Dalla Rosa - Dominating The Auspices

Priests and State in the Roman World
Edited by James H. Richardson and Federico Santangelo

POTSDAMER
ALTERTUMSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE
BEITRÄGE (PAwB)
Herausgegeben von
Pedro Barceló (Potsdam), Peter Riemer
(Saarbrücken), Jörg Rüpke (Erfurt)
und John Scheid (Paris)
––––
Band 33
Priests and State
in the Roman World
Edited by James H. Richardson
and Federico Santangelo
Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2011

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen
Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese
Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.
ISBN 978-3-515-09817-5
Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen

des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar.
Dies gilt insbesondere für Übersetzung, Nachdruck,
Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie
für die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen.
Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier.
© 2011 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart
Druck: AZ Druck und Datentechnik GmbH, Kempten
Printed in Germany
DOMINATING THE AUSPICES:
AUGUSTUS, AUGURY AND THE PROCONSULS
Alberto Dalla Rosa
It is well known that augury played a very important part in the construction of
Augustus’ own image as founder of a new era for the city of Rome. Augustus was
himself an augur and made frequent use of augural symbols on coins and on
monuments. Through the performance of the ancient rite of the augurium salutis
in the year 29 BC, Octavian was celebrated as the bringer of peace to the State,
and the ceremony was repeated several times before Augustus’ death in AD 14.1
Moreover, the name Augustus itself had a clear and acknowledged connection
with augurium.2 This title had an obvious religious meaning, but it had some po-
litical implications as well. Octavian and the leading intellectuals of his era (such
as Varro, Livy and Ovid), were well aware of the significant role of augury in the
city’s foundation and beyond. The augural law concerned a number of aspects of
Roman private, religious and political life.3 The validity of numerous acts carried
out by magistrates depended on the goodness of their auspicationes and this again
depended on their conformity with the augural rules.4 This is why Cicero con-
sidered the augurate the most important priesthood for the correct and virtuous life
of the State, and the auspices one of the two pillars of the Republic, together with
the Senate.5 The written nature of the libri augurales meant that any change to
them had to be approved by the college of the augurs, although in our evidence
there is only one case in which this procedure is attested, and that was when Cae-
sar was created dictator by a praetor and not by a consul as was customary. Since
the augural law did not allow the dictio by anyone other than a consul, an official
decretum augurum was needed to change the rule and to give the dictatorship to
Caesar in the consuls’ absence from Rome.6
1 Suet. Aug. 31.4; Cass. Dio 51.20.4. On the rite cf. Linderski 1986, 2255-2256; on the political
significance for Octavian cf. Linderski 1986, 2226 and 2291; more recently Kearsley 2009,
who exaggerates the role played by the augurium salutis in the process that eventually gave
sole rule to Augustus.
2 Ov. Fast. 1.593-616.
3 An interesting discussion of the intellectual debate about augury in Augustus’ time is found
in Green 2009.
4 This fact led Giovannini 1998, 106 to compare the augural college with a modern constitu-
tional court.
5 Cic. Rep. 2.17: duo firmamenta rei publicae. The most notable statement about the role of the
augurs in the State can be found in Cic. Leg. 2.20-21 and particularly in 2.31-33. Other Cice-
ronian passages concerning this priesthood are usefully collected by Tucker 1976.
6 Cic. Att. 9.9.3.
244 Alberto Dalla Rosa
If the augural books were so important for the correct creation and function-
ing of Rome’s institutions, why are they so often neglected by our sources even
when it comes to the implementation of radical changes to the tradition? We have
no evidence for any decree of the augurs when the first prorogation was conceded
to a magistrate in 324 BC, nor when a private person was given imperium consu-
lare for the first time in 210 BC. Nonetheless, on many occasions the auspices
were at the middle of fierce political battles and remained a central issue up to the
first decades of the Principate.7 On all these occasions every decision was taken
by the civic institutions of the Republic, whose authority was superior to that of
the priests, and in the end the duty of the augurs was and remained simply ensur-
ing the correctness of the procedure.
This paper will try to overcome the condition of our sources and show that,
despite the fact that it is never mentioned, the augural discipline must have played
a considerable part in the imperial monopolisation of victory. It is my intention to
show what the interpretations of the augural doctrine concerning war and tri-
umphs at the end of the Republic were, and to try to understand from these inter-
pretations how the solution that eventually gave Augustus a supremacy over the
other proconsuls evolved. The starting point will be the strange episode of the
triumph that was shared between Octavian and C. Carrinas. Despite the uncertain-
ties associated with it, this case provides the opportunity to investigate the early
stages of a new interpretation of the augural rules about victory. Connected with
Carrinas’ case is the African inscription which mentions the proconsul of AD 7-8,
Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, who won a bellum Gaetulicum fighting under Augus-
tus’ auspices. The central point of this paper will be the explanation and interpre-
tation of Cicero’s view about the nature of the magistracies and the validity of the
auspices of the proconsuls. It is worth pointing out that Cicero’s ideas were not in
accordance with the actual behaviour of magistrates and promagistrates in his day.
Nevertheless Cicero’s opinion could be adopted, and thus used in support of the
idea that Augustus’ auspices were superior to those of the proconsuls. Finally
there will be some remarks on the final affirmation of Augustus’ monopolisation
of victory and the stabilisation of the new hierarchy of the auspices between 19
BC and AD 6.
The reconstruction proposed here may be considered overly hypothetical in
some parts, but nonetheless, even if certainty cannot be established, the argument
will provide a good illustration of the complex interaction between political cir-
cumstance and theoretical interpretation for the adaptation of the auspical tradition
to the new reality of the Principate.
7 Many examples can be found in Linderski 1990 (= Linderski 1995, 560-574).

Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 245
1. THE CARRINAS EPISODE AND ITS INTERPRETATION
After the expiration of the triumvirate, Octavian had to reinvent his position in the
Republic.8 He could count on being designated consul for 31, and on the support
of the vast army that he was readying for the war against Cleopatra and Antony.
Nonetheless, Octavian needed something more to demonstrate that he was not
fighting in his own interests, but on behalf of the Republic. He wanted to identify
himself with the entire State, binding every citizen, Roman or peregrine, of the
western part of the empire to himself through a solemn oath. Augustus himself
recalls that circumstance in his Res gestae (§ 25) saying that more than 700 sena-
tors fought under his standards (sub signis meis). The best men, the boni, the ones
who were to receive the highest honores of the Republic, were all with Octavian,
who was joined by a considerable number of equites too.
The oath did not give Octavian any real new power, but instead provided him
with an auctoritas greater than that of any other aristocrat.9 He conducted the
campaign against Antony and Cleopatra on the basis of his consular imperium.
The new role that Octavian gave to the consulship was in itself relevant and was
clearly used in opposition to Antony, who continued to style himself as triumvir.
Obviously the new position sought by Caesar’s heir inevitably entailed conse-
quences for the holders of imperium, whether they were magistrates or pro-
magistrates. In this context, it is important to recall the events of C. Carrinas’ tri-
umph, which was held either on the 12th of June or on the 14th of July 28 BC, and
which was shared with Octavian for reasons that have not yet been fully clarified.
C. Carrinas, whose father was a victim of the Sullan proscriptions, was one of the
leading Caesarian generals. He campaigned against Sextus Pompeius in Spain in
45, was suffect consul in 43, stood in for Octavian and fought for him against
Sextus Pompeius again in Sicily in 36. Finally, as proconsul of Gallia Comata, he
was victorious against the Morini and other German peoples who had crossed the
Rhine and invaded Roman territory. For these achievements he was granted a tri-
umph, which he held on the Ides of June or July in 28. It is generally agreed that
his proconsulship should be placed in 30-29, because such a date would fit well
with the date of his triumph. This is however not the only possible solution. The
8 A reconstruction of the last years of the triumvirate from a constitutional perspective is given
by Girardet 1990a. His view on the date of the expiration of the triumvirate and on Octa-
vian’s position until 27 BC has been challenged by Roddaz 2003, 405-406, and by Vervaet
2008, 40-44. The problem is far from being resolved, but it is undeniable that Octavian con-
tinued to hold some triumviral prerogatives after dropping the title.
9 A connection between this oath and the consensus uniuersorum of RG 34 is proposed by
Kunkel 1969, 320. Some scholars conjectured that an actual plebiscite gave Octavian ex-
traordinary command (Kienast 1999, 59 n. 240); another interpretation sees the oath as a le-
gitimisation of Octavian’s usurped triumviral authority (Kromayer 1888, 17-19; Herrmann
1968, 78-80; Petzold 1969, 343-351; Fadinger 1969, 145 n.1; De Martino 1972-75, 107-109;
Bleicken 1998, 93; Reinhold 2002, 97-98). But, as Girardet 1990a, 345-346 suggested, Octa-
vian’s position in 32 could have been that of a prorogued triumuir with a designation for the
consulship for the next year (cf. von Premerstein 1937, 42-43).
only narrative of Carrinas’ triumph is provided by Cassius Dio:10
For Gaius Carrinas had subdued the Morini and others who had revolted with them, and had
repulsed the Suebi, who had crossed the Rhine to wage war. Not only did Carrinas, therefore,
celebrate the triumph – and that notwithstanding that his father had been put to death by Sulla
and that he himself along with the others in like condition had once been debarred from hold-
ing office – but Caesar also celebrated it, since the credit of the victory properly belonged to
his position as supreme commander (transl. E. Cary).
This passage comes just after Dio’s account of the first day of the triple triumph
of Octavian and the narrative gives the clear impression that it was on this first
day that the future princeps claimed for himself the achievements of the proconsul
of Gaul.11 The explanation given by Dio is simple: Carrinas did not possess the
autokrator arche. This, and similar expressions like strategos autokrator, are of-
ten used by Dio to identify a generic supreme commander or, more precisely in
relation to Roman warfare, an independent imperium-holder, namely a magistrate
or promagistrate fighting under his own auspicia.12 Such status was the basic pre-
requisite for a triumph, and therefore Dio’s discussion might suggest that Carrinas
was not an independent commander, but one subordinate to Octavian. However,
we know from the fasti triumphales Capitolini,13 that, at the time of his achieve-
ments, Carrinas was proconsul and therefore should have been fighting under his
own auspicia, for it had always been the rule to give this title only to consuls who
had had their imperium prorogued or to private men who had been provided with
consular imperium and who were campaigning independently.
The problem posed by Carrinas’ case has prompted modern scholars to recon-
sider the relationship between the proconsuls and the triumvirs, and that between
the proconsul and Octavian/Augustus.14 Our sources always take for granted a
superiority of Octavian, and this fact has been interpreted in many ways. One so-
lution is to take a stance similar to that of Cassius Dio who imagined that there
was some continuity between the triumviral period and the years 32-28, and who
therefore justified the subordination of the proconsuls by the fact that the trium-
virs and later Octavian had the right to appoint them. For this reason the procon-
suls could not be regarded as supreme commanders, and consequently every tri-
10 Cass. Dio 51.21.6. Cf. Freyburger-Roddaz 1991, 158 n. 204-205.

11 There is no mention of the Gallic and German tribes defeated by Carrinas in the accounts of
the first day of the triumph given by Suet. Aug. 22 and Livy Per. 133.
12 The relevant passages are Cass. Dio 51.21.6 (about C. Carrinas); 51.24.4 (about M. Licinius
Crassus and the spolia opima); 18.57.81 (consul’s superiority over a praetor in a dispute over
the right to triumph); 36.23.4 (Pompey as supreme commander in the war against the pirates);
36.36.2-3 (Roman independent commanders, opposed to lieutenants); 39.14.2 (chief of an
embassy); 40.18.3 (Roman expedition commander); 40.28.2 (Crassus commander-in-chief at
Carrhae); 42.57.5 (Metellus Scipio commander of the Pompeian army at Thapsus); 43.30.2
(Scapula commander of the Pompeian army in Spain); 48.41.5 (Ventidius, Antony’s legate,
not awarded with any honour because he did not fight independently).
13 InscrIt 13.1.86-87, 344-345, 570; for Carrinas’ career cf. PIR2 C 447.
14 Rich 1996, 97 denies that the episode is reliable; contra Östenberg 1999, 160.
umph they celebrated was a kind concession granted by the rulers, rather than a
legitimate right.15 Another solution is based upon two passages from Cicero’s De
diuinatione and De natura deorum that seem to affirm that promagistrates, and
therefore priuati cum imperio too, did not possess auspicia at all. If this were the
case, it would have been easy for Octavian to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
auspices of every proconsul and it could have been on this basis that he shared
Carrinas’ triumph, gradually assuming for himself and his family a control of the
military auspicia and of the religiously correct conduct of warfare.16 Evidence for
this permanent constitutional shift may be provided by an inscription from
Tripolitania, dated to AD 7-8, in which the proconsul Cossus Cornelius Lentulus
is praised for his victory over the Gaetulians in a war conducted under the aus-
pices of Augustus.17
The circumstances surrounding the Carrinas episode are far from clear, but
any explanation for Octavian’s supremacy that is based upon the idea of a perma-
nent constitutional reform risks falling short of providing a reason for the numer-
ous triumphs accorded to the proconsuls in the period from 31 to 19 BC. Had the
auspical prerogatives of Octavian been so strong, or those of the proconsuls so
weak, cases such as that of Carrinas would have been the rule, but because there
are so many cases in which the bestowing of military honours worked as usual, I
believe it is easier to assume that the case of Carrinas was the result of an ad hoc
15 Cass. Dio 48.41.4 wondered how Cn. Domitius Calvinus could have been saluted as imper-
ator for his victories in Spain, for, he says, the region had been assigned to Octavian, who
had to be the legitimate imperator. Even if not stated openly, Dio probably continued to think
in this way for the subsequent period between Actium and 27 BC. Mommsen 1887, 1.130-
132 assumed the total superiority of the triumvirs, justifying the granting of a triumph with
the concession of a fictive imperium to the provincial governors; Schumacher 1985, 191-209
considers the existence of a maior potestas, that would prevent the proconsuls from getting a
triumph if they fought in the same region as one of the triumvirs. A clearer perspective on the
subject is given by Roddaz 1996, 82-87.
16 This position is set out in the excellent series of articles dedicated to imperium and the magis-
tracies of the late Republic by K. M. Girardet, particularly in Girardet 1990a, 118-126 and
Girardet 1992, 218-220. His ideas have been followed by Hurlet 2001 and then further devel-
oped in Hurlet 2006b, 164-173, with some important differences: Girardet dates to 19 BC the
reform that introduced the five year interval between the tenure of the praetorship or the con-
sulship and the provincial government, thus preventing the proconsuls from taking regular
auspicia. This settlement had then paved the way for another act, this time giving to Augus-
tus the monopoly of the auspices. Hurlet, in his most recent contribution on the problem, does
not think that the proconsuls’ auspicia were considered void, but instead gives them an infe-
rior status (auspicia minora) in relation to those of the princeps (auspicia maiora), in the
same way as the auspices of the consuls and the praetors were superior to those of the lesser
magistrates. A more general assumption of a concentration of the military auspices in the
hands of Augustus is expressed, with some differences, by Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101;
Gagé 1930a, Gagé 1930b, Gagé 1933; Grant 1950, 59-72 and 167-169; Rüpke 1990, 241;
Cecconi 1991, 16-17; Pani 1997, 243-244; Scheid 1998, 100-101; Itgenshorst 2004, 452. The
theory of a de facto monopolisation is defended by Kneissl 1969; Eck 1984, 139; Eck 2006,
59; Beard 2007, 295-305.
17 IRT 301.
solution, and therefore constituted an exception. In order to verify this, the first
point that has to be considered is whether or not the proconsuls possessed auspi-
cia, and subsequently, whether or not these auspicia could be considered vitiated.
The history of the auspices is a long one. According to tradition, it predates
the birth of Rome, as Romulus founded the city auspicato.18 Auspicationes were
taken before a great number of activities, both private and public, such as the
crossing of a river, the convening of an assembly of the Senate or the people, or
the commencing of battle. Magistrates, after their nomination, had to take an aus-
pication prior to entering office in order to validate their authority over the citi-
zens.19 They had to take the auspices before crossing the pomerium at the head of
the Roman army. In a solemn ceremony on the Capitol, the magistrate asked the
gods to let him lead the army of the Roman people against the enemy under his
own command and his own auspices. After this act, he had his imperium granted
outside the pomerium, in the military sphere (imperium militiae), until he returned
to the city, crossing the pomerium again and thus relinquishing his military
power.20 This particular aspect of the duration of military powers allowed Q. Pub-
lilius Philo to conclude the siege of Naples in 326 BC having set aside his urban
magistracy, but still holding a regular imperium militiae until he victoriously re-
turned to Rome. This was the first case of ‘prorogation’, not of the magistracy, but
of the imperium based on the auspication taken during the magistracy and prior to
departure for war. War had always been considered to be an activity that was con-
centrated in the period between March and October21 and therefore no magistrate
was ever meant to stay outside the city at the end of his office. But if the urban
magistracy and the connected imperium auspiciumque strictly ended after one
year, this was not the case with the military power. Therefore, in 326 BC the Ro-
18 Cic. Nat. D. 3.5, Diu. 2.33.70, Vat. 6.14.

19 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.5-6: diamanteusasthai peri tes arches; cf. Suet. Aug. 95, App. B Ciu.
3.94. Other sources and discussion in Magdelain 1968, 36-40 and Linderski 1986, 2168-
2172.
20 Had this auspication not been held, then the magistrate would have had no imperium outside
the city and would have been regarded as a priuatus, as is shown by the episode of the consul
C. Flaminius in 217 BC. He did not take the ritual auspication before departing for the war
and therefore the Senate refused to consider him more than a simple private man according to
Livy 22.1.5-7. Another case involves the consul C. Claudius Pulcher in 177 BC, whose im-
perium was not regarded as valid by his own soldiers because he did not take the customary
uota on the Capitol, but preferred to head quickly for his designed province. Pulcher had to
return to Rome to perform the ceremony (Livy 41.10.2-13; cf. Linderski 1993, 69 n. 31 =
Linderski 1995, 624 n. 31). Rüpke 1990, 45-46 has cast some doubts on the real existence of
the auspices of departure as a specific category of auspices, whose validity could extend over
the customary single day period and cover the entire military campaign. His arguments are
probably right, but since this auspication was the basis of the military power of the magis-
trate, it is natural that it was linked with the campaign until its conclusion, namely until the
return to the city. Similarly, the auspices of investiture referred only to the magistrate’s en-
trance into office, but an unfavourable sign was regarded as a bad omen for the whole year
and therefore the magistrate was expected to abdicate (Linderski 1996, 180 = Linderski 2005,
169).
21 Cf. Rüpke 1990, 22-28.
mans decided that the end of the urban auspices did not affect the validity of the
military ones, because of their different duration: fixed for the former ones, but
connected with the crossing of the pomerium for the latter. We do not know if the
augurs were involved in this decision and how much it was debated,22 but in any
case Philo was regarded as fighting under his own auspicia and so was eligible to
celebrate a triumph on his return. The same situation applied to the numerous
other prorogued consuls and praetors in subsequent centuries.
A relevant innovation was introduced during the Second Punic War, when P.
Cornelius Scipio, then a private citizen, was given imperium consulare militiae.23
Scipio could not take the auspication inside the city, because only magistrates
were entitled to do that. Nevertheless he had to validate the power entrusted to
him by means of an auspication, because the Republican tradition could not con-
ceive of any public authority that was not sustained by favourable auspices. We
do not know where and when Scipio took this auspication, but we know from
Livy that he conducted the campaign in Spain under his own auspices and there-
fore his position was considered perfectly legitimate.24 A similar case is presented
by a much later source, the lex arae Augustae Narbonensis, which gives us impor-
tant information about the granting of imperium pro praetore to another private
citizen: Octavian. Propraetorian imperium was given to him by the Senate on
January 2nd, but it was auspicatum five days later, when Caesar’s heir was in
Spoletium.25 This episode is very important for two aspects: firstly, the need for
an auspication to validate a grant of imperium militiae to a private individual; sec-
ondly, the attestation that such an auspication had to be taken outside the pomer-
ium. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that both priuati cum imperio and
magistrates validated their military power and the inherent extra-pomerial author-
ity by means of an auspication, with the important difference that a private man
could do that only outside the pomerium, while a magistrate usually did it in the
city.26
22 For the political context cf. Dalla Rosa 2003, 193-194.

23 Livy 26.2.5-6. Further discussion ibid., 207-212.
24 Livy 26.41.18, 28.16.14.
25 CIL 12.4333 (p. 845) = ILS 112 = AE 1964, 187 = 1980, 609 ll. 21-23: VII quoq(ue) / Idus
Ianuar(ias) qua die primum imperium / orbis terrarum auspicatus est. Speaking of imperium
orbis terrarum, the text uses a hyperbole and refers to that first grant of power that eventually
gave Octavian supreme power. On the powers granted to Octavian cf. RG 1; Livy Per. 118;
Cic. Phil. 6.3, 11.20; App. B. Ciu. 3.51; Cass. Dio 46.29, 46.41. The information about the
location of the ceremony (Spoletium) is given by Plin. HN 11.190. On this inscription see
Magdelain 1968, 53.
26 Rüpke 1990, 46 denies that the auspices of departure were auspicia urbana and allows them
to be taken in the ager Romanus, that is even outside the pomerium (cf. Rüpke 1990, 30-35).
The issue is complex and the same definition of auspicium urbanum as limited by the pomer-
ium-line is given only by the antiquarians Varr. Ling. 5.143 and Gell. NA 13.14.1. But Livy’s
evidence cited above (n. 20, particularly Flaminius’ case) directly links the nuncupatio uoto-
rum on the Capitol and the possession of a iustum imperium auspiciumque. From the same
passages it is clear that there was no other place to celebrate this ceremony except the Capi-
tol, which was inside the pomerium. Pulcher himself makes his repetitio auspiciorum on the
Scipio was denied a triumph because no private man had ever had this honour
before, and this attitude remained unchanged until Pompey triumphed ex Africa
between 81 and 79 BC, after a campaign that was entrusted to him when he had
no magistracy. He obtained the honour again after receiving, as a priuatus, an
extraordinary grant of imperium in order to defeat Sertorius in 77-71, and to fight
the pirates and Mithridates in 67-61.27 These precedents were of great importance
in 52 BC, when the lex Pompeia introduced the deployment of priuati cum impe-
rio in the regular provincial administration, and again some 25 years later, when
the law was reintroduced by Augustus in 27.28 By 28, the year in which Carrinas
triumphed, several other proconsuls had triumphed, although they had been ap-
pointed while still priuati.29
Therefore, in the late first century BC, there was something of a tradition re-
garding priuati cum imperio and their right to hold a triumph. This last point was
strictly connected with the auspication that validated their authority and gave
them the right to fight independently under their own auspices. It could not be
otherwise, because there was no imperium without auspicium.30 However, this
position is apparently challenged by none other than Cicero himself, in two fa-
mous passages:
Nat. D. 2.9: But nowadays the indifference of the nobility has led to the science of the augury
being abandoned; we adhere to the mere forms of the auspices, and despise the truth that they
teach. The result is that the most important activities of the State, including the wars that en-
Capitol (Livy 41.10.11). The augural division of space usually makes no difference within
the ager Romanus, between the inside and the outside of the pomerium, but this sacred line
was fundamental for the distinction between the imperium domi and militiae, as testified by
the different display of the fasces, with or without the axes, carried by the lictors. The auspi-
cation taken before departure for war had to consider the meaning of the pomerium and was,
at least de facto, a strictly urban matter; furthermore, it was considered a solemn public act to
be performed in daylight, and was probably well attended by the people.
27 About the first triumph Cic. Leg. Man. 61; Livy Per. 89; Gran. Lic. 39B.; Plin. HN 7.96. On
the imperia received by Pompey, see Girardet 2001.
28 The lex Pompeia was enforced for just two years and was then replaced by a lex Iulia de
prouinciis in 49. Discussion in Girardet 1987, 293-96; Ferrary 2001, 106-107; Dalla Rosa
2003, 216-220; Hurlet 2006a, 476-483; cf. Campanile 2001, 244-245.
29 Among these were P. Vatinius (cos. 47, procos. in Illyricum 45-43 likely not ex consulatu,
triumphed in 42), L. Marcius Censorinus (praet. 43, procos. 42-40 most probably not ex
praetura, triumphed in 39), C. Sosius (quaest. 39?, procos. in Judaea 38-34, triumphed in 34,
cos. 32), C. Norbanus Flaccus (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 36-34 perhaps not ex consulatu, tri-
umphed in 34), L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 34-33, triumphed in 33), Ap.
Claudius Pulcher (cos. 38, procos. in Spain 33-32/31, triumphed in 31 or before).
30 A later confirmation is provided by Tac. Ann. 3.19.3 where Drusus the Younger is said to
have left the city and retaken the auspices (repetendis auspiciis) in order to celebrate the tri-
umph assigned to him for his deeds in Illyricum in the years AD 17-19 (cf. CIL 14.4534).
This repetitio had been made necessary because Tiberius’ son had entered the city to be pre-
sent at Germanicus’ funeral, and so had lost the imperium militiae received probably as pro-
consul two years previously (cf. Hurlet 1997, 215-216). To be able to celebrate the triumph,
he had to reactivate his imperium but he could do so only with an auspication outside the
pomerium, because his military power was strictly extra-urban.
sure its safety, are conducted without taking the auspices. We no longer take them when
crossing rivers, or witnessing flashing spear-points, or when men are summoned for call-up,
and that is why soldiers no longer make their wills when geared for battle; our commanders
begin their military operations only after dispensing with the auspices (cum auspicia posu-
erunt) (transl. P. G. Walsh).31
Diu. 2.76-77: Our ancestors would not undertake any military enterprise without consulting
the auspices; but now, for many years, our wars have been conducted by pro-consuls and pro-
praetors, who do not have the right to take auspices (qui auspicia non habent). (77) Therefore
they have no tripudium and they cross rivers without first taking the auspices. What, then, has
become of divining by means of birds? It is not used by those who conduct our wars, for they
have not the right of auspices. Since it has been withdrawn from use in the field I suppose it is
reserved for city use only! As to divination ex acuminibus, which is altogether military, it was
wholly ignored by that famous man, Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times and, be-
sides, was a commander-in-chief, as well as a very fine augur (transl. W. A. Falconer).32
Modern scholars have interpreted these texts very differently. The context of both
passages is related to the religious negligence of the Roman ruling class of
Cicero’s time, something that has resulted in the neglecting of the auspices, both
in the public and the private sphere. The passages seem to convey the view that
the Republic had tolerated the idea that military campaigns could be conducted by
people who not only did not consult the auspices but, worse still, did not even
have the right to do so. Much of the interpretation depends on what meaning we
give to Cicero’s phrases auspicia habere and auspicia ponere. Recently, M. Tar-
pin has proposed that both phrases refer to the customary auspications that had to
be taken day by day in the course of the military operations.33 In this case auspicia
habere would mean ‘consult the auspices’, much like senatum habere or con-
tionem habere, i.e. to gather the Senate or the people for consultation. This inter-
pretation could well apply to Diu. 2.77-78, but could not explain the expression
auspicia ponere of Nat. D. 2.9.
Many other scholars, A. Giovannini and F. Hurlet among them, have seen in
Cicero’s words evidence for a more rigorous interpretation of the augural law,34
31 sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa ueritas auspiciorum spreta est, species
tantum retenta; itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in iis bella quibus rei publicae salus
continetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia seruantur, nulla ex acuminibus,
nulli uiri uocantur, ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt; tum enim bella gerere nostri
duces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt.
32 bellicam rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt,
cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent. ita-
que nec amnis transeunt auspicato, nec tripudio auspicantur. ubi ergo auium diuinatio?
quae, quoniam ab iis qui auspicia nulla habent bella administrantur, ab urbanis retenta uide-
tur, a bellicis esse sublata. nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est,
iam M. Marcellus ille quinquiens consul totum omisit, idem imperatori idem augur optumus.
33 Tarpin 2003, 287-289.
34 Giovannini 1983, 60; Hurlet 2006b, 161-164; cf. Magdelain 1968, 55. It is unlikely that
Cicero could refer here to the lex Pompeia of 52, for its provisions had been in place for too
short a time; the passage instead seems to allude to a more general and ancient custom, that
an interpretation similar to that of another important augur, M. Valerius Messalla.

A statement made by Messalla is reported by Varro, according to which no one
but a magistrate could take the auspices. This would mean that, in Messalla’s
view, priuati cum imperio and presumably all consuls and praetors whose im-
perium had been prorogued could not take the auspices.35 But, if a prorogued
magistrate had no right to auspicate, then his power had to be considered void. A
similar position was defended by the consuls of 187 BC, M. Aemilius Lepidus
and C. Flaminius. Livy reports that they complained in the Senate over the proro-
gation of their predecessors in Macedonia and Asia, saying that, if Rome wanted
to maintain an army in those regions, it had to be led by the consuls and not by
private men.36
Prorogued magistrates could not act inside the city, because their magistracy
had expired and therefore they had ‘deposed’ their auspicia urbana. For a strict
traditionalist, a magistracy was marked by a series of actions that were to be car-
ried out inside the pomerium, or at least in the ager Romanus. Cicero himself did
not want to go to a province during his consulship, giving a central significance to
the political and urban role of the supreme magistracy. However there was, as we
have seen, a vigorous series of interpretations and precedents that allowed pro-
rogued magistrates to exist and to fight under their own auspicia, and this was the
case for the priuati cum imperio as well.
The opinions of Cicero and Messalla were and remained largely academic,
and it is very unlikely that they could be adopted tout court by Octavian to justify
his supremacy over the proconsuls.37 In fact, saying simply that proconsuls like
Carrinas had no auspices, was like saying that they had no power at all, because
there was no imperium without the right to take the auspices. Imperium that had
not been validated by auspication did not exist, as a lex rogata against the aus-
pices did not need to be abrogated, simply because it never existed.38
of the magistrates remaining most of the year in the city and leaving for their province only
in the last weeks of office.
35 Varr. Ant. Hum. fr. 84 (ap. Non. 92.8): de coelo auspicari ius nemini sit praeter magistratum.
36 Livy 38.42.9-10, with the final sentence: si exercitus in his terris esse placeat, consules iis
potius quam priuatos praeesse oportere. For the political context of the passage see Briscoe
2008, 150-153.
37 Cicero did not regret asking for a triumph for his achievements in Cilicia (Fam. 11.1.1) and
for this reason remained outside the city until he was sent to recruit news forces to face the
invasion of Caesar in 49 (Fam. 16.11.3, 12.5; Att. 7.11.15, 14.2, 15.2, 8.3.4, 11B.1 and 3,
11D.5.9, 11A.2).
38 There were many ways in which a law could be declared to have been passed against the
auspices. In general, the claim had to do with the validity of the auspications taken before the
convening of the popular assembly, and involved the interpretation of sudden signs from the
sky, like thunder. These signs were considered an expression of disapprobation intentionally
given by the gods and were therefore called auspicia oblatiua. Cic. Phil. 5.7-8, 16 uses this
argument to claim that a law by Antony was passed against the auspices. Apparently, the au-
gur in charge of reporting such auspices was intimidated and did not report what had to be
considered a clear sign given by Jupiter through a thunder clap (7: silet augur uerecundus
Our evidence suggests that during the first decades of the Principate things
went on according to the normal Republican praxis, and therefore the cases in
which the auspical superiority of Octavian/Augustus seems to be in place were
most probably the result of ad hoc measures. These could not be based on a sup-
posed nullity or imperfection of the auspices of the proconsuls, but could only
take advantage of Octavian’s constitutional and moral position. For this reason, it
is fundamental to try to find some analogous cases, in which we can see two gen-
erals with the same imperium fighting one under the auspices of the other. This
will be the subject of the next section.
2. THE CONSULS AND THE PROCONSULS:

CASES OF SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSPICES
F. Hurlet has recently proposed that we should see subordination to the auspices
of Augustus only when proconsuls were nominated directly by the emperor and
without recourse to the lot, i.e. extra sortem. This happened unquestionably in the
case of Cossus Cornelius Lentulus in AD 6-8, who had been nominated by the
emperor after a special decree of the Senate had authorised the emperor to choose
every provincial governor and to appoint them for two years to face the calami-
tous series of insurrections that were taking place throughout the Empire.39 Ac-
cording to Hurlet, Augustus was given this prerogative in 19 BC, as a corollary of
a reform that set his auspicia as greater (maiora) than those of the proconsuls,
considered somewhat invalid for the reasons expressed by Cicero.40
This solution has many merits, but poses two difficulties: the use of the Cice-
ronian passages quoted above, and its inapplicability to the case of Carrinas for
chronological reasons. Nevertheless the connection between the auspical promi-
nence of the emperor and the nomination of the proconsuls in AD 6-8 finds a sig-
nificant parallel in the status of Octavian in 31 BC. As we saw at the beginning,
Caesar’s heir had an unprecedented position in the Republic, as he himself recog-
nises in his Res gestae, and yet it is not his constitutional position that takes centre
stage, but his moral one. As Octavian wrote, his intention was not to gain a greater
potestas over his colleagues in the magistracies, but to define his prominence by
exploiting his extraordinary auctoritas.41 This grew enormously after the con-
iuratio of Italy and the western provinces, but probably much more when almost
the whole Senate (except those who deserted to join Antony) and a good number
of equites fought with him in the campaign. In other words, the whole of the Re-
public was fighting under his guidance, that is under his own auspicia. A hint to
sine collegis de auspiciis. quamquam illa auspicia non egent interpretatione; Ioue enim
tonante cum populo agi non esse fas quis ignorat?).
39 Cass. Dio 55.28.2; IRT 301.
40 Hurlet 2006b, 166-173. It remains unclear how the passages of Cicero (Nat. D. 2.9; Diu.
2.77) could be used to justify an inferior status of these auspices, because, as we have seen,
they seem to say that proconsuls did not have auspicia at all.
41 RG 34.
this effect may be found in the text of the Res gestae itself, when Augustus speaks
of the number of senators and equites that fought under his standards (sub signis
meis tum militauerint).42
To serve under the standards of a general, and in particular of a consul, meant
clearly to be under his auspices, as shown by several passages of Livy.43 A further
detail given by the Res gestae is that such a position of prominence was intended
to be limited to the war that was won at Actium, and therefore could not be ex-
tended beyond this point in time.44
Given these elements, Octavian had many arguments to affirm that, from the
beginning of his third consulship to September 2nd, the date of the victory of Ac-
tium, every military action conducted by generals of the Republic had to be placed
under his auspices, and therefore any achievement by them had to be referred only
to his person. Such a claim would have been unprecedented, but later evidence
tells us that in AD 6-8 something similar happened. The year 31 could thus be
seen in hindsight, and could furnish a reasonable explanation for Carrinas’ case.
In fact, nothing prevents us from placing the achievements of the proconsul of
Gaul in the year 31. The provincial fasti are fragmentary for that period, but a
two-year tenure of the proconsulship does not seem unreasonable and surely Oc-
tavian needed to entrust the Western provinces to his most loyal collaborators
before departing for the East.45
The most important question is related to the legal arguments that Octavian
could employ to give some strength to his claim. We have already seen the coni-
uratio Italiae and the fact that the best men of the Republic served under his stan-
dards. But further claims could be based on the magistracy that he held at that
time, the consulship. Regarding this point, there were some precedents for the
subordination of proconsuls to consuls and Octavian probably knew them.
According to the regular practice of provincial administration under the Re-
public, when a magistrate was sent to replace another magistrate of the same rank,
the latter had to hand over command and return to Rome.46 A proconsul had the
same imperium consulare of the consul that would succeed him, but it was princi-
pally a matter of auctoritas that gave strength to the position of the consul.47 Fur-
thermore, it would not have been a good move for a proconsul to go against the
42 RG 25.
43 Livy 28.27.12 (auspicia sub quibus militatis); 36.17.3 (qui in hac eadem prouincia T. Quincti
ductu auspicioque militaueritis); in 22.30.5 (sub imperium auspiciumque tuum redeo et signa
haec legionesque restituo) Minucius Rufus handed over his standards to the dictator Q.
Fabius Maximus as a sign of submission to his auspices, thus providing us with a good ex-
ample of the equivalence of having one’s own standards and fighting under one’s own aus-
pices.
44 RG 25 refers only to the war that was won in Actium (Italia … belli quo uici ad Actium
ducem depoposcit).
45 In the same years we find C. Calvisius Sabinus in Spain (who could have been there from 31
to 28 as postulated by Broughton 1986, 2.421, cf. PIR2 C 352), L. Autronius Paetus in Africa
and M. Valerius Messalla as Carrinas’ successor in Gaul.
46 For example Livy 36.37.6, 39.54.3.
47 For this point cf. Staveley 1963, 475-477.
Senate’s decision to replace him with a regular magistrate. This lack of a clear
hierarchy between magistrates and promagistrates is probably the principal reason
why the instances of consuls and proconsuls operating simultaneously on the
same battlefield are very rare. It is not surprising that the examples are predomi-
nantly found only in periods of intense military action, such as the Second Punic
War.
To my knowledge, the first circumstance was the ominous campaign that led
to the defeat of Cannae. At the beginning of 216 BC Cn. Servilius Geminus and
M. Atilius Regulus, the consuls of the previous year, were left in Apulia to control
Hannibal’s movements, while the new consuls recruited new men for the army.
Both arrived in Cannae probably at the beginning of the summer, joining the two
proconsuls. At this point Livy notes that Geminus and Regulus had already had
their imperium prorogued, while Polybius states that they were made antistrategoi
by the consul L. Aemilius Paullus.48 The word used by the Greek historian is not
immediately understandable, but in any case cannot be taken as a formal degrada-
tion of the two former consuls, first of all for procedural reasons. A degradation of
imperium could have hardly been possible without the participation of the people,
and the delegation of praetorian imperium would seem very strange, if not absurd,
to a person that already held consular power.49 Furthermore, Livy refers to Servil-
ius simply as prioris anni consul, giving the impression of a normal prorogation.50
Nevertheless, both Livy and Polybius make it clear that Servilius was a subordi-
nate of the two consuls that led the operations. The battle ended up being the
worst defeat in Roman history and Servilius himself, commanding the centre of
the army, fell during the course of it.
A second case occurred in 204 and again in relation to Hannibal’s dangerous
presence in Italy. The consul P. Licinius Crassus Dives was sent against Hannibal
in Bruttium in 205. At the beginning of the next year, the Senate decided to leave
him in place to control the enemy until it seemed appropriate to his successor, the
consul P. Sempronius.51 After he arrived in the ager Crotoniensis, Sempronius did
not seek the proconsul’s help and clashed alone with Hannibal’s forces. Being
defeated, he contacted Crassus and ordered him to join his forces for the next bat-
tle. With two armies, Sempronius did not hesitate and attacked again, leading the
48 Livy 22.34.1; Polyb. 3.106.2.

49 Contra Brennan 2000, 640-41. Concerning the role of the people, we have the example of an
increase of imperium in 217, when the authority of the magister equitum Minucius Rufus was
made equal to that of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus (Livy 22.25.10), and perhaps in 215,
when the people may have given an imperium pro consule to the praetor M. Claudius Marcel-
lus (cf. Brennan 2000, 192; Dalla Rosa 2003, 207); other interventions concerned the com-
plete abrogation of the powers of a certain magistrate (cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.629). As
all these cases present exceptional circumstances, we cannot speak of strict rules, but it seems
clear that the modification of someone’s imperium could not be simply arranged by another
magistrate.
50 The same opinion is expressed by Jashemski 1950, 102 n. 102 and Walbank 1957, 1.435.
51 Livy 29.13.3: quoad eum in prouincia cum imperio morari consuli e re publica uisum esset.
assault, while Crassus remained behind, ready to bring help if necessary.52 In this
way, the consul alone could be said to have reported the victory, and probably he
was well aware that an active participation of the proconsul could have resulted in
an unwanted claim to share the honour deriving from the success. In fact, such a
dispute would not have been unpredictable, given the precedent of 242, when the
praetor Q. Valerius Falto won a naval battle against the Carthaginians while the
consul C. Lutatius Catulus remained inactive. Falto argued that he deserved the
triumph, but after much debate the Senate decide that it was the consul that had to
be credited with the victory because of his superior imperium and auspicium.53 On
the basis of this precedent and given that the assignment of a triumph was often a
matter of dispute, Sempronius did not rely much on the superiority given to him
by the Senate and, considering the consular status of his collaborator, preferred to
avoid every risk and so acted alone.54
The third and final case is another Roman defeat, this time at Arausio in 105
BC. Q. Servilius Caepio had received Gaul as his consular province the year be-
fore, but refused to hand over his command to the new consul Cn. Manlius Maxi-
mus. The Senate had sent him with the intention of replacing the proconsul (as is
clearly indicated by the use of metepempsato by Cassius Dio) and therefore no
collaboration had been planned. However Manlius had no formal power to dis-
miss Servilius, for the two generals had the same imperium consulare. Servilius
clearly did not consider the prominence of the magistrate to be enough to concede
the supreme command to him. Therefore the two Roman armies were prepared to
fight separately against the Cimbri, and Servilius tried in every way to take a posi-
tion between the consul and the enemy, because, as Cassius Dio reports, he had
‘the evident intention of being the first to join battle and so of winning all the
glory of the war’.55
These examples seem to offer little help in solving the problem of Octavian’s
auspical prominence in the Republic at the time of Actium. Anyway, if we have to
think about Roman religion and warfare, precedents can be very important and
these examples can give us some precious evidence.
The first thing that has to be noted is that it was the consul, the regular magis-
trate, that was always meant to be the commander-in-chief (strategos autokrator)
in case of any collaboration with a proconsul. This seems quite logical in a period
when the consuls still had a central role in the fabric of the State and especially in
the conduct of military campaigns. But, apart from the case of Cannae in which it
seems that the Senate was in favour of maintaining the former consuls in the field,
any joint action resulted from the decision of one of the generals: the consul in the
52 Livy 29.36.6-9.
53 Val. Max. 2.8.2. The fasti attribute the triumph to both magistrates (InscrIt 13.1.76-77;
Stewart 1998, 120-122). This is a clear sign that, despite the differences in levels of im-
perium, consuls and praetors were independent generals by their nature, as was pointed out
by Last 1947, 159; Staveley 1963, 471.
54 Cf. recently Beard 2007, 206-214.
55 Cass. Dio 27.91.1-3. More concise accounts of the event are provided by Livy Per. 67; Flor.
1.38.4; Gran. Lic. 17B; Eutr. 5.1.1; Oros. 5.16.17.
case of the year 204, the proconsul in the case of 105. The case of Arausio is par-
ticularly interesting, because it shows all the problems of the archaic system of the
Roman magistracies when it had to face the administration of a large empire,
which needed to be carried out by many officials.
Servilius Caepio could argue that his imperium was equal to that of Manlius,
but his deliberate aim was to obtain the glory of a triumph. Had his troops fought
under the consul’s standard, then he would have definitively lost the right to fight
under his own auspicia. Given the absence of strict regulations for the awarding
of triumphs, his only chance to keep his hopes alive was to attack first and to keep
Manlius away from the enemy, in order to prevent him from having any claim to
the possible victory. Nevertheless, the main question remained the determination
of whether he was fighting under his own auspices or not.
A hierarchy was actually put in place at the battle of Cannae. The consuls had
the leadership and the proconsul Servilius was clearly subordinate to them. The
subordination meant in the first place that Servilius had to fight under the auspices
of the consuls (actually under those of the consul that had his turn in the daily
rotation of the auspices).56 That, and not any change of the level of imperium, was
the only formal way to set the leadership among the three generals pari imperio.
Unfortunately the tremendous defeat meant that no triumph could be celebrated
and so we cannot see which general would have been credited with victory had
there been one, but unquestionably it could not have been Servilius.
In 204 the Senate did not envisage any collaboration between the consul
Sempronius Tuditanus and the proconsul Licinius Crassus, but left it to the magis-
trate’s discretion. The consul did not dismiss Crassus, but nevertheless preferred
to exclude him from the actual fighting against Hannibal. On this occasion as well
the two generals had joined their armies and there should not have been any doubt
that the battle had to be fought under Sempronius’ auspices. Anyway the consul
avoided any kind of participation in the victory and made all contact between
Crassus and the enemy impossible, just to make sure that the proconsul could not
be a contender for any honour deriving from the victory.
A second aspect that has to be pointed out is that the consuls seem not to have
had a theoretical auspical superiority. It was always a concrete situation of danger
that made the Senate decide for a joint action of two or more generals, thus creat-
ing the conditions for a hierarchy of the auspicia. Furthermore, the auspical supe-
riority was strictly connected to the province assigned: according to the cases dis-
cussed above, it seems that it was only when a consul was given the same prouin-
cia as a proconsul that the auspices of the former were intended to be maiora than
those of the latter.
The importance of these precedents for Octavian’s likely claim to be strategos
autokrator of the whole of the Republic in 31 is related to the central role that
they give to the consulship as the only magistracy capable of having greater aus-
56 According to Polyb. 3.110.4, 113.1; Livy 22.45.5; Plut. Fab. Max. 15, Varro was the com-
mander in chief on that day; App. Hann. 19 agrees with this view, but reports that Varro
eventually left the command to Aemilius Paullus.
pices than those of other generals pari imperio. It is well known that between 31
and 23 BC Octavian/Augustus made use of the consulship as the principal instru-
ment to administer the Republic.57 In 27 he received an extraordinary number of
provinces, which he governed by virtue of his consular imperium, like his father
Caesar in 59. As consul he could summon the Senate and he passed many acts of
legislation by virtue of his ius agendi cum populo and cum patribus, something
that he later did on the basis of his tribunicia potestas.58
The consular powers were just one aspect of the plan that Octavian put in
place to redefine his position in the Republic after the expiration of the triumvi-
rate. Despite the unprecedented set of powers that he had, Octavian still wanted to
appear more as the princeps or rector rei publicae outlined in Cicero’s works.59
This figure, according to Cicero, should exercise his good influence on the State
principally by virtue of his moral qualities and of his auctoritas. His political ac-
tion should follow regular Republican practice and therefore the Senate and the
civic magistracies were to remain valuable instruments. In particular, the consul-
ship played a key role in the description of the ideal constitution, as is outlined in
the third book of the De legibus. The consuls possess a regium imperium (limited
only by the tribunician intercession), the militiae summum ius, and their supreme
goal is the safety of the people.60 In another passage Cicero restates that the con-
suls have supreme power and all other magistrates must obey them, with the ex-
ception of the plebeian tribunes.61 The special position of the consuls, this time in
relation to the assigning of the provinces, occurs again in a letter to Atticus62 and
in the Philippics,63 where Cicero clearly states that every province should be at the
consuls’ disposal. The words he uses in the two passages are different: in the for-
mer he speaks of the consul’s right to be assigned to whatever province he desires;
in the latter he seems to imply that the consuls could dispose of, and have power
over, every province, even if not assigned to them. This last passage could be seen
57 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.2.

58 Further evidence is provided by the case of the denial of the spolia opima to M. Licinius
Crassus. A solution to the controversy about the legitimacy of Crassus’ claim is far from be-
ing reached, and I do not intend to risk any new interpretation here. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that Livy (4.20.6) reported that Augustus had said that the last person to have
dedicated the spolia opima was a consul and not a military tribune. That implied that only a
supreme magistrate could receive this honour, because the only two precedents were Romu-
lus, the first king, and M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 222 BC (this is the position held by Syme
1959, 44 [= Syme 1979a, 418], cf. Kienast 1999, 220; for sources cf. Rich 1996, 81 n. 81).
This interpretation conveniently excluded any proconsul like Licinius Crassus.
59 See the famous passage of RG 34: post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis
autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt
(‘After that time, I exceeded all in influence, but I had no greater power than the others who
were colleagues with me in each magistracy’). On the importance of Cicero’s political
thought for Augustus’ consular principate see Grenade 1951 and De Francisci 1968.
60 Cic. Leg. 3.8.
61 Cic. Leg. 3.16.
62 Cic. Att. 8.15.3.
63 Cic. Phil. 4.4.9.
as evidence for a formal superiority of the imperium of the consuls over that of the
provincial governors, but the context of the passage is largely polemical and, de-
spite the general tone of the sentence, there is clear reference to the province of
Gaul, to which Antony wanted to be assigned in place of the proconsul D. Brutus.
Cicero’s assessments did not reflect actual practice but were the result of his
own thinking about magistracies. In fact we know that the provisions of the lex
Sempronia did not give the consuls the chance to get any province but only those
already defined as consular by the Senate before the election. The reforms of 52
by Pompey and of 49 by Caesar do not seem to have introduced any kind of free-
dom of choice for the consuls.64 Cicero’s view seems then to be heavily influ-
enced by his own political reflections on the consulship.65
Another aspect has to be stressed and it concerns the role given to the pro-
magistrates by Cicero. To put it simply, there is no place at all for prorogued mag-
istrates in Cicero’s ideal Roman State. This may be better understood if we look
again at the two passages from the De natura deorum and from the De diuinatione
cited above. Cicero expressed there his doubts about the validity of the auspices of
the promagistrates. Following the augural tradition very strictly, he thought that
there were no auspices other than those of the civic magistrates and therefore
measures like prorogation or the bestowing of imperium on private men were seen
as aberrations and simply could not exist. It has to be said that this extreme con-
servatism was limited to political theory, because in practice Cicero was keen to
accept and promote compromises. He certainly knew very well that the empire
could not be effectively governed without the continuous prorogation of the im-
perium of consuls and praetors and with the occasional creation of extraordinary
commands, such as those of Pompey. Nevertheless he dreamed of a Republic in
which the consuls guided the city with the Senate in every aspect: military, politi-
cal and moral. The emphasis that he put on his own consulship of 63 confirms this
view of the magistracy. In that fateful moment for the State, Cicero took responsi-
bility for breaking one of the principles of the Republic, the prohibition of capital
punishment without the people’s permission, because he was convinced that his
duty as consul was to preserve at any cost the safety of the Roman people. The
safety of the people was the supreme law (suprema lex) for a consul, and only this
fact could justify an extraordinary measure.66
It is time to try to sum up the results of these first two sections. According to
Octavian’s propaganda, in 31 BC Caesar’s heir was not only leading a Roman
64 After the lex Pompeia the provinces continued to be designated by the Senate, as confirmed
by Caes. B Gall. 1.6.5. On the lex Iulia see Girardet 1987.
65 On this argument see Dyck 2004, 456-457. As shown by the excellent analysis of Powell
2001, 32-37, in the exposition of the laws of the ideal State Cicero gradually assumed a uni-
versal perspective, using more general language in the definition of the magistracies. Refer-
ring to virtually any State with a mixed constitution, the role of the supreme magistrates
(sometimes called consuls, sometimes praetors or iudices) was that of representing monar-
chy, with all that that entailed in terms of the extent of their powers.
66 The connection of this passage with the practice of the senatusconsultum ultimum is dis-
cussed in Dyck 2004, 458-459.
army, but the Roman State itself in a great battle for survival against an Eastern
monarchy. The Senate and many equites were under his direct command. Italy
and the Western provinces had sworn to support him in this crucial battle. He
came and won, and won again in Alexandria. Upon his return he celebrated a tri-
ple triumph, something that put him on the same level as Romulus, the founder of
the city.
How does Carrinas’ case fit in to this chain of events? The solution proposed
above assumes that the achievements of the proconsul of Gaul date to 31 and that
Octavian exploited his extraordinary position to place all military action in every
province under his own auspicia. Any reconstruction of how this could have hap-
pened must remain hypothetical, but it is nonetheless worth offering a possible
outline of events. Octavian, after his return to Rome, took an unexpected move
and celebrated Carrinas’ victory among his other achievements in the first tri-
umph. The extraordinary political, moral and military status that he held at Ac-
tium could justify this, as could the appropriate interpretation of those precedents
which suggested that the consuls had greater auspicia than any other generals. He
may have found further support in Cicero’s political theory about the supremacy
of the consuls over the other magistrates. With this act Octavian intended to force
the Senate to accept a new kind of prominence for the consulship and, indirectly,
for him. The second case, of Carrinas’ triumph of 28, which took place three years
after his achievements in Gaul, could be seen as the result of a compromise. The
Senate may have conceded to Octavian that he had the right to celebrate that par-
ticular victory because of his extraordinary position as leader of the entire Repub-
lic, but did not make Carrinas a subordinate, considering his auspicia still inde-
pendent and thus giving him the honour he deserved.
Whether this solution is likely or not, it remains unclear how and why Octa-
vian decided to add Carrinas’ achievements to his own. Normally, it was the Sen-
ate that gave the authorisation for a triumph, and therefore it should have had the
last word on the achievements that deserved to be celebrated. Rather than being
defined by strict rules, the right to hold a triumph was based on a customary set of
requirements, whose interpretation could always be subject to the actual political
circumstances, as we have seen with the priuati cum imperio. In some cases, mag-
istrates took the initiative themselves and celebrated a triumph without having
previously been allowed to do so by the assembly.67 If the Senate acted in favour
67 This is a point well stressed in the recent monograph by Beard 2007, 187-218. Nevertheless,
the author goes too far and argues that there were no real rules for the assigning of triumphs
in the Republic; this statement is unnecessarily derived from the critique of later attempts to
reconstruct a clear ius triumphandi. Even if customary, some of the requirements were clear
enough and concerned chiefly the status of the general (independent or subordinate) and the
importance of the victory itself. Both aspects could be interpreted in a more or less strict
sense, but we are nonetheless able to say that the possession of independent auspices was a
fundamental requisite and that generals with delegated imperium (i.e. legates) were never
able to triumph; Beard 2007, 298, 390 n. 23, following Cass. Dio 48.42.4 and 49.21.2-3
wrongly thinks that Cn. Domitius Calvinus and P. Ventidius Bassus triumphed as legates of
one of the triumvirs, but they were certainly proconsuls as is shown by the triumphal fasti
of Octavian already in 29 – thus acknowledging the extension of Octavian’s aus-

picia to the entire Republic – then a second triumph for the same victory, this time
celebrated by Carrinas, would have seemed very odd. Probably then, the Senate
was not consulted at all and had to face the difficult situation created by Octa-
vian’s unexpected move. Caesar’s heir still had a great share of power, but he
needed to avoid the possibility that, with the end of the emergency status for the
Republic, his opponents could demand the revocation of any extraordinary power
and a return to normal political practice. Nevertheless, Octavian’s attempt did not
completely achieve his goal: the Senate recognised the validity of his triumph and
therefore of the extension of his auspicia to the entire Republic for the period up
to the battle of Actium, but did not downgrade Carrinas’ auspices to a lower level.
After this episode, triumphs continued to be awarded regularly to every proconsul
who deserved them, and Carrinas’ case remained isolated until a new serious mili-
tary crisis occurred.
3. AUGUSTUS’ CONSULAR PREROGATIVES OF 19 BC

AND THE COSSUS INSCRIPTION
In AD 6-8 a tremendous series of riots rocked a very large number of provinces in

the empire. The pirates renewed their activity, the Isaurians ravaged some of their
neighbouring regions, disorder broke out in Africa and Germany, riots began in an
indeterminate number of cities, and among the Dalmatians and the Pannonians.
This dangerous series of upheavals forced Tiberius to come back from his cam-
paign in the heart of German territory and forced the Senate to decide to hand over
to Augustus the nomination of every proconsul, and to extend their service to two
years instead of one.68 As we have seen above, an inscription from Lepcis Magna
reveals that Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, one of the proconsuls appointed for two
years by Augustus in AD 6, celebrated a victory over the Gaetulians, but fought
under Augustus’ auspices.69 The text of the inscription tell us that the war had
been won under the command of the proconsul (ductu … Cossi Cornelii Lentuli …
procos.), but under the auspices of Augustus (auspiciis imp. Caesaris Aug.).70
(InscrIt 13.1.632-633, 636); for Calvinus cf. also RRC 532/1 and CIL 2.6186; for Bassus cf.
Schumacher 1985, 194-197. On the relationship between the triumvirs and the proconsuls cf.
Roddaz 1996, 82-87.
68 Cass. Dio 55.28.1-2.
69 Cossus’ campaign is briefly described by Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4.
70 IRT 301: Marti Augusto sacrum | auspiciis Imp(eratoris) Caesaris Aug(usti) | pontificis
maxumi patris | patriae ductu Cossi Lentuli | co(n)s(ulis) XVuiri sacris faciundis |
proco(n)s(ulis) prouincia Africa | bello Gaetulico liberata | ciuitas Lepcitana. We cannot
doubt the official character of this text (cf. Hurlet 2000, 1515-1516). The inscription men-
tions the traditional formula ‘under the command and the auspices’ (ductu auspicioque) fre-
quently used for Roman generals (for example Livy 28.16.14; other sources in Hurlet 2000,
1518 n. 23), but in this case the two elements are distinguished and referred to two different
persons, reflecting a precise legal difference that was officially defined. The same distinction
Many scholars have already pointed out the importance of this text for the
study of the relationship between the proconsuls and the emperor, and some inter-
pretations also call into play the passages of Cicero quoted above.71 However, we
have seen already that Cicero’s words do not reflect the real position of the pro-
consuls in the Republic. A comparison with Carrinas’ case could, in contrast, shed
some useful light on the matter. As in 31 BC, so in AD 6-8 the State was under
great military pressure that could potentially affect Italy. To face the danger, the
Senate decided to give Augustus some of the powers that he had enjoyed in the
triumviral period, such as the right to nominate every provincial governor, thus
temporarily suspending the traditional allotment of the proconsular provinces.
Furthermore, Cossus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that his campaign
against the Gaetulians and probably every other military action, both in the pro-
consular and in the imperial provinces, were placed under Augustus’ auspices.
This fact did not make the proconsuls the immediate subordinates of the emperor:
their imperium remained consular and continued to derive from the people, and
their auspices were always of the same status as before. Augustus would not have
been in direct command of every province, but nevertheless every victory would
have been credited to him and to no one else.
By AD 6, Augustus’ position in the State was much more secure and clearer
than thirty-five years previously. Furthermore, the last triumph assigned to a gen-
eral who was not a member of the imperial family was twenty-five years in the
past. By AD 6, victory was something that belonged exclusively to the emperor
and his family and this fact required that the Senate find a new solution that could
save the existence of the proconsular provinces while giving to Augustus the right
to claim every military achievement for himself.72 At this point, Carrinas’ case
could have constituted a useful precedent, because of the many similarities be-
tween the two emergency situations of 31 BC and AD 6.
One important difference was the position of Augustus himself. After his ab-
dication from the consulship in 23, the princeps had decided to found his power
on a different basis from the monopoly of the supreme magistracy. Between 23
is made by Flor. 2.31 when he says that ‘[Augustus] suppressed the Musulami and
Gaetulians, who dwell near the Syrtes, under the command of Cossus’ (Cosso duce).
71 Syme 1946, 156 (= Syme 1979a, 192); De Martino 1972-75, 4.185-186; Syme 1979b, 308 (=
Syme 1984, 1198); Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 9 and 44-45; Raaflaub 1987, 261 n. 30;
Bleicken 1990, 89-90; for the use of Cicero’s evidence, cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101;
Magdelain 1968, 55-56; Hurlet 2001, 173-74; Hurlet 2006b, 167-173. I prefer not to refer to
the spolia opima of Licinius Crassus in 29 BC: as said before, the case is complex and proba-
bly over-interpreted by Cassius Dio.
72 The last triumph awarded to a proconsul was in 19 BC (L. Cornelius Balbus, from Africa).
There is still some controversy among those who find a political or a religious reason for the
end of the concession of triumphs to generals other than Augustus and his family. For various
theories on the monopolisation of the auspices by the emperor, see the bibliography cited
above n. 16, and also Gagé 1930a, 1-35, Gagé 1930b, 166-167, Gagé 1933, 2-11 (who con-
nects it with the conferring of Augustus’ name); Giovannini 1983, 43-44 and 77-79; Konrad
1994, 155-159; Rich 1996, 102-103. A purely political motivation is argued for by Eck 1984,
139 and Eck 2006, 59; see also Beard 2007, 295-305.
and 19 a series of powers and prerogatives was granted to Augustus, who could
still act in as many areas as he could have done before, when he was consul.73
However, he did not hold the consulship after 23, apart from on a few occasions,
and therefore could not exploit any more the argument of the pre-eminence of this
magistracy and all the precedents that gave to the consuls greater auspices than
those of the proconsuls. Despite that, it is likely that Augustus found this particu-
lar consular privilege again among the others that were conferred on him in 19
BC, when Cassius Dio tells us that he received a generic consular authority
(exousia ton hupaton).74 The interpretation of this grant is controversial and I do
not intend to go into the details of every possible consequence of this crucial deci-
sion. My intention is to focus on a particular aspect, one related to some tasks that
were the duties of the consuls and that nevertheless Augustus could perform after
receiving the exousia.
Cassius Dio reports that after this grant Augustus was permanently assigned
twelve lictors, like a consul, and could take a seat in the Senate between the two
consuls in office. As J.-L. Ferrary pointed out in his fundamental essay on Augus-
tus’ powers, the assumption of the symbols of consular coercitio could not be pos-
sible without the corresponding authority.75 Similarly, although it was a purely
symbolic measure, the fact that he could sit between the consular pair was of great
importance, as it almost made Augustus into a third consul. Still, the princeps was
not a consul: he could not preside over consular elections and could summon the
Senate or the people by means of his tribunicia potestas only, and not by means of
the ius agendi cum patribus or cum populo that was proper to the magistrates. As
many scholars have already shown, the grant of 19 BC did not give Augustus any
new powers, but probably extended to the city and Italy some of the powers that
he already possessed, that is the imperium consulare and the iurisdictio uoluntaria
proper of the provincial governor residing outside his province.76 Moreover, one
can say that the imperium consulare that Augustus continued to possess as a pro-
magistrate was elevated to a higher dignity, namely that of the consuls. The
exousia ton hupaton would be then the grant to use his powers to perform tasks
that were exclusively conferred upon the consuls for reasons of dignity or because
they concerned the Republic in general, such as the census.77
73 Among these powers and prerogatives were the annually renewed tribunicia potestas and an
imperium greater than that of any proconsul whose province he visited: see Ferrary 2001,
130-141.
74 Cass. Dio 54.10.5.
75 Ferrary 2001, 124; the statement is based on Dig. 1.16.1 (on the possession of the proconsu-
lar insigna); 1.16.16 (on the deposition of the imperium when trespassing the pomerium);
1.16.2 pr. (on jurisdictional prerogatives outside the assigned province); see also Cass. Dio
53.13.4.
76 Cf. Jones 1951, 13-15; Cotton-Yakobson 2002, 196-203; Eck 2006, 58. The levelling of Au-
gustus’ imperium with that of the consuls is suggested by Girardet 1990b, 120-121.
77 One of these tasks could have been the conducting of the general censuses of 8 BC and AD
14, that Augustus held consulari cum imperio (RG 8). He did hold a census in 28, during his
sixth consulship. There is no doubt that, as consul, Octavian could receive censorial powers,
as did the consuls of 75 when they were made responsible for the locatio of Sicily’s uectiga-
What is important for us is that the reform of 19 gave the consular dignity
back to Augustus even without the corresponding magistracy and therefore made
it possible for him to exploit once again all the precedents concerning the auspical
superiority of the consuls over the proconsuls. This privilege could have had a
very broad impact on many different areas and was not primarily concerned with
the auspices of the emperor. But the unexpected emergency of AD 6 required a
drastic measure and it was then that the prerogative that had been granted to Au-
gustus twenty-five years earlier provided a fundamental basis for finding a solu-
tion to the crisis. From that moment on Augustus had another way of securing his
prominence over the other imperium-holders without making them imperial leg-
ates, thus preserving the traditional façade of the Republic.
Following this case, the subordination of a proconsul to the emperor’s aus-
pices recurred on at least two more occasions, both involving the province of Af-
rica, and the proconsuls M. Junius Blaesus in 21-23 and Ser. Sulpicius Galba in
44-46 respectively. Both proconsuls were appointed extra ordinem for a two-year
period and were sent to face difficult military situations: Blaesus had to deal with
the dangerous raids of Tacfarinas, while Galba had to bring security again to a
province troubled by internal unrest and by the incursions of nomadic populations.
For these cases we have good evidence from a passage of Velleius and a probable
imperial acclamation for Claudius.78 There may be other cases, but I would not
argue that the auspical submission was used so frequently: by 11-10 BC, if not
earlier, only the proconsul of Africa was left in command of legionary troops,
while the other senatorial provinces had only a few auxiliary units;79 this meant
that a proconsul was rarely engaged by the enemy and therefore it was de facto
very difficult for him to achieve a victory that could entitle him to a triumph. As a
result, the emperor did not need to fear the competition of these governors and
could leave them independent, apart from on a very few occasions, such as those
lia (Cic. Verr. 2.1.130 and 2.3.18-19). Similarly, the lex portorii indicates that the consuls
had the same task, this time in relation to the province of Asia, in 73 as well, and other pas-
sages of the same text show that many subsequent revisions of the locationes were made by
consuls (cf. Kunkel-Wittmann 1995, 329-330; see now Cottier 2008, 4-8). That means that,
in a period in which no censors were elected, some of the competencies of these magistrates
were passed on to the consuls and that was what happened also in 28. For the next two cen-
suses, Augustus was not consul, but nevertheless could perform the operations. As he himself
says, he was still in possession of his consulare imperium, which was nothing other than the
same power that he enjoyed as promagistrate from 24 and that was freed by the traditional
limit of the pomerium in 23. He was technically a proconsul and no proconsul was ever given
a task of general concern for the State like conducting a census. However, the exousia ton
hupaton of 19 gave Augustus the dignity to perform such assignments. He did not need any
new power, because his imperium was still valid and adequate for the task. What he needed
was the permission to use that power, as if he was a consul.
78 On the military action against Tacfarinas, see Vell. Pat. 2.129.4; on Blaesus’ appointment,
see Tac. Ann. 3.32-35. On the subordination see Eck 1999, 225; contra Hurlet 2006b, 94 and
169 n. 178. For Claudius’ acclamation see Kienast 1996, 91; cf. Mattingly 1968, 1.125 no.
116-121.
79 Cass. Dio 54.34.4; Syme 1934 (= Syme 1971, 40-72); Hurlet 2006b, 135-147.
involving Blaesus and Galba. The auspical subordination was then the best com-
promise and it was only on those few occasions that this ad hoc measure was
adopted. A permanent auspical superiority would have been unnecessary and
could have given rise to some resentment among the senatorial class.
4. CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, the reconstruction proposed here for explaining how the auspical su-
periority of the princeps was put in place relies upon a certain degree of conjec-
ture, as the paucity of ancient evidence inevitably creates great uncertainty. Cos-
sus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that such a subordination was a fact at
the end of Augustus’ reign. Some scholars have deduced from two passages in
Cicero’s writings about religion that the auspices of the promagistrates were
somewhat vitiated and have used these statements as a key argument to justify the
imperial superiority. As I have tried to show, Cicero’s passages were largely po-
lemical and very conservative in the interpretation of augural law and therefore
cannot provide evidence for Republican practice. Had Cicero’s principles been
used, the whole category of proconsuls would have disappeared, but much evi-
dence confirms that the proconsuls continued to enjoy full auspical autonomy.
The vindication of the superiority of Augustus must therefore be founded else-
where and, as far as we can see, the only available precedents all concern cases in
which, for different reasons, consuls were given auspical prominence over pro-
consuls, without diminishing in any way the imperium of the promagistrates. In
the face of this new political interpretation of some of the religious foundations of
the Republic, the augurs as a college of priests did not and could not express any
kind of opposition and this is the reason why they do not appear in our sources;
nevertheless such an arrangement could not have been reached without any debate
about different antiquarian views of the augural discipline concerning magistra-
cies and triumphs.
The cryptic reference of Cassius Dio to a victory in Gaul celebrated by both
Octavian and Carrinas could hint at the first attempt to achieve what we know
became a reality in AD 6. The arguments that the future prince could have used to
justify the celebration of Carrinas’ victory were his position as consul, the large
number of senators and knights fighting under his standards, the precedents about
the auspical superiority of the consulship and Cicero’s political thought about the
prominence of the supreme magistracy. The extreme danger that threatened the
Republic gave the best pretext for Octavian’s claim. The actual events cannot be
reconstructed, but everything probably ended in a compromise. The definitive
recognition came thirty-five years later. At the time Augustus was no longer con-
sul, but the grant of exousia ton hupaton in 19 BC gave him the same dignity as a
consul. Roman religion, always strictly bound to Roman political life, and the
sacral conduction of warfare gave Augustus a powerful instrument to eliminate
every possible threat to his position from the military achievements of the procon-
suls.
One last word has to be said about the actual procedure that was followed to
secure auspical superiority for the emperor. Obviously there had to be a decision
of the Senate, like that of AD 6, but this could not be enough. In fact, we know
from the episode of Arausio that a proconsul could refuse to join the consul’s
forces and could then remain independent; a personal submission seems therefore
to be required, as shown in 217 BC by the case of Minucius Rufus, the magister
equitum of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus. The former’s imperium had been ele-
vated to the same level as the dictator’s by a popular vote and so Minucius could
therefore act independently.80 But following a serious defeat, Minicius returned
under the auspices of Fabius Maximus, offering his personal submission to the
dictator’s standards.81 Similarly, we can think that all the proconsuls of AD 6
made such a personal submission before departing for their province and used
Augustus’ standards for their armies, becoming simply duces of an empire se-
curely led by Augustus’ divine protection.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beard 2007: M. Beard, The Roman Triumph, Cambridge, Mass. 2007.

Bleicken 1990: J. Bleicken, Zwischen Republik und Prinzipat: zum Charakter des Zweiten Trium-
virats, Göttingen 1990.
Bleicken 1998: id., Augustus: eine Biographie, Berlin 1998.
Brennan 2000: T. C. Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, Oxford 2000.
Briscoe 2008: J. Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy, Books 38-40, Oxford 2008.
Broughton 1986: T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Atlanta 1986.
Campanile 2001: D. Campanile, ‘Provincialis molestia. Note su Cicerone proconsole’, Studi
ellenistici 13 (2001), 243-274.
Cecconi 1991: G. A. Cecconi, ‘Delicata felicitas. Osservazioni sull'ideologia imperiale della
vittoria attraverso le fonti letterarie’, Clio 27 (1991), 5-29.
Cottier 2008: M. Cottier-M. H. Crawford-C. Crowther-J.-L. Ferrary-B. Levick-O. Salomies-M.
Wörrle, The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford 2008.
Cotton-Yakobson 2002: H. M. Cotton-A. Yakobson, ‘Arcanum imperii. The Powers of Augustus’,
in G. Clark-T. Rajak (eds.), Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in
Honour of Miriam Griffin, Oxford 2002, 193-209.
Dalla Rosa 2003: A. Dalla Rosa, ‘Ductu auspicioque. Per una riflessione sui fondamenti religiosi
del potere magistratuale fino all’epoca augustea’, SCO 49 (2003), 185-255.
De Francisci 1968: P. De Francisci, ‘Intorno a due passi delle Res gestae Divi Augusti’, AG 175
(1968), 156-163.
De Martino 1972-75: F. De Martino, Storia della costituzione romana, Napoli 1972-75.
Dyck 2004: A. R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, Ann Arbor 2004.
Eck 1984: W. Eck, ‘Senatorial Self-Representation: Developments in the Augustan Period’, in F.
Millar-E. Segal (eds.), Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects, Oxford 1984, 129-167.
Eck 1999: id., ‘Kaiserliche Imperatorenakklamation und ornamenta triumphalia’, ZPE 124 (1999),
223-227.
Eck 2003: id., Augustus und seine Zeit, München 2003.
80 Livy 22.25.10. The rogatio de aequando magistri equitum et dictatoris iure had been pro-
moted by the tribune of the plebs M. Metilius because of the dissatisfaction towards Fabius
Maximus’ cautious tactics against Hannibal.
81 Livy 22.30.5: sub imperium auspiciumque tuum redeo et signa haec legionesque restituo.
Fadinger 1969: V. Fadinger, Die Begründung des Prinzipats: quellenkritische und staatsrechtliche
Untersuchungen zu Cassius Dio und der Parallelüberlieferung, Berlin 1969.
Ferrary 2001: J.-L. Ferrary, ‘À propos des pouvoirs d’Auguste’, CCGG 12 (2001), 101-154.
Freyburger-Roddaz 1991: M.-L. Freyburger-J.-M. Roddaz, Dion Cassius: Histoire Romaine,
Livres 50 et 51, Paris 1991.
Gagé 1930a: J. Gagé, ‘La Victoria Augusti et les auspices de Tibère’, RA (1930), 1-35.
Gagé 1930b: id., ‘Romulus-Auguste’, MEFR 47 (1930), 166-167.
Gagé 1933: id., ‘La Théologie de la victoire impériale’, RH 171 (1933), 2-11.
Giovannini 1983: A. Giovannini, Consulare imperium, Basle 1983.
Giovannini 1998: id., ‘Les Livres auguraux’, in J. Scheid (ed.), La Mémoire perdue. Recherches
sur l’administration romaine, Rome 1998, 103-122.
Girardet 1987: K. M. Girardet, ‘Die lex Iulia de provinciis. Vorgeschichte, Inhalt, Wirkungen’,
RhM 130 (1987), 291-329.
Girardet 1990a: id., ‘Der Rechtsstatus Oktavians im Jahre 32 v. Chr.’, RhM 133 (1990), 322-350.
Girardet 1990b: id., ‘Die Entmachtung des Konsulates im Übergang von der Republik zur Monar-
chie und die Rechtsgrundlagen des Augusteischen Prinzipats’, in W. Görler-S. Koster (eds.),
Pratum Saraviense: Festgabe für Peter Steinmetz, Stuttgart 1990, 89-126.
Girardet 1992: id., ‘Zur Diskussion um das imperium consulare militiae im 1. Jh. v. Ch.’, CCGG 3
(1992), 213-220.
Girardet 2001: id., ‘«Imperia» und «provinciae» des Pompeius 82 bis 48 v. Chr.’, Chiron 31
(2001), 153-209.
Grant 1950: M. Grant, Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius, New York 1950.
Green 2009: S. J. Green, ‘Malevolent Gods and Promethean Birds: Contesting Augury in Augus-
tus’s Rome’, TAPA 139 (2009), 147-167.
Grenade 1951: P. Grenade, ‘Autour du De republica’, REL 29 (1951), 162-183.
Herrmann 1968: P. Herrmann, Der römische Kaisereid: Untersuchungen zu seiner Herkunft und
Entwicklung, Göttingen 1968.
Hurlet 1997: F. Hurlet, Les Collègues du prince sous Auguste et Tibère: de la légalité républicaine
à la légitimité dynastique, Rome 1997.
Hurlet 2000: id., ‘Auspiciis Imperatoris Caesaris Augusti, ductu proconsulis. L’intervention im-
périale dans le choix et les compétences du proconsul d’Afrique sous les Julio-Claudiens’,
L’Africa romana 13 (2000), 1513-1542.
Hurlet 2001: id., ‘Les Auspices d’Octavien/Auguste’, CCGG 12 (2001), 155-180.
Hurlet 2006: id., ‘Auguste et Pompée’, Athenaeum 94 (2006), 467-486.
Hurlet 2006: id., Le Proconsul et le prince d’Auguste à Dioclétien, Bordeaux 2006.
Itgenshorst 2004: T. Itgenshorst, ‘Augustus und der republikanische Triumph. Triumphalfasten
und summi viri-Galerie als Instrumente der imperialen Machtsicherung’, Hermes 132 (2004),
436-458.
Jashemski 1950: W. F. Jashemski, The Origins and History of the Proconsular and Propraetorian
Imperium, Chicago 1950.
Kearsley 2009: R. Kearsley, ‘Octavian and Augury: The Years 30-27 B.C.’, CQ 59 (2009), 147-
166.
Kienast 1996: D. Kienast, Römische Kaisertabelle: Grundzüge einer römischen Kaiserchronolo-
gie, Darmstadt 1996.
Kienast 1999: id., Augustus, Prinzeps und Monarch, Darmstadt 1999.
Kneissl 1969: P. Kneissl, Die Siegestitulatur der römischen Kaiser. Untersuchungen zu den
Siegerbeinamen des 1. und 2. Jahrhunderts, Göttingen 1969.
Konrad 1994: C. F. Konrad, ‘Proconsuls of Africa: the Future Emperor Galba and the togatus in
the Villa Massimo’, JRA 7 (1994), 151-162.
Kromayer 1888: J. Kromayer, Die rechtliche Begründung des Principats, Marburg 1888.
Kunkel 1969: W. Kunkel, ‘Über das Wesen des Augusteischen Prinzipats’, in W. Schmitthenner
(ed.), Augustus, Darmstadt 1969, 311-335.
Kunkel-Wittmann 1995: W. Kunkel-R. Wittmann, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen

Republik. Zweiter Abschnitt: Die Magistratur, München 1995.
Last 1947: H. Last, ‘Imperium maius, a Note’, JRS 57 (1947), 157-164.
Linderski 1986: J. Linderski, ‘The Augural Law’, ANRW 2.16.3 (1986), 2146-2312.
Linderski 1990: id., ‘The Auspices and the Struggle of the Orders’, in W. Eder (ed.), Staat und
Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik, Berlin 1990, 34-48 (= Linderski 1995, 560-
574).
Linderski 1993: id., ‘Roman Religion in Livy’, in W. Schuller (ed.), Livius. Aspekte seines
Werkes, Konstanz 1993, 53-70 (= Linderski 1995, 608-625).
Linderski 1995: id., Roman Questions. Selected Papers 1958-1993, Stuttgart 1995.
Linderski 1996: id., ‘Q. Scipio Imperator’, in J. Linderski (ed.), Imperium sine fine: T. Robert S.
Broughton and the Roman Republic, Stuttgart 1996, 145-185 (= Linderski 2005, 130-174).
Linderski 2005: id., Roman Questions II, Stuttgart 2005.
Magdelain 1968: A. Magdelain, Recherches sur l’imperium. La loi curiate et les auspices
d’investiture, Paris 1968.
Mattingly 1968: H. Mattingly, Roman Imperial Coinage, London 1968.
Mommsen 1887: T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, Leipzig 1887.
Östenberg 1999: I. Östenberg, ‘Demonstrating the Conquest of the World. The Procession of Peo-
ples and Rivers on the Shield of Aeneas and the Triple Triumph of Octavian in 29 B.C. (Aen.
8.722-728)’, ORom (1999), 155-162.
Pani 1997: M. Pani, La politica in Roma antica: cultura e prassi, Rome 1997.
Petzold 1969: K. E. Petzold, ‘Die Bedeutung des Jahres 32 für die Entstehung des Principats’,
Historia (1969), 334-351.
Powell 2001: J. G. F. Powell, ‘Were Cicero’s Laws the Laws of Cicero’s Republic?’, in J. G. F.
Powell-J. A. North (eds.), Cicero’s Republic, London 2001, 17-39.
von Premerstein 1937: A. von Premerstein, Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats, Munich 1937.
Raaflaub 1987: K. Raaflaub, ‘Die Militärreformen des Augustus und die politische Problematik
des frühen Prinzipats’, in Saeculum Augustum I. Herrschaft und Gesellschaft, Darmstadt
1987, 246-307.
Reinhold 2002: M. Reinhold, Studies in Classical History and Society, Oxford 2002.
Rich 1996: J. W. Rich, ‘Augustus and the spolia opima’, Chiron 26 (1996), 85-127.
Roddaz 1996: J.-M. Roddaz, ‘Les Triumvirs et les provinces’, in E. Hermon (ed.), Pouvoir et
«imperium» (IIIe av. J.-C. - Ier ap. J.-C.): actes du colloque tenu dans le cadre du Congrès de
la Fédération Internationale des Études Classiques (F.I.E.C.) du 24 au 26 août 1994, à
l’Université Laval, Naples 1996, 77-96.
Roddaz 2003: id., ‘La Métamorphose d’Octavien à Auguste’, in S. Franchet d’Espèrey (ed.), Fon-
dements et crises du pouvoir, Bordeaux 2003, 397-418.
Rüpke 1990: J. Rüpke, Domi militiae: die religiöse Konstruktion des Krieges in Rom, Stuttgart
1990.
Scheid 1998: J. Scheid, La Religion des Romains, Paris 1998.
Schumacher 1985: L. Schumacher, ‘Die imperatorischen Akklamationen der Triumvirn und die
Auspicia des Augustus’, Historia 34 (1985), 191-222.
Staveley 1963: E. S. Staveley, ‘The fasces and imperium maius’, Historia 12 (1963), 458-484.
Stewart 1998: R. Stewart, Public Office in Early Rome: Ritual Procedure and Political Practice,
Ann Arbor 1998.
Syme 1934: R. Syme, ‘Lentulus and the Origin of Moesia’, JRS 24 (1934), 113-137 (= Syme
1971, 40-72).
Syme 1946: id., Review of Siber, Das Führeramt des Augustus, JRS 36 (1946), 149-158 (= Syme
1979a, 181-196).
Syme 1959: id., ‘Livy and Augustus’, HSCPh 64 (1959), 27-87 (= Syme 1979a, 400-454).
Syme 1971: id., Danubian Papers, Bucharest 1971.
Syme 1979a: id., Roman Papers 1, Oxford 1979.
Syme 1979b: id., ‘Some Imperatorial Salutations’, Phoenix 33 (1979), 308-329 (= Syme 1984,
1198-1219).
Syme 1984: id., Roman Papers 3, Oxford 1984.
Tarpin 2003: M. Tarpin, ‘M. Licinius Crassus «imperator», et les dépouilles opimes de la Répub-
lique’, RPh 77 (2003), 275-311.
Tucker 1976: W. Tucker, ‘Cicero, Augur, De Iure Augurali’, CW 70 (1976), 171-177.
Vervaet 2008: F. J. Vervaet; ‘The Secret History: the Official Position of Imperator Caesar Diui
filius from 31 to 27 BCE.’, Version 1.0, Lampeter Working Papers in Classics (2008).
Vogel-Weidemann 1982: U. Vogel-Weidemann, Die Statthalter von Africa und Asia in den Jahren
14-68 n. Chr. Eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis Princeps und Senat, Bonn 1982.
Walbank 1957: F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1, Oxford 1957.

Dalla Rosa - Dominating The Auspices

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dalla Rosa - Dominating The Auspices

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Priests and State in the Roman World

Edited by James H. Richardson and Federico Santangelo

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 2011

Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen

7 Many examples can be found in Linderski 1990 (= Linderski 1995, 560-574).

1. THE CARRINAS EPISODE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

only narrative of Carrinas’ triumph is provided by Cassius Dio:10

10 Cass. Dio 51.21.6. Cf. Freyburger-Roddaz 1991, 158 n. 204-205.

18 Cic. Nat. D. 3.5, Diu. 2.33.70, Vat. 6.14.

22 For the political context cf. Dalla Rosa 2003, 193-194.

an interpretation similar to that of another important augur, M. Valerius Messalla.

2. THE CONSULS AND THE PROCONSULS:

48 Livy 22.34.1; Polyb. 3.106.2.

57 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.2.

of Octavian already in 29 – thus acknowledging the extension of Octavian’s aus-

3. AUGUSTUS’ CONSULAR PREROGATIVES OF 19 BC

In AD 6-8 a tremendous series of riots rocked a very large number of provinces in

Beard 2007: M. Beard, The Roman Triumph, Cambridge, Mass. 2007.

Kunkel-Wittmann 1995: W. Kunkel-R. Wittmann, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der römischen

You might also like