G.R. No. 133739 May 29, 2002
With this environmental milieu, the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
TOMAS COCA JR., RICARDO COCA and
RAMIL COCA, accused-appellants.
FACTS:
on March 20, 1996, at 7:00 in the
evening, while the victim was having
supper with his wife Merolina and their
two children inside their kitchen, a
sudden burst of gunfire emanated from
underneath the house. Merolina peeped
through the slits on the floor and saw
three persons sitting on their heels. The
fluorescent lamp which illuminated their
kitchen and the 100 watt bulb of the
adjacent house directly opposite the
kitchen enabled Merolina to identify
accused-appellant Tomas, Ricardo and
Ramil Coca, who were all underneath
the house and looking upwards. Tomas
Coca was positioned between Ricardo
and Ramil and aiming a gun at
Edilberto. She turned and saw her
husband, slumped on the floor with
blood oozing from his body.
Meronila purposely withheld the identity
of the culprits. She feared that revealing
the names of the persons who shot her
husband would endanger not only her
life but also that of her children who
were alone in their house all through out
the time that she was in the hospital with
her injured husband. It was only after
almost five months, or on August 19,
1996, that she finally divulged the
identities of the perpetrators.
Issue
Whether or not Meronila’s testimony is
competent.
Ruling
Yes, In the case at bar, the
kitchen/dining area where the victim was
shot from underneath the house was
illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. There
would therefore be light falling on the
faces of accused-appellants, especially
so that they were all facing upwards.
Ordinary human experience would tell
us that bamboo flooring with gaps
smaller than an inch allows every ray of
light emanating from a fluorescent lamp
to freely penetrate through the bamboo
slats.
fluorescent lamp would indeed provide
sufficient illumination to identify the
accused-appellants underneath a 3 to 4
feet high bamboo flooring. What is
more, the 100 watt bulb of the adjacent
house, six meters away, and directly
opposite the kitchen where the victim
was shot, provided additional
illumination below the victim's house.
Clearly, therefore, the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the
crime certainly obliterate the slightest
shred of doubt on the veracity of
accused-appellant's identification.
Sanson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127745, April 22, 2003
Petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson
(Sanson), in his capacity as creditor,
filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, for the
settlement of the estate of Juan Bon
Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on
January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that
the deceased was indebted to him in the
amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister
Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia)
in the amount of P360,000.00.
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo
Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles
Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate
claims against the estate, alleging that
the deceased owed them P50,000.00
and P150,000.00, respectively.
Sanson, in support of the claim of his
sister Celedonia, testified that she had a
transaction with the deceased which is
evidenced by six checks issued by him
before his death, Celedonia presented
the checks to the bank for payment but
were dishonored due to the closure of
his account.
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her
brother Sanson, testified that she knew
that the deceased issued five checks to
Sanson in settlement of a debt.
Jade, in support of the claims of her
husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and
mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on
separate occasions, the deceased
borrowed money from her husband and
mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by
three checks issued by the deceased.
Melecia Sy, as administratrix denied all
claims raising the deadmans statute on
the testimonies of the witnesses.
Issue
Whether or not the dead man’s statute
applies to relatives of the parties who
were their witnesses
Ruling
No, Since the law disqualifies parties to
a case or assignors to a case without
distinguishing between testimony in his
own behalf and that in behalf of others,
he should be disqualified from testifying
for his co-parties. The law speaks of
parties or assignors of parties to a case.
Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson
and Saquin on each others behalf, as
co-parties to the same case, falls under
the prohibition.
But Sansons and Celedonias claims
against the same estate arose from
separate transactions. Sanson is a third
party with respect to Celedonias claim.
And Celedonia is a third party with
respect to Sansons claim. One is not
thus disqualified to testify on the others
transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans
Statute proscribes is the admission of
testimonial evidence upon a claim which
arose before the death of the deceased.
The incompetency is confined to the
giving of testimony.Since the separate
claims of Sanson and Celedonia are
supported by checks-documentary
evidence, their claims can be
prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
G.R. No. 107383 February 20,
1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
Facts
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of
private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Issue
WON the documents / papers are
admissible as evidence
Ruling
No, the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring
“the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband’s infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law.” Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding.”
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO
S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET, respondents.
Facts:
The case involves respondent Paredes
who applied for a free patent over a
piece of land in 1976.
It was later discovered that Paredes
obtained the patent through fraudulent
misrepresentations.
Sansaet served as Paredes' counsel in
the case.
Paredes and his co-respondents were
charged with falsification of public
documents.
Sansaet claimed that he filed falsified
documents upon the inducement of
Paredes.
The prosecution filed a motion for the
discharge of Sansaet as a state witness,
but it was rejected by the Ombudsman,
citing attorney-client privilege.
Issue:
Whether the testimony of Sansaet is
barred by attorney-client privilege.
Whether Sansaet is eligible for
discharge as a particeps criminis.
Ruling:
Attorney-client privilege does not apply
to future crimes.
The privileged communication between
a lawyer and client only applies to
crimes already committed, not to crimes
intended to be committed in the future.
The communications between Paredes
and Sansaet were made in relation to a
crime that had not yet been committed
at the time, so they are not covered by
attorney-client privilege.
Sansaet was a conspirator in the
commission of the crime and the
communication between him and
Paredes was for an unlawful purpose.
The privilege does not attach to
communications made for an illegal
purpose.
The other requisites for the discharge of
Sansaet as a state witness are present.
Sansaet is the only cooperative
eyewitness to the crime.
There is no other direct evidence
available for the prosecution.
There is an absolute necessity for his
testimony.
Ratio:
Attorney-client privilege does not extend
to future crimes.
The purpose of attorney-client privilege
is to encourage open communication
between lawyers and clients to ensure
effective legal representation.
However, this privilege does not protect
communications made in furtherance of
a future crime.
The privilege only applies to crimes that
have already been committed.
In this case, the communications
between Paredes and Sansaet were
made in relation to a crime that had not
yet been committed at the time.
Therefore, attorney-client privilege does
not bar the testimony of Sansaet.
Additionally, Sansaet was a conspirator
in the commission of the crime and the
communication between him and
Paredes was for an unlawful purpose.
The privilege does not attach to
communications made for an illegal
purpose.
Furthermore, the other requisites for the
discharge of Sansaet as a state witness
are present.
Sansaet is the only cooperative
eyewitness to the crime.
There is no other direct evidence
available for the prosecution.
Therefore, there is an absolute
necessity for his testimony.
Considering all these factors, the Court
concluded that Sansaet should be
discharged as a state witness and
allowed to testify against his co-
accused.
The Sandiganbayan should have
considered all the facts and issues in
the case, not just the applicability of
attorney-client privilege, in making its
decision.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA ABAD
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA
EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD,
MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE
S. ABAD, respondents.
Facts
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina
Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad
and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their
brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before
the then Court of First Instance of
Manila. In their petition, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 86792,
petitioners claimed that they were the
only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as
the latter allegedly died a bachelor,
leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. On
May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their
petition by alleging that the real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021, listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually
only administered by the latter, the true
owner being their late mother, Lucila de
Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court
appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
administrator of the intestate estate of
Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents
Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside
proceedings and for leave to file
opposition in Special Proceedings No.
86792. In their motion, they alleged that
Honoria Empaynado had been the
common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for
twenty-seven years before his death, or
from 1943 to 1971, and that during this
period, their union had produced two
children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and
Marian Abad Empaynado. Private
respondents also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child
allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with
another woman, Dolores Saracho. As
the law awards the entire estate to the
surviving children to the exclusion of
collateral relatives, private respondents
charged petitioners with deliberately
concealing the existence of said three
children in other to deprive the latter of
their rights to the estate of Ricardo
Abad. Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer
and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay
Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified
that on the second week of March 1996,
between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he
was passing by the house of Artemio on
his way to the field to catch fish, he
heard somebody crying. He then
peeped through a small opening in the
destroyed portion of the sawali wall of
Artemio’s house. He saw Cynthia lying
on her back and crying, while her father
was on top of her, doing a pumping
motion. Eddie observed them for about
fifteen seconds, and then he left and
proceeded to the field to catch fish.5 He
reported what he had witnessed to
Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later that
morning.
Lastly, petitioners presented the
affidavit of Dr. Pedro
Arenas,8 Ricardo Abad's physician,
declaring that in 1935, he had
examined Ricardo Abad and found
him to be infected with gonorrhea,
and that the latter had become sterile
as a consequence thereof.
Issue
WON Dr. Pedro Arenas’ affidavit is
admissible
Ruling
No, Petitioners conveniently forget
that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose
when the latter contracted gonorrhea,
a fact which most assuredly blackens
his reputation. In fact, given that
society holds virility at a premium,
sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a
sexually-transmitted disease, would
be sufficient to blacken the
reputation of any patient. We thus
hold the affidavit inadmissible in
evidence.
G.R. No. 131636 March 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y
SORIANO, appellant.
Facts
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade
two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary
School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he
is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of
Artemio with his second common-law
wife. Sometime before the end of the
school year in 1996, while he was
sleeping in one room with his father
Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger
brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s
loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw
his father on top of Cynthia, doing a
pumping motion. After about two
minutes, his father put on his short
pants.
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia
and former common-law wife of Artemio,
testified that she and Artemio started
living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
in February 1969. Out of their common-
law relationship, they had six children,
one of whom was Cynthia. In March
1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. Later, Gloria and her
children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When
Artemio’s mother died sometime in
1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a
small one-room dwelling owned by
Celestino and located
in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac,
Tarlac.7 On 30 August 1996, her son
Novelito told her that Cynthia was
pregnant. Gloria then went to the house
of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her
condition. The latter confessed that she
had been sexually abused by her father.
Gloria then went to the office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
Tarlac and reported what Artemio had
done to their daughter Cynthia.
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial
Hospital testified that she examined
Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She
found Cynthia to be five to six months
pregnant and to have incomplete,
healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8
o’clock positions, which could have
been caused by sexual intercourse or
any foreign body inserted in her private
part.
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent,
testified that on 18 September 1996,
Cynthia, accompanied by her mother,
complained before him and NBI
Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that
she was raped by her father Artemio.
She then executed a written
statement,10 which she subscribed and
sworn to before Atty. Canlas.
The defense did not present Artemio as
a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte,
Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness
stand and testified for the defense.
Issue
WON the testimony of Elven Invencion
should be inadmissible due to filial
privelage (+Leading questions during
testimony)
Ruling
No, As to the competency of Elven to
testify, we rule that such is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on
"filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule
on disqualification because a descendant is
not incompetent or disqualified to testify
against an ascendant.20 The rule refers to a
privilege not to testify, which can be invoked
or waived like other privileges. As correctly
observed by the lower court, Elven was not
compelled to testify against his father; he
chose to waive that filial privilege when he
voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven
declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and
only "to tell the truth."21
Neither can Artemio challenge the
prosecution’s act of propounding leading
questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of
Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court22 expressly allows leading
questions when the witness is a child of
tender years like Elven.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON,
Presiding over Branch 6, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
Facts
What has given rise to the controversy
at bar is the equation by the respondent
Judge of the right of an individual not
to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself" accorded by Section 20, Article
III of the Constitution, with the right of
any person "under investigation for the
commission of an offense . . . to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right," granted by the
same provision. The relevant facts are
not disputed.
At the close of the people's case, the him on the first day of the administrative
private prosecutors made a written offer investigation, February 9, 1986 and
of evidence dated June 21, 1988,6 which agreed that the proceedings should be
included "the (above mentioned) recorded, the record having thereafter
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos been marked during the trial of the
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL criminal action subsequently filed
Baguio City Ticket Office," which had against him as Exhibit A, just as it is
been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his obvious that the note (later marked as
"handwritten admission x x given on Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors
February 8, 1986," also above referred on February 8,1986, the day before the
to, which had been marked as Exhibit K. investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was
The defendant's attorneys filed
a free and even spontaneous act on his
"Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
part. They may not be excluded on the
Evidence."7 Particularly as regards the
ground that the so-called "Miranda
peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was
rights" had not been accorded to
that "said document, which appears to
Ramos.
be a confession, was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer." [ G.R. No. 127073, January 29, 1998 ]
Exhibit K was objected to "for the same
JOSE P. DANS, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A'
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and 'J.'
RESPONDENT.
Issue
In short, Marcos and Dans were
WON exhibits A and K should be separately charged under Criminal Case
admitted into evidence Nos. 17451 and 17452 for accepting
employment in and/or acting as
Ruling
Chairman and Director, respectively, of
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is the PGHFI while the latter had pending
granted annulling and setting aside the business (the lease agreements) with
Orders of the respondent Judge in the LRTA, which they both also headed.
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated With regard to the other cases, Criminal
August 9, 1988 and September 14, Case Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453,
1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit the accusations against both of them
in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the stemmed from the contracts they signed
prosecution in said Criminal Case No. in representation of the LRTA and of the
3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the PGHFI which were allegedly entered
trial and adjudgment thereof. The into “under terms and conditions
temporary restraining order of October manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
26, 1988 having become functus officio, to the government.”
is now declared of no further force and
effect.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of
this case that Felipe Ramos was not in
any sense under custodial interrogation,
as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in
which he appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into
play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to