Set 02

IV. Creation and Alteration of Municipal Corporations (Cases)

1.) Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008)

Doctrine: For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.

Facts:
The ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No.
07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City. The consolidated petitions including that of Sema, a candidate in 2007 elections for
Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of said resolution
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office.

Respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed as representative of the legislative district of Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. He added that COMELEC Resolution 7902 is constitutional
because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative
districts in Maguindanao City but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district. He further
claimed that COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato
City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with
Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.

Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

Ruling: No

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay –
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria
fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement
in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an
Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the
delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is
not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In
the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies
of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created,
or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a
legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of
less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population
reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at
the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress
validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House
of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative
district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the
power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.

2.) League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No. 176951, 18 November 2008; 21
December 2009; 24 August 2010; and 15 February 2011)
Doctrine:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Facts:
- During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities.
- During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
- After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
- During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1, but failed to have it approved. Thereafter 16 municipalities filed
individual cityhood bills containing the same provision exempting the 16 municipalities from the
100 million income requirement of RA 9009.
- The cityhood bills later on lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws). The Cityhood Laws direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
- Petitioners filed ta petition to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation
of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.

Issue:

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution

Ruling:

Yes, The Court ruled that the Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law
more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to
any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.

Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local
Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal
means, solutions thereto." Petitioners-in-intervention, which are existing cities, have legal standing
because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared
constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a
taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release
of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for
the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No
other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution
is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform,
non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though
their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all
enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

3.) Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010 and Resolution dated 12 April 2011
Doctrine: When the application of the exemption for province was included in the LGC-IRR,it meant to
correct the congressional oversight and to reflect the legislative intention the making of the Local
Government Code.It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of
local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic
services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income,population and land
area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress,in its collective wisdom, has
debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria,placing emphasis on which of them
should enjoy preferential consideration

Facts:

Due to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 and with 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes during the plebiscite for its ratification, the new Province of Dinagat Islands was
created. Subsequently, the President appointed interim provincial officials to take over temporarily.

Dinagat then selected their new set of provincial officials.Petitioners, former Political leaders of Surigao
Del Norte (mother province of Dinagat), filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9355 stating the it failed to satisfy the requisites for creation of new Provinces
particularly on grounds that Dinagat Island only have 802.12 square kilometers and 106,951 population
as against the required 2,000 square kilometers and 250,000 inhabitants respectively.

On February 10, 2010, the court ruled that RA 9355 is unconstitutional for the failure to satisfy the
requirements provided in Local Government Code Title IV Chapter I

Section 461. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less thanTwenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
NationalStatistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.

(b) The territory need not be contagious if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.The Supreme Court also
held that the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the LGC (LGC-IRR),
stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands" is void.The Local Government Code grants this exemption only in the creation
of municipality or component city but not in the creation of Provinces.

However, in the LGC-IRR provides for said exemption to provinces

Issue: Whether or not the creation of Dinagat Island is valid notwithstanding its non-compliance to the
requirements prescribed by the Local Government Code
Ruling:
YES. The court construed the law liberally in conformity with the with the declared policy to provide
local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve
the desired results.The Court used Section 25, Article II of the Constitution as guide in ruling the case
at bar.“The thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to
decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be
realized.”

Moreover, the Congress recognized the potential and capability of Dinagat Islands to become a
province and in effect amended the Local Government Code particularly the exemption in Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR by enacting RA 9355. And thus “The provision in Article 9(2) of theRules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID.

Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL

4.) Min. Res., GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 11, 2012
(digest only, full text of the min res cannot be found)

Doctrine:
Facts:

• The April 12, 2011 Supreme Court resolution declared as valid and constitutional RA 9355, the law
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, the proclamation of the said Province, and the election of the
officials thereof stands. In the same resolution, the Court had also declared valid the provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,
which provides, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands.”
• Petitioners who are former Surigao del Sur political leaders Rodolfo Navarro, Victor Bernal, and Rene
Medina filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the said April 2011 resolution.

Issue:

W/N RA 9355 which created the province of Dinagat Islands constitutional? – YES.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in this two-page 2012 minute resolution denied with finality the Motion For
Reconsideration filed by petitioners former Surigao del Sur political leaders Rodolfo Navarro, Victor
Bernal, and Rene Medina as no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the
questioned April 12, 2011 resolution. Thus, it is with finality that RA 9355, which created the province
of Dinagat Islands, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
5.) Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999)

Doctrine:
Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.

Facts:
In 1994, R.A. 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component
city. The people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On 1998, R.A. 8528 was enacted. It
amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it downgraded the status of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. However, R.A. No. 8528 lacked provision for the ratification by the
people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.

The OSG argued that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city, hence, it does not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," thus, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city
of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people
in a proper plebiscite?

Ruling:
YES. The Court holds that the Constitution requires a plebiscite, as per section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason
that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly
affected."

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one,
the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under
the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city
council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province.

It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions — first, the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved
by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said
criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements,
however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned.
The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are
designed to achieve an economic purpose. The people's plebiscite is required to achieve a
political purpose.

With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of
Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago.
The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly
urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time

6.) Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

7.) Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)

Doctrine:

As for income, it is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or
received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. Department of Finance
Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it defined annual
income to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided
for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others." (ito
yung nasa Largo)

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality ofSantiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives. The bill was referred to the House Committee on LocalGovernment and the House
Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993. On May 19, 1993,June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993,
and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on
Local Government. The committee submitted to theHouse a favorable report, with amendments, on
December 9, 1993. On December 13, 1993, HBNo. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives
on Second Reading and was approved onThird Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994,
HB No. 8817 was transmitted to theSenate.

Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An ActConverting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,"
was filed in the Senate. This was just after the House of Representativeshad conducted its first public
hearing on HB No. 8817. On February 23, 1994, or a little less thana month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on LocalGovernment conducted public hearings on
SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No.
8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment. On March 3, 1994, Committee
Report No. 378 was passed by theSenate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on
March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action
of the Senate,approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual
income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices fall below the required
annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city. By dividing the
total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average
annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. The
certification issued by the Bureau of Local GovernmentFinance of the Department of Finance indicates
Santiago's average annual income to beP20,974,581.97.

Issue:

I. Whether the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent
component city
II. Whether Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representative
III. Whether Republic Act No. 7720 is constitutionally infirm

Ruling:

I. Yes. Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average
annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component
city.

For a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average
annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.

For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department ofFinance certified,
among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at leastTwenty Million Pesos for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This,the Department of Finance did
after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the
general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes
of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the LocalGovernment Code to be all
revenues and receipts collected or received forming the grossaccretions of funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.

Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts realized by provinces,
cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of
non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales
of fixed assets, and similar others.”

Note: A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of
one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio (binanggit niya itong
maxim na ito dati), the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is
thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only
at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.

II. Yes. Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House ofRepresentatives.

Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners thatRepublic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. HB No. 8817, was the bill
that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. Thus,
no violation of Section 24, ArticleVI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.

The Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,already
approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in theSenate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in theHouse of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives theHouse bill.

III. Yes. Republic Act No. 7720 is constitutionally firm.

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Taking into consideration the
justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court standson the holding that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption.

Cited case:
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Facts:
Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the Court's previous ruling dismissing the petitions filed
for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value- Added Tax Law.
Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not "originate exclusively" in the HoR as required by Article 6,
Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings,
instead passing its own version. Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House bill by
striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with the
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether the R.A. is unconstitutional for having "originated" from the Senate, and not the House of
Representatives

Ruling:
There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is
nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we
explained:
". . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to
‘originate exclusively’ in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist
that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate’s power not only to ‘concur with amendments’ but also to ‘propose amendments.’ It would be to
violate the co-equality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.

8.) Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995)

Doctrine: The territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of
said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Facts: Petitioner assails section 2 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati.

For the petitioner, section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional

Ruling: NO.

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.

However, petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City
of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated
that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.

Furthermore, the deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land
area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect
to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to
decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could
decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

The territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said
cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

9.) Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26, 2001)

Doctrine: The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of
existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

Facts: On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an
"Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." COMELEC, on December 16, 2000,
conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification. On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed3 the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon, Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the grounds that 1) it was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A.
8806; and, 2) that COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.

Two days after filing the said action, the petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this
time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional. He alleged that the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city."

Issues: 1) Whether or not R.A. No. 8806 is violative of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution?

2)Whether or not R.A No. 8806 contravenes the one-subject-one bill rule enunciated in Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.

Ruling:
1)No, R.A. No. 8806 is not violative of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a
province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
Further, Section 8 of the Local Government Code distinctly provides: "Division and merger of existing
local government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code:
Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not
fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ."

Here, the petitioner is not concerned about whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No.
8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population, and land area. What he is
assailing is its mode of creation. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's constricted reading of
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by
vhiwhich a city may be created.

Thus, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing
local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

2) No. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City,
petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct
from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. It is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was
created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor," cannot be
said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to
have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.

Note on publication requirement: Plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days
from the date of the effectivity of the law. The completion of the publication of the law should be the
reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the
date of its approval when the law had not yet been published. Since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, a plebiscite can be scheduled only after the law creating a city took effect.

10.) Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010)

DOCTRINE:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) A contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) A population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition the indispensable income requirement.

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rules 65 of the Rules of Court was filed by Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo. As public officers, tax payers and citizens,
seeks the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment.”
PETITIONERS’ Contention:

The reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of
a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Sec 5(3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads: “Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

RESPONDENTS’ Contention:

The respondents, through the office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition
based on procedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural manners, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
no. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second,
the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716. On
substantive manners, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,00 population condition, but argued that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province.

RULING:

No.

This court paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason
of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance. The
provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum
of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion that
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code States:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) A contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) A population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition the indispensable income requirement.

The court say, that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative district of Camarines Sur,
the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. The ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the
letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.

11.) Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986)

Doctrine:
No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because
of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out
what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The
alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution
categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and
complied with.

Facts:

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) started conducting the plebiscite on Janaury 3, 1986 in Negros
which was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Nrte, namely: the Cities of
Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto.

However, Patricio Tan et al. assailed the constitutionality of the said law, in particular to the exclusion
and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental other than those living within
the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte. This violated the following constitutional
provisions::

Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that—

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.

Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the
legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three
thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an
average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income
of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.

The COMELEC argued that the law remains valid. It maintained that the remaining cities and
municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of
Negros del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as
referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution.

Further it insisted that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic considering that a
plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding
certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in
favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the affirmative
votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus,
respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the
appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations,
respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as
the creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli."

Issue:

Whether the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Constitution,
which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected”

Ruling:
No.

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional
requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount
of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an
alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is
claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged
good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution
categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and
complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to
guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore
and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be
no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the Idol therein.

In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in
Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three
cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This
will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing
province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that
the consequent effects cf the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living
in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The
economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for
the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be
affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to
doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari
materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a
period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of
"areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed
new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.

We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was
enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the
plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not
disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law
can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the
new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.

In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the
plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In
anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was, therefore,
deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase that the new province constitutes the
area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading,
erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected.
The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the other adverse
economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.

The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and
violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed
to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional
infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding
of another plebiscite does not exist.

The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del
Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement
prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 of the Local Government Code is most
revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in
the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the
mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.

Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World
Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence,
is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter.
The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with
or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore,
in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass
of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had
intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with
"land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by
the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

V. General Powers and LGUs (Cases)

12.) Dela Cruz v. Paras G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983

Topic:
Police Power

Doctrine:
The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second
branch of the clause authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.'
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."

Facts:
The Municipality of Bulacan passed Ordinance 84 prohibiting the exercise, operation, and occupation
of night clubs and hostesses. Two cases were filed by petitioners (bar owners) alleging that:
1. Ordinance 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a business,
occupation, or calling, and
2. Ordinance 84 is violative of petitioners’ rights to due process and equal protection as the
license previously given were withdrawn without judicial hearing and
3. that under PD 189, as amended, by PD 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
Respondent judge Paras initially issued a TRO but the cases were later dismissed and the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 was upheld. The Court held: obedient to the
mandates of good government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and
social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. Hence, this certiorari
by way of appeal.

Issue:
Whether a municipal corporation (Bocaue, Bulacan) can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses?

Ruling:
No, the court held that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the
assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.

Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of
council to enact ordinances and make regulations . The municipal council shall enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein."

An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power
to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are
not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or
it will be pronounced invalid."

In another leading case where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by
this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk
of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The
second branch of the clause authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the
general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well
as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by over breadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.

It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal
or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs
and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.

13.) Binay v. Domingo G.R. No. 92389, 11 September 1991

Doctrine: Municipalities can exercise police power to promote the general welfare and provide for the
needs of their constituents, even if such actions incidentally benefit a limited number of individuals.

Facts: In 1988, Petitioner Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60, which established a
Burial Assistance Program to provide financial aid to bereaved families. The program extended
assistance to families whose gross monthly income did not exceed Php 2,000.00. Metro Manila
Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance
Program.

The said resolution was referred to the Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit.
COA disapproved the said resolution and disallowed the disbursement of funds for the program. The
COA argued that the resolution lacked a connection to public safety, general welfare, or the inhabitants
of Makati.
Determined on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60.

However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.

Hence, the petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari
praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.

Issue: Whether Resolution No. 60, and its re-enactment under Resolution No. 243, constitutes a valid
exercise of police power for the general welfare.

Ruling: Yes, Resolution No. 60, and its re-enactment under Resolution No. 243, constitutes a valid
exercise of police power for the general welfare.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they
are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP
337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and
order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
therein."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it
depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a
thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P.
896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions;
it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).

In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its
scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and,
in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is
broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the
benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of
only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).

COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because
it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section
5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section
11, Ibid." (Comment, p. 12)

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been
an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the
hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of
the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a
relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and
it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.

14.) Tano v. Socrates G.R. No. 110249. 21 August 1997

Doctrine: Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter
alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and
impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives,
noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and
to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.46 Finally, it imposes upon the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to
enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance."

Facts: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and
shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in
and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: WON the ordinances and resolution enacted the local government of Puerto Princesa and the
Provincial Government of Palawan are valid exercise of police power? [Yes]
Ruling: Yes, the ordinances and resolution are constitutional and a valid exercise of police power.

The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the
first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

15.) White Light Corp. v. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009

Doctrine:
Substantive requirements of a valid ordinance:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6) must not be unreasonable.

A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.

Facts:
 1. Mayor Alfredo Lim passed an Ordinance which penalized hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments that offer short time admission (stay for less than
12-hours) and “wash-up” rates (stay for only 3 hours). Any violation would result to either P5, 000
or imprisonment for less than 1 year or both.

2. Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief:

a. Praying for an injunction/TRO be issued, and

b. praying to have the Ordinace be declared invalid and unconstitutional. They
alleged that PD 259 authorized them to charge customers on a short-time basis and to
charge them for wash-up rates.

3. White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene in support of MTDC’s petition on
the ground that the Ordinance affected their business interests as they operate several drive-in
hotels and motels in Manila.

4. The petitioners agreed to submit the case for judgment since it was a based on a purely legal
question.

5. RTC declared the Ordinance null and void because

a. it was against personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution
b. it went against encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to need investment.
c. The Ordinance was similar to another Ordinance annulled in another case[1], wherein
what it sought to prevent could easily be circumvented (i.e. Preventing illicit relationships
festering in the motels/hotels could easily be consummated by paying for a 12-hour stay).

6. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC, which the latter treated as a
petition for certiorari and referred it to CA.

7. The City argued that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power under Section
458(4)(iv) of the Local Government Code[2] and Art. 3, Sec. 18(kk) of the Reivsed Manila
Charter.

8. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates right to privacy
and the freedom of movement. Furthermore, it is an invalid exercise of police power because it
was unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

9. CA reversed RTC’s decision and found it to be constitutional for the following reasons:

a. The Ordinance didn’t violate the right to privacy or freedom to movement because it
only penalizes a small group – the owners or operators of establishments that offer short
time stays.
b. Police power is limited only by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method, which what the Ordinance satisfied.
c. The adverse effects to such establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents.
d. As ruled in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by the law.

Issue: WoN the subject ordinance is valid. NO

Ruling:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions
and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights
stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the
guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.

Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the
modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring
a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation
of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and
drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

However well­-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

16.) Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052. February 13, 2008

Doctrine: Local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only
if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Facts: Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumboko sought to compel respondent Lito L. Atienza, then Mayor of City of Manila, to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified Pandacan area from industrial to commercial and redirected the
owners and operators of disallowed businesses to desist from operating their business. Among the
disallowed businesses was the “Pandacan Terminal” of the oil companies namely Cheveron
Philippines Inc, Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of
the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.9 In the same resolution, and declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the
Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003
and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the said oil companies.

In the March 7, 2007 decision, the court ruled that the respondent had the ministerial duty under the
Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city," including Ordinance No. 8027. Further, the court held that it need not resolve the issue of whether
the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by
the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the
MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Hence, concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.

Thereafter, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed motions for reconsideration in
intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of Police Power?

Ruling: Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of Police Power.

Local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Further, in the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

In this case, Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial. In addition, the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting
burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust because it has the power to divide its territory into
residential and industrial zones.

Hence, there is no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure since there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

17.) Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim/Atienza (G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014)

Doctrine:
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested
with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to the pertinent provisions of
the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.”

When the judiciary mediates, we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang
Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

Facts:
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. (G.R. No.
156052), where the Court declared that the subject City of Manila Ordinance No. 8027, enacted during
the term of Mayor Atienza, ordering the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals is
constitutional.

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section
23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby
allowing, once again, the operation of petroleum refineries and oil depots in the Pandacan area.

The petitioners argue that the enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police
power because the measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the people. They
further argue that Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution of
the Philippines on the duty of the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and
“protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.” Moreover, they
argue that despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the
conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 remain the same, the
Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that “judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines.”
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of health and environment-related municipal
laws, and international conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a state party.

Respondents aver that petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public policy, and is
not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws, and international
conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of validity of the assailed
ordinance.

Issue:
Whether the enactment of the assailed Ordinance No. 8187 allowing the continued stay of the oil
companies in the depots is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.

Ruling:
YES, the Court saw no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the
presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested
with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to the pertinent provisions of
the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.”
These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court upheld the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the Ordinance, and declared that the mayor
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts. In the same case, the Court also used
the principle that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents — that the removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary “to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.”

We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter subject of these petitions. In
2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary. Hence, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already
changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again
when some of the previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding
the same seat, and pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give
the oil depots until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim
stood his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.

In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents. Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim
even went to the extent of detailing the steps he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to
show his honest intention to make the right decision.

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of
the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this
day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice
changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations. The
foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of the city does not after all gear
towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another,
dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular
sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.

Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on the
matter, favoring the city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals,
over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make
a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the inhabitants of
Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such thing
as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.

If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we
do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has already
been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so convinced.

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and
made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the
affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the
oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052. The same best interest of
the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the
contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the
life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil
depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.

18.) Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006)

Doctrine:
Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. Properties of public dominion, being
for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy.

Facts:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Oairder No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter").

The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061, stating that the
Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under
Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.

The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings where its City Mayor threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which sought to restrain the City of Parañaque
from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and
Buildings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as well as its motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration.

The City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale announced the public auction sale of the Airport
Lands and Buildings to the highest bidder.

Issue:
Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings can be the subject of an auction sale

Ruling:
No, they cannot be considered as subjects of an auction sale.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce
of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly say that properties of public dominion are outside the
commerce of man. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.

Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public
use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the Airport Lands
and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of public dominion, they are not
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale.

MIAA is an Intrumentality of the Government = Exempt from imposition of taxes

Sec 193 = withdrawal of tax exemptions and tax incentives being enjoyed by GOCC except local
water districts, non-stock, non-profit etc etc

19.) Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos (G.R. No. 120082, 11 September
1996)

Doctrine: MCIAA is a GOCC

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

20.) City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.

(G.R. No. 162015, 06 March 2006)
Topic: Taxing power of LGU

DOCTRINE: While Section 14 of Republic Act 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of
power to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over properties
of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

The exercise of this power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under
Republic Act No. 3259. Section 14 of the said Act provides that (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay
the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. X X X .

On January 1, 1992, Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”
(LGC), took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area
the power to levy tax on real properties whereas Section 234 of the same Code withdrews any
exemption from realty tax granted to or enjoyed by all persons, natural or juridical.

On July 20, 1992, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantel’s original franchise,
copying

Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities
within the territorial boundary of Quezon City.

Pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, infra, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC, the government of Quezon City enacted
Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax on all real
properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real
property tax under Section 234 of the LGC.

on March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, otherwise known as the “Public Telecommunications Policy
Act of the Philippines took effect. On its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real
property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. Thus, the City Government issued
notices of delinquency followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel’s
properties.

The lower court ruled in favor of Bayantel

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are subject to real property tax

RULING: NO. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this franchise” cannot be
construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned
by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or
telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. It is worthy to note that
the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the
first category.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of
Congress’ inherent power to tax the franchisee’s properties belonging to the second group of
properties indicated above, that is, all properties which, “exclusive of this franchise,” are not actually
and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local
governments under both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law.

While Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax,
the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over properties of the
franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was
expressly revived under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete terms, the realty tax exemption
heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by force of
Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, local governments are empowered to levy taxes. pursuant
to this constitutional empowerment, juxtaposed with Section 232 9 of the LGC, the Quezon City
government enacted in 1993 Its local Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties
found within its territorial jurisdiction, but the exercise of this power may be subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy
of local autonomy.

According to Fr. Bernas, Section 5, Article X of the Constitution does not change the doctrine that
municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal
corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. X x x.
Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in
favor of municipal corporations. It is understood, however, that taxes imposed by local government
must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the
jurisdiction of the local unit to pass.”

The power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly
provides that “a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual
ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not
hereinafter specifically exempted.” Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter
exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, 13 this Court has
upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose
taxes. Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC
does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions. xxx

21.) Drilon v. Lim (G.R. No. 112497, 04 August 1994)

Doctrine:
The Secretary of Justice only has the power of mere supervision, not of control. He is not permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.

Facts:
As per Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of
Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings, then Secretary of Justice Hon.
Franklin Drilon declared Ordinance No. 7794 or the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. Said ordinance was on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer.

Section 187:
“Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge
levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may
file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.”
The RTC reversed the decision of the Secretary of Justice, and sustained that the ordinance is valid,
further contending that the procedural requirements had been observed. Instead, RTC held that
Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary
of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution, and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.

By citing the distinction between control and supervision, RTC concluded that the challenged section
gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the
Constitution to the President of the Philippines.

The Secretary of Justice argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional (No)

Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the decision of the RTC, and held that Section 187 of the Local
Government Code is valid.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment
it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only
to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He
has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not
of control but of mere supervision.

22.) Batangas City v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. (G.R. No. 187631, 08 July 2015)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling

23.) City of Lapu-Lapu v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority, G.R. No. 184203 & 187583, 26
November 2014
Doctrine:

Government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public
services for the common good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These
instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even subsidize their
entire operations. Therefore, cannot be taxed by local government units.

Facts:

In G.R. No. 184203

Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created and declared exempt from all taxes that may be
due to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities, and other government
agencies and instrumentalities.

In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or "the Special Economic Zone Act
of 1995" to operate, administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the country.14 The PEZA
was granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the enterprises located in the economic
zones.15

The law required EPZA to "evolve into the PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set
forth in an executive order issued for [the] purpose.

In the letter21 dated March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer,
demanded the PEZA to pay real property taxes on PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic
Zone. It cited Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real
property tax exemptions previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City pointed
out that no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA
from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that
explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA
from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA.

Based on Section 51, the trial court held that all privileges, benefits, advantages, or exemptions
granted to special economic zones created under the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
apply to special economic zones created under the Special Economic ZoneAct of 1995.

According to the trial court, the PEZA remained tax-exempt regardless of Section 24 of the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995. It ruled that Section 24, which taxes real property owned by developers of
economic zones, only applies to private developers of economic zones, not to public developers like
the PEZA. The PEZA, therefore, is not liable for real property taxes on the land it owns.

Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government, the trial court ruled that the
City had no authority to tax the PEZA under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

Facts of G.R. No. 187583

The City of Lapu-lapu claimed that the PEZA is liable for real property taxes under Section 24 of the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. PEZA requested the Province to suspend the service of the real
property tax billing. PEZA filed a petition for injunction69 with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
arguing that it is exempt from payment of real property taxes.
The trial court ruled that the PEZA is not exempt from payment of real property taxes. According to the
trial court, Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code had withdrawn the real property tax
exemptions previously granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical.76 As to the tax exemptions
under Section 51 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the trial court ruled that the provision only
applies to businesses operating within the economic zones, not to the PEZA.

Issue:

Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes. YES
Whether the PEZA is a government agency performing governmental functions. YES

Ruling:

YES, PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.

PEZA is exempt from taxes by virtue of being an instrumentality of the national government
which is discussed below.

YES, PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. Therefore, it is a government

agency performing governmental functions.

It is not integrated within the department framework but is an agency attached to the Department of
Trade and Industry. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department
to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached
agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination."

Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot be taxed by local
government units. Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the PEZA is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for real property taxes.

Government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public
services for the common good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These
instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even subsidize their
entire operations.

Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating,administering, managing, and developing special economic zones
to attract investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor.

Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some corporate powers.
However, it was not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter
provides that the PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no members who shall
share in the PEZA’s profits.

The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country. The government
may even subsidize the PEZA’s operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995, "any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act to be treated as an equity of the national government."

The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a government-owned or

controlled corporation liable for real property taxes.

24.) City Gov. of Quezon City v. Ericta (G.R. No. L-34915, 24 June 1983)
Doctrine:
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment,
Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The
Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof.”

The assailed provision provides that at least 6% of the total area shall be set aside for charity burials
for paupers. For several years, the section was not enforced. Pursuant to a resolution passed by the
QC Council, QC Engineer notified respondent Himalayang Pilipino that the Sec. 9 of Ordiancnce 6118
S-64 would be enforced.

Respondent filed with CFI a petition for declaratory relief seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance
in question.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property.

Issue:
Is section 9 a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling
No. A power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate.

The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is
punishable…” police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use
of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such
as opium and firearms.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

25.) City of Cebu v. Spouses Apolonio (G.R. No. 142971, 07 May 2002)

Doctrine: the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Facts:

In 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case a complaint for eminent domain against respondent
Bedamo covering lots 1527 and 1528 for a public purpose such as for the construction of a public road
as access/relief road to Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The total area to be
expropriated is 1,624 sqm with an assessed value of P1,786,400. The City deposited with PNB the
amount of P51,156 or 15% FMV of the property.

Respondent Dedamo spouses filed a motion to dismiss because the purpose for which their property
was not for a public purpose but for the benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings Inc. and
that the price offered was very low. They also alleged that have no other land in Cebu City.

A pre-trial was held and the City filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession, the parties
executed an Agreement submitted to the trial court declaring that they have partially settled the case.

The amount of just compensation was then to be determined by three appointed commissioners who
assessed the valuation of the property. The court rendered judgment ordering the City to pay the
Dedamo’s P24,865,930.00, which was later on amended and reduced to P20,826,339.50 based on
prevailing market price at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, which the City
opposed. The CA affirmed in toto the lower court decision.

Issue: Whether or not just compensation should be determined at the date of the filing of the complaint

Ruling: No

Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the
Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose.9 However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration therefor.

In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of
at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.

The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not
categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation
in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule
"admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and
not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:

SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the
court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their
report is to be filed with the court.

More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by
them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The
agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be
complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.

Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.
It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of
equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by
his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces
another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that
he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Records show that
petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot
detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners' assessment.1âwphi1.nêt

Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A.
7160, which is a substantive law.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED.

26.) Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146587, 02 July 2002)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Reclassification of Lands
27.) Department of Agrarian Reform v. Saranggani Agricultural Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 165547, 24
January 2007)

Doctrine: Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No.
7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to
Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June
8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify
agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing reclassification of
agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the province in the case of component
cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent component cities in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993
Facts:

In February 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 or
“Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development
Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan
and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor of Sarangani.

In 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate
the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang passed a new Resolution No.
98-03 to reclassify lots from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.

The Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed for an application of land use
conversion covering 1,005 hectares. The Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC)
recommended that SACI present a development plan, surveys and additional documents.

However, in March 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries

Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the
application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were
merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment
period ended on June 15, 1998.

Later in 2000, PLUTC disapproved 158.0672 hectares from SACI’s application of land
conversion, noting that the land is still viable for agriculture, and is irrigated. It is also covered
with a Notice of Coverage and is also opposed by SARBAI.

The DAR affirmed the decision. However, upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was reversed and the DAR was ordered to issue a conversion order.

Issue: Whether the DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and Ordinance of
the Local Sanggunian as primary reference

Ruling: Yes, the Local Government Code grants LGUs the power to reclassify agricultural
lands, subject to limitations as prescribed by law. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that
DAR’s scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to
examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations
have been complied with
 Closing and Opening of Roads

28.) Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 71169, 25 August 1989)

Doctrine:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

29.) MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000)

Doctrine:
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The
power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative
rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.

Facts:
Respondent received from MMDA a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune
Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against MMDA, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.

The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the MMDA has no
authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls and
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila so there is no need for an
ordinance to be enacted first.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and
police powers?

Ruling:
NO. According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative
boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact
ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,
acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

30.) Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc. (G.R. No. 148339, 23 February 2005)

Doctrine:
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers
on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals
could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
specifications.

Facts:
Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that these
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.Ordinance No. 1631 AN ORDINANCE GRANTING
THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE,
ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE
CITY OF LUCENA Ordinance No. 1778 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE
CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS
AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND
ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995

The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable
for another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, for the
construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be
located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion
alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside
the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to
and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner. Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances. The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted City Ordinance Nos.
1631 and 1778?

Ruling:
As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
lawful method. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The
first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present But the ordinances go beyond
what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.

Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the
appellate court. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How
the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner,
can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights. As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in
easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is
reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even
tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City
Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code. City Ordinance
No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena
arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power. Affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition of Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.is DENIED by the
Supreme Court.
Legislative Power

31.) City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, 12 April 2005)

Doctrine:
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good.

Facts:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila
entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting the Establishment or Operation of Businesses Providing Certain
Forms of Amusement, Entertainment, Services And Facilities In The Ermita-Malate Area, Prescribing
Penalties For Violation Thereof, and for Other Purposes”. It basically prohibited establishments such
as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers.

Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and
the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
The ordinance enacted by the City Council prohibits the establishment or operation of businesses
which provides certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate
Area.

MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns and such Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. However,
petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain
forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided
for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether the City of Manila validly exercised their derivative legislative power

Ruling:
No, the City of Manila did not validly exercise their derivative legislative power.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a
constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at
rendering them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution
and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able
to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are
endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare
clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

Cited Case:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila
Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels,
which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.

Facts:
It was alleged that the petitioner Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with
one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, is dedicated to the promotion and protection of
the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate
businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities and regularly paying taxes.

It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After
which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of
its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference
is made to motels. It also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.

Held:
No. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished
the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision
cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

“The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensing fees was intended to discourage “establishments of the kind from operating for a purpose
other than legal” and at the same time, to increase “the income of the city government.”

Valid yung ordinance sa Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila kasi hinihingi mga pangalan ng guests tas bawal minors, unlike dito sa Manila
v. Laguio binawalan na sila completely (ata hahaha correct me if I’m wrong)

32.) Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052, 13 Feb.2008)

Doctrine: Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.

Facts: Petitioners sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of
Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Manila which was approved by respondent Mayor.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed
the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure

Ruling: YES.

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its
police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people. While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated
police power to local governments.

LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this
case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to
take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist
attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of
Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation
of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified
the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a
local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a result of the
zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be
unjust.

Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful subject
and lawful method.

33.) Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City (G.R. No.

225442, 08 August 2017)

Doctrine: Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children, provides: “City or municipal councils may prescribe
such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.”

Facts: Navotas, Manila and Quezon City implemented curfew ordinances due to “Oplan Rody”
declaring 10:00 PM to 4:00 AM restricted hours for minors to go outside with exceptions.

Petitioner Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an association of young adults and
minors that aims to forward a free and just society, filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process. They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during
curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
community. While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or
students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and
breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence,
proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.

Issue: Whether or not the curfew ordinances of Navotas, Manila and Quezon city are unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void,
while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional.

Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal
councils, to set curfew hours for children, provides: “City or municipal councils may prescribe such
curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.”

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances and enforce the same
through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by
the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. They are always subject
to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As
parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights.

With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by
themselves or with a person other than their parents. These limitations demonstrate that the State has
broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the
State's general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

Here, the SC applied the judicial strict scrutiny test. (Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of
a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest)

1. Compelling interest - Respondents passed the first scrutiny test. This Court has ruled that children's
welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State. the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact,
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors.

2. Least restrictive means/Narrowly Drawn - Only the Quezon City ordinance passed the second
scrutiny test while the Manila and Navotas ordinances did not pass since even if exceptions were
made, it still runs the risk of overly restricting the minors’ fundamental freedoms (freedom of religion,
rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others)

Manila and Navotas ordinances should be stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection
of the above-mentioned fundamental rights.

The Quezon City ordinance is accepted since compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression. This Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly
drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.