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Dissecting Madkhalism

Giovanni A. Murcia

April 27th, 2023

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Abstract

The Madkhali movement, otherwise known as the Salafi Quietists, are a religious group whose

namesake comes from Rabi’ al-Madkhali. They are also called the Jami'’ movement or al-

Jamiyyah, the namesake of al-Madkhali's teacher Muhammad Aman Al-Jami'' (d. 1995). They are

primarily known for their strict adherence to obedience to governing authority, deeming anyone

who protests government as a mubtadi’ (innovator). They are noted for their generous application

of tabdi’ (ruling others as innovators) which renders one as opposed to the Sunnah (prophetic

tradition) by inserting “new doctrines” or “new practices” into the religion. Some of the venerated

scholars by this variant of Salafism are Ibn Baz (d. 1999), al-Albani (d. 1999), Ibn Uthaymin (d.

2001) Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'I (d. 2001), Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Najmi (d. 2008), Saleh al-Fawzan,

Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad, and Abd al-Razzaq al-Afifi. The Madkhali movement is best understood

as a reactionary reflex against political Salafism, or Islamism. This treatment aims to address the

threat level of the Madkhali movement, the charges made against Muslims of all persuasions, the

paradigm by which Madkhalis operate from with regards to ruling them as innovators who are

doomed to hellfire.

Keywords: mubtadi’, tabdi’, Madkhali

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Dissecting the Madkhalis

The Rise of al-Jami'' and al-Madkhali

Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali was born in 1936 in the region of Jizan, Saudi Arabia. He

studied under prominent scholars such as Muhammad Amin al-Shinqiti (d. 1973), Ahmad ibn

Yahya al-Najmi, and more famously, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and Muhammad Aman ibn Ali Al-

Jami'. Al-Madkhali's teacher, Al-Jami', was born in 1928 in the Al-Qassim region of Saudi

Arabia. Al-Jami' maintained a teaching position in the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) and

his protégé, al-Madkhali graduated from the university in 1964. In the 1990s, the IUM had seen

less of native Saudi employees. Around 90% of IUM’s faculty were said to be a “handful of non-

Saudis" on campus. At the same time, the school had “increasingly came under sway of

adherents to a distinctive strand of Salafism most prominently associated with faculty members

Muhammad Aman al-Jami' and Rabi’ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali". This strain of Salafi thought in

question, makes necessary “the principle of default obedience to political authority”. The

hallmark of this project is established by its adherents in their attitude towards “politically

engaged Islamists1” which came to “strongly color the missionary project” in the 1990s at IUM

(Farquhar, 2015).

1
Islamists are Muslims who seek the intertwining of the political and personal realms under an Islamic
framework. They may manifest their beliefs in a unitary caliphate, a regional caliphate, an emirate, or a nation-state
that operates under Islamic law. This is often critiqued by mainstream scholars such as Yasir Qadhi insofar that it is
deemed a “modernist” problem that seeks to create a modern Islamic polity that is still subservient to modern
conceptions of what a “state” is.
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Impact and beliefs

Al-Madkhali makes his debut amidst the Gulf war in the 90s, defending royal decrees

allowing U.S. troops on Saudi soil, amongst other Salafi thinkers2. His circles often cite him as

the “Flag-bearer3” of our times, a symbolic attribute with regards to the authority of Islamic

clerical leadership. This symbolic attribution places al-Madkhali on a pedestal amplifying

verdicts deeming other trends or personalities as for or against the prophetic tradition with

charges of tabdi’ (innovation). His defense of ta’at wali al amr (obedience to the ruler) then

assumes its place as the pinnacle of standard belief for Madkhalis. The receiving end of his legal

verdicts are mainly those of the Salafi-Jihadi or Islamist persuasions, dismantling their motions

for revolution or protest. At first, when Madkhalism emerged in Libya, it was treated with

caution. When Gaddafi allowed Madkhalism to flourish to counteract political difference,

students of this Salafi strain began opening mosques and produced religious literature forwarding

support for Gaddafi’s rule (International Crisis Group, 2019). Madkhalis acquiring mosque

property across Libya began demolishing Sufi shrines and prohibiting Sufi public practices in

eastern Libya to secure a monopoly on religious space. This movement extended rule

legitimization of even secular authority, placing al-Madkhali and his followers under scrutiny as

palace scholars or “scholars for dollars”. Despite the reception of al-Madkhali's legitimization of

secular rulers, he issued a fatwa (legal verdict) obligating Salafis to support Haftar as the

recognized ruler and fight the Islamist opposition Muslim Brotherhood. The pact between the

2
This opinion is supported by a medieval Hanbali jurist, ibn Qudamah (d. 1223) in his al-Mughni Vol. 10,
p. 447. Citing that the proof for allowing non-Muslims to help Muslims is an opinion held by the founder of the
Hanbali school, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855).
3
Flag-bearer here refers to the science of al-jarh wa al-ta'dil in contemporary Salafism which is the mastery
of criticizing and praising other scholar credibility. Madkhalis are often eager to cite renowned appraisals of al-
Madkhali by the “senior” scholars such as al-Albani, Ibn Baz, Ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, Ibn Uthaymeen, al-Fawzan, al-
Banna, Ibn Abdullah al-Subayyal, al-Najmi, al-Jabiri.
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Madkhali movement and Haftar proved to be a fertile environment for the growth of this anti-

Islamist movement (Ali, 2017). This relationship is akin to the classical pact between

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792) and Muhammad bin Saud (d. 1765), guaranteeing

legitimization and religious support in exchange for religious dominance in the public domain

and dismissing any dissent as innovation.

Are Madkhalis a national security concern?

Noting the relationship between Libyan secular rulers and Madkhalism, it should be said

that Madkhalis are understood to be the first to support recognized authority however it may be.

In Gaddafi’s case, he assigned Madkhalis to security to survey religious and public spaces for

any challenges to the regime. By the end of Gaddafi’s rule, Madkhalis had already made up the

majority of Salafism. The military support of the Madkhalis in the country was followed with the

bombing of Sufi shrines, and Madkhalis were escorted by the military for protection. Aref al-

Nayed, a former Libyan ambassador to the UAE recounts: “Madkhalis tried to impede the

freedom of other schools of Islam, especially the Maliki tradition. They demolished mausoleums,

burned books, tried to restrict women’s movements. […] The policy of using them militarily is

dangerous.” (International Crisis Group, 2019). The cooperation between religious authorization

and political dominance presents a question of tolerance, diversity, and security. It can be argued

that Madkhalism, like the classical relationship between Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn

Saud, is a recipe for keeping or making tyrants. While Madkhalis are not keen on takfir

(excommunication) like the early Najdi mission of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, they are

generous in applying tabdi’ on opposing views. Ruling others as innovators comes with its own

social consequences. This entails boycotting, expressing animosity, and deeming them enemies
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of God.4 These attitudes stem from an opinion by a classical scholar, Abu Uthman al-Sabuni (d.

1057) who claimed authoritative consensus by scholars on treating those deemed innovators as to

be “subdued, humiliated, disgraced, banished and driven away – that one must keep away from

them, and from keeping company with them, and from living alongside them5.” Aside from their

harsh rhetoric regarding other Muslims, they have been described as a Trojan horse in Libya for

Saudi political dominance (Joffe, 2018). This project of Salafi Quietism would seem to be in bed

with Saudi royalty, having designed a framework by which Saudi royalty is immune to the

critique of religious authority. Madkhalis are treated by Salafi Jihadis as traitors, spies, and

“bootlickers”. They legitimize Arab dictators and silence opposition. Taking from that,

Madkhalis would be law-abiding Muslims in America by virtue of their Hobbesian approach to

governance so long as their “Flag-bearer” Rabi’ al-Madkhali and their interested party, the Saudi

government, would have it so. Madkhalis, again, are political quietists, which doesn’t dismiss the

consequences of their political inactivity. Their actions are said to be quiet, but their political

“voice” is loud (Olidorth, 2015).

4
Ahmad ibn Hanbal said in his Tabaqat al-Hanabilah 1/184: “The graves of ahl al-bid'ah (people of
innovation) from those who were pious ascetics are a pit of fire […] the pious ascetics of ahl al-bid'ah are enemies
of God”
5
Aqeedah al-Salaf Ashab al-Hadith p. 315. This work is a creedal treatise on the beliefs of the Salaf, the
Salaf are considered the greatest generations of Muslims and are considered a defining authority of what it means to
be a Muslim by Salafis.
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References

Farquhar, M. (2015). SAUDI PETRODOLLARS, SPIRITUAL CAPITAL, AND THE

ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OF MEDINA: A WAHHABI MISSIONARY PROJECT IN

TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 47(4), 701–

721. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43998037

International Crisis Group. (2019, April 25). Addressing the Rise of Libya’s Madkhali

Salafis. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/addressing-rise-

libyas-madkhali-salafis

Ali, A. S. (2017, June 6). Haftar and Salafism: A dangerous game. Atlantic Council.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/haftar-and-salafism-a-dangerous-game/

Joffe, G. (2018). The Trojan horse: The Madkhali movement in North Africa. The

Journal of North African Studies, 23(3), 345-359. doi: 10:1080/13629387.2018.1479780

Olidort, J. (2015). The politics of quietist Salafism. Brookings Institution.

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0226_salafism_jacob_olidort.pdf