Set 03

VI. Local Officials (Cases)

1.) Republic of the Philippines v. Rambuyong (G.R. No. 167810, 04 October 2010)

Doctrine:
LGC, Section 90. Practice of Profession. - (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, that sanggunian
members who are also members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any
civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government
is the adverse party.

Facts:
Alfredo Y. Chu (Chu) filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/or damages against the
National Power Corporation (NPC), which was raffled to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay,
Branch 24.

Appearing as counsel for Chu is Atty. Richard B. Rambuyong, who was then the incumbent
Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Thereafter, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty.
Rambuyong, arguing that under Section 90(b)(1) of the Local Government Code: “sanggunian
members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party.” NPC contended that, being a
government-owned or controlled corporation, it is embraced within the term “instrumentality.”

Issue:

Whether NPC is an instrumentality of the government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a

sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it?

Ruling:
Yes. LGC, Section 90. Practice of Profession. - (b) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours:
Provided, that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as
counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party.

LGC, Sec. 5. Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, the following rules shall apply: (e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs
and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.

Administrative Code, Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the text,
or the context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning: (4) “Agency
of the Government” refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein. (10) “Instrumentality” refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Sec. 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous.It categorically provides
that the term “instrumentality” includes GOCCs. There is no room for construction.

All that has to be done is to apply the law as called for by the circumstances of the case. It is
not disputed that the NPC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Therefore, following Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an
instrumentality of the government.

Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.: the Court stated that “[t]he NPC is a government instrumentality with
the enormous task of undertaking the development of hydroelectric generation of power and
production of electricity from other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life of the people pursuant to the State policy
embodied in Section [9], Article II of the 1987 Constitution.”

Given the categorical words of both the law and jurisprudence, to still go to extraordinary
lengths to interpret the intention of the lawmakers and come out with the construction that a
government-owned or controlled corporation like the NPC is not included within the term
“instrumentality of the government” is grave abuse of discretion.

Section 446 of the Local Government Code provides that: “[t]he sangguniang bayan, the
legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the
presiding officer.”

Thus, pursuant to Sec. 90(b)(1) of the Local Government Code, Atty. Rambuyong, as a
sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is
an instrumentality of government.

2.) Catu v. Rellosa (A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008)

Doctrine:
As a civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully
at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned as provided in Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Facts:

Petitioner is a co-owner of a lot and a building wherein his wife, Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and
Antonio Pasto possessed one of the units in the building. His mother and brother contested,
and a complaint was initiated against the wife and Pasto in the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing
of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of
this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel
for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between
the litigants as Punong barangay.In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as
punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to
discipline respondent.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Vincent Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules

Ruling:
Yes.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded,that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left
government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said
service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

However, as a civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time
to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only
with the written permission of the head of the department concerned as provided in Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition
will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in
the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise
or become an officer of the board of directors.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as
counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.The failure of respondent to comply with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer: to obey the laws.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service
rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent also failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's Oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that
any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.Respondent is strongly advised
to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

3.) Flores v. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, 22June 1993)

Doctrine:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

Facts:
Petitioners, employees of the US Facility at Subic, Zambales challenged the appointment of
the Olongapo Mayor Richard Gordon as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA
under RA 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992.Under such law it provides that “the President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority...Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
Petitioners contend that the said paragraph infringes some Constitutional and omnibus
election provisions of the State:
1.) " No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position"
2.) Prohibited acts which lead to be guilty of an election offense, being appointment of new
employees, creation of new position, promotion or giving salary increase during the period of
45 days before a regular election. The appointment of Respondent Gordon was within the 45
day period prior to the May 11 1992 Elections.

Issue:
Whether RA 7227 appointing Gordon as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the SBMA
violates constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

“No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

Said section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job. Hence, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without any
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from
dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which
may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Particularly as regards the first paragraph of
Sec. 7, the basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents. It is
argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.
But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the
issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its
validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority for its validity.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of
the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. The first
sentence appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other governmental posts except as
particularly recognized by the Constitution. The distinction between the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It
was purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation. The
distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph
cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph

4.) Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 09 October 2012)

Doctrine: What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises
from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides
multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.

Facts: In the May 2010 elections for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte, two candidates, Jalosjos and Cardino, were in contention. Jalosjos was seeking his
third term as mayor. However, Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, aiming to deny due course to and cancel Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy.
Cardino's contention was that Jalosjos had made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy by declaring under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino alleged that Jalosjos had a prior conviction by a final judgment for robbery and was
sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City in Criminal Case
No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino argued that Jalosjos had not yet served his sentence. In
response, Jalosjos acknowledged his conviction but claimed he had been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC had revoked Jalosjos' probation in an Order dated March 19,
1987. Jalosjos disputed this and stated that the RTC issued an Order on February 5, 2004,
declaring that he had duly complied with the probation order. Jalosjos further mentioned that
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had denied a petition for disqualification filed
against him in the 2004 elections on similar grounds.

The COMELEC En Banc reviewed the circumstances of Jalosjos' criminal record, outlining the
history of his case. Jalosjos and three others were accused of robbery in 1969 in Cebu City,
with a guilty verdict rendered in 1970, followed by a dismissal of his appeal in 1973. In 1985,
Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation, which was initially granted but subsequently revoked in
1987. However, in 2003, the Parole and Probation Administrator issued a Certification stating
that Jalosjos had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, which Jalosjos used to
secure the dismissal of a disqualification case in 2004.

Cardino brought to the attention of the COMELEC a decision from the Sandiganbayan in
2008, which found the former Parole and Probation Administrator guilty of violating the law for
issuing a falsified Certification in 2003, benefitting Jalosjos and allowing him to participate in
elections.
The COMELEC First Division, on May 10, 2010, granted Cardino's petition and canceled
Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy. The division concluded that Jalosjos had committed material
misrepresentation by claiming eligibility for the mayoral office while having a pending criminal
sentence. They found the certificate of compliance of probation to be fraudulently issued,
indicating that Jalosjos had not served his sentence. Consequently, Jalosjos was disqualified
from running for office under Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160.

On August 11, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc rejected Jalosjos' motion for reconsideration.
They emphasized that the revocation of Jalosjos' probation and his failure to serve the terms
of his sentence left no basis for him to claim that his civil and political rights were violated. As
a person convicted by final judgment, Jalosjos was disqualified from running for office and
was subsequently ousted from the position of Mayor of Dapitan City.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Local Government Code should apply.

Ruling: Yes.

The Court maintains that this perpetual special disqualification constitutes a material fact
involving eligibility, which justifies a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Under Section 78, a verified petition can be filed to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy if any material representation in the certificate is false. In this case, Jalosjos
made a false material representation when he stated under oath in his certificate of candidacy
that he was eligible to run for the mayoral office. The argument is that the word "eligible" in
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code implies having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for public office. Therefore, anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office, and if they falsely state otherwise in their
certificate of candidacy, it warrants a petition under Section 78.

The court majority further emphasizes that the penalty of prisión mayor, which led to perpetual
special disqualification, is not listed in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code as a ground
for disqualification. Section 68 specifically refers to election offenses under the same code
and not crimes under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it cannot be a basis for a Section
68 petition, and the petitioner has the choice of remedies under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

In conclusion, the court majority upholds the cancellation of Jalosjos's certificate of candidacy
because he was never a valid candidate, and all votes for him are considered stray votes.
Therefore, the only qualified candidate, Cardino, received the highest number of votes for the
mayoral position.

The majority opinion further asserts that the COMELEC has a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of someone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment, even without a petition. The final judgment itself
acts as notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification, and it is part of the COMELEC's duty
to enforce and administer all laws related to the conduct of elections.

5.) Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013)

Doctrine: While Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code allows a prior convict to run for
local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the
said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either
as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective
office.

Facts: Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos was convicted by final judgement of two counts of rape and
six counts of acts of lasciviousness. He served his sentence and was later on issued a
Certificate of Discharge from Prison. Years after, Petitioner applied to register as a voter in
Zamboanga City but was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration
Board due to his previous conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for inclusion in the
permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court. Pending resolution of this petition,
petitioner filed a CoC in the upcoming local elections. MTC later on ruled for the denial of the
petition on account of petitioner’s absolute disqualification which in effect deprived him of the
right to vote in any election.

Five petitions were filed before the COMELEC first and second divisions, intended for the
purpose of cancelling Jalosjos COC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC en BANC resolved
for the denial of petitioner Jalosjos COC due to the latter’s perpetual absolute disqualification
as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Thus this petition.

Issue: Whether Petitioner Romeo Jalosjos is qualified to run as Mayor of Zamboanga City?

Ruling: Yes. Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered a law of general application and
therefore must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle that general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject. Article 41 of the RPC also
expressly states that the accessory penalty of disqualification remains even though one is
pardoned as to the principal penalty unless the accessory penalty shall have been so
expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the accessory penalty had not been expressly
remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and, as such, petitioner’s
disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly,
considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that
Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective
office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.

6.) Aratea v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195229, 09 October 2012)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to
deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4)
consecutive terms.

The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending
during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were
proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.

Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor.

Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based
on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms
without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor because
Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates.

Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He reasoned
that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in
his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor was
mandated to succeed as Mayor.

Issue:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio.

Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that
Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local
Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
 xxx

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

xxx

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy.

Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included
among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies
him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.
Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected
to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the
principal penalty of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual
special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is
ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if
he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from
the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC
because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible
to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under
oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,
the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers
from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering
from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
"he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he
clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78.

The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification
under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars
him from running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section
39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the
law.

Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.

Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the

three-term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten
(10) counts of Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s
disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was
never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.

7.) Japzon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 180088. 19 January 2009)

Doctrine:
​Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Facts:
Petitioner Japzon and private respondent Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Samar). Japzon then filed a petition to
disqualify Ty on the ground of material representation. He averred that, when Ty filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented that he was a resident of
Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007.

While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in the place for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991. He further averred that
even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to
make trips to the USA. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the RP,
he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He
had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225.

In his answer, Ty contended that prior to the filing of his COC, he has already done the
following acts: (a) Filed an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (b)
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the RP; (c) applied for a Philippine passport indicating in
his application that his residence was at Samar; (d) personally signed & secured a cedula
(CTC) in Samar; € registered as a voter in said place; and (f) executed on 19 March 2007 a
duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Issue:
Whether or not Ty may run for public office?

Ruling:
Yes. Ty may run for public office because he effectively renounced his American citizenship.

Under Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In this case, when TY left to work in the USA, he eventually became an American citizen.
However, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA. At this point, Ty still held dual
citizenship. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a
notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

Hence, by the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he effectively renounced his American
citizenship. He complied with the two requirements laid down by RA 9225, to wit, persons who
reacquired their Filipino citizenship and wanted to run for public office.

8.) Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec (G.R No. 198742, 10 August 2012)

Doctrine:
To execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Facts:
Petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents,
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon. She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before
the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003). The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which issued the Order certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen. In the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for Mayor in
her hometown of Caba, La Union. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office
during the May 10, 2010 elections for the position of Vice-Mayor. She was proclaimed
as the winning candidate and oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and
Luis M. Bautista, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for
quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground
that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The RTC renders judgment in favor of private respondents and AGAINST petitioner.
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the
findings and conclusions of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Teodora Sobejana-Condon is disqualified and ineligible to her position

as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in
accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Ruling:

Yes. The renunciation of Australian citizenship filed by petitioner a year before she
sought elective public office was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a
disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
 R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. This applies
to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the
exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political
right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

9.) Cordora v. Comelec (GR No. 176947, 19 February 2009)

Doctrine:
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino
who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of
taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.

It is different from residency. Residency for the purpose of election laws, it includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,
and is not dependent upon citizenship.

Facts:

Petitioner Gaudencio Cordora accused Gustavo Tambunting of an election offense for

violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.

To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a

certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and
upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel
dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his
certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of
a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized
as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambunting’s father petitioned him merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he
acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18
November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has
imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the
Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.

To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s
certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his
naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement
is not the same as citizenship.

The Comelec Law Department dismissed Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting and it was
affirmed by COMELEC En Banc and convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation
against Tambunting.

Issue:

Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that
may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.

Ruling:

This petition has no merit.

Tambunting’s Citizenship

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:

Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his
post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country;
that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge.

xxx

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size;
a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding
one hundred words, if he so desires.

Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of
Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.

Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no
longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.

Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained
therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino
who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of
taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.

Tambunting’s Residency

Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of
Tambunting’s naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is
not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the
twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there
permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship.

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully
made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently
proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office
which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements
prescribed by law.

10.) Abundo v. Commission on Elections (GR No. 201716, 08 January 2013)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

11.) Borja v. Comelec (G.R. No. 133495, 03 September 1998)

Doctrines:

It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office—he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply

Art. X, Section 8 of the Constitution contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election.

There is a difference between the case of a vice[1]mayor and that of a member of the House
of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is
removed from office—the vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law while the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy

Facts: On January 18, 1988, Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of
Pateros.

On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja.

On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on
June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years
ending June 30, 1998.

On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., sought Capco’s disqualification
contending that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Comelec disqualified Carpo but the same was reversed by Comelec En banc.

Issue: whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit

Ruling: NO. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election. The first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and bars
“such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office,
states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms
an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation
of office prior to its expiration

The assumption of the mayorship by the vice-mayor in the event of vacancy is more a matter
of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the
application of any term limit.

FOR YOUR REFERENCE: I INCLUDED THE SAMPLE CASES VERBATIM

Sample Cases:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of
the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is twice elected
thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently
resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually served three full terms in
all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the
office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if
the term is one “for which he was elected.” Since A is only completing the service of the term
for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed
one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he
run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three
full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that
he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a
total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X, §8.
Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found
himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.

12.) Aldovino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

13.) Adormeo v. Comelec (G.R. No. 147927, 04 February 2002)

Doctrine: This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed
their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.

Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he
was re-elected in May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election of May
2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the
latter in the 1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground
that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending
that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He
lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a
private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”

Issue: WON Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full
terms and he won in 2000 recall elections.

Ruling: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.

Accordingly, COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr.
to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.5 To bolster
his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional
Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that "if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short,
will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed."

As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members
of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election
provided for members of Congress.

Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation" for clearly it is not.1âwphi1 In
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

…The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of
the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant
their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

14.) Socrates v. Comelec (G.R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002)

Doctrine: A recall election mid-way in the term following third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the
Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a
consecutive fourth term.
Facts: A recall election was convened in Puerto Princesa to initiate the recall of Victorino
Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor which COMELEC en banc gave
due course to the recall resolution despite Socrates’ petition for nullification of the said
resolution and scheduled the recall elections.
In said recall election, Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy to run as mayor.
Hagedorn’s running in the said recall election was then challenged and petition was filed to
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for 3
consecutive full terms prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election thus, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto
Princesa
Ruling: Yes, Hagedorn is qualified to run.

Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as
mayor because Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen.

Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the
electorate to choose their leaders.

Ratio:

The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article 10 of the
Constitution which states that:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) which
provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. — (a) . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the 3 term-limit rule. Second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt continuity of service.

The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents service before and after interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to next regular election for the same office following the end of 3rd consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after 3 consecutive terms. Second, intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection
for a fourth term as long as reelection is not immediately after the end of a 3rd consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the Constitution
prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election
involving same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The
debates in Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election referred to
by the framers of Constitution is immediate reelection after the third term, not any other
subsequent election.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election is not an immediate reelection
after his 3rd consecutive term. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking refers to regular elections, which he did not seek.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June
30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor.
One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make
the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.

In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full
term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The
Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The
clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is
sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of service.

15.) Latasa v. Comelec (G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

16.) Ong v. Alegre (G.R. No. 163295, 23 January 2006)

Doctrine:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions
or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Facts: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong
(Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent
mayor.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to
Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The
petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty
elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for
three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

Alegre and Francis opposed each other for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
1998, Francis was proclaimed while Alegre protested before RTC which declared
Alegre as the duly elected mayor in 2001, when Francis had fully served the term and
starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect.

Comelec First Division dismissed the petition to disqualify Francis on the ground that
one of the requisites for the application of three term rule is not present. Francis was
not elected from 1998-2001 term, when RTC declared Alegre as the legally elected
mayor in said election. Alegre filed MR, Comelec en banc reversed the resolution and
disqualified Francis, his brother Rommel was subsequently nominated as substitute
candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not Francis’ assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente for 1998-2001
term should be considered as full service to apply he 3-term limit rule

Ruling: Yes

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

xxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions
or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three (3) consecutive terms.16

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein,
thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about
petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May
1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995 - June 30,
1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling
that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and
actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs
to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis's assumption of office as Mayor
of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit
rule.

We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full
term", and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term
limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term
for the same position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No.
6850,17 that it was Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race
and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having
been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis' contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly
elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente
as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption
of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the
term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule.

Cited cases: (invoked but not applicable)

Lonzanida v Comelec - There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have served
the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated]
his post before the expiration of the term."
The three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases of Borja and Lonzanida
because there was an interruption in the continuity of service of the three consecutive
terms.

17.) Mendoza v. Comelec (G.R. No. 149736, 17 December 2002)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

18.) Rivera III v. Comelec (G.R. No. 167591, 09 May 2007)

Doctrine: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.

Facts:

A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty

candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the
he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term)
and 2004-2007 (3rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd
term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared
it final and executory on May 14, 2004.

Issue: WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take
his position.

Ruling: Yes. Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in
serving the full term.

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having
the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner,
the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

19.) Dizon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 182088, 30 January 2009)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

20.) Bolos, Jr. v. Comelec (G.R. No. 184082, 17 March 2009)

Doctrine:
The rule on the three-term limit has two parts:
1) An elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule.
2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after
the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.

Facts:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner Nicasio Bolos Jr. was elected to the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and
2002.

In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay, petitioner ran for Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor, leaving his
post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which
was until June 30, 2007.

Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking in the 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Respondent Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same office,
filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the
ground that he had already served the three-term limit, in violation of Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160.

COMELEC contended that petitioner’s relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in

2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to
run as municipal councilor.

Bolos argued that his election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member was
by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of his last term of service.

COMELEC First Division: Held that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong
Barangay was a voluntary renunciation of his office. Cited that it was unlikely that respondent
had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and
exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and
proclaimed, return to his former position. Thus, he was disqualified from being a candidate for
the same office in the 2007 elections.

COMELEC en banc: Denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor which will render unbroken the
continuity of his service as Punong Barangay for the full term of office.

Ruling:
YES.
The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Meanwhile, Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay
officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof states that the term
of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years.

Socrates v. COMELEC: The rule on the three-term limit has two parts:
1) An elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule.
2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after
the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.

Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The second part of the rule shows the clear intent of the framers of
the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term

Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first
condition for disqualification.

As to the second requirement, the COMELEC correctly held that petitioner abandoned his
office. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner did not assume the position of Sangguniang Bayan member by operation of law.
The term “operation of law” is “a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost
by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected.”
Examples of interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law:
1. Municipal Councilor succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the
Vice-Mayor. (Montebon v. COMELEC)
2. Vice-Mayor became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent
Mayor. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC)

In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed
office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary
renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.

21.) Comelec v. Cruz (G.R. No. 186616, 20 November 2009)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

22.) Talaga v. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 09 October 2012)

Doctrine:
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office."

Notes: from Largo

Talaga v. COMELEC." In this case, the COMELEC disqualified the original candidate,
Ramon Talaga, for violating the three (3)-term limit rule. The petitioner therein, Barbara
Ruby Talaga, substituted Ramon before the election. The substitution by Barbara Ruby
Talaga was consequently considered invalid because, as a matter of law, substitution
of a candidate presupposes a valid candidate. And, since Ramon Talaga was
disqualified on ground of ineligibility, his certificate of candidacy was deemed void ab
initio, making him not a valid candidate who can be legally substituted. According to
the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the electorates in this case were aware of the
ineligibility of the substitute such that the 2nd placer cannot be declared winner.

Facts:
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their Certificates of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10,2010 national and local
elections. After four days, Castillo filed a petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of Ramon, alleging that the latter, despite knowing that he has been elected
thrice and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, he still filed his COC.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him from office during his
second term and third terms, and the three term rule did not apply to him. In the meantime,
the Supreme Court held in the case of Aldivino Jr v Comelec that preventive suspension,
being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three
term rule. Ramon filed in the Comelec a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification, he did not withdraw his COC.

The Comelec rendered a Resolution granting the petition of Castillo and declaring Ramon
disqualified to run for Mayor. After initially filing a Motion for Reconsideration, Ramon filed an
ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the pending Motion for Reconsideration. Barbara
Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor in substitution of Ramon. On the election day, the name of
Ramon was printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of his
substitute, Barbara Ruby.

The latter won the elections and was proclaimed as the Mayor, having 44,099 votes against
Castillo's 39, 615. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation alleging that Barbara
could not substitute Ramon because his COC had been cancelled and Barbara could not be
considered as a candidate because the COMELEC en Banc had approved her substitution
three days after election , hence the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
Roderick Alcala, the duly- elected Vice Mayor of sought to intervene, alleging that he should
assume the post of Mayor as Ruby's substitution is invalid and Castillo lost the elections.

Issue: Whether the substitution is valid

Ruling:

No, the substitution is not valid.

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in

the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate,
he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. The Court has recognized in Miranda
v. Abaya that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions for
disqualification to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC;
and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

The declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a
valid candidate to be properly substituted. Considering that a :cancelled CoC does not give
rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a
valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not
at all a candidate.

23.) Gamboa v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 134213, 20 July 1999)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

24.) Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 271)

Doctrine:

Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the
complaints filed against him, hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.
Ganzon appealed the issue to the Court of Appeals and the CA affirmed the suspension order
by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the
President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the
1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the
present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

Ruling: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good
of the public service so requires. As we held, however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it
was not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but
because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him
the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
 The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may
be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior
from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of
Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same,
subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if
warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further
suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie
evidence.

25.) Joson v. Torres (290 SCRA 279)

Doctrine:

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power
to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.

Facts:

The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo
Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija.

On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a
letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997, charging petitioner with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996,
they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily
kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind
petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private
respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative
measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million
from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into
approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held
that day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not considered; that
private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an
unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier
disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another obligation; that petitioner's act
of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and
independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army
posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for
the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of
Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the
province.

President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the refusal of
the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear
to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "take appropriate
preemptive and investigative actions," but to "break not the peace."

Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same
notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit his verified/sworn answer thereto, not
a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that he has in support thereof,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt. Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to
Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the
controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain
peace and order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing
cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.

Issue:

Whether or not the DILG Secretary, in his resolution, was exercising the powers of the
President which are clearly vested by law only upon the President or the Executive Secretary,
and thus his action is contrary to law.

Ruling:

In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority of the DILG
Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that
has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the
alter-ego principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the
President, not with the DILG Secretary.

Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in
two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to these
provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by
himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive
Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate
a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power
to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the
President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against
local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President
remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline.

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the
alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

26.) Salalima v. Guingona (257 SCRA 55)

Doctrine:

Local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the
Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them.

Facts:
This refers to the administrative complaint filed against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima,
Vice-Governor Danilo Azafla, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan Victoria,
Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana, Arturo Osia, Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr.,
Masikap Fontanilla, Vicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer contract for
legal services entered into between the Province of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus
R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the disbursement of public
fund in payment thereof.

The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer agreement with private lawyers and
paying P7, 380, 410.31 to the said private lawyers, respondents violated several provisions of
law which warrants the imposition of administrative penalties against them. It is to be noted
that respondents Victoria, Reyes, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia were not yet members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Resolution No. 129 was passed. However, the complaint
alleges that these respondents were named in the complaint because they approved the
supplemental budget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment of the attorney’s
fees.

Issue:
Whether respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer
agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments
pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC with the Supreme Court
against the Province.

Ruling:

Yes. Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) requires the appointment of a
legal officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent the local
government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit
or any official thereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided, That, in actions or
proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party.

The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, that local
government units cannot be represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial
Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand
because Sec.481 of the Local Government Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised
Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation in the case of Municipality of
Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay,
respondents exceeded their authority and violated the above-quoted section of the Local
Government Code and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the disbursements
to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the
ground that these were made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and
the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No.
86-255 dated 2 April 1986.

The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the Solicitor General’s
conformity dated 15 July 1993. This conformity was, however obtained after the
disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What is required by COA Circular No.
86-255 is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General.

Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution No. 0 1-90
authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services
with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The retainer
contract signed by respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 Tomas Morato Avenue,
Quezon City. That Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm are two separate
entities is evident from the retained contract itself.

In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also
with Atty. Jose R. Cornago, respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution
No. 01-90.

Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the fact that it was
only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province in the
Supreme Court case. Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent Governor dated
15 July 1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys. Ricafort
Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.

Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed
by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten
checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were issued in favor of
the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents
disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as
counsel for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479.

Finally, the attorney’s fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and confirmed by the
other respondents are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent fee of
18% of the ”P2l4 million” claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The
word “unconscionable,” as applied to attorney’s fee, “means nothing more than that the fee
contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an unfair
advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been taken of the client, or
that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.”

The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a comment on NPC’s
petition against the Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already covers the basic
issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an appearance and subsequently a
memorandum for the Province, the petition was already been given due course by the
Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the Court would issue
its decision was a memorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be worth P38.5 million.
Furthermore, the professional character and social standing of Atty. Cornago are not such
as would merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. During the
hearing, respondent Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. Cornago because they were
schoolmates at San Beda College of Law.

It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his
competency and standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons. Likewise,
the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38.5 million for one
memorandum, which, in this case, it had not even filed because it was not the counsel of
record.

Hence, considering the labor and time involved, the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services and the professional character and social standing of the lawyers,
the attorney’s fee of P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing such scandalously
exorbitant attorney’s fees which is patently disadvantageous to the government, respondents
betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuse of authority.

27.) Berces v. Executive Secretary (241 SCRA 539)

Doctrine:
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals
of elective officials in administrative cases.
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against
respondent incumbent Mayor Corral for abuse of authority and obtained a favorable decision
from the Sangunian suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in
accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) . The Office of the
President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution” based on Section 68 of
R.A. No. 7160 (LG Code) and Section 6 of AO No. 18 dated 12 February 1987(rules on
appeal to the Pres). Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner
claims that the governing law in this case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory
provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He
argues that AO No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and
Regulations Governing Appeals to Office thePresident") authorizing the President to stay the
execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was
repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

RULING:

NO. The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended
to be repealed.If there is any repeal, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not
favored. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6
ofAdministrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such
intention. The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a
clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals
of elective officials in administrative cases. The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory
or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found, its
object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other

In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the
Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to
the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the
public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order. petition denied.
28.) Malinao v. Reyes (256 SCRA 616)

Doctrine: Local Government Code provides that the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent, and any administrative disciplinary proceedings are abated
if the respondent is re-elected, condoning previous misconduct.

Facts: The respondent Mayor filed a case against Malinao in the Office of the Ombudsman,
accusing her of gross neglect of duty, inefficiency, and incompetence. During the pendency of
this case, the mayor appointed a replacement for Malinao.

On February 24, 1994, Malinao filed an administrative case against the respondent Mayor,
charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process. This case was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 93-03 and was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Marinduque.

On August 12, 1994, the Sanggunian conducted an executive session to address the
administrative case. The result of the session, as reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes, showed that by a vote of 5 to 3, the Sanggunian found the respondent Mayor guilty of
the charges and imposed a one-month suspension as a penalty.

A "Decision" dated September 5, 1994, was subsequently issued, bearing the signature of
only one member of the Sanggunian, Rodrigo V. Sotto. Sotto identified himself as the
"Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan." Copies of this
decision were served to the respondent Mayor and respondent Governor Luisito Reyes on
September 12, 1994.

On September 14, 1994, the respondent Mayor questioned the validity of the "Decision"
before the Sanggunian, arguing that it should be considered a recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Committee and, as such, was not binding on him. On September 13, 1994, the
respondent Mayor sought the opinion of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) regarding the validity of the "Decision."

DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III opined that the "Decision" did not conform with Section
66 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and established legal precedents. He emphasized
that the Blue Ribbon Committee's duty was purely recommendatory, and it was the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as a collegial body that had the authority to adopt the
recommendation, approve it, and impose the suspension. Meanwhile, on October 14, 1994,
Malinao sent a letter to respondent Governor Reyes, demanding the implementation of the
suspension imposed on the respondent Mayor without further delay.

In response, on October 20, 1994, respondent Governor Reyes informed the Sanggunian that
he agreed with the DILG's opinion, rendering him unable to implement the "Decision." On
October 21, 1994, the Sanggunian conducted a subsequent vote, with a majority of 7 to 2,
acquitting the respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was documented in a
Decision signed by all the members who had participated in this deliberation.
Issue: Whether the "Decision" signed by only one member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Rodrigo V. Sotto, is a binding decision or merely a recommendation.

Ruling: No.
The court points out that the "Decision" of September 5, 1994, was signed by only one
member, Rodrigo V. Sotto, who signed it as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan." This "Decision" did not meet the legal requirement of being a
formal decision, as it lacked the necessary signatures of the majority of the Sanggunian
members. The minutes of the Sanggunian's session on August 12, 1994, indicated that there
was a vote, but it did not constitute a formal decision.

Furthermore, the subsequent "Decision" issued on October 21, 1994, was properly made in
writing, signed by the members, and stated the facts and the law on which it was based. This
document represented the official decision of the Sanggunian.

The court also addressed the issue of notice, stating that no notice of the Sanggunian's
session on October 21, 1994, was required to be given to the petitioner since it was an
internal matter of the Sanggunian.

In terms of legal remedies, the petitioner could have appealed the Sanggunian's decision to
the Office of the President, as provided by the Local Government Code.

The case was deemed moot and academic because the respondent Mayor's term had
expired, and any further proceedings against him were barred by his re-election on May 8,
1995. According to the Local Government Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent, and any administrative disciplinary proceedings are abated
if the respondent is re-elected, condoning previous misconduct.

29.) Sanggunian Baranggay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez (G.R. No. 170626, March
3, 2008)

Doctrine: The Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of
an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code; The most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay
official is suspension.

Facts: Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such
under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Martinez is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of the said local government unit.

Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by THE
Sanggunian through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the
disciplining authority over elective barangay officials. The Sanggunian filed with the
Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint, Martinez was
declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending the administrative proceedings,
Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
The Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong for its implementation. The
Municipal Mayor issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan is
not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid
until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite
suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.

Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary
Injunction before the trial court. The trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of the Mayor void. It maintained that the proper
courts, and not the Sanggunian, are empowered to remove an elective local official from
office. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As
a consequence, the Mayor cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a
void order.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition was filed.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office?

Ruling: No, the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove Martinez.

Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove
elective local officials from office:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. — An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
xxx
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by
order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for
the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case
should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a
penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme
penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring
elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service
is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

30.) Lingating v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 153478, November 13, 2002)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for the disqualification of Sulong, pursuant to §40(b) of RA 7160
which disqualifies from running for any elective local position “those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case.” It appears that Sulong had previously won as mayor of
Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections,
he was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his
first term as mayor of Lapuyan, Sulong, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and
several other individuals, was administratively charged with various offenses, and that, on
February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of
the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had
become final and executory, and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente
Imbing, took his oath as mayor.
The comelec was unable to render judgment before the elections, Rulong was voted
for in the elections and he won as mayor. The comelec then rendered a decision declaring
Sulong disqualified as he was guilty of violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Sulong filed an MR contending that the decision has not become final and executor as the
final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992.
The comelec en banc, however, reversed. It ruled that while it is true that one of the
disqualifications from running in an elective position is removal from office as a result of an
administrative case, said provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is
questioned got re-elected to another term. The re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995
elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision
which found him guilty of dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc[.], granting said decision
has become final and executory.
Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed their will when they cast their
votes in the recent elections as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong to
have won convincingly.

Issue:
WON Sulong was entitled to occupy the office thus vacated

Ruling:
Yes.
We stated in Reyes:
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public
official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the
petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be
decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.
If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be
removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in
the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, the decision in the administrative
case, was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from
office and, pursuant to §40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from
running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision
similar to §40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the
ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification
and malversation of public funds, has not until now become final. The records of this case
show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC
No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on
February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a “motion for reconsideration and/or
notice of appeal;” that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim
Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in AC No.
12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved respondent’s
motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final.

While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Thus, it was held that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule
139-B, §12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B, §12(c) makes no
mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggests that such motion
is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be
encouraged before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error it
may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence.
There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of
Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply
considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was “overtaken by
the local elections of May [11,]1992.”

Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the
highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and
vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become
final because it appears to have been made pursuant to §68 of the Local Government Code,
which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s
motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that
after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago.

31.) Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995)

Doctrine:
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension
over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No.
6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister)
of Local Government by the Office of the President.

Facts:
A criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete
and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, and Bercede.
There respondents were charged with violating R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171
(falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly
causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from
P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.

The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint contending that the
Ombudsman is bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed
against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect
their preventive suspension, has been vested to the Office of the President. In September
1992, a TRO against the Ombudsman was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC
Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been
divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by
virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160

Ruling:
It was held that the authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not
removed neither repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991.

There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on
the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us
to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by
implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be
so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension
over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No.
6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister)
of Local Government by the Office of the President.

32.) Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010)

Doctrine:

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

33.) Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008)

Doctrine:

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - including preventive
suspension - should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken
cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in
that acknowledgement. As earlier mentioned, the court must first determine the validity of the
information through a pre-suspension hearing. But once a proper determination of the validity
of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.

Facts:

Criminal and administrative complaints were filed by Elan Recreation, Inc. (ELAN) against
petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman. The complaints alleged that petitioner, in his
capacity as mayor of the City of Lucena, had unlawfully granted favors to a third party with
respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants.

Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of three criminal charges for violation
for RA 3019 however, only the charge for giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by
approving an ordinance granting to Sy Bang a local franchise to operate bingo games in the
city was sustained and was determined the possible liability of the members of the City
Council which passed Ordinance No, 1963.

Sandiganbayan ordered suspension of the petitioner and his co-accused.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when in abdication of its constitutional duty to resolve a judicial
controversy, it is ministerial duty to issue a preventive suspension order against its petitioner.

Ruling:

No. he purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of
the information so that the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a
challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. In this case,
respondent had determined the validity of the Information when petitioner filed his Motion to
Quash. The hearings or proceedings held thereon, in effect, constituted a pre-suspension
hearing. Respondent has followed the dictates of the law.

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioner is charged, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the law does not require that the information must
allege that the acts in question "caused injury to any party, whether the government or private
party." The presence of the word "or" clearly shows that there are two acts which can be
prosecuted under Section 3: First, causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government, and, Second, giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preference.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court,
all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions - including preventive
suspension - should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken
cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in
that acknowledgement. As earlier mentioned, the court must first determine the validity of the
information through a pre-suspension hearing. But once a proper determination of the validity
of the information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.
34.) Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

35.) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010)

DOCTRINE: The Doctrine of condonation does not apply to appointive officials and
does not violate the right to equal protection of the law

FACTS: Petitioners Salumbides and Glenda were appointed in July 2001 as Municipal
Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan,
Quezon.

Towards the end of 2001, Atty. Salumbides Jr suggested the Mayor that the
construction of the two-classroom building for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School
be charged to the account of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/ Repair
and Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF). Glenda and Salumbides advised the
mayor to source the funds from the P1,000,000 MOOE/RMF allocation in the
approved Municipal Annual Budget for 2002.

Thus, Mayor Salumbides III ordered to proceed with the construction of the projects
even without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public bidding.

Thereafter, respondents, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tagkawayan, filed

with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a complaint against Salumbides, Glenda,
and the Mayor charging them with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of
Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the
Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local Government Code.

But the OMB dropped the administrative charge against the Mayor for being mooted
because he was reelected in the 2004 election. Consequently, Atty. Salumbides Jr.
urge the Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous
appointive officials who were administratively charged along with the reelected
official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during their preceding
term.

ISSUE: WON the Doctrine of Condonation applies to petitioner Salumbides

RULING: NO. The doctrine applies only to elective, not to appointive officials.

In Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, the Court explained that "the
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.

Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi
est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may indeed, supersede a pending
administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career
position.

In this case, Atty. Salumbides Jr and Glenda Hold only appointive positions as
Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of
Tagkawayan, Quezon. they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate.

Thus, the doctrine does not apply. Both Atty. Salumbides Jr and Glenda are
suspended from office for three (3) months without pay.

Note:

Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a
criminal case.

The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the
reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before
the elections, respectively.

As long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or
period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to
the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection (Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica)

Elective officials Appointive officials

occupy their office by virtue of the hold their office by virtue of their
mandate of the electorate designation thereto by an appointing
authority

They are elected to an office for a Some appointive officials hold their
definite term and may be removed office in a permanent capacity and are
therefrom only upon stringent entitled to security of tenure while
conditions. others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
36.) Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. CA and Binay (G.R. Nos. 217126- 27, 10 November
2015)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

37.) De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)

Doctrine: The SC clarified that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution which prohibits
“midnight appointments” applies only to presidential appointments. In fact, there is no law that
expressly prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his
or her tenure.

Facts: Evelyn Abeja run for reelection but lost to de Rama. Before she vacated her office, she
extended permanent appointments to 14 new employees of the municipal government. de
Rama, upon assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these were
"midnight appointments" and, therefore, prohibited under Sec. 15
Art. VII of the Constitution. SC held that the records reveal that when de Rama brought the
matter recalling the appointments of the 14 employees before the Civil Service Commission,
the only reason he cited to justify his actions that these were "midnight appointments" that are
forbidden under the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said
prohibitions applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her
tenure.

Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De
Rama wrote a letter to the SC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of
said employees were "midnight" appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art.
VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.

The SC denied petitioner's request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for
lack of merit. The SC dismissed petitioner's allegation that these were "midnight"
appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits
only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local
elective officials. The SC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments
until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the
position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art.
VII. Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Ruling: YES. The SC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
"midnight appointments," specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to
the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There
is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the
last days of his or her tenure.

It is the SC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil
service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of
the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in
force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's
Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board; (c)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

38.) Plaza v. CA (G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008)

Doctrine: The law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and
employees pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension given to
private respondents cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those
sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back
salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their
suspension must likewise be unjustified.

Facts: A few months after his assumption as Governor of Agusan del Sur in 1992, petitioner
Democrito O. Plaza received separate administrative complaints against the following:
Tan for allegedly committed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Gilsano
was charged with neglect in the performance of duty, and Quismundo was allegedly liable for
technical malversation, an act prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Pursuant to Book I, Title Three, Section 86 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, Plaza issued Executive Order No. 01, Series
of 1992,6 creating a Provincial Investigating Committee (PIC) composed of the following
petitioners:

Chairperson - Atty. Danilo Samson (Provincial Legal Officer)

Secretary - Ms. Fe Tan-Cebrian (Acting Provincial Personnel Officer)
Members: Hon. Virginia M. Getes (SP Member), Mr. Adulfo A. Llagas (Asst. Provincial
Treasurer Officer-in-Charge)

On various dates in October 1992, petitioner Samson, acting as Chairperson of the

Administrative Investigating Committee, notified private respondents of the administrative
complaints. Private respondents were required to answer in writing under oath within 72 hours
from receipt together with the affidavits of their witnesses, if any, and to state whether they
would opt for a formal investigation or would waive such right.

Instead of filing their answers, private respondents filed separate Motions to Inhibit/Dismiss11
seeking to inhibit Samson on the ground that he had no authority under the law to conduct the
administrative investigations because his appointment as Provincial Legal Officer had not
been acted upon by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur, which concurrence is
of utmost necessity to confer upon his appointment by the Provincial Governor the imprimatur
of legality and validity. Another issue raised by private respondents was that they could not
expect to be given due process and the cold neutrality of an impartial committee.

On October 26, 1992, Samson issued an Omnibus Order denying private respondents'
motions to dismiss/inhibit.

On November 9, 1992, Plaza issued Memorandum Order Nos. 131-92 to 133-9214 ordering
the preventive suspension of private respondents for a period of 60 days effective upon
receipt of the orders.

Meantime, Resolution No. 11, Series of 199321 was issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Agusan del Sur on February 11, 1993 reiterating the rejection of the appointment of
Samson as Provincial Legal Officer of the province for lack of the required 5-year law practice.

Issue:

1. W/O the suspension by Samson is valid. YES

2. W/O employees are entitled to backwages. NO

Ruling:

1. W/O the suspension by Samson is valid. YES


CA opined that Samson's authority as chairman of the PIC is not invalidated by the lack of
concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in his appointment as the Provincial Legal
Officer. Moreover, the preventive suspension of private respondents may be ordered even
without a hearing as such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. It likewise ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the RTC was not a delay which would interrupt the running of the period of
preventive suspension. Lastly, the CA pronounced that to sanction preventive suspension
pending resolution of an administrative case is equivalent to indefinite suspension which the
Constitution prohibits.
2. W/O the employees are entitled to backwages. NO

The preventive suspension of the private respondents is authorized by R.A. No. 7160. Section
85 (a) of the LGC of 1991 states:
SEC. 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees.
(a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days any subordinate official or employee under his
authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty
of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
Clearly, the law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and
employees pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension given to
private respondents cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those
sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good.40 To be entitled to back
salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their
suspension must likewise be unjustified.
39.) Atienza v. Villarosa (G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

40.) People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008)

Doctrine: Legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means
disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Facts:

Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan in 1998 elections against Tiape
(now deceased), relative of Villapando’s wife. Villapando won and later designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of San Vicente, earning monthly salary of P27K.
Maagad and Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for violation of Art. 244 of the RPC
before the Ombudsman, Villapando moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
The Court (SB) found the “Demurrer to Evidence” impressed with merit.

Issue: Whether the respondent court acted with gadalej in interpreting that “legal
disqualification” in Art 244 of the RPC does not include the one year prohibition
imposed on losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution and LGC

Ruling: Yes

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory
construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is
the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied Villapando’s Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated Villapando by giving him five days within which to inform
it in writing whether he will submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution without leave of court.

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does
18
not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding
the basic rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision granting Villapando’s Demurrer to
Evidence and acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its decision null and void.
Petition granted, decision granting Villapando’s demurrer to evidence and acquittal of the
crime declared null and void, case remanded for further proceedings

41.) Sales v. Carreon (G.R. No. 160791, 13 February 2007)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

42.) Quirog v. Aumentado (G.R. No. 163443, 11 November 2008)

Doctrine: In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

Facts:

Liza Quirog was permanently appointed as Department Head of the Office of the Bohol
Provincial Agriculture by then Bohol Governor Rene Relampagos. The appointment was
confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Quirog was likewise certified by the Personnel
Selection Board as one of the two candidates qualified for the position.

However, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog’s appointment upon the finding that the
same was part of the bulk appointment issued by Gov. Relampagos after May 14, 2001
elections in violation of a CSC Resolution prohibiting the issuance of midnight appointments.

In a motion for reconsideration, it was contended by the petitioners that the appointment
cannot be considered a midnight appointment because it was made before the expiration of
Relampagos’ term and that Quirog was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior
the said appointment. The CSCROVII ruled that Quirog and Relampagos had no legal
personality to file the pleadings and that under Section 2, Rule V9 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, only the appointing officer may request reconsideration of the
disapproval of an appointment by the Civil Service Commission. However, even Relampagod
could not file a motion for reconsideration because his term already expired.

On appeal with CSC, the latter ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal with the CA, it was
however contended by then incumbent Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado that the petitioners
had no legal personality to file a motion for reconsideration of the disapproval or to appeal the
same and insisted that Quirog’s appointment was a midnight appointment. The CA ruled
against the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the subject was a midnight appointment.

Ruling: No. It cannot also be said that Quirog's appointment was a midnight appointment.
The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically, those made
within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President.

As the Court ruled in De Rama v. CA: The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the
matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC,
the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight appointments that
are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and
correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in
fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the
last days of his or her tenure.

We, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d'
etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made
by chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely
designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments
merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies.

For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties
concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto.
Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a
year of being the Acting Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up
of the position resulted from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the public need for said
position to be permanently filled up.

43.) Montuerto v. Ty (G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

44.) Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, 22 April 2015

Doctrine:
The prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential appointees, not to
appointments made by local chief executives. However, the Civil Service Commission may
nonetheless promulgate rules and regulations that would prohibit such on local chief
executives.

Facts:
Marco was appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II by outgoing Governor Ong,
five (5) days prior to the election, together with other 25 appointees. However, during the
assumption of office of the subsequent Governor Castillo, the provincial budget manifested
that they did not have enough funds to cover the 26 appointees made by Ong, which included
Marco. This was a deviation from the prior certification issued by the same that funds were
available.

Proceedings were then instituted on the issue on whether or not the subsequent withdrawal of
the certification of funds was a valid ground to make the appointment void before the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office, then to the National Office. However, on appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the provincial government averred that the appointment was void because
the appointment was a midnight appointment.

The provincial government of Aurora averred that the ruling by the Court in Nazareno, et.al.
vs. City of Dumaguete should apply, when in that case, the Court declared that the 89
appointments made were void in violation the prohibition on midnight appointments, and CSC
Resolution No. 010988 which prohibited mass appointments made by an outgoing Local Chief
Executive without no apparent need for their immediate issuance.

Issue:
Is the appointment of Marco in violation of the rules on Midnight Appointment?

Ruling:
No. The appointment of Marco is not violative of the rules on Midnight Appointment, and the
application of Nazareno is misplaced.

First, it must be noted that the prohibition of Midnight Appointments under Sec. 15 of Art. VII
of the Constitution only applies to presidential appointments. However, the Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, may establish rules to
promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.

Second, Nazareno was decided on the basis of CSC Resolution No. 101988, which was
superseded by CSC Resolution No. 030918, the applicable rule in this case. The rule
applicable in this case provides that appointments covered by the rule in Midnight Appoints
should be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had
undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as shown in the Promotion
and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.

In this case, records show that Marco was fully qualified for the position, and had undergone
regular screening processes before the election ban, unlike in Nazareno where there was no
showing that the appointees possessed such qualification and undergone regular screening
processes. Moreover, the fact that the appointments were in bulk does not invalidate the
appointments, unlike the previous CSC Resolution.

VII. Intergovernmental Relations (Cases)

45.) MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
46.) MMDA v. Garin (G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005)

Doctrine:
Facts:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was
issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for
parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing
his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified—and therefore unlimited—fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue: Whether MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power

Ruling: No, the MMDA is not vested with police power. In Metro Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924
does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
functions are administrative in nature.

We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power,
as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same.

MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given
to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. 17 (footnotes
omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by
the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of
police power.
47.) Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling: