Sappari K. Sawadjaan v. CA (G.R. No.

141735)
Facts:
Petitioner Sawadjaan was an appraiser/investigator in the Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) when on the basis of his report, a credit line was granted to
Compressed Air Machineries and Equipment Corporation (CAMEC) by virtue of the two parcels of land it offered as collaterals. Meanwhile, Congress
passed a law which created Al-Amanah Investment Bank of the Philippines (AIIBP) and repealed the law creating PAB, transferring all its assets, liabilities
and capital accounts to AIIBP. Later, AIIBP discovered that the collaterals were spurious, thus conducted an investigation and found petitioner Sawadjaan
at fault. Petitioner appealed before the SC which ruled against him. Petitioner moved for a new trial claiming he recently discovered that AIIBP had not yet
adopted its corporate by-laws and since it failed to file within 60 days from the passage of its law, it had forfeited its franchise or charter and thus has no
legal standing to initiate an administrative case. The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of AIIBP to file its by-laws within the period prescribed results to a nullity of all actions and proceedings it has initiated.
Ruling: NO.
The AIIBP was created by Rep. Act No. 6848. It has a main office where it conducts business, has shareholders, corporate officers, a board of directors,
assets, and personnel. It is, in fact, here represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, “the principal law office of government-owned
corporations, one of which is respondent bank.” At the very least, by its failure to submit its by-laws on time, the AIIBP may be considered
a de facto corporation whose right to exercise corporate powers may not be inquired into collaterally in any private suit to which such corporations may be
a party.
Moreover, a corporation which has failed to file its by-laws within the prescribed period does not ipso facto lose its powers as such. The SEC Rules on
Suspension/Revocation of the Certificate of Registration of Corporations, details the procedures and remedies that may be availed of before an order of
revocation can be issued. There is no showing that such a procedure has been initiated in this case.

Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of Southern Philippines vs. North Eastern Mindanao Mission of Seventh Day Adventist,
Inc. (496 SCRA 215)

FACTS:
Spouses Felix Cosio and Felisa Cuysona donate a parcel of land to South Philippine [Union] Mission of Seventh Day Adventist Church, and
was received by Liberato Rayos, an elder of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, on behalf of the donee.

However, twenty years later, the spouses sold the same land to the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission.

Claiming to be the alleged donee’s successors-in-interest, petitioners asserted ownership over the property. This was opposed by
respondents who argued that at the time of the donation, SPUM-SDA Bayugan could not legally be a donee because, not having been
incorporated yet, it had no juridical personality. Neither were petitioners members of the local church then, hence, the donation could not
have been made particularly to them.

ISSUE:
Should the Seventh Day Adventist Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission's ownership of the lot be upheld?

HELD:
We answer in the affirmative.

Donation is undeniably one of the modes of acquiring ownership of real property. Likewise, ownership of a property may be transferred by
tradition as a consequence of a sale.

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another person who accepts it. The
donation could not have been made in favor of an entity yet inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could it have been accepted as there was
yet no one to accept it.

The deed of donation was not in favor of any informal group of SDA members but a supposed SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which,
at the time, had neither juridical personality nor capacity to accept such gift.

(With questions regarding de facto corporation and law of sales.)

Petition Denied.
Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759 Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759

ACTS:

Francisco Co, Jr. was a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila. Abante Tonite is a daily tabloid of general
circulation which Publisher was Allen A. Macasaet; Managing Director was Nicolas V. Quijano; Circulation Manager was Isaias Albano;
Editors were Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and Columnist/Reporter is Lily Reyes.

On July 3, 2000, Co sued petitioners before Branch 51 of the RTC, Manila claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article published
in Abante Tonite on June 6, 2000. In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the business address of
Abante Tonite at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street,
Intramuros, Manila, to effect the personal service of the summons on the petitioners but they were then out of the office. He returned in the
afternoon but petitioners were still out of the office as was informed by Lu-Ann Quijano and Rene Esleta. He decided to resort to substituted
service of the summons and in his sheriff's return had explained the reasons.

On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the
invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further
moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party
in a civil action. However, the RTC denied the motion and directed them to file their answers to the complaint within the remaining period.
Substituted service of summonses was validly applied considering that summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to the persons
of all the defendants. Quijano, Secretary of the President and the wife of the defendant, and Esleta, Editorial Assistant of the defendant, were
considered competent persons with sufficient discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served upon them and to relay it to
petitioners (Sec. 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

On June 29, 2001, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration because substituted service of summons by sheriff considers the
nature of the work of the defendants that they are always on field. Regarding the impleading of Abante Tonite as defendant, the RTC held,
Abante Tonite possesses attributes of a juridical person thus the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may appropriately apply. Petitioners
brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus in the CA which dismissed it, upholding the trial court's finding.

ISSUE:

Whether summons was duly served to acquire jurisdiction over respondents?

HELD:

The SC approved the decision of RTC of Manila City and the CA that substituted service of summons complied with the rules. We are strict in
insisting on personal service on the defendant but we do not cling to such strictness when circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

The plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the
defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the
action.

That summons received by their substitutes is sufficient compliance to inform the parties unless substantially show the otherwise. That
substituted service of summons can be resorted to with sufficient reasons as when efforts to effect personal service occurred to be futile or
impossible within reasonable time.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the
morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and
not available” and the other petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office address on
his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected
or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on
the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

FACTS: Petitioners otherwise called a Peach Sisters of Laguna, is a religious and charitable group created to take care of the abandoned and neglected
elderly persons. Mother Ma. Conception Realon is its superior general. The respondents are the legal heirs of the late Purification Alzona. The latter being
the registered owner of parcels of land located in Calamba City, Laguna. In 1997, Purification discovered that she has lung cancer. Considering her
restrictions in her movement, Purification requested Mother Conception to take care of her house to which the latter agreed. Later, Purification called
Mother Conception and handed her a handwritten letter, purportedly donating her house and lot to the petitioner through Mother Conception. Sometime in
2001, Mother Conception went to SEC and filed the registration application. On August 2001, Purification executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
conveying the subject properties to the petitioner through Mother Conception. ISSUE: Whether at the time of donation by Purification in favor of the
Petitioner, the petitioner was a de facto corporation and has the personality to be a beneficiary and has the power to acquire and possess property.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.

In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the following elements must be present: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the
donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; ( c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi; (d) the donation must be contained in a
public document; and e) that the acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; if acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor must be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, "[t]he donor's
capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation." By analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or the authority of
the latter's representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time of acceptance of the donation. Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code
provides that all those who are not specifically disqualified by law may accept donation5either personally or through an authorized representative with a
special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general and sufficient power. The Court finds that for the purpose of accepting the donation, the
petitioner is deemed vested with personality to accept, and Mother Concepcion is clothed with authority to act on the latter's behalf. Precisely, the existence
of the petitioner as a corporate entity is upheld in this case for the purpose of validating the Deed to ensure that the primary objective for which the
donation was intended is achieved, that is, to convey the property for the purpose of aiding the petitioner in the pursuit of its charitable objectives. In this
controversy, while the initial conveyance is defective, the genuine intent of Purificacion to donate the subject properties in favor of the petitioner is
indubitable. Also, while the petitioner is yet to be incorporated, it cannot be said that the initial conveyance was tainted with fraud or misrepresentation.
Contrarily, Purificacion acted with full knowledge of circumstances of the Petitioner. This is evident from Purificacion's act of referring Mother
Concepcion to Atty. Arcillas, who, in tum, advised the petitioner to apply for registration. Further, with the execution of two (2) documents of conveyance
in favor of the petitioner, it is clear that what Purificacion intended was for the sisters comprising the petitioner to have ownership of her properties to aid
them in the pursuit of their charitable activities, as a token of appreciation for the services they rendered to her during her illness.