A N A LYSIS

PE ACE A N D SECU R I T Y

FEELING
Looking towards Russia:
continuously puzzled

CORNERED Looking towards Ukraine:

cautious solidarity

An Analysis of the Russian-Speaking Looking towards the West:

Minority in Estonia still suspicious

Looking towards Estonia:

difficult relationship
Reinhard Krumm, Tõnis Stamberg, Irina Strapatšuk
Tallinn, September 2023
PE ACE A N D SECU R I T Y

FEELING
CORNERED
An Analysis of the Russian-Speaking
Minority in Estonia
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents

INTRODUCTION 4

RESEARCH DESIGN 5

1. LOOKING TOWARDS RUSSIA: 7

CONTINUOUSLY PUZZLED

2. LOOKING TOWARDS UKRAINE: 11

CAUTIOUS SOLIDARITY

3. LOOKING TOWARDS THE WEST: 15

STILL SUSPICIOUS

4. LOOKING TOWARDS ESTONIA: 19

DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP

CONCLUSION 23

3

INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND
The share of Russian speakers within the Estonian population
is substantial. According to the 2021 Estonian Population
Census, they account for 374,038 residents, which is 27.4%
of the population as a whole, and include Russians (22.5%),
Ukrainians (4.1%), and Belarusians (0.8%). Most of them set-
tled in Estonia during the time of the Soviet Union. The fol-
lowing analysis will concentrate on Russian-speaking Rus-
sians, although the poll includes small numbers of the other
two minorities who chose Russian as their main language.
In 1918, Estonia was freed from the Russian Tsarist state and
achieved the status of an independent country. According to
the 1922 census, Russians made up 8.3% of the Estonian
population at that time. The influx of the Russian-speaking
population accelerated after World War II, when the inde-
pendent Republic of Estonia ceased to exist, and a huge pro-
cess of Russification began. While in 1934, according to the
census, Russians made up 8.2% of the Estonian population,
in 1959 this figure was 20%, and by 1989, it had risen to
30.3%. In the decade after Estonia regained its independ-
ence, 1991–2011, approximately 140,000 Russian-speaking
people, mostly of Russian nationality, left the country. By
2011, the share of Russians in the population had decreased
to 25%.
According to census data, in 2011, 53.9% of Russian resi-
dents in Estonia held Estonian citizenship. By 2021, this figure
had risen to 58.8%. The lowest percentage of Estonian citi-
zens among Russians is found in the 65+ age group. Over the
years, the number of residents holding Russian citizenship
has slightly decreased, and the number of individuals without
any citizenship has decreased as well (from 21% to 17%).
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC
One year after the beginning of the war, the Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung (FES) together with the Estonian survey institute Tu-
ru-uuringute AS conducted this representative and in-depth
survey of the Estonian population with a focus on the Rus-
sian-speaking minority. The main reason was to find out
whether the war had had a major impact on relations be-
tween the Estonian majority and the Russian-speaking mi-
nority. Are there major tensions between the two groups? If
so, that could be a security issue for the country, an EU and
4
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED
NATO member, with consequences for both the political and
economic union as well as the defense alliance. The Russian
Federation has defined the supposed insecurity of Russians
abroad as a legitimate reason to potentially defend their
rights by any means – this was one of its official justifications
for going to war against Ukraine.
The Russian-speaking minority is often described and analyz-
ed as a monolithic community. That was never the case and
was proven wrong in this survey. The minority consists of
groups with different status: citizens of Estonia, citizens of
Russia, and non-citizens, who are protected by the Estonian
constitution but have neither an Estonian nor a Russian pass-
port.
III. DIMENSIONS OF THE SURVEY
The aim of the study is to achieve a better understanding of
any different opinions between the Russian-speaking minor-
ity and Estonian majority. For this, five major themes were
chosen:
1. Foreign policy orientation and threat perception
2. Solidarity with Ukraine
3. Media and narratives
4. Identity, affiliation, and feelings of Russian speakers
5. Relations between Estonians and Russian speakers
The FES hopes that the main results of this opinion poll and
its analysis will be discussed in public. In general, and not
only in Estonia, any issues between majorities and minorities
can only be resolved through a constant conversation about
how to make a country a home for everyone and how to
build a stronger community and more resilient democratic
society to face domestic and foreign challenges. There are
clearly no easy solutions. Instead, the continuation of the
long and difficult process towards a prosperous and thriving
independent Estonian state, which began in 1991, requires
the participation of all communities and a willingness on all
sides to accept some compromises.

RESEARCH DESIGN
From May 16 to May 29, 2023, a study was conducted in
Estonia on the topic “Russian-speaking Estonian residents’
views on current events, narratives, and the war in Ukraine.”
The target group of the study was Estonian residents aged 18
years and older. A total of 1,000 people participated in the
survey.
The sample is representative in terms of Estonia’s regions, set-
tlement types, gender, age groups, and respondents’ ethnic-
ity (data from the 2021 Population Census). The survey was
conducted using a combined method of online and face-to-
face interviews, with 473 and 527 participants respectively.
The face-to-face interviews were carried out with respond-
ents in the regions of Northern Estonia and Northeastern Es-
tonia (in the regions with the most concentrated population
of Russian-speaking residents).
The mixed-mode method was used in order to reach as many
respondents as possible, including those who are not very
active in responding to online surveys, have a lower socio-de-
mographic status, and are more skeptical of internet-based
surveys.
To adjust the resulting initial sample, official data from the
Estonian Department of Statistics (https://www.stat.ee/)
were used for weighting. The variables used as weighting var-
iables were: gender, nationality, age, urban/rural, and region.
Technical characteristics of survey
Population: permanent residents of Estonia aged 18 +
Sample size: 1000 respondents
– 527 respondents reached through personal (face-to-
face) interviews at their places of residence
– 473 respondents reached through the web survey
Sampling methods:
– For face-to-face survey: stratified nationally representa-
tive random sampling
– For the web survey: quota sampling (respondent quotas
on gender, age, ethnicity, and place of residence (regions
of Estonia); quotas were proportional to the actual com-
position of the population)
5
RESEARCH DESIGN
The web sample was created from the population of Estonia
registered in the WebPanel of the public opinion and market-
ing research company Turu-uuringute AS (~ 23,000 partici-
pants/potential respondents)
Time of survey: May 16–29, 2023.
The survey was conducted by the public opinion and
marketing research company Turu-uuringute AS (https://
www.turu-uuringute.ee/)
Respondent groups: The analysis of the survey results re-
vealed four groups of respondents: those who speak only
Russian within their families; those who speak both Estonian
and Russian within their families; those who speak Estonian
within their families; and the fourth group – individuals who
speak Estonian or Russian along with some other language
within their families (this group was not included in the anal-
ysis). Since the number of respondents in the group where
both Russian and Estonian languages were spoken at home
was very small, their results, though included in the overview,
were not analyzed separately.
The creation of such groups is based on the hypothesis that
the language used in the household to a large extent indi-
cates the information space from which a person receives
information about what is happening both in Estonia and
abroad.
In the case of Estonia, the Russian-language and Estoni-
an-language information spaces represent two very different
spheres, with diverse and often even opposite points of view
on the events in the country and the world.
The composition of the language groups according to the
nationality of the respondents revealed the following picture:
– Among those who speak only Estonian in the family,
99.5% are ethnic Estonians, 0.3% are Russians, Ukraini-
ans or Belarusians, and 0.2% are of other nationalities.
– Among those who speak only Russian in the family,
85% are ethnic Russians, 4% are ethnic Ukrainians, 4%
are ethnic Belarusians, 4% are ethnic Estonians, and 3%
are ethnic representatives of other nationalities.
– Among those who speak both Estonian and Russian in
the family (bilinguals), 20% are ethnic Estonians, 64%
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

are ethnic Russians, 8% are ethnic Ukrainians, and 7%

are ethnic representatives of other nationalities.

There was also an outlying group of respondents who speak

some other language at home plus Russian or Estonian. Since
the latter two groups were rather small in number, they were
not included in the analysis separately.

As can be seen, bilinguals represent a very heterogeneous

group in ethnic terms, comprising not only a combination of
Russians and Estonians, but also representatives of other na-
tionalities.

If we look at the spoken language groups depending on the

citizenship status of the respondents, we can see the follow-
ing picture:

– Among those who speak only Estonian in the family,

100% are citizens of the Republic of Estonia. There were
no non-citizens, citizens of another country, or citizens
of Russia in this group.
– Among those who speak only Russian in the family,
44% are citizens of the Republic of Estonia, 24% are
non-citizens, 30% are citizens of the Russian Federation,
and 2% are citizens of other countries.
– Among those who speak both Estonian and Russian in
the family (bilinguals), 76% are citizens of the Republic
of Estonia, 6% are non-citizens, and 18% are citizens of
the Russian Federation.

Estonian speakers mainly live in the Estonian-speaking infor-

mation space, i.e. they mainly consume Estonian-language
media, while Russian speakers live in the Russian-language
information space, consuming mainly Russian-language me-
dia. It should be noted, however, that although some of such
Russian-language information does originate from Russia,
much is also produced locally.

6

LOOKING TOWARDS RUSSIA:
CONTINUOUSLY PUZZLED
After more than 500 days of the war inflicted by the Russian
Federation on Ukraine, the effects on Estonian society are
very clear and visible. This is evident not only from the numer-
ous Ukrainian flags on streets throughout the country but
also in the still increasing support for the Ukrainian state and
society, even as everything connected to Russia faces criti-
cism and attack. During the last parliamentary election in
March 2023, parties with connections to the Russian-speak-
ing minority did not do well, foremost the Center party. For-
mer supporters were confused and angry because the par-
ties in general openly criticized the Russian war.
This confusion can be observed in the answers to the survey
question on how Estonia’s interests would be better served.
Whereas the Estonian majority (74%) prefers working more
closely with Western countries, not even one third of the
Russian-speaking minority support this option. Interestingly,
only 8% of the Russian speakers prefer working more closely
with Russia alone. Instead, over half of this group would like
to see more cooperation with both Western countries and
Russia (figure 1).
Concerning Russia in general and its president Vladimir Putin
in particular, 15% of the Russian-speaking minority like both
Russia and its president (none among the Estonian-speaking
Figure 1
Looking to the future, do you think Estonia’s interests would be better served by...
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %
Respondents
who speak Russian 8 54
in their family
Respondents
who speak both
13
Estonian and Russian
in their family
Respondents
who speak Estonian 1 17 4 4
in their family
...working more closely with Russia
Neither Don’t know/NA
LOOKING TOWARDS RUSSIA: CONTINUOUSLY PUZZLED
majority), 44% like Russia but not the president (similar to the
sentiment among the Estonians), and a quarter do not like
either one, almost three times less than the Estonians (figure
2). When asked to rate the performance of political leaders,
over one third of the Russian-speaking minority consider Pu-
tin’s performance very or rather positively and over half of
them very or rather negatively. 92% of the Estonians rate
Putin very negatively (figure 3).
Whereas three quarters of the Estonians support sanctions
against Russia, only one quarter of the Russian-speaking mi-
nority agree, and almost half do not (figure 4). These differ-
ences in opinion might have something to do with a certain
solidarity with Russia and its population. This could also have
something to do with personal relationships between the
Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and friends or family on
the other side of the border.
But at least some of the diverging opinions are connected to
the different information consumed by each group, respec-
tively. The Russian speakers are critical towards media in gen-
eral. A majority of this group rejects all Estonian media, Rus-
sian federal mass media, Russian independent or opposition
media, as well as Western mass media. They find Estonian
and Western mass media to be completely non-objective
4 6 28
28 10 49
74
...working more closely with both Russia and the Western countries
...working more closely the Western countries
7
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 2
Please assess which of the following statements best describes your views on Russia
and its current policies of its President Vladimir Putin?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

23

54 62
44
25 35
15 13 10
5 6 4 3

I like both Russia and Putin’s policies I like Russia, but I don’t like Putin’s policies Difficult to say/NA
I don’t like Russia, but in general I like Putin’s policies I don’t like either Russia or Putin’s policies

or not very objective (70% and 61%, respectively), and disap-
prove of Russian state media and Russian independent media
at similar rates (58% and 59%, respectively) (figure 5). That
leaves communication with friends and relatives, social me-
dia, and as sense of frustration with information sources in
general.
Over half of the Russian-speaking minority think to different
degrees that Russia was not entitled to use military force
against Ukraine to prevent the country from joining NATO,
whereas a quarter believes that Russia was justified in doing
so. In contrast, almost all the Estonians (94%) believe that
Russia was not entitled to take such action (figure 6). Half of
the Russian-speaking minority agrees with the claim that
Russia is in fact fighting with NATO in Ukraine, whereas one
quarter disagrees (figure 6).
Interesting is the belief of 40% of the Russian-speaking mi-
nority that Russia is a threat to peace and security in Europe,
even as over half think that that is not the case. For 95% of
the Estonians the question is easy to answer – Russia is a
threat (figure 7).

Figure 3
Please tell me how you rate each of them: do you rate this person's performance very positively, rather positively, rather
negatively, or very negatively: Russian President Vladimir Putin
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

22% 58% 92%

31%
25% 8%
5%
1% 9%
10% 14% 5% 1%
10% 6% 1% 2%

Very positively Rather positively Rather negatively Very negatively Haven’t heard of such person Difficult to say/NA

Figure 4
Do you personally support the various sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents
who speak Russian 23 24 10 43
in their family

Respondents who
speak both Estonia and 50 19 7 24
Russian in their family

Respondents
who speak Estonian 74 16 7 3
in their family

Yes, absolutely all Yes, but only partially Difficult to say/NA No

8
 LOOKING TOWARDS RUSSIA: CONTINUOUSLY PUZZLED

Figure 5
How would you assess how objectively such media is covering of what is happening in Ukraine?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

5 5
13 11 2
17 8
13 31
Estonian public 16
mass media (i.e. ETV, ERR) 47
10
23 46 54

4 15 10 1 12
21 23
Russian federal
32
mass media, such as 35
17 26
Russian state TV channels

26 13 65

2 7 1
20 19
29
Russian independent / 33
10 46
opposition mass media 47 22
10 15
26 11

1 9 7
22 17 20
35 4
Western mass media 12
16 10
47
15 59
26

Very objectively Mostly objectively Not very objectively Completely non-objectively Difficult to say/NA

9
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 6
Various statements have been made in society regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the course of these events
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Russia was entitled to use

Russia in fact is fighting
military force against Ukraine to prevent
with NATO in Ukraine
Ukraine from joining NATO

26% 12%
28% 29%
14%
Respondents
who speak Russian 14%
in their family 23%
21% 21%
11%

52% 11%
24%
Respondents 26%
who speak both 15%
Estonian and Russian
2% 24%
in their family 18% 15%
12%

89% 26%
32%
Respondents
who speak Estonian 24%
in their family
5% 14%
1%
1% 4% 5%

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

Figure 7
In the following, I will ask you to assess various statements that have been made in the mass media. To what extent do you
agree or disagree with the following statements: Russia is a threat to peace and security in Europe
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents
who speak Russian 16 24 31 23 6
in their family

Respondents who
speak both Estonia and 39 29 9 11 12
Russian in their family

Respondents
who speak Estonian 81 14 11 3
in their family

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

10

LOOKING TOWARDS UKRAINE:
CAUTIOUS SOLIDARITY
The relationship between Russians and Ukrainians even be-
fore the war was not easy. On the one hand the two societies
are very close. There are many mixed marriages – about
30%, according to the data. But there has always been a
patrimonial approach by Russia towards Ukraine. Relations
were too close, the Ukrainians might say. As one anecdote
puts it, if a Russian offers to share something with a Ukraini-
an “like a brother,” the Ukrainian should say no and insist
instead on a fair 50-50 share. But even this uneven brother-
hood changed after 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, the
subsequent conflicts in and around Ukraine, and now the
military aggression of Russia against Ukraine.
When asked with which of the two belligerents they sympa-
thize with, half of the Russian-speaking majority refuses to
take a side, while 28% are on the side of Ukraine and 17%
on the side of Russia. In comparison, 80% of the Estonians
stand with Ukraine (figure 8) and 89% believe that Russia is
responsible for the outbreak of the war. For the Rus-
sian-speaking minority the latter question poses a challenge:
About one third see Russia as the culprit, 20% the US, 9%
Ukraine, and 6% NATO. One fifth prefers the answer “diffi-
cult to say” (figure 9).
Figure 8
Regarding Russia's so-called military operation against Ukraine, which of the belligerents do you sympathise with?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family
Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family
49%
28%
17%
13%
6%
Russia Ukraine Neither one nor the other
LOOKING TOWARDS UKRAINE: CAUTIOUS SOLIDARITY
Accordingly, the Russian-speaking minority is cautious about
the prospect of the West arming Ukraine to the extent that
Kyiv could defeat Russia and liberate all the territory it occu-
pied. One third support that option. But 55% disagree to a
varying extent. Again, for Estonians the answer is easy – 89%
fully agree with supporting Ukraine militarily to defeat Russia
(figure 10). The Russian speakers have sympathies towards
Ukraine, as will be shown with regard to refugees. But to
support the defeat of Russia itself seems to be too big of a
burden for their Russian identity. This becomes especially
clear when looking at North-Eastern Estonia with its main
city of Narva, where a majority of the Russian speakers live.
There, 73% disagree with the prospect of arming Ukraine
(figure 11).
When asked about Estonia taking in Ukrainian refugees, Es-
tonian society in general is welcoming. The Estonians agree
with 94% for and only 3% against, while the Russian-speak-
ing minority is slightly less enthusiastic, with 72% in favor
and 23% opposed (figure 12). When it comes to Russian cit-
izens fleeing their country because of persecution, hardship,
or avoiding mobilization, the Russian-speaking minority is
less forthcoming: 53% would accept them, but 38% would
Respondents who speak
Estonian in their family
80%
51%
34%
15%
4%
2% 1%
Difficult to say/NA
11
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 9
Who do you think is primarily responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

Russia 30 52 89

USA 20 14 2

Ukraine 9 23 1

The separatists 7 2

NATO 6 2

EU/ European countries 2 1

Other 5 3 1

Difficult to say/ NA 21 4 6

Figure 10
To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements: Western countries should arm Ukraine
to the extent that it is able to defeat Russia completely and liberate all its territory (including Crimea)
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

12 9 6
16 22

19
Respondents 42
Respondents 24 Respondents
17 who speak both
who speak Russian who speak Estonian
29 Estonian and Russian
in their family in their family
in their family
65
12

26 17

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

12
 LOOKING TOWARDS UKRAINE: CAUTIOUS SOLIDARITY

Figure 11
To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements: Western countries should arm Ukraine
to the extent that it is able to defeat Russia completely and liberate all its territory (including Crimea)
Answers depending on who speaks Russian in the family. All figures in %

58 42

14 14 29 31 12
Northern Estonia

Tallinn 1 11 36 37 16

North-Eastern Estonia

19 40 41

26 12 37 25
Central Estonia

Western Estonia

8 4 28 51 8

Southern Estonia

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

not accept any refugees at all from Russia. The Estonians are
even less welcoming in this case: 32% would accommodate
them, but 61% are opposed (figure 13).
When looking at Russia’s arguments justifying the war, the
difference between the Russian-speaking minority and the
Estonians could not be bigger. Whereas 61% of the Rus-
sian-speaking minority believe that Russians and Ukrainians
are one nation, 83% of the Estonians oppose that argument.
Almost 40% of the Russian-speaking minority believe that
Western countries and Ukraine threaten Russia’s security,
while 87% of the Estonians disagree. And whereas 52% of
the Russian-speaking minority do not agree with the claim
that Ukraine is a territory taken from Russia, 93% of the Es-
tonians disagree with this statement (figure 14).
The survey shows a cautious solidarity with Ukraine on the
part of the Russian-speaking minority. But only to a certain
extent, which does not include any defeat of Russia, at least
not for the vast majority of the Russian speakers. And it also
seems difficult for them to re-adjust to a new situation, where
the sympathy in general lies with Ukraine and not with Russia.

Figure 12
A large number of Ukrainians have fled to some European Union countries.
What do you think Estonia should do about Ukrainian refugees?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents Respondents Respondents

who speak Russian who speak both Estonian who speak Estonian
in their family and Russian in their family in their family

6% 3%
5% 8% 13% 3%
23% 25%
30%

66% 49%
69%

Estonia should try to take in as many Ukrainian refugees as possible without much bureaycracy
Estonia should accept only a certain number of Ukrainian refugees, not too many Estonia should not accept Ukrainian refugees at all
Difficult to say/NA

13
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 13
A large number of Russia citizens are currently fleeing to other countries in order not to get mobilized and to avoid different
persecutions and hardships. What do you think Estonia should do about Russian refugees?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents Respondents Respondents

who speak Russian who speak both Estonian who speak Estonian
in their family and Russian in their family in their family

4% 2%
9% 11% 7%
30%
36%
38% 49%
53% 61%

Estonia should try to take in as many Russian refugees as possible without much bureaycracy
Estonia should accept only a certain number of Russian refugees, not too many Estonia should not accept Russian refugees at all
Difficult to say/NA

Figure 14
Various statements have been made in society regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the course of these events.
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

59%

The Russians and

42%
the Ukrainians are, 36%
in fact, one nation
25% 24% 22% 24%
17% 19%
9% 11%
4% 4% 5%
1%

71%

Western countries 43%

and Ukraine threaten
Russias security
23% 22% 21%
16% 18% 16% 16%
13% 15% 13%
7% 5%
2%

80%

In essence, Ukraine 54%

is not a permanent state
in its own right - it is
a territory taken
26% 26%
from Russia 22%
16% 16%
11% 13%
10%
7% 8% 6%

0% 0%

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

14
 LOOKING TOWARDS THE WEST: UNWAVERING SKEPTICISM

LOOKING TOWARDS THE WEST:

STILL SUSPICIOUS

Russia has always maintained a certain wariness towards the
West, skeptical of its motives in working with Russia. Did the
West genuinely believe in cooperation or was it always based
on egoistic motives to keep Russia down and the West up?
Since Peter I opened the window towards the West in the
18th century there have been opposing camps in Petersburg
and Moscow: those who saw the West as the sine qua non
for modernization and those who felt that Russia needs its
own modernization, based on its own possibilities and needs.
The Russian-speaking minority is even more torn, because
they face an additional element in the equation – Estonia.
Many Russians do not feel themselves as part of a minority
but rather as equal citizens of the Baltic country, especially
those who were born in Estonia.
That might explain why one third of the Russian speaking-mi-
nority feel that Estonia might lose its sovereignty to Brussels,
to the EU bureaucracy. Another 43% think this is possible,
but unlikely (figure 15). With such fears in mind, almost 40%
of the Russian-speaking minority think that Estonia should
work neither with the EU nor with Russia to maintain the
values of Estonia (40% support cooperation with the EU, on-
ly 9% with Russia). Concerning doubts about the EU, the
Estonians have a similar opinion, with 37% agreeing that Es-
tonia should work neither with the EU nor Russia (figure 16).
The most important ally of Estonia for both the Estonians and
the Russian speakers is Finland, followed by the country’s
neighbors Latvia and Lithuania. The Russian-speaking minor-
ity does not favor the US or the UK (figure 17). The Estonians
disagree, and are grateful especially to London as responsible
for the Enhanced Forward Presence of NATO in Estonia. The
Russian-speaking minority see as allies Germany (38%) and
Sweden (36%).

Figure 15
In your opinion, what is the possibility that such events can happen in Estonia and in the world in the future:
Total loss of Estonia’s sovereignty and getting under Brussels control
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

43%

Respondents
who speak Russian 33% 16%
in their family

8%

64%

Respondents
who speak both
Estonian and Russian 14%
in their family
14%
7%

39%

Respondents 37%
who speak Estonian
in their family
18%
6%

It is entirely possible It is possible, but unlikely It is not possible Difficult to say/NA

15
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 16
With whom should Estonia more cooperate to achieve the following?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

11 36 64
21 8
9 25
Economic prosperity
and growth
55 69 83

1
11 13 6 13 74
12
Providing security 14
and defense
61 69 88

11 4 13 9 2
21 17
Development of culture, 14
17
entertainment, cinema,
theatre and the arts
51 65 75

11 9 4 9 5

Maintaining 33 37
the values of Estonia 39 40 57
54

Russia The EU Neither Don’t know/NA

Figure 17
Which of the following countries do you consider to be Estonia's most important allies?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Ki ng dom Pol and

Un i te d
Ger
e den ma
ny
Sw
60 46
Fr a
A nc
US 52 37 e

69 24
32 57
ia

Ca
an

57 52
na
hu

da
Li t

58 50 45 24
Dif

16 32
ficu

36 38
ia

69 19
La tv

lt to

26 22
70 5
say

51 6
68 6
N o ne o

52 7
Fin land

77
f the se

2
77 4
56 13

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

16
 LOOKING TOWARDS THE WEST: STILL SUSPICIOUS

Figure 18
In overall, how has your opinion of these countries changed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

5 21 30 47 25
8 14
Ukraine 32 23 6 20 6
21 20 16 2 2
4

11 11 5 29 18 4 33 23
Poland 40 33 34 7
22 11 12 1
5 2

European 14 10 30 21 29
7
43 6 29 10 33 6
Union 21 10 9 12 7
3

11 10 27 22 26
USA 6 37 6 29 12 40 6
19 19 9 14
4 2

9 12 26 22 4 10 18
Germany 45 8 25 40 7
20 7 8 15 20
5

5
8 12 22 24 17
France 48 8 29 6 42 8
18 7 10 9 22 6

5
11 19 9 0 0 5 4
Russia 36 7 18 8
21 20 11 35 5 84

Significantly improved Slightly improved Slightly worsened Significantly worsened No change Difficult to say/NA

When it comes to changing attitudes towards different coun- Germany’s special relations with Russia seem to be over, also
tries after the war, the views of the Russian-speaking minor- in the opinion of Russian speakers in Estonia. Germany is not
ity have become more negative in all cases. Interestingly seen as a special ally, nor has the Russian-speaking minority
enough, the countries for which the most opinions have be- seen any improvement in the relationship since the beginning
come more negative are Ukraine and Russia (both 41%), of the war. And German chancellor Olaf Scholz is seen more
more than the US (38%) or Poland (33%), which are both negatively than positively.
countries usually seen as having a negative stance towards
Russia. The view towards Germany and France has also be-
come more negative for 27% and 25% of respondents, and
towards the EU for 21%. For the majority of Estonians the
view of Ukraine has improved by 72%, while the view of
Russia has worsened by 89% (figure 18).

These numbers correspond with the ratings of major political

leaders. The Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky is seen
positively by 94% of Estonians, followed by US president Joe
Biden (79%). The Russian-speaking minority favors Hungari-
an prime minister Viktor Orban (37%) and Belarusian presi-
dent Alexander Lukashenko (36%). The Russian president
Vladimir Putin and French president Emmanuel Marcon are
both rated positively by 35% of Russian speakers, but nega-
tively by greater numbers (Putin 53%, Macron 39%). The
Russian-speaking minority has no clear international political
champion (figure 19).
17
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 19
Please tell me how you rate each of them: do you rate this person's performance very positively, rather positively,
rather negatively, or very negatively?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

24% 43%
29% 11% 55% 39%
President of Ukraine 25% 12%
Volodymyr Zelensky 2% 21% 3%
13% 12% 1%
7% 2%

33% 14% 63%

25%
43% 20%
President of The United 2%
States Joe Biden 2% 10%
20%
20% 16% 16% 5%
1% 6% 6%

15% 6% 53%
18% 30% 8%
19% 11% 9%
Russian politician 20% 5%
Alexei Navalny 5%
20% 21% 23%
15% 14%
9%

26% 10% 11% 9%

51% 17%
12% 37% 21% 4%
German Chancellor 5%
31%
Olaf Scholz
21% 16% 17%
1% 6% 5%

30%
9% 54% 14% 50% 28%
4% 8%
President of France 34% 3% 4%
Emmanuel Macron 23% 2%
17%
4% 11%
1% 3%

12% 7% 5% 5%
19% 27% 39% 4%
26% 17%
19%
Belarusian politician
Svetlana Tichanovskaya 17%
21% 24% 19%
19% 15%
7%

15% 4% 27%
19% 6% 35% 27%
12%
Hungarian prime minister 33%
35% 9%
Viktor Orbán 24% 15%
12%
14%
4% 5% 3%

23% 53% 77%

27%
President of Belarus 26%
11% 10%
Alexander Lukashenko 2%
8% 15% 2%
10% 12% 14%
4% 1% 5%

22% 58% 92%

31%
Russian President 25% 8%
Vladimir Putin 5%
1% 9%
14% 5% 1%
10% 10% 6% 1% 2%

Very positively Rather positively Rather negatively Very negatively Haven’t heard of such person Difficult to say/NA

18
 LOOKING TOWARDS ESTONIA: DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP

LOOKING TOWARDS ESTONIA:

DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP

The Russian war against Ukraine has had quite an impact on
Estonian society. The Russian-speaking minority has always
been a challenge for the Estonians, because they feel that the
minority should have left Estonia right after the country re-
gained independence in 1991. But the minority stayed –
partly because they do not feel themselves as a minority, and
partly because they no longer view themselves as Russians
but rather as Baltic Russians who do not want to go back. At
the same time, they feel cornered and not welcomed. The
Russian war against Ukraine has again brought their difficult
relationship with the Estonian society up to the forefront of
public discussion.
Over half of the Russian-speaking minority and the Estonians
agree that serious ethnic conflicts between Estonians and
Russian speakers in Estonia are possible, but unlikely. Almost
one quarter of the Estonians think this is entirely possible,
while 14% of the Russian speaking minority supports that
view (figure 20). Interestingly, 57% of the Estonians think
that the attitude in the country towards the Russian-speak-

Figure 20
In your opinion, what is the possibility that such events can happen in Estonia and in the world in the future:
Serious ethnic conflicts between Estonians and Russian-speakers living in the Estonia
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

52%

Respondents
who speak Russian 30%
in their family
14%
3%

57%

Respondents
who speak both
Estonian and Russian
in their family 23% 18%

2%

62%

Respondents
who speak Estonian
in their family
23% 11%

4%

It is entirely possible It is possible, but unlikely It is not possible Difficult to say/NA

19
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 21
Taking into account your own personal experience and observations, has the attitude of Estonians towards
the Russian-speaking population of Estonia changed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Has it…
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents
who speak Russian 14 33 31 42 7
in their family

Respondents
who speak both
25 34 6 26 8
Estonian and Russian
in their family

Respondents
who speak Estonian 16 41 11 32 9
in their family

Significantly worsened Slightly worsened Slightly improved Significantly improved No change Difficult to say/NA

ing minority has worsened, whereas 47% of the Rus-
sian-speaking minority thinks that. 42% of them feel that the
attitude has not changed (figure 21).
But 50% of Russian speakers do think that there is discrimi-
nation against people who do not know or only have poor
knowledge of the Estonian language. Only 16% of the Esto-
nians think this (figure 22). And there are more major differ-
ences concerning views towards societal topics. The Rus-
sian-speaking minority looks very critically towards the
demolition of monuments dedicated to the victory of the
Soviet Union in the Second World War: 67% disapprove and
only 5% approve, while 57% of the Estonians approve and
only 12% disapprove (figure 23).
Over half of the Russian-speaking minority feels that there
are not enough political parties or politicians that represent
their interests. 81% of Estonians believe that their own inter-
est are represented by political parties (figure 24). In general,
free expression of one’s opinion is possible. Nonetheless,
over 50% of the Russian-speaking minority feel that it is dif-
ficult to speak freely about Estonian history in the event that
their opinion differs from the official one. By the same token,
58% of Russian speakers think that the same difficulties ap-
ply when it comes to discussing the Russian military invasion
of Ukraine. Estonians see no such problems (figure 25).
One of the core questions the Estonians have for the Rus-
sian-speaking minority is that of patriotism and loyalty. Will
they support the state in the event of war, possibly against
Russia? When asked about their loyalty, 65% of the Rus-
sian-speaking minority answered that they are rather or defi-
nitely patriots of Estonia, whereas 28% said that they are
rather or definitely not (figure 26).

Figure 22
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: There is discrimination in Estonia against people
who do not know or have poor knowledge of the Estonian language
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

42% 9% 41%
5% 33%
23%
23%
7% 37%

18% 17% 18% 14%

12%
2%

Fully agree Rather agree Difficult to say/NA Rather disagree Fully disagree

20
 LOOKING TOWARDS ESTONIA: DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP

Figure 23
In February 2023, the Estonian Parliament decided that all monuments glorifying the Soviet regime, including those dedicated
to the USSR's victory in the Great Patriotic War, should be demolished in Estonia. What is your attitude to this decision?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents Respondents Respondents

who speak who speak both who speak
Russian in their Estonian and Russian Estonian in their
family in their family family

31%

8% 26%
1%
10%
5%
9%
22%
32% 3%

22%

35%

20%
26%
34%

7% 4% 5%

Strongly support Rather support Rather disapprove Strongly disapprove Neutral attitude Difficult to say/NA

Figure 24
Thinking about the last parliamentary elections, are there any parties
and/or politicians in the Parliament that you would say also represent your interests?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

41%
40%

36%
34%

29%
28%

19%
16%

12%
11%
10%
9%
7%
5%
3%

Definitely More likely Rather not Definitely not Difficult to say/NA

21
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 25
Do you think that people in Estonia can now freely and without fear express their opinions on such issues?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Express attitude towards various

events in Estonian history in case it differs To express attitudes towards Russia and
from the official position of the country its military invasion in Ukraine, if different
(e.g. the question of whether or not the occupation from the official position of the country
of Estonia took place in 1940)

26% 31%

29%
Respondents 26% 27%
who speak Russian 26%
in their family
13%
6% 9% 7%

31% 34%
17%
8%
Respondents
who speak both
Estonian and Russian 34% 20% 20%
24%
in their family
6% 5%

37%
41%

Respondents 40% 19%

who speak Estonian 33%
in their family 11%
4%
2%
6% 7%

Definitely can Rather can Rather can’t Definitely can’t Difficult to say/NA

Figure 26
Thinking about the state of Estonia, please tell me to what extent do you consider yourself a patriot of Estonia?
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

Respondents who speak Respondents who speak both Respondents who speak
Russian in their family Estonian and Russian in their family Estonian in their family

I am definitely
16 30 56
a patriot of Estonia

I am rather
49 39 37
a patriot of Estonia

I am rather not
17 11 4
a patriot of Estonia

I am definitely not
11 15 1
a patriot of Estonia

Don’t know/ NA 7 6 3

22
 CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that the answers of the opinion poll show
that the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia is not mono-
lithic. More than 30 years have past since Estonia regained its
independence. The legacy of the Soviet Union is increasingly
seen as a thing of the past. Estonia has made amazing pro-
gress in all directions, including EU and NATO membership.
Russia chose a different path, which in 2022 lead to a military
aggression against Ukraine. The Russian speaking minority
observed its neighbor’s actions from a close distance and
drew its own conclusions.
As pointed out in this analysis, there remains a group among
the Russian speakers that exhibits a disturbing closeness to
Russian propaganda and disinformation. They hold a more

Figure 27
To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements: European Union and NATO countries should further
support Ukraine militarily, even if Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons as a result
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

11 10 7
14 2
8
30
19
Respondents
Respondents Respondents 45
21 who speak both
28 who speak Russian who speak Estonian
Estonian and Russian
in their family in their family
in their family

12 37

26 29

Answers depending on who speaks Russian in the family. All figures in %

48 52

11 17 33 25 14
Northern Estonia

Tallinn
3 14 29 44 12

9 61 30
North-Eastern Estonia
26 12 37 25
Central Estonia

Western Estonia

8 8 20 55 8

Southern Estonia

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

23
 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – FEELING CORNERED

Figure 28
To what extent do you agree or disagree with following statements: More severe economic sanctions should be
imposed against Russia than current ones, even if this would mean a lower standard of living in Estonia
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family

Respondents Respondents Respondents

who speak who speak both who speak
Russian in their Estonian and Russian Estonian in their
family in their family family

49%

27%

12%
31% 30%
17%

13% 10%
26%
3%
21%

37%

8% 8% 8%

Fully agree Rather agree Rather disagree Fully disagree Difficult to say/NA

positive attitude towards Russia compared to the Estoni-
an-speaking majority. Ukraine is still partly viewed not a
properly independent state or as merely a puppet of the US.
A majority of Russian speakers do not want to side with
Ukraine in the war, yet feel at the same time that siding with
Russia’s position does not feel right. Old clichés, such as the
US or NATO as the eternal enemy, can be seen in a couple of
answers.
But a fair number of the Russian speakers do criticize Russia,
its threat to Europe, its disinformation, and its current presi-
dent. Members of this group see Russia as being responsible
for the war in Ukraine. They see themselves as Estonian patri-
ots and see the value of friendly neighboring states like Fin-
land, Latvia, and Lithuania. Their perception of Russia has
worsened since the beginning of the war.
And then there are those who try to bridge the seemingly
unbearable contradictions of being Russian in Estonia by
finding compromises as in suggesting cooperation with both
the West and Russia. At the same time, a majority do not feel
that there is a favorable climate for open discussions on his-
torical and political disputed topics. It cannot be excluded
that this perception may have led some respondents to ad-
just their answers to certain questions to what they consid-
ered more acceptable responses.
There are still major differences between the Estonian-speak-
ing majority and the Russian-speaking minority. 54% of the
Russian minority does not want to further support Ukraine
militarily if this could lead to the current war spiraling into a
conflict with nuclear weapons (nonetheless, 35% still favor
support). For the Estonians, 82% still endorse support in
such a case, with only 10% disagreeing. Interesting are dif-
ferent answers in the North-Eastern part of Estonia with the
main city of Narva, which is 95% Russian-speaking in com-
parison to the average answers. Here 73% of the Rus-
sian-speaking minority are opposed (figure 27).
A similar contrast can be seen if one looks at the answers to
the question concerning support for sanctions even if it
means a lower standard of living. 63% of the Russian speak-
ers oppose sanctions in this case, whereas the Estonian ma-
jority supports sanctions, at well over 79% (figure 28).
The Russian war against Ukraine is a great challenge for the
Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. Not only do they have
to come to terms with their position towards the war, they
are also more strongly affected by any potential backlash
against Russia, such as the destruction of Soviet war memo-
rials at home in Estonia. And finally, they have to accept that
the Russian Federation is moving away from Europe in par-
ticular and the West in general – for the first time since the
18th century.
One can either deal with the problem or ignore it. The survey
revealed that almost 39% of Russian speakers are not or rath-
er are no longer interested in what is happening in Ukraine.

24
 CONCLUSION

An exception is the North-Eastern part with Narva. In con-
trast, only 11% of the Estonians are not interested (figure 29).
In general, the Estonian government has to come up with
answers to the following questions: How to engage those
parts of the society that do not want to be engaged? Is it up
to the Estonian state to offer bridge-building measures, to
bring the Russian-speaking minority more inclusively into the
rest of the country? Or are the two parts of the society each
simply waiting for the other side to move first?

Figure 29
To what extent are you interested in what is happening in Ukraine? Are you…
Answers depending on the language spoken in the family. All figures in %

4 2 2
17 11 9
22 22

Respondents 44
Respondents Respondents
17 who speak both
who speak Russian who speak Estonian
Estonian and Russian
22 in their family in their family
in their family

44

38
45

Answers depending on who speaks Russian in the family. All figures in %

34 19 19 28

24 30 32 14
Northern Estonia

Tallinn
13 63 8 16

11 38 30 20 1
North-Eastern Estonia
25 36 38 1
Central Estonia

Western Estonia

30 26 16 28

Southern Estonia

Very interested Rather interested Rather not interested Not at all interested Difficult to say/NA

25
 IMPRINT

ABOUT THE AUTHORS IMPRINT

Dr. Reinhard Krumm, born in Hamburg, Germany. From Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Riga office
1991 to 1998 he worked as a journalist in the former Soviet Dzirnavu iela 37-64 | LV-1010 | Latvia
Union, being the Baltic correspondent for Deutsche
Presse-Agentur (dpa) in Riga from 1994 to 1996 and serving Responsible:
as the Moscow correspondent of Der Spiegel magazine from Dr. Reinhard Krumm | Director of the FES in the Baltic States
1996 to 1998. He then joined the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, di- Phone: +371 27 330 765
recting offices in Central Asia (Tashkent) and in the Russian https://baltic.fes.de
Federation (Moscow) as well as the Department of Central https://www.facebook.com/FES.BalticStates
and Eastern Europe (Berlin). In 2016 he set up and directed
the Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe (Vi- Orders/Contact:
enna); since November 2021 he has been the head the Re- Uelle.Keskuela@fes.de
gional Office for the Baltic States (Riga).
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-
Tõnis Stamberg is a managing director of Turu-uuringute Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of
AS since 2005. He started marketing research area on 1999 the FES.
and have worked in several positions in Turu-uuringute AS.
Tõnis holds a master’s degree in Sociology from the Universi-
ty of Tallinn. He has coordinated several international and
local research projects for EU institutions and different uni-
versities in Estonia.

Irina Strapatšuk was born and is currently employed in Es-

tonia. She has been engaged in the field of sociology since
1988. During the years 1988-2016, she held various positions
(ranging from survey manager to data analyst programmer)
at the sociological company Saar Poll. Since the autumn of
2016, she has been employed at the company of social and
market research, Turu-uuringute AS, where she serves as a
project manager and research analyst. She obtained her de-
gree in Russian Philology from Tallinn University.

Graphic design: Agris Bobrovs

FES IN THE BALTIC STATES

The vision of FES Baltics is to see the Baltic States as stable

democracies with a prosperous economy, a just social system
and as important partners in international alliances.

To achieve this, FES promotes dialogue between German,

Baltic and global representatives from politics, business, civil
society and academia. The aim is to overcome challenges in
the areas of geopolitical security, social division, and the rec-
onciliation of economic and social interests.

The FES has been represented in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius

since 1991 and actively supports the political, economic and
social transformation processes.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the authors works. ISBN 978-9916-4-1994-6
 FEELING CORNERED
An Analysis of the Russian-Speaking Minority in Estonia

The military aggression of Russia against
Ukraine had an impact on Estonian
society. The Russian-speaking minority
is trying to cope with the consequences
and their lingering effects. Most difficult
are three challenges – (1) the war itself
against Ukraine, also a former republic
of the Soviet Union, (2) the reaction of
the Estonian government towards the
Russian-speaking minority, and (3) the
seeming end of a long relationship
between Russia and Europe.
Parts of the Russian-speaking minority
still remain suspicious of the West. They
are critical of its institutions, such as the
EU and NATO. They are worried about
different values and view politicians in
the West and the East differently than
the Estonian majority. Most importantly,
they analyze the war in line with the
arguments of Moscow – that Ukraine
and Russia are one nation and one
territory.
There are major differences of opinion
regarding Estonian society. Especially
controversial are topics such as lan-
guage, the tearing down of Soviet
monuments, and political representa-
tion – or lack thereof. The relationship
between the Estonian majority and the
Russian-speaking minority is seen as
problematic. One reason is that the
Russian-speaking minority does not
feel itself represented well by parties or
politicians.

Further information on the topic can be found here:

https://baltic.fes.de