF  XIJMF POMZ ŵŹ QFSDFOU
FYQSFTTFEBOZDPOĕEFODFJOUIFN28
1PMJDF USBJOJOH SFNBJOFE B GFBUVSF PG 64 GPSFJHO QPMJDZ UISPVHIPVU UIF
1990s, when Washington retained its propensity for intervention despite the
DPMMBQTFPGJUTNBKPSJNQFSJBMSJWBM8JUIUIF$MJOUPOBENJOJTUSBUJPOFNQIBTJ[-
JOHNVMUJMBUFSBMJTN QPMJDFBEWJTPSZNJTTJPOTXFSFDBSSJFEPVUJODPOKVODUJPO
XJUIUIF6OJUFE/BUJPOTUPBTTJTUJOQPTUDPOĘJDUOBUJPOCVJMEJOHBOEJODMVEFE
MFDUVSFT PO IVNBO BOE DJWJM SJHIUT 8IJMF IBWJOH TPNF QPTJUJWF JNQBDU  UIJT
FNQIBTJTXBTMBSHFMZNJUJHBUFECZUIFQPMJUJDBMDPOUFYUJOXIJDIUIF*$*5"1
XBT JNQMFNFOUFE BOE UIF GBJMVSF UP QSPNPUF FČFDUJWF KVEJDJBM BOE QSJTPO
SFGPSN29ćFQSPHSBNTXFSFGVSUIFSUBSOJTIFECZUIFDPOUSBDUJOHXJUIQSJWBUF
TFDVSJUZĕSNTTVDIBT%ZO$PSQ*OUFSOBUJPOBMPG'BMMT$IVSDI 7JSHJOJB GPS-
NFSMZ&BTUFSO$BMJGPSOJB"JSXBZT XIPTFFNQMPZFFTXFSFJOWPMWFEJOUIFDIJME
TFYTMBWFUSBEFJO#PTOJBBOEJMMFHBMBSNTTBMFT30
In Egypt, dictator Hosni Mubarak’s secret police were supplied with tear
HBT BOE PUIFS SFQSFTTJWF JOTUSVNFOUT BOE TDIPPMFE BU '#* IFBERVBSUFST JO
2VBOUJDP  7JSHJOJB *O 1FSV  UIF $*" USBJOFE QBSBNJMJUBSZ VOJUT VOEFS XBS
DSJNJOBM7MBEJNJS.POUFTJOPTJOB1IPFOJYTUZMFPQFSBUJPOBHBJOTUUIFMFęJTU
4FOEFSP-VNJOPTPXIJDITQVOPVUPGDPOUSPM31*O)BJUJ "NFSJDBOĕOBODFE
police contributed to the violence after the 1991 coup against Jean-Bertrand
"SJTUJEF BMJCFSBUJPOUIFPMPHJBODPNNJUUFEUPMBOEBOEXFBMUISFEJTUSJCVUJPO
"ęFSIFSFBTTVNFEUIFQSFTJEFODZVOEFSUIFDPOEJUJPOUIBUIFQSPNPUFĕTDBM
BVTUFSJUZ  UIF *$*5"1 JODPSQPSBUFE GPSNFS NJMJUBSZ BOE QBSBNJMJUBSZ PďDFST
into the police force, which was built up as a check on his power. Extrajudicial
LJMMJOHTBOEUPSUVSFSFNBJOFEFOEFNJD32"TUIFTFDBTFTSFWFBM EFTQJUFDMBJNT

238 Conclusion
UIBUUIFFOEPGUIF$PME8BSTQBXOFEBOFXFSBPGIVNBOJUBSJBOJOUFSWFOUJPO 
UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT TIPXFE B TUSPOH DPOUJOVJUZ XJUI UIF QBTU ćF POHPJOH
QPMJUJDJ[BUJPOBOENJMJUBSJ[BUJPOPGQPMJDFBOE$*"JOĕMUSBUJPOPGUIFQSPHSBNT
contributed to the growth of repression, as did support for corrupt and authori-
tarian leaders out of geopolitical expediency.33

ćF EFTUSVDUJWF JNQBDU PG QPMJDF USBJOJOH JT NPTU BDVUFMZ GFMU UPEBZ JO UIF
.JEEMF&BTU XIFSFBOZQSFUFOTFPGQSPNPUJOHEFNPDSBUJDQPMJDFTUBOEBSETIBT
CFFOTVCPSEJOBUFEUPMBSHFSNJMJUBSZHPBMTćF4FQUFNCFSŴŴUFSSPSJTUBUUBDLT
DSFBUFEBDMJNBUFSJQFGPSUIF#VTIBENJOJTUSBUJPOUPDBSSZPVUUIFOFPDPOTFS-
WBUJWFBHFOEBPGFYQBOEJOHUIF"NFSJDBOiFNQJSFPGMJCFSUZwUPBMMDPSOFSTPG
UIFHMPCF JODMVEJOHiGBJMFETUBUFTwTVDIBT"GHIBOJTUBOBOE*SBR XIFSFJOUFS-
WFOUJPOXBTEFTJHOFEUPĘFY64NVTDMFBOEDPOUSPM.JEEMF&BTUBOE$FOUSBM
Asian energy resources.34 "T JO UIF QBTU  QPMJDF USBJOJOH BOE ĕOBODJOH XFSF
DPODFJWFEBTBLFZDPWFSUNFDIBOJTNGPSFTUBCMJTIJOHQSP8FTUFSOCVMXBSLT
DPNNJUUFE UP B OFPMJCFSBM FDPOPNJD WJTJPO BOE B HMPCBM 1BY "NFSJDBOB *O
practice, however, these efforts helped unleash violent social forces which the
6OJUFE4UBUFTDPVMEOPUVMUJNBUFMZDPOUSPM FYQPTJOHPODFBHBJOUIFMJNJUTPG
"NFSJDBOQPXFS
In Afghanistan, after nine years and over $7 billion spent on training and
TBMBSJFT "NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTDPVMEOPUTBZJOŵųŴųIPXNBOZPďDFSTXFSFPO
EVUZPSXIFSFUIPVTBOETPGUSVDLTBOEPUIFSFRVJQNFOUJTTVFEUPQPMJDFIBE
HPOF"HPWFSONFOUSFQPSUDPODMVEFEUIBUiOFQPUJTN ĕOBODJBMJNQSPQSJFUJFT 
BOEVOFUIJDBMSFDSVJUNFOUQSBDUJDFTXFSFDPNNPOQMBDFwBNPOH64CBDLFE
GPSDFT XIJDIFOHBHFEJOXJEFTQSFBEDSJNJOBMBDUJWJUZBOECSJCFSZBOEXFSF
iPWFSNBUDIFEJODPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZBOEDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTPQFSBUJPOTw-FTT
than 20 percent of the population in the eastern and southern provinces
USVTUFE UIF QPMJDF  XIP XFSF GSFRVFOUMZ TUBUJPOFE JO UFSSJUPSJFT EJTUBOU GSPN
UIFJSPXOIPNFT NBLJOHUIFNBQQFBSBOPDDVQZJOHGPSDF"UBYJESJWFSUPME
RAND analyst Seth G. Jones, “Forget about the Taliban, it is the police we
worry about.”35
4VQFSĕDJBMMZJOWPLJOHUIFQPTUo8PSME8BS**PDDVQBUJPOPG+BQBO "NFSJDBO
QPMJDZNBLFSTBOEQSPXBSJOUFMMFDUVBMTIBWFMPOHFNQIBTJ[FEUIFJNQPSUBODF
PGFČFDUJWFQPMJDJOHJOQSPWJEJOHUIFTFDVSJUZOFFEFEGPSFDPOPNJDEFWFMPQ-
NFOUBOEUIFFOUSFODINFOUPGUIFOFXTPDJBMPSEFS*OIJTJOĘVFOUJBMLearning
How to Eat Soup with a Knife: CI Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Lieutenant
Colonel John Nagl writes: “Local forces have inherent advantages over outsid-
FSTJOB$*<DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ>DBNQBJHOćFZDBONPSFFBTJMZHBJOJOUFMMJ-
gence. They don’t need to hire translators to run patrols and understand local
behavioral patterns and the local terrain.”363FQFBUJOHUIFNBOUSBTPG7JFUOBN
FSBNPEFSOJ[BUJPOUIFPSJTUT /BHMBOEIJTDPOUFNQPSBSJFTPWFSMPPLFEUIFDPO-
UFNQUGPSUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUBEWJTFSTTIPXOCZMPDBMPďDJBMTJO"GHIBOJTUBO

The Violence Comes Full Circle 239


EVSJOHUIFŴżŸųTBOEUIFBQQSPQSJBUJPOPGQPMJDFFRVJQNFOUGPSSFQSFTTJWFFOET
in a pattern that has repeated itself.
"ęFS UIF ŵųųŴ JOWBTJPO PG "GHIBOJTUBO  (FSNBOZ XBT HJWFO UIF UBTL PG
SFCVJMEJOHUIF"GHIBO/BUJPOBM1PMJDF "/1 BTBNFBOTPGDPOTPMJEBUJOHUIF
QPXFSPG64/"50DMJFOU)BNJE,BS[BJ BGPSNFSEFQVUZGPSFJHONJOJTUFS 
whose father was assassinated by Taliban agents in 1999. Born to a distin-
HVJTIFE1BTIUVOGBNJMZPGUIF1PQBM[BJDMBOJO,BOEBIBS ,BS[BJSBOBO/(0
JO1BLJTUBOEVSJOHUIFŴżŻųTBTTJTUJOHUIFBOUJ4PWJFUNVKBIJEJO FBSOJOHUIF
OJDLOBNFUIFi(VDDJHVFSSJMMBwGPSTQFOEJOHNPTUPGIJTUJNFOFUXPSLJOHJOUIF
MPCCZPGUIF*TMBNBCBE)PMJEBZ*OO"DDPSEJOHUP.FFOB4JEEJRVJ BIVNBO
rights attorney in Kabul, “Karzai had a good past, a good life, and ate well but
IFDBOOPUEPHPPEGPSIJTQFPQMFCFDBVTFIFEJEOPUDPNFGSPNUIFQFPQMFw
.BOZ"/1PďDFSTXFSF,BS[BJDSPOJFTESBXOGSPNXBSMPSENJMJUJBTBOEIBSE-
FOFECZZFBSTPGĕHIUJOHBHBJOTUUIF4PWJFUTBOEJOUIFTVCTFRVFOUDJWJMXBST
Western intervention helped to stoke ethnic rivalries between the Tajik, Uzbek,
)B[BSB BOE1BTIUVO CSJOHJOHPVUUIFJSNPTUWJPMFOUUFOEFODJFT37
*O ŵųųŶ  DSJUJDJ[JOH (FSNBOZ GPS JUT GPDVT PO DPNNVOJUZ QPMJDJOH PWFS
DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ UIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUHBWF%ZO$PSQ XIJDIIBEBJSMJęFE
TVQQMJFTUP64USPPQTEVSJOHUIF,PSFBO8BS BžŴŴCJMMJPODPOUSBDUGPSNPE-
ernizing the ANP. Advisers traveled around the country seeking to upgrade
SFDPSELFFQJOH DPNNVOJDBUJPOT BOESJPUDPOUSPMDBQBCJMJUJFT/FXQSFDJODUT
XFSFDPOTUSVDUFE TIPEEJMZJOBOVNCFSPGDBTFTPXJOHUPDPTUDVUUJOHNFB-
TVSFT CZ QSJWBUF DPOUSBDUPST  GPSDJOH QPMJDF BU UJNFT UP JOUFSSPHBUF QFPQMF JO
their private residences. Training centers were set up, offering courses in hand-
DVďOH  XFBQPOT NBJOUFOBODF  DPOTUJUVUJPOBM QSPDFEVSF  BOE HVFSSJMMB XBS-
GBSF#SJUJTIBOE$BOBEJBOUSBJOFSTHBWFMFDUVSFTPODSJNFTDFOFJOWFTUJHBUJPO 
FWJEFODFDPMMFDUJPO BOEEJTNBOUMJOH*&%T.BOZPGUIFSFDSVJUTXFSFJMMJUFSBUF
.VDIBTXJUIUIFJMMGBUFEQPMJDFBDBEFNZJO-BPT UIFZTBUJODMBTTSPPNTUIBU
CBLFEJOTVNNFSBOEGSP[FJOXJOUFS MJTUFOJOHUP&OHMJTITQFBLJOHJOTUSVDUPST
UISPVHIQPPSMZUSBJOFEUSBOTMBUPSTXIPXFSFVOGBNJMJBSXJUIQPMJDFUFSNJOPM-
PHZ ćF KPVSOBMJTU "OO +POFT OPUFE UIBU UIF FYFSDJTFT MPPLFE MJLF NJMJUBSZ
NBOFVWFST38
ćFFTUBCMJTINFOUPGBOJEFOUJUZDBSETZTUFNBOEBCJPNFUSJDBSDIJWFPGĕO-
HFSQSJOUTBOEIFBETIPUTSFĘFDUFEUIFEFFQNJTUSVTUPGUIFQPQVMBUJPOJOIFSFOU
JODPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZPQFSBUJPOTBOEBOJNQFSJBMESJWFGPSDPOUSPMSFNJOJTDFOU
of previous U.S. interventions. The sophistication of new technology did not
translate into greater efficiency, however, owing largely to the political context
BOEFYDFTTJWFĕSFQPXFSFNQMPZFECZ64BOE/"50USPPQT XIJDIESPWFPSEJ-
OBSZ"GHIBOTJOUPUIFSFTJTUBODF BiNÏMBOHFPGOBUJPOBMJTUTBOE*TMBNJTUT TIBE-
PXZLPIMFZFENVMMBITBOEIFBECPCCJOHSFMJHJPVTTUVEFOUT wBDDPSEJOHUPUIF
journalist Anand Gopal, “as well as erudite university students, poor illiterate
GBSNFSTBOEWFUFSBOBOUJ4PWJFUDPNNBOEFSTw39

240 Conclusion
%SBXO QSJNBSJMZ GSPN MPXQBJE QPMJDF GPSDFT JO 5FYBT  4PVUI $BSPMJOB 
(FPSHJB BOE'MPSJEB %ZO$PSQFNQMPZFFTNBEFCFUXFFOžźŸ ųųųBOEžŴŸŶ ųųų
QFSZFBS DPNQBSFEUPžŵų ųųųUPžŶų ųųųGPS014PďDFST ĕęZUJNFTNPSF
than their Afghan counterparts, who resented their presence. Attrition rates
BNPOH"GHIBOSFDSVJUTFYDFFEFEŵųQFSDFOU-PZBMQSJNBSJMZUPSFHJPOBMXBS-
MPSET QPMJDFTMFQUBUDIFDLQPJOUT TIPPLEPXOWJMMBHFST TIPUVOBSNFEEFNPO-
TUSBUPST UFSSPSJ[FEQFPQMFJOIPVTFUPIPVTFSBJET BOEJOUJNJEBUFEKPVSOBMJTUT
and voters during fraudulent elections. In Babaji north of Lashkar Gah, officers
bent on taking revenge against clan rivals abducted and raped preteen girls
BOECPZT*OŵųųŹUIF,BCVMDIJFGPGQPMJDF +BNJM+VNCJTI XBTJNQMJDBUFEJO
NVSEFS UPSUVSF BOECSJCFSZ BOEIJTSFQMBDFNFOU "NBOVMMBI(V[BS JOFYUPS-
tion, land grabbing, and the kidnapping of three UN workers.40 These abuses
ĕUUIFIJTUPSJDBMQBUUFSOBOEBSFQBSUMZBQSPEVDUPGUIFTPDJBMQPMBSJ[BUJPOTBOE
DPSSVQUJPOCSFECZUIF64/"50JOUFSWFOUJPOBOENPCJMJ[BUJPOPGQPMJDFGPS
NJMJUBSZBOEQPMJUJDBMFOET
8JLJ-FBLTEPDVNFOUTDPOĕSNXJEFTDBMFQPMJDFCSVUBMJUZBOEJUTDPWFSVQ
In one case, the chief of police in Balkh province raped a sixteen-year-old girl
BOEPSEFSFEIJTCPEZHVBSEUPĕSFPOBDJWJMJBOXIPUSJFEUPSFQPSUUIFJODJEFOU
When the bodyguard refused, he was shot dead.41 In a sign the war was being
MPTU BęFSB64"SNZUBOLTNBTIFEJOUPBUSBďDKBNJO.BZŵųųŹ QPMJDFUISFX
PČUIFJSVOJGPSNTBOEKPJOFEQSPUFTUFSTMPPUJOHCVJMEJOHT WFIJDMFT BOEQPMJDF
posts, denouncing the occupation.42
ćFBCTFODFPGBOFČFDUJWFMFHBMPSKVEJDJBMTZTUFNBOEUIF#VTIBENJOJTUSB-
tion’s support for torture increased the lawlessness of the ANP. The Red Cross
SFQPSUFENBTTJWFQSJTPOPWFSDSPXEJOH iIBSTIwDPOEJUJPOT BOEBMBDLPGDMBSJUZ
BCPVUUIFMFHBMCBTJTGPSEFUFOUJPO BOEGPVOEUIBUJONBUFTXFSFCFJOHTVCKFDUFE
UPiDSVFMwUSFBUNFOUJOWJPMBUJPOPGUIF(FOFWB$POWFOUJPOT JODMVEJOHTFYVBM
BCVTFPGXPNFOBOEKVWFOJMFTJODBSDFSBUFEGPSFTDBQJOHCBENBSSJBHFT.BOZ
were held for lengthy periods without charges or lawyers in facilities lacking
FWFOSVEJNFOUBSZUPJMFUT"OVOEJTDMPTFEOVNCFSEJFEJODVTUPEZ JODMVEJOH
IVOESFET USBOTQPSUFE CZ UIF 6[CFL XBSMPSE 3BTIJE %PTUVN JO VOWFOUJMBUFE
containers, where they suffocated to death or were shot.43
General Stanley A. McChrystal reported in 2009 that Afghan prisons served
BTBLFZSFDSVJUJOHCBTFBOEiTBODUVBSZ<GPS*TMBNJDNJMJUBOUT>UPDPOEVDUMFUIBM
PQFSBUJPOTwBHBJOTUHPWFSONFOUBOEDPBMJUJPOGPSDFT JODMVEJOHUIFŵųųŻCPNC-
JOH PG UIF 4FSFOB )PUFM JO ,BCVM  XIJDI XBT BMMFHFEMZ QMBOOFE GSPN QSJTPO
without interference. In Kandahar in 2011, prison guards were stoned on drugs
XIFOĕWFIVOESFEJONBUFTFTDBQFE44
"MUIPVHI UIFSF XBT MJNJUFE FWJEFODF PG 5BMJCBO JOWPMWFNFOU  UIF 6OJUFE
4UBUFTIBTTVQQPSUFEMFBEJOHOBSDPUJDTUSBďDLFSTTVDIBT)F[C:*TMBNJDPN-
NBOEFS)BKKJ+VNB,IBOBOEIJTTPO"CEVM,IBMJM"OEBSBCJ IFBEPGUIF/PSUI-
east Highway Police, causing production to escalate to over eight thousand

The Violence Comes Full Circle 241


UPOTQFSBOOVNCZŵųŴų45"DDPSEJOHUP8JLJ-FBLTEPDVNFOUT )BNJE,BS[BJ
QBSEPOFEĕWFCPSEFSQPMJDFPďDFSTDBVHIUXJUIŴŵŷLJMPHSBNT ŵźŶQPVOET PG
heroin and intervened in a drug case involving the son of a wealthy supporter.
ćFQSFTJEFOUTIBMGCSPUIFS"INFE8BMJ XIPXBTBTTBTTJOBUFEJO+VMZŵųŴŴCZ
BNFNCFSPGIJTPXOJOOFSDJSDMF XBTB$*"iBTTFUwXIPIFBEFEBQBSBNJMJUBSZ
HSPVQUIBUUBSHFUFEUPQ5BMJCBODPNNBOEFSTBOEVTFEESVHQSPDFFETUPGVOE
TUBUF UFSSPS PQFSBUJPOT *[[BUVMMBI 8BTJĕ  )BNJE ,BS[BJT ŵųųź BQQPJOUNFOU
BTBOUJDPSSVQUJPODIJFG TQFOUBMNPTUGPVSZFBSTJOB/FWBEBQSJTPOGPSTFMMJOH
IFSPJOUPBOVOEFSDPWFSDPQ7JDF1SFTJEFOU"INFE;JB.BTTPPENFBOXIJMF
XBTDBVHIUFOUFSJOH%VCBJXJUIžŸŵNJMMJPOJODBTI"$*"PďDFSDPNNFOUFE
i7JSUVBMMZFWFSZTJHOJĕDBOU"GHIBOĕHVSFIBTIBECSVTIFTXJUIUIFESVHUSBEF
If you are looking for Mother Teresa, she doesn’t live in Afghanistan.”46
$IFSZM#FSOBSE B3"/%BOBMZTUBOEXJGFPG;BMNBZ,IBMJM[BE 64BNCBT-
TBEPSUPUIF6/EVSJOHUIF(FPSHF8#VTIBENJOJTUSBUJPO FYQMBJOFEPOFPG
UIFLFZSFBTPOTGPSUIFMBDLPGHPPEHPWFSOBODFi<5PEFGFBUUIF4PWJFUT>XF
UISFXUIFXPSTUDSB[JFTBHBJOTUUIFNUIBUXFDPVMEĕOEBOEUIFSFXBTBMPUPG
DPMMBUFSBMEBNBHF‫ڀڀ‬ćFOXFBMMPXFEUIFNUPHFUSJEPG KVTULJMMBMMUIFNPE-
FSBUFMFBEFSTćFSFBTPOXFEPOUIBWFNPEFSBUFMFBEFSTJO"GHIBOJTUBOUPEBZ
JTCFDBVTFXFMFUUIFOVUTLJMMUIFNBMMćFZLJMMFEBMMUIFMFęJTUT UIFNPEFSBUFT 
UIF NJEEMFPGUIFSPBEFST ćFZ XFSF KVTU FMJNJOBUFE  EVSJOH UIF ŴżŻųT BOE
afterwards.” The United States continues to tolerate a high level of corruption
PVUPGQFSDFJWFEHFPQPMJUJDBMFYQFEJFODZ DMBJNJOHUIBUJUJTJOHSBJOFEXJUIJO
the political culture of Afghanistan. In reality, however, it is a product of his-
UPSJDBMDPOUJOHFODJFT UIFCSFBLEPXOPGTPDJBMNPSFTDBVTFECZUIFXBSDMJNBUF 
BOEUIFOFFEBNPOHPďDJBMTXIPMBDLQPQVMBSMFHJUJNBDZUPPCUBJONPOFZGPS
counterinsurgency.47
4JNJMBSGBDUPSTXFSFBUQMBZEVSJOHUIFŴżŹųT XIFO7JFUOBNBOE-BPTXFSF
BUUIFDFOUFSPGUIFXPSMEESVHUSBEF CFOFĕUJOHGSPN"NFSJDBOCBDLJOHPGDPS-
rupt officials who controlled the traffic, with the CIA overseeing the produc-
UJPOBOETBMFPGPQJVNCZ)NPOHHVFSSJMMBTJOPSEFSUPĕOBODFUIFTFDSFUXBS
BHBJOTUUIF1BUIFU-BP)JTUPSZJTUIVTDPNJOHGVMMDJSDMFJO"GHIBOJTUBO XIJDI
produces over 90 percent of the world’s heroin and has been widely character-
ized as a “narco-state.”48%SVHNPOFZIBTDPSSVQUFEBMMGBDFUTPGTPDJFUZ DSJQ-
QMFEUIFMFHBMFDPOPNZ BOENBEFJUOFBSMZJNQPTTJCMFUPDBSSZPVUUIFTJNQMFTU
EFWFMPQNFOUQSPKFDUT"TJO4PVUI7JFUOBNVOEFS64PDDVQBUJPO UIFNBJO
BJSQPSUIBTCFDPNFBNBKPSUSBOTTIJQNFOUQPJOUGPSIFSPJO BOEUIFQPTJUJPO
PGQPMJDFDIJFGJONBOZQSPWJODFTJTBVDUJPOFEPČUPUIFIJHIFTUCJEEFSCFDBVTF
PGJUTFOPSNPVTHSBęWBMVF#Zŵųųż UIFQSJDFGPSBKPCBTDIJFGPGQPMJDFPOUIF
CPSEFSXBTSVNPSFEUPCFVQXBSETPGžŴŸų ųųų49
3JDIBSE)PMCSPPLF XIPTFSWFEBTTQFDJBMFOWPZUP"GHIBOJTUBOGSPNŵųųż
VOUJMIJTEFBUIJO%FDFNCFSŵųŴų EFTDSJCFEUIFžŻųųNJMMJPODPVOUFSOBSDPUJDT
DBNQBJHOSVOCZ%ZO$PSQBTiUIFNPTUXBTUFGVMwHPWFSONFOUQSPHSBNIFIBE

242 Conclusion
TFFOJOGPSUZZFBST'SFRVFOUMZUBSHFUJOHDPNQFUJUPSTPG64CBDLFEXBSMPSET 
QPMJDF DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDT UFBNT BSNFE XJUI IPFT  TUJDLT  BOE XFFE XIBDLFST
eradicated a paltry 2,373 acres of poppies in raids that killed or wounded doz-
FOTPG"GHIBOTBOEXFSFNFUXJUITUPOFT TOJQFST SPBETJEFCPNCT BOEBOHSZ
NPCT.BOZGBSNFSTDPOUSBDUFEXJUINJMJUJBNFOFRVJQQFEXJUITUBUFPGUIFBSU
TBUFMMJUFQIPOFT TFNJBVUPNBUJDXFBQPOT BOE5PZPUBQJDLVQTUPQSPUFDUUIFJS
ĕFMET"FSJBMEFGPMJBUJPOEFTUSPZFEDSPQTPGXBUFSNFMPOTBOEXIFBU XIJDIXBT
VOTVSQSJTJOH BT%ZO$PSQXBTBUUIFUJNFGBDJOHBDMBTTBDUJPOTVJUCZ&DVBEPS-
JBOQFBTBOUTGPSTQSBZJOHIFSCJDJEFTJO$PMPNCJBUIBUESJęFEBDSPTTUIFCPSEFS 
resulting in the destruction of food crops and the death of several children.50
*O ŵųųź UIF 64 NJMJUBSZ UPPL PWFS QPMJDF USBJOJOH BOE USJFE UP DMFBO VQ
DPSSVQUJPOCZSBJTJOHTBMBSJFTBOEJNQMFNFOUJOHFMFDUSPOJDQBZ-JUUMFDIBOHFE
BQBSU GSPN GVSUIFS NJMJUBSJ[BUJPO ćF KPVSOBMJTU /JS 3PTFO PWFSIFBSE POF
TFSHFBOUUFMMIJTNFO ićSPXTPNFGVDLJOHSFOBEFT XFSFOPUUIFSFUPBSSFTU
people, just fuckin’ kill people.”51 ćSPVHI UIF QPMJDF QSPHSBNT  $*" BHFOUT
XPSLFE XJUI UIF /BUJPOBM 4FDVSJUZ %JSFDUPSBUF  TUBČFE XJUI NBOZ GPSNFS
,(# iBTTFUTw XIP DVMUJWBUFE JOGPSNBOUT BOE DBSSJFE PVU BTTBTTJOBUJPOT JO B
QSPHSBNGSFRVFOUMZFYQMPJUFECZBHFOUTQVSTVJOHQFSTPOBMGFVET52*O/PWFN-
CFSŵųųż ĕWF#SJUJTITPMEJFSTXFSFBTTBTTJOBUFECZUIFQPMJDFNFOUIFZXFSF
USBJOJOH BOEOJOF"/1XFSFLJMMFECZBDPBMJUJPOCPNCXIJMFUSZJOHUPSFTDVF
"NFSJDBO TPMEJFST *O 'FCSVBSZ ŵųŴų  "NFSJDBO 4QFDJBM 'PSDFT NJTUBLFOMZ
LJMMFEBMPDBMQPMJDFDIJFGBOEBQSPTFDVUPSJOBOJHIUUJNFSBJE"O"/1PďDFS
TVCTFRVFOUMZ LJMMFE TJY "NFSJDBO BEWJTFST53 ćFTF JODJEFOUT FQJUPNJ[FE UIF
growing chaos in Afghanistan, whose people have suffered greatly under the
U.S.-NATO occupation.
*O1BLJTUBOJOŵųųŷ JOBEEJUJPOUPžŴŸCJMMJPOJONJMJUBSZBJE XIJDI1SFTJ-
dent Pervez Musharraf diverted to bolster the Taliban’s insurgent network and
QSFQBSFGPSXBSXJUI*OEJB UIF#VTIBENJOJTUSBUJPOCFHBOQSPWJEJOHUFOTPG
NJMMJPOTPGEPMMBSTUPUIF1BLJTUBOJQPMJDFUISPVHIUIF*$*5"1BOE%&""NFS-
JDBOBEWJTFSTJOUSPEVDFEBDPNQVUFSJ[FETFDVSJUZTZTUFNUPNPOJUPSNPWFNFOU
across the border and created counter-narcotics units and a police air wing
FRVJQQFEXJUIUISFF$BSBWBOTQPUUFSQMBOFTBOEFJHIU)VFZIFMJDPQUFSTUPBJE
in counterinsurgency. Replicating the role played by auto-defense units during
UIF -BP TFDSFU XBS BOE i$IFTUZw 1VMMFST NFO JO /JDBSBHVB OFBSMZ B DFOUVSZ
BHP QPMJDFQFSGPSNFEBWJUBMSPMFBMPOHTJEFQSJWBUFTFDVSJUZĕSNTTVDIBT9F
GPSNFSMZ #MBDLXBUFS  JEFOUJGZJOH UBSHFUT GPS 1SFEBUPS ESPOF BUUBDLT XIJDI
killed hundreds of civilians, including seventy-three children in the village of
Bala Boluk in Afghanistan’s Western Farah province.54 U.S.-trained forces were
NFBOXIJMF JNQMJDBUFE JO iMBSHFTDBMF FOGPSDFE EJTBQQFBSBODFT w QSJNBSJMZ PG
“activists pushing for greater regional and ethnic rights . . . in Baluchistan and
4JOEI wXIJMFUIFHPWFSONFOUVTFEUIFiSIFUPSJDPGĕHIUJOHUFSSPSJTNUPBUUBDL
its internal critics.”55

The Violence Comes Full Circle 243


*O*SBR QPMJDFQSPHSBNTUZQJGZUIFĕBTDPPG"NFSJDBOTUBUFCVJMEJOHFČPSUT
UIFSF 6TJOH UIF QSFUFYU PG żŴŴ UP MBVODI B QSFFNQUJWF JOWBTJPO  UIF #VTI
BENJOJTUSBUJPOBJNFEUPUVSO*SBRJOUPBTIPXQMBDFGPSGSFFNBSLFUJEFBMTBOE
BCBTFGPSUIFQSPKFDUJPOPG"NFSJDBOQPXFSJOUIF.JEEMF&BTU*UJOTUFBEDSF-
ated a violent dystopia by exploiting ethnic fault lines in the society, turning
*SBR JOUP B NPEFSOEBZ LJMMJOH ĕFME ćF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT JOJUJBMMZ QMBOOFE UP
FNQPXFSFYJMFEQPMJUJDJBOTBTTPDJBUFEXJUIUIF*SBRJ/BUJPOBM$POHSFTT OPUB-
CMZ"INBE$IBMBCJ B$*"iBTTFUwJNQMJDBUFEJOBCBOLJOHTDBOEBMJO+PSEBO 
XIPGFEUIF"NFSJDBOTNJTJOGPSNBUJPOJOTVQQPSUPGUIFJOWBTJPOćF$PBMJ-
UJPO1SPWJTJPOBM"VUIPSJUZ $1" VOEFS-1BVM#SFNFS*** GPSNFSBTTJTUBOUUP
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, ignited wide-scale resistance as a result of
USPPQCSVUBMJUZBOEQSJWBUJ[BUJPOTDIFNFTUIBUMFEUPCSB[FODPSSVQUJPOBOEB
decline in social services. With reluctance, the United States eventually backed
UIF*TMBNJTU4IJB%BXB1BSUZ IFBEFECZGPSNFS4ZSJBOTFDSFUQPMJDFTFSHFBOU
Nouri al-Maliki, which had ties to Iran and had suffered repression under Sad-
EBN)VTTFJO56
"TJOQBTUJOUFSWFOUJPOT QPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO*SBRXFSFEFTJHOFEUPFTUBCMJTI
an effective intelligence and social control apparatus, considered vital for sta-
CJMJ[JOHUIFPDDVQBUJPO"ęFSUIFiTIPDLBOEBXFwDBNQBJHOPG.BSDIŵųųŶ 
MPPUFSTEFTUSPZFEQPMJDFTUBUJPOTBOEFRVJQNFOU BOEQPMJDFBCBOEPOFEUIFJS
QPTUTBT"NFSJDBONJMJUBSZPďDFSTTUPPECZ,JEOBQQJOHTBOEDSJNJOBMBDUJW-
JUZQSPMJGFSBUFE1PMJDFUSBJOJOH IPXFWFS EJEOPUCFHJOVOUJM/PWFNCFSćF
NJTTJPOXBTIFBEFECZ#FSOBSE#,FSJL GPSNFS/FX:PSL$JUZQPMJDFDPN-
NJTTJPOFS XIPIBEXPOGBNFJOMFBEJOHSFTDVFFČPSUTBUHSPVOE[FSPPOżŴŴ
and notoriety when he was sentenced in 2010 to four years in prison after being
found guilty of tax fraud and public corruption. Kerik told reporters that he
IBECFFOHJWFOPOMZUFOEBZTUPQSFQBSFGPSIJTQPTUJO*SBR XIJDIIFEJECZ
XBUDIJOH "& EPDVNFOUBSJFT PO 4BEEBN )VTTFJO " IJHI TDIPPM ESPQPVU 
,FSJLIBEQSFWJPVTMZCFFOFYQFMMFEGSPN4BVEJ"SBCJBGPSJMMFHBMMZTQZJOHPO
UIFNFEJDBMTUBČBUBIPTQJUBMXIFSFIFEJSFDUFEUIFTFDVSJUZEFUBJM57
With scant knowledge of the country’s history and culture, Kerik and two
EP[FOPUIFSSFUJSFEMBXFOGPSDFNFOUBHFOUTNFUXJUIMPDBMQPMJDFPďDJBMTBOE
oversaw the rebuilding of new police precincts and training facilities. Gruff and
NVTDMFCPVOE  ,FSJL UPPL QBSU JO OJHIUUJNF SBJET XJUI QBSBNJMJUBSZ SBOHFST
IFBEFECZIJTQSPUÏHÏ"INFE,BEIJN*CSBIJN XIPXBTBDDVTFEPG UPSUVS-
ing prostitutes with electroshocks. The Pentagon issued Taser guns (used by
"NFSJDBO MBX FOGPSDFNFOU BHFODJFT UP JODBQBDJUBUF TVTQFDUT UISPVHI UIF
release of twenty-six watts of electrical energy) and provided high-tech radio,
DPNQVUFS BOETVSWFJMMBODFFRVJQNFOU XIJDIFOBCMFEUIF*SBRJQPMJDFUPDPM-
MFDUPWFSBNJMMJPOĕOHFSQSJOUT XIJDIXFSFTDBOOFEUISPVHITBUFMMJUFMJOLUP
Washington.58
ćF NBKPS USBJOJOH BDBEFNZ GPS *SBRJ QPMJDF XBT CVJMU PVUTJEF "NNBO 

244 Conclusion
Jordan. Here, three thousand cadets were given an eight-week course in
UFDIOJRVFTTVDIBTJNNPCJMJ[JOHTVTQFDUT VTJOHIBOEDVČT BOEDBSSZJOHPVU
DPVOUFSHVFSSJMMBXBSGBSF5SBOTMBUJOHJOTUSVDUJPOGSPN&OHMJTIUP"SBCJDBUF
VQ Ÿų QFSDFOU PG UIF UJNF 6OEFS UIF EF#BBUIJĕDBUJPO QPMJDZ B EFQBSUVSF
GSPN UIF QSBDUJDF PG SFDSVJUJOH GSPN UIF BODJFO SÏHJNF  4BEEBNJTU PďDFST
XFSFEFQSJWFEPGUIFJSQPTJUJPOTBOEPęFOUPPLVQBSNTXJUIUIFJOTVSHFODZ
.BOZFOMJTUFFTXFSFDSJNJOBMTPSJOTVSHFOUTVTJOHUIFQSPHSBNUPHFUXFBQPOT
#SFNFSDPNQMBJOFEUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF$POEPMFF[[B3JDFUIBUUIF"NFSJDBOT
iXFSFKVTUQVMMJOHLJETPČUIFTUSFFUTBOEIBOEJOHUIFNCBEHFTBOE",ŷźT‫ڀڀ‬
<5>IFNPTUGVOEBNFOUBMSPMFPGBOZHPWFSONFOUJTMBXBOEPSEFSćFGBDUUIBU
XFEJEOUDSBDLEPXOPOJUSJHIUGSPNUIFTUBSUTFOUBNFTTBHFUIBUXFXFSFOPU
prepared.”59
*O.BSDIŵųųŷ %ZO$PSQXBTBXBSEFEBžźŸųNJMMJPODPOUSBDUUPQSPGFT-
TJPOBMJ[FUIF*SBRJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDF */1 0QFSBUJOHXJUIGFXMFHBMSFTUSJDUJPOT 
contractors alienated the population through such practices as “driving through
the streets fast and furious without regard for the locals,” public drunkenness,
whoring, and torturing and shooting civilians. One of their slogans was “I do
UIJTKPCGPSUIFPQQPSUVOJUZUPLJMMUIFFOFNJFTPGNZDPVOUSZBOEBMTPUPHFU
UIBUCPBU*BMXBZTXBOUFE‫<ڀڀ‬8>IFOFOHBHFE*XJMMMBZXBTUFUPFWFSZUIJOH
BSPVOENFwćFDPNQBOZBOHFSFEUIF$1"XIFOJUSBJEFE"INBE$IBMBCJT
IPNF PWFSDIBSHFEPOGVFM BOEXBTUFENPOFZCVJMEJOHBO0MZNQJDTJ[FTXJN-
NJOHQPPMGPSUIFVTFPGJUTFNQMPZFFT$//BODIPS5VDLFS$BSMTPOSFQPSUFE
UIBU DPOUSBDUPST XJUI XIPN IF XBT FNCFEEFE CFBU B TVTQFDUFE LJEOBQQFS
iJOUPBCMPPEZNPVOEwCFGPSFUVSOJOHXIBUXBTMFęPGIJNiPWFSUPUIF*SBRJ
police.”60
6OEFS%ZO$PSQTPWFSTJHIU UIF*/1SFNBJOFESJEEMFEXJUIDSPOZJTN ESVH
BCVTF BOEDPSSVQUJPO JUTQBZSPMMTQBEEFEXJUIQIBOUPNFNQMPZFFT61 Histori-
DBMMZ UIFGPSDFTUSBJOFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTUPTVCEVFUIFJSPXODPVOUSZNFO
IBWFUBLFOPOUIFDIBSBDUFSPGQBJENFSDFOBSJFTXJUIMJUUMFMPZBMUZUPUIFDBVTF
UIFZQVSQPSUFEMZSFQSFTFOU*SBRJTOPFYDFQUJPO‰FYDFQUUIBUUIFZXFSFOPX
CFJOHUSBJOFECZNFSDFOBSJFT"TLFECZB8BMM4USFFUSFQPSUFSBCPVU"NFSJDBT
TUBUFEHPBMPGCSJOHJOHEFNPDSBDZUP*SBR DBEFUTHJHHMFEBOEQPJOUFEUPUIF
OFBSCZ.JOJTUSZPG0JM UIFPOMZNBKPSNJOJTUFSJBMCVJMEJOH64USPPQTTBWFE
GSPN MPPUFST EVSJOH UIF JOWBTJPO ićFZ XBOU PVS PJM w TBJE UXFOUZZFBSPME
)BTTBO.VIOFEi8FIBWFOPEFNPDSBDZOPX.BZCFXFXJMMIBWFJUJGUIF
"NFSJDBOTMFBWFw#VU IFBEEFE UIFZTIPVMEOPUMFBWFVOUJMIFXBTQBJE62
8JLJ-FBLTEPDVNFOUTEFNPOTUSBUFUIFDFOUSBMJUZPGQPMJDFUPDPVOUFSJOTVS-
HFODZFČPSUTJO*SBR JODMVEJOHNPVOUJOHSBJET EJTQFSTJOHDSPXET DBQUVSJOH
XFBQPOT  HVBSEJOH TUSBUFHJD JOTUBMMBUJPOT  QSPWJEJOH JOUFMMJHFODF UP NBSJOFT 
and cleaning up IED sites. Once U.S. troops cleared a village or town, the place
was usually turned over to the police. Several reports point to civilian killings in
TIPPUPVUTBNJETUBHFOFSBMDMJNBUFPGMBXMFTTOFTT63 As the country descended

The Violence Comes Full Circle 245


JOUP DJWJM XBS  4IJJUF NJMJUJBT MPZBM UP UIF %BXB 1BSUZ BOE DMFSJD .PRUBEB BM
4BESVTFE"NFSJDBOXFBQPOTUPFOHBHFJOFUIOJDDMFBOTJOHPQFSBUJPOT%SJWJOH
UISPVHIDJUZTUSFFUTXJUIEFBECPEJFTJOUIFCBDLTPGUIFJSUSVDLT UIFZNBEF
GPSBZT JOUP 4VOOJ OFJHICPSIPPET UBSHFUJOH 4BEEBN MPZBMJTUT BOE BMTP LJMMFE
1BMFTUJOJBOTBOEBOZPOFXJUIUIF4VOOJOBNF0NBS*OWFTUJHBUJWFKPVSOBMJTUT
BOEUXPIVOESFEBDBEFNJDTPQQPTFEUPUIF64JOWBTJPOXFSFBNPOHUIPTF
assassinated, including Abdul Latif al-Mayah, the director of the Baghdad Cen-
UFSGPS)VNBO3JHIUT XIPEFOPVODFEUIFDPSSVQUJPOPGUIF*SBRJ(PWFSOJOH
Council on Al-Jazeera television twelve hours before he was killed. According
to the New Statesman BM.BZBIiTQPLFGPSQFPQMFPOUIFTUSFFUBOENBEFTPNF
QPMJUJDJBOTRVJUFKFBMPVTw+FSSZ#VSLF BQPMJDFUSBJOFSGSPN.BTTBDIVTFUUTXIP
TFSWFEUXPUPVSTJO*SBR UPMESFQPSUFSTJOŵųųźUIBUUIF*/1XBTVOTBMWBHFBCMF
BTBOJOTUJUVUJPOIFCFMJFWFEUIBUNBOZPGJUTNFNCFSTTIPVMECFQSPTFDVUFE
GPSIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOT XBSDSJNFT BOEEFBUITRVBEBDUJWJUJFT64
4PNFPG#VSLFTDPMMFBHVFTXPSLFEXJUITQFDJBMQPMJDFDPNNBOEPT SFDSVJUFE
GSPN4BEEBNT4QFDJBM'PSDFTBęFSUIFSFWFSTBMPGUIFEF#BBUIJĕDBUJPOQPMJDZ 
XIPTF NJTTJPO XBT UP iOFVUSBMJ[Fw IJHIMFWFM JOTVSHFOUT "NFSJDBO TUSBUFHZ
JOUIJTSFTQFDUXBTNPEFMFEBęFSUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNJO7JFUOBN PGXIJDI
7JDF1SFTJEFOU%JDL$IFOFZXBTFOBNPSFE BOEBMTP3POBME3FBHBOTUFSSPS-
JTUXBSTJO$FOUSBM"NFSJDBEVSJOHUIFŴżŻųT*Oŵųųŷ$IFOFZDBMMFEGPSUIF
i4BMWBEPSPQUJPO wSFGFSSJOHUPUIF64SPMFJOUSBJOJOHQBSBNJMJUBSJFTUPBTTBT-
TJOBUFMFęXJOHHVFSSJMMBTEVSJOH&M4BMWBEPSTiEJSUZXBSwMBSHFMZXJUIUIFBJN
PG JOUJNJEBUJOH UIF QPQVMBUJPO65 +BNFT 4UFFMF  XIP DPNNBOEFE 4BMWBEPSBO
GPSDFTSFTQPOTJCMFGPSiEJTBQQFBSBODFT wUPSUVSF BOEUIFNBTTBDSFPGDJWJMJBOT 
XBTBQQPJOUFEDIJFGBEWJTFSUPUIF*SBRJQPMJDFDPNNBOEPT66
"OFYFDVUJWFXJUI&OSPOXIPMJFEUP$POHSFTTBCPVUTNVHHMJOHXFBQPOT
UPUIFDPOUSBT 4UFFMFXPSLFEVOEFS"NCBTTBEPS+PIO/FHSPQPOUF XIP EVS-
ing the 1980s, covered up extrajudicial killings in Honduras, a staging base for
BUUBDLT PO /JDBSBHVB 8JUI TVDI NFO JO DIBSHF  UIF KPVSOBMJTU %BIS +BNBJM
XSPUF  JU XBT OP DPJODJEFODF UIBU EBJMZ MJGF JO *SBR DBNF UP SFTFNCMF iXIBU
UIF EFBUI TRVBET HFOFSBUFE JO $FOUSBM "NFSJDB ‫)  ڀ ڀ‬VOESFET PG EFBE MBZ
VODMBJNFEBUUIFNPSHVF‰CMPPEDBLFENFOXIPIBECFFOTIPU LOJGFE HBS-
roted or apparently suffocated by the plastic bag still over their heads. Many of
the bodies were sprawled with their hands still bound.”67
#ZUSBJOJOHBOEBSNJOH*SBRJQPMJDFPďDJBMTXIPCFDBNFOPUPSJPVTGPSDPS-
SVQUJPO CFBUJOHT LJEOBQQJOHT BOEFYFDVUJPOT "NFSJDBOBEWJTFSTDPOUSJCVUFE
JNNFBTVSBCMZ UP UIF CMPPECBUI JO *SBR 'JUUJOH B MPOHTUBOEJOH QSFDFEFOU 
the United States favored hard-liners like Adnan Thabit, head of the police
DPNNBOEPT XIPNDMPTFBJEFTDPNQBSFEUPUIF(PEGBUIFSBOEXIPIPTUFEB
HSPUFTRVFiSFBMJUZwTIPXPO64CBDLFE"M*SBRJZBUFMFWJTJPOXIJDIEJTQMBZFE
CBEMZCFBUFO*SBRJTDPOGFTTJOHUPSFTJTUBODFBDUJWJUJFTćFIFBEPGUIF.JOJTUSZ
PGUIF*OUFSJPSJOŵųųŸoŹ #BZBO+BCS BGPSNFSIJHISBOLJOHNFNCFSPGUIF

246 Conclusion
*SBOJBOCBDLFE #BES #SJHBEF  UIF NJMJUBSZ BSN PG UIF GVOEBNFOUBMJTU 4IJJUF
4VQSFNF$PVODJMGPSUIF*TMBNJD3FWPMVUJPO XIJDIIFJODPSQPSBUFEJOUPUIF
*/1 PWFSTBXBUPSUVSFDIBNCFSCFOFBUIIJTPďDFTJOXIJDITVSWJWPSTXFSFMFę
XJUIESJMMNBSLTPOUIFJSTLVMMT4FSWJOHMBUFSBTĕOBODFNJOJTUFS +BCSXPSLFE
XJUI(FOFSBM%BWJE1FUSBFVT XIPSBOUIFNJMJUBSZQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNJO
2005, and Steven Casteel of the CPA, who as DEA intelligence chief in the 1990s
oversaw the killing of drug lord Pablo Escobar and trained Andean security
forces known for “disappearing” peasant leaders and union activists.68
*O%FDFNCFSŵųųŹUIF*SBR4UVEZ(SPVQQPSUSBZFEBHSBWFBOEEFUFSJPSBUJOH
TUBUFPGBČBJST OPUJOHćF4IJJUFEPNJOBUFEQPMJDFVOJUTiDBOOPUDPOUSPMDSJNF
and . . . routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary deten-
tion, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. . . . Many police
QBSUJDJQBUFEJOUSBJOJOHJOPSEFSUPPCUBJOBXFBQPO VOJGPSN BOEBNNVOJUJPO
for use in sectarian violence.”69")VNBO3JHIUT8BUDISFQPSUBSPVOEUIFTBNF
UJNFEFUBJMFEQPMJDFNFUIPETPGJOUFSSPHBUJPOJOXIJDIQSJTPOFSTXFSFCFBUFO
XJUIDBCMFTBOEQJQFT TIPDLFE PSTVTQFOEFEGSPNUIFJSXSJTUTGPSQSPMPOHFE
QFSJPET0OFJOUFSWJFXFFDPNNFOUFE ićJTJTOUBQPMJDFGPSDF JUTBCVODIPG
UIVHTw 8IBU TVDI SFQPSUT JHOPSF JT UIF TZTUFNBUJD 64 SFTQPOTJCJMJUZ 8IFO
BOFBSOFTUBSNZDBQUBJO 1IJM$BSUFS DPNQMBJOFEUP.BKPS(FOFSBM(IBTTBO
Adnan al-Bawi, the police chief in Diyala province, about torture, al-Bawi tell-
JOHMZ SFTQPOEFE  i* POMZ EP XIBU ZPV EP w DJUJOH (VBOUÈOBNP #BZ BOE "CV
Ghraib.70
"T JO "GHIBOJTUBO  UIF */1 XBT B GSFRVFOU UBSHFU PG JOTVSHFOU BUUBDLT  ŷŶ
percent of which, according to one study, were directed against U.S.-backed
TFDVSJUZGPSDFT/FBSMZUISFFUIPVTBOEQPMJDFXFSFLJMMFEBOEPWFSĕWFUIPV-
TBOE JOKVSFE CFUXFFO 4FQUFNCFS ŵųųŸ BOE "QSJM ŵųųŹ BMPOF 5XP %ZO$PSQ
FNQMPZFFTBOENJMJUBSZBEWJTFSTEJFEJOUIFTBNFQFSJPE*OBSFĘFDUJPOPGUIF
WJPMFOUDMJNBUFCSFECZUIFPDDVQBUJPO TFWFSBMIJHISBOLJOHPďDFST JODMVEJOH
UIFIFBEPGUIFTFSJPVTDSJNFTVOJUJO#BHIEBE XFSFTIPUEFBECZ64TPMEJFST
XIP UIPVHIU UIFZ XFSF TVJDJEF CPNCFST71 *SBRJ QPMJDF FYQSFTTFE SFTFOUNFOU
UPXBSE "NFSJDBOT BOE SBSFMZ BDLOPXMFEHFE UIFJS BEWJDF  DPOEFNOJOH UIFN
BTDPXBSEMZBOEIZQPDSJUJDBM GPSOPUUBLJOH UIF TBNFSJTLT UP UIFJS MJWFT BOE
GPSCFJOHCFUUFSQSPUFDUFEGSPNBUUBDL.BOZGFMUUIBUUIFZXFSFCFJOHTFUVQUP
CFLJMMFE"QPMJDFMJFVUFOBOUJO#BHIEBEDPNQMBJOFE ićF<"NFSJDBOT>IJEF
behind the barricades while we are here in the streets without even guns to
protect ourselves.”72
"T JO UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT BOE 7JFUOBN FBSMJFS  "NFSJDBO BEWJTFST IBSCPSFE
SBDJBMTUFSFPUZQFTPG*SBRJTBOEIBEBQBUFSOBMJTUJDBOEDPMPOJBMNJOETFUUIBU
CSFEGVSUIFSSFTFOUNFOU*OBNFNPJSPGIJTZFBSJO*SBR 3PCFSU$PMF BQPMJDF
PďDFSGSPN&BTU1BMP"MUP $BMJGPSOJB BOEB%ZO$PSQFNQMPZFF FYQMBJOTUIBU
UIFTFBUUJUVEFTXFSFJOHSBJOFEJOBNJOJoCPPUDBNQUSBJOJOHTFTTJPO XIFSFIF
XBT iCSBJOXBTIFE  SFQSPHSBNNFE  BOE EFTFOTJUJ[FEw BOE iNPSQIFEw JOUP B

The Violence Comes Full Circle 247


iUSBJOFE QSPGFTTJPOBM LJMMFSw 0OF PG UIF NBKPS MFTTPOT UBVHIU XBT UIBU *SBRJT
VOEFSTUBOE POMZ GPSDF $PMF XBT UPME UP TIPPU ĕSTU BOE UIJOL MBUFS BOE UP
JOTUSVDUQPMJDFUPEPUIFTBNFi*GZPVTFFBTVTQJDJPVT*SBRJDJWJMJBO QVMMZPVS
XFBQPOBOEHVOIJNEPXO wIFXBTJOTUSVDUFEi:PVEPOUĕSFPOF‫ڀڀ‬PSUXP
TIPUT‫ڀڀ‬:PVSJEEMFIJTTPSSZBTTXJUICVMMFUTVOUJMZPVSFTVSFIFTEFBEBTB
doorknob.”73
ćJT JT BO JOWFSTJPO OPU KVTU PG EFNPDSBUJD QPMJDF NFUIPET CVU FWFO PG
8FTUFSODPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZEPDUSJOF XIJDI BUMFBTUJOUIFPSZ BEWPDBUFTNPE-
eration in the use of force in order to avoid antagonizing the population and
DSFBUJOHNBSUZST74 No wonder the scope of violence has been so vast. Never-
UIFMFTT EFTQJUFBMMUIFCMPPETIFEBOEBMMUIFOFHBUJWFSFQPSUT UIF*SBR4UVEZ
(SPVQSFDPNNFOEFEFYQBOEJOHQPMJDFUSBJOJOH&ČPSUTXFSFNBEFUPJODMVEF
4VOOJTBOEQVSHFDPSSVQUFMFNFOUT75&YUSBKVEJDJBMWJPMFODFSFNBJOFEFOEFNJD 
IPXFWFS JOTQJUFPGBEFDMJOFJOFUIOJDLJMMJOHTSFTVMUJOHGSPNUIFFYIBVTUJPOPG
UIFXBSSJOHQBSUJFTBOEUIFUSJVNQIPGUIF4IJB0O.BSDIŴŹ ŵųųż UIFNew
York Times reported that police continuously linked to torture had abducted
BOELJMMFETJYQSJTPOFSTSFMFBTFEGSPN$BNQ#VDDBJOSFUSJCVUJPOGPSUIFJSEBZT
BT JOTVSHFOUT *O TQSJOH ŵųŴŴ UIFZ TIPU VOBSNFE DJWJMJBOT EFNPOTUSBUJOH JO
TZNQBUIZXJUIUIF&HZQUJBOSFWPMVUJPO76
During the 2007-8 “surge,” heavy responsibility was delegated to the police
GPSNBOOJOHDIFDLQPJOUTBOEBJEJOHJODPNCBUPQFSBUJPOTBHBJOTU.VRUBEBBM
4BEST.BIEJ"SNZ "M2BFEB BOEPUIFSSFTJTUBODFGPSDFT JOUFOTJGZJOHPQQPS-
UVOJUJFTGPSFYUPSUJPOBOEBCVTFćFMPOHUFSNDPOTFRVFODFTSFNBJOVODFSUBJO
3PCFSU . 8JUBKFXTLJ  EJSFDUPS PG UIF 64 FNCBTTZT -BX &OGPSDFNFOU BOE
$PSSFDUJPOBM"ČBJSTQSPHSBN FYQSFTTFEDPODFSOUIBUJOiPWFSNJMJUBSJ[JOHUIF
police,” the United States was potentially “creating an entity that could cause
a coup down the road.”77ćFSFBSFQMFOUZPGIJTUPSJDBMFYBNQMFTPGTVDIGFBST
CFJOHCPSOFPVU'FXJO8BTIJOHUPO IPXFWFS BQQFBSFEUPBDLOPXMFEHFUIFN 
BTXBTFWJEFOUJOUIF0CBNBBENJOJTUSBUJPOTQSPWJTJPOPGPWFSžŵCJMMJPOGPS
police and security assistance as the U.S. troop presence was scaled down.
"NFSJDBO NJTNBOBHFNFOU PG UIF *SBRJ DPSSFDUJPOBM TZTUFN DPNQPVOEFE
UIFOFHBUJWFFČFDUTPGUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTBOEIFMQFEDBUBMZ[FPQQPTJUJPOUP
UIF PDDVQBUJPO -JLF QPMJDF QSFDJODUT  *SBRT QSJTPOT BOE DPVSUIPVTFT XFSF
CBEMZMPPUFEJOUIFBęFSNBUIPGUIFJOWBTJPO1SJTPOFSSFDPSETXFOUNJTTJOH 
BOEJONBUFTFTDBQFEPSXFSFSFMFBTFECZ4BEEBNCFGPSFIFĘFEJOUPIJEJOH*O
May 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft contracted with ICITAP to restore
law and order by rebuilding the prisons. Structural repairs were undertaken
and a guard training course was initiated. Ashcroft pointed to the new prison
TZTUFNBTBTIJOJOHFYBNQMFPGUIFGSFFEPNUIBUUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXBTTVQQPT-
FEMZTQSFBEJOHJO*SBR
According to a RAND Corporation study, however, nearly 90 percent of
detainees were innocent of any charge and were often held for long periods

248 Conclusion
XJUIPVU USJBM #Z ŵųŴŴ UIF DPVSU TZTUFN SFNBJOFE OPOGVODUJPOBM  XJUI POF
TJYUI PG KVEHFT BDDVTFE PG DPSSVQUJPO  "T JO 7JFUOBN  TXFFQJOH BSSFTUT MFE
UPSBNQBOUPWFSDSPXEJOH SFTVMUJOHJOPVUCSFBLTPGUVCFSDVMPTJT TDBCJFT BOE
PUIFSEJTFBTFT*ONBUFTIBEUPTMFFQTUBOEJOHVQBOEXFSFTVCKFDUFEUPTFOTPSZ
EFQSJWBUJPO CFBUJOHT BOEPUIFSGPSNTPGQTZDIPMPHJDBMUPSUVSFMPOHQSPNPUFE
CZ UIF $*" (VBSET QSPWJEFE DPOEPNT BOE NFEJDBM DBSF JO SFUVSO GPS DBTI
SFXBSETPSTFYVBMGBWPST.BMFBOEGFNBMFQSJTPOFST JODMVEJOHKVWFOJMFT XFSF
SBQFE 3JPUT  IVOHFS TUSJLFT  BOE BUUBDLT CZ JOTVSHFOUT XFSF DPNNPO ćF
1FOUBHPODMBJNFEUIBUUIPTFXIPEJFEJODVTUPEZXFSFiTIPUXIJMFUSZJOHUP
FTDBQFw 0OF "NFSJDBO PďDFS TUBUFE UIBU TJY ZFBST XBT B MJGF TFOUFODF JO BO
*SBRJQSJTPOCFDBVTFUIBUXBTUIFFTUJNBUFEMJGFTQBOUIFSF78
"GBSDSZGSPNUIF1I%TJOPDDVQJFE+BQBO NBOZPGUIF"NFSJDBOTTFMFDUFE
UPPWFSTFFUIFQSJTPOTZTUFNIBEDIFDLFSFEQBTUTXIFOJUDBNFUPQSJTPOFST
SJHIUT  IBWJOH CFFO BDDVTFE PG NBMGFBTBODF BT DPSSFDUJPOBM FYFDVUJWFT JO UIF
6OJUFE4UBUFTćFBTTJTUBOUEJSFDUPSPGQSJTPOT +PIO+"SNTUSPOH GPSFYBNQMF 
IBECFFOGPSDFEUPSFTJHOBTIFBEPGUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG$PSSFDUJPOTJO$PO-
OFDUJDVUBęFSTFUUMJOHBMBXTVJUCSPVHIUCZUIF"NFSJDBO$JWJM-JCFSUJFT6OJPO
BOE UIF GBNJMJFT PG UXP JONBUFT XIP EJFE JO B TVQFSNBY GBDJMJUZ XIJDI UIF
National Prison Project referred to as a “high-tech dungeon.” One of the vic-
UJNTEJFEPGIFBSUGBJMVSFBęFSHPJOHJOUPEJBCFUJDTIPDLBOEUIFOCFJOHIJUXJUI
BĕęZUIPVTBOEoWPMUFMFDUSJDDIBSHFCZBHVBSEXJFMEJOHBTUVOHVO"SNTUSPOH
BMTP JHOPSFE DPNQMBJOUT PG TFYVBM BCVTF PG GFNBMF HVBSET PO IJT XBUDI )F
was appointed by the since disgraced Republican governor John G. Rowland,
XIPPODFDPNQMBJOFEUIBUQSJTPOTJO$POOFDUJDVUSFTFNCMFEi$MVC.FEoTUZMF
resorts.”79 ćFTF DPNNFOUT SFĘFDUFE UIF UPVHIPODSJNF BUUJUVEF QSFWBMFOU
BNPOH DPOTFSWBUJWFT UIBU MFE UP EFUFSJPSBUJOH DPOEJUJPOT BOE B EFDMJOF JO
DPODFSOGPSQSJTPOFSTSJHIUT XIJDITQJMMFEPWFSJOUP"NFSJDBTJOUFSOBUJPOBM
practices.80
*$*5"1TUBČNFNCFS5FSSZ%FMBOEGBDFEMBXTVJUTXIJMFTFSWJOHBTEJSFDUPS
of corrections in Utah for subjecting prisoners to cruel and unusual punish-
NFOUBęFSBSFCFMMJPOPWFSVOBDDFQUBCMFDPOEJUJPOT JODMVEJOHGPSDJOHUIFNUP
MJFGBDFEPXOPVUEPPSTGPSEBZTPOFOEBOEMFBWJOHUIFNUPVSJOBUFBOEEFGFDBUF
POUIFNTFMWFT%FMBOEGVSUIFSSFGVTFEUPEJTDJQMJOFHVBSETXIPIBELFQUBOPO-
WJPMFOUPČFOEFSOBLFEGPSĕęZTJYEBZTJOBiTUSJQDFMM wXIJDIXBTEFTDSJCFE
JO DPVSU EPDVNFOUT BT IBWJOH iOP XJOEPXT  OP JOUFSJPS MJHIUT  OP CVOL  OP
ĘPPSDPWFSJOH BOEOPUPJMFUFYDFQUGPSBIPMFJOUIFDPODSFUFĘPPSXIJDIXBT
ĘVTIFEJSSFHVMBSMZGSPNPVUTJEFUIFDFMMw"OPUIFS*$*5"1TUBČFS $PMPOFM-BOF
.D$PUUFS BTEJSFDUPSPGUIF5FYBT%FQBSUNFOUPG$PSSFDUJPOTIBEGPSDFEUIPV-
TBOETPGJONBUFTJOUPUJOZJTPMBUJPODIBNCFSTGPSSFDPSEQFSJPETJOSFTQPOTF
to gang violence. He had also been forced to resign as corrections director in
6UBI JO Ŵżżź XIFO B NFOUBMMZ JMM JONBUF EJFE BęFS HVBSET MFę IJN TIBDLMFE
OBLFEUPBSFTUSBJOJOHDIBJSGPSTJYUFFOIPVST.D$PUUFSUIFOCFDBNFBOFYFDV-

The Violence Comes Full Circle 249


UJWFPGBQSJWBUFQSJTPODPNQBOZXIPTFKBJMTXFSFTUSPOHMZDSJUJDJ[FEJOB+VTUJDF
%FQBSUNFOUSFQPSUKVTUBNPOUICFGPSFUIFEFQBSUNFOUTFOUIJNUP*SBR0OF
PGUIFDPNQBOZTGBDJMJUJFTJO4BOUB'F /FX.FYJDP MBDLFEBEFRVBUFNFEJDBM
BOENFOUBMIFBMUIDBSFBOEIBEOPTVJDJEFQSFWFOUJPOQMBO XIJDIDPOUSJCVUFE
UPBOJONBUFTIBOHJOHIJNTFMG81
.D$PUUFS ĕSTU JEFOUJĕFE "CV (ISBJC BT UIF CFTU TJUF GPS "NFSJDBT NBJO
civilian prison and helped to rebuild the facility and train guards after the U.S.
JOWBTJPO .BOZ PG UIF UPSUVSF UFDIOJRVFT FNQMPZFE UIFSF XIJDI ĕSTU DBNF
UP MJHIU JO ŵųųŷ  JODMVEJOH TFYVBM IVNJMJBUJPO BOE TFOTPSZ EFQSJWBUJPO  IBE
MPOHCFFOVTFEJO"NFSJDBOQSJTPOTXIFSFBOVNCFSPGUIFHVBSETQSFWJPVTMZ
XPSLFE+VMJBO#POE DIBJSNBOPGUIF/""$1 DPNNFOUFEi4BEMZ UIFSFJTOP
TVSQSJTFJOUIFIPSSJĕDQIPUPTGSPN*SBR"NFSJDBOTPGDPMPSBSFBMMUPPGBNJMJBS
XJUIJODJEFOUTPGQSJTPOFSBCVTFTUSFUDIJOHGSPNUIFEJTUBOUQBTUUPUIFQSFTFOU
EBZ*UCFHJOTXIFOUIFQFSTPOIFMEQSJTPOFSJTDPOTJEFSFEMFTTAIVNBOUIBOUIF
prison guard.” 4FOBUPS$IBSMFT4DIVNFS B/FX:PSL%FNPDSBU BHSFFEi8IFO
ZPVBTLZPVSTFMGXIZUIFSFJTBNFTTJO*SBRJQSJTPOT KVTUMPPLBUUIFLJOEPG
oversight and checking that was done with the people that were put in charge.
8JUIUIFTFLJOETPGQFPQMF XBTUIFSFBOZEPVCUUIBUUIFQSJTPOTZTUFNXPVME
CFSVOJOBEFDFOUXBZ "CTPMVUFMZOPUw82
*OŵųųŹUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDFBQQPJOUFE014WFUFSBO%POBME#PSEFO-
LJSDIFSUPSFQBJSUIFQVCMJDSFMBUJPOTEBNBHFDBVTFECZUIF"CV(ISBJCTDBOEBM
BOEJNQSPWFDPOEJUJPOTGPSUIFFJHIUZUIPVTBOEDJWJMJBOQSJTPOFSTJO*SBRJGBDJM-
JUJFTPWFSTFFOCZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT‰BTJNJMBSUBTLUPUIFPOFIFIBECFFOHJWFO
BęFS UIF FYQPTVSF PG UIF iUJHFS DBHFTw JO 7JFUOBN *O UIF JOUFSWFOJOH ZFBST 
Bordenkircher had done consulting work in Saudi Arabia and was warden of
the federal penitentiary in Moundsville, West Virginia, which a Chicago-based
QSJTPOSFGPSNBTTPDJBUJPODIBSBDUFSJ[FEBTBNPOHUIFXPSTUJOUIFDPVOUSZJU
XBTJOGFTUFEXJUIDPDLSPBDIFTBOEĘFBT UIFSFXBTBTUFODIGSPNCBEQMVNCJOH
BOEUIFMFBLJOHPGSBXTFXBHF UIFDFMMTXFSFMFTTUIBOIBMGUIFSFDPNNFOEFE
TJ[F BOEUIFSFXFSFOPSFIBCJMJUBUJPOQSPHSBNT
Known as tough-talking and a stern disciplinarian, Bordenkircher would
MPDL EPXO UIF XIPMF GBDJMJUZ FWFO GPS SFMBUJWFMZ NJOPS JOGSBDUJPOT CZ B GFX
JONBUFTBOEGPSDFUIPTFJONBUFTUPTQFOENPOUITJOTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOU)F
once stated that if a hostage situation occurred, after one warning the hostage-
UBLFSXPVMECFFYFDVUFE SFHBSEMFTTPGIJTEFNBOET*OŴżŻŹ BęFSIJTFMFDUJPOBT
UPXOTIFSJČJO.PVOETWJMMF #PSEFOLJSDIFSPWFSTBXUIFDSVTIJOHPGBOJONBUF
SFCFMMJPOUIBUBSPTFBTBSFTVMUPGXSFUDIFEQSJTPODPOEJUJPOTOPUGBSSFNPWFE
GSPNUIPTFIFIBEPWFSTFFOBEFDBEFBOEBIBMGFBSMJFSJO4PVUI7JFUOBNćF
XBSEFO BU UIF UJNF XBT POF PG #PSEFOLJSDIFST QSPUÏHÏT XIP IBE CFFO IJT
deputy and was also known for his authoritarian style.83
"QSPEVDUPGUIFQPTUo8PSME8BS**iWJDUPSZDVMUVSFwXIPHSFXVQJOBO
JNQPWFSJTIFE 0IJP TUFFM UPXO EVSJOH UIF EFQSFTTJPO  #PSEFOLJSDIFS TVC-

250 Conclusion
TDSJCFEUISPVHIPVUIJTDBSFFSUPBGVOEBNFOUBMMZDPOTFSWBUJWFPVUMPPL DIBSBD-
UFSJ[FECZBEJTEBJOGPSBOZLJOEPGEJTTFOUBHBJOTUUIFTUBUVTRVP SFHBSEMFTTPG
UIFDJSDVNTUBODFT*OUIJTSFTQFDUIFSFTFNCMFEDPOUFNQPSBSJFTTVDIBT#ZSPO
&OHMF XIPCFMJFWFEUIBUUIFiMFęXJOHwQSFTTBOEiMJNPVTJOFMJCFSBMTwJO$PO-
HSFTT IBE DPOTQJSFE UP EFTUSPZ UIF 014 &OHMF DIBNQJPOFE OFPDPOTFSWBUJWF
DBVTFTJOSFUJSFNFOU JODMVEJOHQSFTTJOHGPSBOFOEUPDPOHSFTTJPOBMTBODUJPOT
BHBJOTUUIFXIJUFTVQSFNBDJTUHPWFSONFOUPG*BO4NJUIJO4PVUIFSO3IPEFTJB
;JNCBCXF BOEGPSNPSFBHHSFTTJWFNFBTVSFTUPDPNCBUi.BSYJTUUFSSPSJTNw
worldwide.84 "OPUIFS FYBNQMF JT +FUFS 8JMMJBNTPO  XIP BU BHF FJHIUZFJHIU
wrote a letter to the editor of the Greensboro, North Carolina, News and Record
POUIFFWFPGUIFŵųųŷFMFDUJPODSJUJDJ[JOH%FNPDSBUJDDBOEJEBUF+PIO',FSSZT
iWJDJPVTEFGBNBUJPOwPG64USPPQTEVSJOHUIFXBSJO7JFUOBN TUBUJOHUIBUIF
IJNTFMGXBTOPUBXBSFPGBOZBUSPDJUJFTFYDFQUGPSiUFSSPSJTUBDUJPOwDPNNJUUFE
CZUIFi7JFUDPOHwBHBJOTUDJWJMJBOTBOEQPMJDFXIPNIFIBEUSBJOFE ĕęFFOPG
XIPNXFSFLJMMFEFBDINPOUI85
"TIJTNFNPJSTSFMBUF #PSEFOLJSDIFSWJFXFEUIPTFXIPIFMQFEUPFYQPTF
UIFVTFPGUJHFSDBHFT JODMVEJOHJOBOPEEQBJSJOH%POBME-VDFBOE8JMMJBN
$PMCZ  BT EVQFT PG )BOPJ QSPQBHBOEB )F ĕSTU KPJOFE UIF 014  IF XSJUFT  UP
BWPJESBJTJOHIJTDIJMESFOJO$BMJGPSOJBBUBUJNFXIFOBOUJXBSBDUJWJTNQSP-
MJGFSBUFE $POTJEFSJOH UIF BCVTF BU "CV (ISBJC UP IBWF CFFO OPUIJOH NPSF
UIBO iTFSJPVT DPMMFHF IB[JOH w IF DMBJNT UIBU JO *SBR  QSJTPOFST UPME IJN UIBU
"M2BFEBSFDFJWFEBTTJTUBODFGSPNPOFPG4BEEBNTTPOTCFGPSFżŴŴ and that
XFBQPOTPGNBTTEFTUSVDUJPOFYJTUFE, vindicating the decision to go to war.86
#PSEFOLJSDIFS TFSWFT BT BO JOUFSFTUJOH CSJEHF ĕHVSF XIP FYFNQMJĕFT UIF
DPOUJOVJUZJOQPMJDJFTGSPN7JFUOBNUP*SBRUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTJUTFMG XIFSF
IBSTI NFBTVSFT BSF DPOUJOVPVTMZ KVTUJĕFE PO iTFDVSJUZw HSPVOET BOE CZ UIF
EFNPOJ[BUJPOPGWBSJPVTTPDJBMHSPVQT)FGVSUIFSFNCPEJFTUIFQBSBEPYFTPG
UIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTCZQSPNPUJOHUIFQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPOBOENPEFSOJ[BUJPO
PGDSJNJOBMKVTUJDFJOTUJUVUJPOTJOUIFTFSWJDFPG64HMPCBMIFHFNPOZ UIFLJOE
of thinking that has led to considerable excesses and violence.

Since the Nixon and Reagan eras, with the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, the
"NFSJDBODSJNJOBMKVTUJDFTZTUFNIBTCFFONBSSFECZTZTUFNBUJDBCVTF NBL-
JOHJUTSFQSFTFOUBUJWFTJMMTVJUFEGPSUIFUBTLPGSFCVJMEJOHUIF*SBRJTZTUFN PS
UIBUPGBOZPUIFSDPVOUSZ*OŵųųŴ )VNBO3JHIUT8BUDISFQPSUFEUIBUQSJTPO-
FSTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXFSFiCFBUFOXJUIĕTUTBOECBUPOT TUPNQFEPO LJDLFE 
TIPU  TUVOOFE XJUI FMFDUSPOJD EFWJDFT  EPVTFE XJUI DIFNJDBM TQSBZT  DIPLFE 
BOE TMBNNFE GBDF ĕSTU JOUP DPODSFUF ĘPPST CZ UIF PďDFST XIPTF KPC JU JT UP
HVBSEUIFN*ONBUFTIBWFFOEFEVQXJUICSPLFOKBXT TNBTIFESJCT QFSGPSBUFE
FBSESVNT NJTTJOHUFFUI CVSOTDBST‰OPUUPNFOUJPOQTZDIPMPHJDBMTDBSTBOE
FNPUJPOBM QBJO 4PNF IBWF EJFEw " EJTQSPQPSUJPOBUF BNPVOU PG UIF DSVFMUZ
took place during George W. Bush’s tenure as governor of Texas, where a judge

The Violence Comes Full Circle 251


DPODMVEFE UIBU iUIF QSJTPOT IBE CFDPNF B DVMUVSF PG TBEJTUJD BOE NBMJDJPVT
violence.”87 .VDI BT XJUI UIF 014  NPEFSOEBZ QPMJDF BEWJTFST IBWF IFMQFE
USBOTGFSUPPUIFSDPVOUSJFTTPNFPGUIFXPSTUBTQFDUTPGUIF"NFSJDBODSJNJOBM
KVTUJDFTZTUFN DPOUSJCVUJOHUPFYUFOTJWFIVNBOSJHIUTWJPMBUJPOTćFJSSPMFJO
FYQPSUJOHSFQSFTTJPOFODBQTVMBUFTUIFEBSLTJEFPGUIF"NFSJDBOFNQJSF XIJDI
IBTCFFOTVTUBJOFEUISPVHIUIFEFDBEFT MJLFBMMPUIFSFNQJSFT CZWJPMFODFBOE
DPFSDJPOćF*SBRJBOE"GHIBOQFPQMFBSFCVUUIFMBUFTUUPCFBSJUTXSBUI

252 Conclusion
Abbreviations Used in Notes

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force


 #BTF .POUHPNFSZ "MB
"*%/$ %FWFMPQNFOU1SPKFDU'JMFT3FMBUFEUP/BSDPUJDT$POUSPM  
Office of Public Safety, NARA
"."( "NFSJDBO.JMJUBSZ"TTJTUBODF(SFFDF
".)* 64"SNZ.JMJUBSZ)JTUPSZ*OTUJUVUF $BSMJTMF#BSSBDLT 
Military History Research Institute, Carlisle, Pa.
ASJ Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Papers, White House Files, John F.
Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston
#'&" 644UBUF%FQBSUNFOU #VSFBVPG'BS&BTUFSO"ČBJST
BIA Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, NARA
BNDD Records of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
 GPSNFSMZ'#/ /"3"
CI Special Group on Counter-Insurgency, John F. Kennedy
cabinet
CIA Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intel-
ligence, Washington, D.C.
$*# $SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJPO#SBODI 64"SNZ
$*$ $PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF$PSQT 64"SNZ
CORDS Records of the Office of Civil Operations for Rural Develop-
 NFOU4VQQPSU /"3"
DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans.
GHQ SCAP 3FDPSETPGUIF(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST 4VQSFNF$PNNBOEFS 
for the Allied Powers, NARA
("0 64(PWFSONFOU"DDPVOUBCJMJUZ0ďDF 8BTIJOHUPO %$
(10 64(PWFSONFOU1SJOUJOH0ďDF
HLHU Houghton Library, Harvard University
)2."$7 )FBERVBSUFST 3FDPSETPG64.JMJUBSZ"TTJTUBODF$PN 
 NBOE 7JFUOBN
)264"7 )FBERVBSUFST 3FDPSETPG64"SNZ 7JFUOBN
)45- )BSSZ45SVNBO1SFTJEFOUJBM-JCSBSZ *OEFQFOEFODF .P
HTA Henry T. Allen Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.

253
*$" 3FDPSETPGUIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPO  
 64%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF /"3"
*1" *OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ 8BTIJOHUPO %$
IPS Internal Defense and Public Safety
JFKL John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation and Human Resource
Exploitation Training Manual, George Washington Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C.
-#+- -ZOEPO#BJOFT+PIOTPO-JCSBSZ.VTFVN "VTUJO 5FY
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MSUA Michigan State University Archives
.46( .JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ7JFUOBN"EWJTPSZ(SPVQ
/"3" /BUJPOBM"SDIJWFTBOE3FDPSET"ENJOJTUSBUJPO $PMMFHF1BSL  
Md.
/"$-" /PSUI"NFSJDBO$POHSFTTPO-BUJO"NFSJDB
NSA National Security Archive, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C.
/4$' /BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM'JMFT )BSSZ45SVNBO1SFTJEFOUJBM 
Library, Independence, Mo.
NSF National Security Files
OCB Operations Coordinating Board
0$.) 0ďDFPGUIF$IJFGPG.JMJUBSZ)JTUPSZ %FQBSUNFOUPGUIF 
 64"SNZ 8BTIJOHUPO %$
0*41 0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBN
0.(64 3FDPSETPGUIF0ďDFPG.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUGPS(FSNBOZ  
NARA
OPS Records of the Office of Public Safety, NARA
OSS Records of the Office of Strategic Services, NARA
POF President’s Office Files, Counterinsurgency, JFKL
PSD Records of the Public Safety Division, NARA
PSF President’s Secretary’s Files
3"'4&" 3FDPSETPG64"SNFE'PSDFTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB /"3"
3"00) 3FDPSETPG"MMJFE0QFSBUJPOTBOE0DDVQBUJPO)FBERVBSUFST  
World War II, NARA
3%&" 3FDPSETPGUIF%SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO /"3"
3%4 3FDPSETPGUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF /"3"
RFAA Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, NARA
RFAK Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Mission to Korea,
National Archives, College, Park, Md.
RG Record Group
38, 3PCFSU8,PNFS1BQFST +PIO',FOOFEZ1SFTJEFOUJBM 
Library, Boston

254 Abbreviations Used in Notes


4$"1 3FDPSETPGUIF4VQSFNF$PNNBOEFSGPSUIF"MMJFE1PXFST  
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
4)"&' 3FDPSETPG4VQSFNF)FBERVBSUFST"MMJFE&YQFEJUJPOBSZ 
Force, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
556 5FYBT5FDI6OJWFSTJUZ UIF7JFUOBN$FOUFSBOE"SDIJWF  
Lubbock
64"'*, 3FDPSETPG64"SNZ'PSDFTJO,PSFB /"3"
64"*% 3FDPSETPGUIF64"HFODZGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM%FWFMPQNFOU  
Washington, D.C.
USOM Records of the United States Operations Mission, NARA
8$' 8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT1BQFST )PVHIUPO-JCSBSZ )BSWBSE 
University
;/" ;BNCJBO/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFT -VTBLB

Abbreviations Used in Notes 255


“This page intentionally left blank”
Notes

Introduction
1. Mark Hosenball, Ron Moreau, and T. Christian Miller, “The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot
Straight: Six Billion Dollars Later, the Afghan National Police Can’t Begin to Do Their Jobs
3JHIU‰/FWFS.JOE3FMJFWF"NFSJDBO'PSDFT wNewsweek, March 19, 2010, 29.
2. See Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: The United States and Latin America (Dur-
IBN %VLF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżżŻ  .JDIBFM 5 ,MBSF BOE $ZOUIJB "SPOTPO  Supplying
Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
Policy Studies, 1981); A. J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors: The Truth about U.S. Police Operations
in Latin America /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŴżźŻ Ŵŵų
3. George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays /FX:PSL)BSDPVSU#SBDFBOE
$PNQBOZ ŴżŷŸ Ŷoŷ
4. See Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in
the Americas %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŷ GPSBQBSBMMFM
5. See Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877–1920 /FX:PSL)JMMBOE8BOH ŴżŹŹ 
Tony Platt, ed., The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the U.S. Police (Berkeley:
$FOUFSGPS3FTFBSDIPO$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF ŴżźŸ 
Ź4FF8JMMJBN&-FVDIUFOCVSH i1SPHSFTTJWJTNBOE*NQFSJBMJTNćF1SPHSFTTJWF.PWF-
NFOU BOE "NFSJDBO 'PSFJHO 1PMJDZ  ŴŻżŻoŴżŴŹ w Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39
%FDFNCFSŴżŸŵ Ÿųų"MBO%BXMFZ Changing the World: American Progressives in War and
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). For insights into the ideological
vision of policy elites, see Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven:
:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻź (BCSJFM,PMLP The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analy-
sis of Power and Purpose #PTUPO#FBDPO1SFTT ŴżŹż .JDIBFM-BUIBN The Right Kind of
Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the
Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
7. On this point, see Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the
Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
2009).
Ż.BSL))BMMFS i)JTUPSJDBM3PPUTPG1PMJDF#FIBWJPS$IJDBHP ŴŻżųoŴżŵŸ wLaw and
Society Review 10 (Winter 1976): 308.
9. Frank J. Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban
America #FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŴżżŴ 4BNVFM8BMLFS Popular Justice: A
History of American Criminal Justice,ŵOEFE /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ Źŵ
10. Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens,WPMŴ /FX:PSL)BSDPVSU
Brace, 1931), 207.
ŴŴ4JNPO"$PMF Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identifi-
cation $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŴ 4BNVFM8BMLFS A Critical History of
Police Reform (Washington, D.C.: Lexington Books, 1977).

257
12. Marilynn S. Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New York City (Bos-
ton: Beacon Press, 2003), 9; Donner, Protectors of Privilege,ŷŷoŹŷ4ZEOFZ)BSSJOH Polic-
ing a Class Society: The Experience of American Cities, 1865–1915 (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1983).
13. Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice $BNCSJEHF )BSWBSE
6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŵŷ/BUJPOBM$PNNJTTJPOPO-BX0CTFSWBODFBOE&OGPSDFNFOU 
Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1931), 38, 173;
/BUJPOBM $PNNJTTJPO PO -BX 0CTFSWBODF BOE &OGPSDFNFOU  Report on Police, no. 14
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1931), 17; Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, Police Reform in
the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905–1932 (Berkeley: University of Califor-
OJB1SFTT Ŵżźŷ ŹŹoŹź&NNBOVFM)-BWJOF The Third Degree: A Detailed and Appalling
Exposé of Police Brutality /FX :PSL 7BOHVBSE 1SFTT  ŴżŶų  1MBUU  The Iron Fist and the
Velvet Glove,ŶŵoŷŴ+PF%PNBOJDL To Protect and to Serve: The LAPD’s Century of War in
the City of Dreams /FX:PSL'JHVFSPB ŵųųŶ ŷż'PSNPSFPOUIFQSPCMFNTBTTPDJBUFE
XJUIQPMJDFiQSPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPOwJOUIF1SPHSFTTJWF&SB TFFćPNBT"3FQQFUUP The Blue
Parade /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ BOE8JMMJBN5VSOFS The Police Establishment (New
:PSL(11VUOBN ŴżŹŻ 
Ŵŷ 4FF %BWJE 3PUINBO  Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives
in Progressive America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Rebecca M. McLennan, The Crisis of
Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American Penal State, 1776–1941 (New
:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ 
15. See Donald L. Garrity, “The Prison as Rehabilitative Agency,” in The Prison: Studies
in Institutional Organization and Change,FE%POBME$SFTTFZ /FX:PSL)PMU 3JOFIBSU
8JOTUPO ŴżŹŴ ŶŸŻoŻŴ'SBOL5BOOFOCBVN, Crime and the Community (Boston: Ginn,
1939), 71; Mabel Elliott, Coercion in Penal Treatment: Past and Present *UIBDB /:1BDJĕTU
3FTFBSDI#VSFBV Ŵżŷź ŶŻ ŷŴ+BNFT7#FOOFUU XJUI3PEOFZ$BNQCFMM I Chose Prison
/FX:PSL,OPQG Ŵżźų ŵŸ&SJD$VNNJOT The Rise and Fall of California’s Radical Prison
Movement (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994); Kenyon J. Scudder, Prisoners Are
People /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŸŵ 
16. John L. Gillin, Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology /FX:PSL.BDNJMMBO 
ŴżŶŴ ŵżŸożŹ
17. David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow
Justice /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT Ŵżżź (JMMJO Taming the Criminal, 263; Robert Perkinson,
Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųŴų 
Mortality rates not surprisingly were extraordinarily high.
18. Kate Richards O’Hare, In Prison /FX:PSL,OPQG ŴżŵŶ ŹŶ ŹŸ Źź&EHBSEP3PUNBO 
ićF'BJMVSFPG3FGPSN6OJUFE4UBUFT ŴŻŹŸUPŴżŹŸ wJOThe Oxford History of the Prison, ed.
/PSWBM.PSSJTBOE%BWJE3PUINBO /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŸ Ŵźź+PTFQI
'JTINBO UIF64JOTQFDUPSGPSQSJTPOT SFGFSSFEUPDPVOUZKBJMTJOUIJTQFSJPEBTBiEFCBVDI
PGEJSU EJTFBTF BOEEFHFOFSBDZw RVPUFEJO3PUNBO Ŵźź 4FFBMTP+PTFQI''JTINBOXJUI
7FF1FSMNBO Crucibles of Crime /FX:PSL$PTNPQPMJT1SFTT ŴżŵŶ 
19. George Jackson, Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson, rev. ed. (New
:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM#PPLT Ŵżżŷ 
20. Ben H. Bagdikian and Leon Dash, The Shame of the Prisons /FX:PSL1PDLFU#PPLT 
1972), 3. See also Leonard Orlando, Prisons: Houses of Darkness /FX :PSL 'SFF 1SFTT 
ŴżźŸ &EJUPSTPG3BNQBSUTBOE'SBOL#SPXOJOH Prison Life: A Study of the Explosive Condi-
tions in America’s Prisons /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ 
ŵŴ4FF4BTIB"CSBNTLZ American Furies: Crime, Punishment, and Vengeance in the Age

258 Notes to Pages 4–5


of Mass Imprisonment #PTUPO#FBDPO1SFTT ŵųųź +BNFT"VTUJOBOE+PIO*SXJO It’s About
Time: America’s Imprisonment Binge,SFWFE #FMNPOU $BMJG8BETXPSUI ŴżżŹ $ISJTUJBO
Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (London: Verso, 1999);
)BOOB)PMMFNBO 3PCFSU8.D$IFTOFZ +PIO#FMMBNZ'PTUFS BOE3+BNJM+POOB ićF
Penal State in an Age of Crisis,” Monthly ReviewŹŴ +VOFŵųųż ŴoŴŹ
22. Studs Terkel, “Servants of the State: A Conversation with Daniel Ellsberg,” Harper’s,
February 1972, 56.
23. See Charles DeBenedetti, ed., Peace Heroes in Twentieth-Century America #MPPN-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 6, 7; Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCar-
thyism in America #PTUPO -JUUMF  #SPXO  ŴżżŻ  8JMMJBN 8 5VSOFS  Power on the Right
#FSLFMFZ3BNQBSUT1SFTT ŴżźŴ 
24. Robert H. Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in
Central America, 1821–1960 /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŷ ŴŸŹ"TPVSDFPG
JOGPSNBUJPOPOUIFCBDLHSPVOETPGQPMJDFBEWJTFSTXIJDI*SFMZPOUISPVHIPVUUIFCPPLJT
3FH%BWJTBOE)BSSZ+BNFT The Public Safety Story: An Informal Recollection of Events and
Individuals Leading to the Formation of the AID Office of Public Safety, April 2001; RG 286,
Records Relating to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, box 5. The political
TDJFOUJTU ćPNBT -PCFFTUJNBUFTUIBUIBMGUIF0ďDFPG 1VCMJD4BGFUZ 014 PďDFST UPPL
UIFKPCiGPSUIFNPOFZ GPSBEWFOUVSF UPFTDBQFCBENBSSJBHFT PSUPTIBDLVQXJUI"TJBO
XPNFOwćPNBT%-PCF i641PMJDF"TTJTUBODF'PSUIFćJSE8PSME w1I%EJTT 6OJWFS-
sity of Michigan, 1975, 390.
ŵŸ1PMJDFFYQFSU%BWJE#BZMFZEFĕOFTBEFNPDSBUJDQPMJDFGPSDFBTPOFUIBUJTBDDPVOUBCMF
UPUIFQVCMJDJOXIPTFOBNFJUTQPXFSTBSFBVUIPSJ[FE4FF%BWJE)#BZMFZ Patterns of Polic-
ing: A Comparative International Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1985); and George E. Berkeley, The Democratic Policeman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
ŵŹ088JMTPO i3FQPSUPO1VCMJD4BGFUZ5SBJOJOH1SPHSBNPG*$" w+VMZŵŴoŵź ŴżŸŻ 
.46 7JFUOBN 1SPKFDU  CPY Źźż  .46" -BVSFO + (PJO  NFNPJS  "QSJM ŴżżŴ  *OTUJUVUF PG
*OUFS"NFSJDBO "ČBJST $PMMFDUJPO  6OJWFSTJUZ PG *MMJOPJT BU 4QSJOHĕFME  "SDIJWFT  4QFDJBM
Collections; Colonel Virgil Ney, “Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy,” in Modern Guer-
rilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. F. M. Osanka, intro-
EVDUJPOCZ4BNVFM)VOUJOHUPO /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŹŵ ŵŸoŶŻ8JMTPO UIFEFBOPGUIF
#FSLFMFZ4DIPPMPG$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF QSPWJEFELFZJOUFMMFDUVBMTVQQPSUGPSUIFQSPHSBNTBTB
4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDPOTVMUBOU
ŵź)PPWFSRVPUFEJO3"OESFX,JFM J. Edgar Hoover: The Father of the Cold War; How
His Obsession with Communism Led to the Warren Commission Coverup and Escalation of
the Vietnam War,GPSFXPSECZ$BSM0HMFTCZ -BOIBN .E6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTTPG"NFSJDB 
2000), 27. See also J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America
and How to Fight It /FX:PSL1PDLFU#PPLT ŴżŸż .FMWZO%VCPGTLZ We Shall Be All: A
History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969).
28. Kiel, J. Edgar Hoover,ŵŹ3FHJO4DINJEU Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticom-
munism in the U.S., 1919–1943 $PQFOIBHFO .VTFVN 5VTDVMBOVN 1SFTT  6OJWFSTJUZ PG
$PQFOIBHFO ŵųųų ŵų ŸŶ,FOOFUI%"DLFSNBO Young J. Edgar Hoover: Hoover, the Red
Scare, and the Assault on Civil Liberties /FX:PSL$BSSPMM(SBG ŵųųź 
ŵż$FDJMJB.FOKÓWBSBOE/ÏTUPS13PESÓHVF[ i4UBUF5FSSPSJOUIF64o-BUJO"NFSJDBO
*OUFSTUBUF3FHJNF wJOWhen States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror,
ed. Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor P. Rodríguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 10;
.BY 1BVM 'SJFENBO  Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the
Germans of Latin America in World War II /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŶ 

Notes to Pages 6–7 259


JY ŹŹ0O'#*QSPHSBNTJO$IJOB TFF'SFEFSJD8BLFNBO+S i"NFSJDBO1PMJDF"EWJTFSTBOE
UIF/BUJPOBMJTU$IJOFTF4FDSFU4FSWJDF ŴżŶųoŴżŶź wModern ChinaŴŻ "QSJMŴżżŵ ŴųźoŶź
30. Athan G. Theoharis, The FBI and American Democracy: A Critical History (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2004); Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and
Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System /FX:PSL,OPQG ŴżŻų ŷ'SFE+$PPL 
The FBI Nobody Knows /FX:PSL.BDNJMMBO ŴżŹŷ 4DISFDLFS Many Are the Crimes.
ŶŴ )BSEZ RVPUFE JO %BWJE 8JTF  The American Police State: Government against the
People /FX:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF ŴżźŹ ŶŴŴ%BWJE$VOOJOHIBN There’s Something Hap-
pening Here: The New Left, The Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004); Nelson Blackstock, COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Secret War on Political
Freedom,JOUSPEVDUJPOCZ/PBN$IPNTLZ /FX:PSL7JOUBHF ŴżźŸ /FXFWJEFODFSFWFBMT
UIBUUIFiQFPQMFTIJTUPSJBOw)PXBSE;JOOXBTBNPOHUIPTFTVCKFDUFEUPFYUFOTJWFTQZJOH
BOEIBSBTTNFOU$VOOJOHIBNTIPXTIPXUIF'#*GPDVTFEBMNPTUFYDMVTJWFMZPOUIF/FX
-FęBOEOPUFYUSFNFSJHIUXJOHBOEHFOVJOFUFSSPSJTUPSHBOJ[BUJPOTTVDIBTUIF,MBO
32. See Huey P. Newton, War against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America (New
:PSL)BSMFN3JWFS1SFTT ŵųųų 8BSE$IVSDIJMMBOE+JN7BOEFS8BMM Agents of Repression:
The FBI’s Secret Wars against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement
(Boston: South End Press, 1988); Jeffrey Haas, The Assassination of Fred Hampton: How
the FBI and Chicago Police Murdered a Black Panther /FX :PSL -BXSFODF )JMM #PPLT 
ŵųŴų 4PNF1BOUIFSTSFNBJOJOTPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOUUPEBZ IBWJOHCFFOESJWFOUPJOTBOJUZ
through prolonged isolation.
ŶŶ 4FF .JDIBFM 5 ,MBSF  i1PMJDJOH UIF &NQJSF w Commonweal, 4FQUFNCFS ŴŻ  Ŵżźų 
ŷŸŸoŹŴ
Ŷŷ4FF.BSUIB,)VHHJOT .JLB)BSJUPT'BUPVSPT BOE1IJMJQ(;JNCBSEP Violence
Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2002), 68, 74; Huggins, Political Policing.
ŶŸ & ) "ELJOT +S  i3FTPVSDFT $POUSPM  /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF PG 7JFUOBN w 14%  640. 
March 1965, 23.
36. Arthur M. Thurston, “Survey of the Training Activities of the A.I.D. Police Assistance
1SPHSBN w/PWFNCFSŴżŹŵ 64"*% 014 1BQFSTPG1SFTJEFOU,FOOFEZ /4' CPYŶŶŻ GPMEFS
/4".Ŵźź 1PMJDF"TTJTUBODF1SPHSBNT8JMMJBN+#PQQ O.W.: O.W. Wilson and the Search
for a Police Profession 1PSU 8BTIJOHUPO  /: ,FOOJLBU 1SFTT  Ŵżźź  źŵ  ŴŶŹ .POUIMZ
3FQPSU "QSJMŴżŹŹ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 5FDIOJDBM4FSWJDFT%JWJTJPO $PMPNCJB CPYŷ
1BSLFSRVPUFEJO8JMMJBN85VSOFS Invisible Witness: The Use and Abuse of the New Tech-
nology of Crime Investigation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 196.
37. “Minutes of Meeting, OCB Working Group on NSC Action 1290-d,” January 18,
1955, DDEL, White House Office Files, NSC Staff Papers, OCB, Central File, box 16, folder
*OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ &SJD 1BDF  i%PVHMBT .BD"SUIVS **  ŻŻ  'PSNFS "NCBTTBEPS UP +BQBO w
New York Times,/PWFNCFSŴź Ŵżżź8PMGHBOH4BYPO i)FOSZ47JMMBSE żŸ %JQMPNBU8IP
8SPUF#PPLTJO3FUJSFNFOU wNew York Times,+BOVBSZŵŸ ŴżżŹ"ęFSIJTSFUJSFNFOUGSPN
UIF'PSFJHO4FSWJDF 7JMMBSENPWFEUP-PT"OHFMFTBOEXSPUFCPPLTPOCJSETBOEBCPVUIJT
FODPVOUFST XJUI &SOFTU )FNJOHXBZ EVSJOH 8PSME 8BS * JO *UBMZ  XIFSF IF TFSWFE BT BO
BNCVMBODFESJWFS1PTTFTTJOHBQVSFMZDPMPOJBMJTUWJFXPG"GSJDB IFXBTUIFIFJSUPB/FX
:PSLGPSUVOF IJTGBUIFSXBTBSBJMSPBEUZDPPO BOEFEJUPSPGUIFHarvard Crimson in the
FBSMZŴżŵųT.BD"SUIVSFTDBQFEBLJEOBQQJOHBUUFNQUJO*SBOJOŴżźŵCZNJMJUBOUTPQQPTFE
to the Shah.
38. Albert R. Haney, “Observations and Suggestions Concerning OISP,” January 30, 1957,
0$# %%&- CPYŴŻ GPMEFS*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ)BOFZTUFOVSFJO,PSFBJTEJTDVTTFEJO5JN
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŵųųź ŸŹ Ÿź)FSBO

260 Notes to Pages 8–10


DPWFSUUFBNTJOUP/PSUI,PSFBUIBUXFSFJOĕMUSBUFECZEPVCMFBHFOUT MFBEJOHUPUIFEFBUIT
PGNBOZ
Ŷż4FF/PBN$IPNTLZ Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and U.S. Political
Culture (Boston: South End Press, 1993); Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and
the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųŴ 
Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy /FX:PSL
%BWJE .D,BZ  ŴżźŹ  'PS UIF $BNFMPU WJFX  TFF "SUIVS . 4DIMFTJOHFS +S  A Thousand
Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Roger F. Hils-
NBO To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Ken-
nedy /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŹź ćFPEPSF$4PSFOTPO Kennedy /FX:PSL)BSQFS
Row, 1965).
ŷų 3PCFSU 8 ,PNFS  i.FNP GPS .FNCFST PG 4UVEZ (SPVQT PO %FUFSSFODF PG (VFS-
rilla Warfare, Revised Draft Outline,” March 8, 1961, JFKL, RWK, box 414, folder 1, Special
Group. For the aggressiveness of Kennedy’s inner circle, see also Michael McClintock, “The
Kennedy Crusade,” in Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency,
and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT Ŵżżŵ ŴŹŴoźż
ŷŴ$IFTUFS#PXMFT i.FNPGPSUIF1SFTJEFOUPO$PVOUFS4VCWFSTJPO5SBJOJOHGPS-BUJO
"NFSJDBO1PMJDF'PSDFT w4FQUFNCFSŶų ŴżŹŴ w+',- /4' CPYŶŶŴ$IBSMFT.BFDIMJOH+S 
i1SPQPTFE1MBOPG0QFSBUJPOTGPS*OUFSEFQBSUNFOUBM1PMJDF$PNNJUUFF /4".ŴŷŹ w"QSJM
ŵź ŴżŹŵ +',- /4' 38, CPYŷŴŶ GPMEFS$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ1PMJDF1SPHSBN ŴżŹŴoŴżŹŶ
4FFBMTP%BWJE)BMCFSTUBNTMBOENBSLCPPLThe Best and the Brightest,SFWFE /FX:PSL
Ballantine Books, 1993).
42. “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped
4UBUFT w%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF /PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ +',- 10' CPYżŻ%BWJE(&QTUFJO ićF
Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police
ScienceŸŻ .BSDIŴżŹŻ ŴŷŻoŸŴ/BODZ4UFJO i1PMJDJOHUIF&NQJSF wJOThe Iron Fist and
the Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the U.S. Police, ed. Tony Platt, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Center for
3FTFBSDIPO$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF Ŵżźź ŷŵ
43. Don Bordenkircher, as told to Shirley Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage: An Untold Story
$BNFSPO 87B"CCZ1VCMJTIJOH ŴżżŻ ŵŹNFNPSBOEVN #FSOBSE(#SBOOPO $IJFG
PG,$1% UP4HU(&4RVJSFT i$BQUBJO#ZSPO&OHMF"HFŷŵ PO-FBWF w0DUPCFSź ŴżŸŵ 
DPVSUFTZPGUIF,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU)JTUPSJDBM#SBODI-PCF i641PMJDF"TTJT-
UBODFGPSUIFćJSE8PSME wŸźoŸŻ8JMMJBN3PTFOBV ićF,FOOFEZ"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 64
'PSFJHO*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZBOEUIF$IBMMFOHFPG4VCUFSSBOFBO8BS ŴżŹŴoŴżŹŶ wSmall Wars
and InsurgenciesŴŶ "VUVNOŵųųŶ ŻŸ
44. Arthur M. Thurston, “Survey of the Training Activities of the A.I.D. Police Assis-
UBODF1SPHSBN w/PWFNCFSŴżŹŵ +',- 1BQFSTPG1SFTJEFOU,FOOFEZ /4' CPYŶŶŻ GPMEFS
/4".Ŵźź 1PMJDF"TTJTUBODF1SPHSBNT"+-BOHHVUI Hidden Terrors: The Truth about
U.S. Police Operations in Latin America /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżźŻ ŵŷŵ+BDL"OEFSTPO 
i$*"5FBDIFT5FSSPSJTNUP'SJFOET wWashington Post, October 8, 1973; Michael T. Klare
BOE/BODZ4UFJO i1PMJDF5FSSPSJTNJO-BUJO"NFSJDB4FDSFU64#PNC4DIPPM&YQPTFE w
/"$-" +BOVBSZŴżźŵ IUUQTOBDMBPSH.JDIBFM.D$BOOUP#ZSPO&OHMF /PWFNCFSź 
ŴżŹŹ i5SBJOJOHPG'PSFJHO1PMJDF1FSTPOOFMJO#PNC%JTQPTBM w3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 *14 
box 8, folder 1.
ŷŸ3PCFSU8,PNFSUP8BMU3PTUPX i-FUT/PU'PSHFUUIF0*41w.BZŷ ŴżŹŴ 38, CPY
ŷŴŶ GPMEFS$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
ŷŹ3PCFSU8,PNFSUP.D(FPSHF#VOEZBOE.BYXFMM5BZMPS i$VUCBDLTJO1PMJDF1SP-
HSBNT0WFSTFBTw.BZŸ ŴżŹŵ 38, CPYŷŴŶ GPMEFS$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
Also RWK to Carl Kaysen, June 22, 1962, ibid.

Notes to Pages 10–12 261


ŷź $IBSMFT .BFDIMJOH +S  i$BNFMPU  3PCFSU ,FOOFEZ  BOE $PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ "
.FNPJS w Virginia Quarterly Review 4VNNFS Ŵżżż  ŷŶŻoŸŻ $IBSMFT .BFDIMJOH +S 
“Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsur-
gency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter
,PSOCMVI /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŴżŻŻ ŶŶ0O.BFDIMJOHTFBSMJFSSPMFJOTVQQPSU
PGUIFQSPHSBNT TFFIJTi1SPQPTFE1MBOPG0QFSBUJPOTGPS*OUFSEFQBSUNFOUBM1PMJDF$PN-
NJUUFF /4". ŴŷŹ w "QSJM ŵź  ŴżŹŵ  38,  CPY ŷŴŶ  GPMEFS $PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ 1PMJDF
1SPHSBN ŴżŹŴoŴżŹŶ$IVSDIJMMRVPUFEJO(FPSHJOB4JODMBJS At the End of the Line: Colonial
Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–1980 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2006), 189.
ŷŻ4FF/JMT(JMNBO Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War Amer-
ica #BMUJNPSF+PIOT)PQLJOT6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŶ +PIO++PIOTPO FE The Role of the
Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Robert
"1BDLFOIBN Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign
Aid and Social Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
49. See Walt W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas,” in The Vietnam
Reader,FE.BSDVT(3BTLJOBOE#FSOBSE#'BMM /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT ŴżŹź ŴųŻoŴŹ
Ÿų,FOOBORVPUFEJO/PBN$IPNTLZ Turning the Tide: The U.S. in Latin America (Mon-
USFBM#MBDL3PTF ŴżŻź ŸźBOE%BWJE4DINJU[ Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United
States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999), 149. On Kennan’s political outlook, see Walter L. Hixson, George F. Kennan:
Cold War Iconoclast /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻż 
ŸŴ ,FOOBO RVPUFE JO +BNFT 1FDL  Washington’s China: The National Security World,
the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT 
ŵųųŹ źų5BLFNBF&JKJ Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan, trans. Robert Ricketts
BOE4FCBTUJFO4XBOO /FX:PSL$POUJOVVN ŵųųŵ ŸŸŸ,BUF%PZMF i)VNBO3JHIUTBOE
UIF%JSUZ8BS wDPOĕEFOUJBMBJSHSBN 64FNCBTTZJO.FYJDP$JUZ .BSDIŵŷ ŴżźŹ /4" 
EPDVNFOUŹ
52. See Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to
the War on Terror /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ Źŵi$*" ,6#"3,$PVOUFSJO-
telligence Interrogation,” July 1963, NSA, 87; Michael T. Klare, War without End: American
Planning for the Next Vietnams /FX :PSL ,OPQG  Ŵżźŵ  ŶŻŵoŻŶ 8JMMJBN #MVN  Killing
Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II .POSPF  .F $PNNPO
$PVSBHF1SFTT ŵųųŷ ŵųŵi5FTUJNPOZPG.BTUFS4FSHFBOU%POBME%VODBO wJOAgainst the
Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, ed.
+PIO%VČFU /FX:PSL0)BSF#PPLT ŴżŹŻ ŷŹŴ
53. See Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980
/FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻŻ 8JMMJBN"QQMFNBO8JMMJBNT The Tragedy of American Diplo-
macy (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959); Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New
:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŴżŹŻ 'PSBOBMZTJTPGUIFJNQPSUBODFPGTFDSFDZBOE64GPS-
FJHOQPMJDZ TFF0MB5VOBOEFS i%FNPDSBUJD4UBUFWFSTVT%FFQ4UBUF"QQSPBDIJOHUIF%VBM
State of the West,” in Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty, ed.
Eric Wilson (London: Pluto Press, 2009), and Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: The
Secret Road to the Second Indochina War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
Ÿŷ $IBSMFT .BFDIMJOH +S  i$BNFMPU  3PCFSU ,FOOFEZ  BOE $PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ "
.FNPJSwVirginia Quarterly Review 4VNNFSŴżżż ŷŶŻoŸŻćPNBT-PCF United States
National Security Police and Aid to the Thailand Police (Denver: University of Denver Grad-
uate School of International Studies, 1977), 106. European scholars studying the history of
QPMJDFUSBJOJOHJODPMPOJBMTFUUJOHTIBWFGPVOETJNJMBSMZQPPSSFMBUJPOT4FF FH .BSJFLF

262 Notes to Pages 12–14


#MPFNCFSHFO i#FUXFFO1VCMJD4BGFUZBOE1PMJUJDBM$POUSPM.PEFSO$PMPOJBM1PMJDJOHJO
4VSBCBZB ŴżŴŴoŴżŴż w VOQVCMJTIFEQBQFSJOBVUIPSTQPTTFTTJPO 
55. Huggins, Political Policing; Klare, War without End; Langguth, Hidden Terrors;
Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State Terrorism and Popular Resistance in
Guatemala and El Salvador, 2 vols. (London: Zed Books, 1985); McClintock, Instruments
of Statecraft; /PBN $IPNTLZ BOE &EXBSE 4 )FSNBO  The Political Economy of Human
Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press,
1979); Kolko, Confronting the Third World; McCoy, A Question of Torture; McCoy, Policing
America’s Empire.
ŸŹ'PSBTZOUIFTJTPGTDIPMBSMZEFCBUFTPWFSFNQJSF TFF"MGSFE8.D$PZBOE'SBODJTDP
A. Sarano, eds., Colonial Crucible: Empire and the Making of the Modern American State
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
Ÿź 4FF .JDIBFM & -BUIBN  Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and
“Nation-Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
ŵųųų %BWJE&OHFSNBOFUBM FET Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the
Global Cold War "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųŶ %BWJE&LCMBEI The
Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order
1SJODFUPO 1SJODFUPO 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŵųŴų  "O FYBNQMF PG JNQFSJBM EFOJBM  &LCMBEIT
TUVEZJTFTQFDJBMMZMJNJUFEJOJHOPSJOHQPMJUJDBMFDPOPNZFOUJSFMZ BTIPSUDPNJOHPGNVDI
PGUIJTMJUFSBUVSF GBJMJOHUPEJTDVTTUIFMBSHFSHFPTUSBUFHJDDPOUFYUJOXIJDIEFWFMPQNFOU
QSPHSBNTXFSFJNQMFNFOUFE BOEGBJMJOHUPEJTDVTTUIFDPOTFRVFODFTPGUIFTFQSPHSBNT 
JODMVEJOHUIFMJOLUPFOWJSPONFOUBMEFHSBEBUJPOBOEEJTQMBDFNFOUPGQFBTBOUT
58. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
/FX:PSL7JOUBHF Ŵżźź ćPNBT(#MPNCFSHBOE,BSPM-VDLFO American Penology:
A History of Control )BXUIPSOF /:"MEJOFEF(SVZUFS ŵųųų %BWJE+3PUINBO The
Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic, rev. ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1990), ix.

Part I: Taking Up the “White Man’s Burden”


1. See Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign
Peoples at Home and Abroad /FX:PSL)JMMBOE8BOH ŵųųų ź8BMUFS-B'FCFS The New
Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).
2. Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the
Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

1. The First Operation Phoenix


1. John R. White, Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands /FX:PSL$FO-
UVSZ$PNQBOZ ŴżŵŻ źŷ
ŵ 4FF -V[WJNJOEB 'SBODJTDP  ićF 'JSTU 7JFUOBN ćF 1IJMJQQJOFT"NFSJDBO 8BS 
ŴŻżżoŴżųŵ w JO The Philippines: End of an Illusion (London: Association for Radical East
"TJBO 4UVEJFT <"3&"4>  ŴżźŶ  ŴųŹoŷŸ 1BVM " ,SBNFS  The Blood of Government: Race,
Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
1SFTT ŵųųŹ RVPUBUJPOŴŷŸ
Ŷ 8JMMJBN $BNFSPO 'PSCFT  The Philippine Islands (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928),
ŴŻŻ0OUIFEJTUJODUJWFJNQFSJBMBOUJDPMPOJBMJTNQSBDUJDFECZUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT TFF8JMMJBN
"8JMMJBNT The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,SFWFE /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŵųųż 

Notes to Pages 15–22 263


ŷ 3JDIBSE 8 4NJUI  ićF 1IJMJQQJOF $POTUBCVMBSZw Military Review 48 (May 1968):
źŶoŻų.%FBO)BWSPOFUBM Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict (McLean,
7B)VNBO4DJFODF3FTFBSDI ŴżŹż Ŵoŵ
Ÿ3PHFS)JMTNBO i*OUFSOBM8BSćF/FX$PNNVOJTU5BDUJD wJOThe Guerrilla and How
to Fight Him,FE-JFVUFOBOU$PMPOFM5/(SFFOF /FX:PSL1SBFHFS ŴżŹŸ ŵŹ ŵź'PS
)JMTNBOT JEFBT PO VODPOWFOUJPOBM XBSGBSF  TFF IJT American Guerrilla: My War behind
Japanese Lines 8BTIJOHUPO %$1PUPNBD#PPLT ŵųųź 
6. Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and
Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); R. W.
Van Alstyne, The Rising American Empire $MFWFMBOE 8PSME 1VCMJTIJOH  ŴżŹų  ćPNBT
+ .D$PSNJDL  China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893–1901 (Chicago:
2VBESBOHMF #PPLT  ŴżŹź  "MCFSU + #FWFSJEHF  i*O 4VQQPSU PG BO "NFSJDBO &NQJSF w
Congressional Record,ŸŹUI$POHSFTT ŴTUTFTT ŴŻżżoŴżųų 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 Ŵżųų 
704. See also his “The March of the Flag,” in The Meaning of the Times, and Other Speeches
*OEJBOBQPMJT#PCCT.FSSJMM ŴżųŻ ŷźoŸź
7. See Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States,
1899–1921 $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżźŷ BOEIJTi8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT
Proconsul in the Philippines,” Pacific Historical ReviewŶŸ .BZŴżŹŹ ŵŻŸoŶųŴ'PSCFT The
Philippine Islands; Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine,
Race, and Hygiene in the PhilippineT %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŹ 
8. Glen Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and
Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913 /FX:PSL(SFFOXPPE1SFTT ŴżŻų )8
Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJ-
WFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżŵ ŹŴ4DPUU/FBSJOHBOE+PTFQI'SFFNBO Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in
American Imperialism /FX:PSL7JLJOH1SFTT ŴżŵŸ #ZUIFŴżŵųT PWFSŴŵų64DPNQB-
nies were operating in the Philippines.
ż8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT +PVSOBM WPMŴ ŷ 8$'+PBO+FOTFO Army Surveillance in
America, 1775–1980 /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŴ Ŵųų)5"MMFO NFNPGPS
General Wright, October 1, 1902, HTA.
Ŵų64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Third Annual Report of the Philippines Commission, pt. 1, 2
WPMT #*" 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 Ŵżųŵ ŴŶ ŶŶ-FCCFVT38JMĘFZ The Peace Problem in
the Philippines,BEESFTTEFMJWFSFECZUIF)POPSBCMF-38JMĘFZ "UUPSOFZ(FOFSBM 1IJMJQ-
QJOFT CFGPSFUIF:.$" +VMZŴŴ ŴżųŸŵWPMT .BOJMB&$.D$VMMPVHI ŴżųŸ ŷ)5
"MMFO MFUUFSUP8JMMJBN)5Bę 0DUPCFSŴ Ŵżųŵ )5"
ŴŴ3JDIBSE84NJUI i1IJMJQQJOF$POTUBCVMBSZwMilitary Review (May 1968): 75; Alfred
W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 46.
Ŵŵ64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Third Annual Report of the Philippines Commission, 1:108, 114;
McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 109.
ŴŶ"MGSFE8.D$PZ i1PMJDJOHUIF*NQFSJBM1FSJQIFSZ1IJMJQQJOF1BDJĕDBUJPOBOEUIF
Rise of the U.S. National Security State,” in Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the
Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 114.
14. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 107.
ŴŸ64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Third Annual Report of the Philippines Commission, 1:107.
16. Harold Hanne Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary (Los Angeles: Globe
Print Co., 1949), 2; Charles B. Elliot, The Philippines: To the End of the Military Regime, with
a Prefatory Note by Elihu Root *OEJBOBQPMJT#PCCT.FSSJMM ŴżŴź Ŵźź.BKPS&NNBOVFM
Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems .BOJMB1PCSFT1SFTT ŴżŶŶ ŴųŵoŶ

264 Notes to Pages 22–24


17. Baja, Philippine Police System and Its Problems, 331; Anne L. Foster, “Models for Gov-
FSOJOH0QJVNBOE$PMPOJBM1PMJDJFT ŴŻżŻoŴżŴų wJOThe American Colonial State in the Phil-
ippines: Global Perspectives,FE+VMJBO(PBOE"OOF-'PTUFS %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ
Press, 2003); David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotics Control, 3rd ed.
/FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżźŶ ŵŻ.D$PZ Policing America’s Empire,ŴŸųoŸŴ 
246.
ŴŻ 64 %FQBSUNFOU PG 8BS  Reports of the Acting Director of Constabulary, Annual
Reports, Report of the Philippines Commission, June 30, 1908 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1909), 373.
Ŵż 4FF 8JMMJBN & -FVDIUFOCVSH  i1SPHSFTTJWJTN BOE *NQFSJBMJTN ćF 1SPHSFTTJWF
.PWFNFOUBOE"NFSJDBO'PSFJHO1PMJDZ ŴŻżŻoŴżŴŹ wMississippi Valley Historical Review 39
%FDFNCFSŴżŸŵ ŷŻŶoŸųŷ
20. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 320, 321, 337; Jensen, Army Surveillance in America,
1775–1980,ŴŹŶoŹź)FSCFSU:BSEMFZPGUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDPNNFOUFEPG7BO%FNBO
i)JTIFBWJMZMJOFEGBDFSFNJOEFENFPG-JODPMOT‫)ڀڀڀ‬FBQQFBSFEPMEBOEUFSSJCMZUJSFE CVU
XIFOIFUVSOFEIJTEFFQFZFTUPXBSETNF*TFOTFEIJTQPXFSw .D$PZ Policing America’s
Empire, 298).
21. Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, ŵ ćPNBT " 3FQQFUUP  The Blue
Parade /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ Ŵŵż
22. Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary /FX:PSL%VUUPO 
1938), 30; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire,Ź ŵŵŵ ŵŶŴ8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFTBDLOPXM-
FEHFE JO IJT EJBSZ UIBU KVOJPS BSNZ PďDFST IBE CFFO iBSSPHBOUw BOE iSVEF w BT B DPOTF-
RVFODFPGUIFJSFYDFTTJWFBVUIPSJUZ UIPVHIIFDMBJNFEUIBUUIFSFXBTFYDFMMFOUNBDIJOFSZ
JOQMBDFGPSNBLJOHDPNQMBJOUT'PSCFT +PVSOBM WPMŴ +BOVBSZŴżųŸ
ŵŶ'PSCFT +PVSOBM WPMŴ ŷż&DIPFTPG'PSCFTTSFNBSLTDPVMECFIFBSEOFBSMZBIVOESFE
ZFBSTMBUFSJONBJOTUSFBNEFCBUFTBCPVU64USPPQXJUIESBXBMTGSPN"GHIBOJTUBOBOE*SBR
24. Hurley, Jungle Patrol, 89; The Constabulary Story,QSFQBSFECZUIF1VCMJD*OGPSNBUJPO
0ďDF IFBERVBSUFST1IJMJQQJOF$POTUBCVMBSZ .BOJMB#VTUBNBOUF1SFTT ŴżźŻ żź
ŵŸ'PSBQSPĕMFPG"MMFO TFF.D$PZ Policing America’s Empire,ŻŹożŴRVPUŻż0OIJT
earlier career, see Robert L. Bullard, Fighting Generals: Illustrated Biographical Sketches of
Seven Major Generals in World War I "OO"SCPS+8&EXBSET Ŵżŷŷ ŻźożŸ
ŵŹ-FUUFSUP(FOFSBM)VHIFT 4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżųŴ )5" CPYź
ŵź)FOSZ"MMFOUP8JMMJBN)5Bę /PWFNCFSŴż Ŵżųŵ )5" CPYź
ŵŻ-FUUFSUP4JNFPO4QJOB &TRVJSF 'FCSVBSZŴź Ŵżųŵ )5" CPYź
29. See Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, eds., The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in
Historical Perspective /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŶ .BUUIFX'SZF+BDPC-
son, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad
/FX:PSL)JMMBOE8BOH ŵųųų 
Ŷų)FOSZ5"MMFO i3FQPSUUPUIF4FDSFUBSZPG$PNNFSDFBOE1PMJDF w"VHVTUŶŴ Ŵżųŵ 
Reports of the Chief of the Philippines Constabulary, Manila; Vince Boudreau, “Methods of
%PNJOBUJPOBOE.PEFTPG3FTJTUBODFćF64$PMPOJBM4UBUFBOE1IJMJQQJOFT.PCJMJ[BUJPO
JO$PNQBSBUJWF1FSTQFDUJWF wJO(PBOE'PTUFS The American Colonial State in the Philip-
pines,ŵŸŹożŴ)VSMFZ Jungle Patrol, 115.
31. Coats, “The Philippine Constabulary,” 205; Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Con-
stabulary,Ŵųż8JMĘFZ The Peace Problem in the Philippines, 4; McCoy, Policing America’s
Empire, ŴŶų  ŴŻżożų "VSFMJP 5PMFOUJOP  BO BOUJDPMPOJBMJTU QMBZXSJHIU BOE HJęFE PSBUPS 
MFE BO VQSJTJOH BMPOHTJEF (FOFSBM "SUFNJP 3JDBSUF ćSFBUFOFE XJUI MPOHUFSN JODBS-
DFSBUJPO IFCFHBOQSPNPUJOH"NFSJDBO'JMJQJOPDPPQFSBUJPOBOECFDBNFBDPOTUBCVMBSZ
JOGPSNBOU

Notes to Pages 24–27 265


Ŷŵ"MMFO i3FQPSUUPUIF4FDSFUBSZPG$PNNFSDFBOE1PMJDFw3FOBUP$POTUBOUJOPBOE
Letizio R. Constantino, A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the
Second World War /FX:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŴżźŸ ŵŹŴ)VSMFZ Jungle Patrol, 118.
33. Coats, “The Philippine Constabulary,” 242; White, Bullets and Bolos, 152; Hurley,
Jungle Patrol, 120; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire,Ŵŷź'SBODJTDP ićF'JSTU7JFUOBN w
ŴŶoŴŷ&MVEJOHDBQUVSFGPSPWFSBEFDBEF 4BMWBEPSXBTBTTBTTJOBUFEBęFSUIFDPOTUBCVMBSZ
QFOFUSBUFEIJTJOOFSDJSDMF$PMPOFM#BOEIPMU[ XIPPWFSTBXUIFDBNQBJHO BENJUUFEUIBU
4BMWBEPSiUSFBUTUIFCBSSJPQFPQMFXFMMBOE‫ڀڀ‬QSBZTXJUIUIFNBOEBTLTGPSDPOUSJCVUJPOT
XIJDIUIFZVTVBMMZHJWFw 'SBODJTDP ićF'JSTU7JFUOBN wŴŶoŴŷ 
34. Elarth, The Story of the Philippines Constabulary, 125; McCoy, Policing America’s
Empire, 221.
35. Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael: Presidio Press,
ŴżźŻ Ŵŵų"OESFX+#BDFWJDI+S i%JTBHSFFBCMF8PSL1BDJGZJOHUIF.PSPT ŴżųŶoŴżųŹ w
Military ReviewŹŵ +VOFŴżŻŵ ŸųoŸŴ+PIO()PMNF The Life of Leonard Wood /FX:PSL
%PVCMFEBZ Ŵżŵų ŴŶŹ*O$VCB 8PPEFTUBCMJTIFEB3VSBM(VBSEVOEFSUIFQSFNJTFUIBU
iUIF$VCBOTTIPVMELJMMUIFJSPXOSBUTw4FF-PVJT"1ÏSF[+S ićF1VSTVJUPG1BDJĕDBUJPO
#BOEJUSZBOEUIF640DDVQBUJPOPG$VCB ŴŻżżoŴżųŵ wJournal of Latin American Studies,
ŴŻ ŵ /PWFNCFSŴżŻŹ ŶŴŶoŶŵ
36. Constantino and Constantino, A History of the Philippines,ŵŷŸ,SBNFS The Blood of
Government, 293.
37. White, Bullets and Bolos,ŴųŹoź%POBME4NZUIF Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of
John J. Pershing /FX:PSL$IBSMFT4DSJCOFS4POT ŴżźŶ ŴŹŵ
38. Lane, Armed Progressive, 128.
Ŷż8JMMJBN+1PNFSPZ American Neo-colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and
Asia /FX:PSL*OUFSOBUJPOBM1VCMJTIFST Ŵżźų żŻ1FUFS((PXJOH Mandate in Moro-
land: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920 (Quezon City: Philippines
Center for Advanced Studies, 1977), 240. Gowing notes that strict censorship of the press
XBTJNQPTFECZ1FSTIJOH3FQPSUFSTXIPBQQSPBDIFEUIFTDFOFXFSFBSSFTUFE
40. White, Bullets and Bolos, 196, 202; Elarth, The Story of the Philippines Constabulary,
ŴŶŵ)PMNF The Life of Leonard Wood,ŴŶź%POBME4NZUIF i1FSTIJOHBOEUIF%JTBSNB-
NFOUPGUIF.PSP wPacific Historical Review 31 (August 1962): 242. As the historian Mar-
UJOćPNBTQPJOUTPVU UIFTFDIBSBDUFSJ[BUJPOTXFSFUZQJDBMPGDPMPOJBMEJTDPVSTFTFFIJT
Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2008).
41. Coats, “The Philippines Constabulary,” 240; Hurley, Jungle Patrol, 99, 131.
42. White, Bullets and Bolos, 157; Hurley, Jungle Patrol, 73.
43. Hurley, Jungle Patrol, 31, 146.
ŷŷ64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Third Annual Report of the Philippines Commission, 1:110.
45. Allen, letter to J. Franklin Bell, April 19, 1902; letter to Albert Beveridge, May 3, 1902,
HTA, box 7.
46. White, Bullets and Bolos, 137.
47. See Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Pro-
voked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ
Press, 1998); Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam
War #MPPNJOHUPO*OEJBOB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻż 
48. Bullard, Fighting Generals,żŴ0O1FSTIJOHTDBSFFS TFF4NZUIF Guerrilla Warrior.
49. See McCoy, Policing America’s Empire. On Shanton, see “Col. George R. Shanton,”
"QSJMŴż ŴżŴż 3%4 3FMBUFEUPUIF*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPGUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD ŴżŴųoŴżŵż 

266 Notes to Pages 27–30


M626-839.01, roll 35; Julie Greene, Canal Builders: Making America’s Empire in the Panama
Canal /FX:PSL1FOHVJO#PPLT ŵųųż ŻŸ Żź ŻŻ
50. Baja, Philippines Police Systems and Its Problems,ŴŵŻ,SBNFS The Blood of Govern-
ment, 292; Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 493; Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 171.
51. Forbes, Journal, vol. 1, January 31, 1905, WCF. See also Stanley, A Nation in the Making,
122.
Ÿŵ.JDIBFM4BMNBO iA/PUIJOH8JUIPVU-BCPS1FOPMPHZ %JTDJQMJOF BOE*OEFQFOEFODF
in the Philippines under United States Rule,” in Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on
Filipino Cultures,FE7JDFOUF-3BGBFM 1IJMBEFMQIJB5FNQMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŸ ŴŴŶoŴŷ
ŸŶ4FF FH 1FUFS;JOPNBO The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam,
1862–1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 37; Ann Laura Stoler, “In Cold
Blood: Hierarchies of Credibility and the Politics of Colonial Narratives,” Representations 37
(Winter 1992): 178.
Ÿŷ64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Third Annual Report of the Philippines Commission, 1:110.
55. Constantino and Constantino, A History of the Philippine, 246; Forbes, The Philippine
Islands,ŷŻż64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS "OOVBM3FQPSUT 'JTDBM:FBS&OEJOHŴżųŻ i3FQPSUUP
UIF1IJMJQQJOF$PNNJTTJPOUPUIF4FDSFUBSZPG8BS ŴżųŻ wQUŴ 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 
Ŵżųż Ÿŷ64%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF 3BNPO7JDUPSJP i1SJTPO4ZTUFNJOUIF1IJMJQQJOF
*TMBOET wTQFFDICFGPSFUIF"NFSJDBO1SJTPO$POHSFTT 4BMU-BLF$JUZ "VHVTUŴŸ ŴżŵŴ JO
(PWFSONFOUPGUIF1IJMJQQJOF*TMBOET %FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF Catalogue of Products of the
Industrial Division of Bilibid Prison .BOJMB#VSFBVPG1SJOUJOH Ŵżŵŷ ŶoŸ
ŸŹ 4BMNBO  i/PUIJOH 8JUIPVU -BCPSw ŴŴźoŴŻ ,SBNFS  The Blood of Government, 317;
'SBODJTDP ićF'JSTU7JFUOBN wŴŹ
Ÿź7JDUPSJP i1SJTPO4ZTUFNJOUIF1IJMJQQJOF*TMBOET wŶoŸ'PSCFT The Philippine Islands,
490; John Lewis Gillin, Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology /FX:PSL.BDNJM-
lan, 1931), 44; Victor G. Heiser, Annual Report of the Bureau of Health for the Philippine
Islands, 1906 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1906).
58. See Rodney J. Sullivan, Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippines Career of Dean C.
Worcester (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 112.
59. “Annual Report of the Director of Prisons for 1928,” WCF, Annual Reports; Nathaniel
-FF4NJUI i$VSFEPGUIF)BCJUCZ'PSDFćF64BOEUIF(MPCBM$BNQBJHOUP1VOJTI%SVH
$POTVNFST ŴŻżŻoŴżźųw 1I%EJTT 6OJWFSTJUZPG/PSUI$BSPMJOB ŵųųź ŸųoŸŴ
60. “Annual Report of the Director of Prisons for 1928”; Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 495,
497; Manuel A. Alzate, Convict Labor in the Philippine Islands: Presented at the Ninth Inter-
national Prison Congress Held in London, August 1925 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1926),
Ÿź 64 %FQBSUNFOU PG +VTUJDF  (PWFSONFOU PG UIF 1IJMJQQJOF *TMBOET  #VSFBV PG 1SJTPOT 
General Information Relative to the Bureau of Prisons (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1924), 46.
61. Going to Jail in Manila,EJSFDUFECZ#VSUPO)PMNFT 1BSBNPVOU ŴżŵŴ DJUFEJO&NJMZ
S. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplo-
macy, 1900–ŴżŶų $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżż ŵųŶ
62. Gillin, Taming the Criminal, 45.
63. Ibid., 52.
Źŷ&SWJOH(PČNBO Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other
Inmates $IJDBHP"MEJOF ŴżŹŵ 4FFBMTP%BWJE+3PUINBO Conscience and Convenience:
The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).
65. Forbes, The Philippine Islands,ŷżŵ64%FQBSUNFOUPG8BS Report of the Special Mis-
sion on Investigations to the Philippine Islands, to the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1921); Alzate, Convict Labor in the Philippine Islands, 43.

Notes to Pages 30–33 267


ŹŹ8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT Reports of Inspection of the Provincial Jails, March 29, 1928,
WCF.
Źź*CJE %FDFNCFSŵ Ŵżŵź
ŹŻ0OUIFQJUGBMMTPGUIF'JMJQJOJ[BUJPOQSPHSBN TFF,SBNFS The Blood of Government,
216.
Źż8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT 1928 Report, San Ramon Prison, WCF, Annual Reports.
źų8JMMJBN3(FPSHF The Junior Republic: Its History and Ideals /FX:PSL"QQMFUPO 
1910); Rebecca McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the Making of
the American Penal State, 1776–1941 /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŶŶŴ
71. White, Bullets and Bolos, 316. Returning the praise, Forbes referred to White in his
NFNPJSTBTBNBOPGiTUFSMJOHDIBSBDUFS HSFBUWJTJPO TQMFOEJEFOUIVTJBTN BOECPVOEMFTT
FOFSHZ<)F>JOGVTFEBMJGFBOETQJSJUJOUPUIFDPMPOZXIJDIVQVOUJMUIBUUJNFIBECFFOMBDL-
ing.” Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 505.
72. White, Bullets and Bolos, 317.
73. Forbes, The Philippine Islands, 509.
74. Manila Times,+VOFŴŵ ŴżųżTFFBMTP-ZNBO#FFDIFS4UPXF i"1SJTPOćBU.BLFT
Men Free,” The World’s Workŵź "QSJMŴżŴŷ ŹŵŹoŵŻ+FTVT$-FHB[QJ The Iwahig Penal
Colony: A Study (University of Manila, 1953), 16, 27.
75. Gillin, Taming the Criminal.
źŹ.JDIBFM4BMNBO iAćF1SJTPOćBU.BLFT.FO'SFFćF*XBIJH1FOBM$PMPOZBOE
UIF4JNVMBDSBPGUIF"NFSJDBO4UBUFJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFT wJO.D$PZBOE4DBSBOP Colonial
Crucible,ŴŴŹoŵŹ
77. Legazpi, The Iwahig Penal Colony,ŵź8JMMJBN$BNFSPO'PSCFT Reports of Inspection
of the Iwahig Prison, 1928, WCF, Annual Reports.
źŻ4BMNBO i/PUIJOH8JUIPVU-BCPSwŴŵų
źż$IBMNFST+PIOTPO Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic /FX:PSL.FU-
SPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ źŸ źŹ&SJD'POFS ićF-JFćBU&NQJSF5FMMT*UTFMG wLondon Review
of Books May 19, 2005, 16.
80. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire,ŹŴ4UFQIFO34IBMPN The United States and the
Philippines: A Study in Neocolonialism 1IJMBEFMQIJB *OTUJUVUF GPS UIF 4UVEZ PG )VNBO
Issues, 1981).

2. “Popping Off” Sandinistas and Cacos


Ŵ4NFEMFZ%#VUMFSOld Gimlet Eye: The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler. as told to Low-
FMMćPNBT /FX:PSL'BSSBS3JOFIBSU ŴżŶŶ ŵŴų+BNFT).D$SPDLMJO Garde d’Haiti,
1915–1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1956), 67.
ŵ)BOT4DINJEU Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of
American Military History -FYJOHUPO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTTPG,FOUVDLZ ŴżŻź ŵŶŴ ŵŶź4NFE-
ley D. Butler, War Is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America’s Most Decorated Soldier (New
:PSL'FSBM ŵųųŶ 
Ŷ 3PPU RVPUFE JO .BSUIB )VHHJOT  Political Policing: The United States and Latin
America %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ ŵŸ8BMUFS-B'FCFS Inevitable Revolu-
tions: The United States in Central America /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŻŷ 4DPUU/FBSJOHBOE
+PTFQI'SFFNBO Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperialism /FX:PSL7JLJOH
1SFTT ŴżŵŸ -PVJT"1ÏSF[+S i*OUFSWFOUJPO )FHFNPOZ BOE%FQFOEFODZćF6OJUFE
4UBUFTJOUIF$JSDVN$BSJCCFBO ŴŻżŻoŴżŻų wPacific Historical Review 51, 2 (May 1982):
168.

268 Notes to Pages 33–39


4. Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacio-
nal de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family /FX:PSL0SCJT#PPLT Ŵżźź ŷŴ
Ÿ)BOT4DINJEU The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (New Brunswick: Rut-
gers University Press, 1971), 71, 210; Butler, Old Gimlet Eye, 211; Ernest H. Gruening, “The
$PORVFTU PG )BJUJ BOE 4BOUP %PNJOHP w JO New York Times Current History: A Monthly
MagazineŴŸ 0DUPCFSo.BSDIŴżŵŵ ŻŻŸożŹ"TBMFBEFS #PCPCPSFBTUSPOHSFTFNCMBODF
UPUIFQPQVMJTUQSJFTU+FBO#FSUSBOE"SJTUJEF BWJDUJNPG$*"TVCWFSTJPODBNQBJHOTJOUIF
1990s and 2000s.
Ź'SBOLMJO%3PPTFWFMU "DUJOH4FDSFUBSZPGUIF/BWZ UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF %FDFNCFS
Ŵŷ ŴżŴŸ BOE"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i8FFLMZ3FQPSU w.BZź ŴżŴŻ CPUI
3%4 3FMBUFEUP*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG)BJUJ ŴżŴųoŴżŵż ŻŶŻŴųŸ IFSFBęFS3%4 )BJUJ (MFO
'PXMFS i-FNVFM4IFQIFSE+S &Y$IJFGPG.BSJOFT8IP4FSWFEJOćSFF8BST wNew York
Times, August 8, 1990.
7. Colonel Orval Townshend to Walter O’Bowell, August 15, 1925, RG 165, War Depart-
NFOU (FOFSBMBOE4QFDJBM4UBČT .ŴŷŻŻ IFSFBęFS3(ŴŹŸ .ŴŷŻŻ 0OUIF/FX+FSTFZBOE
1FOOTZMWBOJB DPOTUBCVMBSJFT  TFF ćPNBT " 3FQQFUUP  The Blue Parade /FX :PSL 'SFF
1SFTT ŴżźŻ ŴŶųoŶŴ%BWJE3+PIOTPO American Law Enforcement: A History (St. Louis:
'PSVN1SFTT ŴżŻŴ ŴŸŻoŹŴ
Ż'SFE#BMEXJO i4NFEMFZ#VUMFSBOE1SPIJCJUJPO&OGPSDFNFOUJO1IJMBEFMQIJB Ŵżŵŷo
1925,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography Żŷ +VMZ ŴżŹų  ŶŸŵoŹŻ 4DINJEU 
Maverick Marine, 149.
9. Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism,
1915–1940 $IBQFM)JMM6OJWFSTJUZPG/PSUI$BSPMJOB1SFTT ŵųųŴ Ŵŷź4DINJEU The United
States Occupation of Haiti,żų żŴ4BNVFM(*ONBO Through Santo Domingo and Haiti: A
Cruise with the Marines /FX:PSL$PNNJUUFFPO$PPQFSBUJPOJO-BUJO"NFSJDB ŴżŴż 
68, 69.
10. Faustin Wirkus and Taney Dudley, The White King of La Gonave (BSEFO$JUZ /:
Garden City Publishers, 1931), 68; “Marine King,” Time, +BOVBSZ ŵŹ  ŴżŶŴ  ŴŸ 8JMMJBN
Seabrook, The Magic Island /FX:PSL)BSDPVSU#SBDF Ŵżŵż ŴźŴoŻŷ
11. U.S. Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo
Domingo, źźUI $POH  ŴTU BOE ŵOE TFTT  WPM Ŵ 8BTIJOHUPO  %$ (10  Ŵżŵŵ  ŴŹŶoŹż
Occupied Haiti: Being the Report of a Committee of Six Disinterested Americans Representing
Organizations Exclusively American, Who, Having Personally Studied Conditions in Haiti
in 1926, Favor the Restoration of the Independence of the Negro Republic,FE&NJMZ(SFFOF
#BMDI /FX:PSL8SJUFST1VCMJTIJOH Ŵżŵź 
Ŵŵ"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i8FFLMZ3FQPSU w+VMZŵŵ ŴżŴŻ 3%4 )BJUJ
Renda, Taking Haiti, 150, 162.
ŴŶ4DINJEU Maverick Marine, 163; “Czar of Tenderloin Left Only $14 Estate,” New York
Times, January 30, 1918; Marilynn S. Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in
New York City (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003), 41, 43. According to a naval investigation, Wil-
MJBNTJOTUSVDUFEBUMFBTUPOF(FOEBSNFSJFPďDFSUPBWPJEUBLJOHQSJTPOFSTBOE JGiBOZPG
UIFQSJTPOFSTXFSF$BDPTBOEIBEBSNTJOUIFJSQPTTFTTJPO UPEPBXBZXJUIUIFNw3FOEB 
Taking Haiti, 340.
Ŵŷi3FQPSUPG"DUJWJUJFT w+VMZŴ Ŵżŵųo+VOFŶų ŴżŵŴ 3%4 )BJUJ
ŴŸi)BJUJ4VNNBSZPG*OUFMMJHFODF w'FCSVBSZŴżŵŴ .BZŵŹ ŴżŵŹ i#PMTIFWJL"DUJWJUJFTJO
)BJUJ w3(ŴŹŸ 8BS%FQBSUNFOU .ŴŸųź
16. John H. Craige, Cannibal Cousins /FX:PSL.JOUPO #BMDI ŴżŶŷ ŸŻoŸż(SBDF%
8BUTPO BOE &NJMZ (SFFOF #BMDI  ićF 1SFTT BOE UIF 1SJTPOT w JO #BMDI  Occupied Haiti,
ŴŷŷoŷŸ

Notes to Pages 39–42 269


Ŵź"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i8FFLMZ3FQPSU w+BOVBSZŵŻ ŴżŴż 3%4 
Haiti.
18. Frederic M. Wise, A Marine Tells It to You,BTUPMEUP.FJHT0'SPTU /FX:PSL+)
Sears, 1929), 309.
Ŵżi3FQPSUPGUIF1SFTJEFOUT$PNNJTTJPOGPSUIF4UVEZBOE3FWJFXPG$POEJUJPOTJOUIF
Republic of Haiti,” March 26, 1930 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1930), 4; John H. Craige, Black
Baghdad /FX:PSL.JOUPO #BMDI ŴżŶŶ ŴŹŴ#BMDI Occupied Haiti, 134; Renda, Taking
Haiti; Harry A. Franck, Roaming through the West Indies /FX:PSL#MVF3JCCPO#PPLT 
1920), 149; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps
/FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŻų Ŵżż
ŵų "MFYBOEFS 4 8JMMJBNT UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  i8FFLMZ 3FQPSU w .BZ ŵŻ  ŴżŴŻ  3%4 
Haiti; Craige, Black Baghdad, 132, 133; Irwin R. Franklyn, Knights of the Cockpit: A Romantic
Epic of the Flying Marines in Haiti /FX:PSL%JBM1SFTT ŴżŶŴ ŹŹ Źź
ŵŴi3FQPSUPG"DUJWJUJFT w+VMZŴ Ŵżŵųo+VOFŶų ŴżŵŴ 3%4 )BJUJ0OF(FOEBSNFSJFPďDFS
OBNFE8JMMJTUPOTUBDLFEBMMUIFIBUTPGUIPTFIFELJMMFEPOBQPMFBTBWJTJCMFCPEZDPVOU
ŵŵ"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i8FFLMZ3FQPSU w/PWFNCFSŹ ŴżŴŻ 3%4 
)BJUJ 1FSBMUF XBT B 'SFODIUSBJOFE MBXZFS DIBSBDUFSJ[FE CZ POF NBSJOF BT iIBOETPNF 
CSBWFBOEJOUFMMJHFOUwBOECZBOPUIFSBTIBWJOHBiHJęGPSĘBNCPZBOUQSPDMBNBUJPOTBOEUIF
NPSFJOĘBNJOHCSBOETPGPSBUPSZw4FF.BY#PPU The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and
the Rise of American Power /FX:PSL#BTJD#PPLT ŵųųŶ ŴźŸ
23. Lester Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898–
1934 8JMNJOHUPO %FM4DIPMBSMZ3FTPVSDFT ŵųųŵ ŴŸŸoŸŹ3)(SFBUIPVTF i,JOHPGUIF
Banana Wars,” Marine Corps Gazetteŷŷ +VOFŴżŹų ŵżoŶŶ$SBJHF Cannibal Cousins, 93.
$SBJHFSFGFSSFEUP)BOOFLFOBTBiNBHOJĕDFOUTPMEJFSw)FXBTBTTJTUFECZBOPUIFS.FEBM
PG)POPSXJOOFS -JFVUFOBOU8JMMJBN3#VUUPO XIPTQPLF$SFPMFĘVFOUMZBOEBEPQUFE
DBNPVĘBHFUFDIOJRVFT
ŵŷ$PNNBOEJOH0ďDFSUP#SJHBEF$PNNBOEFS +VMZŴŸ ŴżŵŴ 3%4 )BJUJ.D$SPDLMJO 
Garde d’Haiti, 115; Craige, Cannibal Cousins,źŵ żŵ$SBJHFSFDPSETUIFTFDPNNFOUTGSPN
DBQUVSFETVQQPSUFSTPG#BUSBWJMMFXIPXFSFBMMFHFEMZXJUIIJNQSJPSUP.VSUITEFBUI
ŵŸi)BJUJ4VNNBSZPG*OUFMMJHFODF w.BSDI "QSJM .BZ +VMZ 0DUPCFSŴżŵŴ 3(ŴŹŸ 8BS
%FQBSUNFOU .ŴŸųź
ŵŹi3FQPSUPG"DUJWJUJFT w+VMZŴ Ŵżŵųo+VOFŶų ŴżŵŴ 3%4 )BJUJ'SBOLMZO Knights of the
Cockpit, 227, 228. On the terrible history of air power in the twentieth century, see Michael
Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon /FX )BWFO :BMF
University Press, 1995); Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial
Bombardment (London: Zed Press, 2006).
ŵź"NFSJDBO-FHBUJPOUPUIF1SFTJEFOU 4FQUFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŴż 3%4 )BJUJ$BSM,FMTFZ ićF
"NFSJDBO*OUFSWFOUJPOJO)BJUJBOEUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD wAnnals of the American Acad-
emy of Political and Social Science 100, no. 1 (March 1922): 137; McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 100.
ŵŻ(SBDF%8BUTPOBOE&NJMZ(SFFOF#BMDI i+VEJDJBSZBOE$JWJM-JCFSUJFT wJO#BMDI 
Occupied Haiti, 138; Robert Heinl Jr. and Nancy Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the
Haitian People, 1492–1995,SFWFE /FX:PSL6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTTPG"NFSJDB ŴżżŹ ŷŻŷ
ŵż"MFYBOEFS48JMMJBNTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i8FFLMZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŶBOEŴż 
1918, RDS, Haiti.
Ŷų *CJE  4FQUFNCFS Ŵż  ŴżŴŻ )FMFOB )JMM 8FFE  i)FBSJOH UIF 5SVUI BCPVU )BJUJ w The
Nation,/PWFNCFSż ŴżŵŴ ŸŶŶoŶŸ
31. U.S. Congress, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo
Domingo, 1:517, 556; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward
Latin America $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ ŵŸŹoŸź

270 Notes to Pages 42–44


Ŷŵ4DINJEU The United States Occupation of Haiti, 80, 147. Butler was apparently fond of
IJTiBQFNBOwCMBDLTFSWBOU"OUPJOF XIPXBTBiGBJUIGVMTMBWFwUPUIF#VUMFSDIJMESFO JCJE 
Ŵŷź ćPTFXIPTPVHIUFRVBMJUZBOEQPXFS IPXFWFS XFSFWJFXFEEJČFSFOUMZ
33. U.S. Congress, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo,
ŴŸŴŹoŴŻ(FOEBSNFSJF &YQFEJUJPOBSZ$PNNBOEFS UP.BKPS(FOFSBM$PNNBOEBOU 'FCSV-
ary 12, 1916, RDS, Haiti; Balch, Occupied Haiti,ŴŵŸ,FMTFZ ićF"NFSJDBO*OUFSWFOUJPOJO
)BJUJBOEUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD wŴŶź4VQQPSUJOH64FČPSUTUPi$ISJTUJBOJ[FwUIFiCBDL-
XBSEw)BJUJBOT &WBOTBSHVFEUIBUUIFBUSPDJUJFTDPNNJUUFECZ64GPSDFTBOEUIFJSQSPYJFT
CFMJFEUIFNJTTJPOBSZTQJSJUPGUIFDIVSDIBOEXBSSBOUFEUIFSFNPWBMPGUIF"NFSJDBOT
34. Balch, Occupied Haiti,ŴŶŴ4DINJEU The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1916–1934;
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism
/FX:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT Ŵżżų ŴųŹoź
35. Michael S. Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti (Knoxville: University of Ten-
OFTTFF1SFTT ŴżżŶ źźoźŻ3PCFSU'BUUPO+S The Roots of Haitian Despotism /FX:PSL
Lynne Rienner, 2007), 175.
ŶŹ "NFSJDBO "NCBTTBEPS  1PSUBV1SJODF  UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  .BZ ŴŸ  ŴżŸż  3(
ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 -BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI IFSFBęFS3(ŵŻŹ -"# )BJUJ CPYźź4FFBMTP
Bernard Diederich and Al Burt, Papa Doc and the Tonton Macoutes,GPSFXPSECZ(SBIBN
Greene, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Marcus Wiener, 2005).
37. John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America /FX:PSL%BWJE.D,BZ ŴżŹŸ Ŵżŷ
38. “Marine Unit Going to Haiti,” Washington Post Times Herald, March 1959; Heinl
and Heinl, Written in Blood,ŹŴŻ$IBSMFT58JMMJBNTPO The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti,
1959–1963 (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999), 12, 19; Herbert Hardin, OPS, to
Secretary of State, Haiti, May 15, 1963, RG 286, LAB, Haiti, box 77.
Ŷż"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 1PSUBV1SJODF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i3FWPMWFSTGPSUIF)BJUJBO
Police,” October 1970, RG 286, LAB, Haiti, box 77.
40. Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S.
Occupation of 1916–1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 115, 116; Rayford Logan,
Haiti and the Dominican Republic /FX :PSL 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŹŻ  ŹŴ "MWFZ
Adee to Secretary of State (Charles Hughes), October 13, 1922, RDS, Records Related to the
*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPGUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD ŴżŴųoŴżŵż .ŹŵŹŻŶżųŴ SPMMŶŸ IFSFBęFS3%4 
DR). For policy background, see David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the
Caribbean, 1898–1917 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Melvin M. Knight,
The Americans in Santo Domingo /FX:PSL7BOHVBSE1SFTT ŴżŵŻ 
ŷŴ8JMMJBN83VTTFMM i(VBSEJB 4BOUB%PNJOHP w"QSJMŴż ŴżŵŴ BOEi&ČFDUJWFOFTTPG
(VBSEJB/BDJPOBM%PNJOJDBOB w"QSJMŵŷ ŴżŵŶ 3%4 %3"MWFZ"EFFUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF 
October 13, 1922.
42. Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 56, 58; Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo,
ŴŴŻ(1PQF"ULJOTBOE-BSNBO$8JMTPO The United States and the Trujillo Regime (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 32; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 197. One of Shanton’s
successors, Colonel Presley M. Rixey, had been physician to Theodore Roosevelt.
43. Calder, The Impact of Intervention, ŹŴ 8JMMJBN 8 3VTTFMM UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF 
%FDFNCFSŴų Ŵżŵŷ 3%4 %3
44. Franklin Frost to Secretary of State, July 12, 1927, RDS, DR; Langley, The Banana
Wars,ŴŸŵoŸŷ4VNOFS8FMMFT Naboth’s Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924, vol. 2
/FX:PSL1BZTPO$MBSLF ŴżŵŻ ŻųŸoŴų
45. See Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Tru-
jillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945 %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ 
Jesús de Galindez, The Era of Trujillo: Dominican Dictator /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ

Notes to Pages 44–47 271


1SFTT ŴżŸŻ 0OUIF)BJUJBONBTTBDSF TFF&SJD1BVM3PPSEB i(FOPDJEF/FYU%PPSćF
(PPE/FJHICPS1PMJDZ UIF5SVKJMMP3FHJNF BOEUIF)BJUJBO.BTTBDSFPGŴżŶź wDiplomatic
Historyŵų OPŶ +VOFŵųųź ŶųŴoŴż
ŷŹ4FFćPNBT88BMLFS Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder: Westview Press,
1986); Juan José Arevalo, The Shark and the Sardines /FX:PSL-4UVBSU ŴżŹŴ ŵŸ4DINJEU 
Maverick Marine, 54. According to The Nation,/JDBSBHVBONPUIFSTXFSFTUJMMXBSOJOHUIFJS
children a decade later, “Hush, Major Butler will get you,” if they did not go to sleep. Butler
XSPUFUPIJTXJGF i*UJTUFSSJCMFXFTIPVMECFMPTJOHTPNBOZNFOĕHIUJOHBMMCFDBVTF#SPXO
CSPUIFST<UIFCBOLFST>NBZIBWFTPNFNPOFZEPXOUIFSFw4DINJEU Maverick Marine, 54.
47. Franklin Gunther to Secretary of State, January 10, 1912, RDS, Records Related to the
*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG/JDBSBHVB ŴżŴųoŴżŵż ŻŴźųŸ IFSFBęFS3%4 /JDBSBHVB 
ŷŻ)BSPME/PSNBO%FOOZ Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua
/FX :PSL %JBM 1SFTT  Ŵżŵż  #VUMFS EFTDSJCFE NBSJOFTQPOTPSFE FMFDUJPOT JO /JDBSBHVB
BTGPMMPXTićFPQQPTJUJPODBOEJEBUFTXFSFEFDMBSFECBOEJUTXIFOJUCFDBNFOFDFTTBSZUP
FMFDUPVSNBOUPPďDF0VSDBOEJEBUFTBMXBZTXJO*OPOFFMFDUJPO OPCPEZMJLFEUIFGFMMPX
. . . the district was canvassed and 400 were found who would vote for the proper candidate.
/PUJDFPGUIFPQFOJOHPGUIFQPMMTXBTHJWFOĕWFNJOVUFTCFGPSFIBOE UIFŷųųWPUFSTXFSF
BTTFNCMFEJOBMJOFBOEXIFOUIFZIBEWPUFE JOBCPVUUXPIPVST UIFQPMMTXFSFDMPTFEw*O
4DINJEU The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934, 99.
ŷż3BMQI4,FZTFS i1MBOGPSUIF&TUBCMJTINFOUPGB$POTUBCVMBSZJO/JDBSBHVB w%FDFN-
CFSŴŶ Ŵżŵŷ 3%4 /JDBSBHVB%BWJE4DINJU[ Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man 8JMN-
ington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 58.
Ÿų3BMQI4,FZTFS i$POTUBCVMBSJFTGPS$FOUSBM"NFSJDB wMarine Corps Gazette 11 (June
ŴżŵŹ ŻŻ4FFBMTP&NJMZ43PTFOCFSH Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and
Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930 $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżż 
ŸŴ3BMQI4,FZTFS i1MBOGPSUIF&TUBCMJTINFOUPGB$POTUBCVMBSZJO/JDBSBHVB w3%4 
Nicaragua.
52. Calvin B. Carter to the Honorable Charles Eberhardt, “Guardia Nacional,” October 1,
1925; and Arthur Harris, “Discipline in Guardia,” G-2 Intelligence Report, August 24, 1934,
RG 165, M1488; Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S.
Imperial Rule %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŸ ŵŴŻoŴż
53. “Nicaragua: Loyalty and Discipline,” G-2 Report, June 8, 1933, and Alex A. Cohen,
“Activity in Guardia Nacional,” G-2 Intelligence Report, June 2, 1934, RG 165, M1488; Rich-
BSE(SPTTNBO ićF#MPPEPGUIF1FPQMF wJOWhen States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and
Technologies of Terror, ed. Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2005), 65; Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1967), 178.
54. Evans F. Carlson, “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette 21
(August 1937): 15; Alex A. Cohen, “Friction between Guardia and Civilians,” G-2 Intelli-
gence Report, February 14, 1934, RG 165, M1488; Gobat, Confronting the American Dream;
M. Dean Havron et al., Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict (McLean, Va.:
)VNBO4DJFODF3FTFBSDI ŴżŹż Źź
55. Gobat, Confronting the American Dream, 217; Langley, The Banana Wars, 211.
56. Fred T. Cruse, “Honduras: Political,” May 15, 1929, RG 165, M1488. Turcios, a noted
poet and journalist, was Sandino’s representative in Tegucigulpa and helped gain recruits by
EJTTFNJOBUJOH4BOEJOPTXSJUJOHTBOEDPNNVOJRVÏT
57. On Sandino’s worldview and guerrilla operations, see Robert Edgar Conrad, ed.,
Sandino: The Testimony of a Nicaraguan Patriot, 1921–1934 (Princeton: Princeton University

272 Notes to Pages 47–49


1SFTT Ŵżżų .JDIBFM+4DISPFEFS ićF4BOEJOP3FCFMMJPO3FWJTJUFE$JWJM8BS *NQFSJBMJTN 
1PQVMBS/BUJPOBMJTN BOE4UBUF'PSNBUJPO.VEEMFE6Q5PHFUIFSJOUIF4FHPWJBTPG/JDB-
SBHVB ŴżŵŹoŴżŶŷ wJOClose Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin
American Relations,FE(JMCFSU+PTFQIFUBM %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ ŵŵŵ
58. Conrad, Sandino, 16; Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and
the Making of the New Left (London: Verso, 1993), 17; Carleton Beals, “With Sandino in
Nicaragua,” The Nation,'FCSVBSZŵŵBOEŵż ŴżŵŻ ŵųŷoŸŵŶŵoŶŶ
Ÿż4DINJU[ Henry L. Stimson, 57.
60. LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 26; Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America,
the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism /FX :PSL .FUSPQPMJUBO #PPLT 
2006), 22.
61. Carlson, “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” 18; Langley, The Banana Wars, 212;
George B. Clark, With the Old Corps in Nicaragua (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 2001), 105;
Harold Denny, “Marines Push Drive in Nicaragua Wilds,” New York Times, June 21, 1928.
Źŵ4NJUIRVPUFEJO#VSLF%BWJT Marine! The Life of Lieutenant General Lewis (Chesty)
Puller (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), 65.
63. Ibid., 3, 376; Lewis B. Puller Jr., Fortunate Son /FX :PSL (SPWF 1SFTT  ŴżżŴ  ŵų
+PO)PČNBO Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller /FX:PSL3BOEPN
House, 2003).
64. Carlson, “The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua,” 10, 15; Gregorio Selser, Sandino (New
:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŴżŻŴ Żŵ(SPTTNBO ićF#MPPEPGUIF1FPQMF wźųoźŴ.BDBV-
lay, The Sandino Affair, 116.
ŹŸ.BKPS+VMJBO$4NJUI 64.$ FUBM A Review of the Organization and Operations
of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (Quantico: Marine Corps, 1937), 25; McCauley, The
Sandino Affair, 100.
66. Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, 156.
Źź4DINJU[ Henry L. Stimson,Źų5JN.FSSJMM FE Nicaragua: A Country Study (Wash-
ington, D.C.: GPO, 1993); Alex A. Cohen, Military Attaché, “Who’s Who: General Anastasio
4PNP[B $PNNBOEFSPGUIF(VBSEJB/BDJPOBM w(ŵ*OUFMMJHFODF3FQPSU 'FCSVBSZŴŶ ŴżŶŷ 
RG 165, M1488. The G-2 report noted that he “possessed a pleasing personality and likes to
JOHSBUJBUFIJNTFMGXJUI"NFSJDBOTw
68. J. Edgar Hoover, G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, to Adolf A. Berle Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State, June 17, 1941, RG 165, M1488; Alex Cohen, “5 Privates Shot for Treason,” G-2 Intel-
ligence Report, June 6, 1936, RG 165, M1488; Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty, 184; Michael
%(BNCPOF Eisenhower, Somoza, and the Cold War in Nicaragua, 1953–1961 (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 110.
Źż 4V[BOOF +POBT  i/JDBSBHVB w GVMM JTTVF PG /"$-" /PSUI "NFSJDBO $POHSFTT PO
-BUJO "NFSJDB  North American and Empire Report (February 1976): 24; Jack Anderson
BOE-FT8IJUUFO i4PNP[B$BSJDBUVSFPGB%JDUBUPSwWashington Post,4FQUFNCFSŵż Ŵżźź
(SPTTNBO ićF#MPPEPGUIF1FPQMF wŹŸ'PSUIFMBSHFSQBUUFSOPG64TVQQPSUGPSSJHIU
XJOHEJDUBUPSTIJQ TFF%BWJE'4DINJU[ Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States
and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1999).
źų-VJT/BQPMJUP)FSCFSU)BSEJO 4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŻ 3(ŵŻŹ -"# /JDBSBHVB CPYżų 
GPMEFSŴi/JDBSBHVBćF$IBNQ*T%FBE wTime, October 8, 1956, 43.
71. David M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds., Policing the Empire: Government,
Authority and Control, 1830–1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); David
M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds., Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics

Notes to Pages 49–52 273


and the Police, 1917–1965 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). See also Martin
ćPNBT Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2008); Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial
Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–1980 (London: Ashgate, 2006); David Killingray
i4FDVSJOHUIF#SJUJTI&NQJSF1PMJDJOHBOE$PMPOJBM0SEFS ŴżŵųoŴżŹų wJOThe Policing of
Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives, ed. Mark Mazower (Providence:
#FSHIBIO#PPLT Ŵżżź ŴŹźożŴ
72. Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Prog-
eny and Legacy of United States Intervention (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962),
62.
73. Managua to Secretary of State, October 20, 1962, RG 286, LAB, Nicaragua, box 90,
folder 1.
źŷ)FSCFSU0)BSEJOUPUIF'JMFT i7JTJUUP&NCBTTZ 640..BOBHVB w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ 
1958, RG 286, LAB, Nicaragua, box 90, folder 1.

Part II: Under the Facade of Benevolence


Ŵ4FF5PN&OHFMIBSEU The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillu-
sioning of a Generation, SFWFE "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųź /PBN
$IPNTLZ For Reasons of State /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżźŶ (BCSJFM,PMLP The Politics of
War: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1943–1945 /FX:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF ŴżŹŻ 
ŵ ćJT QPJOU JT OPU BMXBZT XFMM SFDPHOJ[FE CZ NBJOTUSFBN IJTUPSJBOT XSJUJOH JO UIF
United States today, whose viewpoint continues to be warped by the stultifying ideolo-
HJFTPG"NFSJDBOFYDFQUJPOBMJTNBOEUIF$PME8BS8IJMFBUUJNFTPWFSMZSPNBOUJDJ[JOH
UIFN /FX-FęTDIPMBSTXFSFCFUUFSBCMFUPFNQBUIJ[FXJUIUIFTPDJBMPSJHJOTBOEBQQFBM
PGUIFDPNNVOJTUSFWPMVUJPOBSZNPWFNFOUT MBSHFMZCFDBVTFUIFZXFSFBCMFUPUSBOTDFOE
UIFJEFPMPHJDBMEPHNBPGUIFUJNFT'PSBOPVUTUBOEJOHBOBMZTJT TFF.BSL4FMEFO China in
Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited "SNPOL /:.&4IBSQF ŴżżŸ 
Ŷ2VPUFEJO-BVSFODF)4IPVQBOE8JMMJBN.JOUFS Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on
Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy /FX:PSL"VUIPST$IPJDF1SFTT Ŵżźź 
ŵŵŻ.BD"SUIVSRVPUFEJO+PIO%PXFS ićF64+BQBO.JMJUBSZ3FMBUJPOTIJQ wJOPostwar
Japan, 1945 to the Present,FE+PO-JWJOHTUPOF +PF.PPSF BOE'FMJDJB0MEGBUIFS /FX:PSL
1BOUIFPO ŴżźŶ ŵŶŹ0OUIFMPOHTUBOEJOH64ESJWFGPSIFHFNPOZJOUIF"TJB1BDJĕD 
TFF #SVDF $VNJOHT  Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power
/FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż 3JDIBSE%SJOOPO Facing West: The Metaphysics
of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building /PSNBO6OJWFSTJUZPG0LMBIPNB1SFTT ŴżŻų 'PS
TUSBUFHJDQMBOOJOHBęFS8PSME8BS** TFFBMTP$IPNTLZ For Reasons of State.
ŷ4FF'SFEFSJD8BLFNBO+S Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley:
6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŵųųŶ ŴżŵoŵųŸ ŶųŸ.JDIBFM4DIBMMFS The U.S. Crusade in
China, 1938–1945 /FX :PSL $PMVNCJB 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  Ŵżźż  ŵŷź .JMUPO & .JMFT  A
Different Kind of War: The Little-Known Story of the Combined Guerrilla Forces Created in
China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II (BSEFO$JUZ /:%PVCMFEBZ 
ŴżŹź ŷŶŷ ŷźŷoźŸ0ODPOOFDUJPOTXJUIUIF(SFFO(BOHBOEUIFPQJVNUSBEF TFF+POBUIBO
.BSTIBMM i0QJVNBOEUIF1PMJUJDTPG(BOHTUFSJTNJO/BUJPOBMJTU$IJOB ” Bulletin of Con-
cerned Asian ScholarsŻ "VHVTUŴżźŹ ŴżoŷŻ&EXBSE34MBDL+S Opium, State, and Society:
China’s Narco-Economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937 )POPMVMV6OJWFSTJUZPG)BXBJAJ
1SFTT ŵųųŴ 8JMMJBN08BMLFS*** Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search
for Order in Asia, 1912–1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 151.

274 Notes to Pages 52-55


Ÿ8JMMJBN-/FVNBOO America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur #BMUJNPSF
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), 2. On the hysterical response to the Chinese revolu-
UJPO BNPOH 64 QPMJDZ FMJUFT  TFF +BNFT 1FDL Washington’s China: The National Security
World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT
Press, 2006).
6. See Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines,
and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Bruce
$VNJOHT  The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950, vol. 2
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 31.
ź4FF.BSL4FMEFOBOE"MWJO:4P FET War and State Terrorism: The U.S., Japan, and
the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŷ 
/PBN$IPNTLZ Failed States: The Abuse of Power and Assault on Democracy /FX:PSL
.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ BNPOHPUIFSXPSLTCZUIJTHJęFETDIPMBS"MGSFE8.D$PZ A
Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror /FX:PSL
.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŸ BOE"EBN8FTU FE Genocide, War Crimes and the West: His-
tory and Complicity (London: Zed Books, 2002).
8. Drinnon, Facing West,YJW4JS3PCFSUćPNQTPO Defeating Communist Insurgency:
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam /FX:PSL1SBFHFS ŴżŹŹ ŴųŶ4JS3PCFSUćPNQTPO 
Make for the Hills (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 128. See also Marc Curtis, Unpeople: Britain’s
Secret Human Rights Abuses -POEPO7JOUBHFŵųųŷ ŵŴŴ3PCFSU8,PNFS The Malayan
Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counter-insurgency Effort (Santa
.POJDB3"/%$PSQPSBUJPO Ŵżźŵ "+4UPDLXFMM i1PMJDFEVSJOHUIF.BMBZBO&NFSHFODZ 
ŴżŷŻoŴżŹų wJOPolicing and Decolonization: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917–1965,
ed. David M. Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
Ŵżżŵ ŴųŸoŵź3PHFS)JMTNBO To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Admin-
istration of John F. Kennedy /FX :PSL %PVCMFEBZ  ŴżŹź  ŷŶŴ %SBXJOH PO ćPNQTPOT
JEFBT UIF64"SNZDPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZNBOVBMSFMBUFTUIBUi<MPDBM>QPMJDFBSFPęFOUIFCFTU
GPSDFGPSDPVOUFSJOHTNBMMJOTVSHFOUCBOETTVQQPSUFECZUIFMPDBMQPQVMBUJPO<BTBSFTVMU
PGUIFJSGSFRVFOUDPOUBDUXJUIUIFQPQVMBUJPO>*O$0*/<DPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF>PQFSBUJPOT 
TQFDJBM QPMJDF TUSJLF VOJUT NBZ NPWF UP EJČFSFOU "0T <BSFBT PG PQFSBUJPO> XIJMF QBUSPM
QPMJDFSFNBJOJOUIFMPDBMBSFBPOBEBJMZCBTJTBOECVJMEBEFUBJMFEJOUFMMJHFODFQJDUVSFPGUIF
insurgent strength, organization and support.” U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual (U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps War Fighting Publication No.
3-33.5) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 231.

3. “Their Goal Was Nothing Less than Total Knowledge”


1. “Midnight in a Great City Plot,” RDS, Office of Research Intelligence, Relating to the
*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG+BQBO ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż EFDJNBMĕMFŻżŷ IFSFBęFS3%4 +BQBO 
ŵ +PIO 8 %PXFS  i0DDVQJFE +BQBO BOE UIF "NFSJDBO -BLF  ŴżŷŸoŴżŸų w JO America’s
Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations, FE &EXBSE 'SJFENBO BOE .BSL
4FMEFO /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT ŴżźŴ ŴŻŹoŵųź/PBN$IPNTLZ Deterring Democracy
/FX:PSL)JMMBOE8BOH ŴżżŴ Ÿŵ(BS"MQFSPWJU[ Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and
Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power,
SFWFE /FX:PSL1MVUP1SFTT Ŵżżŷ 8BMUFS-B'FCFS The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations
throughout History /FX:PSL/PSUPO Ŵżżź ŵŸŹ
3. See Christopher Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, Corruption, and
Resistance to Reform /FX:PSL3PVUMFEHF Ŵżżź )PXBSE#4DIPOCFSHFS Aftermath of

Notes to Pages 55–58 275


War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University
Press, 1989). Drawing on Edward W. Said’s Orientalism, Naoko Shibusawa points out in
America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy $BNCSJEHF )BSWBSE 6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT ŵųųŹ UIBUJOQPQVMBSEJTDPVSTF +BQBOTJNBHFTIJęFEGSPNUIBUPGIBUFEBOECBSCBSJD
FOFNZUPPOFPGBQBTTJWF DIJMEMJLFQFPQMFSJQFGPSUIFFYQPSUBUJPOPGBMMFHFE"NFSJDBO
CFOFĕDFODFBOEDPOTVNFSJTUWBMVFT XIJDIJUXBTCFMJFWFEXFSFOFFEFEUPMFBEUIFDPVOUSZ
JOUPNBUVSJUZ
4. “Japanese Opinions on Future of National Police Reserve,” Japan Review, August 30,
ŴżŸų  BOE "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  5PLZP  UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  4FQUFNCFS Ż  ŴżŸų  CPUI
3%4 +BQBOi1PMJUJDBM3FPSJFOUBUJPOPG+BQBO 4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŸo4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŻ w3FQPSU
PGUIF(PWFSONFOU4FDUJPO 4VQSFNF$PNNBOEFSGPSUIF"MMJFE1PXFST ŵżŵożŶ 3(ŶŶŴ 
3FDPSETPGUIF(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST4VQSFNF$PNNBOEFSGPSUIF"MMJFE1PXFST ()2
4$"1 (ŵ 3"00) 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO 1PMJDF#SBODI ŴżŷŸoŴżŸŵ  IFSFBęFS1PMJDF
Branch), box 332; D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western
Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan $BNCSJEHF )BSWBSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŻź 
ŶŶożż&MJTF,5JQUPO The Japanese Police State: The Tokkô in Interwar Japan (Honolulu:
6OJWFSTJUZ PG )BXBJAJ 1SFTT  Ŵżżų  1PMJDF SFQSFTTJPO BHBJOTU UIF +BQBOFTF $PNNVOJTU
1BSUZ BOE MBCPS NPWFNFOU TUBSUFE SJHIU GSPN UIFJS JODFQUJPO JO UIF FBSMZ UXFOUJFUI
century.
Ÿ4FF8JMMJBN4#PSEFO The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and
Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955 .BEJTPO6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJO1SFTT ŴżŻŷ /PBN
$IPNTLZ For Reasons of State /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŴżźŶ +PIO8%PXFS i"TJB
BOEUIF/JYPO%PDUSJOFćF/FX'BDFPG&NQJSF wJOOpen Secrets: The Kissinger-Nixon
Doctrine in Asia,FE.BSL4FMEFOBOE7JSHJOJB#SPEJOF GPSFXPSECZ/PBN$IPNTLZ /FX
:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ ŴŷŷoŷŸ
6. Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 9; Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The
Far Eastern General /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻż ŴŵŴ5BLFNBF&JKJ Inside
GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastien Swann (New
:PSL$POUJOVVN ŵųųŵ ŴŹŴ#SVDF$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring
of the Cataract, 1947–1950,WPMŵ 1SJODFUPO1SJODFUPO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżų ŴųŷoŸćF
1SVTTJBOCPSO8JMMPVHICZNBJOUBJOFEDMBOEFTUJOFUJFTUPSJHIUXJOHNJMJUBSJTUT JODMVEJOH
UIFCBDUFSJPMPHJDBMXBSDSJNJOBM(FOFSBM4IJSP*TIJJ"ęFS.BD"SUIVSXBTĕSFEJO,PSFB 
8JMMPVHICZCFDBNF BO BEWJTFS UP'SBODJTDP 'SBODPTHPWFSONFOU JO4QBJO BOEXSPUFBO
JOUFMMJHFODFEJHFTUGPSUIFSJHIUXJOHFWBOHFMJTU#JMMZ+BNFT)BSHJT TFSWJOHBTBOIPOPSBSZ
NFNCFSPGUIF+PIO#JSDI4PDJFUZ)FBMTPTFUVQBOiBOUJDPNNVOJTUJOUFSOBUJPOBMwVTJOH
NPOFZGSPNUIF)VOUCSPUIFSTJO5FYBTBOEFY/B[JTUPXIPNIFXBTDPOOFDUFE*OŴżźŴ 
still up to his old tricks, he accused the CIA-connected MIT Center for International Stud-
JFTPGCFJOHJOĕMUSBUFECZDPNNVOJTUT
7. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II /FX:PSL/PS-
UPO Ŵżżż $PMPOFM)&1VMMJBN i%FNPDSBUJD4UBCMF(PWFSONFOUBOE*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ
1PXFS *NQMFNFOUT w "VHVTU Ÿ  Ŵżŷź  3( ŶŶŴ  ()2 4$"1  'BS &BTU $PNNBOE  .JMJUBSZ
Intelligence Section, PSD, box 283; Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 166, 167. Pul-
MJBNXFOUPOUPIFBEUIFQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPOQSPHSBNBU8BTIJOHUPO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ
Ż#FSOBSE(#SBOOPO $IJFGPG,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU UP4HU(&4RVJSFT 
i$BQUBJO #ZSPO &OHMF‰"HF ŷŵ  PO -FBWF w 0DUPCFS ź  ŴżŸŵ  DPVSUFTZ PG UIF ,BOTBT $JUZ
1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU)JTUPSJDBM#SBODI(BMFO*+PIOTPO i1PMJDJOHJO,BOTBT$JUZ3FGPSN 
3FPSHBOJ[BUJPO BOEUIF$SJNF'JHIUJOH*NBHF ŴżŶżoŴżŹŴw ."UIFTJT 6OJWFSTJUZPG.JT-
TPVSJo,BOTBT$JUZ ŴżżŴ -FBS#3FFE Human Wolves: Seventeen Years of War on Crime
(Kansas City: Brown-White, Lowell Press, 1941), 383, 384. Described by a colleague as an

276 Notes to Pages 58–60


iFYUSPWFSUJNQBUJFOUGPSBDUJPO RVJDLUPBOHFS BOEBNBOPGTUSPOHMJLFTBOEEJTMJLFT w3FFE
XBTBNJOJTUFSTTPOXIP EVSJOHBTUJOUXJUIUIF'#* XBTJOEJDUFEUIPVHIOFWFSDPOWJDUFE
GPSNBOTMBVHIUFSJOUIFEFBUIPGBXPNBOJO4U-PVJT"TUIFDIJFGPGUIF,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF 
IFXSPUFUIBUXIFOi6ODMF4BNJTSFBEZUPQVUVQUIFCBSCFEXJSF XFMMCFUIFĕSTUUPIFMQ
IJNTUSJOHJUVQw4FFćPNBT"3FQQFUUP The Blue Parade /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ 
ŵŻŻożŶ RVPUFPOŵŻż
9. Reppetto, The Blue Parade; Don Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage: An Untold Story (New
:PSL "CCZ 1VCMJTIJOH  ŴżżŻ  ŵŹ 3PCFSU ) #SVDF  i*NQBDU PG UIF 0DDVQBUJPO PG +BQBO
PO"NFSJDBO/PUJPOTBCPVU64*OEVDFE3FGPSNJOUIFćJSE8PSME wIndian Journal of
American StudiesźŸ OPŵ ŴżŻŸ ŴŵŷoŵŸ
10. Oscar G. Olander, Michigan State Police: A Twenty-five-Year History (East Lansing:
Michigan Police Journal Press, 1942), 104; Harold Mulbar, Interrogation 4QSJOHĕFME  *MM
$IBSMFT$ćPNBT ŴżŸŴ i5FTUJNPOZPG)BSPME.VMCBSwJOInvestigation of Un-American
Propaganda Activities in the United States, Hearings before a Special Committee on Un-
American Activities, House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., on House Resolution
282, vol. 2, October 11, 12, 13, 1938, Flint, Michigan (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 1709;
Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937 (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1969), 238.
ŴŴ0OUIFMJNJUTPG/FX%FBMMJCFSBMJTN TFF#BSUPO+#FSOTUFJO ićF/FX%FBMćF
$POTFSWBUJWF"DIJFWFNFOUTPG-JCFSBM3FGPSN wJOTowards a New Past: Dissenting Essays
in American History,FE#BSUPO+#FSOTUFJO /FX:PSL,OPQG ŴżŹŻ ŵŹŶoŻŻ"MTP$ISJT
Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class /FX:PSL/BUJPO#PPLT ŵųŴų 
Ŵŵi1PMJDF#SBODI8FFLMZ4UBČ$POGFSFODF w/PWFNCFSŵŴ ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶŵ
ićF4UBUVTPG1PMJDF3FPSHBOJ[BUJPOJO+BQBO w%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF %JWJTJPOPG3FTFBSDI
GPS'BS&BTU "QSJMŵŵ Ŵżŷż 3(Ÿż 3%4 %JWJTJPOPG3FTFBSDIGPS'BS&BTU3FQPSUT ŴżŷŹo
ŴżŸŵ CPYŷ+PIOTPO'.POSPF 1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUPS UP%BWJE4"SOPME "VHVTUŵŸ ŴżŸų 
1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŵŻ#SVDF i*NQBDUPGUIF0DDVQBUJPOJO+BQBO wŴŵŷ
13. See Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 51; Joe Moore, Japanese Workers and the
Struggle for Power, 1945–1947 .BEJTPO6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJO1SFTT ŴżŻŶ ŴŵoŴŶ)FS-
bert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan /FX:PSL)BSQFS ŵųųŴ 
14. Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 51; Hans Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese
Leaders under the Occupation, SFW FE /FX :PSL (SFFOXPPE 1SFTT  Ŵżźź  źŴ  źŹ &JKJ 
Inside GHQ,ŷźż3BMQI+#SBJCBOUJ i"ENJOJTUSBUJPOPG0DDVQJFE"SFBT w3%4 +BQBO
15. Edward R. Bishop to PSD Division, “Report About 1st Phase In-Service Training,”
May 31, 1951, Police Branch, box 334, folder Reports.
16. On the innovations pioneered at Berkeley, see Gene Carte and Elaine H. Carte, Police
Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905–1932 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975). Records of the correspondence have been preserved in the August
7PMMNFS1BQFSTBUUIF#BODSPę-JCSBSZ #FSLFMFZ4FF FH &JKJ4V[VLJ 0TBLB.FUSPQPMJUBO
1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU UP"VHVTU7PMMNFS 0DUPCFSź ŴżŸų:VTBJ5BLBIBTIJUP"VHVTU7PMMNFS 
March 30, 1947.
Ŵź4FF'SFEFSJD8BLFNBO+S Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley:
6OJWFSTJUZ PG $BMJGPSOJB 1SFTT  ŵųųŶ  ŴżŵoŵųŸ 'SFEFSJD 8BLFNBO +S  Policing Shanghai,
1927–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 74; Oliver J. Caldwell, A Secret
War: Americans in China, 1944–1945 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971),
źŶćFCSVUBMJUZPGUIF.BDIBEPSFHJNFBOEJUTTFDSFUQPMJDFJTEPDVNFOUFEJO$BSMFUPO
Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1933).
ŴŻ+PIOTPO'.POSPF 1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUPS UP%BWJE4"SOPME "VHVTUŵŸ ŴżŸų 1PMJDF
#SBODI CPYŶŵŻ$IJFG$*%UP$IJFGPG$*%/BUJPOBM3VSBM1PMJDF)FBERVBSUFST i0OUIF

Notes to Pages 60–62 277


1SPNPUJPOPG4DJFOUJĕD*OWFTUJHBUJPO w"QSJMŴż ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶŵćFCVEHFUGPS
1949 and 1950 alone was 30 billion yen and 10 billion for 1951 and 1952.
19. Calvin H. Goddard, “The Bureau of Forensics Ballistics” and “The Northwestern
$SJNF %FUFDUJPO -BCPSBUPSZw JO Silent Witness: The Emergence of Scientific Criminal
Investigations (BJUIFSTCVSH .E*OUFSOBUJPOBM"TTPDJBUJPOPG1PMJDF$IJFGT Ŵżźź ŹŻoźŵ 
źźoŻŵi.JMFTUPOFT wTime, March 7, 1955; C. W. Muehlberger, “Col. Calvin Hooker God-
EBSE ŴŻżŴoŴżŸŸ wJournal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police ScienceŷŹ .BZo+VOF
ŴżŸŸ ŴųŶoŷ
ŵų i1PMJDF #SBODI 8FFLMZ 4UBČ $POGFSFODF w /PWFNCFS ŵŴ  ŴżŸų  1PMJDF #SBODI  CPY
ŶŶŵićF1SPCMFNPG$JWJM-JCFSUJFTJO+BQBO w"QSJMŴ ŴżŷŹ 3%4 +BQBOi.POUIMZ3FQPSU
Police Project,” March 3, 1951, Police Branch, box 332.
ŵŴićF1SPCMFNPG$JWJM-JCFSUJFTJO+BQBOw)FOSZ0JOBT,VLLPOFO Tolerance, Sus-
picion, and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes towards the Japanese Communist Movement,
1944–1947 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003), 24; Alfred Oppler, Legal Reform in
Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
ŵŵ$JWJM*OGPSNBUJPOBOE&EVDBUJPO4FDUJPO 0DUPCFSŸ ŴżŷŻ 4$"1 3%4 +BQBOBMTP3
'.BMCVSHUP$IJFG 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO "UUO.S,JNCFSMJOH i1PMJDFBOE+BJMT w+VOF
28, 1947, courtesy Douglas MacArthur Research Center, Norfolk, Va., Robert F. Malburg
Papers.
23. Olander, Michigan State Police,ŴŷoŴŸ ŶŹ żų&BSM)%F-POHBOE'SFE&*OBCV i"
-BX&OGPSDFNFOU1SPHSBNGPSUIF4UBUFPG*MMJOPJT wJournal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nologyŵŹ +BOVBSZ'FCSVBSZŴżŶŹ źŷŴoŸŴ.+)FBMF ićF5SJVNQIPG-JCFSBMJTN 3FE
4DBSF 1PMJUJDT JO .JDIJHBO  ŴżŶŻoŴżŷŸ w Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society
ŴŶż .BSDI ŴżżŸ  ŷŷoŹŹ +BNFT # +BDPCT  ićF $POEVDU PG -PDBM 1PMJUJDBM *OUFMMJHFODFw
1I%EJTT 1SJODFUPO6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżźź 0OUIFIJTUPSZPG64SFETRVBET TFF'SBOL%PO-
ner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
ŵŷ"(4VM[CFSHFS i-B(VBSEJBT5PVHIBOE*ODPSSVQUJCMF1PMJDF$PNNJTTJPOFSwNew
York Times, /PWFNCFS ŴŴ  ŵųųż .BSJMZOO 4 +PIOTPO  Street Justice: A History of Police
Violence in New York City (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003), 177, 179; Lewis J. Valentine, with
Fiorello La Guardia, Night Stick: The Autobiography of Lewis J. Valentine /FX:PSL%JBM
1SFTT Ŵżŷź +BNFT-BSEOFSBOEćPNBT3FQQFUUP NYPD: A City and Its Police /FX:PSL
Henry Holt, 2000), 233.
25. Oscar Olander, “Special Report, Rural Police Planning Group,” June 1946, Police
#SBODI ŴżŷŸoŴżŸŵ CPYŶŶŹ GPMEFS3FQPSUTi1PMJUJDBM3FPSJFOUBUJPOPG+BQBO w3FQPSUPG
UIF (PWFSONFOU 4FDUJPO  4VQSFNF $PNNBOEFS GPS UIF "MMJFE 1PXFST  4FQUFNCFS ŴżŷŸo
4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŻ 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżŷŻ ŵżŶ
26. Lewis Valentine, “Valentine Report,” Police Branch, box 335, folder Reports; Valen-
tine, Nightstick, 296; “Valentine Is Likely to Go to Japan; Wants 10 Police Experts as Aides,”
New York Times,'FCSVBSZŴ ŴżŷŹ-JOEFTBZ1BSSPUU i7BMFOUJOF"NVTFECZ+BQBOT1PMJDF w
New York Times, March 14, 1946.
27. Paul Harrison to Joseph Hawthorne, Tokyo, March 7, 1950, Police Branch, box 328;
Alfred C. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 171; Ralph J. D. Braibanti, “Japan’s New Police Law,” Far
Eastern Survey 18 (January 24, 1949): 19.
ŵŻi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFT +BQBO w()24$"1 "QSJMŴżŷŻ ŸŹ
29. See John Lewis Gillin, Taming the Criminal: Adventures in Penology /FX:PSL.BD-
NJMMBO ŴżŶŴ ŵŹ

278 Notes to Pages 62–65


30. “Detention of Prisoners, Valentine Report” and Monthly Report, April 26, 1946,
Police Branch, box 335, folder Reports; “Civil Report of Police Forces under Militarists,” RG
ŶŶŴ 4$"1 ()2 'BS&BTU$PNNBOE 14% CPYŵŻŶ7BMFOUJOF Nightstick, 306; Aldous, The
Police in Occupation Japan, 82.
31. Burdette G. Lewis, The Offender and His Relation to Law and Society, introduction
CZ (FPSHF 8JDLFSTIBN /FX :PSL )BSQFS  #SPUIFST  ŴżŵŴ  -FXJT PCUBJOFE IJT 1I%
GSPN$PSOFMM6OJWFSTJUZ XIFSFIFIFBSE0TCPSOFHJWFBTQFFDIBCPVUUIFJOOPWBUJWFQFOBM
SFGPSNTIFIBEBEPQUFEBU4JOH4JOHQSJTPOJO/FX:PSL)FDSJUJDJ[FEUIF"VCVSONPEFMPG
TPMJUBSZDPOĕOFNFOUBTiVUUFSMZDPOUSBSZUPFWFSZNPEFSOQSJODJQMFPGQTZDIPMPHZ‫ڀڀ‬ćF
PMEEVOHFPOTBOEDBWFMJLFDPPMFSTBSFSFMJDTPGCBSCBSJTNXIJDIIBWFTVSWJWFECFDBVTFUIPTF
who built correctional institutions and the institutional officials never had the advantage of
USBJOJOHBOEEJTDJQMJOFBDRVJSFEJOUIFNPEFSOQTZDIPMPHJDBMMBCTBOEQVCMJDTDIPPMTw ż 
Ŷŵi4VNNBUJPOPG/PONJMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFT +BQBO w()24$"1 "QSJMŴżŷŻ ŸŹi%FUFO-
tion of Prisoners, Valentine Report,” Police Branch, box 335, folder Reports.
ŶŶi1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU "NPSJ.BJO1SJTPO w1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŶŶż GPMEFS"NPSJ
1 "SBLBXB 7JMMBHF i4VNNBUJPO PG /PONJMJUBSZ "DUJWJUJFT  +BQBO w ()24$"1 .BSDI
1948), 64.
Ŷŷ*OUFSWJFXXJUI($,JNNFM /PWFNCFSŴŸ ŴżŷŹ 3(ŶŶŴ ()24$"1 (ŵ 14% 
3"00) 1SJTPO#SBODI ŴżŷŸoŴżŸŵ CPYŶŶż GPMEFS"NPSJ1"SBLBXB7JMMBHF IFSFBęFS
1SJTPO#SBODI i1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU "NPSJ.BJO1SJTPO w1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŶŶż GPMEFS
"NPSJ1"SBLBXB7JMMBHF
35. “Public Safety Report, Abashira Main Prison,” August 31, 1950, Prison Branch, box
339, folder Abashiri Main Prison.
36. “Fuchu: The Model Prison That Hasn’t Been Copied,” Japan News, October 28, 1950,
5, Prison Branch, box 340.
Ŷźi4VNNBSZ3FQPSUPOUIF3FBM4UBUFPG'VDIV1SJTPOTwCZ,B[VP.VSBJ "QSJMŵŹ ŴżŷŻ
#VSEFUU-FXJTUP)&1VMMJBN $IJFG14% ()2 "QSJMŵż ŴżŷŻBOE%S#VSEFUU-FXJT 
-MPZE .D$PSLMF  BOE (FPSHF ,JNNFM  i*OTQFDUJPO 3FQPSU 'VDIV 1SJTPO w /PWFNCFS Ŵŵ 
1946, Prison Branch, box 340.
ŶŻ .BK 3FFE  .BYXFMM  -U (FPSHF $PSOFMJVT  i3FQPSU PO )JSPTIJNB .BJO 1SJTPO w
/PWFNCFS Ŵ  ŴżŸų (FPSHF 8 $PSOFMJVT  i3FQPSU PO 'VLVTIJNB 1SJTPOTw BOE i(SPVQ
&TDBQFT 5PLZP %FUFOUJPO )PVTF w 'FCSVBSZ ŵŷ  Ŵżŷż BOE $BQUBJO 'PNFOLP  i3FQPSU PO
)BDIJOPLF#SBODI1SJTPO /PWFNCFSŴź Ŵżŷź 1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŶŷŴ3'.BMCVSHUP
$IJFG 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO "UUFOUJPO.S,JNCFSMJOH i1PMJDFBOE+BJMTw+VOFŵŻ Ŵżŷź
and “Marunouchi Police Station Jail,” June 10, 1947, RG 99, Papers of Robert Malburg,
Douglas MacArthur Research Center, Norfolk, Va., box 1. For analysis of the racial stereo-
types guiding U.S. foreign policy in Japan, see Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally.
Ŷż)&1VMMJBNUP%S#VSEFUU-FXJT "QSJMŵź Ŵżŷż 1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŶŴŸi-MPZE
McCorkle, Prison Aide,” New York Times, May 17, 1984; Lloyd W. McCorkle, “Guided Group
Interaction in a Correctional Setting,” International Journal of Group Therapy 4 (April 1954):
ŴżżoŵųŶ3JDIBSE3,PSOBOE-MPZE8.D$PSLMF Criminology and Penology /FX:PSL
)PMU ŴżŸż .D$PSLMFQSPNPUFEBDSJUJDBMWJFXPGUIFEFIVNBOJ[JOHFČFDUTPGQSJTPOMJGF
BOE MJLF-FXJT CFMJFWFEJOUIFJNQPSUBODFPGBEESFTTJOHUIFSPPUDBVTFTPGDSJNF)FXBT
MBUFS BQQPJOUFE /FX +FSTFZT DPNNJTTJPOFS PG DPSSFDUJPOT BOE XFOU PO UP DIBJS UIF MBX
EFQBSUNFOUBU+PIO+BZ4DIPPMPG$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF
40. “Public Safety Report, Chiba Main Prison,” March 27, 1951, Prison Branch, box 339,
GPMEFS $IJCB .BJO 1SJTPO $IJFG  1VCMJD 4BGFUZ %JWJTJPO  i3FQPSU $PWFSJOH 5%:  ,PCF 
,ZPUP .BJTVSV )JHBTIJNBJ[VSV .JZB[V ŴŵoŵŴ4FQUFNCFSŴżŷż w0DUPCFSŷ Ŵżŷż 1SJTPO

Notes to Pages 66–68 279


Branch, box 348, folder Taira Branch Detention House; “Jail Guards Suspected of Cooper-
ating in Red Activities with Prisoners,” Osaka, February 9, 1951, Police Branch, box 351.
ŷŴ#VSEFUU-FXJTUP)&1VMMJBN $IJFG 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO 4FQUFNCFSŵŷ Ŵżŷź 
1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŵŻŴ0O%PXETDBSFFS TFF7JDUPSJB(SBIBN i&YFDVUJPOFS&Y8BSEFO
1VMMFE-FWFSŴŶ5JNFT )BT/P(VJMU'FFMJOHT wBowling Green Daily News, April 24, 1973.
ŷŵ"MGSFE8%PXE "DUJOH$IJFG1SJTPO"ENJOJTUSBUPS UP$IJFG 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO 
'FCSVBSZŴŵ Ŵżŷż 1SJTPO#SBODI CPYŶŶż GPMEFS$PNNVOJTN(SBIBN i&YFDVUJPOFSw
ŷŶ1BVM)BSSJTPOUP$IJFG1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUPS i$VTUPEZPG1SJTPOFST w0DUPCFSŹ ŴżŸų 
Police Branch, box 334, folder Reports.
44. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 390; LaFeber,
The Clash, ŵźŵ (FPSHF ' ,FOOBO UP %FBO "DIFTPO  NFNPSBOEVN  "VHVTU ŵŶ  ŴżŸų 
4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF'JMF "DIFTPO1BQFST 5SVNBO1SFTJEFOUJBM-JCSBSZ POMJOFBSDIJWF 0O
,FOOBOTGVOEBNFOUBMMZBOUJEFNPDSBUJDQPMJUJDBMPVUMPPL TFF8BMUFS-)JYTPO George F.
Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻż 
ŷŸi3FDPNNFOEBUJPOT$PODFSOJOHUIF+BQBOFTF1PMJDF4ZTUFNw0DUPCFSŴż ŴżŷŻ 3(Ÿż 
3%4 #VSFBVPG'BS&BTUFSO"ČBJST ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŵ  IFSFBęFS'BS&BTUFSO"ČBJST CPYŷ GPMEFS
3FQPSUT1IJMJQ+FTTVQ NFNPGPS%FBO3VTL +VMZŵų ŴżŸų 3%4 +BQBO
46. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States For-
eign Policy, 1945–1954 /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ ŸŵŸ4IJHFSV:PTIJEB The Yoshida
Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis,USBOT,FOJDIJ:PTIJEB #PTUPO)PVHIUPO.JĒJO 
ŴżŹŵ  ŴźŹoźź +PIO 8 %PXFS  Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese
Experience, 1878–1954 $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżźż 
ŷźi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFT w()24$"1 "QSJMŴżŷŻ ŸŸ4IVJDIJ4VHBJ 
ićF+BQBOFTF1PMJDF4ZTUFN wJOFive Studies in Japanese Politics, ed. Robert E. Ward (Ann
"SCPS6OJWFSTJUZPG.JDIJHBO1SFTT ŴżŸź ź$IBMNFST+PIOTPO Conspiracy at Matsukawa
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 101; Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan,
203.
48. “Soviet Propaganda Concerning the Japanese Police Force,” January 4, 1948, RDS, Far
Eastern Affairs, box 4, folder Reports.
ŷż0OUIFTBWBHFSZPGUIFCPNCJOHT TFF.JDIBFM44IFSSZ The Rise of American Air
Power: The Creation of Armageddon /FX )BWFO :BMF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŻź  ŵŶoŵŻ 
ŸźoŸż+PIO8%PXFS War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War /FX:PSL
1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŴżŻŹ ŵżŷoŶųų
50. Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 189; Dower, Embracing Defeat,
270.
51. Robert B. Textor, Failure in Japan with Keystones for a Positive Policy, foreword by
0XFO-BUUJNPSF /FX:PSL+PIO%BZ ŴżŸŴ Ŵųų(BSZ%"MMJOTPO Japan’s Postwar History
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 72.
52. Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, 524; Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 145; Glenn
Davis and John G. Roberts, An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-Century Domi-
nation of Japanese Politics 5PLZP:FO#PPLT ŴżżŹ )FSCFSU1#JY i"NFSJDBO-BCPSBOE
Japanese Unionists,” in Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present, ed. Jon Livingston, Joe Moore,
BOE'FMJDJB0MEGBUIFS /FX:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF ŴżźŶ ŴźŶ%PXFS Embracing Defeat, 544.
%PEHFXBTSFGFSSFEUPBTBOiFDPOPNJDD[BSw$IBMNFST+PIOTPODPODMVEFTUIBUUIF%PEHF
QMBODVUJOĘBUJPOCVUiBUUIFDPTUPGBSFDFTTJPOJO+BQBO BTIBSQSJTFJOVOFNQMPZNFOU BOE
TPNFPGUIFIBSTIFTUXPSLJOHDPOEJUJPOTTJODFUIFFOEPGUIFXBSZFBST‫ڀڀ‬ćPVTBOETPG
XPSLFSTXFSFĕSFEw+PIOTPO Conspiracy at Matsukawa, 68.
53. Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility; Schonberger, Aftermath of War;

280 Notes to Pages 68–70


Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 116; Robert Scalapino, The Japanese
Communist Movement, 1920–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 76.
54. Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility;:POFZVLJ4VHJUB Pitfall or Pan-
acea: The Irony of U.S. Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 /FX:PSL3PVUMFEHF ŵųųŶ 
i/BHPZB .VOJDJQBM 0ďDF %JTUSJDU 1MBTUFSFE XJUI $PNNVOJTU )BOECJMMT w Yukan Chubu
Nihon Shimbun (Nagoya), March 21, 1951, Police Branch, box 351, folder Press; Textor,
Failure in Japan, 104; Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa, 60, 61. On MacArthur’s ultracon-
TFSWBUJTN TFF4DIBMMFS Douglas MacArthur. In 1949 the journalist Mark Gayn wrote on the
SFTUPSBUJPOPGGPSNFSXBSDSJNJOBMTićFQVSHF BTPGUIJTEBUF IBTCFDPNFBTIBN8BS
DSJNJOBMTTJUJOUIF%JFU UIF$BCJOFUBOEUIFJNQFSJBMDPVSU ESBXOFXAEFNPDSBUJDMFHJTMB-
UJPOBOEBENJOJTUSBUFUIFQVSHFTUPĕUUIFJSQPMJUJDBMFOET8BSDSJNJOBMTBSFASFWJTJOHUIF
UFYUCPPLT SVOOJOHUIFQSFTT EPNJOBUFUIFSBEJPBOENPWJOHQJDUVSFJOEVTUSJFTćPVHIU
DPOUSPMBHFOUT QVSHFEBOEQVSHFEBHBJO LFFQSFBQQFBSJOHJOQPTJUJPOTPGSFTQPOTJCJMJUZ‰
PęFOXJUI"NFSJDBOFODPVSBHFNFOUw(BZO Japan Diary, 494.
55. “The Status of Police Reorganization in Japan,” April 22, 1949; “Nagoya Municipal
0ďDF %JTUSJDU 1MBTUFSFE XJUI $PNNVOJTU )BOECJMMTw i1PMJDF 3FQPSUT UP #F 4DSFFOFE w
Nippon Times, August 13, 1950, and “National Police Reserve Order,” Nippon Times, August
Ŵų ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŵŻi"SFćFSF4UJMM4PNF3FE1PMJDFNFO 1FSGPSNBODFPG
%VUZ*T&YDFMMFOU %JďDVMUUP*EFOUJGZA4FDSFU'BDUJPO w.BSDIŵŸ ŴżŸŴ 1PMJDF#SBODI CPY
351, folder Press; “Subversive Activity,” March 15, 1951, RG 331, SCAP, G-2, PSD, General
File (hereafter PSD General File), box 282; “Warrants of Arrest for Tokuda and Eight Top-
-FWFM+$1.FNCFST w$*$3FQPSU +VOFŴŸ ŴżŸŴ 14%(FOFSBM'JMF CPYŶŴŷi%JTDIBSHFPG
$PNNVOJTUT GSPN +BQBO (PWFSONFOU .JOJTUSJFT w /PWFNCFS Ŷ  ŴżŸų  $*$ 3FQPSU  14%
(FOFSBM'JMF CPYŶŴŹ+PIO.4UFFWFT ićF+BQBOFTF1PMJDF4ZTUFN w%FDFNCFSŴź ŴżŸŵ 
RDS, Japan; Dower, Embracing Defeat,ŵźŴ ŵźŵi+BQBO1VUT$VSCPO:PLPTVLB3FET wNew
York Times, June 11, 1950; Lindesay Parrott, “Japan Acts to Bar Workers Disorder: Orders
1PMJDFUP$SBDL%PXOPO$PNNVOJTU*OTQJSFE4USJLFTBOE3JPUJOH wNew York Times, June
17, 1949.
56. Nippon Times, July 19, 1950, Police Branch, box 328, folder Press. MacArthur’s views
PODPNNVOJTNBSFBSUJDVMBUFEJO.BKPS(FOFSBM$PVSUOFZ8IJUOFZ MacArthur: His Ren-
dezvous with History /FX:PSL,OPQG ŴżŸŹ ŶųŻoż
Ÿź#ZSPO&OHMFUP$IJFG 14% i3FQPSUPO$PNNVOJTU%FNPOTUSBUJPOT w+VOFŶ ŴżŸų 
1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶŵi$PNNVOJTU4QZ/BCCFEBęFS(FUUJOH*OGPSNBUJPO3F"OUJ3FE
Police Tactics,” Mainichi News,%FDFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŸųi5PLVEB,ZVDIJ w$*$3FQPSU +VMZŴżŸų 
+VOF ŴŸ  ŴżŸŴ  14% (FOFSBM 'JMF  CPY ŶŴŷ )BSPME .VMCBS  i'JSFE $PNNVOJTU "HJUBUPST w
0DUPCFSŵų ŴżŸų BOEi"SSFTUPG$PNNVOJTUT w/PWFNCFSż ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŵż
-U"SUIVS.D$BTMJOćVSTUPO 3(ŵŵŹ 3FDPSETPG0441FSTPOOFM'JMF ŴżŷŴoŴżŷŸ CPYźź
“Personality Sketch” May 23, 1944; and Ezra Shine, “Report on Interrogation of Student
Lee,” Philadelphia, May 17 and 18, 1944, RG 226, Records of OSS Personnel File, box 211.
"DDPSEJOHUPEPDVNFOUT*WFTFFOBUUIF5SVNBO1SFTJEFOUJBM-JCSBSZ ćVSTUPOBMTPTQFOU
UJNF BT BO 044 BHFOU JO #PMJWJB  QPTTJCMZ USBDLJOH EPXO /B[JT )F XBT BMTP B MJBJTPO UP
#SJUJTIJOUFMMJHFODF0O'#*XJSFUBQQJOHQSBDUJDFT TFF8JMMJBN85VSOFS i*8BTB#VSHMBS 
Wiretapper, Bugger and Spy for the FBI,” Ramparts /PWFNCFSŴżŹŹ ŸŴoŸŸ BOEIJTInvis-
ible Witness: The Use and Abuse of the New Technology of Crime Investigation (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1968). During the 1930s, Congress outlawed wiretapping. Franklin Roos-
FWFMU IPXFWFS XIPBENJSFE+&EHBS)PPWFSTUPVHIQPTUVSF HBWFFYFDVUJWFBVUIPSJUZGPS
the attorney general to approve it “when necessarily involving the defense of the nation.”
5VSOFS  i* 8BT B #VSHMFSw Ÿŵ ćF 044 BOE $*" SFHVMBSMZ FNQMPZFE JU VOEFS UIF TBNF

Notes to Pages 70–71 281


QSFUFYU:PTIJLBXBXBTDSFEJUFEXJUICSFBLJOHUIF4PSHFTQZDBTFJOWPMWJOHB4PWJFUBHFOUJO
1941 and loyally served the Tojo order.
58. Orrin DeForest with David Chanoff, Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American
Intelligence in Vietnam /FX:PSL4JNPO4DIVTUFS Ŵżżų źŹ
Ÿż)BSSZ&NFSTPO8JMEFT Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New
:PSL.BDNJMMBO ŴżŸŷ ŵŷ$IBMNFST+PIOTPO FE Okinawa: Cold War Island (San Fran-
cisco: University of San Francisco Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 5; Eiji, Inside
GHQ, 162, 163, 165; David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 45, 48; “Subversive Activity,” February 15,
1951, CIC Report, March 15, 1951, PSD General File, box 282. The Special Z Unit was headed
CZB-JFVUFOBOU+BDL:$BOOPO XIPMBUFSQFOFUSBUFE$BTUSPTHVFSSJMMBPQFSBUJPOBHBJOTU
Batista in Cuba. See Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1993), 178.
60. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 45, 46.
61. Eiji, Inside GHQ, 164, 165.
62. Johnson, Street Justice,Ŵźź"VHVTU7PMMNFS The Police and Modern Society, reprinted
XJUIBOFXJOUSPEVDUJPOCZ+BNFT28JMTPO .POUDMBJS /+1BUUFSTPO4NJUI ŴżźŴ YJ
63. Byron Engle to Chief, Public Safety Division, “Shigeo Shindo,” and “Control of Dis-
UVSCBODFTJOUIF5PLZP"SFB w1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶų GPMEFS%FNPOTUSBUJPOT0OUIFVTF
PGUFBSHBTBHBJOTUUIF#POVTNBSDIFST TFF)PXBSE;JOO A People’s History of the United
States: The Twentieth Century /FX:PSL1FSFOOJBM ŵųųŶ ŴŴź
Źŷ 1SJTPO #SBODI  14%  UP 8JMMJBN " %PXOT  .FNP  $IJFG 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  BOE i5FTU
Results of Riot Type Shot-Gun,” Prison Branch, box 339, folder Current Prisons; Joe Wil-
MJBNTSFQPSU i$POUSPMPG1BSBEFTBOE.BTT%FNPOTUSBUJPOT w+VOFŴżŸŵ 1PMJDF#SBODI CPY
332.
ŹŸ*OUFSWJFXXJUI#ZSPO&OHMF JO8JMMJBN%4UFFWFT+S ićF641VCMJD4BGFUZ1SP-
HSBN *UT&WPMVUJPOBOE%FNJTFw NBTUFSTUIFTJT (FPSHF8BTIJOHUPO6OJWFSTJUZ4DIPPM
PG1VCMJDBOE*OUFSOBUJPOBM"ČBJST ŴżźŸ ŶŹ3PCFSU)#SVDF i)VNBO3JHIUTBOE64
Training of Third World Police,” Conflict Quarterly 8 (Winter 1988): 53. For a description
PGQPMJDFCSVUBMJUZEVSJOHUIFŴżŸŵ.BZ%BZEFNPOTUSBUJPOT TFF%PXFS Embracing Defeat,
554.
66. Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa, ŷŶ "MUIPVHI UIF TVQQPTJUJPO JT JNQPTTJCMF UP
QSPWFCFDBVTF8JMMPVHICZEFTUSPZFEBMMIJTTFDSFUĕMFT UIFNVSEFSTBU.BUTVLBXBDPVME
IBWFCFFOBOFBSMZFYBNQMFPGUIFLJOEPGCMBDLQSPQBHBOEBPQFSBUJPOEPDVNFOUFEJO(SB-
IBN(SFFOFTOPWFMThe Quiet American. See Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 46.
Źź 1BVM . )BSSJTPO UP #ZSPO &OHMF  i)JSPTIJNB %FNPOTUSBUJPO w "VHVTU Ż  ŴżŸų
BOEi3FQPSUPO&JHIU$PNNVOJTUT"SSFTUFEGPS"OUJo"UPNJD#PNC1SPQBHBOEB w1PMJDF
#SBODI CPYŶŶų GPMEFS%FNPOTUSBUJPOTi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO+BQBO w
April 1946, GHQ-SCAP (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 51; Johnson F. Monroe to H. Mat-
TVNPUP i0OB,PSFBO4DIPPMBOE*UT,PSFBO5FBDIFST w.BZŴų ŴżŸŴBOE)BSPME.VMCBSUP
$IJFG 1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO i.PWFTBNPOHUIF,PSFBO$PNNVOJTUTJO+BQBO w.BSDIŵ 
1951, Police Branch, box 329; Burton Crane, “16 Korean Rebels Arrested in Tokyo,” New York
Times,"QSJMŵŻ ŴżŷŹ"DDPSEJOHUP64"SNZ$PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF$PSQT $*$ ĕMFT BO
"NFSJDBONJTTJPOBSZ /FBM)BSUNBO BDPOTDJFOUJPVTPCKFDUPSJO8PSME8BS** XBTBNPOH
UIPTF TVCKFDUFE UP QPMJDF TVSWFJMMBODF BOE IBSBTTNFOU BęFS HJWJOH B TQFFDI BEWPDBUJOH
QBDJĕTN
68. Textor, Failure in Japan, 105.
Źż1SFTT3FQPSUT +BOVBSZŴżŷż 3%4 +BQBO1BVM)BSSJTPOUP$IJFG1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSB-

282 Notes to Pages 71–73


UPS i$VTUPEZPG1SJTPOFST w0DUPCFSŹ ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶŷ GPMEFS3FQPSUT5TVNFP
Saito, “GI Hurt by Reds at Tokyo Rally,” Nippon Times, May 31, 1950; Theodore Cohen,
Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŻź ŵŸŸ
CIC Report, April 15, 1951, PSD General File, box 282.
70. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement,ŻŹ)BSPME.VMCBS i"SSFTUPG$PN-
NVOJTU w/PWFNCFSż ŴżŸų .BSDIŵ ŴżŸŴ 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŵżi4VCWFSTJWF"DUJWJUZw
'FCSVBSZŴŸ ŴżŸŴ $*$'JFME3FQPSUT +BQBO 14%(FOFSBM'JMF CPYŵŻŵi#PNC&YQMPTJPO
Kills One Japanese,” Migagi,"VHVTUŵŻ ŴżŸų $*$3FQPSU 14%(FOFSBM'JMF CPYŶŴŷ:FO-
OBOXBTUIFCBTFPGUIF$IJOFTF$PNNVOJTU1BSUZEVSJOH$IJOBTDJWJMXBS JOXIJDIUIFZ
QJPOFFSFEWBSJPVTSFGPSNTUPXJOPWFSUIFQPQVMBUJPOXIJMFFTUBCMJTIJOHBOFČFDUJWFHVFS-
SJMMBBSNZ
źŴ1SFTT3FQPSUT +BOVBSZŴżŷż 3%4 +BQBOi3FQPSUGSPN.S,VSBJ $IJFGPGUIF(VBSE
4FDUJPO  .1% w +VOF ŷ  ŴżŸų  1PMJDF #SBODI  CPY ŶŶų  GPMEFS %FNPOTUSBUJPOT i/BHPZB
.VOJDJQBM0ďDF%JTUSJDU1MBTUFSFEXJUI$PNNVOJTU)BOECJMMTw
źŵ +PIOTPO ' .POSPF UP )BSPME .VMCBS  i1VSHJOH PG -FBEFST BOE $POĕTDBUJPO PG
Assets,” August 30, 1950, Police Branch, box 330. Monroe later worked for the OPS in Paki-
TUBO "GSJDB 7JFUOBN BOEUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD
źŶi$PNNVOJTU"DUJWJUJFTJO4QFFDI.BLJOHCZ$BOEJEBUFT3VOOJOHGPS.FUSPQPMJUBO
Governorship,” Police Branch, box 329; CIC Field Reports, Japan, March 15, 1951, PSD Gen-
eral File, box 282; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 414.
źŷ )BSPME .VMCBS  i$PNNVOJTU 1VCMJDBUJPOT 4FJ[FE w1PMJDF #SBODI  CPY Ŷŵż $*$
Report, March 15, 1951, PSD General File, box 282.
75. Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 101; Virgil Kilgore to Chief, Public Safety
Division, “Progress Report on Prisoner Conveyance,” March 30, 1951, Police Branch, box
334; Textor, Failure in Japan, 101; “Police Third Degree Methods Lead to Suicide,” Jiman
Shimbun, January 29, 1951, Police Branch, box 351, folder Press; Robert Whiting, Tokyo
Underworld: The Fast Times and Hard Life of an American Gangster in Japan /FX:PSL
Pantheon Books, 1999), 62.
76. Takeo Takagi, “Why Japan’s Police Is Dreaded,” Nippon Times, March 21, 1954; “Police
Third Degree Methods Lead to Suicide.”
źź i4VNNBUJPO PG /PO.JMJUBSZ "DUJWJUJFT JO +BQBO  0DUPCFS Ŵżŷź w ()2  4VQSFNF
"MMJFE $PNNBOE 8BTIJOHUPO  %$ (10  Ŵżŷź  ŶŴ i4XJOEMF CZ 'PSNFS $IBJSNBO PG
1VCMJD4BGFUZ$PNNJTTJPO w'FCSVBSZŵŹ ŴżŸų 1PMJDF#SBODI CPYŶŶŵi4BUBHBZB1PMJDF4UB-
UJPO $IJFG,FO.BFKJNB 3(żż 1BQFSTPG3PCFSU.BMCVSH %PVHMBT.BD"SUIVS3FTFBSDI
Center, Norfolk, Va., box 1, folder 2; Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, 188.
78. Whiting, Tokyo Underworld,ŻŸ ŻŹi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO+BQBO 
0DUPCFSŴżŷź wŶŴ,OPXOGPSIJTTUSFFUĕHIUJOHQSPXFTT JODMVEJOHBOJODJEFOUJOXIJDI
IFLOPDLFEPVUBO"NFSJDBOCMBDLCFMUJOBCBSSPPNĕHIUXJUIPOFQVODI UIF,PSFBO
CPSO.BDIJJCFDBNFDMPTFXJUIUIFIFBEPGUIF,PSFBO$*"*OXFTUFSO&VSPQF UIF$*"
BOBMPHPVTMZ FNQMPZFE 'SFODI BOE $PSTJDBO OBSDPUJDT USBďDLFST BOE HBOHTUFST UP CSFBL
EPDLXPSLFSTTUSJLFTJO.BSTFJMMFTBOEUPLJMMDPNNVOJTUT
79. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 48, 49; Davis and Roberts, An Occupation without Troops.
80. Whiting, Tokyo Underworld,Ŵźi4VNNBUJPO/Pź /PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO+BQBO 
"QSJMŴżŷŹ w()2 4VQSFNF"MMJFE$PNNBOE 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżŷŹ Ÿŵi4VNNB-
UJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO+BQBO +BOVBSZŴżŷŻ w()2 4VQSFNF"MMJFE$PNNBOE
8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżŷŻ ŸŶ*OTPNFDBTFT (*TXFSFQVOJTIFE0OFSFQPSUOPUFTUIF
CSFBLJOHVQPGBTNVHHMJOHSJOHGPSDMPUIJOHBOE19TVQQMJFT JOXIJDIBTPMEJFSXBTLJMMFE
while resisting arrest.

Notes to Pages 73–75 283


81. Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 183, 103; Textor, Failure in Japan,ŴųŴ:VLJ
Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and
the U.S. Occupation /FX:PSL3PVUMFEHF ŵųųŴ ŴŵŶ.BOZPGUIFXPSTUBCVTFTUPPLQMBDF
JO 0LJOBXB  XIFSF QSPTUJUVUJPO BSPVOE 64 NJMJUBSZ CBTFT BOE TFYVBM BCVTF BSF TUJMM B
QSPCMFN
Żŵ3PCFSU&,VIOMFUP"SNZ$SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJPOT%JWJTJPO i0QJVN3BJE w0DUPCFS
Ŷų ŴżŸŵBOE8JMMJBN)4VMMJWBO ŵOE4FDSFUBSZPGUIFFNCBTTZ UP3PCFSU.VSQIZ "NFSJ-
DBO$POTVMUPUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF /PWFNCFSŵŷ ŴżŸŵ 3%4 -"żųŷŷ GPMEFS+BQBO
83. Japanese Liaison Section, G-2, Johnson Monroe, “Hostile Action against Chinese
Residents Alleged,” Radio Press, April 10, 1951, Police Branch, box 351, folder Press; Wildes,
Typhoon in Tokyo, 197. Speer, a Texan, later worked for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(FBN) in Thailand and Indochina.
Żŷ$BMMVN".BD%POBME Korea: The War before Vietnam /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŻŹ 
224; Christopher Robbins, The Invisible Air Force: The Story of the CIA’s Secret Airlines (Lon-
EPO.BDNJMMBO Ŵżźż ŵŵŻoŷŸ
85. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade
/FX:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM ŴżżŴ 5JN8FJOFS Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New
:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŵųųź ŴŴź+POBUIBO.BSTIBMM Drug Wars: Drug Enforcement as Counter-
insurgency (San Francisco: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1987), 54; Scott Anderson and Jon
Lee Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin
American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League /FX :PSL
Dodd, Mead, 1986), 62; Whiting, Tokyo Underworld,ŻŶoŻŷ*OUIFŴżźųT BTUIF+BQBOFTF
BOE,PSFBOBHFOUGPS-PDLIFFE"JSDSBę$PSQPSBUJPO ,PEBNBCSJCFEUIF1SJNF.JOJTUFS
Kakuei Tanaka, forcing his resignation. During the Japanese occupation of China, one of his
NFUIPETXBTUPFOUFSBWJMMBHFBOEIBWFUIFNBZPSTIPUUPFOTVSFUIFWJMMBHFSTGVMMDPPQFSB-
tion in donating supplies. The CIA was generally known to recruit gangsters to carry out
TPNFPGJUTNPSFVOTBWPSZPQFSBUJPOT
86. Aldous, The Police in Occupation Japan, 223; Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 347;
Dower, “The U.S.-Japan Military Relationship,” in Livingston, Moore, and Oldfather, Post-
war Japan, 240.
87. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation
/FX :PSL 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  Ŵżżź  ŷŸ 8JMMJBN .D%PVHBMM  i7VMOFSBCMF CVU
7BMVBCMF(FOFSBM&JDIFMCFSHFS6SHFT4USPOH1PMJDFUP+BQBO‰4USFTTFT3FE%BOHFSwNip-
pon Times, February 1949; Eiji, Inside GHQ,ŷŻŻ)BOTPO#BMEXJO i+BQBOT"SNZ4UBSUT
/BUJPOBM1PMJDF 8IJMF/PUB.JMJUBSZ'PSDF 1SPWJEFT1PUFOUJBM$BESFTGPS/FX"SNZwNew
York Times, %FDFNCFS ŵŸ  ŴżŸų i+BQBOFTF 0QJOJPO PO 'VUVSF /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF 3FTFSWF w
Japan Review, "VHVTU Ŷų  ŴżŸų  BOE + 0XFO ;VSIFMMFS  "NFSJDBO 7JDF $POTVM UP 5PLZP 
“National Police Reserve,” January 24, 1951, both RDS, Japan.
ŻŻ i-FBĘFU *TTVFE CZ UIF $PNNVOJTU 1BSUZ  $IJUPTF $FMM w 0DUPCFS ŴżŸŵ  3%4 ŴżŸųo
1954), folder Japan.
Żż.D%PVHBMM i7VMOFSBCMFCVU7BMVBCMFw0NBS#SBEMFZUPUIF1SFTJEFOU +BOVBSZŵŷ
+BNFT8FCCUP3PCFSU-PWFUU 4FDSFUBSZPG%FGFOTF 4FQUFNCFSŵŻ ŴżŸŴ 3%4 +BQBO
90. David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF
University Press, 2008), 120; M. E. Weinstein, “The Evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces,” in The Modern Japanese Military System, ed. J. H. Buck (London: Sage, 1975);
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 120, 121; “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 4,
1955, DDEL, box 17, folder Internal Security.
91. “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” January 3, 1957, DDEL, box 18. Kaya’s
career and CIA ties are discussed in Weiner, Legacy of Ashes,ŴŵŴćFQSJNFNJOJTUFSJOUIF

284 Notes to Pages 75–77


MBUFŴżŸųT /PCVTVLF,JTIJ XBTBNFNCFSPGUIFXBSDBCJOFUEVSJOH8PSME8BS**BOEB
$MBTT"XBSDSJNJOBM)JTDBSFFSXBTCBOLSPMMFECZ:PTIJP,PEBNB XIPBTTJTUFEIJNJO
TVQQSFTTJOHMFęJTUEFNPOTUSBUJPOTBHBJOTUUIFTJHOJOHPGBCBTFUSFBUZXJUIUIF&JTFOIPXFS
BENJOJTUSBUJPO TVQQPSUFECZNFNCFSTPGUIF+BQBOMPCCZTVDIBTNewsweek foreign affairs
FEJUPS)BSSZ,FSOBOEFYBNCBTTBEPS+PTFQI(SFX
żŵ4VHBJ ićF+BQBOFTF1PMJDF4ZTUFN wŴ'PSBTJNJMBSDPODMVTJPO TFFBMTP8BMUFS"NFT 
Police and Community in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
93. See LaFeber, The Clash;$IBMNFST+PIOTPO Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of
the American Empire /FX:PSL0XM#PPLT ŵųųų ŶŸ+PIOTPO Okinawa.
żŷ+BNFT%PCCJOTFUBM America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2003). For an analysis of how false historical analogies
GSPNUIFPDDVQBUJPOPG+BQBOXFSFVTFEJOTVQQPSUPGUIFXBSJO*SBR TFF+PIO%PXFS Cul-
tures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9–11/Iraq /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŵųŴų %BWJE#BZMFZ 
in Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States (Berkeley: University of
$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŴżźŹ QSBJTFTUIF+BQBOFTFQPMJDFGPSUIFJSQSPGFTTJPOBMJTNJODPNCBUJOH
DSJNFJOUIFŴżźųTXIJMFJHOPSJOHUIFJSJOWPMWFNFOUJOQPMJUJDBMPQFSBUJPOT"TJNJMBSMBDLPG
DSJUJDBMQFSTQFDUJWFJTFWJEFOUJO#BZMFZTMBUFSXPSLPOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBNTJO"GHIBOJ-
TUBOBOE*SBR XIJDIIFDIBNQJPOFE
żŸ %PXFST CPPL JT BMTP TJHOJĕDBOU JO SFUSJFWJOH +BQBOFTF BHFODZ 4FF BMTP 4DIBMMFS 
Altered States; Schonberger, Aftermath of War; Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle
for Power.
żŹ4FF$IPNTLZ Deterring Democracy;(BWBO.D$PSNBDL Client State: Japan in the
American Embrace (London: Verso, 2007); Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 121. While the United
4UBUFTBęFSŴżŸŵPCWJPVTMZEJEOPUDPOUSPMFWFSZEFDJTJPONBEFCZUIF+BQBOFTFHPWFSONFOU 
it helped to ensure the preservation of one-party LDP rule and the suppression of leftist
NPWFNFOUTQVTIJOHGPSBNPSFJOEFQFOEFOUDPVSTF JODMVEJOHOPOBMJHONFOUJOUIF$PME
8BS PSDMPTFSBMMJBODFXJUIUIF13$BOEPS4PWJFU6OJPO *OSFUVSOGPSDPOUJOVFEGPSFJHO
BJE +BQBOXBTDPNQMJBOU GVSUIFSNPSF XJUIMBSHFS64GPSFJHOQPMJDZHPBMTJO4PVUIFBTU
"TJB QSPWJEJOHBOJNQPSUBOUCBTFGPS"NFSJDBOBHHSFTTJPOJO*OEPDIJOB)PSBDF'FMENBO 
$*"TUBUJPODIJFGJO+BQBOJOUIFMBUFŴżŸųT UFMMJOHMZJOGPSNFENew York Times journalist
5JN8FJOFSi8FSBO+BQBOEVSJOHUIFPDDVQBUJPOBOEXFSBOJUJOBEJČFSFOUXBZJOUIFTF
years after the occupation. General MacArthur had his ways, we had ours.” Weiner, Legacy
of Ashes, 121.

4. “Law in Whose Name, Order for Whose Benefit?”


Ŵ)FBERVBSUFST 64"SNZ.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUJO,PSFB UP"MM$PODFSOFE i*OWFTUJ-
HBUJPOPGUIF1PMJDF w+VMZŶų ŴżŷŹ 3(ŸŸŷ 6OJUFE4UBUFT"SNZ'PSDFTJO,PSFB 3FDPSET
3FHBSEJOH UIF 0LJOBXB $BNQBJHO ŴżŷŸoŴżŷŻ  6OJUFE 4UBUFT .JMJUBSZ (PWFSONFOU 
Korean Political Affairs, box 25 (hereafter USAFIK Okinawa).
ŵ#SVDF$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence
of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 1SJODFUPO1SJODFUPO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŴ $BMMVN"
McDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŻŹ ŴŴ0O4ZOHNBO
Rhee’s background, see Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man behind the Myth (New
:PSL %PEE  .FBE  ŴżŹų  BOE PO ,JN *M 4VOH BOE UIF /PSUI ,PSFBO SFWPMVUJPO  TFF
Dae Sook-Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT  ŴżŻŻ  BOE FTQFDJBMMZ $IBSMFT , "SNTUSPOH  The North Korean Revolution, 1945–
1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), which stresses the revolution’s indigenous
roots.

Notes to Pages 77–80 285


Ŷ#SVDF$VNJOHT Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History /FX:PSL/PSUPO Ŵżżź 
210.
ŷ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War; “The Position of the U.S. with Respect to
,PSFB w/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM3FQPSUŻ "QSJMŵ ŴżŷŻ 14' 5SVNBO1BQFST )45-
Ÿ+PO)BMMJEBZBOE#SVDF$VNJOHT Korea: The Unknown War /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO 
ŴżŻŻ ŵŶ%POH$IPPO,JN The Unending Korean War: A Social History, trans. Sung-ok
,JN -BSLTQVS $BMJG5BNBM7JTUB1VCMJDBUJPOT ŵųųų Żų8IFOBTLFECZUIFKPVSOBMJTU
Mark Gayn whether Rhee was a fascist, Lieutenant Leonard Bertsch, an adviser to General
+PIO3)PEHF IFBEPGUIF"NFSJDBOPDDVQBUJPO SFTQPOEFE i)FJTUXPDFOUVSJFTCFGPSF
GBTDJTN‰B USVF #PVSCPOw .BSL (BZO  Japan Diary /FX :PSL 8JMMJBN 4MPBOF  ŴżŷŻ 
352.
6. “A History of the Korean National Police (KNP),” August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa,
box 25.
ź#SVDF$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract,
1947–1950, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 186, 187; Gregory Henderson,
Korea: The Politics of the Vortex $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŹŻ ŴŷŶ
Ż3PZ$4UJMFTBOE"MCFSU-ZNBO ićF"ENJOJTUSBUJPOPG+VTUJDFJO,PSFBVOEFSUIF
+BQBOFTFBOEJO4PVUI,PSFBVOEFSUIF64"SNZ.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUJO,PSFBUP"VHVTU
ŴŸ ŴżŸŻ1BQFSCZ"NFSJDBO"EWJTPSZ4UBČ w%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF 3%4 3FDPSET3FMBUFE
UPUIF*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG,PSFB ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż EFDJNBMĕMFŻżŸ IFSFBęFSDJUFE3%4 ,PSFB 
ż)BSSZ.BHMJO i0SHBOJ[BUJPOPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG,PSFB w%FDFNCFSŵź ŴżŷŸ 64"'*,
0LJOBXB CPYŵŸ&WFSFUU'%SVNSJHIUUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i'#*5SBJOJOH w%FDFNCFSŵŵ 
ŴżŷŻ 3%4 ,PSFB1IJMJQ)5BZMPS i.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOU&YQFSJFODFJO,PSFB wJOAmeri-
can Experiences in Military Government in World War II,FE$BSM+'SJFEFSJDI /FX:PSL
Rinehart, 1948), 377; Harold Larsen, U.S. Army History of the United States Armed Forces
in Korea,QUŶ DIBQŷ i1PMJDFBOE1VCMJD4FDVSJUZw 4FPVMBOE5PLZP NBOVTDSJQUJOUIF
0ďDFPGUIF$IJFGPG.JMJUBSZ)JTUPSZ ŴżŷźoŷŻ 
10. Gayn, Japan Diary, Ŷżų $VNJOHT  The Origins of the Korean War, 1:164; Col. Wil-
MJBN).BHMJO i-PPLJOH#BDLJO)JTUPSZ‫ڀڀ‬ćF,PSFBO/BUJPOBM1PMJDFwMilitary Police
Professional Bulletin 8JOUFSŴżżż ŹźoŹż+PIO.VDDJPUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF "VHVTUŴŶ 
Ŵżŷż %FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF 3%4 ,PSFB$IPF/ßOHKJO i%BOOZ$IPZw DIJFGPGUIF,/1
%FUFDUJWF#VSFBV DBMMFEUIF,/1iUIFSFGVHFIPNFGPS+BQBOFTFUSBJOFEQPMJDFBOEUSBJ-
UPST wJODMVEJOHiDPSSVQUQPMJDFXIPXFSFDIBTFEPVUPG/PSUI,PSFBCZUIFDPNNVOJTUTw
$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,ŴŴŹŹ ŴŹź.BHMJO XIPSPTFUPQSPWPTUNBSTIBM 
XBTUIFTPOPGB/FX:PSLQPMJDFDBQUBJO)FIBECFFOBQBSPMFPďDFSJO/FX:PSL4UBUF
IBEFYQFSJFODFUSBJOJOHUIF'SFODI *UBMJBO BOE.FYJDBOQPMJDFBOEDPNNBOEFENJMJUBSZ
police training in Fort Riley, Kansas, during World War II. In North Korea, by contrast,
police officers during the colonial period were purged, and authorities worked to rebuild a
new police force of people without collaborationist backgrounds. This was a factor account-
JOHGPSUIFMFHJUJNBDZPGUIFSFWPMVUJPOBSZHPWFSONFOU $IBSMFT"SNTUSPOHOPUFT BMUIPVHI
the security structure still built on the foundations of the old in its striving for total infor-
NBUJPODPOUSPM"SNTUSPOH The North Korean Revolution, 205.
ŴŴ&EXBSE8JTNFS 1PMJDF"EWJTFS UP%JSFDUPSPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDF +VOFŹ Ŵżŷź 64"'*, 
3(ŸŸŷ 3FDPSET3FHBSEJOH,PSFBO1PMJUJDBM"ČBJST ŴżŷŸoŴżŷŻ CPYŵŹ,JN The Unend-
ing Korean War,ŴŻŸ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,ŴŸųŵ"O"NFSJDBOQPMJDF
TVQFSWJTPS DPNNFOUFE UIBU UIFSF XBT FOPVHI FWJEFODF PO CPUI $IBOH BOE $IPVHI UP
iIBOHUIFNTFWFSBMUJNFTPWFSw JCJE )PEHFKVTUJĕFEUIFJSBQQPJOUNFOUCZQPJOUJOHUP
UIFJSĕFSDFBOUJDPNNVOJTNBOEMPZBMUZUPUIF"NFSJDBODPNNBOEćF$*"DIBSBDUFSJ[FE

286 Notes to Pages 80–81


$IBOH  NBOBHJOH EJSFDUPS PG UIF CBOL PG 5BFHV JO UIF ŴżŷųT XIP IFSBMEFE GSPN POF PG
,PSFBTPMEFTUBOEXFBMUIJFTUGBNJMJFT BTiBOJOUFMMJHFOU BNCJUJPVTPQQPSUVOJTUXIP XIJMF
basically friendly to the United States, is erratic and unreliable when excited.” NSCF, CIA,
box 4, HSTL.
Ŵŵ4UJMFTBOE-ZNBO ićF"ENJOJTUSBUJPOPG+VTUJDFJO,PSFBVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTFBOEJO
4PVUI,PSFBVOEFSUIF64"SNZ.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUJO,PSFBUP"VHVTUŴŸ ŴżŸŻw3%4 
Korea; “History of the Korean National Police,” August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; ;
Larsen, “Police and Public Security,” 5, 6.
13. “Interview with Lt. Col. Earle L. Miller, Chief of Police of Kyonggi-do, 15 Nov. 1945
to 29 Dec. 1945,” February 3, 1946; Harry S. Maglin, “Organization of National Police of
,PSFB w%FDFNCFSŵź ŴżŷŸ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJW-
JUJFTJO,PSFB w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹ ()24$"1 ŴŻi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO
Korea,” February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187; Arthur F. Brandstatter, Personnel File, Michigan
4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ"SDIJWFT#FHJOOJOHIJTDBSFFSJOŴżŴż .JMMFSXBTBQBUSPMNBO EFUFDUJWF 
BOEIFBEPGQPMJDFUSBJOJOHXJUIUIF$IJDBHP1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU UFBDIJOHDPVSTFTJOQJTUPM
ĕSJOHBOEPSEOBODFVTF
Ŵŷ i*OUFSWJFX XJUI .BKPS "SUIVS ' #SBOETUBUUFS  1PMJDF #VSFBV  ź %FDFNCFS ŴżŷŸ w
USAFIK Okinawa, box 25.
ŴŸi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w/PWFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŷŸ ()24$"1
“History of the Korean National Police,” August 7, 1948;“Police Bureau Renovates Good But
8SFDLFE4ZTUFN wThe Corps Courieur,'FCSVBSZŴŵ ŴżŷŹ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŹi4VN-
NBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹ ()24$"1 ŴŻi4VNNBUJPO
of Non-Military Activities in Korea,” February 1948, GHQ-SCAP, 187; “Chief of Korean
6OJGPSNFE1PMJDF7JTJUT641SPWPTU.BSTIBMM wJournal of Criminal Law, Criminology and
Police Scienceŷŷ +VMZo"VHVTUŴżŸŶ ŵŵų
ŴŹi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w/PWFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŷŸ 64"'*,0LJ-
OBXB CPYŵŹ+)#FSSFBOUP.BKPS.JMMBSE4IBX "DUJOH"EWJTPS %FQBSUNFOUPG1PMJDF 
July 27, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; D. L. Nicolson to J. Edgar Hoover, March 29, 1949,
3%4 ,PSFB ĕMFŻżŸ)FOEFSTPO Korea,ŴŷŵoŷŶ0OUIF$IJOFTFQSFDFEFOU TFF.BSZ.JMFT 
ićF /BWZ -BVODIFE B %SBHPO w VOQVCMJTIFE NBOVTDSJQU  /BWBM 8BS $PMMFHF  /FXQPSU 
R.I., chap. 28, “Unit Nine, School of Intelligence and Counter-Espionage.”
17. Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, The
6OJUFE4UBUFT"SNZ)JTUPSJDBM4FSJFT FE8BMUFS()FSNFT 8BTIJOHUPO %$0$.) 
(10 ŴżŹŵ ŴŶ#SVDF$VNJOHT The Korean War: A History /FX:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF 
ŵųŴų  ŴŶŷ 1FUFS $MFNFOT  i$BQUBJO +BNFT )BVTNBO  64 .JMJUBSZ "EWJTFS UP ,PSFB 
ŴżŷŹoŴżŷŻćF*OUFMMJHFODF.BOPOUIF4QPU wJournal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2002):
184; John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark: University of Delaware
1SFTT ŴżŻż Ŵųų$VNJOHTDIBSBDUFSJ[FE)BVTNBO XIPFOMJTUFEJOUIFBSNZBUUIFBHFPG
sixteen to escape the depression, as the Korean Edward Lansdale (a legendary CIA agent),
NJOVTUIFDPODFSOGPSDJWJDBDUJPO
ŴŻ"MMBO3.JMMFUU i$BQUBJO+BNFT3)BVTNBOBOEUIF'PSNBUJPOPGUIF,PSFBO"SNZ 
ŴżŷŸoŴżŸų wArmed Forces and SocietyŵŶ 4VNNFSŴżżź ŸųŶoŶź$MFNFOT i$BQUBJO+BNFT
)BVTNBO wŴźų"MMBO3.JMMFUU The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 173.
19. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States
Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ ŵżų3JDIBSE%3PCJOTPO i"
1FSTPOBM+PVSOFZUISPVHI5JNFBOE4QBDF wJournal of International Business Studies 25, no.
3 (1994): 436.

Notes to Pages 81–83 287


ŵų$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, 1:267; Henderson, Korea, 145; Richard C.
Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle,
1960).
21. Max Bishop to Charles Stelle, “Answers to Questions on the Korean Situation in Light
of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops,” February 10, 1949, RG 59, RDS, Records of the Division
PG3FTFBSDIGPS'BS&BTU3FQPSUT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŵ CPYŷ GPMEFSŴ
ŵŵ"SNTUSPOH The North Korean Revolution;$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,
1:267; Donald Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die? (Brooksville, Fla.: Vanity Press, 1981),
ŴŴż+PIO3FFE)PEHFUP%PVHMBT.BD"SUIVS 4FQUFNCFSŵź ŴżŷŹ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPY
ŵŸi$PNNVOJTU$BQBCJMJUJFTJO4PVUI,PSFB w0ďDFPG3FQPSUTBOE&TUJNBUFT $*" 'FCSV-
BSZŵŴ Ŵżŷż 14' 5SVNBO1BQFST )45-
ŵŶi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹ ()24$"1 ŴŻ
i4USJLFT3JPUT w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹo.BZŴżŷź 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸ GPMEFSŶi4VNNB-
UJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹ ()24$"1 Ŵźŵź&WFSFUU'
%SVNSJHIU UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  i"NFOEJOH PG 0SHBOJ[BUJPO PG /BUJPOBM 5SBJUPST "DUT w
%FDFNCFS ŵŵ  ŴżŷŻ  3%4  ,PSFB  ĕMF ŻżŸ )FOEFSTPO  Korea, 146; Richard D. Robinson,
i#FUSBZBMPGB/BUJPO wVOQVCMJTIFENBOVTDSJQU ŴżŹų Ŵŷź DPVSUFTZPG)BSWBSE:FODIJOH
Library); Daily Korean Bulletin, June 14, 1952, NSCF, CIA, box 4, HSTL. Lee Sang Ho, edi-
tor of the suspended Chung Ang Shin Mun, and Kwang Tai Hyuk, chief of the newspaper’s
BENJOJTUSBUJWFTFDUJPO XFSFDIBSBDUFSJTUJDBMMZTFOUFODFEUPFJHIUFFONPOUITIBSEMBCPSGPS
QSJOUJOHiJOĘBNNBUPSZBSUJDMFTw'PSIBSTIQPMJDFSFQSFTTJPOPGUIFMBCPSNPWFNFOU TFF
Hugh Deane, The Korean War, 1945–1953 (San Francisco: China Books, 1999), 40.
ŵŷ.JMMBSE4IBX i1PMJDF$PNNFOUTPO(VFSSJMMB4JUVBUJPO w"VHVTUŹ ŴżŷŻ 64"'*,
Okinawa, box 26; George M. McCune, Korea Today $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT 
ŴżŸų ŻŻ,JN The Unending Korean War,ŴŻŹ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,
ŵŵųź:PTEBVHIUFSTVTQFDUTUIBU$IBOH5BFLTBOHXBTUIFDVMQSJUJOIFSGBUIFSTNVSEFS
64NJMJUBSZJOUFMMJHFODFNBZIBWFDPMMBCPSBUFEJOUIFBTTBTTJOBUJPOPGBOPUIFSPG3IFFT
SJWBMT ,JN,V XIPXBTPQQPTFEUP"NFSJDBOJOUFSWFOUJPO,VTBTTBTTJO "O5VIVJ XBT
SFMFBTFEGSPN5BFKPOQFOJUFOUJBSZBęFSBWJTJUCZB64"SNZDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODFPďDFS
BOEXBTBęFSXBSETQSPNPUFEUPBSNZNBKPS
25. Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die,ŴŶŸi4VNNBSZ$POEJUJPOTJO,PSFB w/PWFNCFS
ŴoŴŸ ŴżŷŹ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w
+VOFŴżŷź ()24$"1 ŵŹ4PNFPGUIFTFSBDLFUTJOWPMWFE64TPMEJFST"OBSNZDPMPOFM 
GPSFYBNQMF MPPUFEPWFSGPVSUIPVTBOEDBTFTPGQSFDJPVTBSUXPSLTGSPNNVTFVNT TISJOFT 
BOEUFNQMFT"ęFSIFXBTDBVHIU IFXBTTFOUIPNFPOiTJDLMFBWFw3PCJOTPO i#FUSBZBMPG
a Nation,” 290.
ŵŹ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, 2:188.
ŵźi)JTUPSZPGUIF1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU w64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸ3PCJOTPO i"1FSTPOBM
+PVSOFZ UISPVHI 5JNF BOE 4QBDF w ŷŶź 3PCJOTPO  i#FUSBZBM PG B /BUJPO w ŴŸŸ 3PCJOTPO
TVCTFRVFOUMZSFTJHOFEGSPNUIFBSNZBOECFDBNFBQSPGFTTPSPGNBOBHFNFOUBU.*5)F
XSPUFTPNFPGUIFĕSTUBSUJDMFTJOUIF64QSFTTPO1BMFTUJOJBOSFGVHFFT*O/PSUI,PSFB 
XIJMFEJTTJEFOUTXFSFTFOUUPMBCPSBOEiSFFEVDBUJPOwDBNQT UIFVTFPGUPSUVSFUPFYUSBDU
confessions was abolished and according to the leading authority on the revolution, rarely
QSBDUJDFE"SNTUSPOH The North Korean Revolution, 208.
ŵŻi,PSFBO"NFSJDBO$POGFSFODF w0DUPCFSŵż ŴżŷŹBOEi3FQPSU4QFDJBM"HFOU8JU-
UNFS (ŵ 4VNNBSZw/PWFNCFSŶ ŴżŷŹ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYFTŵŸBOEŵŹ
ŵżi,PSFBO"NFSJDBO$POGFSFODFw3PCJOTPO i#FUSBZBMPGB/BUJPO wŴŸŴi4PVUI,PSFB
"1PMJDF4UBUF w'FCSVBSZŴŹ ŴżŷŻ 3%4 %JWJTJPOPG3FTFBSDIGPS'BS&BTU3FQPSUT ŴżŷŹo
ŴżŸŵ CPYŶi$PNNVOJTU$BQBCJMJUJFTJO4PVUI,PSFBw

288 Notes to Pages 83–86


Ŷų,JN The Unending Korean War, 123.
ŶŴ+BNFT*.BUSBZ The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 77; Gayn, Japan Diary,ŶźŴ:J1PN4PLT044
connections are revealed in Robert John Myers, Korea in the Cross Currents: A Century
of Struggle and the Crisis of Reunification /FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJMMBO ŵųųŴ źŷ-FFT
associate An Ho-Sang apparently served in the Hitler jugend for three years. Voss, an OSS
BHFOUBOEGBTDJTUBENJSFS XBTBDPVODJMNFNCFSPGUIF#PZ4DPVUTPG"NFSJDBBOEGPVOEFS
of the Boy Scouts in the Philippines.
32. Adviser Millard Shaw considered the cross-border operations acts “bordering on
UFSSPSJTNwXIJDIiQSFDJQJUBUFSFUBMJBUPSZSBJET‫ڀڀ‬GSPNUIF/PSUIw3FQPSU .BKPS.JMMBSE
4IBX "DUJOH"EWJTPS i(VBSEPGUIFŶŻUI1BSBMMFMCZUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDF w/PWFNCFSŴżŷŹ 
64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸ GPMEFSŶ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,ŵŴżŸćFĕSTU
to challenge the standard interpretation was I. F. Stone in The Hidden History of the Korean
War /FX:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŴżŹż PSJHJOBMMZQVCMJTIFEJOŴżŸŵ/FXFWJEFODF
GSPN 4PWJFU BSDIJWFT BCPVU 4UBMJOT SFMVDUBOU CBDLJOH PG UIF /PSUI ,PSFBO JOWBTJPO EPFT
OPUDPOUSBEJDUUIFQPJOUUIBUUIF3IFFSFHJNFBOEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTXFSFBUMFBTUFRVBMMZ
responsible for the outbreak of the war.
33. “Police Fraternization Or Being Bribed by Prisoners,” August 28, 1946, USAFIK Oki-
OBXB CPYŵŹ GPMEFSŴų(ŵ1FSJPEJD3FQPSU i$JWJM%JTUVSCBODFT w4FPVM ,PSFB 4FQUFNCFS
1947, USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; Henderson, Korea, 144.
34. Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, 288; John Caldwell, with Lesley Frost, The
Korea Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), 8; Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 156.
ŶŸ3PZ$4UJMFTBOE"MCFSU-ZNBO ićF"ENJOJTUSBUJPOPG+VTUJDFJO,PSFBVOEFSUIF
+BQBOFTFBOEJO4PVUI,PSFBVOEFSUIF64"SNZ.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOUJO,PSFBUP"VHVTU
ŴŸ ŴżŷŻ wQBQFSCZ"NFSJDBO"EWJTPSZ4UBČ %FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF 3%4 ,PSFB ĕMFŻżŸ
i+PJOU ,PSFBO"NFSJDBO $POGFSFODF w 0DUPCFS ŴżŷŹ  64"'*, 0LJOBXB  CPY ŵŹ (BZO 
Japan Diary, 423.
ŶŹi4PVUI,PSFB"1PMJDF4UBUF w'FCSVBSZŴŹ ŴżŷŻ 3%4 %JWJTJPOPG3FTFBSDIGPS'BS
&BTU3FQPSUT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŵ CPYŶ
37. Larsen, “Police and Public Security,” 60.
38. “A History of the Korean National Police (KNP),” August 7, 1948, USAFIK Okinawa,
CPYŵŸi-FU6T"WFOHFUIF7JDUJNTPG,XBOKV w1FPQMFT$PNNJUUFFQBNQIMFU"VHVTUŵŸ 
ŴżŷŹ 64"'*,0LJOBXB CPYŵŸ$VNJOHT Origins of the Korean War,ŴŶŹŷoŹŹ ŸŸų
39. George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle (London: Zed
Books, 1990), 12; Henderson, Korea,Ŵŷź$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War,ŴŶŸŹoŸź
"U:POHDIPO ŶŸųLJMPNFUFSTGSPN4FPVM BNPCPGUFOUIPVTBOEEJTBSNFEBOELJEOBQQFE
GPSUZQPMJDFNFOBęFSBNCVTIJOHUIFQPMJDFTUBUJPOBOECVSOFEUIFIPNFTPGSJHIUJTUCBDL-
ers of the police.
40. John R. Hodge to Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, April 17, 1948; Police Diary, Major
"MCFSU#SPXO 4VSWFZ 0DUPCFSŴżŷŹ BOEi,PSFBO"NFSJDBO$POGFSFODF w64"'*, 0LJ-
OBXB CPYŵŹi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w+VMZŴżŷź ()24$"1 Ŷŷ
Henderson, Korea,ŴŷŹ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, 1:357. Henderson notes
UIBU OPU POF JEFOUJĕBCMF /PSUI ,PSFBO BHFOU XBT JOWPMWFE JO UIF QSPUFTUT  XIJDI MFęJTUT
DMBJNFEFYDFFEFEBOZUIJOHUIBUIBEUBLFOQMBDFVOEFSUIF+BQBOFTF
ŷŴ i4VNNBUJPO PG /PO.JMJUBSZ "DUJWJUJFT w 'FCSVBSZ ŴżŷŻ  ()24$"1  ŴŻŵ 3JDIBSE
J. Johnston, “Political Jailing in Korea Denied: Authorities Say 17,867 Held Are Accused
PGćFę 3JPU .VSEFSBOE0UIFS$SJNFT wNew York Times,/PWFNCFSŵŹ Ŵżŷź3JDIBSE
J. Johnston, “Seoul Aids Police in Checking Reds,” New York Times, 4FQUFNCFS Ź  Ŵżŷż
Richard J. Johnston, “Korean Reds Fight Police and Others,” New York Times, July 29, 1947;

Notes to Pages 86–88 289


i4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w4FQUFNCFSŴżŷŹ ()24$"1 ŵŵi4VN-
NBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFTJO,PSFB w%FDFNCFSŴżŷź ()24$"1 ŴŹŸ)FOEFSTPO 
Korea, 167; Maglin, “Looking Back in History,” 69. A conservative Korean newspaper pro-
DMBJNFE i4PNFUJNFTFWFOUIPTFLOPXOBTQBTTJPOBUFQBUSJPUTBSFBDDVTFEBTMFęJTUTVCWFS-
TJWFFMFNFOUTXJUIPVUTVďDJFOUNBUFSJBMFWJEFODFw$BQUBJO3JDIBSE%3PCJOTPOEFUBJMT
B DBTF JO XIJDI UIF NPUIFS PG POF PG UIF 5BFHV SJPUFST XBT UPSUVSFE UP EFBUI CZ QPMJDF
Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 156.
ŷŵi)JTUPSZPGUIF1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUwBOEi*OWFTUJHBUJPOPGUIF1PMJDF w+VMZŶų ŴżŷŹ 
USAFIK Okinawa, box 25; “Visit to Wanju Jail,” August 1, 1946, USAFIK Okinawa, box
27, folder 1; “Sanitary Inspection of Jails,” USAFIK Okinawa, box 26, folder 4; Gayn, Japan
Diary, 406, 407; Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” 152.
ŷŶ.BKPS(FOFSBM8'%FBOUP-U$PNNBOEFS+PIO3)PEHF i3FWJFXCZUIF%FQBSU-
NFOUPG+VTUJDFPG1FSTPOT$POĕOFEUP1SJTPOTPS1PMJDF+BJMT8IP.JHIU#F$POTJEFSFE
1PMJUJDBM1SJTPOFST w"QSJMŸ ŴżŷŻ 64"'*, 3FDPSETPGUIF(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST 'BS&BTU
$PNNBOE (FOFSBM$PSSFTQPOEFODFT ŴżŷŶoŴżŷŹ "*ŴŶźų CPYŴ
ŷŷi4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFT w"QSJMŴżŷŻ ()24$"1 Ŵźųi4VNNBUJPO
of Non-Military Activities in Korea,” July 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 22.
ŷŸ i4VNNBUJPO PG /PO.JMJUBSZ "DUJWJUJFT w +BOVBSZ ŴżŷŻ  ()24$"1  ŴŻŴ i3FQPSU
PG %BJMZ 1PMJDF "DUJWJUJFT w 64"'*, 0LJOBXB  CPY ŵź  GPMEFS $JWJM 1PMJDF i4VNNBUJPO
of Non-Military Activities in Korea,” August 1947, GHQ-SCAP, 196; Larsen, “Police and
Public Security,” 133, 145; Bertrand M. Roehner, “Relations between Allied Forces and the
Population of Korea,” Working Report, Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics,
University of Paris, 2010, 168.
ŷŹ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, 2:252.
ŷź$VNJOHT The Korean War,Ŵŵŵ.JMMFUU i$BQUBJO+BNFT3)BVTNBOBOEUIF'PSNB-
UJPOPGUIF,PSFBO"SNZwŸųŶ
ŷŻi$IFKVEP4VNNBUJPOPG/PO.JMJUBSZ"DUJWJUJFT w+VOFŴżŷŻ ()24$"1 ŴŹų.FS-
rill, Korea, 66.
49. “Field Report, Mission to Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to ROK,” RG 469,
Mission to Korea, U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK, Records Related to the KNP
ŴżŷŻoŴżŹŴ  IFSFBęFS,/1 CPYŷ GPMEFS$IFKVEP$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean
War,ŵŵŸųoŸż.FSSJMM Korea, 125. My thanks to Cheju-do native Sinae Hyun for providing
NFXJUIBCFUUFSVOEFSTUBOEJOHPGUIFJOUFSOBMEZOBNJDTGVFMJOHUIFWJPMFODFUIFSFEVSJOH
UIJT QFSJPE "ęFS UIF NBTTBDSF  UIF 64 NJMJUBSZ DPNNBOE PWFSTBX BO JODSFBTFE QPMJDF
presence and stepped up local training efforts at the Cheju-do police school, which they
ĕOBODFE8JMMJBN'%FBOUP%JSFDUPSPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDF +VMZŶų ŴżŷŻ 64"'*,0LJOBXB 
box 26, folder Cheju-do.
50. Merrill, Korea, 113; Time,/PWFNCFSŴŷ ŴżŷŻ Ź
51. “Award of UN Service Medal to the National Police, Mission to Korea, Office of
(PWFSONFOU4FSWJDFT 4FOJPS"EWJTFSUP,/1w'FCSVBSZŴų ŴżŸŷ 14% ()24$"1 ŴżŸŸo
1957), box 1, folder Awards and Decorations; “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and
UIF4FDVSJUZPGUIF6OEFSEFWFMPQFE4UBUFT w/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ +',- 10' CPYżŻ,JN 
The Unending Korean War,Ŵŵŵ5JN8FJOFS Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New
:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŵųųź ŸŹ Ÿź)BOFZTDBSFFSXBTTBWFECFDBVTFIFBTTJTUFE"MMFO%VMMFTT
TPO XIPIBECFFOXPVOEFEJODPNCBU'VUVSF014TUBČFS(BSMBOE8JMMJBNTXBTBMTPBďMJ-
ated with the clandestine operations in North Korea.
Ÿŵ $IBSMFT + )BOMFZ BOE +BF4PPO $IBOH  i4VNNFS PG 5FSSPS "U -FBTU Ŵųų ųųų 4BJE
Executed by Korean Ally of US in 1950,” Japan Focus, July 23, 2008.
ŸŶ+BNFT$BNFSPO Point of Departure -POEPO0SJFM1SFTT ŴżźŻ ŴŶŴoŶŵ.D%POBME 

290 Notes to Pages 88–90


Korea, 42; also Nichol, How Many Times Can I Die,ŴŵŻ$*$BHFOU%POBME/JDIPM BDPOĕ-
EBOUPG3IFF SFQPSUFEUIBUIFTUPPECZIFMQMFTTMZJO4VXBOBTiUIFDPOEFNOFEXFSFIBTUJMZ
QVTIFEJOUPMJOFBMPOHUIFFEHFPGUIFOFXMZPQFOFEHSBWFćFZXFSFRVJDLMZTIPUJOUIF
IFBEBOEQVTIFEJOUIFHSBWF‫*ڀڀ‬USJFEUPTUPQUIJTGSPNIBQQFOJOH IPXFWFS *HBWFVQ
XIFO*TBX*XBTXBTUJOHNZUJNFw JCJE
Ÿŷ)BOMFZBOE$IBOH i4VNNFSPG5FSSPSw#SVDF$VNJOHT ićF4PVUI,PSFBO.BT-
sacre at Taejon: New Evidence on U.S. Responsibility and Cover-Up,” Japan Focus, July
ŵŶ ŵųųŻ#SVDF$VNJOHT Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern)JTUPSZ /FX:PSL/PSUPO 
Ŵżżź ŵŸ,JN The Unending Korean War;)BMMJEBZBOE$VNJOHT Korea; Charles J. Hanley,
Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from
the Korean War /FX:PSL)PMU ŵųųų 3FĘFDUJOHUIFCBSCBSJUZPG64XBSUJNFDPOEVDU 
(FOFSBM$VSUJT-F.BZCPBTUFE i8FCVSOFEKVTUBCPVUFWFSZUPXOJO/PSUI,PSFB‰BOE
4PVUI,PSFBUPPw$VNJOHT Korea’s Place in the Sun, 298.
ŸŸ 0O 64 TUSBUFHJD EFTJHOT JO 4PVUIFBTU "TJB  TFF $IBMNFST +PIOTPO  Blowback: The
Costs and Consequences of American Empire /FX:PSL)FOSZ)PMU ŵųųų (BCSJFM,PMLP 
Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO 
Ŵżżų +PIO8%PXFS i0DDVQJFE+BQBOBOEUIF"NFSJDBO-BLF ŴżŷŸoŴżŸų wJOAmerica’s
Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations, FE &EXBSE 'SJFENBO BOE .BSL
4FMEFO /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT ŴżźŴ ŴŻŹoŵųź
56. Colonel Albert Haney, “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 5,
1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security; “Analysis of Internal Security Situation
JO30,1VSTVBOUUP3FDPNNFOEFE"DUJPOGPSŴŵżųE wJOForeign Relations of the United
States, 1955–1957, pt. 2, Korea,FE-PVJT4NJUI 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżżŶ ŴŻŶ
Ÿźi#BOEJU"DUJWJUZ3FQPSU w.BZŴ ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŷ1BSL#ZPOH#BF $IJFG 
Security Division, “Operation Report,” July 1, 1954, and “Periodic Operations Report,”
.BZŵź ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŷi3FTVMUTPG1PMJDF0QFSBUJPOT w+VMZŴŸ ŴżŸŷ ,/1
ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŵi4VNNBSZPG/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE3FQPSUPO,PSFB w%%&- 0$# CPY
17, folder Internal Security.
ŸŻi(ŵ4FDUJPO3FQPSU w'FCSVBSZŵ ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŷ
Ÿżi2VBSUFSMZ)JTUPSJDBM3FQPSU w+VMZŴų ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŷBMTPi(ŵ4FD-
tion Report,” March 25; May 2, 1954.
Źųi+PIOOZwUP1PMJDF"EWJTFS i#BOEJU"DUJWJUZ3FQPSU w.BZŴ ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ 
box 4.
61. “Police Wipe Out Last Known Guerrilla Band and “Red Bandit Chief Slain, Two
Killed,” Korea Times,%FDFNCFSŴżŸŹ /"
62. Henderson, Korea, 173.
ŹŶ8JMMJBN.BYĕFMEUP%JSFDUPS /1</BUJPOBM1PMJDF> 30, 'FCSVBSZŴŹ ŴżŸŷ ,/1
ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ(SFHH#SB[JOTLZ Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans,
and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007),
ŵŻoŶųReport of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea, March 27–April
9, 1975 -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Ŵżźź ŵż8JMMJBN+-FEFSFS A Nation of Sheep
/FX :PSL /PSUPO  ŴżŹŴ  źż i$PNCJOFE ,PSFBO $PNNVOJUJFT JO 64" 1JDLFU 8IJUF
)PVTF UP 1SPUFTU $BSOBHF PG ,PSFBO :PVUI w "QSJM ŵŵ  ŴżŹų  %%&-  0$#  8IJUF )PVTF
Office, Central Files, General File, Korea, box 821; Peer De Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the
Uses of Intelligence /FX:PSL5JNFT#PPLT ŴżźŻ ŴŹŶ
64. “Solon Alleges Police Attack,” Korea Times, October 26, 1956; “Captain Warren
40MJO$IVOHNV%JTUJOHVJTIFE.JMJUBSZ4FSWJDF.FEBMXJUI4JMWFS4UBSw.BSDIŴ ŴżŸŸ 
3FQVCMJDPG,PSFB DPVSUFTZ/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFTBOE3FDPSET"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 4U-PVJTTFF
also “Culprit Charges Police Plotted Murder,” Korea Times,%FDFNCFSŴŸ ŴżŸŹi.BZŸ3JPU

Notes to Pages 91–92 291


/FUT1SJTPO5FSNGPSŴŷ wKorea Times,.BZŴŷ ŴżŸŹ"1BDJĕDXBSWFUFSBOGSPN/FX+FSTFZ 
0MJOXPOB#SPO[F4UBSBOEB4JMWFS4UBSBOEXFOUPOUPIFBEUIFBSNZT$SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHB-
UJPO#SBODIJO7JFUOBN SFUJSJOHJOŴżźŶ
ŹŸ ,JN  The Unending Korean War, ŵųŴoŵ $VNJOHT  The Origins of the Korean War,
ŵŵŹŸ'PSFJHIUNPOUITJOŴżŷź ,JNXBT$IBOH5BFLTBOHTQFSTPOBMCPEZHVBSE
ŹŹ.VDDJP RVPUFEJO$VNJOHT The Korean War,ŴŻŶ0OFEPDVNFOUQSFTFSWFEBUUIF
/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFTXIJDIQPJOUTUPUIFDMPTFTZNCJPUJDSFMBUJPOTIJQCFUXFFO64BEWJTFST
BOE(FOFSBM,JNXBTBMFUUFSGSPN$PMPOFM+PTFQI1FUUFUPGUIF1VCMJD4BGFUZ#SBODIUIBOL-
JOHIJNGPSiUIFXPOEFSGVMQBSUZZPVHBWFVTPO0DUPCFSŵż ŴżŸŷćFGPPEBOEFOUFSUBJO-
NFOUXBTTVQFSCBTBMXBZTBUBA5JHFS,JNQBSUZw+PTFQI1FUUFUUP$IJFG,JN /PWFNCFSŴ 
ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ
Źźi2VBSUFSMZ)JTUPSJDBM3FQPSU w+VMZŴų ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŷ GPMEFSŶ"MCFSU
R. Haney, “Observations and Suggestions Concerning OISP,” January 30, 1957, DDEL, OCB,
box 18, folder Internal Security.
ŹŻ-ZNBO-FNOJU[FSUPćPNBT8JMTPO "TTJTUBOU$IJFGPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO 4FOJPS
"EWJTFSUP,/1 640..JTTJPOUP,PSFB +VOFŸ ŴżŸŹ ,/1 ŴżŸŸoŴżŸź CPYŷ GPMEFSŶ
i1FSJPEJD0QFSBUJPOT3FQPSU w.BZŵź ŴżŸŷ ,/1 ŴżŸŸoŴżŸź CPYŷiŴżŸŹ(VJEF w,/1
ŴżŸŸoŴżŸź  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF -BCPSBUPSZ 'JMF 0O (PJO  TFF -BVSFO + (PJO 
“Details Reproduced by Metal Casting,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police
ScienceŷŶ +VMZo"VHVTUŴżŸŵ ŵŸųoŸŸ-BVSFO+(PJO 8JMMJBN).D,FF BOE1BVM-,JSL 
i)VNBO )BJS 4UVEJFT "QQMJDBUJPO PG UIF .JDSPEFUFSNJOBOU PG $PNQBSBUJWF %FOTJUZw
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science ŷŶ +VMZo"VHVTU ŴżŸŵ  ŵŹŶoźŶ
(PJOTFSWFEJOUIFOBWZEVSJOHUIF1BDJĕDXBSBOEXBTGPSĕWFZFBSTDIJFGNJDSPBOBMZTUBU
UIF8JTDPOTJO4UBUF$SJNF-BCCFGPSFCFDPNJOHEJSFDUPSBU"MMFHIFOZ)FXSPUFIJTNBT-
UFSTUIFTJTBU#FSLFMFZVOEFS1BVM,JSL XIPXBTXFMMLOPXOJOUIFĕFMEPGDSJNJOBMJTUJDT
and worked on the Manhattan Project in World War II.
Źż .46( .POUIMZ 3FQPSU  0DUPCFS ŴżŹų  .46"  7JFUOBN 1SPKFDU  CPY Źźż 0O UIF
repressive nature of Chiang’s secret police apparatus in Taiwan, see Jay Taylor, The Gen-
eralissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan $BNCSJEHF
)BSWBSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŵųųų  5BZMPS RVPUFT B $*" PQFSBUJWF XIP SFQPSUFE IFBSJOH
FYFDVUJPOTCFJOHDBSSJFEPVUJOBTPDDFSTUBEJVNi$IJOHLVPHPUBMMUIFDPNNVOJTUTCVU
also a lot of others” (211).
70. Gene E. Carte and Elaine Carte, Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August
Vollmer, 1905–1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 49; Nathan Douthit,
i"VHVTU 7PMMNFS  #FSLFMFZT 'JSTU $IJFG PG 1PMJDF  BOE UIF &NFSHFODF PG 1PMJDF 1SPGFT-
TJPOBMJTN wCalifornia Historical ReviewŸŷ 4VNNFSŴżźŸ ŴųŴoŵŷ088JMTPO i"VHVTU
7PMMNFSwJournal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Scienceŷŷ .BZo+VOFŴżŸŶ żŸ
4QFBLJOHPVUJOŴżŶŹBHBJOTUUIF8BSPO%SVHT 7PMMNFSQSFTDJFOUMZTUBUFE i4USJOHFOUMBXT 
TQFDUBDVMBSQPMJDFESJWFT WJHPSPVTQSPTFDVUJPO BOEJNQSJTPONFOUPGBEEJDUTBOEQFEEMFST
IBWFQSPWFEOPUPOMZVTFMFTTBOEFOPSNPVTMZFYQFOTJWFCVUUIFZBSFBMTPVOKVTUJĕBCMZBOE
VOCFMJFWBCMZ DSVFM JO UIFJS BQQMJDBUJPOw "VHVTU 7PMMNFS  The Police and Modern Society
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936), 117.
71. Ray Foreaker to Michigan State College, East Lansing, March 9, 1956; “National Police
"EWJTPST)BWF7BSJFE"TTJHONFOUT w64*44FPVM 'FCSVBSZŴŸ ŴżŸŹ ,/1 ŴżŸŸoŴżŸź CPY
1, folder 3. Marc Logie, who fought with the GMD and French foreign legion, succeeded
Foreaker as PSD chief.
źŵ4FF8JMMJBN5VSOFS The Police Establishment /FX:PSL(11VUOBNT4POT ŴżŹŻ 
Ŵźų.BOZPGUIF#FSLFMFZDSJNJOPMPHJTUTXIPBEWJTFEUIF0BLMBOEQPMJDFXFOUPOUPBDUBT
DPOTVMUBOUTXJUIQSPCMFNSJEEFOQPMJDFEFQBSUNFOUTBDSPTTUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT+PIO*OHFSTPMM 

292 Notes to Pages 93–94


GPS FYBNQMF  SPTF UP CFDPNF EJSFDUPS PG UIF #VSFBV PG /BSDPUJDT BOE %BOHFSPVT %SVHT 
TQFBSIFBEJOHESVHXBSQSPHSBNTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJB$IBSMFT(BJO DIJFGPGQPMJDFEVSJOH
UIFŴżŹųTBOEWJMMBJOUPUIF/FX-FęBOEUIF#MBDL1BOUIFST XBTBMTPB7PMMNFSTUVEFOU
BOEQSPUÏHÏXIPTFSWFEXJUIUIF#FSLFMFZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU4PNFPGIJTSFDPMMFDUJPOTBSF
BWBJMBCMFBUUIF7PMMNFSPSBMIJTUPSZQSPKFDUPO6$#FSLFMFZ#BODSPę-JCSBSZTXFCTJUF0O
SBDJBMQSPCMFNT TFF&EXBSE,FBUJOH Free Huey! 4BO'SBODJTDP3BNQBSUT1SFTT ŴżźŴ BOE
UIFNFNPJSTPG#MBDL1BOUIFSMFBEFST
źŶi-JTUPG1PMJDF0ďDFST8IP)BWF#FFOUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT w,/1 ŴżŷŻoŴżŹŴ CPYŶ 
GPMEFS,PSFBO4UVEFOU3FDPSETi$IJFGPG,PSFBO6OJGPSNFE1PMJDF7JTJUT641SPWPTU.BS-
shall,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Scienceŷŷ +VMZo"VHVTUŴżŸŶ ŵŵų
74. Turner, The Police Establishment, 72; Joseph G. Woods, “The Progressives and the
1PMJDF6SCBO3FGPSNBOEUIF1SPGFTTJPOBMJ[BUJPOPGUIF-PT"OHFMFT1PMJDFw 1I%EJTT 
6$-" ŴżźŶ "ęFSUIFJSUSBJOJOHXBTDPNQMFUF UIF,/1PďDFSTXFSFUBLFOUP%JTOFZMBOE
)PXBSE , 4NJUI PG "#$ DPNNFOUFE BęFS 1BSLFST EFBUI GSPN B IFBSU BUUBDL UIBU iIJT
QPMJDFNFOXPOBSFQVUBUJPOGPSFďDJFODZCVUBMTPGPSJNQMBDBCMFFONJUZUPXBSEUIFMPXFS
TUSBUBPGTPDJFUZ UIFQPPS UIFJHOPSBOU UIFVOFNQMPZFEw5VSOFS The Police Establishment,
Żŷ)JTCJHPUSZXBTFWJEFOUXIFO BęFSUIF8BUUTVQSJTJOH IFUPMESFQPSUFSTUIBUTPNFCPEZ
IBEUISPXOBSPDLBOE iMJLFNPOLFZTJOB[PP wPUIFSTGPMMPXFE"MJTB4,SBNFS i8JMMJBN
H. Parker and the Thin Blue Line: Politics, Public Relations, and Policing in Postwar Los
"OHFMFTw 1I%EJTT "NFSJDBO6OJWFSTJUZ ŵųųź ŵżų
źŸ i+VWFOJMF 3FGPSNBUPSJFT w 4FQUFNCFS ŵŶ  ŴżŸŸ  ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS Ŷ
i*OGPSNBUJPO3FMBUFEUPUIF&TUBCMJTINFOUPGB3FGPSNBUPSZw,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŵ
źŹ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO  UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i6TF PG-JHIU "JSDSBę JO 0QJVN
&SBEJDBUJPO$BNQBJHO w4FQUFNCFSŵŹ ŴżŹż 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 0QFSBUJPOT%JWJTJPO "GSJDB
and the Near East and South Asia Branch, box 62, folder 2.
77. J. P Anninos, “Narrative Report of Korean Gangster Operations in Pusan,” February 11,
ŴżŸŷBOEi0QFSBUJPOTPG(BOHTUFST w,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ GPMEFSŶi/BSDPUJD5SBEFBOE
#MBDL.BSLFUJOH w+VMZŵ ŴżŸŸ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ GPMEFS.POUIMZ/BSDPUJDT3FQPSUT
i#MBDL.BSLFU w+VOFŵų ŴżŸŸ ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ GPMEFS#MBDL.BSLFU"DUJWJUJFT
źŻi3FQPSUPO$POEVDUPG,PSFBO.JMJUBSZ1PMJDF1FSTPOOFM w+VOFŵź ŴżŸŸ ,/1 ŴżŸŶo
ŴżŸŸ CPYŴ GPMEFSŶi3FQPSUPG"DDJEFOUXJUI'BUBMJUZw.BSDIŴŹ ŴżŸŸBOEi4VNNBSZ
PG 6/30, *ODJEFOUT 3FQPSUFE CZ UIF ,/1w .BZ ŴżŸŸ  ,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS
ŵi4VNNBSZPG6430,0ČFOTFTBOE*ODJEFOUT w,/1 ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŴ GPMEFS$PPS-
EJOBUJOH$PNNJUUFF-BXBOE0SEFSi%FNPOTUSBUJPOTBU*ODIPO w"VHVTUŴŻ ŴżŸŸ ,/1
ŴżŸŶoŴżŸŸ CPYŶ
79. “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped
4UBUFT w/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ 10' CPYżŻ
Żų4FF#ZPOH,PPL,JNBOE&[SB7PHFM FET The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Transforma-
tion of South Korea $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųŴŴ 4DPUU"OEFSTPOBOE+PO
Lee Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin
American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League /FX :PSL
%PEE .FBE ŴżŻŹ Ÿŵ$VNJOHT The Origins of the Korean War, 2:266. Park’s treachery
BęFSUIF:PTVSFCFMMJPOSFTVMUFEJOUIFQVSHFPGIVOESFETPGDPOTUBCVMBSZPďDFSTBOEUIF
EFBUI PG NBOZ GPSNFS GSJFOET )BVTNBOT JOWPMWFNFOU JO UIF DPVQ JT BDLOPXMFEHFE JO
$MFNPOT i$BQUBJO+BNFT)BVTNBO wŴżŶ
ŻŴ$VSSFOU'PSFJHO3FMBUJPOT i,PSFB1VSJĕFT1PMJUJDBM"DUJWJUJFT w.BSDIŵŴ ŴżŹŵ +',- 
NSF, box 431; Ogle, South Korea, 23.
82. Lauren J. Goin, Lt. Shannon, and Arthur M. Thurston, “Survey of Civil Internal Secu-
SJUZ'PSDFT 3FQVCMJDPG,PSFB w.BZŴżŹŹ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 1SPHSBNT 4VSWFZT BOE

Notes to Pages 94–96 293


Evaluations, box 6; Johnson, Blowback, 107; De Silva, Sub Rosa, xi. De Silva incidentally
helped recruit Nazi spy Reinhard Gehlen after World War II and was involved with the
1IPFOJY QSPHSBN JO 7JFUOBN *OGPSNBUJPO PO ćVSTUPO XBT QSPWJEFE CZ 4FSHFBOU (BSZ
8JMLJOTPOPGUIF*OEJBOB4UBUF1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU BOBDRVBJOUBODFPGTPNFPGćVSTUPOT
GPSNFSDPMMFBHVFTćVSTUPO XIPBMTPTFSWFEXJUIUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNTJO*OEPOFTJB -JCZB 
BOE4PNBMJB EJFEJOUIFFBSMZŵųųųT
83. “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces, Intelligence Annex to
Study on Korea, Prepared by Defense Intelligence Agency,” April 1962, JFKL, NSF, box 431;
ćPNBT"'JOOBOE+BNFT"$SFUFDPT i&WBMVBUJPOPGUIF1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN 64"*% 
,PSFB  +VOF ŵŻ  ŴżźŴo+VMZ ŴŻ  ŴżźŴ w IUUQQEGVTBJEHPWQEG@EPDT1%"#;żŴŶQEG (PJO 
Shannon, and Thurston, “Survey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea.” On
Jessup’s tenure in Indiana, see Marilyn S. Olsen, Gangsters, Gunfire, and Political Intrigue:
The Story of the Indiana State Police (Indianapolis: .38 Special Press), 2001, 75; Julien Mader,
Who’s Who in the CIA (Berlin: J. Mader, 1968), 261.
84. “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces,” April 1962, JFKL, NSC,
CPY ŷŶŴ #ZSPO &OHMF UP 'SBOL ,PMOBDLJ  %FDFNCFS ŴŶ  ŴżŹŻ  54%  CPY Ÿ  GPMEFS ,PSFB
-BVSFO+(PJO .FNPJS "QSJMŴżżŴ *OTUJUVUFPG*OUFS"NFSJDBO"ČBJST$PMMFDUJPO $PVS-
UFTZPG6OJWFSTJUZPG*MMJOPJTBU4QSJOHĕFME"SDIJWFT 4QFDJBM$PMMFDUJPOT$*"BHFOU(FPSHF
i4QFFEZw(BTQBSETUBUFEUIBUQPMJDFVOEFSIJTDPNNBOEiLJMMFEŴŴż</PSUI,PSFBO>BHFOUT
. . . . We didn’t take any prisoners, that was difficult to do. They wouldn’t just surrender.” In
George Schultz Jr., The Secret War against Hanoi /FX:PSL)BSQFS$PMMJOT Ŵżżż ŸŻ
ŻŸi"MMFHFE30,.BTTBDSFT w3(ŷźŵ 3FDPSETPGUIF"SNFE'PSDFTJO4PVUI&BTU"TJB
3"'4&" $SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJPOT#SBODI CPYFTŶŷoŶŹ/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4
)FSNBO  The Political Economy of Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third
World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), 313; Frank Baldwin, Diane Jones, and
Michael Jones, America’s Rented Troops: South Koreans in Vietnam 1IJMBEFMQIJB"NFSJDBO
'SJFOET4FSWJDFT$PNNJUUFF ŴżźŸ #FSOE(SFJOFS War without Fronts: The USA in Viet-
nam /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż Ŵżų
ŻŹ*OUFSWJFXXJUI+BDL(PJO %FDFNCFSż ŴżźŸ BOE#ZSPO&OHMF +BOVBSZŵź ŴżźŹ JO
8JMMJBN%4UFFWFT+S ićF641VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN *UT&WPMVUJPOBOE%FNJTFw NBTUFST
thesis, George Washington University, School of International Affairs, 1975), 9; Brazinsky,
Nation Building in South Korea. .BOZ JEFPMPHJDBMMZ ESJWFO TDIPMBST BEPQU UIF TBNF QFS-
spective in presenting Korea as a successful case of U.S. foreign policy, Brazinsky included.
Paul Wolfowitz argued in a 2009 New York Times editorial that South Korea should serve as
BNPEFMGPS64iOBUJPOCVJMEJOHwJO*SBR
87. Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of Korea, 27 March–9 April
1975,Żoż Ŷź4FFBMTPi/FX3FQSFTTJPOJO4PVUI,PSFB wNew York Times, May 29, 1980; Suh
Sung, Unbroken Spirits: Nineteen Years in South Korea’s Gulag,USBOT+FBO*OHMFT /FX:PSL
3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŴ 
88. See Henry Scott-Stokes and Jai-Eui Lee, eds., The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press
Accounts of Korea’s Tiananmen,GPSFXPSECZ,JN%BF+VOH /FX:PSL.&4IBSQF ŵųųų 
5JNPUIZ4IPSSPDL ićF643PMFJO,PSFBJOŴżźżoŴżŻų wSisa Journal, February 28, 1996,
XXXLJNTPęDPN,PSFB,XBOHKVŶIUN ,JN  The Unending Korean War, ix; Johnson,
Blowback, 116. Richard Holbrooke, who later served as special envoy to Afghanistan, was
BNPOHUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUPďDJBMTXIPHBWFBHSFFOMJHIUGPSBOEUIFODPWFSFEVQUIF
atrocity.
Żż .BSUIB , )VHHJOT  .JLB )BSJUPT'BUPVSPT  BOE 1IJMJQ ;JNCBSEP Violence Work-
ers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2002), 8.

294 Notes to Pages 96–97


5. “Free Government Cannot Exist without Safeguards against Subversion”

Ŵ +PTFQI ,OPY  i'PSNFS (SFFOTCPSP 1PMJDF $IJFG /PX 5BLJOH A)PNF -FBWF JO $JUZw
Greensboro Daily News,%FDFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŹųćJTJOGPSNBUJPOXBTBMTPDPOWFZFEUPNFJO
B QIPOF DPOWFSTBUJPO XJUI 8JMMJBNTPOT EBVHIUFS 7JSHJOJB i1BUTZw )BSSJOHUPO  B SFUJSFE
KPVSOBMJTUXIPTQFOUUJNFJOUIF'BS&BTUBTBUFFOBHFSXIFOIFSGBUIFSXBTTFSWJOHUIFSF
ŵ i1IJMJQQJOFT 1PMJDF 8PSL "QQSBJTFE 8JMMJBNTPO 1PJOUT UP 4IPSUDPNJOHT w Greens-
boro Daily News,+VMZŴżŸŹ DPVSUFTZPG1BUTZ)BSSJOHUPO +FUFS8JMMJBNTPOGBNJMZDPMMFD-
tion). On Lansdale, see Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating
and Empire-Building /PSNBO 0LMBIPNB6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŻų Ŷżŵ +POBUIBO /BTIFM 
Edward Lansdale’s Cold War "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųŹ 
Ŷ/PBN$IPNTLZ i7JFUOBNBOE6OJUFE4UBUFT(MPCBM4USBUFHZwJOThe Chomsky Reader,
FE +BNFT 1FDL /FX :PSL 1BOUIFPO #PPLT  ŴżŻź  ŵŶŴ 8BMU 8 3PTUPX BOE 3JDIBSE 7
Hatch, An American Policy in Asia $BNCSJEHF.*51SFTT ŴżŸŸ ź
ŷ4FF3JDIBSE+"MESJDI (BSZ%3BXOTMFZ BOE.JOH:FI3BXOTMFZ FET The Clandes-
tine Cold War in Asia, 1945–65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations
(London: Frank Cass, 2000); Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the
Second Indochina War /FX:PSL#PCCT.FSSJMM Ŵżźŵ 
Ÿ%FBO"DIFTPO NFNPGPSUIF1SFTJEFOU<)BSSZ45SVNBO> i"MMPDBUJPOPG4FDUJPOŶųŶ
'VOETUP1SPWJEF1PMJDF&RVJQNFOUGPSUIF*OEPOFTJBO$POTUBCVMBSZw+BOVBSZż ŴżŸų 3(
Ÿż 3%4 #VSFBVPG'BS&BTUFSO"ČBJST 3FDPSET3FMBUJOHUP&DPOPNJD"JE CPYŶ BOE3%4 
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Indonesia (hereafter RDS, Indonesia), box 5106, folder 1; also
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950: East Asia and the Pacific, vol. 6 (Washington,
%$(10 ŴżźŹ żŹŷoŹŹ(BCSJFM,PMLP Confronting the Third World: United States For-
eign Policy, 1945–1980 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻŻ 
6. Said Soekanto, Chief of State Police, Republic of Indonesia, to Secretary of State, June
2, 1949, RDS, Indonesia, box 5106, folder 1; Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin,
Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New
:PSL /FX 1SFTT  ŴżżŸ  ŶŴ 3PCFSU + .D.BIPO  Colonialism and Cold War: The United
States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49 (Ithaca: Cornell University
1SFTT ŴżŻŴ ŵŻų.ZUIBOLTUP.BSJFLF#MPFNCFSHFOGPSQSPWJEJOHNFXJUIJOGPSNBUJPO
on Soekanto.
źi"OBMZTJTPGUIF*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPOJO*OEPOFTJBBOE3FDPNNFOEFE"DUJPO w
0QFSBUJPOT$PPSEJOBUJOH#PBSE 8BTIJOHUPO %$ /PWFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŸŸ 1BQFSTPG-#+ /4' 
White House Office, National Security Council Staff, Operations Coordinating Board,
Washington, D.C., box 43, folder Indonesia; George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolu-
tion in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).
Ż8JMMJBN-BDFZUP-PVJTF1BHF.PSSJT +BOVBSZŸ ŴżŸų 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŸŴųŹ GPMEFS
Ŵ'PSBQPSUSBJUPG1BHF.PSSJT TFF.JDIBFM)PM[NBO James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and
the Craft of Counterintelligence "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŴŷŹoŷź
Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Anti-communist and Spymaster /FX:PSL3BO-
EPN)PVTF Ŵżżż ŵŸżoŻųi1BHJF wBTTIFXBTLOPXO DBSSJFEPOBUXFOUZĕWFZFBSBČBJS
XJUI-PWFTUPOFBOEXBTUIFNJTUSFTTPGi8JME#JMMw%POPWBOEVSJOHIFSEBZTJOUIF044
Her brother Edward was also in the CIA.
ż.BUUIFX'PYUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB BOE3BEFO4PFLBOUPUP8JMMJBN-BDFZ 
May 11, 1949, both RDS, Indonesia, box 5106, folder 1. On Fox’s political connections and
CVTJOFTTEFBMJOHT TFF1FUFS%BMF4DPUU i&YQPSUJOH.JMJUBSZ&DPOPNJD%FWFMPQNFOU"NFS-
JDBBOEUIF0WFSUISPXPG4VLBSOP ŴżŹŸoŴżŹź wJOTen Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia, ed.
.BMDPMN$BMEXFMM /PUUJOHIBN#FSUSBOE3VTTFMM1FBDF'PVOEBUJPO ŴżźŸ ŵŴŶ(FSMPG%

Notes to Pages 99–101 295


)PSNBO i"NFSJDBO#VTJOFTT*OUFSFTUTJOUIF*OEPOFTJBO3FQVCMJD ŴżŷŹoŴżŷż wIndonesia
ŶŸ "QSJMŴżŻŶ ŴŵŸoŶŵ'PYXBTBPOFUJNFFYFDVUJWFPG6OJWFSTBM*OUFSOBUJPOBM1JDUVSFTXIP
IBETFSWFEPOUIFXBSQMBOOJOHCPBSEBOEJOUIF64"SNZEVSJOH8PSME8BS**
10. Acheson, “Allocation of Section 303 Funds,” RDS, Indonesia, box 5106.
11. R. E. Murphy to John Peurifoy, “Training and Indoctrination in the U.S. of Certain
Indonesian Police Officials,” January 26, 1950, RDS, Indonesia, box 5106.
12. Mr. Merchant to Mr. Peurifoy, “Training and Indoctrination in the U.S. of Certain
Indonesian Police Officials,” January 27, 1950, RDS, Indonesia, box 5106.
ŴŶ8JMMJBN-BDZUP%FBO3VTL i3FHBSEJOH*OEPOFTJBO1PMJDF5SBJOFF1SPHSBN w.BSDI
Ŵŷ ŴżŸŴ-PVJTF.PSSJTUP8JMMJBN#-BDFZ +BOVBSZŴŻ ŴżŸų).FSMF$PDISBOUP-U$PM
#FBDI i645SBJOJOH"JETGPSUIF*OEPOFTJBO1PMJDF w%FDFNCFSŻ ŴżŸų3&.VSQIZUP
+PIO1FVSJGPZ +BOVBSZŵŹ ŴżŸų8JMMJBN0)BMMUP.S.FSDIBOU 'FCSVBSZŹ ŴżŸų"NFSJ-
DBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB UP4PFLBOUP "QSJMŴż ŴżŸų BMM3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŸŴųŹ+PTFQI
#VSLIPMEFS4NJUI Portrait of a Cold Warrior /FX:PSL(11VUOBN ŴżźŹ ŵŵŴ
Ŵŷ3)*OHFSTPMMUP+BNFT04VMMJWBO i*OEPOFTJBO1PMJDF*OUFMMJHFODF w"QSJMŵŻ ŴżŸų 
RDS, Indonesia, box 5106; Louis Kubler to Merle Cochran, April 18, 1951, RDS, Indonesia,
CPYŸŴųŹi$PNNFOEBUJPOGPS-U$PM-PVJT,VCMFSw"VHVTUŶų ŴżŷŹ 3(ŵŵŹ 0441FSTPO-
nel Files, box 423.
ŴŸi$PNNJUUFFUP4USFOHUIFOUIF4FDVSJUZPGUIF'SFF8PSME w+BOVBSZŵŹ ŴżŹŶ 38, 
CPY ŷŴŵ  GPMEFS Ŵ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  %KBLBSUB  UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  %FDFNCFS ŴŴ  ŴżŹŷ 
1BQFST PG -#+  /4'  "TJB BOE UIF 1BDJĕD  CPY ŵŷŹ  GPMEFS *OEPOFTJB JOUFMMJHFODF NFNP 
HSTL, NSCF, CIA, box 2.
ŴŹi"OBMZTJTPGUIF*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPOJO*OEPOFTJBBOE3FDPNNFOEFE"DUJPO w
0QFSBUJPOT$PPSEJOBUJOH#PBSE 8BTIJOHUPO %$ /PWFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# CPY
43, folder Indonesia; Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third
World /FX:PSL/FX1SFTT ŵųųź ,BIJOBOE,BIJO Subversion as Foreign Policy.
Ŵź+PIO'PTUFS%VMMFTUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB +VOFŶ ŴżŸŸ 3%4 CPYŷŹŻŴ )VHI
$VNNJOH %KBLBSUB UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF +VOFŴų ŴżŸŸ 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŷŹŻŴ
ŴŻ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  4FQUFNCFS ŴŶ  ŴżŸŻ  3%4  *OEPOFTJB  CPY
ŷŹŻŴ)PXBSE+POFTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF %FDFNCFSŴż ŴżŸż 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŷŹŻŴ
+PTFQI + -JOHP BOE .FMWJMMF . i#VDLw 'SVJU  i$POĕEFOUJBM 1SPHSBN &WBMVBUJPO 4UVEZ
Report of Police Assistance Project in Indonesia,” March 1963, RG 286, Records of the
USAID, OPS, Internal Defense and Public Safety, Office of the Director (hereafter IPS), box
8, folder Indonesia; Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare,
Counterinsurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT Ŵżżŵ 
ŷŷ"OPUIFSBEWJTFS #PC#SPVHIBN XBTBGPSNFSOBWZQJMPUBOECVTIQJMPUGPSNJTTJPOBS-
ies in Borneo.
Ŵżi"OBMZTJTPGUIF*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPOJO*OEPOFTJBBOE3FDPNNFOEFE"DUJPO w
0QFSBUJPOT$PPSEJOBUJOH#PBSE 8BTIJOHUPO %$ /PWFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# CPY
ŷŶ GPMEFS*OEPOFTJBi0$#3FQPSU1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ 
%%&-  0$#  CPY Ŵź  GPMEFS *OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  .BOJMB  UP "NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB 'FCSVBSZŵŸ ŴżŸŸ 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŸŴųŹ
ŵų8JMMJBN#MVN Killing Hope: United States Military and CIA Interventions since World
War II .POSPF .F$PNNPO$PVSBHF1SFTT ŴżżŻ Ŵųŵ4NJUI Portrait of a Cold Warrior,
ŵŷų-JCFSBMTVQQPSUGPSUIFSFQSFTTJPOPGDPNNVOJTUTJTPVUMJOFEJO"SUIVS4DIMFTJOHFS+S 
The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (1949), rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962),
135.
ŵŴ4FZNPVS8FJTTUP.S8JMTPO *OEPOFTJBO1PMJDF "QSJMŴź ŴżŸż "NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 

296 Notes to Pages 101–103


%KBLBSUB UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŷŹŻŴ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB 
UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i*OEPOFTJBO1SJTPOTBU$IFSJCPOBOE5KJMBUKBQ /VTB,BOCBSHPO w
August 1, 1959, RDS, Indonesia, box 4681. Much as in Castro’s Cuba, foreign interference
DBVTFE4VLBSOPUPDSBDLEPXONPSFIBSTIMZPOEJTTFOUFSTBOEMFEIJNUPJOJUJBUFBTZTUFN
PGiHVJEFEEFNPDSBDZwJOXIJDITUBUFQPXFSXBTDFOUSBMJ[FE
ŵŵ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF .BSDIŶ ŴżŸŶ 3%4 *OEPOFTJB 
CPYŸŴųŹ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ .BOJMB UP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ %KBLBSUB 'FCSVBSZŵŸ ŴżŸŸ 
RDS, Indonesia, box 4681.
ŵŶ#PC'SVJU i*OEPOFTJBO1PMJDF5SBJOJOH1SPKFDU wGSPN+BNFT(BMCSBJUIUP.S%BZ 
August 6, 1954, RDS, Indonesia, box 5106.
ŵŷ i1PMJDZ PG 3* 1PMJDF w "QSJM ŵ  ŴżŸŻ  "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  %KBLBSUB  UP %FQBSUNFOU
of State, RDS, Indonesia, box 4681; Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, 120;
,FOOFUI+$POCPZBOE+BNFT.PSSJTPO Feet to the Fire: Covert Operations in Indonesia,
1957–1958 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998).
25. Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, ŴŻų #MVN  Killing Hope, ŴųŶ 5JN
Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA /FX:PSL"ODIPS ŵųųŻ ŴźŸ ŴźŹ"ęFS
securing his release in 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy allegedly told Pope, who
IBEESPQQFETVQQMJFTGPSUIF'SFODIBU%JFOCJFOQIV UPiMPTFIJNTFMGJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTw
BOEOFWFSTQFBLPGIJTFYQFSJFODFBHBJO*OŵųųŸIFUPMEBSFQPSUFSi*FOKPZFELJMMJOH$PN-
NVOJTUT*MJLFEUPLJMM$PNNVOJTUTBOZXBZ*DPVMEHFUUIFNw8FJOFS Legacy of Ashes, 175.
ŵŹ)PXBSE+POFTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF %FDFNCFSŴż ŴżŸż 3%4 *OEPOFTJB CPYŷŹŻŴ
ŵź #SBEMFZ 3 4JNQTPO  Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-
Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), 81, 82; Robert
,PNFSUP.S%BWJT i*OEPOFTJBO$JWJD"DUJPOBOE.PCSJH w+VMZŴż ŴżŹŵi$PNNJUUFFUP
Strengthen the Security of the Free World,” RWK, box 412, folder 1.
28. Byron Engle to Robert Lowe, April 1963; also Paul H. Skuse, “Public Safety Monthly
3FQPSU w %FDFNCFS Ź  ŴżŹŵ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w "QSJM ŴżŹŶ  BMM 54%  CPY ż 
folder Indonesia.
ŵż)FOSZ.4BNPSJTLJ i.PCSJH5SBJOJOH1SPHSBNT w'FCSVBSZŵŴ ŴżŹŶ 54% CPYż 
GPMEFS *OEPOFTJB i.FNP GPS UIF 1SFTJEFOU "TTJTUBODF 1SPHSBN JO *OEPOFTJB  ŴżŹŷ w 3(
ŵŻŹ  64"*%  014  &BTU "TJB #SBODI  3FDPSET 3FMBUJOH UP *OEPOFTJB ŴżŹŶoŴżŹŹ  CPY Ŵ 
GPMEFS "EWJTPSZ 5SBJOJOH BOE "TTJTUBODF i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN 4VNNBSZ  *OEPOFTJB w
.BZŴŶ ŴżŹŶ *14 CPYŻ(FPSHF#BMMUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF %FDFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŹŷ 1BQFSTPG-#+ 
NSF, Country File, box 246, folder Indonesia. Background on Robert Lowe was found in his
044ĕMF 3(ŵŹŹ 3FDPSETPGUIF044 CPYŷŹŷ-PXFXBTUSBJOFEBUUIFTFDSFU$BNQ9JO
0TIBXB 0OUBSJP XIFSFBHFOUTXFSFUBVHIUUIFBSUPGTJMFOULJMMJOH BNPOHPUIFSDMBOEFT-
tine skills.
Ŷų %JSFDUPS PG *OUFMMJHFODF  i*OEPOFTJBO $PNNVOJTU 1BSUZw "QSJM ŵź  ŴżŹŹ BOE ićF
Upheaval of Indonesia,” October 8, 1965, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Country File, box 246, folder
*OEPOFTJB,BUIZ ,BEBOF i&Y"HFOUT4BZ$*" $PNQJMFE%FBUI-JTUTGPS*OEPOFTJB  San
Francisco Examiner,.BZŵų Ŵżżų%BWJE3BOTPN ićF#FSLFMFZ.BĕBBOEUIF*OEPOFTJB
Massacre,” in Two, Three . . . Many Vietnams: A Radical Reader on the Wars in Southeast Asia
and the Conflicts at Home, ed. the Editors of Ramparts with Banning Garrett and Katherine
#BSLMFZ 4BO'SBODJTDP$BOĕFME1SFTT ŴżźŴ Ŵŷŷ ŴŷŸ0OUIFDJSDVNTUBODFTTVSSPVOEJOH
the coup, see John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and
Suharto’s Coup d’État in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Ralph
W. McGehee, “The Indonesian Massacre and the CIA,” Covert Action Quarterly 35 (Fall
1990): 57.

Notes to Pages 103–105 297


ŶŴ)PXBSE+POFTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i5SBOTTIJQNFOUPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ$PNNPEJUJFT w
"QSJMż ŴżŹŸ BOE)PXBSE+POFTUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i5FSNJOBUJPOPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPK-
FDU w'FCSVBSZo.BSDIŴżŹŸ CPUI54% CPYż GPMEFS*OEPOFTJB
Ŷŵ3PCFSU"NPSZ PSBMIJTUPSZJOUFSWJFX +',--JOHPBOE'SVJU i$POĕEFOUJBM1SPHSBN
&WBMVBUJPO4UVEZ3FQPSUPG1PMJDF"TTJTUBODF1SPKFDUJO*OEPOFTJBwi1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN
4VNNBSZ *OEPOFTJB w.BZŴŶ ŴżŹŶ *14 CPYŻ
33. Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Ŵżźź 
ŵ3JDIBSE5BOUFS ićF5PUBMJUBSJBO"NCJUJPO*OUFMMJHFODFBOE4FDVSJUZ"HFODJFTJO*OEP-
nesia,” in State and Civil Society in Indonesia,FE"SJFG#VEJNBO $MBZUPO 7JDUPSJB$FOUSF
PG4PVUIFBTU"TJBO4UVEJFT .POBTI6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżżż ŵŴŸoŻż+PTIVB#BSLFS i4UBUFPG'FBS
$POUSPMMJOHUIF$SJNJOBM$POUBHJPOJO4VIBSUPT/FX0SEFSwJOViolence and the State in
Suharto’s Indonesia,FE#FOFEJDU"OEFSTPO *UIBDB4PVUIFBTU"TJB1SPHSBN1VCMJDBUJPOT 
4PVUIFBTU"TJB1SPHSBN $PSOFMM6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżżż ŵųoŸŷ
Ŷŷ$BSNFM#VEJBSEKP i3FQSFTTJPOBOE1PMJUJDBM*NQSJTPONFOU wJO$BMEXFMM Ten Years’
Military Terror in Indonesia,żŸoŴųŸ%JSFDUPSPG*OUFMMJHFODF ićF6QIFBWBMJO*OEPOFTJB w
$*"3FQPSU 0DUPCFSŻ ŴżŹŸ 1BQFSTPG-#+ /4' $PVOUSZ'JMF "TJBBOEUIF1BDJĕD CPY
ŵŷŹ %BOJFM 4 -FW  ićF $SJNJOBM 3FHJNF $SJNJOBM 1SPDFTT JO *OEPOFTJB w JO Figures of
Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, ed. Vicente L. Rafael,
*UIBDB4PVUIFBTU"TJB1SPHSBN1VCMJDBUJPOT 4PVUIFBTU"TJB1SPHSBN $PSOFMM6OJWFSTJUZ 
1999), 183; Justus M. Van der Kroel, “Indonesia’s Political Prisoners,” Pacific Affairs 49 (Win-
UFSŴżźŹoźź ŹŵŸoŷź
ŶŸ $*" %JSFDUPS PG *OUFMMJHFODF  NFNP  "QSJM ŵż  ŴżŹŹ  BOE i*OEPOFTJB 1SPTQFDUT GPS
&DPOPNJD4UBCJMJUZw1BQFSTPG-#+ /4' $PVOUSZ'JMF +VMZŴżŹŻ CPYŵŷż3PC#BSOFUUUP
Charles Mann, Indonesia, April 21, 1966, RG 286, USAID, OPS, East Asia Branch (here-
BęFS&BTU"TJB#SBODI 3FDPSET3FMBUJOHUP*OEPOFTJB ŴżŹŶoŴżŹŹ CPYŵ4FFBMTP,PMLP 
Confronting the Third World, ŴŻŵ /PBN $IPNTLZ BOE &EXBSE 4 )FSNBO  The Political
Economy of Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston:
South End Press, 1979), 154, 155.
ŶŹ +BNFT - .D.BIPO  $IJFG PG 5FDIOJDBM 4FSWJDFT %JWJTJPO  014  UP %S 4PFCJBOUP 
Brigadier General of Police, Negara Djakarta, January 27, 1971, TSD, box 4, folder Indo-
OFTJB i#JPHSBQIJD *OGPSNBUJPO PG ,FZ *OEPOFTJBO 1FSTPOBMJUJFT w 4PVUIFBTU "TJB 3FQPSU 
.BSDIŴų ŴżŻŶ 'PSFJHO#SPBEDBTU*OGPSNBUJPO4FSWJDF ŴŸ.D.BIPO XIPIFMEBEFHSFF
JOQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPOGSPN.JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ TFSWFEBTBQPMJDFBEWJTFS VOEFS
$*"DPWFS JO4PVUI,PSFB UIF1IJMJQQJOFT ćBJMBOE BOE7JFUOBN
Ŷźi#JPHSBQIJD*OGPSNBUJPOPG,FZ*OEPOFTJBO1FSTPOBMJUJFT wŴŷ
38. Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Con-
nection, and the Road to Afghanistan /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųŴų Żż0OUIF
JOUFSFTUTPGUIF"NFSJDBOPJMDPNQBOJFT4IFMM4UBOWBDBOE4UBOEBSE0JMJOćBJMBOE TFF
"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ #BOHLPL UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i4IFMM4UBOWBD1SPQPTBMGPS0JM3FĕO-
ery,” June 18, 1959, RG 59, RDS BFEA, Thailand Files (hereafter RDS, Thailand), box 5068,
folder 1.
Ŷż%BOJFM'JOFNBO A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government
in Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 123, 133; W. H. Godel
UP8JMMJBN%POPWBO ŴżŸŶ ".)* UIF1BQFSTPG8JMMJBN%POPWBO CPYż EPDVNFOUŷųŸŻ
Brigadier General Elliott R. Thorpe, East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence
Officer in the Pacific, 1939–1949 #PTUPO(BNCJU Ŵżŷż ŵŹŻ ŵŹż
40. “Private Training Venture,” New York Times,4FQUFNCFSŵų ŴżŸźi-U$PM1BVM-JPOFM
Helliwell”; and Hunter Fulford to Colonel E. F. Connely, “Major Willis H. Bird,” January
ŵŷ Ŵżŷŷ 3(ŵŵŹ 3FDPSETPGUIF044 1FSTPOOFM'JMFT CPYŸź3)BSSJT4NJUI OSS: The

298 Notes to Pages 105–106


Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1972), 273, 330; Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History
of America’s War on Drugs (London: Verso, 2004), 155; Peter Dale Scott, “Drugs and Oil:
The Deep Politics of U.S. Asian Wars,” in War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan,
and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century,FE.BSL4FMEFOBOE"MWJO:4P /FX
:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŷ ŴŻź1FOOZ-FSOPVY In Banks We Trust /FX:PSL
%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŻŷ źźi0ďDJBMT*OWPMWFEJO0QJVN3VOOJOH w"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ #BOHLPL 
UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  +VMZ ź  ŴżŸŻ  3%4  ćBJMBOE CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS Ÿ "ęFS 8PSME 8BS ** 
Helliwell was Far East division chief of the Strategic Service Unit, the successor to OSS,
charged with controlling the pipeline of covert funds for secret operations throughout East
"TJB " DMPTF DPMMFBHVF PG )FMMJXFMM BOE #JSE  1SJODFUPO HSBE 4IFSNBO +PPTU MFE ,BDIJO
HVFSSJMMBTJO#VSNBEVSJOH8PSME8BS**BTDPNNBOEFSPG044%FUBDINFOUŴųŴ LOPXOGPS
USBEJOHJOPQJVN
ŷŴ8JMMJBN5VSOFSUP.S3PCFSU+PZDF 1PMJDZ1MBOOJOH4UBČ #BOHLPL /PWFNCFSź 
1951, in Classen et al., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: Asia and the Pacific, pt. 2,
WPMŹ FE1BVM$MBTTFOFUBM 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 Ŵżźź ŴŹŶŶ'JOFNBO A Special Rela-
tionship, 135; Scott, American War Machine,ŻŹ#JSETDMPTFSFMBUJPOTIJQUP1IBPTUFNNFE
JOQBSUGSPNIJTNBSSJBHFUPUIFTJTUFSPGćBJBJSGPSDFPďDFS4JUUIJ4BXFUTJMB POFPG1IBPT
cronies.
ŷŵ'JOFNBO A Special Relationship,ŴŷŶ(BSMBOE8JMMJBNTUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO 
“Narcotics Situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East,” August 4, 1959, RG 286, USAID,
OPS, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch (hereafter Africa and Near East and
South Asia Branch), box 62, folder Narcotics; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA
Complicity in the Global Drug Trade /FX:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM ŴżżŴ ŴźŸoźŹ#FSUJM-JOUOFS 
Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994), 106.
ŷŶ'JOFNBO A Special Relationship, 135.
44. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 185; New York Times,/PWFNCFSŹ ŴżŸź
45. Richard K. Stewart to Mr. Rockwood Fester, October 27, 1955, RDS, Thailand, box
ŸųŹŻ4JOBF)ZVO i$PME8BSSJPSTPOUIF.BSHJOTćBJ643FMBUJPOTBOEUIF&NFSHFODF
PGUIF#PSEFS1BUSPM1PMJDF ŴżŷźoŴżŹŸw NBTUFSTUIFTJT 6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJO .BEJTPO 
ŵųųż Ÿŷ4VSBDIFSU#BNSVOHTVL i6OJUFE4UBUFT'PSFJHO1PMJDZBOEćBJ.JMJUBSZ3VMF 
ŴżŷźoŴżźźw NBTUFSTUIFTJT $PSOFMM6OJWFSTJUZ ŴżŻŸ 
ŷŹćPNBT-PCF U.S. National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police (Denver:
University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1977), 27; Darrell Berrigan,
ićFZ4NVHHMF%PQFCZUIF5PO wSaturday Evening Post,.BZŸ ŴżŸŹ ŷŵ ŴŸŹoŸź
ŷź "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  #BOHLPL  UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  ićF /BSDPUJD 4JUVBUJPO JO
ćBJMBOE w+VOFŵż ŴżŸŸ 3%4 ćBJMBOE CPYŸųŹŻ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF 
October 19, 1956, RDS, Thailand, box 5068.
ŷŻ(BSMBOE8JMMJBNTUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO i/BSDPUJDT4JUVBUJPOJO4PVUIFBTU
Asia and the Far East,” August 4, 1959, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box
Źŵ GPMEFS/BSDPUJDT(PWFSONFOUSFDPSETQPJOUUP8JMMJT#JSETIBWJOHCFFOBSSFTUFEGPS
TNVHHMJOHPQJVNWJB"JS"NFSJDBQMBOFTJOUIFFBSMZŴżŹųT)JTDPVTJO8JMMJBN#JSEXBT
also involved in covert operations and illegal activity in Southeast Asia. See also Harry J.
"OTMJOHFSUP(JMCFSU:BUFT 'FCSVBSZŵŸ ŴżŸż 3%&" #/%% CPYŴŹŷ ĕMF7JFUOBN.+
W. Pevoy and J. M. Wilkinson, “References to Thailand in Mr. McCoy’s Book,” 1972, RG 59,
3%4 0ďDFTPGćBJBOE#VSNB"ČBJST ŴżŹŶoŴżźŸ CPYŸ GPMEFS/BSDPUJDT
ŷż'JOFNBO A Special Relationship,ŴŸųoŸŴ.D$PZ The Politics of Heroin, 185; Peter Dale
Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina (New
:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŶ ŴżŴ

Notes to Pages 107–108 299


Ÿų'JOFNBO A Special Relationship, 135.
ŸŴ*CJE ŴźŵoźŶ#BOOJOH(BSSFUU ićBJMBOEćF/FYU%PNJOP wJO&EJUPSTPGRamparts,
Two, Three . . . Many Vietnams, 125; Ralph Thaxton, “Modernization and Counter-Revolu-
tion in Thailand,” in Remaking Asia: Essays on the American Uses of Power, ed. Mark Selden
/FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT Ŵżźŷ ŵŷźoźż0OFPGUIFBOUISPQPMPHJTUTXBTUIFSBDJBMUIFP-
SJTU$BSMFUPO$PPO GPSNFSMZPGUIF044
52. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan /FX:PSL5JNFT#PPLT 
ŴżŻŵ ŻŵŵoŵŶ4FFBMTP%PVHMBT8BMMFS Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the
OSS and Modern American Espionage /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŵųŴŴ 
ŸŶ'(3PCFSUTPOUPUIF4FDSFUBSZ i1PTTJCMF%FTJHOBUJPOPG(FOFSBM8JMMJBN%POPWBO
BT"NCBTTBEPSUPćBJMBOE w+VOFŵ ŴżŸŶBOE#JMM%POPWBOUP1SFTJEFOU&JTFOIPXFS .BZ
7, 1954, DDEL, OCB, John Foster Dulles Papers, Personnel Series, box 1, folder Donovan.
*OUFSFTUJOHMZ UIFQSJODJQBMSFTFSWBUJPOUIF4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUIBEPWFS%POPWBOTBQQPJOU-
NFOUJOWPMWFEIJTPMEDPOUBDUTXJUI1SJEJBOEUIF'SFFćBJNPWFNFOUEVSJOH8PSME8BS
**4JODF64QPMJDZTIJęFEBęFSUIFXBSBOENBOZPGUIF'SFFćBJXFSFOPXEJTTJEFOUT 
Donovan was urged to downplay his prior relationship and keep select OSS colleagues away
GSPN1SJEJ BOEQSFGFSBCMZPVUPGUIFDPVOUSZ
Ÿŷ'JOFNBO A Special Relationship,ŴŻŴ8)(PEFMUP8JMMJBN%POPWBO <OE> ŴżŸŶ 
1BQFSTPG8JMMJBN%POPWBO ".)* CPYż EPDVNFOUŷųŸŻ
ŸŸ3BZNPOE3$PČFZBOE+PTFQI;5BZMPS Thailand Public Safety/Border Patrol Police,
Remote Area Security Development: An Approach to Counter-Insurgency by the Border Patrol
Police, USOM, USAID (Bangkok, 1971), 2; Betty DuMaine to Richard M. Nixon, March 15,
1969, IPS, box 9.
56. Brief History of Camp Narasuan: Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit, USOM, USAID
#BOHLPL ŴżŹŻ i*OUFSWJFXXJUI#JMM-BJS $POEVDUFECZ4UFWF.BYOFSw%FDFNCFSŴŴ ŵųųŴ 
TTU. On the eastern European precedent, see Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s
Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000). Lair, who was Willis
#JSETCSPUIFSJOMBX IFMQFEPSHBOJ[FUIFDMBOEFTUJOF)NPOHBSNZJO-BPT)FDBOEJEMZ
OPUFTIPXIJTNFOPCUBJOFEBQFSDFOUBHFPGUIFNPOFZGSPNESVHTFJ[VSFT UPXIJDIUIFZ
were entitled by law.
Ÿźi0$#3FQPSU1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# CPY
17, folder Internal Security.
58. Jeffrey Race, “The War in Northern Thailand,” Modern Asian Studies 8 (January 1974):
żų'JOFNBO A Special Relationship,ŵųŹoź8BMMFS Wild Bill Donovan, 373.
59. Ralph White, “Observations on Hill Tribes and the Security of Thailand”; and J. Marsh
ćPNQTPOUP"NCBTTBEPS3BMQI6OHBS +BOVBSZŶų ŴżŹŵ 3%4 ćBJMBOE ŴżŹųoŴżŹŶ CPY
Ŷ4FFBMTP4FUI4,JOH ićBJ7JMMBHF8JOLTBU0QJVN5SBďD wNew York Times, August 1,
1965; Maxner, “Interview with Bill Lair.”.
60. The Civic Action Program of the Border Patrol Police and the USOM Public Safety Divi-
sion (Bangkok, 1962), 46; Coffey and Taylor, Thailand Public Safety/Border Patrol Police, 2;
Douglas Blaufarb, The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance /FX:PSL
Free Press, 1977), 194; Hyun, “Cold Warriors on the Margins.”
61. Lobe, U.S. National Security Police and Aid to the Thailand Police, 82; White, “Obser-
WBUJPOTPO)JMM5SJCFTBOEUIF4FDVSJUZPGćBJMBOEw+.BSTIćPNQTPOUP"NCBTTBEPS
Ralph Ungar, January 30, 1962, RDS, Thailand, box 3.
62. Pevoy and Wilkinson, “References to Thailand in Mr. McCoy’s Book”; Robert Lowe,
i0CTFSWBUJPOTPOćBJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDFo64"*%1PMJDF1SPKFDU w3%4 ćBJMBOE CPYŹ3BMQI
McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-five Years in the CIA /FX:PSL0DFBO1SFTT Ŵżżż 

300 Notes to Pages 108–110


80; Al McCoy, “Subcontracting Counter-Insurgency,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
%FDFNCFSŴżźų ŴŸŹ3BDF ićF8BSJO/PSUIFSOćBJMBOEw"T)ZVOOPUFT i$PME8BS-
SJPSTPOUIF.BSHJOTw ćBJPďDJBMTIBETJNJMBSMZQBUSPOJ[JOHWJFXTPGUIFIJMMUSJCFTQFPQMF
ŹŶ#PC-PXF 014'BS&BTU UP+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO i0CTFSWBUJPOTPOUIFćBJ/BUJPOBM
Police,” June 25, 1963, RDS, Thailand, box 6, folder Thailand; K. S. Masterson, “Counter-
*OTVSHFODZ JO ćBJMBOE w WPM Ŵ  i4VNNBSZ BOE &WBMVBUJPO w 8FBQPOT 4ZTUFN &WBMVBUJPO
(SPVQ +VOFŴżŹŻ 1BQFSTPG-#+ /4' $PVOUSZ'JMFT 1BDJĕD#SBODI CPYŵŻŹ ćBJMBOE
64. Lobe, U.S. National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police, 76.
ŹŸ,FWJO+)FXJTPO ićF4UBUFBOE$BQJUBMJTU%FWFMPQNFOUJOćBJMBOE wJOEssays in
the Political Economy of Structural Change, ed. Richard A. Higgott and Richard Robison
(London: Routledge, 1985), 278.
66. Marvin J. Jones and Philip Batson, A Brief History of USOM Support to the Thai
National Police Department, USAID, OPS (Bangkok, 1969), 12; Task Force Southeast Asia,
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i4UBUVT3FQPSUPG$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ1SPKFDUTJOćBJMBOE 7JFUOBN 
BOE$BNCPEJB wŴżŹŵ 3(Ÿż 3%4#'&" 0ďDFPGUIF$PVOUSZ%JSFDUPSGPS-BPT CPYŴ
Coffey and Taylor, Thailand Public Safety/Border Patrol Police, appendix 3; E. H. Adkins Jr.,
i"4VSWFZ3FQPSUPGUIF/BUJPOBM*EFOUJUZ$BSE1SPHSBN 3PZBM(PWFSONFOUPGćBJMBOE 
#BOHLPL w%FDFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŶ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPS 1SPHSBNT 4VS-
veys, and Evaluations, Thailand, box 11.
Źźi1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN 640.ćBJMBOE ŴżŸźoŴżŹŶw #BOHLPL ŴżŹŶ ŵ+POFTBOE
Batson, A Brief History of USOM Support to the Thai National Police Department,Ŵoŵ
68. Bob Lowe, “Observations on the Thai National Police,” RDS, Thailand, box 6, folder
ćBJMBOE)BOFZ i0$#3FQPSU1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ %%&-
Źżi1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN 640.ćBJMBOEw ŴżŸźoŴżŹŶ ŷ
źų 1FSTPOBM JOUFSWJFX XJUI 8BMUFS i4UJDLZw #VSDI  GPSNFS EFQVUZ DIJFG PG QPMJDF 
(SFFOTCPSP /$ "QSJMŵź ŵųŴų&VHFOF.JMMFS i"3FBM.BO/FX$IJFGPG1PMJDF$BNF
Up Hard Way,” Greensboro Record,0DUPCFSŴżŸŴi$BQUBJO8JMMJBNTPO)FBET$MBTTBU'#*
4DIPPM w<Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch> +BOVBSZo.BSDIŴżŷŻ CPUIDMJQQJOHTDPVSUFTZ
PG1BUSJDJBi1BUTZw)BSSJOHUPO +FSSZ#MFETPF i$PQTJO#MBDL8IJUF wRhinotimes.com,
February 12, 2010; “Retired Cop Lauded for Outstanding Service,” Greensboro Police,
XXXHSFFOTCPSPODHPW 0O SBDJBM BOE FDPOPNJD EJTDSJNJOBUJPO JO (SFFOTCPSP JO UIF
ŴżŸųTBOEUIFSFMVDUBODFPGUIFXIJUFFMJUFUPNPWFBHBJOTU+JN$SPXJOTQJUFPGUIFJSDMBJNT
UPCFMFTTCJHPUFEUIBOQPPSXIJUFiSFEOFDLT wTFF8JMMJBN$IBGF Civilities and Civil Rights:
Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFS-
sity Press, 1980), 51.
71. “Ex-Police Chief Describes Subversion in Thailand,” Greensboro Daily News, July 25,
ŴżŹŸ )VUUFS 8JMMJBNT  i8BSOJOH *TTVFE PO 3FE 5BLFPWFS JO 7JFUOBN w Lynchburg (Va.)
Daily Advance,+VMZŵż ŴżŹŸi'PSNFS$IJFG5FMMTPGćBJ1PMJDF8PSL wGreensboro Record,
%FDFNCFS Ŵŵ  ŴżŹų +JN 4DIMPTTFS  i&Y$IJFG PG 1PMJDF 3FNFNCFSFE w Greensboro Daily
News, June 3, 2005.
źŵ4FF+BNFT7#FOOFUUXJUI3PEOFZ$BNQCFMM I Chose Prison /FX:PSL,OPQG Ŵżźų 
3PCFSU.'SFFNBO Correctional Organization and Management: Public Policy Challenges,
Behavior, and Structure 8PCVSO .BTT#VUUFSXPSUI )FJOFNBOO Ŵżżż ŵŴŻ
źŶ64%FQBSUNFOUPG+VTUJDF Report on the Prisons of Thailand: James V. Bennett, Direc-
tor Federal Bureau of Prisons,0DUPCFSŵŹ ŴżŹų *OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 
East Asia Branch, Thailand, box 213, Thai Penology.
źŷ#FOOFUURVPUFEJO"OESFX&)VOU David Dellinger: The Life and Times of a Nonvio-
lent Revolutionary /FX:PSL/FX:PSL6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŹ ŸŻoŸż0OUIFPQQSFTTJWF

Notes to Pages 110–113 301


DMJNBUFJO64QSJTPOTBSPVOEUIJTUJNF TFF#FO)#BHEJLJBO Caged: Eight Prisoners and
Their Keepers /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX ŴżźŹ YJJ YJJJ
źŸ4FZNPVS++POFTUP+PIO$&WBSBOE,FOOFUI,VHFM i#PXFO3FQPSU w"QSJMŵŸ ŴżŹŵ 
3%4 ćBJMBOE ŴżŹųoŴżŹŶ CPYŶi1PMJDZ3FTFBSDI4UVEZ*OUFSOBM8BSGBSFBOEUIF4FDV-
SJUZPGUIF6OEFSEFWFMPQFE4UBUFT w/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ 10' CPYżŻ
76. Robert C. Lowe to Kenneth Kugel, May 2, 1962, RDS, Thailand, box 3; Bob Lowe to
+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO +VOFŵŸ ŴżŹŶ 3%4 ćBJMBOE CPYŹ GPMEFSćBJMBOE4FZNPVS++BOPX
UP +PIOTPO .POSPF  %JSFDUPS 014  i$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ 5SBJOJOH 1SPHSBN GPS 1SPWJO-
DJBM1PMJDF w.BSDIŴŻ ŴżŹŶ 3%4 ćBJMBOE#ZSPO&OHMFUP)BNJMUPO'PXMFS +BOVBSZŵ 
ŴżŹŶ 3%4 ćBJMBOE CPYŹi1SPHSBN"TTFTTNFOUćBJMBOE ŴżŹŶ w3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 
0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPS *OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ CPYŷ(FOFSBM4BJZVE,FSEQIPM The
Struggle for Thailand: Counter-Insurgency, 1965–1985 (Bangkok: Southern Research Center,
ŴżŻŹ ŵŸi3FET3FQPSUFE4UFQQJOH6Q*OĕMUSBUJPO w/PWFNCFSŵŶ ŴżŹŶ JOSurvey Report
of National Identity Card Program, Royal Government of Thailand (Washington, D.C.: State
%FQBSUNFOU ŴżŹŶ 
77. Jones and Batson, A Brief History of USOM Support to the Thai National Police Depart-
ment,Ŵoŵ+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO $IJFG1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO UP5SBDFZ1BSL i"E)PD7JMMBHF
4FDVSJUZ$PNNJUUFF w4FQUFNCFSŴ ŴżŹŸ 014 &BTU"TJB#SBODI ćBJMBOE CPYŵŴŴ 4QFDJBM
1PMJDF 1SPCMFNT  GPMEFS Ŵ i7JMMBHF 1PMJDF 1SPHSBN w %FDFNCFS ŵŴ  ŴżŹŸ  014  &BTU "TJB
#SBODI ćBJMBOE CPYŵŴŴ 4QFDJBM1PMJDF1SPCMFNT GPMEFSŴ7PJDFPGUIF1FPQMFPGćBJMBOE 
.BSDIŵ ŴżŹŸ DMBOEFTUJOF 556 7JFUOBN$FOUFS 7JSUVBM"SDIJWF XXXWJSUVBMWJFUOBN
ttu.edu.
78. Katherine A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the
Village Scout Movement in Thailand /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżź ŹŹ
źż"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i)FMJDPQUFS3FRVJSFNFOUT 3PMFT BOE.JT-
TJPOT w/PWFNCFSŴżŹź 54% CPYŵŴ GPMEFSćBJMBOE(FOFSBM)FMJDPQUFST.BSUJO(MFBTPO
UP+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO +VOFŵų ŴżŹź 54% CPYŵŵ+PIO8)FOEFSTPO ićBJMBOE/BUJPOBM
%FGFOTF BOE *OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZw "SFB )BOECPPL 8BTIJOHUPO  %$ %FQBSUNFOU PG UIF
"SNZ ŴżźŴ "NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ#BOHLPLUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF /PWFNCFSŴżźŶ 3(ŷźŵ 
U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, Thailand, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, box 2.
80. Jones and Batson, A Brief History of USOM Support to the Thai National Police
Department, 3.
81. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty,ŴųŵoŶćPNBT-PCFBOE%BWJE.PSSFMM ićBJ-
MBOET#PSEFS1BUSPM1PMJDF1BSBNJMJUBSZ1PMJUJDBM1PXFSwJOSupplementary Military Forces:
Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries, ed. Louis Zurcher and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (Beverly Hills:
4BHF  ŴżźŻ  ŴŸŶoźŻ .JDIBFM 5 ,MBSF  American Arms Supermarket (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1984), 196; E. Thadeus Flood, The United States and the Military Coup in
Thailand: A Background Study (Washington, D.C.: Indochina Resource Center, 1976); Scott,
American War Machine, 127; Tyrell Haberkorn, Revolution Interrupted: Farmers, Students,
Law, and Violence in Northern Thailand (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).
-BPNFSDFOBSJFTGPSNFSMZJOUIFQBZPGUIF$*"XFSFBMTPJOWPMWFEJOUIFNBTTBDSF XIJDI
XBTSBUJPOBMJ[FEJOQBSUCZGBMTFDMBJNTPGBQMBOOFE7JFUOBNFTFJOWBTJPO TJNJMBSUPUIF
DMBJNTJOJUJBUFECZUIF$*"UPKVTUJGZJUTFTDBMBUJPOPGUIFTFDSFUXBSJO-BPT TFFDIBQUFSŹ 
Żŵ+FSFNZ,V[NBSPW The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on
Drugs "NIFSTU 6OJWFSTJUZ PG .BTTBDIVTFUUT 1SFTT  ŵųųż  Ŵŷŵ "MGSFE 8 .D$PZ  Drug
Traffic: Narcotics and Organized Crime in Australia 4ZEOFZ)BSQFS3PX ŴżŻų 3PHFS
Ernst, Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Bangkok, to Joe W. Johnson, Audit Manager,
Bangkok Office, Far East Bureau, October 3, 1973, East Asia Branch, Thailand, box 212,
folder 1, 346.

302 Notes to Pages 113–115


ŻŶi1SBNVBM$BTF-JOLFEUP'PSFJHO"JE#JMM w%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUFUFMFHSBN "NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZ #BOHLPL UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF /PWFNCFSŴŸ Ŵżźŵ &BTU"TJB#SBODI ćBJMBOE 
CPYŵŴŵ GPMEFSŶi4VNNBSJFTPG3FDFOUćBJ-BOHVBHF1SFTT w"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ #BOHLPL 
to Secretary of State, October 5, 1972, East Asia Branch, Thailand, box 212, folder 3; “Tha-
OPN8IZ*+BJMFE1SBNVBM wBangkok Post,"QSJMŵź ŴżźŶi1SBNVBM*U$PVME)BWF#FFOŷų
:FBST wBangkok Post, April 25, 1973; “Drug Car Belonged to Narcotics Chief,” Bangkok Post,
August 27, 1973; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 581; Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the
Pack: The Personalities, Politics, and Espionage Intrigues That Shaped the DEA (Walterville,
0SF 5SJOF %BZ  ŵųųż  ŵŸŸoŸŹ *O BOPUIFS DBTF FYQPTJOH UIF CSPBE TDBMF PG DPSSVQUJPO 
UIFDBSDBSSZJOHBŴŵŸLJMPHSBNIBVMPGNPSQIJOFPOUIF-BNQPOHIJHIXBZXBTGPVOEUP
CFMPOH UP -BNQPOHT EFQVUZ TVQFSJOUFOEFOU GPS OBSDPUJDT TVQQSFTTJPO  1PMJDF -JFVUFOBOU
Narong Rergitthikorn.
84. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 191. For the larger pattern, see Odd Arne Westad,
The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of Our Times /FX:PSL
$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŸ 'PSBDMBJNPGTVDDFTT TFF(FPSHF,5BOIBN Trial in
Thailand /FX:PSL$SBOF3VTTBL Ŵżźŷ 
ŻŸi'SPN4QFDJBM"HFOUTUP(FTUBQP wManila Chronicle, October 8, 1946; Nathaniel P.
Davis to Secretary of State, October 30, 1946; and Richard Ely to John Howard, “Status of
1IJMJQQJOFT$POTUBCVMBSZw/PWFNCFSŵŸ Ŵżŷż 1IJMJQQJOFT3FQVCMJD 3%4*OUFSOBM"ČBJST
ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż  EFDJNBM ĕMF Żżŷ 0O UIF DPOUJOVJUJFT GSPN UIF DPMPOJBM FSB  TFF "MGSFE 8
.D$PZTNBTUFSQJFDFPolicing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the
Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
86. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Phil-
ippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979), 147; George McGehee to Mac Bundy,
i$PVOUFS(VFSSJMMB $BNQBJHOT JO (SFFDF  .BMBZB  BOE UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT w /PWFNCFS ŵŴ 
ŴżŹŴ +',- /4'0OUIFJOĘVFODFPGXPNFOJOUIF)VLNPWFNFOU TFF7JOB"-BO[POB 
Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
87. Philippines, Country Paper, April 28, 1953, RG 469, RFAA, Records Related to MSA
1SPHSBNJOćBJMBOE ŴżŸŵ ŴżŸŶ CPYŴ
88. Nathaniel P. Davis to Secretary of State, June 28, 1947, Philippines Republic, RDS,
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF *OUFSOBM"ČBJST ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż EFDJNBMĕMFŻżŷi.JMJUBSZ&TUJNBUFPG
UIF4JUVBUJPOJO1IJMJQQJOFT w+VOFŴ ŴżŷŻ )54- 1BQFSTPG)BSSZ45SVNBO 14' *OUFM-
MJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ *OUFSOBM3FQPSUT'JMF CPYŵŴź
89. See Drinnon, Facing West, 392; Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War.0OFUFDIOJRVF
that Lansdale recounts in his autobiography In The Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to
Southeast Asia /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ XBTUIFiWBNQJSFUSJDL wXIFSFCZB)VLTPM-
dier was kidnapped, killed, and drained of blood and his atrophied corpse hung on a wire
JOUIFNJEEMFPGB)VLWJMMBHFUPTUSJLFGFBSJOUPUIFWJMMBHFST-BOTEBMFTTJEFLJDL$PMPOFM
$IBSMFT#PIBOOFOXBTBGPSNFSFUIOPHSBQIFSBUUIF4NJUITPOJBO*OTUJUVUJPOBOEBTQFDJBM-
ist in Navajo folklore who applied the study of culture, particularly folk superstition, to the
XBSPOUIF)VLHVFSSJMMBBSNZ
90. Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannen, Counter-Guerilla Operations:
The Philippine Experience /FX :PSL 1SBFHFS  ŴżŹŵ  żź &EXBSE -BOTEBMF UP 8BMU 8
3PTUPX "VHVTUŴų ŴżŹŴ +',- /4' .FFUJOHTBOE.FNPSBOEB CPYŶŵź".D$PZ Policing
America’s Empire, 375; Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion,ŴżŹ3PHFS)JMTNBO SFQPSUUP+PIO'
,FOOFEZ i3PMFBOE.JTTJPOPG3VSBM1PMJDFJO4PVUI7JFUOBN wŸŸ +',- )JMTNBO1BQFST 
box 332; “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped
4UBUFT %FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF w/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ 10' CPYżŻ"OPUIFSJOUFSOBMTUVEZPG

Notes to Pages 115–116 303


UIF DPOTUBCVMBSZ DPODMVEFE UIBU iDPOTJEFSBCMF OVNCFST PG BMMFHFE EJTTJEFOUT XFSF LJMMFE
in operations” but that the efforts of the constabulary had been “unsuccessful.” “Military
&TUJNBUFPGUIF4JUVBUJPOJO1IJMJQQJOFT w+VOFŴ ŴżŷŻ 1BQFSTPG)BSSZ45SVNBO 14' *OUFM-
MJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ )45- *OUFSOBM3FQPSUTĕMF CPYŵŴź
91. “Philippines: Shored Up Defenses,” Newsweek, July 10, 1950, 34; Soldier Heroes: A
Handbook of the Major Medals Awarded by the Philippines Constabulary and Armed Forces,
foreword by Ferdinand Marcos (Manila: National Media Production Center, 1981), 30.
92. “Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d to Operations
Coordinating Board for the National Security Council,” January 3, 1957, Country Report,
1IJMJQQJOFT %%&- 0$# $FOUSBM'JMF4FSJFT CPYŴŻ GPMEFS*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ'JEFM3BNPT 
The Constabulary Story 2VF[PO$JUZ#VTUBNBOUF1SFTT ŴżźŻ ŶųŶESBęQBQFSCZ%FQVUZ
%JSFDUPS 0ďDFPG1IJMJQQJOFTBOE4PVUIFBTU"TJBO"ČBJST /4$Żŷŵ +BOVBSZŴŸ ŴżŸŴ JO
Classen et al., Foreign Relations of the United States, Asia and the Pacific, pt. 2, 6:1510.
żŶ +FUFS - 8JMMJBNTPO  A Survey of Police Services and Problems in the Philippines
.BOJMB *OTUJUVUF PG 1VCMJD "ENJOJTUSBUJPO  6OJWFSTJUZ PG UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT  ŴżŸŸ  ŴźoŶŴ
“Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d to Operations
$PPSEJOBUJOH#PBSEGPSUIF/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM w%FDFNCFSŴżŸŸo/PWFNCFSŴżŸŹ 
Country Report, Philippines, DDEL, OCB, Central File Series, box 18, folder Internal Secu-
SJUZi1IJMJQQJOFT1PMJDF8PSL"QQSBJTFE8JMMJBNTPO1PJOUTUP4IPSUDPNJOHT wGreensboro
Daily Record,+VOFŴżŸŹ BQQSPYJNBUFEBUFGSPNSFDPSETPG1BUTZ)BSSJOHUPO 
żŷ$POWFSTBUJPOXJUI1BUTZ)BSSJOHUPO*$"/FXTMFUUFS 'FCSVBSZŴżŸź .46"7JFUOBN
1SPKFDU CPYŹźż8JMTPOSBOUIF-PT"OHFMFT1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOUDSJNFMBCGPSBOVNCFSPG
ZFBSTBOEXBTBOJOUFSOBUJPOBMMZSFDPHOJ[FEBVUIPSJUZJODSJNJOBMJTUJDT
żŸ(FOF#MBLF i%FQVUZ$IJFGPG1PMJDFUP5BLF7JFUOBN1PTU wLos Angeles Times, July
Ź ŴżŹż(FPSHF$8JMTPO i4PVUI7JFUOBN1PMJDF"EWJTPSGSPN-""TTBJMFE wLos Angeles
Times, July 9, 1970; Frank E. Walton, “Selective Distribution of Police Patrol Force: His-
UPSZ $VSSFOU1SBDUJDFT 3FDPNNFOEBUJPOT wJournal of Law, Criminology, and Police Science
ŷż +VMZo"VHVTU ŴżŸŻ  ŴŹź 'SBOL %POOFS Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police
Repression in Urban America #FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT Ŵżżų ŵŷŸoŸŸ+PF
%PNBOJDL To Protect and to Serve: The LAPD’s Century of War in the City of Dreams (New
:PSL'JHVFSPB ŵųųŶ Ŵųżi*OWBTJPOGSPN8JUIJO w4FQUFNCFSŴżŸŵ JOParker on Police, ed.
088JMTPO 4QSJOHĕFME *MM$$ćPNBT ŴżŸź ŷżoŹŹ0OUIF8PSME8BS**FYQMPJUT
of the Black Sheep, see Frank E. Walton, Once They Were Eagles: The Men of Black Sheep
Squadron -FYJOHUPO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTTPG,FOUVDLZ ŴżŻŹ i1BQQZw#PZJOHUPOXBTBĘZJOH
BDFXIPTVSWJWFEUXFOUZNPOUITJOB+BQBOFTF108DBNQ
żŹ'SBOL&8BMUPOUP+BNFT&*OHFSTPMM 640. 1IJMJQQJOFT 0DUPCFSŴ ŴżŹŷ *14 CPY
9, folder Philippines.
żź3BNPT The Constabulary Story, 317, 320; Special Group on Counter-Insurgency to
"NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  .BOJMB  i.FEJDBM "DUJWJUZ CZ 1PMJDF BOE 1BSBNJMJUBSZ 'PSDFT JO UIF
1IJMJQQJOFT w 4FQUFNCFS Ŵŷ  ŴżŹŵ  *14  CPY ŴŴ +PIO 4JEFM  ićF 6TVBM 4VTQFDUT /BSEPOH
Putik, Don Pepe Oyson, and Robin Hood,” in Rafael, Figures of Criminality in Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, 74; Alfred W. McCoy, “Covert Netherworld: Clan-
EFTUJOF4FSWJDFTBOE$SJNJOBM4ZOEJDBUFTJO4IBQJOHUIF1IJMJQQJOF4UBUF wJOGovernment
of the Shadows: Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty, ed. Eric Wilson (London: Pluto Press,
2009), 232.
żŻ3BNPT The Constabulary Story,Ÿŷ+BNFT$4DPUU Moral Economy of the Peasant:
3FCFMMJPO BOE 4VCTJTUFODF JO 4PVUIFBTU "TJB /FX )BWFO :BMF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżźŹ 
ŴoŴŵ ŵŵŸoŷų4UFQIFO34IBMPN The United States and the Philippines: A Study in Neo-
Colonialism 1IJMBEFMQIJB*OTUJUVUFGPSUIF4UVEZPG)VNBO*TTVFT ŴżŻŴ ŴŴŸ

304 Notes to Pages 116–118


żż4IBMPN The United States and the Philippines,Źż3BZNPOE#POOFS Waltzing with a
Dictator /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT ŴżŻŻ $IPNTLZBOE)FSNBO The Political Economy
of Human Rights,ŵŴŻćPNBT'JOOBOE+BNFT-.D.BIPO Evaluation Public Safety Pro-
gram,64"*%1IJMJQQJOFT "QSJMŴżźŵćJTMBTUSFQPSUDPODMVEFEUIBUNBJOUBJOJOHSJHIUTUP
UIFCBTFTBOEQSPNPUJOH"NFSJDBOFOUFSQSJTFSFQSFTFOUFEUIFQSJNBSZ64JOUFSFTUTJOUIF
Philippines.
Ŵųų3JDIBSE1$MBVEF i)VNBO3JHIUTJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBOE6OJUFE4UBUFT3FTQPOTJCJM-
JUZw#PTUPO6OJWFSTJUZ4DIPPMPGćFPMPHZ 8PSLJOH1BQFS 'FCSVBSZŶ ŴżźŻ ŷ$IPNTLZ
BOE)FSNBO The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, 241.
ŴųŴ +FUFS - 8JMMJBNTPO BOE 1BVM ,BU[  i1IJMJQQJOFT 5FSNJOBUJPO 1IBTF0VU 3FQPSU 
1974,” USAID, OPS, 1975, 3; Finn and McMahon, Evaluation Public Safety Program.
102. Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., The Logistics of Repression and Other Essays:
The Role of U.S. Assistance in Consolidating the Martial Law Regime in the Philippines
(Washington, D.C.: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977), 30; Alfred W. McCoy, A Question
of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJ-
UBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ Żŵ+FUFS-8JMMJBNTPOBOE1BVM,BU[ i&WBMVBUJPO5FBN 5FSNJOBUJPO
1IBTF0VU4UVEZ 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPKFDU 1IJMJQQJOFT w64"*% Ŵżźŷ ŸŵoŸŸ(FSBMEJOF+FMTDI 
#ZSPO&OHMFTXJGF XBTBMTPQBSUPGUIF014UFBN
103. Bello and Rivera, Logistics of Repression, 30; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 403.
4FFBMTP64)PVTF $PNNJUUFFPOUIF+VEJDJBSZ Testimony of Benedict J. Kerkvliet, Wood-
row Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and the
Philippines,)FBSJOHTCFGPSFUIF4VCDPNNJUUFFPO"TJBOBOE1BDJĕD"ČBJST żŶSE$POH 
2nd sess., June 1974 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), 74; McCoy, A Question of Torture, 91;
8JMMJBNTPOBOE,BU[ i1IJMJQQJOFT5FSNJOBUJPO1IBTF0VU3FQPSU Ŵżźŷ wŶŷ
104. “Constabulary,” Anti-Narcotics Unit, June 9, 1972, IPS, Philippines, box 9, folder 1.
ŴųŸ$PNQUSPMMFS(FOFSBMPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT i3FQPSUUPUIF$POHSFTT4UPQQJOH64
"TTJTUBODFUP'PSFJHO1PMJDFBOE1SJTPOTw 8BTIJOHUPO %$("0 ŴżźŹ ŵŵ ŵŸ"NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZ  .BOJMB  UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  8BTIJOHUPO %$  i/BSDPUJDT $POUSPM w 'FCSVBSZ
Ŵżźŷ *14 CPYŴų GPMEFS/BSDPUJDT'SBOL&8BMUPOUP.S+BNFT)*OHFSTPMM $IJFG4VSWFZ
5FBN %JSFDUPS640. 1IJMJQQJOFT 64"*% 0DUPCFSŴżŹŷ *14 1IJMJQQJOFT CPYż"MGSFE
W. McCoy, “The New Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia” Oui Magazine,%FDFNCFSŴżźŹ 
154; Sidel, “The Usual Suspects.”
106. Bello and Rivera, Logistics of Repression, 31; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, 387.
107. Editors of Ramparts and Frank Browning, Smack! /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ 
15.
ŴųŻ2VPUFEJO/BPNJ,MFJO The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New
:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųź Źż.D(FIFF Deadly Deceits.
109. See Westad, The Global Cold War.

6. The Secret War in Laos and Other Vietnam Sideshows


Ŵ8JMMBSE0#SPXO i.FNPGPS"NCBTTBEPS 3FQPSUCZ.S1BVM4LVTF w"VHVTUŵŻ 
1959, and “Monthly Public Safety Report,” March 4, 1959, RG 469, RFAA, USOM, Laos,
(FOFSBM3FDPSET ŴżŸźoŴżŹų  IFSFBęFS640.-BPT CPYŴ GPMEFS4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP
Units
ŵ2VPUFEJO8JMMJBN#MVN Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World
War II .POSPF .F$PNNPO$PVSBHF1SFTT ŵųųŵ Ŵŷų
Ŷ-FO&"DLMBOE i/P1MBDFGPS/FVUSBMJTNćF&JTFOIPXFS"ENJOJTUSBUJPOBOE-BPT w
in Laos: War and Revolution,FE/JOB4"EBNTBOE"MGSFE8.D$PZ /FX:PSL)BSQFS

Notes to Pages 118–122 305


3PX Ŵżźų ŴŶżoŷų$IBSMFT"4UFWFOTPO The End of Nowhere: American Policy toward
Laos since 1954 #PTUPO#FBDPO1SFTT Ŵżźŵ Ŵ ŵż"OJOĘVFOUJBMCPPLPODPVOUFSJOTVS-
HFODZBUUIFUJNFXBT%BWJE(BMVMB Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St.
Petersburg, Fla.: Hailer Publishing, 1964).
ŷ*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1PMJDF1SPHSBN /4$ŴŵżųE -BPT 'FCSVBSZŴż ŴżŸź %%&- 0$# 
box 40, folder Laos.
5. USAID, United States Agency for International Development, Termination Report,
Vientiane, Laos, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 10. This viewpoint has been
BEWBODFEDPOWJODJOHMZCZ/PBN$IPNTLZJOOVNFSPVTCPPLTBOEBSUJDMFT NPTUOPUB-
bly For Reasons of State /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżźŶ )FJODPSQPSBUFTBOBMZTJTGSPNUIF
TPDBMMFE 8JTDPOTJO TDIPPM  JODMVEJOH 8JMMJBN " 8JMMJBNT  The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy, SFW FE /FX :PSL /PSUPO  ŴżŻŻ  0O UIF IJTUPSJDBM BUUBDINFOU PG 64
FNQJSFCVJMEFST UP UIF "TJB1BDJĕD  XIJDI UIFZ WJFXFE BT BO FYUFOTJPO PG UIF XFTUFSO
GSPOUJFS TFF#SVDF$VNJOHT Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American
Power /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż BOE3JDIBSE%SJOOPO Facing West: The
Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building /PSNBO 6OJWFSTJUZ PG 0LMBIPNB
Press, 1980).
6. Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżź 
ŴųŴ)PSBDF4NJUI i4JHOJĕDBOU%FWFMPQNFOUTJO-BPT ŴżŸŻoŴżŹų w+VMZŵż ŴżŹŹ 1BQFSTPG
-#+ /4' $PVOUSZ'JMF 1BDJĕD#SBODI CPYŵŹŻ GPMEFS-BPT.FSWZO#SPXO The War in
Shangri-la: A Memoir of Civil War in Laos (London: Radcliffe, 2001), 212.
7. Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War: Hearings before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 10, 1972 (Washington, D.C.:
(10 Ŵżźŵ ŴżŻćF$*"DIBSBDUFSJ[FE4PVQIBOPVWPOHTXJGF XIPXBT7JFUOBNFTF BT
iIJHIMZ JOUFMMJHFOU BOE DIBSNJOHw i1PMJUJDBM 4JUVBUJPO JO -BPT w "VHVTU ŵŴ  ŴżŸŻ  640.
Laos, box 1. For a critical view of the Pathet Lao which recognizes their organizational
TUSFOHUI  TFF #FSOBSE # 'BMM  ićF 1BUIFU -BP " A-JCFSBUJPO 1BSUZw JO The Communist
Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements, ed. Robert A Scalapino (Englewood
$MJČT /+1SFOUJDF)BMM ŴżŹŸ ŴŻųoŻŵ0O4PVQIBOPVWPOHTCBDLHSPVOE TFFAutobiog-
raphy of Prince Souphanouvong ,VBMB -BNQVS .BMBZTJB .JOJOH $PSQPSBUJPO #FSIBE 
1989).
Ż64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPGPO(PWFSONFOU0QFSBUJPOT United States Aid
Operations in Laos: Hearings, March 11–June 1, 1959, Seventh Report, 86th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 1959 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1959), 3.
9. Ibid.; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 325; Bernard B. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of
1960–1961 /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŹż ŴŹŷ7JOOFMMGVOEFEDMBOEFTUJOFBDUJWJUJFTTVDIBT
QPMJDFUSBJOJOHJO4BVEJ"SBCJBBOE7JFUOBNćFWJDFQSFTJEFOUPG6OJWFSTBM$POTUSVDUJPO
Co. was Willis Bird.
10. Oudone Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support (Wash-
JOHUPO  %$ 64 "SNZ $FOUFS PG GPS .JMJUBSZ )JTUPSZ  ŴżŻŴ  ŷŹ 4UFWFOTPO  The End of
Nowhere,ŶŻoŶż3VGVT‫ڀ‬1IJMMJQT i-BPT‰ćF$SJUJDBM:FBSTGSPNŴżŸŹoŴżŸż‰"'JSTU)BOE
"DDPVOU w $*"  $POGFSFODF PO -BPT  $BNCPEJB  BOE ćBJMBOE  5FYBT 5FDI 6OJWFSTJUZ 
7JFUOBN$FOUFS .BSDIŴŶ ŵųųż‫ڀ‬0OF$*"BHFOU %JDL)PMN SFĘFDUFEZFBSTMBUFSPOUIF
iBSSPHBODFBOEJHOPSBODFPG"NFSJDBOTTFSWJOHJO-BPT‫ڀڀ‬8FIBEPOMZNJOJNBMVOEFS-
standing of the history, culture, and politics of the people we wanted to aid. . . . Our strategic
JOUFSFTUTXFSFTVQFSJNQPTFEPOUPBSFHJPOXIFSFPVSQSFTJEFOUIBEEFDJEFEUPAESBXUIF
MJOFBHBJOTUDPNNVOJTN"OEXFXPVMEEPJUPVSXBZw3JDIBSE-)PMN The American
Agent: My Life in the CIA -POEPO4U&SNJOT1SFTT ŵųųŶ ŴźŻ

306 Notes to Pages 122–123


11. Victor B. Anthony and Richard R. Sexton, “The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia: The
8BS JO /PSUIFSO -BPT w ŴżŸŷoŴżźŶ  "')3"  ŴżżŶ  ŵŹ ćPNBT - "IFSO +S  Undercover
Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961–1973 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for
UIF4UVEZPG*OUFMMJHFODF ŵųųŹ 4FUI+BDPCT iA/P1MBDFUP'JHIUB8BS-BPTBOEUIF&WPMV-
UJPOPG641PMJDZUPXBSE7JFUOBN ŴżŸŷoŴżŹŶ wJOMaking Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local,
National, and Transnational Perspectives,FE.BSL1#SBEMFZBOE.BSJMZO#:PVOH /FX
:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŷż3FĘFDUJOHUIFQSFKVEJDFTPGUIFUJNF &JTFOIPXFS
SFGFSSFEUPUIF3-"BTiBCVODIPGIPNPTFYVBMTw JCJE
Ŵŵ+BDRVFT/FWBSE i3FWFSTFTJO-BPT-BJEUPA.ZUIPG*OWBTJPOCZ1PXFSGVM'PFT wNew
York Times,"QSJMŵŶ ŴżŹŴ3PHFS)JMTNBO To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy
in the Administration of John F. Kennedy /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŹź ŴŴŶćFQBDJĕTUUFO-
EFODJFTPGUIFŴżŹųT/FX-FęXFSFTJNJMBSMZEFSJEFECZUIFiOFXTQBQFSPGSFDPSE wXIJDI
IBTBMPOHIJTUPSZPGXBSNPOHFSJOH FWJEFOUSFDFOUMZJOUIFEFCBDMFPWFS*SBRBOEJUTTVQ-
QPTFEXFBQPOTPGNBTTEFTUSVDUJPO4FF&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Myth of the Liberal Media
/FX:PSL1FUFS-BOH Ŵżżż 
ŴŶi*OUFSOBM8BSGBSFBOEUIF4FDVSJUZPG6OEFSEFWFMPQFE4UBUFT w%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 
/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ 10' CPYżŻi)JTUPSZPGUIF0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZw3(ŵŻŹ 3FDPSET
of the USAID, PSD, OPS, Southeast Asia Branch, Laos (hereafter OPS Laos), box 4; Stuart-
Fox, A History of Laos, 105.
14. Frank Walton, Paul Skuse, and Wendell Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police,
Vientiane, USAID, OPS, 1965, 28. On Skuse’s CIA connections, see Julius Mader, Who’s Who
in CIA (Berlin: J. Mader, 1968), 481; John D. Marks, “How to Spot a Spook,” Washington
Monthly /PWFNCFSŴżźŷ ŸoŴŴ
ŴŸ64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPGPO(PWFSONFOU0QFSBUJPOT United States Aid
Operations in Laos: Hearings, March 11–June 1, 1959, Seventh Report, 32.
ŴŹ&MNFS#4UBBUT i0QFSBUJPOT1MBOTGPS-BPT 0QFSBUJPOT$PPSEJOBUJOH#PBSE w+VOF
ŷ ŴżŸŻ 556"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZJO-BPTUP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF .BZŵŵ ŴżŸŹ UFMFHSBN 
in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, ed. John P. Glennon, vol. 21, East Asian
Security: Cambodia and Laos, ed. Edward C. Keefer and David W. Mabon (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1990), 763.
17. G. B. Erskine, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, to Assistant Sec-
SFUBSZPG%FGFOTFGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ"ČBJST i.JMJUBSZ&RVJQNFOUGPSUIF/BUJPOBM
"SNZw"QSJMŴŻ ŴżŸŹ JOForeign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, 21:759.
18. Byron Engle and Louise Page, Report on the Internal Security Services of Laos: National
Police and Royal Gendarmerie, Foreign Operations Division, USAID, OPS, Laos, May 1955;
Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, 25, 33.
Ŵżi$JWJM1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO w%FDFNCFSŶų ŴżŸŸ 640.-BPT ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż CPYŴ ĕMF
1PMJDF1SPHSBN
ŵų 1BVM 4LVTF UP 4PVLBO 7JMBZSTBSO BOE 8JMMBSE #SPXO UP +PIO 5PCMFS  /PWFNCFS
ŵŶ  ŴżŸż  3'""  640. -BPT  $BCMFT BOE "JSHSBNT ŴżŸŸoŴżŸŻ  IFSFBęFS 640. -BPT 
Cables), box 1; “Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board: Analysis of Internal
4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPOJO-BPT 1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE BOE3FDPNNFOEFEUP"DUJPO w
%FDFNCFSŵŴ ŴżŸŸ JO,FFGFSBOE.BCPO East Asian Security,źŴŻoŵŶ
21. Paul Skuse to Daly Lavergne, October 4, 1958, USOM Laos, Cables, box 1.
ŵŵ640..BOJMBUPćFP)BMM DIJFG14% $JWJMJBO1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO /PWFNCFSŴż 
1958, USOM Laos, Cables, box 1.
ŵŶ*CJE-BVSFO+(PJOBOE$IBSMFT-FJTUFS i&WBMVBUJPOPGUIF1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN w
64"*% 014 -BPT /PWFNCFSŴżŹż$IBJIFMEB#"BOEBO."JOQVCMJDBENJOJTUSBUJPO
GSPN8BTIJOHUPO6OJWFSTJUZ

Notes to Pages 124–126 307


ŵŷ i(FOFSBM 0VUMJOF PG UIF 1PMJDF 5SBJOJOH 1SPKFDUw BOE i*$" 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN
JO-BPT w.BZŴŻ ŴżŸż 7JODFOU$JMMJT 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO i5FSNJOBM3FQPSU w"QSJMŵŶ 
ŴżŸŻ BMM14% 640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
ŵŸ64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPGPO(PWFSONFOU0QFSBUJPOT United States Aid
Operations in Laos: Hearings, March 11–June 1, 1959, Seventh Report, 2; “ICA Annual Status
Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d to Operations Coordinating Board
GPSUIF/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM w%FDFNCFSŴżŸŸo/PWFNCFSŴżŸŹ %%&- 0$# CPYŴŻ 
folder Internal Security.
26. “Conversation with Khouranhok Souvannavong,” March 16, 1959, USOM Laos, box
Ŵ0OSJTJOHDPTUTPGMJWJOHBOEDPSSVQUJPO TFF/PBN$IPNTLZ i"7JTJUUP-BPT wNew York
Review of Books,+VMZŵŶ Ŵżźų ŵŴoŶŶ"MGSFE8.D$PZ The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complic-
ity in the Global Drug Trade,SFWFE /FX:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM ŴżżŴ 
27. Nikolas Perazic to Vincent Cillis, “Visit to Sayaboury,” March 7, 1958, and Nikolas
1FSB[JDUP7JODFOU$JMMJT i3F4BN/FVB w.BSDIŴŶ ŴżŸŻ CPUI640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF
1SPHSBNT"IFSO Undercover Armies, 552.
28. Paul Skuse to Nikolas Perazic, Public Safety Division, April 2, 1959, USOM Laos, box
Ŵ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT8BMUPO 4LVTF BOE.PUUFS A Survey of the Laos National Police,ŶųoŶŷ
29. Perazic to Cillis, “Visit to Sayaboury; Henry D. Hecksher to Hank Miller and Paul
4LVTF i1PMJDF*OGPSNBUJPO w640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT+BDPCT i/P1MBDFUP'JHIU
a War,” 49.
Ŷų1FSB[JDUP$JMMJT i3F4BN/FVBw
31. “Police Civic Action Activities,” May 18, 1964, RG 286, Records of USAID, OPS, Office
of the Director, IPS, (hereafter IPS), box 6, folder 3; “Conversation with Khouranhok Sou-
vannavong.”
32. Anthony and Sexton, “The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia,” 26; Walter S. Robertson
UPUIF4FDSFUBSZ i1SFMJNJOBSZ"OBMZTJTPG-BP&MFDUJPO3FTVMUT w.BZŴź ŴżŸŻBOE)FOSZ
5,PSFOUP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF +VOFŵŶ ŴżŸŻ 3(Ÿż 3%4 CPYŶŶŹŵ4UFWFOTPO The End
of Nowhere, 96; Peter Dale Scott, “Laos: The Story Nixon Won’t Tell,” New York Review
of Books,"QSJMż Ŵżźų ŶŸoŷŸ#SPXO War in Shangri-la, 212; Paul F. Langer and Joseph
Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos $BNCSJEHF
Harvard University Press, 1970), 66.
ŶŶ 4BOBOJLPOF NBZ IBWF BMTP PSEFSFE UIF BTTBTTJOBUJPO JO ŴżŸŷ PG %FGFOTF .JOJTUFS
,PV7PSBWPOH XIPIBEQSPNPUFEDPODJMJBUJPOXJUIUIF1BUIFU-BP4FFićF.VSEFSPG
Kou Voravong, Defense Minister of Laos” in “3349,” Iron Man of Laos: Prince Phetsarath
Ratanavongsa,FE%BWJE,8ZBUU USBOT+PIO#.VSEPDI *UIBDB /:4PVUIFBTU"TJB
1SPHSBN  %FQBSUNFOU PG "TJBO 4UVEJFT  $PSOFMM 6OJWFSTJUZ  ŴżźŻ  ŻŹoŻż 4PNF TDIPMBST
CFMJFWF BMUFSOBUJWFMZ UIBUUIFNVSEFSXBTPSEFSFECZćBJQPMJDFDIJFG1IBP4JOZBOPO XIP
XBTTFFLJOHUPFYQBOEćBJIFHFNPOZJO-BPT4FF FH "SUIVS%PNNFO The Indochinese
Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam #MPPNJOHUPO6OJWFSTJUZPG*OEJBOB1SFTT ŵųųŴ ŶųŹoź
Ŷŷ8JMMJBN-FEFSFS A Nation of Sheep /FX:PSL'BXDFUU$SFTU ŴżŹź ŴŵoŴŶ'BMM Anat-
omy of a Crisis, 137; Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support,
51; Brown, War in Shangri-la, 25; Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics,
the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE
-JUUMFĕFME  ŵųŴų  żż i2VFTUJPO PG 7JFUNJOI 1SFTFODF w "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  7JFOUJBOF  UP
Secretary of State, February 10, 1964, LBJL, NSF, box 265. Paul Langer and Joseph Zasloff of
3"/% CPUIEPHNBUJDBMMZBOUJDPNNVOJTU DPODFEFJONorth Vietnam and the Pathet Lao
UIBUUIFSFXBTOPFWJEFODFUIBU/PSUI7JFUOBNFTFVOJUTDSPTTFEUIFCPSEFS*OUFSOBMEPDV-

308 Notes to Pages 126–128


NFOUTTIPXUIBUUIFSFXBTOPQSPPGPGBOJOWBTJPOBTMBUFBTŴżŹŷ#FSOBSE'BMMDIBSBDUFS-
J[FEUIFDMBJNTBEWBODFEJOUIFNFEJBCZ$*"DPOOFDUFEWashington PostDPMVNOJTU+PTFQI
Alsop as “nonsense.” Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis, 135, 138
35. Wilfred G. Burchett, The Furtive War: The United States in Vietnam and Laos (New
:PSL *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJTIFST  ŴżŹŶ  ŴźŶoźŷ 1IPVNJ 7POHWJDIJU  Laos and the Victori-
ous Struggle of the Lao People against U.S. Neo-Colonialism (Hanoi: Neo Lao Haksat
1VCMJDBUJPOT  ŴżŹż  ŴŴŻ " OPUF PO #VSDIFUU *O NZ WJFX  #VSDIFUUT QSPDPNNVOJTU BOE
BOUJJNQFSJBMJTUTFOTJCJMJUJFTEPOPUNBLFIJNBOZMFTTDSFEJCMFBSFQPSUFSUIBOQSP8FTUFSO
journalists who display their own bias. And while it is true that Burchett often accepted gov-
FSONFOUQSPDMBNBUJPOTJODPNNVOJTUDPVOUSJFTVODSJUJDBMMZ IJTCPPLChina: The Quality
of LifeJTBQBSUJDVMBSFNCBSSBTTNFOU POUIFXIPMF IJTXPSLJTWFSZWBMVBCMFJOEPDVNFOU-
JOHUIFXBSGSPNUIFiPUIFSTJEF wJOSFMBZJOHJUTIVNBODPOTFRVFODFT BOEJOQSFTFOUJOHUIF
XPSMEWJFXPGUIFHVFSSJMMBĕHIUFSTBOESFWPMVUJPOBSZOBUJPOBMJTUTXIJDIJTOPUDISPOJDMFE
PSFWFOBDLOPXMFEHFECZNBOZ8FTUFSODPNNFOUBUPST JODMVEJOHTPNFIJTUPSJBOTUPEBZ 
/FWFSUIFMFTT JGBWBJMBCMF PUIFSTPVSDFTTIPVMECFVTFEJOXFJHIJOHIJTDMBJNT'PSBGBJSBOE
HFOFSBMMZGBWPSBCMFBTTFTTNFOUPGIJTMJGFTXPSL TFF#FO,JFSOBO FE Burchett: Reporting
the Other Side of the World (London: Quartet Books, 1987).
36. Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support, 52.
37. Ibid., 106; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 333; Vongvichit, Laos and the Victorious
Struggle of the Lao People against U.S. Neo-Colonialism, 199; Ahern, Undercover Armies, 49;
"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 7JFOUJBOF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF %FDFNCFSż ŴżŹŶ -#+- /4' -BPT CPY
265; “Political Situation in Laos,” August 21, 1958, USOM, Laos, box 1.
ŶŻ.S3JDFUP)FOSZ-5,PSFO i1IPVNJT4JOTBOE#MVOEFST w.BZŷ ŴżŹŵ 3(Ÿż 
RDS, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, General Records, Office of the Country Director for
Laos, box 1 (hereafter Office of the Country Director for Laos); Anthony and Sexton, “The
U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia,” 35; Ahern, Undercover Armies, 11; Stuart E. Methven,
Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 77; Arthur
+ %PNNFO  Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization, SFW FE /FX :PSL 1SBFHFS 
ŴżźŴ ŴŶŷ.FUIWFODMBJNTUIBUUIFĕHVSFXBTŶ żŵźWPUFT BOVNCFSEFSJWFEGSPNIJTCJSUI
EBUF 4FQUFNCFSŶ Ŵżŵź
39. Burchett, The Furtive War,ŴźŸoźŹ1IJMJQQF%FWJMMFST ićF-BPUJBO$POĘJDUJO1FS-
TQFDUJWF wJO"EBNTBOE.D$PZ Laos: War and Revolution,ŷŷoŷŸ4UVBSU'PY A History
of Laos,ŴŴŴoŴŵ4BOBOJLPOF The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support, 60.
4BOBOJLPOFDMBJNTUIBU1IPVNJTFU4PVQIBOPVWPOHGSFFUPBWPJEBQPMJUJDBMCBDLMBTI
ŷų"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i2VFTUJPOPG7JFUNJOI1SFTFODF w'FCSV-
BSZ Ŵų  ŴżŹŷ  -#+-  /4'  -BPT  CPY ŵŹŸ *U XBT OPU VOUJM MBUFS UIBU 1"7/ 1FPQMFT "SNZ
PG7JFUOBN JOWPMWFNFOUCFDBNFNPSFXJEFTDBMFćFNBOOFSJOXIJDIUIF64HPWFSO-
NFOUEJTUPSUFEUIFGBDUTCFGPSFUIFQVCMJDBOETPMEUIFXBSCZDMBJNJOH/PSUI7JFUOBNFTF
iBHHSFTTJPOwJTTJNJMBSUPUIBUSFHBSEJOHUIFDPOĘJDUJO4PVUI7JFUOBN XIFSF1"7/VOJUT
EJEOPUDSPTTUIF4FWFOUFFOUI1BSBMMFMTZTUFNBUJDBMMZVOUJMafter the U.S. invasion. As a refer-
ence point, see George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam
/FX:PSL,OPQG ŴżŻŹ 
41. Anthony and Sexton, “The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia,” 35; Sananikone, The
Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support, 77.
42. Wilfred G. Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Laos and Cambodia /FX :PSL
International Publishers, 1970), 169; Douglas S. Blaufarb, Organizing and Managing Uncon-
ventional War in Laos, 1962–1970 .D-FBO 7B)VNBO3FTPVSDFT3FTFBSDI0SHBOJ[BUJPO 
Ŵżźŵ ŷŴ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 7JFOUJBOF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF "VHVTUŷ ŴżŹŷ -#+- -BPT 

Notes to Pages 128–129 309


CPYŵŹŻ%FBO3VTLUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 7JFOUJBOF BOE"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZ
PG4UBUF "VHVTUŴŻ ŴżŹŷ CPUI-#+- /4' CPYŵŹŸ#SPNMFZ4NJUIUP1SFTJEFOU %FDFNCFS
Ŵŷ ŴżŹŷBOE(FPSHF%FOOFZ+S 64%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF +BOVBSZ
ŵź  ŴżŹŸ  -#+-  /4'  CPY ŵŹż 8JUI SFHBSE UP UIF TBODUJPOJOH PG UIF 5ŵŻT  "NCBTTBEPS
-FPOBSE6OHBSQMFEHFEJOBNFNPUP%FBO3VTL i8FXJMMLFFQUIF64FOUJSFMZPVUPGUIJT
NBUUFSXJUIUIFQSFTT JOEJDBUJOHJGQSFTTFE UIBUUIFCPNCTXFSFJOUIF'"3<-BPUJBOBSNZ>
BSTFOBMBOEUIFZBQQBSFOUMZIBWFUBLFOUIFEFDJTJPOJGOFDFTTBSZUPVTFUIFNw"NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZ 7JFOUJBOF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF .BSDIŵų ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' $PVOUSZ'JMF"TJBBOE
UIF1BDJĕD -BPT CPYŵŹŸ*O.BZŴżŹŷ "NFSJDBOBJSDSBęCFHBODBSSZJOHPVUPQFSBUJPOT
BHBJOTUTUSBUFHJD1BUIFU-BPFODBNQNFOUTBOESPBEOFUXPSLT
ŷŶ1BVM)4LVTFUP.S%BMZ-BWFSHOF %JSFDUPS640. i8FBQPOTBOE"NNPGPSUIF
-BP1PMJDF w"VHVTUź ŴżŸż 640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
ŷŷ .S "MEFO $ (JMMDISJTU  1SPDVSFNFOU 0ďDFS  640. -BPT  UP .S +PIO 1 %VLF 
640.ćBJMBOE SBEJPHSBN 0DUPCFSŹ ŴżŸż 640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
ŷŸ640.7JFUOBNUP640.-BPT i#VJMEJOHTGPS-BP/BUJPOBM1PMJDF w"VHVTUŹ ŴżŸż 
USOM Laos, box 1.
ŷŹ 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ %JWJTJPO UP .S 1BVM 4LVTF  i'JSFBSNT 5SBJOJOH w %FDFNCFS ŴŸ  ŴżŸż 
640.-BPT CPYŴ 1PMJDF1SPHSBNT
47. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, 28. Ryan, a graduate
PGUIF6OJWFSTJUZPG.JOOFTPUB IBETQFOUTFWFOZFBSTJO7JFUOBN)FXBTMBUFSNVSEFSFE
CZQPMJDFBEWJTFS3PCFSU,JNCBMMGPSIBWJOHBOBČBJSXJUI,JNCBMMT7JFUOBNFTFNJTUSFTT
0O3ZBOTCBDLHSPVOE TFF+BDL&3ZBO QFSTPOOFMĕMF .JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZBSDIJWFT
,JNCBMMXBTBDRVJUUFEJO3ZBOTNVSEFSCVUTFOUFODFEUPĕWFZFBSTGPSLJMMJOH/HVZFOćJ
)BJ IJTNJTUSFTT)FXBTHSBOUFEBNOFTUZBęFSBZFBSBOESFUVSOFEUPUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
48. Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (London: Oxford University Press,
1968), 141; Ahern, Undercover Armies, 49.
ŷżi4VNNBSZPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ&NQMPZFFT8PVOEFEBOEPS,JMMFEJOUIF-JOFPG%VUZw
*14 CPYŴų GPMEFS014$BTVBMUJFT4LVTFTVSWJWFEBOEXFOUPOUPTFSWFJO7JFUOBN64"3-
MACV to Washington, D.C., “Laos,” April 18, 1964, LBJL, NSF, box 266, folder Laos; CIA
Report, October 18, 1964, LBJL, NSF, box 269.
Ÿų-BOTEBMFNFNP +VMZŴżŹŴ 556#SPXO War in Shangri-la, 73.
ŸŴ4FZNPVS5PQQJOH i-BPUJBOT5SBDF$PVQUPUIF"NCJUJPOTPGB(FOFSBM wNew York
Times, April 27, 1964; D. Gareth Porter, “After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality,” in
"EBNTBOE.D$PZ Laos: War and Revolution, 202; Burchett, The Second Indochina War, 156;
Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support, 73, 79; CIA Intelligence
Report, “Decision at Military Officers Meeting Concerning the Reorganization of the Lao
(PWFSONFOU w"QSJMŵŹ ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' CPYŵŹŹ GPMEFS-BPT$IJBOH$IJOHLVPTCBDL-
ground and political activities are described in Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, Inside
the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads
Have Infiltrated the World Anticommunist League /FX:PSL%PEE .FBE ŴżŻŹ ŸŹ4FF
also Joseph J. Heinlein Jr., “Political Warfare: The Nationalist Chinese Model” (Ph.D. diss.,
"NFSJDBO6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżźŷ BOE+BZ5BZMPS The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and
the Revolutions in China and Taiwan $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųų ŵųŹoŵŵ
52. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, 34.
53. “Battle of the Neckerchiefs,” Time, February 12, 1965, 20, 21; Topping, “Laotians Trace
$PVQUPUIF"NCJUJPOTPGB(FOFSBMw8JMMJBN)4VMMJWBO 64.JTTJPOUP-BPT ŴżŹŻ i1PTU
Report,” TTU; CIA Intelligence Report, “Decision at Military Officers Meeting Concerning
UIF3FPSHBOJ[BUJPOPGUIF-BP(PWFSONFOUw

310 Notes to Pages 129–131


54. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, vi, 1; “Battle of the
/FDLFSDIJFGTw64"SNZ7JFUOBNUP#VOEZ +VMZŵų ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' CPYŵŹŻ -BPT
55. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, vi, 1.
56. Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support, 125. The intrigues
PGQMPUUJOHUIFDPVQBOEJUTGBJMVSFBSFDISPOJDMFEJOBTFSJFTPGNFNPTJOUIF-BPTDPVOUSZ
ĕMFTBU-#+- CPYŵŹżTFF FH $*"*OGPSNBUJPO$BCMF i%FQBSUVSFPG1IPVNJ4JIP1BSUZ
GPS #BOHLPL w 'FCSVBSZ ŴŴ  ŴżŹŸ BOE 8JMMJBN 4VMMJWBO  "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  7JFOUJBOF  UP
4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF .BSDIŵż ŴżŹŸ -#+- /4' -BPT CPYŵŹż"DDPSEJOHUPGPSNFS64"*%
PďDJBM-PSJOH8BHHPOFS BTSFQPSUFECZ"MGSFE.D$PZ ,PVQSBTJUITSJHIUIBOENBO (FO-
FSBMćPOHMJUI$IPLCFOHCPVOH UPMEIJNBUBGVOFSBMTFWFSBMZFBSTBęFSUIFJODJEFOUUIBU
i4JIPXBTEJSUZBOEDPSSVQUwBOEUIBUIFXBTiHMBEwUIBUIFIBEIBEBIBOEJOFMJNJOBUJOH
IJN The Politics of Heroin, 605).
57. CIA Info Cable, April 19, 1964; Situation Report, April, 18, 1964; CIA, Office of Cur-
rent Intelligence, “Background of April 19 Rightist Coup in Laos,” April 22, 1964, LBJL, NSF,
Laos, box 266.
58. Michael Forrestal to John F. Kennedy, April 9, 1962, Office of the Country Director for
Laos, box 1; “Never Were So Many Warnings Ignored as in Laos” and “Dulles Didn’t Want
Peace in Indochina,” I. F. Stone Weekly, January 9, 1961, LBJL, NSF, box 266, folder Laos; D.
(BSFUI1PSUFS i"ęFS(FOFWB4VCWFSUJOH-BPUJBO/FVUSBMJUZwJO"EBNTBOE.D$PZ Laos:
War and Revolution,ŴźżoŵŴŶ
Ÿż"EPMQIF#POOFĕM i1MBOTGPS*ODPSQPSBUJPOPG4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUTJOUIF-/1w
"QSJMŵŶ ŴżŸż 3'"" 640.-BPT CPYŴ GPMEFS4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUT
Źų$IBSMFT.BFDIMJOH+S i%FWFMPQNFOUPG*OEJHFOPVT1PMJDFBOE1BSBNJMJUBSZ3FTPVSDFT 
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 0SHBOJ[BUJPOGPS*OUFSOBM%FGFOTF.BUUFST w+',- /4' CPYŶŶŻ
ŹŴ#POOFĕM i1MBOTGPS*ODPSQPSBUJPOPG4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUTJOUIF-/1w-#4XJDL
to Jack H. Tobler, dictated by Paul Skuse, October 13, 1959, USOM Laos, box 1, folder Special
$PNNBOEP 6OJUT )FOSZ % )FDLTIFS  $*" 4UBUJPO $IJFG  UP )FOSZ.JMMFSw /PWFNCFS ŵ 
1959, ibid.; Colonel Virgil Ney, “Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy,” in Modern Guerrilla
Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. F. M. Osanka, introduction
CZ4BNVFM)VOUJOHUPO /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżŹŵ ŵŸoŶŻ%SJOOPO Facing West. There is
POMZMJNJUFEFWJEFODFGSPNUIFBSDIJWFT GSPNUIFNBUFSJBM*IBWFHPOFUISPVHI PG1BUIFU-BP
BTTBTTJOBUJPOTPGQVCMJDPďDJBMT*OPOFEPDVNFOUFEJODJEFOU BQPMJDFNBTUFSTFSHFBOUBOEB
corporal were shot to death by Pathet Lao cadres while riding their bicycles to work in March
ŴżŹŸ3BMQI+PIOTPOXFOUPOUPQBSUJDJQBUFJOUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNJO7JFUOBN
Źŵ#POOFĕM i1MBOTGPS*ODPSQPSBUJPOPG4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUTJOUIF-/1w)PO
-FPOBSE6OHBS 64FNCBTTZ -BPT UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i$PNNBOEP6OJUTUP0QFSBUF
BHBJOTU1-)FME3PVUFź w%FDFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŹŶ -#+- /4' -BPT CPYŵŹŸ
ŹŶ i" )JTUPSZ PG 14% JO -BPT w 640. -BPT  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS 4QFDJBM $PNNBOEP 6OJUT
i4JUVBUJPOBU9JFOH,IPVBOH w"VHVTUŵź ŴżŸŻ
Źŷ-#4XJDLUP1BVM)4LVTF i"VUP%FGFOTF w%FDFNCFSŴŷ ŴżŸż 640.-BPT ŴżŸŸo
ŴżŸż CPYŴ GPMEFS4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUT
65. See Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and
U.S.-Japanese Relations $PMMFHF4UBUJPO5FYBT".1SFTT ŵųųų ŶŻ
66. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, vi, 1; Willard O.
#SPXO  NFNP GPS "NCBTTBEPS  i3FQPSU CZ .S 1BVM 4LVTF w 640.  -BPT  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS
4QFDJBM$PNNBOEP6OJUT#VSDIFUU The Second Indochina War,ŴŹŴ'SFE#SBOGNBO ićF
Secret Wars of the CIA,” in Uncloaking the CIA: Conference on the CIA and World Peace, ed.
)PXBSE&'SB[JFS /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ żŵ

Notes to Pages 131–134 311


67. “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 4, 1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17,
GPMEFS*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ(-JOXPPE#BSOFZ ićF.FPPG9JFOH,IPVBOH1SPWJODF -BPT w
in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, ed. Peter Kunstadter (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 1967), 275.
ŹŻ64"SNZ -BPT UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 8BTIJOHUPO %$ "QSJMŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' 
$PVOUSZ'JMF "TJB1BDJĕD CPYŵŹŹ GPMEFS-BPT4BOBOJLPOF The Royal Lao Army and U.S.
Army Advice and Support, 78. On Vang’s background, see Ahern, Undercover Armies, 29;
5JNPUIZ$BTUMF At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Gov-
ernment, 1955–1975 /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżź ŴŸŸ ŴŸŹ
Źż 8JMMBSE 0 #SPXO  NFNP GPS "NCBTTBEPS  i3FQPSU CZ .S 1BVM 4LVTFw i.POUIMZ
1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU 1BVM4LVTF w.BSDIŷ ŴżŸż 640.-BPT CPYŴ GPMEFS4QFDJBM$PN-
NBOEP6OJUT
70. Ahern, Undercover Armies, 150; Methven, Laughter in the Shadows, 72.
źŴ$*"UP.D(FPSHF#VOEZ 4FQUFNCFSŵ ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' CPYŵŹŻ GPMEFS-BPT3PVUFź
XBTBIFBWJMZCPNCFEBSFBOPSUIFBTUPG1IPOTBWBO UIFDBQJUBMPG9JFOH,IPVBOHQSPWJODF 
SVOOJOHGSPNUIF/PSUI7JFUOBNFTFCPSEFSUISPVHIUIF1MBJOPG+BST
72. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950
to the Present /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT Ŵżźź ŴŶŻ"OESFX5VMMZ CIA: The Inside Story (New
:PSL8JMMJBN.PSSPX ŴżŹŵ ŵŴź
73. Ahern, Undercover Armies, 213. See also Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender
and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT 
2001), 61.
74. Ahern, Undercover Armies, 241, 254.
źŸ'SFE#SBOGNBO Voices from the Plain of Jars: Life under an Air War /FX:PSL)BSQFS
3PX Ŵżźŵ ŵŵ
76. Ahern, Undercover Armies, 458; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 318; Joseph J. Trento,
Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network
/FX :PSL $BSSPMM BOE (SBG  ŵųųŸ  ŶŻ *O UIF /BUJPOBM "SDIJWFT  * GPVOE B EPDVNFOU
QPJOUJOHUPUIFBSSFTUPG"MBO+BDL3PNNFM BUXFOUZFJHIUZFBSPMENFEJDBMUFDIOJDJBOJO
-BPT POOBSDPUJDTWJPMBUJPOTJO)POH,POHćFBSSFTUSFQPSUNFOUJPOFEUIBUIFXBTiBO
BTTPDJBUFPGUIFMBUF5PN%PPMFZJO#VSNB wBLOPXO$*"BHFOU8IFUIFS3PNNFMXBT
EBCCMJOHJOESVHTPOUIFTJEFPSXBTQBSUPGTPNFUIJOHNPSFTZTUFNBUJDJTOPUDMFBSi"MBO
+BDL3PNNFM w+BOVBSZŵŷ ŴżŹŴ 3(Ŵźų 3FDPSETPGUIF%&" CPYŴŹų GPMEFS-BPT
źź.D$PZ ićF4FDSFU8BSJO-BPT ŴżŸŸoŴżźŸ wŴżŸ1FSSZ--BNZ i#BSSFM3PMM ŴżŹŻo
ŴżźŶ"O"JS$BNQBJHOJO4VQQPSUPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDZw.BYXFMM"JS'PSDF#BTF .BZŴų 
ŴżżŸ#SPNMFZ4NJUIUP1SFTJEFOU %FDFNCFSŴŷ ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' -BPT CPYŵŹż0QFSBUJPO
Barrel Roll focused on northern Laos, while Operation Steel Tiger took place in the eastern
portion of the country along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
źŻ"NCBTTBEPS4VMMJWBOUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF .BZŴŶ ŴżŹŷ 64FNCBTTZUP64"*%BOE
“Accidental Air Strike,” January 21, 1965, LBJL, NSF, box 269, folder Laos. In the errant strike
JO,IBOH,IBZ PO/PWFNCFSŵŵ ŴżŹŸ UIFFNCBTTZSFQPSUFEUIBUiBMUIPVHIŹoŻCPNCT
MBOEFEPOUBSHFU BOPWFSXIFMNJOH QSPQPSUJPO PGUIFPSEOBODFXBT EFMJWFSFE PO,IBOH
,IBZ<UPXO>JUTFMGBOEDPOTJEFSBCMFEFTUSVDUJPOXBTBDIJFWFE‫ڀڀ‬.PTUTPSUJFTDMFBSMZIJU
UIFXSPOHUBSHFUEFTQJUFTVDIGFBUVSFTBTBMBLFBOESPBEOFUXPSLXIJDIUPBMBZNBOTFZF 
XPVMETFFNUPIBWFNBEFUBSHFUJEFOUJĕDBUJPOGFBTJCMFw8JMMJBN4VMMJWBOUP4FDSFUBSZPG
4UBUF /PWFNCFSŵŷ ŴżŹŸ -#+- /4' CPYŵŹż GPMEFS-BPT
źż/PBN$IPNTLZ JOUSPEVDUJPOUP"EBNTBOE.D$PZ Laos: War and Revolution, xviii;
#SBOGNBO Voices from the Plain of Jars, 23; Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, 144.

312 Notes to Pages 134–136


Żų#SBOGNBO Voices from the Plain of Jars,ŶŻoŶż
ŻŴ5%"MMNBO i3VJOFE5PXOB7JHOFUUFPG8BSJO-BPT wNew York Times, October 17,
ŴżŹż5%"MMNBO ićF8BSJO-BPT1MBJO'BDUT wFar Eastern Economic Review, January 8,
Ŵżźŵ ŴŹ'SFE#SBOGNBO i"-BLFPG#MPPE wNew York Times,"QSJMź ŴżźŴ#SBOGNBO Voices
from the Plain of Jars, 4.
82. Ahern, Unconventional Armies,ŴŻŴ#SBOGNBO Voices from the Plain of Jars,ŷŻoŷż 
81; Burchett, The Second Indochina War; Garrett, “Subversion and Revolution in Laos,” 97.
83. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (New
:PSL)BSQFS3PX ŴżŹż ŶŷŻ"IFSO Unconventional Armies, 327; McCoy, The Politics of
Heroin, 436.
84. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police,WJ Ŵ*OGPSNBUJPOPO
(PSEPO:PVOHJTESBXOGSPN.D$PZ The Politics of Heroin,ŶŶż BOE:PVOH Journey from
Banna *OEJBOBQPMJT9JMJCSJT ŵųŴŴ .D#FFTTIBEPXZCBDLHSPVOEJTEFUBJMFEJO%PVHMBT
Valentine, The Strength of the Pack: The Personalities, Politics, and Espionage Intrigues That
Shaped the DEA 8BMUFSWJMMF 0SF5SJOF%BZ ŵųųż Źŷ ŴŹŹoŹź+PIO%POFZXBTBOPUIFS
BEWJTFSXJUI$*"DPOOFDUJPOTXIPUSBJOFEQBSBNJMJUBSZiIVOUFSLJMMFSwTRVBETJO$PMPNCJB
85. Walton, Skuse, and Motter, A Survey of the Laos National Police, 6, 7, 9.
ŻŹ*CJE ŶŸ5SBJOFEBUB'SFODI(FOEBSNFSJFTDIPPMBOEXJUIUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODI
JO.BMBZB 1SBEJDIJU BNFNCFSPGUIFOBUJPOBM0MZNQJDDPNNJUUFF XBTBNJMJUBSZBUUBDIÏ
UPćBJMBOEGSPNŴżŹŵUPŴżŹŷTFSWJOHJO#BOHLPL XIFSFIFDPPSEJOBUFE#11BOE1PMJDF
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1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPKFDU w.BZŴżźŷ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPSPG1SPHSBN
Surveys and Evaluation, Technical Services Division (hereafter TSD), box 6, folder Laos.
88. Paul H. Skuse, Chief Public Safety Advisor, USAID Laos, to Leonard Friesz, “Public
4BGFUZ3FMPBEJOH w%FDFNCFSŴŻ ŴżŹŻ 54% CPYŹ GPMEFS-BPT
89. “Public Safety Project Laos, Phase-Out,” May 1974, TSD box 6, folder Laos; Lau-
SFO+(PJOBOE$IBSMFT-FJTUFS i&WBMVBUJPOPGUIF1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN 64"*%-BPT w
/PWFNCFSŴżŹż0O014DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTFČPSUTEVSJOHUIFFBSMZŴżźųT TFF+FSFNZ,V[-
NBSPW The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs "NIFSTU
6OJWFSTJUZ PG .BTTBDIVTFUUT 1SFTT  ŵųųż  ŴŷųoŷŶ 1BUIFU -BP MFBEFS 1IPVNJ 7POHWJDIJU
DPNNFOUFEBDDVSBUFMZUIBUiBOUJPQJVNNFBTVSFTJO7JFOUJBOFwTFSWFEBTBiDBNPVĘBHFGPS
$*"wBDUJWJUJFT"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ.BOJMB UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF 8BTIJOHUPO %$ 'FCSV-
ary 1974, IPS, box 10.
żų ćF UFSN iTJEFTIPXw EFSJWFT GSPN 8JMMJBN 4IBXDSPTTT JNQPSUBOU TUVEZ Sideshow:
Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia /FX:PSL1PDLFU#PPLT Ŵżźż 
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ŴŵżųE8PSLJOH(SPVQ 'FCSVBSZŴŹ ŴżŸŸ#ZSPO&OHMFBOE-PVJT<sic>1BHF i4FDSFU3FQPSU
PO *OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ 4FSWJDFT PG $BNCPEJB /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF  .VOJDJQBM 1PMJDF  4VSGBDF
%FGFOTF'PSDFT w'PSFJHO0QFSBUJPOT"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 1IOPN1FOI "QSJMŴ ŴżŸŸ .46" 
7JFUOBN 1SPKFDU -PVJTF 1BHF JT MJTUFE BT i-PVJTw 1BHF PO UIJT SFQPSU BOE BMTP JO PďDJBM
014FNQMPZNFOUSFDPSET4IFXBTTBJEUPCFBďMJBUFEXJUI*OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF&RVJQNFOU
Corporation, a known CIA front. This was evidently part of her cover.
żŵ5$/JCMPDLUP#ZSPO&OHMF $BNCPEJB i.POUIMZ3FQPSU ŻŴŶŴżŹŶ w/PWFNCFSŴŻ 
ŴżŹŶi.POUIMZ1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴż ŴżŹŶ 54% CPY$BNCPEJB GPMEFSŶ
Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in
Cambodia, 1930–1975 (London: Verso, 1985), 216.

Notes to Pages 136–138 313


żŶ3PCFSU8,PNFS i.FNPGPS.FNCFSTPG4UVEZ(SPVQTPO%FUFSSFODFPG(VFSSJMMB
Warfare, Revised Draft Outline,” March 8, 1961, RWK, box 414, folder 1, Special Group. On
64TUSBUFHJDBOEFDPOPNJDJOUFSFTUTJO#VSNB TFF+POBUIBO.BSTIBMM i0QJVN 5VOHTUFO 
BOEUIF4FBSDIGPS/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ ŴżŷųoŴżŸŵ wJODrug Control Policy: Essays in Historical
and Comparative Perspective,FE8JMMJBN08BMLFS*** 6OJWFSTJUZ1BSL1FOOTZMWBOJB6OJ-
versity Press, 1992). On how the War on Drugs was later used to perpetuate support for Ne
Win’s forces, see Bertil Lintner, “Heroin and Highland Insurgency in the Golden Triangle,”
in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and
"MBO"#MPDL #PVMEFS8FTUWJFX1SFTT Ŵżżŵ ŵźŷBOE,V[NBSPW Myth of the Addicted
Army, chap. 6.
żŷ4FF8JMGSFE#VSDIFUUBOE/PSPEPN4JBIOPVL My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Related to Wilfred Burchett /FX:PSL*OUFSOBUJPOBM1VCMJTI-
ers, 1962); “Records of the Third Meeting of the Inter-Agency Police Group,” February 18,
ŴżŹŶ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 *OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ CPYŻ GPMEFSŴ
95. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 252; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War (New
:PSL 3PXNBO BOE -JUUMFĕFME  ŵųųŷ  ŴŹźoźų %PVHMBT 7BMFOUJOF  The Phoenix Program
/FX:PSL.PSSPX ŴżżŴ ŶŵŻ
żŹ3FE4VUUPOUP+BNFT$SFUFDPT i/BSDPUJDT&OGPSDFNFOUJO$BNCPEJB w+VOFŴŷ ŴżźŴ 
3( ŵŻŹ  64"*%  014  ćBJMBOE  /BSDPUJDT  CPY Ŵż  GPMEFS ŷ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  1IOPN
1FOI  UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i$BNCPEJBO %SVH 4VQQSFTTJPO 3FQPSU OP Ŵ w +BOVBSZ ŵź 
1972, “Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics by Air in Southeast Asia,” May 28, 1972, and “Narcotics
5SBJOJOH$VTUPNT w+VOFŴżźŶ BMM3%4 #'&" $BNCPEJB ŴżźųoŴżźŶ CPYŶųŸź
żź4FF.BSL4FMEFOBOE"MWJO:4P FET War and State Terrorism: The United States,
Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME 
ŵųųŷ /PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Political Economy of Human Rights,
vol. 1, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press,
1979), 240; Anthony Lewis, “Another Senate Test,” New York Times, July 9, 1973, 33.
żŻ2VPUFEJO$VNJOHT Dominion from Sea to Sea, 471.
żż4FFFTQFDJBMMZ.BINPPE.BNEBOJ ićF$PME8BSBęFS*OEPDIJOB wJOGood Muslim,
Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŵųųŸ 
$IBMNFST+PIOTPO Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of the American Empire (New
:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŵ 

7. “As I Recall the Many Tortures”


Ŵ2VPUFEJO+BNFT#PXFSUP+BDL3ZBO 14% i(SFOBEF*ODJEFOUBU#BONFUIVPU w"QSJMŴż 
1965, RG 472, RAFSEA, HQ MACV, CORDS, Public Safety Directorate, Field Operations
(hereafter CORDS Public Safety), Director General Records, box 2.
2. Warren Hinckle, Robert Scheer, and Sol Stern, “Michigan State: The University on the
.BLF wJOUSPEVDUJPOCZ4UBOMFZ,4DIFJOCBVN Ramparts,"QSJMŴżŹŹ Żųożź
Ŷ4UBUFNFOUCZ+PIO)BOOBI QSFTJEFOU .JDIJHBO4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ "QSJMŵŵ ŴżŹŹ )BO-
OBI1BQFST .46"i8JUIUIF$*"JO7JFUOBN$BNQVT$MPBLTBA4QZ0QFSBUJPO 3BJTFTB
Dispute in the Midwest,” Lansing State Journal, April 18, 1966, article in Hannah Papers. In
response to the RampartsBSUJDMF 8FTMFZ'JTIFMDPNNFOUFEJOBWFJMFETVCTUBOUJBUJPOPGJUT
charges, “There was no secret about intelligence agents’ presence on the project’s payroll and
UIFZQFSGPSNFEOPDMPBLBOEEBHHFSXPSL‰UIFZXFSFTJNQMZUIFSFUPUSBJOUIF7JFUOBNFTF
DJWJMQPMJDFJODPVOUFSTVCWFSTJWFBDUJWJUJFTw)BOOBIIJNTFMGBDLOPXMFEHFEUIFFNQMPZNFOU
PGJOEJWJEVBMTXJUIJOUFMMJHFODFCBDLHSPVOETUPXPSLJOUIFĕFMEPGiDPVOUFSTVCWFSTJPOw

314 Notes to Pages 138–142


4. Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War
in Vietnam, 1950–1963 /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŹ ź Ŵź ŵŴ64$POHSFTT 
Senate, Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War: Hearings before the Committee on
ForeignRelations, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 10, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972),
198. When asked at the hearing whether it was true that Ho Chi Minh would have received
80 percent of the popular vote in an election, OSS agent Frank White responded, “certainly
yes” (198).
5. Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin, 26, 85.
Ź%S8FTMFZ3'JTIFM i3FNBSLTUPUIF3PUBSZ$MVCPG4BJHPOćF3PMFPGUIF.JDIJHBO
4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZ(SPVQJO7JFUOBN w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸź Vietmy, February 1957, 41; Robert
Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State University
Experience /FX :PSL 1SBFHFS  ŴżŹŸ  ŵ +PTFQI 4UBSS  i$JWJM 1PMJDF "ENJOJTUSBUJPO 1SP-
HSBN w0DUPCFSŴŻ ŴżŸŹ 3(ŷŹż 3'"" ŴżŷŻoŴżŹŴ 0ďDFPG1VCMJD4FSWJDFT CPYŴ
7. Quoted in Marc Curtis, Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses (London: Vin-
tage, 2004), 203.
8. See John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam
War (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 13, 14; ICA, “Annual Status
Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d to Operations Coordinating Board
GPSUIF/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM w%FDFNCFSŴżŸŸo/PWFNCFSŴżŸŹ %%&- 8IJUF)PVTF
Office, NSC, OCB, Central File Series, box 18, folder Internal Security; Howard Hoyt, Chief
PG1PMJDF ,BMBNB[PP .JDI BOE$PPSEJOBUPS (FSNBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOHQSPHSBN UP"MCFSU
4DIFJFSO  (SBOE 3BQJET  .JDI  5VSOFS 1BQFST *OUFSOBM SFDPSET TIPX  GPS FYBNQMF  UIBU
.46TQPOTPSFE)FJO[(VUBEFM BHFUIJSUZ BNFNCFSPGUIF'SBOLGVSUQPMJDFEFQBSUNFOU
XIPIBECFFOESBęFEJOUPUIF8FISNBDIUJO8PSME8BS** CFDBNFBĕHIUFSQJMPU BOE
XBTTIPUEPXOPWFS%VOLJSL)FXBTMBUFSTFOUUP3VTTJBBOETFSWFEJOUIF/B[JBSNZJO
/PSNBOEZ XIFSFIFXBTDBQUVSFEBOESFMFBTFEBęFSUXPZFBSTJOB108DBNQ"OPUIFSPG
UIFJOWJUFFTXBT,BSM.FZFS BHFUXFOUZTJY B(FSNBOOBWBMPďDFSDBQUVSFEJOUIF.FEJUFS-
ranean. No one at MSU appeared to express any consternation about their backgrounds.
ż"SUIVS'#SBOETUBUUFS 1FSTPOOFM'JMF .46"*OŴżŹŴ#SBOETUBUUFSXBTOBNFEB4JMWFS
"OOJWFSTBSZ"MM"NFSJDBOCZSports Illustrated, an honor he shared with Green Bay Pack-
FSTDPBDI7JODF-PNCBSEJBOE0LMBIPNBDPBDI$IBSMFTi#VEw8JMLJOTPO3PCFSU,FOOFEZ
BOE3JDIBSE/JYPOXFSFBNPOHUIFKVEHFT#SBOETUBUUFSSFUJSFEGSPNUIF64NJMJUBSZJO
1969 with the rank of brigadier general after thirty-two years’ service. Born in McKee Rock,
1FOOTZMWBOJB IFFBSOFECPUI#"BOE.4$EFHSFFTGSPN.46JOQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPO
10. Personnel File, Howard G. Hoyt, MSUA. During World War II, Hoyt was director of
security for Gopher ordnance works in St. Paul, Minnesota, possibly engaging in industrial
TVSWFJMMBODF)JTTPO B,PSFBO8BSWFUFSBO XBTBMTPJOQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPOBU.46
ŴŴ+BDL3ZBOUP)PXBSE)PZU i(FOFSBM/HVZFO7BO-B w"QSJMŴ ŴżŸŻ .46"7JFUOBN
1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŶi4VSFUÏPS7#*BOE.VOJDJQBM1PMJDFJO#SJFG w.46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU 
CPYŹźż+BDL&3ZBOUP)PXBSE)PZU i(FOFSBM*OGPSNBUJPO3FHBSEJOHUIF7#*BOE*UT
(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFST w"QSJMŴź ŴżŸŹ ŷ 556&SOTU Forging a Fateful Alliance,ŹŸoŹŹ-F
XBTMBUFSQSPNPUFEUPUIF%FGFOTF%FQBSUNFOU
12. Jack E. Ryan, “Brief History of the Sureté in Indochina,” MSUG, January 19, 1956, 7;
"SUIVS#SBOETUBUUFSFUBM i'JFME5SJQ3FQPSU1PMJDFBOE4FDVSJUZ4FSWJDFT w.BZżoŴŴ ŴżŹų
and “Field Trip Report VBI (Cong An), Long An, Kien Hoa, and Binh Duong Provinces,”
%FDFNCFSŴųoŴŴ ŴżŸż .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŷ3BMQI)4NVDLMFSBOENFNCFST
PGUIFQPMJDFUFBN i3FQPSUPOUIF1PMJDFPG7JFUOBNw.46( 5FDIOJDBM"TTJTUBODF1SPKFDU 
%FDFNCFS Ŵ  ŴżŸŸ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ "TTJTUBODF 7JFUOBN  )JTUPSJDBM #BDLHSPVOE w $03%4 

Notes to Pages 142–143 315


14% 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN *OGPSNBUJPO)BOECPPL.BYXFMM5BZMPS i.FNPGPS.FNCFST
PGUIF4QFDJBM(SPVQ644VQQPSUPG'PSFJHO1BSBNJMJUBSZ'PSDFT w3(ŵŻŹ 3FDPSETPGUIF
64"*% 014 1SPHSBN4VSWFZTBOE&WBMVBUJPOT CPYŸ GPMEFSŴ
ŴŶ/PBN$IPNTLZBOE/HP7JOI-POH ićJSUZ:FBS3FUSPTQFDUJWFPOUIF'BMMPG4BJ-
HPO wQVCMJDGPSVNIFMEBU.BTTBDIVTFUUT*OTUJUVUFPG5FDIOPMPHZ #PTUPO POUIFUIJSUJFUI
BOOJWFSTBSZ PG UIF FOE PG UIF 7JFUOBN 8BS  "QSJM Ŷų  ŵųųŸ +PIO .D$BCF UP .BSUJO -
(SPTT i.POUIMZ"DUJWJUZ3FQPSU w%FDFNCFSŴżŹŴ 3(ŵŻŹ 3FDPSETPGUIF64"*% 014 
0QFSBUJPOT %JWJTJPO  &BTU "TJB #SBODI  7JFUOBN  1PMJDF 0QFSBUJPOT IFSFBęFS 014 &BTU
Asia Branch), folder 1.
Ŵŷ i3FQPSU PG /4$ Ŵŵżų% 8PSLJOH (SPVQ  4VNNBSZ PG 4UBUVT PG *OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ
Forces Prepared by the Pentagon,” Appendix B,”Survey of the Vulnerability of Various
$PVOUSJFTUP$PNNVOJTU4VCWFSTJPO w'FCSVBSZŴŹ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# CPYŴŹ GPMEFS*OUFS-
nal Security; Albert Haney, “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d, “August 5, 1955,
DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security.
ŴŸćFTUSFOHUIPGUIF7JFUNJOIBOEUIFEFQFOEFODZPGUIF7JFUOBNFTFHPWFSONFOUPO
GPSFJHOQBUSPOBHFBSFNJTSFQSFTFOUFECZUIFTPDBMMFESFWJTJPOJTUTPSOFPPSUIPEPYIJTUP-
rians such as Mark Moyar (in Triumph Forsaken</FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT 
ŵųųŻ> BOE&EXBSE.JMMFS JOi7JTJPO 1PXFS BOE"HFODZćF"TDFOUPG/HP%JOI%JFN 
ŴżŷŸoŴżŸŷ wJournal of Southeast Asian StudiesŶŸ<ŵųųŷ>ŷŶŶoŸŻ XIPJHOPSFDPOTJEFSBCMF
FWJEFODFBOEEPDVNFOUBUJPOJOUIFJSFČPSUTUPSFIBCJMJUBUF%JFNBOESBUJPOBMJ[FUIF64
intervention.
ŴŹi1FSTPOOFM w.46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźż4PNFPGUIF$*"NFOBTTJHOFEUPUIF
7#* XFSF MJTUFE VOEFS HFOFSJD OBNFT JO UIF .46 SFDPSET "SUIVS 4UFJO  8JMMJBN " ,
+POFT BOE%BO4NJUI JOPSEFSUPIJEFUIFJSSFBMJEFOUJUJFT(FPSHF,JNCBMM BUXFOUZĕWF
ZFBSZFBSWFUFSBOPGUIF%FUSPJUQPMJDFXIPUSBJOFESBEJPUFDIOJDJBOT EJFETVEEFOMZGSPN
illness during his tour.
Ŵź+BDL3ZBO 1FSTPOOFM'JMF .46".BSHBSFU-BVUFSCBDI i.465SBJOFE7JFUOBNFTF
Praised by U.S. Adviser,” East Lansing Town Courier, June 30, 1965; “VBI Detention Center,”
0DUPCFSź ŴżŸŻ .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŷ3ZBOBOE.BOPQPMJUP)PZU i(JB%JOI
%FUFOUJPO$FOUFSw"VHVTUŵŴ ŴżŸŻ .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŷ3ZBOPďDJBMMZTFSWFE
BTBMFDUVSFSPOUIF.46GBDVMUZGPSBZFBSCFGPSFHPJOHUP7JFUOBN UIPVHIJUJTOPUDMFBSJG
he ever taught any classes. Howard Hoyt characterized Boudrias as “undependable, dishon-
FTUBOEWJDJPVT wBOFYBNQMFPGUIFJOUFSOBMEJTTFOTJPOBNPOHUIF.46BEWJTFST
ŴŻ.46(4FQUFNCFS.POUIMZ3FQPSUT 0DUPCFSŻ ŴżŸźi$JWJM(VBSEJO#SJFG w.46"
7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźż)PXBSE)PZUUP640.4BJHPO i.POUIMZ$JWJM1PMJDF3FQPSU 
/PWFNCFSwBOEi4FNJ"OOVBM3FQPSU w+VMZŴżŸź .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźżThe
PentagonPapers:The Senator Gravel Edition,WPMŴ #PTUPO#FBDPO1SFTT ŴżźŴ ŶŴŷ RVPUFE
in John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam $IJDBHP6OJWFSTJUZPG$IJDBHP1SFTT ŵųųź ŴŵŴ8BMUPOXBTBMTPBUUIFUJNF
a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Reserve. Updike told a British official that he sought
UP NPME UIF DJWJM HVBSE BęFS QPMJDF GPSDFT JO /FX :PSL XIJDI GPVHIU UIF i3FE *OEJBOT w
SFBEJOHCPPLTBCPVUUIPTFGPSDFTJOQSFQBSBUJPO4FF8JMMJBN3PTFOBV US Internal Security
Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order (London: Routledge,
2005), 133.
Ŵż &EXBSE 8 8FJEOFS  $IJFG "EWJTFS /BUJPOBM *OTUJUVUF PG "ENJOJTUSBUJPO  4BJHPO 
i4FDPOE3FQPSUPGUIF.46(JO1VCMJD"ENJOJTUSBUJPOUPUIF(PWFSONFOUPG7JFUOBN w
%FDFNCFS ŶŴ  ŴżŸŸ BOE )PXBSE 8 )PZU  i5SBJOJOH 1MBO GPS "TTJTUJOH UIF (PWFSONFOU
PG 7JFUOBN JO UIF 5SBJOJOH PG ćFJS $JWJM 1PMJDF 'PSDF  .46(  1PMJDF %JWJTJPO  4BJHPO w
/PWFNCFSŴżŸź .46( ŴŸ&SOTU Forging a Fateful Alliance, 65.

316 Notes to Pages 144–145


ŵųćFDPSSFTQPOEFODFJTTDBUUFSFEUISPVHIPVUUIFSFDPSETPGUIF.46"7JFUOBN1SPK-
FDU)PZUBMTPSFMJTIFEUIFPQQPSUVOJUZUPUSBWFMJO&VSPQFPOIJTKPVSOFZIPNF)JTXJGF 
#MBODIF XBTQFSDFQUJWFJODSJUJDJ[JOHUIFGBXOJOHNFEJBEFQJDUJPOTPG.NF/IV OPUJOH
UIBUTIFXBTiIBUFEBOEGFBSFECZUIFQFPQMFwBOEUIBUUIF/IVTIBECFDPNFNJMMJPOBJSFT 
XJUIQSPQFSUZJONBOZQBSUTPGUIFXPSME JODMVEJOHIVHFIPNFTCVJMUGPSUIFNJO&OHMBOE
'PS UIF VHMZ "NFSJDBO SFGFSFODF  TFF 8JMMJBN + -FEFSFS BOE &VHFOF #VSEJDL  The Ugly
American /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŹŵ ćFDPMPSGVMOPWFMDSJUJDJ[FT"NFSJDBOTGPSMJWJOHMJLF
DPMPOJBMTJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBXIJMFUIFDPNNVOJTUTXFSFPVUJOUIFĕFMEiXJOOJOHIFBSUTBOE
NJOETw
ŵŴ i$POĕEFOUJBM .FNP *OUFSWJFX XJUI 3FUVSOJOH 7JFUOBN 4UBČ .FNCFST w 3BMQI
5VSOFS1BQFST .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŴŹżŷ IFSFBęFS5VSOFS1BQFST 4DJHMJBOPBOE
Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam,ŴŻoŴż
ŵŵi$POĕEFOUJBM.FNP*OUFSWJFXXJUI3FUVSOJOH7JFUOBN4UBČ.FNCFSTw"ęFSFOE-
JOHIJTUFOVSFXJUIUIF7JFUOBNQSPKFDUJO4FQUFNCFSŴżŹų BMPOHXJUIIJTXJGF)PZUCPVHIU
BUSBWFMMPEHFJO0LMBIPNB$JUZ XIFSFIFIBEHSPXOVQ BOECFDBNFBDPOTVMUBOUUPUIF
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UP7JFUOBN UIPVHIJUEPFTOPUBQQFBSUIBUIFFWFSTFSWFEXJUIUIF014
ŵŶ+BDL&3ZBOUP)PXBSE)PZU i(FOFSBM*OGPSNBUJPO3FHBSEJOHUIF7#*BOE*UT(FO-
FSBM)FBERVBSUFST w"QSJMŴź ŴżŸŹ 556i3ZBO*OUFSWJFXXJUI.S1IBO7BO4PO 4UVEZPG
UIF7#*JOUIF'JFME 5BOBO1SPWJODF w"QSJMŵŶ ŴżŸŹ .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŴ&$
6QEJLF i'JFME5SJQUP#JOI%JOI 1IV:FO ,IBOI)PB /JOI5VBO1SPWJODFXJUI%JSFDUPS
(FOFSBMPGUIF$JWJM(VBSE w.BSDIŴżoŵŵ ŴżŸŻ .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŴ
ŵŷ8FTMFZ3'JTIFM )PXBSE8)PZU BOE3BMQI5VSOFS i1SFMJNJOBSZ3FQPSUPGB$FO-
USBM3FDPSE#VSFBV4FSWJDF .46( w"VHVTUŴżŸź .46(3ZBOUP)PZU i(FOFSBM*OGPSNB-
UJPO3FHBSEJOHUIF7#*BOE*UT(FOFSBM)FBERVBSUFSTwi4FWFOUI3FQPSUPGUIF.46(JO
1VCMJD"ENJOJTUSBUJPOUPUIF(PWFSONFOUPG7JFUOBN 4BJHPO w+VOFŶż ŴżŸŻ .46( ż
ŵŸ3BMQI'5VSOFS 1FSTPOOFM'JMF .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU%BOJFM#FISJOHFS i0ME5JNF
5PVDI)FTB$SJNF /PTUBMHJB#VČ w Lansing State Journal, July 18, 1977. In 1973 Turner
SFDFJWFEUIF#SVDF4NJUI"XBSEGSPNUIF"NFSJDBO"DBEFNZPG'PSFOTJDT4DJFODFTBOE
JOŴżŻŴXBTHJWFOEJTUJOHVJTIFEGBDVMUZIPOPSTCZ.46POUIFPDDBTJPOPGIJTSFUJSFNFOU
ŵŹ i4FQUFNCFS .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w .46(  0DUPCFS Ż  ŴżŸź i"VHVTU .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w
4FQUFNCFSŻ ŴżŸŻi/PWFNCFS.POUIMZ3FQPSUPO$JWJM1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO1SPHSBNGPS
3FQVCMJDPG7JFUOBN w%FDFNCFSŶ ŴżŸźBOEi'FCSVBSZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w.BSDIŴŵ ŴżŸŻ 
.46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźż4IJFMET 8JFOFS 4JFNFL i'JFME5SJQ3FQPSU 7#* -POH
"O ,JFO)PB #JOI%VPOH w%FDFNCFSŴųoŴŴ ŴżŸż .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŴi'JFME
5SJQ3FQPSU 7#* $POH"O %BSMBD 1MFJLV ,POUVN w0DUPCFSŴŵoŴź ŴżŸżBOEi'JFME5SJQ
3FQPSU 7#* 7JOI-POH w/PWFNCFSŴźoŵų ŴżŸż .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻŷ
27. “Ryan Interview with Mr. Phan Van Son”; “Ryan Interview with Mr. Hyunh, Quang
1IVPD $BOćP1SPWJODF w"QSJMŴż ŴżŸŹ 5567JSUVBM7JFUOBN"SDIJWFćPNBT-"IFSO
Jr., The CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954–1963 (Washington,
D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 95; Nguyen Thi Dinh, No Other Road
to Take,USBOT.BJ7&MMJPU *UIBDB$PSOFMM4PVUIFBTU"TJB1SPHSBN ŴżźŹ ŸŹoŸŻ.BSUJO
A. Nicolaus, The Professors, the Policemen, and the Peasants: The Sociology of the Michigan
State University Group Vietnam Project, 1955–1962 #VSOBCZ #$4JNPO'SBTFS6OJWFSTJUZ 
1966), 1.
ŵŻ+BNFT.$BSUFS Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968
/FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŹŻ%PVHMBT7BMFOUJOF The Phoenix Pro-
gram /FX :PSL 8JMMJBN .PSSPX  ŴżżŴ  Ŷŵ 8JMMJBN #FOTPO UP +PIO ' .D$BCF  i7JTJU
UP$IJ)PB1SJTPO w.BZŷ ŴżŹŴ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 7JFUOBN CPYŵŻź 1FOPMPHZićF

Notes to Pages 145–146 317


1SJTPOPG$IJ)PB w.46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹŻų8JMGSFE(#VSDIFUU The Furtive War:
The United States in Vietnam and Laos /FX:PSL*OUFSOBUJPOBM1VCMJTIFST ŴżŹŶ ŷż
29. Ahern Jr., The CIA and the House of Ngo,żŸ.BSJMZO#:PVOH The Vietnam Wars,
1945–1990 /FX:PSL)BSQFS1FSFOOJBM ŴżżŴ ŶŶż+BDL3ZBOUP3BMQI5VSOFS 'FCSVBSZŻ 
ŴżŹŴ 5VSOFS1BQFST+PTFQI4UBSS i$JWJM1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO1SPHSBN w0DUPCFSŴŻ ŴżŸŹ 
3(ŷŹż 3'"" ŴżŷŻoŴżŹŴ 014 CPYŴ014BEWJTFS'SBOL8BMUPOTJNJMBSMZXSPUFJOBTFDSFU
NFNPUIBUUIF%JFNSFHJNFFNQMPZFEUIFQPMJDFJOi(FTUBQPMJLFPQFSBUJPO<T>XJUINJE-
night arrests, holding without charge, brutality and detentions in secret locations.” Rosenau,
US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam, 125.
30. Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, WPM ŵ /FX :PSL 'SFEFSJDL "
1SBFHFS  ŴżŹź  żŸŵoŸŶ +FČSFZ 3BDF  War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a
Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 197; David Hunt, Viet-
nam’s Southern Revolution: From Peasant Insurrection to Total War, 1959–1968 "NIFSTU
University of Massachusetts Press, 2009); Truong Nhu Tang, A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside
Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath /FX :PSL )BSDPVSU #SBDF +PWBOPWJDI 
ŴżŻŸ 1IBN7BO#BDI FE Fascist Terror in South Vietnam: Law 10/59 (Hanoi: Gioi, 1961).
See also George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New
:PSL,OPQG ŴżŻŹ ŴŸŸ#FSOBSE#'BMM The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analy-
sis, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 272
31. Art Brandstatter to Ralph Turner, “Analysis of Role of Security Services,” February
Ŷ ŴżŹŴ 5VSOFS1BQFST .46""TBQPTUTDSJQU JOŴżŹŸ NFNCFSTPGUIF.46(TUJMMPOUIF
faculty, including Brandstatter, Turner, and Fishel, signed a petition that appeared in the
New York TimesDPOEFNOJOHUIFBDBEFNJDUFBDIJONPWFNFOU TVQQPSUFECZUIFJSGPSNFS
DPMMFBHVF4UBO4IFJOCBVN GPSQFSQFUVBUJOHiOVNFSPVTGBMTFIPPETwBOEBOBÕWFUÏBCPVUUIF
DIBSBDUFSPGUIFi7JFUDPOHw-BUFS BęFSUIFQPMJUJDBMXJOETTIJęFE NBOZ.46(QFSTPOOFM
DMBJNFEUPCFBHBJOTUUIFXBS QMBDJOHNVDIPGUIFCMBNFGPSUIFGBJMVSFPGTUBUFCVJMEJOH
QSPKFDUTPOUIF4PVUI7JFUOBNFTF
Ŷŵ3PCFSU)+PIOTPO i.FNPGPS8BMU3PTUPX 4VCKFDU$JWJD"DUJPOJO7JFUOBN w0DUP-
ber 6, 1961, JFKL, NSF, box 113; Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla
Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO Ŵżżŵ 
4UBO4XPČPSE i-BX&OGPSDFNFOU&YQFSU)PNF/PXwGreensboro Daily News,<OE>Ŵżźŷ
DPVSUFTZPG1BUTZ)BSSJOHUPO GBNJMZDPMMFDUJPO 
ŶŶićF3PMFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZJO4VQQPSUPGUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG7JFUOBN w"QSJMŴ ŴżŹż 
64"*% 014 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżŹż /HP7JOI-POH ićF$*"BOEUIF7JFUOBN
Debacle,” in Uncloaking the CIA,FE)PXBSE'SB[JFS /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ źŴi1VC-
MJD 4BGFUZ "TTJTUBODF 7JFUOBN  )JTUPSJDBM #BDLHSPVOE w $03%4  1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN 
*OGPSNBUJPO)BOECPPL 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPSPG1SPHSBNT 4VSWFZT 
BOE&WBMVBUJPOT IFSFBęFS1SPHSBNT 4VSWFZT BOE&WBMVBUJPOT CPYŸ
Ŷŷ "SUIVS 4IJWFMZ UP $IBSMFT 4MPBOF  i3FRVJTJUJPO GPS 8FBQPOT w 4FQUFNCFS Ŵ  ŴżŹŸ 
$03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŴi1VCMJD4BGFUZ"TTJTUBODF7JFUOBN )JTUPSJDBM#BDLHSPVOE w
$03%4 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN *OGPSNBUJPO)BOECPPL'SBOL8BMUPOUP"SUIVS;(BS-
diner, “MAAG Coastal Surveillance Concept,” OPS East Asia Branch box 278, folder 2 ;
i3FTPVSDFT$POUSPMCZUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG7JFUOBN w+VMZŴżŹŹ 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 
ŴżŹŹ 3PCFSU-PXFUP$PM1IBN7BO-JFV %JSFDUPS(FOFSBMPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDF 1PMJDF)2 
4BJHPO  $03%4 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  CPY Ŵ  7JFUOBN ćPNBT - "IFSO +S  The CIA and Rural
Pacification in South Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence,
ŵųųŹ ŵźżoŻŻ+PIO'4VMMJWBO Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

318 Notes to Pages 147–148


ŶŸ i3FRVJSFE "SNT GPS 1SFTJEFOUJBM(VBSE w +VMZ ŵų  ŴżŹŴ 014&BTU"TJB #SBODI  CPY
ŵźŻ GPMEFS1PMJDF0QFSBUJPOT+BNFT#PXFSUP$IBSMJF0#SJFO i-BCPS4USJLFBU3.,1SPK-
FDUTJO$BN3BOI#BZ"SFB w/PWFNCFSŴŸ ŴżŹŸ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŵi/PWFNCFS
.POUIMZ3FQPSUPO$JWJM1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO1SPHSBNGPS3FQVCMJDPG7JFUOBN i%FDFN-
CFSŶ ŴżŸź .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźż$BQUBJO)PSOFSUP)PXBSE)PZU i4FDVSJUZ
GPS+PIOTPO %SBLFBOE1BQFSPG7JFUOBN*OD w"QSJMŴų ŴżŸŻ .46"7JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPY
690; Carter, Inventing Vietnam, 185.
ŶŹ ćPNBT 'JOO UP +PIO ' .BOPQPMJ  $IJFG PG 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  "QSJM ŵż  ŴżŹŻ  3( ŵŻŹ 
64"*% 014 5FDIOJDBM4FSWJDFT%JWJTJPO (FOFSBM$PSSFTQPOEFODFT CPYŴŶ GPMEFS7JFUOBN
Ŷź#ZSPO&OHMFUP'SBOL8BMUPO i1PMJDF"UUBDLPO#VEEIJTU%FNPOTUSBUJPOT w+VMZŴżŹŶ 
$03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŸ0UUP-VEXJH 14% UP3PCFSU-PXF i#VEEIJTU%FNPOTUSB-
tion,” March 23, 1966, CORDS Public Safety, box 5.
38. Ray Landgren to Frank Walton, “Observations of Buddhist Police Incident 17 July
ŴżŹŶBUŸŻŵ1IBN5SBOI(JFO/FBSUIF(JOD.JOI1BHPEB w+VMZŴź ŴżŹŶ 014&BTU"TJB
#SBODI CPYŵŻŹćFTFBDUJPOTTFFNUPIBWFCFFOUZQJDBMQPMJDFMBUFSNVSEFSFEUIF'SFODI
correspondent Paul Léandri for reporting facts that challenged the official view of a North
7JFUOBNFTFUBLFPWFSPGUIF4PVUI'PSSFQPSUTPOBOPUIFSJODJEFOUPGQPMJDFIBSBTTNFOUPG
SFQPSUFST TFF64$POHSFTT 4FOBUF $PNNJUUFFPO'PSFJHO3FMBUJPOT i"NCBTTBEPS%VS-
CSPXT1SFTT3FMBUJPOT 4JUVBUJPOJO7JFUOBN w)FBSJOHT ŻŹUI$POH ŴTUTFTT 8BTIJOHUPO 
D.C.: GPO, 1959), 25 and Wilfred Burchett, Grasshoppers and Elephants: Why Vietnam Fell
/FX:PSL6SJ[FO#PPLT Ŵżźź ŴŹ
39. Buttinger, Vietnam, 996; Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin, 154.
40. Tang, A Vietcong Memoir, 90; CIA Report, October 1, 1964, LBJL, NSF, box 269, folder
-BPT4IJWFMZUP4MPBOF i3FRVJTJUJPOGPS8FBQPOTwi#SJFĕOHGPS.S.D/BNBSB 8FFLMZ
Report,” July 1965, CORDS Public Safety, box 1.
ŷŴ3PCFSU8,PNFS ićF0UIFS8BSJO7JFUOBN"1SPHSFTT3FQPSUw 64"*%ŴżŹŹ 
Ŵŷ  0HEFO 8JMMJBNT 1BQFST  556 %BWJE 8FMDI  i1BDJĕDBUJPO JO 7JFUOBN w Ramparts,
0DUPCFSŴżŹź ŹŴoźż0SSJO%F'PSFTU i&OEMFTT8BSwNew York Times, August 16, 1990. On
UIF .BMBZBO QSFDFEFOU  TFF -FPO $PNCFS  Malaya’s Secret Police, 1945–1960: The Role of
the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency 4JOHBQPSF*4&"4.POBTI6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT 
1997); Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 92. Grieves had a reputation for being uncouth and
BOBMDPIPMJD*OŴżźŵIFCFDBNFEFQVUZUPQVCMJDTBGFUZDIJFG#ZSPO&OHMFBęFSBTUJOUBT
EFQVUZ DPNNBOEFS PG UIF 4QFDJBM 8BSGBSF $FOUFS BU 'PSU #SBHH VOEFS (FOFSBM 8JMMJBN
:BSCPSPVHI
42. Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to
the Present /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT Ŵżźź ŵŴŹ
ŷŶ8JMMJBN$PSTPO The Betrayal /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŹŻ żŵćPNBT-"IFSO+S 
CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam (Washing-
ton, D.C.: CIA, 2006), 46; Leigh Brilliant to John Manopoli, “Monthly Report,” April 1968,
$03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ (FOFSBM3FDPSET CPYż5PN#VDLMFZ i1PSUSBJUPGBO"HJOH%FTQPU w
Harper’sMagazine, "QSJM Ŵżźŵ  ŹŻoźŵ 8JMMJBN + -FEFSFS DIBSBDUFSJTUJDBMMZ XSPUF JO UIF
introduction to Our Own Worst Enemy /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŹŻ UIBUIFDPVMEOPUUIBOL
IJT7JFUOBNFTFGSJFOETCZOBNFCFDBVTFJGIFEJE iUIFZNJHIUSFDFJWFBNJEOJHIUWJTJUGSPN
(FOFSBM-PBOTNFO PS7JDF1SFTJEFOU,ZTTFDSFUQPMJDFw ź ,ZXBTDIBSBDUFSJ[FECZ%JFN
BTBiDPXCPZwBUFSNVTVBMMZSFTFSWFEGPSĘBNCPZBOU$IPMPOHBOHTUFST
44. “National Identity Registration Project: ID Card, Public Safety Division, Office of
$JWJM0QFSBUJPO w+VOFŻ ŴżŹŹ 1SPHSBNT 4VSWFZT BOE&WBMVBUJPOT ćBJMBOE CPYŴŴ GPMEFS
ŷi3FTPVSDFT$POUSPM /BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG7JFUOBN w.BSDIŴżŹŸ 14% 640. 4BJHPO ŵŶ

Notes to Pages 148–150 319


E. H. Adkins Jr., “The Police and Resource Control in Counter-Insurgency,” January 1964,
PSD, USOM, Saigon, 76; Orrin DeForest with David Chanoff, Slow Burn: The Rise and Bit-
ter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam /FX:PSL4JNPO4DIVTUFS Ŵżżų źŹćF
014SFQMJDBUFEUIJTTZTUFNJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFT ćBJMBOE BOEXPSMEXJEF
ŷŸ/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Political Economy of Human Rights: The
Washington Connection and Third World Fascism #PTUPO4PVUI&OE1SFTT Ŵżźż ŶŶŴoŶŵ
Tang, A Vietcong Memoir,ŻŴ ŴųŵoŴŹ4BOESB$5BZMPS Vietnamese Women at War: Fighting
for Ho Chi Minh and the Revolution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). Training
NBOVBMTTUSFTTFEUIFJNQPSUBODFPGDBSSZJOHPVUBSSFTUTMBUFBUOJHIUPSJOUIFEBXOIPVSTUP
catch suspects unaware.
ŷŹi.POUIMZ3FQPSU -POH9VZFO "O(JBOH1SPWJODF w+VOFŴżŹź $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ 
CPYŴ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Political Prisoners in South Vietnam -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFS-
national Publications, Indochina Resource Center, 1973), 36; Tang, A Vietcong Memoir, 81;
i4BJHPO1FBDF$BOEJEBUF3FMFBTFEBęFSŸ:FBST wNew York Times, March 27, 1973.
ŷźi3FTPVSDFT$POUSPM /BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG7JFUOBN w.BSDIŴżŹŸ 14% 640. ŷųoŷŴ
i.POUIMZ3FQPSU5VZFO%VD1SPWJODF w%FDFNCFSŴŸ ŴżŹŸ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŴ
ŷŻićF3PMFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZJO4VQQPSUPGUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG7JFUOBN w"QSJMŴ ŴżŹż 
014 64"*% 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżŹż -+$IBQNBOUP(MFOO%PEHF i*ODSFBTFE
Reporting and Apprehension of ARVN Deserters,” April 18, 1966, RG 472, RAFSEA, HQ
64"7  1SPWPTU .BSTIBMM  1SPUFDUJWF 4FSWJDFT %JWJTJPO  $SJNJOBM *OWFTUJHBUJPOT #SBODI
Ŵżźŵ  IFSFBęFS $*#  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS Ŵ 3PCFSU , #SJHIBN  ARVN: Life and Death in the
South Vietnamese Army (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
49. E. H. Adkins Jr., “The Police and Resource Control in Counter-Insurgency,” Janu-
BSZŴżŹŷ 14% 640. 4BJHPO ŷŵ3PCFSU-PXF .FNPGPSUIF4FOJPS"EWJTFS i3FTPVSDFT
$POUSPM4VSWFZPG)BV/HIJB1SPWJODF w4FQUFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŹŹ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ (FOFSBM
3FDPSET CPYŷ+BDPC)BSSJTUP.BSDVT+(PSEPO i3FTPVSDF$POUSPM )VÏ w%FDFNCFSź 
1965, CORDS Public Safety, General Records, box 4.
Ÿųi&YDFSQUGSPNi(PJOT.POUIMZ"SSFTU3FQPSU w0DUPCFSŴżŹŸ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ 
box 1; Collier, Marion, to Sloane, “Incident Involving Military and NP,” March 15, 1966,
CORDS Public Safety, box 5; Ken Cox to Robert Lowe, “Monthly Report, Bien Hoa,” April
ŴżŹŹ 'FCSVBSZŴżźŹ4UFQIFO+-FEPHBS i.POUIMZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴż ŴżŹŹ $03%4
1VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŸ".$SBJH #FSZFM+1BDF i.POUIMZ3FQPSU 1SFDJODUOPŴ w%FDFNCFS
4, 1968, CORDS Public Safety, box 14, folder Phuong Hoang; Jacob Harris to Robert Lowe,
i#PNCJOH %FNJMJUBSJ[FE ;POF 1PMJDF $PNQPVOE w 4FQUFNCFS ŵź  ŴżŹŸ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU 
$FOUSBM-PXMBOET)VÏ 4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŸ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŵ
ŸŴ.JDIBFM(.D$BOO %JSFDUPS 014 #VSFBV UP+PIO.BOPQPMJ $IJFG 7JFUOBN%JWJ-
sion, “Historical Narrative: PSD Support of Narcotic Control,” Personnel Policy Division,
%SVH"CVTF1SPHSBNT CPYŵŻŹ GPMEFSŵ64FNCBTTZ 4BJHPO UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF 014 
7JFUOBN%JWJTJPO i/BSDPUJDT$POUSPM w/PWFNCFSŴŴ Ŵżźŵ CPYŴŴŵ GPMEFSŶi6QEBUJOHPG
/BSDPUJDT$POUSPM"DUJPO1SPHSBN 0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 4BJHPO w
+VMZŴżźŴ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 &BTU"TJB#SBODI /BSDPUJDT$POUSPM 7JFUOBN IFSFBęFS
/BSDPUJDT$POUSPM7JFUOBN CPYŴŴŶ GPMEFSŹ)PXBSE(SPPNUP'SBOL8BMUPO .POUIMZ
Narcotics Bureau Report, June 1969, CORDS Public Safety, Monthly Reports, box 2. For
GVSUIFSEFUBJMT TFFNZMyth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs
"NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųż DIBQŹ.BOPQPMJ 'SBOL8BMUPO BOE
Jon Weiss, a Las Vegas police officer who assisted in the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan in Guy-
BOB BMTPSBOUIFQSPHSBN
Ÿŵ)PMNFT#SPXOBOE%PO-VDF ićF1SFTFOU4JUVBUJPOPG$IJ)PB1SJTPO wJOHos-
tages of War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners, ed. Brown and Luce (Washington, D.C.: Indochina

320 Notes to Page 150


Mobile Education Project, 1973), 56; Frank Walton to Charles Vopat, “Alleged Corrupt
Practices of Nguyen Huy Thong, Chief, Narcotics Bureau,” March 31, 1971, Narcotics Con-
USPM 7JFUOBN CPYŴŴŵ GPMEFSŷ)FOSZ,BNN i%SJWF'BJMTUP)BMU%SVH4BMFJO7JFUOBN w
New York Times, August 30, 1971; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in
the Global Drug Trade,SFWFE /FX:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM ŵųųŷ ŵŸŸoŸŹ
53. “Alleged National Police Misconduct (Shakedown),” March 18, 1972, RG 286, USAID,
OPS, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, box 278, folder 2; “PSD Survey of Black
Market Activities,” April 16, 1964, OPS East Asia Branch, box 285, folder Black Market.
Ÿŷ8JMMJBN+-FEFSFS The Anguished American (London: Victor Gollancz, 1968), 120;
Corson, The BetrayaM  żŶożŷ 64 $POHSFTT  4FOBUF  $PNNJUUFF PO UIF +VEJDJBSZ  i5FTUJ-
NPOZPG'SFEFSJDL1)FSUFS 8BS3FMBUFE$JWJMJBO1SPCMFNTJO*OEPDIJOB wQUŶ i7JFUOBN w
92nd Cong., 1st sess., April 21, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), 24; Don Luce and John
4PNNFS Vietnam: The Unheard Voices *UIBDB$PSOFMM6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŹż żŹ/PBN
$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO i4BJHPOT$PSSVQUJPO$SJTJTćF4FBSDIGPSBO)POFTU
Quisling,” Ramparts %FDFNCFSŴżźŸ ŵŵ
ŸŸ3JDIBSE%#SBBUFOUP$IBSMFT4MPBOF i8FFLMZ)JHIMJHIU3FQPSU w%FDFNCFSŵŵ ŴżŹŸ 
CORDS Public Safety, box 1; Chester C. Jew to John Manopoli, “CORDS Monthly Report,”
+VMZŸ ŴżŹŻ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŴŷ GPMEFS1IVPOH)PBOH,V[NBSPW Myth of the
Addicted Army; Theodore Brown to Deputy, CORDS, “Allegations of Corruption in Vung
Tau,” October 12, 1967, CORDS Public Safety, box 21.
ŸŹ+BNFT.D.BIPOUP#PC-PXF i2VBOH5SJ/1$IBSHFTPG.JTDPOEVDU w4FQUFNCFS
Ŵż ŴżŹŹ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŸ&MNFS#SJDL 4FOJPS"EWJTFS 2VBOH5SJ UP%BWJE
-B[BS  %FQVUZ  +VOF Ŵź  Ŵżźų  $03%4 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  CPY Ÿ 8JMMJBN $PMCZ UP $03%4 
“Corruption in Bien Hoa,” July 2, 1970, CORDS Public Safety, Phung Hoang, box 21, folder
$PSSVQU1SBDUJDFT$IBSMFT8IJUFIPVTF %FQVUZ $03%4 UP"NCBTTBEPS8JMMJBN$PMCZ 
“Shakedowns,” June 22, 1970, CORDS Public Safety, box 21, folder Corrupt Practices; MAC-
CORDS to George S. Eckhardt, “Alleged National Police Misconduct (Shakedown),” March
ŴŻ Ŵżźŵ8JMMJBN$PMCZUP5SBO7BO,IJFN i*MMFHBM.PWFNFOUPG(PPETBOE$PSSVQUJPOPG
$FSUBJO(7/1FSTPOOFM w%FDFNCFSŴŸ ŴżŹż $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ 1IVOH)PBOH CPYŵŴ 
folder Corrupt Practices.
57. Lederer, The Anguished American, 120; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam,
the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻŸ ,VSU
Jacobsen, Pacification and Its Discontents $IJDBHP1SJDLMZ1BSBEJHN1SFTT ŵųųż ŷŻ
ŸŻ ićF 3PMF PG 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ JO 4VQQPSU PG UIF /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF PG 7JFUOBN w "QSJM Ŵ 
1969, USAID, OPS (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1969), 6.Clowers’s background was with the
5BDPNB 8BTIJOHUPO 1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU+PIO.D$BCF B#FSLFMFZHSBEVBUFXIPTFSWFE
UISFFUPVSTJO,PSFB XBTBNPOHUIFPUIFSTLJMMFE
59. Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 25; Ahern, The CIA and Rural Pacification in Viet-
nam, 58.
60. Valentine, The Phoenix Program; 262; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin,ŵŴŹoŵŵ
ŹŴ'SBOL"SNCSVTUFS A Military and Police Security Program for South Vietnam (Hud-
TPO /:)VETPO*OTUJUVUF "VHVTUŴų ŴżŹź )*ŻŻŴ33 %0%
62. See McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft. "OPUIFS NPEFM XBT UIF 014 BOE $*"
PSHBOJ[FEiIVOUFSLJMMFSwUFBNT XIJDIDPOUSJCVUFEUPUIFEFNJTFPG'"3$ 'VFS[BT"SNBEBT
3FWPMVDJPOBSJPEF$PMPNCJB BOEPUIFSHVFSSJMMBPSHBOJ[BUJPOTJO$PMPNCJB4FFDIBQUFSŴų
63. Theodore Shackley with Richard A. Finney, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles,
7B1PUPNBD#PPLT ŵųųŸ ŵŶŶ#MBVGBSC The Counterinsurgency Era, 247.
64. “Phung Hoang, Monthly Report,” April 29, 1971, CORDS Public Safety, box 13; Tang,
A Vietcong Memoir, 210; Ahern, The CIA and Rural Pacification, 309; Michael T. Klare,

Notes to Pages 151–153 321


i0QFSBUJPO1IPFOJYBOEUIF'BJMVSFPG1BDJĕDBUJPOJO4PVUI7JFUOBN wLiberation 17 (May
ŴżźŶ ŵŴoŵź"M4BOUPMJ Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Thirty-
three Americans Soldiers Who Fought It /FX:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF ŴżŻŴ ŵųŷoŸ
65. “Monthly Report,” October 24, 1971, CORDS Public Safety, box 14, folder Quality
Neutralizations; “Monthly Report,” June 2, 1971, CORDS Public Safety, box 10; Monthly
3FQPSU $IVOHćJFO /PWFNCFSŴŻ ŴżŹż $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ 1IVOH)PBOH CPYŶ.BS-
UJO & 1JFSDF  i$POTPMJEBUFE 7$* *OGSBTUSVDUVSF /FVUSBMJ[BUJPO 3FQPSU w "QSJM ŴoŶų  ŴżŹż 
CORDS Public Safety, box 4.
ŹŹi.POUIMZ3FQPSU w%FDFNCFSŶų ŴżźųBOEi.POUIMZ3FQPSU w"QSJMŵż ŴżźŴ $03%4
Public Safety, box 13, folder Monthly Consolidated Reports; “Minutes of Phung Hoang
"EWJTPST.POUIMZ$POĕSNBUJPO w%FDFNCFSŴų ŴżźŴ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ CPYŴų&WBO
1BSLFS+SUP5VDLFS(PVHMFNBO i7$*/FVUSBMJ[BUJPOT w+BOVBSZŴŻ ŴżŹż $03%41VCMJD
Safety, Phung Hoang, box 1; “Phung Hoang Herbicide Operation,” June 17, 1972, CORDS
1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  1IVOH )PBOH  CPY Ź *WFS 1FUFSTPO  i7JFUOBN ćJT 1IPFOJY *T B #JSE PG
Death” New York Times,+VMZŵŸ ŴżźŴ3PCFSU,PNFS ićF1IVOH)PBOH'JBTDP w$03%4 
Public Safety, Phung Hoang, box 21.
67. “Monthly Report,” October 24, 1971, CORDS Public Safety, box 14, folder Quality
/FVUSBMJ[BUJPOT i.JOVUFT PG 1IVOH )PBOH "EWJTPST .POUIMZ $POĕSNBUJPO w %FDFNCFS
10, 1971, CORDS Public Safety, box 10; Alfred W. McCoy, “Torture in the Crucible of Coun-
terinsurgency,” in Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past, ed.
.BSJMZO#:PVOHBOE-MPZE$(BSEOFS /FX:PSL/FX1SFTT ŵųųź ŵŷŴ
68. Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-five Years in the CIA /FX :PSL
4IFSJEBO4RVBSF1VCMJDBUJPOT ŴżŻŶ ŴŸŹ
69. Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 61. See also Tang, A Vietcong Memoir.
70. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End Told by
the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam, rev. ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2002), 31, 38.
źŴ64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPO"SNFE4FSWJDFT )FBSJOHT +VMZŵ ŵų ŵŸ ŴżźŶ 
i64 "TTJTUBODF 1SPHSBNT JO 7JFUOBN w żŶSE $POH  ŴTU TFTT 8BTIJOHUPO  %$ (10 
ŴżźŶ ŶŴżoŵŴ'SBOL#SPXOJOHBOE%PSPUIZ'PSNBO FET The Wasted Nations: Report of the
International Commission of the Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina /FX:PSL
Harper, 1972), 203.
72. McCoy, “Torture in the Crucible of Counterinsurgency,” 243. In his book Phoenix and
the Birds of Prey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), Mark Moyar, a right-wing apolo-
HJTUGPSUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBNBOEUIF7JFUOBN8BS BTXFMMBTUIF*OEPOFTJBOHFOPDJEFPG
ŴżŹŸ USJFTUPEJTDSFEJU0TCPSOTDIBSBDUFSBTBNFBOTPGJOWBMJEBUJOHIJTUFTUJNPOZ"GFX
PUIFSIJTUPSJBOT TPNFRVJUFXFMMSFTQFDUFE IBWFBMTPBEPQUFEUIJTTQVSJPVTDMBJN
73. Valentine, The Phoenix Program, 192; Bernd Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in
Vietnam /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż Źŵ
źŷi4VNNBSZPG1SPCMFNTPG1IVOH)PBOH1SPHSBN3FDPNNFOEBUJPOGPS5VSOJOH*U
0WFSUPUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDF w4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUFUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI
ŴżźŴoŴżźŶ CPYŵŻų.D-JOUPDL Instruments of Statecraft,Ŵżųożŵ
źŸ 4FF  GPS FYBNQMF  #VSU 6TFFN BOE 1FUFS ,JNCBMM  States of Siege: U.S. Prison Riots,
1971–1986 /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŹ 
źŹ'SBOL8BMUPOUP8JMMJBN$#FOTPO i7JTJUUP7VOH5BV1SJTPO w+VMZŻ ŴżŹŴ 014&BTU
"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź QFOPMPHZ GPMEFSŵ8JMMJBN$#FOTPOUP+PIO' .D$BCF i1SF-
MJNJOBSZ4VSWFZPG$FOUSBM1SJTPO $IJ)PB w*CJE GPMEFSŵi%FCSJFGPGB1SJTPO"EWJTPSw
OPS East Asia Branch, box 287 (penology), folder 1; Phuoc Thuy and Gia Dinh, Vietnam,

322 Notes to Pages 153–155


1960–1967 (Honolulu: Asian Training Center, 1967), 14; Don Bordenkircher, as told to Shir-
ley Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage: An Untold Story $BNFSPO 87B"CCZ1VCMJTIJOH ŴżżŻ 
54; Burchett, The Furtive War,ŷźićF3FIBCJMJUBUJPO4ZTUFNPG7JFUOBN w14% 640.UP
7JFUOBN GPSFXPSECZ'SBOL8BMUPO +BOVBSZŴżŹŴ 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź QFOPM-
ogy), page 29 of report.
źź8JMMJBN$#FOTPOUP'SBOL&8BMUPO i7JTJUUP#JFO)PB1SPWJODJBM1SJTPO w+VOFŴ 
ŴżŹŴ 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź QFOPMPHZ 1FOPMPHZćPNBT-JQQNBO i$MBOEFTUJOF
%PDVNFOU"TTBJMT4PVUI7JFUOBNPO1SJTPOFST wWashington Post, July 27, 1973; DeForest,
Slow Burn, 31, 32, 55.
78. “Visit to Kien Tuong Provincial Rehabilitation Center,” Moc Hoa, February 19, 1962;
8JMMJBN$#FOTPOUP'SBOL&8BMUPO 7JTJUUP#JFO)PB1SJTPO w+VOFŴ ŴżŹŴ 014&BTU
"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź QFOPMPHZ GPMEFSŵ&MNFS)$SBJOUP#PC'SFODI i#JOI%VPOH
Prison Inspection,” October 29, 1966, OPS East Asia, box 287 (penology).
źż-+$JQSJBOJUP8JMMJBN38BHOFS "QSJMŴżźŵ $*# CPYŴ GPMEFSŴ64$POHSFTT 
)PVTF  4VCDPNNJUUFF PO "TJBO BOE 1BDJĕD "ČBJST  )FBSJOHT  Testimony of David and
Jane Barton: The Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam by the Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam,żŶSE$POH ŴTUTFTT 4FQUFNCFSŴŶ ŴżźŶ 8BTIJOHUPO %$
(10 ŴżźŶ ŸųoŸŴ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Political Prisoners in South Vietnam (London:
"NOFTUZ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 1VCMJDBUJPOT  ŴżźŶ  ŶŹ i-FUUFS $IBSHFT 5PSUVSF BU 4FDPOE 7JFU-
OBNFTF1SJTPO wNew York Times,+VMZŴź Ŵżźų)PMNFT#SPXOBOE%PO-VDF Hostages of
War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners (Washington, D.C.: Indochina Mobile Education Project,
ŴżźŶ źŴ$IPNTLZBOE)FSNBO The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, 333;
Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on
Terror /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŸ 
Żųi%FCSJFGPGB1SJTPO"EWJTFS 1VCMJD4BGFUZ 1IVPDćVZBOE(JB%JOI 7JFUOBN w
ŴżŹųoŴżŹź )POPMVMV "TJBO 5SBJOJOH $FOUFS  ŴżŹź  ŴųoŴŴ #SPXO BOE -VDF  Hostages of
Wars, 14.
ŻŴ +BDL "OEFSTPO  i1SJTPOFST 5PSUVSFE JO 4PVUI 7JFUOBNFTF +BJMT w Washington Post,
"VHVTUŶŴ Ŵżźų:PVOH The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990, 61. See also Dennis Neeld, “South
7JFUOBNT/PO1FSTPOT wWashington Post, June 24, 1973; “Letter Charges Torture at Second
7JFUOBNFTF1SJTPO wNew York Times, July 17, 1970.
Żŵ 8JMMJBN $ #FOTPO UP +PIO ' .D$BCF  i7JTJU UP 1MFJLV 3FIBCJMJUBUJPO $FOUFS w
%FDFNCFS Ŵŵ  ŴżŹŴ  BMTP i7JTJU UP %BSMBD 3FIBCJMJUBUJPO $FOUFS w i$IJ )PB w BOE i/IBO
7J $PO4PO wJOTBNFSFQPSU 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź GPMEFSŴ 1FOPMPHZ'SFE
#SBOGNBO i4PVUI7JFUOBNT1PMJDFBOE1SJTPO4ZTUFNćF64$POOFDUJPO wJOUncloak-
ing the CIA,FE)PXBSE'SB[JFS /FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŻ ŴŴŷ#PSEFOLJSDIFS Tiger
Cage, 59.
ŻŶ8JMMJBN#FOTPOUP+PIO'.D$BCF i/IBO7J $PO4PO w014&BTU"TJB#SBODI 
1FOPMPHZ GPMEFSŴ8JMMJBN$#FOTPOUP'SBOL8BMUPO i7JTJUUP#JFO)PB1SJTPO w+VOFŴ 
ŴżŹŴ +VMZŴŷ ŴżŹŴ 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź GPMEFSŴićF3FIBCJMJUBUJPO4ZTUFNPG
7JFUOBN w14% 640.UP7JFUOBN ŵż
Żŷ3PCFSU-PXF .FNPGPS4FOJPS"EWJTFS i3FTPVSDFT$POUSPM4VSWFZPGUIF)BV/HIJB
1SPWJODF w4FQUFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŹŹ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ (FOFSBM3FDPSET CPYŸ $V$IJ
ŻŸ i.POUIMZ 3FQPSU  $PSSFDUJPO BOE %FUFOUJPO w 0DUPCFSo/PWFNCFS ŴżŹŻ  $03%4
1VCMJD4BGFUZ .POUIMZ3FQPSUT +VMZo/PWFNCFSŴżŹŻ CPYŵ
ŻŹi"ęFSUIF4JHOJOHPGUIF1BSJT"HSFFNFOUT%PDVNFOUTPO4PVUI7JFUOBNT1PMJUJDBM
Prisoners,” Narmic-VRC +VOFŴżźŶ ŵź$IPNTLZBOE)FSNBO The Washington Connec-
tion and Third World Fascism, 330.

Notes to Pages 155–156 323


Żźi4PVUI7JFUOBNT1SJTPOT wWashington Post, July 20, 1973; Madelaine Reberioux, The
Forgotten Prisoners of Nguyen Van Thieu by A Group of French University Professors, trans.
John Atherton et al. (Paris: RP Books, 1973), also available on-line at TTU; Bordenkircher,
Tiger Cage, 180.
ŻŻ3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZUP8JMMJBN$PMCZ 4FQUFNCFSŴŸ ŴżźŴ )2."7$ 7JFUOBN 556 
ŷNFNPGPS3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZ #SBODI$IJFG $%#SBODI 14% i3FTVMUTPG+PJOU64
(7/4VSWFZPGŴŷ$PSSFDUJPOBM$FOUFSTPG*7$5; w/PWFNCFSŵŸ ŴżŹŻ $03%41VCMJD
4BGFUZ 1IVOH)PBOH CPYŴŷ GPMEFS$PSSFDUJPOBM$FOUFSTićF3FIBCJMJUBUJPO4ZTUFNPG
7JFUOBN w14% 640.UP7JFUOBN 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź QFOPMPHZ 
89. D. E. Bordenkircher to Randolph Berkeley, “Capacity of Correctional Centers” and
i4VSWFZPG$IBV%PD1SJTPO w/PWFNCFSŵŸ ŴżŹŻ $03%41VCMJD4BGFUZ 1IVOH)PBOH CPY
Ŵŷ GPMEFS$PSSFDUJPOBM$FOUFST#FSLFMFZIBEBCBDLHSPVOEJONJMJUBSZDPVOUFSJOUFMMJHFODF
8IFOIFXPSLFEJOBOPďDJBMDBQBDJUZGPSUIF014 IJTPďDFXBTMPDBUFEOFYUUP8JMMJBN
Colby’s.
żų%&#PSEFOLJSDIFS NFNPGPS3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZ 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO /PWFNCFS
25, 1968, CORDS Public Safety, Phung Hoang, box 14, folder Correctional Centers.
żŴ%&#PSEFOLJSDIFSUP3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZ i"O9VZFO1SJTPO w/PWFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŹŻ 
CORDS Public Safety, Phung Hoang, box 14, folder Correctional Centers.
żŵ8JMMJBN$PMCZUP$03%4 i"MMFHBUJPOTPG&YUPSUJPO w"QSJMŵŷ Ŵżźų $03%4 1VCMJD
Safety, box 21.
żŶ i*$3$ 7JTJUT UP (7/ $PSSFDUJPOBM 'BDJMJUJFT w /PWFNCFS ŵ  Ŵżźų  014 &BTU "TJB
Branch, box 287, folder 1, Penology; Greiner, War without Fronts, 78.
94. “Kien Tuong,” CORDS Public Safety, Phung Hoang, box 2, folder Correctional Cen-
UFSTićF3FIBCJMJUBUJPO4ZTUFNPG7JFUOBN 14% 640.UP7JFUOBN Ŵŵ
żŸ3PCFSU-PXFUP8BEF-BUISBN i(7/1SJTPO4ZTUFNBOE3FMBUFE1SPCMFNT w+VMZŴŶ 
1966 CORDS Public Safety, General Records, box 5.
żŹ3BOEPMQI#FSLFMFZUP8JMMJBN&$PMCZ ."$7 4FQUFNCFSŴŸ ŴżźŴ 5560OUIF
volatile prison conditions in Attica and San Quentin and throughout the United States,
see Ben H. Bagdikian and Leon Dash, The Shame of the Prisons /FX:PSL1PDLFU#PPLT 
1972); Frank Browning and The Editors of Ramparts, eds., Prison Life: A Study of the Explo-
sive Conditions in America’s Prisons /FX:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ 
żź"SNCSVTUFS A Military and Police Security Program for South Vietnam; Corson, The
Betrayal, 92, 93.
98. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and
Minds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 239; also “Thieu’s Political Prisoners,” Newsweek,
%FDFNCFSŴŻ Ŵżźŵ ŹŴ#FSOBSE'BMM i6OSFQFOUBOU 6OZJFMEJOH"O*OUFSWJFXXJUI7JFU-
cong Prisoners,” New Republic, 'FCSVBSZ ŷ  ŴżŹź  Ŵżoŵŷ i.POUIMZ 3FQPSU $PSSFDUJPOT
BOE %FUFOUJPO w /PWFNCFS Ŵŷ  ŴżŹŻ  $03%4 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ  .POUIMZ 3FQPSUT +VMZo
/PWFNCFS ŴżŹŻ  CPY Ŵ %POBME %VODBO  ićF 1SJTPOFS w Ramparts, 4FQUFNCFS ŴżŹż 
ŸŴoŸŹ"OJONBUFBU$IJ)PBUPMENewsweek that on arrival “only two out of every ten
QSJTPOFSTJOUIFDPNNVOJTUDFMMCMPDLXFSFSFBMDPNNVOJTUT CVUZPVDBOCFTVSFUIBUUFO
PVUPGUFOXJMMMFBWFBTDPNNVOJTUTwićJFVT1PMJUJDBM1SJTPOFST wNewsweek,%FDFNCFS
18, 1972, 61.
99. Doris Longacre and Max Ediger, eds., Release Us from Bondage: Six Days in a Viet-
namese Prison "LSPO .FOOPOJUF $FOUSBM $PNNJUUFF 1FBDF 4FDUJPO  +VMZ Ŵżźŷ  ŵ 'SFE
#SBOGNBO i7JFUOBNćF108T8F-Fę#FIJOE wRamparts %FDFNCFSŴżźŶ Ŵŷ
Ŵųų /PBN $IPNTLZ  Towards a New Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy from Vietnam to
Reagan, SFW FE /FX :PSL 'SFF 1SFTT  ŵųųŶ  Ŵźų (SFJOFS  War without Fronts, 79. For

324 Notes to Pages 156–159


FWJEFODFUIBUUIFDMBJNTPGUPSUVSFBOENJTUSFBUNFOUPG64108TXFSFFYBHHFSBUFEJOUIF
6OJUFE4UBUFT TFF+FSSZ-FNCDLF Hanoi Jane: War, Sex, and Fantasies of Betrayal "NIFSTU
6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųŴų ŸŷoŹŴ
101. Longacre and Ediger, Release Us from Bondage,żoŴų
Ŵųŵ 1FUFS ;JOPNBO  The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam,
1862–1940 #FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŵųųŴ ŵż żŷożź"ĘBXPG;JOPNBOT
PUIFSXJTFFYDFMMFOUCPPLJTJUTGBJMVSFUPJEFOUJGZUIFDPOUJOVJUZCFUXFFO'SFODIBOE"NFSJ-
can penal practice in Indochina.
103. Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage, 199; Longacre and Ediger, Release Us from Bondage, 7;
8JMMJBN$#FOTPOUP+PIO'.D$BCF i7JTJUUPA/IBO7J $PO4PO w%FDFNCFSŴżŹŴ 14% 
OPS East Asia Branch, box 287, folder 1, Penology.
Ŵųŷi*$3$7JTJUTUP(7/$PSSFDUJPOBM'BDJMJUJFT1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FWJFXw/PWFNCFSŵ 
Ŵżźų 014&BTU"TJB#SBODI CPYŵŻź GPMEFSŴ 1FOPMPHZ Ŵŵ8JMMJBNi1BQQZw(SJFWFTUP
Frank Walton, Monthly Report, October 1970, CORDS Public Safety, Monthly Reports,
box 10.
ŴųŸ ićF 3FIBCJMJUBUJPO 4ZTUFN PG 7JFUOBN w 14%  640.  ŵż 4ZMWBO 'PY  iŷ 4PVUI
7JFUOBNFTF %FTDSJCF 5PSUVSF JO 1SJTPO A5JHFS $BHF w New York Times, March 3, 1973;
Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage,ŴŻų#PSEFOLJSDIFS XIPXPSLFEBU$PO4PO DMBJNTUIBUQSJT-
POFSTXFSFTIBDLMFEPOMZBUOJHIUUPQSFWFOUUIFNGSPNFTDBQJOHCFDBVTFUIFEPPSTXFSF
FBTZUPQSZPQFO)FBENJUTUIBUTPNFJONBUFTXFSFQBSBMZ[FECVUSFNBJOTQSPVEPGIJT
JOWPMWFNFOU
ŴųŹ64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPO'PSFJHO"ČBJST 4VCDPNNJUUFFPO"TJBOBOE
1BDJĕD"ČBJST The Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam by the Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam,żŶSE$POH ŴTUTFTT 4FQUFNCFSŴŶ ŴżźŶ 8BTIJOHUPO %$
GPO, 1973), 20; Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 181.
107. Brown and Luce, Hostages of War,BQQ# ŷŶ"OUIPOZ-FXJT i8IPN8F8FMDPNF w
New York Times,.BSDIŶŴ ŴżźŶ(PSEPO:PVOH Journey from Banna *OEJBOBQPMJT9JMJ-
CSJT ŵųŴŴ ŵŹż:PVOHXBTTFOUUP$PO4POBęFSUIFiUJHFSDBHFTwXFSFFYQPTFEBOEQVTIFE
GPSUIFSFQMBDFNFOUPGXBSEFO/HVZFO7BO7F
108. Longacre and Ediger, Release Us from Bondage, 11.
109. See H. Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America: How and Why Belief in
Live POWs Has Possessed a Nation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), and
his Vietnam and Other American Fantasies "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT 
2000), 15.
110. “Paying for Thieu’s Police,” Time,4FQUFNCFSŴź ŴżźŶ ŵŹ
111. Don Irwin, “U.S. Owes No Debt to Hanoi, Carter Says,” Los Angeles Times, March 5,
1977.
ŴŴŵ'PSBQSFTDJFOUBOBMZTJT TFF/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Political
Economy of Human Rights, vol. 2, After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Recon-
struction of Imperial Ideology (Boston: South End Press, 1979).

Part III: The Cold War on the Periphery


1. Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary )BSNPOETXPSUI1FOHVJO#PPLT Ŵżźŷ 
563, 597.
ŵ,BUF%PZMF ićF"USPDJUZ'JMFT%FDJQIFSJOHUIF"SDIJWFTPG(VBUFNBMBT%JSUZ8BSw
Harper’s Magazine,%FDFNCFSŵųųź ŸŵoŹŵ

Notes to Pages 159–164 325


8. Arming Tyrants I

Ŵ%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i1PMJDZ3FTFBSDI4UVEZ*OUFSOBM8BSGBSFBOEUIF4FDVSJUZPGUIF
6OEFSEFWFMPQFE4UBUFT w/PWFNCFSŵų ŴżŹŴ +',- 10' CPYżŻ
ŵ 0O UIF FUIOPDFOUSJTN BOE QBUFSOBMJTN VOEFSQJOOJOH 64 JOWPMWFNFOU JO "GSJDB 
see George White Jr., Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy towards
Africa, 1953–1961 /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŸ BOE-BSSZ(SVCCT Secular Mis-
sionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BT-
sachusetts Press, 2009).
3. See David M. Anderson and David Killingray, eds., Policing the Empire: Government,
Authority and Control, 1830–1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991); Geor-
gina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945–1980
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006); Anthony Clayton and David M. Killin-
gray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa (Athens, Ohio: University
Center for International Studies, 1989).
ŷ3BZNPOE"UVHVCB i(IBOB$IBOHJOH0VS*OIFSJUFE1PMJDF*OTUJUVUJPOT wJOAfrica’s
Challenge: Using Law for Good Governance and Development,FE"OO4FJENBOFUBM 5SFO-
ton: Africa World Press, 2007), 64.
5. See, e.g., Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 141.
6. Otwin Marenin, “United States Aid to African Police Forces: The Experience and
*NQBDUPGUIF1VCMJD4BGFUZ"TTJTUBODF1SPHSBN wAfrican Affairs 84 (Fall 1986): 541.
7. Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974: The Politics of
Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 90; White, Holding the Line, 52; Jef-
frey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 75; Ryszard Kapuscinski, The Emperor:
The Downfall of an Autocrat /FX:PSL7JOUBHF ŴżźŻ 
Ż ćFP )BMM  *$"  UP -FP $ZS  "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  "EEJT "CBCB  .BSDI ŴŶ  ŴżŸŹ BOE
&MCFSU$)BOFZUP"NCBTTBEPS+BNFT13JDIBSET "QSJMŴŸ ŴżŸź 3(Ÿż 3%4 /PSUI"GSJDB 
ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż CPYŷŻŻŴ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ "EEJT"CBCB UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i%FWFMPQNFOU
PG.VUVBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBNBOE-POH3BOHF$PVOUSZ1MBOGPS&UIJPQJB w0DUPCFSŵż ŴżŸŹ 
RG 286, USAID, OPS, Operations Division, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch,
box 10, Ethiopia (hereafter Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch).
ż %FUBJMT PG 8JMMJBNTT DBSFFS DBO CF GPVOE JO %PVHMBT 7BMFOUJOF  The Strength of the
Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (London: Verso, 2004), 28, 44; and
+PIO$.D8JMMJBNT The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 1930–1962 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990). Before organizing the border
QBUSPM JOŴżŶŹ8JMMJBNTXBTTFMFDUFEUPOFHPUJBUFBOBOUJTNVHHMJOHBHSFFNFOUXJUI.FYJ-
can president Lázaro Cárdenas that allowed Treasury agents to operate inside Mexico. In
&M1BTPIFDBNFJODPOUBDUXJUI$BSM&JĒFS MFHFOEBSZIFBEPG044%FUBDINFOUŴųŴ BOE
Lee Echols, a police adviser in Japan and Bolivia (see chapter 10). Peter Dale Scott, in Deep
Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 168, notes Wil-
MJBNTTQSPQFOTJUZUPSFDSVJUVOEFSXPSMEJOGPSNBOUTTVDIBTi4POOZw'BTTPVMJTBTTUSBUFHJD
BTTFUTGPSUIF$*"JOEFFQDPWFSXPSLćJTJTBNPOHUIFSFBTPOTXIZOBSDPUJDTBHFOUTXFSF
so valued by “the Agency.”
Ŵų3BMQI4FMCZ i*NQFSJBM&UIJPQJBO1PMJDF4VSWFZBOE&OEPG5PVS3FQPSU w"VHVTUŴ 
ŴżŸż "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŴŴ &UIJPQJB"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 
"EEJT"CBCB  UP %FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 8BTIJOHUPO  %$ i*OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZJO&UIJPQJB w
March 20, 1958, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 12, folder Ethiopia. See

326 Notes to Pages 165–167


BMTP$ISJTUPQIFS$MBQIBN ićF%FDFNCFSŴżŹų&UIJPQJBO$PVQE²UBU wJournal of Afri-
can Affairs %FDFNCFSŴżŹŻ ŷżŸoŸųź"DDPSEJOHUPIJTCJPHSBQIFS3ZT[BSE,BQVTDJOTLJ 
4FMBTTJFIBEBJEFTSFBEIJNUIFJOUFMMJHFODFSFQPSUTFWFSZNPSOJOHBUCSFBLGBTU$IJFGPG
QPMJDF5TJHVF%JCPOXBTBMTPJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFŴżŹųDPVQBOEXBTLJMMFE
ŴŴ4FMCZ i*NQFSJBM&UIJPQJBO1PMJDF4VSWFZBOE&OEPG5PVS3FQPSUw4UFWFO-PXFOTUFJO 
“Ethiopia,” in African Penal Systems,FE"MBO.JMOFS -POEPO3PVUMFEHF,FHBO1BVM 
ŴżŹż ŷź*OBOPUIFSBSDIBJDQSBDUJDF GBNJMZNFNCFSTPGWJDUJNTXFSFBMMPXFEUPQVMMUIF
USJHHFSJODBTFTPGDBQJUBMQVOJTINFOU
Ŵŵi&UIJPQJB,FZ4FDUPSTBOE%FTDSJQUJPOPG641SPHSBNT#FBSJOHPO$PVOUFS*OTVS-
gency,” RG 286, USAID, OPS, Internal Defense and Public Safety, Office of the Director
IFSFBęFS*14 CPYŹ GPMEFSŶ,PSSZEJTDVTTFTCPUIQSPHSBNTJO1BUSJDJP(V[NBOTEPDV-
NFOUBSZSalvador Allende (2007); David Stout, “Edward Korry, 81, Is Dead; Falsely Tied to
Chile Coup,” New York Times, January 20, 2003.
ŴŶ(FPSHF#BMMGSPN8BTIJOHUPOUP"EEJT i%FMJWFSZPG.JMJUBSZ)FMNFUT w/PWFNCFS
Ż ŴżŹŸBOE&EXBSE,PSSZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i3FRVFTUGPS1PMJDF&RVJQNFOU w.BZŶŴ 
1964, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Technical Services Division, General Correspondence (hereaf-
ter TSD), Ethiopia; Ray Foreaker, “End of Tour Report for Ethiopia,” March 18, 1964, TSD,
Ethiopia; Elliot Hensel, “End of Tour Report;” “Israeli Activities with African Civil Security
Forces,” Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Chad, and box 10, folder
Ethiopia.
14. Ray Foreaker, “End of Tour Report for Ethiopia,” March 18, 1964, TSD, Ethiopia; “Pub-
lic Safety Monthly Report,” January 23, 1968, TSD, Ethiopia.
15. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” March 1969, Africa and Near East and South Asia
Branch, box 1, Ethiopia; Horton Steele to Colonel Mitchell Mabardy, “USAID Mission to
Ethiopia,” August 2, 1969; and “Public Safety Monthly Report,” April 1969, Africa and Near
East and South Asia, box 10, folder Ethiopia.
16. Ray Foreaker, “End of Tour Report for Ethiopia,” March 18, 1964, TSD, Ethiopia;
i"TTFTTNFOU PG *OTVSHFODZ ćSFBU JO UIF 0HBEFO w "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE 4PVUI "TJB
Branch, box 10, folder Ethiopia; Ernest Lefever, Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics
in Tropical Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1970), 169.
17. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” February 1968, Africa and Near East and South
Asia Branch, box 10, folder Ethiopia; Horton Steele, “Public Safety Monthly Report,” July
ŴżŹż JCJE CPYŴŴ)PSUPO4UFFMF i1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU /PWFNCFSż ŴżŹź JCJE 
box 12.
ŴŻ3BZ'PSFBLFS i1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w0DUPCFSo/PWFNCFS ŴżŹŶ 54% &UIJP-
QJB.BSZ%JOFT i&UIJPQJBO7JPMBUJPOPG)VNBO3JHIUTJO&SJUSFB wJOThe Long Struggle
of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace, ed. Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson
(Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1988), 149.
Ŵż $ISJTUPQIFS $MBQIBN  African Guerrillas -POEPO +BNFT $VSSFZ  ŴżżŻ  "OEBS-
gachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: Transformation from an Aristocratic
to a Totalitarian Autocracy $BNCSJEHF $BNCSJEHF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżżŶ  0EE "SOF
Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of Our Times (New
:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųź ŵźų
ŵų3VTTFMM"4OPPLBOE8JMMJBN..D(IFF i3FQPSUPG4VSWFZPGUIF1PMJDF$PSQT
PG4PNBMJB w+VMZŴżŸŻ /PSUI"GSJDB ŴżŸŻ *14 CPYŴŴ GPMEFS4PNBMJB0O4OPPLTJOWPMWF-
NFOUJO*UBMZ TFF FH 3VTTFMM"4OPPLUP$PNNJTTJPOFSPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ 0DUPCFSŴż ŴżŷŶ 
“Organization of Training Battalion,” RG 331, Records of the Allied Operations and Occu-
QBUJPO)FBERVBSUFST "MMJFE$POUSPM *UBMZ CPYŴŶŴŷ

Notes to Pages 167–168 327


ŵŴ 3PHFS )JMTNBO  i*OUFSOBM 8BS ćF /FX $PNNVOJTU 5BDUJD w JO The Guerrilla and
How to Fight Him,FE5/(SFFO /FX:PSL1SBFHFS ŴżŹŸ ŶŴ
ŵŵi.POUIMZ3FQPSU 4PNBMJB w'FCSVBSZŴżŹŹ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 (FPHSBQIJD'JMFT 
CPY ŵų IFSFBęFS (FPHSBQIJD 'JMFT  "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  .PHBEJTIV  i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 1SP-
DVSFNFOU w+VMZŴź ŴżŹź 54% CPYż GPMEFS4PNBMJBi.POUIMZ3FQPSU 4PNBMJB w"QSJMŴżŹŸ 
Geographic Files, box 20; “Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,
vol. 24, Africa, ed. Nina Davis Howland (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999), 495.
ŵŶ 4FF .PIBNNFE %JSJZF "CEVMMBIJ  i*O UIF /BNF PG UIF $PME 8BS )PX UIF 8FTU
"JEFEBOE"CFUUFEUIF#BSSF%JDUBUPSTIJQPG4PNBMJB wJOGenocide, War Crimes, and the
West: History and Complicity,FE"EBN+POFT -POEPO;FE#PPLT ŵųųŷ ŵŷŴoŹų"ęFS
#BSSFUPPLPWFS NBOZ64TVQQPSUFEQPMJDFDPNNBOEFSTXFSFKBJMFEPSFYJMFE
24. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn, 15.
ŵŸ(FPSHF$.JMMFS i3FQPSUPG$POTVMUBUJPOUP64&NCBTTZ*OEVTUSJBM4FDVSJUZBOE
UIF-JCZBO1PMJDF w/PWFNCFSŴżŹŸ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŴ 
GPMEFS-JCZB'SBOL8BMUPOUP#ZSPO&OHMF i"SNJOHPG%FGFOTF'PSDFT w.BSDIŴŴ ŴżŹŻ 
Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 30, folder Libya. On U.S. interests in Libya
in the 1950s, see Wilbur Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (New
:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŻų ŶŴŹ)FOSZ7JMMBSE Libya (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956).
26. Elliott B. Hensel, “End of Tour Report,” October 1, 1963, Africa and Near East and
South Asia Branch, box 30, folder Libya.
ŵź (FPČ 4JNNPOT  Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie (London: I.
#5BVSJT ŵųųŶ 'SBOL8BMUPODIBSBDUFSJ[FEUIFSFWPMVUJPOBTBEBNBHJOHCMPXUP64
interests.
ŵŻ"EPMQI#POOFĕM (BSMBOE8JMMJBNT BOE4ZEOFZ8BHPOFS i1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSUPG
Civil Police Forces of Chad,” TSD, box 1, folder Chad. See also Karl Van Meter, “The French
Role in Africa,” in Dirty Work, vol. 2, The CIA in Africa, ed. Ellen Ray, Karl Van Meter, and
-PVJT8PMG /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŵųųż ŵųż
ŵż3PHFS3PCJOTPOUP#ZSPO&OHMF /PWFNCFSŵŴ ŴżŹź "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI
Asia Branch, box 4, Chad.
Ŷųi.POUIMZ3FQPSU w%FDFNCFSŴżŹŸ BOEi3FCFM"DUJWJUZ %FDFNCFSŴoŶŴ ŴżŹź w"GSJDB
and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 12, folder Chad; John F. Manopoli and Sydney
8BHPOFS i4VQQMFNFOUBSZ4VSWFZPGUIF$JWJMQPMJDF'PSDFTPGUIF3FQVCMJDGP$IBE w+BOV-
ary 1966, OPS, USAID, 1966; Edward R. Bishop, “Monthly Public Safety Report,” June 1968,
Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Chad.
31. Edward R. Bishop, “Monthly Public Safety Report,” May 1968, Africa and Near East
and South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Chad.
Ŷŵ i(PWFSONFOU "OUJSFCFM "DUJWJUZw %FDFNCFS ŵŹ  ŴżŹź  "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE
4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŴŵ GPMEFS$IBE3FOÏ-FNBSDIBOE ićF$SJTJTJO$IBE wJOAfrican
Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy,FE(FSBME+#FOEFS +BNFT4$PMFNBO BOE3JDIBSE-
4LMBS #FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŴżŻŸ ŵŶżoŸŹ.BINPPE.BNEBOJ Saviors
and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŵųųż ŵŴŸ"T
.BNEBOJOPUFT UIFDPOOFDUJPOTCFUXFFOUIF$IBEJBODJWJMXBSBOEUIFDSJTJTJO%BSGVSBSF
not well understood by student and celebrity anti-genocide activists, who are often ignorant
of the broader geopolitical context.
ŶŶ#FOKBNJO3FBE NFNPGPS.D(FPSHF#VOEZ .BSDIŵŷ ŴżŹŸ -#+- /4' $PVOUSZ
'JMF "GSJDB CPYżŵ -JCFSJB#)-BSBCFFUP+PTFQI1BMNFS %FQVUZ"TTJTUBOU4FDSFUBSZPG
State, May 2, 1958, OCB, Central Files, box 821. See also D. Elwood Dunn, Liberia and the
United States during the Cold War: Limits of Reciprocity /FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJMMBO 

328 Notes to Pages 169–171


2009), 42; Richard P. Tucker, Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Deg-
radation of the Tropical World,SFWFE /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųź ŴŶŶoŶŷ 
ŴŷŸ"O"NFSJDBOPďDJBMUPMEGVUVSFQSFTJEFOU&MMFO+PIOTPO4JSMFBG XIPXBTBEJTTJEFOU
BUUIFUJNF i0VSTUSBUFHJDJOUFSFTUTBSFNPSFJNQPSUBOUUIBOEFNPDSBDZw/PBN$IPNTLZ 
Deterring Democracy /FX:PSL)JMM8BOH ŴżżŴ ŵŷų
Ŷŷi4VSWFZPGUIF-JCFSJBO/BUJPOBM1PMJDF'PSDF w*$" %FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 0DUPCFSo
/PWFNCFSŴżŸŸ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŴ GPMEFS-JCFSJB
ŶŸ i$PNNPEJUZ 4VQQMJFT w 54%  CPY Ŵŷ  -JCFSJB i*TSBFMJ "DUJWJUJFT XJUI "GSJDBO $JWJM
Security Forces,” Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Chad; Frank A.
Jessup, “Manpower Analysis of the Liberian National Police, Report to the Secretary of State
CZUIF644VSWFZ.JTTJPOUP-JCFSJB w"QSJMŴŴ ŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴ -JCFSJB+JN-FXJTPGUIF
*OEJBOB4UBUF1PMJDFBOE+BNFT-.D$BSUIZ EFQVUZTIFSJČJO0OUBSJP$PVOUZ /FX:PSL 
BOEHSBEVBUFPGUIF'#*USBJOJOHBDBEFNZ XFSFPUIFSBEWJTFSTJO-JCFSJBXIPXFOUPOUP
TFSWFJO7JFUOBN BTEJE#PC-PXFBOE$IBSMJF0#SJFO
ŶŹ+PIO.BOPQPMJBOE'SFEFSJDL$)VCJH+S i&WBMVBUJPO1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNGPSUIF
Republic of Liberia,” October 1972, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 22,
Liberia.
Ŷź +PF 4UPSL  i8PSME $PQ )PX "NFSJDB #VJMET UIF (MPCBM 1PMJDF 4UBUF w JO Polic-
ing America, ed. Anthony Platt and Lynn Cooper (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
Ŵżźŷ ŹŹ3JDIBSE4VUUPO i&OEPG5PVS3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴ ŴżŹŸ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTU
and South Asia Branch, box 22, Liberia. “A Nationwide Broadcast on the Firestone Strike,”
Monrovia, February 12, 1966, in The Official Papers of William V. S. Tubman, President of the
Republic of Liberia: Covering Addresses, Messages, Speeches, and Statements 1960–1967, ed. E.
3FHJOBME5PXOTFOEBOE"CFPEV#PXFO+POFT -POEPO-POHNBOT GPSUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG
*OGPSNBUJPOBOE$VMUVSBM"ČBJST .POSPWJB -JCFSJB ŴżŹŻ ŶźŸoźź5VCNBOBUUSJCVUFEUIF
TUSJLFUPUIFiNZTUJDJTNPGVOSFBMJTUJDJEFPMPHJFTUIBUBSFJMMVTJPOTw'PSNPSFPO'JSFTUPOFT
FYQMPJUBUJWFQSBDUJDFTBOE64JOUFSFTUTJO-JCFSJB TFF"SUIVS*)BZNBOBOE)BSPME1SF-
ece, Lighting Up Liberia /FX:PSL$SFBUJWF"HF1SFTT ŴżŷŶ BOE1FOOZ7PO&TDIFO Race
against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997), 39.
ŶŻ'SBOL-PWFMBOE i3FQPSUPOUIF1SJTPO4ZTUFNPGUIF3FQVCMJDPG-JCFSJB w.BZŴżŹŵ 
Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 22, Liberia; Gerald H. Zarr, “Liberia,” in
Milner, African Penal Systems, 197.
Ŷż +PJOU 5FBN PG (PWFSONFOU PG -JCFSJB BOE 64 "HFODZ GPS *OUFSOBUJPOBM %FWFMPQ-
NFOU  Report on Evaluation of U.S. Public Safety Assistance to Liberia as Related to Law
Enforcement Agencies (Washington, D.C., October 16, 1972), 3; Jerry Knoll to Hendrik Van
Oss, “Liberia Internal Security Survey,” June 9, 1966, Africa and Near East and South Asia
Branch, box 25, Liberia.
ŷų4FF7JSHJOJBćPNQTPO ićF*WPSZ$PBTU wJOAfrican One-Party States, ed. Gwendo-
lyn M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) and Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White
Masks, USBOT $IBSMFT -BN .BSLNBOO /FX :PSL (SPWF 1SFTT  ŴżŹź  #PJHOZ UFMMJOHMZ
EFTDSJCFEDPMPOJBMJTNBTiBOFDFTTBSZFWJMJGJUXBTBOFWJMw
41. Mitchell A. Mabardy to Byron Engle, Director OPS, February 4, 1966, TSD, box 9;
+PIO.BOPQPMJBOE3FOÏ5FUB[ i4VQQMFNFOUBSZ4VSWFZPG/BUJPOBM1PMJDF'PSDFT 3FQVC-
MJD PG UIF *WPSZ $PBTU w "CJEKBO  64"*%  014  ŴżŹŹ /PSNBO 4DIPOPPWFS  i&OE PG 5PVS
3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŹż 54% CPYż *WPSZ$PBTU
ŷŵ+PIO.BOPQPMJBOE3FOÏ5FUB[ i1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU +BOVBSZo'FCSVBSZ
1966,” Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 9.

Notes to Pages 171–173 329


ŷŶ i(IBOBT 1PMJUJDBM BOE &DPOPNJD .BMBJTF 4QFDJBM .FNPSBOEVN 1SFQBSFE JO UIF
Central Intelligence Agency,” July 19, 1962, in Howland, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964–1968,ŵŷŷŹŻ.JDIBFM-BUIBN The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization,
Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011), 87, 89. On U.S. support for the coup, see John Stockwell, In Search
of Enemies: A CIA Story /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżźŻ ŵųŴ4FZNPVS)FSTI i$*"4BJEUP)BWF
"JEFE1MPUUFST8IP0WFSUISFX/LSVNBIJO(IBOB wJO3BZ 7BO.FUFS BOE8PMG Dirty
Work,ŵŴŸżoŹŶ
44. Richard Rathbone, “Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana in the Late 1940s and
1950s,” in Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917–1965, ed.
David Anderson and David Killlingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992),
ŴųŴoŵ 4FF BMTP 4JNPO #BZOIBN  The Military and Police in Nkrumah’s Ghana (Boulder:
8FTUWJFX ŴżŻŻ "INBE3BINBO The Regime Change of Kwame Nkrumah /FX:PSL1BM-
HSBWF.BDNJMMBO ŵųųź 3VUI'JSTU Power in Africa /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO Ŵżźų ŶŻź'JSTU
EFUBJMTIPXUIFNJMJUBSZKVOUBJNQPTFEQSJWBUJ[BUJPOBOEBVTUFSJUZNFBTVSFTBUUIFCFIFTUPG
the World Bank and IMF.
ŷŸćPNBT'JOOUP#ZSPO&OHMF i*%$BSETGPS(IBOB w/PWFNCFSŵŹ ŴżŹŻ 54% CPYŵ
$BQMBOTFSWFEJO4PVUI,PSFB *OEPOFTJB 7JFUOBN 5VSLFZ BOE6SVHVBZ
46. Atuguba, “Ghana: Changing Our Inherited Police Institutions,” 64. Ghanaian prisons
XFSFNBSSFECZiBOJNBMPWFSDSPXEJOHwBOEiTFWFSFBOEEFIVNBOJ[JOHSFHJNFTw
ŷźi4UBUFNFOUPO#JBGSB )POPSBCMF&MMJPU3JDIBSETPO w+VMZŴŸ ŴżŹż "NFSJDBO3FQPSU 
+VOFŴŹoŶŴ ŴżŹż ;/"i3PCCFSTUP#F4IPUPO4JHIUJO/JHFSJB wZambia Times, January
27, 1967; Michael T. Klare and Cynthia Aronson, Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for
Authoritarian Regimes Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981); Melvin
Gurtov, The United States against the Third World /FX:PSL1SBFHFS Ŵżźŷ źų'PSBIJT-
UPSZPGUIF/JHFSJBOQPMJDF TFF5FLFOB/5BNVOP The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861–1965
(Lagos: Ibadan University Press, 1970).
ŷŻ +PIOTPO ' .POSPF  %BIPNFZ  4FQUFNCFS Ŵ  ŴżŹŴ  54%  CPY Ŵŵ  GPMEFS %BIPNFZ
#FOJO  i14 .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w %FDFNCFS Ź  ŴżŹŸ  "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE 4PVUI "TJB
#SBODI  CPY Ŵŵ  .POUIMZ 3FQPSUT 0O QPMJUJDBM EFWFMPQNFOUT  TFF 4BNVFM %FDBMP  Coups
and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and ConstraintT SFWFE /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT Ŵżżų ŵŵ Żż"#"TTFOTPOBOE:WFUUF."MFY"TTFOTPO African Military History
and Politics: Coups, Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present /FX :PSL 1BMHSBWF .BDNJMMBO 
2001), 89. Between 1963 and 1972 there were six coups in Benin. In 1972 a young leftist
BSNZPďDFSOBNFE.BUUIJFV,ÏSÏLPVTFJ[FEQPXFS TXFFQJOHBXBZGPSFWFSXIBU%FDBMP
EFTDSJCFTBTUIFiPMEQPMJUJDBMBOENJMJUBSZFTUBCMJTINFOUw ŴŴź 
49. Johnson Monroe, “ICA Survey Report on the Civil Police Forces of the Republic
PG6QQFS7PMUB /JHFS %BIPNFZ BOE5PHP w4FQUFNCFSŴ ŴżŹŴ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE
South Asia Branch, box 5, folder Niger; Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, 253, 255.
ŸųćPNBT'JOOBOE1BVM,BU[ i5SJQ3FQPSUPO/JHFS4FDVSJUZ'PSDFT w.BZŶŴo+VOFŴŴ 
1965, TSD, box 15, folder Niger.
ŸŴ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ #BOHVJ UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i641PMJDZ"TTFTTNFOUGPS$FO-
USBM"GSJDBO3FQVCMJD w+VOFŴŸ ŴżŹŻ$IBSMFT(PSEPOUP3PC'PSTCFSH %FDFNCFSź ŴżŹŻ 
TSD, Central African Republic; Central Africa General Situation, LBJL, NSF, Country Files,
Africa, box 80. See also, Brian Titley, Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1997).
Ÿŵ (BSMBOE 8JMMJBNT BOE 4ZEOFZ 8BHPOFS  i3FQPSU PG UIF 4FDVSJUZ 'PSDFT  $FOUSBM
Africa Republic,” May 5, 1962, TSD, box 1, folder Central African Republic.

330 Notes to Pages 173–175


ŸŶ *CJE 'PS DSJUJDBM BOBMZTJT PG UIF SBDJBM TUFSFPUZQFT BOE FUIOPDFOUSJTN VOEFSMZJOH
"NFSJDBOQPMJDZ TFF8IJUF Holding the Line; and Grubbs, Secular Missionaries.
54. Florence Bernault, “The Politics of Enclosure in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa,”
in A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa, ed. Florence Bernault, trans. Janet Roit-
NBO 1PSUTNPVUI  /) )FJOFNBOO  ŵųųŶ  ŶŶ %JEJFS #JHP  i/HBSBCB  -JNQPTTJCMF
Prison,” Revue Française de Science PolitiqueŶż OPŹ ŴżŻż ŻŹźoŻŸ
ŸŸ4FF"EBN)PDITIJME King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in
Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).
56. “Police Survey Mission to the Congo,” June 1963, TSD, box 1, folder Congo. On U.S.
FDPOPNJDJOUFSFTUTJOUIF$POHP TFF%BWJE/(JCCT The Political Economy of Third World
Intervention (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
57. See George Nzongala-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History
(London: Zed Books, 2003), 107; Sean Kelley, America’s Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire
8BTIJOHUPO %$"NFSJDBO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŶ Ŷź-VEP%F8JUUF The Assassination
of Lumumba -POEPO7FSTP ŵųųŵ $SBXGPSE:PVOH Politics in the Congo: Decolonization
and Independence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 467.
58. “CIA Situation Report: The Congo,” March 3, 1965, LBJL, NSF, box 87, Congo. They
BMTP CPNCFE B DVTUPNT QPTU %POBME 3JDLBSE XBT UIF $*" DBTF PďDFS GPS )PBSF BOE
assisted in the arrest of Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Laurent Kabila, future president of
UIF$POHP XBTBLFZ4JNCBMFBEFS
Ÿż0SBMIJTUPSZJOUFSWJFX 3PCFSU8,PNFS "QSJMż ŴżźŶ +',- 38,i.JOVUFTPG$* w
June 18, 1964, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Office of the Director, IPS, box 6, folder 4.
60. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976
$IBQFM)JMM6OJWFSTJUZPG/PSUI$BSPMJOB1SFTT ŵųųŵ źŵoźŶi$*"*OUFMMJHFODF.FNP-
SBOEVNćF4JUVBUJPOJO$POHP w.BSDIŴżŹŸ -#+- /4' CPYŻź $POHP&SOFTU-FGFWFS 
BQPMJUJDBMTDJFOUJTUXJUIUIF#SPPLJOHT*OTUJUVUFXIPXBT3POBME3FBHBOTĕSTUDIPJDFGPS
BTTJTUBOUTFDSFUBSZPGTUBUF DPNNFOUFEJOIJTCPPLSpear and Scepter that the “English unit
under Hoare was widely respected for its discipline and civility” (112). Perhaps this was true
BNPOHUIFXIJUF8FTUFSOFST CVUOPUBNPOHUIF$POHPMFTF$*"BHFOU3JDIBSE)PMNDIBS-
BDUFSJ[FE)PBSFTVOJUBTiUIFUPVHIFTU OBTUJFTUCVODIPGNFOwIFIBEFWFSTFFO XIPLFQU
TDPSFDBSETPOUIFOVNCFSPGCMBDLTUIFZLJMMFE3JDIBSE-)PMN The American Agent: My
Life in the CIA -POEPO4U&SNJOT1SFTT ŵųųŶ ŴŹ
61. See George Nzongala-Ntalaja, “United States Policy towards Zaire,” in African Crisis
Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy,FE(FSBME+#FOEFS +BNFT4$PMFNBO BOE3JDIBSE-4LMBS
#FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŴżŻŸ ŵŶŶ$SBXGPSE:PVOHBOEćPNBT5VSOFS 
The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985),
ŴŻųoŻŴ%BWJE'4DINJU[ Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing
Dictatorships, 1921–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
Źŵ i$*" *OUFMMJHFODF .FNPSBOEVN ćF 4FDVSJUZ 4JUVBUJPO JO $POHP w +VOF Ŵź  ŴżŹŷ 
LBJL, NSF, box 81, Congo; see also Marenin, “United States Aid to African Police Forces,”
ŸŵŸi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŸ *14 CPYŸ GPMEFS$POHP
63. “Police Survey Mission to the Congo,” June 1963; “Public Safety Monthly Report, July
1965,” and John F. Manopoli, “End of Tour Report,” April 1966, TSD, Congo.
Źŷ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w %FDFNCFS ŴżŹŸ  "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE 4PVUI
"TJB#SBODI CPYŷ $POHPi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w.BZ+VOFŴżŹŹ i1VCMJD4BGFUZ
.POUIMZ3FQPSU w+VMZź ŴżŹŹ 54% $POHP #PYŸBOEi5FSNJOBUJPO1IBTF0VU4UVEZ ;BJSF w
Public Safety Project, USAID, OPS, 1974; Michael G. Schatzberg, The Dialectic of Oppres-
sion in Zaire #MPPNJOHUPO *OEJBOB 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŻŻ  Ŷż  ŷŴ -PSSJO 3PTFOCBVN 

Notes to Pages 175–178 331


i(PWFSONFOU CZ 5PSUVSF w Worldview "QSJM ŴżźŸ  ŵŹ :PVOH  Politics in the Congo, 469.
/FOEBLBXBTWJDFQSFTJEFOUPG-VNVNCBT./$QBSUZQSJPSUPIJTEFGFDUJPO
65. Zach Levey, “Israel and the Congo,” talk at the Annual Conference of the Society for
)JTUPSJBOTPG"NFSJDBO'PSFJHO3FMBUJPOT 'BMMT$IVSDI 7B +VOFŵź ŵųųżi*TSBFMJ"DUJWJ-
ties with African Civil Security Forces,” Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box
ŷ GPMEFS$IBEi1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNJO%3$ w+VOFŴź ŴżŹż "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE
South Asia Branch, box 4, Congo; Lefever, Spear and Scepter, 129; Sinclair, At the End of the
Line, 63.
66. “Public Safety Report,” April 1968, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box
4; Mitchell Mabardy to Byron Engle, June 16, 1969, Africa and Near East and South Asia
Branch, box 22; Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World
/FX:PSL1FOHVJO#PPLT ŴżŻŹ żų
67. “Public Safety Report,” April 1968, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 22.
68. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 65; Gurtov, The United States against the Third World,
ŹŵoŹŶ:PVOH"NFSJDBOTGPS'SFFEPNQPTUFS ;BNCJBO/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFT -VTBLB%PEE 
JODJEFOUBMMZ XBTBMTPBNBKPSCBDLFSPG1IPVNJ/PTBWBOJO-BPT
69. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” July 7, 1966; May 12, 1966, TSD, Congo, box 5;
Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–1998 /FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJM-
MBO ŵųųŸ ŴŵŻ5TIPNCFTNFSDFOBSJFTXFSFSFGFSSFEUPJO64JOUFSOBMSFQPSUTBTiSBCCMFw
"ęFSUIFLJMMJOHPG-VNVNCB XJUIBTTPDJBUFT.BVSJDF.QPMPBOE+PTFQI0LJUF UIF#FM-
HJBO(FSBSE4PFUFSFDPVOUFEUIBU(FOEBSNFSJFBHFOUTDIPQQFEVQUIFDPSQTFTCFGPSFEJT-
TPMWJOHUIFNJOBDJEćFZXFSFESVOLGPSUIFUXPEBZTCFDBVTFiXFEJEUIJOHTBOBOJNBM
wouldn’t do.”
źųi$*"*OUFMMJHFODF.FNPSBOEVNćF.FSDFOBSZ.VUJOZBOEUIF5TIPNCF1MPU w+VMZ
25, 1967, LBJL, NSF, box 87, folder Congo.
źŴ3PCFSU).D#SJEF "NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF +VMZŴŸ ŴżŹź -#+- /4' 
CPYŻų $IBE$POHP
72. “The Congo: Death of a Rebel,” Time, October 18, 1968, 40. Benoît Verhaegen, Rebel-
lions au Congo #SVTTFMT$FOUSFEF3FDIFSDIFFUE*OGPSNBUJPO4PDJPQPMJUJRVFT ŴżŹŹ Źŷ
3VTTFMM,JSL i64)FTJUBOUUP)FMQ5TIPNCFBHBJOTU.BSYJTU8JUDI%PDUPST wLos Angeles
Times, 4FQUFNCFS ź  ŴżŹŷ 7FSIBFHFOT DBSFGVM TUVEZ QPJOUT UP UIF EFUFSJPSBUJPO PG MJWJOH
DPOEJUJPOT MBDLPGCBTJDTFSWJDFTJODMVEJOHTDIPPMT BOENJTFSZPGUIFQPQVMBUJPOBTCSFFE-
JOHTVQQPSUGPSUIF.VMFMJTUT'PSUIFHFOFSBMQBUUFSOPGNFEJBCJBTBOEQSPQBHBOEB TFF
/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of
the Mass Media /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻż BOEPO0SJFOUBMJTUTUFSFPUZQFTPGćJSE8PSME
peoples, see Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism /FX:PSL7JOUBHF Ŵżżŷ 
73. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” May 12, 1966, TSD, box 5, folder Congo; CIA report,
ićF$POHP"TTFTTNFOUBOE1SPTQFDUT w%FDFNCFSŶŴ ŴżŹŷ -#+- /4' CPYŻź $POHP
Verhaegen, Rebellions au Congo, 78.
źŷ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w .BZ Ŵŵ  ŴżŹŹ  54%  CPY Ÿ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ UP
Secretary of State, July 15, 1967, LBJL, NSF, box 98, Congo; “The Congo: Death of a Rebel,”
Time, October 18, 1968, 40.
źŸ3PCFSU0#MBLFUP)FSNBO,MFJO "QSJMŴŶ ŴżŹź "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB
#SBODI CPYŷ GPMEFS$POHP3BZ-BOEHSFO i1PMJDF1SPCMFNT w"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE
South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Congo. On poor prison conditions in the Congo which
GBJMFEUPQSPWJEFFWFOBNJOJNVNPGTFSWJDFT TFF$3FVCFO i'PPUOPUFTCZB7JTJUJOH4PDJ-
ologist,” in Milner, African Penal Systems, 31.
źŹ.JUDIFMM.BCBSEZUP#ZSPO&OHMF i#SJFĕOHPO$POHP1SPHSBN w+VOFŹ ŴżŹŹ "GSJDB
and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 5, folder Congo.

332 Notes to Pages 178–180


źź+FUFS8JMMJBNTPOXJUI3)3PCJOTPOBOE)%.JMMFS i&WBMVBUJPO1VCMJD4BGFUZ
1SPHSBN ;BJSF w+VMZo"VHVTUŴżźŶ 54% CPYŴŵ GPMEFS$POHP
78. Ibid.; see also Stuart Methven, Laughter in the Shadows: A CIA Memoir (Annapolis:
/BWBM*OTUJUVUF1SFTT ŵųųŻ ŴŶż.PCVUVEJEVMUJNBUFMZOBUJPOBMJ[FDFSUBJOJOEVTUSJFTUP
CPMTUFSIJT1BO"GSJDBODSFEFOUJBMT QMBDJOHUIFNJOUIFIBOETPGQFSTPOBMDSPOJFT
79. T. M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New
:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŸ ŵżŸ$IBSMFT-FJTUFS+SUP#ZSPO&OHMF i(FOEBS-
NFSJF3VOOJOH"NVDL<sic>JO,JOTIBTB w"VHVTUŵ Ŵżźŵ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI
"TJB#SBODI CPYŷ GPMEFS$POHP$*"4QFDJBM3FQPSU ićF$POHP"1PMJUJDBM"TTFTTNFOU w
June 28, 1968, LBJL, NSF, box 98, folder Congo.
80. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, ŵżŷożŻ 4FF BMTP 4DIBU[CFSH  The Dialectics of
Oppression,ŹŶoŹŸćPNBT1MBUFBOE"OESFB%BSWJ Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Net-
work of Terror /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŻŴ ŴŻŴ
81. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” February 1966; May 12, 1966, TSD, Congo, box 5,
i3XBOEB1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN ŴżŹź w54% CPYŴż GPMEFS3XBOEB
Żŵ&E)BNJMUPOUP8BMU83PTUPX i1PTTJCMF1PJOUTGPS%JTDVTTJPOXJUIUIF3XBOEBO
"NCBTTBEPSw+VMZŴŻ ŴżŹź -#+- /4' $PVOUSZ'JMF "GSJDB CPYżŻ GPMEFS3XBOEB/JDIP-
MBT,BU[FOCBDI NFNPGPSUIFQSFTJEFOU "VHVTUŴŴ ŴżŹź -#+- /4' CPYżŻ 3XBOEB.BI-
NPPE.BNEBOJ When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
83. “Police Survey Mission to the Republic of Rwanda,” May 1964, IPS, box 11, folder
3XBOEB)BNJMUPOUP3PTUPX i1PTTJCMF1PJOUTGPS%JTDVTTJPOXJUI/FX3XBOEBO"NCBT-
TBEPS"MTUPO4UBMFZ i.POUIMZ3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN w+BOVBSZŴŶ ŴżŹź "GSJDBBOE
Near East and South Asia branch, box 39, folder Rwanda.
Żŷi3XBOEB ':ŴżŹŹ w54% CPYŻ GPMEFS3XBOEB-FP$ZSUP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF "QSJM
28, 1967, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 39. British intelligence officers
JO6HBOEB XIFSF5VUTJSFGVHFFTDBNFUPCFTFFOBTBTFDVSJUZUISFBUVTFEUIFTBNFUFSN
ŻŸ-FJHI#SJMMJBOUUP.JUDIFMM".BCBSEZ i7FIJDMFTBOE$PNNVOJDBUJPOT&RVJQNFOU
GPS3XBOEBw+PIO.BOPQPMJ i.POUIMZ3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN w4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŸ 
BOEi.POUIMZ3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN w+VMZŴżŹŹ BMM"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI
Asia Branch, box 39, Rwanda.
ŻŹ %FBO 3VTL UP "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  ,JHBMJ  .BSDI ŵŶ  ŶŴ  ŴżŹŹ  54%  CPY Ż  GPMEFS
3XBOEB.POUIMZ3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN +VMZ"VHVTUŴżŹź w54% CPYŴż 3XBOEB
Żź#PC%V#PTFUP&E)BNJMUPO .BSDIŻ ŴżŹŹBOE"NCBTTBEPS-FP$ZSUP%FQBSU-
NFOUPG4UBUF "QSJMŵŻ ŴżŹź "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJBCSBODI CPYŶż GPMEFS
3XBOEB"TBQPTUTDSJQU CZŴżżų BęFS)BCZBSJNBOBSFGVTFEUPBDRVJFTDFUPBOJOWBTJPOPG
UIF$POHPUPVOTFBU.PCVUV XIPIBECFDPNFBQPMJUJDBMFNCBSSBTTNFOU UIF6OJUFE4UBUFT
TXJUDIFE BMMFHJBODFT  CBDLJOH BO JOWBTJPO GSPN 6HBOEB CZ UIF 5VUTJ3XBOEBO 1BUSJPUJD
'SPOU XIJDIQSFDJQJUBUFEUIFWJDJPVTDJWJMXBSUIBUDVMNJOBUFEJOUIFŴżżŷNBTTLJMMJOHTBOE
the Congo war of the late 1990s.
ŻŻi1PMJDF4VSWFZ.JTTJPOUPUIF,JOHEPNPG#VSVOEJ w.BZo+VOFŴżŹŷ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 
014 4VSWFZTBOE&WBMVBUJPOT CPYŴ GPMEFS#VSVOEJ3FOÏ-FNBSDIBOE Burundi: Ethnic
Conflict and Genocide /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŸ ćPNBT1.FMBEZ 
Burundi: The Tragic Years (An Eyewitness Account) /FX:PSL0SCJT#PPLT Ŵżźŷ 0O$IJ-
OFTFJOĘVFODFJOUIFSFHJPO XIJDIBQQFBSTUPIBWFCFFORVJUFMJNJUFECVUXBTVTFEBTBO
FYDVTFUPVQHSBEF64BSNTTVQQMJFTBOEDPWFSUBDUJPO TFF'SBOL37JMBGBOB Cold War in
the Congo: The Confrontation of Cuban Military Forces, 1960–1967 (New Brunswick, N.J.:
5SBOTBDUJPO ŵųųż źŹ%BWJE8JTFBOEćPNBT#3PTT The Espionage Establishment (New
:PSL3BOEPN)PVTF ŴżŹź Ŵżų

Notes to Pages 180–184 333


Żżi.JOVUFTGSPN$*.FFUJOH w0DUPCFSŵż ŴżŹŷ *14 CPYŹ GPMEFSź$IBSMFT.BFDIMJOH
+S i.FNPGPS$*&BTU"GSJDB$VSSFOU*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPO w*14 CPYŹ4FFBMTPNot
Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga /FX:PSL)JMM8BOH ŴżŹź 
żų#ZSPO&OHMF 0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ BOE$PMPOFM.JUDIFMM".BCBSEZ i4VNNBSZ
3FQPSU ,FOZB/BUJPOBM1PMJDF 4QFDJBM"TTFTTNFOU w"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB
Branch, box 8, Kenya.
żŴ 'FSHVTPO  /BJSPCJ FNCBTTZ  UP 64"*%  i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 3FQPSU GPS "QSJMo.BZ ŴżŹŻ w
54% CPYŴŶ GPMEFS,FOZB4FUI4JOHMFUPO i4VQQMFNFOUBSZ.JMJUBSZ'PSDFTJO4VC4BIBSBO
Africa: The Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zaire,” in Supplementary Military Forces: Reserves,
Militias, Auxiliaries, ed. Louis A. Zurcher and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1978), 231.
92. Johnson F. Monroe to Byron Engle, “Report on the Public Safety Activities in East
Africa,” March 27, 1964; Byron Engle to Jack Goin, April 30, 1964; and Lauren J. Goin and
Beryel Price, “The Relationship of the Police Force to the Security Service, United Republic
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar,” June 1964, TSD, box 21, folder Tanganyika; Gleijeses, Conflict-
ing Missions,ŵŷŹ"NSJU8JMTPO U.S. Foreign Policy and Revolution: The Creation of Tanza-
nia (London: Pluto Press, 1989).
żŶ+PIO-JOERVJTU i4VSWFZPGUIF;BNCJBO1PMJDF w0DUPCFSŴŹo/PWFNCFSź ŴżŹż "GSJDB
BOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŸź GPMEFS;BNCJB BMTP54% CPYŴŵ ;BNCJB 
i1PMJDF$PNQMFUF#SJUJTI$PVSTF wZambia Times,+BOVBSZŵź ŴżŹź Ŵ0O"NFSJDBOTVQQPSU
GPS UIF BQBSUIFJE SFHJNF JO 4PVUI "GSJDB BOE UIF VOEFSMZJOH HFPTUSBUFHJD BOE FDPOPNJD
JOUFSFTUTESJWJOH64QPMJDZJOUIFSFHJPO TFFćPNBT#PSTUFMNBOO Apartheid’s Reluctant
Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJ-
WFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŶ 8JMMJBN.JOUFS King Solomon’s Mines Revisited: Western Interests and
the Burdened History of South Africa /FX:PSL#BTJD#PPLT ŴżŻŹ 0O$*"JOWPMWFNFOU 
see Stockwell, In Search of Enemies.
żŷ ,FOOFUI ,BVOEB UP .BOEB  'FCSVBSZ ŵŶ  ŴżŹź  ;/" SFQPSUT  4 $ .CJMJTIJ GSPN
4JNPO ,BQXFQXF  +VOF ŴŹoŶŴ  ŴżŹź  ;/" QFSTPOBM DPOWFSTBUJPO XJUI ,FOOFUI ,BVOEB 
.BSDIŵŵ ŵųųŶ*IBEUIFPQQPSUVOJUZUPWJTJU;BNCJBBOETQPLFXJUISFTJEFOUTPG-VTBLB
XIPTUJMMSFNFNCFSUIFQMBOFTĘZJOHPWFSIFBE
żŸ,FOOFUI,BVOEBUP3VCFO,BNFOHB +VOFż ŴżŹŻ ;/" 3FMBUJPOTXJUIUIF64" 
.'"ŴųŴŶŴųŻ
żŹ*CJE.JDIBFM4BUB i$IJOFTF*OWFTUNFOUJO"GSJDBćF$BTFPG;BNCJB wQBQFSQSF-
TFOUFEUPUIF$PNNJUUFFPO)VNBO3JHIUT4UVEJFT )BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ 0DUPCFSŵŷ ŵųųź
+PIO-JOERVJTU i$POWFSTBUJPOXJUIUIF64"NCBTTBEPSUP;BNCJB w.BZŵŹ Ŵżźų "GSJDB
BOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŸź GPMEFS;BNCJB
żź .BINPPE .BNEBOJ  Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (Trenton, N.J.: Africa
World Press, 1984), 78; Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 266. See also Pat Hutton
BOE+POBUIBO#MPDI i)PXUIF8FTU&TUBCMJTIFE*EJ"NJOBOE,FQU)JNćFSF wJO3BZ 7BO
Meter, and Wolf, Dirty Work,ŵŴźŴoŻųBOE.BSD$VSUJT Unpeople: Britain’s Secret History of
Human Rights Abuses -POEPO7JOUBHF ŵųųŷ ŵŷŸoŹŴ
98. Johnson F. Monroe to Byron Engle, “Report on Public Safety Activities in East Africa,”
March 27, 1964, Geographic Files, box 20, folder Tanganyika; “Israeli Activities with Afri-
can Civil Security Forces,” Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 4, folder Chad;
Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, 163.
99. Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, 104.
Ŵųų+BDL"OEFSTPO i64)FMQFEUP5SBJO"NJO)FODINFO wWashington Post, July 12,
1978; Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, “Ugandans Get Pilot Training in U.S.,” Washington
Post,/PWFNCFSź Ŵżźź

334 Notes to Pages 184–186


101. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, “Ugandans Get Pilot Training in U.S.” Washington
Post,/PWFNCFSź Ŵżźź+BDL"OEFSTPO i*EJ"NJOPG6HBOEB4UJMM'MZJOH)JHI wWashington
Post, April 27, 1978.
Ŵųŵ.BNEBOJ Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda,źż4FF4JOHMFUPO i4VQQMFNFOUBSZ
.JMJUBSZ'PSDFTJO4VC4BIBSBO"GSJDB wŵŴŷoŴŹ
ŴųŶ 4FF +FSFNZ 4DBIJMM  Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary
Army /FX :PSL /BUJPO #PPLT  ŵųųź  4UBZJOH PO JMMFHBMMZ VOEFS QSJWBUF DPOUSBDU  $*"
BHFOU'SBOL5FSQJMCFDBNFBQFSTPOBMBTTJTUBOUUP"NJO EJSFDUJOHTPNFPGIJTFYFDVUJPOT
Joseph C. Goulden, The Death Merchant: The Brutal True Story of Edwin P. Wilson (New
:PSL#BOUBN ŴżŻŸ 
Ŵųŷ,BVOEBUP,BNBOHB +VOFż ŴżŹŻ
ŴųŸ%BWJE,JMMJOHSBZ i(VBSEJOHUIF&YUFOEJOH'SPOUJFS1PMJDJOHUIF(PME$PBTU ŴŻŹŸo
1913,” in Anderson and Killingray, Policing the Empire, 123.
ŴųŹ8JMMJBN%)BSUVOHBOE#SJEHFU.PJY Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the
Congo War /FX:PSL"SNT5SBEF3FTPVSDF$FOUFS 8PSME1PMJDZ*OTUJUVUF ŵųųų ŷ
107. In Assenson and Alex-Assenson, African Military History and Politics, 107.
ŴųŻ 'PS BO FČFDUJWF DSJUJRVF PG UIF DPODFQU PG iIVNBOJUBSJBO JOUFSWFOUJPO w TFF +FBO
#SJDNPOU Humanitarian Imperialism /FX:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŵųųŹ &EXBSE4
)FSNBOBOE%BWJE1FUFSTPO The Politics of Genocide,GPSFXPSECZ/PBN$IPNTLZ /FX
:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŵųŴų 

9. Arming Tyrants II
Ŵi"SNBO&.FMMJ Rahbar,w.BZŸ ŴżŷŹ 3(Ÿż ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż 3%4 CPYźŶŵż GPMEFS*SBO
2. See Lloyd C. Gardner, Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East
after World War II /FX :PSL /FX 1SFTT  ŵųųż  .FMWZO 1 -FĒFS  A Preponderance of
Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford
6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT Ŵżżŵ źżoŻų/PBN$IPNTLZ Deterring Democracy /FX:PSL)JMMBOE
8BOH ŴżżŴ ŸŶ4BMJN:BRVC Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and
the Middle East $IBQFM)JMM6OJWFSTJUZPG/PSUI$BSPMJOB1SFTT ŵųųŷ i4USBUFHJD4JHOJĕ-
DBODFPG*SBOwBOEi4UBUFNFOUPG1PMJDZCZUIF/4$PO641PMJDZUPXBSET*SBO w%FDFNCFS
30, 1954, DDEL, OCB, box 8.
3. Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy 1945–1980
/FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻŻ źų
ŷ+POBUIBO%VOOBHF i$POUJOVJUZJO1PMJDJOH1PMJUJDTJO*UBMZ ŴżŵųoŴżŹų wJOThe Policing
of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives, ed. Mark Mazower (Providence:
#FSHIBIO#PPLT Ŵżżź Żų088JMTPOUP0ďDFPG.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOU i3FRVFTUTGPS
"SNTBOE"NNVOJUJPOGPS*TTVFUP(FSNBO1PMJDF w/PWFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŷŹBOEćFP)BMMUP
%JSFDUPS 0ďDFPG.JMJUBSZ(PWFSONFOU i1PMJDF3BJETJO1SFWFOUJPOPG#MBDL.BSLFU"DUJWJ-
UJFT w"QSJMŵŷ Ŵżŷź 3(ŵŹų 640DDVQBUJPO)FBERVBSUFST 0.(64 1VCMJD4BGFUZ#SBODI 
3FDPSET 3FMBUFE UP (FSNBO 1PMJDF  ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż IFSFBęFS 0.(64 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ #SBODI 
box 274; Robert Murphy, “Report on Special Branch and Public Safety Organization and
0QFSBUJPOTJO$PMPHOF XJUIBO&NQIBTJTPO%FOB[JĕDBUJPO1SPHSBN w.BZŵŷ ŴżŷŸ 3(
Żŷ 'PSFJHO4FSWJDF1PTUT 0ďDFPGUIF641PMJUJDBM"EWJTFSUP(FSNBOZ #FSMJO ŴżŷŸ CPY
18; Kendall D. Gott, Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The U.S. Army Constabulary in Germany,
1946–1953 'PSU-FBWFOXPSUI ,BOT$PNCBU4UVEJFT*OTUJUVUF1SFTT ŵųųŸ ŵųoŶŴ#SJBO"
-JCCZ i1PMJDJOH(FSNBOZćF64$POTUBCVMBSZ ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŵw 1I%EJTT 1VSEVF6OJWFS-
TJUZ Ŵżźź 3PCFSU.8,FNQOFS i1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO wJOGoverning Postwar Germany,
FE&EXBSE)-JUDIĕFMEFUBM 1PSU8BTIJOHUPO /:,FOOJLBU1SFTT ŴżŸŶ ŷųŶoŴŻ

Notes to Pages 186–189 335


Ÿ i.POUIMZ 3FQPSU PG 1SJTPO #SBODI "DUJWJUJFT w 4FQUFNCFS Ź  ŴżŷŹ  0.(64 1VCMJD
4BGFUZ #SBODI  CPY ŵźŷ 0O UIF SFDSVJUNFOU PG GPSNFS /B[JT  TFF $ISJTUPQIFS 4JNQTPO 
Blowback: The First Full Account of America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Disastrous Effect
on the Cold War, Our Domestic and Foreign1PMJDZ ŵOEFE /FX:PSL$PMMJFS#PPLT ŴżŻż 
ćFQSJTPOCSBODIJO(FSNBOZXBTSVOCZ58BEF.BSLMFZ XIPXFOUPOUPSVOUIFGFEFSBM
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, and by Wade Gerlach, a social worker.
6. Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany,
1944–1949 /FX :PSL $BNCSJEHF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżżŹ  'PS B TBNQMF PG QVCMJD TBGFUZ
BDUJWJUJFT  TFF  FH  i3FQPSU GSPN 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 0ďDFT JO 4UVUUHBSU w 0DUPCFS ŵŻ  ŴżŷŻ 
0.(641VCMJD4BGFUZ#SBODI CPYŵźŻi4FNJ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w"VHVTUŵŻ Ŵżŷź 0.(64
1VCMJD4BGFUZ#SBODI CPYŵźź088JMTPOUPDIJFG14% i$PNNFOUT3FHBSEJOH1VCMJD
4BGFUZ .BUUFST JO #BWBSJB w %FDFNCFS ŵŹ  ŴżŷŹ  0.(64 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ #SBODI  CPY ŵźŷ
088JMTPO i3FNPWBMPG/B[JTJOUIF(FSNBO3FJDIQPTU w4FQUFNCFSŵŶ ŴżŷŸ 3(Żŷ 
'PSFJHO4FSWJDF1PTUT 0ďDFPGUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT1PMJUJDBM"EWJTFSUP(FSNBOZ #FSMJO ŴżŷŸ 
CPYŴŻćFNJMJUBSZIJTUPSJBO(FPSHF')PGNBOOIBTTUSFTTFEUIFJNQPSUBODFPGUIF(ŵ
intelligence function of the U.S.-trained constabulary and its function in spying on the
DPNNVOJTUBOETPDJBMJTUQBSUJFTBOEHBJOJOHBEWBODFEJOGPSNBUJPOPOTUSJLFT4FF(FPSHF
' )PGNBOO  i$PME 8BS .PVOUFE 8BSSJPST 64 $POTUBCVMBSZ JO 0DDVQJFE (FSNBOZw
Armor Magazine ŴŴŹ 4FQUFNCFSo0DUPCFS ŵųųź  XXXVTDPOTUBCVMBSZDPNBSNPS@NBH-
DPO@PDDVQ@HFSNIUNM
ź8JMMJBN+#PQQ O. W.: O. W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession (Port Wash-
JOHUPO  /: ,FOOJLBU 1SFTT  Ŵżźź  Ÿ 0 8 8JMTPO  i3FQPSU PO 1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 5SBJOJOH
1SPHSBNPG*$" w+VMZŵŴoŵź ŴżŸŻ .467JFUOBN1SPKFDU CPYŹźż+BNFT-.D$SBX B64
Border Patrol agent, and Major Ulrich Urton, who had experience in police work in Europe
BOEUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT XFSFBNPOHUIFPUIFSLFZBEWJTFSTTFSWJOHXJUIUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT
JO(FSNBOZ
8. See Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949 /FX :PSL
$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŵ #SVDF3,VOJIPMN The Origins of the Cold War in the
Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980).
9. U.S. intelligence noted that local leaders of the organization were soldiers, tobacco
workers, schoolteachers, and lawyers. “Greece” situation report, Papers of Harry S. Tru-
NBO 14' *OUFMMJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ $FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF3FQPSUT'JMF 4JUVBUJPO3FQPSUT 
box 217; Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949, Ŷ %PNJOJRVF &VEFT  The
Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943–1949, USBOT +PIO )PXF /FX :PSL
.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT Ŵżźų &DIPJOHPďDJBMQSPQBHBOEB NBOZUPEBZDPOUJOVFUPNJT-
DIBSBDUFSJ[FUIFMFęJTUNPWFNFOUJO(SFFDFBTBQSPYZPGUIF4PWJFU6OJPOTFF FH 8BMUFS
3VTTFMM .FBE  i" )FHFNPO $PNFT PG "HF w Foreign Affairs +VMZo"VHVTU ŵųųż  Ŵŷŵ 'PS B
XFMMSFTFBSDIFEBDDPVOUFNQIBTJ[JOHUIFOBUJPOBMJTNBOEJEFBMJTNVOEFSMZJOHUIFNPWF-
NFOU CBTFEPOFYUFOTJWFJOUFSWJFXTXJUIGFNBMFHVFSSJMMBT TFF+BOFU)BSU New Voices in the
Nation: Women and the Greek Resistance, 1941–1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1996).
10. Wittner, The American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949,ŴŷŴi3PZBM(SFFL&NCBTTZw
.BSDIŵŶ ŴżŷŻ 3(Ÿż 3%4 /FBS&BTU *OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG(SFFDF ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż ŻŹŻ IFSF-
BęFS3%4 (SFFDF .BSL.B[PXFS i1PMJDJOHUIF"OUJ$PNNVOJTU4UBUFJO(SFFDF Ŵżŵŵo
ŴżźŷA-BXJOXIPTFOBNFPSEFSGPSXIPTFCFOFĕU wJO.B[PXFS The Policing of Politics in
the Twentieth Century,ŴŶųoŶŴ$PM8JMMJBN3/FFEIBN i1BSBNJMJUBSZ'PSDFTJO(SFFDF 
ŴżŷŹoŴżŷżw $BSMJTMF#BSSBDLT 1B"SNZ8BS$PMMFHF ŴżźŴ Źų+PZDF,PMLPBOE(BCSJFM
Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (New
:PSL)BSQFS3PX Ŵżźŵ ŵŵŸ

336 Notes to Pages 189–190


ŴŴ3PCFSU$PFUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF +VOFŴŶ ŴżŷŸ 3%4 (SFFDF%BOB"EBNT4DINJEU 
i(SJTXPME‰A.PTU1PXFSGVM.BOJO(SFFDF wNew York Times Sunday Magazine, October 12,
1947, 10; George C. Marshall to Dwight Griswold, July 11, 1947, Papers of Dwight P. Gris-
wold, HSTL, AMAG Correspondence, box 1 (hereafter GP AMAG). Griswold, who was
repudiated by Nebraska voters for saddling the state with the largest appropriations and
UBYFTJOJUTIJTUPSZ UPMESFQPSUFSTi*IPMEUIFDBSET‫ڀڀ‬8IFOZPVWFHPUBMPUPGNPOFZUP
TQFOE ZPVSFJOBTUSPOHQPTJUJPOw4DINJEU i(SJTXPME wŴųBMTPi(SJTXPME"DDFQUT(SFFL
.JTTJPO+PC"QQPJOUNFOU1SPUFTUFECZ%FNPDSBUT wLincoln Star, GP AMAG.
Ŵŵ (FPSHJOB 4JODMBJS  ićF A*SJTI 1PMJDFNBO BOE UIF &NQJSF *OĘVFODJOH UIF 1PMJDJOH
PGUIF#SJUJTI$PNNPOXFBMUI wIrish Historical StudiesŶŹ OPŴŷŵ /PWFNCFSŵųųŻ ŴŻŴ
/FBSMZTFWFOUZBUUIFUJNF 8JDLIBNXBTBEJTUJOHVJTIFEBMVNOVTPG)BSSPXBOEUIF3PZBM
Military College at Sandhurst and holder of the French Légion d’Honneur. In London, one
PVUSBHFEDPOTUJUVFOUXSPUFUPIJT.1ićFTFOEJOHPGNFNCFSTPGUIF6MTUFS$POTUBCV-
lary to Greece can be interpreted in only one way. This police force is trained in the use of
ĕSFBSNTBOEJTBTTPDJBUFEXJUINBOZBDUTPGCSVUBMJUZJO/*SFMBOEJUTDIJFGXBTBTTPDJ-
BUFEXJUIUIFEJTDSFEJUBCMFFQJTPEFPGUIFA#MBDLBOE5BOT‫*ڀڀ‬OIJTMBUFTUTQFFDIFT .S
$IVSDIJMM‫ڀڀ‬VOEFSMJOFEUIFOFDFTTJUZPGNBJOUBJOJOHAMBXBOEPSEFSJOUIFDPOGVTJPOUIBU
IBTGPMMPXFEUIFDPMMBQTFPGUIF/B[JA/FX0SEFS0OFBTLTA-BXJOXIPTFOBNF PSEFSGPS
XIPTFCFOFĕU (SFFDFIBTCFDPNFOPUIJOHTIPSUPGBQPMJDFTUBUFw.B[PXFS i1PMJDJOHUIF
"OUJ$PNNVOJTU4UBUFJO(SFFDF ŴżŵŵŴżźŷ wŴŷŷ
ŴŶ 3PCFSU $PF UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  +VOF ŴŶ  ŴżŷŸ  3%4  (SFFDF +BNFT )VHI ,FFMFZ 
Chargé d’Affaires, to Secretary of State, “Extension until January 11, 1948, of British Police
BOE1SJTPO.JTTJPOJO(SFFDF w.BSDIŵŹ ŴżŷźBOEi&YUFOTJPOVOUJM%FDFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŷŻ PG
#SJUJTI1PMJDFBOE1SJTPO.JTTJPO w3%4 (SFFDF*OUIFMBUFŴżŷųT BTBNCBTTBEPSUP4ZSJB 
Keeley sponsored a right-wing coup.
Ŵŷ+BDL$%BWJT ićF3PMFPGUIF(SFFL1PMJDFEVSJOHUIF$POĘJDUPGŴżŷŹoŴżŷż w.BSDI
Ż ŴżźŴ ".)* Ŷŷ%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF#JPHSBQIJDBM*OGPSNBUJPO /BQPMFPO;FSWBT (1
"."( ,FFMFZT QBQFST BU 1SJODFUPO 6OJWFSTJUZT .VEE -JCSBSZ DPOUBJO JOGPSNBUJPO IF
DPNQJMFE BT DPOTVM JO 4BMPOJLB PO DPNNVOJTUT XIJDI IF EFSJWFE GSPN 64 JOUFMMJHFODF
DPOUBDUTXJUIUIF(FOEBSNFSJFBOETFDSFUQPMJDFPGUIF.FUBYBTSFHJNF,FFMFZTSPMFJO
VTJOHUIF(FOEBSNFSJFUPHBJOJOUFMMJHFODFPODPNNVOJTUBDUJWJUZJTUZQJDBMPGUIF64DPM-
MVTJPOXJUI.FUBYBTTBOUJDPNNVOJTUDBNQBJHO'PSUIFQBUUFSOPG64TVQQPSUGPSSJHIUJTU
EJDUBUPSTJOUIFŴżŶųT TFF%BWJE'4DINJU[ Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United
States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999).
ŴŸ;FSWBTRVPUFEJO,PMLPBOE,PMLP The Limits of Power, 405; Mazower, “Policing the
"OUJ$PNNVOJTU4UBUFJO(SFFDF ŴżŵŵoŴżźŷ wŴŴź0MJWF4VUUPO Murder Inc. in Greece (New
:PSL/FX$FOUVSZ1VCMJTIFST ŴżŷŻ %FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF#JPHSBQIJDBM*OGPSNBUJPO /BQP-
MFPO;FSWBT-PZ)FOEFSTPOUP(PW(SJTXPME i4LPVSBT.FNP w+VMZŴ Ŵżŷź (1"."(
i3FQPSUCZ$IJFG-FHBM"EWJTPSPGB7JTJUUPUIF$PVSUTJOUIF1FMPQPOOFTF w+VOFŶųo+VMZŸ 
1945, Military Liaison Branch, Greece, Legal Branch, Police Mission, 298-A, NARA. In an
JOUFSSPHBUJPOSFQPSUNBEFLOPXOUP64JOUFMMJHFODF )FSNBO/FVCBDIFS BGPSNFS(FSNBO
PďDJBMJOUIF#BMLBOT EFDMBSFEUIBU;FSWBT BTIFBEPGUIFNBKPSOPODPNNVOJTUSFTJTUBODF
HSPVQJO8PSME8BS** IBEBHSFFEUPBOiVOPďDJBMUSVDFXJUIUIF(FSNBOTXIJDIMBTUFE
VOUJMUIFTVNNFSPGŴżŷŷBOEUPPLOPBDUJPOBHBJOTUUIF(FSNBOT QSPCBCMZCFDBVTFPGUIF
BCTFODFPGQSFTTVSFGSPNUIF#SJUJTI‫)ڀڀ‬FXBTBMXBZTBHBJOTUUIFDPNNVOJTUTIPXFWFSw
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF#JPHSBQIJDBM*OGPSNBUJPO /BQPMFPO;FSWBT (1"."((FIMFOXBT
B/B[JXBSDSJNJOBMSFDSVJUFECZUIF044BOE$*"VOEFS0QFSBUJPO1BQFSUPQSPWJEFJOUFM-
ligence on the Soviet Union for rollback operations behind the Iron Curtain.

Notes to Pages 190–191 337


ŴŹi/PUFTPO.FFUJOH)FMEPOŶSE4FQUFNCFSŴżŷźUP%JTDVTTUIF'VUVSFPGUIF#SJU-
JTI1PMJDFBOE1SJTPO.JTTJPO w4FQUFNCFSŴų Ŵżŷź%PVHMBT%JMMPOUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF 
October 24, 1947, RDS, Greece; J. C. Murray, “The Anti-Bandit War,” Marine Corps Gazette,
ŶŻ +BOVBSZo.BZŴżŸŷ ŹųoŹż.JDIBFM.D$MJOUPDL Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla
Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1980 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT 
Ŵżżŵ ŴŷoŴŹ
Ŵźi#ZUIF8PNFO,FQUJO1SJTPOwUP&NCBTTJFTPG(SFBU#SJUBJO 64 'SBODF BOE$IJFG 
Soviet Military Mission, May 1945; and “By Those Kept in Prison at the State Factory for
Cutting Tobacco” to public prosecutor at Athens, Minister of Interior and Justice, Military
Liaison Branch (Greece), Legal Branch, Police Mission, 298-A, NARA; UN Investigative
$PNNJTTJPO3FQPSU +VOFŵŹ Ŵżŷź (1"."(4VUUPO Murder Inc. in Greece; Kati Marton,
The Polk Conspiracy: Murder and Cover-Up in the Case of CBS News Correspondent George
Polk /FX:PSL'BSSBS 4USBVTBOE(JSPVY Ŵżżų ŴŷŸ%BWJT ićF3PMFPGUIF(SFFL1PMJDF
EVSJOHUIF$POĘJDUPGŴżŷŹoŴżŷżw&EHBS0#BMMBODF The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949 (New
:PSL1SBFHFS ŴżŹŹ ŵŴŷ
ŴŻi/PUFTPO.FFUJOH)FMEPOŶSE4FQUFNCFSŴżŷźUP%JTDVTTUIF'VUVSFPGUIF#SJUJTI
1PMJDFBOE1SJTPO.JTTJPOw-1JUUNBO4QSJOHT "NFSJDBO$POTVM(FOFSBM UP4FDSFUBSZPG
4UBUF .BZŵŷ ŴżŷŹ 3%4 (SFFDF.BKPS(FOFSBM,BUBNCJT 4VQSFNF$PNNBOE i3FQPSUUP
UIF"NFSJDBO&NCBTTZw"QSJMŴŸ Ŵżŷż 3%4 (SFFDFDPSSFTQPOEFODFPG%XJHIU(SJTXPME
BOE(FPSHF$.BSTIBMM BOE-PZ)FOEFSTPOUP(PWFSOPS(SJTXPME i4LPVSBT.FNP w+VMZŴ 
1947, GP AMAG.
19. Clifford Norton to Colleague, March 19, 1947, RDS, Greece; Wittner, The American
Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949, 150; Theo Hall, “Report on the Internal Security Services
of Greece, ICA,” April 1956, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Operations Division, Africa and Near
East and South Asia Branch, box 60, folder Greece (hereafter Africa and Near East and
South Asia Branch); Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism
in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 215, 216.
ŵųi8JMNFUUF$IJFGPG1PMJDFUP"JEJO(FSNBO3VMF wChicago Tribune, June 24, 1945;
3FH%BWJTBOE)BSSZ+BNFT The Public Safety Story: An Informal Recollection of Events and
Individuals Leading to the Formation of the AID Office of Public Safety,"QSJMŵųųŴ IUUQ
QEGVTBJEHPWQEG@EPDTćFP)BMM i#FSMJO%JTUSJDU1VCMJD4BGFUZ8FFLMZ3FQPSU w"VHVTU
6, 1946, OMGUS Public Safety Branch, box 277; Joseph E. Wechler and Theodore Hall,
The Police and Minority Groups: A Program to Prevent Disorders and to Increase Relations
between Opposite Racial, Religious, and National Groups (Chicago: International City Man-
agers Association, 1944), 1, 3.
ŵŴ)BMM i3FQPSUPOUIF*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4FSWJDFTPG(SFFDFw)+$MBZ i6TFPG.VTFVN
as a Prison,” May 1945, Military Liaison Branch, Greece, Legal Branch, Police Mission, 298-
A; Wittner, The American Intervention in Greece 1943–1949, ŴŷŶoŷŸ /JDPT $ "MJWJ[BUPT 
ićFA&NFSHFODZ3FHJNFBOE$JWJM-JCFSUJFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŷż wJOGreece in the 1940s: A Nation
in Crisis, ed. John O. Iatrides (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1981), 222;
Sutton, Murder Inc. in Greece.
22. Marton, The Polk Conspiracy, ŵŵŴ  ŵźŶ  ŵŻŶ i8JME #JMMw %POPWBO BOE UIF JOĘVFO-
UJBMDPMVNOJTU8BMUFS-JQQNBOOQBSUJDJQBUFEJOUIFDPWFSVQCZDIBNQJPOJOHUIFPďDJBM
HPWFSONFOUDMBJNTBCPVUUIFNVSEFS%POPWBOĕSFEJOWFTUJHBUPS+BNFT,FMMJT BO044XBS
IFSPJO$IJOB BęFSIFSBJTFEDSJUJDBMRVFTUJPOTćF#SJUJTIQPMJDFNJTTJPOXBTBMTPJOWPMWFE
JOUIFDPWFSVQBOENBZIBWFEJSFDUMZDPMMVEFEJOUIFNVSEFS XIJDIIBEBMMUIFNBSLJOHT
of a black operation) with Tsaldaris, whose political career was eventually brought down by
a corruption scandal.

338 Notes to Pages 191–193


ŵŶi3FQPSUUP/4$1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$#
(Overseas Coordinating Board), White House Office, National Security Council Staff, box
17, folder Internal Security.
ŵŷ(FPSHF.D(FIFFUP.BD#VOEZ i$PVOUFS(VFSSJMMB$BNQBJHOTJO(SFFDF .BMBZB 
BOE UIF 1IJMJQQJOFT w /PWFNCFS ŵŴ  ŴżŹŴ  +',-  38,  CPY ŷŴŷ  GPMEFS Ŵ  4QFDJBM (SPVQ
i(SFFL 1PMJDF 3FDPSET w "NFSJDBO &NCBTTZ  "UIFOT  UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  +VOF ŵŸ  ŴżŸŻ
BOE&EXBSE,FOOFMMZ i1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNJO(SFFDF w"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI
"TJB#SBODI CPYŹų GPMEFSŵ.POUIMZ1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU %FDFNCFSŴź ŴżŹųi-BNJOB-
tion of ID Cards for Greece,” April 4, 1960; and “Monthly Public Safety Report, July 1958,”
Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 61, folder 1. On Theodore Brown’s record
as police chief in Eugene, see “City’s Police Traffic Safety Mark Praised,” Eugene Register
Guard,"VHVTUŵŸ ŴżŸŷ#SPXODMBJNFEUIBUUIFQSPHSBNTFOBCMFE(SFFLQPMJDFUPiDPNCBU
VOEFSHSPVOEDPNNVOJTUJDBDUJWJUJFTNPSFFČFDUJWFMZw
ŵŸ4FF+BNFT#FDLFUU Barbarism in Greece: A Young American Lawyer’s Inquiry into the
Use of Torture in Contemporary Greece, with Case Histories and Documents, foreword by
4FOBUPS$MBJCPSOF1FMM /FX:PSL8BMLFS Ŵżźų $ISJTUPQIFS.POUBHVF8PPEIPVTF The
Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels /FX:PSL'SBOLMJO8BUUT ŴżŻŸ .B[PXFS i1PMJDJOHUIF
"OUJ$PNNVOJTU4UBUFJO(SFFDF ŴżŵŵoŴżźŷ wŴŷŻ1FUFS.VSUBHI The Rape of Greece: The
King, the Colonels, and the Resistance -POEPO4JNPO4DIVTUFS Ŵżżŷ 
ŵŹ+BNFT"#JMM The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New
)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŻ ŷŴ7JDUPS+$SPJ[BU i*NQFSJBM*SBOJBO(FOEBSNFSJF w
Marine Corps Gazette 0DUPCFSŴżźŸ ŵżi*SBOwTJUVBUJPOSFQPSU 1BQFSTPG)BSSZ45SVNBO 
14' *OUFMMJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ $FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF3FQPSUT'JMF 4JUVBUJPO3FQPSUT CPY
ŵŴź*OBOFBSMJFSFSB JOŴżŴŴ BO"NFSJDBOFDPOPNJTU 8.PSHBO4IVTUFS XBTJOWJUFECZUIF
NPOBSDI .PIBNNBE"MJ4IBI UPSFPSHBOJ[FUIFDPVOUSZTĕOBODFT'JOEJOHUIFDPVOUSZ
QMBHVFECZiCBOEJUSZwXIJDINBEFJUJNQPTTJCMFGPSUBYFTUPCFDPMMFDUFEJOUIFIJOUFSMBOE 
IFSFDPNNFOEFEUIFGPSNBUJPOPGBOŻ ŷųųNBOSVSBMDPOTUBCVMBSZVOEFSUIF.JOJTUSZPG
'JOBODFUPBEESFTTUIFQSPCMFN"MUIPVHI4IVTUFSXBTFYQFMMFEGSPN*SBOBUUIFVSHJOHPGUIF
3VTTJBOT UIF(FOEBSNFSJFXBTFWFOUVBMMZGPSNFEVOEFSUIFDPNNBOEPG4XFEJTIPďDFST
ŵź'-4BUUPOUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i4VHHFTUFE3FGPSNTJO*SBOJBO1PMJDF0SHBOJ[BUJPO w
"QSJM ŵŹ  ŴżŷŹ  3( Ÿż ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż  3%4  CPY źŶŵż  GPMEFS *SBO "OESFX 5VMMZ  CIA: The
Inside Story /FX:PSL8JMMJBN.PSSPX ŴżŹŵ żŷ4UFWFO38BSE Immortal: A Military
History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
ŵųųż Ŵźŵ$SPJ[BU i*NQFSJBM*SBOJBO(FOEBSNFSJF wŵżi-U$PM1BVM-JPOFM)FMMJXFMM w3(
ŵŵŹ 3FDPSETPGUIF044 1FSTPOOFM'JMFT CPYųŶŵŹ4DIXBS[LPQG BDBQUBJOJOUIFBSNZJO
8PSME8BS* XBTB8FTU1PJOUDMBTTNBUFPG.BUUIFX3JEHXBZBOEPGi-JHIUOJOH+PFw$PM-
MJOT GBNPVTGPSJOWFTUJHBUJOHUIF-JOECFSHILJEOBQQJOH)JTCBDLHSPVOEJTUSBDFEJO-FP+
Coakley, Jersey Troopers: A Fifty-Year History of the New Jersey State Police (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1971). At one point Schwarzkopf boasted of controlling the Iranian
QBSMJBNFOU majlis).
ŵŻi"SNBO&.FMMJ Rahbar,” May 5, 1946.
29. Ibid.
30. “Report to NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” DDEL, OCB, box 17; Stephen
Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: The American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (New
:PSL8JMFZ ŵųųŶ 5VMMZ CIA, 97; Ward, Immortal, 195; Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim
World /FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJMMBO ŵųųż ŵŴŷ#JMM The Eagle and the Lion, 55.
31. Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 113; Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket

Notes to Pages 193–194 339


"VTUJO6OJWFSTJUZPG5FYBT1SFTT ŴżŻŷ ŴųŻ ŴŴŹćPNBT.3JDLT i64.JMJUBSZ.JTTJPOT
UP*SBO ŴżŷŶoŴżźŻćF1PMJUJDBM&DPOPNZPG.JMJUBSZ"TTJTUBODF wIranian StudiesŴŵ 4VN-
NFSo"VUVNOŴżźż ŴŹŶożŶ
Ŷŵi.VSEFS5SJBMPGŸ"SNZ0ďDFSTJO*TGBIBOBOE*NQMJDBUJPOT w+VOFŴż ŴżŸŸ 3%4 
3FMBUFEUPUIF*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG*SBO ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż EFDJNBMĕMFŻżŷ
ŶŶ+BNFT1(SBOUUP4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ i4VCKFDU4UBUVT3FQPSUPO
1PMJDF(FOEBSNFSJFBOE$JWJD"DUJPO1SPHSBNJO*SBO w"QSJMŶų ŴżŹŶ +',- /4' CPYŷ
34. See Marilyn Olsen, Gangsters, Gunfire, and Political Intrigues: The Story of the Indiana
State Police *OEJBOBQPMJTŶŻ4QFDJBM1SFTT ŵųųŴ Źżoźųi-U"SUIVS.D$BTMJOćVSTUPO w
3(ŵŵŹ 3FDPSETPG044 1FSTPOOFM'JMF ŴżŷŴoŴżŷŸ CPYźź.BPDIVO:V OSS in China:
Prelude to Cold War /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŹ ŵŵŹ
ŶŸ.JDIBFM(.D$BOO i$PNQMFUJPOPG5PVS3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸż *$"$PMPOFM
Charles Peeke, “End of Tour Report,” July 1, 1963; and Miles J. Furlong, “End of Tour Report,”
June 27, 1963, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 61; Arthur Lang, USOM
"GHIBOJTUBO UP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO i.BSLJOH3FRVJSFNFOUT w"QSJMŵŶ ŴżŸż "GSJDB
and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 60, folder Afghanistan; “Monthly Report, Iran,”
4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŴ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŹŵ GPMEFSŸ,FOOFZ BO
BTTPDJBUFQSPGFTTPSBOEDPPSEJOBUPSPGQPMJDFBENJOJTUSBUJPOQSPHSBNTBU64$ XBTMBUFS
BQQPJOUFE QSFTJEFOU PG UIF "NFSJDBO 4PDJFUZ PG $SJNJOPMPHZ *O ŴżŹų IF DPBVUIPSFE BO
JOĘVFOUJBMCPPLPOQPMJDJOHTFF+PIO1,FOOFZ i"O&WBMVBUJPOPGUIF5SBJOJOHPG'PSFJHO
1PMJDF0ďDFSTJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT w$JWJM1PMJDF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 0ďDFPG1VCMJD4FSWJDFT 
*OUFSOBUJPOBM $PPQFSBUJPO "ENJOJTUSBUJPO 4FQUFNCFS ŴżŸź  #FUTDI MBUFS TFSWFE JO UIF
Philippines.
ŶŹi.POUIMZ3FQPSU *SBO w%FDFNCFSŴżŹų "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI 
box 62, folder 5.
37. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah,żŴ(IPMBN3F[B"ėIBNJ The Life and
Times of the Shah #FSLFMFZ6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŵųųż ŶŻŴ ŶŻŷ+BNFT1(SBOU
UP4QFDJBM(SPVQPO$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ i4UBUVT3FQPSUPO1PMJDF(FOEBSNFSJFBOE$JWJD
"DUJPO1SPHSBNJO*SBO w"QSJMŶų ŴżŹŶ +',- /4' CPYŷi"OBMZTJTPG*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ
4JUVBUJPOJO*SBOBOE3FDPNNFOEFE"DUJPO w/4$"DUJPOOPŴŵżųE %FDFNCFSŵŵ ŴżŸŷ 
DDEL, OCB, box 43, folder Iran.
38. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 118; Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of
Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East /FX:PSL88/PSUPO ŴżŻų żŸ#JMM The
Eagle and the Lion,Ŵųų4PNF$*"DPWFSUBDUJPOTQFDJBMJTUTTVDIBT&EXJO8JMTPOXPSLFE
VOEFSUIFDPWFSPGQSJWBUFTFDVSJUZDPNQBOJFT XIJMFPUIFSTTVDIBTćPNBT-"IFSO+S 
XIPXBTMBUFSUBLFODBQUJWFJOUIFŴżźżoŴżŻŴ*SBOJBOIPTUBHFDSJTJT XPSLFEVOEFSUIFDPWFS
PGUIFOBSDPUJDTDPOUSPMQSPHSBN
Ŷż'SBOL+FTTVQ i$PNQMFUJPOPG5PVS3FQPSU w'FCSVBSZŴų ŴżŹųBOE.JDIBFM.D$BOO 
“End of Tour Report,” April 25, 1962, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 61,
folder 4.
40. Colonel Charles Peeke, “End of Tour Report,” July 1, 1963, and Furlong, “End of Tour
Report,” June 27, 1963, both Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 61; “Out-
MJOFPG$PVOUSZ*OUFSOBM%FGFOTF1MBO w0DUPCFSŶų ŴżŹŵ +',- 38, CPYŷŵŷ"NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZ 5FISBO UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i4USFOHUIFOJOHPG1PMJDF'VODUJPOTPGUIF*NQFSJBM
*SBOJBO(FOEBSNFSJF w.BZŵż ŴżŹŶ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPS *OUFSOBM
Defense and Public Safety (hereafter IPS), box 8.
ŷŴ (SBOU UP 4QFDJBM (SPVQ  i4UBUVT 3FQPSU PO 1PMJDF (FOEBSNFSJF BOE $JWJD "DUJPO
1SPHSBNJO*SBO w"QSJMŶų ŴżŹŶ*SBO4JUVBUJPO3FQPSU 1BQFSTPG)BSSZ45SVNBO 14' 

340 Notes to Pages 195–196


*OUFMMJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ $FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF3FQPSUT'JMF 4JUVBUJPO3FQPSUT CPYŵŴź
$SPJ[BU i*NQFSJBM*SBOJBO(FOEBSNFSJF wŵŻ
ŷŵ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i)VOU GPS %BETIBI $IBSMFT $ 4UFMMF
UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i%FBUIPG#BOEJU%BETIBIw+BOVBSZŴŷ ŴżŸŻ 3%4 3FMBUFEUPUIF
*OUFSOBM "ČBJST PG *SBO ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż  EFDJNBM ĕMF Żżŷ 4UFMMF  GPSNFSMZ B NFNCFS PG 044
%FUBDINFOUŴųŴJO#VSNB XFOUPOUPCFDPNFEFQVUZEJSFDUPSPG4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUJOUFM-
MJHFODF)JTDBSFFSJOUIF044BOEJUTCBDLHSPVOEBSFEJTDVTTFEJO3)BSSJT4NJUI OSS: The
Secret History of America’s First Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press,
Ŵżźŵ ŵŹŷ*OGPSNBUJPOJTBMTPBWBJMBCMFJOIJT044QFSTPOOFMĕMFBUUIF/BUJPOBM"SDIJWFT
(RG 226, box 743).
43. Colonel Charles Peeke, “End of Tour Report,” July 1, 1963, Africa and Near East and
South Asia Branch, box 61; Harry J. Anslinger to George McGehee,” August 4, 1949, RG 59
ŴżŷŸoŴżŷż 3%4 CPYźŶŵż GPMEFS*SBO%PVHMBT7BMFOUJOF The Strength of the Wolf: The
Secret History of America’s War on Drugs -POEPO7FSTP ŵųųŷ ŴŹżoźų
ŷŷ.D#FFXBT"GSJDBO"NFSJDBO BSBSJUZBNPOH$*"BHFOUTPGUIFQFSJPEi3FNBSLT 
(BSMBOE)8JMMJBNT /BSDPUJDT"EWJTFSw"QSJMŵŴ ŴżŸźBOE"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO UP
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i$POUSPMPG/BSDPUJDT%SVHT w0DUPCFSŵŵ ŴżŸż 3%4 3FMBUFEUPUIF
*OUFSOBM "ČBJST PG *SBO ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż  EFDJNBM ĕMF Żżŷ (BSMBOE 8JMMJBNT  i$PNQMFUJPO PG
5PVS3FQPSU w"QSJMż ŴżŸż "NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF +VMZŵŴ ŴżŹŴ 
"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŹŴ8JMMJBNTSFDFJWFEQSBJTFGSPN$*"
EFQVUZDIJFG%FTNPOE'JU[HFSBMEGPSIJTiPVUTUBOEJOHTFSWJDFw0OUIFMPOHTUBOEJOHMJOLT
CFUXFFO64DPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTBOEDMBOEFTUJOFPQFSBUJPOT TFF"MBO"#MPDL i"OUJ$PN-
NVOJTNBOEUIF8BSPO%SVHT wJOPerspectives on Organizing Crime, ed. Block (London:
,MVXFS"DBEFNJD1VCMJTIFST ŴżżŴ ŵųżoŵŹ.JDIBFM.D$BOOBOE$IBSMFT1FFLF BLOPXO
$*"BHFOU XFSFBMTPJOWPMWFEJOUIFDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTQSPHSBNT
ŷŸ8JMFZGPS4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUFBOE$PNNJTTJPOFS"OTMJOHFS .BZŵ ŴżŷŻ 3(Ÿż ŴżŷŸo
1949), RDS, box 7329, folder Iran.
46. Michael Parrish, “Iran: The Portrait of a U.S. Ally,” Christian Science Monitor, May
ŵż  ŴżŹŶ *SBO 3FQPSU  UIF %PDVNFOUBUJPO $FOUSF PG $POGFEFSBUJPO PG *SBOJBO 4UVEFOUT 
Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror in Iran: Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles
'SBOLGVSU $FOUSF PG $POGFEFSBUJPO PG *SBOJBO 4UVEFOUT  Ŵżźź  Ŵż (BSMBOE 8JMMJBNT UP
"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO i/BSDPUJDT4JUVBUJPOJO4PVUIFBTU"TJBBOEUIF'BS&BTU w"VHVTU
4, 1959, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 62, folder Narcotics; Valentine,
The Strength of the Wolf, 117. For the broader historical pattern, see Peter Dale Scott, Drugs,
Oil, and War: The United States in Indochina, Colombia, and Afghanistan /FX:PSL3PX-
NBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŶ 
47. Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade,
SFWFE /FX:PSL-BXSFODF)JMM ŵųųŷ ŴŵŸ8JMMJBNTTFYQFSJFODFJO5VSLFZJTEPDV-
NFOUFECZ.BUUIFX1FNCMFUPOJOIJTVOQVCMJTIFEQBQFSi*TUBOCVMBOEUIF,OJHIUT&SSBOU
PGUIF'FEFSBM#VSFBVPG/BSDPUJDT ŴżŷŻoŴżŹųw8JMMJBNTXBTBMTPJO(SFFDFBSPVOEUIJT
UJNF
ŷŻ 3PCFSU 3 4DIPUU  i"NFSJDBO $POTVMBUF UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF w "VHVTU ŵŷ  ŴżŸź 
3%4 3FMBUFEUPUIF*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG*SBO ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż EFDJNBMĕMFŻżŷ%BSJVT.3FKBMJ 
Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994), 77; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 468.
ŷż3PCFSU%SFFTFO "NFSJDBO$POTVM UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i"OUJ0QJVN$BNQBJHO
JO"[FSCBJKBO w"QSJMŴź ŴżŸŹ 3%4 3FMBUFEUPUIF*OUFSOBM"ČBJSTPG*SBO ŴżŸŸoŴżŸż EFDJ-
NBMĕMFŻżŷ

Notes to Pages 196–198 341


Ÿų'PSBDSJUJRVFPGUIFJOUFSOBUJPOBMESVHXBSBTBGPSNPGOFPDPMPOJBMJTN TFFćPNBT
Szasz, Ceremonial Chemistry: The Ritual Persecution of Drugs, Addicts, and Pushers (New
:PSL"ODIPS#PPLT ŴżźŸ 
51. “Outline of Country Internal Defense Plan, Iran,” October 30, 1962, JFKL, RWK, box
ŷŵŷ3PCFSU8,PNFSUP3BMQI%VOHBO i4FOTFPG%JTRVJFUVEFBCPVU*SBO w0DUPCFSŵŶ 
1962, JFKL, RWK; Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 192.
Ÿŵ3PCFSU8,PNFSUP.BY5BZMPS +VMZź ŴżŹŵ +',- 38, CPYŷŴŶ-FPOBSE'SJFT[UP
ćPNBT'JOO +VOFŷ ŴżŹŻ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 5FDIOJDBM4FSWJDFT%JWJTJPO IFSFBęFS
54% CPYż GPMEFS*SBOi.POUIMZ3FQPSU 4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŴ *SBO w"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE
South Asia Branch, box 62, folder 5; Records of the Third Meeting of the Interagency Police
(SPVQ 'FCSVBSZŴŻ ŴżŹŶ *14 CPYŻ GPMEFSŴ$IBSMFT4JSBHVTBUP(BSMBOE8JMMJBNT 3PNF 
+VMZŴŷ ŴżŸŻ #/%%ĕMFT'SBOL8BMUPOTFSWFEGPSBQFSJPEBTPOFPGUIF014BEWJTFSTBęFS
CFJOHUSBOTGFSSFEGSPN7JFUOBN
53. “Outline of Country Internal Defense Plan, Iran,” October 30, 1962, JFKL, RWK,
CPYŷŵŷ4UVBSU83PDLXFMMUP"NCBTTBEPS i3JPU$POUSPM&RVJQNFOU w+VMZŴŵ ŴżŹŶi1FS-
GPSNBODFPGUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFJOUIF5FISBO3JPUT +VOFŸoŹ ŴżŹŶ w*14 CPYŻ GPMEFSŶ
i.POUIMZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSBOE.BZŴżŹŴ "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI
box 62, folder 5.
54. Earnest R. Oney, “The Eyes and Ears of the Shah,” Intelligence Quarterly 1 (February
1986): 3; Klare, American Arms Supermarket, 124; Bill, The Eagle and the Lion,Ŵżŵ#BRFS
Moin, Khomeini: The Life of the Ayatollah (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
ŸŸ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Annual Report, 1974–1975 -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM
Publications, 1975), 129.
56. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 157; Joseph Trento, Prelude to Terror:
The Rogue CIA; The Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network and the Compromising
of American Intelligence /FX:PSL#BTJD#PPLT ŵųųŸ ŸŹ
57. Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the
War on Terror /FX :PSL .FUSPQPMJUBO #PPLT  ŵųųŹ  źŷoźŸ " + -BOHHVUI  i5PSUVSFT
Teachers,” New York Times, June 11, 1979; Rejali, Torture and Modernity,źŻoźż
58. Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran, introduc-
UJPOCZ&-%PDUPSPX /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT Ŵżźź ź ŴŶŶ Ŵŷż3F[B#BSBIFOJ ićF
4"7",%PDVNFOUT wThe Nation,'FCSVBSZŵŶ ŴżŻų ŴżŻoŵųŵ4FFBMTP+BMBM"MJ"INBE 
Occidentosis: A Plague from the West,USBOTBOEFE3$BNQCFMM JOUSPEVDUJPOCZ)BNJE
"MHBS $POUFNQPSBSZ*TMBNJDćPVHIU1FSTJBO4FSJFT #FSLFMFZ.J[BO1SFTT ŴżŻŷ 
Ÿż4FF$ISJTUPQIFS4VMMJWBOBOE.BOBG%BNMVKJ ićF0SJHJOTPG "NFSJDBO1PXFSJO
*SBR ŴżŷŴoŴżŷŸ wPeace and ChangeŶŷ +VMZŵųųż ŵŶŻoŹų
Źų 5BSJR "MJ  Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq (London: Verso, 2003), 61;
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of
Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’athists, and Free Offi-
cers /FX+FSTFZ1SJODFUPO6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżźŻ Ŷŷŵoŷŷ
ŹŴi3FQPSUPOUIF$JWJM1PMJDF'PSDFTPG*SBR w.BZŴżŸźBOE(FPSHF%FOOFZ+SUP"DU-
ing Secretary, April 5, 1965, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 62, folder
*SBRi"QQFOEJY#4VSWFZPG7BSJPVT$PVOUSJFTUP$PNNVOJTU4VCWFSTJPO 3FQPSUPG/4$
1290-d Working Group,” February 16, 1955, DDEL, OCB, box 16, folder Internal Security;
Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 201.
Źŵi3FQPSUPOUIF$JWJM1PMJDF'PSDFTPG*SBR w.BZŴżŸź "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI
"TJB#SBODI CPYŹŵ GPMEFS*SBR(FPSHF%FOFZ+SUP"DUJOH4FDSFUBSZ "QSJMŸ ŴżŹŸi0$#
Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 5, 1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal

342 Notes to Pages 198–201


4FDVSJUZ 0O UIF TZTUFNBUJD DBNQBJHO PG SFQSFTTJPO BHBJOTU UIF DPNNVOJTUT  XIJDI XBT
supported by the United States, see Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary
Movements of Iraq; and Ilario Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party,
Workers’ Movements, and the Left, 1924–2004 $IJDBHP)BZNBSLFU#PPLT ŵųųŶ ŵŶoŶŷ*O
ŴżŷżUIFMBCPSMFBEFS:VTVG4BMNBO:VTVG i'BIEw XBTQVCMJDMZIBOHFEBOEIJTCPEZXBT
MFęJOBQVCMJDTRVBSFBTBXBSOJOHUP#BHIEBETXPSLFSTOPUUPPSHBOJ[FBHBJOTUUIFSFHJNF
Phelps later served with the OPS in Brazil and Peru.
ŹŶćFP)BMMUP$MZEF1IFMQT i"CV(ISBJC w%FDFNCFSŵ ŴżŸź "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE
4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŹŵ GPMEFS*SBR
Źŷ4FF4BÕE,"CVSJTI A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite /FX:PSL4U
.BSUJOTŴżżź Ŵŷų5JN8FJOFS Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA /FX:PSL%PVCMF-
EBZ ŵųųź ŴŷŴ8FMEPO$.BUUIFXT ićF,FOOFEZ"ENJOJTUSBUJPO $PVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ 
BOE*SBRT'JSTU#BUIJTU3FHJNF wInternational Journal of Middle East Studies: 43,4 (2011),
ŹŷŹoŹŷź
65. For interesting insights on this history, see Ali, Bush in Babylon.
ŹŹćFP)BMM i3FQPSUPOUIF(FOEBSNFSJFPG-FCBOPO w*$" 0DUPCFSŴżŸź&EXJO)
"SOPMEUP+)4NJUI GSPN3PCFSU3VQBSE i"TTJTUBODFUPUIF(FOEBSNFSJFPG-FCBOPO
Status Report,” May 1958, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 64, Leba-
OPO"MCFSU%V#PJT $IJFG1VCMJD4BGFUZ"EWJTFS NFNPGPSUIFSFDPSE +VOFŵź ŴżŹŴ 3(
ŷŹż 3FDPSETPGUIF64'PSFJHO"TTJTUBODF"HFODJFT ŴżŷŻoŴżŹŴ *$" 640. -FCBOPO 
Public Safety Division, box 1; Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States
Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958 /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ
Press, 1997); Melvin Gurtov, The United States against the Third World /FX:PSL1SBFHFS 
1974), 36.
67. Edward Vinson to Wade Fleetwood, “Report on the Internal Security Services of Tur-
LFZw.BSDIŴżŸźi.POUIMZ3FQPSU $JWJM1PMJDF'PSDFTPG5VSLFZw/PWFNCFSŴżŸź +VOFŴŷ 
ŴżŸŻ +VMZŴŹ ŴżŸż&EXBSE3#JTIPQ i&OEPG5PVS3FQPSU "OLBSBwBOE+BNFT.D(SFHPS 
“End of Tour Report,” April 17, 1962, all Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box
ŹŹ 5VSLFZćFTFDSFUBSNJFTJODMVEFEOFPGBTDJTUFMFNFOUTXIPIFMQFEPSDIFTUSBUFBDPVQ
in 1980 and spearheaded the brutal repression of Kurdish uprisings. Ganser, NATO’s Secret
Armies,ŵŶų ŶŴ#MBDLĘBHPQFSBUJPOTBSFEFTJHOFEUPEFDFJWFUIFQVCMJDJOTVDIBXBZUIBU
the operations appear as though they are being carried out by other entities. On Turkish
politics, see Andrew Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally (Beverly Hills: Sage Publi-
cations, 1975); Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, Modernity: A History,
1789–2007 /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż 
68. Frank Sojat to Mr. H. J. Anslinger, “Progress Report no. 3,” October 1, 1951; Frank
4PKBUUP.S)+"OTMJOHFS i1SPHSFTT3FQPSUOPŷ w/PWFNCFSŸ ŴżŸŴBOEi'PSNFS*TUBO-
CVM$VTUPNT$IJFG$BVHIUXJUIŴŸ,JMPTPG)FSPJO w*TUBOCVM 4FQUFNCFSŵ ŴżŸŴ 3FDPSET
PGUIF%SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO 3(Ŵźų #/%% ŴżŴŹoŴżźų 5VSLFZ4QFDJBM'JMFT 
CPYŵŸ1FNCMFUPO i*TUBOCVMBOEUIF,OJHIUT&SSBOUPGUIF'FEFSBM#VSFBVPG/BSDPUJDT 
ŴżŷŻoŴżŹųw#FGPSFCVZJOHIJTXBZPVUPGNVSEFSBOEESVHUSBďDLJOHDIBSHFT 4FLCBOXBT
SFHVMBSMZBMMPXFEUPMFBWFQSJTPOBOEWJTJUIJTGBNJMZ
Źż"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ ,BCVM UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i,BOEBIBS6OSFTU4JUVBUJPOBęFS
%FDFNCFSŴżŸż3JPUTwBOE"SUIVS-BOH i&OEPG5PVS3FQPSU w'FCSVBSZŴżŸżUP.BSDI
1961, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 60, folder Afghanistan. On larger
EFWFMPQNFOUQSPHSBNT TFF/JDL$VMMBUIFS i%BNNJOH"GHIBOJTUBO.PEFSOJ[BUJPOJOB
Buffer State,” Journal of American HistoryŻż 4FQUFNCFSŵųųŵ ŸŴŵoŶź
źų"MCFSU&3JFEFM i.POUIMZ3FQPSUPO$JWJM1PMJDF1SPHSBNGPS"GHIBOJTUBO w+BOVBSZ
29, 1958, Africa and Near East and South Asia Branch, box 60, folder Afghanistan.

Notes to Pages 201–203 343


źŴ"SUIVS-BOH 640."GHIBOJTUBOUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ 5FISBO i.BSLJOH3FRVJSF-
NFOUT w "QSJM ŵŶ  ŴżŸż  "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE 4PVUI "TJB #SBODI  CPY Źų  GPMEFS
Afghanistan.
72. See, e.g., David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (Boul-
EFS8FTUWJFX1SFTT ŴżŻŸ 4BÕE,"CVSJTI The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the
House of Saud /FX:PSL4U.BSUJOT1SFTTŴżżŷ 3PCFSU#BFS Sleeping with the Devil: How
Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude /FX:PSL$SPXO ŵųųŶ 
źŶi"SBC4UBUFT4BVEJ"SBCJB wTJUVBUJPOSFQPSU 1BQFSTPG)BSSZ45SVNBO 14' *OUFM-
MJHFODF'JMFT ŴżŷŹoŴżŸŶ $FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF3FQPSUT'JMF 4JUVBUJPO3FQPSUT CPYŵŴź
74. See Nathan Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the
Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations #MPPNJOHUPO*OEJBOB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŵ .PSEFDIBJ
Abir, Oil, Power, and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Gulf (London: Frank
$BTT Ŵżźŷ %FBO3VTLUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ +JEEB i*OUFSOBM%FGFOTF1MBO 4BVEJ"SBCJB w
June 16, 1964, IPS, box 6, folder 2; Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the
Saudi Oil Frontier (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 159, 160. Faisal described
.BSYJTNBTBiTVCWFSTJWFDSFFEPSJHJOBUFECZBWJMF+FXw3PCFSU%SFZGVTT Devil’s Game:
How the United States Helped to Unleash Fundamentalist Islam /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO
#PPLT ŵųųŸ Ŵŷŵ)JUMFSGFMUUIFTBNFXBZ"CJSEFTDSJCFT'BJTBMBTBOFWPMVUJPOBSZNPE-
FSOJ[FSXIPBEPQUFEBNPEFSOFEVDBUJPOTZTUFNBOEUSBOTQPSUBOEDPNNVOJDBUJPOTJOGSB-
TUSVDUVSFi8IJMFIFNBZIBWFTFFNFEBOBOBDISPOJTNUPUIFTPQIJTUJDBUFEJOUFMMJHFOUTJBPG
UIF"SBCDPVOUSJFT IFOFWFSUIFMFTTIBETPNFBUUSBDUJPOGPSUIFPSUIPEPY VOFEVDBUFE"SBC
NBTTFTBOEFTQFDJBMMZ1VSJUBO4BVEJUSJCFTNFOBOEGBSNFSTw ŶŸ 
źŸ3VTLUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ +JEEB i*OUFSOBM%FGFOTF1MBO 4BVEJ"SBCJBwi.JOVUFTPG
Meeting of CI,” August 13, 1964, IPS, box 6.
76. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia, 45; Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game, 142.
źź64$POHSFTT )PVTF (PWFSONFOU"DDPVOUBCJMJUZ0ďDF i4UPQQJOH64"TTJTUBODF
to Foreign Police and Prisons,” February 19, 1976, GAO, ID-76-517; “Saudi Arabia, Public
4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN 0WFSWJFXw "GSJDB BOE /FBS &BTU BOE 4PVUI "TJB #SBODI  CPY ŷ  GPMEFS
Reports.
78. E. H. Adkins and George Miller, “Survey Report of the Surveillance and Protection
PGUIF4BVEJ"SBCJBO0JM'JFMETBOE*OTUBMMBUJPOTGPSUIF.JOJTUSZPGUIF*OUFSJPS ,JOHEPN
PG4BVEJ"SBCJB w%FDFNCFSŴżźŴ 54% CPYŷ 4BVEJ"SBCJB+FUFS8JMMJBNTPO $IJFG1VCMJD
4BGFUZ"EWJTFS "*%3JZBEI i.POUIMZ3FQPSU w"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ +JEEB UP%FQBSUNFOU
of State, June 1968, TSD, box 4, Saudi Arabia; Michael McCann and John Means, “Report
PG4VSWFZPG1VCMJD4FDVSJUZ'PSDFTPG,JOHEPNPG4BVEJ"SBCJBw 64"*% "VHVTUŴżŹŹ 
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i"OOVBM641PMJDZ"TTFTTNFOU4BVEJ"SBCJB w.BSDIŶų ŴżŹŹ -#+- 
National Security File, Country File, Middle East, box 155, Saudi Arabia.
źż "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  4BVEJ "SBCJB  UP "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  5FISBO  "GSJDB BOE /FBS
East and South Asia Branch, box 66, folder Saudi Arabia; Edward R. Bishop, “Report of the
Study of the Saudi Security Forces Riot Control Capabilities,” June 7, 1967, Africa and Near
East and South Asia Branch, box 65, folder Saudi Arabia. On the repression of the SAP, see
Abir, Oil, Power, and Politics, 54.
Żų8JMMJBN%)BSUVOH i.FSDFOBSJFT*OD)PXB64$PNQBOZ1SPQT6QUIF)PVTFPG
Saud,” The ProgressiveŹų "QSJMŴżżŹ ŵŹoŵŻ,JN8JMMFOTPO ićJT(VOGPS)JSF wNews-
week,'FCSVBSZŵŷ ŴżźŸ Ŷų64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPO*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FMBUJPOT 
Defense Contractors’ Training of Foreign Military Forces,)FBSJOHTCFGPSFUIF4VCDPNNJU-
tee on International Political and Military, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1976), 11; “Executive Mercenaries: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” in The Iron Fist and the
Velvet Glove: An Analysis of the U.S. Police, ed. Tony Platt (Berkeley: Center for Research

344 Notes to Pages 203–205


PO$SJNJOBM+VTUJDF ŴżźŸ ŴźŴ1SBUBQ$IBUUFSKFF Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation (New
:PSL4FWFO4UPSJFT1SFTT ŵųųŷ Ŵŵź
81. See Peter Dale Scott, “Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of U.S. Asian Wars,” in War
and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth
Century,FE.BSL4FMEFOBOE"MWJO:4P /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŷ ŴźŸ
David E. Shapiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and Inter-
national Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Żŵ %FBO 3VTL UP "NNBO 64"*%  +VOF ŵŷ  ŴżŹŹ  54%  CPY ŴŴ  GPMEFS +PSEBO 3FQPSUT
i1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSUT w+VOFŴżŹŹi"NNBO +PSEBO w+VMZŴŸ ŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴŴ GPMEFS+PS-
EBO3FQPSUT"WJ4IMBJN Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New
:PSL"MGSFE",OPQG ŵųųŻ ŴŸų ŴŸŴ#PC8PPEXBSE i$*"1BJE.JMMJPOTUP+PSEBOT,JOH
Hussein,” Washington Post,'FCSVBSZŴŻ Ŵżźź%PVHMBT-JUUMF i.JTTJPO*NQPTTJCMFćF$*"
and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” Diplomatic HistoryŵŻ /PWFNCFSŵųųŷ 
ŹŹŶoźųŴ
ŻŶ3VTLUP"NNBO64"*% +VOFŵŷ ŴżŹŹi1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSUT w+VOFŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴŴ 
GPMEFS+PSEBO3FQPSUTi"NNBO +PSEBO w+VMZŴŸ ŴżŹŹćPNBT-PCF i641PMJDF"TTJTUBODF
for the Third World” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1975), 85. Several thousand Pales-
UJOJBOTBSFFTUJNBUFEUPIBWFCFFOLJMMFEJOUIJTQFSJPE1-0GPVOEFS"INFEBM4IVRBJSZ BO
outspoken critic of King Hussein, was long a target of police surveillance in Jordan.
Żŷ 3BZNPOE 8 .FJFS  i" 3FDPNNFOEFE $PSSFDUJPOBM 4ZTUFN GPS UIF )BTIFNJUF
,JOHEPNPG+PSEBO w64"*% 14% "NNBO "GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI 
CPYŹŶ 4VSWFZPG+PSEBO1SJTPOT3BZNPOE8.FJFS 1SJTPO$POTVMUBOU i'JOBM3FQPSU 
"NNBO +PSEBO w"VHVTU ŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴŴ GPMEFS+PSEBO3FQPSUT
85. “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” Country Report, Pakistan, August
4, 1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal Security; Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War
on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT Ŵżżŷ 4BFFE4IBGRBU Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to
Benazir Bhutto (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 184.
ŻŹ+PIOTPO.POSPFBOE.JUDIFMM.BCBSEZ i&WBMVBUJPO3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN
GPS1SPWJODJBM1PMJDFBOE$JWJM"SNFE'PSDFT w"VHVTUo4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŻ "GSJDBBOE/FBS
East and South Asia Branch, box 65, folder Pakistan; W. Paul Kelley, “Public Safety, Monthly
3FQPSU +BOVBSZŴżŹų w"GSJDBBOE/FBS&BTUBOE4PVUI"TJB#SBODI CPYŹŷ 5BSJR"MJ Can
Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State (London: Verso, 1983), 109.
Żź+PTFQI+$PSSUP+PIOTPO'.VOSPF i3FQPSUPO1PMJDF3FGPSNT w+VMZŴżŹŶ *14 CPY
Ŷ GPMEFS1BLJTUBO64FNCBTTZ ,BSBDIJ UP"*% i1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNGPS1BLJTUBO+PJOU
&NCBTTZ"*%$PVOUSZ5FBN.FTTBHF w"QSJMŵŹ ŴżŹŶ *14 CPYŶ GPMEFS1BLJTUBO
ŻŻi64"*%JO&BTU1BLJTUBO w.BZŴżŹź 4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU 64"*% ŵŷ64FNCBTTZ 
,BSBDIJ UP"*% i1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNGPS1BLJTUBO+PJOU&NCBTTZ"*%$PVOUSZ5FBN
Message” April 26, 1963, IPS, box 8; Pakistan; Gurtov, The United States against the Third
World, Ŵźų /PBN $IPNTLZ BOE &EXBSE 4 )FSNBO  The Political Economy of Human
Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press,
Ŵżźż ŴųŹi#JP%BUB*OGPSNBUJPO3PCFSU/#VTI w+VMZŴŵ ŴżźŴ BOE$PMPOFM%BP2VBO
Hien, “Security Protection Plan for Lower House, Presidential, and Vice-Presidential Elec-
UJPOT w #JFO )PB  3FQVCMJD PG 7JFUOBN  "VHVTU ŴżźŴ  CPUI DPVSUFTZ 4HU (BSZ 8JMLJOTPO 
Indiana State Police, Ret. A captain in the Indiana State Police and a decorated World War II
DPNCBUWFUFSBOXJUIFYQFSJFODFJO4PVUI,PSFBBOE7JFUOBN #VTISFDFJWFEB1VSQMF)FBSU
BOE 4JMWFS 4UBS GPS DPNCBU FYQMPJUT JO &VSPQF EVSJOH 8PSME 8BS ** )F HSBEVBUFE GSPN
1VSEVF6OJWFSTJUZJOUIFŴżŶųT XIFSFIFTUBSSFEPOUIFGPPUCBMMUFBN)FIBEBUXFOUZ
year police career, which included a stint as chief of internal and external security for the

Notes to Pages 205–206 345


$VNJOTFOHJOFDPNQBOZ*OUIFFBSMZŴżźųTIFXPSLFEXJUIUIFQPMJDF4QFDJBM#SBODIJO
#JFO)PBBTQBSUPGUIF1IPFOJYQSPHSBN
Żżi3FQPSUUP/4$0$##PBSE1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ 
%%&- 0$# CPYŴź"INFE3BTIJE Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure
of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia /FX:PSL7JLJOH ŵųųŻ ŶŹ
&RCBM"INBE i1BLJTUBO4JHOQPTUTUPB1PMJDF4UBUF wJournal of Contemporary Asia 4 (April
Ŵżźŷ ŷŵŶoŶŻ0OUIFDPSSVQUJPOPGUIF*4* TFF-BXSFODF-JGTDIVMU[ i1BLJTUBOćF&NQJSF
of Heroin,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W.
.D$PZBOE"MBO"#MPDL #PVMEFS8FTUWJFX1SFTT Ŵżżŵ ŶŴżoŸŵ
90. Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle
East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009). See also Aburish, A Brutal Friendship; Little, American
Orientalism.

10. The Dark Side of the Alliance for Progress


1. See Lee Echols, Hilarious High-Jinks and Dangerous Assignments (Washington, D.C.:
/BUJPOBM3JĘF"TTPDJBUJPO Ŵżżų %BWJE5PCJT ićF"MMJBODFGPS1SPHSFTT%FWFMPQNFOU
1SPHSBNGPSUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT wJOGuatemalan Rebellion: Unfinished History, ed. Jonathan
-'SJFEFUBM /FX:PSL(SPWF1SFTT ŴżŻŶ żŵożź3JDIBSE15VDLFS Insatiable Appetite:
The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World /FX:PSL3PXNBO
-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųź 
2. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times /FX:PSL.BSJOFS#PPLT 
2002), 467; Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Con-
fronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1999); Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy
/FX:PSL%BWJE.D,BZ ŴżźŹ Ŵŵŷ
3. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective,” in Latin Amer-
ica: The Search for a New International Role,FE3POBME()FMMNBOBOE)+PO3PTFOCBVN
/FX :PSL +PIO 8JMFZ  4POT  ŴżźŸ  ŻŶ /PBN $IPNTLZ  Turning the Tide: U.S. Inter-
vention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1987),
12; Charles Maechling Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Low Intensity
Warfare: Counter-Insurgency, Pro-Insurgency, and Anti-terrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael
5,MBSFBOE1FUFS,PSOCMVI /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŴżŻŻ ŵŹoŵź
4. “Internal Warfare and the Security of Underdeveloped States,” POF, box 98.
5. See Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela,
1919–1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 146; Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movements
in Latin America (London: Nelson, 1970), 151; John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America
/FX:PSL$PMMJFS ŴżŹŸ ŴŸż4UFWFO4DIXBSU[CFSH i3ØNVMP#FUBODPVSU'SPNB$PN-
NVOJTU"OUJ*NQFSJBMJTUUPB4PDJBM%FNPDSBUXJUI644VQQPSU wJournal of Latin American
Studiesŵż 0DUPCFSŴżżź ŹŴŶoŹŸ
Źi1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU w/PWFNCFSBOE%FDFNCFSŴżŹŸ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 0145FDIOJ-
cal Services Division, box 24 (hereafter TSD), Venezuela; “Records of the 4th Meeting,
Interagency Group,” April 30, 1963, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Internal Defense and Public
4BGFUZ 0ďDFPGUIF%JSFDUPS CPYŻ IFSFBęFS*14 1FUFS5$IFX i"NFSJDBT(MPCBM1FBDF
Officers,” Kiwanis Magazine (April 1969): 24; Michael T. Klare, The Mercenarization of the
Third World: U.S. Military and Police Assistance Programs /FX :PSL /PSUI "NFSJDBO
$POHSFTT PO /PSUI "NFSJDB  Ŵżźų  ŴŴ +PIO 1 -POHBO  i.FNPJS w XJUI +BNFT % 8JM-
MJBNT +BOVBSZŴżŻŹ Ŷŷ $PVSUFTZPG6OJWFSTJUZPG*MMJOPJTBU4QSJOHĕFME"SDIJWFT 4QFDJBM
Collections.

346 Notes to Pages 206–210


7. Martha K. Huggins, Political Policing: The United States and Latin America %VSIBN
%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŻ ŴŴŶ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Venezuela Report, 1998 (London:
"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM ŴżżŻ ŵ+BNFT%$PDLDSPę Latin America: History, Politics, and
U.S. Policy,ŵOEFE $IJDBHP/FMTPO)BMM1VCMJTIFST ŴżżŹ ŶŻż$PNNVOJTU1BSUZMFBEFS
"MCFSUP-PWFSBXBTBNPOHUIPTFLJMMFE
Żi+PIO1-POHBO i.POUIMZ3FQPSUT 7FOF[VFMB w"QSJMBOE.BZo+VOFŴżŹŹ 54% CPY
24, folder Venezuela; Michael T. Klare, War without End: American Planning for the Next
Vietnams /FX:PSL,OPQG Ŵżźŵ ŵŸŵ
ż 4UBOMFZ 8 (VUI BOE #SZBO - 2VJDL  i7FOF[VFMB 5FSNJOBUJPO 1IBTF0VU 3FQPSU w
April 1974, RG 286, USAID, OPS, Geographic Files, box 12, folder Venezuela (hereafter
Geographic Files); Nikolas Kozloff, Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S.
/FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJMMBO ŵųųŹ 
10. Klare, War without End, 253; José Moreno, Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo
Domingo (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970). One of the heads of the Cascos
#MBODPT $PM'SBODJTDP$BBNB×P%F×Ø XBTBTPOPG5SVKJMMPTDIJFGUPSUVSFS*OŴżŹŸIF
EFGFDUFEUPUIFSFWPMVUJPOBSJFTBOEXBTMBUFSHSPPNFEBT$IF(VFWBSBTTVDDFTTPSJO#PMJWJB
'PSUIFSPMFPGUIF014QSPHSBNTJODPOUSJCVUJOHUPUIFFOUSFODINFOUPGEJDUBUPS'PSCFT
#VSOIBNJO(VJBOBBęFSUIF$*"CBDLFEPVTUFSPGEFNPDSBUJDTPDJBMJTU$IFEEJ+BHBO TFF
Stephen G. Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2009).
ŴŴ&SJDćPNBT$IFTUFS Rag-Tags, Scum, Riff-Raff, and Commies: The U.S. Intervention
in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966 /FX:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŵųųŴ 3BCF The
Most Dangerous Area in the World, ŷŻ ćPNBT .BOO  +PIOTPOT DIJFG BEWJTFS PO -BUJO
"NFSJDB DBMMFE#PTDIBOiJNQSBDUJDBMGFMMPXwBOEiJEFBMJTUXIPXSJUFTCPPLT‫ڀڀ‬8FEPOU
UIJOLUIBUIFJTBDPNNVOJTU<CVUXF>EPOUUIJOLUIBU<IF>VOEFSTUBOETUIBUUIFDPNNV-
nists are dangerous.”
Ŵŵ%FBO3VTLUP64"*%4BOUP%PNJOHP i1PMJDF$JWJD"DUJPO w.BZŴŴ ŴżŹŹi1VCMJD
4BGFUZ3FQPSU 4BOUP%PNJOHP w/PWFNCFSo%FDFNCFSŴżŹŸ .BZŴżŹŹBOEi1VCMJD4BGFUZ
.POUIMZ 3FQPSU  4BOUP %PNJOHP w "QSJM ŴżŹŹ  (FPHSBQIJD 'JMFT  CPY Ŵż  GPMEFS 4BOUP
%PNJOHP .POUIMZ3FQPSUT"NFSJDBO&NCBTTZUP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i4IJQNFOU"SSJWBMJO
4BOUP%PNJOHP w.BZŶŴ ŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴŵ GPMEFS%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD 8FBQPOTBOE5FBS
(BT"$*"iBTTFUwSFDSVJUFEUISPVHIUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT .PSJMMPXBTJOWPMWFEJOBŴżŹŶ
DPVQBHBJOTU#PTDI XIPTFSWFECSJFĘZJOUIFQSFTJEFODZ
ŴŶi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU 4BOUP%PNJOHP w.BZŴżŹŹ (FPHSBQIJD'JMFT CPYŴż 
GPMEFS4BOUP%PNJOHP .POUIMZ3FQPSUT-BVSFO+(PJO 8JMMJBN#SPF BOE-5<IJTĕSTU
OBNFJTOFWFSHJWFO BTJHOIFJT$*">4IBOOPO i%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJDćF$JWJM4FDVSJUZ
'PSDF%FWFMPQNFOU1MBO w4FQUFNCFSŴŶ ŴżŹŸ 64"*% 014 IUUQQEGVTBJEHPWQEG@EPDT
1/"%/żżŴQEG/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Political Economy of Human
Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, vol. 1 (Boston: South End
1SFTT  Ŵżźż  ŵŷŷ  ŵŷŹ /PSNBO (BMM  i4BOUP %PNJOHP ćF 1PMJUJDT PG 5FSSPSw New York
Review of Books,+VMZŵŵ ŴżźŴ ŴŸoŴż.PSTFRVPUFEJOćPNBT%-PCF i641PMJDF"TTJT-
tance For the Third World” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1975), 123.
Ŵŷ+PIOTPO.POSPFUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ -B#BOEB 4FQUFNCFSŵ ŴżźŴBOEi1PMJUJDBM
&WBMVBUJPO w0DUPCFSź ŴżźŴ *14 CPYŷ GPMEFS%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD
15. See Mary Roldán, Blood and Fire: La Violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953
%VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŵ %BWJE#VTIOFMM The Making of Modern Colombia:
A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 231
ŴŹ)FSCFSU0)BSEJOUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ +VOFŴż ŴżŸŻ 3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 -BUJO
"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŵŶ GPMEFS$PMPNCJB IFSFBęFS014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI 

Notes to Pages 210–212 347


Ŵź%FOOJT.3FNQF i(VFSSJMMBT #BOEJUT BOE*OEFQFOEFOU3FQVCMJDT64$PVOUFS
*OTVSHFODZ&ČPSUTJO$PMPNCJB ŴżŸżoŴżŹŸ wSmall Wars and Insurgencies 6 (Winter 1995):
Ŷųŷoŵź.JDIBFM.D$MJOUPDL Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterin-
surgency, Counter-terrorism, 1940–1990 /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT Ŵżżŵ ŵŵŵoŵŶi4USB-
UFHJD4UVEZPG$PMPNCJB w"QSJMŷ ŴżŹŶ "4+ 8IJUF)PVTF'JMFT 8-5ŵż GPMEFS$PMPNCJB
8JMMJBN 1 :BSCPSPVHI  i64 4QFDJBM 8BSGBSF $FOUFSw JO U.S. Department of the Army,
Office of the Chief of Information, Special Warfare, U.S. Army: An Army Specialty (Washing-
UPO %$(10 ŴżŹŶ "SUIVS.4DIMFTJOHFS+S TFOJPSBJEFUP1SFTJEFOU,FOOFEZ SFDPN-
NFOEFEUIBUUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTLFFQJUTTVQQPSUTFDSFUJOPSEFSUPBWPJEBOZCBEQVCMJDJUZ
)BOT5PęFTFSWFEJOUIFBOUJ/B[JVOEFSHSPVOEJO%FONBSLBOEXBTDSFEJUFECZ(FOFSBM
Matthew Ridgway with the “collection of vital intelligence on North Korea.” Tofte went on
UPTFSWFJOUIF1IJMJQQJOFTBOEBDSPTT-BUJO"NFSJDBBTBOVODPOWFOUJPOBMXBSGBSFTQFDJBM-
JTU*OŴżŹŹIFXBTEJTNJTTFECZUIF$*"GPSIBWJOHDMBTTJĕFEEPDVNFOUTJOIJT8BTIJOHUPO
BQBSUNFOU4FF+BNFT#BSSPO i)BOT5PęF 8PSME8BS**4QZ-BUFS%JTNJTTFECZUIF$*" w
New York Times, August 28, 1987.
18. McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft,ŵŵŵoŵŶi4USBUFHJD4UVEZPG$PMPNCJB w"QSJMŷ 
ŴżŹŶ4FFBMTP(FPČ4JNNPOT Colombia: A Brutal History -POEPO4BRJ#PPLT ŵųųŷ ŷŻ
Ŵż 4FF &EVBSEP 1J[BSSP -FPOHØNF[  i3FWPMVUJPOBSZ (VFSSJMMB (SPVQT JO $PMPNCJB w
in Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, ed. Charles
#FSHRVJTU  3JDBSEP 1F×BSBOEB  BOE (PO[BMP 4ÈODIF[ 8JMNJOHUPO  %FM 4DIPMBSMZ
Resources, 1992), 180; Walter J. Broderick, Camilo Torres: A Biography of the Priest-Guer-
rillero /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżźŸ (PUU Guerrilla Movements in Latin America,ŵŵųoŵŴ
20. David Laughlin, Robert Bowling, and Herbert Hardin, “Report on the Police in the
3FQVCMJD PG $PMPNCJB w %FDFNCFS ŴżŹŵ  014  -BUJO "NFSJDB #SBODI  CPY Ÿ  $PMPNCJB
i.POUIMZ3FQPSU w'FCSVBSZŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŷ $PMPNCJBćF$MJOU&BTUXPPEDirty Harry
ĕMNT JOXIJDI&BTUXPPETDIBSBDUFS B4BO'SBODJTDPEFUFDUJWF BEPQUTFYUSBMFHBMWJHJMBOUF
NFUIPETUPHFUUIFiCBEHVZT wXBTBDVMUIJUBNPOHDPOTFSWBUJWFTBOEFODPVSBHFEUIFMBX
BOEPSEFSNPWFNFOU
ŵŴ%BWJE-BVHIMJOUP#ZSPO&OHMF i7JTJUUP$IJMFBOE$PMPNCJB w0DUPCFSŻ ŴżŹŶ 014 
-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŵŶŸ GPMEFS$PMPNCJBi3FQVCMJDPG$PMPNCJB1PMJDF$PNNVOJ-
DBUJPOT4VSWFZ3FQPSU wŴżŹŶ 54% CPYŴ GPMEFS$PMPNCJB$MJęPO.POSPF i4VSWFZPGUIF
*OEVTUSJBM 4FDVSJUZ 0QFSBUJPOT PG &NQSFTB $PMPNCJB EF 1FUSPMFBT w /PWFNCFS ŴżŹż  BOE
"SMFO+FFFUBM i5FSNJOBUJPO1IBTF0VU4UVEZw1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPKFDU "QSJMŴżźŷ BMMUISFF
54%  CPY Ŵ  GPMEFS $PMPNCJB +POBUIBO .BSTIBMM  Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsur-
gency, and Covert Operations in the Third World (San Francisco: Cohan and Cohen, 1991), 5.
Neeley served with the FBI in Argentina before World War II. Other advisers included Roy
Driggers of the New Mexico State police and Peter Ellena of Pasadena, California, who also
served in Brazil, Uruguay, and Laos.
ŵŵi5FSNJOBUJPO1IBTF0VU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPKFDU PG$PMPNCJB w"QSJMŴżźŷ 54% CPY
Ŵŷ  i4USBUFHJD 4UVEZ PG $PMPNCJB w "QSJM ŷ  ŴżŹŶ  +',-  $PVOUSZ 'JMF $PMPNCJB  CPY ŵż 
GPMEFS$PMPNCJB+FČSFZ'5BČFU Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress
in Latin America /FX:PSL3PVUMFEHF ŵųųź ŴŸŸ5BČFUQSPWJEFTTPNFVTFGVMEBUBCVU
VOEFSQMBZTUIFWJPMFOUTJEFPGUIF"MMJBODFBOEIPXJUXBTVTFEUPTVQQPSU64FDPOPNJD
interests.
23. In Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of
the New Imperialism /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ żŻ
24. “Public Safety Monthly Report,” January and February 1966, and Theodore Brown,
i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w "QSJM ŴŻ  ŴżŹŹ  CPUI 54%  $PMPNCJB  CPY ŷ  $PMPNCJB
"MTP i1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSUw+BOVBSZŴżŹź 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŶŵ0O

348 Notes to Pages 212–214


UIF $PMPNCJBO DPVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ  TFF %PVHMBT 4UPLFT  America’s Other War: Terrorizing
Colombia (London: Zed Books, 2005), 57; Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political
Economy of War and Peace in Colombia "MCBOZ4UBUF6OJWFSTJUZPG/FX:PSL1SFTT ŵųųŵ 
Adolph Saenz, The OPS Story: A True Story of Tupamaro, Terrorists, Assassinations, Kidnap-
pings in Colombia, and Communist Subversion and Insurgency (San Francisco: Robert Reed,
2002), 279. Cash rewards were offered for the assassination of guerrilla leaders, in a forerun-
OFSPGUIF7JFUOBN1IPFOJYQSPHSBN
25. Gérard Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World, rev. ed., trans. Diana Johnstone (New
:PSL 7JLJOH  ŴżŻż  ŹŷoŹŸ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w 'FCSVBSZ ŴżŹŹ  54%  CPY ŷ 
$PMPNCJB
26. Broderick, Camilo Torres,ŶŶŵoŵŶ(PUU Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 223.
27. Theodore Brown to Byron Engle, April 22, 1966, TSD, box 4, Monthly Reports 1966;
"NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  #PHPUÈ  UP %FBO 3VTL  i&NFSHFODZ 1SPDVSFNFOU w .BSDI Ŵų  ŴżŹŹ
Geoffrey Oberdich, Federal Laboratories Inc. Washington Office to Mr. Pat Connelly,
64"*% 'FCSVBSZŴŷ ŴżŹŹ54% CPYŷ $PMPNCJB
ŵŻi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w0DUPCFSŴżŹŻ %FDFNCFSŴżŹŻ BOE.BZŴżźų wBMM
014-BUJO"NFSJDB CPYŶŵ4BFO[ The OPS Story, 22.
ŵżi1VCMJD4BGFUZ .POUIMZ3FQPSU +BOVBSZŴżŹź w014-BUJO"NFSJDBCSBODI #PYŶŵ
3FDFOUMZ EFDMBTTJĕFE EPDVNFOUT PO UIF /BUJPOBM 4FDVSJUZ "SDIJWF XFCTJUF QBJOU B HSJN
QJDUVSFPGUIFBCVTFT4FF GPSFYBNQMF i$PMPNCJB$*4UFQTJOUIF3JHIU%JSFDUJPO w'FCSV-
BSZŵ Ŵżżŷ %JSFDUPSPG*OUFMMJHFODF /4"3FNQF i(VFSSJMMBT #BOEJUT BOE*OEFQFOEFOU
3FQVCMJDT w Ŷųŷoŵź + 1BUSJDF .D4IFSSZ  Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert
War in Latin America /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŸ Ŵż
30. Saenz, The OPS Story, 272; “AID Official Byron Engle Dies at 79,” Washington Post,
January 12, 1990.
ŶŴi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w0DUPCFSŴżŹŹ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI $PMPNCJB 
box 30, folder Monthly Public Safety Reports; “Public Safety Monthly Report,” February
ŴżŹŻ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI $PMPNCJB CPYŶų GPMEFS.POUIMZ1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSUT
Ŷŵi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w%FDFNCFSŴżŹŻ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI $PMPN-
bia, box 32, folder Monthly Public Safety Reports; Peter Ellena, “Evaluation of AID Public
4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN JO $PMPNCJB w +VMZ ŴżŹż  64"*%  014  IUUQQEGVTBJEHPWQEG@EPDT
PDACM630.pdf; Marshall, Drug Wars.
ŶŶ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w 'FCSVBSZ BOE "QSJM ŴżŹŹ  54%  CPY ŷ %FDFNCFS
ŴżŹŻ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI $PMPNCJB CPYŶŵ GPMEFS.POUIMZ1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSUT
Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War
on Terror /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŹ "+-BOHHVUI Hidden Terrors: The Truth
about U.S. Police Operations in Latin America /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżźŻ ŻŸ1IJMJQ"HFF 
Inside the Company: A CIA Diary /FX:PSL4JNPO4DIVTUFS ŴżźŸ 
Ŷŷ i$*" *OUFMMJHFODF 3FQPSU w Ŵżżŷ  XXXHXVFEV_OTBSDIJWDPMPNCJBŴżżŷųŴŵŹQEG
"NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ  #PHPUÈ  UP 4FDSFUBSZ PG 4UBUF  i(FOFSBM 3BNJSF[ -BTIFT 0VU BU 4UBUF
%FQBSUNFOU 3FQPSU .PSF (FOFSBMT VOEFS *OWFTUJHBUJPO GPS 1BSBNJMJUBSZ -JOLT w "VHVTU
ŴżżŻ  XXXHXVFEV_OTBSDIJW/4"&##/4"&##ŶŵźEPDųŴ@ŴżżŻųŻŴŶQEG i5SVKJMMP %F
DMBTTJĕFE%PDVNFOUJOH$PMPNCJBT5SBHFEZXJUIPVU&OE w0DUPCFSŸ ŵųųŻ /4"+BWJFS
Giraldo, Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy,GPSFXPSECZ/PBN$IPNTLZ .POSPF .F
$PNNPO $PVSBHF 1SFTT  ŵųųŵ  'PSSFTU )ZMUPO  Evil Hour in Colombia (London: Verso,
2006).
ŶŸi#SJFĕOH 1VCMJD4BGFUZ%JWJTJPO w014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VB-
UFNBMB ,JSTUFO 8FME  i3FBEJOH UIF 1PMJUJDT PG )JTUPSZ JO (VBUFNBMBT /BUJPOBM 1PMJDF
"SDIJWFTw 1I% EJTT  :BMF 6OJWFSTJUZ  ŵųŴų  4UFQIFO 4DIMFTJOHFS BOE 4UFQIFO ,JO[FS 

Notes to Pages 214–216 349


Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, ŵOE FE $BNCSJEHF %BWJE
3PDLFGFMMFS$FOUFSGPS-BUJO"NFSJDBO4UVEJFT )BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżżż (SFH(SBOEJO 
The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004).
36. Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guate-
mala, 1952–1954 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999), 12, 20, 22; Stephen M. Streeter,
Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961 (Athens:
0IJP6OJWFSTJUZ$FOUFSGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM4UVEJFT ŵųųų żŶ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ (VBUFNBMB 
UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i.VUVBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBNJO(VBUFNBMB w4FQUFNCFSŵŴ ŴżŸż 3%4 
3(Ÿż 3%4 CPYŷŵŴŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB IFSFBęFS3%4 (VBUFNBMB 
37. “Fighter’s End,” Time, "VHVTU Ÿ  ŴżŸź  ŵŶ ćPNBT .FMWJMMF BOE .BSKPSJF .FMWJMMF 
Guatemala: Another Vietnam  /FX:PSL1FOHVJO#PPLT ŴżźŴ ŴŵųoŵŴ(FSBTTJ The Great
Fear in Latin America, 182.
38. Cullather, Secret History, 113; Michael McClintock, The American Connection: State
Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala, 2 vols. (London: Zed Books, 1985), 2:18; Ste-
phen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New
:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųŴŴ ŸŶ-JOBSFTXBTLOPXOGPSUPSUVSJOHQSJTPOFSTXJUI
electric-shock baths and head-shrinking steel skullcaps,
Ŷż'SFE'JNCSFT i3FQPSUPOUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFJOUIF3FQVCMJDPG(VBUFNBMB wŴżŸŹ 
3%4 3(Ÿż CPYŷŵŴŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB,BUF%PZMF ićF"USPDJUZ'JMFT%FDJQIFSJOHUIF
"SDIJWFTPG(VBUFNBMBT%JSUZ8BSwHarper’s,%FDFNCFSŵųųź ŸŵoŹŵ
ŷų+PJOU4UBUF*$"UP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ (VBUFNBMB %FDFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ BOE"NFSJDBO
FNCBTTZUP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF +VMZŴŶ ŴżŸŹ CPUI3%4 3(Ÿż CPYŷŵŴŸ GPMEFS(VBUF-
NBMB)FSCFSU)BSEJO i6TFPG'JSFBSNTCZ/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPG(VBUFNBMB w.BSDIŵŻ ŴżŹŵ 
014-BUJO"NFSJDBO#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB
ŷŴ"SMFO+FF i$SJNJOBMJTUJDT0QFSBUJPOTPGUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDF 3FQVCMJDPG(VBUFNBMB 
4VNNBSZBOE'PMMPX6Q w/PWFNCFSŴż Ŵżźų *14 *OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ CPYŷ
"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ (VBUFNBMB UP%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i-BXPO0SHBOJ[JOHUIF/BUJPOBM
1PMJDF w+VMZŸ ŴżŸŸ 3%4 3(Ÿż CPYŷŵŴŸ (VBUFNBMB
42. McClintock, The American Connection, 2:33; “Report to NSC Pursuant to NSC Action
ŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# 8IJUF)PVTF0ďDF /BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PVODJM
Staff, Overseas Coordinating Board, box 17, folder Internal Security; David Atlee Phillips,
The Night Watch -POEPO3PCFSU)BMF ŴżźŻ Ÿŵ1PQQBDPVMECFBDPEFOBNFGPS1IJMMJQT
BOEPS-FF&DIPMT XIPTQFOUUJNFJO(VBUFNBMB
ŷŶi3FQPSUUP/4$1VSTVBOUUP/4$"DUJPOŴŵżųE w4FQUFNCFSŴŵ ŴżŸŸ+BOVBSZŶ ŴżŸź
44. “Fighter’s End.”
ŷŸ8JMMJBN#$POOFUU+S 4FDSFUBSZPG&NCBTTZ i3FQPSUPO/BUJPOBM1PMJDF w0DUPCFS
Ŵ ŴżŸŻBOE4NJUIUP(VBUFNBMB$JUZ 0DUPCFSŴų ŴżŸŻ 3%4 3(Ÿż CPYŷŵŴŸ GPMEFS(VB-
UFNBMB4USFFUFS Managing the Counterrevolution, 93. After large anticorruption protests at
-BT+PSOBEBTXFSFWJPMFOUMZCSPLFOVQ )FSCFSU)BSEJOTJNJMBSMZDMBJNFEUIBUUIFSFMJBODF
CZUIF/BUJPOBM1PMJDFPOEFQSFTTFEĕSFGSPNSJPUHVOTJOTUFBEPGSJĘFĕSFBSNTQSPCBCMZ
iMPXFSFEUIFOVNCFSPGDBTVBMUJFTDPOTJEFSBCMZw8FME i3FBEJOHUIF1PMJUJDTPG)JTUPSZJO
(VBUFNBMBT/BUJPOBM1PMJDF"SDIJWFT wŴŷŻ
ŷŹ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ UP UIF %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i*OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ 4JUVBUJPO BOE
/FFET w"QSJMŹ ŴżŹŴ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB+PIO1-POHBO 
i5PVS3FQPSU w.BZŵŷ ŴżŹų 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB-BVSFO
+(PJOBOE4.PSFZ#FMM i&WBMVBUJPO 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN64"*%(VBUFNBMB w%FDFN-
ber 1971, 58; Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 72.

350 Notes to Pages 216–218


ŷź"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ (VBUFNBMB$JUZ UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF w+VMZŵŷ ŴżŹų 014-BUJO
"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZUPUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF 
“Internal Security Situation and Needs,” April 6, 1961.
ŷŻ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ UP UIF %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i*OUFSOBM 4FDVSJUZ 4JUVBUJPO BOE
/FFET w"QSJMŹ ŴżŹŴ3PCFSU))PMEFO i4FDVSJOH$FOUSBM"NFSJDBBHBJOTU$PNNVOJTN
The United States and the Modernization of Surveillance in the Cold War,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs 41 (Spring 1999): 16. Nevertheless, the OPS continued
PWFSUJNFUPXPSLDMPTFMZXJUIUIF+VEJDJBMQPMJDF FWFOTFUUJOHVQBTQFDJBMBDBEFNZ4FF GPS
FYBNQMF )FSCFSU0)BSEJOUP%-$SJTPTUPNP 4FQUFNCFSŴŴ ŴżŹŴ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB
#SBODI CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB
ŷż64$POHSFTT )PVTF $PNNJUUFFPO'PSFJHO"ČBJST )FBSJOHT Statement by Assis-
tant Secretary Edwin M. Martin before the Latin American Subcommittee on the Subject of
Communist Subversion in the Hemisphere, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., February 18, 1963 (Wash-
JOHUPO%$(10 ŴżŹŶ i'PS3PCFSU8,PNFS(VBUFNBMB*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ4JUVBUJPO w
.BZŻ ŴżŹŵ +',- /4$ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMBi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU 5FHVDJHBMQB w
"VHVTUŴŴ ŴżŹŸ -BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYż GPMEFS)POEVSBTi.JOVUFTPGUIF$*.FFU-
ing,” April 8, 1965, IPS, box 6, folder 3.
Ÿų.FNPSBOEVNGPSUIF1SFTJEFOUGSPN%FQVUZ4FDSFUBSZPG%FGFOTF i$BQBCJMJUZPGUIF
(VBUFNBMBO(PWFSONFOUUP$POUSPM3JPUT w+',- 10' CPYŴŴŻi*OWFOUPSZPG3JPU$POUSPM
&RVJQNFOU w+',- 10' CPYŴŴŻ3BCF The Most Dangerous Area in the World,źŸoźŹ
51. McClintock, The American Connection,ŵŸŵi.FFUJOH14%(VBUFNBMB w0DUPCFSż 
ŴżŹŶ BOE)FSCFSU)BSEJOUP#ZSPO&OHMF i1SPQFS.BOBHFNFOUPG1SPHSBN (VBUFNBMB w
4FQUFNCFS ŴŻ  ŴżŹŶ  CPUI -BUJO "NFSJDB #SBODI  CPY ŹŸ  GPMEFS Ŷ %PZMF  ićF "USPDJUZ
Files.”
Ÿŵ$*"JOGPSNBUJPODBCMF i1MBOOFE(PWFSONFOU.FBTVSFTUP$PVOUFSUIF$PNNVOJTU
and Student Plans for Possible Violence on March 20, 1964,” LBJL, National Security Files,
$PVOUSZ'JMF -BUJO"NFSJDB CPYŸŷ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB
53. Byron Engle, Director OPS, to John P. Longan, Chief Public Safety Advisor, Venezu-
FMB i1MBOTUP$PVOUFS&YUPSUJPO,JEOBQQJOHTJO(VBUFNBMB w+VOFŷ ŴżŹŹ /4"
Ÿŷ(VBUFNBMBUP64"*% i1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w0DUPCFSŴżŹŷ -BUJO"NFSJDB
#SBODI $PVOUSZ'JMF CPYŹŸ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB(SBOEJO The Last Colonial Massacre, 36;
-POHBO i.FNPJSw
55. Melville and Melville, Guatemala: Another Vietnam?, 267; Adolfo Gilly, “The Guer-
SJMMB.PWFNFOUJO(VBUFNBMB wMonthly ReviewŴź .BZŴżŹŸ żoŷų
ŸŹćPNBT)VHIFT */3<*OUFMMJHFODFBOE3FTFBSDI 4UBUF%FQBSUNFOU> UPUIF4FDSF-
UBSZ i"$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ3VOOJOH8JME w0DUPCFSŵŶ ŴżŹź /4"8FME i3FBEJOHUIF
1PMJUJDTPG)JTUPSZJO(VBUFNBMBT/BUJPOBM1PMJDF"SDIJWFT wŴŹŴ/PSNBO(BMM i4MBVHIUFSJO
(VBUFNBMB wNew York Review of Books, May 20, 1971, 14.
57. Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 87.
58. McClintock, The American Connection,ŵŸż Żŷ$*"4QFDJBM3FQPSUT i(VBUFNBMBO
$PNNVOJTUT5BLFB)BSE-JOFPO*OTVSHFODZw"VHVTUŹ ŴżŹŸ -#+- /BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ'JMF 
$PVOUSZ'JMF -BUJO"NFSJDB CPYŴŸŷ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB$*"JOUFSOBMNFNP i(VBUFNBMB
after the Military Shake-Up,” May 13, 1968, LBJL, National Security File, Country File, Latin
"NFSJDB CPYŸŷ GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB&EVBSEP(BMFBOP Guatemala: Occupied Country (New
:PSL.POUIMZ3FWJFX1SFTT ŴżŹŻ źŴ
Ÿżi(VBUFNBMB$BVHIUJOUIF$SPTTĕSF w4FQUFNCFSŹ ŴżŹŻ ŷŵ8BMUFS-B'FCFS Inevita-
ble Revolutions: The United States in Central America /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŴżŻŷ ŵŸź%PZMF 
“The Atrocity File,” 61.

Notes to Pages 000–000 351


Źų i(VBUFNBMBO "OUJ5FSSPSJTU $BNQBJHO w Defense Intelligence Agency, Secret Intelli-
gence Bulletin, January 12, 1971, NSA.
61. McClintock, The American Connection, 2:107; Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People:
United States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture, and Murder and the Persecution
of the Catholic Church in Latin America /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŻų ŴŻŹi1VCMJD4BGFUZ
1SPHSBNJO(VBUFNBMBwBOEi1VCMJD4BGFUZJO(VBUFNBMB"6TFGVM1SPHSBN w*14 CPYŴ 
GPMEFS(VBUFNBMB
Źŵ"NCBTTBEPS$"MMBO4UFXBSU i3FQPSUPO7JTJUUP$FOUSBM"NFSJDBBOE1BOBNBUP
4UVEZ"*%1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBNT w.BZŴŻo+VOFŴŷ ŴżŹź /4")VHIFTUPUIF4FDSFUBSZ i"
$PVOUFS*OTVSHFODZ3VOOJOH8JME w
63. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre, 73; Greg Grandin, “Off the Beach: The United
4UBUFT -BUJO"NFSJDB BOEUIF$PME8BSwJOA Companion to Post-1945 America, ed. Jean-
Christophe Agnew and Roy Rosenzweig (London: Blackwell, 2002), 493.
Źŷ7JSPO7BLZUP.S0MJWFS i(VBUFNBMBBOE$PVOUFS5FSSPSw.BSDIŵż ŴżŹŻ XXX
HXVFEV_OTBSDIJW/4"&##/4"&##ŴŴEPDTųŸųŷIUN
ŹŸ 64 $POHSFTT  4FOBUF  $PNNJUUFF PO 'PSFJHO 3FMBUJPOT  )FBSJOHT  The Nature of
the Revolution, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., February 26, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968);
Melville and Melville, Guatemala: Another Vietnam? 4FF BMTP ćPNBT .FMWJMMF  Through
the Glass Darkly: The American Holocaust in Central America 1IJMBEFMQIJB 9MJCSJT 
2005).
ŹŹi1VCMJD4BGFUZJO(VBUFNBMB"6TFGVM1SPHSBNwBMTP-BVSFO+(PJOBOE4.PSFZ
#FMM i&WBMVBUJPO1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI (VBUFNBMB w%FDFN-
ber 1971; Huggins, Political Policing, 191.
Źź)PMMZ+#VSLIBMUFS i(VBUFNBMB"TLTUIF64GPS5SPVCMF wNew York Times, March
30, 1987.
68. Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre,Ŵ+FOOJGFS4DIJSNFS The Guatemalan Military
Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1998); Piero Gleijeses, “Afterword: A Culture of Fear,” in Cullather, Secret History. Police
CSVUBMJUZBOEDPSSVQUJPOSFNBJOFOEFNJD FYFNQMJĕFECZUIFGBDUUIBUBUUIJTXSJUJOH UXP
GPSNFSQPMJDFDIJFGTXFSFPOUSJBMGPSOBSDPUJDTUSBďDLJOH
Źż "NFSJDBO DPOTVMBUF  .FYJDP  UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i/BSDPUJDT *MMFHBM 'MPX JO
UIF64GSPN.FYJDP w+BOVBSZŵŸ ŴżŹų BOE%BWJE3PXFMMUP.BY$IBQMJO 'FCSVBSZŴŻ 
ŴżŹż CPUI014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŻŻ GPMEFS.FYJDPi.POUIMZ3FQPSUT 1BOBNB w
"QSJMŴżŹŸo+VOFŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŵŴ GPMEFS1BOBNB4BFO[ The OPS Story. On corruption
JOUIF.FYJDBOQPMJDFBOEJOUFMMJHFODFTFSWJDFTBOEUIFJSJOWPMWFNFOUJOQPMJUJDBMiEJTBQ-
pearances,” see Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug
Connection, and the Road to Afghanistan /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųŴų ŷŹ
źų .BUJMEF ;JNNFSNBOO  Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution
%VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŴ ŸŶ3JDIBSE(SPTTNBO ićF#MPPEPGUIF1FPQMF
ćF (VBSEJB /BDJPOBMT 'JęZ:FBS 8BS BHBJOTU UIF 1FPQMF PG /JDBSBHVB  ŴżŵźoŴżźż w JO
When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror, ed. Cecilia Menjívar
and Néstor Rodríguez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 67; “Monthly Public
4BGFUZ3FQPSU w.BZŴżŹŻ &M4BMWBEPS 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŹų GPMEFS.POUIMZ
Reports.
źŴ&MNFS)"ELJOT+SBOE.PSSJT(SPETLZ i0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ /JDBSBHVB 5FSNJ-
OBUJPO1IBTF0VU wŴżźŸ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI /JDBSBHVB CPYżų GPMEFSŴ
źŵ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM The Republic of Nicaragua: An Amnesty International Report
Including the Findings of a Mission to Nicaragua, .BZ ŴųoŴŸ  ŴżźŹ -POEPO "NOFTUZ

352 Notes to Pages 220–222


*OUFSOBUJPOBM1VCMJDBUJPOT Ŵżźź ŴŸ ŵŶ ŵŸ ŵŹ;JNNFSNBOO Sandinista, 94, 119. During
8BHOFSTUFOVSFJO4PVUI7JFUOBN IJTIPNFXBTBUUBDLFECZUIFi7$wJOSFUBMJBUJPOGPSIJT
JOWPMWFNFOUJODMBOEFTUJOFPQFSBUJPOT5XP014BEWJTFST "M'BSLBTBOE+BNFT.D$BSUIZ 
XFSFLJMMFEEFGFOEJOHJU"OPUIFS014BEWJTFSJO/JDBSBHVB -VDJFO(PSNPOU XBTBUFMF-
DPNNVOJDBUJPOTTQFDJBMJTUXIPIBEQSFWJPVTMZXPSLFEJO4PVUI,PSFB
73. Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, 178; “President and Foreign Minister on
$VSSFOU4JUVBUJPOJO&M4BMWBEPSw0DUPCFSŵų ŴżŹų 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI #PYŸż &M
Salvador.
źŷ8JMMJBN#SVCFDLUP.D(FPSHF#VOEZ i&M4BMWBEPSw/PWFNCFSŶų ŴżŹŵ%FQBSUNFOU
PG4UBUFUP"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ i&M4BMWBEPS1MBOPG"DUJPOUP+VMZŴ ŴżŹŶ w%FDFNCFSŵų 
ŴżŹŵ BOE$*"UFMFHSBN i4BMWBEPSBO1PMJDF"OUJDJQBUJPOPG$PNNVOJTU7JPMFODF w+VMZŶ 
1962, both JFKL, NSF, box 69, El Salvador; Earl Searle, “Public Safety Report, El Salvador,”
0DUPCFSŴżŹŶ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŸż &M4BMWBEPS)PMEFO i4FDVSJOH$FOUSBM
"NFSJDBBHBJOTU$PNNVOJTN wź
źŸi1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴżŹŸBOEi.POUIMZ3FQPSUT w"QSJMŴżŹŵ &M4BMWB-
dor, IPS, box 10, El Salvador; “Monthly Report,” June 1966, El Salvador, TSD, box 16, folder
El Salvador.
76. McClintock, The American Connection, ŴŵŴŹoŴŻ ćFPEPSF #SPXO  i&OE PG 5PVS
4VNNBSZ3FQPSU $IJFG1VCMJD4BGFUZ"EWJTPS 64"*%4BO4BMWBEPSw%FDFNCFSŴŷ ŴżŹŵ 
014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŸż &M4BMWBEPS$ZOUIJB+"SPOTPO i8JOEPXPOUIF1BTU
"%FDMBTTJĕFE)JTUPSZPG%FBUI4RVBETJO&M4BMWBEPSwJODeath Squads in Global Perspec-
tive: Murder with Deniability,FE#SVDF#$BNQCFMMBOE"SUIVS%#SFOOFS /FX:PSL4U
Martin’s Press, 2000), 92.
źźi5FSNJOBUJPO1IBTF0VU3FQPSU 1VCMJD4BGFUZ1SPKFDU w.BZŴżźŷ &M4BMWBEPS 54% 
box 16, folder El Salvador.
78. Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in
the Americas %VSIBN %VLF 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŵųųŷ  .BSL %BOOFS The Massacre at El
Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War /FX:PSL7JOUBHF#PPLT ŴżżŶ $IPNTLZ Turning the
Tide; Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 131.
79. McClintock, The American Connection, 1:218.
Żų4FF5JNPUIZ8JDLIBN$SPXMFZ Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Com-
parative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
Ŵżżŵ (SFH(SBOEJO i-JWJOHJO3FWPMVUJPOBSZ5JNF$PNJOHUP5FSNTXJUIUIF7JPMFODF
PG-BUJO"NFSJDBT-POH$PME8BSwJOA Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterin-
surgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War, ed. Greg Grandin and Gilbert M.
+PTFQI %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųŴų ŴoŷŸćFFTTBZTJOUIFMBUUFSWPMVNFTFSWF
BTBOJNQPSUBOUDPSSFDUJWFUPOFPMJCFSBMTDIPMBSTTVDIBT+PSHF$BTUB×FEBXIPEFIJTUPSJDJ[F
UIF HVFSSJMMB XBSGBSF PG UIF $PME 8BS CZ CMBNJOH JU PO UIF iSFWPMVUJPOBSZ SPNBOUJDJTNw
of the New Left. Rehashing the viewpoint of liberal and conservative Cold Warriors, they
ignore the deep-rooted structural variables shaping its genesis and the role of ferocious state
SFQSFTTJPOJOSBEJDBMJ[JOHPQQPTJUJPONPWFNFOUT
81. I. F. Stone, “Anti-Guerrilla War: The Dazzling New Military Toothpaste for Social
Decay,” in In a Time of Torment: 1961–1967 #PTUPO-JUUMF #SPXO ŴżŹź ŴźŶoźŷ
82. See Kyle Longley, The Sparrow and the Hawk: Costa Rica and the United States dur-
ing the Rise of José Figueres 5VTDBMPPTB 6OJWFSTJUZ PG "MBCBNB 1SFTT  Ŵżżź  $IBSMFT %
"NFSJOHFS  Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figueres of Costa Rica "MCVRVFSRVF
University of New Mexico Press, 1978). Figueres had long collaborated with the CIA,
although he was also allegedly the target of at least one assassination plot.

Notes to Pages 222–224 353


ŻŶ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 1SPHSBN 4VNNBSZ  $PTUB 3JDB w Ŵżźų  014 -BUJO "NFSJDB #SBODI 
CPYŻ'PSBEJTDVTTJPOPGUIFMJNJUTPG%PO1FQFTSFGPSNT TFF/PBN$IPNTLZ Necessary
Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies #PTUPO4PVUI&OE1SFTT ŴżŻż ŴŴŴoŴŵ
LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, 105, 106.
Żŷ i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ .POUIMZ 3FQPSU w %FDFNCFS ŴżŹż  /PWFNCFS Ŵżźų  BOE 4FQUFNCFS
Ŵżźų $PTUB3JDB *14 CPYŶż GPMEFS$PTUB3JDB0O'POTFDB TFF;JNNFSNBOO Sandinista.
85. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World,Ŵŷŷ/BPNJ,MFJO The Shock Doctrine:
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųź ŹŶ
86. Capsule biographies of these individuals can be found in Saenz, The OPS Story,ŷŵŹo
ŵźi5FTUJNPOZPGćFPEPSF#SPXO $IJFG1VCMJD4BGFUZ"EWJTFS 64"*%#SB[JM wJOUnited
States Policies and Programs in Brazil, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st
TFTT .BZŷ ŴżźŴ 8BTIJOHUPO %$(10 ŴżźŴ ŶoŸŴ"EFWPVU$ISJTUJBOXIP BDDPSEJOH
UPBGPSNFSDPMMFBHVF EJEOPUESJOL TNPLF PSFWFODVTT #SPXOXBTEFQVUZUPDIJFGPGNJT-
TJPO.JDIBFM.D$BOOJO7JFUOBNGSPNŴżŹżUPŴżźŶ.D$BOOBMTPTFSWFEBTUJOUJO#SB[JM
87. Huggins, Political Policing,ŴŸŴ$IBJN-JUFXTLJ EJS Citizen Boileson (NTSC, 2010).
#PJMFTPOPSJHJOBMMZIBJMFEGSPNUIF/FUIFSMBOET
ŻŻ4FF.BSUIB,)VHHJOT .JLB)BSJUPT'BUPVSPT BOE1IJMJQ(;JNCBSEP Violence
Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley: Uni-
WFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB1SFTT ŵųųŵ i.POUIMZ3FQPSU w4FQUFNCFSŴżźų 014-BUJO"NFSJDB
Branch, box 17, folder Brazil.
Żżi.POUIMZ3FQPSU w.BSDI 4FQUFNCFS 0DUPCFS /PWFNCFSŴżŹŻ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB
#SBODI CPYŴź GPMEFS#SB[JM/JYPORVPUFEJO)BM#SBOET Latin America’s Cold War $BN-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 129. On Carlos Marighella, see his Minimanual of
the Urban Guerrilla (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).
90. Dan Mitrione, “End of Tour Report,” June 11, 1965; “Monthly Report,” October 1971,
014 -BUJO "NFSJDB #SBODI  CPY Ŵź  GPMEFS #SB[JM (FPSHF .JMMFS  i1VCMJD 4BGFUZ 4VSWFZ
3FQPSU 4UBUFPG1BSBJCB w'FCSVBSZŴżŹź 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŴŴ-FSOPVY Cry of
the People, 23; Langguth, Hidden Terrors,ŴżŶ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Report on Allegations
of Torture in Brazil -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM ŴżźŹ ŷż*OŴżŹź UIFDPNNBOEFSPG
UIF(FOEBSNFSJFJO4FSSBEP$BQBSBPQSPWJODFXSPUFBMFUUFSUIBOLJOH64"*%GPSDPNNV-
OJDBUJPOTFRVJQNFOU XIJDIIFTBJEXBTEFDJTJWFJOBOUJHVFSSJMMBPQFSBUJPOT3PESJHP1BUUP
Sa Motta, “Modernizing Repression: USAID and the Brazilian Police,” Revista Braziliera de
Historia 30, no. 59 (June 2010).
91. Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 271; Hugo Blanco, Land or Death: The
Peasant Struggle in Peru /FX:PSL1BUIĕOEFS1SFTT Ŵżźŵ ŴŴ Ŵŷi.POUIMZ3FQPSUPG1VC-
MJD4BGFUZ1SPHSBN -JNB w.BZŴżŹŶ *14 CPYŴųŵ GPMEFS1FSVi.POUIMZ3FQPSUTPG1VCMJD
4BGFUZ1SPHSBN -JNB w+VOFŴżŹŹ 54% CPYŴŻ GPMEFSŵ1FSV"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ -JNB 
UP %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF  i"HSBSJBO 7JPMFODF BU )BDJFOEB )VBQSB &ZFXJUOFTT "DDPVOUT
*ODSJNJOBUF1PMJDF w"VHVTUŵŶ ŴżŹų *14 CPYŴųų GPMEFS1FSV"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ -JNB UP
%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF i1MBOUBUJPO-BCPS$POEJUJPOT w%FDFNCFSŴŹ ŴżŹų 014-BUJO"NFS-
JDB#SBODI CPYŴųų GPMEFS1FSV#MBODPXBTMBUFSSFMFBTFEGSPNKBJMBęFSBOJOUFSOBUJPOBM
DBNQBJHOMFECZIVNBOSJHIUTBDUJWJTUT"OPUIFSSFCFMHSPVQQSPNPUJOHJOEJHFOPVTSJHIUT
FNFSHFEJOUIFNJEŴżŹųT5ÞQBD"NBSV OBNFEBęFSBOFJHIUFFOUIDFOUVSZ*OEJBOMFBEFS
BOEIFBEFECZ(VJMMFSNP-PCBUØOćFMFęXBTSFQSFTTFECVUXPVMESFTVNFBSNFETUSVHHMF
JOUIFŴżŻųTVOEFSUIFCBOOFSPGUIFNPSFWJPMFOU4FOEFSP-VNJOPTP(FPSHF.JMMFSBMTP
TFSWFEJO-JCZBBOEUIF1IJMJQQJOFTIFXPVMEEJFJO7JFUOBN
żŵ-FF&DIPMTUPćFP)BMM /PWFNCFSź ŴżŸź 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŷ GPMEFS
Bolivia; Echols, Hilarious High-Jinks and Dangerous Assignments, 168, 174; “OCB Report

354 Notes to Pages 224–227


Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” August 4, 1955, DDEL, OCB, box 17, folder Internal
4FDVSJUZ'PSJOTJHIUJOUPUIFŴżŸŵSFWPMVUJPOBOE#PMJWJBOQPMJUJDT TFF+BNFT%VOLFSMFZ 
Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952–1982 (London: Verso, 1984); and
Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-Colonialism (London:
)BTMFNFSF ŴżŹż 0O&DIPMTT044FYQFSJFODF TFF%JBOF-)BNN Military Intelligence: Its
Heroes and Legends )POPMVMV6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTTPGUIF1BDJĕD ŵųųŴ ŻŻ
93. John Doney and Richard Frederick, “Evaluation of Public Safety Project,” March 1973,
014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŸ GPMEFS#PMJWJB4BFO[ The OPS Story,ŵųŶćPNBT'JFME 
“Ideology as Strategy: Military-Led Modernization and the Origins of the Alliance for
Progress in Bolivia,” Diplomatic HistoryŶŹŴ +BOVBSZŵųŴŵ ŴŷźoŻŶ4BFO[SFQPSUTUIBU+BDL-
TPOCFDBNFTVJDJEBMXIJMFMJWJOHPVUIJTEBZTJO1BOBNB5PBEEJOTVMUUPJOKVSZ #PC$MBSL 
TVQFSJOUFOEFOUPGUIF/FWBEB)JHIXBZ1BUSPM EJFEGSPNQOFVNPOJBEVSJOHUIFFWBDVBUJPO
of Jackson as a result of the high altitude.
94. Adolph Saenz, “Study and Report of Police Organization and Operations in Bolivia,”
+VOFŴżŹź 64"*% 014 3(ŵŻŹ -BUJO"NFSJDB CPYŸ GPMEFS#PMJWJB4BFO[ The OPS Story,
204, 212.
95. Walt W. Rostow to the President, “Death of Che Guevara,” October 17, 1967, NSA,
Che Guevara Collection; Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of
America’s War on Drugs (London: Verso, 2004), 386. For new evidence on the killing, see
.JDIBFM3BUOFSBOE.JDIBFM4NJUI Who Killed Che? How the CIA Got Away with Murder
/FX:PSL0SCJT#PPLT ŵųŴŴ 
96. John Doney and Richard Frederick, “Evaluation of Public Safety Project,” March
ŴżźŶ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŸ GPMEFS#PMJWJB+BJNF.BMBNVE(PUJ i3FJOGPSD-
ing Poverty: The Bolivian War on Cocaine,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S.
Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan Block (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992),
Źź ŻŴ,BUISZO-FCFEVS i#PMJWJB$MFBS$POTFRVFODFT wJODrugs and Democracy in Latin
America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, FE $PMMFUUB " :PVOHFST BOE &JMFFO 3PTJO #PVMEFS
Lynne Rienner, 2005); Marshall, Drug Wars, 4. Nazi Klaus “The Butcher of Lyon” Barbie was
head of Bolivia’s secret police for a period under Banzer.
97. “Guerrillas Seize 2 in Uruguay,” New York Times, August 1, 1970; Alain Labrousse,
The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay,USBOT%JOBI-JWJOHTUPOF )BSNPOETXPSUI
1FOHVJO ŴżźŶ ćF5VQBNBSPTXFSFOBNFEBęFS*ODBMFBEFS5ÞQBD"NBSV XIPTUBHFE
an unsuccessful rebellion against Spanish forces in 1780 and was captured and executed.
ćFZBMTPESFXJOTQJSBUJPOGSPN+PTÏ"SUJHBT UIFiGBUIFSPG6SVHVBZBOJOEFQFOEFODF wBOE 
BDDPSEJOHUPUIF$*" EJEOPUBTTPDJBUFXJUIUIF6SVHVBZBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ XIJDIGPM-
MPXFEUIF4PWJFUMJOFPGQFBDFGVMDPFYJTUFODFBOEBQBSMJBNFOUBSZBQQSPBDIUPQPXFS
żŻ014 i4UVEZPG6SVHVBZBO5VQBNBSPT/BUJPOBM-JCFSBUJPO.PWFNFOU .-/ w+VMZ
Ŵ ŴżźŴ *14 CPYŴų GPMEFS6SVHVBZBOE$*"SFQPSU ićF5VQBNBSPT1PSUSBJUPGUIF6SCBO
(VFSSJMMB JO 6SVHVBZw 3( ŵŻŹ  64"*%  *14  CPY Ŵų  GPMEFS 6SVHVBZ "NFSJDBO FNCBTTZ 
Montevideo, to Secretary of State, “Internal Security: Alertness to Political Insurgency,”
-#+- /BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ'JMFT $PVOUSZ'JMFT -BUJO"NFSJDBO#SBODI CPYźŷ GPMEFS6SVHVBZ
(BMFBOPXBTSFGFSSFEUPBTBCSJHIUZPVOHJOUFMMFDUVBMPGUIFNPWFNFOUBOEBUBMFOUFEXSJUFS
żż"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ .POUFWJEFP UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ"MFSUOFTT
to Political Insurgency”; Klein, The Shock Doctrine,żŶi%FBUIPGB1PMJDFNBO6OBOTXFSFE
Questions About a Tragedy,” Commonweal, 4FQUFNCFS ŴŻ  Ŵżźų  ŷŸŹ  ŷŸź +FČSFZ 3ZBO 
i5VSOJOH PO ćFJS .BTUFST 4UBUF 5FSSPSJTN BOE 6OMFBSOJOH %FNPDSBDZ JO 6SVHVBZw JO
Menjívar and Rodríguez, When States Kill, 279, 284; unpublished letter on police brutality,
in Labrousse, The Tupamaros,ŴŸŵoŸŷćPVTBOETPGUSBEFVOJPOBDUJWJTUTBOETUVEFOUTXFSF
BNPOHUIPTFUPSUVSFE

Notes to Pages 227–228 355


Ŵųųi1VCMJD4BGFUZ3FQPSU 'FCSVBSZŴżźŷ w"QSJMŴżźŷ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPY
4, folder Uruguay; Agee, Inside the Company,ŷŷŸoŷŹ ŷŹŴoŹŻ4BFO[ The OPS Story, 124;
"MCFSU - #SZBOU BOE -VDJFO 7 (PSNPOU  i5FSNJOBUJPO 1IBTF0VU 4UVEZ  1VCMJD 4BGFUZ
1SPKFDU 6SVHVBZw"QSJMo.BZŴżźŷ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŷ GPMEFSŵų
101. Langguth, Hidden Terrors, 312; McCoy, A Question of Torture, 72; Wolfgang S. Heinz
and Hugo Fruhling, Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and State-
Sponsored Actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina: 1960–1990 (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 101.
Ŵųŵ5PN&OHFMIBSEU The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusion-
ing of a Generation "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųź -BOHHVUI Hidden
Terrors, 42.
103. McSherry, Predatory States; John Dinges, The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His
Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents /FX:PSL/FX1SFTT ŵųųŵ 
104. “OCB Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d,” Country Report, Chile, August 4,
ŴżŸŸ %%&- 0$# CPYŴź GPMEFS*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ0O.JMFTTSPMF TFF'SFEFSJD8BLFNBO
Jr., Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: University of California
1SFTT ŵųųŶ ŸųŹ.JMFTXBTDPNNBOEFSPGUIF1BOBNB$BOBM;POFJOUIFNJEŴżŸųT XIFO
UIFĕSTUQVCMJDTBGFUZQSPHSBNTXFSFMBVODIFE
ŴųŸ"NFSJDBOFNCBTTZ $IJMF UP4FDSFUBSZPG4UBUF i*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBN w+BOVBSZ
Ź ŴżŸŻ 014-BUJO"NFSJDB#SBODI CPYŵŶi1VCMJD4BGFUZ.POUIMZ3FQPSU w"QSJMBOE+VMZ
1965; and “Puntillazo, El Siglo,” April 25, 1965, OPS TSD, box 2, folder Chile. Lingo was also
on the faculty of the Northwestern Traffic Institute and served in Indonesia, Thailand, and
Argentina.
106. For an insider’s perspective, see Theodore Shackley with Richard A. Finney, Spymas-
ter: My Life in the CIA 8BTIJOHUPO %$1PUPNBD#PPLT ŵųųŹ ŵźų
Ŵųź+1BUSJDF.D4IFSSZ i0QFSBUJPO$POEPS)FNJTQIFSJDA$PVOUFS5FSSPSwJO.FOKÓWBS
and Rodríguez, When States Kill, 35; Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My Twenty-five
Years in the CIA /FX:PSL0DFBO1SFTT Ŵżżż ŵź+POBUIBO'SBOLMJO i&Y4QZ$IJFG4BZT
$*")FMQFE)JN4FU6Q1JOPDIFUT4FDSFU1PMJDF wGuardian,4FQUFNCFSŵŶ ŵųųų Ŵźi$IJM-
ean Police Plan to Patrol Streets with 120-Car Fleet,” New York Times, October 9, 1973.
108. McSherry, Predatory States, 36; Dinges, The Condor Years, 65, 71; Byron Engle
UISPVHI8JMMJBN4(BVE i.FBTVSFTUP$POUSPM5SBWFMPG4VCWFSTJWFTGSPNUIF0"44UBUFT
and Cuba,” August 11, 1964; and “Minutes of Meeting of CI,” August 13, 1964, IPS box 6.
109. See Saul Landau and John Dinges, Assassination on Embassy Row /FX:PSL1BO-
theon Books, 1980); Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and
Accountability /FX:PSL/FX1SFTT ŵųųŶ 4DPUU American War Machine,ŶźoŶŻ-FUFMJFS
IBE CFFO JO DIBSHF PG OFHPUJBUJOH UIF UFSNT PG FYQSPQSJBUJPO XJUI DPSQPSBUJPOT TVDI BT
UIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM5FMFQIPOFBOE5FMFHSBQIDPNQBOZJOWPMWFEJOUIFQMPUUJOHUPTBCPUBHF
"MMFOEFTHPWFSONFOUćFDBSCPNCXBTBMMFHFEMZTFUCZ$POUSFSBT FY$*"BHFOU.JDIBFM
5PXOMFZ BOE#BZPG1JHTWFUFSBOTMJOLFEUPUIFOBSDPUJDTUSBEFBOEUFSSPSJTUDSJNFTTVDIBT
UIFCMPXJOHVQPGB7FOF[VFMBOBJSQMBOF0OiTFDVSJUZwDPPQFSBUJPOJO$FOUSBM"NFSJDB 
TFF 3PCFSU )PMEFO  i4FDVSJOH $FOUSBM "NFSJDB BHBJOTU $PNNVOJTN ćF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT
and the Modernization of Surveillance in the Cold War,” Journal of Inter-American Studies
and World AffairsŷŴ 4QSJOHŴżżż ŴoŶų1BVM,BU[ $FOUSBM"NFSJDB5FMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
Report, February 1964, TSD, box 1.
110. Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development:
Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
ŴżźŴ ŴųŻoż

356 Notes to Pages 229–231


111. Huggins, Political Policing, 117.
ŴŴŵćJTQPJOUIBTCFFOWFSZXFMMEPDVNFOUFEJOUIFJNQPSUBOUUIPVHIPęFOOFHMFDUFE
XPSLT PG /PBN $IPNTLZ BOE &EXBSE 4 )FSNBO  JODMVEJOH The Political Economy of
Human Rights: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, BOE )FSNBOT The
Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982).
See also Klein, The Shock Doctrine, and Rabe, The Killing Zone.

Conclusion
Ŵ*OUIJT+PIOTPOCVJMETPOBDPSQVTPGQSFWJPVTXPSL JODMVEJOHNPTUOPUBCMZUIFTFNJ-
OBMDPOUSJCVUJPOTPGUIFTPDBMMFE8JTDPOTJOTDIPPM4FF$IBMNFST+PIOTPO Blowback: The
Costs and Consequences of the American Empire /FX:PSL0XM#PPLT ŵųųų The Sorrows
of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT 
2004), and Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic /FX :PSL .FUSPQPMJUBO 
2008).
ŵćPNBT-PCF U.S. National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police (Denver:
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1977), 112.
3. “Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped
4UBUFT  %FQBSUNFOU PG 4UBUF w /PWFNCFS ŵų  ŴżŹŴ  10'  CPY żŻ .BYXFMM 5BZMPS  i.FNP
GPS.FNCFSTPGUIF4QFDJBM(SPVQ644VQQPSUPG'PSFJHO1BSBNJMJUBSZ'PSDFT w3(ŵŻŹ 
64"*% 014 1SPHSBN4VSWFZTBOE&WBMVBUJPOT CPYŸ GPMEFSŴ
4. See Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and
the Rise of the Surveillance State .BEJTPO6OJWFSTJUZPG8JTDPOTJO1SFTT ŵųųż +BNFT8
Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam /FX:PSL"UMBOUJD.POUIMZ1SFTT ŴżŻŹ 
Kurt Jacobsen, Pacification and Its Discontents $IJDBHP1SJDLMZ1BSBEJHN1SFTT ŵųųż 
Ÿ4FF/PBN$IPNTLZBOE&EXBSE4)FSNBO The Political Economy of Human Rights:
The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979);
Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980 (New
:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŻż /PBN$IPNTLZ ićF3FTQPOTJCJMJUZPG*OUFMMFDUVBMT wJOAmerican
Power and the New Mandarins /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO ŴżŹź ŶŵŶoŹŹćFSFJTBMPUPGSFDFOU
MJUFSBUVSFPOUIFJOĘVFODFPGTPDJBMTDJFOUJTUTBOEUIFNBLJOHPG64GPSFJHOQPMJDZTFF FH 
.JDIBFM-BUIBN Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation-Building”
in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
6. See Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New
:PSL .FUSPQPMJUBO #PPLT  ŵųųŻ  .JDIBFM "EBT  Dominance by Design: Technological
Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission $BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŹ 
ź4FF/PBN$IPNTLZ Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
/FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųź 4FFBMTP1FUFS%BMF4DPUU The Road to 9/11: Wealth,
Empire, and the Future of America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Sheldon
Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitari-
anism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
8. See Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan, Colombia,
and Indochina /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŶ "MFYBOEFS$PDLCVSOBOE+FČSFZ4U
Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press (London: Verso, 1998).
żi5FTUJNPOZPG+BNFT"CPVSF[L wCongressional Record, October 1, 1973, 32259; “Testi-
NPOZPG(FPSHF.D(PWFSO wCongressional Record, March 27, 1974, 8423; telephone inter-
WJFXXJUI+BNFT"CPVSF[L %FDFNCFSŵųųź"CPVSF[LUPMENFUIBUUIF014XBTEFEJDBUFE
to “teaching dictators how to torture.” He added, “Now, we are the lead torturers.”

Notes to Pages 231–235 357


10. Michael T. Klare, American Arms Supermarket (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1984), 22.
ŴŴ4FF7JODF1JOUP i8FBQPOTGPSUIF)PNF'SPOU wBOE-FF8FCC i3FQSFTTJPO"/FX
Growth Industry,” in Policing America, ed. Anthony M. Platt and Lynn B. Cooper (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974); “OPS Processing and Developing of Public Safety
&RVJQNFOU w3(ŵŻŹ 64"*% 014 54% CPYŷ GPMEFSŶ4FFBMTP8JMMJBN85VSOFS Invis-
ible Witness: The Use and Abuse of the New Technology of Crime Investigation (Indianapolis:
#PCCT.FSSJMM ŴżŹŻ ŵźŸoŻż
Ŵŵ .JDIBFM 5 ,MBSF  i1PMJDJOH UIF &NQJSF w JO 1MBUU BOE $PPQFS  Policing America,
64; Police on the Homefront: They’re Bringing It All Back (Philadelphia: National Action
3FTFBSDIPOUIF.JMJUBSZ*OEVTUSJBM$PNQMFY "NFSJDBO'SJFOET4FSWJDF$PNNJUUFF ŴżźŴ 
ŴŹoŴź3JDIBSE,VOOFT The American Heroin Empire: Power, Profits, and Politics /FX:PSL
Dodd, Mead, 1972), 34.
13. Edward J. Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America /FX:PSL
1VUOBN  Ŵżźź  'SBOL #SPXOJOH  ićFZ 4IPPU )JQQJFT %POU ćFZ w Ramparts, /PWFN-
CFS Ŵżźų  ŴŷoŵŶ 3BEMFZ #BMLP  Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America
(Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2006); Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappler, “Militariz-
JOH"NFSJDBO1PMJDFćF3JTFBOE/PSNBMJ[BUJPOPG1BSBNJMJUBSZ6OJUT wSocial Problems
ŷŷ 'FCSVBSZŴżżź ŴoŴŻ.JDIBFM,MBSF i#SJOHJOH*U#BDL1MBOOJOHGPSUIF$JUZwJO1MBUU
and Cooper, Policing America,żźoŴųŷ%PVHMBT7BMFOUJOF i)PNFMBOE*OTFDVSJUZwJOPolice
State America: U.S. Military and “Civil Disturbance” Planning,FE5PN#VSHIBSEU .PO-
USFBM"SNUIF4QJSJU4PMJEBSJUZ ŵųųŵ ŴŷŴoŻż
14. Brandstatter, Personnel File, MSUA; Joan Jenson, Army Surveillance in America,
1775–1980 /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŴ ŵŷŴ#FSU6TFFNBOE1FUFS,JNCBMM FET 
States of Siege: U.S. Prison Riots, 1971–1986 /FX:PSL0YGPSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻż żź
Roger Morris, The Devil’s Butcher Shop: The New Mexico Prison Uprising "MCVRVFSRVF6OJ-
versity of New Mexico Press, 1983), 47, 194. Many OPS veterans served as consultants to local
QPMJDFPSHBOJ[BUJPOT088JMTPO XIPTFUFYUCPPLTXFSFVTFEJOQPMJDFBDBEFNJFTXPSME-
wide, capped off his distinguished career as chief of the Chicago police, retiring just before
UIFCSVUBMTVQQSFTTJPOPGUIFEFNPOTUSBUJPOTEVSJOHUIFŴżŹŻ%FNPDSBUJD1BSUZDPOWFOUJPO
ŴŸ 2VPUFE JO &RCBM "INFE  i3FWPMVUJPOBSZ 8BSGBSF BOE $PVOUFSJOTVSHFODZw JO
National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World,FE/PSNBO.JMMFSBOE3PEFSJDL"ZB
/FX:PSL'SFF1SFTT ŴżźŴ ŵŴŶ4FFBMTP"MBO8PMGF The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repres-
sion in America /FX:PSL%BWJE.D,BZ ŴżźŶ /FMTPO#MBDLTUPOF COINTELPRO: The
FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom,JOUSPEVDUJPOCZ/PBN$IPNTLZ /FX:PSL7JOUBHF 
ŴżźŸ 5SBDZ5VMMJT i"7JFUOBNBU)PNF1PMJDJOHUIF(IFUUPTJOUIF$PVOUFSJOTVSHFODZ
&SBw 1I%EJTT /FX:PSL6OJWFSTJUZ Ŵżżż 
16. See John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture (New
:PSL,OPQG ŵųųų 5POZB.D$MBSZBOE"OESFB3JUDIJF In the Shadows of the War on Ter-
ror: Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United States /FX:PSL
6/)VNBO3JHIUT$PNNJUUFF %FDFNCFSŵųųź +VMMJMZ,PIMFS)BVTNBOO i.JMJUBSJ[JOH
UIF1PMJDF0ďDFS+PO#VSHF 5PSUVSFBOE8BSJOUIFA6SCBO+VOHMF wJOChallenging the
Prison-Industrial Complex: Activism, Arts, and Educational Alternatives, ed. Stephen John
)BSUOFUU 6SCBOB6OJWFSTJUZPG*MMJOPJT1SFTT ŵųŴŴ ŷŶoźŵ
Ŵź4FF+FSFNZ4DBIJMM Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army
/FX:PSL/BUJPO#PPLT ŵųųź ,FO4JMWFSTUFJO Private Warriors (London: Verso, 2000);
/BPNJ,MFJO The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO
Books, 2007).

358 Notes to Pages 235–236


18. Jane Hunter, Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America (Boston: South
&OE1SFTT ŴżŻź ŴŴŹoŴź/PBN$IPNTLZ Turning the Tide: U. S. Intervention in Central
America and the Struggle for Peace (Montreal: Black Rose, 1987).
19. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princ-
FUPO 1SJODFUPO 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  ŴżŻŴ  ŴŻŵoŻŶ .JDIBFM 5 ,MBSF BOE $ZOUIJB "SPOTPO 
Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad (Washington, D.C.:
*OTUJUVUFGPS1PMJDZ4UVEJFT ŴżŻŴ ŵŻ.JUDIFMM.BCBSEZ $POHP ,FOZB 7JFUOBN $IFTUFS
+FX 7JFUOBN "OUIPOZ3VJ[ %PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJDBOE-BUJO"NFSJDB BOE$FTBS#FSOBM
-BUJO"NFSJDB XFSFBNPOHUIF014BEWJTFSTFNQMPZFECZUIF%&"
20. J. Patrice McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin
America /FX:PSL3PXNBO-JUUMFĕFME ŵųųŷ źŷoźŸ1FOOZ-FSOPVY Cry of the People:
United States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture, and Murder and the Persecution of
the Catholic Church in Latin America /FX:PSL%PVCMFEBZ ŴżŻų ŶŶŻoŶż1FUFS%BMF4DPUU
and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 44.
21. Douglas Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed Press,
2005), 90; The Colombian National Police, Human Rights, and U.S. Drug Policy (Washington,
%$8BTIJOHUPO0ďDFPO-BUJO"NFSJDB .BZŴżżŶ ŵŷ+POBUIBO.BSTIBMM Drug Wars:
Corruption, Counterinsurgency, and Covert Operations in the Third World (San Francisco:
$PIBO$PIBO ŴżżŴ ŵŵ
ŵŵ&UIBO"/BEFMNBOO Cops across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal
Law Enforcement (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 120.
ŵŶ*CJE Ŵŵŵ4IJSMFZ$ISJTUJBO i$POHSFTT*T"TLFEGPSžŸŷ.JMMJPOUP"JE-BUJO"NFSJDBO
Antiterrorist Efforts,” New York Times,/PWFNCFSŹ ŴżŻŸ.BSUIB%PHHFUU Underwriting
Injustice: AID and El Salvador’s Judicial Reform Program /FX:PSL-BXZFST$PNNJUUFF
GPS )VNBO 3JHIUT  ŴżŻż  ,JSTUFO 8FME  i3FBEJOH UIF 1PMJUJDT PG )JTUPSZ JO (VBUFNBMBT
/BUJPOBM1PMJDF"SDIJWFTw 1I%EJTT :BMF6OJWFSTJUZ ŵųŴų ŵŶŷ
ŵŷ64%FQBSUNFOUPG4UBUF #VSFBVPG1VCMJD"ČBJST Criminal Justice and Democracy in
the Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 1989); Adolph Saenz, The OPS Story
(San Francisco: Robert D. Reed, 2002), 12.
ŵŸ0OUIFQPMJUJDBMDJSDVNTUBODFTTVSSPVOEJOHUIJTJOUFSWFOUJPOBOEUIFQSFUFYUTVTFEUP
TFMMJUUPBHVMMJCMFQVCMJD TFF/PBN$IPNTLZ Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1991),
150; and Christina J. Johns, State Crime, the Media, and the Invasion of Panama (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991).
ŵŹ"OUIPOZ(SBZBOE.BYXFMM.BOXBSJOH i1BOBNB0QFSBUJPO+VTU$BVTF wJOPolic-
ing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oakley,
Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1998), 57; Richard H. Shultz Jr., In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruc-
tion and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause .POUHPNFSZ  "MB "JS 'PSDF
6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżżŶ ŻųoŻŴ żż
ŵź$IPNTLZ Deterring Democracy,ŴŸŹ&SJD4DINJUU i64)FMQT2VFMM3FWPMUJO1BO-
BNB wNew York Times,%FDFNCFSŹ Ŵżżų0O4UFFMF TFF4DBIJMM Blackwater, 354.
28. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War,ŴųŹoź
29. See Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O’Neil Pouilot, “Haiti: Military Police
Partnership for Public Security,” in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and
Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Wash-
JOHUPO %$/BUJPOBM%FGFOTF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŴżŻŻ ŵŷŵ'PSBOBMZTJTPGUIFMJNJUTPGUIF
IVNBOSJHIUTDVSSJDVMVNJONJMJUBSZUSBJOJOHBDBEFNJFT TFF-FTMFZ(JMM The School of the

Notes to Pages 236–238 359


Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas %VSIBN%VLF6OJWFS-
TJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŸ ćFSFJTOPDPNQBSBCMFTUVEZGPSUIFQPMJDFQSPHSBNT
30. Robert Capps, “Outside the Law,” Salon, +VOF ŵŸ  ŵųųŵ  IUUQEJSTBMPODPNTUPSZ
OFXTGFBUVSFŵųųŵųŻųŹEZODPSQJOEFYIUNM i4FY 4MBWF 8IJTUMF#MPXFST 7JOEJDBUFE w
Salon, "VHVTU Ź  ŵųųŵ  IUUQEJSTBMPODPNTUPSZOFXTGFBUVSFŵųųŵųŻųŹEZODPSQ
JOEFYIUNM1SBUBQ$IBUUFSKFF Iraq, Inc.: A Profitable Occupation /FX:PSL4FWFO4UPSJFT
1SFTT ŵųųŷ ŴŴŴ%ZO$PSQUSJFEUPDPWFSVQUIFDSJNFT XIJDIJODMVEFEDPOUSBDUJOHCZJUT
FNQMPZFFTPGQFSTPOBMTFYTMBWFTBTZPVOHBTUXFMWFZFBSTPME BOEUIFOĕSFEUXPFNQMPZFFT
who spoke out about the abuses. They were later vindicated in court. None of the DynCorp
FNQMPZFFTJOWPMWFEJOUIFTFYUSBEFXFSFFWFSQSPTFDVUFE
31. Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist
Islam /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŸ Ŷŵųi"NCBTTBEPS.BSHBSFU4DPCFZ &HZQUJBO
(PWFSONFOU4USVHHMJOHUP"EESFTT1PMJDF#SVUBMJUZwXXXXJLJMFBLTEF"CEFSSBINBO#FH-
gar, “The Path of State Terror in Peru,” in When States Kill: Latin America, the U.S., and
Technologies of Terror, ed. Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez (Austin: University of
5FYBT1SFTT ŵųųŸ ŵŹŹoŹź(JMM The School of the AmericaT ŴŹŶożź4UPLFT America’s Other
War..POUFTJOPTXBTBMTPEFFQMZJNQMJDBUFEJOUIFOBSDPUJDTUSBďD
32. Peter Hallward, Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide and the Politics of Containment
(London: Verso, 2007), 67; Rachel Neild, “The Haitian National Police,” Washington Office
PO-BUJO"NFSJDB#SJFĕOH1BQFS .BSDIŴŻ ŴżżŹ Ŵi)BJUJ4FDVSJUZ$PNQSPNJTFE3FDZDMFE
Haitian Soldiers on the Police Front Line,” Human Rights Watch Americas 7 (March 1995):
Ŵoŵź 5JN 8FJOFS  i$*" 'PSNFE )BJUJBO 6OJU -BUFS 5JFE UP /BSDPUJDT 5SBEF w New York
Times, /PWFNCFS Ŵŷ  ŴżżŶ 1BVM 'BSNFS  The Uses of Haiti, GPSFXPSE CZ /PBN $IPNTLZ
.POSPF .F$PNNPO$PVSBHF1SFTT Ŵżżŷ Ŷŷ&NNBOVFM$POTUBOU IFBEPGUIF'SPOU
GPSUIF"EWBODFNFOUBOE1SPHSFTTPG)BJUJ BCSVUBMQBSBNJMJUBSZNJMJUJB XBTBNPOHUIPTF
to receive CIA funding, along with Guy Philippe, who in 2004 led a successful coup against
"SJTUJEFBęFSSFUVSOJOHGSPNFYJMFJOUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD8IBUSPMFUIFQPMJDFQSP-
HSBNTQMBZFESFNBJOTJORVFTUJPO UIPVHIJUJTDMFBSUIFZXFSFVTFEUPDVMUJWBUFDPOUBDUT
XJUIJO UIF OBUJPOBM TFDVSJUZ FTUBCMJTINFOU 3XBOEB  MFE CZ 1BVM ,BHBNF  XBT BOPUIFS
authoritarian state where U.S. advisers trained the National Police. See Filip Reyntjens,
The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006 /FX:PSL$BNCSJEHF
University Press, 2009), 72.
ŶŶ 0O UIF DPOUJOVFE JNQFSJBM NPUJWFT ESJWJOH 64 GPSFJHO QPMJDZ JO UIJT QFSJPE  TFF
4UFQIFO34IBMPN Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention after the Cold War (Bos-
UPO4PVUI&OE1SFTT ŴżżŶ /PBN$IPNTLZ A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo,
East Timor, and the Standards of the West (London: Verso, 2000); David Gibbs, First Do No
Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2009).
Ŷŷ4FF FH /PBN$IPNTLZ Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Domi-
nance /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO ŵųųŷ .JDIBFM5,MBSF Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO ŵųųŷ 
ŶŸ +BNFT (MBO[  ićF 3FBDI PG 8BS 64 3FQPSU 'JOET %JTNBM 5SBJOJOH PG "GHIBO
Police,” New York Times,.BSDIŶų ŵųųŹ"INFE3BTIJE Descent into Chaos: The United
States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New
:PSL7JLJOH ŵųųŻ ŵųŷoŸ.BUUIFX)PI UBMLEFMJWFSFEUPUIF5VMTB$PVODJMPO'PSFJHO
3FMBUJPOT %FDFNCFSź ŵųŴų4FUI(+POFT In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in
Afghanistan /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŵųųż Ŵźŵ
ŶŹ4FF+BNFT%PCCJOTFUBM America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002); John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a

360 Notes to Pages 238–239


Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2007), 3; Seth G. Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005); The U.S. Army–Marine Corps Counter-Insurgency Field
Manual, 64 "SNZ 'JFME .BOVBM OP Ŷŵŷ  .BSJOF $PSQT 8BS 'JHIUJOH 1VCMJDBUJPO OP
ŶŶŶŸ GPSFXPSECZ(FO%BWJE)1FUSBFVTBOE+BNFT'"NPT GPSFXPSEUPUIF6OJWFSTJUZ
of Chicago Press edition by Lt. Col. John A. Nagl with a new introduction by Sarah Sewall
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 231; David H. Bayley and Robert Perito, The
Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder: Lynn Riener,
ŵųŴų #BZMFZBOE1FSJUPBSHVFUIBUQPPSNBOBHFSJBMPWFSTJHIUDPNQSPNJTFEQPMJDFUSBJOJOH
QSPHSBNT XIJDIUIFBVUIPSTEFFNDSVDJBMJOiTUBCJMJ[JOHwDPVOUSJFTPDDVQJFECZUIF6OJUFE
4UBUFT8IJMFNBOBHFSJBMPWFSTJHIUXBTJOEFFEQPPS UIFBVUIPSTGBJMUPRVFTUJPOUIFMBSHFS
JNQFSJBMBHFOEBUPXIJDIUIFQSPHSBNTXFSFBUUBDIFEBOEQSPWJEFPOMZBDVSTPSZFYBNJOB-
UJPOPGUIFIJTUPSZPGQPMJDFQSPHSBNT HMPTTJOHPWFSUIFJSMJOLUPUPSUVSFBOETUBUFSFQSFT-
TJPO'PSBDSJUJRVFUIBUTUJMMSFTPOBUFT TFF$IPNTLZ ićF3FTQPOTJCJMJUZPG*OUFMMFDUVBMTw
+PIO%PXFSDSJUJRVFTUIFTVQFSĕDJBMJUZPGDPNQBSJTPOTXJUI+BQBOJOIJTUIPVHIUGVMCPPL
Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9–11/Iraq /FX:PSL/PSUPO ŵųŴų 
Ŷź4FF5BSJR"MJ i.JSBHFPGUIF(PPE8BSwJOThe Case for Withdrawal from Afghani-
stan, ed. Nick Turse (London: Verso, 2010), 51; Nick Mills, Karzai: The Failing American
Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan (Hoboken: Wiley, 2007); Marc Herold, “An
&YDFTTPG$PSSVQUJPOBOEB%FĕDJUPG5PJMFUT"NFSJDBBOE,BS[BJT4VDDFTTJO"GHIBOJTUBO w
RAWA 3FWPMVUJPOBSZ"TTPDJBUJPOPG8PNFOPG"GHIBOJTUBO News,4FQUFNCFSŵŻ ŵųŴų
"INFE3BTIJE Taliban /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųų "ŵųŴŴTUVEZGPVOEMPOH
standing friction in the relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda; see Carlotta Gall,
i/:63FQPSU$BTUT%PVCUPO5BMJCBOT5JFTXJUI"M2BFEBwNew York Times, February 6,
2011.
ŶŻ"OO+POFT i.FFUUIF"GHIBO"SNZ*T*UB'JHNFOUPG8BTIJOHUPOT*NBHJOBUJPO w
in Turse, The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 76; Bayley and Perito, The Police in
War, 21; Rashid, Descent into Chaos,ŵųŸ5JN#JSEBOE"MFY.BSTIBMM Afghanistan: How
the West Lost Its Way /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųŴŴ ŴŵŶ+VEZ%FNQTFZ i(FS-
NBOZ$SJUJDJ[FEGPS*UT5SBJOJOHPG"GHIBO1PMJDF wNew York Times, October 15, 2006; U.S.
(PWFSONFOU"DDPVOUJOH0ďDF Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police
Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined (Washington, D.C.: GAO,
+VOFŵųųŸ ŵŶoŵŸi5SBJOJOHw0DUPCFSŶ /PWFNCFSŶ ŵųųŹ XXXXJLJMFBLTEFi8BUDIEPH
$PNQBOZ#PUDIFE"GHIBO1PMJDF4UBUJPOT w"TTPDJBUFE1SFTT 0DUPCFSŵŹ ŵųŴų
Ŷż 7JLBTI :BEBW  i"OJNBMJ[JOH "GHIBOT #JPNFUSJDT BOE #JPQPMJUJDT JO BO 0DDVQJFE
Zone,” Panel on Policies and Practices of Intervention in South Asia: Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Association for Asian Studies Conference, Honolulu, April 1, 2011; Anand Gopal,
i8IP "SF UIF 5BMJCBO  ćF "GHIBO 8BS %FDJQIFSFE w %FDFNCFS ŷ  ŵųųŻ  XXXUPNEJT-
QBUDIDPN
ŷų % (BSFUI 1PSUFS  i" #JHHFS 1SPCMFN UIBO UIF 5BMJCBO  "GHIBOJTUBOT 64#BDLFE
Child Raping Police,” Counterpunch, +VMZ Ŷų  ŵųųż  XXXDPVOUFSQVODIPSHQPS-
UFSųźŶųŵųųżIUNM/JS3PTFO Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America’s Wars in the
Muslim World /FX:PSL/BUJPO#PPLT ŵųŴų ŷŹŸ+POFT In the Graveyard of Empires,
172; Marc Herold, “Afghanistan: Terror U.S. Style,” Frontline,.BSDIŴŴ ŵųųż XXXSBXBPSH
UFNQSVOFXTŵųųżųŶŴŴUFSSPSVTTUZMFIUNM$BSMPUUB(BMM i"GHIBOT3BJTF5PMMPG%FBE
GSPN.BZ3JPUTJO,BCVMUPŴź wNew York Times, June 8, 2006; Douglas Valentine, “Provin-
DJBM3FDPOTUSVDUJPO5FBNTBOEUIF$*"T%JSUZ8BSJO"GHIBOJTUBO wZ Magazine, February
ŵųŴų ŶŴoŶŸ4BZFE:BRVC*CSBIJNJ i"GHIBO1PMJDF1BSUPGUIF1SPCMFN wInstitute for War
and Peace Reporting,3"8"/FXT +VOFŹ ŵųųŹ XXXSBXBPSHQPMJDFŶIUN

Notes to Pages 240–241 361


ŷŴi6OWBSOJTIFE-PPLBU)BNTUSVOH'JHIU wNew York Times, July 25, 2010; Rosen, After-
math,ŷŹŸiA,JMMJOH:PV*TB7FSZ&BTZćJOHGPS6T)VNBO3JHIUT"CVTFTJO4PVUIFBTU
Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch, +VMZ ŵųųŶ  ŵųoŷŷ 1SBUBQ $IBUUFSKFF  i"GHIBO 1PMJDF
Still Out of Step,” Asia Times, March 2, 2010; “Kunduz Politics of Corruption in the Baghlan
1PMJDF 'PSDFT w %FDFNCFS Ÿ  ŵųųŸ  IUUQXJLJMFBLTLŸTVDBCMFŵųųŸŴŵųŸ,"#6-ŸŴŻŴ
IUNM
42. Tonita Murray, “Police Building in Afghanistan: A Case Study in Civil Security
3FGPSN wInternational Peacekeeping +BOVBSZŵųųź ŴųŻoŵŹ
ŷŶ8JMMJBN'JTDIFS i3JHIUT"GHIBO1SJTPO-PPLT-JLF"OPUIFS(VBOUÈOBNP wIPS News,
+BOVBSZŴŸ ŵųųŻ.BLJB.POJS i1VMF$IBSLIJ+BJM*ONBUFT'BDF"XGVM-JGF wRAWA News,
"VHVTUŴŶ ŵųųŻ XXXSBXBPSHUFNQSVOFXTŵųųŻųŻŴŶQVMFDIBSLIJKBJMJONBUFTGBDF
BXGVMMJGFIUNM%FFQB#BCJOHUPO i4PME 3BQFEBOE+BJMFE"(JSM'BDFT"GHIBO+VTUJDF w
Reuters, March 31, 2010; Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghani-
stan’s Untold Story (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2009), 317. On the deteriorating con-
EJUJPOTGPSXPNFOJO"GHIBOJTUBO JOTQJUFPGDMBJNTCZMFBEJOHMJCFSBMJOUFMMFDUVBMTUIBUUIF
NJTTJPOXBTVOEFSUBLFOGPSUIFJSCFOFĕU TFF.BMBMBJ+PZBXJUI%FSSJDL0,FFGF A Woman
among Warlords: The Extraordinary Story of an Afghan Who Dared to Raise Her Voice (New
:PSL4DSJCOFS ŵųųż 
44. Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or Mission Failure,” Washington Post,
4FQUFNCFS ŵŴ  ŵųųż 3PE /PSEMBOE BOE 4IBSJGVMMBI 4BIBL  i"GHIBO (PWFSONFOU 4BZT
Prisoner Directed Attacks,” New York Times, February 11, 2011; “Break for the Hills,” The
Economist, April 28, 2011.
ŷŸ +BNFT 3JTFO  i1SPQQJOH 6Q B %SVH -PSE  ćFO $IBSHJOH )JN w New York Times,
%FDFNCFS Ŵŵ  ŵųŴų 1JFSSF"SOBVE $IPVWZ  Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy
$BNCSJEHF)BSWBSE6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųŴų+VMJFO.FSDJMMF ićF64A8BSPO%SVHTJO
"GHIBOJTUBO3FBMJUZPS1SFUFYU wCritical Asian Studies 43, no. 2 (2011): 285-309. Gretchen
Peters’s book Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda (New
:PSL4U.BSUJOT1SFTT ŵųųż FYFNQMJĕFTUIFMPOHTUBOEJOHQSBDUJDFBNPOH64HPWFSO-
NFOUPďDJBMTBOEKPVSOBMJTUTPGCMBNJOH64FOFNJFTGPSUSBďDLJOHJOESVHTXIFOJUJT
U.S. allies and proxies who are the principal players. The seasoned Afghan scholar Antonio
Giustozzi writes in Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghani-
stan /FX:PSL$PMVNCJB6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŻ ićFSFJTMJUUMFFWJEFODFPGUIF5BMJCBO
FODPVSBHJOHUIFGBSNFSTUPHSPXQPQQJFTBOEPGUIFJSJOWPMWFNFOUJOUIFUSBEFw ŻŻ 
ŷŹ%FYUFS'JMLJOT .BSL.B[FUUJ BOE+BNFT3JTFO i#SPUIFSPG"GHIBO-FBEFS4BJEUP
Be Paid by CIA,” New York Times, October 27, 2009; Joya, A Woman among Warlords, 205;
“Cables Cite Pervasive Afghan Corruption, Starting at the Top,” New York Times,%FDFNCFS
3, 2010; Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Con-
nection, and the Road to Afghanistan /FX:PSL3PXNBOBOE-JUUMFĕFME ŵųŴų ŵŶŷoŶŸ
47. Fitzgerald and Gould, Invisible History,ŵŻŸ4FFBMTP4POBMJ,PMLIBULBSBOE+BNFT
Ingalls, Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda of Silence (New
:PSL4FWFO4UPSJFT1SFTT ŵųųŹ 1SBUBQ$IBUUFSKFF i1BZJOH0ČUIF8BSMPSET"OBUPNZPGB
Culture of Corruption,” in Turse, The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan,ŻŴoŻŹ
48. Dana Lewis, “Dangerous Ride: Training Afghanistan’s Police,” Fox News blog, Octo-
CFS Ŵŷ  ŵųųŻ  IUUQPOUIFTDFOFCMPHTGPYOFXTDPNŵųųŻŴųŴŷEBOHFSPVTSJEF $BSMPUUB
(BMM i0QJVN)BSWFTUBU3FDPSE-FWFMJO"GHIBOJTUBO wNew York Times,4FQUFNCFSŶ ŵųųŹ
"MGSFE8.D$PZ i$BO"OZCPEZ1BDJGZUIF8PSMET/PŴ/BSDP4UBUF w.BSDIŶų ŵųŴų 
XXXUPNEJTQBUDIDPN
49. Barnett R. Rubin, Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry (Washington,
%$ $FOUFS GPS "NFSJDBO 1SPHSFTT  ŵųųŷ  1BUSJDL $PDLCVSO  i"GHIBOT UP 0CBNB (FU

362 Notes to Pages 241–242


0VU 5BLF,BS[BJXJUI:PV wCounterpunch, May 6, 2009, www.counterpunch.org; Rashid,
Descent into Chaos,ŶŵŹoŵźi8FEEFEUPUIF8BSMPSET/"50T6OIPMZ"GHIBO"MMJBODF w
Globe and Mail, June 3, 2011. Brigadier General Abdul Razik, a brutal NATO-backed war-
MPSEXIPCSBHHFEBCPVUOPUUBLJOHQSJTPOFSTBMJWF QVMMFEJOžŸNJMMJPOBNPOUIBTDIJFGPG
UIFDPVOUFSOBSDPUJDTQPMJDFJO,BOEBIBS IFTVCTFRVFOUMZCFDBNFQPMJDFDIJFG 
50. “Holbrooke Calls Afghan Anti-Drug Policy Most Wasteful Ever Seen,” Progressive
Review,.BSDIŵŶ ŵųųż IUUQQSPSFWDPNŵųųżųŶIPMCSPPLFDBMMTBGHIBOBOUJESVHQPM-
JDZIUNM$IPVWZ Opium,ŴŴŶi'BSNFST"UUBDL"OUJ%SVH1PMJDF "GHIBOJTUBO 'PVS)VSU w
'FCSVBSZŵ ŵųųź XXXXJLJMFBLTEF+BNFT/BUIBO ićF'PMMZPG"GHIBO0QJVN&SBEJDB-
tion,” USA Today Magazine,.BSDIŵųųż ŵŹoŶų0OUIF8BSPO%SVHTJO-BUJO"NFSJDB TFF
Ted G. Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America
/FX:PSL1BMHSBWF.BDNJMMBO ŵųųŹ BOEGPSQBSBMMFMTXJUI7JFUOBN XIFSFGBSNFSTĕSFE
BUQMBOFTPWFSIFBETFOUUPEFGPMJBUFUIFJSĕFMET TFFNZMyth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam
and the Modern War on Drugs "NIFSTU6OJWFSTJUZPG.BTTBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųż 
ŸŴ/JS3PTFO i4PNFUIJOHGSPN/PUIJOH644USBUFHZJO"GHIBOJTUBO wBoston Review,
+BOVBSZo'FCSVBSZŵųŴų Ŵų
52. See, e.g., “State to AID, Kunduz Authorities Turn to Militias as Security Deteriorates,”
0DUPCFSż ŵųŴųi6ODPOWFOUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ'PSDFT8IBUT0VUćFSF w/PWFNCFSŴŴ ŵųųż
BOEi"GHIBO1PMJDF5SBJOJOH4IJęUP'PDVTFE%JTUSJDU%FWFMPQNFOU w/PWFNCFSŴŸ ŵųųź 
www.wikileaks.ch; “Militias in Kunduz: A Tale of Two Districts,” January 10, 2010, www.
XJLJMFBLTDIDBCMFŵųŴųųŴŴų,"#6-ŴŵIUNM (JVTUP[[J  Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop,
ŴŹŵ0OUIF$*"TJOWPMWFNFOUJOUIFXBS TFF5PN&OHFMIBSEUBOE/JDL5VSTF ićF4IBEPX
8BS.BLJOH4FOTFPGUIF/FX$*"#BUUMFĕFME wJO5VSTF The Case for Withdrawal from
Afghanistan,ŴŵźoŶŸ
53. Fisnik Abrashi, “Nine Police Officers Killed in Southern Afghanistan,” Toronto
Globe and Mail, March 26, 2009; Rory Stewart, “Afghanistan: What Could Work,” New
York Review of Books, January 14, 2010, 60; Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Abdul Waheed Wafa,
“Afghan Investigators Say U.S. Troops Tried to Cover Up Evidence in Botched Raid,” New
York Times, "QSJM Ź  ŵųŴų "MJTTB + 3VCJO  i"GHIBO ,JMMFS PG 4JY "NFSJDBOT 8BT 5SVTUFE
Police Officer,” New York Times,/PWFNCFSŶų ŵųŴų#SJBO#SBEZ i%SVHTBOE%FTFSUJPO
How the UK Really Rates Afghan Police,” The Independent, March 28, 2010.
54. C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk, eds., Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal
Security Assistance (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 51;
+FSFNZ4DBIJMM ićF4FDSFU648BSJO1BLJTUBO wThe Nation,%FDFNCFSŵŴoŵŻ ŵųųż ŴŴ
1BUSJDL$PDLCVSO i8IP,JMMFEŴŵų$JWJMJBOT ćF644BZT*UT/PUB4UPSZwCounterpunch,
.BZŴŴ ŵųųż XXXDPVOUFSQVODIPSHXIJUOFZųŸŴŸŵųųżIUNM
ŸŸ5BSJR"MJ The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power /FX:PSL4DSJC-
ner, 2008); Seth Jones and Christine Fair, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2010), 97; Elizabeth Gould and Paul Fitzgerald, Crossing Zero: The
AfPak War at the Turning Point of American Empire (San Francisco: City Lights Books,
ŵųŴŴ Źŵ"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Paki-
stan -POEPO"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM +VMZŵųųŻ ż0OUIFMPOHTUBOEJOHJOWPMWFNFOUPG
UIF1BLJTUBOJNJMJUBSZBOEJOUFMMJHFODFTFSWJDFTJOUIFESVHUSBEF TFF-BXSFODF-JGTDIVMU[ 
i1BLJTUBOćF&NQJSFPG)FSPJO wJOWar on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics
Policy,FE"MGSFE8.D$PZBOE"MBO"#MPDL #PVMEFS8FTUWJFX1SFTT Ŵżżŵ ŶŴżoŸŵ
'BDJOHJNQFBDINFOU .VTIBSSBGSFTJHOFEJO"VHVTUŵųųŻ
56. See Michael Schwartz, War without End: The Iraq War in Context $IJDBHP)BZNBS-
LFU#PPLT ŵųųŻ ćPNBT&3JDLT Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New
:PSL1FOHVJO ŵųųŹ 1BUSJDL$PDLCVSO Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and

Notes to Pages 243–244 363


the Struggle for Iraq -POEPO4DSJCOFS ŵųųŻ "SBN3PTUPO The Man Who Pushed America
to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi /FX:PSL
Nation Books, 2008); Rosen, Aftermath; %BWJE #BDPO  i6OJPO#VTUJOH  *SBRJ4UZMF w The
Nation,0DUPCFSŹ ŵųŴų/FVSPTVSHFPO*ZBE"MMBXJ XIPIBEUJFTUP"NFSJDBOBOE#SJUJTI
intelligence, was another of the key politicians in exile.
Ÿź4BN%PMOJDL i,FSJL*T4FOUFODFEJO$PSSVQUJPO$BTF wNew York Times, February
ŴŻ ŵųŴų#FOKBNJO8FJTFS i,FSJL1MFBET/PU(VJMUZUPB3FWJTFE*OEJDUNFOU wNew York
Times, %FDFNCFS ŵż  ŵųųŻ ,FSJL XBT GPVOE HVJMUZ PG BDDFQUJOH B GSFF SFOPWBUJPO PG IJT
IPNFGSPNBĕSNXJUIUJFTUPUIFNBĕBXIJDIXBTIPQJOHUPSFDFJWFBMVDSBUJWFDPOUSBDUBOE
PGGBJMJOHUPEJTDMPTFBžŵŸų ųųųMPBOUP8IJUF)PVTFPďDJBMTXIPXFSFWFUUJOHIJNGPSUIF
KPCPGIFBEJOHUIF%FQBSUNFOUPG)PNFMBOE4FDVSJUZ)JTPVTUFSGSPN4BVEJ"SBCJBSBJTFT
VOBOTXFSFERVFTUJPOTBCPVUXIBUIJTUSVFQVSQPTFTXFSFBOEXIPIFXBTXPSLJOHGPS
58. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone
/FX:PSL,OPQG ŵųųŹ ŻŷoŻż-U$PM#P#BSCPVS ićF5BTFS.ŵŹJO0QFSBUJPO*SBRJ
'SFFEPN wMilitary Police: The Professional Bulletin of the Military Police Corps, HQ, Depart-
NFOUPGUIF"SNZ "QSJMŵųųŷ ŷźoŷż$BQU+BTPO#VSLF i4UBOEJOH6QćF*SBRJ1PMJDF
'PSDF w JCJE  ŷųoŷŴ "MGSFE 8 .D$PZ  i*NQFSJBM *MMVTJPOT *OGPSNBUJPO *OGSBTUSVDUVSF
and U.S. Global Power,” in Endless Empires: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, and America’s
Decline, ed. Alfred W. McCoy, Joseph M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (Madison: Univer-
TJUZPG8JTDPOTJO1SFTT GPSUIDPNJOHŵųŴŵ 
59. Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City,ŻŷoŻż"MJ"MMBXJ The Occupa-
tion of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųź 
ŴŻŻoŻż4FFBMTP.JDIBFM.PTT i)PX*SBR1PMJDF3FGPSN#FDBNF$BTVBMUZPG8BSwNew
York Times,.BZŵŵ ŵųųŹBOE.BUIJFV%FĘFNBOE4V[BOOF4VUQIJO i1PMJDJOH1PTU8BS
*SBR*OTVSHFODZ $JWJMJBO1PMJDF BOEUIF3FDPOTUSVDUJPOPG4PDJFUZwSociological Focus 39,
OPŷ /PWFNCFSŵųųŹ ŵŹŸoŵŻŶ
60. Ken Isenberg, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Westport: Praeger,
ŵųųż żŴożŷ3PCFSU:1FMUPO Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror /FX:PSL
$SPXO ŵųųŹ 3FOBF.FSMF i$PNJOHVOEFS'JSF%ZO$PSQ%FGFOET*UT8PSLJO5SBJOJOH
Foreign Police Forces,” Washington Post, March 19, 2007; Nir Rosen, “Security Contractors:
3JEJOH4IPUHVOXJUI0VS4IBEPX"SNZJO*SBR wMother Jones,"QSJMŵŷ ŵųųź IUUQNPUI-
FSKPOFTDPNQPMJUJDTŵųųźųŷTFDVSJUZDPOUSBDUPSTSJEJOHTIPUHVOPVSTIBEPXBSNZ
JSBR 5VDLFS $BSMTPO  i)JSFE (VOT w Esquire, .BSDI ŵųųŷ  XXXCSBWPDPNQBOZVTBDPN
"SUJDMFTBTQ *%ŴŷŶ "OOB .VMSJOF  i3PHVF 4FDVSJUZ $PNQBOJFT ćSFBUFO 64 (BJOT JO
Afghan War,” Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 2010; Chatterjee, Iraq, Inc., 111, 112, 150.
$BSMTPOBMTPNFOUJPOTBOJODJEFOUJOXIJDIDPOUSBDUPSTDVUJOBNJMFMPOHHBTMJOFCZXBW-
JOHUIFJSHVOTBUNPUPSJTUT
ŹŴ+JMM$BSSPMM i0ME#SVUBMJUZBNPOH/FX*SBRJ'PSDFT wChristian Science Monitor, May 4,
2005; Nir Rosen, “The Myth of the Surge,” Rolling Stone, March 6, 2008, www.rollingstone.
DPNQPMJUJDTTUPSZŴŻźŵŵŶźŹUIF@NZUI@PG@UIF@TVSHF 5JNPUIZ 8JMMJBNT BOE 0NBS "M
+BXPTIZ i%SVHBOE"MDPIPM"CVTF(SPXJOHJO*SBRJ'PSDFT wNew York Times, October 25,
ŵųŴųi<TUSJDLFO>%FUBJOT<TUSJDLFO>1PMJDF$IJFGGPS$PSSVQUJPO w+BOVBSZŵŷ ŵųųŷ XXX
wikileaks.org.
62. Andrew Higgins, “As It Wields Power Abroad, U.S. Outsources Law and Order Work,”
Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2004.
ŹŶ%FUBJO#Z@1PMJDF4VQQPSU6OJU @*1 "OE5'@-"3*70 3PVUF @"*'%&5 "VHVTU
ŴŸ ŵųųź%FNPOTUSBUJPO*70"4@*/+%BNBHF "VHVTUŻ ŵųųŸ1PMJDF"DUJPOTCZ)JU*70
)*5 3PVUF @$*7,*" 4FQUFNCFSŵŸ ŵųųź8FBQPOT"NNP$POĕTDBUFE#:<TUSJDLFO>JO

364 Notes to Pages 244–245


.PTVM<TUSJDLFO>*/+%BNBHF "QSJMŷ ŵųųŸBOEi%FBE#PEZ'PVOE w+VOFŴŵ ŵųųŸ XXX
wikileaks.org.
Źŷ 4QFODFS "DLFSNBO  i5SBJOJOH *SBRT %FBUI 4RVBET w The Nation, June 4, 2007,
ŵųoŵŹ ,FO 4JMWFSTUFJO  i+FSSZ #VSLF PO *SBRT $PSSVQU 1PMJDF 'PSDF w Harper’s, 4FQUFN-
CFS ŴŴ  ŵųųź  IUUQIBSQFSTPSHBSDIJWFŵųųźųżICDżųųųŴŴŻų $ISJTUPQIFS "MMCSJUUPO 
i8IZ *SBRT 1PMJDF "SF B .FOBDF w Time, .BSDI ŵų  ŵųųŹ  XXXUJNFDPNUJNFXPSME
BSUJDMFų ŻŸżż ŴŴźŸųŸŸ ųųIUNM1BUSJDL$PDLCVSO The Occupation: War and Resistance in
Iraq (London: Verso, 2006), 123; Nicolas J. S. Davies, Blood on Our Hands: The American
Invasion and Destruction of Iraq "OO"SCPS/JNCMF#PPLT ŵųŴų ŵŷŷoŶŴŹ
65. See Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of
the New Imperialism /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJUBO#PPLT ŵųųŸ Ŵ3PCFSU%SFZGVTT i1IPFOJY
Rising,” American Prospect, January 1, 2004, 11; Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story
of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals /FX:PSL %PVCMFEBZ 
ŵųųŻ Ŵŷŷ4IBOF#BVFS i*SBRT/FX%FBUI4RVBET wThe Nation,+VOFŵŵ ŵųųż ŴŴoŵŸ
ŹŹ1FUFS.BBT ićF4BMWBEPSJ[BUJPOPG*SBRćF8BZPGUIF$PNNBOEPT wNew York
Times Magazine,.BZŴ ŵųųŸ Ŵ%BWJE$PSO i'SPN*SBO$POUSBUP*SBR wThe Nation, May
ź ŵųųŸ XXXUIFOBUJPODPNCMPHŴŸŹŴŹźJSBODPOUSBJSBR4UFFMFBMTPXPSLFEDMPTFMZXJUI
UIF SJHIUXJOH $VCBO UFSSPSJTU -VJT 1PTBEB $BSSJMFT )JT CVTJOFTT DBSFFS JT QSPĕMFE PO
IUUQQSFNJFSFTQFBLFSTDPNKJN@TUFFMFCJP"UUIJTXSJUJOH4UFFMFPXOTBQSJWBUFTFDVSJUZ
ĕSN MJLFMZB$*"GSPOU BOEDPOTVMUTGPSUIF1FOUBHPO
Źź%BIS+BNBJM i.BOBHJOH&TDBMBUJPO/FHSPQPOUFBOE#VTIT/FX*SBR5FBN w+BOVBSZ
ż ŵųųź IUUQBOUJXBSDPNKBNBJM BSUJDMFJEŴųŵŻż
ŹŻ .BBT  ićF 4BMWBEPSJ[BUJPO PG *SBR w Ŵ ,MFJO  The Shock Doctrine, ŶźŴ 4PMPNPO
.PPSF i,JMMJOHT-JOLFEUP4IJJUF4RVBETJO*SBRJ1PMJDF'PSDF wLos Angeles Times,/PWFN-
ber 29, 2005; Davies, Blood on Our Hands,ŵŸŶoŸŷ,FO4JMWFSTUFJO ićF.JOJTUFSPG$JWJM
8BS#BZBO+BCS 1BVM#SFNFS BOEUIF3JTFPGUIF*SBRJ%FBUI4RVBET wHarper’s, August
ŵųųŹ ŹźoźŶćF$*"DIBSBDUFSJ[FE+BCS LOPXOGPSESFTTJOHJOGBODZ8FTUFSOTVJUT BTiDPS-
rupt and thuggish” (Silverstein, 67).
Źż+BNFT"#BLFS***BOE-FF))BNJMUPO The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 13.
źų"INFE4)BTIJN Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
TJUZ1SFTT ŵųųŹ ŶŶų$BSSPMM i0ME#SVUBMJUZBNPOH/FX*SBRJ'PSDFTw3PE/PSEMBOE i8JUI
-PDBM$POUSPM /FX5SPVCMFTJO*SBR wNew York Times, March 16, 2009; Rosen, Aftermath,
źųi.VSEFSPG$JWJMJBO w+VOFŵ ŵųųŹi*;%FUBJOFF"CVTF4VNNBSZBU*14UBUJPO w"VHVTUŵ 
2005; and “Alleged Detainee Abuse at Diyala Jail,” May 25, 2006, www.wikileaks.org.
71. Cockburn, The Occupation, 194; Robert Cole, Under the Gun in Iraq: My Year Train-
ing the Iraqi Police,BTUPMEUP+BO)PHBO "NIFSTU /:1SPNFUIFVT#PPLT ŵųųź ŹųoŹŴ
&OFNZ"DUJPO %JSFDU'JSF315 4NBMM"SNT @8FTU4&@*1@*4',*"@$*7,*"@6&,*"
i%SJWF#Z4IPPUJOHPO1PMJDF 7JD"S3BNBEJ w+BOVBSZŶ ŵųųŷi"UUBDLPO1PMJDF$IJFGBOE
Bodyguard,” January 17, 2004; and “Attack on Haditha Police Station,” January 27, 2004,
www.wikileaks.org.
źŵ)BTIJN Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, 25.
73. Cole, Under the Gun in Iraq,ŹųoŹŴ4FFBMTP.BSL3%FQVF Patrolling Baghdad: A
Military Police Company and the War in Iraq (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
74. A classic work on Western counterinsurgency doctrine, recently reissued, is David
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice /FX:PSL)BJMFS ŵųųŸ 
źŸ4FFćPNBT&3JDLT The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military
Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 /FX :PSL 1FOHVJO  ŵųųż  ŴŹŹ 8IJMF QSFTFOUJOH TPNF

Notes to Pages 246–248 365


WBMVBCMF JOGPSNBUJPO  UIJT CPPL JT XSJUUFO BT B QBOFHZSJD UP UIF 64 NJMJUBSZ BOE %BWJE
1FUSBFVT UZQJDBMPGNBJOTUSFBNNFEJBDPWFSBHF
źŹ /PSEMBOE  i8JUI -PDBM $POUSPM  /FX 5SPVCMFT JO *SBRw 3PTFO  ićF .ZUI PG UIF
4VSHFwi*SBRJ1PMJDF4BJEUP'JSFPO1SPUFTU 4USJLJOHź wNew York Times, April 17, 2011.
źź4PMPNPO.PPSF i64&YQBOET5SBJOJOHUP"EESFTT*SBRJ1PMJDF8PFT wLos Angeles
Times, March 9, 2006.
78. Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the
War on Terror /FX :PSL .FUSPQPMJUBO #PPLT  ŵųųŹ  i$PNNBOEP (VBSET ,JMM 1SJTPO
*ONBUF  8PVOE 5XP JO &TDBQF "UUFNQU w "TTPDJBUFE 1SFTT  4FQUFNCFS ŴŻ  ŵųųŻ %BWJFT 
Blood on Our Hands, 285; Rosen, Aftermath,ŵŻŷ Ŷųų"NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM New Order,
Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq -POEPO "NOFTUZ *OUFSOBUJPOBM 
ŵųŴų  i*; 1SJTPO 3JPU w 'FCSVBSZ ŵ  ŵųųŷ i1SJTPOFST &TDBQF GSPN 5JLSJU +BJM w .BSDI ŵŸ 
2004; “RPG Attack on Abu Ghraib Prison,” April 17, 2004; “Riot at Prison, Detainee Killed,”
"QSJM Ŵų  ŵųųŷ i*; 3VO 1SJTPO 6QSJTJOH w +VOF ŵŴ  ŵųųŷ BOE i $SJNJOBM &WFOU  .VSEFS
315@*4',*"w.BZź ŵųųżXXXXJLJMFBLTPSH
źż'PY#VUUFSĕFMEBOE&SJD-JDIUCMBV ićF3FBDIPG8BSćF$POHSFTT 4DSFFOJOHPG
1SJTPO0ďDJBMT*T'BVMUFECZ-BXNBLFST wNew York Times,.BZŵŴ ŵųųŷ'PY#VUUFSĕFME 
i+VTUJDF%FQU3FQPSU4IPXT5SPVCMFJO1SJWBUF64+BJMT1SFDFEFE+PC'JYJOH*SBRT wNew
York Times,+VOFŹ ŵųųŷ-FBI$BMEXFMM i*SBRJ%VOHFPOTBOE5PSUVSF$IBNCFSTVOEFS
/FX"NFSJDBO5SBJOFE.BOBHFNFOU wPrison Legal News,4FQUFNCFSŵųųŷ XXXOPWFN-
CFSPSHTUBZJOGPCSFBLJOHŵ1-/żųŷIUNM
80. See Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New
:PSL7FSTP Ŵżżż &MMJPU$VSSJF Crime and Punishment in America /FX:PSL.FUSPQPMJ-
tan Books, 1998).
ŻŴ#VUUFSĕFME i5SPVCMFJO1SJWBUF64+BJMT1SFDFEFE+PC'JYJOH*SBRJTw$BMEXFMM i*SBRJ
%VOHFPOT BOE 5PSUVSF $IBNCFST VOEFS /FX "NFSJDBO 5SBJOFE .BOBHFNFOUw 3PCFSU
Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire /FX :PSL /BUJPO #PPLT 
ŵųŴų  ŶŴŷ .D$PUUFS  B (SFFO #FSFU JO 7JFUOBN  XBT B QSPUÏHÏ PG MBXBOEPSEFS IBXL
George Belo, who in the 1960s presided over a harsh and racist penal order as director of
UIF5FYBT%FQBSUNFOUPG$PSSFDUJPOT XIJDICFDBNFUIFUBSHFUPGMBOENBSLQSJTPOFSSJHIUT
lawsuits.
Żŵ 4BTIB "CSBNTLZ  American Furies: Crime, Punishment, and Vengeance in the Age
of Mass Imprisonment #PTUPO#FBDPO1SFTT ŵųųź ŴŸŹ$BMEXFMM i*SBRJ%VOHFPOTBOE
5PSUVSF$IBNCFSTVOEFS/FX"NFSJDBO5SBJOFE.BOBHFNFOUw#POERVPUFEJO5JNPUIZ
Black, When Heart Turns Rock Solid: The Lives of Three Puerto Rican Brothers On and Off the
Streets /FX:PSL1BOUIFPO#PPLT ŵųųż ŵŹų
ŻŶ4FF6TFFNBOE,JNCBMM States of Siege, 167.
84. See Byron Engle et al., The Rhodesian Election: An Eye-Witness Account (Washington,
%$ "NFSJDBO $POTFSWBUJWF 6OJPO  Ŵżźż  Ÿ &OHMF TVQQPSUFE 4NJUIT CPNCJOHT PG UIF
iUFSSPSJTUTBODUVBSJFTwPGi.BSYJTUwHVFSSJMMBT+PTIVB/LPNPBOE3PCFSU.VHBCF XJEFMZ
DPOTJEFSFEBUUIFUJNFJO;JNCBCXFUPCFGSFFEPNĕHIUFST
85. Letter to the editor, Greensboro News and Record, 0DUPCFS Ŵų  ŵųųŷ 8JMMJBNTPO
JOUFOEFEUPWPUFGPS(FPSHF8#VTI TUBUJOHJOUIFMFUUFS i*DPVMEOFWFSTVQQPSUGPSDPN-
NBOEFSJODIJFGPGPVSBSNFEGPSDFTTPNFPOFXIPIBEWJMJĕFE<PVSUSPPQT>BTSFNJOJTDFOU
PG(FOHIJT,IBOw3FDFOUTDIPMBSTIJQNBLJOHVTFPGOFXMZEFDMBTTJĕFESFDPSETIBTTIPXO
UIBUBUSPDJUJFTXFSFJOGBDUDPNNJUUFETZTUFNBUJDBMMZCZ64GPSDFTJO7JFUOBN OPTVSQSJTF
HJWFOUIFBCVOEBODFPGFWJEFODFQVUGPSXBSEBUUIFUJNFCZUIFBOUJXBSNPWFNFOU KPVSOBM-
istic exposés, and antiwar GIs.

366 Notes to Pages 248–251


86. Don Bordenkircher, Tiger Cage: An Untold Story /FX:PSL"CCZ1VCMJTIJOH ŴżżŻ 
żŹ 3ZBO .BVSP  i64 0ďDJBM *SBRJT 5PME .F 8.%T 4FOU UP 4ZSJB w World Net Daily,
+VMZŶų ŵųųŻ XXXXOEDPNJOEFYQIQ GB1"(&WJFXQBHF*EźŴųźŹ"EPMQI4BFO[XBT
BOPUIFS014FSXIPXPSLFEJO*SBR TFSWJOHBTBTFOJPS4UBUF%FQBSUNFOUDPOTVMUBOUBOE
adviser to border patrol units.
87. Quoted in Black, When Heart Turns Rock Solid,ŵŸżTFFBMTP"CSBNTLZ American
Furies; Perkinson, Texas Tough, ŶŷųoŷŶ "OOF .BSJF $VTBDL  Cruel and Unusual: The
Culture of Punishment in America /FX)BWFO:BMF6OJWFSTJUZ1SFTT ŵųųż .D$MBSZBOE
Ritchie, In the Shadow of the War on Terror;)BOOB)PMMFNBO 3PCFSU8.D$IFTOFZ +PIO
#FMMBNZ'PTUFS BOE3+BNJM+POOB ićF1FOBM4UBUFJOBO"HFPG$SJTJT wMonthly Review 61
+VOFŵųųż ŴoŴŹ

Notes to Pages 251–252 367


“This page intentionally left blank”
Index

ŴŵżųEQSPHSBN 0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM "NFSJDBO*OEJBOT /BUJWF"NFSJDBOT ŵŴ 


4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBN ŹųoŹŴ źŶ źźoźŻ  28, 49, 99, 110, 133, 316
Ŵŵż ŴŶų ŴŶŻ Ŵŷŵoŷź ŴŹŹ ŴŹż Ŵżų  "NFSJDBO$JWJM-JCFSUJFT6OJPO "$-6 
ŴżŵożŶ ŵųŵoŶ ŵŴŵ ŵŵź ŵŵż ŵŶŹBOE 25, 86, 249
&JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPO żoŴųBOE "NFSJDBO$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ TVQQSFTTJPO
(VBUFNBMB ŵŴźoŴŻBOE*OEPOFTJB ŴųŵoŶ of, 7, 25
BOE*SBO ŴżŸożŹ ŵųųBOE*SBR ŵųųBOE "NJO *EJ ŴŻŸoŻŹ
,PSFB żŶożŹBOE-BPT Ŵŵŷ ŴŶŵoŶŶBOE "NOFTUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM ŴŶ żź Ŵżż ŵŴŵ
ćBJMBOE Ŵųż ŴŴŴBOE7JFUOBN ŴŷŶoŷŷ "NPSZ 3PCFSU +S ŴųŸ
Andarabi, Abdul Khalil, 241
"CPVSF[L +BNFT ŵŶŷoŶŸ ŶŸź Anderson, David, 51
"CSBNT &MMJPU ŵŶź "OHMFUPO +BNFT+FTVT ŴųŴ
Abu Ghraib prison, 156, 201, 247, 250 Anslinger, Harry J., 202
"CV+BNBM .VNJB Ÿ Anton Sudjarwo, 106
Acheson, Dean, 80, 100 An Tu-hui, 288
"ELJOT &MNFS) +S ŴŷŹ Ŵźż ŵŴŴ "SBCJBO"NFSJDBO0JM$PNQBOZ
"GHIBOJTUBO Ŵ ŴŹ ŵųŵoŶ ŵŶżoŷŶ (ARAMCO), 12, 194, 203, 204
"GHIBOJTUBO/BUJPOBM1PMJDF ŵŷųoŷŴ ŵŷŶ BSBQ.PJ %BOJFM ŴŻŶoŻŷ
African National Congress (ANC), 185 «SCFO[ 1SFTJEFOU+BDPCP ŵŴŹoŴź ŵŵŴ
"HFF 1IJMJQ ŴŹŶ ŵŵŻoŵż Areco, Jorge Pacheco, 228
Aglipay, Bishop Gregorio, 24 Arévalo, Juan José, 218
Agnew, Spiro, 220 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 238, 360
"HVJOBMEP &NJMJBOP ŵŶ Aristy, Hector, 212
"IFSO ćPNBT- +S ŴŶź Ŷŷų "SNBT $BSMPT$BTUJMMP ŵŴŹoŴź ŵŴŻ
Al-Bawi, Adnan, 247 "SNCSVTUFS 'SBOL ŴŸŵ ŴŸŶ
Alcatraz Prison, 113 "SNTUSPOH +PIO+ ŵŷż
Aldous, Christopher, 78 Ashcroft, John, 248
Alessandri, Jorge, 229 Ashida, Hitoshi, 72
Allen, Henry T., 26, 27, 29 Attica Prison, 158
Allende, Salvador, 230 "UVHVCB 3BZNPOE Ŵźŷ
Alliance for Progress, 208, 210, 216, 231 Ávila, General Manuel Francisco Sosa, 219
"MMNBO 5% ŴŶŹ "ZHVO ,FNBM ŵųŵ
al-Maliki, Nouri, 244 "[B[[J ;FSFNBSJBO ŴŹŻ
al-Mayah, Abdul Latif, 246 "[VSEJB &OSJRVF1FSBMUB ŵŴŻoŴż
"MUBNJSBOP 1FESP ŷż
BM4BES .PRUBEB ŵŷŹ ŵŷŻ Babineau, Ray, 139, 144
BM4BJE /VSJ ŵųųoŵųŴ #BCV "CEVM3BINBO ŴŻŷ
Al-Qaeda, 248, 251 Baer, Robert, 204

369
#BKB &NNBOVFM Ŷų Bobo, Dr. Rosalvo, 38, 43
Bakary, Djibo, 174 Bohannen, Charles, 303
#BLIUJBS 5FJNVS ŴżŸ Ŵżź ŴżżSee also Boileson, Henning, 225
Iran: SAVAK Bokassa, Jean-Bédel, 175
#BMBHVFS +PBRVÓO ŵŴŴoŴŵ Bond, Julian, 250
#BMDI &NJMZ ŷŸ #POOFĕM "EPMQIF ŴŶŶ ŴźŸ ŴŻŴ ŴŻŶ
Baldwin, Roger, 86 #POVT.BSDIFS"SNZ źŵ
Ball, George, 167 #PSEFOLJSDIFS %PO ŴŸŹoŸź ŵŸųoŸŴ ŶŵŸ
Bandholtz, Harry H., 23, 26 Borja, Pedro, 117
Banzer, Hugo, 228 Borno, Louis, 38
Bao Dai, 143 Bosch, Juan, 211, 212, 347
Baraheni, Reza, 199 Boss Tweed, 44
Barbie, Klaus (“The Butcher of Lyon”), 355 #PVESJBT (FPSHF- ŴŷŷoŷŸ ŶŴŹ
Barnes, Robert L., 225 Bounkhong Pradichit, 137, 313
Barnett, Rob, 105 Bouterse, Arthur D., 57
Barre, Siad, 169, 328 Boyington, Greg “Pappy,” 117, 304
#BSSPX#SPXO -UE ŴŵŸ #SBEMFZ 0NBS źź
#BUJTUB 'VMHFODJP ŵųŻBOE#VSØEFMB #SBOETUBUUFS "SUIVS' ŻŴoŻŵ ŴŷŶoŷŻ ŵŶŹ 
3FQSFTJØOEF"DUJWBEBEFT$PNNVOJTUBT  315, 318
230 #SBOGNBO 'SFE ŴŶŹ
Batraville, Benoit, 42 Bravo, Douglas, 210
Beals, Carleton, 49 #SB[JM ŵŵŸoŵź
#FMHJVN ŴźŹ ŴźŻ ŴŻŴ ŴŻŵ ŴŻŶ #SFNFS -1BVM *** ŵŷŷ
#FMM)FMJDPQUFS$PNQBOZ ŴŻŹ Brilliant, Leigh, 179
#FO#FMMB "INFE ŴŻŸ #SJUJTI ŸŶ ŸŸ ŴŷŶ ŴŷŻ ŴŻŷ ŴŻŸ ŴŻŹ ŴżųożŴ 
Bennett, Don, 179 200, 240; and colonial police, 2, 174; and
#FOOFUU +BNFT7 ŴŴŵ ŵŴź intelligence, 101
Benninghoff, Merrell, 83 Brockway, Zubolon, 66
#FOTPO 8JMMJBN$ ŴŸŸ #SPVHIBN #PC ŵżŹ
beriberi, 34, 155 Brown, Theodore, 171, 193, 213, 214, 222,
Berkeley, California: and police depart- 225, 354
NFOU ŷ ŹŴ żŷ ŵųŵBOE6OJWFSTJUZPG Brown, Willard O., 133
$BMJGPSOJB4DIPPMPG$SJNJOPMPHZ ŹŴ żŶ  #SZBO$IBNPSSP5SFBUZ ŷź
żŷ ŴŴŹ ŴŷŶ ŴŻŸ ŵżŵożŶ Bryant, Albert, 225
Berkeley, Randolph, 157, 158, 324 #VDLMFZ 8JMMJBN' ŴźŻ
Bernal, Cesar, 359 Buell, Edgar “Pop,” 137
Bernard, Cheryl, 242 Burch, Walter “Sticky,” 112
Bertillon procedure, 4, 24 Burchett, Wilfred, 128, 134, 309
#FSUSBOE3VTTFMM8BS$SJNFT5SJCVOBM ŴŶ Burge, Jon, 236
#FUBODPVSU 1SFTJEFOU3ØNVMP ŵŴų Burke, Jerry, 246
Betsch, Carl, 195, 340 Burke, Wilbur, 66
Beveridge, Albert, 22 Burkhaler, Holly J., 221
#JBGSB JOEFQFOEFODFNPWFNFOU Ŵźŷ #VSNB ŵ Ŵųź ŴŶźBOE(FOFSBM/F8JO 
#JMJCJEQSJTPO .BOJMB ŶŴoŶŵ ŴŶŻBOE044%FUBDINFOUŴųŴ ŴŶŸ ŴŹŹ 
#JOI9VZFO ŴŷŶ 299
#JMMM +BNFT Ŵżŷ #VSVOEJ ŴŻŴoŻŶ
#JSE 8JMMJT ŴųŹoŻ ŵżż ŶųŹ #VTI (FPSHF)8 ŵŶźoŶŻ
Bishop, Edward, 170, 204 #VTI (FPSHF8 ŵŷŴ ŵŸŴoŸŵ
Black Panther Party (BPP), 8, 94, 260, 293 Bush, Robert N., 206, 345
Blaufarb, Douglas, 135, 149 #VUMFS 4NFEMFZ ŴŻ Ŷź ŶŻ ŷŷ ŷź ŵźŵ
Bledsoe, Jerry, 111 Buttinger, Joseph, 147

370 Index
Cacos, 37, 42; chiefs (Estraville, Jean, and Chile, 229, 230
Albert), 43 $IPNTLZ /PBN ŸŶ Ŵųų ŴŵŴ ŵŶŷ
Caldwell, John, 87 Chong Sik-Lee, 152
Caldwell, Oliver J., 62 $IPOFEF)VNP 1VČPG4NPLF '"3$
Calhoun, John, 170 cadre, 215
$BMJYUF %FNPTUIÒOF ŷŸ Cho Sing Chik, 85
$BMMBHIZ ćPNBT. ŴŻŴ Chough Pyong-Ok, 81, 85, 286
Caltex, 103, 105, 115, 129 Church, Frank, 8
$BNBSHP "MCFSUP-MFSBT ŵŴŵ Churchill, Winston, 12, 190
$BNCPEJB ŴŶŻoŶż $JMMJT 7JODFOU ŴŵŹoŵź
$BNFSPO +BNFT żų civic action, 49, 109, 110, 116, 124, 127, 148,
$BOOPO +BDL: ŵŻŵ 196, 223
$BOUSFMM 8JMMJBN ŴźŴ ŵŵŻ Civil Air Transport (CAT), 76, 103, 106, 129
$BQMBO )BSPMEi4DPUUZwżŹożź ŴŴŻ ŴźŶ Clark, Bob, 355
Carlson, Roy, 138 Classon, Edward J., 91
Carpio, Caytano, 223 $MPXFST /PSNBO ŴŸŵ Ŷŵų
Carter, Major Calvin, 48 Cohen, Theodore, 70, 73
$BSUFS +JNNZ ŴŹŴ ŵŶŷ ŵŶŹ Colby, Gerard, 214
Carter Phil, 247 $PMCZ 8JMMJBN Ŵŷų ŴŸŷ ŴŸŻ ŵŸŴ
Castano, Ciro Trujillo, 214 $PMF 3PCFSU ŵŷźoŷŻ
Casteel, Steven, 247 $PMPNCJBBOE%FQBSUBNFOUP"ENJOTUSB-
Castro, Fidel, 176, 208 tivo de Seguridad (DAS), 215, 216, 230;
Central Africa Republic, 175 and La Violencia, 212; and Operation
$FOUSBM*OUFMMJHFODF"HFODZ $*" ŴųoŴŶ  .BSRVFUFMJB ŵŴŵoŴŶBOE1MBO-B[P ŵŴŵ
Ŵź Źų źŴoźŵ źŹ ŻŴoŻŵ ŻŸ żŶ żŹ ŴųŴ  Conein, Lucien, 195, 237
ŴųŶoŷ ŴųŹoŻ Ŵųż ŴŴŷ ŴŵųoŵŴ ŴŵŶ  Conrad, Joseph, 40
ŴŵŹoŵź ŴŶŷ ŴŶŸoŶż Ŵŷŵ Ŵŷŷ ŴŷźoŷŻ  $PO4POQSJTPO 1VPMP$POEPSF ŴŸżoŹų 
ŴŸųoŸŶ ŴŸŸ ŴŹŻ ŴźŵoźŶ ŴźŹ ŴźŻoźż ŴŻŴ  325
ŴŻŸ ŴŻŻ Ŵżż ŵųŴ ŵųŷ ŵųŹ ŵŴŴoŴŵ ŵŴŸ  DPOTUBCVMBSJFT HFOEBSNFSJFT #VSVOEJ 
ŵŴŻoŴż ŵŵŵ ŵŵŸ ŵŶų ŵŶŻoŶż ŵŷŵoŷŶ  ŴŻŶ$BNCPEJB Ŵųż$FOUSBM"GSJDB
281, 283, 285, 302, 326 3FQVCMJD ŴźŸ$POHP ŴŻųoŻŴ%PNJOJDBO
$IBE ŴźųoźŴ 3FQVCMJD ŷŹoŷź(FSNBOZ ŴŻż ŶŶŹ
Chai Sevikul, 126 (SFFDF ŴżŴożŶ)BJUJ ŶźoŷŸ*OEPOFTJB 
$IBMBCJ "INBE ŵŷŷ ŵŷŸ 101 (see also*OEPOFTJBNPCJMFCSJHBEF 
$IBNQMJO +PIO ŴŹų *SBO ŴźŸ ŴŻŻ ŴżŶożŷ-BPT ŴŵŸ
$IBNPVO $BNJMMF ŵųŴ /JDBSBHVB ŷźoŸŵ1IJMJQQJOFT ŴŴ ŴŸ Ŵź 
$IBOH5BFL4BOH ŻŴ Żŷ ŻŹ ŵŻŹoŻź ŵŻŻ ŴŻ ŵŴoŶų ŴŴŸ ŴŴŹ ŴŴżćBJMBOE ŴųŹ Ŵųż
Chase Manhattan Bank, 101 Rwanda, 182; Royal Ulster, 191, 337; South
Chávez, Hugo, 211 ,PSFB Żų ŻŶ7JFUOBN Ŵŷż
Chehab, Fouad, 201 $POTUBOU &NNBOVFM ŶŹų
Cheney, Dick, 246 Contreras, Manuel, 230
Chennault, Clare, 106 Coolidge, Calvin, 48
Chevron, 139 Cornelius, George, 67
$IJOB ŸŶ Ŵųų ŴųŵBOE$*",VONJOHTUB- DPSSVQUJPO Ŵ ŵ ż ŵŷ ŷŷ źŸ Żŷ ŻŹ ŴųŹoŻ 
UJPO Ŵųŷ ŴŹŹBOE$IJOFTF$PNNVOJTUT ŴŴŸ ŴŵŶ ŴŵŹoŵź ŴŶż ŴŸųoŸŴ ŴŸźoŸŻ ŴŹź 
$IJDPN źŹ ŴźŶ Ŵźż ŴŻŴ ŴŻŵ ŴŻŷ ŴŻŸ  ŴŻų ŴŻŶ ŴżźożŻ ŵųų ŵŴŵ ŵŴŸ ŵŵŵ ŵŶŻ 
ŵŻŶ ŶŶŶBOE(VPNJOEBOH ź źŹ Żŵ ŴųŹ  ŵŷŴoŷŵ ŶųŶ
Ŵųź ŴŵŹ ŴŶź ŵżŵBOE4PVUIFSO:VOOBO $PSTPO 8JMMJBN Ŵŷż ŴŸŻ
Province, 106, 107, 135 $PTUB3JDB BOEQPMJDFUSBJOJOH ŵŵŷoŵŸ
Chiang Ching-kuo, 93, 131, 292 Costello, Peter, 96
Chi Hwan Choi, 82, 94 $PVODJMPO"NFSJDBO'PSFJHO3FMBUJPOT Ÿŷ

Index 371
Craigie, John H., 42 %JPSJ )BNBOB Ŵźŷ
$SBJO &MNFS) ŴŸŸ Dirty Harry approach, 213, 348
$SBNF 3BGBFM ŵŹ Djojonegoro, Soekarno, 104
Cranston, Alan, 160 %PCCJOT +BNFT źź
$SFPMF1FUSPMFVN ŵŴų ŵŴŴ %PEE ćPNBT+ ŴźŻ
DSJNFMBCT Źŵ żŶ ŴŴŴ ŴŴŸ ŴŶźoŶŻ ŴŷŹ ŴŹŹ  Dodge, Joseph, 69
169, 195, 198, 202, 213, 217, 238 %PF 4BNVFM, ŴŻź
$SJTPTUPNP %FTJEFSJP ŵŴź %PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD$BTDPT#MBODPT ŵŴŴ 
Cruse, Fred T., 49 347; Marine invasion (1965), 211; and
Cruz, Rogelia, 220 United States Occupation and Guardia,
Cuba, 27, 61, 208, 209, 210, 218, 222, 230, ŷŹoŷź
266 Doney, John, 313
Cu Chi, 150, 156 Donner, Frank, 25
Culion, leper colony, 31 %POPWBO 8JMMJBNi8JME#JMM wŻŹ ŴųŻoż 
$VNJOHT #SVDF źżoŻų 295, 338
$VNNJOH )VHI +S Ŵųŵ %PTUVN 3BTIJE ŵŷŴ
$VZNFM'SVJU$PNQBOZ ŷż Dowd, Alfred, 68
Cyr, Leo, 183 Dower, John, 78
Dreesen, Robert, 198
Dacko, David, 175 Driggers, Roy, 348
Da Costa e Silva, General Artur, 226 %SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO %&" 
Dadshah, 196. See also*SBO(FOEBSNFSJF 119, 237, 243, 359
Dagen, Verne, 145 Duartiginave, Philip Sudre, 38
Dahir, Muktal, 168 DuBois, Albert, 111, 201
%BIPNFZ #FOJO Ŵźŷ ŶŶų Dulles, Allen, 103, 108, 124, 129, 216
Dai Li, 54, 62, 64, 82, 86, 131, 196, 230 Dulles, John Foster, 77, 102, 103, 123, 216
Dalat Flower nightclub, 141, 161 Duncan, Donald, 13, 141
D’Aubuisson, Roberto, 223 %VUDI /FUIFSMBOET ŴųųoŴųŴ
Davis, Reginald, 230 %V7BMJFS 'SBOÎPJTi1BQB%PD wŷŸ
%FBO 8JMMJBN' ŻŻ %ZNPOE $PSZ ŴŷŹ
EFBUITRVBET Żŷ ŻŹ żųożŴ ŴŴŴ ŴŶŴ ŴŶŶ  %ZO$PSQ Ŵ Ŵź ŵŶŻ ŵŷųoŷŶ ŵŷŸ ŵŷź ŶŹų
ŴŷŹoŷź Ŵŷż ŴŸŵoŸŷ ŴżŴożŶ ŵŴŵ ŵŴŷoŴź 
ŵŴż ŵŵųoŵŴ ŵŵŶ ŵŵŸoŵŻ ŵŶų ŵŶŶ ŵŶŻ  Eaton, Henry S., 62
246 Echols, Lee, 71, 208, 227, 228, 326, 350
DeForest, Orrin, 71, 155 Eiffler, Carl, 326
Deland, Terry, 249 Eisenberg, Carolyn, 189
Dellinger, David, 113 &JTFOIPXFSBENJOJTUSBUJPOBOEŴŵżųE
%FNPDSBUJD3FQVCMJDPGUIF$POHP ;BJSF  QSPHSBN żoŴųBOE#PMJWJB ŵŵźBOE
"NFSJDBOQPMJDFUSBJOJOH ŴźŹoŻŴ"SNZ  $PMPNCJB ŵŴŵBOE&UIJPQJB ŴŹŹoŹź
ANC, 176; Katanga Province, 178, 180; BOE(SFFDF ŴżŶBOEIPNPTFYVBMT Ŷųź
,JTBOHBOJ 4UBOMFZWJMMF Ŵźż4JNCBT  and Iran, 195; and Japan, 77; and Jordan,
176, 177, 179 205; and Laos, 122, 128; and Libya, 170;
Denig, Robert, 42 BOE14#%ŵŶQSPHSBN ŴųŻBOE4BVEJ
DeNiro, Robert, 160 "SBCJB ŵųŷBOE4PVUI,PSFB żŶożŸ
%F×Ø 'SBODJTDP$BNB×P Ŷŷź BOEćBJMBOE ŴųŻ Ŵųż ŴŴŴBOE7JFUOBN 
De Silva, Peer, 96, 294 Ŵŷŵoŷź
Deuve, Major Jean, 130 Ejécito Liberacion Nacional (ELN), 213,
Diaz, Adolfo, 47 ŵŴŷBOE$BNJMP5PSSFT'SPOU ŵŴŸ
Dien Bien Phu, 122, 144 Elarth, Harold H., 25, 27
Dionisio Sigobela (“Papa Isio”), 27 Ellena, Peter, 348

372 Index
Ellis, Jack, 125, 224 Fishel, Wesley, 142, 143, 314, 318
Ellsberg, Daniel, 5 'JTINBO +PTFQI ŵŸŻ
&M4BMWBEPS ŵŵŵoŵŷ ŵŶź 'JU[HFSBME %FTNPOE ŶŷŴ
&NFSZ 8( ŷŴ Fitzgibbon, George, 66
&OEBSB (VJMMFSNP ŵŶŻ Flores, Leonard Castillo, 219
&OHMF #ZSPOBOE$BNCPEJB ŴŶŻBOE Foner, Eric, 35
$IBE ŴźųBOE$PMPNCJB ŵŴŸBOE 'POTFDB"NBEPS $BSMPT ŵŵŷoŵŸ
Congo, 180; and Indonesia, 104; and Iran, 'PSCFT 8JMMJBN$BNFSPO ŵŶ ŵź Ŷų ŶŴ ŶŶ 
ŴżŸBOE+BQBO ŴŸ ŸżoŹŴ źŴoźŷ źź źŻ 34, 38, 265
BOE,BOTBT$JUZQPMJDFEFQBSUNFOU Ÿż Foreaker, Ray W., 94, 167, 168, 169
BT,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPOBQQPJOUFF ŴŴ  'PSFJHO"TTJTUBODF"DU Ŵżźŷ ŵŶŹoŶź
Ŵŷ ŴŸBOE,FOZB ŴŻŷ,FSOFS$PN- Fortuny, José Manuel, 218
NJTTJPOUFTUJNPOZ ŵŶŸBOE-BPT ŴŵŸ Forrestall, Michael, 132
SFUJSFNFOU ŵŸŴBOE5VSLFZ ŵųŴ Fox, Matthew, 101, 296
&OHFMIBSEU 5PN ŸŶ ŵŵż France, 53, 123, 125, 128, 130, 143, 144, 170,
Estenssoro, President Paz, 227 171, 174, 180, 200, 217
Ethiopia: and Aba Din College, 167; and Frei, Eduardo, 230
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 168; and 'SJU[ &ENVOE ŶŶ
,BHOFXDPNNVOJDBUJPOTGBDJMJUZ ŴŹŹ Fruit, Melville “Buck,” 103, 145
and Ogaden Liberation Front, 168; and Fuchu prison, 67
QPMJDFUSBJOJOH ŴŹŹoŹŻ 'VFOUFT .JHVFM:EÓHPSBT ŵŴŻoŴż
Evans, L. Ton, 41, 44, 271 'VFS[BT"SNBEBT3FWPMVDJPOBSJBTEF
$PMPNCJB '"3$ ŵŴŵoŴŶ ŵŴŷ ŵŴŸ
Faisal, Crown Prince. See under Saudi Furlong, Miles, 193
Arabia
Fall, Bernard, 309 (ŵ BSNZJOUFMMJHFODFTFDUJPO ŷŻ ŹŸ
Fanon, Frantz, 172 Gabriel, Pierre, 170
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front Gain, Charles, 292
(FMLN), 223, 238 Gaitan, Jorge Eliecer, 212
Fargo International, 106 Galeano, Eduardo, 228
Farkas, Al, 353 Garret, Banning, 121
Fay, David, 85 Garwood, Jesse, 25, 39
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), 7, 8, Gaspard, George “Speedy,” 296
54, 73, 102, 111, 117, 130, 146, 173, 192, 197, Gayn, Mark, 86, 281, 286
ŵŴŸ ŵŵżoŶų ŵŶź ŵŶŻ ŵźźBOE$PVOUFS- Gebeyehu, Workneh, 167
JOUFMMJHFODF1SPHSBN $0*/5&-130  Gehlen, Reinhard, 191, 294, 337
8, 71 HFOEBSNFSJFTSee constabularies
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 54, 108, George Junior Republic (school), 34, 66
166, 197, 266. See also War on Drugs George Washington University, 95, 112
'FMENBO )PSBDF ŵŻŸ Gerlach, Wade, 336
Felipe Salvador, 27 (FSNBOZ QPMJDFBOEQSJTPOSFPSHBOJ[BUJPO
Felizardo, Cornelio, 27 after World War II, 95, 113, 143, 189, 192,
Ferguson, Robert, 87 315, 336
Figures, José “Don Pepe,” 224, 353 Gestapo, 131, 149, 318
'JNCSFT 'SFE ŵŴź (FUUZ0JM$PNQBOZ ŵųŷ
'JOFNBO %BOJFM Ŵųź (IBOB ŴźŶoźŷ ŴŻź
ĕOHFSQSJOUJOH ŷ ŴŴŴ ŴŴŻ ŴŷŹ ŴŹź ŴźŸ ŵŵŵ  Gilded Age, 3
244 Gillin, John L., 5, 32, 34, 65
'JOO ćPNBT ŴźŶ ŴźŸ ŴżŸ Gobat, Michel, 48
Firestone Rubber, 12, 171, 172 Goddard, Calvin H., 62, 115

Index 373
Godkin, E. L., 139 Harrison, Paul, 73
Godley, G. McMurtrie, 177 )BSUNBO /FBM ŵŻŵ
Goff, Stan, 237 )BSXPPE 1BVM ŴŷŹoŷź
(PČNBO &SWJOH ŶŶ Hassan, Colonel Eduardo Herrera, 238
Goin, Lauren “Jack,” 93, 97, 104, 201, 204, )BUUBI .PIBNNFE Ŵųų ŴųŴ
225, 292 )BUFN 3PZ Ŵźż
Golden Triangle region, 76 )BVTNBO +BNFT ŻŶ żų żŸ ŵŻź ŵżŶ
Gollings, Robert, 144 Hecksher, Henry, 127, 128
Gopal, Anand, 240 )FĘJO ćPNBT+ ŷż
(PSNPOU -VDJFO ŶŸŶ Heinl, Col. Robert, Jr., 45
(PVMBU +PÍP ŵŵŸ )FMMJXFMM 1BVM ŻŹ ŴųŹoż Ŵżŷ ŵżż
Grandin, Greg, 220 Henderson, Loy, 192
(SFFL$JWJM8BS ŴŻżożŶ Hensel, Elliot B., 169
Green Gang, 54 Hernandez, Hernando Hernandez, 208
(SFFOF (SBIBN ŴŷŴ heroin, 75, 76, 137, 151, 152
Greensboro, North Carolina, police depart- )JMTNBO 3PHFS ŵŵ Ŵŵŷ ŴŶŸ ŴŹż ŵųż ŵŶŶ
NFOU ŴŴŴ ŴŴŵ ŴŴźSee also8JMMJBNTPO  Hinckle, Warren, 142
Jeter )JSPTIJNB Źų Źź
(SJFWFT 8JMMJBNi1BQQZwŴŷż ŴŸż ŶŴż )JUMFSKVHFOE )JUMFS:PVUI ŻŹ
Griswold, Dwight, 190, 192, 337 Hoare, Mike, 176
(SPWF 8JOĕFME4DPUU ŵŸ Ho Chi Minh, 106, 109, 123, 315
(VBOUÈOBNP#BZ ŵŵŻ ŵŷź Ho Chi Minh Trail, 136, 142
(VBUFNBMBBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN ŵŴźoŴŻ Hodge, John R., 80, 83, 89
BOEŴżŸŷDPVQ Ŵų ŵŴŹ(VBUFNBMB$PN- )PMCSPPLF 3JDIBSE ŵŷŵoŷŶ ŵżŹ
NVOJTU1BSUZ 1(5 ŵŴź.BOP#MBODP )PMDPNC 3JDIBSE- ŴźŴ
EFBUITRVBE ŵŴźQPMJDFBSDIJWF ŴŹŷoŹŸ )PMN 3JDIBSE ŶųŹ ŶŶŴ
3FCFM"SNFE'PSDFT '"3 ŵŴżoŵų )PMNFT #VSUPO Ŷŵ
Guevara, Ernesto “Che,” 176, 214, 218, 224, )PMTUSPN +PIO% ŹŴ
ŵŵźoŵŻ ŵŶŹ Honduras, 49, 218; and Tegucigulpa, 272
Guiana, 320, 347 Hoover, J. Edgar, 7, 41, 51, 82, 94, 173, 281
Gulf Oil, 12, 174 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 172, 173, 174
Gutiérrez, Victor Manuel, 218, 219 Hoyt, Henry A., 228
Guth, Stanley, 118, 211 )PZU )PXBSE żŶ ŴŷŶoŷŸ ŶŴŸ ŶŴŹ ŶŴź
(V[BS "NBOVMMBI ŵŷŴ Hué, 150
Huggins, Martha K., 14, 97, 231
Habré, Hissane. See Chad )VNBO3JHIUT8BUDI ŵŷź ŵŸŴ
)BCZBSJNBOB +VWFOBM ŴŻŵ ŴŻŶ ŶŶŶ )VNP $IPOFEF ŵŴŷ
)BJUJBOE(FOEBSNFSJF ŶźoŷŸQPMJDF )VNQISFZ )VCFSU ŴŹź
training in 1990s, 238, 239, 360 Hurley, Vic, 21
Hak Sung Wang, 94 )VTTFJO 4BEEBN ŵųŴ ŵŷŷ
Hale, Walter F., 26
Hall, Theo, 192, 201, 217 *#.DPNQVUFST ŴŷŻ ŴżŶ ŴżŸ ŵŵŹ
Haney, Albert R., 10, 90, 93, 290 identity cards, 111, 137, 150, 152, 174
Hannah, John, 142, 314 India, 21
)BOOFLFO )FSNBO ŷŵ ŵźų Indiana State Police, 11, 195, 198, 211, 213,
)BSCPSE +BNFT ŵż Ŷų 225, 227, 230
Hardin, Herbert, 52, 204, 212, 213, 350 *OEPOFTJBBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN ŴųŵoŶBOE
Hardy, Robert, 8 ŴżŹŸNBTTBDSFT ŴųŸoŹBOE$PNNVOJTU
Harlley, John W. K., 173, 174 1BSUZ 1,* ŴųŴoŹ%VUDIJO ŴųŴBOE
Harris Corporation, 186 .BEJVOSFCFMMJPO ŴųŴNPCJMFCSJHBEF 

374 Index
12, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 178; and OPS, QPMJDFDPSSVQUJPO źŸQFOBMSFGPSN 
104; and prisons, 103 ŹŸoŹŻQPMJDFTVQQSFTTJPOPG.BZ%BZ
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW; EFNPOTUSBUJPOT źŵQPMJDFUSBJOJOH ż 
Wobblies), 7, 25, 63 ŸźoźŻQPMJDFVTFPGUPSUVSF źŷBOE1VC-
Ingersoll, John, 292 lic Safety Division Z Unit, 71, 282; Rural
*ONBO 4BNVFM(VZ ŷų Guard, 65, 76; seizure of newspapers, 74;
International Association of Chiefs of 5PLLÙ TQFDJBMIJHIFSQPMJDF ŸŻ źŴ źŷ
Police, 61, 218 Jeansonne, Tracy, 1
*OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO"ENJOJTUSBUJPO +FTTVQ 'SBOL żŹożź ŴżŹ ŵŵŸ
(ICA). SeeŴŵżųEQSPHSBN Jew, Chester, 359
*OUFSOBUJPOBM$SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJWF Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek), 54, 61, 80,
5SBJOJOH"TTJTUBODF1SPHSBN *$*5"1  131
ŵŶźoŶŻ ŵŷŶ ŵŷŻ +JNFOF[ .BSDPT1ÏSF[ ŵŴų
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 105 Joedodihardjo, Soetjipto, 104
*OUFSOBUJPOBM1PMJDF"DBEFNZ *1" ŴŴ Ŵŵ  +PIOTPO $IBMNFST ŶŸ Źż ŵŶŵ ŵŶŷ ŵŻų
97, 114, 116, 118, 137, 138, 150, 172, 174, 177, Johnson, Marilynn S., 63
186, 206, 213, 216, 230 Johnson, Ralph, 133, 311
International Red Cross, 158, 159 Johnson, Robert H., 147
International Voluntary Service (IVS), 136, Johnson, U. Alexis, 122
159 +PIOTPOBENJOJTUSBUJPO ŴŶŵ
*SBOŴŵżųEQSPHSBNBOE4"7", ŴżŸożŹ  +POFT )PXBSE1 ŴųŷoŸ
ŵųųŴżŸŶ$*"DPVQ ŴżŶożŷŴżźżSFWPMV- Jones, Seth G., 239
UJPO ŴżżoŵųųBOUJPQJVNDBNQBJHO  +PPTU 4IFSNBO ŵżż
ŴżźożŻ(FOEBSNFSJF ŴŻŻ ŶŶżTVQQPSU +PSEBO BOE,JOH)VTTFJO ŵųŸoŹ
GPSUIF4IBI ŴżŷUPSUVSFJO Ŵżżoŵųų Jos, Nigeria, police college, 174
Tudeh Party, 194, 199 +VNCJTI +BNJM ŵŷŴ
*SBRBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN ŵųų"CV(ISBJC juvenile facilities, 4, 95
prison, 156, 201, 247, 250; Ba’ath party,
ŵųŴDPSSFDUJPOBMTZTUFNBOEBCVTFT  Kades, Charles, 59
ŵŷŻoŸŴ*SBRJ/BUJPOBM1PMJDF */1  Kahin, George McT., 100
ŵŷŸoŷźTFDUBSJBOWJPMFODFBOEDJWJMXBS  Kaji, Wataru, 71
ŵŷŹoŷźTVQQSFTTJPOPGDPNNVOJTUT  Kakonge, John, 186
200, 201, 343; “surge,” 248; U.S. invasion ,BNBOHB 3VCFO ŴŻŹ
of, 244 Kan Mai, 183
Israel, 178, 182, 205; and Mossad, 172, 179, ,BOTBT$JUZ1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU Ÿź ŸżoŹų 
186, 236 125, 146, 224
Italian Carabinieri, 101, 189 ,BS[BJ "INFE8BMJ ŵŷŵ
*WPSZ$PBTU ŴźŵoźŶ ,BS[BJ )BNJE ŵŷųoŷŴ
*XBIJHQFOBMDPMPOZ ŶŷoŶŸ ŹŹ Katay Don Sasorith, 123, 125
Katz, Paul, 118, 175
+BCS #BZBO ŵŷŹoŷź ŶŹŸ ,BU[FOCFSH :BTIB ŴŹŹ
Jackson, George, 5 Kaunda, Kenneth, 184, 186, 187
Jackson, Jake, 227, 355 Kaun Soo Pak, 92
Janus, Robert, 103, 206 Kaya, Okinori, 77
Japan: and Japan lobby, 69; Japanese Kayabinda, Grégoire, 181, 182
$PNNVOJTU1BSUZ +$1 ż ŸŻ ŹżoźŴ ,FFMZ +BNFT) +S ŴżŴ ŶŶź
-JCFSBM%FNPDSBUJD1BSUZ -%1 źŹ źź Kelley, Roland, 222
Matsukawa incident, 73; National Police ,FMMJT +BNFT ŴŻŻ ŶŶŻ
3FTFSWF /13 źŹoźźPDDVQBUJPOPG Kendrick, W. Freeland, 39
,PSFB ŻųoŻŴ0LJOBXB źź Ŵŵŷ ŵŻŷ Kennan, George F., 13, 68, 78

Index 375
Kennedy, John F., 10, 209 Korea (Republic of Korea): and 1290-d
Kennedy, Robert, 10, 104, 146, 177, 211 QSPHSBN żŶożŹBOE"NFSJDBO.JMJUBSZ
,FOOFEZBENJOJTUSBUJPO ŴŶŵ ŴŶŸ Ŵŷź  (PWFSONFOUBOE64.JMJUBSZ"EWJTPSZ
167, 169, 222; and Bolivia, 227; and El (SPVQ źżoŻż$IFKVEPVQSJTJOH ŻŶ 
4BMWBEPS ŵŵŵoŵŶBOE&UIJPQJB ŴŹźBOE Żżożų ŵżųDPOTUBCVMBSZ Żų ŻŶ*ODIPO
Indonesia, 104; and South Korea, 95; and Boys Prison, 89; Korean Central intel-
Special Group on Counter-Insurgency, ligence Agency (KCIA), 96; and Korean
ŴųoŴŵ Ŵųŷ ŴŴŷ ŴŶŵ ŴźŹ ŴźŻ ŴŻŶ ŵųżBOE 8BS żųożŵ żŻ ŴųŶ ŴŹŹ,XBOKVVQSJTJOH 
Thailand, 111, 113; and Venezuela, 210; 97; National Police and U.S. training pro-
BOE7JFUOBN ŴŷźoŷŻ HSBNT ż źżożŻ0DUPCFSŴżŷŹ3FWPMUT 
Kenney, John P., 195, 340 ŻźoŻŻBOE0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ 014 
,FOZB ŴŻŶoŻŷ żŹożź3FQVCMJDPG,PSFB"SNZ 30," 
,FOZBUUB +PNP ŴŻŶ ŴŻŷ 83; retention of pro-Japanese officers, 82,
Kérékou, Mathieu, 330 83; Seoul, 82; South Korean Labor Party
Kerik, Bernard B., 244, 364 (SKLP), 84, 89; Truth and Reconciliation
Kerry, John F., 251 $PNNJTTJPO żų8BOKV+BJM ŻŻ:PTV
Key, David, 107 rebellion, 90, 93, 293
Keyser, Ralph, 47, 48 Korry, Edward, 167
khaki and red. See Philippines: and Kouprasith Abhay, 131, 132, 311
EFWFMPQNFOUPGDPOTUBCVMBSZ Kourtessis, Michael, 193
Khalidi, Rashid, 206 Kowalski, Frank, 77
,IBO )BKKJ+VNB ŵŷŴ ,SJBOHTBL$IBNBOBOE ŴŴŷ
,INFS3PVHF ŴŶŻ Kriskovich, David J., 237
Khoranhok Souvannavong, 127 Kubler, Louis E., 102
Kieh, George Klay, Jr., 187 ,VTPNPUP + ŹŹ Źź
,JLVOBNJ ,BUTVNJ źŸ
Killingray, David, 51, 187 -BDFZ 8JMMJBN ŴųŴ
,JNCBMM (FPSHF ŶŴŹ -BJS +BNFTi#JMM wŴųż
,JNCBMM 3PCFSU ŶŴų -BNC $BSSPMM) ŶŸ
,JNCFSMJOH"SUIVS Źŵ Lancina, Ernest, 226
,JN$IPOH8PO i5JHFS,JNw żŵożŶ  Landgren, Ray, 137, 148, 179
108, 149, 292 Lane, Arthur Bliss, 51
,JN%POH$IPPO żŴ Langguth, A. J., 14, 228
,JN*M4VOH źż żų -BOTEBMF &EXBSE żż ŴųżoŴų ŴŴŹ ŴżŸ ŵŶź 
,JN,V ŵŻŻ 303
,JN5V)BO ŻŹ Lansing, Robert, 44
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 8, 185 -BPTBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN Ŵŵŷ ŴŶŵoŶŶ
King Idris. See Libya BVUPEFGFOTFVOJUT ŴŶŵoŶŷCPNCJOHPG 
Kipling, Rudyard, 18, 25 ŴŶŹ ŶŴų ŶŴŵ%POF/PVOF"DBEFNZ ŴŵŹ
Kirk, Russell, 179 BOE(FOFWB"DDPSET Ŵŵŵ ŴŶŸ)NPOH
Kissinger, Henry, 230 DMBOEFTUJOFBSNZ ŴŵŴ ŴŶŷoŶŹ ŴźŸ ŵŷŵ
Klare, Michael T., 14 /BUJPOBM1PMJDF -/1 ŴŵŷoŶŻBOE014 
,MVTNBO $IBSMFT' ŴŶŸ ŴŶźoŶŻ1BUIFU-BP /FP-BP)BL9BU 
Knapp, Harry S., 46 Ŵŵŵ ŴŵźoŵŻ Ŵŵż ŴŶŵoŶŷ ŴŶźoŶŻ ŵŷŵ 
Knowles, H. H., 37 ŶŴŴ1MBJOPG+BST 4BN/FVBBOE1IPOH
Knox, Philander, 49 Saly provinces), 122, 129, 133, 134, 136;
Kolko, Gabriel, 14, 151 BOEQPMJDFUSBJOJOH ŴŵŴoŶŻ3PZBM-BP
,PNFS 3PCFSU8 Ŵų Ŵŵ żż ŴŴŶ Ŵŷż ŴźŹ  (PWFSONFOU 3-( Ŵŵŵ ŴŵŶ3PZBM-BP
198 "SNZ 3-" ŴŵŶoŵŷ Ŵŵż ŴŶŶBOE8BS
Kong Le, 130, 131 on Drugs, 138, 313

376 Index
Larabee, Byron H., 171. See also Firestone Mabardy, Mitchell, 168, 180, 184, 359
Rubber MacArthur, Arthur, 23
Larsen, Harold, 81 MacArthur, General Douglas, 23, 54, 59, 61,
Laughlin, David, 213, 217, 226 63, 70, 71, 72, 78, 83
Lavergne, Daly, 122, 129 MacArthur, Douglas, II, 10, 260
Leaf, Jesse, 199 Machado, Gerardo, 61
Léandri, Paul, 319 .BDIJJ )JTBZVLF ,P:VOH.PL źŸ żŸ 
Lebanon, 201 283
-FEFSFS 8JMMJBN ŴŵŻ .BEBNF/IV Ŵŷŵ ŶŴź
Leister, Charles, 179 Maechling, Charles, Jr., 12, 13
LeMay, General Curtis, 291 .BHMJO 8JMMJBN ŻŴ ŻŻ ŵŻŹ
-FNVT $PMPOFM+PTÏ.BSJB ŵŵŵ .BHTBZTBZ 3BNPO ŴŴŹ
Lerch, Archer, 85 Malaya, 55, 101, 126, 148
Lescot, Elie, 45 Malburg, Robert F., 67
Letelier, Orlando, 230, 356 .BNEBOJ .BINPPE ŴŻŸ
Levan Vilayhon, 127 Mandela, Nelson, 331
Lewis, Anthony, 139 Manecio, Leonardo (Nardong Putik), 117
-FXJT #VSEFUU ŹŹoŹŻ ŵźż Mann, Charles, 105
-FXJT +JN Ŷŵż Manopoli, John, 144, 149, 171, 173, 176,
-JCFSBUJPO'SPOUPG.P[BNCJRVF '3&- ŴŻŴoŻŶ ŵŵŵ Ŷŵų
LIMO), 185 Mao Zedong, 183, 185
-JCFSJB ŴźŴoźŵ Marchetti, Victor, 136
Libya, 169 Marcos, Ferdinand, 118
lie detectors (polygraph), 7, 51, 202, 215 Marenin, Otwin, 166
Li Mi, 107, 108 .BSJBN )BJMF.FOHJTUV ŴŹŻ
-JN4FOH ŴŴż Markley, T. Wade, 336
Linares, José Bernabé, 216, 217 Markos, Vaphiadis, 190
-JOERVJTU +PIO ŴŻŸ Marshall, George C., 80, 190, 191
Lingo, Joseph, 230, 356 Marshall Plan, 100, 189
-PCF ćPNBT ŴŴ Ŵŷ ŵŶŵ ŵŸż Martin, Edwin M., 218
Lockheed Martin, 204 Marulanda, Manuel (Tiro Fijo), 212
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 141 .BTTPPE "INFE;JB ŵŷŵ
Lo Faydang, 134 Mau Mau, 184
Logie, Marc, 292 .BYĕFME 8JMMJBN żŵ
-POHBO +PIO ŵŴų ŵŴŻ ŵŴż ŵŵųoŵŴ ŵŵź ŵŶŸ May, Glen, 22
Lon Nol, 139 McBee, Major, 137, 197
Lon Non, 139 McCabe, John, 321
Lopez, J. Antonio, 48 McCann, Michael, 11, 150, 196, 354
-PQF[ (FOFSBM+PTÏ.PSJMMP-ØQF[ ŵŴŴ .D$BSUIZ +BNFT- Ŷŵż ŶŸŶ
-PT"OHFMFT1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU -"1% ŷ  McCarthy era, 7, 181
94, 117, 211 McChrystal, General Stanley A., 241
-PT'SFTOPT 5FYBT CPNCNBLJOHDPVSTF  McClintock, Michael, 14
11, 12 McCloy, John J., 143
Lovera, Alberto, 347 McCorkle, Lloyd W., 66, 68, 279
Lovestone, Jay, 101 .D$PSNJDL .FEJMM+PTFQI ŷŷ
Lowe, Robert, 104, 172, 297, 329 .D$PUUFS $PMPOFM-BOF ŵŷżoŸų ŶŹŹ
Luce, Don, 159, 251 McCoy, Alfred W., 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 35, 115,
-VNVNCB 1BUSJDF ŴźŹoźź ŴźŻ Ŵźż ŴŻŵ ŶŶŵ 121, 151, 233, 311
-ZNBO "MCFSU Żź .D$SBX +BNFT- ŶŶŹ
-ZOEPO+PIOTPOBENJOJTUSBUJPO ŴŶŵ McGehee, Ralph, 120, 154

Index 377
.D(SFHPS +BNFT ŴŴŻ .VSQIZ 3BZNPOE& ŴųŴ
McKeon, Matthew, 50 Murth, Lawrence, 42
.D.BIPO +BNFT ŴųŸ ŵżŻ Musharraf, Pervez, 243
.D/BNBSB 3PCFSU4 ŴŷŴ ŵŴŷ My Lai, 97
Meade, J. J., 43
.FEJDJ &NJMJP(BSSBTUB[V ŵŵŹ /BHM $PMPOFM+PIO ŵŶżoŷų
.FJFS 3BZNPOE ŵųŸ OBQBMN ŴŴų ŴŴŹ Ŵŵż ŴŶŸ Ŵŷź
.FMWJMMF ćPNBT ŵŵŴ Napoli, Luis, 51
Menderes, Adnan, 201 /BTJSJ /FNBUPMMBI ŴżŸ ŵųų
Menjívar, Cecilia, 7 /BTTFS (BNBM"CEFM ŴŹŻ ŵųŶ
Merchant, Livingstone, 101 Nasution, A. H., 103
Merkel, Charles, 46 /BUJPOBM"TTPDJBUJPOGPSUIF"EWBODFNFOU
Metaxas, Ioannis, 191, 337 of Colored People (NAACP), 44, 250
Methven, Stuart, 129, 135, 309 National Liberation Front, Greece (EAM),
Michelin Rubber, 148 Ŵżųożŵ
Michigan State University, 55, 81, 94, 116, /BUJPOBM-JCFSBUJPO'SPOU 7JFUOBN /-'
ŴŵŸ ŵųŶBOE7JFUOBN1SPKFDU żŶ ŴŷŴ  Vietcong), 55, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152,
Ŵŷŵoŷź 153, 233
.JDPNCFSP .JDIFM ŴŻŶ /BUJWF"NFSJDBOT ŵŴ ŵŻ ŷż żż ŴŴų ŴŶŶ 
Midnight in a Great City ĕMN Ÿź ŹŴ 316
Miles, Milton, 54, 230, 356 Naurocki, Al, 220
Milon, Philippe, 93 Nazis, 7, 86, 143, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 199,
Miller, Earle, 82, 287 315, 337
Miller, George, 226, 354 Neeley, John, 213, 348
Millspaugh, Arthur, 197 Negroponte, John, 246
Mitchell, John A., 5 Nendaka, Victor, 178, 331
Mitrione, Dan, 229, 236 Nesbitt, Charlie, 206
.PCVUV +PTFQI% ŴźŹoŻŴ ŵŶŹ ŶŶŵ ŶŶŶ /FUIFSMBOET ŴųųoŴųŴ
Moghaddan, Alavi, 195 /FVNBOO 8JMMJBN ŸŸ
Molina, Jorge Cordova, 217 New Deal, 4, 58, 59
Moncada, José, 48, 49 New Jersey state constabulary, 39
Monroe, Clifton, 211 New Jersey state police, 102, 168
Monroe, Johnson F., 74, 138, 174, 206, 212 New Right, 6, 96
.POUFTJOPT 7MBEJNJS ŵŶŻ ŶŹų /FX:PSL1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU /:1% ŷź 
.PPSF#VTJOFTT'PSNT ŴŸų 63, 64, 102, 172, 235, 244
.PRJN .PIBNNFE Ŵ Ngaragba prison, 175
Morris, Rex, 217 /HP%JOI%JFN Żų ŴŶų ŴŶŻ Ŵŷŵ ŴŷŶ ŴŷŹ 
Morrison Knudson Corporation, 148, 160 ŴŷŻ ŵŶŶ ŶŴŹ ŶŴżBOEBOUJDPNNVOJTU
Morse, Wayne, 212 DBNQBJHO ŴŷŹoŷź ŴŸŵ
.PTTBEFHI .PIBNNFE ŴŻŻ Ngo Dinh Nhu, 143
Motter, Wendell, 131, 137 Ngo Vinh Long, 143
.QBOHB #FNPOBUV Ŵźź Nguyen Cao Ky, 149, 152, 319
Mubarak, Hosni, 238 Nguyen Huu Tho, 147
Muccio, John, 84, 93 Nguyen Khanh, 132, 149
Muhned, Hassan, 245 Nguyen Lac Le, 160
Mujica, José, 228 Nguyen Ngoc Le, 143, 144
Mulbar, Harold, 60, 63, 71, 74 Nguyen Ngoc Loan, 149, 152, 319
Mulele, Pierre, 179, 182 Nguyen Thi Man, 159
.V×Ø[ (VJMMFSNP-FØO7BMFODJB ŵŴŶ Nguyen Van La, 143
Munro, Dana G., 38 Nguyen Van Thieu, 55, 152

378 Index
Nguyen Van Troi, 141 Olander, Oscar, 63, 64, 65
Nguyen Van Thuc, 158 Olds, Robert, 48
Nguyen Van Ve, 325 Olin, Warren S., 92, 292
/JDBSBHVBO(VBSEJB Ŷź ŷźoŸŵ ŵŵŵ ŵŵŸ Opala, 179. See also%FNPDSBUJD3FQVCMJDPG
Nichol, Donald, 84, 291 UIF$POHP4JNCBT
Niger, 174 Open Door policy, 55, 59
Nigeria, 174 0QFSBUJPO#BOEFJSBOUFT ŵŵŸoŵŹ ŵŶŶ
/JYPO 3JDIBSE. źź ŵŵŹ ŵŶźBENJOJT- Operation Booster Shot, 128
tration of, 174, 185, 194; and doctrine, 21 0QFSBUJPO$POEPS ŵŵż ŵŶųoŶŴ
Njug Ju Myun, 87 Operation Igloo-White, 235
/LSVNBI ,XBNF ŴŹŸ Ŵźŵ ŴźŶoźŷ ŴŻŸ 0QFSBUJPO-JNQJF[B ŵŴż
/PSJFHB .BOVFM ŵŵŵ ŵŶźoŶŻ Operation Paper, 107, 337
Northwest Traffic Institute, 94 Operation Paperclip, 189
Nyerere, Julius, 184 Operation Phoenix (“Phung Hoang”), 13,
ŴŸ ŸŸ ŸŹ żŴ ŴŸŴoŸŷ ŴŸŹ ŴŹų ŴŹŴ ŵŴŴ 
0BLMBOE1PMJDF%FQBSUNFOU żŷ ŵżŵożŶ 221, 222, 225, 233, 236, 246, 349
O’Blake, Robert, 180 0QFSBUJPO5SBNQMF żŵ
Obote, Milton, 186 Opinianzo, Prudencio, 117
O’Brien, Charlie, 152, 201, 329 PQJVN ŵŷ źŸ źŹ ŴųŹ Ŵųź ŴųŻ ŴŴų Ŵŵŷ ŴŵŹ 
0DBUB CPNCJOH Ÿų ŴŶŴ ŴŶŸoŶŹ ŴŶż ŴŷŶ ŵŷŵ
Odinga, Oginga, 184 Oppler, Alfred, 61
0ďDFPG1VCMJD4BGFUZ 014 BCPMJTINFOU Organization of African Unity (OAU),
PG ŵŶŷoŶŸBEWJTFSTQPTUDBSFFST ŵŶŸ  170
ŵŶŹJO#PMJWJB ŵŵźoŵŻJO#SB[JM ŵŵŸoŵŹ Orwell, George, 2, 18, 119, 143, 235
JO#VSVOEJ ŴŻŶJO$BNCPEJB ŴŶŻoŶż 0TBLB QPMJDFBDBEFNZ ŹŴ
in Central Africa Republic, 175; in Chad, Osborn, K. Barton, 154, 322
ŴźųJO$IJMF ŵŶųJO$PMPNCJB ŵŴŷoŴŸ 0TCPSOF ćPNBT.PUU ŹŹ ŴŴŶ ŵźż
JO$POHP ŴźŹoŻŴJO$PTUB3JDB ŵŵŷoŵŸ Osorio, Carlos Arana (“The Butcher of
JO%BIPNFZ #FOJO ŴźŷJO%PNJOJDBO Zacapa”), 220
3FQVCMJD ŵŴŴoŴŵJO&M4BMWBEPS ŵŵŶ Ouane Rattikone, 137
FNQMPZFFBUUJUVEFT ŹJO&UIJPQJB  Oudone Sananikone, 128
ŴŹźoŹŻJO(IBOB ŴźŷJO(VBUFNBMB  0WFSTFBT*OUFSOBM4FDVSJUZ1SPHSBNSee
ŵŴŻoŵŴJO*OEPOFTJB ŴųŷJO*SBO ŴżŻ ŴŵżųEQSPHSBN
JO*SBR ŵŸųoŸŴ ŶŹźJO*WPSZ$PBTU  Owens, Dolph, 151
ŴźŶJO+PSEBO ŵųŸJO,FOZB ŴŻŶoŻŷJO Oyson, Don José “Pepe,” 119
-BPT ŴŶŴ ŴŶźoŶŻJO-JCFSJB ŴźŴoźŵJO Ozu, Kinosuke, 75
Nicaragua, 222; in Niger, 174; origins of,
ŴŴoŴŵJO1BLJTUBO ŵųŹJO1FSV ŵŵŹJO Pace, Beryel, 169
Philippines, 118; roots in Japan, 72, 73, 1BHF.PSSJT -PVJTF ŴųŴoŵ ŴŵŸ ŴŶŻ ŵżŸ 
źŻJO3XBOEB ŴŻŴoŻŵJO4BVEJ"SBCJB  313
ŵųŷJO4PNBMJB ŴŹżJO4PVUI,PSFB  1BL)PO:POH Żŷ ŻŻ
żŹJO5BO[BOJB ŴŻŷJOćBJMBOE ŴŴŴoŴŷ Pak Kyon-jun, 89
JO6HBOEB ŴŻŹJO6SVHVBZ ŵŵŻoŵżJO Pak Wan-so, 53, 86
7FOF[VFMB ŵŴųJO7JFUOBN ŴŷźoŹųJO 1BLJTUBO ŵųŹoź ŵŷŶBOE*OUFS4FSWJDFT
;BNCJB ŴŻŸ Intelligence, 206
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 54, 71, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),
86, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 135, 194, 227, ŵųŸoŹ
266, 281, 289, 300 1BOBNB ŵŵŵ
O’Hare, Kate, 5 1BSDINBO'BSN .JTTJTTJQQJ Ÿ
Oinas-Kukkonen, Henry, 70 1BSL$IVOH)FF żŴ żŸożŹ żź ŵżŶ

Index 379
Parker, Evan, Jr., 153 Pote Pekenand, 114
Parker, Willie, 9, 94, 117, 293 1SBNVBM7BOJHCBOEIV ŴŴŸ
QBSPMFTZTUFNT ŷ ŴŸŹ 1SJEJ1IBOPNZPOH ŴųŹ Ŵųź Ŷųų
1BSTPOT (SBIBN ŴŵŶ ŴŵŻ ŴŶų QSJTPOFSTPGXBS 108T ŴŸżoŹų
Payne, Edward, 171 1SPHSFTTJWF&SBSFGPSNT ŵ Ŷ ŴŸ ŵŵ ŵŸ Ŷų 
Pease, Donald, 186 Ŷż ŹŸoŹŻ Żż żŷ żŸ żź ŴŴŵoŴŶ ŴŸŸ ŴŹź 
Peeke, Charles, 196 205, 233
1FFLF $PM3BZNPOE ŻŻ Pucurull, Fernando, 228
Pellecer, Carlos Manuel, 218 1VMMFS -FXJTi$IFTUZ ŴŻ Ŷź Ŷż ŷų ŷżoŸų 
QFOBMSFGPSN ŷ Ż ŶųoŶŸ ŷŴ ŹŸoŹŻ ŻŻoŻż  133, 208, 243
żŸ ŴŴŵoŴŶ ŴŸŸoŹų ŴŹź Ŵźŵ ŵųŸoŹ  1VMMJBN )PXBSE& Ÿź Ÿż Źź ŵźŹ
ŵŷŻoŸŴ 1VUUBQPSO,ISBNLISVBO ŴŴŸ
Pennsylvania state constabulary, 39
Pentagon, 76, 153, 186 2BEEBĕ .VBNNBSSee Libya
Pentagon Papers, 145 2BTJN "CEVM,BSJN ŵųųoŵųŴ
1FSBMUF $IBSMFNBHOF ŷŵ ŵźų Quang Tri, 151
Perazic, Nikolas, 127
Perez, Roserdo, 217 Rahbar (newspaper), 194
Pershing, John “Black Jack,” 18, 28, 29 Ramparts, 119, 121, 142
Petraeus, General David, 247 RAND Corporation, 6, 55, 97, 152, 231, 239,
Pettet, Colonel Joseph, 292 ŵŷŻoŷż ŶųŻ
Peurifoy, John, 101 Rathbone, Richard, 173
1IBN9VBO$IJFV ŴŷŶ Razik, Brigadier General Abdul, 363
1IBP4JOZBOPO ŴųźoŴų ŴŷŸ ŵżż ŶųŻ Reagan, Ronald, 161, 170, 187
Phelps, Clyde, 62, 200, 226 record keeping, 9, 23, 31, 39, 55, 62, 82, 96,
1IJCVO4POHLISBN ŴųŹ Ŵųź ŴŴŴ ŴŶų ŴŶź ŴŷŹ Ŵŷż ŴŸų ŴŹŶoŹŷ ŴŹŹ 
1IJMJQQJOFTBOUJ)VLQBDJĕDBUJPO ŴŴŹoŴŻ  174, 189, 193, 195, 198, 201, 213, 215, 217,
152, 304; constabulary anti-narcotics 223, 240
VOJU ŴŴżEFWFMPQNFOUPGDPOTUBCVMBSZ  Red Cross, 158, 159, 241
ŵŴoŶŹ żż ŴŴŹ)VLCBMBIBQ HSPXUIPG  Red Scare, 7, 25
ŴŴŸ.BPJTU/FX1FPQMFT"SNZ ŴŴŻ 3FE4RVBET ŷ Ź ŴŴź Ŵŷŷ Źų ŹŶ
Mindanao, 28, 30, 118; Moro Province, 3FFE -FBS# ŸżoŹų ŵźź
Ŵż ŵŻoŵż ŴŴŻQFOBMSFGPSN ŶųoŶŸ014  3FQQFUUP ćPNBT ŵŸ
ŴŴźoŴŻ SFWPMWFST ż Żŵ ŴŵŸ ŴŶź ŴŷŸ ŴźŶ3FNJOH-
Phillips, Charles N., 153 ton and Colt, 25; .38 Special, 106
Phoui Sananikone, 128, 129, 308 3IFF 4ZOHNBO źż Żų Żŷ żŴ żŵ żŸ ŵŴŻ 
1IPVNJ/PTBWBO ŴŵŻoŶŵ ŴŶź 286
Pinilla, General Gustavo Rojas, 212 Rice, Condoleezza, 245
Pinkerton Detective Agency, 3 Riedel, Albert, 202
Pinochet, Augusto, 230 riot control, 9, 42, 45, 55, 72, 82, 83, 100, 102,
Police Services, Inc., 204 105, 109, 115, 117, 118, 137, 141, 148, 168,
political intelligence, 8, 11, 23, 25, 41, 48, 60, 170, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 178, 189, 192,
69, 71, 72, 77, 80, 84, 93, 96, 102, 103, 109, 198, 200, 201, 203, 205, 209, 210, 211, 214,
114, 116, 117, 124, 131, 144, 148, 167, 173, 218, 223, 226, 227, 229, 230, 235, 237, 240
174, 185, 193, 195, 201, 205, 206, 208, 211, 3JWFSB $PMPOFM+VMJP"EBMCFSUP ŵŵŵoŵŶ
215, 217, 218, 219, 222, 225 Robinson, Richard D., 85, 88, 288, 290
Polk, George, 193 Robinson, Roger, 170
Pope, Allen, 103, 297 3PDLFGFMMFSGBNJMZ ŴźŻ ŵŴų
Poppa, John, 217, 350 Rodríguez, Néstor, 7
Portugal, 185, 187 Rogers, Richard W., 144, 171, 195

380 Index
rollback operations, 100, 109 Sekban, Ihsan, 202, 343
3PNFSP »TDBS ŵŵŶ Selassie, Hailie, 166, 327
3PNNFM "MBO+BDL ŶŴŵ Selby, Ralph, 166, 167
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 39, 281 Sendic, Raúl, 228
3PPTFWFMU ,FSNJU ŴżŸ 4FOJ1SBNPK Ŵųź
Roosevelt, Theodore, 3, 28, 47 Shackley, Theodore, 136, 153
Root, Elihu, 38 4IBIPG*SBO 3F[B.PIBNNFE1BIMBWJ 
Rosencof, Mauricio, 228 ŴŹ Ŵżŷ ŴżŸ Ŵżź ŵŶŹBOE.PIBNNFE
3PTOFS /PSNBO ŵŵŸ Reza Khan, 194
3PTUPX 8BMU8 ŴŶ Ŵųų Ŵŷź ŴżŶ ŵŵźoŵŻ Shanton, George R., 30, 46
Rowland, John G., 249 Shaplen, Robert, 137
Ruiz, Anthony, 359 Shaw, Millard, 289
3VNQG $BSM ŴŷŸ 4IFJOCBVN 4UBOMFZ, ŶŴŻ
3VOEMFUU -ZNBO ŴŷŸ Shelby, Gil, 144
Rusk, Dean, 105, 129, 137, 177, 211, 310 Shelton, Turner, 222
3VTTFMM 8JMMJBN8 ŷŹ 4IFQIFSE -FNVFM +S Ŷż ŷŸ
Russo, Anthony, 6 4IJHB :PTIJP źų
3XBOEB ŴŹŸ ŴŻŴoŻŶ Showa Denko, 72
3ZBO +BDL żŶ ŴŶų ŴŷŷoŷŸ Ŵŷź Ŵźż ŶŴų ŶŴŹ Shuster, W. Morgan, 339
4JEEJRVJ .FFOB ŵŷų
Saenz, Adolph, 222, 227, 236, 237, 367 4JIBOPVL /PSPEPN ŴŶŻ
Sakata, Shoichi, 73 4JIP-BNQIPVUIBDPVM ŴŶųoŶŵ ŴŶź ŴŶż Ŵŷż
Sakay, General Macario, 27 4JNNMFS 8JMMJBN+ żŹ
Salazar, Conrado “Zarpazo,” 215 Sinclair, Georgina, 191
4BMNBO .JDIBFM ŶŸ Sirik Matak, 139
4BNBS 1IJMJQQJOFT ŵŹ Skuse, Paul H., 71, 104, 121, 124, 127, 129,
4BNPSJTLJ )FOSZ Ŵųŷ ŴŶų ŴŶŶoŶŷ ŴŶŸ ŴŶź
Sandino, Augusto Cèsar, 49, 50, 222; and Sloane, Charles, 144
Sandanistas, 37 4NJUI +VMJBO ŷż
4BO[ʪ /PTBLB źų 4NJUI8FTTPOIBOEDVČT ŴŶź
San Miguel, New Katipunan Party, 27 Snook, Col. Russell, 168
San Quentin Penitentiary, 156, 158 Soebianto, “Benny,” 105
4BO3BNPOQFOBMDPMPOZ Ŷŷ 4PFLBOUP 3BEFO4BÕE ŴųŴoŷ
Sarit Thanarat, 110, 128, 132 Sojat, Frank, 202
4BVEJ"SBCJB ŵųŶoŷ$SPXO1SJODF'BJTBM  4PNBMJB ŴŹŻoŹż
ŵųŶoŷ ŶŷŷBOE*CO4BVEEZOBTUZ ŵųŶ 4PNP[B(BSDJB "OBTUBTJPi5BDIP wŸŴBOE
National Guard, 204; Sons of the Arabian Anastasio Jr., 51, 222; and Luis, 51
Peninsula (SAP) and repression, 204 Son Ngoc Thanh, 139
Scheer, Robert, 142 Soukan Vilayrsarn, 125, 127, 132
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 209, 348 Souphanouvong, Prince, 122, 123, 125, 128,
4DIPPMPGUIF"NFSJDBT ŵŵŶ ŵŵŻ ŵŶŻ 129, 134
Schott, Robert, 198 South Africa, 171, 176, 185, 187
4DISBNNF +BDL ŴźŻ Southern Police Institute, 117
4DIVNFS 4FOBUPS$IBSMFT ŵŸų 4PVWBOOB1IPVNB ŴŵŻ ŴŶŴ ŴŶŵ
4DIXBS[LPQG )/PSNBO ŴżŶożŷ ŶŶż Soviet Union, 53, 71, 131, 188, 337
4DPUU +BNFT$ ŴŴŻ Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), 39,
Scull, Guy, 47 235
Sea Supply corporation. See under Thailand Speer, Wayland, 76, 284
Seaton, Mark, 220 4QJFS %FMNBS ŴŶź
Sebazungu, Isidore, 183 4NJUI )PSBDF ŴŵŻ

Index 381
4NJUI +BDPC ŵŴ ŵŹ Ratchakan Phaen-din, 109; National
Stakopolous, Gregory, 193 1PMJDF ŴŴŴoŴŷ1PMJDF"FSJBM3FDPOOBJT-
Staley, Alston, 183 sance Unit (PARU), 109; police corrup-
Standard Oil, 210 UJPO ŴųźoŻ ŴŴŸ3FE(BVSTBOENBTTBDSF
Starr, Joseph, 147 PGTUVEFOUTBUćBNNBTBU6OJWFSTJUZ ŴŴŷ
Steele, Horton, 168 and Sea Supply corporation, 108
4UFFMF +BNFT ŵŶŻ ŵŷŹ ŶŹŸ ćBOPN,JUUJLBDIPSO ŴŴŷ
Steffens, Lincoln, 3 ćFQ9BOI ŴŸż
Stelle, Charles, 196, 341 ćPNTPO $IBSMFT ŷŻ
Stern, Sol, 142 ćPNQTPO 4JS3PCFSU ŸŸ ŵźŸ
Stewart, C. Allan, 220 Thorpe, Knute, 211
Stiles, Roy C., 87 Thurston, Arthur M., 71, 96, 169, 195, 281,
4UJNTPO )FOSZ ŸŴ 294
4UPOF *' ŵŵŶoŵŷ 5JBP4PNTBOJUI ŴŵŸ Ŵŵź ŴŶŴ
Strong Richard P., 31 “tiger cages.” See Con Son prison
Sugai, Suichi, 77 Tofte, Hans, 90, 116, 212, 348
4VIBSUP ŴųŷoŹ Ŵŵų 5PHMJBUUJ 1BMNJSP ŴŻż
4VLBSOP "DINFE ŴųųoŴųŸ Tokuda, Kyūchi, 70
Sulzberger, C. L., 107 Tokyo, 75, 76
4VNBUSB ŴųŶ ŴųŸ Tolentino, Aurelio, 265
4VQSFNF$PNNBOEPGUIF"MMJFE1PXFST 5PNCBMCBZF 'SBODPJT Ŵźų
4$"1 ŸŸ ŹųoŹŴ Tonton Macoutes, 45
Sutton, Richard, 172 5PSSFT3FTUSFQP 'BUIFS$BNJMP ŵŴŶ ŵŴŷ
Swick, L. B., 133 UPSUVSF ŵ ŴŶ ŷŶ Źżoźų źŷ Żŷ ŻŸoŻŹ ŻŻ 
92, 97, 118, 119, 130, 131, 141, 146, 147,
5Bę 8JMMJBN) ŵŵ Ŵŷż ŴŸŸoŸŹ ŴŸż ŴŹų ŴŹŷ ŴŹź ŴźŴ ŴźŸ 
5BJSB 'VLVTIJNBQSFGFDUVSF Źż 177, 186, 191, 192, 199, 200, 201, 205, 210,
Takagi, Takeo, 74 ŵŴŸ ŵŴź ŵŴż ŵŵų ŵŵŵ ŵŵŸoŵŹ ŵŵź ŵŵŻ 
5BLBIBTIJ :VTBJ ŹŴ 229, 230, 236, 238, 241, 247, 248, 249,
5BMJCBO ŵŶżoŷŶ ŶŹŴ 250, 251
Tan Malaka, 101 Touby Lyfoung, 121, 134
Tan Son Nhut Airport, 151 Toulia Lyfoung, 121, 134
Tanzania, 184 Touré, Sékou, 172
Taruc, Luis, 115 Townley, Michael, 356
Taylor, Maxwell, 10, 198, 233 5SBOćBOI#FO ŴŷŻoŷż
tear gas, 15, 72, 101, 104, 106, 137, 145, 171, 5SBOćJFO,IJFN ŴŸŵ
178, 182, 184, 192, 198, 199, 200, 202, 206, Tran Van Don, 147
211, 214, 224, 227, 235, 236, 238 Troxel, Oliver L., 185
UFMFDPNNVOJDBUJPOT ż ŷŶ ŹŴ Źŵ Źŷ Żŵ  Trujillo, Rafael L., 46, 211, 212
100, 102, 125, 137, 145, 170, 171, 174, 177, 5SVNBO )BSSZ BOEBENJOJTUSBUJPO Ŵųų 
181, 182, 188, 195, 198, 204, 211, 214, 220, 106, 116, 189, 190
221, 223, 226, 230, 232 Tsaldaris, Constanin, 190, 193, 338
Terpil, Frank, 335 Tshisekedi, Etienne, 180
Tetaz, René, 173 5TIPNCF .PÕTF ŴźŹ ŴźŻ Ŵźż ŶŶŵ
Textor, Robert, 69, 73 Tubbs, George, 126
Thabit, Adnan, 246 5VCNBO 8JMMJBN ŴźŴ Ŵźŵ
ćBJMBOEBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN Ŵųż ŴŴŴ Tucker, Ruben, 133
Border Patrol Police (BPP), 99, 109, 110, 5ÞQBD"NBSV ŶŸŷ ŶŸŸ
ŴŴŷ ŴŵŹ'SFFćBJ.PWFNFOU ŴųŹ Ŵųź  5VQBNPSPT ŵŵŻ ŵŵż ŶŸŸ
ŶųųIJMMUSJCFT ŴųżoŴų,SPN1SBNVBO Turcios, Froylan, 49, 272

382 Index
5VSLFZ ŵųŴoŵ 7JOOFMM$PSQPSBUJPO ŴŵŶ ŵųŷoŸ ŵŶŹ ŶųŹ
5VSOFS 3BMQI żŶ ŴŷŹoŷŻ ŶŴź ŶŴŻ 7JUIPPO:BTBXBTEJ ŴŴŷ
5VSOFS 8JMMJBN Ŵųź 7PMMNFS "VHVTU ŷ ŹŴ żŷ ŴŷŶ ŴŻż ŵżŵ
Voss, Ernest, 86, 289
Ubico, Jorge, 216, 217 Vung Tau, 151
6HBOEB ŴŻŸoŻŹ
Ungar, Leonard, 114, 310 Wagner, Gunther, 222, 353
6OJGPSN$SJNF3FQPSU 6$3 Ŵżŵ Walters, Vernon, 230
6OJUFE'SVJU$PNQBOZ ŷż ŵŴŹ ŵŵų Walton, Frank, 117, 131, 137, 145, 159, 169,
6OJUFE4UBUFT"SNZ$PVOUFS*OUFMMJHFODF 316, 318, 320, 342
Corps (CIC), 72, 84, 86, 108, 189, 288 8BSPO%SVHT Ÿ źŸoźŹ żŸ ŴŴŸ ŴŴż ŴŶŻ 
6OJUFE4UBUFT"SNZ$SJNJOBM*OWFTUJHBUJPOT ŴŶż ŴŸų Ŵżź ŵŵź ŵŶź ŵŷŵoŷŶ ŶŴŶSee
Division (CID), 84 also%SVH&OGPSDFNFOU"ENJOJTUSBUJPO
6OJWFSTBM$POTUSVDUJPO$PNQBOZ ŴŵŶ ŶųŹ Federal Bureau of Narcotics
University of Southern California, 195, 206 8BTJĕ *[[BUVMMBI ŵŷŵ
Unocal, 139 Webber, Colonel John, 220
Untung, Colonel, 104 8FEFNFZFS "MCFSU ŻŸ
Updike, Everett, 144, 316 Weiss, Jon, 320
Urton, Ulrich, 336 Weld, Kirsten, 216
8FMMFT 4VNOFS ŷŹ
7BDDBSP#SPUIFST'SVJU$PNQBOZ ŷŻ Weyland, Walter, 198
Vaky, Viron, 208, 221 White, Frank, 123, 315
7BMEFSSBNB (FOFSBM+PSHF0SEØ×F[ ŵŴŸ White, John R., 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 268
7BMFOUJOF -FXJT ŹŶoŹŸ źŵ Żŵ 8IJUNFS 3PCFSU ŴŴŹ ŴŹŻ
Valeriano, Napoleon, 116 8JDLIBN $IBSMFT ŴżųożŴ ŶŶź
7BO%FNBO 3BMQI ŵŸ ŵŹŸ 8JDLFSTIBN3FQPSU ŷ
7BOH1BP ŴŶŷoŶŹ ŴŶż Wikileaks, 241, 242, 245
Van Houth, 139 Wilkins, Zoris, 198
Vann, John Paul, 158 8JMMJBNT "MFYBOEFS4 ŷŴoŷŷ ŵŹż
7BTJR "CEVMMBI Ŵżż ŵųų 8JMMJBNT "MFYBOEFS4i$MVCCFSwŷŴ
7ÈTRVF[ )PSBDJP ŷŹ 8JMMJBNT (BSMBOE ŴųŻ ŴŹŹoŹź ŴŹŻ ŴźŶ 
7BUUBI1IBOLBN Ŵŵź ŴŶų ŴŶŷ ŴŶź 175, 197, 198, 202, 290, 326, 341
Velouchiotis, Ares, 190 8JMMJBNTPO +FUFS żż ŴŴŴoŴŵ ŴŴŹ ŴŵŹ ŴŷŻ 
7FOF[VFMB ŵŴųoŴŴ 180, 204, 251, 366
7FSOPO 8ZNBO żŷ Willoughby, Gen. Charles, 59, 71, 72, 276,
7JFUOBNBOEŴŵżųEQSPHSBN ŴŷŶoŷŷ 282
"SNZPGUIF3FQVCMJDPG7JFUOBN Wilson, Charles M., 117, 304
(ARVN), 144, 150, 156; Buddhist protests, Wilson, Edwin, 340
148; Bureau of Investigations (VBI), 143, 8JMTPO 0SMBOEP8 ŴŴŵ ŴŷŶ ŴźŶ ŴŻżożų 
ŴŷŸ ŴŷŹ$JWJM(VBSE ŴŷŷoŷŸ Ŵŷź'SFODI 192, 259, 358
Sureté, 141, 143; and Geneva Accords, Wirkus, Faustin E., 40
142, 144; Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious Wise, Frederic M., 42
sects, 143, 150; National Police Field Witajewski, Robert M., 248
'PSDF ŴŷżBOE014 ŴŷŻQFOBMTZTUFN Wood, Leonard, 28, 266
BENJOJTUSBUJPO ŴŸŸoŹųQPMJDFUSBJOJOH  Wooner, Orvall, 206
ŴŷŴoŹŴ1SPWJODJBM3FDPOOBJTTBODF6OJUT Worcester, Dean, 28, 132
136T ŴŸŶoŸŸ Wright, Luke E., 23
7JMMBNPS *HOBDJP Ŷų Wu Han Chai, 85
Villard, Henry S., 10, 169, 260
Vincent, Stenio, 45 9F #MBDLXBUFS ŵŷŶ

Index 383
:BOUTJO /JDL ŵŴŴ Z ĕMN ŴżŶ
:J1PN4PL ŻŹ ;BNCJB ŴŻŷoŻŸ ŴŻŹ
:PO4PTB .BD"OUPOJP ŵŴŻ Zanzibar, 184
:PTIJEB 4IJHFSV Ÿź Źż źų źź ;BQBUB &NJMJBOP ŷż
:PTIJLBXB .JUTVTBEB źŴ ŵŻŵ Zelaya, José Santos, 47
:PTIJP ,PEBNB źŹ ŵŻŷ ŵŻŸ ;FMFEØO #FOKBNJO ŷź
:PVOH (PSEPO ŴŶź ŶŵŸ Zervas, Napoleon, 191, 337
:P6O)ZPOH Żŷ ŵŻŻ Zinn, Howard, 260
:V)BFKJO Żż ;JOPNBO 1FUFS ŴŸż
:VTVG :VTVG4BMNBO 'BIE ŶŷŶ ;VNXBMU 'SFE ŵŵŸ

384 Index
Jeremy Kuzmarov SFDFJWFE IJT 1I% JO IJTUPSZ GSPN #SBOEFJT
6OJWFSTJUZ JO ŵųųŹ BOE IPMET #" BOE ." EFHSFFT GSPN .D(JMM
6OJWFSTJUZ )F IBT UBVHIU BU #VDLOFMM 6OJWFSTJUZ BOE &NNBOVFM
College and is J. P. Walker Assistant Professor of History at the
University of Tulsa. He is the author of The Myth of the Addicted
Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs (University of Mas-
TBDIVTFUUT1SFTT ŵųųż *OŵųŴų ,V[NBSPWXBTOBNFEB5PQ:PVOH
Historian by History News Network. He lives in Tulsa with his wife,
Ngosa, and daughter, Chanda.
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