Criminal Law Calcrim (1) Compressed

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This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

store.lexisnexis.com, for public and internal court use
Preface
These instructions represent the work of the Task Force on Jury Instructions, appointed by
Chief Justice Ronald M. George in 1997. Our charge was to write instructions that are both
legally accurate and understandable to the average juror. The eight-year effort addressed a need
for instructions written in plain English and responded to the specific recommendation of the
Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement that observed: “jury instructions as
presently given in California and elsewhere are, on occasion, simply impenetrable to the
ordinary juror” (Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, Final Report (May
1996) p. 93).1
The reason instructions are so often impenetrable is that they are based on the language of case
law and statutes written by and for a specialized legal audience and expressed in terms of art
that have evolved through multiple languages, in many countries, over several centuries. We do
not seek to lose either the majesty of the law or the rich language in which lawyers and judges
have expressed it. However, our work reflects a belief that sound communication takes into
account the audience to which it is addressed. Jurors perform an essential service in our
democracy. We are absolutely dependent upon them to apply the law fairly and accurately. In
order to do so, they must be able to understand the instructions they are asked to follow.
These instructions were prepared by a statewide committee of justices from the Court of
Appeal, trial court judges, attorneys, academicians, and lay people. They are approved by the
Judicial Council as the state’s official instructions pursuant to the California Rules of Court
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a)).2 The Rules of Court strongly encourage their use (Id.,
Rule 2.1050(e)).3
Each instruction began with the preparation of an initial draft, followed by subcommittee
review and full committee consideration. The task force was assisted by a remarkable group of
staff attorneys that included Robin Seeley, Natasha Minsker, Jeffrey Shea, Melissa Johnson,
Elizabeth Givens, and Lisa Lockyer. Throughout our multi-year effort, drafts were repeatedly
circulated for public comment. The task force reviewed thousands of observations, and this
final product reflects the input of judges and lawyers throughout California. We are grateful for
the willingness of prosecutors, defense counsel, appellate specialists, judges, and justices to
share their insights and the benefit of their experience.
A list of people and organizations who have contributed to this undertaking follows this
preface; we apologize to anyone who has been omitted through oversight.
The official publisher of this work is LexisNexis Matthew Bender. Its representatives have
worked closely with us to prepare the instructions and to create a software platform for their
usage. We have been greatly aided by their efficiency, professionalism, and commitment to
excellence. We particularly recognize Bruce Greenlee for his tireless efforts in this regard.
We gratefully acknowledge our predecessor. The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions,
Criminal, of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, published the first edition of California
Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) in 1946. For six decades, their efforts have helped guide
the deliberations of California jurors. While we have taken a very different approach to the
1
Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, Final Report (May 1996) p. 93.
2
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).
3
Id., Rule 2.1050(e).
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Preface to CALCRIM Updates
This edition of CALCRIM includes a number of additions and changes to the instructions that
were first published in 2005. In providing these updates, the Judicial Council Advisory
Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions is fulfilling its charge to ensure that CALCRIM
reflects all changes in the law.
In addition to maintaining the legal accuracy of CALCRIM, the committee carefully considered
and implemented suggestions from CALCRIM users. Responding to feedback from users is
consistent with the Advisory Committee’s goal to maintain CALCRIM as the work product of
the legal community. We hope that our many contributors view our role in the same way and
will continue to support us.
March 2023
Hon. Jeffrey Ross, San Francisco Superior Court
Chair, Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions welcomes comments.

Send print comments to:
Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions
c/o Judicial Council of California
Criminal Justice Services
455 Golden Gate Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102-3588
Or you may send comments by e-mail to criminaljuryinstructions@jud.ca.gov.
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The Following Persons and Organizations
Assisted the Task Force in the Preparation of the
Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions
Organizations
Alameda County Bar Association
Alameda County District Attorney’s Office
Alameda County Public Defender’s Office
Appellate Defenders, Inc.
Bakersfield College
California Appellate Project
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
California District Attorneys Association
Central California Appellate Program
Constitution Society
Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office
Criminal Justice Forum
California Department of Justice
Fresno County District Attorney’s Office
Fresno County Public Defender’s Office
Kern County Deputy Public Defender’s Office, Writs and Appeals/Training
Los Angeles County Alternate Public Defender’s Office
Los Angeles County Bar Association
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office
Marin County District Attorney’s Office
Marin County Public Defender’s Office
Mariposa County Bar Association
Office of the Alternative Public Defender
Orange County Bar Association
Orange County District Attorney’s Office
Orange County Public Defender’s Office
Queen’s Bench Bar Association
Riverside County District Attorney’s Office
Sacramento County Attorney General’s Office
Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office
Sacramento County Public Defender’s Office
San Bernardino City Public Defender’s Office
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San Bernardino County Bar Association
San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office
San Bernardino County Public Defender’s Office
San Diego County Public Defender’s Office
San Francisco City and County Public Defender’s Office
San Francisco County Public Defender’s Office
San Luis Obispo District Attorney’s Office
San Mateo County District Attorney’s Office
Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office
Santa Cruz County District Attorney’s Office
Second District Court of Appeal
Shasta County District Attorney’s Office
Solano County Bar Association
Solano County District Attorney’s Office
Sonoma County Public Defender’s Office
State Board of Governors
Superior Court of California, County of Fresno
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles
Superior Court of California, County of San Diego
Ventura County Public Defender’s Office
Current and former Administrative Office of the Courts staff attorneys

Starr Babcock
Elizabeth Givens
Sue Hansen
Melissa Johnson
Lisa Lockyer
Natasha Minsker
Robin Seeley
Jeffrey Shea
Cara M. Vonk
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Members of the judiciary
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Members of the bar and others
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Guide for Using Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury
Instructions (CALCRIM)
The Judicial Council jury instructions are accurate, designed to be easy to understand, and easy
to use. This guide provides an introduction to the instructions and explains conventions and
features that will assist in their use.
In order to fulfill its mandate pursuant to rule 10.59 of the California Rules of Court1 to
maintain the criminal jury instructions, members of the advisory committee meet several times
a year to consider changes in statutes, appellate opinions, and suggestions from practitioners. It
bears emphasis that when the committee proposes changing a jury instruction, that does not
necessarily mean the previous version of the instruction was incorrect. Often the committee
proposes changes for reasons of style, consistency among similar instructions, and to improve
clarity.
Judicial Council Instructions Endorsed by Rule of Court
Rule 2.1050 of the California Rules of Court provides:
The California jury instructions approved by the Judicial Council are the official
instructions for use in the state of California . . . [¶] The Judicial Council endorses
these instructions for use and makes every effort to ensure that they accurately state
existing law . . . [¶] Use of the Judicial Council instructions is strongly encouraged.
The California Supreme Court acknowledged CALCRIM’s status as the state’s official pattern
jury instructions in People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1008, fn.5 [274 Cal.Rptr.3d 309,
479 P.3d 797].
Using the Instructions

Bench Notes
The text of each instruction is followed by a section in the Bench Notes titled “Instructional
Duty,” which alerts the user to any sua sponte duties to instruct and special circumstances
raised by the instruction. It may also include references to other instructions that should or
should not be used. In some instances, the directions include suggestions for modification. In
the “Authority” section, all of the pertinent sources for the instruction are listed. Some of the
instructions also have sections containing “Related Issues” and “Commentary.” The Bench
Notes also refer to any relevant lesser included offenses. Secondary sources appear at the end of
instructions. The official publisher, and not the Judicial Council, is responsible for updating the
citations for secondary sources. Users should consult the Bench Notes before using an
instruction. Italicized notes between angle brackets in the language of the instruction itself
signal important issues or choices. For example, in instruction 1750, Receiving Stolen Property,
optional element 3 is introduced thus: <Give element 3 when instructing on knowledge of
presence of property; see Bench Notes>.
Multiple-Defendant and Multiple-Count Cases
These instructions were drafted for the common case in which a single defendant is on trial.
The document-assembly program from the Judicial Council’s official publisher, LexisNexis,
will modify the instructions for use in multi-defendant cases. It will also allow the user to name
1
Rule 10.59(a) states: “The committee regularly reviews case law and statutes affecting jury
instructions and makes recommendations to the Judicial Council for updating, amending, and adding topics
to the council’s criminal jury instructions.”
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the defendants charged in a particular instruction if the instruction applies only to some of the
defendants on trial in the case.
It is impossible to predict the possible fact combinations that may be present when a crime is
charged multiple times or committed by different defendants against different victims involving
different facts. Thus, when an instruction is being used for more than one count and the factual
basis for the instruction is different for the different counts, the user will need to modify the
instruction as appropriate.
Related California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC)
The CALJIC and CALCRIM instructions should never be used together. While the legal
principles are obviously the same, the organization of concepts is approached differently.
Mixing the two sets of instructions into a unified whole cannot be done and may result in
omissions or confusion that could severely compromise clarity and accuracy. Nevertheless, for
convenient reference this publication includes a table of related CALJIC instructions.
Titles and Definitions
The titles of the instructions are directed to lawyers and sometimes use words and phrases not
used in the instructions themselves. The title is not a part of the instruction. The titles may be
removed before presentation to the jury.
The instructions avoid separate definitions of legal terms whenever possible. Instead,
definitions have been incorporated into the language of the instructions in which the terms
appear. When a definition is lengthy, a cross-reference to that definition is provided.
Defined terms are printed in italics in the text of the definition.
Alternatives vs. Options
When the user must choose one of two or more options in order to complete the instruction, the
choice of necessary alternatives is presented in parentheses thus: When the defendant acted,
George Jones was performing (his/her) duties as a school employee.
The instructions use brackets to provide optional choices that may be necessary or appropriate,
depending on the individual circumstances of the case: [If you find that George Jones
threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information
in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]
Finally, both parentheses and brackets may appear in the same sentence to indicate options that
arise depending on which necessary alternatives are selected: [It is not required that the person
killed be the (victim/intended victim) of the (felony/ [or] felonies).].
General and Specific Intent
The instructions do not use the terms general and specific intent because while these terms are
very familiar to judges and lawyers, they are novel and often confusing to many jurors. Instead,
if the defendant must specifically intend to commit an act, the particular intent required is
expressed without using the term of art “specific intent.” Instructions 250–254 provide jurors
with additional guidance on specific vs. general intent crimes and the union of act and intent.
Organization of the Instructions
The instructions are organized into 24 series, which reflect broad categories of crime (e.g.,
Homicide) and other components of the trial (e.g., Evidence). The series, and the instructions
within each series, are presented in the order in which they are likely to be given in an actual
trial. As a result, greater offenses (like DUI with injury) come before lesser offenses (DUI). All
of the defenses are grouped together at the end of the instructions, rather than dispersed
throughout. The misdemeanors are placed within the category of instructions to which they
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belong, so simple battery is found with the other battery instructions rather than in a stand-
alone misdemeanor section.
Lesser Included Offenses
Users may wish to modify instructions used to explain lesser included offenses by replacing the
standard introductory sentence, “The defendant is charged with ” with “The
crime of (e.g., false imprisonment) is a lesser offense than the crime of
(e.g., kidnapping)” to amplify the explanation provided in instructions
3517–3519: “ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of <insert
crime> [charged in Count ].”
When giving the lesser included offense instructions 640 and 641 (homicide) or instructions
3517–3519 (non-homicide), no further modification of the corresponding instructions on lesser
crimes is necessary to comply with the requirements of People v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d
548.
Burden of Production/Burden of Proof
The instructions never refer to the “burden of producing evidence.” The drafters concluded that
it is the court’s decision whether the party has met the burden of production. If the burden is
not met, no further instruction is necessary. The question for the jury is whether a party has met
its properly allocated burden based on the evidence received.
Instruction 103 on Reasonable Doubt states, “Whenever I tell you the People must prove
something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you
otherwise].” Thus, when the concept of reasonable doubt is explained and defined, the jury is
told that it is the standard that applies to every issue the People must prove, unless the court
specifically informs the jury otherwise.
Sentencing Factors and Enhancements
Because the law is rapidly evolving regarding when sentencing factors and enhancements must
be submitted to the jury, we have provided “template” instructions 3250 and 3251 so that the
court may tailor an appropriate instruction that corresponds to this emerging body of law.
Personal Pronouns
Many instructions include an option to insert the personal pronouns “he/she,” “his/her,” or
“him/her.” The committee does not intend these options to be limiting. It is the policy of the
State of California that nonbinary people are entitled to full legal recognition and equal
treatment under the law. In accordance with this policy, attorneys and courts should ensure that
they are using preferred personal pronouns.
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Publication Table of Contents
Volume 1
Preface
Guide for Using Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions
SERIES 100 PRETRIAL
SERIES 200 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY
SERIES 300 EVIDENCE
SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND

ACCESSORIAL CRIMES
SERIES 500 HOMICIDE
SERIES 800 ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES
SERIES 1000 SEX OFFENSES
SERIES 1200 KIDNAPPING
SERIES 1300 CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES
SERIES 1400 CRIMINAL STREET GANGS
SERIES 1500 ARSON
SERIES 1600 ROBBERY AND CARJACKING
SERIES 1700 BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
SERIES 1800 THEFT AND EXTORTION
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Volume 2
SERIES 1900 CRIMINAL WRITINGS AND FRAUD
SERIES 2100 VEHICLE OFFENSES
SERIES 2300 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
SERIES 2500 WEAPONS
SERIES 2600 CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT
SERIES 2800 TAX CRIMES
SERIES 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES
SERIES 3100 ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
SERIES 3400 DEFENSES AND INSANITY
SERIES 3500 POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING
TABLES
Disposition Table
Table of Related Instructions (CALCRIM to CALJIC)
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
INDEX
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Volume 1 Table of Contents
Preface
SERIES 100 PRETRIAL

A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
100. Trial Process (Before or After Voir Dire)
101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or After Jury Is Selected)
102. Note-Taking
103. Reasonable Doubt
104. Evidence
105. Witnesses
106. Jurors Asking Questions
107. Pro Per Defendant
108–119. Reserved for Future Use
B. ADMONITIONS
120. Service Provider for Juror With Disability: Beginning of Trial
121. Duty to Abide by Translation Provided in Court
122. Corporation Is a Person
123. Witness Identified as John or Jane Doe
124. Separation Admonition

A. INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND ADMONITIONS
200. Duties of Judge and Jury
201. Do Not Investigate
202. Note-Taking and Reading Back of Testimony
203. Multiple Defendants
204. Defendant Physically Restrained
205. Charge Removed From Jury Consideration
206. One or More Defendants Removed From Case
207. Proof Need Not Show Actual Date
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B. GENERAL LEGAL CONCEPTS
219. Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings
221. Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial
222. Evidence
223. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined
224. Circumstantial Evidence: Sufficiency of Evidence
225. Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State
226. Witnesses
C. CAUSATION
240. Causation
D. UNION OF ACT AND INTENT

250. Union of Act and Intent: General Intent
251. Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State
252. Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together
253. Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence
254. Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime
SERIES 300 EVIDENCE

300. All Available Evidence
301. Single Witness’s Testimony
302. Evaluating Conflicting Evidence
303. Limited Purpose Evidence in General
304. Multiple Defendants: Limited Admissibility of Evidence
305. Multiple Defendants: Limited Admissibility of Defendant’s Statement
306. Untimely Disclosure of Evidence
B. WITNESSES
(i) Regarding Specific Testimony
315. Eyewitness Identification
316. Additional Instructions on Witness Credibility—Other Conduct
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317. Former Testimony of Unavailable Witness
318. Prior Statements as Evidence
319. Prior Statements of Unavailable Witness
320. Exercise of Privilege by Witness
(ii) Particular Types of Witnesses
330. Testimony of Child 10 Years of Age or Younger
331. Testimony of Person With Developmental, Cognitive, or Mental Disability
332. Expert Witness Testimony
333. Opinion Testimony of Lay Witness
334. Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice
335. Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice
336. In-Custody Informant
337. Witness in Custody or Physically Restrained
C. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
350. Character of Defendant
351. Cross-Examination of Character Witness
D. DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS

352. Character of Victim and of Defendant
355. Defendant’s Right Not to Testify
356. Miranda-Defective Statements
357. Adoptive Admissions
358. Evidence of Defendant’s Statements
359. Corpus Delicti: Independent Evidence of a Charged Crime
360. Statements to an Expert
361. Failure to Explain or Deny Adverse Evidence
362. Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements
E. PARTICULAR TYPES OF EVIDENCE

370. Motive
371. Consciousness of Guilt: Suppression and Fabrication of Evidence
372. Defendant’s Flight
373. Other Perpetrator
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374. Dog Tracking Evidence
375. Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.
376. Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime
377. Presence of Support Person/Dog/Dog Handler (Pen. Code, §§ 868.4, 868.5)
378. Consciousness of Guilt: General
SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND ACCESSORIAL

CRIMES
A. AIDING AND ABETTING AND RELATED DOCTRINES
400. Aiding and Abetting: General Principles
401. Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes
402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses
Charged)
403. Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged)
404. Intoxication
B. CONSPIRACY
415. Conspiracy (Pen. Code, § 182)
416. Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy
417. Liability for Coconspirators’ Acts
418. Coconspirator’s Statements
419. Acts Committed or Statements Made Before Joining Conspiracy
420. Withdrawal From Conspiracy
C. ACCESSORY AND SOLICITATION

440. Accessories (Pen. Code, § 32)
441. Solicitation: Elements (Pen. Code, § 653f)
442. Solicitation of a Minor (Pen. Code, § 653j)
443. Compelling Another to Commit Crime
D. CORPORATE OFFICERS
450. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of Liability
451. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Two Theories of Liability
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E. ATTEMPT
460. Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder (Pen. Code, § 21a)
SERIES 500 HOMICIDE

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
500. Homicide: General Principles
B. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

505. Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another
506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property
507. Justifiable Homicide: By Peace Officer
508. Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)
509. Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace
510. Excusable Homicide: Accident
511. Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion
512. Presumption That Killing Not Criminal (Pen. Code, § 194)
C. MURDER: FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE

520. First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187)
521. First Degree Murder (Pen. Code, § 189)
522. Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder
523. First Degree Murder: Hate Crime (Pen. Code, § 190.03)
524. Second Degree Murder: Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 190(b), (c))
525. Second Degree Murder: Discharge From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190(d))
D. FELONY MURDER
Introduction to Felony-Murder Series
540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code,
§ 189)
540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen.
Code, § 189)
540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death (Pen. Code, § 189)
548. Murder: Alternative Theories
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E. ALTERNATE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
560. Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant
561. Homicide: Provocative Act by Accomplice
562. Transferred Intent
563. Conspiracy to Commit Murder (Pen. Code, § 182)
F. MANSLAUGHTER
(i) Voluntary
570. Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code,
§ 192(a))
571. Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of
Another—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192)
572. Voluntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(a))
(ii) Involuntary
580. Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192(b))
581. Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(b))
582. Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not Charged (Pen.
Code, § 192(b))
(iii) Vehicular
590. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5(a))
591. Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated—Ordinary Negligence (Pen. Code,
§ 191.5(b))
592. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1))
593. Misdemeanor Vehicular Manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2))
594. Vehicular Manslaughter: Collision for Financial Gain (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(3))
595. Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined
G. ATTEMPT
600. Attempted Murder (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 663, 664)
601. Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 189, 664(a))
602. Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial Officer, or Custody Assistant
(Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664(e))
603. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen.
Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
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604. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense
(Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
H. CAUSATION: SPECIAL ISSUES

620. Causation: Special Issues
I. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSE
625. Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen. Code, § 29.4)
626. Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen.
Code, § 29.4)
627. Hallucination: Effect on Premeditation
J. CHARGE TO JURY
640. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged
With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of
Homicide
With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are
With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of
Homicide
With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
K. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
(i) General Instructions
700. Special Circumstances: Introduction (Pen. Code, § 190.2)
701. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990
702. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other
Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(c))
703. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony
Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d))
704. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Sufficiency
705. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Intent or Mental State
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706. Special Circumstances: Jury May Not Consider Punishment
707. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute
Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen. Code, § 1111)
708. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute
(ii) Special Circumstances
720. Special Circumstances: Financial Gain (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(1))
721. Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same Case) (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(3))
722. Special Circumstances: By Means of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4) &
(6))
723. Special Circumstances: Murder to Prevent Arrest or Complete Escape (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(5))
724. Special Circumstances: Murder of Peace Officer, Federal Officer, or Firefighter (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(7), (8) & (9))
725. Special Circumstances: Murder of Witness (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(10))
726. Special Circumstances: Murder of Judge, Prosecutor, Government Official, or Juror
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11), (12), (13) & (20))
727. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—Before March 8, 2000 (Former Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(15))
728. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—After March 7, 2000 (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(15))
729. Special Circumstances: Murder Because of Race, Religion, or Nationality (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(16))
730. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
731. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to
Kill After March 8, 2000 (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
732. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
733. Special Circumstances: Murder With Torture (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(18))
734. Special Circumstances: Murder by Poison (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(19))
735. Special Circumstances: Discharge From Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(21))
736. Special Circumstances: Killing by Street Gang Member (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(22))
737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker (Pen. Code, § 190.25)
(iii) Special Circumstances With Prior Murder
750. Special Circumstances: Prior Murder Conviction (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(2))—Trial on
Prior Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b))
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751. Second Degree Murder With Prior Prison for Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.05)
L. DEATH PENALTY
760. Death Penalty: Introduction to Penalty Phase
761. Death Penalty: Duty of Jury
762. Reserved for Future Use
763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as Aggravating or Mitigating (Pen.
Code, § 190.3)
764. Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes
765. Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes
766. Death Penalty: Weighing Process
767. Jurors’ Responsibility During Deliberation in Death Penalty Case
768. Penalty Trial: Pre-Deliberation Instructions
775. Death Penalty: Intellectual Disability (Pen. Code, § 1376)

A. MAYHEM
800. Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205)
801. Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203)
B. TORTURE
810. Torture (Pen. Code, § 206)
C. ABUSE OF OR INJURY TO CHILD, ELDER OR DEPENDENT ADULT,

SPOUSE
(i) Child
820. Assault Causing Death of Child (Pen. Code, § 273ab(a))
821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 273a(a))
822. Inflicting Physical Punishment on Child (Pen. Code, § 273d(a))
823. Child Abuse (Misdemeanor) (Pen. Code, § 273a(b))
(ii) Elder or Dependent Adult
830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death
(Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))
xxxvii

831. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(c))
(iii) Spouse, etc.
840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent Resulting in Traumatic
Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))
841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent (Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1))
(iv) Evidence
850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining
Witness
851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense
852A. Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence
852B. Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence
853A. Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person
853B. Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person
D. ASSAULT
(i) With Weapon or Force Likely

(A) On Specified People
860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce
Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d))
861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen.
Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))
862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3)
863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely
to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)
(B) General
875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen.
Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))
876. Assault With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(b))
877. Assault With Caustic Chemicals (Pen. Code, § 244)
(ii) With Intent to Commit Other Offense
890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree
Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))
xxxviii

891. Assault With Intent to Commit Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 220(a))
(iii) Simple Assault on Specified People or in Specified Location
900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241)
901. Assault on Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.1)
902. Assault on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.8)
903. Assault on School District Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.4)
904. Assault on School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.6)
905. Assault on Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.7)
906. Assault Committed on School or Park Property (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.2)
907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider’s Property or Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§§ 240, 241.3)
908. Assault Under Color of Authority (Pen. Code, § 149)
(iv) Simple Assault
915. Simple Assault (Pen. Code, § 240)
916. Assault by Conditional Threat
917. Insulting Words Are Not a Defense
E. BATTERY
(i) Causing Injury

925. Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(d))
926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243(b)–(c)(1))
(ii) Sexual Battery
935. Sexual Battery: Felony (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(a) & (d))
936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d))
937. Sexual Battery: By Fraudulent Representation (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(c))
938. Sexual Battery: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1))
(iii) On Specified Person or in Specified Location
945. Battery Against Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b), (c)(2))
946. Battery Against Custodial Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.1)
947. Simple Battery on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.10)
948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3)
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949. Battery Against School Employee (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.6)
950. Battery Against a Juror (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.7)
951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2)
(iv) Simple Battery
960. Simple Battery (Pen. Code, § 242)
F. SHOOTING AND BRANDISHING
(i) Shooting
965. Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246)
966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 247(b))
967. Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft (Pen. Code, § 247(a))
968. Shooting From Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d))
969. Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100(b))
970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner (Pen. Code, § 246.3)
(ii) Brandishing
980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)
981. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e))
982. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon to Resist Arrest (Pen. Code, § 417.8)
983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))
984. Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A))
985. Brandishing Imitation Firearm (Pen. Code, § 417.4)

A. AGAINST ADULT OR MINOR
(i) Rape
1000. Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7))
1001. Rape in Concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1)
1002. Rape of Intoxicated Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(3))
1003. Rape of Unconscious Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(4))
1004. Rape of a Disabled Woman (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(1))
1005. Rape by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(5))
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(ii) Oral Copulation
1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))
1016. Oral Copulation in Concert (Pen. Code, § 287(d))
1017. Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (i))
1018. Oral Copulation of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (f))
1019. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g))
1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))
1021. Oral Copulation by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j))
1022. Oral Copulation While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e))
(iii) Sodomy
1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2) & (3), (k))
1031. Sodomy in Concert (Pen. Code, § 286(d))
1032. Sodomy of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 286(i))
1033. Sodomy of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 286(f))
1034. Sodomy of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 286(g))
1035. Sodomy of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 286(h))
1036. Sodomy by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 286(j))
1037. Sodomy While in Custody (Pen. Code, § 286(e))
(iv) Sexual Penetration
1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1) & (2), (g))
1046. Sexual Penetration in Concert (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 289(a)(1))
1047. Sexual Penetration of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code, § 289(e))
1048. Sexual Penetration of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code, § 289(d))
1049. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 289(b))
1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 289(c))
1051. Sexual Penetration by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 289(f))
(v) Lewd and Lascivious Act
1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2))
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B. AGAINST MINORS ONLY
(i) Unlawful Sexual Intercourse

1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))
1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen. Code,
§ 261.5(a) & (c))
1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within Three Years of Defendant’s
Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))
1080. Oral Copulation With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(1))
1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2))
1082. Oral Copulation With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(1))
(iii) Sodomy
1090. Sodomy With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(1))
1091. Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(2))
1092. Sodomy With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 286(b)(1))
1100. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code, § 289(j))
1101. Sexual Penetration With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 289(i))
1102. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code, § 289(h))
(v) Lewd And Lascivious Act
1110. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(a))
1111. Lewd or Lascivious Act: By Force or Fear (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(1))
1112. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child 14 or 15 Years (Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1))
(vi) Other Offenses
1120. Continuous Sexual Abuse (Pen. Code, § 288.5(a))
1121. Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c))
1122. Annoying or Molesting a Child (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c))
1123. Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code, § 269(a))
1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies (Pen. Code, § 288.3(a))
1125. Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(1))
1126. Going to Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code, § 288.4(b))
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1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger
(Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))
1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of Age or
Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))
C. OTHER SEX RELATED OFFENSES
(i) Obscene or Harmful Matter

1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1) & (2))
1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor (Pen. Code,
§§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))
1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material (Pen. Code, § 311.2(a))
1143. Obscene Live Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.6)
1144. Using a Minor to Perform Prohibited Acts (Pen. Code, § 311.4(b), (c))
1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual Conduct (Pen. Code,
§ 311.11(a))
(ii) Pimping, Pandering, Prostitution
1150. Pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h)
1151. Pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i)
1152. Child Procurement (Pen. Code, § 266j)
1153. Prostitution: Engaging in Act (Pen. Code, § 647(b))
1154. Prostitution: Soliciting Another (Pen. Code, § 647(b))
1155. Prostitution: Agreeing to Engage in Act (Pen. Code, § 647(b))
(iii) Conduct in Public
1160. Indecent Exposure (Pen. Code, § 314)
1161. Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))
1162. Soliciting Lewd Conduct in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(a))
(iv) Failure to Register
1170. Failure to Register as Sex Offender (Pen. Code, § 290(b))
(v) Other Offenses
1180. Incest (Pen. Code, § 285)
1181. Sexual Abuse of Animal (Pen. Code, § 286.5)
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D. EVIDENCE
1190. Other Evidence Not Required to Support Testimony in Sex Offense Case
1191A. Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense
1191B. Evidence of Charged Sex Offense
1192. Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome
1193. Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
1194. Consent: Prior Sexual Intercourse

A. KIDNAPPING
(i) Aggravated
1200. Kidnapping: For Child Molestation (Pen. Code, §§ 207(b), 288(a))
1201. Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent (Pen. Code, § 207(a), (e))
1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact From Another Person (Pen.
Code, § 209(a))
1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses (Pen. Code, § 209(b))
1204. Kidnapping: During Carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 207(a), 209.5(a), (b), 215(a))
(ii) Simple Kidnapping
1215. Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207(a))
B. DEFENSES
1225. Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm (Pen. Code,
§ 207(f)(1))
1226. Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen’s Arrest (Pen. Code, §§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837)
C. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
1240. Felony False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237)
1241. False Imprisonment: Hostage (Pen. Code, §§ 210.5, 236)
1242. Misdemeanor False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237(a))
1243. Human Trafficking (Pen. Code, § 236.1(a) & (b))
1244. Causing Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c))
D. CHILD ABDUCTION
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1250. Child Abduction: No Right to Custody (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278)
1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or Visitation (Pen. Code, §§ 277,
278.5)
1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate Injury (Pen. Code, § 278.7(a)
and (b))

A. THREATENING, STALKING, OR TERRORIZING
1300. Criminal Threat (Pen. Code, § 422)
1301. Stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9(a), (e)–(h))
1302. Terrorizing by Destructive Device, Explosive, or Arson (Pen. Code, § 11413)
1303. Terrorism by Symbol (Pen. Code, § 11411(a) & (b))
1304. Cross Burning and Religious Symbol Desecration (Pen. Code, § 11411(c))
1305. Obstructing Religion by Threat (Pen. Code, § 11412)
B. HATE CRIMES
1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force (Pen. Code,
§ 422.6(a))
1351. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat (Pen. Code,
§ 422.6(a) & (c))
1352. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging Property (Pen.
Code, § 422.6(b))
1353. Hate Crime: Disability Defined
1354. Hate Crime Allegation: Felony (Pen. Code, § 422.75(a)–(c))
1355. Hate Crime Allegation: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 422.7)

1400. Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(a))
1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor))
1402. Gang-Related Firearm Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.53)
1403. Limited Purpose of Evidence of Gang Activity
xlv

SERIES 1500 ARSON
A. ARSON
(i) Aggravated
1500. Aggravated Arson (Pen. Code, § 451.5)
1501. Arson: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 451)
1502. Arson: Inhabited Structure or Property (Pen. Code, § 451(b))
(ii) Simple Arson
1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c) & (d))
(iii) Attempted Arson
1520. Attempted Arson (Pen. Code, § 455)
B. UNLAWFULLY CAUSING A FIRE

1530. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 452)
1531. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited Structure (Pen. Code, § 452)
1532. Unlawfully Causing a Fire (Pen. Code, § 452)
C. OTHER RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

1550. Possession of Incendiary Device (Pen. Code, § 453)
1551. Arson Enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 451.1, 456(b))

A. ROBBERY
1600. Robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)
1601. Robbery in Concert (Pen. Code, § 213(a)(1)(A))
1602. Robbery: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 212.5)
1603. Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor
B. CARJACKING
1650. Carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215)
xlvi

A. BURGLARY
1700. Burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)
1701. Burglary: Degrees (Pen. Code, § 460)
1702. Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor
1703. Shoplifting (Pen. Code, § 459.5)
1704. Possession of Burglary Tools (Pen. Code, § 466)
B. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY AND RELATED INSTRUCTIONS

1750. Receiving Stolen Property (Pen. Code, § 496(a))
1751. Defense to Receiving Stolen Property: Innocent Intent
1752. Owning or Operating a Chop Shop (Veh. Code, § 10801)

A. THEFT
1800. Theft by Larceny (Pen. Code, § 484)
1801. Grand and Petty Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2, 491)
1802. Theft: As Part of Overall Plan
1803. Theft: By Employee or Agent (Pen. Code, § 487(b)(3))
1804. Theft by False Pretense (Pen. Code, § 484)
1805. Theft by Trick (Pen. Code, § 484)
1806. Theft by Embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 503)
1807. Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e))
B. TAKING OR TAMPERING WITH VEHICLE

1820. Felony Unlawful Taking or Driving of Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b))
1821. Tampering With a Vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10852)
1822. Unlawful Taking of Bicycle or Vessel (Pen. Code, § 499b)
C. EXTORTION
1830. Extortion by Threat or Force (Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519)
1831. Extortion by Threatening Letter (Pen. Code, § 523)
1832. Extortion of Signature (Pen. Code, § 522)
xlvii

A. FORGERY
(i) Forging or Passing Document

1900. Forgery by False Signature (Pen. Code, § 470(a))
1901. Forgery by Endorsement (Pen. Code, § 470(a))
1902. Forgery of Handwriting or Seal (Pen. Code, § 470(b))
1903. Forgery by Altering or Falsifying Will or Other Legal Document (Pen. Code, § 470(c))
1904. Forgery by Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting Document (Pen. Code, § 470(d))
1905. Forgery by Passing or Attempting to Use Forged Document (Pen. Code, § 470(d))
1906. Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in One Count
(ii) Counterfeit Driver’s License
1920. Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting a Driver’s License (Pen. Code, § 470a)
1921. Possessing or Displaying False, Altered, or Counterfeit Driver’s License (Pen. Code,
§ 470b)
(iii) Counterfeit Seal
1925. Forgery of Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)
1926. Possession of Counterfeit Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)
(iv) Possession With Intent to Defraud
1930. Possession of Forged Document (Pen. Code, § 475(a))
1931. Possession of Blank Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen. Code, § 475(b))
1932. Possession of Completed Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen. Code, § 475(c))
1933. Possession of Counterfeiting Equipment (Pen. Code, § 480)
(v) Check Fraud
1935. Making, Passing, etc., Fictitious Check or Bill (Pen. Code, § 476)
(vi) Filing False Document
1945. Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False Document for Filing (Pen. Code,
§ 115)
xlix

B. ACCESS CARD FRAUD
1950. Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484e(a))
1951. Acquiring or Retaining an Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484e(c))
1952. Acquiring or Retaining Account Information (Pen. Code, § 484e(d))
1953. Making Counterfeit Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484f(a))
1954. Using or Attempting to Use Counterfeit Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484f(a))
1955. False Signature on Access Card or Receipt (Pen. Code, § 484f(b))
1956. Use of Forged, etc., Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484g(a))
1957. Obtaining Money, etc., by Representing Self as Holder of Access Card (Pen. Code,
§ 484g(b))
C. CHECK WITH INSUFFICIENT FUNDS

1970. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient (Pen. Code, § 476a)
1971. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient: Total Value of Checks (Pen.
Code, § 476a(b))
D. INSURANCE FRAUD
2000. Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(1), (4)–(7) & (9))
2001. Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(2) & (8))
2002. Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(3))
2003. Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value (Pen. Code, § 550(c)(2))
2004. Insurance Fraud: Destruction of Insured Property (Pen. Code, § 548(a))
E. FALSE FINANCIAL STATEMENT

2020. False Financial Statement: Making False Statement (Pen. Code, § 532a(1))
2021. False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit (Pen. Code, § 532a(2))
2022. False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement (Pen. Code, § 532a(3))
2023. False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 532a(4))
F. IDENTITY THEFT
2040. Unauthorized Use of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(a))
2041. Fraudulent Possession of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(c)(1),
(2), or (3))
2042. Fraudulent Sale, Transfer or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information (Pen.
Code, § 530.5(d)(1))
2043. Knowing Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information to
l

Facilitate Its Unauthorized Use (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2))
2044. False Personation (Pen. Code, § 529(a))
2045. False Personation (Pen. Code, § 530)

A. DUI
(i) Causing Injury

2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury (Veh.
Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))
2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(b))
2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury With a Passenger for Hire
(Veh. Code, § 23153(e))
(ii) Without Injury
2110. Driving Under the Influence (Veh. Code, § 23152(a), (f), (g))
2111. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152(b))
2112. Driving While Addicted to a Drug (Veh. Code, § 23152(c))
2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21 (Veh. Code, § 23140(a))
2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code,
§ 23152(e))
(iii) Prior Conviction
2125. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior
Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
(iv) Refusal
2130. Refusal—Consciousness of Guilt (Veh. Code, § 23612)
2131. Refusal—Enhancement (Veh. Code, §§ 23577, 23612)
B. FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY FOLLOWING ACCIDENT
(i) Death or Injury

2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver (Veh.
Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Nondriving
li

Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense (Veh. Code,
§§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
(ii) Property Damage
2150. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Driver
(Veh. Code, § 20002)
2151. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant
Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, § 20002)
(iii) Enhancement
2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for Vehicular Manslaughter
(Veh. Code, § 20001(c))
C. EVADING
2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a),
2800.3(a), (b))
2181. Evading Peace Officer (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.2)
2182. Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor (Veh. Code, § 2800.1(a))
D. RECKLESS DRIVING AND SPEED CONTEST

2200. Reckless Driving (Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b))
2201. Speed Contest (Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3))
2202. Exhibition of Speed (Veh. Code, § 23109(c))
E. LICENSING OFFENSES
2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601,
14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)
2221. Driving Without a License (Veh. Code, § 12500(a))
2222. Failing to Present Driver’s License (Veh. Code, § 12951(b))
F. OTHER VEHICLE OFFENSES

2240. Failure to Appear (Veh. Code, § 40508(a))
2241. Driver and Driving Defined (Veh. Code, § 305)
lii

A. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11352, 11379)
2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11352, 11379)
2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5,
11378, 11378.5)
2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With Firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1)
2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377)
2305. Defense: Momentary Possession of Controlled Substance
2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault (Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
B. SUBSTITUTE SUBSTANCE
2315. Sale of Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
2316. Offer to Sell Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382)
C. FORGED SUBSTANCE
2320. Forged Prescription for Narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11368)
D. MANUFACTURING
(i) Manufacturing and Offering

2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)
2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) &
(c))
(ii) Possession of Materials
2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-ethylamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a))
2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11383.5(b)(1))
liii

2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f))
E. CANNABIS
(i) Sale, Offering to Sell, Possession for Sale

2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11360(a))
2351. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360)
2352. Possession for Sale of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359)
(ii) Transportation or Offering to Transport
2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More
Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
2364. Felony Cannabis Penalty Allegations (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3))
(iii) Planting
2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11358(c)–(d))
(iv) Simple Possession
2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11357(b))
2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds:
Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))
F. OFFENSES INVOLVING MINORS
(i) Controlled Substances

2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353,
11354)
2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11380(a))
liv

2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353,
11354, 11380(a))
(ii) Marijuana
2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
G. USE AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA
(i) Use
2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11550)
2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11365)
(ii) Possession of Paraphernalia
2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)
2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 4326(a))
2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 4326(b))
H. MONEY FROM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

2430. Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled
Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
2432. Attorney’s Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction Involving
Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))
I. OTHER RELATED OFFENSES

2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11366)
2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11366.8)
lv

SERIES 2500 WEAPONS

A. POSSESSION OF ILLEGAL OR DEADLY WEAPON
2500. Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon
2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)
2502. Possession, etc., of Switchblade Knife (Pen. Code, § 21510)
2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen. Code, § 17500)
B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON PROHIBITED

2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to
Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to
2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code, §§ 29815,
29825)
2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)
2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense
C. CARRYING A FIREARM
(i) Concealed
2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(2))
2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(1))
2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(a)(3))
(ii) Loaded
2530. Carrying Loaded Firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850(a))
(iii) Sentencing Factors
2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(a), 25850(c))
2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2))
2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,
§§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or
Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
lvi

2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6))
2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(c)(6))
D. ASSAULT WEAPONS
2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other
Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
E. EXPLOSIVES AND DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES

2570. Possession of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18710)
2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier (Pen. Code,
§ 18725)
2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or
Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
2575. Offer to Sell Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 18730)
2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code,
§ 18745)
2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen. Code,
§ 18750)
2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great
Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)
2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)
F. OTHER WEAPONS OFFENSES

2590. Armed Criminal Action (Pen. Code, § 25800)
2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm Due to
Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
lvii

A. BRIBERY OF OFFICIAL
2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen. Code, § 67)
2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen. Code, § 67.5)
2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code,
§ 67.5(b))
2603. Requesting or Taking a Bribe (Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93)
B. BRIBERY OR INTIMIDATION OF WITNESS
(i) Bribery
2610. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness (Pen. Code, § 137(a))
2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen. Code, § 138(a))
2612. Witness Receiving a Bribe (Pen. Code, § 138(b))
(ii) Threatening or Intimidating
2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen.
Code, § 137(b))
2621. Influencing a Witness by Fraud (Pen. Code, § 137(b))
2622. Intimidating a Witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b))
2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c))
2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 140(a))
C. EVIDENCE TAMPERING
2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen. Code, § 141)
D. PERJURY
2640. Perjury (Pen. Code, § 118)
2641. Perjury by False Affidavit (Pen. Code, § 118a)
E. THREATENING OR RESISTING OFFICER

2650. Threatening a Public Official (Pen. Code, § 76)
2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code,
§ 148(b) & (c))
lviii

2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public
Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen. Code,
§ 148.10(a) & (b))
2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code, § 148(a))
F. LAWFUL PERFORMANCE
2670. Lawful Performance: Peace Officer
2671. Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer
2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force
2673. Pat-Down Search
G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE PEACE

2680. Courthouse Picketing (Pen. Code, § 169)
2681. Disturbance of Public Meeting (Pen. Code, § 403)
2682. Inciting a Riot (Pen. Code, § 404.6(a))
2683. Participating in a Riot (Pen. Code, §§ 404, 405)
2684. Participating in a Rout (Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408)
2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 408)
2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)
2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen. Code, § 416(a))
2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to Fight (Pen. Code,
§§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen. Code, §§ 415(2),
415.5(a)(2))
2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code, §§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))
H. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER

2700. Violation of Court Order (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1))
2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1),
273.6)
2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code,
§§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))
2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen.
Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))
I. CRIMES INVOLVING PRISONERS

lix

(i) Assault and Battery
2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code, § 4500)
2721. Assault by Prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501)
2722. Battery by Gassing (Pen. Code, §§ 243.9, 4501.1)
2723. Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501.5)
(ii) Hostage Taking and Rioting
2735. Holding a Hostage (Pen. Code, § 4503)
2736. Inciting a Riot in a Prison or Jail (Pen. Code, § 404.6(c))
(iii) Possession of Contraband
2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)
2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp
(Pen. Code, § 4574(a))
2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution
(Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))
2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code,
§ 4573.6)
2749. Bringing or Sending Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia Into Penal Institution (Pen.
Code, § 4573(a))
(iv) Escape
2760. Escape (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(1) & (b)(1))
2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2))
2762. Escape After Remand or Arrest (Pen. Code, § 836.6)
2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 836.6)
2764. Escape: Necessity Defense
J. MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY

2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1–7))

A. FAILURE TO FILE
2800. Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))
2801. Willful Failure to File Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)
lx

B. FALSE RETURN
2810. False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a))
2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))
2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)
C. OTHER TAX OFFENSES

2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))
2826. Willful Failure to Pay Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c))
2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))
2828. Failure to Withhold Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709)
D. EVIDENCE
2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous Returns
2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))
2842. Determining Income: Net Worth Method
2843. Determining Income: Bank Deposits Method
2844. Determining Income: Cash Expenditures Method
2845. Determining Income: Specific Items Method
2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense
E. DEFENSES
2860. Defense: Good Faith Belief Conduct Legal
2861. Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice

A. VANDALISM
2900. Vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594)
2901. Vandalism: Amount of Damage (Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1))
2902. Damaging Phone or Electrical Line (Pen. Code, § 591)
B. LOITERING
2915. Loitering (Pen. Code, § 647(h))
lxi

2916. Loitering: Peeking (Pen. Code, § 647(i))
2917. Loitering: About School (Pen. Code, § 653b)
C. TRESPASS
2929. Trespass After Making Credible Threat (Pen. Code, § 601(a))
2930. Trespass: To Interfere With Business (Pen. Code, § 602(k))
2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code, § 602(m))
2932. Trespass: Entry Into Dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))
2933. Trespass: Person Present (Pen. Code, § 602.5(b))
D. ANIMALS
2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen. Code, § 399)
2951. Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5)
2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))
2953. Cruelty to Animals (Pen. Code, § 597(a))
E. ALCOHOL RELATED OFFENSES (NON-DRIVING)

2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(a))
2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(d))
2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or Great
Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))
2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic Collision
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)
2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen. Code, § 647(f))
F. OFFENSES INVOLVING CARE OF MINOR

2980. Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (Pen. Code, § 272)
2981. Failure to Provide (Pen. Code, § 270)
2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code,
§ 272(b)(1))
G. BETTING
lxii

2990. Bookmaking (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
2991. Pool Selling (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1))
2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2))
2993. Receiving or Holding Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3))
2994. Recording Bets (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4))
2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5))
2996. Betting or Wagering (Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6))
H. MONEY LAUNDERING
2997. Money Laundering (Pen. Code, § 186.10)
I. FAILURE TO APPEAR
3001. Failure to Appear While on Bail (Pen. Code, § 1320.5)
3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release (Pen. Code, § 1320)
J. EAVESDROPPING AND RECORDED COMMUNICATION

3010. Eavesdropping or Recording Confidential Communication (Pen. Code, § 632(a))

A. PRIOR CONVICTION
3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
3101. Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
3102. Prior Conviction: Prison Prior
3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158)
B. ARMED WITH FIREARM

3115. Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1))
3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code,
§ 12022(a)(2))
3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code, § 12022(d))
C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022.3)
3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b))
lxiii

3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.06(a)(3))
D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR FIREARM

3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23),
12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06,
1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen.
Code, § 12022.5(b))
3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c))
3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or
Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
E. GREAT BODILY INJURY

3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7,
12022.8)
3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7(b))
3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d))
3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e))
F. SEX OFFENSES
3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(d)(2))
3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen.
Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1))
3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2))
3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))
3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(6))
3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to Engage in
lxiv

Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
3185. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear Against Minor Under 14
Years/14 Years or Older (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1(b), 286(c)(2)(B) & (C), 286(d)(2) & (3),
287(c)(2)(B) & (C), 287(d)(2) & (3), 289(a)(1)(B) & (C))
G. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)
3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379.8)
H. OTHER ENHANCEMENTS
3221. Aggravated White Collar Crime (Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1))
3222. Characteristics of Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b), 667.10(a))
3223. Reckless Driving With Specified Injury (Veh. Code, § 23105(a))
3224. Aggravating Factor: Great Violence, Great Bodily Harm, or High Degree of Cruelty,
Viciousness, or Callousness
3225. Aggravating Factor: Armed or Used Weapon
3226. Aggravating Factor: Particularly Vulnerable Victim
3227. Aggravating Factor: Induced Others to Participate or Occupied Position of Leadership
or Dominance
3228. Aggravating Factor: Induced Minor to Commit or Assist
3229. Aggravating Factor: Threatened, Prevented, Dissuaded, Etc. Witnesses
3230. Aggravating Factor: Planning, Sophistication, or Professionalism
3231. Aggravating Factor: Great Monetary Value
3232. Aggravating Factor: Large Quantity of Contraband
3233. Aggravating Factor: Position of Trust or Confidence
3234. Aggravating Factor: Serious Danger to Society
I. TEMPLATES
3250. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template
3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated
Trial
J. RELATED INSTRUCTIONS
3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior Conviction
lxv

3261. While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule

A. GENERAL DEFENSES
3400. Alibi
3402. Duress or Threats
3403. Necessity
3404. Accident (Pen. Code, § 195)
3405. Parental Right to Punish a Child
3406. Mistake of Fact
3407. Defenses: Mistake of Law
3408. Entrapment
3409. When Conduct of Officer May Not Be Attributed to Defendant
3410. Statute of Limitations
3411. Mistake of Law As a Defense
3412. Compassionate Use (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5)
3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775)
3414. Coercion (Pen. Code, §§ 236.23, 236.24)
3415. Lawful Use Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1)
B. IMPAIRMENT DEFENSES
3425. Unconsciousness
3426. Voluntary Intoxication (Pen. Code, § 29.4)
3427. Involuntary Intoxication
3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code, § 28)
3429. Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Person
C. INSANITY AND CIVIL COMMITMENTS

3450. Insanity: Determination, Effect of Verdict (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)
3451. Present Mental Competence of Defendant
3452. Determining Restoration to Sanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.2)
3453. Extension of Commitment (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1))
3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600,
6600.1)
lxvi

3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6605)
3455. Mental Incapacity as a Defense (Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8)
3456. Initial Commitment of Offender With A Mental Health Disorder as Condition of Parole
(Pen. Code, § 2970)
3457. Extension of Commitment as Offender With A Mental Health Disorder (Pen. Code,
§ 2970)
3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 1800)
D. SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF ANOTHER

3470. Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)
3471. Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor
3472. Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived
3474. Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled
3475. Right to Eject Trespasser From Real Property
3476. Right to Defend Real or Personal Property
3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury
(Pen. Code, § 198.5)

A. UNANIMITY
3500. Unanimity
3501. Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented
3502. Unanimity: When Prosecution Elects One Act Among Many
B. MULTIPLE COUNTS AND COMPLETION OF VERDICT FORMS

3515. Multiple Counts: Separate Offenses (Pen. Code, § 954)
3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited
3517. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included
Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty
and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)
Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One
Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)
3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser Offenses—For Use When
lxvii

Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Separately Charged (Non-Homicide)
C. ADMONITIONS
3530. Judge’s Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127,
1093(f))
3531. Service Provider for Juror With Disability (Code Civ. Proc., § 224)
D. CONCLUDING INSTRUCTION ON SUBMISSION TO JURY

3550. Pre-Deliberation Instructions
3551. Further Instruction About Deliberations
E. ALTERNATES
3575. Substitution of Alternate Juror: During Deliberations (Pen. Code, § 1089)
3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before
Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen. Code, § 1089)
3577. Instructions to Alternate on Submission of Case to Jury
F. FINAL INSTRUCTION ON DISCHARGE OF JURY

3590. Final Instruction on Discharge of Jury
TABLES
Disposition Table
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
INDEX
lxviii

Related Publications from LexisNexis
Matthew Bender
Criminal Practice and Procedure
California Criminal Defense Practice
California Criminal Defense Practice Reporter
Pipes & Gagen, California Criminal Discovery, Third Edition
Seiser & Kumli, California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure
Simons, California Preliminary Examinations, 995 Benchbook: Statutes and Notes
Imwinkelried & Leach, California Evidentiary Foundations, Fourth Edition
Cotchett, California Courtroom Evidence
Imwinkelried & Garland, Exculpatory Evidence: The Accused’s Constitutional Right to
Introduce Favorable Evidence, Third Edition
Rudstein, Erlinder & Thomas, Criminal Constitutional Law
Criminal Defense Techniques
Erickson & George, United States Supreme Court Cases and Comments
Erwin, Greenberg, Goldstein, Bergh, Cohen & Essen, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases:
Criminal—Civil
Marcus, Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases
DerOhannesian, Sexual Assault Trials, Second Edition
Defense of Narcotics Cases
Moore’s Federal Practice: Rules of Criminal Procedure
LexisNexis Automated Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM)
Jury Instructions
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) (LexisNexis Matthew Bender,
Official Publisher)
Codes
Deering’s California Codes Annotated
Matthew Bender and Deering’s Desktop Codes
Citators
Shepard’s Citations
For a complete listing of LexisNexis Matthew Bender products, visit the online bookstore at
<http://bookstore.lexis.com/bookstore/catalog>.
lxix

Publisher’s Editorial Staff
EVE ARNOLD, J.D.
Editorial Director
JASON M. TOM, ESQ.
Legal Editor
CLAUDIA GUREVICH
Director, Content Operations
RODERICK TSANG
Content Operations Analyst
PAT HEALY
Index Editor
lxxi

PRETRIAL
101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or After Jury Is
Selected)
102. Note-Taking
104. Evidence
105. Witnesses
B. ADMONITIONS
1
[Jury service is very important and I would like to welcome you and
thank you for your service.] Before we begin, I am going to describe for
you how the trial will be conducted, and explain what you and the
lawyers and I will be doing. When I refer to “the People,” I mean the
attorney[s] from the (district attorney’s office/city attorney’s office/office
of the attorney general) who (is/are) trying this case on behalf of the
People of the State of California. When I refer to defense counsel, I
mean the attorney[s] who (is/are) representing the defendant[s],
<insert name[s] of defendant[s]>.
[The first step in this trial is jury selection.
During jury selection, the attorneys and I will ask you questions. These
questions are not meant to embarrass you, but rather to determine
whether you would be suitable to sit as a juror in this case.]
The trial will (then/now) proceed as follows: The People may present an
opening statement. The defense is not required to present an opening
statement, but if it chooses to do so, it may give it either after the
People’s opening statement or at the beginning of the defense case. The
purpose of an opening statement is to give you an overview of what the
attorneys expect the evidence will show.
Next, the People will offer their evidence. Evidence usually includes
witness testimony and exhibits. After the People present their evidence,
the defense may also present evidence but is not required to do so.
Because (he/she/they) (is/are) presumed innocent, the defendant[s] (does/
do) not have to prove that (he/she/they) (is/are) not guilty.
After you have heard all the evidence and [before] the attorneys (give/
have given) their final arguments, I will instruct you on the law that
applies to the case.
After you have heard the arguments and instructions, you will go to the
jury room to deliberate.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give an instruction outlining how the trial will
proceed. This instruction has been provided for the convenience of the trial judge
3
101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or
After Jury Is Selected)
Our system of justice requires that trials be conducted in open court

with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that
applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional
information from any other source because that information may be
unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the opportunity
to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based only on the
evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as I provide it
to you.
During the trial, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or
any subject involved in the case with anyone, not even your family,
friends, spiritual advisors, or therapists. You may only say that you are
on a jury and the anticipated length of the trial, and you may inform
others of scheduling and emergency contact information. Do not share
any information about the case by any means of communication,
including in writing, by email, by telephone, on the Internet, social
media, Internet chat rooms, and blogs. You must not talk about these
things with other jurors either, until you begin deliberating.
As jurors, you may discuss the case together only after all of the
evidence has been presented, the attorneys have completed their
arguments, and I have instructed you on the law. After I tell you to
begin your deliberations, you may discuss the case only in the jury room,
and only when all jurors are present.
You must not allow anything that happens outside of the courtroom to
affect your decision [unless I tell you otherwise]. During the trial, do not
read, listen to, or watch any news report or commentary about the case
from any source.
Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or <insert other
relevant source of information or means of communication>]) in any way in
connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not
investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case or
any of its participants. Do not conduct any tests or experiments, or visit
the scene of any event involved in this case. If you happen to pass by the
scene, do not stop or investigate.
[If you have a cell phone or other electronic device, keep it turned off
while you are in the courtroom and during jury deliberations. An
electronic device includes any data storage device. If someone needs to
contact you in an emergency, the court can receive messages that it will
deliver to you without delay.]
During the trial, do not speak to a defendant, witness, lawyer, or anyone
5
CALCRIM No. 101 PRETRIAL
associated with them. Do not listen to anyone who tries to talk to you
about the case or about any of the people or subjects involved in it. If
someone asks you about the case, tell him or her that you cannot discuss
it. If that person keeps talking to you about the case, you must end the
conversation.
If you receive any information about this case from any source outside of
the trial, even unintentionally, do not share that information with any
other juror. If you do receive such information, or if anyone tries to
influence you or any juror, you must immediately tell the bailiff.
Keep an open mind throughout the trial. Do not make up your mind
about the verdict or any issue until after you have discussed the case
with the other jurors during deliberations. Do not take anything I say or
do during the trial as an indication of what I think about the facts, the
witnesses, or what your verdict should be.
You must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence
your assessment of the evidence or your decision. Many people have
assumptions and biases about or stereotypes of other people and may be
unaware of them. You must not be biased in favor of or against any
party, witness, attorney, defendant[s], or alleged victim because of his or
her disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity,
religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, [or] age (./,) [or
socioeconomic status] (./,) [or <insert any other impermissible
form of bias>.]
You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.
I want to emphasize that you may not use any form of research or
communication, including electronic or wireless research or
communication, to research, share, communicate, or allow someone else
to communicate with you regarding any subject of the trial. [If you
violate this rule, you may be subject to jail time, a fine, or other
punishment.]
When the trial has ended and you have been released as jurors, you may
discuss the case with anyone. [But under California law, you must wait
at least 90 days before negotiating or agreeing to accept any payment for
information about the case.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, April 2010,
October 2010, April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, August 2014, September
2019, April 2020
6
PRETRIAL CALCRIM No. 101
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct
themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.) See also California Rules of Court
Rule 2.1035.
When giving this instruction during the penalty phase of a capital case, the court has
a sua sponte duty to delete the sentence which reads “Do not let bias, sympathy,
prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.” (People v. Lanphear (1984) 36
Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; California v. Brown (1987) 479
U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].) The court should also delete the
following sentence: “You must reach your verdict without any consideration of
punishment.”
If there will be a jury view, give the bracketed phrase “unless I tell you otherwise”
in the fourth paragraph. (Pen. Code, § 1119.)
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Admonitions. Pen. Code, § 1122.
• Avoid Discussing the Case. People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199 [155 Cal.Rptr.
657, 595 P.2d 91]; In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860
P.2d 466]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646–658 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665,
889 P.2d 985].
• Avoid News Reports. People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108–1111
[269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d. 394, 889 P.2d 588].
• Judge’s Conduct as Indication of Verdict. People v. Hunt (1915) 26 Cal.App.
514, 517 [147 P. 476].
• No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73
[14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
• No Independent Research. People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 642 [250
Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Castro (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 849, 853
[229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184
Cal.Rptr. 829].
• Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182–1183 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• Court’s Contempt Power for Violations of Admonitions. Pen. Code, § 1122(a)(1);
Code Civ. Proc. § 1209(a)(6) (effective 1/1/12).
RELATED ISSUES
Admonition Not to Discuss Case With Anyone
In People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 298–300 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d
1249], a capital case, two jurors violated the court’s admonition not to discuss the
7
case with anyone by consulting with their pastors regarding the death penalty. The
Supreme Court stated:
It is troubling that during deliberations not one but two jurors had conversations
with their pastors that ultimately addressed the issue being resolved at the
penalty phase in this case. Because jurors instructed not to speak to anyone
about the case except a fellow juror during deliberations . . . . may assume such
an instruction does not apply to confidential relationships, we recommend the
jury be expressly instructed that they may not speak to anyone about the case,
except a fellow juror during deliberations, and that this includes, but is not
limited to, spouses, spiritual leaders or advisers, or therapists. Moreover, the jury
should also be instructed that if anyone, other than a fellow juror during
deliberations, tells a juror his or her view of the evidence in the case, the juror
should report that conversation immediately to the court.
(Id. at p. 306, fn. 11.)
The court may, at its discretion, add the suggested language to the second paragraph
of this instruction.
Jury Misconduct
It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to
deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based
on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (People v. Engelman (2002) 28
Cal.4th 436, 449 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 49 P.3d 209].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial § 726.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 81, Jury
Selection and Opening Statement, § 81.06[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and
Verdict, § 85.05[1], [4] (Matthew Bender).
8
102. Note-Taking
You have been given notebooks and may take notes during the trial. Do
not remove them from the courtroom. You may take your notes into the
jury room during deliberations. I do not mean to discourage you from
taking notes, but here are some points to consider if you take notes:
1. Note-taking may tend to distract you. It may affect your ability to
listen carefully to all the testimony and to watch the witnesses as
they testify;
AND
2. The notes are for your own individual use to help you remember
what happened during the trial. Please keep in mind that your
notes may be inaccurate or incomplete.
At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and
destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the
case record/ <specify other disposition>).
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may
take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or
rule of court requires any particular disposition.
AUTHORITY
• Resolving Jurors’ Questions. Pen. Code, § 1137.
• Jurors’ Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 726.
6 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Judgment,
§ 21.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 85,
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[2] (Matthew Bender).
9
I will now explain the presumption of innocence and the People’s burden
of proof. The defendant[s] (has/have) pleaded not guilty to the charge[s].
The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant[s] is
not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the
defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have) been arrested, charged
with a crime, or brought to trial.
A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something,
I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I
specifically tell you otherwise].
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not
eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt.
In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the
evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the
evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/
she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/
them) not guilty.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and
the state’s burden of proof before deliberations. (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d
220, 225–227 [115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824]; People v. Soldavini (1941) 45
Cal.App.2d 460, 463 [114 P.2d 415]; People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952,
956–958 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 532].) This instruction is included in this section for the
convenience of judges who wish to instruct on this point during voir dire or before
testimony begins.
If the court will be instructing that the prosecution must prove something by a
preponderance of the evidence, give the bracketed phrase “unless I specifically tell
you otherwise.”
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1096, 1096a; People v. Freeman
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; Victor v.
10
Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583]; Lisenbee
v. Henry (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 997.
• Previous Version of CALCRIM 103 Upheld. People v. Reyes (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777].
• Reference to Elements Not Required. People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088–1089 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].
COMMENTARY
This instruction is based directly on Penal Code section 1096. The primary changes
are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the
affirmative rather than in the negative. The instruction also refers to the jury’s duty
to impartially compare and consider all the evidence. (See Victor v. Nebraska (1994)
511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) The appellate courts have
urged the trial courts to exercise caution in modifying the language of section 1096
to avoid error in defining reasonable doubt. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8
Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; People v. Garcia (1975)
54 Cal.App.3d 61 [126 Cal.Rptr. 275].) The instruction includes all the concepts
contained in section 1096 and substantially tracks the statutory language.
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, §§ 624,
716–717, 720–722.
Evidence, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][a][i],
85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
11
104. Evidence
You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the
evidence that is presented in the courtroom [or during a jury view].
“Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted
into evidence, and anything else I tell you to consider as evidence. The
fact that the defendant was arrested, charged with a crime, or brought
to trial is not evidence of guilt.
Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements
and closing arguments, the attorneys will discuss the case, but their
remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the
witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant
only if they help you understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume
that something is true just because one of the attorneys asks a question
that suggests it is true.
During the trial, the attorneys may object to questions asked of a
witness. I will rule on the objections according to the law. If I sustain an
objection, the witness will not be permitted to answer, and you must
ignore the question. If the witness does not answer, do not guess what
the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I order testimony
stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not consider
that testimony for any purpose.
You must disregard anything you see or hear when the court is not in
session, even if it is done or said by one of the parties or witnesses.
The court [reporter] has made a (record/recording) of everything that
was said during the trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may ask
that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s recording be played
for) you. You must accept the (court reporter’s record/court’s recording)
as accurate.
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009, March 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on these evidentiary topics; however,
instruction on these principles has been approved. (See People v. Barajas (1983)
145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750]; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th
795, 843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th
1068, 1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].)
AUTHORITY
• Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 140.
12
• Arguments Not Evidence. People v. Barajas (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809
[193 Cal.Rptr. 750].
• Questions Not Evidence. People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].
• Striking Testimony. People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, §§ 83.01[1], 83.02[2] (Matthew Bender).
13
105. Witnesses
You alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In

deciding whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common sense
and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the
same standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have. You
may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Consider the
testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.
In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that
reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that
testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:
• How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise perceive the
things about which the witness testified?
• How well was the witness able to remember and describe what
happened?
• What was the witness’s behavior while testifying?
• Did the witness understand the questions and answer them
directly?
• Was the witness’s testimony influenced by a factor such as bias or
prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the
case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided?
• What was the witness’s attitude about the case or about
testifying?
• Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or
inconsistent with his or her testimony?
• How reasonable is the testimony when you consider all the other
evidence in the case?
• [Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the
witness testified?]
• [Did the witness admit to being untruthful?]
• [What is the witness’s character for truthfulness?]
• [Has the witness been convicted of a felony?]
• [Has the witness engaged in [other] conduct that reflects on his or
her believability?]
• [Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for
his or her testimony?]
Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or
14
conflicts. Consider whether the differences are important or not. People

sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they
remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear
it differently.
[If the evidence establishes that a witness’s character for truthfulness has
not been discussed among the people who know him or her, you may
conclude from the lack of discussion that the witness’s character for
truthfulness is good.]
[If you do not believe a witness’s testimony that he or she no longer
remembers something, that testimony is inconsistent with the witness’s
earlier statement on that subject.]
[If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something significant
in this case, you should consider not believing anything that witness says.
Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but told the truth
about others, you may simply accept the part that you think is true and
ignore the rest.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on factors relevant to a witness’s
credibility. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr.
119, 538 P.2d 247].) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on
inconsistencies in testimony or a witness who lies, there is authority approving
instruction on both topics. (Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175
P.2d 607]; People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].)
The court may strike any of the enumerated impermissible bases for bias that are
clearly inapplicable in a given case.
Give all of the bracketed factors that are relevant based on the evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 780(e), (i), and (k).)
Give any of the final three bracketed paragraphs if relevant based on the evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Evid. Code, § 780; People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864,
883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
• Proof of Character For Truthfulness From Evidence of Lack of Discussion.
People v. Jimenez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 76]; People
v. Adams (1902) 137 Cal. 580, 582 [70 P. 662].
• Inconsistencies. Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607].
• Witness Who Lies. People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55
15
Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; People v. Reyes (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 965 [240 Cal.Rptr.
752]; People v. Johnson (1986) 190 Cal.App.3d 187, 192–194 [237 Cal.Rptr.
479].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][b], [c], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
16
If, during the trial, you have a question that you believe should be asked
of a witness, you may write out the question and send it to me through
the bailiff. I will discuss the question with the attorneys and decide
whether it may be asked. Do not feel slighted or disappointed if your
question is not asked. Your question may not be asked for a variety of
reasons, including the reason that the question may call for an answer
that is inadmissible for legal reasons. Also, do not guess the reason your
question was not asked or speculate about what the answer might have
been. Always remember that you are not advocates for one side or the
other in this case. You are impartial judges of the facts.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction may be given on request.
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Admonitions. See generally Pen. Code, § 1122.
• Juror Questions. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1033.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, § 82.02[2] (Matthew Bender).
17
(The defendant[s]/ <insert name[s] of self-represented

defendant[s]>) (has/have) the right to be represented by an attorney in
this trial, as do all criminal defendants in this country. (He/She/They)
(has/have) decided instead to exercise (his/her/their) constitutional right
to act as (his/her/their) own attorney in this case. Do not allow that
decision to affect your verdict.
The court applies the rules of evidence and procedure to a (self-
represented defendant/ <insert name[s] of self-represented
defendant[s]>).
New August 2009

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction may be given on request.
AUTHORITY
• Basis for Right of Self-Representation. Sixth Amendment, Constitution of the
United States; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 1, The
California Defense Advocate, § 1.73 (Matthew Bender).
18
B. ADMONITIONS
During trial, <insert name or number of juror> will be

assisted by (a/an) <insert description of service provider, e.g.,
sign language interpreter>. The <insert description of service
provider> is not a member of the jury and is not to participate in the
deliberations in any way other than as necessary to provide the service
to <insert name or number of juror>.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a juror will be using the
assistance of a service provider. (Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).)
AUTHORITY
• Juror Not Incompetent Due to Disability. Code Civ. Proc., § 203(a)(6).
• Juror May Use Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224.
• Court Must Instruct on Use of Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
7 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, §§ 320, 330.
Selection and Opening Statement, §§ 81.02[2], 81.04[4][a] (Matthew Bender).
19
<Alternative A—foreign language testimony>

Some testimony may be given in <insert name
or description of language other than English>. An interpreter will provide
a translation for you at the time that the testimony is given. You must
rely on the translation provided by the interpreter, even if you
understand the language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any
testimony for other jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated
testimony incorrectly, let me know immediately by writing a note and
giving it to the (clerk/bailiff).
<Alternative B—foreign language recording>
You (may/are about to) hear a recording [that is partially] in a foreign
language. You will receive a transcript with an English language
translation of that recording.
You must rely on the transcript, even if you understand the language in
the recording. Do not retranslate the recording for other jurors. If you
believe the transcript is incorrect, let me know immediately by writing a
note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff). [If the recording is partially in
English, the English parts of the recording are the evidence.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2014, August 2016

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The committee recommends giving Alternative A of this instruction whenever
testimony will be received with the assistance of an interpreter, though no case has
held that the court has a sua sponte duty to give the instruction. The instruction may
be given at the beginning of the case, when the person requiring translation testifies,
or both, at the court’s discretion. If the jury may hear a recording that is at least
partially in a foreign language, the court may give Alternative B with the
appropriate bracketed language, as needed.
If the court chooses, the instruction may also be modified and given again at the end
of the case, with all other instructions.
It is misconduct for a juror to retranslate for other jurors testimony that has been
translated by the court-appointed interpreter. (People v. Cabrera (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 300, 303 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].) “If [the juror] believed the court
interpreter was translating incorrectly, the proper action would have been to call the
matter to the trial court’s attention, not take it upon herself to provide her fellow
jurors with the ‘correct’ translation.” (Id. at p. 304.)
20
AUTHORITY
• Juror May Not Retranslate. People v. Cabrera (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 300,
303–304 [281 Cal.Rptr. 238].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation, § 55
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
21
(A/The) defendant[s] in this case, <insert name[s] of

corporate defendant[s]>, (is a corporation/are corporations). Under the
law, a corporation must be treated in the same way as a natural person.
When I use words like person or he or she in these instructions to refer
to the defendant[s], those instructions [also] apply to
<insert name[s] of corporate defendant[s]>.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the defendant is a
corporation.
AUTHORITY
• Corporation Is a Person. Pen. Code, § 7.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 40–43.
Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining, § 42.21[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
22
In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/ <insert

other name used>). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy, as
required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is not
evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial. (Pen.
Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d
9].)
Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may be
identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to
protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or
the defense.” (Id., § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses under
the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse),
262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or
lascivious act), 287 (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force). Note that the
full name must still be provided in discovery. (Id., § 293.5(a); People v. Bohannon
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 798, 803, fn. 7 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 488]; Reid v. Superior Court
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)
Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 55
Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)
AUTHORITY
• Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Discovery and Investigation, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, Crimes
Against the Person, § 142.24[3] (Matthew Bender).
23
[You may be permitted to separate during recesses and at the end of the
day. I will tell you when to return. Please remember, we cannot begin the
trial until all of you are in place, so it is important to be on time.]
Remember, do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any
subject involved in it with anyone, including the other jurors. Do not do
research, share information, or talk to each other or to anyone else about
the facts of the case or anything else connected with the trial, and do not
use any form of electronic or wireless communication to do any of those
things, either.
Do not make up your mind or express any opinion about the case or any
issue connected with the trial until after you have discussed the case with
the other jurors during deliberations.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to admonish the jury “at each adjournment of the
court before the submission of the cause to the jury.” Pen. Code, § 1122(b).
Adjournment means continuing proceedings to another court day, not every time the
court calls a recess. People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 174 [246 Cal.Rptr.
673, 691, 753 P.2d 629], citing People v. Moore (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 851,
852–853 [93 Cal.Rptr. 447].
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 1122(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Verdict, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
24
POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY

222. Evidence
226. Witnesses
C. CAUSATION
240. Causation
25
A. INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTIONS AND
ADMONITIONS
Members of the jury, I will now instruct you on the law that applies to
this case. [I will give you a copy of the instructions to use in the jury
room.] [Each of you has a copy of these instructions to use in the jury
room.] [The instructions that you receive may be printed, typed, or
written by hand. Certain sections may have been crossed-out or added.
Disregard any deleted sections and do not try to guess what they might
have been. Only consider the final version of the instructions in your
deliberations.]
You must decide what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone,
to decide what happened, based only on the evidence that has been
presented to you in this trial.
You must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence
your assessment of the evidence or your decision. Many people have
assumptions and biases about or stereotypes of other people and may be
unaware of them. You must not be biased in favor of or against any
party, witness, attorney, defendant[s], or alleged victim because of his or
her disability, gender, nationality, national origin, race or ethnicity,
religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, [or] age (./,) [or
socioeconomic status] (./,) [or <insert any other impermissible
form of bias>.]
You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with
it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with
my instructions, you must follow my instructions.
Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them
together. If I repeat any instruction or idea, do not conclude that it is
more important than any other instruction or idea just because I
repeated it.
Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that
are different from their meanings in everyday use. These words and
phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. Please be sure to
listen carefully and follow the definitions that I give you. Words and
phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied
using their ordinary, everyday meanings.
Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings
about the facts of the case. [Do not assume just because I give a
27
CALCRIM No. 200 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY
particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.]

After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do
apply to the facts as you find them.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, September
2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that the jurors are the exclusive judges
of the facts and that they are entitled to a copy of the written instructions when they
deliberate. (Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.) Although there is no sua sponte duty to
instruct on the other topics described in this instruction, there is authority approving
instruction on these topics.
In the first paragraph, select the appropriate bracketed alternative on written
instructions. Penal Code section 1093(f) requires the court to give the jury a written
copy of the instructions on request. The committee believes that the better practice
is to always provide the jury with written instructions. If the court, in the absence of
a jury request, elects not to provide jurors with written instructions, the court must
modify the first paragraph to inform the jurors that they may request a written copy
of the instructions.
Do not instruct a jury in the penalty phase of a capital case that they cannot
consider sympathy. (People v. Easley (1982) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875–880 [196 Cal.Rptr.
309, 671 P.2d 813].) Instead of this instruction, CALCRIM 761 is the proper
introductory instruction for the penalty phase of a capital case.
Do not give the bracketed sentence in the final paragraph if the court will be
commenting on the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1127.
AUTHORITY
• Copies of Instructions. Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1137.
• Judge Determines Law. Pen. Code, §§ 1124, 1126; People v. Como (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 922]; see People v. Williams (2001) 25
Cal.4th 441, 455 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209].
• Jury to Decide the Facts. Pen. Code, § 1127.
• Attorney’s Comments Are Not Evidence. People v. Stuart (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d
57, 60–61 [335 P.2d 189].
• Consider All Instructions Together. People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 679
[55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040,
1046 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; People v. Shaw (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 623 [47
Cal.Rptr. 96].
• Follow Applicable Instructions. People v. Palmer (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 679,
686–687 [173 P.2d 680].
28
POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY CALCRIM No. 200
• No Bias, Sympathy, or Prejudice. Pen. Code, § 1127h; People v. Hawthorne

(1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
RELATED ISSUES
Jury Misconduct
It is error to instruct the jury to immediately advise the court if a juror refuses to
deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based
on penalty, punishment, or any other improper basis. (People v. Engelman (2002) 28
SECONDARY SOURCES
727.
Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.05[1], Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.02, Ch. 85, Submission
to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[1], [2][c], 85.03[1], 85.05[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).
29
Do not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or <insert other

relevant source of information or means of communication>]) in any way in
connection with this case, either on your own or as a group. Do not
investigate the facts or the law or do any research regarding this case,
either on your own, or as a group. Do not conduct any tests or
experiments, or visit the scene of any event involved in this case. If you
happen to pass by the scene, do not stop or investigate.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2012
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jurors on how they must conduct
themselves during trial. (Pen. Code, § 1122.)
AUTHORITY
• No Independent Research. Pen. Code, § 1122; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d
612, 642 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Castro (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 849, 853 [229 Cal.Rptr. 280]; People v. Sutter (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184 Cal.Rptr. 829].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§ 24.
Verdict, § 85.05[4][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
30
[You have been given notebooks and may have taken notes during the
trial. You may use your notes during deliberations.] Your notes are for
your own individual use to help you remember what happened during
the trial. Please keep in mind that your notes may be inaccurate or
incomplete.
If there is a disagreement about the testimony [and stipulations] at trial,
you may ask that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s
recording be played for) you. It is the record that must guide your
deliberations, not your notes. You must accept the (court reporter’s
record /court’s recording) as accurate. Do not ask the court reporter
questions during the readback and do not discuss the case in the
presence of the court reporter.
Please do not remove your notes from the jury room.
At the end of the trial, your notes will be (collected and
destroyed/collected and retained by the court but not as a part of the
case record/ <specify other disposition>).
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009, February 2012,
March 2019, September 2020, March 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the members of the jury that they may
take notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
The court may specify its preferred disposition of the notes after trial. No statute or
rule of court requires any particular disposition.
If the jury requests transcripts, the court should remind the jury of the right to
request readback and to advise the court whether there is any testimony they want
read. (See People v. Triplett (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 655, 662 [267 Cal.Rptr.3d 675].)
AUTHORITY
• Jurors’ Use of Notes. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1031.
• Juror Deliberations Must Be Private and Confidential. People v. Oliver (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 423, 429 [241 Cal.Rptr. 804].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§ 21.
31
<Alternative A—different charges for different defendants>

[Because more than one defendant is on trial here, I am going to remind
you which individuals are charged with which crimes.
is charged with .
is charged with .]
<Alternative B—charges the same for all defendants>
[(Both/All) defendants in this case are charged with the same crimes.]
You must separately consider the evidence as it applies to each
defendant. You must decide each charge for each defendant separately. If
you cannot reach a verdict on (all/both) of the defendants, or on any of
the charges against any defendant, you must report your disagreement to
the court and you must return your verdict on any defendant or charge
on which you have unanimously agreed.
Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each defendant.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if multiple defendants are
on trial. (People v. Mask (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181];
People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879].)
Give alternative A if any of the charges against the defendants are different. Give
alternative B if all of the charges against all defendants are the same.
AUTHORITY
• Separate Verdicts When Multiple Defendants. Pen. Code, §§ 970, 1160.
• Instructional Duty. People v. Mask (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 457 [233
Cal.Rptr. 181]; People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr.
879].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
33
The fact that physical restraints have been placed on [the] defendant[s]
[ <insert name[s] of defendant[s] if multiple defendants in case
but not all are restrained>] is not evidence. Do not speculate about the
reason. You must completely disregard this circumstance in deciding the
issues in this case. Do not consider it for any purpose or discuss it
during your deliberations.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a defendant has been
restrained in a manner that is visible to the jury. (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d
282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].) If the restraints are not visible,
do not give this instruction unless requested by the defense.
The court must find a “manifest need for such restraints” and the record must
clearly disclose the reasons the restraints were used. (People v. Duran, supra, 16
Cal.3d at pp. 290–291.) “The imposition of physical restraints in the absence of a
record showing . . . violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming
conduct will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 291.) The
court must make the determination based on facts, not rumor, and may not delegate
the decision to law enforcement personnel. (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201,
1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].) The reasons supporting physical restraints
must relate to the individual defendant. The court cannot rely on the nature of the
charges, the courtroom design, or the lack of sufficient staff. (People v. Slaughter
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1213 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 986–987 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519];
People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 652 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].)
The use of stun belts is subject to the same requirements. (People v. Mar, supra, 28
Cal.4th at pp. 1205–1206.) In addition, the Supreme Court has urged “great caution”
in using stun belts at all, stating that, prior to using such devices, courts must
consider the psychological impact, risk of accidental activation, physical dangers,
and limited ability to control the level of shock delivered. (Ibid.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Duty. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127
Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322].
• Requirements Before Use. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–292 [127
Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1218 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].
34
Count[s] charging the defendant with <insert

name[s] of offense[s]> no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.
Do not speculate about or consider in any way why you no longer need
to decide (this/these) count[s].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original counts has been
removed from the case, whether through plea or dismissal.
36
The charge[s] against defendant[s] <insert names[s] of

defendant[s]> no longer need[s] to be decided in this case.
Do not speculate about or consider in any way why the charge[s] against
defendant[s] <insert names[s] of defendant[s]> (do/does) not
need to be decided.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction if one or more of the original defendants has
been removed from the case, whether through plea, dismissal, or flight.
37
It is alleged that the crime[s] occurred on [or about] <insert

alleged date(s) or date ranges by count>. The People are not required to
prove that the crime[s] took place exactly on (that/those) day[s] but only
that (it/they) happened reasonably close to (that/those) day[s].
New January 2006; Revised February 2014, February 2016, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. This instruction should not
be given: (1) when the evidence demonstrates that the offense was committed at a
specific time and place and the defendant has presented a defense of alibi or lack of
opportunity; or (2) when two similar offenses are charged in separate counts.
(People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358–359 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d
1009]; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 557 [108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705],
overruled on other grounds in Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713
[263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547]; People v. Barney (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490,
497–498 [192 Cal.Rptr. 172]; People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 408, 415–416
[98 Cal.Rptr. 518]; People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475 [195
Cal.Rptr. 233].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 955; People v. Jennings, supra, 53
Cal.3d at pp. 358–359; People v. Jones, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 557; People v.
Barney, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at pp. 497–498; People v. Gavin, supra, 21
Cal.App.3d at pp. 415–416; People v. Deletto, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp.
474–475.
• This Instruction Correctly States the Law. People v. Rojas (2015) 237
SECONDARY SOURCES
Accusatory Pleadings, § 40.07[2] (Matthew Bender).
38
In this case, a person is called ((John/Jane) Doe/ <insert

other name used>). This name is used only to protect (his/her) privacy, as
required by law. [The fact that the person is identified in this way is not
evidence. Do not consider this fact for any purpose.]
New August 2009

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If an alleged victim will be identified as John or Jane Doe, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give this instruction at the beginning and at the end of the trial. (Pen.
Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 58 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d
9].)
Penal Code section 293.5 provides that the alleged victim of certain offenses may be
identified as John or Jane Doe if the court finds it is “reasonably necessary to
protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or
the defense.” (Id., § 293.5(a).) This applies only to alleged victims of offenses under
the following Penal Code sections: 261 (rape), 261.5 (unlawful sexual intercourse),
262 (rape of spouse), 264.1 (aiding and abetting rape), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd or
lascivious act), 287 (oral copulation), and 289 (penetration by force). Note that the
full name must still be provided in discovery. (Id., § 293.5(a); Reid v. Superior
Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].)
Give the last two bracketed sentences on request. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 55
Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)
AUTHORITY
• Identification as John or Jane Doe. Pen. Code, § 293.5(a).
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 293.5(b); People v. Ramirez (1997) 55
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 54–59 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 9].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Discovery and Investigation, § 70.05 (Matthew Bender).
39
The fact that a petition to (declare respondent a sexually violent

predator/declare respondent a mentally disordered offender/extend
respondent’s commitment) has been filed is not evidence that the petition
is true. You must not be biased against the respondent just because the
petition has been filed and this matter has been brought to trial. The
Petitioner is required to prove the allegations of the petition are true
beyond a reasonable doubt.
abiding conviction that the allegations of the petition are true. The
evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
In deciding whether the Petitioner has proved the allegations of the
petition are true beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially
compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the
entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the Respondent
<insert what must be proved in this proceeding, e.g., “is a sexually violent
predator”> beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the petition is not
true.
New August 2009; Revised August 2015

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct jurors on the reasonable doubt standard
in civil commitment proceedings relating to sexually violent predators (Welf. & Inst.
Code, §§ 6604, 6605) and mentally disordered offenders (Pen. Code, §§ 2966, 2972)
as well as extended commitment proceedings for persons found not guilty by reason
of insanity (Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)) and juveniles committed to the Division of
Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1800 et seq.).
In People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1411 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384], the
Court concluded that neither the federal nor the state Constitution compelled an
instruction on a presumption that the allegations of a mentally disordered offender
(MDO) extension petition are not true. However, no court has addressed whether the
respondents in extended insanity commitment and extended juvenile commitment
proceedings are entitled to an instruction on the presumption. (Pen. Code,
§ 1026.5(b)(7); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5; see also Hudec v. Superior Court
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 826 [339 P.3d 998, 1004] [“section 1026.5(b)(7) provides
41
respondents in commitment extension hearings the rights constitutionally enjoyed by

criminal defendants”] and In re Luis C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402–1403
[11 Cal.Rptr.3d 429] [same for Welfare and Institutions Code section 1801.5
juvenile proceedings].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384]; Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(7); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5.
Related Instructions
CALCRIM No. 220, Reasonable Doubt.
CALCRIM No. 3453, Extension of Commitment.
CALCRIM No. 3454, Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator.
CALCRIM No. 3454A, Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually
Violent Predator Act.
CALCRIM No. 3456, Initial Commitment of Mentally Disordered Offender As
Condition of Parole.
CALCRIM No. 3457, Extension of Commitment as Mentally Disordered Offender.
CALCRIM No. 3458, Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities.
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 774.
5 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 104, Parole,
§ 104.06 (Matthew Bender).
42
The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant[s] is
not evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the
defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have) been arrested, charged
with a crime, or brought to trial.
A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something,
I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I
specifically tell you otherwise].
abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not
eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some
In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a
evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the
evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (he/
she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/
them) not guilty.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2013

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the presumption of innocence and
the state’s burden of proof. (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225–227 [115
Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824]; People v. Soldavini (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 460, 463
[114 P.2d 415]; People v. Phillips (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 952, 956–958 [69
Cal.Rptr.2d 532].)
If the court will be instructing that the prosecution has a different burden of proof,
give the bracketed phrase “unless I specifically tell you otherwise.”
AUTHORITY
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; Victor v.
Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583]; Lisenbee
v. Henry (9th Cir. 1999) 166 F.3d 997, 999.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082,
1088–1089 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186].
43
• This Instruction Does Not Suggest That Bias Against Defendant Is Permissible.
People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185–1186 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• Cited With Approval. People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 353 [145
Cal.Rptr.3d 855].
COMMENTARY
This instruction is based directly on Penal Code section 1096. The primary changes
are a reordering of concepts and a definition of reasonable doubt stated in the
affirmative rather than in the negative. The instruction also refers to the jury’s duty
to impartially compare and consider all the evidence. (See Victor v. Nebraska (1994)
511 U.S. 1, 16–17 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) The appellate courts have
urged the trial courts to exercise caution in modifying the language of section 1096
to avoid error in defining reasonable doubt. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8
Cal.4th 450, 503–504 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; People v. Garcia (1975)
54 Cal.App.3d 61, 63 [126 Cal.Rptr. 275].) The instruction includes all the concepts
contained in section 1096 and substantially tracks the statutory language. For an
alternate view of instructing on reasonable doubt, see Committee on Standard Jury
Instructions—Criminal, Minority Report to CALJIC “Reasonable Doubt” Report, in
Alternative Definitions of Reasonable Doubt: A Report to the California Legislature
(May 22, 1987; repr., San Francisco: Daily Journal, 1987) pp. 51–53.
RELATED ISSUES
Pinpoint Instruction on Reasonable Doubt
A defendant is entitled, on request, to a nonargumentative instruction that directs
attention to the defense’s theory of the case and relates it to the state’s burden of
proof. (People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]
[error to deny requested instruction relating defense evidence to the element of
premeditation and deliberation].) Such an instruction is sometimes called a pinpoint
instruction. “What is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but the theory of
the defendant’s case. It is the specific evidence on which the theory of the defense
‘focuses’ which is related to reasonable doubt.” (People v. Adrian (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 335, 338 [185 Cal.Rptr. 506] [court erred in refusing to give requested
instruction relating self-defense to burden of proof]; see also People v. Granados
(1957) 49 Cal.2d 490, 496 [319 P.2d 346] [error to refuse instruction relating
reasonable doubt to commission of felony in felony-murder case]; People v. Brown
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 674, 677–678 [199 Cal.Rptr. 680] [error to refuse instruction
relating reasonable doubt to identification].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
716–717, 720–722.
Evidence, § 83.03[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[1A][a],
[2][a][i], 85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
44
The People are required to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable

doubt.
abiding conviction that the allegation is true. The evidence does not need
to eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some
In deciding whether the People have proved (an/the) allegation beyond a
evidence that was received during this [phase of the] trial. Unless the
evidence proves (an/the) allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find that the allegation has not been proved [and disregard it
completely].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on reasonable doubt in any proceeding
in which that standard of proof applies.
This instruction is provided for the court to use only in bifurcated trials or special
proceedings where the court is required to instruct on reasonable doubt but neither
CALCRIM No. 219, Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings, nor
CALCRIM No. 220, Reasonable Doubt, would apply. Do not use this instruction in
place of CALCRIM No. 220 in a trial on the substantive crimes charged.
Use this instruction only if: (1) the court has granted a bifurcated trial on a prior
conviction or a sentencing factor (see CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction:
Bifurcated Trial and CALCRIM No. 3251, Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or
Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated Trial); or (2) in the penalty phase of a
capital trial when the court is instructing on other violent criminal activity or prior
felony convictions offered as aggravation (see CALCRIM No. 764, Death Penalty:
Evidence of Other Violent Crimes and CALCRIM No. 765, Death Penalty:
Conviction for Other Felony Crimes).
In the first sentence, the court, at its discretion, may wish to insert a description of
the specific allegations that the People must prove.
In the final paragraph, give the bracketed phrase “and disregard it completely” when
using this instruction in the penalty phase of a capital trial.
AUTHORITY
45
222. Evidence
“Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted

into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence.
Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements
and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks
are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’
answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant only if they
helped you to understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume that
something is true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that
suggested it was true.
During the trial, the attorneys may have objected to questions or moved
to strike answers given by the witnesses. I ruled on the objections
according to the law. If I sustained an objection, you must ignore the
question. If the witness was not permitted to answer, do not guess what
the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I ordered
testimony stricken from the record you must disregard it and must not
consider that testimony for any purpose.
You must disregard anything you saw or heard when the court was not
in session, even if it was done or said by one of the parties or witnesses.
[During the trial, you were told that the People and the defense agreed,
or stipulated, to certain facts. This means that they both accept those
facts as true. Because there is no dispute about those facts you must also
accept them as true.]
The court (reporter has made a record of/has recorded) everything that
was said during the trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may ask
that the (court reporter’s record be read to/court’s recording be played
for) you. You must accept the (court reporter’s record/court’s recording)
as accurate.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, February 2012, March 2019,
March 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on these evidentiary topics; however,
instruction on these topics has been approved. (People v. Barajas (1983) 145
Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [193 Cal.Rptr. 750]; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795,
843–844 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068,
1121 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].)
If the parties stipulated to one or more facts, give the bracketed paragraph that
47
begins with “During the trial, you were told.”

If the jury requests transcripts, the court should remind the jury of the right to
request readback and to advise the court whether there is any testimony they want
read. (See People v. Triplett (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 655, 662 [267 Cal.Rptr.3d 675].)
AUTHORITY
• Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 140.
• Arguments Not Evidence. People v. Barajas (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809
[193 Cal.Rptr. 750].
• Questions Not Evidence. People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 843–844 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 400].
• Stipulations. Palmer v. City of Long Beach (1948) 33 Cal.2d 134, 141–142 [199
P.2d 952].
• Striking Testimony. People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478].
RELATED ISSUES
Non-Testifying Courtroom Conduct
There is authority for an instruction informing the jury to disregard defendant’s in-
court, but non-testifying behavior. (People v. Garcia (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 82, 90
[206 Cal.Rptr. 468] [defendant was disruptive in court; court instructed jurors they
should not consider this behavior in deciding guilt or innocence].) However, if the
defendant has put his or her character in issue or another basis for relevance exists,
such an instruction should not be given. (People v. Garcia, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at
p. 91, fn. 7; People v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 25 [246 Cal.Rptr. 855].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Criminal Trial, §§ 715,
726.
Evidence, §§ 83.01[1], 83.02[2] (Matthew Bender).
48
Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence or by a

combination of both. Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. For
example, if a witness testifies he saw it raining outside before he came
into the courthouse, that testimony is direct evidence that it was raining.
Circumstantial evidence also may be called indirect evidence.
Circumstantial evidence does not directly prove the fact to be decided,
but is evidence of another fact or group of facts from which you may
logically and reasonably conclude the truth of the fact in question. For
example, if a witness testifies that he saw someone come inside wearing a
raincoat covered with drops of water, that testimony is circumstantial
evidence because it may support a conclusion that it was raining outside.
Both direct and circumstantial evidence are acceptable types of evidence
to prove or disprove the elements of a charge, including intent and
mental state and acts necessary to a conviction, and neither is necessarily
more reliable than the other. Neither is entitled to any greater weight
than the other. You must decide whether a fact in issue has been proved
based on all the evidence.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction explaining direct and
circumstantial evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial
evidence to establish any element of the case. (People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d
46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove
any element, including intent]; see People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352
[233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167
[246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629].) The court must give this instruction if the court
will be giving either CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence: Suffıciency of
Evidence or CALCRIM No. 225, Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State.
The court, at its discretion, may give this instruction in any case in which
circumstantial evidence has been presented.
AUTHORITY
• Direct Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 410.
• Logical and Reasonable Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600(b).
• Difference Between Direct and Circumstantial Evidence. People v. Lim Foon
(1915) 29 Cal.App. 270, 274 [155 P. 477] [no sua sponte duty to instruct, but
court approves definition]; People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146,
49
152–153 [293 P.2d 495] [sua sponte duty to instruct].

[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• This Instruction Cited With Approval. People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1145, 1166 [140 Cal.Rptr.3d 139, 274 P.3d 1132].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, § 3.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, § 121.
Evidence, § 83.01[2], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][a]
(Matthew Bender).
50
Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact

necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be
convinced that the People have proved each fact essential to that
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the
defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable
conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the
defendant is guilty. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions
from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable
conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you must accept the
one that points to innocence. However, when considering circumstantial
evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any
that are unreasonable.
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on how to evaluate circumstantial
evidence if the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to
establish any element of the case. (People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286
P.2d 1] [duty exists where circumstantial evidence relied on to prove any element,
including intent]; see People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr.
368, 729 P.2d 802]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [246 Cal.Rptr.
673, 753 P.2d 629].)
There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the circumstantial evidence
is incidental to and corroborative of direct evidence. (People v. Malbrough (1961)
55 Cal.2d 249, 250–251 [10 Cal.Rptr. 632, 359 P.2d 30]; People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 831 [299 P.2d 243]; People v. Shea (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257,
1270–1271 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 388].) This is so even when the corroborative
circumstantial evidence is essential to the prosecution’s case, e.g., when
corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony is required under Penal Code section
1111. (People v. Williams (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 869, 874 [208 Cal.Rptr. 790].)
If intent is the only element proved by circumstantial evidence, do not give this
instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 225, Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental
State. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d
1280].)
AUTHORITY
• Direct Evidence Defined. Evid. Code, § 410.
51
• Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600(b).

• Between Two Reasonable Interpretations of Circumstantial Evidence, Accept the
One That Points to Innocence. People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540,
560–562 [297 P.2d 999] [error to refuse requested instruction on this point];
People v. Johnson (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 58, 62 [328 P.2d 809] [sua sponte
duty to instruct].
• “Innocence” Means Not Guilty of the Charged Crime. People v. Doane (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 965, 976–977 [281 Cal.Rptr.3d 594]; People v. Wade (1995) 39
• Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Entirely Consistent With a Theory of Guilt
and Inconsistent With Any Other Rational Conclusion. People v. Bender (1945)
27 Cal.2d 164, 175 [163 P.2d 8] [sua sponte duty to instruct]; People v. Yrigoyen
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1] [same].
• Difference Between Direct and Circumstantial Evidence. People v. Lim Foon
(1915) 29 Cal.App. 270, 274 [155 P. 477] [no sua sponte duty to instruct, but
court approves definition]; People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 146,
152–153 [293 P.2d 495] [sua sponte duty to instruct].
• Each Fact in Chain of Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Proved. People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 831 [299 P.2d 243] [error to refuse requested
instruction on this point].
• Sua Sponte Duty When Prosecutor’s Case Rests Substantially on Circumstantial
Evidence. People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368,
729 P.2d 802].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174,
1186–1187 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• This Instruction Cited With Approval. People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1145, 1166 [140 Cal.Rptr.3d 139, 274 P.3d 1132].
RELATED ISSUES
Extrajudicial Admissions
Extrajudicial admissions are not the type of indirect evidence requiring instruction
on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174–175 [133
Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, § 83.01[2], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][a]
(Matthew Bender).
52
The People must prove not only that the defendant did the act[s]
charged, but also that (he/she) acted with a particular (intent/ [and/or]
mental state). The instruction for (the/each) crime [and allegation]
explains the (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required.
A[n] (intent/ [and/or] mental state) may be proved by circumstantial
evidence.
Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a fact
necessary to find the defendant guilty has been proved, you must be
Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that
the defendant had the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state), you must
be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the
circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required (intent/
[and/or] mental state). If you can draw two or more reasonable
conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of those
reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the defendant did have
the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) and another reasonable
conclusion supports a finding that the defendant did not, you must
conclude that the required (intent/ [and/or] mental state) was not proved
by the circumstantial evidence. However, when considering
circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions
and reject any that are unreasonable.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2011
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
establish the element of a specific intent or a mental state. (People v. Yrigoyen
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1].)
Give this instruction when the defendant’s intent or mental state is the only element
of the offense that rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence. If other
elements of the offense also rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence,
do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence:
Suffıciency of Evidence. (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55
Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 347 [116
Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].)
53
If the court is also instructing on a strict-liability offense, the court may wish to
modify this instruction to clarify the charges to which it applies.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Lizarraga (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 476,
481–482 [268 Cal.Rptr. 262] [when both specific intent and mental state are
elements].
• Intent Manifested by Circumstances. Pen. Code, § 29.2(a).
• Accept Reasonable Interpretation of Circumstantial Evidence That Points Against
Specific Intent. People v. Yokum (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 253–254 [302 P.2d
406], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413
[189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
• Circumstantial Evidence Must Be Entirely Consistent With Existence of Specific
Intent. People v. Yokum (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 253–254 [302 P.2d 406],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413 [189
Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
• Reject Unreasonable Interpretations. People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997,
1049–1050 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 118 [77
Cal.Rptr.3d 120].
RELATED ISSUES
General or Specific Intent Explained
A crime is a general-intent offense when the statutory definition of the crime
consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do
a further act or achieve a future consequence. A crime is a specific-intent offense
when the statutory definition refers to the defendant’s intent to do some further act
or achieve some additional consequence. (People v. McDaniel (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661,
669 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124]; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444,
456–457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]; People v. Swanson (1983) 142
Cal.App.3d 104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768]; see, e.g., People v. Whitfield (1994) 7
Cal.4th 437, 449–450 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [second degree murder
based on implied malice is a specific-intent crime].)
Only One Possible Inference
The fact that elements of a charged offense include mental elements that must
necessarily be proved by inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence does not
alone require an instruction on the effect to be given to such evidence. (People v.
Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 167 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v.
Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174–176 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].) When the
only inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence points to the existence of a
required specific intent or mental state, a circumstantial evidence instruction need
not be given sua sponte, but should be given on request. (People v. Gordon (1982)
54
136 Cal.App.3d 519, 531 [186 Cal.Rptr. 373]; People v. Morrisson (1979) 92
Cal.App.3d 787, 793–794 [155 Cal.Rptr. 152].)
Direct Evidence, Extrajudicial Admission, or No Substantial Reliance
This instruction should not be given if direct evidence of the mental elements exists
(People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 175 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]), if
the only circumstantial evidence is an extrajudicial admission (People v. Gould
(1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 [7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865], overruled on other
grounds in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 271–272 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135,
906 P.2d 1290]), or if the prosecution does not substantially rely on circumstantial
evidence (People v. DeLeon (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 602, 607–608 [188 Cal.Rptr.
63]).
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence:
Suffıciency of Evidence.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 3, 6.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
55
226. Witnesses
You alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In

deciding whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common sense
and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the
same standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have.
You may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Consider
the testimony of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.
In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that
reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that
testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are:
• How well could the witness see, hear, or otherwise perceive the
things about which the witness testified?
• How well was the witness able to remember and describe what
happened?
• What was the witness’s behavior while testifying?
• Did the witness understand the questions and answer them
directly?
• Was the witness’s testimony influenced by a factor such as bias or
prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the
case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided?
• What was the witness’s attitude about the case or about
testifying?
• Did the witness make a statement in the past that is consistent or
inconsistent with his or her testimony?
• How reasonable is the testimony when you consider all the other
evidence in the case?
• [Did other evidence prove or disprove any fact about which the
witness testified?]
• [Did the witness admit to being untruthful?]
• [What is the witness’s character for truthfulness?]
• [Has the witness been convicted of a felony?]
• [Has the witness engaged in [other] conduct that reflects on his or
her believability?]
• [Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for
his or her testimony?]
Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or
56
conflicts. Consider whether the differences are important or not. People

sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they
remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear
it differently.
[If the evidence establishes that a witness’s character for truthfulness has
not been discussed among the people who know him or her, you may
conclude from the lack of discussion that the witness’s character for
truthfulness is good.]
[If you do not believe a witness’s testimony that he or she no longer
remembers something, that testimony is inconsistent with the witness’s
earlier statement on that subject.]
[If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something significant
in this case, you should consider not believing anything that witness says.
Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but told the truth
about others, you may simply accept the part that you think is true and
ignore the rest.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on factors relevant to a witness’s
credibility. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr.
119, 538 P.2d 247].) Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on
inconsistencies in testimony or a witness who lies, there is authority approving
instruction on both topics. (Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175
P.2d 607]; People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].)
The court may strike any of the enumerated impermissible bases for bias that are
clearly inapplicable in a given case.
Give all of the bracketed factors that are relevant based on the evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 780(e), (i), and (k).)
Give any of the final three bracketed paragraphs if relevant based on the evidence.
If the court instructs on a prior felony conviction or prior misconduct admitted
pursuant to People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d
938], the court should consider whether to give CALCRIM No. 316, Additional
Instructions on Witness Credibility—Other Conduct. (See Bench Notes to that
instruction.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Evid. Code, § 780; People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864,
883–884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
• Inconsistencies. Dodds v. Stellar (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 426 [175 P.2d 607].
57
• Witness Who Lies. People v. Murillo (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1107 [55
Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
• Proof of Character For Truthfulness From Evidence of Lack of Discussion.
People v. Jimenez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 732 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 76]; People
v. Adams (1902) 137 Cal. 580, 582 [70 P. 662].
1187–1188 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[1A][b], [2][b], [c], 85.03[2][b] (Matthew
Bender).
58
C. CAUSATION
240. Causation
An act [or omission] causes (injury/ <insert other

description>) if the (injury/ <insert other description>) is the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act [or omission] and
the (injury/ <insert other description>) would not have
happened without the act [or omission]. A natural and probable
consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to
happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence
is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the
evidence.
<Give if multiple potential causes.>
[There may be more than one cause of (injury/ <insert
other description>). An act [or omission] causes (injury/
<insert other description>), only if it is a substantial factor in causing the
(injury/ <insert other description>). A substantial factor is
more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not have to be the
only factor that causes the (injury/ <insert other
description>).]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If causation is at issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proximate
cause. (People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr.
401]; People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29
P.3d 225].) The committee has addressed causation in those instructions where the
issue is most likely to arise. If the particular facts of the case raise a causation issue
and other instructions do not adequately cover the point, give this instruction.
If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court should also give the
bracketed paragraph. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)
AUTHORITY
• Proximate Cause. People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225]; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–322
[6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274].
59
• Substantial Factor. People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111

Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363
[43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].
• Independent Intervening Cause. People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860,
866–874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].
• Causation Instructions. People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 311–322
[6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351,
363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].
• Instructional Duty. People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35
Cal.Rptr. 401].
• Natural and Probable Consequences Defined. See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14
Cal.4th 248, 291 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] (conc. & dis. opn. of
Brown, J.).
• Act or Omission. People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 37–46.
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against the
Person, § 99.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[1A][a] (Matthew Bender).
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.04 (Matthew Bender).
60
The crime[s] [or other allegation[s]] charged in this case require[s] proof
of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.
For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] (in this case/ of
<insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g.,
battery, as charged in Count 1> [or to find the allegation[s] of
<insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true]), that person must
not only commit the prohibited act [or fail to do the required act], but
must do so with wrongful intent. A person acts with wrongful intent
when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act [or fails to do a
required act]; however, it is not required that he or she intend to break
the law. The act required is explained in the instruction for that crime
[or allegation].
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, April 2011, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the union of act and general criminal
intent. (People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].)
However, this instruction must not be used if the crime requires a specific mental
state, such as knowledge or malice, even if the crime is classified as a general intent
offense. In such cases, the court must give CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act and
Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State. (See People v. Southard (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 424, 437 [276 Cal.Rptr.3d 656] [discussing Pen. Code, § 148, Pen.
Code, § 69, and Health & Saf. Code, § 11377]; People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th
345, 360 [18 Cal.Rtpr.3d 260] [discussing Pen. Code, § 290].)
If the case involves both offenses requiring a specific intent or mental state and
offenses that do not, the court may give CALCRIM No. 252, Union of Act and
Intent: General and Specific Intent Together, in place of this instruction.
The court should specify for the jury which offenses require only a general criminal
intent by inserting the names of the offenses and count numbers where indicated in
the second paragraph of the instruction. (People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118
[60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) If all the charged crimes and allegations involve
general intent, the court need not provide a list in the blank provided in this
instruction.
If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit a
general-intent offense, the court must instruct on the specific intent required for
61
aiding and abetting or conspiracy. (See People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; People v. Bernhardt, supra, 222
Cal.App.2d at pp. 586–587.)
If the defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict liability offense,
insert the name of the offense where indicated in the first sentence. The court may
also give CALCRIM No. 253, Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence, or
CALCRIM No. 254, Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime.
Defenses—Instructional Duty
“A person who commits a prohibited act ‘through misfortune or by accident, when it
appears that there was no evil design, intention or culpable negligence’ has not
committed a crime.” (People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 86] [quoting Pen. Code, § 26].) Similarly, an honest and reasonable
mistake of fact may negate general criminal intent. (People v. Hernandez (1964) 61
Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673].) If there is sufficient
evidence of these or other defenses, such as unconsciousness, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give the appropriate defense instructions. (See Defenses and Insanity,
CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.)
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 20; see also Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668.
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60
Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586]; People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567,
586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401]; People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917,
920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
• History of General-Intent Requirement. Morissette v. United States (1952) 342
U.S. 246 [72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed.2d 288]; see also People v. Garcia (2001) 25
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).
62
The crime[s] [(and/or) other allegation[s]] charged in this case require[s]

proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful intent.
For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] (in this case/ of
<insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and count[s], e.g.,
burglary, as charged in Count 1> [or to find the allegation[s] of
<insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true]), that person must
not only intentionally commit the prohibited act [or intentionally fail to
do the required act], but must do so with a specific (intent/ [and/or]
mental state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state)
required are explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].
<Repeat next paragraph as needed>
[The specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for the crime of
<insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] e.g., burglary> is
<insert specific intent>.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the union of act and specific intent
or mental state. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385,
926 P.2d 365].) This instruction must be given if the crime requires a specific
mental state, such as knowledge or malice, even if the crime is classified as a
general intent offense.
Do not give this instruction if the case involves only general-intent offenses that do
not require any specific mental state. (See CALCRIM No. 250, Union of Act and
Intent: General Intent.) If the case involves both offenses requiring a specific intent
or mental state and offenses that do not, the court may give CALCRIM No. 252,
Union of Act and Intent: General and Specific Intent Together, in place of this
instruction.
The court should specify for the jury which offenses are specific-intent offenses by
inserting the names of the offenses and count numbers where indicated in the
second paragraph of the instruction. (See People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118
[60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) The court may use the final optional paragraph if
it deems it helpful, particularly in cases with multiple counts.
1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222
63
Cal.App.2d 567, 586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)

This instruction does not apply to criminal negligence or strict liability. If the
defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict liability offense, the
court should give the appropriate Union of Act and Intent instruction: CALCRIM
No. 253, Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence, or CALCRIM No. 254,
Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime.
Evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental impairment may be admitted to show
that the defendant did not form the required mental state. (See People v. Ricardi
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364].) The court has no sua sponte
duty to instruct on these defenses; however, the trial court must give these
instructions on request if supported by the evidence. (People v. Saille (1991) 54
Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]; see Defenses and Insanity,
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58
Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793
[36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; People v. Turner (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 174,
184 [99 Cal.Rptr. 186]; People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60 Cal.Rptr.
234, 429 P.2d 586].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.03 (Matthew Bender).
64
The crime[s] [(and/or) other allegation[s]] charged in Count[s]

require[s] proof of the union, or joint operation, of act and wrongful
intent.
The following crime[s] [and allegation[s]] require[s] general criminal
intent: <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and
enhancement[s] and count[s], e.g., battery, as charged in Count 1>. For you
to find a person guilty of (this/these) crime[s] [or to find the allegation[s]
true], that person must not only commit the prohibited act [or fail to do
the required act], but must do so with wrongful intent. A person acts
with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally does a prohibited act
[or fails to do a required act]; however, it is not required that he or she
intend to break the law. The act required is explained in the instruction
for that crime [or allegation].
The following crime[s] [and allegation[s]] require[s] a specific intent or
mental state: <insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] and
count[s], e.g., burglary, as charged in Count 1> <insert
name[s] of enhancement[s]>. For you to find a person guilty of (this/
these) crimes [or to find the allegation[s] true], that person must not only
intentionally commit the prohibited act [or intentionally fail to do the
required act], but must do so with a specific (intent/ [and/or] mental
state). The act and the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required
are explained in the instruction for that crime [or allegation].
<Repeat next paragraph as needed>
[The specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for the crime of
<insert name[s] of alleged offense[s] e.g., burglary> is
<insert specific intent>.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, April 2011, March 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the joint union of act and intent.
(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 220 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365];
People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892];
People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) The
court may give this instruction in cases involving both offenses requiring a specific
intent or mental state and offenses that do not, rather than giving both CALCRIM
No. 250 and CALCRIM No. 251.
Do not give this instruction if the case involves only offenses requiring a specific
65
intent or mental state or involves only offenses that do not. (See CALCRIM No.
250, Union of Act and Intent: General Intent, and CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act
and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State.)
The court should specify for the jury which offenses require general criminal intent
and which require a specific intent or mental state by inserting the names of the
offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d
105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) If the crime requires a specific mental
state, such as knowledge or malice, the court must insert the name of the offense in
the third paragraph, explaining the mental state requirement, even if the crime is
classified as a general intent offense.
1117–1118 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]; People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222
Cal.App.2d 567, 586–587 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].)
If the defendant is also charged with a criminal negligence or strict-liability offense,
insert the name of the offense where indicated in the first sentence. The court may
also give CALCRIM No. 253, Union of Act and Intent: Criminal Negligence, or
CALCRIM No. 254, Union of Act and Intent: Strict-Liability Crime.
Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]; see Defenses and Insanity,
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 117 [60
Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792–793 [36
Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917,
920–923 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
• History of General-Intent Requirement. Morissette v. United States (1952) 342
U.S. 246 [72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288]; see also People v. Garcia (2001) 25
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• Instruction on Both General and Specific Intent May Be Necessary for Voluntary
Manslaughter. People v. Martinez (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334–336 [64
Cal.Rptr.3d 580].
66
RELATED ISSUES
See the Bench Notes and Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 250, Union of
Act and Intent: General Intent, and CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act and Intent:
Specific Intent or Mental State.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[1]–[3] (Matthew Bender).
67
For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] of <insert

name[s] of alleged offense[s]> [or to find the allegation[s] of
<insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true], a person must do an act [or
fail to do an act] with (criminal/gross/ordinary) negligence.
[(Criminal/Gross/Ordinary) negligence is defined in the instructions on
that crime.]
[(Criminal/Gross) negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness,
inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with (criminal/gross)
negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death
or great bodily injury;
1. AND
2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way
would create such a risk.
In other words, a person acts with (criminal/gross) negligence when the
way he or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful
person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to
disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.]
[Ordinary negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent
reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else. A person is
negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person
would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction is provided for the court to use when instructing on an offense for
which criminal, gross, or ordinary negligence is an element. Do not give this
instruction if only general or specific-intent offenses are presented to the jury.
(People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 110 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].) Although no
case has held that the court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction, the
committee recommends that the instruction be given, if applicable, as a matter of
caution.
The court must specify for the jury which offenses require criminal negligence by
inserting the names of the offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See People v.
Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)
68
The court should select “criminal,” “gross” or “ordinary” based on the words used
in the instruction on the elements of the underlying offense. (See People v. Nicolas
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1175–1176 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].)
Give the bracketed definition of criminal, gross, or ordinary negligence unless the
court has already given the definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court
may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.
AUTHORITY
• Criminal or Gross Negligence Defined. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861,
879 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8
Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Ordinary Negligence Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; People v. Nicolas (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1174–1175 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].
SECONDARY SOURCES
69
For you to find a person guilty of the crime[s] of <insert

name[s] of alleged offense[s]> [or to find the allegation[s] of
<insert name[s] of enhancement[s]> true], a person only needs to do the
prohibited act [or to fail to do the required act]. The People do not need
to prove any intent or other mental state.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction is provided for the court to use when instructing on a strict-liability
offense. The committee does not believe that the instruction is required. However,
the instruction may be useful when the case also involves general-intent, specific-
intent, or criminal negligence offenses. Do not give this instruction unless the court
is completely certain that the offense is a strict-liability offense. For a discussion of
the rarity of strict-liability offenses in modern criminal law, see People v. Garcia
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590], and People v. Simon
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519–522 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].
The court must specify for the jury which offenses are strict-liability offenses by
inserting the names of the offenses where indicated in the instruction. (See People v.
Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)
AUTHORITY
• Strict-Liability Offenses Discussed. People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754
[107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590]; People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493,
519–522 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[5] (Matthew Bender).
70
EVIDENCE
B. WITNESSES
334. Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice
71
EVIDENCE

370. Motive
72
Neither side is required to call all witnesses who may have information
about the case or to produce all physical evidence that might be relevant.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court is not required to give this instruction sua sponte; however, it should be
given on request. (See generally Pen. Code, §§ 1093(f), 1127; People v. Pitts (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 606, 880, 881 [273 Cal.Rptr. 757].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Simms (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 313 [89
Cal.Rptr. 1].
1189–1190 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
RELATED ISSUES
Willful Suppression of or Failure to Obtain Evidence
Willful suppression of evidence by the government constitutes a denial of a fair trial
and of due process. (People v. Noisey (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 543, 549–550 [71
Cal.Rptr. 339].) Likewise, willful failure by investigating officers to obtain evidence
that would clear a defendant would amount to a denial of due process of law. (Ibid.)
However, failure to look for evidence is different from suppressing known evidence
and “the mere fact that investigating officers did not pursue every possible means of
investigation of crime does not, standing alone, constitute denial of due process or
suppression of evidence.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92,
97–98 [187 P.2d 16], overruled on other grounds as noted by People v. Balderas
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 182 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [“[t]here is no
compulsion on the prosecution to call any particular witness or to make any
particular tests so long as there is fairly presented to the court the material evidence
bearing upon the charge for which the defendant is on trial.”].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, Ch. 83, Evidence (Matthew Bender).
73
[Unless I instruct you otherwise,] (The/the) testimony of only one witness

can prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one
witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the evidence.
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2012, February 2014, September
2017, March 2019, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction on this issue in every case.
(People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884–885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538
P.2d 247].)
Give the bracketed phrase if any testimony requires corroboration. See Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 18 [treason]; Pen. Code, §§ 1111 [accomplice testimony]; 1111.5 [in-custody
informant]; 653f [solicitation of felony]; 118 [perjury]; 1108 [abortion and seduction
of minor]; 532 [obtaining property by false pretenses].
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 411; People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra,
14 Cal.3d at p. 885.
• Corroboration Required. People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 831–832 [218
Cal.Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372].
• No Corroboration Requirement for Exculpatory Accomplice Testimony. People v.
Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1198–1201 [298
Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210].
RELATED ISSUES
Uncorroborated Testimony of Defendant
The cautionary admonition regarding a single witness’s testimony applies with equal
force to uncorroborated testimony by a defendant. (People v. Turner (1990) 50
Cal.3d 668, 696, fn. 14 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].)
Uncorroborated Testimony in Sex Offense Cases
In a prosecution for forcible rape, an instruction that the testimony of a single
witness is sufficient may be given in conjunction with an instruction that there is no
legal corroboration requirement in a sex offense case. Both instructions correctly
state the law and because each focuses on a different legal point, there is no
implication that the victim’s testimony is more credible than the defendant’s
testimony. (People v. Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 700–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541,
74
If you determine there is a conflict in the evidence, you must decide what
evidence, if any, to believe. Do not simply count the number of witnesses
who agree or disagree on a point and accept the testimony of the greater
number of witnesses. On the other hand, do not disregard the testimony
of any witness without a reason or because of prejudice or a desire to
favor one side or the other. What is important is whether the testimony
or any other evidence convinces you, not just the number of witnesses
who testify about a certain point.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on weighing contradictory evidence
unless corroborating evidence is required. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14
Cal.3d 864, 884 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884
[123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Reyes (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1497 [60
Cal.Rptr.3d 777]; People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1190 [67
Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 100.
734.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
76
During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
You may consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an admonition limiting consideration of
evidence; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v.
Simms (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Simms (1970) 10
Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].
RELATED ISSUES
Timing of Instruction
The court has discretion to give limiting instructions at the time the evidence is
admitted or at the close of evidence. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468,
533–534 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035] [giving limiting instruction regarding
use of defendant’s statements to psychiatrist at close of all evidence did not result in
error].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 32, 33, 35.
Evidence, § 83.04[3], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][b]
(Matthew Bender).
77
I instructed you during the trial that certain evidence was admitted only
against [a] certain defendant[s]. You must not consider that evidence
against any other defendant.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction limiting evidence to one
defendant; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v.
Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 83 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127], disapproved
of on other grounds in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269,
790 P.2d 676].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 303, Limited Purpose Evidence in
General.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, § 83.04[3] (Matthew Bender).
78
305. Multiple Defendants: Limited Admissibility of Defendant’s
Statement
You have heard evidence that defendant <insert defendant’s

name> made a statement (out of court/before trial). You may consider
that evidence only against (him/her), not against any other defendant.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on defendant’s statements;
however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Simms (1970)
10 Cal.App.3d 299, 311 [89 Cal.Rptr. 1].)
If the defendant made the statement out of court, give that phrase in the
parenthetical. If the statement was made in a previous proceeding, give the phrase
“before trial.” (See People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 787–788 [103 Cal.Rptr.
161, 499 P.2d 129].)
AUTHORITY
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 303, Limited Purpose Evidence in
General.
SECONDARY SOURCES
79
Both the People and the defense must disclose their evidence to the other
side before trial, within the time limits set by law. Failure to follow this
rule may deny the other side the chance to produce all relevant evidence,
to counter opposing evidence, or to receive a fair trial.
An attorney for the (People/defense) failed to disclose:
<describe evidence that was not disclosed> [within the legal time period].
In evaluating the weight and significance of that evidence, you may
consider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.
[However, the fact that the defendant’s attorney failed to disclose
evidence [within the legal time period] is not evidence that the defendant
committed a crime.]
<Consider for multiple defendant cases>
[You must not consider the fact that an attorney for defendant
<insert defendant’s name> failed to disclose evidence when
you decide the charges against defendant[s] <insert names
of other defendant[s]>.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
While the court has discretion to give an instruction on untimely disclosure of
evidence (Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b)), the court should not give this instruction unless
there is evidence of a prejudicial violation of the discovery statute. (See People v.
Bell (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 249, 254–257 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 808]; People v. Cabral
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 748, 752–753 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 456]; People v. Saucedo
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 937, 942–943 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 692].) The court should
consider whether giving this instruction could jeopardize the defendant’s right to a
fair trial if the jury were to attribute a defense attorney’s malfeasance to the
defendant.
This instruction addresses a failure to comply with Penal Code requirements. If the
court imposes additional sanctions, it may choose to instruct the jury accordingly.
(See People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 103 [167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d
1361]; People v. Edwards (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1265 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 3].) A
court may make any order necessary to enforce the disclosure provisions, including,
but not limited to, orders for immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying
or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence,
continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. (Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b).)
80
EVIDENCE CALCRIM No. 306
If the court concludes that one defendant in a multidefendant case failed to comply
with the statute, the last bracketed paragraph should be given.
If the court determines that the defendant is personally responsible for discovery
abuse, see CALCRIM No. 371, Consciousness of Guilt: Supression and Fabrication
of Evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1054.5(b); People v. Bell (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 249, 254–257 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 808]; People v. Cabral (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 748, 752–753 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 456]; People v. Saucedo (2004) 121
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 93–95
et seq.
Discovery and Investigation, § 70.09[1] (Matthew Bender).
81
B. WITNESSES

You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with

any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful
and accurate testimony.
In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions:
• Did the witness know or have contact with the defendant before
the event?
• How well could the witness see the perpetrator?
• What were the circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to
observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, obstructions,
distance, [and] duration of observation[, and <insert
any other relevant circumstances>]?
• How closely was the witness paying attention?
• Was the witness under stress when he or she made the
observation?
• Did the witness give a description and how does that description
compare to the defendant?
• How much time passed between the event and the time when the
witness identified the defendant?
• Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a group?
• Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendant?
• Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the
identification?
• Are the witness and the defendant of different races?
• [Was the witness able to identify other participants in the crime?]
• [Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a photographic
or physical lineup?]
• [ <insert other relevant factors raised by the
evidence>.]
• Were there any other circumstances affecting the witness’s ability
to make an accurate identification?
83
CALCRIM No. 315 EVIDENCE
• [How certain was the witness when he or she made an

identification?]
[A witness’s expression of certainty about an identification, whether the
identification was made before or at the trial, may not be a reliable
indicator of accuracy. Among the factors you may consider when
evaluating the significance of the witness’s certainty in the identification
are the following:
[• How soon after the event did the witness express certainty about
the identification?]
[• If the witness made an identification before trial, did the witness
express certainty at the time of that identification?]
[• Before the identification, did the witness express confidence in
being able to make an identification?]
[• How confident was the witness in making the identification?]
[• Did the witness receive information before or after the
identification that may have increased the witness’s level of
confidence?]
[• Did the police use procedures that increased the witness’s level of
confidence about the identification?]
[• <insert other relevant factors raised by the evidence>.]]
The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was the defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on eyewitness testimony.
(People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 863 [148 Cal.Rptr. 120],
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682 [156
Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130].) An instruction relating eyewitness identification to
reasonable doubt, including any relevant “pinpoint” factors, must be given by the
trial court on request “[w]hen an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key
element of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence
giving it independent reliability.” (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126,
1143–1144 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049], quoting People v. McDonald (1984)
37 Cal.3d 351, 377 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709], overruled on other grounds in
People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265];
People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36];
84
People v. Palmer (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 79, 89 [203 Cal.Rptr. 474] [error to refuse
defendant’s requested instruction on eyewitness testimony].)
Whenever there is evidence a witness has expressed certainty about an identification,
give the bracketed language beginning with “How certain was the witness” and the
bracketed paragraph that begins with “A witness’s expression of certainty” along
with any applicable bracketed factors.
Whenever there is evidence a witness has expressed doubt about an identification,
give the bracketed language beginning with “How certain was the witness” upon
request, and do not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A witness’s
expression of certainty” nor any of the factors that follow.
AUTHORITY
• Factors. People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1139, fn. 9, 1141 [248
Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049]; People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609
[189 Cal.Rptr. 36].
• Certainty Factor. People v. Lemcke (2021) 11 Cal.5th 644 [278 Cal.Rtpr.3d 849,
486 P.3d 1077].
• Reasonable Doubt. People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 159–160 [167 Cal.Rptr.
844, 616 P.2d 826], overruled on other grounds in People v. Newman (1999) 21
Cal.4th 413, 422, fn. 6 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 981 P.2d 98].
COMMENTARY
The court should give the unbracketed factors, if requested, in every case in which
identity is disputed. A blank space has also been provided for the court to include
any factual circumstances relevant to eyewitness identification that have not been
addressed in the preceding list of factors.
In People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1139 [248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d
1049], the court suggested that the trial court select factors from an approved list of
eyewitness identification factors and then give counsel the opportunity to
supplement with any additional relevant factors. (Id. at pp. 1126, 1143.) Additional
“pinpoint” factors should be neutrally written, brief, and nonargumentative. (Ibid.;
see also People v. Gaglione (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1302–1303 [32
Cal.Rptr.2d 169], overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1995) 11
RELATED ISSUES
Police Procedures in Conducting Eyewitness Identifications
In People v. Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 664–665, the Supreme Court
recognized that the jury may require a further understanding of the type of police
procedures that may be suggestive or confirmatory of an eyewitness’s identification.
Penal Code section 859.7 sets forth standards for law enforcement when conducting
photo lineups and live lineups in order to ensure reliable and accurate eyewitness
identifications.
85
316. Additional Instructions on Witness Credibility—Other
Conduct
<Alternative A—felony conviction>

[If you find that a witness has been convicted of a felony, you may
consider that fact [only] in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s
testimony. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair
a witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact
and whether that fact makes the witness less believable.]
<Alternative B—prior criminal conduct with or without conviction>
[If you find that a witness has committed a crime or other misconduct,
you may consider that fact [only] in evaluating the credibility of the
witness’s testimony. The fact that a witness may have committed a crime
or other misconduct does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness’s
credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether
that fact makes the witness less believable.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction; however, the instruction must
be given on request. (People v. Kendrick (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1278 [260
Cal.Rptr. 27]; People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080] [overruling People v. Mayfield (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d
236 [100 Cal.Rptr. 104], which had found a sua sponte duty to give limiting
instruction on felony conviction admitted for impeachment].)
If a felony conviction or other misconduct has been admitted only on the issue of
credibility, give the bracketed word “only.”
Do not give this instruction if a conviction also has been admitted to prove an
element of a charged offense. (People v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 553–554
[334 P.2d 852].)
It is unclear whether this instruction is appropriate if the evidence also has been
admitted for a purpose other than to prove an element of the offense (as discussed
above). For example, the evidence may have been admitted under Evidence Code
section 1108. In such cases, if the court does give this instruction, the court may
omit the bracketed “only.”
AUTHORITY
• Limiting Instruction Must Be Given on Request. People v. Kendrick (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1273, 1278 [260 Cal.Rptr. 27]; People v. Hernandez (2004) 33
87
Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].

• Felony Conviction Admissible for Impeachment. Evid. Code, § 788.
• Standard for Admitting Felony Conviction. People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d
301, 306–319 [211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]; People v. Beagle (1972) 6
Cal.3d 441, 451–452 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].
• Misdemeanor Conduct Admissible for Impeachment. People v. Wheeler (1992) 4
• Record Must Demonstrate Court Conducted Evid. Code, § 352 Weighing. People
v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 950 [215 Cal.Rptr. 519].
• Modifications to this Instruction Created Error. People v. Gray (2007) 158
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 304–326.
Witnesses, § 82.22[3][e], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][b],
85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
Executive Clemency, § 105.04[3] (Matthew Bender).
88
The testimony that <insert name of witness> has given

under oath (was/will be) (read to/played for) you because (he/she) is not
available. You must evaluate this testimony by the same standards that
you apply to a witness who testified here in court.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has discretion to give an instruction on the weight a jury should give to
former testimony of an unavailable witness. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d
522, 598–599 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) No case holds that a trial court
has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of former testimony of an unavailable
witness.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 598–599
[280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].
• Admissibility of Former Testimony. Evid. Code, § 1291.
• Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence or Deposition Testimony Generally. Pen.
Code, § 686(3).
• Former Testimony Defined. Evid. Code, § 1290.
• Unavailable Witness Defined. Evid. Code, § 240.
• Admissibility of Former Testimony as Substitute for Live Testimony. People v.
Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 225–226 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 18 et seq., 265 et seq.
Evidence, § 83.13[2], [3][o] (Matthew Bender).
89
You have heard evidence of [a] statement[s] that a witness made before
the trial. If you decide that the witness made (that/those) statement[s],
you may use (that/those) statement[s] in two ways:
1. To evaluate whether the witness’s testimony in court is
believable;
AND
2. As evidence that the information in (that/those) earlier
statement[s] is true.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (People v. Griffın (1988)
46 Cal.3d 1011, 1026 [251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].) Use this instruction when
a testifying witness has been confronted with a prior inconsistent statement.
If prior testimony of an unavailable witness was impeached with a prior inconsistent
statement, use CALCRIM No. 319, Prior Statements of Unavailable Witness.
(People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668–669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d
1000].) If the prior statements were obtained by a peace officer in violation of
Miranda, give CALCRIM No. 356, Miranda-Defective Statements.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 158 [90
S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489]; People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 385–386
[105 Cal.Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585]; see Evid. Code, §§ 770, 791, 1235, 1236.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 363–367
[100 Cal.Rptr.3d 820]; People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 120 [77
Cal.Rptr.3d 120].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 158.
Witnesses, § 82.22[3][b], Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.13[3][e], [f], Ch. 85, Submission to
Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
90
<Insert name of unavailable witness> did not testify in this

trial, but (his/her) testimony, taken at another time, was (read/played)
for you. In addition to this testimony, you have heard evidence that
<insert name of unavailable witness> made (another/other)
statement[s]. [I am referring to the statement[s] about which
<insert name[s]> testified.]
If you conclude that <insert name of unavailable witness>
made (that/those) other statement[s], you may only consider (it/them) in
a limited way. You may only use (it/them) in deciding whether to believe
the testimony of <insert name of unavailable witness> that
was (read/played) here at trial. You may not use (that/those) other
statement[s] as proof that the information contained in (it/them) is true,
nor may you use (it/them) for any other reason.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (People v. Griffın (1988)
46 Cal.3d 1011, 1026 [251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].)
Give this instruction when prior inconsistent statements of an unavailable witness
were admitted for impeachment purposes. (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663,
668–669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000].) If a testifying witness was confronted
with prior inconsistent statements, give CALCRIM No. 318, Prior Statements as
Evidence. If the prior statements were obtained by a peace officer in violation of
Miranda, give CALCRIM No. 356, Miranda-Defective Statements.
Evidence Code section 1294 creates an exception to the impeachment-only rule in
Williams for the use of prior inconsistent statements given as testimony in a
preliminary hearing or prior proceeding in the same criminal matter.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668–669
[128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]; see Evid. Code, §§ 145, 240, 770, 791,
1235, 1236, 1291.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, § 83.13[3][e] (Matthew Bender).
91
<Alternative A—Valid Exercise of Privilege>

[A witness may refuse to answer questions that call for privileged
information. Under the law, <insert name of witness> was
justified in refusing to answer certain questions. Do not consider (his/
her) refusal to answer for any reason at all and do not guess what (his/
her) answer would have been.]
<Alternative B—Invalid Exercise of Privilege>
[ <Insert name of witness> did not have the right to refuse to
answer questions in this case. You may consider that refusal during your
deliberations.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on the exercise of privilege
by witnesses; however, it must be given on request. (Evid. Code, § 913(b); see also
People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440–441 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)
Give Alternative A when the court has sustained the exercise of privilege. Give
Alternative B when the witness’s exercise of privilege is invalid. If the witness was
not justified in refusing to answer a question, the jury may draw reasonable
inferences regarding why the witness refused to testify. (People.v. Morgain (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 301]; People v. Lopez (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 655].)
See CALCRIM No. 355, Defendant’s Right Not to Testify.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 913(b); People v. Mincey (1992) 2
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.06, Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.09[2], [17], Ch. 85,
92
You have heard testimony from a child who is age 10 or younger. As

with any other witness, you must decide whether the child gave truthful
and accurate testimony.
In evaluating the child’s testimony, you should consider all of the factors
surrounding that testimony, including the child’s age and level of
cognitive development.
When you evaluate the child’s cognitive development, consider the
child’s ability to perceive, understand, remember, and communicate.
While a child and an adult witness may behave differently, that
difference does not mean that one is any more or less believable than the
other. You should not discount or distrust the testimony of a witness just
because he or she is a child.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on child witnesses; however,
it must be given on request. (Pen. Code, § 1127f.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127f.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540,
558–560 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 43].
RELATED ISSUES
Due Process/Equal Protection Challenges
“The instruction provides sound and rational guidance to the jury in assessing the
credibility of a class of witnesses as to whom ‘traditional assumptions’ may
previously have biased the fact-finding process.” (People v. Gilbert (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1372, 1392–1394 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [instructing jury to make
credibility determinations based on child’s age, level of cognitive development, and
other factors surrounding child’s testimony does not inflate testimony of child
witness and thereby lessen prosecutor’s burden of proof and deny defendant due
process and equal protection].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
93
331. Testimony of Person With Developmental, Cognitive, or
Mental Disability
In evaluating the testimony of a person with a (developmental

disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication)
impairment), consider all of the factors surrounding that person’s
testimony, including his or her level of cognitive development.
Even though a person with a (developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a]
(cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication) impairment)[,] may
perform differently as a witness because of his or her level of cognitive
development, that does not mean he or she is any more or less credible
than another witness.
You should not discount or distrust the testimony of a person with a
(developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or]
communication) impairment)[,] solely because he or she has such (a/an)
(disability/ [or] impairment).
New January 2006; Revised March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction must be given on request in any case “in which a person with a
developmental disability, or cognitive, mental, or communication impairment
testifies as a witness . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1127g.)
The court should consider whether this instruction is appropriate if the witness has a
communication impairment that is not related to a deficiency in cognitive
functioning. Compare People v. Byers (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 447, 457–458 [275
Cal.Rptr.3d 661] [approving use of instruction for a nondependent witness] with
People v. Keeper (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 511, 521 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 451] [holding
that Penal Code section 1127g is limited to a dependent person].
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 1127g.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Catley (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 500, 506–508
[55 Cal.Rptr.3d 786].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, §§ 82.05[2][a], 82.07, 82.22[3][c] (Matthew Bender).
95
(A witness was/Witnesses were) allowed to testify as [an] expert[s] and to

give [an] opinion[s]. You must consider the opinion[s], but you are not
required to accept (it/them) as true or correct. The meaning and
importance of any opinion are for you to decide. In evaluating the
believability of an expert witness, follow the instructions about the
believability of witnesses generally. In addition, consider the expert’s
knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, the reasons the
expert gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the
expert relied in reaching that opinion. You must decide whether
information on which the expert relied was true and accurate.
You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable,
or unsupported by the evidence.
[An expert witness may be asked a hypothetical question. A hypothetical
question asks the witness to assume certain facts are true and to give an
opinion based on the assumed facts. It is up to you to decide whether an
assumed fact has been proved. If you conclude that an assumed fact is
not true, consider the effect of the expert’s reliance on that fact in
evaluating the expert’s opinion.]
[If the expert witnesses disagreed with one another, you should weigh
each opinion against the others. You should examine the reasons given
for each opinion and the facts or other matters on which each witness
relied. You may also compare the experts’ qualifications.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
When expert testimony is received at trial, the court must sua sponte instruct the
jury on evaluating the expert’s testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.)
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “An expert witness may be asked a
hypothetical question,” if an expert witness responded to a hypothetical question.
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “If the expert witnesses disagreed with one
another,” if there is conflicting expert testimony.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127b.
• Inadmissible Case-Specific Hearsay Not Basis for Expert Testimony. People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–686 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320];
People v. Vega-Robles (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 382, 416 [215 Cal.Rptr 3d 284].
96
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 86.
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04 (Matthew Bender).
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][a][ii], 85.03[2][b], Ch. 86, Insanity
Trial, § 86.04[3][a] (Matthew Bender).
97
(A witness/Witnesses)[, who (was/were) not testifying as [an] expert[s],]

gave (his/her/their) opinion[s] during the trial. You may but are not
required to accept (that/those) opinion[s] as true or correct. You may
give the opinion[s] whatever weight you think appropriate. Consider the
extent of the witness’s opportunity to perceive the matters on which his
or her opinion is based, the reasons the witness gave for any opinion,
and the facts or information on which the witness relied in forming that
opinion. You must decide whether information on which the witness
relied was true and accurate. You may disregard all or any part of an
opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the
evidence.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction on request when a lay witness gives opinion testimony.
Give the bracketed phrase “who was not testifying as an expert” if an expert witness
also testified in the case.
CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness Testimony.
CALCRIM No. 1860, Owner’s Opinion of Value.
AUTHORITY
• Opinion Testimony. Evid. Code, §§ 800, 802.
• Opinion Testimony to Prove Character. Evid. Code, § 1100.
• Jury Must Decide What Weight to Give Lay Opinion. See People v. Pena (1977)
68 Cal.App.3d 100, 102–103 [135 Cal.Rptr. 602].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 120 [77
Cal.Rptr.3d 120].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 3–25.
Witnesses, § 82.22[3][d], Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.11 (Matthew Bender).
98
334. Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute
Whether Witness Is Accomplice
Before you may consider the (statement/ [or] testimony) of

<insert name[s] of witness[es]> as evidence against (the defendant/
<insert names of defendants>) [regarding the crime[s] of
<insert name[s] of crime[s] if corroboration only required for
some crime[s]>], you must decide whether <insert name[s]
of witness[es]>) (was/were) [an] accomplice[s] [to (that/those) crime[s]]. A
person is an accomplice if he or she is subject to prosecution for the
identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to
prosecution if:
1. He or she personally committed the crime;
OR
2. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who
committed the crime;
AND
3. He or she intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime[;]/ [or]
participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).
[The burden is on the defendant to prove that it is more likely than not
that <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an]
accomplice[s].]
[An accomplice does not need to be present when the crime is
committed. On the other hand, a person is not an accomplice just
because he or she is present at the scene of a crime, even if he or she
knows that a crime will be committed or is being committed and does
nothing to stop it.]
[A person who lacks criminal intent but who pretends to join in a crime
only to detect or prosecute those who commit that crime is not an
accomplice.]
[A person may be an accomplice even if he or she is not actually
prosecuted for the crime.]
[You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old was an
accomplice unless you also decide that when the child acted, (he/she)
understood:
1. The nature and effect of the criminal conduct;
2. That the conduct was wrongful and forbidden;
99
AND
3. That (he/she) could be punished for participating in the conduct.]
If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was not an accomplice, then
supporting evidence is not required and you should evaluate his or her
(statement/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other witness.
If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was an accomplice, then
you may not convict the defendant of <insert charged
crime[s]> based on his or her (statement/ [or] testimony) alone. You may
use (a statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to
incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if:
1. The accomplice’s (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by
other evidence that you believe;
2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s
(statement/ [or] testimony);
AND
3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the
commission of the crime[s].
Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be
enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged
crime[s], and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the
accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the accomplice testified).
On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely
shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its
commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant
to the commission of the crime.
[The evidence needed to support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of one
accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement/ [or] testimony) of
another accomplice.]
Any (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to
incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not,
however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or]
testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care
and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, April 2011, February 2016,
March 2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is a sua sponte duty to instruct on the principles governing the law of
accomplices, including the need for corroboration, if the evidence at trial suggests
100
that a witness could be an accomplice. (People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331
[106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [76
Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].)
“Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the
facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed.” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) When the
court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties
agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 335, Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice.
If a codefendant’s testimony tends to incriminate another defendant, the court must
give an appropriate instruction on accomplice testimony. (People v. Avila (2006) 38
Cal.4th 491, 562 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; citing People v. Box (2000) 23
Cal.4th 1153, 1209 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
Cal.4th 155, 218 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) The court must also instruct
on accomplice testimony when two codefendants testify against each other and
blame each other for the crime. (Id. at 218–219).
When the witness is a codefendant whose testimony includes incriminating
statements, the court should not instruct that the witness is an accomplice as a
matter of law. (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 555 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d
908].) Instead, the court should give this instruction, informing the jury that it must
decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition, the court
should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to the
testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the
general rules of credibility, but if the jury considers testimony as incriminating
evidence against the non-testifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated
and should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34
Do not give this instruction if accomplice testimony is solely exculpatory or neutral.
(People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892] [telling
jurors that corroboration is required to support neutral or exonerating accomplice
testimony was prejudicial error].)
If the court concludes that the corroboration requirement applies to an out-of-court
statement, use the word “statement” throughout the instruction. (See discussion in
Related Issues section below.)
In a multiple codefendant case, if the corroboration requirement does not apply to
all defendants, insert the names of the defendants for whom corroboration is
required where indicated in the first sentence.
If the witness was an accomplice to only one or some of the crimes he or she
testified about, the corroboration requirement only applies to those crimes and not to
other crimes he or she may have testified about. (People v. Wynkoop (1958) 165
Cal.App.2d 540, 546 [331 P.2d 1040].) In such cases, the court may insert the
101
specific crime or crimes requiring corroboration in the first sentence.

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person who lacks criminal intent”
when the evidence suggests that the witness did not share the defendant’s specific
criminal intent, e.g., witness was an undercover police officer or an unwitting
assistant.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not conclude that a child
under 14 years old” on request if the defendant claims that a child witness’s
testimony must be corroborated because the child acted as an accomplice. (Pen.
Code, § 26; People v. Williams (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 209 [55 P.2d 223].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The burden is on the defendant”
unless acting with an accomplice is an element of the charged crime. (People v.
Martinez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 721, 723 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 442].) Martinez only
involved charges where acting as an accomplice was an element.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18
• Accomplice May Not Provide Sole Basis for Admission of Other Evidence.
People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 863 [31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591].
• Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th
558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
• Defendant’s Burden of Proof. People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 523 [153
Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].
• Defense Admissions May Provide Necessary Corroboration. People v. Williams
• Accomplice Includes Co-perpetrator. People v. Felton (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
260, 268 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 626].
• Definition of Accomplice as Aider and Abettor. People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51
Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
• Extent of Corroboration Required. People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [171
Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
• One Accomplice May Not Corroborate Another. People v. Montgomery (1941)
47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in Murgia v.
Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301, fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d
44] and People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390,
668 P.2d 697].
• Presence or Knowledge Insufficient. People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541,
557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
• Testimony of Feigned Accomplice Need Not Be Corroborated. People v. Salazar
(1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [20 Cal.Rptr. 25]; but see People v.
102
Brocklehurst (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 476 [92 Cal.Rptr. 340]; People v.

Bohmer (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 191–193 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136].
• Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony May Establish Corpus Delicti. People v.
Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rtpr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
• Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th
635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
• In-Custody Informant Testimony and Accomplice Testimony May Corroborate
Each Other. People v. Huggins (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 719–720 [185
Cal.Rptr.3d 672].
Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892].
RELATED ISSUES
Out-of-Court Statements
The out-of court statement of a witness may constitute “testimony” within the
meaning of Penal Code section 1111, and may require corroboration. (People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710]; People v.
Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 526 [153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].) The Supreme
Court has quoted with approval the following summary of the corroboration
requirement for out-of-court statements:
‘[T]estimony’ within the meaning of . . . section 1111 includes . . . all out-of-
court statements of accomplices and coconspirators used as substantive evidence
of guilt which are made under suspect circumstances. The most obvious suspect
circumstances occur when the accomplice has been arrested or is questioned by
the police. [Citation.] On the other hand, when the out-of-court statements are
not given under suspect circumstances, those statements do not qualify as
‘testimony’ and hence need not be corroborated under . . . section 1111.
(People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 245 [quoting People v. Jeffery (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 526] [quotation marks, citations, and italics
removed]; see also People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1230 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144,
812 P.2d 163] [out-of-court statement admitted as excited utterance did not require
corroboration].) The court must determine whether the out-of-court statement
requires corroboration and, accordingly, whether this instruction is appropriate. The
court should also determine whether the statement is testimonial, as defined in
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177], and
whether the Crawford holding effects the corroboration requirement of Penal Code
section 1111.
103
Incest With a Minor

Accomplice instructions are not appropriate in a trial for incest with a minor. A
minor is a victim, not an accomplice, to incest. (People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th
327, 334 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; see CALCRIM No. 1180, Incest.)
Liable to Prosecution When Crime Committed
The test for determining if a witness is an accomplice is not whether that person is
subject to trial when he or she testifies, but whether he or she was liable to
prosecution for the same offense at the time the acts were committed. (People v.
Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 469 [110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298].) However, the
fact that a witness was charged for the same crime and then granted immunity does
not necessarily establish that he or she is an accomplice. (People v. Stankewitz
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].)
Threats and Fear of Bodily Harm
A person who is induced by threats and fear of bodily harm to participate in a
crime, other than murder, is not an accomplice. (People v. Brown (1970) 6
Cal.App.3d 619, 624 [86 Cal.Rptr. 149]; People v. Perez (1973) 9 Cal.3d 651,
659–660 [108 Cal.Rptr. 474, 510 P.2d 1026].)
Defense Witness
“[A]lthough an accomplice witness instruction must be properly formulated . . . ,
there is no error in giving such an instruction when the accomplice’s testimony
favors the defendant.” (United States v. Tirouda (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3d 683, 688.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 110, 111, 118,
122.
Witnesses, § 82.03, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][b],
85.03[2][b], [d], Ch. 87, Death Penalty, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, § 141.02[5][b] (Matthew Bender).
104
335. Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice
If the crime[s] of <insert charged crime[s]> (was/were)

committed, then <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were)
[an] accomplice[s] to (that/those) crime[s].
You may not convict the defendant of <insert crime[s]>
based on the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice alone. You may
use (a statement/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to
incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if:
1. The accomplice’s (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by
other evidence that you believe;
(statement/ [or] testimony);
AND
commission of the crime[s].
crime, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the
accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On
the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows
that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The
supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the
commission of the crime.
[The evidence needed to support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of one
accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement/ [or] testimony) of
and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.
March 2019, March 2023
105
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is a sua sponte duty to instruct on the principles governing the law of
accomplices, including the need for corroboration, if the evidence at trial suggests
that a witness could be an accomplice. (People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331
[106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758].)
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Give this
instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter
of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice. (People v.
Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322] [only give
instruction “‘if undisputed evidence established the complicity’”].) If there is a
dispute about whether the witness is an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 334,
Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice.
If a codefendant’s testimony tends to incriminate another defendant, the court must
give an appropriate instruction on accomplice testimony. (People v. Avila (2006) 38
Cal.4th 491, 562 [43 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; citing People v. Box (2000) 23
Cal.4th 1153, 1209 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
Cal.4th 155, 218 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].) The court must also instruct
on accomplice testimony when two co-defendants testify against each other and
blame each other for the crime. (Id. at pp. 218–219.)
908].) Instead, the court should give CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony
Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice, informing the jury
that it must decide whether the testifying codefendant is an accomplice. In addition,
the court should instruct that when the jury considers this testimony as it relates to
the testifying codefendant’s defense, the jury should evaluate the testimony using the
evidence against the non-testifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated
and should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 105.)
Do not give this instruction if accomplice testimony is solely exculpatory or neutral.
(People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 778–780 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 892] [telling
jurors that corroboration is required to support neutral or exonerating accomplice
testimony was prejudicial error].)
Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.)
106
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18
• Consideration of Incriminating Testimony. People v. Guiuan, supra, 18 Cal.4th at
p. 569.
Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in Murgia v.
Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301, fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d
44] and People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454, fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390,
668 P.2d 697].
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1317 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].
• Witness an Accomplice as a Matter of Law. People v. Williams, supra, 16
Cal.4th at p. 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210]; People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339,
363–367 [100 Cal.Rptr.3d 820].
Cal.Rptr.3d 672].
Smith, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 778–780.
107
View the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant against

the defendant with caution and close scrutiny. In evaluating such (a
statement/ [or] testimony), you should consider the extent to which it
may have been influenced by the receipt of, or expectation of, any
benefits. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such
(statement/ [or] testimony), but you should give it the weight to which
you find it to be entitled in the light of all the evidence in the case.
<Give the following paragraph if the issue of whether a witness was an in-
custody informant is in dispute>
[An in-custody informant is someone [, other than (a/an) (codefendant[,]/
[or] percipient witness[,]/ [or] accomplice[,]/ [or] coconspirator,)] whose
(statement/ [or] testimony) is based on [a] statement[s] the defendant
allegedly made while both the defendant and the informant were held
within a correctional institution. If you decide that a (declarant/ [or]
witness) was not an in-custody informant, then you should evaluate his
or her (statement/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other
witness.]
<Give the first bracketed phrase if the issue of whether a witness was an
in-custody informant is in dispute>
[If you decide that a (declarant/ [or] witness) was an in-custody
informant, then] (You/you) may not convict the defendant of
<insert charged crime[s]> based on the (statement/ [or]
testimony) of that in-custody informant alone. [Nor may you find a
special circumstance true/ [or] use evidence in aggravation based on the
(statement/ [or] testimony) of that in-custody informant alone.]
You may use the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant
against the defendant only if:
1. The (statement/ [or] testimony) is supported by other evidence
that you believe;
2. That supporting evidence is independent of the (statement/ [or]
testimony);
AND
3. That supporting evidence connects the defendant to the
commission of the crime[s] [or to the special circumstance/ [or] to
evidence in aggravation]. The supporting evidence is not sufficient
if it merely shows that the charged crime was committed [or
proves the existence of a special circumstance/ [or] evidence in
aggravation].
109
This supporting evidence requirement does not apply where the

testimony of an in-custody informant is offered for any purpose other
than proving (guilt/ [or] a special circumstance/evidence in aggravation).
[Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be
crime, and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the
accomplice in the statement/ [or] about which the witness testified). On
the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows
that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The
supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the
commission of the crime.]
[Do not use the (statement/ [or] testimony) of an in-custody informant to
support the (statement/ [or] testimony) of another in-custody informant
unless you are convinced that <insert name of party calling
in-custody informant as witness> has proven it is more likely than not that
the in-custody informant has not communicated with another in-custody
informant on the subject of the testimony.]
[A percipient witness is someone who personally perceived the matter
that he or she testified about.]
<Insert the name of the in-custody informant if his or her statement is not in
dispute>
[ <insert name of witness> is an in-custody informant.]
[ <insert name of institution> is a correctional institution.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, February 2016, October 2021, March
2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request. (Pen. Code, § 1127a.)
The court should also be aware of the following statutory provisions relating to in-
custody informants: Penal Code sections 1127a(c) [prosecution must disclose
consideration given to witness]; 1191.25 [prosecution must notify victim of in-
custody informant]; and 4001.1 [limitation on payments to in-custody informants
and action that may be taken by in-custody informant].
If there is no issue over whether the witness is an in-custody informant and the
parties agree, the court may instruct the jury that the witness “is an in-custody
informant.” If there is an issue over whether the witness is an in-custody informant,
give the bracketed definition of the term.
The committee awaits guidance from courts of review on the issue of whether this
110
instruction applies to witnesses other than those called by the People. Until the issue
is resolved, the committee provides this version consistent with the language of the
statute.
Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.)
Related Instruction
CALCRIM No. 337, Witness in Custody or Physically Restrained.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Duty. Pen. Code, §§ 1111.5, 1127a.
Cal.Rptr.3d 672].
Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210].
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Witnesses, § 20.
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 120, 123.
Confessions and Admissions, § 30.32[2] (Matthew Bender).
Witnesses, § 82.03A, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][b],
85.03[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
111
<Alternative A—physically restrained>

[When <insert name[s] of witness[es]> testified, (he/she/
they) (was/were) physically restrained. Do not speculate about the
reason. You must completely disregard this circumstance in deciding the
issues in this case. Do not consider it for any purpose or discuss it
during your deliberations. Evaluate the witness’s testimony according to
the instructions I have given you.]
<Alternative B—in custody>
[When <insert name[s] of witness[es]> testified, (he/she/
they) (was/were) in custody. [Do not speculate about the reason.] The
fact that a witness is in custody does not by itself make a witness more
or less believable. Evaluate the witness’s testimony according to the
instructions I have given you.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the witness has been
physically restrained in a manner that is visible to the jury. (See People v. Duran
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; Wilson v.
McCarthy (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 1482, 1485; People v. Metzger (1904) 143 Cal.
447, 448 [77 P. 155].) If the restraints are not visible, do not give this instruction
unless requested. For an in-custody witness, give this instruction on request.
Do not give this instruction for an in-custody informant unless the witness is also
physically restrained. When an in-custody informant testifies, the court must give
CALCRIM No. 336, In-Custody Informant. For an in-custody informant, the court
may only give this instruction if it is limited to the issue of physical restraints.
In alternative B, always give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not
speculate” unless the jury has been informed of the reason the witness is in custody.
The rules articulated in People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–292 [127
Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322] regarding physical restraints of a defendant at trial
also apply to physical restraint of a defense witness. (Id. at p. 288, fn. 4.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Duty. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291–292 [127
Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; Wilson v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d
1482, 1485; People v. Metzger (1904) 143 Cal. 447, 448 [77 P. 155].
• Requirements Before Restraints Used. People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282,
112
290–292 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322]; People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th
1201, 1218 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].
• Use of Stun Belts. People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1205–1206 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95].
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial,
§§ 13–21.
Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.09[6][b][v] (Matthew Bender).
113
You have heard testimony that the defendant (is a <insert

character trait relevant to crime[s] committed> person/ [or] has a good
reputation for <insert character trait relevant to crime[s]
committed> in the community where (he/she) lives or works).
Evidence of the defendant’s character for <insert character
trait relevant to crime[s] committed> can by itself create a reasonable
doubt [whether the defendant committed <insert name[s] of
alleged offenses[s] and count[s], e.g., battery, as charged in Count 1>].
However, evidence of the defendant’s character for <insert
character trait> may be countered by other evidence of (his/her)
character for the same trait. You must decide the meaning and
importance of the character evidence.
[If the defendant’s character for certain traits has not been discussed
among those who know (him/her), you may assume that (his/her)
character for those traits is good.]
You may take that testimony into consideration along with all the other
evidence in deciding whether the People have proved that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on defendant’s character;
however, it must be given on request. (People v. Bell (1875) 49 Cal. 485, 489–490
[jury should be instructed that evidence of good reputation should be weighed as
any other fact established and may be sufficient to create reasonable doubt of guilt];
People v. Jones (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222 [266 P.2d 38] [character evidence may
be sufficient to create reasonable doubt of guilt]; People v. Wilson (1913) 23
Cal.App. 513, 523–524 [138 P. 971] [court erred in failing to give requested
instruction or any instruction on character evidence].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal. at pp. 489–490;
People v. Wilson, supra, 23 Cal.App. at pp. 523–524; People v. Jones, supra, 42
Cal.2d at p. 222.
• Character Evidence Must Be Relevant to Offense Charged. People v. Taylor
115
(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 622, 629 [225 Cal.Rptr. 733].

• Admissibility. Evid. Code, §§ 1100–1102.
RELATED ISSUES
No Discussion of Character Is Evidence of Good Character
The fact that the defendant’s character or reputation has not been discussed or
questioned among those who know him or her is evidence of the defendant’s good
character and reputation. (People v. Castillo (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 194, 198 [42 P.2d
682].) However, the defendant must have resided in the community for a sufficient
period of time and become acquainted with the community in order for his or her
character to have become known and for some sort of reputation to have been
established. (See Evid. Code, § 1324 [reputation may be shown in the community
where defendant resides and in a group with which he or she habitually associates];
see also People v. Pauli (1922) 58 Cal.App. 594, 596 [209 P. 88] [witness’s
testimony about defendant’s good reputation in community was inappropriate where
defendant was a stranger in the community, working for a single employer for a few
months, going about little, and forming no associations].)
Business Community
The community for purposes of reputation evidence may also be the defendant’s
business community and associates. (People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 163
[287 P.2d 752].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, § 82.22[3][d], [e][ii], Ch. 83, Evidence, § 83.12[1] (Matthew Bender).
116
The attorney for the People was allowed to ask defendant’s character
witness[es] if (he/she/they) had heard that the defendant had engaged in
certain conduct. These “have you heard” questions and their answers are
not evidence that the defendant engaged in any such conduct. You may
consider these questions and answers only to evaluate the meaning and
importance of (the/a) character witness’s testimony.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on cross-examination of
character witnesses; however it must be given on request. (People v. Hempstead
(1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 949, 954 [196 Cal.Rptr. 412] [when cross-examination of
character witness is permitted, a limiting admonition should be given]; Evid. Code,
§ 355.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Hempstead (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 949,
954 [196 Cal.Rptr. 412]; People v. Eli (1967) 66 Cal.2d 63, 79 [56 Cal.Rptr.
916, 424 P.2d 356].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, § 82.22[3][d], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][b], Ch.
87, Death Penalty, § 87.23[5] (Matthew Bender).
117
You have heard testimony that <insert name of alleged

victim> ((is/was) a (violent/ <insert character trait>) person/
(has/had) a character trait for (violence/ <insert character
trait>)) [and testimony that <insert name of alleged victim>
(is/was) (not a violent person/does not have a character trait for
violence/ <insert character trait>)]. [You have also heard
testimony that the defendant (is a violent person/has a character trait for
violence)[ and testimony that the defendant (is not a violent person/does
not have a character trait for violence)].]
<Give only when specific conduct evidence of the defendant’s character for
violence has been admitted>
[The People presented evidence that the defendant (committed ([an]other
offense[s]/the offense[s] of <insert description of alleged
offense[s]>)/ <insert description of alleged conduct admitted
under Evid. Code, § 1103(b)>) and was not charged with (that/those
offense[s]/act[s]) in this case.
You may consider this evidence about the defendant only if the People
have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in
fact committed the (uncharged offense[s]/act[s]). Proof by a
preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if you conclude that the fact is more likely than not to be true.
If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this evidence
entirely.
If you decide that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/
act[s]), you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the
limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant (is a violent person/
has a trait for violence) and acted in conformity with that character
trait.]
A person’s character for (violence/ <insert other relevant
trait>) may be shown by evidence of reputation, opinion, or specific acts.
Evidence of a person’s character for (violence/ <insert other
relevant trait>) may tend to show the person acted in conformity with
that character trait. You may consider such evidence only for this limited
purpose[ and only in deciding the charges of <insert
applicable counts>].
You must decide the meaning and importance of the character evidence.
119
Whether a person had a character for (violence/ <insert

other relevant trait>) and whether that person acted in conformity with
that character trait are matters for you to decide.
[In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity
between the (uncharged offense[s]/act[s]) and the charged offense[s].]
[Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad
character or is disposed to commit crime.]
If you conclude that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/
act[s]), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the
other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is
guilty of <insert charge[s]> [or that the
<insert allegation[s]> (has/have) been proved]. The People must still
prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.
You may consider the testimony regarding character along with all the
other evidence in deciding whether the People have proved that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
No case holds that a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of
character evidence admitted under Evidence Code section 1103. However, the court
should give an instruction on request. (See Evid. Code, § 355.)
AUTHORITY
• Admissibility. Evid. Code, § 1103.
• “Victim” Defined. People v. Tackett (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 445, 455 [50
Cal.Rptr.3d 449].
• “Character Evidence” Defined. People v. Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546,
552–553 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 27].
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Blanco (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1173 [13
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Defendant’s Character for Violence Must Be Relevant to Material Issue. People
v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 700 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 147, 269 P.3d 568].
• Analysis Under Evidence Code Section 352 Applies. People v. Fuiava, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 700.
• Similar Instruction Upheld. People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 694–695.
• Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. People v. Carpenter (1997)
15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708], abrogated on other
120
A defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to testify. He or she

may rely on the state of the evidence and argue that the People have
failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider,
for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not
discuss that fact during your deliberations or let it influence your
decision in any way.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction should only be given on request. (Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450
U.S. 288, 300 [101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241]; People v. Evans (1998) 62
The court has no sua sponte duty to seek a personal waiver of the instruction from
the defendant. (People v. Towey (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 880, 884 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d
326].)
The United States Supreme Court has held that the court may give this instruction
over the defendant’s objection (Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333, 340–341
[98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319]), but as a matter of state judicial policy, the
California Supreme Court has found otherwise. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th
271, 314 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274] [“[T]he purpose of the instruction is to
protect the defendant, and if the defendant does not want it given the trial court
should accede to that request, notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional
requirement to do so.”].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 282 [266
Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] [no sua sponte duty to instruct].
1191–1192 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
SECONDARY SOURCES
742.
2 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Witnesses, § 458.
Defendant’s Trial Rights, § 80.08, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict,
§§ 85.02[1A][a], 85.04[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
122
You have heard evidence that the defendant made a statement to a peace
officer. [I am referring to the statement (about which Officer[s]
testified/ <insert other description to identify
statement, e.g., time and place statement was taken>).]
If you conclude that the defendant made this statement, you may
consider it only to help you decide whether to believe the defendant’s
testimony. You may not consider it as proof that the statement is true or
for any other purpose.
[You should view an unrecorded oral statement cautiously.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction on the use of statements
taken in violation of the Miranda rule. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34
Cal.4th 1, 63 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) The court must give the instruction
on request.
If the defendant made more than one statement, but not all of the statements are
subject to the limiting admonition, specify the relevant statement or statements using
the bracketed text in the first paragraph.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1,
63 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30]; People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [243
Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307]; Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [91 S.Ct.
643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, §§ 330–332.
§§ 111–112.
Confessions and Admissions, §§ 30.02[2], 30.10[3], 30.30[1], 30.57 (Matthew
Bender).
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).
123
If you conclude that someone made a statement outside of court that

(accused the defendant of the crime/ [or] tended to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime) and the defendant did not
deny it, you must decide whether each of the following is true:
1. The statement was made to the defendant or made in (his/her)
presence;
2. The defendant heard and understood the statement;
3. The defendant would, under all the circumstances, naturally have
denied the statement if (he/she) thought it was not true;
AND
4. The defendant could have denied it but did not.
If you decide that all of these requirements have been met, you may
conclude that the defendant admitted the statement was true.
If you decide that any of these requirements has not been met, you must
not consider either the statement or the defendant’s response for any
purpose.
[You must not consider this evidence in determining the guilt of (the/any)
other defendant[s].]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on adoptive admissions;
however, it must be given if requested by the defendant. (People v. Carter (2003) 30
If the court instructs on adoptive admissions, the court also has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on corpus delicti. (See CALCRIM No. 359, Corpus Delicti: Independent
Evidence of a Charged Crime; see also People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334,
364 [279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009] [discussing corpus delicti rule in the case of
an affirmative admission; by analogy the rule also should apply to adoptive
admissions].)
The limiting admonition in the last sentence of the instruction must be given on
request when other codefendants are on trial. (People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d
614, 618–619 [131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67];
see generally Evid. Code, § 355.)
124
Do not give this instruction if the defendant’s failure to reply was based on his or
her invocation of the right to remain silent. (See Griffın v. California (1965) 380
U.S. 609 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106]; People v. Cockrell (1965) 63 Cal.2d 659
[47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Atwood (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316,
332–333 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831]; People v. Vindiola (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 370 [158
Cal.Rptr. 6]; People v. Humphries (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1336 [230
Cal.Rptr. 536]; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d
1, 998 P.2d 969].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Intoxicated When Admission Made
“Declarations of a prisoner under the influence of intoxicants are not rendered
inadmissible by reason of his drunkenness. That condition would go only to the
weight of the evidence.” (People v. MacCagnan (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 100, 112
[276 P.2d 679].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
8 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, § 303.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 103–106.
Confessions and Admissions, §§ 30.04[4], 30.57 (Matthew Bender).
Evidence, § 83.13[3][b] (Matthew Bender).
125
You have heard evidence that the defendant made [an] [oral] [and] [a]
[written] statement[s] (before the trial/while the court was not in
session). You must decide whether the defendant made any (such/of
these) statement[s], in whole or in part. If you decide that the defendant
made such [a] statement[s], consider the statement[s], along with all the
other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how
much importance to give to the statement[s].
[Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a) defendant tending
to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise
recorded.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, February 2014, August
2015, September 2017, September 2020, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. People v. Diaz (2015) 60
Give the bracketed cautionary instruction on request if there is evidence of an
incriminating out-of-court oral statement made by the defendant. (People v. Diaz,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) In the penalty phase of a capital trial, the bracketed
paragraph should be given only if the defense requests it. (People v. Livaditis (1992)
2 Cal.4th 759, 784 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].)
The bracketed cautionary instruction is not required when the defendant’s
incriminating statements are written or tape-recorded. (People v. Gardner (1961) 195
Cal.App.2d 829, 833 [16 Cal.Rptr. 256]; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 173
Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 774, fn. 40 [175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446];
People v. Scherr (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 165, 172 [77 Cal.Rptr. 35]; People v.
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1200 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]
[admonition to view non-recorded statements with caution applies only to a
defendant’s incriminating statements].) If the jury heard both inculpatory and
exculpatory, or only inculpatory, statements attributed to the defendant, give the
bracketed paragraph. If the jury heard only exculpatory statements by the defendant,
do not give the bracketed paragraph.
If a defendant suspected of murder made a statement in a custodial interview that
did not comply with Penal Code section 859.5, give the following additional
instruction:
Consider with caution any statement tending to show defendant’s guilt made by
126
(him/her) during <insert description of interview, e.g., interview

with Offıcer Smith of October 15, 2013>.
When a defendant’s statement is a verbal act, as in conspiracy cases, this instruction
applies. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1224 [249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756
P.2d 795]; People v. Ramirez (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 347, 352 [114 Cal.Rptr. 916];
see also, e.g., Peabody v. Phelps (1858) 9 Cal. 213, 229 [similar, in civil cases].
When a defendant’s statement is an element of the crime, as in conspiracy or
criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), this instruction still applies. (People v. Diaz,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1187, overruling People v. Zichko (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
1055, 1057 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 509].)
If out-of-court oral statements made by the defendant are prominent pieces of
evidence in the trial, then CALCRIM No. 359, Corpus Delicti: Independent
Evidence of a Charged Crime, may also have to be given together with the
bracketed cautionary instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1187, 1190,
1192; People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 784.
• Custodial Statements by Defendants Suspected of Murder. Pen. Code,
§ 859.5(e)(3).
Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210].
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial
§§ 683–686, 723, 724, 733.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay § 52.
3 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial § 127.
Confessions and Admissions, § 30.57 (Matthew Bender).
127
The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on (his/her) out-
of-court statement[s] alone. You may rely on the defendant’s out-of-court
statements to convict (him/her) only if you first conclude that other
evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser included offense] was
committed.
That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a
reasonable inference that a crime was committed.
This requirement of other evidence does not apply to proving the
identity of the person who committed the crime [and the degree of the
crime]. If other evidence shows that the charged crime [or a lesser
included offense] was committed, the identity of the person who
committed it [and the degree of the crime] may be proved by the
defendant’s statement[s] alone.
You may not convict the defendant unless the People have proved (his/
her) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2014, February 2015,
September 2017, March 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on corpus delicti whenever an accused’s
extrajudicial statements form part of the prosecution’s evidence. (People v. Howk
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 707 [16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426], unless the statement
was made during the commission of the crime. (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15
Give the bracketed language in the first paragraph if the court will be instructing on
lesser included offenses.
An earlier version of this instruction was upheld in People v. Reyes (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777]. A later case, People v. Rivas (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1427–1429 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 403], found fault with the same
earlier version of the instruction without referring to Reyes. The instruction has been
modified in light of the discussion in Rivas.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 342 [52
Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 368
[279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009]; People v. Howk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 707
[16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426].
128
• Burden of Proof. People v. Lara (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d
886].
• Earlier Version of This Instruction Correctly States the Law. People v. Rosales
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260–1261 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d 620]; People v. Reyes
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1496 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 777].
• Proof of Identity Independent of “Elements.” People v. Rivas (2013) 214
• Corpus Delicti Rule Does Not Apply Generally to All Uncharged Acts. People v.
Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 636 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 55].
COMMENTARY
Harm Caused by Criminal Conduct
The instruction states that the other evidence need only “be enough to support a
reasonable inference that someone’s criminal conduct caused an injury, loss, or
harm.” This is based in part on People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1171 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372], in which the court stated that “[t]here is no
requirement of independent evidence ‘of every physical act constituting an element
of an offense,’ so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss,
or harm by a criminal agency.” (Citing People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 303
[70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890].)
Scope of Corpus Delicti
The following are not elements of a crime and need not be proved by independent
evidence: the degree of the crime charged (People v. Cooper (1960) 53 Cal.2d 755,
765 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964]), the identity of the perpetrator (People v.
Westfall (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 598, 601 [18 Cal.Rptr. 356]), elements of the
underlying felony when the defendant is charged with felony murder (People v.
Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 680–681 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324 [149
Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308] and People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668,
684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]), special circumstances when the
defendant is charged with a felony-based special circumstance murder as listed in
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) (Pen. Code, § 190.41; see People v. Ray (1996) 13
Cal.4th 313, 341, fn. 13 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]), the knowledge and
intent required for aider-abettor liability (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th
1083, 1128–1129 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]; People v. Ott (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 118, 131 [148 Cal.Rptr. 479]), or facts necessary for a sentencing
enhancement (see People v. Shoemake (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 243, 252–256 [20
Cal.Rptr.2d 36]).
RELATED ISSUES
Truth-in-Evidence Initiative
The “truth-in-evidence” provision of the California Constitution abrogates the corpus
delicti rule insofar as it restricts the admissibility of incriminatory extrajudicial
129
statements by an accused. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1173–1174

[119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372]; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(d) [Proposition 8 of
the June 8, 1982 General Election].) The constitutional provision, however, does not
eliminate the rule insofar as it prohibits conviction when the only evidence that the
crime was committed is the defendant’s own statements outside of court. Thus, the
provision does not affect the rule to the extent it requires a jury instruction that no
person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her
out-of-court statements. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Confessions and Admissions, §§ 30.04[2], 30.57 (Matthew Bender).
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.04[2][c]; Ch. 87, Death Penalty, § 87.13[17][e]
(Matthew Bender).
130
<Insert name> testified that in reaching (his/her)

conclusions as an expert witness, (he/she) considered [a] statement[s]
made by <insert name>. [I am referring only to the
statement[s] <insert or describe statements admitted for this
limited purpose>.] You may consider (that/those) statement[s] only to
evaluate the expert’s opinion. Do not consider (that/those) statement[s] as
proof that the information contained in the statement[s] is true.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Although the court has no sua sponte duty to give this instruction, it should be
given if appropriate under the circumstances. (People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d
672, 683 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308]
and People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603
P.2d 1].)
This instruction should not be given if all of the statements relied on by the expert
were admitted under applicable hearsay exceptions. If some but not all of the
defendant’s statements were admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating the
expert’s testimony, specify those statements in the bracketed sentence.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 412 [46
Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33].
• Inadmissible Case-Specific Hearsay Not Basis for Expert Testimony. People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–686 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, 374 P.3d 320];
People v. Vega-Robles (2017) 9 Cal. App. 5th 382, 416 [215 Cal.Rptr 3d 284].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04 (Matthew Bender).
131
If the defendant failed in (his/her) testimony to explain or deny evidence

against (him/her), and if (he/she) could reasonably be expected to have
done so based on what (he/she) knew, you may consider (his/her) failure
to explain or deny in evaluating that evidence. Any such failure is not
enough by itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide the
meaning and importance of that failure.
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2016, March 2017, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
No authority imposes a duty to give this instruction sua sponte. This instruction
should only be given when the defendant testifies and the privilege against self-
incrimination has not been successfully invoked. (People v. Mask (1986) 188
Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; People v. Haynes (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d
1117, 1118 [196 Cal.Rptr. 450].)
There is a split in authority over the application of People v. Saddler (1979) 24
Cal.3d 671, 682–683 [156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130] [instruction erroneously
given because there was no evidence that defendant failed to deny or explain
incriminating evidence] and whether this instruction should be given when a
testifying defendant fails to explain or deny incriminating evidence in the absence of
a question. (Compare People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 609 [247
Cal.Rptr.3d 258] [approving use of the instruction “when a testifying defendant has
failed to explain or deny matters within the scope of relevant cross-examination, not
simply those matters that were asked of the defendant on cross-examination”] with
People v. Roehler (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 392 [213 Cal.Rptr. 353] [“If a
defendant has not been asked an appropriate question calling for either an
explanation or denial, the instruction cannot be given, as a matter of law”] and
People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 671] [noting
restrictions for when the instruction may be given and quoting Roehler].)
If the court follows Grandberry, the trial court must ascertain as a matter of law:
(1) if the matter was within the scope of relevant cross-examination; (2) if the
defendant knew the facts necessary to explain or deny incriminating evidence or if
some circumstance precluded the defendant from knowing such facts; and (3) if the
defendant failed to explain or deny the incriminating evidence.
If the court follows Roehler, the trial court must ascertain as a matter of law: (1) if
a question was asked that called for an explanation or denial of incriminating
evidence; (2) if the defendant knew the facts necessary to answer the question or if
132
some circumstance precluded the defendant from knowing such facts; and (3) if the
defendant failed to deny or explain the incriminating evidence when answering the
question.
Contradiction of the state’s evidence is not by itself a failure to deny or explain.
(People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1346 [248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260];
People v. Peters (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 75, 86 [180 Cal.Rptr. 76].) Failure to recall
is not an appropriate basis for this instruction. (People v. De Larco (1983) 142
Cal.App.3d 294, 309 [190 Cal.Rptr. 757].)
Give this instruction only when a testifying defendant completely fails to explain or
deny incriminating evidence, or claims to lack knowledge although it appears from
the evidence that defendant could reasonably be expected to have that knowledge.
(People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 117–118 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 369 P.3d
521].)
AUTHORITY
• Cautionary Language. People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 683 [156
Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Vega (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 494–500
[186 Cal.Rptr.3d 671]; People v. Rodriguez (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068
[88 Cal.Rptr.3d 749].
RELATED ISSUES
Bizarre or Implausible Answers
If the defendant’s denial or explanation is bizarre or implausible, several courts have
held that the question whether his or her response is reasonable should be given to
the jury with an instruction regarding adverse inferences. (People v. Mask (1986)
188 Cal.App.3d 450, 455 [233 Cal.Rptr. 181]; People v. Roehler (1985) 167
Cal.App.3d 353, 392–393 [213 Cal.Rptr. 353].) However, in People v. Kondor
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 52, 57 [245 Cal.Rptr. 750], the court stated, “the test for
giving the instruction [on failure to deny or explain] is not whether the defendant’s
testimony is believable. [The instruction] is unwarranted when a defendant explains
or denies matters within his or her knowledge, no matter how improbable that
explanation may appear.”
Facts Beyond the Scope of Examination
If the defendant has limited his or her testimony to a specific factual issue, it is
error for the prosecutor to comment, or the trial court to instruct, on his or her
failure to explain or deny other evidence against him or her that is beyond the scope
of this testimony. (People v. Tealer (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 598, 604–607 [122
Cal.Rptr. 144].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
133
If [the] defendant [ <insert name of defendant when multiple

defendants on trial>] made a false or misleading statement before this
trial relating to the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or
intending to mislead, that conduct may show (he/she) was aware of (his/
her) guilt of the crime and you may consider it in determining (his/her)
guilt. [You may not consider the statement in deciding any other
defendant’s guilt.]
If you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to
decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the
defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself.
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2010, September 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction should not be given unless it can be inferred that the defendant
made the false statement for self-protection rather than to protect someone else.
(People v. Rankin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 430, 436 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 735] [error to
instruct on false statements and consciousness of guilt where defendant lied to
protect an accomplice]; see also People v. Blakeslee (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 831, 839
[82 Cal.Rptr. 839].)
Consider modifying this instruction when the evidence supports an inference that the
defendant was aware of his or her guilt generally, but not of the charged crime.
People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 926, fn.2 [241 Cal.Rptr.3d 35].
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1139 [77
Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d 732] [in context of adoptive admissions]; People v.
Atwood (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316, 333 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831]; but see People v.
Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1197–1198 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981];
see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102–103 [17
Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. McGowan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1104
[74 Cal.Rptr.3d 57].
COMMENTARY
The word “willfully” was not included in the description of the making of the false
statement. Although one court suggested that the jury be explicitly instructed that
the defendant must “willfully” make the false statement (People v. Louis (1984) 159
Cal.App.3d 156, 161–162 [205 Cal.Rptr. 306]), the California Supreme Court
135
subsequently held that such language is not required. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54
Cal.3d 612, 672, fn. 9 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].)
RELATED ISSUES
Evidence
The false nature of the defendant’s statement may be shown by inconsistencies in
the defendant’s own testimony, his or her pretrial statements, or by any other
prosecution evidence. (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr.
148, 749 P.2d 803] [overruling line of cases that required falsity to be demonstrated
only by defendant’s own testimony or statements]; accord People v. Edwards (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1103 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 821]; People v. Williams (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 467, 478–479 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 358].)
Un-Mirandized Voluntary Statement
The Miranda rule (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 [86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) does not prohibit instructing the jury that it may draw an
inference of guilt from a willfully false or deliberately misleading un-Mirandized
statement that the defendant voluntarily introduces into evidence on direct
examination. (People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166–1169 [94
Cal.Rptr.2d 727].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 641.
Evidence, § 83.13[1], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][c]
(Matthew Bender).
136
370. Motive
The People are not required to prove that the defendant had a motive to
(commit (any of the crimes/the crime) charged/ [or] <insert
conduct alleged in support of sentencing enhancement or special
circumstance>). In reaching your verdict you may, however, consider
whether the defendant had a motive.
Having a motive may be a factor tending to show (that the defendant is
guilty/ [or] that an (allegation/ [or] special circumstance) is true). Not
having a motive may be a factor tending to show (the defendant is not
guilty/ [or] that an (allegation/ [or] special circumstance) is not true).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on motive. (People v. Romo
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 196 [121 Cal.Rptr. 111, 534 P.2d 1015] [not error to refuse
instruction on motive].)
Do not give this instruction if motive is an element of all of the crimes charged.
(See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 1122, Annoying or Molesting a Child.) People v. Valenti
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]].)
Modify this instruction as needed if motive is an element of some, but not all, of
the crimes or special circumstances charged or enhancements alleged. (See People v.
Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Romo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 189, 195–196 [121
Cal.Rptr. 111, 534 P.2d 1015]; People v. Young (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 106, 110
[87 Cal.Rptr. 767].
• Jury May Consider Motive. People v. Brown (1900) 130 Cal. 591, 594 [62 P.
1072]; People v. Gonzales (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 867, 877–878 [198 P.2d 81].
• Proof of Presence or Absence of Motive Not Required. People v. Daly (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 47, 59 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
1009, 1017–1018 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
1192–1193 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
137
RELATED ISSUES
Entrapment Defense
The court should not instruct on motive if the defendant admits his guilt for the
substantive crime and presents an entrapment defense, because in that instance his
or her commission of the crime would not be an issue and motive would be
irrelevant. (See People v. Martinez (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 660, 669 [203 Cal.Rptr.
833]; People v. Lee (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 841 [268 Cal.Rptr. 595].)
No Conflict With Other Instructions
Motive, intent, and malice are separate and distinct mental states. Giving a motive
instruction does not conflict with intent and malice instructions. (People v. Hillhouse
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503–504 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754] [motive describes
the reason a person chooses to commit a crime]; People v. Snead (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].) Similarly, a motive instruction that
focuses on guilt does not conflict with a special circumstance instruction, which the
jury is directed to find true or not true. (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147,
178 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629] [defendant argued motive to prevent victim
from testifying was at core of special circumstance].) A torture murder instruction
that requires an intent to cause cruel pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, or any sadistic purpose also does not conflict with the motive instruction.
The torture murder instruction does not elevate motive to the status of an element of
the crime. It simply makes explicit the treatment of motive as an element of proof
in torture murder cases. (People v. Lynn (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 727–728 [206
Cal.Rptr. 181].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 281.
138
371. Consciousness of Guilt: Suppression and Fabrication of
Evidence
<Alternative A—suppression>
[If the defendant tried to hide evidence or discourage someone from
testifying against (him/her), that conduct may show that (he/she) was
aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such an
attempt, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However,
evidence of such an attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.]
<Alternative B—fabrication>
[If the defendant tried to create false evidence or obtain false testimony,
that conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you
conclude that the defendant made such an attempt, it is up to you to
decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence of such an
attempt cannot prove guilt by itself.]
<Alternative C—fabrication or suppression by a third party>
[If someone other than the defendant tried to create false evidence,
provide false testimony, or conceal or destroy evidence, that conduct may
show the defendant was aware of (his/her) guilt, but only if the
defendant was present and knew about that conduct, or, if not present,
authorized the other person’s actions. It is up to you to decide the
meaning and importance of this evidence. However, evidence of such
conduct cannot prove guilt by itself.]
<Give final paragraph if multiple defendants on trial>
[If you conclude that a defendant (tried to hide evidence[,]/ discouraged
someone from testifying[,]/ [or] authorized another person to (hide
evidence/ [or] discourage a witness)), you may consider that conduct only
against that defendant. You may not consider that conduct in deciding
whether any other defendant is guilty or not guilty.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
No authority imposes a duty to give this instruction sua sponte. However, People v.
Atwood (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316 [35 Cal.Rptr. 831] held that the court had a sua
sponte duty, under the circumstances of that case, to instruct on consciousness of
guilt based on defendant’s false statements because they pertained to the vital
question of whether defendant admitted his guilt. (Id. at pp. 333–334.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Atwood (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 316 [35
139
Cal.Rptr. 831]; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1,
102–103 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].
• Fabrication or Suppression of Evidence. Evid. Code, § 413; People v. Jackson
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224–1225 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254]; People
v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1138–1140 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].
• Suppression of Evidence. Evid. Code, § 413; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28
Cal.4th 107, 165 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [instruction referring to
defendant’s refusal to provide blood or hair sample was not an erroneous
pinpoint instruction].
• Defendant Present or Authorized Suppression by Third Party. People v. Hannon
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597–600 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]; People v.
Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 554 [327 P.2d 527]; People v. Kendall (1952) 111
Cal.App.2d 204, 213–214 [244 P.2d 418].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 112, 113.
140
If the defendant fled [or tried to flee] (immediately after the crime was
committed/ [or] after (he/she) was accused of committing the crime), that
conduct may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you
conclude that the defendant fled [or tried to flee], it is up to you to
decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence
that the defendant fled [or tried to flee] cannot prove guilt by itself.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on flight whenever the prosecution relies
on evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt. (People v. Williams (1960) 179
Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [3 Cal.Rptr. 782].) There is, however, no reciprocal duty to
instruct on the significance of the absence of flight, even on request. (People v.
Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 459 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968]; People v.
Williams (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 648, 651 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 203].)
If the defendant’s flight did not occur immediately after the crime was committed,
the trial court should give the second option in the parenthetical. (People v. Carrera
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 313 [261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121] [flight from county
jail]; People v. Farley (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1712 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 702]
[when flight was from custody, the instructional language “immediately after the
commission of a crime” was irrelevant but harmless].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127c; People v. Williams (1960) 179
Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [3 Cal.Rptr. 782]; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th
1005, 1054–1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544]; see People v. Mendoza
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 29–32
[93 Cal.Rptr.3d 901]; People v. Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159–1160
[60 Cal.Rptr.3d 591].
RELATED ISSUES
Flight, Meaning
Flight does not require a person to physically run from the scene or make an escape.
What is required is acting with the purpose of avoiding observation or arrest.
(People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d
544] [defendant fled when he left victim’s apartment after killing her, told the
assistant manager, “I really got to get the hell out of here,” returned to his
apartment, packed his belongings, asked a former girlfriend who lived out of the
141
area if he could stay with her, and repeatedly pleaded with his roommate to drive
him out of town].) However, a suicide attempt that does not involve a departure
from the crime scene is not flight. (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477,
499 [276 Cal.Rptr.3d 694].)
Identity at Issue
If evidence identifies the defendant as the person who fled, and this evidence is
relied on as tending to show guilt, then it is not error to instruct the jury on flight.
(People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 723–724.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, §§ 107–110.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][a][ii], 85.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).
142
The evidence shows that (another person/other persons) may have been
involved in the commission of the crime[s] charged against the
defendant. There may be many reasons why someone who appears to
have been involved might not be a codefendant in this particular trial.
You must not speculate about whether (that other person has/those other
persons have) been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether
the defendant on trial here committed the crime[s] charged.
[This instruction does not apply to the testimony of <insert
names of testifying coparticipants>.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction on unjoined co-participants;
however, it must be given on request. (See People v. Sanders (1990) 221
Cal.App.3d 350, 359 [271 Cal.Rptr. 534].)
If other alleged participants in the crime are testifying, this instruction should not be
given or the bracketed portion should be given exempting the testimony of those
witnesses. (People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312 [261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777
P.2d 121]; People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1218 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d
163]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 226–227 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940
P.2d 710].) It is not error to give the first paragraph of this instruction if a
reasonable juror would understand from all the instructions that evidence of criminal
activity by a witness not being prosecuted in the current trial should be considered
in assessing the witness’s credibility. (People v. Fonseca (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
543, 549–550 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 513].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918–919
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46];
People v. Sanders (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 359 [271 Cal.Rptr. 534].
RELATED ISSUES
Jury Can Still Consider Evidence That Someone Else Was the Perpetrator
“The instruction does not tell the jury it cannot consider evidence that someone else
was the perpetrator. It merely says the jury is not to speculate on whether someone
else might or might not be prosecuted.” (People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888,
918–919 [254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940], disapproved on other grounds in People
143
You have received evidence about the use of a tracking dog. You may not
conclude that the defendant is the person who committed the crime
based only on the fact that a dog indicated the defendant [or a location].
Before you may rely on dog tracking evidence, there must be:
1. Evidence of the dog’s general reliability as a tracker;
AND
2. Other evidence that the dog accurately followed a trail that led to
the person who committed the crime. This other evidence does
not need to independently link the defendant to the crime.
In deciding the meaning and importance of the dog tracking evidence,
consider the training, skill, and experience, if any, of the dog, its trainer,
and its handler, together with everything else that you learned about the
dog’s work in this case.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on tracking dogs whenever they are
used to prove the identity of a defendant. (People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d
234, 241 [188 Cal.Rptr. 569], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 917–918
[150 Cal.Rptr. 676].
• Dog Tracking Evidence Need Not Be Viewed With Caution. People v. Malgren
(1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 241 [188 Cal.Rptr. 569], disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811
P.2d 757].
• Corroboration Requirement. People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 410
[267 Cal.Rptr. 138].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 78.
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04[1][d][ii] (Matthew Bender).
145
375. Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent,
Common Plan, etc.
<Introductory Sentence Alternative A—evidence of other offense admitted>

[The People presented evidence that the defendant committed ((another/
other) offense[s]/the offense[s] of <insert description of
alleged offense[s]>) that (was/were) not charged in this case.]
<Introductory Sentence Alternative B—evidence of other act admitted>
[The People presented evidence (of other behavior by the defendant that
was not charged in this case/that the defendant <insert
description of alleged conduct admitted under Evid. Code, § 1101(b)>).]
You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
(uncharged offense[s]/act[s]). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is
a different burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact
is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that the
fact is more likely than not to be true.
entirely.
If you decide that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/
act[s]), you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the
limited purpose of deciding whether:
<Select specific grounds of relevance and delete all other options>
<A. Identity>
[The defendant was the person who committed the offense[s] alleged
in this case](./; or)
<B. Intent>
[The defendant acted with the intent to <insert specific
intent required to prove the offense[s] alleged> in this case](./; or)
<C. Motive>
[The defendant had a motive to commit the offense[s] alleged in this
case](./; or)
<D. Knowledge>
[The defendant knew <insert knowledge required to prove
the offense[s] alleged> when (he/she) allegedly acted in this case](./;
or)
146
<E. Accident>
[The defendant’s alleged actions were not the result of mistake or
accident](./; or)
<F. Common Plan>
[The defendant had a plan [or scheme] to commit the offense[s]
alleged in this case](./; or)
<G. Consent>
[The defendant reasonably and in good faith believed that
<insert name or description of complaining witness>
consented](./; or)
<H. Other Purpose>
[The defendant <insert description of other permissible
purpose; see Evid. Code, § 1101(b)>.]
[In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity
between the uncharged (offense[s]/ [and] act[s]) and the charged
offense[s].]
Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the
limited purpose of <insert other permitted purpose, e.g.,
determining the defendant’s credibility>].
If you conclude that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/
act[s]), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the
guilty of <insert charge[s]> [or that the
<insert allegation[s]> has been proved]. The People must still prove (the/
each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2016, August 2016, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other offenses has
been introduced. (Evid. Code, § 1101(b); People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312,
382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708], abrogated on other grounds in People v. Diaz
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431, 345 P.3d 62]; People v. Collie (1981)
30 Cal.3d 43, 63–64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534].) The court is only required
to give this instruction sua sponte in the “occasional extraordinary case in which
unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the
147
accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate
purpose.” (People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 63–64.)
Do not give this instruction in the penalty phase of a capital case. (See CALCRIM
No. 764, Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes.)
If evidence of uncharged conduct is admitted only under Evidence Code section
1108 or 1109, do not give this instruction. (See CALCRIM No. 1191, Evidence of
Uncharged Sex Offense; CALCRIM No. 852, Evidence of Uncharged Domestic
Violence; and CALCRIM No. 853, Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or
Dependent Person.)
If the court admits evidence of uncharged conduct amounting to a criminal offense,
give introductory sentence alternative A and select the words “uncharged offense[s]”
where indicated. If the court admits evidence under Evidence Code section 1101(b)
that does not constitute a criminal offense, give introductory sentence alternative B
and select the word “act[s]” where indicated. (People v. Enos (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d
25, 42 [109 Cal.Rptr. 876] [evidence tending to show defendant was “casing” a
home admitted to prove intent where burglary of another home charged and
defendant asserted he was in the second home by accident].) The court is not
required to identify the specific acts to which this instruction applies. (People v.
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 668 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].)
If the court has admitted evidence that the defendant was convicted of a felony or
committed a misdemeanor for the purpose of impeachment in addition to evidence
admitted under Evidence Code section 1101(b), then the court must specify for the
jury what evidence it may consider under section 1101(b). (People v. Rollo (1977)
20 Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771], superseded in part on
other grounds as recognized in People v. Olmedo (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096
[213 Cal.Rptr. 742].) In alternative A, insert a description of the uncharged offense
allegedly shown by the 1101(b) evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony
convictions or misdemeanor conduct for impeachment, then the court may give the
alternative “another offense” or “other offenses” without specifying the uncharged
offenses.
The court must instruct the jury on what issue the evidence has been admitted to
prove and delete reference to all other potential theories of relevance. (People v.
Swearington (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 935, 949 [140 Cal.Rptr. 5]; People v. Simon
(1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 131 [228 Cal.Rptr. 855].) Select the appropriate
grounds from options A through H and delete all grounds that do not apply.
When giving option F, the court may give the bracketed “or scheme” at its
discretion, if relevant.
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating this
evidence” at its discretion when instructing on evidence of uncharged offenses that
has been admitted based on similarity to the current offense. (See People v. Ewoldt
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402–404 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757]; People v.
Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 424 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].) For
148
example, when the evidence of similar offenses is admitted to prove common plan,
intent, or identity, this bracketed sentence would be appropriate.
Give the bracketed sentence beginning with “Do not conclude from this evidence
that” on request if the evidence is admitted only under Evidence Code section
1101(b). Do not give this sentence if the court is also instructing under Evidence
Code section 1108 or 1109.
The paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant committed” has
been included to prevent jury confusion regarding the standard of proof. (See People
v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1013 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601]
[instruction on section 1108 evidence sufficient where it advised jury that prior
offense alone not sufficient to convict; prosecution still required to prove all
elements beyond a reasonable doubt].)
AUTHORITY
• Evidence Admissible for Limited Purposes. Evid. Code, § 1101(b); People v.
Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 393–394; People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 422.
• Degree of Similarity Required. People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.
402–404; People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 424.
• Analysis Under Evidence Code Section 352 Required. People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 404; People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 426–427.
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 63–64;
People v. Morrisson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 790 [155 Cal.Rptr. 152].
• Other Crimes Proved by Preponderance of Evidence. People v. Carpenter, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 382.
• Two Burdens of Proof Pose No Problem for Properly Instructed Jury. People v.
Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1258–1259 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 253 P.3d 553].
RELATED ISSUES
Circumstantial Evidence—Burden of Proof
The California Supreme Court has upheld CALJIC Nos. 2.50, 2.50.1, and 2.50.2 on
the burden of proof for uncharged crimes and CALJIC No. 2.01 on sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1258–1259.)
Virgil explained it was not error to permit consideration of evidence by two different
evidentiary standards: “If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven [by a
preponderance of the evidence] for consideration, it must still decide whether the
facts are sufficient, taken with all the other evidence, to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 1259–1260.) Jury instructions on the
People’s burden of proof and circumstantial evidence eliminate any danger that the
jury might use the preponderance of evidence standard to decide elemental facts or
149
issues because together those instructions make clear that ultimate facts must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
Issue in Dispute
The “defendant’s plea of not guilty does put the elements of the crime in issue for
the purpose of deciding the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct,
unless the defendant has taken some action to narrow the prosecution’s burden of
proof.” (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 400, fn. 4; People v. Rowland
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897].) The defense may
seek to “narrow the prosecution’s burden of proof” by stipulating to an issue.
(People v. Bruce (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1103–1106 [256 Cal.Rptr. 647].)
“[T]he prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if
the effect would be to deprive the state’s case of its persuasiveness and
forcefulness.” (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 16–17 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348,
939 P.2d 748].) However, an offer to stipulate may make the evidence less probative
and more cumulative, weighing in favor of exclusion under Evidence Code section
352. (People v. Thornton (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 49 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 825]
[observing that offer “not to argue” the issue is insufficient].) The court must also
consider whether there could be a “reasonable dispute” about the issue. (See People
v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 422–423 [evidence of other offense not admissible
to show intent to rape because if jury believed witness’s account, intent could not
reasonably be disputed]; People v. Bruce, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1103–1106
[same].)
Subsequent Offenses Admissible
Evidence of a subsequent as well as a prior offense is admissible. (People v.
Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 422–423, 425.)
Offenses Not Connected to Defendant
Evidence of other offenses committed in the same manner as the alleged offense is
not admissible unless there is sufficient evidence that the defendant committed the
uncharged offenses. (People v. Martinez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006–1007
[12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838] [evidence of how auto-theft rings operate inadmissible]; People
v. Hernandez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 225, 242 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 769] [evidence from
police database of similar sexual offenses committed by unknown assailant
inadmissible].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 76–97.
Evidence, § 83.12[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
150
376. Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a
Crime
If you conclude that the defendant knew (he/she) possessed property and
you conclude that the property had in fact been recently (stolen/
extorted), you may not convict the defendant of <insert
crime> based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that
supporting evidence tends to prove (his/her) guilt, then you may
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove (he/she) committed
<insert crime>.
The supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by
itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, where, and when the
defendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant
circumstances tending to prove (his/her) guilt of <insert
crime>.
[You may also consider whether <insert other appropriate
factors for consideration>.]
Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless
you are convinced that each fact essential to the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
New January 2006, September 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1141 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 184 P.3d
732], the Supreme Court abrogated People v. Clark (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 342, 346
[265 P.2d 43] [failure to instruct that unexplained possession alone does not support
finding of guilt was error]. Accordingly, there is no longer a sua sponte duty to give
this instruction.
The instruction may be given when the charged crime is robbery, burglary, theft, or
receiving stolen property. (See People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 755 [26
Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449] [burglary and theft]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6
Cal.4th 1, 36–37 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673] [burglary]; People v. Gamble
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 453 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451] [robbery]; People v. Anderson
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 424 [258 Cal.Rptr. 482] [receiving stolen property].)
The crime of receiving stolen property includes receiving property that was obtained
by extortion (Pen. Code, § 496). Thus, the instruction also includes optional
language for recently extorted property.
Use of this instruction should be limited to theft and theft-related crimes. (People v.
151
Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 248–249 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123] [trial
court’s failure to do so was error]; People v. Barker (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1166,
1176 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 403] [disapproving use of instruction to infer guilt of
murder]; but see People v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 856 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d
105] [court did not err in giving modified instruction on possession of recently
stolen property in relation to special circumstance of murder committed during
robbery]; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 975–978 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243,
978 P.2d 1171] [in a case involving both premeditated and felony murder, no error
in instructing on underlying crimes of robbery and burglary]; People v. Mendoza
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176–177 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].)
Corroborating Evidence
The bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may also consider” may be used if
the court grants a request for instruction on specific examples of corroboration
supported by the evidence. (See People v. Russell (1932) 120 Cal.App. 622,
625–626 [8 P.2d 209] [list of examples]; see also People v. Peters (1982) 128
Cal.App.3d 75, 85–86 [180 Cal.Rptr. 76] [reference to false or contradictory
statement improper when no such evidence was introduced]). Examples include the
following:
a. False, contradictory, or inconsistent statements. (People v. Anderson (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 414, 424 [258 Cal.Rptr. 482]; see, e.g., People v. Peete (1921) 54
Cal.App. 333, 345–346 [202 P. 51] [false statement showing consciousness of
guilt]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024–1025 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386,
782 P.2d 627] [false explanation for possession of property]; People v. Farrell
(1924) 67 Cal.App. 128, 133–134 [227 P. 210] [same].)
b. The attributes of possession, e.g., the time, place, and manner of possession that
tend to show guilt. (People v. Anderson, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 424;
People v. Hallman (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 638, 641 [110 Cal.Rptr. 891]; see,
e.g., People v. Gamble (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 453–454 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d
451].)
c. The opportunity to commit the crime. (People v. Anderson, supra, 210
Cal.App.3d at p. 425; People v. Mosqueira (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1176
[91 Cal.Rptr. 370].)
d. The defendant’s conduct or statements tending to show guilt, or the failure to
explain possession of the property under circumstances that indicate a
“consciousness of guilt.” (People v. Citrino (1956) 46 Cal.2d 284, 288–289
[294 P.2d 32]; People v. Wells (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 324, 328–329, 331–332
[9 Cal.Rptr. 384]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 175–176 [99
Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; People v. Champion (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 29,
32 [71 Cal.Rptr. 113].)
e. Flight after arrest. (People v. Scott (1924) 66 Cal.App. 200, 203 [225 P. 767];
People v. Wells, supra, 187 Cal.App.2d at p. 329.)
f. Assuming a false name and being unable to find the person from whom the
152
defendant claimed to have received the property. (People v. Cox (1916) 29

Cal.App. 419, 422 [155 P. 1010].)
g. Sale of property under a false name and at an inadequate price. (People v.
Majors (1920) 47 Cal.App. 374, 375 [190 P. 636].)
h. Sale of property with identity marks removed (People v. Miller (1920) 45
Cal.App. 494, 496–497 [188 P. 52]) or removal of serial numbers (People v.
Esquivel (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1401 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 324]).
i. Modification of the property. (People v. Esquivel, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p.
1401 [shortening barrels of shotguns].)
j. Attempting to throw away the property. (People v. Crotty (1925) 70 Cal.App.
515, 518–519 [233 P. 395].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157,
1172 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; see People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 755
[26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577
[64 Cal.Rptr.3d 116]; People v. Solorzano (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1036
[63 Cal.Rptr.3d 659].
• Corroboration Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. McFarland (1962) 58
Cal.2d 748, 754–755 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].
• Due Process Requirements for Permissive Inferences. Ulster County Court v.
Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157, 165 [99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777]; People v.
Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1172; People v. Gamble (1994) 22
• Examples of Corroborative Evidence. People v. Russell (1932) 120 Cal.App.
622, 625–626 [8 P.2d 209].
• Recently Stolen. People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421–422 [258
Cal.Rptr. 482]; People v. Lopez (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 274, 278 [271 P.2d 874].
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against
Property, § 14 [in context of larceny]; § 82 [in context of receiving stolen property];
§ 85 [in context of robbery]; § 157 [in context of burglary].
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 629
[presumptions].
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Burden of Proof and Presumptions,
§ 63.
153
377. Presence of Support Person/Dog/Dog Handler (Pen. Code,
§§ 868.4, 868.5)
<insert name of witness> (will have/has/had) a

(person/dog) present during (his/her) testimony. Do not consider the
presence of the (person/dog [and dog handler]) who (is/was) with the
witness for any purpose or allow it to distract you.
New March 2018; Revised April 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction on request. If instructing on support persons,
this instruction only applies to prosecution witnesses.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 868.4, 868.5.
154
If the defendant [or tried to

] <insert post-offense conduct>, that conduct
may show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that
the defendant [or tried to
] <insert post-offense conduct>, it is up to you to
decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence
that the defendant [or tried to
] <insert post-offense conduct> cannot prove
guilt by itself.
New March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
No authority imposes a duty to give this instruction sua sponte.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 477, 497–500 [276 Cal.Rptr.3d 694]; People v. Butler (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 189, 193 [90 Cal.Rptr. 497].
155
AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND
ACCESSORIAL CRIMES

402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target
Offenses Charged)
404. Intoxication
B. CONSPIRACY
E. ATTEMPT
157
A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have
directly committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator.
Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly
committed the crime.
A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally
or aided and abetted the perpetrator.
[Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding
and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other
crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, April 2010
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and abetting when the
prosecutor relies on it as a theory of culpability. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)
When the prosecution is relying on aiding and abetting, give this instruction before
other instructions on aiding and abetting to introduce this theory of culpability to the
jury.
An aider and abettor may be found guilty of a different crime or degree of crime
than the perpetrator if the aider and abettor and the perpetrator do not have the same
mental state. (People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1166 [91
Cal.Rptr.3d 874]; People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1577–1578 [11
Cal.Rptr.2d 231]; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1115–1116 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].)
If the prosecution is also relying on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
the court should also instruct with the last bracketed paragraph. Depending on which
theories are relied on by the prosecution, the court should then instruct as follows.
Intended Crimes (Target Crimes)
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant intended to aid and abet the crime
or crimes charged (target crimes), give CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes.
Natural & Probable Consequences Doctrine (Non-Target Crimes)
If the prosecution’s theory is that any of the crimes charged were committed as a
natural and probable consequence of the target crime, CALCRIM No. 402 or 403
159
CALCRIM No. 400 AIDING AND ABETTING
should also be given. If both the target and non-target crimes are charged, give
CALCRIM No. 402, Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and
Non-Target Offenses Charged). In some cases, the prosecution may not charge the
target crime but only the non-target crime. In that case, give CALCRIM No. 403,
Natural and Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged).
AUTHORITY
• Aiding and Abetting Defined. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561
[199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
• Murder Not Complete Until Victim Dies. People v. Celis (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
466, 471–474 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 139].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Introduction to Crimes,
§§ 94–97.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).
160
To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and

abetting that crime, the People must prove that:
1. The perpetrator committed the crime;
2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the
crime;
3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant
intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;
AND
4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s
unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact,
aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime.
If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to
actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as
an aider and abettor.
[If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or
failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining
whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a
person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime
does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]
[A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he or
she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person
must do two things:
1. He or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is involved
in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer
participating. The notification must be made early enough to
prevent the commission of the crime.
AND
2. He or she must do everything reasonably within his or her power
to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does not
have to actually prevent the crime.
the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this burden,
you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting
161
theory.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
prosecution relies on it as a theory of culpability. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)
If there is evidence that the defendant was merely present at the scene or only had
knowledge that a crime was being committed, the court has a sua sponte duty to
give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that defendant was
present.” (People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn.14 [271 Cal.Rptr.
738]; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [149 Cal.Rptr. 87].)
If there is evidence that the defendant withdrew from participation in the crime, the
court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed portion regarding withdrawal.
(People v. Norton (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; People v. Ross
(1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].)
Give CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, before this
instruction. Note that Penal Code section 30 uses “principal” but that CALCRIM
Nos. 400 and 401 substitute “perpetrator” for clarity.
If the prosecution charges non-target crimes under the Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine, give CALCRIM No. 402, Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged), if both non-
target and target crimes have been charged. Give CALCRIM No. 403, Natural and
Probable Consequences (Only Non-Target Offense Charged), if only the non-target
crimes have been charged.
If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting robbery and there is an issue as
to when intent to aid and abet was formed, give CALCRIM No. 1603, Robbery:
Intent of Aider and Abettor.
If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting burglary and there is an issue as
to when intent to aid and abet was formed, give CALCRIM No. 1702, Burglary:
Intent of Aider and Abettor.
AUTHORITY
• Definition of Principals. Pen. Code, § 31.
• Parties to Crime. Pen. Code, § 30.
557 fn.14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
• Requirements for Aiding and Abetting. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547,
162
AIDING AND ABETTING CALCRIM No. 401
560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].

• Withdrawal. People v. Norton (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87];
People v. Ross (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].
• This Instruction Correct re Withdrawal Defense. People v. Battle (2011) 198
RELATED ISSUES
Perpetrator versus Aider and Abettor
For purposes of culpability the law does not distinguish between perpetrators and
aiders and abettors; however, the required mental states that must be proved for
each are different. One who engages in conduct that is an element of the charged
crime is a perpetrator, not an aider and abettor of the crime. (People v. Cook (1998)
61 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1371 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 183].)
Accessory After the Fact
The prosecution must show that an aider and abettor intended to facilitate or
encourage the target offense before or during its commission. If the defendant
formed an intent to aid after the crime was completed, then he or she may be liable
as an accessory after the fact. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1160–1161
[282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742] [get-away driver, whose intent to aid was formed
after asportation of property, was an accessory after the fact, not an aider and
abettor]; People v. Rutkowsky (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1072–1073 [126 Cal.Rptr.
104]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 760–761 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726
P.2d 113].)
Factors Relevant to Aiding and Abetting
Factors relevant to determining whether a person is an aider and abettor include:
presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before or after the
offense. (People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492 [241 Cal.Rptr. 842]
[citing People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 429 [193 Cal.Rptr. 711]];
People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 525].)
Presence Not Required
A person may aid and abet a crime without being physically present. (People v.
Bohmer (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 199 [120 Cal.Rptr. 136]; see also People v.
Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 27 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) Nor does a person have to
physically assist in the commission of the crime; a person may be guilty of aiding
and abetting if he or she intends the crime to be committed and instigates or
encourages the perpetrator to commit it. (People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th
1247, 1256 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 202].)
Principal Acquitted or Convicted of Lesser Offense
Although the jury must find that the principal committed the crime aided and
abetted, the fact that a principal has been acquitted of a crime or convicted of a
lesser offense in a separate proceeding does not bar conviction of an aider and
abettor. (People v. Wilkins (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1092–1094 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d
163
764]; People v. Summersville (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066–1069 [40

Cal.Rptr.2d 683]; People v. Rose (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 990 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 887].)
A single Supreme Court case has created an exception to this principle and held that
non-mutual collateral estoppel bars conviction of an aider and abettor when the
principal was acquitted in a separate proceeding. (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d
686, 696–698 [117 Cal.Rptr.70, 527 P.2d 622].) In Taylor, the defendant was the
“get-away driver” in a liquor store robbery in which one of the perpetrators
inadvertently killed another during a gun battle inside the store. In a separate trial,
the gunman was acquitted of the murder of his co-perpetrator because the jury did
not find malice. The court held that collateral estoppel barred conviction of the
aiding and abetting driver, reasoning that the policy considerations favoring
application of collateral estoppel were served in the case. The court specifically
limited its holding to the facts, emphasizing the clear identity of issues involved and
the need to prevent inconsistent verdicts. (See also People v. Howard (1988) 44
Cal.3d 375, 411–414 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279] [court rejected collateral
estoppel argument and reiterated the limited nature of its holding in Taylor].)
Specific Intent Crimes
If a specific intent crime is aided and abetted, the aider and abettor must share the
requisite specific intent with the perpetrator. “[A]n aider and abettor will ‘share’ the
perpetrator’s specific intent when he or she knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s
criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of
facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35
Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [citations omitted].) The
perpetrator must have the requisite specific intent and the jury must be so instructed.
(People v. Patterson (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 610 [257 Cal.Rptr. 407] [trial court
erred in failing to instruct jury that perpetrator must have specific intent to kill];
People v. Torres (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 763, 768–769 [274 Cal.Rptr. 117].) And the
jury must find that the aider and abettor shared the perpetrator’s specific intent.
(People v. Acero (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 217, 224 [208 Cal.Rptr. 565] [to convict
defendant of aiding and abetting and attempted murder, jury must find that he
shared perpetrator’s specific intent to kill].)
Greater Guilt Than Actual Killer
An aider and abettor may be guilty of greater homicide-related crimes than the
actual killer. When a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and
abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the
combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own mens rea. If that
person’s mens rea is more culpable than another’s, that person’s guilt may be greater
even if the other is deemed the actual killer. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1111, 1121 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 94–97.
164

165
402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
(Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged)
The defendant is charged in Count[s] with <insert

target offense> and in Counts[s] with <insert non-
target offense>.
You must first decide whether the defendant is guilty of
<insert target offense>. If you find the defendant is guilty of this crime,
you must then decide whether (he/she) is guilty of <insert
non-target offense>.
Under certain circumstances, a person who is guilty of one crime may
also be guilty of other crimes that were committed at the same time.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of <insert non-target
offense>, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant is guilty of <insert target offense>;
2. During the commission of <insert target offense> a
coparticipant in that <insert target offense>
committed the crime of <insert non-target offense>;
AND
3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have known that the commission of
<insert non-target offense> was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the
<insert target offense>.
A coparticipant in a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and
abetted the perpetrator. It does not include a victim or innocent
bystander.
A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person
would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In
deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of
the circumstances established by the evidence.
[Do not consider evidence of defendant’s intoxication in deciding whether
<insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable
consequence of <insert target offense>.]
To decide whether the crime of <insert non-target offense>
was committed, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/
have given) you on that crime.
[The People allege that the defendant originally intended to aid and abet
166
the commission of either <insert target offense> or

<insert other target offense>. The defendant is guilty of
<insert non-target offense> if the People have proved that
the defendant aided and abetted either <insert target
offense> or <insert other target offense> and that
<insert non-target offense> was the natural and probable
consequence of either <insert target offense> or
<insert other target offense>. However, you do not need to
agree on which of these two crimes the defendant aided and abetted.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2013, August 2014,
February 2015, September 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
prosecution relies on that theory of culpability. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d
547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to identify and instruct on any target offense relied
on by the prosecution as a predicate offense when substantial evidence supports the
theory. Give all relevant instructions on the alleged target offense or offenses. The
court, however, does not have to instruct on all potential target offenses supported
by the evidence if the prosecution does not rely on those offenses. (People v.
Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; see
People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 677–678 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] [no sua
sponte duty to instruct on simple assault when prosecutor never asked court to
consider it as target offense].)
The target offense is the crime that the accused parties intended to commit. The
non-target is an additional unintended crime that occurs during the commission of
the target.
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “Do not consider evidence of defendant’s
intoxication” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a non-target
offense. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959
P.2d 735].)
Give CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and CALCRIM
No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes, before this instruction.
This instruction should be used when the prosecution relies on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and charges both target and non-target crimes. If
only non-target crimes are charged, give CALCRIM No. 403, Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine (Only Non-Target Offense Charged).
167
AUTHORITY
[199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
• Natural and Probable Consequences, Reasonable Person Standard. People v.
Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
• Reasonably Foreseeable Crime Need Not Be Committed for Reason Within
Common Plan. People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616–617 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d
100, 337 P.3d 1159].
COMMENTARY
In People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d
1013], the court concluded that the trial court must sua sponte identify and describe
for the jury any target offenses allegedly aided and abetted by the defendant.
Although no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms “natural”
and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, we have
included a suggested definition. (See People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.
291 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107–109 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [court did not err in
failing to define “natural and probable”].)
RELATED ISSUES
Murder
A verdict of murder may not be based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3). (Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes
2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019.) The amendment
added “malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” The question whether this amendment abolished the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder is unresolved.
The court has a duty to instruct on lesser included offenses that could be the natural
and probable consequence of the intended offense when the evidence raises a
question whether the greater offense is a natural and probable consequence of the
original, intended criminal act. (People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570,
1586–1588 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 231] [aider and abettor may be found guilty of second
degree murder under doctrine of natural and probable consequences although the
principal was convicted of first degree murder].)
Specific Intent—Non-Target Crimes
Before an aider and abettor may be found guilty of a specific intent crime under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury must first find that the
perpetrator possessed the required specific intent. (People v. Patterson (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 610, 614 [257 Cal.Rptr. 407] [trial court erroneously failed to instruct
the jury that they must find that the perpetrator had the specific intent to kill
necessary for attempted murder before they could find the defendant guilty as an
168
aider and abettor under the “natural and probable” consequences doctrine],
disagreeing with People v. Hammond (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 463 [226 Cal.Rptr.
475] to the extent it held otherwise.) However, it is not necessary that the jury find
that the aider and abettor had the specific intent; the jury must only determine that
the specific intent crime was a natural and probable consequence of the original
crime aided and abetted. (People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1586–1587
[11 Cal.Rptr. 2d 231].)
Target and Non-Target Offense May Consist of Same Act
Although generally, non-target offenses charged under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine will be different and typically more serious criminal acts than
the target offense alleged, they may consist of the same act with differing mental
states. (People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463–1466 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d
680] [defendants were properly convicted of attempted murder as natural and
probable consequence of aiding and abetting discharge of firearm from vehicle.
Although both crimes consist of same act, attempted murder requires more culpable
mental state].)
Target Offense Not Committed
The Supreme Court has left open the question whether a person may be liable under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine for a non-target offense, if the target
offense was not committed. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262, fn. 4
[58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013], but see People v. Ayala (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1440, 1452 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 575]; People v. Laster (1997) 52
See generally, the related issues under CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 102, 104–106, 110.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[1A][a], 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).
169
403. Natural and Probable Consequences
(Only Non-Target Offense Charged)
[Before you may decide whether the defendant is guilty of

<insert non-target offense>, you must decide whether (he/she) is guilty of
<insert target offense>.]
To prove that the defendant is guilty of <insert non-target
offense>, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant is guilty of <insert target offense>;
2. During the commission of <insert target offense> a
coparticipant in that <insert target offense>
committed the crime of <insert non-target offense>;
AND
3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have known that the commission of
the <insert non-target offense> was a natural and
probable consequence of the commission of the
<insert target offense>.
A coparticipant in a crime is the perpetrator or anyone who aided and
abetted the perpetrator. It does not include a victim or innocent
bystander.
[Do not consider evidence of defendant’s intoxication in deciding whether
<insert non-target offense> was a natural and probable
To decide whether crime of <insert non-target offense> was
committed, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on (that/those) crime[s].
[The People are alleging that the defendant originally intended to aid
and abet <insert target offenses>.
If you decide that the defendant aided and abetted one of these crimes
and that <insert non-target offense> was a natural and
probable consequence of that crime, the defendant is guilty of
<insert non-target offense>. You do not need to agree about
which of these crimes the defendant aided and abetted.]
170
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, February 2015, September 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
prosecution relies on it as a theory of culpability. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to identify and instruct on any target offense relied
on by the prosecution as a predicate offense when substantial evidence supports the
theory. Give all relevant instructions on the alleged target offense or offenses. The
court, however, does not have to instruct on all potential target offenses supported
by the evidence if the prosecution does not rely on those offenses. (People v.
Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; see
People v. Huynh (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 677–678 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 340] [no sua
sponte duty to instruct on simple assault when prosecutor never asked court to
consider it as target offense].)
The target offense is the crime that the accused parties intended to commit. The
non-target is an additional unintended crime that occurs during the commission of
the target.
Do not give the first bracketed paragraph in cases in which the prosecution is also
pursuing a conspiracy theory.
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning, “Do not consider evidence of defendant’s
intoxication” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a non-target
offense. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959
P.2d 735].)
Give CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and CALCRIM
No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes, before this instruction.
This instruction should be used when the prosecution relies on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and charges only non-target crimes. If both target
and non-target crimes are charged, give CALCRIM No. 402, Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses Charged).
AUTHORITY
[199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
• Natural and Probable Consequences, Reasonable Person Standard. People v.
Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
• No Unanimity Required. People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267–268
[58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013].
557 fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr. 738]; In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87, 926 P.2d 1013].
171
• Reasonably Foreseeable Crime Need Not Be Committed for Reason Within
Common Plan. People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616–617 [180 Cal.Rptr.3d
100, 337 P.3d 1159].
COMMENTARY
In People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d
1013], the court concluded that the trial court must sua sponte identify and describe
for the jury any target offenses allegedly aided and abetted by the defendant.
and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, we have
included a suggested definition. (See People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.
291 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107–109 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] [court did not err in
failing to define “natural and probable.”])
RELATED ISSUES
Murder
doctrine. (Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3). Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes
2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019.) This amendment
participation in a crime.” The question whether this legislation abolished the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder is unresolved.
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting, and
CALCRIM No. 402, Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and
Non-Target Offenses Charged).
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 102, 104–106, 110.
172
404. Intoxication
If you conclude that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
alleged crime, you may consider this evidence in deciding whether the
defendant:
A. Knew that <insert name of perpetrator> intended to
commit <insert target offense>;
AND
B. Intended to aid and abet <insert name of
perpetrator> in committing <insert target offense>.
Someone is intoxicated if he or she (took[,]/ [or] used[,]/[or] was given)
any drug, drink, or other substance that caused an intoxicating effect.
[Do not consider evidence of intoxication in deciding whether
<insert charged nontarget offense> is a natural and probable
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication; however, the
trial court must give this instruction on request. (See People v. Ricardi (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364]; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th
1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d
1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context not involving aiding and
abetting].) Although voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to a crime,
the jury may consider evidence of voluntary or involuntary intoxication and its
effect on a defendant’s ability to form specific mental states. (Pen. Code, §§ 22, 26;
People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959
P.2d 735]; People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 832 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].)
Give the last bracketed paragraph on request if the defendant was charged with both
target and nontarget crimes. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134 [77
Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].)
See CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary Intoxication, and CALCRIM No. 3427,
Involuntary Intoxication.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 29.4; People v. Mendoza (1998) 18
Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; see People v.
173
Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197];
People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588]
[in context other than aiding and abetting].
• Burden of Proof. See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1118–1119 [2
Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context other than aiding and abetting].
RELATED ISSUES
Intoxication Based on Mistake of Fact Is Involuntary
Intoxication resulting from trickery is not “voluntary.” (People v. Scott (1983) 146
Cal.App.3d 823, 831–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633] [defendant drank punch not knowing
it contained hallucinogens; court held his intoxication was result of trickery and
mistake and involuntary].)
Unconsciousness Based on Voluntary Intoxication Is Not a Complete Defense
Unconsciousness is typically a complete defense to a crime except when it is caused
by voluntary intoxication. (People v. Heffıngton (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107
Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by
former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4], rather than by section
26, and is only a partial defense to a crime. (People v. Walker (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on
unconsciousness when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the
time of the crime].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.10[3][c] (Matthew Bender).
174
B. CONSPIRACY
[I have explained that (the/a) defendant may be guilty of a crime if (he/

she) either commits the crime or aids and abets the crime. (He/She) may
also be guilty if (he/she) is a member of a conspiracy.]
(The defendant[s]/Defendant[s] <insert name[s]>) (is/are)
charged [in Count ] with conspiracy to commit
<insert alleged crime[s]> [in violation of Penal Code section 182].
To prove that (the/a) defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that:
1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with [one or more
of] (the other defendant[s]/ [or] <insert name[s] or
description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to commit <insert
alleged crime[s]>;
2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and [one or more of]
the other alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended that one
or more of them would commit <insert alleged
crime[s]>;
3. (The/One of the) defendant[s][,] [or <insert name[s]
or description[s] of coparticipant[s]>][,] [or (both/all) of them]
committed [at least one of] the following alleged overt act[s] to
accomplish <insert alleged crime[s]>:
<insert the alleged overt acts>;
AND
4. [At least one of these/This] overt act[s] was committed in
California.
To decide whether (the/a) defendant committed (this/these) overt act[s],
consider all of the evidence presented about the act[s].
To decide whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other
alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit
<insert alleged crime[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I
(will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].
The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy had
an agreement and intent to commit <insert alleged
crime[s]>. The People do not have to prove that any of the members of
the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal
agreement to commit (that/one or more of those) crime[s]. An agreement
175
may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the

alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime[s].
An overt act is an act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy
that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act
must happen after the defendant has agreed to commit the crime. The
overt act must be more than the act of agreeing or planning to commit
the crime, but it does not have to be a criminal act itself.
[You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was committed in
California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, but you do
not have to all agree on which specific overt act or acts were committed
or who committed the overt act or acts.]
[You must make a separate decision as to whether each defendant was a
member of the alleged conspiracy.]
[The People allege that the defendant[s] conspired to commit the
following crimes: <insert alleged crime[s]>. You may not
find (the/a) defendant guilty of conspiracy unless all of you agree that
the People have proved that the defendant conspired to commit at least
one of these crimes, and you all agree which crime (he/she) conspired to
commit.] [You must also all agree on the degree of the crime.]
[A member of a conspiracy does not have to personally know the identity
or roles of all the other members.]
[Someone who merely accompanies or associates with members of a
conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a
member of the conspiracy.]
[Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped
accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove
that the person was a member of the conspiracy.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction defining the elements of the
crime when the defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See People v. Morante
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071].) If the defendant is
charged with conspiracy to commit murder, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 563, Conspiracy to Commit Murder. If the defendant is not charged
with conspiracy but evidence of a conspiracy has been admitted for another purpose,
do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 416, Evidence of Uncharged
Conspiracy.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the offense alleged to
176
be the target of the conspiracy. (People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223,

1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608].) Give all appropriate instructions
defining the elements of the offense or offenses alleged as targets of the conspiracy.
The court has a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction if “the evidence
suggested two discrete crimes, i.e., two discrete conspiracies . . . .” (People v.
Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see also
People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d
971].) A unanimity instruction is not required if there is “merely possible uncertainty
on how the defendant is guilty of a particular conspiracy.” (People v. Russo, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) Thus, the jury need not unanimously agree as to what overt
act was committed or who was part of the conspiracy. (People v. Russo, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 1135–1136.) However, it appears that a unanimity instruction is
required when the prosecution alleges multiple crimes that may have been the target
of the conspiracy. (See People v. Diedrich, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 285–286
[approving of unanimity instruction as to crime that was target of conspiracy]; but
see People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 560–561, 564 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d
210] [not error to decline to give unanimity instruction; if was error, harmless].)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The People alleged that the defendant[s]
conspired to commit the following crimes,” if multiple crimes are alleged as target
offenses of the conspiracy. Give the bracketed sentence regarding the degree of the
crime if any target felony has different punishments for different degrees. (See Pen.
Code, § 182(a).) The court must also give the jury a verdict form on which it can
state the specific crime or crimes that the jury unanimously agrees the defendant
conspired to commit.
In addition, if a conspiracy case involves an issue regarding the statute of limitations
or evidence of withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may be
required. (People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1136, fn. 2; see also Related
Issues section below on statute of limitations.)
In elements 1 and 3, insert the names or descriptions of alleged coconspirators if
they are not defendants in the trial. (See People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119,
1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section below.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision,”
if more than one defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See People v. Fulton (1984)
155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879]; People v. Crain (1951) 102
Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A member of a conspiracy does not
have to personally know,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant did not
personally know all the alleged coconspirators. (See People v. Van Eyk (1961) 56
Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)
177
Give the two final bracketed sentences on request. (See People v. Toledo-Corro
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew from the alleged
conspiracy, the court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 420, Withdrawal
From Conspiracy.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 182(a), 183; People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403,
416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071]; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th
593, 600 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994]; People v. Liu (1996) 46
• Overt Act Defined. Pen. Code, § 184; People v. Saugstad (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d
536, 549–550 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 549,
fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; see People v. Brown (1991) 226
Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368 [277 Cal.Rptr. 309]; People v. Tatman (1993) 20
• Association Alone Not a Conspiracy. People v. Drolet (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 207,
218 [105 Cal.Rptr. 824]; People v. Toledo-Corro (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812,
820 [345 P.2d 529].
• Elements of Underlying Offense. People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223,
• Two Specific Intents. People v. Miller (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 423–426 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 773], disapproved on other ground in People v. Cortez (1998) 18
• Unanimity on Specific Overt Act Not Required. People v. Russo (2001) 25
• Unanimity on Target Offenses of Single Conspiracy. People v. Diedrich (1982)
31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People v. Vargas
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 560–561, 564 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 210].
• Penal Code Section 182 Refers to Crimes Under California Law Only. People v.
Zacarias (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 652, 660 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 81].
COMMENTARY
It is sufficient to refer to coconspirators in the accusatory pleading as “persons
unknown.” (People v. Sacramento Butchers’ Protective Ass’n (1910) 12 Cal.App.
471, 483 [107 P. 712]; People v. Roy (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 459, 463 [59 Cal.Rptr.
636]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements,
§ 82.) Nevertheless, this instruction assumes the prosecution has named at least two
members of the alleged conspiracy, whether charged or not.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included target
178
offense if there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy
to commit that offense. (People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 297 [115 Cal.Rptr.
516, 524 P.2d 1300], disapproved on other ground in People v. Cortez (1998) 18
Cal.4th 1223, 1237–1238 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; People v. Cook (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 910, 918 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 204]; People v. Kelley (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 1358, 1365–1366, 1370 [269 Cal.Rptr. 900].
There is a split of authority whether a court may look to the overt acts in the
accusatory pleadings to determine if it has a duty to instruct on any lesser included
offenses to the charged conspiracy. (People v. Cook, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp.
919–920, 922 [court may look to overt acts to determine whether charged offense
includes a lesser included offense]; contra, People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1688, 1708–1709 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608] [court should examine
description of agreement in pleading, not description of overt acts, to decide
whether lesser offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy].)
RELATED ISSUES
Acquittal of Coconspirators
The “rule of consistency” has been abandoned in conspiracy cases. The acquittal of
all alleged conspirators but one does not require the acquittal of the remaining
alleged conspirator. (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 858, 864–865 [103
Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15 P.3d 234].)
Conspiracy to Collect Insurance Proceeds
A conspiracy to commit a particular offense does not necessarily include a
conspiracy to collect insurance proceeds. (People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419,
435 [124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].)
Death of Coconspirator
A surviving conspirator is liable for proceeding with an overt act after the death of
his or her coconspirator. (People v. Alleyne (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1262 [98
Cal.Rptr.2d 737].)
Factual Impossibility
Factual impossibility of accomplishing a substantive crime is not a defense to
conspiracy to commit that crime. (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119,
1130–1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578]; see also United States v. Jimenez Recio (2003) 537
U.S. 270, 274–275 [123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744] [rejecting the rule that a
conspiracy ends when the object of the conspiracy is defeated].)
Statute of Limitations
The defendant may assert the statute of limitations defense for any felony that is the
primary object of the conspiracy. The limitations period begins to run with the last
overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. (Parnell v. Superior Court
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 410 [173 Cal.Rptr. 906]; People v. Crosby (1962) 58
Cal.2d 713, 728 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see Pen. Code, §§ 800, 801.) If
the substantive offense that is the primary object of the conspiracy is successfully
attained, the statute begins to run at the same time as for the substantive offense.
179
(People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].)
“[I]f there is a question regarding the statute of limitations, the court may have to
require the jury to agree an overt act was committed within the limitations period.”
(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1136, fn. 2 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d
641] [dicta].) See generally CALCRIM No. 3410, Statute of Limitations and
CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.
Supplier of Goods or Services
A supplier of lawful goods or services put to an unlawful use is not liable for
criminal conspiracy unless he or she both knows of the illegal use of the goods or
services and intends to further that use. The latter intent may be established by
direct evidence of the supplier’s intent to participate, or by inference based on the
supplier’s special interest in the activity or the aggravated nature of the crime itself.
(People v. Lauria (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 471, 476–477, 482 [59 Cal.Rptr. 628].)
Wharton’s Rule
If the cooperation of two or more persons is necessary to commit a substantive
crime, and there is no element of an alleged conspiracy that is not present in the
substantive crime, then the persons involved cannot be charged with both the
substantive crime and conspiracy to commit the substantive crime. (People v.
Mayers (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 809, 815 [168 Cal.Rptr. 252] [known as Wharton’s
Rule or “concert of action” rule].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02[2][a][i], 85.03[2][d] (Matthew Bender).
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, §§ 141.01, 141.02, 141.10 (Matthew Bender).
180
The People have presented evidence of a conspiracy. A member of a

conspiracy is criminally responsible for the acts or statements of any
other member of the conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the
conspiracy.
To prove that (the/a) defendant was a member of a conspiracy in this
case, the People must prove that:
description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to commit <insert
alleged crime[s]>;
or more of them would commit <insert alleged
crime[s]>;
committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] to
accomplish <insert alleged crime[s]>:
<insert the alleged overt acts>;
AND
California.
To decide whether (the/a) defendant or another member of the
conspiracy committed (this/these) overt act[s], consider all of the
evidence presented about the act[s].
alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit
<insert alleged crime[s]>, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].
an agreement and intent to commit <insert alleged
crime[s]>. The People do not have to prove that any of the members of
the alleged conspiracy actually met or came to a detailed or formal
agreement to commit (that/one or more of those) crime[s]. An agreement
may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the
alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.
181
[You must all agree that at least one overt act was committed in
[You must decide as to each defendant whether he or she was a member
of the alleged conspiracy.]
[The People contend that the defendant[s] conspired to commit one of
the following crimes: <insert alleged crime[s]>. You may
not find (the/a) defendant guilty under a conspiracy theory unless all of
you agree that the People have proved that the defendant conspired to
commit at least one of these crimes, and you all agree which crime (he/
she) conspired to commit.] [You must also all agree on the degree of the
crime.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2016

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the prosecution has
not charged the crime of conspiracy but has introduced evidence of a conspiracy to
prove liability for other offenses or to introduce hearsay statements of
coconspirators. (See, e.g., People v. Pike (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664,
372 P.2d 656]; People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369
P.2d 714].)
defining the elements of the offense or offenses alleged as targets of the conspiracy.
182
The court has a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction if “the evidence
suggested two discrete crimes, i.e., two discrete conspiracies . . . .” (People v. Russo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see also People v.
Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 285–286 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) See the
Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy, on when the court is required to
give a unanimity instruction.
1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section to CALCRIM No.
415, Conspiracy.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision,”
if the prosecution alleges that more than one defendant was a member of the
conspiracy. (See People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr.
879]; People v. Crain (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)
Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)
from Conspiracy.
CALCRIM No. 417, Liability for Coconspirators’ Acts.
CALCRIM No. 418, Coconspirator’s Statements.
CALCRIM No. 419, Acts Committed or Statements Made Before Joining
Conspiracy.
AUTHORITY
fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; see People v. Brown (1991) 226
Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368 [277 Cal.Rptr. 309]; People v. Tatman (1993) 20
• Association Alone Not a Conspiracy. People v. Drolet (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 207,
218 [105 Cal.Rptr. 824]; People v. Toledo-Corro (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812,
820 [345 P.2d 529].
• Elements of Underlying Offense. People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]; People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223,
1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].
183
• Two Specific Intents. People v. Miller (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 423–426 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 773], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cortez (1998) 18
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, §§ 141.01, 141.02 (Matthew Bender).
184
A member of a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the crimes that

he or she conspires to commit, no matter which member of the
conspiracy commits the crime.
A member of a conspiracy is also criminally responsible for any act of
any member of the conspiracy if that act is done to further the
conspiracy and that act is a natural and probable consequence of the
common plan or design of the conspiracy. This rule applies even if the
act was not intended as part of the original plan. [Under this rule, a
defendant who is a member of the conspiracy does not need to be
present at the time of the act.]
A member of a conspiracy is not criminally responsible for the act of
another member if that act does not further the common plan or is not a
natural and probable consequence of the common plan.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s]
, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant conspired to commit one of the following crimes:
<insert target crime[s]>;
2. A member of the conspiracy committed <insert
nontarget offense[s]> to further the conspiracy;
AND
3. <insert nontarget offense[s]> (was/were) [a] natural
and probable consequence[s] of the common plan or design of the
crime that the defendant conspired to commit.
[The defendant is not responsible for the acts of another person who was
not a member of the conspiracy even if the acts of the other person
helped accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.]
[A conspiracy member is not responsible for the acts of other conspiracy
members that are done after the goal of the conspiracy had been
accomplished.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2021

185
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction when there is an issue whether the defendant is liable for the
acts of coconspirators. (See People v. Flores (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [9
Cal.Rptr.2d 754] [no sua sponte duty when no issue of independent criminal act by
coconspirator].)
The court must also give either CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy, or CALCRIM No.
416, Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy, with this instruction. The court must also
give all appropriate instructions on the offense or offenses alleged to be the target of
the conspiracy. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 254 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d
827, 926 P.2d 1013].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Under this rule,” if there is evidence
that the defendant was not present at the time of the act. (See People v. Benenato
(1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 356 [175 P.2d 296]; People v. King (1938) 30
Cal.App.2d 185, 203 [85 P.2d 928].)
and “probable,” nor holds that there is a sua sponte duty to define them, a suggested
definition is included. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 291 [58
Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)
Give either of the last two bracketed paragraphs on request, when supported by the
evidence.
CALCRIM No. 418, Coconspirator’s Statements.
AUTHORITY
• Natural and Probable Consequences; Reasonable Person Standard. People v.
Superior Court (Shamis) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 833, 842–843 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d
388]; see People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323]
[in context of aiding and abetting].
• Vicarious Liability of Conspirators. People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 188 [5
Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].
• Must Identify and Describe Target Offense. People v. Prettyman (1996) 14
RELATED ISSUES
Murder
doctrine. Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3). (Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes
2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437), became effective January 1, 2019.) The amendment
participation in a crime.” The question of whether this amendment abolished the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as to attempted murder is unresolved.
186
In deciding whether the People have proved that (the

defendant[s]/Defendant[s] <insert name[s] of defendant[s] if
codefendant trial and this instruction does not apply to all defendants; see
Bench Notes>) committed [any of] the crime[s] charged, you may not
consider any statement made out of court by <insert
name[s] of coconspirator[s]> unless the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
1. Some evidence other than the statement itself establishes that a
conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement was
made;
2. <insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> (was/were) [a]
member[s] of and participating in the conspiracy when (he/she/
they) made the statement;
3. <insert name[s] of coconspirator[s]> made the
statement in order to further the goal of the conspiracy;
AND
4. The statement was made before or during the time that (the
defendant[s]/Defendant[s] <insert name[s] of
defendant[s] if codefendant trial and this instruction does not apply
to all defendants>) (was/were) participating in the conspiracy.
A statement means an oral or written expression, or nonverbal conduct
intended to be a substitute for an oral or written expression.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different standard of proof
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that the fact is more
likely than not to be true.
[You may not consider statements made by a person who was not a
member of the conspiracy even if the statements helped accomplish the
goal of the conspiracy.]
[You may not consider statements made after the goal of the conspiracy
had been accomplished.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
It is an open question whether the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use
of a coconspirator’s statement to incriminate a defendant. (See People v. Prieto
188
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 251–252 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123]; People v. Sully
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1231–1232 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) On request,
the court must give this instruction if the statement has been admitted under
Evidence Code section 1223. (See Evid. Code, § 403(c)(1); see also People v.
Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1198 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981]; People v.
Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 362 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34]; People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 833 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].)
The court must also give either CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy, or CALCRIM No.
416, Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy, with this instruction.
If the coconspirator statement has been admitted against all defendants on trial, then
use “the defendant[s]” in the first sentence and in element 4. If the coconspirator
statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section 1223 against only one or
some of the defendants on trial, insert the names of the defendants to whom this
instruction applies where indicated. For example, if the prosecution is relying on a
statement made by a defendant in the trial, the statement may be used against that
defendant as an admission. However, as to the other defendants, the statement may
be used only if it qualifies under Evidence Code section 1223 or another hearsay
exception. In such cases, insert the names of the other codefendants where indicated
in the first sentence and in element 4.
Give either of the last two bracketed paragraphs on request, when supported by the
evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Hearsay Exception for Coconspirator’s Statements. Evid. Code, § 1223; People v.
Jeffery (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 215 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 526]; People v. Lipinski
(1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 575 [135 Cal.Rptr. 451].
• “Statement” Defined. Evid. Code, § 225.
• Burden of Proof. People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 63 [98
Cal.Rptr.2d 911].
• Independent Evidence Conspiracy Existed at Time of Statement. People v. Leach
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 430, fn. 10, 436 [124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, §§ 141.01[5], 141.02 (Matthew Bender).
189
419. Acts Committed or Statements Made Before Joining
Conspiracy
(The/A) defendant is not responsible for any acts that were done before
(he/ [or] she) joined the conspiracy.
You may consider evidence of acts or statements made before the
defendant joined the conspiracy only to show the nature and goals of the
conspiracy. You may not consider any such evidence to prove that the
defendant is guilty of any crimes committed before (he/ [or] she) joined
the conspiracy.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if there is evidence
suggesting that the defendant joined an alleged conspiracy after the crime was
committed or after an act or statement was made to further the object of the
conspiracy.
AUTHORITY
• Joining Conspiracy After Commission of Crime. People v. Marks (1988) 45
Cal.3d 1335, 1345 [248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]; People v. Feldman (1959)
171 Cal.App.2d 15, 21–22 [339 P.2d 888].
• Use of Prior Acts or Statements. People v. Weiss (1958) 50 Cal.2d 535, 564–566
[327 P.2d 527].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, § 141.02[6] (Matthew Bender).
190
The defendant is not guilty of conspiracy to commit <insert

target offense> if (he/she) withdrew from the alleged conspiracy before
any overt act was committed. To withdraw from a conspiracy, the
defendant must truly and affirmatively reject the conspiracy and
communicate that rejection, by word or by deed, to the other members
of the conspiracy known to the defendant.
[A failure to act is not sufficient alone to withdraw from a conspiracy.]
[If you decide that the defendant withdrew from a conspiracy after an
overt act was committed, the defendant is not guilty of any acts
committed by remaining members of the conspiracy after (he/she)
withdrew.]
the defendant did not withdraw from the conspiracy [before an overt act
was committed]. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of conspiracy. [If the People have not met this
burden, you must also find the defendant not guilty of the additional acts
committed after (he/she) withdrew.]
New January 2006; Revised December 2008

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if there is evidence that the
defendant attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy.
AUTHORITY
• Withdrawal From Conspiracy as Defense. People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d
713, 731 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839].
• Ineffective Withdrawal. People v. Sconce (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 701 [279
Cal.Rptr. 59]; People v. Beaumaster (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 996, 1003 [95
Cal.Rptr. 360].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, § 141.02[6], [7] (Matthew Bender).
191
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with being an accessory to a

felony [in violation of Penal Code section 32].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that:
1. Another person, whom I will call the perpetrator, committed a
felony;
2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator had committed a felony
or that the perpetrator had been charged with or convicted of a
felony;
3. After the felony had been committed, the defendant either
harbored, concealed, or aided the perpetrator;
AND
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that the perpetrator
avoid or escape arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment.
[To decide whether the perpetrator committed the (felony/felonies) of
<insert offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions
that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction defining the elements of the
crime.
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the underlying felony unless it is unclear
that a felony occurred. However, the defendant is entitled to such an instruction on
request. (People v. Shields (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1, 4–5 [271 Cal.Rptr. 228].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 32; People v. Duty (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 100–101
[74 Cal.Rptr. 606].
COMMENTARY
There is no authority defining “harbor.” The committee therefore kept “harbor” in
the instruction. Black’s Law Dictionary defines harbor as “[t]he act of affording
193
lodging, shelter, or refuge to a person, esp. a criminal or illegal alien.” (7th ed.,
1999, at p. 721.) The court may wish to give an additional definition depending on
the facts of the case.
RELATED ISSUES
Accessory and Principal to the Same Crime
There is a split of authority on whether a person may ever be guilty as an accessory
and a principal to the same crime. Early case law held that it was not possible to be
convicted of both because either logic or policy prohibited it. (People v. Prado
(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 271–273 [136 Cal.Rptr. 521]; People v. Francis (1982)
129 Cal.App.3d 241, 246–253 [180 Cal.Rptr. 873].) However, a later case disagreed
with both of these cases and held “that there is no bar to conviction as both
principal and accessory where the evidence shows distinct and independent actions
supporting each crime.” (People v. Mouton (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1324 [19
Cal.Rptr.2d 423], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Prettyman (1996) 14
Cal.4th 248 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; People v. Riley (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 1808, 1816 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; but see People v. Nguyen (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 518, 536 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] [suggesting in dicta that a person guilty
as a principal can never be guilty as an accessory].)
Awareness of the Commission of Other Crimes Insufficient to Establish Guilt as
an Accessory
Awareness that a co-perpetrator has committed other crimes is not enough to find a
person guilty as an accessory to those crimes unless there is evidence that the
person intentionally did something to help the co-perpetrator avoid or escape arrest,
trial, conviction or punishment for those offenses. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 518, 537 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] [defendants’ convictions as accessories to
sexual assaults committed by co-perpetrators in the course of a robbery reversed; no
evidence existed that defendants did anything to help co-perpetrators escape
detection].)
Passive Nondisclosure
Although a person is not guilty of being an accessory if he or she fails or refuses to
give incriminating information about a third party to the police, providing a false
alibi for that person violates the accessory statute. (People v. Duty (1969) 269
Cal.App.2d 97, 103–104 [74 Cal.Rptr. 606].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 112–113.
194
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with soliciting another

person to commit a crime [in violation of Penal Code section 653f].
prove that:
1. The defendant requested [or <insert other synonyms
for solicit as appropriate>] another person to commit [or join in
the commission of] the crime of <insert target
offense>;
[AND]
2. The defendant intended that the crime of <insert
target offense> be committed(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing that person solicited must receive
message; see Bench Notes.>
[AND
3. The other person received the communication containing the
request.]
To decide whether the defendant intended that the person commit
<insert target offense>, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.
<Alternative A—Corroboration by One Witness>
[The crime of solicitation must be proved by the testimony of at least
one witness and corroborating evidence.]
<Alternative B—Corroboration by Two Witnesses>
[The crime of solicitation must be proved by the testimony of at least
two witnesses or by the testimony of one witness and corroborating
evidence.]
Corroborating evidence is evidence that (1) tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime and (2) is independent of the
evidence given by the witness who testified about the solicitation or
independent of the facts testified to by that witness. Corroborating
evidence need not be strong or even enough to establish each element by
itself. Corroborating evidence may include the defendant’s acts,
statements, or conduct, or any other circumstance that tends to connect
(him/her) to the crime.
[A person is guilty of solicitation even if the crime solicited is not
195
completed or even started. The person solicited does not have to agree to
commit the crime.]
[If you find the defendant guilty of solicitation, you must decide how
many crimes (he/she) solicited. When deciding this question, consider the
following factors:
1. Were the crimes solicited part of a plan with a single objective or
motive or did each crime solicited have a different objective or
motive?
2. Were the crimes solicited to be committed at the same time?
3. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same place?
4. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same way?
5. Was the payment, if any, for the crimes solicited one amount or
were different amounts solicited for each crime?
Consider all of these factors when deciding whether the defendant’s
alleged acts were a single crime or <insert number of
solicitations alleged by the People> separate crimes of solicitation.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the target offense.
(See People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].) Give all
relevant instructions on the target crime alleged. If the crime is solicitation to
commit murder, do not instruct on implied malice murder. (People v. Bottger (1983)
142 Cal.App.3d 974, 980–981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].)
One court has held that the person solicited must actually receive the solicitous
communication. (People v. Saephanh (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 458–459 [94
Cal.Rptr.2d 910].) In Saephanh, the defendant mailed a letter from prison containing
a solicitation to harm the fetus of his girlfriend. (Id. at p. 453.) The letter was
intercepted by prison authorities and, thus, never received by the intended person.
(Ibid.) If there is an issue over whether the intended person actually received the
communication, give bracketed element 3.
A blank has also been provided in element one to permit substituting other words
for “solicit.” Other approved language includes: to ask, entreat, implore, importune,
to make petition to, to plead for, to try to obtain, or to offer or invite another to
commit a crime. (People v. Gordon (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 472 [120 Cal.Rptr.
840]; People v. Phillips (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453 [160 P.2d 872]; People v.
196
Sanchez (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1494 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 309]; Laurel v. Superior
Court for Los Angeles County (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [63 Cal.Rptr. 114].)
Penal Code section 653f lists those crimes that may be the target of a solicitation. If
the target crime is listed in subdivision (a) or (b) of that section, insert the bracketed
portion “[or join in the commission of].” If the target crime is listed in subdivision
(c), (d), or (e), of the section, omit that bracketed portion. (See People v. Herman
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1380 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199.)
When instructing on the corroboration requirements, if the target crime is listed in
subdivision (d) or (e) of section 653f, give Alternative A. If the target crime is listed
in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of section 653f, give Alternative B.
Authority is divided on whether the judge or jury is to determine the number of
solicitations if multiple crimes were solicited by the defendant. The bracketed
portion at the end of the instruction should be given if multiple solicitations have
been charged and the trial court determines that this is a question for the jury.
(Compare People v. Davis (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 317, 322–323 [259 Cal.Rptr. 348]
with People v. Morocco (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1454 [237 Cal.Rptr. 113].) If
the court decides to present this issue to the jury, multiple target offenses must be
inserted in elements 1 and 2, and the paragraph immediately following the elements.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 653f.
• Corroboration. People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 75–76 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127,
711 P.2d 423]; People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].
• Solicitation Defined. People v. Gordon (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 472 [120
Cal.Rptr. 840]; People v. Sanchez (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1494 [71
Cal.Rptr.2d 309]; see People v. Herman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1380 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 199] [since a minor cannot violate § 288 by engaging in lewd
conduct with an adult, an adult who asks a minor to engage in such conduct
does not violate § 653f(c)].
RELATED ISSUES
Crime Committed Outside of California
The solicitation of a person in California to commit a felony outside the state
constitutes solicitation. (People v. Burt (1955) 45 Cal.2d 311, 314 [288 P.2d 503].)
Solicitation of Murder
When defining the crime of murder, in the case of a solicitation of murder, the trial
court must not instruct on implied malice as an element of murder. Because the
“crime of solicitation to commit murder occurs when the solicitor purposely seeks to
have someone killed and tries to engage someone to do the killing,” the person must
have express malice to be guilty of the solicitation. (People v. Bottger (1983) 142
Cal.App.3d 974, 981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].) An instruction on murder that includes
implied malice as an element has the potential of confusing the jury. (Ibid.)
197
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, § 141.10 (Matthew Bender).
198
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with soliciting a minor to

commit a crime [in violation of Penal Code section 653j].
prove that:
1. The defendant voluntarily (asked/ [or] encouraged / [or] induced/
[or] intimidated) a minor to commit the crime of
<insert target offense>;
2. (He/She) intended that the minor commit the crime of
<insert target offense>;
[AND]
3. At the time of the offense, the defendant was at least 18 years
old(;/.)
[AND]
<Alternative 4—defendant five years older>
[4. At the time of the offense, the minor was 16 or 17 years old, and
the defendant was at least 5 years older than the minor(;/.)]
[AND
5. The minor received the communication containing the request.]
To decide whether the defendant intended that the minor commit
<insert target offense>, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.
A minor is a person under the age of 18.
[If you find the defendant guilty of solicitation, you must decide how
many crimes (he/she) solicited. When deciding this question, consider the
following factors:
1. Were the crimes solicited part of a plan with a single objective or
motive or did each crime solicited have a different objective or
motive?
2. Were the crimes solicited to be committed at the same time?
3. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same place?
4. Were the crimes solicited to be committed in the same way?
199
5. Was the payment, if any, for the crimes solicited one amount or
were different amounts solicited for each crime?
Consider all of these factors when deciding whether the defendant’s
alleged acts were a single crime or <insert number of
solicitations alleged by the People> separate crimes of solicitation.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the minor is 16 or 17 years old, the jury must find that the defendant is at least 5
years older and the court must instruct sua sponte on element 3A. (Pen. Code,
§ 653j(a).) Give element 3B if element 3A does not apply.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the target offense.
(See People v. Baskins (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 732 [165 P.2d 510].) Give all
relevant instructions on the target crime alleged. Penal Code section 653j lists those
offenses that may be the target of a solicitation of a minor. If the crime is
solicitation to commit murder, do not instruct on implied malice murder. (People v.
Bottger (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 980–981 [191 Cal.Rptr. 408].)
Authority is divided on whether the judge or jury is to determine the number of
solicitations if multiple crimes were solicited by the defendant. The bracketed
portion at the end of the instruction should be given if multiple solicitations have
been charged and the trial court determines that this is a question for the jury.
(Compare People v. Davis (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 317, 322–323 [259 Cal.Rptr. 348]
with People v. Morocco (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1449, 1454 [237 Cal.Rptr. 113].) If
the court decides to present this issue to the jury, multiple target offenses must be
inserted in elements 1 and 2, and the paragraph immediately following the elements.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 653j.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 441, Solicitation: Elements.
200
If the defendant forced another person to commit a crime by

threatening, menacing, commanding, or coercing that person, then the
defendant is guilty of the crime that the defendant forced the other
person to commit.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the theory of liability advanced by
the prosecution. (See People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199
Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and abetting].)
AUTHORITY
• Principals Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
SECONDARY SOURCES
202
450. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Single Theory of
Liability
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with <insert

offense charged> while acting as an (officer/ [or] agent) of a corporation.
The People must prove that the defendant (personally committed/was a
direct participant in) the crime charged. The fact that the defendant is
an (officer/ [or] agent) of the corporation is not sufficient by itself to
support a finding of guilt.
<Alternative A—prosecution alleges only that defendant committed prohibited
act personally>
[To prove that the defendant personally committed the crime charged,
the People must prove that the defendant <insert description
of conduct alleged in offense>.]
<Alternative B—prosecution alleges only that defendant had authority to
control conduct of others>
[To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime
charged, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant had the authority to control <insert
description of conduct alleged in offense>;
[AND]
2. The defendant (failed to/authorized/caused/permitted)
<insert description of conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)]
<Alternative 3A: Give if offense alleged requires only knowledge or
general criminal intent.>
[AND
3. The defendant knew <insert description of knowledge
about conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)]
<Alternative 3B: Give if offense alleged requires specific intent.>
[AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to
<insert description of specific intent required>.]

203
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction in any case where the
defendant is charged as the officer or agent of a corporation. (See Sea Horse Ranch,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681];
Otis v. Superior Court (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].) Repeat this instruction
for each offense, inserting the specific requirements for that offense.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant personally committed some or all of the
acts alleged in the offense, give alternative A. If the prosecution’s theory is solely
that the defendant had control over the conduct alleged, give alternative B. If the
prosecution is pursing both theories of liability, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 451, Liability of Corporate Offıcers and Agents: Two Theories of
Liability.
Give element 3A if the alleged offense requires knowledge or general criminal intent
by the defendant. (See Sea Horse Ranch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456–458;
People v. Epstein (1931) 118 Cal.App. 7, 10 [4 P.2d 555].) Give element 3B if
specific intent is required. If a strict-liability offense is alleged, give only elements 1
and 2. (See People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d
348].)
Example
In Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 681], the defendant was charged as the president of a corporation with
involuntary manslaughter based on a horse’s escape from the ranch that caused a
fatal vehicle accident. The instruction in such a case could read:
To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime charged, the
People must prove that:
1. The defendant had the authority to control the maintenance of the fences.
2. The defendant failed to ensure that the fences were properly maintained.
AND
3. The defendant knew that horses had repeatedly escaped from the ranch
due to poor maintenance of the fences.
AUTHORITY
• Liability of Corporate Officer or Agent. Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; see People v.
Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348]; Otis v. Superior
Court (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 117–118.
204
451. Liability of Corporate Officers and Agents: Two Theories of
Liability
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with <insert

offense charged> while acting as an (officer/ [or] agent) of a corporation.
The People must prove that the defendant either personally committed
or was a direct participant in the crime charged. The fact that the
defendant is an (officer/ [or] agent) of the corporation is not sufficient by
itself to support a finding of guilt.
To prove that the defendant personally committed the crime charged, the
People must prove that the defendant <insert description of
conduct alleged in offense>.
To prove that the defendant was a direct participant in the crime
charged, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant had the authority to control <insert
description of conduct alleged in offense>;
[AND]
2. The defendant (failed to/authorized/caused/permitted)
<insert description of conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)
<Alternative 3A: Give if offense alleged requires only knowledge or
general criminal intent.>
[AND
3. The defendant knew <insert description of knowledge
about conduct alleged in offense>(;/.)]
<Alternative 3B: Give if offense alleged requires specific intent.>
[AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to ___________
<insert description of specific intent required>.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction in any case where the
defendant is charged as the officer or agent of a corporation. (See Sea Horse Ranch,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681];
Otis v. Superior Court (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].) Repeat this instruction
206
for each offense, inserting the specific requirements for that offense.
If the prosecution alleges only one theory of liability, do not give this instruction.
Give CALCRIM No. 450, Liability of Corporate Offıcers and Agents: Single Theory
of Liability.
Give element 3A if the alleged offense requires knowledge or general criminal intent
by the defendant. (See Sea Horse Ranch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 456–458;
People v. Epstein (1931) 118 Cal.App. 7, 10 [4 P.2d 555].) Give element 3B if
specific intent is required. If a strict-liability offense is alleged, give only elements 1
and 2. (See People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d
348].)
For an example of how to complete this instruction, see the Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 450, Liability of Corporate Offıcers and Agents: Single Theory of
Liability.
It is unclear if the court is required to instruct on unanimity. For a discussion of
instructional requirements on unanimity, see CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.
AUTHORITY
• Liability of Corporate Officer or Agent. Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456–458 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681]; see People v.
Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348]; Otis v. Superior
Court (1905) 148 Cal. 129, 131 [82 P. 853].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 117–118.
207
E. ATTEMPT
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with attempted

prove that:
1. The defendant took a direct but ineffective step toward
committing <insert target offense>;
AND
2. The defendant intended to commit <insert target
offense>.
A direct step requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit
<insert target offense> or obtaining or arranging for
something needed to commit <insert target offense>. A
direct step is one that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows
that a person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct step
indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to commit
<insert target offense>. It is a direct movement towards the commission
of the crime after preparations are made. It is an immediate step that
puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have been completed if
some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt.
[A person who attempts to commit <insert target offense> is
guilty of attempted <insert target offense> even if, after
taking a direct step towards committing the crime, he or she abandoned
further efforts to complete the crime or if his or her attempt failed or
was interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control. On
the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her
plans before taking a direct step toward committing <insert
target offense>, then that person is not guilty of attempted
To decide whether the defendant intended to commit
<insert target offense>, please refer to the separate instructions that I
(will give/have given) you on that crime.
[The defendant may be guilty of attempt even if you conclude that
<insert target offense> was actually completed.]

209
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the crime of attempt
when charged, or, if not charged, when the evidence raises a question whether all
the elements of the charged offense are present. (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19
If the jury is instructed on attempted criminal threat, give the following third
element, as required by People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 525 [176
Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 332 P.3d 538], along with CALCRIM No. 1300, Criminal Threat.
3. The intended criminal threat was sufficient under the circumstances to
cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.
If an attempted crime is charged, give the first bracketed paragraph and choose the
phrase “this crime” in the opening line of the second paragraph. If an attempted
crime is not charged but is a lesser included offense, omit the first bracketed
paragraph and insert the attempted target offense in the opening line of the second
paragraph.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person who attempts to commit”
if abandonment is an issue.
If the attempted crime is murder, do not give this instruction; instead give the
specific instruction on attempted murder. (People v. Santascoy (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 909, 918 [200 Cal.Rptr. 709]; see CALCRIM No. 600, Attempted
Murder.)
Do not give this instruction if the crime charged is assault. There can be no attempt
to commit assault, since an assault is by definition an attempted battery. (In re
James M. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
If instructing on attempt to escape, see People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740,
748–752 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 279 P.3d 1120] [specific intent to escape and intent
to avoid further confinement required].
AUTHORITY
• Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664; People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th
221, 229–230 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051].
• Conviction for Charged Attempt Even If Crime Is Completed. Pen. Code, § 663.
RELATED ISSUES
Insufficient Evidence of Attempt
The court is not required to instruct on attempt as a lesser-included offense unless
there is sufficient evidence that the crime charged was not completed. (People v.
Aguilar (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1436 [263 Cal.Rptr. 314]; People v. Llamas
210
(1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1743–1744 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 357]; People v. Strunk

Legal or Factual Impossibility
Although legal impossibility is a defense to attempt, factual impossibility is not.
(People v. Cecil (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 769, 775–777 [179 Cal.Rptr. 736]; People v.
Meyer (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 496, 504–505 [215 Cal.Rptr. 352].)
Solicitation
Some courts have concluded that a mere solicitation is not an attempt. (People v.
Adami (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 452, 457 [111 Cal.Rptr. 544]; People v. La Fontaine
(1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 176, 183 [144 Cal.Rptr. 729], overruled on other grounds in
People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 292–293 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d
713].) At least one court disagrees, stating that simply because “an invitation to
participate in the defendant’s commission of a crime consists only of words does not
mean it cannot constitute an ‘act’ toward the completion of the crime, particularly
where the offense by its nature consists of or requires the requested type of
participation.” (People v. Herman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1387 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 199] [attempted lewd acts on a child under Pen. Code, § 288(c)(1)]; see
People v. Delvalle (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 877 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 725.)
Specific Intent Crime
An attempted offense is a specific intent crime, even if the underlying crime requires
only general intent. (See People v. Martinez (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 938, 942 [165
Cal.Rptr. 11].) However, an attempt is not possible if the underlying crime can only
be committed unintentionally. (See People v. Johnson (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329,
1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798] [no attempted involuntary manslaughter].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
211
HOMICIDE
506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on
Property
D. FELONY MURDER
540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
(Pen. Code, § 189)
540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
(Pen. Code, § 189)
540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death (Pen.
Code, § 189)
213
HOMICIDE

F. MANSLAUGHTER
(i) Voluntary
570. Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen.
Code, § 192(a))
(ii) Involuntary
582. Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not
Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(b))
(iii) Vehicular
§ 191.5(b))
G. ATTEMPT
601. Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 189,
664(a))
602. Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial Officer, or Custody
Assistant (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664(e))
603. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense
(Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
604. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included
Offense (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
214
HOMICIDE

626. Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes
(Pen. Code, § 29.4)
J. CHARGE TO JURY
640. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is
Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for
Each Level of Homicide
Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty
Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and
Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses
Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for
Each Level of Homicide
Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty
Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and
Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses
701. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6,
1990
702. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5,
1990—Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(c))
703. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5,
1990—Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d))
707. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen. Code, § 1111)
708. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No
215
HOMICIDE
Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen. Code, § 1111)

721. Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same Case) (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(3))
722. Special Circumstances: By Means of Destructive Device (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(4) & (6))
723. Special Circumstances: Murder to Prevent Arrest or Complete Escape (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(5))
724. Special Circumstances: Murder of Peace Officer, Federal Officer, or
Firefighter (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(7), (8) & (9))
726. Special Circumstances: Murder of Judge, Prosecutor, Government Official, or
Juror (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11), (12), (13) & (20))
727. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—Before March 8, 2000 (Former Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(15))
§ 190.2(a)(15))
729. Special Circumstances: Murder Because of Race, Religion, or Nationality
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(16))
730. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(17))
731. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Kidnapping With
Intent to Kill After March 8, 2000 (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
732. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Arson With Intent
to Kill (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
736. Special Circumstances: Killing by Street Gang Member (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(22))
737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker (Pen. Code,
§ 190.25)
750. Special Circumstances: Prior Murder Conviction (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(2))—Trial on Prior Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b))
216
HOMICIDE
L. DEATH PENALTY
763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as Aggravating or
Mitigating (Pen. Code, § 190.3)
217
Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. (Murder/ [and]

(Manslaughter/manslaughter)) (is/are) [a] type[s] of homicide. The
defendant is charged with (murder/ [and] manslaughter). [Manslaughter
is a lesser offense to murder.]
[A homicide can be lawful or unlawful. If a person kills with a legally
valid excuse or justification, the killing is lawful and he or she has not
committed a crime. If there is no legally valid excuse or justification, the
killing is unlawful and, depending on the circumstances, the person is
guilty of either murder or manslaughter. You must decide whether the
killing in this case was unlawful and, if so, what specific crime was
committed. I will now instruct you in more detail on what is a legally
permissible excuse or justification for homicide.] [I will [also] instruct
you on the different types of (murder/ [and] manslaughter).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction should be given if there are multiple theories of homicide or
evidence supporting justification or excuse, as a way of introducing the jury to the
law of homicide.
If no homicide defense instructions are given, do not give the bracketed language in
the second paragraph beginning “A homicide can be lawful . . . .” If no instructions
will be given on offenses other than first degree murder, do not give the last
bracketed sentence.
AUTHORITY
• Homicide Defined. People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 87 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475,
539 P.2d 43].
• Justification or Excuse. Pen. Code, § 189.5; People v. Frye (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217], disapproved on other grounds in People
v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832
[85 Cal.Rptr.3d 664].
COMMENTARY
The committee decided that a short introduction on the law of homicide would help
219
CALCRIM No. 500 HOMICIDE
the jury understand basic principles governing a complicated body of law. By giving
the jury a simple framework, this instruction will help the jurors understand the rest
of the instructions. Although “homicide” is a classic legal term, the committee
decided to use the word because it appears to now be a part of lay vocabulary and
therefore easily recognizable by jurors.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 96, 102–103.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01, 142.02 (Matthew Bender).
220
The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/ attempted

murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she) was justified
in (killing/attempting to kill) someone in (self-defense/ [or] defense of
another). The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of
another) if:
1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/
[or] <insert name or description of third party>) was
in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury [or was in imminent danger of being a victim of
( <insert inherently forcible and atrocious crime such as
rape or mayhem>/<insert noninherently forcible and atrocious crime
such as robbery>under circumstances in which (he/she) reasonably
believed that (he/she) would suffer great bodily injury or death)];
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of
deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger;
AND
3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary
to defend against that danger.
Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely
the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or]
someone else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she)
must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only
entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would
believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more
force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified.
When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider
all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the
defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation
with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs
were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
[The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened
may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not
true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed
that the information was true.]
[If you find that <insert name of decedent/victim> threatened
221
or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that
information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs
were reasonable.]
[If you find that the defendant knew that <insert name of
decedent/victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may
consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct
and beliefs were reasonable.]
[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past, is
justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures
against that person.]
[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that
(he/she) reasonably associated with <insert name of
decedent/victim>, you may consider that threat in deciding whether the
defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/[or] defense of
another).]
[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his
or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary,
to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/great bodily injury/
<insert forcible and atrocious crime>) has passed. This is so
even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]
[Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]
the [attempted] killing was not justified. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or]
manslaughter/ attempted murder/ [or] attempted voluntary
manslaughter).
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2012, September 2020, March
2022, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense when: “it appears that
the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence
supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s
theory of the case.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77
Cal.Rtpr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing duty to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter as lesser included offense, but also discussing duty to instruct on
defenses generally]; see also People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478 [249
Cal.Rptr. 897] [if substantial evidence of self-defense exists, court must instruct sua
222
HOMICIDE CALCRIM No. 505
sponte and let jury decide credibility of witnesses].)

If there is substantial evidence of self-defense that is inconsistent with the
defendant’s testimony, the court must ascertain whether the defendant wants an
instruction on self-defense. (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 156.) The
court is then required to give the instruction if the defendant so requests. (People v.
Elize (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 611–615 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 35].)
On defense request and when supported by sufficient evidence, the court must
instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats and assaults
against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant’s conduct.” (People v.
Garvin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].) The court must also
instruct that the jury may consider previous threats or assaults by the aggressor
against someone else or threats received by the defendant from a third party that the
defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (See People v. Pena (1984) 151
Cal.App.3d 462, 475 [198 Cal.Rptr. 819]; People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055,
1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337].)
Forcible and atrocious crimes are generally those crimes whose character and
manner reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm. (People v. Ceballos
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241].) In Ceballos, the court
identified murder, mayhem, rape, and robbery as examples of forcible and atrocious
crimes. (Id. at p. 478.) However, as noted in People v. Morales (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 978, 992–993 [284 Cal.Rptr.3d 693], Ceballos involved a burglary, not
a robbery, and contemplated the traditional common law robbery, which, unlike the
modern understanding of robbery in California, did not include situations where
very little force or threat of force is involved. Morales concluded that “[a] robbery
therefore cannot trigger the right to use deadly force in self-defense unless the
circumstances of the robbery gave rise to a reasonable belief that the victim would
suffer great bodily injury or death.” (Id. at p. 992.)
The second sentence of the great bodily injury definition could result in error if the
prosecution improperly argues great bodily injury may be shown by greater than
minor injury alone. (Compare People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519,
533–535 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 867] [the definition was reasonably susceptible to
prosecutor’s erroneous argument that the injury need only be greater than minor]
with People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 466 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 86]
[upholding instructions containing great bodily injury definition as written].)
CALCRIM Nos. 506–511, Justifiable and Excusable Homicides.
CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions: Defense of Self, Another,
Property.
CALCRIM No. 571, Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect
Defense of Another—Lesser Included Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Justifiable Homicide. Pen. Code, §§ 197–199.
223
• Fear. Pen. Code, § 198.

• Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
• Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; People v. Banks (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d
379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
• Elements. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d
142, 921 P.2d 1].
• Forcible and Atrocious Crimes. People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp.
478–479; People v. Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992–993.
• Imminence. People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr.
167], overruled on other grounds in People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p.
1089.
• No Duty to Retreat. People v. Hughes (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 493 [237
P.2d 64]; People v. Hatchett (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].
• Reasonable Belief. People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1082; People v.
Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal.Rptr. 682].
• Must Act Under Influence of Fear Alone. Pen. Code, § 198.
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Lopez (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306
[132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832 [85
Cal.Rptr.3d 664].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 197, subdivision 1 provides that self-defense may be used in
response to threats of death or great bodily injury, or to resist the commission of a
felony. (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 1.) However, in People v. Ceballos, supra, 12
Cal.3d at pp. 477–479, the court held that although the latter part of section 197
appears to apply when a person resists the commission of any felony, it should be
read in light of common law principles that require the felony to be: “some
atrocious crime attempted to be committed by force.” (Id. at p. 478.) This
instruction is therefore written to provide that self-defense may be used in response
to threats of great bodily injury or death or to resist the commission of forcible and
atrocious crimes.
RELATED ISSUES
Imperfect Self-Defense
Most courts hold that an instruction on imperfect self-defense is required in every
case in which a court instructs on perfect self-defense. If there is substantial
evidence of a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense, there will always be
substantial evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction because the
reasonableness of that belief will always be at issue. (People v. Ceja (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 78, 85–86 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475], overruled on other grounds in People
v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; People v.
De Leon (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 825].) The court in People
224
v. Rodriguez disagreed, however, and found that an imperfect self-defense

instruction was not required sua sponte on the facts of the case where defendant’s
version of the crime “could only lead to an acquittal based on justifiable homicide,”
and when the prosecutor’s version could only lead to a conviction of first degree
murder. (People v. Rodriguez (1992) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1275 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d
345]; see also People v. Williams (1997) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441,
841 P.2d 961] [in rape prosecution, no mistake-of-fact instruction was required when
two sides gave wholly divergent accounts with no middle ground to support a
mistake-of-fact instruction].)
No Defense for Initial Aggressor
An aggressor whose victim fights back in self-defense may not invoke the doctrine
of self-defense against the victim’s legally justified acts. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) If the aggressor attempts
to break off the fight and communicates this to the victim, but the victim continues
to attack, the aggressor may use self-defense against the victim to the same extent
as if he or she had not been the initial aggressor. (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 3; People
v. Trevino (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 [246 Cal.Rptr. 357]; see CALCRIM No.
3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor.) In addition, if the
victim responds with a sudden escalation of force, the aggressor may legally defend
against the use of force. (People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10
Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; see CALCRIM No. 3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat
or Initial Aggressor.)
Transferred Intent Applies
“[T]he doctrine of self-defense is available to insulate one from criminal
responsibility where his act, justifiably in self-defense, inadvertently results in the
injury of an innocent bystander.” (People v. Mathews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018,
1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see also People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337,
1357 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304].) There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on this principle,
although such an instruction must be given on request when substantial evidence
supports it. (People v. Mathews, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 1025; see also
CALCRIM No. 562, Transferred Intent.)
Definition of “Imminent”
In People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1089, the jury requested clarification of
the term “imminent.” In response, the trial court instructed:
“Imminent peril,” as used in these instructions, means that the peril must have
existed or appeared to the defendant to have existed at the very time the fatal
shot was fired. In other words, the peril must appear to the defendant as
immediate and present and not prospective or even in the near future. An
imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.
(Ibid.)
225
The Court of Appeal agreed with this definition of “imminent.” (Id. at pp.
1187–1190 [citing People v. Scoggins (1869) 37 Cal. 676, 683–684].)
Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment
In People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the
court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense
should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. “The common
law does not take account of a person’s mental capacity when determining whether
he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds ‘the
mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the
person were a normal, prudent person.’ (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984)
§ 32, p. 177.)” (Ibid.; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 283B.)
Reasonable Person Standard and Physical Limitations
A defendant’s physical limitations are relevant when deciding the reasonable person
standard for self-defense. (People v. Horn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 672, 686 [277
Cal.Rptr.3d 901].) See also CALCRIM No. 3429, Reasonable Person Standard for
Physically Disabled Person.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11, 73.12 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
226
506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person
Within Home or on Property

murder/ [or] attempted voluntary manslaughter) if (he/she)
(killed/attempted to kill) to defend (himself/herself) [or any other person]
in the defendant’s home. Such (a/an) [attempted] killing is justified, and
therefore not unlawful, if:
1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she) was defending a
home against <insert name of decedent>, who
(intended to or tried to commit ___________ <insert forcible and
atrocious crime>/ [or] violently[[,] [or] riotously[,]/ [or]
tumultuously] tried to enter that home intending to commit an
act of violence against someone inside);
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the danger was imminent;
3. The defendant reasonably believed that the use of deadly force
was necessary to defend against the danger;
AND
to defend against the danger.
imminent danger of violence to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else).
Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have
acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use
that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary
in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was
reasonable, then the [attempted] killing was not justified.
to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/
<insert forcible and atrocious crime>) has passed. This is so
even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]
227
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of [attempted] (murder/
[or] manslaughter).
New January 2006; Revised September 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give defense instructions supported by
substantial evidence and not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.
(See People v. Baker (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 803]; People
v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195 [47 Cal.Rtpr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531]; People v.
Slater (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 358, 367–368 [140 P.2d 846] [error to refuse
instruction based on Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2 when substantial evidence supported
inference that victim intended to enter the habitation].)
Penal Code section 197, subdivision 2 provides that “defense of habitation” may be
used to resist someone who “intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to
commit a felony . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2.) However, in People v. Ceballos
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 477–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241], the court held
that the felony feared must be “some atrocious crime attempted to be committed by
force.” (Id. at p. 478.) Forcible and atrocious crimes are those crimes whose
character and manner reasonably create a fear of death or serious bodily harm. (Id.)
Ceballos specifically held that burglaries which “do not reasonably create a fear of
great bodily harm” are not sufficient “cause for exaction of human life.” (Ibid.)
Thus, although the statute refers to “defense of habitation,” Ceballos requires that a
person be at risk of great bodily harm or an atrocious felony in order to justify
homicide. (Ibid.) The instruction has been drafted accordingly.
If the defendant is asserting that he or she was resisting the commission of a
forcible and atrocious crime, give the first option in element 1 and insert the name
of the crime. If there is substantial evidence that the defendant was resisting a
violent entry into a residence for the general purpose of committing violence against
someone inside, give the second option in element 1. (See Pen. Code, § 197, subd.
2.) The court may give the bracketed words “riotously” and “tumultuously” at its
discretion.
CALCRIM No. 3477, Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death
or Great Bodily Injury.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 2.
• Actual and Reasonable Fear. See Pen. Code, § 198; see People v. Curtis (1994)
30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1361 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304].
• Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5.
• Fear of Imminent Harm. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56
228
Cal.Rtpr.2d 146, 921 P.2d 1]; People v. Lucas (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 305, 310
[324 P.2d 933].
• Forcible and Atrocious Crimes. People v. Ceballos, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp.
478–479; People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 992–993 [284
Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
SECONDARY SOURCES
229
The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter/attempted

(killed/attempted to kill) someone while (acting as a peace officer/obeying
a peace officer’s command for aid and assistance). (A/An) [attempted]
killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:
1. The defendant was (a peace officer/obeying a peace officer’s
command for aid and assistance);
AND
2. The [attempted] killing was committed while the defendant
either:
A. Reasonably believed, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the force was necessary to defend against
an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the
defendant or another person;
OR
B. Reasonably believed, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that:
B1. <insert name of fleeing felon> was fleeing;
B2. The force was necessary to arrest or detain
<insert name of fleeing felon> for the crime of
<insert name of felony>;
B3. The commission of the crime of <insert name
of felony> created a risk of or resulted in death or serious
bodily injury to another person;
AND
B4. <insert name of fleeing felon> would cause
death or serious bodily injury to another person unless
immediately arrested or detained.
[A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical
condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of
consciousness/ concussion/ bone fracture/ protracted loss or impairment
of function of any bodily member or organ/ a wound requiring extensive
suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).]
[A threat of death or serious bodily injury is imminent when, based on
the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same
situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity,
230
and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury

to the peace officer or to another person. An imminent harm is not
merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no
matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from
appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.]
[Totality of the circumstances means all facts known to the defendant at
the time, including the conduct of the defendant and <insert
name of decedent> leading up to the use of deadly force.]
[Deadly force means any use of force that creates a substantial risk of
causing death or serious bodily injury. Deadly force includes, but is not
limited to, the discharge of a firearm.]
[A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not
retreat or stop because the person being arrested is resisting or
threatening to resist. A peace officer does not lose (his/her) right to self-
defense by using objectively reasonable force to arrest or to prevent
escape or to overcome resistance.]
[A person who is employed as a police officer by <insert
name of agency that employs police offıcer> is a peace officer.]
[A person employed by <insert name of agency that employs
peace offıcer, e.g., “the Department of Fish and Wildlife”> is a peace officer
if <insert description of facts necessary to make employee a
peace offıcer, e.g, “designated by the director of the agency as a peace
offıcer”>.]
[or] manslaughter).
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, April 2020,
September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on justifiable homicide when “it appears
that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence
theory of the case.” (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 156 [77
Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [addressing sua sponte duty to instruct on self-
defense].)
Penal Code sections 196 and 835a, as amended by Statutes 2019, ch.170 (A.B. 392),
became effective on January 1, 2020. If the defendant’s act occurred before this
231
date, the court should give the prior version of this instruction.
The jury must determine whether the defendant was a peace officer. (People v.
Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The
court may instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the
statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve
Police Officer are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may not instruct the
jury that the defendant was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed
was a peace officer”). (Ibid.) If the defendant is a police officer, give the bracketed
sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the defendant
is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A
person employed by.”
CALCRIM No. 508, Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Offıcer).
CALCRIM No. 509, Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Offıcer Preserving the Peace.
AUTHORITY
• Justifiable Homicide by Peace Officer. Pen. Code, §§ 196, 199, 835a.
• Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; People v. Frye (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148,
1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217]; People v. Banks (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379,
383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
• Peace Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); People v. Taylor (2004)
118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
• Deadly Force Defined. Pen. Code, § 835a(e).
COMMENTARY
Graham Factors
In determining reasonableness, the inquiry is whether the officer’s actions are
objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
(Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396 [109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443].)
Factors relevant to the totality of the circumstances may include those listed in
Graham, but those factors are not exclusive. (See Glenn v. Washington County (9th
Cir. 2011) 673 F.3d 864, 872.) The Graham factors may not all apply in a given
case. (See People v. Perry (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 444, 473, fn. 18 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d
522].) Conduct and tactical decisions preceding an officer’s use of deadly force are
relevant considerations. (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639
[160 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 305 P.3d 252] [in context of negligence liability].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.15[1] (Matthew Bender).
232

233

(killed/attempted to kill) someone while trying to arrest him or her for a
violent felony. Such (a/an) [attempted] killing is justified, and therefore
not unlawful, if:
1. The defendant committed the [attempted] killing while lawfully
trying to arrest or detain <insert name of decedent>
for committing (the crime of <insert forcible and
atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily
injury>/ <insert crime decedent was suspected of
committing, e.g., burglary>, and that crime threatened the
defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
2. <insert name of decedent> actually committed (the
crime of <insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e.,
felony that threatened death or great bodily injury>/
<insert crime decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>,
and that crime threatened the defendant or others with death or
great bodily injury);
3. The defendant had reason to believe that <insert
name of decedent> had committed (the crime of
<insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death
or great bodily injury>/ <insert crime decedent was
suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>, and that crime threatened
the defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
[4. The defendant had reason to believe that <insert
name of decedent> posed a threat of death or great bodily injury,
either to the defendant or to others];
AND
5. The [attempted] killing was necessary to prevent ’s
<insert name of decedent> escape.
A person has reason to believe that someone [poses a threat of death or
great bodily injury or] committed (the crime of <insert
forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily
injury> / <insert crime decedent was suspected of committing,
e.g., burglary>, and that crime threatened the defendant or others with
death or great bodily injury) when facts known to the person would
persuade someone of reasonable caution to have (that/those) belief[s].
Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
234
an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

[or] manslaughter).
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
defense].)
It is unclear whether the defendant must always have probable cause to believe that
the victim poses a threat of future harm or if it is sufficient if the defendant knows
that the victim committed a forcible and atrocious crime. In Tennessee v. Garner
(1985) 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11 [105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1], the Supreme Court held
that, under the Fourth Amendment, deadly force may not be used by a law
enforcement officer to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed suspected felon
unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury
to the officer or others. “Garner necessarily limits the scope of justification for
homicide under section 197, subdivision 4, and other similar statutes from the date
of that decision.” (People v. Martin (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1111, 1124 [214
Cal.Rptr. 873].) In a footnote, Garner, supra, 471 U.S. 1, 16, fn. 15, noted that
California law permits a killing in either situation, that is either when the suspect
has committed an atrocious crime or when the suspect poses a threat of future harm.
(See also Long Beach Police Offıcers Assn v. City of Long Beach (1976) 61
Cal.App.3d 364, 371–375 [132 Cal.Rptr. 348] [also stating the rule as “either” but
quoting police regulations, which require that the officer always believe there is a
risk of future harm].) The committee has provided both options. See People v.
Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478–479 [116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 526 P.2d 241]. The
court should review relevant case law before giving bracketed element 4.
235
CALCRIM No. 507, Justifiable Homicide: By Public Offıcer.
CALCRIM No. 509, Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Offıcer Preserving the Peace.
AUTHORITY
• Justifiable Homicide to Preserve the Peace. Pen. Code, §§ 197, subd. 4, 199.
• Lawful Resistance to Commission of Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
• Private Persons, Authority to Arrest. Pen. Code, § 837.
1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
• Felony Must Threaten Death or Great Bodily Injury. People v. Piorkowski (1974)
41 Cal.App.3d 324, 328–329 [115 Cal.Rptr. 830].
RELATED ISSUES
Felony Must Actually Be Committed
A private citizen may use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon only if the
suspect in fact committed the felony and the person using deadly force had
reasonable cause to believe so. (People v. Lillard (1912) 18 Cal.App. 343, 345 [123
P. 221].)
Felony Committed Must Threaten Death or Great Bodily Injury
Deadly force is permissible to apprehend a felon if “the felony committed is one
which threatens death or great bodily injury . . . .” (People v. Piorkowski (1974) 41
Cal.App.3d 324, 328–329 [115 Cal.Rptr. 830]).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.15[1], [3] (Matthew Bender).
236
509. Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the
Peace

(killed/attempted to kill) someone while preserving the peace. Such (a/an)
[attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:
1. The defendant committed the [attempted] killing while lawfully
(suppressing a riot/keeping and preserving the peace);
2. The defendant had probable cause to believe that
<insert name of decedent> posed a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the defendant or someone else;
AND
3. The [attempted] killing was necessary to lawfully (suppress a riot/
keep and preserve the peace).
A person has probable cause to believe that someone poses a threat of
serious physical harm when facts known to the person would persuade
someone of reasonable caution that the other person is going to cause
serious physical harm to another.
[A riot occurs when two or more people, acting together and without
legal authority, disturb the public peace by use of force or violence or by
threat to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry out
those threats.]
[A disturbance of the public peace may happen in any place of
confinement. <insert name of detention facility> is a place of
confinement.]
[or] manslaughter).
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
237
defense].)
CALCRIM No. 507, Justifiable Homicide: By Public Offıcer.
CALCRIM No. 508, Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Offıcer).
AUTHORITY
• Justifiable Homicide to Preserve the Peace. Pen. Code, §§ 197, subd. 4, 199.
• Lawful Resistance to the Commission of an Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 692–694.
• Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404(a).
1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
RELATED ISSUES
Person Using Force Must Fear Imminent Death or Bodily Injury
“Deadly force may not be used to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed
suspected felon unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others.” (Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471
U.S. 1, 3, 11 [105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1].) “Garner necessarily limits the scope
of justification for homicide under section 197, subdivision 4, and other similar
statutes from the date of that decision.” (People v. Martin (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d
1111, 1124 [214 Cal.Rptr. 873].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
238
The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter) if (he/she)

killed someone:
1. By accident and misfortune;
OR
1. If the defendant was doing a lawful act in a lawful way;
2. The defendant was acting with usual and ordinary caution;
AND
3. The defendant was acting without an unlawful intent to commit
(murder/ [or] manslaughter).
A person acts with usual and ordinary caution if he or she acts in a way
that a reasonably careful person would act in the same or similar
situation.
the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on accident. (People v. Anderson
When this instruction is given, it should always be given in conjunction with
CALCRIM No. 581, Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged or CALCRIM
No. 580, Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense, unless vehicular
manslaughter with ordinary negligence is charged. (People v. Velez (1983) 144
Cal.App.3d 558, 566–568 [192 Cal.Rptr. 686].) A lawful act can be the basis of
involuntary manslaughter, but only if that act is committed with criminal negligence
(“in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection”). (Pen. Code,
§ 192(b).) The level of negligence described in this instruction, 510, is ordinary
negligence. While proof of ordinary negligence is sufficient to prevent a killing from
being excused under Penal Code section 195, subd. 1, proof of ordinary negligence
is not sufficient to find a defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter under Penal
Code section 192(b). (People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d
926].)
CALCRIM No. 3404, Accident.
239
AUTHORITY
• Excusable Homicide. Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 1; People v. Garnett (1908) 9
Cal.App. 194, 203–204 [98 P. 247], disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Collup (1946) 27 Cal.2d 829, 838–839 [167 P.2d 714] and People v. Bouchard
(1957) 49 Cal.2d 438, 441–442 [317 P.2d 971].
1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
• Instructing With Involuntary Manslaughter. People v. Velez (1983) 144
Cal.App.3d 558, 566–568 [192 Cal.Rptr. 686].
RELATED ISSUES
Traditional Self-Defense
In People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1358–1359 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 304],
the court held that the claim that a killing was accidental bars the defendant from
relying on traditional self-defense not only as a defense, but also to negate implied
malice. However, in People v. Elize (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 610–616 [84
Cal.Rptr.2d 35], the court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to give self-defense instructions where the defendant testified
that the gun discharged accidentally. Elize relies on two Supreme Court opinions,
People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rtpr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531], and
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
Because Curtis predates these opinions, Elize appears to be the more persuasive
authority.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.01[5], 73.16 (Matthew Bender).
240
The defendant is not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter) if (he/she)

killed someone by accident while acting in the heat of passion. Such a
killing is excused, and therefore not unlawful, if, at the time of the
killing:
1. The defendant acted in the heat of passion;
2. The defendant was (suddenly provoked by <insert
name of decedent>/ [or] suddenly drawn into combat by
<insert name of decedent>);
3. The defendant did not take undue advantage of
<insert name of decedent>;
4. The defendant did not use a dangerous weapon;
5. The defendant did not kill <insert name of decedent>
in a cruel or unusual way;
6. The defendant did not intend to kill <insert name of
decedent> and did not act with conscious disregard of the danger
to human life;
AND
7. The defendant did not act with criminal negligence.
A person acts in the heat of passion when he or she is provoked into
doing a rash act under the influence of intense emotion that obscures his
or her reasoning or judgment. The provocation must be sufficient to have
caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.
Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It
can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without
due deliberation and reflection.
In order for the killing to be excused on this basis, the defendant must
have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I
have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight
or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur
over a short or long period of time.
It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant
is not allowed to set up (his/her) own standard of conduct. You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation
was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation
241
and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather
than judgment.
[A dangerous weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is
inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it
is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]
[An object is inherently deadly if it is deadly or dangerous in the
ordinary use for which it was designed.]
Criminal negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness,
inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with criminal
negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a way that creates a high risk of death or great
bodily injury;
AND
In other words, a person acts with criminal negligence when the way he
or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would
act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for
human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.
the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, September 2019, September 2020, March
2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on accident and heat of passion that
excuses homicide when there is evidence supporting the defense. (People v.
Hampton (1929) 96 Cal.App. 157, 159–160 [273 P. 854] [court erred in refusing
defendant’s requested instruction].)
Give the bracketed phrase “that is inherently deadly or one” and give the bracketed
definition of inherently deadly only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of
law. (People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d
156].)
242
CALCRIM No. 510, Excusable Homicide: Accident.
CALCRIM No. 3471, Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor.
CALCRIM No. 570, Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included
Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Excusable Homicide if Committed in Heat of Passion. Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 2.
1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
• Deadly Weapon Defined. See People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023,
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Inherently Deadly Defined. People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232
Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42]; People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023,
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Examples of Noninherently Deadly Weapon. People v. Aledamat (2019) 8
Cal.5th 1, 6 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 447 P.3d 277] [box cutter]; People v. Perez
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1065 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.3d 42] [vehicle]; People
v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188 [153 P.2d 315] [knife].
RELATED ISSUES
Distinguished From Voluntary Manslaughter
Under Penal Code section 195, subd. 2, a homicide is “excusable,” “in the heat of
passion” if done “by accident,” or on “sudden . . . provocation . . . or . . .
combat.” (Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 2.) Thus, unlike voluntary manslaughter, the
killing must have been committed without criminal intent, that is, accidentally. (See
People v. Cooley (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 173, 204 [27 Cal.Rptr. 543], disapproved
on other grounds in People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 778, fn. 1 [69 Cal.Rptr.
102, 441 P.2d 942]; Pen. Code, § 195, subd. 1 [act must be without criminal intent];
Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5 [accident requires absence of “evil design [or] intent”].)
The killing must also be on “sudden” provocation, eliminating the possibility of
provocation over time, which may be considered in cases of voluntary manslaughter.
(See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 570, Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of
Passion—Lesser Included Offense.)
Distinguished From Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter requires a finding of gross or criminal negligence. (See
Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 581, Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not
243
Charged; Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5 [accident requires no “culpable negligence”].)

SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 230.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[1][b], [g], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
244
The law presumes that a killing is not criminal if the person killed dies
more than three years and one day from the day of the incident that
caused the death.
The People must overcome this presumption by proving that the killing
was criminal. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the killing was
criminal, you must find the defendant not guilty.
[To count the three year and one day period, begin with the day on
which the incident happened. Count that day as one whole day
regardless of what time the incident happened.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on presumptions relevant to the issues
of the case. (See People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462
P.2d 370].)
AUTHORITY
• Presumption of Lawful Killing. Pen. Code, § 194.
• Rebuttable Presumptions Affecting Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, §§ 601, 604,
606.
RELATED ISSUES
May Prosecute Defendant for Attempted Murder and Murder
Double jeopardy does not preclude prosecution of the defendant for attempted
murder and also for murder if the victim dies after the conviction for attempted
murder. (In re Saul S. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1068 [213 Cal.Rptr. 541].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 99.
Against the Person, § 142.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
245
520. First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought
(Pen. Code, § 187)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with murder [in violation of

Penal Code section 187].
prove that:
[1A. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of
(another person/ [or] a fetus);]
[OR]
[1B. The defendant had a legal duty to (help/care
for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/ <insert
other required action[s]>) __________ <insert description of
decedent/person to whom duty is owed> and the defendant failed to
perform that duty and that failure caused the death of (another
person/ [or] a fetus);]
[AND]
2. When the defendant (acted/[or] failed to act), (he/she) had a state
of mind called malice aforethought(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on justifiable or excusable homicide.>
[AND
3. (He/She) killed without lawful (excuse/[or] justification).]
There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied
malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required
for murder.
The defendant had express malice if (he/she) unlawfully intended to kill.
The defendant had implied malice if:
1. (He/She) intentionally (committed the act/[or] failed to act);
2. The natural and probable consequences of the (act/[or] failure to
act) were dangerous to human life;
3. At the time (he/she) (acted/[or] failed to act), (he/she) knew (his/
her) (act/[or] failure to act) was dangerous to human life;
AND
4. (He/She) deliberately (acted/[or] failed to act) with conscious
247
disregard for (human/ [or] fetal) life.

Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the victim.
It is a mental state that must be formed before the act that causes death
is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any
particular period of time.
[It is not necessary that the defendant be aware of the existence of a
fetus to be guilty of murdering that fetus.]
[A fetus is an unborn human being that has progressed beyond the
embryonic stage after major structures have been outlined, which
typically occurs at seven to eight weeks after fertilization.]
[(An act/[or] (A/a) failure to act) causes death if the death is the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of the (act/[or] failure to act) and the
death would not have happened without the (act/[or] failure to act). A
natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would
know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the
circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of death. (An act/[or] (A/a) failure
to act) causes death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the death.
A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it
does not need to be the only factor that causes the death.]
[(A/An) <insert description of person owing duty> has a legal
duty to (help/care for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/
<insert other required action[s]>) <insert description of
decedent/person to whom duty is owed>.]
<Give the following bracketed paragraph if the second degree is the only
possible degree of the crime for which the jury may return a verdict>
[If you find the defendant guilty of murder, it is murder of the second
degree.]
<Give the following bracketed paragraph if there is substantial evidence of
first degree murder>
[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it is murder of the
second degree, unless the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that it is murder of the first degree as defined in CALCRIM No.
<insert number of appropriate first degree murder instruction>.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, February 2013, August
2013, September 2017, March 2019, September 2019, March 2021
248
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the first two elements of the crime. If
there is sufficient evidence of excuse or justification, the court has a sua sponte
duty to include the third, bracketed element in the instruction. (People v. Frye
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1155–1156 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].) The court also has a
sua sponte duty to give any other appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM
Nos. 505–627, and CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death, the court
should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed
paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death, the court
should also give the “substantial factor” instruction and definition in the second
bracketed causation paragraph. (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363
[43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243
Cal.Rptr. 54].) If there is an issue regarding a superseding or intervening cause, give
the appropriate portion of CALCRIM No. 620, Causation: Special Issues.
If the prosecution’s theory of the case is that the defendant committed murder based
on his or her failure to perform a legal duty, the court may give element 1B.
Review the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 582, Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure
to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not Charged.
If the defendant is charged with first degree murder, give this instruction and
CALCRIM No. 521, First Degree Murder. If the defendant is charged with second
degree murder, no other instruction need be given.
If the defendant is also charged with first degree felony murder, instruct on that
crime and give CALCRIM No. 548, Murder: Alternative Theories.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 187.
• Malice. Pen. Code, § 188; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212,
1217–1222 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]; People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4
Cal.4th 91, 103–105 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969]; People v. Blakeley
• Causation. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276,
826 P.2d 274].
• Fetus Defined. People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 814–815 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d
50, 872 P.2d 591]; People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 867 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d
510, 86 P.3d 881].
• Ill Will Not Required for Malice. People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 722
[112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in People v. Flannel
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; People v.
249
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].
• Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. People v. Genovese (2008) 168
• Voluntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
• Involuntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
• Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 189.
• Sentence Enhancements and Special Circumstances Not Considered in Lesser
Included Offense Analysis. People v. Boswell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 59–60
[208 Cal.Rptr.3d 244].
Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5(a)) and
vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)) are not lesser included offenses of
murder. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988–992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698,
16 P.3d 118]; People v. Bettasso (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1059 [263 Cal.Rptr.3d
563].) Similarly, child abuse homicide (Pen. Code, § 273ab) is not a necessarily
included offense of murder. (People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 744
[125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].)
RELATED ISSUES
Causation—Foreseeability
Authority is divided on whether a causation instruction should include the concept
of foreseeability. (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 362–363 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Temple (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1756 [24
Cal.Rptr.2d 228] [refusing defense-requested instruction on foreseeability in favor of
standard causation instruction]; but see People v. Gardner (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
473, 483 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603] [suggesting the following language be used in a
causation instruction: “[t]he death of another person must be foreseeable in order to
be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s act”].) It is clear,
however, that it is error to instruct a jury that foreseeability is immaterial to
causation. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826
P.2d 274] [error to instruct a jury that when deciding causation it “[w]as immaterial
that the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the harmful result”].)
Second Degree Murder of a Fetus
The defendant does not need to know a woman is pregnant to be convicted of
second degree murder of her fetus. (People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 868 [11
Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 P.3d 881] [“[t]here is no requirement that the defendant
specifically know of the existence of each victim.”]) “[B]y engaging in the conduct
he did, the defendant demonstrated a conscious disregard for all life, fetal or
otherwise, and hence is liable for all deaths caused by his conduct.” (Id. at p. 870.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 96–101, 112–113.
250
<Select the appropriate section[s]. Give the final paragraph in every case.>
<Give if multiple theories alleged.>
[The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under (two/
<insert number>) theories: (1) <insert first theory,
e.g., “the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated”> [and] (2)
<insert second theory, e.g., “the murder was committed by
lying in wait”> [and] [ <insert additional theories>].
[Each theory of first degree murder has different requirements, and I
will instruct you on (both/all <insert number>).
You may not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless all
of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed
murder. But all of you do not need to agree on the same theory.]
<A. Deliberation and Premeditation>
[The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved
that (he/she) acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The
defendant acted willfully if (he/she) intended to kill. The defendant acted
deliberately if (he/she) carefully weighed the considerations for and
against (his/her) choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill.
The defendant acted with premeditation if (he/she) decided to kill before
completing the act[s] that caused death.
The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does
not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and premeditated.
The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may
vary from person to person and according to the circumstances. A
decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration
is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated
decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the
reflection, not the length of time.]
<B. Torture>
that the defendant murdered by torture. The defendant murdered by
torture if:
1. (He/She) willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation intended
to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on the person killed while
that person was still alive;
2. (He/She) intended to inflict such pain on the person killed for the
calculated purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other
sadistic reason;
252
3. The acts causing death involved a high degree of probability of

death;
AND
4. The torture was a cause of death.]
[A person commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on
purpose. A person commits an act deliberately if he or she carefully
weighs the considerations for and against his or her choice and, knowing
the consequences, decides to act. A person commits an act with
premeditation if (he/she) decided to inflict extreme and prolonged pain on
a person before completing the act[s] that caused death.]
[There is no requirement that the person killed be aware of the pain.]
[A finding of torture does not require that the defendant intended to
kill.]
<C. Lying in Wait>
that the defendant murdered while lying in wait or immediately
thereafter. The defendant murdered by lying in wait if:
1. (He/She) concealed (his/her) purpose from the person killed;
2. (He/She) waited and watched for an opportunity to act;
AND
3. Then, from a position of advantage, (he/she) intended to and did
make a surprise attack on the person killed.
The lying in wait does not need to continue for any particular period of
time, but its duration must be substantial enough to show a state of
mind equivalent to deliberation or premeditation. [Deliberation means
carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice and,
knowing the consequences, deciding to act. An act is done with
premeditation if the decision to commit the act is made before the act is
done.]
[A person can conceal his or her purpose even if the person killed is
aware of the person’s physical presence.]
[The concealment can be accomplished by ambush or some other secret
plan.]]
<D. Destructive Device or Explosive>
that the defendant murdered by using a destructive device or explosive.]
[An explosive is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose
253
main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2)

which is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and
heat.]
[An explosive is [also] any substance whose main purpose is to be
combined with other substances to create a new substance that can
release gas and heat rapidly or relatively instantaneously.]
[ <insert type of explosive from Health & Saf. Code, § 12000>
is an explosive.]
[A destructive device is <insert definition supported by
evidence from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]
[ <insert type of destructive device from Pen. Code, § 16460>
is a destructive device.]
<E. Weapon of Mass Destruction>
that the defendant murdered by using a weapon of mass destruction.
[ <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 11417(a)(1)> is a
weapon of mass destruction.]
[ <insert type of agent from Pen. Code, § 11417(a)(2)> is a
chemical warfare agent.]]
<F. Penetrating Ammunition>
that when the defendant murdered, (he/she) used ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor to commit the murder and (he/
she) knew that the ammunition was designed primarily to penetrate
metal or armor.]
<G. Discharge From Vehicle>
that the defendant murdered by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle.
The defendant committed this kind of murder if:
1. (He/She) shot a firearm from a motor vehicle;
2. (He/She) intentionally shot at a person who was outside the
vehicle;
AND
3. (He/She) intended to kill that person.
A firearm is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a
projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of an
explosion or other form of combustion.
254
A motor vehicle includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor

scooter/bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/
<insert other type of motor vehicle>).]
<H. Poison>
that the defendant murdered by using poison.
[Poison is a substance, applied externally to the body or introduced into
the body, that can kill by its own inherent qualities.]]
[ <insert name of substance> is a poison.]
[The requirements for second degree murder based on express or
implied malice are explained in CALCRIM No. 520, First or Second
Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought.]
the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty
of first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2010, October 2010,
February 2012, February 2013, February 2015, August 2015, September 2017,
September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Before giving this instruction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 520,
Murder With Malice Aforethought. Depending on the theory of first degree murder
relied on by the prosecution, give the appropriate alternatives A through H.
The court must give the final paragraph in every case.
If the prosecution alleges two or more theories for first degree murder, give the
bracketed section that begins with “The defendant has been prosecuted for first
degree murder under.” If the prosecution alleges felony murder in addition to one of
the theories of first degree murder in this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 548,
Murder: Alternative Theories, instead of the bracketed paragraph contained in this
instruction.
When instructing on murder by weapon of mass destruction, explosive, or
destructive device, the court may use the bracketed sentence stating, “
is a weapon of mass destruction” or “is a chemical warfare agent,” only if the
device used is listed in the code section noted in the instruction. For example,
“Sarin is a chemical warfare agent.” However, the court may not instruct the jury
that the defendant used the prohibited weapon. For example, the court may not state,
255
“the defendant used a chemical warfare agent, sarin,” or “the material used by the
defendant, sarin, was a chemical warfare agent.” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33
Do not modify this instruction to include the factors set forth in People v. Anderson
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]. Although those factors
may assist in appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support findings
of premeditation and deliberation, they neither define the elements of first degree
murder nor guide a jury’s determination of the degree of the offense. (People v.
Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 31 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591]; People v. Steele
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1254 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225]; People v. Lucero
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020 [245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342].)
AUTHORITY
• Types of Statutory First Degree Murder. Pen. Code, § 189.
• Armor Piercing Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16660.
• Destructive Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16460.
• For Torture, Act Causing Death Must Involve a High Degree of Probability of
Death. People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 602 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d
492].
• Mental State Required for Implied Malice. People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th
139, 143 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157, 158 P.3d 731].
• Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000; People v. Clark (1990) 50
Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
• Weapon of Mass Destruction Defined. Pen. Code, § 11417.
• Discharge From Vehicle. People v. Chavez (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 386–387
[12 Cal.Rptr.3d 837] [drive-by shooting clause is not an enumerated felony for
purposes of the felony murder rule].
• Lying in Wait Requirements. People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 794 [42
Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481]; People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139 [17
Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55]; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 [285
Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273]; People v. Poindexter (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572,
582–585 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 489]; People v. Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786,
794–795 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 668].
• Poison Defined. People v. Van Deleer (1878) 53 Cal. 147, 149.
• Premeditation and Deliberation Defined. People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th
393, 443–444 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793]; People v. Anderson, supra,
70 Cal.2d at pp. 26–27; People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 183–184 [163
P.2d 8]; People v. Daugherty (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876, 901–902 [256 P.2d 911].
• Torture Requirements. People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278
Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1101
[259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659], habeas corpus granted in part on other
256
grounds in In re Bittaker (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 679];

People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 168–172 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d
881]; see also People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11
Cal.Rptr.3d 739] [comparing torture murder with torture].
• Murder. Pen. Code, § 187.
• Voluntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
• Involuntary Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
• Attempted First Degree Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 189.
• Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 187.
• Elements of Special Circumstances Not Considered in Lesser Included Offense
Analysis. People v. Boswell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 59–60 [208 Cal.Rptr.3d
244].
RELATED ISSUES
Premeditation and Deliberation—Heat of Passion Provocation
Provocation may reduce murder from first to second degree. (People v. Thomas
(1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable doubt about
premeditation or deliberation, “leaving the homicide as murder of the second degree;
i.e., an unlawful killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but without
premeditation and deliberation”]; see People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675,
679 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889] [evidence of hallucination is admissible at guilt phase to
negate deliberation and premeditation and to reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this
issue. (People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 31–33 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 366],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 752 [3
Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 74 P.3d 771].) On request, give CALCRIM No. 522, Provocation:
Effect on Degree of Murder.
Torture—Causation
The finding of murder by torture encompasses the totality of the brutal acts and
circumstances that led to a victim’s death. “The acts of torture may not be
segregated into their constituent elements in order to determine whether any single
act by itself caused the death; rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that
constitutes the torture [citation].” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 530–531
[15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100].)
Torture—Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication
“[A] court should instruct a jury in a torture-murder case, when evidence of
intoxication warrants it, that intoxication is relevant to the specific intent to inflict
257
cruel suffering.” (People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1242; see CALCRIM

No. 625, Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes.)
Torture—Pain Not an Element
All that is required for first degree murder by torture is the calculated intent to
cause pain for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic
purpose. There is no requirement that the victim actually suffer pain. (People v.
Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].)
Torture—Premeditated Intent to Inflict Pain
Torture-murder, unlike the substantive crime of torture, requires that the defendant
acted with deliberation and premeditation when inflicting the pain. (People v. Pre,
supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 419–420; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408,
434–436 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)
Lying in Wait—Length of Time Equivalent to Premeditation and Deliberation
In People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 794, the court approved this instruction
regarding the length of time a person lies in wait: “[T]he lying in wait need not
continue for any particular time, provided that its duration is such as to show a state
of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”
Discharge From a Vehicle—Vehicle Does Not Have to Be Moving
Penal Code section 189 does not require the vehicle to be moving when the shots
are fired. (Pen. Code, § 189; see also People v. Bostick (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 287,
291 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 760] [finding vehicle movement is not required in context of
enhancement for discharging firearm from motor vehicle under Pen. Code,
§ 12022.55].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 117.
Against the Person, § 142.01 (Matthew Bender).
258
Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree

[and may reduce a murder to manslaughter]. The weight and
significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide.
If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked,
consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or
second degree murder. [Also, consider the provocation in deciding
whether the defendant committed murder or manslaughter.]
[Provocation does not apply to a prosecution under a theory of felony
murder.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, March 2017

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Provocation may reduce murder from first to second degree. (People v. Thomas
(1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable doubt about
premeditation or deliberation, “leaving the homicide as murder of the second degree;
i.e., an unlawful killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but without
premeditation and deliberation”]; see also People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1211–1212 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [court adequately instructed on
relevance of provocation to whether defendant acted with intent to torture for torture
murder].) There is, however, no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue.
(People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877–880 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d
135].) This is a pinpoint instruction, to be given on request.
This instruction may be given after CALCRIM No. 521, First Degree Murder.
If the court will be instructing on voluntary manslaughter, give both bracketed
portions on manslaughter.
If the court will be instructing on felony murder, give the bracketed sentence stating
that provocation does not apply to felony murder.
AUTHORITY
• Provocation Reduces From First to Second Degree. People v. Thomas (1945) 25
Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7]; see also People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1211–1212 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].
• Pinpoint Instruction. People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 877–878 [48
Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327,
1333–1335 [107 Cal.Rptr.3d 915].
259
If you find the defendant guilty of first degree murder [as charged in
Count ], you must then decide whether the People have proved
the additional allegation that the murder was a hate crime.
To prove this allegation the People must prove that the defendant
committed the murder, in whole or in part, because of the deceased
person’s actual or perceived (disability[,]/[or] gender[,]/[or] nationality[,]/
[or] race or ethnicity[,]/[or] religion[,]/[or] sexual orientation[,]/ [or]
association with a person or group with (this/one or more of these)
actual or perceived characteristic[s]).
The defendant acted, in whole or in part, because of the actual or
perceived characteristic[s] of the deceased person if:
1. The defendant was biased against the other person based on the
other person’s actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/
[or] nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or]
sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group
having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived
characteristic[s]);
AND
2. The bias motivation caused the defendant to commit the alleged
murder.
If you find that the defendant had more than one reason to commit the
alleged murder, the bias described here must have been a substantial
motivating factor. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote
factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the
conduct.
[The term disability is explained in Instruction 1353, to which you should
refer.]
[Gender, as used here, means sex and includes a person’s gender identity
and gender related appearance and behavior whether or not
stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.]
[Nationality, as used here, means country of origin, immigration status,
including citizenship, and national origin.]
[Race or ethnicity includes ancestry, color, and ethnic background.]
[Religion, as used here, includes all aspects of religious belief,
observance, and practice and includes agnosticism and atheism.]
[Sexual orientation means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.]
261
[Association with a person or group with (this/one or more of these) actual

or perceived characteristic[s] includes (advocacy for[,]/ identification
with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or adjacent to,]) a
(person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/ educational facility[,]/
office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/ private institution[,]/ public
agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with
people who have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]
The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
this allegation has not been proved.
New January 2006; Revised March 2017, March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement. (See People v. Marshall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 186,
193–195 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 441]; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466,
475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
This statute was substantially revised, effective January 1, 2005. Prior to that time,
the statute was limited to murder committed because of the decedent’s disability,
gender, or sexual orientation.
Do not give CALCRIM No. 370, Motive, with this instruction because motive is an
element of this enhancement. (See People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140,
1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121,
1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
Give all relevant bracketed definitions. If the term “disability” is used, give
CALCRIM No. 1353, Hate Crime: Disability Defined.
AUTHORITY
• Murder That is a Hate Crime. Pen. Code, § 190.03(a).
• Hate Crime Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.55.
• “In Whole or in Part Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(d); In re M.S.
Superior Court (Aishman) (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896
P.2d 1387].
• Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(b); Gov. Code, § 12926(i)–(l).
• Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c) & 422.57.
• Nationality Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(e).
• Race or Ethnicity Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(f).
• Religion Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(g).
262
524. Second Degree Murder: Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 190(b),
(c))
If you find the defendant guilty of second degree murder [as charged in
the additional allegation that (he/she) murdered a peace officer.
To prove this allegation the People must prove that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a peace
officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace officer;
[AND]
2. When the defendant killed <insert offıcer’s name,
excluding title>, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>
was a peace officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
<Give element 3 when defendant charged with Pen. Code, § 190(c)>
[AND
3. The defendant (intended to kill the peace officer/ [or] intended to
inflict great bodily injury on the peace officer/ [or] personally
used a (deadly or dangerous weapon/ [or] firearm) in the
commission of the offense).]
[A deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon
[that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a
way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great
bodily injury.]
[A firearm is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a
explosion or other form of combustion.]
[Someone personally uses a (deadly weapon/ [or] firearm) if he or she
intentionally does any of the following:
1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the weapon;
OR
3. Fires the weapon.]
264
[The People allege that the defendant <insert all of the

factors from element 3 when multiple factors are alleged>. You may not
find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have
proved at least one of these alleged facts and you all agree on which fact
or facts were proved. You do not need to specify the fact or facts in your
verdict.]
peace offıcer, e.g., “designated by the director of the agency as a peace
offıcer”>.]
[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of peace offıcer> include
<insert job duties>.]
<When lawful performance is an issue, give the following paragraph and
Instruction 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer.>
[A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she
is (unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or
excessive force in his or her duties). Instruction 2670 explains (when an
arrest or detention is unlawful/ [and] when force is unreasonable or
excessive).]
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, February 2013, September 2019,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 190(b), give only elements 1
and 2. If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 190(c), give all three
elements, specifying the appropriate factors in element 3, and give the appropriate
definitions, which follow in brackets. Give the bracketed unanimity instruction if the
prosecution alleges more than one factor in element 3.
In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer
must be acting lawfully. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275
Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause
must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (Ibid.) If
265
excessive force is an issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that
the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in
which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in
response to excessive force. (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47
[173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the
burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful
performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and
the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a peace officer. (People v.
court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the
jury that the alleged victim was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer
Reed was a peace officer”). (Ibid.) If the alleged victim is a police officer, give the
bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the
alleged victim is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that
begins with “A person employed by.”
“Peace officer,” as used in this statute, means “as defined in subdivision (a) of
Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of
Section 830.33, or Section 830.5.” (Pen. Code, § 190(b) & (c).)
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of a
<insert title . . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a
description of the officer’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially valid
search warrant.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275 Cal.Rptr.
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
156].)
AUTHORITY
• Second Degree Murder of a Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 190(b) & (c).
• Personally Used Deadly or Dangerous Weapon. Pen. Code, § 12022.
266
• Personally Used Firearm. Pen. Code, § 12022.5.

• Personal Use. Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 186.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 87, Death
Penalty, § 87.13[7] (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[4][c] (Matthew Bender).
267
525. Second Degree Murder: Discharge From Motor Vehicle (Pen.
Code, § 190(d))
If you find the defendant guilty of second degree murder [as charged in
the additional allegation that the murder was committed by shooting a
firearm from a motor vehicle.
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:
1. (The defendant/ <insert name or description of
principal if not defendant>) killed a person by shooting a firearm
from a motor vehicle;
principal if not defendant>) intentionally shot at a person who was
outside the vehicle;
AND
3. When (the defendant/ <insert name or description of
principal if not defendant>) shot a firearm, (the defendant/
<insert name or description of principal if not
defendant>) intended to inflict great bodily injury on the person
outside the vehicle.
[A motor vehicle includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor
[The term[s] (great bodily injury[,]/ firearm[,]/ [and] motor vehicle) (is/are)
defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]
[The People must prove that the defendant intended that the person shot
at suffer great bodily injury when (he/she/ <insert name or
description of principal if not defendant>) shot from the vehicle. However,
the People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to injure
the specific person who was actually killed.]
that this allegation has not been proved.
268

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The statute does not specify whether the defendant must personally intend to inflict
great bodily injury or whether accomplice liability may be based on a principal who
intended to inflict great bodily injury even if the defendant did not. The instruction
has been drafted to provide the court with both alternatives in element 3.
Give the relevant bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the
definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed
sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People must prove that the
defendant intended,” if the evidence shows that the person killed was not the person
the defendant intended to harm when shooting from the vehicle. (People v. Sanchez
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 851, fn. 10 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209].)
AUTHORITY
• Second Degree Murder, Discharge From Vehicle. Pen. Code, § 190(d).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 186.
Against the Person, § 142.01[1][a], [2][a][vii], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).
269
D. FELONY MURDER
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) substantially changed accomplice
liability for felony murder. Malice may no longer be imputed simply from
participation in a designated crime. (Pen. Code, § 188(a)(3).) If a defendant
participated in the commission or attempted commission of a designated felony
when a person was killed, the defendant is now liable under the felony-murder rule
only if: (1) the defendant was the actual killer; (2) the defendant was not the actual
killer but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in committing murder in the first
degree; or (3) the defendant was a major participant in the underlying designated
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 189(e).)
These restrictions do not apply when the victim was a peace officer and the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace
officer acting within the performance of his or her duties. (Pen. Code, § 189(f).)
As a result of these changes, the committee has modified CALCRIM Nos. 540B and
540C to incorporate the additional statutory elements for accomplice liability. The
committee has also removed CALCRIM Nos. 541A, 541B, and 541C which
addressed second degree felony murder.
The three separate instructions for felony murder present the following options:
A. Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
B. Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
C. Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death
For a simple case in which the defendant allegedly personally caused the death by
committing a direct act of force or violence against the victim, the court may use
CALCRIM No. 540A. This instruction contains the least amount of bracketed
material and requires the least amount of modification by the court.
In a case where the prosecution alleges that a participant in the felony other than the
defendant caused the death, the court must use CALCRIM No. 540B. This
instruction allows the court to instruct that the defendant may have committed the
underlying felony or may have aided and abetted or conspired to commit an
underlying felony that actually was committed by a coparticipant.
If the evidence indicates that either the defendant or a coparticipant may have
committed the fatal act, the court should give both CALCRIM No. 540A and
CALCRIM No. 540B.
In addition, the committee has provided CALCRIM No. 540C to account for the
unusual factual situations where a victim dies during the course of a felony as a
result of a heart attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act
of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the participants. (See
People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) This instruction is the most
271
HOMICIDE
complicated of the three instructions. Thus, although CALCRIM No. 540C is broad
enough to cover most felony-murder scenarios, the committee recommends using
CALCRIM Nos. 540A or 540B whenever appropriate to avoid providing the jury
with unnecessarily complicated instructions.
In People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 344, the Supreme Court clarified the
temporal component necessary for liability for a death under the felony-murder rule
and noted the limited usefulness of former CALCRIM No. 549, Felony Murder, One
Continuous Transaction—Defined. To avoid any potential confusion, the committee
has deleted that instruction and replaced it with appropriate bench note references. If
the defendant committed the homicidal act and fled, that killing did not occur in the
commission of the felony if the fleeing felon has reached a place of temporary
safety. (People v. Wilkins, supra, at p. 345.)
272
540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly
Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with murder, under a

theory of first degree felony murder.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this
theory, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant committed [or attempted to commit]
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>;
2. The defendant intended to commit <insert felony or
felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>;
AND
3. While committing [or attempting to commit] <insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>, the defendant personally
committed (an/the) act[s] that directly caused the death of
another person.
A person [who was the actual killer] may be guilty of felony murder
even if the killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.
To decide whether the defendant committed [or attempted to commit]
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>, please
refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on
(that/those) crime[s]. You must apply those instructions when you decide
whether the People have proved first degree murder under a theory of
felony murder.
<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies are
given.>
[The defendant must have intended to commit the (felony/felonies) of
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> before or at
the time that (he/she) caused the death.]
<If the facts raise an issue whether the commission of the felony continued
while a defendant was fleeing the scene, give the following sentence instead
of CALCRIM No. 3261, While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape
Rule.>
[The crime of <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code,
§ 189> continues until a defendant has reached a place of temporary
safety.]
[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act[s]
causing death occurred while the defendant was committing the (felony/
felonies).]
273
CALCRIM No. 540A HOMICIDE
[It is not required that the person killed be the (victim/intended victim)
of the (felony/felonies).]
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, September 2019, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. The court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of any
underlying felonies. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481,
892 P.2d 1224].) Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies with
this instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction
on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense.
If the facts raise an issue whether the homicidal act caused the death, the court has
a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, Causation.
When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 540B or with CALCRIM No.
540C, give the bracketed phrase [who was the actual killer].
The felonies that support a charge of first degree felony murder are arson, rape,
carjacking, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem, train wrecking, sodomy, lewd or
lascivious acts on a child, oral copulation, and sexual penetration. (See Pen. Code,
§ 189(a).)
If there is evidence that the defendant did not form the intent to commit the felony
until after the homicide, the defendant is entitled on request to an instruction
pinpointing this issue. (People v. Hudson (1955) 45 Cal.2d 121, 124–127 [287 P.2d
497]; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have intended to
commit the felony.” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases,
see People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not required that the person die
immediately” on request if relevant based on the evidence.
The felony-murder rule does not require that the person killed be the victim of the
underlying felony. (People v. Johnson (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 658 [104 Cal.Rptr.
807] [accomplice]; People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 117–119 [104 Cal.Rptr.
217, 501 P.2d 225] [innocent bystander]; People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823
[103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7] [police officer].) Give the bracketed sentence that
begins with “It is not required that the person killed be” on request.
There is no sua sponte duty to clarify the logical nexus between the felony and the
homicidal act. If an issue about the logical nexus requirement arises, the court may
give the following language:
There must be a logical connection between the cause of death and the
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted
274
HOMICIDE CALCRIM No. 540A
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>]. The

connection between the cause of death and the <insert felony
or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> [or attempted <insert felony
or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>] must involve more than just their
occurrence at the same time and place.]
People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 203–204 [14 Cal.Rtpr.3d 281, 91 P.3d 222];
People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].
If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, also
give CALCRIM No. 548, Murder: Alternative Theories. If the prosecutor is relying
only on a theory of felony murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See
People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 35–37 [error to instruct on malice when
felony murder only theory].)
Drive-By Shooting
The drive-by shooting clause in Penal Code section 189 is not an enumerated felony
for purposes of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Chavez (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
379, 386–387 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 837].) A finding of a specific intent to kill is required
in order to find first degree murder under this clause. (Ibid.)
Related Instructions—Other Causes of Death
This instruction should be used only when the prosecution alleges that the defendant
committed the act causing the death.
If the prosecution alleges that another coparticipant in the felony committed the fatal
act, give CALCRIM No. 540B, Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant
Allegedly Committed Fatal Act. If the evidence indicates that either the defendant or
a coparticipant may have committed the fatal act, give both instructions.
When the alleged victim dies during the course of the felony as a result of a heart
attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act of force or
violence committed against the victim by one of the participants, give CALCRIM
No. 540C, Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death. (Cf.
People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542];
People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598]; People v.
Hernandez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166]; but see People v.
Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 966–971 [299 Cal.Rptr.3d 131] [defendant liable
as actual killer for robbing elderly victim who died of heart attack an hour later];
People v. Gunnerson (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [a
simultaneous or coincidental death is not a killing].)
If the evidence indicates that someone other than the defendant or a coparticipant
committed the fatal act, then the crime is not felony murder. (People v. Washington
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782–783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]; People v. Caldwell
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; see also People v.
Gardner (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 477 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].) Liability may be
imposed, however, under the provocative act doctrine. (Pizano v. Superior Court
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see CALCRIM No.
275
CALCRIM No. 540A HOMICIDE
560, Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant.)

AUTHORITY
• Felony Murder: First Degree. Pen. Code, § 189.
• Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28
• Infliction of Fatal Injury. People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 222–223 [58
Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
• Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply to First Degree Felony Murder. People v.
Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1118–1120 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361].
• Meaning of “Actual Killer.” People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 151
[259 Cal.Rptr.3d 600]; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 4 [293
Cal.Rptr.3d 272]; People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88 [297 Cal.Rptr.3d
806]; People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 966–971 [299 Cal.Rptr.3d
131].
RELATED ISSUES
Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder
If a felony, such as robbery, is committed merely to facilitate an intentional murder,
then the felony-murder rule does not apply. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61
[164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [robbery
committed to facilitate murder did not satisfy felony-murder special circumstance].)
If the defense requests a special instruction on this point, see CALCRIM No. 730,
Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony.
No Duty to Instruct on Lesser Included Offenses of Uncharged Predicate Felony
“Although a trial court on its own initiative must instruct the jury on lesser included
offenses of charged offenses, this duty does not extend to uncharged offenses
relevant only as predicate offenses under the felony-murder doctrine.” (People v.
Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371 [original italics]; see People v. Cash (2002) 28
Cal.4th 703, 736–737 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545] [no duty to instruct on theft as lesser
included offense of uncharged predicate offense of robbery].)
Auto Burglary
Auto burglary may form the basis for a first degree felony-murder conviction.
(People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 622–623, 628 [150 Cal.Rptr. 515]
[noting problems of applying felony-murder rule to nondangerous daytime auto
burglary].)
Duress
“[D]uress can, in effect, provide a defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by
negating the underlying felony.” (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 784
276
HOMICIDE CALCRIM No. 540A
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368] [dictum]; see also CALCRIM No. 3402, Duress
or Threats.)
Imperfect Self-Defense
Imperfect self-defense is not a defense to felony murder because malice
aforethought, which imperfect self-defense negates, is not an element of felony
murder. (See People v. Tabios (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–9 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753],
disapproved on another ground in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172,
1198–1199 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425].)
Actual Killer vs. Aider and Abettor
The meaning of actual killer is literal. It is not enough that the defendant’s act
formed part of a series of events that resulted in the death, if the act itself would not
cause death. (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 149–155 [259
Cal.Rptr.3d 600].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 151–168.
Against the Person, § 142.01[1][e], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).
277
540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly
Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code, § 189)
<Give the following introductory sentence when not giving CALCRIM No.
540A.>
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with murder, under a
theory of first degree felony murder.]
The defendant may [also] be guilty of murder, under a theory of felony
murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death. I
will call the other person the perpetrator.
1. The defendant (committed [or attempted to commit][,]/ [or] aided
and abetted[,]/ [or] was a member of a conspiracy to commit)
2. The defendant (intended to commit[,]/ [or] intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing[,]/ [or] intended that one or
more of the members of the conspiracy commit)
3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to
commit] <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code,
§ 189>, then a perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and
abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant conspired), committed [or
attempted to commit] <insert felony or felonies from
Pen. Code, § 189>;
4. While committing [or attempting to commit] <insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189>, the perpetrator caused
the death of another person;
4. <Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(e)(2) and (e)(3) liability>
[5A. The defendant intended to kill;
AND
5B. The defendant (aided and abetted[,])/ [or] counseled[,]/ [or]
commanded[,]/ [or] induced[,]/ [or] solicited[,]/ [or] requested[,]/
[or] assisted) the perpetrator in the commission of first degree
murder(./;)]
[OR]
[(5A/6A). The defendant was a major participant in the
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>;
278
HOMICIDE CALCRIM No. 540B
AND
(5B/6B). When the defendant participated in the < insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>, (he/she) acted with
reckless indifference to human life(./;)]
[OR]
(5B/6B). <Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(f) liability>
[(5A/6A/7A). <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a
peace officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a
peace officer;
AND
(5B/6B/7B). When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably
should have known, that <insert offıcer’s name,
excluding title> was a peace officer performing (his/her)
duties.]
[A person may be guilty of felony murder of a peace officer even if the
killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.]
To decide whether (the defendant/ [and] the perpetrator) committed [or
attempted to commit] <insert felony or felonies from Pen.
Code, § 189>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/
have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the
defendant aided and abetted a crime, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To
decide whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit a
crime, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those instructions when you
decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a
theory of felony murder.
[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aid and abet[,]/
[or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/felonies) of
the time of the death.]
[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act
felonies).]
[It is not required that the defendant be present when the act causing
the death occurs.]
[You may not find the defendant guilty of felony murder unless all of
279
CALCRIM No. 540B HOMICIDE
you agree that the defendant or a perpetrator caused the death of

another. You do not all need to agree, however, whether the defendant or
a perpetrator caused that death.]
<The following instructions can be given when reckless indifference and
major participant under Pen. Code § 189(e)(3) applies>
[A person acts with reckless indifference to human life when he or she
knowingly engages in criminal activity that he or she knows involves a
grave risk of death.]
[When you decide whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine
whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Among the factors you may consider are:
[• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] would be
present during the <insert underlying felony>?]
[• Did the defendant know that [a] lethal weapon[s] (was/were)
likely to be used?]
used?]
[• Did the defendant know the number of weapons involved?]
[• Was the defendant near the person(s) killed when the killing
occurred?]
[• Did the defendant have an opportunity to stop the killing or to
help the victim(s)?]
[• How long did the crime last?]
[• Was the defendant aware of anything that would make a
coparticipant likely to kill?]
[• Did the defendant try to minimize the possibility of violence?]
[• <insert any other relevant factors>]]
[When you decide whether the defendant was a major participant,
consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary,
nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine whether the
defendant was a major participant. Among the factors you may consider
are:
[• What was the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to
the death[s]?]
[• What was the defendant’s role in supplying or using lethal
weapons?]
280
[• What did the defendant know about dangers posed by the crime,
any weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participant[s]?]
[• Was the defendant in a position to facilitate or to prevent the
death?]
[• Did the defendant’s action or inaction play a role in the death?]
[• What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?]
[• <insert any other relevant factors.>]]
<Give the following instructions when Pen. Code § 189(f) applies>
offıcer”>.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, February 2015, September
2019, April 2020, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
892 P.2d 1224].)
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr.60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The court has a sua sponte
duty to instruct on conspiracy when the prosecution has introduced evidence of a
conspiracy to prove liability for other offenses. (See, e.g., People v. Pike (1962) 58
Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d
415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].)
Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies, aiding and abetting,
and conspiracy.
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant, as well as the perpetrator,
281
committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony or felonies, then select

“committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended to commit” in
element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select
both “the defendant and the perpetrator.” Give all appropriate instructions on any
underlying felonies with this instruction. The court may need to modify the first
sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the defendant is not separately
charged with that offense. The court may also need to modify the instruction to state
“the defendant and the perpetrator each committed [the crime] if . . . .”
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired to
commit the felony, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the
corresponding intent requirements in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that
begins with “To decide whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give
the second and/or third bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on any
underlying felonies and on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this
instruction. The court may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an
underlying felony if the defendant is not separately charged with that offense. The
court may also need to modify the instruction to state “the perpetrator committed,”
rather than “the defendant,” in the instructions on the underlying felony.
If the defendant was a nonkiller who fled, leaving behind an accomplice who killed,
see People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 206, fn. 7 [14 Cal.Rtpr.3d 281, 91 P.3d
222] [continuous transaction] and the discussion of Cavitt in People v. Wilkins
until after the homicide, or did not join the conspiracy or aid and abet the felony
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant must have (intended to
commit.” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see People v.
Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].
Give the last bracketed sentence, stating that the defendant need not be present, on
request.
If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, or is
proceeding under multiple felony-murder theories, give CALCRIM No. 548,
282
Murder: Alternative Theories. If the prosecutor is relying only on a theory of felony

murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1, 35–37 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [error to instruct on malice
when felony murder only theory].)
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d
330], the court identified certain factors to guide the jury in its determination of
whether the defendant was a major participant but stopped short of holding that the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. The trial court should
determine whether the Banks factors need be given.
The court does not have a sua sponte duty to define “reckless indifference to human
life.” (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d
1197].) However, this “holding should not be understood to discourage trial courts
from amplifying the statutory language for the jury.” (Id. at p. 579.) The court may
give the bracketed definition of reckless indifference if requested.
In People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d
whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life but did not
hold that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on those factors. Clark noted
that these factors had been applied by appellate courts “in cases involving
nonshooter aiders and abettors to commercial armed robbery felony murders.” (Id. at
p. 618.) The trial court should determine whether the Clark factors need be given.
This instruction should be used only when the prosecution alleges that a
coparticipant in the felony committed the act causing the death.
When the alleged victim dies during the course of the felony as a result of a heart
attack, a fire, or a similar cause, rather than as a result of some act of force or
violence committed against the victim by one of the participants, give CALCRIM
No. 540C, Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death. (Cf.
People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542];
People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598]; People v.
283
Hernandez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166]; but see People v.
Gunnerson (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488] [simultaneous
or coincidental death is not killing].)
If the evidence indicates that someone other than the defendant or a coparticipant
committed the fatal act, then the crime is not felony murder. (People v. Washington
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782–783 [44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]; People v. Caldwell
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274]; see also People v.
Gardner (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 477 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].) Liability may be
imposed, however, under the provocative act doctrine. (Pizano v. Superior Court of
Tulare County (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see
CALCRIM No. 560, Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant.)
CALCRIM No. 400 et seq., Aiding and Abetting: General Principles.
CALCRIM No. 415 et seq., Conspiracy.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
• Defendant Must Join Felonious Enterprise Before or During Killing of Victim.
People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 726 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d
1235].
• Logical Nexus Between Felony and Killing. People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141]; People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197–206].
• Reckless Indifference to Human Life. People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
614–620 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 372 P.3d 811]; People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788, 807–811 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; People v. Estrada (1995) 11
Cal.4th 568, 578 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197]; Tison v. Arizona (1987)
481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
• Major Participant. People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803–808 [189
Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 540A, Felony Murder: First
Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act.
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
284
540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused
Death (Pen. Code, § 189)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with first degree murder,

under a theory of felony murder.
The defendant may be guilty of murder, under a theory of felony
murder, even if another person did the act that resulted in the death. I
will call the other person the perpetrator.
<Give element 3 if defendant did not personally commit or attempt
felony.>
[3. A perpetrator, (whom the defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or]
with whom the defendant conspired), personally committed [or
attempted to commit] <insert felony or felonies from
Pen. Code, § 189>;]
(3/4). The commission [or attempted commission] of the
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 189> was a substantial
factor in causing the death of another person;
<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(e)(2) and (e)(3) liability>
[(4A/5A). The defendant intended to kill;
AND
(4B/5B). The defendant (aided and abetted[,]/[or] counseled[,]/ [or]
commanded[,]/ [or] induced[,]/ [or] solicited[,]/ [or] requested[,]/
[or] assisted) the perpetrator in the commission of murder(./;)]
[OR]
[(4A/5A/6A). The defendant was a major participant in the
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>;
AND
(4B/5B/6B). When the defendant participated in the
286
HOMICIDE CALCRIM No. 540C
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code § 189>, (he/she) acted

with reckless indifference to human life(./;)]
[OR]
<Alternative for Pen. Code § 189(f) liability>
[(4A/5A/6A/7A). <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>
was a peace officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a peace
officer;
AND
(4B/5B/6B/7B). When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or
reasonably should have known, that <insert offıcer’s
name, excluding title> was a peace officer performing (his/her)
duties.]
[A person may be guilty of felony murder of a peace officer even if the
killing was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.]
Code, § 189>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/
have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the
decide whether the People have proved first degree murder under a
theory of felony murder.
An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without
the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable
person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In
deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the
circumstances established by the evidence.
[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if
it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A substantial factor is more
than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only
factor that causes the death.]
[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aid and abet[,]/
[or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/felonies) of
the time of the death.]
[It is not required that the person die immediately, as long as the act
287
CALCRIM No. 540C HOMICIDE
felonies).]
[It is not required that the defendant be present when the act causing
the death occurs.]
<The following instructions can be given when reckless indifference and
major participant under Pen. Code § 189(e)(3) applies>
to human life, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine
likely to be used?]
used?]
occurred?]
consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors is necessary,
are:
288
[• [What was the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to
the death[s]?]
weapons?]
participant[s]?]
death?]
<Give the following instructions when Pen. Code § 189(f) applies>
offıcer”>.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, August 2013, September 2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
892 P.2d 1224].)
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr.60, 674 P.2d 1318].) The court has a sua sponte
duty to instruct on conspiracy when the prosecution has introduced evidence of a
conspiracy to prove liability for other offenses. (See, e.g., People v. Pike (1962) 58
Cal.2d 70, 88 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d
415, 447 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].)
289
Give all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies, aiding and abetting,
and conspiracy.
401]; see generally, People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866–874 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].) Because causation is likely to be an issue in any
case in which this instruction is given, the committee has included the paragraph
that begins with “An act causes death if.” If there is evidence of multiple potential
causes, the court should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There
may be more than one cause of death.” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834,
845–849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant committed or attempted to commit
the underlying felony, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element
1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins
with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all
appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies with this instruction. The court
may need to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if
the defendant is not separately charged with that offense.
commit the felony, select one of these options in element 1 and the corresponding
intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. Give the bracketed
sentence at the beginning of the instruction that begins with “The defendant may be
guilty of murder.” In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide
whether,” select “the perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third
bracketed sentences. Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies and
on aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction. The court may need
to modify the first sentence of the instruction on an underlying felony if the
defendant is not separately charged with that offense. The court may also need to
modify the instruction to state “the perpetrator committed,” rather than “the
defendant,” in the instructions on the underlying felony.
until after the homicide, or did not join the conspiracy or aid and abet the felony
commit).” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see People
v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].
290
Give the last bracketed sentence, stating that the defendant need not be present, on
request.
If the defendant was a nonkiller who fled, leaving behind an accomplice who killed,
see People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 206, fn. 7 [14 Cal.Rtpr.3d 281, 91 P.3d
222] [continuous transaction] and the discussion of Cavitt in People v. Wilkins
If the prosecutor is proceeding under both malice and felony-murder theories, or is
proceeding under multiple felony-murder theories, give CALCRIM No. 548,
Murder: Alternative Theories. If the prosecutor is relying only on a theory of felony
murder, no instruction on malice should be given. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1, 35–37 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [error to instruct on malice
when felony murder only theory].)
whether the defendant was a major participant but stopped short of holding that the
291
This instruction should be used only when the alleged victim dies during the course
of the felony as a result of a heart attack, fire, or a similar cause rather than as a
result of some act of force or violence committed against the victim by one of the
participants in the felony. (Cf. People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6
Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542] [arson causing death of accomplice]; People v. Stamp
(1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598] [heart attack caused by
robbery]; People v. Hernandez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166]
[same]; but see People v. Gunnerson (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141
Cal.Rptr. 488] [simultaneous or coincidental death is not killing].)
See the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 540A, Felony Murder: First
Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act, for a discussion of other
instructions to use if the evidence indicates a person committed an act of force or
violence causing the death.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].
• Defendant Must Join Felonious Enterprise Before or During Killing of Victim.
People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 726 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d
1235].
• Death Caused by Felony but Not by Act of Force or Violence Against Victim.
People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542]
[arson causing death of accomplice]; People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203,
209–211 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598] [heart attack caused by robbery]; People v.
Hernandez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 287 [215 Cal.Rptr. 166] [same]; but see
People v. Gunnerson (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 378–381 [141 Cal.Rptr. 488]
[simultaneous or coincidental death is not killing].
• Logical Nexus Between Felony and Killing. People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866]; People v. Cavitt (2004) 33
292
481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 540A, Felony Murder: First
Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act, and CALCRIM No. 540B,
Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act.
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 118–168.
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.04, 140.10[3][b], Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.01[1][e], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).
293
The defendant has been prosecuted for murder under multiple theories.
Each theory of murder has different requirements, and I will instruct
you on each.
You may not find the defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree
that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder. You
need not all agree on the same theory but you must unanimously agree
on the degree of murder.
New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2016, September 2019, April
2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction should be given after the court has given any applicable instructions
on defenses to homicide and before CALCRIM No. 520, Murder With Malice
Aforethought.
If there is evidence of multiple acts from which the jury might conclude that the
defendant killed the decedent, the court may be required to give CALCRIM No.
3500, Unanimity. (See People v. Dellinger (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 284, 300–302
[209 Cal.Rpt. 503] [error not to instruct on unanimity where evidence that the
victim was killed either by blunt force or by injection of cocaine].) Review the
Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 3500 discussing when a unanimity instruction is
required.
AUTHORITY
• Unanimity on Degrees of Crime and Lesser Included Offenses. Pen. Code
§ 1157; People v. Sanchez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1025 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d.
880]; People v. Aikin (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 685, 704 [97 Cal.Rptr. 251],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 512 [119
Cal.Rptr. 225].
• Alternate Theories May Support Different Degrees of Murder. People v. Sanchez
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1025 [164 Cal.Rptr.3d. 880].
294
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with <insert

underlying crime>.] The defendant is [also] charged [in Count ]
with murder. A person can be guilty of murder under the provocative act
doctrine even if someone else did the actual killing.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under the provocative
act doctrine, the People must prove that:
1. In (committing/ [or] attempting to commit) <insert
underlying crime>, the defendant intentionally did a provocative
act;
2. The defendant knew that the natural and probable consequences
of the provocative act were dangerous to human life and then
acted with conscious disregard for life;
3. In response to the defendant’s provocative act,
<insert name or description of third party> killed
<insert name of decedent>;
AND
4. ’s <insert name of decedent> death was the natural
and probable consequence of the defendant’s provocative act.
A provocative act is an act:
1. [That goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the
<insert underlying crime>;]
[AND
2.] Whose natural and probable consequences are dangerous to
human life, because there is a high probability that the act will
provoke a deadly response.
In order to prove that ’s <insert name of decedent> death
was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s provocative
act, the People must prove that:
1. A reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have
foreseen that there was a high probability that his or her act
could begin a chain of events resulting in someone’s death;
2. The defendant’s act was a direct and substantial factor in causing
’s <insert name of decedent> death;
295
AND
3. ’s <insert name of decedent> death would not have
happened if the defendant had not committed the provocative act.
does not need to be the only factor that caused the death.
<Multiple Provocative Acts>
[The People alleged that the defendant committed the following
provocative acts: <insert acts alleged>. You may not find
the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved
that the defendant committed at least one of these acts. However, you do
not all need to agree on which act.]
<Independent Criminal Act>
[A defendant is not guilty of murder if the killing of <insert
name of decedent> was caused solely by the independent criminal act of
someone else. An independent criminal act is a free, deliberate, and
informed criminal act by a person who is not acting with the defendant.]
<Degree of Murder>
[[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of murder, you must decide
whether the murder is first or second degree.]
<Give if multiple theories alleged.>
[The defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under (two/
<insert number>) theories: (1) <insert first theory,
e.g., “the provocative act was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (murder/
attempted murder)”> [and] (2) <insert second theory, e.g.,
“the provocative act was committed during the defendant’s perpetration of an
enumerated felony> [ <insert additional theories>”].
Each theory of first degree murder has different requirements, and I will
instruct you on (both/all <insert number>.)
You may not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless all
of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed
murder. But all of you do not need to agree on the same theory.]
<A. Deliberation and Premeditation>
that (his/her) provocative act was a (murder/attempted murder)
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant
acted willfully in committing this provocative act if (he/she) intended to
kill. The defendant acted deliberately if (he/she) carefully weighed the
considerations for and against (his/her) choice and, knowing the
296
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with premeditation if

(he/she) decided to kill before committing the provocative act[s] that
(caused/(was/were) intended to cause) death.
not alone determine whether the (killing/attempted killing) is deliberate
and premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and
premeditation may vary from person to person and according to the
circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without
careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other
hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test
is the extent of the reflection, not the length of time.]
<Give the following paragraph if more than one defendant was involved in
the provocative act>
For a defendant to be found guilty of first degree murder, (he/she)
personally must have acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation
when the (murder/attempted murder) was committed.
<B. Enumerated Felony>
[To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the People
must prove that:
1. As a result of the defendant’s provocative act,
<insert name of decedent> was killed during the commission of
<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>;
AND
2. Defendant intended to commit <insert Pen. Code,
§ 189 felony> when (he/she) did the provocative act.
2. In deciding whether the defendant intended to commit
<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony> and whether the
death occurred during the commission of <insert
Pen. Code, § 189 felony>, you should refer to the instructions I
have given you on <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>.]
<C. If there is another theory, see Bench Note below and modify and use
CALCRIM No. 521 in a manner consistent with the modifications in section
A. Deliberation and Premeditation>
the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the
of first degree murder.
Any murder that does not meet these requirements for first degree
murder is second degree murder.
297
[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, that crime is
murder in the second degree.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the provocative act
doctrine is one of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence. (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d
370].) If the prosecution relies on a first degree murder theory based on a Penal
Code section 189 felony, the court has a sua sponte duty to give instructions
relating to the underlying felony, whether or not it is separately charged.
If the defendant is an accomplice, aider and abettor, or coconspirator of the person
who did the provocative act, give CALCRIM No. 561, Homicide: Provocative Act
by Accomplice, instead of this instruction.
The first bracketed sentence of this instruction should only be given if the
underlying felony is separately charged.
In the definition of “provocative act,” the court should always give the bracketed
phrase that begins, “that goes beyond what is necessary,” unless the court
determines that this element is not required because the underlying felony includes
malice as an element. (In re Aurelio R. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212
Cal.Rptr. 868]; see also People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 582 [112
Cal.Rptr.2d 401]; People v. Gonzalez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 968 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d
637].) See discussion in the Related Issues section below.
If the evidence suggests that there is more than one provocative act, give the
bracketed paragraph on “multiple provocative acts,” which instructs the jury that
they need not unanimously agree about which provocative act caused the killing.
(People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].)
If there is evidence that the actual perpetrator may have committed an independent
criminal act, give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A defendant
is not guilty of murder if . . . .” (See People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860,
874 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].)
If the prosecution is not seeking a first degree murder conviction, omit those
bracketed paragraphs relating to first degree murder and simply give the last
bracketed sentence of the instruction. As an alternative, the court may omit all
instructions relating to the degree and secure a stipulation that if a guilty verdict is
returned, the degree of murder is set at second degree. If the prosecution is seeking
a first degree murder conviction, give the bracketed section on “degree of murder.”
If there is a theory of first degree murder other than A. Deliberation and
Premeditation, or B. Enumerated Felony, e.g., torture, insert relevant portions of
CALCRIM No. 521. That instruction must be modified to reflect the circumstances
298
of the case. For example, if the defendant’s provocative act is the torture of A,
which causes B to shoot and kill C, the defendant will not have inflicted the
required pain on “the person killed,” C, but on “the person tortured,” People v.
Concha I (2010) 47 Cal.4th 653, 666 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, 218 P.3d 660].
AUTHORITY
• Provocative Act Doctrine. People v. Gallegos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 453, 461
[63 Cal.Rptr.2d 382].
• Felony-Murder Rule Invoked to Determine Degree. People v. Gilbert (1965) 63
Cal.2d 690, 705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]; Pizano v. Superior Court
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 139, fn. 4 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see People
v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216–217, fn. 2 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d
274].
• Independent Intervening Act by Third Person. People v. Cervantes (2001) 26
• Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine. People v. Gardner (1995) 37
• Response of Third Party Need Not Be Reasonable. People v. Gardner (1995) 37
• Unanimity on Which Act Constitutes Provocative Act is Not Required. People v.
Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [multiple
provocative acts].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Baker-Riley (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 631,
635–636 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 737].
RELATED ISSUES
Act “Beyond What is Necessary”
The general rule that has arisen in the context of robbery cases is that the
provocative act must be one that goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the
underlying felony. However, more recent cases make clear that this requirement is
not universal. In attempted murder or assault with a deadly weapon cases, the crime
itself may be a provocative act because it demonstrates either express or implied
malice. (In re Aurelio R. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212 Cal.Rptr. 868]; see
Pizano v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d
659].)
Death of a Fetus
The California Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the felony-murder
doctrine could constitutionally apply to the death of a fetus that did not result from
a direct attack on the mother. (People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 810, fn. 2 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591].) That ambiguity could extend to the provocative act
doctrine as well.
299
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with <insert

underlying crime>.] The defendant is [also] charged [in Count ]
with murder. A person can be guilty of murder under the provocative act
doctrine even if someone else did the actual killing.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under the provocative
act doctrine, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant was an accomplice of <insert name[s]
or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> in (committing/ [or]
attempting to commit) <insert underlying crime>;
2. In (committing/ [or] attempting to commit) <insert
underlying crime>, <insert name[s] or description[s]
of alleged provocateur[s]> intentionally did a provocative act;
3. <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged
provocateur[s]> knew that the natural and probable consequences
of the provocative act were dangerous to human life and then
acted with conscious disregard for life;
4. In response to ’s <insert name[s] or description[s] of
alleged provocateur[s]> provocative act, <insert name
or description of third party> killed <insert name of
decedent>;
AND
5. ’s <insert name of decedent> death was the natural
and probable consequence of ’s <insert name[s] or
description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> provocative act.
A provocative act is an act:
1. [That goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the
<insert underlying crime>;]
[AND
2.] Whose natural and probable consequences are dangerous to
human life, because there is a high probability that the act will
provoke a deadly response.
The defendant is an accomplice of <insert name[s] or
description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> if the defendant is subject to
prosecution for the identical offense that you conclude
<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> (committed/
[or] attempted to commit). The defendant is subject to prosecution if (he/
301
she) (committed/ [or] attempted to commit) the crime or if:

1. (He/She) knew of ’s <insert name[s] or description[s]
of alleged provocateur[s]> criminal purpose to commit
<insert underlying crime>;
AND
2. The defendant intended to, and did in fact, (aid, facilitate,
promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of
<insert underlying crime>/ [or] participate in a criminal
conspiracy to commit <insert underlying crime>).
because he or she is at the scene of a crime, even if he or she knows that
a crime [will be committed or] is being committed and does nothing to
stop it.]
In order to prove that ’s <insert name of decedent> death
was the natural and probable consequence of ’s <insert
name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> provocative act, the
1. A reasonable person in ’s <insert name[s] or
description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> position would have
foreseen that there was a high probability that (his/her/their) act
could begin a chain of events resulting in someone’s death;
2. ’s <insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged
provocateur[s]> act was a direct and substantial factor in causing
’s <insert name of decedent> death;
AND
3. ’s <insert name or description of decedent> death
would not have happened if <insert name[s] or
description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> had not committed the
provocative act.
<Multiple Provocative Acts>
[The People alleged the following provocative acts: <insert
acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree
that the People have proved that:
provocateur[s]> committed at least one provocative act;
AND
302
2. At least one of the provocative acts committed by

<insert name[s] or description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> was a
direct and substantial factor that caused the killing.
However, you do not all need to agree on which provocative act has been
proved.]
<Accomplice Deceased>
[If you decide that the only provocative act that caused ’s
<insert name of deceased accomplice> death was committed by
<insert name of deceased accomplice>, then the defendant is
not guilty of ’s <insert name of deceased accomplice>
murder.]
<Independent Criminal Act>
[A defendant is not guilty of murder if the killing of <insert
name or description of decedent> was caused solely by the independent
criminal act of someone other than the defendant or <insert
name[s] or description[s] of all alleged accomplice[s]>. An independent
criminal act is a free, deliberate, and informed criminal act by a person
who is not acting with the defendant.]
<Degree of Murder>
[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of murder, you must decide
whether the murder is first or second degree.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the People
must prove that:
1. As a result of ’s <insert name[s] or description[s] of
alleged provocateur[s]> provocative act, <insert name
of decedent> was killed while <insert name[s] or
description[s] of alleged provocateur[s]> (was/were) committing
<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>;
AND
provocateur[s]> specifically intended to commit ___________
<insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony> when (he/she/they) did the
provocative act.
In deciding whether <insert name[s] or description[s] of
alleged provocateur[s]> intended to commit <insert Pen.
Code, § 189 felony> and whether the death occurred during the
commission of <insert Pen. Code, § 189 felony>, you should
refer to the instructions I have given you on <insert Pen.
Code, § 189 felony>.
303
Any murder that does not meet these requirements for first degree
murder is second degree murder.]
[If you decide that the defendant committed murder, that crime is
murder in the second degree.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2014, September 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the provocative act
doctrine is one of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence. (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d
370].) If the prosecution relies on a first degree murder theory based on a Penal
Code section 189 felony, the court has a sua sponte duty to give instructions
relating to the underlying felony, whether or not it is separately charged.
Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437),
became effective January 1, 2019. The amendment added “malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The
continued legality of provocative act murder liability when an accomplice
committed the provocative act may be affected by this statutory change.
The first bracketed sentence of this instruction should only be given if the
underlying felony is separately charged.
In the definition of “provocative act,” the court should always give the bracketed
phrase that begins, “that goes beyond what is necessary,” unless the court
determines that this element is not required because the underlying felony includes
malice as an element. (In re Aurelio R. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 59–60 [212
Cal.Rptr. 868].) See discussion in the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 560,
Homicide: Provocative Act by Defendant.
In the paragraph that begins with “An accomplice does not need to be present,” use
the bracketed phrase “will be committed or” if appropriate under the facts of the
case.
If a deceased accomplice participated in provocative acts leading to his or her own
death, give the bracketed sentence that begins, “If you decide that the only
provocative act that caused . . . .” (See People v. Garcia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
1324, 1330 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 254]; People v. Superior Court (Shamis) (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 833, 846 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388]; Taylor v. Superior Court (1970) 3
Cal.3d 578, 583–584 [91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 477 P.2d 131]; People v. Antick (1975) 15
Cal.3d 79, 90 [123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. McCoy (20010 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d
1210].)
If there is evidence that the actual perpetrator may have committed an independent
criminal act, give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins, “A defendant is
304
not guilty of murder if . . . .” (See People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 874
[111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 29 P.3d 225].)
If the evidence suggests that there is more than one provocative act, give the
bracketed section on “Multiple Provocative Acts.” (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92
If the prosecution is not seeking a first degree murder conviction, omit those
bracketed paragraphs relating to first degree murder and simply give the last
bracketed sentence of the instruction. As an alternative, the court may omit all
instructions relating to the degree and secure a stipulation that if a murder verdict is
returned, the degree of murder is set at second degree. If the prosecution is seeking
a first degree murder conviction, give the bracketed section on “degree of murder.”
AUTHORITY
• Provocative Act Doctrine. People v. Gallegos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 453, 461
[63 Cal.Rptr.2d 382].
• Felony-Murder Rule Invoked to Determine Degree. People v. Gilbert (1965) 63
Cal.2d 690, 705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]; Pizano v. Superior Court
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 139, fn. 4 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; see People
v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 216–217, fn. 2 [203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d
274].
• Independent Intervening Act by Third Person. People v. Cervantes (2001) 26
• Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine. People v. Gardner (1995) 37
• Response of Third Party Need Not Be Reasonable. People v. Gardner (1995) 37
• Unanimity on Which Act Constitutes Provocative Act Is Not Required. People v.
Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [multiple
provocative acts].
• Implied Malice May Be Imputed to Absent Mastermind. People v. Johnson
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 560, Homicide: Provocative Act by
Defendant.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 168–177.
305
<A. Only unintended victim is killed.>

[If the defendant intended to kill one person, but by mistake or accident
killed someone else instead, then the crime, if any, is the same as if the
intended person had been killed.]
<B. Both intended and unintended victims are killed.>
[If the defendant intended to kill one person, but by mistake or accident
also killed someone else, then the crime, if any, is the same for the
unintended killing as it is for the intended killing.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if transferred intent is one
of the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.
(People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)
Give optional paragraph A if only an unintended victim is killed. Give optional
paragraph B if both the intended victim and an unintended victim or victims are
killed. (See discussion in Commentary, below.)
Any defenses that apply to the intended killing apply to the unintended killing as
well. (People v. Mathews (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628].)
This includes defenses that decrease the level of culpable homicide such as heat of
passion or imperfect self-defense.
Do not give this instruction for a charge of attempted murder. The transferred intent
doctrine does not apply to attempted murder. A defendant’s guilt of attempted
murder must be judged separately for each alleged victim. (People v. Bland (2002)
28 Cal.4th 313, 327–328, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]; see CALCRIM
No. 600, Attempted Murder.)
Always give the appropriate related homicide instructions.
AUTHORITY
• Common Law Doctrine of Transferred Intent. People v. Mathews (1979) 91
Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024 [154 Cal.Rptr. 628].
COMMENTARY
Intent Transfers to Unintended Victim
“[A] person’s intent to kill the intended target is not ‘used up’ once it is employed
to convict the person of murdering that target. It can also be used to convict of the
307
murder of others the person also killed . . . . [A]ssuming legal causation, a person
maliciously intending to kill is guilty of the murder of all persons actually killed. If
the intent is premeditated, the murder or murders are first degree . . . . Intent to kill
transfers to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended target is killed.”
(People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 322, 323–324, 326 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546,
48 P.3d 1107] [disapproving People v. Birreuta (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 458,
463 [208 Cal.Rptr. 635]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[3][b], Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.01[2][b][vii] (Matthew Bender).
308
(The defendant[s]/Defendant[s] <insert name[s]>) (is/are)

charged [in Count ] with conspiracy to commit first degree
murder [in violation of Penal Code section 182].
To prove that (the/a) defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that:
description[s] of coparticipant[s]>) to intentionally and unlawfully
kill;
or more of them would intentionally and unlawfully kill;
committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] alleged to
accomplish the killing: <insert the alleged overt
acts>;
AND
California.
To decide whether (the/a) defendant committed (this/these) overt act[s],
consider all of the evidence presented about the overt act[s].
alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit murder in the
first degree, please refer to Instructions 520 (First or Second Degree
Murder With Malice Aforethought) and 521 (First Degree Murder) which
define that crime.
When deciding whether (the/a) defendant and [one or more of] the other
alleged member[s] of the conspiracy intended to commit murder in the
first degree, do not consider implied malice. Conspiracy to commit
murder requires an intent to kill.
an agreement and intent to commit murder. The People do not have to
prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy actually met or
came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit that crime. An
agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members
of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the
crime.
309

[You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was committed in
[You must make a separate decision as to whether each defendant was a
member of the alleged conspiracy.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2014,
September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime when the defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See People v. Morante
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071].) Use this
instruction only if the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit murder. If the
defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit another crime, give CALCRIM No.
415, Conspiracy. If the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but evidence of a
conspiracy has been admitted for another purpose, do not give either instruction.
Give CALCRIM No. 416, Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy.
defining the elements of murder.
1131 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578].) See also the Commentary section below.
310
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must all agree that at least one
overt act alleged” if multiple overt acts are alleged in connection with a single
conspiracy. (See People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135–1136 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must make a separate decision”
if more than one defendant is charged with conspiracy. (See People v. Fulton (1984)
155 Cal.App.3d 91, 101 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879]; People v. Crain (1951) 102
Cal.App.2d 566, 581–582 [228 P.2d 307].)
Do not cross-reference the murder instructions unless they have been modified to
delete references to implied malice. Otherwise, a reference to implied malice could
confuse jurors, because conspiracy to commit murder may not be based on a theory
of implied malice. (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994].)
Cal.2d 471, 479 [15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 P.2d 326].)
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 820 [345 P.2d 529].)
From Conspiracy.
If the case involves an issue regarding the statute of limitations or evidence of
withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may be required. (People v.
Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1136, fn. 2 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; see
also Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy, and CALCRIM
3500, Unanimity.)
CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy.
CALCRIM No. 520, Murder With Malice Aforethought.
CALCRIM No. 521, First Degree Murder
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 182(a), 183; People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403,
416 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 975 P.2d 1071]; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th
593, 600 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994]; People v. Liu (1996) 46
fn. 8 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].
• Elements of Underlying Offense. People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
311
1688, 1706 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]; People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223,
1238–1239 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].
• Express Malice Murder. People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607
[49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994].
• Premeditated First Degree Murder. People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223,
1232 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].
• Unanimity on Specific Overt Act Not Required. People v. Russo (2001) 25
• No Conspiracy to Commit Second Degree Murder. People v. Beck and Cruz
COMMENTARY
It is sufficient to refer to coconspirators in the accusatory pleading as “persons
unknown.” (People v. Sacramento Butchers’ Protective Association (1910) 12
Cal.App. 471, 483 [107 P. 712]; People v. Roy (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 459, 463 [59
Cal.Rptr. 636]; see 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012)
Elements, § 87.) Nevertheless, this instruction assumes the prosecution has named at
least two members of the alleged conspiracy, whether charged or not.
Conspiracy to commit murder cannot be based on a theory of implied malice.
(People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602–603, 607 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909
P.2d 994].) All conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit
premeditated first degree murder. (People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1232
[77 Cal.Rptr. 2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].)
There is no crime of conspiracy to commit attempted murder. (People v. Iniguez
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included target
offense if there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy
to commit that offense. (People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 297 [115 Cal.Rptr.
516, 524 P.2d 1300], disapproved on other ground in People v. Cortez (1998) 18
Cal.4th 1223, 1237–1238 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537]; People v. Cook (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 910, 918 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 204]; People v. Kelley (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 1358, 1365–1366, 1370 [269 Cal.Rptr. 900].
There is a split of authority whether a court may look to the overt acts in the
accusatory pleadings to determine if it has a duty to instruct on any lesser included
offenses to the charged conspiracy. (People v. Cook, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp.
919–920, 922 [court may look to overt acts pleaded in charge of conspiracy to
determine whether charged offense includes a lesser included offense]; contra,
People v. Fenenbock, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1708–1709 [court should
examine description of agreement in pleading, not description of overt acts, to
decide whether lesser offense was necessarily the target of the conspiracy].)
312
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Conspiracies
Separately planned murders are punishable as separate conspiracies, even if the
separate murders are incidental to a single objective. (People v. Liu (1996) 46
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, §§ 141.01[2], 141.02[3], [4][b], [5][c], Ch.
142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.01[2][e] (Matthew Bender).
313
F. MANSLAUGHTER
(i) Voluntary
570. Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included
Offense (Pen. Code, § 192(a))
A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary

manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion.
The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion if:
1. The defendant was provoked;
2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and
under the influence of intense emotion that obscured (his/her)
reasoning or judgment;
AND
3. The provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is,
from passion rather than from judgment.
In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and
immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific
type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not
sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period
of time.
than from judgment.
[If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a
person of average disposition to “cool off” and regain his or her clear
reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
manslaughter on this basis.]
315
the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder.
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2014, August 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter on either
theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is
“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Barton
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)
If the victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation raises specific issues concerning
whether provocation was objectively reasonable, give an instruction tailored to those
issues on request. (Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.)
CALCRIM No. 511, Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(a).
• Heat of Passion Defined. People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 938, 942, 957
[157 Cal.Rptr. 3d 503, 301 P.3d 1120]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Valentine (1946) 28
Cal.2d 121, 139 [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82
Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].
• “Average Person” Need Not Have Been Provoked to Kill, Just to Act Rashly and
Without Deliberation. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 938, 942, 957
[157 Cal.Rptr. 3d 503, 301 P.3d 1120]); People v. Najera (2006) 138
• Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Not Proper Basis for Finding
Provocation Objectively Reasonable. Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective
January 1, 2015.
• Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter. People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d
818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; People v. Williams (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d
1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
(People v. Orr (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784 [27 Cal.Rtpr.2d 553].)
316
RELATED ISSUES
Heat of Passion: Sufficiency of Provocation—Examples
In People v. Breverman, sufficient evidence of provocation existed where a mob of
young men trespassed onto defendant’s yard and attacked defendant’s car with
weapons. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163–164 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d
870, 960 P.2d 1094].) Provocation has also been found sufficient based on the
murder of a family member (People v. Brooks (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 694 [230
Cal.Rptr. 86]); a sudden and violent quarrel (People v. Elmore (1914) 167 Cal. 205,
211 [138 P. 989]); verbal taunts by an unfaithful wife (People v. Berry (1976) 18
Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777]); and the infidelity of a lover
(People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328–329 [325 P.2d 97]).
In the following cases, evidence has been found inadequate to warrant instruction on
provocation: evidence of name calling, smirking, or staring and looking stone-faced
(People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 739 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 282]); calling
someone a particular epithet (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585–586
[36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614]); refusing to have sex in exchange for drugs
(People v. Michael Sims Dixon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1555–1556 [38
Cal.Rptr.2d 859]); a victim’s resistance against a rape attempt (People v. Rich (1988)
45 Cal.3d 1036, 1112 [248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960]); the desire for revenge
(People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 608]); and
a long history of criticism, reproach and ridicule where the defendant had not seen
the victims for over two weeks prior to the killings (People v. Kanawyer (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 1233, 1246–1247 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 401]). In addition the Supreme Court
has suggested that mere vandalism of an automobile is insufficient for provocation.
(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 164, fn. 11 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870,
960 P.2d 1094]; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 779, fn. 3 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d
33, 872 P.2d 574].)
Heat of Passion: Types of Provocation
Heat of passion does not require anger or rage. It can be “any violent, intense, high-
wrought or enthusiastic emotion.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,
163–164 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)
Heat of Passion: Verbal Provocation Sufficient
The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but the conduct
must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection. (People v. Lee
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001]; People v. Valentine
(1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 138–139 [169 P.2d 1].)
Heat of Passion: Defendant Initial Aggressor
“[A] defendant who provokes a physical encounter by rude challenges to another
person to fight, coupled with threats of violence and death to that person and his
entire family, is not entitled to claim that he was provoked into using deadly force
when the challenged person responds without apparent (or actual) use of such
317
force.” (People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303, 1312–1313 [7

Cal.Rptr.3d 161].)
Heat of Passion: Defendant’s Own Standard
Unrestrained and unprovoked rage does not constitute heat of passion and a person
of extremely violent temperament cannot substitute his or her own subjective
standard for heat of passion. (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139 [169
P.2d 1] [court approved admonishing jury on this point]; People v. Danielly (1949)
33 Cal.2d 362, 377 [202 P.2d 18]; People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134
Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777].) The objective element of this form of voluntary
manslaughter is not satisfied by evidence of a defendant’s “extraordinary character
and environmental deficiencies.” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253
[120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] [evidence of intoxication, mental deficiencies,
and psychological dysfunction due to traumatic experiences in Vietnam are not
provocation by the victim].)
Premeditation and Deliberation—Heat of Passion Provocation
Provocation and heat of passion that is insufficient to reduce a murder to
manslaughter may nonetheless reduce murder from first to second degree. (People v.
Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7] [provocation raised reasonable
doubt about the idea of premeditation or deliberation].) There is, however, no sua
sponte duty to instruct the jury on this issue because provocation in this context is a
defense to the element of deliberation, not an element of the crime, as it is in the
manslaughter context. (People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 32–33 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 366], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31
Cal.4th 745, 752 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 74 P.3d 771].) On request, give CALCRIM No.
522, Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder.
Fetus
Manslaughter does not apply to the death of a fetus. (People v. Carlson (1974) 37
Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [112 Cal.Rptr. 321].) While the Legislature has included the
killing of a fetus, as well as a human being, within the definition of murder under
Penal Code section 187, it has “left untouched the provisions of section 192,
defining manslaughter [as] the ‘unlawful killing of a human being.’ ” (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person §§ 111, 224, 226–245.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a], [3][c] (Matthew
Bender).
318
571. Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect
Defense of Another—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, § 192)
A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary

manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because (he/she) acted in
(imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another).
If you conclude the defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another), (his/her) action was lawful and you must find (him/
her) not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete
(self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and (imperfect self-defense/ [or]
imperfect defense of another) depends on whether the defendant’s belief
in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.
The defendant acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of
another) if:
1. The defendant actually believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/
<insert name of third party>) was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;
AND
2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly
force was necessary to defend against the danger;
BUT
3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
the harm is believed to be.
In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances as
they were known and appeared to the defendant.
<The following definition may be given if requested>
[A danger is imminent if, when the fatal wound occurred, the danger
actually existed or the defendant believed it existed. The danger must
seem immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It
may not be merely prospective or in the near future.]
[Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through (his/
her) own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify (his/
her) adversary’s use of force.]
[If you find that <insert name of decedent/victim> threatened
or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that
information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]
319
decedent/victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may

consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]
(he/she) associated with <insert name of decedent/victim>,
you may consider that threat in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]
the defendant was not acting in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect
defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of murder.
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, February 2015, September 2020, March
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter on either
theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is
“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Barton
See discussion of imperfect self-defense in Related Issues section of CALCRIM No.
505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
CALCRIM No. 3470, Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide).
CALCRIM No. 3472, Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived.
AUTHORITY
• Imperfect Self-Defense Defined. People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668,
320
680–683 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at
p. 201; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d
574]; see People v. Uriarte (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 197–198 [272 Cal.Rptr.
693] [insufficient evidence to support defense of another person].
• Imperfect Defense of Others. People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 995–1000
[28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 111 P.3d 987], overruled on another ground in People v.
Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425].
• Imperfect Self-Defense May be Available When Defendant Set in Motion Chain
of Events Leading to Victim’s Attack, but Not When Victim was Legally
Justified in Resorting to Self-Defense. People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735,
761 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 269 P.3d 543]; People v. Vasquez (2006) 136
• Imperfect Self-Defense Does Not Apply When Defendant’s Belief in Need for
Self-Defense is Entirely Delusional. People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121,
145 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, 325 P.3d 951].
[132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 832 [85
Cal.Rptr.3d 664].
• Defendant Relying on Imperfect Self-Defense Must Actually, Although Not
Reasonably, Associate Threat With Victim. People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1055, 1069 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337] [in dicta].
818, 822 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; People v. Williams (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1018,
1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
(People v. Orr (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].)
RELATED ISSUES
Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects
Evidence relating to intimate partner battering (formerly “battered women’s
syndrome”) and its effects may be considered by the jury when deciding if the
defendant actually feared the batterer and if that fear was reasonable. (See People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; see
also In re Walker (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 536, fn.1 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 411].)
Blakeley Not Retroactive
The decision in Blakeley—that one who, acting with conscious disregard for life,
unintentionally kills in imperfect self-defense is guilty of voluntary
manslaughter—may not be applied to defendants whose offense occurred prior to
Blakeley’s June 2, 2000, date of decision. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82,
91–93 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].) If a defendant asserts a killing was done
in an honest but mistaken belief in the need to act in self-defense and the offense
321
occurred prior to June 2, 2000, the jury must be instructed that an unintentional
killing in imperfect self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Johnson
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 576–577 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]; People v. Blakeley,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 93.)
Inapplicable to Felony Murder
Imperfect self-defense does not apply to felony murder. “Because malice is
irrelevant in first and second degree felony murder prosecutions, a claim of
imperfect self-defense, offered to negate malice, is likewise irrelevant.” (See People
v. Tabios (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–9 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]; see also People v.
Anderson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1646, 1666 [285 Cal.Rptr. 523]; People v.
Loustaunau (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 163, 170 [226 Cal.Rptr. 216].)
Fetus
See also the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide:
Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 242–244.
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.11[1][c], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.04[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
322
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a], [3][c]
(Matthew Bender).
323
572. Voluntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code,
§ 192(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with voluntary

manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(a)].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the
1. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of another
person;
[AND]
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) unlawfully intended to kill
someone(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another.>
[AND
3. (He/She) killed without lawful excuse or justification.]
Or the People must prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally committed an act that caused the
death of another person;
2. The natural consequences of the act were dangerous to human
life;
3. At the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) knew the act was dangerous to
human life;
[AND]
4. (He/She) deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human
life(;/.)
[AND
5. (He/She) killed without lawful excuse or justification.]
[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
the circumstances established by the evidence.]
324

New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. The court should give this instruction only in cases where voluntary
manslaughter is charged alone, without murder. In such cases,
[A] conviction of voluntary manslaughter may be sustained upon proof and
findings that the defendant committed an unlawful and intentional homicide.
Provocation and imperfect self-defense are not additional elements of voluntary
manslaughter which must be proved and found beyond reasonable doubt in
order to permit a conviction of that offense.
(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463, 469 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066].)
“[V]oluntary manslaughter . . . is also committed when one kills unlawfully, and
with conscious disregard for life.” (People v. Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 461, fn. 7
[emphasis in original], citing People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 90–91 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108–110 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666].)
should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed
paragraph on causation. (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243
Cal.Rptr. 54].) See also CALCRIM No. 620, Causation: Special Issues.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code § 192(a); People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 463, 469
[97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066].
RELATED ISSUES
Blakeley Not Retroactive
The decision in Blakeley—that one who, acting with conscious disregard for life,
unintentionally kills in imperfect self-defense is guilty of voluntary
manslaughter—may not be applied to defendants whose offense occurred prior to
Blakeley’s June 2, 2000, date of decision. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82,
91–93 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].) If a defendant asserts a killing was done
325
in an honest but mistaken belief in the need to act in self-defense and the offense
occurred prior to June 2, 2000, the jury must be instructed that an unintentional
killing in imperfect self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Johnson
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 576–577 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]; People v. Blakeley,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 93.) In such cases, do not give the portion of the instruction
that begins, “Or the People must prove that” or any of the elements that follow.
Fetus
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 224, 226–228.
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.04, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.02[1][a], [e], [f], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).
326
(ii) Involuntary
580. Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense (Pen.
Code, § 192(b))
When a person commits an unlawful killing but does not intend to kill
and does not act with conscious disregard for human life, then the crime
is involuntary manslaughter.
The difference between other homicide offenses and involuntary
manslaughter depends on whether the person was aware of the risk to
life that his or her actions created and consciously disregarded that risk.
An unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with full knowledge and
awareness that the person is endangering the life of another, and done in
conscious disregard of that risk, is voluntary manslaughter or murder.
An unlawful killing resulting from a willful act committed without intent
to kill and without conscious disregard of the risk to human life is
involuntary manslaughter.
The defendant committed involuntary manslaughter if:
1. The defendant committed (a crime/ [or] a lawful act in an
unlawful manner);
2. The defendant committed the (crime/ [or] act) with criminal
negligence;
AND
3. The defendant’s acts caused the death of another person.
[The People allege that the defendant committed the following crime[s]:
<insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/noninherently dangerous
(felony/felonies)/inherently dangerous assaultive (felony/felonies)>.
Instruction[s] tell[s] you what the People must prove in
order to prove that the defendant committed <insert
misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/ noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)/
inherently dangerous assaultive (felony/felonies)>.]
[The People [also] allege that the defendant committed the following
lawful act[s] with criminal negligence: <insert act[s]
alleged>.]
negligence when:
327
AND
or she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person
would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard
for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.
[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (crime[s]/
[and] lawful act[s] with criminal negligence): <insert alleged
predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the
defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that
the defendant committed at least one of these alleged acts and you all
agree that the same act or acts were proved.]
In order to prove murder or voluntary manslaughter, the People have
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted with intent to kill or with conscious disregard for human life. If
the People have not met either of these burdens, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder and not guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013, September 2018, September
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of murder when there is sufficient evidence that the defendant
lacked malice. (People v. Glenn (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1461, 1465–1467 [280
Cal.Rptr. 609], overruled in part in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)
328
When instructing on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense, the court has a

sua sponte duty to instruct on both theories of involuntary manslaughter
(misdemeanor/infraction/noninherently dangerous felony/inherently dangerous
assaultive felony and lawful act committed without due caution and circumspection)
if both theories are supported by the evidence. (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47,
61 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001].) In element 2, instruct on either or both of
theories of involuntary manslaughter as appropriate.
The court has a sua sponte duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor, infraction, or
noninherently dangerous felony alleged and to instruct on the elements of the
predicate offense(s). (People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205
Cal.Rptr. 688]; People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d
409]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d
894], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p.
89.)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter based on
the commission of an inherently dangerous assaultive felony and to instruct on the
elements of the predicate offense(s). (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24,
33–34 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 98]; see also People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 964
[157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 301 P.3d 1136].)
Cal.Rptr. 54].) See also CALCRIM No. 620, Causation: Special Issues.
In cases involving vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)), there is a split in
authority on whether there is a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction
when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (People v. Gary (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; People v.
Durkin (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; People v. Mitchell
(1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; People v. Leffel (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].) A unanimity instruction is included
in a bracketed paragraph, should the court determine that such an instruction is
appropriate.
329
AUTHORITY
• Involuntary Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
• Due Caution and Circumspection. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861,
879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440
[8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Criminal Negligence Requirement; This Instruction Upheld. People v. Butler
• Unlawful Act Not Amounting to a Felony. People v. Thompson (2000) 79
• Unlawful Act Must Be Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission.
People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374];
People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 674 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189].
• Proximate Cause. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6
Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 186 Cal.App.2d at
p. 440.
• Lack of Due Caution and Circumspection Contrasted With Conscious Disregard
of Life. People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637
P.2d 279]; People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
• Inherently Dangerous Assaultive Felonies. People v. Bryant, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 964; People v. Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 33–34.
Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of both degrees of murder, but
it is not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Orr (1994)
There is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Johnson (1996)
51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798]; People v. Broussard (1977) 76
Cal.App.3d 193, 197 [142 Cal.Rptr. 664].)
Aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.
(People v. Murray (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1140 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 676].)
RELATED ISSUES
Imperfect Self-Defense and Involuntary Manslaughter
Imperfect self-defense is a “mitigating circumstance” that “reduce[s] an intentional,
unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating the element of
malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide.” (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th
450, 461 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066] [citations omitted, emphasis in
original].) However, evidence of imperfect self-defense may support a finding of
involuntary manslaughter, where the evidence demonstrates the absence of (as
330
opposed to the negation of) the elements of malice. (People v. Blakeley, supra, 23
Cal.4th at p. 91 [discussing dissenting opinion of Mosk, J.].) Nevertheless, a court
should not instruct on involuntary manslaughter unless there is evidence supporting
the statutory elements of that crime.
See also the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 581, Involuntary
Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 246–260.
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.02[4], 140.04, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][a], [b], [e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).
331
581. Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code,
§ 192(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with involuntary

manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed (a crime/ [or] a lawful act in an
unlawful manner);
2. The defendant committed the (crime/ [or] act) with criminal
negligence;
AND
3. The defendant’s acts caused the death of another person.
[The People allege that the defendant committed the following crime[s]:
<insert misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/noninherently dangerous
(felony/felonies)>.
misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s])/ noninherently dangerous (felony/felonies)>.]
lawful act[s] with criminal negligence: <insert act[s]
alleged>.]
negligence when:
AND
for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.
332

[The People allege that the defendant committed the following (crime[s]/
[and] lawful act[s] with criminal negligence): <insert alleged
predicate acts when multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the
the defendant committed at least one of these alleged acts and you all
agree on which act (he/she) committed.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the offense.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on both theories of involuntary
manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction/noninherently dangerous felony and lawful
act committed without due caution and circumspection) if both theories are
supported by the evidence. (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 61 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d
625, 971 P.2d 1001].) In element 1, instruct on either or both theories of involuntary
manslaughter as appropriate.
The court has a sua sponte duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor, infraction or
noninherently dangerous felony alleged and to instruct on the elements of the
predicate offense(s). (People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205
Cal.Rptr. 688]; People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d
409]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d
894], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)
333
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
In cases involving vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192(c)), there is a split in
authority on whether there is a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction
when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (People v. Gary (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; People v.
Durkin (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; People v. Mitchell
(1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; People v. Leffel (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].) A unanimity instruction is included
in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at its discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Involuntary Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192(b).
• Due Caution and Circumspection. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861,
879–880 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440
[8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Unlawful Act Not Amounting to a Felony. People v. Thompson (2000) 79
• Criminal Negligence Requirement. People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998,
1014 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].
• Unlawful Act Must Be Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission.
People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374];
People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 674 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189].
• Proximate Cause. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6
Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433,
440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Lack of Due Caution and Circumspection Contrasted With Conscious Disregard
of Life. People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637
P.2d 279]; People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 596 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 637].
334
RELATED ISSUES
Due Caution and Circumspection
“The words lack of ‘due caution and circumspection’ have been heretofore held to
be the equivalent of ‘criminal negligence.’ ” (People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861,
879 [285 P.2d 926].)
Felonies as Predicate “Unlawful Act”
“[T]he only logically permissible construction of section 192 is that an unintentional
homicide committed in the course of a noninherently dangerous felony may properly
support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, if that felony is committed
without due caution and circumspection.” (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d
824, 835 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675] [practicing
medicine without a license cannot be predicate offense for second degree murder
because not inherently dangerous but can be for involuntary manslaughter even
though Penal Code section 192 specifies an “unlawful act, not amounting to a
felony”].)
No Inherently Dangerous Requirement for Predicate Misdemeanor/Infraction
“[T]he offense which constitutes the ‘unlawful act’ need not be an inherently
dangerous misdemeanor or infraction. Rather, to be an ‘unlawful act’ within the
meaning of section 192(c)(1), the offense must be dangerous under the
circumstances of its commission. An unlawful act committed with gross negligence
would necessarily be so.” (People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50
Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)
Fetus
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 225, 246–260.
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.02[4], 140.04, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.02[1][a], [b], [e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).
335
582. Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal
Duty—Murder Not Charged (Pen. Code, § 192(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with involuntary

manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(b)] based on failure
to perform a legal duty.
prove that:
1. The defendant had a legal duty to <insert name of
decedent>;
2. The defendant failed to perform that legal duty;
3. The defendant’s failure was criminally negligent;
AND
4. The defendant’s failure caused the death of <insert
name of decedent>.
(A/An) <insert description of person owing duty> has a legal
duty to (help/care for/rescue/warn/maintain the property of/
<insert other required action[s]>) <insert description of
decedent, not name>.
negligence when:
AND
or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would
336

[There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death, only
if it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A substantial factor is
more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the
only factor that causes the death.]
New January 2006; Revised September 2020, October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Legal Duty
The existence of a legal duty is a matter of law to be decided by the judge.
(Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819 [59
Cal.Rtpr.2d 756, 927 P.2d 1260]; Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38
Cal.3d 112, 124 [211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653].) The court should instruct the
jury if a legal duty exists. (See People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 614
[140 Cal.Rptr. 282] [proper instruction that parent has legal duty to furnish
necessary clothing, food, and medical attention for his or her minor child].) In the
instruction on legal duty, the court should use generic terms to describe the
relationship and duty owed. For example:
A parent has a legal duty to care for a child.
A paid caretaker has a legal duty to care for the person he or she was hired to
care for.
A person who has assumed responsibility for another person has a legal duty to
care for that other person.
The court should not state “the defendant had a legal duty to the decedent.” (See
People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]
[correct to state “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer [is a] peace officer”; would
be error to state “Officer Reed was a peace officer”].)
However, in a small number of cases where the legal duty to act is based on the
defendant having created or increased risk to the victim, the existence of the legal
337
duty may depend on facts in dispute. (See People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d
138, 149 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138].) If there is a conflict in testimony over the facts
necessary to establish that the defendant owed a legal duty to the victim, then the
issue must be submitted to the jury. In such cases, the court should insert a section
similar to the following:
The People must prove that the defendant had a legal duty to (help/rescue/
warn/ <insert other required action[s]>) <insert
name of decedent>.
In order to prove that the defendant had this legal duty, the People must
prove that the defendant <insert facts that establish legal
duty>.
If you decide that the People have proved that the defendant
<insert facts that establish legal duty>, then the defendant had a legal duty
to (help/rescue/warn/ <insert other required action[s]>)
<insert name of decedent>.
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant <insert
facts that establish legal duty>, then you must find (him/her) not guilty.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(b); People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 146
[258 Cal.Rptr. 138].
• Criminal Negligence. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d
926]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Legal Duty. People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 198–199 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d
236, 886 P.2d 1229]; People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 149 [258
Cal.Rptr. 138].
• Causation. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 315–321 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276,
826 P.2d 274].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Skiff (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 571, 579–580
[273 Cal.Rptr.3d 572].
RELATED ISSUES
Legal Duty to Aid
In People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138], the court
explained the requirement of a legal duty to act as follows:
A necessary element of negligence, whether criminal or civil, is a duty owed to
the person injured and a breach of that duty . . . . Generally, one has no legal
duty to rescue or render aid to another in peril, even if the other is in danger of
losing his or her life, absent a special relationship which gives rise to such
338
duty . . . . In California civil cases, courts have found a special relationship

giving rise to an affirmative duty to act where some act or omission on the part
of the defendant either created or increased the risk of injury to the plaintiff, or
created a dependency relationship inducing reliance or preventing assistance
from others . . . . Where, however, the defendant took no affirmative action
which contributed to, increased, or changed the risk which would otherwise
have existed, and did not voluntarily assume any responsibility to protect the
person or induce a false sense of security, courts have refused to find a special
relationship giving rise to a duty to act.
Duty Based on Dependency/Voluntary Assumption of Responsibility
A legal duty to act exists when the defendant is a caretaker or has voluntarily
assumed responsibility for the victim. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d
112, 134–138 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852] [parent to child]; People v. Montecino
(1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 85, 100 [152 P.2d 5] [contracted caretaker to dependent].)
Duty Based on Conduct Creating or Increasing Risk
A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant’s behavior created or
substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the
dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147–148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act
where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him
to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the
floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent
freeway creating risk].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 258–260.
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.03, 140.04, Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.02[2][b] (Matthew Bender).
339
(iii) Vehicular
590. Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated (Pen. Code,
§ 191.5(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with gross vehicular

manslaughter while intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section
191.5(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (drove under the influence of (an alcoholic
beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an
alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/drove under the influence of (an
alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence
of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/
drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when
under the age of 21);
2. While driving that vehicle under the influence of (an alcoholic
beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an
alcoholic beverage and a drug], the defendant also committed (a/
an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act
that might cause death);
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/
[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with gross
negligence;
AND
4. The defendant’s grossly negligent conduct caused the death of
another person.
[The People allege that the defendant committed the following
(misdemeanor[s]/ [and] infraction[s]): <insert
misdemeanor[s] /infraction[s]>.
misdemeanor[s]/infraction[s]>.]
otherwise lawful act(s) that might cause death: <insert
act[s] alleged>.]
order to prove that the defendant (drove under the influence of (an
340
alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an

alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level
of 0.08 or higher/drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/
[or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage
and a drug] when under the age of 21/drove while having a blood
alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when under the age of 21).
Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention,
or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when:
AND
In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or
she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would
The combination of driving a vehicle while under the influence of (an
alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] a drug) and violating a traffic law is not
enough by itself to establish gross negligence. In evaluating whether the
defendant acted with gross negligence, consider the level of the
defendant’s intoxication, if any; the way the defendant drove; and any
other relevant aspects of the defendant’s conduct.
[A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency situation not
caused by that person’s own negligence is required only to use the same
care and judgment that an ordinarily careful person would use in the
same situation, even if it appears later that a different course of action
would have been safer.]
341

(misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] otherwise lawful act[s]
that might cause death): <insert alleged predicate acts when
multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of
you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at
least one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or]
otherwise lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which
(misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might
cause death) the defendant committed.]
[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.
If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty of that crime. You must consider whether the defendant is guilty
of the lesser crime[s] of <insert lesser offense[s]>.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to specify the predicate misdemeanor(s) or
infraction(s) alleged and to instruct on the elements of the predicate offense(s).
(People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688]; People v.
Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) In element 1, instruct
on the particular “under the influence” offense charged. In element 2, instruct on
either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act
committed with negligence) as appropriate. The court must also give the appropriate
instruction on the elements of the driving under the influence offense and the
predicate misdemeanor or infraction.
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
There is a split in authority over whether there is a sua sponte duty to give a
unanimity instruction when multiple predicate offenses are alleged. (People v. Gary
(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235 Cal.Rptr. 30] [unanimity instruction
required, overruled on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481
342
[76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; People v. Durkin (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp.
9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735] [unanimity instruction not required but preferable]; People
v. Mitchell (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438] [unanimity
instruction not required]; People v. Leffel (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249
Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, harmless error if was required].)
A unanimity instruction is included in a bracketed paragraph for the court to use at
its discretion.
If there is sufficient evidence and the defendant requests it, the court should instruct
on the imminent peril/sudden emergency doctrine. (People v. Boulware (1940) 41
Cal.App.2d 268, 269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) Give the bracketed sentence that begins
with “A person facing a sudden and unexpected emergency.”
If the defendant is charged with one or more prior conviction (see Pen. Code,
§ 191.5(d)), the court should also give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior conviction or
the court has granted a bifurcated trial. (See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100.)
AUTHORITY
• Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 191.5(a).
• Unlawful Act Dangerous Under the Circumstances of Its Commission. People v.
Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 982 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].
• Specifying Predicate Unlawful Act. People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d
487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Elements of the Predicate Unlawful Act. People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
• Unanimity Instruction. People v. Gary (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 1218 [235
Cal.Rptr. 30], overruled on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th
470, 481 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; People v. Durkin (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 13 [252 Cal.Rptr. 735]; People v. Mitchell (1986) 188
Cal.App.3d 216, 222 [232 Cal.Rptr. 438]; People v. Leffel (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Gross Negligence. People v. Penny, (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d
• Gross Negligence—Overall Circumstances. People v. Bennett (1992) 54 Cal.3d
1032, 1039 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 819 P.2d 849].
• Causation. People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal.Rptr.
863].
343
• Imminent Peril/Sudden Emergency Doctrine. People v. Boulware (1940) 41

Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Hovda (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1358
[98 Cal.Rptr.3d 499].
• Vehicular Manslaughter With Gross Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen. Code,
§ 192(c)(1); People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26
Cal.Rptr.2d 610].
• Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence While Intoxicated. Pen. Code,
§ 191.5(b); People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1165–1166 [123
Cal.Rptr.2d 322].
• Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen.
Code, § 192(c)(2); People v. Rodgers (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 166 [210 P.2d
71].
• Injury to Someone While Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs. Veh.
Code, § 23153; People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1466–1467 [26
Cal.Rptr.2d 610].
Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of
murder. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 992 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16
P.3d 118].)
RELATED ISSUES
DUI Cannot Serve as Predicate Unlawful Act
The Vehicle Code driving-under-the-influence offense of the first element cannot do
double duty as the predicate unlawful act for the second element. (People v. Soledad
(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 74, 81 [235 Cal.Rptr. 208].) “[T]he trial court erroneously
omitted the ‘unlawful act’ element of vehicular manslaughter when instructing in
. . . [the elements] by referring to Vehicle Code section 23152 rather than another
‘unlawful act’ as required by the statute.” (Id. at p. 82.)
Predicate Act Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous
Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)
Lawful Act in an Unlawful Manner: Negligence
The statute uses the phrase “lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner.” (Pen. Code, § 191.5.) “[C]ommitting a lawful act in an unlawful manner
simply means to commit a lawful act with negligence, that is, without reasonable
caution and care.” (People v. Thompson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53 [93
344
Cal.Rptr.2d 803].) Because the instruction lists the negligence requirement as

element 3, the phrase “in an unlawful manner” is omitted from element 2 as
repetitive.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 263–272.
§ 142.02[2][c], [4], Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, §§ 145.02[4][c],
145.03[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
345
591. Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated—Ordinary
Negligence (Pen. Code, § 191.5(b))
<If vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated—ordinary negligence is a

charged offense, give alternative A; if this instruction is being given as a
lesser included offense, give alternative B.>
<Introductory Sentence: Alternative A—Charged Offense>
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with vehicular
manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated [in violation of
Penal Code section 191.5(b)].]
<Introductory Sentence: Alternative B—Lesser Included Offense>
[Vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while intoxicated is a
lesser crime than the charged crime of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated.]
To prove that the defendant is guilty of vehicular manslaughter with
ordinary negligence while intoxicated, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant (drove under the influence of (an alcoholic
beverage/[or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an
alcoholic beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 or higher/ drove under the influence of (an
alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence
of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when under the age of 21/
drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or higher when
under the age of 21/operated a vessel under the influence of (an
alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or a combined influence of an
alcoholic beverage and a drug]/operated a vessel while having a
blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher);
2. While (driving that vehicle/operating that vessel) under the
influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the
combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug], the
defendant also committed (a/an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or]
infraction[,] /[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death);
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]
/[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with ordinary
negligence;
AND
4. The defendant’s negligent conduct caused the death of another
person.
346

misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.
act[s] alleged>.]
order to prove that the defendant (drove under the influence of (an
alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug) [or a combined influence of an alcoholic
beverage and a drug]/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or
higher/ drove under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug)
[or a combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug] when
under the age of 21/drove while having a blood alcohol level of 0.05 or
higher when under the age of 21/operated a vessel under the influence of
(an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug [or a combined influence of an
alcoholic beverage and a drug])/operated a vessel while having a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 or higher).
[The difference between this offense and the charged offense of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the degree of negligence
required. I have already defined gross negligence for you.]
Ordinary negligence[, on the other hand,] is the failure to use reasonable
care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else.
A person is negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably
careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do
something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same
situation).
347
(misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] otherwise lawful act[s]
that might cause death): <insert alleged predicate acts when
multiple acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of
you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at
least one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or]
otherwise lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which
the defendant committed vehicular manslaughter with ordinary
negligence while intoxicated. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of that crime. You must consider
whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime[s] of
<insert lesser offense[s]>.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Important note: The legislature repealed Penal Code section 192(c)(3) in the form
that was previously the basis for this instruction effective January 1, 2007.
crime.
on the particular “under the influence” offense charged. In element 2, instruct on
either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act
instruction on the elements of the driving under the influence offense and the
predicate misdemeanor or infraction.
348
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
There is a split in authority over whether there is a sua sponte duty to give an
[76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]]; People v. Durkin (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp.
its discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated. Pen. Code, § 191.5(b).
• Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel While Intoxicated. Pen.
Code, § 192.5(c).
487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Elements of the Predicate Unlawful Act. People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Rest.2d Torts, § 282.
• Causation. People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal. Rptr.
863].
Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
• Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence Without Intoxication. Pen.
349
Code, § 192(c)(2); see People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464,

1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].
• Injury to Same Victim While Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs.
Veh. Code, § 23153; People v. Machuca (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 393, 400–401
[263 Cal.Rptr.3d 52]; People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464,
1466–1467 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 610].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 590, Gross Vehicular
Manslaughter While Intoxicated.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 263–271.
§ 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4], Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[4][c]
(Matthew Bender).
350
<If gross vehicular manslaughter is a charged offense, give alternative A; if

this instruction is being given as a lesser included offense, give alternative
B.>
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with gross vehicular
manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(c)(1)].]
[Gross vehicular manslaughter is a lesser crime than gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated.]
To prove that the defendant is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter,
the People must prove that:
1. The defendant (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel);
2. While (driving that vehicle/operating that vessel), the defendant
committed (a/an) (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/ [or]
otherwise lawful act that might cause death);
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction[,]/
[or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) with gross
negligence;
AND
4. The defendant’s grossly negligent conduct caused the death of
another person.
AND
she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act
in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human
life or indifference to the consequences of that act.
351

misdemeanor[s]/ infraction[s]>.]
act[s] alleged>.]
[You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the
People have proved that the defendant committed at least one alleged
cause death) and you all agree on which (misdemeanor[,]/ [or]
infraction[,]/ [or] otherwise lawful act that might cause death) the
defendant committed.]
the defendant committed gross vehicular manslaughter. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of that
crime. You must consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser
crime[s] of <insert lesser offense[s]>.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2015, September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
352
on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act
instruction on the elements of the the predicate misdemeanor or infraction.
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
its discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Gross Vehicular Manslaughter. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1).
• Gross Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel. Pen. Code,
§ 192.5(a).
353

487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Elements of Predicate Unlawful Act. People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334,
1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Gross Negligence. People v. Bennett (1992) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d
8, 819 P.2d 849].
• Causation. People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8 Cal. Rptr.
863].
Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
• Vehicular Manslaughter With Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2); see
People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1165–1166 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d
322].
• Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel Without Gross Negligence. Pen.
Code, § 192.5(b).
RELATED ISSUES
Predicate Act Need Not Be Inherently Dangerous
Cal.Rtpr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].)
Lawful Act in an Unlawful Manner: Negligence
The statute uses the phrase “lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner.” (Pen. Code, § 192(c)(1).) “[C]ommitting a lawful act in an unlawful
manner simply means to commit a lawful act with negligence, that is, without
reasonable caution and care.” (People v. Thompson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 53
[93 Cal.Rptr.2d 803].) Because the instruction lists the negligence requirement as
element 3, the phrase “in an unlawful manner” is omitted from element 2 as
repetitive.
354
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 262–268.
§ 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).
355
<If misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter—ordinary negligence is a charged

offense, give alternative A; if this instruction is being given as a lesser
included offense, give alternative B.>
[The defendant is charged [in Count ] with vehicular
manslaughter [in violation of Penal Code section 192(c)(2)].]
[Vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence is a lesser crime than
(gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated/ [and] gross vehicular
manslaughter/ [and] vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence
while intoxicated.)]
To prove that the defendant is guilty of vehicular manslaughter with
ordinary negligence, the People must prove that:
1. While (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel), the defendant
committed (a misdemeanor[,]/ [or] an infraction/ [or] a lawful act
in an unlawful manner);
2. The (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/ [or] otherwise lawful act)
was dangerous to human life under the circumstances of its
commission;
3. The defendant committed the (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/
[or] otherwise lawful act) with ordinary negligence;
AND
4. The (misdemeanor[,]/ [or] infraction/ [or] otherwise lawful act)
caused the death of another person.
otherwise lawful act[s] with ordinary negligence: <insert
act[s] alleged>.]
[The difference between this offense and the charged offense of gross
vehicular manslaughter is the degree of negligence required. I have
356
already defined gross negligence for you.]

Ordinary negligence[, on the other hand,] is the failure to use reasonable
care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else.
A person is negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably
careful person would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do
something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same
situation).
(misdemeanor[s][,]/ [and] infraction[s][,]/ [and] lawful act[s] that might
cause death): <insert alleged predicate acts when multiple
acts alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you
agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least
one of these alleged (misdemeanors[,]/ [or] infractions[,]/ [or] otherwise
lawful acts that might cause death) and you all agree on which
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, April 2011
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
357
on either theory of vehicular manslaughter (misdemeanor/infraction or lawful act
instruction on the elements of the predicate misdemeanor or infraction.
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
[76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]]; People v. Durkin (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d Supp.
its discretion. In the definition of ordinary negligence, the court should use the
entire phrase “harm to oneself or someone else” if the facts of the case show a
failure by the defendant to prevent harm to him-or herself rather than solely harm to
another.
AUTHORITY
• Vehicular Manslaughter Without Gross Negligence. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(2).
• Vehicular Manslaughter During Operation of a Vessel Without Gross Negligence.
Pen. Code, § 192.5(b).
487, 506 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Elements of Predicate Unlawful Act. People v. Ellis (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334,
1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].
358

Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Ordinary Negligence. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Rest.2d Torts, § 282.
863].
Cal.App.2d 268, 269 [106 P.2d 436].
• Criminal Negligence Requirement. People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998,
1014 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 592, Gross Vehicular
Manslaughter.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 263–271.
§ 142.02[1][a], [2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).
359
594. Vehicular Manslaughter: Collision for Financial Gain (Pen.
Code, § 192(c)(3))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with vehicular manslaughter

by causing a collision for financial gain [in violation of Penal Code
section 192(c)(3)].
prove that:
1. While driving a vehicle, the defendant knowingly caused or
participated in a vehicular collision;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the purpose of the
vehicular collision was to make a false or fraudulent insurance
claim for financial gain;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so with intent to defraud;
AND
4. The collision caused the death of another person.
A person intends to defraud if he or she intends to deceive another
person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal, financial, or
property right.
[For the purpose of this instruction, a person includes (a governmental
agency/a corporation/a business/an association/the body politic).]
it is a substantial factor in causing the death. A substantialfactor is more
New January 2006; Revised April 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
360
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “For the purpose of this instruction” if
the evidence shows an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural
person. (Pen. Code, § 8.)
CALCRIM No. 2002, Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 192(c)(3).
863].
• Intent to Defraud—Defined. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [38
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Intent to Defraud Entity. Pen. Code, § 8.
RELATED ISSUES
Does Not Preclude Murder Charge
Section 192(c)(3) of the Penal Code states that: “This paragraph does not prevent
prosecution of a defendant for the crime of murder.”
Probable and Natural Consequences of a Conspiracy
A nondriver coconspirator may be liable for a death that results from a conspiracy
to commit a vehicular collision for insurance fraud under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Superior Court (Shamis) (1998) 58 Cal.App.4th
833, 842–843 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 262–263.
Property, § 222.
§ 142.02[2][c], [4] (Matthew Bender).
361
<A. Violation of Maximum Speed Law, Veh. Code, § 22349>

[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the maximum
speed law, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant drove a vehicle on a highway;
AND
2. The defendant drove faster than (65/55/ <insert other
posted speed limit>) mph.
[The term highway describes any area publicly maintained and open to
the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]]
<B. Violation of Basic Speed Law, Veh. Code, § 22350>
[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the basic speed
law, the People must prove that:
AND
2. The defendant drove (faster than a reasonable person would have
driven considering the weather, visibility, traffic, and conditions
of the highway/ [or] at a speed that endangered the safety of
other people or property).
The speed of travel, alone, does not establish whether a person did or
did not violate the basic speed law. When determining whether the
defendant violated the basic speed law, consider not only the speed, but
also all the surrounding conditions known by the defendant and also
what a reasonable person would have considered a safe rate of travel
given those conditions.
the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]]
<C. Violation of Prima Facie Speed Law, Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352>
[To prove that the defendant committed a violation of the prima facie
speed law, the People must prove that:
2. The defendant drove faster than (15/25) mph;
[AND]
3. The defendant drove <insert appropriate description
362
from Veh. Code, § 22352 of area where alleged violation

occurred>(;/.)
[AND
4. The defendant’s rate of speed was faster than a reasonable
person would have driven considering the weather, visibility,
traffic, and conditions of the highway.]
the public for purposes of vehicular travel and includes a street.]
[When determining whether the defendant drove faster than a
reasonable person would have driven, consider not only the speed, but
also all the surrounding conditions known by the defendant and also
what a reasonable person would have considered a safe rate of travel
given those conditions.
the defendant’s rate of travel was not reasonable given the overall
conditions, even if the rate of travel was faster than the prima facie
speed law. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant did not violate the prima facie speed law.]]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In a vehicular manslaughter case, the court has a sua sponte duty instruct on the
elements of the predicate misdemeanors or infractions alleged. (People v. Ellis
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409].) This instruction covers
some of the more common infractions alleged. The court must give all appropriate
instructions defining the element of vehicular manslaughter with this instruction.
When instructing on the prima facie speed law, insert the appropriate description of
where the defendant was driving when the alleged violation occurred. If the
defendant presents evidence that the rate of travel was not in violation of the basic
speed law even though in violation of the prima facie speed law, give bracketed
element 4 and the two bracketed paragraphs that begin, “When determining whether
the defendant drove faster than a reasonable person.”.(Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352.)
The court should define the term highway; however, it need only be defined once. If
the court instructs on multiple Vehicle Code sections, give the bracketed definition
of highway at the end of the last Vehicle Code section instructed on.
AUTHORITY
• Maximum Speed Law. Veh. Code, § 22349.
• Basic Speed Law. Veh. Code, § 22350.
363
• Prima Facie Speed Law. Veh. Code, §§ 22351, 22352.

• Highway Defined. Veh. Code, § 360.
• Duty to Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. People v. Ellis (1999) 69
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public
Peace and Welfare, § 320.
Against the Person, § 142.02[2][c], [3][b], Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.02[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
364
G. ATTEMPT
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with attempted murder.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People
must prove that:
1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward
killing (another person/ [or] a fetus);
AND
2. The defendant intended to kill (that/a) (person/ [or] fetus).
A direct step requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit
murder or obtaining or arranging for something needed to commit
murder. A direct step is one that goes beyond planning or preparation
and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct
step indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to kill. It is a direct
movement toward the commission of the crime after preparations are
made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the
plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside the plan
had not interrupted the attempt.
[A person who attempts to commit murder is guilty of attempted murder
even if, after taking a direct step toward killing, he or she abandons
further efforts to complete the crime, or his or her attempt fails or is
interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control. On the
other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her plans
before taking a direct step toward committing the murder, then that
person is not guilty of attempted murder.]
[The defendant may be guilty of attempted murder even if you conclude
that murder was actually completed.]
[A fetus is an unborn human being that has progressed beyond the
embryonic stage after major structures have been outlined, which
typically occurs at seven to eight weeks after fertilization.]
<Give when kill zone theory applies>
[A person may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] secondary
target[s] within a zone of fatal harm or “kill zone.” A “kill zone” is an
area in which the defendant used lethal force that was designed and
intended to kill everyone in the area around the primary target.
In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of
<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted
365
murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that

the defendant not only intended to kill <insert name of
primary target alleged> but also either intended to kill
<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s]
on concurrent-intent theory>, or intended to kill everyone within the kill
zone.
In determining whether the defendant intended to kill
<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s]
on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that (1) the only
reasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force, is that the
defendant intended to create a kill zone; and (2) <insert
name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on
concurrent-intent theory> was located within the kill zone.
In determining whether the defendant intended to create a “kill zone”
and the scope of such a zone, you should consider all of the
circumstances including, but not limited to, the following:
[• The type of weapon used(;/.)]
[• The number of shots fired(;/.)]
[• The distance between the defendant and <insert name
or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on
concurrent-intent theory>(;/.)]
[• The distance between <insert name or description of
victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent
theory> and the primary target.]
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill
<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted
murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> or intended to kill
<insert name or description of primary target alleged> by
killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not
guilty of the attempted murder of <insert name or
description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-
intent theory>.]
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, August 2009, April 2011, August 2013,
September 2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the crime of
attempted murder when charged, or if not charged, when the evidence raises a
question whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. (See People v.
366
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]
[discussing duty to instruct on lesser included offenses in homicide generally].)
The second bracketed paragraph is provided for cases in which the prosecution
theory is that the defendant created a “kill zone,” harboring the specific and
concurrent intent to kill others in the zone. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313,
331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].) “The conclusion that transferred intent
does not apply to attempted murder still permits a person who shoots at a group of
people to be punished for the actions towards everyone in the group even if that
person primarily targeted only one of them.” (Id. at p. 329.)
The Bland court stated that a special instruction on this issue was not required. (Id.
at p. 331, fn. 6.) The bracketed language is provided for the court to use at its
discretion.
Give the next-to-last bracketed paragraph when the defendant has been charged only
with attempt to commit murder, but the evidence at trial reveals that the murder was
actually completed. (See Pen. Code, § 663.)
Penal Code section 188, as amended by Statutes 2018, ch. 1015 (S.B. 1437),
became effective January 1, 2019. The amendment added “malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The natural
and probable consequences doctrine as the basis for attempted murder may be
affected by this statutory change.
CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions.
CALCRIM No. 601, Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation.
CALCRIM No. 602, Attempted Murder: Peace Offıcer, Firefighter, Custodial Offıcer,
or Custody Assistant.
CALCRIM No. 603, Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser
Included Offense.
CALCRIM No. 604, Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-
Defense—Lesser Included Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 663, 664.
• Murder Defined. Pen. Code, § 187.
• Specific Intent to Kill Required. People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386
[220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252].
• Fetus Defined. People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 814–815 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d
50, 872 P.2d 591]; People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 867 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d
510, 86 P.3d 881].
• Kill Zone Explained. People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607–608 [248
Cal.Rptr.3d 370, 442 P.3d 686]; People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 137–138
[92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272].
367
• This Instruction Correctly States the Law of Attempted Murder. People v.

Lawrence (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 547, 556–557 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 324].
Attempted voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense. (People v. Van Ronk
(1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581]; People v. Williams (1980)
102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].)
RELATED ISSUES
Specific Intent Required
“[T]he crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill . . . .” (People v.
Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 386 [220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252].)
In instructing upon the crime of attempt to commit murder, there should never
be any reference whatsoever to implied malice. Nothing less than a specific
intent to kill must be found before a defendant can be convicted of attempt to
commit murder, and the instructions in this respect should be lean and
unequivocal in explaining to the jury that only a specific intent to kill will do.
(People v. Santascoy (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 909, 918 [200 Cal.Rptr. 709].)
Solicitation
Attempted solicitation of murder is a crime. (People v. Saephanh (2000) 80
Single Bullet, Two Victims
A shooter who fires a single bullet at two victims who are both in his line of fire
can be found to have acted with express malice toward both victims. (People v.
Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 744 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730]. See also
People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 225 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, 234 P.3d 557].)
No Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter
“[T]here is no such crime as attempted involuntary manslaughter.” (People v.
Johnson (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 798].)
Transferred and Concurrent Intent
“[T]he doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder.” (People v.
Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].) “[T]he
defendant may be convicted of the attempted murders of any[one] within the kill
zone, although on a concurrent, not transferred, intent theory.” (Id.)
Kill Zone Theory
Give the kill zone instruction “only in those cases where the court concludes there
is sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that the only reasonable
inference from the circumstances of the offense is that a defendant intended to kill
everyone in the zone of fatal harm. The use or attempted use of force that merely
endangered everyone in the area is insufficient to support a kill zone instruction.”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 608 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 370, 442 P.3d
686].)
368
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[3]; Ch. 141, Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt,
§ 141.20; Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.01[3][e] (Matthew Bender).
369
601. Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation (Pen.
Code, §§ 21a, 189, 664(a))
If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder [under Count

], you must then decide whether the People have proved the
additional allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and
with deliberation and premeditation.
(The defendant/ <insert name or description of principal if
not defendant>) acted willfully if (he/she) intended to kill when (he/she)
acted. (The defendant/ <insert name or description of
principal if not defendant>) deliberated if (he/she) carefully weighed the
consequences, decided to kill. (The defendant/ <insert name
or description of principal if not defendant>) acted with premeditation if
(he/she) decided to kill before completing the act[s] of attempted murder.
[The attempted murder was done willfully and with deliberation and
premeditation if either the defendant or <insert name or
description of principal> or both of them acted with that state of mind.]
not alone determine whether the attempted killing is deliberate and
premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and
circumstances. A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without
careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate
and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill
can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not the
length of time.
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, February 2015

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476,
490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]; Pen. Code, § 664(a).) Give this instruction
when an enhancement for deliberation and premeditation is charged.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 600, Attempted Murder.
When a charged attempted murder also forms the basis for a charge of provocative
370
act murder, the court must take care to clarify that the defendant must have
personally premeditated and deliberated an attempted murder in order to be
convicted of first degree murder resulting from attempted murder under the
provocative act doctrine. As described in CALCRIM No. 560, Homicide:
Provocative Act by Defendant, the mental state for first degree murder under the
provocative act murder doctrine requires that the defendant “personally premeditated
and deliberated the attempted murder that provoked a lethal response.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 662 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, 278 P.3d 1242].)
AUTHORITY
• Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Murder. Pen. Code, § 189.
• Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Attempted Murder. Pen. Code, § 664(a).
• Premeditation and Deliberation Defined. People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th
393, 443–444 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793]; People v. Anderson (1968)
70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942]; People v. Bender (1945)
27 Cal.2d 164, 183–184 [163 P.2d 8]; People v. Daugherty (1953) 40 Cal.2d
876, 901–902 [256 P.2d 911].
• Attempted Premeditated Murder and the Natural and Probable Consequences
Doctrine. People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 279
P.3d 1131].
RELATED ISSUES
Accomplice Liability
An aider and abettor is subject to this penalty provision where the principal
attempted a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder even though the accomplice
did not personally deliberate or premeditate. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613,
622–623 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
1450, 1473 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].) The accomplice must still share the intent to kill.
(People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 623–624.)
See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 521, Murder: Degrees for
discussion of “deliberate and premeditated.”
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02[3]; Ch. 141, Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt,
§§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.01[1][e], [g], [3][e]
(Matthew Bender).
371
602. Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial
Officer, or Custody Assistant (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664(e))
If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder [under Count

additional allegation that (he/she) attempted to murder a (peace officer/
firefighter/custodial officer).
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a (peace
officer/firefighter/custodial officer/custody assistant/nonsworn
uniformed employee of a sheriff’s department) lawfully
performing (his/her) duties as a (peace officer/firefighter/custodial
officer/custody assistant/nonsworn uniformed employee of a
sheriff’s department);
AND
2. When the defendant attempted the murder, the defendant knew,
or reasonably should have known, that <insert
offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a (peace
officer/firefighter/custodial officer/custody assistant/nonsworn
uniformed employee of a sheriff’s department) who was
performing (his/her) duties.
offıcer”>. ]
[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of peace offıcer, firefighter,
custodial offıcer, custody assistant or nonsworn uniformed employee of a
sheriff’s department> include <insert job duties>. ]
[A firefighter includes anyone who is an officer, employee, or member of
a (governmentally operated (fire department/fire protection or
firefighting agency) in this state/federal fire department/federal fire
protection or firefighting agency), whether or not he or she is paid for his
or her services.]
[A custodial officer is someone who works for a law enforcement agency
of a city or county, is responsible for maintaining custody of prisoners,
and helps operate a local detention facility. [[A/An] (county jail/city jail/
<insert other detention facility>) is a local detention facility.]
372
[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]]

<If the custodial offıcer is employed by a law enforcement agency of San
Diego County, Fresno County, Kern County, Stanislaus County, Riverside
County, Santa Clara County, or a county having a population of 425,000 or
less, give the following sentence in place of the definition above.>
[A person designated as (a/an) (correctional officer/jailer/
<insert similar title>) employed by the county of <insert
name of county designated by Penal Code section 831.5(a)> is a custodial
officer.]
[A custody assistant is a person who is a full-time, non-peace officer
employee of the county sheriff’s department who assists peace officer
personnel in maintaining order and security in a custody detention,
court detention, or station jail facility of the sheriff’s department.]
[For the purpose of this instruction, a nonsworn uniformed employee of
a sheriff’s department is someone whose job includes the care or control
of inmates in a detention facility. [A prison, jail, camp, or other
correctional facility used for the confinement of adults or both adults
and minors/ <insert other applicable definition from Penal
Code section 289.6(c)> is a detention facility for the purpose of this
definition.]]
excessive).]
Instruction 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Offıcer.>
[A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or
she is using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties.
Instruction 2671 explains when force is unreasonable or excessive.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476,
490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
373
In order to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,” a peace officer or

custodial officer must be acting lawfully. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the
issue of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty
element.” (Ibid.) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser
included offense in which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used
reasonable force in response to excessive force. (People v. Olguin (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that
the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr.
651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer is an issue, give the bracketed
paragraph on lawful performance of a peace officer and the appropriate portions of
CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer. If lawful performance of
a custodial officer is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance
of a custodial officer and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671, Lawful
Performance: Custodial Offıcer.
Brown(1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The
Penal Code section 664(e) refers to the definition of peace officer used in Penal
Code section 190.2(a)(7), which defines “peace officer” as “defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5,
830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12.”
Penal Code section 664(e) refers to the definition of firefighter used in Penal Code
section 190.2(a)(9), which defines “firefighter” “as defined in Section 245.1.”
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of (a/an)
<insert title . . . .> include,” on request.The court may insert a
search . . . warrant.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275
Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
In the bracketed definition of “local detention facility,” do not insert the name of a
specific detention facility. Instead, insert a description of the type of detention
facility at issue in the case. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76
Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869] [jury must determine if alleged victim is a peace
officer]; see Penal Code section 6031.4 [defining local detention facility].)
374
AUTHORITY
• Attempted Murder on a Peace Officer or Firefighter. Pen. Code, § 664(e).
• Firefighter Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.1.
• Custody Assistant Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.7.
• Nonsworn Uniformed Employee of Sheriff’s Department Defined. Pen. Code,
§ 664(e).
• Custodial Officer as Referenced in Pen. Code, § 664, Defined. Pen. Code,
§§ 831(a) and 831.5(a).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Conspiracy, Solicitation, and Attempt, §§ 141.20[2], 141.21; Ch. 142, Crimes
Against the Person, § 142.01[3][e] (Matthew Bender).
375
603. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser
Included Offense (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
An attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is

reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant attempted
to kill someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
The defendant attempted to kill someone because of a sudden quarrel or
in the heat of passion if:
killing a person;
2. The defendant intended to kill that person;
3. The defendant attempted the killing because (he/she) was
provoked;
4. The provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is,
from passion rather than from judgment;
AND
5. The attempted killing was a rash act done under the influence of
intense emotion that obscured the defendant’s reasoning or
judgment.
In order for a sudden quarrel or heat of passion to reduce an attempted
murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have
acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have
defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or
remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur
over a short or long period of time.
than judgment.
[If enough time passed between the provocation and the attempted
killing for a person of average disposition to “cool off” and regain his or
her clear reasoning and judgment, then the attempted murder is not
376
reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter on this basis.]

the defendant attempted to kill someone and was not acting as a result
of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met
this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of attempted murder.
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2010, April 2011, August 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter on
either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is
“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (See People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing
charge of completed murder]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] [same].)
If the victim’s gender identity or sexual orientation raises specific issues concerning
whether provocation was objectively reasonable, give an instruction tailored to those
issues on request. (Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective January 1, 2015.)
CALCRIM No. 511, Excusable Homicide: Accident in the Heat of Passion.
CALCRIM No. 570, Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included
Offense.
CALCRIM No. 604, Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-
Defense—Lesser Included Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664.
• Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192.
1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
• Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation Not Proper Basis for Finding
Provocation Objectively Reasonable. Pen. Code, § 192(f), amended effective
January 1, 2015.
RELATED ISSUES
Specific Intent to Kill Required
An attempt to commit a crime requires an intention to commit the crime and an
overt act towards its completion. Where a person intends to kill another person
and makes an unsuccessful attempt to do so, his intention may be accompanied
377
by any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which can accompany the

completed crimes. In other words, the intent to kill may have been formed after
premeditation or deliberation, it may have been formed upon a sudden explosion
of violence, or it may have been brought about by a heat of passion or an
unreasonable but good faith belief in the necessity of self-defense.
(People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824 [217 Cal.Rptr. 581] [citation
omitted].)
No Attempted Involuntary Manslaughter
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 570, Voluntary Manslaughter:
Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person § 224.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
378
604. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-
Defense—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
An attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is

reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant attempted
to kill a person because (he/she) acted in imperfect (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another).
If you conclude the defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another), (his/her) action was lawful and you must find (him/
her) not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete
(self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and imperfect (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another) depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the
need to use deadly force was reasonable.
The defendant acted in imperfect (self-defense/ [or] defense of another)
if:
killing a person.
2. The defendant intended to kill when (he/she) acted.
3. The defendant believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.
AND
4. The defendant believed that the immediate use of deadly force
was necessary to defend against the danger.
BUT
5. At least one of the defendant’s beliefs was unreasonable.
the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have actually believed
there was imminent danger of death or great bodily injury to (himself/
herself/ [or] someone else).
In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances as
they were known and appeared to the defendant.
[If you find that <insert name or description of alleged
victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you
may consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.]
[If you find that the defendant knew that <insert name or
379
description of alleged victim> had threatened or harmed others in the

past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s
beliefs.]
(he/she) reasonably associated with <insert name or
description of alleged victim>, you may consider that threat in evaluating
the defendant’s beliefs.]
the defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the People have
not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of attempted
murder.
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, February 2012, February
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter on
either theory, heat of passion or imperfect self-defense, when evidence of either is
“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. (See People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing
charge of completed murder]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] [same].)
Perfect Self-Defense
Most courts hold that an instruction on imperfect self-defense is required in every
case in which a court instructs on perfect self-defense. If there is substantial
evidence of a defendant’s belief in the need for self-defense, there will always be
substantial evidence to support an imperfect self-defense instruction because the
reasonableness of that belief will always be at issue. (See People v. Ceja (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 78, 85–86 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475], overruled in part in People v. Blakeley
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675]; see also People v. De
Leon (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 824 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 825].) The court in People v.
Rodriguez disagreed, however, and found that an imperfect self-defense instruction
was not required sua sponte on the facts of the case where the defendant’s version
of the crime “could only lead to an acquittal based on justifiable homicide,” and
380
when the prosecutor’s version of the crime could only lead to a conviction of first
degree murder. (People v. Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1275 [62
Cal.Rptr.2d 345]; see also People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14
Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961] [in a rape prosecution, the court was not required to
give a mistake-of-fact instruction where the two sides gave wholly divergent
accounts with no middle ground to support a mistake-of-fact instruction].)
In evaluating whether the defendant actually believed in the need for self-defense,
the jury may consider the effect of antecedent threats and assaults against the
defendant, including threats received by the defendant from a third party that the
defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1069 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337].) If there is sufficient
evidence, the court should give the bracketed paragraphs on prior threats or assaults
on request.
CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477, Defense Instructions.
CALCRIM No. 571, Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser
Included Offense.
CALCRIM No. 603, Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser
Included Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Attempt Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664.
• Manslaughter Defined. Pen. Code, § 192.
1018, 1024–1026 [162 Cal.Rptr. 748].
• Imperfect Self-Defense Defined. People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668,
680–683 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186,
201 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531]; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768,
773 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574]; see People v. Uriarte (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 192, 197–198 [272 Cal.Rptr. 693] [insufficient evidence to support
defense of another person].
[132 Cal.Rptr.3d 248].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 603, Attempted Voluntary
Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense and CALCRIM No. 571,
Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 224.
381
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
382
There may be more than one cause of death. An act causes death only if
factor that causes the death.
<A. Negligence of Decedent or Third Party, Not Medical Personnel>
[The failure of <insert name of decedent> or another person
to use reasonable care may have contributed to the death. But if the
defendant’s act was a substantial factor causing the death, then the
defendant is legally responsible for the death even though
<insert name of decedent> or another person may have failed to use
reasonable care.]
<B. Negligence of Medical Personnel>
[The failure of the (doctor(s)/ [or] medical staff) to use reasonable care in
treating <insert name of decedent> may have contributed to
the death. But if the injury inflicted by the defendant was a substantial
factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally responsible for the
death even though the (doctor[s]/ [or] medical staff) may have failed to
use reasonable care. On the other hand, if the injury inflicted by the
defendant was not a substantial factor causing the death, but the death
was caused by grossly improper treatment by the (doctor[s]/[or] medical
staff), then the defendant is not legally responsible for the death.]
<C. Vulnerable Victim—Injury Accelerating Death>
[ <insert name of decedent> may have suffered from an
illness or physical condition that made (him/her) more likely to die from
the injury than the average person. The fact that <insert
name of decedent> may have been more physically vulnerable is not a
defense to (murder/ [or] manslaughter). If the defendant’s act was a
substantial factor causing the death, then the defendant is legally
responsible for the death. This is true even if <insert name
of decedent> would have died in a short time as a result of other causes
or if another person of average health would not have died as a result of
the defendant’s actions.]
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant’s act caused the
death, you must find (him/her) not guilty.
383
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
401].)
AUTHORITY
• Negligence of Third Party. People v. Clark (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 271, 277–278
[235 P.2d 56]; People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243
Cal.Rptr. 54].
• Negligence of Medical Staff. People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240–241
[187 P.2d 706]; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 312 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276,
826 P.2d 274].
• Vulnerable Victim. People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155–157 [109
Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357]; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 579 [51
Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flood
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869]; People v.
Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 209 [82 Cal.Rptr. 598].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Elements, §§ 39, 40,
45.
384
625. Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen.
Code, § 29.4)
You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary

intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only
in deciding whether the defendant acted with an intent to kill[,] [or] [the
defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation[,]] [[or] the
defendant was unconscious when (he/she) acted[,]] [or the defendant
<insert other specific intent required in a homicide charge or
other charged offense>.]
A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by
willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing
that it could produce an intoxicating effect, or willingly assuming the
risk of that effect.
You may not consider evidence of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication
for any other purpose.
New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2016, March 2019, October
2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
With the statutory elimination of diminished capacity as a defense, there is no sua
sponte duty to instruct on the effect of voluntary intoxication on the mental states
required for homicide. (Pen. Code, § 28(b); People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103,
1119–1120 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) However, subsequent cases affirm
that voluntary intoxication can be used to negate an element of the crime that must
be proven by the prosecution. (People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982 [61
Cal.Rptr.2d 39]; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 56–57 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495,
825 P.2d 388].) Such an instruction is a “pinpoint” instruction, which must be given
on request when there is sufficient evidence supporting the theory. (People v. Saille,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120.)
Include the bracketed language regarding unconsciousness if the court also gives
CALCRIM No. 626, Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on
Homicide Crimes.
If the defendant is charged with a homicide crime that has as an element an
additional specific intent requirement other than intent to kill, include the required
intent in the last bracketed portion of the second sentence. For example, if the
defendant is charged with torture murder, include “whether the defendant intended
385
to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.” Or, if the defendant is charged with felony-
murder, insert intent to commit the felony where indicated. Similarly, if the
defendant is also charged with a nonhomicide crime with a specific intent
requirement, include that intent requirement. For example, if the defendant is
charged with murder and robbery, include “whether the defendant intended to
permanently deprive the owner of the property.”
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible on the question of whether a
defendant believed it necessary to act in self-defense. (People v. Soto (2018) 4
AUTHORITY
• Voluntary Intoxication Defined. Pen. Code, § 29.4(c).
• Unconsciousness Not Required. People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28–29 [120
Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].
• No Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct. People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [2
Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
• Evidence of Intoxication Inapplicable to Implied Malice. Pen. Code, § 29.4(b);
People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114–1115 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].
• Applies to Attempted Murder. People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016
[68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197].
• Voluntary Intoxication Relevant to Knowledge. People v. Reyes (1997) 52
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Turk (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1381 [80
Cal.Rptr.3d 473]; People v. Timms (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1298 [60
Cal.Rptr.3d 677].
RELATED ISSUES
General Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication
This instruction is a specific application of CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary
Intoxication, to homicide.
Unconsciousness
Unconsciousness (as defined in CALCRIM No. 3425, Unconsciousness) is not
required. (People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28–29 [120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d
1017], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675].)
Not Applicable in Murder Cases Based Exclusively on Implied Malice
This instruction is inapplicable to cases where the murder charge is exclusively
based on a theory of implied malice because voluntary intoxication can only negate
express malice. (Pen. Code, § 29.4(b); People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107,
1114–1115 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) Drunk-driving second degree murder is one type
of case that is typically based exclusively on an implied malice theory.
386
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew
Bender).
387
626. Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on
Homicide Crimes (Pen. Code, § 29.4)
Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to be unconscious of his or

her actions. A very intoxicated person may still be capable of physical
movement but may not be aware of his or her actions or the nature of
those actions.
When a person voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the
point of unconsciousness, the person assumes the risk that while
unconscious he or she will commit acts inherently dangerous to human
life. If someone dies as a result of the actions of a person who was
unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary
manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant killed without legal justification or excuse;
2. The defendant did not act with the intent to kill;
3. The defendant did not act with a conscious disregard for human
life;
AND
4. As a result of voluntary intoxication, the defendant was not
conscious of (his/her) actions or the nature of those actions.
the defendant was not unconscious. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or]
voluntary manslaughter).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication causing
unconsciousness if there is evidence to support this finding. (People v. Graham
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153] [partially abrogated by
Pen. Code, § 29.4(c)]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423–424 [79
388
Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) However, the court may properly refuse to give
this instruction when the evidence shows that the defendant acted with malice
before becoming intoxicated. (People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27
Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially abrogated by amendments to Pen. Code,
§ 29.4(a)].)
In People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423–424 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d
442] [quoting People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455
P.2d 153]], the court stated,
[I]f the state of unconsciousness results from intoxication voluntarily induced
. . . it is not a complete defense. If the intoxication is voluntarily induced, it
can never excuse homicide . . . . [The] requisite element of criminal negligence
is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness, and a defendant stands guilty
of involuntary manslaughter if he voluntarily procured his own intoxication.
The committee has chosen not to include the phrase “criminal negligence is deemed
to exist” because the committee concluded that this unnecessarily complicates the
issue for the jury.
AUTHORITY
• Definition of Voluntary Intoxication. Pen. Code, § 29.4(c).
• Presumption of Criminal Negligence. People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303,
317, fn. 4 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153] [partially abrogated by Pen. Code,
§ 29.4(c)].
• Malice Preceded Intoxication. People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27
Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially abrogated by amendments to Pen.
Code, § 29.4(a)].
• Criminal Negligence. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d
RELATED ISSUES
Unconsciousness Does Not Require Inability to Move
“[U]nconsciousness can exist . . . where the subject physically acts in fact but is
not, at the time, conscious of acting.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 424
[79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted];
see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 343–344 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39
P.3d 432].)
Malice Preceded Intoxication: Drunk Driving
In a case in which the defendant was convicted of second degree murder following
a fatal drunk driving accident, the trial court properly refused to give an
unconsciousness instruction where the defendant’s long history of drinking and
driving established that he acted with malice prior to becoming intoxicated. (People
v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 455 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] [partially
abrogated by amendments to Pen. Code, § 29.4(a)].)
389
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 252.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][d.1], [e], 142.02[1][e], [f], [2][b], [3][c] (Matthew
Bender).
390
A hallucination is a perception not based on objective reality. In other

words, a person has a hallucination when that person believes that he or
she is seeing or hearing [or otherwise perceiving] something that is not
actually present or happening.
You may consider evidence of hallucinations, if any, in deciding whether
the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation.
the defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first
degree murder.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This is a pinpoint instruction to be given only on request when the evidence
supports the defense theory. (People v. McCarrick (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 243
[210 Cal.Rptr.3d 838].) The court may need to modify this instruction if evidence of
delusions, rather than hallucinations, is offered. (People v. Gana (2015) 236
“[E]vidence of a hallucination—a perception with no objective reality—is
inadmissible to negate malice so as to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter
but is admissible to negate deliberation and premeditation so as to reduce first
degree murder to second degree murder.” (People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th
675, 677 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 889].)
AUTHORITY
• Hallucination Evidence. People v. Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 677 [126
Cal.Rptr.2d 889].
• Hallucination Alone Not a Basis for Imperfect Self-Defense. People v. Mejia-
Lenares (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 404].
• Imperfect Self-Defense Does Not Apply When Defendant’s Belief in Need for
Self-Defense is Entirely Delusional. People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121,
145 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, 325 P.3d 951].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 107–108.
391

Against the Person, § 142.01[1][g] (Matthew Bender).
392
J. CHARGE TO JURY
640. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use
When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is
Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide
[For each count charging murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will be) given
verdict forms for guilty and not guilty of first degree murder (, /and)
[second degree murder] [(, /and)] [voluntary manslaughter] [(, /and)]
[involuntary manslaughter].
You may consider these different kinds of homicide in whatever order
you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of
<insert second degree murder or, if the jury is not instructed
on second degree murder as a lesser included offense, each form of
manslaughter, voluntary and/or involuntary, on which the jury is instructed>
only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of first degree
murder, [and I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of (voluntary/
involuntary/voluntary or involuntary) manslaughter only if all of you
have found the defendant not guilty of both first and second degree
murder].
[As with all of the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty
or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.
Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed
final verdict form[s]. [Return the unused verdict form[s] to me,
unsigned.]
1. If all of you agree that the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree
murder, complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or
sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of first
degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an agreement
and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that count].
2. <In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is
instructed on second degree murder as a lesser included offense.>
[3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree
murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of second
degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first
degree murder and the form for guilty of second degree murder.
Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree
393
murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of

second degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty
of first degree murder and inform me that you cannot reach
further agreement. Do not complete or sign any other verdict
forms [for that count].]
instructed on second degree murder as the only lesser included
offense.>
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete and
sign the verdict forms for not guilty of both. Do not complete or
sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]
[5. <In addition to paragraphs 1–4, give the following if the jury is
instructed on second degree murder and only one form of
manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as lesser included offenses.>
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but also agree
that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, complete and sign the forms for not guilty of first
degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder and the
form for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not
complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but cannot agree
whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, complete and sign the forms for not guilty of first
degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder and
inform me that you cannot reach further agreement. Do not
murder, not guilty of second degree murder, and not guilty of
(voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the
verdict forms for not guilty of each crime. Do not complete or
sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]
instructed on second degree murder and both voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses.>
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete and
sign the forms for not guilty of first degree murder and not guilty
of second degree murder.
394
6. If all of you agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty of voluntary

or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the appropriate
verdict form for each charge on which you agree. You may not
find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter [as to any count]. Do not complete or sign any
other verdict forms [for that count].
7. If you cannot reach agreement as to voluntary manslaughter or
involuntary manslaughter, inform me of your disagreement. Do
not complete or sign any verdict form for any charge on which
you cannot reach agreement.]
7. <In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is not
instructed on second degree murder and the jury is instructed on one
form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as the only lesser
included offense.>
murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/
involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for not
guilty of first degree murder and the form for guilty of
(voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign
any other verdict forms [for that count].
(voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form
for not guilty of first degree murder and inform me that you
cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any
murder or (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and
sign the verdict forms for not guilty of each crime. Do not
complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].]
instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, but not
second degree murder, as lesser included offenses.>
murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of first degree
murder.
or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the appropriate
verdict form for each charge on which you agree. You may not
find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter [as to any count]. Do not complete or sign any
395

New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2009

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In all homicide cases in which the defendant is charged with first degree murder and
one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a sua sponte duty
to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 641, Deliberations and Completion of
Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and
Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used
When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses.
(See People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]
[must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; People v.
Dixon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must
determine degree]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d
870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; People v.
Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if
jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; People v.
Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to
instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that
defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31
Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to
render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty
to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found
defendant not guilty of greater offense].)
In Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519, the Supreme Court suggested
that the trial court provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not guilty on each of
the charged and lesser offenses. The court later referred to this “as a judicially
declared rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322,
329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a mandatory procedure.
(Ibid.)
If the court chooses to follow the procedure suggested in Stone, the court may give
this instruction or CALCRIM No. 642, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict
Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury
Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide, in place of this instruction.
The court should tell the jury it may not return a guilty verdict on a lesser included
396
offense unless it has found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense. (People v.
Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked
on the greater offense but, despite the court’s instructions, has returned a guilty
verdict on the lesser included offense, the court should again instruct the jury that it
may not convict of the lesser included offense unless it has found the defendant not
guilty of the greater offense. (Ibid.) The court should direct the jury to reconsider
the “lone verdict of conviction of the lesser included offense” in light of this
instruction. (Ibid.; Pen. Code, § 1161.) If the jury is deadlocked on the greater
offense but the court nevertheless records a guilty verdict on the lesser included
offense and then discharges the jury, retrial on the greater offense will be barred.
(People v. Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307; Pen. Code, § 1023.)
If, after following the procedures required by Fields, the jury declares that it is
deadlocked on the greater offense, then the prosecution must elect one of the
following options: (1) the prosecutor may request that the court declare a mistrial on
the greater offense without recording the verdict on the lesser offense, allowing the
prosecutor to retry the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may
ask the court to record the verdict on the lesser offense and to dismiss the greater
offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than retry the defendant on
the greater offense. (People v. Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 311.)
The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the various
homicide offenses. (People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 330–331.)
Do not give this instruction if felony murder is the only theory for first degree
murder. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908–909 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4
P.3d 265].)
AUTHORITY
• Lesser Included Offenses-Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; People v.
• Degree to Be Set by Jury. Pen. Code, § 1157; People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d
216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; People v. Dixon (1979) 24 Cal.3d
43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
• Reasonable Doubt as to Degree. Pen. Code, § 1097; People v. Morse (1964) 60
Cal.2d 631, 657 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]; People v. Dewberry (1959) 51
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
• Conviction of Lesser Precludes Re-trial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; People v.
Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832];
People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d
572].
• Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser Absent Finding on
Greater. Pen. Code, § 1161; People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 310 [52
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
• Must Permit Partial Verdict of Acquittal on Greater. People v. Marshall (1996)
13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; Stone v. Superior
397
Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].
• Involuntary Manslaughter Not a Lesser Included Offense of Voluntary
Manslaughter. People v. Orr (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784–785 [27
Cal.Rptr.2d 553].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.20 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[3][e], 142.02[3][c] (Matthew Bender).
398
When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is
Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to
Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are
[For each count charging (murder/ manslaughter),] (Y/y)ou (have been/

will be) given verdict forms for [guilty of first degree murder][,] [guilty
of second degree murder][,] [guilty of voluntary manslaughter][,] [guilty
of involuntary manslaughter][,] and not guilty.
you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if all
of you have found the defendant not guilty of [all of] the greater
crime[s].
[As with all the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or
not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.
Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed,
final verdict form. You will complete and sign only one verdict form [per
count]. [Return the unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.]
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of first
degree murder, inform me only that you cannot reach an
agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for
that count].
instructed on second degree murder as a lesser included offense.>
murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of second
degree murder, complete and sign the form for guilty of second
degree murder. Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms
[for that count].]
second degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach
agreement [on that count]. Do not complete or sign any verdict
forms [for that count].
399
instructed on second degree murder as the only lesser included

offense.>
4. [5. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of first
degree murder and not guilty of second degree murder, complete
and sign the not guilty verdict form.] Do not complete or sign any
instructed on second degree murder and only one form of
manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as lesser included offenses.>
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but also agree
that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, complete and sign the form for guilty of
murder and not guilty of second degree murder, but cannot agree
whether the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, inform me that you cannot reach agreement [on
that count]. Do not complete or sign any verdict forms [for that
count].
murder, not guilty of second degree murder, and not guilty of
(voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the
verdict form for not guilty. Do not complete or sign any other
verdict forms [for that count].]
7. <In addition to paragraphs 1–2, give the following if the jury is not
instructed on second degree murder and the jury is instructed on one
form of manslaughter (voluntary or involuntary) as the only lesser
included offense.>
murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of (voluntary/
involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the form for guilty
of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not complete or sign
(voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, inform me that you cannot
reach agreement [for that count]. Do not complete or sign any
verdict forms [for that count].
400
murder or (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and
sign the verdict form for not guilty. Do not complete or sign any
other verdict forms [for that count].]
5. <If the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter as lesser included offenses, whether the jury is
instructed on second degree murder or not, the court must give the
jury guilty and not guilty verdict forms as to first degree murder and
all lesser crimes, and instruct pursuant to CALCRIM 640.>

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In all homicide cases in which the defendant is charged with first degree murder and
one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a sua sponte duty
to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 640, Deliberations and Completion of
Verdict Forms: For Use When the Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder
and the Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide. (See People v.
Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct
jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; People v. Dixon (1979) 24
Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree];
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d
1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; People v. Dewberry (1959) 51
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable
doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; People v. Fields (1996) 13
Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury
cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not
guilty of the greater offense]; Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519
[183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict
of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in People v. Marshall (1996) 13
Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about
partial acquittal in absence of indication jury may have found defendant not guilty
of greater offense].)
(Ibid.) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in Stone, the court
may give this instruction. If the jury later declares that it is unable to reach a verdict
on a lesser offense, then the court must provide the jury an opportunity to acquit on
the greater offense. (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; Stone v.
401
Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.) In such cases, the court must give
CALCRIM No. 640 and must provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not
guilty for each offense. (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; Stone v.
Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.)
If the greatest offense charged is second degree murder, the court should give
CALCRIM 643, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When
Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not
Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and
Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses instead of this instruction.
prosecutor to re-try the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may
offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than re-try the defendant on
homicide offenses. (People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 322, 330.)
Do not give this instruction if felony murder is the only theory for first degree
murder. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908–909 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4
P.3d 265].)
AUTHORITY
43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
402
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
572].
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
Cal.Rptr.2d 553].
SECONDARY SOURCES
403
When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury
Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide
[For each count charging second degree murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will
be) given verdict forms for guilty and not guilty of second degree
murder (, /and) [voluntary manslaughter (, /and)] [involuntary
manslaughter].
you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty or not guilty of [voluntary]
[or] [involuntary] manslaughter only if all of you have found the
defendant not guilty of second degree murder.
[As with all of the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty
or not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.
Follow these directions before you give me any completed and signed
final verdict form[s]. [Return the unused verdict form[s] to me,
unsigned.]
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of second degree
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of
second degree murder, inform me that you cannot reach an
that count].
instructed on only one form of manslaughter (voluntary or
involuntary) as a lesser included offense.>
[3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second
degree murder but also agree that the defendant is guilty of
for not guilty of second degree murder and the form for guilty of
4. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second
degree murder but cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty
of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, complete and sign the
form for not guilty of second degree murder and inform me that
you cannot reach further agreement. Do not complete or sign any
404

degree murder and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict forms for not guilty
of both.]
instructed on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser
included offenses.>
[3. If all of you agree that the defendant is not guilty of second
degree murder, complete and sign the form for not guilty of
second degree murder.
manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, complete and sign the
appropriate verdict form for each charge on which you agree. Do
not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
You may not find the defendant guilty of both voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter [as to any count].
New August 2009

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In all homicide cases in which second degree murder is the greatest offense charged
and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give this instruction. (See People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207
Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct jury that it must be unanimous as to
degree of murder]; People v. Dixon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592
P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,
162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included
offenses]; People v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty
to instruct that if jury has reasonable doubt of greater offense must acquit of that
charge]; People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914
P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has
concluded that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense]; Stone v. Superior
Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give
jury opportunity to render a verdict of partial acquittal on a greater offense],
clarified in People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919
P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about partial acquittal in absence of indication jury
may have found defendant not guilty of greater offense].)
405
(Ibid.)
If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in Stone, the court may
give CALCRIM No. 643, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use
When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only
One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary
and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses, in place of this
instruction.
prosecutor to retry the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may
offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than retry the defendant on
homicide offenses. (People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 330–331.)
AUTHORITY
43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
406
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
572].
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
Cal.Rptr.2d 553].
SECONDARY SOURCES
407
When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury
Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to
Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are
[For each count charging second degree murder,] (Y/y)ou (have been/will
be) given verdict forms for guilty of second degree murder, guilty of
(voluntary /involuntary) manslaughter and not guilty.
you wish, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter only if all of you have found the defendant not guilty of
second degree murder.
[As with all the charges in this case,] (To/to) return a verdict of guilty or
not guilty on a count, you must all agree on that decision.
final verdict form. You will complete and sign only one verdict form [per
count]. [Return the unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.]
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of second degree
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty of
second degree murder, inform me only that you cannot reach an
that count].
degree murder, but also agree that the defendant is guilty of
for guilty of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter. Do not
degree murder and cannot agree whether the defendant is guilty
of (voluntary/involuntary) manslaughter, inform me that you
cannot reach agreement [on that count]. Do not complete or sign
degree murder and not guilty of (voluntary/involuntary)
manslaughter, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty.
Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms [for that count].
408
5. <If the jury is instructed on both voluntary and involuntary

manslaughter as lesser included offenses, this instruction may not be
used. The court must give the jury guilty and not guilty verdict forms
as to second degree murder and each form of manslaughter, and
must instruct pursuant to CALCRIM 642.>
New August 2009

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In all homicide cases in which the greatest offense charged is second degree murder
and one or more lesser offense is submitted to the jury, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give this instruction or CALCRIM No. 642, Deliberations and Completion
of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder
and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide. (See People v.
Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121] [must instruct
jury that it must be unanimous as to degree of murder]; People v. Dixon (1979) 24
Cal.3d 43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752] [jury must determine degree];
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d
1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; People v. Dewberry (1959) 51
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has reasonable
doubt of greater offense must acquit of that charge]; People v. Fields (1996) 13
Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct that jury
cannot convict of a lesser offense unless it has concluded that defendant is not
guilty of the greater offense]; Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519
[183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render a verdict
of partial acquittal on a greater offense], clarified in People v. Marshall (1996) 13
Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about
(Ibid.) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure suggested in Stone, the court
may give this instruction. If the jury later declares that it is unable to reach a verdict
on a lesser offense, then the court must provide the jury an opportunity to acquit on
the greater offense. (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; Stone v.
Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 519.) In such cases, the court must give
CALCRIM No. 642 and must provide the jury with verdict forms of guilty/not
guilty for each offense. (People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 826; Stone v.
409
prosecutor to re-try the defendant for the greater offense; or (2) the prosecutor may
offense, opting to accept the current conviction rather than re-try the defendant on
homicide offenses. (People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 322, 330.)
AUTHORITY
43, 52 [154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 P.2d 752].
Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
572].
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
410

Cal.Rptr.2d 553].
SECONDARY SOURCES
411

If you find (the/a) defendant guilty of first degree murder, you must also
decide whether the People have proved that [one or more of] the special
circumstance[s] is true.
The People have the burden of proving (the/each) special circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the special circumstance has not been proved. [You must
return a verdict form stating true or not true for each special
circumstance on which you all agree.]
In order for you to return a finding that a special circumstance is or is
not true, all 12 of you must agree.
[You must (consider each special circumstance separately/ [and you
must] consider each special circumstance separately for each defendant).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the special circumstances
and to instruct that, in the case of a reasonable doubt, the jury must find the special
circumstance not true. (Pen. Code, § 190.4; see People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d
142, 180 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,
420 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to consider each special
circumstance separately. (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 681 [63
Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].) Give the bracketed paragraph if more than one
special circumstance is charged or there are multiple defendants.
Where multiple special circumstances are charged, the court may accept a partial
verdict if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on all of the special
circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 190.4.)
AUTHORITY
• Reasonable Doubt. Pen. Code, § 190.4; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142,
180 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,
420 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].
413
• Partial Verdict. Pen. Code, § 190.4.

• Consider Each Special Circumstance Separately. People v. Holt (1997) 15
RELATED ISSUES
Right to Jury Trial on Special Circumstances
Unless specifically waived, the defendant has a right to jury trial on the special
circumstance allegations even if the defendant pleaded guilty to the underlying
charges. (People v. Granger (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 422, 428 [164 Cal.Rptr. 363].)
Prior Conviction for Murder Requires Bifurcated Trial
If the defendant is charged with the special circumstance of a prior conviction for
murder, under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2), the court must bifurcate the trial.
(Pen. Code, § 190.1.) The jury should first determine whether the defendant is guilty
of first degree murder and whether any other special circumstances charged are true.
(Ibid.) The prior conviction special circumstance should then be submitted to the
jury in a separate proceeding. (Ibid.)
All Special Circumstances Constitutional Except Heinous or Atrocious Murder
The special circumstance for a heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(14)) has been held to be unconstitutionally vague. (People v. Superior
Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 803 [183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76]; People
v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 520 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].) No other
special circumstance has been found unconstitutional.
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Punishment, § 544.
Penalty, §§ 87.02, 87.10–87.15, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[4][a] (Matthew Bender).
414
701. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice
Before June 6, 1990
If you decide that (the/a) defendant is guilty of first degree murder but
was not the actual killer, then, when you consider the special
circumstance[s] <insert special circumstance[s] without intent
requirement for actual killer>, you must also decide whether the defendant
acted with the intent to kill.
In order to prove (this/these) special circumstance[s] for a defendant who
is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an
aider and abettor/ [or] a member of a conspiracy), the People must
prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.
[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with the
intent to kill in order for (this/these) special circumstance[s] to be true.
[If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, but you
cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer, then, in order
to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find that the
defendant acted with the intent to kill.]]
If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with
the intent to kill for the special circumstance[s] <insert
special circumstance[s] without intent requirement for actual killer> to be
true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/these)
special circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that
defendant].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the mental state required for
accomplice liability when a special circumstance is charged and there is sufficient
evidence to support the finding that the defendant was not the actual killer. (See
People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].)
If there is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant may have been an
accomplice and not the actual killer, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the
accomplice intent instruction, regardless of the prosecution’s theory of the case.
(Ibid.)
For all murders committed prior to June 6, 1990, the People must prove that an
aider and abettor or coconspirator acted with intent to kill for all special
circumstances except Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2) (prior conviction for murder).
415
(People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d
1306] [modifying Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135 [197
Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862]]; see pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) Since the
Supreme Court ruling in People v. Anderson, supra, the People do not have to show
intent to kill on the part of the actual killer unless specified in the special
circumstance. (People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1147.) However, if the
killing occurred during the window of time between Carlos and Anderson (1983 to
1987), then the People must also prove intent to kill on the part of the actual killer.
(People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].)
Use this instruction for any case in which the jury could conclude that the defendant
was an accomplice to a homicide that occurred prior to June 6, 1990, where any
special circumstance is charged that does not require intent to kill on the part of the
actual killer, other than Penal Code section 190.2(a)(2). For those special
circumstances where intent to kill is required for both the actual killer and the
accomplice, this instruction is not required. For those special circumstances, the
instruction on the special circumstance states “the defendant intended to kill” as an
element.
The court should carefully review the prior versions of Penal Code section 190.2 to
determine if the special circumstance required intent to kill at the time of the killing
because the special circumstances have been amended by referendum several times.
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to
kill on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant alleged to be the actual
killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the actual killer or an
accomplice.
If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, and
the defendant is charged with a special circumstance that does not require intent to
kill by the principal, then jury must find intent to kill if they cannot agree that the
defendant was the actual killer. (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should give both bracketed
paragraphs.
If the homicide occurred between 1983 and 1987, do not give this instruction.
(People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].)
For homicides during that period, the prosecution must prove intent to kill by the
actual killer as well as the accomplice. The court should make sure that the
instruction on the special circumstance states that the prosecution must prove that
the defendant intended to kill.
Do not give this instruction if accomplice liability is not at issue in the case.
CALCRIM No. 702, Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice
After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder.
After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder.
416
AUTHORITY
• Accomplice Intent Requirement. Pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(b); People
v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 536,
543.
Penalty, § 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
417
After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(c))
circumstance[s] of <insert only special circumstance[s] under
Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6)>, you must also decide
whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill.
prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.
[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with the
intent to kill in order for (this/these) special circumstance[s] to be true.
to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find that the
defendant acted with the intent to kill.]]
the intent to kill for the special circumstance[s] <insert only
special circumstance[s] under Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6)>
to be true. If the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/
these) special circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that
defendant].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
(Ibid.)
Proposition 115 modified the intent requirement of the special circumstance law,
codifying the decisions of People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240
418
Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158
[107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]. The current law provides that the actual killer
does not have to act with intent to kill unless the special circumstance specifically
requires intent. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) A defendant who is not the actual killer
must act with intent to kill unless the felony-murder special circumstance is charged.
(Pen. Code, §§ 190.2(c), (d).) If the felony-murder special circumstance is charged,
then the People must prove that a defendant who was not the actual killer either
acted with intent to kill or was a major participant and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d); People v. Estrada (1995) 11
was an accomplice to a homicide that occurred after June 5, 1990, and the
defendant is charged with a special circumstance, other than felony murder, that
does not require intent to kill by the actual killer. Currently, the only special
circumstances, other than felony murder, that do not require intent to kill by the
actual killer are: Prior conviction for murder (§ 190.2(a)(2)); Multiple offenses of
murder (§ 190.2(a)(3)); Murder by hidden explosive (§ 190.2(a)(4)); Murder to avoid
arrest (§ 190.2(a)(5)); and Murder by mail bomb (§ 190.2(a)(6)). However, the court
should carefully review the prior versions of Penal Code section 190.2 to determine
if the special circumstance required intent to kill at the time of the killing because
the special circumstances have been amended by referendum several times.
For those special circumstances where intent to kill is required for both the actual
killer and the accomplice, this instruction is not required. For those special
circumstances, the instruction on the special circumstance states “the defendant
intended to kill” as an element.
When the felony-murder special circumstance is charged, use CALCRIM No. 703,
Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5,
1990—Felony Murder.
kill on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant alleged to be the actual
killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the actual killer or an
accomplice.
If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, and
the defendant is charged with one of the special circumstances that does not require
intent to kill by the principal, then the jury must find intent to kill if they cannot
agree that the defendant was the actual killer. (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th
1084, 1117 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should then
give both bracketed paragraphs.
Before June 6, 1990.
419

After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder.
AUTHORITY
• Accomplice Intent Requirement. Pen. Code, § 190.2(c).
• Constitutional Standard for Intent by Accomplice. Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481
U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, §§ 536,
543.
420
After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d))
circumstance[s] of <insert felony murder special
circumstance[s]>, you must also decide whether the defendant acted
either with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life.
prove either that the defendant intended to kill, or the People must
prove all of the following:
1. The defendant’s participation in the crime began before or
during the killing;
2. The defendant was a major participant in the crime;
AND
3. When the defendant participated in the crime, (he/she) acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
[The People do not have to prove that the actual killer acted with intent
to kill or with reckless indifference to human life in order for the special
circumstance[s] of <insert felony-murder special
circumstance[s]> to be true.]
to find (this/these) special circumstance[s] true, you must find either that
the defendant acted with intent to kill or you must find that the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major
participant in the crime.]
to human life, consider all the evidence. No one of the following factors
is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to determine
421

likely to be used?]
used?]
occurred?]
consider all the evidence. No one of these following factors is necessary,
are:
[• [What was the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to
the death[s]?]
weapons?]
participant[s]?]
death ?]
either the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life and
was a major participant in the crime for the special circumstance[s] of
<insert felony murder special circumstance[s]> to be true. If
the People have not met this burden, you must find (this/these) special
422
circumstance[s] (has/have) not been proved true [for that defendant].
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2016, August 2016, September
2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
(Ibid.)
Do not give this instruction when giving CALCRIM No. 731, Special
Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to Kill
After March 8, 2000 or CALCRIM No. 732, Special Circumstances: Murder in
Commission of Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill. (People v. Odom (2016) 244
When multiple special circumstances are charged, one or more of which require
intent to kill, the court may need to modify this instruction.
Proposition 115 modified the intent requirement of the special circumstance law,
codifying the decisions of People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240
Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157–158
[107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]. The current law provides that the actual killer
does not have to act with intent to kill unless the special circumstance specifically
requires intent. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) If the felony-murder special circumstance is
charged, then the People must prove that a defendant who was not the actual killer
was a major participant and acted with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to
human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d); People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–809
[189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330]; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 571
[46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197].)
was an accomplice to a killing that occurred after June 5, 1990, when the felony-
murder special circumstance is charged.
kill or reckless indifference on the part of the actual killer if there is a codefendant
alleged to be the actual killer or if the jury could convict the defendant as either the
actual killer or an accomplice.
If the jury could convict the defendant either as a principal or as an accomplice, the
jury must find intent to kill or reckless indifference if they cannot agree that the
423
defendant was the actual killer. (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) In such cases, the court should give both the
bracketed paragraph stating that the People do not have to prove intent to kill or
reckless indifference on the part of the actual killer, and the bracketed paragraph
that begins with “[I]f you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder,
but you cannot agree whether the defendant was the actual killer . . . .”
whether the defendant was a major participant, but stopped short of holding that the
AUTHORITY
• Accomplice Intent Requirement, Felony Murder. Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).
481 U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
• Constitutional Standard for Intent by Accomplice. Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481
U.S. 137, 157–158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127].
Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 351 P.3d 330].
SECONDARY SOURCES
543.
Penalty, § 87.14[2][b][ii] (Matthew Bender).
424
704. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial
Evidence—Sufficiency
Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that a

special circumstance allegation is true, you must be convinced that the
People have proved each fact essential to that conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find that a
special circumstance allegation is true, you must be convinced that the
only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is
that the special circumstance allegation is true. If you can draw two or
more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one
of those reasonable conclusions supports a finding that the special
circumstance allegation is true and another reasonable conclusion
supports a finding that it is not true, you must conclude that the
allegation was not proved by the circumstantial evidence. However, when
considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable
conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
including intent]; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr.
368, 729 P.2d 802].)
Give CALCRIM No. 223, Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined, with this
instruction.
The Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to give an instruction specifically
tailored to the use of circumstantial evidence in determining the truth of a special
circumstance allegation. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133
Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106
Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) However, the court is not required to give this
instruction if it has also given the more general instruction on circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938
425
P.2d 388]; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 653; see CALCRIM No. 224,
Circumstantial Evidence: Suffıciency of Evidence.)
CALCRIM No. 223, Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined.
CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence: Suffıciency of Evidence.
CALCRIM No. 225, Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State.
CALCRIM No. 705, Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Intent or
Mental State.
AUTHORITY
• Duty to Instruct on Circumstantial Evidence Generally. People v. Yrigoyen
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333,
351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].
• Appropriate to Instruct on Special Circumstance. People v. Maury (2003) 30
Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27
Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25
• Instruction Duplicative, Not Required. People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,
653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997,
1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, § 83.03, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][a] (Matthew
Bender).
426
705. Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Intent or
Mental State
In order to prove the special circumstance[s] of <insert

special circumstance[s] with intent requirement>, the People must prove
not only that the defendant did the act[s] charged, but also that (he/she)
acted with a particular intent or mental state. The instruction for (each/
the) special circumstance explains the intent or mental state required.
An intent or mental state may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that the
defendant had the required intent or mental state, you must be
Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that
the defendant had the required intent or mental state, you must be
convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the
circumstantial evidence is that the defendant had the required intent or
mental state. If you can draw two or more reasonable conclusions from
the circumstantial evidence, and one of those reasonable conclusions
supports a finding that the defendant did have the required intent or
mental state and another reasonable conclusion supports a finding that
the defendant did not have the required intent or mental state, you must
conclude that the required intent or mental state was not proved by the
circumstantial evidence. However, when considering circumstantial
evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any
that are unreasonable.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
including intent]; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr.
368, 729 P.2d 802].)
Give CALCRIM No. 223, Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined, with this
instruction.
The Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to give an instruction specifically
tailored to the use of circumstantial evidence in determining the truth of a special
427
circumstance allegation. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428 [133

Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 653 [106
Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392].) However, the court is not required to give this
instruction if it has also given the more general instruction on circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1051 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938
P.2d 388]; People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 653; see CALCRIM No. 225,
Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State.)
If intent or mental state is the only element of the special circumstance that rests
substantially on circumstantial evidence, then this instruction should be given in
place of CALCRIM No. 704, Special Circumstances: Circumstantial
Evidence—Suffıciency. (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 849 [55
Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]). If other elements of the special circumstance also
rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, the court may give the more
general instruction, CALCRIM No. 704, instead of this instruction. (People v.
Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 347.) The court may choose to give both
instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 704 and 705) and may also choose to give both
circumstantial evidence instructions for non-special circumstance cases (CALCRIM
Nos. 224 and 225). (See People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 428.)
CALCRIM No. 223, Direct and Circumstantial Evidence: Defined.
CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence: Suffıciency of Evidence.
CALCRIM No. 225, Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State.
CALCRIM No. 704, Special Circumstances: Circumstantial Evidence—Suffıciency.
AUTHORITY
• Duty to Instruct on Circumstantial Evidence Generally. People v. Yrigoyen
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333,
351–352 [233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].
• Appropriate to Instruct on Special Circumstance. People v. Maury (2003) 30
Cal.4th 342, 428 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27
Cal.4th 287, 346 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25
• Instruction Duplicative, Not Required. People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,
653 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997,
1051 [64 Cal.Rtpr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
SECONDARY SOURCES
428
In your deliberations, you may not consider or discuss penalty or

punishment in any way when deciding whether a special circumstance,
or any other charge, has been proved.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury not to consider penalty or
punishment when deciding on the special circumstances or other charges. (People v.
Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 36 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Holt
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458 [208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207] [jury may not
consider punishment in deciding on special circumstances].)
AUTHORITY
• Duty to Instruct. People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 36 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77,
655 P.2d 279].
• Jury May Not Consider Punishment. People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 458
[208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207].
429
Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen.
Code, § 1111)

special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime>, the People
must prove that the defendant committed <insert crime[s]
(other than murder) that must be proved>. The People have presented the
(statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of <insert name[s] of
witness[es]> on this issue.
Before you may consider the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of
<insert name[s] of witness[es]> on the question of whether
the special circumstance[s] (was/were) proved, you must decide whether
(he/she/they) (was/were) [an] accomplice[s]. A person is an accomplice if
he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical offense alleged
against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she
personally committed the offense or if:
committed the offense;
AND
2. He or she intended to, and did, in fact, (aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the commission of the offense[,]/ [or]
participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the offense).
The burden is on the defendant to prove that it is more likely than not
that <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) subject to
prosecution for the identical offense.
because he or she is present at the scene of a crime, even if he or she
knows that a crime [will be committed or] is being committed and does
nothing to stop it.]
[A person who lacks criminal intent but who pretends to join in a crime
only to detect or prosecute (the person/those) who commit[s] that crime
is not an accomplice.]
[A person may be an accomplice even if he or she is not actually
prosecuted for the crime.]
[You may not conclude that a child under 14 years old was an
accomplice unless you also decide that when the child acted, (he/she)
understood:
1. The nature and effect of the criminal conduct;
430
2. That the conduct was wrongful and forbidden;

AND
3. That (he/she) could be punished for participating in the conduct.]
If you find that <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were)
[an] accomplice[s], then you may not find that the special
circumstance[s] of <insert special circumstance[s] requiring
proof of additional crime> (is/are) true based on (his/her/their)
(statement[s]/ [or] testimony) alone. You may use the (statement[s]/ [or]
testimony) of an accomplice to find the special circumstance true only if:
1. The accomplice’s (statement[s]/ [and] testimony) (is/are)
supported by other evidence that you believe;
(statement[s]/ [and] testimony);
AND
commission of <insert crime[s] (other than murder)
that must be proved>.
enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant committed
<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>, and it does not
need to support every fact (mentioned by the witness in the statement/
[or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not
enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was
committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting
evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of
<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>.
[The evidence needed to support the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of one
accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of
and caution and in light of all the other evidence.
If you decide that <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/
were) not [an] accomplice[s], you should evaluate (his/her/their)
(statement[s]/ [or] testimony) as you would that of any other witness.

431
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is a sua sponte duty to instruct that testimony by an accomplice must be
corroborated if that testimony is used to prove a special circumstance based on a
crime other than the murder charged in the case. (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48
Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) “When the special
circumstance requires proof of some other crime [besides the charged murder], that
crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But
when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant
has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement . . . does not apply.”
(Ibid.; see also People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 85–86 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 118,
406 P.3d 788].)
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) When the
court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties
agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 708, Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.
evidence against the nontestifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated
and should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34
Cal.4th 1, 103–106 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].)
When the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law or the parties agree about the
witness’s status as an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 708, Special Circumstances:
Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice.
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “A person who lacks criminal intent” when
the evidence suggests that the witness did not share the defendant’s specific criminal
intent, e.g., witness is an undercover police officer or an unwitting assistant.
Give the bracketed paragraph beginning “You may not conclude that a child under
14 years old” on request if the defendant claims that a child witness’s testimony
432
must be corroborated because the child acted as an accomplice. (Pen. Code, § 26;
People v. Williams (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 209 [55 P.2d 223].)
Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.
CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether
Witness Is Accomplice.
CALCRIM No. 335, Accomplice Testimony: No Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice.
AUTHORITY
• Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142,
1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th
558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
• Defendant’s Burden of Proof. People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 523 [153
Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].
Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and
Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204,
540 P.2d 44].
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
433
635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].

SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Evidence (4th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 122.
Witnesses, § 82.03, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][d], Ch. 87,
Death Penalty, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).
434
Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice (Pen.
Code, § 1111)

special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime>, the People
must prove that the defendant committed <insert crime[s]
(other than murder) that must be proved>. The People have presented the
(statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of <insert name[s] of
witness[es]> on this issue.
If the crime[s] of <insert crime[s]> (was/were) committed,
then <insert name[s] of witness[es]> (was/were) [an]
accomplice[s] to (that/those) crime[s].
You may not find that the special circumstance[s] of <insert
special circumstance[s] requiring proof of additional crime> is true based
on the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice alone. You may use
the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of an accomplice to find the special
circumstance true only if:
1. The accomplice’s (statement[s]/ [and] testimony) (is/are)
supported by other evidence that you believe;
(statement[s]/ [and] testimony);
AND
commission of <insert crime[s] (other than murder)
that must be proved>.
enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant committed
<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>, and it does not
need to support every fact (mentioned by the witness in the statement/
[or] about which the witness testified). On the other hand, it is not
enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was
committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting
evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of
<insert crime[s] (other than murder) that must be proved>.
[The evidence needed to support the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of one
accomplice cannot be provided by the (statement[s]/ [or] testimony) of
435
and caution and in light of all the other evidence.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is a sua sponte duty to instruct that testimony by an accomplice must be
corroborated if that testimony is used to prove a special circumstance based on a
crime other than the murder charged in the case. (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48
Cal.3d 1142, 1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) “When the special
circumstance requires proof of some other crime [besides the charged murder], that
crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But
when . . . it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which defendant
has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement . . . does not apply.”
(Ibid.; see also People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 85–86 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 118,
406 P.3d 788].)
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 104 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Give this
instruction only if the court concludes that the witness is an accomplice as a matter
of law or the parties agree about the witness’s status as an accomplice. (People v.
Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322] [only give
instruction “ ‘if undisputed evidence established the complicity’ ”].) If there is a
dispute about whether the witness is an accomplice, give CALCRIM No. 707,
Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute
Whether Witness Is Accomplice.
evidence against the nontestifying codefendant, the testimony must be corroborated
and should be viewed with caution.
Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice.
436
Witness Is Accomplice.
CALCRIM No. 335, Accomplice Testimony; No Dispute Whether Witness Is
Accomplice.
AUTHORITY
• Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142,
1177 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th
558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr. 2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
558, 569 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928].
Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].
47 Cal.App.2d 1, 15 [117 P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and
Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204,
540 P.2d 44].
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
635, 679 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Evidence (4th ed. 2012) Presentation at Trial, § 122.
Witnesses, § 82.03, Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.03[2][d], Ch. 87,
Death Penalty, § 87.23[4][b] (Matthew Bender).
437
720. Special Circumstances: Financial Gain (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(1))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder for

financial gain [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(1)].
To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove
that:
1. The defendant intended to kill;
[AND]
2. The killing was carried out for financial gain(;/.)
<Give element 3 only if robbery-murder also charged; see Bench Notes.>
[AND
principal if not defendant>) expected the financial gain to result
from the death of <insert name of decedent>.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the special
circumstance. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
The third element should only be given when the defendant is also charged with a
robbery-murder special circumstance. (People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751
[209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409
[243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) When both are charged, there is a risk that the
jury will read the financial gain circumstance broadly, causing it to overlap with the
robbery-murder special circumstance. (People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p.
751.) In such cases, the financial gain special circumstance is subject to “a limiting
construction under which . . . [it] applies only when the victim’s death is the
consideration for, or an essential prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by the
defendant.” (Ibid.)
The third element should not be given if the robbery-murder special circumstance is
not charged. (People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 410 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749
P.2d 279].) “Bigelow’s formulation should be applied when it is important to serve
the purposes underlying that decision, but . . . it is not intended to restrict
438
construction of ‘for financial gain’ when overlap is not a concern.” (Ibid. [emphasis
in original].) In such cases, the unadorned language of the statute is sufficiently
clear for the jury to understand. (Id. at pp. 408–409; People v. Noguera (1992) 4
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(1).
• Cannot Overlap With Robbery Murder. People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731,
751 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910,
927 [218 Cal.Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248].
• Language of Statute Sufficient If No Robbery-Murder Charge. People v. Howard
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 410 [243 Cal.Rtpr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; People v. Noguera
• Expectation of Financial Benefit. People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409
[243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983,
1025 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599,
636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].
RELATED ISSUES
Financial Gain Need Not Be Primary or Sole Motive
“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the defendant committed the murder in the
expectation that he would thereby obtain the desired financial gain.” (People v.
Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; People v.
Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].) Financial
gain does not have to be “a ‘dominant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘significant’ motive.”
(People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 635–636 [special circumstance applied
where defendant both wanted to kill wife in order to be with another woman and to
inherit her estate]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d
285, 49 P.3d 1032] [applied where defendant wanted to protect friend from abuse by
victim and help friend get proceeds of insurance policy].)
Need Not Actually Receive Financial Gain
“Proof of actual pecuniary benefit to the defendant from the victim’s death is neither
necessary nor sufficient to establish the financial-gain special circumstance.” (People
v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025–1026 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]
[financial gain element satisfied where defendant believed death would relieve him
of debt to victim even though legally not true]; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th
599, 636 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th
486, 519 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [satisfied even though insurance
company refused to pay].)
Defendant May Act for Another to Receive Financial Gain
“Defendant’s other proffered instructions were similarly flawed. His second
alternative would not have embraced the prospect that the killing was committed
with the expectation that another would benefit financially . . . .” (People v.
439
Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409, fn. 9 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]
[emphasis in original]; see also People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 519 [122
Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [defendant killed for friend to receive insurance
proceeds].)
Financial Gain Need Not Be Cash
“[A] murder for the purpose of avoiding a debt is a murder for financial gain . . . .”
(People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]
[avoidance of child support payments]; see also People v. Silberman (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 1099, 1114–1115 [261 Cal.Rptr. 45] [prevent discovery of
embezzlement].) “A murder for purposes of eliminating a business competitor is a
murder for financial gain . . . .” (People v. McLead (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 906,
918 [276 Cal.Rptr. 187] [elimination of rival drug dealer].) “[I]t makes little
difference whether the coin of the bargain is money or something else of value: the
vice of the agreement is the same, the calculated hiring of another to commit
premeditated murder.” (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d
426, 906 P.2d 388] [payment in drugs sufficient].)
Murder for Hire: Hirer Need Not Receive Financial Gain
[W]hen a person commits murder for hire, the one who did the hiring is guilty
of the financial gain special circumstance only as an accomplice. (See, e.g.,
People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 750, fn. 11 [construing the 1978 law].)
Moreover, in this case, before defendant could be found subject to the financial
gain special circumstance as an accomplice, the jury was required to find that
defendant had the intent to kill. (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104,
1142 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] [“. . . section 190.2(b) lays down a
special rule for a certain class of first degree murderers: if the defendant is
guilty as an aider and abettor, he must be proved to have acted with intent to
kill before any special circumstance (with the exception of a prior murder
conviction) can be found true.”].)
(People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388]
[emphasis in original]; see also People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751, fn. 11
[209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; People v. Freeman (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337,
339 [238 Cal.Rptr. 257].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, §§ 87.13[1], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
440
721. Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same
Case) (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(3))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of having been

convicted of more than one murder in this case [in violation of Penal
Code section 190.2(a)(3)].
that:
1. The defendant has been convicted of at least one charge of first
degree murder in this case;
AND
2. The defendant has also been convicted of at least one additional
charge of either first or second degree murder in this case.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court must submit the multiple-murder special
circumstance to the jury unless the defendant has specifically waived jury trial on
the special circumstance. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 850 [55
Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].)
Intent to kill is not required for the actual killer but is required for an accomplice. If
the evidence raises the issue of accomplice liability, the court has a sua sponte duty
to instruct on that issue. (See People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359].) Give CALCRIM No. 702, Special Circumstances:
Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other Than Felony Murder.
If the homicide occurred prior to June 5, 1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, Special
Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990.
In a case in which the prosecution seeks the death penalty, only one special
circumstance of multiple murder may be alleged. (People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d
36, 67 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433]; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].)
AUTHORITY
• One Special Circumstance May Be Alleged When Death Penalty Sought. People
v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433]; People v.
441
Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
• Must Submit to Jury. People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 850 [55
Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].
• Intent to Kill Not Required for Actual Killer. People v. Anderson (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
RELATED ISSUES
Applies to Killing of Woman and Fetus
Application of the multiple-murder special circumstance to the killing of a woman
and her unborn fetus is constitutional. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 510
[71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035].)
One Count of First Degree Murder Required
The defendant must be convicted of one count of first degree murder for this special
circumstance to apply. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 923 [245 Cal.Rptr.
336, 751 P.2d 395]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 828 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90,
809 P.2d 865].) However, the additional murder or murders may be second degree.
(See People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 995 [269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d
1289].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
442
722. Special Circumstances: By Means of Destructive Device
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4) & (6))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder by

use of (a/an) (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) [in
violation of <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
that:
1. The murder was committed by using (a/an) (bomb[,]/ [or]
explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device);
<Alternative 2A—device planted, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4)>
[2. The (bomb[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) was
planted, hidden, or concealed in (a/an) (place[,]/ [or] area[,]/ [or]
dwelling[,]/ [or] building[,]/ [or] structure);]
<Alternative 2B—device mailed or delivered, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(6)>
[2. The defendant (mailed or delivered[,]/ [or] attempted to mail or
deliver[,]/ [or] caused to be mailed or delivered) the (bomb[,]/ [or]
explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device);]
AND
3. The defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that (his/
her) actions would create a great risk of death to one or more
human beings.
main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) that
is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]
[An explosive is also any substance whose main purpose is to be
is an explosive.]
[A destructive device is <insert definition supported by
evidence from Pen. Code, § 16460>.]
[For the purpose of this special circumstance, delivery of (a/an) (bomb[,]/
[or] explosive[,]/ [or] destructive device) includes throwing it.]
443

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
In element 2, give alternative 2A, stating that the device was “planted,” if the
defendant is charged with the special circumstance under Penal Code section
190.2(a)(4). Give alternative 2B, stating that the device was “mailed or delivered,”
if the defendant is charged with the special circumstance under Penal Code section
190.2(a)(6).
Give the bracketed paragraphs defining “explosive” if an explosive was used.
(Health & Safety Code, § 12000; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 603 [268
Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) Give the bracketed definition of “destructive device,”
inserting the appropriate description from Penal Code section 16460, if a device
covered by that statute was used. If the case involves a specific explosive listed in
Health and Safety Code section 12000 or a specific destructive device listed in
Penal Code section 16460, the court may also give the bracketed sentence stating
that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a destructive device.” For example,
“Dynamite is an explosive.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the
defendant used an explosive. For example, the court may not state that “the
defendant used an explosive, dynamite,” or “the material used by the defendant,
dynamite, is an explosive.” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26
[39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)
Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not vague and is understood in
its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (People v. Quinn (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d
251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; People v. Dimitrov, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If
the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the following
definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or
detonate under certain conditions.” (See People v. Morse (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620,
647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)
Give the bracketed sentence stating that “deliver” includes throwing if the facts
demonstrate the item was thrown. (People v. Snead (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1088,
1095 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].)
444
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance: Planting Device. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4).
• Special Circumstance: Mailing or Delivering Device. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(6).
Cal.3d 583, 603 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
• Destructive Device Defined. Penal Code, § 16460.
RELATED ISSUES
Gasoline Not an Explosive
“Under the statutory definition of explosive, the nature of the substance, not the
manner in which a substance is used, is determinative.” (People v. Clark (1990) 50
Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127] [gasoline, by its nature, not an
explosive even where used to ignite a fire].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, § 87.13[4], [6] (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
445
723. Special Circumstances: Murder to Prevent Arrest or
Complete Escape (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(5))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder (to

prevent arrest/ [or] to escape from custody) [in violation of Penal Code
section 190.2(a)(5)].
that:
1. [The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest(./
;)]
[OR
2.] [The murder was committed while completing or attempting to
complete an escape from lawful custody.]
<A. Lawful Arrest>
[In order for a killing to be committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, a lawful arrest must be [or appear to be]
imminent.]
[Instruction 2670 explains when an officer is lawfully arresting someone.]
<B. Escape From Custody>
[A killing is committed while completing or attempting to complete escape
from lawful custody if a person is killed during the escape itself or while
the prisoner[s] (is/are) fleeing from the scene.
A killing is not committed while completing or attempting to complete
escape if the prisoner[s] (has/have) actually reached a temporary place of
safety before the killing.]
[Lawful custody includes (confinement/placement) in (county jail/prison/
the California Youth Authority/work furlough/ <insert name
or description of other detention facility, see Pen. Code, § 4532>. [A person
is in lawful custody if he or she has been entrusted to the custody of an
officer or other individual during a temporary release from the place of
confinement.]]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
446
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the arrest must be “imminent” only if the
evidence does not clearly establish that an arrest would have been made in the near
future. (See People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691
P.2d 994]; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1300–1301 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d
796, 850 P.2d 1].) For example, it may be appropriate to instruct that the arrest must
be imminent if no peace officer is present or if the decedent is not a peace officer.
(See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1300–1301; but see People v.
Vorise (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 322 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 12].)
If the lawfulness of the arrest is an issue, give relevant portion of CALCRIM No.
2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer, and the bracketed sentence telling the
jury that CALCRIM No. 2670 explains lawful arrest.
Give the bracketed paragraphs defining “completing or attempting to complete
escape” if there is an issue in the case about whether the defendant had reached a
temporary place of safety prior to the killing. (See People v. Bigelow (1984) 37
Cal.3d 731, 754 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].)
Give the bracketed paragraph explaining lawful custody if there is an issue about
whether the defendant was in lawful custody. (See Pen. Code, § 4532; People v.
Diaz (1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952].)
AUTHORITY
• Arrest Must Be Imminent. People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209
Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994]; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 146 [255
Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32]; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233,
1300–1301 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].
• Killing During Escape Must Be During Hot Pursuit. People v. Bigelow (1984) 37
Cal.3d 731, 754 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].
• Lawful Custody. See Pen. Code, § 4532 (escape from custody); People v. Diaz
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952].
SECONDARY SOURCES
447
724. Special Circumstances: Murder of Peace Officer, Federal
Officer, or Firefighter (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(7), (8) & (9))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder of a

(peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) [in violation of
Penal Code section 190.2(a)].
that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a (peace
officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) [lawfully
performing (his/her) duties as a (peace officer/federal law
enforcement officer/firefighter)];
2. The defendant intended to kill <insert offıcer’s name,
excluding title>;
AND
<Alternative 3A—killing during performance of duties>
[3. When <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was
killed, the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known,
that <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a
(peace officer/federal law enforcement officer/firefighter) who was
performing (his/her) duties.]
<Alternative 3B—killing in retaliation>
[3. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was killed in
retaliation for the performance of (his/her) official duties.]
offıcer”>.]
or her services.]
448

excessive).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
“Lawful performance” by the officer is not an element when the prosecution’s
theory is that the officer was killed in retaliation for performing his or her duties but
is an element when the theory is that the officer was killed while engaging in his or
her duties. If the prosecution’s theory is that the killing occurred while the decedent
was carrying out official duties, give the bracketed phrase “lawfully performing (his/
her) duties” in element 1 and give alternative 3A. If the prosecution’s theory is that
the killing was in retaliation for the officer’s performance of his or her duties, do
not give the bracketed language in element 1 and give alternative 3B. The retaliation
theory does not apply to the killing of a firefighter. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(9).)
must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (Ibid.) If
excessive force is an issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that
the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in
which lawful performance is an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in
response to excessive force. (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47
[173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the
burden of proving the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful
performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and
Offıcer.
449
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(7) defines “peace officer” as “defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5,
830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12.”
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(9) defines “firefighter” “as defined in Section 245.1.”
If the decedent was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, then the term
“federal law enforcement officer” may need to be defined for the jury depending on
the decedent’s position.
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The duties of (a/an)
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance: Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(7).
• Special Circumstance: Federal Officer. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(8).
• Special Circumstance: Firefighter. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(9).
• Engaged in Performance of Duties. People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179,
1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].
RELATED ISSUES
Reasonable Knowledge Standard
Application of the special circumstance to a defendant who “reasonably should have
known” that the decedent was a peace officer is constitutional. (People v. Rodriguez
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 781–782 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
[I]n appropriate cases it would be proper for the court to instruct that a
defendant may not be found guilty of the special circumstance at issue here
(even if he reasonably should have known his victim was a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his duty) if, by reason of non-self-induced
“diminished capacity,” defendant was unable actually to know the status of his
victim.
(Id. at p. 781, fn. 18 [emphasis in original].)
Such an instruction is not warranted in a case where the defendant is voluntarily
intoxicated or has otherwise “self-induced diminished capacity.” (People v. Brown
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 445, fn. 7 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].)
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
450
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment,
§§ 538–539.
Penalty, §§ 87.13[7], [8], [9], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
451
725. Special Circumstances: Murder of Witness (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(10))

witness [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(10)].
that:
1. The defendant intended to kill <insert name of
decedent>;
2. <insert name of decedent> was a witness to a crime;
3. The killing was not committed during the commission [or
attempted commission] of the crime to which <insert
name of decedent> was a witness;
AND
4. The defendant intended that <insert name of
decedent> be killed (to prevent (him/her) from testifying in a
(criminal/ [or] juvenile) proceeding/ [or] in retaliation for (his/
her) testimony in a (criminal/ [or] juvenile) proceeding).
[A killing is committed during the commission [or attempted
commission] of a crime if the killing and the crime are part of one
continuous transaction. The continuous transaction may occur over a
period of time or in more than one location.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
The last bracketed paragraph should be given if there is evidence that the killing
and the crime witnessed were part of one continuous transaction. The court may
choose to give further instruction on one continuous transaction on request. (See
People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 631 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].)
AUTHORITY
• Continuous Transaction. People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 1015–1016 [131
Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 261 P.3d 243]; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 631 [247
452
Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070]; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 95 [279
Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].
RELATED ISSUES
Purpose of Killing
In order for this special circumstance to apply, the defendant must kill the witness
for the purpose of preventing him or her from testifying or in retaliation for his or
her testimony. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 800 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543,
897 P.2d 481].) However, this does not have to be the sole or predominant purpose
of the killing. (Ibid.; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 519 [273 Cal.Rptr.
537, 797 P.2d 561].)
Victim Does Not Have to Be An Eyewitness or Important Witness
“[N]othing in the language of the applicable special circumstance or in our decisions
applying this special circumstance supports the suggestion that the special
circumstance is confined to the killing of an ‘eyewitness,’ as opposed to any other
witness who might testify in a criminal proceeding.” (People v. Jones (1996) 13
Cal.4th 535, 550 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 917 P.2d 1165].) “It is no defense to the
special circumstance allegation that the victim was not an important witness in the
criminal proceeding, so long as one of the defendant’s purposes was to prevent the
witness from testifying.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1018 [95
Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; see also People v. Bolter (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
240, 242–243 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 760] [special circumstance applied to retaliation for
testifying where witness’s actual testimony was “innocuous”].)
Defendant Must Believe Victim Will Be Witness
“[S]ection 190.2, subd. (a)(10) is applicable if defendant believes the victim will be
a witness in a criminal prosecution, whether or not such a proceeding is pending or
about to be initiated.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1018 [95
Cal.Rptr.2d 377] [emphasis in original]; see also People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d
836, 853 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380] [abrogated by statutory amendment];
People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 518 [273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561].)
“Continuous Transaction” in Context of Witness Special Circumstance
“[T]o establish one continuous criminal transaction, the time-lag between the first
and second killing does not matter so much as whether the defendant shows a
common criminal intent toward all the victims upon the initiation of the first
criminal act. When that criminal intent toward all victims is present, the criminal
transaction does not conclude until the killing of the final victim.” (People v. San
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 655 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
453
726. Special Circumstances: Murder of Judge, Prosecutor,
Government Official, or Juror (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11), (12), (13)
& (20))

(prosecutor/judge/government official/juror) [in violation of Penal Code
section 190.2(a)].
that:
decedent>;
2. <insert name of decedent> was a (prosecutor/judge/
government official/juror in <insert name or
description of local, state, or federal court of record in this or
another state>);
AND
3. The defendant intended that <insert name of
decedent> be killed (to prevent (him/her) from performing (his/
her) official duties as a (prosecutor/judge/government official/
juror)/ [or] in retaliation for ’s <insert name[s] of
decedent[s]> performance of (his/her) official duties as a
(prosecutor/judge/government official/juror)).
[(A/An) <insert title of government offıcial’s position> is an
(elected/appointed) government official.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
The jury must determine whether the decedent is a prosecutor, judge, juror, or
government official. (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr.
604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition
of “government official” (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a
Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer are government officials”). (Ibid.) However,
the court may not instruct the jury that the decedent was a government official as a
matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a government official”). (Ibid.)
454
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance: Prosecutor. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11).
• Special Circumstance: Judge. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(12).
• Special Circumstance: Government Official. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(13).
• Special Circumstance: Juror. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(20).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, §§ 87.13[11], [12], [13], [20], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
455
727. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—Before March 8, 2000
(Former Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder

committed while lying in wait [in violation of former Penal Code section
190.2(a)(15)].
that:
1. The defendant intentionally killed <insert name of
decedent>;
AND
2. The defendant committed the murder while lying in wait.
A person commits murder while lying in wait if:
1. He or she concealed his or her purpose from the person killed;
2. He or she waited and watched for an opportunity to act;
3. Immediately after watching and waiting, he or she made a
surprise attack on the person killed from a position of advantage;
AND
4. He or she intended to kill the person by taking the person by
surprise.
time, but its duration must be substantial and must show a state of mind
equivalent to deliberation and premeditation.
The defendant acted deliberately if (he/she) carefully weighed the
(he/she) decided to kill before committing the act that caused death.
In order for a murder to be committed while lying in wait, the attack
must immediately follow the period of watching and waiting. The lethal
acts must begin at and flow continuously from the moment the
concealment and watchful waiting ends. If there is a detectable interval
between the period of watching and waiting and the period during which
the killing takes place, then the murder is not committed while lying in
wait. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the murder was committed
while lying in wait, you must find this special circumstance has not been
proved.
456
aware of the other person’s physical presence.]

plan.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
Prior to March 8, 2000, the lying in wait special circumstance required that the
murder be committed “while” lying in wait. Effective March 8, 2000, the special
circumstance was amended to require that the murder be committed “by means of”
lying in wait. Use this instruction only for homicides alleged to have occurred prior
to March 8, 2000. (See Domino v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000,
1007 [181 Cal.Rptr. 486] [“while lying in wait” distinguished from “by means of
lying in wait”]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 558 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770
P.2d 244].)
For cases after March 8, 2000, use CALCRIM No. 728, Special Circumstances:
Lying in Wait—After March 7, 2000, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15). (People v. Michaels
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032] [noting
amendment to statute].)
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that physical concealment is not required if the
evidence shows that the decedent was aware of the defendant’s presence. (People v.
Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) Give the
bracketed paragraph stating that concealment may be accomplished by ambush if the
evidence shows an attack from a hidden position.
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15) (before March 8, 2000).
• While Lying in Wait. Domino v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000,
1007 [181 Cal.Rptr. 486]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 558 [257
Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032].
• Physical Concealment Not Required. People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527,
554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].
RELATED ISSUES
Dual Purpose
“[I]f a person lies in wait intending first to rape and second to kill, then immediately
proceeds to carry out that intent (or attempts to rape, then kills), the elements of the
457
lying-in-wait special circumstance are met.” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th

312, 389 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 525–526.
Penalty, §§ 87.13[15][a], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).
458
728. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—After March 7, 2000
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(15))

committed by means of lying in wait [in violation of Penal Code section
190.2(a)(15)].
that:
decedent>;
AND
2. The defendant committed the murder by means of lying in wait.
A person commits a murder by means of lying in wait if:
1. He or she concealed his or her purpose from the person killed;
2. He or she waited and watched for an opportunity to act;
3. Then he or she made a surprise attack on the person killed from
a position of advantage;
AND
4. He or she intended to kill the person by taking the person by
surprise.
time, but its duration must be substantial and must show a state of mind
equivalent to deliberation or premeditation.
(he/she) decided to kill before committing the act that caused death.
aware of the other person’s physical presence.]
plan.]
New January 2006
459
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
Effective March 8, 2000, the special circumstance was amended to require that the
murder be committed “by means of” lying in wait rather than “while” lying in wait.
(People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 516–517 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d
1032] [noting amendment to statute]; People v. Superior Court (Bradway) (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 324] [holding amended statute is not
unconstitutionally vague].) Use this instruction for cases in which the alleged
homicide occurred on or after March 8, 2000.
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that physical concealment is not required if the
evidence shows that the decedent was aware of the defendant’s presence. (People v.
Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) Give the
bracketed paragraph stating that concealment may be accomplished by ambush if the
evidence shows an attack from a hidden position.
AUTHORITY
• Amended Statute Not Unconstitutionally Vague. People v. Superior Court of San
Diego County (Bradway) (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 297, 309 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d
324].
• Physical Concealment Not Required. People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527,
554–556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].
• Definition of Lying in Wait. People v. Poindexter (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572,
582–585 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 489].
RELATED ISSUES
Dual Purpose
“[I]f a person lies in wait intending first to rape and second to kill, then immediately
proceeds to carry out that intent (or attempts to rape, then kills), the elements of the
lying-in-wait special circumstance are met.” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th
312, 389 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 525–526.
Penalty, §§ 87.13[15][b], 87.14 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).
460
729. Special Circumstances: Murder Because of Race, Religion,
or Nationality (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(16))

committed because of the deceased’s (race[,]/ color[,]/ religion[,]/
nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin) [in violation of Penal Code section
190.2(a)(16)].
that the defendant intended to kill because of the deceased person’s
(race[,]/ color[,]/ religion[,]/ nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin).
[If the defendant had more than one reason to (commit[,]/ participate
in[,]/ [or] aid and abet) the murder, the deceased person’s (race[,]/
color[,]/ religion[,]/ nationality[,]/ [or] country of origin) must have been
a substantial factor motivating the defendant’s conduct. A substantial
factor is more than a trivial or remote factor, but it does not need to be
the only factor that motivated the defendant.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
Give the bracketed paragraph if there is evidence that the defendant had more than
one reason to commit the murder. (In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42
Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].)
element of this special circumstance. (See People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th
1140, 1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121,
1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance Constitutional. People v. Sassounian (1986) 182
Cal.App.3d 361, 413 [226 Cal.Rptr. 880]; People v. Talamantez (1985) 169
Cal.App.3d 443, 469 [215 Cal.Rptr. 542].
• “Because of” Defined. Pen. Code, § 190.03(c); People v. Superior Court
(Aishman) (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387]; In re
M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 719–720 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
461
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.01[4][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
462
730. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))

committed while engaged in the commission of <insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> [in violation of Penal
that:
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(17)>;
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>;
felony.>
[3. If the defendant did not personally commit [or attempt to
§ 190.2(a)(17)>, then a perpetrator, (whom the defendant was
aiding and abetting before or during the killing/ [or] with whom
the defendant conspired), personally committed [or attempted to
§ 190.2(a)(17)>;]
AND
(3/4). (The defendant/ <insert name or description of
person causing death if not defendant>) personally committed (an/
the) act[s] that directly caused the death of another person.
Code, § 190.2(a)(17)>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will
give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s]. [To decide whether the
decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance.
463
<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on all underlying felonies,

aiding and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>
[The defendant must have (intended to commit[,]/ [or] aided and
abetted/ [or] been a member of a conspiracy to commit) the (felony/
felonies) of <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(17)> before or at the time of the act causing the death.]
[In addition, in order for this special circumstance to be true, the People
must prove that the defendant intended to commit <insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> independent of the
killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit murder
and the commission of <insert felony or felonies from Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> was merely part of or incidental to the commission
of that murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, August 2013, March 2021,
March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
elements of any felonies alleged. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40
Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)
If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on that issue. Give CALCRIM No. 703, Special
Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony
Murder, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17). If the homicide occurred on or before June 5,
1990, give CALCRIM No. 701, Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for
Accomplice Before June 6, 1990.
the underlying felony, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element
1 and “intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins
with “To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all
appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies.
commit the felony, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the
corresponding intent requirement in element 2. Give bracketed element 3. In
addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide whether,” select “the
perpetrator” in the first sentence. Give the second and/or third bracketed sentences.
464
Give all appropriate instructions on any underlying felonies and on aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy with this instruction.
commit.)” For an instruction specially tailored to robbery-murder cases, see People
v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 691 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].
In addition, the court must give the final bracketed paragraph stating that the felony
must be independent of the murder if the evidence supports a reasonable inference
that the felony was committed merely to facilitate the murder. (People v. Green
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718
P.2d 99]; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 609 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d
127]; People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d
803]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d
1182].)
Proposition 115 added Penal Code section 190.41, eliminating the corpus delicti rule
for the felony-murder special circumstance. (Pen. Code, § 190.41; Tapia v. Superior
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434].) If, however,
the alleged homicide predates the effective date of the statute (June 6, 1990), then
the court must modify this instruction to require proof of the corpus delicti of the
underlying felony independent of the defendant’s extrajudicial statements. (Tapia v.
If the alleged homicide occurred between 1983 and 1987 (the window of time
between Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672
P.2d 862] and People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585,
742 P.2d 1306]), then the prosecution must also prove intent to kill on the part of
the actual killer. (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802,
58 P.3d 931]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6
P.3d 150].) The court should then modify this instruction to specify intent to kill as
an element.
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent to Commit Felony Required. People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th
73, 105 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].
• Provocative Act Murder. People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 596 [112
Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [citing People v. Kainzrants (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081
[53 Cal.Rptr.2d 207]].
• Concurrent Intent. People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.183; People v.
Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 608–609.
465
• Felony Cannot Be Incidental to Murder. People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p.

61; People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 182.
• Instruction on Felony as Incidental to Murder. People v. Kimble, supra, 44
Cal.3d at p. 501; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 609; People v.
Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 505.
• Proposition 115 Amendments to Special Circumstance. Tapia v. Superior Court,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 298.
• Meaning of “Actual Killer.” People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123,
149–155 [259 Cal.Rptr.3d 600]; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 4
[293 Cal.Rptr.3d 272]; People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88 [297
Cal.Rptr.3d 806]; People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 966–971 [299
Cal.Rptr.3d 131].
RELATED ISSUES
Applies to Felony Murder and Provocative Act Murder
“The fact that the defendant is convicted of murder under the application of the
provocative act murder doctrine rather than pursuant to the felony-murder doctrine
is irrelevant to the question of whether the murder qualified as a special-
circumstances murder under former section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The statute
requires only that the murder be committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of an enumerated felony.” (People v. Briscoe, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at
p. 596 [citing People v. Kainzrants (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 207]].)
Concurrent Intent to Kill and Commit Felony
“Concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a
felony-murder special circumstance.” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
183; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 608–609.)
Multiple Special Circumstances May Be Alleged
The defendant may be charged with multiple felony-related special circumstances
based on multiple felonies committed against one victim or multiple victims of one
felony. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d
213]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 225–226 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776
P.2d 285].)
Actual Killer vs. Aider and Abettor
The meaning of actual killer is literal. It is not enough that the defendant’s act
formed part of a series of events that resulted in the death, if the act itself would not
cause death. (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 149–155 [259
Cal.Rptr.3d 600].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 532–534, 536.
466
467
731. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of
Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to Kill After March 8, 2000 (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of intentional

murder while engaged in the commission of kidnapping [in violation of
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)].
that:
kidnapping;
more of the members of the conspiracy commit) kidnapping;
kidnapping.>
commit] kidnapping, then another perpetrator, (whom the
defendant was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant
conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit]
kidnapping;]
(3/4). (The defendant/ <insert name or description of person
causing death if not defendant>) did an act that was a substantial
factor in causing the death of another person;
AND
(4/5). The defendant intended that the other person be killed.
attempted to commit] kidnapping, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime. [To decide
whether the defendant aided and abetted the crime, please refer to the
separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and
abetting.] [To decide whether the defendant was a member of a
conspiracy to commit the crime, please refer to the separate instructions
that I (will give/have given) you on conspiracy.] You must apply those
instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this
special circumstance.
<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on underlying kidnapping,
aiding and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>
468
[If all the listed elements are proved, you may find this special
circumstance true even if the defendant intended solely to commit
murder and the commission of kidnapping was merely part of or
incidental to the commission of that murder.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
elements of the kidnapping alleged. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40
Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)
Do not give CALCRIM No. 703, Special Circumstances: Intent requirement for
Accomplice After June 5, 1990, together with this instruction. See People v. Odom
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 256–257 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].
Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) eliminates the application of
People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], to
intentional murders during the commission of kidnapping or arson of an inhabited
structure. The statute may only be applied to alleged homicides after the effective
date, March 8, 2000. This instruction may be given alone or with CALCRIM No.
730, Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony, Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(17).
For the standard felony-murder special circumstance, it is not necessary for the
actual killer to intend to kill. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) However, an accomplice who
is not the actual killer must either act with intent to kill or be a major participant
and act with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).)
Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) does not specify whether the
defendant must personally intend to kill or whether accomplice liability may be
based on an actual killer who intended to kill even if the defendant did not. (See
Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).) This instruction has been drafted to require that the
469
defendant intend to kill, whether the defendant is an accomplice or the actual killer.
If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability and the court concludes
that the accomplice need not personally intend to kill, then the court must modify
element 5 to state that the person who caused the death intended to kill. In such
cases, the court also has a sua sponte duty give CALCRIM No. 703, Special
Murder, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).
kidnapping, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and
“intended to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with
“To decide whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all
appropriate instructions on kidnapping.
commit kidnapping, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the
Give all appropriate instructions on kidnapping and on aiding and abetting and/or
conspiracy with this instruction.
When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 730, give the final bracketed
paragraph.
CALCRIM No. 1200, Kidnapping: For Child Molestation.
CALCRIM No. 1201, Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent.
CALCRIM No. 1202, Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion.
CALCRIM No. 1203, Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses.
CALCRIM No. 1204, Kidnapping During Carjacking.
CALCRIM No. 1215, Kidnapping.
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(B), (H) & (M).
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 532–533.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[2][b], 142.14[3] (Matthew Bender).
470
732. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of
Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of intentional

murder while engaged in the commission of arson that burned an
(inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property) [in violation of Penal Code
section 190.2(a)(17)].
that:
arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited
property);
more of the members of the conspiracy commit) arson that
burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property);
arson.>
commit] arson, then another perpetrator, (whom the defendant
was aiding and abetting/ [or] with whom the defendant
conspired), personally committed [or attempted to commit] arson
that burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property);]
(3/4). The commission [or attempted commission] of the arson was a
substantial factor in causing the death of another person;
AND
(4/5). The defendant intended that the other person be killed.
attempted to commit] arson that burned an (inhabited structure/[or]
inhabited property), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will
give/have given) you on that crime. [To decide whether the defendant
aided and abetted the crime, please refer to the separate instructions
that I (will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting.] [To decide
whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to commit the
decide whether the People have proved this special circumstance.
<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on underlying arson, aiding
471
and abetting, and conspiracy are given.>

[If all the listed elements are proved, you may find this special
circumstance true even if the defendant intended solely to commit
murder and the commission of arson was merely part of or incidental to
the commission of that murder.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2013, August 2016, September 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
elements of the arson alleged. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40
Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].)
Do not give CALCRIM No. 703, Special Circumstances: Intent requirement for
Accomplice After June 5, 1990, together with this instruction. See People v. Odom
Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) eliminates the application of
People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], to
intentional murders during the commission of kidnapping or arson of an inhabited
structure. The statute may only be applied to alleged homicides after the effective
date, March 8, 2000. This instruction may be given alone or with CALCRIM No.
730, Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony, Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(17).
For the standard felony-murder special circumstance, it is not necessary for the
actual killer to intend to kill. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(b).) However, an accomplice who
is not the actual killer must either act with intent to kill or be a major participant
and act with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d).)
Subparagraph (M) of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) does not specify whether the
defendant must personally intend to kill or whether accomplice liability may be
based on an actual killer who intended to kill even if the defendant did not. (See
472
Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).) This instruction has been drafted to require that the
defendant intend to kill, whether the defendant is an accomplice or the actual killer.
If the evidence raises the potential for accomplice liability and the court concludes
that the accomplice need not personally intend to kill, then the court must modify
element 5 to state that the person who caused the death intended to kill. In such
cases, the court also has a sua sponte duty give CALCRIM No. 703, Special
Murder, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).
P.3d 225].) Because causation is likely to be an issue in any case where this
instruction is given, the committee has included the paragraph that begins with “An
act causes death if.” If there is evidence of multiple potential causes, the court
should also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than
one cause of death.” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 845–849 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 135].)
arson, then select “committed [or attempted to commit]” in element 1 and “intended
to commit” in element 2. In addition, in the paragraph that begins with “To decide
whether,” select “the defendant” in the first sentence. Give all appropriate
instructions on arson.
commit arson, select one or both of these options in element 1 and the
Give all appropriate instructions on arson and on aiding and abetting and/or
conspiracy with this instruction.
When giving this instruction with CALCRIM No. 730, give the final bracketed
paragraph.
CALCRIM No. 1502, Arson: Inhabited Structure or Property.
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17) (H) & (M).
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 532–533.
473
474
733. Special Circumstances: Murder With Torture (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(18))

involving the infliction of torture [in violation of Penal Code section
190.2(a)(18)].
that:
decedent>;
2. The defendant also intended to inflict extreme physical pain and
suffering on <insert name of decedent> while that
person was still alive;
3. The defendant intended to inflict such pain and suffering on
<insert name of decedent> for the calculated purpose
of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic reason;
AND
<Alternative A—on or after June 6, 1990>
[4. The defendant did an act involving the infliction of extreme
physical pain and suffering on <insert name of
decedent>.]
<Alternative B—before June 6, 1990>
[4. The defendant in fact inflicted extreme physical pain on
<insert name of decedent>.]
There is no requirement that the person killed be aware of the pain.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
In element 4, always give alternative 4A unless the homicide occurred prior to June
6, 1990. (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710
P.2d 861].) If the homicide occurred prior to June 6, 1990, give alternative 4B. For
homicides after that date, alternative 4B should not be given. (People v. Crittenden
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].)
475
AUTHORITY
• Must Specifically Intend to Torture. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247,
265–266 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52
Cal.3d 1210, 1255 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].
• Causation Not Required. People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 141–142 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].
• Pain Not an Element. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221
Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn.
14. [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]
• Intent to Torture Need Not be Deliberate, and Premeditated. People v. Cole
• Prolonged Pain Not Required. People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1227–1228 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811].
• Spatial and Temporal Nexus. People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1278
[144 Cal.Rptr.3d 757, 281 P.3d 834].
RELATED ISSUES
Causation Not Required for Special Circumstance
“[T]he prosecution was not required to prove that the acts of torture inflicted upon
[the victim] were the cause of his death” in order to prove the torture-murder
special circumstance. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 142 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d
474, 885 P.2d 887].) Causation is required for first degree murder by torture. (Ibid.)
Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication
“[A] court should instruct a jury in a torture-murder case, when evidence of
intoxication warrants it, that intoxication is relevant to the specific intent to inflict
cruel suffering.” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1242 [278 Cal.Rptr.
640, 805 P.2d 899]; see CALCRIM No. 625, Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on
Homicide Crimes.)
Pain Not an Element
As with first degree murder by torture, all that is required for the special
circumstance is the calculated intent to cause pain for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or any other sadistic purpose. Prior to June 6, 1990, the
special circumstance stated “torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme
physical pain.” (Pre-June 6, 1990, Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(18).) Proposition 115
eliminated this language. Thus, for all homicides after June 6, 1990, there is no
requirement under the special circumstance that the victim actually suffer pain.
(People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1239 [278 Cal.Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d
899]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d
476
861]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885
P.2d 887].)
Deliberate, and Premeditated Intent to Inflict Pain Not Required
“[P]remeditated and deliberate intent to torture is not an element of the torture-
murder special circumstance.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1227 [17
Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [italics omitted].)
Prolonged Pain Not Required
“We have held that by enacting the torture-murder special circumstance statute
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), the electorate meant to foreclose any requirement that the
defendant be proved to have intended to inflict prolonged pain.” (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1228 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] [italics in original,
citation and internal quotation marks omitted].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 525–526.
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][v] (Matthew Bender).
477
734. Special Circumstances: Murder by Poison (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(19))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murder by

poison [in violation of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(19)].
that:
decedent>;
AND
2. The defendant killed <insert name of decedent> by
the administration of poison.
[Poison is a substance, applied externally to the body or introduced into
the body, that can kill by its own inherent qualities.]
[ <insert name of substance> is a poison.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
Give the bracketed definition of poison if there is a dispute over whether the
substance is a poison. Give the bracketed paragraph stating that the substance is a
poison if the parties agree that the substance is a poison.
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance Is Constitutional. People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81,
159 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].
• Poison Defined. People v. Van Deleer (1878) 53 Cal. 147, 149.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 527–528.
478
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][iii] (Matthew Bender).
479
735. Special Circumstances: Discharge From Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(21))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of committing

murder by shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle [in violation of Penal
that:
principal if not defendant>) shot a firearm from a motor vehicle,
killing <insert name of decedent>;
principal if not defendant>) intentionally shot at a person who was
outside the vehicle;
AND
3. At the time of the shooting, the defendant intended to kill.
[A motor vehicle includes (a/an) (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor
[The terms (firearm/ [and] motor vehicle) (is/are) defined elsewhere in
another instruction to which you should refer.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
AUTHORITY
• Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 415.
• Special Circumstance Is Constitutional. People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66
SECONDARY SOURCES
480
Against the Person, § 142.01[2][a][vii] (Matthew Bender).
481
736. Special Circumstances: Killing by Street Gang Member (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(22))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of committing

murder while an active participant in a criminal street gang [in violation
of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(22)].
that:
victim>;
2. At the time of the killing, the defendant was an active participant
in a criminal street gang;
3. The defendant knew that members of the gang engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity;
AND
4. The murder was carried out to further the activities of the
criminal street gang.
Active participation means involvement with a criminal street gang in a
way that is more than passive or in name only.
[The People do not have to prove that the defendant devoted all or a
substantial part of (his/her) time or efforts to the gang, or that (he/she)
was an actual member of the gang.]
<If criminal street gang has already been defined>
[A criminal street gang is defined in another instruction to which you
should refer.]
<If criminal street gang has not already been defined in another instruction>
[A criminal street gang is an ongoing organized association or group of
three or more persons, whether formal or informal:
1. That has a common name or common identifying sign or symbol;
2. That has, as one or more of its primary activities, the commission
of <insert one or more crimes listed in Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(e)(1)>;
AND
3. Whose members collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity.
In order to qualify as a primary activity, the crime must be one of the
482
group’s chief or principal activities rather than an occasional act

committed by one or more persons who happen to be members of the
group.]
A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means:
1. [The] (commission of[,]/ [or] attempted commission of[,]/ [or]
conspiracy to commit[,]/ [or] solicitation to commit[,]/ [or]
conviction of[,]/ [or] (Having/having) a juvenile petition sustained
for commission of) (any combination of two or more of the
following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more
of the following crimes]:) <insert one or more crimes
listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)>;
2. At least one of those crimes was committed after September 26,
1988;
3. The most recent crime occurred within three years of one of the
earlier crimes and within three years of the date of the charged
offense;
4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions, or by two or
more members;
5. The crimes commonly benefitted a criminal street gang;
AND
6. The common benefit from the crimes was more than reputational.
Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may
include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation,
targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of
a potential current or previous witness or informant.
[If you find the defendant guilty of a crime in this case, you may
consider that crime in deciding whether one of the group’s primary
activities was commission of that crime.]
[You may not consider evidence of the charged offense[s] in deciding
whether a pattern of criminal gang activity has been established.]
[You may not find that there was a pattern of criminal gang activity
unless all of you agree that two or more crimes that satisfy these
requirements were committed, but you do not have to all agree on which
crimes were committed.]
[Other instructions explain what is necessary for the People to prove that
a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed <insert
crimes from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1) inserted in definition of pattern of
criminal gang activity>.]
483
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2014, February
2016, March 2022, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].) The effective date of this special circumstance was March 8,
2000.
There is a split in authority over the meaning of “collectively.” (Compare People v.
Delgado (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1067 [290 Cal.Rptr.3d 189] [two or more gang
members must have committed each predicate offense]; People v. Clark (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 133 [296 Cal.Rptr.3d 153] [pattern of criminal gang activity may be
established either by (1) two gang members who separately committed crimes on
different occasions, or (2) two gang members who committed a crime together on a
single occasion], review granted October 19, 2022, S275746.)
On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not need
to prove that the defendant devoted all or a substantial part of . . . .” (See Pen.
Code, § 186.22(j).)
On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you find the defendant
guilty of a crime in this case.” (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316,
322–323 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; People v. Duran (2002) 97
On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find that
there was a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (People v. Funes (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1506, 1527–1528 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 758]; see also Related Issues section
to CALCRIM No. 1400, Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang.)
On request, the court must give a limiting instruction on the gang evidence. (People
v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d
1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, Limited Purpose of Evidence of
Gang Activity.
CALCRIM No. 562, Transferred Intent.
CALCRIM No. 1400, Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang.
AUTHORITY
• “Active Participation” Defined. People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747
[97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
• “Criminal Street Gang” Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(f).
• Transferred Intent Under Penal Code Section 190.2(a)(22). People v. Shabazz
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 55 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 130 P.3d 519].
484
• “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity” Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (g).

• Examples of Common Benefit. Pen. Code, § 186.22(g).
• “Felonious Criminal Conduct” Defined. People v. Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d
692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140] [abrogated on other grounds by People v.
Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747–748 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
• Separate Intent From Underlying Felony. People v. Herrera (1999) 70
• Crimes Committed After Charged Offense Not Predicates. People v. Duran,
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458.
• Proof of Sufficient Connection Among Gang “Subsets” and Umbrella Gang
Required. People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309,
355 P.3d 480].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Bench Notes and Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, Active
Participation in Criminal Street Gang.
The criminal street gang special circumstance applies when a participant in a
criminal street gang intends to kill one person but kills someone else by mistake.
People v. Shabazz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 66; see CALCRIM No. 562, Transferred
Intent.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.03[3][a] (Matthew Bender).
485
737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker
(Pen. Code, § 190.25)
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of murdering

(a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code,
§ 190.25> [in violation of Penal Code section 190.25].
that:
decedent>;
2. <insert name of decedent> was (a/an) (operator/
driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) <insert
name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code,
§ 190.25> performing (his/her) duties;
AND
3. When <insert name of decedent> was killed, the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that
<insert name of decedent> was (a/an) (operator/
driver/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) <insert
name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code,
§ 190.25> and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].)
This special circumstance alone does not provide for the death penalty. (People v.
Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 234 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222].) However, if
the defendant is also convicted of a special circumstances listed in Penal Code
section 190.2(a), the defendant may be eligible for the death penalty. (Ibid.; see also
Pen. Code, § 190.25(c).)
AUTHORITY
• Special Circumstance. Pen. Code, § 190.25.
SECONDARY SOURCES
486
487
750. Special Circumstances: Prior Murder Conviction (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(2))—Trial on Prior Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b))
The defendant is charged with the special circumstance of having been

convicted previously of murder. You must now decide if the People have
proved that this special circumstance is true.
that the defendant was convicted previously of murder in the (first/
second) degree.
[A conviction of <insert name of offense from other state> is
the same as a conviction for (first/second) degree murder.]
[In deciding whether the People have proved this special circumstance,
consider only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider
your verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]
[You may not return a finding that this special circumstance has or has
not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
573, 941 P.2d 752].) The court must bifurcate trial on this special circumstance from
trial on the other charges unless the defendant specifically waives bifurcation. (Pen.
Code, § 190.1(b); Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1302 [276
Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].)
The court must also give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial
and CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions.
If the defendant has waived bifurcation, the court should give paragraphs one and
two. The court may also give paragraph three if appropriate. The remainder of the
instruction should not be given.
“The jury sitting as trier of fact must determine ‘the truth of’ the prior
conviction—i.e., the fact that defendant was previously convicted of first or second
degree murder.” (Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1301 [276 Cal.Rptr.
49, 801 P.2d 292].) The court must determine the validity of the prior conviction.
(Id. at p. 1302.) For an out-of-state prior, the court must determine whether the
elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted satisfy the elements
of first or second degree murder in California. (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th
488
673, 684–686 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d
200, 223 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “In deciding whether the People have
proved,” on request.
AUTHORITY
• Bifurcated Trial. Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b).
• Fact of Conviction Determined by Jury. Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1292, 1301 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].
• Validity of Conviction Determined by Court. Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51
Cal.3d 1292, 1302 [276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292].
• Out-of-State Priors. People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 684–686 [3
Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748]; People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242
[109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200,
223 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].
RELATED ISSUES
Order of Conviction Relevant, Not Order of Murders
“The unambiguous language and purpose of section 190.2(a)(2) thus require that a
person such as defendant, already convicted of murder in a prior proceeding, must
be considered eligible for the death penalty if convicted of first degree murder in a
subsequent trial. The order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial.”
(People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350];
People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 636 [123 Cal.Rtpr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].)
Intent to Kill Not Required
“Defendant also contends that section 190.2(a)(2) requires a finding of intent to kill.
Plainly, the provision does not expressly require such a finding.” (People v.
Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 596 [238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; People v.
Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 633 [123 Cal.Rtpr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, §§ 87.02[1], 87.12, 87.13[2] (Matthew Bender).
489
751. Second Degree Murder With Prior Prison for Murder (Pen.
Code, § 190.05)
The defendant is charged with the additional allegation of having

previously served a prison term for murder. You must now decide if the
People have proved this allegation.
To prove that this allegation is true, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the (first/
second) degree;
AND
2. The defendant served time in prison as a result of that conviction.
[A conviction of <insert name of offense from other state> is
the same as a conviction for (first/second) degree murder.]
[For the purpose of this allegation, serving time in <insert
name of institution from Pen. Code, § 190.05> qualifies as serving time in
prison.]
<Limiting instruction alternative A—bifurcated trial>
[In deciding whether the People have proved this allegation, consider
only the evidence presented in this proceeding. Do not consider your
verdict or any evidence from the earlier part of the trial.]
<Limiting instruction alternative B—nonbifurcated trial>
[Consider the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding
whether the defendant was previously convicted of the crime[s] alleged
[or for the limited purpose of <insert other permitted
purpose, e.g., assessing credibility of the defendant>]. Do not consider this
evidence for any other purpose.]
[You may not return a finding that this allegation has or has not been
proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the additional
allegation. (See Pen. Code, § 190.05(c) [must submit special allegation to jury].)
Penal Code section 190.05 provides for possible sentences of either life without
parole or 15 years to life for a defendant convicted of second degree murder who
490
has served a prior prison term for first or second degree murder. (Pen. Code,
§ 190.05(a).) The statute requires the jury to find the fact of the conviction true
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pen. Code, § 190.05(c), (d).) The statute does not
require that trial on the prior conviction be bifurcated from trial on the underlying
charge. If the court does use a bifurcated trial, the court must also give CALCRIM
No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial, and CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-
Deliberation Instructions. (See People v. Gutierrez (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1576,
1579 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 897].) The court must also give the last bracketed sentence.
On request, the court should give one of the appropriate limiting instruction,
depending on whether the court has granted a bifurcated trial.
If the prior is found true, the court must then proceed with a separate penalty phase
in which the jury determines which of the two possible sentences is appropriate.
(Pen. Code, § 190.05(e); People v. Gutierrez, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1579.) The
court should then modify the death penalty phase instructions for use in this penalty
phase trial. The factors for the jury to consider under Penal Code section 190.05(e)
are identical to the factors to be considered in a death penalty trial. Thus, the court
needs to change only the penalties that the jury must choose between.
AUTHORITY
• Second Degree Murder With Prior Prison for Murder. Pen. Code, § 190.05.
• Right to Jury Trial on Prior Conviction. Pen. Code, § 190.05(c).
• Reasonable Doubt Standard. Pen. Code, § 190.05(d).
• Separate Penalty Phase. Pen. Code, § 190.05(e).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 186.
Against the Person, § 142.01[4][d] (Matthew Bender).
491
L. DEATH PENALTY
This [phase of the] trial is to determine (the/each) defendant’s penalty.

The law provides for two possible penalties: death or life in prison
without the possibility of parole. You must decide which penalty (the/
each) defendant will receive.
[You must disregard all of the instructions I gave you earlier. I will give
you a set of instructions that apply only to this phase of the trial. Some
of these instructions will be the same or similar to instructions you have
heard before. However, you must follow only this new set of instructions
in this phase of the trial.]
[The first step in this process is the opening statements.
Next, the People will offer evidence. Evidence usually includes witness
testimony and exhibits. After the People’s case, the defense (will/may)
also present evidence.
After you have heard all the evidence and [before] the attorneys have
given their final arguments, I will instruct you on the law that applies to
the case.
After you have heard the arguments and instructions, you will go to the
jury room to deliberate.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on general concepts of law. (People v.
Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Because the
introductory instructions for the guilt phase contain concepts that do not apply to the
penalty phase, the court must clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the
penalty phase. (People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718, fn. 26; People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub
nom. Weaver v. California (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d
828].) The Supreme Court has stated that, in order to avoid confusion, the trial court
should provide the jury with a completely new set of instructions for the penalty
phase. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 982.)
The court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed paragraph instructing the jury
to disregard all previous instructions unless the current jury did not hear the guilt
phase of the case. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d
493
770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub nom. Arias v. California (1997) 520 U.S. 1251
[117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)
This instruction should be followed by any other introductory instructions the court
deems appropriate prior to the presentation of penalty phase evidence. The
committee recommends that the court give CALCRIM No. 101, Cautionary
Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before or After Jury Is Selected). The court may also
consider giving CALCRIM No. 102, Note-Taking; CALCRIM No. 104, Evidence;
and CALCRIM No. 105, Witnesses.
When CALCRIM No. 101, Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before or After
Jury Is Selected), is given, the court has a sua sponte duty to delete the sentence
which reads “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your
decision.” (People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680
P.2d 1081]; California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 545 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93
L.Ed.2d 934].) The court should also delete the following sentence: “You must reach
your verdict without any consideration of punishment.”
If the current jury did not hear the previous phases of the case, the court should
give the bracketed paragraphs that begin with “The first step in this process.”
AUTHORITY
• Death Penalty Statute. Pen. Code, § 190.3.
• Must Tell Jury Which Instructions Apply. People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d
660, 718, fn. 26 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].
• Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions. People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th
876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. Weaver v.
California (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].
• Error to Instruct Not to Consider Sympathy. People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d
858, 876 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]; People v. Lanphear (1984) 36
Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; California v. Brown (1987)
479 U.S. 538, 542 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, §§ 87.20–87.26 (Matthew Bender).
494
I will now instruct you on the law that applies to this [phase of the] case.
[I will give you a copy of the instructions to use in the jury room.] [Each
of you has a copy of these instructions to use in the jury room.]
[You must disregard all of the instructions I gave you earlier. I will give
you a set of instructions that apply only to this phase of the trial. Some
of these instructions will be the same or similar to instructions you have
heard before. However, you must follow only this new set of instructions
in this phase of the trial.]
You must decide whether (the/each) defendant will be sentenced to death
or life in prison without the possibility of parole. It is up to you and you
alone to decide what the penalty will be. [In reaching your decision,
consider all of the evidence from the entire trial [unless I specifically
instruct you not to consider something from an earlier phase].] Do not
allow bias, prejudice, or public opinion to influence your opinion in any
way.
You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with
it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with
my instructions, you must follow my instructions.
Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them
together. If I repeat any instruction or idea, do not conclude that it is
more important than any other instruction or idea just because I
repeated it.
Some words or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that
are different from their meanings in everyday use. These words and
phrases will be specifically defined in these instructions. Please be sure to
listen carefully and follow the definitions that I give you. Words and
phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be applied
using their ordinary, everyday meanings.
Some of these instructions may not apply, depending on your findings
about the facts of the case. [Do not assume just because I give a
particular instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts.]
After you have decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that
apply to the facts as you find them.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Because the
495
introductory instructions for the guilt phase contain concepts that do not apply to the
penalty phase, the court must clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the
penalty phase. (People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718, fn. 26; People v.
Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub
nom. Weaver v. California (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d
828].) The Supreme Court has stated that, in order to avoid confusion, the trial court
should provide the jury with a completely new set of instructions for the penalty
phase. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 982.)
The court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed paragraph instructing the jury
to disregard all previous instructions unless the current jury did not hear the guilt
phase of the case. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d
770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub nom. Arias v. California (1997) 520 U.S. 1251
[117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)
The court should give the bracketed portion of the last paragraph that begins with
“Do not assume just because,” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence
pursuant to Penal Code section 1127. The committee recommends against any
comment on the evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case.
This instruction should be followed by any other general instructions on evidence or
principles of law the court deems appropriate based on the facts of the case.
Specifically:
• The court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence and
CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57,
107–108 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)
• The court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable
Doubt: Bifurcated Trial, if the prosecution offers aggravating evidence of other
criminal conduct or other felony convictions. However, the reasonable doubt
standard does not apply to the question of whether the jury should impose the
death penalty or to proof of other aggravating factors. (People v. Miranda, supra,
44 Cal.3d at p. 107; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230
Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
• If the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence to prove other criminal
conduct, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on circumstantial evidence
in the penalty phase. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 564 [3
Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137] [no error where prosecution relied exclusively on
direct evidence].)
• When requested, the court must give instructions admonishing the jury not to
consider the defendant’s failure to testify during the penalty phase. (People v.
Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 757–758 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].)
AUTHORITY
• Must Tell Jury Which Instructions Apply. People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at
p. 718, fn. 26.
496
• Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions. People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 982.
• Error to Instruct Not to Consider Sympathy. People v. Lanphear (1984) 36
Cal.3d 163, 165 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; California v. Brown (1987)
479 U.S. 538, 542 [107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934].
• Reasonable Doubt. People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 107; People v.
Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 777–779.
• Circumstantial Evidence. People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 564.
• Defendant’s Failure to Testify. People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp.
757–758.
Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210].
SECONDARY SOURCES
497
763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as
Aggravating or Mitigating (Pen. Code, § 190.3)
In reaching your decision, you must consider and weigh the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances or factors shown by the evidence.
An aggravating circumstance or factor is any fact, condition, or event
relating to the commission of a crime, above and beyond the elements of
the crime itself, that increases the wrongfulness of the defendant’s
conduct, the enormity of the offense, or the harmful impact of the crime.
An aggravating circumstance may support a decision to impose the
death penalty.
A mitigating circumstance or factor is any fact, condition, or event that
makes the death penalty less appropriate as a punishment, even though
it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A mitigating circumstance
is something that reduces the defendant’s blameworthiness or otherwise
supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may
support a decision not to impose the death penalty.
Under the law, you must consider, weigh, and be guided by specific
factors, where applicable, some of which may be aggravating and some
of which may be mitigating. I will read you the entire list of factors.
Some of them may not apply to this case. If you find there is no evidence
of a factor, then you should disregard that factor.
The factors are:
(a) The circumstances of the crime[s] of which the defendant was
convicted in this case and any special circumstances that were
found true.
(b) Whether or not the defendant has engaged in violent criminal
activity other than the crime[s] of which the defendant was
convicted in this case. Violent criminal activity is criminal activity
involving the unlawful use, attempt to use, or direct or implied
threat to use force or violence against a person. [The other violent
criminal activity alleged in this case will be described in these
instructions.]
(c) Whether or not the defendant has been convicted of any prior
felony other than the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in
this case.
(d) Whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance when (he/she) committed the
crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
(e) Whether the victim participated in the defendant’s homicidal
498
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.

(f) Whether the defendant reasonably believed that circumstances
morally justified or extenuated (his/her) conduct in committing
the crime[s] of which (he/she) was convicted in this case.
(g) Whether at the time of the murder the defendant acted under
extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
person.
(h) Whether, at the time of the offense, the defendant’s capacity to
appreciate the criminality of (his/her) conduct or to follow the
requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental
disease, defect, or intoxication.
(i) The defendant’s age at the time of the crime[s] of which (he/she)
was convicted in this case.
(j) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to the murder and
(his/her) participation in the murder was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance, whether related to these charges or not,
that lessens the gravity of the crime[s] even though the
circumstance is not a legal excuse or justification. These
circumstances include sympathy or compassion for the defendant
or anything you consider to be a mitigating factor, regardless of
whether it is one of the factors listed above.
[You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt [and
sanity] phase[s] of this trial if it conflicts with your consideration and
weighing of these factors.]
Do not consider the absence of a mitigating factor as an aggravating
factor.
[You may not consider as an aggravating factor anything other than the
factors contained in this list that you conclude are aggravating in this
case. You must not take into account any other facts or circumstances as
a basis for imposing the death penalty.]
[Even if a fact is both a “special circumstance” and also a “circumstance
of the crime,” you may consider that fact only once as an aggravating
factor in your weighing process. Do not double-count that fact simply
because it is both a “special circumstance” and a “circumstance of the
crime.”]
[Although you may consider sympathy or compassion for the defendant,
you may not let sympathy for the defendant’s family influence your
decision. [However, you may consider evidence about the impact the
defendant’s execution would have on (his/her) family if that evidence
demonstrates some positive quality of the defendant’s background or
499
character.]]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, December 2008,
March 2021, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the factors to consider in
reaching a decision on the appropriate sentence. (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S.
586, 604–605 [98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d
754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)
Although not required, “[i]t is . . . the better practice for a court to instruct on all
the statutory penalty factors, directing the jury to be guided by those that are
applicable on the record.” (People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269
Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], cert. den. sub nom. Marshall v. California (1991) 498
U.S. 1110; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104–105 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594,
744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750
P.2d 741].) The jury must be instructed to consider only those factors that are
“applicable.” (Williams v. Calderon (1998) 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 1023.)
When the court will be instructing the jury on prior violent criminal activity in
aggravation, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other violent
criminal activity alleged in this case.” (See People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d
21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93,
151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) The court also has a sua sponte duty to
give CALCRIM No. 764, Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes, in
addition to this instruction.
When the court will be instructing the jury on prior felony convictions, the court
also has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 765, Death Penalty: Conviction
for Other Felony Crimes, in addition to this instruction.
On request, the court must instruct the jury not to double-count any “circumstances
of the crime” that are also “special circumstances.” (People v. Melton, supra, 44
Cal.3d at p. 768.) When requested, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with
“Even if a fact is both a ‘special circumstance’ and also a ‘circumstance of the
crime’.”
On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You may not let sympathy
for the defendant’s family.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins
with “However, you may consider evidence about the impact the defendant’s
execution.” (Ibid.)
The bracketed sentence that begins with “You must disregard any jury instruction”
may be given unless the jury did not hear a prior phase of the case. (See People v.
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980], cert. den. sub
500
nom. Arias v. California (1997) 520 U.S. 1251 [117 S.Ct. 2408, 138 L.Ed.2d 175].)
AUTHORITY
• Jury Must Be Instructed to Consider Any Mitigating Evidence and Sympathy.
Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 604–605; People v. Benson, supra, 52
Cal.3d at p. 799; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 876 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309,
671 P.2d 813].
• Should Instruct on All Factors. People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 932.
• Must Instruct to Consider Only “Applicable Factors.” Williams v. Calderon,
supra, 48 F.Supp.2d at p. 1023; People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 932.
• Mitigating Factor Must Be Supported by Evidence. Delo v. Lashley (1993) 507
U.S. 272, 275, 277 [113 S.Ct. 1222, 122 L.Ed.2d 620].
• “Aggravating and Mitigating” Defined. People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26,
77–78 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1]; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207,
269–270 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].
• On Request Must Instruct to Consider Only Statutory Aggravating Factors.
People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509 [117 Cal.Rptr. 2d 45, 40 P.3d
754], cert. den. sub nom. Hillhouse v. California (2003) 537 U.S. 1114 [123
S.Ct. 869, 154 L.Ed.2d 789]; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn.
14 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].
• Mitigating Factors Are Examples. People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 760;
Belmontes v. Woodford (2003) 350 F.3d 861, 897].
• Must Instruct to Not Double-Count. People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p.
768.
• Threats of Violence Must Be Directed at Persons. People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7
• This Instruction Upheld Against Due Process Challenge to Victim-Impact
Factors. People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1220–1221 [298 Cal.Rptr.3d
150, 515 P.3d 1210].
COMMENTARY
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors—Need Not Specify
The court is not required to identify for the jury which factors may be aggravating
and which may be mitigating. (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 509.)
“The aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-evident within the
context of each case.” (Ibid.) However, the court is required on request to instruct
the jury to consider only the aggravating factors listed. (Ibid.; People v. Gordon
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn. 14 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) In People
v. Hillhouse, the California Supreme Court stated, “we suggest that, on request, the
court merely tell the jury it may not consider in aggravation anything other than the
aggravating statutory factors.” The committee has rephrased this for clarity and
501
included in the text of this instruction, “You may not consider as an aggravating
factor anything other than the factors contained in this list that you conclude are
aggravating in this case.” (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 509, fn. 6.)
Although the court is not required to specify which factors are the aggravating
factors, it is not error for the court to do so. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17
Cal.4th 1216, 1269 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) In People v. Musselwhite,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1269, decided prior to Hillhouse, the Supreme Court held
that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “only factors (a), (b) and (c) of
section 190.3 could be considered in aggravation . . .” (italics in original).
SECONDARY SOURCES
549–550, 563, 568, 571–572, 584–591.
Penalty, §§ 87.23, 87.24 (Matthew Bender).
502
The People allege as an aggravating circumstance that (the defendant/

<insert name of defendant>) committed <insert
specific description of alleged offense[s]>.
The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (the defendant/
<insert name of defendant>) committed [each of] the alleged
crime[s]. [Consider each of the alleged crimes separately.] If you have a
reasonable doubt whether (the defendant/ <insert name of
defendant>) committed (the/an) alleged crime, you must completely
disregard any evidence of that crime. If the People have proved that (the
defendant/ <insert name of defendant>) committed (the/an)
alleged crime, you may consider the evidence of that alleged crime as an
aggravating circumstance.
[To decide whether the defendant committed <insert specific
description of alleged offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions
Each of you must decide for yourself whether the People have proved
that the defendant committed an alleged crime. You do not all need to
agree whether an alleged crime has been proved. If any juror
individually concludes that an alleged crime has been proved, that juror
may give the evidence whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate.
On the other hand, if any juror individually concludes that an alleged
crime has not been proved, that juror must disregard the evidence
completely.
You may not consider any other evidence of alleged criminal activity as
an aggravating circumstance [except for the alleged prior felony
conviction[s] about which I will now instruct you].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that alleged prior crimes offered in
aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Robertson (1982)
33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Davenport (1985)
41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) Evidence of prior crimes is
limited to offenses involving the “use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.” (Pen. Code, § 190.3(b).)
The prosecution must specify what prior crimes are alleged in aggravation and the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to consider only evidence relating to
503
those alleged crimes. (People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr.
77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186,
72 P.3d 1166].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to give any necessary instructions on defenses to
the alleged prior crimes, including instructions on voluntary intoxication as a
defense. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 942 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d
1277].)
When requested by the defense, the court must instruct on the elements of the
alleged prior offense. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 571 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d
145, 73 P.3d 1137]; (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 964 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d
272, 70 P.3d 277]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, fn. 14 [106
Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347] [rule not changed by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]], cert. den. sub
nom. Anderson v. California (2002) 534 U.S. 1136 [122 S.Ct. 1082, 151 L.Ed.2d
982].) However, the court is not required to instruct on the elements sua sponte.
(People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 571; People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p.
964.) The defense may, for tactical reasons, prefer not to have the jury hear the
elements.
Give the bracketed portion in the final paragraph when the court is also instructing
the jury on prior felony convictions alleged in aggravation. (See CALCRIM No.
765, Death Penalty: Conviction for Other Felony Crimes.)
If the case involves only one defendant, the court should use the word “defendant”
throughout the instruction. If the case involves codefendants tried jointly, the court
should insert the name of the specific defendant alleged to have committed the prior
crimes in the places indicated in the instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Factor (b). Pen. Code, § 190.3.
• Must Instruct on Reasonable Doubt. People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21,
53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d
247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].
• Must Instruct Jury to Consider Only Specified Prior Crimes Evidence. People v.
Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].
• Instruct on Elements Only When Requested. People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th
518, 571 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137]; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th
916, 964 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25
Cal.4th 543, 589, fn. 14 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347], cert. den. sub nom.
Anderson v. California (2002) 534 U.S. 1136 [122 S.Ct. 1082, 151 L.Ed.2d 982].
• Defense Instructions to Uncharged Crimes. People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th
877, 942 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277].
• Constitutional to Admit Evidence of Uncharged Crimes. People v. Balderas
504
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; People v. Brown
• No Unanimity Requirement. People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276
Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].
RELATED ISSUES
Need Not Instruct on Presumption of Innocence
The court is not required to instruct on the presumption of innocence regarding
alleged prior crimes. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 809–810 [276
Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)
No Unanimity Requirement
“We see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether
uncharged criminal activity has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so,
what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.” (People v.
Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)
No Requirement to Instruct Jury Must Find “Violence or Threat of Violence”
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The court is required to instruct the jury that the alleged prior crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court does not have to instruct the jury
that the fact that the alleged crime involved violence or the threat of violence must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ochoa (2002) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453
[110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78], cert. den. sub nom. Ochoa v. California (1999)
535 U.S. 1040 [122 S.Ct. 1803, 152 L.Ed.2d 660].)
May Use Same Conduct Under Factor (b) and Factor (c)
“Where violent ‘criminal activity’ results in a ‘prior felony conviction,’ it shows
both a propensity for violence and an inability or unwillingness to be deterred by
prior criminal sanctions. The jury was entitled to consider the relevance of
defendant’s prior conviction for both purposes under factors (b) and (c).” (People v.
Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 654 [274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849] [emphasis in
original]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 156 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d
1166].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 558–561.
505
The People allege as an aggravating circumstance that (the defendant/

<insert name of defendant>) was convicted of
<insert name of felony conviction> on <insert date of
conviction>. <Repeat for each felony conviction alleged.>
The People must prove (this/these) allegation[s] beyond a reasonable
doubt. If you have a reasonable doubt whether (the defendant/
<insert name of defendant>) was convicted of (the/an)
alleged crime, you must completely disregard any evidence of that crime.
If the People have proved that (the defendant/ <insert name
of defendant>) was convicted of (the/an) alleged prior crime, you may
consider the fact of that prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance.
You may not consider any other evidence of alleged criminal activity as
an aggravating circumstance [except for the alleged criminal activity I
discussed in the previous instruction].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that alleged prior felony convictions
offered in aggravation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v.
Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].)
The prosecution must specify what convictions are alleged in aggravation, and the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to consider only evidence relating to
those prior convictions. (See People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188
Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 151 [2
Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].)
To be admissible under factor (c), the defendant must have been convicted of the
other felony offense prior to the commission of the offenses charged in the current
case. (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d
480]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 702 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d
278].)
Give the bracketed portion in the final paragraph when the court is also instructing
the jury on prior violent crimes alleged in aggravation. (See CALCRIM No. 764,
Death Penalty: Evidence of Other Violent Crimes.)
In People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 811 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330],
the Supreme Court held that the jury need not be unanimous about whether prior
violent crimes offered under factor (b) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
506
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether this also applies to prior felony
convictions offered under factor (c). If the court determines that the jury need not be
unanimous about whether prior felony convictions have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, the court may, on request, add the following paragraph:
Each of you must decide for yourself whether the People have proved that the
defendant was convicted of an alleged crime. You do not all need to agree
whether an alleged conviction has been proved. If any juror individually
concludes that an alleged conviction has been proved, that juror may give the
evidence whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate. On the other hand,
if any juror individually concludes that an alleged conviction has not been
proved, that juror must disregard the evidence completely.
If the case involves only one defendant, the court should use the word “defendant”
throughout the instruction. If the case involves codefendants tried jointly, the court
should insert the name of the specific defendant alleged to have been convicted of
the prior felony in the places indicated in the instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Factor (c). Pen. Code, § 190.3.
• Must Be Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. People v. Robertson (1982) 33
Cal.3d 21, 53–55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]; People v. Davenport (1985)
41 Cal.3d 247, 281 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].
• Must Pre-Date Current Offense. People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205
[222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 702
[276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].
• Defendant May Raise Constitutional Challenge to Prior. People v. La Fargue
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 890 [195 Cal.Rptr. 438].
• Out-of-State Convictions. People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038–1039 [264
Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].
• Constitutional to Admit Evidence of Prior Convictions. People v. Kaurish (1990)
52 Cal.3d 648, 701 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].
RELATED ISSUES
Out-of-State Felony Convictions
“In the absence of limitation, a reference to ‘prior felony convictions’ is deemed to
include any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting
jurisdiction.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038–1039 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386,
782 P.2d 627].) Thus, the out-of-state prior does not have to qualify as a felony
under California law. (Ibid.)
Constitutional Challenge
The defendant may bring a constitutional challenge to the validity of the prior
conviction. (People v. La Fargue (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 890 [195 Cal.Rptr.
438].) If the conviction is from another country, the defendant may challenge the
507
prior on the basis that the foreign jurisdiction does not provide the procedural
safeguards mandated by the United States Constitution. (Ibid.)
Evidence of Charges and Underlying Facts Not Admissible, Only Conviction
“Because the . . . burglaries were nonviolent crimes, only evidence authenticating
defendant’s conviction for these crimes was relevant and admissible under section
190.3, factor (c). Unlike violent criminal activity admissible under factor (b), the
charges leading to a conviction of a nonviolent crime are inadmissible.” (People v.
Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 703 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278] [emphasis in
original]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 819 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897
P.2d 481] [facts admissible under factor (b) but not under factor (c)].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
508
You have sole responsibility to decide which penalty (the/each) defendant

will receive.
You must consider the arguments of counsel and all the evidence
presented [during (both/all) phases of the trial] [except for the items of
evidence I specifically instructed you not to consider].
In reaching your decision, you must consider, take into account, and be
guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Each of you is
free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you find appropriate
to each individual factor and to all of them together. Do not simply
count the number of aggravating and mitigating factors and decide
based on the higher number alone. Consider the relative or combined
weight of the factors and evaluate them in terms of their relative
convincing force on the question of punishment.
Each of you must decide for yourself whether aggravating or mitigating
factors exist. You do not all need to agree whether such factors exist. If
any juror individually concludes that a factor exists, that juror may give
the factor whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate.
Determine which penalty is appropriate and justified by considering all
the evidence and the totality of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Even without mitigating circumstances, you may decide
that the aggravating circumstances are not substantial enough to
warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be
persuaded that the aggravating circumstances both outweigh the
mitigating circumstances and are also so substantial in comparison to the
mitigating circumstances that a sentence of death is appropriate and
justified.
To return a verdict of either death or life without the possibility of
parole, all 12 of you must agree on that verdict.
[You must separately consider which sentence to impose on each
defendant. If you cannot agree on the sentence[s] for one [or more]
defendant[s] but you do agree on the sentence[s] for the other
defendant[s], then you must return a verdict for (the/each) defendant on
whose sentence you do agree.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the weighing process in a
capital case. (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 [230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726
509
P.2d 516]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d
330].)
Following this instruction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-
Deliberation Instructions, explaining how to proceed in deliberations.
AUTHORITY
• Error to Instruct “Shall Impose Death.” People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512,
544 [230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516].
• Must Instruct on Weighing Process. People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 544
[230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 799
[276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955,
977–979 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].
• Aggravating Factors “So Substantial in Comparison to” Mitigating. People v.
Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 977–979 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].
• This Instruction Approved in Dicta. People v. Murtishaw (2011) 51 Cal.4th 574,
588–589 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 247 P.3d 941].
• Responding to Juror Inquiry re Commutation of Sentence. People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 204–207 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62].
RELATED ISSUES
No Presumption of Life and No Reasonable Doubt Standard
The court is not required to instruct the jury that there is a presumption in favor of
a life sentence; that the aggravating factors (other than prior crimes) must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt; or that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. (People v.
Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 800 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; People v.
Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 107 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v.
Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
Unanimity on Factors Not Required
The court is not required to instruct the jury that they must unanimously agree on
any aggravating circumstance. (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777–779
[230 Cal.Rtpr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
Commutation Power
The court must not state or imply to the jury that the ultimate authority for selecting
the sentence to be imposed lies elsewhere. (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S.
320, 328–329 [105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231].)
Deadlock—No Duty to Inform Jury Not Required to Return Verdict
“[W]here, as here, there is no jury deadlock, a court is not required to instruct the
jury that it has the choice not to deliver any verdict.” (People v. Miranda (1987) 44
510
Cal.3d 57, 105 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)

Deadlock—Questions From the Jury About What Will Happen
If the jury inquires about what will happen in the event of a deadlock, the court
should instruct jurors: “[T]hat subject is not for the jury to consider or to concern
itself with. You must make every effort to reach [a] unanimous decision if at all
possible.” (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1281, [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 253
P.3d 553], citing People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828
P.2d 101].)
No Duty to Instruct Not to Consider Deterrence or Costs
“Questions of deterrence or cost in carrying out a capital sentence are for the
Legislature, not for the jury considering a particular case.” (People v. Benson (1990)
52 Cal.3d 754, 807 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330] [citation and internal
quotation marks omitted].) Where “[t]he issue of deterrence or cost [is] not raised at
trial, either expressly or by implication,” the court need not instruct the jury to
disregard these matters. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 549–550, 584–587, 589–591.
Penalty, §§ 87.23[2], 87.24[1] (Matthew Bender).
511
767. Jurors’ Responsibility During Deliberation in Death Penalty
Case
It is your responsibility to decide which penalty is appropriate for the

defendant in this case. Base your decision only on the evidence you have
heard in court and on the instructions that I have given you. Do not
speculate or consider anything other than the evidence and my
instructions.
New April 2010; Revised April 2011, September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction may be given on request and must be given in response to a jury
question about commutation of sentence. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50
Cal.4th 99, 204–207 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62]; People v. Ramos (1984) 37
Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430]). “The key in Ramos is
whether the jury raises the commutation issue so that it ‘cannot be avoided.’ ”
(People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1251 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171]
(conc. opn. of Moreno, J.)) Commutation instructions are proper, however, when the
jury implicitly raises the issue of commutation. No direct question is necessary.
(People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 932 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 190.3; People v. Letner and Tobin
Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430]).
SECONDARY SOURCES
512
When you go to the jury room, the first thing you should do is (choose a
foreperson/decide whether to retain the same foreperson). The
foreperson should see to it that your discussions are carried on in an
organized way and that everyone has a fair chance to be heard. Please
treat one another courteously.
It is your duty to talk with one another and to deliberate in the jury
room in order to agree on a penalty if you can. Each of you must decide
the penalty for yourself, but only after you have discussed the evidence
with the other jurors. Do not hesitate to change your mind if you
become convinced that you are wrong. But do not change your mind just
because other jurors disagree with you.
Keep an open mind and openly exchange your thoughts and ideas about
this case. Stating your opinions too strongly at the beginning or
immediately announcing how you plan to vote may interfere with an
open discussion.
Do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject
involved in it with anyone, including, but not limited to, your spouse or
other family, or friends, spiritual leaders or advisors, or therapists. You
must discuss the case only in the jury room and only when all jurors are
present. Do not discuss your deliberations with anyone. Do not
communicate using: <insert currently popular social media>
during your deliberations.
It is very important that you not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or
<insert other relevant source of information>]) in any way in
connection with this case during your deliberations or at any time until
your jury service is completed.
[During the trial, several items were received into evidence as exhibits.
You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help you in your
deliberations. (These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you
when you begin to deliberate./If you wish to see any exhibits, please
request them in writing.)]
If you need to communicate with me while you are deliberating, send a
note through the bailiff, signed by the foreperson or by one or more
members of the jury. To have a complete record of this trial, it is
important that you not communicate with me except by a written note.
If you have questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer, so it
may take some time. You should continue your deliberations while you
wait for my answer. I will answer any questions in writing or orally here
in open court.
513
Do not reveal to me or anyone else any aspect of your deliberations or

how the vote stands on the question of penalty unless I ask you to do so.
Your verdict of either death or life without possibility of parole must be
unanimous. This means that, to return a verdict, all of you must agree to
it. [Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.]
<During a retrial, give the following paragraph on request to inform jury
about prior proceedings without introducing extraneous matters>
[Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials. The only issue in this trial
is the penalty.]
It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. [Do not take
anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I think
about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.]
You will be given [a] verdict form[s]. As soon as all jurors have agreed
on a verdict, the foreperson must date and sign the [appropriate] verdict
form[s] and notify the bailiff.
New March 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that the jury’s verdict must be
unanimous. Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the other topics
relating to deliberations, there is authority approving such instructions. (See People
v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; People v.
Selby (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426]; People v. Hunt (1915) 26 Cal.App.
514, 517 [147 P. 476].)
If the court automatically sends exhibits into the jury room, give the bracketed
sentence that begins with “These exhibits will be sent into the jury room.” If not,
give the bracketed phrase that begins with “You may examine whatever exhibits you
think.”
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not take anything I said or did
during the trial” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f).)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Sometimes issues are tried in
separate trials” if requested. (People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205 [226
Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].)
AUTHORITY
• Exhibits. Pen. Code, § 1137.
• Questions. Pen. Code, § 1138.
• Verdict Forms. Pen. Code, § 1140.
514
• Unanimous Verdict. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; Pen. Code, § 190.4(b); People v.
Howard (1930) 211 Cal. 322, 325 [295 P. 333]; People v. Kelso (1945) 25
Cal.2d 848, 853–854 [155 P.2d 819]; People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687,
692 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742]; People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372,
425 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].
• Duty to Deliberate. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr.
861, 566 P.2d 997].
514, 517 [147 P. 476].
• Keep an Open Mind. People v. Selby (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426].
• Hung Jury. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850–852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861,
566 P.2d 997]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118–1121 [117
Cal.Rptr.2d 715].
RELATED ISSUES
Admonition Not to Discuss Case with Anyone
(Id. at p. 306, fn. 11.)
The court may, in its discretion, add the suggested language to the fourth paragraph
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 726–727.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02, 85.03[1], 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
515
I will now instruct you on the law that applies to this [phase of the] case.
[You must disregard all the instructions I gave you earlier and decide
this phase of the trial applying only the instructions that I am giving you
now. Some of these instructions will be the same or similar to
instructions you have heard before. However, you must follow only this
new set of instructions in this phase of the trial.]
You must decide whether the defendant is intellectually disabled.
In order to establish that (he/she) is intellectually disabled, the defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. (His/Her) general intellectual functioning is significantly below
average;
2. (He/She) also has deficits in two or more areas of adaptive
behavior;
AND
3. These conditions were observable before the defendant reached
the end of the developmental period.
Adaptive behavior is the set of learned skills that people generally need to
function in their everyday lives. Those skill areas include communication,
self-care, home-living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health
and safety.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different standard than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more
likely than not that (he/she) is intellectually disabled. If the defendant
has not met this burden, you must find that (he/she) has not proved that
(he/she) is intellectually disabled. In order to return a finding that the
defendant is or is not intellectually disabled, you must all agree on that
finding.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) In the context
of penalty phase instructions, the Supreme Court has stated that the trial court must
516
clarify for the jury which instructions apply to the penalty phase. (People v. Babbitt,
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718, fn. 26; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982
[111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom. Weaver v. California (2002)
535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].) In order to avoid confusion, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the preferable practice is for the court to provide
the jury with a completely new set of instructions. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 982.) The committee recommends this approach in the intellectual
disability phase as well.
When the defendant in a capital trial raises the issue of intellectual disability, the
jury must decide the question unless the defendant has waived a jury on the issue.
(Pen. Code, § 1376(b)(1).) The hearing on intellectual disability shall be conducted
after the guilt phase and prior to the penalty phase. (Ibid.) If the defendant has
entered a plea of not guilty by insanity, the hearing on intellectual disability shall be
conducted after the sanity phase. (Pen. Code, § 1376(e).) The defense bears the
burden of proving intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence. (Pen.
Code, § 1376(b)(2).)
The court must also give any necessary instructions on witnesses and evidence,
such as CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses, and
CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness. The court must conclude with CALCRIM No.
3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions.
AUTHORITY
• Hearing on Intellectual Disability in Death Penalty Case. Pen. Code, § 1376.
• Execution of Intellectually Disabled Unconstitutional. Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
536 U.S. 304, 319–321 [122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335].
• Intellectual Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 1376(a).
• Weight of IQ Tests in Assessing Intellectual Disability. Hall v. Florida (2014)
572 U.S. 701, 722–723 [134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007]; In re Hawthorne
• Should Give Jury New Set of Instructions (Penalty Phase). People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 982 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103], cert. den. sub nom.
Weaver v. California (2002) 535 U.S. 1058 [122 S.Ct. 1920, 152 L.Ed.2d 828].
RELATED ISSUES
Scope of Expert Testing
When the defendant places at issue the question of whether he or she is
intellectually disabled, the defendant must submit to examination by a prosecution
expert. (Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 40 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d
533].) “However, those examinations are permissible only to the extent they are
reasonably related to the determination of the existence of the mental condition
raised . . . . [On] a defense objection to specific proposed prosecution tests, the trial
court must make a threshold determination that the tests bear some reasonable
relation to measuring mental retardation, including factors that might confound or
517
explain the testing, such as malingering . . . . The trial court must prohibit any tests
it concludes are not reasonably related to determining mental retardation.” (Id. at p.
45.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Penalty, §§ 87.16, 87.17, 87.18 (Matthew Bender).
776–799 Reserved for Future Use
518
ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES
A. MAYHEM
B. TORTURE
SPOUSE
(i) Child
821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code,
§ 273a(a))
830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or
Death (Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))
(iii) Spouse, etc.
840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent Resulting in
Traumatic Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))
841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent (Pen. Code,
§ 243(e)(1))
(iv) Evidence
850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of
Complaining Witness
851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the
Defense
519

D. ASSAULT
860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely
to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d))
861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))
862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce
Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3)
863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With Deadly Weapon or
Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)
(B) General
875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))
890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First
Degree Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))
900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified Victim (Pen. Code,
§§ 240, 241)
907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider’s Property or Vehicle
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.3)
520
(iv) Simple Assault

E. BATTERY
(i) Causing Injury
926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace Officer (Pen. Code,
§§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1))
(ii) Sexual Battery
936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) &
(d))
948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243.3)
951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243.2)
(iv) Simple Battery
(i) Shooting
966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 247(b))
521
970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner (Pen. Code,
§ 246.3)
(ii) Brandishing
980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 417.3)
983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code,
§ 417(a)(1) & (2))
522
A. MAYHEM
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with aggravated mayhem

[in violation of Penal Code section 205].
prove that:
1. The defendant unlawfully and maliciously (disabled or disfigured
someone permanently/ [or] deprived someone else of a limb,
organ, or part of (his/her) body);
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (permanently
disable or disfigure the other person/ [or] deprive the other
person of a limb, organ, or part of (his/her) body);
AND
3. Under the circumstances, the defendant’s act showed extreme
indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of the
other person.
Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure
someone else.
[A disfiguring injury may be permanent even if it can be repaired by
medical procedures.]
[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give the first option if the defendant was prosecuted for permanently
disabling or disfiguring the victim. Give the second option if the defendant was
prosecuted for depriving someone of a limb, organ, or body part. (See Pen. Code,
§ 205.)
The bracketed sentence regarding “permanent injury” may be given on request if
there is evidence that the injury may be repaired by medical procedures. (People v.
Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to
523
CALCRIM No. 800 ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES
instruct that an injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be
medically feasible].)
The bracketed sentence stating that “The People do not have to prove that the
defendant intended to kill,” may be given on request if there is no evidence or
conflicting evidence that the defendant intended to kill someone. (See Pen. Code,
§ 205.)
AUTHORITY
• Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; People v. Lopez (1986) 176
Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
• Permanent Disability. See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507,
512 [158 Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months], overruled
on other grounds People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr.
148, 749 P.2d 803].
• Permanent Disfigurement. See People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571
[28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; see also People v. Newble (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451
[174 Cal.Rptr. 637] [head is member of body for purposes of disfigurement].
• Specific Intent to Cause Maiming Injury. People v. Ferrell (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 828, 833 [267 Cal.Rptr. 283]; People v. Lee (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
320, 324–325 [269 Cal.Rptr. 434].
• Simple Mayhem. People v. Robinson (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 77–80 [180
Cal.Rptr.3d 796].
• Attempted Aggravated Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 205, 663.
• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
• Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
Assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)) is
not a lesser included offense to mayhem. (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
855, 862–863 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371]).
RELATED ISSUES
Victim Must Be Alive
A victim of mayhem must be alive at the time of the act. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23
Cal.4th 978, 1058 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68]; see People v. Jentry (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 615, 629 [138 Cal.Rptr. 250].)
Evidence of Indiscriminate Attack or Actual Injury Constituting Mayhem
Insufficient to Show Specific Intent
“Aggravated mayhem . . . requires the specific intent to cause the maiming injury.
[Citation.] Evidence that shows no more than an ‘indiscriminate attack’ is
insufficient to prove the required specific intent. [Citation.] Furthermore, specific
524
ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES CALCRIM No. 800
intent to maim may not be inferred solely from evidence that the injury inflicted
actually constitutes mayhem; instead, there must be other facts and circumstances
which support an inference of intent to maim rather than to attack indiscriminately.
[Citation.]” (People v. Park (2000) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 815].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person §§ 89–91.
525
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with mayhem [in violation

of Penal Code section 203].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of mayhem, the People must prove
that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously:
[1. Removed a part of someone’s body(;/.)]
[OR]
[2. Disabled or made useless a part of someone’s body and the
disability was more than slight or temporary(;/.)]
[OR]
[3. Permanently disfigured someone(;/.)]
[OR]
[4. Cut or disabled someone’s tongue(;/.)]
[OR]
[5. Slit someone’s (nose[, ]/ear[,]/ [or] lip) (;/.)]
[OR]
[6. Put out someone’s eye or injured someone’s eye in a way that so
significantly reduced (his/her) ability to see that the eye was
useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]
someone else.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2014, March 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Whether the complaining witness suffered a serious bodily injury is a question for
the jury to determine. If the defendant disputes that the injury suffered was a serious
bodily injury, use the first bracketed paragraph. If the parties stipulate that the injury
suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the second bracketed paragraph.
526
The last bracketed sentence may be given on request if there is evidence of a

disfiguring injury that may be repaired by medical procedures. (See People v. Hill
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to instruct
that injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically
feasible].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
• No Serious Bodily Injury Requirement. People v. Santana (2013) 56 Cal.4th
999, 1010 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 547, 301 P.3d 1157].
• Disabled. See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507, 512 [158
Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months], overruled on other
grounds in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 498 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749
P.2d 803].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226 [113
Cal.Rptr.2d 1]; People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 453 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d
606].
• Permanent Disfigurement. People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28
Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; Goodman v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 624
[148 Cal.Rptr. 799]; see also People v. Newble (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451
• Put Out Eye. People v. Dennis (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1138 [215 Cal.Rptr.
750]; People v. Green (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1, 3–4 [130 Cal.Rptr. 318]
[addressing corrective lenses]; People v. Nunes (1920) 47 Cal.App. 346, 350
[190 P. 486].
• Slit Lip. People v. Caldwell (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 952 [200 Cal.Rptr. 508]
[defendant bit through victim’s lower lip].
• Attempted Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 203, 663.
• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see People v. De Angelis (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 837,
841 [159 Cal.Rptr. 111] [mayhem occurred during continuing assault].
Assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)) is
not a lesser included offense to mayhem. (People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
855, 862–863 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].)
Battery with serious bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of mayhem under
the statutory elements test. People v. Poisson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 121, 123–125
[200 Cal.Rptr.3d 542].
527
RELATED ISSUES
Disfigurement
Disfigurement constitutes mayhem “only when the injury is permanent.” (Goodman
v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 624 [148 Cal.Rptr. 799]; People v. Hill
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783].) However, the “possibility
that a victim’s disfigurement might be alleviated through reconstructive surgery is
no bar to a finding of ‘permanent’ injury.” (People v. Williams (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1767, 1774 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 521].) “We . . . reject [the] contention that
evidence of medical alleviation may be used in a mayhem trial to prove an injury,
permanent by its nature, may be corrected by medical procedures.” (People v. Hill,
supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) In addition, “[t]he fact that [disfiguring injuries]
are on a normally unexposed portion of [a] body does not render them any less
significant.” (People v. Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 36 [277 Cal.Rptr. 687]
[burns inflicted on victim’s breasts by a cigarette].)
Imperfect Self-Defense Not Available
“[A]part from the McKelvy lead opinion, there is no authority to support [the] claim
that the mere use of the term ‘malicious’ in section 203 requires a court to instruct a
jury that an actual but unreasonable belief will negate the malice required to convict
for mayhem . . . . [Mayhem] involves a different requisite mental state and has no
statutory history recognizing a malice aforethought element or the availability of the
Flannel defense.” (People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 457 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d
606]; contra, People v. McKelvy (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 694, 702–704 [239
Cal.Rptr. 782] (lead opn. of Kline, P.J.).)
A victim of mayhem must be alive at the time of the act. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23
Cal.4th 978, 1058 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68]; see People v. Jentry (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 615, 629 [138 Cal.Rptr. 250].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 84–88.
528
B. TORTURE
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with torture [in violation of

prove that:
1. The defendant inflicted great bodily injury on someone else;
AND
2. When inflicting the injury, the defendant intended to cause cruel
or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.
[It is not required that a victim actually suffer pain.]
[Someone acts for the purpose of extortion if he or she intends to (1)
obtain a person’s property with the person’s consent and (2) obtain the
person’s consent through the use of force or fear.]
[Someone acts for the purpose of extortion if he or she (1) intends to get
a public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make
the official do the act. An official act is an act that an officer does in his
or her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]
[Someone acts with a sadistic purpose if he or she intends to inflict pain
on someone else in order to experience pleasure himself or herself.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Unlike murder by torture, the crime of torture does not require that the intent to
cause pain be premeditated or that any cruel or extreme pain be prolonged. (People
v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; People v. Aguilar
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1205 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; People v. Vital
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Torture as defined in section
206 of the Penal Code focuses on the mental state of the perpetrator and not the
529
actual pain inflicted. (People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d
904].) Give the first bracketed paragraph on request if there is no proof that the
alleged victim actually suffered pain. (See Pen. Code, § 206.)
“Extortion” need not be defined for purposes of torture. (People v. Barrera (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1564 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 395]; but see People v. Hill (1983) 141
Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628] [term should be defined for kidnapping
under Pen. Code, § 209].) Nevertheless, either of the bracketed definitions of
extortion, and the related definition of “official act,” may be given on request if any
of these issues are raised in the case. (See Pen. Code, § 518 [defining “extortion”];
People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141]
[defining “official act”].) Extortion may also be committed by using “the color of
official right” to make an official do an act. (Pen. Code, § 518; see Evans v. United
States (1992) 504 U.S. 255, 258 [112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57]; McCormick v.
United States (1990) 500 U.S. 257, 273 [111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307] [both
discussing common law definition of the term].) It appears that this type of extortion
would rarely occur in the context of torture, so it is excluded from this instruction.
“Sadistic purpose” may be defined on request. (See People v. Barrera, supra, 14
Cal.App.4th at p. 1564; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [approving use of phrase in torture-murder and
special circumstances torture-murder instructions].)
First degree murder by torture defines torture differently for the purposes of murder.
See CALCRIM No. 521, Murder: Degrees.
AUTHORITY
• Extortion Defined. Pen. Code, § 518.
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); see, e.g., People v. Hale
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904] [broken and smashed teeth,
split lip, and facial cut sufficient evidence of great bodily injury].
• Cruel Pain Equivalent to Extreme or Severe Pain. People v. Aguilar (1997) 58
• Intent. People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739];
People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 106–107 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904]; People
v. Jung (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042–1043 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 5]; see People
v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1206 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619] [neither
530
premeditation nor intent to inflict prolonged pain are elements of torture].

• Sadistic Purpose Defined. People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196,
1202–1204 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; see People v. Healy (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1142 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 274] [sexual element not required].
In People v. Martinez (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1042–1046 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d
508], the court held that none of the following offenses were lesser included
offenses to torture: assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)); corporal
injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5); forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2));
forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 287(c)); criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422);
dissuading a witness by force or threats (Pen. Code, § 136.1(c)(1)); false
imprisonment by violence. (Pen. Code, § 236.)
The court did not decide whether assault with force likely to cause great bodily
injury is a lesser included offense to torture. (Id. at p. 1043–1044.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 92–95.
531
C. ABUSE OF OR INJURY TO CHILD, ELDER OR
DEPENDENT ADULT, SPOUSE
(i) Child
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with killing a child under

the age of 8 by assaulting the child with force likely to produce great
bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 273ab(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant had care or custody of a child who was under the
age of 8;
2. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to the child;
3. The defendant did that act willfully;
4. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would
lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature
would directly and probably result in great bodily injury to the
child;
6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to
apply force likely to produce great bodily injury to the child;
[AND]
7. The defendant’s act caused the child’s death(;/.)
<Give element 8 when instructing on parental right to discipline>
[AND
8. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was not reasonably
disciplining a child.]
Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on
purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt
someone else, or gain any advantage.
An act causes death if:
533
1. The death was the natural and probable consequence of the act;
2. The act was a direct and substantial factor in causing the death;
AND
3. The death would not have happened without the act.
[Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first
minute of his or her birthday has begun.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
defense of disciplining a child. (People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045,
1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 8 and CALCRIM No. 3405,
Parental Right to Punish a Child.
Give the bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,
§ 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d
391].)
CALCRIM No. 875, Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Injury.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 273ab(a); see People v. Malfavon (2002) 102
Cal.App.4th 727, 735 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 618] [sometimes called “child abuse
homicide”].
534
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); People v. Albritton (1998)
• Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see People v. Lara (1996) 44
• Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. People v. Preller (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 93, 97–98 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 507] [need not prove that reasonable
person would believe force would be likely to result in child’s death].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 658–659
[79 Cal.Rptr.2d 169].
• Mental State for Assault. People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 790 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
• Attempted Assault on Child With Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury.
Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273ab(b).
• Assault With Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code,
§ 245(a)(1); People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 392 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d
285].
Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section
273ab. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 796 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 888];
Orlina v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 258, 261–262 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d
384].)
Neither murder nor child abuse homicide is a necessarily included offense within the
other. (People v. Malfavon (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 743–744 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d
618].)
RELATED ISSUES
Care or Custody
“The terms ‘care or custody’ do not imply a familial relationship but only a
willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (People v.
Cochran (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 115.
Against the Person, §§ 142.13[2A], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).
535
821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death
(Pen. Code, § 273a(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with child abuse likely to

produce (great bodily harm/ [or] death) [in violation of Penal Code
section 273a(a)].
prove that:
<Alternative A—inflicted pain>
[1. The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or
mental suffering on a child;]
<Alternative B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>
[1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering;]
<Alternative C—while having custody, caused or permitted to suffer
injury>
[1. The defendant, while having care or custody of a child, willfully
caused or permitted the child’s person or health to be injured;]
<Alternative D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed
in danger>
caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where
the child’s person or health was endangered;]
[AND]
2. The defendant (inflicted pain or suffering on the child/ [or]
caused or permitted the child to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be
endangered)) under circumstances or conditions likely to produce
(great bodily harm/ [or] death)(;/.)
<Give element 3 when giving alternatives 1B, 1C or 1D>
[AND]
[3. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or
permitted the child to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be
endangered)(;/.)]
[AND
4. The defendant did not act while reasonably disciplining a child.]
536

purpose.
The phrase likely to produce (great bodily harm/ [or] death) means the
probability of (great bodily harm/ [or] death) is high.
Great bodily harm means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
A child is any person under the age of 18 years.
[Unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering is pain or suffering that
is not reasonably necessary or is excessive under the circumstances.]
[Criminal negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness,
negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from
the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same
situation;
2. The person’s acts amount to disregard for human life or
indifference to the consequences of his or her acts;
AND
would naturally and probably result in harm to others.]
[A child does not need to actually suffer great bodily harm. But if a child
does suffer great bodily harm, you may consider that fact, along with all
the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed the
offense.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2010, October 2010, February 2013
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable
537
physical pain or mental suffering. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the defendant
caused or permitted a child to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had care or
custody of a child and caused or permitted the child’s person or health to be injured,
give element 1C. Finally, give element 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had
care or custody of a child and endangered the child’s person or health. (See Pen.
Code, § 273a(a).)
Give bracketed element 3 and the bracketed definition of “criminally negligent” if
element 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any indirect
acts. (See People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42
P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780].)
Give on request the bracketed definition of “unjustifiable” physical pain or mental
suffering if there is a question about the necessity or degree of pain or suffering.
(See People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)
Give on request the bracketed paragraph stating that a child need not actually suffer
great bodily harm. (See People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83
Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 835 [159 Cal.Rptr.
771].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 273a(a); People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr.
311, 678 P.2d 886].
• Child Defined. See Fam. Code, § 6500; People v. Thomas (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d
854, 857–858 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273d].
• Likely Defined. People v. Chaffın (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1351–1352 [93
Cal.Rptr.3d 531] [questioning analysis of term in People v. Wilson]; People v.
Wilson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 919].
• Great Bodily Harm or Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); People v. Cortes
Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; People v. Vargas (1988) 204
Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
• Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. People v. Valdez (2002) 27
Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody
(1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780]; see People v. Penny
(1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926] [criminal negligence for
homicide]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 135 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1,
763 P.2d 852].
• General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering.
538
People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d
409]; see People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 361 [125 Cal.Rptr. 855];
People v. Wright (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 14 [131 Cal.Rptr. 311].
COMMENTARY
Any violation of Penal Code section 273a(a) must be willful. (People v. Smith
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [678 P.2d 886]; People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; but see People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 789
[118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511] [the prong punishing a direct infliction of
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering does not expressly require that the
conduct be willful].) Following Smith and Cortes, the committee has included
“willfully” in element 1A regarding direct infliction of abuse until there is further
guidance from the courts.
• Attempted Child Abuse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273a(a).
• Misdemeanor Child Abuse. Pen. Code, § 273a(b).
RELATED ISSUES
Care or Custody
willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (People v.
Toney (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 618, 621–622 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 578] [quoting People v.
Cochran (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257]].)
Prenatal Conduct
Penal Code section 273a does not apply to prenatal conduct endangering an unborn
child. (Reyes v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 217–218, 219 [141
Cal.Rptr. 912].)
Unanimity
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity when the prosecution has
presented evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (People v. Russo (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].) However, the court does
not have to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes a “continuous course of
conduct.” (People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d
777].) Child abuse may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated
incident. (Ibid.) The court should carefully examine the statute charged, the
pleadings, and the evidence presented to determine whether the offense constitutes a
continuous course of conduct. (Ibid.) See generally CALCRIM No. 3500,
Unanimity.
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Offenses and
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 161–168.
539
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[2][a][v], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).

Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure § 12:17 (The Rutter
Group).
540
822. Inflicting Physical Punishment on Child (Pen. Code,
§ 273d(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with inflicting on a child

cruel or inhuman physical punishment or injury that caused a traumatic
condition [in violation of Penal Code section 273d(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully inflicted (cruel or inhuman physical
punishment/ [and/or] an injury) on a child;
[AND]
2. The (punishment/ [and/or] injury) inflicted by the defendant
caused a traumatic physical condition to the child(;/.)
[AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was not reasonably
disciplining a child.]
purpose.
A traumatic physical condition is a wound or other bodily injury, whether
minor or serious, caused by the direct application of physical force.
A (punishment/ [and/or] injury) caused a traumatic physical condition if:
1. The traumatic condition was the natural and probable
consequence of the (punishment/ [and/or] injury);
2. The (punishment/ [and/or] injury) was a direct and substantial
factor in causing the condition;
AND
3. The condition would not have happened without the (punishment/
[and/or] injury).
541

does not need to be the only factor that caused the traumatic condition.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 273d(a).
• Child Defined. People v. Thomas (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857–858 [135
Cal.Rptr. 644] [victim’s size and age relevant to reasonableness of corporal
punishment]; see Fam. Code, § 6500.
• Duty to Define Traumatic Condition. People v. Burns (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 867,
873–874 [200 P.2d 134].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [125
Cal.Rptr. 855].
• Traumatic Condition Defined. People v. Thomas (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 854, 857
[135 Cal.Rptr. 644]; People v. Stewart (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 88, 91 [10
Cal.Rptr. 217]; see People v. Gutierrez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 951–953
[217 Cal.Rptr. 616] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273.5].
• Attempted Infliction of Corporal Punishment. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 273d.
• Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
• Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; see People v. Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206,
1220 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835, 970 P.2d 409]; People v. Stewart (1961) 188
Cal.App.2d 88, 89 [10 Cal.Rptr. 217].
Willfully causing or permitting a child to suffer, or willfully inflicting on a child,
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering under circumstances other than those
542
likely to produce great bodily harm or death (Pen. Code, § 273a(b)) is not a lesser
included offense of Penal Code section 273d. (See People v. Lofink (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [253 Cal.Rptr. 384].)
RELATED ISSUES
Spanking
It is not unlawful for a parent to spank a child for disciplinary purposes with an
object other than the hand. The punishment, however, must be necessary and not
excessive in relation to the individual circumstances. (80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 203
(1997).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.13[2], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
543
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with child abuse [in

violation of Penal Code section 273a(b)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—inflicted pain>
mental suffering on a child;]
<Alternative 1B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>
[1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer
<Alternative 1C—while having custody, caused or permitted to suffer
injury>
caused or permitted the child’s person or health to be injured;]
<Alternative 1D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed
in danger>
caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where
the child’s person or health was endangered;]
<Give element 2 when giving alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D.>
[AND]
[2. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or
permitted the child to (suffer[,]/ [or] be injured[,]/ [or] be
endangered)(;/.)]
<Give element 2/3 when instructing on parental right to discipline.>
[AND
(2/3). The defendant did not act while reasonably disciplining a child.]
purpose.
544

negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from
the way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same
situation;
2. The person’s acts amount to disregard for human life or
indifference to the consequences of his or her acts;
AND
would naturally and probably result in harm to others.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, August 2009, October 2010, February
2013
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) Give bracketed element 2/3 and CALCRIM No. 3405,
Give alternative 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the
defendant caused or permitted a child to suffer. If it is alleged that the defendant had
care or custody of a child and caused or permitted the child’s person or health to be
injured, give alternative 1C. Finally, give alternative 1D if it is alleged that the
defendant had care or custody of a child and endangered the child’s person or
health. (See Pen. Code, § 273a(b).)
Give bracketed element 2 and the bracketed definition of “criminal negligence” if
alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that the defendant committed any
indirect acts. (See People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d
3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr.
780].)
suffering if there is a question about the necessity or degree of pain or suffering.
(See People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P. 801].)
545
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 273a(b); People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447,
453–457 [49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334]; People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr.
311, 678 P.2d 886].
• Child Defined. See Fam. Code, § 6500; People v. Thomas (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d
854, 857–858 [135 Cal.Rptr. 644] [in context of Pen. Code, § 273d].
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); see People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402]; People v. Vargas (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1455,
1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
• Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. People v. Valdez (2002) 27
Cal.4th 778, 788–789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody
(1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780]; see People v. Penny
(1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d 926] [criminal negligence for
homicide]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 135 [253 Cal.Rptr.1,
763 P.2d 852].
• General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering.
409]; see People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 358 [125 Cal.Rptr. 855];
People v. Wright (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 14 [131 Cal.Rptr. 311].
COMMENTARY
See Commentary to CALCRIM No. 821, Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Harm or Death.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 821, Child Abuse Likely to
Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Group).
546
830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (elder/dependent adult)

abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death [in violation of Penal
Code section 368(b)(1)].
prove that:
<Alternative A—inflicted pain>
mental suffering on <insert name or description of
elder or dependent adult>;]
<Alternative B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>
[1. The defendant willfully caused or permitted <insert
name or description of elder or dependent adult> to suffer
<Alternative C—while having custody, caused or permitted to be injured>
[1. The defendant, while having care or custody of
<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> willfully
caused or permitted (his/her) person or health to be injured;]
<Alternative D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed
in danger>
<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult> willfully
caused or permitted (him/her) to be placed in a situation where
(his/her) person or health was endangered;]
2. The defendant (inflicted suffering on <insert name or
description of elder or dependent adult>/ [or] caused or permitted
<insert name of elder or dependent adult> to (suffer/
[or] be injured/ [or] be endangered)) under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death;
3. <insert name or description of elder or dependent
adult> (is/was) (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)
[AND]
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew or reasonably should
have known that <insert name or description of elder
547
or dependent adult> was (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)

<Give element 5 when giving alternative 1B and it is alleged the
defendant permitted the suffering.>
[AND]
[5. The defendant had a legal duty to supervise and control the
conduct of the person[s] who caused or inflicted unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering on <insert name or
description of elder or dependent adult>, but failed to supervise or
control that conduct(;/.)]
[AND
6. The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or
permitted <insert name or description of elder or
dependent adult> to (suffer/ [or] be injured/ [or] be endangered).]
purpose.
Great bodily harm means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
[An elder is someone who is at least 65 years old.]
[A dependent adult is someone who is between 18 and 64 years old and
has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry
out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. [This definition
includes an adult who has physical or developmental disabilities or
whose physical or mental abilities have decreased because of age.] [A
dependent adult is also someone between 18 and 64 years old who is an
inpatient in a (health facility/psychiatric health facility/ [or] chemical
dependency recovery hospital).]
[A person who does not have care or custody of (an elder/a dependent
adult) may still have a legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a
third person who can inflict abuse on the (elder/dependent adult) if the
person has a special relationship with the third person. A special
relationship is created, for example, when (1) a person takes charge of a
third person whom (he/she) knows or should know is likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled, and (2) the person has the ability
to control the third person’s conduct.]
negligence when:
548

or great bodily harm;
AND
for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.]
[(An elder/A dependent adult) does not need to actually suffer great
bodily harm. But if (an elder/a dependent adult) does suffer great bodily
harm, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in
deciding whether the defendant committed the offense.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the defendant
caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. If it is alleged that the
defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant
caused or permitted the elder’s or dependent adult’s person or health to be injured,
give element 1C. Finally, give element 1D if it is alleged that the defendant had
care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant endangered
the elder’s or dependent adult’s person or health. (See Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1).)
Give bracketed element 5 if it is alleged under element 1B that the defendant
permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer unjustifiable pain or mental suffering.
(See People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d
1229].) If element 5 is given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining who has a
“legal duty to control the conduct of a third person.”
Give bracketed element 6 regarding criminal negligence, and the bracketed
definition of “criminally negligent,” if element 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging that
the defendant committed any indirect act. (People v. Manis (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th
110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Heitzman
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; People v. Superior
Court (Holvey) (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335], disapproved on
549
other grounds by People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236,
886 P.2d 1229]; see People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118
Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 48–49
[119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [latter two cases in context of parallel child abuse statute].)
Give the bracketed definition of “elder” or “dependent adult” depending on the
status of the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 368(g) & (h).)
suffering if there is a question about the necessity for or the degree of pain or
suffering. (See People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P.
801].)
If there is a question whether an elder or dependent adult suffered great bodily
harm, give on request the bracketed paragraph stating that a person “does not need
to actually suffer great bodily harm.” (See People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 835
[159 Cal.Rptr. 771] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].)
If a victim actually suffers great bodily injury or dies, the defendant’s sentence may
be enhanced based on the victim’s age. (See Pen. Code, § 368(b)(2) & (3); see
People v. Adams (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 722].) Give
CALCRIM No. 3162, Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim, or any other appropriate
instructions on enhancements. (See series 3100–3399.)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1).
• Great Bodily Harm or Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 368(b)(2), 12022.7(f); see
People v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [in context
of parallel child abuse statute].
• Sentence Enhancements. Pen. Code, § 368(b)(2) & (3); see People v. Adams
Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
• Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. People v. Manis (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; People v. Superior Court (Holvey)
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335]; see People v. Valdez (2002)
27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody
(1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [in context of parallel
child abuse statute].
• Duty to Control Conduct of Person Inflicting Abuse. People v. Heitzman (1994)
9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].
550
• General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering. See
409] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].
COMMENTARY
Any violation of Penal Code section 368(b)(1) must be willful. (See People v. Smith
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886]; People v. Cortes
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 80 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [both in context of parallel child
abuse statute]; but see People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d
3, 42 P.3d 511] [the prong punishing a direct infliction of unjustifiable physical pain
or mental suffering does not expressly require that the conduct be willful].)
Following Smith and Cortes, the committee has included “willfully” in element 1A
regarding direct infliction of abuse until there is further guidance from the courts.
• Attempted Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 368(b)(1).
• Misdemeanor Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, § 368(c).
RELATED ISSUES
Care or Custody
willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (See People
v. Toney (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 618, 621–622 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 578] [quoting People
v. Cochran (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257]; both in context of
parallel child abuse statute].)
Unanimity
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity when the prosecution has
presented evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (People v. Russo (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].) However, the court does
not have to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes a “continuous course of
conduct.” (People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d
777].) Elder abuse may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated
incident. (People v. Rae (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 123 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 312].)
The court should carefully examine the statute charged, the pleadings, and the
evidence presented to determine whether the offense constitutes a continuous course
of conduct. (People v. Napoles, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 115–116.) See
generally CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.11[1][f], 142.13[5] (Matthew Bender).
551
Group).
552
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (elder/dependent adult)

abuse [in violation of Penal Code section 368(c)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—inflicted pain>
mental suffering on <insert name or description of
elder or dependent adult>;]
<Alternative 1B—caused or permitted to suffer pain>
[1. The defendant allowed someone, whose conduct the defendant
had a duty to supervise and control, to inflict unjustifiable
description of elder or dependent adult>;]
<Alternative 1C—while having custody, caused or permitted to be
injured>
<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, willfully
caused or permitted that person or (his/her) health to be injured;]
<Alternative 1D—while having custody, caused or permitted to be placed
in danger>
<insert name or description of elder or dependent adult>, willfully
caused or permitted that person to be placed in a situation where
(his/her) person or health was endangered;]
2. <insert name or description of elder or dependent
adult> (is/was) (an elder/a dependent adult);
[AND]
have known that <insert name or description of elder
or dependent adult> was (an elder/a dependent adult)(;/.)
<Give element 4 when giving alternative 1B and it is alleged the
defendant permitted the suffering.>
[AND]
[4. The defendant had a legal duty to supervise and control the
conduct of the person[s] who caused or inflicted unjustifiable
553

description of elder or dependent adult>, but failed to supervise or
control that conduct(;/.)]
[AND
(4/5). The defendant was criminally negligent when (he/she) caused or
permitted <insert name or description of elder or
dependent adult> to (suffer[,]/ [or] be injured[,]/ [or] be
endangered).]
purpose.
out normal activities or to protect his or her rights. [This definition
dependency recovery hospital).]
[A person who does not have care or custody of (an elder/a dependent
adult) may still have a legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a
third person who can inflict abuse on the (elder/dependent adult) if the
person has a special relationship with the third person. A special
relationship is created, for example, when (1) a person takes charge of a
third person whom (he/she) knows or should know is likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled, and (2) the person has the ability
to control the third person’s conduct.]
negligence when:
or great bodily harm;
AND
554

New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative 1A if it is alleged that the defendant directly inflicted unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the
defendant caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. If it is alleged
that the defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the
defendant caused or permitted the elder’s or dependent adult’s person or health to be
injured, give alternative 1C. Finally, give alternative 1D if it is alleged that the
defendant had care or custody of an elder or dependent adult and that the defendant
endangered the elder’s or dependent adult’s person or health. (See Pen. Code,
§ 368(c).)
Give bracketed element 4 if it is alleged under alternative 1B that the defendant
permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer unjustifiable pain or mental suffering.
(See People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d
1229].) If element 4 is given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining who has a
“legal duty to supervise and control the conduct of a third person.”
Give bracketed element 5 regarding criminal negligence, and the bracketed
definition of “criminal negligence,” if alternative 1B, 1C, or 1D is given alleging
that the defendant committed any indirect act. (People v. Manis (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619], disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; People
v. Superior Court (Holvey) (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 [37
Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229]; see People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 788,
789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43,
48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [latter two cases in context of parallel child abuse
statute].)
Give the bracketed definition of “elder” or “dependent adult” depending on the
status of the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 368(g) & (h).)
suffering if there is a question about the necessity for or the degree of pain or
555
suffering. (See People v. Curtiss (1931) 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 779–780 [300 P.
801].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(c).
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; see People v. Lara (1996) 44
Cal.App.3d 1455, 1462, 1468–1469 [251 Cal.Rptr. 904].
• Criminal Negligence Required for Indirect Conduct. People v. Manis (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 110, 114 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; People v. Superior Court (Holvey)
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [252 Cal.Rptr. 335]; see People v. Valdez (2002)
27 Cal.4th 778, 788, 789 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42 P.3d 511]; People v. Peabody
(1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 47, 48–49 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] [in context of parallel
child abuse statute].
• Duty to Control Conduct of Person Inflicting Abuse. People v. Heitzman (1994)
• General Criminal Intent Required for Direct Infliction of Pain or Suffering. See
409] [in context of parallel child abuse statute].
COMMENTARY
See Commentary to CALCRIM No. 830, Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely
to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 830, Abuse of Elder or Dependent
Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Group).
556
(iii) Spouse, etc.
840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent
Resulting in Traumatic Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with inflicting an injury on

[his/her] ([former] spouse/[former] cohabitant/the (mother/father) of (his/
her) child/someone with whom (he/she) had, or previously had, an
engagement or dating relationship that resulted in a traumatic condition
[in violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] inflicted a physical
injury on (his/her) ([former] spouse/[former] cohabitant/the
(mother/father) of (his/her) child)/someone with whom (he/she)
had, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship);
[AND]
2. The injury inflicted by the defendant resulted in a traumatic
condition.
<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense or defense of another>
[AND
3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of
someone else).]
purpose.
A traumatic condition is a wound or other bodily injury, whether minor
or serious, caused by the direct application of physical force.
[The term cohabitants means two unrelated persons living together for a
substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the
relationship. Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting
include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties
while sharing the same residence, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3)
joint use or ownership of property, (4) the parties’ holding themselves
out as (spouses/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the relationship,
and (6) the length of the relationship.]
[The term dating relationship means frequent, intimate associations
primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual
involvement [independent of financial considerations].]
[A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at
557
different locations, during the same time frame, if he or she maintains

substantial ongoing relationships with each person and lives with each
person for significant periods.]
[A person is considered to be the (mother/father) of another person’s
child if the alleged male parent is presumed under law to be the natural
father. <insert name of presumed father> is presumed under
law to be the natural father of <insert name of child>.]
[A traumatic condition is the result of an injury if:
1. The traumatic condition was the natural and probable
consequence of the injury;
2. The injury was a direct and substantial factor in causing the
condition;
AND
3. The condition would not have happened without the injury.
does not need to be the only factor that resulted in the traumatic
condition.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2012, August 2014, February 2015,
February 2016, March 2018, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If there is sufficient evidence of self-defense or defense of another, the court has a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3 and any
appropriate defense instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)
P.3d 225].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins, “A traumatic condition is the
result of an injury if . . . .”
Give CALCRIM No. 3404, Accident, on request if there is sufficient evidence that
an alleged victim’s injuries were caused by an accident. (People v. Anderson (2011)
558
51 Cal.4th 989, 998, fn. 3 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408, 252 P.3d 968].).
Give the bracketed language “[and unlawfully]” in element 1 if there is evidence
that the defendant acted in self-defense.
Give the third bracketed sentence that begins “A person may cohabit simultaneously
with two or more people,” on request if there is evidence that the defendant
cohabited with two or more people. (See People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
1323, 1335 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].)
Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins “A person is considered to be
the (mother/father)” if an alleged parental relationship is based on the statutory
presumption that the male parent is the natural father. (See Pen. Code, § 273.5(d);
see also People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 711 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479]
[parentage can be established without resort to any presumption].)
If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for a prior conviction for a similar
offense within seven years and has not stipulated to the prior conviction, give
CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial. If the court has
granted a bifurcated trial, see CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated
Trial.
If there is evidence that the traumatic condition resulted from strangulation or
suffocation, consider instructing according to the special definition provided in Pen.
Code, § 273.5(d).
The amendment to Penal Code section 273.5(b) adding “someone with whom the
offender has, or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship as defined in
Penal Code section 243(f)(10)” to the list of potential victims became effective on
January 1, 2014.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 273.5(a).
• Traumatic Condition Defined. Pen. Code, § 273.5(d); People v. Gutierrez (1985)
171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952 [217 Cal.Rptr. 616].
• Cohabitant Defined. People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000 [252
Cal.Rptr. 729]; People v. Ballard (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 318–319 [249
Cal.Rptr. 806].
• Direct Application of Force. People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580
[91 Cal.Rptr.2d 805].
• Duty to Define Traumatic Condition. People v. Burns (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 867,
873–874 [200 P.2d 134].
• Strangulation and Suffocation. Pen. Code, § 273.5(d).
• General Intent Crime. See People v. Thurston (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055
[84 Cal.Rptr.2d 221]; People v. Campbell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 305, 307–309
559
[90 Cal.Rptr.2d 315]; contra People v. Rodriguez (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1398,

1402 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 495] [dictum].
• Simultaneous Cohabitation. People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335
[52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].
• Dating Relationship Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).
• Attempted Infliction of Corporal Punishment on Spouse. Pen. Code, §§ 664,
273.5(a); People v. Kinsey (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1627, 1628 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 769] [attempt requires intent to cause traumatic condition, but does
not require a resulting “traumatic condition”].
• Misdemeanor Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a); see People v. Gutierrez (1985)
171 Cal.App.3d 944, 952 [217 Cal.Rptr. 616].
• Battery Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent. Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1);
see People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 580 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 805].
• Simple Assault. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241(a); People v. Van Os (1950) 96
Cal.App.2d 204, 206 [214 P.2d 554].
RELATED ISSUES
Continuous Course of Conduct
Penal Code section 273.5 is aimed at a continuous course of conduct. The
prosecutor is not required to choose a particular act and the jury is not required to
unanimously agree on the same act or acts before a guilty verdict can be returned.
(People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224–225 [206 Cal.Rptr. 516].)
Multiple Acts of Abuse
A defendant can be charged with multiple violations of Penal Code section 273.5
when each battery satisfies the elements of section 273.5. (People v. Healy (1993)
Prospective Parents of Unborn Children
Penal Code section 273.5(a) does not apply to a man who inflicts an injury upon a
woman who is pregnant with his unborn child. “A pregnant woman is not a
‘mother’ and a fetus is not a ‘child’ as those terms are used in that section.” (People
v. Ward (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 122, 126, 129 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 531].)
Termination of Parental Rights
Penal Code section 273.5 “applies to a man who batters the mother of his child
even after parental rights to that child have been terminated.” (People v. Mora
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 64–67.
560
561
841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow
Parent (Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against [his/

her] ([former] spouse/cohabitant/fiancé[e]/a person with whom the
defendant currently has, or previously had, a (dating/ [or] engagement)
relationship/the (mother/father) of (his/her) child) [in violation of Penal
Code section 243(e)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] touched
<insert name of complaining witness> in a harmful or offensive
manner;
[AND]
2. <insert name of complaining witness> is (the/a)
(defendant’s [former] spouse/defendant’s cohabitant/defendant’s
fiancé[e]/person with whom the defendant currently has, or
previously had, a (dating/ [or] engagement) relationship/(mother/
father) of the defendant’s child)(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in
a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including
through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to
cause pain or injury of any kind.
[The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or someone
else] to touch the other person.]
out as (husband and wife/domestic partners), (5) the continuity of the
562
relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.]

[A person may cohabit simultaneously with two or more people at
different locations, during the same time frame, if he or she maintains
substantial ongoing relationships with each person and lives with each
person for significant periods.]
involvement independent of financial considerations.]
[A person is considered to be the (mother/father) of another person’s
child if the alleged male parent is presumed under the law to be the
natural father. <insert name of presumed father> is
presumed under law to be the natural father of <insert
name of child>.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed language “[and unlawfully]” in element 1 if there is evidence
that the defendant acted in self-defense.
Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue.
Give the third bracketed sentence that begins with “A person may cohabit
simultaneously with two or more people” on request if there is evidence that the
defendant cohabited with two or more people. (See People v. Moore (1996) 44
Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A person is considered to
be the (mother/father)” if an alleged parental relationship is based on the statutory
presumption that the male parent is the natural father. (See Pen. Code, § 273.5(d);
see also People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 711 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479]
[parentage can be established without resort to any presumption].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1).
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Least Touching. People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d
563
518] [citing People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899–900, fn. 12 [92 Cal.Rptr.
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Cohabitant Defined. People v. Holifield (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 1000 [252
Cal.Rptr. 729]; People v. Ballard (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 318–319 [249
Cal.Rptr. 806].
• Dating Relationship Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).
• Simultaneous Cohabitation. People v. Moore (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1335
[52 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].
• Simple Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 19.
564
(iv) Evidence
850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects:
Credibility of Complaining Witness
You have heard testimony from <insert name of expert>

regarding the effect of (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner
battering/ <insert other description used by expert for
syndrome>).
(Battered women’s syndrome/Intimate partner battering and its effects/
<insert other description used by expert for syndrome>) relate
to a pattern of behavior that may be present in domestic abuse cases.
Testimony as to (battered women’s syndrome/the effects of intimate
partner battering/ <insert other description used by expert for
syndrome>) is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged
victim of domestic abuse.
’s <insert name of expert> testimony about (battered
women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ <insert other
description used by expert for syndrome>) is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or
any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
’s <insert name of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been abused and in
evaluating the believability of (his/her) testimony.
New January 2006; Revised March 2017, April 2020, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Several courts of review have concluded there is no sua sponte duty to give a
similar limiting instruction (see CALCRIM No. 1193, Testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) when an expert testifies on child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. (People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063,
1073–1074 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 248]; People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721,
736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [261
Cal.Rptr. 479] [instruction required only on request].) See also People v. Humphrey
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5, 1090–1091, 1100 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d
1], which concludes that a limiting instruction on battered woman syndrome is
required only on request. But see People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947,
958–959 [9 Cal.Rtpr.2d 431], which did find a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM
No. 1193.
565
In People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906–908 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d
574], the Supreme Court held that testimony from an expert in battered women’s
syndrome could be admitted under Evidence Code section 801 even though there
was no evidence of prior incidents of violence between the defendant and the
alleged victim. The court held that the expert could testify generally about the
“cycle of violence” and the frequency of recantation by victims of domestic abuse,
without testifying specifically about “battered women’s syndrome.” (Ibid.) It is
unclear if the court is required to give a cautionary admonition sua sponte when
such evidence is admitted.
If this instruction is given, also give CALCRIM No. 303, Limited Purpose Evidence
in General, and CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness Testimony.
See also CALCRIM No. 851, Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its
Effects: Offered by the Defense.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See Evid. Code, § 1107(a); People v. Humphrey,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1088, fn. 5.
• Abuse Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6203.
• Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6211.
• Relevant After Single Incident of Abuse. See People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at pp. 906–908; People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1129 [93
Cal.Rptr.2d 356].
• Relevant to Rehabilitate Victim’s Credibility. People v. Gadlin (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 587, 594–595 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 890] [victim recanted incident and
reunited with abuser]; People v. Morgan (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1210,
1215–1217 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 772] [victim recanted].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Sexton (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 465–468
[250 Cal.Rptr.3d 496].
RELATED ISSUES
Assumptions Underlying Expert Testimony
It is unnecessary, and potentially misleading, to instruct that the expert testimony
assumes that physical or mental abuse has in fact occurred. (See People v. Gilbert
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [in context of child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome].)
Definition and Preferred Name
In 2004, the Legislature amended Evidence Code section 1107(d), changing all
references from “battered women’s syndrome” to “intimate partner battering and its
effects.” Previous decisional law continues to apply. (Evid. Code, § 1107(f).)
Battered women’s syndrome has been defined as “a series of common characteristics
that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an
566
extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.” (People v.
Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1083–1084.) The Supreme Court had previously
noted that experts prefer to call the syndrome “expert testimony on battered
women’s experiences.” (See id. at pp. 1083–1084, fn. 3.)
No Testimony on Actual State of Mind
While evidence is admissible “to explain how [a] defendant’s asserted subjective
perception of a need to defend herself ‘would reasonably follow from the
defendant’s experience as a battered woman,’ ” an expert may not give an opinion
“that the defendant actually perceived that she was in danger and needed to defend
herself.” (People v. Erickson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1400, 1401 [67
Cal.Rptr.2d 740] [§ 1107(a) codifies existing rules regarding battered women’s
syndrome testimony; original italics].) Section 1107 “does not create an exception to
Penal Code section 29,” which prohibits an expert who is testifying about a mental
defect from testifying about whether a defendant had a required mental state.
(People v. Erickson, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1401–1402 [syndrome was
characterized as mental defect].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04[1][d][v][C] (Matthew Bender).
567
851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects:
Offered by the Defense

regarding the effect of (battered women’s syndrome/intimate partner
battering/ <insert other description used by expert for
syndrome>).
’s <insert name of expert> testimony about (battered
women’s syndrome/intimate partner battering/ <insert other
description used by expert for syndrome>) is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her).
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether the defendant
actually believed that (he/she) needed to defend (himself/herself) against
an immediate threat of great bodily injury or death, and whether that
belief was reasonable or unreasonable.
When deciding whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable or
unreasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known by or
appeared to the defendant. Also consider what conduct would appear to
be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar
knowledge.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if an expert testifies on
intimate partner battering and its effects, previously known as battered women’s
syndrome. (See People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [sua sponte duty in context of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome]; People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 250 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681
P.2d 291] [rape trauma syndrome not admissible to prove rape occurred].)
The court may need to modify this instruction if the defense offers testimony on
intimate partner battering and its effects on an issue other than whether the
defendant actually and reasonably believed in the need for self-defense. (See People
v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 98–101 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d
30] [evidence offered to show defendant did not act with intent to kill but acted out
of fear of codefendant].)
in General and CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness Testimony.
See also:
568
CALCRIM No. 850, Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects:
Credibility of Complaining Witness.
CALCRIM No. 571, Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See Evid. Code, § 1107(a); People v. Humphrey
Jaspar (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 99, 111, fn. 6 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 470].
• Abuse Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6203.
• Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1107(c); Fam. Code, § 6211.
• Relevant After Single Incident of Abuse. See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th
892, 906–908 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574]; People v. Williams (2000) 78
• Relevant to Claim of Self-Defense. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073,
1082–1083, 1088–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 850, Testimony on Intimate
Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining Witness.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04[1][d][v][C]; Ch. 73, Defenses and
Justifications, § 73.11[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
569
The People presented evidence that the defendant committed domestic

violence that was not charged in this case[, specifically:
<insert other domestic violence alleged>.]
<Alternative A—As defined in Pen. Code, § 13700>
[Domestic violence means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully
emancipated minor) who is a (spouse[,]/ [or] former spouse[,]/ [or]
cohabitant[,]/ [or] former cohabitant[,]/ [or] person with whom the
defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person who dated or is dating the
defendant[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the defendant).]
<Alternative B—As defined in Fam. Code, § 6211>
[Domestic violence means abuse committed against a (spouse[,]/ [or]
former spouse[,]/ [or] cohabitant[,]/ [or] former cohabitant[,]/ [or] person
with whom the defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person who dated or is
dating the defendant[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the
defendant/ [or] child[,]/ [or] grandchild[,]/ [or] parent[,]/ [or]
grandparent[,]/ [or] brother[,]/ [or] sister[,]/ [or] father-in-law[,]/ [or]
mother-in-law[,]/ [or] brother-in-law[,]/ [or] sister-in-law[,]/ [or] son-in-
law[,]/ [or] daughter-in-law[,]/ [or] <insert relationship of
consanguinity or affınity within the second degree>) of the defendant.]
Abuse means intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause
bodily injury, [or] [committing sexual assault][,] [or] placing another
person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or
herself or to someone else[, or engaging in <insert behavior
that was or could be enjoined pursuant to Fam. Code, § 6320>].
[A fully emancipated minor is a person under the age of 18 who has
gained certain adult rights by marrying, being on active duty for the
United States armed services, or otherwise being declared emancipated
under the law.]
<Definition of cohabitant under Pen. Code § 13700(b)>
[The term cohabitant means a person who lives with an unrelated person
for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of the
out as spouses, (5) the parties’ registering as domestic partners, (6) the
continuity of the relationship, and (7) the length of the relationship.]
<Definition of cohabitant under Fam. Code § 6209>
[The term cohabitant means a person who regularly resides in the
570
ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES CALCRIM No. 852A
household. Former cohabitant means a person who formerly regularly

resided in the household.]
uncharged domestic violence. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A
fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it
is more likely than not that the fact is true.
If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard this
evidence entirely.
If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic
violence, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence
that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence
and, based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely
to commit [and did commit] <insert charged offense[s]
involving domestic violence>, as charged here. If you conclude that the
defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is
only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not
sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of
<insert charged offense[s] involving domestic violence>. The
People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the
determining the defendant’s credibility>].]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, February 2014,
March 2017, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other domestic
violence has been introduced. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924
[89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting instruction on request];
People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727];
People v. Willoughby (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1067 [210 Cal.Rptr. 880]
[general limiting instructions should be given when evidence of past offenses would
be highly prejudicial without them].)
admitted under Evidence Code section 1109, then the court must specify for the jury
what evidence it may consider under section 1109. (People v. Rollo (1977) 20
571
CALCRIM No. 852A ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES
Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771] [discussing section
1101(b); superseded in part on other grounds as recognized in People v. Olmedo
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096 [213 Cal.Rptr. 742]].) In the first sentence, insert
a description of the uncharged offense allegedly shown by the section 1109
evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony convictions or misdemeanor
conduct for impeachment, then, in the first sentence, the court is not required to
insert a description of the conduct alleged.
The definition of “domestic violence” contained in Evidence Code section 1109(d)
was amended, effective January 1, 2006. The definition is now in subdivision (d)(3),
which states that, as used in section 1109:
‘Domestic violence’ has the meaning set forth in Section 13700 of the Penal
Code. Subject to a hearing conducted pursuant to section 352, which shall
include consideration of any corroboration and remoteness in time, ‘domestic
violence’ has the further meaning as set forth in section 6211 of the Family
Code, if the act occurred no more than five years before the charged offense.
If the court determines that the evidence is admissible pursuant to the definition of
domestic violence contained in Penal Code section 13700, give the definition of
domestic violence labeled alternative A. If the court determines that the evidence is
admissible pursuant to the definition contained in Family Code section 6211, give
the definition labeled alternative B. Give the bracketed portions in the definition of
“abuse” if the evidence is admissible pursuant to Family Code section 6211.
Depending on the evidence, give on request the bracketed paragraphs defining
“emancipated minor” (see Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq.) and “cohabitant” (see Pen.
Code, § 13700(b)).
In the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed,” the
committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in brackets. One appellate court
has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an inference about disposition.
(People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].)
The court should review the Commentary section below and give the bracketed
phrase at its discretion.
Give the final sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.
CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent,
Common Plan, etc.
CALCRIM No. 1191A, Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense.
CALCRIM No. 1191B, Evidence of Charged Sex Offense.
CALCRIM No. 852B, Evidence of Charged Domestic Violence.
CALCRIM No. 853A, Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.
CALCRIM No. 853B, Evidence of Charged Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person.
572
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1109(a)(1); see People v. Reliford
v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 37 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100]; People v.
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 923–924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182]
[dictum].
• Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(a); Fam. Code, § 6203; People v. Kovacich
• Cohabitant Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(b); Fam. Code, § 6209.
• Dating Relationship Defined. Fam. Code, § 6210.
• Determining Degree of Consanguinity. Prob. Code, § 13.
• Affinity Defined. Fam. Code, § 6205.
• Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(3); Pen. Code, § 13700(b);
Fam. Code, § 6211; see People v. Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139 [83
Cal.Rptr.2d 320] [spousal rape is higher level of domestic violence].
• Emancipation of Minors Law. Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq.
15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; People v. James (2000) 81
• Propensity Evidence Alone Is Not Sufficient to Support Conviction Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt. People v. Younger (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101
Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357–1358, fn. 8
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823]; see People v. Hill (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278
[103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127] [in context of prior sexual offenses].
• Charged Sex Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of
Propensity. People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186-1186 [206
Cal.Rptr.3d 835]; People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1161 [144
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
• Previous Version of This Instruction Upheld. People v. Johnson (2008) 164
• No Sua Sponte Duty to Give Similar Instruction. People v. Cottone (2013) 57
COMMENTARY
The paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed” tells
the jury that they may draw an inference of disposition. (See People v. Hill (2001)
86 Cal.App.4th 273, 275–279 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; People v. Brown (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334–1335 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) One appellate court, however,
suggests using more general terms to instruct the jury how they may use evidence
of other domestic violence offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the argument
of counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
573
1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial
court adopts this approach, the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the
defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence” may be replaced with the
following:
If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence,
you may consider that evidence and weigh it together with all the other
evidence received during the trial to help you determine whether the defendant
committed <insert charged offense involving domestic violence>.
Remember, however, that evidence of uncharged domestic violence is not
sufficient alone to find the defendant guilty of <insert charged
offense involving domestic violence>. The People must still prove (the/each)
(charge/ [and] allegation) of <insert charged offense involving
domestic violence> beyond a reasonable doubt.
RELATED ISSUES
Constitutional Challenges
Evidence Code section 1109 does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process
(People v. Escobar (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1095–1096 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 696];
People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1028–1029 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 208];
People v. Johnson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 420 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 596]; see People
v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915–922 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182]
(construing Evid. Code, § 1108, a parallel statute to Evid. Code, § 1109); People v.
Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 281 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 870] (construing Evid.
Code, § 1108) or equal protection (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301,
1310–1313 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; see People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172,
184–185 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753] (construing Evid. Code, § 1108).
Exceptions
Evidence of domestic violence occurring more than 10 years before the charged
offense is inadmissible under section 1109 of the Evidence Code, unless the court
determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice. (Evid.
Code, § 1109(e).) Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative
agencies regulating health facilities is also inadmissible under section 1109. (Evid.
Code, § 1109(f).)
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged
Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc., and CALCRIM No. 1191,
Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 720–722.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Circumstantial Evidence, §§ 101, 102.
574
575
The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the

crime[s] of <insert description of offense[s]> charged in
Count[s] <insert count[s] of domestic violence offense[s]
charged in this case>.
If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required
to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or
inclined to commit domestic violence offenses, and based on that
decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did
commit] the other domestic violence offenses charged in this case.
If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes,
that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty
of another crime. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and]
allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.
New March 2017

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request if the People rely on charged
offenses as evidence of predisposition to commit similar crimes charged in the same
case. (Evid. Code § 355.)
Common Plan, etc.
CALCRIM No. 852A, Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence.
AUTHORITY
• Charged Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
576
ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES CALCRIM No. 852B
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 720–722.
577
853A. Evidence of Uncharged Abuse of Elder or Dependent
Person
The People presented evidence that the defendant committed abuse of

(an elder/a dependent person) that was not charged in this case[,
specifically: <insert other abuse alleged>.] Abuse of (an
elder/a dependent person) means (physical abuse[,] [or] sexual abuse[,]/
[or] neglect[,]/ [or] financial abuse[,]/ [or] abandonment[,]/ [or]
isolation[,]/ [or] abduction[,]/[or] the act by a care custodian of not
providing goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or
mental suffering[,]/ [or] [other] treatment that results in physical harm
or pain or mental suffering).
[An elder is a person residing in California who is age 65 or older.]
[A dependent person is a person who has physical or mental impairments
that substantially restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities
or to protect his or her rights. This definition includes, but is not limited
to, those who have developmental disabilities or whose physical or
mental abilities have significantly diminished because of age.]
uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person). Proof by a
preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is
true.
evidence entirely.
If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an
elder/a dependent person), you may, but are not required to, conclude
from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to
commit abuse of (an elder/a dependent person), and based on that
decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did
commit] <insert charged offense[s] involving abuse of elder
or dependent person>, as charged here. If you conclude that the
defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent
person), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the
guilty of <insert charged offense[s] involving abuse of elder
or dependent person>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/
[and] allegation) beyond a reasonable doubt.
578

determining the defendant’s credibility>].]
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2014, March 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other abuse of an
elder or dependent person has been introduced. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21
Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting
instruction on request]; People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318
[97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; People v. Willoughby (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1067 [210
Cal.Rptr. 880] [general limiting instructions should be given when evidence of past
offenses would be highly prejudicial without them].)
admitted under Evidence Code section 1109, then the court must specify for the jury
what evidence it may consider under section 1109. (People v. Rollo (1977) 20
Cal.3d 109, 123, fn. 6 [141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771] [discussing section
1101(b); superseded in part on other grounds as recognized in People v. Olmedo
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096 [213 Cal.Rptr. 742]].) In the first sentence, insert
a description of the uncharged offense allegedly shown by the section 1109
evidence. If the court has not admitted any felony convictions or misdemeanor
conduct for impeachment, then, in the first sentence, the court is not required to
insert a description of the conduct alleged.
Depending on the evidence, give on request the bracketed definition of an elder or
dependent person. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.23 [dependent adult],
15610.27 [elder].) Other terms may be defined on request depending on the
evidence. See the Authority section below for references to selected definitions from
the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 15600 et seq.)
In the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed,” the
committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in brackets. One appellate court
has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an inference about disposition.
(People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].)
The court should review the Commentary section below and give the bracketed
phrase at its discretion.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.
CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, or
Common Plan, etc.
579

AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1109(a)(2).
• Abandonment Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.05.
• Abduction Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.06.
• Abuse of Elder or Dependent Person Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(1).
• Care Custodian Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17.
• Dependent Person Defined. Evid. Code, § 177.
• Elder Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.27.
• Financial Abuse Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.
• Goods and Services Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.35.
• Isolation Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.43.
• Mental Suffering Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.53.
• Neglect Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.57.
• Physical Abuse Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.63.
15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; People v. James (2000) 81
Reasonable Doubt. People v. Younger (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101
Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; People v. James, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357–1358, fn.
8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [in context of prior domestic violence offenses]; see
People v. Hill (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127] [in
context of prior sexual offenses].
• Charged Sex Offenses Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt May Be Evidence of
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
• No Sua Sponte Duty To Give Similar Instruction. People v. Cottone (2013) 57
COMMENTARY
The paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the defendant committed” tells
the jury that they may draw an inference of disposition. (See People v. Hill, supra,
86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–279; People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324,
580
1334–1335 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].) One appellate court, however, suggests using
more general terms to instruct the jury how they may use evidence of other
domestic violence offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the argument of
counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (People v. James, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1357, fn. 8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823] [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial
court adopts this approach, the paragraph that begins with “If you decide that the
defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a dependent person)” may be
replaced with the following:
If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged abuse of (an elder/a
dependent person), you may consider that evidence and weigh it together with
all the other evidence received during the trial to help you determine whether
the defendant committed <insert charged offense involving abuse
of elder or dependent person>. Remember, however, that evidence of uncharged
abuse of (an elder/a dependent person) is not sufficient alone to find the
defendant guilty of <insert charged offense involving abuse of
elder or dependent person>. The People must still prove (the/each) (charge/
[and] allegation) of <insert charged offense involving abuse of
elder or dependent person> beyond a reasonable doubt.
RELATED ISSUES
Exceptions
Evidence of abuse of an elder or dependent person occurring more than 10 years
before the charged offense is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1109, unless
the court determines that the admission of this evidence is in the interest of justice.
(Evid. Code, § 1109(e).) Evidence of the findings and determinations of
administrative agencies regulating health facilities is also inadmissible under section
1109. (Evid. Code, § 1109(f).)
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged
Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc., CALCRIM No. 852, Evidence
of Uncharged Domestic Violence, and CALCRIM No. 1191, Evidence of Uncharged
Sex Offense.
SECONDARY SOURCES
581

Count[s] <insert count[s] of elder or dependent person abuse
charged in this case>.
inclined to commit abuse of (elders/ [or] dependent persons), and based
on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
[and did commit] the other (elder/ [or] dependent person) abuse
offense[s] charged in this case.
New March 2017

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case. (Evid. Code § 355.)
CALCRIM No. 852A, Evidence of Domestic Violence.
CALCRIM No. 852B, Evidence of Domestic Violence.
CALCRIM No. 853A, Evidence of Elder or Dependent Person Abuse.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
SECONDARY SOURCES
582
ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES CALCRIM No. 853B
583
D. ASSAULT

860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon
or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240,
245(c) & (d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with (force

likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a
semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50 BMG
rifle) on a (firefighter/peace officer) [in violation of Penal Code section
245].
prove [either] that:
<Alternative 1A—force with weapon>
[1A. The defendant did an act with (a deadly weapon/a firearm/a
semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon/a .50
BMG rifle) that by its nature would directly and probably result
in the application of force to a person;]
[OR]
<Alternative 1B—force without weapon>
[1Bi. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to a person, and
1Bii. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
would directly and probably result in the application of force to
someone;
apply force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly
weapon/with a firearm/with a semiautomatic firearm/with a
machine gun/with an assault weapon/with a .50 BMG rifle) to a
person;
5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was lawfully
585
performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer);

[AND]
6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the person assaulted was a (firefighter/peace
officer) who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a
harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it
is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person,
including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not
have to cause pain or injury of any kind.]
[The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually
touched someone.]
The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually
intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.
No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant’s act. But if
someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the
other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault[,
and if so, what kind of assault it was].
[Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault.]
[A deadly weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently
deadly or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing
and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]
ordinary use for which it is designed.]
[In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the
surrounding circumstances.]
586

[A semiautomatic firearm extracts a fired cartridge and chambers a fresh
cartridge with each single pull of the trigger.]
[A machine gun is any weapon that (shoots/is designed to shoot/ [or] can
readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a
single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.]
[An assault weapon includes <insert names of appropriate
designated assault weapons listed in Pen. Code, § 30510 and further defined
by Pen. Code § 30515>.]
[A .50 BMG rifle is a center fire rifle that can fire a .50 BMG cartridge
[and that is not an assault weapon or a machine gun]. A .50 BMG
cartridge is a cartridge that is designed and intended to be fired from a
center fire rifle and that has all three of the following characteristics:
1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base of the cartridge to
the tip of the bullet;
2. The bullet diameter for the cartridge is from .510 to, and
including, .511 inch;
AND
3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to,
and including, .804 inch.]
[The term[s] (great bodily injury[,]/ deadly weapon[,]/ firearm[,]/ machine
gun[,]/assault weapon[,]/ [and] .50 BMG rifle) (is/are) defined in another
instruction to which you should refer.]
offıcer”>.]
[The duties of a <insert title of offıcer> include
or her services.]
587
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, February 2013, September
2019, April 2020, September 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In addition, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on
self-defense as it relates to the use of excessive force. (People v. White (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of
the offense charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is
an element, if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force.
(People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On
request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving the
lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Castain (1981) 122
Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance is an issue, give
Offıcer. In addition, give CALCRIM No. 2672, Lawful Performance: Resisting
Unlawful Arrest With Force, if requested.
Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon, a
firearm, a semiautomatic firearm, a machine gun, an assault weapon, or .50 BMG
rifle. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force
likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245(c) & (d).)
Give the bracketed definition of “application or force and apply force” on request.
156].)
Give the bracketed portion that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is
not a weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (People v. Aguilar
Godwin (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)
If determining whether the item is an inherently deadly weapon requires resolution
of a factual issue, give both bracketed instructions.
588
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
Do not give an attempt instruction in conjunction with this instruction. There is no
crime of “attempted assault” in California. (In re James M. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517,
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d)(1)–(3).
• Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515.
• Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520.
• Machine Gun Defined. Pen. Code, § 16880.
• Semiautomatic Pistol Defined. Pen. Code, § 17140.
• .50 BMG Rifle Defined. Pen. Code, § 30530.
• Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Deadly Weapon Defined. People v. Brown (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 6–8 [147
Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
589
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Assault With a Deadly Weapon. Pen. Code, § 245.
• Assault on a Peace Officer. Pen. Code, § 241(b).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
Dual Convictions Prohibited
Penal Code section 245(c) describes a single offense. (In re C.D. (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 1021, 1029 [227 Cal.Rptr.3d 360] [“Aggravated assault against a peace
officer under section 245, subdivision (c), remains a single offense, and multiple
violations of the statute cannot be found when they are based on the same act or
course of conduct”].) See CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative
Charges For One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.
If both theories of assault are included in the case, the jury must unanimously agree
which theory or theories are the basis for the verdict.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 69.
Against the Person, § 142.11; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][j]
(Matthew Bender).
590
861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or
Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with a (stun

gun/ [or] less lethal weapon) on a (firefighter/peace officer) [in violation
of Penal Code section 244.5(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant did an act with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon)
that by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to a person;
someone;
apply force with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) to a person;
performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer);
[AND]
officer) who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[A stun gun is anything, except a less lethal weapon, that is used or
intended to be used as either an offensive or defensive weapon and is
capable of temporarily immobilizing someone by inflicting an electrical
charge.]
[A is a less lethal weapon.]
[ is less lethal ammunition.]
[A less lethal weapon is any device that is either designed to or that has
been converted to expel or propel less lethal ammunition by any action,
mechanism, or process for the purpose of incapacitating, immobilizing,
591
or stunning a human being through the infliction of any less than lethal
impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical
pain or discomfort. It is not necessary that the weapon leave any lasting
or permanent incapacitation, discomfort, pain, or other injury or
disability in order to qualify as a less lethal weapon.]
[Less lethal ammunition is any ammunition that is designed to be used in
any less lethal weapon or any other kind of weapon, including, but not
limited to, firearms, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles, and spring,
compressed air, and compressed gas weapons. When used in a less lethal
weapon or other weapon, less lethal ammunition is designed to
immobilize or incapacitate or stun a human being by inflicting less than
lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including
physical pain or discomfort.]
The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a
have to cause pain or injury of any kind.
touched someone.]
No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant’s act. But if
offıcer”>.]
592

or her services.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, April 2011, February 2012
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
593

519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 244.5.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Less Lethal Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 16780.
• Less Lethal Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16770.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 69.
Against the Person, § 142.11[3]; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][j]
(Matthew Bender).
594
862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force
Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245,
245.3)

likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) on a custodial
officer [in violation of Penal Code section 245.3].
prove that:
[1. The defendant willfully did an act with a deadly weapon that by
its nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to a person;]
[1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and
1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
someone;
weapon) to a person;
performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer;
[AND]
have known, both that the person assaulted was a custodial
officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a
custodial officer(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
595
touched someone.]
[The term[s] (great bodily injury/ [and] deadly weapon) (is/are) defined in
A custodial officer is someone who works for a law enforcement agency
and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city jail/
[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013, September 2019, September
2020, March 2022
596
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
(People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If lawful
performance is an issue, give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2671,
Lawful Performance: Custodial Offıcer.
Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon.
Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to
produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245.3.)
156].)
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
597
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3.
• Custodial Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 831.
• Local Detention Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 6031.4.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 72–74.
Against the Person, § 142.11; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][j]
(Matthew Bender).
598
863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With
Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury
(Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)

likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) on (a/an)
(operator/driver/station agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in
Pen. Code, § 245.2> [in violation of Penal Code section 245.2].
prove that:
[1. The defendant willfully did an act with a deadly weapon that by
its nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to a person;]
someone;
weapon) to a person;
<Alternative 5A—transportation personnel>
[5. When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was performing
(his/her) duties as (a/an) (operator/driver/station agent/ticket
agent) of (a/an) <insert name of vehicle or
transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2>;]
<Alternative 5B—passenger>
[5. The person assaulted was a passenger of (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen.
Code, § 245.2>;]
[AND]
599

have known, [both] that the person assaulted was (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity
specified in Pen. Code, § 245.2> [and that (he/she) was performing
(his/her) duties](;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
600
[The term[s] (great bodily injury/ [and] deadly weapon) (is/are) defined in
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, September 2019, September 2020,
March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon.
Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed with force likely to
produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code, § 245.2.)
If the victim was an operator, driver, station agent, or ticket agent of an identified
vehicle or transportation entity, give element 5A and the bracketed language in
element 6. If the victim was a passenger, give element 5B and omit the bracketed
language in element 6.
156].)
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
601
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 79.
Against the Person, § 142.11[3]; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][j]
(Matthew Bender).
602
(B) General
875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce
Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))

likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon other than a
firearm/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault
weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) [in violation of Penal Code section 245].
prove that:
[1. The defendant did an act with (a deadly weapon other than a
firearm/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an
assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) that by its nature would directly
and probably result in the application of force to a person;]
someone;
[AND]
weapon other than a firearm/with a firearm/with a semiautomatic
firearm/with a machine gun/with an assault weapon/with a .50
BMG rifle) to a person(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
603

touched someone.]
[A deadly weapon other than a firearm is any object, instrument, or
weapon [that is inherently deadly or one] that is used in such a way that
it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]
[A semiautomatic pistol extracts a fired cartridge and chambers a fresh
cartridge with each single pull of the trigger.]
[A machine gun is any weapon that (shoots/is designed to shoot/ [or] can
readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot by a
single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.]
[An assault weapon includes <insert names of appropriate
designated assault weapons listed in Pen. Code, § 30510 or as defined by
Pen. Code, § 30515>.]
604

AND
3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to,
and including, .804 inch.]
[The term[s] (great bodily injury[,]/ deadly weapon other than a firearm[,]/
firearm[,]/ machine gun[,]/assault weapon[,]/ [and] .50 BMG rifle) (is/are)
defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2009, October 2010, February 2012,
February 2013, August 2013, September 2019, September 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a deadly weapon
other than a firearm, firearm, semiautomatic firearm, machine gun, an assault
weapon, or .50 BMG rifle. Give element 1B if it is alleged that the assault was
committed with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (See Pen. Code,
§ 245(a).)
156].)
not a deadly weapon as a matter of law and is capable of innocent uses. (People v.
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204];
605
People v. Godwin (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1573–1574 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].)

519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
If the charging document names more than one victim, modification of this
instruction may be necessary to clarify that each victim must have been subject to
the application of force. (People v. Velasquez (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1176–1177 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 612].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
• To Have Present Ability to Inflict Injury, Gun Must Be Loaded Unless Used as
Club or Bludgeon. People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 3 [82
Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].
• This Instruction Affirmed. People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 122–123
[77 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].
• Semiautomatic Pistol Defined. Pen. Code, § 17140.
• Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1; People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
606
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Assault with a firearm is a lesser included offense of assault with a semiautomatic
firearm. (People v. Martinez (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 197, 199 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d
141].)
A misdemeanor brandishing of a weapon or firearm under Penal Code section 417 is
not a lesser and necessarily included offense of assault with a deadly weapon.
(People v. Escarcega (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 398 [117 Cal.Rptr. 595]; People v.
Steele (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 218, 221 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 458].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 41.
607
876. Assault With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen. Code,
§§ 240, 244.5(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with a (stun

gun/[or] less lethal weapon) [in violation of Penal Code section 244.5(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant did an act with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon)
that by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to a person;
someone;
[AND]
apply force with a (stun gun/[or] less lethal weapon) to a
person(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[A stun gun is anything, except a less lethal weapon, that is used or
intended to be used as either an offensive or defensive weapon and is
capable of temporarily immobilizing someone by inflicting an electrical
charge.]
[A less lethal weapon is any device that is either designed to or that has
been converted to expel or propel less lethal ammunition by any action,
mechanism, or process for the purpose of incapacitating, immobilizing,
or stunning a human being through the infliction of any less than lethal
impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including physical
pain or discomfort. It is not necessary that the weapon leave any lasting
or permanent incapacitation, discomfort, pain, or other injury or
disability in order to qualify as a less lethal weapon.]
[Less lethal ammunition is any ammunition that is designed to be used in
any less lethal weapon or any other kind of weapon, including, but not
limited to, firearms, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles, and spring,
608
compressed air, and compressed gas weapons. When used in a less lethal
weapon or other weapon, less lethal ammunition is designed to
immobilize or incapacitate or stun a human being by inflicting less than
lethal impairment of physical condition, function, or senses, including
physical pain or discomfort.]
touched someone.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
609

102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Less Lethal Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 16780.
• Less Lethal Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16770.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 53.
610
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (placing/ [or] throwing)

caustic chemicals on someone else [in violation of Penal Code section
244].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (placed[,]/ threw[,]/
caused to be placed[,]/ [or] caused to be thrown) any (caustic
chemical[,]/ corrosive acid[,]/ flammable substance[,]/ [or] vitriol)
on someone else;
[AND]
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to injure the flesh of
or disfigure the other person’s body(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[A flammable substance includes gasoline, petroleum products, or
flammable liquids with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less.]
purpose.
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, defraud,
annoy, or injure someone else.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
611
• Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).

107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Simple Assault Not a Lesser Included Offense. People v. Warren (1963) 223
Cal.App.2d 798, 801 [36 Cal.Rptr. 127].
• Threat of Great Bodily Harm Not Required. People v. Day (1926) 199 Cal. 78,
85–86 [248 P. 250].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
COMMENTARY
Although Penal Code section 244 is titled “assault with caustic chemicals,” this
statute does not truly define an assault crime since actual contact with the other
person is required.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 54.
612
890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While
Committing First Degree Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with intent to

commit <insert crime specified in Penal Code section 220(a)>
[while committing first degree burglary] [in violation of Penal Code
section 220((a)/ [and] (b))].
prove that:
probably result in the application of force to a person;
someone;
apply force to a person;
[AND]
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to commit
<insert crime specified in Pen. Code, § 220(a)>;
[AND
6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was committing a first degree
burglary.]
<If the court concludes that the first degree burglary requirement in Pen.
Code, § 220(b) is a penalty allegation and not an element of the offense,
give the bracketed language below in place of element 6.>
6. [If you find the defendant guilty of the charged crime, you must
then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the crime was committed in the commission of a
first degree burglary.]
[First degree burglary is defined in another instruction to which you
should refer.]
purpose.
613

touched someone.]
To decide whether the defendant intended to commit <insert
crime specified in Pen. Code, § 220(a)> please refer to Instruction[s]
which define[s] (that/those) crime[s].
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, October 2010, August 2012, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to give a Mayberry consent instruction if the
defense is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the defense
raised at trial. (People v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 124–125 [261 Cal.Rptr.
502]; see People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d
1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats [alternative
paragraph on reasonable and actual belief in consent].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the sex offense or offense alleged.
(People v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].) In the blanks,
specify the sex offense or offenses that the defendant is charged with intending to
commit. Included sex offenses are: rape (Pen. Code, § 261); oral copulation (Pen.
Code, § 287 [including in-concert offense]); sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286 [including
in-concert offense]); sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289); rape or sexual
penetration in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1); and lewd or lascivious acts (Pen. Code,
§ 288). (See Pen. Code, § 220.) Give the appropriate instructions on the offense or
offenses alleged.
The court should also give CALCRIM Nos. 1700 and 1701 on burglary, if defendant
is charged with committing the offense during a first degree burglary, as well as the
appropriate CALCRIM instruction on the target crime charged pursuant to Penal
Code section 220.
614
If the specified crime is mayhem, give CALCRIM No. 891, Assault With Intent to
Commit Mayhem.
Element 6 is in brackets because there is no guidance from courts of review
regarding whether the first degree burglary requirement in Penal Code section
220(b) is an element or an enhancement.
CALCRIM No. 915, Simple Assault.
AUTHORITY
• Elements for Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th
779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
• Court Must Instruct on Elements of Intended Crime. People v. May (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to commit rape].
• Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see People v. Greene (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d
622, 653 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160] [in context of charged assault with intent to commit
rape].
Both assault with intent to commit rape and first degree burglary are lesser included
offenses of assault with intent to commit rape during first degree burglary (Pen.
Code, § 220(b); (People v. Dyser (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1021 [135
Cal.Rptr.3d 891].)
There is no crime of attempted assault to commit an offense. (See People v. Duens
(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 314 [134 Cal.Rptr. 341] [in context of assault to commit
rape].)
RELATED ISSUES
Abandonment
An assault with intent to commit another crime is complete at any point during the
incident when the defendant entertains the intent to commit the crime. “It makes no
difference whatsoever that he later abandons that intent.” (See People v. Trotter
(1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1223 [207 Cal.Rptr. 165]; People v. Meichtry (1951)
37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389 [231 P.2d 847] [both in context of assault to commit rape].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 28–34.
Sentencing, § 91.60 (Matthew Bender).
615
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with intent to

commit mayhem [in violation of Penal Code section 220(a)].
prove that:
someone;
AND
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to commit mayhem.
The defendant intended to commit mayhem if (he/she) intended to
unlawfully and maliciously:
[1. Remove a part of someone’s body(;/.)]
[OR]
[2. Disable or make useless a part of someone’s body by inflicting a
more than slight or temporary disability(;/.)]
[OR]
[3. Permanently disfigure someone(;/.)]
[OR]
[4. Cut or disable someone’s tongue(;/.)]
[OR]
[5. Slit someone’s (nose[,]/ear[,]/ [or] lip) (;/.)]
[OR]
[6. Put out someone’s eye or injure someone’s eye in a way that
would so significantly reduce (his/her) ability to see that the eye
would be useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]
purpose.
616

someone else.
touched someone.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Do not use this instruction if defendant is charged with having committed this crime
during the commission of a first degree burglary. Use CALCRIM No. 890, Assault
With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree Burglary]
instead.
Depending on the evidence, select the appropriate elements of mayhem. (See People
v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to
commit rape].) See generally CALCRIM No. 801, Mayhem.
The last bracketed sentence may be given on request if there is evidence of a
disfiguring injury that may be repaired by medical procedures. (See People v. Hill
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [not error to instruct
that injury may be permanent even though cosmetic repair may be medically
feasible].)
CALCRIM No. 915, Simple Assault.
AUTHORITY
617
• Elements for Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th
779, 790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
• Elements for Mayhem. Pen. Code, § 203.
• Court Must Instruct on Elements of Intended Crime. People v. May (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502] [in context of assault to commit rape].
• Attempted Mayhem. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 203.
• Simple Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see People v. Greene (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d
622, 653 [110 Cal.Rptr. 160] [in context of charged assault with intent to commit
rape].
There is no crime of attempted assault to commit an offense. (See People v. Duens
(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 314 [134 Cal.Rptr. 341] [in context of assault to commit
rape].)
RELATED ISSUES
Abandonment
An assault with intent to commit another crime is complete at any point during the
incident when the defendant entertains the intent to commit the crime. “It makes no
difference whatsoever that he later abandons that intent.” (See People v. Trotter
(1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1217, 1223 [207 Cal.Rptr. 165]; People v. Meichtry (1951)
37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389 [231 P.2d 847] [both in context of assault to commit rape].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 28–34.
Against the Person, §§ 142.11, 142.16 (Matthew Bender).
618
(iii) Simple Assault on Specified People or in Specified
Location
900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified
Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a

(firefighter/peace officer/ <insert description of other person
from Pen. Code, § 241(b/c)>) [in violation of Penal Code section 241(b/c)].
prove that:
lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act would
directly, naturally, and probably result in the application of force
to someone;
performing (his/her) duties as a (firefighter/peace officer/
<insert description of other person from Pen. Code,
§ 241(b) or (c)>);
[AND]
officer/ <insert description of other person from Pen.
Code, § 241(b) or (c)>) (who was performing (his/her) duties/
providing emergency medical care)(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
619

touched someone.]
[A person employed as a police officer by <insert name of
agency that employs police offıcer> is a peace officer.]
offıcer”>.]
[The duties of a <insert title of peace offıcer specified in Pen.
Code, § 830 et seq.> include <insert job duties>.]
or her services.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, April 2011

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
620
Select the option in element six for “providing emergency medical care” if the
victim is a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care.
must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (Ibid.) The
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it
relates to the use of excessive force. (People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161,
167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) If excessive force is an issue, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct the jury that the defendant is not guilty of the offense
charged, or any lesser included offense in which lawful performance is an element,
if the defendant used reasonable force in response to excessive force. (People v.
Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) On request, the court
must also instruct that the People have the burden of proving the lawfulness of an
arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138,
145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) Give the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670,
Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer.
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The duties of a
<insert title of peace offıcer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>
include” on request. The court may insert a description of the officer’s duties such
as “the correct service of a facially valid search warrant.” (People v. Gonzalez,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1222.)
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
621
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
RELATED ISSUES
Resisting Arrest
“[A] person may not use force to resist any arrest, lawful or unlawful, except that
he may use reasonable force to defend life and limb against excessive force . . . .”
(People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 357 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].) “[I]f
the arrest is ultimately determined factually to be unlawful [but the officer did not
use excessive force], the defendant can be validly convicted only of simple assault
or battery,” not assault or battery of a peace officer. (Id. at pp. 355–356.) See
CALCRIM No. 2672, Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest With Force.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 69.
622
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a custodial

officer [in violation of Penal Code section 241.1].
prove that:
someone;
performing (his/her) duties as a custodial officer;
[AND]
have known, both that the person assaulted was a custodial
officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a
custodial officer(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
623
and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city jail/
[A custodial officer is not a peace officer.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
624

102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 72–74.
625
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a member of

the United States Armed Forces [in violation of Penal Code section
241.8].
prove that:
lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act would
directly, naturally, and probably result in the application of force
to someone;
5. The person assaulted was a member of the United States Armed
Forces at the time of the assault;
[AND]
6. The defendant knew the other person was a member of the
United States Armed Forces and assaulted the other person
because of that person’s service(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
626
A <insert description, e.g., “private in the United States
Army”> is a member of the United States Armed Forces.
A person commits an assault because of someone’s service in the Armed
Forces if:
1. That person is biased against the assaulted person based on the
assaulted person’s military service;
AND
2. That bias caused the person to commit the alleged assault.
If the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged assault,
the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating factor. A
substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does
not need to be the only factor that motivated the assault.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. Give bracketed element 7 and any
The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a member of the United
States Armed Forces. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250
Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate
definition of member of the armed forces. However, the court may not instruct the
jury that the alleged victim was a member of the armed forces as a matter of law.
(Ibid.)
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
627
element of this crime. (See People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165
[197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 69.
628
903. Assault on School District Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 240,
241.4)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a school

district peace officer [in violation of Penal Code section 241.4].
prove that:
someone;
performing (his/her) duties as a school district peace officer;
[AND]
have known, both that the person assaulted was a school district
peace officer and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as
a school district peace officer(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
629
touched someone.]
A school district peace officer is a peace officer who is a member of a
police department of a school district under Education Code section
38000.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.4; Educ. Code, § 38000.
630
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
COMMENTARY
A school district peace officer is anyone so designated by the superintendent of the
school district, but is not vested with general police powers. (See Educ. Code,
§ 38000(a).) The scope of authority for school district peace officers is set forth in
Penal Code section 830.32. (See Educ. Code, § 38001.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 72–74.
Against the Person, § 142.11; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.02 (Matthew
Bender).
631
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a school

employee [in violation of Penal Code section 241.6].
prove that:
someone;
have known, that the person assaulted was a school employee
[and that (he/she) was performing (his/her) duties as a school
employee];
[AND]
6. (When the defendant acted, the person assaulted was performing
(his/her) duties[,]/ [or] (The/the) defendant acted in retaliation for
something the school employee had done in the course of (his/her)
duties)(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
632
touched someone.]
A school employee is any person employed as a permanent or
probationary certificated or classified employee of a school district on a
part-time or full-time basis, including a substitute teacher, student
teacher, or school board member.
[It is not a defense that an assault took place off campus or outside of
school hours.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the sole motivation alleged for the assault is retaliation, do not give CALCRIM
No. 370, Motive, do not give the bracketed clause in element 5, and give only the
second option in element 6. (See People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140,
1165 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121,
1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
633
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 21, 23, 80.
Bender).
634
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault on a juror [in

violation of Penal Code section 241.7].
prove that:
1. The defendant was a party to a case for which a jury had been
selected;
probably result in the application of force to someone who had
been sworn as a juror [or alternate juror] to decide that case;
someone;
[AND]
apply force to a person(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
635

[It is not a defense that an assault was committed after the trial was
completed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
COMMENTARY
Unlike other statutes penalizing assault on a particular person, Penal Code section
241.7 does not state that the defendant must have known that the person assaulted
was a juror. Thus, the committee has not included knowledge among the elements.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 78.
636
906. Assault Committed on School or Park Property (Pen. Code,
§§ 240, 241.2)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assaulting a person on

(school/park) property [in violation of Penal Code section 241.2].
prove that:
someone;
[AND]
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (school/park)
property.
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
637
[A school is any (elementary school/junior high school/four-year high
school/senior high school/adult school [or any branch
thereof]/opportunity school/continuation high school/regional
occupational center/evening high school/technical school/community
college).]
[A park is any publicly maintained or operated park. It does not include
any facility that is being used for professional sports or commercial
events.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 24.
638
Bender).
639
907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider’s
Property or Vehicle (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241.3)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assaulting a person on

a public transportation provider’s (property/vehicle) [in violation of
Penal Code section 241.3].
prove that:
someone;
[AND]
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (the property of a
public transportation provider/a motor vehicle of a public
transportation provider)(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
640
A public transportation provider is a public or private operator of a (bus/
taxicab/streetcar/cable car/trackless trolley/school bus/ [or] other motor
vehicle) that transports people for (money/hire).
[A motor vehicle includes a vehicle that runs on stationary rails or on a
track or rail suspended in the air.]
[The property of the transportation provider includes the entire station
where public transportation is available and the parking lot reserved for
those who use the system.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 6–7 (assault generally).
641
642
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (assaulting/ [or]

beating) a person under color of authority and without lawful necessity
prove that:
1. The defendant was a public officer;
2. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] (did an act that by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to <insert name of alleged victim>/touched
<insert name of alleged victim> in a harmful or
offensive manner);
<instruct with elements 3 and 4 for assault>
[3. When the defendant did the act, (he/she) was aware of facts that
would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to someone;
4. When the defendant did the act, (he/she) had the present ability
to apply force to a person;]
(3/5). When the defendant (did the act/touched <insert
name of alleged victim> in a harmful or offensive manner), the
defendant was performing or purporting to perform (his/her)
duties as a public officer;
[AND]
(4/6). When the defendant (did the act/touched <insert
name of alleged victim>), (he/she) acted without lawful necessity(;/.)
[AND]
[(5/7). When the defendant (did the act/touched <insert
name of alleged victim>), (he/she) did not act in (self-defense/ [or]
defense of someone else).]
[An officer of <insert name of state or local government
agency that employs public offıcer> is a public officer.]
agency that employs police offıcer> is a peace officer. A peace officer is a
public officer.]
[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of peace or public offıcer>
include <insert job duties>.]
643

[No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant’s act. But
if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the
other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault.]
Without lawful necessity means more force than was reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.
Under color of authority means clothed in the authority of law or when
acting under pretense of law.
[Special rules control the use of force by a peace officer.]
[A peace officer may use reasonable nondeadly force to arrest or detain
someone, to prevent escape, to overcome resistance, or in self-defense.]
[A peace officer may use deadly force if (he/she):
1. Reasonably believed, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that the force was necessary to defend against an imminent threat
of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person;
OR
that:
a. <insert name of fleeing felon> was fleeing;
b. The force was necessary to arrest or detain
c. The commission of the crime of <insert name of
felony> created a risk of or resulted in death or serious bodily
injury to another person;
AND
d. <insert name of fleeing felon> would cause death
or serious bodily injury to another person unless immediately
arrested or detained.]
644
consciousness/concussion/bone fracture protracted loss or impairment of
function of any bodily member or organ/a wound requiring extensive
Totality of the circumstances means all facts known to the defendant at
the time, including the conduct of the defendant and
<insert name of alleged victim> leading up to the use of deadly force.
New September 2022; Revised March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 5/7 and any
The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “public officer” from
the statute. However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant was a
public officer as a matter of law.
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins “The duties of a
<insert title . . .> include” on request.
AUTHORITY
645
• Objectively Reasonable Force to Effect Arrest. Pen. Code, § 835a(b).

• Violation of Statute Does Not Include Detention Without Lawful Authority.
People v. Lewelling (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 [224 Cal.Rptr.3d 255].
• “Willful” Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Public Officer. See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 831(a) [custodial officer], 831.4 [sheriff’s
or police security officer], 831.5 [custodial officer], 831.6 [transportation officer],
3089 [county parole officer]; In re Frederick B. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 79,
89–90 [237 Cal.Rptr. 338], disapproved on other grounds in In re Randy G.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567, fn. 2 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239] [“public
officers” is broader category than “peace officers”]; In re Eddie D. (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 417, 421–422 [286 Cal.Rptr. 684]; In re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th
530, 536–539 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 278 P.3d 1221]; see also Pen. Code,
§ 836.5(a) [authority to arrest without warrant].
• Public Officer Includes De Facto Officer. People v. Cradlebaugh (1914) 24
Cal.App. 489, 491–492.
• “Peace Officer” Defined. Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.
• Without Lawful Necessity. People v. Dukes (1928) 90 Cal.App. 657, 661–662;
People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1140 & fn.20 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d
423]; People v. Lewelling, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 298–299; People v.
Perry (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 444 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 522].
• Color of Authority. People v. Plesniarski (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 108, 114 [99
Cal.Rptr. 196].
COMMENTARY
Graham Factors
case. (See People v. Perry, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 473, fn. 18.) Conduct and
tactical decisions preceding an officer’s use of deadly force are relevant
considerations. (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 639 [160
Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 305 P.3d 252] [in context of negligence liability].)
RELATED ISSUES
Sexual Battery
Officer convicted of sexually assaulting an arrestee was properly convicted of both
sexual battery and assault under color of authority because the latter offense is not a
646
necessarily included offense in the former. (See People v. Alford (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 799, 804–805 [286 Cal.Rptr. 762].)
647
(iv) Simple Assault
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault [in violation of

prove that:
someone;
[AND]
apply force to a person(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
touched someone.]
648

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197]; People v. Wright (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703,
706 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
1193–1195 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
RELATED ISSUES
Transferred Intent
The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to general intent crimes such as
assault. (People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1737 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 723].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 6–12, 16.
649
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault committed by a

conditional threat to use force.
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully threatened to use force on another person
unless that person immediately did an act that the defendant
demanded;
2. The defendant intended to use force immediately to compel the
other person to do the act;
3. The defendant had no right to demand that the other person do
the act;
4. When the defendant made the threat, (he/she) had the present
ability to use force on the other person;
[AND]
5. The defendant placed (himself/herself) in a position to compel
performance of the act (he/she) demanded and took all steps
necessary to carry out (his/her) intention(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
purpose.
[The term use force means to touch in a harmful or offensive manner.
The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry
way. It is enough if the touching makes contact with the person,
including through his or her clothing. The touching need not cause pain
or injury of any kind.]
650
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. People v. McMakin (1857) 8 Cal. 547, 548–549; People v. McCoy
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 192–193 [153 P.2d 315]; People v. Lipscomb (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 564, 570 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 445]; see also People v. Page (2004) 123
Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 45.
Against the Person, §§ 142.11, 142.11A[1] (Matthew Bender).
651
Words, no matter how offensive, and acts that are not threatening, are
not enough to justify an assault or battery.
[However, if you conclude that <insert name> spoke or
acted in a way that threatened <insert name of defendant or
third party allegedly threatened> with immediate harm [or an unlawful
touching]/ [or] great bodily injury/ [or] trespass on land/ [or] trespass
against goods], you may consider that evidence in deciding whether
<insert name of defendant> acted in (self-defense/ [or]
defense of others).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. It is no defense to battery or
assault that insulting or offensive words, or acts that fall short of a threat of
immediate harm, were used. (People v. Mayes (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [68
Cal.Rptr. 476]; People v. Mueller (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 233, 239–240 [305 P.2d
178].)
If the evidence raises the issue of defense of self or others, give the bracketed
paragraph along with any other appropriate defense instruction. (See People v.
Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 161]; see CALCRIM
Nos. 3470–3477.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542 [41
Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; People v. Mueller (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 233,
239–240 [305 P.2d 178].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 6–7.
652
E. BATTERY
(i) Causing Injury

925. Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243(d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery causing serious

bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 243(d)].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this charge, the People must
prove that:
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner;
[AND]
2. <insert name> suffered serious bodily injury as a
result of the force used(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, or
reasonable discipline.>
[AND
someone else/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).]
Making contact with another person, including through his or her
clothing, is enough to commit a battery.
[ <Insert description of injury when appropriate; see Bench
Notes> is a serious bodily injury.]

653
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3, the bracketed
words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See
CALCRIM Nos. 3470–3477.)
If there is sufficient evidence of reasonable parental discipline, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3, the bracketed
words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and CALCRIM No. 3405, Parental Right to
Punish a Child.
Whether the complaining witness suffered a serious bodily injury is a question for
the jury to determine. If the defendant disputes that the injury suffered was a serious
bodily injury, use the first bracketed paragraph. If the parties stipulate that the injury
suffered was a serious bodily injury, use the second bracketed paragraph.
Give the final bracketed paragraph if indirect touching is an issue.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(d); see People v. Martinez (1970) 3
Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4); People v. Burroughs
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [201 Cal.Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894] [serious bodily
injury and great bodily injury are essentially equivalent elements], disapproved
on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d
451, 999 P.2d 675]; People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12
Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Defense of Parental Discipline. People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045,
1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
• Medical Treatment Not an Element. People v. Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th
1142, 1148–1150 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 529].
Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is not a lesser
included offense. (Pen. Code, § 245; In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090,
1095 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 228].)
654
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 39.
655
926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace
Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against (a/an)

<insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> [in violation
prove that:
<Alternative 2A—specified person performing duties>
[2. When the defendant acted, <insert name> was a
<insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> and
was performing the duties of (a/an) <insert title
specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)>;]
<Alternative 2B—nurse or doctor>
[2. When the defendant used that force, <insert name>
was a (nurse/medical doctor) who was giving emergency medical
care outside of a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility;]
[AND]
have known, that <insert name> was (a/an)
<insert title specified in Pen. Code, § 243(c)(1)> who
was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
<Give element 4 when the defendant is charged with Pen. Code,
§ 243(c)(1).>
[AND
4. <insert name> suffered injury as a result of the force
used(;/.)]
[AND
(4/5). The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of
someone else).]
656
clothing, is enough to commit a battery.

[The duties of (a/an) <insert title specified in Pen. Code,
§ 243(c)(1)> include <insert appropriate list of job duties
from statutory definition of professions, if available>.]
[It does not matter whether <insert name> was actually on
duty at the time.]
[An injury is any physical injury that requires professional medical
treatment. The question whether an injury requires such treatment
cannot be answered simply by deciding whether or not a person sought
or received treatment. You may consider those facts, but you must decide
this question based on the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury
itself.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. This instruction should be used when the alleged victim is not a peace
officer. If the alleged victim is a peace officer, use CALCRIM No. 945, Battery
Against Peace Offıcer.
If the alleged victim is a doctor or nurse, give element 2B. Otherwise give element
2A.
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 243(c)(1), give bracketed
element 4 and the definition of “injury.” If the defendant is charged with
misdemeanor battery under Penal Code section 243(b), do not give element 4 or the
definition of “injury”
Give the appropriate list of job duties for the alleged victim’s profession from the
current Penal Code section, if one is provided. Emergency medical technician,
nurse, custodial officer, lifeguard, traffic officer, and animal control officer are
defined in Penal Code section 243(f). Firefighter is defined in Penal Code section
245.1. If a definition is provided in the statute, it should be given. (See People v.
Lara (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 669 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 886].)
657
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b)–(c)(1); see People v. Martinez (1970) 3
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(6); People v. Longoria (1995) 34
COMMENTARY
People v. Longoria (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 17 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 213], explains the
meaning of injury as defined in the statute:
It is the nature, extent, and seriousness of the injury—not the inclination or
disinclination of the victim to seek medical treatment—which is determinative.
A peace officer who obtains “medical treatment” when none is required, has not
sustained an “injury” within the meaning of section 243, subdivision (c). And a
peace officer who does not obtain “medical treatment” when such treatment is
required, has sustained an “injury” within the meaning of section 243,
subdivision (c). The test is objective and factual.
• Assault on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 241(b).
• Misdemeanor Battery on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 243(b).
• Resisting Officer. Pen. Code, § 148.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 21–23, 70–74.
658
(ii) Sexual Battery
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual battery [in

prove that:
1. The defendant [or an accomplice] unlawfully restrained
<insert name of complaining witness>;
<Alternative 2A—defendant touched>
[2. While <insert name of complaining witness> was
restrained, the defendant touched an intimate part of
<insert name of complaining witness>;]
<Alternative 2B—caused complaining witness to touch>
restrained, the defendant (caused <insert name of
complaining witness> to touch (his/her) own intimate part/ [or]
caused <insert name of complaining witness> to touch
the intimate part of defendant [or someone else]);]
3. The touching was done against ’s <insert name of
complaining witness> will;
AND
4. The touching was done for the specific purpose of sexual arousal,
sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.
An intimate part is a female’s breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ or
buttocks of anyone.
Contact must have been made with ’s <insert name of
complaining witness> bare skin. This means that:
1. The defendant must have touched the bare skin of ’s
<insert name of complaining witness> intimate part;
OR
2. ’s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin
must have touched the defendant’s [or ’s <insert
name or description of third person>] intimate part either directly
or through (his/her) clothing.
Someone is unlawfully restrained when his or her liberty is controlled by
659
words, acts, or authority of another and the restraint is against his or

her will. Unlawful restraint requires more than just the physical force
necessary to accomplish the sexual touching. [A person does not
unlawfully restrain someone if he or she only uses lawful authority for a
lawful purpose.]
[A touching is done against a person’s will if that person does not consent
to it. To consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know the
nature of the touching.]
[A person is an accomplice if he or she is subject to prosecution for the
prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if:
AND
encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime/ [or]
participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime).]
<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>
[The defendant is not guilty of sexual battery if (he/she) actually and
reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed that the other person consented
to the touching [and actually and reasonably believed that (he/she)
consented throughout the act of touching]. The People have the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
actually and reasonably believe that the other person consented. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of mistaken but honest
and reasonable belief in consent if there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct
that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent
existed where it did not. (See People v. Andrews (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602
[184 Cal.Rptr.3d 183]; following People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14
Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158
[125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)
Give either alternative 2A or 2B depending on the evidence in the case. The
660
committee has concluded that the direct touching requirement for felony sexual
battery is satisfied when (1) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch the
defendant’s intimate parts through the defendant’s clothing with the alleged victim’s
bare skin; (2) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch any part of the
defendant with the victim’s unclothed intimate part, whether the defendant’s body is
clothed or not; or (3) the defendant touches the alleged victim’s bare intimate part
either directly or through clothing. If a defendant is only charged under Penal Code
section 243.4(a), the defendant must touch the victim’s intimate part, not the other
way around. (People v. Elam (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 309–310 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d
185].)
The committee omitted the word “masturbate” from the elements because the plain
language of Penal Code section 243.4(d) requires only that the victim be compelled
to touch him-or herself, and a further finding of whether that act of touching was
actually masturbation is unnecessary.
Give the bracketed definition of “against a person’s will” on request.
If the court gives the bracketed phrase “or an accomplice” in element 1, the court
must also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (People v. Verlinde (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs
providing further explanation of the definition of “accomplice” are contained in
Witness Is Accomplice. The court should review that instruction and determine
whether any of these additional paragraphs should be given.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(a) & (d).
• Intimate Part. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
• Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(f).
• Otherwise Lawful Restraint for Unlawful Purpose. People v. Alford (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 799, 803–804 [286 Cal.Rptr. 762].
• Sexual Abuse Defined. People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205 [224
Cal.Rptr. 467] [discussing Pen. Code, § 289].
• Specific Intent Crime. People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100
Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
• Caused to Masturbate. People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 50 [109
Cal.Rptr.2d 728].
• Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Verlinde (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322]; People v. Stankewitz (1990)
51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
• Misdemeanor Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).
661
COMMENTARY
In a case addressing the meaning of “for the purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the
context of Penal Code section 289, one court stated, “when a penetration is
accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes
sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual
arousal or gratification whatsoever.” (People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193,
205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes it this reasoning applies to the
crime sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the
following language can be used:
Sexual abuse means any touching of a person’s intimate parts in order to cause
pain, injury, or discomfort. The perpetrator does not need to achieve any sexual
arousal or sexual gratification.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 26, 81–83.
662
936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243.4(b) & (d))

prove that:
<Alternative 1A—defendant touched>
institutionalized for medical treatment and was seriously disabled
or medically incapacitated, the defendant touched an intimate
part of <insert name of complaining witness>;]
<Alternative 1B—caused complaining witness to touch>
institutionalized for medical treatment and was seriously disabled
or medically incapacitated, the defendant (caused
<insert name of complaining witness> to touch (his/her) own
intimate part/ [or] caused <insert name of
complaining witness> to touch the intimate part of defendant [or
someone else]);]
AND
buttocks of anyone.
complaining witness> bare skin. This means that:
1. The defendant must have touched the bare skin of ’s
<insert name of complaining witness> intimate part;
OR
2. ’s <insert name of complaining witness> bare skin
must have touched the defendant’s [or ’s <insert
name or description of third person>] intimate part either directly
or through (his/her) clothing.
[Someone is institutionalized if he or she is a patient in a hospital,
663
medical treatment facility, nursing home, acute care facility, or mental

hospital.]
[Someone is seriously disabled if he or she has severe physical or sensory
disabilities.]
[Someone is medically incapacitated if he or she is incapacitated because
of prescribed sedatives, anesthesia, or other medication.]
[An act is done against a person’s will if that person does not consent to
the act. In order to consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and
know the nature of the act.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give either alternative 2A or 2B depending on the evidence in the case. The
committee has concluded that the direct touching requirement for felony sexual
battery is satisfied when (1) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch the
defendant’s intimate parts through the defendant’s clothing with the alleged victim’s
bare skin; (2) the defendant forces the alleged victim to touch any part of the
defendant with the victim’s unclothed intimate part, whether the defendant’s body is
clothed or not; or (3) the defendant touches the alleged victim’s bare intimate part
either directly or through clothing. If a defendant is only charged under Penal Code
section 243.4(a), the defendant must touch the victim’s intimate part, not the other
way around. (People v. Elam (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 309–310 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d
185].)
The committee omitted the word “masturbate” from the elements because the plain
language of Penal Code section 243.4(d) requires only that the victim be compelled
to touch him-or herself, and a further finding of whether that act of touching was
actually masturbation is unnecessary.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d).
• Institutionalized. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(5).
• Intimate Part. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
• Medically Incapacitated. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(4).
• Seriously Disabled. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(3).
664
Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Specific Intent Crime. People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100
Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
• Misdemeanor Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).
COMMENTARY
In a case addressing the meaning of “for the purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Person,
§ 26.
665
937. Sexual Battery: By Fraudulent Representation (Pen. Code,
§§ 242, 243.4(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual battery by

fraudulent representation [in violation of Penal Code section 243.4(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant touched an intimate part of ’s <insert
name of complaining witness> body;
sexual gratification, or sexual abuse;
3. The defendant fraudulently represented that the touching served
a professional purpose;
AND
4. The person touched was not conscious of the sexual nature of the
act because of the fraudulent representation.
buttocks of anyone.
complaining witness> bare skin. This means that the defendant must have
touched the bare skin of ’s <insert name of complaining
witness> intimate part either directly or through the defendant’s
clothing.
A person is not conscious of the sexual nature of the act if he or she is
not aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the
perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching served a
professional purpose when it did not.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(c).
• Intimate Part Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
666

• Unconscious of Nature of Act Defined. See Pen. Code, § 261(a)(4)(D) [in
context of rape].
Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by
misrepresentation of professional purpose under the statutory elements test.
People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 210–213 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 370
P.3d 1043].
• Attempted sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by
fraudulent representation. People v. Babaali (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 982, 1000
[90 Cal.Rptr.3d 278].
COMMENTARY
In a case addressing the meaning of for the “purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the
RELATED ISSUES
Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation
A person may induce someone else to consent to engage in a sexual act by a false
or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does
induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free
will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain
consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See People v. Cardenas
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 74.
667

violation of Penal Code section 243.4(e)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant touched an intimate part of <insert
name of complaining witness>;
AND
An intimate part is a female’s breast or the anus, groin, sexual organ, or
buttocks of anyone.
Touching, as used here, means making physical contact with another
person. Touching includes contact made through the clothing.
[The defendant is not guilty of sexual battery if (he/she) actually and
reasonably believed that the other person consented to the touching [and
actually and reasonably believed that (he/she) consented throughout the
act of touching]. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably
believe that the other person consented. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]
New January 2006, Revised February 2016, September 2017

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of mistaken but honest
and reasonable belief in consent if there is substantial evidence of equivocal conduct
that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent
668
existed where it did not. (See People v. Andrews (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602
[184 Cal.Rptr.3d 183]; following People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14
Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158
[125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(1).
• Touches Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(e)(2).
• Intimate Part Defined. Pen. Code, § 243.4(g)(1).
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
• Specific-Intent Crime. People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 29 [100
Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
• Defendant Must Touch Intimate Part of Victim. People v. Elam (2001) 91
• Defendant Need Not Touch Skin. People v. Dayan (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 707,
716 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 391].
• Misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by
misrepresentation of professional purpose under the statutory elements test.
People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 210–213 [202 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 370
P.3d 1043].
• Attempted sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by
fraudulent representation. People v. Babaali (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 982, 1000
[90 Cal.Rptr.3d 278].
COMMENTARY
In a case addressing the meaning of for the “purpose of . . . sexual abuse” in the
context of Penal Code section 289, one court has stated that “when a penetration is
205 [224 Cal.Rptr. 467].) If the court concludes that this reasoning applies to the
crime of sexual battery and a party requests a definition of “sexual abuse,” the
following language may be used:
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 26.
669
670
945. Battery Against Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b),
(c)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against a peace

officer [in violation of Penal Code section 243].
prove that:
1. <Insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a peace
officer performing the duties of (a/an) <insert title of
peace offıcer specified in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>;
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> in a harmful or offensive
manner;
[AND]
have known, that <insert offıcer’s name, excluding
title> was a peace officer who was performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
<Give element 4 when instructing on felony battery against a peace
offıcer.>
[AND
4. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> suffered injury
as a result of the touching(;/.)]
[AND
someone else).]
<Do not give this paragraph when instructing on felony battery against a
peace offıcer.>
[The slightest touching can be enough to commit a battery if it is done in
cause pain or injury of any kind.]
671
<Give this definition when instructing on felony battery against a peace

offıcer.>
itself.]
offıcer”>.]
[It does not matter whether <insert offıcer’s name, excluding
title> was actually on duty at the time.]
[A <insert title of peace offıcer specified in Pen. Code, § 830
et seq.> is also performing the duties of a peace officer if (he/she) is in a
police uniform and performing the duties required of (him/her) as a
peace officer and, at the same time, is working in a private capacity as a
part-time or casual private security guard or (patrolman/patrolwoman).]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, October 2010
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
672
<insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
Give the bracketed language about a peace officer working in a private capacity if
relevant. (Pen. Code, § 70.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(b), (c)(2); see People v. Martinez (1970) 3
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Physical Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(5); People v. Longoria (1995) 34
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
673
• Assault on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 241(b).

• Misdemeanor Battery on Specified Victim. Pen. Code, § 243(b).
• Resisting Officer. Pen. Code, § 148.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery and 2670,
Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 5.
674
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against a

custodial officer [in violation of Penal Code section 243.1].
prove that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a custodial
officer performing the duties of a custodial officer;
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> in a harmful or offensive
manner;
[AND]
title> was a custodial officer who was performing (his/her)
duties(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
and helps operate a local detention facility. [A (county jail/city
jail/ <insert description>) is a local detention facility.] [A
custodial officer is not a peace officer.]

675
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a custodial officer. (See
People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]
[discussing definition of “peace officer”].) The court may instruct the jury on the
appropriate definition of “custodial officer” from the statute. (Ibid.) However, the
court may not instruct the jury that the alleged victim was a custodial officer as a
matter of. (Ibid.)
If there is a dispute about whether the site of an alleged crime is a local detention
facility, see Penal Code section 6031.4.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.1; see In re Rochelle B. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
1212, 1221 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 851] [section 243.1 applies only to batteries
committed against custodial officers in adult penal institutions]; People v.
Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive
touching].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 840–841 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 94 P.3d 551].
676

• Battery on Person Not Confined. Pen. Code, § 243.15.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery, and
CALCRIM No. 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 72–74.
677
947. Simple Battery on Military Personnel (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243.10)

member of the United States Armed Forces [in violation of Penal Code
section 243.10].
prove that:
<insert name of complaining witness> in a harmful or offensive
manner;
2. <insert name of complaining witness> was a member
of the United States Armed Forces at the time of the touching;
[AND]
3. The defendant knew <insert name of complaining
witness> was a member of the United States Armed Forces and
touched <insert name of complaining witness> in a
harmful or offensive manner because of <insert
name of complaining witness>’s service(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
A <insert description, e.g., “private in the United States
Army”> is a member of the United States Armed Forces.
A person commits a battery because of someone’s service in the armed
forces if:
1. He or she is biased against the person battered based on that
person’s military service;
678
AND
2. That bias caused him or her to commit the alleged battery.
If the defendant had more than one reason to commit the alleged
battery, the bias described here must have been a substantial motivating
factor. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor.
However, it does not need to be the only factor that motivated the
battery.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The jury must determine whether the alleged victim is a member of the armed
forces. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604,
758 P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of
“member of the armed forces.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that the
alleged victim was a member of the armed forces as a matter of law. (Ibid.)
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Simple Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243(a).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
679
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 19.
680
948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen.
Code, §§ 242, 243.3)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against (a/an)

(operator/driver/ passenger/station agent/ticket agent) of (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity specified in
Pen. Code, § 243.3> [in violation of Penal Code section 243.3].
prove that:
1. <Insert name> was (a/an) (operator/driver/station
agent/ticket agent/passenger) of (a/an) <insert name
of vehicle or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>;
<Give element 3 when alleged victim is an operator, driver, station agent,
or ticket agent.>
[3. When the defendant acted, <insert name> was
performing (his/her) duties as (a/an) (operator/driver/station
agent/ticket agent) of (a/an) <insert name of vehicle
or transportation entity specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3>;]
[AND]
have known, that <insert name> was (a/an)
<insert name of vehicle or transportation entity
specified in Pen. Code, § 243.3> [and that <insert
name> was performing (his/her) duties](;/)
<Give element 5 when the defendant is charged with felony battery based
on injury.>
[AND]
[5. <insert name> suffered an injury as a result of the
force used(;/.)]
[AND
someone else).]
681
clothing, is enough to commit a battery. [The slightest touching can be
enough if it is done in a rude or angry way.] [The touching does not
itself.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the alleged victim was an operator, driver, station agent, or ticket agent of a
statutorily specified vehicle or transportation entity, give bracketed element 3 and
the bracketed language in element 4. If the alleged victim was a passenger, omit
bracketed element 3 and the bracketed language in element 4.
Give bracketed element 5 and the bracketed definition of “injury” if the defendant is
charged with felony battery based on an injury to the alleged victim. (See Pen.
Code, § 243.3.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3; see People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d
886, 889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
682
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
If the defendant is charged with felony battery on transportation personnel or
passenger based on an injury to the alleged victim, then the misdemeanor battery on
the specified victim is a lesser included offense. (See Pen. Code, § 243.3.)
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 21, 23, 79.
683

school employee [in violation of Penal Code section 243.6].
prove that:
1. <Insert name> was a school employee;
<Alternative 3A—performing duties>
[3. When the defendant acted, <insert name> was
performing (his/her) duties as a school employee;]
<Alternative 3B—retaliation>
[3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was retaliating against
<insert name> because of something
<insert name> had done while performing (his/her) duties as a
school employee;]
[AND]
have known, that <insert name> was a school
employee(;/.)
<Give element 5 when the defendant is charged with felony battery based
on injury.>
[AND]
[5. <insert name> suffered injury as a result of the force
used(;/.)]
[AND
someone else).]
clothing, is enough to commit a battery. [The slightest touching can be
enough if it is done in a rude or angry way.] [The touching does not
684

[It is not a defense that the touching occurred off campus or outside
regular school hours.]
A school employee is any person employed as a permanent or
probationary certificated or classified employee of a school district on a
part-time or full-time basis, including a substitute teacher, student
teacher, or school board member.
itself.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative 3A or 3B, depending on whether there is evidence that the
defendant used force while the employee was performing job duties or used force in
retaliation for something the employee previously did while performing job duties.
(See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)
Give element 5 and the bracketed definition of “injury” if the defendant is charged
with a felony based on an injury to the alleged victim. (See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)
Give the bracketed paragraph on touching if indirect touching is an issue.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.6; People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d
• School Employee Defined. Pen. Code, § 245.5(d).
685
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
If the defendant is charged with felony battery on a school employee based on an
injury to the alleged victim, then the misdemeanor battery on the specified victim is
a lesser included offense. (See Pen. Code, § 243.6.)
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections to CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 80.
Bender).
686
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery against a juror

[in violation of Penal Code section 243.7].
prove that:
1. The defendant was a party to a case for which a jury had been
selected;
2. <insert name> had been sworn as a juror [or
alternate juror] to decide that case;
[AND]
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[The touching may have taken place either while the case was pending
or after it was concluded.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
687
Give the final bracketed paragraph on touching if indirect touching is an issue.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.7; see People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
COMMENTARY
Unlike other statutes penalizing battery on a particular person, Penal Code section
243.7 does not state that the defendant must have known that the person assaulted
was a juror. Thus, the committee has not included knowledge among the elements.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 78.
688
951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property
(Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2)

person on (school property/park property/hospital grounds) [in violation
of Penal Code section 243.2].
prove that:
[AND]
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was on (school property/park
property/the grounds of a hospital)(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, of
reasonable discipline>
[AND
3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense[,]/ [or] in defense of
someone else[,]/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).]
[A school is any (elementary school/junior high school/four-year high
school/senior high school/adult school [or any branch
thereof]/opportunity school/continuation high school/regional
occupational center/evening high school/technical school/community
college).]
[A park is any publicly maintained or operated park. It does not include
any facility that is being used for professional sports or commercial
events.]
[A hospital is any facility for the diagnosis, care, and treatment of human
illness that is (licensed/specifically exempt from licensing) under state
law.]
689
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed paragraph on indirect touching if that is an issue. Give any of
the bracketed definitions on request depending on the facts in the case.
CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
CALCRIM No. 906, Assault Committed on School or Park Property.
AUTHORITY
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
RELATED ISSUES
Touching of Something Attached to or Closely Connected with Person
The committee could not locate any authority on whether it is sufficient to commit a
battery if the defendant touches something attached to or closely connected with the
person. Thus, the committee has not included this principle in the instruction.
Labor Dispute
Penal Code section 243.2 does not apply to conduct arising during the course of an
otherwise lawful labor dispute. (Pen. Code, § 243.2(c).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 24–25.
Against Order, § 144.02 (Matthew Bender).
690
(iv) Simple Battery
The defendant is charged with battery [in violation of Penal Code section
242].
prove that:
<insert name> in a harmful or offensive manner(;/.)
<Give element 2 when instructing on self-defense, defense of another, or
reasonable discipline.>
[AND
someone else/ [or] while reasonably disciplining a child).]
New January 2006; Revised August 2013, February 2014, March 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If there is sufficient evidence of reasonable parental discipline, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2, the bracketed
words “and unlawfully” in element 1, and CALCRIM No. 3405, Parental Right to
Punish a Child.
691

AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 242; see People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886,
889 [83 Cal.Rptr. 914] [harmful or offensive touching].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Defense of Parental Discipline. People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045,
1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
RELATED ISSUES
Touching of Something Attached to or Closely Connected with Person
The committee could not locate any authority on whether it is sufficient to commit a
battery if the defendant touches something attached to or closely connected with the
person. Thus, the committee has not included this principle in the instruction.
Battery Against Elder or Dependent Adult
When a battery is committed against an elder or dependent adult as defined in Penal
Code section 368, with knowledge that the victim is an elder or a dependent adult,
special punishments apply. (Pen. Code, § 243.25.)
Related Instruction
CALCRIM No. 917, Insulting Words Are Not a Defense.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 12–16.
692
(i) Shooting
965. Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle
(Pen. Code, § 246)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with shooting at an

(inhabited house/inhabited house car/inhabited camper/occupied
building/occupied motor vehicle/occupied aircraft) [in violation of Penal
Code section 246].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm;
[AND]
2. The defendant shot the firearm at an (inhabited house/inhabited
house car/inhabited camper/occupied building/occupied motor
vehicle/occupied aircraft)(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
purpose.
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to disturb, annoy, or
injure someone else.
[A (house/house car/camper) is inhabited if someone uses it as a dwelling,
whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged shooting.]
[A (house/house car/camper) is inhabited if someone used it as a dwelling
and left only because a natural or other disaster caused him or her to
leave.]
[A (house/house car/camper) is not inhabited if the former residents have
moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal property
remains inside.]
[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ <insert other
structure>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with
it.]
693
[A motor vehicle includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/

bus/school bus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor and trailer/
[A house car is a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently
altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has
been permanently attached.]
[A camper is a structure designed to be mounted upon a motor vehicle
and to provide facilities for human habitation or camping purposes.]
[An aircraft is an airplane or other craft intended for and capable of
transporting persons through the air.]
[The term[s] (firearm/ <insert other term>) (is/are) defined in
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2012, September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
CALCRIM No. 966, Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle.
CALCRIM No. 967, Shooting at Unoccupied Aircraft.
AUTHORITY
• Meaning of “at” in Pen. Code, § 246. People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427,
431–433 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148].
• Aircraft Defined. Pen. Code, § 247.
• Camper Defined. Veh. Code, § 243.
694
• House Car Defined. Veh. Code, § 362.

• Malicious Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); People v. Watie (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
866, 879 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258].
• Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432,
1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Jischke (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [59
Cal.Rptr.2d 269]; People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 431–433 [45
Cal.Rptr.2d 148] [intent to strike building not required].
• Occupied Building. People v. Adams (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 346, 354–355 [187
Cal.Rptr. 505] [attached garage].
• Occupied Motor Vehicle. People v. Buttles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1631, 1638
[273 Cal.Rptr. 397] [tractor/trailer rig being operated on a road].
• House Not Inhabited Means Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
• Offense of Discharging Firearm at Occupied Vehicle Can Be Committed When
Gun Is Inside Vehicle. People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889–890 [138
Cal.Rptr. 16, 270 P.3d 711].
Assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245) is not necessarily included in the
offense of discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle. (In re Daniel R. (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 239, 244, 247 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 414].)
Grossly negligent discharge of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 246.3(a) is
a lesser included offense of discharging a firearm at an occupied building. (People v.
Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 990 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 201 P.3d 466].)
RELATED ISSUES
Concurrent Sentence for Firearm Possession
If a prior felon arrives at the scene already in possession of a firearm and then
shoots at an inhabited dwelling, Penal Code section 654 does not preclude imposing
sentences for both offenses. (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 319].)
Shooting Weapon Inside Dwelling
“[T]he firing of a pistol within a dwelling house does not constitute a violation of
Penal Code section 246.” (People v. Stepney (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1021
[175 Cal.Rptr. 102] [shooting television inside dwelling].) However, shooting from
“inside [an] apartment . . . in the direction of the apartment below” is a violation of
section 246. (People v. Jischke (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 556 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d
269].)
695
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 49, 50.
Against Order, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).
696
966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle
(Pen. Code, § 247(b))

(uninhabited house[,]/ [or] uninhabited building[,]/ [or] unoccupied
motor vehicle) [in violation of Penal Code section 247(b)].
prove that:
[1.] The defendant willfully shot a firearm at an (uninhabited
house[,]/ [or] uninhabited building[,]/ [or] unoccupied motor
vehicle)(;/.)
<Give element 2 when consent of the owner is an issue; see Bench
Notes.>
[AND]
[2. The defendant did the shooting without the owner’s permission(;/
.)]
[AND
someone else).]
structure>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected with
it.]
New January 2006; Revised January 2007, February 2012

697
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Consent of the owner of the vehicle or building is an affirmative defense. (Pen.
Code, § 247(b); People v. Lam (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d
431].) If there is sufficient evidence of consent, the court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 2.
CALCRIM No. 965, Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 247(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 49–50.
Against Order, § 144.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).
698

unoccupied aircraft [in violation of Penal Code section 247(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm;
[AND]
2. The defendant shot the firearm at an unoccupied aircraft(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
purpose.
[An aircraft is an airplane or other craft intended for and capable of
transporting persons through the air.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
699
CALCRIM No. 965, Shooting at Inhabited House or Occupied Motor Vehicle.
CALCRIM No. 966, Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle.
AUTHORITY
• Aircraft Defined. Pen. Code, § 247.
1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155] [in context of Pen. Code, § 246].
RELATED ISSUES
Laser
Willfully and maliciously discharging a laser at an occupied aircraft that is in
motion or flight is a separate crime. (See Pen. Code, § 247.5.) It is also a crime to
willfully shine a light or other bright device at an aircraft with the intent to interfere
with the aircraft’s operation. (See Pen. Code, § 248.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 52.
700
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with shooting from a motor

vehicle [at another person] [in violation of Penal Code section 26100].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously shot a firearm from a
motor vehicle(;/.)
<Give element 2 when defendant charged with Pen. Code, § 26100(c).>
[AND]
[2. The defendant shot the firearm at another person who was not in
a motor vehicle(;/.)]
[AND
someone else).]
purpose.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
701
Give the bracketed phrase “at another person” in the first sentence plus bracketed
element 2 if the defendant is charged with shooting at someone who was not in a
motor vehicle. (See Pen. Code, § 26100(c).) If the defendant is only charged with
shooting from a motor vehicle (see Pen. Code, § 26100(d)), give element 1 but not
element 2.
CALCRIM No. 969, Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 26100(c) & (d).
1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155] [in context of Pen. Code, § 246].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1468 [61
Cal.Rptr.2d 680] [dictum].
• Assault With a Firearm is not a Lesser Included Offense. People v. Licas (2007)
41 Cal.4th 362 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 31].
RELATED ISSUES
Shooting at Animal
It is a separate crime to shoot from a motor vehicle at any game bird or mammal.
(See Fish & G. Code, § 3002.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 51.
Against Order, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2], [4] (Matthew Bender).
702
969. Permitting Someone to Shoot From Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 26100(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with permitting someone to

shoot from a vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section 26100(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was the (driver/ [or] owner) of a vehicle;
2. The defendant permitted someone to shoot a firearm from the
vehicle;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) was permitting someone to
shoot a firearm from the vehicle;
AND
4. The other person shot the firearm from the vehicle.
[A vehicle owner who permits someone else to shoot a firearm from the
vehicle is guilty even if the owner is not in the vehicle when the shooting
happens.]
[A vehicle is a device by which people or things may be moved on a road
or highway. A vehicle does not include a device that is moved only by
human power or used only on stationary rails or tracks.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
CALCRIM No. 968, Shooting From Motor Vehicle.
703
AUTHORITY
• General Intent Crime. People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1468 [61
Cal.Rptr.2d 680].
• Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, § 670.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 51.
Against Order, §§ 144.01[1][i], 144.03[2] (Matthew Bender).
704
970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner
(Pen. Code, § 246.3)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with shooting a (firearm/BB

Device) in a grossly negligent manner [in violation of Penal Code section
246.3].
prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally shot a (firearm/BB device);
2. The defendant did the shooting with gross negligence;
[AND]
3. The shooting could have resulted in the injury or death of a
person(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
or great bodily injury.
AND
she acts is so different from the way an ordinarily careful person would
[A BB device is any instrument that expels a projectile, such as a BB or
a pellet, through the force of air pressure, gas pressure, or spring
action.]
705
[The term[s] (great bodily injury/ [and] firearm) (is/are) defined in

New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2012, September 2019, September
2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 246.3.
• Discharge Must be Intentional. People v. Robertson (2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167
[17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872]; In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432,
1438 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 538 [16
Cal.Rptr.2d 656].
• BB Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 246.3(c).
• Willful Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
• Gross Negligence Defined. People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 540 [16
Cal.Rptr.2d 656]; see People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879–880 [285 P.2d
926].
• Actual Belief Weapon Not Loaded Negates Mental State. People v. Robertson
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 156, 167 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872]; In re Jerry R.
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438–1439, 1440 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155].
Unlawful possession by a minor of a firearm capable of being concealed on the
706
person (see Pen. Code, § 29610) is not a necessarily included offense of unlawfully
discharging a firearm with gross negligence. (In re Giovani M. (2000) 81
RELATED ISSUES
Actual Belief Weapon Not Loaded Negates Mental State
“A defendant who believed that the firearm he or she discharged was unloaded . . .
would not be guilty of a violation of section 246.3.” (People v. Robertson (2004) 34
Cal.4th 156, 167 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872] [citing In re Jerry R. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438–1439, 1440 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 48.
707
(ii) Brandishing
980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor
Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with brandishing a firearm

in the presence of someone in a motor vehicle [in violation of Penal Code
section 417.3].
prove that:
1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm in the presence of
another person who was in a motor vehicle that was being driven
on a public street or highway;
[AND]
2. The defendant drew or exhibited the firearm against the other
person in a threatening manner that would cause a reasonable
person to fear bodily harm(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[A motor vehicle is proceeding on a public street or highway if it is
moving on a street or highway with its engine running and propelling
the vehicle.]
[It is not required that the firearm be loaded.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
708

Give the bracketed paragraph about the lack of any requirement that the firearm be
loaded on request. (See Pen. Code, § 417.3.)
For misdemeanor brandishing instructions, see CALCRIM No. 983, Brandishing
Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 417.3; People v. Lara (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1560,
1565–1566 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 349] [brandishing must be directed against occupant
of vehicle].
• Motor Vehicle Defined. Veh. Code, §§ 415, 670.
• Proceeding Defined. People v. Howard (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 94, 97 [121
Cal.Rptr.2d 892].
• Victim’s Awareness of Firearm Not a Required Element. People v. McKinzie
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891] [in context of misdemeanor
brandishing under Pen. Code, § 417(a)].
• Brandishing a Firearm. Pen. Code, § 417.3; People v. Howard (2002) 100
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 4–7.
Against Order, § 144.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).
709
981. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Officer (Pen.
Code, § 417(c) & (e))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with brandishing a firearm

in the presence of a peace officer [in violation of Penal Code section 417].
prove that:
1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm in the immediate
presence of a peace officer;
2. The defendant drew or exhibited the firearm in a rude, angry, or
threatening manner;
3. When the defendant acted, the officer was lawfully performing
(his/her) duties;
[AND]
have known, from the person’s uniform or other identifying
action[s] that the person was a peace officer who was performing
(his/her) duties(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
[The term firearm is defined in another instruction to which you should
refer.]
offıcer”>.]
710

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Offıcer.
Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has already given the
loaded on request.
<insert title . . .> include,” on request. The court may insert a
711
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
For misdemeanor brandishing instructions, see CALCRIM No. 983, Brandishing
Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(c) & (e).
• Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520; see In re Jose A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
697, 702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 44] [pellet gun not a “firearm” within meaning of Pen.
Code, § 417(a)].
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891] [in context of misdemeanor
brandishing under Pen. Code, § 417(a)].
• Weapon Need Not Be Pointed Directly at Victim. People v. Sanders (1995) 11
Cal.4th 475, 542 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420] [in context of Pen. Code,
§ 417(a)].
• Brandishing a Firearm. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2).
RELATED ISSUES
Infliction of Serious Bodily Injury
It is a separate offense to intentionally inflict serious bodily injury while drawing or
exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer. (See Pen. Code, § 417.6(a);
see also Pen. Code, § 417.6(b) [defining “serious bodily injury”].)
Multiple Peace Officers
A “single act of exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer . . . cannot
be punished as many times as there are peace officers observing the act . . . . [T]he
multiple-victim exception [under Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11,
20–21 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839] for acts of violence against multiple victims]
is just that, a multiple-victim exception, not a multiple-observer exception.” (People
v. Hall (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095–1096 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 279].)
Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled Defendant
A defendant with a physical disability is entitled to an instruction that the reasonable
person standard as used in this instruction means a person with the same physical
disability. (People v. Mathews (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 99 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330];
see CALCRIM No. 3429, Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled
Person.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
712
713
982. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon to Resist Arrest
(Pen. Code, § 417.8)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with brandishing a (firearm/

deadly weapon) to resist arrest or detention [in violation of Penal Code
section 417.8].
prove that:
1. The defendant drew or exhibited a (firearm/deadly weapon);
AND
2. When the defendant drew or exhibited the (firearm/deadly
weapon), (he/she) intended to resist arrest or to prevent a peace
officer from arresting or detaining (him/her/someone else).
[The term[s] (firearm[,]/ deadly weapon[,]/ [and] great bodily injury) (is/
are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]
offıcer”>.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, September 2019,
714
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
loaded on request.
156].)
CALCRIM No. 983, Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor.
CALCRIM No. 981, Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Peace Offıcer.
CALCRIM No. 2653, Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Offıcer or
Public Offıcer.
715
AUTHORITY
• Firearm Defined. Pen. Code, § 16520; see In re Jose A. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
697, 702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 44] [pellet gun not a “firearm” within meaning of Pen.
Code, § 417(a)].
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204] [hands and feet not deadly weapons]; see, e.g.,
People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 351]
[screwdriver was capable of being used as a deadly weapon and defendant
intended to use it as one if need be]; People v. Henderson (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
453, 469–470 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 450] [pit bulls were deadly weapons under the
circumstances].
• Lawful Performance of Duties Not an Element. People v. Simons (1996) 42
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
Resisting arrest by a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties in
violation of Penal Code section 148(a) is not a lesser included offense of Penal
Code section 417.8. (People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1108–1110 [50
Cal.Rptr.2d 351].) Brandishing a deadly weapon in a rude, angry, or threatening
manner in violation of Penal Code section 417(a)(1) is also not a lesser included
offense of section 417.8. (People v. Pruett (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 77, 88 [66
Cal.Rptr.2d 750].)
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 981, Brandishing Firearm in
Presence of Peace Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
716
983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen.
Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with brandishing a (firearm/

deadly weapon) [in violation of Penal Code section 417(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant drew or exhibited a (firearm/deadly weapon) in
the presence of someone else;
[AND]
<Alternative 2A—displayed in rude, angry, or threatening manner>
[2. The defendant did so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner(;/
.)]
<Alternative 2B—used in fight>
[2. The defendant [unlawfully] used the (firearm/deadly weapon) in a
fight or quarrel(;/.)]
[AND
someone else).]
[The term[s] (firearm[,]/ deadly weapon[,]/ [and] great bodily injury) (is/
are) defined in another instruction to which you should refer.]
717
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2012, February 2013,
September 2019, September 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant displayed the weapon in a rude, angry,
or threatening manner, give alternative 2A. If the prosecution alleges that the
defendant used the weapon in a fight, give alternative 2B.
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A), the court must
also give CALCRIM No. 984, Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place.
Give the bracketed definition of “firearm” or “deadly weapon” unless the court has
already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the court may give
the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere.
156].)
On request, give the bracketed sentence stating that the firearm need not be loaded.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2).
718

Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 794 [224 Cal.Rptr. 891].
• Weapon Need Not Be Pointed Directly at Victim. People v. Sanders (1995) 11
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
719
984. Brandishing Firearm: Misdemeanor—Public Place (Pen.
Code, § 417(a)(2)(A))
If you find the defendant guilty of brandishing a firearm, you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the
defendant brandished a firearm that was capable of being concealed on
the person while in a public place [in violation of Penal Code section
417(a)(2)(A)].
1. The defendant drew or exhibited a firearm that was capable of
being concealed on the person;
AND
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was (in a public place in an
incorporated city/ [or] on a public street).
A firearm capable of being concealed on the person is a firearm that has
a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A firearm capable of being
concealed on the person also includes any device that has a barrel 16
inches or more in length that is designed to be interchanged with a
barrel less than 16 inches in length.]
[As used here, a public place is a place that is open and accessible to
anyone who wishes to go there.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A), the court has a
sua sponte duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 983, Brandishing Firearm or
Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor.
The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate
if the prosecution has or has not been proved this allegation.
Penal Code section 417(a)(2)(A) applies to a firearm that “is a pistol, revolver, or
other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Penal Code section
12001(a)(1) provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the
committee has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of
being concealed on the person.”
720
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 417(a)(2)(A).
• Firearm Capable of Being Concealed Defined. Pen. Code, § 16530.
• Public Place Defined. In re Zorn (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 652 [30 Cal.Rptr. 811,
381 P.2d 635]; People v. Strider (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1401 [100
Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, § 4–7.
Against Order, § 144.01[1][d], [e] (Matthew Bender).
721
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with brandishing an

imitation firearm [in violation of Penal Code section 417.4].
prove that:
1. The defendant drew or exhibited an imitation firearm in a
threatening manner against another person;
2. The defendant’s act caused someone to fear bodily harm to
himself or herself or someone else;
[AND]
3. That fear of harm was reasonable(;/.)
[AND
4. When the defendant drew or exhibited the imitation firearm, (he/
she) was not acting (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of someone
else).]
An imitation firearm is a device[, or a toy gun, replica of a firearm, gun-
shaped phone case, or BB device,] that is so substantially similar to a
real firearm in color and overall appearance that a reasonable person
would believe that it is a real firearm. [A BB device is an instrument that
expels a projectile, such as a BB or other pellet, either 6 millimeters or 8
millimeters in caliber, through the force of air pressure, gas pressure, or
spring action, or any spot marker gun that expels a projectile 10
millimeters or less in caliber.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2016, September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Imitation Firearm. Pen. Code, § 16700.
722
• BB Device Defined. Pen. Code, § 16250.

• Reasonable Person Must Be Placed in Fear. In re Michael D. (2002) 100
• Person Placed in Fear May Be Bystander. In re Michael D. (2002) 100
RELATED ISSUES
Reasonable Person Who Fears Harm May Be Bystander
Penal Code section 417.4 requires not “only the presence of another person against
whom the imitation firearm is displayed or exhibited, but also some person’s
knowledge of, and a reaction to, the perpetrator’s action.” (In re Michael D. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 115, 124 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 909].) Thus, someone must be placed in
fear as a result of the defendant’s conduct; however, this does not have to be the
person against whom the object is exhibited. (Id. at pp. 120–123.) The term
“reasonable person,” as used in the statute “refers to anyone who witnesses the
actions of the perpetrator, not just to the person against whom the device is drawn
or exhibited.” (Id. at p. 123.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][e], [h] (Matthew Bender).
723
SEX OFFENSES

(i) Rape
1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3),
(k))
1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code,
§ 287(a), (h))
(iii) Sodomy
1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2) & (3), (k))
1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1) & (2),
(g))
725
SEX OFFENSES

1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code,
§ 289(c))
1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) &
(c)(2))
1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a)
& (d))
1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen.
Code, § 261.5(a) & (c))
1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within Three Years of
Defendant’s Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))
1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code,
§ 287(b)(2))
(iii) Sodomy
726
SEX OFFENSES

(vi) Other Offenses
1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies (Pen. Code,
§ 288.3(a))
1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10 Years of Age or
Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))
1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of
Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))
1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen. Code,
§ 288.2(a)(1) & (2))
1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor (Pen.
Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))
1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material (Pen. Code,
§ 311.2(a))
1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual Conduct (Pen.
Code, § 311.11(a))
727
SEX OFFENSES

(v) Other Offenses
D. EVIDENCE
728
(i) Rape
1000. Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6)
& (7))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with rape by force [in

violation of Penal Code section 261(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with a woman;
2. The woman did not consent to the intercourse;
AND
3. The defendant accomplished the intercourse by
<Alternative 3A—force or fear>
[force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to the woman or to someone else.]
<Alternative 3B—future threats of bodily harm>
[threatening to retaliate in the future against the woman or someone
else when there was a reasonable possibility that the defendant would
carry out the threat. A threat to retaliate is a threat to kidnap, falsely
imprison, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]
<Alternative 3C—threat of offıcial action>
[threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport someone. A public official is a person employed by
federal, state, or local government who has authority to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport. The woman must have reasonably believed that the
defendant was a public official even if he was not.]
Sexual intercourse means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the
vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]
[To consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and know the
nature of the act.]
[A woman who initially consents to an act of intercourse may change her
mind during the act. If she does so, under the law, the act of intercourse
is then committed without her consent if:
729
CALCRIM No. 1000 SEX OFFENSES
1. She communicated through words or acts to the defendant that

she no longer consented to the act of intercourse;
2. A reasonable person would have understood that her words or
acts expressed her lack of consent;
AND
3. The defendant forcibly continued the act of intercourse despite
her objection.]
[It is not required that she physically resist or fight back in order to
communicate her lack of consent.]
[Evidence that the defendant and the woman (dated/were married/had
been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[Evidence that the woman (requested/suggested/communicated) that the
defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by
itself to constitute consent.]
[Intercourse is accomplished by force if a person uses enough physical
force to overcome the woman’s will.]
[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or
retribution that would cause a reasonable person to do [or submit to]
something that she would not do [or submit to] otherwise. When
deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the
circumstances, including the woman’s age and her relationship to the
defendant.]
[Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.]
[Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure
someone.]
[Intercourse is accomplished by fear if the woman is actually and
reasonably afraid [or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and the
defendant knows of her fear and takes advantage of it].]
[A woman must be alive at the time of the sexual intercourse for the
crime of rape to occur.]
[The defendant is not guilty of rape if he actually and reasonably
believed that the woman consented to the intercourse [and actually and
reasonably believed that she consented throughout the act of
intercourse]. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and reasonably
believe that the woman consented. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.]
730
SEX OFFENSES CALCRIM No. 1000
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, February 2014, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction defining the elements of
rape.
Penal Code section 261, as amended by Assembly Bill 1171 (Stats. 2021, ch. 626),
became effective on January 1, 2022. If the defendant’s alleged act occurred before
this date, the court should give the prior version of this instruction.
The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 3 describing how the
sexual intercourse was allegedly accomplished.
Rape requires that the victim be alive at the moment of intercourse. (People v.
Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965];
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 391 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].)
Intercourse with a deceased victim may constitute attempted rape if the defendant
intended to rape a live victim. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 524–526 [3
Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) If this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed
sentence that begins with “A woman must be alive . . .”
The defendant must continue to actually and reasonably believe in the victim’s
consent throughout the act. If the act of intercourse begins consensually and the
victim then changes her mind, the victim must clearly and unequivocally
communicate to the defendant her withdrawal of consent to the act. If, however, the
defendant initiates the use of nonconsensual duress, menace, or force during the act,
the victim’s subsequent withdrawal of consent to the act may be inferred from the
circumstances and need not be expressed. (People v. Ireland (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
328, 338 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 915]). If there is an issue regarding the defendant’s
continued belief in the victim’s consent, give the second optional first sentence in
the definition of “Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent.”
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in
consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a
defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”
(See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d
961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542
P.2d 1337].)
CALCRIM No. 1001, Rape in Concert, may be given in conjunction with this
instruction, if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2), (6) & (7).
• Duress Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(b).
731
• Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c).

• Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 263; People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 600 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
• Fear Defined. People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d
258, 872 P.2d 1183] [level of fear].
• Force Defined. People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
• Mistake of Fact Regarding Consent. People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp.
153–158; People v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 124 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].
• Circumstances Requiring Mayberry Instruction. People v. Dominguez (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1141 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866].
• Withdrawal of Consent. In re John Z. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128
Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].
• Inferring Lack of Consent From Circumstances. People v. Ireland (2010) 188
• Victim Need Not Resist. People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 297–302 [228
Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110].
COMMENTARY
Gender-specific language is used because rape usually occurs between a man and a
woman. In keeping with plain English principles, the committee used those terms to
make the instruction clear and concrete.
“[T]he offense of forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual
intercourse, the victim expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the
defendant forcibly continues despite the objection . . . . ‘[I]t is immaterial at what
point the victim withdraws her consent, so long as that withdrawal is communicated
to the male and he thereafter ignores it.’ ” (In re John Z., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.
760.)
The instruction includes definitions of “duress,” “menace,” and the sufficiency of
“fear” because those terms have meanings in the context of rape that are technical
and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See Pen. Code, §§ 262(b) [duress] and
(c) [menace]; People v. Iniguez, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 856–857 [fear].)
The term “force” as used in the rape statutes does not have a specialized meaning
and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (People v. Griffın, supra, 33
Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024.) In People v. Griffın, the Supreme Court further stated,
Nor is there anything in the common usage definitions of the term “force,” or in
the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a
forcible rape prosecution actually means force “substantially different from or
substantially greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of
consensual sexual intercourse. [People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465,
732
474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].] To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in
order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, subdivision (2), the
prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a degree
sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was against the
will of the [victim].” (People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257–258
[235 Cal.Rptr. 361] . . . .)
(Ibid. [emphasis in original].)
The committee has provided a bracketed definition of “force,” consistent with
People v. Griffın, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024, that the court may give on
request.
• Assault With Intent to Commit Rape. Pen. Code, § 220; In re Jose M. (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]; People v. Moran (1973) 33
Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible rape is charged].
• Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261.
• Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; People v. Guiterrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624,
1636 [284 Cal.Rptr. 230], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cromer
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; but see
People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 38–39 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262]
[battery not a lesser included of attempted rape].
RELATED ISSUES
A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sexual intercourse
by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which
does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her
free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to
obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See People v.
Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting
defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force,
and were only violations of section 266c].)
Minor Victim and Unanimity
“Generic testimony” by a victim who was 15 and 16 years old does not deprive a
defendant of a due process right to defend against the charges. If the victim
“specifies the type of conduct involved, its frequency, and that the conduct occurred
during the limitation period, nothing more is required to establish the substantiality
of the victim’s testimony.” (People v. Matute (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1446
[127 Cal.Rptr.2d 472] [affirming conviction for multiple counts of rape under Pen.
Code, § 261(a)(2); citing People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 316 [270 Cal.Rptr.
611, 792 P.2d 643]].)
When there is no reasonable likelihood the jury will disagree on particular acts of
733
molestation, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed
all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in
addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts,
also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all
the acts described by the victim. (People v. Matute, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p.
1448; People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322; see CALCRIM No. 3501,
Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented.)
Mistake-of-Fact Defense and Developmental Disability
A defendant cannot base a reasonable-belief-of-consent defense on the fact that he is
developmentally disabled and, as a result, did not act as a reasonable person would
have acted. (People v. Castillo (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 124–125 [238 Cal.Rptr.
207].)
Multiple Rapes
A penetration, however slight, completes the crime of rape; therefore a separate
conviction is proper for each penetration that occurs. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48
Cal.3d 321, 329–334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078].)
Resistance Is Not Required
Resistance by the victim is not required for rape; any instruction to that effect is
erroneous. (People v. Barnes, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 292, 302.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–15, 20, 178.
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][a], [2], 142.23[1][e] (Matthew Bender).
Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:18, 12:19
(The Rutter Group).
734
The defendant[s] [ <insert name[s] if not all defendants in

trial charged with this count>] (is/are) charged [in Count ] with
committing rape by acting in concert [with <insert name[s]
or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code
section 264.1].
To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that:
<Alternative A—defendant committed rape>
[1.] [The defendant personally committed forcible rape and
voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted its
commission(;/.)]
[OR]
<Alternative B—defendant aided and abetted>
[(1/2).] [The defendant voluntarily aided and abetted someone else
who personally committed forcible rape.]
To decide whether the defendant[s] [or <insert name[s] or
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed rape, please refer
to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that
crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or <insert
name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and abetted
rape, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given)
you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions when you
decide whether the People have proved rape in concert.
<Make certain that all appropriate instructions on rape and aiding and
abetting are given.>
[To prove the crime of rape in concert, the People do not have to prove a
prearranged plan or scheme to commit rape.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2021, March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (See Pen. Code, § 264.1; People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621
[236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The
court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct on rape. Give one or more of the
following instructions defining rape: CALCRIM No. 1000, or CALCRIM Nos.
1005–1114.
735
Select alternative A or B, or both, depending on whether the defendant personally

committed the crime or aided and abetted someone else.
Depending on the evidence, give the final bracketed paragraph on request regarding
the lack of a prearranged plan. (See People v. Calimee (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337,
341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)
See generally CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles and
CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes.
CALCRIM No. 3185, Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factor—Using Force or Fear
Against Minor Under 14 Years/14 Years or Older.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 264.1; see People v. Mom (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217,
1224 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [requires no greater force than that necessary for
forcible rape], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Griffın (2004) 33
• Forcible Rape Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2).
• Aiding and Abetting. People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 445–446 [23
Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; see People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199
Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
COMMENTARY
There is conflicting authority whether all types of forcible rape may be the basis for
charging a rape in concert. (Compare In re Jose M. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [rape by duress, menace, and fear unavailable under Pen.
Code, § 264.1] and People v. Mom (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1222–1223 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [§ 264.1 only includes rape involving “force” and “violence”],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089], with People v. Wheeler (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 902,
907 [139 Cal.Rptr. 737] [§ 264.1 includes any unlawful use of force, including
threat of harm].) The instruction addresses rape accomplished by force or violence.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(2), 264.1.) If another basis for charging rape in concert is
argued, for example, rape by duress, menace, fear, or threats (see Pen. Code,
§ 261(a)(2), (6), & (7)), see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats
for appropriate language that may be included on request.
Penal Code section 264.1 deals with a crime of substance, and is not an
enhancement statute, as discussed in People v. Best (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 232, 237
[191 Cal.Rptr. 614].
• Assault With Intent to Commit Rape. Pen. Code, § 220; In re Jose M. (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]; People v. Moran (1973) 33
736
Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where forcible rape is charged].
• Rape. Pen. Code, § 261.
RELATED ISSUES
Need Not Personally Participate
A defendant may be convicted of rape in concert if he or she was at the general
scene of the rape and aided and abetted another person in accomplishing the act,
even if the defendant did not personally participate in the act or was not personally
present at the exact scene of the act. (See People v. Lopez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d
882, 887–888 [172 Cal.Rptr. 374]; People v. Barnett (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1046,
1049 [127 Cal.Rptr. 88] [oral copulation in concert although not in room when act
took place]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 933 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547]
[rape in concert by holding victim’s family at gun point in another room].)
However, the Supreme Court has not resolved whether a person acts in concert
when his accomplice assists in the commission of the crime, but is not present at the
general scene (for example, when the accomplice provides the rapist with
information about the victim, or pays the rapist to commit the act). (People v.
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 933, fn. 22 [891 P.2d 93].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, § 21.
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][a], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
737
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with raping a woman while

she was intoxicated [in violation of <insert appropriate code
section[s]>].
prove that:
2. The effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance
prevented the woman from resisting;
AND
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
effect of (a/an) (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance
prevented the woman from resisting.
A person is prevented from resisting if he or she is so intoxicated that he
or she cannot give legal consent. In order to give legal consent, a person
must be able to exercise reasonable judgment. In other words, the person
must be able to understand and weigh the physical nature of the act, its
moral character, and probable consequences. Legal consent is consent
given freely and voluntarily by someone who knows the nature of the act
involved.
[ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance> (is/are) [a]
controlled substance[s].]
<Defense: Reasonable Belief Capable of Consent>
[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if he actually and reasonably
believed that the woman was capable of consenting to sexual intercourse,
even if that belief was wrong. The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and
reasonably believe that the woman was capable of consenting. If the
guilty.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, March 2018, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
738
A space is provided to identify controlled substances, if the parties agree.
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief that the
person was capable of consent. (People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187 [223
Cal.Rptr.3d 105].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 261(a)(3).
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6.
• Controlled Substances. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see People v.
Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
• Anesthetic Effect. See People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95
Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].
• General Intent and Knowledge Requirements. People v. Linwood (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 59, 67–72 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 73] [statute is not impermissibly vague
and uses appropriate criminal negligence standard].
• “Prevented From Resisting” Defined. People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
187, 192–193 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105] [CALCRIM 1032 has correct definition];
People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].
• Reasonable Belief in Capacity to Consent. People v. Lujano (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 187, 191–192 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105]; People v. Giardino (2000) 82
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Smith (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 199, 204–205
[120 Cal.Rptr.3d 52].
COMMENTARY
• Attempted Rape. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261(a)(3).
739

[battery not a lesser included offense of attempted rape].
RELATED ISSUES
Administering Drugs to Assist Commission of Felony
A person who administers to someone else any chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any
controlled substance, anesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with the intent to enable or
assist himself or herself or any other person to commit a felony is guilty of a felony.
(Pen. Code, § 222.)
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–8, 18, 20, 178.
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][a], [5], 142.23[1][e] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
740
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with raping a woman who

was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of
<insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
2. The woman was unable to resist because she was unconscious of
the nature of the act;
AND
3. The defendant knew that the woman was unable to resist because
she was unconscious of the nature of the act.
A woman is unconscious of the nature of the act if she is (unconscious or
asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not aware of the
essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator tricked, lied
to, or concealed information from her/ [or] not aware of the essential
characteristics of the act because the perpetrator fraudulently
represented that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose
when it served no professional purpose).
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, August 2013, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Select the appropriate language defining “unconscious of the nature of the act”
based on the facts of the case.
AUTHORITY
741
• Unconscious of Nature of Act. People v. Howard (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 55
[172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required]; see Boro v. Superior
Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122] [rape victim
not unconscious of nature of act; fraud in the inducement].
COMMENTARY
The statutory language describing unconsciousness includes “was not aware,
knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.” (See Pen. Code,
§ 261(a)(4)(B)–(D).) The committee did not discern any difference among the
statutory terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue
over a particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.
• Attempted Rape of Unconscious Woman. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 261(a)(4).
RELATED ISSUES
Advance Consent
Neither a woman’s actual “advance consent” nor a man’s belief in “advance
consent” eliminates the wrongfulness of a man’s conduct in knowingly depriving an
unconscious woman of her freedom of choice both at the initiation of and during
sexual intercourse. A person who commits the prohibited act necessarily acts with a
wrongful intent. (People v. Dancy (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 21, 37 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d
898].)
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 1–8, 178.
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][a], [5] (Matthew Bender).
742
(The Rutter Group).
743
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with raping a mentally or

physically disabled woman [in violation of Penal Code section 261(a)(1)].
prove that:
2. He and the woman were not married to each other at the time of
the intercourse;
3. The woman had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical
disability) that prevented her from legally consenting;
AND
woman had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical
disability) that prevented her from legally consenting.
A woman is prevented from legally consenting if she is unable to
understand the act, its nature, and possible consequences.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492,
495–496 [290 P. 618].
744
• This Instruction Completely Explains Inability to Give Legal Consent. People v.
Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419, fn. 13 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 315] [in
dicta].
COMMENTARY
RELATED ISSUES
No Duty to Define “Developmental Disability”
There is no sua sponte duty to define “developmental disability” under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 4512(a) or Penal Code section 1370.1(a)(1). The
Legislature did not intend to limit this phrase to such technical medical or legal
definitions, although a pinpoint instruction may be requested if it helps the jury in
any particular case. (People v. Mobley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 781–783 [85
Cal.Rptr.2d 474] [in context of oral copulation].)
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
745
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with rape by fraud [in

violation of Penal Code section 261(a)(5)].
prove that:
2. The woman submitted to the intercourse because she believed the
defendant was someone she knew, other than the defendant;
AND
3. The defendant tricked her, lied to her, [used an artifice or
pretense,] or concealed information from her, intending to make
her believe he was someone she knew, while intending to hide his
own identity.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
COMMENTARY
746
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
747
1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code,
§ 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with oral copulation by

force [in violation of Penal Code section 287].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone
else;
2. The other person did not consent to the act;
AND
3. The defendant accomplished the act by
[force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to someone.]
[threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a reasonable
possibility that the threat would be carried out. A threat to retaliate is
a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or confine, or inflict extreme
pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]
[threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport someone. A public official is a person employed by a
government agency who has the authority to incarcerate, arrest, or
deport. The other person must have reasonably believed that the
defendant was a public official even if (he/she) was not.]
Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth
of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person.
Penetration is not required.
[In order to consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know
the nature of the act.]
[Evidence that the defendant and the person (dated/were married/had
been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[Evidence that the person (requested/suggested/communicated) that the
defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough by
itself to constitute consent.]
748
[An act is accomplished by force if a person uses enough physical force to

overcome the other person’s will.]
[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger,
hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit
to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].
When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all
the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her)
relationship to the defendant.]
someone.]
[An act is accomplished by fear if the other person is actually and
reasonably afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the
defendant knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]
[The defendant is not guilty of forcible oral copulation if he or she
actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the
act. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the
person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2021, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the act was allegedly
accomplished.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k).
• Duress Defined. People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
• Menace Defined. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
749
• Oral Copulation Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(a); People v. Grim (1992) 9

• Threatening to Retaliate Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(l).
• Fear Defined. People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr.
651]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d
1183] [in context of rape].
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089]; People v. Guido (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566,
574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].
• Threatening to Retaliate. People v. White (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 473, 484–485
[34 Cal.Rptr.3d 848]; People v. Ward (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 459, 468 [233
Cal.Rptr. 477].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 287 requires that the oral copulation be “against the will” of the
other person. (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k).) “Against the will” has been
defined as “without consent.” (People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203
Cal.Rptr. 144]; see also People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257 [235
Cal.Rptr. 361].)
The instruction includes a definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term
has meaning in the context of forcible oral copulation that is technical and may not
be readily apparent to jurors. (See People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857
[30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)
The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “duress” or
“menace” and Penal Code section 287 does not define either term. (People v.
Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress].) Optional
definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of
“duress” is based on People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definition
contained in Penal Code section 261 (rape). (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving
forcible lewd acts].) In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court
held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261
and former 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court
did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the
Leal opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a
specialized meaning and court is not required to define the term sua sponte. (People
v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024; People v. Guido (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 566, 574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826]). In People v. Griffın, supra, the
Supreme Court further stated,
750
[235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
(People v. Griffın, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1024 [emphasis in original]; see
also People v. Guido (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 574–576 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826]
[Griffın reasoning applies to violation of Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2)].)
People v. Griffın, supra, that the court may give on request.
• Assault With Intent to Commit Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 220; see In re Jose
M. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape];
People v. Moran (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where
forcible crime is charged].
• Attempted Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287.
RELATED ISSUES
A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in oral copulation by a
false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s
argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were
only violations of section 266c].)
Consent Withdrawn
A forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim
expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly
continues despite the objection. (In re John Z. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128
Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to oral
751
copulation was withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.
Multiple Acts of Oral Copulation
An accused may be convicted for multiple, nonconsensual sex acts of an identical
nature that follow one another in quick, uninterrupted succession. (People v. Catelli
(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1446–1447 [278 Cal.Rptr. 452] [defendant properly
convicted of multiple violations of former Pen. Code, § 288a where he interrupted
the acts of copulation and forced victims to change positions].)
Sexual Organ
A man’s “sexual organ” for purposes of Penal Code section 287 includes the penis
and the scrotum. (Pen. Code, § 287; People v. Catelli (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434,
1448–1449 [278 Cal.Rptr. 452].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][c], [2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
752

committing oral copulation by acting in concert [with
<insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in
violation of Penal Code section 287(d)].
that:
<Alternative A—defendant committed oral copulation>
[1.] [The defendant personally committed oral copulation and
commission(;/.)]
[OR]
who personally committed oral copulation.]
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed oral copulation,
please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you
on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or
<insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and
abetted oral copulation, please refer to the separate instructions that I
(will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those
instructions when you decide whether the People have proved oral
copulation in concert.
<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON ORAL
COPULATION AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>
[To prove the crime of oral copulation in concert, the People do not have
to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit oral copulation.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (See Pen. Code, § 287(d).) The court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct
on oral copulation. Give one or more of the following instructions defining oral
copulation: CALCRIM No. 1015 or CALCRIM Nos. 1017–1022.
753

341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)
See generally CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(d).
• Aiding and Abetting. People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446
[23 Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; People v. Caldwell (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 951–952
[200 Cal.Rptr. 508]; People v. Calimee (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122
Cal.Rptr. 658] [in context of sodomy in concert].
• Consent Defined. People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P.
618].
• Assault With Intent to Commit Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 220; see In re Jose
M. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape];
People v. Moran (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [when
• Attempted Oral Copulation in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 287(d).
• Oral Copulation. Pen. Code, § 287.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1015, Oral Copulation by
Force, Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1001, Rape in Concert.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 35, 40, 178.
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][c], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
754
1017. Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code,
§ 287(a), (i))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with oral copulation of a

person while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code
section 287(i)].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with another
person;
2. An (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance prevented the
other person from resisting;
AND
effect of an (intoxicating/anesthetic/controlled) substance
prevented the other person from resisting.
involved.
[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) actually and
reasonably believed that the person was capable of consenting to oral
copulation, even if the defendant’s belief was wrong. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
actually and reasonably believe that the woman was capable of
consenting. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty.]

755
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A space is provided to identify controlled substances if the parties agree that there is
no issue of fact.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief the
person was capable of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense.
(See People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].)
CALCRIM No. 1016, Oral Copulation in Concert, may be given in conjunction
with this instruction, if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (i).
• Controlled Substances. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see People v.
Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
• Anesthetic Effect. See People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799 [95
Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].
• Oral Copulation Defined. People v. Grim (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
• “Prevented From Resisting” Defined. See People v. Giardino (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315] [rape of intoxicated woman].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1015, Oral Copulation by Force,
Fear, or Threats.
A defendant may be convicted of both oral copulation of an intoxicated person and
oral copulation of an unconscious person. (People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th
533 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 335 P.3d 1083]; Pen. Code, § 287(f), (i).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency §§ 35–37, 39, 178.
756
(The Rutter Group).
757
1018. Oral Copulation of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code,
§ 287(a), (f))

person who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of
Penal Code section 287(f)].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of oral copulation with another
person;
2. The other person was unable to resist because (he/she) was
unconscious of the nature of the act;
AND
3. The defendant knew that the other person was unable to resist
because (he/she) was unconscious of the nature of the act.
A person is unconscious of the nature of the act if he or she is
(unconscious or asleep/ [or] not aware that the act is occurring/ [or] not
aware of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator
tricked, lied to, or concealed information from the person/ [or] not aware
of the essential characteristics of the act because the perpetrator
fraudulently represented that the oral copulation served a professional
purpose when it served no professional purpose).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (f).
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
758
COMMENTARY
§ 287(f)(2)–(4).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory
terms and therefore used “aware” in the instruction. If there is an issue over a
particular term, that term should be inserted in the instruction.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues Section to CALCRIM No. 1015, Oral Copulation by Force,
Fear, or Threats.
A defendant may be convicted of both oral copulation of an intoxicated person and
oral copulation of an unconscious person. (People v. Gonzalez (2014) 60 Cal.4th
533 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 335 P.3d 1083]; Pen. Code, § 287(f), (i).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency §§ 35–37, 39, 178.
(The Rutter Group).
759
1019. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code, § 287(a),
(g))

mentally or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section
287(g)].
prove that:
else;
2. The other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or
physical disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally
consenting;
AND
other person had a (mental disorder/developmental or physical
disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting.
A person is prevented from legally consenting if he or she is unable to

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (g).
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492,
495–496 [290 P. 618].
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
760
• This Instruction Completely Explains Inability to Give Legal Consent. People v.

Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1419, fn. 13 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 315] [in
dicta].
RELATED ISSUES
Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
761
1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital
(Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))

mentally or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation
of Penal Code section 287(h)].
prove that:
else;
consenting;
disability) that prevented (him/her) from legally consenting;
AND
4. At the time of the act, both people were confined in a state
hospital or other mental health facility.
A person is incapable of giving legal consent if he or she is unable to
[ <Insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/mental health
facility).] [A state hospital or other mental health facility includes a state
hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or any
other public or private facility approved by a county mental health
director for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A space is provided to identify a facility as a state hospital or other mental health
facility if the parties agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a
762
factual dispute about whether an institution is a state hospital or other mental health
facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 287(h).)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h).
• State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 287(h); see Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 7100 [county psychiatric facilities], § 7200 [state hospitals for
mentally disordered], § 7500 [state hospitals for developmentally disabled].
• Legal Consent. People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
RELATED ISSUES
Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
763
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with oral copulation by

fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 287(j)].
prove that:
else;
2. The other person submitted to the oral copulation because (he/
she) believed the defendant was someone (he/she) knew, other
than the defendant;
AND
3. The defendant tricked, lied, [used an artifice or pretense,] or
concealed information, intending to make the other person believe
(he/she) was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide (his/
her) own identity.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (j).
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
RELATED ISSUES
Fear, or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crime Against Decency, § 38.
764
(The Rutter Group).
765
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with oral copulation

committed while (he/she) was confined in (state prison/a local detention
facility) [in violation of Penal Code section 287(e)].
prove that:
1. The defendant participated in an act of oral copulation with
someone else;
AND
2. At the time of the act, the defendant was confined in a (state
prison/local detention facility).
[ <insert name of facility> is a (state prison/local detention
facility).] [A state prison is any prison or institution maintained by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.] [A local detention facility
includes any city, county, or regional jail or other facility used to confine
adults [or both adults and minors].]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A space is provided to identify a state prison or local detention facility if the parties
agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a factual dispute about
whether the defendant was confined in a state prison or local detention facility, give
the second or third bracketed sentences (or both, if necessary). (See Pen. Code,
§§ 4504, 5003, 6031.4.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 287(a), (e).
766
• State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003.

[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
RELATED ISSUES
Fear, or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
767
(iii) Sodomy
1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2) &
(3), (k))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy by force [in

violation of Penal Code section 286].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
AND
3. The defendant accomplished the act:
[by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to another person.]
[by threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a
reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat.
A threat to retaliate is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or
confine, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]
[by threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate,
government agency who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or
Sodomy is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one
person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]
[Evidence that the defendant and the other person (dated/were married/
had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[Evidence that the other person (requested/suggested/communicated) that
the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough
by itself to constitute consent.]
768

hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit
to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].
When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all
the circumstances, including the age of the other person and (his/her)
someone.]
reasonably afraid [or he or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and
the defendant knows of his or her fear and takes advantage of it].]
[The other person must be alive at the time of the act for the crime of
sodomy to occur.]
[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sodomy if (he/she) actually and
reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person
consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012, October 2021, March
2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sodomy. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k); People v. Martinez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d
19, 24–26 [232 Cal.Rptr. 736]; People v. Moore (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1407
[260 Cal.Rptr. 134].)
The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the
sodomy was accomplished.
Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of the act. (People v.
Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; If
this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other
person must be alive . . .”
769
P.2d 1337].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
• Sodomy Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see People v. Singh (1923) 62 Cal.App.
450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
651]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089]; see also People v. Guido (2005) 125
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 286 requires that the sodomy be “against the will” of the other
person. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).) “Against the will” has been defined as
“without consent.” (People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr.
144] [in context of rape]; see also People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257
[235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
The instruction includes a definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term
has meaning in the context of forcible sodomy that is technical and may not be
readily apparent to jurors. (See People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810
[200 Cal.Rptr. 651] [fear]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at 50.
770
The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definition contained in Penal

Code section 261 (rape). (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14
[126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd acts].)
In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court held that the
statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and former
262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not
discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the Leal
opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].)
In People v. Griffın, supra, the Supreme Court further stated,
consensual sexual intercourse. (People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465,
474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in
order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, [former] subdivision
(2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a
degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual intercourse was
against the will of the [victim].” (People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248,
257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
(Ibid. [emphasis in original]; see also People v. Guido (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566,
574 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].)
• Assault With Intent to Commit Sodomy. Pen. Code, § 220; see In re Jose M.
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape];
• Attempted Forcible Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286.
• Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 366 [116
Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].
Non-forcible sex crimes requiring the perpetrator and victim to be within certain age
limits are not lesser included offenses of forcible sex crimes. (People v. Scott (2000)
771
RELATED ISSUES
A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sodomy by a false
or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s
argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were
only violations of section 266c].)
Consent Withdrawn
Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to sodomy was
withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or Threats, for language
that may be adapted for use in this instruction.
Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of penetration. (People v.
Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 521, fn. 20 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; People
v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965].) Sodomy
with a deceased victim can constitute attempted sodomy if the defendant attempted
an act of forcible sodomy while the victim was alive or with the mistaken belief
that the victim was alive. (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 521, fn. 20;
People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683].)
Penetration May Be Through Victim’s Clothing
If there is penetration into a victim’s anus by a perpetrator’s sexual organ, it is
sodomy, even if the victim is wearing clothing at the time. (People v. Ribera (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 81, 85–86 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 538].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 27, 28, 30, 178.
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][b], [2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
772

committing sodomy by acting in concert [with <insert
name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of
Penal Code section 286(d)].
that:
<Alternative A—defendant committed sodomy>
[1.] [The defendant personally committed sodomy and voluntarily
acted with someone else who aided and abetted its commission(;/
.)]
[OR]
who personally committed sodomy.]
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed sodomy, please
refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that
sodomy, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions
when you decide whether the People have proved sodomy in concert.
<MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ON
SODOMY AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>
[To prove the crime of sodomy in concert, the People do not have to
prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit sodomy.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape
in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The court also has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on sodomy. Give one or more of the following instructions
defining sodomy: CALCRIM No. 1030 or CALCRIM Nos. 1032–1037.
773

341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)
See CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and CALCRIM
No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes.
AUTHORITY
• Aiding and Abetting. People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446
Cal.Rptr. 658].
• Assault With Intent to Commit Sodomy. Pen. Code, § 220; see In re Jose M.
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape];
• Attempted Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286.
• Attempted Sodomy in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 286(d).
• Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 286.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1030, Sodomy by Force, Fear,
or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1001, Rape in Concert.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][b], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
774
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy of a person

while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code section
286(i)].
prove that:
prevented the other person from resisting;
AND
effect of that substance prevented the other person from resisting.
involved.
[ <If appropriate, insert controlled substance[s]> (is/are) [a]
reasonably believed that the other person was capable of consenting to
the act, even if that belief was wrong. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually
and reasonably believe that the other person was capable of consenting.
guilty.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
775
no issue of fact.
CALCRIM No. 1031, Sodomy in Concert, may be given in conjunction with this
instruction if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(i); People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791,
802–803 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
• Anesthetic Effect Defined. People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798–799
[95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
• Controlled Substances Defined. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see
People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
• Prevented From Resisting Defined. People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187,
192–193 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105] [CALCRIM 1032 has correct definition]; People
v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 465–466 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315][in context
of rape].
• Reasonable Belief in Capacity to Consent. People v. Lujano (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 187, 191–192 [223 Cal.Rptr.3d 105]; People v. Giardino (2000) 82
• Attempted Sodomy of Intoxicated Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(i).
RELATED ISSUES
or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 31–33, 178.
(The Rutter Group).
776
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy of a person

who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of Penal Code
section 286(f)].
prove that:
AND
fraudulently represented that the sexual penetration served a
professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(f).
[172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required]; see Boro v. Superior
777
Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122] [rape victim
not unconscious of nature of act; fraud in the inducement].
COMMENTARY
§ 286(f)(2)–(4).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory
• Attempted Sodomy of Unconscious Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(f).
RELATED ISSUES
or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
778
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy of a mentally

or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section 286(g)].
prove that:
consenting;
AND
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(g).
• Prevented from Legally Consenting, Defined. People v. Boggs (1930) 107
Cal.App. 492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
• Attempted Sodomy of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(g).
RELATED ISSUES
779
or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.

SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
780
1035. Sodomy of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen.
Code, § 286(h))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy of a mentally

or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation of Penal
Code section 286(h)].
prove that:
consenting;
AND
understand the act, its nature, and probable consequences.
[ <If appropriate, insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/
mental health facility).] [A state hospital or other mental health facility
includes a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally
disordered or any other public or private facility approved by a county
mental health director for the care and treatment of the mentally
disordered.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
781
facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 286(h).)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(h).
• State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 286(h); see Welf.
• Attempted Sodomy of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(h).
RELATED ISSUES
or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
782
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy by fraud [in

violation of Penal Code section 286(j)].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with someone else;
2. The other person submitted to the sodomy because (he/she)
believed the defendant was someone (he/she) knew, other than the
defendant;
AND
that he was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide his
own identity.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(j).
• Attempted Sodomy by Fraud. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(j).
RELATED ISSUES
or Threats.
783
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
784
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy while he was

confined in (state prison/a local detention facility) [in violation of Penal
Code section 286(e)].
prove that:
1. The defendant participated in an act of sodomy with another
person;
AND
2. At the time of the act, the defendant was confined in (state
prison/a local detention facility).
[ <Insert name of facility> is a (state prison/local detention
facility).] [A state prison is any prison or institution maintained by the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.] [A local detention facility
includes any city, county, or regional jail or other facility used to confine
adults [or both adults and minors].]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A space is provided to identify a state prison or local detention facility if the parties
agree that there is no issue of fact. Alternatively, if there is a factual dispute about
whether the defendant was confined in a state prison or local detention facility, give
the second or third bracketed sentences (or both, if necessary). (See Pen. Code,
§§ 4504, 5003, 6031.4.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(e); People v. West (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 892, 898
[277 Cal.Rptr. 237] [only applies to inmates].
785
• State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 4504, 5003.
• Attempted Sodomy While in Custody. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(e).
RELATED ISSUES
or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 28, 178.
(The Rutter Group).
786
1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code,
§ 289(a)(1) & (2), (g))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual penetration by

force [in violation of Penal Code section 289].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with
another person;
2. The penetration was accomplished by using (a/an) (foreign
object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or] instrument[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or]
unknown object);
AND
4. The defendant accomplished the act:
[by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to another person.]
[by threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a
reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat.
A threat to retaliate is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or
confine, or inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]
[by threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate,
government agency who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or
Sexual penetration means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or
anal opening of the other person/ [or] causing the other person to
penetrate, however slightly, the defendant’s or someone else’s genital or
anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, however
slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) for the purpose of sexual
abuse, arousal, or gratification.
[A foreign object, substance, instrument, or device includes any part of the
787
body except a sexual organ.] [An unknown object includes any foreign
object, substance, instrument, or device, or any part of the body,
including a penis, if it is not known what object penetrated the opening.]
[Penetration for sexual abuse means penetration for the purpose of
causing pain, injury, or discomfort.]
[Evidence that the defendant and the other person (dated/were married/
had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[Evidence that the other person (requested/suggested/communicated) that
the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not enough
by itself to constitute consent.]
hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person of
ordinary sensitivity to do [or submit to] something that he or she would
not otherwise do [or submit to]. When deciding whether the act was
accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including the age
of the other person and (his/her) relationship to the defendant.]
someone.]
[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sexual penetration if (he/she)
actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the
act. The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other
person consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2016, April 2020, October 2021, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sexual penetration.
788
The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 4 to instruct how the
sexual penetration was accomplished.
P.2d 1337].) The statutory presumption that a minor over 14 is incapable of legal
consent does not apply to a violation of Penal Code section 289(a)(1)(C). (People v.
Duarte-Lara (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 332, 339 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g).
• Specific Intent Crime. People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 [156
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
• Foreign Object, Substance, Instrument, or Device Defined. Pen. Code,
§ 289(k)(2); People v. Wilcox (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rtpr.
170] [a finger is a “foreign object”].
• Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k); see People v. Quintana (2001)
89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital opening
refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
• Unknown Object Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(3).
651]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].
• Intent. People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 776 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 14]
[specific intent is “purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse”].
• Mistake of Fact Regarding Consent. See People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d
789
143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337] [in context of kidnapping and
rape]; People v. Duarte-Lara (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 332, 339 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d
774] [noting minor over 14].
• Sexual Abuse Defined. People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205–206
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 289 requires that the sexual penetration be “against the victim’s
will.” (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g).) “Against the will” has been defined as
“without consent.” (See People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203
Cal.Rptr. 144] [in context of rape]; see also People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d
248, 257 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
The instruction includes an optional definition of the sufficiency of “fear” because
that term has meaning in the context of forcible sex offenses that is technical and
may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d
803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr. 651] [fear in context of sodomy and oral copulation];
People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d
1183] [fear in context of rape].)
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definition
contained in Penal Code section 261 (rape). (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in case involving
forcible lewd acts].) In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the court
held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261
and former 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court
did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the
Leal opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].)
In People v. Griffın, supra, the Supreme Court further stated,
790
[235 Cal.Rptr. 361] . . . .)
(Ibid. at 1023–1024 [emphasis in original].)
• Assault With Intent to Commit Forcible Sexual Penetration. See Pen. Code,
§ 220; In re Jose M. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in
context of rape].
• Attempted Forcible Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1), (2), (g).
• Sexual Battery. Pen. Code, §§ 243.4(a), (e)(1) under the expanded accusatory
pleading test; People v. Ortega (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 956, 967–970 [193
Cal.Rptr.3d 142].
Nonforcible sex crimes requiring the perpetrator and victim to be within certain age
limits are not lesser included offenses of forcible sex crimes. (People v. Scott (2000)
RELATED ISSUES
A person may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sexual penetration
by a false or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which
does induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her
free will. (Pen. Code, § 266c [wobbler offense].) While section 266c requires
coercion and fear to obtain consent, it does not involve physical force or violence.
(See People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567]
[rejecting defendant’s argument that certain acts were consensual and without
physical force, and were only violations of section 266c].)
Consent Withdrawn
Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to sexual
penetration was withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.
Minor Victim
When sexual penetration is committed against the will of a person who is incapable
of consent, such as a baby, and is accomplished by physical force that results in
791
physical injury to the victim, the statutory requirements “against the will” and “use
of force” are fully satisfied. (People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 202 [224
Cal.Rptr. 467].)
Multiple Penetrations
A violation of section 289 is complete when “slight” penetration occurs. A new and
separate violation is completed each time a new and separate penetration, however
slight, occurs. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329, 334 [256 Cal.Rtpr.
401, 768 P.2d 1078] [disapproving People v. Hammon (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084,
1097 [236 Cal.Rptr. 822]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][d], [2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
792
1046. Sexual Penetration in Concert (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1,
289(a)(1))

committing sexual penetration by acting in concert [with
<insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in
violation of Penal Code sections 264.1 and 289(a)(1)].
that:
<Alternative A—defendant committed sexual penetration>
[1.] [The defendant personally committed sexual penetration and
commission(;/.)]
[OR]
who personally committed sexual penetration.]
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed sexual penetration,
on that crime. To decide whether the defendant[s] [or
<insert name[s] or description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] aided and
abetted sexual penetration, please refer to the separate instructions that I
(will give/have given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those
instructions when you decide whether the People have proved sexual
penetration in concert.
SEXUAL PENETRATION AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>
[To prove the crime of sexual penetration in concert, the People do not
have to prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit sexual
penetration.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 621 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [rape
793
in concert is a separate crime, not an enhancement].) The court also has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on sexual penetration. Give one or more of the following
instructions defining sexual penetration: CALCRIM Nos. 1045 or 1047–1051.
341–342 [122 Cal.Rtpr. 658].)
See generally CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 264.1, 289(a)(1); see People v. Mom (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 172] [rape in concert requires no greater
force than that necessary for forcible rape], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1028 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d
1089].
• Aiding and Abetting. People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 445–446 [23
Cal.Rptr.2d 512]; see People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199
Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1).
• Attempted Sexual Penetration in Concert. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 264.1, 289(a)(1).
• Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1045, Sexual Penetration by
Force, Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1001, Rape in Concert.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][d], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
794
1047. Sexual Penetration of an Intoxicated Person (Pen. Code,
§ 289(e))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual penetration of a

person while that person was intoxicated [in violation of Penal Code
section 289(e)].
prove that:
another person;
object[,]/ [or] substance[,]/ [or]instrument[,]/ [or]device[,]/ [or]
unknown object);
prevented the other person from resisting the act;
AND
effect of that substance prevented the other person from resisting
the act.
involved.
795

reasonably believed that the person was capable of consenting to the act,
even if the defendant’s belief was wrong. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually
and reasonably believe that the woman was capable of consenting. If the
guilty.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
no issue of fact.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief the
person was capable of consent if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense.
(See People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 472 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315].)
CALCRIM No. 1046, Sexual Penetration in Concert, may be given in conjunction
with this instruction if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(e).
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
• Controlled Substances Defined. Health & Safety Code, §§ 11054–11058; see
People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 798, fn. 7 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651].
§ 289(k)(2); People v. Wilcox (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr.
• Sexual Penetration Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(k)(1); see People v. Quintana
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1371 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 235] [penetration of genital
opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not the vagina].
• Anesthetic Effect Defined. See People v. Avila (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 791,
798–799 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651] [in context of sodomy].
796
• Prevented From Resisting Defined. See People v. Giardino (2000) 82

Cal.App.4th 454, 465–467 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 315] [in context of rape].
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(a)(1) & (2), (g).
• Attempted Sexual Penetration of Intoxicated Person. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 289(e).
RELATED ISSUES
Force, Fear, or Threats.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
797
1048. Sexual Penetration of an Unconscious Person (Pen. Code,
§ 289(d))

person who was unconscious of the nature of the act [in violation of
Penal Code section 289(d)].
prove that:
another person;
unknown object);
AND
fraudulently represented that the sexual penetration served a
professional purpose when it served no professional purpose).

798
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
§ 289(k)(2); see People v. Wilcox (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 717 [223 Cal.Rptr.
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
[172 Cal.Rptr. 539] [total unconsciousness is not required; in context of sodomy
and oral copulation]; see Boro v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1224,
1229–1231 [210 Cal.Rptr. 122] [rape victim not unconscious of nature of act;
fraud in the inducement].
COMMENTARY
§ 289(d)(2).) The committee did not discern any difference among the statutory
• Attempted Sexual Penetration of Unconscious Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664,
289(d).
RELATED ISSUES
799
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
800
1049. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person (Pen. Code,
§ 289(b))

mentally or physically disabled person [in violation of Penal Code section
289(b)].
prove that:
another person;
unknown object);
consenting;
AND
including a penis, if it is not known what object was used to accomplish
the penetration.]

801
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; see People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App.
492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(b).
RELATED ISSUES
Force, Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
802
1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental
Hospital (Pen. Code, § 289(c))

mentally or physically disabled person in a mental hospital [in violation
of Penal Code section 289(c)].
prove that:
another person;
unknown object);
consenting;
AND
the penetration.]
[ <If appropriate, insert name of facility> is a (state hospital/
803
mental health facility).] [A state hospital or other mental health facility

includes a state hospital for the care and treatment of the mentally
disordered or any other public or private facility approved by a county
mental health director for the care and treatment of the mentally
disordered.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
facility, give the final bracketed sentence. (See Pen. Code, § 289(c).)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
• Consent Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.6; see People v. Boggs (1930) 107 Cal.App.
492, 495–496 [290 P. 618].
• State Hospital or Mental Health Facility Defined. Pen. Code, § 289(c); see Welf.
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
804
• Attempted Sexual Penetration of Disabled Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(c).

RELATED ISSUES
Force, Fear, or Threats, and CALCRIM No. 1004, Rape of a Disabled Woman.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
805
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual penetration by

fraud [in violation of Penal Code section 289(f)].
prove that:
another person;
2. At the time of the act, the defendant and the other person were
not married to each other;
unknown object);
4. The other person submitted to the act because (he/she) believed
the person (committing the act/causing the act to be committed)
was someone (he/she) knew, other than the defendant;
AND
that (he/she) was someone (he/she) knew, while intending to hide
(his/her) own identity.
the penetration.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2015, April 2020, September 2022
806
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 382].
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration by Fraud. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(f).
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
807
1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code,
§ 288(b)(2) & (c)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with a lewd or lascivious act

on a dependent person [by force or fear] [in violation of Penal Code
section 288].
prove that:
1. The defendant was a caretaker of a dependent person;
2. The defendant willfully (committed/conspired to commit/aided
and abetted/facilitated) a lewd or lascivious act on a person;
[AND]
3. The defendant (committed/conspired to commit/aided and
abetted/facilitated) the act with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/
herself) or the dependent person(;/.)
<Give element 4 when instructing on force or violence>
[AND
4. In (committing/conspiring to commit/aiding and abetting/
facilitating) the act, the defendant used force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the
dependent person or someone else.]
A lewd or lascivious act is any touching of a person with the intent to
sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. A lewd or lascivious
act includes touching any part of the person’s body, either on the bare
skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A lewd or lascivious
act includes causing someone to touch his or her own body or someone
else’s body at the instigation of the perpetrator who has the required
intent.]
A caretaker is an owner, operator, administrator, employee, independent
contractor, agent, or volunteer of a public or private facility, including
(a/an) <insert specific facility from Pen. Code, § 288(f)(1)>,
that provides care for dependent persons or for those aged 65 or older.
A dependent person is someone who has physical or mental impairments
808
that substantially restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities
or to protect his or her rights. This definition includes, but is not limited
to, those who have developmental disabilities or whose physical or
mental abilities have been significantly diminished by age.
[Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or
sexual desires of the perpetrator or dependent person is not required.]
[The force used must be substantially different from or substantially
greater than the force needed to accomplish the lewd and lascivious act
itself.]
[Duress is a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship,
or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or submit to]
something that he or she would not do [or submit to] otherwise. When
deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the
circumstances, including the age of the dependent person and (his/her)
someone.]
[An act is accomplished by fear if the dependent person is actually and
[It is not a defense that the dependent person may have consented to the
act.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, September 2017, March 2022,
September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged in a single count with multiple alleged acts, the court has
a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294,
321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) The court must determine whether it is
appropriate to give the standard unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500,
Unanimity, or the modified unanimity instruction, CALCRIM No. 3501, Unanimity:
When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented. Review the discussion in the bench
notes to these two instructions and People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp.
321–322.
If the defendant is charged with using force or fear in committing the lewd act on a
809
dependent person, give bracketed element 4 and the bracketed sentence that begins
with “The force must be substantially different.” (See People v. Pitmon (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [court has sua sponte duty to define “force”
as used in Pen. Code, § 288(b)(1)]; People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015,
1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) On request, give any of the
relevant bracketed definitions of duress, menace, or fear.
In the paragraph defining “caretaker,” insert applicable caretaker facilities listed in
Penal Code section 288(f)(1), such as a 24-hour health facility, a home health
agency, or a community care or respite care facility, depending on the facts of the
case.
Penal Code section 288(b)(2) or (c)(2) does not apply to a caretaker who is a spouse
of, or who is in an equivalent domestic relationship with, the dependent person.
(Pen. Code, § 288(h).)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “Actually arousing, appealing to,” on
request. (People v. McCurdy (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502 [213 P. 59].)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that” on request,
if there is evidence that the dependent adult consented to the act. (People v.
Montoya (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 980, 999 [284 Cal.Rptr.3d 18] [“nothing in the
language of section 288, subdivisions (a) and (c)(2) indicates that lack of consent is
an element of lewd conduct by a caretaker upon a dependent person.”].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2).
• Caretaker Defined. Pen. Code, § 288(f)(1) & (g).
• Dependent Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 288(f)(3).
Cal.Rptr.3d 869]; People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 50; People v.
Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
• Elder Defined. See Pen. Code, § 368(g).
• Menace Defined. See Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
• Actual Arousal Not Required. See People v. McCurdy, supra, 60 Cal.App. at p.
502.
• Any Touching With Intent to Arouse. See People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th
434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving People v.
Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its
progeny]; see People v. Diaz (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
• Dependent Person Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. See
People v. Meacham (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586]
[“constructive” touching; approving Austin instruction]; People v. Austin (1980)
810
111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].

• Fear Defined. See People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26
Cal.Rptr.2d 567]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258,
872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
• Force Defined. People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr.
582]; People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 52; see also People v.
Griffın, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1018–1019 [discussing Cicero and Pitmon].
• Lewd Defined. See In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497
P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure]; see Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979)
25 Cal.3d 238, 256–257, fn. 13 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
• Defendant Need Not Be Victim’s Caretaker. People v. Montoya, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.
COMMENTARY
The instruction includes definitions of “force” and “fear” because those terms have
meanings in the context of the crime of lewd acts by force that are technical and
may not be readily apparent to jurors. (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at
p. 52 [force]; see People v. Cardenas, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939–940 [fear];
People v. Iniguez, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 856–857 [fear in context of rape].) The
Court of Appeal has held that the definition of “force” as used in Penal Code
section 288(b), subsection (1) (lewd acts by force with a minor) is different from the
meaning of “force” as used in other sex offense statutes. (People v. Cicero, supra,
157 Cal.App.3d at p. 474 disapproved on other grounds by People v. Soto (2011) 51
Cal.4th 229, 241–244 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410].) In other sex offense
statutes, such as Penal Code section 261 defining rape, “force” does not have a
technical meaning and there is no requirement to define the term. (People v. Griffın,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1018–1019.) In Penal Code section 288(b)(1), on the other
hand, “force” means force “substantially different from or substantially greater than”
the physical force normally inherent in the sexual act. (Id. at p. 1018 [quoting
People v. Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 474] [emphasis in Griffın].) The court
is required to instruct sua sponte in this special definition of “force.” (People v.
Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 52; see also People v. Griffın, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at pp. 1026–1028.) It would seem that this definition of “force” would also apply to
the crime of lewd acts with a dependant person, under Penal Code section 288(b),
subsection (2).
Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 52 [duress].) Optional definitions are provided
for the court to use at its discretion. The definition of “duress” is based on People v.
Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, and People v. Pitmon, supra, 170
Cal.App.3d at p. 50. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definition
contained in Penal Code section 261 (rape). (See People v. Cochran, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at pp. 13–14 [using rape definition in case involving forcible lewd
acts].) In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1007, the court held that the
811
statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections 261 and former
262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court did not
discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider the Leal
opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
• Attempted Lewd Act With Dependent Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(c)(2).
• Attempted Lewd Act by Force With Dependent Person. Pen. Code, §§ 664,
288(b)(2).
• Simple Battery Not Lesser Included Offense of Lewd Act on Dependent Person
Under the Statutory Elements Test. People v. Chenelle (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
1255, 1263–1264 [209 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].
RELATED ISSUES
Developmental Disability
If the dependent person has a developmental disability, arguably there is no sua
sponte duty to define “developmental disability” under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 4512(a) or Penal Code section 1370.1(a)(1). The Legislature did not intend
to limit this phrase in other code sections to such technical medical or legal
definitions, although a pinpoint instruction may be requested if it helps the jury in
any particular case. (See People v. Mobley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 781–783 [85
Cal.Rptr.2d 474] [in context of oral copulation of disabled person].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][a][iv], [v], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
812

1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen.
Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with having unlawful sexual

intercourse with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time
after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of
Penal Code section 261.5(d)].
prove that:
1. The defendant had sexual intercourse with another person;
2. The defendant and the other person were not married to each
other at the time of the intercourse;
3. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the
intercourse;
AND
4. The other person was under the age of 16 years at the time of the
intercourse.
[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the
intercourse.]
<Defense: Good Faith Belief 18 or Over>
[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) reasonably and
actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. In order for
reasonable and actual belief to excuse the defendant’s behavior, there
must be evidence tending to show that (he/she) reasonably and actually
believed that the other person was age 18 or older. If you have a
reasonable doubt about whether the defendant reasonably and actually
believed that the other person was age 18 or older, you must find (him/
her) not guilty.]
813

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
For a discussion of the sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of mistake of
fact, see CALCRIM No. 3406.
if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See People v. Kemp (1934)
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably and actually believed
that the minor was age 18 or older, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
the defense. (See People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr.
361, 393 P.2d 673]; People v. Winters (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 716 [51 Cal.Rptr.
735].)
Related Instruction
CALCRIM No. 3406, Mistake of Fact.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d).
• Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. People v. Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51.
• Good Faith Belief in Victim’s Age. People v. Zeihm (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1085,
1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528].
• Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261.5; see, e.g.,
People v. Nicholson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 622–624 [159 Cal.Rptr. 766].
Contributing to the delinquency of a minor (Pen. Code, § 272) is not a lesser
included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse. (People v. Bobb (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 88, 93–96 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on another ground in People
v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].)
814
RELATED ISSUES
Calculating Age
The “birthday rule” of former Civil Code section 26 (now see Fam. Code, § 6500)
applies. A person attains a given age as soon as the first minute of his or her
birthday has begun, not on the day before the birthday. (In re Harris (1993) 5
Cal.4th 813, 844–845, 849 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)
Participant Must be Over 21
One of the two participants in the act of unlawful sexual intercourse must be over
21 and the other person must be under 16. Proof that an aider and abettor was over
21 is insufficient to sustain the aider and abettor’s conviction if neither of the actual
participants was over 21 years old. (See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 508, 513, 515 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347] [applying same argument to section
287(c), where perpetrator must be 10 years older than victim under 14].)
Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age
A defendant is not entitled to a mistake of fact instruction if he claims that he
believed that the complaining witness was over 16. His belief would still constitute
the mens rea of intending to have sex with a minor. (People v. Scott (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 784, 800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70].) However, if he claims that he
believed that the complaining witness was over 18 years old, he is entitled to the
mistake of fact instruction. (See People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529,
535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673].)
Married Minor Victim
A defendant may be convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse even if the minor
victim is married or was previously married to another person. (People v. Courtney
(1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 61, 62 [4 Cal.Rptr. 274] [construing former statute]; People
v. Caldwell (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 229, 230–231 [63 Cal.Rptr. 63].)
Sterility
Sterility is not a defense to unlawful sexual intercourse. (People v. Langdon (1987)
192 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1421 [238 Cal.Rptr. 158].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
815
1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years
Younger (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawful sexual

intercourse with a minor who was more than three years younger than
the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 261.5(c)].
prove that:
AND
3. At the time of the intercourse, the other person was under the
age of 18 and more than three years younger than the defendant.
intercourse.]
actually believed that the other person was age 18 or older. The People
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
reasonably and actually believe that the other person was at least 18
years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
816
§ 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rprtr.2d 373, 855 P.2d
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (c).
• Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. People v. Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34
P.2d 502].
• Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529,
535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; see People v. Zeihm (1974) 40
Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528] [belief about age is a defense],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Freeman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 419, 428,
fn. 6 [250 Cal.Rptr. 598, 758 P.2d 1128].
RELATED ISSUES
Minor Perpetrator
The fact that a minor may be a victim does not exclude a minor from being charged
as a perpetrator. (In re T.A.J. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d
331] [construing Pen. Code, § 261.5(b)].) There is no privacy right among minors to
engage in consensual sexual intercourse. (Id. at p. 1361.) However, a minor victim
of unlawful sexual intercourse cannot be held liable as an aider and abettor, a
coconspirator, or an accomplice. (In re Meagan R. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 17, 25 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 325].)
Attempted Sexual Intercourse is Not a Lesser Included Offense
People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1070, Unlawful Sexual
Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older.
SECONDARY SOURCES
817
(The Rutter Group).
818
1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within
Three Years of Defendant’s Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawful sexual

intercourse with a minor whose age was within three years of the
defendant’s age [in violation of Penal Code section 261.5(b)].
prove that:
AND
3. At the time of the intercourse, the other person was under the
age of 18 but not more than three years (younger/older) than the
defendant.
intercourse.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
819
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Misdemeanor Offense. Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b).
P.2d 502].
535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673]; see People v. Zeihm (1974) 40
Cal.App.3d 1085, 1089 [115 Cal.Rptr. 528] [belief about age is a defense],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Freeman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 419, 428,
fn. 6 [250 Cal.Rptr. 598, 758 P.2d 1128].
• Attempted Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 261.5; see, e.g.,
People v. Nicholson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 622–624 [159 Cal.Rtpr. 707].
RELATED ISSUES
Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older, and CALCRIM No. 1071, Unlawful Sexual
Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger.
SECONDARY SOURCES
820
(The Rutter Group).
821
1080. Oral Copulation With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code,
§ 287(c)(1))

person who was under the age of 14 and at least 10 years younger than
the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 287(c)(1)].
prove that:
another person;
AND
2. At the time of the act, the other person was under the age of 14
and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.
[It is not a defense that the other person may have consented to the act.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242–1243 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [in context of lewd acts with
children].
822
• Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See People v. Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48,
51 [34 P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
• Oral Copulation With Minor Under 18. People v. Culbertson (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; People v. Jerome (1984) 160
Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199].
RELATED ISSUES
Mistake of Fact Defense Not Available
In People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 649 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the
court held that the defendant’s mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no
defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.
Attempted Oral Copulation is Not a Lesser Included Offense
People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 84 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][c], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
823
1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen.
Code, § 287(b)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in an act of

oral copulation with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a
time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation
of Penal Code section 287(b)(2)].
prove that:
another person;
2. The defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the act;
AND
act.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
824
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
children].
• Attempted Oral Copulation With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 288a(b)(2).
• Oral Copulation With Minor Under 18. See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of section
288a(c)].
RELATED ISSUES
Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][c], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
825
1082. Oral Copulation With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code,
§ 287(b)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with oral copulation with a

person who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section
287(b)(1)].
prove that:
another person;
AND
2. The other person was under the age of 18 when the act was
committed.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
Give the final bracketed paragraph about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,
826
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
children].
535–536 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673] [in context of statutory rape]; People
v. Peterson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734].
• A violation of Penal Code section 288.3 is not a lesser included offense of
attempted oral copulation, because attempt can be committed without contacting
or communicating with the victim under the statutory elements test. (People v.
Medelez (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 663 [206 Cal.Rptr.3d 402].)
RELATED ISSUES
Minor Perpetrator
A minor under age 14 may be adjudged responsible for violating Penal Code section
287(b)(1) upon clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness. (Pen. Code,
§ 26; In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 49 [270 Cal.Rptr. 369].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][c], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
827
(iii) Sodomy
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy with a person

who was under the age of 14 years and at least 10 years younger than
the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 286(c)(1)].
prove that:
person;
AND
years and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
828

• Attempted Sodomy With Minor Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(c)(1).
• Sodomy With Minor Under 18. See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d
508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; People v. Jerome (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087,
1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code, § 287(c)].
RELATED ISSUES
In People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the court
held that the defendant’s mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no defense
to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][b], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
829
1091. Sodomy With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code,
§ 286(b)(2))

sodomy with a person who was under the age of 16 years at a time after
the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in violation of Penal
prove that:
person;
AND
act.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
830
§ 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rtpr.2d 361, 393 P.2d
673].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
• Attempted Sodomy With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code, §§ 664,
286(b)(2).
• Sodomy With Minor Under 18. See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d
508, 516 [217 Cal.Rptr. 347]; People v. Jerome (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087,
1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rtpr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code, § 287(c)].
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][b], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
831
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy with a person

who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section
286(b)(1)].
prove that:
person;
AND
act.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
832
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
• Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. See People v. Scott (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784,
800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70]; People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529,
v. Peterson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734] [in context of
oral copulation with minor].
• Attempted Sodomy of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286(b)(1).
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][b], [3][d], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
833
1100. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 14 (Pen. Code,
§ 289(j))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual penetration with

a person who was under the age of 14 and at least 10 years younger
than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 289(j)].
prove that:
1. The defendant participated in an act of sexual penetration with
another person;
unknown object);
AND
years and was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.
anal openings of another person/ [or] causing another person to
anal opening/ [or] causing the other person to penetrate, no matter how
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
834
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(j).
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(j).
• Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 18. See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of oral
copulation with minor under 14].
RELATED ISSUES
In People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 649 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52], the
court held that the defendant’s mistaken belief that the victim was over 14 was no
defense to a charge of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[1][d], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
835
1101. Sexual Penetration With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen.
Code, § 289(i))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with participating in an act

of sexual penetration with a person who was under the age of 16 years
at a time after the defendant had reached (his/her) 21st birthday [in
violation of Penal Code section 289(i)].
prove that:
another person;
unknown object);
AND
act.
836
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 289(i).
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor When Defendant Over 21. Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 289(i).
• Sexual Penetration With Minor Under 18. See People v. Culbertson (1985) 171
837
Cal.App.3d 1087, 1097–1098 [207 Cal.Rptr. 199] [both in context of Pen. Code,
§ 287(c)].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM 1070, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse:
Defendant 21 or Older.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][d], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
838
1102. Sexual Penetration With Person Under 18 (Pen. Code,
§ 289(h))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual penetration with

a person who was under the age of 18 [in violation of Penal Code section
289(h)].
prove that:
another person;
unknown object);
AND
act.
839
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
735].)
AUTHORITY
P.2d 502] [in context of statutory rape].
• Mistake of Fact Regarding Age. See People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529,
v. Peterson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 397 [178 Cal.Rptr. 734] [in context of
oral copulation with minor].
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration With Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 289(h).
840
RELATED ISSUES
Forcible Self-Penetration
In a prosecution under Penal Code section 289(a), one court has held that forcible
self-penetration comes within the ambit of the statute. (People v. Keeney (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 886, 889 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].) Keeney was construing Penal Code
section 289(k)(1). Section 289(h), governing penetration with a minor, requires that
the perpetrator “participate in [the] act.” Until this issue is clarified by the appellate
courts, the definition of self-penetration in this instruction excludes forcible self-
penetration.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[1][d], [3][b], 142.23[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
841
1110. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years (Pen. Code,
§ 288(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with committing a lewd or

lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of Penal
Code section 288(a)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—defendant touched child>
[1A. The defendant willfully touched any part of a child’s body either
on the bare skin or through the clothing;]
[OR]
<Alternative 1B—child touched defendant>
[1B. The defendant willfully caused a child to touch (his/her) own
body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on
the bare skin or through the clothing;]
2. The defendant committed the act with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
(himself/herself) or the child;
AND
3. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the act.
sexual desires of the perpetrator or the child is not required.]
[It is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2013, August 2014
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
842
321–322.
In element 1, give alternative 1A if the prosecution alleges that the defendant
touched the child. Give alternative 1B if the prosecution alleges that the defendant
caused the child to do the touching.
if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (People v. Soto (2011) 51
Cal.4th 229, 233 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410] [“the victim‘s consent is not a
defense to the crime of lewd acts on a child under age 14 under any
circumstances”].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Actual Arousal Not Required. People v. McCurdy (1923) 60 Cal.App. 499, 502
[213 P. 59].
• Any Touching of Child With Intent to Arouse. People v. Martinez (1995) 11
Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving People v. Wallace (1992)
11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see People v.
Diaz (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of
examples].
• Child’s Consent Not a Defense. See People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th
927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta].
• Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Instigation. People v. Meacham
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586] [“constructive”
touching; approving Austin instruction]; People v. Austin (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d
110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
• Lewd Defined. In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365 [102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497
• Attempted Lewd Act With Child Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(a); People v.
843
Imler (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181–1182 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 915]; People v.

Herman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1389–1390 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 199].
• Battery Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (People v. Shockley
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 403, 406 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 497, 314 P.3d 798].)
Annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18 (Pen. Code, § 647.6) is not a
lesser included offense of section 288(a). (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282,
290, 292 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].)
RELATED ISSUES
Any Act That Constitutes Sexual Assault
A lewd or lascivious act includes any act that constitutes a crime against the person
involving sexual assault as provided in title 9 of part 1 of the Penal Code (Pen.
Code, §§ 261–368). (Pen. Code, § 288(a).) For example, unlawful sexual intercourse
on the body of a child under 14 can be charged as a lewd act under section 288 and
as a separate offense under section 261.5. However, these charges are in the
alternative and, in such cases, the court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM
No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction
Prohibited. (See Pen. Code, § 654(a); People v. Nicholson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d
617, 625 [159 Cal.Rptr. 766].)
Calculating Age
The “birthday rule” of former Civil Code section 26 (now see Fam. Code, § 6500)
applies so that a person attains a given age as soon as the first minute of his or her
birthday has begun, not on the day before the birthday. (See In re Harris (1993) 5
Cal.4th 813, 844–845, 849 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)
Minor Perpetrator
A minor under age 14 may be convicted for violating Penal Code section 288(a) on
clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness and the minor’s intent to
arouse his or her own sexual desires. (See Pen. Code, § 26; In re Randy S. (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 400, 406–408 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 423]; see also In re Paul C. (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 43, 49 [270 Cal.Rptr. 369] [in context of oral copulation].) The age
of the minor is a factor to consider when determining if the conduct was sexually
motivated. (In re Randy S., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 405–406 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d
423].)
Solicitation to Violate Section 288
Asking a minor to engage in lewd conduct with the person making the request is
not punishable as solicitation of a minor to commit a violation of Penal Code
section 288. (People v. Herman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1379 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d
199] [conviction for solicitation under Penal Code section 653f(c) reversed].) “[A]
minor cannot violate section 288 by engaging in lewd conduct with an adult.” (Id. at
p. 1379.)
Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age
A defendant charged with a lewd act on a child under Penal Code section 288(a) is
not entitled to a mistake of fact instruction regarding the victim’s age. (People v.
844
Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 647 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52] [adult defendant];
In re Donald R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1629–1630 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 442]
[minor defendant].) The mistake of fact defense can apply to attempted lewd acts on
a child under 14 years of age. (People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461
[160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210].)
Multiple Lewd Acts
Each individual act that meets the requirements of section 288 can result in a new
and separate statutory violation. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 346–347 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040]; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329,
334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078] [in context of sexual penetration].) For
example, if a defendant fondles one area of a victim’s body with the requisite intent
and then moves on to fondle a different area, one offense has ceased and another
has begun. There is no requirement that the two be separated by a hiatus or period
of reflection. (People v. Jimenez (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d
426].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41–46, 53–55, 178.
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][a][i], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
845
1111. Lewd or Lascivious Act: By Force or Fear (Pen. Code,
§ 288(b)(1))

by force or fear on a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of
Penal Code section 288(b)(1)].
prove that:
[OR]
body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on the
bare skin or through the clothing;]
2. In committing the act, the defendant used force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the child or
someone else;
AND
4. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the act.
The force used must be substantially different from or substantially
greater than the force needed to accomplish the act itself.
[Duress means the use of a direct or implied threat of force, violence,
danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable person
to do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or
submit to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
consider all the circumstances, including the age of the child and (his/
her) relationship to the defendant.]
846

someone.]
[An act is accomplished by fear if the child is actually and reasonably
afraid [or (he/she) is actually but unreasonably afraid and the defendant
knows of (his/her) fear and takes advantage of it].]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, August 2014, August 2016
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
321–322.
391].)
Lack of consent by a minor is not an element of lewd act or lascivious act against a
child under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b), whether
accomplished by force, duress, or otherwise. Likewise, consent by the child is not
an affirmative defense to such a charge. (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 232
[119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d 410].) The bracketed paragraph that begins “It is not
a defense that the child” may be given on request if there is evidence of consent.
AUTHORITY
• Duress Defined. People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 232 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775,
245 P.3d 410]; People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d
869, 94 P.3d 1071]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 [216
847
Cal.Rptr. 221]; People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126

Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
[213 P. 59].
Cal.4th 434, 444, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving People
v. Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its
110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
• Fear Defined. People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 939–940 [26
Cal.Rptr.2d 567]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258,
872 P.2d 1183] [in context of rape].
• Force Defined. People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr.
582]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see
also People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891,
94 P.3d 1089] [discussing Cicero and Pitmon].
COMMENTARY
The instruction includes definitions of “force” and “fear” because those terms have
meanings in the context of the crime of lewd acts by force that are technical and
may not be readily apparent to jurors. (People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38,
52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [force]; see People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927,
939–940 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [fear]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847,
856–857 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].) The
definition of “force” as used in Penal Code section 288(b)(1) is different from the
meaning of “force” as used in other sex offense statutes. (People v. Cicero (1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) In other sex offense statutes, such as
Penal Code section 261 defining rape, “force” does not have a technical meaning
and there is no requirement to define the term. (People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1015, 1018–1019 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089].) In Penal Code section
288(b)(1), on the other hand, “force” means force “substantially different from or
substantially greater than” the physical force normally inherent in the sexual act.
(Id. at p. 1018 [quoting People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 474 [204
Cal.Rptr. 582]] [emphasis in Griffın].) The court is required to instruct sua sponte
in this special definition of “force.” (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p.
848
52; see also People v. Griffın, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1028.)

Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071] and People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221]. The definition of “menace” is based on the statutory definitions
contained in Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See People v. Cochran
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape definition in
case involving forcible lewd acts].) In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1007,
the court held that the statutory definition of “duress” contained in Penal Code
sections 261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The
court did not discuss the statutory definition of “menace.” The court should consider
the Leal opinion before giving the definition of “menace.”
• Attempted Lewd Act by Force With Child Under 14. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288(b).
• Lewd or Lascivious Act on Child Under 14. Pen. Code, § 288(a).
RELATED ISSUES
Evidence of Duress
In looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine if duress was used to
commit forcible lewd acts on a child, “relevant factors include threats to harm the
victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and
warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing
the family. . . . The fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or
threats does not require a finding of no duress; the victim’s testimony must be
considered in light of her age and her relationship to the defendant.” (People v.
Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 14.)
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1110, Lewd
or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][a][ii], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
849
1112. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Child 14 or 15 Years (Pen. Code,
§ 288(c)(1))

on a 14- or 15-year-old child who was at least 10 years younger than the
defendant [in violation of Penal Code section 288(c)(1)].
prove that:
[OR]
body, the defendant’s body, or the body of someone else, either on
the bare skin or through the clothing;]
3. The child was (14/15) years old at the time of the act;
AND
4. When the defendant acted, the child was at least 10 years
younger than the defendant.
The touching need not be done in a lewd or sexual manner.
[In determining whether a person is at least 10 years older than a child,
measure from the person’s birthdate to the child’s birthdate.]
850

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
321–322.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “It is not a defense that the child,” on
request, if there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See People v.
Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
Give the bracketed paragraphs about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code,
§ 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [855 P.2d 391].)
AUTHORITY
[213 P. 59].
110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
• Minor’s Consent Not a Defense. See People v. Cardenas (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th
927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta].
• Mistaken Belief About Victim’s Age Not a Defense. People v. Paz (2000) 80
851
• Mistake of Fact Defense May Apply to Attempted Lewd Acts on a Child 14 or

15. People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 210].
• Attempted Lewd Act on a Child of 14 or 15. In re Lesansky (2001) 25 Cal.4th
11, 13].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1110, Lewd
or Lascivious Act: Child Under 14 Years.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 41–46, 53–55, 178.
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][a][iii], [b]–[d] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
852
(vi) Other Offenses
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with continuous sexual

abuse of a child under the age of 14 years [in violation of Penal Code
section 288.5(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (lived in the same home with/ [or] had recurring
access to) a minor child;
2. The defendant engaged in three or more acts of (substantial
sexual conduct/ [or] lewd or lascivious conduct) with the child;
3. Three or more months passed between the first and last acts;
AND
4. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of the acts.
[Substantial sexual conduct means oral copulation or masturbation of
either the child or the perpetrator, or penetration of the child’s or
perpetrator’s vagina or rectum by (the other person’s penis/ [or] any
foreign object).]
[Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth
Penetration is not required.]
[Lewd or lascivious conduct is any willful touching of a child
accomplished with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the
child. Contact with the child’s bare skin or private parts is not required.
Any part of the child’s body or the clothes the child is wearing may be
touched.] [Lewd or lascivious conduct [also] includes causing a child to
touch his or her own body or someone else’s body at the instigation of a
perpetrator who has the required intent.]
[Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on
someone else, or gain any advantage.]
You cannot convict the defendant unless all of you agree that (he/she)
committed three or more acts over a period of at least three months, but
you do not all need to agree on which three acts were committed.
sexual desires of the perpetrator or child is not required for lewd or
lascivious conduct.]
853

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the court gives the definition of “lewd and lascivious conduct,” the definition of
“willfully” must also be given.
Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.5(a); People v. Vasquez (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1277,
1284–1285, 1287 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 389].
• Substantial Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 1203.066(b).
• Unanimity on Specific Acts Not Required. Pen. Code, § 288.5(b); People v.
Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 631].
[213 P. 59].
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 152–153 [199 Cal.Rptr. 586]; People v. Austin
(1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta in context of lewd or lascivious act].
854
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884]; see Pen. Code, § 288a(a).

• “Recurring Access” Is Commonly Understand Term Not Requiring Sua Sponte
Definitional Instruction. People v. Rodriguez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 543, 550 [122
Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 49 P.3d 1085] [disapproving People v. Gohdes (1997) 58
• Necessary Intent in Touching. People v. Cuellar (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1067,
1070–1072 [145 Cal.Rptr.3d 898].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 288.5 does not require that the defendant reside with, or have
access to, the child continuously for three consecutive months. It only requires that
a period of at least three months passes between the first and last acts of
molestation. (People v. Vasquez (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1284–1285, 1287 [59
Cal.Rptr.2d 389].)
Section 288.5 validly defines a prohibited offense as a continuous course of conduct
and does not unconstitutionally deprive a defendant of a unanimous jury verdict.
(People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309–1312 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].)
• Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
Since a conviction under Penal Code section 288.5 could be based on a course of
substantial sexual conduct without necessarily violating section 288 (lewd or
lascivious conduct), the latter is not necessarily included within the former and no
sua sponte instruction is required. (People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303,
1313–1314 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; see People v. Palmer (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 440,
444–445 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 301].)
RELATED ISSUES
Alternative Charges
Under Penal Code section 288.5(c), continuous sexual abuse and specific sexual
offenses pertaining to the same victim over the same time period may only be
charged in the alternative. In these circumstances, multiple convictions are
precluded. (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 245, 248 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d
197, 47 P.3d 1064] [exception to general rule in Pen. Code, § 954 permitting joinder
of related charges].) In such cases, the court has a sua sponte duty to give
CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual
Conviction Prohibited. If a defendant is erroneously convicted of both continuous
sexual abuse and specific sexual offenses and a greater aggregate sentence is
imposed for the specific offenses, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the conviction
855
for continuous sexual abuse. (People v. Torres (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1060
[126 Cal.Rptr.2d 92].)
Masturbation
For a discussion of the term masturbation, see People v. Chambless (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 773, 783–784, 786–787 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 444] [construing term for
purposes of finding defendant committed sexually violent offenses under the
Sexually Violent Predators Act].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][c][ii], [2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
856
1121. Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling (Pen. Code,
§ 647.6(a)–(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with annoying or molesting

a child in an inhabited dwelling [in violation of Penal Code section
647.6(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant entered an inhabited (dwelling house/part of a
building/trailer coach) without consent;
2. After entering the (house/building/trailer coach), the defendant
engaged in conduct directed at a child;
3. A normal person, without hesitation, would have been disturbed,
irritated, offended, or injured by the defendant’s conduct;
4. The defendant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or
abnormal sexual interest in the child;
AND
5. The child was under the age of 18 years at the time of the
conduct.
[It is not necessary that the child actually be irritated or disturbed.] [It
is [also] not necessary that the child actually be touched.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is inhabited if someone uses it
as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged
conduct.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is inhabited if someone used it
as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused
him or her to leave.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is not inhabited if the former
residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some
personal property remains inside.]
description>) that is attached to the house and functionally connected
with it.]
[A trailer coach is a vehicle without its own mode of power, designed to
be pulled by a motor vehicle. It is made for human habitation or human
occupancy and for carrying property.]
857
[A trailer coach is [also] a park trailer that is intended for human

habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and
(1) has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;
(2) is not more than 14 feet wide;
(3) is built on a single chassis;
AND
(4) may be transported on public highways only with a permit.]
<Defense: Good Faith Belief Over 18>
actually believed that the child was at least 18 years of age. The People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not reasonably and actually believe the child was at least
18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; People v. Epps (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d
691, 703–704 [176 Cal.Rptr. 332].) However, child annoyance or molestation may
be committed by a single act or a repetitive course of conduct. There is no sua
sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction when a defendant’s conduct clearly
constituted a single course of conduct. (People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1005, 1014–1016 [230 Cal.Rptr. 237].) The court must determine if a unanimity
instruction is required and whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity
instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, or the modified unanimity instruction,
CALCRIM No. 3501, Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented.
Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and People v.
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.
element of the crime. (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165 [197
Cal.Rptr.3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38
Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
858
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for a violation of Penal Code
section 647.6 or any other specified sexual offense (see Pen. Code, § 647.6(c)), give
CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, or CALCRIM No.
3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has stipulated to the
truth of the prior conviction. (People v. Merkley (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58
Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; see People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr.
847, 807 P.2d 1076].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “It is not a defense that,” on request if
there is evidence that the minor consented to the act. (See People v. Kemp (1934)
139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
If appropriate, give any of the bracketed definitions of “inhabited,” “house” or
“trailer coach” on request.
391].)
If the defendant was charged with simple annoying or molesting a child without any
allegations about entering an inhabited house, building, or trailer coach, do not give
this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 1122, Annoying or Molesting a Child.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the child
was over 18 years of age, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
defense. (See People v. Atchison (1978) 22 Cal.3d 181, 183 [148 Cal.Rptr. 881, 583
P.2d 735]; People v. Paz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 300 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)–(c).
• Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459 [in context of burglary].
• Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635; Health & Saf. Code, § 18009.3.
• Acts Motivated by Unnatural or Abnormal Sexual Interest. People v. Maurer
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335]; In re Gladys R.
(1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 867 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].
• Annoy and Molest Defined; Objective Standard. People v. Lopez (1998) 19
Cal.4th 282, 289–290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195]; People v. Kongs (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 1741, 1749–1750 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 327]; People v. Pallares (1952)
112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901–902 [246 P.2d 173].
• Lewd Act Not Required. People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459,
465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].
927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta, in context of lewd act].
• Minor Need Not Actually Be Annoyed. People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282,
290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].
859
• Actual Touching Not Required. People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 195].
• House Not Inhabited If Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
COMMENTARY
See the Commentary section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1122, Annoying
or Molesting a Child.
• Attempted Annoying or Molesting of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 647.6(b).
Annoying or molesting a child without entering an inhabited dwelling is a
misdemeanor and lesser included offense. (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a).)
Neither simple assault (People v. Greene (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 654–655 [110
Cal.Rptr. 160]) or contributing to the delinquency of a minor (People v. Romero
(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [121 Cal.Rptr. 800] [construing former versions of
Pen. Code, §§ 272 and 647.6]) is a necessarily included lesser offense of annoying
or molesting a child.
RELATED ISSUES
After Entering
The statute does not require that the defendant engage in the molesting conduct
while still in the home. (People v. Mendoza (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 571, 575–576
[13 Cal.Rptr.3d 195].) It is sufficient if the defendant engaged in the conduct after
entering the home and there is a “nexus between the residential entry and the
molesting conduct.” (Id. at p. 576.)
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1122,
Annoying or Molesting a Child.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 80, 81.
(The Rutter Group).
860
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with annoying or molesting

a child [in violation of Penal Code section 647.6].
prove that:
1. The defendant engaged in conduct directed at a child;
2. A normal person, without hesitation, would have been disturbed,
irritated, offended, or injured by the defendant’s conduct;
3. The defendant’s conduct was motivated by an unnatural or
abnormal sexual interest in the child;
AND
4. The child was under the age of 18 years at the time of the
conduct.
[It is not necessary that the child actually be irritated or disturbed.] [It
is [also] not necessary that the child actually be touched.]
reasonably believed that the child was at least 18 years of age. The
defendant did not actually and reasonably believe the child was at least
18 years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
861
321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; People v. Epps (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d
691, 703–704 [176 Cal.Rptr. 332].) However, child annoyance or molestation may
be committed by either a single act or a repetitive course of conduct. There is no
sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction when a defendant’s conduct clearly
constituted a single course of conduct. (People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1005, 1014–1016 [230 Cal.Rptr. 237].) The court must determine if a unanimity
instruction is required and whether it is appropriate to give the standard unanimity
instruction, CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, or the modified unanimity instruction,
Review the discussion in the bench notes to these two instructions and People v.
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321–322.
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for a violation of Penal Code
section 647.6 or any other specified sexual offense (see Pen. Code, § 647.6(c)), give
truth of the prior conviction. (People v. Merkley (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 476 [58
Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; see People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279 Cal.Rptr.
847, 807 P.2d 1076].)
Kemp (1934) 139 Cal.App. 48, 51 [34 P.2d 502].)
391].)
If the defendant was charged with annoying or molesting a child after entering an
inhabited house, building, or trailer coach, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 1121, Annoying or Molesting a Child in a Dwelling.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably believed that the child
was over 18 years of age, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
defense. (See People v. Atchison (1978) 22 Cal.3d 181, 183 [148 Cal.Rptr. 881, 583
P.2d 735]; People v. Paz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 300 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166].)
AUTHORITY
• Acts Motivated by Unnatural or Abnormal Sexual Interest. People v. Maurer
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335]; In re Gladys R.
(1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 867 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].
• Annoy and Molest Defined; Objective Standard. People v. Lopez (1998) 19
Cal.4th 282, 289–290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713]; People v. Kongs
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1749–1750 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 327]; People v. Pallares
(1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901–902 [246 P.2d 173].
862
• Lewd Act Not Required. People v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459,
465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].
927, 937, fn. 7 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [dicta, in context of lewd act].
• Minor Need Not Actually Be Annoyed. People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282,
290 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].
• Actual Touching Not Required. People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713].
COMMENTARY
“Annoy” and “molest” are synonymous and generally refer to conduct designed to
disturb, irritate, offend, injure, or at least tend to injure, another person. (People v.
Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713]; People v.
Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426 [318 P.2d 4].) “Annoy means to disturb or
irritate, especially by continued or repeated acts. . . . [¶] ‘[M]olest’ [means] . . . ‘to
interfere with or meddle with unwarrantably so as to injure or disturb.’ ” (People v.
Pallares (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 901 [246 P.2d 173].) A photographer
can “annoy” a minor by taking the minor’s photograph in a public place in an
offensive and irritating manner. (See Ecker v. Raging Waters Group, Inc. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 1320, 1325 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 320].) A lewd act is not required. (People
v. Thompson (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 465–466 [253 Cal.Rptr. 564].)
• Attempted Annoying or Molesting of Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 647.6(a).
Annoying or Molesting a minor is a misdemeanor unless the defendant is charged
with one of the specified prior convictions. (Pen. Code, § 647.6(a).) If the defendant
is charged with a felony based on a qualifying prior conviction, the misdemeanor is
a lesser included offense.
Neither simple assault (People v. Greene (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 654–655 [110
Cal.Rptr. 160]) or contributing to the delinquency of a minor (People v. Romero
(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [121 Cal.Rptr. 800] [construing former versions of
Pen. Code, §§ 272 and 647.6]) is a necessarily included lesser offense of annoying
or molesting a child.
RELATED ISSUES
Minor Perpetrator
A minor under age 14 may be convicted for violating Penal Code section 647.6 on
clear proof of the minor’s knowledge of wrongfulness. (See Pen. Code, § 26; In re
Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 862, 869 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127] [12-year-
old may be declared ward of court for annoying or molesting another minor].)
863
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
864
1123. Aggravated Sexual Assault of Child Under 14 Years (Pen.
Code, § 269(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with aggravated sexual

assault of a child who was under the age of 14 years and at least seven
years younger than the defendant [in violation of Penal Code section
269(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed <insert sex offense specified
in Pen. Code, § 269(a)(1)–(5)> on another person;
AND
2. When the defendant acted, the other person was under the age of
14 years and was at least seven years younger than the defendant.
To decide whether the defendant committed <insert sex
offense specified in Pen. Code, § 269(a)(1)–(5)>, please refer to the
separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1 and in the sentence following element 2, insert the sex offense
specified in Penal Code section 269(a)(1)–(5) that is charged. The sex offenses
specified in section 269(a)(1)–(5) and their applicable instructions are:
1. Rape (Pen. Code, § 261(a)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape by Force, Fear,
or Threats).
2. Rape or sexual penetration in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1; see CALCRIM No.
1001, Rape in Concert, and CALCRIM No. 1046, Sexual Penetration in
Concert).
3. Sodomy (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1030, Sodomy by Force,
Fear, or Threats).
4. Oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2); see CALCRIM No. 1015, Oral
Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats).
865
5. Sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289(a); see CALCRIM No. 1045, Sexual
Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats).
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Underlying Sex Offense. Pen. Code, §§ 261(a)(2) [rape], 264.1 [rape or sexual
penetration in concert], 286(c)(2) [sodomy], 287(c)(2) [oral copulation], 289(a)
[sexual penetration].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[2][a], [c], [7][c] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
866
1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies
(Pen. Code, § 288.3(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (contacting/[or]

attempting to contact) a minor with the intent to commit
<insert enumerated offense from statute> [in violation of Penal
Code section 288.3(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (contacted or communicated with/ [or] attempted
to contact or communicate with) a minor;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to commit
<insert enumerated offense from statute> involving that
minor;
AND
3. [The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
person was a minor(;/.)]
3. [OR]
3. [The defendant believed that the person was a minor.]
Contacting or communicating with a minor includes direct and indirect
contact or communication. [That contact or communication may take
place personally or by using (an agent or agency/ [or] any print medium/
[or] any postal service/ [or] a common carrier/ [or] communication
common carrier/ [or] any electronic communications system/ [or] any
telecommunications/ [or] wire/ [or] computer/ [or] radio communications
[device or system]).]
<specify sex offense[s] listed in Pen. Code, § 288.3(a)>, please refer to the
separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those)
crime[s].
New August 2009; Revised March 2017, September 2020
867
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to define the elements of the underlying/target sex
offense. (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39
P.3d 432 and People v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 129 [261 Cal.Rptr. 502].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.3(a).
• Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813,
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
• Attempted Contact or Communication Does Not Require Minor Victim. People
v. Korwin (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 688 [248 Cal.Rptr.3d 763].
Attempted oral copulation is not a necessarily included offense of Penal Code
section 288.3 under the statutory elements test, because luring can be committed
without a direct act. (People v. Medelez (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 663 [206
Cal.Rptr.3d 402].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
868
1125. Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen.
Code, § 288.4(a)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with arranging a meeting

with a minor for a lewd purpose [while having a prior conviction] [in
violation of Penal Code section 288.4(a)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant arranged a meeting with (a minor / [or] a person
(he/she) believed to be a minor);
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was motivated by an
unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children;
[AND]
3. At that meeting, the defendant intended to (expose (his/her)
genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] have the minor expose (his/
her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] engage in lewd or
lascivious behavior).
[Lewd and lascivious behavior includes any touching of a person with the
intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. Lewd or
lascivious behavior includes touching any part of the person’s body,
either on the bare skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A
lewd or lascivious act includes causing someone to touch his or her own
body or someone else’s body at the instigation of the perpetrator who
has the required intent.]]
New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, August 2016, March 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the good faith belief that the victim
was not a minor as a defense for certain sex crimes with minors, including statutory
rape, when that defense is supported by evidence. Until courts of review clarify
whether this defense is available in prosecutions for violations of Pen. Code,
§ 288.4(a)(1), the court will have to exercise its own discretion. Suitable language
869
for such an instruction is found in CALCRIM No. 1070, Unlawful Sexual

Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
Whether the defendant suffered a prior conviction for an offense listed in subsection
(c) of section 290 is not an element of the offense and is subject to a severed jury
trial. (Pen. Code, § 288.4(a)(2).) See CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial, or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct that the “motivated by” element of the
offense must have been a substantial factor in its commission. (People v. Fromuth
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.4.
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
870
1126. Going to Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose (Pen. Code,
§ 288.4(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with going to a meeting

with a minor for a lewd purpose [in violation of Penal Code section
288.4(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant arranged a meeting with (a minor/ [or] a person
(he/she) believed to be a minor);
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was motivated by an
unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children;
3. At that meeting, the defendant intended to (expose (his/her)
genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] have the minor expose (his/
her) genitals or pubic or rectal area/ [or] engage in lewd or
lascivious behavior);
AND
4. The defendant went to the arranged meeting place at or about
the arranged time.
<Give the bracketed language at the beginning of the following sentence if
instructing on other offenses mentioning children for which the definition
given here does not apply.>
[For the purposes of this instruction,] (A/a) child or minor is a person
under the age of 18.
[Lewd and lascivious behavior includes any touching of a person with the
intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the other person. Lewd or
lascivious behavior includes touching any part of the person’s body,
either on the bare skin or through the clothes the person is wearing. [A
lewd or lascivious act includes causing someone to touch his or her own
body or someone else’s body at the instigation of the perpetrator who
has the required intent.]]
New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, August 2016, March 2017
871
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
element of the crime. (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal. App. 4th 1140, 1165 [197
Cal. Rptr. 3d 317]; People v. Maurer (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1126–1127 [38
Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
It is unclear how violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(b), which involve actually going
to an arranged meeting, correlate to violations of Pen. Code, § 288.4(a) (cf.
CALCRIM No. 1125, Arranging Meeting With Minor for Lewd Purpose). Violations
of section 288.4(a) may be lesser included offenses of violations of section 288.4(b).
In the alternative, a violation of section 288.4(b) could be characterized as sentence
enhancement of a violation of section 288.4(a). This matter must be left to the trial
court’s discretion until courts of review provide guidance.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the good faith belief that the victim
was not a minor as a defense for certain sex crimes with minors, including statutory
rape, when that defense is supported by evidence. Until courts of review clarify
whether this defense is available in prosecutions for violations of Pen. Code,
§ 288.4(b), the court will have to exercise its own discretion. Suitable language for
such an instruction is found in CALCRIM No. 1070, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse:
Defendant 21 or Older.
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct that the “motivated by” element of the
offense must have been a substantial factor in its commission. (People v. Fromuth
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Enumerated Offenses. Pen. Code, § 288.4.
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
• Meaning of Child and Minor. People v. Yuksel (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850,
854–855 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 823].
SECONDARY SOURCES
872
(The Rutter Group).
873
1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10
Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in (sexual

intercourse/ [or] sodomy) with a child 10 years of age or younger [in
violation of Penal Code section 288.7(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant engaged in an act of (sexual intercourse/ [or]
sodomy) with <insert name of complaining witness>;
2. When the defendant did so, <insert name of
complaining witness> was 10 years of age or younger;
3. At the time of the act, the defendant was at least 18 years old.
[Sexual intercourse means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the
vagina or genitalia by the penis. [Ejaculation is not required.]]
[Sodomy is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one
person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]]
New August 2009; Revised February 2013, September 2017

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Calculating Age. Fam. Code, § 6500; People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261,
1264, 1275 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 274 P.3d 456] [“10 years of age or younger”
means “under 11 years of age”]; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21
Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
• Attempts to commit the following crimes are not lesser included offenses of the
874
underlying crime: sexual intercourse with child 10 years of age or younger,

sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger, oral copulation with a child 10
years of age or younger. People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83 [191
Cal.Rptr.3d 905].
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
875
1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With
Child 10 Years of Age or Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in (oral

copulation/ [or] sexual penetration) with a child 10 years of age or
younger [in violation of Penal Code section 288.7(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant engaged in an act of (oral copulation/ [or] sexual
penetration) with <insert name of complaining
witness>;
2. When the defendant did so, <insert name of
complaining witness> was 10 years of age or younger;
3. At the time of the act, the defendant was at least 18 years old.
[Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth
Penetration is not required.]
[Sexual penetration means (penetration, however slight, of the genital or
slightly, his or her own genital or anal opening) by any foreign object,
substance, instrument, device, or any unknown object for the purpose of
sexual abuse, arousal, or gratification.]
[An unknown object includes any foreign object, substance, instrument,
or device, or any part of the body, including a penis, if it is not known
what object penetrated the opening.]
body except a sexual organ.]
New August 2009; Revised April 2010, February 2013, February 2015, September
2017, September 2019, September 2020
876
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
When sexual penetration is charged under Penal Code section 288.7(b), instruct that
the defendant must have specific intent. People v. Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
605, 613–615 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 544].
A conviction for Penal Code section 288.7(b) under an aiding and abetting theory
requires that the direct perpetrator be at least 18 years old. People v. Vital (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 925, 930 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 22]. If the defendant is charged under an
aiding and abetting theory, substitute the word “perpetrator” instead of “defendant”
in elements 1, 2, and 3.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.7(b).
opening refers to penetration of labia majora, not vagina].
170] [finger is “foreign object”].
[11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884].
Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
[224 Cal.Rptr. 467].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Saavedra (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 615
[234 Cal.Rptr.3d 544].
• Attempted Sexual Penetration. People v. Ngo (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126,
158–161 [170 Cal.Rptr.3d 90].
• Attempt to commit oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger is
not a lesser included offense. People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 83
[191 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].
SECONDARY SOURCES
877
(The Rutter Group).
878

1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen.
Code, § 288.2(a)(1) & (2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (exhibiting[,]/

sending[,]/ distributing[,]/ [or] offering to exhibit or distribute) harmful
material to a minor [or to a person the defendant believed was a minor]
prove that:
<Give alternative paragraph 1A for violations of Penal Code section
288.2(a)(1)>
[1. The defendant (exhibited[,]/ sent[,]/ caused to be sent[,]/
distributed[,]/ [or] offered to exhibit or distribute) harmful
material depicting a minor or minors engaging in sexual conduct
to another person by any means;]
<Give alternative paragraph 1B for violations of Penal Code section
288.2(a)(2)>
[1. The defendant (exhibited[,]/ sent[,]/ caused to be sent[,]/
distributed[,]/ [or] offered to exhibit or distribute) harmful
material to another person by any means;]
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the character of the
material;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew, should have known, or
believed that the other person was a minor;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to arouse, appeal to,
or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of (himself/herself)
or of the other person;
AND
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to engage in sexual
intercourse, sodomy, or oral copulation with the other person or
to have either person touch an intimate body part of the other
person.
You must decide whether the material at issue in this case meet[s] the
definition of harmful material. Material is harmful if, when considered as
a whole:
879
1. It shows or describes sexual conduct in an obviously offensive

way;
2. A reasonable person would conclude that it lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors;
AND
3. An average adult person, applying contemporary statewide
standards, would conclude it appeals to prurient interest.
For the purpose of this instruction, an intimate body part includes the
sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, or the breasts of a
female.
A prurient interest is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion.
Material, as used in this instruction, means any (book, magazine,
newspaper, video recording, or other printed or written material[;]/ [or]
any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial
representation[;]/ [or] any statue or other figure[;]/ [or] any recording,
transcription, or mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction[;]/ [or]
any other articles, equipment, machines, or materials). [Material includes
live or recorded telephone messages when transmitted or distributed as
part of a commercial transaction.]
Applying contemporary statewide standards means using present-day
standards and determining the effect of the material on all those whom it
is likely to reach within the state, in other words, its impact on the
average person in the statewide community. The average adult person is a
hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both
men and women; religious and nonreligious people; and adults of
varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities, and
points of view. The contemporary statewide standard means what is
acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person
or persons may believe the community ought to accept. The test you
must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal,
social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective
determination of what would offend the statewide community as a whole.
[You may consider evidence of local community standards in deciding
what the contemporary statewide standard is. However, you may not use
the standard of a local community, by itself, to establish the
contemporary statewide standard.]
The material is not harmful unless a reasonable person would conclude
that, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors. When deciding whether the material is
harmful, do not weigh its value against its prurient appeal.
880
[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make material harmful. In

order for material containing nudity to be harmful, it must depict sexual
activity and it must meet the requirements for harmful material listed
above.]
[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make material
harmful. In order for material depicting sexual activity to be harmful, it
must meet the requirements for harmful material listed above.]
The People must prove that the defendant knew the character of the
material but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the
material met the definition of harmful material.
A minor is anyone under the age of 18. [Under the law, a person
becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday
has begun.]
[If it appears from the nature of the material or the circumstances of its
distribution or showing that it is designed for clearly defined deviant
sexual groups, the appeal of the material must be judged based on its
intended audience.]
[In deciding the material’s nature and whether it lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the circumstances
of its (production[,]/ presentation[,]/ sale[,]/ dissemination[,]/
distribution[,]/ publicity) indicate that the material was being
commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must
determine the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether, applying contemporary statewide standards, the
material appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether
similar material is openly shown in the community. You must determine
the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[Harmful material may be sent or distributed by live or recorded
telephone messages.]
[To distribute means to transfer possession, whether or not the transfer is
made for money or anything else of value.]
<Defense: Parent providing sex education>
[A parent or guardian is not guilty of this offense if he or she acted to
promote legitimate sex education. The People must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not providing legitimate sex
education. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
<Defense: Legitimate scientific or educational purpose>
[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was engaging in
881
legitimate scientific or educational activities. The People have the burden

of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting
for a legitimate scientific or educational purpose. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence about calculating age if requested. (Fam. Code, § 6500;
In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].)
Penal Code section 288.2(a) was amended effective January 1, 2014.
Give any of the other bracketed paragraphs on request.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was “acting in aid of legitimate sex
education,” the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen.
Code, § 288.2(f).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of
proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law
stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See People
v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate scientific
or educational activities, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense.
(See Pen. Code, § 288.2(g).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what
standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or
case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of
the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply.
(See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49
P.3d 1067]; see also People v. Woodward (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10
Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition and the trial court erred in
giving amplifying instruction based on People v. Marler (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d
Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1), (2).
• Harmful Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 313.
• Know Character of Matter. Pen. Code, § 313(e); see People v. Kuhns (1976) 61
Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725] [no error in instructing that it was
882
unnecessary to establish that the accused had knowledge that material was
legally obscene].
• Means of Distribution. Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1), (2).
• Contemporary Community Standards. See Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S.
476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498] [quoting trial court instruction].
• Prurient Interest Defined. Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77
[127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229] [quoting former Pen. Code, § 311].
• Taken or Considered as a Whole. People v. Goulet (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d Supp.
1, 3 [98 Cal.Rptr. 782]; Kois v. Wisconsin (1972) 408 U.S. 229, 231 [92 S.Ct.
2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
• Matter Designed for Deviant Sexual Group. Pen. Code, § 313(a)(1); see People
v. Young (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 14–15 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604].
• Commercial Exploitation Is Probative of Matter’s Nature. Pen. Code,
§ 313(a)(2); People v. Kuhns (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 748–753 [132 Cal.Rptr.
725].
• Similar Matter Shown in Community. In re Harris (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880
[366 P.2d 305]; People v. Heller (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr.
830].
• Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 487
[77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
• Obscenity Contrasted With Nudity. People v. Noroff (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791,
795–796 [63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479]; In re Panchot (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105,
108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
• Defense of Sex Education. Pen. Code, § 288.2(f).
• Defense of Legitimate Scientific or Educational Activity. Pen. Code, § 288.2(g).
• Prior Version of This Instruction Was Correct. People v. Richardson (2007) 151
Under the version of Penal Code section 288.2 effective January 1, 2014,
misdemeanor distribution of harmful matter (Pen. Code, § 313.1(a)) is not a lesser
included offense. (People v. Collom (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 35, 42–44 [265
Cal.Rptr.3d 705].)
Under the prior version of Penal Code section 288.2, in effect until December 31,
2013, the following were held to be lesser included offenses:
• Attempted Distribution of Harmful Matter to Minor. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288.2;
see, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170, 185 [94
Cal.Rptr.2d 453].
• Misdemeanor Distribution of Harmful Matter. Pen. Code, § 313.1(a); People v.
Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 244 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 609].
883
RELATED ISSUES
Telephone, Cable, or ISPs
A telephone corporation, a cable television company or its affiliates, an Internet
service provider, or commercial online service provider does not violate section
288.2 by carrying, broadcasting, or transmitting harmful matter while providing its
services. (Pen. Code, § 288.2(e).)
Expert Testimony Not Required
Neither the prosecution nor the defense is required to introduce expert witness
testimony regarding the harmful nature of the matter. (Pen. Code, § 312.1
[abrogating In re Giannini (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 574 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d
535]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.21[1][d][iii], [2][c], Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order,
§ 144.10[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
884
1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a
Minor (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with distributing obscene

matter that shows a minor engaging in sexual conduct [in violation of
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—sent or brought>
[1. The defendant (sent/ [or] brought) obscene matter into California
[or caused obscene matter to be (sent/ [or] brought) into
California];]
<Alternative 1B—possessed>
[1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] prepared[,]/ [or] published[,]/
[or] produced[,]/ [or] developed[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] printed)
obscene matter;]
<Alternative 1C—offered to distribute>
[1. The defendant offered to distribute obscene matter to someone
else;]
<Alternative 1D—distributed>
[1. The defendant (distributed/ [or] showed/ [or] exchanged) obscene
matter (to/with) someone else;]
matter;
[AND]
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the matter showed
a person under the age of 18 years who was personally
participating in or simulating sexual conduct(;/.)
<Give element 4 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, or 1C; see
Bench Notes>
[AND
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (sell or distribute/
distribute, show, or exchange/distribute) the matter to someone
else [for money or other commercial benefit].]
You must decide whether the matter at issue in this case meets the
definition of obscene matter. Matter is obscene if, when considered as a
whole:
885

way;
artistic, political, or scientific value;
AND
3. An average adult person, applying contemporary statewide
standards, would conclude it appeals to a prurient interest.
excretion.
Matter means any representation of information, data, or image,
including any
(film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/videotape/video laser
disc/computer hardware or software/computer floppy disk/data storage
medium/CD-ROM/computer-generated equipment/ [or] computer-
generated image that contains any film or filmstrip).
standards and determining the effect of the matter on all those whom it
average person in the statewide community. The average adult person is a
hypothetical person who represents the entire community, including both
men and women; religious and nonreligious people; and adults of
varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities, and
points of view. The contemporary statewide standard means what is
acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what some person
or persons may believe the community ought to accept. The test you
must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own personal,
social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective
what the contemporary statewide standard is. However, you may not use
the standard of a local community, by itself, to establish the
contemporary statewide standard.]
The material is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude
scientific value. When deciding whether the material is obscene, do not
weigh its value against its prurient appeal.
[Matter is not considered obscene under the law if (all persons under the
age of 18 depicted in the matter are legally emancipated/ [or] it only
shows lawful conduct between spouses).]
[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make matter obscene. In
886
order for matter containing nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual

activity and it must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make matter obscene.
In order for matter depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it must meet
the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
Sexual conduct means actual or simulated (sexual intercourse/ [or] oral
copulation[,]/ [or] anal intercourse[,]/ [or] anal oral copulation[,]/ [or]
<insert other sexual conduct as defined in Pen. Code,
§ 311.4(d)(1)>). An act is simulated when it gives the appearance of being
sexual conduct.
The People must prove that the defendant knew the obscene nature of
the matter but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether
the matter met the definition of obscene.
[Commercial benefit means receipt of, or intent to receive, financial value
or compensation.]
[A person accused of committing this crime can be an individual,
partnership, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or
other legal entity.]
[In deciding the matter’s nature and whether it lacks serious literary,
of its (production[,]/ presentation[,]/ sale[,]/ dissemination[,]/
distribution[,]/ publicity) indicate that the matter was being
commercially exploited because of its prurient appeal. You must decide
the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether the matter lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value, you may [also] consider whether the defendant knew
that the matter showed persons under the age of 16 years engaging in
sexual conduct. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether, applying contemporary statewide standards, the
matter appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether similar
matter is openly shown in the community. You must decide the weight, if
any, to give this evidence.]
[If it appears from the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its
distribution or showing that it is designed for clearly defined deviant
sexual groups, the appeal of the matter must be judged based on its
intended audience.]
[Two or more people may possess something at the same time.]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to possess
887
it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control
it), either personally or through (another person/other people).]
[A person who possesses obscene matter for his or her own personal use
is not guilty of this crime.]
legitimate medical, scientific, or educational activities. The People have
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific, or educational purpose. If
the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty of this crime.]
<Defense: Law enforcement agent>
[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was a member [or
agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency and was involved in
the investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
acting as a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting
agency. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of this crime.
[A person is an agent of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency if he
or she does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of a law
enforcement or prosecuting agency.]]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give one of the alternatives A–D depending on the charges and
evidence in the case. Give element 4 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, or
1C. (People v. Young (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604];
People v. Burrows (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28]; In re Klor
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].) When giving
alternative 1A, select “sell or distribute” in element 4. When giving alternative 1B,
select “distribute, show, or exchange” in element 4. When giving alternative 1C,
select “distribute.” Do not give element 4 with alternative 1D. No published case
has held that distributing or showing obscene material requires specific intent. Give
the bracketed phrase “for money or other commercial benefit” in element 4 if the
defendant is charged under Penal Code section 311.2(b).
888
Give any of the other bracketed paragraphs on request.

If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was engaging in legitimate medical,
scientific, or educational activities, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
that defense. (See Pen. Code, §§ 311.2(e); 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the
burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence
of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to
provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense
does not apply. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122
Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also People v. Woodward (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require
definition and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on People
v. Marler (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was acting as a law enforcement
agent, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code,
§ 311.2(e).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof
applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that
the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the
committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See People v. Mower,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 478–479.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b).
• Specific Intent to Distribute or Exhibit. People v. Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d
Supp. at p. 12 [possession with intent to distribute or exhibit]; see People v.
Burrows, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at p. 231 [preparation or publication with
specific intent to distribute]; In re Klor, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 819.
• Obscene Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(a); see Bloom v. Municipal Court
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77, 81 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229]; Miller v.
California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419]; see also
Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439].
476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
• Prurient Interest Defined. Bloom v. Municipal Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 77.
• Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311.4(d)(1); see People v. Spurlock (2003)
• Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(c).
• Distribute Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(d).
• Knowingly Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(e); see People v. Kuhns (1976) 61
Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
889
• Exhibit Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(f).

v. Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pp. 14–15.
§ 311(a)(2); People v. Kuhns, supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at pp. 748–753.
• Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Matter’s Nature.
Pen. Code, § 311(a)(3).
[16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305]; People v. Heller (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d Supp.
1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
• Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(b)–(d), 311.2(e)–(g);
Pen. Code, § 311.8.
• Agent Defined. See People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr.
237, 591 P.2d 527] [in context of entrapment].
2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
• Obscenity Contrasted With Sex. Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. at p. 487.
108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
• Possessing For Personal Use Not a Crime. Stanley v. Georgia (1969) 394 U.S.
557, 568 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542].
• Constructive vs. Actual Possession. People v. Barnes (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 552,
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Commercial Benefit Defined. People v. Wimer (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 113, 129
[289 Cal.Rptr.3d 164].
• Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.1(a).
• Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter for Commercial Consideration. Pen.
Code, §§ 664, 311.2(b).
RELATED ISSUES
Advertising Obscene Matter Involving Minors
It is a felony to advertise for sale or distribution any obscene matter knowing that it
depicts a minor engaged in sexual conduct. (Pen. Code, § 311.10.)
Employing or Using Minor to Pose in Film
It is a felony to employ, use, or persuade a minor to engage in or assist others in
posing or modeling for the purpose of preparing a commercial or noncommercial
890
film or other medium involving sexual conduct by a minor. (See Pen. Code,
§ 311.4(b), (c).) Producing child pornography and posting it on the Internet to
induce others to trade such pornography without making a monetary profit satisfies
the “commercial purposes” requirement of Penal Code section 311.4(b). (People v.
Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 406–407 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 48 P.3d 1148].)
Excluded Conduct
Neither section 311.1 nor 311.2 applies to law enforcement and prosecuting agencies
investigating or prosecuting criminal offenses, to legitimate medical, scientific, or
educational activities, or to lawful conduct between spouses. (Pen. Code,
§§ 311.1(b), 311.2(e); see Pen. Code, § 311.8(a) [“defense” that act committed in aid
of legitimate scientific or educational purpose].) Nor do these sections apply to
depictions of a minor who is legally emancipated. (Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(c), 311.2(f);
see Fam. Code, § 7000 et seq. [emancipation of minors].)
Telephone Services
A telephone corporation (see Pub. Util. Code, § 234) does not violate section 311.1
or 311.2 by carrying or transmitting messages described in these sections, or by
performing related activities in providing telephone services. (Pen. Code,
§§ 311.1(d), 311.2(g).)
Expert Testimony Not Required
Neither the prosecution nor the defense is required to introduce expert witness
testimony regarding the obscene nature of the matter. (Pen. Code, § 312.1
[abrogating In re Giannini (1968) 69 Cal.2d 563, 574 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d
535]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
7 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law,
§§ 486–492.
(The Rutter Group).
891
1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material
(Pen. Code, § 311.2(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with distributing obscene

material [in violation of Penal Code section 311.2(a)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—sent or brought>
[1. The defendant (sent/ [or] brought) obscene material into
California [or caused obscene material to be (sent/ [or] brought)
into California];]
<Alternative 1B—possessed>
[1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] prepared[,]/ [or] published[,]/
[or] produced[,]/ [or] printed) obscene material in California;]
<Alternative 1C—offered to distribute>
[1. The defendant offered to distribute obscene material to someone
else;]
<Alternative 1D—distributed>
[1. The defendant (distributed/ [or] showed) obscene material to
someone else;]
[AND]
material(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, or 1C; see
Bench Notes.>
[AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (sell or distribute/
distribute or show/distribute) the material to someone else.]
You must decide whether the material at issue in this case meet[s] the
definition of obscene material. Material, when considered as a whole, is
obscene if:
way;
AND
892
3. An average adult person applying contemporary statewide

standards would conclude that it appeals to a prurient interest.
excretion.
Material means ([[a] ((book[,]/ [or] magazine[,]/ [or] newspaper[,]/ [or]
[other] printed or written material][(,/;)]/ [or] [a picture[,]/ [or]
drawing[,]/ [or] photograph[,]/ [or] motion picture[,]/ [or] [other]
pictorial representation][(,/;)]/ [or] [a statue or other figure][(,/;)]/ [or] [a
(recording[,]/ [or] transcription[,]/ [or] mechanical, chemical, or electrical
reproduction][(,/;)]/ [or any other article, equipment, or machine]).
[Material also means live or recorded telephone messages transmitted,
disseminated, or distributed as part of a commercial transaction.]
standards and determining the effect of the material on all those whom it
average adult person in the statewide community. The average adult
person is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community,
including both men and women, religious and nonreligious people, and
adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities,
and points of view. The term contemporary statewide standards means
what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what
some person or persons may believe the community should accept. The
test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own
personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective
what the contemporary statewide standards are. However, you may not
use the standards of a specific local community, by themselves, to
establish the contemporary statewide standards.]
The material is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude
scientific value. When deciding whether the material is obscene, do not
weigh its value against its prurient appeal.
[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make material obscene. In
order for material containing nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual
activity and must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make material
obscene. In order for material depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it
must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
[Material is not considered obscene under the law if (all persons under
the age of 18 years depicted in the material are legally emancipated/ [or]
893
it only shows lawful conduct between spouses).]

material but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the
material met the definition of obscene.
[In deciding the material’s character and whether it lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, consider whether the
circumstances of its (production[,]/ [or] presentation[,]/ [or] sale[,]/ [or]
dissemination[,]/ [or] distribution[,]/ [or] publicity) indicate that the
material was being commercially exploited because of its prurient
appeal. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
that the material showed persons under 16 years old engaging in sexual
conduct. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether, according to contemporary statewide standards,
the material appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether
similar material is openly shown in the statewide community. You must
decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[If it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of
its distribution or showing that it is designed for a clearly defined
deviant sexual group, the appeal of the material must be judged based
on its intended audience.]
it), either personally or through (another person/other people).]
[A person who possesses obscene material for his or her own personal
use is not guilty of this crime.]
<Defense: Legitimate Scientific or Educational Purpose>
894
<Defense: Law Enforcement Agent>

[The defendant is not guilty of this crime if (he/she) was a member [or
agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency and was involved in
the investigation or prosecution of crimes. The People have the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting
as a member [or agent] of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency. If
guilty of this crime.
[A person is an agent of a law enforcement or prosecuting agency if he
or she does something at the request, suggestion, or direction of a law
enforcement or prosecuting agency.]]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give one of the alternatives 1A–1D depending on the charges and
evidence in the case. Give element 3 when instructing with alternative 1A, 1B, 1C
or 1D. (People v. Young (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604];
People v. Burrows (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28]; In re Klor
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].) When giving
alternative 1A, select “sell or distribute” in element 3. When giving alternative 1B,
select “distribute or show” in element 3. When giving alternative 1C, select
“distribute.” Do not give element 3 with alternative 1D. No published case has held
that distributing or showing obscene material requires specific intent.
that defense. (See Pen. Code, §§ 311.2(e), 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the
burden of proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence
of statutory authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to
provide that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense
does not apply. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122
Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; see also People v. Woodward (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require
definition, and the trial court erred in giving amplifying instruction based on People
v. Marler (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was acting as a law enforcement
agent, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. (See Pen. Code,
895
§ 311.2(e).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof and what standard of proof
applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory authority or case law stating that
the defendant must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the
committee has drafted the instruction to provide that the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. (See People v. Mower
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent to Distribute or Exhibit. People v. Young (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 10, 12 [143 Cal.Rptr. 604] [possession with intent to distribute or exhibit];
see People v. Burrows (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 231 [67 Cal.Rptr. 28]
[preparation or publication with specific intent to distribute]; In re Klor (1966)
64 Cal.2d 816, 819 [51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791].
• Obscene Matter Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(a); see Bloom v. Municipal Court
(1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 77, 81 [127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229]; Miller v.
California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419]; see also
Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439].
476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
[127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].
• Distribute Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(d).
Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
725].
• Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Matter’s Nature.
Pen. Code, § 311(a)(3).
1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
• Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, §§ 311.1(b)–(d), 311.2(e)–(g);
311.8.
• Agent Defined. See People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr.
896
237, 591 P.2d 527] [in context of entrapment].

2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
[77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
• Possessing for Personal Use Not a Crime. Stanley v. Georgia (1969) 394 U.S.
557, 568 [89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Attempted Distribution of Obscene Matter. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.1(a).
RELATED ISSUES
Definition of “Sexual Conduct”
“Obscene matter” must depict or describe “sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 311(a).) The statute does not define “sexual conduct.”
Penal Code sections 311.4(d)(1) and 311.3(b) provide definitions of the term “sexual
conduct” as used in those sections. If the court determines that a definition of
“sexual conduct” is necessary, the court may wish to review those statutes. (See also
People v. Spurlock (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1131 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 372]
[discussing definition of sexual conduct in prosecution for violating Pen. Code,
§§ 311.3 and 311.4].)
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1141, Distributing Obscene Matter
Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 486–492.
(The Rutter Group).
897
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (engaging or

participating in[,]/ [or] managing[,]/ [or] producing[,]/ [or] sponsoring[,]/
[or] presenting or showing) obscene live conduct [in violation of Penal
Code section 311.6].
prove that:
1. The defendant (engaged or participated in[,]/ [or] managed[,]/
[or] produced[,]/ [or] sponsored[,]/ [or] presented or showed)
obscene live conduct;
2. The defendant knew of the character of the conduct;
AND
3. The obscene live conduct occurred in front of an audience of at
least one person in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the
public[, or a segment of the public,] or to public view).
Live conduct means physical activity by a person acting alone or with
someone else[, including but not limited to (dancing[,]/ [or] acting[,]/ [or]
simulating[,]/ [or] pantomiming[,]/ [or] singing[,]/ [or] speaking)].
You must decide whether the conduct at issue in this case meets the
definition of obscene live conduct. Live conduct, when considered as a
whole, is obscene if:
way;
AND
3. An average adult person applying contemporary statewide
standards would conclude it appeals to a prurient interest.
excretion.
standards and determining the effect of the conduct on all those whom it
average adult person in the statewide community. The average adult
person is a hypothetical person who represents the entire community,
including both men and women, religious and nonreligious people, and
adults of varying ages, educational and economic levels, races, ethnicities,
898
and points of view. The term contemporary statewide standards means

what is acceptable to the statewide community as a whole, not what
some person or persons may believe the community should accept. The
test you must apply is not what you find offensive based on your own
personal, social, or moral views. Instead, you must make an objective
what the contemporary statewide standards are. However, you may not
use the standards of a specific local community, by themselves, to
establish the contemporary statewide standards.]
The conduct is not obscene unless a reasonable person would conclude
scientific value. When deciding whether the conduct is obscene, do not
weigh the value of the conduct against its prurient appeal.
[The depiction of nudity, by itself, does not make conduct obscene. In
order for conduct involving nudity to be obscene, it must depict sexual
activity and must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
[The depiction of sexual activity, by itself, does not make conduct
obscene. In order for conduct depicting sexual activity to be obscene, it
must meet the requirements for obscenity listed above.]
conduct but do not need to prove that the defendant knew whether the
conduct met the definition of obscene.
[In deciding the conduct’s character and whether it lacks serious literary,
of its (production[,]/ [or] presentation[,]/ [or] advertising[,]/ [or] showing)
indicate that the conduct was being commercially exploited because of its
prurient appeal. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this
evidence.]
[In deciding whether the conduct lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
that the conduct showed persons under 16 years old engaging in sexual
activities. You must decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[In deciding whether, according to contemporary statewide standards,
the conduct appeals to a prurient interest, you may consider whether
similar conduct is openly shown in the statewide community. You must
decide the weight, if any, to give this evidence.]
[If it appears from the character of the conduct or the circumstances of
899
its presentation or showing that it is designed for a clearly defined

deviant sexual group, the appeal of the conduct must be judged based on
its intended audience.]
<Defense: Legitimate Scientific or Educational Purpose>
not acting for a legitimate medical, scientific or educational purpose. If
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
that defense. (Pen. Code, § 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of proof
and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory
authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not
apply. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326];
see also People v. Woodward (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d
779] [“legitimate” does not require definition, and the trial court erred in giving
amplifying instruction based on People v. Marler (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889
[18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)
AUTHORITY
• Obscene Live Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311(g); see In re Giannini (1968)
69 Cal.2d 563, 575 [72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535] [not all topless dancing
obscene]; Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d
419]; Pope v. Illinois (1987) 481 U.S. 497, 500–501 [107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d
439].
476, 489–490 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
[127 Cal.Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].
900

Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
725].
• Knowledge That Matter Depicts Child Under 16 Is Probative of Conduct’s
Nature. Pen. Code, § 311(g)(3).
1, 7 [157 Cal.Rptr. 830].
• Exceptions to Statutory Prohibitions. Pen. Code, § 311.8.
2245, 33 L.Ed.2d 312].
[77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498].
108–109 [73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d 385].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1141, Distributing Obscene Matter
Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor, and CALCRIM No. 1142, Distributing or
Intending to Distribute Obscene Material.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 486–492.
(The Rutter Group).
901
1144. Using a Minor to Perform Prohibited Acts (Pen. Code,
§ 311.4(b), (c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with using a minor to

perform prohibited acts [in violation of <insert appropriate
code section[s]>].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A>
[1. The defendant (promoted/ [or] employed/ [or] used/ [or]
persuaded/ [or] induced/ [or] coerced) a minor who was under
(18/14) years old at the time to pose or model or assist others to
pose or model, alone or with others;
[1. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (promoting/ [or]
employing/ [or] using/ [or] persuading/ [or] inducing/ [or]
coercing) a minor of that age to pose or model or assist others to
pose or model;]
<Alternative 1B>
[1. The defendant was the (parent/ [or] guardian) in control of a
minor who was under (18/14) years old at the time and the
defendant permitted that minor to pose or model or assist others
to pose or model, alone or with others;
[1. At the time the defendant gave permission to the minor, (he/she)
knew that the minor would pose or model or assist others to pose
or model, alone or with others;]
2. The purpose of the posing or modeling was to prepare matter
containing [or incorporating] sexual conduct;
3. The minor participated in the sexual conduct alone[, or with
other persons][, or with animals];
4. The defendant was aware of the character of the matter or live
conduct;
[AND]
5. The defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, based on
facts of which (he/she) was aware, that the minor was under (18/
14) years of age;
[AND
6. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that the matter
902
would be used for commercial purposes.]

Matter means any representation of information, data, or image,
including any
(film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/videotape/video laser
disc/computer hardware or software/computer floppy disk/data storage
medium/CD-ROM/computer-generated equipment/ [or] computer-
generated image that contains any film or filmstrip). For the purpose of
this instruction matter does not include material (in which all of the
persons depicted under the age of 18 are legally emancipated/ [or] that
only depicts lawful conduct between spouses).
sexual conduct.
[Use for commercial purposes includes intending to trade the matter
depicting sexual conduct for a commercial purpose at some point in the
future. A commercial purpose does not have to include financial gain.]
New April 2010

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
903
that defense. (See Pen. Code, § 311.8(a).) It is unclear who bears the burden of
proof and what standard of proof applies to this defense. In the absence of statutory
authority or case law stating that the defendant must prove the defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, the committee has drafted the instruction to provide
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not
apply. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326,
49 P.3d 1067]; see also People v. Woodward (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 840–841
[10 Cal.Rptr.3d 779] [“legitimate” does not require definition and the trial court
erred in giving amplifying instruction based on People v. Marler (1962) 199
Cal.App.2d Supp. 889 [18 Cal.Rptr. 923]].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 311.4(b), (c).
• Defendant Need Not Directly Engage in Posing or Modeling Victim. People v.
Hobbs (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1, 5–7 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 685].
• Minor Under Age of 14. Pen. Code, § 311.4(f).
• Commercial Purposes Defined. People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396,
402–407 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 595, 48 P.3d 1148].
Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 96, 111–112.
(The Rutter Group).
904
1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual
Conduct (Pen. Code, § 311.11(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing matter that

shows a minor engaged in or simulating sexual conduct [in violation of
Penal Code section 311.11(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed or controlled matter that contained [an]
image[s] of a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual
conduct;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed or controlled the
matter;
AND
3. The defendant knew that the matter contained [an] image[s] of a
minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.
Matter, as used in this instruction, means any visual work[s], including
any (film/filmstrip/photograph/negative/slide/photocopy/video recording/
computer-generated media[,]/[or] <insert other item listed in
Pen. Code § 311.11(a)>).
[Matter does not include drawings, figurines, or statues.]
[Matter does not include any film rated by the Motion Picture
Association of America.]
[The matter does not have to be obscene.] <For a definition of obscene, see
CALCRIM 1141>
it) either personally or through another person.]
A minor is anyone under the age of 18. [Under the law, a person
becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday
has begun.]
sexual conduct.
<Sentencing Factors>
905
[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s]
additional allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the People have
proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime beyond a reasonable
doubt and return a separate finding for each crime.]
<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged with the felony
enhancement under Penal Code section 311.11(b)>
[To prove the prior conviction allegation, the People must prove that the
defendant has at least one prior conviction for violating or attempting to
violate Penal Code section 311.11(a) or for committing or attempting to
commit ( ) <insert description of offense requiring registration
pursuant to Penal Code section 290>.]
<Give the following four paragraphs if the defendant is charged with the
felony enhancement under Penal Code section 311.11(c)(1)>
[To prove the multiple images allegation, the People must prove that:
The matter the defendant knowingly possessed or controlled contained
more than 600 images all of which the defendant knew showed a minor
engaged in or simulating sexual conduct;
AND
The matter contained at least ten or more images involving a
prepubescent minor or a minor under 12 years of age.
Each photograph, picture, computer or computer-generated image, or
any similar visual depiction counts as one image.
Each video, video-clip, movie, or similar visual depiction counts as 50
images.]
<Give the following three paragraphs if the defendant is charged under
Penal Code section 311.11(c)(2)>
[To prove the sexual sadism or sexual masochism allegation, the People
must prove that the matter showed sexual sadism or sexual masochism
involving a minor.
Sexual sadism means intentionally causing pain for purposes of sexual
gratification or stimulation.
Sexual masochism means intentionally experiencing pain for purposes of
sexual gratification or stimulation.]
New March 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give the sentencing factors if appropriate.
906
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.3d 735, 756–758 [132 Cal.Rptr. 725].
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
• Personally Defined. People v. Gerber (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 368, 386 [126
Cal.Rptr.3d 688].
• Possession or Control of Computer Image. Tecklenburg v. Appellate Div. of
Superior Court (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1418–1419 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 460].
• Simultaneous Possession of Materials at Same Location is One Offense. People
v. Manfredi (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 622, 624 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 810].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 486–492.
(The Rutter Group).
907
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with pimping [in violation

of Penal Code section 266h].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of pimping, the People must prove
that:
1. The defendant knew that <insert name> was a
prostitute;
[AND]
<Alternative 2A—money earned by prostitute supported defendant>
[2. The (money/proceeds) that <insert name> earned as
a prostitute supported defendant, in whole or in part(;/.)]
<Alternative 2B—money loaned by house manager supported defendant>
[2. Money that was (loaned to/advanced to/charged against)
<insert name> by a person who (kept/managed/was
a prostitute at) the house or other place where the prostitution
occurred, supported the defendant in whole or in part(;/.)]
<Alternative 2C—defendant asked for payment>
[2. The defendant asked for payment or received payment for
soliciting prostitution customers for <insert name>(;/
.)]
<Give element 3 when defendant charged with pimping a minor.>
[AND
3. <insert name> was a minor (over the age of 16
years/under the age of 16 years) when (he/she) engaged in the
prostitution.]
A prostitute is a person who engages in sexual intercourse or any lewd
act with another person in exchange for money [or other compensation].
A lewd act means physical contact of the genitals, buttocks, or female
breast of either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other
person’s body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

908
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 2, use the appropriate alternative A–C depending on the evidence in the
case.
Give element 3 if it is alleged that the prostitute was a minor. Punishment is
enhanced if the minor is under the age of 16 years. (Pen. Code, § 266h(b).)
§ 6500; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 849–850 [855 P.2d 391].)
If necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case, the court must instruct sua
sponte on a defense theory in evidence, for example, that nude modeling does not
constitute an act of prostitution and that an act of procuring a person solely for the
purpose of nude modeling does not violate either the pimping or pandering statute.
(People v. Hill (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 536–537 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 266h.
• Prostitution Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(b); People v. Hill (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d
525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; People v. Romo (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 83,
90–91 [19 Cal.Rptr. 179]; Wooten v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422,
431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute
and customer].
• General Intent Crime. People v. McNulty (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 624, 630–631
[249 Cal.Rptr. 22].
• Proof Person Is a Prostitute. People v. James (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 608, 613
[79 Cal.Rptr. 182].
• Solicitation Defined. People v. Smith (1955) 44 Cal.2d 77, 78–80 [279 P.2d 33].
• Good Faith Belief That Minor Is 18 No Defense to Pimping and Pandering.
People v. Branch (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 516, 521–522 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 412].
COMMENTARY
Solicitation
In deciding there was sufficient evidence of solicitation, the court in People v.
Phillips (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453 [160 P.2d 872], quoted the following
definitions:
“[S]olicit” is defined as: “To tempt . . . ; to lure on, esp. into evil, . . . to bring
about . . . ; to seek to induce or elicit . . . .” (Webster’s New International
Dictionary (2d ed.)). “. . . to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving;
to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; . . . to try to obtain . . . . While it
909
does imply a serious request, it requires no particular degree of importunity,

entreaty, imploration or supplication.” (58 C.J. 804–805.)
General Intent
The three ways of violating Penal Code section 266h are all general intent crimes,
as held in People v. McNulty (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 624, 630–631 [249 Cal.Rptr.
22]:
[D]eriving support with knowledge that the other person is a prostitute is all that
is required for violating the section in this manner. No specific intent is
required . . . . Receiving compensation for soliciting with knowledge that the
other person is a prostitute is the only requirement under the first alternative of
violating section 266h by solicitation. Under the second alternative to pimping
by soliciting (soliciting compensation), . . . if the accused has solicited for the
prostitute and has solicited compensation even though he had not intended to
receive compensation, he would nevertheless be guilty of pimping. Pimping in
all its forms is not a specific intent crime.
• Attempted Pimping. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266h; see People v. Osuna (1967) 251
Cal.App.2d 528, 531 [59 Cal.Rptr. 559].
• There is no crime of aiding and abetting prostitution. People v. Gibson (2001) 90
RELATED ISSUES
House of Prostitution
One room of a building or other place is sufficient to constitute a house of
prostitution, and one person may keep such a place to which others resort for
purposes of prostitution. (People v. Frey (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 33, 53 [39 Cal.Rptr.
49]; see Aguilera v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 848, 852 [78 Cal.Rptr.
736].)
Receiving Support
A conviction for living or deriving support from a prostitute’s earnings does not
require evidence that the defendant received money directly from the prostitute, or
that the defendant used money received from the prostitution solely to pay his or
her own living expenses. (People v. Navarro (1922) 60 Cal.App. 180, 182 [212 P.
403].)
Unanimity Instruction Not Required
Pimping is a crime “of a continuous ongoing nature and [is] therefore not subject to
the requirement that the jury must agree on the specific act or acts constituting the
offense.” (People v. Dell (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 265–266 [283 Cal.Rptr. 361];
People v. Lewis (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 460–462 [143 Cal.Rptr. 587] [living or
deriving support from prostitute’s earnings is an ongoing continuing offense].) Proof
of an ongoing relationship between the defendant and the prostitute is not required.
(People v. Jackson (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 207, 209–210 [170 Cal.Rptr. 476].)
910
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.11[2] (Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
911
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with pandering [in violation

of Penal Code section 266i].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of pandering, the People must
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—persuaded/procured>
[1. The defendant successfully (persuaded/procured)
<insert name> to become a prostitute(;/.)]
<Alternative 1B—promises/threats/violence used to cause person to
become prostitute>
[1. The defendant used (promises[,]/ threats[,]/ violence[,]/ [or] any
device or scheme) to (cause/persuade/encourage/induce)
<insert name> to become a prostitute[, although the
defendant’s efforts need not have been successful](;/.)]
<Alternative 1C—arranged/procured a position>
[1. The defendant (arranged/procured a position) for
<insert name> to be a prostitute in either a house of prostitution
or any other place where prostitution is encouraged or allowed(;/
.)]
<Alternative 1D—promises/threats/violence used to cause person to
remain>
[1. The defendant used (promises[,]/ threats[,]/ violence[,]/ [or] any
device or scheme) to (cause/persuade/encourage/induce)
<insert name> to remain as a prostitute in a house
of prostitution or any other place where prostitution is
encouraged or allowed(;/.)]
<Alternative 1E—used fraud>
[1. The defendant used fraud, trickery, or duress [or abused a
position of confidence or authority] to (persuade/procure)
<insert name> to (be a prostitute/enter any place
where prostitution is encouraged or allowed/enter or leave
California for the purpose of prostitution)(;/.)]
<Alternative 1F—received money>
[1. The defendant (received/gave/agreed to receive/agreed to give)
money or something of value in exchange for
(persuading/attempting to persuade/procuring/attempting to
procure) <insert name> to (be a prostitute/enter or
912
leave California for the purpose of prostitution)(;/.)]

AND
2. The defendant intended to influence <insert name>
to be a prostitute(;/.)
<Give element 3 when defendant charged with pandering a minor.>
[AND
3. <insert name> was (16 years old or older/under the
age of 16) at the time the defendant acted.]
[It does not matter whether <insert name> was (a prostitute
already/ [or] an undercover police officer).]
A prostitute is a person who engages in sexual intercourse or any lewd
act with another person in exchange for money [or other compensation].
[Pandering requires that an intended act of prostitution be with someone
other than the defendant.] A lewd act means physical contact of the
genitals, buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer
with some part of the other person’s body for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification.
hardship, or retribution that would cause a reasonable person to do [or
submit to] something that he or she would not do [or submit to]
otherwise. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
consider all the circumstances, including the person’s age and (her/his)
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2012, August 2012, February
2015, April 2020, March 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–F depending on the evidence in the
case. (See People v. Montgomery (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 12, 24, 27–28 [117 P.2d
437] [statutory alternatives are not mutually exclusive], disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668
P.2d 697] and Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124
Cal.Rtpr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].)
913
The committee included “persuade” and “arrange” as options in element one

because the statutory language, “procure,” may be difficult for jurors to understand.
Give bracketed element 3 if it is alleged that the person procured, or otherwise
caused to act, by the defendant was a minor “over” or “under” the age of 16 years.
(Pen. Code, § 266i(b).)
Give the bracketed paragraph defining duress on request if there is sufficient
evidence that duress was used to procure a person for prostitution. (Pen. Code,
§ 266i(a)(5); see People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d
869, 94 P.3d 1071] [definition of “duress”].)
391].)
There is a split of authority on whether pandering requires that services be procured
for a person other than the defendant. (People v. Dixon (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1154, 1159–1160 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 901] [third person required]; People v. Jacobo
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 47 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 236] [no third person required].) If
the court concludes that Penal Code section 266i(a)(2) requires a third person, give
the bracketed sentence that begins with “Pandering requires.”
If necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case, the court must instruct sua
sponte on a defense theory in evidence, for example, that nude modeling does not
constitute an act of prostitution and that an act of procuring a person solely for the
purpose of nude modeling does not violate either the pimping or pandering statute.
(People v. Hill (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 536–537 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 266i.
525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; People v. Romo (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 83,
90–91 [19 Cal.Rptr. 179]; Wooten v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 422,
431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching between prostitute
and customer].
• Procurement Defined. People v. Montgomery (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 12 [117
P.2d 437], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d
441, 454 fn. 2 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] and Murgia v. Municipal Court
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 301 fn. 11 [124 Cal.Rtpr. 204, 540 P.2d 44].
• Proof of Actual Prostitution Not Required. People v. Osuna (1967) 251
Cal.App.2d 528, 531–532 [59 Cal.Rptr. 559].
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221]; People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126
Cal.Rptr.2d 416].
914
• Good Faith Belief That Minor Is 18 No Defense to Pimping and Pandering.

People v. Branch (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 516, 521–522 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 412].
• Specific Intent Crime. People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980 [127
Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 254 P.3d 965].
• Victim May [Appear to] Be a Prostitute Already. People v. Zambia (2011) 51
• Encouraging Person to Become Prostitute Need Not Be Successful. People v.
Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 662, 254 P.3d 965].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463,
495–496 [265 Cal.Rptr.3d 136].
• Attempted Pandering. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266i; People v. Charles (1963) 218
Cal.App.2d 812, 819 [32 Cal.Rptr. 653]; People v. Benenato (1946) 77
Cal.App.2d 350, 366–367 [175 P.2d 296], disapproved on other grounds in In re
Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654–655, fn. 3 [56 Cal.Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d 998].
There is no crime of aiding and abetting prostitution. (People v. Gibson (2001) 90
RELATED ISSUES
See Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1150, Pimping.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
915
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (providing/causing) a

child to engage in a lewd or lascivious act [in violation of Penal Code
section 266j].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—gave/transported a child>
[1. The defendant intentionally (gave/transported/provided/made
available) a child to someone else so the person could engage in a
lewd or lascivious act with that child;]
<Alternative 1B—offered to give/transport a child>
[1. The defendant offered to (give/transport/provide/make available)
a child to someone else so the person could engage in a lewd or
lascivious act with that child;]
<Alternative 1C—caused child to engage in>
[1. The defendant (caused/persuaded/induced) a child to engage in a
lewd or lascivious act with someone else;]
[AND]
2. When the defendant acted, the child was under the age of 16
years(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on “offered.”>
[AND
3. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (give/
transport/provide/make available) a child to someone else so the
person could engage in a lewd or lascivious act with that child.]
A lewd or lascivious act is any touching of a child with the intent to
sexually arouse either the perpetrator or the child. Contact with the
child’s bare skin or private parts is not required. Any part of the child’s
body or the clothes the child is wearing may be touched. [A lewd or
lascivious act includes causing a child to touch his or her own body or
someone else’s body at the instigation of the other person who has the
required intent.]

916
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–C depending on the evidence in the
case. When giving alternative 1B, “offered,” give element 3 as well.
391].)
See CALCRIM Nos. 1110–1112, relating to lewd and lascivious acts in violation of
Penal Code section 288.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 266j.
Cal.4th 434, 443–445, 452 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [in context of
Pen. Code, § 288; disapproving People v. Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568,
574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; see People v. Diaz (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1424, 1427–1428 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252] [list of examples].
• Child Touching Own Body Parts at Defendant’s Request. People v. Meacham
touching; approving Austin instruction in context of Pen. Code, § 288]; People v.
Austin (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114–115 [168 Cal.Rptr. 401].
P.2d 807] [in context of indecent exposure].
• Attempted Child Procurement. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266j.
RELATED ISSUES
Corroboration Not Required
A minor victim is not an accomplice and the jury need not be instructed that the
minor’s testimony requires corroboration. (People v. Mena (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d
420, 425 [254 Cal.Rptr. 10].)
See CALCRIM Nos. 1110–1112, relating to lewd and lascivious acts in violation of
Penal Code section 288.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 46, 54–55.
917

(The Rutter Group).
918

prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 647(b)].
prove that the defendant willfully engaged in sexual intercourse or a
lewd act with someone else in exchange for money [or other
compensation].
A lewd act means touching the genitals, buttocks, or female breast of
either the prostitute or customer with some part of the other person’s
body for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either person.
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions, give CALCRIM No.
3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has stipulated to
the conviction. If the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use
CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
AUTHORITY
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
525, 534–535 [163 Cal.Rptr. 99]; Wooten v. Superior Court (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 422, 431–433 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 195] [lewd act requires touching
between prostitute and customer].
• Lewd Conduct Defined. Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256
[158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
RELATED ISSUES
Payment Does Not Need to Be Made Directly to Person Doing Act
“[W]e know of no statutory or case law requiring that payment be made to the
person actually providing sexual favors.” (People v. Bell (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d
1396, 1400 [248 Cal.Rptr. 57].)
919
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
920

person to engage in an act of prostitution [in violation of Penal Code
section 647(b)].
prove that:
for “solicit,” as appropriate>] that another person engage in an
act of prostitution;
[AND]
2. The defendant intended to engage in an act of prostitution with
the other person(;/.)
[AND
request.]
A person engages in an act of prostitution if he or she has sexual
intercourse or does a lewd act with someone else in exchange for money
[or other compensation]. A lewd act means touching the genitals,
buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some
part of the other person’s body for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification. Under the law, when a prostitute and a customer engage in
sexual intercourse or lewd acts, both of them are engaged in an act of
prostitution.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
921
AUTHORITY
[158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
• Solicitation Requires Specific Intent. People v. Norris (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 32, 38 [152 Cal.Rptr. 134]; People v. Love (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp.
1, 13 [168 Cal.Rptr. 591]; People v. Dell (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 264 [283
Cal.Rptr. 361].
• Solicitation Defined. People v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 338, 345–346
[138 Cal.Rptr. 66, 562 P.2d 1315].
• Person Solicited Must Receive Communication. People v. Saephanh (2000) 80
• Solicitation Applies to Either Prostitute or Customer. Leffel v. Municipal Court
(1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 569, 575 [126 Cal.Rptr. 773].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 441, Solicitation: Elements.
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
922
1155. Prostitution: Agreeing to Engage in Act (Pen. Code,
§ 647(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with agreeing to engage in

an act of prostitution [in violation of Penal Code section 647(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant agreed to engage in an act of prostitution with
someone else;
2. The defendant intended to engage in an act of prostitution with
that person;
AND
3. In addition to agreeing, the defendant did something to further
the commission of an act of prostitution.
A person engages in an act of prostitution if he or she has sexual
intercourse or does a lewd act with someone else in exchange for money
[or other compensation]. A lewd act means touching the genitals,
buttocks, or female breast of either the prostitute or customer with some
part of the other person’s body for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification.
[The conduct that furthers the commission of the act of prostitution may
happen before, after, or at the same time as the agreement to engage in
prostitution.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
923
[158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
• Specific Intent Required. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
• Act in Furtherance Required. Pen. Code, § 647(b).
• Act in Furtherance May Precede Agreement. In re Cheri T. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 1400, 1407–1408 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 397]; contra, People v. Davis
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [247 Cal.Rptr. 359].
• Act in Furtherance May Consist of Words Alone. Kim v. Superior Court (People)
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
924
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with indecent exposure [in

prove that:
1. The defendant willfully exposed (his/her) genitals in the presence
of another person or persons who might be offended or annoyed
by the defendant’s actions;
[AND]
2. When the defendant exposed (himself/herself), (he/she) acted
lewdly by intending to direct public attention to (his/her) genitals
for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying (himself/herself)
or another person, or sexually offending another person(;/.)
<Give element 3 if defendant charged with entering inhabited dwelling.>
[AND]
[3. The willful and lewd exposure occurred after the defendant had
entered an inhabited (dwelling house/part of a building/trailer
coach) without consent.]
[It is not required that another person actually see the exposed genitals.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is inhabited if someone uses it
as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged
indecent exposure.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is inhabited if someone used it
as a dwelling and left only because a natural or other disaster caused
him or her to leave.]
[A (house/part of a building/trailer coach) is not inhabited if the former
residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some
personal property remains inside.]
with it.]
925

[A trailer coach is [also] a park trailer that is intended for human
habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and
1. has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;
2. is not more than 14 feet wide;
3. is built on a single chassis;
AND
4. may only be transported on public highways with a permit.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 3 if the defendant is charged with entering an inhabited dwelling.
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for indecent exposure give
truth of the prior conviction. (See People v. Merkley (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472,
476 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279
Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90
[282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “It is not required that another person
actually see” on request if the evidence shows that no one actually saw the
defendant’s genitals. (People v. Carbajal (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 986 [8
Cal.Rptr.3d 206].)
AUTHORITY
• Affront Must Be Sexual. In re Dallas W. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 937, 939 [102
Cal.Rptr.2d 493]; People v. Archer (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 402, 406 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 783] [“sexual affront” means to sexually insult or offend another
person].
• Exposing Person Must Have Intent to Expose Genitals. People v. Massicot
• Must Expose to Other Person But Other Person Need Not View. People v.
Carbajal (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 986 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 206].
926
• Lewd Intent Defined. In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 365–366 [102 Cal.Rptr.
335, 497 P.2d 807].
• Lewd Intent Does Not Require That Genitals Be Touched. People v. Rehmeyer
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1766 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321]; see People v. Meeker
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 358, 362 [256 Cal.Rptr. 79].
• “Private Parts” Means Genitals. People v. Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920,
925, fn. 3 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 705]; see In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 362, 366 [102
Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d 807].
• Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459 [in context of burglary].
• House Not Inhabited is Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
• Attempted Indecent Exposure. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 314; People v. Rehmeyer
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1766–1767 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321]; see also People v.
Finley (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 454, 456–459 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 288] [attempted
misdemeanor indecent exposure is not elevated to felony by recidivist provision
of Pen. Code, § 314].
Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor if the defendant does not have qualifying priors
and the alleged event did not occur in an inhabited dwelling. (Pen. Code, § 314.) If
the defendant is charged with one of the factors that elevates the offense to a felony,
then the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense.
Soliciting anyone to engage in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public place (see
Pen. Code, § 647(a)) is not a lesser included offense of indecent exposure under
Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1. (People v. Meeker (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d
358, 361–362 [256 Cal.Rptr. 79] [following construction of “lewd or dissolute
conduct” in Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330,
599 P.2d 636]]; contra, People v. Curry (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 181, 186–187 [142
Cal.Rptr. 649]; People v. Swearington (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 935, 944 [140 Cal.Rptr.
5].) Burglary is also not a necessarily included offense of unlawful entry for
indecent exposure. (People v. Rehmeyer (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1768–1769
[24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321].)
RELATED ISSUES
Presence of Others
“[A] conviction for indecent exposure under Penal Code section 314, subdivision 1
requires evidence that a defendant actually exposed his or her genitals in the
presence of another person, but there is no concomitant requirement that such
927
person must actually have seen the defendant’s genitals.” (People v. Carbajal (2003)
Burglary
Felony indecent exposure can be the underlying felony to support a burglary charge.
(People v. Rehmeyer (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 1767 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 321].)
After Entering
The statute does not require that the defendant expose himself or herself while still
in the home. (See People v. Mendoza (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 571, 575–576 [13
Cal.Rptr.3d 195] [discussing identical language in Pen. Code, § 647.6(a)].) It is
sufficient if the defendant engaged in the conduct after entering the home and there
is “a clear nexus between the residential entry and the . . . conduct.” (Id. at p. 576.)
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1701, Burglary: Degrees, for
additional authority on “inhabited dwelling house.”
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
928
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in lewd

conduct in public [in violation of Penal Code section 647(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully engaged in the touching of ((his/her) own/
[or] another person’s) (genitals[,]/ [or] buttocks[,]/ [or] female
breast);
2. The defendant did so with the intent to sexually arouse or gratify
(himself/herself) or another person, or to annoy or offend another
person;
3. At the time the defendant engaged in the conduct, (he/she) was in
(a public place/ [or] a place open to the public [or to public
view]);
4. At the time the defendant engaged in the conduct, someone else
who might have been offended was present;
AND
5. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that
another person who might have been offended by (his/her)
conduct was present.
purpose.
New January 2006; Revised September 2017, March 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(a); Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238,
256–257 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; People v. Rylaarsdam (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3–4 [181 Cal.Rptr. 723].
102, 107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
929
• “Lewd” and “Dissolute” Synonymous. Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25

Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
[158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
RELATED ISSUES
Need Not Prove Someone Was Offended
“It is not the burden of the prosecution to prove that the observer was in fact
offended by the conduct but only that the conduct was such that defendant should
know that the observer ‘may be offended.’ ” (People v. Rylaarsdam (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [181 Cal.Rptr. 723].)
Does Not Apply to Live Theater Performance
“It seems evident from the foregoing that the vagrancy law, [Penal Code] section
647, subdivision (a), was not intended to apply to live performances in a theater
before an audience.” (Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 827–828
[83 Cal.Rptr. 819, 464 P.2d 483].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
930

person to engage in lewd conduct in public [in violation of Penal Code
section 647(a)].
prove that:
for “solicit,” as appropriate>] that another person engage in the
touching of ((his/her) own/ [or] another person’s) (genitals[,]/ [or]
buttocks[,]/ [or] female breast);
2. The defendant requested that the other person engage in the
requested conduct in (a public place/ [or] a place open to the
public [or in public view]);
3. When the defendant made the request, (he/she) was in (a public
place/ [or] a place open to the public [or in public view]);
4. The defendant intended for the conduct to occur in (a public
place/ [or] a place open to the public [or in public view]);
5. When the defendant made the request, (he/she) did so with the
intent to sexually arouse or gratify (himself/herself) or another
person, or to annoy or offend another person;
[AND]
someone was likely to be present who could be offended by the
requested conduct(;/.)
[AND
request.]
purpose.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, September 2017, March
2019
931
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(a); Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238,
256–257 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; People v. Rylaarsdam (1982) 130
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Likely Defined. People v. Lake (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d
452].
• Solicitation Requires Specific Intent. People v. Norris (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 32, 38 [152 Cal.Rptr. 134].
• Solicitation Defined. People v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 338, 345–346
[138 Cal.Rptr. 66, 562 P.2d 1315].
• Person Solicited Must Receive Communication. People v. Saephanh (2000) 80
• “Lewd” and “Dissolute” Synonymous. Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25
Cal.3d 238, 256 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
[158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636].
Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1161, Lewd Conduct in Public
and CALCRIM No. 441, Solicitation: Elements.
SECONDARY SOURCES
932

(The Rutter Group).
933
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to register as a

sex offender [in violation of Penal Code section 290(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was previously (convicted of/found to have
committed) <specify the offense for which the
defendant is allegedly required to register>;
2. The defendant resided (in <insert name of city>,
California/in an unincorporated area or a city with no police
department in <insert name of county> County,
California/on the campus or in the facilities of
<insert name of university or college> in California);
3. The defendant actually knew (he/she) had a duty under Penal
Code section 290 to register as a sex offender [living at
<insert specific address or addresses in California>]
and that (he/she) had to register within five working days of
<insert triggering event specified in Penal Code section
290(b)>;
AND
<Alternative 4A—change of residence>
[4. The defendant willfully failed to register as a sex offender with
the (police chief of that city/sheriff of that county/the police chief
of that campus or its facilities) within five working days of
(coming into/ [or] changing (his/her) residence within) that (city/
county/campus).]
<Alternative 4B—birthday>
[4. The defendant willfully failed to annually update (his/her)
registration as a sex offender with the (police chief of that city/
sheriff of that county/the police chief of that campus) within five
working days of (his/her) birthday.]
purpose.
[Residence means one or more addresses where someone regularly
resides, regardless of the number of days or nights spent there, such as a
shelter or structure that can be located by a street address. A residence
934
may include, but is not limited to, houses, apartment buildings, motels,
hotels, homeless shelters, and recreational and other vehicles.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2010, October 2010, February
2013, February 2014, August 2014, August 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective January 1,
2006. The instruction may not be appropriate for offenses that occurred before that
date. Note also that this is an area where case law is developing rapidly. The court
should review recent decisions on Penal Code section 290 before instructing.
In element 1, if the specific offense triggering the registration requirement is spousal
rape, the instruction must include the requirement that the offense involved the use
of “force or violence.” (People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–827 [160
Cal.Rptr.3d 516].)
In element 3, choose the option “living at <insert specific address
in California> if there is an issue whether the defendant actually knew that a place
where he or she spent time was a residence triggering the duty to register. (People v.
Cohens (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1451 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 289]; People v.
LeCorno (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1068–1069 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 775].
In element 4, give alternative 4A if the defendant is charged with failing to register
within five working days of changing his or her residence or becoming homeless.
(Pen. Code, § 290(b).) Give alternative 4B if the defendant is charged with failing to
update his or her registration within five working days of his or her birthday. (Pen.
Code, § 290.012.)
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction for failing to register, give
truth of the prior conviction. (See People v. Merkley (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 472,
476 [58 Cal.Rptr. 2d 21]; People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 477–480 [279
Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076]; People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90
[282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)
For the charge of failure to register, it is error to give an instruction on general
criminal intent that informs the jury that a person is “acting with general criminal
intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.” (People v.
Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507]; People v.
Edgar (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 219 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 662].) The court should
consider whether it is more appropriate to give CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act
and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State, or to give a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 250, Union of Act and Intent: General Intent, as explained in the
935
Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 250.

AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 290(b) [change in residence], 290.012 [birthday];
People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
• Spousal Rape Not Registerable Offense Absent Force or Violence. People v.
Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 825–826 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d 516].
• Definition of Residence. Pen. Code, § 290.011(g); People v. Gonzales (2010) 183
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); see People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th
345, 360 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507].
• Actual Knowledge of Duty Required. People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744,
752 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 23 P.3d 590].
• Continuing Offense. Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527–528
[63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, 936 P.2d 101].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 360 [18
Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507]; People v. Johnson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 67, 72
[78 Cal.Rptr.2d 795].
• No Duty to Define Residence. People v. McCleod (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1205,
1219 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].
• Registration is Not Punishment. In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 262 [14
Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 92 P.3d 311].
• Jury May Consider Evidence That Significant Involuntary Condition Deprived
Defendant of Actual Knowledge. People v. Sorden (2005) 36 Cal.4th 65, 72 [29
Cal.Rptr.3d 777, 113 P.3d 565].
• People Must Prove Defendant Was California Resident at Time of Offense.
People v Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1102–1104 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d
618].
• Defendant Must Have Actual Knowledge That Location is Residence for Purpose
of Duty to Register. People v. Aragon (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 504, 510 [143
Cal.Rptr.3d 476]; People v. LeCorno (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067–1070
[135 Cal.Rptr.2d 775].
RELATED ISSUES
Other Violations of Section 290
This instruction applies to violations under Penal Code sections 290(b) and 290.012.
Section 290 imposes numerous other duties on persons convicted of sex offenses.
For example, a registered sex offender must:
1. Notify the agency where he or she was last registered of any new address or
location, whether inside or outside California, or any name change. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 290.013–290.014; People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 800–802 [11
936
Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 86 P.3d 348] [under former Pen. Code, § 290(f), which
allowed notice of change of address in writing, there is sufficient notice if
defendant mails change of address form even if agency does not receive it];
People v. Annin (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 725, 737–740 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 712]
[discussing meaning of “changed” residence]; People v. Davis (2002) 102
Cal.App.4th 377, 385 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 519] [must instruct on requirement of
actual knowledge of duty to notify law enforcement when moving out of
jurisdiction]; see also People v. Franklin (1999) 20 Cal.4th 249, 255–256 [84
Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 975 P.2d 30] [construing former Pen. Code, § 290(f), which
did not specifically require registration when registrant moved outside
California].)
2. Register multiple residences wherever he or she regularly resides. (See Pen.
Code, § 290.010; People v. Edgar (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 219–222 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 662] [court failed to instruct that jury must find that defendant
actually knew of duty to register multiple residences; opinion cites former
section 290(a)(1)(B)]; People v. Vigil (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 485, 501 [114
Cal.Rptr.2d 331].)
3. Update his or her registration at least once every 30 days if he or she is “a
transient.” (See Pen. Code, § 290.011.)
A sexually violent predator who is released from custody must verify his or her
address at least once every 90 days and verify any place of employment. (See Pen.
Code, § 290.012.) Other special requirements govern:
1. Residents of other states who must register in their home state but are working
or attending school in California. (See Pen. Code, § 290.002.)
2. Sex offenders enrolled at, employed by, or carrying on a vocation at any
university, college, community college, or other institution of higher learning.
(See Pen. Code, § 290.01.)
In addition, providing false information on the registration form is a violation of
section 290.018. (See also People v. Chan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408 [26
Cal.Rptr.3d 878].)
Forgetting to Register
If a person actually knows of his or her duty to register, “just forgetting” is not a
defense. (People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 356–357 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96
P.3d 507].) In reaching this conclusion, the court stated, “[w]e do not here express
an opinion as to whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an acute
psychological condition, or a chronic deficit of memory or intelligence, might negate
the willfulness required for a section 290 violation.” (Id. at p. 358 [italics in
original].)
Registration Requirement for Consensual Oral Copulation With Minor
Penal Code section 290 requires lifetime registration for a person convicted of
consensual oral copulation with a minor but does not require such registration for a
person convicted of consensual sexual intercourse with a minor. (Pen. Code,
937
§ 290(c).) The mandatory registration requirement for consensual oral copulation

with a minor does not deny equal protection of laws. (Johnson v. Department of
Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 341 P.3d 1075] [overruling
People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1191, 1205–1206 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821,
129 P.3d 29]].)
Moving Between Counties—Failure to Notify County Leaving and County Moving
To Can Only Be Punished as One Offense
A person who changes residences a single time, failing to notify both the
jurisdiction he or she is departing from and the jurisdiction he or she is entering,
commits two violations of Penal Code section 290 but can only be punished for one.
(People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 953–954 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 87 P.3d 812].)
Further, if the defendant has been prosecuted in one county for the violation, and
the prosecutor in the second county is aware of the previous prosecution, the second
county cannot subsequently prosecute the defendant. (Id. at pp. 955–956.)
Notice of Duty to Register on Release From Confinement
No reported case has held that the technical notice requirements are elements of the
offense, especially when the jury is told that they must find the defendant had actual
knowledge. (See former Pen. Code, § 290(b), after October 13, 2007, section
290.017; People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 754, 755–756 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d
355, 23 P.3d 590] [if defendant willfully and knowingly failed to register, Buford
does not require reversal merely because authorities failed to comply with technical
requirements]; see also People v. Buford (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 987 [117
Cal.Rptr. 333] [revoking probation for noncompliance with section 290, an abuse of
discretion when court and jail officials also failed to comply].) The court in Garcia
did state, however, that the “court’s instructions on ‘willfulness’ should have
required proof that, in addition to being formally notified by the appropriate officers
as required by section 290, in order to willfully violate section 290 the defendant
must actually know of his duty to register.” (People v. Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 754.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment
§§ 136–149.
Disabilities Flowing From Conviction, § 93.04[2] (Matthew Bender).
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.20[1][a], Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person, § 142.21
(Matthew Bender).
(The Rutter Group).
938
(v) Other Offenses
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with incest [in violation of

prove that:
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was at least 14 years old;
3. When the defendant did so, the other person was at least 14 years
old;
AND
4. The defendant and the other person are related to each other as
<insert description of relationship from Family Code
section 2200>.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, October 2010, February 2012, August 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
This instruction focuses on incestuous sexual intercourse with a minor, which is the
most likely form of incest to be charged. Incest is also committed by intercourse
between adult relatives within the specified degree of consanguinity, or by an
incestuous marriage. (See Pen. Code, § 285.)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Incestuous Marriages. Fam. Code, § 2200.
• Sexual Intercourse Defined. See Pen. Code, § 263; People v. Karsai (1982) 131
939
Cal.App.3d 224, 233–234 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], disapproved on other grounds by

People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165].
• Attempted Incest. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 285.
RELATED ISSUES
Accomplice Instructions
A minor is a victim of, not an accomplice to, incest. Accomplice instructions are not
appropriate in a trial for incest involving a minor. (People v. Tobias (2001) 25
Cal.4th 327, 334 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758]; see People v. Stoll (1927) 84
Cal.App. 99, 101–102 [257 P. 583].) An exception may exist when two minors
engage in consensual sexual intercourse, and thus both are victims of the other’s
crime. (People v. Tobias, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 334; see In re T.A.J. (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364–1365 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 331] [minor perpetrator under Pen.
Code, § 261.5].) An adult woman who voluntarily engages in the incestuous act is
an accomplice, whose testimony must be corroborated. (See People v. Stratton
(1904) 141 Cal. 604, 609 [75 P. 166].)
Half-Blood Relationship
Family Code section 2200 prohibits sexual relations between brothers and sisters of
half blood, but not between uncles and nieces of half blood. (People v. Baker (1968)
69 Cal.2d 44, 50 [69 Cal.Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675] [construing former version of
§ 2200].) However, sexual intercourse between persons the law deems to be related
is proscribed. A trial court may properly instruct on the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy (see Fam. Code, § 7540) if a defendant uncle asserts that the victim’s
mother is actually his half sister. The presumption requires the jury to find that if
the defendant’s mother and her potent husband were living together when the
defendant was conceived, the husband was the defendant’s father, and thus the
defendant was a full brother of the victim’s mother. (People v. Russell (1971) 22
Cal.App.3d 330, 335 [99 Cal.Rptr. 277].)
Lack of Knowledge as Defense
No reported cases have held that lack of knowledge of the prohibited relationship is
a defense to incest. (But see People v. Patterson (1894) 102 Cal. 239, 242–243 [36
P. 436] [dictum that party without knowledge of relationship would not be guilty];
see also People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, 805 [299 P.2d 850] [good faith
belief is defense to bigamy].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Crimes Against Decency §§ 140–143, 178.
(The Rutter Group).
940
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sexual abuse of an

animal [in violation of Penal Code section 286.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant had sexual contact with an animal;
AND
2. The defendant did so with the intent of sexual arousal or
gratification, abuse, or financial gain.
Sexual contact means any act between a person and an animal involving
contact between the sex organs or anus of one and the mouth, sex
organs, or anus of the other, or, without a bona fide veterinary or animal
husbandry purpose, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the
body of a person or any object into the vaginal or anal opening of an
animal, or the insertion of any part of the body of an animal into the
vaginal or anal opening of a person.
[Animal means any nonhuman creature, whether alive or dead.]
<Defense: Veterinarian>
[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was a licensed
veterinarian who performed a lawful and accepted practice related to
veterinary medicine. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not a veterinarian who
performed a lawful and accepted practice. If the People have not met
this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]
<Defense: Veterinary Technician>
[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was a certified
veterinary technician who, under the guidance of a licensed veterinarian,
performed a lawful and accepted practice related to veterinary medicine.
the defendant was not a veterinary technician who performed a lawful
and accepted practice under the guidance of a licensed veterinarian. If
guilty of this offense.]
<Defense: Conduct Authorized>
[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) performed any
artificial insemination of animals for reproductive purposes, any
accepted animal husbandry practices such as raising, breeding, or
941
assisting with the birthing process of animals or any other practice that
provides care for an animal, or to any generally accepted practices
related to the judging of breed conformation. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
authorized to perform the act. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was a licensed veterinarian or a
certified veterinary technician, or was otherwise authorized to perform the act, give
the relevant bracketed Defense paragraph.
AUTHORITY
• Sexual Contact Defined. Pen. Code, § 286.5(c)(2).
• Animal Defined. Pen. Code, § 286.5(c)(1).
• Exceptions. Pen. Code, § 286.5(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
(The Rutter Group).
942
D. EVIDENCE
1190. Other Evidence Not Required to Support Testimony in Sex
Offense Case
Conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a

complaining witness alone.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction may be given on request if a complaining witness testifies in a sex
offense case. The court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 301, Single
Witness’s Testimony, in every case. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864,
884–885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247].) Because both instructions correctly
state the law and each focuses on a different legal point, there is no implication that
the victim’s testimony is more credible than the defendant’s testimony. (People v.
Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 700–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, 828 P.2d 682]
[resolving split of authority on whether the two instructions can be given together].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Blassingill (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1413,
1422 [245 Cal.Rptr. 599]; People v. Akey (1912) 163 Cal. 54, 55–56 [124 P.
718].
• Conviction of Sex Crime Sustained on Prosecutrix’s Uncorroborated Testimony.
People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].
• Given Together With Instruction on Single Witness’s Testimony. People v.
Gammage (1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, 701–702 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, 828 P.2d 682];
People v. Hollis (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1525–1526 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 524].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.23[3][e][ii] (Matthew Bender).
943

crime[s] of <insert description of offense[s]> that (was/were)
not charged in this case. (This/These) crime[s] (is/are) defined for you in
these instructions.
uncharged offense[s]. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a
different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact
is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is
more likely than not that the fact is true.
evidence entirely.
If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense[s], you
may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based
on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
[and did commit] <insert charged sex offense[s]> , as
charged here. If you conclude that the defendant committed the
uncharged offense[s], that conclusion is only one factor to consider along
with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the
defendant is guilty of <insert charged sex offense[s]> . The
People must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation)
beyond a reasonable doubt.
limited purpose of <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining the
defendant’s credibility> ].]
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, February 2013, February 2014, March
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Although there is ordinarily no sua sponte duty (People v. Cottone (2013) 57
Cal.4th 269, 293, fn. 15 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 303 P.3d 1163]), the court must give
this instruction on request when evidence of other sexual offenses has been
introduced. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847,
986 P.2d 182] [error to refuse limiting instruction on request]; People v. Jennings
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1317–1318 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 727] [in context of prior
acts of domestic violence].)
944
SEX OFFENSES CALCRIM No. 1191A
Evidence Code section 1108(a) provides that “evidence of the defendant’s

commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by
Section 1101.” Subdivision (d)(1) defines “sexual offense” as “a crime under the law
of a state or of the United States that involved any of the following[,]” listing
specific sections of the Penal Code as well as specified sexual conduct. In the first
sentence, the court must insert the name of the offense or offenses allegedly shown
by the evidence. The court must also instruct the jury on elements of the offense or
offenses.
In the fourth paragraph, the committee has placed the phrase “and did commit” in
brackets. One appellate court has criticized instructing the jury that it may draw an
inference about disposition. (People v. James (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn.
8 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 823].) The court should review the Commentary section below
and give the bracketed phrase at its discretion.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not consider” on request.
Common Plan, etc.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirement. Evid. Code, § 1108(a); see People v. Reliford (2003)
29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1016 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601]; People v.
Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 37 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 100]; People v. Falsetta,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 923–924 [dictum].
• Previous Version of CALCRIM No. 1191 Upheld. People v. Schnabel (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 83, 87 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 922]; People v. Cromp (2007) 153
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Phea (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 583, 614 [240
Cal.Rptr.3d 526].
• Sexual Offense Defined. Evid. Code, § 1108(d)(1).
15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; People v. James, supra,
81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359; People v. Van Winkle (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 133, 146
Reasonable Doubt. People v. Hill (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 277–278 [103
Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; see People v. Younger (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1382 [101
945
CALCRIM No. 1191A SEX OFFENSES
Cal.Rptr.2d 624] [in context of prior acts of domestic violence]; People v. James,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357–1358, fn. 8 [same].
Propensity. People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
COMMENTARY
The fourth paragraph of this instruction tells the jury that they may draw an
inference of disposition. (See People v. Hill (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 275–279
[103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127]; People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334–1335 [92
Cal.Rptr.2d 433] [in context of prior acts of domestic violence].) One appellate
court, however, suggests using more general terms to instruct the jury how they may
use evidence of other sexual offenses, “leaving particular inferences for the
argument of counsel and the jury’s common sense.” (People v. James, supra, 81
Cal.App.4th at p. 1357, fn. 8 [includes suggested instruction].) If the trial court
adopts this approach, the fourth paragraph may be replaced with the following:
If you decide that the defendant committed the other sexual offense[s], you may
consider that evidence and weigh it together with all the other evidence received
during the trial to help you determine whether the defendant committed
<insert charged sex offense>. Remember, however, that evidence
of another sexual offense is not sufficient alone to find the defendant guilty of
<insert charged sex offense>. The People must still prove (the/
each) (charge/ [and] allegation) of <insert
charged sex offense> beyond a reasonable doubt.
RELATED ISSUES
Constitutional Challenges
Evidence Code section 1108 does not violate a defendant’s rights to due process
(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915–922 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d
182]; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 281 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 870];
People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 184 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]) or equal
protection (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1310–1313 [97
Cal.Rptr.2d 727]; People v. Fitch, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184–185).
Expert Testimony
Evidence Code section 1108 does not authorize expert opinion evidence of sexual
propensity during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. (People v. McFarland (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 489, 495–496 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] [expert testified on ultimate issue of
abnormal sexual interest in child].)
Rebuttal Evidence
When the prosecution has introduced evidence of other sexual offenses under
Evidence Code section 1108(a), the defendant may introduce rebuttal character
evidence in the form of opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of
946
SEX OFFENSES CALCRIM No. 1191A
specific incidents of conduct under similar circumstances. (People v. Callahan

Subsequent Offenses Admissible
“[E]vidence of subsequently committed sexual offenses may be admitted pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1108.” (People v. Medina (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 897, 903
[8 Cal.Rptr.3d 158].)
Evidence of Acquittal
If the court admits evidence that the defendant committed a sexual offense that the
defendant was previously acquitted of, the court must also admit evidence of the
acquittal. (People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 663 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d
534].)
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged
Offense to Prove Identity, Intent, Common Plan, etc.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.23[3][e][ii], [4] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
947

Count[s] <insert count[s] of sex offense[s] charged in this
case >.
inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also
conclude that the defendant was likely to commit [and did commit] the
other sex offense[s] charged in this case.
New March 2017; Revised September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case, Evid. Code section 355.
Common Plan, etc.
AUTHORITY
Propensity. People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1186–1186 [206
Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 281 P.3d 390].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 68 [253
Cal.Rptr.3d 859].
948
SEX OFFENSES CALCRIM No. 1191B
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.23[3][e][ii], [4] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
949

regarding rape trauma syndrome.
Rape trauma syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be
present in rape cases. Testimony as to the trauma syndrome is offered
only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of rape.
’s <insert name of expert> testimony about rape trauma
syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with which
(he/she) was not charged]. You may consider this evidence only in
deciding whether or not ’s <insert name of alleged rape
victim> conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has
been raped, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if an expert testifies on rape
trauma syndrome. (See People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [sua sponte duty in context of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome (CSAAS)]; CJER Mandatory Criminal Jury Instructions Handbook (CJER
2019) Sua Sponte Instructions, § 2.163; but see People v. Sanchez (1989) 208
Cal.App.3d 721, 736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] [instruction on CSAAS only required on
request].)
in General, and CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness Testimony.
AUTHORITY
• Rebut Inference That Victim’s Conduct Inconsistent With Claim of Rape. People
v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247–248 [203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291].
• Syndrome Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Rape Occurred. People v. Bledsoe,
supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 251.
COMMENTARY
It is unnecessary and potentially misleading to instruct that the expert testimony
assumes that a rape has in fact occurred. (See People v. Gilbert (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660] [in context of child molestation].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, § 53.
950
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04[1][d][v][B] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
951
1193. Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome

regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of
behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as
to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain
behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse.
’s <insert name of expert> testimony about child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant
committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct
or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged].
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
’s <insert name of alleged victim of abuse> conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in
evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.
New January 2006; Revised August 2016, April 2020, March 2021, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Several courts of review have concluded there is no sua sponte duty to give this
instruction when an expert testifies on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
(People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073–1074 [197 Cal.Rptr.3d 248];
People v. Sanchez (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 736 [256 Cal.Rptr. 446] and People
v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116 [261 Cal.Rptr. 479] [instruction required
only on request].) See also People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5,
1090–1091, 1100 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1], which concludes that a limiting
instruction on battered woman syndrome is required only on request. But see People
v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958–959 [9 Cal.Rtpr.2d 431], which did find a
sua sponte duty to give this instruction.
in General, and CALCRIM No. 332, Expert Witness.
AUTHORITY
• Eliminate Juror Misconceptions or Rebut Attack on Victim’s Credibility. People
v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393–394 [249 Cal.Rptr. 886].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474
[266 Cal.Rptr.3d 136]; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [224
Cal.Rptr.3d 421].
952
COMMENTARY
The jurors must understand that the research on child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome assumes a molestation occurred and seeks to describe and explain
children’s common reactions to the experience. (People v. Bowker, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. 394.) However, it is unnecessary and potentially misleading to
instruct that the expert testimony assumes that a molestation has in fact occurred.
(See People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1387 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660].)
The prosecution must identify the myth or misconception the evidence is designed
to rebut (People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394; People v. Sanchez,
supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 735; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439,
449–450 [271 Cal.Rptr. 653]), or the victim’s credibility must have been placed in
issue (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744–1745 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d
345]).
RELATED ISSUES
Expert Testimony Regarding Parent’s Behavior
An expert may also testify regarding reasons why a parent may delay reporting
molestation of his or her child. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1300–1301 [283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Scientific and Expert Evidence, § 71.04[1][d][v][B] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
953
You have heard evidence that ( <insert name of complaining

witness>/Jane Doe/John Doe) had consensual sexual intercourse with the
defendant before the act that is charged in this case. You may consider
this evidence only to help you decide (whether the alleged victim
consented to the charged act[s]/ [and] whether the defendant reasonably
and in good faith believed that
( <insert name of complaining witness>/Jane Doe/John Doe)
consented to the charged act[s]). Do not consider this evidence for any
other purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give a limiting admonition if the defendant is
charged with rape or unlawful sexual intercourse or an attempt or assault with intent
to commit either crime and evidence of prior sexual intercourse with the alleged
victim has been admitted. (Pen. Code, § 1127d.)
If during the trial the court referred to a complaining witness by the name of Jane
or John Doe, use that designation in giving this instruction. (See Pen. Code, §§ 293,
293.5.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1127d.
• Protecting Identity of Complaining Witness. Pen. Code §§ 293, 293.5.
RELATED ISSUES
Admissibility of Sexual Conduct of Complaining Witness
Evidence Code section 782 sets out the procedure for admitting evidence of the
sexual conduct of the complaining witness.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.23[1][f], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
954
KIDNAPPING
A. KIDNAPPING
(i) Aggravated
1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact From Another
Person (Pen. Code, § 209(a))
1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses (Pen. Code,
§ 209(b))
B. DEFENSES
§ 207(f)(1))
D. CHILD ABDUCTION
1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or Visitation (Pen. Code,
§§ 277, 278.5)
1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate Injury (Pen. Code,
§ 278.7(a) and (b))
955
A. KIDNAPPING
(i) Aggravated
1200. Kidnapping: For Child Molestation (Pen. Code, §§ 207(b),
288(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping for the

purpose of child molestation [in violation of Penal Code section 207(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (persuaded/hired/enticed/decoyed/ [or] seduced by
false promises or misrepresentations) a child younger than 14
years old to go somewhere;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to commit a lewd or
lascivious act on the child;
AND
3. As a result of the defendant’s conduct, the child then moved or
was moved a substantial distance.
As used here, substantial distance means more than a slight or trivial
distance. The movement must have increased the risk of [physical or
psychological] harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the
molestation. In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider
all the circumstances relating to the movement.
As used here, a lewd or lascivious act is any touching of a child with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual
desires of either the perpetrator or the child. Contact with the child’s
bare skin or private parts is not required. Any part of the child’s body
or the clothes the child is wearing may be touched. [A lewd or lascivious
act includes causing a child to touch his or her own body, the
perpetrator’s body, or someone else’s body at the instigation of a
perpetrator who has the required intent.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, August 2013, April
2020, March 2022
957
CALCRIM No. 1200 KIDNAPPING
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give this instruction when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section
207(b) with kidnapping a child without the use of force for the purpose of
committing a lewd or lascivious act. Give CALCRIM No. 1201, Kidnapping: Child
or Person Incapable of Consent, when the defendant is charged under Penal Code
section 207(a) with using force to kidnap an unresisting infant or child, or person
with a mental impairment, who was incapable of consenting to the movement.
391].)
Kidnapping with intent to commit a rape or other specified sex crimes is a separate
offense under Penal Code section 209(b). (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1,
8–11 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369].) See CALCRIM No. 1203, Kidnapping:
For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses.
A defendant may be prosecuted for both the crimes of child abduction and
kidnapping. Child abduction or stealing is a crime against the parents, while
kidnapping is a crime against the child. (People v. Campos (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1250, Child Abduction: No Right
to Custody.
For instructions based on violations of Penal Code section 288, see CALCRIM No.
1110, Lewd or Lascivious Acts: Child Under 14, and the following instructions in
that series.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(b), 288(a).
• Increased Prison Term If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b).
• Asportation Requirement. See People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th
965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 & fn.
20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th
225, 232 & fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512]; People v. Rayford (1994) 9
Cal.4th 1, 11–14, 20 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369]; People v. Daniels
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225].
• Lewd or Lascivious Acts Defined. People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452
[45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037] [disapproving People v. Wallace (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 568, 574–580 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 67] and its progeny]; People v.
Levesque (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 530, 538–542 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 439]; People v.
Marquez (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321–1326 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 821].
• Movement of Victim Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm to Victim.
958
KIDNAPPING CALCRIM No. 1200
People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66];
People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 & fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251
P.3d 943]; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4 [83
Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
• Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207.
False imprisonment is a lesser included offense if there is an unlawful restraint of
the child. (See Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; People v. Magana (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 281–282, 291.
Sentencing, § 91.38[1] (Matthew Bender).
959
1201. Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent (Pen.
Code, § 207(a), (e))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping (a child/

[or] a person with a mental impairment who was not capable of giving
legal consent to the movement) [in violation of Penal Code section 207].
prove that:
1. The defendant used (physical force/fear) to take and carry away
an unresisting (child/ [or] person with a mental impairment);
2. The defendant moved the (child/ [or] person with a mental
impairment) a substantial distance(;/.)
[AND]
<Section 207(e)>
[3. The defendant moved the child with an illegal intent or for an
illegal purpose(;/.)]
[AND]
<Alternative 4A—alleged victim under 14 years.>
[4. The child was under 14 years old at the time of the movement(;/
.)]
<Alternative 4B—alleged victim has mental impairment.>
[(3/4). <Insert name of complaining witness> suffered from
a mental impairment that made (him/her) incapable of giving
legal consent to the movement.]
Substantial distance means more than a slight or trivial distance. In
deciding whether the distance was substantial, consider all the
circumstances relating to the movement. [Thus, in addition to
considering the actual distance moved, you may also consider other
factors such as whether the movement increased the risk of [physical or
psychological] harm, increased the danger of a foreseeable escape
attempt, gave the attacker a greater opportunity to commit additional
crimes, or decreased the likelihood of detection.]
A person is incapable of giving legal consent if he or she is unable to
960
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, April 2020, September 2020, October 2021,
March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative 4A if the defendant is charged with kidnapping a person under 14
years of age. (Pen. Code, § 208(b).) Do not use this bracketed language if a
biological parent, a natural father, an adoptive parent, or someone with access to the
child by a court order takes the child. (Ibid.) Give alternative 4B if the alleged
victim has a mental impairment.
In the paragraph defining “substantial distance,” give the bracketed sentence listing
factors that the jury may consider, when evidence permits, in evaluating the totality
of the circumstances. (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [83
Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].) However, in the case of simple kidnapping, if the
movement was for a substantial distance, the jury does not need to consider any
other factors. (People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237; see People v.
Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058].)
Give this instruction when the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 207(a)
with using force to kidnap an unresisting infant or child, or person with a mental
impairment, who was incapable of consenting to the movement. (See, e.g., In re
Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; see also
2003 Amendments to Pen. Code, § 207(e) [codifying holding of In re Michele D.].)
Give CALCRIM No. 1200, Kidnapping: For Child Molestation, when the defendant
is charged under Penal Code section 207(b) with kidnapping a child without the use
of force for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act.
391].)
There is no sua sponte duty to define “illegal intent” or “illegal purpose.” (People v.
Singh (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 175, 181–183 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].)
kidnapping is a crime against the child. (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600,
614 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; People v. Campos (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
to Custody.
For instructions relating to defenses to kidnapping, see CALCRIM No. 1225,
Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm.
961
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 207(a), (e).
• Punishment If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b); People v.
Magpuso (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206] [ignorance of
victim’s age not defense].
• Asportation Requirement. See People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225,
235–237 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged
asportation test from People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369] and People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119,
1139 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225]].
• Force Required to Kidnap Unresisting Infant or Child. In re Michele D. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 600, 610 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d 164]; Pen. Code, § 207(e).
• Force Required to Kidnap Unconscious and Intoxicated Adult. People v. Daniels
• Movement Must Be for Illegal Purpose or Intent if Victim Incapable of Consent.
In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610–611 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d
164]; People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 [12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d
593]; but see People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 80 [268 Cal.Rptr.3d
1] [an illegal purpose or intent is not required for an intoxicated and resisting
adult victim].
• Substantial Distance Requirement. People v. Daniels (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th
1046, 1053 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588,
600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must be more than
slight or trivial, it must be substantial in character].
• Deceit Alone Does Not Substitute for Force. People v. Nieto (2021) 62
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 207(a) uses the term “steals” in defining kidnapping not in the
sense of a theft, but in the sense of taking away or forcible carrying away. (People
v. McCullough (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 169, 176 [160 Cal.Rptr. 831].) The
instruction uses “take and carry away” as the more inclusive terms, but the statutory
terms “steal,” “hold,” “detain” and “arrest” may be used if any of these more
closely matches the evidence.
Attempted kidnapping is not a lesser included offense of simple kidnapping under
subdivision (a) of section 207, but the jury may be instructed on attempted
kidnapping if supported by the evidence. (People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57,
65–71 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341, 447 P.3d 252] [discussing Pen. Code, § 1159].)
962
RELATED ISSUES
A victim must be alive when kidnapped. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th
469, 498 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 286–289.
Against the Person § 142.14[1], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).
963
1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact
From Another Person (Pen. Code, § 209(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping (for

ransom[,]/ [or] for reward[,]/ [or] to commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from
a different person money or something valuable) [that resulted in
(death[,]/ [or] bodily harm[,]/ [or] exposure to a substantial likelihood of
death)] [in violation of Penal Code section 209(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (kidnapped[,]/ [or] abducted[,]/ [or] seized[,]/ [or]
confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or] carried away[,]/ [or] inveigled[,]/
[or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed) a person;
<Alternative 2A—held or detained>
[2. The defendant held or detained that person;]
<Alternative 2B—intended to hold or detain that person>
[2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to hold or detain
that person;]
3. The defendant did so (for ransom[,]/ [or] for reward[,]/ [or] to
commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from a different person money or
something valuable);
[AND]
4. The person did not consent to being (kidnapped[,]/ [or]
abducted[,]/ [or] seized[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or]
carried away[,]/ [or] inveigled[,]/ [or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed)(;/.)
<Give element 5 if instructing on reasonable belief in consent>
[AND
5. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the
person consented to being (kidnapped[,]/ [or] abducted[,]/ [or]
seized[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] concealed[,]/ [or] carried away[,]/
[or] inveigled[,]/ [or] enticed[,]/ [or] decoyed).]
[It is not necessary that the person be moved for any distance.]
<Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent>
[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) reasonably and
964
actually believed that the person consented to the movement. The People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the person
consented to the movement. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]
<Defense: Consent Given>
[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the person consented to go
with the defendant. The person consented if (he/she) (1) freely and
voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant, (2) was
aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient mental capacity to choose
to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the person did not consent to go with the
defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
[Consent may be withdrawn. If, at first, a person agreed to go with the
defendant, that consent ended if the person changed his or her mind and
no longer freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the
defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the person
withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have defined
it.]
[Someone intends to commit extortion if he or she intends to: (1) obtain a
person’s property with the person’s consent and (2) obtain the person’s
consent through the use of force or fear.]
[Someone intends to commit extortion if he or she: (1) intends to get a
public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make the
official do the act.] [An official act is an act that a person does in his or
her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]
<Sentencing Factor>
[If you find the defendant guilty of kidnapping (for ransom [,]/ [or] for
reward[,]/ [or] to commit extortion[,]/ [or] to get from a different person
money or something valuable), you must then decide whether the People
have proved the additional allegation that the defendant (caused the
kidnapped person to (die/suffer bodily harm)/ [or] intentionally confined
the kidnapped person in a way that created a substantial likelihood of
death).
[Bodily harm means any substantial physical injury resulting from the
use of force that is more than the force necessary to commit
kidnapping.]
[The defendant caused ’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped
person> (death/bodily harm) if:
965
foreseen that the defendant’s use of force or fear could begin a

chain of events likely to result in ’s <insert name of
allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm);
2. The defendant’s use of force or fear was a direct and substantial
factor in causing ’s <insert name of allegedly
kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm);
AND
3. ’s <insert name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/
bodily harm) would not have happened if the defendant had not
used force or fear to hold or detain <insert name of
allegedly kidnapped person>.
need not have been the only factor that caused ’s <insert
name of allegedly kidnapped person> (death/bodily harm).]
that the allegation has not been proved.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2011, February 2015, March 2017, September
2020, March 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges that the kidnapping resulted in death or bodily harm, or
exposed the victim to a substantial likelihood of death (see Pen. Code, § 209(a)), the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the sentencing factor. (See People v.
Schoenfeld (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 685–686 [168 Cal.Rptr. 762] [bodily harm
defined]); see also People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1318 [76
Cal.Rptr.2d 160] [court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to issues
raised by the evidence].) The court must also give the jury a verdict form on which
the jury can indicate whether this allegation has been proved. If causation is an
issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed section that begins “The
defendant caused.” (See Pen. Code, § 209(a); People v. Monk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 288,
296 [14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865]; People v. Reed (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 37,
48–49 [75 Cal.Rptr. 430].)
Give the bracketed definition of “consent” on request.
Give alternative 2A if the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant
actually held or detained the alleged victim. Otherwise, give alternative 2B. (See
Pen. Code, § 209(a).)
966
“Extortion” is defined in Penal Code section 518. If the kidnapping was for
purposes of extortion, give one of the bracketed definitions of extortion on request.
Give the second definition if the defendant is charged with intending to extort an
official act. (People v. Hill (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see
People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1229–1230 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382];
discussing common law definition].) It appears that this type of extortion rarely
occurs in the context of kidnapping, so it is excluded from this instruction.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of consent if there is
sufficient evidence to support the defense. (See People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th
463, 516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [approving consent instruction as
given]; see also People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 717, fn. 7 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1,
518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 165 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [when court must instruct on
defenses].) Give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of consent. On request, if
supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with
“Consent may be withdrawn.” (See People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814
[129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)
The defendant’s reasonable and actual belief in the victim’s consent to go with the
defendant may be a defense. (See People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127
Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a
defense to kidnapping].)
For the elements of extortion, see CALCRIM No. 1830, Extortion by Threat or
Force.
AUTHORITY
• Requirement of Lack of Consent. People v. Eid (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 878
[114 Cal.Rptr.3d 520].
• Extortion. Pen. Code, § 518; People v. Hill (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 668
[190 Cal.Rptr. 628]; see People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207,
1229–1230 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382].
• Amount of Physical Force Required. People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
52, 59 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434]; People v. Schoenfeld (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671,
685–686 [168 Cal.Rptr. 762].
• Bodily Injury Defined. People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 59; People
967
v. Schoenfeld (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 685–686; see People v. Reed (1969)
270 Cal.App.2d 37, 48–50 [75 Cal.Rptr. 430] [injury reasonably foreseeable
from defendant’s act].
• Control Over Victim When Intent Formed. People v. Martinez (1984) 150
Cal.App.3d 579, 600–602 [198 Cal.Rptr. 565] [disapproved on other ground in
People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 627–628, fn. 10 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802
P.2d 376].]
• No Asportation Required. People v. Macinnes (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 844
[106 Cal.Rptr. 589]; see People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11–12, fn. 8 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369]; People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d
1207, 1227 [277 Cal.Rptr. 382].
• Official Act Defined. People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485]; People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219
Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141].
• Kidnapping To Extract From Another Person Any Money or Valuable Thing
Requires That The Other Person Not Be The Person Kidnapped. People v.
Harper (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 172, 192–193 [257 Cal.Rptr.3d 440]; People v.
Stringer (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 974, 983 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 678].
COMMENTARY
A trial court may refuse to define “reward.” There is no need to instruct a jury on
the meaning of terms in common usage. Reward means something given in return
for good or evil done or received, and especially something that is offered or given
for some service or attainment. (People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298,
367–368 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61].) In the absence of a request, there is also no duty to
define “ransom.” The word has no statutory definition and is commonly understood
by those familiar with the English language. (People v. Hill (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d
661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628].)
• False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; People v. Chacon (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434]; People v. Magana (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; People v. Gibbs (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].
• Extortion. Pen. Code, § 518.
• Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 518.
• Multiple Convictions of Lesser Included Offenses of Pen. Code, § 209(a)
Possible. People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 655–658 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 328
P.3d 69].
If the prosecution alleges that the kidnapping resulted in death or bodily harm, or
exposed the victim to a substantial likelihood of death (see Pen. Code, § 209(a)),
then kidnapping for ransom without death or bodily harm is a lesser included
offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will
indicate if the allegation has been proved.
968
Simple kidnapping under section 207 of the Penal Code is not a lesser and
necessarily included offense of kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion. (People
v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 368, fn. 56 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d. 61]
[kidnapping for ransom can be accomplished without asportation while simple
kidnapping cannot]; see People v. Macinnes (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 843–844
[106 Cal.Rptr. 589]; People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 755, fn. 14 [209
Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994].)
RELATED ISSUES
Extortion Target
The kidnapped victim may also be the person from whom the defendant wishes to
extort something. (People v. Ibrahim (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1696–1698 [24
Cal.Rptr.2d 269].)
No Good-Faith Exception
A good faith exception to extortion or kidnapping for ransom does not exist. Even
actual debts cannot be collected by the reprehensible and dangerous means of
abducting and holding a person to be ransomed by payment of the debt. (People v.
Serrano (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1677–1678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 305].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 301–302.
969
1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses
(Pen. Code, § 209(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping for the

purpose of (robbery/rape/oral copulation/sodomy/sexual penetration) [in
violation of Penal Code section 209(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant intended to commit (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] oral
copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or]
<insert other offense specified in statute>);
2. Acting with that intent, the defendant took, held, or detained
another person by using force or by instilling a reasonable fear;
3. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person
[or made the other person move] a substantial distance;
4. The other person was moved or made to move a distance beyond
that merely incidental to the commission of a (robbery/ [or] rape/
[or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or]
<insert other offense specified in statute>);
5. When that movement began, the defendant already intended to
commit (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/
[or] sexual penetration/ [or] <insert other offense
specified in statute>);
[AND]
6. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/.)
<Give element 7 if instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>
[AND
other person consented to the movement.]
distance. The movement must have increased the risk of [physical or
psychological] harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the
(robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual
penetration/ [or] <insert other offense specified in statute>).
In deciding whether the movement was sufficient, consider all the
circumstances relating to the movement.
970
[To be guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or]
oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration), the defendant does
not actually have to commit the (robbery/ [or] rape/ [or] oral copulation/
[or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or] <insert other
offense specified in statute>).]
To decide whether the defendant intended to commit (robbery/ [or] rape/
[or] oral copulation/ [or] sodomy/ [or] sexual penetration/ [or]
<insert other offense specified in statute>), please refer to the
actually believed that the other person consented to the movement. The
defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the other person
[The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person consented
to go with the defendant. The other person consented if (he/she) (1)
freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the defendant,
(2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient mental capacity to
choose to go with the defendant. The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did not consent to go
with the defendant. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]
defendant. The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if after the other
person withdrew consent, the defendant committed the crime as I have
defined it.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, February 2013, August 2013,
April 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In addition, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the
alleged underlying crime.
971

defenses].) Give the bracketed paragraph on the defense of consent. On request, if
supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that begins with
“Consent may be withdrawn.” (See People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 814
[129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)
The defendant’s reasonable and actual belief in the victim’s consent to go with the
defendant may be a defense. (See People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127
Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that victim consented to movement is a
defense to kidnapping].)
Timing of Necessary Intent
No court has specifically stated whether the necessary intent must precede all
movement of the victim, or only one phase of it involving an independently
adequate asportation.
Kidnapping a child for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act is a
separate crime under Penal Code section 207(b). See CALCRIM No. 1200,
Kidnapping: For Child Molestation.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 209(b)(1); People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th
965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 869–870
& fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251 P.3d 943]; People v. Martinez (1999) 20
Cal.4th 225, 232 & fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512]; People v. Rayford
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 1 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d.
1119 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225].
• Robbery Defined. Pen. Code, § 211.
• Rape Defined. Pen. Code, § 261.
• Other Sex Offenses Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 264.1 [acting in concert], 286
[sodomy], 287 [oral copulation], 289 [sexual penetration].
• Intent to Commit Robbery Must Exist at Time of Original Taking. People v.
Tribble (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, 830–832 [94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 484 P.2d 589]; People
v. Bailey (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 699 [113 Cal.Rptr. 514]; see People v.
Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 769–770 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467], overruled on other
grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d
1].
972
• Kidnapping to Effect Escape From Robbery. People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d

192, 199–200 [104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145] [violation of section 209 even
though intent to kidnap formed after robbery commenced].
• Kidnapping Victim Need Not Be Robbery Victim. People v. Laursen (1972) 8
Cal.3d 192, 200, fn. 7 [104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145].
• Use of Force or Fear. See People v. Martinez (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 579,
599–600 [198 Cal.Rptr. 565], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hayes
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 627–628, fn. 10 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376];
People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 713–714 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
• Movement of Victim Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm to Victim.
People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66];
People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 870 fn. 20 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 251
P.3d 943]; People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232 fn. 4 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d
533, 973 P.2d 512].
• Movement Must Be for Illegal Purpose or Intent if Victim Incapable of Consent.
In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 610–611 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 P.3d
164]; People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 768 [12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361 P.2d
593].
• Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207; People v. Bailey (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 699
[113 Cal.Rptr. 514]; see People v. Jackson (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 182, 189 [77
Cal.Rptr.2d 564].
• False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; People v. Magana (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 1117, 1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; People v. Gibbs (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93
RELATED ISSUES
Psychological Harm
Psychological harm may be sufficient to support conviction for aggravated
kidnapping under Penal Code section 209(b). An increased risk of harm is not
limited to a risk of bodily harm. (People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 885–886
[95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493] [substantial movement of robbery victim that
posed substantial increase in risk of psychological trauma beyond that expected
from stationary robbery].)
973
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 293–300, 310, 311–313.
974
1204. Kidnapping: During Carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 207(a),
209.5(a), (b), 215(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping during a

carjacking [in violation of Penal Code section 209.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed a carjacking;
2. During the carjacking, the defendant took, held, or detained
another person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear;
3. The defendant moved the other person or made that person move
a substantial distance from the vicinity of the carjacking;
4. The defendant moved or caused the other person to move with
the intent to facilitate the carjacking [or to help (himself/herself)
escape/or to prevent the other person from sounding an alarm];
5. The person moved was not one of the carjackers;
[AND]
6. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/)
<Give element 7 when instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>
[AND
distance. The movement must have been more than merely brief and
incidental to the commission of the carjacking. The movement must also
have increased the risk of [physical or psychological] harm to the person
beyond that necessarily present in the carjacking. In deciding whether
the movement was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to
the movement.
975

(2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient maturity and
understanding to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did
not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]
defined it.]
To decide whether the defendant committed carjacking, please refer to
the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that crime.
[Fear, as used in this instruction, means fear of injury to the person or
injury to the person’s family or property.] [It also means fear of
immediate injury to another person present during the incident or to
that person’s property.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. The court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of
carjacking. Give CALCRIM No. 1650, Carjacking.
defenses].) An optional paragraph is provided for this purpose, “Defense: Consent
Given.”
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defendant’s reasonable and actual
976
belief in the victim’s consent to go with the defendant, if supported by the evidence.
(See People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61];
People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good
faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) Give
bracketed element 7 and the paragraph “Defense: Good Faith Belief in Consent.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(a), 209.5(a), (b), 215(a).
• Force or Fear Requirement. People v. Moya (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916–917
[6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323]; People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111
Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820] [fear must be reasonable].
• Incidental Movement. See People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237–238
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
• Increased Risk of Harm. People v. Ortiz (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 410, 415 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 92].
• Intent to Facilitate Commission of Carjacking. People v. Perez (2000) 84
• Movement Need Not Substantially Increase Risk of Harm. People v. Robertson
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 982 [146 Cal.Rptr.3d 66]; People v. Ortiz (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 410 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 92]; Pen. Code, § 209.5(a).
• Vicinity of Carjacking. People v. Moore (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 37, 43–46 [88
Cal.Rptr.2d 914].
• Carjacking. Pen. Code, § 215(a); People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616,
624–626 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485]; People v. Contreras (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 760,
765 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233] [Pen. Code, § 209.5 requires completed offense of
carjacking].
• Attempted Carjacking. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215(a); People v. Jones (1999) 75
• False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; see People v. Russell (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1083, 1088–1089 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 241]; People v. Gibbs (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].
An unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle with an intent to temporarily deprive the
owner of possession (Veh. Code, § 10851(a)) is not a necessarily included lesser
offense or a lesser related offense of kidnapping during a carjacking. (People v.
Russell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1088–1091 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 241] [evidence
only supported finding of kidnapping by force or fear; automobile joyriding
formerly governed by Pen. Code, § 499b].)
Grand theft is not a necessarily included offense of carjacking. (People v. Ortega
977
RELATED ISSUES
Dominion and Control
Carjacking can occur when a defendant forcibly takes a victim’s car keys, not just
when a defendant takes a car from the victim’s presence. (People v. Hoard (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 599, 608–609 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 855] [victim was not physically
present when defendant drove car away].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 314–315.
Against the Person, §§ 142.10A, 142.14 (Matthew Bender).
978
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with kidnapping [in

prove that:
1. The defendant took, held, or detained another person by using
force or by instilling reasonable fear;
2. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other person
[or made the other person move] a substantial distance;
[AND]
3. The other person did not consent to the movement(;/.)
<Give element 4 when instructing on reasonable belief in consent.>
[AND]
[4. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the
Substantial distance means more than a slight or trivial distance. In
deciding whether the distance was substantial, you must consider all the
circumstances relating to the movement. [Thus, in addition to
considering the actual distance moved, you may also consider other
factors such as [whether the distance the other person was moved was
beyond that merely incidental to the commission of <insert
associated crime>], whether the movement increased the risk of [physical
or psychological] harm, increased the danger of a foreseeable escape
attempt, or gave the attacker a greater opportunity to commit additional
crimes, or decreased the likelihood of detection.]
979

(2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient maturity and
understanding to choose to go with the defendant. The People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the other person did
not consent to go with the defendant. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.
defined it.]]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, April 2020, October 2021, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In the paragraph defining “substantial distance,” give the bracketed sentence listing
factors that the jury may consider, when evidence permits, in evaluating the totality
of the circumstances. (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237 [83
Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].) However, in the case of simple kidnapping, if the
movement was for a substantial distance, the jury does not need to consider any
other factors. (People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237; see People v.
Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058].)
The court must give the bracketed language on movement incidental to an
associated crime when it is supported by the evidence. (People v. Martinez, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 237; People v. Bell (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 [102
Cal.Rptr.3d 300].)
518 P.2d 913] overruled on other grounds in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
defenses].) An optional paragraph is provided for this purpose, “Defense: Consent
Given.”
On request, if supported by the evidence, also give the bracketed paragraph that
980
begins with “Consent may be withdrawn.” (See People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d
808, 814 [129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defendant’s reasonable and actual
belief in the victim’s consent to go with the defendant, if supported by the evidence.
(See People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61];
People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good
faith belief that victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) Give
bracketed element 4 and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.
If the victim is incapable of consent because of immaturity or mental condition, see
CALCRIM No. 1201, Kidnapping: Child or Person Incapable of Consent. An illegal
purpose or intent is not required for an intoxicated and resisting adult victim.
(People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 80 [268 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].)
to Custody.
For instructions relating to other defenses to kidnapping, see CALCRIM No. 1225,
Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent Harm, and CALCRIM No.
1226, Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen’s Arrest.
AUTHORITY
• Punishment If Victim Under 14 Years of Age. Pen. Code, § 208(b); People v.
Magpuso (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206] [ignorance of
victim’s age not a defense].
• Asportation Requirement. People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235–237
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged asportation
test from People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884
P.2d 1369], and People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr.
897, 459 P.2d 225]].
• Consent to Physical Movement. See People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463,
516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].
Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820]; see People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517,
fn. 13, 518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [kidnapping requires use of force
or fear; consent not vitiated by fraud, deceit, or dissimulation].
• Good Faith Belief in Consent. Pen. Code, § 26(3) [mistake of fact]; People v.
Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–155 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337];
981
People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279]; People v.

Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 968 [179 Cal.Rptr. 276].
• Incidental Movement Test. People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237–238
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512].
• Intent Requirement. People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765 [114 Cal.Rptr.
467, 523 P.2d 267], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979)
25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th
463, 519 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; People v. Moya (1992) 4
• Substantial Distance Requirement. People v. Derek Daniels (1993) 18
Cal.App.4th 1046, 1053; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 600–601
[114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must be more than slight or
trivial, it must be substantial in character].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 207(a) uses the term “steals” in defining kidnapping not in the
sense of a theft, but in the sense of taking away or forcible carrying away. (People
v. McCullough (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 169, 176 [160 Cal.Rptr. 831].) The
instruction uses “take,” “hold,” or “detain” as the more inclusive terms, but includes
in brackets the statutory terms “steal” and “arrest” if either one more closely
matches the evidence.
• False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; People v. Magana (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 1117, 1120–1121 [281 Cal.Rptr. 338]; People v. Gibbs (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 526, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr. 866].
RELATED ISSUES
A victim must be alive when kidnapped. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th
469, 498 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)
Threat of Arrest
“[A]n implicit threat of arrest satisfies the force or fear element of section 207(a)
kidnapping if the defendant’s conduct or statements cause the victim to believe that
unless the victim accompanies the defendant the victim will be forced to do so, and
the victim’s belief is objectively reasonable.” (People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th
321, 331 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 870, 92 P.3d 360].)
982
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 281–291, 316.
983
B. DEFENSES
1225. Defense to Kidnapping: Protecting Child From Imminent
Harm (Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1))
The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) (took/stole/enticed

away/detained/concealed/harbored) a child under the age of 14 years to
protect that child from danger of imminent harm.
An imminent harm is an immediate and present threat of harm. Belief in
future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the
harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed that the child
was in imminent danger.
the defendant did not act to protect the child from the danger of
imminent harm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of kidnapping.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
An instruction on a defense must be given sua sponte if there is substantial
evidence supporting the defense and the defendant is relying on the defense or the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (People v.
Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716–717 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved
on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160
Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] and in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163,
fn. 10, 164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Burnham (1986)
176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1139, fn. 3 [222 Cal.Rptr. 630].)
The prevention of imminent harm may be asserted against the following forms of
kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1)):
1. Simple kidnapping by force or fear. (Pen. Code, § 207(a).)
2. Kidnapping for the purpose of committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child.
(Pen. Code, § 207(b).)
3. Kidnapping by force or fear for the purpose of selling the victim into slavery or
involuntary servitude. (Pen. Code, § 207(c).)
985
4. Kidnapping by bringing a person unlawfully abducted out of state into

California. (Pen. Code, § 207(d).)
CALCRIM No. 3403, Necessity.
CALCRIM No. 3402, Duress or Threats.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 207(f)(1).
• Imminent Harm Defined. See People v. Rodriguez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250,
1269 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 345] [defining “imminent” for purposes of imperfect self-
defense to murder charge]; In re Eichorn (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 382, 389 [81
Cal.Rptr.2d 535] [citing with approval definition of necessity that includes
physical harm].
• Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Imminent Harm Defense. People v. Neidinger
RELATED ISSUES
Whether Belief Must Be Reasonable
The language of Penal Code section 207(f)(1) does explicitly require that the
defendant “reasonably” believe that the child was in danger of harm. There are no
reported cases on this issue.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 281.
986
1226. Defense to Kidnapping: Citizen’s Arrest (Pen. Code,
§§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837)
The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) was making a

lawful citizen’s arrest. The defendant was making a lawful citizen’s
arrest if (he/she) acted because:
<Alternative A—person actually committed felony>
[The person arrested committed <insert specific
felony>(;/.)]
[OR]
<Alternative B—reasonable cause to believe person committed felony>
[ <Insert specific felony> had been committed, and the
defendant had reasonable cause to believe the person arrested
committed it(;/.)]
[OR]
<Alternative C—person committed misdemeanor in defendant’s presence>
[The person arrested committed or attempted to commit
<insert specific misdemeanor or infraction> in the defendant’s
presence.]
[Someone has reasonable cause if he or she knows facts that would
persuade someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime.]
the defendant was not making a lawful citizen’s arrest. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
kidnapping.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on making a citizen’s arrest when there
is sufficient evidence supporting each of the factors establishing the defense. (See
People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1151–1152 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d
384] [crime occurred before 1990 adoption of Pen. Code, § 207(e)(2); no obligation
to instruct sua sponte if insubstantial evidence of defense].)
The three bracketed alternative paragraphs reflect the situations when a private
person may make an arrest. (See Pen. Code, § 837.) If the second alternative is
987
given, also give the bracketed paragraph defining “reasonable cause.”

AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 207(f)(2), 834, 837.
• Arrest by Actual Restraint or Submission to Custody. Pen. Code, § 835.
• Summoning Assistance in Making Arrest. Pen. Code, § 839.
• Burden of Proof. See People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 665–666 [107 P.2d
601] [defendant need only raise reasonable doubt regarding lawfulness of arrest
as defense to false imprisonment charge]; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d
953, 963–964 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335].
• Presence Defined. People v. Lee (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 12 [204
Cal.Rptr. 667] [neither physical proximity nor sight is essential].
• Public Offense Defined. Pen. Code, § 15; see People v. Tuck (1977) 75
Cal.App.3d 639, 644 [142 Cal.Rptr. 362] [public offense includes felony,
misdemeanor, or infraction].
• Reasonable Cause Defined. People v. Wilkins (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 763,
767–768 [104 Cal.Rptr. 89] [proof of commission of felony not necessary when
reasonable cause exists].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 281, 291.
988
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with false imprisonment by

violence or menace [in violation of Penal Code section 237(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally [and unlawfully] (restrained[,]/ [or]
confined[,]/ [or] detained) someone [or caused that person to be
(restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained)] by violence or
menace;
AND
2. The defendant made the other person stay or go somewhere
against that person’s will.
Violence means using physical force that is greater than the force
reasonably necessary to restrain someone.
Menace means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a
deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.
[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained be
confined in jail or prison.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (People v. Haney (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 312–313 [142 Cal.Rptr. 186]
[failure to instruct on elements of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit necessary to
establish felony false imprisonment requires reversal].)
Give the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1 on request if there is
evidence that the defendant acted lawfully. The court will need to further define for
the jury when a restraint, detention, or confinement is legal.
Give the final paragraph on request to inform jurors that false “imprisonment” is not
989
limited to confinement in jail or prison. (People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655, 659
[107 P.2d 601]; People v. Haney (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142 Cal.Rptr.
186].)
CALCRIM No. 1242, Misdemeanor False Imprisonment.
If the defendant is charged with false imprisonment for purposes of protection from
arrest or use as a shield (Pen. Code, § 210.5), see CALCRIM No. 1241, False
Imprisonment: Hostage.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237; People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655,
659–660 [107 P.2d 601].
• Confinement in Jail or Prison Not Required. People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d
655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; People v. Haney (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142
Cal.Rptr. 186].
• General-Intent Crime. People v. Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 717–718
[31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391,
1399–1400 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; People v. Swanson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104,
109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].
• Menace Defined. People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 484–486 [41
Cal.Rptr.2d 459].
• Violence Defined. People v. Babich (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806 [18
Cal.Rptr.2d 60].
COMMENTARY
The instruction includes a definition of “violence” because it has a specific meaning
in the context of felony false imprisonment. In addition, force and violence are
separate elements with different meanings that must be made clear to the jury.
(People v. Babich (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 806–807 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].) Force
is required for a finding of both misdemeanor and felony false imprisonment, while
violence is only required for the felony. “Violence” is a force greater than that
reasonably necessary to effect the restraint. (People v. Hendrix (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th
1458, 1462 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 922].)
A definition of “menace” is also included. Menace has a specific meaning in the
context of felony false imprisonment. (People v. Babich, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p.
806.) Two categories of menace include a threat involving either the use of a deadly
weapon or verbal threats of harm. (People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480,
485–486 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459].) “Menace” is not a mere modifier of “violence.”
(People v. Arvanites (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1060 [95 Cal.Rptr. 493].)
The committee found only one case that involved fraud and deceit. (People v. Rios
(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 450–451 [222 Cal.Rptr. 913]; see also Parnell v.
Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 409–410 [173 Cal.Rptr. 906].) Thus,
this instruction focuses on the use of violence or menace to restrain the victim. If
990
there is evidence of the use of fraud or deceit, the court must modify the instruction.
• Attempted False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 236, 237; People v. Ross
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1554–1555 [253 Cal.Rptr. 178] [present ability not
prerequisite to attempted false imprisonment].
• Misdemeanor False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, § 236; People v. Matian (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 480, 484, fn. 4, 487 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 459]; People v. Babich (1993)
RELATED ISSUES
Elder or Dependent Adult Victim
False imprisonment of an elder or dependent adult by use of violence, menace,
fraud, or deceit is punishable by imprisonment for two, three, or four years. (Pen.
Code, §§ 237(b), 368(f).) An elder is any person who is 65 years of age or older.
(Pen. Code, § 368(g).) A dependent adult is any person between the ages of 18 and
64 with specified physical or mental limitations. (Pen. Code, § 368(h).)
Parent Confining Child
A parent who confines his or her child with the intent to endanger the health and
safety of the child or for an unlawful purpose can be prosecuted for false
imprisonment. (People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 [84
Cal.Rptr.2d 491] [unlawful purpose of avoiding prosecution].) A parent asserting the
defense of parental authority may introduce evidence of his or her intent in
confining or restraining the child and of the reasonableness of the restraint or
confinement. (Id. at p. 1196.) There is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense
absent substantial evidence supporting the defense or reliance on it during the trial.
(Id. at p. 1197.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 273–276, 279.
Against the Person, § 142.14[2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).
991
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with false imprisonment of

a hostage [in violation of Penal Code section 210.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant faced a threat or risk of imminent arrest;
2. The defendant (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or] detained)
another person by force or by a threat to use force;
3. The defendant intended to protect (himself/herself) against the
threat of imminent arrest by restraining the other person;
4. The defendant made the other person stay or go somewhere
against that person’s will;
AND
5. The defendant either substantially increased the risk of [physical
or psychological] harm to the (restrained[,]/ [or] confined[,]/ [or]
detained) person or intended to use that person as a shield.
[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained be
confined in jail or prison.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
186].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 210.5, 236.
• Imminent Arrest. People v. Gomez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 819, 825 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d
418] [dicta].
992
COMMENTARY
Unlike simple false imprisonment, false imprisonment of a hostage is a specific
intent crime. (See Pen. Code, § 210.5 [falsely imprison “for purposes of protection
from arrest”]; see also People v. McDaniel (1979) 24 Cal.3d 661, 669 [156 Cal.Rptr.
865, 597 P.2d 124] [specific intent crime exists when defendant intends to do some
further act or achieve some additional consequence].)
Section 210.5 does not expressly require a threat of arrest when a perpetrator
commits false imprisonment “for purposes of using the person as a shield.” Until the
appellate courts provide more guidance, this instruction assumes that a threat of
imminent arrest is required. (See People v. Gomez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 819, 825 [3
Cal.Rptr.2d 418] [dicta].)
• False Imprisonment. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237.
• Attempted False Imprisonment of Hostage. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 210.5, 236.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 277.
Against the Person, § 142.14[1][c], [2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).
993
1242. Misdemeanor False Imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236,
237(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with false imprisonment [in

prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally [and unlawfully] (restrained[,]/ [or]
detained[,]/ [or] confined) a person;
AND
2. The defendant’s act made that person stay or go somewhere
against that person’s will.
[False imprisonment does not require that the person restrained or
detained be confined in jail or prison.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed words “and unlawfully” in element 1 on request if there is
evidence that the defendant acted lawfully. The court will need to further define for
the jury when a restraint, detention, or confinement is legal.
186].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237(a); People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d 655,
659–660 [107 P.2d 601].
• General-Intent Crime. People v. Fernandez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 717–718
[31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; People v. Olivencia (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391,
1399–1400 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; People v. Swanson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 104,
109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].
994
• Confinement in Jail or Prison Not Required. People v. Agnew (1940) 16 Cal.2d

655, 659 [107 P.2d 601]; People v. Haney (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 313 [142
Cal.Rptr. 186].
RELATED ISSUES
General-Intent Crime
False imprisonment is a general-intent crime. (People v. Fernandez (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 710, 716–718 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 677]; People v. Olivencia (1988) 204
Cal.App.3d 1391 [251 Cal.Rptr. 880]; People v. Swanson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d
104, 109 [190 Cal.Rptr. 768].) Thus, the court is not required to instruct on the joint
union of act and specific intent (People v. Fernandez, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p.
716), on the use of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent (People v.
Swanson, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 109–110), or that the jury should consider
mental illness in deciding whether the defendant acted with specific intent (People v.
Olivencia, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1399).
Parent Confining Child
A parent who confines his or her child with the intent to endanger the health and
safety of the child or for an unlawful purpose can be prosecuted for false
imprisonment. (People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 [84
Cal.Rptr.2d 491] [unlawful purpose of avoiding prosecution]; see also People v. Rios
(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 451 [222 Cal.Rptr. 913].) If there is sufficient evidence
that the parent’s restraint or confinement was a reasonable exercise of parental
authority, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. (People v.
Checketts, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 273, 279.
Against the Person, § 142.14[2][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).
995
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with human trafficking [in

prove that:
1. The defendant either deprived another person of personal liberty
or violated that other person’s personal liberty;
AND
<Give Alternative 2A if the defendant is charged with a violation of
subsection (a).>
[2A. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to obtain forced
labor or services(./;)]
[OR]
<Give Alternative 2B if the defendant is charged with a violation of
subsection (b).>
[2B. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or]
maintain) a [felony] violation of <insert appropriate code
section[s]>).]
Depriving or violating another person’s personal liberty, as used here,
includes substantial and sustained restriction of another person’s liberty
accomplished through <insert terms that apply from statutory
definition, i.e.: force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace,
or threat of unlawful injury> to the victim or to another person under
circumstances in which the person receiving or perceiving the threat
reasonably believes that it is likely that the person making the threat
would carry it out.
[Forced labor or services, as used here, means labor or services that are
performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained
through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that
would reasonably overbear the will of the person.]
hardship, or retribution that is enough to cause a reasonable person to
do [or submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or
submit to].]
[Duress includes (a direct or implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove,
confiscate, or possess any actual or purported passport or immigration
document of the other person/ [or] knowingly destroying, concealing,
996
removing, confiscating, or possessing any actual or purported passport or

immigration document of the other person).]
[Violence means using physical force that is greater than the force
reasonably necessary to restrain someone.]
[Menace means a verbal or physical threat of harm[, including use of a
deadly weapon]. The threat of harm may be express or implied.]
[Coercion includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a
person to believe that failing to perform an act would result in (serious
harm to or physical restraint against someone else/ [or] the abuse or
threatened abuse of the legal process/ [or] debt bondage/ [or] providing
or facilitating the possession of any controlled substance to impair the
other person’s judgment).]
[When you decide whether the defendant (used duress/ [or] used
coercion/ [or] deprived another person of personal liberty or violated that
other person’s personal liberty), consider all of the circumstances,
including the age of the other person, (his/her) relationship to the
defendant [or defendant’s agent[s]], and the other person’s handicap or
disability, if any.]
New August 2009; Revised August 2013, February 2014, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If necessary, insert the correct Penal Code section into the blank provided in
element 2B and give the corresponding CALCRIM instruction.
Give bracketed element three if the defendant is charged with a violation of Pen.
Code, § 236.1(c).
This instruction is based on the language of the statute effective November 7, 2012,
and only applies to crimes committed on or after that date.
The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the definition of “menace” or
“violence” and Penal Code section 236.1 does not define these terms. (People v.
Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional
definitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
• Menace Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. People v. Matian (1995) 35
• Violence Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. People v. Babich (1993) 14
997

RELATED ISSUES
The victim’s consent is irrelevant. (People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084,
1097 [269 Cal.Rptr.3d 201].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 278.
Against the Person, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).
998
1244. Causing Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen.
Code, § 236.1(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (causing, inducing, or

persuading / (and/or) attempting to cause, induce, or persuade) a minor
to engage in a commercial sex act [in violation of Penal Code section
236.1(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (caused/ [or] induced/ [or] persuaded) [or]
attempted to (cause/ [or] induce/ [or] persuade)] another person
to engage in a commercial sex act;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or]
maintain) a [felony] violation of <insert appropriate
code section[s]>;
AND
3. When the defendant did so, (the other person was under 18 years
of age/ [or] the defendant believed that the person was under 18
years of age).
A commercial sex act is sexual conduct that takes place in exchange for
anything of value.
When you decide whether the defendant (caused/ [or] induced/ [or]
persuaded) the other person to engage in a commercial sex act, consider
all of the circumstances, including the age of the other person, (his/her)
relationship to the defendant [or defendant’s agent[s]], and the other
person’s handicap or disability, if any.
[The other person’s consent is not a defense to this crime.]
[Being mistaken about the other person’s age is not a defense to this
crime.]
New February 2014; Revised March 2019, October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
999
Insert the correct Penal Code section into the blank provided in element 2 and give
the corresponding instruction or instructions.
and applies only to crimes committed on or after that date.
CALCRIM No. 3184, Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to
Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
849–850 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
• Attempt to Cause, Induce, or Persuade Does Not Require Minor Victim. People
v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893, 912–913 [272 Cal.Rptr.3d 862, 477 P.3d 579].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 278.
Against the Person, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).
1000
D. CHILD ABDUCTION
1250. Child Abduction: No Right to Custody (Pen. Code, §§ 277,
278)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with child abduction

without a right of custody [in violation of Penal Code section 278].
prove that:
1. The defendant maliciously (took[,]/ [or] enticed away[,]/ [or]
kept[,]/ [or] withheld[,]/ [or] concealed) a child from (his/her)
lawful custodian;
2. The child was under the age of 18;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did not have a right to
custody of that child;
AND
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to detain or conceal
the child from the child’s lawful custodian.
A lawful custodian is a person, guardian, or public agency having a right
to custody of the child. The right to custody means the right to physical
care, custody, and control of the child according to the law or because of
a court order. [A public agency has the right to custody if it has been
given protective custody or jurisdiction of the care, custody, control, or
conduct of the child by statute or court order.]
[Intending to detain includes delaying or hindering. A person can detain
someone without using force.]
[To entice away means to lure away by creating hope or desire.]
[The defendant can be guilty of child abduction whether or not the child
resisted or objected, and even if the child consented to go with the
defendant.]
[A parent has no right to physical custody if his or her parental rights
were terminated by court order.]
[A parent loses his or her right to custody if he or she (is unable to take
custody of the child[,]/ [or] refuses to take custody of the child[,]/ [or]
abandons his or her family).]
1001
[A parent abandons a child by actually deserting the child with the intent
to cut off the relationship with the child and end all parental obligations.
Intent to abandon can be shown in many ways, including, but not
limited to:
1. Leaving the child without providing a way for the child to be
identified;
2. Leaving the child with the other parent for at least one year
without communicating with or supporting the child;
OR
3. Leaving the child with someone other than a parent for at least
six months without communicating with or supporting the child.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If requested, give the final bracketed sentence at the end of the paragraph defining
“lawful custodian” if a public agency was the lawful custodian at the time of the
alleged abduction. (See Pen. Code, § 277(e).)
If requested, give the bracketed sentences defining “intending to detain” (see People
v. Moore (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791 [155 P.2d 403]) or “entice away” (see
People v. Torres (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175]) depending on the
evidence in the case.
If requested, give the bracketed paragraph about the child’s consent or lack of
resistance if there is evidence the child did not resist or consented to go with the
defendant. (People v. Moore, supra, 67 Cal.App.2d at p. 792 [child’s consent
irrelevant]; People v. Grever (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].)
Give on request the bracketed paragraph that begins with “A parent loses his or her
right to custody . . .” if there is evidence the defendant lost his or her right to
custody by being unable or refusing to take custody, or by abandoning his or her
family. (See Pen. Code, § 277(f).)
If there is evidence of abandonment, give the bracketed paragraphs defining when a
parent “abandons” a child. The trial court must define abandonment sua sponte
when it is closely connected to the evidence presented on the right to custody.
(People v. Ryan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1319 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) If an
Indian parent is involved, see Fam. Code, § 7822(e).
1002
391].)
894, 899 [182 Cal.Rptr. 698].) See CALCRIM No. 1215, Kidnapping.
AUTHORITY
• Abandonment Defined. Fam. Code, § 7822(a), (b); People v. Ryan (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 1304, 1315–1316, 1320 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].
• Court Order or Custody Order Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(b).
• Custody Proceeding Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(c).
• Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4).
• Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or parent’s agent].
• Child’s Consent Irrelevant. People v. Moore (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791–792
[155 P.2d 403] [crime against parent]; People v. Grever (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].
• Detain Defined. People v. Moore (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 791 [155 P.2d 403]
[includes delaying, hindering, or retarding but not necessarily the use of force].
• Entice Defined. People v. Torres (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175].
• Attempted Child Abduction. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 278.
RELATED ISSUES
Custody Placed With Other Parent
Penal Code section 278 applies to a parent of a minor child whose custody has been
placed with the other parent by court order. (People v. Hyatt (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d
618, 622 [96 Cal.Rptr. 156].) A parent with bare legal custody does not have a
“right of custody” under the statute. (People v. Irwin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 891,
897 [202 Cal.Rptr. 475] [father only had joint legal custody; physical custody was
awarded to the mother].)
Intent to Detain or Conceal Not Required
Proof of violation of section 278 does not require the intent to detain or conceal the
child in California. Proof of detention or concealment, however, supports an
inference of an intention to detain or conceal. (People v. Hyatt (1971) 18
Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [96 Cal.Rptr. 156] [construing former section 278 that required
intent to detain “and” conceal].)
1003
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 318–327.
Against the Person, § 142.14[2][b], [c], [3] (Matthew Bender).
1004
1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or
Visitation (Pen. Code, §§ 277, 278.5)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with depriving someone else

of the right to (custody/ [or] visitation) [in violation of Penal Code
section 278.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant (took[,]/ [or] enticed away[,]/ [or] kept[,]/ [or]
withheld[,]/ [or] concealed) a child;
2. The child was under the age of 18;
AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) maliciously (deprived a lawful
custodian of (his/her/its) right to custody/ [or] deprived a person
of a lawful right to visitation).
A lawful custodian is a person, guardian, or public agency that has a
right to custody of the child. The right to custody means the right to
physical care, custody, and control of the child according to the law or
because of a court order. [A public agency has the right to custody if it
has been given protective custody or jurisdiction of the care, custody,
control, or conduct of the child by statute or court order.]
[To entice away means to lure away by creating hope or desire.]
[The defendant can be guilty of child abduction whether or not the child
resisted or objected, and even if the child consented to go with the
defendant.]
[Visitation means the time ordered by a court granting someone access to
the child.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
1005
If requested, give the final bracketed sentence in the paragraph defining “lawful
custodian” if there is evidence that a public agency was the lawful custodian at the
time of the alleged abduction. (See Pen. Code, § 277(e).)
If requested, give the bracketed paragraph defining “entice away” (see People v.
Torres (1920) 48 Cal.App. 606, 609 [192 P. 175]) depending on the evidence in the
case.
If requested, give the bracketed paragraph about the child’s consent or lack of
resistance if there is evidence the child did not resist or consented to go with the
defendant. (People v. Moore (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 792 [155 P.2d 403] [child’s
consent irrelevant]; People v. Grever (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 [259
Cal.Rptr. 469].)
If requested, give the bracketed paragraph regarding visitation if evidence is
presented that the defendant deprived another person of his or her right to visitation.
(See Pen. Code, §§ 277(h), 278.5(a).)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Custody Proceeding Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(c).
• Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or an agent of a parent].
• Child’s Consent Irrelevant. People v. Moore (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 792 [155
P.2d 403] [crime against parent]; People v. Grever (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d Supp.
1, 7 [259 Cal.Rptr. 469].
COMMENTARY
A crime under Penal Code section 278.5 is sometimes referred to as “child
detention.” (See People v. Moses (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 462, 464, fn. 2 [50
Cal.Rptr.2d 665].) This instruction uses the phrase “depriving someone else of the
right to (custody/ [or] visitation)” to avoid any confusion with detention under Penal
Code section 278, the general child abduction statute.
• Attempted Child Detention. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 278.5.
Section 278.5 does not limit the court’s contempt power. (Pen. Code, § 278.5(b).)
Contempt is not a lesser included offense of a crime under section 278.5. There is
no sua sponte duty to instruct on contempt. (People v. Moses (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th
462, 469, 471 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 665].)
1006
RELATED ISSUES
Custody Order After Abduction
A custody order obtained after the abduction of a child is not a defense to a crime
charged under section 278.5. (Pen. Code, § 278.5(c).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 318, 328–329.
Against the Person, § 142.14[2][b], [c], [3] (Matthew Bender).
1007
1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate
Injury (Pen. Code, § 278.7(a) and (b))
The defendant did not maliciously deprive a (lawful custodian of a right

to custody/ [or] person of a right to visitation) if the defendant:
1. Had a right to custody of the child when (he/she) abducted the
child;
2. Had a good faith and reasonable belief when abducting the child
that the child would suffer immediate bodily injury or emotional
harm if left with the other person;
3. Made a report to the district attorney’s office in the county where
the child lived within a reasonable time after the abduction;
4. Began a custody proceeding in an appropriate court within a
reasonable time after the abduction;
AND
5. Informed the district attorney’s office of any change of address or
telephone number for (himself/herself) and the child.
To abduct means to take, entice away, keep, withhold, or conceal.
The right to custody means the right to physical care, custody, and
control of the child because of a court order or under the law.
[One way a child may suffer emotional harm is if he or she has a parent
who has committed domestic violence against the parent accused of
abducting the child. Acts of “domestic violence” include, but are not
limited to (1) sexual assault; (2) causing or attempting to cause bodily
injury, either intentionally or recklessly; or (3) causing a person to
reasonably fear imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself or
another.]
The report to the district attorney must include the defendant’s name,
the defendant’s or child’s current address and telephone number, and
the reasons the child was abducted.
A reasonable time within which to make a report to the district
attorney’s office is at least 10 days from when the defendant took the
child.
A reasonable time to begin a custody proceeding is at least 30 days from
the time the defendant took the child.
the defendant maliciously deprived a (lawful custodian of a right to
custody/ [or] person of a right to visitation). If the People have not met
1008
this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of

<insert crime charged>.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this defense if the defendant is
relying on it, or if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (See People v.
Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 75, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502] [defendant
must raise a reasonable doubt]; People v. Mehaisin (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 965
[124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715–716 [112
Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913] [duty to instruct on defenses], disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.Rptr.
84, 603 P.2d 1] and in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, fn. 10,
164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)
People v. Mehaisin (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 965 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683] holds
that the “defendant was not entitled to a section 278.7 defense because he did not
report the taking to the Sacramento District Attorney and did not commence a
custody proceeding”]; People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 73 fn.4, 79 [51
Cal.Rptr.3d 45, 146 P.3d 502] explains that “the section 278.7(a) defense provides a
specific example of when the person does not act maliciously.”
Give on request the bracketed paragraph regarding “emotional harm” and “domestic
violence” if there is evidence that the defendant had been a victim of domestic
violence committed by the other parent. (See Pen. Code, §§ 278.7(b), 277(j); Fam.
Code, §§ 6203, 6211.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Defense. Pen. Code, § 278.7.
• Abduct Defined Pen. Code, § 277(k).
• Domestic Violence Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(j); see Fam. Code, §§ 6203, 6211.
• Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(i) [includes parent or parent’s agent].
• Right to Custody Defined. Pen. Code, § 277(e); see People v. Mehaisin (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 958, 964 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 683] [liberal visitation period does
not constitute right to custody].
• Pen. Code § 278.7, subdivision (a), Is Specific Example of Proving Absence of
Malice. (People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 79 [51 Cal.Rptr.3rd 45, 146
P.3d 502].)
1009
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person § 331.
1010
CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES

B. HATE CRIMES
1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force (Pen.
Code, § 422.6(a))
1351. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat (Pen.
Code, § 422.6(a) & (c))
1352. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging
Property (Pen. Code, § 422.6(b))
1011
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with having made a

criminal threat [in violation of Penal Code section 422].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or
unlawfully cause great bodily injury to <insert name
of complaining witness or member[s] of complaining witness’s
immediate family>;
2. The defendant made the threat (orally/in writing/by electronic
communication device);
3. The defendant intended that (his/her) statement be understood as
a threat [and intended that it be communicated to
<insert name of complaining witness>];
4. Under the circumstances, the threat was so clear, immediate,
unconditional, and specific that it communicated to
<insert name of complaining witness> a serious intention and the
immediate prospect that the threat would be carried out;
5. The threat actually caused <insert name of
complaining witness> to be in sustained fear for (his/her) own
safety [or for the safety of (his/her) immediate family];
[AND]
6. ’s <insert name of complaining witness> fear was
reasonable under the circumstances.
purpose.
In deciding whether a threat was sufficiently clear, immediate,
unconditional, and specific, consider the words themselves, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.
Someone who intends that a statement be understood as a threat does
not have to actually intend to carry out the threatened act [or intend to
have someone else do so].
Sustained fear means fear for a period of time that is more than
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.
1013
CALCRIM No. 1300 CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES
[An immediate ability to carry out the threat is not required.]

[An electronic communication device includes, but is not limited to: a
telephone, cellular telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, or fax
machine.]
[Immediate family means (a) any spouse, parents, and children; (b) any
grandchildren, grandparents, brothers and sisters related by blood or
marriage; or (c) any person who regularly lives in the other person’s
household [or who regularly lived there within the prior six months].]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2015, February
2016, March 2018, September 2020, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A specific crime or the elements of any specific Penal Code violation that might be
subsumed within the actual words of any threat need not be identified for the jury.
(See People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 758 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].) The
threatened acts or crimes may be described on request depending on the nature of
the threats or the need to explain the threats to the jury. (Id. at p. 760.)
When the threat is conveyed through a third party, give the appropriate bracketed
language in element three. (People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 913 [112
Cal.Rptr.2d 311]; In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861–862 [123
Cal.Rptr.2d 193] [insufficient evidence minor intended to convey threat to victim].)
Give the bracketed definition of “electronic communication” on request. (Pen. Code,
§ 422; 18 U.S.C., § 2510(12).)
If there is evidence that the threatened person feared for the safety of members of
his or her immediate family, the bracketed phrase in element 5 and the final
bracketed paragraph defining “immediate family” should be given on request. (See
Pen. Code, § 422; Fam. Code, § 6205; Prob. Code, §§ 6401, 6402.)
If instructing on attempted criminal threat, give the third element in the bench notes
of CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder. (People v. Chandler
1014
CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES CALCRIM No. 1300
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 422; In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007]; People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529,
1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
• Sufficiency of Threat Based on All Surrounding Circumstances. People v.
Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; People v.
Butler, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 752–753; People v. Martinez (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218–1221 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 303]; In re Ricky T. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137–1138 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165]; People v. Solis (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013–1014 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464]; see People v. Garrett
• Crime That Will Result in Great Bodily Injury Judged on Objective Standard.
People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 685 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 628].
• Threatening Hand Gestures Not Verbal Threats Under Penal Code Section 422.
People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1147 [218 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 394 P.3d
1074].
• Threat Not Required to Be Unconditional On Its Face. People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 339–340 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374], disapproving People v.
Brown (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76]; People v.
Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1540; People v. Stanfield (1995) 32
• Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required. People v. Lopez (1999) 74
• Sustained Fear. In re Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1139–1140; People
v. Solis, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024; People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1149, 1155–1156 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 7].
• Verbal Statement, Not Mere Conduct, Is Required. People v. Franz (2001) 88
• Statute Not Unconstitutionally Vague. People v. Maciel, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 684–686.
• Attempted Criminal Threats. People v. Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.
• Statute Authorizes Only One Conviction and One Punishment Per Victim, Per
Threatening Encounter. People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 202 [183
Cal.Rptr.3d 541].
COMMENTARY
This instruction uses the current nomenclature “criminal threat,” as recommended by
the Supreme Court in People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 224, fn. 1 [109
Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051] [previously called “terrorist threat”]. (See also Stats.
2000, ch. 1001, § 4.)
1015
Because a threat need only be “so . . . unconditional,” a conditional threat may

nonetheless violate Penal Code section 422 if it conveys a gravity of purpose and
the immediate prospect of execution. (See People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp.
339–340, disapproving People v. Brown, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1256.)
• Attempted Criminal Threat. See Pen. Code, § 422; People v. Toledo, supra, 26
Cal.4th at pp. 230–231.
• Threatening a public officer of an educational institution in violation of Penal
Code section 71 may be a lesser included offense of a section 422 criminal
threat under the accusatory pleadings test. (In re Marcus T. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 468, 472–473 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 451].) But see People v. Chaney
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 253, 257–258 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 714], finding that a
violation of section 71 is not a lesser included offense of section 422 under the
accusatory pleading test when the pleading does not specifically allege the intent
to cause (or attempt to cause) a public officer to do (or refrain from doing) an
act in the performance of official duty.
RELATED ISSUES
Ambiguous and Equivocal Poem Insufficient to Establish Criminal Threat
In In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 628–629, a minor gave two classmates a
poem containing language that referenced school shootings. The court held that “the
text of the poem, understood in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not ‘as
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to [the two
students] a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the
threat.’ ” (Id. at p. 638.)
Related Statutes
Other statutes prohibit similar threatening conduct against specified individuals.
(See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 76 [threatening elected public official, judge, etc., or staff
or immediate family], 95.1 [threatening jurors after verdict], 139 [threatening
witness or victim after conviction of violent offense], 140 [threatening witness,
victim, or informant].)
Unanimity Instruction
If the evidence discloses a greater number of threats than those charged, the
prosecutor must make an election of the events relied on in the charges. When no
election is made, the jury must be given a unanimity instruction. (People v. Butler,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 755, fn. 4; People v. Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1534, 1539.)
Whether Threat Actually Received
If a threat is intended to and does induce a sustained fear, the person making the
threat need not know whether the threat was actually received. (People v. Teal
1016
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.11A[1] (Matthew Bender).
1017
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with stalking [in violation of

prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously harassed or willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly followed another person;
AND
2. The defendant made a credible threat with the intent to place the
other person in reasonable fear for (his/her) safety [or for the
safety of (his/her) immediate family].
<If a court order prohibiting defendant’s contact with the threatened person
was in effect at the time of the charged conduct, give the following two
paragraphs>
[If you find the defendant guilty of stalking [in Count[s]], you must then
decide whether the People have proved that a/an (temporary restraining
order/injunction/<describe other court order>) ) prohibiting
the defendant from engaging in this conduct against the threatened
person was in effect at the time of the conduct.
that this allegation has not been proved.]
A credible threat is one that causes the target of the threat to reasonably
fear for his or her safety [or for the safety of his or her immediate
family] and one that the maker of the threat appears to be able to carry
out.
A credible threat may be made orally, in writing, or electronically or may
be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements and
conduct.
Harassing means engaging in a knowing and willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person that seriously annoys, alarms, torments, or
terrorizes the person and that serves no legitimate purpose.
A course of conduct means two or more acts occurring over a period of
time, however short, demonstrating a continuous purpose.
[A person is not guilty of stalking if (his/her) conduct is constitutionally
protected activity. <Describe type of activity; see Bench Notes
below> is constitutionally protected activity.]
1018

purpose.
[Repeatedly means more than once.]
[The People do not have to prove that a person who makes a threat
intends to actually carry it out.]
[Someone who makes a threat while in prison or jail may still be guilty
of stalking.]
[A threat may be made electronically by using a telephone, cellular
telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, fax machine, or other similar
electronic communication device.]
[Immediate family means (a) any spouse, parents, and children; (b) any
grandchildren, grandparents, brothers, and sisters related by blood or
marriage; or (c) any person who regularly lives in the other person’s
household [or who regularly lived there within the prior six months].]
[The terms and conditions of (a/an) (restraining order/injunction/
<describe other court order>) remain enforceable despite the
parties’ actions, and may only be changed by court order.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 3 if the defendant is charged with stalking in violation of a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or any other court order. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(b).)
If there is substantial evidence that any of the defendant’s conduct was
constitutionally protected, instruct on the type of constitutionally protected activity
involved. (See the optional bracketed paragraph regarding constitutionally protected
activity.) Examples of constitutionally protected activity include speech, protest, and
assembly. (See Civ. Code, § 1708.7(f) [civil stalking statute].)
The bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not have to prove that”
may be given on request. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(g).)
The bracketed sentence about the defendant’s incarceration may be given on request
if the defendant was in prison or jail when the threat was made. (See Pen. Code,
§ 646.9(g).)
1019
Give the bracketed definition of “electronic communication” on request. (See Pen.

Code, § 422; 18 U.S.C., § 2510(12).)
his or her immediate family, give the bracketed paragraph defining “immediate
family” on request. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(l); see Fam. Code, § 6205; Prob. Code,
§§ 6401, 6402.)
If the defendant argues that the alleged victim acquiesced to contact with the
defendant contrary to a court order, the court may, on request, give the last
bracketed paragraph stating that such orders may only be changed by the court. (See
Pen. Code, § 13710(b); People v. Gams (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–152,
154–155 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 423].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 646.9(a), (e)–(h); People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
199, 210 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177]; People v. Norman (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234,
1239 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].
• Intent to Cause Victim Fear. People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 295,
297–298 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624]; People v. Carron (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1230,
1236, 1238–1240 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328]; see People v. McCray (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 159, 171–173 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 872] [evidence of past violence
toward victim].
• Repeatedly Defined. People v. Heilman (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 399, 400 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 422].
• Safety Defined. People v. Borrelli (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 719–720 [91
Cal.Rptr.2d 851]; see People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 294–295 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
• Substantial Emotional Distress Defined. People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
199, 210 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177]; see People v. Carron (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
1230, 1240–1241 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].
• Victim’s Fear Not Contemporaneous With Stalker’s Threats. People v. Norman
• Subsections (b) & (c) of Pen. Code, § 646.9 are Alternate Penalty Provisions.
People v. Muhammad (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 484, 494 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 695].
1195–1197 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 871].
• Attempted Stalking. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 646.9.
1020
RELATED ISSUES
Harassment Not Contemporaneous With Fear
The harassment need not be contemporaneous with the fear caused. (See People v.
Norman (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1239–1241 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)
Constitutionality of Terms
The term “credible threat” is not unconstitutionally vague. (People v. Halgren
(1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1230 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The element that the
objectionable conduct “serve[] no legitimate purpose” (Pen. Code, § 646.9(e) is also
not unconstitutionally vague; “an ordinary person can reasonably understand what
conduct is expressly prohibited.” (People v. Tran (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 253, 260
[54 Cal.Rptr.2d 650].)
Labor Picketing
Section 646.9 does not apply to conduct that occurs during labor picketing. (Pen.
Code, § 646.9(i).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 333–336.
Against the Person, § 142.11A[2] (Matthew Bender).
1021
1302. Terrorizing by Destructive Device, Explosive, or Arson (Pen.
Code, § 11413)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with terrorizing by (use of

(a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive)/committing arson) [in violation
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—destructive device or explosive>
[1. The defendant exploded or ignited [or attempted to explode or
ignite] (a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive);]
<Alternative 1B—arson>
[1. The defendant committed arson;]
2. The defendant (used [or attempted to use] the (device/ [or]
explosive)/committed the arson) in or around <insert
one or more of the places listed in Pen. Code, § 11413(b)>;
AND
3. The defendant committed these acts with the intent to terrorize
someone else or with reckless disregard of terrorizing someone
else.
To terrorize means to cause a person of ordinary emotions and
sensibilities to fear for his or her personal safety.
A person acts with reckless disregard when (1) he or she is aware that his
or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk, (2) he or she
ignores that risk, and (3) the person’s behavior is grossly different from
what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.
To decide whether the defendant (exploded or ignited [or attempted to
explode or ignite] (a/an) (destructive device/ [or] explosive)/committed
arson), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
heat.]
is an explosive.]
1022
[A destructive device is <insert definition from Pen. Code,

§ 16460>.]
[The term[s] (explosive/ [and] destructive device) (is/are) defined in
another instruction.]
[Judicial officer means a magistrate, judge, justice, commissioner, or
referee of a state or federal court located in this state, or a person
appointed by a court to serve in one of these capacities.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative 1A or 1B depending on whether the defendant is charged with
exploding or igniting a destructive device or explosive, or with committing arson.
Give all relevant instructions on the offense alleged. (For arson, see CALCRIM No.
1500, et seq.; for exploding or igniting destructive devices and explosives, see
CALCRIM No. 2500, et seq.)
In element 2, insert one or more of the places specifically protected against
terrorizing. (See Pen. Code, § 11413(b).) These places are:
1. Any health facility licensed under Health and Safety Code section 1250 et seq.,
or any place where medical care is provided by a licensed health care
professional.
2. Any church, temple, synagogue, or other place of worship.
3. The buildings, offices, and meeting sites of organizations that counsel for or
against abortion or among whose major activities are lobbying, publicizing, or
organizing with respect to public or private issues relating to abortion.
4. Any place at which a lecture, film-showing, or other private meeting or
presentation that educates or propagates with respect to abortion practices or
policies, whether on private property or at a meeting site authorized for specific
use by a private group on public property, is taking place.
5. Any bookstore or public or private library.
6. Any building or facility designated as a courthouse.
7. The home or office of a judicial officer.
8. Any building or facility regularly occupied by county probation department
personnel in which the employees perform official duties of the probation
department.
1023
9. Any private property, if the property was targeted because of the race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation of the
owner or occupant of the property.
10. Any public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten or grades 1
to 12, inclusive.
Depending on the device or substance used, give the bracketed definitions of
“explosive” or “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal
Code section 16460 or 16510, unless the court has already given the definition in
other instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating
that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in
Health and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may
instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or
“is a destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.”
However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive
device. For example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive
device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a
destructive device.” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39
Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)
If the device used is a bomb, the court may insert the word “bomb” in the bracketed
definition of destructive device without further definition. (People v. Dimitrov, supra,
33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Appellate courts have held that the term “bomb” is not
vague and is understood in its “common, accepted, and popular sense.” (People v.
Quinn (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 258 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139]; People v. Dimitrov,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p.25 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].) If the court wishes to define
the term “bomb,” the court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device
carrying an explosive charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.”
(See People v. Morse (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)
If it is alleged in element 2 that the home or office of a judicial officer was attacked
(Pen. Code, § 11413(b)(7)), the final bracketed paragraph defining “judicial officer”
(see Pen. Code, § 11413(c)) may be given on request.
Penal Code section 11413 does not prohibit prosecution under Penal Code section
18740 or any other provision of law. (Pen. Code, § 11413(e).) Section 18740
prohibits the possession or explosion of any destructive device or explosive with the
intent to injure or terrify any person, or with the intent to injure or destroy property.
For instructions relating to the wrongful possession or explosion of destructive
devices or explosives, see series 2500, Weapons, Destructive Devices, and
Explosives.
AUTHORITY
• Explosive Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 12000.
1024
• Definition of Reckless Disregard per Pen. Code, § 11411(c). People v. Carr

(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 837, 845–846 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] [noting that voluntary
intoxication is not a defense to violations of Pen. Code, § 11411].
• Arson and Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, §§ 451, 455 [when arson is charged
conduct].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.11[3][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
1025
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with terrorizing by use of a

symbol [in violation of Penal Code section 11411].
prove that:
1. The defendant placed or displayed a sign, mark, symbol, emblem,
or physical impression on the private property of another person;
2. The defendant did not have authorization to place or display the
sign, symbol, emblem or physical impression on the property;
[AND]
3. The defendant committed (this/these) act[s] with the intent to
terrorize the owner or occupant of the property [or with reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of the
property].
<Include the fourth element in Penal Code section 11411(b)
prosecutions.>
[AND
4. The defendant committed these acts on two or more occasions.]
<Alternative A—Reckless Disregard: General Definition>
[A person acts with reckless disregard when (1) he or she knows there is
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will terrorize the
owner or occupant, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the
risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done
in the same situation.]
<Alternative B—Reckless Disregard: Voluntary Intoxication>
[A person acts with reckless disregard when (1) he or she does an act that
presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of terrorizing the owner or
occupant, and (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is
voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant
willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing
that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]
New August 2006

1026
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative A or B depending on whether or not there is evidence that the
defendant was voluntary intoxicated.
The legislature included the Nazi swastika as an example of a prohibited symbol.
Although Pen. Code, § 11411 states that reckless disregard may provide the
necessary mental state for committing this crime, this provision may run counter to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366
[123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535] [without specific intent requirement, statute
prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional.]
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 11411(a) & (b).
• Requirement of Specific Intent. Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366
[123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1027
1304. Cross Burning and Religious Symbol Desecration (Pen.
Code, § 11411(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (terrorism by cross

burning/terrorism by religious symbol desecration) [in violation of Penal
Code section 11411(c)].
prove that:
<Alternative A—Private Property>
1. The defendant burned or desecrated a religious symbol on the
private property of another person;
2. The defendant knew the object that he or she burned or
desecrated was a religious symbol;
3. The defendant did not have authorization to burn or desecrate
the religious symbol on the property; and
terrorize the owner or occupant of the property [or with reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of the
property].
<Alternative B—School Grounds>
1. The defendant burned or desecrated a religious symbol on the
property of a primary school, junior high school, middle school,
or high school;
2. The defendant knew the object that he or she burned or
desecrated was a religious symbol; and
terrorize someone who attends the school, works at the school or
is associated with the school.
<Alternative A—Reckless Disregard: General Definition>
[A person acts with reckless disregard when (1) he or she knows there is
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act will terrorize the
owner or occupant, (2) he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the
risk is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would have done
in the same situation.]
<Alternative B—Reckless Disregard: Voluntary Intoxication>
[A person acts with reckless disregard when (1) he or she does an act that
1028
presents a substantial and unjustifiable risk of terrorizing the owner or

occupant, but (2) he or she is unaware of the risk because he or she is
voluntarily intoxicated. Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant
willingly used any intoxicating drink, drug, or other substance knowing
that it could produce an intoxicating effect.]
New August 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative A or B regarding reckless disregard depending on whether or not
there is evidence that the defendant was voluntary intoxicated.
Although Pen. Code, § 11411 states that reckless disregard may provide the
necessary mental state for committing this crime, this provision may run counter to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366
[123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535] [without specific intent requirement, statute
prohibiting cross burning was unconstitutional.]
AUTHORITY
• Requirement of Specific Intent. Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 365–366
[123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1029
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with obstructing religion by

threat [in violation of Penal Code section 11412].
prove that:
1. The defendant caused or attempted to cause a person to refrain
from (exercising his or her religion/engaging in a religious
service) by threatening to inflict an unlawful injury upon that
person or upon property;
2. The defendant directly communicated the threat to that person;
3. The person reasonably believed the threat could be carried out;
and
<Alternative A—Exercising religion>
4. At the time the defendant made the threat, (he/she) intended to
cause the person to refrain from exercising his or her religion.
<Alternative B—Religious service>
4. At the time the defendant made the threat, (he/she) intended to
cause the person to refrain from engaging in a religious service.
New August 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative A or B depending on the alleged intent of the defendant.
AUTHORITY
SECONDARY SOURCES
1030
B. HATE CRIMES
1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by
Force (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with interfering with

another person’s civil rights by the use of force [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant used force to willfully interfere with[, or injure,
intimidate, or oppress,] another person’s free exercise or
enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to <describe the
right allegedly infringed, e.g., “be free from violence or bodily
harm”>, established by the law or Constitution of California or
the United States;
2. The defendant did so in whole or in part because of the other
person’s actual or perceived (disability[,]/ [or] gender[,]/ [or]
nationality[,]/ [or] race or ethnicity[,]/ [or] religion[,]/ [or] sexual
orientation[,]/ [or] association with a person or group having
(this/one or more of these) actual or perceived characteristic[s]);
AND
3. The defendant intended to interfere with the other person’s
legally protected right [or privilege].
purpose.
The defendant acted in whole or in part because of the actual or
perceived characteristic[s] of the other person if:
characteristic[s]);
AND
acts.
1031
alleged acts, the bias described here must have been a substantial
conduct.
refer.]
and gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not
[Association with a person or group having (this/one or more of these)
actual or perceived characteristic[s] includes (advocacy for[,]/ [or]
identification with[,]/ [or] being on the ground owned or rented by[, or
adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ [or] group[,]/ [or] family[,]/ [or] community
center[,]/ [or] educational facility[,]/ [or] office[,]/ [or] meeting hall[,]/
[or] place of worship[,]/ [or] private institution[,]/ [or] public agency[,]/
[or] library[,]/ [or] other entity) that has, or is identified with people who
have, (that/one or more of those) characteristic[s].]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution is based on the defendant’s speech alone, do not give this
instruction. (Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42
Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].) Give CALCRIM No. 1351, Hate Crime:
Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat.
In element 1, insert a description of the specific right or rights allegedly infringed,
for example, the right to be free from violence or the threat of violence or the right
to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43, 51.7; People v. Lashley
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 950–951 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; People v. MacKenzie
1032

[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
P.2d 1387].
• Gender Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 422.56(c), 422.57.
• Sexual Orientation Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(h).
• Association With Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(a).
• Specific Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Right Required. In re M.S.
Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].
• Not Limited to “Significant Constitutional Rights.” People v. MacKenzie (1995)
• Statute Constitutional. In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 715–717, 724 [42
Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Need Not Know He or She Is Violating the Law
“ ‘[S]pecific intent’ under the statute does not require an actual awareness on the
part of the defendant that he is violating another’s constitutional rights. It is enough
that he engages in activity that interferes with rights clearly and specifically
protected by the laws of the United States.” (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
938, 948 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629].) “It is sufficient if the right is clearly defined and that
the defendant intended to invade interests protected by constitutional or statutory
authority.” (Id. at p. 949.)
Penal Code Section 654
In In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 727 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365], the
court rejected the argument that Penal Code section 654 does not apply to
1033
convictions under Penal Code section 422.6. In 2004, the Legislature amended the
statute to add subdivision (d), which specifically states that Penal Code section 654
applies to convictions under Penal Code section 422.6.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1034
Threat (Pen. Code, § 422.6(a) & (c))

another person’s civil rights by threatening violence [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant threatened physical violence against a specific
person [or a specific group of people];
2. The threat would have caused a reasonable person to be afraid
because the defendant appeared able to carry out the threat;
3. The defendant used the threat to willfully interfere with[, or
injure, intimidate, or oppress,] another person’s free exercise or
enjoyment of the right [or privilege] to <describe the
right allegedly infringed, e.g., “be free from violence or bodily
harm”>, established by the law or Constitution of California or
the United States;
AND
purpose.
characteristic[s]);
AND
acts.
1035
conduct.
refer.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give this instruction if the prosecution is based on the defendant’s speech alone.
(Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d
355, 896 P.2d 1365].)
1036

[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 422.6(a) & (c).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
P.2d 1387].
• Requirements for Threat of Violence. Pen. Code, § 422.6(c); In re M.S. (1995)
10 Cal.4th 698, 711–716 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1350, Hate Crime: Misdemeanor
Interference With Civil Rights by Force.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1037
Damaging Property (Pen. Code, § 422.6(b))

another person’s civil rights by damaging property [in violation of Penal
Code section 422.6(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (defaced[,]/ [or] damaged[,]/ [or] destroyed) (real/
[or] personal) property (owned[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] possessed[,]/
[or] occupied) by another person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (defacing[,]/ [or]
damaging[,]/ [or] destroying) property that was (owned[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] possessed[,]/ [or] occupied) by that person;
3. The defendant did so for the purpose of interfering with [or
intimidating] that person’s free exercise or enjoyment of the right
[or privilege] to <describe the right allegedly
infringed, e.g., “be free from violence or bodily harm”>, established
by the law or Constitution of California or the United States;
AND
characteristic[s]);
AND
acts.
1038
conduct.
refer.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
1039
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 422.6(b).
P.2d 1387].
Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365].
• Victim Need Not Own Property. In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718,
724–726 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10].
RELATED ISSUES
Target of Intimidation Need Not Own Property
“[T]he phrase ‘property of any other person’ in section 422.6, subdivision (b) does
not require that the victim own the property. As long as the property is regularly and
openly used, possessed, or occupied by the victim so that it is readily identifiable
with him or her, it falls within the statutory scope.” (In re Michael M. (2001) 86
Cal.App.4th 718, 724–726 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 10] [classroom was the “property of”
the students whose class met there].)
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1350, Hate Crime: Misdemeanor
Interference With Civil Rights by Force.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1040
The term disability includes a (mental/ [or] physical) disability.

<Alternative A—mental disability>
[A person has a mental disability if he or she has a mental or
psychological condition that limits a major life activity. The term mental
disability includes (mental retardation[,]/ [and] organic brain
syndrome[,]/ [and] emotional or mental illness[,]/ [and] specific learning
disabilities).]
<Alternative B—physical disability>
[A person has a physical disability if he or she has (a physiological
(disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition)[;]/ [or] a cosmetic
disfigurement[;]/ [or] an anatomical loss) that:
1. Affects one or more of the following body systems:
(neurological[(,/;)]/ immunological[(,/;)]/ musculoskeletal[(,/;)]/
sensory, primarily the special sense organs[(,/;)]/ respiratory,
including speech organs[(,/;)]/ cardiovascular[(,/;)]/
reproductive[(,/;)]/ digestive[(,/;)]/ genitourinary[(,/;)]/ hemic and
lymphatic[(,/;)]/ skin[(,/;)]/ [or] endocrine);
AND
2. Limits a major life activity.]
Major life activities include physical, mental, and social activities,
including but not limited to working.
A (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) limits a major life activity if
it makes participation in the major life activity difficult.
[In deciding whether a (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) limits a
major life activity, do not consider whether the limitation can be
overcome with medications, assistive devices, reasonable
accommodations, or other mitigating measures. [However, if a mitigating
measure itself limits a major life activity, you may consider this as
evidence that the (disease[,]/ [or] disorder[,]/ [or] condition) limits a
major life activity.]]
[A person has a disability if he or she has a (mental or psychological
condition/ [or] health impairment) that requires special education or
related services.]
[A person has a disability if <insert description of other
condition not covered by the foregoing but included in Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990>.]
1041
[Disability does not include (sexual behavior disorders[,]/ [or] compulsive

gambling[,]/ [or] kleptomania[,]/ [or] pyromania[,]/ [or] psychoactive
substance—use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of
controlled substances or other drugs).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction when using the term “disability” in any other instruction.
If the case involves a person with a mental disability, give alternative A. If the case
involves a person with a physical disability, give alternative B.
Give any of the bracketed paragraphs on request.
AUTHORITY
• Mental Disability. Gov. Code, § 12926(i).
• Physical Disability. Gov. Code, § 12926(k).
• Disability Includes Anything Covered by ADA. Gov. Code, § 12926(l).
SECONDARY SOURCES
1042
If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s]

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the
lesser crime[s] of <insert name[s] of alleged lesser
offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People
have proved the additional allegation that the crime[s] committed by the
defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s]. [You must decide whether the
People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate
finding for each crime.]
To prove this allegation [for each crime] the People must prove that the
defendant committed that crime in whole or in part because of the
alleged victim’s actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/
race or ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with
a person or group having (this/one or more of these) actual or perceived
characteristic[s]).
As used here, victim includes, but is not limited to, a (person[,]/ [or]
individual[,]/ [or] family[,]/ [or] group[,]/ [or] community center[,]/ [or]
educational facility[,]/ [or] entity[,]/ [or] office[,]/ [or] meeting hall[,]/ [or]
place of worship[,]/ [or] private institution[,]/ [or] public agency[,]/ [or]
library[,]/ [or] other victim or intended victim of the crime).
perceived characteristic[s] of the victim if:
1. The defendant was biased against the victim based on the victim’s
actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/ race or
ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or] association with
a person or group with (this/one or more of these) actual or
perceived characteristic[s]);
AND
acts.
conduct.
refer.]
1043

actual or perceived characteristic[s] includes (advocacy for[,]/
adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/
educational facility[,]/ office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/
private institution[,]/ public agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that
has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those)
characteristic[s].]
[If you conclude that the People have proved that the crime[s]
committed by the defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s], you must also
decide whether the defendant voluntarily acted together with another
person by either personally committing the crime or by aiding and
abetting another person in committing the crime.]
The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
CALCRIM No. 1353, Hate Crimes: Disability Defined.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant acted in concert with another, pursuant
to Penal Code section 422.75(b), give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If
you conclude that the People have proved.” Give all relevant instructions on aiding
and abetting. The jury must be provided with a verdict form on which it may
indicate whether this factor has also been proved.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant has a qualifying prior conviction under
Penal Code section 422.75(d), then, in addition to this instruction, also give
1044

truth of the prior conviction.
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
CALCRIM No. 1350, Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by
Force.
Threat.
Damage to Property.
CALCRIM No. 1355, Hate Crime Allegation: Misdemeanor.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 422.75(a)–(c).
P.2d 1387].
• Victim Defined. Pen. Code, § 422.56(i).
• Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. See People v. Wallace (2003) 109
• Aiding and Abetting. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199
Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
• Acting in Concert. See People v. Calimee (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [122
Cal.Rptr. 658] [construing sodomy-in-concert statute]; People v. Lopez (1981)
116 Cal.App.3d 882, 886 [172 Cal.Rptr. 374] [construing rape-in-concert statute].
• No Specific Intent Required. People v. Superior Court (Aishman) (1995) 10
1045

SECONDARY SOURCES
1046
If you find the defendant guilty of <insert offense[s]> [as

charged in Count[s] ], you must then decide whether the People
have proved the additional allegation that the crime[s] committed by the
defendant (was a/were) hate crime[s]. [You must decide whether the
To prove this allegation [for each crime], the People must prove that:
1. When committing that crime, the defendant intended to interfere
with [or intimidate] another person’s free exercise or enjoyment
of the right [or privilege] to <describe the right
raised by the evidence>, established by the law or Constitution of
California or the United States;
[AND]
2. The defendant acted in whole or in part because of the other
person’s actual or perceived (disability[,]/ gender[,]/ nationality[,]/
race or ethnicity[,]/ religion[,]/ sexual orientation[,]/ [or]
association with a person or group having (this/one or more of
these) actual or perceived characteristic[s])(;/.)
[AND
<Alternative 3A—caused physical injury>
[3. When committing that crime, the defendant caused an actual
physical injury or had the ability at that time to cause a violent
injury.]
<Alternative 3B—caused property damage>
[3. The defendant caused property damage in excess of $950.]]
characteristic[s]);
AND
acts.
1047
conduct.
refer.]
actual or perceived characteristic[s] includes (advocacy for[,]/
adjacent to,]) a (person[,]/ group[,]/ family[,]/ community center[,]/
educational facility[,]/ office[,]/ meeting hall[,]/ place of worship[,]/
private institution[,]/ public agency[,]/ library[,]/ [or] other entity) that
has, or is identified with people who have, (that/one or more of those)
characteristic[s].]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2017, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
enhancement. (People v. Wallace (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d
324] [statute defines enhancement, not separate offense].) This enhancement makes a
crime “committed against the person or property of another” that would otherwise
be a misdemeanor into a misdemeanor-felony “wobbler.” (Pen. Code, § 422.7.)
to be protected from bodily harm. (See Civil Code, §§ 43 & 51.7; People v. Lashley
1048

Give element 3A if the prosecution alleges that the crime was committed “against a
person” and caused injury or included “the present ability to commit a violent
injury.” (Pen. Code, § 422.7(a)). Give element 3B if the prosecution alleges property
damage exceeding $950. (Pen. Code, § 422.7(b).) If the prosecution alleges that the
defendant has a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code section 422.7(c), then,
in addition to this instruction, also give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial, or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial,
unless the defendant has stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.
CALCRIM No. 1353, Hate Crimes: Disability Defined.
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 335].)
Force.
Threat.
Damaging Property.
CALCRIM No. 1354, Hate Crime Allegation: Felony.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 422.7.
Superior Court (Aishman) (1995) 10 Cal.4th 735, 741 [896 P.2d 1387].
• Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. People v. Wallace (2003) 109
1049

• Intent to Deprive Individual of Protected Rights. In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th
698, 713 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365]; People v. Lashley (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 938, 947–949 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629]; People v. MacKenzie (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 1256, 1268 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 793]; In re Joshua H. (1993) 13
• The underlying misdemeanor, and the attempt of the underlying misdemeanor
(see Pen. Code, § 664), are lesser included offenses of a violation of Penal Code
section 422.7.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1050
CRIMINAL STREET GANGS

1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang
(Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or
Misdemeanor))
1051
1400. Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with participating in a

criminal street gang [in violation of Penal Code section 186.22(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant actively participated in a criminal street gang;
2. When the defendant participated in the gang, (he/she) knew that
members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity;
AND
3. The defendant willfully assisted, furthered, or promoted felonious
criminal conduct by members of the gang either by:
a. directly and actively committing a felony offense;
OR
b. aiding and abetting a felony offense.
At least two members of that same gang must have participated in
committing the felony offense. The defendant may count as one of those
members if you find that the defendant was a member of the gang.
should refer.]
§ 186.22(e)(1)>;
AND
1052
CRIMINAL STREET GANGS CALCRIM No. 1400

group.]
<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the pattern of
criminal gang activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a
conviction or sustained juvenile petition>
[To decide whether the ongoing organized association or group has, as
one of its primary activities, the commission of <insert
felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)>, please refer to the
separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those)
crime[s].]
following crimes/[,] [or] two or more occurrences of [one or more
1988;
offense;
4. The crimes were committed on separate occasions or were
personally committed by two or more members;
AND
[To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed
1053
CALCRIM No. 1400 CRIMINAL STREET GANGS
<insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)>,

on (that/those) crime[s].]
The People need not prove that every perpetrator involved in the pattern
of criminal gang activity, if any, was a member of the alleged criminal
street gang at the time when such activity was taking place.
As the term is used here, a willful act is one done willingly or on
purpose.
Felonious criminal conduct means committing or attempting to commit
[any of] the following crime[s]: <insert felony or felonies by
gang members that the defendant is alleged to have furthered, assisted,
promoted or directly committed>.
<insert felony or felonies listed immediately above>, please
(that/those) crime[s].]
To prove that the defendant aided and abetted felonious criminal
conduct by a member of the gang, the People must prove that:
1. A member of the gang committed the crime;
2. The defendant knew that the gang member intended to commit
the crime;
intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the
crime;
AND
1054

[If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to
an aider and abettor.]
must do two things:
prevent the commission of the crime;
AND
theory.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, December 2008, August 2012,
February 2013, August 2013, February 2014, August 2014, February 2016, March
2022, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In the definition of “felonious criminal conduct,” insert the felony or felonies the
defendant allegedly aided and abetted. (See People v. Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d
692, 704 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140] [abrogated on other grounds by People v. Castenada
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747–748 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].) Note that a
defendant’s misdemeanor conduct in the charged case, which is elevated to a felony
by operation of Penal Code section 186.22(a), is not sufficient to satisfy the
felonious criminal conduct requirement of an active gang participation offense
1055
charged under subdivision (a) of section 186.22 or of active gang participation

charged as an element of felony firearm charges under section 12025(b)(3) or
12031(a)(2)(C). People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 524 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179,
169 P.3d 102].
The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of
crimes inserted in the list of alleged “primary activities” or inserted in the definition
of “pattern of criminal gang activity” that have not been established by prior
convictions or sustained juvenile petitions. The court should also give the
appropriate instructions defining the elements of all crimes inserted in the definition
of “felonious criminal conduct.”
Code, § 186.22(j).)
guilty of a crime in this case.” (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316,
322–323 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; People v. Duran (2002) 97
below on Unanimity.)
Gang Activity.
If the defendant is charged with other counts that do not require gang evidence as
an element, the court must try the Penal Code section 186.22(a) count separately.
(Pen. Code, § 1109(b).)
present.” (People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557 fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr.
1056
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give the final bracketed section on the defense of withdrawal.
This instruction should be used when a defendant is charged with a violation of
Penal Code section 186.22(a) as a substantive offense. If the defendant is charged
with an enhancement under 186.22(b), use CALCRIM No. 1401, Felony or
Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor)).
For additional instructions relating to liability as an aider and abettor, see the Aiding
and Abetting series (CALCRIM No. 400 et seq.).
AUTHORITY
• “Active Participation” Defined. People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 747.
• “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity” Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (g).
• “Willful” Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
• Applies to Both Perpetrator and Aider and Abettor. People v. Ngoun (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 432, 436 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837]; People v. Castenada, supra, 23
Cal.4th at pp. 749–750.
• “Felonious Criminal Conduct” Defined. People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
54–59 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062]; People v. Green, supra, 227
Cal.App.3d at p. 704.
• Separate Intent From Underlying Felony. People v. Herrera (1999) 70
• Willfully Assisted, Furthered, or Promoted Felonious Criminal Conduct. People
v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1132–1138 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d
1143].
• Temporal Connection Between Active Participation and Felonious Criminal
Conduct. People v. Garcia (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1509 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d
104].
• Conspiracy to Commit This Crime. People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250,
255, 266–267 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 70, 303 P.3d 379].
Required. People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal. 4th 59, 81–85 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 309,
355 P.3d 480].
COMMENTARY
The jury may not consider the circumstances of the charged crime to establish a
1057
pattern of criminal activity. (Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(2).) A “pattern of criminal gang

activity” requires two or more “predicate offenses” during a statutory time period.
Another offense committed on the same occasion by a fellow gang member may
serve as a predicate offense. (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9–10 [69
Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313]; see also In re Nathaniel C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d
990, 1002–1003 [279 Cal.Rptr. 236] [two incidents each with single perpetrator, or
single incident with multiple participants committing one or more specified offenses,
are sufficient]; People v. Ortiz (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 484 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d
126].) However, convictions of a perpetrator and an aider and abettor for a single
crime establish only one predicate offense (People v. Zermeno (1999) 21 Cal.4th
927, 931–932 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, 986 P.2d 196]), and “[c]rimes occurring after the
charged offense cannot serve as predicate offenses to prove a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (People v. Duran, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458 [original italics].)
The “felonious criminal conduct” need not be gang-related. (People v. Albillar,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 54–59.)
Predicate Offenses Not Lesser Included Offenses
The predicate offenses that establish a pattern of criminal gang activity are not
lesser included offenses of active participation in a criminal street gang. (People v.
Burnell (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 938, 944–945 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 40].)
RELATED ISSUES
Conspiracy
Anyone who actively participates in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its
members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who
willfully promotes, furthers, assists, or benefits from any felonious criminal conduct
by the members, is guilty of conspiracy to commit that felony. (Pen. Code, § 182.5;
see Pen. Code, § 182; CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy.)
Labor Organizations or Mutual Aid Activities
The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act does not apply to
labor organization activities or to employees engaged in activities for their mutual
aid and protection. (Pen. Code, § 186.23.)
Related Gang Crimes
Soliciting or recruiting others to participate in a criminal street gang, or threatening
someone to coerce them to join or prevent them from leaving a gang, are separate
crimes. (Pen. Code, § 186.26.) It is also a crime to supply a firearm to someone who
commits a specified felony while participating in a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code,
§ 186.28.)
Unanimity
The “continuous-course-of-conduct exception” applies to the “pattern of criminal
gang activity” element of Penal Code section 186.22(a). Thus the jury is not
required to unanimously agree on which two or more crimes constitute a pattern of
1058
criminal activity. (People v. Funes, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527–1528.)

SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace
and Welfare, §§ 31–46.
1059
1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal
Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d)
(Felony or Misdemeanor))

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those crime[s])][,][or the
lesser offense[s] of <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then
decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional
allegation that the defendant committed that crime (for the benefit of[,]/
at the direction of[,]/ [or] in association with) a criminal street gang.
[You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for
each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
[You must also decide whether the crime[s] charged in Count[s]
(was/were) committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000 feet of a public
or private (elementary/ [or] vocational/ [or] junior high/ [or] middle/ [or]
high) school open to or being used by minors for classes or school-
related programs at the time.]
1. The defendant (committed/ [or] attempted to commit) the crime
(for the benefit of[,]/ at the direction of[,]/ [or] in association with)
a criminal street gang;
AND
2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal
conduct by gang members.
To benefit, promote, further, or assist means to provide a common
benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than
reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than
reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or
motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or
informant.
should refer.]
1060

§ 186.22(e)(1)>;
AND
group.]
[To decide whether the organized association or group has, as one of its
primary activities, the commission of <insert felony or
felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)>, please refer to the separate
instructions that I (will give/have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]
following crimes/[,][or] two or more occurrences of [one or more
1988;
offense;
AND
1061

[The People need not prove that the defendant is an active or current
member of the alleged criminal street gang.]
that the allegation has not been proved.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, December 2008,
August 2012, February 2013, August 2013, February 2014, February 2016, March
2022, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement. (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [109
Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466,
475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of
crimes inserted in the list of alleged “primary activities,” or the definition of
“pattern of criminal gang activity” that have not been established by prior
convictions or sustained juvenile petitions.
guilty of a crime in this case.” (People v. Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp.
1062
322–323; People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d

272].)
below on Unanimity.)
1080].) If requested, give CALCRIM No. 1403, Limited Purpose of Gang Evidence.
The court must bifurcate the trial on the gang enhancement upon request of the
defense. (Pen. Code, § 1109(a).) If the trial is bifurcated, give CALCRIM No. 221,
Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1).
• “Specific Intent” Defined. People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 64–68 [119
Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 244 P.3d 1062].
• “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity” Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(e), (g); see
People v. Zermeno (1999) 21 Cal.4th 927, 931–932 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 863, 986
P.2d 196] [conviction of perpetrator and aider and abettor for single crime
establishes only single predicate offense].
• “To Benefit, Promote, Further, or Assist” Defined. Pen. Code, § 186.22(g).
• Active or Current Participation in Gang Not Required. In re Ramon T. (1997) 57
• “Primary Activities” Defined. People v. Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp.
323–324.
• Defendant Need Not Act With Another Gang Member. People v. Rodriguez
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1138–1139 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533].
355 P.3d 480].
• Evidence Required for Gang Member Acting Alone. People v. Renteria (2022)
1063
RELATED ISSUES
Commission On or Near School Grounds
In imposing a sentence under Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1), it is a circumstance
in aggravation if the defendant’s underlying felony was committed on or within
1,000 feet of specified schools. (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(2).)
Enhancements for Multiple Gang Crimes
Separate criminal street gang enhancements may be applied to gang crimes
committed against separate victims at different times and places, with multiple
criminal intents. (People v. Akins (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 339–340 [65
Cal.Rptr.2d 338].)
Wobblers
Specific punishments apply to any person convicted of an offense punishable as a
felony or a misdemeanor that is committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
and with the intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members. (See Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(d); see also Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 909 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951].) However, the felony enhancement provided by Penal
Code section 186.22(b)(1) cannot be applied to a misdemeanor offense made a
felony pursuant to section 186.22(d). (People v. Arroyas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
1439, 1449 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 380].)
Murder—Enhancements Under Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1) May Not Apply
at Sentencing
The enhancements provided by Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1) do not apply to
crimes “punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life . . .” (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(b)(5); People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1004 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869,
103 P.3d 270].) Thus, the 10-year enhancement provided by Penal Code section
186.22(b)(1)(C) for a violent felony committed for the benefit of the street gang
may not apply in some sentencing situations involving the crime of murder.
Conspiracy—Alternate Penalty Provisions Under Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(4)
The alternate penalty provisions provided by Penal Code section 186.22(b)(4) apply
only to completed target offenses, not to conspiracies. (People v. Lopez (2022) 12
See also the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1400, Active Participation in
Criminal Street Gang.
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public Peace
and Welfare, § 40.
1064

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]] [or the lesser
crime[s] of <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>] and
you find that the defendant committed (that/those) crime[s] for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street
gang with the intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members, you must then decide whether[, for each
crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that one of the
principals (personally used/personally and intentionally discharged) a
firearm during that crime [and caused (great bodily injury/ [or] death)].
[1.] Someone who was a principal in the crime personally (used/
discharged) a firearm during the commission [or attempted
commission] of the <insert appropriate crime listed in
Penal Code section 12022.53(a)>(./;)
[AND]
[2. That person intended to discharge the firearm(./;)]
[AND
3. That person’s act caused (great bodily injury to/ [or] the death
of) another person [who was not an accomplice to the crime].]
A person is a principal in a crime if he or she directly commits [or
attempts to commit] the crime or if he or she aids and abets someone
else who commits [or attempts to commit] the crime.
[The term firearm is defined in another instruction.]
[A firearm does not need to be in working order if it was designed to
shoot and appears capable of shooting.] [A firearm does not need to be
loaded.]
[A principal personally uses a firearm if he or she intentionally does any
of the following:
1. Displays the firearm in a menacing manner.
2. Hits someone with the firearm.
1065
OR
3. Fires the firearm.]
[An act causes (great bodily injury/ [or] death) if the (injury/ [or] death)
is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the
(injury/ [or] death) would not have happened without the act. A natural
and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is
likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a
consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances
established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of (great bodily injury/ [or] death).
An act causes (injury/ [or] death) only if it is a substantial factor in
causing the (injury/ [or] death). A substantial factor is more than a trivial
or remote factor. However, it does not need to be the only factor that
causes the (injury/ [or] death).]
identical crime charged against the defendant. A person is subject to
prosecution if he or she committed the crime or if:
AND
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the firearm
“during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
enhancement. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
In order for the defendant to receive an enhancement under Penal Code section
1066
12022.53(e), the jury must find both that the defendant committed a felony for the
benefit of a street gang and that a principal used or intentionally discharged a
firearm in the offense. Thus, the court must give CALCRIM No. 1401, Felony or
Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang, with this instruction
and the jury must find both allegations have been proved before the enhancement
may be applied.
In this instruction, the court must select the appropriate options based on whether
the prosecution alleges that the principal used the firearm, intentionally discharged
the firearm, and/or intentionally discharged the firearm causing great bodily injury or
death. The court should review CALCRIM Nos. 3146, 3148, and 3149 for guidance.
Give the bracketed definition of “personally used” only if the prosecution
specifically alleges that the principal “personally used” the firearm. Do not give the
bracketed definition of “personally used” if the prosecution alleges intentional
discharge or intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death.
cause (People v. Jomo K. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546,
48 P.3d 1107]); give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “An act causes . . . .”
bracketed paragraph that begins with “There may be more than one cause . . . .”
(Id. at pp. 335–338.)
The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm” unless the court has
If the case involves an issue of whether the principal used the weapon “during the
commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, While
Committing a Felony: Defined-Escape Rule. (See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th
98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32
If, in the elements, the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an
accomplice to the crime,” the court should also give the bracketed definition of
“accomplice.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123
Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the
definition of “accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice
Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice. The
court should review that instruction and determine whether any of these additional
paragraphs should be given.
1067

AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.53(e).
• Vicarious Liability Under Subdivision (e). People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th
1166, 1171 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648]; People v. Gonzales (2001) 87
• Principal Defined. Pen. Code, § 31.
• Personally Uses. People v. Marvin Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; People v. Johnson (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315,
1319–1320 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
• “In Commission of” Felony. People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104
Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014
[55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578,
582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
• Proximate Cause. People v. Jomo K. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 335–338 [121
Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107].
51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
RELATED ISSUES
Principal Need Not Be Convicted
It is not necessary that the principal who actually used or discharged the firearm be
convicted. (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1176 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52
P.3d 648].)
Defendant Need Not Know Principal Armed
For an enhancement charged under Penal Code section 12022.53(e) where the
prosecution is pursuing vicarious liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew that the principal intended to use or discharge a
firearm. (People v. Gonzales (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 14–15 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d
247].)
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM Nos. 3146–3149.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 359–360.
1068
1069
You may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose
of deciding whether:
• [The defendant acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge
that are required to prove the gang-related (crime[s]/ [and]
enhancement[s]/ [and] special circumstance allegations) charged(;/
.)]
[OR]
• [The defendant had a motive to commit the crime[s] charged(;/.)]
[OR]
• [The defendant actually believed in the need to defend (himself/
herself/ [or] someone else) and acted under fear of imminent
death or great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone
else)(;/.)]
[OR]
• [The defendant acted in the heat of passion(;/.)]
[OR]
• [ <insert other reason court admitted gang evidence>.]
[You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate the credibility
or believability of a witness and when you consider the facts and
information relied on by an expert witness in reaching his or her
opinion.]
You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not
conclude from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad
character or that (he/she) has a disposition to commit crime.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
On request, the court must give a limiting instruction when evidence of gang
activity has been admitted. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040,
1051–1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080].) There is, however, no sua sponte
duty to instruct the jury on this issue.
AUTHORITY
• Instruction Must Be Given on Request. People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at pp. 1051–1052.
1070
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148,

1170 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874]; People v. Kaihea (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 257, 265
[285 Cal.Rptr.3d 334].
• Defense of Others. People v. Kaihea, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 266–267.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1071
ARSON
A. ARSON
(i) Aggravated
(ii) Simple Arson
1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c) & (d))
1077
A. ARSON
(i) Aggravated
If you find the defendant guilty of arson [as charged in Count[s]

], you must then decide whether[, for each crime of arson,] the
People have proved the additional allegation that the arson was
aggravated. [You must decide whether the People have proved this
allegation for each crime of arson and return a separate finding for each
crime of arson.]
1. The defendant acted willfully, maliciously, deliberately, and with
premeditation;
[AND]
2. The defendant acted with intent to injure one or more persons, or
to damage property under circumstances likely to injure one or
more persons, or to damage one or more structures or inhabited
dwellings(;/.)
[AND
<Alternative 3A—loss exceeding $8.3 million>
[3A. The fire caused property damage and other losses exceeding $8.3
million[, including the cost of fire suppression].]
[OR]
<Alternative 3B—destroyed five or more inhabited structures>
[3B. The fire damaged or destroyed five or more inhabited
structures.]]
purpose.
consequences, decided to commit the arson. The defendant acted with
premeditation if (he/she) decided to commit the arson before committing
the act that caused the arson.
1079
CALCRIM No. 1500 ARSON
[The length of time the person spends considering whether to commit

arson does not alone determine whether the arson is deliberate and
premeditated. The amount of time required for deliberation and
circumstances. A decision to commit arson made rashly, impulsively, or
without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences is not
deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated
decision to commit arson can be reached quickly. The test is the extent
of the reflection, not the length of time.]
[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is inhabited if someone lives there and either
is present or has left but intends to return.]
[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is inhabited if someone used it as a dwelling
leave.]
[A (dwelling/ [or] structure) is not inhabited if the former residents have
remains inside.]
[A dwelling includes any (structure/garage/office/ ) that is
attached to the house and functionally connected with it.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2015, April 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing factor if the defendant is charged with aggravated arson.
If the prosecution alleges that the fire caused more than 8.3 million dollars in
damage, give alternative A in element 3. If the prosecution alleges that the fire
damaged five or more inhabited structures, give alternative B in element 3.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was previously convicted of arson
within ten years of the current offense, give elements 1 and 2 only. The court must
also give either CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, or
CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has
stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.
The definitions of “deliberation” and “premeditation” and the bracketed paragraph
that begins with “The length of time” are derived from the first degree murder
instruction because no recorded case construes their meaning in the context of Penal
Code section 451.5. (See CALCRIM No. 521, Murder: Degrees.)
1080
ARSON CALCRIM No. 1500
Give the bracketed definitions of inhabited dwelling or structure if relevant.

If there is an issue as to whether the fire caused the property damage, give
CALCRIM No. 240, Causation.
AUTHORITY
• Inhabitation Defined. Pen. Code, § 459.
• House Not Inhabited Means Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
Arson under section 451 is not a lesser included offense of aggravated arson.
(People v. Shiga (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 483 [246 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1515, Arson.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property §§ 268–273.
Against Property, § 143.11 (Matthew Bender).
1081
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with arson that caused great
bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section 451].
prove that:
1. The defendant set fire to or burned [or (counseled[,]/ [or]
helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/forest land/
property);
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously;
AND
3. The fire caused great bodily injury to another person.
To set fire to or burn means to damage or destroy with fire either all or
part of something, no matter how small the part.
purpose.
act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to defraud, annoy, or
[A structure is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or
public tent).]
[Forest land means brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands,
or woods.]
[Property means personal property or land other than forest land.]
[A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her
own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud,
or the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s structure, forest
land, or property.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, April 2020, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
1082
If attempted arson is charged, do not instruct generally on attempts but give
CALCRIM No. 1520, Attempted Arson. (Pen. Code, § 455.)
AUTHORITY
• Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
• Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
• To Burn Defined. People v. Haggerty (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355; In re Jesse L.
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].
• Arson. Pen. Code, § 451.
• Attempted Arson. Pen. Code, § 455.
• Unlawfully Causing a Fire. People v. Hooper (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182
[226 Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186
[47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on its holding that failure to instruct on this
crime as a lesser included offense of arson was invited error because defense
counsel objected to such instruction; People v. Schwartz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th
1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1515, Arson.
A single act of arson cannot result in convictions under different subdivisions of
Penal Code section 451. (People v. Shiga (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 475 [246
Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1083
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with arson that burned an

(inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property) [in violation of Penal Code
section 451(b)].
prove that:
helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/ [or] property);
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously;
AND
3. The fire burned an (inhabited structure/[or] inhabited property).
purpose.
A structure is any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or
public tent.)
A (structure/[or] property) is inhabited if someone uses it as a dwelling,
whether or not someone is inside at the time of the fire. An (inhabited
structure/[or] inhabited property) does not include the land on which it
is located.
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, March 2017, September
2019, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
1084
AUTHORITY
• Inhabited Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; People v. Jones (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 543
[245 Cal.Rptr. 85].
• Inhabitant Must Be Alive at Time of Arson. People v. Vang (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
377, 382–387 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 455].
• Structure and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].
• Arson. Pen. Code, § 451.
1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].
RELATED ISSUES
Inhabited Apartment
Defendant’s conviction for arson of an inhabited structure was proper where he set
fire to his estranged wife’s apartment several days after she had vacated it. Although
his wife’s apartment was not occupied, it was in a large apartment building where
many people lived; it was, therefore, occupied for purposes of the arson statute.
(People v. Green (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 369, 378–379 [194 Cal.Rptr. 128].)
Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1085
(ii) Simple Arson
1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c) & (d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with arson [in violation of

Penal Code section 451(c/d)].
prove that:
helped[,]/ [or] caused) the burning of] (a structure/forest land/
property);
AND
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously.
purpose.
public tent).]
or woods.]
[A person does not commit arson if the only thing burned is his or her
own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to defraud,
or the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s structure, forest
land, or property.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If it is also alleged that the fire caused great bodily injury or burned an inhabited
1086
structure or property, see CALCRIM No. 1501, Arson: Great Bodily Injury and
CALCRIM No. 1502, Arson: Inhabited Structure.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 451(c–d).
• Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; see People v.
Labaer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 289, 293–294 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 629] [“structure”
does not require finished or completed building].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 83–84, 86 [104
Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660] [evidence of voluntary intoxication not admissible
to negate mental state].
• Property Defined. In re L.T. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 262, 264–265 [126
Cal.Rptr.2d 778].
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].
1319, 1324 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 816].
RELATED ISSUES
Fixtures
Fire damage to fixtures within a building may satisfy the burning requirement if the
fixtures are an integral part of the structure. (In re Jesse L. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d
161, 167–168 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389]; People v. Lee (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1778
[30 Cal.Rptr.2d 224] [whether wall-to-wall carpeting is a fixture is question of fact
for jury].)
Property: Clothing
Arson includes burning a victim’s clothing. (People v. Reese (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d
737, 739–740 [227 Cal.Rptr. 526].)
1087
Property: Trash
Burning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson. There is no
requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone. (In re L.T. (2002) 103
Cal.Rptr.3d 198].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1088
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the crime of attempted

arson [in violation of Penal Code section 455].
prove that:
1. The defendant attempted to set fire to or burn [or (counseled[,]/
[or] helped[,]/ [or] caused) the attempted burning of] (a structure/
forest land/property);
AND
2. (He/She) acted willfully and maliciously.
A person attempts to set fire to or burn (a structure/forest land/property)
when he or she places any flammable, explosive, or combustible material
or device in or around it with the intent to set fire to it.
purpose.
public tent).]
[Forest land is any brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands,
or woods.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Attempted arson is governed by Penal Code section 455, not the general
attempt statute found in section 664. (People v. Alberts (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1424,
1427–1428 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 401] [defendant was convicted under §§ 451 and 664;
the higher sentence was reversed because § 455 governs attempted arson].)
AUTHORITY
1089
• “Structure, Forest Land, and Maliciously” Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.

• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Rubino (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 407, 412–413
[227 Cal.Rptr.3d 75].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1090
1530. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code,
§ 452)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully causing a

fire that caused great bodily injury [in violation of Penal Code section
452].
prove that:
1. The defendant set fire to[,] [or] burned[,] [or caused the burning
of] (a structure/forest land/property);
2. The defendant did so recklessly;
AND
3. The fire caused great bodily injury to another person.
<Alternative A—Recklessness: General Definition>
[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she is aware that his or her
actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire, (2)
he or she ignores that risk, and (3) ignoring the risk is a gross deviation
from what a reasonable person would have done in the same situation.]
<Alternative B—Recklessness: Voluntary Intoxication>
[A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she does an act that presents a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing a fire but (2) he or she is
unaware of the risk because he or she is voluntarily intoxicated.
Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating
drink, drug, or other substance knowing that it could produce an
intoxicating effect.]
public tent).]
or woods.]
1091
[A person does not unlawfully cause a fire if the only thing burned is his
or her own personal property, unless he or she acts with the intent to
defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s structure,
forest land, or property.]
[Arson and unlawfully causing a fire require different mental states. For
arson, a person must act willfully and maliciously. For unlawfully
causing a fire, a person must act recklessly.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but “caused” the
fire, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (People v.
Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) See CALCRIM Nos.
400–403.
Depending upon the theory of recklessness the prosecutor is alleging, the court
should instruct with alternative A or B.
If the defendant is also charged with arson, the court may wish to give the last
bracketed paragraph, which explains the difference in intent between unlawfully
causing a fire and arson. (People v. Hooper (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226
Cal.Rptr. 810], disapproved of in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47
Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531] on the point that defense counsel’s objection to
instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error; People v. Schwartz
AUTHORITY
• Great Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
• Structure, Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
• Difference Between This Crime and Arson. People v. Hooper (1986) 181
Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
1092
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].

• Unlawfully Causing a Fire. Pen. Code, § 452.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1515, Arson, and CALCRIM
No. 1532, Unlawfully Causing a Fire.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1093
1531. Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited Structure (Pen. Code,
§ 452)

fire that burned an inhabited structure [in violation of Penal Code
section 452].
prove that:
2. The defendant did so recklessly;
AND
3. The fire burned an inhabited structure.
Intoxication is voluntary if the defendant willingly used any intoxicating
A structure is a (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial or public
tent).
A structure is inhabited if someone lives there and either (a) is present or
(b) has left but intends to return.
or woods.]
1094
defraud, or the fire also injures another person or another person’s

structure, forest land, or property.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but rather “aided,
counseled or procured” the fire, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
aiding and abetting. (People v. Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr.
34].) See CALCRIM Nos. 400–403.
instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error]; People v. Schwartz
AUTHORITY
• Inhabited Defined. Pen. Code, § 450; People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d
832, 838, 848 [193 Cal.Rptr. 54]; People v. Jones (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 543
[245 Cal.Rptr. 85].
Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].
• Unlawfully Causing a Fire. Pen. Code, § 452.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections under CALCRIM No. 1515, Arson and CALCRIM
No. 1532, Unlawfully Causing a Fire.
1095
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1096

fire [in violation of Penal Code section 452].
prove that:
AND
2. The defendant did so recklessly.
Intoxication is voluntary if the person willingly used any intoxicating
public tent).]
or woods.]
defraud, or the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s structure,
forest land, or property.]
1097
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant did not set the fire but “caused” the
fire, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and abetting. (People v.
Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) See CALCRIM Nos.
400–403.
instruction on lesser included offense constituted invited error; People v. Schwartz
If it is also alleged that the fire caused great bodily injury or burned an inhabited
structure or property, see CALCRIM No. 1530, Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Great
Bodily Injury, and CALCRIM No. 1531, Unlawfully Causing a Fire: Inhabited
Structure.
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 [226 Cal.Rptr. 810].
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–167 [270 Cal.Rptr. 389].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1515, Arson.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1098
1099
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing an

incendiary device or flammable material [in violation of Penal Code
section 453].
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed/made/manufactured/disposed of)
flammable or combustible material or an incendiary device in an
arrangement or preparation;
AND
2. The defendant willfully and maliciously intended to use the
material or device to set fire to or burn (a structure/forest land/
property).
purpose.
Incendiary device means a device constructed or designed to start an
incendiary fire by instant, remote or delayed means. [It is not a device
commercially manufactured primarily for illumination.]
Incendiary fire means a fire deliberately ignited under circumstances in
which a person knows that the fire should not be ignited.
[Dispose of means to give, give away, offer, offer for sale, sell, transfer, or
loan.]
[A structure means any (building/bridge/tunnel/power plant/commercial
or public tent).]
[Forest land means any brush-covered land, cut-over land, forest,
grasslands, or woods.]
1101
it), either personally or through another person.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Structure and Forest Land Defined. Pen. Code, § 450.
• Manufacture Defined. People v. Combs (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 422, 427 [211
Cal.Rptr. 617].
• Includes Intent to Damage Own Property. People v. Morse (2004) 116
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 268–276.
1102
If you find the defendant guilty of arson [as charged in Count[s]

], you must then decide whether[, for each crime of arson,] the
People have proved (the additional allegation that/one or more of the
following additional allegations):
<Alternative A—monetary gain>
• [The defendant intended to obtain monetary gain when (he/she)
committed the arson.]
<Alternative B—injury to firefighter, peace offıcer, or EMT>
• [(A/An) (firefighter[,]/ peace officer[,]/ [or] emergency worker)
suffered great bodily injury as a result of the arson.]
<Alternative C—great bodily injury to more than one person>
• [The defendant caused great bodily injury to more than one
person during the commission of the arson.]
<Alternative D—multiple structures burned>
• [The defendant caused multiple structures to burn during the
commission of the arson.]
<Alternative E—device designed to accelerate fire>
• [The arson (caused great bodily injury[,]/ [or] caused an
inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn[,]/ [or] burned
a structure or forest land), and was caused by use of a device
designed to accelerate the fire or delay ignition.]
offıcer”>.]
or her services.]
[An emergency worker includes an emergency medical technician. An
emergency medical technician is someone who holds a valid certificate
1103
under the Health and Safety Code as an emergency medical technician.]

[A (structure/ [or] property) is inhabited if someone lives there and either
is present or has left but intends to return.]
[A (structure/ [or] property) is inhabited if someone used it as a dwelling
leave.]
[A (structure/ [or] property) is not inhabited if the former residents have
remains inside.]
[A device designed to accelerate the fire means a piece of equipment or a
mechanism intended, or devised, to hasten or increase the fire’s
progress.]
[In order to prove that the defendant caused (great bodily injury to more
than one person/ [or] more than one structure to burn), the People must
prove that:
foreseen that committing arson could begin a chain of events
likely to result in (great bodily injury to more than one person/
[or] the burning of more than one structure);
2. The commission of arson was a direct and substantial factor in
causing (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or] the
burning of more than one structure);
AND
3. The (great bodily injury to more than one person/ [or the]
burning of more than one structure) would not have happened if
the defendant had not committed arson.]
each crime of arson and return a separate finding for each crime of
arson.]
The People have the burden of proving (this/each) allegation beyond a

1104
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing enhancement.
The reference to “arson” in the first paragraph refers to all crimes charged under
Penal Code section 451, including arson of a structure, forest land, or property (see
CALCRIM No. 1515), arson causing great bodily injury (see CALCRIM No. 1501),
and arson of an inhabited structure (see CALCRIM No. 1502). It does not refer to
aggravated arson under Penal Code section 451.5 (see CALCRIM No. 1500).
Give one of the bracketed alternatives, A–E, depending on the enhancement alleged.
If the defendant is charged with a qualifying prior conviction under Penal Code
section 451.1(a)(1), give either CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction, or
CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has
stipulated to the truth of the prior conviction.
Give all relevant bracketed definitions, based on the enhancement alleged.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In order to prove that the defendant
caused” if the prosecution alleges that the defendant caused great bodily injury to
multiple people or caused multiple structures to burn. (Pen. Code, § 451.1(a)(5); see
Pen. Code, § 451(a)–(c).)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “You must decide whether the People
have proved” if the same enhancement is alleged for multiple counts of arson.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 451.1, 456(b).
• Device Designed to Accelerate Fire Defined. People v. Andrade (2000) 85
1105

• Emergency Medical Technician Defined. Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 1797.80–1797.84.
• Duty to Define Proximate Cause. See People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313,
334–335 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107] [in context of firearm
enhancement].
RELATED ISSUES
Discretion to Strike Enhancement
The trial court retains discretion under Penal Code section 1385 to strike an arson
sentence enhancement. (People v. Wilson (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 198, 203 [115
Cal.Rptr.2d 355] [enhancement for use of an accelerant under Pen. Code,
§ 451.1(a)(5)].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.11[3] (Matthew Bender).
1106
ROBBERY AND CARJACKING
A. ROBBERY
B. CARJACKING
1107
A. ROBBERY
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with robbery [in violation of

prove that:
1. The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own;
2. The property was in the possession of another person;
3. The property was taken from the other person or (his/her)
immediate presence;
4. The property was taken against that person’s will;
5. The defendant used force or fear to take the property or to
prevent the person from resisting;
AND
6. When the defendant used force or fear, (he/she) intended (to
deprive the owner of the property permanently/ [or] to remove
the property from the owner’s possession for so extended a
period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major
portion of the value or enjoyment of the property).
The defendant’s intent to take the property must have been formed
before or during the time (he/she) used force or fear. If the defendant
did not form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then
(he/she) did not commit robbery.
possible degree of the charged crime for which the jury may return a
verdict.>
[If you find the defendant guilty of robbery, it is robbery of the second
degree.]
[A person takes something when he or she gains possession of it and
moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short.]
[The property taken can be of any value, however slight.] [Two or more
people may possess something at the same time.]
1109
CALCRIM No. 1600 ROBBERY AND CARJACKING
[A (store/ [or] business) (employee/ <insert description>)

who is on duty has possession of the (store/ [or] business) owner’s
property.]
[Fear, as used here, means fear of (injury to the person himself or
herself[,]/ [or] injury to the person’s family or property[,]/ [or]
immediate injury to someone else present during the incident or to that
person’s property).]
An act is accomplished by fear if the other person is actually afraid. The
other person’s actual fear may be inferred from the circumstances.
[Property is within a person’s immediate presence if it is sufficiently
within his or her physical control that he or she could keep possession of
it if not prevented by force or fear.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010, April 2011, August 2013,
August 2014, March 2017, September 2018, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
To have the requisite intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the
owner permanently or to deprive the owner of a major portion of the property’s
value or enjoyment. (See People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115
Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].) Select the appropriate language in element 5.
There is no sua sponte duty to define the terms “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate
presence.” (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414
P.2d 366] [fear]; People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1708 [286
Cal.Rptr. 394] [fear].) These definitions are discussed in the Commentary below.
If second degree robbery is the only possible degree of robbery that the jury may
return as their verdict, do not give CALCRIM No. 1602, Robbery: Degrees.
If there is an issue as to whether the defendant used force or fear during the
commission of the robbery, the court may need to instruct on this point. (See People
v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909].) See CALCRIM No.
3261, While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule.
AUTHORITY
1110
ROBBERY AND CARJACKING CALCRIM No. 1600
• Fear Defined. Pen. Code, § 212; see People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th
333, 340–341 [279 Cal.Rptr.3d 407]; People v. Cuevas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
689, 698 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 529] [victim must actually be afraid].
• Immediate Presence Defined. People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626–627
[276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].
• Intent. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52–53 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d
468], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834,
fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]; see Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1984)
159 Cal.App.3d 821, 826 [205 Cal.Rptr. 750] [same intent as theft].
• Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. See People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th
49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [in context of theft]; People v.
Zangari (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1447 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 250] [same].
• Possession Defined. People v. Bekele (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39
Cal.Rptr.2d 797], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rodriguez (1999)
• Robbery of Store Employee or Contractor. People v. Frazer (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 1105, 1115–1117 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 319]; People v. Gilbeaux (2003)
• Constructive Possession by Employee. People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743,
751 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 200 P.3d 837].
• Constructive Possession by Subcontractor/Janitor. People v. Gilbeaux (2003) 111
• Constructive Possession by Person With Special Relationship. People v. Weddles
• Felonious Taking Not Satisfied by Theft by False Pretense. People v. Williams
• Constructive Possession and Immediate Presence of Funds in Account of
Robbery Victims Using ATM. People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 603
[228 Cal.Rptr.3d 198].
COMMENTARY
The instruction includes definitions of “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate
presence” because those terms have meanings in the context of robbery that are
technical and may not be readily apparent to jurors. (See People v. McElheny (1982)
137 Cal.App.3d 396, 403 [187 Cal.Rptr. 39]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221].)
Possession was defined in the instruction because either actual or constructive
possession of property will satisfy this element, and this definition may not be
readily apparent to jurors. (People v. Bekele (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39
Cal.Rptr.2d 797] [defining possession], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 13–14 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618]; see also
People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 761, 763 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 14 P.3d
1111
221] [robbery victim must have actual or constructive possession of property taken;
disapproving People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 129 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141]].)
Fear was defined in the instruction because the statutory definition includes fear of
injury to third parties, and this concept is not encompassed within the common
understanding of fear. Force was not defined because its definition in the context of
robbery is commonly understood. (See People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d
1703, 1709 [286 Cal.Rptr. 394] [“force is a factual question to be determined by the
jury using its own common sense”].)
Immediate presence was defined in the instruction because its definition is related to
the use of force and fear and to the victim’s ability to control the property. This
definition may not be readily apparent to jurors.
• Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d
411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].
• Grand Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487g; People v. Webster, supra, at p. 443;
People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 694, 699 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d
48]; see People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411–1413 [Cal.Rptr.2d
1] [insufficient evidence to require instruction].
• Grand Theft Automobile. Pen. Code, § 487(d); People v. Gamble (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 446, 450 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451] [construing former Pen. Code,
§ 487h]; People v. Escobar (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 477, 482 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 9]
[same].
• Petty Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 488; People v. Covington (1934) 1 Cal.2d 316,
320 [34 P.2d 1019].
• Petty Theft With Prior. Pen. Code, § 666; People v. Villa (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
1429, 1433–1434 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 282].
When there is evidence that the defendant formed the intent to steal after the
application of force or fear, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on any
relevant lesser included offenses. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005,
1055–1057 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544] [error not to instruct on lesser
included offense of theft]); People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 350–352
[216 Cal.Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613] [same].)
On occasion, robbery and false imprisonment may share some elements (e.g., the
use of force or fear of harm to commit the offense). Nevertheless, false
imprisonment is not a lesser included offense, and thus the same conduct can result
in convictions for both offenses. (People v. Reed (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 274,
281–282 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 781].)
RELATED ISSUES
Asportation—Felonious Taking
To constitute a taking, the property need only be moved a small distance. It does
not have to be under the robber’s actual physical control. If a person acting under
1112
the robber’s direction, including the victim, moves the property, the element of
taking is satisfied. (People v. Martinez (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 170, 174 [79
Cal.Rptr. 18]; People v. Price (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 576, 578 [102 Cal.Rptr. 71].)
Claim of Right
If a person honestly believes that he or she has a right to the property even if that
belief is mistaken or unreasonable, such belief is a defense to robbery. (People v.
Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 573 [55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703]; People v. Romo
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440] [discussing defense in context
of theft]; see CALCRIM No. 1863, Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right.)
This defense is only available for robberies when a specific piece of property is
reclaimed; it is not a defense to robberies perpetrated to settle a debt, liquidated or
unliquidated. (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 945–950 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d
143, 987 P.2d 168].)
Fear
A victim’s fear may be shown by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Davison
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 438].) Even when the victim
testifies that he or she is not afraid, circumstantial evidence may satisfy the element
of fear. (People v. Renteria (1964) 61 Cal.2d 497, 498–499 [39 Cal.Rptr. 213, 393
P.2d 413]; People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 341 [279 Cal.Rptr.3d 407].)
Force—Amount
The force required for robbery must be more than the incidental touching necessary
to take the property. (People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 256] [noting that force employed by pickpocket would be insufficient],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fns.
2, 3 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262, 92 P.3d 841].) Administering an intoxicating substance or
poison to the victim in order to take property constitutes force. (People v. Dreas
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 623, 628–629 [200 Cal.Rptr. 586]; see also People v. Wright
(1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 209–210 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [explaining force for
purposes of robbery and contrasting it with force required for assault].)
Force—When Applied
The application of force or fear may be used when taking the property or when
carrying it away. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165, fn. 8 [282
Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742]; People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 65–67 [18
Cal.Rptr.2d 636]; People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27–28 [194 Cal.Rptr.
909].)
Immediate Presence
Property that is 80 feet away or around the corner of the same block from a forcibly
held victim is not too far away, as a matter of law, to be outside the victim’s
immediate presence. (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 415–419 [37
Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193]; see also People v. Prieto (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
210, 214 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 761] [reviewing cases where victim is distance away from
property taken].) Property has been found to be within a person’s immediate
1113
presence when the victim is lured away from his or her property and force is
subsequently used to accomplish the theft or escape (People v. Webster (1991) 54
Cal.3d 411, 440–442 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273]) or when the victim
abandons the property out of fear (People v. Dominguez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1342, 1348–1349 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 46].)
Multiple Victims
Multiple counts of robbery are permissible when there are multiple victims even if
only one taking occurred. (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 589 [180
Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908], reversed on other grounds California v. Ramos (1983)
463 U.S. 992 [103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171]; People v. Miles (1996) 43
Cal.App.4th 364, 369, fn. 5 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 87] [multiple punishment permitted].)
Conversely, a defendant commits only one robbery, no matter how many items are
taken from a single victim pursuant to a single plan. (People v. Brito (1991) 232
Cal.App.3d 316, 325–326, fn. 8 [283 Cal.Rptr. 441].)
Value
The property taken can be of small or minimal value. (People v. Simmons (1946) 28
Cal.2d 699, 705 [172 P.2d 18]; People v. Thomas (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 128,
134–135 [113 P.2d 706].) The property does not have to be taken for material gain.
All that is necessary is that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the
person of the property. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 57 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1,
609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d
826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 85.
1114

robbery by acting in concert [with <insert name[s] or
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] [in violation of Penal Code
section 213(a)(1)(A)].
that:
1. The defendant personally committed or aided and abetted a
robbery;
2. When (he/ [or] she) did so, the defendant voluntarily acted with
two or more other people who also committed or aided and
abetted the commission of the robbery;
AND
3. The robbery was committed in an inhabited
(dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building).
A (dwelling/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is
inhabited if someone lives there and either is present or has left but
intends to return.
[A dwelling includes any (structure/garage/office/ ) that is
description[s] of uncharged participant[s]>] committed robbery, please
refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that
robbery, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions
when you decide whether the People have proved robbery in concert.
ROBBERY AND AIDING AND ABETTING ARE GIVEN.>
[To prove the crime of robbery in concert, the People do not have to
prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit robbery.]
New January 2006

1115
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court must also give CALCRIM No. 1600, Robbery, and all necessary
instructions on aiding and abetting (see CALCRIM Nos. 400–404).
If supported by the evidence, give on request the final bracketed paragraph
regarding the lack of a prearranged plan. (See People v. Calimee (1975) 49
Cal.App.3d 337, 341–342 [122 Cal.Rptr. 658].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 213(a)(1)(A).
• Acting in Concert. People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 429, 444–446
Cal.Rptr. 658] [in context of sodomy in concert].
• Inhabited. See Pen. Code, § 459; People v. Jackson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1185,
1188 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 239].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 85.
1116
Robbery is divided into two degrees. If you conclude that the defendant
committed a robbery, you must then decide the degree.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree robbery, the People
must prove that:
[The robbery was committed in an inhabited (dwelling/vessel/floating
home/trailer coach/part of a building). A (dwelling/vessel/floating home/
trailer coach/part of a building) is inhabited if someone lives there and
either is present or has left but intends to return.]
[The robbery was committed while the person robbed was using or had
just used an ATM machine and was still near the machine.]
[The robbery was committed while the person robbed was performing
(his/her) duties as the driver of or was a passenger on (a/an) (bus/taxi/
cable car/streetcar/trackless trolley/ <other kind of vehicle
used to transport people>).]
All other robberies are of the second degree.
the robbery was first degree rather than a lesser crime. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first
degree robbery.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction if first degree robbery has
been charged, or if the prosecution is seeking a first degree conviction based on the
facts. Give one of the three bracketed paragraphs defining the elements of first
degree robbery.
AUTHORITY
• Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 212.5.
• Floating Home Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 18075.55(d).
• Vessel Defined. Harb. & Nav. Code, § 21.
• Inhabitation. People v. Jackson (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d
239].
• Inhabited Jail Cell. People v. McDade (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 118, 127–128 [280
Cal.Rptr. 912].
1117
RELATED ISSUES
Hotel Room
A hotel room is an “inhabited dwelling house” for purposes of first degree robbery.
(People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987–988 [217 Cal.Rptr. 612].)
Robbery in One’s Own Residence
A robbery committed in one’s own residence is still first degree robbery. (Pen. Code,
§ 212.5; People v. Alvarado (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1169 [274 Cal.Rptr. 452]
[defendant robbed two salesmen after bringing them back to his hotel room]; People
v. McCullough (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1300 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 341].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 86.
Against the Person, § 142.10[1][a][i], [3] (Matthew Bender).
1118
To be guilty of robbery as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have

formed the intent to aid and abet the commission of the robbery before
or while a perpetrator carried away the property to a place of
temporary safety.
A perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety with the property
if he or she has successfully escaped from the scene, is no longer being
pursued, and has unchallenged possession of the property.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the defendant is
charged with aiding and abetting a robbery and an issue exists about when the
defendant allegedly formed the intent to aid and abet. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1158, 1165–1166 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742] [defendant who drove
get-away car asserted he did not intend to aid and abet at time of robbery].)
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes.
Do not give this instruction if the defendant is charged with felony murder.
Do not give CALCRIM No. 3261, While Committing a Felony: Defined-Escape
Rule as a substitute for this instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Aider and Abettor to Robbery—When Intent Formed. People v. Cooper (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165–1166 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742].
• Place of Temporary Safety. People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 364–368 [197
Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560
[7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].
RELATED ISSUES
Place of Temporary Safety Based on Objective Standard
Whether the defendant had reached a place of temporary safety is judged on an
objective standard. The “issue to be resolved is whether a robber had actually
reached a place of temporary safety, not whether the defendant thought that he or
she had reached such a location.” (People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560
[7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1119

§ 142.10[1][b], [e] (Matthew Bender).
1120
B. CARJACKING
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with carjacking [in violation

prove that:
1. The defendant took a motor vehicle;
2. The vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of a person
who possessed the vehicle or was its passenger;
3. The vehicle was taken against that person’s will;
4. The defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent
that person from resisting;
AND
5. When the defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, (he/
she) intended to deprive the other person of possession of the
vehicle either temporarily or permanently.
The defendant’s intent to take the vehicle must have been formed before
or during the time (he/she) used force or fear. If the defendant did not
form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then (he/she)
did not commit carjacking.
[The term motor vehicle is defined in another instruction to which you
should refer.]
A person takes something when he or she gains possession of it and
moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short.
[Fear, as used here, means fear of (injury to the person himself or
1121
herself[,]/ [or] injury to the person’s family or property[,]/ [or]

immediate injury to someone else present during the incident or to that
person’s property).]
[A vehicle is within a person’s immediate presence if it is sufficiently
within his or her control so that he or she could keep possession of it if
not prevented by force or fear.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
There is no sua sponte duty to define the terms “possession,” “fear,” and “immediate
presence.” (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414
P.2d 366] [fear]; People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1708 [286
Cal.Rptr. 394] [fear].) These definitions are discussed in the Commentary to
CALCRIM No. 1600, Robbery.
AUTHORITY
• Fear Defined. Pen. Code, § 212.
• Immediate Presence Defined. People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626–627
[276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; People v. Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643,
650 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 112].
• Possession Defined. People v. Bekele (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1461 [39
Cal.Rptr.2d 797], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rodriguez (1999)
20 Cal.4th 1, 13–14 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618]; see People v. Hamilton
• Carjacking Crime Against Possession, not Ownership, of Vehicle. People v.
Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 701–702 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 373].
• Sufficient Force. People v. Hudson (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 837 [217
Cal.Rptr.3d 775]; People v. Lopez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1237 [214
Cal.Rptr.3d 618].
• Attempted Carjacking. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 215; see People v. Jones (1999) 75
Neither theft or robbery is a necessarily included offense of carjacking. (People v.
1122
Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48] [theft]; People
v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 153] [robbery].)
Vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851(a)) is not a lesser included offense of carjacking.
(People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1035 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d
1098].)
Attempted grand theft auto is not a lesser included offense of attempted carjacking.
People v. Marquez (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1066 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 31].
RELATED ISSUES
Force—Timing
Force or fear must be used against the victim to gain possession of the vehicle. The
timing, however, “in no way depends on whether the confrontation and use of force
or fear occurs before, while, or after the defendant initially takes possession of the
vehicle.” (People v. O’Neil (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 72].)
Asportation—Felonious Taking
“Felonious taking” has the same meaning in carjacking as in robbery. (People v.
Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1062 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548].) “To satisfy
the asportation requirement for robbery, no great movement is required, and it is not
necessary that the property be taken out of the physical presence of the victim.
[S]light movement is enough to satisfy the asportation requirement.” (Id. at p. 1061
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) The taking can occur whether or
not the victim remains with the car. (People v. Duran (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371,
1375–1377 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 812].) Carjacking can also occur when a defendant
forcibly takes a victim’s car keys, not just when a defendant takes a car from the
victim’s presence. (People v. Hoard (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 608–609 [126
Cal.Rptr.2d 855] [although victim was not physically present in the parking lot
when defendant drove the car away, she had been forced to relinquish her car
keys].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 114–117.
Against the Person, §§ 142.10[2][b], 142.10A (Matthew Bender).
1123
BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
A. BURGLARY
1125
A. BURGLARY
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with burglary [in violation

prove that:
1. The defendant entered (a/an) (building/room within a building/
locked vehicle/structure/ <insert other statutory
target>);
[AND]
2. When (he/she) entered (a/an) (building/room within the building/
locked vehicle/structure/ <insert other statutory target>), (he/she)
intended to commit (theft/ [or] <insert one or more
felonies>).
<If the evidence supports a defense theory that the crime was shoplifting
as defined by Penal Code section 459.5, give paragraph 3A and the
appropriate following optional paragraphs>
[AND]
[3A. The value of the property taken or intended to be taken was
more than $950.00](;/.)]
[OR]
[3B. The structure that the defendant entered was a noncommercial
establishment(;/,)]
[OR]
[3C. The structure was a commercial establishment that the defendant
entered during non-business hours.]]
To decide whether the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>), please refer to the separate
possible degree of the charged crime for which the jury may return a
verdict.>
[If you find the defendant guilty of burglary, it is burglary of the second
degree.]
A burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to
1127
CALCRIM No. 1700 BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
commit (theft/ [or] <insert one or more felonies>). The

defendant does not need to have actually committed (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>) as long as (he/she) entered
with the intent to do so. [The People do not have to prove that the
defendant actually committed (theft/ [or] <insert one or
more felonies>).]
[Under the law of burglary, a person enters a building if some part of his
or her body [or some object under his or her control] penetrates the area
inside the building’s outer boundary.]
[A building’s outer boundary includes the area inside a window screen.]
[An attached balcony designed to be entered only from inside of a
private, residential apartment on the second or higher floor of a building
is inside a building’s outer boundary.]
[The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>). You may not find the
defendant guilty of burglary unless you all agree that (he/she) intended
to commit one of those crimes at the time of the entry. You do not all
have to agree on which one of those crimes (he/she) intended.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2012, February 2013, August
2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the crime charged is shoplifting, give CALCRIM No. 1703, Shoplifting, instead
When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in
Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant
to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
If second degree burglary is the only possible degree of burglary that the jury may
return as their verdict, do not give CALCRIM No. 1701, Burglary: Degrees.
Although actual commission of the underlying theft or felony is not an element of
burglary (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041–1042 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128,
874 P.2d 903]), the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that the defendant must
have intended to commit a felony and has a sua sponte duty to define the elements
of the underlying felony. (People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 706 [144
Cal.Rptr. 330]; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 349 [116
Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].) Give all appropriate instructions on theft or the
felony alleged.
1128
BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY CALCRIM No. 1700
If the area alleged to have been entered is something other than a building or locked
vehicle, insert the appropriate statutory target in the blanks in elements 1 and 2.
Penal Code section 459 specifies the structures and places that may be the targets of
burglary. The list includes a house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, floating home as
defined in Health and Safety Code section 18075.55(d), railroad car, locked or
sealed cargo container whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach as defined
in Vehicle Code section 635, house car as defined in Vehicle Code section 362,
inhabited camper as defined in Vehicle Code section 243, locked vehicle as defined
by the Vehicle Code, aircraft as defined in Public Utilities Code section 21012, or
mine or any underground portion thereof. (See Pen. Code, § 459.)
On request, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Under the law of
burglary,” if there is evidence that only a portion of the defendant’s body, or an
instrument, tool, or other object under his or control, entered the building. (See
People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 7–8 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920];
People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 717–722 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d
1083].)
On request, give the bracketed sentence defining “outer boundary” if there is
evidence that the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary was a
window screen. (See People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 12–13 [120
Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920].)
Whenever a private, residential apartment and its balcony are on the second or
higher floor of a building, and the balcony is designed to be entered only from
inside the apartment, that balcony is part of the apartment and its railing constitutes
the apartment’s “outer boundary.” (People v. Yarbrough (2012) 54 Cal.4th 889, 894
[144 Cal.Rptr.3d 164, 281 P.3d 68].)
If multiple underlying felonies are charged, give the bracketed paragraph that begins
with “The People allege that the defendant intended to commit either.” (People v.
Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39]; People v. Griffın
If the defendant is charged with first degree burglary, give CALCRIM No. 1701,
Burglary: Degrees.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 564, 568–569
[51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39]; People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698,
706–711 [144 Cal.Rptr. 330]; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027,
1041–1042 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].
• Burden for Consent Defense Is to Raise Reasonable Doubt. People v. Sherow
1129

• Attempted Burglary. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 459.
• Tampering With a Vehicle. Veh. Code, § 10852; People v. Mooney (1983) 145
Cal.App.3d 502, 504–507 [193 Cal.Rptr. 381] [if burglary of automobile
charged].
RELATED ISSUES
Auto Burglary—Entry of Locked Vehicle
Under Penal Code section 459, forced entry of a locked vehicle constitutes burglary.
(People v. Young K. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 861, 863 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 12].) However,
there must be evidence of forced entry. (See People v. Woods (1980) 112
Cal.App.3d 226, 228–231 [169 Cal.Rptr. 179] [if entry occurs through window
deliberately left open, some evidence of forced entry must exist for burglary
conviction]; People v. Malcolm (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 217, 220–223 [120 Cal.Rptr.
667] [pushing open broken wing lock on window, reaching one’s arm inside vehicle,
and unlocking car door evidence of forced entry].) Opening an unlocked passenger
door and lifting a trunk latch to gain access to the trunk is not an auto burglary.
(People v. Allen (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 909, 917–918 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 626].)
Auto Burglary—Definition of Locked
To lock, for purposes of auto burglary, is “to make fast by interlinking or interlacing
of parts . . . [such that] some force [is] required to break the seal to permit
entry . . . .” (In re Lamont R. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 244, 247 [245 Cal.Rptr. 870],
quoting People v. Massie (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 812, 817 [51 Cal.Rptr. 18] [vehicle
was not locked where chains were wrapped around the doors and hooked together];
compare People v. Malcolm (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 217, 220–223 [120 Cal.Rptr. 667]
[vehicle with locked doors but broken wing lock that prevented window from being
locked, was for all intents and purposes a locked vehicle].)
Auto Burglary—Intent to Steal
Breaking into a locked car with the intent to steal the vehicle constitutes auto
burglary. (People v. Teamer (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457–1461 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d
296]; see also People v. Blalock (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1082 [98 Cal.Rptr.
231] [auto burglary includes entry into locked trunk of vehicle].) However, breaking
into the headlamp housings of an automobile with the intent to steal the headlamps
is not auto burglary. (People v. Young K. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 861, 864 [57
Cal.Rptr.2d 12] [stealing headlamps, windshield wipers, or hubcaps are thefts, or
attempted thefts, auto tampering, or acts of vandalism, not burglaries].)
Building
A building has been defined for purposes of burglary as “any structure which has
walls on all sides and is covered by a roof.” (In re Amber S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
185, 187 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 672].) Courts have construed “building” broadly and found
the following structures sufficient for purposes of burglary: a telephone booth, a
popcorn stand on wheels, a powder magazine dug out of a hillside, a wire chicken
coop, and a loading dock constructed of chain link fence. (People v. Brooks (1982)
1130
133 Cal.App.3d 200, 204–205 [183 Cal.Rptr. 773].) However, the definition of
building is not without limits and courts have focused on “whether the nature of a
structure’s composition is such that a reasonable person would expect some
protection from unauthorized intrusions.” (In re Amber S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
185, 187 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 672] [open pole barn is not a building]; see People v.
Knight (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1423–1424 [252 Cal.Rptr. 17] [electric
company’s “gang box,” a container large enough to hold people, is not a building;
such property is protected by Penal Code sections governing theft].)
Outer Boundary
A building’s outer boundary includes any element that encloses an area into which a
reasonable person would believe that a member of the general public could not pass
without authorization. Under this test, a window screen is part of the outer boundary
of a building for purposes of burglary. (People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1,
12–13 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920].) Whether penetration into an area behind
a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the
burglary statute is a question of law. The instructions must resolve such a legal issue
for the jury. (Id. at p. 16.)
Attached Residential Balconies
An attached residential balcony is part of an inhabited dwelling. (People v. Jackson
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 918, 924–925 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 623] [balcony was
“functionally interconnected to and immediately contiguous to . . . [part of] the
apartment . . . used for ‘residential activities’ ”]; but see dictum in People v.
Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 5 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 P.3d 920]
[“unenclosed balcony” is not structure satisfying “reasonable belief test”].)
Theft
Any one of the different theories of theft will satisfy the larcenous intent required
for burglary. (People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 29–30 [219 Cal.Rptr.
707] [entry into building to use person’s telephone fraudulently]; People v. Nguyen
Burglarizing One’s Own Home—Possessory Interest
A person cannot burglarize his or her own home as long as he or she has an
unconditional possessory right of entry. (People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 714
[125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365].) However, a family member who has moved out
of the family home commits burglary if he or she makes an unauthorized entry with
a felonious intent, since he or she has no claim of a right to enter that residence. (In
re Richard M. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 7, 15–16 [252 Cal.Rptr. 36] [defendant, who
lived at youth rehabilitation center, properly convicted of burglary for entering his
parent’s home and taking property]; People v. Davenport (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d
885, 889–893 [268 Cal.Rptr. 501] [defendant convicted of burglarizing cabin owned
and occupied by his estranged wife and her parents]; People v. Sears (1965) 62
Cal.2d 737, 746 [44 Cal.Rptr. 330, 401 P.2d 938], overruled on other grounds by
People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 494, 510 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037]
[burglary conviction proper where husband had moved out of family home three
1131
weeks before and had no right to enter without permission]; compare Fortes v.
Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 704, 712–714 [170 Cal.Rptr. 292] [husband
had unconditional possessory interest in jointly owned home; his access to the house
was not limited and strictly permissive, as in Sears].)
Consent
While lack of consent is not an element of burglary, consent by the owner or
occupant of property may constitute a defense to burglary. (People v. Sherow (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 255]; People v. Felix (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397–1398 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 860]; People v. Superior Court
(Granillo) (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1485 [253 Cal.Rptr. 316] [when an
undercover officer invites a potential buyer of stolen property into his warehouse of
stolen goods, in order to catch would-be buyers, no burglary occurred].) The consent
must be express and clear; the owner/occupant must both expressly permit the
person to enter and know of the felonious or larcenous intent of the invitee. (People
v. Felix (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1397–1398 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 860].) A person
who enters for a felonious purpose, however, may be found guilty of burglary even
if he or she enters with the owner’s or occupant’s consent. (People v. Frye (1998)
18 Cal.4th 894, 954 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183] [no evidence of
unconditional possessory right to enter].) A joint property owner/occupant cannot
give consent to a third party to enter and commit a felony on the other
owner/occupant. (People v. Clayton (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 418, 420–423 [76
Cal.Rptr.2d 536] [husband’s consent did not preclude a burglary conviction based
upon defendant’s entry of premises with the intent to murder wife].) The defense of
consent is established when the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of consent by the
owner or occupant. (People v. Sherow (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1309 [128
Cal.Rptr.3d 255]).
Entry by Instrument
When an entry is made by an instrument, a burglary occurs if the instrument passes
the boundary of the building and if the entry is the type that the burglary statute
intended to prohibit. (People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 717–722 [76
Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 P.2d 1083] [placing forged check in chute of walk-up window
of check-cashing facility was not entry for purposes of burglary] disapproving of
People v. Ravenscroft (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 639, 643–644 [243 Cal.Rptr. 827]
[insertion of ATM card into machine was burglary].)
Multiple Convictions
Courts have adopted different tests for multi-entry burglary cases. In In re William
S. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 316–318 [256 Cal.Rptr. 64], the court analogized
burglary to sex crimes and adopted the following test formulated in People v.
Hammon (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1099 [236 Cal.Rptr. 822] [multiple
penetration case]: “ ‘[W]hen there is a pause . . . sufficient to give defendant a
reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his conduct, and the [action by the defendant]
is nevertheless renewed, a new and separate crime is committed.’ ” (In re William
S., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 317.) The court in In re William S. adopted this test
1132
because it was concerned that under certain circumstances, allowing separate

convictions for every entry could produce “absurd results.” The court gave this
example: where “a thief reaches into a window twice attempting, unsuccessfully, to
steal the same potted geranium, he could potentially be convicted of two separate
counts.” (Ibid.) The In re William S. test has been called into serious doubt by
People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 332–334 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d
1078], which disapproved of Hammon. Harrison held that for sex crimes each
penetration equals a new offense. (People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 329.)
The court in People v. Washington (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 774],
a burglary case, agreed with In re William S. to the extent that burglary is analogous
to crimes of sexual penetration. Following Harrison, the court held that each
separate entry into a building or structure with the requisite intent is a burglary even
if multiple entries are made into the same building or as part of the same plan.
(People v. Washington, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–579; see also 2 Witkin and
Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d. ed. 1999 Supp.) “Multiple Entries,” § 662A, p. 38.)
The court further stated that any “concern about absurd results are [sic] better
resolved under [Penal Code] section 654, which limits the punishment for separate
offenses committed during a single transaction, than by [adopting] a rule that, in
effect, creates the new crime of continuous burglary.” (People v. Washington, supra,
50 Cal.App.4th at p. 578.)
Room
Penal Code section 459 includes “room” as one of the areas that may be entered for
purposes of burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) An area within a building or structure is
considered a room if there is some designated boundary, such as a partition or
counter, separating it from the rest of the building. It is not necessary for the walls
or partition to touch the ceiling of the building. (People v. Mackabee (1989) 214
Cal.App.3d 1250, 1257–1258 [263 Cal.Rptr. 183] [office area set off by counters
was a room for purposes of burglary].) Each unit within a structure may constitute a
separate “room” for which a defendant can be convicted on separate counts of
burglary. (People v. O’Keefe (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 517, 521 [271 Cal.Rptr. 769]
[individual dormitory rooms]; People v. Church (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1159
[264 Cal.Rptr. 49] [separate business offices in same building].)
Entry into a bedroom within a single-family house with the requisite intent can
support a burglary conviction if that intent was formed only after entry into the
house. (People v. Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d
289] [“the unadorned word ‘room’ in section 459 reasonably must be given its
ordinary meaning”]; see People v. McCormack (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 253, 255–257
[285 Cal.Rptr. 504]; People v. Young (1884) 65 Cal. 225, 226 [3 P. 813].) However,
entry into multiple rooms within one apartment or house cannot support multiple
burglary convictions unless it is established that each room is a separate dwelling
space, whose occupant has a separate, reasonable expectation of privacy. (People v.
1133
Richardson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 570, 575 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 802]; see also People
v. Thomas (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 899, 906, fn. 2 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 434].)
Temporal or Physical Proximity—Intent to Commit the Felony
According to some cases, a burglary occurs “if the intent at the time of entry is to
commit the offense in the immediate vicinity of the place entered by defendant; if
the entry is made as a means of facilitating the commission of the theft or felony;
and if the two places are so closely connected that intent and consummation of the
crime would constitute a single and practically continuous transaction.” (People v.
Wright (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 184, 191 [23 Cal.Rptr. 734] [defendant entered office
with intent to steal tires from attached open-air shed].) This test was followed in
People v. Nance (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 925, 931–932 [102 Cal.Rptr. 266] [defendant
entered a gas station to turn on outside pumps in order to steal gas]; People v.
Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 230–232 [214 Cal.Rptr. 82] [defendant entered
lobby of apartment building, intending to burglarize one of the units]; and People v.
Ortega (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 691, 695–696 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 246] [defendant
entered a home to facilitate the crime of extortion].
However, in People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 40], the
court applied a less restrictive test, focusing on just the facilitation factor. A burglary
is committed if the defendant enters a building in order to facilitate commission of
theft or a felony. The defendant need not intend to commit the target crime in the
same building or on the same occasion as the entry. (People v. Kwok, supra, 63
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1248 [defendant entered building to copy a key in order to
facilitate later assault on victim].) The court commented that “the ‘continuous
transaction test’ and the ‘immediate vicinity test’ . . . are artifacts of the particular
factual contexts of Wright, Nance, and Nunley.” (Id. at p. 1247.) With regards to the
Ortega case, the Kwok court noted that even though the Ortega court “purported to
rely on the ‘continuous transaction’ factor of Wright, [the decision] rested principally
on the ‘facilitation’ factor.” (Id. at pp. 1247–1248.) While Kwok and Ortega
dispensed with the elemental requirements of spatial and temporal proximity, they
did so only where the subject entry is “closely connected” with, and is made in
order to facilitate, the intended crime. (People v. Griffın (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 741,
749 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 273].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 128–129.
1134
Burglary is divided into two degrees. If you conclude that the defendant
committed a burglary, you must then decide the degree.
First degree burglary is the burglary of an inhabited (house [or a room
within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a
building).
A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is inhabited
if someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the
time of the alleged entry.
[A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is
inhabited if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a natural
or other disaster caused him or her to leave.]
[A (house/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building) is not
inhabited if the former residents have moved out and do not intend to
return, even if some personal property remains inside.]
[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ ) that is
[A vessel includes ships of all kinds, steamboats, steamships, canal boats,
barges, sailing vessels, and any structure intended to transport people or
merchandise over water.]
[A floating home is a floating structure that:
(1) is intended to be used as a stationary waterborne residence;
(2) does not have its own mode of power;
(3) is dependent on a continuous utility link originating on shore;
AND
(4) has a permanent continuous hookup to a sewage system on
shore.]
[A trailer coach is also a park trailer that is intended for human
habitation for recreational or seasonal use only and:
(1) has a floor area of no more than 400 square feet;
(2) is not more than 14 feet wide;
(3) is built on a single chassis;
1135
AND
(4) may only be transported on public highways with a permit.]
All other burglaries are second degree.
the burglary was first degree burglary. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree burglary.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction if there is evidence
supporting first degree burglary.
AUTHORITY
• Determination of Degrees. Pen. Code, § 460.
• Floating Home Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 18075.55(d).
• Definition of “Inhabited” Properly Excludes Word “Currently.” People v.
Meredith (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1264–1265 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 297].
• Room Within Inhabited House. People v. Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 86–87
[120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].
• House Not Inhabited if Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
RELATED ISSUES
Dwelling Houses for Purposes of First Degree Burglary
A “house” has been broadly defined as “any structure which has walls on all sides
and is covered by a roof.” (People v. Wilson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1483,
1487–1489 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 77], citing People v. Buyle (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 143,
148 [70 P.2d 955].) In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited
dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is “functionally
interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.”
(People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1404 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 256],
disapproved on another ground in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 559 [66
Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56]; People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101,
1107, 1113 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 236].) The following structures have each been held to
be a dwelling house or part of a dwelling house for purposes of first degree
burglary:
1136
a. A hospital room to which a patient was assigned overnight. (People v. Fond

b. An occupied hotel room. (People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 988
[217 Cal.Rptr. 612].)
c. A tent. (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1487–1489.)
d. A common-area laundry room located under the same roof as and contiguous to
occupied apartments. (People v. Woods (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 345, 348–350
[75 Cal.Rptr.2d 917].)
e. An attached garage. (People v. Fox (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046–1047 [68
Cal.Rptr.2d 424]; People v. Moreno (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 112 [204
Cal.Rptr. 17].)
f. A home office sharing a common wall and roof with the living quarters. (People
v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1107–1112 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 236].)
g. A storeroom connected to a house by a breezeway. (People v. Coutu (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 192, 193 [217 Cal.Rptr. 191].)
h. An unoccupied but occasionally used guest house. (People v. Hines (1989) 210
Cal.App.3d 945, 949–951 [259 Cal.Rptr. 128], disapproved of on other grounds
in People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 862–866 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984
P.2d 486].)
Mistake Concerning Residential Nature of Building
A reasonable but mistaken belief that a dwelling house is not inhabited is not a
defense to first degree burglary. (People v. Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818,
821–824 [223 Cal.Rptr. 284].) The Penal Code does not make knowledge that a
“dwelling house” is “inhabited” an element of first degree burglary. (See Pen. Code,
§§ 459, 460; People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 843–848 [193 Cal.Rptr.
54].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 129–133.
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.10, Ch. 143, Crimes Against Property, § 143.10[1][b],
[d] (Matthew Bender).
1137
To be guilty of burglary as an aider and abettor, the defendant must

have known of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and must have
formed the intent to aid, facilitate, promote, instigate, or encourage
commission of the burglary before the perpetrator finally left the
structure.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
charged with aiding and abetting a burglary and there is an issue about when the
defendant allegedly formed the intent to aid and abet.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes.
Do not give this instruction if the defendant is charged with felony murder.
AUTHORITY
• Aider and Abettor to Burglary—When Intent Formed. People v. Montoya (1994)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 128.
1138
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with shoplifting [in violation

of Penal Code section 459.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant entered a commercial establishment;
2. When the defendant entered the commercial establishment, it was
open during regular business hours;
AND
3. When (he/she) entered the commercial establishment, (he/she)
intended to commit theft.
To decide whether the defendant intended to commit theft, please refer
to the separate instructions that I (will give/have given) you on that
crime.
The defendant does not need to have actually committed theft as long as
(he/she) entered with the intent to do so.
[A person enters a structure if some part of his or her body [or some
object under his or her control] penetrates the area inside the structure’s
outer boundary.]
[A structure’s outer boundary includes the area inside a window screen.]
New August 2015

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
To instruct on the necessary intent to commit theft, see CALCRIM No. 1800, Theft
by Larceny.
AUTHORITY
• Burden for Consent Defense Is to Raise Reasonable Doubt. People v. Sherow
1139

SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2015 Supp.) Crimes Against
Property, § 15.
1140
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing [a]

burglary tool[s] [in violation of Penal Code section 466].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed [a] (picklock[s][,]/ [or] crow[bar][s][,]/
[or] keybit[s][,]/ [or] screwdriver[s][,]/ [or] vise grip[s][,]/ [or]
pliers[,]/ [or] water-pump pliers[,]/ [or] slidehammer[s][,]/ [or]
slim jim[s][,]/ [or] tension bar[s][,]/ [or] lock pick gun[s][,]/ [or]
tubular lock pick[s][,]/ [or] bump key[s][,]/ [or] floor-safe door
puller[s][,]/ [or] master key[s][,]/ [or] ceramic or porcelain spark
plug chips or pieces/ [or] <insert other instrument or
tool>);
2. When the defendant possessed the (picklock[s][,]/ [or]
crow[bar][s][,]/ [or] keybit[s][,]/ [or] screwdriver[s][,]/ [or] vise
grip[s][,]/ [or] pliers[,]/ [or] water-pump pliers[,]/ [or]
slidehammer[s][,]/ [or] slim jim[s][,]/ [or] tension bar[s][,]/ [or]
lock pick gun[s][,]/ [or] tubular lock pick[s][,]/ [or] bump
key[s][,]/ [or] floor-safe door puller[s][,]/ [or] master key[s][,]/ [or]
ceramic or porcelain spark plug chips or pieces/ [or]
<insert other instrument or tool>), (he/she) intended to use the
item[s] to break or enter into a (building/railroad car/aircraft/
vessel/trailer coach/vehicle);
AND
3. When the defendant possessed the (picklock[s][,]/ [or]
crow[bar][s][,]/ [or] keybit[s][,]/ [or] screwdriver[s][,]/ [or] vise
grip[s][,]/ [or] pliers[,]/ [or] water-pump pliers[,]/ [or]
slidehammer[s][,]/ [or] slim jim[s][,]/ [or] tension bar[s][,]/ [or]
lock pick gun[s][,]/ [or] tubular lock pick[s][,]/ [or] bump
key[s][,]/ [or] floor-safe door puller[s][,]/ [or] master key[s][,]/ [or]
ceramic or porcelain spark plug chips or pieces/ [or]
<insert other instrument or tool>), (he/she) intended to commit [a]
(theft/ [or] <insert one or more felonies>) within a
(building/railroad car/aircraft/vessel/trailer coach/vehicle).
[To decide whether the defendant intended to commit
<insert one or more felonies>, please refer to the separate instructions
[The People allege that the defendant intended to commit
<insert one or more felonies>. You may not find the defendant guilty
unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one of those crimes
1141
when (he/she) possessed the item. You do not all have to agree on which
one of those crimes (he/she) intended to commit.]
[A vehicle is a device by which any person or property may be propelled,
moved, or drawn upon a highway, except a device moved exclusively by
human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.]
[A trailer coach is a vehicle, other than a motor vehicle, designed for
human habitation or human occupancy for industrial, professional, or
commercial purposes, for carrying property on its own structure, and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle.]
[An aircraft is a manned contrivance used or designed for navigation of,
or flight in, the air requiring certification and registration as prescribed
by federal statute or regulation.]
New September 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Penal Code section 466 encompasses additional conduct. This instruction addresses
only possession of burglary tools.
AUTHORITY
• Intent Requirement. In re H.W. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1068, 1076 [245 Cal.Rptr.3d 51,
436 P.3d 941].
• Statute Prohibits Constructive Possession. People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
126, 133 [253 Cal.Rptr.3d 26].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Trailer Coach Defined. Veh. Code, § 635.
• Aircraft Defined. Public Utilities Code, § 21012.
COMMENTARY
Other Instrument or Tool
In addition to items expressly listed as burglary tools in Penal Code section 466, the
statute also contemplates a violation based on possession of some “other instrument
1142
or tool.” In In re H.W., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1076, the California Supreme Court

held that even if a nonenumerated item such as pliers qualified as an “other
instrument or tool,” a person may not be convicted of violating Penal Code section
466 without “a showing that the defendant intended to use the instrument or tool
possessed to break or effectuate physical entry into a structure in order to commit
theft or a felony within the structure.” For example, in In re H.W., pliers used to
remove a security tag, rather than to enter the store, were found not to be a burglary
tool.
1143
B. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY AND RELATED
INSTRUCTIONS
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with receiving stolen

property [in violation of Penal Code section 496(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (bought/received/sold/aided in selling/concealed or
withheld from its owner/aided in concealing or withholding from
its owner) property that had been (stolen/obtained by extortion);
[AND]
2. When the defendant (bought/received/sold/aided in
selling/concealed or withheld/aided in concealing or withholding)
the property, (he/she) knew that the property had been (stolen/
obtained by extortion)(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on knowledge of presence of property;
see Bench Notes.>
[AND
3. The defendant actually knew of the presence of the property.]
[Property is stolen if it was obtained by any type of theft, or by burglary
or robbery. [Theft includes obtaining property by larceny, embezzlement,
false pretense, or trick.]]
[Property is obtained by extortion if: (1) the property was obtained from
another person with that person’s consent, and (2) that person’s consent
was obtained through the use of force or fear.]
[To receive property means to take possession and control of it. Mere
presence near or access to the property is not enough.] [Two or more
people can possess the property at the same time.] [A person does not
have to actually hold or touch something to possess it. It is enough if the
person has [control over it] [or] [the right to control it], either personally
or through another person.]
[If you find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property, you must
then decide whether the value of the property received was more than
$950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the property received has
a value of more than $950, you must find this allegation has not been
proved.]
1145
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, October 2010, August 2014,
August 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is also charged with a theft crime, the court has a sua sponte duty
to instruct that the defendant may not be convicted of receiving stolen property if he
is convicted of the theft of the same property. (CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple
Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited; see Pen.
Code, § 496(a); People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 6–7 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229
P.3d 995]; People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881–882 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335,
111 P.3d 310] [upholding dual convictions for receiving stolen property and a
violation of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) as a nontheft conviction for post-theft
driving].)
If there are factual issues regarding whether the received stolen property was taken
with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on the complete definitions of theft. People v. MacArthur
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 275 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 736]. For instructions defining extortion
and the different forms of theft, see Series 1800, Theft and Extortion. On request,
the court should give the complete instruction on the elements of theft or extortion.
If substantial evidence exists, a specific instruction must be given on request that the
defendant must have knowledge of the presence of the stolen goods. (People v.
Speaks (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 36, 39–40 [174 Cal.Rptr. 65]; see People v. Gory
(1946) 28 Cal.2d 450, 455–456, 458–459 [170 P.2d 433] [possession of narcotics
requires knowledge of presence]; see also discussion of voluntary intoxication in
Related Issues, below.) Give bracketed element 3 when supported by the evidence.
For an instruction about when guilt may be inferred from possession of recently
stolen property, see CALCRIM No. 376, Possession of Recently Stolen Property as
Evidence of a Crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 496(a); People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223
[35 Cal.Rptr.2d 544].
• Theft Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 490a.
1146
• Concealment. Williams v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 330, 343–344

[146 Cal.Rptr. 311].
• General Intent Required. People v. Wielograf (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 488, 494
[161 Cal.Rptr. 680] [general intent crime]; but see People v. Reyes (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39] [knowledge element is a “specific
mental state”].
• Knowledge Element. People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61
Cal.Rptr.2d 39].
• Possession and Control. People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223–224 [35
Cal.Rptr.2d 544]; People v. Zyduck (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 336 [75
Cal.Rptr. 616]; see People v. Gatlin (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 44–45 [257
Cal.Rptr. 171] [constructive possession means knowingly having the right of
control over the property directly or through another]; People v. Scott (1951) 108
Cal.App.2d 231, 234 [238 P.2d 659] [two or more persons may jointly possess
property].
• Stolen Property. People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250 [107 Cal.Rptr. 184,
507 P.2d 1392] [theft]; see, e.g., People v. Candiotto (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 348,
349 [6 Cal.Rptr. 876] [burglary]; People v. Siegfried (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 489,
493 [57 Cal.Rptr. 423] [robbery].
• Attempted Receiving Stolen Property. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 496(d); People v.
Rojas (1961) 55 Cal.2d 252, 258 [10 Cal.Rptr. 465, 358 P.2d 921] [stolen goods
recovered by police were no longer “stolen”]; People v. Moss (1976) 55
Cal.App.3d 179, 183 [127 Cal.Rptr. 454] [antecedent theft not a necessary
element].
Theft by appropriation of lost property (Pen. Code, § 485) is not a necessarily
included offense of receiving stolen property. (In re Greg F. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d
466, 469 [205 Cal.Rptr. 614].)
RELATED ISSUES
Defense of Voluntary Intoxication or Mental Disease
Though receiving stolen property is a general intent crime, one element of the
offense is knowledge that the property was stolen, a specific mental state. With
regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is a “specific intent
crime” as that term is used in Penal Code sections 29.4(b) and 28(a). (People v.
Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].) Therefore, the
defendant should have the opportunity to introduce evidence and request instructions
regarding the lack of requisite knowledge. (Id. at p. 986; see People v. Mendoza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735]; but see People v.
Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 96–97 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660] (conc. opn.
of Brown, J.) [criticizing Mendoza and Reyes as wrongly transmuting a knowledge
1147
requirement into a specific intent].) See CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary

Intoxication.
A person may not be convicted of stealing and of receiving the same property.
(People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706]
superseded by statute on related grounds, as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1157 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 440]; see People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d
179, 183 [25 Cal.Rptr. 832].) See CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts:
Alternative Charges For One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.
Receiving Multiple Items on Single Occasion
A defendant who receives more than one item of stolen property on a single
occasion commits one offense of receiving stolen property. (See People v. Lyons
(1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 275 [324 P.2d 556].)
Specific Vendors
The Penal Code establishes separate crimes for specific persons buying or receiving
particular types of stolen property, including the following:
1. Swap meet vendors and persons dealing in or collecting merchandise or
personal property. (Pen. Code, § 496(b).)
2. Dealers or collectors of junk metals or secondhand materials who buy or
receive particular metals used in providing telephone, transportation, or public
utility services. (Pen. Code, § 496a(a).)
3. Dealers or collectors of secondhand books or other literary materials. (Pen.
Code, § 496b [misdemeanors].)
4. Persons buying or receiving motor vehicles, trailers, special construction
equipment, or vessels. (Pen. Code, § 496d(a).)
5. Persons buying, selling, receiving, etc., specific personal property, including
integrated computer chips or panels, electronic equipment, or appliances, from
which serial numbers or identifying marks have been removed or altered. (Pen.
Code, § 537e(a).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 72.
Against Property, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.03, 143.10[2][c], [d] (Matthew Bender).
1148
The defendant is not guilty of receiving (stolen/extorted) property if (he/

she) intended to (return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the
property to law enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/
withheld) the property.
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant intended to
(return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law
enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/withheld) the
property, you must find (him/her) not guilty of receiving (stolen/extorted)
property.
[This defense does not apply if the defendant decided to (return the
property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law enforcement) only
after (he/she) wrongfully (bought/received/concealed/withheld) the
property.] [The defense [also] does not apply if the defendant intended to
(return the property to its owner/ [or] deliver the property to law
enforcement) when (he/she) (bought/received/concealed/withheld) it, but
later decided to (sell/conceal/withhold) the property.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this defense if there is substantial
evidence supporting the defense and the defendant is relying on the defense or the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (People v.
Osborne (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 477 [143 Cal.Rptr. 582]; see People v. Sedeno
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716–717 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684–685, fn. 12 [160 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] and in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163, fn.
10, 164–178 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Burnham (1986) 176
Cal.App.3d 1134, 1139, fn. 3 [222 Cal.Rptr. 630].)
For the general requirement of a union between an act and intent (Pen. Code, § 20),
see CALCRIM No. 250, Union of Act and Intent: General Intent.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Osborne (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 476
[143 Cal.Rptr. 582].
• Burden of Proof. People v. Dishman (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 717, 721–722 [180
Cal.Rptr. 467]; People v. Wielograf (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 488, 494 [161
Cal.Rptr. 680].
1149
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 72.
Against Property, § 143.03[1][d], [2][a] (Matthew Bender).
1150
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with owning or operating a

chop shop [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10801].
prove that:
1. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/ [or] operated) a chop
shop;
AND
2. The defendant intentionally (owned/ [or] operated) the chop shop.
A chop shop is a building, lot, or other place where:
1. A person alters, destroys, takes apart, reassembles, or stores a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle part;
2. That person knows that the vehicle or part has been obtained by
theft, fraud, or conspiracy to defraud;
AND
3. That person knows that the vehicle or part was obtained in order
to either:
a. Sell or dispose of the vehicle or part;
a. OR
b. Alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge,
obliterate, or remove the identity, including an identification
number, of the vehicle or part, in order to misrepresent its
identity or prevent its identification.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 10801.
• Chop Shop Defined. Veh. Code, § 250.
• Meaning of “Operate.” People v. Ramirez (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 408, 414–415
1151

• Receiving Stolen Property. Pen. Code, § 496. There is a split in authority on this
issue. People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 333–334 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d
271] concluded that receiving stolen property is a lesser included offense, but a
defendant may be convicted of both offenses when different property is involved
in the two convictions. However, People v. Strohman (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
1313, 1316 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 520], reached the opposite conclusion.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 309.
Against Property, § 143.03[2][c] (Matthew Bender).
1152
THEFT AND EXTORTION
A. THEFT
C. EXTORTION
D. PETTY THEFT WITH A PRIOR
1850. Petty Theft With Prior Conviction (Pen. Code, § 666)
E. THEFT RELATED INSTRUCTIONS
1860. Owner’s Opinion of Value
1861. Jury Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft
1862. Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513)
1863. Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right (Pen. Code, § 511)
1153
A. THEFT
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [grand/petty] theft [by

larceny] [in violation of Penal Code section 484].
prove that:
1. The defendant took possession of property owned by someone
else;
2. The defendant took the property without the owner’s [or owner’s
agent’s] consent;
3. When the defendant took the property (he/she) intended (to
deprive the owner of it permanently/ [or] to remove it from the
owner’s [or owner’s agent’s] possession for so extended a period
of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of
the value or enjoyment of the property);
AND
4. The defendant moved the property, even a small distance, and
kept it for any period of time, however brief.
[An agent is someone to whom the owner has given complete or partial
authority and control over the owner’s property.]
[For petty theft, the property taken can be of any value, no matter how
slight.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
To have the requisite intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the
Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].) Select the appropriate language in element 3.
If the defendant is also charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801, Theft:
Degrees. If the defendant is charged with petty theft, no other instruction is
1155
CALCRIM No. 1800 THEFT AND EXTORTION
required, and the jury should receive a petty theft verdict form.
If the defendant is charged with petty theft with a prior conviction, give CALCRIM
No. 1850, Petty Theft With Prior Conviction.
If a different theory of theft is presented, see CALCRIM No. 1804, Theft by False
Pretense, CALCRIM No. 1805, Theft by Trick, CALCRIM No. 1806, Theft by
Embezzlement. See also CALCRIM No. 1861, Jury Does Not Need to Agree on
Form of Theft. The court may also wish to instruct with the bracketed “[by
larceny]” in the first sentence to distinguish this theory of theft from the others.
For theft of real property, use CALCRIM No. 1804, Theft by False Pretense. (See
People v. Sanders (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413–1417 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484; People v. Williams (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 154, 157
[166 P.2d 63]; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–117 [236 P. 944],
disapproved on other grounds in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [48
Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].
• Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49,
57–59 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], disapproving, to extent it is inconsistent,
People v. Marquez (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115, 123 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 365]; People
v. Zangari (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1447 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 250].
COMMENTARY
Asportation
To constitute a completed theft, the property must be asported or carried away.
(People v. Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 654 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 177].)
Asportation requires three things: (1) the goods are severed from the possession or
custody of the owner, (2) the goods are in the complete possession of the thief or
thieves, and (3) the property is moved, however slightly. (Ibid.; People v. Edwards
(1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 114–115 [236 P. 944], disapproved on other grounds in In
re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; People v. Collins
(1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [342 P.2d 370] [joint possession of property by
more than one thief].) Asportation is fulfilled by wrongful removal of property from
the owner or possessor, against his or her will with the intent to steal it, even
though the property is retained by the thief but a moment. (People v. Quiel (1945)
68 Cal.App.2d 674, 679 [157 P.2d 446].) Paragraph 4 sets forth the asportation
element.
Value
The property taken must have some intrinsic value, however slight. (People v.
Franco (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 535, 542 [84 Cal.Rptr. 513]; People v. Martinez (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 581, 585 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 574].) The final bracketed paragraph may
be given on request if the property in question was of slight value.
• Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 486.
1156
THEFT AND EXTORTION CALCRIM No. 1800
• Attempted Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484.

• Taking an Automobile Without Consent. Veh. Code, § 10851; People v. Pater
(1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 926 [73 Cal.Rptr. 823].
• Auto Tampering. Veh. Code, § 10852; People v. Anderson (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806,
810–811 [126 Cal.Rptr. 235, 543 P.2d 603].
• Misdemeanor Joyriding. Pen. Code, § 499b [of bicycle, motorboat, or vessel].
Petty theft is a not lesser-included offense of grand theft when the charge of grand
theft is based on the type of property taken. (People v. Thomas (1974) 43
Cal.App.3d 862, 870 [118 Cal.Rptr. 226].)
RELATED ISSUES
Claim of Right
If a person actually believes that he or she has a right to the property even if that
belief is mistaken or unreasonable, such belief is a defense to theft. (People v. Romo
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440]; see also People v. Devine
(1892) 95 Cal. 227, 229 [30 P. 378] [“[i]t is clear that a charge of larceny, which
requires an intent to steal, could not be founded on a mere careless taking away of
another’s goods”]; In re Bayles (1920) 47 Cal.App. 517, 519–521 [190 P. 1034]
[larceny conviction reversed where landlady actually believed she was entitled to
take tenant’s property for cleaning fees incurred even if her belief was
unreasonable]; People v. Navarro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–6, 10–11 [160
Cal.Rptr. 692]; see CALCRIM No. 1863, Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of
Right.)
Community Property
A person may be found guilty of theft of community property, but only if he or she
has the intent to deprive the other owner of the property permanently. (People v.
Llamas (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1738–1740 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 357].)
Fraudulent Refunds
A person who takes property while in a store and presents it for a refund is guilty of
theft. (People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165].)
The Supreme Court held that taking with the intent to fraudulently obtain a refund
constitutes both an intent to permanently deprive the store of property and a
trespassory taking within the meaning of larceny. (Id. at pp. 317–318; see also
People v. Shannon (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 649 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 177].)
Multiple or Single Conviction of Theft-Overall Plan or Scheme
If multiple items are stolen from a single victim over a period of time and the
takings are part of one intent, plan, or impulse, only one theft occurs and the value
of the items is aggregated when determining the degree of theft. (People v. Bailey
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 514, 518–519 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39]; accord People v.
Sullivan (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 16, 19–21 [145 Cal.Rptr. 313]; see CALCRIM No.
1802, Theft: As Part of Overall Plan.)
A serial thief “may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate
1157
and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching

scheme.” [disapproving any interpretation of People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514
[11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39] inconsistent with this conclusion.] People v.
Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 740–741 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 329 P.3d 154].
No Need to Use or Benefit From the Property Taken
It does not matter that the person taking the property does not intend to use the
property or benefit from it; he or she is guilty of theft if there is intent to
permanently deprive the other person of the property. (People v. Kunkin (1973) 9
Cal.3d 245, 251 [107 Cal.Rptr. 184, 507 P.2d 1392]; People v. Green (1980) 27
Cal.3d 1, 57–58 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] [defendant intended to destroy the
property], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826,
834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]; People v. Pierce (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d
598, 609 [243 P.2d 585] [irrelevant that defendant did not personally benefit from
embezzled funds]; see also People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115
Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [intent to deprive owner of major value or enjoyment].)
Possession
The victim of a theft does not have to be the owner of property, only in possession
of it. (People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 116 [236 P. 944], disapproved on
other grounds in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408
P.2d 948].) “Considered as an element of larceny, ‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ may
be regarded as synonymous terms; for one who has the right of possession as
against the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner.” (Ibid; see also
People v. Davis (1893) 97 Cal. 194, 195 [31 P. 1109] [fact that property in
possession of victim sufficient to show ownership].)
Unanimity of Theft Theory Not Required
If multiple theories of theft have been presented, the jury does not need to agree on
which form of theft was committed. All the jury must agree on is that an unlawful
taking of property occurred. (People v. Counts (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 785, 792–793
[37 Cal.Rptr.2d 425]; People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 567–569 [51 Cal.Rptr.
103, 414 P.2d 39] [burglary case]; People v. Nor Woods (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584, 586
[233 P.2d 897] [addressing the issue for theft].) See CALCRIM No. 1861, Jury
Does Not Need to Agree on Form of Theft.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 14–17.
1158
1801. Grand and Petty Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2,
491)
If you conclude that the defendant committed a theft, you must decide
whether the crime was grand theft or petty theft.
[The defendant committed petty theft if (he/she) stole property [or
services] worth $950 or less.]
[The defendant committed grand theft if the value of the property [or
services] is more than $950.]
[Theft of property from the person is grand theft if the value of the
property is more than $950. Theft is from the person if the property
taken was in the clothing of, on the body of, or in a container held or
carried by, that person.]
[Theft of (an automobile/a horse/ <insert other item listed in
statute>) is grand theft if the value of the property is more than $950.]
[Theft of a firearm is grand theft.]
[Theft of (fruit/nuts/ <insert other item listed in statute>)
worth more than $950 is grand theft.]
[Theft of (fish/shellfish/aquacultural products/ <insert other
item listed in statute>) worth more than $950 is grand theft if (it/they)
(is/are) taken from a (commercial fishery/research operation).]
[The value of <insert relevant item enumerated in Pen. Code,
§ 487(b)(1)(B)> may be established by evidence proving that on the day
of the theft, the same items of the same variety and weight as those
stolen had a wholesale value of more than $950.]
[The value of (property/services) is the fair (market value of the
property/market wage for the services performed).]
<Fair Market Value—Generally>
[Fair market value is the highest price the property would reasonably
have been sold for in the open market at the time of, and in the general
location of, the theft.]
<Fair Market Value—Urgent Sale>
[Fair market value is the price a reasonable buyer and seller would agree
on if the buyer wanted to buy the property and the seller wanted to sell
it, but neither was under an urgent need to buy or sell.]
the theft was grand theft rather than a lesser crime. If the People have
1159
not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of grand
theft.
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2015, April 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction if grand theft has been
charged.
If the evidence raises an issue that the value of the property may be inflated or
deflated because of some urgency on the part of either the buyer or seller, the
second bracketed paragraph on fair market value should be given.
AUTHORITY
• Determination of Grand vs. Petty Theft. Pen. Code, §§ 486, 487–488, 490.2,
491.
• Value/Nature of Property/Theft from the Person. Pen. Code, §§ 487(b)–(d), 487a.
• Theft of a firearm is grand theft. Pen. Code, §§ 487(d)(2), 490.2(c).
RELATED ISSUES
Proposition 47 (Penal Code Section 490.2)
After the passage of Proposition 47 in 2014, theft is defined in Penal Code section
487 as a misdemeanor unless the value of the property taken exceeds $950. Pen.
Code, § 490.2. This represents a change from the way grand theft was defined under
Penal Code section 487(b)–(d) before the enactment of Proposition 47. In 2016,
Proposition 63 added subdivision (c) to Pen. Code, § 490.2 (excepting theft of a
firearm).
Taking From the Person
To constitute a taking from the person, the property must, in some way, be
physically attached to the person. (People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465,
1472 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243].) Applying this rule, the court in Williams held that a
purse taken from the passenger seat next to the driver was not a taking from the
person. (Ibid. [see generally for court’s discussion of origins of this rule].) Williams
was distinguished by the court in People v. Huggins (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1654,
1656–1657 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 177], where evidence that the defendant took a purse
placed on the floor next to and touching the victim’s foot was held sufficient to
establish a taking from the person. The victim intentionally placed her foot next to
1160
her purse, physically touching it and thereby maintaining dominion and control over
it.
Theft of Fish, Shellfish, or Aquacultural Products
Fish taken from public waters are not “property of another” within the meaning of
Penal Code section 484 and 487; only the Fish and Game Code applies to such
takings. (People v. Brady (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 959, 961–962 [286 Cal.Rptr.
19]; see, e.g., Fish & Game Code, § 12006.6 [unlawful taking of abalone].)
Value of Written Instrument
If the thing stolen is evidence of a debt or some other written instrument, its value
is (1) the amount due or secured that is unpaid, or that might be collected in any
contingency, (2) the value of the property, title to which is shown in the instrument,
or (3) or the sum that might be recovered in the instrument’s absence. (Pen. Code,
§ 492; see Buck v. Superior Court (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 431, 438 [54 Cal.Rptr.
282] [trust deed securing debt]; People v. Frankfort (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 703
[251 P.2d 401] [promissory notes and contracts securing debt]; People v. Quiel
(1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 674, 678 [157 P.2d 446] [unpaid bank checks]; see also Pen.
Code, §§ 493 [value of stolen passage tickets], 494 [completed written instrument
need not be issued or delivered].) If evidence of a debt or right of action is
embezzled, its value is the sum due on or secured by the instrument. (Pen. Code,
§ 514.) Section 492 only applies if the written instrument has value and is taken
from a victim. (See People v. Sanders (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414, fn. 16 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 806].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property §§ 4, 8.
1161
If you conclude that the defendant committed more than one theft, you
must then decide if the defendant committed multiple petty thefts or a
single grand theft. To prove that the defendant is guilty of a single grand
theft, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant committed theft of property from the same owner
or possessor on more than one occasion;
2. The combined value of the property was over $950;
AND
3. The defendant obtained the property as part of a single, overall
plan or objective.
If you conclude that the People have failed to prove grand theft, any
multiple thefts you have found proven are petty thefts.
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, August 2015, August 2016
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aggregating the value of the property
or services taken if grand theft is charged on that theory.
The total value of the property taken must exceed $950 to be grand theft. (See Pen.
Code, § 490.2.)
AUTHORITY
• Aggregating Value of Property Taken According to Overall Plan or General
Intent. People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514, 518–519 [11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360
P.2d 39].
• Grand Theft of Property or Services. Pen. Code, § 487(a) [property or services
exceeding $950 in value].
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Victims
Where multiple victims are involved, there is disagreement about applying the
Bailey doctrine and cumulating the charges even if a single plan or intent is
demonstrated. (See People v. Brooks (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 30 [210 Cal.Rptr.
1162
90] [auctioneer stole proceeds from property belonging to several people during a
single auction; conviction for multiple counts of theft was error]; People v.
Columbia Research Corp. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d Supp. 33 [163 Cal.Rptr. 455]
[series of petty thefts from numerous victims occurring over 10-month period
properly consolidated into single grand theft conviction where defendant employed
same scheme to defraud victims of money]; but see People v. Garcia (1990) 224
Cal.App.3d 297, 307–309 [273 Cal.Rptr. 666] [defendant filed fraudulent bonds at
different times involving different victims; multiple convictions proper]; In re David
D. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 304, 309 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 552] [stating that Garcia
“articulately criticized” Brooks and Columbia Research; declined to apply Bailey to
multiple acts of vandalism].)
Combining Grand Thefts
The Bailey doctrine can be asserted by the defendant to combine multiple grand
thefts committed as part of an overall scheme into a single offense. (See People v.
Brooks (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 31 [210 Cal.Rptr. 90] [multiple grand thefts from
single auction fund]; People v. Gardner (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 42, 47–48 [153
Cal.Rptr. 160] [multiple grand theft of hog carcasses]; People v. Richardson (1978)
83 Cal.App.3d 853, 866 [148 Cal.Rptr. 120] [multiple attempted grand thefts],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682, fn. 8
[156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597 P.2d 130]; see also People v. Sullivan (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d
16, 19 [145 Cal.Rptr. 313] [error to refuse defense instruction about aggregating
thefts].)
A serial thief “may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate
and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching
scheme.” [disapproving any interpretation of People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514
[11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360 P.2d 39] inconsistent with this conclusion.] People v.
Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 740–741 [174 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 329 P.3d 154].
Theft Enhancement
If there are multiple charges of theft, whether grand or petty theft, the aggregate loss
exceeds any of the statutory minimums in Penal Code section 12022.6(a), and the
thefts arise from a common scheme or plan, an additional prison term may be
imposed. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6(b).) If the aggregate loss exceeds statutory amounts
ranging from $50,000 to $2.5 million, an additional term of one to four years may
be imposed. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6(a)(1)–(4); see People v. Daniel (1983) 145
Cal.App.3d 168, 174–175 [193 Cal.Rptr. 277] [no error in refusing to give
unanimity instruction].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 12, 13.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).
1163
If you conclude that the defendant committed more than one theft, you
must decide whether the defendant committed multiple petty thefts or a
single grand theft. To prove that the defendant is guilty of a single grand
theft, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant was an (employee/agent) of <insert
name of employer/principal>;
2. The defendant committed theft of property [or services] from
<insert name of employer/principal>;
AND
3. The combined value of the property [or services] that the
defendant obtained during a period of 12 consecutive months was
$950 or more.
If you conclude that the People have failed to prove grand theft, any
multiple thefts you have found proven are petty thefts.
[An agent is a person who represents someone else in dealing with other
people, corporations, or entities.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aggregating the value of the property
or services taken by an employee or agent if grand theft is charged on that theory.
AUTHORITY
• Aggregating Value of Property Taken by Employee or Agent. Pen. Code,
§ 487(b)(3); People v. Packard (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 626–627 [182
Cal.Rptr. 576].
• Agent Defined. Civ. Code, § 2295.
• Employee Defined. Lab. Code, § 2750.
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 487(b)(3) allows the prosecutor, under specified conditions, to
cumulate a series of petty thefts into a grand theft, without having to prove a single
intent or scheme. (People v. Packard (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 626 [182 Cal.Rptr.
576].) Therefore, this instruction does not include a single intent or scheme as an
element. (Compare People v. Daniel (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 168, 175 [193 Cal.Rptr.
277] [theft pursuant to overall plan and single fraudulent intent], and CALCRIM
1164
No. 1802, Theft: As Part of Overall Plan.) Under the appropriate circumstances,
however, a defendant may assert that grand thefts committed against his or her
employer over a period greater than 12 consecutive months should be combined into
a single grand theft in the absence of evidence of separate intents or plans. (See
People v. Packard, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at pp. 626–627 [thefts over three-year
period].)
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1802, Theft: As Part of Overall
Plan.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
1165
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [grand/petty] theft by

false pretense [in violation of Penal Code section 484].
prove that:
1. The defendant knowingly and intentionally deceived a property
owner [or the owner’s agent] by false or fraudulent
representation or pretense;
2. The defendant did so intending to persuade the owner [or the
owner’s agent] to let the defendant [or another person] take
possession and ownership of the property;
AND
3. The owner [or the owner’s agent] let the defendant [or another
person] take possession and ownership of the property because
the owner [or the owner’s agent] relied on the representation or
pretense.
You may not find the defendant guilty of this crime unless the People
have proved that:
[A. The false pretense was accompanied by either a false writing or
false token(;/.)]
[OR]
[(A/B). There was a note or memorandum of the pretense signed or
handwritten by the defendant(;/.)]
[OR]
[(A/B/C). Testimony from two witnesses or testimony from a single
witness along with other evidence supports the conclusion that the
defendant made the pretense.]
[Property includes money, labor, and real or personal property.]
A false pretense is any act, word, symbol, or token the purpose of which
is to deceive.
[Someone makes a false pretense if, intending to deceive, he or she does
[one or more of] the following:
[1. Gives information he or she knows is false(./;)]
[OR
2. Makes a misrepresentation recklessly without information that
1166
justifies a reasonable belief in its truth(./;)]

[OR
3. Does not give information when he or she has an obligation to do
so(./;)]
[OR
4. Makes a promise not intending to do what he or she promises.]]
[Proof that the representation or pretense was false is not enough by
itself to prove that the defendant intended to deceive.]
[Proof that the defendant did not perform as promised is not enough by
itself to prove that the defendant did not intend to perform as promised.]
[A false token is a document or object that is not authentic, but appears
to be, and is used to deceive.]
slight.]
[An owner [or an owner’s agent] relies on false pretense, if the falsehood
is an important part of the reason the owner [or agent] decides to give
up the property. The false pretense must be an important factor, but it
does not have to be the only factor the owner [or agent] considers in
making the decision. [If the owner [or agent] gives up property some
time after the pretense is made, the owner [or agent] must do so because
he or she relies on the pretense.]]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, December 2008, April 2010
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of this crime, including
the corroboration requirements stated in Penal Code section 532(b). (People v.
Mason (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 281, 286 [109 Cal.Rptr. 867] [error not to instruct on
corroboration requirements].)
1167
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code § 484; People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1842
[52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765]; see People v. Webb (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 688, 693–694
[88 Cal.Rptr.2d 259] [false statement of opinion].
• Corroboration Requirements. Pen. Code § 532(b); People v. Gentry (1991) 234
Cal.App.3d 131, 139 [285 Cal.Rptr. 591]; People v. Fujita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d
454, 470–471 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].
• Agent. People v. Britz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 743, 753 [95 Cal.Rptr. 303].
• Reckless Misrepresentation. People v. Schmitt (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 87, 110
[317 P.2d 673]; People v. Ryan (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 904, 908–909 [230 P.2d
359].
• Defendant Need Not Be Beneficiary of Theft. People v. Cheeley (1951) 106
Cal.App.2d 748, 753 [236 P.2d 22].
• Reliance. People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1842–1843 [52
Cal.Rptr.2d 765] [defining reliance]; People v. Sanders (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
1403, 1413 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 806] [reversible error to fail to instruct on reliance];
People v. Whight (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1152–1153 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 163]
[no reliance if victim relies solely on own investigation].
• Theft of Real Property by False Pretenses. People v. Sanders (1998) 67
• Theft by False Pretenses Includes Obtaining Loan by False Pretenses. Perry v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 276, 282–283 [19
Cal.Rptr.1, 368 P.2d 529].
• Either Token or Writing Must Be False. People v. Henning (2009) 173
RELATED ISSUES
Attempted Theft by False Pretense
Reliance on the false pretense need not be proved for a person to be guilty of
attempted theft by false pretense. (People v. Fujita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 467
[117 Cal.Rptr. 757].)
Continuing Nature of False Pretense
Penal Code section 484 recognizes that theft by false pretense is a crime of a
continuing nature and covers any “property or service received as a result thereof,
and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was
1168
committed on any date during the particular period in question.” (Pen. Code,
§ 484(a).)
Corroboration—Defined/Multiple Witnesses
“Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime in such a way so as to reasonably satisfy the jury that the
complaining witness is telling the truth.” (People v. Fujita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d
454, 470 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].) When considering if the pretense is corroborated the
jury may consider “the entire conduct of the defendant, and his declarations to other
persons.” (People v. Wymer (1921) 53 Cal.App. 204, 206 [199 P. 815].) The test for
corroboration of false pretense is the same as the test for corroborating the
testimony of an accomplice in Penal Code section 1111. (Ibid.; see also People v.
MacEwing (1955) 45 Cal.2d 218, 224 [288 P.2d 257].) To establish corroboration by
multiple witnesses, the witnesses do not have to testify to the same false pretense.
The requirement is satisfied as long as they testify to the same scheme or type of
false pretense. (People v. Gentry (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 131, 139 [285 Cal.Rptr.
591]; People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 268 [267 P.2d 271].)
Distinguished from Theft by Trick
Although fraud is used to obtain the property in both theft by trick and theft by
false pretense, in theft by false pretense, the thief obtains both possession and title
to the property. For theft by trick, the thief gains only possession of the property.
(People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258 [267 P.2d 271]; People v. Randono
(1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 172 [108 Cal.Rptr. 326].) False pretenses does not
require that the title pass perfectly and the victim may even retain a security interest
in the property transferred to the defendant. (People v. Counts (1995) 31
Fraudulent Checks
If a check is the basis for the theft by false pretense, it cannot also supply the
written corroboration required by statute. (People v. Mason (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d
281, 288 [109 Cal.Rptr. 867].)
Genuine Writings
A genuine writing that is falsely used is not a false token. (People v. Beilfuss (1943)
59 Cal.App.2d 83, 91 [138 P.2d 332] [valid check obtained by fraud not object of
theft by false pretense].)
Implicit Misrepresentations
The misrepresentation does not have to be made in an express statement; it may be
implied from behavior or other circumstances. (People v. Mace (1925) 71 Cal.App.
10, 21 [234 P. 841]; People v. Randono (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 174–175 [108
Cal.Rptr. 326] [analogizing to the law of implied contracts].)
Non-Performance of a Promise Is Insufficient to Prove a False Pretense
The pretense may be made about a past or present fact or about a promise to do
something in the future. (People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 259–265 [267 P.2d
271].) If the pretense relates to future actions, evidence of non-performance of the
1169
promise is not enough to establish the falsity of a promise. (People v. Fujita (1974)
43 Cal.App.3d 454, 469 [117 Cal.Rptr. 757].) The intent to defraud at the time the
promise is made must be demonstrated. As the court in Ashley stated, “[w]hether the
pretense is a false promise or a misrepresentation of fact, the defendant’s intent must
be proved in both instances by something more than mere proof of non-performance
or actual falsity.” (People v. Ashley, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 264 [court also stated that
defendant is entitled to instruction on this point but did not characterize duty as sua
sponte].)
See the Related Issues section under CALCRIM No. 1800, Theft by Larceny.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1170

trick [in violation of Penal Code section 484].
prove that:
1. The defendant obtained property that (he/she) knew was owned
by someone else;
2. The property owner [or the owner’s agent] consented to the
defendant’s possession of the property because the defendant used
fraud or deceit;
3. When the defendant obtained the property, (he/she) intended (to
deprive the owner of it permanently/ [or] to remove it from the
owner’s [or owner’s agent’s] possession for so extended a period
of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of
the value or enjoyment of the property);
4. The defendant kept the property for any length of time;
AND
5. The owner [or the owner’s agent] did not intend to transfer
ownership of the property.
[Obtaining the owner’s [or the owner’s agent’s] consent to use the
property for a specified purpose while intending to use it in a different
way constitutes fraud or deceit.]
slight.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
To have the requisite intent for theft, the thief must either intend to deprive the
1171
Cal.Rptr.2d 403].) Select the appropriate language in element 3.
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Theft. Pen. Code, § 484.
• Intent to Deprive Owner of Main Value. People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49,
57–59 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], disapproving, to extent it is inconsistent,
People v. Marquez (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115, 123 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 365].
RELATED ISSUES
Distinguished From Theft by False Pretense
Although fraud is used to obtain the property in both theft by trick and theft by
false pretense, in theft by false pretense, the thief obtains both possession and title
to the property. For theft by trick, the thief gains only possession of the property.
(People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258 [267 P.2d 271]; People v. Randono
(1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 172 [108 Cal.Rptr. 326]; People v. Traster (2003) 111
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 15.
1172

embezzlement [in violation of Penal Code section 503].
prove that:
1. An owner [or the owner’s agent] entrusted (his/her) property to
the defendant;
2. The owner [or owner’s agent] did so because (he/she) trusted the
defendant;
3. The defendant fraudulently (converted/used) that property for
(his/her) own benefit;
AND
4. When the defendant (converted/used) the property, (he/she)
intended to deprive the owner of (it/its use).
A person acts fraudulently when he or she takes undue advantage of
another person or causes a loss to that person by breaching a duty, trust
or confidence.
[A good faith belief in acting with authorization to use the property is a
defense.]
[In deciding whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to
the property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith, consider
all the facts known to (him/her) at the time (he/she) obtained the
property, along with all the other evidence in the case. The defendant
may hold a belief in good faith even if the belief is mistaken or
unreasonable. But if the defendant was aware of facts that made that
belief completely unreasonable, you may conclude that the belief was not
held in good faith.]
[An intent to deprive the owner of property, even temporarily, is
enough.]
[Intent to restore the property to its owner is not a defense.]
slight.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, October 2010, April 2011
1173
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the evidence supports it, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that a good
faith belief in acting with authorization to use the property is a defense. People v.
Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].
Intent to return the property at the time of the taking is not a defense to
embezzlement under Pen. Code, § 512 unless the property was returned before the
person was charged. People v. Sisuphan (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 800, 812 [104
Cal.Rptr.3d 654].
If the defendant is charged with grand theft, give CALCRIM No. 1801 Theft:
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 484, 503–515; In re Basinger (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1348,
1362–1363 [249 Cal.Rptr. 110, 756 P.2d 833]; People v. Wooten (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 1834, 1845 [52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765]; People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 314, 361 [234 Cal.Rptr. 442].
• Fraud Defined. People v. Talbot (1934) 220 Cal. 3, 15 [28 P.2d 1057]; People v.
Stein (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 235, 241 [156 Cal.Rptr. 299].
• Intent to Temporarily Deprive Owner of Property Sufficient. People v. Casas
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246–1247 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 811] [acknowledging
general rule for larceny requires intent to permanently deprive owner of property,
citing People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d
1165]].
RELATED ISSUES
Alter Ego Defense
A partner can be guilty of embezzling from his own partnership. “[T]hough [the
Penal Code] requir[es] that the property be ‘of another’ for larceny, [it] does not
require that the property be ‘of another’ for embezzlement . . . . It is both illogical
and unreasonable to hold that a partner cannot steal from his partners merely
because he has an undivided interest in the partnership property. Fundamentally,
1174
stealing that portion of the partners’ shares which does not belong to the thief is no
different from stealing the property of any other person.” (People v. Sobiek (1973)
30 Cal.App.3d 458, 464, 468 [106 Cal.Rptr. 519]; see Pen. Code, § 484.)
Fiduciary Relationships
Courts have held that creditor/debtor and employer/employee relationships are not
presumed to be fiduciary relationships in the absence of other evidence of trust or
confidence. (People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 1846 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d
765] [creditor/debtor]; People v. Threestar (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 747, 759 [213
Cal.Rptr. 510] [employer/employee].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 29.
1175
1807. Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(d),
(e))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with theft of property from

(an elder/a dependent adult) [in violation of Penal Code section 368].
prove that:
1. The defendant committed (theft[,]/ embezzlement[,]/ forgery[,]/
fraud[,]/ [or] identity theft);
2. The (property taken/ [or] personal identifying information used)
was (owned by/that of) (an elder/a dependent adult);
<Do not give element 3 in misdemeanor cases where the value is $950 or
less.>
3. [The property, goods, or services obtained was worth more than
$950;]
AND
<Alternative 4A—defendant not caretaker>
[4. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the
(owner of the property/person to whom the identifying
information belonged) was (an elder/a dependent adult).]
[OR]
<Alternative 4B—defendant caretaker>
[4. The defendant was a caretaker of the (elder/dependent adult).]
To decide whether the defendant committed (theft[,]/ embezzlement[,]/
forgery[,]/ fraud[,]/ [or] identity theft), please refer to the separate
out normal activities or to protect his or her rights.] [This definition
inpatient in a [psychiatric] health facility [or chemical dependency
recovery hospital/ or <insert relevant type of health facility
from Health & Saf. Code, § 1250>] that provides 24-hour inpatient care.]
[A caretaker is someone who has the care, custody, or control of (a/an)
1176
(elder/dependent adult), or is someone who stands in a position of trust

with (a/an) (elder/dependent adult).]
[Property includes money, labor, or real or personal property.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. The court also has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the
underlying theft offense.
If the defendant is charged with taking property valued at more than $950 (see Pen.
Code, § 368(d), (e)), give element 3.
If the person charged is not alleged to be a caretaker (see Pen. Code, § 368(i)), give
alternative 4A. If the person charged stipulated to be a caretaker, give alternative
4B. If it is in dispute whether the person charged is a caretaker, give both
alternatives 4A and 4B and the bracketed paragraph defining caretaker.
Give the bracketed definition of “elder” or “dependent adult” (see Pen. Code,
§ 368(g), (h)) on request depending on the evidence in the case. Give the second
and/or third bracketed sentences of the definition of “dependent adult” if a further
definition is requested.
The definition of “property” may be given on request. (See Pen. Code, § 368(d),
(e).)
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 368(d), (e).
• Caretaker Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(i).
• Dependent Adult Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(h).
• Elder Defined. Pen. Code, § 368(g).
• 24-Hour Health Facility. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1250, 1250.2, 1250.3.
• Felony Value Threshold Applies to Identity Theft. People v. Baratang (2020) 56
• Attempted Theft From Elder or Dependent Adult. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 368(d), (e).
1177
• Theft. Pen. Code, § 484.

SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.01[1], [4][h] (Matthew Bender).
1178
1820. Felony Unlawful Taking or Driving of Vehicle (Veh. Code,
§ 10851(a), (b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully taking or

driving a vehicle [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851].
prove that:
<Alternative A—taking with intent to deprive>
[1. The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s
consent;
2. When the defendant took the vehicle, (he/she) intended to deprive
the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any
period of time;
AND
3. The vehicle was worth more than $950.]
[OR]
<Alternative B—posttheft driving>
[1. The defendant drove someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s
consent;
AND
2. When the defendant drove the vehicle, (he/she) intended to
deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for
any period of time.]
[Even if you conclude that the owner had allowed the defendant or
someone else to take or drive the vehicle before, you may not conclude
that the owner consented to the driving or taking on
<insert date of alleged crime> based on that previous consent alone.]
[A taking requires that the vehicle be moved for any distance, no matter
how small.]
[A vehicle includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/
schoolbus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor/ [and] trailer/ [and]
semitrailer/ <insert other type of vehicle>).]
<Sentencing Factor: Ambulance, Police Vehicle, Fire Dept. Vehicle>
[If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a
1179
vehicle, you must then decide whether the People have proved the
additional allegation that the defendant took or drove an emergency
vehicle on call. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that:
1. The vehicle was (an ambulance/a distinctively marked law
enforcement vehicle/a distinctively marked fire department
vehicle);
2. The vehicle was on an emergency call when it was taken;
AND
3. The defendant knew that the vehicle was on an emergency call.
<Sentencing Factor: Modified for Disabled Person>
[If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a
vehicle, you must then decide whether the People have proved the
additional allegation that the defendant took or drove a vehicle modified
for a disabled person. To prove this allegation, the People must prove
that:
1. The vehicle was modified for the use of a disabled person;
2. The vehicle displayed a distinguishing license plate or placard
issued to disabled persons;
AND
vehicle was so modified and displayed the distinguishing plate or
placard.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges that the vehicle was an emergency vehicle or was
modified for a disabled person, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
sentencing factor. (Veh. Code, § 10851(b); see Veh. Code, § 10851(d) [fact issues for
jury].)
1180
If the defendant is charged with unlawfully driving or taking an automobile and

with receiving the vehicle as stolen property, and there is evidence of only one act
or transaction, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the
defendant cannot be convicted of both stealing the vehicle and receiving a stolen
vehicle. (People v. Black (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 525 [271 Cal.Rptr. 771];
People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 376 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].) In such
cases, give CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One
Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.
Similarly, a defendant cannot be convicted of grand theft of a vehicle and
unlawfully taking the vehicle in the absence of any evidence showing a substantial
break between the taking and the use of the vehicle. (People v. Kehoe (1949) 33
Cal.2d 711, 715 [204 P.2d 321]; see People v. Malamut (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 237,
242 [93 Cal.Rptr. 782] [finding substantial lapse between theft and driving].) In such
cases, give CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One
Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.
The bracketed paragraph that begins with “Even if you conclude that” may be given
on request if there is evidence that the owner of the vehicle previously agreed to let
the defendant or another person drive or take the vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851(c).)
The bracketed sentence defining “taking” may be given on request if there is a
question whether a vehicle that was taken was moved any distance. (People v. White
(1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862].)
The definition of “vehicle” may be given on request. (See Veh. Code, § 670
[“vehicle” defined].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 10851(a), (b); De Mond v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 340, 344 [368 P.2d 865].
• Ambulance Defined. Veh. Code, § 165(a).
• Owner Defined. Veh. Code, § 460.
• Application to Trolley Coaches. Veh. Code, § 21051.
• Expiration of Owner’s Consent to Drive. People v. Hutchings (1966) 242
Cal.App.2d 294, 295 [51 Cal.Rptr. 415].
• Taking Defined. People v. White (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862]
[any removal, however slight, constitutes taking]; People v. Frye (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180] [taking is limited to removing
vehicle from owner’s possession].
• Vehicle Value Must Exceed $950 for Felony Taking With Intent to Temporarily
or Permanently Deprive. People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 109 [260
Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 460 P.3d 262]; People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175,
1183–1187 [225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406 P.3d 319].
1181

• Attempted Unlawful Driving or Taking of Vehicle. Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code,
§ 10851(a), (b).
RELATED ISSUES
Other Modes of Transportation
The “joyriding” statute, Penal Code section 499b, now only prohibits the unlawful
taking of bicycles, motorboats, or vessels. The unlawful taking or operation of an
aircraft is a felony, as prohibited by Penal Code section 499d.
Community Property
A spouse who takes a community property vehicle with the intent to temporarily,
not permanently, deprive the other spouse of its use is not guilty of violating Vehicle
Code section 10851. (People v. Llamas (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1739–1740 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 357].)
Consent Not Vitiated by Fraud
The fact that an owner’s consent was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation does
not supply the element of nonconsent. (People v. Cook (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 716,
719 [39 Cal.Rptr. 802].)
Theft-Related Convictions
A person cannot be convicted of taking a vehicle and receiving it as stolen property
unless the jury finds that the defendant unlawfully drove the vehicle, as opposed to
unlawfully taking it, and there is other evidence that establishes the elements of
receiving stolen property. (People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757–759 [129
Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706]; People v. Cratty (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 98, 102–103
[91 Cal.Rptr.2d 370]; People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 372–374 [35
Cal.Rptr.2d 494].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 107–113.
Against the Person, § 142.10A, Ch. 143, Crimes Against Property, § 143.01[1][j],
[2][c], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).
1182
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (damaging/ [or]

tampering with) a vehicle [in violation of Vehicle Code section 10852].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—damaged or tampered with>
[1. The defendant willfully (damaged/ [or] tampered with) someone
else’s vehicle [or the contents of that vehicle];]
<Alternative 1B—broke or removed part of>
[1. The defendant willfully (broke/ [or] removed) part of someone
else’s vehicle;]
[AND]
2. The defendant did not have the owner’s consent to do that act(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on “in association with” others.>
[AND
3. The defendant acted in association with one or more other
persons.]
[A person acts in association with one or more other people, when he or
she joins with another to accomplish a common unlawful purpose.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant did not personally commit the act of
tampering but acted “in association with” others, give bracketed element 3 and the
paragraph that begins with “A person acts in association . . .” (People v. Farina
1183
(1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 291, 294 [33 Cal.Rptr. 794].) The court has a sua sponte
duty to also give CALCRIM No. 416, Evidence of Uncharged Conspiracy.
The statute uses the term “injure.” (Veh. Code, § 10852.) The committee has
replaced the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure”
generally refers to harm to a person rather than to property.
Give the bracketed definition of vehicle on request.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 10852.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• “In Association With” Means to Conspire With. People v. Farina (1963) 220
Cal.App.2d 291, 294 [33 Cal.Rptr. 794].
• Tamper Defined. People v. Anderson (1975) 15 Cal.3d 806, 810–811 [126
Cal.Rptr. 235, 543 P.2d 603]; People v. Mooney (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 502, 505
[193 Cal.Rptr. 381].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 308.
Against Property, § 143.10[1][b], [2][c] (Matthew Bender).
1184
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully taking a

(bicycle/vessel) [in violation of Penal Code section 499b].
prove that:
1. The defendant took someone else’s (bicycle/vessel) without the
owner’s consent;
AND
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to use [or operate]
the (bicycle/vessel) for any period of time.
[A taking requires that the (bicycle/vessel) be moved for any distance, no
matter how slight.]
[A vessel includes ships of all kinds, steamboats, steamships, canal boats,
barges, sailing vessels, and any structure intended to transport people or
merchandise over water.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The defendant cannot be convicted of both unlawfully taking a bicycle or vessel and
receiving the same item as stolen property where there is evidence of only one act
or transaction. (See People v. Black (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 525 [271 Cal.Rptr.
771]; People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 376 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494].)
Similarly, a defendant cannot be convicted of both an unlawful taking and theft of
the same item in the absence of evidence showing a substantial break between the
theft and the use of the property. (See People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715
[204 P.2d 321]; People v. Malamut (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 242 [93 Cal.Rptr.
782].) In such cases, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that the
defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses. Give CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple
Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.
On request, give the bracketed definition of “taking.” (People v. White (1945) 71
Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862].)
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a qualifying prior conviction
under Penal Code section 499, the court must give either CALCRIM No. 3100,
Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction:
1185
Bifurcated Trial, unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the conviction.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 499b.
• Felony Offense If Qualifying Prior Conviction. Pen. Code, § 499.
• Taking Defined. People v. White (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 525 [162 P.2d 862];
People v. Frye (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180].
• Expiration of Owner’s Consent. People v. Hutchings (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 294,
295 [51 Cal.Rptr. 415].
COMMENTARY
Prior to 1997, this statute also applied to the taking of vehicles. (See People v.
Howard (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 323, 326, fn. 2 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 849].) The
Legislature determined that the previous statute was duplicative of Vehicle Code
section 10851 and, therefore, restricted the scope of the statute to only bicycles and,
later, vessels. (Stats. 1996, ch. 660, § 3; see People v. Howard, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at p. 326, fn. 2.)
Prior to this amendment, a split in authority developed over whether this is a
specific-intent crime. The statute requires that the defendant take the item “for the
purpose of temporarily using or operating” it. (Pen. Code, § 499b(a) & (b).)
Analyzing the statute when it still applied to vehicles, the majority of cases held that
this required the specific intent to use or operate the vehicle. (People v. Howard
(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 323, 327–328 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 849]; People v. Ivans (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663–1664 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 66]; People v. Diaz (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 745, 749–751 [260 Cal.Rptr. 806].) One case, however, held that this
was a general-intent crime requiring only that the vehicle be taken by an act of
driving or operating. (People v. Frye (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090–1091 [34
Cal.Rptr.2d 180].) The reasoning of the court in People v. Frye, supra, is based on
the premise that one “takes” a vehicle by driving or operating it. (Id. at p. 1091
[“the ‘taking’ proscribed by Penal Code section 499b is an act of taking possession
through driving . . . .”].) As discussed in People v. Howard, supra, however, one
may “take” a vehicle without driving or operating it, such as by towing it. This
distinction is even more apparent in the context of bicycles and vessels, the only
items now covered by the statute. One can “take” a bicycle without using or
operating it by simply carrying it away. Similarly, if a vessel is on land, one can
“take” it without using or operating it by towing it away. In such circumstances, it
would appear that the person has not violated Penal Code section 499b unless there
is some evidence that he or she also intends to use or operate the bicycle or vessel.
Thus, in light of the amendments to the statute, the committee believes that the
reasoning of Howard and Diaz, supra, finding this to be a specific-intent crime, is
more persuasive.
1186

• Attempted Unlawful Taking of Bicycle or Vessel. Pen. Code, § 664; Pen. Code,
§ 499b.
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a prior conviction, then the
misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury
with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior conviction has been
proved. If the jury finds that the prior conviction has not been proved, then the
offense should be set at a misdemeanor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 113.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][j], [4][e] (Matthew Bender).
1187
C. EXTORTION
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with extortion by (threat/

[or] force) [in violation of Penal Code section 518].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—threatened to injure or used force>
[1. The defendant (threatened to unlawfully injure/ [or] used force
against) (another person or a third person/ [or] the property of
another person or a third person);]
<Alternative 1B—threatened to accuse of crime>
[1. The defendant threatened to accuse another person[, or that
person’s relative or family member,] of a crime;]
<Alternative 1C—threatened to expose secret>
[1. The defendant threatened to expose a secret about another
person[, or that person’s relative or family member,] [or to
expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a (disgrace[,]/ [or]
crime[,]/ [or] deformity)];]
2. When (making the threat/ [or] using force), the defendant
intended to use that (fear/ [or] force) to obtain the other person’s
consent (to give the defendant money [or property]/ [or] to give
the defendant anything of value [that involves (sexual conduct/
[or] an image of an intimate body part)]/ [or] to do an official
act);
3. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person
consented (to give the defendant money [or property]/ [or] to give
the defendant anything of value [that involves (sexual conduct/
[or] an image of an intimate body part)]/ [or] to do an official
act);
AND
4. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person then
(gave the defendant money [or property]/ [or] gave the defendant
anything of value [that involves (sexual conduct/ [or] an image of
an intimate body part)]/ [or] did an official act).
The term consent has a special meaning here. Consent for extortion can
be coerced or unwilling, as long as it is given as a result of the wrongful
use of force or fear.
1189
The (threat/use of force) must be the controlling reason that the other
person consented. If the person consented because of some other
controlling reason, the defendant is not guilty of extortion.
[Threatening to do something that a person has a legal right to do is not
a threat to commit an unlawful injury.]
[The threat may involve harm to be inflicted by the defendant or by
someone else.]
[An official act is an act that a person does in his or her official capacity,
using the authority of his or her public office.]
[A secret is a fact that:
1. Is unknown to the general public or to someone who might be
interested in knowing the fact;
AND
2. Harms the threatened person’s reputation or other interest so
greatly that he or she would be likely to (give the defendant
money [or property]/ [or] give the defendant anything of value
[that involves (sexual conduct/ [or] an image of an intimate body
part)]/ [or] do an official act) to prevent the fact from being
revealed.]
[Sexual conduct means any of the following:
[• Sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex or between humans and animals(;/.)]
[• Penetration of the vagina or rectum by any object(;/.)]
[• Masturbation for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the
viewer(;/.)]
[• Sadomasochistic abuse for the purpose of sexual stimulation of
the viewer(;/.)]
[• Exhibition of the genitals or the pubic or rectal area of any
person for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer(;/.)]
[• Defecation or urination for the purpose of sexual stimulation of
the viewer.]
[An intimate body part means any portion of the genitals, the anus, and,
in the case of a female, also includes any portion of the breasts below the
top of the areola that is either uncovered or clearly visible through
clothing.]
1190

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (See People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 788–790 [213 Cal.Rptr.
465].)
Depending on the evidence, in element 1, give the appropriate alternative A–C
describing the threat. (Pen. Code, § 519.)
For an instruction on the crime of kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion, see
CALCRIM No. 1202, Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519; People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
781, 789 [213 Cal.Rptr. 465].
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Hesslink (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781,
789–790 [213 Cal.Rptr. 465].
• Felony Punishment. Pen. Code, § 520.
• Property Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(10) and (12); see People v. Baker (1978) 88
Cal.App.3d 115, 119 [151 Cal.Rptr. 362] [includes right to file administrative
protest]; People v. Cadman (1881) 57 Cal. 562, 564 [includes right to prosecute
appeal]; People v. Kozlowski (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 853, 869 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d
504] [includes PIN code].
• Coerced Consent. People v. Goodman (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d
536]; People v. Peck (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881].
• Force or Fear Must Be Controlling Cause. People v. Goodman (1958) 159
Cal.App.2d 54, 61 [323 P.2d 536].
• Official Act Defined. See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485] [kidnapping for extortion]; People v. Norris (1985)
40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [same].
• Secret Defined. People v. Lavine (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496].
• Threat of Harm by Third Person. People v. Hopkins (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 708,
709–710 [233 P.2d 948].
• Unlawful Injury Defined. People v. Schmitz (1908) 7 Cal.App. 330, 369–370 [94
P. 407].
• Wrongful Defined. People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 83–84 [172 P. 152].
• Sexual Conduct Defined. Pen. Code, § 311.3(b).
• Intimate Body Part Defined. Pen. Code, § 647(j)(4)(C).
• Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524; see People v. Sales (2004) 116
1191
Cal.App.4th 741, 748–749 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 527]; People v. Franquelin (1952)

109 Cal.App.2d 777, 783–784 [241 P.2d 651]; Isaac v. Superior Court (1978) 79
Cal.App.3d 260, 263 [146 Cal.Rptr. 396]; People v. Lavine (1931) 115 Cal.App.
289, 297 [1 P.2d 496].
RELATED ISSUES
No Defense of Good Faith
A good faith belief in the right to property does not negate the specific intent
required for extortion. A debt cannot be collected by extortion. (People v. Beggs
(1918) 178 Cal. 79, 84 [172 P. 152]; see People v. Serrano (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1672, 1677–1678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 305] [kidnapping for ransom].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 119–124.
1192
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sending a threatening

letter with the intent to extort [in violation of Penal Code section 523].
prove that:
1. The defendant sent or delivered a threatening letter [or other
writing] to another person;
<Alternative 2A—threatened to injure>
[2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to unlawfully
injure (the other person or someone else/ [or] the property of the
other person or someone else);]
[2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to accuse the
other person[, or that person’s relative or family member,] of a
crime;]
[2. In the letter [or writing], the defendant threatened to expose a
secret about the other person[, or that person’s relative or family
member,] [or to expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a
(disgrace[,]/ [or] crime[,]/ [or] deformity)];]
AND
3. When sending or delivering the letter [or writing], the defendant
intended to use fear to obtain (money [or property]/[or] the
performance of an official act) with the other person’s consent.
The term consent has a special meaning here. Consent for extortion can
be coerced or unwilling, as long as it is given as a result of the wrongful
use of force or fear.
[The threat can be directly stated in the letter [or writing] or can be
implied by the contents of the letter [or writing] and the surrounding
circumstances or can be intended by the sender to be understood as a
threat by the recipient.]
[The letter [or writing] does not need to be signed and does not need to
have been (written/dictated/composed) by the defendant.]
[The crime is complete when the letter [or writing] is either delivered to
1193
someone or deposited in a post office or any other place, with the intent
that the letter [or writing] be forwarded to the intended recipient. It is
not required that the intended recipient actually receive the letter [or
writing].]
[It is not required that the intended recipient actually (give the
defendant money [or property]/ [or] do an official act).]
[An official act is an act that a person does in his or her official capacity,
using the authority of his or her public office.]
AND
greatly that he or she would be likely to (give the defendant
money[or property]/ [or] do an official act) to prevent the fact
from being revealed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
describing the threat. (Pen. Code, § 519.)
AUTHORITY
• Crime Complete When Mailed. Pen. Code, § 660.
• Felony Punishment. Pen. Code, § 520.
• Threats. Pen. Code, § 519.
536]; People v. Peck (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881] [extortion under
Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
• Official Act Defined. See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 769–773 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485] [kidnapping for extortion]; People v. Norris (1985)
40 Cal.3d 51, 55–56 [219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141] [same].
• Secret Defined. People v. Lavine (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496]
[extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
1194
P. 407] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
• Threat to Accuse of Crime Includes Threat to Continue Pursuit of Criminal
Charge. People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 640–641 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d
573].
COMMENTARY
Adding “official act” to section 518 expanded the definition of extortion in the
related code sections, including section 523, to include extortion of an official act.
(Isaac v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 260, 263–264 [146 Cal.Rptr. 396].)
• Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 125.
⁢Crimes Against Property, § 143.02 (Matthew Bender).
1195
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with obtaining a signature

by extortion [in violation of Penal Code section 522].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—threatened to injure or used force>
[1. The defendant (threatened to unlawfully injure/ [or] used force
against) (another person or someone else/ [or] the property of
another person or someone else);]
[1. The defendant threatened to accuse another person[, or that
person’s relative or family member,] of a crime;]
[1. The defendant threatened to expose a secret about another
person[, or that person’s relative or family member,] [or to
expose or connect (him/her/any of them) with a (disgrace[,]/ [or]
crime[,]/ [or] deformity)];]
2. When (making the threat/ [or] using force), the defendant
intended to use that (fear/ [or] force) to obtain the other person’s
signature on (a/an) (document/check/ <specify other
paper or instrument>) that, if voluntarily signed, would transfer
property or create a (debt/demand/charge/right of legal action);
AND
3. As a result of the (threat/ [or] use of force), the other person
signed the (document/check/ <specify other paper or
instrument>).
[The fear caused by the threat must be the controlling reason that the
other person signed the document. If the person signed the document
because of some other controlling reason, the defendant is not guilty of
extortion.]
AND
1196

greatly that he or she would be likely to sign (a/an) (document/
check/ <specify other paper or instrument>) to
prevent the fact from being revealed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
describing the threat. (See Pen. Code, § 519.)
AUTHORITY
536]; People v. Peck (1919) 43 Cal.App. 638, 645 [185 P. 881] [extortion under
Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
• Crime Complete When Document Signed. People v. Massengale (1970) 10
Cal.App.3d 689, 692 [89 Cal.Rptr. 237].
• Fear Must Be Controlling Cause. People v. Goodman (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 54,
61 [323 P.2d 536] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
• Secret Defined. People v. Lavine (1931) 115 Cal.App. 289, 295 [1 P.2d 496]
[extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
P. 407] [extortion under Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519].
• Threat to Accuse of Crime Includes Threat to Continue Pursuit of Criminal
Charge. People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 640–641 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d
573].
• Attempted Extortion. Pen. Code, § 524.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 126.
1197
If you find the defendant guilty of petty theft, you must then decide
whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the
defendant has been convicted of a theft offense before and served a term
in a penal institution as a result of that conviction. It has already been
determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits
<insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must decide
whether the evidence proves that the defendant was previously convicted
of the alleged crime[s].
1. The defendant was previously convicted of a theft offense;
AND
2. The defendant served a term in a penal institution for that
conviction.
The People allege that the defendant was previously convicted of:
[1.] A violation of <insert code section violated>, on
<insert date of conviction>, in the <insert
name of court>, in Case Number <insert docket or case
number>(;/.)
[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged>.]
[ <insert name of penal institution> is a penal institution.]
[A penal institution includes [a] (city jail/county jail/state prison/any
facility, camp, hospital, or institution operated to confine, treat, employ,
train, and discipline persons in the legal custody of the Department of
Corrections/federal prison/ <specify other institution>).]
[You must consider each alleged conviction separately.] The People have
the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has
not been proved.
1199

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior conviction.
(See Pen. Code, § 1025 [on defendant’s denial, jury must decide issue of prior
convictions]; People v. Barre (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)
Do not give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial.
The enhancement allegation under Penal Code section 666 applies only if the
defendant has been previously convicted of a crime listed in Penal Code sections
368(d) or (e) or 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or is required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration Act. If applicable, give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
NonBifurcated Trial.
If the court grants a bifurcated trial, on either of the offenses described in the
paragraph above or a qualifying prior theft conviction, give CALCRIM No. 3101,
Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 666; People v. Bruno (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1102,
1105 [237 Cal.Rptr. 31]; People v. Bean (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 639, 642 [261
Cal.Rptr. 784].
• Convictions From Other States. Pen. Code, § 668; People v. Perry (1962) 204
Cal.App.2d 201, 204 [22 Cal.Rptr. 54].
• Prior Incarceration Requirement. People v. James (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 604,
612 [318 P.2d 175] [service of partial term is sufficient]; People v. Valenzuela
(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 798, 803 [172 Cal.Rptr. 284] [custody resulting from
credit for time served is sufficient]; but see People v. Cortez (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 510, 513–514 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 445] [participation in work release
program alone is insufficient].
• Penal Institution Defined. Ex parte Wolfson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 20, 26 [180 P.2d
326] [includes county jail]; People v. Valenzuela (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 798,
803, 804, 807–808 [172 Cal.Rptr. 284] [includes California Rehabilitation
Center]; see Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(h) [defining state prison or federal penal
institution for purposes of prior prison term enhancement], 969b [prima facie
evidence of prior conviction and term served in any state or federal penitentiary,
reformatory, or county or city jail], 6081, 6082 [prison defined]; Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 851 [excludes juvenile hall].
If the defendant is charged with felony petty theft based on a prior conviction, then
the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the
jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior conviction has
been proved. If the jury finds that the prior conviction has not been proved, then the
1200
There is no crime of attempted petty theft with a prior conviction. None of the
elements of Penal Code section 666 may be attempted. (People v. Bean (1989) 213
Cal.App.3d 639, 642, fn. 4 [261 Cal.Rptr. 784].)
RELATED ISSUES
Jury Findings on Prior Convictions
The jury must determine the truth of the prior conviction unless jury trial is waived
or the defendant admits to the prior conviction. If more than one prior conviction is
charged, the jury must make a separate finding on each charged prior. (Pen. Code,
§ 1158; People v. Barre (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965–966 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)
Judicial Notice of Prior Conviction
It is error for a trial court to take judicial notice of a defendant’s alleged prior
conviction when a reasonable juror could only understand the notice to mean that
the court conclusively determined the prior-conviction allegation to be true. (People
v. Barre (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 965–966 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307].)
Defense Stipulation to Prior Convictions
The prior conviction and incarceration requirement of Penal Code section 666 is a
sentencing factor for the trial court and not an element of a section 666 offense.
(People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 478–480 [279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d
1076]; People v. Stevens (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 982, 987 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 13].) Thus,
the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (People v. Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d
at pp. 478–480; People v. Stevens, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 987; People v.
Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].)
If the defendant stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury
unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1093;
People v. Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 471–472, 480; People v. Hall (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)
Motion for Bifurcated Trial
Either the defendant or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (People v.
Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; People v. Cline (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; People v. Weathington, supra,
231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 9.
1201
A witness gave (his/her) opinion of the value of the property (he/she)

[allegedly] owned. In considering the opinion, you may but are not
required to accept it as true or correct. Consider the reasons the witness
gave for any opinion, the facts or information on which (he/she) relied in
forming that opinion, and whether the information on which the witness
relied was true and accurate. You may disregard all or any part of an
opinion that you find unbelievable or unreasonable. You may give the
opinion whatever weight, if any, you believe it deserves.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
When the owner of property testifies about his or her opinion of the value of the
property, give this instruction on request.
If an expert witness testified about its value, give CALCRIM No. 332, Expert
Witness Testimony.
AUTHORITY
• Owner May Testify to Value. People v. Coleman (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 358,
361 [35 Cal.Rptr. 141].
• Jury Must Decide What Weight to Give Owner Opinion. People v. Pena (1977)
68 Cal.App.3d 100, 102–103 [135 Cal.Rptr. 602].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 10.
1 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Opinion Evidence, §§ 18, 103.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][i] (Matthew Bender).
1203
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with theft.

The defendant has been prosecuted for theft under (two/ <insert
number>) theories: <insert theories, e.g., theft by trick, theft
by larceny, etc.>.
Each theory of theft has different requirements, and I have instructed
you on (both/all).
You may not find the defendant guilty of theft unless all of you agree
that the People have proved that the defendant committed theft under at
least one theory. But all of you do not have to agree on the same theory.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction when instructing on multiple forms of theft.
AUTHORITY
• Unanimity on Theft Theory Not Required. People v. McLemore (1994) 27
Cal.App.4th 601, 605 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 687]; People v. Counts (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 785, 792–793 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 425]; People v. Failla (1966) 64
Cal.2d 560, 567–569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39] [burglary case]; People v.
Nor Woods (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897] [addressing the issue for
theft].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1204
1862. Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft (Pen. Code,
§§ 512, 513)
If you conclude that the People have proved that the defendant
committed <insert charged theft crime>, the return or offer
to return (some/all) of the property wrongfully obtained is not a defense
to that charge.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
An instruction that restoration of wrongfully obtained property is no defense to a
charge of theft may be given on request. (See People v. Pond (1955) 44 Cal.2d 665,
674–675 [284 P.2d 793]; see also People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 297
[34 Cal.Rptr.2d 483] [court need not instruct on its own motion on specific points
developed at trial]; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462
P.2d 370].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513; see People v. Pond (1955)
44 Cal.2d 665, 674–675 [284 P.2d 793].
• Intent to Return Embezzled Property At Time of Taking Not a Defense Under
Pen. Code, § 512 Unless the Property was Returned Before the Person was
Charged. People v. Sisuphan (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 800, 812 [104 Cal.Rptr.3d
654].
RELATED ISSUES
Exception to Show Evidence of Intent
This instruction relates to wrongfully obtained property. However, a defendant may
present evidence that he or she restored or improved property to show that his or
her intent at the time of the taking was not larcenous. But there must be a relevant
and probative link in the defendant’s subsequent actions from which an original,
innocent intent might be inferred. (People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092,
1100–1101 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 821].)
Embezzlement of Public Funds
In a case of alleged embezzlement of public funds, it is error to instruct that
restoration may be used to mitigate punishment. (People v. Smith (1929) 206 Cal.
235, 237 [273 P. 789]; People v. Marquis (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 553, 558–559 [315
P.2d 57]; see Pen. Code, § 1203(e)(7) [probation prohibited for embezzlement of
public funds].)
1205
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.01[1][e] (Matthew Bender).
1206
1863. Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right (Pen. Code,
§ 511)
If the defendant obtained property under a claim of right, (he/she) did

not have the intent required for the crime of (theft/ [or] robbery).
The defendant obtained property under a claim of right if (he/she)
believed in good faith that (he/she) had a right to the specific property or
a specific amount of money, and (he/she) openly took it.
In deciding whether the defendant believed that (he/she) had a right to
the property and whether (he/she) held that belief in good faith, consider
all the facts known to (him/her) at the time (he/she) obtained the
property, along with all the other evidence in the case. The defendant
may hold a belief in good faith even if the belief is mistaken or
unreasonable. But if the defendant was aware of facts that made that
belief completely unreasonable, you may conclude that the belief was not
held in good faith.
[The claim-of-right defense does not apply if the defendant attempted to
conceal the taking at the time it occurred or after the taking was
discovered.]
[The claim-of-right defense does not apply to offset or pay claims against
the property owner of an undetermined or disputed amount.]
[The claim-of-right defense does not apply if the claim arose from an
activity commonly known to be illegal or known by the defendant to be
illegal.]
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant had the
intent required for (theft/ [or] robbery), you must find (him/her) not
guilty of <insert specific theft crime>.
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, August 2015, February 2016
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is a split in authority about whether the trial court must instruct sua sponte
on the defense of claim of right. (See People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
1415, 1429 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263] [sua sponte duty when claim of right supported];
but see People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 268–269 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d
679] [no sua sponte duty to instruct on claim of right], following People v.
Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 998 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408, 252 P.3d 968] [no sua
sponte duty to instruct on accident].)
AUTHORITY
• Defense. Pen. Code, § 511; People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 952, fn. 4
1207
[90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168]; People v. Anderson (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
93, 102 [185 Cal.Rptr.3d 128][third parties]; People v. Romo (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 514, 517, 518 [269 Cal.Rptr. 440].
• Good Faith Belief. People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 139–140 [127
Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317]; People v. Navarro (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1,
4, 10–11 [160 Cal.Rptr. 692].
• No Concealment of Taking. People v. Wooten (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1834,
1848–1849 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765].
• Not Available to Recover Unliquidated Claims. People v. Holmes (1970) 5
Cal.App.3d 21, 24–25 [84 Cal.Rptr. 889].
• Not Available to Recover From Notoriously or Known Illegal Activity. People v.
Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1181–1182 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].
• Claim of Right Defense Available to Aiders and Abettors. People v. Williams
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property §§ 27, 36, 38.
Against the Person, § 142.10[1][b], Ch. 143, Crimes Against Property,
§§ 143.01[1][d], 143.10[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
1208
Judicial Council of California
Criminal Jury Instructions
CALCRIM
2023
2
Series 1900–3500
Judicial Council of California

Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions
Hon. Jeffrey S. Ross, Chair
LexisNexis Matthew Bender

Official Publisher
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ISSN 1557-1378
ISBN 978-1-6633-5065-7 (print)
Copyright 2023, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. No copyright is claimed to the
text of the jury instructions, bench notes, authority, other Task Force and Advisory Committee commentary, or
references to secondary sources.
CITE THIS BOOK: Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2022 edition)
Cite these instructions: “CALCRIM No. _______.”
Editorial Office
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(5/2023–Pub.1284)
Publication Table of Contents
Volume 1
Preface
SERIES 100 PRETRIAL
SERIES 300 EVIDENCE
SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND

ACCESSORIAL CRIMES
SERIES 500 HOMICIDE
SERIES 1500 ARSON
iii
Volume 2
SERIES 2500 WEAPONS
SERIES 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER MISCEL-

LANEOUS OFFENSES
TABLES
Disposition Table
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
INDEX
v
Preface
SERIES 100 PRETRIAL

101. Cautionary Admonitions: Jury Conduct (Before, During, or After Jury Is Selected)
102. Note-Taking
104. Evidence
105. Witnesses
B. ADMONITIONS

vii
222. Evidence
226. Witnesses
C. CAUSATION
240. Causation

SERIES 300 EVIDENCE

B. WITNESSES
viii
334. Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice


370. Motive
ix
SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND ACCESSORIAL

CRIMES
402. Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine (Target and Non-Target Offenses
Charged)
404. Intoxication
B. CONSPIRACY

x
E. ATTEMPT
SERIES 500 HOMICIDE


506. Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property

D. FELONY MURDER
540A. Felony Murder: First Degree—Defendant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen. Code,
§ 189)
540B. Felony Murder: First Degree—Coparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act (Pen.
Code, § 189)
540C. Felony Murder: First Degree—Other Acts Allegedly Caused Death (Pen. Code, § 189)
xi
F. MANSLAUGHTER
(i) Voluntary
570. Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen. Code,
§ 192(a))
(ii) Involuntary
582. Involuntary Manslaughter: Failure to Perform Legal Duty—Murder Not Charged (Pen.
Code, § 192(b))
(iii) Vehicular
§ 191.5(b))
G. ATTEMPT
601. Attempted Murder: Deliberation and Premeditation (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 189, 664(a))
602. Attempted Murder: Peace Officer, Firefighter, Custodial Officer, or Custody Assistant
(Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 664(e))
603. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of Passion—Lesser Included Offense (Pen.
Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)
xii
604. Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense
(Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 192, 664)

626. Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes (Pen.
Code, § 29.4)
J. CHARGE TO JURY
With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of
Homicide
With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each Level of
Homicide
With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
701. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice Before June 6, 1990
702. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Other
Than Felony Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(c))
703. Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony
Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2(d))
xiii
707. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute
708. Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute
721. Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same Case) (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(3))
722. Special Circumstances: By Means of Destructive Device (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(4) &
(6))
723. Special Circumstances: Murder to Prevent Arrest or Complete Escape (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(5))
724. Special Circumstances: Murder of Peace Officer, Federal Officer, or Firefighter (Pen.
Code, § 190.2(a)(7), (8) & (9))
726. Special Circumstances: Murder of Judge, Prosecutor, Government Official, or Juror
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(11), (12), (13) & (20))
727. Special Circumstances: Lying in Wait—Before March 8, 2000 (Former Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(15))
§ 190.2(a)(15))
729. Special Circumstances: Murder Because of Race, Religion, or Nationality (Pen. Code,
§ 190.2(a)(16))
730. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
731. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Kidnapping With Intent to
Kill After March 8, 2000 (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
732. Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony—Arson With Intent to Kill
(Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17))
736. Special Circumstances: Killing by Street Gang Member (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(22))
737. Special Circumstances: Murder of Transportation Worker (Pen. Code, § 190.25)
750. Special Circumstances: Prior Murder Conviction (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(2))—Trial on
Prior Murder (Pen. Code, § 190.1(a) & (b))
xiv
L. DEATH PENALTY
763. Death Penalty: Factors to Consider—Not Identified as Aggravating or Mitigating (Pen.
Code, § 190.3)

A. MAYHEM
B. TORTURE

SPOUSE
(i) Child
821. Child Abuse Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death (Pen. Code, § 273a(a))
830. Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Likely to Produce Great Bodily Harm or Death
(Pen. Code, § 368(b)(1))
xv
(iii) Spouse, etc.
840. Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent Resulting in Traumatic
Condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a))
841. Simple Battery: Against Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent (Pen. Code, § 243(e)(1))
(iv) Evidence
850. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Credibility of Complaining
Witness
851. Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects: Offered by the Defense
D. ASSAULT

860. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce
Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(c) & (d))
861. Assault on Firefighter or Peace Officer With Stun Gun or Less Lethal Weapon (Pen.
Code, §§ 240, 244.5(c))
862. Assault on Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.3)
863. Assault on Transportation Personnel or Passenger With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely
to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245, 245.2)
(B) General
875. Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Pen.
Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(4), (b))
890. Assault With Intent to Commit Specified Crimes [While Committing First Degree
Burglary] (Pen. Code, § 220(a), (b))
xvi
900. Assault on Firefighter, Peace Officer or Other Specified Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 240, 241)
907. Assault Committed on Public Transportation Provider’s Property or Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§§ 240, 241.3)
(iv) Simple Assault
E. BATTERY
(i) Causing Injury

926. Battery Causing Injury to Specified Victim Not a Peace Officer (Pen. Code, §§ 242,
243(b)–(c)(1))
(ii) Sexual Battery
936. Sexual Battery on Institutionalized Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.4(b) & (d))
948. Battery Against Transportation Personnel or Passenger (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.3)
xvii
951. Battery Committed on School, Park, or Hospital Property (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2)
(iv) Simple Battery
(i) Shooting
966. Shooting at Uninhabited House or Unoccupied Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 247(b))
970. Shooting Firearm or BB Device in Grossly Negligent Manner (Pen. Code, § 246.3)
(ii) Brandishing
980. Brandishing Firearm in Presence of Occupant of Motor Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3)
983. Brandishing Firearm or Deadly Weapon: Misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 417(a)(1) & (2))

(i) Rape
xviii
1015. Oral Copulation by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 287(c)(2) & (3), (k))
1020. Oral Copulation of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 287(a), (h))
(iii) Sodomy
1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k))
1045. Sexual Penetration by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 289(a)(1), (2), (g))
1050. Sexual Penetration of a Disabled Person in a Mental Hospital (Pen. Code, § 289(c))
1060. Lewd or Lascivious Act: Dependent Person (Pen. Code, § 288(b)(2) & (c)(2))
xix

1070. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (d))
1071. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor More Than Three Years Younger (Pen. Code,
§ 261.5(a) & (c))
1072. Misdemeanor Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Minor Within Three Years of Defendant’s
Age (Pen. Code, § 261.5(a) & (b))
1081. Oral Copulation With Minor: Defendant 21 or Older (Pen. Code, § 287(b)(2))
(iii) Sodomy
(vi) Other Offenses
1124. Contacting Minor With Intent to Commit Certain Felonies (Pen. Code, § 288.3(a))
xx
1127. Engaging in Sexual Intercourse or Sodomy With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger
(Pen. Code, § 288.7(a))
1128. Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of Age or
Younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7(b))

1140. Distributing, Sending, or Exhibiting Harmful Material (Pen. Code, § 288.2(a)(1) & (2))
1141. Distributing Obscene Matter Showing Sexual Conduct by a Minor (Pen. Code,
§§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b))
1142. Distributing or Intending to Distribute Obscene Material (Pen. Code, § 311.2(a))
1145. Possession of Matter Depicting Minor Engaged in Sexual Conduct (Pen. Code,
§ 311.11(a))
(v) Other Offenses
1181. Sexual Abuse of Animal (Pen. Code, §§ 286.5, 597f)
xxi
D. EVIDENCE

A. KIDNAPPING
(i) Aggravated
1202. Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, Extortion or to Exact From Another Person (Pen.
Code, § 209(a))
1203. Kidnapping: For Robbery, Rape, or Other Sex Offenses (Pen. Code, § 209(b))
B. DEFENSES
§ 207(f)(1))
D. CHILD ABDUCTION
xxii
1251. Child Abduction: By Depriving Right to Custody or Visitation (Pen. Code, §§ 277,
278.5)
1252. Defense to Child Abduction: Protection From Immediate Injury (Pen. Code, § 278.7(a)
and (b))

B. HATE CRIMES
1350. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Force (Pen. Code,
§ 422.6(a))
1351. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Threat (Pen. Code,
§ 422.6(a) & (c))
1352. Hate Crime: Misdemeanor Interference With Civil Rights by Damaging Property (Pen.
Code, § 422.6(b))

1401. Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or Misdemeanor))
xxiii
SERIES 1500 ARSON
A. ARSON
(i) Aggravated
(ii) Simple Arson
1515. Arson (Pen. Code, § 451(c) & (d))



A. ROBBERY
B. CARJACKING
xxiv
A. BURGLARY


A. THEFT

C. EXTORTION
xxv

1862. Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft (Pen. Code, §§ 512, 513)
1863. Defense to Theft or Robbery: Claim of Right (Pen. Code, § 511)
xxvi
A. FORGERY

1903. Forgery by Altering or Falsifying Will or Other Legal Document (Pen. Code, § 470(c))
1904. Forgery by Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting Document (Pen. Code, § 470(d))
1905. Forgery by Passing or Attempting to Use Forged Document (Pen. Code, § 470(d))
1920. Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting a Driver’s License (Pen. Code, § 470a)
1921. Possessing or Displaying False, Altered, or Counterfeit Driver’s License (Pen. Code,
§ 470b)
1926. Possession of Counterfeit Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)
1932. Possession of Completed Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen. Code, § 475(c))
(v) Check Fraud
1945. Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False Document for Filing (Pen. Code,
§ 115)
xxvii
1951. Acquiring or Retaining an Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code, § 484e(c))
1957. Obtaining Money, etc., by Representing Self as Holder of Access Card (Pen. Code,
§ 484g(b))

1971. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient: Total Value of Checks (Pen.
Code, § 476a(b))
D. INSURANCE FRAUD

2023. False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 532a(4))
F. IDENTITY THEFT
2040. Unauthorized Use of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(a))
2041. Fraudulent Possession of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(c)(1),
(2), or (3))
2042. Fraudulent Sale, Transfer or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information (Pen.
Code, § 530.5(d)(1))
2043. Knowing Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information to
xxviii
Facilitate Its Unauthorized Use (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2))

A. DUI
(i) Causing Injury

2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury (Veh.
Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))
2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(b))
2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury With a Passenger for Hire
(Veh. Code, § 23153(e))
(ii) Without Injury
2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21 (Veh. Code, § 23140(a))
2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code,
§ 23152(e))
Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
(iv) Refusal
(i) Death or Injury

2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver (Veh.
Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Nondriving
xxix
Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense (Veh. Code,
§§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2150. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant Driver
(Veh. Code, § 20002)
(iii) Enhancement
2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for Vehicular Manslaughter
(Veh. Code, § 20001(c))
C. EVADING
2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a),
2800.3(a), (b))

2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601,
14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)

xxx
2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11352, 11379)
2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11352, 11379)
2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5,
11378, 11378.5)
2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With Firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1)
2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377)
2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault (Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
C. FORGED SUBSTANCE
2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11368)
D. MANUFACTURING

2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)
2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) &
(c))
2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-ethylamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a))
2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11383.5(b)(1))
xxxi
2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled Substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f))
E. CANNABIS

2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11360(a))
2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away Cannabis: More
Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
(iii) Planting
2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11357(b))
2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School Grounds:
Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))

2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353,
11354)
2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11380(a))
xxxii
2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353,
11354, 11380(a))
(ii) Marijuana
2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361)
2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a))
(i) Use
2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11550)
2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11365)
2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364)
2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 4326(a))
2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 4326(b))

Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
2432. Attorney’s Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction Involving
Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))

2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11366)
2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11366.8)
xxxiii
SERIES 2500 WEAPONS

2500. Illegal Possession, etc. of Weapon
2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310, 16470)

2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to
2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to
2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code, §§ 29815,
29825)
2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)
(i) Concealed
2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(a)(3))
(ii) Loaded
§§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction, Court Order, or
Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
xxxiv
2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(c)(6))
D. ASSAULT WEAPONS
2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)

2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier (Pen. Code,
§ 18725)
2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Injure or
Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen. Code,
§ 18745)
2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen. Code,
§ 18750)
2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or Great
2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)

Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
xxxv
2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code,
§ 67.5(b))
(i) Bribery
2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information Given (Pen.
Code, § 137(b))
2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 140(a))
D. PERJURY

2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code,
§ 148(b) & (c))
xxxvi
2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or Public
Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen. Code,
§ 148.10(a) & (b))

2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407, 409)
§§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
415.5(a)(2))

2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1),
273.6)
2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code,
§§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))
2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence (Pen.
Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))

xxxvii
2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4502)
2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County Road Camp
(Pen. Code, § 4574(a))
2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal Institution
(Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))
2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution (Pen. Code,
§ 4573.6)
2749. Bringing or Sending Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia Into Penal Institution (Pen.
Code, § 4573(a))
(iv) Escape

2765. Misappropriation of Public Money (Pen. Code § 424(a)(1)–(7))

A. FAILURE TO FILE
xxxviii
B. FALSE RETURN
2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))
2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706)

2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2))
2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4))
D. EVIDENCE
2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a))
E. DEFENSES

A. VANDALISM
B. LOITERING
xxxix
C. TRESPASS
D. ANIMALS

2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(a))
2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(d))
2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or Great
Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))
2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic Collision
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)

2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen. Code,
§ 272(b)(1))
G. BETTING
xl
H. MONEY LAUNDERING

3010. Eavesdropping or Recording Confidential Communication (Pen. Code, § 632(a))

A. PRIOR CONVICTION

3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code,
§ 12022(a)(2))
3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code, § 12022(d))

3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b))
xli
3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.06(a)(3))

12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen.
Code, § 12022.5(b))
3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or
Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))

3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7,
12022.8)
3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7(b))
F. SEX OFFENSES
§ 667.61(d)(2))
3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))
3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense (Pen.
Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(5))
3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(6))
3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to Engage in
xlii
Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
3185. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factor—Using Force or Fear Against Minor Under 14 Years/
14 Years or Older (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1(b), 286(c)(2)(B) & (C), 286(d)(2) & (3),
287(c)(2)(B) & (C), 287(d)(2) & (3), 289(a)(1)(B) & (C))
3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)
3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11379.8)
3224. Aggravating Factor: Great Violence, Great Bodily Harm, or High Degree of Cruelty,
Viciousness, or Callousness
3227. Aggravating Factor: Induced Others to Participate or Occupied Position of Leadership
or Dominance
I. TEMPLATES
3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue: Template—Bifurcated
Trial
3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior Conviction
xliii

A. GENERAL DEFENSES
3400. Alibi
3403. Necessity
3408. Entrapment
3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.775)
3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code, § 28)

3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600,
6600.1)
xliv
3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6605)
3456. Initial Commitment of Offender With A Mental Health Disorder as Condition of Parole
(Pen. Code, § 2970)
3457. Extension of Commitment as Offender With A Mental Health Disorder (Pen. Code,
§ 2970)
3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 1800)

3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily Injury
(Pen. Code, § 198.5)

A. UNANIMITY
3500. Unanimity

3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited
Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty
and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)
Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One
Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)
3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser Offenses—For Use When
xlv
Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Separately Charged (Non-Homicide)
C. ADMONITIONS
3530. Judge’s Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127,
1093(f))

E. ALTERNATES
3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before
Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen. Code, § 1089)

TABLES
Disposition Table
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
INDEX
xlvi
CRIMINAL WRITINGS AND FRAUD
A. FORGERY
1903. Forgery by Altering or Falsifying Will or Other Legal Document (Pen. Code,
§ 470(c))
1904. Forgery by Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting Document (Pen. Code,
§ 470(d))
1905. Forgery by Passing or Attempting to Use Forged Document (Pen. Code,
§ 470(d))
1920. Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting a Driver’s License (Pen. Code,
§ 470a)
1921. Possessing or Displaying False, Altered, or Counterfeit Driver’s License
(Pen. Code, § 470b)
1926. Possession of Counterfeit Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen.
Code, § 472)
1932. Possession of Completed Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen. Code,
§ 475(c))
(v) Check Fraud
1

1945. Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False Document for Filing
(Pen. Code, § 115)
1951. Acquiring or Retaining an Access Card or Account Number (Pen. Code,
§ 484e(c))
1957. Obtaining Money, etc., by Representing Self as Holder of Access Card (Pen.
Code, § 484g(b))
1971. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient: Total Value of
Checks (Pen. Code, § 476a(b))
D. INSURANCE FRAUD
2023. False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying Information (Pen. Code,
§ 532a(4))
F. IDENTITY THEFT
2040. Unauthorized Use of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code,
§ 530.5(a))
2
2041. Fraudulent Possession of Personal Identifying Information (Pen. Code,

§ 530.5(c)(1), (2), or (3))
2042. Fraudulent Sale, Transfer or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information
(Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(1))
2043. Knowing Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance of Personal Identifying Information
to Facilitate Its Unauthorized Use (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2))
3
A. FORGERY

The defendant is charged [in Count ] with forgery committed by

signing a false signature [in violation of Penal Code section 470(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant signed (someone else’s name/ [or] a false name) to
[a/an] <insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code,
§ 470(d)>;
2. The defendant did not have authority to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have that authority;
AND
4. When the defendant signed the document, (he/she) intended to
defraud.
Someone intends to defraud if he or she intends to deceive another
person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/
[or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to, a legal, financial,
or property right.
[It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer
a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant’s acts.]
[The People allege that the defendant forged the following documents:
<insert description of each document when multiple items
alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree
that the People have proved that the defendant forged at least one of
these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) forged.]
<Sentencing factor for instruments specified in Penal Code section 473(b)>
[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by false signature, you must
then decide whether the value of the (check/bond/bank bill/
note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than $950.
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the
(check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order)
5
CALCRIM No. 1900 CRIMINAL WRITINGS AND FRAUD
has a value of more than $950, you must find this allegation has not
been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant forged multiple
documents, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the
last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is
not required.)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not necessary” if the evidence
shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone. (People v. Morgan
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant passed or attempted to pass the
same document, give CALCRIM No. 1906, Forging and Passing or Attempting to
Pass: Two Theories in One Count.
If the charged crime involves an instrument listed in Penal Code section 473(b), use
the bracketed language beginning “If you find the defendant guilty . . .”
AUTHORITY
• Signature Not Authorized—Element of Offense. People v. Hidalgo (1933) 128
Cal.App. 703, 707 [18 P.2d 391]; People v. Maioli (1933) 135 Cal.App. 205, 207
[26 P.2d 871].
• Intent to Defraud. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Documents. People v. Sutherland (1993) 17
6
CRIMINAL WRITINGS AND FRAUD CALCRIM No. 1900
Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].

• Required Additional Findings. Pen. Code, § 473(b).
• Scope of Pen. Code, §473(b). People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.
RELATED ISSUES
Documents Not Specifically Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d)
A document not specifically listed in Penal Code section 470(d) may still come
within the scope of the forgery statute if the defendant “forges the . . . handwriting
of another.” (Pen. Code, § 470(b).) “[A] writing not within those listed may fall
under the part of section 470 covering a person who ‘counterfeits or forges the . . .
handwriting of another’ if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud anyone.
[Citations.] The false writing must be something which will have the effect of
defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.” (People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32
Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The document must affect an
identifiable legal, monetary, or property right. (Id. at p. 743; Lewis v. Superior Court
(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 398–399 [265 Cal.Rptr. 855] [campaign letter with false
signature of President Reagan could not be basis of forgery charge].) See
CALCRIM No. 1902, Forgery of Handwriting or Seal.
Check Fraud
A defendant who forges the name of another on a check may be charged under
either Penal Code section 470 or section 476, or both. (People v. Hawkins (1961)
196 Cal.App.2d 832, 838 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66]; People v. Pearson (1957) 151
Cal.App.2d 583, 586 [311 P.2d 927].) However, the defendant may not be convicted
of and sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; People
v. Hawkins, supra, 196 Cal.App.2d at pp. 839–840 [one count ordered dismissed];
see also CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One
Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.)
Credit Card Fraud
A defendant who forges the name of another on a credit card sales slip may be
charged under either Penal Code section 470 or section 484f, or both. (People v.
Cobb (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 1, 4.) However, the defendant may not be convicted
and sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; see also
CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual
Conviction Prohibited.)
Return of Property
Two cases have held that the defendant may present evidence that he or she
returned some or all of the property in an effort to demonstrate that he or she did
not originally intend to defraud. (People v. Katzman (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 777,
790 [66 Cal.Rptr. 319], disapproved on other grounds in Rhinehart v. Municipal
7
Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 780 fn. 11 [200 Cal.Rptr. 916, 677 P.2d 1206]; People
v. Braver (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 303, 307–308 [40 Cal.Rptr. 142].) However, other
cases have held, based on the particular facts of the cases, that such evidence was
not admissible. (People v. Parker (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 500, 510 [89 Cal.Rptr. 815]
[evidence that the defendant made full restitution following arrest not relevant];
People v. Wing (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [107 Cal.Rptr. 836] [evidence of
restitution not relevant where defendant falsely signed the name of another to a
check knowing he had no authority to do so].) If such evidence is presented, the
court may give CALCRIM No. 1862, Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft.
(People v. Katzman, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 791.) In addition, in People v.
Katzman, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 792, the court held that, on request, the
defense may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction that evidence of restitution may be
relevant to determining if the defendant intended to defraud. If the court concludes
that such an instruction is appropriate, the court may add the following language to
the beginning of CALCRIM No. 1862, Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft:
If the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of the] property
obtained, that conduct may show (he/she) did not intend to defraud. If you
conclude that the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of the]
property, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.
Inducing Mentally Ill Person to Sign Document
In People v. Looney (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 242, 248 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 502], the
court held that the defendants could not be prosecuted for forgery where the
evidence showed that the defendants induced a mentally ill person to sign legal
documents transferring property to them. The court concluded that, because the
defendants had accurately represented the nature of the documents to the mentally
ill person and had not altered the documents after he signed, they did not commit
forgery. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property §§ 165, 168–177.
Against Property, § 143.04[1][a], [d][2][a] (Matthew Bender).
8

endorsement [in violation of Penal Code section 470(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant signed (the back of a check/(a/an)
<insert type of negotiable instrument>) with (the name of the payee
of that (check/ <insert type of negotiable
instrument>)/ [or] the name of another person whose signature
was required to (cash that check/negotiate that instrument));
2. The defendant did not have authority to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have that authority;
AND
4. When the defendant signed the document, (he/she) intended to
defraud.
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant forged the following documents:
alleged>.
You may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the
People have proved that the defendant forged at least one of these
documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) forged.]
[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by endorsement, you must
then decide whether the value of the (check/bond/bank bill/
note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than $950.
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the
been proved.]
9

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
[26 P.2d 871].
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Forgery by Endorsement. People v. Maldonado (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 128,
133–134 [34 Cal.Rptr. 168]; In re Valencia (1927) 84 Cal.App. 26, 26 [259 P.
116].
• Scope of Pen. Code, § 473(b). People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44 [237
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
• Attempted Forgery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 470.
10
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 1900,
Forgery by False Signature.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 165, 168–177.
Against Property, § 143.04[1][b], [c], [d] (Matthew Bender).
11
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with forging [or

counterfeiting] the (handwriting/seal) of another person [in violation of
Penal Code section 470(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant forged [or counterfeited] the (handwriting/seal) of
another person on <insert type[s] of document[s] that
could defraud; see discussion in Related Issues>;
AND
2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to defraud.
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant forged [or counterfeited] the
following documents: <insert description of each document
when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty
unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant
forged [or counterfeited] at least one of these documents and you all
agree on which document (he/she) forged [or counterfeited].]
[If you find the defendant guilty of forging [or counterfeiting] the
(handwriting/seal) of another person, you must then decide whether the
value of the (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s
check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than $950. If you have a
reasonable doubt whether the value of the
been proved.]

12
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Applies to Document Not Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d). People v. Gaul-
Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
RELATED ISSUES
Documents Not Specifically Listed in Penal Code Section 470(d)
A document not specifically listed in Penal Code section 470(d) may still come
within the scope of the statute if the defendant “forges the . . . handwriting of
13
another.” (Pen. Code, 470(b).) However, not all writings are included within the
scope of this provision. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 379,
398–399 [265 Cal.Rptr. 855] [campaign letter with false signature of President
Reagan could not be basis of forgery charge].) “[A] writing not within those listed
may fall under the part of section 470 covering a person who ‘counterfeits or forges
the . . . handwriting of another’ if, on its face, the writing could possibly defraud
anyone. [Citations.] The false writing must be something which will have the effect
of defrauding one who acts upon it as genuine.” (People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741–742 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 176].) The document must affect an
identifiable legal, monetary, or property right. (Id. at p. 743; see also Lewis v.
Superior Court, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 398–399.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 165, 168–177.
14
1903. Forgery by Altering or Falsifying Will or Other Legal
Document (Pen. Code, § 470(c))

(altering[,]/ corrupting[,]/ [or] falsifying) a legal document [in violation of
Penal Code section 470(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (altered[,]/ corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) a document;
2. That document was [a record of] (a/an) (will[,]/ codicil[,]/
conveyance[,]/ [or] court judgment[,]/ [or] officer’s return to a
court’s process/ [or other] legal writing that the law accepts as
evidence);
AND
3. When the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified)
the document, (he/she) intended to defraud.
or property right.
[Someone alters a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a
part of the document that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]
[The People allege that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or]
falsified) the following documents: <insert description of
each document when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the
the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified) at least one of
these documents and you all agree on which document (he/she)
(altered[,]/ [or] corrupted[,]/ [or] falsified).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
15
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
If the prosecution alleges that the document was “corrupted,” the court may need to
draft a definition of this term based on the evidence.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Alteration Defined. People v. Nesseth (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 718–720 [274
P.2d 479]; People v. Hall (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 352 [130 P.2d 733].
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law 4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against
Property, §§ 165, 168–177.
16
1904. Forgery by Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting Document
(Pen. Code, § 470(d))

(falsely making[,]/ [or] altering[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] counterfeiting) a
document [in violation of Penal Code section 470(d)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or]
counterfeited) (a/an) <insert type[s] of document[s]
from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;
AND
or property right.
[A person alters a document if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a
[The People allege that the defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or]
forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) the following documents:
<insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You
may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People
have proved that the defendant (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or]
forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) at least one of these documents and you all
agree on which document (he/she) (falsely made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or]
forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by (falsifying[,]/[or]
altering[,]/[or] counterfeiting), you must then decide whether the value of
the (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s
check/money order) was more than $950. If you have a reasonable doubt
whether the value of the (check/bond/bank
bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) has a value of
more than $950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]
17

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 470(d) provides that every person who, with the intent to
defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters, publishes, passes or
18
attempts or offers to pass, as true and genuine, any of the items specified in
subdivision (d), knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, is
guilty of forgery. Penal Code section 470(d), as amended by Statutes 2005, ch. 295
(A.B. 361), became effective January 1, 2006. The amendment added “or falsifies
the acknowledgment of any notary public or any notary public who issues an
acknowledgment knowing it to be false” after the list of specified items. The
committee believes that the added language has introduced ambiguities. The phrase
“falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public” seems to refer back to “person”
at the beginning of subdivision (d), but it’s not clear whether this falsification must
also be done with the intent to defraud in order to be forgery. If so, why was
“acknowledgement of a notary public,” which is parallel in kind to the other
documents and instruments listed in subdivision (d), not simply added to the list of
items in subdivision (d)? With respect to the provisions regarding a notary public
who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false, it could be that the
Legislature intended the meaning to be that “[e]very person who . . . falsifies the
acknowledgment of . . . any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing
it to be false” is guilty of forgery. However, this interpretation makes the provision
superfluous, as the amendment separately makes it forgery to falsify the
acknowledgment of any notary public. Also, if a notary issues a false
acknowledgment, it seems unlikely that it would be further falsified by a defendant
who is not the notary, but who presumably sought and obtained the false
acknowledgement. Alternatively, the Legislature could have intended to make a
notary’s issuance of false acknowledgment an act of forgery on the part of the
notary. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 361 states that the bill
makes it a “misdemeanor for a notary public to willfully fail to perform the required
duties of a notary public” and makes “other related changes.” The bill amended a
number of sections of the Civil Code and the Government Code as well as Penal
Code section 470. The committee awaits clarification by the Legislature or the
courts to enable judges to better interpret the newly-added provisions to Penal Code
section 470(d).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ §§ 165, 168–177.
Against Property, § 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).
19
1905. Forgery by Passing or Attempting to Use Forged Document
(Pen. Code, § 470(d))

(passing[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] (attempting/ [or] offering) to use) a forged
document [in violation of Penal Code section 470(d)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or]
offered) to use) [a/an] (false[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or]
counterfeited) <insert type[s] of document[s] from
Pen. Code, § 470(d)>;
2. The defendant knew that the <insert type[s] of
document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>(was/were) (false[,]/
altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited);
AND
3. When the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or]
offered) to use) the <insert type[s] of document[s]
from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>, (he/she) intended that (it/they) be
accepted as genuine and (he/she) intended to defraud.
or property right.
A person (passes[,]/ [or] uses[,]/ [or] (attempts/ [or] offers) to use) a
document if he or she represents to someone that the document is
genuine. The representation may be made by words or conduct and may
be either direct or indirect.
[The People allege that the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or]
(attempted/ [or] offered) to use) the following documents:
<insert description of each document when multiple items alleged>. You
may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People
have proved that the defendant (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/
20
[or] offered) to use) at least one document that was (false[,]/ [or]
altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) and you all agree on which
document (he/she) (passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to
use).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of forgery by (passing[,]/[or] using[,]/
[or] attempting[,]/[or] offering to use) a forged document, you must then
decide whether the value of the (check/bond/bank bill/note/
cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than $950. If
you have a reasonable doubt whether the value of the
been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant passed or
attempted to use multiple forged documents, the court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619,
fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items
alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing
when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770], defines the
term “utter” as to “use” or “attempt to use” an instrument. The committee has
omitted the unfamiliar term “utter” in favor of the more familiar terms “use” and
“attempt to use.”
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
If the prosecution also alleges that the defendant forged the same document, give
CALCRIM No. 1906, Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories in
One Count.
AUTHORITY
21

Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Pass or Attempt to Use Defined. People v. Tomlinson (1868) 35 Cal. 503, 509;
People v. Jackson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled
on other grounds in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240
Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
• Required Additional Findings. Pen.Code, § 473(b).
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
COMMENTARY
The committee was unable to locate any authority for what constitutes “offering to
pass” a forged document. In People v. Compton (1899) 123 Cal. 403, 409–411 [56
P. 44], the court held that attempting to pass a forged document requires, at a
minimum, that the defendant present the document to an innocent party, with an
assertion that the document is genuine. (Ibid.; see also People v. Fork (1965) 233
Cal.App.2d 725, 730–731 [43 Cal.Rptr. 804] [discussing sufficiency of the evidence
for attempting to pass].) In light of this holding, it is unclear if any act less than this
would be sufficient for a conviction for “offering to pass.” The committee urges
caution when considering whether to instruct the jury with the phrase “offering to
pass.”
Penal Code section 470(d) provides that every person who, with the intent to
defraud, falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits, utters, publishes, passes or
attempts or offers to pass, as true and genuine, any of the items specified in
subdivision (d), knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, is
guilty of forgery. Penal Code section 470(d), as amended by Statutes 2005, ch. 295
(A.B. 361), became effective January 1, 2006. The amendment added “or falsifies
the acknowledgment of any notary public or any notary public who issues an
acknowledgment knowing it to be false” after the list of specified items. The
committee believes that the added language has introduced ambiguities. The phrase
“falsifies the acknowledgment of any notary public” seems to refer back to “person”
at the beginning of subdivision (d), but it’s not clear whether this falsification must
also be done with the intent to defraud in order to be forgery. If so, why was
“acknowledgement of a notary public,” which is parallel in kind to the other
documents and instruments listed in subdivision (d), not simply added to the list of
items in subdivision (d)? With respect to the provisions regarding a notary public
who issues an acknowledgment knowing it to be false, it could be that the
Legislature intended the meaning to be that “[e]very person who . . . falsifies the
acknowledgment of . . . any notary public who issues an acknowledgment knowing
22
it to be false” is guilty of forgery. However, this interpretation makes the provision

superfluous, as the amendment separately makes it forgery to falsify the
acknowledgment of any notary public. Also, if a notary issues a false
acknowledgment, it seems unlikely that it would be further falsified by a defendant
who is not the notary, but who presumably sought and obtained the false
acknowledgement. Alternatively, the Legislature could have intended to make a
notary’s issuance of false acknowledgment an act of forgery on the part of the
notary. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill 361 states that the bill
makes it a “misdemeanor for a notary public to willfully fail to perform the required
duties of a notary public” and makes “other related changes.” The bill amended a
number of sections of the Civil Code and the Government Code as well as Penal
Code section 470. The committee awaits clarification by the Legislature or the
courts to enable judges to better interpret the newly-added provisions to Penal Code
section 470(d).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 178.
23
1906. Forging and Passing or Attempting to Pass: Two Theories
in One Count
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with forgery of [a/an]

<insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code, § 470(d)>.
The defendant is being prosecuted for forgery under two theories: (1)
that the defendant forged the document; and (2) that the defendant
(passed[,]/ used[,]/ [or] (attempted/ [or] offered) to use) the forged
document.
Each theory of forgery has different requirements, and I have instructed
you on both.
You may not find the defendant guilty of forgery unless all of you agree
that the People have proved that the defendant committed forgery under
at least one theory. But all of you do not have to agree on the same
theory.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction is to be given when the prosecution pursues the two theories of
forgery of a single document in one count. (See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17
AUTHORITY
• Unanimity on Theory Not Required. People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
602, 618–619 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 178.
24
1920. Falsifying, Altering, or Counterfeiting a Driver’s License
(Pen. Code, § 470a)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (altering[,]/ [or]

falsifying[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] duplicating[,]/ [or] reproducing[,]/ [or]
counterfeiting) a (driver’s license/ [or] government-issued identification
card) [in violation of Penal Code section 470a].
prove that:
1. The defendant (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or]
duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) a (driver’s
license/ [or] government-issued identification card);
AND
2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended that the
(driver’s license/ [or] identification card) be used to help commit
forgery.
Someone intends to commit forgery if he or she intends to use a forged,
counterfeit, altered, falsified, duplicated, or reproduced document to
deceive another person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal,
financial, or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or]
forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) the
following documents: <insert description of each document
when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty
unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
(altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or]
reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) at least one of these documents and
you all agree on which document (he/she) (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or]
forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited).]
New January 2006

25
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 470a.
• Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. People v. Sutherland (1993) 17
• Possession of Altered Driver’s License. Veh. Code, § 14610.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 199–200.
26
1921. Possessing or Displaying False, Altered, or Counterfeit
Driver’s License (Pen. Code, § 470b)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (possessing[,]/ [or]

displaying[,]/ [or] causing [or permitting] to be displayed) (an/a)
(altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or]
reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited) (driver’s license/ [or] government-
issued identification card) [in violation of Penal Code section 470b].
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or
permitted] to be displayed) a (driver’s license/ [or] government-
issued identification card);
2. The (driver’s license/ [or] government-issued identification card)
was (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/
[or] reproduced[,]/ [or] counterfeited);
3. The defendant knew that the (driver’s license/ [or] government-
issued identification card) had been (altered[,]/ [or] falsified[,]/
[or] forged[,]/ [or] duplicated[,]/ [or] reproduced[,]/ [or]
counterfeited);
AND
4. When the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused
[or permitted] to be displayed) the (driver’s license/ [or]
government-issued identification card), (he/she) intended that the
document be used to commit forgery.
Someone intends to commit forgery if he or she intends to use a forged,
counterfeit, altered, falsified, duplicated, or reproduced document to
deceive another person in order to cause a loss of, or damage to, a legal,
financial, or property right.
27

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/ [or]
caused [or permitted] to be displayed) the following documents:
<insert description of each documents when multiple items
alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that
the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] displayed[,]/
[or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed) at least one of these
documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) (possessed[,]/
[or] displayed[,]/ [or] caused [or permitted] to be displayed).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Possession of Altered Driver’s License. Veh. Code, § 14610.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 199–200.
28

29
1925. Forgery of Government, Public, or Corporate Seal (Pen.
Code, § 472)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (forging/ [or]

counterfeiting) a (government/public/corporate) seal [or (falsely
making[,]/ [or] forging[,]/ [or] counterfeiting) an impression representing
a seal] [in violation of Penal Code section 472].
prove that:
1. The defendant (forged/ [or] counterfeited) a seal [or (falsely
made[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited) an impression
representing a seal] of (this state[,] /[or] a legally authorized
public officer[,] /[or] a court of record[,] /[or] a corporation[,]/
[or] a public seal legally authorized or recognized by any state,
government, or country);
AND
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant (forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited[,]/ [or]
falsely made) the following items: ___________ <insert description of each
seal or impression when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the
defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that
the defendant (forged[,]/ [or] counterfeited[,]/ [or] falsely made) at least
one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) (forged[,]/
[or] counterfeited[,]/ [or] falsely made).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
30
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Attempted Forgery of Seal. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 472.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 199–200.
31
1926. Possession of Counterfeit Government, Public, or
Corporate Seal (Pen. Code, § 472)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing a counterfeit

(government/public/corporate) seal [or an impression of a counterfeit
(government/public/corporate) seal] [in violation of Penal Code section
472].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a counterfeit seal [or an impression of a
counterfeit seal] of (this state[,]/ [or] a legally authorized public
officer[,]/ [or] a court of record[,]/ [or] a corporation[,]/ [or] a
public seal legally authorized or recognized by any state,
government, or country);
2. The defendant knew that the seal [or impression of the seal] was
counterfeit;
3. The defendant willfully concealed the fact that the seal [or
impression of the seal] was counterfeit;
AND
4. When the defendant possessed the seal [or impression of the seal],
(he/she) intended to defraud.
purpose.
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following items:
<insert description of each seal or impression when multiple
items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all
32
agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least
one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed multiple
forged items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People
v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Attempted Possession of Counterfeit Seal. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 472.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 199–200.
33
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (possessing/ [or]

receiving) (a/an) (forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit) document [in
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed/ [or] received) (a/an) (forged[,]/ [or]
altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit) (document/ [or] completed
<insert type[s] of document[s] from Pen. Code,
§ 470(d)>);
2. The defendant knew that the document was (forged[,]/ [or]
altered[,]/ [or] counterfeit);
3. The defendant intended to (pass[,]/ [or] use[,]/ [or] aid the
passage or use of) the document as genuine;
AND
4. When the defendant (possessed/ [or] received) the document, (he/
she) intended to defraud.
or property right.
A person (passes/ [or] uses) a document if he or she represents to
someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made
by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following documents:
the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these
documents and you all agree on which document (he/she) possessed.]
34
[If you find the defendant guilty of (possessing/ [or] receiving) (a/an)
(forged[,]/ [or] altered[,]/[or] counterfeit) document, you must then
decide whether the value of the (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s
check/traveler’s check/money order) was more than $950. If you have a
reasonable doubt whether the value of the (check/bond/bank bill/note/
cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) has a value of more than
$950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.
New January 2006; Revised March 2019, October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
forged items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People
v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 475(a); People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th
314, 330–333 [258 Cal.Rptr.3d 670].
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
People v. Jackson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 562 [155 Cal.Rptr. 89],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104,
1123 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
35
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
RELATED ISSUES
Possession and Uttering
The defendant cannot be convicted of possessing and uttering the same document.
(People v. Reisdorff (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 675, 679 [95 Cal.Rptr. 224].)
Possession of Multiple Documents Only One Offense
Even if the defendant possessed multiple forged documents at the same time, only
one violation of Penal Code section 475 may be charged. (People v. Bowie (1977)
72 Cal.App.3d 143, 156–157 [140 Cal.Rptr. 49] [11 checks supported 1 count, not
11].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 192.
36
1931. Possession of Blank Check: With Intent to Defraud (Pen.
Code, § 475(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing a (blank/

[or] unfinished) (check[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s
check[,]/ [or] bank bill) with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal
Code section 475(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a (blank/ [or] unfinished) (check[,]/ [or]
note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check[,]/ [or] bank
bill);
AND
2. When the defendant possessed the document, (he/she) intended to
complete [or aid the completion of] the document in order to
defraud.
or property right.
[The (check[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check[,]/
[or] bank bill) may be real or fictitious.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
37
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1930, Possession of Forged
Document.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 192.
38
1932. Possession of Completed Check: With Intent to Defraud
(Pen. Code, § 475(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing a completed

(check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check[,]/ [or] warrant or
county order) with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section
475(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a completed (check[,]/ [or] money
order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check[,]/ [or] warrant or county order);
AND
(pass[,]/ [or] use[,]/ [or] aid the passage or use of) the document
in order to defraud.
or property right.
A person (passes/ [or] uses) a document if he or she represents to
someone that the document is genuine. The representation may be made
by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.
[The (check[,]/ [or] money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check[,]/ [or] warrant
or county order) may be real or false.]
[If you find the defendant guilty of possessing a completed (check[,]/ [or]
money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check) with intent to defraud, you must
then decide whether the value of the (check[,]/ [or] money
order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check) was more than $950. If you have a
39
reasonable doubt whether the value of the (check[,]/ [or]

money order[,]/ [or] traveler’s check) has a value of more than $950, you
must find this allegation has not been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 1930, Possession of Forged
Document.
40
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 192.
41
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with making or possessing

counterfeiting equipment [in violation of Penal Code section 480].
prove that:
1. The defendant [made] [or] [possessed] (a/an) (die/ [or] plate/ [or]
apparatus/ [or] paper/ [or] metal/ [or] machine/ [or]
<insert other item>);
[2. The defendant knew of the equipment’s presence;]
AND
(2/3). The defendant knew that the (die/ [or] plate/ [or] apparatus/ [or]
paper/ [or] metal/ [or] machine/ [or] <insert other
item>) had been or would be used to counterfeit (coin/gold dust/
gold or silver (bars/bullion/lumps/pieces/nuggets)/bank notes or
bills).
<insert description of each item when multiple items alleged>.
You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the
People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of these
items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]
New March 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The defendant knew” if the defendant
is charged with possessing the equipment. Do not give this bracketed sentence if the
defendant is only charged with making the equipment.
counterfeiting equipment, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity.
(See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d
42
752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also
Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on
unanimity is and is not required.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements Pen. Code, § 480; People v. Seo (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1081,
1084–1085 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d 497].
• Statute Constitutional Ex parte Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 763–764 [264 P.2d
513].
• Possession of the Means for Counterfeiting Does Not Include Possession of
Completed Counterfeit Items People v. Clark (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1267
[13 Cal.Rptr.2d 209].
• Bills Include Federal and Foreign Currency People v. McDonnell (1889) 80 Cal.
285, 287 [22 P. 190]; People v. Ray (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1723 [50
Cal.Rptr.2d 612].
• Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items People v. Sutherland (1993) 17
43
(v) Check Fraud
1935. Making, Passing, etc., Fictitious Check or Bill (Pen. Code,
§ 476)

making[,]/ [or] passing[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to pass or use)
(a/an) (false/ [or] altered) (check[,]/ [or] bill[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or other]
legal writing for the payment of money or property) [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) (a/an) (false/ [or] altered)
(check[,]/ [or] bill[,]/ [or] note[,]/ [or other] legal writing for the
payment of money or property);
2. The defendant knew that the document was (false/ [or] altered);
[AND]
3. When the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) the document, (he/she)
intended to defraud(;/.)
<Give element 4 only when possession charged.>
[AND
pass or use the document as genuine.]
or property right.
A person (passes[,]/ [or] uses[,]/ [or] attempts to pass or use) a document
if he or she represents to someone that the document is genuine. The
representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either
direct or indirect.
44
[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or]
passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) the following
documents: <insert description of each document when
multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you
all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/
[or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use) at
least one document that was (fictitious/ [or] altered) and you all agree on
which document (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] passed[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to pass or use).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of (possessing[,]/[or] making[,]/ [or]
passing [,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to pass or use) a fictitious
(check/bill/note/legal writing), you must then decide whether the value of
the (check/bond/bank bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s
check/money order) was more than $950. If you have a reasonable doubt
whether the value of the (check/bond/bank
bill/note/cashier’s check/traveler’s check/money order) has a value of
more than $950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant passed or
possessed multiple forged documents, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21
Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged.
(See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when
instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant possessed the document, give element
4. Do not give element 4 if the prosecution alleges that the defendant made, passed,
used, or attempted to pass or use the document.
45
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
• Explanation of “Fictitious.” People v. Mathers (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1464,
1467–1468 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 720].
Cal.Rptr.3d 193, 424 P.3d 280].
• Attempted Making, etc., of Fictitious Check. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 476.
RELATED ISSUES
Check Fraud
A defendant who forges the name of another on a check may be charged under
either Penal Code section 470 or section 476. (People v. Hawkins (1961) 196
Cal.App.2d 832, 838 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66]; People v. Pearson (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d
583, 586 [311 P.2d 927].) However, the defendant may not be convicted of and
sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Pen. Code, § 654; People v.
Hawkins, supra, 196 Cal.App.2d at pp. 839–840; see also CALCRIM No. 3516,
Multiple Counts—Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 178, 192, 195.
46
47
1945. Procuring Filing of False Document or Offering False
Document for Filing (Pen. Code, § 115)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (offering a (false/ [or]

forged) document for (filing[,]/ [or] recording[,]/ [or] registration)/having
a (false/ [or] forged) document (filed[,]/ [or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered))
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—offering>
[1. The defendant offered a (false/ [or] forged) document for (filing[,]/
[or] recording[,]/ [or] registration) in a public office in
California;]
<Alternative 1B—procuring>
[1. The defendant caused a (false/ [or] forged) document to be
(filed[,]/ [or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered) in a public office in
California;]
2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) knew that the
document was (false/ [or] forged);
AND
3. The document was one that, if genuine, could be legally (filed[,]/
[or] recorded[,]/ [or] registered).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Materiality of Alteration Not Element. People v. Feinberg (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th
1566, 1578–1579 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
• Meaning of Instrument as Used in Penal Code section 115. People v. Parks
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 886–887 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 450]; Generes v. Justice
Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682–684 [165 Cal.Rptr. 222]; People v.
48
Powers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 295–297 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 619].

RELATED ISSUES
Meaning of Instrument
Penal Code section 115 applies to any “instrument” that, “if genuine, might be filed,
registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States . . . .”
(Pen. Code, § 115(a).) Modern cases have interpreted the term “instrument”
expansively, including any type of document that is filed or recorded with a public
agency that, if acted on as genuine, would have the effect of deceiving someone.
(See People v. Parks (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 886–887 [9 CalRptr.2d 450];
Generes v. Justice Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682–684 [165 Cal.Rptr. 222].)
Thus, the courts have held that “instrument” includes a modified restraining order
(People v. Parks, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 886), false bail bonds (People v. Garcia
(1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 297, 306–307 [273 Cal.Rptr. 666]), and falsified probation
work referrals (People v. Tate (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 663, 667 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d
206]). In People v. Powers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 297 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 619],
the court held that fishing records were “instruments” under Penal Code section 115.
The court stated that “California courts have shown reluctance to interpret section
115 so broadly that it encompasses any writing that may be filed in a public office.”
(Id. at p. 295.) The court adopted the following analysis for whether a document is
an “instrument,” quoting the Washington Supreme Court:
(1) the claimed falsity relates to a material fact represented in the
instrument; and (2a) the information contained in the document is of
such a nature that the government is required or permitted by law,
statute or valid regulation to act in reliance thereon; or (2b) the
information contained in the document materially affects significant
rights or duties of third persons, when this effect is reasonably
contemplated by the express or implied intent of the statute or valid
regulation which requires the filing, registration, or recording of the
document.
(Id. at p. 297 [quoting State v. Price (1980) 94 Wash.2d 810, 819 [620 P.2d 994].)
Each Document Constitutes a Separate Offense
Penal Code section 115 provides that each fraudulent instrument filed or offered for
filing constitutes a separate violation (subdivision (b)) and may be punished
separately (subdivision (d)). “Thus, the Legislature has unmistakably authorized the
imposition of separate penalties for each prohibited act even though they may be
part of a continuous course of conduct and have the same objective.” (People v.
Gangemi (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1800 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 462].)
Meaning of False
Unlawful procurement of a deed does not make it a false or forged document.
(People v. Schmidt (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1056–1058 [254 Cal.Rptr.3d 694].)
49
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 188–189.
Against Property, § 143.04[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
50
1950. Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account Number (Pen.
Code, § 484e(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (selling[,]/ [or]

transferring[,]/ [or] conveying) an access card [in violation of Penal Code
section 484e(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) an
access card;
2. The defendant did so without the consent of the cardholder or the
issuer of the card;
AND
3. When the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed)
the access card, (he/she) intended to defraud.
An access card is a card, plate, code, account number, or other means of
account access that can be used, alone or with another access card, to
obtain (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] anything of value), or
that can be used to begin a transfer of funds[, other than a transfer
originated solely by a paper document].
[(A/An) <insert description, e.g., ATM card, credit card> is an
access card.]
A cardholder is someone who has been issued an access card [or who has
agreed with a card issuer to pay debts arising from the issuance of an
access card to someone else].
A card issuer is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or
person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.
[Selling means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of
value.]
or property right.
51

[The People allege that the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or]
conveyed) the following access cards: <insert description of
each card when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant
guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved that the
defendant (sold[,]/ [or] transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed) at least one of these
cards and you all agree on which card (he/she) (sold[,]/ [or]
transferred[,]/ [or] conveyed).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of (selling[,]/ [or] transferring[,]/ [or]
conveying) an access card, you must then decide whether the value of the
access card was more than $950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether
the value of the access card was more than $950, you must find this
allegation has not been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant sold or transferred
multiple cards, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752].)
Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench
Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on unanimity
is and is not required.)
In the definition of “access card,” the court may give the bracketed portion that
begins with “other than a transfer” at its discretion. This statement is included in the
statutory definition of access card. (Pen. Code, § 484d(2).) However, the committee
believes it would rarely be relevant.
The court may also give the bracketed sentence stating “(A/An) is an
access card” if the parties agree on that point.
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(a).
52
• Definitions. Pen. Code, § 484d.

Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Cal.App.4th 602, 619].
• Value Must Exceed $950 For Felony. People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th
903, 908–910 [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633].
Possession of Access Card With Intent to Sell (Pen. Code, § 484e(c)) may be a
lesser included offense. (But see People v. Butler (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224,
1245–1246 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].)
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Charges Based on Single Act
Prosecution under Penal Code section 484d et seq. does not preclude simultaneous
prosecution under other statutes for the same conduct. (People v. Braz (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 553]; People v. Butler (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224,
1243–1244 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].) Thus, the defendant may also be charged with
such offenses as burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), forgery (Pen. Code, § 470), grand theft
(Pen. Code, § 487), or telephone fraud (Pen. Code, § 502.7). (People v. Braz, supra,
57 Cal.App.4th at p. 8; People v. Butler, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243–1244.)
However, Penal Code section 654 may preclude punishment for multiple offenses.
(People v. Butler, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.)
Cloned Cellular Phone
“[T]he Legislature intended that the definition of access card be broad enough to
cover future technologies, the only limitation being on purely paper transactions. As
the evidence disclosed here, a cloned cellular phone is a sophisticated and unlawful
‘means of account access’ to the account of a legitimate telephone subscriber.”
(People v. Butler (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1244 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 215–216.
53
1951. Acquiring or Retaining an Access Card or Account Number
(Pen. Code, § 484e(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully (acquiring/

[or] retaining) an access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484e(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) an access card;
issuer of the card;
AND
3. When the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the access card, (he/
she) intended to defraud by (using it[,]/ [or] selling or
transferring it to someone other than the cardholder or issuer).
access card.]
[Selling means exchanging something for money, services, or anything of
value.]
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the
54
following access cards: <insert description of each card when

multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you
all agree that the People have proved that the defendant (acquired/ [or]
retained) at least one of these cards and you all agree on which card (he/
she) (acquired/ [or] retained).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant acquired or
retained multiple cards, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity.
752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also
Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on
unanimity is and is not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(c).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
55
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 215–216.
56
1952. Acquiring or Retaining Account Information (Pen. Code,
§ 484e(d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (acquiring/ [or]

retaining) the account information of an access card [in violation of
Penal Code section 484e(d)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information
of an access card that was validly issued to someone else;
issuer of the card;
AND
3. When the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account
information, (he/she) intended to use that information
fraudulently.
access card.]
or property right.
[The People allege that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the
account information of the following access cards: <insert
57
description of each card when multiple items alleged>. You may not find
the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved
that the defendant (acquired/ [or] retained) the account information of at
least one of these cards and you all agree on which card’s account
information (he/she) (acquired/ [or] retained).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of (acquiring/ [or] retaining) the
account information of an access card, you must then decide whether the
value of the account information was more than $950. If you have a
reasonable doubt whether the value of the account information was more
than $950, you must find this allegation has not been proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant possessed the
account information of multiple cards, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21
Cal.Rptr.2d 752].) Give the last bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged.
(See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, discussing when
instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484e(d).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
58

• Value Must Exceed $950 for Felony. People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th
903, 908–910 [215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758, 391 P.3d 633].
RELATED ISSUES
Acquires
“If appellant is arguing that only the person who first acquires this information with
the requisite intent is guilty of the crime, we disagree. We interpret the crime to
apply to any person who acquires that information with the intent to use it
fraudulently.” (People v. Smith (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d
75].)
Includes Possession of Cancelled Card
In People v. Molina (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 507, 511 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 493], the
defendant possessed a cancelled access card that had been issued to someone else.
The court held that this constituted a violation of Penal Code section 484e(d). (Id. at
pp. 514–515.) The court further held that, although the defendant’s conduct also
violated Penal Code section 484e(c), a misdemeanor, the defendant’s right to equal
protection was not violated by being prosecuted for the felony offense. (Id. at pp.
517–518.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 215–216.
59
1953. Making Counterfeit Access Card or Account Number (Pen.
Code, § 484f(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (designing[,]/ [or]

making[,]/ [or] altering[,]/ [or] embossing) a counterfeit access card [in
violation of Penal Code section 484f(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or]
embossed) a counterfeit access card;
AND
access card.]
A counterfeit access card is a counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged
access card or a false representation or depiction of an access card or
any part of such a card.
or property right.
[A person alters an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a
part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]
[The People allege that the defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or]
altered[,]/ [or] embossed) the following counterfeit access cards:
<insert description of each card when multiple items alleged>.
People have proved that the defendant (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or]
altered[,]/ [or] embossed) at least one of these cards and you all agree on
60
which card (he/she) (designed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] altered[,]/ [or]

embossed).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made multiple
cards, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(a).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Attempted Forgery of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484f.
61
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections in CALCRIM No. 1900, Forgery by False
Signature, and CALCRIM No. 1950, Sale or Transfer of Access Card or Account
Number.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 217.
62
1954. Using or Attempting to Use Counterfeit Access Card (Pen.
Code, § 484f(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (using/ [or] attempting

to use) a counterfeit access card [in violation of Penal Code section
484f(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) a counterfeit access
card;
AND
access card.]
A counterfeit access card is a counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged
access card or a false representation or depiction of an access card or
any part of such a card.
or property right.
agency/a corporation/an unincorporated business/an association/the body
politic).]
A person alters an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a
part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.
A person (uses/ [or] attempts to use) a counterfeit access card if he or she
represents to someone that the card is genuine. The representation may
be made by words or conduct and may be either direct or indirect.
[The People allege that the defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) the
63
following counterfeit access cards: <insert description of

defendant (used/ [or] attempted to use) at least one of these cards and
you all agree on which card (he/she) (used/ [or] attempted to use).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant used multiple
cards, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
not required.)
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(a).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
64
Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
RELATED ISSUES
Number.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 217.
Against Property, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).
65
1955. False Signature on Access Card or Receipt (Pen. Code,
§ 484f(b))

signing a false signature on (an access card/ [or] a document authorizing
payment by an access card) [in violation of Penal Code section 484f(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant signed (someone else’s name/ [or] a false name) on
[an access card] [or] [a (sales slip[,]/ [or] sales draft[,]/ [or]
document for the payment of money) to complete an access card
transaction];
2. The defendant was not the cardholder and did not have the
authority of the cardholder to sign that name;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) did not have authority to sign
that name;
AND
4. When the defendant signed the name, (he/she) intended to
defraud.
access card.]
or property right.
66

[The People allege that the defendant forged the following (access cards/
[or] documents authorizing payment by an access card):
<insert description of each item when multiple items alleged>. You may not
find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have
proved that the defendant forged at least one of these (cards/documents)
and you all agree on which (card/document) (he/she) forged.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
cards or transactions, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484f(b).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
67
[26 P.2d 871].
• Attempted Forgery of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484f.
RELATED ISSUES
Number.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 217.
68
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with using (an access card/
[or] account information for an access card) that had [been] (altered[,]/
[or] forged[,]/ [or] expired[,]/ [or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained
without permission of the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or]
<insert other description of card obtained or retained in violation of Pen.
Code, §§ 484e or 484f>) [in violation of Penal Code section 484g(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant used (an access card/ [or] account information for
an access card) that had [been] (altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or]
expired[,]/ [or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained without
permission of the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or]
<insert other description of card obtained or retained in violation of
Pen. Code, §§ 484e or 484f>);
2. The defendant knew that the (access card/ [or] account
information) had [been] (altered[,]/ [or] forged[,]/ [or] expired[,]/
[or] revoked[,]/ [or] acquired or retained without permission of
the cardholder or card issuer[,]/ [or] <insert other
description of card obtained or retained in violation of Pen. Code,
§§ 484e or 484f>);
3. When the defendant used the (card/ [or] information), (he/she)
intended to obtain money, goods, services, or anything of value;
AND
4. When the defendant used the (card/ [or] information), (he/she)
intended to defraud.
access card.]
[An expired access card is one that shows on its face an expiration date
that has passed.]
[A revoked access card is one that the card issuer no longer authorizes
for use by the cardholder who has been given written notice of the
revocation.]
69
[A cardholder is anyone who has been issued an access card [or who has
access card to someone else].]
[A card issuer is a company [or person] [or the agent of a company or
person] that issues an access card to a cardholder.]
or property right.
[A person alters an access card if he or she adds to, erases, or changes a
part of the card that affects a legal, financial, or property right.]
[The People allege that the defendant used the following (access cards/
[or] access card account information): <insert description of
defendant used at least one of these (cards/ [or] card’s account
information) and you all agree on which (card/ [or] card account
information) (he/she) used.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
cards or transactions, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
If the prosecution alleges that the card was “obtained or retained in violation of
Penal Code section 484e or 484f,” the court may use the phrase “acquired or
retained without permission of the cardholder or card issuer,” if appropriate based
on the facts. (See Pen. Code, § 484e(d).) Alternatively, the court may insert an
appropriate description of a card “obtained or retained in violation of Penal Code
section 484e or 484f” where indicated. If the court inserts another description, the
70
court should also give the jury an instruction explaining when a card is “obtained or
retained” in violation of the applicable section, defining any necessary terms.
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484g(a).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Attempted Use of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484g.
RELATED ISSUES
Revoked Access Card
To prove that the defendant used a “revoked” access card, the prosecution must
prove that written notice of the revocation was sent to the cardholder. (People v.
Whight (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 163].)
Number.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 218.
71
Against Property, §§ 143.01[2][c], 143.04[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).
72
1957. Obtaining Money, etc., by Representing Self as Holder of
Access Card (Pen. Code, § 484g(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with obtaining something of

value by fraudulently representing (himself/herself) as the holder of an
access card [in violation of Penal Code section 484g(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/
[or] something [else] of value) by representing that (he/she) was
the holder of an access card;
2. The access card had not, in fact, been issued;
3. The defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/
[or] something [else] of value) without the consent of the
cardholder;
AND
4. When the defendant obtained (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or]
services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value), (he/she) intended to
defraud.
access card.]
or property right.
73

[If you find the defendant guilty of obtaining money by access card, you
must then decide whether the value of the (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or]
services[,]/ [or] something [else] of value) obtained in any 6-month
period was more than $950. If you have a reasonable doubt whether the
value of the (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]/ [or] something [else]
of value) was more than $950, you must find this allegation has not been
proved.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 484g(b).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
COMMENTARY
The committee has written this instruction based on the language of the statute,
74
Penal Code section 484g(b). However, the committee notes that the requirements of
the statute appear to be internally inconsistent.
• Attempted Use of Access Card. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 484g.
RELATED ISSUES
Number.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 218.
Against Property, § 143.01[2][c] (Matthew Bender).
75
1970. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient
(Pen. Code, § 476a)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (making[,]/ [or]

drawing[,]/ [or] delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an)
(check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient
funds for payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) [in violation
of Penal Code section 476a].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/
[or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/
[or] order) on a (bank or depositary[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/
[or] corporation) for the payment of money;
2. The defendant acted (for (himself/herself)[,]/ [or] as an agent or
representative of someone else[,]/ [or] as an officer of a
corporation);
3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or]
order), there (were/was) insufficient (funds in/ [or] credit with)
the (bank or depositary[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or]
corporation) to cover full payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/
[or] order) and all other outstanding (checks[,]/ [or] drafts[,]/ [or]
orders) on that account;
4. The defendant knew that there (were/was) insufficient (funds/ [or]
credit) available in that account;
AND
5. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or]
order), (he/she) intended to defraud.
(A/An) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) is a written document directing
a (bank or depositary[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) to
pay the indicated amount to a person named as payee or to someone
designated by that person.
A person makes or draws (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) when
he or she writes it [or causes it to be written] and signs it to authorize
payment.
77
[Credit, as used here, is an arrangement or understanding with a (bank

or depositary[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) for payment
of money authorized by (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order).]
purpose.
or property right.
[A person (uses/ [or] attempts to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or]
order) if he or she represents to someone that the instrument is genuine.
The representation may be made by words or conduct and may be either
direct or indirect.]
[The People allege that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or]
delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the following items:
<insert description of each instrument when multiple items alleged>.
People have proved that the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or]
delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) at least one of these items
and you all agree on which item (he/she) (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or]
delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use).]
[If you find the defendant guilty of (making[,]/ [or] drawing[,]/ [or]
delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ [or]
draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds for
payment of the (check[,]/ [or] draft[,]/ [or] order) you must also
determine whether the defendant was previously convicted of
<insert at least three theft crimes specified in Penal Code section 476a(b)>.]
<Defense: Reasonable Expectation of Payment>
[Even if the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) (a/an) (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order)
knowing that there were insufficient funds for payment of the (check[,]/
draft[,]/ [or] order), the defendant did not intend to defraud if, at the
time (he/she) acted, (he/she) reasonably and actually believed that the
(check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) would be paid by the (bank or
depositary[,]/ [or] person[,]/ [or] firm[,]/ [or] corporation) when
presented for payment.
78
the defendant intended to defraud. If the People have not met this
<Defense: Defendant Informed Payee About Insuffıcient Funds>
[If, when the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or]
used[,]/ [or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order), (he/she)
told the person designated to receive payment on the (check[,]/ draft[,]/
[or] order) that there were insufficient funds to allow the (check[,]/
draft[,]/ [or] order) to be paid, then the defendant is not guilty of this
crime.
when the defendant (made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/
[or] attempted to use) the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order), (he/she) did not
tell the person designated to receive payment that there were insufficient
funds to allow the (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) to be paid. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this
crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant made or used
multiple checks, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the
defendant,” inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No.
3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant made or attempted to use, etc., more
than $950 in checks, give CALCRIM No. 1971, Making, Using, etc., Check
Knowing Funds Insuffıcient: Total Value of Checks. If the prosecution alleges that
the defendant has a prior forgery-related conviction, give CALCRIM No. 3100,
Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial.
79
(1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801 [296 P.2d 75].)
If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant expected
the check to be paid, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed option
headed “Defense: Reasonable Expectation of Payment.” (People v. Pugh (2002) 104
If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant informed
the payee that there were insufficient funds to cash the check, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give the bracketed option headed “Defense: Defendant Informed
Payee About Insufficient Funds.” (People v. Poyet (1972) 6 Cal.3d 530, 535–537 [99
Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d 1150]; People v. Pugh, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 73.)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Use or Attempt to Use. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 73 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 770]; People v. Jackson (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 561 [155
Cal.Rptr. 89], overruled on other grounds in People v. Anderson (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1104, 1122 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].
• Informed Payee About Insufficient Funds. People v. Poyet (1972) 6 Cal.3d 530,
535–537 [99 Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d 1150]; People v. Pugh (2002) 104
• Reasonable Expectation of Payment. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66,
73 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
This offense is a misdemeanor if the total amount of the checks does not exceed
$950, unless the defendant has been previously convicted of three specified theft
offenses. (Pen. Code, § 476a(b).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the
with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the checks
exceeds $950 or if the prior convictions have or have not been proved. If the jury
80
finds that the amount did not exceed $950 or the prior convictions were not proved,
then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Checks Totaling Over $950—Number of Counts
Under Penal Code section 476a(b), the offense is a felony-misdemeanor if the total
amount of the checks made or issued exceeds $950. In general, the prosecution may
charge a separate count for each check. However, if the individual checks do not
meet the statutory amount and the offense is charged as a felony based only on the
aggregate value, the prosecution can only charge a single felony count covering all
of the checks that total more than $950. (In re Watkins (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866,
868–869 [51 Cal.Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d 805].) If, on the other hand, the defendant is
charged with felony offenses based on a prior forgery-related conviction, the
prosecution may charge each check as a separate felony count. (People v. Pettit
(1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 397, 398 [41 Cal.Rptr. 42].)
Grand Theft
A defendant who uses a check with insufficient funds to obtain property may be
charged under either Penal Code section 476a or section 487, or both. (People v.
Martin (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 867, 876–878 [25 Cal.Rptr. 610].) However, the
defendant may not be sentenced on both charges for the same conduct. (Ibid.; Pen.
Code, § 654.)
Return of Property
Two cases have held that the defendant may present evidence that he or she
returned some or all of the property in an effort to demonstrate that he or she did
not originally intend to defraud. (People v. Katzman (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 777,
790 [66 Cal.Rptr. 319], disapproved on other grounds in Rhinehart v. Municipal
Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 780, fn. 11 [200 Cal.Rptr.916, 677 P.2d 1206]; People
v. Braver (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 303, 307–308 [40 Cal.Rptr. 142].) However, other
cases have held that, based on the facts of the particular cases, such evidence was
not admissible. (People v. Parker (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 500, 510 [89 Cal.Rptr. 815]
[evidence of defendant’s offer to repay following arrest not relevant]; People v. Wing
(1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [107 Cal.Rptr. 836] [evidence of restitution not
relevant where defendant falsely signed the name of another to a check knowing he
had no authority to do so].) If such evidence is presented, the court may give
CALCRIM No. 1862, Return of Property Not a Defense to Theft. (People v.
Katzman, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 791.) In addition, in People v. Katzman,
supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 792, the court held that, on request, the defense may be
entitled to a pinpoint instruction that evidence of restitution may be relevant to
determining if the defendant intended to defraud. If the court concludes that such an
instruction is appropriate, the court may add the following to the beginning of
CALCRIM No. 1862:
If the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of] the property
obtained, that conduct may show (he/she) did not intend to defraud. If you
conclude that the defendant returned or offered to return [some or all of] the
81
property, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.

SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 180–187.
82
1971. Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing Funds Insufficient:
Total Value of Checks (Pen. Code, § 476a(b))
If you find the defendant guilty of (making[,]/ [or] drawing[,]/ [or]

delivering[,]/ [or] using[,]/ [or] attempting to use) (a/an) (check[,]/
draft[,]/ [or] order) knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover
it, you must then decide whether the People have proved either of the
following:
1. That at least one (check[,]/ draft[,]/ [or] order) that the defendant
(made[,]/ [or] drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or]
attempted to use) knowing that there were insufficient funds to
cover it was for more than $950;
OR
2. That the total value of the (checks[,]/ [or] drafts[,]/ [or] orders)
charged in Count that the defendant (made[,]/ [or]
drew[,]/ [or] delivered[,]/ [or] used[,]/ [or] attempted to use)
knowing that there were insufficient funds to cover them was
more than $950.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the checks, the court
has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction on the other
elements of the offense, CALCRIM No. 1970, Making, Using, etc., Check Knowing
Funds Insuffıcient.
whether the prosecution has or has not been proved that the value of the checks
exceeds $950. (See Penal Code § 476a(b).)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 476a(b).
83
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Checks Totaling Over $950—Number of Counts
Under Penal Code section 476a(b), the offense is a felony-misdemeanor if the total
amount of the checks made or issued exceeds $950. In general, the prosecution may
charge a separate count for each check. However, if the individual checks do not
meet the statutory amount and the offense is charged as a felony based only on the
aggregate value, the prosecution can only charge a single felony count covering all
of the checks that total more than $950. (In re Watkins (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866,
868–869 [51 Cal.Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d 805].) If, on the other hand, the defendant is
charged with felony offenses based on a prior forgery-related conviction, the
prosecution may charge each separate check as a separate felony count. (People v.
Pettit (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 397, 398 [41 Cal.Rptr. 42].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 180.
84
D. INSURANCE FRAUD
2000. Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(1),
(4)–(7) & (9))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with insurance fraud

committed by fraudulent claim [in violation of Penal Code section
550(a)].
prove that the defendant knowingly committed the following crime[s]
[[or] [aided and abetted] [or] [solicited] [or] [conspired with someone
else] to commit (it/them)]:
<Alternative 1A—presented fraudulent claim>
[1. The defendant (presented/ [or] caused to be presented) a false
or fraudulent claim for payment for a loss or injury;]
<Alternative 1B—presented fraudulent claim for vehicle theft or damage>
[1. The defendant falsely or fraudulently claimed payment for a
loss due to (theft[,]/ [or] destruction[,]/ [or] damage[,]/ [or]
conversion) of (a motor vehicle[,]/ [or] a motor vehicle part[,]/
[or] contents of a motor vehicle);]
<Alternative 1C—writing to be used for fraudulent claim>
[1. The defendant (prepared[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] signed or
subscribed) a document with the intent to (present or use it/
[or] allow it to be presented) to support a false or fraudulent
claim;]
<Alternative 1D—made fraudulent claim for health-care benefits>
[1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false or
fraudulent claim for payment of a health-care benefit;]
<Alternative 1E—submitted claim for health-care benefit not used>
[1. The defendant presented a claim for a health-care benefit that
was not used by [or on behalf of] the person named in the
claim;]
<Alternative 1F—presented claim for health-care benefit undercharges>
[1. The defendant claimed payment for undercharges for health-
care benefits for a specific person without presenting for
reconciliation, at that same time, any known overcharges for
benefits for the same person;]
85
2. The defendant knew that the claim was false or fraudulent;

AND
or property right.
A person claims, makes, or presents a claim for payment by requesting
payment under a contract of insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/
health-care benefit).
[A claim for payment of a health-care benefit includes a claim submitted
by or on behalf of the provider of a workers’ compensation health
benefit defined in the Labor Code.]
[Conversion of property means interfering with someone else’s property,
without authorization or justification, and depriving the owner of use
and possession of the property.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant presented or
caused to be presented multiple claims or made multiple documents in support of a
fraudulent claim, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].)
However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity
instruction is not required. (Id. at p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity
instruction is required, give CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.
If the prosecution proceeds on a theory of aiding and abetting, soliciting, or
conspiracy, give appropriate instructions for those theories.
In element 1, give alternative 1A if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal
Code section 550(a)(1). Give alternative 1B if the prosecution alleges a violation of
Penal Code section 550(a)(4). Give alternative 1C if the prosecution alleges a
86
violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(5). Give alternative 1D if the prosecution

alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6). Give alternative 1E if the
prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(7). Give alternative 1F
if the prosecution alleges a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(9).
If a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(2) or (8) is alleged, give CALCRIM No.
2001, Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims. If a violation of Penal Code section
550(a)(3) is alleged, give CALCRIM No. 2002, Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident.
If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(6),
(7), or (9), give CALCRIM No. 2003, Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total
Value.
shows that the defendant did not succeed in defrauding anyone.
See generally CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles and
CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy
CALCRIM No. 441, Solicitation: Elements
CALCRIM No. 2001, Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims.
CALCRIM No. 2003, Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (7) & (9).
• Intent to Defraud Element of Offense. People v. Scofield (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d
1018, 1025–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 405]; People v. Benson (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d
519, 529 [23 Cal.Rptr. 908], overruled on other grounds in People v. Perez
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Unanimity Instruction. People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275
[107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].
Fraudulent claims for health-care benefits, under Penal Code section 550(a)(6) to
(9), are misdemeanors if the total amount of the claims does not exceed $950. (Pen.
Code, § 550(c)(2).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor
87
offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the claims exceeds $950.
If the jury finds that the amount does not exceed $950, then the offense should be
set at a misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
Writing to Be Used for Fraudulent Claim
Penal Code section 550(a)(5) makes it a felony to “[k]nowingly prepare, make, or
subscribe any writing, with the intent to present or use it, or to allow it to be
presented, in support of any false or fraudulent claim.” “Under this section, the
writing required need not be false or fraudulent as long as it is intended to be
presented or used in support of any false or fraudulent claim.” (People v. Zelver
(1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 226, 235 [287 P.2d 183].) In addition, “[i]t need not be
shown that defendant himself executed the false instrument if there is proof that he
procured its execution or aided and abetted another in doing so.” (People v. Singh
Liability of Care Provider
A doctor or other care provider who prepares false documents for a fraudulent
insurance claim may be prosecuted under Penal Code section 550(a)(1) for “causing
the presentation of a fraudulent claim,” even though another person actually presents
the claim. (People v. Singh (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1369–1370 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d
644].) Alternatively, the care provider may be prosecuted under Penal Code section
550(a)(5), discussed above. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 222, 224.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).
88
2001. Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims (Pen. Code, § 550(a)(2) &
(8))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with submitting multiple

insurance claims with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code
section 550(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant presented two or more claims for (the same (loss/
[or] injury)/payment of the same health-care benefit) to (the
same/ [or] more than one) insurer;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was submitting two or more
claims for the same ((loss/ [or] injury)/health-care benefit);
AND
3. When the defendant presented the claims, (he/she) intended to
defraud.
or property right.
A person presents a claim for payment by demanding payment under a
contract of insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/ health-care benefit).
[A claim for payment of a health-care benefit includes a claim submitted
by or on behalf of the provider of a workers’ compensation health
benefit defined in the Labor Code.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Use this instruction if a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(2) or (8) is
alleged.
If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(8),
89
give CALCRIM No. 2003, Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value, with
this instruction.
CALCRIM No. 2000, Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 550(a)(2) & (8).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
Fraudulent claims for health-care benefits, under Penal Code section 550(a)(6) to
(9), are misdemeanors if the total amount of the claims does not exceed $950. (Pen.
Code, § 550(c)(2).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the misdemeanor
offense is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate if the total amount of the claims exceeds $950.
If the jury finds that the amount does not exceed $950, then the offense should be
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 222, 224.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).
90
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with insurance fraud in

connection with a vehicle accident [in violation of Penal Code section
550(a)(3)].
prove that:
1. The defendant caused or participated in a vehicle accident;
2. The defendant knew that the purpose of the accident was to
present a false or fraudulent insurance claim;
AND
3. When the defendant caused or participated in the accident, (he/
she) intended to defraud.
or property right.
A person presents a claim by demanding payment under a contract of
insurance for (a/an) ((loss/ [or] injury)/health-care benefit).
[A person causes an accident if the accident is the direct, natural, and
probable consequence of the person’s action and the accident would not
have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is
one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and
probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of an accident. An act causes an
accident only if it is a substantial factor in causing the accident. A
substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it
need not be the only factor that causes the accident.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Use this instruction if a violation of Penal Code section 550(a)(3) is alleged.
91
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of the accident, the
court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first bracketed
paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of the accident, the
court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second bracketed
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
CALCRIM No. 2000, Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims.
CALCRIM No. 2001, Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 222.
§ 142.02[2][c], Ch. 143, Crimes Against Property, § 143.01[1][f] (Matthew Bender).
92
2003. Insurance Fraud: Health-Care Claims—Total Value (Pen.
Code, § 550(c)(2))
If you find the defendant guilty of insurance fraud in connection with

health-care claims, you must then decide whether the People have
proved that the total value of the (claim[s] involved/ [or] amount at
issue) was more than $950 [within a period of 12 consecutive months].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the total value of the claims, the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this element.
elements of the offense, CALCRIM No. 2000, Insurance Fraud: Fraudulent Claims,
CALCRIM No. 2001, Insurance Fraud: Multiple Claims, or CALCRIM No. 2002,
Insurance Fraud: Vehicle Accident.
if the prosecution has or has not proved that the total value of the claims exceeded
$950.
Give the bracketed “within a period of 12 consecutive months” if the facts show
several claims filed over a period of time.
AUTHORITY
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 224.
Against Property, § 143.01[1][a], [f], [i] (Matthew Bender).
93
2004. Insurance Fraud: Destruction of Insured Property (Pen.
Code, § 548(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (injuring[,]/ [or]

destroying[,]/ [or] hiding[,]/ [or] abandoning[,]/ [or] disposing of) insured
property with intent to defraud [in violation of Penal Code section
548(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (injured[,]/ [or] destroyed[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or]
abandoned[,]/ [or] disposed of) property that was insured against
loss or damage from (theft[,]/ [or] embezzlement[,]/ [or] any
casualty other than fire);
AND
2. When the defendant did that act, (he/she) intended to (defraud/
[or] prejudice) the insurer.
or property right.
[It does not matter whether the defendant or someone else owned or
possessed the property.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It does not matter” if there is
94
evidence that someone else owned or possessed the property.

For arson, see the Arson series, CALCRIM No. 1500 et seq.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
• Attempted Destruction or Disposal of Property. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 548; People
v. Splawn (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 559 [211 Cal.Rptr. 638].
RELATED ISSUES
Disposes Of
“ ‘[D]isposes of’ in Penal Code section 548 requires a definite change of control [of
the property].” (People v. Splawn (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 558 [211 Cal.Rptr.
638].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 226.
Against Property, §§ 143.01[1], 143.11[2] (Matthew Bender).
95
2020. False Financial Statement: Making False Statement (Pen.
Code, § 532a(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (making/ [or] causing

to be made) a false written statement about (his/her/another person’s/a
corporation’s) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay)
[in violation of Penal Code section 532a(1)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—statement made about defendant himself/herself>
[1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false written
statement about (his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or]
ability to pay);]
<Alternative 1B—statement made about someone else or a corporation>
[1. The defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) a false written
statement about the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or]
ability to pay) of (another person/a firm or corporation (in which
the defendant had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was
acting));]
2. The defendant knew that the statement was false;
3. When the defendant (made the statement/ [or] caused the
statement to be made), (he/she) intended that the statement be
relied on;
AND
4. The defendant (made the statement/ [or] caused the statement to
be made) to obtain the (delivery of personal property[,]/ [or]
payment of cash[,]/ [or] making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of
credit[,]/ [or] execution of a contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/
[or] discount of an account receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance,
discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory
note) for ((his/her) benefit/the benefit of the (other person/
corporation)).
[A person may (make a false statement/ [or] cause a false statement to be
made) either directly or indirectly, or through his or her agent. An agent
is someone authorized by the defendant to act for (him/her) in dealings
with third parties.]
[The People allege that the defendant (made/ [or] caused to be made) the
97
following statements: <insert description of each statement

when multiple statements alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty
unless you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
(made/ [or] caused to be made) at least one of these statements and that
the statement was false. You must all agree on which false statement (he/
she) (made/ [or] caused to be made).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
false statements, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See
People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752];
People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].)
However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity
instruction is not required. (People v. Dieguez, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) If
the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last bracketed
paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No.
3500, Unanimity, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
If the defendant is charged with a felony violation of Penal Code section 532a(1),
give CALCRIM No. 2023, False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying
Information.
Give the penultimate bracketed paragraph if there is evidence that the defendant
made or caused any statements to be made indirectly or through an agent.
CALCRIM No. 2021, False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit.
CALCRIM No. 2022, False Financial Statement: Reaffırming Statement.
CALCRIM No. 2023, False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying
Information.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 532a(1).
• Agent. Civ. Code, § 2295.
• Unanimity Instruction If Multiple Items. See People v. Sutherland (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; People v. Dieguez (2001) 89
A violation of Penal Code section 532a is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used
98
“a fictitious name, social security number, business name, or business address, or

. . . falsely represent[ed] himself or herself to be another person or another
business.” (Pen. Code, § 532a(4).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the
with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if this allegation has or has not
been proved. If the jury finds that the allegation has not been proved, then the
RELATED ISSUES
Misrepresentation of Identity Insufficient
Penal Code section 532a “require[s] a false statement respecting ‘financial condition,
or means or ability to pay.’ ” (People v. Vincent (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 696,
702–703 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 714].) A statement in which the defendant misrepresents
his or her identity or social security number is insufficient. (Ibid.)
Application for Credit Does Not Include Apartment Rental
In People v. Maguire (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1029–1030 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 573],
the court held that an application to rent an apartment containing false information
was not covered by Penal Code section 532a.
SECONDARY SOURCES
99
2021. False Financial Statement: Obtaining Benefit (Pen. Code,
§ 532a(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with obtaining a benefit

using a false written statement about (his/her/another person’s/a
[in violation of Penal Code section 532a(2)].
prove that:
[1. The defendant knew that a false written statement had been
made about (his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or]
ability to pay);]
[1. The defendant knew that a false written statement had been
made about the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability
to pay) of (another person/a firm or corporation (in which the
defendant had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was
acting));]
AND
2. The defendant obtained, for ((his/her) benefit/the benefit of the
(other person/corporation)), the (delivery of personal property[,]/
[or] payment of cash[,]/ [or] making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of
credit[,]/ [or] execution of a contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/
[or] discount of an account receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance,
discount, sale, or endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory
note) by using the false written statement.
[The People allege that the defendant obtained the following benefits:
<insert description of each benefit when multiple benefits
the People have proved that the defendant obtained at least one of these
benefits and you all agree on which benefit (he/she) obtained.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
100
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant received multiple
benefits, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; People v.
Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 160].) However,
where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a unanimity instruction
is not required. (People v. Dieguez, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) If the court
concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last bracketed paragraph,
inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3500,
Unanimity, discussing when instruction on unanimity is and is not required.)
Information.
CALCRIM No. 2020, False Financial Statement: Making False Statement.
Information.
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.4th 602, 619, fn. 6 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752]; People v. Dieguez (2001) 89
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2020, False
Financial Statement: Making False Statement.
SECONDARY SOURCES
101
102
2022. False Financial Statement: Reaffirming Statement (Pen.
Code, § 532a(3))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with representing in writing

that a false written statement about (his/her/another person’s/a
was true [in violation of Penal Code section 532a(3)].
prove that:
[1. The defendant knew a written statement had been made about
(his/her) (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay);]
[1. The defendant knew a written statement had been made about
the (financial condition[,]/ [or] means[,]/ [or] ability to pay) of
(another person/a firm or corporation (in which the defendant
had an interest/ [or] for which the defendant was acting));]
2. After that first written statement had been made, the defendant
made a second written statement representing that the contents of
the first statement were true at the time of the second statement;
3. The defendant knew that the contents of the first statement were
not true at the time (he/she) made the second statement;
AND
4. Based on the second statement, the defendant obtained the
(delivery of personal property[,]/ [or] payment of cash[,]/ [or]
making of a loan[,]/ [or] extension of credit[,]/ [or] execution of a
contract of guaranty or suretyship[,]/ [or] discount of an account
receivable[,]/ [or] making, acceptance, discount, sale, or
endorsement of a bill of exchange or promissory note) for ((his/
her) benefit/the benefit of the (other person/corporation)).
[The People allege that the defendant represented that the following
statements were true: <insert descriptions when multiple
statements alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all
agree that the People have proved that the defendant represented that at
least one of these statements was true while knowing that the statement
was false. You must all agree on which false statement (he/she)
represented to be true.]
New January 2006

103
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant represented as true
multiple false statements, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity.
752]; People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 274–275 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d
160].) However, where the evidence shows a “continuous course of conduct,” a
unanimity instruction is not required. (People v. Dieguez, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at
p. 275.) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is required, give the last
bracketed paragraph, inserting the items alleged. (See also Bench Notes to
not required.)
Information.
Information.
AUTHORITY
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2020, False
Financial Statement: Making False Statement.
104
SECONDARY SOURCES
105
2023. False Financial Statement: Use of False Identifying
Information (Pen. Code, § 532a(4))
If you find the defendant guilty of ((making/ [or] causing to be made) a

false written statement as charged in Count [,]/ [or] obtaining a
benefit using a false written statement as charged in Count [,]/
[or] representing as true a false written statement as charged in Count
), you must then decide whether the People have proved that the
defendant used false identifying information.
<Alternative A—fictitious information>
[To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant used
a fictitious (name[,]/ [or] social security number[,]/ [or] business name[,]/
[or] business address).]
<Alternative B—represented self as someone else>
[To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant
falsely (represented that (he/she) was someone else/ [or] claimed that (he/
she) represented a business when (he/she) did not).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on using false identifying
information, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.
elements of the offense, CALCRIM Nos. 2020 to 2022.
if the prosecution has or has not been proved that the defendant used false
identifying information.
AUTHORITY
106
SECONDARY SOURCES
107
F. IDENTITY THEFT
2040. Unauthorized Use of Personal Identifying Information (Pen.
Code, § 530.5(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the unauthorized use

of someone else’s personal identifying information [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully obtained someone else’s personal
identifying information;
2. The defendant willfully used that information for an unlawful
purpose;
AND
3. The defendant used the information without the consent of the
person whose identifying information (he/she) was using.
Personal identifying information means <insert relevant items
from Pen. Code, § 530.55(b)> or an equivalent form of identification.
[As used here, person means a human being, whether living or dead, or a
firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, company,
corporation, limited liability company, or public entity, or any other legal
entity.]
purpose.
An unlawful purpose includes unlawfully (obtaining/[or] attempting to
obtain) (credit[,]/[or] goods[,]/[or] services[,]/[or] real property[,]/ [or]
medical information)/ [or] <insert other unlawful purpose>)
without the consent of the other person.
It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a
financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant’s acts.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, August 2009, April 2010,
August 2012, August 2013, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
109
In the definition of personal identifying information, give the relevant items based
on the evidence presented.
The definition of unlawful purpose is not limited to acquiring information for
financial motives, and may include any unlawful purpose for which the defendant
may have acquired the personal identifying information, such as using the
information to facilitate violation of a restraining order. (See, e.g., People v.
Tillotson (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 533 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 42].)
AUTHORITY
• Personal Identifying Information Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(b).
• Person Defined. Pen. Code, § 530.55(a).
• No Personation Requirement. People v. Barba (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 214,
223–224 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].
• Proof of Knowledge that Information Belonged to a Real Person Not Required.
People v. Zgurski (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 250, 264 [288 Cal.Rptr.3d 214].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 210, 212.
Against Property, § 143.01[1], [4][h] (Matthew Bender).
110
2041. Fraudulent Possession of Personal Identifying Information
(Pen. Code, § 530.5(c)(1), (2), or (3))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the fraudulent

possession of personal identifying information [with a prior conviction
for the same offense][in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(c)((1)/(2)/
(3))].
prove that:
1. The defendant acquired or kept the personal identifying
information of (another person/ten or more other persons);
[AND]
2. The defendant did so with the intent to defraud another person(;/
.)
2. <Give paragraph 3 if defendant is charged with having a prior
conviction and has not stipulated to that conviction.>
[AND
3. The defendant has a prior conviction for <insert
prior conviction suffered pursuant to Penal Code section 530.5>.]
person in order to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]
[or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to a legal, financial,
or property right.
corporation, limited liability company, public entity or any other legal
entity.]
New August 2009; Revised April 2010

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
111
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “As used here” if the evidence shows
an intent to defraud an entity or association rather than a natural person. (Pen. Code,
§ 8.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(c).
Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 212–214.
112
2042. Fraudulent Sale, Transfer or Conveyance of Personal
Identifying Information (Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the fraudulent

(sale/ [or] transfer/ [or] conveyance) of personal identifying information
[in violation of Penal Code section 530.5(d)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (sold/ [or] transferred/ [or] conveyed) the personal
identifying information of another person;
AND
2. The defendant did so with the intent to defraud.
person either to cause a loss of (money[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] services[,]
[or] something [else] of value), or to cause damage to a legal, financial,
or property right.
entity.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
§ 8.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(d).
113

Cal.Rptr.2d 176].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 212–214.
114
2043. Knowing Sale, Transfer, or Conveyance of Personal
Identifying Information to Facilitate Its Unauthorized Use (Pen.
Code, § 530.5(d)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the knowing (sale/ [or]
transfer [or] conveyance) of personal identifying information [in
violation of Penal Code section 530.5(d)(2)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (sold/ [or] transferred/ [or] conveyed) the personal
identifying information of (a specific person/ <insert
name of victim>);
AND
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) knew that the personal
identifying information would be used to obtain or attempt to
obtain (credit/ [or] goods/ [or] services/ [or] real property/ [or]
medical information) [[or] <insert other unlawful
purpose>] without the consent of that specific person.
entity.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
§ 8.)
The definition of unlawful purpose is not limited to acquiring information for
financial motives, and may include any unlawful purpose for which the defendant
may have acquired the personal identifying information, such as using the
115
information to facilitate violation of a restraining order. (See, e.g., People v.

Tillotson (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 533 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 42].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 530.5(d)(2).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 212–214.
116
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with falsely impersonating

another person in that person’s private or official capacity and
performing certain acts [in violation of Penal Code section 529(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant falsely impersonated another person in the other
person’s private or official capacity;
1. AND
2. While falsely impersonating that person, the defendant:
2. [A. Posted bail or acted as surety for anyone in any proceeding,
before any judge or officer authorized to take that bail or
surety(;/.)]
2. [OR]
2. [B(1). Verified, published, acknowledged, or proved, in the name
of that person, any written document;
2. AND
2. B(2). When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended that the
written document be recorded, delivered, or used as though
it were an authentic document(./;)]
2. [OR]
2. [C. Did any act that, if done by the person being falsely
impersonated, might cause (that person to be liable in a
lawsuit or criminal prosecution/ [or] that person to pay any
amount of money/ [or] that person to be subject to any
charge, forfeiture, or penalty/ [or] the defendant or anyone
else to receive a benefit as a result).]
New February 2015; Revised March 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
117
• Additional Act Requirement People v. Guion (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1426,

1431–1432 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 395].
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code section 529(a)(3) does not require any specific mental state beyond
intentionally falsely impersonating another. People v. Rathert (2000) 24 Cal.4th 200,
205–206 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 6 P.3d 700].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 202.
Investigative Detention, § 10.05[2] (Matthew Bender).
118
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with falsely impersonating

another person in that person’s private or official capacity and
performing certain acts [in violation of Penal Code section 530].
prove that:
1. The defendant falsely impersonated another person in the other
person’s private or official capacity;
AND
2. While falsely impersonating that person:
A. The defendant received money or property;
B. The defendant knew that the money or property was intended
to be delivered to the person that (he/she) was falsely
impersonating;
[AND]
C. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to deprive the
true owner of the money or property, or to use it for (his/her)
own benefit, or to let someone else use it(;/.)
[AND]
<Do not give element 3 in misdemeanor cases where the value is $950 or
less.>
[3. The money or property was worth more than $950.]
New October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Determination of Grand vs. Petty Theft. Pen. Code, § 490.2.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 202
119
Investigative Detention, § 10.05[2] (Matthew Bender)
120
VEHICLE OFFENSES
A. DUI
(i) Causing Injury
2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury
(Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))
2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153(b))
2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury With a Passenger
for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23153(e))
(ii) Without Injury
2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21 (Veh. Code,
§ 23140(a))
2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire (Veh.
Code, § 23152(e))
2125. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol:
Prior Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
2126. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol:
Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 &
23566)
(iv) Refusal
(i) Death or Injury
2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant
Driver (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant
Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 &
20004)
121
VEHICLE OFFENSES
2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense (Veh.
Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
Driver (Veh. Code, § 20002)
(iii) Enhancement
2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for Vehicular
Manslaughter (Veh. Code, § 20001(c))
C. EVADING
2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh. Code,
§§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b))
2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh. Code,
§§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)
122
A. DUI
(i) Causing Injury

2100. Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence
Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with causing injury to

another person while (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel) under the
[combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an
alcoholic beverage and a drug) [in violation of Vehicle Code section
23153(a)/(f)/(g)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel);
2. When (he/she) (drove a vehicle/operated a vessel), the defendant
was under the [combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or]
a drug/ [or] an alcoholic beverage and a drug);
3. While (driving a vehicle/operating a vessel) under the influence,
the defendant also (committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to
perform a legal duty);
AND
4. The defendant’s (illegal act/ [or] failure to perform a legal duty)
caused bodily injury to another person.
A person is under the influence if, as a result of (drinking [or consuming]
an alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] taking a drug), his or her mental or
physical abilities are so impaired that he or she is no longer able to
(drive a vehicle/operate a vessel) with the caution of a sober person,
using ordinary care, under similar circumstances.
The manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish
whether the person is or is not under the influence of (an alcoholic
beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic
beverage and a drug]. However, it is a factor to be considered, in light of
all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether the person was
under the influence.
[An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be
consumed that contains ethanol. Ethanol is also known as ethyl alcohol,
drinking alcohol, or alcohol. [An alcoholic beverage includes
<insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Veh. Code, § 109 or Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]]
123
CALCRIM No. 2100 VEHICLE OFFENSES
[A drug is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol,

that could so affect the nervous system, brain, or muscles of a person
that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to (drive a vehicle/
operate a vessel) as an ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of
his or her faculties and using reasonable care, would (drive a vehicle/
operate a vessel) under similar circumstances.]
[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of
the chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude that
the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the
time of the alleged offense.]
[In evaluating any test results in this case, you may consider whether or
not the person administering the test or the agency maintaining the
testing device followed the regulations of the California Department of
Public Health.]
[The People allege that the defendant committed the following illegal
act[s]: <list name[s] of offense[s]>.
To decide whether the defendant committed <list name[s] of
offense[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on (that/those) crime[s].]
[The People [also] allege that the defendant failed to perform the
following legal (duty/duties) while (driving the vehicle/operating the
vessel): (the duty to exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain
proper control of the (vehicle/vessel)/ <insert other duty or
duties alleged>).]
People have proved that the defendant (committed [at least] one illegal
act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).
<Alternative A—unanimity required; see Bench Notes>
[You must all agree on which (act the defendant committed/ [or] duty
the defendant failed to perform).]
<Alternative B—unanimity not required; see Bench Notes>
[But you do not have to all agree on which (act the defendant
committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]]
[Using ordinary care means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably
foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to exercise ordinary
care if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would
not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably
careful person would do in the same situation).]
[An act causes bodily injury to another person if the injury is the direct,
124
VEHICLE OFFENSES CALCRIM No. 2100
natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury would not
probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of injury. An act causes bodily
injury to another person only if it is a substantial factor in causing the
injury. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor.
However, it need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]
[It is not a defense that the defendant was legally entitled to use the
drug.]
[If the defendant was under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [and/
or] a drug), then it is not a defense that something else also impaired
(his/her) ability to (drive a vehicle/operate a vessel).]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, December 2008, August 2015,
September 2017, March 2018, September 2019, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant committed an act
forbidden by law, the court has a sua sponte duty to specify the predicate offense
alleged and to instruct on the elements of that offense. (People v. Minor (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 431, 438–439 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 641]; People v. Ellis (1999) 69
If the prosecution alleges under element 3 that the defendant neglected to perform a
duty imposed by law, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the duty
allegedly neglected. (See People v. Minor, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438–439.) If
the prosecution alleges that the defendant neglected the general duty of every driver
to exercise ordinary care (see People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219
Cal.Rptr. 243]), the court should give the bracketed definition of “ordinary care.”
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of injury, the court
should give the first bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes the “direct,
natural, and probable” language. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the
court should also give the second bracketed paragraph on causation, which includes
the “substantial factor” definition. (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351,
363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
125
required], overruled on other grounds in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481
Cal.Rptr. 906] [unanimity instruction not required, failure to give harmless error if
was required].) If the court concludes that a unanimity instruction is appropriate,
give the unanimity alternative A. If the court concludes that unanimity is not
required, give the unanimity alternative B.
The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent” explains
a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code,
§§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased
as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory
presumption. (People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501,
658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with Roder, the instructions have been written as
permissive inferences.
The court must not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was
0.08 percent” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol
level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test. In addition, if the test falls
within the range in which no presumption applies, 0.05 percent to just below 0.08
percent, do not give this bracketed sentence. (People v. Wood (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 15 [255 Cal.Rptr. 537].) The court should also consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the test result exceeds the
margin of error before giving this instruction for test results of 0.08 percent.
(Compare People v. Campos (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [188 Cal.Rptr.
366], with People v. Randolph (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [262 Cal.Rptr.
378].)
The statute also creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was not under
the influence if his or her blood alcohol level was less than 0.05 percent. (People v.
Gallardo (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].) Depending on the
facts of the case, the defendant may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction on this
presumption. It is not error to refuse an instruction on this presumption if the
prosecution’s theory is that the defendant was under the combined influence of
drugs and alcohol. (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [32
Cal.Rptr.2d 442].)
If the evidence demonstrates that the person administering the test or agency
maintaining the testing device failed to follow the title 17 regulations, give the
bracketed sentence that begins with “In evaluating any test results in this case.”
126
(People v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to
follow regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of
the evidence]; People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854,
49 P.3d 203] [same]; People v. Esayian (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5
Cal.Rptr.3d 542] [results of blood test admissible even though phlebotomist who
drew blood not authorized under title 17].)
Give the bracketed sentence stating that “it is not a defense that something else also
impaired (his/her) ability to drive” if there is evidence of an additional source of
impairment such as an epileptic seizure, inattention, or falling asleep.
If the defendant is charged with one or more prior convictions for driving under the
influence, the defendant may stipulate to the convictions. (People v. Weathington
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) In addition, either the defendant
or the prosecution may move for a bifurcated trial. (People v. Calderon (1994) 9
Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83]; People v. Cline (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41]; People v. Weathington, supra,
231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the defendant does not stipulate and the court does not
grant a bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2125, Driving Under the Influence or
With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions. If the court grants a
bifurcated trial, give CALCRIM No. 2126, Driving Under the Influence or With
0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial. If the
defendant stipulates to the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not
be disclosed to the jury unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See
People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
On request, give CALCRIM No. 2241, Driver and Driving Defined.
On request, if supported by the evidence, the court must instruct on the “imminent
peril/sudden emergency” doctrine. (People v. Boulware (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 268,
269–270 [106 P.2d 436].) The court may use the bracketed instruction on sudden
emergency in CALCRIM No. 590, Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated.
CALCRIM No. 2101, Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury.
CALCRIM No. 2125, Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions.
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial.
CALCRIM No. 595, Vehicular Manslaughter: Speeding Laws Defined.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(a), (f), (g); People v. Minor (1994) 28
• Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Veh. Code, § 109, Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
• Drug Defined. Veh. Code, § 312.
127
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; People v. Milham (1984)
159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Under the Influence Defined. People v. Schoonover (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 101,
105–107 [85 Cal.Rptr. 69]; People v. Enriquez (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661,
665–666 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].
• Manner of Driving. People v. Stockman (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1099–1101
[270 Cal.Rptr.3d 812]; People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 84
[282 Cal.Rptr. 170]; People v. McGrath (1928) 94 Cal.App. 520, 524 [271 P.
549].
• Must Instruct on Elements of Predicate Offense. People v. Minor (1994) 28
• Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; Restatement Second of
Torts, § 282; People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219 Cal.Rptr.
243] [ordinary negligence standard applies to driving under the influence causing
injury].
863].
• Legal Entitlement to Use Drug Not a Defense. Veh. Code, § 23630.
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Prior Convictions. People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282
Cal.Rptr. 170].
• Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 Percent. Veh. Code,
§ 23152(a) & (b); People v. Capetillo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 220 [269
Cal.Rptr. 250].
• Driving Under the Influence Causing Injury is not a lesser included offense of
vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence. People v. Binkerd (2007) 155
• Violations of Vehicle Code section 23153(a), are not lesser included offenses of
Vehicle Code section 23153(f) [now 23153(g)]. People v. Cady (2016) 7
RELATED ISSUES
DUI Cannot Serve as Predicate Unlawful Act
“[T]he evidence must show an unlawful act or neglect of duty in addition to driving
under the influence.” (People v. Minor (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 438 [33
128
Cal.Rptr.2d 641] [italics in original]; People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663,
668 [219 Cal.Rptr. 243].)
Act Forbidden by Law
The term “ ‘any act forbidden by law’ . . . refers to acts forbidden by the Vehicle
Code . . . .” (People v. Clenney (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 241, 253 [331 P.2d 696].)
The defendant must commit the act when driving the vehicle. (People v. Capetillo
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 217 [269 Cal.Rptr. 250] [violation of Veh. Code,
§ 10851 not sufficient because offense not committed “when” defendant was driving
the vehicle but by mere fact that defendant was driving the vehicle].)
Neglect of Duty Imposed by Law
“In proving the person neglected any duty imposed by law in driving the vehicle, it
is not necessary to prove that any specific section of [the Vehicle Code] was
violated.” (Veh. Code, § 23153(c); People v. Oyaas (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669
[219 Cal.Rptr. 243].) “[The] neglect of duty element . . . is satisfied by evidence
which establishes that the defendant’s conduct amounts to no more than ordinary
negligence.” (People v. Oyaas, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 669.) “[T]he law
imposes on any driver [the duty] to exercise ordinary care at all times and to
maintain a proper control of his or her vehicle.” (Id. at p. 670.)
Multiple Victims to One Drunk Driving Accident
“In Wilkoff v. Superior Court [(1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 352 [211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696
P.2d 134]] we held that a defendant cannot be charged with multiple counts of
felony drunk driving under Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a), where
injuries to several people result from one act of drunk driving.” (People v.
McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 802 [254 Cal.Rptr. 331, 765 P.2d 493].) However,
when “a defendant commits vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence[,] . . . he
may properly be punished for [both the vehicular manslaughter and] injury to a
separate individual that results from the same incident.” (Id. at p. 804.) The
prosecution may also charge an enhancement for multiple victims under Vehicle
Code section 23558.
See also the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2110, Driving Under the
Influence.
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Demonstrative, Experimental, and
Scientific Evidence, § 56.
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02 (Matthew Bender).
129
2101. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury
(Veh. Code, § 23153(b))

another person while driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent
or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant drove a vehicle;
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08
percent or more by weight;
3. When the defendant was driving with that blood alcohol level,
(he/she) also (committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to perform a
legal duty);
AND
[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of
the defendant’s (blood/breath) was taken within three hours of the
defendant’s [alleged] driving and that a chemical analysis of the sample
showed a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, you may, but are
not required to, conclude that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was
0.08 percent or more at the time of the alleged offense.]
Public Health.]
following legal (duty/duties) while driving the vehicle: (the duty to
exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain proper control of the
vehicle/ <insert other duty or duties alleged>).]
130
act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).

committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]]
probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, August 2015, March 2018,
September 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
to exercise ordinary care (see People v. Oyass (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219
131
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
reasonable doubt that a sample of” explains a rebuttable presumption created by
statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(b); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California
Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption
in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (People v.
Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In
accordance with Roder, the instructions have been written as permissive inferences.
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a sample of” if there is no substantial
evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was at or above 0.08 percent at the
time of the test.
132

People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)
CALCRIM No. 2100, Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence
Causing Injury.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(b); Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal. 3d
257, 265–266 [198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
• Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); People v. Bransford (1994) 8 Cal.4th
885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23153(b); Evid. Code, § 607; People v. Milham
(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Negligence—Ordinary Care. Pen. Code, § 7(2); Restatement Second of Torts,
§ 282.
863].
133
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
• Statute Constitutional. Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273 [198
Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
Cal.Rptr. 170].
• Misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 Percent. Veh. Code,
§ 23152(a) & (b); People v. Capetillo (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 220 [269
Cal.Rptr. 250].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, Driving With 0.08 Percent
Blood Alcohol and CALCRIM No. 2100, Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel
Under the Influence Causing Injury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[1] (Matthew Bender).
134
2102. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol Causing Injury
With a Passenger for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23153(e))

another person while driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.04 percent
or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(e)].
prove that:
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.04
3. When (he/she) drove with that blood-alcohol level, (he/she) also
(committed an illegal act/ [or] neglected to perform a legal duty);
4. When (he/she) drove, there was a passenger for hire in the
vehicle;
AND
A person is a passenger for hire when the person or someone else pays,
or is expected to pay, for the ride, the payment is or will be with money
or something else of value, and the payment is made to, or expected to
be made to, the owner, operator, agent or any other person with an
interest in the vehicle.
showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more, you may, but are
not required to, conclude that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was
Public Health.]
135
following legal (duty/duties) while driving the vehicle: (the duty to
exercise ordinary care at all times and to maintain proper control of the
vehicle/ <insert other duty or duties alleged>).]
act/[or] failed to perform [at least] one duty).]
committed/ [or] duty the defendant failed to perform).]
New March 2018, effective July 2018; Revised September 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
136
to exercise ordinary care (see People v. Oyass (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [219
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23153(e); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California
evidence that the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was at or above 0.04 percent at the
time of the test.
137
Do not give this instruction if the court has bifurcated the trial. Instead, give
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial. See the Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, for an extensive
discussion of bifurcation. If the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give
CALCRIM No. 2100, Driving a Vehicle or Operating a Vessel Under the Influence
Causing Injury.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23153(e); Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d
257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
• Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152; People v. Bransford (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885,
890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23153(e); Evid. Code, § 607; People v. Milham
(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
§ 282.
863].
138

Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [249 Cal.Rptr. 906].
Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
Cal.Rptr. 170].
• Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger for Hire. Veh. Code,
§ 23152(e).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, Driving a Vehicle or
Operating a Vessel Under the Influence Causing Injury (Veh. Code, § 23153)(a), (f),
(g) and CALCRIM No. 2100, Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol (Veh. Code,
§ 23152(b).
139
(ii) Without Injury
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving under the

[combined] influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an
alcoholic beverage and a drug) [in violation of Vehicle Code section
23152(a)/(f)/(g)].
prove that:
AND
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant was under the [combined]
influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [or] a drug/ [or] an alcoholic
beverage and a drug).
A person is under the influence if, as a result of (drinking [or consuming]
an alcoholic beverage/ [and/or] taking a drug), his or her mental or
physical abilities are so impaired that he or she is no longer able to drive
a vehicle with the caution of a sober person, using ordinary care, under
similar circumstances.
The manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish
whether the person is or is not under the influence of (an alcoholic
beverage/ [or] a drug) [or under the combined influence of an alcoholic
beverage and a drug]. However, it is a factor to be considered, in light of
all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether the person was
under the influence.
[An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be
consumed that contains ethanol. Ethanol is also known as ethyl alcohol,
drinking alcohol, or alcohol. [An alcoholic beverage includes
<insert type[s] of beverage[s] from Veh. Code, § 109 or Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]]
[A drug is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol,
that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to drive as an
ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of his or her faculties and
using reasonable care, would drive under similar circumstances.]
[If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent or more at the time of
the chemical analysis, you may, but are not required to, conclude that
the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage at the
time of the alleged offense.]
140
Public Health.]
drug.]
[If the defendant was under the influence of (an alcoholic beverage/ [and/
or] a drug), then it is not a defense that something else also impaired
(his/her) ability to drive.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2015, September 2017,
March 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor or a
felony based on prior convictions.
People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.08 percent” explains
a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code,
§§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction phrased
as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates an unconstitutional mandatory
presumption. (People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501,
658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with Roder, the instructions have been written as
permissive inferences.
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was
141
0.08 percent” if there is no substantial evidence that the defendant’s blood alcohol
level was at or above 0.08 percent at the time of the test. In addition, if the test falls
within the range in which no presumption applies, 0.05 percent to just below 0.08
percent, do not give this bracketed sentence. (People v. Wood (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 15 [255 Cal.Rptr. 537].) The court should also consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the test result exceeds the
margin of error before giving this instruction for test results of 0.08 percent.
(Compare People v. Campos (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4–5 [188 Cal.Rptr.
366], with People v. Randolph (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 11 [262 Cal.Rptr.
378].)
The statute also creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was not under
the influence if his or her blood alcohol level was less than 0.05 percent. (People v.
Gallardo (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].) Depending on the
facts of the case, the defendant may be entitled to a pinpoint instruction on this
presumption. It is not error to refuse an instruction on this presumption if the
prosecution’s theory is that the defendant was under the combined influence of
drugs and alcohol. (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [32
Cal.Rptr.2d 442].)
Give the bracketed sentence stating that “it is not a defense that something else also
impaired (his/her) ability to drive” if there is evidence of an additional source of
impairment such as an epileptic seizure, inattention, or falling asleep.
CALCRIM No. 2111, Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(a), (f), (g).
• Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Veh. Code, § 109; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
142
• Driving. Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 768 [280
Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, § 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; People v. Milham (1984)
159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Mandatory Presumption Unconstitutional Unless Instructed as Permissive
Inference. People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501,
658 P.2d 1302].
• Under the Influence Defined. People v. Schoonover (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 101,
105–107 [85 Cal.Rptr. 69]; People v. Enriquez (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661,
665–666 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].
• Manner of Driving. People v. Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 84 [282
Cal.Rptr. 170]; People v. McGrath (1928) 94 Cal.App. 520, 524 [271 P. 549].
• Legal Entitlement to Use Drug Not a Defense. Veh. Code, § 23630.
Cal.Rptr. 170].
If the defendant is charged with felony driving under the influence based on prior
convictions, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court
must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior
convictions have been proved. If the jury finds that the prior convictions have not
been proved, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.
• Attempted Driving Under the Influence. Pen. Code, § 664; Veh. Code,
§ 23152(a); People v. Garcia (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3–4 [262 Cal.Rptr.
915].
RELATED ISSUES
Driving
“[S]ection 23152 requires proof of volitional movement of a vehicle.” (Mercer v.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 768 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d
404].) However, the movement may be slight. (Padilla v. Meese (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [229 Cal.Rptr. 310]; Henslee v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles
(1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 445, 450–453 [214 Cal.Rptr. 249].) Further, driving may be
established through circumstantial evidence. (Mercer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 770;
People v. Wilson (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [222 Cal.Rptr. 540] [sufficient
evidence of driving where the vehicle was parked on the freeway, over a mile from
the on-ramp, and the defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was found in the
driver’s seat with the vehicle’s engine running].) See CALCRIM No. 2241, Driver
and Driving Defined.
PAS Test Results
The results of a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test “are admissible upon a
showing of either compliance with title 17 or the foundational elements of (1)
143
properly functioning equipment, (2) a properly administered test, and (3) a qualified
operator . . . .” (People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d
854, 49 P.3d 203].)
Presumption Arising From Test Results—Timing
Unlike the statute on driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, the
statute permitting the jury to presume that the defendant was under the influence if
he or she had a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more does not contain a time
limit for administering the test. (Veh. Code, § 23610; People v. Schrieber (1975) 45
Cal.App.3d 917, 922 [119 Cal.Rptr. 812].) However, the court in Schrieber, supra,
noted that the mandatory testing statute provides that “the test must be incidental to
both the offense and to the arrest and . . . no substantial time [should] elapse . . .
between the offense and the arrest.” (Id. at p. 921.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin, California Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Demonstrative, Experimental, and
Scientific Evidence, § 56.
144
2111. Driving With 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol (Veh. Code,
§ 23152(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving with a blood

alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more [in violation of Vehicle Code section
23152(b)].
prove that:
AND
percent or more by weight.
Public Health.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2008, August 2015,
March 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
145
People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690].)
statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(b); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California
time of the test.
CALCRIM No. 2110, Driving Under the Influence.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d
257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
• Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152(b); People v. Bransford (1994) 8 Cal.4th
885, 890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, §§ 23152(b), 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; People v.
Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
146

Cal.Rptr. 170].
If the defendant is charged with felony driving under the influence based on prior
convictions, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court
must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the prior
convictions have been proved. If the jury finds that the prior convictions have not
RELATED ISSUES
Partition Ratio
In 1990, the Legislature amended Vehicle Code section 23152(b) to state that the
“percent, by weight, of alcohol in a person’s blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.” Following
this amendment, the Supreme Court held that evidence of variability of breath-
alcohol partition ratios was not relevant and properly excluded. (People v. Bransford
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2110, Driving Under the Influence.
SECONDARY SOURCES
147
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving while addicted

to a drug [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(c)].
prove that:
AND
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant was addicted to a drug.
A drug is a substance or combination of substances, other than alcohol,
that it would appreciably impair his or her ability to drive as an
ordinarily cautious person, in full possession of his or her faculties and
using reasonable care, would drive under similar circumstances.
A person is addicted to a drug if he or she:
1. Has become physically dependent on the drug, suffering
withdrawal symptoms if he or she is deprived of it;
2. Has developed a tolerance to the drug’s effects and therefore
requires larger and more potent doses;
AND
3. Has become emotionally dependent on the drug, experiencing a
compulsive need to continue its use.
drug.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor a felony
based on prior convictions.
Cal.4th 69, 77–78 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333]; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
1327, 1334–1336; People v. Weathington, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) If the
148
defendant does not stipulate and the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions. If the court grants a bifurcated trial, give
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial. If the defendant stipulates to
the truth of the convictions, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury
unless the court admits them as otherwise relevant. (See People v. Hall (1998) 67
Vehicle Code section 23630 states that the fact that the defendant was legally
entitled to use the drug is not a defense to a charge of driving under the influence.
(Veh. Code, § 23630.) It is unclear whether this provision applies to the charge of
driving while addicted. If the court concludes that the statute does apply, the court
may add the bracketed sentence at the end of the instruction: “It is not a defense
that the defendant was legally entitled to use the drug.”
In addition, Vehicle Code section 23152(c) states “[t]his subdivision shall not apply
to a person who is participating in a narcotic treatment program approved pursuant
to Article 3 (commencing with Section 11875) of Chapter 1 of Part 3 of Division
10.5 of the Health and Safety Code.” If there is evidence that the defendant is
participating in an approved treatment program, the court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on this defense.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(c).
• Addict Defined. People v. O’Neil (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 754 [44 Cal.Rptr. 320,
401 P.2d 928].
Cal.Rptr. 170].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
149
2113. Driving With 0.05 Percent Blood Alcohol When Under 21
(Veh. Code, § 23140(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving when under

the age of 21 years with a blood alcohol level of 0.05 percent or more [in
violation of Vehicle Code section 23140(a)].
prove that:
AND
3. At that time, the defendant was under 21 years old.
Public Health.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Note that this offense is an infraction. (Veh. Code, §§ 40000.1, 40000.15.)
However, this instruction has been included because this offense may serve as a
predicate offense for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated or vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated. (Pen. Code, §§ 191.5, 192(c)(3); see People v.
Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 275–276 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558].)
150
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23140(a); Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d
257, 265–266 [198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732].
• Statute Constitutional. See Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 273
[198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732]; People v. Goslar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 270,
275–276 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2111, Driving With 0.08 Percent
Blood Alcohol.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare §§ 272–277.
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[1A][a] (Matthew Bender).
151
2114. Driving With 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol With a Passenger
for Hire (Veh. Code, § 23152(e))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving with a blood-

alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more with a passenger for hire [in
violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(e)].
prove that:
2. When (he/she) drove, the defendant’s blood-alcohol level was 0.04
AND
3. When (he/she) drove, there was a passenger for hire in the
vehicle.
A person is a passenger for hire when the person or someone else pays,
or is expected to pay, for the ride, the payment is or will be with money
or something else of value, and the payment is made to, or expected to
be made to, the owner, operator, agent or any other person with an
interest in the vehicle.
Public Health.]
New March 2018, effective July 2018

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
152

discussion of bifurcation.
statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23152(e); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California
time of the test.
CALCRIM No. 2110, Driving Under the Influence.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23152(e).
• Partition Ratio. Veh. Code, § 23152; People v. Bransford (1994) 8 Cal.4th 885,
890 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, 884 P.2d 70].
• Presumptions. Veh. Code, §§ 23152(e), 23610; Evid. Code, § 607; People v.
Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 503–505 [205 Cal.Rptr. 688].
Cal.Rptr. 170].
153
RELATED ISSUES
The defendant may stipulate to the truth of the prior convictions. (People v.
Weathington (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 90 [282 Cal.Rptr. 170].) If the defendant
stipulates, the prior convictions should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court
admits them as otherwise relevant. (See People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128,
135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
154
2125. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 &
23566)
If you find the defendant guilty of ([causing injury while] driving under
the influence/ [or] [causing injury while] driving with a blood alcohol
level of (0.08/0.04) percent or more), [or the lesser offense of driving
under the influence [or driving with a blood alcohol level of (0.08/0.04)
percent or more]], you must then determine whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that the defendant has been convicted of
(another/other) driving under the influence offense[s] before. It has
already been determined that the defendant is the person named in
exhibits <insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must
decide whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of
the alleged crime[s].
The People allege that the defendant has been convicted of:
[1.] A violation of <insert Veh. Code section violated>, on
<insert date of conviction>, in the
<insert name of court>, in Case Number <insert docket or
case number>(;/.)
the burden of proving (the/each) alleged conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any alleged
conviction], you must find that the alleged conviction has not been
proved.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior
convictions.
Any prior convictions are a sentencing factor for the trial court and not an element
155
of the offense. (People v. Burris (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1016, fn. 3 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d
876, 103 P.3d 276].)
discussion of bifurcation.
This instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements
of the driving under the influence offense charged, CALCRIM Nos. 2100, 2101,
2110, 2111.
On request, the court should give the bracketed limiting instruction regarding the
evidence of the prior convictions. (See People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170,
182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the
limiting instruction and the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given.
(See People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)
if the prior convictions have or have not been proved.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.
Cal.Rptr. 170].
• Judge Determines if Defendant Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code,
§ 1025(b); People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d
694].
• Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d
170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; People v. Griggs (2003) 110
RELATED ISSUES
Ten-Year “Washout” Period
Effective January 1, 2005, prior convictions for driving under the influence within
ten years of the current offense may be used for enhancement purposes. (See Veh.
Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.)
Order of Convictions, Not Offenses Relevant
In order for the sentencing enhancements for multiple driving under the influence
offenses to apply, the conviction for the other offense or offenses must predate the
current offense. (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1216 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615,
947 P.2d 808].) The date on which the other offenses occurred is not relevant.
(Ibid.)
All Offenses Must Occur Within Time Period
“[F]or a fourth DUI offense to be charged as a felony, the offense must be
committed within [. . . ten] years of three or more separate DUI violations resulting
156
in convictions, and all four must occur within a period of [. . . ten] years.” (People
v. Munoz (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 12, 20 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 182].)
Prior Felony Reduced to Misdemeanor
In People v. Camarillo (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1389 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 618], the
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony driving under the influence
offense. After successful completion of probation, that felony was reduced to a
misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). (Ibid.) The court held that that
conviction could not later be used as a prior felony conviction to enhance the
defendant’s sentence. (Ibid.)
135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
See also the Related Issues section and Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior
Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[3][d] (Matthew Bender).
157
2126. Driving Under the Influence or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent
Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions—Bifurcated Trial (Veh. Code,
§§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566)
The People have alleged that the defendant was previously convicted of
(another/other) driving under the influence offense[s]. It has already been
determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibits
<insert numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must decide whether the
evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].
[1.] A violation of <insert Veh. Code section violated>, on
<insert name of court>, in Case Number ______ <insert docket or
case number>(;/.)
[In deciding whether the People have proved the allegation[s], consider
You may not return a finding that (the/any) alleged conviction has or has
not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proof of the alleged prior
convictions. Give this instruction if the court has granted a bifurcated trial. The
court must also give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether the People have
proved” on request.
if the prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23550, 23550.5 & 23566.
Cal.Rptr. 170].
• Bifurcation. People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d
333]; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d
41].
158
• Judge Determines if Defendant Person Named in Documents. Pen. Code,

§ 1025(b); People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d
694].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2125, Driving Under the Influence
or With 0.08 or 0.04 Percent Blood Alcohol: Prior Convictions, and CALCRIM No.
3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial.
SECONDARY SOURCES
159
(iv) Refusal
The law requires that any driver who has been [lawfully] arrested
submit to a chemical test at the request of a peace officer who has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested was driving under
the influence.
<Give for refusal by words or conduct>
[If the defendant refused to submit to such a test after a peace officer
asked (him/her) to do so and explained the test’s nature to the
defendant, then the defendant’s conduct may show that (he/she) was
aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the defendant refused to
submit to such a test, it is up to you to decide the meaning and
importance of the refusal. However, evidence that the defendant refused
to submit to a chemical test cannot prove guilt by itself.]
<Give for refusal by silence>
[A defendant’s silence in response to an officer’s request to (submit to a
chemical test/ [or] complete a chemical test) may be a refusal. If you
conclude that the defendant’s silence was a refusal, it is up to you to
decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the
defendant refused to submit to a chemical test cannot prove guilt by
itself.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may instruct the jury that refusal to submit to a chemical analysis for
blood alcohol content may demonstrate consciousness of guilt. (People v. Sudduth
(1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 547 [55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401].) There is no sua sponte
duty to give this instruction.
Do not give this instruction if the defendant is exempted from the implied consent
law because the defendant has hemophilia or is taking anticoagulants. (See Veh.
Code, § 23612(b) & (c).)
The implied consent statute states that “[t]he testing shall be incidental to a lawful
arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable cause to
believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23140,
23152, or 23153.” (Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(1)(C).) If there is a factual issue as to
whether the defendant was lawfully arrested or whether the officer had reasonable
cause to believe the defendant was under the influence, the court should consider
160
whether this entire instruction, or the bracketed word “lawfully” is appropriate and/
or whether the jury should be instructed on these additional issues. For an
instruction on lawful arrest and reasonable cause, see CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful
Performance: Peace Offıcer.
AUTHORITY
• Implied Consent Statute. Veh. Code, § 23612.
• Instruction Constitutional. People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 547 [55
Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401].
• Silence in Response to Request May Constitute Refusal. Garcia v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 73, 82–84 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 906].
RELATED ISSUES
Silence
Silence in response to repeated requests to submit to a chemical analysis constitutes
a refusal. (Lampman v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 922, 926 [105
Cal.Rptr. 101].)
Inability to Complete Chosen Test
If the defendant selects one test but is physically unable to complete that test, the
defendant’s refusal to submit to an alternative test constitutes a refusal. (Cahall v.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [94 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Kessler
v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 46].)
Conditions Placed on Test by Defendant
“It is established that a conditional consent to a test constitutes a refusal to submit
to a test within the meaning of section 13353.” (Webb v. Miller (1986) 187
Cal.App.3d 619, 626 [232 Cal.Rptr. 50] [request by defendant to see chart in wallet
constituted refusal, italics in original]; Covington v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1980)
102 Cal.App.3d 54, 57 [162 Cal.Rptr. 150] [defendant’s response that he would only
take test with attorney present constituted refusal].) However, in Ross v. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 398, 402–403 [268 Cal.Rptr. 102], the court
held that the defendant was entitled under the implied consent statute to request to
see the identification of the person drawing his blood. The court found the request
reasonable in light of the risks of HIV infection from improper needle use. (Id. at p.
403.) Thus, the defendant could not be penalized for refusing to submit to the test
when the technician declined to produce identification. (Ibid.)
Defendant Consents After Initial Refusal
“Once the driver refuses to take any one of the three chemical tests, the law does
not require that he later be given one when he decides, for whatever reason, that he
is ready to submit. [Citations.] [¶] . . . Simply stated, one offer plus one rejection
161
equals one refusal; and, one suspension.” (Dunlap v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1984)
156 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [202 Cal.Rptr. 729].)
Defendant Refuses Request for Urine Sample Following Breath Test
In People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 893 [166 Cal.Rptr. 801], the
defendant submitted to a breath test revealing a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent.
The officer then asked the defendant to submit to a urine test in order to detect the
presence of drugs, but the defendant refused. (Ibid.) The court held that this was a
refusal under the implied consent statute. (Ibid.)
Sample Taken by Force After Refusal
“[T]here was no voluntary submission on the part of respondent to any of the blood
alcohol tests offered by the arresting officer. The fact that a blood sample ultimately
was obtained and the test completed is of no significance.” (Cole v. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 870, 875 [189 Cal.Rptr. 249].)
Refusal Admissible Even If Faulty Admonition
Vehicle Code section 23612 requires a specific admonition to the defendant
regarding the consequences of refusal to submit to a chemical test. If the officer
fails to properly advise the defendant in the terms required by statute, the defendant
may not be subject to the mandatory license suspension or the enhancement for
willful refusal to complete a test. (See People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d
971, 978 [108 Cal.Rptr. 620]; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137
Cal.App.3d 114, 118 [186 Cal.Rptr. 716].) However, the refusal is still admissible in
criminal proceedings for driving under the influence. (People v. Municipal Court
(Gonzales), supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 118.) Thus, the court in People v.
Municipal Court (Gonzales), supra, 137 Cal.App.3d at p. 118, held that the
defendant’s refusal was admissible despite the officer’s failure to advise the
defendant that refusal would be used against him in a court of law, an advisement
specifically required by the statute. (See Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(4).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[2][f] (Matthew Bender).
162
If you find the defendant guilty of (causing injury while driving under
the influence/ [or] [the lesser offense of] driving under the influence), you
must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the defendant willfully refused to (submit to/ [or]
complete) a chemical test to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/
[or] whether (he/she) had consumed a drug).
1. A peace officer asked the defendant to submit to a chemical test
to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/ [or] whether (he/
she) had consumed a drug);
2. The peace officer fully advised the defendant of the requirement
to submit to a test and the consequences of not submitting to a
test;
3. The defendant willfully refused to (submit to a test/ [or] to
complete the test);
AND
4. The peace officer lawfully arrested the defendant and had
reasonable cause to believe that defendant was driving a motor
vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 23140, 23152, or
23153.
To have fully advised the defendant, the peace officer must have told
(him/her) all of the following information:
1. (He/She) may choose a blood(,/ or) breath[, or urine] test; [if (he/
she) completes a breath test, (he/she) may also be required to
submit to a blood [or urine] test to determine if (he/she) had
consumed a drug;] [if only one test is available, (he/she) must
complete the test available;] [if (he/she) is not able to complete
the test chosen, (he/she) must submit to (the other/another) test;]
2. (He/She) does not have the right to have an attorney present
before saying whether (he/she) will submit to a test, before
deciding which test to take, or during administration of a test;
3. If (he/she) refuses to submit to a test, the refusal may be used
against (him/her) in court;
4. Failure to submit to or complete a test will result in a fine and
mandatory imprisonment if (he/she) is convicted of driving under
the influence or with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
more;
163
AND
5. Failure to submit to or complete a test will result in suspension of
(his/her) driving privilege for one year or revocation of (his/her)
driving privilege for two or three years.
5. <Short Alternative; see Bench Notes>
5. [(His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for two or three years
if (he/she) has previously been convicted of one or more specific
offenses related to driving under the influence or if (his/her)
driving privilege has previously been suspended or revoked.]
5. <Long Alternative; see Bench Notes>
[A. (His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for two years if
(he/she) has been convicted within the previous (seven/ten)
years of a separate violation of Vehicle Code section 23140,
23152, 23153, or 23103 as specified in section 23103.5, or of
Penal Code section 191.5 or 192(c)(3). (His/Her) driving
privilege will also be revoked for two years if (his/her) driving
privilege has been suspended or revoked under Vehicle Code
section 13353, 13353.1, or 13353.2 for an offense that occurred
on a separate occasion within the previous (seven/ten) years;
[A. AND
B. (His/Her) driving privilege will be revoked for three years if
(he/she) has been convicted within the previous (seven/ten)
years of two or more of the offenses just listed. (His/Her)
driving privilege will also be revoked for three years if (his/
her) driving privilege was previously suspended or revoked on
two occasions, or if (he/she) has had any combination of two
convictions, suspensions, or revocations, on separate occasions,
within the previous (seven/ten) years.]
[Vehicle Code section 23140 prohibits a person under the age of 21 from
driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.05 percent or more. Vehicle
Code section 23152 prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs or driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more.
Vehicle Code section 23153 prohibits causing injury while driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs or causing injury while driving with a
blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. Vehicle Code section 23103
as specified in section 23103.5 prohibits reckless driving involving
alcohol. Penal Code section 191.5 prohibits gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated, and Penal Code section 192(c)(3) prohibits vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated.]
164

offıcer”>.]
[A defendant’s silence in response to an officer’s request to (submit to a
chemical test/ [or] complete a chemical test) may be a refusal. If you
conclude that the defendant was silent in response to an officer’s request
to (submit to a chemical test/[or] complete a chemical test), you must
decide whether that conduct was a refusal.]
the defendant willfully refused to (submit to/ [or] complete) a chemical
test to determine ((his/her) blood alcohol content/ [or] whether (he/she)
had consumed a drug). If the People have not met this burden, you must
find this allegation has not been proved.
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, March 2017, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of the enhancement.
Do not give this instruction if the defendant is exempted from the implied consent
law because the defendant has hemophilia or is taking anticoagulants. (See Veh.
Code, § 23612(b), (c).)
The implied consent statute states that “[t]he testing shall be incidental to a lawful
arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable cause to
believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23140,
23152, or 23153.” (Veh. Code, § 23612(a)(1)(C).) For an instruction on lawful arrest
and reasonable cause, see CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace
Offıcer.
No reported case has established the degree of detail with which the jury must be
instructed regarding the refusal admonition mandated by statute. The committee has
provided several different options. The first sentence of element 5 under the
definition of “fully advised” must be given. The court then may add either the short
alternative or the long alternative or neither. If there is no issue regarding the two-
and three-year revocations in the case and both parties agree, the court may choose
to use the short alternative or to give just the first sentence of element 5. The court
may choose to use the long alternative if there is an objection to the short version or
165
the court determines that the longer version is more appropriate. The court may also
choose to give the bracketed paragraph defining the Vehicle and Penal Code sections
discussed in the long alternative at its discretion.
When giving the long version, give the option of “ten years” for the time period in
which the prior conviction may be used, unless the court determines that the law
prior to January 1, 2005 is applicable. In such case, the court must select the
“seven-year” time period.
The jury must determine whether the witness is a peace officer. (People v. Brown
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) The court may
instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the statute
(e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police
Officer are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may not instruct the jury that
the witness was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace
officer”). (Ibid.) If the witness is a police officer, give the bracketed sentence that
begins with “A person employed as a police officer.” If the witness is another type
of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “A person employed
by.”
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Veh. Code, §§ 23577 & 23612.
• Statute Constitutional. Quintana v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 361,
366–369 [237 Cal.Rptr. 397].
• Statutory Admonitions Not Inherently Confusing or Misleading. Blitzstein v.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 138, 142 [244 Cal.Rptr. 624].
• Silence in Response to Request May Constitute Refusal. Garcia v. Department of
Motor Vehicles (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 73, 82–84 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 906].
RELATED ISSUES
Admonition Must Convey Strong Likelihood of Suspension
It is insufficient for the officer to advise the defendant that his or her license “could”
be suspended. (Decker v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1972) 6 Cal.3d 903, 905–906
[101 Cal.Rptr. 387, 495 P.2d 1307]; Giomi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1971) 15
Cal.App.3d 905, 907 [93 Cal.Rptr. 613].) The officer must convey to the defendant
that there is a strong likelihood that his or her license will be suspended. (Decker,
supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 906; Giomi, supra, 15 Cal.App.3d at p. 907.)
Admonition Must Be Clearly Conveyed
“[T]he burden is properly placed on the officer to give the warning required by
section 13353 in a manner comprehensible to the driver.” (Thompson v. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 363 [165 Cal.Rptr. 626].) Thus, in
Thompson, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 363, the court set aside the defendant’s
license suspension because radio traffic prevented the defendant from hearing the
admonition. However, where the defendant’s own “obstreperous conduct . . .
prevented the officer from completing the admonition,” or where the defendant’s
166
own intoxication prevented him or her from understanding the admonition, the
defendant may be held responsible for refusing to submit to a chemical test.
(Morphew v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 738, 743–744 [188
Cal.Rptr. 126]; Bush v. Bright (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 792 [71 Cal.Rptr. 123].)
Defendant Incapable of Understanding Due to Injury or Illness
When the defendant, through no fault of his or her own, is incapable of
understanding the admonition or of submitting to the test, the defendant cannot be
penalized for refusing. (Hughey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d
752, 760 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].) Thus, in Hughey, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 760,
the court held that the defendant was rendered incapable of refusing due to a head
trauma. However, in McDonnell v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d
653, 662 [119 Cal.Rptr. 804], the court upheld the license suspension when
defendant’s use of alcohol triggered a hypoglycemic attack. The court held that
because voluntary alcohol use aggravated the defendant’s illness, the defendant
could be held responsible for his subsequent refusal, even if the illness prevented
the defendant from understanding the admonition. (Ibid.)
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2130, Refusal—Consciousness of
Guilt.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[2][f], [4][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).
167
B. FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY FOLLOWING
ACCIDENT
(i) Death or Injury

2140. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or
Injury—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to perform a

legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or]
[permanent] injury) to another person [in violation of
prove that:
1. While driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident;
2. The accident caused (the death of/ [or] [permanent, serious]
injury to) someone else;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an
accident that injured another person [or knew from the nature of
the accident that it was probable that another person had been
injured];
AND
4. The defendant willfully failed to perform one or more of the
following duties:
(a) To immediately stop at the scene of the accident;
(b) To provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the
accident;
(c) To give to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any
vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the
accident all of the following information:
• The defendant’s name and current residence address;
[AND]
• The registration number of the vehicle (he/she) was
driving(;/.)
<Give following sentence if defendant not owner of vehicle.>
[[AND]
169
• The name and current residence address of the owner of

the vehicle if the defendant is not the owner(;/.)]
<Give following sentence if occupants of defendant’s vehicle were
injured.>
[AND
• The names and current residence addresses of any
occupants of the defendant’s vehicle who were injured in
the accident.]
[AND]
(d) When requested, to show (his/her) driver’s license if available
to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any vehicle
collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the
accident(;/.)
<Give element 4(e) if accident caused death.>
[AND
(e) The driver must, without unnecessary delay, notify either the
police department of the city where the accident happened or
the local headquarters of the California Highway Patrol if the
accident happened in an unincorporated area.]
The duty to immediately stop means that the driver must stop his or her
vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.
To provide reasonable assistance means the driver must determine what
assistance, if any, the injured person needs and make a reasonable effort
to see that such assistance is provided, either by the driver or someone
else. Reasonable assistance includes transporting anyone who has been
injured for medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such
treatment, if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured
person requests transportation. [The driver is not required to provide
assistance that is unnecessary or that is already being provided by
someone else. However, the requirement that the driver provide
assistance is not excused merely because bystanders are on the scene or
could provide assistance.]
The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of who
was injured and regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does
not matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was
unavoidable.
170
People have proved that the defendant failed to perform at least one of
the required duties. You must all agree on which duty the defendant
failed to perform.
[To be involved in a vehicle accident means to be connected with the
accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the
driver’s vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]
[When providing his or her name and address, the driver is required to
identify himself or herself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the
accident.]
[A permanent, serious injury is one that permanently impairs the
function or causes the loss of any organ or body part.]
[An accident causes (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury) if the
(death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of
the accident and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened
without the accident. A natural and probable consequence is one that a
reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable,
consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] [permanent, serious]
injury). An accident causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial
factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A substantial factor is more
than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor
that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]
[If the accident caused the defendant to be unconscious or disabled so
that (he/she) was not capable of performing the duties required by law,
then (he/she) did not have to perform those duties at that time.
[However, (he/she) was required to do so as soon as reasonably
possible.]]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, February 2012, March
2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the
vehicle. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present
in the vehicle or other passenger in control of the vehicle, give CALCRIM No.
2141, Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant
Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control.
171
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of death or injury, the
paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of death or injury,
the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second
bracketed paragraph on causation. (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351,
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(1) with leaving the
scene of an accident causing injury, but not death or permanent, serious injury,
delete the words “death” and “permanent, serious” from the instruction. If the
defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(2) with leaving the scene
of an accident causing death or permanent, serious injury, use either or both of these
options throughout the instruction, depending on the facts of the case. When
instructing on both offenses, give this instruction using the words “death” and/or
“permanent, serious injury,” and give CALCRIM No. 2142, Failure to Perform Duty
Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense.
Give bracketed element 4(e) only if the accident caused a death.
Give the bracketed portion that begins with “The driver is not required to provide
assistance” if there is an issue over whether assistance by the defendant to the
injured person was necessary in light of aid provided by others. (See People v.
Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; People v. Scofield
(1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; see also discussion in the Related Issues
section below.)
Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in a vehicle accident” if that is an
issue in the case.
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “the driver is required to identify himself
or herself as the driver” if there is evidence that the defendant stopped and
identified himself or herself but not in a way that made it apparent to the other
parties that the defendant was the driver. (People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the accident caused the defendant
to be unconscious” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was unconscious
or disabled at the scene of the accident.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004.
• Sentence for Death or Permanent Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(2).
• Sentence for Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
• Knowledge of Accident and Injury. People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74,
172
79–80 [45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423]; People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d
239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207]; People v. Hamilton (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124,
133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].
• Willful Failure to Perform Duty. People v. Crouch (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d Supp.
14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
• Duty Applies Regardless of Fault for Accident. People v. Scofield (1928) 203
Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
• Involved Defined. People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 631 [71
Cal.Rptr. 415]; People v. Sell (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 [215 P.2d 771].
• Immediately Stopped Defined. People v. Odom (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 641,
646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
• Duty to Render Assistance. People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P.
914]; People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
• Permanent, Serious Injury Defined. Veh. Code, § 20001(d).
• Statute Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege. California v. Byers (1971)
402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
• Must Identify Self as Driver. People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535,
1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].
• Unanimity Instruction Required. People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710
[265 P. 914].
• Unconscious Driver Unable to Comply at Scene. People v. Flores (1996) 51
• Offense May Occur on Private Property. People v. Stansberry (1966) 242
Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
• Duty Applies to Injured Passenger in Defendant’s Vehicle. People v. Kroncke
• Failure to Stop Following Accident—Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
• Misdemeanor Failure to Stop Following Accident—Property Damage. Veh. Code,
§ 20002; but see People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52
Cal.Rptr. 207].
RELATED ISSUES
Constructive Knowledge of Injury
“[K]nowledge may be imputed to the driver of a vehicle where the fact of personal
injury is visible and obvious or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a
173
reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries.” (People v.
Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207] [citations omitted].)
Accusatory Pleading Alleged Property Damage
If accusatory pleading alleges property damage, Veh. Code, § 20002, see People v.
Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52 Cal.Rptr. 207].
Reasonable Assistance
Failure to render reasonable assistance to an injured person constitutes a violation of
the statute. (People v. Limon (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 575, 578 [60 Cal.Rptr. 448].)
“In this connection it must be noted that the statute requires that necessary
assistance be rendered.” (People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]
[emphasis in original].) In People v. Scofield, supra, the court held that where other
people were caring for the injured person, the defendant’s “assistance was not
necessary.” (Id. at p. 709 [emphasis in original].) An instruction limited to the
statutory language on rendering assistance “is inappropriate where such assistance
by the driver is unnecessary, as in the case where paramedics have responded within
moments following the accident.” (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009,
1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) However, “the driver’s duty to render necessary
assistance under Vehicle Code section 20003, at a minimum, requires that the driver
first ascertain what assistance, if any, the injured person needs, and then the driver
must make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, whether
through himself or third parties.” (Ibid.) The presence of bystanders who offer
assistance is not alone sufficient to relieve the defendant of the duty to render aid.
(Ibid.) “[T]he ‘reasonable assistance’ referred to in the statute might be the
summoning of aid,” rather than the direct provision of first aid by the defendant.
(People v. Limon (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 575, 578 [60 Cal.Rptr. 448].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Sentencing, §§ 91.60[2][b][ii], 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.03, Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.02[3A][a] (Matthew Bender).
174
2141. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or
Injury—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control
(Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)

[permanent] injury) to another person [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant [owned and] was riding as a passenger in a vehicle
involved in an accident;
2. At the time of the accident, the defendant had full authority to
direct and control the vehicle even though another person was
driving the vehicle;
3. The accident caused (the death of/ [or] [permanent, serious]
injury to) someone else;
4. The defendant knew that the vehicle had been involved in an
injured];
AND
following duties:
(a) To cause the driver of the vehicle to immediately stop at the
scene of the accident;
(b) When requested, to show (his/her) driver’s license, or any
other available identification, to (the person struck/ the driver
or occupants of any vehicle collided with) or any peace officer
at the scene of the accident;
(c) To provide reasonable assistance to any person injured in the
accident;
[OR]
(d) To give to (the person struck/the driver or occupants of any
vehicle collided with) or any peace officer at the scene of the
accident all of the following information:
• The defendant’s name and current residence address;
175
• The registration number of the vehicle (he/she) (owned/

was a passenger in);
• [AND]
• The name and current residence address of the driver of
the vehicle(;/.)
• <Give following sentence if defendant not owner of vehicle.>
• [[AND]
• The name and current residence address of the owner of
the vehicle if the defendant is not the owner(;/.)]
• <Give following sentence if occupants of defendant’s vehicle
were injured.>
• [AND
• The names and current residence addresses of any
occupants of the defendant’s vehicle who were injured in
the accident(;/.)]
<Give element 5(e) if accident caused death.>
[OR
(e) The driver must, without unnecessary delay, notify either the
police department of the city where the accident happened or
accident happened in an unincorporated area.]
The duty to immediately stop means that the (owner/passenger in control)
must cause the vehicle he or she is a passenger in to stop as soon as
reasonably possible under the circumstances.
To provide reasonable assistance means the (owner/passenger in control)
must determine what assistance, if any, the injured person needs and
make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, either
by the (owner/passenger in control) or someone else. Reasonable
assistance includes transporting anyone who has been injured for
medical treatment, or arranging the transportation for such treatment, if
it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if an injured person
requests transportation. [The (owner/passenger in control) is not
required to provide assistance that is unnecessary or that is already
being provided by someone else. However, the requirement that the
(owner/passenger in control) provide assistance is not excused merely
because bystanders are on the scene or could provide assistance.]
176
The (owner/passenger in control) of a vehicle must perform the duties

listed regardless of who was injured and regardless of how or why the
accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused the
accident or if the accident was unavoidable.
failed to perform.
[To be involved in an accident means to be connected with the accident in
a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the vehicle to collide
with another vehicle or person.]
[A permanent, serious injury is one that permanently impairs the
function or causes the loss of any organ or body part.]
[An accident causes (death/ [or] [permanent, serious] injury) if the
(death/ [or] injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of
the accident and the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened
without the accident. A natural and probable consequence is one that a
reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable,
consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] [permanent, serious]
injury). An accident causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial
factor in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A substantial factor is more
than a trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor
that causes the (death/ [or] injury).]
possible.]]
[If the defendant told the driver to stop and made a reasonable effort to
stop the vehicle, but the driver refused, then the defendant is not guilty
of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a
nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control. If the
177
prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the vehicle, give CALCRIM No. 2140,
Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver.
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
If the defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(1) with leaving the
scene of an accident causing injury, but not death or permanent, serious injury,
delete the words “death” and “permanent, serious” from the instruction. If the
defendant is charged under Vehicle Code section 20001(b)(2) with leaving the scene
of an accident causing death or permanent, serious injury, use either or both of these
options throughout the instruction, depending on the facts of the case. When
instructing on both offenses, give this instruction using the words “death” and/or
“permanent, serious injury,” and give CALCRIM No. 2142, Failure to Perform Duty
Following Accident: Lesser Included Offense.
Give bracketed element 5(e) only if the accident caused a death.
Give the bracketed portion that begins with “The (owner/passenger in control) is not
required to provide assistance” if there is an issue over whether assistance by the
defendant to the injured person was necessary in light of aid provided by others.
(See People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676];
People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914]; see also discussion in the
Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2140, Failure to Perform Duty Following
Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver.)
Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident” if that is an issue
in the case.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant told the driver to
stop” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to cause the vehicle
to be stopped.
AUTHORITY
178
133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].
14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
• Duty to Render Assistance. People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708 [265 P.
914]; People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1027 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
• Nondriving Owner. People v. Rallo (1931) 119 Cal.App. 393, 397 [6 P.2d 516].
402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
[265 P. 914].
Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
• Duty Applies to Injured Passenger in Defendant’s Vehicle. People v. Kroncke
• Failure to Stop Following Accident—Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
• Misdemeanor Failure to Stop Following Accident—Property Damage. Veh. Code,
§ 20002; but see People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 242–243 [52
Cal.Rptr. 207].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2140, Failure to Perform Duty
Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver.
SECONDARY SOURCES
179
2142. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Lesser
Included Offense (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003 & 20004)
The crime[s] of (failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle

accident that caused injury/ [and] failing to perform a legal duty
following a vehicle accident that caused property damage) (is a/are)
lesser crime[s] than failing to perform a legal duty following a vehicle
accident that caused (death/ [or] permanent, serious injury).
the defendant committed the crime of failing to perform a legal duty
following a vehicle accident that caused (death/ [or] permanent, serious
injury) rather than a lesser offense. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of failing to perform a
permanent, serious injury). You must consider whether the defendant is
guilty of the lesser crime[s] of [failing to perform a legal duty following a
vehicle accident that caused injury] [or] [failing to perform a legal duty
following a vehicle accident that caused property damage].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction when: (1) the defendant is charged with leaving the scene of an
accident resulting in death or permanent, serious injury and the court is instructing
on the lesser offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury, and/or
leaving the scene of an accident resulting in property damage; or (2) when the
defendant is charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury and
the court is instructing on the lesser offense of leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in property damage.
AUTHORITY
• Sentence for Injury. Veh. Code, § 20001(b)(1).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2140, Failure to Perform Duty
Following Accident: Death or Injury—Defendant Driver.
180
SECONDARY SOURCES
181
2150. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident:
Property Damage—Defendant Driver (Veh. Code, § 20002)

legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage [in
violation of Vehicle Code section 20002].
prove that:
1. While driving, the defendant was involved in a vehicle accident;
2. The accident caused damage to someone else’s property;
accident that caused property damage [or knew from the nature
of the accident that it was probable that property had been
damaged];
AND
following duties:
(a) To immediately stop at the scene of the accident;
OR
(b) To immediately provide the owner or person in control of the
damaged property with (his/her) name and current residence
address [and the name and address of the owner of the vehicle
the defendant was driving].
The driver of a vehicle may provide the required information in one of
two ways:
1. The driver may locate the owner or person in control of the
damaged property and give that person the information directly.
On request, the driver must also show that person his or her
driver’s license and the vehicle registration;
OR
2. The driver may leave the required information in a written note
in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other damaged property.
The driver must then also, without unnecessary delay, notify
either the police department of the city where the accident
happened or the local headquarters of the California Highway
Patrol if the accident happened in an unincorporated area.
182

The duty to immediately stop means that the driver must stop his or her
vehicle as soon as reasonably possible under the circumstances.
The driver of a vehicle must perform the duties listed regardless of how
or why the accident happened. It does not matter if someone else caused
the accident or if the accident was unavoidable.
failed to perform.
[To be involved in a vehicle accident means to be connected with the
accident in a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the
driver’s vehicle to collide with another vehicle or person.]
[When providing his or her name and address, the driver is required to
identify himself or herself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the
accident.]
[The property damaged may include any vehicle other than the one
allegedly driven by the defendant.]
[An accident causes property damage if the property damage is the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the
damage would not have happened without the accident. A natural and
probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is
[There may be more than one cause of property damage. An accident
causes property damage only if it is a substantial factor in causing the
damage. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor.
However, it need not be the only factor that causes the property
damage.]
possible.]]

183
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant drove the
vehicle. If the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a nondriving owner present
in the vehicle or other passenger in control of the vehicle, give CALCRIM No.
2151, Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant
Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control.
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of property damage,
the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first
bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of property
damage, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in a vehicle accident” if that is an
issue in the case.
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “the driver is required to identify himself
or herself as the driver” if there is evidence that the defendant stopped and
identified himself or herself but not in a way that made it apparent to the other
parties that the defendant was the driver. (People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
1535, 1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The property damaged may include”
if the evidence shows that the accident may have damaged only the defendant’s
vehicle.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 20002; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123,
fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
• Knowledge of Accident. People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10
[43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
184
646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
• Must Identify Self as Driver. People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535,
1546 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 493].
[265 P. 914].
Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
SECONDARY SOURCES
185
2151. Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property
Damage—Defendant Nondriving Owner or Passenger in Control
(Veh. Code, § 20002)

legal duty following a vehicle accident that caused property damage [in
prove that:
1. The defendant [owned and] was riding as a passenger in a vehicle
involved in an accident;
2. At the time of the accident, the defendant had full authority to
direct and control the vehicle even though another person was
driving;
3. The accident caused damage to someone else’s property;
accident that caused property damage [or knew from the nature
of the accident that it was probable that property had been
damaged];
AND
following duties:
(a) To cause the vehicle to immediately stop at the scene of the
accident;
(a) OR
(b) To provide the owner or person in control of the damaged
property with (his/her) name and current residence address
[and the name and address of the driver of the vehicle the
defendant [owned and] was a passenger in].
The (owner/passenger in control) may provide the required information
in one of two ways:
1. He or she may locate the owner or person in control of the
damaged property and give that person the required information
directly. On request, he or she must also show that person his or
her driver’s license, or any other available identification, and the
vehicle registration;
OR
2. He or she may leave the required information in a written note in
186
a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other damaged property. He

or she must then also, without unnecessary delay, notify either
the police department of the city where the accident happened or
accident happened in an unincorporated area.
The duty to immediately stop means that the (owner/passenger in control)
must cause the vehicle he or she is a passenger in to stop as soon as
reasonably possible under the circumstances.
The (owner/passenger in control) of a vehicle must perform the duties
listed regardless of how or why the accident happened. It does not
matter if someone else caused the accident or if the accident was
unavoidable.
failed to perform.
a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the vehicle to collide
with another vehicle or person.]
[The property damaged may include any vehicle other than the one the
defendant allegedly (owned/was a passenger in).]
[An accident causes property damage if the property damage is the
direct, natural, and probable consequence of the accident and the
damage would not have happened without the accident. A natural and
[There may be more than one cause of property damage. An accident
causes damage only if it is a substantial factor in causing the damage. A
need not be the only factor that causes the property damage.]
possible.]]
[If the defendant told the driver to stop and made a reasonable effort to
187
stop the vehicle, but the driver refused, then the defendant is not guilty
of this crime.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was a
nondriving owner present in the vehicle or other passenger in control. If the
prosecution alleges that that the defendant drove the vehicle, give CALCRIM No.
2150, Failure to Perform Duty Following Accident: Property Damage—Defendant
Driver.
401].) If the evidence indicates that there was only one cause of property damage,
the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable” language in the first
bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of property
damage, the court should also give the “substantial factor” instruction in the second
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident,” if that is an issue
in the case.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The property damaged may include”
if the evidence shows that the accident may have damaged only the defendant’s
vehicle.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the defendant told the driver to
stop” if there is sufficient evidence that the defendant attempted to cause the vehicle
to be stopped.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 20002; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123,
fn. 10 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
• Knowledge of Accident. People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10
[43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67].
14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
188
Cal. 703, 708 [265 P. 914].
646–647 [66 P.2d 206].
• Nondriving Owner. People v. Rallo (1931) 119 Cal.App. 393, 397 [6 P.2d 516].
402 U.S. 424, 434 [91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9].
[265 P. 914].
Cal.App.2d 199, 204 [51 Cal.Rptr. 403].
SECONDARY SOURCES
189
(iii) Enhancement
2160. Fleeing the Scene Following Accident: Enhancement for
Vehicular Manslaughter (Veh. Code, § 20001(c))
If you find the defendant guilty of vehicular manslaughter [as a felony]

[under Count ], you must then decide whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that the defendant fled the scene of the
accident after committing vehicular manslaughter [in violation of Vehicle
Code section 20001(c)].
injured];
AND
2. The defendant willfully fled the scene of the accident.
a natural or logical manner. It is not necessary for the driver’s vehicle to
collide with another vehicle or person.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing factor. (See Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with an enhancement under Vehicle
Code section 20001(c). This enhancement only applies to felony vehicular
manslaughter convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 191.5, 192(c)(1) & (3), and 192.5(a) & (c))
and must be pleaded and proved. (Veh. Code, § 20001(c).) Give the bracketed
“felony” in the introductory paragraph if the jury is also being instructed on
misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
190
Give the bracketed paragraph defining “involved in an accident” if that is an issue

in the case.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Veh. Code, § 20001(c).
133–134 [145 Cal.Rptr. 429].
14, 21–22 [166 Cal.Rptr. 818].
• Fleeing Scene of Accident. People v. Vela (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 942, 950 [140
Cal.Rptr.3d 755].
• First Element of This Instruction Cited With Approval. People v. Nordberg
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.02, Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.03[4][a] (Matthew Bender).
191
C. EVADING
2180. Evading Peace Officer: Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Veh.
Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with evading a peace officer

and causing (death/ [or] serious bodily injury) [in violation of
prove that:
1. A peace officer in a vehicle was pursuing the defendant, who was
also driving a vehicle;
2. The defendant intended to evade the peace officer;
3. While driving, the defendant willfully fled from, or tried to elude,
the pursuing peace officer;
4. The defendant’s attempt to flee from, or elude, the pursuing
peace officer caused (the death of/ [or] serious bodily injury to)
someone else;
AND
5. All of the following were true:
(a) There was at least one lighted red lamp visible from the front
of the peace officer’s vehicle;
(b) The defendant either saw or reasonably should have seen the
lamp;
(c) The peace officer’s vehicle was sounding a siren as reasonably
necessary;
(d) The peace officer’s vehicle was distinctively marked;
AND
(e) The peace officer was wearing a distinctive uniform.
offıcer”>.]
193

A vehicle is distinctively marked if it has features that are reasonably
noticeable to other drivers, including a red lamp, siren, and at least one
other feature that makes it look different from vehicles that are not used
for law enforcement purposes.
A distinctive uniform means clothing adopted by a law enforcement
agency to identify or distinguish members of its force. The uniform does
not have to be complete or of any particular level of formality. However,
a badge, without more, is not enough.
[An act causes (death/ [or] serious bodily injury) if the (death/ [or]
injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and
the (death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the act. A
natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would
know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the
circumstances established by the evidence.]
[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] serious bodily
injury). An act causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor
in causing the (death/ [or] injury). A substantial factor is more than a
trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that
causes the (death/ [or] injury).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
194

Cal.Rptr. 54].)
The jury must determine whether a peace officer was pursuing the defendant.
(People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].)
The court must instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from
the statute. (Ibid.) It is an error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace
officer as a matter of law. (Ibid. [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer
Gurney are peace officers” was error].) If the witness is a police officer, give the
witness is another type of peace officer, give the bracketed sentence that begins with
“A person employed by.”
On request, the court must give CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary Intoxication, if
there is sufficient evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the intent to evade.
(People v. Finney (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 712 [168 Cal.Rptr. 80].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.3(a), (b).
• Distinctively Marked Vehicle. People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002,
1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
• Distinctive Uniform. People v. Estrella (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 724 [37
Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; People v. Mathews (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 491 [75
Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
• Jury Must Determine If Peace Officers. People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470,
482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
• Red Lamp, Siren, Additional Distinctive Feature of Car, and Distinctive Uniform
Must Be Proved. People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1013 [44
Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168]; People v. Acevedo (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195,
199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; People v. Brown (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596,
599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].
• Misdemeanor Evading a Pursuing Peace Officer. Veh. Code, § 2800.1; People v.
Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680–1681 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 278].
RELATED ISSUES
Not Inherently Dangerous Felony
Vehicle Code section 2800.3 is not an inherently dangerous felony and does not
support a felony-murder conviction. (People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 663,
668–669 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 724]; People v. Sanchez (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 970, 974
[103 Cal.Rptr.2d 809].)
195
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2182, Evading Peace Offıcer:
Misdemeanor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, § 328, 329.
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 63, Double
Jeopardy, § 63.21[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, §§ 91.22[1][a][iv], 91.60[2][b][i], [ii], 91.81[1][d], [8] (Matthew
Bender).
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[2][b][ii][B], 142.02[2][c], [3][c] (Matthew Bender).
196

[in violation of Vehicle Code section[s] (2800.1(a)/ [or] 2800.2)].
prove that:
1. A peace officer driving a motor vehicle was pursuing the
defendant;
2. The defendant, who was also driving a motor vehicle, willfully
fled from, or tried to elude, the officer, intending to evade the
officer;
<Give the appropriate paragraph[s] of element 3 when the defendant is
charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2>
[3A. During the pursuit, the defendant drove with willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property;]
[OR]
[3B. During the pursuit, the defendant caused damage to property
while driving;]
[OR]
[3C. During the pursuit, the defendant committed three or more
violations, each of which would make the defendant eligible for a
traffic violation point;]
AND
[3/4]. All of the following were true:
lamp;
necessary;
(d) AND
197
offıcer”>.]
[A person acts with wanton disregard for safety when (1) he or she is
aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of harm, and (2) he or she intentionally ignores that risk. The person
does not, however, have to intend to cause damage.]
[ <insert traffıc violations alleged> are each assigned a traffic
violation point.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, September 2018, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from
198
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1(a), 2800.2.
• Willful or Wanton Disregard. People v. Schumacher (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 335,
339–340 [14 Cal.Rptr. 924].
• Three Violations or Property Damage as Wanton Disregard—Definitional. People
v. Taylor (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1202–1203 [228 Cal.Rptr.3d 575]; People
v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387, 392–393 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274].
1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
• Jury Must Determine Status as Peace Officer. People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th
at p. 482.
Must Be Proved. People v. Hudson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1013; People v.
Acevedo (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195, 199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; People v.
Brown (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].
• Defendant Need Not Receive Violation Points for Conduct. People v. Leonard
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 275, 281 [222 Cal.Rptr3d 868].
• Statute Does Not Require Lawful Performance of a Duty. People v. Fuentes
• Misdemeanor Evading a Pursuing Peace Officer. Veh. Code, § 2800.1; People v.
Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680–1681 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 278].
• Failure to Yield. Veh. Code, § 21806; People v. Diaz (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1491 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 653]. (Lesser included offenses may not be used for
the requisite “three or more violations.”)
RELATED ISSUES
Inherently Dangerous Felony
A violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2 is not an inherently dangerous felony
supporting a felony murder conviction. (People v. Howard (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129,
1139 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107].)
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2182, Evading Peace Offıcer:
Misdemeanor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
199
Sentencing, § 91.22[1][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[2][b][ii][B], 142.02[2][c] (Matthew Bender).
200
2182. Evading Peace Officer: Misdemeanor (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.1(a))

[in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.1(a)].
prove that:
1. A peace officer driving a motor vehicle was pursuing the
defendant;
2. The defendant, who was also driving a motor vehicle, willfully
fled from, or tried to elude, the officer, intending to evade the
officer;
AND
3. All of the following were true:
lamp;
necessary;
(d) AND
offıcer”>.]
201


BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 2800.1(a).
1010–1011 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168].
Cal.Rptr.2d 289].
• Jury Must Determine If Peace Officers. People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470,
482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
Must Be Proved. People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1013 [44
Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168]; People v. Acevedo (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195,
199 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 270]; People v. Brown (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596,
599–600 [264 Cal.Rptr. 908].
202
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Pursuing Officers Constitutes Only One Offense
A defendant “may only be convicted of one count of section 2800.2 even though the
pursuit involved multiple police officers in multiple police vehicles.” (People v.
Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1163 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, § 328, 329.
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 63, Double
Jeopardy, § 63.21[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, § 91.22[1][a][iv] (Matthew Bender).
203
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with reckless driving [in

prove that:
1. The defendant drove a vehicle (on a highway/in an off-street
parking facility);
AND
2. The defendant intentionally drove with wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property.
A person acts with wanton disregard for safety when (1) he or she is
aware that his or her actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of harm, and (2) he or she intentionally ignores that risk. The person
does not, however, have to intend to cause damage.
[If you conclude that the defendant drove faster than the legal speed
limit, that fact by itself does not establish that the defendant drove with
wanton disregard for safety. You may consider the defendant’s speed,
along with all the surrounding circumstances, in deciding whether the
defendant drove with wanton disregard for safety.]
the public for purposes of vehicular travel, and includes a street.]
[The term[s] (vehicle/ [and] highway) (is/are) defined in another
[An off-street parking facility is an off-street facility open for use by the
public for parking vehicles. It includes a facility open to retail customers,
where no fee is charged for parking.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2013, October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
205
If the defendant is charged with reckless driving on a highway (Veh. Code,

§ 23103(a)), select the phrase “on a highway” in element 1. If the defendant is
charged with reckless driving in an off-street parking facility (Veh. Code,
§ 23103(b)), select that phrase in element 1.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant
was driving faster than” on request if relevant based on the evidence. (People v.
Nowell (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 813–814 [114 P.2d 81].)
The court must define the terms “highway” and “vehicle.” Give the bracketed
definitions of the terms unless the court has already given these definitions in other
instructions. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that
the terms are defined elsewhere.
If the People allege that defendant violated Vehicle Code section 23105(b) in
committing this crime, give CALCRIM No. 3223, Reckless Driving With Specified
Injury, in addition to this instruction.
Give CALCRIM No. 2241, Driver and Driving Defined, on request.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23103(a) & (b).
• Off-Street Parking Facility Defined. Veh. Code, § 12500(c).
• Willful or Wanton Disregard. People v. Schumacher (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 335,
340 [14 Cal.Rptr. 924]; People v. Young (1942) 20 Cal.2d 832, 837 [129 P.2d
353].
• Gross Negligence Insufficient. People v. Allison (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d Supp.
932, 935 [226 P.2d 85].
• Speeding May Constitute Recklessness Based on Circumstances. People v.
Nowell (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 813–814 [114 P.2d 81].
• Requires Reckless Act of Driving, Not Merely Mental State. People v. McNutt
(1940) 40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835, 838–839 [105 P.2d 657]; People v. Smith
(1939) 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 751 [92 P.2d 1039].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 808 [269
Cal.Rptr.3d 712].
RELATED ISSUES
Offense Is a Misdemeanor, Not an Infraction
Reckless driving is a misdemeanor and may not be reduced to an infraction. (People
v. Dibacco (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)
Speeding Not Necessarily Lesser Included Offense
Speeding is not a necessarily lesser included offense of reckless driving. (People v.
Dibacco (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 258].)
206
SECONDARY SOURCES
Sentencing, §§ 91.60[2][b][i], [ii], 91.81[1][d], [8] (Matthew Bender).
207
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in a speed

contest [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23109].
prove that:
1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle on a highway;
[AND]
2. While so driving, the defendant willfully engaged in a speed
contest(./;)
[AND]
3. The speed contest was a substantial factor in causing someone
other than the defendant to suffer [serious] bodily injury.
A person engages in a speed contest when he or she uses a motor vehicle
to race against another vehicle, a clock, or other timing device. [A speed
contest does not include an event in which the participants measure the
time required to cover a set route of more than 20 miles but where the
vehicle does not exceed the speed limits.]
consciousness/concussion/bone fracture/protracted loss or impairment of
function of any bodily member or organ/a wound requiring extensive
[A motor vehicle includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/bus/ school bus/
commercial vehicle/truck tractor/ <insert other type of motor
vehicle>).]
[The term[s] (motor vehicle/ [and] highway) (is/are) defined in another

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
208
The court must define the terms “motor vehicle” and “highway.” Give the bracketed
definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In
such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is
defined elsewhere.
If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a speed contest under Vehicle
Code section 23109(b), give CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended
Crimes. This instruction also must be given, but the court should modify the first
sentence and change “defendant” to “perpetrator” throughout the instruction.
Give the appropriate bracketed language of element 3 if the defendant is charged
with causing an injury, as well as CALCRIM No. 240, Causation.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Speed Contest. In re Harvill (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 492–493 [335 P.2d
1016] [discussing prior version of statute].
• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.02[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
209
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with engaging in an

exhibition of speed [in violation of Vehicle Code section 23109].
prove that:
AND
2. While so driving, the defendant willfully engaged in an exhibition
of speed.
A person engages in an exhibition of speed when he or she accelerates or
drives at a rate of speed that is dangerous and unsafe in order to show
off or make an impression on someone else.
[The People must prove that the defendant intended to show off or
impress someone but are not required to prove that the defendant
intended to show off to or impress any particular person.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court must define the terms “motor vehicle” and “highway.” Give the bracketed
definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In
such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is
defined elsewhere.
If the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting an exhibition of speed, give
210
CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting: Intended Crimes. This instruction also
must be given, but the court should modify the first sentence and change
“defendant” to “perpetrator” throughout the instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23109(c), (e)(2), (f)(1)–(3).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 243(f)(4).
• Exhibition of Speed Defined. People v. Grier (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 360, 364
[38 Cal.Rptr. 11]; In re Harvill (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 492–493 [335 P.2d
1016] [discussing prior version of statute]; see also Tischoff v. Wolfchief (1971)
16 Cal.App.3d 703, 707 [94 Cal.Rptr. 299] [term did not require definition in
civil case].
• Screeching Tires. In re F. E. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 222, 225 [136 Cal.Rptr. 547];
People v. Grier (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [38 Cal.Rptr. 11].
SECONDARY SOURCES
211
2220. Driving With Suspended or Revoked Driving Privilege (Veh.
Code, §§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving while (his/her)

driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked) [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle while (his/her) driving
privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked) [for <insert
basis for suspension or revocation>];
AND
2. When the defendant drove, (he/she) knew that (his/her) driving
privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).
[If the People prove that:
1. The California Department of Motor Vehicles mailed a notice to
the defendant telling (him/her) that (his/her) driving privilege had
been (suspended/ [or] revoked);
2. The notice was sent to the most recent address reported to the
department [or any more recent address reported by the person,
a court, or a law enforcement agency];
AND
3. The notice was not returned to the department as undeliverable
or unclaimed;
then you may, but are not required to, conclude that the defendant knew
that (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).]
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a court informed
the defendant that (his/her) driving privilege had been (suspended/ [or]
revoked), you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant
knew that (his/her) driving privilege was (suspended/ [or] revoked).]
should refer.]
213

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, the court may insert the reason for the suspension or revocation unless
the court has accepted a stipulation regarding this issue.
The two bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove” each explain
rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See Veh. Code, §§ 14601(a), 14601.1(a),
14602(c), 14601.5(c); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has
held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case
creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (People v. Roder (1983) 33
Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with Roder, the bracketed
paragraphs have been written as permissive inferences.
prove that the California Department of Motor Vehicles mailed a notice” if there is
evidence that the defendant did not receive the notice or for other reasons did not
know that his or her driving privilege was revoked or suspended.
Similarly, the court must not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a court informed the defendant” if
there is evidence that the defendant did not receive the notice or for other reasons
did not know that his or her driving privilege was revoked or suspended. In
addition, this provision regarding notice by the court only applies if the defendant is
charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.2. (See Veh. Code,
§ 14601.2(c).) Do not give this paragraph if the defendant is charged under any
other Vehicle Code section.
Give the bracketed definition of motor vehicle unless the court has already given the
definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, §§ 13106, 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.5.
• Actual Knowledge of Suspension or Revocation Required. In re Murdock (1968)
68 Cal.2d 313, 315–316 [66 Cal.Rptr. 380, 437 P.2d 764].
214
658 P.2d 1302].
RELATED ISSUES
Suspension or Revocation Continues Until License Restored
In People v. Gutierrez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 166], the
defendant’s license had been suspended for a period of one year for driving under
the influence. The defendant was arrested for driving after that one-year period had
expired. The court held that the defendant’s license remained suspended even though
the stated time period had passed because the defendant had not taken the steps
necessary to restore his driving privilege. (Id. at pp. 8–9.)
Privilege to Drive May Be Suspended or Revoked Even If No License Issued
A person’s privilege to drive may be suspended or revoked even though that person
has never been issued a valid driver’s license. (People v. Matas (1988) 200
Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 9 [246 Cal.Rptr. 627].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
215
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with driving without a

license [in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500(a)].
prove that:
[AND]
2. When the defendant drove, (he/she) did not hold a valid
California driver’s license(;/.)
<Give element 3 when instructing on statutory exemption.>
[AND
3. The defendant was not excused from the requirement to have a
California driver’s license.]
Whether the defendant was properly licensed is a matter within (his/her)
own knowledge. The defendant must produce evidence tending to show
that (he/she) did hold a valid driver’s license. If the evidence raises in
your mind a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant held a valid
driver’s license, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Exemptions to the licensing requirement are stated in Vehicle Code sections 12501
to 12505. If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was exempt, the court has
a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element 3.
The court must define the terms “highway” and “motor vehicle.” Give the relevant
216
bracketed definitions unless the court has already given the definition in other
the term is defined elsewhere.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 12500(a).
• Offense Is a Misdemeanor. Veh. Code, § 40000.11(b).
• Instruction on Production of Evidence. People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th
1159, 1164 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694]; In re Shawnn F. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 184,
198–199 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 263].
SECONDARY SOURCES
217
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to present (his/

her) driver’s license to a peace officer [in violation of Vehicle Code
section 12951(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle;
2. A peace officer, enforcing the Vehicle Code, demanded that the
defendant present (his/her) driver’s license for the officer to
examine;
AND
3. The defendant did not present (his/her) driver’s license in
response to the officer’s request.
should refer.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed definition of motor vehicle unless the court has already given the
definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 12951(b).
• Offense Is a Misdemeanor. Veh. Code, § 40000.11(i).
218
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 11, Arrest,
219
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to appear in

court [in violation of Vehicle Code section 40508(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant received a citation;
2. In connection with that citation, the defendant (signed a written
promise to appear (in court/[or] before a person authorized to
receive a deposit of bail)/ [or] received a lawfully granted
continuance of (his/her) promise to appear);
AND
3. The defendant willfully failed to appear (in court/[or] before a
person authorized to receive a deposit of bail).
[It does not matter whether the defendant was found guilty of the
violation of the Vehicle Code alleged in the original citation.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 40508(a).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
SECONDARY SOURCES
4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings,
§ 53.
§ 11.22[2], Ch. 12, Bail, § 12.04 (Matthew Bender).
221
[A driver is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a

vehicle.]
[A person drives a vehicle when he or she intentionally causes it to move
by exercising actual physical control over it. The person must cause the
vehicle to move, but the movement may be slight.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
No case has held that the court has a sua sponte duty to define “driver” or
“driving.” This instruction is provided for the court to use, on request, at its
discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Driver Defined. Veh. Code, § 305.
• Driving Defined. Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753,
763–765 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].
• Slight Movement Sufficient. Padilla v. Meese (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029
[229 Cal.Rptr. 310]; Music v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d
841, 850 [270 Cal.Rptr. 692].
RELATED ISSUES
Circumstantial Evidence
Driving may be established through circumstantial evidence. (Mercer v. Dept. of
Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 770 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].) For
example, in People v. Wilson (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [222 Cal.Rptr. 540],
the court found sufficient evidence of driving where the vehicle was parked on the
freeway, over a mile from the on-ramp, and the defendant, the sole occupant of the
vehicle, was found in the driver’s seat with the vehicle’s engine running.
Engine Need Not Be On
In People v. Hernandez (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1177, 1184 [269 Cal.Rptr. 21], the
court held that the defendant was “driving” because he was “seated in the driver’s
seat steering or controlling the truck while it was still moving, even though the
engine was no longer running.” (See also People v. Jordan (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d
222
Supp. 1, 9 [142 Cal.Rptr. 401] [defendant “driving” a moped when she moved it by
pedaling, even though the engine was not on].)
Steering Vehicle
In In re Queen T. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1145 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 922], the court
held that the minor was “driving” when she steered the vehicle, even though
someone else was sitting in the driver’s seat operating the accelerator and brake.
Relocating Vehicle in Accident
In People v. Kelley (1937) 27 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 773 [70 P.2d 276], the court
held that the defendant was not “driving” when he got in the driver’s seat and
steered a disabled vehicle, moving it four or five feet to a safe location following an
accident. The court specifically stated that its holding was based on the unique facts
of the case and that it was not attempting to “give a definition to the word ‘drive.’ ”
(Id. at p. 775.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
223
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled Substance (Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351,
11351.5, 11378, 11378.5)
2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With Firearm (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1)
2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350,
11377)
2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
C. FORGED SUBSTANCE
2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11368)
D. MANUFACTURING
2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a),
11362.3)
2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11379.6(a) & (c))
2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine or N-
ethylamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11383(a))
225
2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine (Health & Saf.

Code, § 11383.5(b)(1))
2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled
Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f))
E. CANNABIS
2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11360(a))
2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to Give Away
Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
(iii) Planting
2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis: Misdemeanor
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))
2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis on School
Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))
2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to Minor (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354)
2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11380(a))
226
2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
(ii) Marijuana
2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11361)
2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11361(a))
(i) Use
2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11550)
2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11365)
2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11364)
2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 4326(a))
2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe (Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 4326(b))
2430. Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction Involving
Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
2431. Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction Involving
Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6)
2432. Attorney’s Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction
Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b))
2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11366)
2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
227
Code, § 11366.8)
228
2300. Sale, Transportation for Sale, etc., of Controlled Substance
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with

(selling/furnishing/administering/giving away/transporting for sale/
importing) <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled
substance [in violation of <insert appropriate code
section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant (sold/furnished/administered/gave
away/transported for sale/imported into California) a controlled
substance;
2. The defendant knew of its presence;
3. The defendant knew of the substance’s nature or character as a
controlled substance;
<When instructing on transportation for sale, give element 4>
[AND]
[4. When the defendant transported the controlled substance, (he/
she) intended (to sell it/[or] that someone else sell it);]
[AND]
<If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in
sections 11054 through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give
paragraph 4/5B and the definition of analog substance below instead of
paragraph 4/5A.>
(4/5)A. The controlled substance was <insert type of
controlled substance>(;/.)
(4/5)B. The controlled substance was an analog of <insert
type of controlled substance>(;/.)
<Give element 4/5/6 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench
Notes.>
[AND
(4/5/6). The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]
[In order to prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
229
CALCRIM No. 2300 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
must prove that <insert name of analog drug> is an analog

of <insert type of controlled substance>. An analog of a
controlled substance:
[1. Has a chemical structure substantially similar to the structure of
a controlled substance(./;)]
[OR]
[(2/1). Has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system
substantially similar to or greater than the effect of a controlled
substance.]]
[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging a
controlled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]
[A person transports for sale if he or she carries or moves something
from one location to another for sale, even if the distance is short.]
[A person administers a substance if he or she applies it directly to the
body of another person by injection, or by any other means, or causes
the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.]
[A usable amount is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as
a controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts.
On the other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in
either amount or strength, to affect the user.]
[The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew which specific
controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away/
transported for sale/imported).]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to
(sell/furnish/administer/transport it for sale/import/give it away) [it]. It is
enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right to control it),
either personally or through another person.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, August 2014, February
2016, September 2017, March 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Transportation of a controlled substance requires a “usable amount.” (People v.
Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907]; People v. Ormiston
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567].) Sale of a controlled
230
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CALCRIM No. 2300
substance does not. (See People v. Peregrina-Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522,

1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When the prosecution alleges transportation, give
bracketed element 5 and the definition of usable amount. When the prosecution
alleges sales, do not use these portions. There is no case law on whether furnishing,
administering, giving away, or importing require usable quantities.
If the defendant is charged with attempting to import or transport a controlled
substance, give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder, with
this instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379.
• Administering. Health & Saf. Code, § 11002.
• Administering Does Not Include Self-Administering. People v. Label (1974) 43
Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
• Knowledge. People v. Horn (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
• Selling. People v. Lazenby (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1845 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541].
• Transportation: Usable Amount. People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313,
1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907]; People v. Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682
[129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567].
• Usable Amount. People v. Rubacalba (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 65–67 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d
628, 859 P.2d 708]; People v. Piper (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• Definition of Analog Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, § 11401; People
v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 357, fn. 2 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, 303 P.3d 1179].
• No Finding Necessary for “Expressly Listed” Controlled Substance. People v.
Davis, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 362, fn. 5.
• Intent Requirement for Transportation for Sale. People v. Lua (2017) 10
• Simple Possession Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (People v.
Murphy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983–984 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 926]; People v.
Peregrina-Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser
related offense but not necessarily included].)
• Possession for Sale Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (People v.
Note: In reviewing the appropriateness of sentencing enhancements, Valenzuela v.
Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1451 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 781], finds that
offering to sell is a lesser included offense of selling, and that therefore a lesser
sentence is appropriate for offering to sell. However, the cases it cites in support
231
of that conclusion do not address that specific issue. Because offering to sell is a
specific-intent crime (see People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30
Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]) and selling does not require specific intent, the
committee does not include offering to sell as a lesser included offense.
RELATED ISSUES
Transportation
Transportation does not require personal possession by the defendant. (People v.
Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 134 [95 Cal.Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129] [abrogated in part
by statute on other grounds].) Transportation of a controlled substance includes
transporting by riding a bicycle (People v. LaCross (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 182, 187
[109 Cal.Rptr.2d 802]) or walking (People v. Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676,
685 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567]). The controlled substance must be moved “from one
location to another,” but the movement may be minimal. (Id. at p. 684.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
232
2301. Offering to Sell, Transport for Sale, etc., a Controlled
Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with offering to (sell/furnish/

administer/give away/transport for sale/import) <insert type
of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/furnish/administer/give
away/transport for sale/import into California) a controlled
substance;
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell/
furnish/administer/give away/transport for sale/import) the
controlled substance.
AND
paragraph 3B and the definition of analog substance below instead of
paragraph 3A.>
3A. The controlled substance was <insert type of
controlled substance>.
3B. The controlled substance was an analog of <insert
type of controlled substance>.
[OR]
substance.]]
233
from one location to another, even if the distance is short.]

[The People do not need to prove that the defendant actually possessed
the controlled substance.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2014, August 2014, September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent. People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr.
329, 381 P.2d 1].
• Intent Requirement for Transportation for Sale. People v. Lua (2017) 10
• Simple Possession of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350,
11377; People v. Peregrina-Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28
Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included]; but see
People v. Tinajero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298]
[finding a lesser included offense on factual but not legal basis].
• Possession for Sale. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378; People v. Peregrina-
Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related
offense but not necessarily included] but see People v. Tinajero (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 298] [finding a lesser included offense
on factual but not legal basis].
RELATED ISSUES
No Requirement That Defendant Delivered or Possessed Drugs
A defendant may be convicted of offering to sell even if there is no evidence that he
or she delivered or ever possessed any controlled substance. (People v. Jackson
234
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1]; People v. Brown (1960)
55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)
Transportation for Sale
Effective January 1, 2014, the definition of “transportation” is limited to
transportation for sale for the purposes of section 11352. Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11352(c).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 85–113, 147–151.
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j] (Matthew Bender).
235
2302. Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possession for sale of

<insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance
[in violation of <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed a controlled substance;
4. When the defendant possessed the controlled substance, (he/she)
intended (to sell it/ [or] that someone else sell it);
paragraph 5A.>
controlled substance>;
type of controlled substance>;
AND
6. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.
[OR]
substance.]]
Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging
<insert type of controlled substance> for money, services, or
anything of value.
236
A usable amount is a quantity that is enough to be used by someone as a

controlled substance. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts.
either amount or strength, to affect the user.
controlled substance (he/she) possessed.]
[Agreeing to buy a controlled substance does not, by itself, mean that a
person has control over that substance.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, February 2016,
September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11378, 11378.5.
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• This Instruction Is Correct. People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1177 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 668].
• Specific Intent to Sell Personally or That Another Will Sell Required. People v.
Parra (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 226 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 541] and People v.
Consuegra (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1726, 1732, fn. 4 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288].
237

• Simple Possession of a Controlled Substance. People v. Saldana (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 443, 453–458 [204 Cal.Rptr. 465].
• Possession of Cocaine for Sale Is Not Necessarily Included Offense of Selling
Cocaine Base. People v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1508 [36
Cal.Rptr.3d 872]).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 87–88, 101.
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [e], [h] (Matthew Bender).
238
2303. Possession of Controlled Substance While Armed With
Firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing

<insert type of controlled substance specified in Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1>, a controlled substance, while armed with a firearm [in
prove that:
paragraph 4A.>
5. The controlled substance was in a usable amount;
6. While possessing that controlled substance, the defendant had a
loaded, operable firearm available for immediate offensive or
defensive use;
AND
7. The defendant knew that (he/she) had the firearm available for
immediate offensive or defensive use.
[OR]
239

substance.]]
Knowledge that an available firearm is loaded and operable is not
required.
A firearm is any device designed to be used as a weapon, from which a
projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of an
explosion or other form of combustion.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, August 2013, February
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th
1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Knowledge of Controlled Substance. People v. Horn (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68,
74–75 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• Loaded Firearm. People v. Clark (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 99].
240
• Knowledge of Presence of Firearm. People v. Singh (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 905,

912–913 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 769].
• Knowledge That Firearm is Loaded or Operable Not Required. People v. Heath
• Simple Possession of a Controlled Substance Not a Lesser Included Offense.
People v. Sosa (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 946, 949–950 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 826];
Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377.
See also Firearm Possession instructions, CALCRIM Nos. 2510 to 2530.
RELATED ISSUES
Loaded Firearm
“Under the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘loaded,’ a firearm is
‘loaded’ when a shell or cartridge has been placed into a position from which it can
be fired; the shotgun is not ‘loaded’ if the shell or cartridge is stored elsewhere and
not yet placed in a firing position.” (People v. Clark (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147,
1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][f]; Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.01[1][a]–[d], [3][b] (Matthew Bender).
241
2304. Simple Possession of Controlled Substance (Health & Saf.
Code, §§ 11350, 11377)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing

<insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance [in violation
of <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
paragraph 4A.>
AND
[OR]
substance.]]
242
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something, to possess
<Defense: Prescription>
[The defendant is not guilty of possessing <insert type of
controlled substance> if (he/she) had a valid, written prescription for that
substance from a physician, dentist, podiatrist, [naturopathic doctor], or
veterinarian licensed to practice in California. The People have the
have a valid prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of possessing a controlled substance.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, October 2010, February 2014, August
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Nonbifurcated Trial, or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
The prescription defense is codified in Health and Safety Code sections 11350 and
11377. It is not available as a defense to possession of all controlled substances. The
defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of
the drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See People v. Mower (2002)
28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient
evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the
defense.
A recent amendment to section 11150 includes a naturopathic doctor in the category
of those who may furnish or order certain controlled substances, so that bracketed
option should be included in this instruction if substantial evidence supports it.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9
243

556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• Prescription. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
• Persons Authorized to Write Prescriptions. Health & Saf. Code, § 11150.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).
244
If you conclude that the defendant possessed <insert name

of controlled substance>, that possession was not illegal if the defendant
can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to establish this
defense, the defendant must prove that:
1. The defendant possessed <insert name of controlled
substance> only for a momentary or transitory period;
2. The defendant possessed <insert name of controlled
substance> in order to (abandon[,]/ [or] dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy)
it;
AND
3. The defendant did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials
from obtaining the <insert name of controlled
substance>.
The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than
likely than not that each of the three listed items is true.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of transitory possession
when supported by the evidence. (People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 423 [99
Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].)
This defense “applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for
the purpose of disposal . . . .” (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081] [disapproving of People v. Cole (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445 [249 Cal.Rptr. 601], which had held that the length of time
the contraband was possessed was just one factor to consider].) As the Martin court
explained, the defense is established if the evidence shows “brief or transitory
possession of narcotics with the intent to dispose of the contraband.” (Id. at p. 1191,
fn. 9.) The Martin court did not state that the defendant must also specifically intend
to end someone else’s unlawful possession of the contraband or prevent someone
else from obtaining the contraband. Thus, the committee has not included this as an
element.
245
AUTHORITY
• Momentary Possession. People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 423 [99
Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
• Burden on Defendant to Establish by Preponderance. People v. Spry (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1345, 1369 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691] [noted as valid authority on this
holding in People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1192, fn. 10 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th
457, 480, fn. 8 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
SECONDARY SOURCES
246
2306. Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent to Commit
Sexual Assault (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possession of

<insert type of controlled substance from sections
11056(c)(11), (g), 11054(e)(3); or 11057(d)(13) of the Health and Safety
Code>, a controlled substance, with intent to commit
<insert description of alleged target crime or crimes from sections 243.4,
261, 286, 287, or 289 of the Penal Code>, [in violation of Health and
Safety Code section[s] (11350.5[,]/ [and/or] 11377.5)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a controlled substance;
intended to use it to commit <insert description of
alleged target crime or crimes from sections 243.4, 261, 286, 287, or
289 of the Penal Code>;
5. The controlled substance was <insert type of
247
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court must also give the appropriate instructions on the target sexual offense or
offenses in element 4.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350.5, 11377.5.
• Prohibited Controlled Substances. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054(e)(3),
11056(c)(11) or (g); 11057(d)(13).
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
SECONDARY SOURCES
248
2315. Sale of Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355,
11382)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (selling/transporting/

administering/giving/furnishing/delivering) a substance in lieu of
<insert name of controlled substance> [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant (agreed/consented/offered/arranged/negotiated) to
(sell/transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver)
<insert name of controlled substance>, a controlled substance;
AND
2. After doing so, the defendant (sold/transported/administered/gave/
furnished/delivered) a substance in lieu of <insert
name of controlled substance>.
[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the
substance for money, services, or anything of value.]
[A person transports something if he or she carries or moves it from one
location to another, even if the distance is short.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382; People v. McDaniel (1979) 24
Cal.3d 661, 669–670 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124].
SECONDARY SOURCES
249
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[i] (Matthew Bender).
250
2316. Offer to Sell Substitute Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11355, 11382)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with intending to (sell/

transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) a noncontrolled substance in
lieu of <insert name of controlled substance> [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] offered to (sell/transport/administer/
give/furnish/deliver) <insert name of controlled
substance>, a controlled substance;
AND
transport/administer/give/furnish/deliver) a noncontrolled
substance in lieu of <insert name of controlled
substance>.
noncontrolled substance for money, services, or anything of value.]
the noncontrolled substance.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11355, 11382; People v. McDaniel (1979) 24
Cal.3d 661, 669–670 [156 Cal.Rptr. 865, 597 P.2d 124].
SECONDARY SOURCES
251
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j] (Matthew Bender).
252
C. FORGED SUBSTANCE
2320. Forged Prescription for Narcotic (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11368)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with ((forging/altering) a

prescription/giving someone (a forged/an altered) prescription/using [or
attempting to use] (a forged/an altered) prescription) for a narcotic drug
[in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11368].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—forged or altered>
[1. The defendant (forged/altered) a prescription;]
<Alternative 1B—issued>
[1. The defendant gave someone (a prescription with a forged or
fictitious signature/an altered prescription);]
<Alternative 1C—used or attempted to use>
[1. The defendant used [or attempted to use] (a prescription with a
forged or fictitious signature) to obtain drugs;]
[AND]
2. The prescription was for a narcotic drug(;/.)
<Give element 3 when giving alternative 1B or 1C.>
[AND
3. The defendant knew that the (signature on the prescription was
forged or fictitious/prescription was altered).]
<insert name or description of narcotic from Health & Saf.
Code, § 11019> is a narcotic drug.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Use this instruction when the prosecution alleges that the defendant forged, issued,
or attempted to use a forged prescription without actually obtaining the narcotic.
253
When the prosecution alleges that the defendant obtained or possessed the narcotic
by using a forged prescription, use CALCRIM No. 2321, Forged Prescription for
Narcotic: With Possession of Drug.
Give element 3 when the prosecution alleges that the defendant issued, used, or
attempted to use an altered or forged prescription. Do not give element 3 when the
prosecution alleges that the defendant personally forged or altered the prescription.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11368; People v. Beesly (1931) 119 Cal.App.
82, 86 [6 P.2d 114] [intent to defraud not an element]; People v. Katz (1962) 207
Cal.App.2d 739, 745 [24 Cal.Rptr. 644].
• Narcotic Drug. Health & Saf. Code, § 11019.
• Forgery of Prescription by Telephone. People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d
446, 455 [43 Cal.Rptr. 566].
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [2][b], [c] (Matthew Bender).
254
2321. Forged Prescription for Narcotic: With Possession of Drug
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11368)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (obtaining/possessing) a

narcotic drug [obtained] with (a/an) (forged[,]/ fictitious[,]/ [or] altered)
prescription [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11368].
prove that:
1. The defendant (obtained/possessed) a narcotic drug;
narcotic drug;
4. The narcotic drug was in a usable amount;
5. The narcotic drug was obtained by using (a/an) (forged[,]/
fictitious[,]/ [or] altered) prescription;
AND
6. The defendant knew that the narcotic was obtained using (a/an)
(forged[,]/ fictitious[,]/ [or] altered) prescription.
<insert name or description of narcotic from Health & Saf.
Code, § 11019> is a narcotic drug.
narcotic drug. Useless traces [or debris] are not usable amounts. On the
other hand, a usable amount does not have to be enough, in either
amount or strength, to affect the user.
narcotic drug (he/she) possessed.]
[Agreeing to buy a narcotic drug does not, by itself, mean that a person
has control over that substance.]

255
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Use this instruction when the prosecution alleges that the defendant obtained or
possessed the narcotic by using a forged prescription. When the prosecution alleges
that the defendant forged or attempted to use a forged prescription without obtaining
the narcotic, use CALCRIM No. 2320, Forged Prescription for Narcotic.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11368; People v. Beesly (1931) 119 Cal.App.
82, 86 [6 P.2d 114] [intent to defraud not an element]; People v. Katz (1962) 207
Cal.App.2d 739, 745 [24 Cal.Rptr. 644].
• Narcotic Drug. Health & Saf. Code, § 11019.
• Forgery of Prescription by Telephone. People v. Jack (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d
446, 455 [43 Cal.Rptr. 566].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [2][b], [c] (Matthew Bender).
256
D. MANUFACTURING

2330. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11379.6(a), 11362.3)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (manufacturing/

compounding/converting/producing/deriving/processing/preparing)
<insert concentrated cannabis or a controlled substance from
Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058>, a
controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section
(11379.6/ 11362.3)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (manufactured/compounded/converted/produced/
derived/processed/prepared) a controlled substance, specifically
<insert controlled substance>, using chemical
extraction or independent chemical synthesis;
[AND]
[The chemical extraction or independent chemical synthesis may be done
either directly or indirectly.]
controlled substance was involved, only that (he/she) was aware that it
was a controlled substance.]
[The People do not need to prove that the defendant completed the
process of manufacturing or producing a controlled substance. Rather,
the People must prove that the defendant knowingly participated in the
beginning or intermediate steps to process or make a controlled
substance. [Thus, the defendant is guilty of this crime if the People have
proved that:
1. The defendant engaged in the synthesis, processing, or
preparation of a chemical that is not itself a controlled substance;
AND
2. The defendant knew that the chemical was going to be used in
the manufacture of a controlled substance.]]
257

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed paragraph stating that “The People do not need to prove that the
defendant completed the process” when the evidence indicates that the defendant
completed only initial or intermediary stages of the process. (People v. Jackson
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1503–1504 [267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; People v. Lancellotti
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 640].) Give the final bracketed
section stating “Thus, the defendant is guilty” when the evidence shows that the
defendant manufactured a precursor chemical, such as ephedrine, but had not
completed the process of manufacturing a controlled substance. (People v. Pierson
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (b), 11054–11058,
11362.3(a)(6).
• Knowledge of Controlled Substance. People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 874
[89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970].
• Initial or Intermediary Stages. People v. Jackson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1493,
1503–1504 [267 Cal.Rptr. 841]; People v. Lancellotti (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809,
813 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 640]; People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 703–704
[78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240].
• Precursor Chemicals. People v. Pierson (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 983, 992 [103
Cal.Rptr.2d 817].
RELATED ISSUES
Providing Place for Manufacture
Health and Safety Code section 11366.5 prohibits providing a place for the
manufacture or storage of a controlled substance. A defendant who provides a place
for the manufacture of a controlled substance may be convicted both as an aider and
abettor under Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 and as a principal under
Health and Safety Code section 11366.5. (People v. Sanchez (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
918, 923 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; People v. Glenos (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208
[10 Cal.Rptr.2d 363].) Conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11379.6
requires evidence that the defendant specifically intended to aid the manufacture of
the controlled substance, while conviction under Health and Safety Code section
11366.5 requires evidence that the defendant knew that the controlled substance was
for sale or distribution. (People v. Sanchez (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 918, 923 [33
Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; People v. Glenos (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d
363].)
258
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [f] (Matthew Bender).
259
2331. Offering to Manufacture a Controlled Substance (Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with offering to

(manufacture/compound/convert/produce/derive/process/prepare)
<insert controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058>, a controlled substance [in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6].
prove that:
1. The defendant offered to (manufacture/compound/convert/
produce/derive/process/prepare) a controlled substance,
specifically <insert controlled substance>, intending
to use chemical extraction or independent chemical synthesis;
AND
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to
(manufacture/compound/convert/produce/derive/process/prepare)
the controlled substance.
[The intent to use chemical extraction or chemical synthesis includes the
intent to use such methods directly or indirectly.]
controlled substance was involved, only that (he/she) was aware that it
was a controlled substance.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379.6(a) & (c), 11054–11058.
329, 381 P.2d 1].
SECONDARY SOURCES
260
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [f] (Matthew Bender).
261
2335. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine
or N-ethylamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing substances

with the intent to manufacture (methamphetamine/N-ethylamphetamine)
[in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed both (methylamine and
phenyl-2-propanone/ethylamine and phenyl-2-propanone) at the
same time;
AND
2. When the defendant possessed both those substances, (he/she)
intended to use them to manufacture (methamphetamine/N-
ethylamphetamine).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with possessing isomers or precursor chemicals under
Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or (f), give CALCRIM No.
2338, Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to Manufacture Controlled
Substance, instead of this instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(a).
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 583 [154
Cal.Rptr. 309].
262
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [d], [3][d] (Matthew Bender).
263
2336. Possession With Intent to Manufacture PCP (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11383(a))

with the intent to manufacture phencyclidine (PCP) [or
<insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d)(22) or § 11055(e)(3)>]
[in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11383(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed both (piperidine and
cyclohexanone/pyrrolidine and cyclohexanone/morpholine and
cyclohexanone) at the same time, either as individual substances
or combined together in one substance;
AND
2. When the defendant possessed those substances, (he/she) intended
to use them to manufacture phencyclidine (PCP) [or
<insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d)(22) or
§ 11055(e)(3)>].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(a).
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 309].
264
SECONDARY SOURCES
265
2337. Possession With Intent to Manufacture Methamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1))

with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine [or
<insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>] [in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11383.5(b)(1)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—ephedrine or pseudoephedrine>
[1. The defendant possessed [a substance containing] (ephedrine/ [or]
pseudoephedrine) [or any salts, isomers, or salts of isomers of
(ephedrine/ [or] pseudoephedrine)];]
<Alternative 1B—other listed substances>
[1. The defendant possessed both <insert substances
from Health & Saf. Code, § 11383(c)> at the same time, either as
individual substances or combined together in one substance;]
AND
2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) substance[s], (he/she)
intended to use (it/them) to manufacture methamphetamine [or
<insert analog from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(b)(1).
266

556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 309].
SECONDARY SOURCES
267
2338. Possession of Isomers or Precursors With Intent to
Manufacture Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11383.5(c)–(f))

with the intent to manufacture (methamphetamine [or
<insert analog of methamphetamine from Health & Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>]/
N-ethylamphetamine/phencyclidine (PCP) [or <insert analog
of PCP from Health & Saf. Code, § 11054(d) or § 11055(e)>]) [in violation
of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed <insert name or description
of substance[s] from Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c), (d), (e), or
(f)>;
AND
2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) substance[s], (he/she)
intended to use (it/them) to manufacture (methamphetamine [or
<insert analog of methamphetamine from Health &
Saf. Code, § 11055(d)>]/N-ethylamphetamine/phencyclidine (PCP)
[or <insert analog of PCP from Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11054(d) or § 11055(e)>]).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Subdivisions (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Health and Safety Code section 11383.5 make it
a felony to possess any of the following: isomers of other substances listed in that
section, precursor chemicals sufficient for manufacturing listed substances, chemicals
sufficient to manufacture hydriodic acid or another reducing agent, and compounds
or mixtures containing listed substances. In element 1, the court should insert the
name or description of the specific substances the defendant is charged with
possessing.
268
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11383.5(c)–(f).
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 309].
SECONDARY SOURCES
269
E. CANNABIS

2350. Sale, Furnishing, Administering or Importing of Cannabis
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (selling[,]/[ or]

furnishing[,]/ [or] administering/importing) cannabis, a controlled
substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] administered[,]/ [or]
imported into California) a controlled substance;
[AND]
4. The controlled substance was cannabis(;/.)
<Give element 5 when instructing on usable amount; see Bench Notes.>
[AND
5. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]
<Sentencing Factor on defendant’s age>
If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s]
additional allegation that when the defendant (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/
[or] administered[,]/ [or] imported into California) cannabis, (he/she) was
18 years of age or older.
cannabis for money, services, or anything of value.]
271
[Cannabis means all or part of the Cannabis sativa L. plant, whether
growing or not, including the seeds and resin extracted from any part of
the plant. [It also includes every compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin.]]
<If applicable, give the definition of industrial hemp: Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11018.5>
[Cannabis does not include industrial hemp. Industrial hemp means a
fiber or oilseed crop, or both, that only contain types of the plant
Cannabis sativa L. with no more than three-tenths of 1 percent
tetrahydrocannabinol from the dried flowering tops, whether growing or
not. Industrial hemp may include the seeds of the plant; the resin
extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin
produced from the seeds.]
controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/imported).]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell/
furnish/administer/import) it. It is enough if the person has (control over
it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another
person.]
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, August 2014, February
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Sale of a controlled substance does not require a usable amount. (See People v.
Peregrina-Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 316].) When
the prosecution alleges sales, do not give element 5 or the bracketed definition of
“usable amount.” There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or
importing require usable quantities. (See People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
1313, 1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; People v.
Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) Element
5 and the definition of usable amount are provided for the court to use at its
discretion.
272
If any penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3) are
charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.
If a medical cannabis defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the
Medical Marijuana Program Act (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.),
the burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt that the conduct was lawful. (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial
evidence, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been
lawful, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the relevant defense instruction:
CALCRIM No. 3412, Compassionate Use Defense, or CALCRIM No. 3413,
Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense.
Give CALCRIM No. 3415, Legal Use Defense, on request if supported by
substantial evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a); People v. Van Alstyne (1975) 46
Cal.App.3d 900, 906 [121 Cal.Rptr. 363].
• Knowledge. People v. Romero (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 151–153, 157, fn. 3
[64 Cal.Rptr.2d 16]; People v. Winston (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158 [293 P.2d 40].
Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• Compassionate Use Defense Generally. People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81
[51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
747 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 859]; People v. Galambos (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147,
1165–1167 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 844]; People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron (1997) 59
• Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense. People v. Jackson (2012) 210
• Definition of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
• Definition of Industrial Hemp. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.5.
• Simple Possession Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (People v.
273
Murphy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 983–984 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 926]; People v.
• Possession for Sale Is Not a Lesser Included Offense of This Crime. (People v.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [g]–[i], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew
Bender).
274
2351. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11360)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with offering to (sell[,]/ [or]

furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) cannabis, a controlled
substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360].
prove that:
1. The defendant offered to (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/
[or] import into California) cannabis, a controlled substance;
AND
2. When the defendant made the offer, (he/she) intended to (sell[,]/
[or] furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) the controlled
substance.
additional allegation that when the defendant offered to (sell[,]/ [or]
furnish[,]/ [or] administer[,]/ [or] import) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years
of age or older.
[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging cannabis
for money, services, or anything of value.]
§ 11018.5>
275
the cannabis.]
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2015, September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If any of the penalty allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)
are charged, give CALCRIM No. 2364, as appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360; People v. Van Alstyne (1975) 46
Cal.App.3d 900, 906 [121 Cal.Rptr. 363].
329, 381 P.2d 1].
Cal.App.3d 766, 770–771 [119 Cal.Rptr. 522].
276
RELATED ISSUES
55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [g]–[j], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew
Bender).
277
2352. Possession for Sale of Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11359)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing for sale

cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code
section 11359].
prove that:
intended (to sell it/ [or] that someone else sell it);
5. The controlled substance was cannabis;
AND
additional allegation that when the defendant possessed cannabis for
sale, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime [as charged in Count[s]
], and you find that the defendant was 18 years of age or older,
then you must decide whether the People have proved the following
allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the People have proved (this/
these) allegation[s] and return a separate finding for each allegation.]
To prove (this/these) allegation[s] [for each crime], the People must prove
that:
<Insert the appropriate bracketed paragraphs if the defendant is charged
under one of the paragraphs of Health and Safety Code section 11359(c) and
sequentially number them as appropriate>
[___. When the defendant possessed cannabis, (he/she) knew that (he/
she) was (selling/ [or] attempting to sell) cannabis to another
person under the age of 18 years(./;)]
278
[___. The defendant has at least two prior convictions for possession of
cannabis for sale(./;)]
[___. The defendant has at least one prior conviction for ( )
<insert description of offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal
Code section 290 or for an offense specified in clause (iv) of
subparagraph (c) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Penal Code
section 667.>](./;)
<Insert the following bracketed paragraphs if defendant is charged with
violating Health and Safety Code section 11359(d)>
[___. The defendant was 21 years of age or older when (he/she) (hired/
employed/used) a person 20 years of age or younger to
[unlawfully] (cultivate[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] carry[,]/ [or]
sell[,]/ [or] offer to sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] prepare for
sale[,]/ [or] peddle) cannabis;
AND
[___. When the defendant (hired/employed/used) a person 20 years of
age or younger to [unlawfully] (cultivate[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or]
carry[,]/ [or] sell[,]/ [or] offer to sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or]
prepare for sale[,]/ [or] peddle) cannabis, (he/she) knew that
person’s age and the tasks that the person would be doing.]
Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging the cannabis
for money, services, or anything of value.
§ 11018.5>
279

New January 2006; Revised December 2008, October 2010, February 2015,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the appropriate bracketed elements if the offense is charged as a felony.
If a medical marijuana defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the
If the defendant is charged with prior convictions under subdivisions (c)(1) or (2) of
section 11359, give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial or
CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial, as appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
280

• Specific Intent to Sell Personally or That Another Will Sell Required. People v.
Parra (1999) 70 Cal. App. 4th 222, 226 [70 Cal.App.4th 222] and People v.
Consuegra (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1732, fn. 4 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[e], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).
281
2361. Transporting for Sale or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than
28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (giving away/ [or]

transporting for sale) more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, a controlled
prove that:
1. The defendant (gave away/transported for sale) a controlled
substance;
4. The controlled substance was cannabis;
AND
5. The cannabis possessed by the defendant weighed more than 28.5
grams.
additional allegation that when the defendant (gave away/ [or]
transported for sale) cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
§ 11018.5>
282

[Cannabis does not include the weight of any other ingredient combined
with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations, food, drink, or
other product.]
[A person transports something if he or she carries or moves it for sale
controlled substance (he/she) (gave away/transported).]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (give it
away/transport it). It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the
right to control it), either personally or through another person.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, October 2010, April 2011, February 2015,
August 2016, September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give CALCRIM No. 3415, Legal Use Defense, on request, if supported by
Related Instruction
Use this instruction when the defendant is charged with transporting or giving away
more than 28.5 grams of cannabis. For offering to transport or give away more than
28.5 grams of cannabis, use CALCRIM No. 2363, Offering to Transport or Give
Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams.
283
AUTHORITY
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5.
• Compassionate Use Defense to Transportation. People v. Wright (2006) 40
Cal.4th 81, 87–88 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; People v. Trippet (1997) 56
• Burden of Proof for Defense of Medical Use. People v. Mower (2002) 28
• Primary Caregiver. People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 282–292 [85
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
• Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Compassionate Use Defense. People v. Mentch
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 292–294 [85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061] (conc.opn.
of Chin, J.).
• Medical Marijuana Program Defense. People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
525, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
• Prior Version of this Instruction Upheld. People v. Busch (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
150, 155–156 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 683].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew
Bender).
2362 Reserved for Future Use
284
2363. Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to
Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11360(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (offering to give away/

[or] offering to transport for sale/ [or] attempting to transport for sale)
more than 28.5 grams of cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11360(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (offered to give away/ [or] offered to transport for
sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale) cannabis, a controlled
substance, in an amount weighing more than 28.5 grams;
AND
2. When the defendant made the (offer/ [or] attempt), (he/she)
intended to (give away/ [or] transport for sale) the controlled
substance.
additional allegation that when the defendant (offered to give away/ [or]
offered to transport for sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale)
cannabis, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
§ 11018.5>
285
with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations food, drink, or
other product.]
[A person transports something if he or she carries or moves it for sale
the cannabis.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2010, February 2015, August 2016, September
2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Also give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder, if the
defendant is charged with attempt to transport.
Use this instruction when the defendant is charged with offering to transport or give
away more than 28.5 grams of cannabis. For transporting or giving away more than
28.5 grams of cannabis, use CALCRIM No. 2361, Transporting for Sale or Giving
Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams.
AUTHORITY
286
329, 381 P.2d 1].
• Compassionate Use Defense to Transportation. People v. Wright (2006) 40
Cal.4th 81, 87–88 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531]; People v. Trippet (1997) 56
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
of Chin, J.).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [g], [j], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew
Bender).
287
2364. Felony Cannabis Penalty Allegations (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11360(a)(3))
If you find the defendant guilty of <insert offense[s]> [as

have proved the additional allegation[s]. [You must decide whether the
People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime and return a
separate finding for each crime.]
that:
<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health &
Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(A)>
[___. The defendant has at least one prior conviction for
<insert description of offense requiring registration pursuant to Penal
Code section 290(c) or for an offense specified in Penal Code section
667(e)(2)(C)(iv)>(./;)]
<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health
& Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(B)>
[___. The defendant has at least two prior convictions for
<insert description of offense specified in Health & Safety Code
sections 11360(a) and 11360(a)(2)>(./;)]
<Give the following paragraph if the defendant is charged under Health
& Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(C)>
[___. When committing that crime, the defendant knew that (he/she)
was selling, furnishing, administering, giving away, attempting to
sell, or offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give away cannabis
to a person under the age of 18 years(./;)]
<Give the following paragraphs if the defendant is charged under Health
& Safety Code section 11360(a)(3)(D)>
[___. The defendant (imported/[or] offered to import/[or] attempted to
import) (more than 28.5 grams of cannabis/more than 4 grams of
concentrated cannabis) into California(./;)]
[OR]
[___. The defendant (transported for sale/ [or] offered to transport for
sale/ [or] attempted to transport for sale) (more than 28.5 grams
of cannabis/more than 4 grams of concentrated cannabis) out of
California.]
288

§ 11018.5>
not. It may include the seeds of the plant; the resin extracted from any
part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin produced from the
seeds.]
other product.]
[Concentrated cannabis means the separated resin, whether crude or
purified, from cannabis.]
controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/imported).]
furnish/administer/import) it. It is enough if the person has (control over
it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through another
person.]
The People have the burden of proving an allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met that burden as to an
allegation, you must find that allegation has not been proved.
New September 2018

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction defining the elements of an
enhancement. (See, e.g., People v. Wallace (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1702 [1
Cal.Rptr.3d 324] [statute defines enhancement, not separate offense].)
289
Give all relevant bracketed definitions.

CALCRIM No. 2361, Transporting or Giving Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5
Grams.
CALCRIM No. 2363, Offering or Attempting to Transport for Sale or Offering to
Give Away Cannabis: More Than 28.5 Grams.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360(a)(3).
• Enhancement, Not Substantive Offense. People v. Wallace (2003) 109
290
(iii) Planting
2370. Planting, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11358(c)–(d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (planting[,] [or]/

cultivating[,] [or]/ harvesting[,] [or]/ drying[,] [or]/ processing) more than
six living cannabis plants, [or any part thereof,] a controlled substance
[in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11358 <insert
appropriate subsection[s] of statute>].
prove that:
1. The defendant (planted[,] [or]/ cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/
dried[,] [or]/ processed) more than six cannabis plants;
AND
2. The defendant knew that the substance (he/she) (planted[,] [or]/
cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/ dried[,] [or]/ processed) was
cannabis.
additional allegation that when the defendant (planted[,] [or]/
cultivated[,] [or]/ harvested[,] [or]/ dried[,] [or]/ processed) more than six
cannabis plants, (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
[If you find the defendant guilty of <insert offense[s]> [as
have proved the additional allegation[s].] [You must decide whether the
People have proved (this/these) allegation[s] for each crime and return a
that:
<Give the next paragraph if defendant is charged with violating a subsection
of Health & Safety Code section 11358(d)>
[___. (The defendant’s conduct caused <insert description
of statutory violation specified in Health & Safety Code section
11358(d)(3)>/ The defendant intentionally or with gross
negligence caused substantial environmental harm to public lands
or other public resources;)]
291
<Give the appropriate paragraphs below if defendant has prior convictions

specified in Health & Safety Code section 11358(d)(1–2)>
[___. The defendant has at least two prior convictions for
<insert description of prior convictions for this crime>(./;)]
[___. The defendant has at least one prior conviction for
<insert description of offense[s] specified in clause (iv) of
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667
of the Penal Code or an offense requiring registration pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 290 of the Penal Code>.]
§ 11018.5>
seeds.]
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A medical marijuana defense under the Compassionate Use Act or the Medical
Marijuana Program Act may be raised to a charge of violating Health and Safety
Code section 11358. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.) The burden
is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that
the conduct was lawful. (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 460 [122
Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525,
538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].) If the defendant introduces substantial evidence,
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the conduct may have been lawful, the
court has a sua sponte duty to give the relevant defense instruction: CALCRIM No.
3412, Compassionate Use Defense, or CALCRIM No. 3413, Collective or
Cooperative Cultivation Defense.
292

AUTHORITY
• Harvesting. People v. Villa (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 386, 390 [192 Cal.Rptr. 674].
• Aider and Abettor Liability. People v. Null (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 849, 852 [204
Cal.Rptr. 580].
• Medical Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.5, 11362.775.
• Amount Must Be Reasonably Related to Patient’s Medical Needs. People v.
Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1550–1551 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
of Chin, J.).
• Simple Possession of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357.
RELATED ISSUES
Aider and Abettor Liability of Landowner
In People v. Null (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 849, 852 [204 Cal.Rptr. 580], the court
held that a landowner could be convicted of aiding and abetting cultivation of
cannabis based on his or her knowledge of the activity and failure to prevent it. “If
[the landowner] knew of the existence of the illegal activity, her failure to take steps
to stop it would aid and abet the commission of the crime. This conclusion is based
upon the control that she had over her property.” (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).
293
2375. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis:
Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing (more than

28.5 grams of cannabis/more than 8 grams of concentrated cannabis), a
controlled substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11357(b)].
prove that:
4. The controlled substance was (cannabis/concentrated cannabis);
AND
5. The (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) possessed by the defendant
weighed more than (28.5 grams/8 grams).
additional allegation that when the defendant possessed
(cannabis/concentrated cannabis), (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
§ 11018.5>
294

with cannabis to prepare topical or oral administrations food, drink, or
other product.]
purified, from the cannabis plant.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, October 2010, April 2011,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(b); People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th
1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].
295

• Definition of Concentrated Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11006.5.
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; People v. Frazier (2005)
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
of Chin, J.).
• Prior Version of This Instruction Upheld. People v. Busch (2010) 187
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [d], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew
Bender).
296
2376. Simple Possession of Cannabis or Concentrated Cannabis
on School Grounds: Misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing (cannabis/

concentrated cannabis), a controlled substance, on the grounds of a
school [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357(c)].
prove that:
4. The controlled substance was (cannabis/concentrated cannabis);
5. The (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) was in a usable amount but
not more than (28.5 grams/8 grams);
AND
6. The defendant possessed the (cannabis/concentrated cannabis) on
the grounds of or inside a school providing instruction in any
grade from kindergarten through 12, when the school was open
for classes or school-related programs.
additional allegation that when the defendant possessed
(cannabis/concentrated cannabis), (he/she) was 18 years of age or older.
§ 11018.5>
297

other product.]
purified, from the cannabis plant.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2010, October 2010, February 2015,
September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
391].)
If a medical marijuana defense applies under the Compassionate Use Act or the
298
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11357(c); People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th
1236, 1242 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717].
• Definition of Concentrated Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11006.5.
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
Cal.4th 457, 460 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; People v. Frazier (2005)
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
of Chin, J.).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[d], [3][a], [a.1] (Matthew Bender).
299

2380. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Controlled Substance to Minor
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

(selling/furnishing/administering/giving away) <insert type
of controlled substance>, a controlled substance, to someone under 18
years of age [in violation of <insert appropriate code
section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold/furnished/administered/gave
away) a controlled substance to <insert name of
alleged recipient>;
2. The defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance;
4. At that time, the defendant was 18 years of age or older;
5. At that time, <insert name of alleged recipient> was
under 18 years of age;
[AND]
paragraph 6A.>
controlled substance>(;/.)
type of controlled substance>(;/.)
[AND
7. The controlled substance was in a usable amount.]
301

[OR]
substance.]]
[Selling for the purpose of this instruction means exchanging
<insert type of controlled substance> for money, services, or
anything of value.]
controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away).]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell it/
furnish it/administer it/give it away). It is enough if the person has
(control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through
another person.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
the prosecution alleges sales, do not use bracketed element 7 or the definition of
usable amount. There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or giving
away require usable quantities. (See People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313,
302
1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; People v.

Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) The
bracketed element 7 and the definition of usable amount are provided here for the
court to use at its discretion.
If the defendant is charged with violating Health and Safety Code section 11354(a),
in element 4, the court should replace “18 years of age or older” with “under 18
years of age.”
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a).
• Age of Defendant Element of Offense. People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328,
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
• No Defense of Good Faith Belief Offeree Over 18. People v. Williams (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454]; People v. Lopez (1969) 271
Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr. 643].
• Sale to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11379.
11377; People v. Tinajero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d
298]; but see People v. Peregrina-Larios, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524
[lesser related offense but not necessarily included].
• Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351,
11378; People v. Tinajero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547; but see People v.
Peregrina-Larios, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [lesser related offense but
not necessarily included].
303
RELATED ISSUES
No Defense of Good Faith Belief Over 18
“The specific intent for the crime of selling cocaine to a minor is the intent to sell
cocaine, not the intent to sell it to a minor. [Citations omitted.] It follows that
ignorance as to the age of the offeree neither disproves criminal intent nor negates
an evil design on the part of the offerer. It therefore does not give rise to a ‘mistake
of fact’ defense to the intent element of the crime. [Citations omitted.]” (People v.
Williams, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 410–411.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.02, Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.01[1][a]–[c], [h], [i], [3][a], [d] (Matthew Bender).
304
2381. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Controlled Substance to
Minor (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))

administer/give away) <insert type of controlled substance>,
a controlled substance, to someone under 18 years of age [in violation of
prove that:
away) a controlled substance to <insert name of
alleged recipient>;
furnish/administer/give away) the controlled substance;
paragraph 3A.>
AND
under 18 years of age.
[OR]
substance.]]
305


BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
years of age.”
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
329, 381 P.2d 1].
• Offering to Sell to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, 11360,
11379.
11377; People v. Tinajero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d
306
298]; but see People v. Peregrina-Larios (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1524 [28
Cal.Rptr.2d 316] [lesser related offense but not necessarily included].
• Possession for Sale of Controlled Substance. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351,
11378; People v. Tinajero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1547; but see People v.
Peregrina-Larios, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [lesser related offense but
not necessarily included].
RELATED ISSUES
55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2380, Sale, Furnishing, etc., of
Controlled Substance to Minor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [h]–[j], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
307
2382. Employment of Minor to Sell Controlled Substance (Health
& Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (hiring/employing/

using) someone under 18 years of age to (transport/carry/sell/give away/
prepare for sale/peddle) <insert type of controlled
substance>, a controlled substance [in violation of <insert
appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (hired/employed/used)
<insert name of person hired>;
2. <insert name of person hired> was (hired/employed/
used) to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle) a
paragraph 3A.>
5. At that time, <insert name of person hired> was
AND
of <insert type of controlled substance> . An analog of a
[OR]
308

substance.]]
controlled substance was to be (transported/carried/sold/given
away/prepared for sale/peddled), only that (he/she) was aware that it was
a controlled substance.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
years of age.”
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
Davis, supra, 57 Cal.4th 353 at p. 362, fn. 5.
SECONDARY SOURCES
309
§ 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [h], [3][a], [b], [c] (Matthew Bender).
310
2383. Use of Minor as Agent to Violate Controlled Substance Law
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with using someone under

18 years of age as an agent to (transport/sell/give away/possess/possess
for sale) <insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled
prove that:
1. The defendant used <insert name of person hired> as
an agent;
2. <insert name of person hired> was used by the
defendant to (transport/sell/give away/possess/possess for sale) a
paragraph 3A.>
AND
[OR]
311

substance.]]
An agent is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in
dealings with other people.
controlled substance was to be (transported/sold/given away/possessed/
possessed for sale), only that (he/she) was aware that it was a controlled
substance.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
• Agent. Civ. Code, § 2295.
SECONDARY SOURCES
312
§ 145.01[1][a], [b], [d], [e], [g], [h], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
313
2384. Inducing Minor to Violate Controlled Substance Laws
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11353, 11354, 11380(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (soliciting/inducing/

encouraging/intimidating) someone under 18 years of age to commit the
crime of <insert description of Health and Safety Code
violation alleged> [in violation of <insert appropriate code
section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully (solicited/induced/encouraged/intimidated)
<insert name of person solicited> to commit the
crime of <insert description of Health and Safety Code
violation alleged> [of] a controlled substance;
paragraph 2A.>
3. The defendant intended that <insert name of person
solicited> would commit that crime;
AND
5. At that time, <insert name of person solicited> was
[OR]
substance.]]
314
To decide whether the defendant intended that <insert name

of person solicited> would commit the crime of <insert
description of Health and Safety Code violation alleged>, please refer to the
purpose.
actually believed that <insert name of person solicited> was
18 years of age or older. The People have the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually
believe that <insert name of person solicited> was at least 18
years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
New January 2006; Revised February 2014, September 2017, September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Where indicated in the instruction, insert a description of the Health and Safety
Code violation allegedly solicited. For example, “the crime of possession for sale of
cocaine,” or “the crime of sale of cannabis.”
years of age.”
391].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to give the final bracketed paragraph if there is
substantial evidence supporting the defense that the defendant had a reasonable and
good faith belief that the person was over 18 years of age. (People v. Goldstein
(1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
315
• Good Faith Belief Minor Over 18 Defense to Inducing or Soliciting. People v.

Goldstein (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§ 145.01[1][a], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
316
(ii) Marijuana
2390. Sale, Furnishing, etc., of Cannabis to Minor (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11361)

(selling/furnishing/administering/giving away) cannabis, a controlled
substance, to someone under (18/14) years of age [in violation of Health
and Safety Code section 11361].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold/furnished/administered/gave
away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to <insert
name of alleged recipient>;
2. The defendant knew of the presence of the controlled substance;
[AND]
under (18/14) years of age;
[AND
6. The cannabis was in a usable amount.]
317
§ 11018.5>
seeds.]
controlled substance (he/she) (sold/furnished/administered/gave away).]
[A person does not have to actually hold or touch something to (sell it/
furnish it/administer it/give it away). It is enough if the person has
(control over it/ [or] the right to control it), either personally or through
another person.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, September 2018

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 5, give the alternative of “under 14 years of age” only if the defendant is
charged with furnishing, administering, or giving away cannabis to a minor under
14. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).)
the prosecution alleges sales, do not use bracketed element 6 or the definition of
usable amount. There is no case law on whether furnishing, administering, or giving
away require usable quantities. (See People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313,
1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907] [transportation requires usable quantity]; People v.
Ormiston (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 682 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [same].) Element
6 and the bracketed definition of usable amount are provided here for the court to
use at its discretion.
When instructing on the definition of “cannabis,” the court may choose to give just
the first bracketed sentence or may give the first bracketed sentence with either or
both of the bracketed sentences following. The second and third sentences should be
given if requested and relevant based on the evidence. (See Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11018 [defining cannabis].)
318
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Usable Amount. People v. Piper (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 250 [96 Cal.Rptr.
643].
• “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, § 11018.
• Sale to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360.
• Possession for Sale of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.
RELATED ISSUES
No Defense of Good Faith Belief Over 18
“The specific intent for the crime of selling cocaine to a minor is the intent to sell
cocaine, not the intent to sell it to a minor. [Citations omitted.] It follows that
ignorance as to the age of the offeree neither disproves criminal intent nor negates
an evil design on the part of the offerer. It therefore does not give rise to a ‘mistake
of fact’ defense to the intent element of the crime. [Citations omitted.]” (People v.
Williams (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]–[c], [h], [i], [3][a] (Matthew
Bender).
319
2391. Offering to Sell, Furnish, etc., Cannabis to Minor (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11361)

administer/give away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to someone
under (18/14) years of age [in violation of Health and Safety Code
section 11361].
prove that:
away) cannabis, a controlled substance, to <insert
name of alleged recipient>;
furnish/administer/give away) the controlled substance;
AND
under (18/14) years of age.
§ 11018.5>
seeds.]
320

the cannabis.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 4, give the alternative of “under 14 years of age” only if the defendant is
charged with offering to furnish, administer, or give away cannabis to a minor under
14. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361(a).)
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
Cal.App.2d 754, 760 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59].
329, 381 P.2d 1].
• Offering to Sell to Person Not a Minor. Health & Saf. Code, § 11360.
• Possession for Sale of Cannabis. Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.
• “Cannabis” Defined. Health & Saf. Code, §11018.
RELATED ISSUES
321
55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)

See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2390, Sale, Furnishing, etc., of
Cannabis to Minor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [h]–[j], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
322
2392. Employment of Minor to Sell, etc., Cannabis (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11361(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (hiring/employing/

using) someone under 18 years of age to (transport/carry/sell/give away/
prepare for sale/peddle) cannabis, a controlled substance [in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11361(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (hired/employed/used) <insert name of
person hired>;
2. <insert name of person hired> was (hired/employed/
used) to (transport/carry/sell/give away/prepare for sale/peddle)
cannabis, a controlled substance;
AND
§ 11018.5>
323
controlled substance was to be (transported/carried/sold/given
away/prepared for sale/peddled), only that (he/she) was aware that it was
a controlled substance.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
When instructing on the definition of “cannabis,” the court may choose to give just
the first bracketed sentence or may give the first bracketed sentence with either or
both of the bracketed sentences following. The second and third sentences should be
given if requested and relevant based on the evidence. (See Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11018 [defining cannabis].)
391].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b], [g], [h], [3][a] (Matthew
Bender).
324
2393. Inducing Minor to Use Cannabis (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11361(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with inducing someone

under 18 years of age to use cannabis [in violation of Health and Safety
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (encouraged/persuaded/solicited/
intimidated/induced) <insert name of person
solicited> to use cannabis;
2. At that time, the defendant was at least 18 years of age or older;
AND
3. At that time, <insert name of person solicited> was
§ 11018.5>
seeds.]
actually believed that <insert name of person solicited> was
at least 18 years of age. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually
believe that <insert name of person solicited> was at least 18
years of age. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
325

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
391].)
The court has a sua sponte duty to give the final bracketed paragraph if there is
substantial evidence supporting the defense that the defendant had a reasonable and
good faith belief that the person was over 18 years of age. (People v. Goldstein
(1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].)
AUTHORITY
332 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205].
• Good Faith Belief Minor Over 18 Defense to Inducing or Soliciting. People v.
Goldstein (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1036–1037 [182 Cal.Rptr. 207].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [3][a] (Matthew Bender).
326
(i) Use
2400. Using or Being Under the Influence of Controlled Substance
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (using/ [or] being

under the influence of) <insert controlled substance listed in
Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance [in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11550].
prove that:
<Alternative A—use of controlled substance>
1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] used
<insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>,
a controlled substance[, a short time before (his/her) arrest](;/.)
[OR]
<Alternative B—under the influence of controlled substance>
(1/2). The defendant was willfully [and unlawfully] under the
influence of <insert controlled substance listed in
Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance, when (he/
she) was arrested.
purpose.
[Someone is under the influence of a controlled substance if that person
has taken or used a controlled substance that has appreciably affected
the person’s nervous system, brain, or muscles or has created in the
person a detectable abnormal mental or physical condition.]
<Defense: Prescription>
[The defendant is not guilty of (using/ [or] being under the influence of)
<insert controlled substance listed in Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11550> if (he/she) had a valid prescription for that substance written
by a physician, dentist, podiatrist, [naturopathic doctor] or veterinarian
licensed to practice in California. The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid
prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
327

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
A violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550 based on “use” of a controlled
substance requires “ ‘current use’ or ‘use immediately prior to arrest’ . . . .” (People
v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 403–404 [234 Cal.Rptr. 408]; see also People
v. Velasquez (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 695, 699–700 [126 Cal.Rptr. 656]; People v.
Gutierrez (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 402 [140 Cal.Rptr. 122].) In People v. Jones,
supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 406, the court found evidence of use within 48 hours
prior to the defendant’s arrest sufficient. If there is an issue in the case over when
the defendant allegedly used the substance, give the bracketed phrase “a short time
before (his/her) arrest” in element 1. (Ibid.) Alternatively, the court may insert a
specific time or time frame in element 1, e.g., “24 to 48 hours prior to (his/her)
arrest.”
A recent amendment to section 11150 includes a naturopathic doctor in the category
of those who may furnish or order certain controlled substances, so that bracketed
option should be included in this instruction if substantial evidence supports it.
If the court instructs the jury on both use and being under the influence, the court
should consider whether a unanimity instruction is required. (See CALCRIM No.
3500, Unanimity.)
The prescription defense is codified in Health and Safety Code section 11550. The
defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether his or her use of the
drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28
Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is sufficient
evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give the
bracketed “and unlawfully” in the elements and the bracketed paragraph on the
defense.
AUTHORITY
• Under the Influence. People v. Culberson (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959,
960–961 [295 P.2d 598]; see also People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1278
[14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168]; People v. Enriquez (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 661,
665 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 710].
• Under the Influence and Use Distinguished. People v. Gutierrez (1977) 72
Cal.App.3d 397, 402 [140 Cal.Rptr. 122].
• Willfulness Element of Offense. People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766,
775 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446].
328
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Specific Controlled Substance Must Be Alleged. Sallas v. Municipal Court
(1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 737, 743 [150 Cal.Rptr. 543].
• Requires Current Use. People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 403–404
[234 Cal.Rptr. 408]; see also People v. Velasquez (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 695,
699–700 [126 Cal.Rptr. 656]; People v. Gutierrez (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 402
[140 Cal.Rptr. 122].
• Statute Constitutional. Bosco v. Justice Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 179,
191–192 [143 Cal.Rptr. 468].
• Prescription Defense. Health & Saf. Code, § 11550.
• Prescription Defined. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11027, 11164, 11164.5.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [k], [l], [2][b] (Matthew Bender).
329
2401. Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Use of Controlled Substance
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with aiding and abetting

unlawful use of a controlled substance in a place [in violation of Health
and Safety Code section 11365].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and intentionally (visited/ [or] was present
in) a place where someone else was (smoking/ [or] using)
<insert controlled substance specified in Health & Saf.
Code, § 11365>, a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew that the other person intended to (smoke/
[or] use) the controlled substance;
3. The defendant intended to aid and abet the other person in
(smoking/ [or] using) the controlled substance;
4. The defendant did or said something that did in fact aid and abet
the other person in (smoking/ [or] using) the controlled
substance;
AND
5. The defendant knew that (his/her) words or conduct aided and
abetted the other person in (smoking/ [or] using) the controlled
substance.
purpose.
Someone aids and abets a crime if, before or during the commission of
the crime, he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he
or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.
[If you conclude that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime
or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining
must do two things:
330

AND
theory.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. (See People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60,
674 P.2d 1318] [duty to instruct on aiding and abetting].)
give the bracketed portion that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant was
present.” (People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr.
If there is evidence that the defendant withdrew from participation in the crime, the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on withdrawal. (People v. Norton (1958) 161
Cal.App.2d 399, 403 [327 P.2d 87]; People v. Ross (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 391,
404–405 [154 Cal.Rptr. 783].) Give the bracketed portion that begins with “A
person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty.”
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Aiding and Abetting Required. Health. & Saf. Code, § 11365(b); People v.
Cressey (1970) 2 Cal.3d 836, 848–849 [87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 19].
• Knowledge and Willful, Intentional Involvement Required. People v. Brim
(1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 839, 842 [65 Cal.Rptr. 265].
• Requirements for Aiding and Abetting Generally. People v. Beeman (1984) 35
Cal.3d 547, 560–561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].
331
[149 Cal.Rptr. 87].
RELATED ISSUES
Drug Use in Car
A car is a “place” for the purposes of this offense. (People v. Lee (1968) 260
Cal.App.2d 836, 840–841 [67 Cal.Rptr. 709].)
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and Abetting:
Intended Crimes.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.10[3]; Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses,
§ 145.01[1][a], [m] (Matthew Bender).
332
2410. Possession of Controlled Substance Paraphernalia (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11364)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing an object

that can be used to unlawfully inject or smoke a controlled substance [in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed an object used for
unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance;
2. The defendant knew of the object’s presence;
AND
3. The defendant knew it to be an object used for unlawfully
injecting or smoking a controlled substance.
<insert each specific item of paraphernalia when multiple
items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all
agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least
one of these items and you all agree on which item (he/she) possessed.]
<Defense: Authorized Possession for Personal Use>
[The defendant did not unlawfully possess [a] hypodermic (needle[s]/ [or]
syringe[s]) if (he/she) was legally authorized to possess (it/them). The
defendant was legally authorized to possess (it/them) if:
1. (He/She) possessed the (needle[s]/ [or] syringe[s]) for personal
use;
[AND]
2. (He/She) obtained (it/them) from <insert source
authorized by Health & Safety Code section 11364(c)>.]
the defendant was not legally authorized to possess the hypodermic
(needle[s]/ [or] syringe[s]). If the People have not met this burden, you
333
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, April 2011, August 2015, September
2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].) Give the bracketed paragraph
that begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed,” inserting the
items alleged.
Section 11364 does not apply to possession of hypodermic needles or syringes for
personal use if acquired from an authorized source. The defendant need only raise a
reasonable doubt about whether his or her possession of these items was lawful.
(See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d
1067].) If there is sufficient evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
this defense. (See People v. Fuentes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045 [274
Cal.Rptr. 17] [authorized possession of hypodermic is an affirmative defense]);
People v. Mower, at pp. 478–481 [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the
burden of proof].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1 and the
bracketed paragraph on that defense.
AUTHORITY
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Chambers (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4
[257 Cal.Rptr. 289].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Unanimity. People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d
483].
• Authorized Possession Defense. Health & Saf. Code, § 11364(c).
RELATED ISSUES
Cannabis Paraphernalia Excluded
Possession of a device for smoking cannabis, without more, is not a crime. (In re
Johnny O. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 888, 897 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 471].)
334
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare § 155.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.04[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a], [b] (Matthew Bender).
2411 Reserved for Future Use
335
2412. Fraudulently Obtaining a Hypodermic Needle or Syringe
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with fraudulently obtaining

a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [in violation of Business and
Professions Code section 4326(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant obtained a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe);
AND
2. To do so, the defendant (used fraud[,]/ [or] used a forged or
fictitious name[,]/ [or] violated the law by <insert
description of conduct in violation of statute>).
[A person uses fraud when he or she makes a false statement,
misrepresents information, hides the truth, or otherwise does something
with the intent to deceive.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(a).
• Fraud Defined. See People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012), Crimes Against Public
Against Property, § 143.04; Ch. 145, Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a]
(Matthew Bender).
336
2413. Using or Permitting Improper Use of a Hypodermic Needle
or Syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (using[,]/ [or]

permitting[,]/ [or] causing) a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [to be
used] for a purpose other than the one for which it had been obtained
[in violation of Business and Professions Code section 4326(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant obtained a hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) from
someone who had a license to (sell/ [or] furnish) the (needle/ [or]
syringe);
AND
2. The defendant (used[,]/ [or] permitted[,]/ [or] caused) that
hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) [to be used] for a purpose other
than the one for which it had been obtained.
[The defendant may have either directly or indirectly caused the
hypodermic (needle/ [or] syringe) to be used for a purpose other than
the one for which it had been obtained.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4326(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
337
2430. Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction
Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.6)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the unlawful possession

of more than $100,000 obtained from a transaction involving a controlled
substance [in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11370.6].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed more than $100,000 in (cash/ [or]
<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>);
2. The (cash/ [or] <insert type[s] of negotiable
instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained from the (sale/possession for
sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/offer to manufacture)
[of] <insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>, [a]
controlled substance[s];
AND
3. The defendant knew that the (cash/ [or] <insert
type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained as a
result of the (sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/
offer to sell/offer to manufacture) [of] a controlled substance.
[In determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of this crime, you
may consider, in addition to any other relevant evidence:
[Whether the defendant had paid employment(;/.)]
[The opinion of a controlled substances expert on the source of the (cash/
[or] <insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>)(;/.)]
[Documents or ledgers, if any, that show sales of controlled substances.]
You must decide the significance, if any, of this evidence.]
New January 2006

339
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of this crime.
Give the bracketed paragraphs instructing that the jury may consider the defendant’s
employment, expert testimony, and ledgers if such evidence has been presented. If a
controlled substances expert testifies, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the
jury on evaluating the expert’s testimony. (Pen. Code, § 1127b.) Give CALCRIM
No. 332, Expert Witness Testimony.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6.
• Possession Has Same Meaning as in Drug Possession Cases. People v. Howard
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419, fn. 6 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766].
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [36
Cal.Rptr.2d 150]; People v. Granados (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20
Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
• Instruction on Factor to Consider Constitutional. People v. Mitchell (1994) 30
RELATED ISSUES
No Requirement Defendant Be Involved in Drug Crime
Culpability under Health and Safety Code section 11370.6 does not require that the
defendant possess a controlled substance or participate in a transaction involving
controlled substances in any manner. (People v. Mitchell (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 783,
797–798 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 150].) However, the defendant must have knowledge of the
origin of the money. (Id. at p. 798.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
340
2431. Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to Transaction
Involving Controlled Substance: Money to Purchase (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.6)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with the unlawful possession

of more than $100,000 intended for purchasing a controlled substance [in
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed more than $100,000 in (cash/ [or]
<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>);
2. The defendant intended to use the (cash/ [or] <insert
type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) to unlawfully purchase
<insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>, [a]
AND
3. The defendant committed an act in substantial furtherance of the
purchase.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
341
AUTHORITY
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2430, Possession of More Than
$100,000 Related to Transaction Involving Controlled Substance: Proceeds.
SECONDARY SOURCES
342
2432. Attorney’s Possession of More Than $100,000 Related to
Transaction Involving Controlled Substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.6(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with being an attorney who

knowingly accepted more than $100,000 from a client who obtained it
from a transaction involving a controlled substance [in violation of
Health and Safety Code section 11370.6(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (is/was) an attorney;
2. The defendant accepted a fee of more than $100,000 in (cash/ [or]
<insert type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) for
representing a client in a criminal investigation or proceeding;
3. The (cash/ [or] <insert type[s] of negotiable
instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained from the (sale/possession for
[of] <insert name[s] of controlled substance[s]>, [a]
4. The defendant knew that the (cash/ [or] <insert
type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) (was/were) obtained from the
(sale/possession for sale/transportation/manufacture/offer to sell/
offer to manufacture) of the controlled substance;
AND
<A. Intent to Participate>
5A. [The defendant accepted the (cash/ [or] <insert
type[s] of negotiable instrument[s]>) with the intent to participate
in the client’s (sale/possession for
[of] a controlled substance(;/.)]
[OR]
<B. Intent to Disguise Source>
5B. [The defendant accepted the money with the intent to disguise or
aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the
criminal activity.]
An attorney is someone licensed by [the] (California State Bar/
<insert name of licensing state or country>) to practice law.
343

New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
When an attorney is charged with unlawful possession of drug proceeds, the
prosecution must prove the additional element that the attorney intended to aid the
illegal activity or to disguise the source of the funds. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.6(b); People v. Granados (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 519 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d
131].) Give either optional paragraph A, B, or both, depending on the charged crime
and the evidence proffered at trial.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6(b).
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
Cal.Rptr.2d 131].
344
SECONDARY SOURCES
California Defense Advocate, § 1.12[2] (Matthew Bender).
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, §§ 145.01[4], 145.01A[5] (Matthew Bender).
345
2440. Maintaining a Place for Controlled Substance Sale or Use
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (opening/ [or]

maintaining) a place for the (sale/ [or] use) of a (controlled substance/
[or] narcotic drug) [in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11366].
prove that:
1. The defendant (opened/ [or] maintained) a place;
AND
2. The defendant (opened/ [or] maintained) the place with the intent
to (sell[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] allow others to use) a (controlled
substance/ [or] narcotic drug), specifically <insert
name of drug>, on a continuous or repeated basis at that place.
New January 2006; Revised August 2009, October 2010

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Purpose Must Be Continuous or Repetitive Use of Place for Illegal Activity.
People v. Horn (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 72 [9 Cal.Rptr. 578]; People v.
Holland (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 583, 588–589 [322 P.2d 983].
• Jury Must Be Instructed on Continuous or Repeated Use. People v. Shoals
• “Opening” and “Maintaining” Need Not Be Defined. People v. Hawkins (2004)
• Violations Are Crimes of Moral Turpitude Involving Intent to Corrupt Others, So
Solo Use of Drugs Not Covered by Section 11366. People v. Vera (1999) 69
• Evidence of Personal Drug Use Not Sufficient. People v. Franco (2009) 180
347
RELATED ISSUES
Corpus Delicti Includes Intent
“[T]he perpetrator’s purpose of continuously or repeatedly using a place for selling,
giving away, or using a controlled substance is part of the corpus delicit of a
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11366.” (People v. Hawkins (2004) 124
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][n] (Matthew Bender).
348
2441. Use of False Compartment to Conceal Controlled
Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.8)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with ((possessing/using/

controlling)/ [or] (designing/constructing/building/altering/fabricating/
installing/attaching)) a false compartment with the intent to (store/
conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled substance in a vehicle [in
prove that:
<A. Possessed, Used, Controlled>
1. [The defendant (possessed/used/controlled) a false compartment
with the intent to (store/conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled
substance in the false compartment in a vehicle(;/.)]
[OR
<B. Designed, Built, etc.>
2. ][The defendant (designed/constructed/built/altered/fabricated/
installed/attached) a false compartment (for/in/to) a vehicle with
the intent to (store/conceal/smuggle/transport) a controlled
substance in it.]
A false compartment is any box, container, space, or enclosure intended
or designed to (conceal[,]/hide[,]/ [or] [otherwise] prevent discovery of)
any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle. A false
compartment may be ((a/an) (false/modified/altered) fuel tank[,]/original
factory equipment of a vehicle that is (modified/altered/changed)[,]/ [or]
a compartment, space, or box that is added to, or made or created from,
existing compartments, spaces, or boxes within a vehicle).
A vehicle includes any car, truck, bus, aircraft, boat, ship, yacht, or
vessel.
New January 2006
349
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give either optional paragraph A, B, or both, depending on the charged crime
and the evidence proffered at trial.
AUTHORITY
• False Compartment Does Not Require Modification. People v. Gonzalez (2004)
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[1][o] (Matthew Bender).
350
WEAPONS

2500. Illegal Possession, Etc. of Weapon
2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen. Code, §§ 21310,
16470)
2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No
Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation
to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900)
2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order (Pen. Code,
§§ 29815, 29825)
2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic Drug (Pen. Code,
§ 29800)
(i) Concealed
2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within Vehicle (Pen.
Code, § 25400(a)(3))
(ii) Loaded
§§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))
2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4),
25850(c)(4))
2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to Conviction,
351
WEAPONS
Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))

2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and Weapon Loaded
(Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))
D. ASSAULT WEAPONS
2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, §§ 30605,
30600)
2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing
Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as Enhancement (Pen. Code,
§ 30615)
2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing
Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier
(Pen. Code, § 18725)
2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place (Pen.
Code, § 18715)
2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent
to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to Murder (Pen.
Code, § 18745)
2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury (Pen.
Code, § 18750)
2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Death, Mayhem, or
Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)
2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or Explosive (Pen.
Code, § 18720)
2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm
Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From Possessing Firearm
Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
352
2500. Illegal Possession, Etc. of Weapon
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully (possessing/

manufacturing/causing to be manufactured/importing/keeping for sale/
offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending/buying/receiving) a weapon,
specifically (a/an) <insert type of weapon> [in violation of
Penal Code section[s] <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be
manufactured/imported into California/kept for sale/offered or
exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) (a/an)
<insert type of weapon>;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused
to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for
sale/gave/lent/bought/received) the <insert type of
weapon>;
[AND]
<Alternative 3A—object capable of innocent uses>
[3. The defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be
manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/
gave/lent/bought/received) the object as a weapon (;/.)]
<Alternative 3B—object designed solely for use as weapon>
[3. The defendant knew that the object (was (a/an) __________
<insert characteristics of weapon, e.g., “unusually short shotgun,
penknife containing stabbing instrument”>/could be used
<insert description of weapon, e.g., “as a stabbing
weapon,” or “for purposes of offense or defense”>)(;/.)]
<Give element 4 only if defendant is charged with offering or exposing
for sale.>
[AND
4. The defendant intended to sell it.]
[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to use the
object as a weapon.]
<Give only if alternative 3A is given.>
[When deciding whether the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused
353
CALCRIM No. 2500 WEAPONS
to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/

gave/lent/bought/received) the object as a weapon, consider all the
surrounding circumstances relating to that question, including when and
where the object was (possessed/manufactured/caused to be
manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/
lent/bought/received)[,] [and] [where the defendant was going][,] [and]
[whether the object was changed from its standard form][,] and any
other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a
dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]
<Give only if alternative 3B is given.>
[(A/An) <insert type of weapon> means <insert
appropriate definition>.]
<Give only if the weapon used has specific characteristics of which the
defendant must have been aware.>
[A <insert type of weapon specified in element 3B> is
<insert defining characteristics of weapon>.
[The People do not have to prove that the object was (concealable[,]/ [or]
carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]]
[(A/An) <insert prohibited firearm> does not need to be in
working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of
shooting.]
[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to
be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/
lent/bought/received) the following weapons: <insert
description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find
the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved
that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be manufactured/
imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/
received) at least one of these weapons and you all agree on which
weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/ caused to be manufactured/
imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/
received).]
<Defense: Statutory Exemptions>
[The defendant did not unlawfully (possess/manufacture/cause to be
manufactured/import/keep for sale/offer or expose for sale/give/lend/buy/
receive) (a/an) <insert type of weapon> if
354
WEAPONS CALCRIM No. 2500
<insert exception>. The People have the burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully (possessed/
manufactured/caused to be manufactured/imported/kept for sale/offered
or exposed for sale/gave/lent/bought/received) (a/an) <insert
type of weapon>. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, April 2008, February 2012, February
2015, March 2017, March 2019, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Penal Code section 12020 has been repealed. In its place, the legislature enacted
numerous new statutes that became effective January 1, 2012. Whenever a blank in
the instruction calls for inserting a type of weapon, an exception, or a definition,
refer to the appropriate new Penal Code section.
Element 3 contains the requirement that the defendant know that the object is a
weapon. A more complete discussion of this issue is provided in the Commentary
section below. Select alternative 3A if the object is capable of innocent uses. In such
cases, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on when an object is possessed
“as a weapon.” (People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404 [111
Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621, fn. 9 [47
Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100].)
Select alternative 3B if the object “has no conceivable innocent function” (People v.
Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405), or when the item is specifically designed
to be one of the weapons defined in the Penal Code (see People v. Gaitan (2001) 92
Cal.App.4th 540, 547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885]).
Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged with offering or exposing for sale.
(See People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d
1].)
For any of the weapons not defined in the Penal Code, use an appropriate definition
from the case law, where available.
weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court
has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph
beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,”
355
inserting the items alleged. Also make the appropriate adjustments to the language
of the instruction to refer to multiple weapons or objects.
If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of one
of the statutory exemptions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
instruction on that defense. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and
the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph
beginning, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 19200, 20310, 20410, 20510, 20610, 20710, 20910,
21110, 21810, 22210, 24310, 24410, 24510, 24610, 24710, 30210, 31500,
32310, 32311, 32900, 33215, 33600.
• Need Not Prove Intent to Use. People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp.
620–621, fn. 9.
• Knowledge Required. People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 331–332;
People v. Gaitan, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.
• Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Cal.2d at
pp. 469–470.
• Specific Intent Includes Knowledge of Forbidden Characteristics of Weapon.
People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 627–628 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 133 P.3d
636].
• Innocent Object—Must Prove Possessed as Weapon. People v. Grubb, supra, 63
Cal.2d at pp. 620–621; People v. Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.
• Definition of Blackjack, etc. People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402
[111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; People v. Mulherin (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35
P.2d 174].
• Firearm Need Not Be Operable. People v. Favalora (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 988,
991 [117 Cal.Rptr. 291].
• Measurement of Sawed-Off Shotgun. People v. Rooney (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
1207, 1211–1213 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 900]; People v. Stinson (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d
497, 500 [87 Cal.Rptr. 537].
• Measurement of Fléchette Dart. People v. Olmsted (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 270,
275 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 755].
• Constructive vs. Actual Possession. People v. Azevedo (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d
235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in In re Jorge M.
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
• Knowledge of Specific Characteristics of Weapon. People v. King, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 628.
356
• Intent to Use as a Weapon. People v. Baugh (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 438, 446

[228 Cal.Rptr.3d 898].
COMMENTARY
Element 3—Knowledge
“Intent to use a weapon is not an element of the crime of weapon possession.”
(People v. Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) However, interpreting now-
repealed Penal Code section 12020(a)(4), possession of a concealed dirk or dagger,
the Supreme Court stated that “[a] defendant who does not know that he is carrying
the weapon or that the concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing weapon is
. . . not guilty of violating section 12020.” (People v. Rubalcava, supra, 23 Cal.4th
at pp. 331–332.) Applying this holding to possession of other weapons prohibited
under now-repealed Penal Code section 12020(a), the courts have concluded that the
defendant must know that the object is a weapon or may be used as a weapon, or
must possess the object “as a weapon.” (People v. Gaitan, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at
p. 547; People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 941 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 23];
People v. Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.)
In People v. Gaitan, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 547, for example, the court
considered the possession of “metal knuckles,” defined in now-repealed Penal Code
section 12020(c)(7) as an object “worn for purposes of offense or defense.” The
court held that the prosecution does not have to prove that the defendant intended to
use the object for offense or defense but must prove that the defendant knew that
“the instrument may be used for purposes of offense or defense.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in People v. Taylor, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 941, involving possession
of a cane sword, the court held that “[i]n order to protect against the significant
possibility of punishing innocent possession by one who believes he or she simply
has an ordinary cane, we infer the Legislature intended a scienter requirement of
actual knowledge that the cane conceals a sword.”
Finally, People v. Fannin, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404, considered whether a
bicycle chain with a lock at the end met the definition of a “slungshot.” The court
held that “if the object is not a weapon per se, but an instrument with ordinary
innocent uses, the prosecution must prove that the object was possessed as a
weapon.” (Ibid. [emphasis in original]; see also People v. Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d
at pp. 620–621 [possession of modified baseball bat].)
In element 3 of the instruction, the court should give alternative 3B if the object has
no innocent uses, inserting the appropriate description of the weapon. If the object
has innocent uses, the court should give alternative 3A. The court may choose not
to give element 3 if the court concludes that a previous case holding that the
prosecution does not need to prove knowledge is still valid authority. However, the
committee would caution against this approach in light of Rubalcava and In re
Jorge M. (See People v. Schaefer (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 893, 904–905 [13
Cal.Rptr.3d 442] [observing that, since In re Jorge M., it is unclear if the
prosecution must prove that the defendant knew shotgun was “sawed off” but that
357
failure to give instruction was harmless if error].)

It is not unlawful to possess a large-capacity magazine or large-capacity conversion
kit. It is unlawful, however, to receive or buy these items after January 1, 2014, the
effective date of Penal Code sections 32310 and 32311.
SECONDARY SOURCES
358
2501. Carrying Concealed Explosive or Dirk or Dagger (Pen.
Code, §§ 21310, 16470)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully carrying a

concealed (explosive/dirk or dagger) [in violation of Penal Code section
21310].
prove that:
1. The defendant carried on (his/her) person (an explosive/a dirk or
dagger);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying it;
3. It was substantially concealed on the defendant’s person;
AND
4. The defendant knew that it (was an explosive/could readily be
used as a stabbing weapon).
The People do not have to prove that the defendant used or intended to
use the alleged (explosive/dirk or dagger) as a weapon.
main or common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) that
is capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat.]
is an explosive.]
[A dirk or dagger is a knife or other instrument with or without a
handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may
inflict great bodily injury or death. Great bodily injury means significant
or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor
or moderate harm.]
[A (pocketknife/nonlocking folding knife/folding knife that is not
prohibited by Penal Code section 21510) is not a dirk or dagger unless
the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.]
[A knife carried in a sheath and worn openly suspended from the waist
of the wearer is not concealed.]
<Give only if object may have innocent uses.>
[When deciding whether the defendant knew the object (was an
359
explosive/could be used as a stabbing weapon), consider all the

surrounding circumstances, including the time and place of possession.
Consider also (the destination of the defendant[,]/ the alteration of the
object from standard form[,]) and other facts, if any.]
[The People allege that the defendant carried the following weapons:
<insert description of each weapon when multiple items
that the People have proved that the defendant carried at least one of
these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) carried and
when (he/she) carried it.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,”
inserting the items alleged.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “When deciding whether” only if the
object was not designed solely for use as a stabbing weapon but may have innocent
uses. (People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1404 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496];
People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620–621, fn. 9 [47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d
100].)
When instructing on the meaning of “explosive,” if the explosive is listed in Health
and Safety Code section 12000, the court may use the bracketed sentence stating,
“ is an explosive.” For example, “Nitroglycerine is an explosive.”
However, the court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used an explosive.
For example, the court may not state, “The defendant used an explosive,
nitroglycerine,” or “The substance used by the defendant, nitroglycerine, was an
explosive.” (See People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39
Cal.Rptr.2d 257]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr.
604, 758 P.2d 1135].)
If the court gives the instruction on a “folding knife that is not prohibited by Penal
Code section 21510,” give a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2502, Possession,
etc., of Switchblade Knife.
360

AUTHORITY
• Need Not Prove Intent to Use. People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Knowledge Required. People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Substantial Concealment. People v. Wharton (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 75 [6
Cal.Rptr.2d 673]; People v. Fuentes (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134
Cal.Rptr. 885].
Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].
• Dirk or Dagger Defined. Pen. Code, § 16470.
• Dirk or Dagger—No Length Requirement. In re Victor B. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
521, 526 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 362].
• Dirk or Dagger—Object Not Originally Designed as Knife. In re Victor B.
• Dirk or Dagger—Capable of Ready Use. People v. Sisneros (1997) 57
• Dirk or Dagger—Pocketknives. In re Luke W. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 650,
655–656 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905]; In re George W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1208,
1215 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 868].
RELATED ISSUES
Knowledge Element
“[T]he relevant language of section 12020 is unambiguous and establishes that
carrying a concealed dirk or dagger does not require an intent to use the concealed
instrument as a stabbing weapon.” (People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020].)
However, “to commit the offense, a defendant must still have the requisite guilty
mind: that is, the defendant must knowingly and intentionally carry concealed upon
his or her person an instrument ‘that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon.’
([now repealed] § 12020(a), (c)(24).) A defendant who does not know that he is
carrying the weapon or that the concealed instrument may be used as a stabbing
weapon is therefore not guilty of violating section 12020.” (Id. at pp. 331–332
361
[emphasis in original] [referencing repealed Pen. Code § 12020; see now Pen. Code,
§§ 16479, 21310].)
Definition of Dirk or Dagger
The definition of “dirk or dagger” contained in Penal Code section 16470 was
effective on January 1, 2012. Prior decisions interpreting the meaning of “dirk or
dagger” should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Mowatt (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 713, 719–720 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 722] [comparing old and new
definitions]; People v. Sisneros (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d
782] [same]; In re George W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1215 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d
868] [discussing 1997 amendment].)
Dirk or Dagger—“Capable of Ready Use”
“[T]he ‘capable of ready use’ requirement excludes from the definition of dirk or
dagger a device carried in a configuration that requires assembly before it can be
utilized as a weapon.” (People v. Sisneros (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1457 [67
Cal.Rptr.2d 782].)
Dirk or Dagger—“Pocketknife”
“Although they may not have folding blades, small knives obviously designed to be
carried in a pocket in a closed state, and which cannot be used until there have been
several intervening manipulations, comport with the implied legislative intent that
such knives do not fall within the definition of proscribed dirks or daggers but are a
type of pocketknife excepted from the statutory proscription.” (In re Luke W. (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 650, 655–656 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
362
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully (possessing

in a vehicle/carrying on (his/her) person/selling/offering or exposing for
sale/giving/lending/transferring) a switchblade knife [in violation of Penal
Code section 21510].
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed in the (passenger’s/ [or] driver’s) area
of a motor vehicle in a (public place/place open to the public)/
carried on (his/her) person/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/
lent/transferred) a switchblade knife [to another person];
2. The blade of the knife was two or more inches long;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed/carried/sold/offered
or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) it [to another person];
[AND]
4. The defendant knew that it had the characteristics of a
switchblade(;/.)
<Give element 5 only if defendant is charged with offering or exposing
for sale.>
[AND
5. The defendant intended to sell it.]
A switchblade knife is a knife that looks like a pocketknife and has a
blade that can be released automatically by a flick of a button, pressure
on the handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released
by the weight of the blade or any other mechanism. A switchblade
includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity knife, or any
other similar type knife. A switchblade knife does not include a knife that
opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely to the blade
of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, if the knife has a
detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be
overcome in opening the blade or that biases the blade back toward its
closed position.
[The (passenger’s/ [or] driver’s) area means that part of a motor vehicle
that is designed to carry the (driver/ [and] passengers), including the
interior compartment or space within.]
use the alleged switchblade knife as a weapon.
363

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed in a vehicle/carried/sold/
offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred) the following
switchblade knives: <insert description of each knife when
multiple items alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all
of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed
in a vehicle/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred)
at least one of these knives which was a switchblade and you all agree on
which switchblade knife (he/she) (possessed in a
vehicle/carried/sold/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent/transferred).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following
switchblade knives,” inserting the items alleged.
AUTHORITY
• Need Not Prove Intent to Use. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322,
328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. Mendoza (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d
835, 842–843 [60 Cal.Rptr. 5].
• Knowledge Required. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d
468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6, [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
• Passenger’s or Driver’s Area Defined. Pen. Code, § 16965.
364
RELATED ISSUES
Butterfly and Tekna Knives Included
Butterfly and Tekna knives are prohibited switchblades under Penal Code section
17235 [formerly section 653k]. (People ex rel. Mautner v. Quattrone (1989) 211
Cal.App.3d 1389, 1395 [260 Cal.Rptr. 44].)
Broken-Spring Knife
Where the spring mechanism on the knife did not work, the court found insufficient
evidence that the knife was a prohibited switchblade under Penal Code section
17235 [formerly section 653k]. (In re Roderick S. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 48, 52
[177 Cal.Rptr. 800].)
Public Place
On the meaning of “public place,” see In re Danny H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 92,
98 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 222], discussing the meaning of public place in Penal Code
section 594.1. See also CALCRIM No. 2966, Disorderly Conduct: Under the
Influence in Public, and cases cited therein.
SECONDARY SOURCES
365
2503. Possession of Deadly Weapon With Intent to Assault (Pen.
Code, § 17500)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing a deadly

weapon with intent to assault [in violation of Penal Code section 17500].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a deadly weapon on (his/her) person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed the weapon;
AND
3. At the time the defendant possessed the weapon, (he/she) intended
to assault someone.
A person intends to assault someone else if he or she intends to do an act
that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application
of force to a person.
[The term deadly weapon is defined in another instruction to which you
should refer.]
surrounding circumstances, including when and where the object was
possessed[,] [and] [where the person who possessed the object was
going][,] [and] [whether the object was changed from its standard form]
and any other evidence that indicates that the object would be used for a
dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]
The term application of force means to touch in a harmful or offensive
manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or
angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his
or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or
injury of any kind.
touched someone.]
366
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons:
weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) possessed.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, February 2013, September 2019,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time [or] space,” the court has a
sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph that
begins with “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following
weapons,” inserting the items alleged.
Give the definition of deadly weapon unless the court has already given the
156].)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether” if the object is
Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [on duty to instruct generally];
People v. Stevenson (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 976, 988 [145 Cal.Rptr. 301] [instructions
applicable to possession of weapon with intent to assault].) See Defenses and
Insanity, CALCRIM No. 3400 et seq.
367
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Objects With Innocent Uses. People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023,
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; People v. Godwin (1996) 50
• Knowledge Required. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332
[96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. Gaitan (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540,
547 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 885].
• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; see also People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779,
790 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 29 P.3d 197].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
368
B. POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PERSON
PROHIBITED
2510. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to
Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800,
29805, 29820, 29900)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully possessing a

firearm [in violation of <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
1. The defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) (owned/purchased/received/
possessed) the firearm;
[AND]
3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/two
offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of
<insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or Pen. Code,
§ 23515(a), (b), or (d), or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code,
§ 29820>)(;/.)
[AND]
<Alternative 4A—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 29805.>
[4. The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the
defendant possessed the firearm.]
<Alternative 4B—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 29820.>
[4. The defendant was under 30 years old at the time (he/she)
possessed the firearm.]
explosion or other form of combustion. [The frame or receiver of such a
firearm is also a firearm for the purpose of this instruction.]]
<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines
firearm in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>
369
shoot and appears capable of shooting.]

[A juvenile court finding is the same as a conviction.]
[A conviction of <insert name of other-state or federal
offense> is the same as a conviction for a felony.]
[You may consider evidence, if any, that the defendant was previously
convicted of a crime only in deciding whether the People have proved
this element of the crime [or for the limited purpose of
<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant’s credibility>]. Do
not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]
[The People allege that the defendant (owned/purchased/received/
possessed) the following firearms: <insert description of each
firearm when multiple firearms alleged>. You may not find the defendant
guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the
defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed) at least one of the
firearms, and you all agree on which firearm (he/she) (owned/purchased/
received/possessed).]
<Defense: Momentary Possession>
[If you conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession
was not unlawful if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary
possession. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove
that:
1. (He/She) possessed the firearm only for a momentary or
transitory period;
2. (He/She) possessed the firearm in order to (abandon[,]/ [or]
dispose of[,]/ [or] destroy) it;
AND
3. (He/She) did not intend to prevent law enforcement officials from
seizing the firearm.
The defendant has the burden of proving each element of this defense by
a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a
likely than not that each element of the defense is true.]
<Defense: Justifiable Possession>
370
was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was justified in
possessing the firearm. In order to establish this defense, the defendant
must prove that:
1. (He/She) (found the firearm/took the firearm from a person who
was committing a crime against the defendant);
[AND]
2. (He/She) possessed the firearm no longer than was necessary to
deliver or transport the firearm to a law enforcement agency for
that agency to dispose of the weapon(;/.)
[AND
3. If the defendant was transporting the firearm to a law
enforcement agency, (he/she) gave prior notice to the law
enforcement agency that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to
the agency for disposal.]]
likely than not that each element of the defense is true.
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant does not stipulate to the prior
conviction. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d
433]; People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d
913].) If the defendant stipulates, use CALCRIM No. 2511, Possession of Firearm
by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction. (People v. Sapp,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173.)
926 P.2d 365].) Therefore, because of the knowledge requirement in element 2 of
this instruction, the court must give CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act and Intent:
Specific Intent or Mental State, together with this instruction. Nevertheless, the
knowledge requirement in element 2 does not require any “specific intent.”
firearms and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,” the court
has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (People v. Wolfe (2003) 114
371
beginning “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms,”
Element 4 should be given only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code
section 29805, possession within 10 years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or
Penal Code section 29820, possession by someone under 30 years old with a
specified juvenile finding.
already given the definition in other instructions on crimes based on Penal Code
section 29800. In such cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that
On request, the court should give the limiting instruction regarding the evidence of
the prior conviction that begins, “You may consider . . . .” (People v. Valentine
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua
sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no
limiting instruction be given. (People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139
[2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)
“[T]he defense of transitory possession devised in [People v. Mijares (1971) 6
Cal.3d 415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115]] applies only to momentary
or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (People v.
Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081].)
The court in Martin, supra, approved of People v. Hurtado (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th
805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853], which held that the defense of momentary possession
applies to a charge of violating now-repealed Penal Code section 12021. This is an
affirmative defense, and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If sufficient evidence has been presented, the
court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed paragraph, “Defense: Momentary
Possession.”
Penal Code section 29850 states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if the
listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears the
burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) If sufficient
evidence has been presented, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
paragraph, “Defense: Justifiable Possession.”
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm only in self-
defense, the court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 2514, Possession
of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute—Self-Defense.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 23515, 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900; People v. Snyder
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
• Defense of Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 29850.
• Presenting Evidence of Prior Conviction to Jury. People v. Sapp (2003) 31
372
Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Valentine (1986) 42
Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].
• Accidental Possession. People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [49
Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
• Lack of Knowledge of Nature of Conviction Not a Defense. People v. Snyder
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
• Momentary Possession Defense. People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180,
1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, 25 P.3d 1081]; People v. Hurtado (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853]; People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d
415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
• Possession of Frame or Receiver Sufficient but not Necessary For Crimes
Charged Under [Now-Superseded] Section 12021. People v. Arnold (2006) 145
Neither possessing firearm after conviction of felony nor possessing firearm after
conviction of specified violent offense is a lesser included offense of the other.
(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 739–740 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26, 288 P.3d
83].
RELATED ISSUES
Proof of Prior Conviction
The trial court “has two options when a prior conviction is a substantive element of
a current charge: Either the prosecution proves each element of the offense to the
jury, or the defendant stipulates to the conviction and the court ‘sanitizes’ the prior
by telling the jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction, without
specifying the nature of the felony committed.” (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th
240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d
170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].)
Lack of Knowledge of Status of Conviction Not a Defense
“[R]egardless of what she reasonably believed, or what her attorney may have told
her, defendant was deemed to know under the law that she was a convicted felon
forbidden to possess concealable firearms. Her asserted mistake regarding her
correct legal status was a mistake of law, not fact. It does not constitute a defense to
373
[now-superseded] section 12021.” (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186
Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].)
Out-of-State Convictions
For an out-of-state conviction, it is sufficient if the offense is a felony under the
laws of the “convicting jurisdiction.” (People v. Shear (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 278,
283 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 707].) The prosecution does not have to establish that the
offense would be a felony under the laws of California. (Ibid.) Even if the
convicting jurisdiction has restored the defendant’s right to possess a firearm, the
defendant may still be convicted of violating [now-superseded] Penal Code section
12021. (Ibid.)
Pardons and Penal Code Section 1203.4 Motions
A pardon pursuant to Penal Code section 4852.17 restores a person’s right to
possess a firearm unless the person was convicted of a “felony involving the use of
a dangerous weapon.” (Pen. Code, § 4852.17.) The granting of a Penal Code section
1203.4 motion, however, does not restore the person’s right to possess any type of
firearm. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4(a); People v. Frawley (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 796
[98 Cal.Rptr.2d 555].)
Submitting False Application for Firearm
A defendant who submitted a false application to purchase a firearm may not be
prosecuted for “attempted possession of a firearm by a felon.” (People v. Duran
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 666, 673 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 495].) “Instead, the felon may
only be prosecuted pursuant to the special statute, [now-repealed Penal Code
section] 12076, which expressly proscribes such false application.” (Ibid.) [see now
Pen. Code, § 28215].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Disabilities Flowing From Conviction, § 93.06 (Matthew Bender).
Against Order, § 144.01[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
374
2511. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to
Conviction—Stipulation to Conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 29800,
29805, 29820, 29900)

firearm [in violation of <insert appropriate code section[s]>].
prove that:
[AND]
3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a/two) (felony/
misdemeanor[s])(;/.)
[AND]
<Alternative 4A—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 29805.>
[4. The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the
defendant possessed the firearm.]
<Alternative 4B—give only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 29820.>
[4. The defendant was under 30 years old at the time (he/she)
possessed the firearm.]
<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines firearm
in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>
it), either personally or through another person).]
375
The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that the
defendant was previously convicted of (a/two) (felony/misdemeanor[s]).
This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.
[Do not consider this fact for any other purpose [except for the limited
purpose of <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., determining
the defendant’s credibility>]. Do not speculate about or discuss the nature
of the conviction.]
that:
transitory period;
AND
likely than not that each element of the defense is true. If the defendant
has not met this burden, (he/she) has not proved this defense.]
must prove that:
376
[AND]
[AND
enforcement agency, (he/she) gave prior notice to the law
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant stipulates to the prior conviction.
(People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433];
People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If
the defendant does not stipulate, use CALCRIM No. 2510, Possession of Firearm
by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction. (People v.
Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173.)
If the defendant has stipulated to the fact of the conviction, the court should sanitize
all references to the conviction to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction
to the jury. (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 261; People v. Valentine, supra,
42 Cal.3d at p. 173.) If the defendant agrees, the court should not read the portion
of the information describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court
should ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.
377

Element 4 should be given only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code
section 29805, possession within 10 years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or
Penal Code section 29820, possession by someone under 30 years old with a
the prior conviction that begins, “Do not consider this fact for any other
purpose . . . .” (People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr.
25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and
the defense may prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (People v. Griggs
Possession.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 23515, 29800, 29805, 29820, 29900; People v. Snyder
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
• Presenting Evidence of Prior Conviction to Jury. People v. Sapp (2003) 31
378
Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].
Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
• Lack of Knowledge of Nature of Conviction Not a Defense. People v. Snyder
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
RELATED ISSUES
See CALCRIM No. 2510, Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to
Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction.
Neither possessing firearm after conviction of felony nor possessing firearm after
conviction of specified violent offense is a lesser included offense of the other.
(People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 739–740 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26, 288 P.3d
83].
SECONDARY SOURCES
379
2512. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Court Order
(Pen. Code, §§ 29815, 29825)

firearm [in violation of Penal Code section[s] <insert appropriate
code section[s]>].
prove that:
[AND]
3. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/purchase/
receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)
<Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code,
§ 29825.>
[AND
4. The defendant knew of the court’s order.]
<Do not use the language below unless the other instruction defines firearm
in the context of a crime charged pursuant to Pen. Code, § 29800.>
[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that a court
ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm.
This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.]
<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation to order>
380

the defendant’s credibility>]. Do not speculate about why the court’s order
was made.]
<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation to order>
[You may consider evidence, if any, that a court ordered the defendant
not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm only in deciding whether
the People have proved this element of the crime [or for the limited
purpose of <insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing
defendant’s credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other
purpose.]
that:
transitory period;
AND
must prove that:
381

[AND]
[AND
enforcement agency, (he/she) had given prior notice to the agency
that (he/she) would be delivering a firearm to the agency for
disposal.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Use this instruction only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code
section 29815, possession by someone prohibited as a condition of probation
following conviction for a crime not listed in other provisions of Penal Code section
29800, or Penal Code section 29825, possession by someone prohibited by a
temporary restraining order or other protective order.
Give element 4 only if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 29825.
382
If the defendant has not stipulated to the probation order, do not give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated . . . .”
If the defendant does stipulate to the probation order, the court must give the
bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have
stipulated . . . .” The court must also sanitize all references to the probation order to
prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (People v. Sapp,
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Valentine
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant
agrees, the court must not read the portion of the information describing the nature
of the conviction. Likewise, the court must ensure that the verdict forms do not
reveal the nature of the conviction.
the probation condition. (People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 182, fn. 7.) There
is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer
that no limiting instruction be given. (People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to the probation
condition, give alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give alternative B.
Possession.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 29815 & 29825; People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d
383
590, 592 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].

Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
SECONDARY SOURCES
384
2513. Possession of Firearm by Person Addicted to a Narcotic
Drug (Pen. Code, § 29800)

firearm [in violation of Penal Code section 29800].
prove that:
AND
3. At the time the defendant (owned/purchased/received/possessed)
the firearm, (he/she) was addicted to the use of a narcotic drug.
<insert narcotic drug alleged> is a narcotic drug.
A person is addicted to the use of a narcotic drug if:
1. The person has become emotionally dependent on the drug in the
sense that he or she experiences a compulsive need to continue its
use;
2. The person has developed a tolerance to the drug’s effects and
therefore requires larger and more potent doses;
AND
3. The person has become physically dependent, suffering
withdrawal symptoms if he or she is deprived of the drug.
projectile is expelled through a barrel by the force of an explosion or
other form of combustion.]
385
that:
transitory period;
AND
must prove that:
[AND]
[AND
enforcement agency, the defendant gave prior notice to the law
386

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the union of general criminal intent
and action, CALCRIM No. 251, Union of Act and Intent—General Intent. (People v.
Jeffers (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 924 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) “Wrongful intent must
be shown with regard to the possession and custody elements of the crime of being
a felon in possession of a firearm . . . . [A] felon who acquires possession of a
firearm through misfortune or accident, but who has no intent to exercise control or
to have custody, commits the prohibited act without the required wrongful intent.”
(Id. at p. 922.) The defendant is also entitled to a pinpoint instruction on
unintentional possession if there is sufficient evidence to support the defense. (Id. at
pp. 924–925.)
affirmative defense and the defense bears the burden of establishing it by a
387
Possession.”
listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense and the defense bears the
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 29800; People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 592 [186
Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42].
• Narcotic Addict. People v. O’Neil (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 754 [44 Cal.Rptr. 320,
401 P.2d 928].
Cal.Rptr.2d 86].
415, 420, 423 [99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 P.2d 1115].
SECONDARY SOURCES
388
2514. Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute:
Self-Defense
The defendant is not guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm[, as

charged in Count ,] if (he/she) temporarily possessed the firearm
in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant possessed the
firearm in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:
1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/someone else/
danger of suffering great bodily injury;
force was necessary to defend against that danger;
3. A firearm became available to the defendant without planning or
preparation on (his/her) part;
4. The defendant possessed the firearm temporarily, that is, for a
period no longer than was necessary [or reasonably appeared to
have been necessary] for self-defense;
5. No other means of avoiding the danger of injury was available;
AND
6. The defendant’s use of the firearm was reasonable under the
circumstances.
imminent danger of great bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone
else). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must
have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to
use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is
necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than
was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another).
[The defendant’s belief that (he/she/someone else) was threatened may be
reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true.
389
However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that
the information was true.]
[If you find that <insert name of person who allegedly
threatened defendant> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in
the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the
defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
person who allegedly threatened defendant> had threatened or harmed
others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding
whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past, is
(he/she) reasonably associated with <insert name of person
who was the alleged source of the threat>, you may consider that threat in
deciding whether the defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/
[or] defense of another).]
the defendant did not temporarily possess the firearm in (self-defense/
[or] defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2012, September 2020,
March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense when “it appears that
the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence
Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing duty to instruct on defenses generally];
see also People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478 [249 Cal.Rptr. 897] [if
substantial evidence of self-defense exists, court must instruct sua sponte and let
jury decide credibility of witnesses]; People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148
Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000] [self-defense applies to charge under now-repealed
Pen. Code, § 12021].)
instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats or assaults
390
1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 505,
Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.) If these instructions have
already been given in CALCRIM No. 3470 or CALCRIM No. 505, the court may
delete them here.
CALCRIM No. 3470, Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide).
CALCRIM No. 3472, Right to Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived.
AUTHORITY
• Temporary Possession of Firearm by Felon in Self-Defense. People v. King
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000].
• Duty to Retreat Limited to Felon in Possession Cases. People v. Rhodes (2005)
• Possession Must Be Brief and Not Planned. People v. McClindon (1980) 114
Cal.App.3d 336, 340 [170 Cal.Rptr. 492].
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Moody (1943) 62 Cal.App.2d 18 [143 P.2d
978]; People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, 336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d
518].
• Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693, 694; Civ. Code, § 50.
379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
142, 921 P.2d 1].
167], disapproved on other grounds by People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1073, 1088–1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142].
• Reasonable Belief. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56
391
Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377
[181 Cal.Rptr. 682].
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 86, 87,
68, 71, 72, 73.
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.11[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
392
(i) Concealed
2520. Carrying Concealed Firearm on Person (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(a)(2))

concealed firearm on (his/her) person [in violation of Penal Code section
25400(a)(2)].
prove that:
1. The defendant carried on (his/her) person a firearm capable of
being concealed on the person;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying a firearm;
AND
3. It was substantially concealed on the defendant’s person.
[A firearm capable of being concealed on the person is any device
designed to be used as a weapon, from which a projectile is expelled or
discharged through a barrel by the force of an explosion or other form
of combustion and that has a barrel less than 16 inches in length. [A
firearm capable of being concealed on the person also includes any device
that has a barrel 16 inches or more in length that is designed to be
interchanged with a barrel less than 16 inches in length.] [A firearm also
includes any rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar
device containing any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not
the device is designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]
[The term firearm capable of being concealed on the person is defined in
[Firearms carried openly in belt holsters are not concealed.]
<Defense: Statutory Exemption>
[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a concealed firearm if
<insert defense from Pen. Code, § 25450, 25510, 25525,
25600, or 25605>. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully carried a concealed
firearm. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
393

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. If the defendant is charged with any of the sentencing factors in Penal Code
section 25400(c), the court must also give the appropriate instruction from
CALCRIM Nos. 2540–2546. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
The court should give the bracketed definition of “firearm capable of being
concealed on the person” unless the court has already given the definition in other
Penal Code section 25400(a) prohibits carrying a concealed “pistol, revolver, or
16530 provides a single definition for this class of weapons. Thus, the committee
has chosen to use solely the all-inclusive phrase “firearm capable of being concealed
on the person.”
Exemptions and a justification for carrying a concealed firearm are stated in Penal
Code sections 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, and 25450. If sufficient evidence has
been presented to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for
the defendant’s actions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
instruction on the defense. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481
that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”
CALCRIM No. 2540, Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions.
CALCRIM No. 2541, Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm.
CALCRIM No. 2542, Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street
Gang.
CALCRIM No. 2543, Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession.
CALCRIM No. 2544, Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to
Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness.
CALCRIM No. 2545, Carrying Firearm: Not Registered Owner.
CALCRIM No. 2546, Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and
Weapon Loaded.
394
AUTHORITY
• Knowledge Required. People v. Jurado (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1030–1031
[102 Cal.Rptr. 498]; People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Concealment Required. People v. Nelson (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 578, 580–581
[8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
• Factors in Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. People v.
Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
• Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510,
25450.
• Need Not Be Operable. People v. Marroquin (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 82 [258
Cal.Rptr. 290].
Cal.Rptr.2d 673] [interpreting now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12020(a)(4)]; People v.
Fuentes (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 955 [134 Cal.Rptr. 885] [same].
• Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague. People v. Hodges (1999) 70
If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors that makes this
offense a felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The
statute defines as a misdemeanor all violations of the statute not covered by the
specified sentencing factors. (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(7).) The court must provide the
jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has
been proved. If the jury finds that the sentencing factor has not been proved, then
the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Convictions Prohibited
A single act of carrying a concealed firearm cannot result in multiple convictions
under different subdivisions of Penal Code section 25400(a). (People v. Duffy (2020)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204–209.
395
2521. Carrying Concealed Firearm Within Vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 25400(a)(1))

concealed firearm within a vehicle [in violation of Penal Code section
25400].
prove that:
1. The defendant carried within a vehicle a firearm capable of being
concealed on the person;
2. The defendant knew the firearm was in the vehicle;
3. The firearm was substantially concealed within the vehicle;
AND
4. The vehicle was under the defendant’s control or direction.
[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a concealed firearm with in a
vehicle if <insert defense from Pen. Code, §§ 25450, 25510,
25525, 25600, 25605, or 25610>. The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully carried a
concealed firearm within a vehicle. If the People have not met this
New January 2006; Revised February 2012, March 2018, March 2021
396
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
on the person.”
Code sections 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600, 25605, and 25610. If sufficient evidence
has been presented to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis
for the defendant’s actions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
Gang.
Weapon Loaded.
AUTHORITY
397
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
[8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
• Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510,
25450.
Cal.Rptr. 290].
RELATED ISSUES
Gun in Unlocked Carrying Case Is Concealed
“If a firearm is transported in a vehicle in such a manner as to be invisible unless its
carrying case is opened, it is concealed in the ordinary and usual meaning of the
term.” (People v. Hodges (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1355 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 619].)
Thus, carrying a firearm in an unlocked case in a vehicle violates Penal Code
section 25400(a)(1). (Ibid.) However, Penal Code section 25525 makes it lawful to
transport a firearm in a vehicle if it is in a locked case.
Not Necessary for Defendant to Possess or Control the Firearm
“The statute does not require that the defendant have the exclusive possession and
control of the firearm.” (People v. Davis (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 33, 36 [320 P.2d
88].) The court in People v. Davis, supra, upheld the conviction where the defendant
owned and controlled the vehicle and knew of the presence of the firearm below the
seat, even though the weapon was placed there by someone else and belonged to
someone else. (Ibid.)
398

SECONDARY SOURCES
399
2522. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Caused to Be Carried Within
Vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400(a)(3))

firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant caused a firearm capable of being concealed on the
person to be concealed while it was carried within a vehicle;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) caused the firearm to be
concealed in the vehicle;
3. The firearm was substantially concealed within the vehicle;
AND
4. The defendant was in the vehicle during the time the firearm was
concealed there.
[The People do not need to prove that the defendant initially brought the
firearm into the vehicle.]
[The defendant did not unlawfully cause a firearm to be carried
concealed within a vehicle if <insert defense from Pen. Code,
§ 25450, 25510, 25525, 25600 or 25605>. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully caused
400
a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle. If the People have not


BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
on the person.”
Code sections 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510, and 25450. If the defense presents
sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis
for the defendant’s actions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
Gang.
Weapon Loaded.
401
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
[8 Cal.Rptr. 288].
• Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code §§ 25600, 25605, 25525, 25510,
25450.
Cal.Rptr. 290].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Need Not Bring Firearm Into Car
“Appellant caused the gun to be carried concealed in a vehicle in which he was an
occupant, by concealing the gun between the seats. His conduct fits the language
and purpose of the statute. The prosecution was not required to prove that appellant
initially brought the gun into the car.” (People v. Padilla (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127,
134 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 457].)
402
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204–209.
403
(ii) Loaded

loaded firearm (on (his/her) person/in a vehicle) [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant carried a loaded firearm (on (his/her) person/in a
vehicle);
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying a firearm;
AND
3. At that time, the defendant was in a public place or on a public
street in (an incorporated city/in an unincorporated area where it
was unlawful to discharge a firearm).
[A public place is a place that is open and accessible to anyone who
wishes to go there.]
projectile is expelled or discharged through a barrel by the force of any
explosion or other form of combustion. [A firearm also includes any
rocket, rocket-propelled projectile launcher, or similar device containing
any explosive or incendiary material, whether or not the device is
designed for emergency or distress signaling purposes.]]
As used here, a firearm is loaded if there is an unexpended cartridge or
shell in the firing chamber or in either a magazine or clip attached to the
firearm. An unexpended cartridge or shell consists of a case that holds a
charge of powder and a bullet or shot. [A muzzle-loader firearm is loaded
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot
in the barrel or cylinder.]
[ <insert location> is (an incorporated city/in an
unincorporated area where it is unlawful to discharge a firearm).]
[The defendant did not unlawfully carry a loaded firearm if
<insert defense from Pen Code, §§ 25900, 26000 et seq.>. The People have
404
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

unlawfully carried a loaded firearm. If the People have not met this

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
section 25850, the court must also give the appropriate instruction from CALCRIM
Nos. 2540–2546. (See People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
If the defense presents sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the
existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See People v. Mower (2002)
28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative
defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the
bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”
Gang.
Weapon Loaded.
AUTHORITY
• Knowledge of Presence of Weapon Required. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23
Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. Dillard (1984)
405
154 Cal.App.3d 261, 267 [201 Cal.Rptr. 136].

• Knowledge Firearm Loaded Not Required. People v. Dillard (1984) 154
Cal.App.3d 261, 266 [201 Cal.Rptr. 136]; People v. Harrison (1969) 1
Cal.App.3d 115, 120 [81 Cal.Rptr. 396].
• Justifications and Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 25900, 26000 et seq.
• Need Not Be Operable. People v. Taylor (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 437 [199
Cal.Rptr. 6].
• “Loaded” Firearm. People v. Clark (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 99].
• Must Be in Incorporated City or Prohibited Area of Unincorporated Territory.
People v. Knight (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 384].
Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
• Loaded Firearm in Backpack is “On the Person.” People v. Wade (2016) 63
Cal.4th 137, 140 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876].
RELATED ISSUES
Loaded Firearm
“Under the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘loaded,’ a firearm is
‘loaded’ when a shell or cartridge has been placed into a position from which it can
be fired; the shotgun is not ‘loaded’ if the shell or cartridge is stored elsewhere and
not yet placed in a firing position.” (People v. Clark (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1147,
1153 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99].)
Location—Court May Take Judicial Notice
“The location of local streets within city boundaries is properly a matter of judicial
notice [citation omitted], as is the fact that a particular jurisdiction is an
incorporated city.” (People v. Vega (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 954, 958 [96 Cal.Rptr.
391] [footnote and citation omitted].)
406
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][d], [f] (Matthew Bender).
407
2540. Carrying Firearm: Specified Convictions (Pen. Code,
§§ 25400(a), 25850(c))
If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully (carrying a concealed

firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be
carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/ [or] carrying a loaded firearm)
[under Count[s] ], you must then decide whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that (he/she) was previously convicted of
(a felony/the crime[s] of <insert one or more weapons
offenses punishable as a felony, crimes against the person or property, or
narcotics and dangerous drug violations>). It has already been determined
that the defendant is the person named in exhibits <insert
numbers or descriptions of exhibits>. You must decide whether the
evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].
[1.] A violation of <insert code section alleged>, on
<insert name of court>, in Case Number <insert docket or
case number>(;/.)
[A conviction of <insert name of offense from other state or
federal offense> is the same as a conviction for a felony.]
the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
People have not met this burden [for any alleged conviction], you must
find that the alleged conviction has not been proved.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing factor. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d
690].)
408
Give this instruction if the defendant is charged under Penal Code section
25400(c)(1), (5), 25850(c)(1), (5), unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on
the prior conviction or the defendant stipulates to the prior conviction. (People v.
Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) This instruction must be given with the
appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm,
CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No.
2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will
indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.
If the court grants bifurcation, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No.
3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
If the defendant does stipulate to the prior conviction, this instruction should not be
given and the prior conviction should not be disclosed to the jury unless the court
admits it as otherwise relevant. (People v. Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
the prior conviction that begins, “Consider the evidence presented . . . .” (People v.
Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There
is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer
that no limiting instruction be given. (People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)
AUTHORITY
• Factors in Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c), 25850(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements.
People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 203, 204, 249, 250.
409
2541. Carrying Firearm: Stolen Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2),
25850(c)(2))

proved the additional allegation that the firearm was stolen.
1. The firearm the defendant (carried/ [or] caused to be carried
concealed in a vehicle) was stolen;
AND
2. The defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the
firearm was stolen.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
25400(c)(2) or 25850(c)(2) and the defendant does not stipulate to the firearm being
stolen. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This
instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of
carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a
loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.
If the defendant does stipulate that the firearm was stolen, this instruction should not
be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See People v.
Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(2), 25850(c)(2). Sentencing Factors, Not
Elements People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
410
SECONDARY SOURCES
411
2542. Carrying Firearm: Active Participant in Criminal Street Gang
(Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3))

proved the additional allegation that the defendant was an active
participant in a criminal street gang.
1. When the defendant (carried the firearm/ [or] caused the firearm
to be carried concealed in a vehicle), the defendant was an active
participant in a criminal street gang;
2. When the defendant participated in the gang, (he/she) knew that
members of the gang engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity;
AND
3. The defendant willfully assisted, furthered, or promoted felonious
criminal conduct by members of the gang either by:
a. Directly and actively committing a felony offense;
a. OR
b. aiding and abetting a felony offense.
At least two members of that same gang must have participated in
committing the felony offense. The defendant may count as one of those
members if you find that the defendant was a member of the gang.
A criminal street gang is an ongoing organized association or group of
§ 186.22(e)(1)>;
AND
412

group.
<Give this paragraph only when the conduct that establishes the primary
activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or sustained
juvenile petition.>
[To decide whether the organization, association, or group has, as one of
its primary activities, the commission of <insert felony or
felonies from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1)>, please refer to the separate
following crimes/[,] [or] two or more occurrences of [one or more
listed in Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1);
1988;
earlier crimes and within three years of the date of the currently
charged offense;
AND
primary activity, i.e., predicate offenses, has not resulted in a conviction or
sustained juvenile petition>
413

As the term is used here, a willful act is one done willingly or on
purpose.
Felonious criminal conduct means committing or attempting to commit
[any of] the following crime[s]: <insert felony or felonies by
gang members that the defendant is alleged to have furthered, assisted, or
promoted>.
To decide whether a member of the gang [or the defendant] committed
<insert felony or felonies listed immediately above and crimes
from Pen. Code, § 186.22(e)(1) inserted in definition of pattern of criminal
gang activity>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/
have given) you on (that/those) crime[s].
To prove that the defendant aided and abetted felonious criminal
conduct by a member of the gang, the People must prove that:
1. A member of the gang committed the crime;
2. The defendant knew that the gang member intended to commit
the crime;
intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the
crime;
AND
[If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to
414
an aider and abettor.]
must do two things:
AND
theory.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, December 2008, February
2012, August 2013, February 2014, February 2016, March 2022, March 2023
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing factor. (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 327 [109
Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739]; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [99
Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 5 P.3d 176] [now-repealed Pen. Code, § 12031(a)(2)(C)
incorporates entire substantive gang offense defined in section 186.22(a)]; see
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435].)
25400(c)(3) or 25850(c)(3) and the defendant does not stipulate to being an active
gang participant. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d
415
690].) This instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction defining the
elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or
carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury
with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been
proved.
If the defendant does stipulate that he or she is an active gang participant, this
instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the
jury. (See People v. Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
The court should also give the appropriate instructions defining the elements of all
crimes inserted in the definition of “criminal street gang,” “pattern of criminal gang
activity,” or “felonious criminal conduct.”
Note that a defendant’s misdemeanor conduct in the charged case, which is elevated
to a felony by operation of Penal Code section 186.22(a), is not sufficient to satisfy
the felonious criminal conduct requirement of an active gang participation offense
charged under subdivision (a) of section 186.22 or of active gang participation
charged as an element of felony firearm charges under sections 25400(c)(3) or
25850(c)(3). People v. Lamas (2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 524 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179, 169
P.3d 102].
Code, § 186.22(j).)
guilty of a crime in this case.” (People v. Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp.
322–323; People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1464–1465 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d
272].)
to CALCRIM No. 1400, Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang.)
416

Gang Activity.
present.” (People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557, fn. 14 [271 Cal.Rptr.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant withdrew, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give the final bracketed section on the defense of withdrawal.
CALCRIM No. 1401, Felony or Misdemeanor Committed for Benefit of Criminal
Street Gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22(b)(1) (Felony) and § 186.22(d) (Felony or
Misdemeanor)).
For additional instructions relating to liability as an aider and abettor, see series 400,
Aiding and Abetting.
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(3), 25850(c)(3)
• Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. People v. Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p.
135.
• Elements of Gang Factor. Pen. Code, § 186.22(a); People v. Robles, supra, 23
Cal.4th at p. 1115.
• “Active Participation” Defined. People v. Salcido (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 356
[56 Cal.Rptr.3d 912]; People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747 [97
Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278].
• “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity” Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 186.22(e), (g).
• Willfully Assisted, Furthered, or Promoted Felonious Criminal Conduct. People
v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1132–1138 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d
1143].
355 P.3d 480].
417
RELATED ISSUES
Gang Expert Cannot Testify to Defendant’s Knowledge or Intent
In People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 658 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876], the
court held it was error to permit a gang expert to testify that the defendant knew
there was a loaded firearm in the vehicle:
[The gang expert] testified to the subjective knowledge and intent of each
occupant in each vehicle. Such testimony is much different from the
expectations of gang members in general when confronted with a specific
action . . . . ¶ . . . [The gang expert] simply informed the jury of his belief of
the suspects’ knowledge and intent on the night in question, issues properly
reserved to the trier of fact. [The expert’s] beliefs were irrelevant.
(Ibid. [emphasis in original].)
See also the Commentary and Related Issues sections of the Bench Notes for
SECONDARY SOURCES
Peace and Welfare, §§ 31–46, 204, 249–250.
Against Order, §§ 144.01[1], 144.03 (Matthew Bender).
418
2543. Carrying Firearm: Not in Lawful Possession (Pen. Code,
§§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))
The People have also alleged that the defendant did not lawfully possess
the firearm at issue in this case. If you find the defendant guilty of
unlawfully (carrying a concealed firearm (on (his/her) person/within a
vehicle)[,]/ causing a firearm to be carried concealed within a vehicle[,]/
[or] carrying a loaded firearm) [under Count[s] ], you must then
decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation.
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant did
not lawfully possess the firearm.
A person lawfully possesses a firearm if he or she either lawfully owns the
firearm or has the permission of (the lawful owner/ [or] a person who
otherwise has apparent authority over the firearm). A person does not
have lawful possession of a firearm if he or she takes it without the
permission of the lawful owner or custodian of the firearm.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
25400(c)(4) or 25850(c)(4) and the defendant does not stipulate to unlawful
possession. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
This instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements
of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522, or carrying a
loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor has been proved.
If the defendant does stipulate to unlawful possession, this instruction should not be
given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See People v. Hall,
supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4).
• Factors in Now Repealed Pen. Code, § 12025(b) Sentencing Factors, Not
419
Elements. People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
SECONDARY SOURCES
420
2544. Carrying Firearm: Possession of Firearm Prohibited Due to
Conviction, Court Order, or Mental Illness (Pen. Code,
§§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4))

proved the additional allegation that the defendant was prohibited by
law from possessing a firearm.
<Alternative 1A—prohibited due to mental illness or SVP status>
[The defendant <insert description from Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 8100 or 8103>.]
<Alternatives 1B & 2B—prohibited by court order. Give both elements 1B
and 2B in cases involving restraining orders. For probation orders, give
only 1B.>
[1. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/ purchase/
receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)]
[AND
2. The defendant knew about the court’s order.]
<Alternatives 1C & 2C—prohibited due to conviction. Give both elements
1C and 2C in cases involving misdemeanor convictions or juvenile
findings. For all other cases involving prior convictions, give 1C only.>
[1. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/two
offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of
<insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or 23515, or a
juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820(a)(2)>)(;/.)]
[AND
2. (The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the
defendant (carried the firearm/caused the firearm to be carried
concealed in a vehicle)./The defendant was less than 30 years old
at the time (he/she) (carried the firearm/caused the firearm to be
carried concealed in a vehicle).)]
[You may consider evidence, if any, that (the defendant was previously
421
convicted of a crime/a court ordered the defendant not to (own[,]/

purchase[,]/ receive[,]/ [or] possess) a firearm) only in deciding whether
the People have proved this allegation [or for the limited purpose of
<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant’s
credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
25400(c)(4) or 25850(c)(4) and the defendant does not stipulate that he or she is
prohibited from possessing a firearm. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128,
135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction must be given with the appropriate
instruction defining the elements of carrying a concealed firearm, CALCRIM No.
2521, 2522, or carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must
provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the
sentencing factor has been proved.
If the defendant does stipulate that he or she is prohibited from possessing a firearm,
this instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to
the jury unless the court admits the information as otherwise relevant. (See People
v. Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
When giving alternative 1B, only give element 2B if the prosecution alleges that the
defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Penal Code section
29825(a), (b).
When giving alternative 1C, only give element 2C if the prosecution alleges that the
defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm under Penal Code section
29805, possession within ten years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal
Code section 29820(a), (b), possession by someone under 30 years old with a
the prior conviction that begins, “You may consider . . . .” (People v. Valentine
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There is no sua
sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no
[2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)
422
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 25400(c)(4), 25850(c)(4) Sentencing Factors, Not
Elements. People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].
RELATED ISSUES
See Related Issues section of Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 2510, Possession of
Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to Conviction—No Stipulation to Conviction.
SECONDARY SOURCES
423
2545. Carrying Loaded Firearm: Not Registered Owner (Pen.
Code, § 25850(c)(6))
If you find the defendant guilty of unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm

[under Count ], you must then decide whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that the defendant was not the
registered owner of the firearm.
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant is not
listed with the Department of Justice as the registered owner of the
firearm.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
25850(c)(6) and the defendant does not stipulate that he or she was not the
registered owner. (People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d
690].) This instruction must be given with the appropriate instruction defining the
elements of carrying a loaded firearm, CALCRIM No. 2530. The court must provide
the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing factor
has been proved.
If the defendant does stipulate that he or she was not the registered owner, this
instruction should not be given and that information should not be disclosed to the
jury. (See People v. Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, § 25850(c)(6) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. People v.
SECONDARY SOURCES
424
2546. Carrying Concealed Firearm: Not Registered Owner and
Weapon Loaded (Pen. Code, § 25400(c)(6))

firearm (on (his/her) person/within a vehicle)/causing a firearm to be
carried concealed within a vehicle) [under Count[s] ], you must
then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation
that the defendant was not the registered owner of the firearm and (the
firearm was loaded/the defendant possessed the firearm with
ammunition).
1. The defendant is not listed with the Department of Justice as the
registered owner of the firearm;
AND
<Alternative 2A—firearm loaded>
[2. The firearm was loaded.]
<Alternative 2B—ammunition nearby>
[2. The firearm and unexpended ammunition capable of being
discharged from that firearm were either in the defendant’s
immediate possession or readily accessible to (him/her).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
[120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
25400(c)(6) and the defendant does not stipulate that the firearm was loaded or
possessed with ammunition and that he or she was not the registered owner. (People
v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].) This instruction must
be given with the appropriate instruction defining the elements of carrying a
concealed firearm, CALCRIM No. 2520, 2521, or 2522. The court must provide the
been proved.
425
If the defendant does stipulate to this sentencing factor, this instruction should not
be given and that information should not be disclosed to the jury. (See People v.
Hall, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, § 25400(c) Sentencing Factors, Not Elements. People v. Hall
SECONDARY SOURCES
426
D. ASSAULT WEAPONS
2560. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle (Pen.
Code, §§ 30605, 30600)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully (possessing/

manufacturing/causing to be manufactured/distributing/transporting/
importing/keeping for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending)
(an assault weapon, specifically [a/an] <insert type of
weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>/a .50 BMG
rifle) [in violation of Penal Code section <insert relevant
Penal Code section>].
prove that:
manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) (an assault weapon,
specifically [a/an] <insert type of weapon from Pen.
Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>/a .50 BMG rifle);
to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) it;
AND
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that it had
characteristics that made it (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle).
[(A/An) <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 30510 or
description from § 30515> is an assault weapon.]
AND
3. The case base diameter for the cartridge is from .800 inch to, and
including, .804 inch.]
427

be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered
or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the following weapons:
<insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may
not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have
proved that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused to be
manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or
exposed for sale/gave/lent) at least one of these weapons, and you all
agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/caused to be
manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or
exposed for sale/gave/lent).]
<Defense: Permit, Registration, or Exemption From Statute>
manufactured/distribute/transport/import/keep for sale/offer or expose
for sale/give/lend) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) if (he/she) (had
registered the weapon/had a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell)
the weapon/ <insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625,
30630(a)–(c), 30635, 30640, 30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)–(c), 30665,
30670(a), (b), 30675(a)–(c)>). The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not (register the
weapon/have a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/
<insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625, 30630(a)–(c),
30635, 30640, 30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)–(c), 30665, 30670(a), (b),
30675(a)–(c)>). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed paragraph that
begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons,”
inserting the items alleged. But see Pen. Code, § 30600(c), which states that except
428
in case of a first violation involving not more than two firearms, if more than one
assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle is involved in any violation of this section, there
shall be a distinct and separate offense for each.
The jury must decide if the weapon possessed was an assault weapon or a .50 BMG
rifle. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d
869].) When instructing on the definition of assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle, the
court should not state that the weapon possessed by the defendant was an assault
weapon or was a .50 BMG rifle. In the case of an assault weapon, where indicated
in the instruction, the court may insert a weapon listed in Penal Code section 30510
or a description of a weapon from section 30515. In the case of a .50 BMG rifle,
give the bracketed definition of that term.
If the defendant is charged with both a separate count and an enhancement for
violating Penal Code section 30615 while committing another crime, give this
instruction and CALCRIM No. 2561, Possession, etc., of Assault or .50 BMG Rifle
Weapon While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Enhancement of
Punishment for Another Crime (Pen. Code, § 30615; People v. Jimenez (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].) If the defendant is only charged with
an enhancement under Penal Code section 30615 and not with a separate count for
violating Penal Code section(s) 30605 or 30610, give only CALCRIM No. 2562,
Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While Committing Other
Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Charged Only as Enhancement.
Registration and permitting procedures are contained in Penal Code sections 30900
to 31005. Exemptions to the statute are stated in Penal Code section 30625 et seq.
The existence of a statutory exemption is an affirmative defense. (People v. Jimenez,
supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395–397.) If the defense presents sufficient evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for his or her actions,
the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense.
(See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49
P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)
Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph that begins, “The
defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 30605, 30600.
• Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code §§ 30510, 30515; see also Harrott v. County
of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1142–1145 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 25 P.3d 649]
[discussing statutory definition of assault weapon, amendments to statute and
petition procedure by which the Attorney General may have weapon listed].
• Permits and Registration. Pen. Code, §§ 30900–31005.
• Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 30625 et seq.
429
• Knowledge Required. In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d

466, 4 P.3d 297].
• Permits, Registration, and Exemptions Are Affirmative Defenses. People v.
Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 395–397 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
• Statute Constitutional. Silveira v. Lockyer (2002) 312 F.3d 1052, 1056; Kasler v.
Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 478 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][b], [d] (Matthew Bender).
430
2561. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While
Committing Other Offense—Charged as Separate Count and as
Enhancement (Pen. Code, § 30615)
If you find the defendant guilty of both (possessing/manufacturing/

causing to be manufactured/distributing/transporting/importing/keeping
for sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending) (an assault weapon/a
.50 BMG rifle) under Count and the crime of
<insert other offense alleged> under Count , you must then decide
whether the People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she)
committed the first crime while committing the second one.
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant
(possessed/ manufactured/ caused to be manufactured/distributed/
transported/imported/kept for sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent)
(an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) while committing the crime of
<insert other offense alleged>.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
enhancement. (See Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435]; People v. Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10
Cal.Rptr.2d 281] [enhancement under Pen. Code, § 30600(b) must be pleaded and
proved].)
Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with a separate count for violating
Penal Code section 30615 and an enhancement for violating Penal Code section
30600 while committing another crime. (Pen. Code, § 30615; People v. Jimenez,
supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 398.) This instruction must be given with CALCRIM
No. 2560, Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle, and the appropriate
instruction defining the elements of the other offense charged.
if the sentencing enhancement has been proved.
If the defendant is not charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code
section 30600 but is charged only with the enhancement, do not give this
instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 2562, Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50
431
BMG Rifle While Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30600—Charged Only as
Enhancement.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 30615; People v. Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391,
398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
432
2562. Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While
Committing Other Offense—Charged Only as Enhancement (Pen.
Code, § 30615)
If you find the defendant guilty of the crime of <insert other

offense alleged> [under Count ], you must then decide whether the
People have proved the additional allegation that (he/she) committed that
offense while unlawfully (possessing/manufacturing/causing to be
manufactured/distributing/ transporting/importing/keeping for
sale/offering or exposing for sale/giving/lending) (an assault weapon,
specifically [a/an] <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code,
§ 30510 or description from § 30515>/a .50 BMG rifle).
prove that:
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) (an assault weapon,
specifically [a/an] <insert type of weapon from Pen.
Code, § 30510 or description from § 30515>/a .50 BMG rifle);
to be manufactured/distributed/transported/ imported/kept for
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) it;
3. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that it had
characteristics that made it (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle);
AND
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the weapon while
committing the crime of <insert other offense
alleged>.
1. The overall length is 5.54 inches from the base to the tip of the
bullet;
433
AND
be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for sale/offered
or exposed for sale/gave/lent) the following weapons:
<insert description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may
not find this additional allegation true unless all of you agree that the
People have proved that the defendant (possessed/manufactured/caused
to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent) at least one of these weapons,
and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed/manufactured/
caused to be manufactured/distributed/transported/imported/kept for
sale/offered or exposed for sale/gave/lent).]
<Defense: Permit, Registration, or Exemption From Statute>
manufactured/distribute/transport/import/keep for sale/offer or expose
for sale/give/lend) (an assault weapon/a .50 BMG rifle) if (he/she) (had
registered the weapon/had a valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell)
the weapon/ <insert exemption from Pen. Code,
§ 12280(e)–(s)>). The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not (register the weapon/have a
valid permit to (possess/manufacture/sell) the weapon/
<insert exemption from Pen. Code, §§ 30625, 30630(a)–(c), 30635, 30640,
30645, 30655(a), (b), 30660(a)–(c), 30665, 30670(a), (b), 30675(a)–(c)>). If
guilty of this allegation.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
enhancement. (See Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 475–476, 490 [120
434
S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] [any fact, other than prior conviction, that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged, submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 398 [10
Cal.Rptr.2d 281] [enhancement under Pen. Code, § 30600(b) must be pleaded and
proved].)
Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with an enhancement for violating
Penal Code section 12280 while committing another crime but is not charged with a
separate count for violating Penal Code section 30600. (Pen. Code, § 30615; People
v. Jimenez, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 398.) The court must provide the jury with a
verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the sentencing enhancement has or
has not been proved.
If the defendant has been charged with a separate count for violating Penal Code
section 30600 and with the enhancement, do not give this instruction. Give
CALCRIM No. 2561, Possession, etc., of Assault Weapon or .50 BMG Rifle While
Committing Other Offense: Pen. Code, § 30615—Charged as Separate Count and as
Enhancement.
If the prosecution alleges under a single enhancement that the defendant possessed
multiple weapons and the possession was “fragmented as to time . . . [or] space,”
the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483].) Give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following
weapons,” inserting the items alleged. But see Pen. Code, § 30600(c), which states
that except in case of a first violation involving not more than two firearms, if more
than one assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle is involved in any violation of this
section, there shall be a distinct and separate offense for each.
The jury must decide if the weapon possessed was an assault weapon or .50 BMG
rifle. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d
869].) When instructing on the definition of assault weapon or .50 BMG rifle, the
court should not state that the weapon possessed by the defendant was an assault
weapon or was a .50 BMG rifle. In the case of an assault weapon, where indicated
in the instruction, the court may insert a weapon listed in Penal Code section 30510
or a description of a weapon from section 30515. In the case of a .50 BMG rifle,
give the bracketed definition of that term.
Registration and permitting procedures are contained in Penal Code sections 30900
to 31005. Exemptions to the statute are stated in Penal Code section 30625 et seq.
The existence of a statutory exemption is an affirmative defense. (People v. Jimenez,
supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395–397.) If the defense presents sufficient evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s
actions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed instruction on the
defense. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d
326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of
435
proof].) Insert the appropriate language in the bracketed paragraph beginning, “The
defendant did not unlawfully . . . .”
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 30615; People v. Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391,
398 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
• Assault Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 30510, 30515; see also Harrott v.
County of Kings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1138, 1142–1145 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 25
P.3d 649] [discussing statutory definition of assault weapon, amendments to
statute and petition procedure by which the Attorney General may have weapon
listed].
• Permits and Registration. Pen. Code, §§ 30900–31005.
• Exemptions. Pen. Code, § 30625 et seq.
• Knowledge Required. In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d
466, 4 P.3d 297].
• Permits, Registration, and Exemptions Are Affirmative Defenses. People v.
Jimenez (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 395–397 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 281].
• Statute Constitutional. Silveira v. Lockyer (2002) 312 F.3d 1052, 1056; Kasler v.
Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 478 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
436

destructive device [in violation of Penal Code section 18710].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a destructive device;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) possessed it;
AND
3. The defendant knew that what (he/she) possessed was a
destructive device.
§ 16460>.]
[The term destructive device is defined in another instruction.]
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following destructive
devices: <insert description of each destructive device when
multiple devices alleged>. You may not find the defendant guilty unless all
of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at
least one of the alleged devices, and you all agree on which alleged
device (he/she) possessed.]
<Defense: Permit>
[The defendant did not unlawfully possess a destructive device if (he/she)
had a valid permit to do so. The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have a valid
permit. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the

437
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (People v.
Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].) Give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the following
destructive devices,” inserting the items alleged.
Give the bracketed definition of “destructive device,” inserting the appropriate
definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the
sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific
device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead give the bracketed
sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive device.” For example, “A
grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may not instruct the jury that
the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the court may not state that
“the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or “the device used by the
defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the
court may use the following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive
charge fused to blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See People v. Morse
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)
Penal Code section 18900 allows for the possession of a destructive device with a
permit. The existence of a valid permit is an affirmative defense. (People v.
Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) The defendant
bears the burden of producing evidence of a valid permit. If there is sufficient
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a permit, the court has a
sua sponte duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See People v.
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]
[discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)
AUTHORITY
• Permit Exemption. Pen. Code, § 18900; People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91
438
Cal.App.3d 609, 627–628 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].

• Knowledge. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331–332 [96
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98
Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609,
629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
• Constructive vs. Actual Possession. See People v. Azevedo (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270], questioned on other grounds in In
re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297];
People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
RELATED ISSUES
Tracer Ammunition
Penal Code section 16460(a)(1) states that “destructive device” includes “that which
is commonly known as tracer or incendiary ammunition, except tracer ammunition
manufactured for use in shotguns.” In People v. Miller (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190,
213 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 410], the court held that “proof of the purpose for which tracer
ammunition was manufactured is an affirmative defense to the charge of possessing
a destructive device, and not an element of the offense.”
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew Bender).
439
2571. Carrying or Placing Explosive or Destructive Device on
Common Carrier (Pen. Code, § 18725)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (carrying/ [or] placing)

(an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) on (a/an) (common carrier/boat/
plane/car/bus/ <insert type of other vehicle>) that transports
paying passengers [in violation of Penal Code section 18725].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—carried or placed on common carrier>
[1. The defendant willfully (carried/ [or] placed) (an explosive/ [or] a
destructive device) on (a/an) (common carrier/boat/plane/car/bus/
<insert type of other vehicle>) that transports paying
passengers;]
<Alternative 1B—carried or placed in baggage while on common
carrier>
[1. The defendant willfully (carried/ [or] placed) (an explosive/ [or] a
destructive device) in (hand baggage[,]/ a roll[,]/ (or another/a)
container) while on board (a/an) (common carrier/boat/plane/car/
bus/ <insert type of other vehicle>) that transports
paying passengers;]
<Alternative 1C—placed in baggage to be checked on common carrier>
[1. The defendant willfully placed (an explosive/ [or] a destructive
device) in baggage that was later checked with a common
carrier;]
AND
2. The defendant knew that the object that (he/she) (carried/ [or]
placed) was (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device).
heat.]
440

is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
[A common carrier is a person or business that publicly offers to carry
persons, property, or messages. [A person or business that publicly offers
to carry only telegraphic messages is not a common carrier.]]
[ <insert type or name of common carrier> is a common
carrier.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Code section 16460, unless the court has already given the definition in other
the term is defined elsewhere. If the case involves a specific device listed in Health
and Safety Code section 12000 or Penal Code section 16460, the court may instead
give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is an explosive” or “is a
destructive device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the
court may not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For
example, the court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a
grenade,” or “the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive
device.” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d
257].)
Similarly, in the definition of “common carrier,” the court may instruct generally
that a type of vehicle is a common carrier. For example, “a Greyhound bus is a
common carrier.” The court may not instruct that the particular vehicle in the case
was a common carrier. For example, the court may not instruct that “the defendant
was on a common carrier, a Greyhound bus,” or “the vehicle in this case, a
Greyhound bus, is a common carrier.”
441
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98
Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297]; People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609,
619 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
• Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710.
RELATED ISSUES
Gasoline Not an Explosive
“Under the statutory definition of explosive, the nature of the substance, not the
manner in which a substance is used, is determinative.” (People v. Clark (1990) 50
Cal.3d 583, 604 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127] [gasoline, by its nature, not an
explosive even where used to ignite a fire].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
442
2572. Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified
Place (Pen. Code, § 18715)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with recklessly or

maliciously possessing (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) (in[,]/
on[,]/ [or] near) <insert type of place alleged from Pen. Code,
§ 18715> [in violation of Penal Code section 18715].
prove that:
1. The defendant recklessly or maliciously possessed (an explosive/
[or] a destructive device);
AND
2. At the time the defendant possessed the (substance/ [or] device),
(he/she) was
<2A.>
[on a public street or highway](;[ or]/.)
<2B.>
[in or near a (theater[,]/ hall[,]/ school[,]/ college[,]/ church[,]/ hotel[,]/
[or] other public building/ [or] private habitation](;[ or]/.)
<2C.>
[in, on, or near a (plane[,]/ passenger train[,]/ car[,]/ cable road or
cable car[,]/ boat carrying paying passengers)](; or/.)
<2D.>
[in, on, or near another public place ordinarily passed by human
beings].
A person acts recklessly when (1) he or she is aware that his or her
actions present a substantial and unjustifiable risk, (2) he or she ignores
that risk, and (3) the person’s behavior is grossly different from what a
reasonable person would have done in the same situation.
someone else.
heat.]
443

is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
[The People do not need to prove that the (explosive/ [or] destructive
device) was set to explode.]
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following
(explosive[s]/ [or] destructive device[s]): <insert description
of each explosive or destructive device when multiple items alleged>. You
may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People
have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of the alleged
items and you all agree on which alleged item (he/she) possessed.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the
following,” inserting the items alleged. The jury does not have to be unanimous
about whether the defendant acted recklessly or maliciously. (Ibid.) The jury also
does not have to agree on whether the item was an explosive or a destructive
device. (People v. Westoby (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 797 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97]; see
also People v. Quinn, (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 257 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139] [a bomb
may be an explosive and may be a destructive device].)
444

257].)
Quinn, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 258; People v. Dimitrov, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at
p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the
following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to
blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See People v. Morse (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)
AUTHORITY
• Recklessly Defined. People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 334 [130
Cal.Rptr. 349]; In re Steven S. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 614–615 [31
Cal.Rptr.2d 644]; Model Pen. Code, § 2.02(2)(c).
• Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(4); People v. Lopez (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d
545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101]; see also People v. Heideman (1976) 58
Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].
• Unanimity. People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr.
349].
• Possession of Destructive Device. Pen. Code, § 18710; People v. Westoby (1976)
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
445
• Possession of Explosive. Health & Saf. Code, § 12305; People v. Westoby (1976)
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
RELATED ISSUES
Need Not Be Set to Explode
“One need not possess a destructive device already set to explode in order to violate
[now-repealed] Penal Code section 12303.2.” (People v. Westoby (1976) 63
Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].) Thus, the defendant in Westoby was guilty
of possessing a destructive device even though the battery wires were not connected
on the pipe bomb. (Ibid.) Similarly, in People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d
321, 335–336 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant was guilty of illegally possessing
dynamite even though he did not have the blasting caps necessary to ignite the
dynamite. (See also People v. Morse (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 646–647 [3
Cal.Rptr.2d 343] [instruction on this point proper].)
Multiple Charges Based on Multiple Explosives or Destructive Devices
The defendant may be charged with multiple counts of violating Penal Code section
18715 based on possession of multiple explosives or destructive devices. (People v.
DeGuzman (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 538, 548 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 739].)
Maliciously—People v. Heideman
In People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant
offered to commit murder for hire using explosives and possessed the explosives.
(Id. at pp. 327–329.) The defendant asserted that he did not actually intend to
physically injure anyone but simply to defraud the individuals offering to pay for
the murders. (Id. at pp. 330–331.) On appeal, the defendant contended that the court
had improperly instructed on the meaning of “recklessness,” which the prosecution
conceded. (Id. at p. 334.) Noting that the “[d]efendant admitted that his purpose in
storing the dynamite in his room was to carry out a nefarious scheme to defraud his
victims,” the court found sufficient evidence to establish malice. (Id. at p. 335.) The
court stated that under the facts of the case before it, the term “maliciously” did not
“require an actual intent to physically injure, intimidate or terrify others.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, the court found that the error in the instruction on “recklessness” was
harmless given that there was sufficient evidence to support the higher culpability
standard of malice. (Ibid.) The committee did not incorporated the language from
Heideman in the definition of “maliciously” in this instruction because the
committee concluded that this case reflects unique facts and that the language
quoted is dicta, not essential to the ruling of the case.
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2571, Carrying or Placing
Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier.
SECONDARY SOURCES
446

447
2573. Possession, Explosion, etc., of Explosive or Destructive
Device With Intent to Injure or Damage (Pen. Code, § 18740)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (possessing/ [or]

exploding/ [or] igniting/ [or] attempting to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an
explosive/ [or] a destructive device) with intent (to injure, intimidate, or
terrify another person/ [or] to wrongfully damage or destroy someone
else’s property) [in violation of Penal Code section 18740].
prove that:
1. The defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or]
attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a
destructive device);
AND
2. At the time the defendant acted, (he/she) intended (to injure,
intimidate, or terrify another person/ [or] to wrongfully damage
or destroy someone else’s property).
heat.]
is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
[The People allege that the defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or]
448
ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) the following

(explosive[s]/ [or] destructive device[s]): <insert description
of each explosive or destructive device when multiple items alleged>. You
may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People
have proved that the defendant (possessed/ [or] exploded/ [or] ignited/
[or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)) at least one of the alleged items,
and you all agree on which alleged item (he/she) (possessed/ [or]
exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/ [or] ignite)).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
paragraph that begins, “The People allege that the defendant possessed the
following,” inserting the items alleged. The jury also does not have to agree on
whether the item was an explosive or a destructive device. (People v. Westoby
(1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 797 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97]; see also People v. Quinn, (1976)
57 Cal.App.3d 251, 257 [129 Cal.Rptr. 139] [a bomb may be an explosive and may
be a destructive device].)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to explode or ignite the item,
the court must also give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted
Murder.
257].)
449
Quinn, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 258; People v. Dimitrov, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at
p. 25.) If the court wishes to define the term “bomb,” the court may use the
following definition: “A bomb is a device carrying an explosive charge fused to
blow up or detonate under certain conditions.” (See People v. Morse (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 620, 647, fn. 8 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343].)
AUTHORITY
• Must Intend to Harm Another Person. People v. Godwin (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th
1112, 1118 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 708].
• Unanimity. People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 333 [130 Cal.Rptr.
349].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
RELATED ISSUES
Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier, and CALCRIM No. 2572,
Possession of Explosive or Destructive Device in Specified Place.
SECONDARY SOURCES
450
2574. Sale or Transportation of Destructive Device (Pen. Code,
§ 18730)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (selling/transporting) a

prove that:
1. The defendant (sold/transported) a destructive device;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (sold/transported) it;
AND
3. The defendant knew that what (he/she) (sold/transported) was a
destructive device.
[As used here, selling means exchanging something for money, services,
or anything of value.]
location to another even if the distance is short.]
§ 16460>.]
[Two or more people may (sell/transport) something at the same time.]
transport) it. It is enough if the person has (control over it/ [or] the right
to control it), either personally or through another person.]
<Defense: Statutory Exception>
[The defendant did not unlawfully (sell/transport) a destructive device if
(he/she) was legally authorized to do so. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally
authorized to (sell/transport) a destructive device. If the People have not

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
451
Depending on the device used, give the bracketed definitions of “destructive

device,” inserting the appropriate definition from Penal Code section 16460, unless
the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the
court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If
the case involves a specific device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court
may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive
device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may
not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the
court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or
“the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (People v.
Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)
Penal Code section 18730 allows for the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of a
destructive device “as provided by this chapter.” As with a permit for possession,
the existence of a legally valid basis for the defendant to sell or transport a
destructive device is an affirmative defense. (See People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91
Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) If there is sufficient evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s
actions, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed instruction on the
proof].)
AUTHORITY
• Knowledge. See People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154
Cal.Rptr. 314]; People v. Guy (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 593 [165 Cal.Rptr. 463].
452
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].

SECONDARY SOURCES
453
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with offering to sell a

prove that:
1. The defendant offered to sell a destructive device;
AND
2. The defendant intended to sell a destructive device.
[As used here, selling means exchanging something for money, services,
or anything of value.]
§ 16460>.]
<Defense: Statutory Exception>
[The defendant did not unlawfully offer to sell a destructive device if (he/
she) was legally authorized to do so. The People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally
authorized to offer to sell a destructive device. If the People have not met
this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Depending on the device used, give the bracketed definitions of “destructive
device,” inserting the appropriate description from Penal Code section 16460, unless
the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such cases, the
court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined elsewhere. If
the case involves a specific device listed in Penal Code section 16460, the court
may instead give the bracketed sentence stating that the listed item “is a destructive
device.” For example, “A grenade is a destructive device.” However, the court may
not instruct the jury that the defendant used a destructive device. For example, the
court may not state that “the defendant used a destructive device, a grenade,” or
454
“the device used by the defendant, a grenade, was a destructive device.” (People v.
Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 25–26 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 257].)
Penal Code section 18730 allows for the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of a
destructive device “as provided by this chapter.” As with a permit for possession,
the existence of a legally valid basis for the defendant to offer to sell a destructive
device is an affirmative defense. (See People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d
609, 627–629 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt about the existence of a legal basis for the defendant’s actions, the
court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See
People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d
1067] [discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].)
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent Required for Offer to Sell. People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d
468, 469–470 [30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 P.2d 1].
• Knowledge. See People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 619 [154
Cal.Rptr. 314]; People v. Guy (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 593, 601 [165 Cal.Rptr.
463].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
SECONDARY SOURCES
455
456
2576. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device With Intent to
Murder (Pen. Code, § 18745)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (exploding/ [or]

igniting/ [or] attempting to (explode/ [or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a
destructive device) with intent to commit murder [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant (exploded/ [or] ignited/ [or] attempted to (explode/
[or] ignite)) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);
AND
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) acted with the intent to
murder someone.
heat.]
is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to explode or ignite the item,
the court must also give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted
Murder.
457

257].)
If the jury is not otherwise instructed on murder or attempted murder, give a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 520, Murder With Malice Aforethought.
AUTHORITY
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Charges Based on Multiple Victims Appropriate
The defendant may be charged with multiple counts of violating Penal Code section
18745 based on multiple victims, even if he or she used only one explosive device.
(People v. Ramirez (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1766–1767 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].)
458

SECONDARY SOURCES
459
2577. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing

igniting) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) causing bodily injury to
another person [in violation of Penal Code section 18750].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (exploded/ [or] ignited)
(an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);
AND
2. The explosion caused bodily injury to another person.
someone else.
heat.]
is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
[An act causes bodily injury if the injury is the direct, natural, and
probable consequence of the act, and the injury would not have
happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one
that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
460

[There may be more than one cause of bodily injury. An act causes
bodily injury only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury. A
need not be the only factor that causes the injury.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
cause. (See People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr.
401] [causation issue in homicide].) If the evidence indicates that there was only
one cause of injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable”
language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of
multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor”
instruction and definition in the second bracketed paragraph. (See People v. Autry
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197
Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)
257].)
461

AUTHORITY
Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].
• Must Injure Another Person. People v. Teroganesian (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th
1534, 1538 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 489].
• General Intent Crime. See People v. Thompson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966,
1970–1971 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 15].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
RELATED ISSUES
Maliciously—People v. Heideman
In People v. Heideman (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 321 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349], the defendant
offered to commit murder for hire using explosives and possessed the explosives.
(Id. at pp. 327–329.) The defendant asserted that he did not actually intend to
physically injure anyone but simply to defraud the individuals offering to pay for
the murders. (Id. at pp. 330–331.) On appeal, the defendant contended that the court
had improperly instructed on the meaning of “recklessness,” which the prosecution
conceded. (Id. at p. 334.) Noting that the “[d]efendant admitted that his purpose in
storing the dynamite in his room was to carry out a nefarious scheme to defraud his
victims,” the court found sufficient evidence to establish malice. (Id. at p. 335.) The
court stated that under the facts of the case before it, the term “maliciously” did not
“require an actual intent to physically injure, intimidate or terrify others.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, the court found that the error in the instruction on “recklessness” was
harmless given that there was sufficient evidence to support the higher culpability
standard of malice. (Ibid.) The committee did not incorporate the language from
Heideman in the definition of “maliciously” in this instruction because the
committee concluded that this case reflects unique facts and that the language
quoted is dicta, not essential to the ruling of the case.
462
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.04, Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][e]
(Matthew Bender).
463
2578. Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing
Death, Mayhem, or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 18755)

igniting) (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device) causing (death[,]/
mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) to another person [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and maliciously (exploded/ [or] ignited)
(an explosive/ [or] a destructive device);
AND
2. The explosion caused (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily
injury) to another person.
someone else.
[Mayhem means unlawfully:
2. <A. Removing Body Part>
2. [Removing a part of someone’s body](;[ or]/.)
2. <B. Disabling Body Part>
2. [Disabling or making useless a part of someone’s body and the
disability is more than slight or temporary](;[ or]/.)
2. <C. Disfigurement>
2. [Permanently disfiguring someone](;[ or]/.)
2. <D. Tongue Injury>
2. [Cutting or disabling someone’s tongue](;[ or]/.)
2. <E. Slitting Nose, Ear, or Lip>
2. [Slitting someone’s (nose[,]/ear[,]/ [or] lip)](; or/.)
2. <F. Significant Eye Injury>
464
2. [Putting out someone’s eye or injuring someone’s eye in a way

that so significantly reduces his or her ability to see that the eye
is useless for the purpose of ordinary sight.]]
[A disfiguring injury may be permanent even though it can be repaired
by medical procedures.]
heat.]
is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
[An act causes (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) if the
(death/injury) is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act,
and the (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great bodily injury) would not have
[There may be more than one cause of (death[,]/ mayhem[,]/ [or] great
bodily injury). An act causes (death/injury) only if it is a substantial
factor in causing the (death/injury). A substantial factor is more than a
trivial or remote factor. However, it need not be the only factor that
causes the (death/injury).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
465
cause. (See People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr.
401] [causation issue in homicide].) If the evidence indicates that there was only
one cause of injury, the court should give the “direct, natural, and probable”
language in the first bracketed paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of
multiple causes of injury, the court should also give the “substantial factor”
instruction and definition in the second bracketed paragraph. (See People v. Autry
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197
Cal.App.3d 732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)
257].)
AUTHORITY
466
Cal.App.3d 321, 335 [130 Cal.Rptr. 349].

• Must Injure Another Person. See People v. Teroganesian (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th
1534, 1538 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 489].
• General Intent Crime. See People v. Thompson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1966,
1970–1971 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 15].
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 61 [103
Cal.Rptr. 623].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
63 Cal.App.3d 790, 795 [134 Cal.Rptr. 97].
• Explosion of a Destructive Device Causing Injury. Pen. Code, § 18750; see
People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 60 [103 Cal.Rptr. 623].
RELATED ISSUES
Explosive or Destructive Device on Common Carrier, and CALCRIM No. 2577,
Explosion of Explosive or Destructive Device Causing Bodily Injury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§ 142.01[2][a][i], [ii], Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.01[1][c] (Matthew
Bender).
467
2579. Possession of Materials to Make Destructive Device or
Explosive (Pen. Code, § 18720)

(substance[,]/[or] material[,]/ [or] combination of substances and
materials) with the intent to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive
device) [in violation of Penal Code section 18720].
prove that:
1. The defendant possessed a (substance[,]/ [or] material[,]/ [or]
combination of substances and materials);
AND
2. When the defendant possessed (that/those) item[s], (he/she)
intended to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device).
heat.]
is an explosive.]
§ 16460>.]
<Defense: Permit>
[The defendant did not unlawfully possess a (substance[,]/ [or]
material[,]/ [or] combination of substances and materials) if (he/she) had
a valid permit to make (an explosive/ [or] a destructive device). The
468
defendant did not have a valid permit to make (an explosive/ [or] a
destructive device). If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
257].)
The existence of a valid permit is an affirmative defense to a violation of Penal
Code section 18720. (People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 627–629 [154
Cal.Rptr. 314] [discussing repealed Penal Code section 12312].) The defendant bears
the burden of producing evidence of a valid permit. If there is sufficient evidence to
raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of a permit, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give the bracketed instruction on the defense. (See People v. Mower (2002)
28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing affirmative
defenses generally and the burden of proof].)
469
AUTHORITY
• Permit Exemption. Pen. Code, § 18900; People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91
Cal.App.3d 609, 627–628 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314].
• Substance or Material. People v. Yoshimura (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 410, 415 [133
Cal.Rptr. 228].
RELATED ISSUES
“Substance” or “Material” Not Unconstitutionally Vague
[Now-repealed] Section 12312 provides that possession of a “substance” or
“material” is punishable only if the possession is with the specific intent to
make a destructive device or explosive . . . . When the statute is thus read as a
whole, the vagueness of the meaning of “substance” and “material” is
eliminated, and the terms are seen to refer to constituent or necessary items in
the construction of nonlicensed destructive devices and explosives.
(People v. Yoshimura (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 410, 415 [133 Cal.Rptr. 228].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
470
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with carrying a loaded

firearm with intent to commit a felony [in violation of Penal Code
section 25800].
prove that:
1. The defendant carried a firearm;
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was carrying the firearm;
3. When the defendant carried the firearm, (he/she) intended to
commit <insert felony alleged>;
[AND]
4. The firearm was loaded(;/.)
<See Commentary regarding element 5.>
[AND
5. The defendant knew that the firearm was loaded.]
projectile is expelled or expelled through a barrel by the force of an
As used here, a firearm is loaded if the firearm and ammunition capable
of being discharged from the firearm are in the immediate possession of
the same person.
<See Commentary regarding this paragraph.>
<See Commentary regarding this paragraph.>
[A person carries a firearm when he or she has the firearm on his or her
person or has it available for use in either offense or defense.]
<insert felony alleged>, please refer to the separate instructions that I
(will give/have given) you on that crime.
471

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Loaded Defined. Pen. Code, § 16840.
• Knowledge of Presence of Weapon Required. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23
COMMENTARY
There are no published cases on this statute. Thus, it is unclear whether the firearm
must be operable or whether the defendant must know the firearm is “loaded.” It is
also unclear whether the statute requires that the defendant carry the firearm on his
or her person or whether it is sufficient if the defendant “has the firearm available.”
(See People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274]
[discussing meaning of “armed” in Pen. Code, § 12022(a)].) The instruction has
been drafted to provide the court options on these issues. If these issues are present
in the case, the court must decide whether to give bracketed element 5 and which of
the bracketed paragraphs are appropriate.
SECONDARY SOURCES
472
2591. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From
Possessing Firearm Due to Conviction or Mental Illness (Pen.
Code, § 30305(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully possessing

ammunition [in violation of Penal Code section 30305(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or
control) ammunition;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (owned/possessed/had under (his/
her) custody or control) the ammunition;
[AND]
<Alternative 3A—prohibited due to mental illness or SVP status>
[3. The defendant <insert description from Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 8100 or 8103>.]
<Alternative 3B—prohibited due to conviction. Give both element 3B and
element 4 in cases involving misdemeanor convictions or juvenile
findings. For all other cases involving prior convictions, give 3B only.>
[3. The defendant had previously been convicted of (a felony/a
misdemeanor/two offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of
<insert misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805
or 23515, or a juvenile finding from Pen. Code, § 29820>)(;/.)]
[AND
4. (The previous conviction was within 10 years of the date the
defendant possessed the ammunition./The defendant was less than
30 years old at the time (he/she) possessed the ammunition.)]
Ammunition means a bullet, cartridge, magazine, clip, speed loader,
autoloader, or projectile capable of being fired from a firearm with a
deadly consequence. Ammunition includes reloaded ammunition.
473
[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that the
defendant was previously convicted of a (a felony/a misdemeanor/two
offenses of brandishing a firearm/the crime of <insert
misdemeanor offense from Pen. Code, § 29805 or 23515, or a juvenile
finding from Pen. Code, § 29820>). This stipulation means that you must
accept this fact as proved.]
<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation as to conviction>
the defendant’s credibility>]. Do not speculate about or discuss the nature
of the conviction.]
<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation as to conviction>
[You may consider evidence, if any, that the defendant was previously
convicted of a crime only in deciding whether the People have proved
this element of the charged crime [or for the limited purpose of
<insert other permitted purpose, e.g., assessing defendant’s
credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any other purpose.]
[If you conclude that the defendant possessed ammunition, that
possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was
justified in possessing the ammunition. In order to establish this defense,
the defendant must prove that:
1. (He/She) (found the ammunition/took the ammunition from a
person who was committing a crime against the defendant);
AND
2. (He/She) possessed the ammunition no longer than was necessary
to deliver or transport the ammunition to a law enforcement
agency for that agency to dispose of the ammunition.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
474
Give element 4 only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited
from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29805, possession within 10
years of a specified misdemeanor conviction, or Penal Code section 29820,
possession by someone under 30 years old with a specified juvenile finding.
If the defendant has not stipulated to the conviction, do not give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated,” and insert
the full name of the offense in element 3B.
If the defendant does stipulate to the conviction, the court must give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated,” and in
element 3B select the word “felony” or “misdemeanor.” The court must sanitize all
references to the conviction to prevent disclosure of the nature of the conviction to
the jury. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d
433]; People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d
913].) If the defendant agrees, the court must not read the portion of the information
describing the nature of the conviction. Likewise, the court must ensure that the
verdict forms do not reveal the nature of the conviction.
the conviction. (People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 182, fn. 7.) There is no
sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may prefer that no
[2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to the conviction, give
alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give alternative B.
Penal Code section 30305(c) states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if
the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense, and the defense bears
the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) If
sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the
bracketed paragraph on the defense of justifiable possession. This defense only
applies to persons “prohibited from possessing any ammunition or reloaded
ammunition solely because that person is prohibited from owning or possessing a
firearm only by virtue of [now-repealed] Section 12021.” (Pen. Code, § 30305(b).)
AUTHORITY
• Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16150.
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 30305(b).
475

re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
SECONDARY SOURCES
476
2592. Possession of Ammunition by Person Prohibited From
Possessing Firearm Due to Court Order (Pen. Code, § 30305(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with unlawfully possessing

ammunition [in violation of Penal Code section 30305(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (owned/possessed/had under (his/her) custody or
control) ammunition;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) (owned/possessed/had under (his/
her) custody or control) the ammunition;
[AND]
3. A court had ordered that the defendant not (own/purchase/
receive/possess) a firearm(;/.)
<Give element 4 in cases involving restraining orders.>
[AND
4. The defendant knew of the court’s order.]
Ammunition means a bullet, cartridge, magazine, clip, speed loader,
autoloader, or projectile capable of being fired from a firearm with a
deadly consequence. Ammunition includes reloaded ammunition.
[The defendant and the People have stipulated, or agreed, that a court
ordered the defendant not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm.
This stipulation means that you must accept this fact as proved.]
<Alternative A—limiting instruction when stipulation as to order>
the defendant’s credibility>]. Do not speculate about why the court’s order
was made.]
<Alternative B—limiting instruction when no stipulation as to order>
[You may consider evidence, if any, that a court ordered the defendant
not to (own/purchase/receive/possess) a firearm only in deciding whether
the People have proved this element of the charged crime [or for the
477

assessing defendant’s credibility>]. Do not consider such evidence for any
other purpose.]
[If you conclude that the defendant possessed ammunition, that
possession was not unlawful if the defendant can prove that (he/she) was
justified in possessing the ammunition. In order to establish this defense,
the defendant must prove that:
1. (He/She) (found the ammunition/took the ammunition from a
person who was committing a crime against the defendant);
AND
2. (He/She) possessed the ammunition no longer than was necessary
to deliver or transport the ammunition to a law enforcement
agency for that agency to dispose of the ammunition.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Use this instruction only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited
from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29815, possession by someone
prohibited as a condition of probation who was convicted of a crime not listed in
other provisions of Penal Code section 29800, or under Penal Code section 29825,
possession by someone prohibited by a temporary restraining order or other
protective order.
Give element 4 only if the prosecution alleges that the defendant was prohibited
from possessing firearms under Penal Code section 29825.
If the defendant has not stipulated to the probation order, do not give the bracketed
paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated.”
If the defendant does stipulate to the probation order, the court must give the
bracketed paragraph that begins, “The defendant and the People have stipulated.”
The court must also sanitize all references to the probation order to prevent
disclosure of the nature of the conviction to the jury. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31
478
Cal.3d 170, 173 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) If the defendant agrees, the court
must not read the portion of the information describing the nature of the conviction.
Likewise, the court must ensure that the verdict forms do not reveal the nature of
the conviction.
the probation condition. (People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 182, fn. 7.)
There is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may
prefer that no limiting instruction be given. (People v. Griggs (2003) 110
Cal.App.4th 1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].) If the defendant does not stipulate to
the probation condition, give alternative A. If the defendant does stipulate, give
alternative B.
Penal Code section 30305(c) states that a violation of the statute is “justifiable” if
the listed conditions are met. This is an affirmative defense and the defense bears
the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) If
sufficient evidence has been presented, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the
bracketed paragraph on the defense of justifiable possession.
AUTHORITY
• Ammunition Defined. Pen. Code, § 16150.
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].
• Justifiable Possession. Pen. Code, § 30305(c).
re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 876, fn. 6 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].
SECONDARY SOURCES
479
CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT
2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer: Value of Thing Offered
(Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))
(i) Bribery
2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before Testimony or Information
Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))
2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code,
§ 140(a))
D. PERJURY
2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing Duty (Pen. Code,
§ 69)
2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or Public Officer
481
(Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))

2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From Peace Officer or
Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting Peace Officer (Pen.
Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))
2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407,
409)
§§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
415.5(a)(2))
2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away (Pen. Code,
§§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)
2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury
(Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))
2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence
(Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))
482

2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution (Pen. Code,
§ 4502)
2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a Jail or County
Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))
2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive Into Penal
Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))
2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in Penal Institution
(Pen. Code, § 4573.6)
2749. Bringing or Sending Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia Into Penal Institu-
tion (Pen. Code, § 4573(a))
(iv) Escape
483
2600. Giving or Offering a Bribe to an Executive Officer (Pen.
Code, § 67)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (giving/ [or] offering) a

bribe to an executive officer [in violation of Penal Code section 67].
prove that:
1. The defendant (gave/ [or] offered) a bribe to an executive officer
in this state [or someone acting on the officer’s behalf];
AND
2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to unlawfully
influence that officer’s official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/
opinion[,]/ [or] <insert description of alleged conduct
in other proceeding>).
As used here, bribe means something of present or future value or
advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is given or offered
with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the public or official
action, vote, decision, [or] opinion, [or <insert description of
alleged conduct at other proceeding>] of the person to whom the bribe is
given.
A person acts with corrupt intent when he or she acts to wrongfully gain
a financial or other advantage for himself, herself, or someone else.
The official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] proceeding) the
defendant sought to influence must have related to an existing subject
that could have been brought before the public officer in his or her
official capacity. It does not have to relate to a duty specifically given by
statute to that officer.
An executive officer is a government official who may use his or her own
discretion in performing his or her job duties. [(A/An)
<insert title, e.g., police offıcer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]
[The executive officer does not need to have (accepted the bribe[,]/ [or]
performed the requested act[,]/ [or] deliberately failed to perform a
duty).]
[Offering a bribe does not require specific words or behavior, as long as
the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to bribe.
[The thing offered does not need to actually be given, exist at the time it
485
CALCRIM No. 2600 CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT
is offered, or have a specific value.]]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The statute applies to giving or offering a bribe to “any executive officer . . . with
intent to influence him in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion, or other
proceeding as such officer . . . .” It is unclear what “other proceeding” refers to and
there are no cases defining the phrase. If the evidence presents an issue about
attempting to influence an officer in any “other proceeding,” the court may insert a
description of the proceeding where indicated.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The executive officer does not” if the
evidence shows that the executive officer did not accept the bribe or follow through
on the action sought.
Give the bracketed definition of “offering a bribe” if the prosecution is pursuing this
theory. Give the bracketed sentence that begins, “The thing offered does not need to
actually,” on request.
AUTHORITY
• Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(6).
• Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(3).
• Executive Officer Defined. People v. Strohl (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129
Cal.Rptr. 224].
• Corrupt Intent Is an Element of Bribery. People v. Gliksman (1978) 78
Cal.App.3d 343, 351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d
222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
• Subject Matter of Bribe. People v. Megladdery (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 782
[106 P.2d 84], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Posey (2004) 32
Cal.4th 193, 214–215 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755] and People v. Simon
Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 276 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].
• Offering a Bribe. People v. Britton (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 564 [22
Cal.Rptr. 921].
• Bribery and Extortion Distinguished. People v. Powell (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436,
441 [195 P. 456].
• No Bilateral Agreement Necessary. People v. Gliksman (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d
343, 350–351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
486
CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT CALCRIM No. 2600
RELATED ISSUES
Entrapment
The crime is complete once an offer is made. Accordingly, subsequent efforts to
procure corroborative evidence do not constitute entrapment. (People v. Finkelstin
(1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 545, 553 [220 P.2d 934]; People v. Bunkers (1905) 2
Cal.App. 197, 209 [84 P. 364].)
Accomplice Liability and Conspiracy
The giver and the recipient of a bribe are not accomplices of one another, nor are
they coconspirators, because they are guilty of distinct crimes that require different
mental states. (People v. Wolden (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 798, 804 [63 Cal.Rptr.
467].)
Extortion Distinguished
Extortion is bribery with the additional element of coercion. Accordingly, the
defendant cannot be guilty of receiving a bribe and extortion in the same
transaction. (People v. Powell (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Governmental Authority, §§ 33–56.
487
2601. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer (Pen.
Code, § 67.5)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (giving/ [or] offering) a

bribe to a (ministerial officer/government employee/government
appointee) [in violation of Penal Code section 67.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant (gave/ [or] offered) a bribe to (a/an) (ministerial
officer/employee/appointee) of the (State of California/City of
<insert name of city>/County of <insert
name of county>/ <insert name of political subdivision
from Pen. Code, § 67.5>) [or to someone acting on the (officer’s/
employee’s/appointee’s) behalf];
AND
2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to unlawfully
influence that (officer’s/employee’s/appointee’s) official (act[,]/
decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] <insert description
of alleged conduct in other proceeding>).
with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the public or official
action, vote, decision, or opinion of the person to whom the bribe is
given.
The official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ opinion[,]/ [or] proceeding) the
defendant sought to influence must have related to an existing subject
that could have been brought before the (officer/employee/appointee) in
his or her official capacity. It does not have to relate to a duty
specifically given by statute to that (officer/employee/appointee).
[A ministerial officer is an officer who has a clear and mandatory duty
involving the performance of specific tasks without the exercise of
discretion.]
[The (officer/employee/appointee) does not need to have (accepted the
bribe[,]/ [or] performed the requested act[,]/ [or] deliberately failed to
perform a duty).]
488

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on the value of the item offered or
given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), give CALCRIM No. 2602, Giving or Offering a Bribe
to a Ministerial Offıcer: Value of Thing Offered.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (officer/employee/appointee) does
not” if the evidence shows that the officer did not accept the bribe or follow through
on the action sought.
AUTHORITY
• Bribe Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 6.
• Corruptly Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 3.
• Grand Theft Defined. Pen. Code, § 487.
• Ministerial Officer Defined. Gov. Code, § 820.25(b); People v. Strohl (1976) 57
Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
Cal.App.3d 343, 351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d
222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
• Subject Matter of Bribe. People v. Megladdery (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 782
[106 P.2d 84], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Posey (2004) 32
Cal.4th 193, 214–215 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82 P.3d 755] and People v. Simon
Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 276 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].
Cal.Rptr. 921].
441 [195 P. 456].
• No Bilateral Agreement Necessary. People v. Gliksman (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d
343, 350–351 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
489

given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), then the misdemeanor is a lesser included offense
(Pen. Code, § 67.5(a)). The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on
which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has proved that the thing offered was
worth more than $950 or was something that if stolen would qualify as grand theft.
If the jury finds that this allegation has not been proved, then the offense should be
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2600, Giving or Offering a Bribe
to an Executive Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
490
2602. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Ministerial Officer:
Value of Thing Offered (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b))
If you find the defendant guilty of (giving/ [or] offering) a bribe to a

(ministerial officer/government employee/government appointee), you
must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
allegation that the defendant (gave/ [or] offered) the (officer/employee/
appointee) (something worth more than $950/ <insert other
item from Pen. Code, § 487>).

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
given (Pen. Code, § 67.5(b)), the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this
sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2601, Giving or Offering a
Bribe to a Ministerial Offıcer.
if the alleged sentencing factor has or has not been proved.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 67.5(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
491
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (requesting[,]/

taking[,]/ [or] agreeing to take) a bribe [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant was (a/an) (executive officer/ministerial officer/
employee/appointee/legislative officer/judicial officer) of the (State
of California/City of <insert name of city>/County of
<insert name of county>/ <insert name
of political subdivision from Pen. Code, § 68>);
2. The defendant (requested[,]/ took[,]/ [or] agreed to take) a bribe;
3. When the defendant (requested[,]/ took[,]/ [or] agreed to take) the
bribe, (he/she) represented that the bribe would unlawfully
influence (his/her) official (act[,]/ decision[,]/ vote[,]/ [or] opinion).
The representation may have been express or implied;
AND
4. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that (his/her) public
or official duty would be unlawfully influenced.
advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is requested or taken
with the corrupt intent that the public or official action, vote, decision,
or opinion of the person to who is requesting, taking, or agreeing to take
the bribe, will be unlawfully influenced.
[An executive officer is a government official who may use his or her own
discretion in performing his or her job duties. [A <insert
title, e.g., police offıcer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]]
[A ministerial officer is an officer who has a clear and mandatory duty
involving the performance of specific tasks without the exercise of
discretion.]
[A legislative officer is a member of the (Assembly/Senate/
<insert name of other legislative body specified in Penal Code, § 86>) of
this state.]
[A judicial officer includes a (juror[,]/ [or] judge [,]/ [or] referee[,]/ [or]
commissioner[,]/ [or] arbitrator [,]/ [or] umpire[,]/ [or] [other] person
492
authorized by law to hear or determine any question or controversy).]

[Requesting or agreeing to take a bribe does not require specific words or
behavior, as long as the language used and the circumstances clearly
show that the person is seeking a bribe from someone else. [The People
do not need to prove that the other person actually consented to give a
bribe.]]
[The People do not need to prove that the defendant made any effort to
follow through on the purpose for which the bribe was sought.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed definition of “requesting or agreeing to take a bribe” if the
prosecution is pursuing this theory.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove that
the defendant made any effort to follow through” if there is no evidence that the
defendant took any action based on the alleged bribe.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 68, 86, 93.
• Executive Officer Defined. People v. Strohl (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129
Cal.Rptr. 224].
• Ministerial Officer Defined. Gov. Code, § 820.25(b); People v. Strohl (1976) 57
Cal.App.3d 347, 361 [129 Cal.Rptr. 224].
• Legislative Member. Pen. Code, § 86.
• Judicial Officer. Pen. Code, § 93.
Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451]; People v. Zerillo (1950) 36
Cal.2d 222, 232 [223 P.2d 223].
• Meaning of Understanding or Agreement. People v. Pic’l (1982) 31 Cal.3d 731,
738–740 [183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 P.2d 847]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d
263, 273–274 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People v. Gliksman (1978) 78
Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
441 [195 P. 456].
493
RELATED ISSUES
to an Executive Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
494
(i) Bribery
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (giving[,]/ [or]

offering[,]/ [or] promising) a bribe to a witness [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant (gave[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ [or] promised) a bribe to
(a witness[,]/ [or] a person about to be called as a witness[,]/ [or]
a person about to give material information to a law enforcement
official about a crime)[,] [or to someone acting on the (witness’s/
[or] person’s) behalf];
AND
2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent to persuade the
(witness/ [or] person) to agree that the bribe would unlawfully
influence the (testimony/information) that the (witness/ [or]
person) would give.
with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the testimony or
information of the person to whom the bribe is given.
[As used here, witness means someone [or a person the defendant
reasonably believed to be someone]:
<Give the appropriate bracketed paragraph[s].>
• [Who knows about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating
to a crime(;/.)]
[OR]
• [Whose declaration under oath has been or may be received as
evidence(;/.)]
[OR]
• [Who has reported a crime to a (peace officer[,]/ [or]
495
prosecutor[,]/ [or] probation or parole officer[,]/ [or] correctional

officer[,]/ [or] judicial officer)(;/.)]
[OR
• Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority
of any state or federal court.]]
[A person is about to be called as a witness (if he or she knows or has
been told that he or she will be called as a witness [,]/ [or] if he or she
knows material information relating to the issues in a case that has been
or may be filed).]
[Information is material if it is significant or important.]
[(A/The) (district attorney[,]/ [or] deputy district attorney[,]/ [or] city
attorney[,]/ [or] deputy city attorney[,]/ [or] Attorney General[,]/ [or]
deputy attorney general[,]/ [or] <insert title of peace offıcer
included in Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.>) is a law enforcement official.]
[The (witness/ [or] person giving information) does not need to (have
accepted the bribe[,]/ have been influenced by the bribe[,]/ [or] have
intended to give the (testimony/information) the defendant sought).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (witness/person giving
information) does not need” if the evidence shows the witness did not accept the
bribe or follow through on the bribe.
AUTHORITY
• Witness Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
496

• Law Enforcement Official Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(e).
• About to Be Called as a Witness. People v. Broce (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 71,
75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
• Intent Requirement. People v. Gliksman (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350
[144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
Cal.Rptr. 921].
RELATED ISSUES
Extortion Distinguished
Extortion is bribery with the additional element of coercion. Accordingly, one
cannot be guilty of receiving a bribe and extortion in the same transaction. (People
v. Powell (1920) 50 Cal.App. 436, 441 [195 P. 456].)
Witness
A witness need not have information that is actually true or that relates to charges
that result in conviction. (People v. Cribas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 596, 610–611
[282 Cal.Rptr. 538].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
497
2611. Giving or Offering a Bribe to a Witness Not to Testify (Pen.
Code, § 138(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (giving[,]/ [or]

offering[,]/ [or] promising) a bribe to a witness not to testify [in violation
of Penal Code section 138(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (gave[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ [or] promised) a bribe to
(a witness/ [or] a person about to be called as a witness) [or to
someone else acting on the (witness’s/ [or] person’s) behalf];
AND
2. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that the bribe would
unlawfully persuade the (witness/ [or] person) not to attend (a
trial/ [or] <insert type of other judicial proceeding>).
with the corrupt intent to unlawfully influence the witness not to attend
(a trial/ [or] <insert type of other judicial proceeding>).
to a crime(;/.)]
[OR]
evidence(;/.)]
[OR]
[OR
498
been told that he or she will be called as a witness[,]/ [or] if he or she

or may be filed). [Information is material if it is significant or
important.]]
[The (witness/ [or] person giving information) does not need to (have
accepted the bribe[,]/ have been influenced by the bribe[,]/ [or] have
failed to attend (the trial[,]/ [or] <insert type of other judicial
proceeding>)).]
the language used and the circumstances clearly show an intent to
ensure that the witness will not attend (a trial/ [or] <insert
type of other judicial proceeding>). [The thing offered does not need to
actually be given, exist at the time it is offered, or have a specific value.]]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The (witness/person giving
information) does not need” if the evidence shows the witness did not accept the
bribe or follow through on the bribe.
AUTHORITY
75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
• Intent Requirement. People v. Gliksman (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350
[144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
Cal.Rptr. 921].
499
RELATED ISSUES
to a Witness.
SECONDARY SOURCES
500
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with receiving a bribe as a

witness [in violation of Penal Code section 138(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was (a witness/about to be called as a witness);
2. The defendant (received/ [or] offered to receive) a bribe;
3. When the defendant (received/ [or] offered to receive) the bribe,
(he/she) represented that the bribe would unlawfully (influence
(his/her) testimony/cause (him/her) not to attend the (trial/
<insert type of other judicial proceeding>)). The
representation may have been express or implied;
AND
4. The defendant acted with the corrupt intent that the bribe would
unlawfully (influence (his/her) testimony/cause (him/her) not to
attend the (trial/ <insert type of other judicial
proceeding>)).
advantage, or a promise to give such a thing, that is requested or
received with corrupt intent.
[As used here, witness means someone [or a person reasonably believed
to be someone]:
to a crime(;/.)]
[OR]
evidence(;/.)]
[OR]
[OR
501
been told that he or she will be called as a witness[,]/ [or] if he or she
or may be filed). [Information is material if it is significant or
important.]]
[Offering to receive a bribe does not require specific words or behavior, as
long as the language used and the circumstances clearly show that the
person is seeking a bribe from someone else. [The People do not need to
prove that the other person actually consented to give a bribe.]]
[The People do not need to prove that the defendant made any effort to
follow through on the purpose for which the bribe was sought.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the definition of “offering to take a bribe” if that is the prosecution’s theory of
the case.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove” if
there is no evidence that the defendant took any action based on the alleged bribe.
AUTHORITY
75–76 [142 Cal.Rptr. 628].
Cal.App.3d 343, 346–350 [144 Cal.Rptr. 451].
Cal.Rptr. 921].
RELATED ISSUES
to a Witness.
502
SECONDARY SOURCES
503
2620. Using Force or Threatening a Witness Before
Testimony or Information Given (Pen. Code, § 137(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (using force/ [or]

threatening to use force) against a person to cause that person [or
someone else] to (give false (testimony/ [or] information)/ [or] withhold
true (testimony/ [or] information)) [in violation of Penal Code section
137(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (used force/ [or] threatened to use
force) against <insert name/description of person
allegedly targeted>;
AND
<Alternative 2A—to give or withhold testimony>
[2. When the defendant (used force/ [or] made the threat), (he/she)
intended to cause <insert name/description of person
defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false testimony/
[or] withhold true testimony).]
<Alternative 2B—to give or withhold information>
[2. When the defendant (used force/ [or] made the threat), (he/she)
intended to cause <insert name/description of person
defendant allegedly sought to influence> to (give false material
information about a crime to/ [or] withhold true material
information about a crime from) a law enforcement official.]
[A person makes a threat of force when he or she communicates to
someone else a believable threat of unlawful injury to a person or
property.]
[The People do not need to prove that <insert
name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> actually
(gave false (testimony/information)/ [or] withheld true
(testimony/information)).]
504
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that beings with “A person makes a threat of force”
whenever the prosecution alleges that the defendant made a threat. (Pen. Code,
§ 137(b).)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove
that” if the evidence shows that the testimony or information of the alleged target
was not affected.
AUTHORITY
• Threat Defined. Pen. Code, § 137(b).
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930
The misdemeanor offense of knowingly inducing a false statement to a law
enforcement official in violation of Penal Code section 137(c) is not a lesser
included offense of section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the element that
the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (People v. Miles
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code Sections 137(b), 136.1, and 138
Because one cannot “influence” the testimony of a witness if the witness does not
testify, a conviction under Penal Code section 137(b) is inconsistent with a
conviction under Penal Code section 136.1 or 138, which require that a defendant
prevent, rather than influence, testimony. (People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
926, 931 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Governmental Authority, §§ 6, 12.
505
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with using fraud to

influence a person to (give false (testimony/ [or] information)/ [or]
withhold true (testimony/ [or] information)) [in violation of Penal Code
section 137(b)].
prove that:
1. The defendant used fraud against <insert
name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>;
AND
<Alternative 2A—to give or withhold testimony>
[2. When the defendant used fraud, (he/she) intended to cause
<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly
sought to influence> to (give false testimony/ [or] withhold true
testimony).]
<Alternative 2B—to give or withhold information>
[2. When the defendant used fraud, (he/she) intended to cause
<insert name/description of person defendant allegedly
sought to influence> to (give false material information about a
crime to/ [or] withhold true material information about a crime
from) a law enforcement official.]
A person uses fraud when he or she makes a false statement,
with the intent to deceive.
[The People do not need to prove that <insert
name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence> actually
(gave false (testimony/information)/ [or] withheld true
(testimony/information)).]
New January 2006

506
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not need to prove
that” if the evidence shows that the testimony or information of the alleged target
was not affected.
AUTHORITY
• Fraud Defined. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d
770].
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930
included offense of section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the element that
the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (People v. Miles
RELATED ISSUES
Deceiving a Witness
Deceiving a witness is a separate crime under Penal Code section 133:
Every person who practices any fraud or deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits
any false statement, representation, token, or writing, to any witness or person
about to be called as a witness upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or
investigation whatever, authorized by law, with intent to affect the testimony of
such witness, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Governmental Authority, § 12.
507
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with intimidating a witness

prove that:
<Alternative 1A—attending or giving testimony>
[1. The defendant maliciously (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/
(prevented/ [or] discouraged)) <insert
name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>
from (attending/ [or] giving testimony at) <insert
type of judicial proceeding or inquiry authorized by law>;]
<Alternative 1B—report of victimization>
[1. The defendant (tried to (prevent/ [or] discourage)/(prevented/ [or]
discouraged)) <insert name/description of person
defendant allegedly sought to influence> from making a report that
(he/she/someone else) was a victim of a crime to
<insert type of offıcial specified in Pen. Code, § 136.1(b)(1)>;]
<Alternative 1C—causing prosecution>
defendant allegedly sought to influence> from cooperating or
providing information so that a
(complaint/indictment/information/probation violation/parole
violation) could be sought and prosecuted, and from helping to
prosecute that action;]
<Alternative 1D—causing arrest>
defendant allegedly sought to influence> from (arresting[,]/ [or]
(causing/ [or] seeking) the arrest of [,]) someone in connection
with a crime;]
2. <insert name/description of person defendant allegedly
sought to influence> was a (witness/ [or] crime victim);
AND
3. The defendant knew (he/she) was (trying to (prevent/ [or]
discourage)/(preventing/ [or] discouraging)) <insert
name/description of person defendant allegedly sought to influence>
508
from <insert appropriate description from element 1>

and intended to do so.
[A person acts maliciously when he or she unlawfully intends to annoy,
harm, or injure someone else in any way, or intends to interfere in any
way with the orderly administration of justice.]
to a crime(;/.)]
[OR]
evidence(;/.)]
[OR]
[OR
• [Who has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority
[A person is a victim if there is reason to believe that a federal or state
crime is being or has been committed or attempted against him or her.]
[It is not a defense that the defendant was not successful in preventing
or discouraging the (victim/ [or] witness).]
[It is not a defense that no one was actually physically injured or
otherwise intimidated.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, alternative 1A applies to charges under Penal Code section 136.1(a),
which prohibits “knowingly and maliciously” preventing or attempting to prevent a
witness or victim from giving testimony. If the court instructs with alternative 1A,
the court should also give the bracketed definition of “maliciously.” (See People v.
509
Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 912–913 [292 Cal.Rptr.3d 865].)

Alternatives 1B through 1D apply to charges under Penal Code section 136.1(b).
Because the offense always requires specific intent, the committee has included the
knowledge requirement with the specific intent requirement in element 3. (People v.
Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 [193 Cal.Rptr. 684]; see also People v.
Womack (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 929–930 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 76].)
If the defendant is charged with one of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section
136.1(c), give CALCRIM No. 2623, Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors. If
the defendant is charged with the sentencing factor based on a prior conviction, the
court must give both CALCRIM No. 2623 and CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior
Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on
the prior conviction or the defendant has stipulated to the conviction.
Note that Penal Code section 136.1(a)(3) states, “For purposes of this section,
evidence that the defendant was a family member who interceded in an effort to
protect the witness or victim shall create a presumption that the act was without
malice.” It is unclear whether the court must instruct on this presumption.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 136.1(a) & (b).
• “Malice” Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(1).
• “Witness” Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
• “Victim” Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(3).
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Ford, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d p. 990; see also
People v. Womack, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 929–930.
• Malice Not Required for Violations of Penal Code Section 136.1(b). People v.
Brackins (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 56, 66–67 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 261].
A violation of Penal Code section 136.1(a) or (b) is a felony-misdemeanor,
punishable by a maximum of three years in state prison. If the defendant is also
charged with one of the sentencing factors in Penal Code section 136.1(c), then the
offense is a felony punishable by two, three, or four years. If the defendant is
charged under Penal Code section 131.6(c), then the offenses under subdivisions (a)
and (b) are lesser included offenses. The court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate if the prosecution has proved the sentencing
factor alleged. If the jury finds that this allegation has not been proved, then the
offense should be set at the level of the lesser offense.
included offense of Penal Code section 137(b) because the latter offense lacks the
element that the defendant must actually cause a false statement to be made. (People
v. Miles (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 575, 580 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 52].)
510
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code Sections 137(b), 136.1, and 138
Because one cannot “influence” the testimony of a witness if the witness does not
testify, a conviction under Penal Code section 137(b) is inconsistent with a
conviction under Penal Code section 136.1 or 138, which requires that a defendant
prevent, rather than influence, testimony. (People v. Womack, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th
at p. 931.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Governmental Authority, §§ 5, 6.
Witnesses, § 82.07, Ch. 84, Motions at Trial, § 84.11 (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, §§ 91.23[6][e], 91.43 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.13[4][b]; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.03[2], [4]
(Matthew Bender).
511
2623. Intimidating a Witness: Sentencing Factors (Pen. Code,
§ 136.1(c))
If you find the defendant guilty of intimidating a witness, you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation[s] that
the defendant [acted maliciously] [and] [(acted in furtherance of a
conspiracy/ [or] used or threatened to use force/ [or] acted to obtain
money or something of value)].
To prove (this/these) allegation[s], the People must prove that:
[1. The defendant acted maliciously(;/.)]
[AND]
<Alternative A—furtherance of a conspiracy>
[(2A/1). The defendant acted with the intent to assist in a conspiracy
to intimidate a witness(;/.)]
<Alternative B—used or threatened force>
[(2B/2). The defendant used force or threatened, either directly or
indirectly, to use force or violence on the person or property of a
(witness[,]/ [or] victim[,]/ [or] person other than (him/her)self)(;/.)]
<Alternative C—financial gain>
[(2C/3). The defendant acted (in order to obtain (money/ [or]
something of value)/ [or] at the request of someone else in
exchange for something of value).]
[Instruction[s] <insert instruction number[s]> explain[s] when
someone is acting in a conspiracy to intimidate a witness. You must
apply (that/those) instruction[s] when you decide whether the People
have proved this additional allegation. <The court must modify and give
Instruction 415, et seq., explaining the law of conspiracy as it applies to the
facts of the particular case.>]
[A person acts maliciously when he or she unlawfully intends to annoy,
harm, or injure someone else in any way, or intends to interfere in any
way with the orderly administration of justice.]
The People have the burden of proving (this/each) allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any
allegation], you must find that (this/the) allegation has not been proved.

512
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on Penal Code section 136.1(c), the
court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the alleged sentencing factor. This
instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2622, Intimidating a Witness.
As noted in the Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 2622, the court will instruct the
jury that knowledge and malice are elements of a violation of Penal Code section
136.1(a). If the court has given the malice element in CALCRIM No. 2622, the
court may delete it here. If the court has not already given this element and the
defendant is charged under subdivision (c), the court must give the bracketed
element requiring malice here, as well as the bracketed definition of “maliciously.”
(See People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 912–913 [292 Cal.Rptr.3d 865].)
If the defendant is charged with the sentencing factor based on a prior conviction,
the court must give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial,
unless the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction or the
defendant has stipulated to the conviction. In such cases, the court should also give
this instruction, CALCRIM No. 2623, only if the court has not already instructed
the jury on malice or the defendant is also charged with another sentencing factor.
if each alleged sentencing factor has or has not been proved.
If the court instructs on furtherance of a conspiracy, give the appropriate
corresponding instructions on conspiracy. (See CALCRIM No. 415, Conspiracy.)
AUTHORITY
• Factors. Pen. Code, § 136.1(c).
• “Malice” Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(1).
• Statutory Meaning of “Third Person” Excludes Defendant. People v. Johnson
SECONDARY SOURCES
Witnesses, § 82.07, Ch. 84, Motions at Trial, § 84.11 (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, §§ 91.23[6][e], 91.43 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.13[4][b], Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.03[2], [4]
(Matthew Bender).
513
2624. Threatening a Witness After Testimony or Information Given
(Pen. Code, § 140(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (using force/ [or]

threatening to use force) against a witness [in violation of Penal Code
section 140(a)].
prove that:
1. <insert name/description of person allegedly targeted>
gave (assistance/ [or] information) to a (law enforcement officer/
public prosecutor) in a (criminal case/juvenile court case);
[AND]
2. The defendant willfully (used force/ [or] threatened to use force
or violence against <insert name/description of person
allegedly targeted>/ [or] threatened to take, damage, or destroy
the property of <insert name/description of person
allegedly targeted>) because (he/she) had given that (assistance/
[or] information)(;/.)
<Give the following language if the violation is based on a threat>
[AND]
[3. A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar
knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context and
surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of intent to
commit an act of unlawful force or violence(;/.)]
[OR]
[(3./4.) A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar
knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context
and surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of
intent to commit an act of unlawful taking, damage or
destruction of property.]
purpose.
[An officer or employee of (a/an) (local police department[,]/ [or] sheriff’s
office[,]/ [or] <insert title of agency of peace offıcer
enumerated in Pen. Code, § 13519(b)>) is a law enforcement officer.]
[A lawyer employed by (a/an/the) (district attorney’s office[,]/ [or]
Attorney General’s office[,]/ [or] city (prosecutor’s/attorney’s) office) to
prosecute cases is a public prosecutor.]
514
[The People do not need to prove that the threat was communicated to
<insert name/description of person allegedly targeted> or that
(he/she) was aware of the threat.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Victim Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(3).
• Public Prosecutor Defined. Gov. Code, §§ 26500, 12550, 41803.
• Law Enforcement Officer Defined. Pen. Code, § 13519(b).
• General Intent Offense. People v. McDaniel (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 278, 283 [27
Cal.Rptr.2d 306].
• Threat Need Not Be Communicated to Target. People v. McLaughlin (1996) 46
• Reasonable Listener Standard. People v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 [128
Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 257 P.3d 72].
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 140 does not define “threat.” (Cf. Pen. Code, §§ 137(b), 76
[both statutes containing definition of threat].) In People v. McDaniel (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 278, 283 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 306], the Court of Appeal held that
threatening a witness under Penal Code section 140 is a general intent crime.
According to the holding of People v. McDaniel, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 284,
there is no requirement that the defendant intend to cause fear to the victim or
intend to affect the victim’s conduct in any manner. In People v. McLaughlin (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 4], the court held that the threat does not
need to be communicated to the intended target in any manner. The committee has
drafted this instruction in accordance with these holdings. However, the court may
wish to consider whether the facts in the case before it demonstrate a sufficiently
“genuine threat” to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. (See In re George T. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 620, 637–638 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007]; People v. Gudger
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510]; Watts v. United States
(1969) 394 U.S. 705, 707 [89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664]; United States v. Kelner
(2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020, 1027.)
515
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, § 140.02; Ch. 142, Crimes Against the Person,
§ 142.11A[1][a] (Matthew Bender).
516
2630. Evidence Tampering by Peace Officer or Other Person (Pen.
Code, § 141)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with tampering with

evidence [in violation of Penal Code section 141].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully, intentionally, and wrongfully (changed[,]/
[or] planted[,]/ [or] placed[,]/ [or] made[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or] moved)
<insert name/description of physical matter at issue>;
2. The defendant knew (he/she) was (changing[,]/ [or] planting[,]/
[or] placing[,]/ [or] making[,]/ [or] hiding[,]/ [or] moving) the
<insert name/ description of physical matter at issue>;
[AND]
3. When the defendant (changed[,]/ [or] planted[,]/ [or] placed[,]/
[or] made[,]/ [or] hid[,]/ [or] moved) the <insert
name/description of physical matter at issue>, (he/she) intended that
(his/her) action would result in (someone being charged with a
crime/ [or] the <insert name/description of physical
matter at issue> being wrongfully produced as genuine or true in
(a/an) <insert type of court proceeding specified in
Pen. Code, § 141>)(;/.)
<Give element 4 if the defendant is charged under Pen. Code, § 141(b).>
[AND
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was a peace officer.]
purpose.
[A sworn member of <insert name of agency that employs
peace offıcer>, authorized by <insert appropriate section
from Pen. Code, § 830 et seq.> to <describe statutory
authority>, is a peace officer.]
517
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 4 if the defendant is a peace officer charged with a felony violation of
Penal Code section 141(b).
The jury must determine whether the defendant was a peace officer. (See People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court
must instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the
statute. (Ibid.) It is error for the court to instruct that a person is a peace officer as a
matter of law. (Ibid. [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney are
peace officers” was error].)
AUTHORITY
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on being a peace officer
(Pen. Code, § 141(b)), then the misdemeanor of evidence tampering by a non-peace
officer is a lesser included offense. (Pen. Code, § 141(a).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Discovery and Inspection, § 70.21[3] (Matthew Bender).
518
D. PERJURY
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with perjury [in violation of

prove that:
<Alternative 1A—defendant took an oath>
[1. The defendant took an oath to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or]
depose[,]/ [or] certify) truthfully before a competent (tribunal[,]/
[or] officer[,]/ [or] person) under circumstances in which the oath
of the State of California lawfully may be given;]
<Alternative 1B—defendant gave statement under penalty of perjury>
[1. The defendant (testified[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/ [or]
certified) under penalty of perjury under circumstances in which
such (testimony[,]/ [or] declaration[,]/ [or] deposition[,]/ [or]
certificate) was permitted by law;]
2. When the defendant (testified[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/
[or] certified), (he/she) willfully stated that the information was
true even though (he/she) knew it was false;
3. The information was material;
4. The defendant knew (he/she) was making the statement under
(oath/penalty of perjury);
[AND]
5. When the defendant made the false statement, (he/she) intended
to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely
while under (oath/penalty of perjury)(;/.)
<Give element 6 only if statement made in declaration, deposition, or
certificate.>
[AND
6. The defendant signed and delivered (his/her) (declaration[,]/ [or]
deposition[,]/ [or] certificate) to someone else intending that it be
circulated or published as true.]
purpose.
[An oath is an affirmation or any other method authorized by law to
affirm the truth of a statement.]
519
[Information is material if it is probable that the information would

influence the outcome of the proceedings, but it does not need to actually
have an influence on the proceedings.]
[Information is material if <insert appropriate definition; see
Bench Notes>.]
The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew that the
information in (his/her) statement was material.
You may not find the defendant’s statement was false based on the
testimony of <insert name of witness> alone. In addition to
the testimony of <insert name of witness>, there must be
some other evidence that the defendant’s statement was false. This other
evidence may be direct or indirect. [However, if you conclude, based on
the defendant’s own testimony, that the allegedly false statement was in
fact false, then additional evidence is not required.]
If the defendant actually believed that the statement was true, the
defendant is not guilty of this crime even if the defendant’s belief was
mistaken.
The People allege that the defendant made the following false
statement[s]: <insert alleged statement[s]>.
People have proved that the defendant made at least one false statement
and you all agree on which particular false statement the defendant
made. The People do not need to prove that all the allegedly false
statements were in fact false.]
[It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular
manner/ [or] that the defendant did not go before or take the oath in the
presence of the officer claiming to administer the oath) as long as the
defendant caused the officer administering the oath to certify that the
oath had been taken.]
[When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that
information is true, but he or she does not know whether the
information is true, the making of that statement is the same as saying
something that the person knows is false.]
[If the defendant attempted to correct the statement after it was made,
that attempt may show that the defendant did not intend to (testify[,]/
[or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely. It is up to you to decide
the meaning and importance of that conduct.]
New January 2006

520
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to define “material.” (People v. Kobrin (1995) 11
Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027] [materiality is a fact question
to be decided by the jury].) The first bracketed definition of material is appropriate
for court proceedings or legislative hearings. (People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d
395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] [not appropriate for charge of perjury
on required disclosure forms].) For other types of proceedings, the court should use
the second bracketed sentence, inserting an appropriate definition in the blank
provided. (Id. at pp. 405–407.)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury about the need for
corroboration of the evidence of perjury. (People v. Di Giacomo (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 688, 698 [14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; Pen. Code, § 118(b).) If the evidence that
the statement is false is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s testimony, give
the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, if you conclude, based on the
defendant’s own testimony.”
statements that were perjury, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (People v. McRae (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr.
854].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find the
defendant guilty unless.”
Give element 6 if the case involves a declaration, deposition, or certificate. (Pen.
Code, § 124; People v. Griffıni (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 581, 596 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 590]
[delivery requirement applies to “declaration”; discussing at length meaning of
“deposition,” “declaration,” “certificate,” and “affidavit”]; Collins v. Superior Court
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123]; People v. Post (2001) 94
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not a defense (that the oath was
given or taken in an irregular manner” on request if supported by the evidence and
when instructing with element 1A. (Pen. Code, § 121.)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When a person makes a statement,
without qualification,” on request if supported by the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 125.)
If there is sufficient evidence, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
defendant attempted to correct.” (People v. Baranov (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 52,
60–61 [19 Cal.Rptr. 866].)
AUTHORITY
• Oath Defined. Pen. Code, § 119.
• Irregular Oath Not a Defense. Pen. Code, § 121.
521
• Knowledge of Materiality Not Necessary. Pen. Code, § 123.

• Completion of Deposition, Affidavit, or Certificate. Pen. Code, § 124; Collins v.
Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123].
• Unqualified Statement Equivalent to False Statement. Pen. Code, § 125.
• Material Defined. People v. Pierce (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 817,
423 P.2d 969]; People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr.
803, 795 P.2d 1260]; People v. Rubio (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 927, 930–934 [17
Cal.Rptr.3d 524].
• Materiality Is Element to Be Decided by Jury. People v. Kobrin (1995) 11
Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027]; People v. Feinberg (1997)
• Specific Intent to Testify Falsely Required. People v. Viniegra (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 577, 584 [181 Cal.Rptr. 848]; see also People v. Hagen (1998) 19
Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563] [discussing intent
requirement for perjury].
• Good Faith Belief Statement True Negates Intent. People v. Von Tiedeman
(1898) 120 Cal. 128, 134 [52 P. 155] [cited with approval in People v. Hagen
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]]; People v.
Louie (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 28, 43 [205 Cal.Rptr. 247].
• Declaration Must Be Delivered. People v. Griffıni (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 581,
596 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 590].
• Unanimity. People v. McRae (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr.
854].
• Attempted Perjury. People v. Post (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114
Cal.Rptr.2d 356].
RELATED ISSUES
Unsigned Deposition
In People v. Post (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356], the
court held that an unexecuted deposition transcript was like an undelivered
statement that could not form the basis for a perjury conviction. Nevertheless, it was
sufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser included offense of
attempted perjury. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
522
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with perjury by false

affidavit [in violation of Penal Code section 118a].
prove that:
1. The defendant gave an affidavit in which (he/she) (swore[,]/ [or]
affirmed[,]/ [or] declared[,]/ [or] deposed[,]/ [or] certified) that
(he/she) would (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or]
certify) before a competent (tribunal[,]/ [or] officer[,]/ [or] person)
in connection with a case that had been or would be filed;
2. The defendant signed and delivered (his/her) affidavit to someone
else intending that it be used, circulated, or published as true;
3. In the affidavit, the defendant willfully stated that information
was true even though (he/she) knew it was false;
4. The information was material;
5. The defendant knew (he/she) was making the statement under
(oath/affirmation);
AND
6. When the defendant made the false statement, (he/she) intended
to (testify[,]/ [or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely
while under (oath/affirmation).
purpose.
An affidavit is a written statement made under an (oath/affirmation)
given by a person authorized to administer oaths. [An oath is an
affirmation or any other method authorized by law to affirm the truth of
a statement.]
[Information is material if it is probable that the information would
influence the outcome of the proceedings, but it does not need to actually
have an influence on the proceedings.]
[Information is material if <insert appropriate definition; see
Bench Notes>.]
The People do not need to prove that the defendant knew that the
information in (his/her) statement was material.
You may not find the defendant’s statement was false based on the
testimony of <insert name of witness> alone. In addition to
523
the testimony of <insert name of witness>, there must be

some other evidence that the defendant’s statement was false. This other
evidence may be direct or indirect. [However, if you conclude, based on
the defendant’s own testimony, that the allegedly false statement was in
fact false, then additional evidence is not required.]
If the defendant actually believed that the statement was true, the
defendant is not guilty of this crime even if the defendant’s belief was
mistaken.
The People allege that the defendant made the following false
statement[s]: <insert alleged statement[s]>.
People have proved that the defendant made at least one false statement
and you all agree on which particular false statement the defendant
made. The People do not need to prove that all the allegedly false
statements were in fact false.]
[It is not a defense (that the oath was given or taken in an irregular
manner/ [or] that the defendant did not go before or take the oath in the
presence of the officer claiming to administer the oath) as long as the
defendant caused the officer administering the oath to certify that the
oath had been taken.]
[If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that after the defendant made
the statement[s] in the affidavit, (he/she) testified under oath in another
case involving the same facts, but made [a] statement[s] that (was/were)
different from (that/those) in the affidavit, you may, but are not required
to, rely on that testimony to conclude that the statement[s] in the
affidavit (is/are) false.]
[When a person makes a statement, without qualification, that
information is true, but he or she does not know whether the
information is true, the making of that statement is the same as saying
something that the person knows is false.]
[If the defendant attempted to correct the statement after it was made,
that attempt may show that the defendant did not intend to (testify[,]/
[or] declare[,]/ [or] depose[,]/ [or] certify) falsely. It is up to you to decide
the meaning and importance of that conduct.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
524
The court has a sua sponte duty to define “material.” (People v. Kobrin (1995) 11
Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027] [materiality is a fact question
to be decided by the jury].) The first bracketed definition of material is appropriate
for court proceedings or legislative hearings. (People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d
395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] [not appropriate for charge of perjury
on required disclosure forms].) For other types of proceedings, the court should use
the second bracketed sentence, inserting an appropriate definition in the blank
provided. (Ibid.)
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury about the need for
corroboration of the evidence of perjury. (People v. Di Giacomo (1961) 193
Cal.App.2d 688, 698 [14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; Pen. Code, § 118(b).) If the evidence that
the statement is false is based in whole or in part on the defendant’s testimony, give
the bracketed sentence that begins with “However, if you conclude, based on the
defendant’s own testimony.”
statements that were perjury, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (People v. McRae (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr.
854].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You may not find the
defendant guilty unless.”
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “It is not a defense (that the oath was
given or taken in an irregular manner” on request if supported by the evidence.
(Pen. Code, § 121.)
Do not give the bracketed paragraph stating that defendant “testified under oath in
another case involving the same facts” if there is evidence that the defendant’s
statements alleged to be false in the current case were in fact true. (Pen. Code,
§ 118a; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607; People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 497–505
[189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) Although the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that the first statements made were false, the instruction has been
written as a permissive inference. An instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption
would create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (See People v. Roder,
supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 497–505.)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When a person makes a statement,
without qualification,” on request if supported by the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 125.)
If there is sufficient evidence, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
defendant attempted to correct.” (People v. Baranov (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 52,
60–61 [19 Cal.Rptr. 866].)
AUTHORITY
• Oath Defined. Pen. Code, § 119.
• Irregular Oath Not a Defense. Pen. Code, § 121.
• Knowledge of Materiality Not Necessary. Pen. Code, § 123.
525
• Completion of Deposition, Affidavit, or Certificate. Pen. Code, § 124; Collins v.

Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 123].
• Unqualified Statement Equivalent to False Statement. Pen. Code, § 125.
• Material Defined. People v. Pierce (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 817,
423 P.2d 969]; People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 405 [272 Cal.Rptr.
803, 795 P.2d 1260]; People v. Rubio (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 927, 930–934 [17
Cal.Rptr.3d 524].
• Materiality Is Element to Be Decided by Jury. People v. Kobrin (1995) 11
Cal.4th 416, 430 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027]; People v. Feinberg (1997)
• Specific Intent to Testify Falsely Required. People v. Viniegra (1982) 130
Cal.App.3d 577, 584 [181 Cal.Rptr. 848]; see also People v. Hagen (1998) 19
Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563] [discussing intent
requirement for perjury].
• Good Faith Belief Statement True Negates Intent. People v. Von Tiedeman
(1898) 120 Cal. 128, 134 [52 P. 155] [cited with approval in People v. Hagen
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 663–664 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]]; People v.
Louie (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 28, 43 [205 Cal.Rptr. 247].
• Unanimity. People v. McRae (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 120–121 [63 Cal.Rptr.
854].
658 P.2d 1302].
• Attempted Perjury. People v. Post (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 480–481 [114
Cal.Rptr.2d 356].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2640, Perjury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
526
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with threatening a public

official [in violation of Penal Code section 76].
prove that:
1. The defendant willingly (threatened to kill/ [or] threatened to
cause serious bodily harm to) (a/an) <insert title of
person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)> [or a member of the
immediate family of (a/an) <insert title of person
specified in Pen. Code, § 76(a)>];
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended that (his/her)
statement be taken as a threat;
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the person (he/she)
threatened was (a/an) <insert title of person specified
in Pen. Code, § 76(a)> [or a member of the immediate family of
(a/an) <insert title of person specified in Pen. Code,
§ 76(a)>];
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the apparent ability to
carry out the threat;
[AND]
5. The person threatened reasonably feared for (his/her) safety [or
for the safety of (his/her) immediate family](;/.)
<Give element 6 if directed at a person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(d) or
(e).>
[AND
6. The threat was directly related to the ’s <insert title
of person specified in Pen. Code, § 76(d) or (e)> performance of
(his/her) job duties.]
A threat may be oral or written and may be implied by a pattern of
conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.
[When the person making the threat is an incarcerated prisoner with a
stated release date, the ability to carry out the threat includes the ability
to do so in the future.]
[Serious bodily harm includes serious physical injury or serious traumatic
condition.]
527
[Immediate family includes a spouse, parent, or child[, or anyone who has

regularly resided in the household for the past six months].]
[Staff of a judge includes court officers and employees[, as well as
commissioners, referees, and retired judges sitting on assignment].]
[The defendant does not have to communicate the threat directly to the
intended victim, but may do so through someone else.]
[Someone who intends that a statement be understood as a threat does
have someone else do so].]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 76.
• Reasonable Fear by Victim Is Element. People v. Andrews (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
1173, 1178 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 683].
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Gudger (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 321 [34
Cal.Rptr.2d 510].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Barrios (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 270, 278 [77
Cal.Rptr.3d 456].
An offense under Penal Code section 71, threatening a public officer to prevent him
or her from performing his or her duties, may be a lesser included offense.
However, there is no case law on this issue.
RELATED ISSUES
Threat Must Convey Intent to Carry Out
“Although there is no requirement in section 76 of specific intent to execute the
threat, the statute requires the defendant to have the specific intent that the statement
be taken as a threat and also to have the apparent ability to carry it out,
requirements which convey a sense of immediacy and the reality of potential danger
and sufficiently proscribe only true threats, meaning threats which ‘convincingly
express an intention of being carried out.’ . . . [¶] . . . Thus, section 76 . . .
adequately expresses the notion that the threats proscribed are only those ‘so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution.’ ” [citations
528
omitted] (People v. Gudger (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d

510]; see also In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 637–638 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61,
93 P.3d 1007].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.11A[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
529
2651. Trying to Prevent an Executive Officer From Performing
Duty (Pen. Code, § 69)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with trying to (prevent/ [or]

deter) an executive officer from performing that officer’s duty [in
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully and unlawfully used (violence/ [or] a
threat of violence) to try to (prevent/ [or] deter) an executive
officer from performing the officer’s lawful duty;
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (prevent/ [or]
deter) the executive officer from performing the officer’s lawful
duty;
<Give the following language if the violation is based on a threat>
[3. A reasonable listener in a similar situation with similar
knowledge would interpret the threat, in light of the context and
surrounding circumstances, as a serious expression of intent to
commit an act of unlawful force or violence;]
AND
(3/4). When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that the person was an
executive officer.
purpose.
<insert title, e.g., peace offıcer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]
The executive officer does not need to be performing his or her job
duties at the time the threat is communicated.
A threat may be oral or written and may be implied by a pattern of
conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.
[Photographing or recording an executive officer while the officer is in a
public place or while the person photographing or recording is in a place
where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]
intended victim, but may do so through someone else. The defendant
must, however, intend that (his/her) statement be taken as a threat by
the intended victim.]
530

[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of offıcer specified in Pen.
excessive).]
New January 2006; Revised August 2014, August 2016, September 2019, March
2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In order to be “performing a lawful duty,” an executive officer, including a peace
officer, must be acting lawfully. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816–817
[66 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880]; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179,
1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on lawful performance and the defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it
relates to the use of excessive force when this is an issue in the case. (People v.
Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; People v. Olguin
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; People v. White (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)
For this offense, “the relevant factor is simply the lawfulness of the official conduct
that the defendant (through threat or violence) has attempted to deter, and not the
lawfulness (or official nature) of the conduct in which the officer is engaged at the
time the threat is made.” (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 817.) Thus, if the
evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant attempted to deter the officer’s
current performance of a duty, the court should instruct on the lawfulness of that
duty. (Ibid.) Where the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant
attempted to deter the officer from performing a duty in the future, the court should
only instruct on the lawfulness of that future duty. (Ibid.)
531
If there is an issue in the case as to the lawful performance of a duty by a peace

officer, give the last bracketed paragraph and CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful
If a different executive officer was the alleged victim, the court will need to draft an
appropriate definition of lawful duty if this is an issue in the case.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 69; People v. Atkins (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 979
[243 Cal.Rptr.3d 283] [statute requires actual knowledge that person was an
executive officer].
• Specific Intent Required. People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1154 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].
• Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required. People v. Hines (1997) 15
• Lawful Performance Element to Attempting to Deter. In re Manuel G. (1997) 16
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].
• Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 69(b).
• Reasonable Listener Standard People v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 [128
Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 257 P.3d 72]; People v. Smolkin (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 183,
188 [262 Cal.Rptr.3d 696].
RELATED ISSUES
Resisting an Officer Not Lesser Included Offense
Resisting an officer, Penal Code section 148(a), is not a lesser included offense of
attempting by force or violence to deter an officer. (People v. Smith (2013) 57
Statute as Written Is Overbroad
The statute as written would prohibit lawful threatening conduct. To avoid
overbreadth, this instruction requires that the defendant act both “willfully” and
“unlawfully.” (People v. Superior Court (Anderson) (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 893,
895–896 [199 Cal.Rptr. 150].)
State of Mind of Victim Irrelevant
Unlike other threat crimes, the state of mind of the intended victim is irrelevant.
(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1153 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d
572]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061, fn. 15 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938
P.2d 388].)
Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required
“As long as the threat reasonably appears to be a serious expression of intention to
inflict bodily harm and its circumstances are such that there is a reasonable tendency
532
to produce in the victim a fear that the threat will be carried out, a statute
proscribing such threats is not unconstitutional for lacking a requirement of
immediacy or imminence. Thus, threats may be constitutionally prohibited even
when there is no immediate danger that they will be carried out.” (People v. Hines
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388] [quoting In re M.S.
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 714 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365], citation and
internal quotation marks removed, emphasis in original]; see also People v. Gudger
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 320–321 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 510]; Watts v. United States
(1969) 394 U.S. 705, 707 [89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664]; United States v. Kelner
(2d Cir. 1976) 534 F.2d 1020, 1027.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.11A[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
533
2652. Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty (Pen.
Code, § 69)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with resisting an executive

officer in the performance of that officer’s duty [in violation of Penal
Code section 69].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] used force [or violence] to resist an
executive officer;
2. When the defendant acted, the officer was performing (his/her)
lawful duty;
3. When the defendant acted, the defendant knew that the person
(he/she) resisted was an executive officer;
AND
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew the executive officer was
performing (his/her) duty.
<insert title, e.g., peace offıcer, commissioner, etc.> is an executive officer.]
[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of offıcer specified in Pen.
[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of an
executive officer while the officer is in a public place or the person taking
the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she
has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]
excessive).]
534
New January 2006; Revised August 2014, February 2015, August 2016, September
2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In order to be “performing a lawful duty,” an executive officer, including a peace
officer, must be acting lawfully. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 816 [66
Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 941 P.2d 880]; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217
[275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
lawful performance and the defendant’s reliance on self-defense as it relates to the
use of excessive force when this is an issue in the case. (People v. Castain (1981)
122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; People v. Olguin (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d
161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)
If there is an issue in the case as to the lawful performance of a duty by a peace
officer, give the last bracketed paragraph and CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful
If a different executive officer was the alleged victim, the court will need to draft an
appropriate definition of lawful duty if this is an issue in the case.
AUTHORITY
• General Intent Offense. People v. Roberts (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9
[182 Cal.Rptr. 757].
• Lawful Performance Element to Resisting Officer. In re Manuel G. (1997) 16
• Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 69(b).
Penal Code section 148(a) is not a lesser included offense of this crime under the
statutory elements test, but may be one under the accusatory pleading test. People v.
Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 241–242 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 57, 303 P.3d 368]; see also
People v. Belmares (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 400] and
People v. Lopez (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1532 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 586].
Assault may be a lesser included offense of this crime under the accusatory pleading
test. See People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 153 [199 Cal.Rptr.3d 303].
SECONDARY SOURCES
535
536
2653. Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Officer or
Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with taking a (firearm/

weapon) from a (peace/public) officer while (resisting[,]/obstructing[,]/
[or] delaying) the officer in performing or attempting to perform (his/
her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148].
prove that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a (peace/
public) officer lawfully performing or attempting to perform (his/
her) duties as a (peace/public) officer;
2. The defendant willfully (resisted[,]/obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed)
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> in the
performance of or attempt to perform those duties;
title> was a (peace/public) officer performing or attempting to
perform (his/her) duties;
[AND]
4. While the defendant (resisted[,]/obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed)
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>, the defendant
took or removed a (firearm/weapon) from ’s <insert
offıcer’s name, excluding title> person [or immediate presence](;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
refer.]
537

offıcer”>.]
[An officer or employee of <insert name of state or local
government agency that employs public offıcer> is a public officer.]
[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of a (peace
officer/ [or] public officer) while the officer is in a public place or the
person taking the photograph or making the recording is in a place
where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]
excessive).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].) If lawful performance of a peace officer
is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful performance and the appropriate
538
portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer. If lawful

performance by a public officer is an issue, the court must draft an appropriate
instruction depending on the duties of the officer.
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
CALCRIM No. 2654, Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From
Peace Offıcer or Public Offıcer.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(b) & (c); see In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21] [elements of Pen. Code, § 148(a)
offense]; Nuno v. County of San Bernardino (1999) 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133
[officer lawfully performing duties]; People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592,
599–600 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207] [knowledge that other person is an officer].
• Multiple Violations. Pen. Code, § 148(e).
89–90 [237 Cal.Rptr. 338], disapproved on other grounds in In re Randy G.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567, fn. 2 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239] [“public
officers” is broader category than “peace officers”]; see also Pen. Code,
• Public Official Defined. Gov. Code, § 82048; see In re Eddie D. (1991) 235
539
Cal.App.3d 417, 421 [286 Cal.Rptr. 684].

• Unlawful Arrest or Act by Officer. Pen. Code, § 148(f); Franklin v. Riverside
County (1997) 971 F.Supp. 1332, 1335–1336; People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d
347, 354 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94
• Delaying Officer From Performing Duties. People v. Allen (1980) 109
Cal.App.3d 981, 985–986, 987 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502].
• General Intent Crime. In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329
[116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21]; People v. Matthews (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 175 [82
Cal.Rptr.2d 502].
• “Take” or “Remove” Defined. People v. Matthews (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 164,
173, 175 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 502].
• Verbal Resistance or Obstruction. People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961,
968, 970–972 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446] [nondisclosure of identity following arrest for
felony, not misdemeanor]; People v. Green (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438
[59 Cal.Rptr.2d 913] [attempt to intimidate suspected victim into denying
offense].
• Merely Photographing or Recording Officers Not a Crime. Pen. Code, § 148(g).
• Attempted Removal of Firearm or Weapon. Pen. Code, §§ 663, 148(b) & (c).
• Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. Pen. Code, § 148(a)(1).
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Violations
A person may be convicted of multiple violations of this section if there are
multiple officer victims. (Pen. Code, § 148(e).) However, a person may not be
convicted of both resisting an officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(a) and
removing a weapon or firearm from an officer in violation of Penal Code section
148(b), (c), or (d) if the resistance and removal were committed against the same
officer. (Pen. Code, § 148(e).)
Other Forms of Resistance or Interference
It is a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 148(a)(1) to willfully resist, delay, or
obstruct any emergency medical technician in discharging or attempting to discharge
his or her duties of employment. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1797 [defining
emergency medical technician].) It is also a misdemeanor under Penal Code section
148(a)(2) to knowingly and maliciously interrupt, disrupt, impede, or otherwise
interfere with the transmission of a communication over a public safety radio
frequency.
SECONDARY SOURCES
540
541
2654. Intentionally Taking or Attempting to Take Firearm From
Peace Officer or Public Officer (Pen. Code, § 148(d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with intentionally (taking/

[or] attempting to take) a firearm from a (peace/public) officer while the
officer was performing (his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section
148(d)].
prove that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a (peace/
public) officer lawfully performing (his/her) duties as a (peace/
public) officer;
2. The defendant (took or removed/ [or] attempted to take or
remove) a firearm from ’s <insert offıcer’s name,
excluding title> person [or immediate presence];
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to take or remove
the firearm from ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding
title> person [or immediate presence];
[AND]
title> was a (peace/public) officer performing (his/her) duties(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
To prove that the defendant intended to take or remove a firearm from
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>, the People must
prove [at least one of] the following:
[1. The defendant unfastened ’s <insert offıcer’s name,
excluding title> holster strap.]
[2. The defendant partially removed the firearm from ’s
<insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> holster.]
[3. The defendant released the safety on ’s <insert
offıcer’s name, excluding title> firearm.]
[4. (a) The defendant said that (he/she) intended to remove the
firearm from <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>;
(b) the defendant actually touched the firearm; and (c) an
542
independent witness has given testimony that you believe, which

supports the conclusion that the defendant made the statement
about (his/her) intent and actually touched the firearm.]
[5. (a) The defendant actually had (his/her) hand on the firearm; (b)
the defendant tried to take it away from <insert
offıcer’s name, excluding title>, who was holding it; and (c) an
independent witness has given testimony that you believe, which
supports the conclusion that the defendant actually had (his/her)
hand on the firearm and tried to take it away from the officer.]
[6. The defendant’s fingerprint[s] (was/were) found on the firearm or
holster.]
[7. Physical evidence authenticated by a scientifically verifiable
procedure establishes that the defendant touched the firearm.]
[8. ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> firearm fell
during a struggle and the defendant attempted to pick it up.]
[A person may intend to take a weapon from an officer without
intending to permanently deprive the officer of the firearm.]
refer.]
offıcer”>.]
543
excessive).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Depending on the evidence in the case, give the appropriate bracketed
paragraph or paragraphs describing direct but ineffectual acts that establish
defendant’s specific intent to remove or take a firearm. (See Pen. Code,
§ 148(d)(1)–(8).)
portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer. If lawful
performance by a public officer is an issue, the court must draft an appropriate
instruction depending on the duties of the officer.
544

729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
CALCRIM No. 2653, Taking Firearm or Weapon While Resisting Peace Offıcer or
Public Offıcer.
CALCRIM No. 1801, Theft: Degrees (theft of firearm from an officer).
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(d); see In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21] [elements of Pen. Code, § 148(a) offense];
Nuno v. County of San Bernardino (1999) 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133 [officer
lawfully performing duties]; People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592,
599–600 [233 Cal.Rptr. 207] [knowledge that other person is an officer].
• Multiple Violations. Pen. Code, § 148(e).
89–90 [237 Cal.Rptr. 338] [“public officers” is broader category than “peace
officers”], disapproved on other grounds in In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th
556, 567, fn. 2 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239]; see also Pen. Code,
• Public Official Defined. Gov. Code, § 82048; see In re Eddie D. (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 417, 421 [286 Cal.Rptr. 684].
• “Take” or “Remove” Defined. See People v. Matthews (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
164, 173, 175 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 502] [in context of Pen. Code, § 148(a)].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section to CALCRIM No. 2653, Taking Firearm or Weapon
While Resisting Peace Offıcer or Public Offıcer.
SECONDARY SOURCES
545
2655. Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury While Resisting
Peace Officer (Pen. Code, § 148.10(a) & (b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with causing (the death of/
serious bodily injury to) a peace officer performing (his/her) duties [in
prove that:
1. <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> was a peace
officer lawfully performing or attempting to perform (his/her)
duties as a peace officer;
2. The defendant willfully resisted <insert offıcer’s
name, excluding title> in the performance of or the attempt to
perform (his/her) duties;
title> was a peace officer performing or attempting to perform
(his/her) duties;
4. ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title> actions were
reasonable, based on the facts or circumstances confronting (him/
her) at the time;
5. The detention and arrest of (the defendant/ <insert
name of person other than defendant who was arrested>) were
lawful and there was probable cause to detain;
[AND]
6. The defendant’s willful resistance caused (the death of/serious
bodily injury to) <insert offıcer’s name, excluding
title>(;/.)
[AND
someone else).]
In order to prove that ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding
title> (death/serious bodily injury) was caused by the defendant’s willful
resistance, the People must prove that:
546

foreseen that (his/her) willful resistance could begin a chain of
events likely to result in the officer’s death or serious bodily
injury;
2. Defendant’s willful resistance was a direct and substantial factor
in causing ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>
(death/serious bodily injury);
AND
3. ’s <insert offıcer’s name, excluding title>
(death/serious bodily injury) would not have happened if the
defendant had not willfully resisted <insert offıcer’s
name, excluding title> from performing or attempting to perform
(his/her) duties.
does not need to be the only factor that caused ’s <insert
offıcer’s name, excluding title> (death/serious bodily injury).
[Willful resistance may include fleeing from the officer.]
offıcer”>.]
[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of an
executive officer while the officer is in a public place or the person taking
the photograph or making the recording is in a place where he or she
has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime.]
547

excessive).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer.
729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
AUTHORITY
548

• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 148.10(d), 243(f)(4); People v.
Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 25, fn. 4 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693].
• Willful Resistance Includes Flight. People v. Superior Court (Ferguson) (2005)
• Misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. Pen. Code, § 148(a)(1).
RELATED ISSUES
Exclusions
Penal Code section 148.10 “does not apply to conduct that occurs during labor
picketing, demonstrations, or disturbing the peace.” (Pen. Code, § 148.10(c).)
Photographing or Recording Officers
Penal Code section 148(g) provides that merely photographing or recording a public
officer or peace officer under certain conditions is not a crime. This new provision
limits its application to violations of subdivision (a) of the same statute, however.
Until the legislature or courts of review provide further guidance, it is unclear
whether section 148(g) would apply to violations of Penal Code section 148.10.
SECONDARY SOURCES
549
2656. Resisting Peace Officer, Public Officer, or EMT (Pen. Code,
§ 148(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (resisting[,]/ [or]

obstructing[,]/ [or] delaying) a (peace officer/public officer/emergency
medical technician) in the performance or attempted performance of
(his/her) duties [in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)].
prove that:
1. <insert name, excluding title> was (a/an) (peace
officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) lawfully
performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties as a (peace
officer/public officer/emergency medical technician);
2. The defendant willfully (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or]
delayed) <insert name, excluding title> in the
performance or attempted performance of those duties;
AND
have known, that <insert name, excluding title> was
(a/an) (peace officer/public officer/emergency medical technician)
performing or attempting to perform (his/her) duties.
offıcer”>.]
[An emergency medical technician is someone who holds a valid
certificate as an emergency medical technician.]
[The duties of (a/an) <insert title of peace offıcer, public
offıcer, or emergency medical technician> include <insert job
duties>.]
[Taking a photograph or making an audio or video recording of a (peace
550
officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) while the officer is in a

public place or the person taking the photograph or making the
recording is in a place where he or she has the right to be is not, by
itself, a crime.]
excessive).]
[[The People allege that the defendant (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or]
delayed) <insert name, excluding title> by doing the
following: <insert description of acts when multiple acts
alleged>.] You may not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree
that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of
the alleged acts of (resisting[,]/ [or] obstructing[,]/ [or] delaying) a (peace
officer/public officer/emergency medical technician) who was lawfully
performing his or her duties, and you all agree on which act (he/she)
committed.]
[If a person intentionally goes limp, requiring an officer to drag or carry
the person in order to accomplish a lawful arrest, that person may have
willfully (resisted[,]/ [or] obstructed[,]/ [or] delayed) the officer if all the
other requirements are met.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, August 2016, October 2021
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court may use the optional bracketed language in the penultimate paragraph to
insert a description of the multiple acts alleged if appropriate.
“[I]f a defendant is charged with violating section 148 and the arrest is found to be
unlawful, a defendant cannot be convicted of that section.” (People v. White (1980)
101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].) An unlawful arrest includes both an
arrest made without legal grounds and an arrest made with excessive force. (Id. at p.
167.) “[D]isputed facts bearing on the issue of legal cause must be submitted to the
jury considering an engaged-in-duty element.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct that the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged if the arrest was
unlawful. (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].)
551
On request, the court must instruct that the prosecution has the burden of proving
the lawfulness of an arrest beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Castain (1981)
122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651].)
If lawful performance is an issue, give the bracketed paragraph on lawful
performance and the appropriate portions of CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful
Performance: Peace Offıcer. When giving the portion of CALCRIM No. 2670 on
the “use of force,” the court must either delete the following sentence or specify
that this sentence does not apply to a charge of violating Penal Code section 148:
“If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is arresting or
detaining him or her, the person must not use force or any weapon to resist an
officer’s use of reasonable force.” (People v. White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp.
168–169 [court must clarify that Pen. Code, § 834a does not apply to charge under
section 148].)
If the prosecution alleges multiple, distinct acts of resistance, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (People v. Moreno (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, 9 [108 Cal.Rptr. 338].) Give CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity, if needed.
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The duties of a
<insert title . . . > include” on request. The court may insert a
description of the alleged victim’s duties such as “the correct service of a facially
valid search warrant.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [275
Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].)
If the facts indicate passive resistance to arrest, give the bracketed sentence that
begins with “If a person goes limp.” (In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 53 [49
Cal.Rptr. 322].)
There is a split in authority over the knowledge requirement in Penal Code section
148(a). (Compare People v. Mackreth (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 317, 334 [272
Cal.Rptr.3d 498] [actual knowledge that person is an officer not required] with In re
A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 22 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 572] [defendant must have
actual knowledge he or she is resisting an officer in the performance of duty].) If
the trial court agrees with Mackreth, give the instruction as written. If the trial court
agrees with A.L., modify the instruction.
552
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 148(a); see In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
1325, 1329 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
• General-Intent Crime. In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329
[116 Cal.Rptr.2d 21].
• Knowledge Required. People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 599–600
[233 Cal.Rptr. 207].
• Multiple Violations Permissible If Multiple Officers. Pen. Code, § 148(e).
• Emergency Medical Technician Defined. Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 1797.80–1797.84.
• Delaying Officer From Performing Duties. People v. Allen (1980) 109
Cal.App.3d 981, 985–986, 987 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502].
• Verbal Resistance or Obstruction. People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961,
968, 970–972 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446] [nondisclosure of identity following arrest for
felony, not misdemeanor]; People v. Green (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438
[59 Cal.Rptr.2d 913] [attempt to intimidate suspected victim into denying
offense].
• Passive Resistance to Arrest. In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 53 [49
Cal.Rptr. 322].
• Unanimity. People v. Moreno (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9 [108 Cal.Rptr.
338].
SECONDARY SOURCES
553
<insert name, excluding title> was lawfully performing (his/
her) duties as a peace officer. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of <insert name[s] of all
offense[s] with lawful performance as an element>.
A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is
(unlawfully arresting or detaining someone/ [or] using unreasonable or
excessive force when making or attempting to make an otherwise lawful
arrest or detention).
<A. Unlawful Detention>
[A peace officer may legally detain someone if [the person consents to the
detention or if]:
1. Specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him or her to
suspect that the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to
be involved in activity relating to crime;
AND
2. A reasonable officer who knew the same facts would have the
same suspicion.
Any other detention is unlawful.
In deciding whether the detention was lawful, consider evidence of the
officer’s training and experience and all the circumstances known by the
officer when he or she detained the person.]
<B. Unlawful Arrest>
[A peace officer may legally arrest someone [either] (on the basis of an
arrest warrant/ [or] if he or she has probable cause to make the arrest).
Any other arrest is unlawful.
Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer at the
time of the arrest would persuade someone of reasonable caution that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
In deciding whether the arrest was lawful, consider evidence of the
officer’s training and experience and all the circumstances known by the
officer when he or she arrested the person.]
<Arrest without warrant for most misdemeanors or infractions>
[In order for an officer to lawfully arrest someone without a warrant for
555
a misdemeanor or infraction, the officer must have probable cause to

believe that the person to be arrested committed a misdemeanor or
infraction in the officer’s presence.]
<Arrest without warrant for felony or misdemeanor not requiring commission
in offıcer’s presence; see Bench Notes>
[In order for an officer to lawfully arrest someone for (a/an) (felony/ [or]
<insert misdemeanor not requiring commission in offıcer’s
presence>) without a warrant, the officer must have probable cause to
believe the person to be arrested committed (a/an) (felony/ [or]
<insert misdemeanor not requiring commission in offıcer’s
presence>). However, it is not required that the offense be committed in
the officer’s presence.]
<insert crime that was basis for arrest> is (a/an) (felony/
misdemeanor/infraction).
<Entering home without warrant>
[In order for an officer to enter a home to arrest someone without a
warrant [and without consent]:
1. The officer must have probable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested committed a crime and is in the home;
AND
2. Exigent circumstances require the officer to enter the home
without a warrant.
The term exigent circumstances describes an emergency situation that
requires swift action to prevent (1) imminent danger to life or serious
damage to property, or (2) the imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence.]
[The officer must tell that person that the officer intends to arrest him or
her, why the arrest is being made, and the authority for the arrest. [The
officer does not have to tell the arrested person these things if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the person is committing or
attempting to commit a crime, is fleeing immediately after having
committed a crime, or has escaped from custody.] [The officer must also
tell the arrested person the offense for which he or she is being arrested
if he or she asks for that information.]]
<When giving either paragraph A on unlawful detention or paragraph B on
unlawful arrest, give the following paragraph also, if applicable>
[Photographing or recording a peace officer while the officer is in a
public place or while the person photographing or recording is in a place
where he or she has the right to be is not, by itself, a crime nor a basis
556
for (reasonable suspicion to detain/ [nor] probable cause to arrest).]

<C. Use of Force by a Peace Offıcer>
[Special rules control the use of force.]
[A peace officer may use reasonable non-deadly force to arrest or detain
OR
that:
felony>created a risk of or resulted in death or serious bodily
AND
557

Totality of the circumstances means all facts known to the peace officer at
<insert name of offıcer> leading up to the use of deadly force.
<D. Use of Force by a Person Being Arrested or Detained>
[If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is
arresting or detaining him or her, the person must not use force or any
weapon to resist an officer’s use of reasonable force. [However, you may
not find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest if the arrest was
unlawful, even if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the officer was arresting him or her.]
If a peace officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while (arresting or
attempting to arrest/ [or] detaining or attempting to detain) a person,
that person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself or
herself.
A person being arrested or detained uses reasonable force when he or
she: (1) uses that degree of force that he or she actually believes is
reasonably necessary to protect himself or herself from the officer’s use
of unreasonable or excessive force; and (2) uses no more force than a
reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary for
his or her protection.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2016, March 2022, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if there is sufficient
evidence that the officer was not lawfully performing his or her duties and lawful
performance is an element of the offense. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] [“disputed facts bearing on the issue
of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty
element”]; People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663];
People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; People v.
White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)
Give section A if there is an issue as to whether the officer had a legal basis to
detain someone. Give section B if there is an issue as to whether the officer had a
558
legal basis to arrest someone. Give section C if there is an issue as to whether the
officer used excessive force in arresting or detaining someone. If the issue is
whether the officer used excessive force in some other duty, give section C with any
necessary modifications.
If this instruction is only relevant to a charge of violating Penal Code section 148,
the court must not give the bracketed sentence in section C that begins with “If a
person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace officer is arresting or
detaining him or her.” (People v. White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 168–169
[court must clarify that Penal Code section 834a does not apply to charge under
section 148].) If the case does not involve an alleged violation of Penal Code
section 148 (either as a charge offense or as a lesser), the court should give that
bracketed sentence. If the case involves an alleged violation of Penal Code section
148 as well as other offenses in which lawful performance is an element, the court
may give the bracketed sentence but must also give the sentence that begins with
“However, you may not find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest.”
When giving the bracketed section under the heading “A. Unlawful Detention,” if
there is a factual issue about whether the person was in fact “detained,” the court
should provide the jury with a definition of when a person is detained. Similarly, if
there is a factual issue as to whether the person consented to the detention, the court
should instruct on consent. (See People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 777
[17 Cal.Rptr.2d 743].)
In the section headed “B. Unlawful Arrest,” two options are provided for arrests
without a warrant. The general rule is that an officer may not make an arrest for a
misdemeanor or infraction unless the offense was committed in the officer’s
presence. (See Pen. Code, § 836(a)(1).) Statutes provide exceptions to this
requirement for some misdemeanors. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 836(c) [violation of
domestic violence protective or restraining order]; Veh. Code, § 40300.5 [driving
under the influence plus traffic accident or other specified circumstance].) If the
officer made the arrest for an infraction or a misdemeanor falling under the general
rule, give the bracketed paragraph under the heading “Arrest without warrant for
most misdemeanors or infraction.” If the officer made the arrest for a felony or
misdemeanor not requiring commission in the officer’s presence give the bracketed
paragraph under the heading “Arrest without warrant for felony or misdemeanor not
requiring commission in officer’s presence.” The court may also give both bracketed
paragraphs, if appropriate.
Give the bracketed section about entering a home without a warrant if the arrest
took place in a home. (People v. Wilkins, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.) If there
is a factual issue about whether the officer had consent to enter the home, the court
must also instruct on the legal requirements for consent. (Ibid.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Duty. People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1217; People v.
Olguin, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 46–47; People v. Castain, supra, 122
Cal.App.3d at p. 145; People v. White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 166–168.
559
• Lawful Detention. People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 674–675 [16

Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027].
• Lawful Arrest. Pen. Code, §§ 834–836, 841.
• Probable Cause Defined. People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673; People v.
Fischer (1957) 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 [317 P.2d 967].
• Officer’s Training and Experience Relevant. People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22
Cal.3d 891, 899 [150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706]; People v. Clayton (1970) 13
Cal.App.3d 335, 338 [91 Cal.Rptr. 494].
• Duty to Submit to Arrest or Detention. Pen. Code, § 834(a); People v. Allen
(1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 985 [167 Cal.Rptr. 502]; People v. Curtis (1969) 70
Cal.2d 347, 351 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].
• Exigent Circumstances to Enter Home. People v. Wilkins, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th
at p. 777; People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 276 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545
P.2d 1333]; People v. Hoxter (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 406, 414, fn. 7 [89
Cal.Rptr.2d 259].
• Reasonable Force. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.
• Excessive Use of Deadly Force. Pen. Code, § 835a.
• Excessive Force Makes Arrest Unlawful. People v. White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 166–168.
• Excessive Force Triggers Right to Self-Defense With Reasonable Force. People
v. Curtis, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 356.
COMMENTARY
Graham Factors
RELATED ISSUES
Service of Warrant
An officer is lawfully engaged in his or her duties if he or she is correctly serving
“a facially valid search or arrest warrant, regardless of the legal sufficiency of the
560
facts shown in support of the warrant.” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p.

1222.) On the other hand, “the proper service of a warrant is a jury issue under the
engaged-in-duty requirement.” (Id. at p. 1223 [emphasis in original].) If there is a
factual dispute over the manner in which the warrant was served, the court should
instruct the jury on the requirements for legal service of the warrant. (Ibid.)
Lawfulness of Officer’s Conduct Based on Objective Standard
The rule “requires that the officer’s lawful conduct be established as an objective
fact; it does not establish any requirement with respect to the defendant’s mens rea.”
(People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d
1044].) The defendant’s belief about whether the officer was or was not acting
lawfully is irrelevant. (Id at p. 1021.)
Photographing or Recording Officers
Penal Code section 148(g) provides that merely photographing or recording a public
officer or peace officer under certain conditions is not a crime. The intended scope
of this new legislation is unclear. Until the legislature or courts of review provide
further guidance, the court will have to determine whether section 148(g) should
apply in an individual case.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 11.01–11.06 (Matthew Bender).
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.15[1], [2] (Matthew Bender).
561
<insert name, excluding title> was lawfully performing (his/
her) duties as a custodial officer. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of <insert name[s] of
all offense[s] with lawful performance as an element>.
A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or
Special rules control the use of force.
A custodial officer may use reasonable force in his or her duties to
restrain a person, to overcome resistance, to prevent escape, or in self-
defense.
If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a custodial officer is
restraining him or her, that person must not use force or any weapon to
resist an officer’s use of reasonable force.
If a custodial officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while
(restraining a person/ [or] overcoming a person’s resistance/ [or]
preventing a person from escaping/ [or] defending him- or herself from a
person), that person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself
or herself.
A person uses reasonable force when he or she: (1) uses that degree of
force that he or she actually believes is reasonably necessary to protect
himself or herself from the officer’s use of unreasonable or excessive
force; and (2) uses no more force than a reasonable person in the same
situation would believe is necessary for his or her protection.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if there is sufficient
evidence that the officer was not lawfully performing his or her duties and lawful
performance is an element of the offense. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] [“disputed facts bearing on the issue
of legal cause must be submitted to the jury considering an engaged-in-duty
element”]; People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663];
People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145 [175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; People v.
White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Duty. People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275
562
Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39,
46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663]; People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145
[175 Cal.Rptr. 651]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166–168 [161
Cal.Rptr. 541].
• Reasonable Force. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693.
• Excessive Force Triggers Right to Self-Defense With Reasonable Force. People
v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33].
• Circumstances Under Which Defendant May Resort to Self-Defense. People v.
Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 522–524 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 228].
RELATED ISSUES
Lawfulness of Officer’s Conduct Based on Objective Standard
The rule “requires that the officer’s lawful conduct be established as an objective
fact; it does not establish any requirement with respect to the defendant’s mens rea.”
(People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d
1044].) The defendant’s belief about whether the officer was or was not acting
lawfully is irrelevant. (Id. at p. 1021.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11–73.14 (Matthew Bender).
563
2672. Lawful Performance: Resisting Unlawful Arrest
With Force
The defendant is not guilty of the crime of (battery against a peace

officer[,]/ [or] assault against a peace officer[,]/ [or] assault with (force
semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon) against a peace
officer[,]/ [or] <insert other crime charged, e.g., resisting
arrest>) if the officer was not lawfully performing (his/her) duties
because (he/she) was unlawfully arresting someone.
However, even if the arrest was unlawful, as long as the officer used only
reasonable force to accomplish the arrest, the defendant may be guilty of
the lesser crime of (battery[,]/ [or] assault[,]/ [or] assault with (force
semiautomatic firearm/a machine gun/an assault weapon)).
On the other hand, if the officer used unreasonable or excessive force,
and the defendant used only reasonable force in (self-defense/ [or]
defense of another), then the defendant is not guilty of the lesser crime[s]
of (battery[,]/ [or] assault[,]/ [or] assault with (force likely to produce
great bodily injury/a deadly weapon/a firearm/a semiautomatic firearm/a
machine gun/an assault weapon)).
[A peace officer may use reasonable non-deadly force to arrest or detain
OR
that:
felony> created a risk of or resulted in death or serious bodily
AND
564

condition. Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to,]: (loss of
Totality of the circumstances means all facts known to the peace officer at
<insert name of offıcer> leading up to the use of deadly force.
the officer was lawfully performing (his/her) duties. If the People have
not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty [of
<insert crimes>].
New January 2006; Revised March 2022, September 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction on request.
AUTHORITY
• No Right to Forcibly Resist Arrest. Pen. Code, § 834a.
• Applies to Arrest, Not Detention. People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 221
[60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15]; People v. Jones (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 710, 717
[87 Cal.Rptr. 625].
565
• Forcible Resistance to Unlawful Arrest Is Battery or Assault on Nonofficer.

People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355–356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33];
People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541].
• Use of Reasonable Force in Response to Excessive Force Is Complete Defense.
People v. White, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 168.
• May Not Be Convicted of Resisting Unlawful Arrest. People v. White, supra,
101 Cal.App.3d at p. 166; People v. Moreno (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10
[108 Cal.Rptr. 338].
COMMENTARY
Graham Factors
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11[2][b], 73.15[2] (Matthew Bender).
566
An officer who has lawfully detained someone may conduct a carefully

limited search of the detained person’s outer clothing, in order to
discover whether that person has a weapon. The officer may conduct this
limited search only if he or she reasonably believes that the detained
person may be armed and dangerous.
[If, during the search, the officer finds an object that feels reasonably
like (a/an) (knife[,]/ [or] gun[,]/ [or] club[,]/ [or] <insert
specific type of weapon>), the officer may remove the object from the
person’s clothing.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction on request.
AUTHORITY
• Stop and Frisk Permissible. Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 [88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889]; People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 248 [128 Cal.Rptr.
39, 546 P.2d 327].
• Officer May Remove Object That Feels Like Typical Weapon. People v. Collins
(1970) 1 Cal.3d 658, 663 [83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403]; People v. Watson
(1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 130, 135 [90 Cal.Rptr. 483].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Illegally Obtained
Evidence, § 306 et seq.
Investigative Detention, §§ 10.01–10.06 (Matthew Bender).
567
G. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY AND DISTURBING THE
PEACE
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (picketing/ [or]

parading) near a courthouse [in violation of Penal Code section 169].
prove that:
1. The defendant (picketed/ [or] paraded) in or near a state court
building;
AND
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so with the intent (to
interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice/
[or] to influence (a/an) (judge[,]/ [or] juror[,]/ [or] witness[,]/ [or]
officer of the court) in the discharge of his or her duty).
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Similar Statute Constitutional. Cox v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 559, 564 [85
S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487] [upholding Louisiana statute nearly identical to Pen.
Code, § 169].
SECONDARY SOURCES
569
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (disturbing/ [or]

breaking up) a public meeting [in violation of Penal Code section 403].
prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally committed acts that violated (implicit
customs or usages of/ [or] explicit rules for governing) a public
meeting;
2. The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that (his/
her) acts violated those (customs[,]/ [or] usages[,]/ [or] rules);
AND
3. The defendant’s acts substantially [and unlawfully] interfered
with the conduct of the meeting.
You may not find the defendant guilty of this crime unless you find that
the defendant’s acts themselves, not the message or expressive content of
the acts, substantially interfered with the conduct of the meeting.
[When deciding whether the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that (his/her) acts violated the (implicit customs or usages of/ [or]
explicit rules for governing) the meeting, you may consider whether
someone warned or requested the defendant to stop (his/her) activities.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
On request, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “When deciding whether,”
if the meeting did not have explicit rules of governance. (In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d
930, 945 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].)
Do not give this instruction if the disturbance occurs at a religious meeting covered
by Pen. Code, § 302 or at a meeting where “electors” are “assembling” pursuant to
Elec. Code, § 18340. The court will need to draft separate instructions for those
offenses.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 403; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 941–943 [83
Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].
570
• First Amendment Limitations on Statute. In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930,

941–942 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].
• Must Be Public Meeting. Farraher v. Superior Court (1919) 45 Cal.App. 4, 6
[187 P. 72].
• No Clear and Present Danger Requirement. McMahon v. Albany Unified School
Dist. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1287–1288 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 184].
SECONDARY SOURCES
571
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with inciting a riot [in

violation of Penal Code section 404.6(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (did an act or engaged in conduct that encouraged
a riot[,]/ [or] urged others to commit acts of force or violence[,]/
[or] urged others to burn or destroy property);
2. The defendant acted at a time and place and under circumstances
that produced a clear, present, and immediate danger that (a riot
would occur/ [or] acts of force or violence would happen/ [or]
property would be burned or destroyed);
AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to cause a riot.
A riot occurs when two or more people, acting together and without legal
authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by
threatening to use force or violence with the immediate ability to carry
out those threats.
[The People do not have to prove that anyone actually (rioted/ [or]
committed acts of force or violence/ [or] burned or destroyed property).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not have to prove” on
request.
AUTHORITY
• Riot Defined. Pen. Code, § 404.
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Davis (1968) 68 Cal.2d 481, 484–487 [67
Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 P.2d 651].
• Terms of Statute Understandable. People v. Jones (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 437,
447 [96 Cal.Rptr. 795].
572
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Must Urge Others
To be guilty of inciting a riot, the defendant must urge others to commit acts of
force or property destruction. (People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 778 [215
Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [173
Cal.Rptr. 766].) Thus, in In re Wagner, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 106, the court
held that the evidence was insufficient to establish incitement to riot where the
defendant was observed throwing rocks at the police.
SECONDARY SOURCES
573
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with participating in a riot

prove that the defendant willfully participated in a riot.
out those threats.
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
RELATED ISSUES
Prior Agreement Not Necessary
“It [is] not necessary that a previous agreement between the aggressors should have
been alleged, or have existed, to bring such offenses within the inhibitions of section
404.” (People v. Bundte (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 743 [197 P.2d 823].) “Thus, it is
the concurrence of unlawful action by individuals in the use, or threat to unlawfully
use force or violence that constitutes the offense of riot. [Citation.] All persons who
encourage, incite, promote, give support to or countenance a riot are principals in a
riot.” (People v. Cipriani (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299, 304 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722] [italics
in original, citing People v. Bundte, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d at pp. 744–746].)
Mere Presence Not Sufficient
Mere presence alone does not make someone a rioter. (People v. Bundte (1948) 87
Cal.App.2d 735, 746 [197 P.2d 823].)
574
SECONDARY SOURCES
575
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with participating in a rout

prove that the defendant willfully participated in a rout.
A rout occurs when two or more people, assembled and acting together,
make an attempt to commit or advance toward committing an act that
would be a riot if actually committed.
out those threats.
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 406, 408; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106
[173 Cal.Rptr. 766].
• Rout Defined. Pen. Code, § 406.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
SECONDARY SOURCES
576
2685. Participating in an Unlawful Assembly (Pen. Code, §§ 407,
408)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with participating in an

unlawful assembly [in violation of Penal Code section 408].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully participated in an unlawful assembly;
AND
2. The defendant knew that the assembly was unlawful when (he/
she) participated.
purpose.
An unlawful assembly occurs when two or more people assemble
together (to commit a crime/ [or] to do a lawful act in a violent manner).
[When two or more people assemble to do a lawful act in a violent
manner, the assembly is not unlawful unless violence actually occurs or
there is a clear and present danger that violence will occur immediately.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Penal Code section 407 defines an “unlawful assembly” as two or more people
assembled together “to do an unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent,
boisterous, or tumultuous manner.” The Supreme Court has held that “the
proscriptions of sections 407 and 408 on assemblies to do a lawful act must be
limited to assemblies which are violent or which pose a clear and present danger of
imminent violence.” (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510
P.2d 1017]; see Collins v. Jordan (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.) Because the
assembly must in fact be violent or pose an immediate threat of violence, an
assembly that is “boisterous or tumultuous” does not establish a violation of the
statute. The committee has therefore eliminated these words from the instruction
since they are archaic and potentially confusing.
AUTHORITY
577
• Unlawful Assembly Defined. Pen. Code, § 407.

• Assembly for Lawful Act Requires Violence or Clear and Present Danger of
Violence. In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d
1017]; see Collins v. Jordan (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.
• Specific Intent to Commit Unlawful or Violent Act Not Required. People v.
Kerrick (1927) 86 Cal.App. 542, 551 [261 P. 756].
• Knowledge That Assembly Unlawful Required. In re Wagner (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 90, 103–104 [173 Cal.Rptr. 766]; Coverstone v. Davies (1952) 38
Cal.2d 315, 320 [239 P.2d 876].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
SECONDARY SOURCES
578
2686. Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly (Pen.
Code, §§ 407, 409)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with refusal to disperse

after being ordered to do so [in violation of Penal Code section 409].
prove that:
1. The defendant was present at the location of (a/an) (riot[,]/ [or]
rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly);
2. A public officer lawfully ordered the defendant to disperse;
[AND]
3. The defendant willfully remained present at the location of the
(riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly) after the order to
disperse(;/.)
<Give element 4 when instructing on the defense of being a public offıcer
or person assisting an offıcer.>
[AND
4. The defendant was not a public officer or a person assisting an
officer in attempting to disperse the (riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or]
unlawful assembly).]
purpose.
[A riot occurs when two or more people, acting together and without
legal authority, disturb the public peace by using force or violence or by
out those threats.]
[A rout occurs when two or more people, assembled and acting together,
make an attempt to commit or advance toward committing an act that
would be a riot if actually committed.]
[An unlawful assembly occurs when two or more people assemble
together (to commit a crime/ [or] to do a lawful act in a violent manner).
[When two or more people assemble to do a lawful act in a violent
manner, the assembly is not unlawful unless violence actually occurs or
there is a clear and present danger that violence will occur
immediately.]]
(A/An) <insert description> is a public officer.
A public officer lawfully warns people to disperse when the officer directs
579
them, in the name of the People of the State, to immediately disperse.

The officer is not required to use any particular words. However, the
words used must be sufficient to inform a reasonable person that the
officer is acting in an official capacity and ordering people to leave the
area. In addition, the officer must communicate the order in a
reasonable way that ensures that the order is heard.
[The People do not have to prove that the defendant participated in the
(riot[,]/ [or] rout[,]/ [or] unlawful assembly).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give element 4 if there is evidence that the defendant was a public officer or
assisting a public officer.
Penal Code section 407 defines an “unlawful assembly” as two or more people
assembled together “to do an unlawful act, or do a lawful act in a violent,
boisterous, or tumultuous manner.” The Supreme Court has held that “the
proscriptions of sections 407 and 408 on assemblies to do a lawful act must be
limited to assemblies which are violent or which pose a clear and present danger of
imminent violence.” (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510
P.2d 1017]; see Collins v. Jordan (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.) Because the
assembly must in fact be violent or pose an immediate threat of violence, an
assembly that is “boisterous or tumultuous” does not establish a violation of the
statute. The committee has therefore eliminated these words from the instruction
since they are archaic and potentially confusing.
The jury must determine whether the person who allegedly gave the order was a
public officer. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr.
of “public officer” (e.g., in the case of “peace officer,” the court may state “a
Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer
are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the
person was a public officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace
officer”). (Ibid.)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The People do not have to prove” on
request. (In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].)
AUTHORITY
• Command to Disperse. Pen. Code, § 726.
580

• Rout Defined. Pen. Code, § 406.
• Unlawful Assembly Defined. Pen. Code, § 407.
• Assembly for Lawful Act Requires Violence or Clear and Present Danger of
Violence. In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 623 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d
1017]; see Collins v. Jordan (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.
• No Particular Manner of Warning Required. In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d
34, 50–51 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; People v. Cipriani (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299,
307–308 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722]; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 105 [173
Cal.Rptr. 766].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code Sections 409 and 416(a)
Penal Code section 409 applies to any person remaining at an unlawful assembly
following an order to disperse, whether or not that person is involved in the violent
or illegal activity. (Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2001) 266
F.3d 959, 967–968; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].)
Refusal to disperse is also punishable under Penal Code section 416(a). Penal Code
section 416(a) applies only to those who have the specific intent to commit violent
or unlawful acts but does not require that the gathering meet the definition of riot,
rout, or unlawful assembly. (Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco (2001) 266
F.3d 959, 967–968; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 110–111 [173 Cal.Rptr.
766].) Use this instruction only for a charge of violating Penal Code section 409. If
the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 416(a), give CALCRIM No.
2687, Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act.
SECONDARY SOURCES
581
2687. Refusal to Disperse: Intent to Commit Unlawful Act (Pen.
Code, § 416(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with refusal to disperse

after being ordered to do so [in violation of Penal Code section 416(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant assembled with one or more other people;
2. The defendant intended to (disturb the public peace/ [or] commit
a crime);
3. A public officer had probable cause to believe that the purpose of
the assembly was unlawful;
4. The public officer lawfully warned the defendant to disperse;
AND
5. The defendant willfully remained present at the location after the
order to disperse.
[As used here, a person intends to disturb the public peace if he or she
intends to commit overt acts that are themselves violent or that tend to
incite others to violence.]
purpose.
(A/An) <insert description> is a public officer.
A public officer lawfully warns people to disperse when the officer directs
them, in the name of the People of the State, to immediately disperse.
The officer is not required to use any particular words. However, the
words used must be sufficient to inform a reasonable person that the
officer is acting in an official capacity and ordering people to leave the
area. In addition, the officer must communicate the order in a
reasonable way that ensures that the order is heard.
An officer has probable cause to believe that the purpose of the assembly
is unlawful if the officer knows facts that would persuade someone of
reasonable caution to believe that the people present intend to
(immediately commit criminal or violent acts/ [or] incite others to
immediately commit acts of violence).
In deciding whether the officer has probable cause, consider evidence of
the officer’s training and experience and all the circumstances the officer
knew about at the time.
582
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The jury must determine whether the person who allegedly gave the order was a
public officer. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr.
of “public officer” (e.g., in the case of “peace officer,” the court may state “a
Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden Grove Reserve Police Officer
are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may not instruct the jury that the
person was a public officer as a matter of law (e.g., “Officer Reed was a peace
officer”). (Ibid.)
AUTHORITY
• First Amendment Limitations on Statute. Chambers v. Municipal Court (1977)
65 Cal.App.3d 904, 909–911 [135 Cal.Rptr. 695].
• Command to Disperse. Pen. Code, § 726.
• No Particular Manner of Warning Required. In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d
34, 50–51 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; People v. Cipriani (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 299,
307–308 [95 Cal.Rptr. 722]; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 105 [173
Cal.Rptr. 766].
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code Sections 409 and 416(a)
Penal Code section 409 applies to any person remaining at an unlawful assembly
following an order to disperse, whether or not that person is involved in the violent
or illegal activity. (Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2001) 266
F.3d 959, 967–968; In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322].)
Refusal to disperse is also punishable under Penal Code section 416(a). Penal Code
section 416(a) applies only to those who have the specific intent to commit violent
or unlawful acts but does not require that the gathering meet the definition of riot,
rout, or unlawful assembly. (Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco (9th Cir.
2001) 266 F.3d 959, 967–968; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 110–111
[173 Cal.Rptr. 766].) Use this instruction only for a charge of violating Penal Code
section 416(a). If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 409, give
CALCRIM No. 2686, Refusal to Disperse: Riot, Rout, or Unlawful Assembly.
583
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Order, §§ 144.21, 144.22 (Matthew Bender).
584
2688. Disturbing the Peace: Fighting or Challenging Someone to
Fight (Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with disturbing the peace

prove that:
1. The defendant willfully [and unlawfully] (fought/ [or] challenged
someone else to fight);
[AND]
2. The defendant and the other person were (in a public place/in a
building or on the grounds of <insert description of
school from Pen. Code, § 415.5>) when (the fight occurred/ [or]
the challenge was made)(;/.)
[AND]
[3. The defendant did not act (in self-defense/ [or] in defense of
someone else)(;/.)]
<Give element 4 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(f).>
[AND
(3/4). The defendant was not (a registered student at the school/ [or] a
person engaged in lawful employee-related activity).]
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime. Give this instruction if the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code
section 415(1) or section 415.5(a)(1).
sua sponte duty to instruct on that defense. Give bracketed element 3, the phrase
“and unlawfully” in element 1, and any appropriate defense instructions. (See
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(1), select “within a
585
building or on the grounds of” in element 2 and insert the type of school from the
statute. If there is sufficient evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section
415.5(f) applies, the court has a sua sponte duty to give bracketed element 4.
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(1), select “in a public
place” in element 2. Do not give bracketed element 4.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 415(1), 415.5(a)(1).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
SECONDARY SOURCES
586
2689. Disturbing the Peace: Loud and Unreasonable Noise (Pen.
Code, §§ 415(2), 415.5(a)(2))

prove that:
[1.] The defendant maliciously and willfully disturbed another person
by causing loud and unreasonable noise(;/.)
<Give element 2 when instructing on Pen. Code, § 415.5(a)(2).>
[AND]
[2. The other person was in a building or on the grounds of
<insert description of school from Pen. Code, § 415.5>
at the time of the disturbance(;/.)]
[AND
(2/3). The defendant was not (a registered student of the school/ [or] a
someone else.
purpose.
In order to disturb another person by causing loud and unreasonable
noise, there must be either:
1. A clear and present danger of immediate violence;
OR
2. The noise must be used for the purpose of disrupting lawful
activities, rather than as a means to communicate.
The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to provoke
a violent response.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
587
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(2), give bracketed
element 2 and insert the type of school from the statute. If there is sufficient
evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section 415.5(f) applies, the court has a
sua sponte duty to give bracketed element 3.
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(1), give only element 1.
Do not give bracketed elements 2 and 3.
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Loud and Unreasonable Noise Defined. In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612,
618–621 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017].
SECONDARY SOURCES
588
2690. Disturbing the Peace: Offensive Words (Pen. Code,
§§ 415(3), 415.5(a)(3))

prove that:
1. The defendant used offensive words that were inherently likely to
provoke an immediate violent reaction;
[AND]
2. When the defendant used those words, (he/she) was (in a public
place/in a building or on the grounds of <insert
description of school from Pen. Code, § 415.5>)(;/.)
[AND
3. The defendant was not (a registered student of the school/ [or] a
A person uses offensive words inherently likely to provoke an immediate
violent reaction if:
1. He or she says something that is reasonably likely to provoke
someone else to react violently;
AND
2. When he or she makes that statement, there is a clear and
present danger that the other person will immediately erupt into
violence.
In deciding whether the People have proved both of these factors,
consider all the circumstances in which the statement was made and the
person to whom the statement was addressed.
The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to provoke
a violent response.
<Defense: Good Faith Belief Language Not Likely to Provoke>
actually believed that the language (he/she) used was not inherently
likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction. The People have the
reasonably and actually believe this to be true. If the People have not
589
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415.5(a)(3), select “within a
building or on the grounds of” in element 2 and insert the type of school from the
statute. If there is sufficient evidence that the exemption in Penal Code section
415.5(f) applies, the court has a sua sponte duty to give bracketed element 3.
If the defendant is charged under Penal Code section 415(3), select “in a public
place” in element 2. Do not give bracketed element 3.
If there is sufficient evidence to support the defense that the defendant reasonably
believed that his or her words would not provoke, the court has a sua sponte duty
to give the instruction on that defense. (See In re John V. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d
761, 770 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503] [recognizing defense].)
AUTHORITY
• Must Be Clear and Present Danger of Immediate Violence. Cohen v. California
(1971) 403 U.S. 15, 17 [91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284]; In re Brown (1973) 9
Cal.3d 612, 618 [108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017].
• Statement Must Be Uttered in Provocative Manner. Jefferson v. Superior Court
(1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 721, 724–725 [124 Cal.Rptr. 507]; In re John V. (1985)
167 Cal.App.3d 761, 767–768 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503]; In re Alejandro G. (1995) 37
• Context Must Be Considered. Jefferson v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d
721, 724–725 [124 Cal.Rptr. 507]; In re John V. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761,
767–768 [213 Cal.Rptr. 503]; In re Alejandro G. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44,
47–50 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 471].
• Intention to Cause Violence Not Required. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310
U.S. 296, 309 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213].
• Good Faith Defense. In re John V. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 770 [213
Cal.Rptr. 503].
RELATED ISSUES
Statement Made to Police Officer
“In determining whether section 415 subdivision (3) was violated, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances, including the status of the addressee. That
the addressee was a police officer trained and obliged to exercise a higher degree of
590
restraint than the average citizen is merely one factor to be considered along with
the other circumstances.” (In re Alejandro G. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 47–50 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 471]; see also People v. Callahan (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 631, 635 [214
Cal.Rptr. 294] [evidence showed officer “was neither offended . . . nor provoked”].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
591
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with violating a court order

prove that:
1. A court [lawfully] issued a written order that the defendant
<insert description of order>;
2. The defendant knew about the court order and its contents;
3. The defendant had the ability to follow the court order;
AND
4. The defendant willfully violated the court order.
purpose.
[The People must prove that the defendant knew about the court order
and that (he/she) had the opportunity to read the order or to otherwise
become familiar with what it said. But the People do not have to prove
that the defendant actually read the court order.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In order for a defendant to be guilty of violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4), the
court order must be “lawfully issued.” (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); People v. Gonzalez
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366].) The defendant
may not be convicted for violating an order that is unconstitutional, and the
defendant may bring a collateral attack on the validity of the order as a defense to
this charge. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–818; In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].) The defendant may
raise this issue on demurrer but is not required to. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12
Cal.4th at pp. 821, 824; In re Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 146.) The legal question
of whether the order was lawfully issued is the type of question normally resolved
by the court. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–820; In re Berry,
593
supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 147.) If, however, there is a factual issue regarding the
lawfulness of the court order and the trial court concludes that the issue must be
submitted to the jury, give the bracketed word “lawfully” in element 1. The court
must also instruct on the facts that must be proved to establish that the order was
lawfully issued.
Penal Code section 166(b)(1) provides for an increased sentence if the defendant
was previously convicted of stalking and violated a court order “by willfully
contacting a victim by phone or mail, or directly.” If the prosecution alleges this
factor, in element 1, the court should state that the court ordered the defendant “not
to contact <insert name of victim in stalking case> directly, by
phone, or by mail,” or something similar. The jury must also determine if the prior
conviction has been proved unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the prior.
(See CALCRIM Nos. 3100–3103 on prior convictions.)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant violated a protective order in a case
involving domestic violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6), do not use this
instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 2701, Violation of Court Order: Protective Order
or Stay Away.
defendant knew” on request. (People v. Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928,
938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v. Brindley (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925,
927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4) & (b)(1).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Order Must Be Lawfully Issued. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); People v. Gonzalez
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366]; In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].
• Knowledge of Order Required. People v. Saffell (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp.
967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
• Proof of Service Not Required. People v. Saffell (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp.
967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
• Must Have Opportunity to Read but Need Not Actually Read Order. People v.
Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v.
Brindley (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both
decisions affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943
[47 Cal.Rptr. 679].
• Ability to Comply With Order. People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
• General-Intent Offense. People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4
[184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
594
RELATED ISSUES
Violation of Order to Pay Support—Court May Suspend Proceedings
If the defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4) based on a
failure to pay child, spousal, or family support, the court may suspend criminal
proceedings if the defendant acknowledges his or her obligation to pay and posts a
bond or other surety. (Pen. Code, § 166.5.)
Person Not Directly Bound by Order
A person who is not directly bound by a court order may nevertheless violate Penal
Code section 166(a)(4) if he or she acts in concert with a person who is directly
bound by the order. (People v. Saffell (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 978–979
[168 P.2d 497]; Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 [167 P. 143].)
“[A] nonparty to an injunction is subject to the contempt power of the court when,
with knowledge of the injunction, the nonparty violates its terms with or for those
who are restrained.” (People v. Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903 [64
Cal.Rptr.2d 248] [italics in original].) The mere fact that the nonparty shares the
same purpose as the restrained party is not sufficient. (Ibid.) “An enjoined party
. . . has to be demonstrably implicated in the nonparty’s activity.” (Ibid.)
Violating Condition of Probation
A defendant may not be prosecuted under Penal Code section 166(a)(4) for violating
a condition of probation. (People v. Johnson (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 109 [24
Cal.Rptr.2d 628].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
California Defense Advocate, § 1.30 (Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.13[4]; Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.10[1]
(Matthew Bender).
595
2701. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay Away
(Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with violating a court order

prove that:
1. A court [lawfully] issued a written order that the defendant
<insert description of content of order>;
2. The court order was a (protective order/stay-away court order/
<insert description of other type of order>), issued
under <insert code section under which order made>
[in a pending criminal proceeding involving domestic violence/as
a condition of probation after a conviction for (domestic violence/
elder abuse/dependent adult abuse)].
3. The defendant knew of the court order;
4. The defendant had the ability to follow the court order;
AND
<For violations of Pen. Code, § 166(c)(3), choose “willfully”; for violations
of Pen. Code § 273.6(c), choose “intentionally” for the scienter
requirement.>
5. The defendant (willfully/intentionally) violated the court order.
purpose.
[The People must prove that the defendant knew of the court order and
that (he/she) had the opportunity to read the order or to otherwise
become familiar with what it said. But the People do not have to prove
that the defendant actually read the court order.]
[Domestic violence means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully
defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person who dated or is dating the
defendant[,]/ [or] person who was or is engaged to the defendant).
bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent
serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else.]
596

[(Elder/(D/d)ependent adult) abuse means that under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, the defendant:
1. Willfully caused or permitted any (elder/dependent adult) to
suffer;
OR
2. Inflicted on any (elder/dependent adult) unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering;
OR
3. Having the care or custody of any (elder/dependent adult),
willfully caused or permitted the person or health of the (elder/
dependent adult) to be injured;
OR
4. Willfully caused or permitted the (elder/dependent adult) to be
placed in a situation in which (his/her) person or health was
endangered.
out normal activities or to protect his or her rights.] [This definition
dependency recovery hospital).]]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008, August 2009
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In order for a defendant to be guilty of violating Penal Code section 166(a)(4), the
court order must be “lawfully issued.” (Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); People v. Gonzalez
597
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366].) The defendant
may not be convicted for violating an order that is unconstitutional, and the
defendant may bring a collateral attack on the validity of the order as a defense to
this charge. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–818; In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].) The defendant may
raise this issue on demurrer but is not required to. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12
Cal.4th at pp. 821, 824; In re Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 146.) The legal question
of whether the order was lawfully issued is the type of question normally resolved
by the court. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 816–820; In re Berry,
supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 147.) If, however, there is a factual issue regarding the
lawfulness of the court order and the trial court concludes that the issue must be
submitted to the jury, give the bracketed word “lawfully” in element 1. The court
must also instruct on the facts that must be proved to establish that the order was
lawfully issued.
In element 2, give the bracketed phrase “in a criminal case involving domestic
violence” if the defendant is charged with a violation of Penal Code section
166(c)(1). In such cases, also give the bracketed definition of “domestic violence”
and the associated terms.
In element 2, if the order was not a “protective order” or “stay away order” but
another type of qualifying order listed in Penal Code section 166(c)(3) or 273.6(c),
insert a description of the type of order from the statute.
In element 2, in all cases, insert the statutory authority under which the order was
issued. (See Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1) & (3), 273.6(a) & (c).)
defendant knew” on request. (People v. Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928,
938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v. Brindley (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925,
927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both decisions affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943 [47 Cal.Rptr. 679].)
If the prosecution alleges that physical injury resulted from the defendant’s conduct,
in addition to this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 2702, Violation of Court Order:
Protective Order or Stay Away—Physical Injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2),
273.6(b).)
If the prosecution charges the defendant with a felony based on a prior conviction
and a current offense involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence, in
addition to this instruction, give CALCRIM No. 2703, Violation of Court Order:
Protective Order or Stay Away—Act of Violence. (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4),
273.6(d).) The jury also must determine if the prior conviction has been proved
unless the defendant stipulates to the truth of the prior. (See CALCRIM Nos.
3100–3103 on prior convictions.)
Related Instruction
CALCRIM No. 831, Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult (Pen. Code, § 368(c)).
598
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(1), 273.6.
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Order Must Be Lawfully Issued. Pen. Code, § 166(a)(4); People v. Gonzalez
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 804, 816–817 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 910 P.2d 1366]; In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273].
• Knowledge of Order Required. People v. Saffell (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp.
967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
• Proof of Service Not Required. People v. Saffell (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d Supp.
967, 979 [168 P.2d 497].
• Must Have Opportunity to Read but Need Not Actually Read Order. People v.
Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 938–941 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v.
Brindley (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 927–928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 668], both
decisions affd. sub nom. People v. Von Blum (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943
[47 Cal.Rptr. 679].
• Ability to Comply With Order. People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, 4 [184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
• General-Intent Offense. People v. Greenfield (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4
[184 Cal.Rptr. 604].
• Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(a).
• Cohabitant Defined. Pen. Code, § 13700(b).
• Domestic Violence Defined. Evid. Code, § 1109(d)(3); Pen. Code, § 13700(b);
see People v. Poplar (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 320]
[spousal rape is higher level of domestic violence].
• Abuse of Elder or Dependent Adult Defined. Pen. Code, § 368.
COMMENTARY
Penal Code section 166(c)(1) also includes protective orders and stay aways “issued
as a condition of probation after a conviction in a criminal proceeding involving
domestic violence . . . .” However, in People v. Johnson (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th
106, 109 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 628], the court held that a defendant cannot be prosecuted
for contempt of court under Penal Code section 166 for violating a condition of
probation. Thus, the committee has not included this option in the instruction.
If the defendant is charged with a felony based on a prior conviction and the
allegation that the current offense involved an act of violence or credible threat of
violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d)), then the misdemeanor offense is a
lesser included offense. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on
which the jury will indicate if the additional allegations have or have not been
599
proved. If the jury finds that the either allegation was not proved, then the offense
should be set at a misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2700, Violation of Court Order.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 64, 66–68.
600
2702. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay
Away—Physical Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b))
If you find the defendant guilty of violating a court order, you must then
decide whether the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct
resulted in physical injury to another person.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant’s violation of the court order resulted in
physical injury, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2701, Violation of Court Order:
Protective Order or Stay Away.
if the prosecution has or has not been proved the allegation.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(2), 273.6(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
601
2703. Violation of Court Order: Protective Order or Stay
Away—Act of Violence (Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d))
If you find the defendant guilty of violating a court order, you must then
decide whether the People have proved that the defendant’s conduct
involved an act of violence [or a credible threat of violence].
[A person makes a credible threat of violence when he or she willfully
and maliciously communicates a threat to a victim of or a witness to the
conduct that violated a court order. The threat must be to use force or
violence against that person or that person’s family. The threat must be
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat in
a way to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.]
purpose.]
[Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful
annoy, or injure someone else.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a felony for violating a court order based on a prior
conviction and an act of violence or credible threat of violence, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on this sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2701, Violation of Court Order:
Protective Order or Stay Away.
if the prosecution has or has not been proved the allegation.
The court must also give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated
Trial, unless the defendant has stipulated to the conviction. If the court has granted
a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction, use CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior
Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 166(c)(4), 273.6(d).
602
SECONDARY SOURCES
603

2720. Assault by Prisoner Serving Life Sentence (Pen. Code,
§ 4500)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with assault with

(force likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) with malice
aforethought, while serving a life sentence [in violation of Penal Code
section 4500].
prove that:
[1. The defendant did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature
would directly and probably result in the application of force to a
person;]
[1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to a person, and the force
used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply
force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a
person;
5. The defendant acted with malice aforethought;
[AND]
<Alternative 6A—defendant sentenced to life term>
[6. When (he/she) acted, the defendant had been sentenced to a
maximum term of life in state prison [in California](;/.)]
<Alternative 6B—defendant sentenced to life and to determinate term>
[6. When (he/she) acted, the defendant had been sentenced to both a
specific term of years and a maximum term of life in state prison [in
California](;/.)]
<Give element 7 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue raised
by the evidence.>
605
[AND
someone else).]
purpose.
touched someone.]
deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable
of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]
[The term (great bodily injury/deadly weapon) is defined in another
instruction.]
There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied
malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required
for this crime.
The defendant acted with express malice if (he/she) unlawfully intended
to kill the person assaulted.
The defendant acted with implied malice if:
1. (He/She) intentionally committed an act.
2. The natural and probable consequences of the act were
dangerous to human life.
606
3. At the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) knew (his/her) act was

dangerous to human life.
AND
4. (He/She) deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human
life.
Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the victim.
It is a mental state that must be formed before the act is committed. It
does not require deliberation or the passage of any particular period of
time.
[A person is sentenced to a term in a state prison if he or she is
(sentenced to confinement in <insert name of institution from
Pen. Code, § 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation[, Division of Juvenile Justice,]) by an order made
according to law[, regardless of both the purpose of the (confinement/
commitment) and the validity of the order directing the (confinement/
commitment), until a judgment of a competent court setting aside the
order becomes final]. [A person may be sentenced to a term in a state
prison even if, at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local
correctional institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison
walls or boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited
to serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released
on parole is not sentenced to a term in a state prison.]]
New January 2006; Revised February 2013, August 2016, September 2019,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 1, give alternative 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a
deadly weapon. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed
with force likely to produce great bodily injury.
In element 6, give alternative 6A if the defendant was sentenced to only a life term.
Give element 6B if the defendant was sentenced to both a life term and a
determinate term. (People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell) (2002) 99
Give the bracketed definition of “application of force and apply force” on request.
607
156].)
On request, give the bracketed definition of “sentenced to a term in state prison.”
Within that definition, give the bracketed portion that begins with “regardless of the
purpose,” or the bracketed second or third sentence, if requested and relevant based
on the evidence.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
Penal Code section 4500 provides that the punishment for this offense is death or
life in prison without parole, unless “the person subjected to such assault does not
die within a year and a day after” the assault. If this is an issue in the case, the
court should consider whether the time of death should be submitted to the jury for
a specific factual determination pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S.
466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
Defense—Instructional Duty
As with murder, the malice required for this crime may be negated by evidence of
heat of passion or imperfect self-defense. (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524,
530–531 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765,
780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].) If the evidences raises an issue about one
or both of these potential defenses, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the
appropriate instructions, CALCRIM No. 570, Voluntary Manslaughter: Heat of
Passion—Lesser Included Offense, or CALCRIM No. 571, Voluntary Manslaughter:
608
Imperfect Self-Defense—Lesser Included Offense. The court must modify these

instructions for the charge of assault by a life prisoner.
Bodily Injury.
CALCRIM No. 520, Murder With Malice Aforethought.
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Assault by Life Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 4500.
• Elements of Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely. Pen. Code, §§ 240,
245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Deadly Weapon Defined. People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028–1029
[68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Malice Equivalent to Malice in Murder. People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d
524, 536–537 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69
Cal.2d 765, 780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106].
• Malice Defined. Pen. Code, § 188; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212,
1217–1222 [264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200]; People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4
• Ill Will Not Required for Malice. People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 722
[112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], overruled on other grounds in People v. Flannel
• Undergoing Sentence of Life. People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell)
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily
Injury—Not a Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 245; see People v. St. Martin (1970) 1
Cal.3d 524, 536 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390]; People v. Noah (1971) 5
609
Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].

• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96
Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].
Note: In People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 476–477 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487
P.2d 1009], the court held that assault by a prisoner not serving a life sentence,
Penal Code section 4501, is not a lesser included offense of assault by a prisoner
serving a life sentence, Penal Code section 4500. The court based its on
conclusion on the fact that Penal Code section 4501 includes as an element of the
offense that the prisoner was not serving a life sentence. However, Penal Code
section 4501 was amended, effective January 1, 2005, to remove this element. The
trial court should, therefore, consider whether Penal Code section 4501 is now a
lesser included offense to Penal Code section 4500.
RELATED ISSUES
Status as Life Prisoner Determined on Day of Alleged Assault
Whether the defendant is sentenced to a life term is determined by his or her status
on the day of the assault. (People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell) (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836]; Graham v. Superior Court (1979) 98
Cal.App.3d 880, 890 [160 Cal.Rptr. 10].) It does not matter if the conviction is later
overturned or the sentence is later reduced to something less than life. (People v.
Superior Court of Monterey (Bell), supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341; Graham v.
Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)
Undergoing Sentence of Life
This statute applies to “[e]very person undergoing a life sentence . . . .” (Pen. Code,
§ 4500.) In People v. Superior Court of Monterey (Bell) (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
1334, 1341 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836], the defendant had been sentenced both to life in
prison and to a determinate term and, at the time of the assault, was still technically
serving the determinate term. The court held that he was still subject to prosecution
under this statute, stating “a prisoner who commits an assault is subject to
prosecution under section 4500 for the crime of assault by a life prisoner if, on the
day of the assault, the prisoner was serving a sentence which potentially subjected
him to actual life imprisonment, and therefore the prisoner might believe he had
‘nothing left to lose’ by committing the assault.” (Ibid.)
Error to Instruct on General Definition of Malice and General Intent
“Malice,” as used in Penal Code section 4500, has the same meaning as in the
context of murder. (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 536–537 [83 Cal.Rptr.
166, 463 P.2d 390]; People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 780–781 [73 Cal.Rptr.
10, 447 P.2d 106].) Thus, it is error to give the general definition of malice found in
Penal Code section 7, subdivision 4. (People v. Jeter (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1212,
1217 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 402].) It is also error to instruct that Penal Code section 4500
is a general intent crime. (Ibid.)
610
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 58–60.
611

likely to produce great bodily injury/a deadly weapon) while serving a
state prison sentence [in violation of Penal Code section 4501].
prove that:
[1. The defendant did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature
would directly and probably result in the application of force to a
person;]
[1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to a person, and the force
used was likely to produce great bodily injury;]
lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply
force (likely to produce great bodily injury/with a deadly weapon) to a
person;
[AND]
5. When (he/she) acted, the defendant was confined in a [California]
state prison(;/.)
<Give element 6 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue raised
by the evidence.>
[AND
someone else).]
612
touched someone.]
deadly or dangerous or one] that is used in such a way that it is capable
of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.]
[The term (great bodily injury/deadly weapon) is defined in another
instruction.]
A person is confined in a state prison if he or she is (confined in
<insert name of institution from Pen. Code,
§ 5003>/committed to the Department of Corrections and
order becomes final]. [A person may be confined in a state prison even if,
at the time of the offense, he or she is confined in a local correctional
institution pending trial or is temporarily outside the prison walls or
boundaries for any permitted purpose, including but not limited to
serving on a work detail.] [However, a prisoner who has been released
on parole is not confined in a state prison.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2016, September 2019, September 2020, March
2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
613

In element 1, give alternative 1A if it is alleged the assault was committed with a
deadly weapon. Give alternative 1B if it is alleged that the assault was committed
with force likely to produce great bodily injury.
Give the bracketed definition of “application of force and apply force” on request.
156].)
In the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the bracketed portion
that begins with “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or third
sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.
519, 521–522 [108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].)
Bodily Injury.
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Assault by Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 4501.
• Elements of Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great
Bodily Injury. Pen. Code, §§ 240, 245(a)(1)–(3) & (b).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
614

[68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
• Confined in State Prison Defined. Pen. Code, § 4504.
• Underlying Conviction Need Not Be Valid. Wells v. California (9th Cir. 1965)
352 F.2d 439, 442.
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
• Assault With Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce Great Bodily
Injury—Not a Prisoner. Pen. Code, § 245; see People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d
469, 478–479 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].
• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240; People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 478–479 [96
Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].
RELATED ISSUES
Not Serving a Life Sentence
Previously, this statute did not apply to an inmate “undergoing a life sentence.” (See
People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 477 [96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009].) The
statute has been amended to remove this restriction, effective January 1, 2005. If the
case predates this amendment, the court must add to the end of element 5, “for a
term other than life.”
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 61, 63.
615
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery by gassing [in

prove that:
1. The defendant was (serving a sentence in a [California] state
prison/confined in a local detention facility);
2. While so confined, the defendant intentionally committed an act
of gassing, that is, (he/she) (placed[,]/ [or] threw[,]/ [or] caused to
be placed or thrown) (human excrement/human urine/human
bodily fluids or substances/a mixture containing human bodily
substances) on the body of (a peace officer/an employee of a (state
prison/local detention facility));
AND
3. The (excrement/urine/bodily fluids or substances/mixture) actually
made contact with the skin [or membranes] of (a peace officer/an
employee of a (state prison/local detention facility)).
[A person is serving a sentence in a state prison if he or she is (confined
in <insert name of institution from Pen. Code,
order becomes final]. [A person may be serving a sentence in a state
on parole is not serving a sentence in a state prison.]]
[A (county jail/city jail/ <insert description>) is a local
detention facility.]

616
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the battery is charged under Penal Code section 4501.1, in element 1, use the
phrase “serving a sentence in state prison” and the bracketed definition of this
phrase. If the battery is charged under Penal Code section 243.9, in element 1, give
the language referencing a “local detention facility” and the bracketed definition of
local detention facility.
When giving the definition of “serving a sentence in a state prison,” give the
bracketed portion that begins “regardless of the purpose,” or the bracketed second or
third sentence, if requested and relevant based on the evidence.
The jury must determine whether the alleged victim was a peace officer. (People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) The court
must instruct the jury in the appropriate definition of “peace officer” from the
statute. (Ibid.) It is error for the court to instruct that the witness is a peace officer
as a matter of law. (Ibid. [instruction that “Officer Bridgeman and Officer Gurney
are peace officers” was error].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.9, 4501.1.
• Battery by Prisoner on Non-Prisoner. People v. Flores (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
924, 929 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 924].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–15, 62.
617
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with battery on someone

who was not a prisoner [in violation of Penal Code section 4501.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully touched <insert name of
person allegedly battered, excluding title of law enforcement agent>
in a harmful or offensive manner;
2. When (he/she) acted, the defendant was serving a sentence in a
[California] state prison;
[AND]
3. <insert name of person allegedly battered, excluding
title of law enforcement agent> was not serving a sentence in state
prison(;/.)
<Give element 4 when self-defense or defense of another is an issue
raised by the evidence.>
[AND
someone else).]
A person is serving a sentence in a state prison if he or she is (confined in
§ 5003>/committed to the Department of (Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice/Corrections and
Rehabilitation)) by an order made according to law[, regardless of both
the purpose of the (confinement/commitment) and the validity of the
order directing the (confinement/commitment), until a judgment of a
competent court setting aside the order becomes final]. [A person may be
serving a sentence in a state prison even if, at the time of the offense, he
618
or she is confined in a local correctional institution pending trial or is

temporarily outside the prison walls or boundaries for any permitted
purpose, including but not limited to serving on a work detail.]
[However, a prisoner who has been released on parole is not serving a
sentence in a state prison.]
Instruction 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Offıcer.>
[A custodial officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or
Instruction 2671 explains when force is unreasonable or excessive.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defendant’s reliance on self-defense
as it relates to the use of excessive force. (See People v. Coleman (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 1016, 1022–1023 [149 Cal.Rptr. 134]; People v. White (1980) 101
Cal.App.3d 161, 167–168 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541]; People v. Olguin (1981) 119
Cal.App.3d 39, 46–47 [173 Cal.Rptr. 663].) If there is evidence of excessive force,
give bracketed element 4, the last bracketed paragraph, and the appropriate portions
of CALCRIM No. 2671, Lawful Performance: Custodial Offıcer.
CALCRIM No. 960, Simple Battery.
AUTHORITY
• Elements of Battery by Prisoner on Nonprisoner. Pen. Code, § 4501.5.
• Elements of Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; see People v. Martinez (1970) 3
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
619
172, 479 P.2d 372]].
352 F.2d 439, 442.
• Simple Battery. Pen. Code, § 242.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 13–16, 57.
620
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with holding a hostage [in

prove that:
1. The defendant (held a person hostage/ [or] held a person against
his or her will, by force or threat of force, in defiance of official
orders) inside a (prison/facility under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Corrections);
AND
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was serving a sentence in a
[California] state prison.
A person is serving a sentence in a state prison if he or she is (confined in
order becomes final]. [A person may be serving a sentence in a state
on parole is not serving a sentence in a state prison.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
621

352 F.2d 439, 442.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 291.
622
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with inciting a riot [in a

(state prison/county jail)] [in violation of Penal Code section 404.6(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (did an act [or engaged in conduct] that
encouraged a riot[,]/ [or] urged others to commit acts of force or
violence[,]/ [or] urged others to (burn/ [or] destroy) property);
2. The defendant acted at a time and place and under circumstances
that produced a clear, present, and immediate danger that (acts
of force or violence would happen/ [or] property would be
(burned/ [or] destroyed));
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to cause a riot;
4. As a result of the defendant’s action [or conduct], a riot occurred
[in a (state prison/county jail)];
AND
5. The riot resulted in serious bodily injury to someone.
out those threats. [A disturbance of the public peace may happen in any
place of confinement, including a (state prison/ [or] county jail).]
A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition.
Such an injury may include[, but is not limited to]: (loss of
suturing/ [and] serious disfigurement).
[To commit acts of force or violence means to wrongfully [and unlawfully]
apply physical force to the property or person of another.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The defendant may admit to the fact that the incident occurred in a state prison or
623
county jail. (Pen. Code, § 404.6(d).) If the defendant makes such an admission, the
court should delete all bracketed references to state prison or county jail. If the
defendant does not make such an admission, the court should give the bracketed
portions referring to state prison or county jail.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 404.6(c).
• Force or Violence Defined. See People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618,
627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; People v. Bravott (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227
Cal.Rptr. 810].
• Statute Constitutional. People v. Davis (1968) 68 Cal.2d 481, 484–487 [67
Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 P.2d 651].
• Terms of Statute Understandable. People v. Jones (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 437,
447 [96 Cal.Rptr. 795].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Must Urge Others
To be guilty of inciting a riot, the defendant must urge others to commit acts of
force or property destruction. (People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 778 [215
Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]; In re Wagner (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 106 [173
Cal.Rptr. 766].) Thus, in In re Wagner, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 106, the court
held that the evidence was insufficient to establish incitement to riot where the
defendant was observed throwing rocks at the police. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
624
2745. Possession or Manufacture of Weapon in Penal Institution
(Pen. Code, § 4502)

manufacturing[,]/ [or] attempting to manufacture) a weapon, specifically
[(a/an)] <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g.,
“explosive”>, while (in a penal institution/being taken to or from a penal
institution/under the custody of an (official/officer/employee) of a penal
institution) [in violation of Penal Code section 4502].
prove that:
1. The defendant was (present at or confined in a penal institution/
being taken to or from a penal institution/under the custody of an
(official/officer/employee) of a penal institution);
2. The defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/her) person[,]/
[or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or]
manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) [(a/an)]
<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g.,
“explosive”>;
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on
(his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/
[or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) the
<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g.,
“explosive”>;
AND
4. The defendant knew that the object (was [(a/an)]
<insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, e.g., “explosive”>/
could be used <insert description of weapon’s use,
e.g., “as a stabbing weapon,” or “for purposes of offense or
defense”>).
A penal institution is a (state prison[,]/ [or] prison camp or farm[,]/ [or]
county jail[,]/ [or] county road camp).
[Metal knuckles means any device or instrument made wholly or
partially of metal that is worn in or on the hand for purposes of offense
or defense and that either protects the wearer’s hand while striking a
blow or increases the injury or force of impact from the blow. The metal
contained in the device may help support the hand or fist, provide a
shield to protect it, or consist of projections or studs that would contact
the individual receiving a blow.]
625

heat.]
(is/are) [an] explosive[s].]
[Fixed ammunition is a projectile and powder enclosed together in a case
ready for loading.]
[A dirk or dagger is a knife or other instrument, with or without a
handguard, that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may
inflict great bodily injury or death.] [Great bodily injury means significant
or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor
or moderate harm.]
explosion or other form of combustion.] [A firearm need not be in
shooting.]
[Tear gas is a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce
temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury when vaporized or
otherwise dispersed in the air.]
[A tear gas weapon is a shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being
discharged or exploded to release or emit tear gas.] [A tear gas weapon
[also] means a revolver, pistol, fountain pen gun, billy, or other device,
portable or fixed, intended specifically to project or release tear gas.] [A
tear gas weapon does not include a device regularly manufactured and
sold for use with firearm ammunition.]
[[(A/An)] <insert type of weapon from Pen. Code, § 4502, not
covered in above definitions> (is/means/includes) <insert
appropriate definition, see Bench Notes>.]
use the object as a weapon.
[You may consider evidence that the object could be used in a harmless
way in deciding if the object is (a/an) <insert type of weapon
from Pen. Code, § 4502>, as defined here.]
carried by the defendant on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] (displayed/visible)).]
626

[The People allege that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried on (his/
her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or]
manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) the following weapons:
that the People have proved that the defendant (possessed[,]/ [or] carried
on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or control[,]/ [or]
manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture) at least one of these
weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) (possessed[,]/ [or]
carried on (his/her) person[,]/ [or] had under (his/her) custody or
control[,]/ [or] manufactured[,]/ [or] attempted to manufacture).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Where indicated in the instruction, insert one or more of the following weapons
from Penal Code section 4502, based on the evidence presented:
metal knuckles
explosive substance
fixed ammunition
dirk or dagger
sharp instrument
pistol, revolver, or other firearm
tear gas or tear gas weapon
an instrument or weapon of the kind commonly known as a blackjack,
slungshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag
Following the elements, give the appropriate definition of the alleged weapon. If the
prosecution alleges that the defendant possessed an “instrument or weapon of the
kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, [or] sandbag,” the
court should give an appropriate definition based on case law. (See People v. Fannin
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496] [definition of “slungshot”];
627
People v. Mulherin (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35 P.2d 174] [definition of this
class of weapons].)
weapons, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland
items alleged.
If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object possessed, give the
bracketed sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object
could be used in a harmless way . . . .” (People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant attempted to manufacture a weapon,
give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder.
It is unclear if the defense of momentary possession for disposal applies to a charge
of weapons possession in a penal institution. In People v. Brown (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 736, 740 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 519], the court held that the defense was not
available on the facts of the case before it but declined to consider whether “there
can ever be a circumstance justifying temporary possession in a penal institution.”
(Ibid. [emphasis in original].) The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the
momentary possession defense is available to a charge of illegal possession of a
weapon. (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d
599, 25 P.3d 1081].) However, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the
defense is available in a penal institution. If the trial court determines that an
instruction on momentary possession is warranted on the facts of the case before it,
give a modified version of the instruction on momentary possession contained in
CALCRIM No. 2510, Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to
If there is sufficient evidence of imminent death or bodily injury, the defendant may
be entitled to an instruction on the defense of duress or threats. (People v. Otis
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 125–126 [344 P.2d 342].) Give CALCRIM No. 3402,
Duress or Threats, modified as necessary.
AUTHORITY
• Metal Knuckles Defined. Pen. Code, § 21810.
628

• Fixed Ammunition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (accessed January 11, 2012).
• Dirk or Dagger Defined. Pen. Code, § 16470.
• Tear Gas Defined. Pen. Code, § 17240.
• Tear Gas Weapon Defined. Pen. Code, § 17250.
• Blackjack, etc., Defined. People v. Fannin (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402
[111 Cal.Rptr.2d 496]; People v. Mulherin (1934) 140 Cal.App. 212, 215 [35
P.2d 174].
Cal.Rptr.2d 735]; People v. Reynolds (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 776, 779 [252
Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds, People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th
470, 484 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
• Harmless Use. People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744 [19
Cal.Rptr.2d 115]; People v. Martinez (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 910–913 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
483].
• Constructive vs. Actual Possession. People v. Reynolds (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d
776, 782, fn. 5 [252 Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds in People v.
Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].
RELATED ISSUES
Administrative Punishment Does Not Bar Criminal Action
“[P]rison disciplinary measures do not bar subsequent prosecution in a criminal
action for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the basis
of the prison discipline by virtue of the proscription against double punishment
provided in section 654 [citation] or by the proscription against double jeopardy
provided in the California Constitution (art. I, § 13) and section 1023.” (People v.
Vatelli (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 54, 58 [92 Cal.Rptr. 763] [citing People v. Eggleston
(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 340 [63 Cal.Rptr. 104]].)
Possession of Multiple Weapons at One Time Supports Only One Conviction
“[D]efendant is subject to only one conviction for his simultaneous possession of
three sharp wooden sticks in prison.” (People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61,
65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 900].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
629

Prisoners’ Rights, § 94.04 (Matthew Bender).
630
2746. Possession of Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive in a
Jail or County Road Camp (Pen. Code, § 4574(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing a weapon

while confined in a (jail/county road camp) [in violation of Penal Code
section 4574(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was lawfully confined in a (jail/county road camp);
2. While confined there, the defendant [unlawfully] possessed [(a/
an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear
gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon) within the (jail/county road camp);
3. The defendant knew that (he/she) possessed the (firearm[,]/ [or]
deadly weapon[,]/ [or] explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas
weapon);
AND
4. The defendant knew that the object was [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or]
weapon).
[A jail is a place of confinement where people are held in lawful
custody.]
shooting.]
[As used here, a deadly weapon is any weapon, instrument, or object that
has the reasonable potential of being used in a manner that would cause
great bodily injury or death.] [Great bodily injury means significant or
substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or
moderate harm.]
heat.]
(is/are) [an] explosive[s].]
631
[Tear gas is a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce

temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury through being
vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air.]
[A tear gas weapon is a shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being
way in deciding whether the object is a deadly weapon as defined here.]
it. It is enough if the person knowingly has (control over it/ [or] the right
to control it), either personally or through another person).]
[The People allege that the defendant possessed the following weapons:
that the People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of
these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she) possessed.]
<Defense: Possession Authorized>
[The defendant is not guilty of this offense if (he/she) was authorized to
possess the weapon by (law[,]/ [or] a person in charge of the (jail/county
road camp)[,]/ [or] an officer of the (jail/county road camp) empowered
by the person in charge of the (jail/camp) to give such authorization).
the defendant was not authorized to possess the weapon. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this
offense.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
632
weapons, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v.
Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland
items alleged.
Note that the definition of “deadly weapon” in the context of Penal Code section
4574 differs from the definition given in other instructions. (People v. Martinez
If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object possessed, give the
bracketed sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object
could be used in a harmless way . . . .” (People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
738, 743–744 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to possess the
weapon, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 2. Give also the bracketed
paragraph headed “Defense: Possession Authorized.”
It is unclear if the defense of momentary possession for disposal applies to a charge
of weapons possession in a penal institution. In People v. Brown (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 736, 740 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 519], the court held that the defense was not
available on the facts of the case before it but declined to consider whether “there
can ever be a circumstance justifying temporary possession in a penal institution.”
(Ibid. [emphasis in original].) The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the
momentary possession defense is available to a charge of illegal possession of a
weapon. (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191–1192 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d
599, 25 P.3d 1081].) However, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the
defense is available in a penal institution. If the trial court determines that an
instruction on momentary possession is warranted on the facts of the case before it,
give a modified version of the instruction on momentary possession contained in
CALCRIM No. 2510, Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited Due to
If there is sufficient evidence of imminent death or bodily injury, the defendant may
be entitled to an instruction on the defense of duress or threats. (People v. Otis
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 125–126 [344 P.2d 342].) Give CALCRIM No. 3402,
Duress or Threats, modified as necessary.
633
AUTHORITY
• Deadly Weapon Defined. People v. Martinez (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
• Jail Defined. People v. Carter (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 550 [172 Cal.Rptr.
838].
Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. James (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 645, 650 [81
Cal.Rptr. 845].
Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
483].
• Firearm Need Not Be Operable. People v. Talkington (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d
557, 563 [189 Cal.Rptr. 735].
• Constructive vs. Actual Possession. People v. Reynolds (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d
776, 782, fn. 5 [252 Cal.Rptr. 637], overruled on other grounds, People v. Flood
RELATED ISSUES
“[P]rison disciplinary measures do not bar subsequent prosecution in a criminal
action for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the basis
of the prison discipline by virtue of the proscription against double punishment
provided in section 654 [citation] or by the proscription against double jeopardy
provided in the California Constitution (art. I, § 13) and section 1023.” (People v.
Vatelli (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 54, 58 [92 Cal.Rptr. 763]; [citing People v. Eggleston
(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 340 [63 Cal.Rptr. 104]].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
634

635
2747. Bringing or Sending Firearm, Deadly Weapon, or Explosive
Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4574(a)–(c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (bringing/sending/ [or]

assisting in (bringing/sending)) a weapon into a penal institution [in
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in
(bringing/sending)) [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or] deadly weapon[,]/
[or]explosive[,]/ [or] tear gas[,]/ [or] tear gas weapon) into a penal
institution [or onto the grounds (of/ [or] adjacent to) a penal
institution];
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (bringing/sending/ [or]
assisting in (bringing/sending)) an object into a penal institution
[or onto the grounds (of/ [or] adjacent to) a penal institution];
AND
3. The defendant knew that the object was [(a/an)] (firearm[,]/ [or]
weapon).
jail[,]/ [or] county road camp[,]/ [or] place where prisoners of the state
prison are located under the custody of prison officials, officers, or
employees).
shooting.]
[As used here, a deadly weapon is any weapon, instrument or object that
has the reasonable potential of being used in a manner that would cause
great bodily injury or death.] [Great bodily injury means significant or
substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or
moderate harm.]
heat.]
636

[ <insert type[s] of explosive[s] from Health & Saf. Code,
§ 12000> (is/are) [an] explosive[s].]
[Tear gas means a liquid, gaseous, or solid substance intended to produce
temporary physical discomfort or permanent injury through being
vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air.]
[A tear gas weapon means any shell, cartridge, or bomb capable of being
way in deciding if the object is a deadly weapon as defined here.]
[The People allege that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in
(bringing/sending)) the following weapons: <insert
description of each weapon when multiple items alleged>. You may not find
the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved
that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)) at
least one of these weapons and you all agree on which weapon (he/she)
(brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)).]
(bring/send) a weapon into the penal institution by (law[,]/ [or] a person
in charge of the penal institution[,]/ [or] an officer of the penal
institution empowered by the person in charge of the institution to give
such authorization). The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to (bring/send)
the weapon into the institution. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
637
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant brought or sent
multiple weapons into the institution, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7
Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d
900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the
defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)),” inserting the items
alleged.
If the defendant is charged with a felony for bringing or sending tear gas or a tear
gas weapon into a penal institution resulting in the release of tear gas (Pen. Code,
§ 4574(b)), the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on this additional
allegation. The court should give the jury an additional instruction on this issue and
a verdict form on which the jury may indicate if this fact has or has not been
proved.
Note that the definition of “deadly weapon” in the context of Penal Code section
4574 differs from the definition given in other instructions. (People v. Martinez
If there is sufficient evidence of a harmless use for the object, give the bracketed
sentence that begins with “You may consider evidence that the object could be used
in a harmless way . . . .” (People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 743–744
[19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115].)
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to bring or send the
weapon, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1. Give also the bracketed
paragraph headed “Defense: Conduct Authorized.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 4574(a), (b) & (c).
• Deadly Weapon Defined. People v. Martinez (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 909 [79
Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
838].
• Knowledge of Nature of Object. See People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322,
638
331–332 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52]; People v. James (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d
645, 650 [81 Cal.Rptr. 845].
• Knowledge of Location as Penal Institution. People v. Seale (1969) 274
Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
Cal.Rptr.2d 334].
483].
• Firearm Need Not Be Operable. People v. Talkington (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d
557, 563 [189 Cal.Rptr. 735].
• “Adjacent to” and “Grounds” Not Vague. People v. Seale (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d
107, 114–115 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
• Attempt to Bring or Send Weapon Into Penal Institution. Pen. Code, §§ 664,
4574(a), (b), or (c); People v. Carter (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 548 [172
Cal.Rptr. 838].
If the defendant is charged with bringing or sending tear gas or a tear gas weapon
into a penal institution, the offense is a misdemeanor unless tear gas was released in
the institution. (Pen. Code, § 4574(b) & (c).) If the defendant is charged with a
felony, then the misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. The court must
provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the
prosecution has proved that tear gas was released. If the jury finds that this has not
RELATED ISSUES
Inmate Transferred to Mental Hospital
A prison inmate transferred to a mental hospital for treatment pursuant to Penal
Code section 2684 is not “under the custody of prison officials.” (People v. Superior
Court (Ortiz) (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 745].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
639
2748. Possession of Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia in
Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573.6)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with possessing (

<insert type of controlled substance>, a controlled substance/
an object intended for use to inject or consume controlled substances), in
a penal institution [in violation of Penal Code section 4573.6].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed (a controlled substance/an
object intended for use to inject or consume controlled
substances) in a penal institution [or on the grounds of a penal
institution];
2. The defendant knew of the (substance’s/object’s) presence;
[AND]
3. The defendant knew (of the substance’s nature or character as a
controlled substance/that the object was intended to be used for
injecting or consuming controlled substances)(;/.)
<Give elements 4 and 5 if defendant is charged with possession of a
controlled substance, not possession of paraphernalia.>
paragraph 4A.>
[4A. The controlled substance was <insert type of
AND
5. The controlled substance was a usable amount.]
[OR]
640

substance.]]
(county/ [or] city) jail[,]/ [or] county road camp[,]/ [or] county farm[,]/
[or] place where prisoners of the state prison are located under the
custody of prison officials, officers, or employees/ [or] place where
prisoners or inmates are being held under the custody of a (sheriff[,]/
[or] chief of police[,]/ [or] peace officer[,]/ [or] probation officer).
[An object is intended to be used for injecting or consuming controlled
substances if the defendant (1) actually intended it to be so used, or (2)
should have known, based on the item’s objective features, that it was
intended for such use.]
<insert description of each controlled substance or all
paraphernalia when multiple items alleged>. You may not find the
the defendant possessed at least one of these items and you all agree on
which item (he/she) possessed.]
<A. Defense: Prescription>
[The defendant is not guilty of unlawfully possessing
<insert type of controlled substance> if (he/she) had a valid prescription
for that substance written by a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or
veterinarian licensed to practice in California. The People have the
have a valid prescription. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of possessing a controlled substance.]
641
<B. Defense: Conduct Authorized>

possess the (substance/item) by (the rules of the (Department of
Corrections/prison/jail/institution/camp/farm/place)/ [or] the specific
authorization of the (warden[,]/ [or] superintendent[,]/ [or] jailer[,]/ [or]
[other] person in charge of the (prison/jail/institution/camp/farm/place)).
the defendant was not authorized to possess the (substance/item). If the
of this offense.]
New January 2006; Revised October 2010, February 2014, September 2017,
September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with possessing a controlled substance, give elements 1
through 5. If the defendant is charged with possession of paraphernalia, give
elements 1 through 3 only.
items, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland
items alleged.
Give the bracketed sentence defining “intended to be used” if there is an issue over
whether the object allegedly possessed by the defendant was drug paraphernalia.
(See People v. Gutierrez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 561].)
The prescription defense is codified in Health & Safety Code sections 11350 and
11377. This defense does apply to a charge of possession of a controlled substance
in a penal institution. (People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 [25
Cal.Rptr.2d 52].) The defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt about whether
his possession of the drug was lawful because of a valid prescription. (See People v.
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) If there is
sufficient evidence of a prescription, give the bracketed “unlawfully” in element 1
and the bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Prescription.”
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to possess the
substance or item, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1 and the
bracketed paragraph headed “Defense: Conduct Authorized.” (People v. George
(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275–276 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750]; People v. Cardenas
642

AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 4573.6; People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242
[40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717]; People v. Carrasco (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d
936, 944–948 [173 Cal.Rptr. 688].
• Knowledge. People v. Carrasco, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at pp. 944–947.
• Usable Amount. People v. Carrasco, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 948.
• Prescription Defense. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11377.
• Prescription Defense Applies. People v. Fenton (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 969
• Authorization Is Affirmative Defense. People v. George (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th
262, 275–276 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750]; People v. Cardenas, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 245–246.
838].
Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
• “Adjacent to” and “Grounds” Not Vague. People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d
at pp. 114–115.
556 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 162].
483].
RELATED ISSUES
A prison inmate transferred to a mental hospital for treatment under Penal Code
section 2684 is not “under the custody of prison officials.” (People v. Superior
Court (Ortiz) (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 745].) However, the
inmate is “held under custody by peace officers within the facility.” (Id. at p. 1003.)
Thus, Penal Code section 4573.6 does apply. (Ibid.)
Use of Controlled Substance Insufficient to Prove Possession
“ ‘[P]ossession,’ as used in that section, does not mean ‘use’ and mere evidence of
use (or being under the influence) of a proscribed substance cannot circumstantially
643
prove its ‘possession.’ ” (People v. Spann (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 408 [232
Cal.Rptr. 31] [italics in original]; see also People v. Carrasco, supra, 118
Cal.App.3d at p. 947.)
Posting of Prohibition
Penal Code section 4573.6 requires that its “prohibitions and sanctions” be posted
on the grounds of the penal institution. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6.) However, that
requirement is not an element of the offense, and the prosecution is not required to
prove compliance. (People v. Gutierrez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 561]; People v. Cardenas, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 246.)
Possession of Multiple Items at One Time
“[C]ontemporaneous possession in a state prison of two or more discrete controlled
substances . . . at the same location constitutes but one offense under Penal Code
section 4573.6.” (People v. Rouser (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1067 [69
Cal.Rptr.2d 563].)
“The protection against multiple punishment afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause . . . is not implicated by prior prison disciplinary proceedings . . . .” (Taylor
v. Hamlet (N.D. Cal. 2003) 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19451; see also People v. Ford
(1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 [345 P.2d 354] [Pen. Code, § 654 not implicated].)
Medical Use of Cannabis
The medical cannabis defense provided by Health and Safety Code section 11362.5
is not available to a defendant charged with violating Penal Code section 4573.6.
(Taylor v. Hamlet, supra, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19451.) However, the common law
defense of medical necessity may be available. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
644
2749. Bringing or Sending Controlled Substance or Paraphernalia
Into Penal Institution (Pen. Code, § 4573(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (bringing/sending/ [or]

assisting in (bringing/sending)) ( <insert type of controlled
substance>, a controlled substance/an object intended for use to inject or
consume controlled substances), into a penal institution [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in
(bringing/sending)) (a controlled substance/ [or] an object
intended for use to inject or consume controlled substances) into
a penal institution [or onto the grounds of a penal institution];
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (bringing/sending/ [or]
assisting in (bringing/sending)) (a controlled substance/an object
intended for use to inject or consume a controlled substance) into
a penal institution [or onto the grounds of a penal institution];
[AND]
3. The defendant knew (of the substance’s nature or character as a
controlled substance/that the object was intended to be used for
injecting or consuming a controlled substance)(;/.)
<Give elements 4 and 5 if defendant is charged with possession of a
controlled substance, not possession of paraphernalia.>
[4. The controlled substance was [an analog of] <insert
AND
5. The controlled substance was a usable amount.]
[OR]
substance.]]
645

jail[,]/ [or] county road camp[,]/ [or] place where prisoners of the state
prison are located under the custody of prison officials, officers, or
employees).
[An object is intended to be used for injecting or consuming a controlled
substance if the defendant (1) actually intended it to be so used, or (2)
should have known, based on the item’s objective features, that it was
intended for such use.]
[The People allege that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in
(bringing/sending)) the following items: <insert description
of each controlled substance or all paraphernalia when multiple items
that the People have proved that the defendant (brought/sent/ [or]
assisted in (bringing/sending)) at least one of these items and you all
agree on which item (he/she) (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/
sending)).]
(bring/send) the (substance/item) into the penal institution by (law[,]/ [or]
a person in charge of the penal institution[,]/ [or] an officer of the penal
institution empowered by the person in charge of the institution to give
such authorization). The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not authorized to (bring/send)
the (substance/item) into the institution. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this offense.]
New March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with bringing or sending a controlled substance, give
elements 1 through 5. If the defendant is charged with bringing or sending
paraphernalia, give elements 1 through 3 only.
If the controlled substance is not listed in the schedules set forth in sections 11054
through 11058 of the Health and Safety Code, give the bracketed phrase “an analog
of” in element 4.
646
If the prosecution alleges under a single count that the defendant brought or sent
multiple items into the institution, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
unanimity. (See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 184–185 [7
Cal.Rptr.3d 483]; People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 65 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d
900].) Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People allege that the
defendant (brought/sent/ [or] assisted in (bringing/sending)),” inserting the items
alleged.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was authorized to bring or send the
controlled substance or item, give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in element 1.
Give also the bracketed paragraph under the heading “Defense: Conduct
Authorized.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 4573; People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 381–387
[110 Cal.Rptr.3d 640, 232 P.3d 635].
• Knowingly Brings or Sends. People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 386 [110
Cal.Rptr.3d 640, 232 P.3d 635]; People v. Gastello (2010) 49 Cal.4th 395,
402–403 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 232 P.3d 650].
• Usable Amount. People v. Blanco (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 278, 286 [275
Cal.Rptr.3d 558].
838].
Cal.App.2d 107, 111 [78 Cal.Rptr. 811].
483].
RELATED ISSUES
A prison inmate transferred to a mental hospital for treatment pursuant to Penal
Code section 2684 is not “under the custody of prison officials.” (People v. Superior
Court (Ortiz) (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 1002 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 745].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
647
648
(iv) Escape
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (escape/ [or]

attempting to escape) [in violation of Penal Code section 4532].
prove that:
1. The defendant was a prisoner who had been ((arrested and
booked for[,]/ [or] charged with[,]/ [or] convicted of) a
(misdemeanor/felony)/committed by order of the juvenile court to
an adult facility);
<Alternative 2A—confined in penal institution>
[2. The defendant was confined in (a/an) (county jail/city jail/prison/
industrial farm/industrial road camp);]
<Alternative 2B—engaged in county work>
[2. The defendant was working on (a county road/ [or other] county
work) as an inmate;]
<Alternative 2C—lawful custody>
[2. The defendant was in the lawful custody of (an officer/ [or] a
person);]
<Alternative 2D—work furlough>
industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was authorized to be
away from the place of confinement in connection with a work
furlough program;]
<Alternative 2E—temporary release>
industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was away from the
place of confinement in connection with an authorized temporary
release;]
<Alternative 2F—home detention>
[2. The defendant was a participant in a home detention program;]
<Alternative 2G—confined under Pen. Code, § 4011.9>
[2. The defendant was confined as an inmate in a hospital for
treatment even though no guard was present to detain the
defendant;]
649
AND
[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the (jail/
prison/farm/camp).]
[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the
custody of the (officer/ [or] person in charge of (him/her)) while
engaged in work at, or going to or returning from, the county
work site.]
custody of the (officer/ [or] person) who had lawful custody of the
defendant.]
prison/farm/camp) by failing to return to the place of
confinement.]
confinement.]
[3. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the place
of confinement in the home detention program.]
of hospital confinement.]
[A person has been booked for a (misdemeanor/felony) if he or she has
been taken to a law enforcement office where an officer or employee has
recorded the arrest and taken the person’s fingerprints and photograph.]
[A person has been charged with a (misdemeanor/felony) if a formal
complaint, information, or indictment has been filed in court alleging
that the person committed a crime.]
Escape means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the physical
limits of his or her custody. [It is not necessary for the prisoner to have
left the outer limits of the institution’s property. However, the prisoner
must breach a wall or fence marking the security perimeter of the
650
correctional facility. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to be merely

outside the particular area within the facility where he or she is
permitted to be.]
[A prisoner also escapes if he or she willfully fails to return to his or her
place of confinement within the period that he or she was authorized to
be away from that place of confinement. Someone commits an act
willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]
[A prisoner is in the lawful custody of (an officer/ [or] a person) if the
(officer/ [or] person), acting under legal authority, physically restrains or
confines the prisoner so that the prisoner is significantly deprived of his
or her freedom of movement or the prisoner reasonably believes that he
or she is significantly deprived of his or her freedom of movement.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In elements 2 and 3, select the location where the defendant was allegedly confined
or the program that the defendant allegedly escaped from.
In the definition of escape, give the bracketed sentence if there is an issue as to
whether the defendant went far enough to constitute an escape. (See People v.
Lavaie (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].)
Give the bracketed paragraph on willful failure to return if appropriate based on the
evidence.
Give the bracketed paragraph defining lawful custody if there is an issue as to
whether the defendant was in lawful custody. (People v. Nicholson (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 823 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 476].)
If the defendant is charged with attempt, give CALCRIM No. 460, Attempt Other
Than Attempted Murder. (People v. Gallegos (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114
Cal.Rptr. 166].)
If the prosecution alleges escape with force or violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) or
(b)(2)), give CALCRIM No. 2761, Escape By Force or Violence. (People v.
Gallegos, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 518–519.)
If there is sufficient evidence of necessity, the court has a sua sponte duty to give
CALCRIM No. 2764, Escape: Necessity Defense. (People v. Condley (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; People v. Lovercamp (1974) 43
Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)
651
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent Not an Element of Completed Escape. People v. George (1980)
109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
• Attempt to Escape—Must Instruct on Direct Act and Specific Intent. People v.
Gallegos (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 517 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].
• Escape Defined. People v. Lavaie (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82
Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
• Arrested Defendant Must Be Booked Before Statute Applies. People v. Diaz
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952]; see also
People v. Trotter (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 965, 967, 971 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].
• Arrest of Probationer—Booking Not Required. People v. Cisneros (1986) 179
Cal.App.3d 117, 120–123 [224 Cal.Rptr. 452].
• Arrest of Parolee—Booking Not Required. People v. Nicholson (2004) 123
• Must Be Confined in Adult Penal Institution. People v. Rackley (1995) 33
Attempted escape is not a lesser included offense of escape. (People v. Bailey
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 748–752 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 279 P.3d 1120]).
RELATED ISSUES
Violating Work Furlough Conditions
In order for an inmate assigned to work furlough to violate Penal Code section
4532, the inmate must “willfully” fail to return on time. (Yost v. Superior Court
(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 289, 292 [125 Cal.Rptr. 74] [defendant who was arrested on
other charges on his way back to camp did not willfully fail to return].) If the
defendant merely violates conditions of the work furlough release, that conduct falls
under Penal Code section 1208, not section 4532. (Id. at p. 295.)
Defendant Illegally Detained
If a person is detained in custody “without any process, . . . wholly without
authority of law,” or “where the judgment was void on its face,” the detention is
illegal and the defendant may “depart” without committing the crime of escape.
(People v. Teung (1891) 92 Cal. 421, 421–422, 426 [28 P. 577]; In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 749 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948].) “But where the
imprisonment is made under authority of law and the process is simply irregular in
form, or the statute under which he is confined is unconstitutional, the escape is
unlawful.” (In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 749.) Note that this is a narrow
exception, one that has not been applied by the courts since the case of People v.
Clark (1924) 69 Cal.App. 520, 523 [231 P. 590].
652
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).
Prisoners’ Rights, § 94.20[2] (Matthew Bender).
653
2761. Escape by Force or Violence (Pen. Code, § 4532(a)(2) &
(b)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (escape/ [or] attempted

escape) committed by force or violence [in violation of Penal Code
section 4532].
prove that:
1. The defendant was ((arrested and booked for[,]/ [or] charged
with[,]/ [or] convicted of) a (misdemeanor/felony)/committed by
order of the juvenile court to an adult facility);
industrial farm/industrial road camp);]
[2. The defendant was working on (a county road/ [or other] county
work) as an inmate;]
[2. The defendant was in the lawful custody of (an officer/ [or] a
person);]
industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was authorized to be
away from the place of confinement in connection with a work
furlough program;]
industrial farm/industrial road camp) but was away from the
place of confinement in connection with an authorized temporary
release;]
[2. The defendant was a participant in a home detention program;]
[2. The defendant was confined as an inmate in a hospital for
treatment even though no guard was present to detain the
defendant;]
654

prison/farm/camp);]
custody of the (officer/ [or] person in charge of (him/her)) while
engaged in or going to or returning from the county work site;]
custody of the (officer/ [or] person) who had lawful custody of the
defendant;]
confinement;]
confinement;]
of confinement in the home detention program;]
of hospital confinement;]
AND
4. The defendant committed the (escape/ [or] attempted escape) by
force or violence.
[A person has been booked for a (misdemeanor/felony) if he or she has
been taken to a law enforcement office where an officer or employee has
recorded the arrest and taken the person’s fingerprints and photograph.]
[A person has been charged with a (misdemeanor/felony) if a formal
complaint, information, or indictment has been filed in court alleging
that the person committed a crime.]
Escape means the unlawful departure of a prisoner from the physical
limits of his or her custody. [It is not necessary for the prisoner to have
655
left the outer limits of the institution’s property. However, the prisoner
must breach a wall or fence marking the security perimeter of the
correctional facility. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to be merely
outside the particular area within the facility where he or she is
permitted to be.]
[A prisoner also escapes if he or she willfully fails to return to his or her
place of confinement within the period that he or she was authorized to
be away from that place of confinement. Someone commits an act
willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose.]
To commit an act by force or violence means to wrongfully use physical
force against the property or person of another. [To use force against a
person means to touch the other person in a harmful or offensive
manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or
angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his
or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or
injury of any kind.]
[The People must prove that the defendant personally used force or
violence or aided and abetted another in using force or violence. Mere
knowledge that someone else used force or violence is not enough.
Instruction[s] <insert instruction numbers; see Bench Notes>
explain[s] when a person aids and abets another.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In elements 2 and 3, select the location where the defendant was allegedly confined
or the program that the defendant allegedly escaped from and use the appropriate
alternative paragraphs.
In the definition of escape, give the bracketed sentence if there is an issue as to
whether the defendant went far enough to constitute an escape. (See People v.
Lavaie (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 459–461 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].)
Give the bracketed paragraph on willful failure to return if appropriate based on the
evidence.
In the definition of force or violence, use the bracketed sentences if the prosecution
alleges that the defendant used force against a person. (People v. Lozano (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 618, 627 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612] [meaning of “force” in Pen. Code, § 4532
equivalent to simple battery].)
656
defendant personally” if this is an issue in the case. (People v. Moretto (1994) 21

Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].) Give also CALCRIM No. 400,
Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and
Abetting: Intended Crimes.
Cal.Rptr. 166].)
Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)
AUTHORITY
109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
• Force or Violence Defined. People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627
[237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; People v. Bravott (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227
Cal.Rptr. 810].
• Force Includes Damage to Property. People v. White (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 862,
866 [249 Cal.Rptr. 165]; People v. Bravott (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227
Cal.Rptr. 810].
• Defendant Must Personally Use Force or Aid and Abet Another. People v.
Moretto (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
• Arrested Defendant Must Be Booked Before Statute Applies. People v. Diaz
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 712, 716–717 [150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586 P.2d 952]; see also
People v. Trotter (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 965, 967, 971 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 898].
• Arrest of Probationer—Booking Not Required. People v. Cisneros (1986) 179
Cal.App.3d 117, 120–123 [224 Cal.Rptr. 452].
• Must Be Confined in Adult Penal Institution. People v. Rackley (1995) 33
Escape carries a more severe penalty if done with force or violence. (Pen. Code,
§ 4532(a)(2) & (b)(2).) If the defendant is charged with using force or violence, then
the escape without force or violence is a lesser included offense. (People v. Gallegos
657
(1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 518–519 [114 Cal.Rptr. 166].) Note that the court must
instruct on all the elements of escape with force or violence and must then give a
separate instruction on the lesser offense, stating all of the elements except force or
violence. (People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 633 [237 Cal.Rptr. 612].)
The court may not give the jury a verdict form asking specifically if the element of
force or violence has been proved. (Ibid.)
RELATED ISSUES
See Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 2760, Escape.
SECONDARY SOURCES
658
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (escape/ [or] attempted

escape) following (a remand/an arrest) [in violation of Penal Code
section 836.6].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—remanded>
[1. The defendant was remanded, which means that a (magistrate/
judge) ordered (him/her) placed into the custody of a (sheriff[,]/
[or] marshal[,]/ [or other] (police agency/peace officer));]
<Alternative 1B—arrested>
[1. The defendant was lawfully arrested by a peace officer and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that (he/she)
had been arrested;]
AND
2. The defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape) from the
custody of the (sheriff[,]/ marshal[,]/ [or other] (police agency/
peace officer)).
Escape means the unlawful departure from the physical limits of custody.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with a felony for use of force or violence, give
CALCRIM No. 2763, Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence with this
instruction.
Cal.Rptr. 166].)
If lawfulness of the arrest is an issue, give the appropriate paragraphs from
659
CALCRIM No. 2670, Lawful Performance: Peace Offıcer.

The jury must determine whether the person who arrested the defendant is a peace
officer. (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758
P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace
officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden
Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may
not instruct the jury that the person was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g.,
“Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (Ibid.)
Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 836.6
109 Cal.App.3d 814, 819 [167 Cal.Rptr. 603].
Cal.Rptr.2d 719].
Escape after remand or arrest is a misdemeanor unless the defendant used force or
violence and caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 836.6(c).)
If the defendant is charged with the felony, then the misdemeanor is a lesser
included offense. (See People v. Gallegos (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 518–519 [114
Cal.Rptr. 166].) The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the
jury will indicate if the additional elements have or have not been proved. If the
jury finds that these elements have not been proved, then the offense should be set
at a misdemeanor.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).
660
2763. Escape After Remand or Arrest: Force or Violence (Pen.
Code, § 836.6)
If you find the defendant guilty of (escape/ [or] attempted escape)

following (remand/arrest), you must then decide whether the People have
proved the additional allegation that the defendant used force or violence
and caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer.
1. The defendant committed the (escape/ [or] attempted escape) by
force or violence;
AND
2. The defendant caused serious bodily injury to a peace officer.
As used here, using force or violence means the wrongful application of
physical force against the person of another. To use force against a
person means to touch the other person in a harmful or offensive
manner.
[The People must prove that the defendant personally used force or
violence or aided and abetted another in using force or violence. Mere
knowledge that someone else used force or violence is not enough.
Instruction[s] <insert instruction numbers; see Bench Notes>
explain[s] when a person aids and abets another.]
However, it does not need to be the only factor that causes the injury.]
A sworn member of <insert name of agency that employs
authority>, is a peace officer.
661
the defendant used force or violence and caused serious bodily injury to
a peace officer. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
sentencing factor.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2762, Escape After Remand or
Arrest. The court must provide the jury with a verdict form on which the jury will
indicate if the prosecution has or has not been proved the additional allegation of
the use of force.
paragraph on causation. If there is evidence of multiple causes of injury, the court
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
defendant personally” if this is an issue in the case. (People v. Moretto (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].) Give also CALCRIM No. 400,
Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, and CALCRIM No. 401, Aiding and
Abetting: Intended Crimes.
The jury must determine whether the person who arrested the defendant is a peace
officer. (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 444–445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758
P.2d 1135].) The court may instruct the jury on the appropriate definition of “peace
officer” from the statute (e.g., “a Garden Grove Regular Police Officer and a Garden
Grove Reserve Police Officer are peace officers”). (Ibid.) However, the court may
not instruct the jury that the person was a peace officer as a matter of law (e.g.,
“Officer Reed was a peace officer”). (Ibid.)
AUTHORITY
• Force or Violence Defined. People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 627
[237 Cal.Rptr. 612]; People v. Bravot (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 97 [227
Cal.Rptr. 810].
• Defendant Must Personally Use Force or Aid and Abet Another. People v.
662
Moretto (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1278 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 719].

SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 11.02, 11.06[3] (Matthew Bender).
663
If you conclude that the defendant (escaped/ [or] attempted to escape),

that conduct was not illegal if the defendant can prove the defense of
necessity. In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove
that:
1. The defendant was faced with a specific threat of (death[,]/ [or]
forcible sexual attack[,]/ [or] substantial bodily injury) in the
immediate future;
2. (There was no time for the defendant to make a complaint to the
authorities/ [or] (There/there) was a history of complaints that
were not acted on, so that a reasonable person would conclude
that any additional complaints would be ineffective);
3. There was no time or opportunity to seek help from the courts;
4. The defendant did not use force or violence against prison
personnel or other people in the escape [other than the person
who was the source of the threatened harm to the defendant];
AND
5. The defendant immediately reported to the proper authorities
when (he/she) had attained a position of safety from the
immediate threat.
preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof from
likely than not that each of the five listed items is true.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
defense of necessity if there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515];
People v. Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].)
AUTHORITY
• Escape—Necessity Defense. People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999,
1008–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515]; People v. Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823,
831–832 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110].
664
SECONDARY SOURCES
665
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with misappropriating

public money [in violation of Penal Code section 424(a)( ) <insert
correct paragraph>].
prove that:
1. The defendant was responsible for receiving, safekeeping,
transferring or distributing public money;
[AND]
2. The defendant, while responsible for receiving, safekeeping,
transferring or distributing public money:
2. <select the element that corresponds to the paragraph of Pen. Code
§ 424(a) with which defendant is charged>
<(a)(1)> [took some of that money for (his/her) own or someone
else’s use without legal authority;]
<(a)(2)> [loaned, made a profit from, or used some of that money
without legal authority;]
<(a)(3)> [knowingly kept a false account or made a false entry or
erasure in any account of the money.]
<(a)(4)> [fraudulently changed, falsified, hid, destroyed, or
obliterated an accounting of that money.]
<(a)(5)> [willfully refused or failed to disburse, on demand, any
public money in (his/her) control in response to a draft,
order, or warrant drawn upon that money by competent
authority;]
<(a)(6)> [willfully failed to transfer any public money when the
transfer was required by law;]
<(a)(7)> [willfully failed or refused to disburse any money that (he/
she) had received to a person legally authorized to receive
that money, despite having a legal duty to do so;]
2. <give element 3 when instructing on Pen. Code § 424(a)(1), (a)(2),
(a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7)>
[AND
3. When the defendant did so, (he/she) (knew that (he/she) was not
667
following the law on receiving, safekeeping, transferring or

distributing public money or was acting without legal authority/
[or] was criminally negligent in failing to know the legal
requirements for or restrictions on (his/her) conduct).]
A person who is responsible for public money only needs to have some
control over the money. That control does not need to be a major part of
that person’s job.
negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an
ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her
act amounts to disregard for the consequences of that act.]
[A person acts fraudulently when he or she makes a false statement,
with the intent to deceive.]
[The term public money includes all funds, bonds, and evidence of
indebtedness received or held by state, county, district, city, town, or
public agency officers in their official capacity. It also includes money
received from selling bonds or other evidence of indebtedness authorized
by the legislative body of any city, county, district, or public agency.]
[A person commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on
purpose.]
New March 2018

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte to give this instruction defining the elements of the
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Definition of Public Funds/Moneys. Pen. Code, §§ 424(b), 426.
• Definition of Responsible for/Charged With. People v. Groat (1993) 19
• Definition of Fraudulent Behavior. People v. Pugh (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 66,
72 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770].
• Criminal Negligence Requirement. Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th
368, 399 [128 Cal.Rptr.3d 611, 257 P.3d 41].
668
TAX CRIMES
A. FAILURE TO FILE
B. FALSE RETURN
2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))
2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 19706)
2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 19705(a)(2))
2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 19705(a)(4))
D. EVIDENCE
2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 17282(a))
E. DEFENSES
669
A. FAILURE TO FILE
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to (file a tax

return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax Board [in
violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was required to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply
information to) the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant repeatedly failed to (file a tax return/ [or] supply
required information) over a period of two years or more;
AND
3. The defendant’s failure to (file the return/ [or] supply required
information) resulted in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at
least fifteen thousand dollars.
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax
Board issued a certificate stating that (a return had not been filed/ [or]
information had not been supplied) as required by law, you may but are
not required to conclude that (the return was not filed/ [or] the
information was not supplied).]
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the (president/ [or] chief operating officer) of a corporation, you may but
are not required to conclude that the defendant is the person responsible
for (filing a return with/ [or] supplying information to) the Franchise
Tax Board as required for that corporation.]
[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of unreported
income.]
[The People do not have to prove that the (unreported/ [or]
underreported) income came from illegal activity.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
671
CALCRIM No. 2800 TAX CRIMES
The two bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that” both explain rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See
Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19703, 19701(d); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California
In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if
there is no evidence to contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence
has been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
without regard to the presumption.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, the court must not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax Board” if there is
evidence that the return was filed or the information was supplied.
Similarly, the court must not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the (president” if
there is evidence that someone else was responsible for filing the return or
supplying the information.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).
• Certificate of Franchise Tax Board. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19703.
• President Responsible for Corporate Filings. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(d).
658 P.2d 1302].
• Need Not Prove Exact Amount. United States v. Wilson (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d
95, 99; United States v. Johnson (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct. 1233,
87 L.Ed. 1546].
• Need Not Prove From Illegal Activity. People v. Smith (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d
1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
COMMENTARY
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) does not require that the defendant’s
conduct be “willful” and specifically states that the act may be “[w]ith or without
intent to evade.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).) Courts have held that this
language creates a strict liability offense with no intent requirement. (People v. Allen
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 849 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 26]; People v. Kuhn (1963) 216
Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [31 Cal.Rptr. 253]; People v. Jones (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 41, 47 [197 Cal.Rptr. 273].) In addition, in People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th
652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563], the Court held that section 19701 was a
lesser included offense of section 19705, willful failure to file a tax return. The
672
TAX CRIMES CALCRIM No. 2800
Court then concluded that the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was
not error since the “the evidence provided no basis for reasonable doubt as to
willfulness.” (Id. at p. 672.) Thus, it appears that “willfulness” is not an element of
a violation of section 19701(a).
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) states that a person is liable if the
person
repeatedly over a period of two years or more, fails to file any return or to
supply any information required, or who . . . makes, renders, signs, or verifies
any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent
information, resulting in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen
thousand dollars ($15,000).
It is not completely clear from this language whether the requirement of an
estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars applies both to
the failure to file a return and to the making, etc. of a false or fraudulent return. The
Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill No. 139, the bill that added this
provision to the statute, indicates that this provision is intended to apply to all the
violations specified in Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a), including the
failure to file a return or supply required information. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig.,
Assem. Bill No. 139 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2005, ch. 74, par. (34).) The
committee has adopted this interpretation pending clarification from either the
Legislature or case law.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.02[5], 140.03 (Matthew Bender).
673
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with intentionally failing to

(file a tax return with/ [or] supply information to) the Franchise Tax
Board [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706].
prove that:
1. The defendant was required to (file a tax return with/ [or] supply
information to) the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant did not (file the tax return/ [or] supply the
information) by the time required;
3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to (file the tax return/ [or]
supply the information), with the intent to violate a legal duty
known to (him/her);
AND
4. When the defendant made that choice, (he/she) intended to
unlawfully evade paying a tax.
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Franchise Tax
Board issued a certificate stating that (a return had not been filed/ [or]
information had not been supplied) as required by law, you may but are
not required to conclude that (the return was not filed/ [or] the
information was not supplied).]
[The People do not have to prove the exact amount of (unreported
income/ [or] [additional] tax owed). The People must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report income/ [or] owed
[additional] taxes)]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The statute states that the defendant’s acts must be “willful.” (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 19706.) As used in the tax code, “willful” means that the defendant must act “in
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” (People v. Hagen (1998) 19
Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to
674
use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word “willful” to
avoid confusion with other instructions that provide a different definition of
“willful.”
The bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that” explains a rebuttable presumption created by statute. (See Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 19703; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held
that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case creates
an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491,
497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with Roder, the
instruction has been written as a permissive inference. In addition, it is only
appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive inference if there is no evidence to
contradict the inference. (Evid. Code, § 640.) If any evidence has been introduced to
support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall determine the existence or
nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the
presumption.” (Ibid.)
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” if there is evidence that the return
was filed or the information was supplied.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “The People do not have to prove the
exact amount” on request. (United States v. Wilson (3d Cir. 1979) 601 F.2d 95, 99;
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.)
If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a
good faith belief that his or her conduct was legal, the court has a sua sponte duty
to give the instruction on this defense. (People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660
[80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give CALCRIM No. 2860, Defense: Good
Faith Belief Conduct Legal.
If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant relied on
the advice of a professional, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the instruction
on this defense. (United States v. Mitchell (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288;
see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) Give
CALCRIM No. 2861, Defense: Reliance on Professional Advice.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.
• Willful Requires Volitional Violation of Known Legal Duty. People v. Hagen
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; see also Federal
Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.20.
• Evade a Tax Defined. See United States v. Bishop (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360, fn.
8 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]; Distinctive Theatres of Columbus v. Looker
(S.D.Ohio 1958) 165 F.Supp. 410, 411.
• Certificate of Franchise Tax Board. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19703.
675
658 P.2d 1302].
95, 99; United States v. Johnson (1943) 319 U.S. 503, 517–518 [63 S.Ct 1233,
87 L.Ed. 1546].
• Amount of Unpaid Taxes Need Not Be Substantial. People v. Mojica (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 634]; United States v. Holland (1989)
880 F.2d 1091, 1095–1096.
1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
• Failure to File Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; People v. Smith (1984)
155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1182–1183 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
SECONDARY SOURCES
676
B. FALSE RETURN
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (supplying (false/ [or]

fraudulent) information to the Franchise Tax Board/ [or] (making[,]/ [or]
verifying[,]/ [or] signing[,]/ [or] rendering) a (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax
return/ [or] statement)) [in violation of Revenue and Taxation Code
section 19701(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant repeatedly (supplied information to the Franchise
Tax Board/ [or] (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or]
rendered [a] tax return[s]/ [or] statement[s]) over a period of two
years or more;
2. The (information[,]/ [or] tax return[,]/ [or] statement) was (false/
[or] fraudulent);
<Alternative 3A—information>
[3. When the defendant supplied the information, (he/she) knew that
it was (false/ [or] fraudulent);]
<Alternative 3B—tax return or statement>
[3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed [,]/ [or]
rendered) the (tax return/ [or] statement), (he/she) knew that it
contained (false/ [or] fraudulent) information;]
AND
4. The defendant’s (supplying of (false/ [or] fraudulent) information/
[or] (making[,]/ [or] verifying[,]/ [or] signing[,]/ [or] rendering)
the (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return/ [or] statement)) resulted in
an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand
dollars.
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
the (president/ [or] chief operating officer) of a corporation, you may but
are not required to conclude that the defendant is the person responsible
for (filing a return with / [or] supplying information to) the Franchise
Tax Board as required for that corporation.]
income/ [or] [additional] tax owed).]
677

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Code, § 19701(d); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” if there is evidence that someone else
was responsible for filing the return or supplying the information.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).
• President Responsible for Corporate Filings. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(d).
658 P.2d 1302].
87 L.Ed. 1546].
1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
COMMENTARY
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) does not require that the defendant’s
conduct be “willful” and specifically states that the act may be “[w]ith or without
intent to evade.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(a).) In the context of failure to file a
tax return, courts have held that this language creates a strict liability offense with
no intent requirement. (People v. Allen (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 849 [25
Cal.Rptr.2d 26]; People v. Kuhn (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [31 Cal.Rptr. 253];
678
People v. Jones (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 41, 47 [197 Cal.Rptr. 273].) In
addition, in People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967
P.2d 563], the Court held that section 19701 was a lesser included offense of section
19705, willful failure to file a tax return. (Id. at p. 670.) The Court then concluded
that the failure to instruct on the lesser included offense was not error since “the
evidence provided no basis for reasonable doubt as to willfulness.” (Id. at p. 672.)
Thus, it appears that “willfulness” is not an element of a violation of section
19701(a).
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a) states that a person is liable if the
person
repeatedly over a period of two years or more, fails to file any return or to
supply any information required, or who . . . makes, renders, signs, or verifies
any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplies any false or fraudulent
information, resulting in an estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen
thousand dollars ($15,000).
It is not completely clear from this language whether the requirement of an
estimated delinquent tax liability of at least fifteen thousand dollars applies both to
the failure to file a return and to the making, etc. of a false or fraudulent return. The
Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Assembly Bill No. 139, the bill that added this
provision to the statute, indicates that this provision is intended to apply to all the
violations specified in Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(a), including the
failure to file a return or supply required information. (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig.,
Assem. Bill No. 139 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2005, ch. 74, par. (34).) The
committee has adopted this interpretation pending clarification from either the
Legislature or case law.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Challenges to Crimes, §§ 140.02, 140.03 (Matthew Bender).
679
2811. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Statement Made Under
Penalty of Perjury (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with intentionally making

and signing (a/an) (false/ [or] inaccurate) (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/
[or other] document) provided to the Franchise Tax Board [in violation
of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant made and signed a (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/
[or other] document) provided to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document)
(contained/ [or] was verified by) a written declaration that it was
made under penalty of perjury;
3. The (tax return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document)
contained a material statement that was (false/ [or] inaccurate);
4. When the defendant made and signed the (tax return[,]/ [or]
statement[,]/ [or other] document), (he/she) did not believe that
the document was true and correct about every material matter;
AND
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with the
intent to violate a legal duty known to (him/her).
A (false/ [or] inaccurate) statement is material if a reasonable person
would believe that it could influence the calculation or monitoring of the
amount of tax owed. [Although the People must prove that the statement
was material, the People do not have to prove that any additional tax
was owed to the government.]
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s
name is signed to a (return[,]/ [or] statement[,]/ [or other] document)
filed with the Franchise Tax Board, you may but are not required to
conclude that the defendant was the person who actually signed the
document. [A document can be filed using (a/an) (computer modem[,]/
[or] magnetic media[,]/ [or] optical disk[,]/ [or] facsimile machine[,]/ [or]
telephone).]]
income/ [or] [additional] tax owed).]
680
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Two statutes prohibit willfully making a false return. (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 19705(a)(1), 19706.) Section 19705(a)(1) requires verification under penalty of
perjury whereas section 19706 requires an intent to evade. (People v. Hagen (1998)
19 Cal.4th 652, 659 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give this instruction if the
defendant is charged with a violation of section 19705(a)(1). If the defendant is
charged with a violation of section 19706, give CALCRIM No. 2812, Willfully
Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax.
§ 19705(a)(1).) As used in the tax code, “willful” means that the defendant must act
“in voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” (People v. Hagen (1998)
19 Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen
to use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word “willful” to
“willful.”
In the definition of “material,” give the bracketed sentence beginning with
“Although the People must prove that the statement was material” if requested.
(United States v. Ballard (8th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 400, 404; Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) §§ 67.15, 67.19.)
Code, § 19075(c); Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court has held
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” if there is evidence that the defendant
did not sign the document.
681
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(1); see Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.15.
• False or Inaccurate Statement Required. People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652,
670 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
• Material Defined. People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 667–668 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
658 P.2d 1302].
87 L.Ed. 1546].
1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
• Electronic Technology Defined. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 18621.5.
• Filing False Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; People v. Hagen (1998) 19
SECONDARY SOURCES
682
2812. Willfully Filing False Tax Return: Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 19706)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (supplying (false/ [or]

fraudulent) information/ [or] (making[,]/ [or] verifying [,]/ [or] signing[,]/
[or] rendering) [a] (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return[s]/ [or]
statement[s])) to the Franchise Tax Board with intent to evade a tax [in
violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19706].
prove that:
1. The defendant (supplied information/ [or] (made[,]/ [or]
verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or] rendered)) [a] (tax return[s]/ [or]
statement[s] provided) to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The (information[,]/ [or] tax return[,]/ [or] statement) was (false/
[or] fraudulent);
<Alternative 3A—information>
[3. When the defendant supplied the information, (he/she) knew that
it was (false/ [or] fraudulent);]
<Alternative 3B—tax return or statement>
[3. When the defendant (made[,]/ [or] verified[,]/ [or] signed[,]/ [or]
rendered) the (tax return/ [or] statement), (he/she) knew that it
contained (false/ [or] fraudulent) information;]
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with intent
to violate a legal duty known to (him/her);
AND
5. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to unlawfully evade
paying a tax.
reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report income/ [or] owed
[additional] taxes).]
683
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Two statutes prohibit willfully making a false return. (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 19705(a)(1), 19706.) Section 19705(a)(1) requires verification under penalty of
perjury whereas section 19706 requires an intent to evade. (People v. Hagen (1998)
19 Cal.4th 652, 659 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) Give this instruction if the
defendant is charged with a violation of section 19706. If the defendant is charged
with a violation of section 19705(a)(1), give CALCRIM No. 2811, Willfully Filing
False Tax Return: Statement Made Under Penalty of Perjury.
§ 19706.) As used in the tax code, “willful” means that the defendant must act “in
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” (People v. Hagen (1998) 19
Cal.4th 652, 666 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].) The committee has chosen to
use this description of the meaning of the term in place of the word “willful” to
“willful.”
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706.
• Evade a Tax Defined. See United States v. Bishop (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360, fn.
8 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941]; Distinctive Theatres of Columbus v. Looker
(S.D.Ohio 1958) 165 F.Supp. 410, 411.
684
87 L.Ed. 1546].
1103, 1158 [203 Cal.Rptr. 196].
• Amount of Unpaid Taxes Need Not Be Substantial. People v. Mojica (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 634]; United States v. Holland (1989)
880 F.2d 1091, 1095–1096.
• Filing False Tax Return. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701; People v. Hagen (1998) 19
SECONDARY SOURCES
685
2825. Aiding in Preparation of False Tax Return (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 19705(a)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (aiding in[,]/ [or]

assisting in[,]/ [or] procuring[,]/ [or] counseling[,]/ [or] advising) the
(preparation/ [or] presentation) of a (false/ [or] fraudulent) (tax return[,]/
[or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document) [in violation of
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(2)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (aided in[,]/ assisted in[,]/ [or] procured[,]/ [or]
counseled[,]/ [or] advised) the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of a
(tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other] document)
required under the (personal income/corporation) tax laws;
2. The (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other]
document) contained a material statement that was (false/ [or]
fraudulent);
<See Bench Notes on element 3.>
[3. The defendant knew that the (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or]
claim[,]/ [or other] document) contained a (false/ [or] fraudulent)
statement;]
AND
(3/4). When the defendant acted, (he/she) did so voluntarily, with
intent that a known legal duty would be violated.
A (false/ [or] fraudulent) statement is material if a reasonable person
would believe that it could influence the calculation or monitoring of the
amount of tax owed. [Although the People must prove that the statement
was material, the People do not have to prove that any additional tax
was owed to the government.]
The People do not need to prove that the taxpayer, as opposed to the
defendant, knew the (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or
other] document) contained a (false/ [or] fraudulent) statement.
Someone aids in the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of a (false/ [or]
fraudulent) (tax return[,]/ [or] affidavit[,]/ [or] claim[,]/ [or other]
document) if, before or during the (preparation/ [or] presentation) of the
document, he or she does something that encourages another person to
(prepare/ [or] present) the (false/ [or] fraudulent) document. [The
687
defendant does not need to personally prepare the document or even be

present when the document is completed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
§ 19705(a)(2).) As used in the tax code, “willful” means that the defendant must act
“willful.”
Element 3 contains a knowledge requirement. The statute does not specifically
require that the defendant knew that the return contained false information. (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2).) However, federal pattern jury instructions for the
analogous federal crime (26 U.S.C., § 7206(2)) require that the defendant must have
known that the document was false even though the federal statute also does not
explicitly contain a knowledge requirement. (Pattern Jury Instructions of the District
Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 95 (2003);
Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges Association of the Fifth Circuit,
Criminal Cases, Instruction No. 2.97 (2001); but see Pattern Jury Instructions of the
Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, Criminal Cases,
Instruction No. 9.38 (2003) [knowledge not specifically required, defendant must
assist in preparing “false” return].) Element 3 is included for the court to give at its
discretion. The committee recommends that the court review current federal case
law, as advised in People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967
P.2d 563].
In the definition of “material,” give the bracketed sentence beginning with
“Although the People must prove that the statement was material” if requested.
(Edwards v. United States (9th Cir. 1967) 375 F.2d 862, 865, overruled on other
grounds in United States v. Bishop (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 351, fn. 3 [93 S.Ct. 2008,
36 L.Ed.2d 941]; see also United States v. Ballard (8th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 400,
404; Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) §§ 67.15, 67.19.)
688
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(2).
• Material Defined. People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 667–668 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563].
• Aiding and Abetting. United States v. Graham (3d Cir. 1985) 758 F.2d 879, 885;
United States v. Buttorff (8th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 619, 623.
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Need Not Personally Prepare Document
Federal courts have held that the analogous federal statute applies to individuals
who counsel and advise the preparation of fraudulent documents. (United States v.
Clark (5th Cir. 1998) 139 F.3d 485, 489–490; United States v. Bryan (5th Cir. 1990)
896 F.2d 68, 74.) The defendant need not personally prepare the document or even
be present when the document is completed. (United States v. Clark, supra, 139
F.3d at pp. 489–490; United States v. Bryan, supra, 896 F.2d at p. 74; see also
United States v. Buttorff (8th Cir. 1978) 572 F.2d 619, 623 [sufficient evidence of
aiding where defendants lectured about antitax views to large groups].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
689

pay a required (tax/estimated tax) to the Franchise Tax Board [in
violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(c)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was required to pay a (tax/estimated tax) to the
Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant failed to pay the (tax/estimated tax) by the date it
was due;
AND
3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to pay, with intent to violate
a legal duty known to (him/her).
reasonable doubt that the defendant (failed to report a substantial
amount of income/ [or] owed a substantial amount in [additional] taxes).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
§ 19701(c).) As used in the tax code, “willful” means that the defendant must act
“willful.”
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) Federal cases
have held that when intent to evade is an element of the offense, the prosecution
must show that the amount owed in taxes or the amount of unreported income was
substantial. (United States v. Wilson, supra, 601 F.2d at p. 99; see also Federal Jury
Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) “The word ‘substantial’ . . .
is necessarily a relative term and not susceptible of an exact meaning.” (Canaday v.
690
United States (8th Cir. 1966) 354 F.2d 849, 852–853.) “[It] is not measured in terms
of gross or net income nor by any particular percentage of the tax shown to be due
and payable. All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration.”
(United States v. Nunan (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.2d 576, 585, cert. den. (1957) 353
U.S. 912.) “Whether the tax evaded was ‘substantial’ is, therefore, a jury
question . . . .” (Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08
[see also § 67.03, noting that “substantial” is generally not defined for the jury].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c).
COMMENTARY
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19701(c) provides that a person who willfully
fails to pay any estimated tax or tax that the person is required to pay is guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be fined not to exceed five thousand dollars
or be imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court,
together with costs of investigation and prosecution. However, subdivision (c) also
provides that the preceding sentence “shall not apply to any person who is mentally
incompetent, or suffers from dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, or similar condition.”
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19701(c).
SECONDARY SOURCES
691
2827. Concealing Property With Intent to Evade Tax (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 19705(a)(4))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (removing[,]/ [or]

depositing[,]/ [or] concealing) property with intent to evade a tax [in
violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (removed[,]/ [or] deposited[,]/ [or] concealed)
(property[,]/ [or] goods[,]/ [or] commodities);
<Alternative 2A—concealment of goods or commodities to avoid tax>
[2. A tax was (imposed on/ [or] legally authorized for) the (goods/
[or] commodities);]
<Alternative 2B—concealment of property to avoid levy>
[2. A levy was legally authorized against the property;]
AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to unlawfully (evade/
[or] defeat) the (assessment/ [or] collection) of [a] (tax[,]/
additions to a tax[,]/ penalty[,]/ [or] interest) imposed under the
tax laws.
[To levy property means to seize, attach, or garnish the property as
payment for a debt owed. A levy is legally authorized against property if:
1. The Franchise Tax Board has assessed a tax against the
defendant and sent the defendant a notice demanding payment;
2. The defendant has neglected or refused to pay;
AND
3. The defendant owns the property that is the subject of the levy.]
[As used here, a person removes an item when he or she takes it from
the place [where it was made and] where a tax was supposed to be
assessed and paid on the item.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
692
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4) applies to two situations: (1) when
a person conceals or removes goods or commodities that are subject to taxation in
order to prevent paying the tax owed on those goods; and (2) when a person who
has failed to pay a tax owed conceals property that the government has the right to
levy as payment for the tax.
In element 2, give alternative 2A if the defendant is charged with concealing goods
or commodities to avoid a tax assessment. Give alternative 2B and the bracketed
definition of “levy” if the defendant is charged with concealing property to avoid a
levy. (United States v. Swarthout (6th Cir. 1970) 420 F.2d 831, 833–835.)
Depending on the legal basis of the levy, the court may need to add additional items
to the explanation of “legally authorized.” (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4)
and statutes cited therein on when a levy is legally authorized.)
Give the bracketed definition of “remove” if the defendant is charged with removing
goods or commodities subject to taxation. (Price v. United States (5th Cir. 1945)
150 F.2d 283, 285.) Give the bracketed phrase “where it was made” if the defendant
is charged with removing an item from the site of manufacture. (Ibid.)
Revenue and Taxation Code section 19705(a)(4) also penalizes anyone “concerned
in removing, depositing, or concealing” property. If the defendant is charged with
“being concerned in” the conduct, the court should instruct on aiding and abetting.
(See CALCRIM No. 400, Aiding and Abetting: General Principles, et seq.)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705(a)(4).
• Concealment to Avoid Levy: Tax Must Have Been Assessed. United States v.
Swarthout (6th Cir. 1970) 420 F.2d 831, 833–835; United States v. Minarik (6th
Cir. 1989) 875 F.2d 1186, 1195.
• Removal Defined. Price v. United States (5th Cir. 1945) 150 F.2d 283, 285.
693
RELATED ISSUES
Physical Concealment Not Required
A defendant may “conceal” property for the purposes of this statute by making a
false record that he or she does not own the property. (United States v. Bregman (3d
Cir. 1962) 306 F.2d 653, 654–655.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
694

(withhold/collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay (a/an) (tax/ [or]
amount required to be withheld) to the Franchise Tax Board [in
prove that:
1. Under state tax laws, the defendant was required to (withhold/
collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay (a/an) (tax/ [or]
amount required to be withheld) to the Franchise Tax Board;
2. The defendant did not do so;
AND
3. The defendant voluntarily chose not to do so, with intent to
violate a legal duty known to (him/her).
[The People do not have to prove the exact amount owed. The People
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount the defendant
failed to (withhold/collect, or truthfully account for,) and pay to the
Franchise Tax Board was substantial.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with a violation of Revenue and Taxation Code section
19709, give the option “withhold” in the introduction, element 1, and the last
bracketed paragraph. If the defendant is charged with a violation of Revenue and
Taxation Code section 19708, give the option “collect or truthfully account for.” See
Commentary below on the use of the term “willful.”
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) Federal cases
have held that when intent to evade is an element of the offense, the prosecution
must show that the amount owed in taxes or the amount of unreported income was
substantial. (United States v. Wilson, supra, 601 F.2d at p. 99; see also Federal Jury
Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08.) “The word ‘substantial’ . . .
is necessarily a relative term and not susceptible of an exact meaning.” (Canaday v.
United States (8th Cir. 1966) 354 F.2d 849, 852–853.) “[It] is not measured in terms
695
of gross or net income nor by any particular percentage of the tax shown to be due
and payable. All the attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration.”
(United States v. Nunan (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.2d 576, 585, cert. den. (1957) 353
U.S. 912.) “Whether the tax evaded was ‘substantial’ is, therefore, a jury
question . . . .” (Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.08
[see also § 67.03, noting that “substantial” is generally not defined for the jury].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 19708, 19709.
• Violation of Section 19709 Must Be Willful. People v. Singer (1980) 115
Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 10 [171 Cal.Rptr. 587].
87 L.Ed. 1546].
COMMENTARY
Element 3 contains the definition of “willful” violation of a tax law derived from
People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 659–660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563],
and United States v. Bishop (1973) 412 U.S. 346, 360–361 [93 S.Ct. 2008, 36
L.Ed.2d 941]. Revenue and Taxation Code section 19708 specifically requires that
the defendant’s act be willful, but section 19709 does not explicitly include the
element of willfulness. In People v. Singer (1980) 115 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 10 [171
Cal.Rptr. 587], the court construed section 19709 as also requiring a willful
violation. Although it is unclear, it appears that based on this ruling, the Hagen-
Bishop definition of willful also applies to a violation of section 19709.
SECONDARY SOURCES
696
697
D. EVIDENCE
2840. Evidence of Uncharged Tax Offense: Failed to File Previous
Returns
The People presented evidence that the defendant did not file [a] tax
return[s] for [a] year[s] not charged in this case.
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not file [a] tax
return[s] for (that/those) year[s]. Proof by a preponderance of the
evidence is a different standard of proof from proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you
conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.
entirely.
If you conclude that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for (that/
those) year[s], you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence
for the limited purpose of deciding whether:
<A. Intent>
[The defendant acted with the intent to <insert specific
intent required to prove the offense alleged> in this
case](./;)
[OR]
<B. Accident or Mistake>
[The defendant’s alleged actions were not the result of mistake or
accident.]
Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose [except for the
determining the defendant’s credibility>].
If you conclude that the defendant did not file [a] tax return[s] for (that/
those) year[s], that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with
all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the
defendant is guilty of <insert charged offense>. The People
must still prove (the/each) (charge/ [and] allegation) beyond a reasonable
doubt.
699

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must give this instruction on request when evidence of other offenses has
been introduced under Evidence Code section 1101(b). (Evid. Code, § 1101(b);
People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708];
People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63–64 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534].)
Evidence of the failure of the defendant to file tax returns in previous years may be
admitted as evidence of prior illegal acts tending to show intent or lack of accident
or mistake. (United States v. Fingado (10th Cir. 1991) 934 F.2d 1163, 1165–1166.)
The court must identify for the jury what issue the evidence has been admitted for:
to prove mental state, to prove lack of accident or mistake, or to prove both.
The paragraph that begins with “If you conclude that the defendant did not file” has
been included to prevent jury confusion over the standard of proof. (See People v.
Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1012–1013 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 62 P.3d 601]
[instruction on Evidence Code section 1108 evidence sufficient where it advised jury
that prior offense alone not sufficient to convict; prosecution still required to prove
all elements beyond a reasonable doubt].)
CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of Uncharged Offenses to Prove Identity, Intent, or
Common Plan, etc.
AUTHORITY
• Evidence of Prior Uncharged Acts. Evid. Code, § 1101(b).
• Standard of Proof Preponderance of Evidence. People v. Carpenter (1997) 15
• Previous Failure to File Tax Returns. United States v. Fingado (1991) 934 F.2d
1163, 1165–1166.
RELATED ISSUES
See Bench Notes and Related Issues section in CALCRIM No. 375, Evidence of
Uncharged Offenses of Prove Identity, Intent, or Common Plan, etc.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Evidence, § 83.12 (Matthew Bender).
700
2841. No Deductions on Gross Income From Illegal Conduct (Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 17282(a))
When computing taxable income, no deductions are allowed on gross

income derived directly from illegal activities, including
<insert activity from Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a)>.
In addition, no deductions are allowed on gross income that is derived
from any other activities directly connected or associated with illegal
activities, or that directly tend to promote or to further illegal activities.
[Prohibited deductions include deductions for cost of goods sold.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction if requested and relevant based on the evidence.
Where indicated, insert the specific offense from Revenue and Taxation Code
section 17282(a) that was allegedly the source of the income.
AUTHORITY
• Statute. Rev. & Tax. Code, § 17282(a).
701
In this case, the People are using what is called the net worth method to
try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will
now explain the net worth method.
On any given date, a person’s net worth is the value of everything that
person owns minus the value of all that person’s debts and financial
obligations. It is the difference between what a person owns and what
that person owes. The value of any item that a person owns is measured
by what it was worth when it was acquired, not its current market
value.
If the People prove that the defendant’s net worth increased during
<insert year alleged>, then you may but are not required to
conclude that the defendant received money or property during that
year.
In order to prove that the money or property received was taxable
income, the People must also prove that: (1) the defendant had one or
more sources of taxable income, and (2) the money or property the
defendant received during the year did not come from nontaxable
sources. Nontaxable sources of income include gifts, inheritances, loans,
or redeposits or transfers of funds between bank accounts.
If the People have proved that: (a) the defendant’s net worth increased
during <insert year alleged>, (b) the defendant had one or
more sources of taxable income, and (c) the money or property the
defendant received during that year did not come from nontaxable
sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that the money
or property received was taxable income to the defendant. If you have a
reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved (a), (b), or (c),
you must find that the People have not proved under the net worth
method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.
In order to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income
[using the net worth method], the People must also prove that the
defendant’s net worth increased by an amount that was substantially
greater than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax
return for <insert year alleged>.
[There is another factor you may consider in deciding whether the
People have proved that the defendant had unreported taxable income
under the net worth method. If the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) during the year, the defendant spent money in
ways that did not change (his/her) net worth at the end of the year and
(2) those expenditures would not be valid tax deductions, then you may
702
but are not required to conclude that the defendant received money or
property during the year. If the People also prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the money or property received did not come from
nontaxable sources, then you may but are not required to conclude that
the money or property was also taxable income. If you have a reasonable
doubt about whether the People have proved any of these factors, you
may not take the expenditures into account in applying the net worth
method.]
In order to rely on the net worth method of proving income, the People
must prove the defendant’s net worth at the starting point with
reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1,
<insert year alleged>. The People are not required to prove the exact
value of each and every asset the defendant owned at the starting point.
However, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all the
assets the defendant owned at the starting point were not enough to
account for any proven increase in (his/her) net worth during the year.
In deciding whether the defendant’s net worth at the starting point has
been proved with reasonable certainty and whether the People have
proved that any money or property the defendant received during the
year did not come from nontaxable sources, consider whether law
enforcement agents sufficiently investigated all reasonable “leads”
concerning the existence and value of other assets and sources of
nontaxable income. Law enforcement agents must investigate all
reasonable leads that arise during the investigation or that the defendant
suggests regarding assets and income. This duty to reasonably investigate
applies only to leads that arise during the investigation or to
explanations the defendant gives during the investigation. Law
enforcement agents are not required to investigate every conceivable
asset or source of nontaxable funds.
If you have a reasonable doubt about any of the following:
A. Whether the investigation reasonably pursued or refuted the
defendant’s explanations or other leads regarding defendant’s
assets or income during the year,
B. Whether the People have proved the defendant’s net worth at the
beginning of <insert year alleged> to a reasonable
degree of certainty,
OR
C. Whether the People have proved that any increase in the
defendant’s net worth[, together with any nondeductible
expenditures the defendant made during the year,] was
substantially more than the income that the defendant reported
on (his/her) tax return for <insert year alleged>,
703
then you must find that the People have not proved under the net worth
method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.
[If, on the other hand, you conclude that the defendant did have
unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the People
have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s] ].]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the prosecution is relying on the net worth method, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give this instruction. (Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129 [75
S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 994, 998.)
The court must also give the appropriate instruction on the elements of the offense
charged.
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If, on the other hand, you conclude”
in every case, unless the court is giving CALCRIM No. 2846, Proof of Unreported
Taxable Income: Must Still Prove Elements of Offense.
AUTHORITY
• Net Worth Method Explained. Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 121,
129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the
District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.2
(2003); Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.05.
• Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. Holland v. United States (1954) 348
U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981)
650 F.2d 994, 998.
• Requirements for Proof. Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 129–138
[75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; see also United States v. Sabino (6th Cir. 2001)
274 F.3d 1053, 1071.
704
In this case, the People are [also] using what is called the bank deposits
method to try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable
income. I will now explain the bank deposits method.
If the People prove that: (a) the defendant engaged in an activity that
produced taxable income, (b) the defendant periodically deposited money
in bank accounts in (his/her) name or under (his/her) control, and (c) the
money deposited did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may
but are not required to conclude that these bank deposits are taxable
income. Nontaxable sources of the bank deposits include gifts,
inheritances, loans, or redeposits or transfers of funds between accounts.
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved
(a), (b), or (c), you must find that the People have not proved under the
bank deposits method that the defendant had unreported taxable
income.
[using the bank deposits method], the People must also prove that the
defendant’s total taxable bank deposits were substantially greater than
the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for
<insert year alleged>.
under the bank deposits method. If the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) during the year, the defendant spent money
from funds not deposited in any bank and (2) those expenditures would
not be valid tax deductions, then you may but are not required to
conclude that the defendant received money or property during the year.
If the People also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the money or
property received did not come from nontaxable sources, then you may
but are not required to conclude that the money or property was also
taxable income. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the
People have proved any of these factors, you may not take the
expenditures into account in applying the bank deposits method.]
In order to rely on the bank deposits method of proving taxable income,
the People must prove the defendant’s cash on hand at the starting point
with reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1,
<insert year alleged>. Cash on hand is cash that the
defendant had in (his/her) possession at the starting point. The People do
not need to show the exact amount of the cash on hand at the starting
point, but the People’s claimed cash on hand figure must be reasonably
certain.
705
In deciding whether the claimed cash on hand figure has been proved
with reasonable certainty and whether the People have proved that any
money or property the defendant received during the year did not come
from nontaxable sources, consider whether law enforcement agents
sufficiently investigated all reasonable “leads” concerning the existence
and value of other assets and sources of nontaxable income. Law
enforcement agents must investigate all reasonable leads that arise
during the investigation or that the defendant suggests regarding assets
and income. This duty to reasonably investigate applies only to leads that
arise during the investigation or to explanations the defendant gives
during the investigation. Law enforcement agents are not required to
investigate every conceivable asset or source of nontaxable funds.
B. Whether the People have proved the defendant’s cash on hand at
the beginning of <insert year alleged> to a
reasonable degree of certainty,
OR
C. Whether the People have proved that the defendant’s total bank
deposits, together with any nondeductible expenditures the
defendant made during the year, were substantially more than
the income that the defendant reported on (his/her) tax return for
<insert year alleged>,
then you must find that the People have not proved under the bank
deposits method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the prosecution is relying on the bank deposits method, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give this instruction. (See Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S.
121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981) 650
F.2d 994, 999.)
charged.
706
AUTHORITY
• Bank Deposits Method Explained. United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d
994, 997, fn. 4; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the District Judges
Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.3 (2003); Federal
• Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981)
650 F.2d 994, 999.
• Requirements for Proof. United States v. Conaway (5th Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 40,
43–44; United States v. Abodeely (8th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1020, 1024; United
States v. Boulet (5th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 1165, 1167.
707
In this case, the People are [also] using the cash expenditures method to
try to prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will
now explain the cash expenditures method.
The cash expenditures method involves an examination of money the
defendant spent during the taxable year along with (his/her) net worth at
the beginning and at the end of that year.
On any given date, a person’s net worth is the value of everything that
person owns minus the value of all that person’s debts and financial
obligations. It is the difference between what a person owns and what
that person owes. The value of any item that a person owns is measured
by what it was worth when acquired, not its current market value.
If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) during
the year, the defendant spent money in ways that did not change (his/
her) net worth at the end of the year and (2) those expenditures would
not be valid tax deductions, then you may but are not required to
conclude that the defendant received money or property during the year.
The People must also prove that the money or property was taxable
income. In order do so, the People must prove that: (a) the defendant
had one or more sources of taxable income, and (b) the money or
property the defendant received during the year did not come from
nontaxable sources. Nontaxable sources of income include gifts,
inheritances, loans, or redeposits or transfers of funds between bank
accounts. If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have
proved any of these factors, you must find that the People have not
proved under the cash expenditures method that the defendant had
unreported taxable income.
[using the cash expenditures method], the People must prove that the
defendant’s cash expenditures establish taxable income that was
substantially greater than the income that (he/she) reported on (his/her)
tax return for <insert year alleged>.
under the cash expenditures method. If the People prove that the
defendant’s net worth increased during <insert year
alleged>, then you may but are not required to conclude that the
defendant received money or property during that year. In order to
prove that the money or property received was taxable income, the
People must also prove that: (1) the defendant had one or more sources
708
of taxable income and (2) the money or property the defendant received
during the year did not come from nontaxable sources. If the People
have proved that: (a) the defendant’s net worth increased during
<insert year alleged>, (b) the defendant had one or more
sources of taxable income, and (c) the money or property the defendant
received during the year did not come from nontaxable sources, then you
may but are not required to conclude that the money or property
received was taxable income to the defendant. If you have a reasonable
doubt about whether the People have proved (a), (b), or (c), you may not
take any increase in the defendant’s net worth into account in applying
the cash expenditures method.]
In order to rely on an increase in the defendant’s net worth to prove
unreported taxable income under the cash expenditures method, the
People must prove the defendant’s net worth at the starting point with
reasonable certainty. Here the starting point is January 1,
<insert year alleged>. The People are not required to prove the exact
value of each and every asset defendant owned at the starting point.
However, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that all the
assets defendant owned at the starting point were not enough to account
for any proven increase in the defendant’s net worth during the year.
In deciding whether the defendant’s net worth at the starting point has
been proved with reasonable certainty and whether the People have
proved that any money or property the defendant received during the
year did not come from nontaxable sources, consider whether law
enforcement agents sufficiently investigated all reasonable “leads”
concerning the existence and value of other assets and sources of
nontaxable income. Law enforcement agents must investigate all
reasonable leads that arise during the investigation or that defendant
suggests regarding assets and income. This duty to reasonably investigate
applies only to leads that arise during the investigation or to
explanations the defendant gives during the investigation. Law
enforcement agents are not required to investigate every conceivable
asset or source of nontaxable funds.
B. Whether the People have proved the defendant’s net worth at the
beginning of <insert year alleged> to a reasonable
degree of certainty,
OR
C. Whether the People have proved that any nondeductible
709
expenditures the defendant made during the year, together with

any increase in the defendant’s net worth, were substantially
more than the income that the defendant reported on (his/her)
tax return for <insert year alleged>,
then you must find that the People have not proved under the cash
expenditures method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the prosecution is relying on the cash expenditures method, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give this instruction. (See Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S.
121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 1981) 650
F.2d 994, 998.)
charged.
AUTHORITY
• Cash Expenditures Method Explained. United States v. Caswell (8th Cir. 1987)
825 F.2d 1228, 1231–1232; see also Pattern Jury Instructions of the District
Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit, Offense Instruction No. 93.4 (2003);
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.07.
• Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on Method. See Holland v. United States (1954) 348
U.S. 121, 129 [75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150]; United States v. Hall (1981) 650
F.2d 994, 998.
• Requirements for Proof. United States v. Caswell (8th Cir. 1987) 825 F.2d 1228,
1231–1232; United States v. Citron (2d Cir. 1986) 783 F.2d 307, 315–316;
Taglianetti v. United States (1st Cir. 1968) 398 F.2d 558, 562–563, 565.
710
In this case, the People are [also] using the specific items method to try to
prove that the defendant had unreported taxable income. I will now
explain the specific items method.
In order to prove that the defendant received unreported taxable income
under the specific items method, the People must prove that:
1. The defendant received income during <insert year
alleged>;
2. The income the defendant received was taxable;
AND
3. The income the defendant received was substantially greater than
the income (he/she) reported on (his/her) tax return for
<insert year alleged>.
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the People have proved 1,
2, or 3, you must find that the People have not proved under the specific
items method that the defendant had unreported taxable income.
have proved all elements of the crimes[s] charged [in Count[s] ].]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
It is unclear if the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the specific items
method of proof. If the prosecution is relying on this method and another method of
proof, the court should instruct on both methods. (See United States v. Meriwether
(5th Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 753, 756–757 [reversed because instructions on specific
items and net worth method not sufficiently clear].)
charged.
AUTHORITY
• Specific Items Method Explained. United States v. Hart (6th Cir. 1995) 70 F.3d
854, 860; United States v. Black (D.C. Cir. 1988) 843 F.2d 1456, 1459; United
711
States v. Marabelles (9th Cir. 1984) 724 F.2d 1374, 1379, fn. 3.
712
2846. Proof of Unreported Taxable Income: Must Still Prove
Elements of Offense
If you conclude based on the (net worth[,]/ [or] bank deposits[,]/ [or]
cash expenditures[,]/ [or] specific items) method that the defendant did
have unreported taxable income, you must still decide whether the
People have proved all elements of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s]
].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the court is instructing on multiple methods of proving unreported taxable
income, the court may give this instruction once, after explaining some or all of the
methods, rather than repeating the last paragraph of each instruction on each
method.
SECONDARY SOURCES
713
E. DEFENSES
The defendant did not voluntarily and intentionally violate a legal duty
known to (him/her) if (he/she) had a good faith but mistaken
understanding of what (his/her) duty was under the law. This is so even
if the mistaken understanding was due to (his/her) own negligence. If the
defendant actually believed that (he/she) was meeting the requirements
of the tax laws, (his/her) belief did not have to be reasonable.
[A person’s (opinion that the tax laws violate his or her constitutional
rights/ [or] disagreement with the government’s tax collection system)
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law.]
the defendant did not act in good faith. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime[s] charged
[in Count[s] ] [or the lesser offense[s] of <insert
description of lesser offense[s]>].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that his or her conduct
was legal. (People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967
P.2d 563]; Cheek v. United States (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 201 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112
L.Ed.2d 617].) This includes asserting that the defendant was ignorant of the law or
mistaken in his or her interpretation of it. (People v. Hagen, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p.
660; Cheek v. United States, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 201.) Further, the defendant’s
belief need not be objectively reasonable. (People v. Hagen, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p.
660; Cheek v. United States, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 201.) If there is sufficient
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about a good faith belief, the court has a sua
sponte duty to give this instruction.
The good faith belief defense does not apply to a “tax protestor,” who asserts that
the tax law is illegal or unconstitutional. (Cheek v. United States (1991) 498 U.S.
192, 206 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; United States v. Bressler (7th Cir. 1985)
772 F.2d 287, 291.) On the other hand, “[w]e must remind ourselves here that the
good-faith defense need not be rational, if there is sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that even irrational beliefs were truly held.” (United
States v. Mann (10th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 532, 536–537 [reversing for failure to
properly instruct on good faith defense where defendant asserted that the tax laws
715
were invalid, that he believed he did not fall under them, and that the system was
maintained by “Satan’s little helpers”]; see also Cheek v. United States, supra, 498
U.S. at p. 203 [preventing jury from considering good faith defense based on
“irrational belief” would raise constitutional problems].) Thus, while the court may
exclude evidence that the defendant disagreed with the tax laws (Cheek v. United
States, supra, 498 U.S. at p. 206), the court should use caution. If the court
concludes that there is sufficient basis to instruct on the good faith defense but
evidence that the defendant actions were based on a disagreement with the tax
system has also been admitted, the court may give the bracketed sentence that
begins with “A person’s opinion . . . .”
AUTHORITY
• Good Faith Belief Defense. People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652, 660 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967 P.2d 563]; Cheek v. United States (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 201
[111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; see Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,
Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.
• Disagreement With Law Is Not Good Faith Misunderstanding. Cheek v. United
States (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 206 [111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; United States
v. Bressler (7th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 287, 291.
• Belief Need Not Be Rational. Cheek v. United States (1991) 498 U.S. 192, 203
[111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617]; United States v. Mann (10th Cir. 1989) 884
F.2d 532, 536–537.
SECONDARY SOURCES
716
The defendant did not voluntarily and intentionally violate a legal duty
known to (him/her) if, (in preparing (his/her) (tax return[,]/ [or]
statement[,]/ [or other] document[s] filed with the Franchise Tax Board)/
[or] failing to file a tax return), (he/she) relied in good faith on the
advice of <insert name of person allegedly relied on>, who
represented (himself/herself) to be (a/an) (accountant/attorney/
<insert other professional>) qualified to provide such advice.
The defendant did not rely on the advice in good faith if:
1. The defendant did not give <insert name of person
allegedly relied on> all the information about the defendant’s
income and expenses for the year(;/.)
AND
<Alternative 2A—defendant charged with filing false or inaccurate
document>
[2A. When the defendant submitted the (tax return[,]/ [or]
statement[,]/ [or other] document) to the Franchise Tax Board,
(he/she) knew or had reason to believe that the information
contained in the document was incorrect or false.]
[OR]
<Alternative 2B—defendant charged with failing to file>
[(2B). When the defendant chose not to file a tax return based on
’s <insert name of person allegedly relied on> advice,
(he/she) knew or had reason to believe that the advice was
incorrect or false.]
the defendant did not rely in good faith on the advice of
<insert name of person allegedly relied on>. If the People have not met
this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime[s]
charged [in Count[s] ] [or the lesser offense[s] of
<insert description of lesser offense[s]>].
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The defendant may assert as a defense good faith reliance on the advice of a
professional. (United States v. Segal (8th Cir. 1988) 867 F.2d 1173, 1179; United
717
States v. Mitchell (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 285, 287–288; see Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.) “[T]he defendant must show he
actually relied on expert advice and that his reliance was in good faith.” (United
States v. Segal, supra, 867 F.2d at p. 1179.) Further, this defense is not available if
the defendant failed to provide the professional with all of the relevant information
or knew that the document was false or inaccurate when submitted. (United States v.
Claiborne (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 784, 798; see also United States v. Segal, supra,
867 F.2d at p. 1179 [defendant, charged with failing to file tax return, knew advice
was inaccurate].) If there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the
defendant relied on professional advice, the court has a sua sponte duty to give this
instruction.
Give alternative A if the defendant is charged with filing a false tax return or
document. Give alternative B if the defendant is charged with failing to file a tax
return. The court may give both alternatives if appropriate based on the evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Reliance on Advice Defense. United States v. Mitchell (4th Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d
285, 287–288; United States v. Platt (2d Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 789, 792–793;
Bursten v. United States (5th Cir. 1968) 395 F.2d 976, 981; United States v.
Duncan (6th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 1104, 1117, disapproved on other grounds by
Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 634–635 [111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d
555]; United States v. Phillips (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F.2d 435, 440; United States
v. Claiborne (9th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 784, 798; see also Federal Jury Practice
and Instructions, Criminal (5th ed.) § 67.25.
• Reliance Must Be Actual and in Good Faith. United States v. Segal (8th Cir.
1988) 867 F.2d 1173, 1179; United States v. Duncan (6th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d
1104, 1116.
SECONDARY SOURCES
718
VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER
A. VANDALISM
B. LOITERING
C. TRESPASS
D. ANIMALS
2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25662(a))
2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(b))
2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21 (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 25658(a))
2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic Beverage (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 25658(d))
2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21: Resulting in Death or
Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c))
719
VANDALISM, LOITERING, AND TRESPASS
2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage: Causing Traffic

Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)
2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years of Age (Pen.
Code, § 272(b)(1))
G. BETTING
H. MONEY LAUNDERING
3010. Eavesdropping or Recording Confidential Communication (Pen. Code,
§ 632(a))
720
A. VANDALISM
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with vandalism [in violation

prove that:
1. The defendant maliciously (defaced with graffiti or with other
inscribed material[,]/ [or] damaged[,]/ [or] destroyed) (real/ [or]
personal) property;
[AND]
2. The defendant (did not own the property/owned the property
with someone else)(;/.)
<See Bench Notes regarding when to give element 3.>
[AND
3. The amount of damage caused by the vandalism was $400 or
more.]
someone else.
Graffiti or other inscribed material includes an unauthorized inscription,
word, figure, mark, or design that is written, marked, etched, scratched,
drawn, or painted on real or personal property.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013, August 2013, September
2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with a felony for causing $400 or more in damage and
the court is not instructing on the misdemeanor offense, give element 3. If the court
is instructing on both the felony and the misdemeanor offenses, give CALCRIM No.
2901, Vandalism: Amount of Damage, with this instruction. (Pen. Code,
§ 594(b)(1).) The court should also give CALCRIM No. 2901 if the defendant is
charged with causing more than $10,000 in damage under Penal Code section
594(b)(1).
721
CALCRIM No. 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, AND TRESPASS
In element 2, give the alternative language “owned the property with someone else”
if there is evidence that the property was owned by the defendant jointly with
someone else. (People v. Wallace (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 144, 150–151 [19
Cal.Rptr.3d 790]; People v. Kahanic (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 466 [241 Cal.Rptr.
722] [Pen. Code, § 594 includes damage by spouse to spousal community
property].)
AUTHORITY
Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
• Damage to Jointly Owned Property. People v. Wallace (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
144, 150–151 [19 Cal.Rptr.3d 790]; People v. Kahanic (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d
461, 466 [241 Cal.Rptr. 722].
• Wrongful Act Need Not Be Directed at Victim. People v. Kurtenbach (2012) 204
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Carrasco (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 715,
722–723 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 383].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Moore (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 895–896
[228 Cal.Rptr.3d 261].
This offense is a misdemeanor unless the amount of damage is $400 or more. (Pen.
Code, § 594(b)(1) & (2)(A).) If the defendant is charged with a felony, then the
misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense. When instructing on both the
felony and misdemeanor, the court must provide the jury with a verdict form on
which the jury will indicate if the amount of damage has or has not been proved to
be $400 or more. If the jury finds that the damage has not been proved to be $400
or more, then the offense should be set at a misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
Lack of Permission Not an Element
The property owner’s lack of permission is not an element of vandalism. (In re
Rudy L. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 864].)
Damage Need Not Be Permanent
To “deface” under Penal Code section 594 does not require that the defacement be
permanent. (In re Nicholas Y. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 941, 944 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]
[writing on a glass window with a marker pen was defacement under the statute].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 277–285.
722
VANDALISM, LOITERING, AND TRESPASS CALCRIM No. 2900
Against Property, § 143.11[2], Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.03[2] (Matthew
Bender).
723
If you find the defendant guilty of vandalism [in Count[s] ], you

must then decide whether the People have proved that the amount of
damage caused by the vandalism [(in each count/in Count[s] )]
was $400 or more. [If you decide that the amount of damage was $400
or more, you must then decide whether the People have proved that the
damage [(in each count/in Count[s] )] was also $10,000 or more.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on these sentencing factors.
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2900, Vandalism.
if the prosecution has or has not been proved that the damage was $400 or more
and, if appropriate, $10,000 or more.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 594(b)(1).
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Carrasco (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 715,
722–723 [147 Cal.Rptr.3d 383].
RELATED ISSUES
Aggregation of Damages
Damage resulting from multiple acts of vandalism may be aggregated to constitute a
felony if the acts were part of a single general impulse, intention, or plan. (People v.
Carrasco, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pp. 719–721.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 277–285.
724
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (taking down[,]/ [or]

removing [,]/ [or] damaging[,]/ [or] disconnecting/ [or] cutting/[or]
obstructing/severing/making an unauthorized connection to) a (telegraph/
telephone/cable television/electrical) line [in violation of Penal Code
section 591].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—removed, damaged, or obstructed>
[1. The defendant unlawfully (took down[,]/ [or] removed[,]/ [or]
damaged[,]/ [or] obstructed/ [or] disconnected/ [or] cut) [part of] a
(telegraph/telephone/cable television/electrical) line [or mechanical
equipment connected to the line];]
<Alternative 1B—severed>
[1. The defendant unlawfully severed a wire of a (telegraph/telephone/
cable television/electrical) line;]
<Alternative 1C—unauthorized connection>
[1. The defendant unlawfully made an unauthorized connection with
[part of] a line used to conduct electricity [or mechanical equipment
connected to the line];]
AND
2. The defendant did so maliciously.
someone else.
[As used here, mechanical equipment includes a telephone.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The statute uses the term “injure.” (Pen. Code, § 591.) The committee has replaced
the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure” generally
refers to harm to a person rather than to property.
The statute uses the phrase “appurtenances or apparatus.” (Pen. Code, § 591.) The
725
committee has chosen to use the more understandable “mechanical equipment” in

place of this phrase.
Give the bracketed sentence that states “mechanical equipment includes a telephone”
on request. (People v. Tafoya (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 220, 227 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 681];
People v. Kreiling (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 699, 704 [66 Cal.Rptr. 582].)
AUTHORITY
• Maliciously Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4; People v. Lopez (1986) 176
Cal.App.3d 545, 550 [222 Cal.Rptr. 101].
• Applies to Damage to Telephone. People v. Tafoya (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 220,
227; People v. Kreiling (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 699, 704 [66 Cal.Rptr. 582].
• “Obstruct” Not Unconstitutionally Vague. Kreiling v. Field (9th Cir. 1970) 431
F.2d 502, 504.
• Applies to Theft of Service. People v. Trieber (1946) 28 Cal.2d 657, 661 [171
P.2d 1].
• General Intent Crime. People v. Quarles (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 636 [236
Cal.Rptr.3d 49].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property §§ 304, 305.
726
B. LOITERING
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with loitering [in violation

of Penal Code section 647(h)].
prove that:
1. The defendant delayed, lingered, prowled, or wandered on the
private property of someone else;
2. When the defendant was on that property, (he/she) did not have a
lawful purpose for being there;
3. When the defendant was on the property, (he/she) intended to
commit a crime if the opportunity arose;
AND
4. The defendant’s purpose for being on the property was to commit
a crime if the opportunity arose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent to Commit Crime Required. In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308,
311–312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305]; see In re Joshua M. (2001) 91
SECONDARY SOURCES
727
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with peeking in the door or

window of an inhabited (building/ [or] structure) [in violation of Penal
Code section 647(i)].
prove that:
1. The defendant delayed, lingered, prowled, or wandered on the
private property of someone else;
2. When the defendant was on that property, (he/she) did not have a
lawful purpose for being there;
AND
3. When the defendant was on the property, (he/she) peeked in the
door or window of an inhabited building or structure.
[A (building/ [or] structure) is inhabited if someone uses it as a dwelling,
whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged peeking.]
[A (building/ [or] structure) is not inhabited if the former residents have
remains inside.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 647(i).
• Specific Intent to Commit Crime Not Required. In re Joshua M. (2001) 91
• Inhabitation Defined. See Pen. Code, § 459.
• House Not Inhabited If Former Residents Not Returning. People v. Cardona
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109].
SECONDARY SOURCES
728
729
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with loitering at or near (a

school children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally
congregate) [in violation of Penal Code section 653b].
prove that:
<If the court concludes that both loitering as defined in 1A and the conduct
defined in 1B are required pursuant to the statute, give both 1A and 1B if the
defendant is charged with the conduct described in 1B. Otherwise, give
either 1A or 1B, as appropriate.>
1A. The defendant delayed, lingered, or idled at or near (a school
children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally
congregate);
1B. The defendant entered, reentered, or remained at (a school
children attend/ [or] a public place where children normally
congregate) within 72 hours after having been asked to leave by
(the chief administrative official of that school/ <insert
name of other offıcial named in Penal Code section 653(b)>)];
2. The defendant did not have a lawful purpose for being at or near
the (school/ [or] public place);
AND
3. The defendant intended to commit a crime if the opportunity
arose.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In a nonbinding opinion, McSherry v. Block (9th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1049, 1058,
the Ninth Circuit discussed the problem caused by amending the predecessor of
Penal Code section 653b by adding the language described by paragraph 1B,
namely, that it made it possible to “read the request to leave language as modifying
the loitering provision which has been in the statute all along.” The Ninth Circuit
determined that no request to leave was necessary for a loitering conviction. The
court relied on the depublished opinion of the Appellate Department in the case
below, which had determined that the “request to leave” language applies only to
730
the vagrancy and not to the loitering provision of the statute. McSherry v. Block (9th
Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 1049, 1053.
In the absence of binding authority on how to resolve an apparent ambiguity in the
statute, the court must exercise its own discretion to determine whether loitering is
required if the defendant is charged with the conduct described in paragraph 1B, or
whether paragraphs 1A and 1B define separate ways in which this offense may be
committed.
AUTHORITY
• Specific Intent to Commit Crime Required. In re Christopher S. (1978) 80
Cal.App.3d 903, 911 [146 Cal.Rptr. 247]; People v. Hirst (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d
75, 82–83 [106 Cal.Rptr. 815]; People v. Frazier (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 174, 183
[90 Cal.Rptr. 58]; Mandel v. Municipal Court (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 663
[81 Cal.Rptr. 173].
RELATED ISSUES
Activity Protected by First Amendment
In Mandel v. Municipal Court (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 670–674 [81 Cal.Rptr.
173], the court held that the defendant could not be convicted of loitering near a
school for an unlawful purpose when the defendant was giving the students leaflets
protesting the war and calling for a student strike. (See also People v. Hirst (1973)
31 Cal.App.3d 75, 85–86 [106 Cal.Rptr. 815].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
731
C. TRESPASS
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with trespass after making a

credible threat [in violation of Penal Code section 601(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant made a credible threat to cause serious bodily
2. The defendant made the threat with the intent to place the other
person in reasonable fear for (his/her) safety [or for the safety of
(his/her) immediate family];
AND
<Alternative 3A—entered home>
[3. Within 30 days of making the threat, the defendant unlawfully
entered the threatened person’s residence[, or the real property
next to the residence of the threatened person,] without a lawful
purpose and with the intent to carry out the threat against the
target of the threat.]
<Alternative 3B—entered workplace>
[3. Within 30 days of making the threat, the defendant unlawfully
entered the workplace of the threatened person, knowing that the
place (he/she) entered was the threatened person’s workplace, and
tried to locate that person without a lawful purpose and with the
intent to carry out the threat.]
A credible threat is one that causes the target of the threat to reasonably
fear for his or her safety [or for the safety of his or her immediate
family] and one that the maker of the threat appears able to carry out.
A credible threat may be made orally, in writing, or electronically or
may be implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of statements
and conduct.
To decide whether the defendant unlawfully entered the threatened
733
person’s (residence [or the real property next to the residence]/

workplace), please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
given) you on unlawful entry.
[Immediate family means (a) a spouse, parent, or child; (b) a grandchild,
grandparent, brother, or sister related by blood or marriage; and (c) a
person who regularly lives in the household [or who regularly lived there
within the six months before the alleged incident].]
[A threat may be made electronically by using a telephone, cellular
telephone, pager, computer, video recorder, fax machine, or other similar
electronic communication device.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Give alternative 3A or 3B depending on whether the prosecution alleges that the
defendant entered the threatened person’s residence or property next to that
residence, or entered the threatened person’s workplace. (Pen. Code, §§ 601(a)(1) &
(2).)
Give the appropriate instruction defining “unlawful entry” depending on the
evidence. (See CALCRIM Nos. 2930–2933.)
his or her immediate family, give on request the bracketed phrases in element 2 and
in the definition of “credible threat,” as well as the bracketed paragraph defining
“immediate family.” (Pen. Code, §§ 601(a), 646.9(l); see Fam. Code, § 6205
[“affinity” defined]; Prob. Code, §§ 6401, 6402 [degrees for purposes of intestate
succession].)
If there is evidence that a threat was communicated through an “electronic
communication device,” give on request the bracketed paragraph listing the different
means of electronically communicating a threat. (See Pen. Code, § 646.9(h) [in
context of stalking]; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).)
Related Instruction
CALCRIM No. 1301, Stalking.
AUTHORITY
• Credible Threat Defined. See Pen. Code, § 646.9(g); People v. Falck (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 287, 295, 297–298 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624] [both in context of
stalking].
734
• Immediate Family Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 601(a), 646.9(l).

• Serious Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, §§ 243(f)(4), 417.6(b), 601(a).
RELATED ISSUES
Labor Union Activities
Penal Code section 601 does not apply to any person who is engaged in labor union
activities that are permitted by the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (see
Lab. Code, § 1140 et seq.) or by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.). (Pen. Code, § 601(c).)
Personal Residence, Real Property, or Workplace
Penal Code section 601 does not apply if the person making the threat enters his or
her own residence, real property, or workplace. (Pen. Code, § 601(b).)
SECONDARY SOURCES
735
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with trespassing [in

violation of Penal Code section 602(k)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully entered (land/ [or] a building) belonging
to someone else;
2. When the defendant entered, (he/she) intended (to damage
someone else’s property [or property right]/ [or] to interfere with,
obstruct, or damage a lawful business or occupation carried on
by the (owner of the land[,]/ [or] owner’s agent[,]/ [or] person in
lawful possession of the land));
AND
3. The defendant actually did (damage someone else’s property [or
property right]/ [or] interfere with, obstruct, or damage a lawful
business or occupation carried on by the (owner of the land[,]/
[or] owner’s agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the
land)).
purpose.
[An agent is a person who is authorized to act for someone else in
dealings with third parties.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The statute uses the term “injure.” (Pen. Code, § 602(k).) The committee has
replaced the word “injure” with the word “damage” because the word “injure”
generally refers to harm to a person rather than to property.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 602(k).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Actual Damage Required. In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal.3d 289, 295 [90 Cal.Rptr.
736
176, 475 P.2d 208]; In re Ball (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 380, 386 [100 Cal.Rptr.
189].
• “Land” Includes Building on the Land. People v. Brown (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d
Supp. 915, 917–919 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 287–288.
737
2931. Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property (Pen. Code,
§ 602(m))

violation of Penal Code section 602(m)].
prove that:
1. The defendant willfully entered (land/ [or] a building) belonging
to someone else without the consent of the (owner[,]/ [or] owner’s
agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the property);
2. After the defendant entered, (he/she) occupied the (land/ [or]
building) without the consent of the (owner[,]/ [or] owner’s
agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession of the property);
3. The defendant occupied some part of the (land/ [or] building)
continuously until removed.
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 602(m).
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Entry Must Be Without Consent. People v. Brown (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp.
915, 920–921 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662]; People v. Poe (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp.
928, 932 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670], disapproved on other grounds in In re Hayes (1969)
70 Cal.2d 604, 614, fn. 2 [75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430].
• Occupy Defined. People v. Wilkinson (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906,
909–911 [56 Cal.Rptr. 261].
• “Land” Includes Building on the Land. People v. Brown (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d
Supp. 915, 917–919 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662] [partially abrogated by statute].
738

SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 287–288.
739

prove that:
1. The defendant willfully entered or remained in a noncommercial
(dwelling house[,]/ [or] apartment[,]/ [or other] residential place)
belonging to someone else;
[AND]
2. The defendant entered or remained without the consent of the
(owner[,]/ [or] owner’s agent[,]/ [or] person in lawful possession
of the property)(;/.)
<Give element 3 if evidence shows defendant may have been public
offıcer.>
[AND
3. The defendant was not a public officer or employee acting in the
lawful performance of (his/her) duties as a public officer or
employee.]
purpose.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the defendant is charged with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section
602.5(b), the court must also give CALCRIM No. 2933, Trespass: Person Present,
with this instruction.
If there is sufficient evidence that the defendant was a public officer or employee,
the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. Give bracketed element
3. If lawful performance is an issue, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on
when a public officer is lawfully performing his or her duties and that the
prosecution has the burden of proving lawful performance beyond a reasonable
740
doubt. (See People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729,
800 P.2d 1159].) For instructions on lawful performance by a public officer, see
CALCRIM Nos. 2670–2673.
AUTHORITY
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Entry Need Not Be Without Consent. See People v. Brown (1965) 236
• Building Must Be Used for Residential Purposes. In re D. C. L. (1978) 82
Cal.App.3d 123, 125–126 [147 Cal.Rptr. 54].
If the defendant is charged with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section
602.5(b) based on another person being present in the building, then
“nonaggravated” trespass is a lesser included offense. The court must provide the
jury with a verdict form on which the jury will indicate if the aggravating factor has
been proved. If the jury finds that the factor has not been proved, then the offense
should be set at the lower level misdemeanor.
RELATED ISSUES
Not Necessarily a Lesser Included Offense of Burglary
Trespassing in violation of Penal Code section 602.5 is not necessarily a lesser
included offense of burglary based on the elements test. (People v. Lohbauer (1981)
29 Cal.3d 364, 369 [173 Cal.Rptr. 453, 627 P.2d 183].) A violation of Penal Code
section 602.5 may be a lesser included offense of burglary depending on how that
offense is charged. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [94
Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46] [assuming for argument that trespass was a lesser
included offense of burglary under accusatory pleading test].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
741
If you find the defendant guilty of trespassing, you must then decide
whether the People have proved that a resident [or other person
authorized to be in the dwelling] was present at some time while the
defendant was trespassing.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if the defendant is charged
with aggravated trespass under Penal Code section 602.5(b).
This instruction must be given with CALCRIM No. 2932, Trespass: Entry Into
Dwelling.
if the prosecution has or has not proved that another person was present.
AUTHORITY
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, §§ 287–288.
742
D. ANIMALS
2950. Failing to Maintain Control of a Dangerous Animal (Pen.
Code, § 399)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with causing (injury/death)

by failing to maintain control of a dangerous animal [in violation of
prove that:
1. The defendant (owned/ [or] had custody or control of) a
dangerous animal;
2. The defendant knew that the animal was dangerous;
<Alternative 3A—allowed to run free>
[3. The defendant willfully allowed the animal to run free;]
<Alternative 3B—failed to use ordinary care>
[3. The defendant failed to use ordinary care in keeping the animal;]
[AND]
4. The animal (killed/caused serious bodily injury to)
<insert name of person allegedly attacked> while the defendant
(allowed it to run free/failed to use ordinary care in keeping it)(;/
.)
<Give element 5 unless alleged victim not capable of taking precautions;
see Bench Notes.>
[AND
5. <insert name of person allegedly attacked> took all
the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in the
same situation.]
[If the People have proved that <insert name of person
allegedly attacked> was (under the age of five years/incapable of taking
reasonable precautions because <insert reason for
incapacity>), then the People do not need to prove item 5 and you do not
have to find that (he/she) took all the precautions that a reasonable
person would have taken in the same situation.]
someone else, or gain any advantage.]
743

foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to use ordinary care if
he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do
in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful
person would do in the same situation).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In element 3, give either alternative 3A or 3B as appropriate based on the facts of
the case. When giving alternative 3A, also give the definition of “willfully.” When
giving alternative 3B, also give the definition of “ordinary care.”
The first bracketed paragraph is for use when the victim is by law incapable of
being held to the ordinary standard of care under the law of negligence. (See People
v. Berry (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [children under five
are deemed incapable of negligent acts.]) If the parties agree that the alleged victim
was under five years old or incapable of taking responsible precautions, the court
may omit element 5 and not give the bracketed paragraph.
AUTHORITY
• Victim Incapable of Negligence Due to Lack of Capacity. People v. Berry (1992)
• Definition of Dangerous Animal. Sea Horse Ranch Inc. v. Superior Court (1994)
§ 282.
SECONDARY SOURCES
744
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to use ordinary

care in (owning/ [or] controlling) an attack dog [in violation of Penal
Code section 399.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant (owned/ [or] had custody or control of) a dog
trained to fight, attack, or kill;
dog was vicious or dangerous;
3. The defendant failed to use ordinary care in (owning/ [or]
controlling) the dog;
[AND]
4. As a result of the defendant’s failure to use ordinary care, the
dog (bit someone on two separate occasions/caused substantial
physical injury to <insert name[s] of person[s]
allegedly attacked>)(;/.)
<Give element 5 unless alleged victim not capable of taking precautions;
see Bench Notes.>
[AND
5. <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> took
all the precautions that a reasonable person would have taken in
the same situation.]
[If the People have proved that <insert name[s] of person[s]
allegedly attacked> (was/were) (under the age of five years/ [or] incapable
of taking reasonable precautions because <insert reason for
incapacity>), then the People do not need to prove item 5 and you do not
have to find that (he/she/they) took all the precautions that a reasonable
person would have taken in the same situation.]
Using ordinary care means using reasonable care to prevent reasonably
foreseeable harm to someone else. A person fails to use ordinary care if
he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person would not do
in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a reasonably careful
person would do in the same situation).
New January 2006

745
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The first bracketed paragraph is to be used when the victim is by law incapable of
being held to the ordinary standard of care under the law of negligence. (See People
v. Berry (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 785–786 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [children under five
are deemed incapable of negligent acts.]) If the parties agree that the alleged victim
was under five years old or incapable of taking responsible precautions, the court
may omit element 5 and not give the bracketed paragraph.
Penal Code section 399.5(c) states that “nothing in this section shall authorize the
bringing of an action pursuant to” three listed situations. If any of these defenses are
raised, give CALCRIM No. 2952, Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog.
AUTHORITY
• Victim Incapable of Negligence Due to Lack of Capacity. People v. Berry (1992)
SECONDARY SOURCES
746
2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code,
§ 399.5(c))
You must find the defendant not guilty of failing to use ordinary care in
(owning/ [or] controlling) an attack dog if:
<Alternative A—trespassing>
[ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> (was/
were) trespassing at the time (he/she/they) (was/were) bitten by the
dog][; or/.]
<Alternative B—provocation>
[ <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>
provoked the dog or otherwise contributed to (his/her/their) own
injuries][; or/.]
<Alternative C—dog doing military or police work>
[The dog was being used in military or police work and the biting
occurred while the dog was actually performing in that capacity.]
[A trespasser is someone who (enters a residence without the consent of
the (owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/
[or] enters land (enclosed by a fence/ [or] posted with “no trespassing”
signs) and refuses to leave the property when requested to do so by the
(owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/ [or]
<insert other definition of trespasser, see Pen. Code, § 602 et
seq.>).]
[Provoking includes, but is not limited to, approaching, in a threatening
manner, the owner or custodian of a dog held on a leash so that the dog
reacts in a protective manner.]
<Alternative A—reasonable doubt standard>
( <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> (was/were)
not trespassing[,]/ [or] [ <insert name[s] of person[s]
allegedly attacked>] did not provoke the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was not
being used in military or police work). If the People have not met this
<Alternative B—preponderance standard>
[The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a
747
likely than not that ( <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly

attacked> (was/were) trespassing[,]/ [or] [ <insert name[s] of
person[s] allegedly attacked>] provoked the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was being
used in military or police work).]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Penal Code section 399.5(c) states that “nothing in this section shall authorize the
bringing of an action pursuant” to this statute in the three situations described
above: i.e., the bitten trespasser; the injured party who provokes the dog or who
contributes to his or her own injuries; or the police or military dog performing in
that capacity. No case presently addresses the issue of who must bear the burden of
proving the existence or nonexistence of these facts.
Because the very bringing of a prosecution is barred under the circumstances stated
in subdivision (c), it appears the Legislature intended to place these factual
situations outside the scope of its criminal prohibition. This is to be contrasted with
affirmative defenses such as entrapment, where the defendant’s conduct is within the
statute’s facial reach but subject to an exception to the general rule based on
considerations other than guilt or innocence. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28
Cal.4th 457, 476–483 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing at length
affirmative defenses and burdens of proof]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal
Law (3d ed. 2000), Pretrial Proceedings, § 202.) That being so, the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the subdivision (c)
circumstances would properly be placed on the prosecution. (See People v. Mower,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 482 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) However, there
must still be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to have a reasonable
doubt about whether one or more of the circumstances existed before an instruction
on this issue would be required.
Alternative paragraphs on both the reasonable doubt and preponderance of the
evidence standards have been included. The court must choose, at its discretion,
either alternative A—reasonable doubt standard, or alternative B—preponderance
standard.
AUTHORITY
• Defenses. Pen. Code, § 399.5(c).
SECONDARY SOURCES
748
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with cruelty to animals [in

prove that:
1. The defendant (maimed[,]/ [or] mutilated[,]/ [or] tortured[,]/ [or]
wounded[,]/ [or] killed) a living animal);
AND
2. The defendant acted maliciously.
[Torture means every act, failure to act, or neglect that causes or permits
unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering.]
[Maiming means disabling or disfiguring an animal permanently or
depriving it of a limb, organ, or other part of the body.]
injure an animal.
New August 2012; Revised February 2014

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court will need to modify this instruction if Penal Code section 599(c) applies.
The committee concluded that the definition of “animal” provided in Penal Code
section 599b, including “every dumb creature,” would not be helpful to a jury and
that no definition of the word was necessary.
AUTHORITY
• Definition of Torture. Pen. Code, § 599b
• Definition of Malicious. Pen. Code, § 7
• Maiming. See CALCRIM No. 800, Aggravated Mayhem
• General Intent Crime. People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1182
[23 Cal.Rptr.3d 391]
• Cruelty. People v. Burnett (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 868, 873 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 120]
749
• Any Living Animal. People v. Thomason (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1067 [101
Cal.Rptr.2d 247]
SECONDARY SOURCES
Property, § 310.
3 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 23, Animals: Civil Liability,
750
2960. Possession of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [unlawfully] possessing

an alcoholic beverage when under 21 years old [in violation of Business
and Professions Code section 25662(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] possessed an alcoholic beverage (in/
on) a (street[,]/ [or] highway[,]/ [or] public place[,]/ [or] a place
open to the public);
AND
2. At the time, the defendant was under 21 years old.
An alcoholic beverage is a liquid or solid material intended to be
consumed that contains one-half of 1 percent or more of alcohol by
volume. [An alcoholic beverage includes <insert type[s] of
beverage[s] from Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004, e.g., wine, beer>.]
[Two or more persons may possess something at the same time.]
<Defense: Following Reasonable Adult Instructions>
[The defendant did not unlawfully possess an alcoholic beverage if (he/
she) was following, in a timely manner, the reasonable instructions of
(his/her) (parent/legal guardian/responsible adult relative/employer/
<insert name or description of person designated by parent or
legal guardian>) to deliver [or dispose of] the alcoholic beverage. The
defendant was not following such instructions. If the People have not
New January 2006

751
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Business and Professions Code section 25662 allows for the lawful possession of
alcohol by a minor if authorized by a responsible adult for a limited purpose. If
there is sufficient evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
proof].) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1,
and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.
AUTHORITY
• Alcoholic Beverage Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23004.
• Authorized Possession Defense. See People v. Fuentes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d
1041, 1045 [274 Cal.Rptr. 17]; People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
SECONDARY SOURCES
752
2961. Purchase of Alcoholic Beverage by Person Under 21 (Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 25658(b))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (purchasing/ [or]

(drinking/consuming)) an alcoholic beverage when under 21 years old [in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658(b)].
prove that:
<Alternative 1A—purchased>
[1. The defendant purchased an alcoholic beverage;]
<Alternative 1B—drank or consumed>
[1. The defendant (drank/consumed) an alcoholic beverage at a
business that was lawfully licensed to sell alcoholic beverages;]
AND
2. At the time, the defendant was under 21 years old.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
753
2962. Selling or Furnishing Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under
21 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [unlawfully] (selling[,]/

[or] furnishing[,]/ [or] giving away)[, or causing to be (sold[,]/ [or]
furnished[,]/ [or] given away),] an alcoholic beverage to a person under
21 years old [in violation of Business and Professions Code section
25658(a)].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] gave
away)[, or caused to be (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] given
away),] an alcoholic beverage to <insert name of
person under 21>;
AND
2. When the defendant did so, <insert name of person
under 21> was under 21 years old.
<Defense: Good Faith Belief at Least 21>
actually believed that <insert name of person under 21> was
at least 21 years old. The People have the burden of proving beyond a
believe that <insert name of person under 21> was at least
21 years old. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
<Defense: Actual Reliance on Identification>
[The defendant did not unlawfully (sell[,]/ [or] furnish[,]/ [or] give
away)[, or cause to be (sold[,]/ [or] furnished[,]/ [or] given away,)] an
alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years old if:
1. The defendant [or (his/her) (employee/ [or] agent)] demanded to
see a government-issued document as evidence of ’s
<insert name of person under 21> age and identity;
2. <insert name of person under 21> showed the
754
defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] a government-

issued document, or what appeared to be a government-issued
document, as evidence of (his/her) age and identity;
AND
3. The defendant [or (his/her) employee/ [or] agent)] actually relied
on the document as evidence of ’s <insert name of
person under 21> age and identity.]
As used here, a government-issued document is a document [including a
driver’s license or an identification card issued to a person in the armed
forces] that has been, or appears to have been, issued by a government
agency and contains the person’s name, date of birth, description, and
picture. The government-issued document does not have to be genuine.
[An agent is a person who is authorized to act for the defendant in
dealings with other people.]
the defendant did not actually rely on a government-issued document, or
what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of
’s <insert name of person under 21> age and identity. If the
of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
In In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906], the
Supreme Court held that, although the prosecution is not required to prove that the
defendant knew the age of the person he or she provided with alcohol, the defendant
may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the person was at least 21. The
burden is on the defendant to prove this defense. (Ibid.) The Court failed to state
what burden of proof applies. Following People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457,
478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067], the committee has drafted the
instruction on the premise that the defendant’s burden is to merely raise a
reasonable doubt about the defense, and the prosecution must then prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. If there is sufficient evidence, the
court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed paragraph on the defense. (Ibid.)
755
Business and Professions Code section 25660 provides a defense for those who rely
in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient
evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. (See People v.
Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].)
Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the
bracketed paragraph on the defense.
AUTHORITY
• Knowledge of Age Not an Element. In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280
[17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
• Good Faith Belief Person at Least 21 Defense. In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th
254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
• Bona Fide Evidence of Age Defense. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25660(c); Kirby v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895, 897,
898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].
• Affirmative Defenses. See People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
RELATED ISSUES
Use of Underage Decoys
The police may use underage decoys to investigate sales of alcohol to people under
21. (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1994) 7 Cal.4th
561, 564 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163].) Moreover, a criminal defendant may
not raise as a defense the failure of the police to follow the administrative
regulations regarding the use of decoys. (People v. Figueroa (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th
1409, 1414–1415 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 216] [court properly denied instruction on failure
to follow regulation].)
“Furnishing” Requires Affirmative Act
“In order to violate section 25658, there must be some affirmative act of furnishing
alcohol . . . . It is clear that assisting with food and decorations cannot conceivably
be construed as acts of ‘furnishing’ liquor, nor . . . can providing the room for the
party, even with the knowledge that minors would be drinking . . . . A permissible
inference from [the] undisputed testimony was that [the defendant] tacitly authorized
his son to provide his beer to the plaintiffs . . . . Such an authorization constitutes
the requisite affirmative act as a matter of law. In order to furnish an alcoholic
beverage the offender need not pour the drink; it is sufficient if, having control of
the alcohol, the defendant takes some affirmative step to supply it to the drinker.”
(Sagadin v. Ripper (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1157–1158 [221 Cal.Rptr. 675].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
756
2963. Permitting Person Under 21 to Consume Alcoholic
Beverage (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [unlawfully] permitting

a person under 21 years old to consume an alcoholic beverage [in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658(d)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was licensed to sell alcoholic beverages on the
premises of a business;
2. The defendant [unlawfully] permitted <insert name
of person under 21> to consume an alcoholic beverage on the
premises of that business;
AND
3. The defendant knew that <insert name of person
under 21> was consuming an alcoholic beverage.
The People are not required to prove that the defendant knew that
<insert name of person under 21> was under 21.
[The defendant did not unlawfully permit a person under 21 years old to
consume an alcoholic beverage if:
757

AND
person under 21> age and identity.
what appeared to be a government issued document, as evidence of
of this crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
Business and Professions Code section 25660(c) provides a defense for those who
rely in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]
[discussing affirmative defenses generally and the burden of proof].) Give the
bracketed word “unlawfully” in the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed
paragraph on the defense.
Supreme Court held that, for a prosecution under Business and Professions Code
section 25658(a), the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the
758
person was at least 21. If the trial court concludes that this defense also applies to a
prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658(d) and there is
sufficient evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. The
court may use the bracketed language to instruct on this defense if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(d).
898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 2962, Selling or Furnishing
Alcoholic Beverage to Person Under 21.
SECONDARY SOURCES
759
2964. Purchasing Alcoholic Beverage for Person Under 21:
Resulting in Death or Great Bodily Injury (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 25658(a) & (c))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with [unlawfully]

(purchasing an alcoholic beverage for[,]/ [or] (furnishing[,]/ [or] giving[,]/
[or] giving away) an alcoholic beverage to[,]) a person under 21 years
old causing (death/ [or] great bodily injury) [in violation of Business and
Professions Code section 25658].
prove that:
1. The defendant [unlawfully] (purchased an alcoholic beverage
for[,]/ [or] (furnished[,]/ [or] gave[,]/ [or] gave away) an alcoholic
beverage to[,]) <insert name of person under 21>;
2. When the defendant did so, <insert name of person
under 21> was under 21 years old;
3. <insert name of person under 21> consumed the
alcoholic beverage;
AND
4. ’s <insert name of person under 21> consumption of
the alcoholic beverage caused (death/ [or] great bodily injury) to
(himself/herself/ [or] another person).
[Great bodily injury is significant or substantial physical injury. It is an
injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.]
An act causes (death/ [or] great bodily injury) if the (death/ [or] injury)
is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the
(death/ [or] injury) would not have happened without the act. A natural
and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is
established by the evidence.
[There may be more than one cause of (death/ [or] great bodily injury).
An act causes (death/ [or] injury) only if it is a substantial factor in
causing the (death/ [or] injury). A substantial factor is more than a trivial
causes the (death/ [or] injury).]
760
[The defendant did not unlawfully furnish an alcoholic beverage to a
person under 21 years old if:
AND
person under 21> age and identity.
what appeared to be a government-issued document, as evidence of
of this crime.]

761
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proximate cause. (People v.
Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If there is
evidence of multiple causes of death or injury, the court should also give the
bracketed paragraph on causation that begins with “There may be more than one
cause of (death/ [or] great bodily injury).” (See People v. Autry (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135]; People v. Pike (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d
732, 746–747 [243 Cal.Rptr. 54].)
Supreme Court held that, although the prosecution is not required to prove that the
defendant knew the age of the person he or she provided with alcohol, the defendant
may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the person was at least 21. The
burden is on the defendant to prove this defense. (Ibid.) The Court failed to state
what burden of proof applies. Following People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457,
478–481 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067], the committee has drafted the
instruction on the premise that the defendant’s burden is to merely raise a
reasonable doubt about the defense, and the prosecution must then prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. If there is sufficient evidence
supporting the defense, the court has a sua sponte duty to give the bracketed
paragraph on the defense. (Ibid.)
Business and Professions Code section 25660 provides a defense for those who rely
in good faith on bona fide evidence of age and identity. If there is sufficient
Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 478–481.) Give the bracketed word “unlawfully” in
the first sentence and element 1, and the bracketed paragraph on the defense.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658(a) & (c).
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f).
• Knowledge of Age Not an Element. In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 280
[17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
• Good Faith Belief Person at Least 21 Defense. In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th
254, 280 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906].
762
898–899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].
[122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
763
2965. Parent Permitting Child to Consume Alcoholic Beverage:
Causing Traffic Collision (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with permitting a child to

consume an alcoholic beverage at (his/her) home [in violation of Business
and Professions Code section 25658.2].
prove that:
1. The defendant was the (parent/guardian) of <insert
name of defendant’s child>;
2. The defendant permitted <insert name of defendant’s
child> [or , <insert name of other person under 18
years old> who was in the company of <insert name
of defendant’s child>, or both,] to (consume an alcoholic beverage/
[or] use <insert controlled substance listed in Health
& Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled substance,) in the defendant’s
home;
3. <insert name of defendant’s child> [and
<insert name of other person under 18 years old>] (was/were)
under 18 years old at the time;
4. The defendant knew that (he/she) was permitting
<insert name of defendant’s child> [or <insert name of
other person under 18 years old>, or both,] to (consume an
alcoholic beverage/ [or] use <insert controlled
substance listed in Health & Saf. Code, § 11550>, a controlled
substance,) in the defendant’s home;
5. As a result of (consuming the alcoholic beverage/ [or] using the
controlled substance), <insert name of defendant’s
child or other person under 18 years old> (had a blood-alcohol
concentration of 0.05 percent or greater, as measured by a
chemical test[,]/ [or] was under the influence of a controlled
substance);
6. The defendant allowed <insert name of defendant’s
child or other person under 18 years old> to drive a vehicle after
leaving the defendant’s home;
7. The defendant knew that (he/she) was allowing
<insert name of defendant’s child or other person under 18 years
old> to drive a vehicle after leaving the defendant’s home;
AND
8. <insert name of defendant’s child or other person
764
under 18 years old> caused a traffic collision while driving the

vehicle.
An act causes a traffic collision if the collision is the direct, natural, and
probable consequence of the act and the collision would not have
probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence.
[There may be more than one cause of a traffic collision. An act causes a
collision only if it is a substantial factor in causing the collision. A
substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does
not need to be the only factor that causes the collision.]
[In evaluating the test results in this case, you may consider whether or
Health Services.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on proximate cause. (People v.
Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 590–591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].) If there is
evidence of multiple causes of the collision, the court should also give bracketed
765
paragraph on causation that begins with “There may be more than one cause of a
traffic collision.” (See People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [43
Cal.Rptr. 54].)
bracketed that begins with “In evaluating (the/any) test results in this case.” (People
v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 567 [131 Cal.Rptr. 190] [failure to follow
regulations in administering breath test goes to weight, not admissibility, of
evidence]; People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854, 49
P.3d 203] [same]; People v. Esayian (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1039 [5
Subdivision (a)(2) of Business and Professions Code section 25658.2 only
contemplates a “parent” as a defendant, whereas the other subdivisions include both
“parent” as well as “legal guardian.” The committee concluded that this omission, as
well as the typographical error in subdivision (a) of the statute, are inadvertent and
has therefore included both options. If the court disagrees, it must revise the
language of element 1 accordingly.
Supreme Court held that, for a prosecution under Business and Professions Code
section 25658(a), the defendant may assert as a defense a good faith belief that the
person was at least 21. If the trial court concludes that this defense also applies to a
prosecution under Business and Professions Code section 25658.2, and there is
sufficient evidence that the defendant had a good faith belief that the “other person
under 18” with the defendant’s child was actually over 18, the court has a sua
sponte duty to instruct on the defense. The court may use the bracketed language to
instruct on this defense, if appropriate.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25658.2.
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
766
767
2966. Disorderly Conduct: Under the Influence in Public (Pen.
Code, § 647(f))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with being under the

influence of (alcohol/ [and/or] a drug) in public [in violation of Penal
Code section 647(f)].
prove that:
1. The defendant was willfully under the influence of (alcohol[,]/
[and/or] a drug[,]/ [and/or] a controlled substance[,]/ [and/or]
toluene);
2. When the defendant was under the influence, (he/she) was in a
public place;
AND
<Alternative 3A—unable to care for self>
[3. The defendant was unable to exercise care for (his/her) own
safety [or the safety of others].]
<Alternative 3B—obstructed public way>
[3. Because the defendant was under the influence, (he/she) interfered
with, obstructed, or prevented the free use of a street, sidewalk,
or other public way.]
purpose.
As used here, a public place is a place that is open and accessible to
anyone who wishes to go there.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr. 3d 66].
768
• Statute Constitutional. Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101,

1119–1121 [232 Cal.Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80]; In re Joseph G. (1970) 7
Cal.App.3d 695, 703–704 [87 Cal.Rptr. 25]; In re Spinks (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d
748, 752 [61 Cal.Rptr. 743].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant in Parked Car
In People v. Belanger (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 654, 657 [52 Cal.Rptr. 660], the court
held that the defendant was in a public place when he was found sitting in a parked
car on a public street.
SECONDARY SOURCES
769
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with contributing to the

delinquency of a minor [in violation of Penal Code section 272].
prove that:
<Alternative A—caused or encouraged minor to come under jurisdiction of
juvenile court>
[1. The defendant (committed an act/ [or] failed to perform a duty);
AND
2. In (doing so/ [or] failing to do so)[,] the defendant (caused[,]/ [or]
encouraged[,]/ [or] contributed to (causing/ [or] encouraging)) a minor
to become [or continue to be] a (dependent /delinquent) child of the
juvenile court.]
<Alternative B—induced minor to come or remain under jurisdiction of
juvenile court or not to follow court order>
[The defendant by (act[,]/ [or] failure to act[,]/ [or] threat[,]/ [or]
command[,]/ [or] persuasion) induced or tried to induce a
(minor/delinquent child of the juvenile court/dependent child of the
juvenile court) to do either of the following:
1. Fail or refuse to conform to a lawful order of the juvenile court;
OR
2. (Do any act/Follow any course of conduct/Live in a way) that would
cause or obviously tend to cause that person to become or remain a
(dependent /delinquent) child of the juvenile court.]
In order to commit this crime, a person must act with [either] (general
criminal intent/ [or] criminal negligence).
[In order to act with general criminal intent, a person must not only
commit the prohibited act [or fail to do the required act], but must do so
intentionally or on purpose. However, it is not required that he or she
intend to break the law.]
negligence when:
771
AND
A minor is a person under 18 years old.
[A parent [or legal guardian] has a duty to exercise reasonable care,
supervision, protection, and control over his or her minor child.]
[A guardian means the legal guardian of a child.]
<A. Dependent Child Defined: Physical Abuse>
[A minor may become a dependent child if his or her parent [or
guardian] has intentionally inflicted serious physical harm on him or her,
or there is a substantial risk that the parent [or guardian] will do so.]
[The manner in which a less serious injury, if any, was inflicted, any
history of repeated infliction of injuries on the child or the child’s
siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or
guardian may be relevant to whether the child is at substantial risk of
serious physical harm.]
[Serious physical harm does not include reasonable and age-appropriate
spanking of the buttocks when there is no evidence of serious physical
injury.]
<B. Dependent Child Defined: Neglect>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she has suffered, or is at
substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness as a result
of [one of the following]:
[1.] [The failure or inability of his or her parent [or guardian] to
adequately supervise or protect the child(;/.)]
[OR]
[(1/2).] [The willful or negligent failure of his or her parent [or
guardian] to provide the child with adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment(;/.)]
[OR]
[(1/2/3).] [The inability of his or her parent [or guardian] to provide
772
regular care for the child due to the parent’s [or guardian’s]
(mental illness[,]/ [or] developmental disability[,]/ [or]
substance abuse).]
[A minor cannot become a dependent child based only on the fact that
there is a lack of emergency shelter for the minor’s family.]
[Deference must be given to a parent’s [or guardian’s] decision to give
medical treatment, nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer
alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church
or religious denomination, by one of its accredited practitioners. A minor
cannot be found to be a dependent child unless such a finding is
necessary to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or
illness. The following factors may bear on such a determination:
1. The nature of the treatment proposed by the parent [or
guardian];
2. The risks, if any, to the child posed by the course of treatment or
nontreatment proposed by the parent [or guardian];
3. The risks, if any, of any alternative course of treatment being
proposed for the child by someone other than the parent [or
guardian];
AND
4. The likely success of the course of treatment or nontreatment
proposed by the parent [or guardian].]
[A minor may be a dependent child only as long as necessary to protect
him or her from the risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.]]
<C. Dependent Child Defined: Serious Emotional Damage>
[A minor may become a dependent child if (his or her parent’s [or
guardian’s] conduct[,]/ [or] the lack of a parent [or guardian] who is
capable of providing appropriate care[,]) has caused the minor to suffer
serious emotional damage or to face a substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional damage. Serious emotional damage may be shown by
severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or unruly, aggressive behavior
toward himself, herself, or others. [However, a minor cannot become a
dependent child on this basis if the parent [or guardian] willfully fails to
provide mental health treatment to the minor based on a sincerely held
religious belief and a less-intrusive intervention is available.]]
<D. Dependent Child Defined: Sexually Abused>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she:
1. Has been sexually abused;
2. Faces a substantial risk of being sexually abused by (his or her
773
(parent/ [or] guardian)/ [or] a member of his or her household);

OR
3. Has a parent [or guardian] who has failed to adequately protect
him or her from sexual abuse when the parent [or guardian]
knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in
danger of sexual abuse.]
<E. Dependent Child Defined: Severe Physical Abuse Under Age Five>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she is under five years
old and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent or by any person
known by the parent if the parent knew or reasonably should have
known that the person was physically abusing the child.
As used here, the term severe physical abuse means any of the following:
1. A single act of abuse that causes physical trauma of sufficient
severity that, if left untreated, would cause permanent physical
disfigurement, permanent physical disability, or death;
2. A single act of sexual abuse that causes significant bleeding, deep
bruising, or significant external or internal swelling;
3. More than one act of physical abuse, each of which causes
bleeding, deep bruising, significant external or internal swelling,
bone fracture, or unconsciousness;
OR
4. The willful, prolonged failure to provide adequate food.]
<F. Dependent Child Defined: Parent or Guardian Caused Death>
guardian] caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.]
<G. Dependent Child Defined: Left Without Support>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she has been left
without any provision for support.]
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she has been voluntarily
surrendered according to law and has not been reclaimed within the 14-
day period following that surrender.]
guardian] has been incarcerated or institutionalized and cannot arrange
for the child’s care.]
[A minor may become a dependent child if his or her relative or other
adult custodian with whom he or she resides or has been left is unwilling
or unable to provide care or support for the child, the parent’s
774
whereabouts are unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate the parent

have been unsuccessful.]
<H. Dependent Child Defined: Freed for Adoption>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she has been freed for
adoption by one or both parents for 12 months by either relinquishment
or termination of parental rights, or an adoption petition has not been
granted.]
<I. Dependent Child Defined: Acts of Cruelty>
[A minor may become a dependent child if he or she has been subjected
to an act or acts of cruelty by (his or her (parent/ [or] guardian)/ [or] a
member of his or her household), or the parent [or guardian] has failed
to adequately protect the child from an act or acts of cruelty when the
parent [or guardian] knew or reasonably should have known that the
child was in danger of being subjected to an act or acts of cruelty.]
<J. Dependent Child Defined: Sibling Abused>
[A minor may become a dependent child if his or her sibling has been
abused or neglected, as explained above, and there is a substantial risk
that the child will be abused or neglected in the same way. The
circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental
condition of the parent [or guardian], and other factors may bear on
whether there is a substantial risk to the child.]
<Delinquent Child Defined>
[A delinquent child is a minor whom a court has found to have
committed a crime.]
[A delinquent child is [also] a minor who has violated a curfew based
solely on age.]
[A delinquent child is [also] a minor who persistently or habitually
refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his or
her parent [or guardian or custodian], or who is beyond the control of
that person.]
[A delinquent child is [also] a minor who <insert other
grounds for delinquency from Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601>.]
<Sexual Abuse Defined>
[Sexual abuse includes (rape[,]/ [and] statutory rape[,]/ [and] rape in
concert[,]/ [and] incest[,]/ [and] sodomy[,]/ [and] lewd or lascivious acts
on a child[,]/ [and] oral copulation[,]/ [and] sexual penetration [,]/ [and]
child molestation[,]/ [and] employing a minor to perform obscene acts[,]/
[and] preparing, selling, or distributing obscene matter depicting a
minor).]
775
To decide whether the (parent/guardian/ <insert description

of person alleged to have committed abuse>) committed (that/one of those)
crime[s], please refer to the separate instructions that I (will give/have
[Sexual abuse also includes, but is not limited to, the following:
• [Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of
one person by the penis of another person, whether or not semen
is emitted(;/.)]
• [Any sexual contact between the genitals or anal opening of one
person and the mouth or tongue of another person(;/.)]
• [Any intrusion by one person into the genitals or anal opening of
another person, including the use of any object for this purpose[,
unless it is done for a valid medical purpose](;/.)]
• [The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts
(including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and
buttocks), or the clothing covering them, of a child, or of the
perpetrator by a child, for purposes of sexual arousal or
gratification(;/.) [However, sexual abuse does not include touching
that may be reasonably construed as normal caretaker
responsibilities, interactions with, or demonstrations of affection
for the child, or acts performed for a valid medical purpose(;/.)]]
• [The intentional masturbation of the perpetrator’s genitals in the
child’s presence(;/.)]
• [Conduct by (someone who knows that he or she is aiding,
assisting, employing, using, persuading, inducing, or coercing/a
person responsible for a child’s welfare who knows that he or she
is permitting or encouraging) a child to engage in[, or assist
others to engage in,] (prostitution[,]/ [or] a live performance
involving obscene sexual conduct[,]/ [or] posing or modeling,
alone or with others, for purposes of preparing a film,
photograph, negative, slide, drawing, painting, or other pictorial
depiction involving obscene sexual conduct)(;/.) [A person
responsible for a child’s welfare is a (parent[,]/ [or] guardian[,]/
[or] foster parent[,]/ [or] licensed administrator or employee of a
public or private residential home, residential school, or other
residential institution)(;/.)]]
• [Commercial sexual exploitation including (the sexual trafficking
of a child/ [or] providing food, shelter, or payment to a child in
exchange for the performance of <insert description
of sex act[s] specified in Penal Code sections 11165.1 or 236.1>).]
• [(Depicting a child in/[,] [or] (K/k)nowingly (developing/[,]
776
duplicating/[,] printing/[,] downloading/[,] streaming/[,] accessing

through electronic or digital media/[,] [or] exchanging,) any (film/
[,] photograph/[,] videotape/[,] video recording/[,] negative/[,] [or]
slide) knowing that it shows a child engaged in an act of obscene
sexual conduct. [However, sexual abuse does not include (conduct
by a person engaged in legitimate medical, scientific, or
educational activities[;]/ [or] lawful conduct between spouses[;]/
conduct by a person engaged in law enforcement activities[;]/ [or]
conduct by an employee engaged in work for a commercial film
developer while acting within the scope of his or her employment
and as instructed by his or her employer, provided that the
employee has no financial interest in the commercial developer
who employs him or her).]]]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If more than one act is alleged as a basis for the charge, the court has a sua sponte
duty to give a unanimity instruction. (People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212,
215–216 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897].) Give CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity. A unanimity
instruction is not required if the acts “constitute a continuing course of conduct.”
(Ibid.) See the discussion in the Bench Notes for CALCRIM No. 3500. (See also
People v. Schoonderwood (1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 125, 127 [164 P.2d 69] [continuous
course of conduct exception applied to charge of contributing to delinquency of a
minor]; People v. Dutra (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 311, 321–322 [171 P.2d 41]
[exception did not apply].)
If the case involves allegations of child molestation and the evidence has been
presented in the form of “generic testimony” about recurring events without specific
dates and times, the court should determine whether it is more appropriate to give
(People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].)
See discussion in the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.
391].)
The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request if relevant.
AUTHORITY
777
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Sexual Abuse Defined. Pen. Code, § 11165.1.
• Delinquent/Ward of Court Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 601–602.
• Dependent Child Defined. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.
• Minor Defined. Pen. Code, § 270e; Fam. Code, § 6500.
RELATED ISSUES
Lesser Offense of Rape or Lewd Acts
There is disagreement regarding whether a violation of Penal Code section 272 is a
necessarily lesser included offense of rape or lewd and lascivious acts. The Supreme
Court concluded that it was in People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 597–598 [184
P.2d 512], overruled on other grounds in People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289,
308, fn. 6 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832]. However, in People v. Bobb (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 88, 92 [254 Cal.Rptr. 707], disapproved on other grounds by People
v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198, fn. 7 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531], the
Court of Appeal expressly declined to follow Greer, concluding that “the calculus
has been altered” by an intervening amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 601 and further faulting Greer for failing to analyze the elements of the
lesser included offenses.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.20[8], Ch. 144, Crimes Against Order, § 144.10[1]
(Matthew Bender).
778
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to provide for

(his/her) (child/children) [in violation of Penal Code section 270].
prove that:
1. The defendant was the parent of <insert name[s] of
child or children>;
2. <insert name[s] of child or children> (was/were) [a]
minor[s];
3. The defendant failed to provide necessities for
<insert name[s] of child or children>;
AND
4. The failure to provide was willful and without lawful excuse.
A minor is a person under 18 years old.
purpose.
Necessities are necessary clothing, food, shelter, [and] medical care[, or
other remedial care] for a minor child.
[Other remedial care includes spiritual treatment through prayer alone in
accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination and by one of its duly accredited practitioners.]
[A parent must do all that is reasonable in order to provide necessities
for minor children. A parent has a lawful excuse for failing to do so if,
through no fault of his or her own, he or she is unable to earn enough
money and does not have other income or assets to pay for those
necessities. [It is not a lawful excuse if the parent is unable to provide
necessities because he or she has unreasonably chosen to spend money
on other things or has failed to diligently seek work.]]
[When you decide whether the defendant was able to provide necessities
for <insert name[s] of child or children>, consider all of (his/
her) income, including social insurance benefits and gifts.]
[A parent must provide necessities for a minor child even if he or she
never married or is divorced from the child’s other parent. This duty
also exists regardless of any court order for alimony or child support in
a divorce action.]
[It is not a lawful excuse that the other parent has legal custody of the
779
minor child or that the other parent, another person, or an organization

voluntarily or involuntarily has provided necessities for the minor child
or undertaken to do so.]
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew
of ’s <insert name[s] of child or children> existence and
either:
1. Abandoned or deserted <insert name[s] of child or
children>,
OR
2. Failed to provide <insert name[s] of child or
children> with necessities,
then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant’s
failure to provide was willful and without lawful excuse.]
[The husband of a woman who bears a child as a result of artificial
insemination is the father of that child if he consented in writing to the
artificial insemination.]
[If the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. <insert name[s] of child or children> (was/were) born
while the defendant’s wife was cohabiting with him,
AND
2. The defendant is neither impotent nor sterile,
then you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant is
’s <insert name[s] of child or children> father.]
the defendant is the parent of <insert name[s] of child or
children>. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
[An unborn child is considered a minor for whom a parent must provide
necessities.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
780
The bracketed paragraphs that begin with “If the People prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that” explain rebuttable presumptions created by statute. (See Pen. Code,
§ 270; Fam. Code, § 7540; Evid. Code, §§ 600–607.) The California Supreme Court
has held that a jury instruction phrased as a rebuttable presumption in a criminal
case creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (People v. Roder (1983) 33
Cal.3d 491, 497–505 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].) In accordance with
Roder, these paragraphs of the instruction have been written as permissive
inferences. In addition, it is only appropriate to instruct the jury on a permissive
inference if there is no evidence to contradict the inference. If any evidence has
been introduced to support the opposite factual finding, then the jury “shall
determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
without regard to the presumption.” (Evid. Code, § 604.)
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of
’s <insert name[s] of child or children> existence” if there is
evidence that the defendant either did not know of the child’s existence or did not
act willfully or without a lawful excuse.
In addition, the court must not give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “If the
People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1. <insert name[s] of
child or children> (was/were) born while the defendant’s wife was cohabiting with
him” if there is evidence that the defendant is not the child’s father.
If there is evidence that the defendant is not the child’s parent, give the bracketed
paragraph that begins with “The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable that the defendant is the parent.”
391].)
The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request if supported by the
evidence.
AUTHORITY
• Willfully Defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1).
• Inability as Excuse. People v. Wallach (1923) 62 Cal.App. 385, 391 [217 P. 81].
• Must Do All Reasonable. People v. Caseri (1933) 129 Cal.App. 88, 91–92 [18
P.2d 389].
• Parentage Through Artificial Insemination Defined. Fam. Code, § 7613.
• Presumption and Inference Defined. Evid. Code, § 600.
• Permissive Inference of Parentage. Fam. Code, § 7540; People v. Roder (1983)
33 Cal.3d 491, 506–507 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302].
781
• Evidentiary Presumptions. Evid. Code, §§ 602–604.

SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Crimes and Crimes
Against Decency, § 144.
782
2982. Persuading, Luring, or Transporting a Minor Under 14 Years
of Age (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with persuading, luring, or

transporting a minor who is under 14 years of age [in violation of Penal
prove that:
1. The defendant contacted or communicated with
<insert name of minor>;
2. When the defendant did so, (he/she) was an adult stranger to the
minor;
3. <insert name of minor> was under 14 years of age at
the time;
4. The defendant knew that (he/she) was contacting or
communicating with <insert name of minor>;
<insert name of minor> was under 14 years of age at
the time;
6. The defendant contacted or communicated with
<insert name of minor> with the intent to persuade, lure, or
transport[, or attempt to persuade, lure, or transport,] (him/her),
for any purpose, away from ( ’s <insert name of
minor> home/ [or] any location known by ’s <insert
name of minor> parent[, legal guardian, or custodian] as a place
where the child is located);
7. The defendant did not have the express consent of ’s
<insert name of minor> parent [or legal guardian];
[AND]
8. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to avoid the consent
of ’s <insert name of minor> parent [or legal
guardian](;/.)
<Give element 9 when instructing on an emergency situation.>
[AND
9. The defendant was not acting in an emergency situation.]
An adult stranger is a person at least 21 years old who has no substantial
relationship with the child or is merely a casual acquaintance, or who
783
has established or promoted a relationship with the child for the primary
purpose of victimization.
Express consent means oral or written permission that is positive, direct,
and unequivocal, requiring no inference or implication to supply its
meaning.
[Contact or communication includes the use of a telephone or the
Internet.]
[Internet means the global information system that is logically linked
together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet
Protocol (IP), or its subsequent extensions, and that is able to support
communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite, or its subsequent extensions, or other IP-
compatible protocols, and that provides, uses, or makes accessible, either
publicly or privately, high-level services layered on the communications
and related infrastructure described in this definition.]
[An emergency situation is a situation where a child is threatened with
imminent bodily, emotional, or psychological harm.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
defense of an “emergency situation.” (Pen. Code, § 272(b)(2).) Give element 9 and
the definition of “emergency situation.”
391].)
The remaining bracketed paragraphs should be given on request as appropriate.
Note that the Penal Code section 272 was amended by Stats. 2005, ch. 461 (AB33)
to change the victim’s age to “under 14 years of age.” Prosecutions based on
conduct that occurred before January 1, 2006 should use the former age requirement
of “twelve years old or younger.”
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 272(b)(1).
• Internet Defined. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17538(f)(6).
784
• Victimization as Predatory Sexual Conduct. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600(e).

SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Sex Crimes and Crimes
Against Decency, § 154.
785
G. BETTING
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with bookmaking [in

violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(1)].
prove that:
1. The defendant engaged in bookmaking;
AND
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that (he/she) was
engaging in bookmaking.
Bookmaking includes the taking of bets, either orally or recorded in
writing. The defendant does not need to be involved in betting as a
business or occupation. The taking of one bet is sufficient.
A bet is a wager or agreement between two or more people that if an
uncertain future event happens, the loser will (pay money to the winner/
[or] give the winner something of value). [A bet includes a wager made
on the outcome of any actual or purported event, including but not
limited to any kind of sporting contest [or <insert
description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>].] [It is not necessary that
the event that was bet on actually take place.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); People v. Burch (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 122,
124 [257 P.2d 44]; People v. Ghio (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P. 205].
• Knowledge Required. People v. Coppla (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224
P.2d 828].
• Bookmaking Defined. People v. Thompson (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 734, 739 [24
Cal.Rptr. 101]; People v. Fontes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 650, 653–654 [86
Cal.Rptr. 790]; People v. Bradford (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 372, 377–378 [213 P.2d
37].
787
• Bet Defined. People v. Oreck (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 220 [168 P.2d 186].
• Writing Not Required. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); People v. Burch (1953) 118
Cal.App.2d 122, 124 [257 P.2d 44].
• One Bet Sufficient. People v. Buckman (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 50 [8
Cal.Rptr. 765].
• Event Need Not Occur. People v. Ghio (1927) 82 Cal.App. 28, 32–33 [255 P.
205].
COMMENTARY
As a result of statutory amendments, the committee believes that there is no longer
a distinction between the elements of this crime and the offense of accepting a bet.
(Pen. Code § 337a(a)(6); see CALCRIM No. 2996, Betting or Wagering.)
RELATED ISSUES
Cash Not Required
A bet does not require that the defendant receive cash. (People v. Raze (1949) 91
Cal.App.2d 918, 922 [205 P.2d 1062].) It is sufficient if the defendant received
something of value equivalent to money. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
788
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with pool selling [in

prove that:
1. The defendant sold or distributed shares or chances in a betting
pool;
AND
2. When (he/she) acted, the defendant knew that (he/she) was selling
or distributing shares or chances in a betting pool.
The defendant does not need to be involved in selling or distributing
shares or chances as a business or occupation. A single act that violates
the statute is sufficient. [It is not necessary that the event that is the
subject of a betting pool actually take place.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); Finster v. Keller (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836,
846 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241].
• Knowledge Required. People v. Coppla (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224
P.2d 828].
• Pool Selling Defined. Finster v. Keller (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 846 [96
Cal.Rptr. 241]; People v. Coppla (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d
828].
• One Bet Sufficient. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1).
205].
SECONDARY SOURCES
789
2992. Keeping a Place for Recording Bets (Pen. Code,
§ 337a(a)(2))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with keeping a place for the
purpose of recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool [in
prove that:
1. The defendant kept or occupied a place for any period of time;
2. The defendant kept or occupied the place for the purpose of
recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool;
3. The place contained [(a/an)] (book[,]/ [or] paper[,]/ [or]
apparatus[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] paraphernalia) to record [or
register] bets or shares in a betting pool;
AND
4. The defendant possessed the (book[,]/ [or] paper[,]/ [or]
apparatus[,]/ [or] device[,]/ [or] paraphernalia) for the purpose of
recording [or registering] bets or shares in a betting pool.
As used here, a place means the whole or part of any (room[,]/ [or]
building[,]/ [or] stand[,]/ [or] shed[,]/ [or] tenement[,]/ [or] tent[,]/ [or]
booth[,]/ [or] float[,]/ [or] vessel[,]/ [or] vehicle[,]/ [or] enclosure) of any
kind.
Recording [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or
using any other material or device, to allow winnings on the bet to be
distributed in the future. [Recording [or registering] a bet does not
require the type of registering or recording that occurs in a legitimate
business establishment.]
[It is not required that any bets actually be made.]
New January 2006

790
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(2); Finster v. Keller (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836,
847–848 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241]; People v. Cuda (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 397, 414 [3
Cal.Rptr. 86].
• Place Applies to Vehicle. People v. Roche (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 665, 669–670
[157 P.2d 440].
• Actual Bet Not Required. People v. Cuda (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 397, 414 [3
Cal.Rptr. 86].
RELATED ISSUES
Ownership Not Required
Test is occupancy, rather than ownership, of the premises for the illegal purposes.
(People v. Reyes (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 69 [132 Cal.Rptr. 848].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
791
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (receiving[,]/ [or]

holding[,]/ [or] forwarding) bets [in violation of Penal Code section
337a(a)(3)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (received[,]/ [or] held[,]/ [or] forwarded) money [or
something valuable];
AND
2. The defendant knew that it was given to (him/her) as a bet.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(3); People v. Gaspard (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d
487, 488 [2 Cal.Rptr. 193].
• Must Receive Money or Thing of Value. People v. Gaspard (1960) 177
Cal.App.2d 487, 488 [2 Cal.Rptr. 193]; People v. Chavez (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d
356, 359 [223 P.2d 663].
• Event Need Not Occur. People v. Chavez (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 356, 359 [223
P.2d 663].
RELATED ISSUES
Cash Not Required
792

SECONDARY SOURCES
793
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with recording [or

registering] a bet [in violation of Penal Code section 337a(a)(4)].
prove that:
1. The defendant recorded [or registered] a bet;
AND
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) knew that (he/she) was
recording or registering a bet.
Recording [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or
business establishment.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(4); People v. Allen (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 745,
747 [252 P.2d 968].
• Knowledge Required. See People v. Coppla (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768
[224 P.2d 828].
• Event Need Not Occur. People v. Warnick (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 900, 902 [195
P.2d 552].
• Recording a Bet. People v. Ross (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 116, 121 [223 P.2d 85].
794
SECONDARY SOURCES
795
2995. Permitting Place to Be Used for Betting Activities (Pen.
Code, § 337a(a)(5))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with permitting a place to

be used for betting activities [in violation of Penal Code section
337a(a)(5)].
prove that:
1. The defendant owned, rented, or occupied a place;
2. The defendant allowed the place to be used for (bookmaking[,]/
[or] pool selling[,]/ [or] recording [or registering] bets[,]/ [or]
receiving, holding, or forwarding bets);
AND
3. The defendant knew that the place was being used for that
purpose.
As used here, a place means the whole or part of any (room[,]/ [or]
building[,]/ [or] stand[,]/ [or] shed[,]/ [or] tenement[,]/ [or] tent[,]/ [or]
booth[,]/ [or] float[,]/ [or] vessel[,]/ [or] vehicle[,]/ [or] enclosure) of any
kind.
[Bookmaking includes the taking of bets, either orally or recorded in
writing. The defendant does not need to be involved in betting as a
business or occupation. The taking of one bet is sufficient.]
[Pool selling means selling or distributing shares or chances in a betting
pool. The defendant does not need to be involved in selling or
distributing shares or chances as a business or occupation. A single act
that violates the statute is sufficient. [It is not necessary that the event
that is the subject of a betting pool actually take place.]]
description of event from Pen. Code, § 337a>.] [It is not necessary that the
event that was bet on actually take place.]
[Recording [or registering] a bet means making a notation on paper, or
business establishment.]]
796
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(5).
[224 P.2d 828].
• “Place” Applies to Vehicle. People v. Roche (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 665, 669–670
[157 P.2d 440].
• Bookmaking Defined. People v. Thompson (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 734, 739 [24
Cal.Rptr. 101]; People v. Fontes (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 650, 653–654 [86
Cal.Rptr. 790]; People v. Bradford (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 372, 377–378 [213 P.2d
37].
• Pool Selling Defined. Finster v. Keller (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 846 [96
Cal.Rptr. 241]; People v. Coppla (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [224 P.2d
828].
• Writing Not Required. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(1); People v. Burch (1953) 118
Cal.App.2d 122, 124 [257 P.2d 44].
• One Bet Sufficient. People v. Buckman (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 50 [8
Cal.Rptr. 765].
205].
SECONDARY SOURCES
797
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with (making[,]/ [or]

offering[,]/ or accepting) a bet [in violation of Penal Code section
337a(a)(6)].
prove that:
1. The defendant (made[,]/ [or] offered[,]/ or accepted) a bet;
AND
2. The defendant knew that (he/she) was (making[,]/ [or] offering[,]/
or accepting) a bet.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 337a(a)(6).
[224 P.2d 828].
205].
RELATED ISSUES
Cash Not Required
798
SECONDARY SOURCES
799
H. MONEY LAUNDERING
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with money

laundering [in violation of Penal Code section 186.10].
prove that:
1. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) one or
more financial transactions involving at least one monetary
instrument through at least one financial institution;
1. <Give 2A when only one transaction is alleged.>
[2A. The financial transaction involved [a] monetary instrument[s]
with a total value of more than $5,000;]
[2A. <Give 2B and/or 2C as appropriate when multiple transactions are
alleged.>
[2B. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) the
financial transactions within a seven-day period and the monetary
instrument[s] involved had a total value of more than $5,000;]
[OR]
[2C. The defendant (conducted/ [or] attempted to conduct) the
financial transactions within a 30-day period and the monetary
instrument[s] involved had a total value of more than $25,000;]
[AND]
[2C. <Give 3A, 3B, or both, as appropriate.>
[3A. When the defendant did so, (he/she) intended to (promote/ [or]
manage/ [or] establish/ [or] carry on/ [or] facilitate) criminal
activity;]
[OR]
[3B. The defendant knew that the monetary instrument[s] represented
the proceeds of criminal activity or (was/were) derived directly or
indirectly from the proceeds of criminal activity(;/.)]
[AND]
[3B. <Give element 4 as appropriate if the defendant is an attorney.>
[4. The attorney defendant accepted a fee for representing a client in
a criminal investigation or proceeding and accepted the monetary
801
instrument with the intent to disguise or aid in disguising the

source of the funds or the nature of the criminal activity.]
Conducting includes, but is not limited to, initiating, participating in, or
concluding a transaction.
Financial institution means (any national bank or banking institution/
<insert appropriate entity from Pen. Code, § 186.9(b)>)
located or doing business in the state of California.
A transaction includes the (deposit/ [or] withdrawal/ [or] transfer/ [or]
bailment/ [or] loan/ [or] pledge/ [or] payment/ [or] exchange) of
(currency/ [or] a monetary instrument/ [or] the electronic, wire,
magnetic, or manual transfer) of funds between accounts by, through, or
to, a financial institution.
A monetary instrument means (money of the United States of America/
[or] <insert appropriate item from Pen. Code, § 186.9(d)>.
Criminal activity means (a criminal offense punishable under the laws of
the state of California by [death or] imprisonment in the state prison/
[or] a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction, which, under
the laws of that jurisdiction is punishable by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year).
[Foreign bank draft means a bank draft or check issued or made out by
a foreign (bank/ [or] savings and loan/ [or] casa de cambio/ [or] credit
union/ [or] currency dealer or exchanger/ [or] check cashing business/
[or] money transmitter/ [or] insurance company/ [or] investment or
private bank) [or any other foreign financial institution that provides
similar financial services,] on an account in the name of the foreign bank
or foreign financial institution held at a bank or other financial
institution located in the United States or a territory of the United
States.]
<Give the following paragraph if a sentence enhancement is alleged
pursuant to Pen. Code, § 186.10(c).>
[If you find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must then determine
whether the [total] value of the [attempted] transaction[s] was more than
<insert alleged minimum value> but less than <insert
alleged top limit>. The People have the burden of proving this additional
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find that this allegation has not been proved.]

802
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
If the definition of proceeds is an issue, see United States v. Santos (2008) 553 U.S.
507 [128 S.Ct. 2020, 2022, 170 L.Ed.2d 912], holding that “proceeds” in the federal
money laundering statute means “profits” in the context of an illegal gambling
scheme.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 186.10; People v. Mays (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 29
[55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356].
• Definitions. Pen. Code, § 186.9.
• Definition of Proceeds. United States v. Santos (2008) 553 U.S. 507 [128 S.Ct.
2020, 2022, 170 L.Ed.2d 912].
SECONDARY SOURCES
803
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to appear while

out of custody on bail [in violation of Penal Code section 1320.5].
prove that:
1. The defendant was (charged with/convicted of) the commission of
a felony in (this case/case number );
2. The defendant was released from custody on bail in (this/that)
case;
3. The defendant was required to appear in court at a specific date,
time and place in (this/that) case;
4. The defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required;
AND
5. When the defendant willfully failed to appear in court as
required, (he/she) did so in order to evade the process of the
court.
purpose.
[If you find the defendant willfully failed to appear within 14 days of the
date assigned for appearance, you may, but are not required to, infer
that the failure to appear was for the purpose of evading the process of
the court.]
New March 2018

BENCH NOTES
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Willfully defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Specific intent. People v. Sutton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 799–800 [23
Cal.Rptr.2d 632]; People v. Wesley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519 [243 Cal.Rptr.
785].
805
• Mandatory presumption unconstitutional unless instructed as permissive

inference. People v. Forrester (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1703 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d
19].
SECONDARY SOURCES
4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings, § 116.
806
3002. Failure to Appear While on Own Recognizance Release
(Pen. Code, § 1320)
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with failing to appear while

released from custody on (his/her) own recognizance [in violation of
Penal Code section 1320((a)/(b))].
prove that:
1. The defendant was (charged with/convicted of) the commission of
a (felony/misdemeanor) in (this case/case number );
2. The defendant was released from custody on (his/her) own
recognizance pursuant to a signed written release;
3. The defendant willfully failed to appear in court as required;
AND
4. When the defendant willfully failed to appear in court as
required, (he/she) did so in order to evade the process of the
court.
purpose.
A signed written release must contain the following:
1. Defendant’s promise to appear as ordered by a judge or
magistrate;
2. Defendant’s promise to obey all reasonable conditions imposed by
a judge or magistrate;
3. Defendant’s promise not to leave the state without permission
from the court;
4. Defendant’s agreement to waive extradition if he or she fails to
appear as required and is arrested outside the State of California;
AND
5. Defendant’s acknowledgement that he or she has been informed
of the consequences and penalties for violations of the conditions
of release.
[If you find the defendant willfully failed to appear within 14 days of the
date assigned for appearance, you may, but are not required to, infer
that the failure to appear was for the purpose of evading the process of
the court.]
807
New March 2018

BENCH NOTES
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Requirement of written agreement conforming to Pen. Code, § 1318. People v.
Hernandez (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1182 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 548]; People v. Jenkins
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 22 [193 Cal.Rptr. 854].
• Split of authority over whether substantial compliance with Penal Code section
1318 is sufficient. People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406 [167
Cal.Rptr.3d 60] (Yes); People v. Mohammed (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 920 [76
Cal.Rptr.3d 372] (No).
• Willfully defined. Pen. Code, § 7(1); People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102,
107 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402].
• Specific intent. People v. Sutton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 799–800 [23
Cal.Rptr.2d 632]; People v. Wesley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519 [243 Cal.Rptr.
785].
• Mandatory presumption unconstitutional unless instructed as permissive
inference. People v. Forrester (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1703 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d
19].
SECONDARY SOURCES
4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th Ed. 2012) Pretrial Proceedings,
§§ 135–139.
808
J. EAVESDROPPING AND RECORDED
COMMUNICATION
3010. Eavesdropping or Recording Confidential Communication
(Pen. Code, § 632(a))
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with using an electronic

device to eavesdrop on or to record a confidential communication [in
prove that:
1. The defendant intentionally listened to or recorded a
(conversation/communication);
2. When the defendant listened to or recorded the (conversation/
communication), (he/she) used (an/a) (electronic amplifying/
recording) device;
3. When the defendant listened to or recorded the (conversation/
communication), (he/she) did not have the consent of all the
individuals who were party to the (conversation/communication);
4. At least one of the [other] individuals who were party to the
(conversation/communication) intended that the (conversation/
communication) be confidential;
[AND]
5. The individual[s] who intended that the (conversation/
communication) be confidential had objectively reasonable
grounds to believe that the (conversation/communication) would
be confidential(;/.)
[AND]
<Give element 6 if evidence shows defendant may have been an offıcer,
agent, or employee of a public communications utility.>
[6. The defendant was not an officer, agent, or employee of a public
communications utility company acting in the lawful performance
of (his/her) duties.]
[A confidential communication does not include a communication made
in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive, or
administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other
circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably
expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.]
809
New March 2022

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
crime.
AUTHORITY
• Confidential Communication. Pen. Code, § 632(c); Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002)
• Exceptions. Pen. Code, § 632(e) & (f).
RELATED ISSUES
Intent to Record Confidential Communication
In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 70 Cal.2d 123, 133 [74
Cal.Rptr. 294, 449 P.2d 230], the California Supreme Court interpreted a prior but
similar version of Penal Code section 632 and held that the recording of a
confidential communication must be intentional.
Prostitution and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
“A person’s participation in sexual activities at a private residence in exchange for
money, without more, does not necessarily cause them to expect that their words
and actions will be recorded without their consent.” (People v. Lyon (2021) 61
Wiretapping
Wiretapping is the interception of communications by an unauthorized connection to
the transmission line. (See Pen. Code, § 631.) Penal Code section 632 does not
prohibit wiretapping but instead prohibits the interception of communications with
equipment that is not connected to a transmission line. (See People v. Ratekin
(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1168 [261 Cal.Rptr. 143].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
810
ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS
A. PRIOR CONVICTION
3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle
(Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))
3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed (Pen. Code,
§ 12022(d))
3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c),
12022.3(b))
3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When Arrested (Pen.
Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))
12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)
1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))
3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50 BMG Rifle
(Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))
3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death
(Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and Discharge Causing
Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))
3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 1192.7(c)(8),
12022.7, 12022.8)
811
3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or Paralyzed

(Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))
F. SEX OFFENSES
§ 667.61(d)(2))
3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(d)(3))
3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex
Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))
3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(4))
3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(5))
3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered Controlled Substance (Pen.
Code, § 667.61(e)(6))
3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to Cause Minor to
Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2))
3185. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear Against Minor
Under 14 Years/14 Years or Older (Pen. Code, §§ 264.1(b), 286(c)(2)(B) &
(C), 286(d)(2) & (3), 287(c)(2)(B) & (C), 287(d)(2) & (3), 289(a)(1)(B) &
(C))
3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4);
Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)
3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled Substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8)
3224. Aggravating Factor: Great Violence, Great Bodily Harm, or High Degree of
Cruelty, Viciousness, or Callousness
812

3227. Aggravating Factor: Induced Others to Participate or Occupied Position of
Leadership or Dominance
I. TEMPLATES
3251. Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Specific Factual Issue:
Template—Bifurcated Trial
3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing Factor, or Prior
Conviction
813
A. PRIOR CONVICTION
3100. Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial (Pen. Code, §§ 1025,
1158)
If you find the defendant guilty of a crime, you must also decide whether
the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was
previously convicted of (another/other) crime[s]. It has already been
determined that the defendant is the person named in exhibit[s]
<insert number[s] or description[s] of exhibit[s]>. You must decide
whether the evidence proves that the defendant was convicted of the
alleged crime[s].
[1.] A violation of <insert code section alleged>, [for
which judgment was entered] on <insert date of
conviction/judgment>, in the <insert name of court>,
in Case Number <insert docket or case number>(;/.)
evidence as proof that the defendant committed any of the crimes with
which he is currently charged or for any other purpose.]
the burden of proving (the/each) alleged conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the People have not met this burden [for any alleged
conviction], you must find that the alleged conviction has not been
proved.
New January 2006; Revised March 2018, September 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction, the court has a sua sponte duty
to instruct on the allegation.
If identity is an issue, the court must make the factual determination that the
defendant is the person who has suffered the convictions in question before giving
this instruction.
815
CALCRIM No. 3100 ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS

If the defendant is charged with a prison prior, the court must determine whether the
jury should decide if the defendant served a separate prison term for the conviction
and whether the defendant remained free of prison custody for the “washout”
period. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) The Commentary below discusses these
issues further. If the court chooses to submit these issues to the jury, give
CALCRIM No. 3102, Prior Conviction: Prison Prior, with this instruction.
If the court determines that there is a factual issue regarding the prior conviction
that must be submitted to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3103: Prior Conviction:
Factual Issue for Jury, with this instruction. The Commentary below discusses this
issue further.
Give the bracketed phrase “for which judgment was entered” if there is more than
one prior conviction charged.
On request, the court should give the limiting instruction that begins with “Consider
the evidence presented on this allegation only when deciding.” (See People v.
Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913].) There
is no sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction, and the defense may request
that no limiting instruction be given. (See People v. Griggs (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1139 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 380].)
whether the prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158.
• Bifurcation. People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333,
885 P.2d 83]; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71
Cal.Rptr.2d 41].
• Judge Determines Whether Defendant Is Person Named in Documents. Pen.
Code, § 1025(c); People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572,
18 P.3d 2]; People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132
Cal.Rptr.2d 694].
• Limiting Instruction on Prior Conviction. See People v. Valentine (1986) 42
Cal.3d 170, 182, fn. 7 [228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913]; People v. Griggs (2003)
• Disputed Factual Issues. See People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136 [226
Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 254,
268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438]; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530
U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
• Three-Strikes Statutes. Pen. Code, §§ 667(e), 1170.12.
• Five-Year Enhancement for Serious Felony. Pen. Code, § 667(a)(1).
• Three-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior If Violent Felony. Pen. Code,
§ 667.5(a).
816
ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS CALCRIM No. 3100
• One-Year Enhancement for Prison Prior. Pen. Code, § 667.5(b).

• Serious Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 1192(c).
• Violent Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.5(c).
COMMENTARY
Factual Issues—Decided by Jury or Court?
Penal Code sections 1025 and 1158 state that when an accusation charges a
defendant with having suffered a prior conviction, the jury must decide whether the
defendant “suffered the prior conviction” (unless the right to a jury trial is waived).
Under Penal Code section 1025, the court, not the jury, must determine whether the
defendant is the person named in the documents submitted to prove the prior
conviction. (Pen. Code, § 1025(c); see also People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19,
24–25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2].)
In some cases, however, a prior conviction may present an ancillary factual issue
that must be decided before the conviction may be used under a particular
enhancement or sentencing statute. For example, if the prosecution seeks sentencing
under the “three strikes” law and alleges that the defendant was previously
convicted of two burglaries, these prior convictions would qualify as “strikes” only
if the burglaries were residential. (See People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 455
[87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518].) If the defendant had been specifically convicted
of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, then there would be no issue over
whether the prior convictions qualified. If, on the other hand, the defendant had
been convicted simply of “burglary,” then whether the offenses were residential
would be a factual issue. (Ibid.)
The court’s role is “limited to identifying those facts that were established by virtue
of the conviction itself—that is, facts the jury was necessarily required to find to
render a guilty verdict, or that the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a
guilty plea.” (See People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136–137 [226
Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55].) A court considering whether to impose an increased
sentence based on a prior conviction may not make its own findings about what
facts or conduct “realistically” supported the conviction. (Ibid.) To allow otherwise
would constitute impermissible judicial factfinding violative of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. (Ibid.; see also Descamps v. United States (2013)
570 U.S. 254, 268–70 [133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438] [under federal
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, the only facts related to a prior
conviction that a sentencing court can rely on in imposing recidivist punishment are
the facts necessarily implied by the elements of the relevant prior offense].)
Prior Prison Term and “Washout” Period
A similar issue arises over whether the jury or the court must decide if the
defendant served a prison term as a result of a particular conviction and if the
defendant has been free of custody for sufficient time to satisfy the “washout”
period. (See Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) In People v. Winslow (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 680, 687 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 901], the Court of Appeal held that the jury
817
must determine whether the defendant served a prior prison term for a felony
conviction. The other holdings in Winslow were rejected by the California Supreme
Court. (People v. Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 458–459; People v. Wiley (1995) 9
Cal.4th 580, 592 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541].) However, the Winslow
holding that the jury must determine if the defendant served a prison term for a
felony conviction remains controlling authority.
But, in People v. Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 25–26, the Court expressed doubt,
in dicta, about whether the fact of having served a prison term is properly submitted
to the jury. Discussing the 1997 amendment to Penal Code section 1025, the Court
noted that
[t]he analysis lists the following questions that the jury would still decide if
Senate Bill 1146 became law: . . . ‘Was the defendant sentenced to prison based
on that conviction? How long has the defendant been out of custody since he or
she suffered the prior conviction?’ . . .
[T]hough we do not have a case before us raising the issue, it appears that many
of the listed questions are the sort of legal questions that are for the court under
[Wiley]. For example, determining . . . whether the defendant was sentenced to
prison is “largely legal” (Kelii, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at p. 455, quoting Wiley,
supra, 9 Cal. 4th at p. 590), and though these questions require resolution of
some facts, “a factual inquiry, limited to examining court documents, is . . .
‘the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing
function.’ ” (Kelii, at p. 457, quoting Wiley, at p. 590.) . . . Therefore, the list
of questions in the committee analysis should not be read as creating new jury
trial rights that did not exist under Wiley.
(Ibid.)
On the other hand, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435] could be interpreted as requiring the jury to make these factual
findings. (But see People v. Thomas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [110
Cal.Rptr.2d 571] [even under Apprendi, no federal due process right to have jury
determine whether defendant served a prior prison term].)
Until the California Supreme Court resolves this question, the court should consider
submitting to the jury the issues of whether the defendant served a prison term and
whether the defendant has remained free of custody for sufficient time to satisfy the
“washout” period. The court may use CALCRIM No. 3102, Prior Conviction:
Prison Prior.
RELATED ISSUES
Constitutionality of Prior
The prosecution is not required to prove the constitutional validity of a prior
conviction as an “element” of the enhancement. (People v. Walker (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 380, 386 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 264].) Rather, following the procedures
established in People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 922–924 [206 Cal.Rptr.
707, 687 P.2d 904], and People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 435–436 [87
818
Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 981 P.2d 525], the defense may bring a motion challenging the
constitutional validity of the prior. These questions are matters of law to be
determined by the trial court.
135 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 690].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining, § 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60, 91.80 (Matthew Bender).
819
The People have alleged that the defendant was previously convicted of
(another/other) crime[s]. It has already been determined that the
defendant is the person named in exhibit[s] <insert number[s] or
description[s] of exhibit[s]>. You must decide whether the evidence
proves that the defendant was convicted of the alleged crime[s].
[1.] A violation of <insert code section[s] alleged>, [for
which judgment was entered] on <insert date of
conviction/judgment>, in the <insert name of court>,
Case Number <insert docket or case number>(;/.)
[AND <Repeat for each prior conviction alleged.>]
[In deciding whether the People have proved the allegation[s], consider
You may not return a finding that (the/any) alleged conviction has or has
not been proved unless all 12 of you agree on that finding.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction, the court has a sua sponte duty
to instruct on the allegation. Give this instruction if the court has granted a
bifurcated trial. The court must also give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt:
Bifurcated Trial.
If the defendant is charged with a prison prior, the court must determine whether the
jury should decide if the defendant served a separate prison term for the conviction
and whether the defendant remained free of prison custody for the “washout”
period. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(a) & (b).) The Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100
discusses this issue. If the court chooses to submit these issues to the jury, give
CALCRIM No. 3102, Prior Conviction: Prison Prior, with this instruction.
If the court determines that there is a factual issue regarding the prior conviction
that must be submitted to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3103: Prior Conviction:
Factual Issue for Jury, with this instruction. The Commentary to CALCRIM No.
3100 discusses this issue.
Give the bracketed phrase “for which judgment was entered” if there is more than
one prior conviction alleged.
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “In deciding whether the People have
proved” on request.
820
whether each prior conviction has been proved. (Pen. Code, § 1158.)
AUTHORITY
• Bifurcation. People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 77–79 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333,
885 P.2d 83]; People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334–1336 [71
Cal.Rptr.2d 41].
• Judge Determines Whether Defendant Is Person Named in Documents. Pen.
Code, § 1025(b); People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572,
18 P.3d 2]; People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 [132
Cal.Rptr.2d 694].
U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
• Three-Strikes Statutes. Pen. Code, §§ 667(e), 1170.12.
• Five-Year Enhancement for Serious Felony. Pen. Code, § 667(a)(1).
§ 667.5(a).
• Serious Felony Defined. Pen. Code, § 1192(c).
RELATED ISSUES
See Motion for Bifurcated Trial in the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No.
3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Sentencing, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60, 91.80 (Matthew Bender).
821
If you find that the defendant was previously convicted of

<insert description of prior conviction>, you must also decide whether the
People have proved that the defendant served a separate prison term for
the crime and did not remain (out of prison custody/ [and] free of a new
felony conviction) for (5/10) years.
1. The defendant served a separate prison term for the crime of
<insert description of prior conviction>;
AND [EITHER]
[2[A]. The defendant did not remain out of prison custody for (5/10)
years after (he/she) was no longer in prison custody for that
crime(;/.)]
[OR]
[2[B]. The defendant was convicted of a new felony that (he/she)
committed within (5/10) years after (he/she) was no longer in
prison custody.]
A person served a separate prison term for a crime if he or she served a
continuous period of prison confinement imposed for that crime. [The
prison term may have been served for that crime alone or in
combination with prison terms imposed at the same time for other
crimes.] [A person is still serving a separate prison term for a crime if he
or she is placed back in custody (following an escape/ [or] for a parole
violation).] [If a person is returned to custody following (an escape/ [or]
a parole violation) and is also sentenced to prison for a new crime, then
that person is serving a new separate prison term.]
A person is in prison custody until he or she is discharged from prison or
released on parole, whichever happens first. [A person is also in prison
custody if he or she (is placed back in custody for a parole violation/ [or]
has unlawfully escaped from custody).]
A prison term includes confinement in [(a/the)] (state prison/federal penal
institution/California Youth Authority/Division of Juvenile
Justice/Department of Youth and Community Restoration/
<insert name of hospital or other institution where confinement entitles
person to prison credits>).
[A prison term includes commitment to the State Department of Mental
Health as a mentally disordered sex offender following a felony
conviction if the commitment lasts more than one year.]
822

federal offense> is the same as a conviction for a felony if the defendant
served one year or more in prison for the crime.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Review the Commentary to CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated
Trial, regarding the current state of the law on whether the court must submit these
issues to the jury. If the court gives this instruction, the court must also give either
CALCRIM No. 3100 or CALCRIM No. 3101.
The court must give one of the bracketed elements (did not remain out of prison
custody or was convicted of a new felony), depending on the prosecution’s theory.
The court may give both of the bracketed elements with the bracketed words
“either” and “or.”
The court may give the bracketed sentence that begins with “If a person is returned
to custody following (an escape/ [or] a parole violation) and is also sentenced to
prison for a new offense” on request if relevant based on the evidence. (People v.
Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865].)
If the court gives this instruction, the court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate whether the allegation has been proved. (Pen.
Code, § 1158.)
AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 407 P.3d 55]; People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23 [104
U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
• Burden of Proof. People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1231 [8
Cal.Rptr.3d 247].
• Continuous, Completed Term. People v. Medina (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 986,
991–992 [254 Cal.Rptr. 89]; People v. Cardenas (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 56
[237 Cal.Rptr. 249].
• Term for Offense Committed in Prison Is Separate. People v. Langston (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1237, 1242 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865]; People v. Walkkein (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 383]; People v. Cardenas (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 51, 56 [237 Cal.Rptr. 249].
823
• Direct Commitment to Youth Authority as Minor Is Not Prison Prior. People v.

Seals (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384–1385 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].
• New Commitment Following Escape Is Separate Prison Term. People v.
Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241, 1246 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d 865].
§ 667.5(a).
RELATED ISSUES
Commitment to Youth Authority
A direct commitment to the Department of Youth and Community Restoration
(DYCR) (formerly known as California Youth Authority (CYA) and Division of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ)) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5(a) is not
a prison prior for the purposes of Penal Code section 667.5. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(j);
People v. Seals (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383–1385 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) Time
at one of the above facilities qualifies as a prison prior only if the person was
sentenced to state prison and transferred to the facility for housing under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 1731.5(c). (People v. Seals, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1383–1385.)
Term for Offense Committed in Prison Is Separate
“When a consecutive sentence is imposed under section 1170.1, subdivision (c), for
an offense committed in state prison, section 1170.1 requires such sentence to
commence after the completion of the term for which the defendant was originally
imprisoned. Thus, each term is a separate, ‘continuous completed’ term, which is
available for enhancement under section 667.5 if the defendant is subsequently
convicted of a felony.” (People v. Walkkein (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409–1410
[18 Cal.Rptr.2d 383] [footnote and citations omitted; italics in original]; see also
People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, 95 P.3d
865].)
Calculating “Washout” Period
Penal Code section 667.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), contain “washout” periods of 10
and 5 years, respectively. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
“washout” period does not apply to a particular conviction. (People v. Fielder
(2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1232 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 247].) The “washout” period
commences when the defendant is discharged from custody or released on parole,
“whichever first occurs.” (Pen. Code, § 667.5(d); People v. Nobleton (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 76, 84–85 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 611].) Any return to prison on a parole
violation is considered part of the original prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5(d).)
Thus, in calculating whether the defendant has remained free of prison custody and
a felony conviction for sufficient time, the calculation begins from when the
defendant was released on parole without subsequently returning to prison on a
parole violation. (People v. Nobleton, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84–85.) The
824
calculation ends when the defendant commits a new offense that ultimately results
in a felony conviction. (People v. Fielder, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.) The
date the offense is committed, not the date of the ultimate conviction, is controlling.
(Id. at pp. 1233–1234.) The new felony ends the allowable time for the “washout”
period regardless of whether the defendant was sentenced to prison for the new
felony. (Id. at p. 1230.)
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Arraignment, Pleas, and Plea Bargaining,§ 42.21[6][a] (Matthew Bender).
Sentencing, §§ 91.21[2], 91.80 (Matthew Bender).
825
3103. Prior Conviction: Factual Issue for Jury (Pen. Code,
§§ 1025, 1158)
If you find that the defendant was previously convicted of the crime of
<insert description of prior conviction>, you must also decide
whether the People have proved that in the commission of that prior
crime <insert description of other factual issue, e.g., the
defendant personally used a firearm>.
<INSERT ELEMENTS REQUIRED.>

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
To determine whether or not this instruction is required, review the Commentary to
CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, regarding the current
state of the law on whether the jury must determine ancillary factual issues.
If the court gives this instruction, the court must provide the jury with a verdict
form on which the jury will indicate whether the allegation has been proved. (Pen.
Code, § 1158.)
AUTHORITY
U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction:
Nonbifurcated Trial.
SECONDARY SOURCES
826
Sentencing, §§ 91.21[2], 91.60[2][b], [c][ii], [3][b], 91.80[1][c], [2][a][ii] (Matthew

Bender).
827

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or the
have proved the additional allegation that one of the principals was
armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission] of
that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this
allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
loaded.]
A principal is armed with a firearm when that person:
1. Carries a firearm [or has a firearm available] for use in either
offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged in
Count[s] [or the lesser crime[s] of <insert
name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>,];
AND
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm [or has it available].
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the principal was armed with
the firearm “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

829
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
When two or more defendants are charged with an arming enhancement for the
same offense, the preferred approach is for the court to provide the jury with a
separate verdict form for the enhancement for each defendant. (People v. Paul
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 708 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 958 P.2d 412].) However, this
procedure is not required. (Id. at p. 705.)
In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has a
firearm available” on request if the evidence shows that the firearm was at the scene
of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the
underlying felony.” (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43
Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d
918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved; sufficient
evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; People v. Jackson (1995) 32
Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm was two
blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to defendant].)
If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “in the commission
of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, While Committing a
Felony: Defined—Escape Rule. (See People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109 [104
582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)
If there is evidence that the defendant was an aider and abettor, give the appropriate
instructions on aider and abettor liability, CALCRIM Nos. 400–410.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(1).
• Armed. People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898
P.2d 391]; People v. Jackson (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38
Cal.Rptr.2d 214]; People v. Wandick (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278
Cal.Rptr. 274].
• Firearm Need Not Be Operable. People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 360
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
830
• Firearm Need Not Be Loaded. See People v. Steele (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 788,
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
• “In Commission of” Felony/Facilitative Nexus. People v. Bland (1995) 10
Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; People v. Jones (2001) 25
Cal.4th 98, 109–110 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; People v. Masbruch
Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
• Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. Smith v. United States
(1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Need Not Know Principal Armed
For an enhancement charged under Penal Code section 12022(a) where the
prosecution is pursuing vicarious liability, it is not necessary for the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew that the principal was armed. (People v. Overten
Conspiracy
A defendant convicted of conspiracy may also receive an enhancement for being
armed during the conspiracy, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the
offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (People v. Becker (2000) 83
Facilitative Nexus/Connection
Even though the Supreme Court is currently reviewing the Court of Appeal’s
decision in People v. Pitto, the committee has revised the language of this
instruction to more clearly express the facilitative nexus required in People v. Bland
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1002 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391] [contemporaneous
possession of illegal drugs and firearm not sufficient without evidence of facilitative
nexus between the two, comparing to federal law requirement of carrying a firearm
‘during and in relation to’ drug trafficking].
SECONDARY SOURCES
364.
831
3116. Armed With Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or .50
BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2))

have proved the additional allegation that one of the principals was
armed with (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) in the
commission [or attempted commission] of that crime. [You must decide
whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and
return a separate finding for each crime.]
[A machine gun is any weapon that (shoots[,]/ [or] is designed to shoot[,]/
[or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot
by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.] [(A/
An) <insert name of weapon deemed by the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as readily convertible to a machine gun> is
[also] a machine gun.]
bullet;
AND
[The term (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle) is defined in
[(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to
be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of
shooting.] [(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not
need to be loaded.]
832
A principal is armed with (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG
rifle) when that person:
1. Carries (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) [or
has (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) available]
for use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s]
charged in Count[s] [or the lesser crime[s] of
<insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>];
[AND]
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the weapon [or has it
available](./;)
<See Bench Notes regarding element 3.>
[AND
3. Knows or reasonably should know that the weapon has
characteristics that make it (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a
.50 BMG rifle).]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The Supreme Court has held that for the crime of possession of an assault weapon,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the weapon possessed the characteristics of an assault weapon. (In re
Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].) It is unclear
if this holding applies to an enhancement for being armed with an assault weapon.
Element 3 is provided for the court to use at its discretion.
The court should give the bracketed definition of “assault weapon,” “machine gun,”
or “.50 BMG rifle” unless the court has already given the definition in other
833
In the definition of “armed,” the court may give the bracketed phrase “or has (an
assault weapon/a machine gun) available” on request if the evidence shows that the
weapon was at the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use
in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991,
997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391]; see also People v. Wandick (1991) 227
Cal.App.3d 918, 927–928 [278 Cal.Rptr. 274] [language of instruction approved;
sufficient evidence defendant had firearm available for use]; People v. Jackson
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214] [evidence that firearm
was two blocks away from scene of rape insufficient to show available to
defendant].)
If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “during the
Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule. (See People v. Jones (2001) 25
Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(a)(2).
• Knowledge Required for Possession of Assault Weapon. In re Jorge M. (2000)
Cal.Rptr. 274].
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
834
v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
• Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. (Smith v. United States
(1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138]).
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3115, Armed With Firearm.
SECONDARY SOURCES
364.
835
3117. Armed With Firearm: Knowledge That Coparticipant Armed
(Pen. Code, § 12022(d))

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant knew that
someone who was a principal was armed with a firearm in the
1. Someone who was a principal in the crime was armed with a
firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that
crime;
AND
2. The defendant was also a principal in the crime and knew that
the other person was armed with a firearm.
loaded.]
A principal is armed with a firearm when that person:
1. Carries a firearm [or has a firearm available] for use in either
offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged in
Count[s] [or the lesser crime[s] of <insert
name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>];
1. AND
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm [or has it available].
836

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the case involves an issue of whether the principal was armed “in the
commission” of the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, While
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022(d).
837
Cal.Rptr. 274].
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
• Presence of Gun Cannot Be Accident or Coincidence. (Smith v. United States
(1993) 508 U.S. 223, 238 [113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138]).
RELATED ISSUES
Conspiracy
A defendant convicted of conspiracy may also receive an enhancement for being
armed during the conspiracy, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the
offense alleged to be the target of the conspiracy. (People v. Becker (2000) 83
SECONDARY SOURCES
364.
838
C. PERSONALLY ARMED WITH DEADLY WEAPON OR
FIREARM
3130. Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.3)

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was personally
armed with a deadly weapon in the commission [or attempted
commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have
proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for
each crime.]
A deadly weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon [that is inherently
and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.
[and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used
for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]]
A person is armed with a deadly weapon when that person:
1. Carries a deadly weapon [or has a deadly weapon available] for
use in either offense or defense in connection with the crime[s]
charged;
AND
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the deadly weapon [or has it
available].
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant was armed with
the weapon “in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>
839
New January 2006; Revised December 2008, February 2013, September 2019,
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction when the enhancement is
charged. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435].)
156].)
deadly weapon available” on request if the evidence shows that the weapon was at
the scene of the alleged crime and “available to the defendant to use in furtherance
of the underlying felony.” (People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant was armed “in the
840

AUTHORITY
Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
1078, 1086–1087 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 717].
• Armed. People v. Pitto (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180
P.3d 338]; People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77,
898 P.2d 391]; People v. Jackson (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38
Cal.Rptr. 274].
• Must Be Personally Armed. People v. Rener (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 267 [29
Cal.Rptr.2d 392]; People v. Reed (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 149, 152–153 [185
Cal.Rptr. 169].
582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
RELATED ISSUES
Penal Code Section 220
A defendant convicted of violating Penal Code section 220 may receive an
enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.3 even though the latter statute does
not specifically list section 220 as a qualifying offense. (People v. Rich (2003) 109
Cal.App.4th 255, 261 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 553].) Section 12022.3 does apply to
attempts to commit one of the enumerated offenses, and a conviction for violating
section 220, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, “translates into an
attempt to commit” a sexual offense. (People v. Rich, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p.
261.)
Multiple Weapons
There is a split in the Court of Appeal over whether a defendant may receive
multiple enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3 if the defendant has
841
multiple weapons in his or her possession during the offense. (People v. Maciel
(1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 273, 279 [215 Cal.Rptr. 124] [defendant may only receive
one enhancement for each sexual offense, either for being armed with a rifle or for
using a knife, but not both]; People v. Stiltner (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 216, 232 [182
Cal.Rptr. 790] [defendant may receive both enhancement for being armed with a
knife and enhancement for using a pistol for each sexual offense].) The court should
review the current state of the law before sentencing a defendant to multiple
weapons enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.3.
Pepper Spray
In People v. Blake (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 543, 559 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 678], the court
upheld the jury’s determination that pepper spray was a deadly weapon.
SECONDARY SOURCES
364, 388.
Against the Person, §§ 142.20[7][c], 142.21[1][d][iii] (Matthew Bender).
842
3131. Personally Armed With Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3),
12022(c), 12022.3(b))

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was personally
armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission] of
that crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this
allegation for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
loaded.]
A person is armed with a firearm when that person:
1. Carries a firearm or has a firearm available for use in either
offense or defense in connection with the crime[s] charged;
AND
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm or has it available
for use.
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant was armed with
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, February 2012
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the enhancement is
L.Ed.2d 435].)
843
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant was armed “in the
If the defendant is charged with being ineligible for probation under Penal Code
section 1203.06 for being armed during the commission of the offense and having
been convicted of a specified prior crime, the court should also give CALCRIM No.
3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, with this instruction unless the
defendant has stipulated to the prior conviction or the court has granted a bifurcated
trial.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 1203.06(b)(3), 12022(c), 12022.3(b).
• Armed. People v. Pitto (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180
P.3d 338]; People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997–998 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77,
898 P.2d 391]; People v. Jackson (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 419–422 [38
Cal.Rptr. 274].
• Personally Armed. People v. Smith (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 203–208 [11
Cal.Rptr.2d 645].
• Must Be Personally Armed for Enhancement Under Penal Code Section 12022.3.
People v. Rener (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 267 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 392]; People v.
Reed (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 149, 152–153 [185 Cal.Rptr. 169].
• Defendant Not Present When Drugs and Weapon Found. People v. Bland (1995)
• Facilitative Nexus. People v. Pitto (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236–240 [74
Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180 P.3d 338].
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
844
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Not Present When Drugs and Weapon Found
In People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 995 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391],
the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and an
enhancement for being armed during that offense despite the fact that he was not
present when the police located the illegal drugs and firearm. The Court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the arming enhancement, stating:
[W]hen the prosecution has proved a charge of felony drug possession, and the
evidence at trial shows that a firearm was found in close proximity to the illegal
drugs in a place frequented by the defendant, a jury may reasonably infer: (1)
that the defendant knew of the firearm’s presence; (2) that its presence together
with the drugs was not accidental or coincidental; and (3) that, at some point
during the period of illegal drug possession, the defendant had the firearm close
at hand and thus available for immediate use to aid in the drug offense. These
reasonable inferences, if not refuted by defense evidence, are sufficient to
warrant a determination that the defendant was “armed with a firearm in the
commission” of a felony within the meaning of section 12022.
(Ibid.)
The Bland case did not state that the jury should be specifically instructed in these
inferences, and it appears that no special instruction was given in Bland. If the
prosecution requests a special instruction on this issue, the court may consider using
the following language:
If the People have proved that a firearm was found close to the
<insert type of controlled substance allegedly possessed> in a place where the
defendant was frequently present, you may but are not required to conclude that:
1. The defendant knew the firearm was present;
2. It was not accidental or coincidental that the firearm was present together
with the drugs;
AND
3. During at least part of the time that the defendant allegedly possessed the
illegal drug, (he/she) had the firearm close at hand and available for
immediate use to aid in the drug offense.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence supports these
conclusions, you may but are not required to conclude that the defendant was
personally armed with a firearm in the commission [or attempted commission]
845
of the <insert name of alleged offense>] [or the lesser crime of

<insert name of alleged lesser offense>].
Multiple Defendants—Single Weapon
Two or more defendants may be personally armed with a single weapon at the same
time. (People v. Smith (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 205 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 645].) It is for
the jury to decide if the firearm was readily available to both defendants for use in
offense or defense. (Ibid.)
For enhancements charged under Penal Code section 12022.3, see also the Related
Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3130, Personally Armed With Deadly Weapon.
SECONDARY SOURCES
357, 364, 388.
846
3132. Personally Armed With Firearm: Unlawfully Armed When
Arrested (Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3))

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant was unlawfully
armed with a firearm when (he/she) was arrested for that crime. [You
must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each
crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
1. The defendant was personally armed with a firearm when (he/
she) was arrested for the crime;
AND
2. The defendant possessed the firearm unlawfully.
loaded.]
A person is armed with a firearm when that person:
1. Carries a firearm or has a firearm available for use in either
offense or defense;
AND
2. Knows that he or she is carrying the firearm or has it available
for use.
Other instructions explain what is necessary for the People to prove that
the defendant possessed the firearm unlawfully. You must apply those
instructions when you decide whether the People have proved this
additional allegation.
847

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction when the enhancement is
L.Ed.2d 435].)
The court must also give the appropriate instruction on unlawful possession of a
firearm under Penal Code section 29800, 25400, or 25850. See CALCRIM Nos.
2500 et seq., on weapons.
If the defendant is charged with being ineligible for probation under Penal Code
section 1203.06 for being armed when arrested and having been convicted of a
specified prior crime, the court should also give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior
Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, with this instruction unless the defendant has
stipulated to the prior conviction or the court has granted a bifurcated trial.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 1203.06(a)(3).
Cal.Rptr. 274].
• Personally Armed. People v. Smith (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 203–208 [11
Cal.Rptr.2d 645].
• Firearm Need Not Be Operable. See People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355,
360 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201].
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887].
848
SECONDARY SOURCES
357, 364, 388.
849
D. PERSONALLY USED DEADLY WEAPON OR
FIREARM
3145. Personally Used Deadly Weapon (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2), 12022.3)

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used
a deadly [or dangerous] weapon during the commission [or attempted
commission] of that crime. [You must decide whether the People have
each crime.]
A deadly [or dangerous] weapon is any object, instrument, or weapon
that is [inherently deadly] [or] [dangerous] [or] [one that is] used in such
a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great
bodily injury.
[and any other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used
for a dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.]]
Someone personally uses a deadly [or dangerous] weapon if he or she
intentionally [does any of the following]:
[1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner(./;)]
[OR]
[(2/1). Hits someone with the weapon(./;)]
[OR]
[(3/2). Fires the weapon(./;)]
[OR
(4/3). <insert description of use>.]
851
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the weapon
“in the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2013, September 2017, September
2019, September 2020, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
Give all of the bracketed “or dangerous” phrases if the enhancement charged uses
both the words “deadly” and “dangerous” to describe the weapon. (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.61, 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b).) Do not give these bracketed phrases if the
enhancement uses only the word “deadly.” (Pen. Code, § 12022.3.)
Give the bracketed phrase “inherently deadly” and give the bracketed definition of
inherently deadly only if the object is a deadly weapon as a matter of law. (People
v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317–318 [240 Cal.Rptr.3d 156].)
In the definition of “personally uses,” the court may give the bracketed item 3 if the
case involves an object that may be “fired.”
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “in the
852

AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 1192.7(c)(23), 12022(b)(1) & (2),
12022.3.
[68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204]; People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
1078, 1086–1087 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 717].
• Personally Uses. People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77,
898 P.2d 391]; People v. Johnson (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319–1320 [45
Cal.Rptr.2d 602]; see also Pen. Code, § 1203.06(b)(2).
582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].
• May Not Receive Enhancement for Both Using and Being Armed With One
Weapon. People v. Wischemann (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 162, 175–176 [156
Cal.Rptr. 386].
1028–1029 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].
RELATED ISSUES
No Duty to Instruct on “Lesser Included Enhancements”
“[A] trial court’s sua sponte obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses does
not encompass an obligation to instruct on ‘lesser included enhancements.’ ” (People
v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 411 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137].) Thus, if
the defendant is charged with an enhancement for use of a weapon, the court does
not need to instruct on an enhancement for being armed.
Weapon Displayed Before Felony Committed
Where a weapon is displayed initially and the underlying crime is committed some
time after the initial display, the jury may conclude that the defendant used the
weapon in the commission of the offense if the display of the weapon was “at least
. . . an aid in completing an essential element of the subsequent crimes . . . .”
853
(People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d
705].)
Weapon Used Did Not Cause Death
In People v. Lerma (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1224 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 580], the
defendant stabbed the victim and then kicked him. The coroner testified that the
victim died as a result of blunt trauma to the head and that the knife wounds were
not life threatening. (Ibid.) The court upheld the finding that the defendant had used
a knife during the murder even though the weapon was not the cause of death. (Id.
at p. 1226.) The court held that in order for a weapon to be used in the commission
of the crime, there must be “a nexus between the offense and the item at issue,
[such] that the item was an instrumentality of the crime.” (Ibid.) [ellipsis and
brackets omitted] Here, the court found that “[t]he knife was instrumental to the
consummation of the murder and was used to advantage.” (Ibid.)
“One Strike” Law and Use Enhancement
Where the defendant’s use of a weapon has been used as a basis for applying the
“one strike” law for sex offenses, the defendant may not also receive a separate
enhancement for use of a weapon in commission of the same offense. (People v.
Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 754 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].)
Assault and Use of Deadly Weapon Enhancement
“A conviction [for assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to
cause great bodily injury] under [Penal Code] section 245, subdivision (a)(1) cannot
be enhanced pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b).” (People v. Summersville
Robbery and Use of Deadly Weapon Enhancement
A defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both robbery and an enhancement
for use of a deadly weapon during the robbery. (In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d
81, 88 [216 Cal.Rptr. 140, 702 P.2d 222].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 40.
§§ 356–357, 361–369.
Sentencing, §§ 91.30, 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
854
3146. Personally Used Firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8),
667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53(b))

a firearm during the commission [or attempted commission] of that
crime. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation
for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
loaded.]
Someone personally uses a firearm if he or she intentionally does any of
the following:
1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the weapon;
OR
3. Fires the weapon.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
855
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the weapon “during the
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(e)(4), 1203.06, 12022.3,
12022.5, 12022.53(b).
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
• “During Commission of” Felony. People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 109–110
[104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001,
1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32
Cal.Rptr. 386].
RELATED ISSUES
Multiple Victims—Penal Code Section 12022.5
A defendant may receive multiple use enhancements under Penal Code section
12022.5 if convicted of multiple charges based on multiple victims even if the
crimes occurred in a single “transaction” or “occurrence.” (In re Tameka C. (2000)
22 Cal.4th 190, 195–198 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 P.2d 603].) Thus, where the
defendant was convicted of two counts of assault based on firing a single shot at
one person, injuring a second, unintended victim, the defendant properly received
two use enhancements. (Id. at p. 200.)
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3145, Personally Used Deadly
Weapon.
SECONDARY SOURCES
358–369.
856
Sentencing, §§ 91.30, 91.81[1][d] (Matthew Bender).
857
3147. Personally Used Firearm: Assault Weapon, Machine Gun, or
.50 BMG Rifle (Pen. Code, § 12022.5(b))

(an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG rifle) during the
[A machine gun is any weapon that (shoots[,]/ [or] is designed to shoot[,]/
[or] can readily be restored to shoot) automatically more than one shot
by a single function of the trigger and without manual reloading.] [(A/
An) <insert name of weapon deemed by the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms as readily convertible to a machine gun> is
[also] a machine gun.]
bullet;
AND
[The term (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle) is defined in
[(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not need to
be in working order if it was designed to shoot and appears capable of
shooting.] [(An assault weapon/A machine gun/A .50 BMG rifle) does not
need to be loaded.]
Someone personally uses (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50 BMG
rifle) if he or she [knows or reasonably should know that the weapon has
858
characteristics that make it (an assault weapon/a machine gun/a .50

BMG rifle) and] intentionally does any of the following:
1. Displays the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle) in a
menacing manner;
2. Hits someone with the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG
rifle);
OR
3. Fires the (assault weapon/machine gun/.50 BMG rifle).
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant used the weapon

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The Supreme Court has held that for the crime of possession of an assault weapon,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the weapon possessed the characteristics of an assault weapon. (In re
Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 887 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297].) It is unclear
if this holding applies to an enhancement for using an assault weapon. In the
definition of “personally uses,” the court may give the bracketed phrase that begins
“knows or reasonably should know” at its discretion.
The court should give the bracketed definition of “assault weapon” or “machine
gun” unless the court has already given the definition in other instructions. In such
cases, the court may give the bracketed sentence stating that the term is defined
elsewhere.
AUTHORITY
859

• Knowledge Required for Assault Weapon Possession. In re Jorge M. (2000) 23
[182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
791–795 [286 Cal.Rptr. 887]; see also Pen. Code, § 12022.53(b).
Cal.Rptr. 386].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 3145, Personally Used Deadly
Weapon, and CALCRIM No. 3146, Personally Used Firearm.
SECONDARY SOURCES
358–369.
860
3148. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53(c))

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm during that offense. [You must decide
1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during the
commission [or attempted commission] of the crime;
AND
2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm.
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant discharged the
firearm “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].) If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for both
intentional discharge and intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death,
the court may give CALCRIM No. 3150, Personally Used Firearm: Intentional
Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death Both Charged, instead of this
instruction.
861

AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.53(c).
RELATED ISSUES
Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense
Penal Code section 12022.53(l) provides that “[t]he enhancements specified in this
section shall not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm . . . by any
person in lawful self-defense, lawful defense of another, or lawful defense of
property, as provided in Sections 197, 198, and 198.5.” In People v. Watie (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 258], the court held, “[t]his subdivision,
on its face, exempts lawful (perfect) self-defense from the section’s application. It
does not exempt imperfect self-defense.” Further, an instruction informing the jury
that the defense of self-defense applies to the enhancement is not necessary. (Id. at
p. 886.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 359–360.
862
3149. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge Causing
Injury or Death (Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm during that crime causing (great
bodily injury/ [or] death). [You must decide whether the People have
each crime.]
commission [or attempted commission] of that crime;
2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm;
AND
3. The defendant’s act caused (great bodily injury to/ [or] the death
of) a person [who was not an accomplice to the crime].
is the direct, natural and probable consequence of the act and the (injury/
[or] death) would not have happened without the act. A natural and
identical crime (charged against/intended by) the defendant [of which the
863
intentional discharge of a firearm was a natural and probable

consequence]. A person is subject to prosecution if he or she committed
the crime or if:
AND
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].) If the defendant is charged with an enhancement for both
intentional discharge and intentional discharge causing great bodily injury or death,
the court may give CALCRIM No. 3150, Personally Used Firearm: Intentional
Discharge and Discharge Causing Injury or Death Both Charged, instead of this
instruction.
(Id. at pp. 335–338.)
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant used the firearm “during the
864
In element 3, give the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime”
if there is evidence that the victim was an accomplice to the intended crime of
which the intentional discharge of a firearm was a natural and probable
consequence. (See People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174, 182 [28
Cal.Rptr.3d 232]; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 340–341 [282
Cal.Rptr.3d 151].)
If the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime,”
the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (People v.
Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].)
Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of
“accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice. The court should review that
instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be
given.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d).
• “During Commission of” Felony. People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
109–110; People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1014; People v. Taylor,
• Proximate Cause. People v. Jomo K. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335–338.
• Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Verlinde, supra, 100
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167–1168; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91
[270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
• Accomplice Exception Attaches to Intended Crime. People v. Flores, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 182; People v. Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 340–341.
RELATED ISSUES
Need Not Personally Cause Injury or Death
“[Penal Code] Section 12022.53(d) requires that the defendant ‘intentionally and
personally discharged a firearm’ (italics added), but only that he ‘proximately
caused’ the great bodily injury or death . . . . The statute states nothing else that
defendant must personally do. Proximately causing and personally inflicting harm
865
are two different things.” (People v. Jomo K. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 336
[italics in original].)
Person Injured or Killed Need Not Be Victim of Crime
In People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1052 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 88 P.3d 56],
the defendant fired two shots into a group of people, hitting and injuring one. He
was convicted of five counts of premeditated attempted murder. The court held that
the subdivision (d) enhancement for causing great bodily injury applied to each of
the five counts even though the defendant only injured one person. (Id. at p. 1056.)
The court observed that “the phrase, ‘any person other than an accomplice,’ does not
mean ‘the victim’ of the underlying crime.” (Id. at p. 1055.)
Multiple Enhancements for Single Injury
The court in Oates (supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1056) also held that the trial court was
required to impose all five subdivision (d) enhancements because Penal Code
section 12022.53(f) requires a court to impose the longest enhancement available.
The court further found that Penal Code section 654 did not preclude imposition of
multiple subdivision (d) enhancements due to “the long-recognized, judicially-
created exception for cases involving multiple victims of violent crime.” (Id. at p.
1062.)
Multiple Enhancements May Not Be Imposed Based on Multiple Participants
In People v. Cobb (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1054, fn. 3 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 869],
the defendant and two others simultaneously shot at the decedent. The defendant
was convicted of personally inflicting death by use of a firearm. (Id. at p. 1053; Pen.
Code, § 12022.53(d).) In addition to the sentence for personally using a firearm, the
trial court also imposed two sentences under Penal Code section 12022.53(e)(1)
based on the other two participants having also fired at the decedent (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal reversed the latter two enhancements, holding that Penal Code
section 12022.53(f) did not permit multiple sentence enhancements based on
multiple participants in one crime. (Id. at p. 1058.)
Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense
Penal Code section 12022.53(l) provides that “[t]he enhancements specified in this
section shall not apply to the lawful use or discharge of a firearm by a public
officer, as provided in Section 196, or by any person in lawful self-defense, lawful
defense of another, or lawful defense of property, as provided in Sections 197, 198,
and 198.5.” In People v. Watie (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 884 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d
258], the court held, “[t]his subdivision, on its face, exempts lawful (perfect) self-
defense from the section’s application. It does not exempt imperfect self-defense.”
Further, an instruction informing the jury that the defense of self-defense applies to
the enhancement is not necessary. (Id. at p. 886.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 359–360.
866
867
3150. Personally Used Firearm: Intentional Discharge and
Discharge Causing Injury or Death—Both Charged (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d))

have proved the additional allegations that the defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm during (that/those) crime[s] and, if so,
whether the defendant’s act caused (great bodily injury/ [or] death). [You
must decide whether the People have proved these allegations for each
crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
To prove that the defendant intentionally discharged a firearm, the
commission [or attempted commission] of that crime;
AND
2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm.
If the People have proved both 1 and 2, you must then decide whether
the People also have proved that the defendant’s act caused (great bodily
injury to/ [or] the death of) a person [who was not an accomplice to the
crime].
is the direct natural and probable consequence of the act and the (injury/
[or] death) would not have happened without the act. A natural and
868
identical (charged against/intended by) the defendant[ of which the
intentional discharge of a firearm was a natural and probable
consequence]. A person is subject to prosecution if he or she committed
the crime or if:
AND
The People have the burden of proving each of these allegations beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find that the allegation has not been proved.
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].) This instruction may be used when the defendant is charged
with an enhancement both for intentional discharge and for intentional discharge
causing great bodily injury or death. If only one of these enhancements is charged,
do not use this instruction. Instead, give CALCRIM No. 3148, Personally Used
Firearm: Intentional Discharge, or CALCRIM No. 3149, Personally Used Firearm:
Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death, whichever is appropriate.
(Id. at pp. 335–338.)
869
In the paragraph following the elements, give the bracketed phrase “who was not an
accomplice to the crime” if there is evidence that the victim was an accomplice to
the intended crime of which the intentional discharge of a firearm was the natural
and probable consequence. (See People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174, 182
[28 Cal.Rptr.3d 232]; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 340–341 [282
Cal.Rptr.3d 151].)
If the court gives the bracketed phrase “who was not an accomplice to the crime,”
the court should also give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (People v.
Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].)
Additional paragraphs providing further explanation of the definition of
“accomplice” are contained in CALCRIM No. 334, Accomplice Testimony Must Be
Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice. The court should review that
instruction and determine whether any of these additional paragraphs should be
given.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, §§ 667.61(e)(3), 12022.53(d).
• “During Commission of” Felony. People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp.
109–110; People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1014; People v. Taylor,
• Proximate Cause. People v. Jomo K. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335–338.
• Accomplice Defined. See Pen. Code, § 1111; People v. Verlinde, supra, 100
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167–1168; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91
[270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
• Accomplice Exception Attaches to Intended Crime. People v. Flores, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 182; People v. Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 340–341.
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 3148, Personally Used Firearm:
Intentional Discharge, and CALCRIM No. 3149, Personally Used Firearm:
870
Intentional Discharge Causing Injury or Death.

SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 359–360.
871
3160. Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6),
1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7, 12022.8)

have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury on <insert name of injured
person> during the commission [or attempted commission] of that crime.
[The People must also prove that <insert name of injured
person> was not an accomplice to the crime.]
[Committing the crime of <insert sexual offense charged> is
not by itself the infliction of great bodily injury.]
<Group Assault>
[If you conclude that more than one person assaulted
<insert name of injured person> and you cannot decide which person
caused which injury, you may conclude that the defendant personally
person> if the People have proved that:
1. Two or more people, acting at the same time, assaulted
<insert name of injured person> and inflicted great
bodily injury on (him/her);
2. The defendant personally used physical force on
<insert name of injured person> during the group assault;
AND
[3A. The amount or type of physical force the defendant used on
<insert name of injured person> was enough that it
alone could have caused <insert name of injured
person> to suffer great bodily injury(;/.)]
[OR]
[3B. The physical force that the defendant used on
873
<insert name of injured person> was sufficient in combination with

the force used by the others to cause <insert name of
injured person> to suffer great bodily injury.]
The defendant must have applied substantial force to
<insert name of injured person>. If that force could not have caused or
contributed to the great bodily injury, then it was not substantial.]
AND
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the
injury “during the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, February 2015, September 2020, March
2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction on the enhancement when
L.Ed.2d 435].)
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Committing the crime of” if the
defendant is charged with a sexual offense. (People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740,
746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100] [injury must be more than that which is
present in every offense of rape].)
The bracketed section beneath the heading “Group Assault” is designed to be used
in cases where the evidence shows a group assault.
If the court gives the bracketed sentence instructing that the People must prove that
the person assaulted “was not an accomplice to the crime,” the court should also
give the bracketed definition of “accomplice.” (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167–1168 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 322].) Additional paragraphs
874

The jury must determine whether an injury constitutes “great bodily injury.” (People
v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; People v.
Nava (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 1498 [255 Cal.Rptr. 903] [reversible error to
instruct that a bone fracture is a significant or substantial injury].)
If there is an issue in the case over whether the defendant inflicted the injury
“during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261,
While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule. (See People v. Jones (2001) 25
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.5(c)(8), 667.61(d)(6), 12022.7, 12022.8.
• Great Bodily Injury Enhancements Do Not Apply to Conviction for Murder or
Manslaughter. People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal. 4th 922, 924 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d
502].
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); People v. Escobar (1992)
• Great Bodily Injury May Be Established by Pregnancy or Abortion. People v.
Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 68 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 373, 190 P.3d 706].
• Must Personally Inflict Injury. People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 631 [3
Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176]; People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 571 [183
Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; People v. Ramirez (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 603,
627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
• Sex Offenses—Injury Must Be More Than Incidental to Offense. People v.
Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 746 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100].
• Group Beating Instruction. People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 500–501 [46
Cal.Rptr.3d 762, 139 P.3d 136].
• This Instruction Is Correct In Defining Group Beating. People v. Dunkerson
875
51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].

RELATED ISSUES
Specific Intent Not Required
Penal Code section 12022.7 was amended in 1995, deleting the requirement that the
defendant act with “the intent to inflict such injury.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 341, § 1; see
also People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 756 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569] [noting
amendment].)
Instructions on Aiding and Abetting
In People v. Magana (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1378–1379 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 59],
the evidence indicated that the defendant and another person both shot at the
victims. The jury asked for clarification of whether the evidence must establish that
the bullet from the defendant’s gun struck the victim in order to find the
enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury true. (Id. at p. 1379.) The
trial court responded by giving the instructions on aiding and abetting. (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal reversed, finding the instructions erroneous in light of the
requirement that the defendant must personally inflict the injury for the enhancement
to be found true. (Id. at p. 1381.)
Sex Offenses—Examples of Great Bodily Injury
The following have been held to be sufficient to support a finding of great bodily
injury: transmission of a venereal disease (People v. Johnson (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d
1137, 1140 [225 Cal.Rptr. 251]); pregnancy (People v. Sargent (1978) 86
Cal.App.3d 148, 151 [150 Cal.Rptr. 113]); and a torn hymen (People v. Williams
(1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 446, 454 [171 Cal.Rptr. 401]).
Enhancement May be Applied Once Per Victim
The court may impose one enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 for each
injured victim. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(h); People v. Ausbie (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th
855, 864 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 371].)
Furnishing Drugs
In People v. Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682 [279 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 487 P.3d 981], the
defendant was charged with personally inflicting great bodily injury on a victim who
had voluntarily ingested the drugs furnished by the defendant. The court held:
“[T]he act of furnishing is not by itself sufficient to establish personal infliction.
Whether a defendant who furnishes drugs personally inflicts such injury depends on
the facts of the particular case. To determine whether a defendant personally inflicts
such injury, fact finders and courts must examine the circumstances of the
underlying offense and the defendant’s role in causing the injury that followed.” (11
Cal.5th at p. 685.)
876
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 350–351.
877
3161. Great Bodily Injury: Causing Victim to Become Comatose or
Paralyzed (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(b))

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or the lesser
crime[s] of <insert name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you
must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the
additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury that caused <insert name of injured person> to become
(comatose/ [or] permanently paralyzed). [You must decide whether the
1. The defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on
<insert name of injured person> during the
[AND]
2. The defendant’s acts caused <insert name of injured
person> to (become comatose due to brain injury/ [or] suffer
permanent paralysis)(./;)
<Give element 3 when instructing on whether injured person was an
accomplice.>
[AND
3. <insert name of injured person> was not an
accomplice to the crime.]
[Paralysis is a major or complete loss of motor function resulting from
injury to the nervous system or to a muscular mechanism.]
<Group Assault>
878

AND
[OR]
AND
2. The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find that the allegation has not been proved.
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, September 2020
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
L.Ed.2d 435].)
879
If the court gives bracketed element 3 instructing that the People must prove that
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant inflicted the injury “during
the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, While
AUTHORITY
627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
880
RELATED ISSUES
Coma Need Not Be Permanent
In People v. Tokash (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378 [94 Cal.Rptr. 2d 814], the
court held that an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7(b) was proper
where the victim was maintained in a medically induced coma for two months
following brain surgery necessitated by the assault.
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, Great Bodily Injury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 350–354.
881
3162. Great Bodily Injury: Age of Victim (Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c)
& (d))

injury on someone who was (under the age of 5 years/70 years of age or
older). [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation
for each crime and return a separate finding for each crime.]
1. The defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on
<insert name of injured person> during the
[AND]
2. At that time, <insert name of injured person> was
(under the age of 5 years/70 years of age or older)(./;)
<Give element 3 when instructing on whether injured person was an
accomplice.>
[AND
3. <insert name of injured person> was not an
accomplice to the crime.]
<Group Assault>
882
AND
[OR]
AND
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
L.Ed.2d 435].)
883
If the court gives bracketed element 3 instructing that the People must prove that
391].)
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(c) & (d).
627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
884
Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
51 Cal.3d 72, 90–91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, Great Bodily Injury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 350–354.
885
3163. Great Bodily Injury: Domestic Violence (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.7(e))

injury on <insert name of injured person> during the
commission [or attempted commission] of that crime, under
circumstances involving domestic violence. [You must decide whether the
[The People must also prove that <insert name of injured
person> was not an accomplice to the crime.]
Domestic violence means abuse committed against (an adult/a fully
defendant has had a child[,]/ [or] person with whom the defendant is
having or has had a dating relationship[,]/ [or] person who was or is
engaged to the defendant).
bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable fear of imminent
serious bodily injury to himself or herself or to someone else.
involvement independent of financial considerations.]
include, but are not limited to (1) sexual relations between the parties
[A fully emancipated minor is a person under the age of 18 who has
gained certain adult rights by marrying, being on active duty for the
United States armed services, or otherwise being declared emancipated
under the law.]
886

<Group Assault>
AND
[OR]
AND
[The person who was injured does not have to be a person with whom
the defendant had a relationship.]
887

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
L.Ed.2d 435].)
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(e).
• Dating Relationship Defined. Fam. Code, § 6210; Pen. Code, § 243(f)(10).
888
627 [236 Cal.Rptr. 404] [Pen. Code, § 12022.8].
• General Intent Only Required. People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752,
755–756 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569].
Cal.Rptr.3d 762].
RELATED ISSUES
Person Who Suffers Injury Need Not Be “Victim” of Domestic Abuse
Penal Code section 12022.7(e) does not require that the injury be inflicted on the
“victim” of the domestic violence. (People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887,
899 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 904].) Thus, the enhancement may be applied where “an angry
husband physically abuses his wife and, as part of the same incident, inflicts great
bodily injury upon the man with whom she is having an affair.” (Id. at p. 900.)
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3160, Great Bodily Injury.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 350–354.
889
F. SEX OFFENSES
3175. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Kidnapping
(Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2))

<insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>,
you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved
the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped
<insert name of alleged victim>, increasing the risk of harm to (him/her).
1. The defendant took, held, or detained <insert name
of alleged victim> by the use of force or by instilling reasonable
fear;
2. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved
<insert name of alleged victim> [or made (him/her) move] a
substantial distance;
3. The movement of <insert name of alleged victim>
substantially increased the risk of harm to (him/her) beyond that
necessarily present in the <insert sex offense[s] from
Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>;
[AND]
4. <insert name of alleged victim> did not consent to
the movement(./;)
[AND
5. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that
<insert name of alleged victim> consented to the
movement.]
Substantial distance means more than a slight or trivial distance. The
movement must be more than merely incidental to the commission of
<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>. In
deciding whether the distance was substantial and whether the
movement substantially increased the risk of harm, you must consider all
the circumstances relating to the movement.
891
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction on the sentencing factor
when charged. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348,
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The victim’s consent to go with the defendant may be a defense. (See People v.
Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 375 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 61]; People v. Isitt
(1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279] [reasonable, good faith belief that
victim consented to movement is a defense to kidnapping].) For paragraphs
instructing on actual consent or a reasonable, good faith belief in consent, see
CALCRIM No. 1215, Kidnapping.
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Kidnapping Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(2).
• Factors Must Be Pleaded and Proved. Pen. Code, § 667.61(j); People v. Mancebo
• Sentencing Factor Does Not Require Specific Intent to Commit Sex Offense.
People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
• Sentencing Factor Requires Greater Movement Than That Incidental to Offense.
People v. Diaz (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 246 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 682]; see also
People v. Aguilar (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1052 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 231]
[discussing meaning of “incidental”].
• Elements of Kidnapping. Pen. Code, § 207(a).
• Asportation Requirement. People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235–237
[83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512] [adopting modified two-pronged asportation
test from People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12–14 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884
P.2d 1369], and People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal.Rptr.
897, 459 P.2d 225]].
• Consent to Physical Movement. See People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463,
516–518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].
Cal.Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820]; see People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517,
fn. 13, 518 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [kidnapping requires use of force
or fear; consent not vitiated by fraud, deceit, or dissimulation].
• Good Faith Belief in Consent. Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 3 [mistake of fact]; People
v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–155 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337];
People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 28 [127 Cal.Rptr. 279]; People v.
Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 968 [179 Cal.Rptr. 276].
892
• Intent Requirement. People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765 [114 Cal.Rptr.
467, 523 P.2d 267]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 519 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d
826, 896 P.2d 119]; People v. Moya (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 916 [6
Cal.Rptr.2d 323].
• Substantial Distance Requirement. People v. Derek Daniels (1993) 18
Cal.App.4th 1046, 1053 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11
Cal.3d 588, 600–601 [114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058] [since movement must
be more than slight or trivial, it must be substantial in character].
RELATED ISSUES
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 1215, Kidnapping.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
Sentencing, §§ 91.38[1], 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
893
3176. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Aggravated Mayhem
(Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3))

the additional allegation that, while committing that crime, the defendant
also committed aggravated mayhem. [You must decide whether the
1. During the commission of the crime, the defendant unlawfully
and maliciously (disabled or disfigured someone permanently/ [or]
deprived someone else of a limb, organ, or other part of (his/her)
body);
2. When the defendant acted, (he/she) intended to (permanently
disable or disfigure the other person/ [or] deprive the other
person of a limb, organ, or other part of (his/her) body);
AND
3. Under the circumstances, the defendant’s act showed extreme
indifference to the physical or psychological well-being of the
other person.
someone else.
[The People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill.]
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the mayhem was committed
New January 2006
894
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
The bracketed sentence about the permanency of “disfiguring injury” may be given
on request if there is evidence that the injury may be repaired by medical
procedures. (People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574–1575 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d
783] [not error to instruct that an injury may be permanent even though cosmetic
repair may be medically feasible].)
The final bracketed sentence may be given on the prosecution’s request when there
is no evidence or conflicting evidence that the defendant intended to kill someone.
(See Pen. Code, § 205.)
If the case involves an issue of whether the defendant committed the mayhem
“during the commission of” the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261,
While Committing a Felony: Defined—Escape Rule. (See People v. Jones (2001) 25
Cal.4th 98, 109 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753]; People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001,
1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
578, 582 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Aggravated Mayhem Factor. Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(d)(3).
• Elements of Aggravated Mayhem. Pen. Code, § 205.
• Permanent Disability. See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 507,
512 [158 Cal.Rptr. 120] [serious ankle injury lasting over six months].
• Permanent Disfigurement. See People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571
[28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783]; see also People v. Newble (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 451
• Specific Intent to Cause Maiming Injury. People v. Ferrell (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 828, 833 [267 Cal.Rptr. 283]; People v. Lee (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
320, 324–325 [269 Cal.Rptr. 434].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 800, Aggravated Mayhem.
895
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
896
3177. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Torture (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(d)(3))

the additional allegation that, while committing that crime, the defendant
also committed torture. [You must decide whether the People have
each crime.]
1. During the commission of the crime, the defendant inflicted great
bodily injury on someone else;
AND
2. When inflicting the injury, the defendant intended to cause cruel
or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, or persuasion or for any sadistic purpose.
[It is not required that a victim actually suffer pain.]
[Someone acts for the purpose of extortion if he or she intends to (1)
obtain a person’s property with the person’s consent and (2) obtain the
person’s consent through the use of force or fear.]
[Someone acts for the purpose of extortion if he or she (1) intends to get
a public official to do an official act and (2) uses force or fear to make
the official do the act. An official act is an act that an officer does in his
or her official capacity using the authority of his or her public office.]
[Someone acts with a sadistic purpose if he or she intends to inflict pain
on someone else in order to experience pleasure himself or herself.]
<If there is an issue in the case over whether the torture was inflicted

897
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
Unlike murder by torture, the crime of torture under Penal Code section 206 does
not require that the intent to cause pain be premeditated or that any cruel or extreme
pain be prolonged. (People v. Pre (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 419–420 [11
Cal.Rptr.3d 739]; People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1205 [68
Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 444 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d
676].) Torture as defined in section 206 focuses on the mental state of the
perpetrator and not the actual pain inflicted. (People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904].) Give the bracketed sentence stating that “It is not
required that a victim actually suffer pain” on request if there is no proof that the
alleged victim actually suffered pain.
“Extortion” need not be defined for purposes of torture. (People v. Barrera (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1564 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 395]; but see People v. Hill (1983) 141
Cal.App.3d 661, 668 [190 Cal.Rptr. 628] [term should be defined for kidnapping
under Pen. Code, § 209].) Nevertheless, either of the bracketed definitions of
extortion, and the related definition of “official act,” may be given on request if any
of these issues are raised in the case. (See Pen. Code, § 518 [defining “extortion”];
discussing common law definition of the term].) It appears that this type of extortion
would rarely occur in the context of torture, so it is excluded from this instruction.
“Sadistic purpose” may be defined on request. (See People v. Barrera, supra, 14
Cal.App.4th at p. 1564; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [approving use of phrase in torture-murder and
special circumstances torture-murder instructions].)
898
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Torture Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(3).
• Elements of Torture. Pen. Code, § 206.
• Great Bodily Injury Defined. Pen. Code, § 12022.7(f); see, e.g., People v. Hale
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 108 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904] [broken and smashed teeth,
split lip, and facial cut sufficient evidence of great bodily injury].
• Cruel Pain Equivalent to Extreme or Severe Pain. People v. Aguilar (1997) 58
• Intent. People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 106–107 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904];
People v. Jung (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1042–1043 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 5]; see
People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204–1206 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]
[neither premeditation nor intent to inflict prolonged pain are elements of
torture].
• Sadistic Purpose Defined. People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899–901 [8
Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196,
1202–1204 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 619]; see People v. Healy (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
1137, 1142 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 274] [sexual element not required].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 810, Torture.
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 202) Punishment, §§ 459–463.
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a][i] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
899
3178. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary With Intent to
Commit Sex Offense (Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4))

the additional allegation that the defendant committed the crime during
the commission of burglary, with the intent to commit
<insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>. [You must decide
1. The defendant entered an inhabited (house [or a room within an
inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a
building);
2. When the defendant entered the (house [or room within the
house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/
she) intended to commit <insert sex offense[s] from
Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>;
AND
3. After the defendant entered the (house [or room within the
house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building), (he/
she) committed <insert sex offense[s] from Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(c)> [before (he/she) escaped to a place of temporary
safety].
A (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating
home/trailer coach/part of a building) is inhabited if someone uses it as a
dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged
entry.
[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ <insert
with it.]
[The defendant intended to commit rape if he intended to have sexual
intercourse with a woman [who was not his wife], without her consent,
by (using force, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to her or to another person/threatening to retaliate against
her or against a third person with a reasonable possibility that the threat
would be carried out/threatening to have her or a third person
incarcerated, arrested, or deported).]
900
<insert sex offense[s] other than rape from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, please
(that/those) crime[s].]
[A person has reached a place of temporary safety if he or she has
successfully escaped from the scene of the crime and is no longer being
pursued.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the defendant is charged with rape, give the bracketed sentence that begins with
“The defendant intended to commit rape . . . .” If the defendant is charged with
another offense, use the next bracketed paragraph, and give all necessary
instructions on the Penal Code section 667.61(c) offenses alleged.
For a definition of “vessel,” “floating home,” or “trailer coach,” see CALCRIM No.
1701, Burglary: Degrees.
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Burglary With Intent to Commit Sex Offense.
Pen. Code, § 667.61(d)(4).
• During the Commission of Burglary Defined for Sentencing Factor. People v.
Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 191 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
• Elements of Burglary. Pen. Code, § 459.
[120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].
RELATED ISSUES
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1700, Burglary, and CALCRIM
No. 1701, Burglary: Degrees.
901
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
902
3179. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Kidnapping (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(1))

the additional allegation that the defendant kidnapped
<insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]>. [You must decide whether the
To decide whether the defendant kidnapped <insert name[s]
of alleged victim[s]>, please refer to the separate instructions that I (will
give/have given) you on kidnapping. You must apply those instructions
when you decide whether the People have proved this additional
allegation.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
This sentencing factor applies if “the defendant kidnapped the victim of the present
offense in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.” (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1).)
Give the appropriate instruction on kidnapping, depending on which Penal Code
section the prosecution alleges, as follows:
Pen. Code, § 207: CALCRIM No. 1215, Kidnapping
CALCRIM No. 1200, Kidnapping: For Child
Molestation
CALCRIM No. 1201, Kidnapping: Person Incapable
of Consent
Pen. Code, § 209: CALCRIM No. 1202, Kidnapping: For Ransom,
Reward, or Extortion
CALCRIM No. 1203, Kidnapping: For Robbery,
Rape, or Other Sex Offenses
Pen. Code, § 209.5: CALCRIM No. 1204, Kidnapping: During
Carjacking
903
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Kidnapping Factor. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(1).
• Sentencing Factor Does Not Require Specific Intent to Commit Sex Offense.
People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 717 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506].
• Sentencing Factor Requires More Movement Than Incidental to Offense. People
v. Diaz (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 246 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 682].
RELATED ISSUES
See also the Related Issues sections of the instructions on kidnapping, CALCRIM
Nos. 1200–1204, 1215.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
Sentencing, §§ 91.38[1], 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
904
3180. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Burglary (Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(2))

the additional allegation that the defendant committed the crime during
the commission of a burglary. [You must decide whether the People have
each crime.]
1. The defendant entered (a building/an inhabited (house [or a room
within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part
of a building));
2. When the defendant entered the (building/house [or a room
within the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a
building), (he/she) intended to commit (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>);
[AND]
3. After the defendant entered the (building/house [or a room within
the house]/vessel/floating home/trailer coach/part of a building),
(he/she) committed <insert sex offense[s] from Pen.
Code, § 667.61(c)> [before (he/she) escaped to a place of
temporary safety](./;)
<Give element 4 only if prosecution alleges defendant entered a building
that does not meet definition of inhabited dwelling.>
[AND
4. When the defendant committed <insert sex offense[s]
from Pen. Code, § 667.61(c)>, the building was closed to the
public.]
[A (house [or a room within an inhabited house]/vessel/floating home/
trailer coach/part of a building) is inhabited if someone uses it as a
dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged
entry.]
[A house includes any (structure/garage/office/ <insert
with it.]
<Alternative A—theft>
[The defendant intended to commit theft [by larceny] if (he/she) intended
905
to take property owned by someone else, without the owner’s consent, to

deprive the owner of it permanently [or to remove it from the owner’s
possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be
deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property],
to move the property, even a small distance, and to keep it for any
period of time, however brief.]
<Alternative B—rape by force, fear, or threats>
[The defendant intended to commit rape if he intended to have sexual
intercourse with a woman [who was not his wife], without her consent,
by (using force, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury to her or to another person/threatening to retaliate against
her or against a third person with a reasonable possibility that the threat
would be carried out/threatening to have her or a third person
incarcerated, arrested, or deported).]
<Alternative C—other felony>
<insert other felony/felonies alleged>, please refer to the separate
[A person has reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she) has
successfully escaped from the scene of the crime and is no longer being
pursued.]
[The burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to
commit (theft/ [or] <insert one or more felonies>). The
defendant does not need to have actually committed that crime as long
as (he/she) entered with the intent to do so. [The People do not have to
prove that the defendant actually committed (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>).]]
[The People allege that the defendant intended to commit (theft/ [or]
<insert one or more felonies>). You may not find this
allegation true unless you all agree that (he/she) intended to commit one
of those crimes at the time of the entry. You do not need to all agree on
which one of those crimes (he/she) intended.]
New January 2006
906
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the prosecution alleges that the defendant entered a “building” that does not meet
the definition of inhabited dwelling, give element 4.
Give alternative A, B, or C depending on the prosecution’s theory about which
felony the defendant intended to commit at the time of entry. To have the requisite
intent for theft, the defendant must either intend to deprive the owner permanently
or deprive the owner of a major portion of the property’s value or enjoyment. (See
People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].)
When giving this portion of the instruction, select the appropriate language in
alternative A—theft.
If the prosecution alleges multiple underlying felonies, give the bracketed paragraph
that begins with “The People allege that the defendant intended to commit
either . . . .” (People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560, 569 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414
P.2d 39]; People v. Griffın (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 741, 750 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 273].)
For a definition of “vessel,” “floating home,” or “trailer coach,” see CALCRIM No.
1701, Burglary: Degrees.
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Burglary. Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(2).
• During the Commission of Burglary Defined for Sentencing Factor. People v.
Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 191 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 624].
• Elements of Burglary. Pen. Code, § 459.
[120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 P.3d 289].
RELATED ISSUES
“Closed to the Public”
“[T]he commission of a specified sex offense during a burglary is within the statute
if the business is closed when the sex offense is committed.” (People v. Palmore
See the Related Issues sections of CALCRIM No. 1700, Burglary, and CALCRIM
No. 1701, Burglary: Degrees.
907
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
5 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Criminal Trial, § 727.
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
908
3181. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Multiple Victims (Pen.
Code, § 667.61(e)(4))
If you find the defendant guilty of two or more sex offenses, as charged
in Counts <insert counts charging sex offense[s] from Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(c)>, you must then decide whether the People have proved the
additional allegation that those crimes were committed against more
than one victim in this case.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
This sentencing factor must be pleaded, proved, and found true by the trier of fact.
(People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].)
The court may not impose a sentence using this factor unless the jury has
specifically made a finding that the factor has been proved, even if the defendant is
convicted in the proceeding of qualifying offenses against more than one person.
(Ibid.)
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Multiple Victims Factor. Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(4).
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].).
RELATED ISSUES
“Present Case or Cases”
This sentencing factor applies when the “offenses are prosecuted ‘in the present case
or cases.’ ” (People v. Stewart (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 171 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d
353].) There is no requirement that the offenses be committed on the same date or
in the course of the same transaction, so long as the offenses are tried together. (Id.
at p. 172.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
909
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a][ii], [3] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
910
3182. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Tying or Binding (Pen.
Code, § 667.61(e)(5))

the additional allegation that the defendant tied or bound
<insert name[s] of alleged victim[s] or other person[s]> during the
commission of (that/those) crime[s]. [You must decide whether the People
have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding
for each crime.]
<If there is an issue in the case as to whether the tying or binding occurred
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during the
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Tying or Binding Factor. Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(5).
RELATED ISSUES
Binding Includes Placing Tape Over Victim’s Eyes
In People v. Campbell (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 71, 77–79 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 830], the
court held that “binding” included placing tape over the victim’s eyes to prevent her
from seeing.
911
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 459–463.
Sentencing, § 91.102[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
912
3183. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Administered
Controlled Substance (Pen. Code, § 667.61(e)(6))

the additional allegation that the defendant administered a controlled
substance to <insert name[s] of alleged victim[s]> during
the commission of (that/those) crime[s]. [You must decide whether the
1. In the commission of <insert sex offense[s] from Pen.
Code, § 667.61(c)>, the defendant administered
<insert controlled substance from Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11054–11058> to <insert name[s] of alleged
victim[s]>;
AND
2. The defendant did so for the purpose of committing
<insert felony alleged>.
A person administers a substance if he or she applies it directly to the
the other person to inhale, ingest, or otherwise consume the substance.
<If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during
the commission of” the offense, see Bench Notes.>

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
If there is an issue in the case as to whether the defendant acted “during the
commission” of the offense, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3261, While
913
Cal.4th 1001, 1014 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705] [weapon used before
elements of felony committed]; People v. Taylor (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 582
[38 Cal.Rptr.2d 127].)
AUTHORITY
• One-Strike Sex Offense Statute—Administered Controlled Substance. Pen. Code,
§ 667.61(e)(6).
• Elements of Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 12022.75.
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 574–578.
Sentencing, §§ 91.42, 91.102[2][a][ii] (Matthew Bender).
Group).
914
3184. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear to
Cause Minor to Engage in Commercial Sex Act (Pen. Code,
§ 236.1(c)(2))

<insert count[s] charging violation[s] of Penal Code section
236.1(c)> you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People
have proved the additional allegation that when the defendant committed
(that/those) crime[s], (he/she) used (force[,]/ [or] fear[,]/ [or] deceit[,]/
[or] coercion[,]/ [or] violence[,]/ [or] duress[,]/ [or] menace) [on]) ([or]
threat of unlawful injury to) (the other person/ [or] to someone else).
submit to].
harm to or physical restraint again someone else/ [or] the abuse or
[Serious harm includes any harm, either physical or nonphysical,
including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is
sufficiently serious, under all the circumstances, to force a reasonable
person of the same background and in the same circumstances to
perform or to continue performing labor, services[, or commercial sex
acts] in order to avoid that harm.]
[When you decide whether the defendant acted with (duress/ [or]
coercion), consider all of the circumstances, including the age of the
other person, (his/her) relationship to the defendant [or defendant’s
agent[s]], and the other person’s handicap or disability, if any.]
915
New February 2014

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction defining this enhancement.
and applies only to crimes committed on or after that date.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1(c)(2).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, § 278.
916
3185. Sex Offenses: Sentencing Factors—Using Force or Fear
Against Minor Under 14 Years/14 Years or Older (Pen. Code,
§§ 264.1(b), 286(c)(2)(B) & (C), 286(d)(2) & (3), 287(c)(2)(B) & (C),
287(d)(2) & (3), 289(a)(1)(B) & (C))

[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]], you must
then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the
additional allegation that when the defendant committed (that/those)
crime[s], the defendant used
<Violations of Pen. Code §§ 286(c)(2)(B) & (C), 287(c)(2)(B) & (C),
289(a)(1)(B) & (C)>
[(force[,]/[or] violence[,]/[or] duress[,]/[or] menace[,]/[or] fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury [to another person]) on]
<Violations of Pen. Code § 264.1(b)>
[(force/[or] violence) and against the will of]
<Violations of Pen. Code §§ 286(d)(2) & (3) and 287(d)(2) & (3)>
[(force/[or] fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury [to another
person]) on]
a minor who was (under the age of 14 years/14 years of age or older).
[A minor is a person under the age of 18.]
New October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction on the sentencing factor. (See
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d
435].)
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, §§ 264.1(b), 286(c)–(d), 287(c)–(d),
289(a)(1).
917
Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391].
918
3200. Controlled Substance: Quantity (Pen. Code,
§§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4)

lesser crime[s] of <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then
allegation that the crime involved [more than] a specified amount [or
more] of the controlled substance. [You must decide whether the People
have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate finding
for each crime.]
[1.] The defendant <insert conduct alleged, e.g., sold or
conspired to sell> [more than] <insert quantity
alleged> by (weight/volume) [or more] of a substance containing
<insert controlled substance>(./;)
<Give element 2 if enhancement alleged in conspiracy count.>
[AND
2. The defendant was substantially involved in the planning,
direction, execution, or financing of the <insert
conduct alleged, e.g., sale> of the <insert controlled
substance>.]
[In deciding whether the required (weight/volume) has been proved, do
not take into account plant or vegetable material.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
charged with an enhancement or a probation ineligibility clause based on the
quantity of the controlled substance. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466,
490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435].)
Give the bracketed phrases “more than” if the defendant is charged with an
919
enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4. Give the bracketed
phrases “or more” if the defendant is charged under Health and Safety Code section
11352.5 or Penal Code section 1203.07.
Give bracketed element 2 if an enhancement under Health and Safety Code section
11370.4 is alleged in a count of conspiracy. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4(a);
People v. Salcedo (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 539].) Do not
give element 2 if the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but is being
prosecuted for one or more substantive offenses on a theory of coconspirator
liability. (People v. Salcedo, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) If the defendant is
charged with the enhancement on both conspiracy and substantive offenses, the
court should give this instruction once for the conspiracy charge, with element 2,
and once for all the substantive offenses, without element 2. If properly instructed,
the jury need not make a special finding that the defendant was substantially
involved. (People v. Lobato (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d
429].)
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements and Sentencing Factors. Pen. Code, §§ 1203.07(a)(1), (2) & (4);
Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352.5, 11370.4.
• Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Need Not Be Pure. People v.
Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 903 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420].
• Knowledge of Quantity or Specific Intent Not Required. People v. Meza (1995)
• Conspiracy Instruction. People v. Duran (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941–942
[114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595]; People v. Salcedo (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35
Cal.Rptr.2d 539]; People v. Lobato (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 429].
RELATED ISSUES
Must Controlled Substance Actually Exist?
In Valenzuela v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1447 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d
781], the court held that, where a defendant is charged with offering to sell, an
enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 “must be based on the
weight of a substance in existence, not on an amount merely offered or negotiated.”
Thus, the enhancement was not proper where the defendant negotiated to sell five
kilograms of heroin but in fact only produced less than one kilogram, or where the
defendant offered to sell four kilograms of cocaine but never possessed that
substance. (Valenzuela, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) Similarly, People v. Lopez
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 897, 902–903 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 649], held that an
enhancement under Health and Safety Code section 11379.8 was not proper where
the defendant agreed to manufacture more than three pounds of methamphetamine
but failed to produce any of the substance. On the other hand, in People v. Howard
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414–1416 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 766], the court upheld an
enhancement where the defendants agreed to purchase seven kilograms of cocaine
920
and had the required money on hand, but the officers conducting the undercover
operation only provided one kilogram of the substance. The court distinguished prior
holdings, finding that where a defendant is charged with conspiracy to purchase a
controlled substance in an undercover operation, it is not necessary for the officers
to produce all of the drugs promised. (Id. at p. 1416.)
Sentencing Entrapment or Manipulation
Some jurisdictions have recognized a defense of “sentencing entrapment or
manipulation,” where undercover law enforcement officers persuade a defendant to
sell or produce a greater quantity of the controlled substance for the purpose of later
obtaining a higher mandatory sentence. (See People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1207, 1212 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 80 P.3d 662].) The doctrine of “sentencing
entrapment” does not apply in California. (Ibid.) In Smith, the Court did not decide
whether the doctrine of “sentence manipulation” does apply. (Ibid.) The Court did
find that if the doctrine of sentence manipulation applies in California, its
application to a particular case would require “truly outrageous” conduct by law
enforcement officers. (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
615.
Narcotics and Alcohol Offenses, § 145.01[3][e][ii] (Matthew Bender).
921
3201. Controlled Substance: Quantity—Manufacture of Controlled
Substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8)

<insert counts charging manufacturing or processing of controlled
substance>, you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People
have proved the additional allegation that the crime involved more than
a specified amount of the controlled substance. [You must decide whether
the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a
1. A substance used in, to be used in, or produced during the
(manufacturing/ <insert description of alleged other
process>) process contained <insert controlled
substance from Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11054–11058>;
[AND]
2. The substance containing <insert controlled
substance> was more than <insert quantity alleged>
by (weight/volume)(./;)
<Give element 3 if enhancement alleged in conspiracy count.>
[AND
3. The defendant was substantially involved in the direction or
supervision of, or in a significant portion of the financing of, the
(manufacturing/ <insert description of alleged other
process>) of <insert controlled substance>.]
[In deciding whether the required (weight/volume) has been proved, do
not take into account plant or vegetable material.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
charged with an enhancement based on the quantity of the controlled substance.
(Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d
435].)
922
Give bracketed element 3 if the enhancement is alleged in a count of conspiracy to

manufacture a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8(e); People v.
Duran (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595].) Do not give element
3 if the defendant is not charged with conspiracy but is being prosecuted for one or
more substantive offenses on a theory of coconspirator liability. (People v. Duran,
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.) If the defendant is charged with the enhancement
on both conspiracy and substantive offenses, the court should give this instruction
once for the conspiracy charge, with element 3, and once for all the substantive
offenses, without element 3. If properly instructed, the jury need not make a special
finding that the defendant was substantially involved. (People v. Lobato (2003) 109
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8.
• Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Need Not Be Pure. People v.
Burgio (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 769, 774 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 397].
• Substance Containing Controlled Substance—Used or to Be Used in Process.
People v. Hard (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 272, 275 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 107].
• Knowledge of Quantity or Specific Intent Not Required. People v. Meza (1995)
• Conspiracy Instruction. People v. Duran (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 941–942
[114 Cal.Rptr.2d 595]; People v. Salcedo (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [35
Cal.Rptr.2d 539]; People v. Lobato (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 766 [135
Cal.Rptr.2d 429].
RELATED ISSUES
Combining Measurements
Health and Safety Code section 11379.8 provides two sets of measurements, one for
“liquid by volume” and one for “solids by weight.” “[S]o long as there is sufficient
evidence, the trier of fact should be permitted to add the common measures of the
seized substances in order to meet the statute’s standards.” (People v. Good (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 1533, 1537 [266 Cal.Rptr. 608].)
See the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 3200, Controlled Substance:
Quantity.
SECONDARY SOURCES
615.
923
924

lesser crimes[s] of <insert lesser offense[s]>], you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the
defendant engaged in a pattern of related felony conduct that (involved
the taking of/ [or] resulted in the loss by another person or entity of)
more than $ <insert amount alleged>.
1. The defendant committed two or more related felonies,
specifically <insert names of alleged felonies and
descriptions if necessary>;
2. Fraud or embezzlement was a material element of at least two
related felonies committed by the defendant;
3. The related felonies involved a pattern of related felony conduct;
AND
4. The pattern of related felony conduct (involved the taking of/ [or]
resulted in the loss by another person or entity of) more than
$ <insert amount alleged>.
A pattern of related felony conduct means engaging in at least two
felonies that have the same or similar purpose, result, principals, victims,
or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics, and that are not isolated events.
Related felonies are felonies committed against two or more separate
victims, or against the same victim on two or more separate occasions.
[Fraud is a material element of <insert name of alleged
felony>.]
[Embezzlement is a material element of <insert name of
alleged felony>.]

925
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the court has not otherwise instructed the jury on all the elements of the
underlying felonies, the court must also give the appropriate instructions on those
elements.
It is unclear if the court may instruct the jury that the fraud or embezzlement is a
material element of the felonies. The bracketed sentences are provided for the court
to use at its discretion.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancement. Pen. Code, § 186.11(a)(1).
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against Property, § 143.01[4][d], [f] (Matthew Bender).
926
3222. Characteristics of Victim (Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b),
667.10(a))

allegation that the defendant committed that crime against a person who
was (65 years of age or older/under the age of 14
years/blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or] quadriplegic).
1. At the time of the crime, <insert name of alleged
victim> was (65 years of age or older/under the age of 14 years/
blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or] quadriplegic);
AND
2. At that time, the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that <insert name of alleged victim> was (65
years of age or older/under the age of 14
years/blind/deaf/developmentally disabled/paraplegic/ [or]
quadriplegic).
[Developmentally disabled means a severe, chronic disability of a person
that:
1. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or a
combination of mental and physical impairments;
2. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
AND
3. Results in substantial functional limitation in three or more of the
following abilities:
a. To care for one’s self;
b. To understand and express language;
c. To learn;
d. To be independently mobile;
e. To engage in self-direction;
927
f. To live independently;
OR
g. To be economically self-sufficient.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
L.Ed.2d 435].)
If the defendant is charged with a prior conviction under Penal Code section
667.9(b) or 667.10, the court must also give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior
Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial, unless the defendant has stipulated to the prior or
the court has granted a bifurcated trial on the prior conviction.
391].)
Give the bracketed definition of developmental disability if that enhancement is
charged.
AUTHORITY
• Enhancements. Pen. Code, §§ 667.9(a) & (b), 667.10(a).
• Developmental Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 667.9(d).
• Reasonably Should Have Known Not Unconstitutionally Vague. People v. Smith
• Prior Conviction Not Required for Enhancement Under Penal Code Section
667.9(a). People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1213 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d
592].
• Proof of Knowledge Requirement. People v. Morris (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
1147, 1153–1154 [111 Cal.Rptr.3d 204].
SECONDARY SOURCES
420.
928
3223. Reckless Driving With Specified Injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23105(a))
If you find the defendant guilty of reckless driving, you must then decide
whether the People have proved the additional allegation that when the
defendant committed that crime, (he/she) caused someone else to suffer
<insert injury or injuries specified in Veh. Code § 23105(b)>.
New August 2013; Revised August 2016

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction. See Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] [any fact that
increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt.]
The court has a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 240, Causation, if the issue
of whether the defendant’s act caused injury goes to the jury. (People v. Bernhardt
(1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 591 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Veh. Code, § 23105(b).
CALCRIM No. 2200, Reckless Driving.
SECONDARY SOURCES
929
3224. Aggravating Factor: Great Violence, Great Bodily Harm, or
High Degree of Cruelty, Viciousness, or Callousness
<Introductory paragraph for nonbifurcated trial>

[If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged [in Count[s]
[,]][ or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or the
allegation[s] that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved (great
violence[,]/ [or ]great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threat[s] of great bodily
harm[,]/ [or ][(other/an)] act[s] revealing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness).]
<Introductory paragraph for bifurcated trial>
[The People have alleged that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved
(great violence[,]/ [or ]great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threat[s] of great bodily
harm[,]/ [or ][(other/an)] act[s] revealing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness).]
1. During the commission of the crime[s], the defendant (used great
violence[,]/ [or ]inflicted great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threatened to
inflict great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]committed (other/an) act[s]
showing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness);
AND
2. The (type/level) of (violence[,]/ [or ]bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threat of
bodily harm[,]/ [or ]cruelty, viciousness, or callousness) was
distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the
crime[s].
[For the crime to have been committed with (great violence[,]/ [or
]cruelty[,]/ [or ]viciousness[,]/ [or ]callousness), no one needs to actually
have been injured by the defendant’s act. But if someone was injured,
you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding
whether the defendant committed the crime with (great violence[,]/ [or
]cruelty[,]/ [or ]viciousness[,]/ [or ]callousness).]
[Great bodily harm means significant or substantial physical injury, as
opposed to minor or moderate harm.]
[Threat of great bodily harm means the threat of significant or substantial
physical injury. It is a threatened injury that would result in greater
than minor or moderate harm.]
[Viciousness means dangerously aggressive or marked by violence or
930
ferocity. Viciousness is not the same as violence. For example, some acts
which may be described as vicious do not involve violence at all, but
rather involve acts such as deceit and slander. On the other hand, many
violent acts do not indicate viciousness, but instead show frustration,
justifiable rage, or self-defense.]
[An act discloses cruelty when it demonstrates the deliberate infliction of
physical or mental suffering.]
[An act discloses callousness when it demonstrates a lack of sympathy
for the suffering of, or harm to, the victim[s].]
You may not find the allegation true unless all of you agree that the
People have proved at least one of the following: that the defendant
(used great violence[,]/ [or ]inflicted great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threatened
to inflict great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]committed[ other] acts showing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness). However, you need not all
agree on the act[s] or conduct that [constitutes the (use of great
violence[,]/ [or ]infliction of great bodily harm[,]/ [or ]threat to inflict
great bodily harm)][ or][ show a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.
People have proved that the defendant’s conduct was distinctively worse
than an ordinary commission of the underlying crime.
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction is provided for the court to use for an aggravating factor as stated
in California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1170, 1170.1; see also
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856].)
Do not give an aggravating factor that is an element of the convicted offense. (Pen.
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
The court should specify which crimes the aggravating factor pertains to if it applies
to one or more specific counts.
The court must bifurcate the jury’s determination of the aggravating factors on the
defendant’s request. (Pen. Code, § 1170(b)(2).) For a bifurcated trial, the court must
931
also give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial.

AUTHORITY
• Aggravating Factor. California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).
• “Aggravating Fact” Defined. People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817 [62
Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 161 P.3d 1130]; People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496,
512 [225 Cal.Rptr.3d 682]; People v. Zamarron (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 865, 872
[36 Cal.Rptr.2d 17]; People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110 [179
Cal.Rptr. 879] [“The essence of ‘aggravation’ relates to the effect of a particular
fact in making the offense distinctively worse than the ordinary”].
• Unanimity Not Required Regarding Facts Underlying the Aggravating Factor.
People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142–148 [283 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 493
P.3d 815].
• Force, Violence, or Threat Beyond What is Necessary to Accomplish Criminal
Purpose. People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 239 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406];
see also People v. Cortez (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [163 Cal.Rptr. 1];
People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 116 [208 Cal.Rptr. 910]; People v.
Garcia (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 790, 793–794 [257 Cal.Rptr. 495].
• Viciousness Not Equivalent To Violence. People v. Reed (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
489, 492 [203 Cal.Rptr. 659].
• Actual Bodily Harm Not Required. People v. Duran (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 987,
990 [182 Cal.Rptr. 17].
COMMENTARY
Distinctively Worse Than The Ordinary
The committee is aware of Johnson v. United States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 597–598
[135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569], in which the United States Supreme Court held
that determining what constitutes an “ordinary” violation of a criminal statute may
create a constitutional vagueness problem. Nevertheless, in light of California case
law that has never been disapproved (see, e.g., People v. Moreno, supra, 128
Cal.App.3d at p. 110), the committee has elected to include in the instruction the
state law requirement that an aggravating factor may not be found to be true unless
the defendant’s conduct was distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of the
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Prohibition Against Dual Use of Facts at Sentencing
The jury may find true multiple aggravating factors based on the same underlying
fact. However, at sentencing, a single underlying fact may not support more than
one aggravating factor. (People v. Fernandez (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 669, 680 [276
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
932

allegation[s] that the defendant was armed with or used a weapon, to
wit: <insert description of weapon>, during commission of
the crime[s] in Count[s] .]
[The People have alleged that the defendant was armed with or used a
weapon, to wit: <insert description of weapon>, during
commission of the crime[s][ in Count[s] ].]
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant, while
committing the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] (knowingly carried a
weapon[,]/ [or ]knowingly had a weapon available for use[,]/ [or
]intentionally displayed a weapon in a menacing manner[,]/ [or
]intentionally (fired/ [or ]attempted to fire) a weapon[,]/ [or ]intentionally
(struck[,]/ [or ]stabbed[,]/ [or ]slashed[,]/ [or ]hit][,]/ [or ]attempted to
(strike[,]/ [or ]stab[,]/ [or ]slash[,]/ [or ]hit) another person with a
weapon).]
[A device, instrument, or object that is capable of being used to inflict
injury or death may be a weapon. In determining whether
<insert description> was a weapon, you may consider the totality of
circumstances, including the manner in which it was used or possessed.]
People have proved that the defendant was either armed or used a
weapon. However, all of you do not need to agree on which act[s] or
conduct constitutes the arming or use of a weapon.
933
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856].)
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
Give the bracketed portion that defines weapon if the object is not a weapon as a
matter of law and is capable of innocent uses.
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• Arming Includes Available for Use. People v. Garcia (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d
335, 350 [228 Cal.Rptr. 87].
COMMENTARY
934
underlying crime.
Penal Code section 12022
Consistent with the language of rule 4.421(a)(2), the instruction has been drafted
with the assumption that the defendant is personally armed. The armed enhancement
contained in Penal Code section 12022(a)(1) provides: “This additional term shall
apply to a person who is a principal in the commission of a felony or attempted
felony if one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, whether or not the
person is personally armed with a firearm.” Whether there is a relationship between
the rule of court and Penal Code section 12022(a)(1) has not been addressed by case
law.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
935

[If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged[ in Count[s]
allegation[s] that <insert name of victim> was a particularly
vulnerable victim.]
[The People have alleged[ in Count[s] ] that <insert
name of victim> was a particularly vulnerable victim.]
1. <insert name of victim> (suffered/ [or ]was
threatened with suffering) a loss, injury, or harm as the result of
the crime[s];
AND
2. <insert name of victim> was particularly vulnerable.
Particularly vulnerable includes being defenseless, unguarded,
unprotected, or otherwise susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act to a
special or unusual degree.
In determining whether <insert name of victim> was
particularly vulnerable, you should consider all of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, including the characteristics of
<insert name of victim> and the manner and setting in
which the crime was committed.
[You may not find vulnerability based solely on <insert
element of the offense>, which is an element of <insert
offense>.]
People have proved that the victim was particularly vulnerable.
However, you do not have to agree on which facts show that the victim
was particularly vulnerable.
You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each
crime and return a separate finding for each crime[ and for each victim].
936

New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Pen. Code section 1170.85(b) states: “Upon conviction of any felony it shall be
considered a circumstance in aggravation in imposing a term under subdivision (b)
of Section 1170 if the victim of an offense is particularly vulnerable, or unable to
defend himself or herself, due to age or significant disability.” If this section is
applicable, the instruction should be modified to reflect the victim’s alleged inability
to defend himself or herself based on age or significant disability.
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
The court should specify which crime and victim the aggravating factor pertains to
if it applies to one or more specific counts or victims.
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• “Victim” Defined. People v. Simon (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 761, 765 [193
Cal.Rptr. 28].
• “Particularly Vulnerable” Defined. People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79,
154–155 [158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 303 P.3d 1]; People v. Spencer (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 1208, 1223 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 627]; People v. Price (1984) 151
Cal.App.3d 803, 814 [199 Cal.Rptr. 99]; People v. Ramos (1980) 106
937
Cal.App.3d 591, 607 [165 Cal.Rptr. 179]; People v. Smith (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d
433, 436 [156 Cal.Rptr. 502].
• Vulnerability Cannot Be Based Solely on Age if Age Is Element of Offense.
People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1693–1694 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117,
1123 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986]; People v. Quinones (1988) 202
Cal.App.3d 1154, 1159 [249 Cal.Rptr. 435], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 244–245 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 P.3d
410]; People v. Ginese (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 468, 476–477 [175 Cal.Rptr.
383]; People v. Flores (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 924, 927 [171 Cal.Rptr. 777].
• Factor Did Not Apply in Vehicular Manslaughter. People v. Piceno (1987) 195
Cal.App.3d 1353, 1358–1359 [241 Cal.Rptr. 391].
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
938
3227. Aggravating Factor: Induced Others to Participate or
Occupied Position of Leadership or Dominance

[,]] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or the
allegation that the defendant induced others to participate in committing
the crime[s] or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
participants in the commission of the crime[s].]
[The People have alleged[ in Count[s] ] that the defendant
induced others to participate in committing the crime[s] or occupied a
position of leadership or dominance of other participants in the
commission of the crime[s].]
1. The defendant induced others to participate in the commission of
the crime[s];
OR
2. The defendant occupied a position of leadership or dominance
over other participants during commission of the crime[s].
Induced means persuaded, convinced, influenced, or instructed.
People have proved that the defendant either induced others to
participate or occupied a position of leadership or dominance. However,
all of you do not need to agree on which act[s] or conduct constitutes
inducing others to participate or occupying a position of leadership or
dominance.
939
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• More Than One Participant Required. People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d
184, 198 [172 Cal.Rptr. 756, 763–764].
• Leadership Not Equivalent to Dominance. People v. Kellett (1982) 134
Cal.App.3d 949, 961 [185 Cal.Rptr. 1].
• Factor Requires More Than Being Willing Participant. People v. Searle (1989)
213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1097 [261 Cal.Rptr. 898].
COMMENTARY
940
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
941

allegation[s] that the defendant induced a minor to commit or assist in
the commission of the crime[s][ in Count[s] ].]
[The People have alleged[ in Count[s] ] that the defendant
induced a minor to commit or assist in the commission of the crime[s].]
1. The defendant induced a minor to commit the crime[s];
OR
2. The defendant induced a minor to assist in the commission of the
crime[s].
Induced means persuaded, convinced, influenced, or instructed.
A minor is a person under the age of 18 years.
People have proved that the defendant induced a minor either to commit
the crime or to assist in the commission of the crime. However, all of you
do not need to agree on which act[s] or conduct constitutes the
inducement.
New March 2023

942
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
943
3229. Aggravating Factor: Threatened, Prevented, Dissuaded, Etc.
Witnesses

allegation[s] that the defendant[ in Count[s] ] (threatened
witnesses[,]/ [or ]unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses from
testifying[,]/ [or ]suborned perjury[,]/ [or ] <insert other
illegal activity that interfered with the judicial process>).]
[The People have alleged that the defendant[ in Count[s] ]
(threatened witnesses[,]/ [or ]unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses
from testifying[,]/ [or ]suborned perjury[,]/ [or ] <insert
other illegal activity that interfered with the judicial process>).]
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant
(threatened [a ]witness[es]/ [or ]prevented [a ]witness[es] from testifying/
[or ]dissuaded [a ]witness[es] from testifying/ [or ]suborned perjury/[or
] <insert other illegal activity that interfered with the judicial
process>).
[As used here, witness means someone[ or a person the defendant
to a crime(;/.)]
[OR]
evidence(;/.)]
[OR]
[OR
[A threat may be oral or written and may be implied by a pattern of
944
conduct or a combination of statements and conduct.]

intended victim, but may do so through someone else.]
[Dissuaded means persuaded or advised not to do something.]
[Suborned perjury means encouraged, induced, or assisted witnesses to
willfully make [a ]false statement[s] under oath. In order to find that the
defendant suborned perjury, the People must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, not only that the sworn statement was actually false, but also that
the defendant, at the time (he/she) encouraged, induced, or assisted the
witness(es) to make the statement, knew that it was false.]
[Induced means persuaded, convinced, influenced, or instructed.]
People have proved that the defendant (threatened [a ]witness[es]/ [or
]prevented [a ]witness[es] from testifying/ [or ]dissuaded [a ]witness[es]
from testifying/ [or ]suborned perjury/ [or ] <insert other
illegal activity that interfered with the judicial process>). However, all of
you do not need to agree on which act[s] or conduct constitutes
(threatening [a ]witness[es]/ [or ]preventing [a ]witness[es] from
testifying/ [or ]dissuading [a ]witness[es] from testifying/ [or ]suborning
perjury/ [or ] <insert other illegal activity that interfered with
the judicial process>).
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
945
Penal Code section 1170.85(a) states: “Upon conviction of any felony assault or
battery offense, it shall be considered a circumstance in aggravation of the crime in
imposing a term under subdivision (b) of Section 1170 if the offense was committed
to prevent or dissuade a person who is or may become a witness from attending
upon or testifying at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law, or if the
offense was committed because the person provided assistance or information to a
law enforcement officer, or to a public prosecutor in a criminal or juvenile court
proceeding.” If this section is applicable, the bracketed catch-all provision of the
instruction related to other illegal activity should be modified to reflect the
defendant’s alleged conduct.
If it is alleged the defendant interfered with the judicial process by committing
perjury, the bracketed catch-all provision for other illegal activity should be
modified and the trial court should also instruct with CALCRIM No. 2640, Perjury.
(See People v. Howard (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 999, 1002–1004 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d
676].)
The catch-all provision of other illegal activity can include attempts to dissuade or
prevent a witness from testifying. (See People v. Lewis (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 259,
266–267 [280 Cal.Rptr. 128].)
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• “Witness” Defined. Pen. Code, § 136(2).
• “Threat” Defined. Pen. Code, § 76(5).
• Attempted Subornation of Perjury. People v. Lewis (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 259,
266–267 [280 Cal.Rptr. 128].
946
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
Perjury
Perjury committed by the defendant can constitute “an illegal activity that interfered
with the judicial process.” (See People v. Howard (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 999, 1002
[21 Cal.Rptr.2d 676].) If it is alleged that the defendant committed perjury, the jury
must find all the elements of a perjury violation. Id. at p. 1004 [holding that the
court is constitutionally required to make findings encompassing the elements of
perjury: “a willful statement, under oath, of any material matter which the witness
knows to be false.”]; see also United States v. Dunnigan (1993) 507 U.S. 87, 96
[113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445].) The concern, essentially, is that a sentence may
be aggravated if the defendant actually committed perjury by being untruthful, but
not if the defendant merely gave inaccurate testimony because of confusion,
mistake, faulty memory, or some other reason besides a willful attempt to impede
justice. (Howard, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005; Dunnigan, supra, 507 U.S. at
pp. 95–96.)
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
947
3230. Aggravating Factor: Planning, Sophistication, or
Professionalism

allegation[s] that the offense was carried out with planning,
sophistication, or professionalism.]
[The People have alleged[ in Count[s] ] that the offense was
carried out with planning, sophistication, or professionalism.]
To prove this allegation, the People must prove that the defendant’s
manner of committing the crime involved planning, sophistication, or
professionalism.
Whether the manner of committing the crime involves planning,
sophistication, or professionalism depends on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the offense.
Planning refers to conduct before the crime, preparing for its
commission.
Sophistication refers to conduct demonstrating knowledge or awareness
of the complexities or details involved in committing the crime.
Professionalism refers to conduct demonstrating particular experience or
expertise.
People have proved that the defendant’s manner of committing the crime
involved planning, sophistication, or professionalism. However, all of you
do not need to agree on which act[s] or conduct demonstrates that the
manner of committing the crime involves planning, sophistication, or
professionalism.
[You must decide whether the People have proved (this/these)
allegation[s] for each crime and return a separate finding for each
crime.]
948
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
• Aggravating Factors. California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8).
P.3d 815].
• “Planning, Sophistication, Professionalism” Defined. People v. Mathews (1980)
102 Cal.App.3d 704, 710 [162 Cal.Rptr. 615]; People v. Stewart (1983) 140
Cal.App.3d 11, 17 [189 Cal.Rptr. 141]; People v. Charron (1987) 193
Cal.App.3d 981, 994–995 [238 Cal.Rptr. 660]; People v. Dancer (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1677, 1695 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282], disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d
986].
COMMENTARY
949

underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
950

allegation[s] that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved [(a/an)]
[attempted] [or] [actual] (taking/ [or] damage) of great monetary value.]
[The People have alleged that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved[
(a/an)][ attempted][ or][ actual] (taking/ [or] damage) of great monetary
value.]
1. During the commission of the crime[s], the defendant (attempted
to take/ [or ]actually took/damaged) <insert
description of item>;
AND
2. The monetary value of the <insert description of item
or damage to item> was great.
[In determining whether the monetary value was great, you may consider
all evidence presented on the issue of value.]
People have proved that the (item/damage) that the defendant
(attempted to take/took / [or] caused) was of great monetary value.
However, all of you do not need to agree on a specific monetary value.
New March 2023

951
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• Great Monetary Value. People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 707 & 714 [180
Cal.Rptr. 196, 639 P.2d 267] [losses of $2,300 and $3,250 qualified]; People v.
Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 197 [172 Cal.Rptr. 756] [damage of $450 did
not qualify]; People v. Bejarano (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 693, 705–706 [173
Cal.Rptr. 71] [loss of rifle, shotgun, and television did not qualify].
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
952
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
953

allegation[s] that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved a large
quantity of contraband.]
[The People have alleged that the crime[s][ in Count[s] ] involved
a large quantity of contraband.]
1. The <insert description of contraband> was
contraband;
AND
2. The quantity of <insert description of contraband>
was large.
[Contraband means illegal or prohibited items.]
In determining whether the quantity was large, you may consider all
evidence presented on the issue of amount.
People have proved that the quantity of contraband was large. However,
all of you do not need to agree on the specific quantity.
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
954
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
955

allegation[s] that the defendant took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the crime.]
[The People have alleged[ in Count[s] ] that the defendant took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the crime.]
1. (Prior to/During) the commission of the crime, the defendant
(had/developed) a relationship with <insert name of
victim or other person>;
2. This relationship allowed the defendant to occupy a position of
trust or caused <insert name of victim or other
person> to have confidence in the defendant;
AND
3. The defendant took advantage of this position of trust or
confidence to commit the crime.
People have proved that the defendant took advantage of a position of
trust or confidence with the victim to commit the crime. However, all of
you do not need to agree on which act[s] or conduct constitutes the
taking advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the
crime.
New March 2023

956
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
AUTHORITY
P.3d 815].
• Factor Focuses on Special Status to Victim. People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57
Cal.4th 79, 155 [158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 303 P.3d 1]; People v. Burbine (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 1250, 1262–1263 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 628] [quasi-paternal
relationship]; People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1694–1695 [53
Cal.Rptr.2d 282] [defendant intentionally cultivated friendship], disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1123 [65
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986]; People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328,
337–338 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 376] [stepfather entrusted with care]; People v. Clark
(1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 663, 666 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 709] [stepfather entrusted with
care]; People v. Jones (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1577 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 9]
[legal parent].
COMMENTARY
957
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
958

decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that
<insert name of defendant> has engaged in violent conduct,
to wit: <insert description of conduct>, which indicates (he/
she) is a serious danger to society.]
[The People have alleged that <insert name of defendant>
has engaged in violent conduct, to wit: <insert description of
conduct>, which indicates (he/she) is a serious danger to society.]
1. The defendant has engaged in violent conduct;
AND
2. The violent conduct, considered in light of all the evidence
presented[ and the defendant’s background], shows that the
defendant is a serious danger to society.
[To determine whether the defendant is a serious danger to society, you
may consider the defendant’s conduct before or after commission of the
crime[ as well as evidence about the defendant’s background].]
People have proved that the defendant engaged in violent conduct that
shows (he/she) is a serious danger to society. However, all of you do not
need to agree on which violent conduct shows that the defendant is a
serious danger to society.
People have proved that the defendant’s violent conduct was distinctively
worse than that posed by an ordinary commission of the underlying
crime and that the violent conduct, considered in light of all the evidence
presented[ and the defendant’s background], shows that the defendant is
a serious danger to society.
959
New March 2023

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Code, § 1170(b)(5).)
The court should specify the crime(s) to which the aggravating factor pertains.
AUTHORITY
• Aggravating Factors. California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).
P.3d 815].
• Danger to Society: Subsequent Conduct Can Be Considered. People v. Gonzales
(1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1173 [256 Cal.Rptr. 669].
COMMENTARY
underlying crime.
RELATED ISSUES
960
Cal.Rptr. 631].)
961
I. TEMPLATES
Template

allegation that <insert description of enhancement, sentencing
factor, or factual issue>. [You must decide whether the People have
each crime.]
<Insert elements required.>
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This template is provided for the court to use for any enhancements, sentencing
factors, or factual issues to be submitted to the jury that are not covered in previous
instructions. (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166
L.Ed.2d 856]; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159
L.Ed.2d 403].)
963
Template—Bifurcated Trial
The People have alleged that <insert description of

enhancement, sentencing factor, or factual issue>.
<Insert elements required.>
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This template is provided for the court to use for any enhancements, sentencing
factors, or factual issues to be submitted to the jury that are not covered in previous
instructions when the court grants a bifurcated trial on that issue. (Cunningham v.
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856]; Blakely v.
Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403].)
The court must also give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial.
When inserting the description in the first sentence, the court should specify which
crimes the enhancement or sentencing factor pertains to if it applies to one or more
specific counts. For example, “the victim of the robbery in Count 1 was particularly
vulnerable.”
964
3260. Duty of Jury: Verdict Form for Enhancement, Sentencing
Factor, or Prior Conviction
You have been given (a/ <insert number>) verdict form[s] for the
additional allegation[s]. If you reach a verdict on any additional
allegation, complete the verdict form for that allegation.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction when instructing on any
enhancements, sentencing factors, prior convictions, or other special findings.
Do not give this instruction for special circumstances. Give CALCRIM No. 700,
Special Circumstances: Introduction.
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, §§ 1158, 1158a.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Sentencing, §§ 91.31, 91.102[3] (Matthew Bender).
965
The People must prove that <insert allegation, e.g., the

defendant personally used a firearm> while committing [or attempting to
commit] <insert felony or felonies>.
<Give one or more bracketed paragraphs below depending on crime[s]
alleged.>
<Robbery>
[The crime of robbery [or attempted robbery] continues until the
perpetrator[s] (has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety.
The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if:
• (He/She/They) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene;
[and]
• (He/She/They) (is/are) not or (is/are) no longer being chased(;
[and]/.)
• [(He/She/They) (has/have) unchallenged possession of the
property(; [and]/.)]
• [(He/She/They) (is/are) no longer in continuous physical control of
the person who is the target of the robbery.]]
<Burglary>
[The crime of burglary [or attempted burglary] continues until the
The perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/
she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene[,] [and] (is/are)
no longer being chased[, and (has/have) unchallenged possession of the
property].]
<Sexual Assault>
[The crime of <insert sexual assault alleged> [or attempted
<insert sexual assault alleged>] continues until the
she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene[,] [and] (is/are)
no longer being chased[, and (is/are) no longer in continuous physical
control of the person who was the target of the crime].]
<Kidnapping>
[The crime of kidnapping [or attempted kidnapping] continues until the
966

she/they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene, (is/are) no
longer being chased, and (is/are) no longer in continuous physical control
of the person kidnapped.]
<Other Felony>
[The crime of <insert felony alleged> [or attempted
<insert felony alleged>] continues until the perpetrator[s]
(has/have) actually reached a place of temporary safety. The
perpetrator[s] (has/have) reached a place of temporary safety if (he/she/
they) (has/have) successfully escaped from the scene and (is/are) no
longer being chased.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction whenever the evidence raises an issue over the duration of the
felony and another instruction given to the jury has required some act “during the
commission or attempted commission” of the felony. (See People v. Wilkins (2013)
56 Cal.4th 333, 347–348 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903].)
This instruction should not be given if the issue is when the defendant formed the
intent to aid and abet a robbery or a burglary. For robbery, give CALCRIM No.
1603, Robbery: Intent of Aider and Abettor. For burglary, give CALCRIM No.
1702, Burglary: Intent of Aider and Abettor.
AUTHORITY
• Escape Rule. People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 347–348 [153 Cal.Rptr.3d
519, 295 P.3d 903].
• Place of Temporary Safety. People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103
Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7]; People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560 [7
Cal.Rptr.2d 23].
• Continuous Control of Victim. People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134,
171–172 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857] [lewd acts]; People v. Carter (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1251–1252 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 888] [robbery].
• Robbery. People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 823 [103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d
7]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1170 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d
742].
• Burglary. People v. Bodely (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 311, 313–314 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d
72].
• Lewd Acts on Child. People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 171–172 [266
Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857].
967
• Sexual Assault. People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132,
976 P.2d 683]; People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 348 [253 Cal.Rptr.
199, 763 P.2d 1289].
• Kidnapping. People v. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 1299 [280 Cal.Rptr.
584]; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 632 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d
1070].
RELATED ISSUES
Place of Temporary Safety Based on Objective Standard
Whether the defendant had reached a place of temporary safety is judged on an
objective standard. The “issue to be resolved is whether a robber had actually
reached a place of temporary safety, not whether the defendant thought that he or
she had reached such a location.” (People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 560
[7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Person, §§ 156, 157, 160, 162.
Against the Person, §§ 142.01[2][b][v], 142.10[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
968
DEFENSES AND INSANITY
A. GENERAL DEFENSES
3400. Alibi
3403. Necessity
3408. Entrapment
3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11362.775)
3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State (Pen. Code,
§ 28)
3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 6600, 6600.1)
3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually Violent Predator Act
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605)
969
DEFENSES AND INSANITY

3456. Initial Commitment of Offender With A Mental Health Disorder as
Condition of Parole (Pen. Code, § 2970)
3457. Extension of Commitment as Offender With A Mental Health Disorder (Pen.
Code, § 2970)
3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 1800)
3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death or Great Bodily
Injury (Pen. Code, § 198.5)
970
A. GENERAL DEFENSES
3400. Alibi
The People must prove that the defendant committed

<insert crime[s] charged>. The defendant contends (he/she) did not
commit (this/these) crime[s] and that (he/she) was somewhere else when
the crime[s] (was/were) committed. The People must prove that the
defendant was present and committed the crime[s] with which (he/she) is
charged. The defendant does not need to prove (he/she) was elsewhere at
the time of the crime.
If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was present
when the crime was committed, you must find (him/her) not guilty.
[However, the defendant may also be guilty of <insert
crime[s] charged> if (he/she) (aided and abetted/ [or] conspired with)
someone else to commit (that/those) crime[s]. If you conclude that the
defendant (aided and abetted/ [or] conspired to commit)
<insert crime[s] charged>, then (he/she) is guilty even if (he/she) was not
present when the crime[s] (was/were) committed.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on alibi. (People v. Freeman (1978) 22
Cal.3d 434, 437–438 [149 Cal.Rptr. 396, 584 P.2d 533]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4
Cal.4th 742, 803–804 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].) The court must give
this instruction on request when evidence of alibi has been introduced. (People v.
Whitson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 593, 603 [154 P.2d 867] [no sua sponte duty even if
substantial evidence has been introduced by the defense]; People v. Freeman (1978)
22 Cal.3d 434, 437–438 [149 Cal.Rptr. 396, 584 P.2d 533].)
The defendant is not entitled to an instruction on alibi if the prosecution does not
rely on the defendant’s presence at the commission of the crime to establish
culpability. (People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 211 [132 Cal.Rptr. 265]
[in prosecution for conspiracy and murder, defendant was not entitled to jury
instruction on alibi, where prosecution never contended he was present at time of
actual commission of any homicide and his presence was not requirement for
culpability].)
If the prosecution’s theory is that the defendant aided and abetted or conspired with
the perpetrator but was not present when the crime was committed, give the last
bracketed paragraph that begins with “However, the defendant may also be guilty.”
971
CALCRIM No. 3400 DEFENSES AND INSANITY
(People v. Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 26–28 [272 Cal.Rptr. 34].) If this
paragraph is given, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on aiding and
abetting. (Ibid. [court properly instructed that alibi was not a defense in an aiding
and abetting case, but erred in failing to define aiding and abetting].)
AUTHORITY
• Burden of Proof. In re Corey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 828 [41 Cal.Rptr.
379].
• Alibi, Aiding and Abetting. People v. Sarkis (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 26–28
[272 Cal.Rptr. 34].
RELATED ISSUES
Defendant Need Not Prove Alibi, Only Raise Reasonable Doubt
Alibi evidence need only raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not present
at the scene of the crime. It is therefore error to instruct the jury (1) that an alibi
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) that alibi evidence must
convince the jury of the defendant’s innocence, (3) that the jury must give less
credit to the testimony of alibi witnesses, or (4) that the jury must give more careful
scrutiny or less weight to alibi evidence than to other evidence. (People v. Costello
(1943) 21 Cal.2d 760, 763 [135 P.2d 164].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 688–719.
972
The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she)

acted under duress. The defendant acted under duress if, because of
threat or menace, (he/she) believed that (his/her/ [or] someone else’s) life
would be in immediate danger if (he/she) refused a demand or request to
commit the crime[s]. The demand or request may have been express or
implied.
The defendant’s belief that (his/her/ [or] someone else’s) life was in
immediate danger must have been reasonable. When deciding whether
the defendant’s belief was reasonable, consider all the circumstances as
they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a
reasonable person in the same position as the defendant would have
believed.
A threat of future harm is not sufficient; the danger to life must have
been immediate.
[The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not act under duress. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of <insert crime[s]>.]
[This defense does not apply to the crime of <insert
charge[s] of murder; see Bench Notes>.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, April 2008

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it and there is
substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence supporting it and either the
defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case.
When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence and
is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, however, it should ascertain
whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (People v. Gonzales
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; People v. Breverman
Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.
(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127 P.3d 40].)
Fear of great bodily harm can also raise the defense of duress. (See People v. Otis
973
(1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 124 [344 P.2d 342]; United States v. Bailey (1980) 444
U.S. 394, 409 [100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575; cf. People v. Subielski (1985) 169
Cal.App.3d 563, 566–567 [211 Cal.Rptr. 579] [duress cannot be based on fear of
some unspecified injury].)
As provided by statute, duress is not a defense to crimes punishable by death. (Pen.
Code, § 26(6); People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587,
50 P.3d 368] [duress is not a defense to any form of murder].) If such a crime is
charged, the court should instruct, using the last bracketed paragraph, that the
defense is not applicable to that count. However, “duress can, in effect, provide a
defense to murder on a felony-murder theory by negating the underlying felony.”
(Id. at p. 784.) If the defendant is charged with felony-murder, the court should
instruct that the defense of duress does apply to the underlying felony.
The defense of duress applies when the threat of danger is immediate and
accompanied by a demand, either direct or implied, to commit the crime. (People v.
Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 899–901 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120]; People v. Steele
(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 703, 706 [253 Cal.Rptr. 773].) If the threat is of future harm
or there is no implicit or explicit demand that the defendant commit the crime, the
evidence may support instructing on the defense of necessity. (See CALCRIM No.
3403, Necessity.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(6).
• Burden of Proof. People v. Graham (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 238, 240 [129
Cal.Rptr. 31].
• Difference Between Necessity and Duress. People v. Heath (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 892, 897–902 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].
RELATED ISSUES
Necessity Distinguished
Although evidence may raise both necessity and duress defenses, there is an
important distinction between the two concepts. With necessity, the threatened harm
is in the immediate future, thereby permitting a defendant to balance alternative
courses of conduct. (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1009–1013 [138
Cal.Rptr. 515].) Necessity does not negate any element of the crime, but rather
represents a public policy decision not to punish a defendant despite proof of the
crime. (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].) The
duress defense, on the other hand, does negate an element of the crime. The
974
DEFENSES AND INSANITY CALCRIM No. 3402
defendant does not have the time to form the criminal intent because of the
immediacy of the threatened harm. (Ibid.)
Duress Cannot Reduce Murder to Manslaughter
Duress cannot reduce murder to manslaughter. (People v. Anderson (2002) 28
Cal.4th 767, 783–785 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368] [only the Legislature can
recognize killing under duress as new form of manslaughter].)
Mental State or Intent
Evidence of duress may be relevant to determining whether the defendant acted with
the required mental state, even if insufficient to constitute a complete defense.
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 99–100 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710,
96 P.3d 30] [noting that court properly instructed that duress may be considered on
the question of whether the defendant acted with the proper mental state].)
Great Bodily Harm
Penal Code section 26(6) discusses life-endangering threats and several older cases
have outlined the defense of duress in the literal language of the statute. However,
some cases have concluded that fear of great bodily harm is sufficient to raise this
defense. (Compare People v. Hart (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 514, 516 [220 P.2d 595]
and People v. Lindstrom (1932) 128 Cal.App. 111, 116 [16 P.2d 1003] with People
v. Otis (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 124 [344 P.2d 342]; see also 1 Witkin &
Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 59 [discussing this
split]; but see People v. Subielski (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 563, 566–567 [211
Cal.Rptr. 579] [court rejects defense of duress because evidence showed defendant
feared only a beating].) It is clear, however, that threats of great bodily harm are
sufficient in the context of necessity. (People v. Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d
823, 831 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110]; People v. Pena (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 27
[197 Cal.Rptr. 264].)
Third Person Threatened
In People v. Pena (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 21–25 [197 Cal.Rptr. 264], the
court held that the defenses of necessity and duress may be based on threats of
harm to a third party. Although Pena is regarded as a necessity case, its discussion
of this point was based on out-of-state and secondary authority involving the
defense of duress. (See People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 898 [255
Cal.Rptr. 120] [acknowledging that though Pena uses the terms necessity and duress
interchangeably, it is really concerned with the defense of necessity].) No other
California cases discuss threats made to a third party and duress. (See also 1 Witkin
& Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 60 [discussing Pena
on this point].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
975
3403. Necessity

acted because of legal necessity.
In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:
1. (He/She) acted in an emergency to prevent a significant bodily
harm or evil to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else);
2. (He/She) had no adequate legal alternative;
3. The defendant’s acts did not create a greater danger than the one
avoided;
4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) actually believed that the act
was necessary to prevent the threatened harm or evil;
5. A reasonable person would also have believed that the act was
necessary under the circumstances;
AND
6. The defendant did not substantially contribute to the emergency.
likely than not that each of the six listed items is true.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
Substantial evidence means evidence of necessity, which, if believed, would be
976
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to
be more likely than not.
If the threatened harm was immediate and accompanied by a demand to commit the
crime, the defense of duress may apply. (See CALCRIM No, 3402, Duress or
Threats.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Pena (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14
[197 Cal.Rptr. 264]; People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 [48
Cal.Rptr.2d 877]; People v. Kearns (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135–1136 [64
Cal.Rptr. 2d 654].
• Burden of Proof. People v. Waters (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 938 [209
Cal.Rptr. 661]; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [138
Cal.Rptr. 515].
• Difference Between Necessity and Duress. People v. Heath (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 892, 897–902 [255 Cal.Rptr. 120].
RELATED ISSUES
Duress Distinguished
Although a defendant’s evidence may raise both necessity and duress defenses, there
is an important distinction between the two concepts. With necessity, the threatened
harm is in the immediate future, thereby permitting a defendant to balance
alternative courses of conduct. (People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999,
1009–1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515].) Necessity does not negate any element of the
crime, but rather represents a public policy decision not to punish a defendant
despite proof of the crime. (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 [255
Cal.Rptr. 120].) The duress defense, on the other hand, does negate an element of
the crime. The defendant does not have the time to form the criminal intent because
of the immediacy of the threatened harm. (Ibid.)
Abortion Protests
The defense of necessity is not available to one who attempts to interfere with
another person’s exercise of a constitutional right (e.g., demonstrators at an abortion
clinic). (People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 244 [281 Cal.Rptr. 307].)
Economic Necessity
Necessity caused by economic factors is valid under the doctrine. A homeless man
was entitled to an instruction on necessity as a defense to violating an ordinance
prohibiting sleeping in park areas. Lack of sleep is arguably a significant evil and
his lack of economic resources prevented a legal alternative to sleeping outside. (In
re Eichorn (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–391 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 535].)
Medical Necessity
There is a common law and statutory defense of medical necessity. The common
law defense contains the same requirements as the general necessity defense. (See
977
People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1538 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 559].) The
statutory defense relates specifically to the use of cannabis and is based on Health
and Safety Code section 11362.5, the “Compassionate Use Act,” but see Gonzales v.
Raich (2005) 545 U.S. 1 [125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1] [medical necessity
defense not available].
SECONDARY SOURCES
3 Witkin and Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 58–65.
978
<Give this paragraph when instructing on general or specific intent crimes>

[The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she)
acted [or failed to act] without the intent required for that crime, but
acted instead accidentally. You may not find the defendant guilty of
<insert crime[s]> unless you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that (he/she) acted with the required intent.]
<Give this paragraph when instructing on criminal or ordinary negligence
crimes>
[The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she)
acted [or failed to act] accidentally without (criminal/ordinary)
negligence. You may not find the defendant guilty of <insert
crime[s]> unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/
she) acted with (criminal/ordinary) negligence.
[(Criminal/Ordinary) negligence is defined in another instruction.]
negligence when:
AND
[Ordinary negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent
reasonably foreseeable harm to oneself or someone else. A person is
negligent if he or she (does something that a reasonably careful person
would not do in the same situation/ [or] fails to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation).]]
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, August 2012, September 2017, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on accident. (People v. Anderson
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 997–998 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408].)
979
The court should select either “criminal” or “ordinary” based on the words used in
the instruction on the elements of the underlying offense. (See People v. Nicolas
Give the bracketed definition of criminal or ordinary negligence unless the court has
already given the definition in another instruction. In such cases, the court may give
If murder is charged, see CALCRIM No. 510, Excusable Homicide: Accidental.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 26(5), 195.
• Burden of Proof. People v. Black (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 69, 79 [229 P.2d 61];
People v. Frye (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1154–1155 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217].
• Misfortune as Accident. People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [265
P.2d 69].
• Criminal or Gross Negligence Defined. People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861,
879 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [8
Cal.Rptr. 863].
• Ordinary Negligence Defined. Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 2; People v. Nicolas (2017)
SECONDARY SOURCES
980
A (parent/guardian/ <insert title of other person legally

permitted to discipline the child>) is not guilty of <insert
crime> if (he/she) used (justifiable physical force/ [(a/or) another]
justifiable method) to discipline a child. (Physical force/ [or]
<insert other method of punishment>) is justifiable if a reasonable person
would find that punishment was necessary under the circumstances and
that the (physical force/ [or] method) used was reasonable.
The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the (force/ [or]
method of punishment) used was not justifiable. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
<insert crime>.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the right of a parent to discipline a
child. (People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045,
1049–1051 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].
• Lawful Forms of Discipline. People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190,
1194 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 491].
RELATED ISSUES
Confinement
Reasonable acts of discipline include confinement to a particular location for
disciplinary purposes. However, confining a child for an unlawful purpose or with
the intent to endanger the child’s health and safety is not a reasonable exercise of
parental authority. (People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194, 1195 [84
Cal.Rptr.2d 491].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, §§ 142.13[2][a], 142.23[7] (Matthew Bender).
981

did not have the intent or mental state required to commit the crime
because (he/she) [reasonably] did not know a fact or [reasonably and]
mistakenly believed a fact.
If the defendant’s conduct would have been lawful under the facts as
(he/she) [reasonably] believed them to be, (he/she) did not commit
<insert crime[s]>.
If you find that the defendant believed that <insert alleged
mistaken facts> [and if you find that belief was reasonable], (he/she) did
not have the specific intent or mental state required for
<insert crime[s]>.
specific intent or mental state required for <insert
crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that crime/those
crimes).
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, December 2008, August 2014, September
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests it, there is
substantial evidence supporting the defense, and the instruction is legally correct.
(People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996–997 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 408, 252 P.3d
968]; People v. Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791 [289 Cal.Rptr.3d 816] [No
sua sponte duty to instruct on mistake of fact defense].)
The mistake of fact instruction must negate an element of the crime. (People v.
Speck, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.)
If the defendant is charged with a general intent crime, the trial court must instruct
with the bracketed language requiring that defendant’s belief be both actual and
reasonable.
982
If the mental state element at issue is either specific criminal intent or knowledge,
do not use the bracketed language requiring the belief to be reasonable. (People v.
Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984 & fn. 6 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39]; People v.
Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425–1426 [51 Cal.Rptr.3d 263].)
Mistake of fact is not a defense to the following crimes under the circumstances
described below:
1. Involuntary manslaughter (People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565–566
[192 Cal.Rptr. 686] [mistake of fact re whether gun could be fired]).
2. Furnishing cannabis to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352; People v. Lopez
(1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 760–762 [77 Cal.Rptr. 59]).
3. Selling narcotics to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11353; People v. Williams
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 410–411 [284 Cal.Rptr. 454] [specific intent for the
crime of selling narcotics to a minor is the intent to sell cocaine, not to sell it
to a minor]).
4. Aggravated kidnapping of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 208(b);
People v. Magpuso (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 118 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 206]).
5. Unlawful sexual intercourse or oral copulation by person 21 or older with
minor under the age of 16 (Pen. Code, §§ 261.5(d), 287(b)(2); People v. Scott
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 800–801 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70]).
6. Lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,
§ 288(a); People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 645–646 [205 Cal.Rptr. 492,
685 P.2d 52]).
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(3).
• Burden of Proof. People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 157 [125 Cal.Rptr.
745, 542 P.2d 1337].
• This Defense Applies to Attempted Lewd and Lascivious Conduct With Minor
Under 14. People v. Hanna (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 461 [160 Cal.Rptr.3d
210].
RELATED ISSUES
Mistake of Fact Based on Involuntary Intoxication
A mistake of fact defense can be based on involuntary intoxication. (People v. Scott
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 829–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].) In Scott, the court held
that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact, as a matter of
law, where the evidence established that he unknowingly and involuntarily ingested
a hallucinogen. As a result he acted under the delusion that he was a secret agent in
a situation where it was necessary to steal vehicles in order to save his own life and
possibly that of the President. The court held that although defendant’s mistake of
fact was irrational, it was reasonable because of his delusional state and had the
mistaken facts been true, his actions would have been justified under the doctrine of
983
necessity. The court also stated that mistake of fact would not have been available if
defendant’s mental state had been caused by voluntary intoxication. (Ibid.; see also
People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 573 [111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875]
[mistake of fact based on voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent
crime].)
Mistake of Fact Based on Mental Disease
Mistake of fact is not a defense to general criminal intent if the mistake is based on
mental disease. (People v. Gutierrez (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1076, 1084 [225
Cal.Rptr. 885]; see People v. Castillo (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 124–125 [238
Cal.Rptr. 207].) In Gutierrez, the defendant was charged with inflicting cruel injury
on a child, a general intent crime, because she beat her own children under the
delusion that they were evil birds she had to kill. The defendant’s abnormal mental
state was caused in part by mental illness. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 180
Cal.App.3d at pp. 1079–1080.) The court concluded that evidence of her mental
illness was properly excluded at trial because mental illness could not form the basis
of her mistake of fact defense. (Id. at pp. 1083–1084.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
984
It is not a defense to the crime[s] of <insert crime[s]> that

the defendant did not know (he/she) was breaking the law or that (he/
she) believed (his/her) act was lawful.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to give this instruction. It is no defense to a crime that
the defendant did not realize he or she was breaking the law when he or she acted.
(People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819].) This is
true even when the defendant claims he or she was acting in good faith on the
mistaken advice of counsel. (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186
Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42] [defendant’s mistaken belief, based on attorney’s advice,
that prior conviction was a misdemeanor no defense to felon in possession of a
firearm]; People v. McCalla (1923) 63 Cal.App. 783, 795 [220 P. 436], disapproved
on other grounds by People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354
P.2d 225]; People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 347–348 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d
555]; People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 792–793 [48 Cal.Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d
222] [no defense to felony murder that defendant did not know that entering a store
intending to pass a forged check constituted burglary in California].)
The court should, however, exercise caution with specific intent crimes. A mistaken
belief about legal status or rights may be a defense to a specific intent crime if the
mistake is held in good faith. (People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137
[177 Cal.Rptr. 819] [defendants’ belief that they had a legal right to use clients’ gold
reserves to buy future contracts could be a defense if held in good faith]; (People v.
Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317] [defendant’s
good faith belief that he was legally authorized to use property could be defense to
embezzlement]; People v. Flora (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669–670 [279 Cal.Rptr.
17] [defendant’s belief, if held in good faith, that out-of-state custody order was not
enforceable in California could have been basis for defense to violating a child
custody order]; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000)
Defenses, § 37.) Although concerned with knowledge of the law, a mistake about
legal status or rights is a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. (See CALCRIM No.
3406, Mistake of Fact.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137
[177 Cal.Rptr. 819]; People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr.
117, 544 P.2d 1317]; People v. Flora (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 669–670 [279
Cal.Rptr. 17].
985
RELATED ISSUES
Good Faith Reliance on Statute or Regulation
Good faith reliance on a facially valid statute or administrative regulation (which
turns out to be void) may be considered an excusable mistake of law. Additionally, a
good faith mistake-of-law defense may be established by special statute. (See 1
Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 46.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th Ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 45–46.
986
3408. Entrapment
Entrapment is a defense. The defendant has the burden of proving this

defense by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard
from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet this burden, the
defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was
entrapped.
A person is entrapped if a law enforcement officer [or (his/her) agent]
engaged in conduct that would cause a normally law-abiding person to
commit the crime.
Some examples of entrapment might include conduct like badgering,
persuasion by flattery or coaxing, repeated and insistent requests, or an
appeal to friendship or sympathy.
Another example of entrapment would be conduct that would make
commission of the crime unusually attractive to a normally law-abiding
person. Such conduct might include a guarantee that the act is not illegal
or that the offense would go undetected, an offer of extraordinary
benefit, or other similar conduct.
If an officer [or (his/her) agent] simply gave the defendant an
opportunity to commit the crime or merely tried to gain the defendant’s
confidence through reasonable and restrained steps, that conduct is not
entrapment.
In evaluating this defense, you should focus primarily on the conduct of
the officer. However, in deciding whether the officer’s conduct was likely
to cause a normally law-abiding person to commit this crime, also
consider other relevant circumstances, including events that happened
before the crime, the defendant’s responses to the officer’s urging, the
seriousness of the crime, and how difficult it would have been for law
enforcement officers to discover that the crime had been committed.
When deciding whether the defendant was entrapped, consider what a
normally law-abiding person would have done in this situation. Do not
consider the defendant’s particular intentions or character, or whether
the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime.
[As used here, an agent is a person who does something at the request,
suggestion, or direction of an officer. It is not necessary that the agent
know the officer’s true identity, or that the agent realize that he or she is
actually acting as an agent.]
If the defendant has proved that it is more likely than not that (he/she)
<insert charged crime, e.g., committed embezzlement> because
(he/she) was entrapped, you must find (him/her) not guilty of
987
<insert charged crime>.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
Substantial evidence means evidence of entrapment, which, if believed, would be
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to
be more likely than not.
Give the bracketed definition of an agent if agency is an issue.
In the last paragraph, enter a phrase with a verb in the first blank to state what the
defendant did (e.g., “committed embezzlement” or “sold cocaine”). Enter the
crime(s) in the second blank (e.g., “embezzlement” or “sale of a controlled
substance”).
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. McIntyre (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 229, 232
[271 Cal.Rptr. 467]; People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 689–691 [153
Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947].
• Burden of Proof. People v. McIntyre (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 229, 232 [271
Cal.Rptr. 467]; People v. Peppars (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 684 [189
Cal.Rptr. 879]; People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 691, fn. 6 [153
Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]; In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 930–931 [112
Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073].
• Definition of Agent. People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr.
237, 591 P.2d 527].
RELATED ISSUES
Decoy Programs Permitted
The use of “ruses, stings, and decoys” to expose illicit activity does not constitute
entrapment, as long as no pressure or overbearing conduct is employed by the
decoy. (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1994) 7
988
Cal.4th 561, 568–570 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163] [use of underage, but
mature-looking, decoys to expose unlawful sales of alcoholic beverages to minors
not entrapment; no pressure or overbearing conduct occurred, and targets could have
protected themselves by routinely checking customer IDs].) The conduct of an
unwitting decoy may also constitute sufficient badgering, cajoling, or importuning
that entitles the defendant to an entrapment instruction. (Bradley v. Duncan (9th Cir.
2002) 315 F.3d 1091, 1096–1098.)
Multiple Defenses Permitted
A defendant may assert entrapment and still deny guilt. (People v. Perez (1965) 62
Cal.2d 769, 775–776 [44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934].) “Although the defense of
entrapment is available to a defendant who is otherwise guilty [citation], it does not
follow that the defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. A defendant, for
example, may deny that he committed every element of the crime charged, yet
properly allege that such acts as he did commit were induced by law enforcement
officers [citation].” (Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
989
3409. When Conduct of Officer May Not Be Attributed to
Defendant
If, while acting for a law enforcement purpose, an officer [or (his/her)
agent] pretends to be an accomplice of a defendant, then no act done by
the officer [or agent] may be attributed to the defendant or held against
the defendant, unless the defendant, using (his/her) independent will,
directed the officer [or agent] to do the act.
[As used in this instruction, an agent is a person who does something at
the request, suggestion, or direction of an officer. It is not necessary that
the agent know the officer’s true identity, or that the agent realize that
he or she is acting as an agent.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Give this instruction on request if supported by the evidence. (People v. Goldberg
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 562 [314 P.2d 151]; People v. Lanzit (1925) 70 Cal.App.
498, 509 [233 P. 816].)
AUTHORITY
• Case Law. People v. Goldberg (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 562 [314 P.2d 151];
People v. Lanzit (1925) 70 Cal.App. 498, 509 [233 P. 816].
• Agent Defined. People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 748 [153 Cal.Rptr. 237,
591 P.2d 527].
SECONDARY SOURCES
990
A defendant may not be convicted of <insert crime[s]>

unless the prosecution began within years of the date the crime[s]
((was/were) committed/(was/were) discovered/should have been
discovered). The present prosecution began on <insert
date>.
[A crime should have been discovered when the (victim/law enforcement
officer) was aware of facts that would have alerted a reasonably diligent
(person/law enforcement officer) in the same circumstances to the fact
that a crime may have been committed.]
The People have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that prosecution of this case began within the required time.
This is a different standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
the People must prove that it is more likely than not that prosecution of
this case began within the required time. If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of <insert
crime[s]>.
[If the People have proved that it is more likely than not that the
defendant was outside of California for some period of time, you must
not include that period [up to three years] in determining whether the
prosecution began on time.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the statute of limitations if the
defendant is relying on such a defense and there is substantial evidence supporting
it. (See generally People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117,
544 P.2d 1317] [discussing duty to instruct on defenses].)
Do not give this instruction in cases in which the statute of limitations had already
expired under the pre-2009 version of Penal Code section 804(c).
The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. (People v. Crosby (1962) 58
Cal.2d 713, 725 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see CACI 200, Obligation to
Prove—More Likely True Than Not True.)
For most crimes, the statute begins to run when the offense is committed. If the
crime is a fraud-related offense and included in Penal Code section 803, the statute
begins to run after the completion of or discovery of the offense, whichever is later.
991
(Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803.) Courts interpreting the date of discovery provision have
imposed a due diligence requirement on investigative efforts. (People v. Zamora
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 561 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; People v. Lopez (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 233, 246 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) If one of the crimes listed in Section
803 is at issue, the court should instruct using the “discovery” language.
If there is a factual issue about when the prosecution started, the court should
instruct that the prosecution begins when (1) an information or indictment is filed,
(2) a complaint is filed charging a misdemeanor or infraction, (3) the defendant is
arraigned on a complaint that charges the defendant with a felony, or (4) an arrest
warrant or bench warrant is issued describing the defendant with the same degree of
particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint. (Pen. Code,
§ 804.)
Limitation Periods
No limitations period (Pen. Code, § 799):
Embezzlement of public funds and crimes punishable by death or by life
imprisonment.
Six-year period (Pen. Code, § 800):
Felonies punishable for eight years or more, unless otherwise specified
by statute.
Five-year period (Pen. Code, § 801.6):
All other crimes against elders and dependent adults.
Four-year period (Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803(c)):
Fraud, breach of fiduciary obligation, theft, or embezzlement on an elder
or dependent adult, and misconduct in office.
Three-year period (Pen. Code, §§ 801, 802(b)):
All other felonies, unless otherwise specified by statute, and
misdemeanors committed upon a minor under the age of 14. Note: “If
the offense is an alternative felony/misdemeanor ‘wobbler’ initially
charged as a felony, the three-year statute of limitations applies, without
regard to the ultimate reduction to a misdemeanor after the filing of the
complaint [citation].” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 453 [6
Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].)
Two-year period (Pen. Code, § 802(c)):
Misdemeanors under Business and Professions Code section 729.
One-year period (Pen. Code, § 802(a)):
Misdemeanors. Note: “If the initial charge is a felony but the defendant
is convicted of a necessarily included misdemeanor, the one-year period
for misdemeanors applies.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 453
[6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; Pen. Code, § 805(b); see also 1
992
Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses,
§ 220.)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 799 et seq.; People v. Stewart (1976)
16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].
• Tolling the Statute. Pen. Code, § 803.
• Burden of Proof. People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 250 [60
Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 565 [134 Cal.Rptr.
784, 557 P.2d 75]; People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 725 [25 Cal.Rptr.
847, 375 P.2d 839].
RELATED ISSUES
Burden of Proof
At trial, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the prosecution began within the required time. However, at a pretrial
motion to dismiss, the defendant has the burden of proving that the statute of
limitations has run as a matter of law. (People v. Lopez (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 233,
249–251 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511].) The defendant is entitled to prevail on the motion
only if there is no triable issue of fact. (Id. at p. 249.)
Computation of Time
To determine the exact date the statute began to run, exclude the day the crime was
completed. (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557
P.2d 75].)
Felony Murder
Felony-murder charges and felony-murder special circumstances allegations may be
filed even though the statute of limitations has run on the underlying felony. (People
v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 14–18 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843], disapproved
of on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446,
887 P.2d 527].)
Offense Completed
When an offense continues over a period of time, the statutory period usually does
not begin until after the last overt act or omission occurs. (People v. Zamora (1976)
18 Cal.3d 538, 548 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75] [last act of conspiracy to burn
insured’s property was when fire was ignited and crime was completed; last act of
grand theft was last insurance payment].)
Waiving the Statute of Limitations
A defendant may affirmatively, but not inadvertently, waive the statute of limitations.
(People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338, 340–342 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 981
P.2d 42]; People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1089–1090 [130
Cal.Rptr.2d 717] [defendant did not request or acquiesce to instruction on time-
barred lesser included offense].)
993
SECONDARY SOURCES
Accusatory Pleadings, § 40.09 (Matthew Bender).
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).
994
[I have already explained that it is not a defense to the crime[s] of

<insert crime[s]> that the defendant did not know (he/she)
was breaking the law or that (he/she) believed (his/her) act was lawful.
But when you consider the crime[s] of <insert crime[s]>, a
different rule applies.]
<insert crime[s]> require[s] that a defendant act with a
specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state). The act and the specific (intent/
[and/or] mental state) required are explained in the instruction for (that/
those) crime[s].
made an honest or good faith mistake about the law, if that mistake
shows that (he/she) did not have the specific (intent/ [and/or] mental
state) required for the crime[s] of <insert crime[s]>.
specific (intent/ [and/or] mental state) required for <insert
crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty of (that/those) crime[s].
New August 2013; Revised October 2021

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a defendant charged with
a specific intent crime is appropriately relying on this defense or there is substantial
evidence that a defendant’s good faith mistake of law provides a valid defense to a
specific intent crime and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory
of the case. (People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 774–780 [33
Cal.Rptr.3d 859]).
Many defendants seek to rely on the defense of mistake of law, but few are
successful, because it is limited to crimes in which a specific intent or mental state
is negated by the mistake. (People v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 771, 809 [272
Cal.Rptr.3d 732] [instruction appropriate where defendant relied on advice of
counsel to establish mistake of law related to omission of material fact in sale of
security]; People v. Cole (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 483–484 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 526]
[no error in instructing jury that mistake of law is no defense when defendant was
charged with a general intent crime]; People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d
127, 137 [177 Cal.Rptr. 819] [defendants’ belief that they had a legal right to use
clients’ gold reserves to buy future contracts could be a defense if held in good
faith]; People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d
1317] [defendant’s good faith belief that he was legally authorized to use property
995
could be defense to embezzlement]; People v. Flora (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 662,

669–670 [279 Cal.Rptr. 17] [defendant’s belief, if held in good faith, that out-of-
state custody order was not enforceable in California could have been basis for
defense to violating a child custody order]).
Although concerned with knowledge of the law, a mistake about legal status or
rights is a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. (See CALCRIM No. 3406, Mistake
of Fact.) If the defendant is charged with a general intent crime and raises a mistake
of law defense, give instead CALCRIM No. 3407, Defenses: Mistake of Law. If
both general and specific intent crimes are charged, use the bracketed first paragraph
of this instruction as necessary.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Cole (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 483–484
[67 Cal.Rptr.3d 526]; People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 585–587,
592 [35 Cal.Rptr. 401].
RELATED ISSUES
Good Faith Reliance on Statute or Regulation
Good faith reliance on a facially valid statute or administrative regulation (which
turns out to be void) may be considered an excusable mistake of law. Additionally, a
good faith mistake-of-law defense may be established by special statute. (See 1
Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 46.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
996
Possession or cultivation of cannabis is lawful if authorized by the

Compassionate Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act allows a person to
possess or cultivate cannabis (for personal medical purposes/ [or] as the
primary caregiver of a patient with a medical need) when a physician
has recommended [or approved] such use. The amount of cannabis
possessed or cultivated must be reasonably related to the patient’s
current medical needs.
the defendant was not authorized to possess or cultivate cannabis for
medical purposes. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of this crime.
[A primary caregiver is someone who has consistently assumed
responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who may
legally possess or cultivate cannabis.]
New February 2015; Revised September 2018, March 2019

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Pursuant to Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5, defendants may raise a medical
cannabis defense in appropriate cases. The burden is on the defendant to produce
sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that possession was lawful. (People v.
Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067]; People v.
Jones (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 341, 350 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 916] [error to exclude
defense where defendant’s testimony raised reasonable doubt about physician
approval]; see also People v. Tilehkooh (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1441 [7
Cal.Rptr.3d 226] [defendant need not establish “medical necessity”].)
If the evidence shows that a physician may have “approved” but not
“recommended” the cannabis use, give the bracketed phrase “or approved” in the
first paragraph of this instruction. (People v. Jones, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 347
[“approved” distinguished from “recommended”].)
A local ordinance prohibiting cannabis dispensaries does not nullify a defense under
the Medical Marijuana Program Act or the Compassionate Use Act. (People v.
Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 142–143 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 472]).
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.5; People v. Jackson (2012) 210
997

Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061].
of Chin, J.).
SECONDARY SOURCES
998
3413. Collective or Cooperative Cultivation Defense (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11362.775)
(Planting[,] [or]/ cultivating[,] [or]/ harvesting[,] [or]/ drying[,] [or]/

processing) cannabis is lawful if authorized by the Medical Marijuana
Program Act. The Medical Marijuana Program Act allows qualified
patients [and their designated primary caregivers] to associate within the
State of California to collectively or cooperatively cultivate cannabis for
medical purposes, for the benefit of its members, but not for profit.
In deciding whether a collective meets these legal requirements, consider
the following factors:
1. The size of the collective’s membership;
2. The volume of purchases from the collective;
3. The level of members’ participation in the operation and
governance of the collective;
4. Whether the collective was formally established as a nonprofit
organization;
5. Presence or absence of financial records;
6. Accountability of the collective to its members;
7. Evidence of profit or loss.
There is no limit on the number of persons who may be members of a
collective.
Every member of the collective does not need to actively participate in
the cultivation process. It is enough if a member provides financial
support by purchasing cannabis from the collective.
A qualified patient is someone for whom a physician has previously
recommended or approved the use of cannabis for medical purposes.
Collectively means involving united action or cooperative effort of all
members of a group.
Cooperatively means working together or using joint effort toward a
common end.
Cultivate means to foster the growth of a plant.
[A primary caregiver is someone who has consistently assumed
responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of a patient who may
legally possess or cultivate cannabis.]
999
the defendant was not authorized to (plant[,] [or]/ cultivate[,] [or]/

harvest[,] [or]/ dry[,] [or]/ process) cannabis for medical purposes. If the
of this crime.
New February 2015; Revised August 2015, September 2018, March 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
A collective or cooperative cultivation defense under the Medical Marijuana
Program Act may be raised to certain cannabis charges. (See Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11362.775.) The burden is on the defendant to produce sufficient evidence to raise
a reasonable doubt that possession was lawful. (People v. Jackson (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 525, 529–531, 538–539 [148 Cal.Rptr.3d 375].)
A local ordinance prohibiting cannabis dispensaries does not nullify a defense under
the Medical Marijuana Program Act or the Compassionate Use Act. (People v.
Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 142–143 [235 Cal.Rptr.3d 472]).
AUTHORITY
• Factors To Consider. People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525 [148
Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 195 P.3d 1061]; People v. Mitchell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1189, 1205–1206 [170 Cal.Rptr.3d 825].
• Defendant’s Burden of Proof on Medical Marijuana Program Act Defense.
People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 529–531, 538–539 [148
Cal.Rptr.3d 375].
• All Members Need Not Participate in Cultivation. People v. Anderson (2015)
232 Cal.App.4th 1259 [182 Cal.Rptr.3d 276].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1000

acted because of coercion.
In order to establish this defense, the defendant must prove that:
1. (He/She) acted because of coercion;
2. The coercion was a direct result of being a victim of (human
trafficking/intimate partner violence/sexual violence) at the time
the defendant acted;
AND
3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had a reasonable fear of
harm.
<Give for defense under Pen. Code, § 236.23.>
[To prove that the defendant was the victim of human trafficking, the
defendant must prove that:
1. Another person either deprived the defendant of personal liberty
or violated the defendant’s personal liberty;
[AND]
<Give Alternative 2A if the defendant claims he or she was the victim of
human traffıcking under Pen. Code, § 236.1(a).>
[2A. When the other person acted, (he/she) intended to obtain forced
labor or services(./;)]
[OR]
<Give Alternative 2B if the defendant claims he or she was the victim of
human traffıcking under Pen. Code, § 236.1(b).>
[2B. When the other person acted, (he/she) intended to (commit/ [or]
maintain) a [felony] violation of <insert appropriate
code section[s]>).]]
[Depriving or violating a person’s personal liberty, as used here, includes
substantial and sustained restriction of a person’s liberty accomplished
through <insert terms that apply from statutory definition, i.e.:
force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of
unlawful injury> to the person under circumstances in which the person
receiving or perceiving the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that
the person making the threat would carry it out.]
[Forced labor or services, as used here, means labor or services that are
1001
performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained

through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that
would reasonably overbear the will of the person.]
submit to].]
[Violence means using physical force that is greater than the force
reasonably necessary to restrain someone.]
harm to or physical restraint against someone else/ [or] the abuse or
[When you decide whether the other person (used duress/ [or] used
coercion/ [or] deprived the defendant of personal liberty or violated the
defendant’s personal liberty), consider all of the circumstances, including
the age of the defendant, (his/her) relationship to the other person [or
the other person’s agent[s]], and the defendant’s handicap or disability, if
any.]
has not met this burden, (he/she) has not proved this defense.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
1002

case.
Substantial evidence means evidence, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that the defendant has shown the defense to be more likely
than not true.
This defense does not apply to a violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of
Penal Code section 667.5.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 236.23, 236.24.
• Definition of Coercion. Pen. Code, § 236.1(h)(1); In re D.C. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 915, 920 [275 Cal.Rptr.3d 191] [in context of human trafficking].
• Burden of Proof. People v. Waters (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 938 [209
Cal.Rptr. 661]; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1008 [138
Cal.Rptr. 515].
• Human Trafficking Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, § 236.1.
• Violence Defined [in context of false imprisonment]. People v. Babich (1993) 14
Related Instruction
See CALCRIM No. 1243, Human Traffıcking.
SECONDARY SOURCES
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142, Human
Traffıcking, § 142.14A (Matthew Bender).
1003
It is lawful for a person 21 years of age or older to do any of the

following:
[(Possess[,]/ [or] process[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or]
obtain[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older), without
receiving compensation, no more than 28.5 grams of cannabis [that is
not in the form of concentrated cannabis.]]
[(Possess[,]/ [or] process[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or]
obtain[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older) without
receiving compensation, no more than eight grams of cannabis in the
form of concentrated cannabis, including concentrated cannabis
contained in cannabis products.]
[(Possess[,]/ [or] plant[,]/ [or] cultivate[,]/ [or] harvest[,]/ [or] dry[,]/ [or]
process) no more than six living cannabis plants and possess the
cannabis produced by those plants.]
[Smoke or ingest cannabis or cannabis products.]
[(Possess[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or] purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] use[,]/
[or] manufacture[,]/ [or] give away to persons 21 years of age or older
without receiving compensation) cannabis accessories.]
the defendant did not lawfully (possess[,]/ [or] transport[,]/ [or]
purchase[,]/ [or] obtain[,]/ [or] give away[,]/ [or] plant[,]/ [or] cultivate[,]/
[or] harvest[,]/ [or] dry[,]/ [or] process) (cannabis[,]/ [or] concentrated
cannabis[,]/ [or] cannabis products.) If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.
§ 11018.5>
seeds.]
1004
New September 2018

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Pursuant to Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.1, certain activities involving cannabis are
lawful. Give the relevant bracketed paragraphs on defense request.
This instruction does not apply to offenses charged under Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11362.2, 11362.3, and 11362.4, nor to any of the offenses enumerated in Health
& Saf. Code § 11362.45.
AUTHORITY
• Elements. Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11362.1, 11362.2, 11362.3, 11362.4, 11362.45.
1005

acted while unconscious. Someone is unconscious when he or she is not
conscious of his or her actions. [Someone may be unconscious even
though able to move.]
Unconsciousness may be caused by (a blackout[,]/ [or] an epileptic
seizure[,]/ [or] involuntary intoxication[,]/ [or] <insert a
similar condition>).
[The defense of unconsciousness may not be based on voluntary
intoxication.]
The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was conscious when (he/she) acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant acted as if (he/she) were conscious, you should
conclude that (he/she) was conscious, unless based on all the evidence,
you have a reasonable doubt that (he/she) was conscious, in which case
you must find (him/her) not guilty.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
Because there is a presumption that a person who appears conscious is conscious
(People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63–64 [198 P.2d 865]), the defendant must
produce sufficient evidence raising a reasonable doubt that he or she was conscious
1007
before an instruction on unconsciousness may be given. (Ibid.; People v. Kitt (1978)

83 Cal.App.3d 834, 842 [148 Cal.Rptr. 447], disapproved on other grounds by
People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]
[presumption of consciousness goes to the defendant’s burden of producing
evidence].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 26(4); People v. Mathson (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167]; People v. Stewart (1976)
16 Cal.3d 133, 140 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317].
• Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, § 607; People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 64
[198 P.2d 865]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 330–331 [147
Cal.Rptr. 740].
• Unconsciousness Defined. People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376 [87
Cal.Rptr. 394]; People v. Heffıngton (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [107 Cal.Rptr.
859].
• Unconscious State: Blackouts. People v. Cox (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 166, 172
[153 P.2d 362].
• Unconscious State: Epileptic Seizures. People v. Freeman (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d
110, 115–116 [142 P.2d 435].
• Unconscious State: Involuntary Intoxication. People v. Heffıngton (1973) 32
Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859]; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th
287, 343–344 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] [jury was adequately informed
that unconsciousness does not require that person be incapable of movement].
• Unconscious State: Somnambulism, Sleepwalking, or Delirium. People v.
Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167];
People v. Methever (1901) 132 Cal. 326, 329 [64 P. 481], overruled on other
grounds in People v. Gorshen (1953) 51 Cal.2d 716 [336 P.2d 492].
COMMENTARY
The committee did not include an instruction on the presumption of consciousness.
There is a judicially created presumption that a person who acts conscious is
conscious. (People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63–64 [198 P.2d 865].) Although
an instruction on this presumption has been approved, it has been highly criticized.
(See People v. Kitt (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 834, 842–843 [148 Cal.Rptr. 447],
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281
Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865] [acknowledging instruction and suggesting
modification]; People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 332 [147 Cal.Rptr. 740]
[criticizing instruction for failing to adequately explain the presumption].)
The effect of this presumption is to place on the defendant a burden of producing
evidence to dispel the presumption. (People v. Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp.
330–331; People v. Kitt, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 842, disapproved on other
grounds by People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d
1008
865]; and see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 689–696 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69,
755 P.2d 253] [an instruction on this presumption “did little more than guide the
jury as to how to evaluate evidence bearing on the defendant’s consciousness and
apply it to the issue.”].) However, if the defendant produces enough evidence to
warrant an instruction on unconsciousness, the rebuttable presumption of
consciousness has been dispelled and no instruction on its effect is necessary. The
committee, therefore, concluded that no instruction on the presumption of
consciousness was needed.
RELATED ISSUES
Inability to Remember
Generally, a defendant’s inability to remember or his hazy recollection does not
supply an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on unconsciousness. (People
v. Heffıngton (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 10 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859]); People v. Sameniego
(1931) 118 Cal.App. 165, 173 [4 P.2d 809] [“The inability of a defendant . . . to
remember . . . is of such common occurrence and so naturally accountable for upon
the normal defects of memory, or, what is more likely, the intentional denial of
recollection, as to raise not even a suspicion of declarations having been made while
in an unconscious condition.”].) In People v. Coston (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 23,
40–41 [185 P.2d 632], the court stated that forgetfulness may be a factor in
unconsciousness; however, “there must be something more than [the defendant’s]
mere statement that he does not remember what happened to justify a finding that
he was unconscious at the time of that act.”
Two cases have held that a defendant’s inability to remember warrants an instruction
on unconsciousness. (People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 414 [303 P.2d
1018] and People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 761–762 [59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427
P.2d 820].) Both cases were discussed in People v. Heffıngton (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d
1 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859], but the court declined to hold that Bridgehouse and Wilson
announced an “ineluctable rule of law” that “a defendant’s inability to remember or
his ‘hazy’ recollection supplies an evidentiary foundation for a jury instruction on
unconsciousness.” (Id. at p. 10.) The court stated that, “[b]oth [cases] were
individualized decisions in which the court examined the record and found evidence,
no matter how incredible, warranting the instruction.” (Ibid.)
Intoxication—Involuntary versus Voluntary
Unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to a criminal
charge under Penal Code section 26, subdivision (4). (People v. Heffıngton (1973)
32 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [107 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Unconsciousness due to voluntary
intoxication is governed by former Penal Code section 22 [now Penal Code section
29.4], rather than section 26, and is not a defense to a general intent crime. (People
v. Chaffey (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 852, 855 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 757]; see CALCRIM No.
3426, Voluntary Intoxication.)
Mental Condition
A number of authorities have stated that a conflict exists in California over whether
an unsound mental condition can form the basis of a defense of unconsciousness.
1009
(See People v. Lisnow (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 21, 23 [151 Cal.Rptr. 621]; 1
Witkin California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 32 [noting the split and
concluding that the more recent cases permit the defense for defendants of unsound
mind]; Annot., Automatism or Unconsciousness as a Defense or Criminal Charge
(1984) 27 A.L.R.4th 1067, § 3(b) fn. 7.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 32.
1010
You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s voluntary

intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only
in deciding whether the defendant acted [or failed to do an act] with
<insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g., “the intent
to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property” or “knowledge that
. . .” or “the intent to do the act required”>.
In connection with the charge of <insert first charged offense
requiring specific intent or mental state> the People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted [or failed to
act] with <insert specific intent or mental state required, e.g.,
“the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property” or
“knowledge that . . .”>. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of <insert first charged
offense requiring specific intent or mental state>.
<Repeat this paragraph for each offense requiring specific intent or a
specific mental state.>
You may not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other
purpose. [Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to <insert
general intent offense[s]>.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2012, August 2013, February 2015, March 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication; however, the
trial court must give this instruction on request. (People v. Ricardi (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 364]; People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th
1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d
1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) Although voluntary intoxication is
not an affirmative defense to a crime, the jury may consider evidence of voluntary
intoxication and its effect on the defendant’s required mental state. (Pen. Code,
§ 29.4; People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982–986 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39]
[relevant to knowledge element in receiving stolen property]; People v. Mendoza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735] [relevant to
mental state in aiding and abetting].)
1011
Voluntary intoxication may not be considered for general intent crimes. (People v.
Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1127–1128 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735];
People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 81 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18 P.3d 660]; see
also People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 451 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]
[applying specific vs. general intent analysis and holding that assault type crimes are
general intent; subsequently superseded by amendments to former Penal Code
Section 22 [now Penal Code section 29.4] on a different point].)
If both specific and general intent crimes are charged, the court must specify the
general intent crimes in the bracketed portion of the last sentence and instruct the
jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to those crimes. (People v. Aguirre
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 391, 399–402 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 48]; People v. Rivera (1984)
162 Cal.App.3d 141, 145–146 [207 Cal.Rptr. 756].)
If the defendant claims unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication as a defense
to driving under the influence, see People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297,
1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].
The court may need to modify this instruction if given with CALCRIM No. 362,
Consciousness of Guilt. (People v. Wiidanen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 526, 528, 533
[135 Cal.Rptr.3d 736].)
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible on the question of whether a
defendant believed it necessary to act in self-defense. (People v. Soto (2018) 4
Cal.5th 968, 970 [231 Cal.Rptr.3rd 732, 415 P.3d 789].)
CALCRIM No. 3427, Involuntary Intoxication.
CALCRIM No. 625, Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Crimes.
CALCRIM No. 626, Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on
Homicide Crimes.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 29.4; People v. Castillo (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1009, 1014 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197]; People v. Saille (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
• Effect of Prescription Drugs. People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297,
1328, fn. 32 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].
RELATED ISSUES
Implied Malice
“[E]vidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible on the issue of implied
malice aforethought.” (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114–1115 [93
1012
Cal.Rptr.2d 433], quoting People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984, fn. 6 [61
Cal.Rptr.2d 39].)
Intoxication Based on Mistake of Fact Is Involuntary
Intoxication resulting from trickery is not “voluntary.” (People v. Scott (1983) 146
Cal.App.3d 823, 831–833 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633] [defendant drank punch not knowing
it contained hallucinogens; court held his intoxication was result of trickery and
mistake and involuntary].)
Premeditation and Deliberation
“[T]he trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct that voluntary intoxication may
be considered in determining the existence of premeditation and deliberation.”
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432],
citing People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d
588]; see People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1018 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945
P.2d 1197] [counsel not ineffective for failing to request instruction specifically
relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation].)
26 and is only a partial defense to a crime. (People v. Walker (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on unconsciousness
when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the time of the
crime]; see also People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408,
966 P.2d 442] [“if the intoxication is voluntarily induced, it can never excuse
homicide. Thus, the requisite element of criminal negligence is deemed to exist
irrespective of unconsciousness, and a defendant stands guilty of involuntary
manslaughter if he voluntarily procured his own intoxication [citation].”].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1013
Consider any evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated

in deciding whether the defendant had the required (intent/ [or] mental
state) when (he/she) acted.
A person is involuntarily intoxicated if he or she unknowingly ingested
some intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance, or if his or her
intoxication is caused by the (force/[, [or] duress/, [or] fraud/, [or]
trickery of someone else), for whatever purpose[, without any fault on
the part of the intoxicated person].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
It appears that the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary
intoxication, unless the intoxication results in unconsciousness. (See People v. Saille
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [no sua sponte duty
when evidence of voluntary intoxication presented to negate element of offense].) If
the defendant is relying on the defense of unconsciousness caused by involuntary
intoxication, see CALCRIM No. 3425, Unconsciousness.
In the definition of “involuntarily intoxicated,” the phrase “without any fault on the
part of the intoxicated person” is taken from People v. Velez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d
785, 796 [221 Cal.Rptr. 631]. It is unclear when this concept of “fault” would apply
if the person has no knowledge of the presence of the intoxicating substance. The
committee has included the language in brackets for the court to use at its
discretion.
If the defendant claims unconsciousness due to involuntary intoxication as a defense
to driving under the influence, see People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297,
1317–1323 [149 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].
See CALCRIM No. 3426, Voluntary Intoxication.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See Pen. Code, § 26(3).
• Burden of Proof. See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1106 [2
Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588] [in context of voluntary intoxication].
• Involuntary Intoxication Defined. People v. Velez (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 785,
796 [221 Cal.Rptr. 631].
COMMENTARY
One court has held that a mistake of fact defense (see Pen. Code, § 26(3)) can be
1014
based on involuntary intoxication. (People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823,

831–832 [194 Cal.Rptr. 633].) For further discussion, see CALCRIM No. 3406,
Mistake of Fact.
RELATED ISSUES
26, and is only a partial defense to a crime. (People v. Walker (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1615, 1621 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 431] [no error in refusing to instruct on
unconsciousness when defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs at the
time of the crime].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1015
3428. Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental
State (Pen. Code, § 28)
You have heard evidence that the defendant may have suffered from a
mental (disease[,]/ [or] defect[,]/ [or] disorder). You may consider this
evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of
the charged crime, the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the intent
or mental state required for that crime.
the defendant acted [or failed to act] with the required intent or mental
state, specifically: <insert specific intent or mental state
required, e.g., “malice aforethought,” “the intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his or her property,” or “knowledge that . . .”>. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
<insert name of alleged offense>.
<Repeat this paragraph for each offense requiring specific intent or a
specific mental state.>
[Do not consider evidence of mental (disease[,]/ [or] defect[,]/ [or]
disorder) when deciding if <insert name of nontarget
offense> was a natural and probable consequence of <insert
name of target offense>.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on mental impairment as a defense to
specific intent or mental state; however, the trial court must give this instruction on
request. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d
588].) The jury may consider evidence of mental impairment and its effect on the
defendant’s ability to form any mental state required for the offense charged. (Pen.
Code, § 28; People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 983–985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d
39] [relevant to knowledge element in receiving stolen property]; People v. Mendoza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735] [voluntary
intoxication relevant to mental state in aiding and abetting].)
Evidence of mental impairment may not be considered for general-intent crimes,
unless there is an element, such as knowledge, that requires a specific mental state.
(People v. Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 983–985; People v. Mendoza, supra,
18 Cal.4th at pp. 1131–1134 [aiding and abetting].)
In all cases, the court must insert the specific intent or mental state required and the
offense for which the mental state is an element. (See People v. Hill (1967) 67
1016
Cal.2d 105, 118 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].)

Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “You must not consider evidence of
mental” when instructing on aiding and abetting liability for a nontarget offense.
(People v. Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1134.)
In an attempted murder case, it was error to insert “intent to kill” instead of
“express malice” as the required intent in paragraph two of this instruction. (See
People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 233].)
The court may need to modify this instruction to ensure it does not prohibit the jury
from considering evidence of a defendant’s mental illness or impairment for a
purpose other than deciding whether defendant possessed the required mental state
for murder. (People v. McGehee (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1205 [201
Cal.Rptr.3d 714].) For example, giving this unmodified instruction with CALCRIM
No. 362, Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements, could be error if a defendant’s
false statements were the product of mental illness or impairment. (Ibid).
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Pen. Code, § 28; see also Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119 [2
Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].
• Mental States—Knowledge. People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975,
983–985 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39].
• Mental States—Aiding and Abetting. People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114,
1131–1134 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735].
RELATED ISSUES
Scope of Expert Testimony
Penal Code section 29 provides that an expert testifying about a defendant’s mental
illness “shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the
required mental states.” (Pen. Code, § 29.) In People v. Coddington (2000) 23
Cal.4th 529, 582–583 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081], disapproved on other
grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618], the Supreme Court held that the trial court
improperly restricted the scope of the expert testimony when the court refused to
permit “hypothetical questions regarding the effect of mental defect or illness on a
person’s ability to deliberate or premeditate.” (Id. at p. 582.) “An expert’s opinion
that a form of mental illness can lead to impulsive behavior is relevant to the
existence vel non of the mental states of premeditation and deliberation regardless of
whether the expert believed appellant actually harbored those mental states at the
time of the killing.” (Id. at pp. 582–583 [italics original]; see also People v. Nunn
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1364–1365 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 294] [discussing
appropriate scope of expert testimony].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1017
1018
3429. Reasonable Person Standard for Physically Disabled
Person
A person with a physical disability is required to (know what/use the

amount of care that) a reasonably careful person with the same physical
disability would (know/use) in the same situation.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court should give this instruction on request if the defendant has a physical
disability and the crimes charged or lesser offenses include a reasonable person
standard. (People v. Mathews (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 99–100 [30 Cal.Rptr. 2d
330].) This includes cases where the prosecution must prove that the defendant
“reasonably should have known” a fact, and cases involving negligence.
For example, in People v. Mathews, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 93–94 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 330], the defendant, who was blind, hearing impaired, and confined to a
wheelchair, was charged with brandishing a firearm at police officers when the
officers entered the defendant’s home. The issue at trial was whether the defendant
“reasonably should have known” that these were officers entering his home. (Id. at
p. 98.) The court held that the trial court erred by failing to give the defense’s
requested instruction that the defendant must be held to the standard of a reasonable
person with the same physical disabilities, not to the standard of a reasonable person
without disabilities. (Id. at pp. 99–100.)
If the case requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant “reasonably should
have known” a fact, then, in the first parenthesis, select the words “know what” and,
in the second, select “know.”
If the case requires the prosecution to prove negligence by the defendant, then, in
the first parenthesis, select the phrase “use the amount of care that” and, in the
second, select “use.”
By “same” disability, this instruction is referring to the effect of the disability, not
the cause.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Mathews (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89,
99–100 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330].
• Authority. Restatement Second of Torts, § 283C; see also Restatement Second of
Torts, § 283B; CACI No. 403.
1019
RELATED ISSUES
SECONDARY SOURCES
1020
3450. Insanity: Determination, Effect of Verdict (Pen. Code, §§ 25,
29.8)
You have found the defendant guilty of <insert crime[s]>.

Now you must decide whether (he/she) was legally insane when (he/she)
committed the crime[s].
The defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that (he/she)
was legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime[s].
The defendant was legally insane if:
1. When (he/she) committed the crime[s], (he/she) had a mental
disease or defect;
AND
2. Because of that disease or defect, (he/she) was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of (his/her) act
or was incapable of knowing or understanding that (his/her) act
was morally or legally wrong.
Do not base a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity solely on the
basis of a personality disorder, adjustment disorder, seizure disorder, or
an abnormality of personality or character made apparent only by a
series of criminal or antisocial acts.
[Special rules apply to an insanity defense involving drugs or alcohol.
Addiction to or abuse of drugs or intoxicants, by itself, does not qualify
as legal insanity. This is true even if the intoxicants cause organic brain
damage or a settled mental disease or defect that lasts after the
immediate effects of the intoxicants have worn off. Likewise, a temporary
mental condition caused by the recent use of drugs or intoxicants is not
legal insanity.]
[If the defendant suffered from a settled mental disease or defect caused
by the long-term use of drugs or intoxicants, that settled mental disease
or defect combined with another mental disease or defect may qualify as
legal insanity. A settled mental disease or defect is one that remains after
the effect of the drugs or intoxicants has worn off.]
You may consider any evidence that the defendant had a mental disease
or defect before the commission of the crime[s]. If you are satisfied that
(he/she) had a mental disease or defect before (he/she) committed the
crime[s], you may conclude that (he/she) suffered from that same
condition when (he/she) committed the crime[s]. You must still decide
1021
whether that mental disease or defect constitutes legal insanity.

[If you find the defendant was legally insane at the time of (his/her)
crime[s], (he/she) will not be released from custody until a court finds
(he/she) qualifies for release under California law. Until that time (he/
she) will remain in a mental hospital or outpatient treatment program, if
appropriate. (He/She) may not, generally, be kept in a mental hospital or
outpatient program longer than the maximum sentence available for (his/
her) crime[s]. If the state requests additional confinement beyond the
maximum sentence, the defendant will be entitled to a new sanity trial
before a new jury. Your job is only to decide whether the defendant was
legally sane or insane at the time of the crime[s]. You must not speculate
as to whether (he/she) is currently sane or may be found sane in the
future. You must not let any consideration about where the defendant
may be confined, or for how long, affect your decision in any way.]
[You may find that at times the defendant was legally sane and at other
times was legally insane. You must determine whether (he/she) was
legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime.]
[If you conclude that the defendant was legally sane at the time (he/she)
committed the crime[s], then it is no defense that (he/she) committed the
crime[s] as a result of an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse.]
If, after considering all the evidence, all twelve of you conclude the
defendant has proved that it is more likely than not that (he/she) was
legally insane when (he/she) committed the crime[s], you must return a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, October 2010, August 2014, August 2015,
September 2017
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on insanity when the defendant has
entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (Pen. Code, § 25.)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Special rules apply” when the sole
basis of insanity is the defendant’s use of intoxicants. (Pen. Code, § 29.8; People v.
Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 427–428 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 832].) If the
defendant’s use of intoxicants is not the sole basis or causative factor of insanity,
but rather one factor among others, give the bracketed paragraph that begins with
“If the defendant suffered from a settled mental.” (Id. at p. 430, fn. 5.)
Do not give CALCRIM No. 224, Circumstantial Evidence: Suffıciency of Evidence,
or CALCRIM No. 225, Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State. These
instructions have “no application when the standard of proof is preponderance of the
1022
evidence.” (People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d
286].)
There is no sua sponte duty to inform the jury that an insanity verdict would result
in the defendant’s commitment to a mental hospital. However, this instruction must
be given on request. (People v. Moore (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 556 [211
Cal.Rptr. 856]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 538 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822
P.2d 385].)
If the court conducts a bifurcated trial on the insanity plea, the court must also give
the appropriate post-trial instructions such as CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation
Instructions, CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, and CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses.
(See In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584
P.2d 524].) These instructions may need to be modified.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8; People v. Skinner (1985) 39
Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].
• Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 25(b).
• Commitment to Hospital. Pen. Code, §§ 1026, 1026.5; People v. Moore (1985)
166 Cal.App.3d 540, 556 [211 Cal.Rptr. 856]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th
495, 538 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].
• Excluded Conditions. Pen. Code, § 29.8.
• Anti-Social Acts. People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 368–372 [197 Cal.Rptr.
803, 673 P.2d 680]; People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271 [252
Cal.Rptr. 913].
• Long-Term Substance Use. People v. Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 427
[84 Cal.Rptr.2d 832].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. McCarrick (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227,
250–252 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 838] [delusion also may negate premeditation and
deliberation].
RELATED ISSUES
Bifurcated Proceedings
The defendant has a right to bifurcated proceedings on the questions of sanity and
guilt. (Pen. Code, § 1026.) When the defendant enters both a “not guilty” and a “not
guilty by reason of insanity” plea, the defendant must be tried first with respect to
guilt. If the defendant is found guilty, he or she is then tried with respect to sanity.
The defendant may waive bifurcation and have both guilt and sanity tried at the
same time. (Pen. Code, § 1026(a).)
Extension of Commitment
The test for extending a person’s commitment is not the same as the test for
insanity. (People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490 [284
Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity is whether the accused “was incapable of
1023
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of

distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” (Pen.
Code, § 25(b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 768 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704
P.2d 752].) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section
1026.5, subdivision (b), is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease,
defect, or disorder represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.”
(People v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; People v. Wilder
Legal and Moral Wrong
The wrong contemplated by the two-part insanity test refers to both the legal wrong
and the moral wrong. If the defendant appreciates that his or her act is criminal but
does not think it is morally wrong, he or she may still be criminally insane. (See
People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 777–784 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685]; see also
People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271–1274 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].)
Temporary Insanity
The defendant’s insanity does not need to be permanent in order to establish a
defense. The relevant inquiry is the defendant’s mental state at the time the offense
was committed. (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 577 [111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516
P.2d 875].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 9–16,
18–20.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 86, Insanity
Trial, §§ 86.01A, 86.04 (Matthew Bender).
1024
You must decide whether the defendant is mentally competent to stand

trial. That is the only purpose of this proceeding. Do not consider
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of any crime or whether
(he/she) was sane or insane at the time that any alleged crime was
committed.
The defendant is mentally competent to stand trial if (he/she) can do all
of the following:
1. Understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings
against (him/her);
2. Assist, in a rational manner, (his/her) attorney in presenting (his/
her) defense;
AND
3. Understand (his/her) own status and condition in the criminal
proceedings.
The law presumes that a defendant is mentally competent. In order to
overcome this presumption, ((the defendant/the People) must prove/it
must be proved) that it is more likely than not that the defendant is now
mentally incompetent because of a (mental disorder/developmental
disability).
[A developmental disability is a disability that begins before a person is
18 years old and continues, or is expected to continue, for an indefinite
period of time. It must be a substantial handicap and does not include
other handicapping conditions that are solely physical in nature.
Examples of developmental disabilities include intellectual disability,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, and conditions closely related to
intellectual disability or requiring treatment similar to that required for
intellectually disabled individuals.]

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the standard for competence.
The party that seeks a finding of incompetence bears the burden of proof. If the
court raises the issue, neither party bears that burden. Choose the appropriate
language regarding which party bears the burden of proof in the paragraph that
begins with “The law presumes that . . . .” (People v. Skeirik (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 444, 459–460 [280 Cal.Rptr. 175].)
1025
Give CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, and any other relevant
post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, or CALCRIM No.
226, Witnesses.
286]).
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 1367–1370.
• Developmental Disability Defined. Pen. Code, § 1370.1(a)(1)(H).
• Presumption of Competence. Pen. Code, § 1369(f).
• Unanimous Verdict. Pen. Code, § 1369(f).
• Mental Competence Defined. Pen. Code, § 1367(a); Dusky v. United States
(1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 [80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824]; People v. Jablonski
RELATED ISSUES
Threshold for Section 1368 Hearing
A trial court must conduct a section 1368 hearing when there is substantial evidence
of incompetence. (People v. Cox (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 221, 225–226 [147 Cal.Rptr.
73].) Substantial evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s
competence to stand trial. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951–952 [77
Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].)
Defense Counsel May Seek Finding Contrary to Client’s Wishes
A section 1368 hearing is civil in nature. Since neither guilt nor innocence is at
issue, defense counsel must “advocate the position counsel perceives to be in the
client’s best interests even when that interest conflicts with the client’s stated
position [citation].” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d
543, 897 P.2d 481].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
Suspension of Criminal Proceedings, §§ 64.01, 64.02 (Matthew Bender).
1026
The defendant was previously found not guilty of a crime and committed
to a mental health facility. You must decide whether the defendant
currently poses a danger to the health and safety of others as a result of
a mental disease, defect, or disorder. That is the only purpose of this
proceeding. You are not being asked to decide the defendant’s mental
condition at any other time or whether (he/she) is guilty of any crime.
<Alternative A—defendant’s ability to continue unsupervised self-medication
not an issue>
[The law presumes that the defendant currently poses a danger to the
health and safety of others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or
disorder. In order to overcome this presumption, the defendant has the
burden of proving that it is more likely than not that (he/she) no longer
poses such a danger.]
<Alternative B—defendant’s ability to continue unsupervised self-medication
an issue>
[The law presumes that the defendant currently poses a danger to the
health and safety of others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or
disorder. In order to overcome this presumption, the defendant has the
burden of proving that it is more likely than not that:
1. (He/She) is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others
because (he/she) is now taking prescribed medicine that controls
(his/her) mental condition;
AND
2. (He/She) will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised
environment.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the standard for determining if a
defendant has been restored to sanity.
Revise and give CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, as follows:
replace the paragraph that begins with “Your verdict [on each count and any special
finding(s)] must be unanimous” with “Nine or more of you must agree on your
verdict.” (In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 149 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d
465].) In addition, give any other relevant post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM
1027
No. 222, Evidence, or CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses.

286].)
Do not give this instruction in conjunction with proceedings under Penal Code
sections 2970 and 2972. (People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 190 [121
Cal.Rptr.2d 918].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1026.2.
• Unsupervised Self-Medication. People v. Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1476,
1481–1482 [244 Cal.Rptr. 429].
• Presumption of Continuing Insanity. In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 126, 141
[101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465] [interpreting precursor statute].
• Three-Fourths Verdict and Defendant’s Burden of Proof. In re Franklin (1972) 7
Cal.3d 126, 149 [101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465]; People v. Mapp (1983) 150
Cal.App.3d 346, 351 [198 Cal.Rptr. 177].
RELATED ISSUES
Court May Order a Directed Verdict
The court may order a directed verdict when insufficiency of the evidence warrants
it. (People v. Mapp (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 351 [198 Cal.Rptr. 177].)
Both Parties Have Right to Jury Trial on Issue of Restoration of Sanity
Even if the defendant waives the right to a jury on the issue of restoration of sanity,
the prosecution may still assert its right to a jury. (People v. Superior Court
(Almond) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 607, 612 [268 Cal.Rptr. 375].)
No Right to Jury Trial on First-Stage Hearing on Outpatient Treatment
Even though success at the first-stage hearing is a necessary step on the way to
eventual release, equal protection does not require that a criminal defendant who has
been committed has a right to a jury at such a hearing. (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54
Cal.3d 56, 67 [284 Cal.Rptr. 288, 813 P.2d 1318].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 803–813.
Trial, § 86.10[4], [7] (Matthew Bender).
1028
<insert name of respondent> has been committed to a

mental health facility. You must decide whether (he/she) currently poses
a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental
disease, defect, or disorder. That is the only purpose of this proceeding.
You are not being asked to decide <insert name of
respondent>’s mental condition at any other time or whether (he/she) is
guilty of any crime.
To prove that <insert name of respondent> currently poses a
substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental
disease, defect, or disorder, the People must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. (He/She) suffers from a mental disease, defect, or disorder;
AND
2. As a result of (his/her) mental disease, defect, or disorder, (he/
she) now:
a. Poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others;
AND
b. Has serious difficulty in controlling (his/her) dangerous
behavior.
[Control of a mental condition through medication is a defense to a
petition to extend commitment. To establish this defense,
<insert name of respondent> must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
1. (He/She) no longer poses a substantial danger of physical harm to
others because (he/she) is now taking medicine that controls (his/
her) mental condition;
AND
2. (He/She) will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised
environment.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof
from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than
not that the fact is true.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, December 2008, August 2015
1029
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the standard for extending
commitment, including the constitutional requirement that the person be found to
have a disorder that seriously impairs the ability to control his or her dangerous
behavior. (People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 663 [70 Cal.Rptr.3d 190].).
Give CALCRIM No. 219, Reasonable Doubt in Civil Commitment Proceedings and
CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, as well as any other relevant
post-trial instructions, such as CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, or CALCRIM No.
226, Witnesses.
The constitutional requirement for an involuntary civil commitment is that the
person be found to have a disorder that seriously impairs the ability to control his or
her dangerous behavior. (Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, 412–413 [122 S.Ct.
867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856]; In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d
866, 106 P.3d 305].) This requirement applies to an extension of a commitment after
a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. (People v. Zapisek (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 1151, 1159–1165 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 873]; People v. Bowers (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 870, 878 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 74]; People v. Galindo (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 531 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 241].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1).
• Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23
Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship
proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment
proceedings in general].
• Affirmative Defense of Medication. People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d
1591, 1600–1602 [266 Cal.Rptr. 724].
• Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior. People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
655, 662–663 [70 Cal.Rptr.3d 190] [applying the principles of Kansas v. Crane
and In re Howard N.].
RELATED ISSUES
Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity is whether the accused “was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of
distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” (Pen.
Code, § 25(b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d
752.) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section
1026.5(b) is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder
[,] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (People v. Superior
1030
Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; see People v. Wilder (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 90, 99 [39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 247].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 816–819.
Trial, § 86.10[7] (Matthew Bender).
1031
3454. Initial Commitment as Sexually Violent Predator (Welf. &
Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1)
The petition alleges that <insert name of respondent> is a

sexually violent predator.
To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. (He/She) has been convicted of committing a sexually violent
offense;
2. (He/She) has a diagnosed mental disorder;
[AND]
3. As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, (he/she) is a danger
to the health and safety of others because it is likely that (he/she)
will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior(;/.)
<Give element 4 when evidence has been introduced at trial on the issue
of amenability to voluntary treatment in the community.>
[AND
4. It is necessary to keep (him/her) in custody in a secure facility to
ensure the health and safety of others.]
The term diagnosed mental disorder includes conditions either existing at
birth or acquired after birth that affect a person’s ability to control
emotions and behavior and predispose that person to commit criminal
sexual acts to an extent that makes him or her a menace to the health
and safety of others.
A person is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior
if there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk
that the person will engage in such conduct if released into the
community.
The likelihood that the person will engage in such conduct does not have
to be greater than 50 percent.
Sexually violent criminal behavior is predatory if it is directed toward a
stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial
relationship exists, or a person with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
<Insert name[s] of crime[s] enumerated in Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 6600(b)> (is/are) [a] sexually violent offense[s] when committed by
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury to the victim or another person or threatening to retaliate in the
1032
future against the victim or any other person.

[ <Insert name[s] of crime[s] enumerated in Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 6600(b)> (is/are) also [a] sexually violent offense[s] when the
offense[s] (is/are) committed on a child under 14 years old.]
As used here, a conviction for committing a sexually violent offense is
one of the following:
<Give the appropriate bracketed description[s] below.>
<A. Conviction With Fixed Sentence>
[A prior [or current] conviction for one of the offenses I have just
described to you that resulted in a prison sentence for a fixed period
of time.]
<B. Conviction With Indeterminate Sentence>
[A conviction for an offense that I have just described to you that
resulted in an indeterminate sentence.]
<C. Conviction in Another Jurisdiction>
[A prior conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes
all of the same elements of one of the offenses that I have just
described to you.]
<D. Conviction Under Previous Statute>
[A conviction for an offense under a previous statute that includes all
of the elements of one of the offenses that I have just described to
you.]
<E. Conviction With Probation>
[A prior conviction for one of the offenses that I have just described
to you for which the respondent received probation.]
<F. Acquittal Based on Insanity Defense>
[A prior finding of not guilty by reason of insanity for one of the
offenses that I have just described to you.]
<G. Conviction as Mentally Disordered Sex Offender>
[A conviction resulting in a finding that the respondent was a
mentally disordered sex offender.]
<H. Conviction Resulting in Commitment to Department of Youth
Authority Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5>
[A prior conviction for one of the offenses that I have just described
to you for which the respondent was committed to the Department of
1033
Youth Authority pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section

1731.5.]
You may not conclude that <insert name of respondent> is a
sexually violent predator based solely on (his/her) alleged prior
conviction[s] without additional evidence that (he/she) currently has such
a diagnosed mental disorder.
In order to prove that <insert name of respondent> is a
danger to the health and safety of others, the People do not need to
prove a recent overt act committed while (he/she) was in custody. A
recent overt act is a criminal act that shows a likelihood that the actor
may engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, August 2009, April 2011,
February 2012, March 2019
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury about the basis for a finding
that a respondent is a sexually violent predator.
Do not use this instruction for extension or status proceedings. Use instead
CALCRIM No. 3454A, Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually
Violent Predator Act.
If evidence is presented about amenability to voluntary treatment, the court has a
sua sponte duty to give bracketed element 4. (People v. Grassini (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662]; People v. Calderon (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 80, 93 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 92].) Evidence of involuntary treatment in the
community is inadmissible at trial because it is not relevant to any of the SVP
requirements. (People v. Calderon, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at 93.)
The court also must give CALCRIM No. 219, Reasonable Doubt in Civil
Proceedings; 222, Evidence; 226, Witnesses; 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions;
and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be
modified.
Jurors instructed in these terms must necessarily understand that one is not eligible
for commitment under the SVPA unless his or her capacity or ability to control
violent criminal sexual behavior is seriously and dangerously impaired. No
additional instructions or findings are necessary. People v. Williams (2003) 31
Cal.4th 757, 776–777 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779] (interpreting Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600, the same statute at issue here).
But see In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 137–138 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106
P.3d 305], which found in a commitment proceeding under a different code section,
i.e., Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800, that when evidence of inability to
control behavior was insufficient, the absence of a specific “control” instruction was
1034
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, In re Howard N. discusses

Williams extensively without suggesting that it intended to overrule Williams.
Williams therefore appears to be good law in proceedings under section 6600.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6600.1.
• Likely Defined. People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d
861, 62 P.3d 97].
• Predatory Acts Defined. People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1183 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116].
• Must Instruct on Necessity for Confinement in Secure Facility. People v.
Grassini (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662].
• Determinate Sentence Defined. Pen. Code, § 1170.
• Impairment of Control. In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128–130 [24
Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].
• Amenability to Voluntary Treatment. Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th
228, 256 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654].
• Need for Treatment and Need for Custody Not the Same. People v. Ghilotti
• Substantial Danger. People v. Ghilotti (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].
RELATED ISSUES
Different Proof Requirements at Different Stages of the Proceedings
Even though two concurring experts must testify to commence the petition process
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6001, the same requirement does not
apply to the trial. (People v. Scott (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1064 [123
Cal.Rptr.2d 253].)
Masturbation Does Not Require Skin-to-Skin Contact
Substantial sexual conduct with a child under 14 years old includes masturbation
when the touching of the minor’s genitals is accomplished through his or her
clothing. (People v. Lopez (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1312 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 801];
People v. Whitlock (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 463 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 389].) “[T]he
trial court properly instructed the jury when it told the jury that ‘[t]o constitute
masturbation, it is not necessary that the bare skin be touched. The touching may be
through the clothing of the child.’ ” (People v. Lopez, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p.
1312.)
1035
SECONDARY SOURCES
298.
1036
3454A. Hearing to Determine Current Status Under Sexually
Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6605)
The People allege that <insert name of petitioner> currently

is a sexually violent predator.
doubt that:
1. (He/She) has a diagnosed mental disorder;
[AND]
2. As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, (he/she) is a danger
to the health and safety of others because it is likely that (he/she)
will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior(;/.)
<Give element 3 when evidence has been introduced at trial on the issue
of amenability to voluntary treatment in the community>
[AND
3. It is necessary to keep (him/her) in (custody in a secure facility/
[or] a state-operated conditional release program) to ensure the
health and safety of others.]
The term diagnosed mental disorder includes conditions either existing at
birth or acquired after birth that affect a person’s ability to control
emotions and behavior and predispose that person to commit criminal
sexual acts to an extent that makes him or her a menace to the health
and safety of others.
A person is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior
if there is a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk
that the person will engage in such conduct if released in the community.
The likelihood that the person will engage in such conduct does not have
to be greater than 50 percent.
Sexually violent criminal behavior is predatory if it is directed toward a
stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial
relationship exists, or a person with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
<Give the following paragraph if evidence of the petitioner’s failure to
participate in or complete treatment is offered as proof that petitioner’s
condition has not changed>
[You may consider evidence that <insert name of petitioner>
failed to participate in or complete the State Department of Mental
Health Sex Offender Commitment Program as an indication that (his/
1037
CALCRIM No. 3454A DEFENSES AND INSANITY
her) condition as a sexually violent predator has not changed. The

meaning and importance of that evidence is for you to decide.]
<Give the following paragraph if the jury has been told about the
petitioner’s underlying conviction>
[You may not conclude that <insert name of petitioner> is
currently a sexually violent predator based solely on (his/her) prior
conviction[s] without additional evidence that (he/she) currently has such
a diagnosed mental disorder.]
In order to prove that <insert name of petitioner> is a
danger to the health and safety of others, the People do not need to
prove a recent overt act committed while (he/she) was in custody. A
recent overt act is a criminal act that shows a likelihood that the actor
may engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.
New April 2011; Revised February 2012

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
that a petitioner is currently a sexually violent predator.
If evidence is presented about amenability to voluntary treatment, the court has a
sua sponte duty to give bracketed element 3. (People v. Grassini (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662]; People v. Calderon (2004) 124
Cal.App.4th 80, 93 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 92].) Evidence of involuntary treatment in the
community is inadmissible at trial because it is not relevant to any of the SVP
requirements. (People v. Calderon, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at 93.)
Proceedings; 222, Evidence; 226, Witnesses; 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions;
and any other relevant post-trial instructions. These instructions may need to be
modified.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6605.
• Likely Defined. People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d
861, 62 P.3d 97].
• Predatory Acts Defined. People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1183 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116].
1038
DEFENSES AND INSANITY CALCRIM No. 3454A
• Must Instruct on Necessity for Confinement in Secure Facility. People v.

Grassini (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 662].
• Impairment of Control. In re Howard N. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 128–130 [24
Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].
• Amenability to Voluntary Treatment. Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th
228, 256 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654].
• Need for Treatment and Need for Custody Not the Same. People v. Ghilotti
• State-Operated Conditional Release Program. People v. Superior Court (George)
• Substantial Danger. People v. Ghilotti (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922 [119
Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1039
You may not find the defendant guilty of <insert description

of crime> if (he/she) was legally incapable of committing a crime because
of mental incapacity.
The defendant was legally incapable of committing a crime because of
mental incapacity if at the time the crime was committed:
1. (He/She) had a mental disease or defect;
AND
2. Because of that disease or defect, (he/she) was incapable of
knowing or understanding the nature and quality of (his/her) act
or was incapable of knowing or understanding that (his/her) act
was morally or legally wrong.
preponderance of the evidence. [This is a different burden of proof from
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.] To meet the burden of proof by a
likely than not that (he/she) was legally incapable of committing a crime
because of mental incapacity.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on mental incapacity when the
defendant has raised this defense and substantial evidence supports it. (Pen. Code,
§ 25.) Substantial evidence means evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would
be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s
guilt. (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982–983 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127
P.3d 40].)
If the court grants a bifurcated trial on the defense of mental incapacity, the court
must also give the appropriate post-trial instructions such as CALCRIM No. 3550,
Pre-Deliberation Instructions, CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, and CALCRIM No.
226, Witnesses. (See In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149
Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].)
If the court does not grant a bifurcated trial, give the bracketed sentence “This is a
different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, §§ 25, 29.8, 26.
1040
• Burden of Proof. In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427, fn. 10 [149

Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].).
• Same Test for Both Mental Incapacity and Insanity. In re Ramon M. (1978) 22
Cal.3d 419, 427 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524].).
• Requirement of Mental Disease or Defect. People v. McCaslin (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [223 Cal.Rptr. 587].
• Incapacity Based on Mental Disease or Defect. People v. Stress (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271 [252 Cal.Rptr. 913].
• Penal Code Section 25(b) Supersedes Model Penal Code Test. People v. Phillips
COMMENTARY
In In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524],
the Supreme Court held that the same test should apply for determining both mental
incapacity and insanity. However, the court was applying the Model Penal Code test,
which was subsequently superseded by Proposition 8 as codified in Penal Code
section 25(b). The Court of Appeal in People v. Phillips (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 170,
173 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 448], expressly found that “the test for insanity as stated in
section 25, subdivision (b) applies also to determine whether a person is an idiot
pursuant to section 26.” Accordingly, the committee followed Phillips in drafting
this instruction.
RELATED ISSUES
Legal and Moral Wrong
The wrong contemplated by the two-part insanity test refers to both the legal wrong
and the moral wrong. If the defendant appreciates that his or her act is criminal but
does not think it is morally wrong, he or she may still be criminally insane. (See
People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 777–784 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752];
see also People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271–1274 [252 Cal.Rptr.
913].)
Penal Code Sections 1016, 1017, 1026, 1027
The Supreme Court found in In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 427 [149
Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524] that the same test for legal incapacity should apply to
both insanity and mental retardation. Moreover, the court concluded that the
Legislature “probably intended [Pen. Code, §§ 1016, 1017, 1026, 1027] to apply to
all persons who assertedly lack mental capacity to commit crime [citation]. In light
of this legislative intent, and of the identity of the legal test for mental incapacity
and insanity . . . we conclude that the term ‘insanity’ in Penal Code sections 1016
through 1027 refers to mental incapacity, whether arising from mental illness or
mental retardation. Accordingly a defendant asserting a defense of mental incapacity
should raise that defense by separate plea (see Pen. Code, §§ 1016, 1017), may
1041
obtain a bifurcated trial (see Pen. Code, § 1026), [and] must prove his incapacity by
a preponderance of the evidence [citation] . . . .” (Id. at p. 427, fn. 10.)
Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity and mental incapacity is whether the accused
“was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act
or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.”
(Pen. Code, § 25(b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685,
704 P.2d 752].) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section
1026.5(b) is whether a defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder
[,] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (People v. Superior
Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489–490; People v. Wilder (1995) 33
SECONDARY SOURCES
1042
3456. Initial Commitment of Offender With A Mental Health
Disorder as Condition of Parole (Pen. Code, § 2970)
The petition alleges that <insert name of respondent> is an

offender with a mental health disorder.
doubt that at the time of (his/her) hearing before the Board of Parole
Hearings:
1. (He/She) was convicted of <specify applicable
offense(s) from Penal Code section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)> and
received a prison sentence for a fixed period of time;
2. (He/She) had a severe mental disorder;
3. The severe mental disorder was one of the causes of the crime for
which (he/she) was sentenced to prison or was an aggravating
factor in the commission of the crime;
4. (He/She) was treated for the severe mental disorder in a state or
federal prison, a county jail, or a state hospital for 90 days or
more within the year before (his/her) parole release date;
5. The severe mental disorder either was not in remission, or could
not be kept in remission without treatment;
AND
6. Because of (his/her) severe mental disorder, (he/she) represented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others.
A severe mental disorder is an illness or disease or condition that
substantially impairs the person’s thought, perception of reality,
emotional process, or judgment; or that grossly impairs his or her
behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain syndrome for
which prompt remission, in the absence of treatment, is unlikely. [It does
not include (a personality or adjustment disorder[,]/ [or] epilepsy[,]/ [or]
mental retardation or other developmental disabilities[,]/ [or] addiction
to or abuse of intoxicating substances).]
Remission means that the external signs and symptoms of the severe
mental disorder are controlled by either psychotropic medication or
psychosocial support.
[A severe mental disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment if
during the year before the Board of Parole hearing, [on
<insert date of hearing, if desired>], the person:
<Give one or more alternatives, as applicable>
1043
[1. Was physically violent except in self-defense(;/.) [or]]

[2. Made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the
person of another so as to cause the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
immediate family(;/.) [or]]
[3. Intentionally caused property damage(;/.) [or]]
[4. Did not voluntarily follow the treatment plan.]]
[A person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan if he or she has
acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan.]
[A substantial danger of physical harm does not require proof of a recent
overt act.]
You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding of
whether the allegation that <insert name of respondent> is
an offender with a mental health disorder is true or not true. To find the
allegation true or not true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to
be true unless all of you agree the People have proved it beyond a
reasonable doubt.
New December 2008; Revised August 2014, September 2017, September 2020,
September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
that a respondent is an offender with a mental health disorder.
Give this instruction for an initial commitment as a condition of parole. For
recommitments, give CALCRIM No. 3457, Extension of Commitment as Offender
With A Mental Health Disorder.
Proceedings, CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses,
CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, and any other relevant posttrial
instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.
Case law provides no direct guidance about whether a finding of an enumerated act
is necessary to show that the disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment
or whether some alternative showing, such as medical opinion or non-enumerated
conduct evidencing lack of remission, would suffice. One published case has said in
dictum that “the option of ‘cannot be kept in remission without treatment’ requires a
further showing that the prisoner, within the preceding year, has engaged in violent
or threatening conduct or has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan.” (People
v. Buffıngton (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161, fn. 4 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 696]). The
Buffıngton case involved a sexually violent predator.
1044
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, §§ 2962, 2966(b); People v. Merfield
• Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 2966(b); Conservatorship of
Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing
conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil
commitment proceedings in general].
• Institutions That May Fulfill the 90-Day Treatment Requirement. Pen. Code,
§ 2981.
• Treatment Must Be for Serious Mental Disorder Only. People v. Sheek (2004)
• Definition of Remission. Pen. Code, § 2962(a).
• Need for Treatment Established by One Enumerated Act. People v. Burroughs
• Evidence of Later Improvement Not Relevant. Pen. Code, § 2966(b); People v.
Tate (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1678, 1683 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 250].
• Board of Parole Hearings. Pen. Code, § 5075.
• This Instruction Cited As Authority With Implicit Approval. People v. Harrison
• Proof of Recent Overt Act Not Required. Pen. Code, § 2962(g).
• 90-Day Treatment Period Includes Extension Under Pen. Code, § 2963. People v.
Parker (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 286, 289 [257 Cal.Rptr.3d 493].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 763–767.
1045
3457. Extension of Commitment as Offender With A Mental Health
Disorder (Pen. Code, § 2970)
The petition alleges that <insert name of respondent> is an

offender with a mental health disorder.
doubt that [at the time of (his/her) hearing before the Board of Parole
Hearings]:
1. (He/She) (has/had) a severe mental disorder;
2. The severe mental disorder (is/was) not in remission or (cannot/
could not) be kept in remission without continued treatment;
AND
3. Because of (his/her) severe mental disorder, (he/she) (presently
represents/represented) a substantial danger of physical harm to
others.
A severe mental disorder is an illness or disease or condition that
substantially impairs the person’s thought, perception of reality,
emotional process, or judgment; or that grossly impairs his or her
behavior; or that demonstrates evidence of an acute brain syndrome for
which prompt remission, in the absence of treatment, is unlikely. [It does
not include (a personality or adjustment disorder[,]/ [or] epilepsy[,]/ [or]
mental retardation or other developmental disabilities[,]/ [or] addiction
to or abuse of intoxicating substances).]
Remission means that the external signs and symptoms of the severe
mental disorder are controlled by either psychotropic medication or
psychosocial support.
[A severe mental disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment
if, during the period of the year prior to <insert the date the
trial commenced> , the person:
<Give one or more alternatives, as applicable.>
[1. Was physically violent except in self-defense(;/.) [or]]
[2. Made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the
person of another so as to cause the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
immediate family(;/.) [or]]
[3. Intentionally caused property damage(;/.) [or]]
[4. Did not voluntarily follow the treatment plan.]]
[A person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan if he or she has
1046
acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan.]

[A substantial danger of physical harm does not require proof of a recent
overt act.]
You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding of
whether the allegation that <insert name of respondent> is
an offender with a mental health disorder is true or not true. To find the
allegation true or not true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to
be true unless all of you agree the People have proved it beyond a
reasonable doubt.
New December 2008; Revised September 2017, September 2020, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
that a respondent is an offender with a mental health disorder.
Give this instruction for a successive commitment. For an initial commitment as a
condition of parole, give CALCRIM No. 3456, Initial Commitment of Offender With
A Mental Health Disorder as Condition of Parole.
CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, and any other relevant post-
trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.
Give the bracketed language in the sentence beginning with “To prove this
allegation” and use the past tense for an on-parole recommitment pursuant to Penal
Code section 2966. For a recommitment after the parole period pursuant to Penal
Code sections 2970 and 2972, omit the bracketed phrase and use the present tense.
Case law provides no direct guidance about whether a finding of an enumerated act
is necessary to show that the disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment
or whether some alternative showing, such as medical opinion or non-enumerated
conduct evidencing lack of remission, would suffice. One published case has said in
dictum that “the option of ‘cannot be kept in remission without treatment’ requires a
further showing that the prisoner, within the preceding year, has engaged in violent
or threatening conduct or has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan.” (People
v. Buffıngton (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161, fn. 4 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 696]). The
Buffıngton case involved a sexually violent predator.
The committee found no case law addressing the issue of whether or not instruction
about an affirmative obligation to provide treatment exists.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Pen. Code, §§ 2966, 2970, 2972; People v. Merfield
1047
• Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 2972(a); Conservatorship of

Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing
conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil
commitment proceedings in general].
• Treatment Must Be for Serious Mental Disorder Only. People v. Sheek (2004)
• Definition of Remission. Pen. Code, § 2962(a).
• Recommitment Must Be for the Same Disorder That Was Basis For Initial
Commitment. People v. Torfason (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067–68 [252
Cal.Rptr.3d 11]; People v. Garcia (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 558, 565 [25
Cal.Rptr.3d 660].
• Proof of Recent Overt Act Not Required. Pen. Code, § 2962(g).
• Redesignation of Qualifying Conviction to Misdemeanor Under Penal Code
Section 1170.18 Does Not Bar Recommitment. People v. Foster (2019) 7 Cal.5th
1202, 1211 [251 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 447 P.3d 228].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1048
3458. Extension of Commitment to Division of Juvenile Facilities
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800)
The petition alleges that <insert name of respondent> is

physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physical
deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that causes (him/her) to have serious
difficulty controlling (his/her) dangerous behavior.
To prove this petition is true, the People must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. (He/She) has a mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or
abnormality;
2. The mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality
causes (him/her) serious difficulty in controlling (his/her)
dangerous behavior;
AND
3. Because of (his/her) mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or
abnormality, (he/she) would be physically dangerous to the public
if released from custody.
You will receive [a] verdict form[s] on which to indicate your finding
whether the petition is true or not true. To find the petition true or not
true, all of you must agree. You may not find it to be true unless all of
you agree the People have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt.
New December 2008

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
that a respondent is physically dangerous to the public.
CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, and any other relevant post-
trial instructions. These instructions may need to be modified.
AUTHORITY
• Elements and Definitions. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800 et seq.
• Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5;
Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590
P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
1049
• Serious Difficulty in Controlling Dangerous Behavior. In re Lemanuel C. (2007)

41 Cal.4th 33 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 597, 158 P.3d 148]; In re Howard N. (2005) 35
Cal.4th 117 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 P.3d 305].
SECONDARY SOURCES
10 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child,
§§ 966–977.
Postdisposition Proceedings, § 125.03 (Matthew Bender).
1050
Self-defense is a defense to <insert list of pertinent crimes

charged>. The defendant is not guilty of (that/those crime[s]) if (he/she)
used force against the other person in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of
another). The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of
another) if:
1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/
[or] <insert name of third party>) was in imminent
danger of suffering bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of
being touched unlawfully];
force was necessary to defend against that danger;
AND
to defend against that danger.
(imminent danger of bodily injury to (himself/herself/ [or] someone else)/
[or] an imminent danger that (he/she/ [or] someone else) would be
touched unlawfully). Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and
(he/she) must have acted because of that belief. The defendant is only
entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would
believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more
force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful
(self-defense/ [or] defense of another).
[The slightest touching can be unlawful if it is done in a rude or angry
way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her
clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury
of any kind.]
[The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened
may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not
true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed
that the information was true.]
1051
[If you find that <insert name of victim> threatened or

harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that
information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs
were reasonable.]
victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider
that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs
were reasonable.]
[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is
(he/she) reasonably associated with <insert name of victim>,
you may consider that threat in deciding whether the defendant was
justified in acting in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).]
to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/
<insert crime>) has passed. This is so even if safety could
have been achieved by retreating.]
the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).
guilty of <insert crime(s) charged>.
August 2012, March 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case. When the court concludes that the defense is supported by substantial evidence
and is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case, however, it should
ascertain whether defendant wishes instruction on this alternate theory. (People v.
Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 389–390 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111]; People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)
1052
instruct that the jury may consider the effect of “antecedent threats and assaults
1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 505,
Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.)
CALCRIM Nos. 3471–3477, Defense Instructions: Defense of Self, Another,
Property.
CALCRIM No. 851, Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects:
Offered by the Defense.
CALCRIM No. 2514, Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-
Defense.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Moody (1943) 62 Cal.App.2d 18 [143 P.2d
978]; People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, 336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d
518].
• Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693, 694; Civ. Code, § 50; see also
People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
379, 383–384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
142, 921 P.2d 1].
167] (overruled on other grounds in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073,
1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]).
• Temporary Possession of Firearm by Felon in Self-Defense. People v. King
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000].
• Duty to Retreat Limited to Felon in Possession Cases. People v. Rhodes (2005)
• Inmate Self-Defense. People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561 [67
Cal.Rptr.3d 403].
• Reasonable Belief. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56
1053
Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377
[181 Cal.Rptr. 682].
RELATED ISSUES
Brandishing Weapon in Defense of Another
The defense of others is a defense to a charge of brandishing a weapon under Penal
Code section 417(a)(2). (People v. Kirk (1986) 192 Cal.App.3d Supp. 15, 19 [238
Cal.Rptr. 42].)
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide:
Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 68,
71–73, 86–87.
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11, 73.12 (Matthew Bender).
1054
A person who (engages in mutual combat/ [or who] starts a fight) has a
right to self-defense only if:
1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting;
[AND]
2. (He/She) indicated, by word or by conduct, to (his/her) opponent,
in a way that a reasonable person would understand, that (he/she)
wanted to stop fighting and that (he/she) had stopped fighting(;/.)
<Give element 3 in cases of mutual combat.>
[AND
3. (He/She) gave (his/her) opponent a chance to stop fighting.]
If the defendant meets these requirements, (he/she) then had a right to
self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.
[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent
responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could
not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend
(himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try to stop
fighting(,/ or) communicate the desire to stop to the opponent[, or give
the opponent a chance to stop fighting].]
[A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual consent
or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and
must occur before the claim to self-defense arose.]
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, December 2008, April 2011, February 2013
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
Give CALCRIM No. 3470, Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-
Homicide), together with this instruction.
1055

Give bracketed element 3 if the person claiming self-defense was engaged in mutual
combat.
If the defendant started the fight using non-deadly force and the opponent suddenly
escalates to deadly force, the defendant may defend himself or herself using deadly
force. (See People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301–302 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d
196]; People v. Sawyer (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75 [63 Cal.Rptr. 749]; People v.
Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464 [42 P. 307].) In such cases, give the bracketed
sentence that begins with “However, if the defendant . . .”.
If the defendant was the initial aggressor and is charged with homicide, always give
CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another, in
conjunction with this instruction.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See Pen. Code, § 197, subd. 3; People v. Button
(1895) 106 Cal. 628, 633 [39 P. 1073]; People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833,
871–872 [251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423]; People v. Sawyer (1967) 256
Cal.App.2d 66, 75 [63 Cal.Rptr. 749].
• Escalation to Deadly Force. People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294,
301–302 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 196]; People v. Sawyer (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 75
[63 Cal.Rptr. 749]; People v. Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464 [42 P. 307];
People v. Anderson (1922) 57 Cal.App. 721, 727 [208 P. 204].
• Definition of Mutual Combat. People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045
[66 Cal.Rptr.3d 438].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 68,
78–80.
1056
A person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a

fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.
[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent
responded with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could
not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to defend
(himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try to stop
fighting.]
New January 2006; Revised February 2016, March 2017, September 2022
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction on request when supported by the evidence.
(People v. Olguin (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1381 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596].) The
California Supreme Court has held that language in CALJIC No. 5.55, which is
similar to this instruction, correctly states California law on self-defense and
imperfect self-defense. (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761–762 [269 P.3d
543]; People v. Hinshaw (1924) 194 Cal. 1, 26 [227 P. 156].)
Give the bracketed sentence if there is evidence that the defendant intended to
provoke only a non-deadly confrontation and the victim responded with deadly
force. (People v. Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334 [203 Cal.Rptr.3d 101];
People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 952 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 267].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381;
Fraguglia v. Sala (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d 738, 743–744 [62 P.2d 783]; People v.
Hinshaw, supra, 194 Cal. at p. 26.
• This Instruction Generally a Correct Statement of Law. People v. Eulian, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, §§ 75, 78.
1057
The right to use force in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) continues

only as long as the danger exists or reasonably appears to exist. [When
the attacker (withdraws/ [or] no longer appears capable of inflicting any
injury), then the right to use force ends.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court may give this instruction on request when supported by the evidence. (See
People v. Martin (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1010 [162 Cal.Rptr. 133].)
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See People v. Keys (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 903, 916
[145 P.2d 589]; People v. Perez (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 232, 236 [90 Cal.Rptr.
521].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, § 73.11[1][b] (Matthew Bender).
1058
The (owner/lawful occupant) of a (home/property) may request that a

trespasser leave the (home/property). If the trespasser does not leave
within a reasonable time and it would appear to a reasonable person
that the trespasser poses a threat to (the (home/property)/ [or] the
(owner/ [or] occupants), the (owner/lawful occupant) may use reasonable
force to make the trespasser leave.
Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in
the same situation would believe is necessary to make the trespasser
leave.
[If the trespasser resists, the (owner/lawful occupant) may increase the
amount of force he or she uses in proportion to the force used by the
trespasser and the threat the trespasser poses to the property.]
When deciding whether the defendant used reasonable force, consider all
the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant
and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar
knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were
reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
the defendant used more force than was reasonable. If the People have
not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
<insert crime>.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
1059
CALCRIM No. 3476, Right to Defend Real or Personal Property.
CALCRIM No. 506, Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person
Within Home or on Property.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See People v. Corlett (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 33,
51–52 [153 P.2d 595]; People v. Teixeira (1899) 123 Cal. 297, 298–299 [55 P.
988]; Civ. Code, § 50.
• Burden of Proof. See Boyer v. Waples (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24
Cal.Rptr. 192] [civil action].
RELATED ISSUES
Negating Self-Defense Claim
The right to defend one’s home may negate a defendant’s claim of imperfect self-
defense, as held in People v. Watie (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 878 [124
Cal.Rptr.2d 258]:
[T]he right of a victim to defend himself and his property is a relevant
consideration in determining whether a defendant may prevail when he seeks to
negate malice aforethought by asserting the affirmative defense of imperfect
self-defense . . . [¶] . . . If [the victim] had a right to use force to defend
himself in his home, then defendant had no right of self-defense, imperfect, or
otherwise.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11[1], 73.13[2] (Matthew Bender).
1060
The owner [or possessor] of (real/ [or] personal) property may use
reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm. [A
person may also use reasonable force to protect the property of a (family
member/guest/master/servant/ward) from immediate harm.]
Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in
the same situation would believe is necessary to protect the property
from imminent harm.
When deciding whether the defendant used reasonable force, consider all
the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant
and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar
knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were
reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
the defendant used more force than was reasonable to protect property
from imminent harm. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of <insert crime>.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
case.
CALCRIM No. 3475, Right to Eject Trespasser From Real Property.
1061
CALCRIM No. 506, Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person

Within Home or on Property.
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. See Civ. Code, § 50; Boyer v. Waples (1962) 206
Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24 Cal.Rptr. 192].
• Burden of Proof. See Boyer v. Waples (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 727 [24
Cal.Rptr. 192] [civil action].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1062
3477. Presumption That Resident Was Reasonably Afraid of Death
or Great Bodily Injury (Pen. Code, § 198.5)
The law presumes that the defendant reasonably feared imminent death
or great bodily injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a member of (his/her)
family or household,] if:
1. An intruder unlawfully and forcibly (entered/ [or] was entering)
the defendant’s home;
2. The defendant knew [or reasonably believed] that an intruder
unlawfully and forcibly (entered/ [or] was entering) the
defendant’s home;
3. The intruder was not a member of the defendant’s household or
family;
AND
4. The defendant used force intended to or likely to cause death or
great bodily injury to the intruder inside the home.
The People have the burden of overcoming this presumption. This means
that the People must prove that the defendant did not have a reasonable
fear of imminent death or injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a member of
his or her family or household,] when (he/she) used force against the
intruder. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant reasonably feared death or injury to (himself/herself)[, or to a
member of his or her family or household].
New January 2006; Revised March 2017, September 2020

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on presumptions relevant to the issues
of the case. (See People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 449 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462
P.2d 370]; but see People v. Silvey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1327 [68
Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [presumption not relevant because defendant was not a resident];
People v. Owen (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005 [277 Cal.Rptr. 341] [jury was
otherwise adequately instructed on pertinent law].)
Give this instruction when there is evidence that a resident had a reasonable
expectation of protection against unwanted intruders. People v. Grays (2016) 246
1063
AUTHORITY
• Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 198.5; People v. Brown (1992) 6
• Rebuttable Presumptions Affecting Burden of Proof. Evid. Code, §§ 601, 604,
606.
• Definition of Residence. People v. Grays (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 679, 687–688
[202 Cal.Rptr.3d 288].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1064
POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING
A. UNANIMITY
3500. Unanimity
3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual Conviction
Prohibited
3517. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser
Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and the
Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser
Offenses (Non-Homicide)
3518. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser
Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged and Jury
Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count (Non-
Homicide)
3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser Offenses—For Use
When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Separately Charged
(Non-Homicide)
C. ADMONITIONS
3530. Judge’s Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code,
§§ 1127, 1093(f))
E. ALTERNATES
3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination,
Before Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen. Code, § 1089)
1065
POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING

1066
A. UNANIMITY
3500. Unanimity
The defendant is charged with <insert description of alleged

offense> [in Count ] [sometime during the period of
to ].
The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that
the defendant committed this offense. You must not find the defendant
defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on
which act (he/she) committed.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give a unanimity instruction if the prosecution
presents evidence of multiple acts to prove a single count. (People v. Russo (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; People v. Diedrich
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People v. Madden
(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; People v. Alva (1979) 90
Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].) The committee has addressed unanimity
in those instructions where the issue is most likely to arise. If a case raises a
unanimity issue and other instructions do not adequately cover the point, give this
instruction.
The Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows: “[W]hen the evidence suggests
more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or
the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act. On the other hand,
where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for
disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s
precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases
often put it, the ‘theory’ whereby the defendant is guilty.” (People v. Russo, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 1132; see also People v. Sutherland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 602,
618–619 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 752] [unanimity required in forgery case where prosecution
alleges forgery of multiple documents under single count, but not where defendant
charged with forging and uttering single document].)
The court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on unanimity if the offense constitutes
a “continuous course of conduct.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423
[133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; People v. Madden, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p.
218.) “This exception arises in two contexts. The first is when the acts are so
closely connected that they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one
1067
CALCRIM No. 3500 POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING
offense. The second is when . . . the statute contemplates a continuous course of

conduct of a series of acts over a period of time.” (People v. Napoles (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777], quoting People v. Avina (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1309 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 511]; internal quotation marks and citations
omitted].) The court should carefully examine the statute under which the defendant
is charged, the pleadings, and the evidence presented to determine whether the
offense constitutes a continuous course of conduct. (Ibid.) [noting that child abuse
may be a continuous course of conduct or a single, isolated incident]; see also
People v. Madden, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 218 [distinguishing “continuous
crime spree” and finding repeated sexual offenses did not constitute continuous
course of conduct]; People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d
483] [unanimity instruction required where acts fragmented in time or space];
People v. Rae (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 123 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 312] [elder abuse
offense did constitute continuous course of conduct]; People v. Cortez (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 580] [kidnapping is a continuous course of
conduct].)
In addition, “where the acts were substantially identical in nature, so that any juror
believing one act took place would inexorably believe all acts took place, the
[unanimity] instruction is not necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.”
(People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311];
see also People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 932 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891
P.2d 93], questioned on unrelated issue in People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369,
fn. 2 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846].) However, the court should use caution in
applying this exception. (See People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1493,
1500–1501 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 407]; People v. Wolfe, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.)
The better practice is to provide a unanimity instruction to the jury when evidence
has been admitted of separate acts that could form the basis for one charge.
The jury need not unanimously agree on whether the defendant was an aider and
abettor or a direct perpetrator of the offense. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th
900, 1024–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; People v. Beardslee, supra, 53
Cal.3d at p. 93.)
The jury need not unanimously agree on which provocative act the defendant
committed when prosecution is pursing a provocative-act theory of murder. (People
v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].)
In a conspiracy case, the jury need not unanimously agree on what overt act was
committed or who was part of the conspiracy. (People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
pp. 1135–1136.) However, if a conspiracy case involves an issue about the statute of
limitations or evidence of withdrawal by the defendant, a unanimity instruction may
be required. (Id. at p. 1136, fn. 2.)
In a child molestation case, if the evidence has been presented in the form of
“generic testimony” about recurring events without specific dates and times, the
court should determine whether it is more appropriate to give CALCRIM No. 3501,
Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented. (People v. Jones (1990)
1068
POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING CALCRIM No. 3500
51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].) See discussion below in
Related Issues section.
If the prosecution elects one act among many as the basis for the offense, do not
give this instruction. (People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [70
Cal.Rptr.2d 878].) Give CALCRIM No. 3502, Unanimity: When Prosecution Elects
One Act Among Many.
Give the bracketed “sometime during the period” if the information alleges that the
charged event happened during a period of time rather than on a single date.
AUTHORITY
• Unanimity Required. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
• Instruction Required If Multiple Acts Could Support Single Charge. People v.
Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; People
v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People
v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; People v. Alva
(1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].
• Continuous Course of Conduct. People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423
[133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
108, 115–116 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777]; People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d
212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 185
• Acts Substantially Identical in Nature. People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68,
93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311]; see also People v. Champion (1995) 9
Cal.4th 879, 932 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93], questioned on unrelated
issue in People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 369, fn. 2 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296,
914 P.2d 846].
• Aider and Abettor v. Direct Perpetrator. People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900,
1024–1026 [95 Cal.Rptr. 2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53
Cal.3d 68, 93 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].
• Provocative-Act Murder. People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 591 [112
Cal.Rptr.2d 401].
• Conspiracy. People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135–1136 [108
Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
• Generic Testimony. People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270
Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].
• Must Instruct on Election by Prosecutor. People v. Melhado (1998) 60
RELATED ISSUES
Cases Based on Generic Testimony
In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643], the
Court analyzed the due process concerns raised when a witness testifies to
1069
numerous, repeated acts of child molestation over a period of time, but the witness
is unable to give specifics on time and date. The Court held that prosecutions based
on this type of evidence satisfied due process where the testimony met specified
criteria. (Id. at p. 316.) The Court then addressed what type of unanimity instruction
is required in such cases:
In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the
particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be
given. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon [(1985)] 165 Cal. App.3d [839,] 855–856
[defendant raised separate defenses to the two offenses at issue].) But when
there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and
the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them,
the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to
allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also
allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all
the acts described by the victim.
(Id. at pp. 321–322; People v. Matute (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1448 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 472].) If the court concludes that the modified jury instruction is
appropriate, do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 3501, Unanimity:
When Generic Testimony of Offense Presented.
Instruction That Unanimity Not Required
In People v. Culuko (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 321–323 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789], the
court held that an instruction stating that the jurors need not agree on whether the
defendant was an aider and abettor or a principal was a correct statement of the law
and not error to give. However, in People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108,
119 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 777], the court found that the nonunanimity instruction given
in that case was erroneous. The court cautioned against giving any nonunanimity
instruction in a case involving a continuous course of conduct offense. (Id. at p. 119,
fn. 6.) The court stated that if a nonunanimity instruction must be given, the
following language would be appropriate:
The defendant is accused of having [], [in count] by having engaged in a course
of conduct between [date] and [date]. The People must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in this course of conduct. Each
juror must agree that defendant engaged in acts or omissions that prove the
required course of conduct. As long as each of you is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed some acts or omissions that
prove the course of conduct, you need not all rely on the same acts or omissions
to reach that conclusion.
(Ibid.)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 727–731.
1070

4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 84, Motions
at Trial, § 84.03[2][b], Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][a][i]
(Matthew Bender).
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][c][iii] (Matthew Bender).
1071
The defendant is charged with <insert description[s] of

alleged offense[s]> [in Count[s] ] sometime during the period of
to .
The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that
the defendant committed (this/these) offense[s]. You must not find the
defendant guilty unless:
1. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which
act (he/she) committed [for each offense];
OR
2. You all agree that the People have proved that the defendant
committed all the acts alleged to have occurred during this time
period [and have proved that the defendant committed at least
the number of offenses charged].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
In People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643], the
Court analyzed the due process concerns raised when a witness testifies to
numerous, repeated acts of child molestation over a period of time, but the witness
is unable to give specifics on time and date. The Court held that prosecutions based
on this type of evidence satisfied due process where the testimony met specified
criteria. (Id. at p. 316.) The Court then addressed what type of unanimity instruction
is required in such cases:
In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the
particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be
given. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon [(1985)] 165 Cal. App.3d [839,] 855–856
[defendant raised separate defenses to the two offenses at issue].) But when
there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and
the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them,
the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to
allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also
allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all
the acts described by the victim.
(Id. at pp. 321–322; People v. Matute (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1448 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 472].) If the court concludes that the modified jury instruction is
appropriate, give this instruction. If the court determines that the standard unanimity
1072
instruction is appropriate, give CALCRIM No. 3500, Unanimity.

Give the bracketed portions when the defendant is charged with numerous charges
for the same offense alleged to have occurred during the specified time period. (See
People v. Matute, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448 [15 rapes charged during 15
months].)
AUTHORITY
• Unanimity Required. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th
1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641].
• Instruction Required If Multiple Acts Could Support Single Charge. People v.
Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; People
v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 282 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971]; People
v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]; People v. Alva
(1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 426 [153 Cal.Rptr. 644].
• Generic Testimony. People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321–322 [270
Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540,
555–558 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 43].
SECONDARY SOURCES
Against the Person, § 142.21[1][c][iii] (Matthew Bender).
1073
You must not find the defendant guilty of <insert name of

alleged offense> [in Count ] unless you all agree that the People
have proved specifically that the defendant committed that offense [on]
<insert date or other description of event relied on>.
[Evidence that the defendant may have committed the alleged offense (on
another day/ [or] in another manner) is not sufficient for you to find
(him/her) guilty of the offense charged.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the prosecutor has elected a specific factual basis for the offense alleged but
evidence of multiple acts has been admitted, the court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on the election unless the prosecutor informs the jury of the election.
(People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534–1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].)
AUTHORITY
• Election Required on Demand. People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132
[108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641]; People v. Salvato (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d
872, 882 [285 Cal.Rptr. 837].
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529,
1534–1536 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1074
B. MULTIPLE COUNTS AND COMPLETION OF VERDICT
FORMS
Each of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime [except for
Counts , which are charged as alternative offenses]. You must
consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each
one [except for Counts , which are for lesser included offenses and
will be addressed in other instructions].

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court should give this instruction on request if the defendant is charged with
multiple counts for separate offenses. (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 456
[99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) The court has no sua sponte duty to give this
instruction. (Ibid.)
If the prosecution has charged, in the alternative, more than one offense for the
same event, give CALCRIM No. 3516, Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for
One Event—Dual Conviction Prohibited. Do not give this instruction unless the case
involves both charges for separate events and charges in the alternative for a single
event. In such cases, the court should give both instructions, inserting where
indicated in this instruction the counts that are addressed in CALCRIM No. 3516.
Likewise, if the case involves lesser included offenses, the court should give either
CALCRIM No. 3517, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use
When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not Separately Charged
and the Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser
Offenses (Non-Homicide), or CALCRIM No. 3518, Deliberations and Completion of
Verdict Forms: For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are
Not Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
Each Count (Non-Homicide). (See People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 308–311
[52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].) Do not give this instruction unless the case
involves both charges for separate events and one or more charges with a lesser
included offense. In such cases, the court should give both instructions, inserting
where indicated in this instruction the counts that are addressed in CALCRIM No.
3517 or 3518.
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority for Multiple Charges. Pen. Code, § 954.
1075
• Instructional Requirements. People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 456 [99

Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1076
3516. Multiple Counts: Alternative Charges for One Event—Dual
Conviction Prohibited
<Give this paragraph when the law does not specify which crime must be
sustained or dismissed if the defendant is found guilty of both.>
[The defendant is charged in Count with <insert
name of alleged offense> and in Count with <insert
name of alleged offense>. These are alternative charges. If you find the
defendant guilty of one of these charges, you must find (him/her) not
guilty of the other. You cannot find the defendant guilty of both.]
<Give the following paragraph when the defendant is charged with both theft
and receiving stolen property offenses based on the same incident.>
[The defendant is charged in Count with <insert
theft offense> and in Count with <insert receiving
stolen property offense>. You must first decide whether the defendant is
guilty of <insert name of theft offense>. If you find the
defendant guilty of <insert name of theft offense>, you must
return the verdict form for <insert name of receiving stolen
property offense> unsigned. If you find the defendant not guilty of
<insert theft offense> you must then decide whether the defendant is
guilty of <insert name of receiving stolen property offense>.]
New January 2006; Revised June 2007, October 2010, April 2011
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction where the defendant is
charged in the alternative with multiple counts for a single event. (See People v.
Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; People v.
Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].) This
instruction applies only to those cases in which the defendant may be legally
convicted of only one of the alternative charges. See dual conviction list in Related
Issues section below.
If the evidence raises the issue whether the same act or single event underlies both a
theft conviction and a receiving stolen property conviction, this may be a question
for the jury and the instruction should be modified accordingly.
If the defendant is charged with both theft and receiving stolen property, and the
jury informs the court that it cannot reach a verdict on the theft count, the court
may then instruct the jury to consider the receiving stolen property count.
If the defendant is charged with multiple counts for separate offenses, give
CALCRIM No. 3515, Multiple Counts: Separate Offenses.
1077
If the case involves separately charged greater and lesser offenses, the court should
give CALCRIM No. 3519. Because the law is unclear in this area, the court must
decide whether to give this instruction if the defendant is charged with specific
sexual offenses and, in the alternative, with continuous sexual abuse under Penal
Code section 288.5. If the court decides not to so instruct, and the jury convicts the
defendant of both continuous sexual abuse and one or more specific sexual offenses
that occurred during the same period, the court must then decide which conviction
to dismiss.
AUTHORITY
• Prohibition Against Dual Conviction. People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686,
692 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48]; People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983,
988 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 16 P.3d 118]; People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846,
851 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d
752, 757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].
• Instructional Requirements. See People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89
Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757
[129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].
• Conviction of Receiving Stolen Property Not Possible if Defendant Convicted of
Theft. People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 3–4 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 P.3d
995].
RELATED ISSUES
Dual Conviction May Not Be Based on Necessarily Included Offenses
“[T]his court has long held that multiple convictions may not be based on
necessarily included offenses. The test in this state of a necessarily included offense
is simply that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing
another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.” (People v. Ortega
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48] [emphasis in original,
citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also People v. Montoya (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d 1098].) “In deciding whether an
offense is necessarily included in another, we apply the elements test, asking
whether all the legal ingredients of the corpus delicti of the lesser offense are
included in the elements of the greater offense.” (People v. Montoya, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1034 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)
Dual Conviction—Examples of Offense Where Prohibited or Permitted
The courts have held that dual conviction is prohibited for the following offenses:
• Robbery and theft. People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 699 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d
489, 968 P.2d 48].
• Robbery and receiving stolen property. People v. Stephens (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 575, 586–587 [267 Cal.Rptr. 66].
• Theft and receiving stolen property. People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752,
757 [129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].
1078
• Battery and assault. See People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
• Forgery and check fraud. People v. Hawkins (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 838
[17 Cal.Rptr. 66].
• Forgery and credit card fraud. People v. Cobb (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 1, 4 [93
Cal.Rptr. 152].
The courts have held that dual conviction is permitted for the following offenses
(although dual punishment is not):
• Burglary and theft. People v. Bernal (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1458 [27
Cal.Rptr.2d 839].
• Burglary and receiving stolen property. People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846,
866 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486].
• Carjacking and grand theft. People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
• Carjacking and robbery. People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 700 [80
Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48].
• Carjacking and unlawful taking of a vehicle. People v. Montoya (2004) 33
• Murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. People v. Sanchez
• Murder and child abuse resulting in death. People v. Malfavon (2002) 102
Joy Riding and Receiving Stolen Property
A defendant cannot be convicted of both joy riding (Veh. Code, § 10851) and
receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496), unless the record clearly demonstrates
that the joy riding conviction is based exclusively on the theory that the defendant
drove the car, temporarily depriving the owner of possession, not on the theory that
the defendant stole the car. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 851 [89
Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984 P.2d 486]; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 758–759
[129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706]; People v. Austell (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1249,
1252 [273 Cal.Rptr. 212].)
Accessory and Principal
In People v. Prado (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 273 [136 Cal.Rptr. 521], and People
v. Francis (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 241, 248 [180 Cal.Rptr. 873], the courts held that
the defendant could not be convicted as both a principal and as an accessory after
the fact for the same offense. However, later opinions have criticized these cases,
concluding, “there is no bar to conviction as both principal and accessory where the
evidence shows distinct and independent actions supporting each crime.” (People v.
Mouton (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1324 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 423]; People v. Riley
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1816 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]; see also People v. Nguyen
1079
SECONDARY SOURCES
1080
When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not
Separately Charged and the Jury Receives Guilty and Not Guilty
Verdict Forms for Greater and Lesser Offenses (Non-Homicide)
If all of you find that the defendant is not guilty of a greater charged
crime, you may find (him/her) guilty of a lesser crime if you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that
lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and
lesser crime for the same conduct.
[Now I will explain to you the crimes affected by this instruction
[including lesser crimes of the lesser crimes]:]
[ <insert crime> is a lesser crime of <insert
crime> [charged in Count .]]
It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each crime and
the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser
crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the
corresponding greater crime.
<Give the following paragraphs if the jury has separate guilty and not guilty
forms for both greater and lesser offenses pursuant to Stone v. Superior
Court.>
[[For (the/any) count in which a greater and lesser crime is charged,]
(Y/y)ou will receive verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the greater
crime and also verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the lesser crime.
final verdict form. Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.
1. If all of you agree the People have proved that the defendant is
guilty of the greater crime, complete and sign the verdict form
for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict
form [for that count].
2. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that
the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, inform me only that
you cannot reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any
verdict form [for that count].
3. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the
1081
defendant is guilty of the greater crime and you also agree that
the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime,
complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater
crime and the verdict form for guilty of the lesser crime.
4. If all of you agree the People have not proved that the defendant
is guilty of the greater or lesser crime, complete and sign the
verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict
form for not guilty of the lesser crime.
is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot agree on a
verdict for the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form
for not guilty of the greater crime and inform me only that you
cannot reach an agreement about the lesser crime.]
<Give the following paragraphs if the jury has a combined verdict form for
both greater and lesser offenses.>
[[For (the/any) charge with a lesser crime,] (Y/y)ou will receive a form
for indicating your verdict on both the greater crime and the lesser
crime. The greater crime is listed first. When you have reached a verdict,
have the foreperson complete the form, sign, and date it. Follow these
directions before writing anything on the form.
1. If all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant
is guilty of the greater crime as charged, (write “guilty” in the
blank/circle the word “guilty”/check the box for “guilty”) for that
crime, then sign, date, and return the form. Do not (write/circle/
check) anything for the lesser crime.
the defendant is guilty of the greater crime as charged, inform me
only that you cannot reach an agreement and do not write
anything on the verdict form.
defendant is guilty of the greater crime and you also agree that
the People have proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime,
(write “not guilty” in the blank/circle the words “not
guilty”/check the box for “not guilty”) for the greater crime and
(write “guilty” in the blank/circle the word “guilty”/check the box
for “guilty”) for the lesser crime. You must not (write/circle/
check) anything for the lesser crime unless you have (written/
circled/checked) “not guilty” for the greater crime.
defendant is guilty of either the greater or the lesser crime, (write
“not guilty” in the blank/circle the words “not guilty”/check the
1082
box for “not guilty”) for both the greater crime and the lesser
crime.
defendant is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot
agree on a verdict for the lesser crime, (write “not guilty” in the
blank/circle the words “not guilty”/check the box for “not guilty”)
for the greater crime, then sign, date, and return the form. Do
not (write/circle/check) anything for the lesser crime, and inform
me only that you cannot reach an agreement about that crime.]
Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you
otherwise].
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, February 2012, August 2012,
February 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If lesser included crimes are not charged separately and the jury receives only one
verdict form for each count, the court should use CALCRIM 3518 instead of this
instruction. For separately charged greater and lesser included offenses, use
CALCRIM 3519.
In all cases in which one or more lesser included offenses are submitted to the jury,
whether charged or not, the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the applicable
procedures. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870,
960 P.2d 1094] [duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]; People v. Dewberry
(1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852] [duty to instruct that if jury has
reasonable doubt of greater offense, must acquit of that charge]; People v. Fields
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 309–310 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] [duty to instruct
that jury cannot convict of a lesser included offense unless it has concluded that
defendant not guilty of greater offense].)
the charged and lesser included offenses. The court later referred to this “as a
judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46
Cal.3d 322, 328 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a
mandatory procedure. (Ibid.) If the court chooses not to follow the procedure
1083
suggested in Stone, the court may give CALCRIM No. 3518 in place of this
instruction.
Do not give this instruction for charges of murder or manslaughter; instead give the
appropriate homicide instruction for lesser included offenses: CALCRIM No. 640,
Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant is
Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not Guilty Forms for Each
Level of Homicide, CALCRIM No. 641, Deliberations and Completion of Verdict
Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With First Degree Murder and Jury Is
Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for Each Count; Not to Be Used When
Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter Are Lesser Included Offenses,
When Defendant Is Charged With Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Not
Guilty Forms for Each Level of Homicide, or CALCRIM No. 643, Deliberations
and Completion of Verdict Forms: For Use When Defendant Is Charged With
Second Degree Murder and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict Form for
Each Count; Not to Be Used When Both Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter
Are Lesser Included Offenses.
The court may not control the sequence in which the jury considers the offenses.
(People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 330.)
AUTHORITY
• Lesser Included Offenses—Duty to Instruct. Pen. Code, § 1159; People v.
• Lesser Included Offenses—Standard. People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117
[77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
• Reasonable Doubt as to Degree or Level of Offense. Pen. Code, § 1097; People
v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548, 555–557 [334 P.2d 852].
• Conviction of Lesser Precludes Retrial on Greater. Pen. Code, § 1023; People v.
572].
1084
• Court May Ask Jury to Reconsider Conviction on Lesser If Jury Deadlocked on

Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
RELATED ISSUES
Duty to Instruct on Lesser
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct “on lesser included offenses when the
evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense
were present [citation] but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less
than that charged. [Citations.] The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses
exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the
instruction but expressly objects to its being given. [Citations.] Just as the People
have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that
established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that
evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. [Citations.]” (People v.
Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154–155 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].)
Acquittal of Greater Does Not Bar Retrial of Lesser
Where the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the
lesser is not barred. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 602 [189 Cal.Rptr. 862,
659 P.2d 1152].)
Lesser Included Offenses Barred by Statute of Limitations
The defendant may waive the statute of limitations to obtain a jury instruction on a
lesser offense that would otherwise be time-barred. (Cowan v. Superior Court (1996)
14 Cal.4th 367, 373 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438].) However, the court has no
sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser that is time-barred. (People v. Diedrich
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) If the court instructs
on an uncharged lesser offense that is time-barred without obtaining an explicit
waiver from the defendant, it is unclear if the defendant must object at that time in
order to raise the issue on appeal or if the defendant may raise the issue for the first
time on appeal. (See People v. Stanfill (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145–1151 [90
Cal.Rptr.2d 885] [reasoning criticized in People v. Smith (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
1182, 1193–1194 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 185]].) The better practice is to obtain an explicit
waiver on the statute of limitations when instructing on a time-barred lesser.
Conviction of Greater and Lesser
The defendant cannot be convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense.
(People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763].) If the
evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense, the conviction on the lesser
included offense should be set aside. (Ibid.)
1085
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 708–712.
§ 70.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.03[2][g], 85.05, 85.20 (Matthew Bender).
1086
When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater Crimes Are Not
Separately Charged and Jury Is Given Only One Not Guilty Verdict
Form for Each Count (Non-Homicide)
It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each crime and
the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser
crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the
corresponding greater crime.
[For count[s] , you will receive (a/multiple) verdict form[s]. Follow
these directions before you give me any completed and signed final
verdict form. Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.
for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any other verdict
form [for that count].
is guilty of the greater crime and also agree the People have
proved that (he/she) is guilty of (the/a) lesser crime, complete and
sign the verdict form for guilty of the lesser crime. Do not
complete or sign any other verdict form[s] [for that count].
verdict form for not guilty.
the defendant is guilty of a charged or lesser crime, inform me
1087
only that you cannot reach agreement [as to that count] and do
not complete or sign any verdict form [for that count].]
otherwise].
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, June 2007, April 2010, February 2012,
August 2012, February 2015
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If lesser crimes are not charged separately and the jury receives separate not guilty
and guilty verdict forms for each count, the court should use CALCRIM No. 3517
instead of this instruction. For separately charged greater and lesser included
offenses, use CALCRIM No. 3519.
that jury cannot convict of lesser included offense unless it has concluded that
defendant is not guilty of greater offense]; Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d
503, 519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] [duty to give jury opportunity to render
verdict of partial acquittal on greater offense], clarified in People v. Marshall (1996)
13 Cal.4th 799, 826 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280] [no duty to inquire about
the charged and lesser included offenses. The court later referred to this “as a
judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46
Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) However, this is not a
mandatory procedure. (Ibid.) If the court chooses to follow the procedure suggested
in Stone, the court should give CALCRIM No. 3517 in place of this instruction.
1088

AUTHORITY
[77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
572].
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
1089
RELATED ISSUES
When the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the
659 P.2d 1152].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 708–712.
§ 70.
1090
3519. Deliberations and Completion of Verdict Forms: Lesser
Offenses—For Use When Lesser Included Offenses and Greater
Crimes Are Separately Charged (Non-Homicide)
[ <insert crime>, as charged in Count , is a lesser
crime to <insert crime> [as charged in Count .]]
It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each greater
and lesser crime and the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of
guilty of the lesser crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty
of the greater crime.
[[For (the/any) count in which a greater and lesser crime is charged,]
(Y/y)ou will receive verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for [each/the]
greater crime and lesser crime. Follow these directions before you give
me any completed and signed, final verdict form. Return any unused
verdict forms to me, unsigned.
for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any verdict form
for the [corresponding] lesser crime.
the defendant is guilty of the greater crime, inform me of your
disagreement and do not complete or sign any verdict form for
that crime or the [corresponding] lesser crime.
is guilty of the greater crime and also agree the People have
proved that (he/she) is guilty of the lesser crime, complete and
sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the
verdict form for guilty of the [corresponding] lesser crime. Do not
complete or sign any other verdict forms [for those charges].
1091
verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict
form for not guilty of the [corresponding] lesser crime.
is guilty of the greater crime, but all of you cannot agree on a
verdict for the lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form
for not guilty of the greater crime and inform me about your
disagreement on the lesser crime.]
otherwise].
New June 2007; Revised August 2012, February 2015

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
that jury cannot convict of a lesser included offense unless it has concluded that
defendant not guilty of greater offense]).
Whenever greater and lesser included crimes are separately charged the court must
use this instruction instead of CALCRIM No. 3517 or CALCRIM No. 3518.
1092
Fields, supra,13 Cal.4th at pp. 310–311.) If the jury announces that it is deadlocked
AUTHORITY
[77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].
572].
Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].
RELATED ISSUES
1093
Where the jury acquits of a greater offense but deadlocks on the lesser, retrial of the
659 P.2d 1152].)
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 708–712.
§ 70.
1094
C. ADMONITIONS
3530. Judge’s Comment on the Evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f))
Do not take anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of

what I think about the evidence, the witnesses, or what your verdict
should be.
Now, I will comment on the evidence only to help you decide the issues
in this case.
However, it is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. You
are the sole judges of the evidence and believability of witnesses. It is up
to you and you alone to decide the issues in this case. You may disregard
any or all of my comments about the evidence or give them whatever
weight you believe is appropriate.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
If the court comments on the evidence, the court has a sua sponte duty to give this
instruction. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f); People v.
Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 543 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; People v.
Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], overruled on
other grounds in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr.
159, 658 P.2d 86].)
“[J]udicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative,
and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment,
withdraw material evidence from the jury’s consideration, distort the record,
expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury’s ultimate
factfinding power.” (People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 542.)
The judge may comment on the evidence before the case is submitted to the jury or
after the jury has announced it is deadlocked. (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d
730, 766 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [overruling People v. Cook (1983) 33
Cal.3d 400 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].)
The judge may comment on the evidence at the sanity phase of a trial. (People v.
Scott (1960) 53 Cal.2d 558, 563–565 [2 Cal.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882], overruled in
part by People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 638, fn. 2, 648–649 [36 Cal.Rptr.
201, 388 P.2d 33].)
The judge may comment on the evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial.
1095
(People v. Friend (1958) 50 Cal.2d 570, 579 [327 P.2d 97], overruled on other
grounds in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159,
658 P.2d 86].) However, Friend was decided in 1958, prior to most of the modern
case law on capital trials. Thus, the committee recommends proceeding with great
caution prior to making any comment on the evidence in the penalty phase of a
capital case.
AUTHORITY
• Judge May Comment on Evidence. Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code,
§§ 1127, 1093(f).
• Admonition Required. Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10; Pen. Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f);
People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 543 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d
1100]; People v. Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d
889], overruled on other grounds in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413,
fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].
• Comments Must Not Direct Verdict and Must Be Fair. People v. Proctor (1992)
4 Cal.4th 499, 542 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100]; People v. Brock (1967)
66 Cal.2d 645, 651 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], overruled on other grounds
in People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, fn. 13 [189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658
P.2d 86].
• Judge May Comment After Jury Declares Deadlock. People v. Rodriguez (1986)
42 Cal.3d 730, 766 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 741–746.
Witnesses, § 82.02[2]; Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.02[2][c]
(Matthew Bender).
1096
3531. Service Provider for Juror With Disability (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 224)
<insert name or number of juror> has been assisted by (a/an)

<insert description of service provider, e.g., sign language
interpreter> to communicate and receive information. The
<insert description of service provider> will be with you during your
deliberations. You may not discuss the case with the <insert
description of service provider>. The <insert description of
service provider> is not a member of the jury and is not to participate in
the deliberations in any way other than as necessary to provide the
service to <insert name or number of juror>.
All jurors must be able to fully participate in deliberations. In order to
allow the <insert description of service provider> to properly
assist <insert name or number of juror>, jurors should not
talk at the same time and should not have side conversations. Jurors
should speak directly to <insert name or number of juror>,
not to the <insert description of service provider>.
[Two <insert description of service providers> will be present
during deliberations and will take turns in assisting <insert
name or number of juror>.]
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if a juror will be using the
assistance of a service provider in deliberations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).)
AUTHORITY
• Juror Not Incompetent Due to Disability. Code Civ. Proc., § 203(a)(6).
• Juror May Use Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224.
• Court Must Instruct on Use of Service Provider. Code Civ. Proc., § 224(b).
SECONDARY SOURCES
7 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, §§ 320, 330.
1097
Selection and Opening Statement, § 81.02[2]; Ch. 85, Submission to Jury and
Verdict, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
1098
D. CONCLUDING INSTRUCTION ON SUBMISSION TO
JURY
When you go to the jury room, the first thing you should do is choose a
foreperson. The foreperson should see to it that your discussions are
carried on in an organized way and that everyone has a fair chance to
be heard.
It is your duty to talk with one another and to deliberate in the jury
room. You should try to agree on a verdict if you can. Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but only after you have discussed the
evidence with the other jurors. Do not hesitate to change your mind if
you become convinced that you are wrong. But do not change your mind
just because other jurors disagree with you.
Keep an open mind and openly exchange your thoughts and ideas about
this case. Stating your opinions too strongly at the beginning or
immediately announcing how you plan to vote may interfere with an
open discussion. Please treat one another courteously. Your role is to be
an impartial judge of the facts, not to act as an advocate for one side or
the other.
As I told you at the beginning of the trial, do not talk about the case or
about any of the people or any subject involved in it with anyone,
including, but not limited to, your spouse or other family, or friends,
spiritual leaders or advisors, or therapists. You must discuss the case
only in the jury room and only when all jurors are present. Do not
discuss your deliberations with anyone. Do not communicate using:
<insert currently popular social media> during your
deliberations.
It is very important that you not use the Internet (, a dictionary/[, or
<insert other relevant source of information>]) in any way in
connection with this case during your deliberations.
[During the trial, several items were received into evidence as exhibits.
You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help you in your
deliberations. (These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you
when you begin to deliberate./ If you wish to see any exhibits, please
request them in writing.)]
If you need to communicate with me while you are deliberating, send a
note through the bailiff, signed by the foreperson or by one or more
members of the jury. To have a complete record of this trial, it is
1099
important that you not communicate with me except by a written note.

If you have questions, I will talk with the attorneys before I answer so it
may take some time. You should continue your deliberations while you
wait for my answer. I will answer any questions in writing or orally here
in open court.
Do not reveal to me or anyone else how the vote stands on the (question
of guilt/[or] issues in this case) unless I ask you to do so.
Your verdict [on each count and any special findings] must be
unanimous. This means that, to return a verdict, all of you must agree to
it. [Do not reach a decision by the flip of a coin or by any similar act.]
<During a retrial, give the following paragraph on request to inform jury
about prior proceedings without introducing extraneous matters>
[Sometimes issues are tried in separate trials. The only issue in this trial
is whether the People have proved the charge[s] of <insert
description of charge[s]> [in Count[s] ]. Do not speculate about
whether the defendant was already found guilty for (his/her) conduct or
may be found guilty in the future in another trial. Do not consider any
potential punishment.]
It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be. [Do not take
anything I said or did during the trial as an indication of what I think
about the facts, the witnesses, or what your verdict should be.]
You must reach your verdict without any consideration of punishment.
You will be given [a] verdict form[s]. As soon as all jurors have agreed
on a verdict, the foreperson must date and sign the appropriate verdict
form[s] and notify the bailiff. [If you are able to reach a unanimous
decision on only one or only some of the (charges/ [or] defendants), fill in
(that/those) verdict form[s] only, and notify the bailiff.] Return any
unsigned verdict form.
New January 2006; Revised April 2008, October 2010, April 2011, September 2018
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct that the jury’s verdict must be
unanimous. Although there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on the other topics
relating to deliberations, there is authority approving such instructions. (See People
v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; People v.
Selby (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426]; People v. Hunt (1915) 26 Cal.App.
514, 517 [147 P. 476].)
If the court automatically sends exhibits into the jury room, give the bracketed
1100
sentence that begins with “These exhibits will be sent into the jury room.” If not,
give the bracketed phrase that begins with “You may examine whatever exhibits you
think.”
Give the bracketed sentence that begins with “Do not take anything I said or did
during the trial” unless the court will be commenting on the evidence. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 1127, 1093(f).)
Give the bracketed paragraph that begins with “Sometimes issues are tried in
separate trials” if requested. (People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205 [226
Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].)
AUTHORITY
• Exhibits. Pen. Code, § 1137.
• Questions. Pen. Code, § 1138.
• Verdict Forms. Pen. Code, § 1140.
• Unanimous Verdict. Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Howard (1930) 211 Cal.
322, 325 [295 P. 333]; People v. Kelso (1945) 25 Cal.2d 848, 853–854 [155 P.2d
819]; People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 692 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d
742].
861, 566 P.2d 997].
514, 517 [147 P. 476].
• Do Not Consider Punishment. People v. Nichols (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 21, 24
[62 Cal.Rptr.2d 433].
• Hung Jury. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 850–852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861,
566 P.2d 997]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118–1121 [117
Cal.Rptr.2d 715].
• This Instruction Upheld. People v. Santiago (2010) 178 Cal.App.4th 1471,
1475–1476 [101 Cal.Rptr.3d 257].
• Special Instruction for Retrial Jury. People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 205
[226 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407 P.3d 409].
RELATED ISSUES
Admonition Not to Discuss Case with Anyone
1101
(Id. at p. 306, fn. 11.)
The court may, at its discretion, add the suggested language to the fourth paragraph
SECONDARY SOURCES
§§ 726–727.
Submission to Jury and Verdict, §§ 85.02, 85.03[1], 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
1102
Sometimes juries that have had difficulty reaching a verdict are able to
resume deliberations and successfully reach a verdict [on one or more
counts]. Please consider the following suggestions.
Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views. Fair and effective jury
deliberations require a frank and forthright exchange of views.
Each of you must decide the case for yourself and form your individual
opinion after you have fully and completely considered all of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. It is your duty as jurors to deliberate
with the goal of reaching a verdict if you can do so without surrendering
your individual judgment. Do not change your position just because it
differs from that of other jurors or just because you or others want to
reach a verdict. Both the People and the Defendant are entitled to the
individual judgment of each juror.
It is up to you to decide how to conduct your deliberations. You may
want to consider new approaches in order to get a fresh perspective.
Let me know whether I can do anything to help you further, such as give
additional instructions or clarify instructions I have already given you.
Please continue your deliberations at this time. If you wish to
communicate with me further, please do so in writing [using the form
my bailiff has given you].
New February 2012

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
There is no sua sponte duty to instruct a deadlocked jury on continuing its
deliberations. Nevertheless, courts of review have approved instruction on the topics
covered in this instruction (See People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 856 [139
Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1118
[117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].) The court may give this instruction if the jury announces
that it is unable to reach a verdict. In case of an impasse, Penal Code Section 1140
vests the trial court with discretion to determine whether there is a reasonable
probability of agreement among jurors. California Rules of Court, Rule 2.1036
further explains the court’s role in such a case.
AUTHORITY
• Allen Charge Disapproved. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 842 [139
Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].
861, 566 P.2d 997].
1103
• Alternate Methods of Deliberation. People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105,
1118 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].
SECONDARY SOURCES
§ 44.
Submission to Jury and Verdict. § 85.05 (Matthew Bender).
1104
E. ALTERNATES
3575. Substitution of Alternate Juror: During Deliberations (Pen.
Code, § 1089)
One of your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror has
been selected to join the jury.
Do not consider this substitution for any purpose.
The alternate juror must participate fully in the deliberations that lead
to any verdict. The People and the defendant[s] have the right to a
verdict reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes
determine that verdict. This right will only be assured if you begin your
deliberations again, from the beginning. Therefore, you must set aside
and disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over
again. Each of you must disregard the earlier deliberations and decide
this case as if those earlier deliberations had not taken place.
Now, please return to the jury room and start your deliberations from
the beginning.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction if an alternate juror has
been seated. (People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782,
552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th
381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].)
If an alternate juror is seated during the penalty phase of a capital trial but prior to
submission of the penalty phase to the jury, give CALCRIM No. 3576, Substitution
of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt Determination, Before Submission of
Penalty Phase to Jury.
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority to Seat Alternate Juror. Pen. Code, § 1089.
• Jury Must Be Instructed to Disregard Previous Deliberations. People v. Collins
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on
other grounds in People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127
Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; People v. Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552,
559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287].
SECONDARY SOURCES
1105
Selection and Opening Statement, §§ 81.01[2], 81.05[4]; Ch. 85, Submission to Jury
and Verdict, § 85.05[1] (Matthew Bender).
1106
3576. Substitution of Alternate Juror in Capital Case: After Guilt
Determination, Before Submission of Penalty Phase to Jury (Pen.
Code, § 1089)
One of your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror has
been selected to take (his/her) place, as provided by law.
For the purposes of this phase of the trial, the alternate juror must
accept [all] the verdict[s] and finding[s] returned by the jury in the prior
phase[s] of the trial.
In this phase of the trial, you must now determine what penalty is
appropriate in light of the prior verdict[s] and finding[s] and all the
other evidence that bears on this question. The People and the
defendant[s] have the right to a verdict on the issue of penalty that is
reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes determine
that verdict. This right may be assured only if the alternate juror
participates fully in the deliberations, including any necessary review of
the evidence presented in the prior phase[s] of this trial.
New January 2006

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction may be used if an alternate juror has been seated for the penalty
phase of a capital trial. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 66–67 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d
481, 892 P.2d 1224]; People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131
Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in People v. Boyette
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) It is unclear
if the court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction. (Compare People v. Cain,
supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 66–67 [instruction approved]; People v. Renteria (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 552, 559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287] [court required to give Collins
instruction when juror substituted during guilt deliberations; noncapital case]; People
v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1030 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519] [no
error in failing to give instruction on beginning guilt phase deliberations anew
where alternate juror seated for penalty phase]). The preferred approach would be to
give the instruction when relevant.
In People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 64–65 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224],
the trial court gave a longer explanation of what verdicts and findings the alternate
juror was required to accept. The committee believes that the second paragraph of
this instruction sufficiently explains this concept. However, if the court would like to
provide a more detailed explanation, the court may insert the following after that
paragraph:
For (that/those) offense[s] for which the jury returned a verdict of guilty and for
1107
(that/those) special circumstance[s] that the jury found to be true, the alternate
juror must accept that those matters have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Similarly, for ((that/those) offense[s] for which the jury returned a
verdict of not guilty/ [and] for (that/those) special circumstance[s] that the jury
found (was/were) not proved), the alternate juror must accept that (that/those)
matter[s] (has/have) not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.] [The alternate
juror must also accept the jury’s finding at the sanity phase of this trial.]
If the defendant requests an instruction on lingering doubt regarding guilt, the court
should review the instruction approved of in People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp.
64–65. However, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on lingering doubt.
(People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1030.)
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority to Seat Alternate Juror. Pen. Code, § 1089.
• Alternate Juror Seated During Deliberations: Must Be Instructed to Disregard
Previous Deliberations. People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693–694 [131
Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742], overruled on other grounds in People v. Boyette
Renteria (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 559 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 287].
• Alternate Juror Seated Prior to Penalty Phase. People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th
1, 66–67 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25
SECONDARY SOURCES
1108
To the alternate juror[s]: The jury (will soon begin/is now) deliberating,
but you are still [an] alternate juror[s] and are bound by my earlier
instructions about your conduct.
Do not talk about the case or about any of the people or any subject
involved in it with anyone, not even your family or friends[, and not
even with each other]. Do not have any contact with the deliberating
jurors. Do not decide how you would vote if you were deliberating. Do
not form or express an opinion about the issues in this case, unless you
are substituted for one of the deliberating jurors.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
This instruction is provided for the court to use at its discretion.
1109
You have now completed your jury service in this case. On behalf of all
the judges of the court, please accept my thanks for your time and
effort.
Now that the case is over, you may choose whether or not to discuss the
case and your deliberations with anyone.
[I remind you that under California law, you must wait at least 90 days
before negotiating or agreeing to accept any payment for information
about the case.]
Let me tell you about some rules the law puts in place for your
convenience and protection.
The lawyers in this case, the defendant[s], or their representatives may
now talk to you about the case, including your deliberations or verdict.
Those discussions must occur at a reasonable time and place and with
your consent.
Please tell me immediately if anyone unreasonably contacts you without
your consent.
Anyone who violates these rules is violating a court order and may be
fined.
[I order that the court’s record of personal juror identifying information,
including names, addresses, and telephone numbers, be sealed until
further order of this court.
If, in the future, the court is asked to decide whether this information
will be released, notice will be sent to any juror whose information is
involved. You may oppose the release of this information and ask that
any hearing on the release be closed to the public. The court will decide
whether and under what conditions any information may be disclosed.]
Again, thank you for your service. You are now excused.

BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
The court has a sua sponte duty to give this instruction on discharge of the jury.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 206.) The court may give the bracketed portions at its discretion.
(Id., § 237.)
1111
Code of Civil Procedure section 237(a)(2) requires the court to seal the personal
identifying information of jurors in a criminal case following the recording of the
jury’s verdict. Access to the sealed records may be permitted on a showing of good
cause in a petition to the court, as provided by subdivisions (b) through (d).
Section 14 of the California Standards of Judicial Administration states that “it is
appropriate for the trial judge to thank jurors for their public service, but the judge’s
comments should not include praise or criticism of the verdict or the failure to reach
a verdict.”
AUTHORITY
• Statutory Authority. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 206, 237.
• Jury Tampering. Pen. Code, § 116.5.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Submission to Jury and Verdict, § 85.05[1], [4][c] (Matthew Bender).
1112
Disposition Table
DT-1
Tables of Related Instructions
TRI-1
Table 1 Tables of Related Instructions
TRI-2
Tables of Related Instructions Table 1
TRI-3
TRI-4
TRI-5
TRI-6
TRI-7
TRI-8
TRI-9
TABLE OF CASES
[References are to the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), e.g., 1900]
A Akey; People v., 163 Cal. 54, 124 P. 718 (1912). .1190
Akins; People v., 56 Cal.App.4th 331, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 338
A.L., In re, 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 250 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
(2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2656
Alberts; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 1424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
Abodeely; United States v., 801 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 401 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1520
1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2843
Albillar; People v., 51 Cal.4th 47, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 415,
Abrahamian; People v., 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 258 244 P.3d 1062 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . 1400, 1401
Cal.Rptr.3d 670 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1930
Albritton; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d
Acero; People v., 161 Cal.App.3d 217, 208 Cal.Rptr. 565 169 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
(1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401
Alcala; People v., 4 Cal.4th 742, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842
Acevedo; People v., 105 Cal.App.4th 195, 129 P.2d 1192 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400
Cal.Rptr.2d 270 (2003). . . . . . . . . . .2180–2182
Aledamat; People v., 8 Cal.5th 1, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 371,
Adames; People v., 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 447 P.3d 277 (2019). .511; 524; 860; 862, 863; 875;
631 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120 982, 983; 2503; 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145
Adami; People v., 36 Cal.App.3d 452, 111 Cal.Rptr. 544 Alejandro G., In re, 37 Cal.App.4th 44, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .460 471 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2690
Adams; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d Alford; People v., 235 Cal.App.3d 799, 286 Cal.Rptr. 762
512 (1993). . . . . . .1001; 1016; 1031; 1046; 1601 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908; 935
Adams; People v., 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 131 Cal.Rptr. 190 Allen; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 846, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 26
(1976). . .2100–2102; 2110, 2111; 2113, 2114; 2965 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2800; 2810
Adams; People v., 93 Cal.App.4th 1192, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d Allen; People v., 21 Cal.4th 424, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 981
722, 113 A.L.R.5th 729 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . 830 P.2d 525 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3100
Adams; People v., 137 Cal. 580, 70 P. 662 (1902) . 105; Allen; People v., 21 Cal.4th 846, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 984
226 P.2d 486 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701; 3516
Adams; People v., 137 Cal.App.3d 346, 187 Cal.Rptr. 505 Allen; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 7
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .965 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Adcox; People v., 47 Cal.3d 207, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 Allen; People v., 86 Cal.App.4th 909, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 906 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 626 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
Adrian; People v., 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 Allen; People v., 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 167 Cal.Rptr. 502
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653; 2656; 2670
Agnew; People v., 16 Cal.2d 655, 107 P.2d 601 Allen; People v., 115 Cal.App.2d 745, 252 P.2d 968
(1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226; 1240–1242 (1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2994
Aguilar; People v., 16 Cal.4th 1023, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, Alleyne; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 1256, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d
945 P.2d 1204 (1997) . 511; 524; 860; 862, 863; 875; 737 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
982, 983; 2503; 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145
Allison; People v., 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 932, 226 P.2d
Aguilar; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 85 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2200
619 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .810; 3177
Alonzo; People v., 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d
Aguilar; People v., 120 Cal.App.4th 1044, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 656 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
231 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3175
Alva, In re, 33 Cal.4th 254, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 811, 92 P.3d
Aguilar; People v., 214 Cal.App.3d 1434, 263 Cal.Rptr. 311 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
314 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Alva; People v., 90 Cal.App.3d 418, 153 Cal.Rptr. 644
Aguilera v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.App.2d 848, 78 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3500, 3501
Cal.Rptr. 736 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Alvarado; People v., 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d
Aguirre; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 391, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3178; 3180
48 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3426
Alvarado; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 23
Ahmed; People v., 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d Cal.Rptr.3d 391 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2953
472 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3412, 3413
Alvarado; People v., 224 Cal.App.3d 1165, 274 Cal.Rptr.
Aikin; People v., 19 Cal.App.3d 685, 97 Cal.Rptr. 251 452 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1602
(1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .548
TC-1

TABLE OF CASES AS
Alvarez; People v., 14 Cal.4th 155, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, Antick; People v., 15 Cal.3d 79, 123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539
926 P.2d 365 (1996) . . . . . . . 251, 252; 334, 335; P.2d 43 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500; 561
540A–540C; 2510–2512 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348,
Alvarez; People v., 27 Cal.4th 1161, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). . .523–525; 601, 602; 764;
46 P.3d 372. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359 1354; 1401, 1402; 2160; 2541–2546; 2561, 2562;
Amber S., In re, 33 Cal.App.4th 185, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 2720; 3100–3103; 3115–3117; 3130–3132;
(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 3145–3150; 3160–3163; 3175–3183; 3185; 3200,
Andersen; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 32 3201; 3221–3223
Cal.Rptr.2d 442 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . 2100; 2110 Aragon; People v., 207 Cal.App.4th 504, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d
Anderson v. California, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1082, 476 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764 Aranda; People v., 55 Cal.4th 342, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 855,
Anderson; People v., 5 Cal.5th 372, 235 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 283 P.3d 632 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
420 P.3d 825 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768 Archer; People v., 98 Cal.App.4th 402, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d
Anderson; People v., 15 Cal.3d 806, 126 Cal.Rptr. 235, 783 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1160
543 P.2d 603 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1821 Arias v. California, 520 U.S. 1251, 117 S.Ct. 2408, 138
Anderson; People v., 25 Cal.4th 543, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d L.Ed.2d 175 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . 760, 761; 763
575, 22 P.3d 347 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764 Arias; People v., 13 Cal.4th 92, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913
Anderson; People v., 28 Cal.4th 767, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 980 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760, 761; 763
587, 50 P.3d 368 (2002) . . . . . . . . . 540A; 3402 Aris; People v., 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167
Anderson; People v., 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505; 2514; 3470
742 P.2d 1306 . 701–703; 720, 721; 730; 1905; 1930; Arnold; People v., 145 Cal.App.4th 1408, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d
1935; 1954; 1970 545 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2510–2512
Anderson; People v., 51 Cal.4th 989, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d Arroyas; People v., 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d
408, 252 P.3d 968 (2011) . . . 510; 840; 1863; 3404; 380 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1401
3406 Arvanites; People v., 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 95 Cal.Rptr.
Anderson; People v., 57 Cal.App. 721, 208 P. 204 493 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1240
(1922) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3471 Ashley; People v., 42 Cal.2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 . . 1804,
Anderson; People v., 64 Cal.2d 633, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 1805
414 P.2d 366 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1650 Atchison; People v., 22 Cal.3d 181, 148 Cal.Rptr. 881,
Anderson; People v., 70 Cal.2d 15, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 583 P.2d 735 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122
P.2d 942 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 601; 701 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153
Anderson; People v., 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368, L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 775
28 Cal.4th 767 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402 Atkins; People v., 25 Cal.4th 76, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738, 18
Anderson; People v., 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 258 Cal.Rptr. P.3d 660 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . 1515; 1750; 3426
482 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 Atkins; People v., 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d
Anderson; People v., 232 Cal.App.4th 1259, 182 283 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2651
Cal.Rptr.3d 276 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3413 Atkins; People v., 53 Cal.App.3d 348, 125 Cal.Rptr. 855
Anderson; People v., 233 Cal.App.3d 1646, 285 Cal.Rptr. (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821–823
523 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571 Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder. (People v.
Anderson; People v., 235 Cal.App.4th 93, 185 Chandler, 60 Cal.4th 508, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548, 332
Cal.Rptr.3d 128 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1863 P.3d 538 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Andrade; People v., 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d Atwood; People v., 223 Cal.App.2d 316, 35 Cal.Rptr. 831
254 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1551 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357; 362; 371
Andrews; People v., 49 Cal.3d 200, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, Aurelio R., In re, 167 Cal.App.3d 52, 212 Cal.Rptr. 868
776 P.2d 285 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730; 750 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560, 561
Andrews; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 1173, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d Ausbie; People v., 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d
683, 64 Cal. Comp. Cases 1377 (1999) . . . . . 2650 371 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801; 3160
Andrews; People v., 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 184 Austell; People v., 223 Cal.App.3d 1249, 273 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.3d 183 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . .935; 938 212 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3516
Annin; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 725, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d Austin; People v., 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 168 Cal.Rptr. 401
712 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170 (1980) . . . . . . . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1120; 1152
TC-2

AS TABLE OF CASES
Autry; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 Ballard; United States v., 535 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.
(1995) . . . 240; 520; 540C; 572; 580, 581; 590–594; 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2811; 2825
732; 2002; 2100–2102; 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; Bammes; People v., 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 71 Cal.Rptr.
2180; 2577, 2578; 2763; 2964, 2965 415 (1968). . . . . . .2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; 2160
Avalos; People v., 37 Cal.3d 216, 207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 Banks; People v., 61 Cal.4th 788, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 208,
P.2d 121 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640–643 351 P.3d 330 (2015). . . . . . . . .540B, 540C; 703
Avery; People v., 27 Cal.4th 49, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 Banks; People v., 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 137 Cal.Rptr. 652
P.3d 1 (2002). . . . . . . . .1600; 1800; 1805; 3180 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 507; 2514; 3470
Avila; People v., 38 Cal.4th 491, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 Barajas; People v., 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 193 Cal.Rptr.
P.3d 1076 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335 750 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104; 222
Avila; People v., 80 Cal.App.4th 791, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 651 Baranov; People v., 201 Cal.App.2d 52, 19 Cal.Rptr. 866
(2000). . . . . . . . . . . . .1002; 1017; 1032; 1047 (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641
Avina; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d Baratang; People v., 56 Cal.App.5th 252, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d
511 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120; 3500 280 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1807
Ayala; People v., 181 Cal.App.4th 1440, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d Barba; People v., 211 Cal.App.4th 214, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d
575 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 371 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2040
Azevedo; People v., 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 207 Cal.Rptr. Barber; People v., 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d
270 (1984) . . . 2500; 2502; 2510–2513; 2560; 2562; 712 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2200
2570; 2572–2575; 2579; 2591, 2592 Barker; People v., 34 Cal.4th 345, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96
P.3d 507 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250; 1170
B Barker; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 1166, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d
403 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Babaali; People v., 171 Cal.App.4th 982, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d
278 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937, 938 Barnes; People v., 42 Cal.3d 284, 228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721
P.2d 110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Babbitt; People v., 45 Cal.3d 660, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755
P.2d 253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760, 761; 775; 3425 Barnes; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 552, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d
162 (1997) . . . 1141, 1142; 1550; 1704; 2302–2304;
Babich; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 801, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
2306; 2335–2338; 2350; 2352; 2361; 2375, 2376;
60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240; 1243; 3414
2380; 2390; 2410; 2430–2432; 2441; 2748
Bacon, In re, 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 Cal.Rptr. 322
Barnett; People v., 17 Cal.4th 1044, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121,
(1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2656; 2686, 2687
954 P.2d 384 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Bailey; People v., 38 Cal.App.3d 693, 113 Cal.Rptr. 514
Barnett; People v., 54 Cal.App.3d 1046, 127 Cal.Rptr. 88
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Bailey; People v., 54 Cal.4th 740, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 647,
Barney; People v., 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 192 Cal.Rptr.
279 P.3d 1120 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 460; 2760
172 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Bailey; People v., 55 Cal.2d 514, 11 Cal.Rptr. 543, 360
Barraza; People v., 23 Cal.3d 675, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591
P.2d 39 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1802
P.2d 947 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3408
Bailey; United States v., 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62
Barre; People v., 11 Cal.App.4th 961, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 307
L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3402
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
Baker; People v., 69 Cal.2d 44, 69 Cal.Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d
Barrera; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
675 (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1180
395. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .810; 3177
Baker; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 243, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 803
Barrios; People v., 163 Cal.App.4th 270, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506
456 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2650
Baker; People v., 88 Cal.App.3d 115, 151 Cal.Rptr. 362
Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal.3d 821, 83 Cal.Rptr.
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830
819, 464 P.2d 483 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . .1161
Baker-Riley; People v., 207 Cal.App.4th 631, 143
Barton; People v., 12 Cal.4th 186, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569,
Cal.Rptr.3d 737 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .560
906 P.2d 531 (1995). .506; 510; 570, 571; 603, 604;
Balcom; People v., 7 Cal.4th 414, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 1070–1072; 1501, 1502; 1515; 1530–1532; 2980
867 P.2d 777 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Basinger, In re, 45 Cal.3d 1348, 249 Cal.Rptr. 110, 756
Balderas; People v., 41 Cal.3d 144, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, P.2d 833 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1806
711 P.2d 480 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . 300; 764, 765
Baskins; People v., 72 Cal.App.2d 728, 165 P.2d 510
Ball, In re, 23 Cal.App.3d 380, 100 Cal.Rptr. 189 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2930
Basuta; People v., 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d
Ballard; People v., 203 Cal.App.3d 311, 249 Cal.Rptr. 285 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
806 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841
TC-3

TABLE OF CASES AS
Battle; People v., 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d Beltran; People v., 56 Cal.4th 935, 157 Cal.Rptr. 3d 503,
828 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 301 P.3d 1120 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Baugh; People v., 20 Cal.App.5th 438, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d Bender; People v., 27 Cal.2d 164, 163 P.2d 8
898 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224; 521; 601
Bay; People v., 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 Benenato; People v., 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 175 P.2d 296
(2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1704 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417; 1151
Bayles, In re, 47 Cal.App. 517, 190 P. 1034 Bennett; People v., 54 Cal.3d 1032, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 819
(1920) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800 P.2d 849 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590; 592
Beagle; People v., 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 Benson; People v., 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802
P.2d 1 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316; 3515 P.2d 330 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763–766
Beames; People v., 40 Cal.4th 907, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, Benson; People v., 206 Cal.App.2d 519, 23 Cal.Rptr. 908
153 P.3d 955 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2000–2002
Bean; People v., 213 Cal.App.3d 639, 261 Cal.Rptr. 784 Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 P. 143, 15
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850 A.L.R. 373 (1917) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700
Beardslee; People v., 53 Cal.3d 68, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, Bernal; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d
806 P.2d 1311 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . 725; 3500 839 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3516
Beasley; People v., 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 130 Bernhardt; People v., 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 35 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.2d 717 (2003) . . . . . . . 3130; 3145; 3410 401 (1963) . . . 240; 250–252; 520; 540C; 572; 580,
Beaumaster; People v., 17 Cal.App.3d 996, 95 Cal.Rptr. 581; 590–594; 620; 732; 840; 2002; 2100–2102;
360 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; 2180; 2577, 2578; 2763;
Beck and Cruz; People v., 8 Cal.5th 548, 256 Cal.Rptr.3d 2964, 2965; 3223; 3411
1, 453 P.3d 1038 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 Berry, In re, 68 Cal.2d 137, 65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d
Becker; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 294, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 273, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2657 . . . . . . 2700, 2701
354 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3115; 3117 Berry; People v., 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416
Beeman; People v., 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2950, 2951
P.2d 1318 (1984) . 400–403; 443; 540B, 540C; 1001; Berry; People v., 18 Cal.3d 509, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556
1046; 1354; 2401 P.2d 777 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Beesly; People v., 119 Cal.App. 82, 6 P.2d 114 Berry; People v., 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 172 Cal.Rptr. 756
(1931). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2320, 2321 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3227; 3231
Beeson; People v., 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d Best; People v., 143 Cal.App.3d 232, 191 Cal.Rptr. 614
384 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Beggs; People v., 178 Cal. 79, 172 P. 152 (1918) . 1830 Bettasso; People v., 49 Cal.App.5th 1050, 263
Beilfuss; People v., 59 Cal.App.2d 83, 138 P.2d 332 Cal.Rptr.3d 563 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .520
(1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804 Bigelow; People v., 37 Cal.3d 731, 209 Cal.Rptr. 328,
Bejarano; People v., 114 Cal.App.3d 693, 173 Cal.Rptr. 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723 . . . 720; 723; 1202
71 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3231 Billa; People v., 31 Cal.4th 1064, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79
Bekele; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 1457, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d P.3d 542 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 525; 540A–540C
797 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1650 Binkerd; People v., 155 Cal.App.4th 1143, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d
Belanger; People v., 243 Cal.App.2d 654, 52 Cal.Rptr. 675 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2100
660 (1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2966 Birks; People v., 19 Cal.4th 108, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960
Bell; People v., 49 Cal. 485 (1875). . . . . . . . . .350 P.2d 1073 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519
Bell; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 249, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 808 Birreuta; People v., 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr.
(2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306 635 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Bell; People v., 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d Bishop; United States v., 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36
300 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1215 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973) . . . . . 2801; 2812; 2825; 2828
Bell; People v., 201 Cal.App.3d 1396, 248 Cal.Rptr. 57 Bittaker, In re, 55 Cal.App.4th 1004, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 679
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .521
Belmares; People v., 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d Bittaker; People v., 48 Cal.3d 1046, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630,
400 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2652 774 P.2d 659 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861 (2003) . . . . 763 Black; People v., 41 Cal.4th 799, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 161
Belton; People v., 23 Cal.3d 516, 153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.3d 1130 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234
P.2d 485 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334; 707
TC-4

AS TABLE OF CASES
Black; People v., 103 Cal.App.2d 69, 229 P.2d 61 Bolter; People v., 90 Cal.App.4th 240, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3404 760 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725
Black; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 523, 271 Cal.Rptr. 771 Booth; People v., 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822 202 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Black; United States v., 843 F.2d 1456, 269 U.S. App. Borchers; People v., 50 Cal.2d 321, 325 P.2d 97
D.C. 128 (D.C. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2845 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570
Blake; People v., 117 Cal.App.4th 543, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d Boro v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 210
678 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3130 Cal.Rptr. 122 (1985) . . . . . . . . 1003; 1033; 1048
Blakeley; People v., 23 Cal.4th 82, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, Borrelli; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 703, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d
999 P.2d 675 (2000). .505; 520; 571, 572; 580, 581; 851 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301
604; 625; 925 Bosco v. Justice Court, 77 Cal.App.3d 179, 143 Cal.Rptr.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 468 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2400
159 L.Ed.2d 403, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 619 (2004).3250, Bostick; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 287, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d
3251 760 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Blakeslee; People v., 2 Cal.App.3d 831, 82 Cal.Rptr. 839 Boswell; People v., 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .362 244 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520, 521
Blalock; People v., 20 Cal.App.3d 1078, 98 Cal.Rptr. 231 Bottger; People v., 142 Cal.App.3d 974, 191 Cal.Rptr.
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 408 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442
Blanco; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 1167, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d Bouchard; People v., 49 Cal.2d 438, 317 P.2d 971
176 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 (1957). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .510
Blanco; People v., 61 Cal.App.5th 278, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d Boulet; United States v., 577 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir.
558 (2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2749 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2843
Bland; People v., 10 Cal.4th 991, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 Boulware; People v., 41 Cal.App.2d 268, 106 P.2d 436
P.2d 391 (1995) . 3115–3117; 3131, 3132; 3145–3147 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590–593; 2100–2102
Bland; People v., 28 Cal.4th 313, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 Bouzas; People v., 53 Cal.3d 467, 279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807
P.3d 1107 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . .562; 600; 1551 P.2d 1076 (1991) . . . 1121, 1122; 1160; 1170; 1850
Blassingill; People v., 199 Cal.App.3d 1413, 245 Bowers; People v., 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d
Cal.Rptr. 599 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190 74 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3453
Bledsoe; People v., 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 Bowie; People v., 72 Cal.App.3d 143, 140 Cal.Rptr. 49
P.2d 291 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851; 1192 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1930
Blitzstein v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 199 Cal.App.3d Bowker; People v., 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal. Rptr.
138, 244 Cal.Rptr. 624 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . 2131 886 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1193
Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal.3d 71, 127 Cal.Rptr. Bowley; People v., 59 Cal.2d 855, 31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382
317, 545 P.2d 229 (1976) . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143 P.2d 591, 96 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1963) . . 334, 335; 707,
Bloyd; People v., 43 Cal.3d 333, 233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 708
P.2d 802 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . 223, 224; 704, 705 Box; People v., 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d
Bobb; People v., 207 Cal.App.3d 88, 254 Cal.Rptr. 707 130 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070–1072; 2980 Boyd; People v., 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d
Bodely; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 311, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 782 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2682; 2736
(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3261 Boyd; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 271 Cal.Rptr. 738
Boggs; People v., 107 Cal.App. 492, 290 P. 618 (1990) . . 334, 335; 401; 403; 707, 708; 1400; 2401;
(1930) . . 1004; 1016; 1019, 1020; 1034; 1049, 1050 2542
Bohannon; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 798, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d Boyer v. Waples, 206 Cal.App.2d 725, 24 Cal.Rptr. 192
488 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3475, 3476
Bohmer; People v., 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 120 Cal.Rptr. 136 Boyette; People v., 29 Cal.4th 381, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544,
(1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 401; 707, 708 58 P.3d 391 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . .3575, 3576
Bolden; People v., 29 Cal.4th 515, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, Brackins; People v., 37 Cal.App.5th 56, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d
58 P.3d 931 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701; 730 261 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2622
Bolden; People v., 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 266 Cal.Rptr. Bradford; People v., 14 Cal.4th 1005, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225,
724 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3453 929 P.2d 544 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . .372; 1600
Bolin; People v., 18 Cal.4th 297, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 Bradford; People v., 95 Cal.App.2d 372, 213 P.2d 37
P.2d 374 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300 (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2995
TC-5

TABLE OF CASES AS
Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) . 3408 Brooks; People v., 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 210 Cal.Rptr. 90
Brady; People v., 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 286 Cal.Rptr. 19 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1802
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1801 Brooks; People v., 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 230 Cal.Rptr. 86
Bramit; People v., 46 Cal.4th 1221, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570
210 P.3d 1171 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 Brothers; People v., 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d
Branch; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
870 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 1191A Broussard; People v., 76 Cal.App.3d 193, 142 Cal.Rptr.
Branch; People v., 184 Cal.App.4th 516, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 664 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
412 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150, 1151 Brown, In re, 9 Cal.3d 612, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d
Brannon; People v., 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 108 Cal.Rptr. 1017 (1973) . . . . . . . . . 2685, 2686; 2689, 2690
620 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2130 Brown; People v., 6 Cal.App.3d 619, 86 Cal.Rptr. 149
Bransford; People v., 8 Cal.4th 885, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 613, (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334
884 P.2d 70 (1994). . . . . .2101, 2102; 2111; 2114 Brown; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 1489, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 513
Braver; People v., 229 Cal.App.2d 303, 40 Cal.Rptr. 142 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3477
(1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 1970 Brown; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d
Bravott; People v., 183 Cal.App.3d 93, 227 Cal.Rptr. 810 76 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2736; 2761; 2763 Brown; People v., 31 Cal.4th 518, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73
Braz; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 1, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d P.3d 1137 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 761; 764
553. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1950 Brown; People v., 33 Cal.4th 892, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94
Bregman; United States v., 306 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. P.3d 574 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .850, 851
1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2827 Brown; People v., 40 Cal.3d 512, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726
Bressler; United States v., 772 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. P.2d 516 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2860 Brown; People v., 42 Cal.App.4th 1493, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d
Breverman; People v., 19 Cal.4th 142, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3500
870, 960 P.2d 1094 (1998) . 460; 505; 507–510; 520; Brown; People v., 46 Cal.3d 432, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758
570, 571; 600; 603, 604; 640–643; 1202–1204; P.2d 1135 (1988).507; 524; 582; 602; 724; 726; 860,
1215; 1225; 1252; 1751; 2514; 3402, 3403; 3406; 861; 900; 902; 945–947; 981, 982; 1551; 2131;
3408; 3414; 3425; 3470, 3471; 3475, 3476; 2501; 2653–2656; 2686, 2687; 2762, 2763
3517–3519 Brown; People v., 55 Cal.2d 64, 9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d
Bridgehouse; People v., 47 Cal.2d 406, 303 P.2d 1018 1072 (1960) . . . . . . . . . 2301; 2351; 2381; 2391
(1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425 Brown; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d
Brim; People v., 257 Cal.App.2d 839, 65 Cal.Rptr. 265 433 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2401 Brown; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 736, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d
Brindley; People v., 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 47 519 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745, 2746
Cal.Rptr. 668 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700, 2701 Brown; People v., 130 Cal. 591, 62 P. 1072 (1900) . 370
Briscoe; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d Brown; People v., 152 Cal.App.3d 674, 199 Cal.Rptr. 680
401 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . 560, 561; 730; 3500 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
Brito; People v., 232 Cal.App.3d 316, 283 Cal.Rptr. 441 Brown; People v., 210 Cal.App.4th 1, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 848 (2012) . . . 860; 862, 863; 875; 982, 983; 2503;
Britt; People v., 32 Cal.4th 944, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 87 3130
P.3d 812 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Brown; People v., 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 264 Cal.Rptr. 908
Britton; People v., 205 Cal.App.2d 561, 22 Cal.Rptr. 921 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2180–2182
(1962). . . . . . . . . . . . .2600, 2601; 2610–2612 Brown; People v., 226 Cal.App.3d 1361, 277 Cal.Rptr.
Britz; People v., 17 Cal.App.3d 743, 95 Cal.Rptr. 303 309 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804 Brown; People v., 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 915, 47
Broce; People v., 76 Cal.App.3d 71, 142 Cal.Rptr. 628 Cal.Rptr. 662 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2930–2932
(1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2610–2612 Brown; People v., 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d
Brock; People v., 66 Cal.2d 645, 58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 303 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2652
P.2d 889 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3530 Bruce; People v., 208 Cal.App.3d 1099, 256 Cal. Rptr.
Brocklehurst; People v., 14 Cal.App.3d 473, 92 Cal.Rptr. 647 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
340 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708 Bruno; People v., 191 Cal.App.3d 1102, 237 Cal.Rptr. 31
Brooks; People v., 133 Cal.App.3d 200, 183 Cal.Rptr. (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
773 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
TC-6

AS TABLE OF CASES
Bryan; United States v., 896 F.2d 68 . . . . . . . . 2825 Busch; People v., 187 Cal.App.4th 150, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d
Bryant; People v., 56 Cal.4th 959, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 522, 683 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2361; 2375
301 P.3d 1136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580 Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123
Buck v. Superior Court, 245 Cal.App.2d 431, 54 Cal.Rptr. (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2131
282 (1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1801 Butler; People v., 12 Cal.App.3d 189, 90 Cal.Rptr. 497
Buckman; People v., 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 8 Cal.Rptr. 765 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378
(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2995 Butler; People v., 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d
Buffington; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 88 150. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1950
Cal.Rptr.2d 696 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . 3456, 3457 Butler; People v., 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421
Buford; People v., 42 Cal.App.3d 975, 117 Cal.Rptr. 333 P.2d 703 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Butler; People v., 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d
Bullard; People v., 9 Cal.5th 94, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 460 269 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300
P.3d 262 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820 Butler; People v., 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d
Bundte; People v., 87 Cal.App.2d 735, 197 P.2d 696 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .580, 581; 593
823. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2683 Buttles; People v., 223 Cal.App.3d 1631, 273 Cal.Rptr.
Bunkers; People v., 2 Cal.App. 197, 84 P. 364 397 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
(1905) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600 Button; People v., 106 Cal. 628, 39 P. 1073
Bunyard; People v., 45 Cal.3d 1189, 249 Cal.Rptr. 71, (1895) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3471
756 P.2d 795 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 Buttorff; United States v., 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.
Burbine; People v., 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 131 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2825
Cal.Rptr.2d 628 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3233 Buyle; People v., 22 Cal.App.2d 143, 70 P.2d 955
Burch; People v., 118 Cal.App.2d 122, 257 P.2d 44 (1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
(1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2995 Byers; People v., 61 Cal.App.5th 447, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d
Burden; People v., 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 140 Cal.Rptr. 282 661 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
(1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .582
Burg v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 257, 198 Cal. Rptr. C
145, 673 P.2d 732 (1983) . . 2101, 2102; 2111; 2113
C.D., In re, 18 Cal.App.5th 1021, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 360
Burgio; People v., 16 Cal.App.4th 769, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .860
397 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3201
Cabral; People v., 121 Cal.App.4th 748, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
Burnell; People v., 132 Cal.App.4th 938, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d
456 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
40 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400
Cabrera; People v., 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d
Burnett; People v., 110 Cal. App. 4th 868, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d
373 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650
120. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2953
Cabrera; People v., 230 Cal.App.3d 300, 281 Cal.Rptr.
Burnham; People v., 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 222 Cal.Rptr.
238, 281 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . 121
630 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225; 1751
Cadman; People v., 57 Cal. 562 (1881). . . . . . .1830
Burns; People v., 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 200 P.2d 134
Cady; People v., 7 Cal.App.5th 134, 212 Cal. Rptr.3d 319
(1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822; 840
(2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100
Burris; People v., 34 Cal. 4th 1012, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876,
Cahall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal.App.3d 491, 94
103 P.3d 276 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2125
Cal.Rptr. 182 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130
Burroughs; People v., 35 Cal.3d 824, 201 Cal.Rptr. 319,
Cahill; People v., 5 Cal.4th 478, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853
678 P.2d 894 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . 580, 581; 925
P.2d 1037 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Burroughs; People v., 131 Cal.App.4th 1401, 32
Cain; People v., 10 Cal.4th 1, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892
Cal.Rptr.3d 729 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3456
P.2d 1224 (1995) . . . . 540A–540C; 730–732; 3576
Burrows; People v., 260 Cal.App.2d 228, 67 Cal.Rptr. 28
Calderon; People v., 9 Cal.4th 69, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333,
(1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1141, 1142
885 P.2d 83 (1994) . . 1850; 2100, 2101; 2110–2112;
Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 644
2114; 2125, 2126; 3100, 3101
(5th Cir. 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2861
Calderon; People v., 124 Cal.App.4th 80, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d
Burt; People v., 45 Cal.2d 311, 288 P.2d 503, 51 A.L.R.2d
92 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3454; 3454A
948 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86
Burton; People v., 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d
L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
35 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Caldwell; People v., 36 Cal.3d 210, 203 Cal.Rptr. 433,
Burton; People v., 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d
681 P.2d 274 (1984) . . . . . . 540A, 540B; 560, 561
334 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
TC-7

TABLE OF CASES AS
Caldwell; People v., 153 Cal.App.3d 947, 200 Cal.Rptr. Carbajal; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 978, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d
508 (1984). . . . . . . . . . .801; 1016; 1031; 1601 206 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1160
Caldwell; People v., 255 Cal.App.2d 229, 63 Cal.Rptr. Cardenas; People v., 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d
63, 32 A.L.R.3d 1026 (1967). . . . . . . . . . .1070 567 (1994) . . . 937; 1000; 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060;
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 1110–1112; 1120–1122
L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 760, 761 Cardenas; People v., 53 Cal.App.4th 240, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 583 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2748
L.Ed.2d 9 (1971). . . . . . .2140, 2141; 2150, 2151 Cardenas; People v., 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 237 Cal.Rptr.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 249 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3102
L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 Cardona; People v., 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 191 Cal.Rptr.
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 109 (1983) . . . . 965; 1121; 1160; 1500; 1701; 2916
L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79,
Calimee; People v., 49 Cal.App.3d 337, 122 Cal.Rptr. 658 672 P.2d 862 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701; 730
(1975). . . . . .1001; 1016; 1031; 1046; 1354; 1601 Carlson; People v., 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321
Callahan; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 356, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570–572; 581
838 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A Carpenter, In re, 9 Cal.4th 634, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889
Callahan; People v., 168 Cal.App.3d 631, 214 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 985 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
294 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2690 Carpenter; People v., 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,
Camarillo; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 101 935 P.2d 708 (1997).352; 359; 375; 727, 728; 852A;
Cal.Rptr.2d 618 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2125 853A; 1000; 1191A; 2840
Camden; People v., 16 Cal.3d 808, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 Carr; People v., 81 Cal.App.4th 837, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 143
P.2d 1110 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . 1202, 1203; 1215 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1302–1304
Campbell; People v., 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d Carrasco; People v., 118 Cal.App.3d 936, 173 Cal.Rptr.
525 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 688 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2748
Campbell; People v., 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 265 Carrasco; People v., 209 Cal.App.4th 715, 147
Cal.Rptr.3d 136 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . 2900, 2901
Campbell; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 305, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d Carrera; People v., 49 Cal.3d 291, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777
315 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 P.2d 121 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .372, 373
Campbell; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 71, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d Carroll; People v., 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 167
830 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3182 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 (Yes 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3002
Campos; People v., 131 Cal.App.3d 894, 182 Cal.Rptr. Carron; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d
698 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . 1200, 1201; 1215; 1250 328 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301
Campos; People v., 138 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 188 Carskaddon; People v., 49 Cal.2d 423, 318 P.2d 4
Cal.Rptr. 366 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100; 2110 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67
1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2826; 2828 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Candiotto; People v., 183 Cal.App.2d 348, 6 Cal.Rptr. Carter; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1236, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d
876 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1750 888 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3261
Canizales; People v., 7 Cal. 5th 591, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d Carter; People v., 30 Cal.4th 1166, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553,
370, 442 P.3d 686 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 70 P.3d 981 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 357; 362; 418
Cannady; People v., 8 Cal.3d 379, 105 Cal.Rptr. 129, 503 Carter; People v., 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569
P.2d 585 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160; 3163
Cantrell; People v., 8 Cal.3d 672, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 Carter; People v., 117 Cal.App.3d 546, 172 Cal.Rptr. 838
P.2d 1256 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359, 360 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2746–2749
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 Carter; People v., 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 52 Cal.Rptr. 207
L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1940). . . . . . .2690 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2140, 2141; 2160
Canty; People v., 32 Cal.4th 1266, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 Casas; People v., 184 Cal.App.4th 1242, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.3d 1168 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400 811 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1806
Capetillo; People v., 220 Cal.App.3d 211, 269 Cal.Rptr. Caseri; People v., 129 Cal.App. 88, 18 P.2d 389
250 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100, 2101 (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2981
Carbajal; People v., 10 Cal.4th 1114, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, Cash; People v., 28 Cal.4th 703, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50
899 P.2d 67 (1995). . . . . . . . . .357; 2150, 2151 P.3d 332 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .540A
TC-8

AS TABLE OF CASES
Castain; People v., 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 175 Cal.Rptr. Chaffin; People v., 173 Cal.App.4th 1348, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d
651 (1981) . 524; 602; 724; 860, 861; 900; 903; 945; 531 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
981; 2651–2656; 2670, 2671 Chagolla; People v., 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 193 Cal.Rptr.
Castenada; People v., 23 Cal.4th 743, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 711 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
3 P.3d 278 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . 736; 1400; 2542 Chambers v. Municipal Court, 65 Cal.App.3d 904, 135
Castillo; People v., 5 Cal.App.2d 194, 42 P.2d 682 Cal.Rptr. 695 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2687
(1935). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350 Chambers; People v., 209 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 257
Castillo; People v., 16 Cal.4th 1009, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, Cal.Rptr. 289 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2410
945 P.2d 1197 (1997) . . . . . . . . . 404; 625; 3426 Chambless; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 773, 88
Castillo; People v., 193 Cal.App.3d 119, 238 Cal.Rptr. Cal.Rptr.2d 444 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
207 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 3406 Champion; People v., 9 Cal.4th 879, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547,
Castro; People v., 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 891 P.2d 93 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . .1001; 3500
P.2d 111 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316 Champion; People v., 265 Cal.App.2d 29, 71 Cal.Rptr.
Castro; People v., 184 Cal.App.3d 849, 229 Cal.Rptr. 280 113 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 201 Chan; People v., 128 Cal.App.4th 408, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d
Caswell; United States v., 825 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 878 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2844 Chandler; People v., 60 Cal.4th 508, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 548,
Catelli; People v., 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 278 Cal.Rptr. 332 P.3d 538 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
452 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1015 Chaney; People v., 131 Cal.App.4th 253, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d
Catley; People v., 148 Cal.App.4th 500, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 714 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300
786 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Charles; People v., 218 Cal.App.2d 812, 32 Cal.Rptr. 653
Catlin; People v., 26 Cal.4th 81, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
P.3d 357 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .620; 734 Charron; People v., 193 Cal.App.3d 981, 238 Cal.Rptr.
Cavitt in People v. Wilkins, 56 Cal.4th 333, 153 660 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3230
Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903 (2013) . . 540B, 540C Chavez; People v., 39 Cal.3d 823, 218 Cal.Rptr. 49, 705
Cavitt; People v., 33 Cal.4th 187, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281, 91 P.2d 372 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
P.3d 222 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C Chavez; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d
Ceballos; People v., 12 Cal.3d 470, 116 Cal.Rptr. 233, 680 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .935, 936; 938
526 P.2d 241 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506; 508 Chavez; People v., 100 Cal.App.2d 356, 223 P.2d 663
Cecil; People v., 127 Cal.App.3d 769, 179 Cal.Rptr. 736 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2993
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .460 Chavez; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d
Ceja; People v., 4 Cal.4th 1134, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 837 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 540A
P.2d 55 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 Checketts; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 84
Ceja; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 78, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 (1999) . . . . . . . 1240; 1242; 3405
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 604 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112
Ceja; People v., 49 Cal.4th 1, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 229 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2860
P.3d 995 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750; 3516 Cheeley; People v., 106 Cal.App.2d 748, 236 P.2d 22
Celis; People v., 33 Cal.4th 667, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
P.3d 1027 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2670 Chenelle; People v., 4 Cal.App.5th 1255, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d
Celis; People v., 141 Cal.App.4th 466, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 139 371 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1060
(2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .400 Cheri T., In re, 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 397
Centeno v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 11 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Cal.Rptr.3d 533 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .775 Christian S., In re, 7 Cal.4th 768, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872
Cervantes; People v., 26 Cal.4th 860, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 574 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . 505; 570, 571; 604
148, 29 P.3d 225 (2001) . 240; 540C; 560, 561; 732; Christopher S., In re, 80 Cal.App.3d 903, 146 Cal.Rptr.
840 247 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2917
Chacon; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 Chun; People v., 45 Cal.4th 1172, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106,
(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202 203 P.3d 425 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 571
Chacon; People v., 69 Cal. 2d 765, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 Church; People v., 215 Cal.App.3d 1151, 264 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 106 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2720 49 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Chaffey; People v., 25 Cal.App.4th 852, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d
757 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3425
TC-9

TABLE OF CASES AS
Cicero; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d 465, 204 Cal.Rptr. 582 Cobb; People v., 124 Cal.App.4th 1051, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1984). . . . . .1000; 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060; 1111 869 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3149
Cipriani; People v., 18 Cal.App.3d 299, 95 Cal.Rptr. 722 Cochran; People v., 28 Cal.4th 396, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 595,
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2683; 2686, 2687 48 P.3d 1148 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141; 1144
Circumstantial Evidence: Intent or Mental State. (People Cochran; People v., 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d
v. Marshall, 13 Cal.4th 799, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 257 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .820, 821; 830
P.2d 1280 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Cochran; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cisneros; People v., 179 Cal.App.3d 117, 224 Cal.Rptr. 416 (2002) . . . 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060; 1111; 1151
452 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760, 2761 Cockrell; People v., 63 Cal.2d 659, 47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408
Citrino; People v., 46 Cal.2d 284, 294 P.2d 32 P.2d 116 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357
(1956). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 Coddington; People v., 23 Cal.4th 529, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d
Citron; United States v., 783 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 528, 2 P.3d 1081 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428
1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2844 Coffey; People v., 67 Cal.2d 204, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430
City of (see name of city) P.2d 15 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2672
Claiborne; United States v., 765 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. Coffman and Marlow; People v., 34 Cal.4th 1, 17
1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2861 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30 (2004) . . 334, 335; 356;
Clark; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 1259, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 362; 371; 402, 403; 707, 708; 851; 3402
209 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1933 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29
Clark; People v., 12 Cal.App.4th 663, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 709 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2690
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3233 Cohens; People v., 178 Cal.App.4th 1442, 101
Clark; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1147, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2303; 2530 Cole v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 139 Cal.App.3d 870,
Clark; People v., 50 Cal.3d 583, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 189 Cal.Rptr. 249 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130
P.2d 127 (1990) . . . . . . 521; 722; 730; 2501; 2571 Cole; People v., 31 Cal.3d 568, 183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645
Clark; People v., 52 Cal.4th 856, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, P.2d 1182 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160–3163
261 P.3d 243 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 Cole; People v., 33 Cal.4th 1158, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95
Clark; People v., 63 Cal.4th 522, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, P.3d 811 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .522; 733
372 P.3d 811 (2016). . . . . . . . .540B, 540C; 703 Cole; People v., 156 Cal.App.4th 452, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 526
Clark; People v., 69 Cal.App. 520, 231 P. 590 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3411
(1924) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760 Cole; People v., 202 Cal.App.3d 1439, 249 Cal.Rptr. 601
Clark; People v., 81 Cal.App.5th 133, 296 Cal.Rptr.3d (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2305
153 (2022). . . . . . . . . . .736; 1400, 1401; 2542 Coleman; People v., 48 Cal.3d 112, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813,
Clark; People v., 106 Cal.App.2d 271, 235 P.2d 56 768 P.2d 32 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .723
(1951). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .620 Coleman; People v., 84 Cal.App.3d 1016, 149 Cal.Rptr.
Clark; People v., 122 Cal.App.2d 342, 265 P.2d 43 134 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2723
(1953). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 Coleman; People v., 222 Cal.App.2d 358, 35 Cal.Rptr.
Clark; People v., 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 181 Cal.Rptr. 682 141 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1860
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505; 2514; 3470 Collie; People v., 30 Cal.3d 43, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634
Clark; United States v., 139 F.3d 485 . . . . . . . . 2825 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981) . . . . 375; 2840
Clayton; People v., 13 Cal.App.3d 335, 91 Cal.Rptr. 494 Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363 (1996) . . . 2685, 2686
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2670 Collins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal.App.4th 1244, 108
Clayton; People v., 65 Cal.App.4th 418, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 706
536 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641
Clenney; People v., 165 Cal.App.2d 241, 331 P.2d 696 Collins; People v., 1 Cal.3d 658, 83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463
(1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100 P.2d 403 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2673
Cline; People v., 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 41 Collins; People v., 17 Cal.3d 687, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552
(1998) . . 1850; 2100, 2101; 2110–2112; 2114; 2125, P.2d 742 (1976) . . . . . . . . 768; 3550; 3575, 3576
2126; 3100, 3101 Collins; People v., 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d
Cobb; People v., 15 Cal.App.3d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 152 407 (2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 3516 Collins; People v., 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 342 P.2d 370
Cobb; People v., 45 Cal.2d 158, 287 P.2d 752 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
(1955). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350
TC-10

AS TABLE OF CASES
Collom; People v., 52 Cal.App.5th 35, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d Corey, In re, 230 Cal.App.2d 813, 41 Cal.Rptr. 379
705 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400
Collup; People v., 27 Cal.2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 Coria; People v., 21 Cal.4th 868, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985
(1946). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .510 P.2d 970 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
Columbia Research Corp.; People v., 103 Cal.App.3d Corlett; People v., 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 153 P.2d 595
Supp. 33, 163 Cal.Rptr. 455 (1980) . . . . . . . 1802 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3475
Combs; People v., 165 Cal.App.3d 422, 211 Cal.Rptr. 617 Cornett; People v., 53 Cal.4th 1261, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837,
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1550 274 P.3d 456 (2012). . . . . . . . .1127, 1128; 3185
Como; People v., 95 Cal.App.4th 1088, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d Cortes; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 519
922 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 823; 830
Compton; People v., 123 Cal. 403, 56 P. 44 Cortez; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 1202, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 580
(1899) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1905 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3500
Conaway; United States v., 11 F.3d 40 (5th Cir. Cortez; People v., 18 Cal.4th 1223, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733,
1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2843 960 P.2d 537 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416; 563
Concha I; People v., 47 Cal.4th 653, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, Cortez; People v., 24 Cal.App.4th 510, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d
218 P.3d 660 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560 445 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1850
Condley; People v., 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 138 Cal.Rptr. Cortez; People v., 63 Cal.4th 101, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 846,
515 (1977) . . . 2760–2762; 2764; 3402, 3403; 3414 369 P.3d 521 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Conrad; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d Cortez; People v., 103 Cal.App.3d 491, 163 Cal.Rptr. 1
248 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224
Consciousness of Guilt. (People v. Wiidanen, 201 Costello; People v., 21 Cal.2d 760, 135 P.2d 164
Cal.App.4th 526, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 736 (2011) . . 3426 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400
Conservatorship of (see name of party) Coston; People v., 82 Cal.App.2d 23, 185 P.2d 632
Consuegra; People v., 26 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 32 (1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
Cal.Rptr.2d 288 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . 2302; 2352 Cottone; People v., 57 Cal.4th 269, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 385,
Contreras; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 760, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 P.3d 1163 (2013) . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
233 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204 Counts; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 785, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cook; People v., 33 Cal.3d 400, 189 Cal.Rptr. 159, 658 425 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1800; 1804; 1861
P.2d 86 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225; 3530 County of (see name of county)
Cook; People v., 39 Cal.4th 566, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 Courtney; People v., 180 Cal.App.2d 61, 4 Cal.Rptr. 274
P.3d 492 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Cook; People v., 60 Cal. 4th 922, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 502, Coutu; People v., 171 Cal.App.3d 192, 217 Cal.Rptr. 191
342 P.3d 404 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
Cook; People v., 61 Cal.App.4th 1364, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 239 P.2d 876
183 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2685
Cook; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 910, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d Covington v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 102 Cal.App.3d
204 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 563 54, 162 Cal.Rptr. 150 (1980). . . . . . . . . . .2130
Cook; People v., 228 Cal.App.2d 716, 39 Cal.Rptr. 802 Covington; People v., 1 Cal.2d 316, 34 P.2d 1019
(1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820 (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Cooksey; People v., 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 116 Cowan v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 367, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 458, 926 P.2d 438 (1996) . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519
Cooley v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 228, 127 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654 (2002) . . 3454; 3454A 487 (1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2680
Cooley; People v., 211 Cal.App.2d 173, 27 Cal.Rptr. 543 Cox; People v., 23 Cal.4th 665, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2
(1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .511 P.3d 1189 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580, 581
Cooper; People v., 53 Cal.2d 755, 3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 Cox; People v., 29 Cal.App. 419, 155 P. 1010
P.2d 964 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 (1916). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
Cooper; People v., 53 Cal.3d 771, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 Cox; People v., 30 Cal.4th 916, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70
P.2d 865 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721; 3425 P.3d 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
Cooper; People v., 53 Cal.3d 1158, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, Cox; People v., 67 Cal.App.2d 166, 153 P.2d 362
811 P.2d 742 (1991). . . . . .401; 1600; 1603; 3261 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
Coppla; People v., 100 Cal.App.2d 766, 224 P.2d 828 Cox; People v., 82 Cal.App.3d 221, 147 Cal.Rptr. 73
(1950). . . . . . . . . . . . .2990, 2991; 2994–2996 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3451
TC-11

TABLE OF CASES AS
Cradlebaugh; People v., 24 Cal.App. 489, 141 P. 943 Cummings; People v., 4 Cal.4th 1233, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1914). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908 796, 850 P.2d 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .723
Craig; People v., 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 150 Cal.Rptr. 676 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856,
(1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .374 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) . . . 3224–3234; 3250, 3251
Crain; People v., 102 Cal.App.2d 566, 228 P.2d 307 Cunningham; People v., 25 Cal.4th 926, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416; 563 291, 25 P.3d 519 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . 204; 3576
Crandell; People v., 46 Cal.3d 833, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, Curl v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 1292, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49,
760 P.2d 423 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3471 801 P.2d 292 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750
Cratty; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 98, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 Curry; People v., 76 Cal.App.3d 181, 142 Cal.Rptr. 649
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, Curtis; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 304 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505, 506; 510
Cregler, In re, 56 Cal.2d 308, 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d Curtis; People v., 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450
305 (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2915 P.2d 33 (1969). . . . . .900; 2653–2655; 2670–2672
Cressey; People v., 2 Cal.3d 836, 87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 Curtiss; People v., 116 Cal.App. Supp. 771, 300 P. 801,
P.2d 19 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2401 116 Cal.App. 771 (1931) . . . . . 821; 823; 830, 831
Cribas; People v., 231 Cal.App.3d 596, 282 Cal.Rptr. 538
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2610 D
Crittenden; People v., 9 Cal.4th 83, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474,
D.C., In re, 60 Cal.App.5th 915, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 191
885 P.2d 887 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
(2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3414
Cromer; People v., 24 Cal.4th 889, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15
D. C. L., In re, 82 Cal.App.3d 123, 147 Cal.Rptr. 54
P.3d 243 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 1002–1004
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2932
Cromp; People v., 153 Cal.App.4th 476, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d
Dallas W., In re, 85 Cal.App.4th 937, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 493
848 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A
(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Crosby; People v., 58 Cal.2d 713, 25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375
Daly; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 47, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 21
P.2d 839 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 420; 3410
(1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370
Cross; People v., 45 Cal.4th 58, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 373, 190
Dancer; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.3d 706 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160
282 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . .3226; 3230; 3233
Crotty; People v., 70 Cal.App. 515, 233 P. 395
Dancy; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 21, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1925). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
898 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1003
Crouch; People v., 108 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 166
Daniel; People v., 145 Cal.App.3d 168, 193 Cal.Rptr. 277
Cal.Rptr. 818 (1980) . 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; 2160
(1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1802, 1803
Cruz; People v., 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 835
Daniel R., In re, 20 Cal.App.4th 239, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 414
(2016) . . . 852A, 852B; 853A, 853B; 1191A, 1191B
(1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .965
Cruz; People v., 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148
Danielly; People v., 33 Cal.2d 362, 202 P.2d 18
(1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .965
(1949). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570
Cruz; People v., 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 147 Cal.Rptr.
Daniels; People v., 18 Cal.App.4th 1046, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d
740. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3425
877 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201
Cuda; People v., 178 Cal.App.2d 397, 3 Cal.Rptr. 86
Daniels; People v., 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459
(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2992
P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677 (1969).1200, 1201; 1203;
Cuellar; People v., 208 Cal.App.4th 1067, 145
1215; 3175
Cal.Rptr.3d 898 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Daniels; People v., 176 Cal.App.4th 304, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d
Cuevas; People v., 12 Cal.4th 252, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135,
659 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201
906 P.2d 1290 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Danks; People v., 32 Cal.4th 269, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82
Cuevas; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 689, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.3d 1249 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . .101; 768; 3550
529 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
Danny H., In re, 104 Cal.App.4th 92, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 222
Culberson; People v., 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 959, 295
(2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2502
P.2d 598 (1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400
Daugherty; People v., 40 Cal.2d 876, 256 P.2d 911
Culbertson; People v., 171 Cal.App.3d 508, 217 Cal.Rptr.
(1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 601
347 (1985) . . . 1070; 1080, 1081; 1090, 1091; 1100,
Davenport; People v., 41 Cal.3d 247, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794,
1101
710 P.2d 861 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . 733; 764, 765
Culuko; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d
789 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3500
TC-12

AS TABLE OF CASES
Davenport; People v., 219 Cal.App.3d 885, 268 Cal.Rptr. Dellinger; People v., 49 Cal.3d 1212, 264 Cal.Rptr. 841,
501 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700 783 P.2d 200 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . .520; 2720
David D., In re, 52 Cal.App.4th 304, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 552 Dellinger; People v., 163 Cal.App.3d 284, 209 Cal.Rptr.
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1802 503 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
Davis; People v., 7 Cal.4th 797, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 113 S.Ct. 1222, 122
P.2d 591 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520; 560; 600 L.Ed.2d 620 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
Davis; People v., 10 Cal.4th 463, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 Delvalle; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 119 (1995) . 917; 1030; 1202–1204; 1215; 3175 725 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Davis; People v., 18 Cal.4th 712, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 958 Dennis; People v., 17 Cal.4th 468, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680,
P.2d 1083 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 950 P.2d 1035 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . .303; 721
Davis; People v., 19 Cal.4th 301, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 Dennis; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 1135, 215 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 1165, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (1998). .1800; 1806 750 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Davis; People v., 57 Cal.4th 353, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 405, Derek Daniels; People v., 18 Cal.App.4th 1046, 22
303 P.3d 1179. .2300–2304; 2380–2384; 2748, 2749 Cal.Rptr.2d 877 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . 1215; 3175
Davis; People v., 68 Cal.2d 481, 67 Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 133 S.Ct. 2276,
P.2d 651 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2682; 2736 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . 3100–3103
Davis; People v., 97 Cal. 194, 31 P. 1109 (1893). .1800 Devine; People v., 95 Cal. 227, 30 P. 378 (1892) . 1800
Davis; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 377, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d Dewberry; People v., 51 Cal.2d 548, 334 P.2d 852
519 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . 316; 640–643; 3517–3519
Davis; People v., 157 Cal.App.2d 33, 320 P.2d 88 . 2521 Di Giacomo; People v., 193 Cal.App.2d 688, 14 Cal.Rptr.
Davis; People v., 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 55 574 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
(2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359 Diaz; People v., 22 Cal.3d 712, 150 Cal.Rptr. 471, 586
Davis; People v., 201 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 247 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 952 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . .723; 2760, 2761
359 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1155 Diaz; People v., 41 Cal.App.4th 1424, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 252
Davis; People v., 211 Cal.App.3d 317, 259 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1996) . . . . . . . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1120; 1152
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442 Diaz; People v., 60 Cal.4th 1176, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431,
Davison; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 P.3d 62 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . 352; 358; 375
438 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600 Diaz; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 243, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 682
Day; People v., 199 Cal. 78, 248 P. 250 (1926) . . . 877 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3175; 3179
Dayan; People v., 34 Cal.App.4th 707, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d Diaz; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 1484, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d
391 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 653 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2181
De Angelis; People v., 97 Cal.App.3d 837, 159 Cal.Rptr. Diaz; People v., 212 Cal.App.3d 745, 260 Cal.Rptr. 806
111 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1822
De Larco; People v., 142 Cal.App.3d 294, 190 Cal.Rptr. Dibacco; People v., 117 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 12
757 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 Cal.Rptr.3d 258 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2200
De Leon; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 815, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d Diedrich; People v., 31 Cal.3d 263, 182 Cal.Rptr. 354,
825 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 604 643 P.2d 971 . . . . . . 415, 416; 2600, 2601; 2603;
De Mond v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 340, 368 P.2d 865, 2610–2612; 3500, 3501; 3517–3519
19 Cal.Rptr. 313 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820 Dieguez; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d
Decker v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 6 Cal.3d 903, 101 160, 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 594, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160
Cal.Rptr. 387, 495 P.2d 1307 (1972). . . . . . .2131 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2000; 2020–2022
DeGuzman; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 538, 6 Dillard; People v., 154 Cal.App.3d 261, 201 Cal.Rptr. 136
Cal.Rptr.3d 739 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2572 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2530
DeHoyos; People v., 57 Cal.4th 79, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, Dillon; People v., 34 Cal.3d 441, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668
303 P.3d 1 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226; 3233 P.2d 697 (1983). . . . . . .334, 335; 707, 708; 1151
DeLeon; People v., 138 Cal.App.3d 602, 188 Cal.Rptr. 63 Dimitrov; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225 257 (1995). . . . .521; 722; 1302; 2501; 2570–2579
Deletto; People v., 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 195 Cal.Rptr. Dingle; People v., 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 219 Cal.Rptr. 707
233 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Delgado; People v., 74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 290 Dishman; People v., 128 Cal.App.3d 717, 180 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.3d 189 (2022) . . . . 736; 1400, 1401; 2542 467 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1751
Dell; People v., 232 Cal.App.3d 248, 283 Cal.Rptr. 361 Distinctive Theatres of Columbus v. Looker, 165 F.Supp.
(1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1150; 1154 410 (S.D.Ohio 1958). . . . . . . . . . . .2801; 2812
TC-13

TABLE OF CASES AS
Ditson; People v., 57 Cal.2d 415, 20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 Duran; People v., 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 714 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . 416; 540B, 540C 595 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200, 3201
Dixon, Ex parte, 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 Duran; People v., 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1933 272 (2002). . . . . . . . . . .736; 1400, 1401; 2542
Dixon; People v., 24 Cal.3d 43, 154 Cal.Rptr. 236, 592 Duran; People v., 130 Cal.App.3d 987, 182 Cal.Rptr. 17
P.2d 752 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640–643 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224
Dixon; People v., 191 Cal.App.4th 1154, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d Durkin; People v., 205 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 252 Cal.Rptr.
901 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1151 735 (1988) . . . . . . 580, 581; 590–593; 2100–2102
Doane; People v., 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4
594 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3451
Dodds v. Stellar, 77 Cal.App.2d 411, 175 P.2d 607 Dutra; People v., 75 Cal.App.2d 311, 171 P.2d 41
(1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105; 226 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2980
Dominguez; People v., 11 Cal.App.4th 1342, 15 Duty; People v., 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606
Cal.Rptr.2d 46 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440
Dominguez; People v., 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 45 Dyer; People v., 45 Cal.3d 26, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753
Cal.Rptr.2d 153 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650 P.2d 1 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
Dominguez; People v., 39 Cal.4th 1141, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d Dyser; People v., 202 Cal.App.4th 1015, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d
575, 140 P.3d 866 (2006) . . . . . 540B, 540C; 1000 891 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Domino v. Superior Court, 129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 181
Cal.Rptr. 486 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 E
Donald R., In re, 14 Cal.App.4th 1627, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
Easley; People v., 34 Cal.3d 858, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671
442 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1110
P.2d 813 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200; 760; 763
Dotson; People v., 16 Cal.4th 547, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423,
Ecker v. Raging Waters Group, Inc., 87 Cal.App.4th
941 P.2d 56 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
1320, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 320 (2001) . . . . . . . . 1122
Dreas; People v., 153 Cal.App.3d 623, 200 Cal.Rptr. 586
Eddie D., In re, 235 Cal.App.3d 417, 286 Cal.Rptr. 684
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
(1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908; 2653, 2654
Drolet; People v., 30 Cal.App.3d 207, 105 Cal.Rptr. 824
Edelbacher; People v., 47 Cal.3d 983, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586,
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416
766 P.2d 1 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
Duarte-Lara; People v., 49 Cal.App.5th 332, 262
Edgar; People v., 104 Cal.App.4th 210, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 774 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
662 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
Dubner v. City and Co. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959
Edwards v. United States, 375 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.
(2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2686, 2687
1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2825
Duens; People v., 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 134 Cal.Rptr. 341
Edwards; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 891
821 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .362; 1862
Duffy; People v., 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 59
Edwards; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 1248, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2520–2522
3 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306
Dukes; People v., 90 Cal.App. 657, 266 P. 558
Edwards; People v., 72 Cal.App. 102, 236 P. 944
(1928). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908
(1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
Duncan; People v., 53 Cal.3d 955, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810
Eggleston; People v., 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 63 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 131 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
104 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745, 2746
Duncan; United States v., 850 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir.
Eichorn, In re, 69 Cal.App.4th 382, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 535
1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2861
(1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225; 3403
Dunkerson; People v., 155 Cal.App.4th 1413, 66
Eid; People v., 59 Cal.4th 650, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 328
Cal.Rptr.3d 795 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160
P.3d 69 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Dunlap v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 156 Cal.App.3d 279,
Eid; People v., 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 520
202 Cal.Rptr. 729 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130
(2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d
Elam; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 298, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d
445. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3229
185 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .935, 936; 938
Duran; People v., 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545
Eli; People v., 66 Cal.2d 63, 56 Cal.Rptr. 916, 424 P.2d
P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1 . . . . . . . . . . 204; 337
356 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Duran; People v., 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d
812 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650
TC-14

AS TABLE OF CASES
Elize; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 Evans; People v., 62 Cal.App.4th 186, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 543
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 510 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .355
Elliot; People v., 54 Cal.2d 498, 6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d Evers; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 637
225 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3407 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580, 581
Ellis; People v., 69 Cal.App.4th 1334, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 Ewing; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1999). . . . . .580, 581; 590–593; 595; 2100–2102 177 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301
Elmore; People v., 59 Cal.4th 121, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, Ewoldt; People v., 7 Cal.4th 380, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867
325 P.3d 951 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571; 627 P.2d 757 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Elmore; People v., 167 Cal. 205, 138 P. 989 (1914).570 Ex parte (see name of relator)
Emmal; People v., 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d
907 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . 2300; 2350; 2380; 2390 F
Engelman; People v., 28 Cal.4th 436, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d
F. E., In re, 67 Cal.App.3d 222, 136 Cal.Rptr. 547
862, 49 P.3d 209 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 200
(1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2202
Enos; People v., 34 Cal.App.3d 25, 109 Cal.Rptr. 876
Failla; People v., 64 Cal.2d 560, 51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414
(1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .375
P.2d 39 (1966) . . . . . . . . 1700; 1800; 1861; 3180
Enraca; People v., 53 Cal.4th 735, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 117,
Falck; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624
269 P.3d 543 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . .571; 3472
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301; 2929
Enriquez; People v., 42 Cal.App.4th 661, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d
Falsetta; People v., 21 Cal.4th 903, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847,
710 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2100; 2110; 2400
986 P.2d 182 (1999) . . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
Epps; People v., 25 Cal.4th 19, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18
Fannin; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 1399, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.3d 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3100–3102
496. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500, 2501; 2745
Epps; People v., 122 Cal.App.3d 691, 176 Cal.Rptr. 332
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
(1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1121, 1122
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Epstein; People v., 118 Cal.App. 7, 4 P.2d 555
Farina; People v., 220 Cal.App.2d 291, 33 Cal.Rptr. 794
(1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450, 451
(1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1821
Erickson; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d
Farley; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1697, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d
740 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
702 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Esayian; People v., 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d
Farley; People v., 46 Cal.4th 1053, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191,
542 (2003) . . . 2100–2102; 2110, 2111; 2113, 2114;
210 P.3d 361 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . .540A–540C
2965
Farmer; People v., 47 Cal.3d 888, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765
Escarcega; People v., 43 Cal.App.3d 391, 117 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 940 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
595 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Farnam; People v., 28 Cal.4th 107, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106,
Escobar; People v., 3 Cal.4th 740, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 586,
47 P.3d 988 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .371
837 P.2d 1100 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . 3160–3163
Farraher v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.App. 4, 187 P. 72
Escobar; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 477, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 9
(1919) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2681
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Farrell; People v., 67 Cal.App. 128, 227 P. 210
Escobar; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1924). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
696 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A
Favalora; People v., 42 Cal.App.3d 988, 117 Cal.Rptr.
Esquivel; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 1386, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d
291 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500
324 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Favor; People v., 54 Cal.4th 868, 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 659,
Estes; People v., 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 194 Cal.Rptr. 909
279 P.3d 1131 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Feinberg; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1566, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d
Estrada, In re, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d
323 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1945; 2640, 2641
948 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 2760
Feldman; People v., 171 Cal.App.2d 15, 339 P.2d 888
Estrada; People v., 11 Cal.4th 568, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586,
(1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .419
904 P.2d 1197 (1995) . . . . . 540B, 540C; 702, 703
Felix; People v., 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 860
Estrella; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 716, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
383 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2180–2182
Felix; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 311
Eulian; People v., 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d
(2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3472
Felton; People v., 122 Cal.App.4th 260, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119
626 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . 810; 1202; 3177
TC-15

TABLE OF CASES AS
Fenenbock; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 54 Flores; People v., 129 Cal.App.4th 174, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d
Cal.Rptr.2d 608 (1996) . . . . . . 415, 416; 563; 570 232 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3149, 3150
Fenton; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 965, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 Flores; People v., 176 Cal.App.4th 924, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2748 924 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2722
Fernandez; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 710, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d Fond; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 660
677 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240; 1242 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
Fernandez; People v., 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 157 Fonseca; People v., 105 Cal.App.4th 543, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 43 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . .330; 3501 513 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Fernandez; People v., 226 Cal.App.3d 669, 276 Cal.Rptr. Fontenot; People v., 8 Cal.5th 57, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 341,
631 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234 447 P.3d 252 (2019) . . . . . . . . 1201; 1203; 1215
Ferrell; People v., 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 267 Cal.Rptr. 283 Fontes; People v., 7 Cal.App.3d 650, 86 Cal.Rptr. 790
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800; 3176 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2995
Fielder; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d Ford; People v., 60 Cal.2d 772, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d
247. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3102 892 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251, 252
Fields; People v., 13 Cal.4th 289, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 Ford; People v., 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 193 Cal.Rptr. 684
P.2d 832 . . . . . . 640–643; 2980; 3515; 3517–3519 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622
Fields; People v., 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 Ford; People v., 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 345 P.2d 354
P.2d 680 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1603; 3450 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2748
Figueroa; People v., 68 Cal.App.4th 1409, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d Fork; People v., 233 Cal.App.2d 725, 43 Cal.Rptr. 804
216 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2962 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1905
Fingado; United States v., 934 F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. Forrester; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 1697, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2840 19 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3001, 3002
Finkelstin; People v., 98 Cal.App.2d 545, 220 P.2d 934 Fortes v. Municipal Court, 113 Cal.App.3d 704, 170
(1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600 Cal.Rptr. 292 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Finley; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 454, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 288 Foss, In re, 10 Cal.3d 910, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 1073 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3408
Finney; People v., 110 Cal.App.3d 705, 168 Cal.Rptr. 80 Foster; People v., 7 Cal.5th 1202, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 312,
(1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2180–2182 447 P.3d 228 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3457
Finster v. Keller, 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 96 Cal.Rptr. 241 Foster; People v., 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 246 Cal.Rptr. 855
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2991, 2992; 2995 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .222
Fischer; People v., 49 Cal.2d 442, 317 P.2d 967 Fox; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1041, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 424
(1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2670 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
Fitch; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 Fraguglia v. Sala, 17 Cal.App.2d 738, 62 P.2d 783
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 1191A (1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3472
Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal.4th 766, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d Francis; People v., 129 Cal.App.3d 241, 180 Cal.Rptr.
574, 41 P.3d 575 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3010 873 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440; 3516
Flannel; People v., 25 Cal.3d 668, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 Franco; People v., 4 Cal.App.3d 535, 84 Cal.Rptr. 513
P.2d 1 (1979) . 359, 360; 520; 571; 604; 1203; 1215; (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
1225; 1252; 1751; 2720 Franco; People v., 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d
Fleetwood; People v., 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 217 Cal.Rptr. 310 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2440
612 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1602; 1701 Frankfort; People v., 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 251 P.2d 401
Flood; People v., 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1801
P.2d 869 (1998) . 580, 581; 590–593; 602; 620; 862; Franklin v. County of Riverside, 971 F. Supp. 1332
901; 2100–2102; 2180–2182; 2560; 2562; 2630; (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653–2655
2722; 2745, 2746 Franklin, In re, 7 Cal.3d 126, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d
Flora; People v., 228 Cal.App.3d 662, 279 Cal.Rptr. 17 465 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3452
(1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3407; 3411 Franklin; People v., 20 Cal.4th 249, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 241,
Flores; People v., 7 Cal.App.4th 1350, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 975 P.2d 30 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
(1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417 Franklin; People v., 25 Cal.App.4th 328, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d
Flores; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1199, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3233
637 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151 Franquelin; People v., 109 Cal.App.2d 777, 241 P.2d 651
Flores; People v., 115 Cal.App.3d 924, 171 Cal.Rptr. 777 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830
(1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226
TC-16

AS TABLE OF CASES
Franz; People v., 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d Funes; People v., 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d
773 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 758 (1994). . . . . . . . . . .736; 1400, 1401; 2542
Frawley; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 784, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d
555 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2510 G
Frazier; People v., 11 Cal.App.3d 174, 90 Cal.Rptr. 58
Gadlin; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2917
890 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Frazier; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d
Gaglione; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 1291, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d
100 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 1191A
169 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Frazier; People v., 128 Cal.App.4th 807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d
Gainer; People v., 19 Cal.3d 835, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566
336 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2375, 2376
P.2d 997 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . .768; 3550, 3551
Frederick B., In re, 192 Cal.App.3d 79, 237 Cal.Rptr. 338
Gaitan; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908; 2653, 2654
885 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500; 2503
Freeman; People v., 8 Cal.4th 450, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558,
Galambos; People v., 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 128
882 P.2d 249, 31 A.L.R.5th 888 (1994). . .103; 220,
Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (2002). . . . . . . . . . .2350–2352
221
Galindo; People v., 142 Cal.App.4th 531, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d
Freeman; People v., 22 Cal.3d 434, 149 Cal.Rptr. 396,
241 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3453
584 P.2d 533 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400
Gallardo; People v., 4 Cal.5th 120, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 379,
Freeman; People v., 46 Cal.3d 419, 250 Cal.Rptr. 598,
407 P.3d 55 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . .3100–3103
758 P.2d 1128 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . 1071, 1072
Gallardo; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 489, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d
Freeman; People v., 61 Cal.App.2d 110, 142 P.2d 435
502 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100; 2110
(1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
Gallegos; People v., 39 Cal.App.3d 512, 114 Cal.Rptr.
Freeman; People v., 193 Cal.App.3d 337, 238 Cal.Rptr.
166 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760–2762
257 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
Gallegos; People v., 54 Cal.App.4th 453, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d
Frey; People v., 228 Cal.App.2d 33, 39 Cal.Rptr. 49
382 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560, 561
(1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Gamble; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d
Friend; People v., 50 Cal.2d 570, 327 P.2d 97
451 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376; 1600
(1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3530
Gammage; People v., 2 Cal.4th 693, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 541,
Frierson; People v., 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599
828 P.2d 682 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . .301; 1190
P.2d 587 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
Gams; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 147, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 423
Fromuth; People v., 2 Cal.App.5th 91, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 83
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301
(2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1125, 1126
Gana; People v., 236 Cal.App.4th 598, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d
Frye; People v., 7 Cal.App.4th 1148, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 217
724 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . 500; 507–511; 520; 3404
Gangemi; People v., 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d
Frye; People v., 18 Cal.4th 894, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959
462 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1945
P.2d 183 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700; 3451
Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 185 Cal.App.4th
Frye; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 1080, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 180
73, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 (2010) . . . . . . 2130, 2131
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822
Garcia; People v., 25 Cal.4th 744, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 355,
Fudge; People v., 7 Cal.4th 1075, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875
23 P.3d 590 (2001). . . . . . . .250; 252; 254; 1170
P.2d 36 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Garcia; People v., 28 Cal.4th 1166, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464,
Fuentes; People v., 64 Cal.App.3d 953, 134 Cal.Rptr. 885
52 P.3d 648 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1402
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2501; 2520–2522
Garcia; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d
Fuentes; People v., 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d
256 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
43 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2181
Fuentes; People v., 224 Cal.App.3d 1041, 274 Cal.Rptr.
600 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 730
17 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2410; 2960
Garcia; People v., 54 Cal.App.3d 61, 126 Cal.Rptr. 275
Fuiava; People v., 53 Cal.4th 622, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 147,
(1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103; 220
269 P.3d 568 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
Fujita; People v., 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 117 Cal.Rptr. 757
254 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
Fuller; People v., 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 150 Cal.Rptr. 515
131 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 730
(1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .540A
Fulton; People v., 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 201 Cal.Rptr. 879
694 (2003) . . . 2125, 2126; 2182; 2221; 3100, 3101
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203; 415, 416; 563
TC-17

TABLE OF CASES AS
Garcia; People v., 127 Cal.App.4th 558, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d Gentry; People v., 234 Cal.App.3d 131, 285 Cal.Rptr. 591
660 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3457 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
Garcia; People v., 153 Cal.App.4th 1499, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d George; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d
104 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400 750 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2748
Garcia; People v., 160 Cal.App.3d 82, 206 Cal.Rptr. 468 George; People v., 109 Cal.App.3d 814, 167 Cal.Rptr.
(1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .222 603 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760–2762
Garcia; People v., 183 Cal.App.3d 335, 228 Cal.Rptr. 87 George T., In re, 33 Cal.4th 620, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3225 P.3d 1007 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . 1300; 2624; 2650
Garcia; People v., 209 Cal.App.3d 790, 257 Cal.Rptr. 495 George W., In re, 68 Cal.App.4th 1208, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224 868 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2501
Garcia; People v., 214 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 262 Cal.Rptr. Gerber; People v., 196 Cal.App.4th 368, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d
915 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2110 688 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1145
Garcia; People v., 224 Cal.App.3d 297, 273 Cal.Rptr. 666 Ghilotti; People v., 27 Cal.4th 888, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1802; 1945 P.3d 949 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3454; 3454A
Gardner; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d Ghio; People v., 82 Cal.App. 28, 255 P. 205
603 (1995) . . . . . . . . 520; 540A, 540B; 560, 561 (1927). . . . . . . . . . . . .2990, 2991; 2995, 2996
Gardner; People v., 90 Cal.App.3d 42, 153 Cal.Rptr. 160 Giannini, In re, 69 Cal.2d 563, 72 Cal.Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d
(1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1802 535 (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140, 1141; 1143
Gardner; People v., 195 Cal.App.2d 829, 16 Cal.Rptr. 256 Giardino; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358 315 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . 1002; 1017; 1032; 1047
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1. .508 Gibbs; People v., 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 90 Cal.Rptr. 866
Garnett; People v., 9 Cal.App. 194, 98 P. 247 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202–1204; 1215
(1908). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .510 Gibson; People v., 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
Garrett; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 962, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 809 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150, 1151
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300 Gilbeaux; People v., 111 Cal.App.4th 515, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d
Garvin; People v., 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 835 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
774 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 2514; 3470 Gilbert; People v., 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660
Gary; People v., 189 Cal.App.3d 1212, 235 Cal.Rptr. 30 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330; 850; 1192, 1193
(1987). . . . . . . . .580, 581; 590–593; 2100–2102 Gilbert; People v., 63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408
Garza; People v., 35 Cal.4th 866, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 111 P.2d 365 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .560, 561
P.3d 310 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 Ginese; People v., 121 Cal.App.3d 468, 175 Cal.Rptr. 383
Garziano; People v., 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 281 Cal.Rptr. (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226
307 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3403 Giomi v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 15 Cal.App.3d 905, 93
Gaspard; People v., 177 Cal.App.2d 487, 2 Cal.Rptr. 193 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2131
(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2993 Giovani M., In re, 81 Cal.App.4th 1061, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d
Gastello; People v., 49 Cal.4th 395, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 319 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
232 P.3d 650 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2749 Gladys R., In re, 1 Cal. 3d 855, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464
Gates; People v., 43 Cal.3d 1168, 240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 127 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122
P.2d 301 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1863 Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.
Gatlin; People v., 209 Cal.App.3d 31, 257 Cal.Rptr. 171 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507; 908; 2670; 2672
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 Glenn; People v., 229 Cal.App.3d 1461, 280 Cal.Rptr.
Gaul-Alexander; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 38 609 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Cal.Rptr.2d 176 (1995) . . . . 594; 1900–1905; 1925, Glenos; People v., 7 Cal.App.4th 1201, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d
1926; 1930–1932; 1935; 1950–1957; 1970; 363 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2330
2000–2002; 2004; 2041, 2042 Gliksman; People v., 78 Cal.App.3d 343, 144 Cal.Rptr.
Gauze; People v., 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 451 (1978). . . . . . .2600, 2601; 2603; 2610–2612
P.2d 1365 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 Godwin; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 1112, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
Gavin; People v., 21 Cal.App.3d 408, 98 Cal.Rptr. 518 708 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2573
(1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 Godwin; People v., 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d
Generes v. Justice Court, 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 165 545 (1996) . . . 860; 862, 863; 875; 982, 983; 2503;
Cal.Rptr. 222 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145
Genovese; People v., 168 Cal.App.4th 817, 85 Gohdes; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1520, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 664 (2008) . . . . . . 500; 505; 520; 571 719 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120
TC-18

AS TABLE OF CASES
Goldberg; People v., 152 Cal.App.2d 562, 314 P.2d 151 Goodman; People v., 159 Cal.App.2d 54, 323 P.2d 536
(1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3409 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830–1832
Golde; People v., 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d Gordon; People v., 10 Cal.3d 460, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516
120 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . .225; 318; 333; 875 P.2d 298 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Goldstein; People v., 130 Cal.App.3d 1024, 182 Cal.Rptr. Gordon; People v., 47 Cal.App.3d 465, 120 Cal.Rptr. 840
207 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2384; 2393 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .441
Goldstein; People v., 139 Cal.App.2d 146, 293 P.2d 495 Gordon; People v., 50 Cal.3d 1223, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451,
(1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223, 224 792 P.2d 251 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
Gomez; People v., 2 Cal.App.4th 819, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 Gordon; People v., 136 Cal.App.3d 519, 186 Cal.Rptr.
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241 373 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 Gordon; People v., 165 Cal.App.3d 839, 212 Cal.Rptr.
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3403 174 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3500, 3501
Gonzales; People v., 6 Cal.5th 44, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 193, Gorgol; People v., 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 265 P.2d 69
424 P.3d 280 (2018) . 1900–1902; 1904, 1905; 1930; (1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3404
1932; 1935 Gorshen; People v., 51 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492
Gonzales; People v., 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d (1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
421 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1193 Gory; People v., 28 Cal.2d 450, 170 P.2d 433
Gonzales; People v., 54 Cal.4th 1234, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
757, 281 P.3d 834 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733 Goslar; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d
Gonzales; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2113
111 (1999) . . . 3402, 3403; 3406; 3408; 3414; 3425; Gould; People v., 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354
3470, 3471; 3475, 3476 P.2d 865 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Gonzales; People v., 87 Cal.App.2d 867, 198 P.2d 81 Goulet; People v., 21 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 98 Cal.Rptr.
(1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370 782 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143
Gonzales; People v., 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104
247 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1402 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). . . . . . .507; 908; 2670; 2672
Gonzales; People v., 183 Cal.App.4th 24, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d Graham v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.3d 880, 160 Cal.
11 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Rptr. 10 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2720
Gonzales; People v., 208 Cal.App.3d 1170, 256 Cal.Rptr. Graham; People v., 57 Cal.App.3d 238, 129 Cal.Rptr. 31
669 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3234 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402
Gonzales; People v., 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 267 Cal.Rptr. Graham; People v., 71 Cal.2d 303, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455
138 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374 P.2d 153 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 626
Gonzalez; People v., 2 Cal.5th 1138, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, Graham; United States v., 758 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.
394 P.3d 1074 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2825
Gonzalez; People v., 12 Cal.4th 804, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, Granados; People v., 16 Cal.App.4th 517, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d
910 P.2d 1366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700, 2701 131 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2430–2432
Gonzalez; People v., 31 Cal.4th 745, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, Granados; People v., 49 Cal.2d 490, 319 P.2d 346
74 P.3d 771 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 570 (1957). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
Gonzalez; People v., 51 Cal.3d 1179, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, Grandberry; People v., 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 247
800 P.2d 1159 (1990) . 524; 602; 724; 860, 861; 900; Cal.Rptr.3d 258 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361
945; 981; 2651–2656; 2670, 2671; 2932 Granger; People v., 105 Cal.App.3d 422, 164 Cal.Rptr.
Gonzalez; People v., 54 Cal.4th 643, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, 363 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
278 P.3d 1242 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601 Grassini; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d
Gonzalez; People v., 60 Cal.4th 533, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 662 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3454; 3454A
335 P.3d 1083 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . 1017, 1018 Gray; People v., 158 Cal.App.4th 635, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 876
Gonzalez; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 1405, 11 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316
Cal.Rptr.3d 434 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2441 Grays; People v., 246 Cal. App. 4th 679, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d
Gonzalez; People v., 190 Cal.App.4th 968, 118 288. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3477
Cal.Rptr.3d 637 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .560 Green; People v., 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d
Good; People v., 217 Cal.App.3d 1533, 266 Cal.Rptr. 608 468 (1980). . . . . . . .540A; 730–732; 1600; 1800
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3201 Green; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1433, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d
Goodman v. Superior Court, 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 148 913 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653; 2656
Cal.Rptr. 799 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
TC-19

TABLE OF CASES AS
Green; People v., 59 Cal.App.3d 1, 130 Cal.Rptr. 318 Gunnerson; People v., 74 Cal.App.3d 370, 141 Cal.Rptr.
(1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801 488 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .540A–540C
Green; People v., 146 Cal.App.3d 369, 194 Cal.Rptr. 128 Gurule; People v., 28 Cal.4th 557, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345,
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1502 51 P.3d 224 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .750
Green; People v., 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 Guthrie; People v., 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 193 Cal.Rptr. 54
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736; 1400 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1531; 1701
Greenberger; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 68 Gutierrez; People v., 23 Cal.App.4th 1576, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 61 (1997) . . . . 1202–1204; 1215; 3175 897 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
Greene; People v., 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 110 Cal.Rptr. 160 Gutierrez; People v., 28 Cal.4th 1083, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 891; 1121, 1122 373, 52 P.3d 572 (2002) . . . 359; 540A–540C; 2651
Greenfield; People v., 134 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 184 Gutierrez; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 380, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr. 604 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700, 2701 561 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2748
Greer; People v., 30 Cal.2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 Gutierrez; People v., 65 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 76
(1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2980 Cal.Rptr.2d 166 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2220
Greg F., In re, 159 Cal.App.3d 466, 205 Cal.Rptr. 614 Gutierrez; People v., 72 Cal.App.3d 397, 140 Cal.Rptr.
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 122 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2400
Grever; People v., 211 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 259 Cal.Rptr. Gutierrez; People v., 171 Cal.App.3d 944, 217 Cal.Rptr.
469 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250, 1251 616 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822; 840
Grier; People v., 226 Cal.App.2d 360, 38 Cal.Rptr. 11 Gutierrez; People v., 174 Cal. App. 4th 515, 94 Cal. Rptr.
(1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2202 3d 228. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2671
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 Gutierrez; People v., 180 Cal.App.3d 1076, 225 Cal.Rptr.
L.Ed.2d 106, 5 Ohio Misc. 127, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 437 885. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3406
(1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357 Guy; People v., 107 Cal.App.3d 593, 165 Cal.Rptr. 463
Griffin; People v., 33 Cal.4th 1015, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2574, 2575
94 P.3d 1089 (2004) . 1000, 1001; 1015; 1030; 1045,
1046; 1060; 1111 H
Griffin; People v., 46 Cal.3d 1011, 251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761
P.2d 103 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318, 319 H.W., In re, 6 Cal.5th 1068, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 436 P.3d
941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1704
Griffin; People v., 90 Cal.App.4th 741, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d
273 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700; 3180 Hagen; People v., 19 Cal.4th 652, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 967
P.2d 563 (1998) . . . . . . . 2640, 2641; 2800, 2801;
Griffini; People v., 65 Cal.App.4th 581, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d
2810–2812; 2825–2828; 2860
590 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640
Haggerty; People v., 46 Cal. 354 (1873) . . 1501, 1502;
Griggs; People v., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d
1515; 1530–1532
380 . . . 2125; 2510–2512; 2540; 2544; 2591, 2592;
3100 Hale; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810; 3177
Grim; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1240, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 884
(1992) . . 1015; 1017–1022; 1080–1082; 1120; 1128 Halgren; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 1223, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d
176 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301
Groat; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1228, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 15
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2765 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188
L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .775
Grubb; People v., 63 Cal.2d 614, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408
P.2d 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500, 2501 Hall; People v., 28 Cal.3d 143, 167 Cal.Rptr. 844, 616
P.2d 826 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Gudger; People v., 29 Cal.App.4th 310, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d
510 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2624; 2650, 2651 Hall; People v., 41 Cal.3d 826, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718
P.2d 99 (1986) . . . . . . . . 540A; 730; 1600; 1800
Guerra; People v., 40 Cal.3d 377, 220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 708
P.2d 1252 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 Hall; People v., 55 Cal.App.2d 343, 130 P.2d 733
(1942) . . 1903, 1904; 1920, 1921; 1930; 1935; 1953,
Guido; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 566, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d
1954; 1956
826 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015; 1030
Hall; People v., 67 Cal. App. 4th 128, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690
Guion; People v., 213 Cal.App.4th 1426, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1998) . . 1850; 2100, 2101; 2110–2112; 2114; 2125;
395 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2044
2520–2522; 2530; 2540–2546; 3100
Guiterrez; People v., 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 284 Cal.Rptr.
Hall; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 1084, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d
230 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1000; 1002–1004
279 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Guiuan; People v., 18 Cal.4th 558, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239,
957 P.2d 928 (1998). . . . . . . .334, 335; 707, 708
TC-20

AS TABLE OF CASES
Hall; United States v., 650 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. Harris; People v., 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679
1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2842–2844 P.2d 433 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721
Hallman; People v., 35 Cal.App.3d 638, 110 Cal.Rptr. Harrison; People v., 1 Cal.App.3d 115, 81 Cal.Rptr. 396
891 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2530
Hamilton; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 1137, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d Harrison; People v., 48 Cal.3d 321, 256 Cal.Rptr. 401,
343 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650 768 P.2d 1078 (1989) . . . . 1000; 1045; 1110; 1700
Hamilton; People v., 48 Cal.3d 1142, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, Harrison; People v., 57 Cal.4th 1211, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d
774 P.2d 730 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707, 708 167, 312 P.3d 88 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3456
Hamilton; People v., 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 145 Cal.Rptr. Harrison; People v., 768 P.2d 1078, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 256
429 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2140, 2141; 2160 Cal. Rptr. 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Hammon; People v., 15 Cal.4th 1117, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, Harrott v. County of Kings, 25 Cal.4th 1138, 108
938 P.2d 986 (1997) . . . . . . . . 3226; 3230; 3233 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 25 P.3d 649 (2001) . . . 2560; 2562
Hammon; People v., 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 236 Cal.Rptr. Hart; People v., 20 Cal.4th 546, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976
822 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045; 1700 P.2d 683 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030; 3261
Hammond; People v., 181 Cal.App.3d 463, 226 Cal.Rptr. Hart; People v., 98 Cal.App.2d 514, 220 P.2d 595
475 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402
Hampton; People v., 96 Cal.App. 157, 273 P. 854 Hart; United States v., 70 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 1995).2845
(1929). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .511 Hartland; People v., 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 268 Cal.Rptr.3d
Haney; People v., 75 Cal.App.3d 308, 142 Cal.Rptr. 186 1 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201; 1215
(1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1240–1242 Harvey; People v., 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 208 Cal.Rptr. 910
Hanna; People v., 218 Cal.App.4th 455, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224
210 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1110; 1112; 3406 Harvill, In re, 168 Cal.App.2d 490, 335 P.2d 1016
Hannon; People v., 19 Cal.3d 588, 138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 (1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2201, 2202
P.2d 1203 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Hatch v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 170, 94
Hard; People v., 112 Cal.App.4th 272, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
(2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3201 Hatchett; People v., 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 132 P.2d 51
Harden; People v., 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506; 3470
105 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 Hawkins; People v., 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d
Hardy; People v., 2 Cal.4th 86, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 500 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2440
P.2d 781 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Hawkins; People v., 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 17 Cal. Rptr. 66
Hardy; People v., 33 Cal.2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 1935; 3516
(1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425 Hawthorne, In re, 35 Cal.4th 40, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105
Harlan; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 271 Cal.Rptr. 653 P.3d 552 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 775
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 Hawthorne; People v., 4 Cal.4th 43, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133,
Harper; People v., 44 Cal.App.5th 172, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 841 P.2d 118 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 200
440 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202 Hayes v. County of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 160
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 305 P.3d 252 (2013) . . . 507; 908;
L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .356 2670; 2672
Harris, In re, 5 Cal.4th 813, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d Hayes, In re, 70 Cal.2d 604, 75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d
391 (1993). . . . . .820–823; 830, 831; 1070–1072; 430 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2931
1080–1082; 1090–1092; 1100–1102; 1110–1112; Hayes; People v., 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802
1120–1128; 1140; 1144, 1145; 1150–1152; 1180; P.2d 376 (1990) . . . . . . . 1202, 1203; 1600; 1650
1200, 1201; 1244; 1250, 1251; 1807; 2113; 2376; Haynes; People v., 148 Cal.App.3d 1117, 196 Cal.Rptr.
2380–2384; 2390–2393; 2960–2965; 2980–2982; 450 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
3162; 3185; 3222 Healy; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1137, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d
Harris, In re, 56 Cal.2d 879, 366 P.2d 305, 16 Cal.Rptr. 274 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810; 840; 3177
889 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143 Heath; People v., 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240
Harris, In re, 855 P.2d 391, 5 Cal.4th 813, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
373. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1071 Heath; People v., 134 Cal.App.4th 490, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 66
Harris; People v., 9 Cal.4th 407, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2303
P.2d 1193 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
TC-21

TABLE OF CASES AS
Heath; People v., 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 255 Cal.Rptr. 120 Herrera; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3402, 3403 307 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .736; 1400
Hecker; People v., 109 Cal. 451, 42 P. 307 (1895).3471 Herrera; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 911
Hedgecock; People v., 51 Cal.3d 395, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .418
795 P.2d 1260 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641 Hesslink; People v., 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 213 Cal.Rptr.
Heffington; People v., 32 Cal.App.3d 1, 107 Cal.Rptr. 859 465 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404; 3425–3427 Hicks; People v., 4 Cal.5th 203, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 565, 407
Heideman; People v., 58 Cal.App.3d 321, 130 Cal.Rptr. P.3d 409 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768; 3550
349 (1976). . . . . . .2570; 2572, 2573; 2577, 2578 Hicks; People v., 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d
Heilman; People v., 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234
422 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301 Hidalgo; People v., 128 Cal.App. 703, 18 P.2d 391
Heishman; People v., 45 Cal.3d 147, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900, 1901; 1955
753 P.2d 629 (1988). . . . . . . .124; 223–225; 370 Hill; People v., 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 783
Heitzman; People v., 9 Cal.4th 189, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .800, 801; 891; 3176
886 P.2d 1229 (1994). . . . . . . . . .582; 830, 831 Hill; People v., 66 Cal.2d 536, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d
Heller; People v., 96 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 157 Cal.Rptr. 908 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708
830 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143 Hill; People v., 67 Cal.2d 105, 60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d
Hempstead; People v., 148 Cal.App.3d 949, 196 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250–254; 3428
412 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Hill; People v., 86 Cal.App.4th 273, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 127
Henderson; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 453, 90 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
Cal.Rptr.2d 450 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .982 Hill; People v., 103 Cal.App.3d 525, 163 Cal.Rptr. 99
Hendricks; People v., 43 Cal.3d 584, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150, 1151; 1153–1156
737 P.2d 1350 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750 Hill; People v., 141 Cal.App.3d 661, 190 Cal.Rptr. 628
Hendrix; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 1458, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .810; 1202; 3177
922 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1240 Hillhouse v. California, 537 U.S. 1114, 123 S.Ct. 869,
Henning; People v., 173 Cal.App.4th 632, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 154 L.Ed.2d 789 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
775 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1804 Hillhouse; People v., 27 Cal.4th 469, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45,
Henslee v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 168 Cal.App.3d 445, 40 P.3d 754 (2002) . . . . . . . 370; 763; 1201; 1215
214 Cal.Rptr. 249 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2110 Hines; People v., 15 Cal.4th 997, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938
Herman; People v., 97 Cal.App.4th 1369, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 388 (1997) . . . . . . . . . 225; 704, 705; 2651
199 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441; 460; 1110 Hines; People v., 61 Cal.2d 164, 37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390
Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal.3d 713, 263 P.2d 398 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547 (1989) . . . . . . . . 207 Hines; People v., 210 Cal.App.3d 945, 259 Cal.Rptr. 128
Hernandez; People v., 33 Cal.4th 1040, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
880, 94 P.3d 1080 (2004) . . . 316; 736; 1400, 1401; Hinks; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d
1403; 2542 440 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1750
Hernandez; People v., 47 Cal.3d 315, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, Hinshaw; People v., 194 Cal. 1, 227 P. 156 (1924).3472
763 P.2d 1289 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3261 Hirst; People v., 31 Cal.App.3d 75, 106 Cal.Rptr. 815
Hernandez; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 225, 63 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2917
Cal.Rptr.2d 769 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .375 Hitchings, In re, 6 Cal.4th 97, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d
Hernandez; People v., 61 Cal.2d 529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 466 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092 (1964). . . . . .250; Hoard; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 599, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d
1070–1072; 1081, 1082; 1091, 1092; 1101, 1102 855 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204; 1650
Hernandez; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 282, 215 Cal.Rptr. Hobbs; People v., 152 Cal.App.4th 1, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 685
166 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .540A–540C (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Hernandez; People v., 177 Cal.App.4th 1182, 99 Hodges; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 548 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3002 619 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2520–2522
Hernandez; People v., 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 107 Hofsheier; People v., 37 Cal.4th 1185, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d
Cal.Rptr.3d 915 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .522 821, 129 P.3d 29 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Hernandez; People v., 219 Cal.App.3d 1177, 269 Holford; People v., 63 Cal.2d 74, 45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403
Cal.Rptr. 21 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2241 P.2d 423 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . 2140, 2141; 2160
Hernandez; People v., 393 P.2d 673, 61 Cal.2d 529, 39
Cal.Rptr. 361, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092 . . . . . . . . . 1091
TC-22

AS TABLE OF CASES
Holifield; People v., 205 Cal.App.3d 993, 252 Cal.Rptr. Howard; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 323, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d
729 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841 849. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1822
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 Howard; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 94, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d
L.Ed. 150, 1954-2 C.B. 215 (1954) . . . . 2842–2844 892 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980
Holland; People v., 158 Cal.App.2d 583, 322 P.2d 983 Howard; People v., 117 Cal.App.3d 53, 172 Cal.Rptr. 539
(1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2440 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003; 1033; 1048
Holland; United States v., 880 F.2d 1091 (1989) . 2801; Howard; People v., 211 Cal. 322, 295 P. 333
2812 (1930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768; 3550
Hollis; People v., 235 Cal.App.3d 1521, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d Howard; People v., 749 P.2d 279, 44 Cal.3d 375, 243
524 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1190 Cal.Rptr. 842 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
Holloway; People v., 50 Cal.3d 1098, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, Howk; People v., 56 Cal.2d 687, 16 Cal.Rptr. 370, 365
790 P.2d 1327 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 P.2d 426 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Holmes; People v., 5 Cal.App.3d 21, 84 Cal.Rptr. 889 Hoxter; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 406, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1863 259 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2670
Holt; People v., 15 Cal.4th 619, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 Hudec v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.4th 815, 339 P.3d 998,
P.2d 213 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .700; 730 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Holt; People v., 37 Cal.3d 436, 208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 Hudson; People v., 11 Cal.App.5th 831, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 1207 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706 775 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650
Honig; People v., 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 Hudson; People v., 38 Cal.4th 1002, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632,
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3407 136 P.3d 168 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2180–2182
Hood; People v., 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d Hudson; People v., 45 Cal.2d 121, 287 P.2d 497
370 (1969) . . 225; 512; 560–562; 1862; 3426; 3477 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C; 730
Hooper; People v., 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 226 Cal.Rptr. Huggins; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1654, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d
810 (1986). . . . . . .1501, 1502; 1515; 1530–1532 177 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1801
Hoover; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d Huggins; People v., 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 185
208 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A Cal.Rptr.3d 672 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . 334–336
Hopkins; People v., 105 Cal.App.2d 708, 233 P.2d 948 Hughes; People v., 27 Cal.4th 287, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401,
(1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830 39 P.3d 432 (2002) . 225; 626; 704, 705; 1030; 1124;
Horn; People v., 12 Cal.3d 290, 115 Cal.Rptr. 516, 524 1700; 3425, 3426
P.2d 1300 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 563 Hughes; People v., 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 237 P.2d 64
Horn; People v., 63 Cal.App.5th 672, 277 Cal.Rptr.3d 901 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506; 3470
(2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 571; 2514; 3470 Hughey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal.App.3d 752,
Horn; People v., 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 9 Cal.Rptr. 578 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 115 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2131
(1960) . . 2300; 2302–2304; 2306; 2380; 2382, 2383; Humphrey; People v., 13 Cal.4th 1073, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d
2390; 2392; 2440 142, 921 P.2d 1 (1996) . . . 505, 506; 571; 850, 851;
Horton; People v., 11 Cal.4th 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 1193; 2514; 3470
906 P.2d 478 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104; 222 Humphries; People v., 185 Cal.App.3d 1315, 230
Housley; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d Cal.Rptr. 536 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
431 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . .850, 851; 1192, 1193 Hunt; People v., 26 Cal.App. 514, 147 P. 476
Hovda; People v., 176 Cal.App.4th 1355, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d (1915) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 768; 3550
499 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590 Huricks; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d
Howard, 17 Cal.App.4th 999, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 . 3229 592 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3222
Howard N., In re, 35 Cal.4th 117, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 866, 106 Hurtado; People v., 28 Cal.4th 1179, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186,
P.3d 305 (2005) . . . . . . 3453, 3454; 3454A; 3458 52 P.3d 116 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . .3454; 3454A
Howard; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 999, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d Hurtado; People v., 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d
676 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3229 853 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2510–2513
Howard; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d Hussain; People v., 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d
766 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2430–2432; 3200 679 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1863
Howard; People v., 34 Cal.4th 1129, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, Hutchings; People v., 242 Cal.App.2d 294, 51 Cal.Rptr.
104 P.3d 107 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2181 415 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822
Howard; People v., 44 Cal.3d 375, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 Huynh; People v., 99 Cal.App.4th 662, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 279 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401; 720 340 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402, 403
TC-23

TABLE OF CASES AS
Hyatt; People v., 18 Cal.App.3d 618, 96 Cal.Rptr. 156 Jackson; People v., 114 Cal.App.3d 207, 170 Cal.Rptr.
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 476 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1150
Jackson; People v., 190 Cal.App.4th 918, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d
I 623 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
Jackson; People v., 210 Cal.App.4th 525, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d
Ibarra; People v., 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 375 (2012) . . . 2350–2352; 2361; 2363; 2370; 2375,
871 (2007) . 100–102; 104; 200; 220; 223, 224; 226; 2376; 3412, 3413
250; 252; 300; 302; 355; 370; 915; 1301
Jackson; People v., 218 Cal.App.3d 1493, 267 Cal.Rptr.
Ibrahim; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1692, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2330
269 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202
Jacobo; People v., 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d
Imler; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1178, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 915 236 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1151
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110
James M., In re, 9 Cal.3d 517, 108 Cal.Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d
In re (see name of party) 33 (1973) . . 460; 860–863; 875, 876; 900–907; 915,
Ingram; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 916; 2720, 2721
256 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1701 James; People v., 1 Cal.App.3d 645, 81 Cal.Rptr. 845
Iniguez; People v., 7 Cal.4th 847, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2746, 2747
P.2d 1183 (1994) . . . 1000; 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060; James; People v., 81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d
1111 823 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
Iniguez; People v., 96 Cal.App.4th 75, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d James; People v., 155 Cal.App.2d 604, 318 P.2d 175
634 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
Ireland; People v., 188 Cal.App.4th 328, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d James; People v., 274 Cal.App.2d 608, 79 Cal.Rptr. 182
915 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1000 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Irwin; People v., 155 Cal.App.3d 891, 202 Cal.Rptr. 475 Jaramillo; People v., 16 Cal.3d 752, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306,
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 548 P.2d 706 (1976) . . . . . . . . 1750; 1820; 3516
Isaac v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App.3d 260, 146 Cal.Rptr. Jaramillo; People v., 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 159 Cal.Rptr.
396 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830, 1831 771 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 830
Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal.3d 112, Jaspar; People v., 98 Cal.App.4th 99, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 470
211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985). . . . . .582 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .851
Isitt; People v., 55 Cal.App.3d 23, 127 Cal.Rptr. 279 Jeffers; People v., 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 86
(1976). . . . . . . . . . . . .1202–1204; 1215; 3175 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250; 252; 2510–2513
Ivans; People v., 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 66 Jefferson v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.3d 721, 124
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1822 Cal.Rptr. 507 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2690
Jefferson; People v., 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d
J 473 (2004) . . . . . . . . 505; 571; 2514; 3429; 3470
Jablonski; People v., 37 Cal.4th 774, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, Jeffery; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d
126 P.3d 938 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3451 526 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334; 418
Jack; People v., 233 Cal.App.2d 446, 43 Cal.Rptr. 566 Jenkins; People v., 22 Cal.4th 900, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377,
(1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2320, 2321 997 P.2d 1044 (2000) . . . . . 725; 2670, 2671; 3500
Jackson; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 1185, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d Jenkins; People v., 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d
239 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1601, 1602 483 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1862
Jackson; People v., 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, Jenkins; People v., 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 154 Cal.Rptr. 309
920 P.2d 1254 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2335–2338
Jackson; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d Jenkins; People v., 146 Cal.App.3d 22, 193 Cal.Rptr. 854
214 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . 3115–3117; 3130–3132 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3002
Jackson; People v., 59 Cal.2d 468, 30 Cal.Rptr. 329, 381 Jennings, In re, 34 Cal.4th 254, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95
P.2d 1 (1963) . 2300, 2301; 2331; 2351; 2363; 2381; P.3d 906 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2962–2965
2391; 2500; 2502; 2575 Jennings; People v., 53 Cal.3d 334, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780,
Jackson; People v., 66 Cal.App.4th 182, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 P.2d 1009 (1991). . . . . . . . . .207; 357; 359
564 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1203 Jennings; People v., 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d
Jackson; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 574, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A
805 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Jensen; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 224, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d
Jackson; People v., 92 Cal.App.3d 556, 155 Cal.Rptr. 89 609 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140
(1979) . . . . . . . . . 1905; 1930; 1935; 1954; 1970
TC-24

AS TABLE OF CASES
Jentry; People v., 69 Cal.App.3d 615, 138 Cal.Rptr. 250 Johnson; People v., 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801 802 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571, 572
Jerome; People v., 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 207 Cal.Rptr. Johnson; People v., 163 Cal.App.2d 58, 328 P.2d 809
199 (1984) . . . 1080, 1081; 1090, 1091; 1100, 1101 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
Jerry R., In re, 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 Johnson; People v., 164 Cal.App.4th 731, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965; 967, 968; 970 568 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A
Jesse L., In re, 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 270 Cal.Rptr. 389 Johnson; People v., 181 Cal.App.3d 1137, 225 Cal.Rptr.
(1990) . . . . . . . . . 1501, 1502; 1515; 1530–1532 251 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3160
Jeter; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 1212, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d Johnson; People v., 190 Cal.App.3d 187, 237 Cal.Rptr.
402 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2720 479 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Jimenez; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 391, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d Johnson; People v., 221 Cal.App.4th 623, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d
281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2560–2562 505 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Jimenez; People v., 99 Cal.App.4th 450, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d Johnson; United States v., 319 U.S. 503, 63 S.Ct. 1233,
426 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1110 87 L.Ed. 1546, 1943 C.B. 995 (1943) . . 2800, 2801;
Jimenez; People v., 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 2810–2812; 2828
76 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105; 226 Johnston; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d
Jimenez Recio; United States v., 537 U.S. 270, 123 S.Ct. 161 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570; 917
819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 415 Johnwell; People v., 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 18
Jischke; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 552, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.Rptr.3d 286 (2004). . . . . . . . . . .3450–3452
269 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Jomo K. Bland; People v., 28 Cal.4th 313, 121
John V., ; In re, 167 Cal.App.3d 761, 213 Cal.Rptr. 503 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107 (2002) . . . 600; 1402;
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2690 3149, 3150
John Z., In re, 29 Cal.4th 756, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 Jones, 25 Cal.4th 98, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18 P.3d 674
P.3d 183 . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 1015; 1030; 1045 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3163
Johnny O., In re, 107 Cal.App.4th 888, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d Jones; People v., 8 Cal.App.3d 710, 87 Cal.Rptr. 625
471 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2410 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2672
Johnson v. Department of Justice, 60 Cal. 4th 871, 183 Jones; People v., 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510
Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 341 P.3d 1075 (2015) . . . . . 1170 P.2d 705 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, Jones; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 1566, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 9
192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3233
Johnson; People v., 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23 Jones; People v., 13 Cal.4th 535, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 917
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1603; 3261 P.2d 1165 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725
Johnson; People v., 6 Cal.4th 1, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 Jones; People v., 17 Cal.4th 279, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949
P.2d 673 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 P.2d 890 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Johnson; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d Jones; People v., 19 Cal.App.3d 437, 96 Cal.Rptr. 795
628 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700, 2701 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2682; 2736
Johnson; People v., 28 Cal.4th 240, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 197, Jones; People v., 25 Cal.4th 98, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 18
47 P.3d 1064 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120 P.3d 674 (2001) . . . . 1402; 3115–3117; 3130, 3131;
Johnson; People v., 28 Cal.App.3d 653, 104 Cal.Rptr. 807 3145–3150; 3160–3163; 3176, 3177; 3182, 3183
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C Jones; People v., 30 Cal.4th 1084, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370,
Johnson; People v., 38 Cal.App.4th 1315, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 70 P.3d 359 (2003). . . . . . . . .701–703; 721–723
602 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1402; 3145–3147 Jones; People v., 42 Cal.2d 219, 266 P.2d 38
Johnson; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1329, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d (1954). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350
798 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . 460; 580, 581; 600; 603 Jones; People v., 46 Cal.3d 585, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758
Johnson; People v., 57 Cal.4th 250, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 70, P.2d 1165 (1988) . . . 1000; 1002–1005; 1070–1072;
303 P.3d 379 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400 1127; 1180
Johnson; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 67, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d Jones; People v., 51 Cal.3d 294, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792
795 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170 P.2d 643 . 1000; 1060; 1110–1112; 1121, 1122; 3500,
Johnson; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 410, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 3501
596 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A Jones; People v., 53 Cal.3d 1115, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811
Johnson; People v., 79 Cal.App.5th 1093, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d P.2d 757 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
353 (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2623
TC-25

TABLE OF CASES AS
Jones; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 506 Karsai; People v., 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 182 Cal.Rptr. 406
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203; 3175; 3179 (1982) . . 1000; 1002–1005; 1070–1072; 1127; 1180;
Jones; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 3224
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204; 1650 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th 472, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2
Jones; People v., 82 Cal.App.4th 663, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 724 P.3d 581 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2560; 2562
(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2180 Katz; People v., 207 Cal.App.2d 739, 24 Cal.Rptr. 644
Jones; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2320, 2321
319 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 Katzman; People v., 258 Cal.App.2d 777, 66 Cal.Rptr.
Jones; People v., 112 Cal.App.4th 341, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 66 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1968). . . . . . .1900; 1970
916. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3412 Kaurish; People v., 52 Cal.3d 648, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802
Jones; People v., 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 41, 197 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 278 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765
273 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2800; 2810 Kay, In re, 1 Cal.3d 930, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142
Jones; People v., 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 234 Cal.Rptr. (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2681
408. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2400 Kearns; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 64 Cal.Rptr. 2d
Jones; People v., 199 Cal.App.3d 543, 245 Cal.Rptr. 85 654 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3403
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1502; 1531 Keenan; People v., 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 277 Cal.Rptr. 687
Jordan; People v., 75 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 142 Cal.Rptr. (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801
401 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2241 Keeney; People v., 24 Cal.App.4th 886, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d
Jorge M., In re, 23 Cal.4th 866, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 451 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1102
P.3d 297 (2000). . . .2500; 2502; 2510–2513; 2560; Keeper; People v., 192 Cal.App.4th 511, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d
2562; 2570–2575; 2579; 2591, 2592; 3116; 3147 451 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Jose A., In re, 5 Cal.App.4th 697, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 Kehoe; People v., 33 Cal.2d 711, 204 P.2d 321
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981, 982 (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822
Jose H., In re, 77 Cal.App.4th 1090, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 Kelii, 21 Cal.4th 452, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d
(2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .925 518. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3100
Jose M., In re, 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55 Kellett; People v., 134 Cal.App.3d 949, 185 Cal.Rptr. 1
(1994) . . 1000, 1001; 1015, 1016; 1030, 1031; 1045 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3227
Joseph G., In re, 7 Cal.App.3d 695, 87 Cal.Rptr. 25 Kelley; People v., 27 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 70 P.2d 276
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2966 (1937) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2241
Joshua H., In re, 13 Cal.App.4th 1734, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d Kelley; People v., 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 269 Cal.Rptr.
291 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1355 900 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 563
Joshua M., In re, 91 Cal.App.4th 743, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d Kelly; People v., 1 Cal.4th 495, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822
662 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2915, 2916 P.2d 385 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 3450
Jung; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 1036, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 Kelly; People v., 10 Cal.3d 565, 111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810; 3177 P.2d 875 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3406; 3450
Jurado; People v., 25 Cal.App.3d 1027, 102 Cal.Rptr. 498 Kelner; United States v., 534 F.2d 1020, 34 A.L.R. Fed.
(1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2520–2522 767 (2d Cir. 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624; 2651
Kelso; People v., 25 Cal.2d 848, 155 P.2d 819
K (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768; 3550
Kemp; People v., 139 Cal.App. 48, 34 P.2d 502
Kahanic; People v., 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 241 Cal.Rptr. (1934). . . . . .1070–1072; 1080–1082; 1090–1092;
722 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2900 1100–1102; 1112; 1120–1122
Kaihea; People v., 70 Cal.App.5th 257, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d Kendall; People v., 111 Cal.App.2d 204, 244 P.2d 418
334. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1403 (1952). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .371
Kainzrants; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 53 Kendrick; People v., 211 Cal.App.3d 1273, 260 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.2d 207 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .730 27 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Kanawyer; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 1233, 7 Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th
Cal.Rptr.3d 401 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570 814, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 756, 927 P.2d 1260 (1997) . 582
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 Kerrick; People v., 86 Cal.App. 542, 261 P. 756
L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3453 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2685
Karis; People v., 46 Cal.3d 612, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758
P.2d 1189 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 201
TC-26

AS TABLE OF CASES
Kessler v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 9 Cal.App.4th 1134, Kraft; People v., 23 Cal.4th 978, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d
12 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130 68 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801
Key; People v., 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 203 Cal.Rptr. 144 Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1970) . . 2902
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015; 1030; 1045 Kreiling; People v., 259 Cal.App.2d 699, 66 Cal.Rptr. 582
Keys; People v., 62 Cal.App.2d 903, 145 P.2d 589 (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2902
(1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3474 Kroncke; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 1535, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d
Killebrew; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 126 493 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2140, 2141; 2150
Cal.Rptr.2d 876 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2542 Kronemyer; People v., 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 234 Cal.Rptr.
Kim v. Superior Court (People), 136 Cal.App.4th 937, 39 442 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1806
Cal.Rptr.3d 338 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Kuhn; People v., 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 31 Cal.Rptr. 253
Kimble; People v., 44 Cal.3d 480, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2800; 2810
P.2d 803 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . 362; 730; 800, 801 Kuhns; People v., 61 Cal.App.3d 735, 132 Cal.Rptr. 725
King; People v., 22 Cal.3d 12, 148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140–1145
P.2d 1000 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2514; 3470 Kunkin; People v., 9 Cal.3d 245, 107 Cal.Rptr. 184, 507
King; People v., 30 Cal.App.2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 P.2d 1392, 57 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1973) . . . 1750; 1800
(1938). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .417 Kurtenbach; People v., 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 139
King; People v., 38 Cal.4th 617, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2900
P.3d 636 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500 Kurtzman; People v., 46 Cal.3d 322, 250 Cal.Rptr. 244,
Kinsey; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 1621, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 P.2d 572. . . . . . . . . . .640–643; 3517–3519
769 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 Kwok; People v., 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d
Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 267 40, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Cal.App.2d 895, 73 Cal.Rptr. 352 (1968).2962–2964
Kirk; People v., 192 Cal.App.3d Supp. 15, 238 Cal.Rptr. L
42 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3470
L.T., In re, 103 Cal.App.4th 262, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 778
Kirkpatrick; People v., 7 Cal.4th 988, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818,
(2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1515
874 P.2d 248 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763
La Fargue; People v., 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 195 Cal.Rptr.
Kitt; People v., 83 Cal.App.3d 834, 148 Cal.Rptr. 447
438 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 765
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
La Fontaine; People v., 79 Cal.App.3d 176, 144 Cal.Rptr.
Klor, In re, 64 Cal.2d 816, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791
729 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
(1966). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1141, 1142
Labaer; People v., 88 Cal.App.4th 289, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
Knight; People v., 121 Cal.App.4th 1568, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d
629 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1515
384 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2530
Label; People v., 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 119 Cal.Rptr. 522
Knight; People v., 204 Cal.App.3d 1420, 252 Cal.Rptr. 17
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2300; 2350, 2351
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
LaCross; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 182, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d
Knoller; People v., 41 Cal.4th 139, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157,
802 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2300
158 P.3d 731 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Lake; People v., 156 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d
Kobrin; People v., 11 Cal.4th 416, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895,
452 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1162
903 P.2d 1027 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55
Koenig; People v., 58 Cal.App.5th 771, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d
L.Ed.2d 319 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
732 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3411
Lam; People v., 122 Cal.App.4th 1297, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 92 S.Ct. 2245, 33
431 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
L.Ed.2d 312 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . .1140–1143
Lamas; People v., 42 Cal.4th 516, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 179,
Kondor; People v., 200 Cal.App.3d 52, 245 Cal.Rptr. 750
169 P.3d 102 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400; 2542
(1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361
Lamont R., In re, 200 Cal.App.3d 244, 245 Cal.Rptr. 870
Kongs; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
327 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122
Lampman v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal.App.3d
Korwin; People v., 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d
922, 105 Cal.Rptr. 101 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . 2130
763 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1124
Lancellotti; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 809, 23
Kovacich; People v., 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 133
Cal.Rptr.2d 640 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
Cal.Rptr.3d 924 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . .852A
Land; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 544
Kozlowski; People v., 96 Cal.App.4th 853, 117
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
Cal.Rptr.2d 504 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830
TC-27

TABLE OF CASES AS
Lang; People v., 49 Cal.3d 991, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 Lee; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 723
P.2d 627 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376; 765 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .915
Langdon; People v., 192 Cal.App.3d 1419, 238 Cal.Rptr. Lee; People v., 31 Cal.4th 613, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d
158 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1070 176 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601; 3160–3163
Langston; People v., 33 Cal.4th 1237, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 596, Lee; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d Supp. 9, 204 Cal.Rptr.
95 P.3d 865 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3102 667 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1226
Lanphear; People v., 36 Cal.3d 163, 203 Cal.Rptr. 122, Lee; People v., 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 268 Cal.Rptr. 595
680 P.2d 1081 (1984). . . . . . . . . .101; 760, 761 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370
Lanzit; People v., 70 Cal.App. 498, 233 P. 816 Lee; People v., 220 Cal.App.3d 320, 269 Cal.Rptr. 434
(1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3409 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800; 3176
Lara; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 886 Lee; People v., 260 Cal.App.2d 836, 67 Cal.Rptr. 709
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359; 926 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2401
Lara; People v., 43 Cal.App.4th 1560, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 349 Leffel v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal.App.3d 569, 126
(1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .980 Cal.Rptr. 773 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Lara; People v., 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 Leffel; People v., 203 Cal.App.3d 575, 249 Cal.Rptr. 906
(1996) . 253; 820–823; 830, 831; 840, 841; 860–863; (1988). . . . . . . . .580, 581; 590–593; 2100–2102
875–877; 900–908; 915; 925, 926; 945–951; 960; Lemanuel C., In re, 41 Cal.4th 33, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 597,
1153; 1161, 1162; 1350, 1351; 1821; 2201, 2202; 158 P.3d 148 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3458
2240; 2400, 2401; 2683–2689; 2700, 2701; 2720, Lemcke; People v., 11 Cal.5th 644, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 849,
2721; 2723; 2930–2932; 2980; 3001, 3002 486 P.3d 1077 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Lashley; People v., 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 629 Lemus; People v., 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 249 Cal.Rptr. 897
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1350–1352; 1355 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 2514
Lasko; People v., 23 Cal.4th 101, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 Leonard; People v., 15 Cal.App.5th 275, 222 Cal.Rptr3d
P.2d 666 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572 868 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2181
Laster; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d Lerma; People v., 42 Cal.App.4th 1221, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d
680 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . .402; 601; 968, 969 580 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3145
Laurel v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 255 Lesansky, In re, 25 Cal.4th 11, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 17
Cal.App.2d 292, 63 Cal.Rptr. 114 (1967) . . . . . 441 P.3d 764 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Lauria; People v., 251 Cal.App.2d 471, 59 Cal.Rptr. 628 Letner and Tobin; People v., 50 Cal.4th 99, 112
(1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62 (2010). . . . .766, 767
Laursen; People v., 8 Cal.3d 192, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 Levesque; People v., 35 Cal.App.4th 530, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 1145 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203 439 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1200
Lavaie; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 456, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d Lew; People v., 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d
719 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760–2762 942 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
Lavine; People v., 115 Cal.App. 289, 1 P.2d 496 Lewelling; People v., 16 Cal.App.5th 276, 224
(1931). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830–1832 Cal.Rptr.3d 255. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908
Lawrence; People v., 177 Cal.App.4th 547, 99 Lewis v. Superior Court, 217 Cal.App.3d 379, 265
Cal.Rptr.3d 324 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .600 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . .1900; 1902
Laws; People v., 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 668 Lewis; People v., 25 Cal.4th 610, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22
(1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .521 P.3d 392. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .704, 705
Lazenby; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 1842, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d Lewis; People v., 26 Cal.4th 334, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28
541 (1992) . . . 2300; 2302; 2350–2352; 2380; 2382, P.3d 34 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
2383; 2390; 2392 Lewis; People v., 50 Cal.3d 262, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786
Leach; People v., 15 Cal.3d 419, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 892 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
P.2d 296 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415; 418 Lewis; People v., 77 Cal.App.3d 455, 143 Cal.Rptr. 587,
Leal; People v., 33 Cal.4th 999, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 3 A.L.R.4th 1185 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
P.3d 1071 . . . . 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060; 1111; 1151 Lewis; People v., 229 Cal.App.3d 259, 280 Cal.Rptr. 128
LeCorno; People v., 109 Cal.App.4th 1058, 135 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3229
Cal.Rptr.2d 775 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Licas; People v., 41 Cal.4th 362, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 31, 159
Lee; People v., 20 Cal.4th 47, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.3d 507 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
P.2d 1001 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . 570; 580, 581 Lilienthal; People v., 22 Cal.3d 891, 150 Cal.Rptr. 910,
Lee; People v., 24 Cal.App.4th 1773, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 224 587 P.2d 706 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2670
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1515
TC-28

AS TABLE OF CASES
Lillard; People v., 18 Cal.App. 343, 123 P. 221 Lopez; People v., 19 Cal.4th 282, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965
(1912). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .508 P.2d 713 (1998) . . . . . . . . 460; 1110; 1121, 1122
Lim Foon; People v., 29 Cal.App. 270, 155 P. 477 Lopez; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 897, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 649
(1915) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223, 224 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200
Limon; People v., 252 Cal.App.2d 575, 60 Cal.Rptr. 448 Lopez; People v., 31 Cal.4th 1051, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79
(1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2140 P.3d 548 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650
Lindstrom; People v., 128 Cal.App. 111, 16 P.2d 1003 Lopez; People v., 34 Cal.4th 1002, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 869,
(1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402 103 P.3d 270 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
Lines; People v., 13 Cal.3d 500, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 Lopez; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 233, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 511
P.2d 793 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410
Linwood; People v., 105 Cal.App.4th 59, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d Lopez; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 1550, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d
73 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 655 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Lipinski; People v., 65 Cal.App.3d 566, 135 Cal.Rptr. 451 Lopez; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 252
(1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .418 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Lipscomb; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 564, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d Lopez; People v., 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 293 Cal.Rptr.3d 272
445 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 730
Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) . . 103; Lopez; People v., 116 Cal.App.3d 882, 172 Cal.Rptr. 374
220 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001; 1354
Lisnow; People v., 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 21, 151 Cal.Rptr. Lopez; People v., 123 Cal.App.4th 1306, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d
621 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3425 801. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3454
Little; People v., 115 Cal.App.4th 766, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446 Lopez; People v., 126 Cal.App.2d 274, 271 P.2d 874
(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400 (1954). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
Liu; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 578 Lopez; People v., 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416; 563 586 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2652
Livaditis; People v., 2 Cal.4th 759, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 Lopez; People v., 176 Cal.App.3d 545, 222 Cal.Rptr. 101
P.2d 297 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 (1986) . . . 800, 801; 2572; 2577, 2578; 2900; 2902
Livingston; People v., 53 Cal.4th 1145, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d Lopez; People v., 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 233 Cal.Rptr. 207
139, 274 P.3d 1132 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . 223, 224 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654; 2656
Lizarraga; People v., 219 Cal.App.3d 476, 268 Cal.Rptr. Lopez; People v., 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d
262 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 248 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505; 571; 604
Llamas; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d Lopez; People v., 271 Cal.App.2d 754, 77 Cal.Rptr. 59
357 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460; 1800; 1820 (1969) . . . . . . . . . 2380, 2381; 2390, 2391; 3406
Lobato; People v., 109 Cal.App.4th 762, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d Louie; People v., 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 28, 205 Cal.Rptr.
429 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200, 3201 247 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d Louis; People v., 159 Cal.App.3d 156, 205 Cal.Rptr. 306
973, 9 Ohio Op. 3d 26 (1978). . . . . . . . . . .763 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .362
Loeun; People v., 17 Cal.4th 1, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 Loustaunau; People v., 181 Cal.App.3d 163, 226
P.2d 1313 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400 Cal.Rptr. 216 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
Lofink; People v., 206 Cal.App.3d 161, 253 Cal.Rptr. 384 Love; People v., 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 168 Cal.Rptr.
(1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .822 591 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1154
Lohbauer; People v., 29 Cal.3d 364, 173 Cal.Rptr. 453, Lovercamp; People v., 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 118 Cal.Rptr.
627 P.2d 183 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2932 110, 69 A.L.R.3d 668 (1974) . . . 2760–2762; 2764;
Long Beach Police Officers Assn v. City of Long Beach, 3402
61 Cal.App.3d 364, 132 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1976) . . 508 Low; People v., 49 Cal.4th 372, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 640, 232
Longoria; People v., 34 Cal.App.4th 12, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d P.3d 635 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2749
213 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . .926; 945; 948, 949 Lowery; People v., 52 Cal.4th 419, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 648,
Looney; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 242, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 257 P.3d 72 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . .2624; 2651
502 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1900 Lozano; People v., 192 Cal.App.3d 618, 237 Cal.Rptr.
Lopez; People v., 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2736; 2761; 2763
618 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650 Lua; People v., 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 23
Lopez; People v., 12 Cal.5th 957, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2300, 2301
507 P.3d 925 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
TC-29

TABLE OF CASES AS
Lucas; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 Magana; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 1371, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570 59 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160
Lucas; People v., 160 Cal.App.2d 305, 324 P.2d 933 Magana; People v., 230 Cal.App.3d 1117, 281 Cal.Rptr.
(1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506 338 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . 1200; 1202, 1203; 1215
Lucero; People v., 44 Cal.3d 1006, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 Magpuso; People v., 23 Cal.App.4th 112, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 1342 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 206 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201; 1215; 3406
Luis C., In re, 116 Cal.App.4th 1397, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 Maguire; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 1022, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 573 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2020
Lujano; People v., 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 223 Cal.Rptr.3d Mai; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 141
105 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002; 1032 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Luke W., In re, 88 Cal.App.4th 650, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 905 Maioli; People v., 135 Cal.App. 205, 26 P.2d 871
(2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2501 (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900, 1901; 1955
Lungren, People ex rel. v. Peron, 59 Cal.App.4th 1383, 70 Majors; People v., 18 Cal.4th 385, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684,
Cal.Rptr.2d 20 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . 2350–2352 956 P.2d 1137 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3145
Lynn; People v., 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 206 Cal.Rptr. 181 Majors; People v., 33 Cal.4th 321, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 870, 92
(1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370 P.3d 360 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215
Lyon; People v., 61 Cal.App.5th 237, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 Majors; People v., 47 Cal.App. 374, 190 P. 636
(2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3010 (1920). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
Lyons; People v., 50 Cal.2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 Malamut; People v., 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 93 Cal.Rptr. 782
(1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822
Malbrough; People v., 55 Cal.2d 249, 10 Cal.Rptr. 632,
M 359 P.2d 30 (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
Malcolm; People v., 47 Cal.App.3d 217, 120 Cal.Rptr.
M., In re, 22 Cal.3d 419, 149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524 667 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3455
Maldonado; People v., 221 Cal.App.2d 128, 34 Cal.Rptr.
M.M., In re, 54 Cal.4th 530, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 278 168 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1901
P.3d 1221 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Malfavon; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 727, 125
M.S., In re, 10 Cal.4th 698, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d 618 (2002) . . . . . . . . 520; 820; 3516
1365 (1995). . . .523; 729; 1350–1352; 1354, 1355;
Malgren; People v., 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 188 Cal.Rptr.
2651
569 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
MacArthur; People v., 142 Cal.App.4th 275, 47
Mancebo; People v., 27 Cal.4th 735, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550,
Cal.Rptr.3d 736 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
41 P.3d 556 (2002) . . . . . . . . . 3145; 3175–3183
MacCagnan; People v., 129 Cal.App.2d 100, 276 P.2d
Mandel v. Municipal Court, 276 Cal.App.2d 649, 81
679 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Cal.Rptr. 173 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2917
Mace; People v., 71 Cal.App. 10, 234 P. 841
Manfredi; People v., 169 Cal.App.4th 622, 86 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
810 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1145
MacEwing; People v., 45 Cal.2d 218, 288 P.2d 257
Manis; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 110, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
619, 12 Cal.Rptr. 619 (1992). . . . . . . . .830, 831
Machuca; People v., 49 Cal.App.5th 393, 263 Cal.Rptr.3d
Mann; United States v., 884 F.2d 532 (10th Cir.
52 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591
1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2860
Maciel; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 679, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d
Manriquez; People v., 37 Cal.4th 547, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d
628 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300
340, 123 P.3d 614 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Maciel; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 273, 215 Cal.Rptr. 124
Manson; People v., 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 132 Cal.Rptr. 265
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3130
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400
Macinnes; People v., 30 Cal.App.3d 838, 106 Cal.Rptr.
Manuel G., In re, 16 Cal.4th 805, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701,
589 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202
941 P.2d 880 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2651, 2652
Mackabee; People v., 214 Cal.App.3d 1250, 263
Manzo; People v., 53 Cal.4th 880, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 16,
Cal.Rptr. 183 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
270 P.3d 711 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
MacKenzie; People v., 34 Cal.App.4th 1256, 40
Mapp; People v., 150 Cal.App.3d 346, 198 Cal.Rptr. 177
Cal.Rptr.2d 793 (1995) . . . . . . . 1350–1352; 1355
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3452
Mackreth; People v., 58 Cal.App.5th 317, 272
Mar; People v., 28 Cal.4th 1201, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52
Cal.Rptr.3d 498 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2656
P.3d 95 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204; 337
Madden; People v., 116 Cal.App.3d 212, 171 Cal.Rptr.
897 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2980; 3500, 3501
TC-30

AS TABLE OF CASES
Marabelles; United States v., 724 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. Martinez; People v., 31 Cal.4th 673, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648,
1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2845 74 P.3d 748 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .750
Marcus T., In re, 89 Cal.App.4th 468, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d Martinez; People v., 34 Cal.App.5th 721, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d
451 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 442 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Marks; People v., 31 Cal.4th 197, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 Martinez; People v., 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.3d 1222 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737 303 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300
Marks; People v., 45 Cal.3d 1335, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 Martinez; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 905, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 260 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361; 419 334 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745–2747
Marler; People v., 199 Cal.App.2d Supp. 889, 18 Martinez; People v., 95 Cal.App.4th 581, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr. 923 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1144 574 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1800
Marquez; People v., 16 Cal.App.4th 115, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d Martinez; People v., 105 Cal.App.3d 938, 165 Cal.Rptr.
365 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1805 11 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Marquez; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 1315, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d Martinez; People v., 125 Cal.App.4th 1035, 23
821 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1200 Cal.Rptr.3d 508 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .810
Marquez; People v., 152 Cal.App.4th 1064, 62 Martinez; People v., 150 Cal.App.3d 579, 198 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.3d 31 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650 565 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202, 1203
Marquis; People v., 153 Cal.App.2d 553, 315 P.2d 57 Martinez; People v., 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1862 580 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Marroquin; People v., 210 Cal.App.3d 77, 258 Cal.Rptr. Martinez; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d 660, 203 Cal.Rptr.
290 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2520–2522 833 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Marshall v. California, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1023, Martinez; People v., 188 Cal.App.3d 19, 232 Cal.Rptr.
112 L.Ed.2d 1105 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 736 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1030
Marshall; People v., 13 Cal.4th 799, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, Martinez; People v., 208 Cal.App.4th 197, 145
919 P.2d 1280 (1996) . 225; 418; 640–643; 705; 721; Cal.Rptr.3d 141 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .875
3517–3519 Martinez; People v., 274 Cal.App.2d 170, 79 Cal.Rptr. 18
Marshall; People v., 15 Cal.4th 1, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
P.2d 262 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 1002–1004 Marvin Bland; People v., 10 Cal.4th 991, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d
Marshall; People v., 50 Cal.3d 907, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 77, 898 P.2d 391 (1995) . . . . . . 1402; 3130, 3131
790 P.2d 676 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304; 763 Masbruch; People v., 13 Cal.4th 1001, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d
Marshall; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 186, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705 (1996) . . 1402; 3115–3117; 3130,
441 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .523–525 3131; 3145–3150; 3160–3163; 3176, 3177; 3182,
Martin, 23 Cal.4th 866, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 3183
297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2510–2513 Mask; People v., 188 Cal.App.3d 450, 233 Cal.Rptr. 181
Martin; People v., 25 Cal.4th 1180, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 599, (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203; 361
25 P.3d 1081 (2001). .2305; 2510–2513; 2745, 2746 Mason; People v., 34 Cal.App.3d 281, 109 Cal.Rptr. 867
Martin; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
433 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .625; 3426 Mason; People v., 52 Cal.3d 909, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802
Martin; People v., 101 Cal.App.3d 1000, 162 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 950 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
133 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3474 Mason; People v., 218 Cal.App.4th 818, 160 Cal.Rptr.3d
Martin; People v., 168 Cal.App.3d 1111, 214 Cal.Rptr. 516 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
873 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508, 509 Massengale; People v., 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 89 Cal.Rptr.
Martin; People v., 208 Cal.App.2d 867, 25 Cal.Rptr. 610 237 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1832
(1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970 Massicot; People v., 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d
Martinez; People v., 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 83 Cal.Rptr. 914 705 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1160
(1970) . . . 925, 926; 945, 946; 948–950; 960; 2723 Massie; People v., 241 Cal.App.2d 812, 51 Cal.Rptr. 18
Martinez; People v., 10 Cal.App.4th 1001, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
838 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Matas; People v., 200 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 246 Cal.Rptr.
Martinez; People v., 11 Cal.4th 434, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 627 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2220
903 P.2d 1037 (1995) . 315; 1060; 1110–1112; 1120; Mateo; People v., 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d
1152; 1200 248 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .850; 1193
Martinez; People v., 20 Cal.4th 225, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, Mathers; People v., 183 Cal.App.4th 1464, 108
973 P.2d 512 (1999) . 1200, 1201; 1203, 1204; 1215; Cal.Rptr.3d 720 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1935
3175
TC-31

TABLE OF CASES AS
Mathews; People v., 25 Cal.App.4th 89, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d McClindon; People v., 114 Cal.App.3d 336, 170 Cal.Rptr.
330 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .981; 3429 492 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2514
Mathews; People v., 64 Cal.App.4th 485, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d McCormack; People v., 234 Cal.App.3d 253, 285
289 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2180–2182 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Mathews; People v., 91 Cal.App.3d 1018, 154 Cal.Rptr. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 111 S.Ct.
628 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505; 562 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1990). . . .810; 1202; 3177
Mathews; People v., 102 Cal.App.3d 704, 162 Cal.Rptr. McCoy (20010; People v., 25 Cal.4th 1111, 108
615 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3230 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210. . . . . . . . . . .561
Mathson; People v., 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 149 McCoy; People v., 25 Cal.2d 177, 153 P.2d 315
Cal.Rptr.3d 167 (2012). . . . . . . . . . .3425–3427 (1944) . 511; 524; 860; 862, 863; 875; 916; 982, 983;
Matian; People v., 35 Cal.App.4th 480, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 2503; 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145
459 (1995). . . . . . .1240; 1243, 1244; 3184; 3414 McCoy; People v., 25 Cal.4th 1111, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188,
Matthews; People v., 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 P.3d 1210 (2001) . . . . . 250–252; 400, 401; 500
348 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450, 451 McCoy; People v., 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 156
Matthews; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 164, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.Rptr.3d 382 (2013) . . . . . . . 1045; 1047–1051
502 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654 McCray; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 159, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d
Matute; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 1437, 127 872 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301
Cal.Rptr.2d 472 . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 3500, 3501 McCullough; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1298, 12
Maurer; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 1121, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1602
335 (1995). . .523; 729; 902; 904; 947; 1121, 1122; McCullough; People v., 100 Cal.App.3d 169, 160
1125, 1126; 1350–1352; 1354, 1355 Cal.Rptr. 831 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . .1201; 1215
Maury; People v., 30 Cal.4th 342, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, McCurdy; People v., 60 Cal.App. 499, 213 P. 59
68 P.3d 1 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . .704, 705; 3500 (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1120
Mautner, People ex rel. v. Quattrone, 211 Cal.App.3d McDade; People v., 230 Cal.App.3d 118, 280 Cal.Rptr.
1389, 260 Cal.Rptr. 44 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . 2502 912 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1602
May; People v., 44 Cal.3d 309, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 McDaniel; People v., 12 Cal.5th 97, 283 Cal.Rptr.3d 32,
P.2d 307 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 493 P.3d 815 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234
May; People v., 213 Cal.App.3d 118, 261 Cal.Rptr. 502 McDaniel; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 278, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 891; 1000; 1124 306. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2624
Mayberry; People v., 15 Cal.3d 143, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745, McDaniel; People v., 24 Cal.3d 661, 156 Cal.Rptr. 865,
542 P.2d 1337 (1975) . . 890; 935; 938; 1000; 1030; 597 P.2d 124 (1979). . . . . .225; 1241; 2315, 2316
1045; 1215; 3175; 3406 McDonald; People v., 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236,
Mayers; People v., 110 Cal.App.3d 809, 168 Cal.Rptr. 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 (1984) . . . . . 315
252 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 McDonnell v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 45 Cal.App.3d
Mayes; People v., 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 68 Cal.Rptr. 476 653, 119 Cal.Rptr. 804 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . 2131
(1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .917 McDonnell; People v., 80 Cal. 285, 22 P. 190
Mayfield; People v., 14 Cal.4th 668, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, (1889) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1933
928 P.2d 485 (1997) . . . . . . . . 1202; 1830, 1831 McElheny; People v., 137 Cal.App.3d 396, 187 Cal.Rptr.
Mayfield; People v., 23 Cal.App.3d 236, 100 Cal.Rptr. 39 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
104 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 McFarland; People v., 47 Cal.3d 798, 254 Cal.Rptr. 331,
Mays; People v., 148 Cal.App.4th 13, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 356 765 P.2d 493, 254 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989) . . . . 2100
(2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2997 McFarland; People v., 58 Cal.2d 748, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473,
McAlpin; People v., 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 376 P.2d 449 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
812 P.2d 563 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193 McFarland; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 489, 92
McCalla; People v., 63 Cal.App. 783, 220 P. 436 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191A
(1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3407 McGee; People v., 31 Cal.2d 229, 187 P.2d 706
McCarrick; People v., 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 210 (1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .620
Cal.Rptr.3d 838 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . 627; 3450 McGehee; People v., 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 201
McCaslin; People v., 178 Cal.App.3d 1, 223 Cal.Rptr. Cal.Rptr.3d 714 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428
587 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3455 McGowan; People v., 160 Cal.App.4th 1099, 74
McCleod; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 1205, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d Cal.Rptr.3d 57 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
545 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
TC-32

AS TABLE OF CASES
McGrath; People v., 94 Cal.App. 520, 271 P. 549 Meichtry; People v., 37 Cal.2d 385, 231 P.2d 847
(1928). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2100; 2110 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 891
McIntire; People v., 23 Cal.3d 742, 153 Cal.Rptr. 237, Mejia-Lenares; People v., 135 Cal.App.4th 1437, 38
591 P.2d 527 (1979) . . . . . 1141, 1142; 3408, 3409 Cal.Rptr.3d 404 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .627
McIntyre; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 229, 271 Cal.Rptr. Melhado; People v., 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d
467 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3408 878 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300; 3500; 3502
McKelvy; People v., 194 Cal.App.3d 694, 239 Cal.Rptr. Melton; People v., 44 Cal.3d 713, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750
782 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 P.2d 741 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .761; 763
McKinzie; People v., 179 Cal.App.3d 789, 224 Cal.Rptr. Memro; People v., 11 Cal. 4th 786, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219,
891 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .980, 981; 983 905 P.2d 1305 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122
McLaughlin; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 836, 54 Mena; People v., 206 Cal.App.3d 420, 254 Cal.Rptr. 10
Cal.Rptr.2d 4 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
McLead; People v., 225 Cal.App.3d 906, 276 Cal.Rptr. Mendoza; People v., 18 Cal.4th 1114, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428,
187 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720 959 P.2d 735 (1998) . . . 402–404; 1750; 3426; 3428
McLemore; People v., 27 Cal.App.4th 601, 32 Mendoza; People v., 23 Cal.4th 896, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431,
Cal.Rptr.2d 687 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1861 4 P.3d 265 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . .315; 640, 641
McMahon v. Albany Unified School Dist., 104 Mendoza; People v., 24 Cal.4th 130, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485,
Cal.App.4th 1275, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (2002) . 2681 6 P.3d 150 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . .372; 376; 730
McMakin; People v., 8 Cal. 547 (1857) . . . . . . . 916 Mendoza; People v., 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d
McNulty; People v., 202 Cal.App.3d 624, 249 Cal.Rptr. 728 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300
22 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150 Mendoza; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 571, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d
McNutt; People v., 40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835, 105 P.2d 195, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 195 (2004) . . . . . 1121; 1160
657 (1940). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2200 Mendoza; People v., 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d
McRae; People v., 256 Cal.App.2d 95, 63 Cal.Rptr. 854 905 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . 1071; 1080; 1127, 1128
(1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 Mendoza; People v., 251 Cal.App.2d 835, 60 Cal.Rptr. 5
McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1989).2917 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2502
Meacham; People v., 152 Cal.App.3d 142, 199 Cal.Rptr. Meneses; People v., 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d
586 (1984) . . . . . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1120; 1152 859 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191B
Meagan R., In re, 42 Cal.App.4th 17, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 325 Mentch; People v., 45 Cal.4th 274, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 480,
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071 195 P.3d 1061 (2008) . . . . 2361; 2363; 2370; 2375,
Medelez; People v., 2 Cal.App.5th 659, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 2376; 3412, 3413
402 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082; 1124 Mercer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal.3d 753, 280
Medellin; People v., 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 258 Cal.Rptr.3d Cal. Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404 (1991) . . . 2110; 2241
867 (2020) . 505; 508; 511; 524, 525; 571; 580–582; Meredith; People v., 174 Cal.App.4th 1257, 95
590; 592; 604; 810; 820; 860; 862, 863; 875; 970; Cal.Rptr.3d 297 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
982, 983; 1300; 1402; 1501; 1530; 1551; 2501; Merfield; People v., 147 Cal.App.4th 1071, 54
2503; 2514; 2578; 2720, 2721; 2745–2747; 3130; Cal.Rptr.3d 834 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . 3456, 3457
3145; 3149, 3150; 3160–3163; 3177; 3477 Meriwether; United States v., 440 F.2d 753 (5th Cir.
Medina; People v., 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2845
112 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1650 Merkley; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 472, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d
Medina; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 897, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 21 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122; 1160; 1170
158 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A Merkouris; People v., 46 Cal.2d 540, 297 P.2d 999
Medina; People v., 206 Cal.App.3d 986, 254 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1956). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3102 Methever; People v., 132 Cal. 326, 64 P. 481
Meeker; People v., 208 Cal.App.3d 358, 256 Cal.Rptr. 79 (1901) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160 Metzger; People v., 143 Cal. 447, 77 P. 155 (1904) . 337
Megladdery; People v., 40 Cal.App.2d 748, 106 P.2d 84 Meyer; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 496, 215 Cal.Rptr. 352
(1940). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2600, 2601 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .460
Mehaisin; People v., 101 Cal.App.4th 958, 124 Meza; People v., 38 Cal.App.4th 1741, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 683 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 844 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200, 3201
Mehserle; People v., 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 423, 206
Cal.App.4th 1125. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .908
TC-33

TABLE OF CASES AS
Michael D., In re, 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d Miranda; People v., 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 132
909 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . 1004; 1019
Michael L., In re, 39 Cal.3d 81, 216 Cal.Rptr. 140, 702 Mitchell; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 783, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 222 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3145 150 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2430–2432
Michael M., In re, 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d Mitchell; People v., 188 Cal.App.3d 216, 232 Cal.Rptr.
10 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1352 438 (1986) . . . . . . 580, 581; 590–593; 2100–2102
Michael Sims Dixon; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 1547, 38 Mitchell; People v., 225 Cal.App.4th 1189, 170
Cal.Rptr.2d 859 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570 Cal.Rptr.3d 825 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3413
Michael T., In re, 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 149 Cal.Rptr. 87 Mitchell; United States v., 495 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
(1978) . . 334, 335; 401; 403; 707, 708; 1400; 2401; 1974) . . . . . . 2801; 2811, 2812; 2826–2828; 2861
2542 Mobley; People v., 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d
Michaels; People v., 28 Cal.4th 486, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 474 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004; 1060
49 P.3d 1032 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . 720; 727, 728 Modiri; People v., 39 Cal.4th 481, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 762,
Michele D., In re, 29 Cal.4th 600, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 59 139 P.3d 136 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160–3163
P.3d 164 (2002) . . . . . . . 1201; 1203; 1215; 1250 Mohammed; People v., 162 Cal.App.4th 920, 76
Mickey; People v., 54 Cal.3d 612, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 Cal.Rptr.3d 372 (No 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3002
P.2d 84 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 Mojica; People v., 139 Cal.App.4th 1197, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d
Middleton; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 634 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2801; 2812
366 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 570 Molina; People v., 120 Cal.App.4th 507, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d
Mijares; People v., 6 Cal.3d 415, 99 Cal.Rptr. 139, 491 493 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1952
P.2d 1115 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . 2305; 2510–2513 Mom; People v., 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d
Miles; People v., 43 Cal.App.4th 364, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 172 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001; 1046
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 Monk; People v., 56 Cal.2d 288, 14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363
Miles; People v., 43 Cal.App.4th 575, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 52 P.2d 865 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
(1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2620–2622 Montalvo; People v., 4 Cal.3d 328, 93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482
Milham; People v., 159 Cal.App.3d 487, 205 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 205, 49 A.L.R.3d 518 (1971) . . . . 2380–2384;
688 (1984) . . 580, 581; 590–593; 2100–2102; 2110, 2390–2393
2111; 2114 Montecino; People v., 66 Cal.App.2d 85, 152 P.2d 5
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 (1944). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .582
L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . .1141–1143 Montero; People v., 155 Cal.App.4th 1170, 66
Miller; People v., 45 Cal.App. 494, 188 P. 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 668 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2302
(1920). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 Montgomery; People v., 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 117 P.2d 437
Miller; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 773 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708; 1151
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416 Montiel; People v., 5 Cal.4th 877, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705,
Miller; People v., 50 Cal.3d 954, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 855 P.2d 1277 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
P.2d 1289 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721 Montiel; People v., 39 Cal.3d 910, 218 Cal.Rptr. 572, 705
Miller; People v., 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 410 P.2d 1248 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2570 Montoya; People v., 7 Cal.4th 1027, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128,
Minarik; United States v., 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 874 P.2d 903 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700; 1702
1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2827 Montoya; People v., 33 Cal.4th 1031, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902,
Mincey; People v., 2 Cal.4th 408, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 94 P.3d 1098 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650; 3516
P.2d 388 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . 320; 521; 3410 Montoya; People v., 68 Cal.App.5th 980, 284 Cal.Rptr.3d
Minifie; People v., 13 Cal.4th 1055, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
920 P.2d 1337, 55 A.L.R.5th 835 (1996) . . 505; 571; Moody; People v., 62 Cal.App.2d 18, 143 P.2d 978
604; 2514; 3470 (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2514; 3470
Minor; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 431, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d Moon; People v., 37 Cal.4th 1, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117
641 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100–2102 P.3d 591 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 Mooney; People v., 145 Cal.App.3d 502, 193 Cal.Rptr.
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, 36 381 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700; 1821
Ohio Op. 2d 237 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 Moore; People v., 15 Cal.App.3d 851, 93 Cal.Rptr. 447
Miranda; People v., 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124
610 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590, 591 Moore; People v., 19 Cal.App.5th 889, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d
Miranda; People v., 44 Cal.3d 57, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 261 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2900
P.2d 1127 (1987) . . . . . . . . . 304; 761; 763; 766
TC-34

AS TABLE OF CASES
Moore; People v., 44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d Morse; People v., 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 343
256 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722; 1302; 2570–2579
Moore; People v., 67 Cal.App.2d 789, 155 P.2d Morse; People v., 60 Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388
403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250, 1251 P.2d 33 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640–643; 3530
Moore; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 37, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 Morse; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 1160, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 9
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1550
Moore; People v., 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d Mosby; People v., 33 Cal.4th 353, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262, 92
715 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768; 3550, 3551 P.3d 841 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Moore; People v., 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856 Moses; People v., 10 Cal.5th 893, 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 862,
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450 477 P.3d 579 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244
Moore; People v., 185 Cal.App.3d 1005, 230 Cal.Rptr. Moses; People v., 43 Cal.App.4th 462, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d
237 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122 665 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1251
Moore; People v., 211 Cal.App.3d 1400, 260 Cal.Rptr. Mosqueira; People v., 12 Cal.App.3d 1173, 91 Cal.Rptr.
134 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1030 370 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Mora; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1349, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d Moss; People v., 55 Cal.App.3d 179, 127 Cal.Rptr. 454
801 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
Morales; People v., 48 Cal.3d 527, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 Mouton; People v., 15 Cal.App.4th 1313, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 244 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .727, 728 423 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440; 3516
Morales; People v., 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d Mowatt; People v., 56 Cal.App.4th 713, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d
151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3149, 3150 722 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2501
Morales; People v., 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 284 Cal.Rptr.3d Mower; People v., 28 Cal.4th 457, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326,
693 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506 49 P.3d 1067 (2002) . . . . . 1140–1144; 2304, 2305;
Moran; People v., 1 Cal.3d 755, 83 Cal.Rptr. 411, 463 2350–2352; 2361; 2363; 2370; 2375, 2376; 2400;
P.2d 763 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519 2410; 2500; 2510–2513; 2520–2522; 2530; 2560;
Moran; People v., 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 109 Cal.Rptr. 287 2562; 2570; 2574, 2575; 2579; 2748; 2952; 2960;
(1973). . . . . .1000, 1001; 1015, 1016; 1030, 1031 2962–2964; 3412
Morante; People v., 20 Cal.4th 403, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, Moya; People v., 4 Cal.App.4th 912, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 323
975 P.2d 1071 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . .415; 563 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204; 1215; 3175
Moreno; People v., 32 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 108 Cal.Rptr. Mueller; People v., 147 Cal.App.2d 233, 305 P.2d 178
338 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2656; 2672 (1956). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .917
Moreno; People v., 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 179 Cal.Rptr. Muhammad; People v., 157 Cal.App.4th 484, 68
879 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234 Cal.Rptr.3d 695 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301
Moreno; People v., 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 204 Cal.Rptr. 17 Muhammed C., In re, 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 116
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701 Cal.Rptr.2d 21 (2002). . . . . . . .2653, 2654; 2656
Moretto; People v., 21 Cal.App.4th 1269, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d Mulherin; People v., 140 Cal.App. 212, 35 P.2d 174
719 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2761; 2763 (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500; 2745
Morgan; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d Mullens; People v., 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d
772 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 534 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A
Morgan; People v., 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 296 P.2d 75 Mullins; People v., 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1956) . . . . . 1900–1905; 1920, 1921; 1925, 1926; 198 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
1930–1932; 1935; 1950–1957; 1970 Munch; People v., 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 136 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1193
96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250; 252 Mungia; People v., 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 286 Cal.Rptr.
Morocco; People v., 191 Cal.App.3d 1449, 237 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1650
113 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441, 442 Municipal Court (Gonzales); People v., 137 Cal.App.3d
Morphew v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 137 Cal.App.3d 114, 186 Cal.Rptr. 716 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130
738, 188 Cal.Rptr. 126 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . 2131 Munoz; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 12, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d
Morris; People v., 46 Cal.3d 1, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 182 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2125
P.2d 843 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410 Murdock, In re, 68 Cal.2d 313, 66 Cal.Rptr. 380, 437 P.2d
Morris; People v., 185 Cal.App.4th 1147, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 764 (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2220
204 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3222 Murgia v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal.3d 286, 124 Cal.Rptr.
Morrisson; People v., 92 Cal.App.3d 787, 155 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2803
152 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225; 375 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708; 1151
TC-35

TABLE OF CASES AS
Murillo; People v., 47 Cal.App.4th 1104, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d Nesseth; People v., 127 Cal.App.2d 712, 274 P.2d 479
21 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105; 226 (1954) . . 1903, 1904; 1920, 1921; 1930; 1935; 1953,
Murphy; People v., 134 Cal.App.4th 1504, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 1954; 1956
872 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2302 Newble; People v., 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 174 Cal.Rptr.
Murphy; People v., 154 Cal.App.4th 979, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 637 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801; 3176
926 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2300; 2350 Newman; People v., 21 Cal.4th 413, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 474,
Murray; People v., 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 981 P.2d 98 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315
676 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .580–582 Newton; People v., 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394
Murtishaw; People v., 29 Cal.3d 733, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
631 P.2d 446 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358 Ngo; People v., 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 90
Murtishaw; People v., 51 Cal.4th 574, 247 P.3d 941, 121 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Cal.Rptr.3d 586 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .766 Ngoun; People v., 88 Cal.App.4th 432, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d
Music v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 221 Cal.App.3d 841, 837 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400
270 Cal.Rptr. 692 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2241 Nguyen; People v., 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d
Musselwhite; People v., 17 Cal.4th 1216, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 323 (1993) . . . . . . . . . 402, 403; 417; 440; 3516
212, 954 P.2d 475 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763 Nguyen; People v., 22 Cal.4th 872, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178,
Myers; People v., 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 997 P.2d 493 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
(1998) . 841; 860–863; 875, 876; 900–908; 915, 916; Nguyen; People v., 24 Cal.4th 756, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 548,
945–951; 960; 2503; 2514; 2720, 2721; 2723; 3470 14 P.3d 221 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Myers; People v., 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 Nguyen; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .352 840 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
Nicholas Y., In re, 85 Cal.App.4th 941, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d
N 511 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2900
Nichols; People v., 54 Cal.App.4th 21, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d
Najera; People v., 43 Cal.4th 1132, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 433 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3550
184 P.3d 732 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362; 376
Nicholson; People v., 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 159 Cal.Rptr.
Najera; People v., 138 Cal.App.4th 212, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 766 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1070; 1072; 1110
244 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Nicholson; People v., 123 Cal.App.4th 823, 20
Nance; People v., 25 Cal.App.3d 925, 102 Cal.Rptr. 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 476 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Nicolas; People v., 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d
Napoles; People v., 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253; 3404
777 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 830; 3500
Nicolas; People v., 34 Cal.4th 614, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612,
Nathaniel C., In re, 228 Cal.App.3d 990, 279 Cal.Rptr. 101 P.3d 509 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
236 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400
Nieto Benitez; People v., 4 Cal.4th 91, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d
Nava; People v., 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, 255 Cal.Rptr. 903 864, 840 P.2d 969 (1992). . . . . . . . . .520; 2720
(1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3160–3163
Nieto; People v., 62 Cal.App.5th 188, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d
Navarette; People v., 30 Cal.4th 458, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 379 (2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201
66 P.3d 1182 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Noah; People v., 5 Cal.3d 469, 96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d
Navarez; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 936, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1009 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2720, 2721
519 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Noble; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d
Navarro; People v., 60 Cal.App. 180, 212 P. 403 918 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3452
(1922) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Nobleton; People v., 38 Cal.App.4th 76, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d
Navarro; People v., 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 160 Cal.Rptr. 611. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3102
692 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1863
Noguera; People v., 4 Cal.4th 599, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400,
Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 842 P.2d 1160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
357 P.2d 839 (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Noisey; People v., 265 Cal.App.2d 543, 71 Cal.Rptr. 339
Neidinger; People v., 40 Cal.4th 67, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45, (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .300
146 P.3d 502 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225; 1252
Nor Woods; People v., 37 Cal.2d 584, 233 P.2d 897
Nelson; People v., 185 Cal.App.2d 578, 8 Cal.Rptr. 288 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1861
(1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2520–2522
Nordberg; People v., 189 Cal.App.4th 1228, 117
Nelums; People v., 31 Cal.3d 355, 182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 Cal.Rptr.3d 558 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2160
P.2d 201 (1982).3115–3117; 3131, 3132; 3146, 3147
TC-36

AS TABLE OF CASES
Norman; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 1234, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d Oliver; People v., 54 Cal.App.5th 1084, 269 Cal.Rptr.3d
806 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1301 201 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1243
Noroff; People v., 67 Cal.2d 791, 63 Cal.Rptr. 575, 433 Oliver; People v., 55 Cal.2d 761, 12 Cal.Rptr. 865, 361
P.2d 479 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140–1143 P.2d 593 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201; 1203
Norris; People v., 40 Cal.3d 51, 219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d Oliver; People v., 196 Cal.App.3d 423, 241 Cal.Rptr. 804
1141 (1985). . . . . . .810; 1202; 1830, 1831; 3177 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202
Norris; People v., 88 Cal.App.3d Supp. 32, 152 Cal.Rptr. Oliver; People v., 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 258 Cal.Rptr. 138
134 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154; 1162 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .582
Norton; People v., 161 Cal.App.2d 399, 327 P.2d 87 Ollo; People v., 11 Cal.5th 682, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 487
(1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401; 403; 2401 P.3d 981 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160
Nowell; People v., 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 Olmedo; People v., 167 Cal.App.3d 1085, 213 Cal.Rptr.
(1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2200 742 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . .375; 852A; 853A
Null; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d 849, 204 Cal.Rptr. 580 Olmsted; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 270, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370 755 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500
Nunan; United States v., 236 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. Olsen; People v., 36 Cal.3d 638, 205 Cal.Rptr. 492, 685
1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2826; 2828 P.2d 52 (1984). . . . .1080; 1090; 1100; 1110; 3406
Nunes; People v., 47 Cal.App. 346, 190 P. 486 Ordonez; People v., 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 277 Cal.Rptr.
(1920). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801 382 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202
Nunley; People v., 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 214 Cal.Rptr. 82 Oreck; People v., 74 Cal.App.2d 215, 168 P.2d 186
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2992–2996
Nunn; People v., 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d Orlina v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.App.4th 258, 86
294 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3428 Cal.Rptr.2d 384 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .820
Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, 58 F.Supp.2d 1127 Ormiston; People v., 105 Cal.App.4th 676, 129
(1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653, 2654 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 (2003) . . . 2300; 2350; 2380; 2390
Orr; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553
O (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . .570, 571; 580; 640–643
Ortega; People v., 11 Cal.App.4th 691, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d
O’Keefe; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 517, 271 Cal.Rptr. 246 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
769 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
Ortega; People v., 19 Cal.4th 686, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489,
O’Neil; People v., 56 Cal.App.4th 1126, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 968 P.2d 48 (1998). . . . . .1204; 1600; 1650; 3516
72 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650
Ortega; People v., 240 Cal.App.4th 956, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d
O’Neil; People v., 62 Cal.2d 748, 44 Cal.Rptr. 320, 401 142 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1045
P.2d 928, 17 A.L.R.3d 806 (1965) . . . . 2112; 2513
Ortiz; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 480, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 126
Oates; People v., 32 Cal.4th 1048, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 325, 88 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400
P.3d 56 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3149
Ortiz; People v., 101 Cal.App.4th 410, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 92
Ocegueda; People v., 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 203 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Cal.Rptr.3d 233 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428
Osband; People v., 13 Cal.4th 622, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919
Ochoa v. California, 535 U.S. 1040, 122 S.Ct. 1803, 152 P.2d 640 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
L.Ed.2d 660 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
Osborne; People v., 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 143 Cal.Rptr.
Ochoa; People v., 19 Cal.4th 353, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 582 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1751
966 P.2d 442 (1998) . . . . . . . 626; 700; 763; 3426
Osuna; People v., 251 Cal.App.2d 528, 59 Cal.Rptr. 559
Ochoa; People v., 26 Cal.4th 398, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1150, 1151
28 P.3d 78 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
Otis v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 129, 82 P. 853
Odom; People v., 19 Cal.App.2d 641, 66 P.2d 206 (1905) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450, 451
(1937). . . . . . . . . . . . .2140, 2141; 2150, 2151
Otis; People v., 174 Cal.App.2d 119, 344 P.2d 342
Odom; People v., 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745, 2746; 3402
774 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .703; 731, 732
Ott; People v., 84 Cal.App.3d 118, 148 Cal.Rptr. 479
Olguin; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359
596 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3472
Overten; People v., 28 Cal.App.4th 1497, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d
Olguin; People v., 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 173 Cal.Rptr. 663 232 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3115
(1981) . 524; 602; 724; 860–862; 900, 901; 903; 945,
Owen; People v., 226 Cal.App.3d 996, 277 Cal.Rptr. 341
946; 981; 2651–2656; 2670, 2671; 2723
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3477
Olivencia; People v., 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 251 Cal.Rptr.
880 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240; 1242
TC-37

TABLE OF CASES AS
Oyaas; People v., 173 Cal.App.3d 663, 219 Cal.Rptr. 243, Patino; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d
219 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1985) . . . . . . . . . 2100–2102 345 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1193
Patrick; People v., 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 179 Cal.Rptr. 276
P (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215; 3175
Patterson; People v., 102 Cal. 239, 36 P. 436
Packard; People v., 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 182 Cal.Rptr. (1894) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180
576. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1803
Patterson; People v., 209 Cal.App.3d 610, 257 Cal.Rptr.
Padilla v. Meese, 184 Cal.App.3d 1022, 229 Cal.Rptr. 407 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401, 402
310 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2110; 2241
Paul C., In re, 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 270 Cal.Rptr. 369
Padilla; People v., 11 Cal.4th 891, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1082; 1110
906 P.2d 388 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
Paul; People v., 18 Cal.4th 698, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 958
Padilla; People v., 98 Cal. App. 4th 127, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d P.2d 412 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3115–3117
457. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2522
Pauli; People v., 58 Cal.App. 594, 209 P. 88 (1922).350
Padilla; People v., 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d
Paysinger; People v., 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d
889 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 627
901 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Page; People v., 3 Cal.5th 1175, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 406
Paz; People v., 80 Cal.App.4th 293, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 166
P.3d 319 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820
(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112; 1121, 1122
Page; People v., 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d
Peabody v. Phelps, 9 Cal. 213 (1858) . . . . . . . . 358
857 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Peabody; People v., 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 119 Cal.Rptr. 780
Palaschak; People v., 9 Cal.4th 1236, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722,
(1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 823; 830, 831
893 P.2d 717 (1995). .2303, 2304; 2375, 2376; 2748
Pearch; People v., 229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 280 Cal.Rptr.
Pallares; People v., 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 246 P.2d
584 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3261
173 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122
Pearson; People v., 56 Cal.4th 393, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541,
Palmer v. City of Long Beach, 33 Cal.2d 134, 199 P.2d
297 P.3d 793 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 601
952 (1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Pearson; People v., 151 Cal.App.2d 583, 311 P.2d 927
Palmer; People v., 24 Cal.4th 856, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 13, 15
(1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 1935
P.3d 234 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
Peck; People v., 43 Cal.App. 638, 185 P. 881
Palmer; People v., 76 Cal.App.2d 679, 173 P.2d 680
(1919). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830–1832
(1946). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Peete; People v., 54 Cal.App. 333, 202 P. 51
Palmer; People v., 86 Cal.App.4th 440, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1921). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
301 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120
Pena; People v., 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 135 Cal.Rptr. 602
Palmer; People v., 154 Cal.App.3d 79, 203 Cal.Rptr. 474,
(1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333; 1860
199 Cal.Rptr. 868 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Pena; People v., 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 197 Cal.Rptr.
Palmore; People v., 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d
264 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402, 3403
784 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3180
Pena; People v., 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 198 Cal.Rptr. 819
Panchot, In re, 70 Cal.2d 105, 73 Cal.Rptr. 689, 448 P.2d
(1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505; 2514; 3470
385 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143
Penny; People v., 44 Cal.2d 861, 285 P.2d 926
Park; People v., 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 815
(1955) . 253; 510; 580–582; 590; 626; 821; 823; 970;
(2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .800
3404
Parker; People v., 11 Cal.App.3d 500, 89 Cal.Rptr. 815
Pensinger; People v., 52 Cal.3d 1210, 278 Cal.Rptr. 640,
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 1970
805 P.2d 899 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 733
Parker; People v., 44 Cal.App.5th 286, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d
People v. (see name of defendant)
493 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3456
People, 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 116
Parker; People v., 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 223 Cal.Rptr. 284
(2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
People Duran, 124 Cal.App.4th 666, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 495
Parks; People v., 7 Cal.App.4th 883, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2510
450. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1945
People ex rel. (see name of relator)
Parnell v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.App.3d 392, 173
Cal.Rptr. 906 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 1240 People.v. Morgain, 177 Cal.App.4th 454, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d
301 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Parra; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2302; 2352 Peppars; People v., 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 189 Cal.Rptr.
879 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3408
Pater; People v., 267 Cal.App.2d 921, 73 Cal.Rptr. 823
(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
TC-38

AS TABLE OF CASES
Pepper; People v., 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d Piceno; People v., 195 Cal.App.3d 1353, 241 Cal.Rptr.
877 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3403 391 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3226
Peregrina-Larios; People v., 22 Cal.App.4th 1522, 28 Pierce; People v., 24 Cal.3d 199, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595
Cal.Rptr.2d 316 (1994) . . . 2300, 2301; 2350; 2380, P.2d 91 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2381; 2390 Pierce; People v., 66 Cal.2d 53, 56 Cal.Rptr. 817, 423
Perez; People v., 4 Cal.5th 1055, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 416 P.2d 969 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
P.3d 42 (2018) . . 511; 524; 860; 862, 863; 875; 982, Pierce; People v., 110 Cal.App.2d 598, 243 P.2d 585
983; 2503; 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
Perez; People v., 9 Cal.3d 651, 108 Cal.Rptr. 474, 510 Pierson; People v., 86 Cal.App.4th 983, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 1026 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 817 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2330
Perez; People v., 12 Cal.App.3d 232, 90 Cal.Rptr. 521 Pieters; People v., 52 Cal.3d 894, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3474 P.2d 420 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200
Perez; People v., 50 Cal.4th 222, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, Pike; People v., 58 Cal.2d 70, 22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d
234 P.3d 557 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 656 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416; 540B, 540C
Perez; People v., 62 Cal.2d 769, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 Pike; People v., 197 Cal.App.3d 732, 243 Cal.Rptr. 54
P.2d 934 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . 2000–2002; 3408 (1988) . . . 520; 572; 580, 581; 590–594; 620; 2002;
Perez; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 856, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 2100–2102; 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; 2180; 2577,
376 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204 2578; 2763; 2964, 2965
Perry v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 57 Cal.2d Pinkston; People v., 112 Cal. App. 4th 387, 5 Cal. Rptr.
276, 19 Cal.Rptr. 1, 368 P.2d 529 (1962) . . . . 1804 3d 274. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2181
Perry; People v., 7 Cal.3d 756, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 Piorkowski; People v., 41 Cal.App.3d 324, 115 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 129 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 830 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
Perry; People v., 36 Cal.App.5th 444, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d Piper; People v., 19 Cal.App.3d 248, 96 Cal.Rptr. 643
522 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . 507; 908; 2670; 2672 (1971) . . 2300; 2302–2304; 2306; 2350; 2352; 2376;
Perry; People v., 204 Cal.App.2d 201, 22 Cal.Rptr. 54 2380; 2390
(1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850 Pitmon; People v., 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 216 Cal.Rptr. 221
Peters; People v., 128 Cal.App.3d 75, 180 Cal.Rptr. 76 (1985) . . 1015; 1030; 1045; 1060; 1111; 1151; 1243;
(1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361; 376 1600
Peterson; People v., 126 Cal.App.3d 396, 178 Cal.Rptr. Pitto; People v., 43 Cal.4th 228, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 590, 180
734 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1082; 1092; 1102 P.3d 338 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3130, 3131
Pettigrew; People v., 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 276 Pitts; People v., 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 273 Cal.Rptr. 757
Cal.Rptr.3d 694 (2021). . . . . . . . . . . .372; 378 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .300
Pettit; People v., 230 Cal.App.2d 397, 41 Cal.Rptr. 42 Pizano v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 128, 145 Cal.Rptr.
(1964). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1970, 1971 524, 577 P.2d 659 (1978) . . . 540A, 540B; 560, 561
Pham; People v., 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 Platt; United States v., 435 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2861
Phea; People v., 29 Cal.App.5th 583, 240 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 Plesniarski; People v., 22 Cal.App.3d 108, 99 Cal.Rptr.
(2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191A 196 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Phillips; People v., 41 Cal.3d 29, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 Poe; People v., 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928, 47 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 423 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 670 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701; 2931
Phillips; People v., 59 Cal.App.4th 952, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d Poggi; People v., 45 Cal.3d 306, 246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753
532 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103; 220 P.2d 1082 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Phillips; People v., 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 Poindexter; People v., 144 Cal.App.4th 572, 50
P.2d 353 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . .521; 728
Phillips; People v., 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 160 P.2d 872 Poisson; People v., 246 Cal.App.4th 121, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441; 1150 542 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Phillips; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 170, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d Pond; People v., 44 Cal.2d 665, 284 P.2d 793
448 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3455 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1862
Phillips; United States v., 217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d
1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2861 439 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141–1143
Pic’l; People v., 31 Cal.3d 731, 183 Cal.Rptr. 685, 646 Poplar; People v., 70 Cal.App.4th 1129, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 847 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . 2603; 2610–2612 320 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .852A; 2701
TC-39

TABLE OF CASES AS
Posey; People v., 32 Cal.4th 193, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 82

P.3d 755 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600, 2601 Q
Post; People v., 94 Cal.App.4th 467, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 356,
Quach; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d
66 Cal. Comp. Cases 1503 (2001) . . . . 2640, 2641
196 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .505; 3471
Poulin; People v., 27 Cal.App.3d 54, 103 Cal.Rptr. 623
Quarles; People v., 25 Cal.App.5th 631, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2578
49 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2902
Powell; People v., 50 Cal.App. 436, 195 P. 456
Queen T., In re, 14 Cal.App.4th 1143, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 922
(1920). . . . . . . . . . . . .2600, 2601; 2603; 2610
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2241
Powers; People v., 117 Cal.App.4th 291, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d
Quiel; People v., 68 Cal.App.2d 674, 157 P.2d 446
619 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1945
(1945). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1800, 1801
Poyet; People v., 6 Cal.3d 530, 99 Cal.Rptr. 758, 492 P.2d
Quinn; People v., 57 Cal.App.3d 251, 129 Cal.Rptr. 139
1150 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722; 1302; 2570–2579
Prado; People v., 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 136 Cal.Rptr. 521
Quinones; People v., 202 Cal.App.3d 1154, 249 Cal.Rptr.
(1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440; 3516
435 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3226
Pre; People v., 117 Cal.App.4th 413, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 739
Quinonez; People v., 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 260
(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 810; 3177
Cal.Rptr.3d 86 (2020) . 505; 508; 511; 524, 525; 571;
Preller; People v., 54 Cal.App.4th 93, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 507
580–582; 590; 592; 604; 810; 820; 860; 862, 863;
(1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .820
875; 970; 982, 983; 1300; 1402; 1501; 1530; 1551;
Prettyman; People v., 14 Cal.4th 248, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 2501; 2503; 2514; 2578; 2720, 2721; 2745–2747;
926 P.2d 1013 (1996) . . . . 240; 402, 403; 417; 440 3130; 3145; 3149, 3150; 3160–3163; 3177; 3477
Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.4th 1046, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d Quintana v. Municipal Court, 192 Cal.App.3d 361, 237
409, 25 P.3d 618 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428 Cal.Rptr. 397 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2131
Price v. United States, 150 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. Quintana; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 108
1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2827 Cal.Rptr.2d 235 (2001). . . . . . .1045; 1047–1051;
Price; People v., 25 Cal.App.3d 576, 102 Cal.Rptr. 71 1100–1102; 1128
(1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 Quiroga; People v., 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d
Price; People v., 151 Cal.App.3d 803, 199 Cal.Rptr. 99 446 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653; 2656
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226
Price; State v., 94 Wash.2d 810, 620 P.2d 994
(1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945
R
Prieto; People v., 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 761 Rackley; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 1659, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 49 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2760, 2761
Prieto; People v., 30 Cal.4th 226, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 Rae; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 312
P.3d 1123 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376; 418 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830; 3500
Proctor; People v., 4 Cal.4th 499, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 Raley; People v., 2 Cal.4th 870, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830
P.2d 1100 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 3530 P.2d 712 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810; 3177
Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Rallo; People v., 119 Cal.App. 393, 6 P.2d 516
Board, 7 Cal.4th 561, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d (1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2141; 2151
1163 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2962; 3408 Ramey; People v., 16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545
Pruett; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 77, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 P.2d 1333 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2670
(1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .982 Ramirez; People v., 6 Cal.App.4th 1762, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d
Prunty; People v., 62 Cal. 4th 59, 355 P.3d 480, 192 Cal. 624 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2576
Rptr. 3d 309 (2015) . . . . . . 736; 1400, 1401; 2542 Ramirez; People v., 40 Cal.App.3d 347, 114 Cal.Rptr.
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal.3d 238, 158 Cal.Rptr. 916 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
330, 599 P.2d 636 (1979) . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1125, Ramirez; People v., 45 Cal.4th 980, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 586,
1126; 1153–1156; 1160–1162 201 P.3d 466 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Pugh; People v., 104 Cal.App.4th 66, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 Ramirez; People v., 50 Cal.3d 1158, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286,
(2002). . .594; 1900–1905; 1925, 1926; 1930–1932; 791 P.2d 965 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000; 1030
1935; 1950–1957; 1970; 2000–2002; 2004; 2041, Ramirez; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d
2042; 2412; 2621; 2765 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123; 208
Pulido; People v., 15 Cal.4th 713, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, Ramirez; People v., 79 Cal.App.4th 408, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d
936 P.2d 1235 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . 540B, 540C 76 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1752
Pulliam; People v., 62 Cal.App.4th 1430, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d
371 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1156
TC-40

AS TABLE OF CASES
Ramirez; People v., 189 Cal.App.3d 603, 236 Cal.Rptr. Reed; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d 489, 203 Cal.Rptr. 659
404 (1987). . . . . . .1001; 1031; 1046; 3160–3163 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224
Ramirez; People v., 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 183 Reed; People v., 270 Cal.App.2d 37, 75 Cal.Rptr. 430
Cal.Rptr.3d 267 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3472 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Ramkeesoon; People v., 39 Cal.3d 346, 216 Cal.Rptr. Reese; People v., 182 Cal.App.3d 737, 227 Cal.Rptr. 526
455, 702 P.2d 613 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . .1600 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1515
Ramon M., In re, 22 Cal. 3d 419, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387, 584 Reeves; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 524 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450; 3455 728 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935
Ramon T., In re, 57 Cal.App.4th 201, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 816 Rehmeyer; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1758, 24
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Ramos; People v., 30 Cal.3d 553, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 Reid v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 64
P.2d 908 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . .123; 208
Ramos; People v., 37 Cal.3d 136, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 Reisdorff; People v., 17 Cal.App.3d 675, 95 Cal.Rptr. 224
P.2d 430 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 767 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1930
Ramos; People v., 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 165 Cal.Rptr. 179 Reliford; People v., 29 Cal.4th 1007, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226 254, 62 P.3d 601 (2003) . . 375; 852A; 1191A; 2840
Ramos; People v., 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d Rener; People v., 24 Cal.App.4th 258, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 392
186 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103; 220 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3130, 3131
Randle; People v., 35 Cal.4th 987, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, Renteria; People v., 61 Cal.2d 497, 39 Cal.Rptr. 213, 393
111 P.3d 987 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571 P.2d 413 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Randolph; People v., 213 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 262 Renteria; People v., 93 Cal.App.4th 552, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr. 378 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100; 2110 287 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3575, 3576
Randono; People v., 32 Cal.App.3d 164, 108 Cal.Rptr. Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 141
326 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804, 1805 Cal.Rptr. 912 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Randy G., In re, 26 Cal.4th 556, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 Reyes; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39
P.3d 239 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . .908; 2653, 2654 (1997). . . . . . . . . .625; 1750; 3406; 3426; 3428
Randy S., In re, 76 Cal.App.4th 400, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d Reyes; People v., 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 132 Cal.Rptr. 848
423. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1110 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2992
Rankin; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 430, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 735 Reyes; People v., 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .362 777 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103; 302; 359
Ratekin; People v., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 261 Cal. Rptr. Reyes; People v., 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 200 Cal.Rptr. 651
143 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3010 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015; 1030; 1045
Rathert; People v., 24 Cal.4th 200, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 6 Reyes; People v., 195 Cal.App.3d 957, 240 Cal.Rptr. 752
P.3d 700 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2044 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105
Ravenscroft; People v., 198 Cal.App.3d 639, 243 Reynolds; People v., 205 Cal.App.3d 776, 252 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr. 827 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 637 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745, 2746
Ray; People v., 13 Cal.4th 313, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal.3d 772, 200
P.2d 846 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359; 3500 Cal.Rptr. 916, 677 P.2d 1206 (1984) . . . 1900; 1970
Ray; People v., 14 Cal.3d 20, 120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d Rhodes; People v., 129 Cal.App.4th 1339, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d
1017 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .625 226 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2514; 3470
Ray; People v., 42 Cal.App.4th 1718, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 Ribera; People v., 133 Cal.App.4th 81, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1933 538 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1030
Rayford; People v., 9 Cal.4th 1, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 Ricardi; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 1369 (1994) . . . . . . . 1200–1203; 1215; 3175 364 (1992). . . . . . . . .251, 252; 404; 2503; 3426
Raze; People v., 91 Cal.App.2d 918, 205 P.2d 1062 Rices; People v., 4 Cal.5th 49, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 406
(1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2993; 2996 P.3d 788 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .707, 708
Reed; People v., 13 Cal.4th 217, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 Rich; People v., 45 Cal.3d 1036, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755
P.2d 184 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 P.2d 960 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Reed; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 274, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 781 Rich; People v., 109 Cal.App.4th 255, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 553. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3130
Reed; People v., 135 Cal.App.3d 149, 185 Cal.Rptr. 169 Richard M., In re, 205 Cal.App.3d 7, 252 Cal.Rptr. 36
(1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3130, 3131 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
TC-41

TABLE OF CASES AS
Richards; People v., 17 Cal.3d 614, 131 Cal.Rptr. 537, Robinson; People v., 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 180
552 P.2d 97 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357 Cal.Rptr.3d 796 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .800
Richardson; People v., 83 Cal.App.3d 853, 148 Cal.Rptr. Robles; People v., 23 Cal.4th 1106, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 5
120 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315; 1802 P.3d 176 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2542
Richardson; People v., 117 Cal.App.4th 570, 11 Rocha; People v., 3 Cal.3d 893, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479
Cal.Rptr.3d 802 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 P.2d 372 (1971). .841; 860–863; 875, 876; 900–908;
Richardson; People v., 151 Cal.App.4th 790, 60 915, 916; 945–951; 960; 2503; 2720, 2721; 2723
Cal.Rptr.3d 458 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140 Roche; People v., 68 Cal.App.2d 665, 157 P.2d 440
Ricky T., In re, 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2992; 2995
(2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300 Rochelle B., In re, 49 Cal.App.4th 1212, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d
Riel; People v., 22 Cal.4th 1153, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 851 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
P.2d 969 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Roder; People v., 33 Cal.3d 491, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658
Riley; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1808, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 1302 (1983) . . . 2100–2102; 2110, 2111; 2114;
676 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440; 3516 2220; 2641; 2800, 2801; 2810, 2811; 2981
Rincon-Pineda; People v., 14 Cal.3d 864, 123 Cal.Rptr. Roderick S., In re, 125 Cal.App.3d 48, 177 Cal.Rptr. 800
119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845 (1975) . . . 105; (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2502
226; 301, 302; 1190 Rodgers; People v., 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 210 P.2d 71
Rios; People v., 23 Cal.4th 450, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 (1949). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590
P.3d 1066 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572; 580 Rodrigues; People v., 8 Cal.4th 1060, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235,
Rios; People v., 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 P.2d 1 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
591 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.3d 821, 205
Rios; People v., 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 222 Cal.Rptr. 913 Cal.Rptr. 750 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240; 1242 Rodriguez; People v., 5 Cal.App.4th 1398, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d
Rivas; People v., 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 495 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
403 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 Rodriguez; People v., 20 Cal.4th 1, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413,
Rivera; People v., 162 Cal.App.3d 141, 207 Cal.Rptr. 756 971 P.2d 618 (1999) . . . . . . . . . 875; 1600; 1650
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3426 Rodriguez; People v., 28 Cal.4th 543, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d
Rivers; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1040, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 49 P.3d 1085 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . .1120
602 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Rodriguez; People v., 42 Cal.3d 730, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667,
Roach; People v., 108 Cal.App.3d 891, 166 Cal.Rptr. 801 726 P.2d 113 (1986) . . . . 401; 724; 761; 766; 3530
(1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130 Rodriguez; People v., 53 Cal.App.4th 1250, 62
Robbery of Store Employee or Contractor. People v. Cal.Rptr.2d 345 (1992) . . . . . . . . 505; 604; 1225
Frazer, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 319 Rodriguez; People v., 55 Cal.4th 1125, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d
(2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 533, 290 P.3d 1143 (2012) . . . . . 1400, 1401; 2542
Roberge; People v., 29 Cal.4th 979, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 861, Rodriguez; People v., 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d
62 P.3d 97 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3454; 3454A 676 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
Robert L. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.4th 894, 135 Rodriguez; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 92
Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951 (2003) . . . . . . . 1401 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1701
Roberts; People v., 2 Cal.4th 271, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 Rodriguez; People v., 170 Cal.App.4th 1062, 88
P.2d 274 (1992). . . . .240; 355; 520; 580–582; 620 Cal.Rptr.3d 749 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361
Roberts; People v., 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 182 Rodriguez; People v., 186 Cal.App.2d 433, 8 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr. 757 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2652 863 (1960) . . . . . . . 253; 580–582; 590–594; 626;
Robertson; People v., 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 2100–2102; 3404
P.2d 279 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706; 763–765 Rodriguez; People v., 726 P.2d 113, 42 Cal.3d 730, 230
Robertson; People v., 34 Cal.4th 156, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, Cal.Rptr. 667 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 766
95 P.3d 872 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .970 Roehler; People v., 167 Cal.App.3d 353, 213 Cal.Rptr.
Robertson; People v., 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 146 353 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Cal.Rptr.3d 66 (2012). . . . . . . .1200; 1203, 1204 Rogers; People v., 5 Cal.3d 129, 95 Cal.Rptr. 601, 486
Robinson; People v., 63 Cal.4th 200, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d P.2d 129 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2300
485, 370 P.3d 1043 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . 937, 938 Rogers; People v., 39 Cal.4th 826, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141
Robinson; People v., 72 Cal.App.4th 421, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d P.3d 135 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
832 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3450
TC-42

AS TABLE OF CASES
Rojas; People v., 55 Cal.2d 252, 10 Cal.Rptr. 465, 358 Rubino; People v., 18 Cal.App.5th 407, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 921, 85 A.L.R.2d 252 (1961) . . . . . . . . 1750 75 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1520
Rojas; People v., 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d Rubio; People v., 121 Cal.App.4th 927, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
811 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 524 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
Rollo; People v., 20 Cal.3d 109, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 Rudy L, In re, 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 864
P.2d 771 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . 375; 852A; 853A (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2900
Romanowski; People v., 2 Cal.5th 903, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d Russell; People v., 22 Cal.App.3d 330, 99 Cal.Rptr. 277
758, 391 P.3d 633 (2017) . . . . . . . . . 1950; 1952 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180
Romero; People v., 48 Cal.App.3d 752, 121 Cal.Rptr. 800 Russell; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 1083, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1121, 1122 241 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204
Romero; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 147, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d Russell; People v., 120 Cal.App. 622, 8 P.2d 209
16 (1997) . . . . 2350–2352; 2361; 2363; 2375, 2376 (1932). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376
Romo; People v., 14 Cal.3d 189, 121 Cal.Rptr. 111, 534 Russell; People v., 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 1015 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 263 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1863; 3406
Romo; People v., 200 Cal.App.2d 83, 19 Cal.Rptr. 179 Russo; People v., 25 Cal.4th 1124, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436,
(1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1150, 1151 25 P.3d 641. . .415, 416; 563; 821; 830; 3500–3502
Romo; People v., 220 Cal.App.3d 514, 269 Cal.Rptr. 440 Rutkowsky; People v., 53 Cal.App.3d 1069, 126 Cal.Rptr.
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1800; 1863 104 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Rooney; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 1207, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d Ryan D., In re, 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 193
900 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
Rosales; People v., 222 Cal.App.4th 1254, 166 Ryan; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 1304, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 620 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359 160, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 (1999) . . . . . . 1202; 1250
Rose; People v., 56 Cal.App.4th 990, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 887 Ryan; People v., 103 Cal.App.2d 904, 230 P.2d 359
(1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
Ross v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 219 Cal.App.3d 398, Rylaarsdam; People v., 130 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 181
268 Cal.Rptr. 102 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130 Cal.Rptr. 723 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161, 1162
Ross; People v., 92 Cal.App.3d 391, 154 Cal.Rptr. 783
(1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401; 403; 2401 S
Ross; People v., 100 Cal.App.2d 116, 223 P.2d 85
Saavedra; People v., 24 Cal.App.5th 605, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2994
544 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1128
Ross; People v., 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d
Saavedra; People v., 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d
438 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3471
403 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3470
Ross; People v., 205 Cal.App.3d 1548, 253 Cal.Rptr. 178
Sabino; United States v., 274 F.3d 1053 (6th Cir.
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2842
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1
Sacramento Butchers’ Protective Ass’n; People v., 12
L.Ed.2d 1498, 14 Ohio Op. 2d 331
Cal.App. 471, 107 P. 712 (1910). . . . . . .415; 563
(1957). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140–1143
Saddler; People v., 24 Cal.3d 671, 156 Cal.Rptr. 871, 597
Roulet, Conservatorship of, 23 Cal.3d 219, 152 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 130 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . 315; 361; 1802
425, 590 P.2d 1 (1979). . . . . .3453, 3454; 3454A;
3456–3458 Saephanh; People v., 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d
910 (2000). . . . . . . . .441, 442; 600; 1154; 1162
Rouser; People v., 59 Cal.App.4th 1065, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d
563 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2748 Saffell; People v., 74 Cal.App.2d Supp. 967, 168 P.2d 497
(1946). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701
Rowland; People v., 4 Cal.4th 238, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377,
841 P.2d 897 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal.App.3d 1141, 221 Cal.Rptr.
675 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2962
Rowland; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d
900 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2410; 2745–2749 Saille; People v., 54 Cal.3d 1103, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820
P.2d 588 (1991) . . . . . . 251, 252; 404; 625; 2503;
Roy; People v., 251 Cal.App.2d 459, 59 Cal.Rptr. 636
3426–3428
(1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 563
Salas; People v., 7 Cal.3d 812, 103 Cal.Rptr. 431, 500
Rubacalba; People v., 6 Cal.4th 62, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 628,
P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832 (1972) . . 540A–540C; 3261
859 P.2d 708 (1993) . 2300; 2302–2304; 2306; 2350;
2352; 2376; 2380 Salas; People v., 37 Cal.4th 967, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 127
P.3d 40 (2006).3402; 3406; 3425; 3455; 3470, 3471;
Rubalcava; People v., 23 Cal.4th 322, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735,
3475, 3476
1 P.3d 52 (2000) . . . 2500–2503; 2520–2522; 2530;
2570, 2571; 2590–2592; 2745–2747
TC-43

TABLE OF CASES AS
Salazar; People v., 201 Cal.App.2d 284, 20 Cal.Rptr. 25 Santascoy; People v., 153 Cal.App.3d 909, 200 Cal.Rptr.
(1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708 709 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460; 600
Salcedo; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 209, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d Santiago; People v., 178 Cal.App.4th 1471, 101
539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200, 3201 Cal.Rptr.3d 257 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3550
Salcido; People v., 149 Cal.App.4th 356, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d Santos; United States v., 553 U.S. 507, 128 S. Ct. 2020,
912 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2542 170 L. Ed. 2d 912 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2997
Saldana; People v., 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 204 Cal.Rptr. Sapp; People v., 31 Cal.4th 240, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73
465 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2302 P.3d 433. . . . . . . . . . . .2510–2512; 2591, 2592
Sales; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 741, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d Sargent; People v., 19 Cal.4th 1206, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 835,
527 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830 970 P.2d 409 (1999). . . . . . . .821–823; 830, 831
Sallas v. Municipal Court, 86 Cal.App.3d 737, 150 Sargent; People v., 86 Cal.App.3d 148, 150 Cal.Rptr. 113
Cal.Rptr. 543 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3160
Salvato; People v., 234 Cal.App.3d 872, 285 Cal.Rptr. Sarkis; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 23, 272 Cal.Rptr. 34
837 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3502 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401; 1530–1532; 3400
Samaniego; People v., 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 91 Sassounian, In re, 9 Cal.4th 535, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887
Cal.Rptr.3d 874 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . 400; 1403 P.2d 527 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410
Samayoa; People v., 15 Cal.4th 795, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, Sassounian; People v., 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 226 Cal.Rptr.
938 P.2d 2 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104; 222 880 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
Sameniego; People v., 118 Cal.App. 165, 4 P.2d 809 Saucedo; People v., 121 Cal.App.4th 937, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d
(1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425 692 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
San Nicolas; People v., 34 Cal.4th 614, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d Saugstad; People v., 203 Cal.App.2d 536, 21 Cal.Rptr.
612, 101 P.3d 509 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 740 (1962). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415, 416; 563
Sanchez; People v., 24 Cal.4th 983, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, Saul S., In re, 167 Cal.App.3d 1061, 213 Cal.Rptr. 541
16 P.3d 118 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . 520; 590; 3516 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .512
Sanchez; People v., 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, Savedra; People v., 15 Cal.App.4th 738, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d
29 P.3d 209 (2001) . . . . . . . 240; 525; 540C; 732 115 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745–2747
Sanchez; People v., 27 Cal.App.4th 918, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d Sawyer; People v., 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 63 Cal.Rptr. 749
155 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2330 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3471
Sanchez; People v., 60 Cal.App.4th 1490, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115
309 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2861
Sanchez; People v., 63 Cal.4th 665, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102, Schaefer; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 893, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d
374 P.3d 320 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332; 360 442 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2500
Sanchez; People v., 86 Cal. App. 4th 970, 103 Cal. Rptr. Scheer; People v., 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d
2d 808, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809 . . . . . . . . . . 2180 676 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370; 2140, 2141
Sanchez; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d Scheid; People v., 16 Cal.4th 1, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939
271 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1752 P.2d 748 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Sanchez; People v., 208 Cal.App.3d 721, 256 Cal.Rptr. Scherr; People v., 272 Cal.App.2d 165, 77 Cal.Rptr. 35
446 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850; 1192, 1193 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358
Sanchez; People v., 221 Cal.App.4th 1012, 164 Schmidt; People v., 41 Cal.App.5th 1042, 254
Cal.Rptr.3d. 880 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 Cal.Rptr.3d 694 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945
Sanders; People v., 11 Cal.4th 475, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, Schmitt; People v., 155 Cal.App.2d 87, 317 P.2d 673
905 P.2d 420 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981; 983 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
Sanders; People v., 51 Cal.3d 471, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 Schmitz; People v., 7 Cal.App. 330, 94 P. 407, 94 P. 419
P.2d 561 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .700; 725 (1908). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1830–1832
Sanders; People v., 55 Cal.4th 731, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26, Schnabel; People v., 150 Cal.App.4th 83, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d
288 P.3d 83 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . .2510, 2511 922 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A
Sanders; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 1403, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d Schoenfeld; People v., 111 Cal.App.3d 671, 168 Cal.Rptr.
806 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1800, 1801; 1804 762 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202
Sanders; People v., 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 271 Cal.Rptr. Schoonderwood; People v., 72 Cal.App.2d 125, 164 P.2d
534 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 69 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2980
Santana; People v., 56 Cal.4th 999, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 547, Schoonover; People v., 5 Cal.App.3d 101, 85 Cal.Rptr. 69
301 P.3d 1157 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2100; 2110
TC-44

AS TABLE OF CASES
Schrieber; People v., 45 Cal.App.3d 917, 119 Cal.Rptr. Selby; People v., 198 Cal. 426, 245 P. 426 (1926) . 768;
812, 119 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975). . . . . . . . . .2110 3550, 3551
Schumacher; People v., 194 Cal.App.2d 335, 14 Cal.Rptr. Sell; People v., 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 215 P.2d 771
924 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2181; 2200 (1950) . . . . . . . . . 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151; 2160
Schwartz; People v., 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d Sengpadychith; People v., 26 Cal.4th 316, 109
816 (1992). . . . . . .1501, 1502; 1515; 1530–1532 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739 (2001). . . .736; 1400,
Scofield; People v., 17 Cal.App.3d 1018, 95 Cal.Rptr. 405 1401; 2542
(1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2000–2002 Senior; People v., 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 14
Scofield; People v., 203 Cal. 703, 265 P. 914 . . . 2140, (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
2141; 2150, 2151 Seo; People v., 48 Cal.App.5th 1081, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 497
Scoggins; People v., 37 Cal. 676 (1869) . . . . . . . 505 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1933
Sconce; People v., 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 279 Cal.Rptr. 59 Serrano; People v., 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .420 305 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202; 1830
Scott; People v., 9 Cal.4th 331, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 Serrano; People v., 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 1040 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 865 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622, 2623
Scott; People v., 16 Cal.3d 242, 128 Cal.Rptr. 39, 546 Sexton; People v., 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 250 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 327 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2673 496 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Scott; People v., 45 Cal.4th 743, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 200 Shabazz; People v., 38 Cal.4th 55, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 750,
P.3d 837 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 130 P.3d 519 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
Scott; People v., 53 Cal.2d 558, 2 Cal.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d Shadden; People v., 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d
882 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3530 826 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1203
Scott; People v., 66 Cal.App. 200, 225 P. 767 Shannon; People v., 66 Cal.App.4th 649, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1924). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 177 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1800
Scott; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70 Shaw; People v., 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 47 Cal.Rptr. 96
(2000) . . . . . . . . . 1030; 1045; 1070; 1092; 3406 (1965). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Scott; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 1060, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d Shawnn F., In re, 34 Cal.App.4th 184, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 263
253 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3454 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2221
Scott; People v., 108 Cal.App.2d 231, 238 P.2d 659 Shea; People v., 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 388
(1951) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
Scott; People v., 146 Cal.App.3d 823, 194 Cal.Rptr. 633 Shear; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 278, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 707
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404; 3406; 3426, 3427 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2510
Sea Horse Ranch, 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d Sheek; People v., 122 Cal.App.4th 1606, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d
681 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450, 451; 582; 2950 737 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3456, 3457
Seale; People v., 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 Sherow; People v., 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 128
(1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2747–2749 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . 1700; 1703
Seals; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1379, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d Shields; People v., 222 Cal.App.3d 1, 271 Cal.Rptr. 228
676. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3102 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440
Searle; People v., 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 261 Cal.Rptr. Shiga; People v., 34 Cal.App.5th 466, 246 Cal.Rptr.3d
898 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3227 198 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1500–1502; 1515
Sears; People v., 2 Cal.3d 180, 84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d Shoals; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 475, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 296
847 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2440
Sears; People v., 62 Cal.2d 737, 44 Cal.Rptr. 330, 401 Shockley; People v., 58 Cal.4th 400, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 497,
P.2d 938 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700 314 P.3d 798 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110
Seaton; People v., 26 Cal.4th 598, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, Shoemake; People v., 16 Cal.App.4th 243, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d
28 P.3d 175 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .204 36 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Sedeno; People v., 10 Cal.3d 703, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 Siegfried; People v., 249 Cal.App.2d 489, 57 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 913 (1974) . 520; 1202–1204; 1215; 1225; 1252; 423 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1750
1751; 2720 Silberman; People v., 212 Cal.App.3d 1099, 261
Segal; United States v., 867 F.2d 1173 . . . . . . . 2861 Cal.Rptr. 45 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .720
Sekona; People v., 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d Silva; People v., 25 Cal.4th 345, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21
606 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 P.3d 769 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C; 730
TC-45

TABLE OF CASES AS
Silva; People v., 45 Cal.3d 604, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 Smith; People v., 12 Cal.App.5th 766, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.2d 1070 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725; 3261 892 (2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301; 334, 335
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (2002). .2560; 2562 Smith; People v., 13 Cal.App.4th 1182, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d
Silvey; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1320, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 820 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3222
681 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3477 Smith; People v., 31 Cal.4th 1207, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 80
Simmons; People v., 28 Cal.2d 699, 172 P.2d 18 P.3d 662 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200
(1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600 Smith; People v., 32 Cal.4th 792, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 290, 86
Simms; People v., 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 89 Cal.Rptr. 1 P.3d 348 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300; 303; 305 Smith; People v., 33 Cal.3d 596, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659
Simon; People v., 9 Cal.4th 493, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1152 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519
P.2d 1271 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Smith; People v., 35 Cal.3d 798, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678
Simon; People v., 25 Cal.4th 1082, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, P.2d 886 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 823; 830
25 P.3d 598 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . .2600, 2601 Smith; People v., 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 1039
Simon; People v., 144 Cal.App.3d 761, 193 Cal.Rptr. 28 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2200
(1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226 Smith; People v., 37 Cal.4th 733, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124
Simon; People v., 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 228 Cal.Rptr. 855 P.3d 730 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
(1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .375 Smith; People v., 44 Cal.2d 77, 279 P.2d 33
Simons; People v., 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
351 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 982 Smith; People v., 57 Cal.4th 232, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 57, 303
Singer; People v., 115 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, 171 Cal.Rptr. P.3d 368 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2651, 2652
587 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2828 Smith; People v., 60 Cal.4th 603, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 100,
Singh; People v., 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 P.3d 1159 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . .402, 403
644 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2000 Smith; People v., 63 Cal.2d 779, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382, 409
Singh; People v., 42 Cal.App.5th 175, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d P.2d 222 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3407
871 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201 Smith; People v., 64 Cal.App.4th 1458, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 75
Singh; People v., 62 Cal.App. 450, 217 P. 121 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1952
(1923) . . . . . . 1030; 1032–1037; 1090–1092; 1127 Smith; People v., 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 144 Cal.Rptr. 330
Singh; People v., 119 Cal.App.4th 905, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
769 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2303 Smith; People v., 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 156 Cal.Rptr. 502
Singleton; People v., 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 241 Cal.Rptr. (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3226
842 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 Smith; People v., 98 Cal.App.4th 1182, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d
Sisneros; People v., 57 Cal.App.4th 1454, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519
782 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2501 Smith; People v., 155 Cal.App.3d 1103, 203 Cal.Rptr.
Sisuphan; People v., 181 Cal.App.4th 800, 104 196 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . 2800, 2801; 2810–2812
Cal.Rptr.3d 654 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . 1806; 1862 Smith; People v., 206 Cal. 235, 273 P. 789 (1929).1862
Skeirik; People v., 229 Cal.App.3d 444, 280 Cal.Rptr. Smithey; People v., 20 Cal.4th 936, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243,
175 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3451 978 P.2d 1171 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Skiff; People v., 59 Cal.App.5th 571, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 Smolkin; People v., 49 Cal.App.5th 183, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d
(2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .582 696 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2651
Skinner; People v., 39 Cal.3d 765, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 Snead; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1088, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d
P.2d 752 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . 3450; 3453; 3455 922 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370; 722
Slater; People v., 60 Cal.App.2d 358, 140 P.2d 846 Snook; People v., 16 Cal.4th 1210, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615,
(1943). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506 947 P.2d 808 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2125
Slaughter; People v., 27 Cal.4th 1187, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d Snyder; People v., 32 Cal.3d 590, 186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652
477, 47 P.3d 262 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . 204; 358 P.2d 42 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . .2510–2513; 3407
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 Sobiek; People v., 30 Cal.App.3d 458, 106 Cal.Rptr. 519,
L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . .3115–3117 82 A.L.R.3d 804 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1806
Smith, In re, 7 Cal.3d 362, 102 Cal.Rptr. 335, 497 P.2d Soldavini; People v., 45 Cal.App.2d 460, 114 P.2d 415
807 (1972) . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1125, 1126; 1152; (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103; 220
1160 Soledad; People v., 190 Cal.App.3d 74, 235 Cal.Rptr. 208
Smith; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 196, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 645 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590
(1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3131, 3132
TC-46

AS TABLE OF CASES
Solis; People v., 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d Stansbury; People v., 9 Cal.4th 824, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d. 394,
464 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 889 P.2d 588 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Solorzano; People v., 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 63 Stanworth; People v., 11 Cal.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250,
Cal.Rptr.3d 659 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .376 522 P.2d 1058 (1974). . . . . . . .1201; 1215; 3175
Sorden; People v., 36 Cal.4th 65, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 777, 113 Stark v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.4th 368, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d
P.3d 565 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 611, 257 P.3d 41 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2765
Sosa; People v., 210 Cal.App.4th 946, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d Stark; People v., 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 261 Cal.Rptr. 479
826 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2303 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850; 1193
Soto; People v., 4 Cal.5th 968, 231 Cal.Rptr.3rd 732, 415 State v. (see name of defendant)
P.3d 789 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625; 3426 State of (see name of state)
Soto; People v., 51 Cal.4th 229, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 245 Staten; People v., 24 Cal.4th 434, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11
P.3d 410 (2011). . . . . . . .1060; 1110, 1111; 3226 P.3d 968 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Southard; People v., 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d Steele; People v., 27 Cal.4th 1230, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432,
656 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 47 P.3d 225 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 570
Spann; People v., 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 232 Cal.Rptr. 31 Steele; People v., 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 458
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2748 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .875
Sparks; People v., 28 Cal.4th 71, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 47 Steele; People v., 206 Cal.App.3d 703, 253 Cal.Rptr. 773
P.3d 289 (2002) . . . . . . . 1700, 1701; 3178; 3180 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402
Speaks; People v., 120 Cal.App.3d 36, 174 Cal.Rptr. 65 Steele; People v., 235 Cal.App.3d 788, 286 Cal.Rptr. 887
(1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750 (1991) . . . . . . 3115–3117; 3131, 3132; 3146, 3147
Speck; People v., 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d Stein; People v., 94 Cal.App.3d 235, 156 Cal.Rptr. 299
816. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3406 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1806
Spencer, In re, 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d Stephens; People v., 218 Cal.App.3d 575, 267 Cal.Rptr.
33 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 66 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3516
Spencer; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1208, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d Stephenson; People v., 10 Cal.3d 652, 111 Cal.Rptr. 556,
627 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3226 517 P.2d 820 (1974) . . . . . . . . 1204; 1215; 3175
Spinks, In re, 253 Cal.App.2d 748, 61 Cal.Rptr. 743 Stepney; People v., 120 Cal.App.3d 1016, 175 Cal.Rptr.
(1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2966 102 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Splawn; People v., 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 211 Cal.Rptr. Steven S., In re, 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 644
638 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2004 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2572
Springfield; People v., 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 17 Stevens; People v., 48 Cal.App.4th 982, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 278 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . 2180, 2181 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
Spry; People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 1345, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 Stevenson; People v., 79 Cal.App.3d 976, 145 Cal.Rptr.
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2305 301 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2503
Spurlock; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d Stewart; People v., 16 Cal.3d 133, 127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544
372 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . 1141, 1142; 1144, 1145 P.2d 1317 (1976) . . . 1806; 1863; 3407; 3410, 3411;
St. Martin; People v., 1 Cal.3d 524, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 3425
P.2d 390 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2720 Stewart; People v., 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d
Stamp; People v., 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598 888 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
(1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C; 620 Stewart; People v., 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d
Stanfield; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3181
328 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 Stewart; People v., 140 Cal.App.3d 11, 189 Cal.Rptr. 141
Stanfill; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 1137, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3230
885 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3517–3519 Stewart; People v., 188 Cal.App.2d 88, 10 Cal.Rptr. 217
Stankewitz; People v., 51 Cal.3d 72, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .822
793 P.2d 23 (1990). .334, 335; 707, 708; 935; 1402; Stiltner; People v., 132 Cal.App.3d 216, 182 Cal.Rptr.
3149, 3150; 3160–3162 790 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3130
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 Stinson; People v., 8 Cal.App.3d 497, 87 Cal.Rptr. 537
L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141, 1142 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500
Stanley; People v., 10 Cal.4th 764, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, Stockman; People v., 56 Cal.App.5th 1093, 270
897 P.2d 481 (1995) . . . . . . . 521; 725; 765; 3451 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100
Stansberry; People v., 242 Cal.App.2d 199, 51 Cal.Rptr.
403 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . 2140, 2141; 2150, 2151
TC-47

TABLE OF CASES AS
Stoll; People v., 84 Cal.App. 99, 257 P. 583 Superior Court (Engert); People v., 31 Cal.3d 797, 183
(1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76 (1982). . . . . . . . .700
Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. Superior Court (Ferguson); People v., 132 Cal.App.4th
647, 646 P.2d 809 (1982). . . .640–643; 3517–3519 1525, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 (2005). . . . . . . . .2655
Stone; People v., 46 Cal.4th 131, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 Superior Court (George); People v., 164 Cal.App.4th 183,
P.3d 272 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 711 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 3454A
Stratton; People v., 141 Cal. 604, 75 P. 166 Superior Court (Ghilotti); People v., 27 Cal.4th 888, 119
(1904) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949 (2002). . . .3454; 3454A
Stress; People v., 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 252 Cal.Rptr. Superior Court (Granillo); People v., 205 Cal.App.3d
913 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450; 3455 1478, 253 Cal.Rptr. 316 (1988) . . . . . . . . . 1700
Strider; People v., 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 100 Cal.Rptr. Superior Court (Holvey); People v., 205 Cal.App.3d 51,
3d 66 (2009) . . . . . . 984; 1161, 1162; 2530; 2966 252 Cal.Rptr. 335 (1988). . . . . . . . . . .830, 831
Stringer; People v., 41 Cal.App.5th 974, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d Superior Court of Los Angeles County; People v., 70
678 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202 Cal.2d 123, 74 Cal.Rptr. 294, 449 P.2d 230
Strohl; People v., 57 Cal.App.3d 347, 129 Cal.Rptr. 224 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3010
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600, 2601; 2603 Superior Court of Monterey (Bell); People v., 99
Strohman; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 1313, 101 Cal.App.4th 1334, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836
Cal.Rptr.2d 520 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1752 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2720
Strong; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d Superior Court of San Diego County (Bradway); People
494 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822 v., 105 Cal.App.4th 297, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 324
Strunk; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 265, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .728
868 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460 Superior Court (Ortiz); People v., 115 Cal.App.4th 995, 9
Stuart; People v., 168 Cal.App.2d 57, 335 P.2d 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 745 (2004). . . . . . . . . . .2747–2749
(1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 Superior Court; People v., 19 Cal.3d 338, 138 Cal.Rptr.
Stutelberg; People v., 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 240 66, 562 P.2d 1315 (1977) . . . . . . . . . 1154; 1162
Cal.Rptr.3d 156 (2018) . . . 511; 524; 860; 862, 863; Superior Court; People v., 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 284
875; 982, 983; 2503; 2720, 2721; 3130; 3145 Cal.Rptr. 601. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3450; 3455
Subielski; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 563, 211 Cal.Rptr. Superior Court (Shamis); People v., 58 Cal.App.4th 833,
579 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3402 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388 (1997) . . . . . . . 417; 561; 594
Sudar; People v., 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d Superior Court (Williams); People v., 233 Cal.App.3d
190 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3453 477, 284 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1991) . . . 3450; 3453; 3455
Sudduth; People v., 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 115
P.2d 401 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 (2002). . . . . . . . . . .2653–2655
Sullivan; People v., 80 Cal.App.3d 16, 145 Cal.Rptr. 313 Sutherland; People v., 17 Cal.App.4th 602, 21
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1802 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 (1993) . . . 1900–1906; 1920, 1921;
Sully; People v., 53 Cal.3d 1195, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 1925, 1926; 1930–1933; 1935; 1950–1956; 1970;
P.2d 163 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334; 373; 418 2020–2022; 3500
Summersville; People v., 34 Cal.App.4th 1062, 40 Sutter; People v., 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 184 Cal.Rptr. 829
Cal.Rptr.2d 683 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 401; 3145 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101; 201
Sumstine; People v., 36 Cal.3d 909, 206 Cal.Rptr. 707, Sutton; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d
687 P.2d 904 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3100 632 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3001, 3002
Sundance v. Municipal Court, 42 Cal.3d 1101, 232 Swain; People v., 12 Cal.4th 593, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909
Cal.Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80 (1986) . . . . . . . . 2966 P.2d 994 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415; 563
Superior Court (Aishman); People v., 10 Cal.4th 735, 42 Swanson; People v., 142 Cal.App.3d 104, 190 Cal.Rptr.
Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 896 P.2d 1387 (1995) . . . 523; 729; 768 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225; 1240; 1242
1350–1352; 1354, 1355 Swarthout; United States v., 420 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
Superior Court (Almond); People v., 219 Cal.App.3d 607, 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2827
268 Cal.Rptr. 375 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3452 Swearington; People v., 71 Cal.App.3d 935, 140 Cal.Rptr.
Superior Court (Anderson); People v., 151 Cal.App.3d 5 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375; 1160
893, 199 Cal.Rptr. 150 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . 2651 Szeto; People v., 29 Cal.3d 20, 171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623
Superior Court (Bradway); People v., 105 Cal.App.4th P.2d 213 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 707, 708
297, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 (2003) . . . . . . . . . 728
TC-48

AS TABLE OF CASES
Tealer; People v., 48 Cal.App.3d 598, 122 Cal.Rptr. 144

T (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361
Teamer; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1454, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d
T.A.J., In re, 62 Cal.App.4th 1350, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 331
296 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
(1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1071; 1180
Tecklenburg v. Appellate Div. of Superior Court, 169
Tabios; People v., 67 Cal.App.4th 1, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753 Cal.App.4th 1402, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2009) . . 1145
(1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 571
Teixeira; People v., 123 Cal. 297, 55 P. 988
Tackett; People v., 144 Cal.App.4th 445, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d (1899) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3475
449 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
Temple; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1750, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d
Tafoya; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 220, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
681 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2902
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85
Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508, 509
1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2844
Teroganesian; People v., 31 Cal.App.4th 1534, 37
Talamantez; People v., 169 Cal.App.3d 443, 215 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . 2577, 2578
Cal.Rptr. 542 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889,
Talbot; People v., 220 Cal. 3, 28 P.2d 1057 (1934).1806 44 Ohio Op. 2d 383 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . 2673
Talkington; People v., 140 Cal.App.3d 557, 189 Cal.Rptr. Teung; People v., 92 Cal. 421, 28 P. 577 (1891) . . 2760
735 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2746, 2747
Tewksbury; People v., 15 Cal.3d 953, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135,
Tameka C., In re, 22 Cal.4th 190, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 544 P.2d 1335 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1226
P.2d 603 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3146
This Instruction Upheld. People v. Smith, 191
Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 282, 279 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.4th 199, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 52 (2010) . . 1002
592, 807 P.2d 434 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Thomas; People v., 2 Cal.4th 489, 828 P.2d 101, 7
Tate; People v., 29 Cal.App.4th 1678, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 250 Cal.Rptr.2d 199 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .766
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3456
Thomas; People v., 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7
Tate; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 663, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521, 522; 570
(1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945
Thomas; People v., 43 Cal.App.3d 862, 118 Cal.Rptr. 226
Tatman; People v., 20 Cal.App.4th 1, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416
Thomas; People v., 45 Cal.App.2d 128, 113 P.2d 706
Tatum; People v., 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832 (1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
(1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
Taylor v. Hamlet, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19451 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821–823
(PR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2748
Thomas; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d
Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 578, 91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 571 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3100
477 P.2d 131 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Taylor; People v., 12 Cal.3d 686, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801; 3176
P.2d 622 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Thomas; People v., 235 Cal.App.3d 899, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d
Taylor; People v., 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1700
575 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2181
Thomason; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 1064, 101
Taylor; People v., 32 Cal.4th 863, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 510, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2953
P.3d 881 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .520; 600
Thompson v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 107 Cal.App.3d
Taylor; People v., 32 Cal.App.4th 578, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 354, 165 Cal.Rptr. 626 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . 2131
127 (1995) . . . . . . 1402; 3115–3117; 3130, 3131;
Thompson; People v., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1966, 10 Cal. Rptr.
3145–3150; 3160–3163; 3176, 3177; 3182, 3183
2d 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2577, 2578
Taylor; People v., 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d
Thompson; People v., 50 Cal.3d 134, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309,
23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2500
785 P.2d 857 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3261
Taylor; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 693
Thompson; People v., 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2004) . . . 507; 925; 2180; 2655; 2736; 2763; 2950
803 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . .580, 581; 590; 592
Taylor; People v., 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 199 Cal.Rptr. 6
Thompson; People v., 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 206 Cal.Rptr.
(1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2530
516 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Taylor; People v., 180 Cal.App.3d 622, 225 Cal.Rptr. 733
Thompson; People v., 206 Cal.App.2d 734, 24 Cal.Rptr.
(1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350
101 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2990; 2995
Teal; People v., 61 Cal.App.4th 277, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 644
(1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
TC-49

TABLE OF CASES AS
Thompson; People v., 206 Cal.App.3d 459, 253 Cal.Rptr. Traster; People v., 111 Cal.App.4th 1377, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d
564 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121, 1122 680 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1805
Thornton; People v., 11 Cal.3d 738, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, Trevino; People v., 26 Cal.4th 237, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567,
523 P.2d 267 (1974) . . . . . . . . 1203; 1215; 3175 27 P.3d 283 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .750
Thornton; People v., 85 Cal.App.4th 44, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d Trevino; People v., 200 Cal.App.3d 874, 246 Cal.Rptr.
825 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 357 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Threestar; People v., 167 Cal.App.3d 747, 213 Cal.Rptr. Tribble; People v., 4 Cal.3d 826, 94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 484
510 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1806 P.2d 589 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Thurston; People v., 71 Cal.App.4th 1050, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d Trieber; People v., 28 Cal.2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946) . .
221 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840 2902
Tilbury; People v., 54 Cal.3d 56, 284 Cal.Rptr. 288, 813 Triplett; People v., 48 Cal. App. 5th 655, 267 Cal. Rptr.
P.2d 1318 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3452 3d 675 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .202; 222
Tilehkooh; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 7 Trippet; People v., 56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 226 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3412 559 (1997). . .2361; 2363; 2370; 2375, 2376; 3403;
Tillotson; People v., 157 Cal.App.4th 517, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 3412
42 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2040; 2043 Trotter; People v., 65 Cal.App.4th 965, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d
Timms; People v., 151 Cal.App.4th 1292, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 898 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760, 2761
677 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625 Trotter; People v., 160 Cal.App.3d 1217, 207 Cal.Rptr.
Tinajero; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 891
298 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2301; 2380, 2381 Truong; People v., 90 Cal.App.4th 887, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
Tirouda; United States v., 394 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 904 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3163
2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 Tuck; People v., 75 Cal.App.3d 639, 142 Cal.Rptr. 362
Tischoff v. Wolfchief, 16 Cal.App.3d 703, 94 Cal.Rptr. (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
299 (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2202 Tufunga; People v., 21 Cal.4th 935, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143,
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 987 P.2d 168 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1863
L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) . . . . . . 540B, 540C; 702, 703 Tuggles; People v., 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 100 Cal.Rptr.3d
Tobias; People v., 25 Cal.4th 327, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 21 820 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318; 335
P.3d 758 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . 334, 335; 1180 Turk; People v., 164 Cal.App.4th 1361, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d
Tokash; People v., 79 Cal.App.4th 1373, 94 Cal.Rptr. 2d 473 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625
814 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3161 Turner; People v., 22 Cal.App.3d 174, 99 Cal.Rptr. 186
Toledo; People v., 26 Cal.4th 221, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, (1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251
26 P.3d 1051 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . .460; 1300 Turner; People v., 50 Cal.3d 668, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789
Toledo-Corro; People v., 174 Cal.App.2d 812, 345 P.2d P.2d 887 (1990) . . . . . . . . 301; 540A–540C; 730
529 (1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415, 416; 563 Tuthill; People v., 31 Cal.2d 92, 187 P.2d 16
Tomlinson; People v., 35 Cal. 503 (1868). .1905; 1930; (1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .300
1935; 1954
Toney; People v., 76 Cal.App.4th 618, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 578 U
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 830
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct.
Torfason; People v., 38 Cal.App.5th 1062, 252
2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Cal.Rptr.3d 11 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3457
Umana; People v., 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d
Torres; People v., 48 Cal.App. 606, 192 P. 175
573 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1831, 1832
(1920). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1250, 1251
Unanimity: When Generic Testimony of Offense
Torres; People v., 102 Cal.App.4th 1053, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d
Presented. (People v. Jones, 51 Cal.3d 294, 270
92 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643 (1990) . . . . 2980; 3500
Torres; People v., 224 Cal.App.3d 763, 274 Cal.Rptr. 117
Underlying Conviction Need Not Be Valid. Wells v.
(1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401
California, 352 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1965). . . . .2735
Towey; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 880, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d
United States v. (see name of defendant)
326 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Uriarte; People v., 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 272 Cal.Rptr. 693
Tran; People v., 13 Cal.5th 1169, 298 Cal.Rptr.3d 150,
(1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571; 604
515 P.3d 1210 (2022) . 301; 335, 336; 358; 761; 763
Urziceanu; People v., 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 33
Tran; People v., 47 Cal.App.4th 253, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 650
Cal.Rptr.3d 859 (2005) . . . . . . . 2350–2352; 3411
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301
TC-50

AS TABLE OF CASES
Vega; People v., 236 Cal.App.4th 484, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d

V 671 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Vega-Robles; People v., 9 Cal. App. 5th 382, 224 Cal.
Valdez; People v., 27 Cal.4th 778, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 42
Rptr. 3d 19 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332; 360
P.3d 511 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . 821; 823; 830, 831
Vela; People v., 205 Cal.App.4th 942, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d
Valdez; People v., 32 Cal.4th 73, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 755 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2160
P.3d 296 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
Velasquez; People v., 54 Cal.App.3d 695, 126 Cal.Rptr.
Valencia, In re, 84 Cal.App. 26, 259 P. 116 (1927).1901 656 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2400
Valencia; People v., 28 Cal.4th 1, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 131, 46 Velasquez; People v., 211 Cal.App.4th 1170, 150
P.3d 920, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (2002) . . . . . 1700 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .875
Valenti; People v., 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 197 Velez; People v., 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 192 Cal.Rptr. 686
Cal.Rptr.3d 317 (2016) . . . 370; 523; 729; 902; 904; (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510; 3406
947; 1121, 1122; 1125, 1126; 1350–1352; 1354,
Velez; People v., 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631
1355
(1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3427
Valentine; People v., 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P.2d 1
Vera; People v., 69 Cal.App.4th 1100, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 128
(1946). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570
(1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2440
Valentine; People v., 42 Cal.3d 170, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720
Verlinde; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 123
P.2d 913 (1986). . . .2125; 2510–2512; 2540; 2544;
Cal.Rptr.2d 322 (2002) . . . 335; 590; 592; 708; 935;
2591, 2592; 3100
1402; 3149, 3150; 3160–3162
Valenzuela v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.4th 1445, 39
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127
Cal.Rptr.2d 781 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . 2300; 3200
L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . .103; 220
Valenzuela; People v., 116 Cal.App.3d 798, 172 Cal.Rptr.
Victor B., In re, 24 Cal.App.4th 521, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 362
284 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1850
(1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2501
Van Alstyne; People v., 46 Cal.App.3d 900, 121 Cal.Rptr.
Vigil; People v., 94 Cal.App.4th 485, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 331
363 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2350, 2351
(2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Van Deleer; People v., 53 Cal. 147 (1878) . . . 521; 734
Villa; People v., 144 Cal.App.3d 386, 192 Cal.Rptr. 674
Van Eyk; People v., 56 Cal.2d 471, 15 Cal.Rptr. 150, 364 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370
P.2d 326 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416; 563
Villa; People v., 157 Cal.App.4th 1429, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d
Van Os; People v., 96 Cal.App.2d 204, 214 P.2d 554 282 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
(1950). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .840
Villatoro; People v., 54 Cal.4th 1152, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d
Van Ronk; People v., 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 217 Cal.Rptr. 401, 281 P.3d 390 (2012) . 852A, 852B; 853A, 853B;
581 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . 570, 571; 600; 603, 604 1191A, 1191B
Van Winkle; People v., 75 Cal.App.4th 133, 89 Villegas; People v., 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.2d 28 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A 1 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .801
Vang; People v., 1 Cal.App.5th 377, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 455 Vincent; People v., 19 Cal.App.4th 696, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d
(2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1502 714 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2020
Vang; People v., 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 806 Vindiola; People v., 96 Cal.App.3d 370, 158 Cal.Rptr. 6
(2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A; 730 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357
Vann; People v., 12 Cal.3d 220, 115 Cal.Rptr. 352, 524 Vineberg; People v., 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 177 Cal.Rptr.
P.2d 824 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103; 220 819 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3407; 3411
Vargas; People v., 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d Vines; People v., 51 Cal.4th 830, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830,
210 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 251 P.3d 943 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200; 1203
Vargas; People v., 204 Cal.App.3d 1455, 251 Cal.Rptr. Viniegra; People v., 130 Cal.App.3d 577, 181 Cal.Rptr.
904 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . .821; 823; 830, 831 848 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641
Vasquez; People v., 51 Cal.App.4th 1277, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d Virgil; People v., 51 Cal.4th 1210, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465,
389, 59 Cal.Rptr. 389 (1996). . . . . . . . . . .1120 253 P.3d 553 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375; 766
Vasquez; People v., 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 39 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155
Cal.Rptr.3d 433 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .571 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1303, 1304
Vatelli; People v., 15 Cal.App.3d 54, 92 Cal.Rptr. 763 Visciotti; People v., 2 Cal.4th 1, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825
(1971). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2745, 2746 P.2d 388 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625
Vega; People v., 18 Cal.App.3d 954, 96 Cal.Rptr. 391 Vital; People v., 40 Cal.App.5th 925, 254 Cal.Rptr.3d 22
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2530 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Vega; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479
(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841
TC-51

TABLE OF CASES AS
Vital; People v., 45 Cal.App.4th 441, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676 Warren; People v., 223 Cal.App.2d 798, 36 Cal.Rptr. 127
(1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810; 3177 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .877
Vogel; People v., 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 Washington; People v., 50 Cal.App.4th 568, 57
(1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 Cal.Rptr.2d 774, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774 (1996) . . 1700
Von Blum; People v., 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 943, 47 Washington; People v., 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442,
Cal.Rptr. 679 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700, 2701 402 P.2d 130 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . 540A, 540B
Von Tiedeman; People v., 120 Cal. 128, 52 P. 155 Waters; People v., 163 Cal.App.3d 935, 209 Cal.Rptr. 661
(1898). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3403; 3414
Vorise; People v., 72 Cal.App.4th 312, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 12 Watie; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .723 258 (2002). . . . . . . . . . .965; 3148, 3149; 3475
Watkins, In re, 64 Cal.2d 866, 51 Cal.Rptr. 917, 415 P.2d
W 805 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970, 1971
Watson; People v., 12 Cal.App.3d 130, 90 Cal.Rptr. 483
Wade; People v., 39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2673
645 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Watson; People v., 30 Cal.3d 290, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637
Wade; People v., 63 Cal.4th 137, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876, P.2d 279 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .580, 581
369 P.3d 546 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2530
Watson; People v., 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243
Wade; People v., 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d (1956). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224
529 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22
Wagner, In re, 119 Cal.App.3d 90, 173 Cal.Rptr. L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624; 2651
766 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2682; 2684–2687; 2736
Weathington; People v., 231 Cal.App.3d 69, 282
Waidla; People v., 22 Cal.4th 690, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, Cal.Rptr. 170 (1991) . 1160; 1170; 1850; 2100–2102;
996 P.2d 46 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373; 2932 2110–2112; 2114; 2125, 2126; 3100
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, Weaver v. California, 535 U.S. 1058, 122 S.Ct. 1920, 152
763 P.2d 852 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . 582; 821; 823 L.Ed.2d 828 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . 760, 761; 775
Walker, In re, 147 Cal.App.4th 533, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 411 Weaver; People v., 26 Cal.4th 876, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29
(2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .571 P.3d 103 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760, 761; 775
Walker; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1615, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d Webb v. Miller, 187 Cal.App.3d 619, 232 Cal.Rptr. 50
431 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404; 3426, 3427 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2130
Walker; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 380, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d Webb; People v., 74 Cal.App.4th 688, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 259,
264 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3100 64 Cal. Comp. Cases 1040 (1999) . . . . . . . . 1804
Walkkein; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 18 Webster; People v., 54 Cal.3d 411, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814
Cal.Rptr.2d 383 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3102 P.2d 1273 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521; 1600
Wallace, In re, 3 Cal.3d 289, 90 Cal.Rptr. 176, 475 P.2d Weddles; People v., 184 Cal.App.4th 1365, 109
208 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2930 Cal.Rptr.3d 479 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600
Wallace; People v., 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d Weidert; People v., 39 Cal.3d 836, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705
67 (1992) . . . . 1060; 1110–1112; 1120; 1152; 1200 P.2d 380 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725
Wallace; People v., 109 Cal.App.4th 1699, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d Weiss; People v., 50 Cal.2d 535, 327 P.2d 527
324 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1354, 1355; 2364 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371; 419
Wallace; People v., 123 Cal.App.4th 144, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d Welch; People v., 8 Cal.3d 106, 104 Cal.Rptr. 217, 501
790 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2900 P.2d 225 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A–540C
Wallace; People v., 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d Wells v. California, 352 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1965) . 2721;
618 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170 2723
Wallach; People v., 62 Cal.App. 385, 217 P. 81 Wells; People v., 12 Cal.4th 979, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911
(1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2981 P.2d 1374 (1996). . . . . . . . . .580, 581; 590–593
Wandick; People v., 227 Cal.App.3d 918, 278 Cal.Rptr. Wells; People v., 187 Cal.App.2d 324, 9 Cal.Rptr.
274 (1991) . . . . . . . 2590; 3115–3117; 3130–3132 384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Ward; People v., 62 Cal.App.4th 122, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 Wells; People v., 911 P.2d 1374, 12 Cal.4th 979, 50
(1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .840 Cal.Rptr.2d 699. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .592
Ward; People v., 188 Cal.App.3d 459, 233 Cal.Rptr. 477 Wesley; People v., 198 Cal.App.3d 519, 243 Cal.Rptr.
(1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 785 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3001, 3002
Warnick; People v., 86 Cal.App.2d 900, 195 P.2d 552
(1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2994
TC-52

AS TABLE OF CASES
West; People v., 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 Wiley; People v., 18 Cal.3d 162, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554
(1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315 P.2d 881 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224, 225
West; People v., 226 Cal.App.3d 892, 277 Cal.Rptr. 237 Wilkins; People v., 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037 743 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2670
Westfall; People v., 198 Cal.App.2d 598, 18 Cal.Rptr. 356 Wilkins; People v., 26 Cal.App.4th 1089, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .359 764 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Westoby; People v., 63 Cal.App.3d 790, 134 Cal.Rptr. 97 Wilkins; People v., 27 Cal.App.3d 763, 104 Cal.Rptr. 89
(1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2572–2578 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Wetmore; People v., 22 Cal.3d 318, 149 Cal.Rptr. 265, Wilkins; People v., 56 Cal.4th 333, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519,
583 P.2d 1308 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . .359, 360 295 P.3d 903 . . . . . . . . . 525; 540A–540C; 3261
Wharton; People v., 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 Wilkinson; People v., 33 Cal.4th 821, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420,
(1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2501; 2520–2522 94 P.3d 551 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .946
Wharton; People v., 53 Cal.3d 522, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, Wilkinson; People v., 248 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 56
809 P.2d 290 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 Cal.Rptr. 261 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2931
Wheeler; People v., 4 Cal.4th 284, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, Wilkoff v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.3d 345, 211 Cal.Rptr.
841 P.2d 938 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226; 316 742, 696 P.2d 134 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . .2100
Wheeler; People v., 71 Cal.App.3d 902, 139 Cal.Rptr. William S., In re, 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 256 Cal. Rptr. 64
737 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1001 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Whight; People v., 36 Cal.App.4th 1143, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979 (1998) . . . 763
163 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804; 1956 Williams v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.3d 330, 146
White; People v., 71 Cal.App.2d 524, 162 P.2d 862 Cal.Rptr. 311 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
(1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1820; 1822 Williams; People v., 4 Cal.4th 354, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441,
White; People v., 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 841 P.2d 961 (1997). . . .505; 604; 935; 938; 1000;
(1980). . . .860–862; 900, 901; 903; 945, 946; 981; 1030; 1045
2651–2656; 2670–2672; 2723 Williams; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d
White; People v., 133 Cal.App.4th 473, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 243 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1801
848 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1015 Williams; People v., 12 Cal.App.2d 207, 55 P.2d 223
White; People v., 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 224 Cal.Rptr. 467 (1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334; 707
(1986).935–938; 1045; 1047–1051; 1100–1102; 1128 Williams; People v., 16 Cal.3d 663, 128 Cal.Rptr. 888,
White; People v., 202 Cal.App.3d 862, 249 Cal.Rptr. 165 547 P.2d 1000 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . .318, 319
(1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2761 Williams; People v., 16 Cal.4th 153, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123,
Whitehurst; People v., 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 12 940 P.2d 710 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334; 373
Cal.Rptr.2d 33 (1992) . . . 820–823; 925; 960; 3405 Williams; People v., 16 Cal.4th 635, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573,
Whitfield; People v., 7 Cal.4th 437, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 941 P.2d 752 (1997) . . 334, 335; 707, 708; 720–737;
868 P.2d 272 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225; 626 750
Whitlock; People v., 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d Williams; People v., 21 Cal.4th 335, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 412,
389 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3454 981 P.2d 42 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410
Whitmer; People v., 59 Cal.4th 733, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, Williams; People v., 25 Cal.4th 441, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295,
329 P.3d 154 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800; 1802 21 P.3d 1209 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Whitson; People v., 25 Cal.2d 593, 154 P.2d 867 Williams; People v., 26 Cal.4th 779, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114,
(1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3400 29 P.3d 197 (2001). . .820; 860–863; 875–877; 890,
Whitt; People v., 51 Cal.3d 620, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 891; 900–907; 915, 916; 2503
P.2d 849 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764 Williams; People v., 28 Cal.4th 408, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 854,
Wielograf; People v., 101 Cal.App.3d 488, 161 Cal.Rptr. 49 P.3d 203 (2002) . . 2100–2102; 2110, 2111; 2113,
680 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750, 1751 2114; 2965
Wilcox; People v., 177 Cal.App.3d 715, 223 Cal. Rptr. Williams; People v., 31 Cal.4th 757, 74 P.3d 779, 3
170 (1986). . . .1045; 1047–1051; 1100–1102; 1128 Cal.Rptr.3d 684 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3454
Wilder; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 247 Williams; People v., 33 Cal.App.4th 467, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450; 3453; 3455 358 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Wiley, 9 Cal.4th 580, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d Williams; People v., 44 Cal.3d 883, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336,
541. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3100 751 P.2d 395 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721
Wiley; People v., 18 Cal. 3d 162, 133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 Williams; People v., 45 Cal.3d 1268, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834,
P.2d 881 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 756 P.2d 221 (1988). . . . . . . .334, 335; 707, 708
TC-53

TABLE OF CASES AS
Williams; People v., 46 Cal.App.4th 1767, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d Winston; People v., 46 Cal.2d 151, 293 P.2d 40
521 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801 (1956). . . . . .2350–2352; 2361; 2363; 2375, 2376
Williams; People v., 55 Cal.App.4th 648, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d Winters; People v., 242 Cal.App.2d 711, 51 Cal.Rptr. 735
203 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 (1966) . . 1070–1072; 1081, 1082; 1091, 1092; 1101,
Williams; People v., 57 Cal.4th 776, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 1102
305 P.3d 1241 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600 Wischemann; People v., 94 Cal.App.3d 162, 156
Williams; People v., 73 Cal.App.2d 154, 166 P.2d 63 Cal.Rptr. 386 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3145–3147
(1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1800 Wolden; People v., 255 Cal.App.2d 798, 63 Cal.Rptr. 467
Williams; People v., 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600
356 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 851 Wolfe; People v., 114 Cal.App.4th 177, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 483
Williams; People v., 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d (2003) . . 2410; 2500–2503; 2510–2513; 2560; 2562;
727 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362; 376 2745–2749; 3500
Williams; People v., 102 Cal.App.3d 1018, 162 Cal.Rptr. Wolfson, Ex parte, 30 Cal.2d 20, 180 P.2d 326
748 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . 570, 571; 600; 603, 604 (1947) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1850
Williams; People v., 115 Cal.App.3d 446, 171 Cal.Rptr. Womack; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 926, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d
401 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3160 76 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2620–2622
Williams; People v., 162 Cal.App.3d 869, 208 Cal.Rptr. Wood; People v., 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 255 Cal.Rptr.
790 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 537 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100; 2110
Williams; People v., 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 98 Woods; People v., 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr.3d 770 (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1863 231 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400; 402
Williams; People v., 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 3 Cal.Rptr. 782 Woods; People v., 65 Cal.App.4th 345, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d
(1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .372 917 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1701
Williams; People v., 198 Cal.App.3d 1476, 244 Cal.Rptr. Woods; People v., 112 Cal.App.3d 226, 169 Cal.Rptr. 179
429 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3452 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Williams; People v., 233 Cal.App.3d 407, 284 Cal.Rptr. Woodward; People v., 116 Cal.App.4th 821, 10
454 (1991). . . . . . .2380, 2381; 2390, 2391; 3406 Cal.Rptr.3d 779 (2004). . . . . . . . . . .1140–1144
Williams; People v., 756 P.2d 221, 45 Cal.3d 1268, 248 Wooten v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.App.4th 422, 113
Cal.Rptr. 834 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 Cal.Rptr.2d 195 (2001) . . . . 1150, 1151; 1153–1156
Willoughby; People v., 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 210 Wooten; People v., 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d
Cal.Rptr. 880 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . 852A; 853A 765 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . .1804; 1806; 1863
Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985).337 Wright v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.4th 521, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d
Wilson, 11 Cal.App.4th 1483, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 77. .1701 322, 936 P.2d 101 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
Wilson; People v., 23 Cal.App. 513, 138 P. 971 Wright, In re, 65 Cal.2d 650, 56 Cal.Rptr. 110, 422 P.2d
(1913). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350 998 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1151
Wilson; People v., 66 Cal.2d 749, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 Wright; People v., 30 Cal. 3d 705, 180 Cal. Rptr. 196, 639
P.2d 820 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425 P.2d 267 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3231
Wilson; People v., 95 Cal.App.4th 198, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d Wright; People v., 40 Cal.4th 81, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146
355 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1551 P.3d 531 (2006). . . . . . . .2350–2352; 2361; 2363
Wilson; People v., 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d Wright; People v., 45 Cal.3d 1126, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755
919 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821 P.2d 1049 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Wilson; People v., 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 222 Cal.Rptr. Wright; People v., 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d
540 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2110; 2241 316 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600
Wilson; People v., 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d Wright; People v., 60 Cal.App.3d 6, 131 Cal.Rptr. 311
541 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1300 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821; 823
Wilson; United States v., 601 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. Wright; People v., 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d
1979) . . . . . . 2800, 2801; 2810–2812; 2826; 2828 494 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Wimer; People v., 74 Cal.App.5th 113, 289 Cal.Rptr.3d Wright; People v., 206 Cal.App.2d 184, 23 Cal.Rptr. 734
164 (2022). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1141 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Wing; People v., 32 Cal.App.3d 197, 107 Cal.Rptr. 836 Wymer; People v., 53 Cal.App. 204, 199 P. 815
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1900; 1970 (1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1804
Winslow; People v., 40 Cal.App.4th 680, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d Wynkoop; People v., 165 Cal.App.2d 540, 331 P.2d 1040
901 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3100 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .334
TC-54

AS TABLE OF CASES
Zamarron; People v., 30 Cal.App.4th 865, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d

Y 17 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3224–3234
Zambia; People v., 51 Cal.4th 965, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 662,
Yarbrough; People v., 54 Cal.4th 889, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d
254 P.3d 965 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
164, 281 P.3d 68 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Zamora; People v., 18 Cal.3d 538, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557
Yeoman; People v., 31 Cal.4th 93, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.2d 75 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416; 563; 3410
P.3d 1166 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 763–765
Zamora; People v., 28 Cal.3d 88, 167 Cal.Rptr. 573, 615
Yokum; People v., 145 Cal.App.2d 245, 302 P.2d 406 P.2d 1361 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
(1956). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225
Zangari; People v., 89 Cal.App.4th 1436, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d
Yoshimura; People v., 62 Cal.App.3d 410, 133 Cal.Rptr. 250 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1600; 1800
228 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2579
Zapisek; People v., 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d
Yoshimura; People v., 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 154 Cal.Rptr. 873 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3453
314 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . .2570–2575; 2579
Zeihm; People v., 40 Cal.App.3d 1085, 115 Cal.Rptr. 528
Yost v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.App.3d 289, 125 Cal.Rptr. (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1070–1072
74 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2760
Zelver; People v., 135 Cal.App.2d 226, 287 P.2d 183
Young K.; People v., 49 Cal.App.4th 861, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2000
12 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1700
Zerillo; People v., 36 Cal.2d 222, 223 P.2d 223
Young; People v., 9 Cal.App.3d 106, 87 Cal.Rptr. 767 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600, 2601; 2603
(1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .370
Zermeno; People v., 21 Cal.4th 927, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 863,
Young; People v., 20 Cal.2d 832, 129 P.2d 353 986 P.2d 196 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400, 1401
(1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2200
Zgurski; People v., 73 Cal.App.5th 250, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d
Young; People v., 65 Cal. 225, 3 P. 813 (1884) . . 1700 214 (2021). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2040
Young; People v., 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 10, 143 Cal.Rptr. Zichko; People v., 118 Cal.App.4th 1055, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d
604 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140–1143 509 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Young; People v., 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 235 Cal.Rptr. 361 Zorn, In re, 59 Cal.2d 650, 30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635
(1987). . . . . . . . . . . . .1000; 1015; 1030; 1045 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . 984; 1161, 1162; 2530; 2966
Younger; People v., 84 Cal.App.4th 1360, 101 Zyduck; People v., 270 Cal.App.2d 334, 75 Cal.Rptr. 616
Cal.Rptr.2d 624 (2000) . . . . . 852A; 853A; 1191A (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
Yrigoyen; People v., 45 Cal.2d 46, 286 P.2d 1
(1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223–225; 704, 705
Yuksel; People v., 207 Cal. App. 4th 850, 143 Cal. Rptr.
3d 823 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Z
Zacarias; People v., 157 Cal.App.4th 652, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d
81 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
TC-55

TABLE OF STATUTES
Code of Civil Procedure—Cont.

CALIFORNIA Sec. Inst.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3590
224 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120, 3531
California Constitution 224(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120, 3531
Art.:Sec. Inst. 237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3590
237(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3590
I:13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2745, 2746
1209(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
I:16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768, 3500, 3501, 3550
I:18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .301
Education Code
I:28(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
VI:10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3530
Sec. Inst.
38000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .903
CALIFORNIA STATUTES 38000(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
38001. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .903
Business and Professions Code
Sec. Inst. Elections Code
729 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410 Sec. Inst.
4326(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2412 18340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2681
4326(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2413
17538(f)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2982 Evidence Code
23004 . 2100, 2110, 2960, 2961, 2962, 2963, 2964, 2965 Sec. Inst.
25658 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2964
56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2100, 2110
25658(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2962, 2963, 2964, 2965
98 to 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191A
25658(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2961
140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104, 222
25658(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2964
145 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
25658(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2963
177 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853A
25658.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2965
225 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
25660 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2962, 2964
240 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317, 319
25660(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2962, 2963, 2964
352 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316, 352, 375
25662 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2960
355. . .303, 304, 305, 351, 352, 357, 378, 852B, 853B,
25662(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2960 1191B
403(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Civil Code 410 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223, 224
Sec. Inst. 411 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070, 1110 413 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361, 371
43. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1350, 1351, 1352, 1355 600 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2981
50. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2514, 3470, 3475, 3476 600 to 607 . 2100, 2101, 2102, 2110, 2111, 2114, 2220,
51.7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1350, 1351, 1352, 1355 2641, 2800, 2801, 2810, 2811, 2981
1708.7(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1301 600(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .223, 224
2295 . . . . . . . . 1803, 2020, 2383, 2930, 2931, 2932 601 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512, 3477
602 to 604 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2981
Code of Civil Procedure 604 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512, 2981, 3477
Sec. Inst. 606 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512, 3477
607. . . . . .2100, 2101, 2102, 2110, 2111, 2114, 3425
203(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120, 3531
TS-1

TABLE OF STATUTES AS
Family Code
Evidence Code—Cont. Sec. Inst.
Sec. Inst. 2200. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1180
640 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2800, 2801, 2810, 2811 6203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 851, 852A, 1252
665. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250, 251, 252, 253 6205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A, 1300, 1301, 2929
668. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250, 251, 252, 253 6209 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A
770 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318, 319 6210. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .852A, 3163
780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105, 226 6211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 851, 852A, 1252
780(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105, 226 6320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A
780(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105, 226 6500. .820, 821, 822, 823, 830, 831, 1070, 1071, 1072,
780(k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105, 226 1080, 1081, 1082, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1100, 1101,
782 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194 1102, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123,
788 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1140, 1144, 1145,
791 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318, 319 1150, 1151, 1152, 1180, 1200, 1201, 1244, 1250,
1251, 1807, 2113, 2376, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383,
800 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
2384, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2960, 2961, 2962,
801 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850 2963, 2964, 2965, 2980, 2981, 2982, 3162, 3185,
802 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 3222
913(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 7000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A, 1141
1100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 7540 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180, 2981
1100 to 1102. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .350 7613. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2981
1101(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375, 2840 7822(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
1103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 7822(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
1103(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .352 7822(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
1107(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 851
1107(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 851 Fish and Game Code
1107(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .850 Sec. Inst.
1107(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
3002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
1108 . . . . . . . . . . . . 316, 375, 852A, 1191A, 2840
12006.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1801
1108(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191A
1108(d)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1191A
1109. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .375, 852A, 853A
Government Code
1109(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A Sec. Inst.
1109(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853A 820.25(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2601, 2603
1109(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .852A 12550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624
1109(d)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853A 12926 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1353
1109(d)(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .852A, 2701 12926(i). . . .523, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355
1109(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A, 853A 12926(k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1353
1109(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852A, 853A 26500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624
1223 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 41803 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624
1235 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318, 319 82048 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654
1236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318, 319
1290 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 Harbors and Navigation Code
1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317, 319 Sec. Inst.
1294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1602, 1701, 1822
1324 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
TS-2

AS TABLE OF STATUTES
Health and Safety Code

Sec. Inst. Health and Safety Code—Cont.
1250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1302, 1807 Sec. Inst.
1250.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1807 11358(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370
1250.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1807 11358(d)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370
1797. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653 11359 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2352, 2390, 2391
1797.80 to 1797.84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1551, 2656 11359(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2352
11002 . . . . 2300, 2301, 2350, 2351, 2380, 2381, 2390, 11359(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2352
2391, 3183 11360. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2351, 2381, 2390, 2391
11006.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2375, 2376 11360(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2350, 2361, 2363, 2364
11018 . . . . 2350, 2351, 2352, 2361, 2363, 2364, 2370, 11360(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2364
2375, 2376, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 3415 11360(a)(3) . . . . . . . . 2350, 2351, 2361, 2363, 2364
11018.5 . . . 2350, 2351, 2352, 2361, 2363, 2364, 2370, 11360(a)(3)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2364
2375, 2376, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 3415 11360(a)(3)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2364
11019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2320, 2321 11360(a)(3)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2364
11027 . . . . . . . . . . . 2304, 2320, 2321, 2400, 2748 11360(a)(3)(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2364
11054 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331 11361 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2390, 2391
11054 to 11058 . . 1002, 1017, 1032, 1047, 2300, 2301, 11361(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393
2302, 2303, 2304, 2330, 2331, 2380, 2381, 2382, 11362.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3415
2383, 2384, 2748, 2749, 3183, 3201
11362.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3415
11054(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2338
11362.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3415
11054(d)(22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2336
11362.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3415
11054(e)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306
11362.5 . . . 2350, 2351, 2352, 2361, 2363, 2370, 2375,
11055 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331 2376, 2748, 3403, 3412
11055(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2337, 2338 11362.45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3415
11056 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331 11362.775. .2350, 2351, 2352, 2361, 2363, 2370, 2375,
11056(c)(11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306 2376, 3413
11056(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306 11364 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2410
11057 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331 11364(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2410
11057(d)(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306 11365 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2401
11058 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331 11365(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2401
11150 . . . . . . . . . . . 2304, 2320, 2321, 2400, 2748 11366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2440
11164 . . . . . . . . . . . 2304, 2320, 2321, 2400, 2748 11366.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
11164.5 . . . . . . . . . . 2304, 2320, 2321, 2400, 2748 11366.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2441
11350. . . . . . . .2301, 2303, 2304, 2380, 2381, 2748 11368 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2320, 2321
11350.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306 11370.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2303
11351. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2301, 2302, 2380, 2381 11370.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200
11351.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2302 11370.4(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200
11352 . . . . . . . . . . . 2300, 2301, 2380, 2381, 3406 11370.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2430, 2431
11352(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2301 11370.6(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2432
11352.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200 11377 . . . . . 250, 2301, 2303, 2304, 2380, 2381, 2748
11353 . . . . . . . . . . . 2380, 2381, 2382, 2384, 3406 11377.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2306
11354. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2380, 2381, 2382, 2384 11378. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2301, 2302, 2380, 2381
11354(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2380, 2381, 2382, 2384 11378.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2302
11355 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2315, 2316 11379. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2300, 2301, 2380, 2381
11357 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370, 2390, 2391 11379.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331
11357(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2375 11379.6(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330, 2331
11357(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2376 11379.6(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2330
11358 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370
TS-3

Health and Safety Code—Cont. Penal Code—Cont.

Sec. Inst. Sec. Inst.
11379.6(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2331 7(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600
11379.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3200, 3201 7(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830
11379.8(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3201 7(12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830
11380(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2380, 2381, 2383, 2384 8. . . .594, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1920,
11382 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2315, 2316 1921, 1925, 1926, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1935, 1950,
11383(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335, 2336 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1970,
11383(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2337 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2041, 2042, 2043
11383.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2338 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
11383.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335 17(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2125
11383.5(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2337 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300
11383.5(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338 20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250, 251, 252, 253, 1751
11383.5(c) to (f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2338 21a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .460, 600, 603, 604
11383.5(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .404
11383.5(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428, 3450, 3455
11383.5(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338 25(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450, 3453, 3455
11401 . . . . 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2380, 2381, 26 . . 250, 334, 404, 511, 707, 1082, 1110, 1122, 3175,
2382, 2383, 2384, 2748, 2749 3455
11550 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2400, 2965 26(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1215, 3406, 3427
12000. .521, 722, 1302, 2501, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2576, 26(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3425
2577, 2578, 2579, 2745, 2746, 2747 26(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3404
12305 . . . . . . . . . . . 2572, 2573, 2576, 2577, 2578 26(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3402
16460 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2571 28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3428
18009.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . .1121, 1160, 1602, 1701 28(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1750
18075.55(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1602, 1700, 1701 28(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625
29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850, 3428
Labor Code 29.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Sec. Inst. 29.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404, 3425, 3426, 3427
29.4(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 626
1140. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2929 29.4(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .625, 1750
2750. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1803 29.4(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625, 626
29.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3450
Penal Code 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401
Sec. Inst. 31 . . . . . . . . . . . 401, 443, 1402, 3115, 3116, 3117
7 . . . 122, 253, 591, 593, 800, 801, 820, 821, 822, 830, 32. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .440
831, 840, 841, 875, 876, 900, 901, 902, 904, 906, 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600
907, 947, 951, 1161, 2100, 2601, 2603, 2610, 2611, 67.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
2612, 2720, 2721, 2900, 2902, 2953, 3404 67.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
7(1) . 823, 860, 861, 862, 863, 877, 903, 905, 908, 915, 67.5(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601, 2602
925, 926, 945, 946, 948, 949, 950, 960, 965, 967,
68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2603
968, 970, 1153, 1162, 1170, 1350, 1351, 1400,
69. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250, 2651, 2652
1821, 2201, 2202, 2240, 2400, 2401, 2683, 2684,
2685, 2686, 2687, 2688, 2689, 2700, 2701, 2720, 69(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2651, 2652
2723, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2980, 2981, 3001, 3002 70. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .945
7(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2101, 2102, 2950 71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300, 2650
7(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2600 76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1300, 2624, 2650
7(4).877, 965, 967, 968, 1250, 1251, 2572, 2577, 2578, 76(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3229
2689 76(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2650
TS-4

Penal Code—Cont. Penal Code—Cont.

76(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2650 148(d)(1) to (8). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2654
76(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2650 148(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654, 2656
86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2603 148(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654, 2655
93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2603 148(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2655, 2656, 2670
115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945 148.10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2655
115(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1945 148.10(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2655
116.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3590 148.10(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2655
118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640 148.10(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2655
118a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2641 148.10(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2655
118(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641 149 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
119 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2640, 2641 166. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701
121. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 166(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2701
123. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 166(a)(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701
124. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 166(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700
125. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2640, 2641 166(c)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701
131.6(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2622 166(c)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2701, 2702
133 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2621 166(c)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2701
136(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622, 2623 166(c)(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2701, 2703
136(2) . . . . . . . 2610, 2611, 2612, 2622, 2624, 3229 166.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700
136(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622, 2624 169 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2680
136.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2620, 2622 182. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415, 563, 1400
136.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622, 2623 182(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .415, 563
136.1(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622 182.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400
136.1(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2622 183 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 563
136.1(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622 184 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415, 416, 563
136.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2622, 2623 186.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2997
136.1(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810 186.9(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2997
137(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2610 186.9(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2997
137(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2620, 2621, 2622, 2624 186.10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2997
137(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2620, 2621, 2622 186.10(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2997
137(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2610, 2620, 2621 186.11(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3221
138. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2620, 2622 186.22(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400, 2542
138(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2611 186.22(b)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400, 1401, 2542
138(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2612 186.22(b)(1)(C). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1401
140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2624 186.22(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
140(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2624 186.22(b)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2630 186.22(b)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
141(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2630 186.22(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401
141(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2630 186.22(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736, 1400, 1401, 2542
148 . . . . . . . . . . . 250, 926, 945, 2653, 2656, 2670 186.22(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 736, 1400, 1401, 2542
148(a) . . . . . . . . 982, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2656 186.22(e)(1) to (25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400
148(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653, 2655 186.22(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1400
148(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653 186.22(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . .736, 1400, 1401, 2542
148(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653 186.22(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736, 1400, 1401, 2542
148(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2653 186.22(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736, 1400, 2542
148(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2653, 2654 186.23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400
TS-5


186.26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400 190.2(a)(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
186.28. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1400 190.2(a)(14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
187 . . . . . . . . . . 520, 521, 570, 571, 572, 581, 600 190.2(a)(15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727, 728
188. . . . . . . . . .402, 403, 417, 520, 561, 600, 2720 190.2(a)(16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
188(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402, 403, 417, 525 190.2(a)(17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359, 730, 731, 732
189. . . . .520, 521, 540A, 540B, 540C, 560, 561, 601 190.2(a)(17)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
189(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540A 190.2(a)(17)(M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731, 732
189(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525 190.2(a)(18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
189(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540B, 540C 190.2(a)(19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
189(e)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540B, 540C 190.2(a)(20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
189(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525, 540B, 540C 190.2(a)(21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
189.5. . .500, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 2514, 190.2(a)(22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
3470 190.2(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701, 702, 703, 731, 732
190(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 190.2(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
190(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524 190.2(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702, 703, 731, 732
190(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525 190.3 . . . . . . . . . 760, 761, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767
190.03(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .523 190.3(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
190.03(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .729 190.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700
190.05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751 190.4(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768
190.05(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .751 190.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
190.05(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .751 190.25(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .737
190.05(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .751 190.41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359, 730
190.05(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .751 191.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590, 2113, 2131, 2160
190.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700 191.5(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .520, 590
190.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750 191.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590, 591
190.1(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 750 191.5(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590
190.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701, 702 192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581, 603, 604
190.2(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 192(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2160
190.2(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 192(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520, 521, 570, 571, 572
190.2(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 192(b) . . . . . . . . . . . 510, 520, 521, 580, 581, 582
190.2(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 192(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520, 580, 581
190.2(H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731, 732 192(c)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .590, 592, 2160
190.2(M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731, 732 192(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590, 591, 592, 593
190.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724, 726, 737 192(c)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591, 594, 2113, 2131
190.2(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720 192(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570, 603
190.2(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 700, 701, 702, 750 192.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592, 2160
190.2(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721 192.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .592, 593
190.2(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722 192.5(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591, 2160
190.2(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723 194 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
190.2(a)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722 195. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .510, 511, 3404
190.2(a)(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602, 724 196 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
190.2(a)(8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724 197 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506, 508, 509, 3471
190.2(a)(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602, 724 197 to 199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
190.2(a)(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505, 506
190.2(a)(11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726 198.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3477
190.2(a)(12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
TS-6


199 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507 240. .800, 801, 820, 822, 840, 841, 860, 861, 862, 863,
203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801, 891 875, 876, 890, 891, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905,
205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 3176 906, 907, 915, 925, 926, 935, 936, 937, 945, 946,
206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810, 3177 947, 948, 949, 950, 960, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003,
1004, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1045, 1046,
207 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 3179
1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1120, 1123, 2503,
207(a) . . . . . . . 1200, 1201, 1204, 1215, 1225, 3175 2720, 2721, 2723
207(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200, 1201, 1203, 1225 241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
207(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1225 241(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
207(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1225 241(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860, 900, 926, 945
207(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1201 241.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
207(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 241.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
207(f)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225 241.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
207(f)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226 241.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
208(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200, 1201, 1215, 3406 241.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
209 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810, 3177, 3179 241.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
209(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1202 241.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
209(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200, 1203 242. .800, 801, 822, 840, 841, 925, 926, 935, 936, 937,
209.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204, 3179 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 960, 1000, 1001,
209.5(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204 1002, 1003, 1004, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 1032,
209.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1120,
210.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1240, 1241 2722, 2723
211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203, 1600 242.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
212. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1600, 1650 243 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926, 945
212.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1602 243(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841, 947
213(a)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1601 243(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .926, 945
215 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1650 243(b) to 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
215(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1204 243(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
220 . . . 890, 891, 1000, 1001, 1015, 1016, 1030, 1031, 243(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
1045, 3130 243(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
220(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .890, 891 243(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841
220(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890 243(f). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .926
222 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002 243(f)(4). . . .507, 925, 2180, 2201, 2202, 2655, 2736,
236 . . 810, 1200, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1215, 1240, 1241, 2763, 2929, 2950
1242 243(f)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
236.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243, 1244, 2980, 3414 243(f)(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926, 948, 949
236.1(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3414 243(f)(10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840, 841, 3163
236.1(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3414 243.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
236.1(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1243, 1244, 3184 243.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
236.1(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3184 243.2(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
236.1(h)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3414 243.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
236.23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3414 243.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .935, 936, 2306
236.24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3414 243.4(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935, 936, 1045
237. . . . . .1200, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1215, 1240, 1241 243.4(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 936
237(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240, 1242 243.4(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
237(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1240 243.4(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .935, 936
TS-7


243.4(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935, 936, 938, 1045 261(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
243.4(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938 261(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
243.4(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935, 936, 937 261(a)(4)(B) to (D). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1003
243.4(g)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 935, 936, 937, 938 261(a)(4)(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
243.4(g)(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .936 261(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
243.4(g)(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .936 261(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1000
243.4(g)(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .936 261(c). . . . . . . .1000, 1015, 1030, 1045, 1060, 1111
243.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 261.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070, 1072, 1180
243.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950 261.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070, 1071, 1072
243.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2722 261.5(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071, 1072
243.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947 261.5(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1071
243.15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946 261.5(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070, 3406
243.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960 261.6 . 938, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1015, 1017, 1019, 1030,
244 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877 1032, 1045, 1049, 1050
244.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861, 876 261.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . 938, 1000, 1015, 1030, 1045
244.5(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876 262 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111
244.5(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861 262(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1000
245 . . . . . . 860, 862, 863, 875, 925, 965, 2720, 2721 263. .1000, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1070, 1071, 1072,
245(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875 1127, 1180
245(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 800, 801, 810, 820, 3145 264.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 1001, 1046, 1123, 1203
245(a)(1) to 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875, 2720, 2721 264.1(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3185
245(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875, 2720, 2721 266c . . . . . . . . . . . . 937, 1000, 1015, 1030, 1045
245(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 266h. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1150
245(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860 266h(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
245(d)(1) to 3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .860 266i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
245.1 . . . . . . . . . . . 602, 860, 861, 900, 926, 1551 266i(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
245.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863 266i(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
245.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862 266i(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
245.5(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949 266j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965, 967, 968 269(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1123
246.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 269(a)(1) to (5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1123
246.3(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965 270 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2981
246.3(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970 270e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2980, 2981, 2982
247 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965, 967 272. . . . . .1070, 1071, 1072, 1121, 1122, 2980, 2982
247(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 272(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2982
247(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966 272(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2982
247.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 273.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810, 822, 840
248 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967 273.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
261. . . .123, 208, 890, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 273.5(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
1005, 1015, 1030, 1045, 1060, 1111, 1203, 2306 273.5(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .840, 841
261(6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000, 1001 273.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2700, 2701
261(7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000, 1001 273.6(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2701
261 to 368 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 273.6(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2701, 2702
261(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1000 273.6(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2701
261(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 273.6(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2701, 2703
261(a)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . .810, 1000, 1001, 1123 273a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
TS-8


273a(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .821 286.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181
273a(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821, 822, 823 286.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1181
273ab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520, 820 286.5(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181
273ab(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 286.5(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1181
273ab(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820 287 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890, 1015, 1016
273d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .821, 822, 823 287(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3185
273d(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .822 287(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185
277. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1250, 1251 287(a). . . .1015, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022,
277(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1250, 1251, 1252 1080, 1081, 1082
277(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250, 1251 287(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
277(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250, 1251, 1252 287(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
277(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250 287(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810, 1090, 1091, 1101
277(h). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1251 287(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
277(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250, 1251, 1252 287(c)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1015, 1123
277(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 287(c)(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185
277(k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1252 287(c)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185
278. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1250, 1251 287(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1016
278.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251 287(d)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185
278.5(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1251 287(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1022
278.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1251 287(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017, 1018
278.5(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1251 287(f)(2) to (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
278.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252 287(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1019
278.7(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1252 287(h). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1020
278.7(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1252 287(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017
285 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1180 287(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
286. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .890, 1030, 1031, 2306 288 . . . . . . . . . . 890, 1060, 1110, 1111, 1152, 1200
286(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030, 3185 288(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1110, 1111, 1200, 3406
286(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185 288(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060, 1111
286(a). . . .1030, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 288(b)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1060, 1111
1090, 1091, 1092, 1127 288(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
286(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092 288(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460, 1112
286(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091 288(c)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
286(c)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090 288(f)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
286(c)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1030, 1123 288(f)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
286(c)(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185 288(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1060
286(c)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185 288(h). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1060
286(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1031 288.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
286(d)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3185 288.2(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140
286(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1037 288.2(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140
286(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 288.2(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
286(f)(2) to (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 288.2(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
286(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1034 288.2(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140
286(h). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1035 288.2(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
286(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 288.2(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1140
286(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 288.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082, 1124
286(k). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1030 288.3(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1124
TS-9


288.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125, 1126 289.6(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
288.4(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1126 290. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .250, 1145, 1170, 2352
288.4(a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 290(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
288.4(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125 290(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170, 2364, 2370
288.4(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1126 290(f) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
288.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120, 3516 290.002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
288.5(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120 290.01. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1170
288.5(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120 290.010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
288.5(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1120 290.011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
288.7(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1127 290.011(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
288.7(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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viii

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

The Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions welcomes comments.

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

Current and former Administrative Office of the Courts staff attorneys

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

Using the Instructions

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

Guide for Using Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions

SERIES 100 PRETRIAL

SERIES 200 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY

SERIES 300 EVIDENCE

SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND

SERIES 500 HOMICIDE

SERIES 800 ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES

SERIES 1000 SEX OFFENSES

SERIES 1200 KIDNAPPING

SERIES 1300 CRIMINAL THREATS AND HATE CRIMES

SERIES 1400 CRIMINAL STREET GANGS

SERIES 1500 ARSON

SERIES 1600 ROBBERY AND CARJACKING

SERIES 1700 BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY

SERIES 1800 THEFT AND EXTORTION

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SERIES 1900 CRIMINAL WRITINGS AND FRAUD

SERIES 2100 VEHICLE OFFENSES

SERIES 2300 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

SERIES 2500 WEAPONS

SERIES 2600 CRIMES AGAINST GOVERNMENT

SERIES 2800 TAX CRIMES

SERIES 2900 VANDALISM, LOITERING, TRESPASS, AND OTHER

SERIES 3100 ENHANCEMENTS AND SENTENCING FACTORS

SERIES 3400 DEFENSES AND INSANITY

SERIES 3500 POST-TRIAL: CONCLUDING

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SERIES 100 PRETRIAL

SERIES 200 POST-TRIAL: INTRODUCTORY

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D. UNION OF ACT AND INTENT

SERIES 300 EVIDENCE

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D. DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AND STATEMENTS

E. PARTICULAR TYPES OF EVIDENCE

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SERIES 400 AIDING AND ABETTING, INCHOATE, AND ACCESSORIAL

C. ACCESSORY AND SOLICITATION

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SERIES 500 HOMICIDE

B. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES

C. MURDER: FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE

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This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

H. CAUSATION: SPECIAL ISSUES

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This version provided by LexisNexis® Matthew Bender®, Official Publisher, 800-533-1637,

SERIES 800 ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES