Team U - Petitioner's Memorial-1

- TABLE OF CONTENTS- Page |1
TEAM CODE: U
TEAM CODE: U
32nd ALL INDIA MOOT COURT (3rd VIRTUAL) COMPETITION
2023
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

W.P.No._____/2023
IN THE MATTERS OF:
POSTGRAM LIMITED…………………….…..…………...……….Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA…………………….……………............………Respondent
As Submitted to the Chief Justice & other Companion Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India.
- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER -
- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………..……5
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………….………...6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………9
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………….....................10
QUESTIONS PRESENTED…………………………………………….……12
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS…………..………………………..……….13
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES……………………………………….15
I. WHETHER THE WRIT PEITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT?.....................................................15
A. Violation of fundamental rights and presence of locus standi…15
i. Petition maintainable if there exists violation of fundamental

rights …………………………………………………………...……15
ii. Postgram’s rights and presence of locus standi………………..16
B. Remedy under Article 32 is a matter of right………………....17
C. Presence of alternative remedy no ground to bar relief under

Article 32…………………………………………………...…19
II. WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

RULES, 2021 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?..............................................................21
A. Rule 4(2) violates the fundamental right to privacy…….……21

B. Rule 4(2) violates the fundamental right to freedom of speech

and expression making power of the Central
Government…………………………………………………..24
i. Chills lawful speech…………………………………………….…25
ii. Unreasonable restrictions……………………………………..…25
C. Rule 4(2) is manifestly arbitrary and in violation of Article

14……………………………………………………………..26
D. Rule 4(2) is ultra vires the intent of the IT Act itself……...…27
E. Impugned Rule violates the intent of the IT Act

itself………………………………………………………..…28
III. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR

NON COMPILANCE WITH RULE 4(2) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?..............................................................30
A. Circumvention of safe harboring and exceeding powers of the

parent statute…………………………………..……………...30
i. Requirements under Section 79 of the IT Act for exemption…30
ii. Traceability compliance liability outside the purview of Section

79……………………………………………………………………..31
B. Absence of mens rea and vicarious liability to constitute a

criminal liability………………………………………………32
i. Applying principle of Attribution for implying ‘mens rea’……..33
ii. Inclusion pf provisions for vicarious liability under the

Statute……………………………………………………………..…34
C. Existence of Corporate Veil…………………………………..35

D. Violation of Article 19(1)(g)………………………………….37
PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………..…39

- TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS- Page |5
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM
v. Versus
& And
Vol. Volume
Ed. Edition
SSMI Significant Social Media Intermediary
CSAM Child Sexual Abuse Material
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
AIR All India Reporter
SC Supreme Court
WP Writ Petition
WLR Weekly Law Reports
DE Departmental Enquiry
DLT Delhi Law Times
AC Appeal Cases
All ER All England Reports
Hon’ble Honourable
UoI Union of India
Ors Others
Anr Another

- INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- Page |6
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
SUPREME COURT CASES
ADM Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521…………………….….22

Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad, (1969) 1 SCR 518……………………………......17
Bal Krishna Agarwal (Dr) v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1995) 1 SCC 614).…....17
Bishan Das and Others v. State of Punjab AIR 1969………………………….22
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., 1950 SCR 759………………………………30
Chiranjitlal Chaudhary v. Association of India. 1950, SC 9…………………..29
Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC
1506……………………………………………………………………………17
D.A.V. College vs State of Punjab (1971 2 SCC 261)………………………….15
Daimler Co. Ltd v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd 1916 2 A.C.
307……………………………………………………………………………..29
E.P. Royappa V State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1974 SCC 555……….…................23
Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148……………………………………21
Godhra Electricity v. State of Gujarat 975 SCR (2) 42…………………..……..30
Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Incorporated (2011) 1 SCC 74…..…...27
Jyoti Limited v. Kanwaljit Kaur Bhasin 1987 32 DLT 198……………………..29
K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725, 730…………………....18
Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corp. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC
710…………………………………………………………………………..…20
Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P., (2000) 3 SCC 40………………….....24
L.I.C India v. Escorts Ltd. & Ors 1985 SC 15………………………………....29
M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad (AIR 1969
SC 556)…………………………………………………………………...……17
Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311……………….....23
Mohd. Faruk v. State of M.P., (1969) 1 SCC 853……………………………..30
MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, AIR 1954 SC

300……………………………………………………………………………..20
National Council for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, 2007 6
SCC 506…………………………………………………………..……………15
National Stock Exchange Member v. Union of India 125 (2005) DLT 165…….27
R. Rajagopal and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 SCC (6) 632…………….21
R.C. Cooper V. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564…………………………..…30
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163……………...18
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana. AIR 1950 SC 163, 165……...…17
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124………………………18
S. Khushboo vs Kanniammal & Anr (2010) 5 SCC 600……………………....21
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22………………………………....15
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22…………………………………12
Santanu Ray v. Union of India 1988 DE 60……………………………...……..29
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73………………………..21
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar 1959 SCR 279…………….....12
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar 1959 SCR 279…………..……15
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement AIR 2005 SC
2622…………………………………………………………………………....28
State of TN v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC
517…………………………………………………………………………..…22
State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co 1988 SC 505……………………………30
Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 60……...27
`………………….27
The Workmen Employed in Associated Rubber Industries Ltd., Bhavnagar v. The
Associated Rubber Industries Ltd., Bhavnagar 1985 SC 236……………….…29
Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882……………………………...17
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC
1………………………………………………………………………………..17

INTERNATIONAL CASES
Jones v. Lipman 1962, 1 W.L.R 832………………………...............................29

Daimler Co. Ltd v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd 1916 2 A.C.
307……………………………………………………………………………..29
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22…………………………………12
STATUTES
Constitution of India, 1950……………………………………………………15
Information Technology Act, 2000…………………………………………...27
Information Technology (Intermediary and Digital Media Ethics) Rules, 2021
General Clauses Act, 1897……………………………………………………17
BOOKS
Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum,1967……… ………….17

Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)……………………… …………….15
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th ed. 2004) …………………………17

- STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION- Page |9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners have approached the Honourable Supreme Court of India under

Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the issuance of writ of Mandamus.
The Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background:
Shanthisthan is a state in the Indian Union Postgram, Postgram is the largest social
media platform of Shanthisthan, Population of the State is 5,48,67,345. Postgram
allows the user to create and share the photos, stories, and videos with the friends
and followers. The purpose is notified as “Connect with friends, share what you're
up to, or see what's new from others all over the world. Explore our community
where you can feel free to be yourself and share everything from your daily
moments to life's highlights”. 80% of its users are youngsters of 16-30 age group.
Relevant Facts:
On 07/07/2022, Shanthisthan Times published an article titled “Postgram is the

Champion of Fake News”. This article was co-authored by 2 researchers at the
University of Shanthisthan. It stated that false news travels faster as it is shared
more often by users. The study also found that the majority of the fake news that
was spread on Postgram was of political nature. On 02/09/2022, Shanthisthan
published another article accusing Postgram of not taking any steps to observe the
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics
Code) Rules, 2021. This act puts due diligence on significant social media
companies who must enable the identification of the first originator of information
within India on its platform. This may be required by an order of a Court or the
competent authority under the IT Act.

- STATEMENT OF FACTS - P a g e | 11
The Final Dispute:
On 17 -10 -2022 Postgram filed a petition before the Supreme Court under Art 32
of the Constitution with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, direction, or order to declare that (i) Rule 4(2) of Information
Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution, ultra vires
the IT Act, and illegal as to end-to-end encrypted messaging services; and (ii)
criminal liability may not be imposed for noncompliance with Impugned Rule 4(2)
and any attempt to impose criminal liability for non-compliance with Impugned
Rule 4(2) is unconstitutional, ultra vires the IT Act, and illegal.
-The matter is slated to be heard on 8th February, 2023-

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The petitioner very respectfully puts forth to the hon’ble supreme court, the
following queries:
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE WRIT OF PETITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS
MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT?
ISSUE II
WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RULES, 2021 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR NON-

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(2) OF THE IT RULES IS
UNCONSTUTIONAL?

-SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS- P a g e | 13
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the writ petition is
maintainable based as on (A) There is violation of fundamental rights and

presence of locus standi (B) Remedy under Article 32 being a matter of right
(C) Presence of alternative remedy cannot be a ground to bar relief under
Article 32. Hence, it is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble court that, before
dismissing a writ petition on the ground of existence of substitute relief, it
must consider the nature of the alternative remedy available and court should
not dismiss the petition merely because it appears that an alternate remedy
exists based on above precedence,
II. WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INTERMEDIARY RULES IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted before this court that the Rule 4(2) of Intermediary
Guidelines is unconstitutional as (A) It violates the right to privacy under
Article 21. (B) It violates the right to freedom of speech and expression under
Article 19. (C) It is manifestly arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.
(D) It is ultra vires the intent of the IT Act, 2000. (E) It violates the principle
of data minimisation the contention is substantiated through this five-fold
submissions. Therefore, based on the above five-fold submissions, it is
submitted to the Hon’ble court that the Impugned Rule of the Guidelines are
violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 and is also ultra vires the IT Act and hence
is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional

-SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS- P a g e | 14

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(2) OF THE IT RULES IS
UNCONSTUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the imposition of criminal
liability for non-compliance with Rule 4(2) is unconstitutional as there is (A)
Circumvention of safe harbouring principle and exceeding powers of parent
statute. (B) Absence of mens rea and vicarious liability to constitute criminal
liability. (C) Existence of Corporate Veil. (D) Violation of Article 19(1)(g).
Therefore, it humbly submitted that the criminal liability cannot be constitute
on non-compliance with the traceability provisions as clearly the impugned
rules not only exceed the authority of parent statue but also fails on others
factors as put forth through these submissions and hence should be held
unconstitutional.

- PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES- P a g e | 15
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITES
I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the writ petition is
maintainable based as on (A) There is violation of fundamental rights and

presence of locus standi (B) Remedy under Article 32 being a matter of right
(C) Presence of alternative remedy cannot be a ground to bar relief under
Article 32.
A. VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LOCUS

STANDI
3. The Article 32 of Indian Constitution provides for protection of fundamental
rights in case they are violated. The maintainability of a petition under Article
32 is a settled law and the courts on numerous counts have underscored the
two aspects: 1) violation of Fundamental rights and 2) locus standi of
petitioner.
i. Petition maintainable if there exists violation of fundamental rights
4. If prima facie there is violation of fundamental rights the writ petition under
Article 321 is maintainable, the reliance for this argument is placed on the
judgment of National Council for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India (UOI) and
Ors. in this case, the hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
1
INDIA CONST. art. 32.

“We are also of the view that public interest litigation may be
entertained when an issue of great public importance is involved,
but not to settle private scores as was held in Dattaraj Nathuji
Thaware's case. Furthermore, in an application under Article 32 of
the Constitution, there must be an element of infraction of one or the
other fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution” 2
5. A petition under Article 32 can be entertained even if a prima facie case is
made out that there is a threat to fundamental rights and it is not necessary for
the petitioners to wait till the actual threat has taken place3. In present case the
Rule 4(2)4 of Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital
Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 violates the right to privacy of all users of
Postgram Limited and thereby warrants allowing the petition under Article 32.
ii. Postgram’s rights and presence of locus standi
6. A company is recognised as a juristic person in the landmark case of Salomon
v. Salomon5, and has been reiterated in India as well. In Shri Ram Krishna
Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar6 corporates were also included under the ambit
of Article 14. Furthermore, the term ‘person’ as used in Article 14, shall be
interpreted along the lines of General Clauses Act, 1897 by virtue of Article
367 of the Constitution. According to this ‘person’ includes ‘company’
thereby guaranteeing fundamental rights.
2
2007 6 SCC 506
3
D.A.V. College vs State of Punjab (1971 2 SCC 261)
4
Hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Rule”
5
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22
6
1959 SCR 279

7. When the State or the officer of the State acts in an unreasonable manner, it is
deemed arbitrary and negates equality the said act therefore violates Article
14 of the Constitution. In addition to, the petitioners are not only representing
other SSMI's who are being affected but also, the substantial users of Postgram
whose Right to Privacy enshrined under Art 21 is being violated.
8. Therefore Postgram, has locus standi in the present case, as not only it
establishes prima facie violation of fundamental rights but, also is associated

with the affected parties as in representing general interest of public.
B. REMEDY UNDER ARTICLE 32 IS A MATTER OF RIGHT.
9. Article 32 guarantees the right to move to the Supreme Court, by appropriate
proceedings, in order to enforce the Fundamental Rights7 enumerated in the

Constitution.8 It is also well established that courts being the protector and
guarantor of the Fundamental Rights,9 cannot refuse to entertain petitions that
seek protection against infringement of the fundamental Rights.10
10. By virtue of the Latin Maxim: ‘Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium’;11 where there is a
right, there is a remedy similarly Article 32 was brought12 as a remedy for the
protection of the rights. If, the Petitioner can show a prima facie infringement
of fundamental rights13 or a public interest14 successfully, then according to
7
INDIA CONST. part III
8
M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th ed. 2014).
9
Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 147, 1461.
10
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124
11
Ibid Note at 8
12
K.K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SCC 725.
13
Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar, (2010) 4 SCC 4
14
Tara Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 335; Dadu v. State of Maharasthra, (2000) 8
SCC 437

clause 1,15 of Article 32, protection against such infringement is guaranteed.

Thus, writ petition under Article 32 shall be an appropriate remedy.16
11. It is evident that in the case at hand, the fundamental rights which have been
guaranteed by the Constitution are infringed upon and therefore the writ
petition is maintainable.
12. Furthermore, in terms of the procedural aspects under Article 32, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had observed that in case where there is gross violation of
Fundamental rights only in such cases the procedural aspects can be done
away with. The relevant extract has been highlighted below;
“It is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental

rights by a group or a class action or when basis human rights are invaded
or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience
that the Courts, especially the Supreme Court, should leave aside
procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction
under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of
the needy, the underdog and the neglected. It is necessary to have some
self-imposed restraint on Public Interest Litigants”.17
13. There are an estimated 1.1 Crore social media users of Postgram around the
globe and one of the largest social media service providers of Shantisthan,18
the ramifications of such unfettered invasion of privacy is gross violation of
right to life, which demands departure from the procedural aspects in case of
failure to fulfil the procedural shackles.
15
INDIA CONST. art. 32, cl. 1
16
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj v. T.N. Legislative Assembly, (2016) 6 SCC
17
Prashant Mehta v. State of H.P, 2021 HP 5438
18
Factsheet

C. PRESENCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDY NO GROUND TO

BAR RELIEF UNDER ARTICLE 32
14. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble court that mere presence of an
alternative remedy, shall not be adequate to invalidate the Writ Petition filed
in cases of violation or threat of violation to a fundamental right.
15. The existence of alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for granting relief
under article 226 but “is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of
granting writs”19 Exceptions to the rule of exhaustion under Article 226 have
been laid down by the Supreme Court, in a Division Bench ruling, in
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai.20 The generally
accepted exceptions include:
• The writ prayed is for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

• There has been a violation of the principles of natural justice.21
• The authority lacks jurisdiction.
• The vires of the statute, under which the authority acts, is challenged.22
16. The Apex Court cited the exceptions laid down in the case of Collector of
Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani,23 and held that a writ petition can
be held to be maintainable even if an alternative remedy is available to an
aggrieved party where the court or tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction or
enforcement of fundamental right is in question; or if there had been a
19
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana. AIR 1950 SC 163, 165; Union of india v.
T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882, Babu Ram v. Zila Parishad, (1969) 1 SCR 518
20
1998 8 SCC 1.
21
M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad (AIR 1969 SC 556).
22
Bal Krishna Agarwal (Dr) v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1995) 1 SCC 614)
23
AIR 1961 SC 1506

violation of principle of natural justice or where vires of the Act is under

interrogation.
17. The decision to apply the rule depends on the scope of the Article, and the
circumstances that bring the case within it. The refusal to entertain a merit-
worthy petition under Article 32 fails to find sustenance in the present
constitutional set up. However, neither the existence of an alternative remedy
nor the fact that the petition raises disputed questions of fact, justifies the
rejection of a petition under Article 32.
18. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the prominent case
of K. K. Kochuni v. State of Madras,24 after referring to Rashid Ahmed v.

Municipal Board, Kairana.25 and Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,26
precisely made the following instructive interpretations:
“The mere existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy cannot per

se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Article
32 if the existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or
threatened, of such right is alleged and is prima facie established on the
petition.”27
19. Furthermore, the issue raised in the petition is of constitutional or of public
importance, and the interest of general public is involved in the subject matter
and therefore should not be dismissed.
24
AIR 1959 SC 725, 730
25
AIR 1950 SC 163.
26
AIR 1950 SC 124.
27
Supra note 8 at Page No 17

20. Hence, it is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble court that, before dismissing a
writ petition on the ground of existence of substitute relief, it must consider

the nature of the alternative remedy available and court should not dismiss the
petition merely because it appears that an alternate remedy exists based on
above precedence,
II. Whether the Rule 4(2) of Information Technology (Intermediary

Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 is
Unconstitutional?
21. It is humbly submitted before this court that the Rule 4(2) of Intermediary
Guidelines is unconstitutional as (A) It violates the right to privacy under

Article 21. (B) It violates the right to freedom of speech and expression under
Article 19. (C) It is manifestly arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.
(D) It is ultra vires the intent of the IT Act, 2000. (E) It violates the principle
of data minimisation the contention is substantiated through this five-fold
submissions
A. RULE 4(2) VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

PRIVACY.
22. In the landmark decision of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,28 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
28
2017 10 SCC 1

23. Impugned Rule infringes upon the fundamental right to privacy without
satisfying the three-part test set forth by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
same case:
i. Legality;
24. To satisfy the legality requirement, there must be a valid law allowing for the
invasion of privacy. However, there is no statute requiring intermediaries to

enable the identification of the first originator of information in India on end-
to-end encrypted messaging services upon government or court order. Nor is
there any statute that allows the imposition of such a requirement through
subordinate legislation like the Intermediary Rules.
25. There is no law enacted by Parliament that expressly requires an intermediary
to enable the identification of the first originator of information in India on its

end-to-end encrypted platform or otherwise authorizes the imposition of such
a requirement through rule-making. While Impugned Rule seeks to impose
such a requirement, the Impugned Rule is not a valid law as it is subordinate
legislation, passed by a Ministry and not Parliament, that is ultra vires its
parent statute,
ii. Necessity;
26. To satisfy the necessity requirement, there must be a “guarantee against
arbitrary State action”29. Notably, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized
the importance of judicial review before the invasion of privacy occurs to
guarantee against arbitrary State action. The Impugned Rule, however, allows
tracing orders to be issued with no judicial review.
29
State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, 1974 2 SCC 70

27. As per the Impugned rule, the order for identification of first originator of
information can be directed by either through a by a judicial order passed by

a court of competent jurisdiction or an order passed under section 69 30 by the
‘Competent Authority” as per the Information Technology Rules, 2009, The
Competent Authority can be a secretary from Ministry of Home Affairs, this
enables doorway for arbitrary State action which is against the provision of
necessity.
28. Furthermore, Sec. 93 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires judicial
approval before the Government is allowed to execute a search-warrant for a

physical search. As an 8- judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held —
before privacy was even recognized as a fundamental right the “issue of a
search warrant is normally the judicial function of the Magistrate.”31 There is
no reason that a search of private, encrypted conversations should escape the
same judicial scrutiny required to protect fundamental rights.
iii. Proportionality
29. To satisfy the proportionality requirement, the infringement of fundamental
rights must “be through the least restrictive alternatives”.32 However, enabling
the identification of the first originator of information in India is not the least
restrictive alternative. Since there is no way to predict which message will be
the subject of a tracing order, intermediaries like Petitioner would have to
build the ability to identify the first originator of every communication sent in
India on their platforms for all time, infringing upon the privacy of even lawful
users. Enabling the identification of the first originator of information in India
breaks end-to-end encryption and the privacy principles underlying it.
30
Section 69 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for interception,
monitoring and decryption of information) Rules, 2009
31
MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi, AIR 1954 SC 300
32
Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corp. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710

30. SSMIs would have to build a mechanism that would permit tracing of every
communication sent in India on its messaging service, including those who

are using the service lawfully, as there is no way to predict which message
will be the subject of such an order seeking first originator information. This
is contrary to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s precedent that surveillance must
be targeted and limited only to those “persons, whether or not previously
convicted, whose conduct shows a determination to lead a life of crime”.33
31. More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed that the right to privacy
includes the right to anonymity in the case of Central Public Information

Officer, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal,34 . The Apex Court held
that “Privacy and confidentiality encompass a bundle of rights including the
right to protect identity and anonymity.”
32. Requiring intermediaries “to enable the identification of the first originator of
the information” in India on end-to-end encrypted messaging services

constitutes a dangerous invasion of privacy. This eliminates the right of the
users of Postgram in maintaining the privacy of their messages, which is
antithetical to end-to-end encryption and the core privacy principles
underlying it.
B. RULE 4(2) VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
33. Impugned Rule’s requirement to enable the identification of the first originator
of information in India unreasonably infringes upon the fundamental right to

freedom of speech and expression for at least two reasons:
33
Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148
34
2020 5 SCC 481\

i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a law violates the
fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression if it chills
lawful speech. Shreya Singhal case35; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil
Nadu36; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal37.
34. With end-to-end encryption, users feel safe to communicate freely. Enabling
the identification of the first originator of information in India on Postgram

breaks end-to-end encryption and infringes user privacy. As a result, it also
significantly restricts the right to freedom of speech and expression online.
Once citizens become aware that SSMIs have built the ability to identify the
first originator of information in India on their end-to-end encrypted
messaging services, individuals will not feel safe to speak freely for fear that
their lawful private communications will be used against them, thereby
infringing their rights to privacy and free speech.
ii. Impugned Rule is an unreasonable restriction on the right to free

speech for many of the same reasons that it violates the right to
privacy.
35. There is no express valid law passed by Parliament authorizing this
infringement upon the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.

In the case of Bishan Das38, the Court held that holding any infringement on a
fundamental right must be backed by law. The Rule permits tracing orders to
be issued without prior judicial review, and, therefore, fails to provide
constitutionally adequate safeguards to guarantee against arbitrary
35
Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73
36
R. Rajagopal and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 SCC (6) 632
37
S. Khushboo vs Kanniammal & Anr (2010) 5 SCC 600
38
Bishan Das and Others v. State of Punjab AIR 1969

Government action. The Rule is not proportional as the harm it causes

outweighs its purported benefits.
C. RULE 4(2) IS MANIFESTLY ARBITRARY AND IN VIOLATION

OF ARTICLE 14.
36. It is submitted that the Impugned is disproportionate as the harms it causes far
outweigh its purported benefits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
subordinate legislation suffers from manifest arbitrariness when Parliament
did not intend to give authority to make such legislation39. Nothing in the IT
Act suggests that Parliament ever intended to empower Respondents to require
SSMIs to enable the identification of the first originator of information in
India.
37. Because the impugned rule suffers from manifest arbitrariness it is violative
of Article 14. To substantiate this, Justice Bhagwati in A.D.M Jabalpur v. Shiv

Kant Shukla40, discarded a 'narrow, pedantic or lexicographical' interpretation
to the concept of 'equality' written in article 14 and held thus: Equality is a
dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed
cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a
positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.
38. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule
of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute
monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Art. 14.
39
State of TN v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517
40
1976 2 SCC 521

39. In Mardia Chemicals Ltd v. Union of India41 the Supreme Court of India struck
down Section 17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets

and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, for being oppressive,
unreasonable and arbitrary.
40. In the locus classicus, E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,42 equality and
arbitrariness were declared ‘sworn enemies’ and ‘antithetic’ principles.

Bhagwati J., in his celebrated opinion in Royappa, found that equality and
arbitrariness were conflicting principles – one belonged to the rule of law, the
other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
41. Hence, given that the present equally suffers from being oppressive,
unreasonable and arbitrary, the Impugned Rule is not in Violation of Right to

Equality.
D. RULE 4(2) IS ULTRA VIRES THE INTENT OF THE IT ACT ITSELF
42. Section 69A empowers and delegates to the Central Government to direct an
intermediary to block access to content on its platform by issuing directions

prescribing the same. Sec. 69A(2) also empowers the Central Government to
prescribe “the procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for
access by the public may be carried out”. However, Impugned Rule is neither
a “procedure” nor “safeguard” “subject to which a blocking order may be
carried out.” Accordingly, Impugned Rule exceeds the scope of Respondent’s
rule-making authority under Section 69A.
41
2004 4 SCC 311
42
AIR 1974 SCC 555

43. Sec. 79 is a safe harbour immunity provision that protects intermediaries from
liability for third-party content on their platforms, and provides that an

intermediary must observe “due diligence” prescribed by the Central
Government to enjoy that immunity. Sec. 79 does not enable the Respondent
to impose a requirement that intermediaries enable the identification of the
first originator of information in India on end-to-end encrypted messaging
services.
44. Subordinate legislation is ultra vires the parent statute if it travels beyond, or
does not conform with, the parent statute. It is a well-recognised principle of

interpretation of a statute that conferment of rule-making power by an Act
does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond
the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant
thereto43
45. Thus, it is clear that subordinate / delegated legislation (which the Central
Government has received through Sections 69 and 69A) cannot go beyond the
scope of the substantive provisions of the main law (which is the Information
Technology Act, 2000) and in the hierarchy of laws, statutory law will always
prevail over delegated legislation.
E. IMPUGNED RULE VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF DATA

MINIMISATION
46. Data minimisation principles dictate that, generally, an online service should
only collect and store user data that is essential to provide its service in order
to minimize the risks of unauthorized entities accessing that data. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Sikri, J.’s majority judgment in Puttaswamy,44 observed
43
Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P., (2000) 3 SCC 40
44
Supra Note 28 at Page No 21

that only with “strict observance” of the principles of data minimisation and
storage limitation “can the State successfully discharge the burden of
proportionality while affecting the privacy rights of its citizens.” (Puttaswamy
II, at para 221.) Chandrachud J.’s decision likewise observed that the statute
at issue in the case was unconstitutional for violating, inter alia, the principle
of data minimisation. (Puttaswamy II, at para 510.4.)
47. To the extent the Impugned Rule requires intermediaries like Petitioner to
store additional data for every message sent in India on its platform, it is
contrary to data minimization principles. Such a requirement would also be
particularly disproportionate as the Impugned Rule does not prescribe a time
limit, forcing Petitioner to store this additional data even years after the
message was sent.
48. To be clear, traceability is incompatible with end-to- end encryption.
Encryption as a service is used by journalists and whistle-blowers to

legitimately protect their privacy and in that is an enabler of the right to
privacy and the freedom of expression. Apart from protecting privacy,
encryption also makes communications more secure and helps ensure integrity
of information. But the requirement to store data for years is violating the
principle of data minimisation.
49. Therefore, based on the above five-fold submissions, it is submitted to the
Hon’ble court that the Impugned Rule of the Guidelines are violative of
Articles 14, 19 and 21 and is also ultra vires the IT Act and hence is liable to
be struck down as unconstitutional


NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(2) OF THE IT RULES IS
UNCONSTUTIONAL?
50. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the imposition of criminal
liability for non-compliance with Rule 4(2) is unconstitutional as there is (3.1)

Circumvention of safe harbouring principle and exceeding powers of parent
statute. (3.2) Absence of mens rea and vicarious liability to constitute criminal
liability. (3.3) Existence of Corporate Veil. (3.4) Violation of Article 19(1)(g)
A. CIRCUMVENTION OF SAFE HARBOURING PRINCIPLE AND

EXCEEDING POWERS OF THE PARENT STATUTE
51. The Government in the present case is trying to wilfully circumvent the safe
harbour principle under Sec. 79 of the IT Act,45 and is trying to introduce

criminal liability under the Intermediary Rules that is exceeding and
contradicting the provisions under the parent statute and is therefore liable to
be held unconstitutional. The contention is substantiated in the following two
folded submission.
i. Requirements under Sec. 79 of IT Act for exemption:
52. Sec. 79 of IT act sets forth certain cases in which exemption from liability for
any third-party information, data, or communication link made available or

hosted by the intermediary is given this exemption applies to SSMIs only if:
• The function of intermediary is limited to providing access or
45
Section 79 of Information Technology Act, 2000

• Intermediary does not initiate nor modify the transmission or

• Intermediary has observed due diligence while discharging its duties
53. In the present case, Postgram is an SSMI, whose main function is limited to
providing access to the communication system and has observed due diligence
in all matters as prescribed by the central government and guidelines thereof.
Hence, we find full application of the Sec. 79 of IT Act in the present case.
ii. Traceability compliance liability outside the purview of Sec. 79
54. Sec. 79(3) of the IT Act, elucidates on scenarios for non-application of the
Safe harbour principle in certain cases. The Sub section requires the company
to either have:
a) Conspired or abetted or aided or induced, in a commission of an
unlawful Act
b) Upon notification by Government the SSMI fails to remove or disable
access to the material.
55. The current requirement of ensuring knowledge of the First Originator falls
outside the purview of the above two scenarios as neither is it an aiding of an

unlawful act nor is it failing to adhere to governments direction on removal of
content, the Intermediaries Guidelines also prescribes the punishment for non-
observance of this requirement by attracting the provisions of Indian Penal
Code.46
56. It is contended that non-compliance with rule 4(2) is not an exception for non-
application of section 79 in the IT Act. Therefore, there is no rationale as to
46
Rule 7 of Information Technology (Intermediary & Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021

the circumvention of Section 79 of IT Act. Hence, the Rule 7, is in direct

conflict with Section 79 (3) of the IT Act, thereby exceeding the provisions of
the IT Act,
57. As previously stated, a subordinate legislation is ultra vires the parent statute
if it travels beyond, or does not conform with, the parent statute. It is a well-
recognised principle of interpretation of a statute that conferment of rule-
making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a
rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is
inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.47
58. the High Court of Delhi in a case held that, “.in every legal system there is a
hierarchy of laws, and the general principle is that if there is a conflict between
a norm in a higher layer of the hierarchy and a norm in a lower level of the
hierarchy, then the norm in the higher layer prevails, and the norm in the lower
layer becomes ultra vires.”48
59. Therefore, it humbly submitted that the action of imposing criminal liability
on non-compliance with Impugned Rule of subordinate legislation is in direct

conflict with Sec. 79 (3) of IT Act and also exceeds the provisions of the IT
Act.
B. ABSENCE OF MENS REA AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY TO

CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL LIABILITY?
47
Supra Note 40 at Page No. 26
48
National Stock Exchange Member v. Union of India 125 (2005) DLT 165

60. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the new rules not only
force social media platforms to exercise judgements on censorship, but also

potentially implicate their employees in criminal proceedings.
61. The settled position of law is that if a company commits a criminal offence,
the liability rests with the directors in two ways:
i. Applying Principle of Attribution for imputing ‘mens rea’
62. ‘Principle of attribution’ is applied to impute criminal intention to the
company on account of the criminal intention of its ‘alter ego’49 In other

words, the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company / body corporate,
i.e., the person or group of persons that guide the business of the company,
would be imputed to the corporation.50
63. The Apex court in another judgement relying upon the law laid down in
Iridium51 stated that the ‘principle of attribution’ is applied to impute criminal

intention to the company on account of the criminal intention of its ‘alter ego’
and cannot be applied in a reverse scenario to make the directors liable for
offences committed by the company.52
64. Therefore, for the alter ego to be held liable, there is a requirement of mens
rea to wilfully commit the crime and when the offence committed by the
company involves mens rea, it would normally come down to the intent and
action of the individual acting on behalf of the company. Thus, an individual
49
Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Incorporated (2011) 1 SCC 74
50
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. .v. Nattrass (1971) 2 All E.R. 1
51
Ibid at 49
52
Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2015) 4 SCC 60

who has perpetrated an offence on behalf of the company can be made an

accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active
role coupled with criminal intent.53
ii. Inclusion of provisions for vicarious liability under the statute.
65. The liability to the directors also extends where the statutory regime itself
attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability by specifically providing for such

liability. There are various legislations including foreign exchange
regulations, tax, labour and environment laws that attract the doctrine of
vicarious liability by specifically providing for liabilities of a person in-charge
and/or directors in the case of an offence being committed by a company.
66. The present Intermediary Rules does not contain a provision for the vicarious
liability of directors in the same manner as provided in other legislation

referred to above. In absence of vicarious liability provision for directors
under the statute, the criminal liability cannot be imposed.54
67. Hence, it said that mens rea is attributed to the company on the principle of
alter ego and it does not apply in reverse where vicarious liability is imputed
on the persons dealing with the business of the company. In the present case
due to non-application of principle of attribution and absence of vicarious
liability provisions under the impugned rules. It is humbly submitted that the
criminal liability cannot be constitute on non-compliance with the traceability
provisions to the company or to the persons dealing with the business of the
company.
53
54

C. EXISTENCE OF CORPORATE VEIL.
68. According to the principle of perpetual succession, a company is considered
to be solely dependent on itself and survives longer than any of its members,
i.e. "members may come and members may go, but the company stays on until
it‘s winded up by due process of law."55 It can be stated that there exists a
‘veil‘ that separates the company and its members.
69. To impose Criminal Liability, the corporate veil must be lifted, since a
company cannot be prescribed mandatory imprisonment, the idea is to

penalise and imprison the persons that are behind the management and
decisions of the company.
70. This principle of "lifting the corporate veil" by the courts, can be regarded as
an ‘exception’ to the corporate personality rule of corporate law. Since

corporate personality forms the fundamental of a company, courts are often
faced with a dilemma when it comes to lifting the veil, as misapplication of
this rule may harm the business prospects of the company and give suboptimal
outcomes.
71. The Apex Court observed that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the
Constitution are not only accessible by singular natives but also by the
corporate bodies.56 Article 21 states that no individual can be denied of his life
and liberty with the exception as per procedure established by law57. A
corporate body does enjoy the right of individual life and liberty under the
ambit of Article 21,
55
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement AIR 2005 SC 2622
56
Chiranjitlal Chaudhary v. Association of India. 1950, SC 9
57
INDIA CONST. Art 21

72. But in exceptional circumstances, the same individuality privilege can be
taken away as per the procedure established by law. The Supreme Court of
India has enshrined such exceptions for disregarding the notion of corporate
personality and lifting the veil by tribunals in the LIC Case.58 The
circumstances under which the Tribunal can remove the corporate veil, have
been broadly categorized into two heads, i.e., "Statutory Provisions" and
"Judicial Interpretations
73. The following are the grounds for lifting corporate veil through judicial
interpretations:
• To determine the true character and intent of the company, in the interest
of public policy.59
• Against Public Policy.60
• Avoiding welfare legislation.61
• Tax Evasion.62
• Fraud or improper conduct.63
74. The present circumstance or event finds no ground to pierce the corporate veil
as it’s an action of non-compliance which has no evidence of criminal intent

nor warrants the need for piercing the corporate veil. the Courts should only
resort to lifting the corporate veil only in exceptional cases, as it is not a
general settled rule.64
58
L.I.C India v. Escorts Ltd. & Ors 1985 SC 1
59
Daimler Co. Ltd v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd 1916 2 A.C. 307
60
Jyoti Limited v. Kanwaljit Kaur Bhasin 1987 DE 245
61
The Workmen Employed in Associated Rubber Industries Ltd., Bhavnagar v. The
Associated Rubber Industries Ltd., Bhavnagar 1985 SC 236
62
Santanu Ray v. Union of India 1988 DE 60
63
Jones v. Lipman 1962, 1 W.L.R 83
64
State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co 1988 SC 505

75. The principle should not be applied consistently but only in rare case. Even
the companies have the right to life and freedom as provided under Article 21
of the constitution.65 The Courts must resist the temptation for lifting the veil
as a swift resort. As rightly pointed out by the Apex Court in the Balwant Rai
Case.66
D. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1)(g)
76. It is humbly submitted before the court that the imposition of criminal liability
on non-compliance is violating Article 19(1)(g) as it requires the company to

fundamentally alter their business and failure to do so attracts criminal
proceedings towards the company. This in turn is creating an onerous situation
in carrying out their business as a social media intermediary which is violative
of their freedom to practice trade and profession.
77. As per the Bank Nationalization case,67 when the fundamental rights of
shareholders are impaired by state action, then a shareholder is entitled to be

protection of Article 19 and a mere association with the company does not
render loss of its individual right, as the shareholders rights are equally and
necessarily affected if the rights of the company are affected and hence the
Postgram should be able to challenge the violation of 19(1)g.68
78. It is submitted that while there is no dispute that the State has power to regulate
the business activities, as provided under Article 19(6).69 However, it is
65
Supra Note 55 at Page 35
66
Balwant Rai Saluja vs. Air India Ltd. (2014 LLR 1009)
67
R.C. Cooper V. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 564
68
Godhra Electricity v. State of gujarat 975 SCR (2) 42
69
INDIA CONST. Art 19(6)

contended that in view of Chintaman Rao70 & Mohd. Farooq,71 the onus lies
on the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of restrictions.
79. According to the case of Express Newspapers, any restriction upon the
freedom of profession would be unconstitutional and it is not necessary that

the restriction have to destroy the industry or business perse, but even if it
creates a situation wherein it is impossible to carry on the business except in
onerous conditions, such a restriction shall be held unconstitutional.
80. In present case, the action of imposing criminal liability is creating a situation
in which directors are forced to comply with the requirements of impugned

rule that not is manifestly arbitrary, but is clearly violating the fundamental
rights of both Postgram and its users. This creation of impossible situation
should therefore be held unconstitutional.
81. Therefore, it humbly submitted that the criminal liability cannot be constitute
on non-compliance with the traceability provisions as clearly the impugned

rules not only exceed the authority of parent statue but also fails on others
factors as put forth through these submissions and hence should be held
unconstitutional.
70
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., 1950 SCR 759
71
Mohd. Faruk v. State of M.P., (1969) 1 SCC 853

=PRAYER FOR RELIEF- P a g e | 39
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities

cited, it is humbly prayed that this Hon’ble court may be pleased to;
• ALLOW the writ petition filed before the Supreme court.

• HOLD the Rule 4(2) of Intermediary Guidelines to be Unconstitutional.
• HOLD imposition of criminal liability on non-compliance with Rule 4(2)
to be Unconstitutional.
And any other relief that this hon’ble court may be pleased to grant in the interest
of Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, all of which is respectfully submitted.
Sd /-
Counsels for the Petitioners

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- TABLE OF CONTENTS- Page |1

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

IN THE MATTERS OF:

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER -

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES……………………………………….15

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PEITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

A. Violation of fundamental rights and presence of locus standi…15

i. Petition maintainable if there exists violation of fundamental

ii. Postgram’s rights and presence of locus standi………………..16

B. Remedy under Article 32 is a matter of right………………....17

C. Presence of alternative remedy no ground to bar relief under

II. WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

A. Rule 4(2) violates the fundamental right to privacy…….……21

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

B. Rule 4(2) violates the fundamental right to freedom of speech

i. Chills lawful speech…………………………………………….…25

ii. Unreasonable restrictions……………………………………..…25

C. Rule 4(2) is manifestly arbitrary and in violation of Article

D. Rule 4(2) is ultra vires the intent of the IT Act itself……...…27

E. Impugned Rule violates the intent of the IT Act

III. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR

A. Circumvention of safe harboring and exceeding powers of the

i. Requirements under Section 79 of the IT Act for exemption…30

ii. Traceability compliance liability outside the purview of Section

B. Absence of mens rea and vicarious liability to constitute a

i. Applying principle of Attribution for implying ‘mens rea’……..33

ii. Inclusion pf provisions for vicarious liability under the

C. Existence of Corporate Veil…………………………………..35

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

D. Violation of Article 19(1)(g)………………………………….37

PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………..…39

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

SUPREME COURT CASES

ADM Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521…………………….….22

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

Jones v. Lipman 1962, 1 W.L.R 832………………………...............................29

Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum,1967……… ………….17

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

Petitioners have approached the Honourable Supreme Court of India under

The Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court.

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

On 07/07/2022, Shanthisthan Times published an article titled “Postgram is the

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

-The matter is slated to be heard on 8th February, 2023-

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RULES, 2021 IS

WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR NON-

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

maintainable based as on (A) There is violation of fundamental rights and

II. WHETHER RULE 4(2) OF INTERMEDIARY RULES IS

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

III. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR

- WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS -

PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITES

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY POSTGRAM IS

maintainable based as on (A) There is violation of fundamental rights and

A. VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LOCUS

3. The Article 32 of Indian Constitution provides for protection of fundamental

Team U - Petitioner's Memorial-1

Team U - Petitioner's Memorial-1