PAPER

Tahsin And Taqbih

Arranged to Fulfill The Taks of Ushul Fiqih Subject

Lecturer : Mr. Muhammad Syarif Hidayat, Lc., M. Pd.

Arranged by Group 6

ICP-PAI 4A :

Irbasabila Annafi’atsaani 2103016034

Muhammad Helmi Labib 2103016063

ISLAMIC EDUCATION

FACULTY OF TARBIYAH AND TEACHER TRAINING

WALISONGO STATE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY SEMARANG

2023
 CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY

A. Background

The science of Usul Fikih is inseparable from the science of kalam. The science of kalam
explains about usul al-din or tawhid which explains the rational argumentation about the oneness
of Allah SWT, the apostleship of the apostles in general and the apostleship of Muhammad SAW
in particular, and the pillars of faith. Usul fiqh science builds its rules based on the premise of
Kalam science such as the discussion of dalil (argument) and its division, so many things are
arranged, including knowledge of who is the nature of the judge (law maker); what can
determine the law; and an explanation of whether reason (al-"aql) or revelation (al-syar") which
determines the value of good (tahsin) or bad (taqbih).
The discussion of tahsin and taqbih is material discussed by kalam scholars. The
discussion is then doperoanjnang by ushul scholars in the subject matter of judges, although
there are also those who have made both material ushul fiqh specifically: about hasan and qobih.
The discussion caused a sharp and interesting polemic, so the title was added "polemic about
good (hasan) and bad (qobih)".
Because it was originally a subject of kalam, the polemic on the determination of good
and bad did not sharply contradict the two main schools of ushul fiqh: mutakallimin and ahnaf,
but rather kept the schools of kalam. The schools of thought that clashed were the Ash'Ariyyah,
Mu'tazillah and Maturidis. The hanafiyyah opinion seems only as a supplement that strengthens
one of the three camps. if grouped, still the involved are mutakalimin (Ash'Ariyyah, Mu'tazillah,
and Maturidiyah) and ahnaf (hanafiyyah), although hanafiyyah is not as an independent camp.
B. Formulated of the Question
1. What is the meaning of Tahsin and Taqbih
2. Tahsin and Taqbih according Asy’ariyah, Mu’tazilah and Maturidiyah
 CHAPTER II
DISCUSSION
A. Definition of Tahsin (al-Hasan) and Taqbih (al-Qabih)
In ushul fiqh, Tahsin and Taqbih can also be called Al-Hasan and al-Qabih. Usul
fiqh scholars put forward several definitions of al-hasan and alqabih, including:
1. al-hasan means all actions that are in accordance with human nature such as (taste)
sweetness and helping people drown. Whereas al-qabih is something that is disliked by
humans, such as bitter and taking other people's property by way of persecution.
2. al-hasan means perfect traits, such as knowledge and glory, while al-qabih means
negative traits or shortcomings of a person such as ignorance and miserliness. These two
meanings of al-hasan and al-qabih are agreed upon by all scholars and can be reached by
reason.
3. al-hasan is something that humans can do who know its goodness and are able to do it,
while al-qabih is something that humans cannot do and cannot be achieved by reason.
4. al-hasan is something that if done, the person who does it gets praise in this world and
gets rewarded in the hereafter, such as obedience. Whereas al-qabih means something
that if it is done, the person who does it will be criticized in this world and will be
punished in the hereafter, such as committing sin.
B. Tahsin (al-Hasan) and Taqbih (al-Qabih) according to some schools:
The difference of opinion about good and bad in the study of ushul fiqh comes
from the difference of opinion among kalam scholars. The difference is about whether the
good and bad value of an object is an essential characteristic of that object or not.
1. Ash'ariyah faction
The Ash'ariyah faction, which is the opinion of the majority of usul scholars,
believes that al-hasan and alqabih in the third and fourth senses above are shari'a and
must be determined by shara' because they can only be known by shara'. What al-Sharia
commands, such as faith, prayer and Hajj, is hasan. But what it prohibits, such as
disbelief and other muharramat, is qabih. Good and bad are not found in the substance,
but in something that is relative.
According to this group of Ahlu Sunnah, before the apostle was appointed and the
existence of shari'a, the human mind was incapable of determining the law. The human
mind cannot know what is good and what is bad without the mediation of the messenger
and the heavenly books. The intellect cannot be used as a way to know Allah's rulings
regarding the actions of the believer. What is obligatory or permissible is good and what
is forbidden is bad. The reason is that if al-husn and al-qubh were something that is aqly,
surely Allah would not give a choice in his laws but instead would be binding in the
legislation of these laws, because He must legislate something based on the fact that in
that action there is good or bad. This means that al-ahkam must be in accordance with
reason, and command (al-wujub) is contrary to choice (al-ikhtiyar). This reason is also
weak according to al-Zuhaili, because the coincidence of God's law with wisdom does
not require coercion (idhtirar), but in it choice remains.
2. The Muktazilah school
The school of Muktazilah and those who agree (from the group of Karomiyah, Khawarij,
Shi'ah Ja'fariyah, Barahimah, and Tsanawiyah). In this case there are several opinions: a.
The Mu'tazilah are of the opinion that actions can be divided into two categories:

1) Actions whose good or bad nature is essential.

Saying the truth as long as its essence is good, and vice versa lying as long
as its essence is bad. The same applies to praiseworthy qualities such as being fair,
courteous, brave, honest, and helping others, as long as they are essentially good so that
the human mind is able to state that they are good every time it witnesses them.
Reprehensible qualities such as injustice, cowardice, and treachery are so
bad in their essence that the human mind is capable of declaring them to be bad whenever
it witnesses them. Since good and bad are essential properties of an action, the power of a
healthy mind is independently capable of knowing them. That is, to know the good and
bad of some actions can be done by the mind, not depending on revelation.
The function of revelation is to tell people which actions are essentially
good and which are bad, not to determine the good and bad of an action. Revelation tells
whether an action is good or bad, in the form of commands and prohibitions. A good
action according to its essence will be commanded by revelation, and vice versa
revelation will prohibit an action that according to its essence is bad. From there it can be
concluded that according to this school, the function of reason is to know what is
essentially good and what is bad, not to determine good and bad, and the function of
revelation as stated above is to inform what is good and what is bad so that it can confirm
what has been discovered by reason.
According to this school, the human mind is able to recognize good and
bad, some without requiring reflection (badihy) and some requiring reflection (nadzhary).
Something that can be known to be good and bad without requiring reflection is, for
example, that helping a shipwrecked person in the ocean can easily be known to be good,
and doing injustice to others can easily be known to be bad. As for what requires
reflection, for example, honesty is good even if it will harm oneself and lying is bad even
if it benefits oneself.
In this case, because it requires reflection, there is a possibility that people
may be fooled into concluding that what is good in essence is bad in reality. In line with
this belief, every action that is good according to its essence and can be known by the
mind, is obligatory to be carried out and for its obedience it is rewarded. Then, whatever
is bad according to its essence and is known by the intellect is forbidden to be done, and
the one who abstains from such acts is rewarded, while the one who violates them is
punished with sin.
Thus, in such matters, the intellect is capable of knowing the ruling
without any wa hyu. According to this view, Allah's law must be in accordance with the
essence of things in terms of good and bad.
2) Actions that cannot be known by the intellect in terms of good and bad.
Such as worship and its methods. In this case, revelation is absolutely
necessary to know the good and bad. In line with this. Abu al-Husein al-Bashri (d. 436
H./1044 AD), a Mu'tazilah figure, in his book al-Mu'tamad (Juz. 1/370), divides human
deeds into two categories, namely: First, aqliyah deeds, which are deeds whose laws can
be known with the mind. Secondly, shar'iyah deeds, which are deeds in which Shara'
determines the ruling and its form. This category of actions consists of two types:
- Actions in which only by sharia can be known the law, form, and position as worship
for the perpetrator. For example, the act of prayer
- Actions in which the Shari'ah modifies, adds to, or subtracts from the requirements that
are already known to the mind. In this case, the Shari'ah modifies an action, so that it is
called a shar'i action.
On the basis of their belief, mankind was already burdened with taklifi law
at a time before the Messenger was sent by Allah, or before the da'wah reached them in
matters that could be known by reason. Mankind is bound by the decision of a sound
mind, because what the mind decides is considered the law of Allah.
Therefore, obeying them is an obligation for humans. Their reasoning is that there are
many kinds of actions that reason says should be done because they are good and the
person doing them is praiseworthy. Such actions are good in themselves. For example,
telling the truth is good in itself, so it must be done. On the other hand, there are many
things that reason says should not be done because they will bring reproach from society.
Such actions are bad in themselves. For example, lying is bad in itself, so it should not be
done. A reasonable person will choose to tell the truth rather than lie.
3. Maturidiyah School
The Maturidiyah school argues that al-husn and al-qubh are something aqliyy or not
based on (instructions) shara' but can be known by the intellect. This group according to
Abdul Aziz Dahlan tried to mediate by saying that there are actions or words that are
good in substance, and some are bad. Allah SWT does not command humans to do
actions that are bad in substance, just as He also does not prohibit an act that is good in
substance. With regard to the good and bad that do not lie in the substance of actions or
words, syarak has the authority to determine them. Up to this point, the Maturidiyah
opinion is similar to Muktazilah. The Maturidis then add that actions or words that are
deemed good or bad by the intellect are not obligatory to be done or left, and the one who
does or leaves them does not get rewarded solely through the intellect. According to the
Maturidis, the obligation to do good and the provision of rewards for the doer cannot be
determined by reason alone, but must be based on the nass (verse or hadith). Similarly,
the obligation to refrain from bad words or actions and the punishment inflicted on the
perpetrator cannot be determined through reason alone. Reason cannot stand alone in
determining an obligation.
C. Implications of the Debate on Tahsin and Taqbih
The debate about al-hasan and al-qabih has several implications, including:
1. "Status" of people who have not reached him da'wah Islam.
According to Mu'tazilah, they get rewards or threats for all the actions performed
because what is required of them is to do what the mind identifies as good, and leave
what is bad. This is the law of Allah. Meanwhile, according to the Asy'ariyah and
Maturidiyah, there is no calculation, reward, and punishment for those who have not
reached them with the da'wah of Islam.
2. Shukr al-mun'im (gratitude to the Giver of favors).
It is not obligatory according to the Ash'ariyah and the Maturidiyah mutaakhirun.
According to them, if reason is mujib (obligatory), then it should be obligatory because of
the benefit so that it does not become useless, and that is certainly bad. The behavior of
gratitude is a form of burdening oneself with hardship in the form of avoiding
intellectually bad things and doing good things, even though such burdens are not
permitted upon a person. But according to the Mu'tazilah and the Maturidis, it is
obligatory. Gratitude is directing what Allah has given in accordance with the purpose for
which it was created. Gratitude prevents dzann al-dharar (suspected harm). If preventing
a suspected harm is obligatory then so is gratitude, it is obligatory. Grateful behavior that
causes mashaqqah does not eliminate the benefits that are the result of gratitude, such as
gaining health and increasing sustenance.
3. Positioning reason in ijtihad
Can reason be one of the sources of law? The Ash'ariyyah and Maturidis argue
that reason cannot independently be a source of law. Reason plays an important role in
uncovering and capturing the intentions of Shara' in enacting the law and establishing
general rules in exploring the law, not as a determinant of the law. Muhammad Abu
Zahrah emphasized that all fiqh products are the result of human reasoning power which
will never run out. But the reasoning used should always rely on the nash, and not be
completely detached. In contrast to this opinion, the Mu'tazilah and Shi'ah Ja'fariyah say
that reason is the third source of law after the Qur'an and Sunnah. With a simpler
expression, Satria Efendi states that according to Mu'tazilah reason becomes a source of
law in matters not mentioned in the Qur'an. Meanwhile, according to Maturidiyah and
Asy'ariyah, reason is only a tool to understand God's revelation.
 CONCLUSION

In terms of al-tahsin and al-taqbih, the scholars differed into three major "currents",
Asy'ariyah which is the majority group, Mu'tazilah, and Maturidiyah which is
"moderate". This difference has many impacts including the assessment of those who
have not reached him da'wah islamiyah, the obligation to thank Allah before the arrival of
the message, and the affirmation of the "position" of reason in ijtihad. This difference
boils down to a difference of opinion about the function of reason in knowing whether
something is good or bad.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdul Aziz Dahlan, Abdul. Et.al. (1997) Ensiklopedi Hukum Islam, Jakarta: PT Ichtiar
Baru Van Houve
Ahmad Tuqyah, Ahmad. (2000). Al-Mukhtasar al-Wafi fi Usul al-Fiqh. Beirut: Muassasat
al-kutub al-tsaqafiyah
Al-Zuhaili,Wahbah .(1986). Usul al-Fiqh al-Islamy. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Islami
Efendi, Satria. (2005) Ushul Fiqih, Jakarta: PT Kencana
Haroen, Nasroen. (1997) Ushul Fiqh 1 Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu
Zaidan, Abd al-Karim. (1987). Al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh. Beirut: Muassasa al-Risalat