Cherry Hopley Page 1 of 15

Why was there a ‘phoney war’ in western Europe between

September 1939 and May 1940?

'The great powers had declared war and

absolutely nothing was happening...'1

John Colville, 1974

There is no doubt there was a phoney war in 1939-1940, a period of relative

calm, where the supposed massive invasion of Britain and France by Germany did

not occur. Britain’s preparation for war was in full flow on the day war was declared

with; sand bagging, gas mask distribution and shelter designation in case of air raid.

In France the supposed impregnable Maginot Line defence had already been

militarised, Britain and France were primed and ready for an invasion. So where was

the blanket bombing of British and French cities by Germany in September 1939

expected by their respective governments?

This essay will argue that although there were many contributory factors to

the phoney war, the most significant was the harshest winter seen in western Europe

for decades. The weather impacted on governmental and military decisions in

Britain, France and Germany, but other factors contributed in smaller ways to the

continuation of the phoney war. Firstly, the appeasement mentality of the British

government and how negotiations continued into 1939. Secondly, the passive way in

which the Royal Air Force (RAF) was used to distribute propaganda during this time.

Thirdly, how the British government were given bad advice from the military.

Fourthly, how the period of relative calm was not used to good effect to build-up

1
John Colville cited in Richard Holmes, The World at War: The Landmark Oral History (London: Ebury
Publishing, 2007) p.75.
Cherry Hopley Page 2 of 15

British and French armies. Fifthly, Britain and France new the invasion would come

through Belgium, but that Belgium neutrality at this time caused problems. Lastly, the

French did not have the resolution or resources to fight at this time. The fact still

remains all of these issues were, to a smaller extent, contributing to the continuation

of the phoney war. The main complication was the severe winter conditions in

western Europe.

Arguably, the single and most important cause of the phoney war between

September 1939–May 1940 was the weather. Britain and other parts of Western

Europe were in the grips of the coldest winter for fifty years,'...frost gripped the whole

of Europe, touching even the Italian Riviera, and had caused Hitler to postpone, not

for the first time his long-expected offensive against the French and British Armies.' 2

This affected not only German invasion plans, but the French and British

preparations for war in two ways.

Firstly, although most armies on both sides had mechanization of troops, the

German and French armies still relied on horses to pull equipment and artillery. In

the summer months food for horses was plentiful, but during the winter grazing the

horses was not possible, especially in the grips of this snow covered winter.

Secondly, transportation and communication lines were affected by the extreme

winter being experienced. In Germany the River Danube had frozen making

transportation of troops, equipment and goods complex. 3 In Britain transportation

was difficult with trains and snow ploughs being, ‘engulfed in thirty feet of snow.' The

lines of communication had been affected by heavy snow on telephone lines causing

them to break.4 The harsh winter of 1939-1940 meant that to mount any kind of
2
Laurence Thompson, 1940: Year of Legend Year of History (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1966) p.13.
3
Williamson Murray, ‘The Strategy of the "Phoney War": A Re-Evaluation’, Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Feb.,
1981), pp. 13-17, p.13.
4
Thompson, 1940: Year of Legend Year of History, p.13
Cherry Hopley Page 3 of 15

substantial military campaign against the enemy would be almost impossible. The

supplies Germany needed to defeat France and Britain were simply not able to be

mobilised, as were communications from Generals to the front line were not able to

be received. The weather is undoubtedly the main cause of the phoney war, but it

could be debated other reasons only exacerbated this period.

Appeasement was one strategy which had been used by the British and

French governments to prevent any confrontation or war between the powers. The

appeasing of Germany had originally been supported by the British public; anything

that would prevent the horrors of 1914-1918 from reoccurring was advocated.

Conservative politician Richard (Rab) Butler, who supported appeasement

comments there was an, '... absolute saturation of the country in peace

propaganda.'5 This could explain why appeasement was popular with the British

public at the beginning of the war. By the declaration of war it was clear

appeasement had failed and the British people concluded either; 'it's got to come, we

might as well have it and finish with it,’ or 'We can't let old Hitler get away with it

again can we?'6 In the autumn of 1939 the British government continued with

negotiating for peace with Germany. 7 Governmental adviser and 'military theorist'

Captain Basil Liddell Hart championed negotiations with Hitler, along with liberal

leader and former Prime Minister David Lloyd George who also had this view and

'considerable public support.'8 Appeasement and negotiations were popular with

some aspects of general public opinion, other areas of society also agreed with this

strategy.

5
Holmes, The World at War, p.66.
6
Thompson, 1940: Year of Legend Year of History, p.12.
7
Alexander Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of Appeasement: The Social Sources of British
Foreign Policy During the 1930s’, Review of International Studies, Vol 37, No 2, (April 2011) pp. 601-629, p.625.
8
Bond, Brian, ‘From Prophecy to Prediction: Liddell Hart and the War in Europe, 1939-1940’, Futures, Vol 10,
No. 5, (1978) pp. 421-427, p.426.
Cherry Hopley Page 4 of 15

It could also be suggested the upper classes of German and British society

did not want a war either, for fear of their lifestyles being affected. In Germany the

'ruling class' viewed Nazis with 'much distaste.’ It was the poor and young Germans

who supported the Nazi regime. In Britain appeasement was supported, 'If the 'ruling

classes' had had matters their own way we may be absolutely certain there would

have been no 1939 war.'9 This argument, it could be suggested, is without

substance; as it was the British upper class that were in government and pushing for

action against Germany. There was also another political and social reason for

continuing negotiations and possible appeasement strategies in western Europe. A

Another view of the appeasement strategy was to prevent the spread of

communism through Europe. To the British and French it was ambiguous as to who

was the greater enemy, Nazi Germany or the Bolshevik Soviet Union. 10 Germany

and the Soviet Union had entered into an agreement 22 August 1939, much to the

surprise of Britain and French. This Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had agreed to divide

parts of conquered eastern Europe after invasion by Germany and, more importantly

for the Soviet Union, Poland. This further increased the need for a positive outcome

for negotiations between the British, French and Germans, ‘the only gains from a

European war would come to the domestic left and Soviet Union.’ 11 At this time the

British and French government perceived the spread of Bolshevism a more

dangerous threat than that of Nazism.

The appeasement and negotiation strategy adopted in 1938 by the British and

French continued right into the phoney war. It was initially popular for several

reasons; the public wanted appeasement as did British and French governments,

9
Roy Douglas, The Advent of War (Baisingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1978) p.144.
10
Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of Appeasement’, p.626.
11
Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of Appeasement, p.625.
Cherry Hopley Page 5 of 15

appeasement meant prevention of any type of fighting, and to halt the spread of

Bolshevism which was perceived more dangerous than Nazism. The negotiations

were unsuccessful and the phoney war continued on, as did the cold and icy

conditions which prevented any fighting during the winter. Meanwhile how the British

and French governments were currently fending off any type of hostilities were, in

actual fact, modestly contributing to the absence of hostilities.

RAF Bomber Command during the phoney war was not used in its capacity

as a war weapon, but to drop propaganda leaflets into Germany. British Prime

Minister Neville Chamberlain had been at the forefront of an appeasement strategy

towards Germany. John Colville, Assistant Private Secretary to Chamberlain

comments on how Chamberlain, '...felt that his life's work was to prevent a repetition

of the appalling massacres of the First World War. He gave everything he had to that

end...'12 Chamberlain also believed the dropping of leaflets on Germany was a ‘good

way of conducting the war’ according to Colville. 13 The propaganda dropped in

Germany in 1939 consisted of emphasising the lack of perceived accomplishments

by the German military, and that in time Britain would deploy a catastrophic military

counteroffensive towards Germany.14 This propaganda was designed to encourage

the German people to revolt against the Nazi regime. In turn, this populous support

would urge the insurrection of German generals. The British were under the

impression the propaganda would work due to information they had received.

British Intelligence believed Hitler was unpopular in Germany and that it was

extremely likely he was to be deposed at any moment. Colville states Chamberlain

was led by British intelligence to believe that Hitler was not advocated by the
12
Holmes, The World at War, p.65.
13
Holmes, The World at War, pp.73-74.
14
Robert Cole, ‘The Other 'Phoney War': British Propaganda in Neutral Europe, September-December 1939’,
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 455-479.
Cherry Hopley Page 6 of 15

German people.15 Chamberlain was also optimistic that Hitler would be

assassinated, which he believed would end the war.16 Chamberlain may have been

under the belief that serious fighting could be avoided with the use of propaganda.

This information from British intelligence was clearly incorrect and had no substance

to the claims of Hitler’s unpopularity.

This defensive strategy was also adopted by Bomber Command, leaflet drops

rather than bombs over Germany were part of a propaganda plan. British Intelligence

supported the perception of Hitler’s unpopularity with the German people. These

flights, however, were hampered by the weather, as planes could not take off and fly

in the hazardous conditions. The propaganda was part of the military advice to the

government to wait before taking any action against Germany.

The advice the government was receiving from its military advisers was to

delay any offensive towards Germany. George Hodgkinson Labour councillor for

Coventry stated he believed at this time there was not enough organisation of

resources, both locally and nationally to bring about the demolition of Germany and

to ‘defeat Hitler completely and handsomely.'17 This it could be argued stemmed from

the bad military advice that was being given to government. Colville states the

Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha was relying on advice from Liddell

Hart. Yet, Liddlell Hart was not trusted by British Generals, as he was military

correspondent for The Times and although his advice was at times perceptively

sharp, the British Generals 'found it hard to tolerate' his advice to Hore-Belisha. 18 The

overriding view of the British and indeed French military was to adopt a defensive

posture against the inevitable German attack.

15
Holmes, The World at War, p.73.
16
Holmes, The World at War, p.76.
17
Holmes, The World at War, p.74.
18
Holmes, The World at War, pp.75-76.
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The British and French had assumed a defence theory and strategy on

bombing raids. In March 1939 an agreement had been reached between Britain,

France and Germany whereby in the event of war only strategic military targets

would be bombed, so civilian casualties would be avoided at all costs. 19 This

agreement was preventing the RAF from operating any type of strategic bombing

campaign against Germany. The mentality of the British and French governments

was, if we do not attack them, they will not attack us. Robert Boothby conservative

politician stated, '…the government were with the idea that we could fight this war

without fighting it.'20 This meant the nature of the phoney war was apathetic, leaving

the Germans to make the first move causing a stalemate. The continuation of the

phoney war also meant the Germans could adopt an offensive strategy, '...by

allowing the Germans to pick the time and place for their offensive, in effect

maximized the Wehrmacht's military potential in May 1940.' 21 This defensive position

within the war adopted by the British and French was also meant to gain time to build

up military personnel and equipment.

The declaration of war without any military action was conceivably of benefit

to Britain and France. The extra time could have been spent on building up of

military personnel, armaments and munitions ready to allay any attack. The

industries had government orders to switch production, but the inflow of skilled

people into munitions manufacturing was low. This meant there was a shortfall

between production and receipt of munitions by the military, 'Criticism in this period

focused primarily on slow mobilisation of industries and manpower.' 22 Although

19
A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (London: Penguin Books, 1975) p.554.
20
Holmes, The World at War, p.74.
21
Williamson Murray, ‘The Strategy of the "Phoney War": A Re-Evaluation’, Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 1
(Feb., 1981), pp. 13-17, p.13.
22
Margaret Gowing, ‘The Organisation of Manpower in Britain during the Second World War’, Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 7, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1972), pp. 147-167, p.149.
Cherry Hopley Page 8 of 15

output was increased, unemployment figures did not change and remained at around

one million people by April 1940.23 Yet it has been suggested, there was no increase

in production which would suggest a reason for the unchanging unemployment

figures.24 There is also an indication that the government, ‘…implemented pre-war

contingency plans to ally popular panic and protect the health and safety of the

civilian population.'25 Keeping the public busy with preparations of war not only

contained hysteria, but made the people feel they were making a contribution to the

war. In France there was also no increase in production, but this was due to disputes

between the workers and government. This meant the French war economy could

not keep up with production of munitions and planes. The build-up of armaments by

the British and French could be considered as not as effective as it should have

been during the quiet period of the war.

The British and French perceptions of how to fight the war was one of

defence, to wait for an offensive by the Germans and only then retaliate. The

advantage of the phoney war meant that it would have been possible for the British

and French to build up troops and armaments. Although war production of military

equipment had been ordered to increase, the actual production took most of the

phoney war to accomplish due to the lack of skilled workers. All of these factors

however can be directly related to the dreadful weather conditions. Workers on

production lines may have found the interruption to transportation equally difficult to

contend with, as getting to the factories could be hazardous. Therefore, the advice to

wait and adopt a defensive strategy was not one of choice but one of necessity due

23
Kevin Jefferys, Finest and Darkest Hours (London: Atlantic Books, 2002) p.9.
24
Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p.566-567.
25
Jose Harris, ‘War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front during the Second World War’,
Contemporary European History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 17-35, 22.
Cherry Hopley Page 9 of 15

to the weather. The weather, however, did not stop the military theorist suggesting

Germany’s possible offensive approach.

Britain and France both assumed a German invasion of France would be

sooner, rather than later and that the Germans assault would come through Belgium.

Yet, Belgium’s proclaimed neutrality was a problem for Britain and France. If they

were to work with the Belgians in shoring up defences of the country, this could be

seen as an act of aggression by Germany. Alternatively, Britain and France were

perceived as protectors of small European states, they could not be seen to march

through a small neutral country such as Belgium to attack Germany. 26 The British

and French did however gain a slight advantage through an accident.

The capture of German invasion plans Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) after a plane

crash on 10 January 1940 was a coup for the British and French, as it showed the

German plan was to attack France through Belgium. The so called Mechelen

Incident was of great benefit to the British and French, as it did show the German

plan for the French invasion. However, it could also be considered beneficial to the

Germans, as they now had to come up with an alternative plan. The new plan was to

attack France at Sedan which was thought to be impregnable due to the rough

terrain; this in turn led to the eventual Fall of France.

As a neutral state Belgium needed to be protected, but any defences or build-

up of troops in the state could have been seen as an act of aggression. The capture

of invasion plans was a stroke of luck for the British and French, but the neutrality of

Belgium prevented any plans to be put in place regarding the repelling of an

invasion. All of these strategies were also under the influence of the weather as the

moving of equipment and troops would have been hampered. However, Britain and
26
Murray, ‘The Strategy of the "Phoney War": A Re-Evaluation’, p.15.
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France had been organised at sea enough to put the imports of raw materials to

Germany under pressure, or so they thought.

The Allies believed that most raw materials for fighting a war such as iron,

rubber and zinc were inaccessible to Germany. Colville states ambiguous

intelligence reports given to Chamberlain showed, ‘...that Germany was on the brink

of starvation or would be brought to starvation by economic warfare.' 27 The

blockading of waters around German imports of raw materials and fuel would mean

Germany would be deprived of essential goods resulting in submission. It could be

suggested it was the pressure on the German economy by the blockades which

postponed the German offensive in Western Europe. Britain and France perceived

the controlling mineral exports within the British Empire would give Germany

problems. Another misconception suggested shortages in ammunition and fuel that

were the reason the Luftwaffe (German Air force) did not begin a bombing offensive

against Britain and France in 1939. This was due to Germany only having munitions

and fuel to mount a land campaign. 28 These perceptions by Britain and France had

not taken into account any supplies from the east of Europe and the Soviet Union.

Britain and France were neglectful of supply chains through the Soviet Union,

as this supply had been more significant than had been predicted. 29 Hitler believed

that a blockade of German resources would not work as Germany could get

resources from eastern Europe. Although, German fuel stocks had dropped in 1939-

1940 from 2.4 to 1.6 million tons,30 this was arguably not due to the blockade, but the

exceptionally cold winter Germany was experiencing.

27
Holmes, The World at War, p.73.
28
Murray, ‘The Strategy of the "Phoney War": A Re-Evaluation’, pp. 13-14.
29
Nick Smart, British Strategy and Politics During the Phony War: Before the Balloon Went Up (Westport:
Praeger Publishers, 2003) p.75.
30
Murray, ‘The Strategy of the "Phoney War": A Re-Evaluation’, p.13.
Cherry Hopley Page 11 of 15

Britain and France saw one way of supressing an attack from Germany was

by blockading supplies into Germany. This was unsuccessful as Germany sort other

suppliers and routes through eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. German stocks

of fuel did experience a decrease, but this was more likely to be explained by the

usage for heat due to the exceptional winter. However, the alliance between Britain

and France was perhaps not as resolute, on the part of the French, as it may have

seemed.

The lack of French resolution stemmed from, '...resentment at having been

forced by the British into what many regarded as an unnecessary war over

Poland...'31 On mainland France there was a reluctance to fire on the enemy for fear

of retaliation, thus no serious French assault was mounted in 1939 or early 1940.

AJP Taylor describes a small assault, 'French forces tiptoed across the German

frontier while Hitler was busy in Poland. Then withdrew a little later when German

soldiers opened fire upon them.' 32 It was clear that the French would not be as

aggressive in this war as they had been in 1914. This coupled with the antiquated

perception of French commanders, who believed a defensive approach to the war

would work, and political leaders who believed in appeasement. 33 These two issues

impacted on troops on the ground mainly stationed at the Maginot Line, the

supposed impregnable French defensive bunker which ran for most of the border

between Germany and France.

The French morale was also very low at this point, arguably caused by the

indecision of political and military leaders. This resulted in the French commanders

authority to lead being eroded. This can be illustrated by a visit to French defences

31
Thompson, 1940: Year of Legend Year of History, p.16.
32
Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p.561.
33
T.A. Morris, European History 1848-1945 (London: Collins Educational, 1992) p.275.
Cherry Hopley Page 12 of 15

by American Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. He received grievances

from, French officers about the lack of discipline among their men, which included if

no offensive came from the Germans soon the French army on the Maginot line

would, 'spontaneously pack up and go home.' 34 The French army perhaps was not

the force it once was and as a result in line for defeat.

Although it was the British and French who had entered in to the war against

Germany, the British had misconceptions about how impregnable the French army

was. Low morale, weak leadership and the supposed strong hold of the Maginot Line

were all contributing to the disarray of the French army. As the harsh winter was also

biting in main land France it is likely the weather was considered a help to the

French army, as their disorganisation meant they were in no way ready for a German

invasion.

In conclusion, the ‘phoney war’ was caused and exacerbated by the harshest

winter conditions seen for fifty years. The weather affected the two main areas

needed to mount an affective offensive by either side; transport and

communications. It could be perceived there were other causes of the phoney war,

such as appeasement may have prolonged the period of calm. Another factor was

the bad advice and intelligence given to the British government regarding Bomber

Command, and the reluctance of Britain and France in attacking Germany for fear of

reprisals. The perceived slow implementation of war production and build-up of

troops was also a part of the phoney war continuation. The neutrality of Belgium also

became a problem for Britain and France, as did the lack of French resolution by

political and military leadership to fend off an invasion. The idea of blockading

German imports was a sound idea, but the strategists did not factor in the possible

34
Thompson, 1940: Year of Legend Year of History, p.17.
Cherry Hopley Page 13 of 15

trade routes from the Soviet Union. In the eight months of the phoney war in western

Europe, it could be argued it was the fault of the politicians of Britain and France and

their indecisiveness. Yet the main cause of the phoney war was an issue that neither

side could control, the weather. The phoney war was a part of history that can be

overlooked, but this period had a greater impact on the change of perceptions in

military and political thinking and how this war was to be fought.

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Studies, Vol 37, No 2, (April 2011) pp. 601-629.

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