The Journal of Peasant Studies

ISSN: 0306-6150 (Print) 1743-9361 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjps20

The trade-ification of the food sustainability

agenda

Jennifer Clapp

To cite this article: Jennifer Clapp (2016): The trade-ification of the food sustainability agenda,
The Journal of Peasant Studies, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2016.1250077

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1250077

Published online: 02 Dec 2016.

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The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1250077

The trade-ification of the food sustainability agenda

Jennifer Clapp

This contribution argues that the food sustainability agenda in global food governance
arrangements is becoming ‘trade-ified’. It shows that international trade has become
normalized in these settings not only as being compatible with, but also as a key
delivery mechanism for, food system sustainability. The paper first explains the
rationale for this dominant narrative, which revolves around the efficiency gains from
trade. Second, it outlines two important critiques of this approach – one that stresses
the need to look beyond food as an economic commodity, and one that reveals the
internal flaws of trade theory – which together provide important counterpoints to this
dominant narrative. Third, the paper offers three interrelated explanations for why
trade continues to be presented as a key ingredient to food sustainability despite the
weaknesses of the dominant approach: institutional fragmentation in global food
governance; the carryover of previous normative compromises regarding trade and
the environment in other governance settings; and the influence of powerful interests.
Keywords: international trade; environmental sustainability; global food governance;
norms; institutional fragmentation; interests

Introduction
The 2007–2008 food price spikes gave new impetus to longstanding food system sustain-
ability questions, as policymakers focused their attention on the question of how to feed an
expanding world population with limited available land and resources in an era of climate
change (Godfray et al. 2010). At the same time, there is growing awareness of the fact that
the global industrial food system, as it is currently organized, is unsustainable in environ-
mental terms. The agricultural sector is responsible for a significant proportion of green-
house gases and contributes to biodiversity loss, water depletion and deforestation,
among other environmental impacts (Foley et al. 2011; Garnett 2013). For these reasons,
it is now widely understood that the world must transition to more sustainable food
systems on a global scale if food security is to be improved over the long run. The impor-
tance of food system sustainability is stressed in a range of global governance initiatives
that set the rules and norms of behaviour for food and agriculture.
Most observers welcome the wide embrace of environmental sustainability as a guiding
norm in global food governance. But, as the food sustainability norm has risen on the
agenda in recent decades, it has been forced to share the stage with another powerful
norm that has also gained influence in this governance space: the norm of agricultural
trade liberalization. This contribution makes the case that the norm of food sustainability
is accompanied by a discourse that normalizes trade as a key mechanism for delivering sus-
tainability in the food sector. It suggests that the development of this discourse is an attempt

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

2 J. Clapp

by trade advocates to ‘trade-ify’ food sustainability in global governance settings. This

approach has been remarkably influential, as the idea that agricultural trade is essential
for food system sustainability now features prominently in a variety of formal governance
arrangements that are important for food and agriculture, from the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Committee on World
Food Security (CFS) and the Group of Twenty (G20), among others.
Why does the trade-ification of global governance initiatives for food sustainability
matter? Those promoting food system sustainability at the local level may view global
food governance initiatives, and their language around trade and sustainability, as remote
or perhaps even irrelevant to the promotion of sustainable food systems. Indeed, much
of the agenda for the promotion of local sustainable food systems is focused on fostering
the application of agroecological farming principles and building locally oriented distri-
bution systems. This is important work. But the context within which local food systems
operate is shaped nonetheless by broader trends in the global political economy, trends
influenced by global governance initiatives that promote trade liberalization as a key
source of sustainability. It is thus essential to examine the ways in which global governance
initiatives for food sustainability have been ‘trade-ified’, as well as the wider implications of
this trend. Such an exercise begs important questions: What is the underlying rationale
within the dominant narrative for presenting trade liberalization as a key ingredient to
food system sustainability? What are the limitations of this dominant narrative? Why
does this dominant narrative persist in global food governance settings, despite its
limitations?
This paper seeks to answer these questions. The first section provides an overview of the
extent to which the trade-ification of the food sustainability narrative is reflected in major
global governance initiatives and explains the ways in which proponents of the dominant
narrative rationalize this approach through a discourse focused on efficiency gains from
trade. The second section outlines two lines of critique that challenge this dominant narra-
tive: one that rejects a prioritization of economic efficiency and promotes an idea of food
sustainability based on agroecological principles that do not require trade; and another
that points out internal inconsistencies in the pro-trade logic that undermine its economic
efficiency claims. To date, these critiques have developed through different literatures
and disciplines, but together they form a powerful counter-narrative to the trade-ification
of food sustainability. The third section of the paper argues that the persistence of the domi-
nant narrative in global governance settings, despite its flaws as highlighted by its critics, is
the product of several interrelated factors. These include: the fragmented nature of global
governance arrangements for food systems, which enables some governance arenas to
carry more weight than others; the carry-over of a broader ideational ‘compromise’
between liberalism and sustainability to the food governance arena; and the ability of
powerful interests that benefit from a liberal trade regime to navigate these features of
the governance landscape to their advantage.

Trade liberalization and sustainability norms in global food governance: the

dominant narrative
International norms establish standards of behaviour, and can influence the rights and obli-
gations that are set out in international agreements and upheld by international institutions
(Krasner 1982, 186; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Emergent international norms are
shaped and reshaped by processes of contestation over time before they become widely
accepted and institutionalized (Halliday and Shaffer 2015). Different norms also interact
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 3

with each other on the global stage, often shaping each other in the process, as we have seen
with trade and environment norms more broadly that have become increasingly entwined
with one another (Bernstein 2002). Norms regarding agricultural trade and food sustainabil-
ity have also evolved in important ways over the years, and have become increasingly
linked in global governance arenas in the last quarter century.
Trade liberalization has been a dominant norm in the global economy, especially since
the adoption of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which seeks to
promote a progressively more open and liberal trade regime. It is only relatively recently,
however, that the norm of trade liberalization has been embraced within food and agricul-
ture governance. Agricultural trade was largely exempted from the GATT agreement up
until the adoption of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) under the Uruguay Round in
1994. Prior to this time, agricultural ‘exceptionalism’ was the dominant norm throughout
the twentieth century, reflecting the desire of powerful countries to support their agricultural
sectors through restrictive trade policies and subsidy programmes (McCalla 1969; Skogstad
1998). Since the adoption of the AoA, trade liberalization has risen to become a powerful
idea shaping global food governance. The emergence of agricultural trade liberalization as a
dominant norm occurred despite the fact that its application has been highly uneven in prac-
tice (see Bukovansky 2010).
Environmental concerns have also risen on the agenda in global governance arenas
since the 1970s, and have been accompanied by the adoption of a growing number of
international environmental agreements since that time. The rise in concern for agricul-
tural sustainability in the global governance context first emerged in an era when
environment and development were widely seen to be in tension with one another. At
the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, for example, mentions
of agriculture focused primarily on the ecological damage resulting from the green revo-
lution (UN 1972). But as neoliberal economic ideas rose to prominence in the following
decade, the Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future, introduced the idea of
‘sustainable development’, which saw environment and development as potentially com-
patible, including for the agricultural sector (WCED 1987). Agricultural sustainability
was a focus of discussions at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit alongside other environmental
issues (UN 1992). Concern regarding food sustainability again rose to prominence in the
wake of the 2007–2008 food price spikes, which were accompanied by a growing
concern with the ability to produce sufficient food supplies without causing irreparable
environmental damage (Foley et al. 2011).
Although the norms of food sustainability and agricultural trade liberalization rose to
global prominence along different trajectories, and have shifted over time as a result of con-
testation and ideational change, they have been increasingly and consistently linked to each
other in global food governance initiatives over the past two and a half decades. Trade lib-
eralization has increasingly been presented not only as compatible with, but also as an
essential ingredient to, food system sustainability. The linkage of these norms in this
way, not surprisingly, coincided with the rise of neoliberal economic thinking in that
same period. The extent to which this linkage appears in various global governance initiat-
ives that affect the food sector, and the rationale that those promoting this linkage use to
justify their connection, are outlined below.

Trade increasingly prominent in food sustainability initiatives

Global food system governance is currently spread across a number of institutions and
arrangements, spanning economic, food and environmental governance spheres. It is in
4 J. Clapp

these contexts that trade liberalization and sustainability have been increasingly linked to
one another. One of the earliest formal global governance arenas where food sustainability
and agricultural trade liberalization were prominently linked was in a chapter on ‘Sustain-
able Agriculture and Rural Development’ in Agenda 21, the document adopted at the 1992
Rio Earth Summit as the blueprint for building a more environmentally sustainable future
(UN 1992). The agricultural sustainability chapter specifically called for a more open and
non-discriminatory trade system and avoidance of ‘unjustifiable’ trade barriers (UN 1992).
The linkage between food sustainability and agricultural trade liberalization at Rio marked a
significant shift from the 1972 World Conference on the Human Environment, which did
not explicitly link the concepts (UN 1972). This shift likely reflected both the fact that
the Uruguay Round AoA was being negotiated at the time, and the growing embrace of
the notion of sustainable development.
The linkage between trade liberalization and food sustainability was also made in the
context of the WTO in the mid-1990s when it was established upon completion of the
Uruguay Round. The WTO is a central force in the trade governance arena, and this
dominance is relevant for how agriculture and food systems are governed in a global
context. The WTO has fully embraced the norm of trade liberalization, the promotion
of which is at the core of its mandate. It has also embraced the norm of sustainability,
which was mentioned as a key goal in the preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement that
formally established the WTO (WTO 1995). The idea that trade and sustainable devel-
opment are mutually supportive also made its way directly into the AoA adopted at
the same time, which included language on ‘nontrade concerns’ – referring to both
food security and the environment – as being compatible with liberalized trade in the
sector (WTO 1994; Sakuyama 2005). The Doha Declaration, which launched the
Doha Round of trade negotiations in 2001, included a pledge to renegotiate the AoA,
and further emphasized that the goal of environmental sustainability is compatible
with an open multilateral trade system:

We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development … . We are

convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multi-
lateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment and the promotion of
sustainable development can and must be mutually supportive. (WTO 2001)

The Doha Declaration also pledged to consider crafting rules to give countries policy space
to address non-trade issues such as food security and the environment as they relate to agri-
culture (WTO 2001).
The linkage between trade and food sustainability has also appeared in global gov-
ernance arenas specifically focused on food security. Global food security governance
is coordinated most prominently within the United Nations (UN) Committee on World
Food Security (CFS), housed at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and open
to member states of the FAO, World Food Programme (WFP) and International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The CFS was reformed in 2009 to include non-
governmental organizations more fully in its deliberations (albeit non-voting) and is
widely seen to be the premier institution for coordinating governance on food security
(McKeon 2009, 2015). A prominent mandate of the CFS is to examine issues at the
intersection of food security and the environment, but the body has been explicitly dis-
couraged by its member states from discussing trade issues in relation to food security
(Clapp and Murphy 2013, 134). Although this body is often silent on matters of trade
in its deliberations, the norm of trade liberalization shapes it nonetheless. The Global
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 5

Strategic Framework (GSF), a guidance document for the CFS regularly renegotiated
by its members, stresses the need for open trade flows and multilateral trade nego-
tiations in numerous places throughout (CFS 2014). At the same time, much of its
mandate is to address issues of environmental sustainability, especially the resilience
of food systems in the face of climate change. The GSF explicitly mentions the need
for agro-ecological practices in food systems. The body is more introspective on the
potential tensions, however, when it notes, ‘it is important to promote consistency of
trade and development and environmental policies … ’ (CFS 2014, 19).
The work of the CFS builds on the Rome Declaration of the World Summit on Food
Security (WSFS) held in 2009, in the aftermath of the food price crisis. The declaration
embraces and outlines the Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security, to
which countries agreed to adhere (WSFS 2009). These include, under Principle 3 (strive
for a comprehensive twin-track approach to food security) a statement (paragraph 22)
that: ‘We support WTO-consistent, non-trade-distorting special measures … ’ and ‘We
agree to refrain from taking measures that are inconsistent with WTO rules … ’. Also
under Principle 3 (paragraph 25), the document stresses: ‘We will implement sustainable
practices, including responsible fisheries, improved resource use, protection of the environ-
ment, conservation of the natural resource base and enhanced use of ecosystem services’
(WSFS 2009). There is no mention in the document of how to ensure that these goals
are mutually compatible, however.
Other more recent multilateral governance initiatives that matter for food security have
followed a similar approach. The recently adopted SDGs link trade and food sustainability
goals explicitly (UN 2015). Goal #2: ‘End hunger, achieve food security and improved
nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’ includes in its sub-goal 2.4 language that
calls on governments to:

ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that
increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity
for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters, and
that progressively improve land and soil quality. (UN 2015)

At the same time, it also calls on governments to ‘correct and prevent trade restrictions and
distortions in world agricultural markets … ’. Goal #17 further embeds trade liberalization
into the SDGs, by stressing the need to ‘promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discri-
minatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization,
including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda’.
The text of the SDGs stresses that these goals are deeply ‘integrated and indivisible’
(UN 2015).
The G20 also recently adopted an Action Plan on Food Security and Sustainable Food
Systems in fall 2015. This plan stresses the importance of ‘building food systems that are
more sustainable and resilient’. It maps out the necessary components for such a system,
which includes an ‘open’ trade system. It further stresses: ‘We reaffirm our commitment
to the fundamental role of a rules-based multilateral trading system in global food security
and to the on-going WTO negotiations with a view to promptly conclude the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda’ (G20 2015).
As these examples show, trade has become increasingly prominent in global govern-
ance initiatives seeking to promote sustainability in the global food system. The norms
of food system sustainability and liberal trade policies have been increasingly cast not
just as compatible, but also as tightly linked.
6 J. Clapp

Trade-ification: crafting a narrative that trade and sustainability are mutually

supportive
The presentation in global governance arenas of trade liberalization and food system sus-
tainability as mutually supportive norms is supported by a dominant narrative that has
become increasingly prominent in the trade literature as well as in official communications
from various governance organizations in recent years. This dominant narrative focuses its
analysis within the language of trade and liberal economic theory, highlighting the ways in
which trade generates economic efficiency gains that can be harnessed to promote sustain-
ability in the food system.
The association of trade with efficiency gains draws on the economic concept of com-
parative advantage, which is frequently referenced in both academic and policy documents
that take this perspective. First outlined by David Ricardo in 1817, the theory of compara-
tive advantage posits that gains will arise from international trade even for countries that do
not have an absolute advantage (lowest production costs compared to other countries) in
producing any particular good. The rationale for this finding is that countries face different
opportunity costs to producing different goods within their borders, based on their unique
endowments of land, labour, climate, capital and technology. Because of these differences,
all countries have a comparative advantage in producing at least some goods over others.
Ricardo showed that if all countries specialize in the goods for which they have the least
opportunity costs, and then engage in trade, efficiencies would result from the process,
and world welfare would increase because there would be more goods produced globally
and thus more goods available for everyone (on the concept of comparative advantage,
see Schumacher 2013; Prasch 1996).
The dominant narrative often refers to the concept of comparative advantage to make
the case that trade supports sustainability (see, for example, Baldos and Hertel 2015;
Lamy 2011, 2013; UNEP-WTO 2009). Those who view trade’s role as a positive force
for sustainability in the food system typically put forward several types of arguments, all
of which refer to the predicted efficiency gains from trade in one way or another.
Perhaps the most common argument for trade supporting sustainable food systems is that
trade allows for the capture of efficiency gains on a global scale, minimizing the overall
use of natural resources required for agriculture by shifting production to the countries
best suited to producing specific crops (Lamy 2011). Trade advocates highlight the fact
that some countries are naturally endowed with an appropriate climate for growing
certain crops, enabling them to produce those crops with minimal additional inputs and
without practices that could deplete natural resources (Lamy 2012). These countries,
they argue, can then export their surpluses, while importing crops from countries that are
naturally well endowed to produce other crops (Meridian 2011, 19). According to this
narrative, countries that face severe natural resource constraints can preserve their natural
resources by relying on imported food items rather than expanding production at home.
As the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) pointed out in
a recent publication:

Trade will be essential in order for supply increases to be achieved sustainably. Trade enables
production to locate in areas where natural resources, notably land and water, are relatively
abundant, and where systems are more resilient to the effects of climate change. (OECD
2013, 18)

The dominant narrative also notes that the economic benefits associated with greater pro-
duction should increase the capacity of farmers to obtain new technologies that support
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 7

more sustainable agricultural production methods and enable adaptation to climate change
(UNEP-WTO 2009, 31). Trade advocates often stress the need for technological solutions
to sustainability challenges, such as the adoption of drought-tolerant genetically modified
seeds and other technological strategies for ‘sustainable intensification’, alongside their pre-
scription for greater trade liberalization, as the two are seen to positively reinforce one
another (e.g. World Bank 2007; OECD 2013). Trade, for example, is promoted as an impor-
tant channel for the global spread of these kinds of agricultural technologies (UNEP-WTO
2009, 31).
Promoters of trade liberalization also warn that restrictive agricultural trade policies can
directly result in environmental degradation (UNEP-WTO 2009). Some have argued that
restrictive trade policies implemented in the name of food self-sufficiency are misguided
because self-sufficiency is biophysically impossible for a large number of countries, in
addition to being highly inefficient from an economic perspective (Lamy 2012). Insistence
on producing food domestically, trade advocates argue, can increase a country’s reliance on
irrigation, which puts stress on water resources, and also encourages land clearing, which is
associated with deforestation, biodiversity loss and the release of greenhouse gases. Trade
distortions, such as subsidies and other restrictions, according to this narrative, only disrupt
trade’s contributions to sustainable development (UNEP-WTO 2009; Baldos and Hertel
2015).
Trade advocates frequently reference climate change to give their arguments more
urgency. Climate change is widely expected to exacerbate existing food production imbal-
ances between rich and poor countries, as regions such as sub-Saharan Africa face a pro-
jected decline in agricultural productivity as a result of a changing global climate (Porter
et al. 2014; Elbehri 2015, 13). Some scientific studies show that countries that depend
on imported food are already facing natural resource constraints (Fader et al. 2013; D’Odor-
ico et al. 2014). In this context, developing country agricultural imports are expected to
double as a result of climate change (Campbell et al. 2011, 35). More open trade channels,
trade advocates argue, provide an economic adaptation strategy to climate change that
enables countries to access food and agricultural products from trading partners that are
less affected (UNEP-WTO 2009, 62). This strategy is also widely seen by its promoters
to have other positive environmental impacts, as it reduces pressure on scarce natural
resources in the most affected countries (Lamy 2012). Proponents of this narrative
further argue that countries’ comparative advantages over the long run are likely to shift
as a result of climate change, and in this context they promote trade as a strategy for adapt-
ing to climate-related changes in countries’ opportunity costs (Baldos and Hertel 2015).
Supporters of this dominant narrative do not deny that there are environmental chal-
lenges associated with the global food system, and even associate some of its challenges
with industrial agriculture (e.g. Hertel et al. 2014). But they see these problems as being
entirely separate from trade, and instead stress that they arise from externalities associated
with domestic policy failures. Economists typically stress that externalities can be dealt with
through appropriate pricing mechanisms at the domestic level, rather than through the use
of trade policy (see Bhagwati 1993). As Pascal Lamy, former Director General of the WTO,
linked this argument to agriculture in a 2011 speech:

no matter how sophisticated our trade policies are, if domestic policies do not themselves
incentivize agriculture, and internalize negative social and environmental externalities, we
will not be satisfied with our agricultural systems … . Trade policy – no doubt – has its
place in this picture. But it cannot and does not, by itself, answer each and every challenge
in agriculture. (Lamy 2011)
8 J. Clapp

In recent decades, environmental economists have developed a suite of economic tools for
cost internalization in the agricultural sector, from payment for ecosystem services, to tax
and subsidy programmes. Voluntary market-led certification schemes in the agricultural
sector are also widely promoted in this narrative as mechanisms by which environmental
externalities associated with the production of certain export crops can be internalized
into the price of the goods, and this is seen to be a more appropriate means by which to
address externalities than the restriction of trade. Such schemes do not conflict with
WTO trade rules and articulate well with the above arguments regarding the means by
which international trade can contribute to sustainability in the food system.

Trade and the ecological crisis in the food system: two lines of critique
At the same time that the dominant narrative rationalized trade as a key component of food
system sustainability because of its promised efficiency gains, trade was being critiqued in
other literatures for contributing to unsustainable practices in the food system. Two main
lines of critique have emerged. One set of critiques focuses on the need to look beyond
food as an economic commodity, and to consider agriculture’s other functions in society,
including the ecological benefits of diverse farming systems, when evaluating the role of
trade. Another set of critiques points to internal contradictions within the dominant narra-
tive that cast doubt on that narrative’s promise of efficiency gains from trade. Together,
these two types of critique make a compelling counter-narrative to the dominant,
pro-trade approach to food system sustainability.

Beyond food as a commodity

The first set of critiques does not engage with the specifics of trade theory and its efficiency
claims per se, but rather stresses that sustainability in the food system requires us to look
beyond food’s economic value. These critics stress that food is ‘different’ because of agri-
culture’s important contributions beyond its role as a commodity, including the provision of
livelihoods, traditions, culture, rural landscapes and ecological services (Rosset 2006).1
Sustainability, from this perspective, requires a fundamental rethinking of agricultural pro-
duction and food systems towards more ecologically sound and socially just practices, the
adoption of which do not require trade. Food sovereignty advocates, for example, promote
the potential of agroecological production methods and local alternative food movements
while at the same time critiquing trade (Rosset 2006; Desmarais 2007; Wittman et al. 2010).
The idea that agriculture provides essential ecosystem functions, such as genetic diver-
sity, carbon absorption and water and air filtration, is central to agroecological science, and
farming systems based on this idea seek to preserve and protect those functions (Altieri
2002; Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013). Scientific research on agroecological farming
methods shows that they are ‘climate cooling’ because on balance they absorb carbon
rather than emit it (Martinez-Alier 2011; Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013). Critics along
these lines also point out that ecological resilience in the agricultural sector can benefit
from a degree of redundancy that is typical of diverse farming systems, even if it means
a loss in economic efficiency (Fuchs and Hoffmann 2013). Recognition of these dynamics

1
This kind of argument shares some elements with the negotiating stance of some countries in the
context of the WTO who defend their agricultural policies against claims that they distort trade on
the grounds that agriculture is ‘multifunctional’ (Potter and Tilzey 2007).
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 9

has led to calls for more assessment of the balance between economic efficiency and
ecological resilience in global food production and trade (Puma et al. 2015, 12).
Critics also stress that ecologically diverse farming systems provide meaningful liveli-
hoods and other social benefits for a large segment of humanity and as such are vital to
overall sustainability in the sector (Sachs et al. 2007). Agriculture provides a livelihood
for approximately 30 percent of the world’s active workforce, with a much higher pro-
portion engaged in the sector in many developing countries (World Bank 2014). Around
2.5 billion people are engaged in small-scale agriculture, and small-scale farms make up
the bulk of the world’s 570 million farms (IFAD & UNEP 2013, 8; Graeub et al. 2015).
Critics point out that around 70 percent of the world’s food supply is provided by small-
scale producers, and argue that the preservation of their diverse farming systems is a
vital component of both food security and sustainably (ETC Group 2013). Small-scale
farming systems typically are highly productive, demonstrate more agricultural biodiver-
sity, contribute to poverty reduction, and enhance dietary diversity (Chappell et al. 2013;
Graeub et al. 2015, 3).
Critics from this perspective also draw attention to the environmental costs associated
with agricultural trade, highlighting the ways in which a narrow focus on economic effi-
ciency obscures trade’s ecological impacts. Drawing on sustainability assessment literature,
some critics point out that if we evaluate the ecological impact of food trade using biophysi-
cal, rather than economic, indicators, we get very different results regarding its impact. For
example, an evaluation of the ‘efficiency’ of food trade in socio-metabolic terms – that is, in
physical terms as measured by the use of energy, water and land per unit of output – rather
than in monetary terms, shows that large-scale industrial agricultural models typical for
many export crops are in fact highly inefficient in terms of both energy (and its associated
carbon emissions) (Weis 2010; Martinez-Alier 2011) and water use (D’Odorico et al.
2014).
Other studies have shown that environmental harm can be concentrated in certain
countries that are stuck producing export crops that have a high ecological impact. Just
five countries account for over 95 percent of soy and palm oil production that is sold on
export markets, for example, even as global demand for these crops has risen dramatically.
Yet it is the countries that produce soy and palm oil that pay the highest environmental costs
in the form of deforestation, carbon emissions and biodiversity loss (MacDonald et al. 2015,
283). Although voluntary sustainability initiatives aim to correct for market failures that
result in ecological damage, a number of studies show that these measures are patchy in
their coverage and overall weak in their requirements (e.g. Fortin 2013; Sneyd 2014).

Internal contradictions of trade theory

A second set of critiques of the dominant narrative engages more directly with trade theory,
pointing out how flaws in its internal logic can lead to policies that perpetuate environ-
mental harm in the food system. Critical economists, for example, have pointed out that
the assumptions that underlie the theory of comparative advantage simply do not hold in
today’s world (Daly 1993; Prasch 1996; Chang 2009; Fletcher 2010; Moon 2011). All
economic models are built on assumptions, but if those assumptions are unrealistic, then
the predicted results that arise from those models are questionable. Comparative advantage
rests on the idea that only goods are mobile across borders, and that labour and capital are
not. In the primary example Ricardo gave to demonstrate the gains from trade – Britain and
Portugal trading wine and cloth – these goods were the only items that crossed borders. The
assumption that only goods can move across borders is indispensable to the theory, because
10 J. Clapp

otherwise capital would seek out investments where absolute advantage, rather than com-
parative advantage, holds, thus negating the gains from trade for all partners (Schumacher
2013). The original model also referred to the exchange of goods in perfectly competitive
markets, and did not take transportation costs or externalities into account (Daly 1993).
These critics point out that these are unrealistic assumptions in today’s world. For them,
when trade is increased in situations where these assumptions do not hold, environmental
quality is at risk unless appropriate safeguards are built into trade policies.
Even a cursory look at the global food system today reveals that the assumptions on
which Ricardo built his theory are not applicable in today’s context. To start with, trade
within the global food system is much more complex in the current era than it was 200
years ago. Most of the world’s food trade in the current era takes place within complex
global supply chains that are controlled by only a handful of large transnational corpor-
ations whose operations span the globe (Murphy 2008). The ability of transnational corpor-
ations to invest in multiple locations around the world, and at numerous points along global
supply chains, undermines the most basic assumption of comparative advantage, which is
that capital is not mobile between countries (Clapp 2014). In cases where agricultural
markets are dominated by transnational corporate actors operating in several countries,
any gains from trade are likely to accrue to the owners of the capital, rather than to the
local farmers who supply those firms or work as paid labour on large-scale foreign-
owned farms (McMichael 2013). Such an outcome undermines the dominant narrative’s
arguments that increased income from trade will encourage farmers to adopt more sustain-
able farming practices.
Corporate concentration is also rampant in the food system, demonstrating that perfect
competition is merely a notion that is rarely achieved in practice. Economists consider situ-
ations where the top four firms control 40 percent or less of the market as generally consti-
tuting a competitive market. Ratios higher than 40 percent for the top four firms imply some
degree of market control, which in economic terms is considered inefficient. Concentration
ratios in the food and agriculture sector, however, often exceed that percentage, indicating
uncompetitive and distorted markets (Murphy 2006). Just four firms dominate the global
grain market, for example, accounting for over 70 percent of the world’s grain trade
(Murphy, Burch, and Clapp 2012, 9). Market power of this sort enables firms to manipulate
prices in ways that result in inefficient outcomes (Gonzalez 2011, 771). Competition is also
undermined by the highly financialized nature of global agricultural value chains. Follow-
ing the food crisis of 2007–2008, large volumes of transnational financial capital moved
into the agricultural sector, sparking widespread concern about the impact of speculative
financial capital driving agricultural production decisions and its ecological consequences
(Isakson 2014).
As noted above, the original formulation of comparative advantage also did not take
externalities into account. Instead, it assumed that all costs of production are paid for by
the producers of goods, and as such are incorporated into market prices. This assumption
is important, as internalized costs are central to determining comparative advantage and
ensuring the efficient allocation of resources. This assumption has been widely critiqued
for being unrealistic, and in particular for ignoring the environmental costs of production
(Daly 1993; Fletcher 2010; Prasch 1996). Some economists have recently calculated that
if external costs were incorporated into the price of food, that these costs would outweigh
any possible gains from trade. Schmitz et al. (2012), for example, have calculated that
although trade liberalization in the period from now to 2045 will likely result in efficiency
gains of around USD 9 trillion, these gains will be accompanied by an increase in carbon
emissions of around 75 gigatons, and the cost of the damage caused would negate the
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 11

financial gains. The increased carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are largely due to land-use
changes to accommodate comparative advantages, primarily the conversion of tropical
forests, particularly in Latin America, to the production of agricultural crops for export
(Schmitz et al. 2012). The transportation required for trade also emits carbon and other
forms of pollution, as does the storage and processing infrastructure required for the indus-
trial food system to function (Garnett 2013). These costs are rarely considered within the
dominant narrative. But with growing levels of international food trade, including the wide-
spread practice of re-exporting agricultural goods, the environmental consequences of these
transportation-related externalities can be significant.
As noted above, most mainstream economists today see externalities as unfortunate but
relatively rare occurrences that are due to inefficiencies and a failure to price nature cor-
rectly in the marketplace through a variety of policies. Critics, however, argue that those
externalities are inextricably linked to the operation of the trade-based food system and
that simple valuation exercises will not reduce them. The organization of agricultural pro-
duction and trade into complex supply chains, as noted above, tends to encourage more
industrial forms of agriculture, which come with enormous external costs for the environ-
ment. Policies to improve efficiencies on the margins of this system ignore the ecological
costs associated with the system as a whole (Weis 2010; Moon 2011). Many of the food
items that are central to today’s industrial food system and whose trade has grown remark-
ably in recent decades – palm oil, soy, maize, sugar, meat, and processed and packaged
foods – are the very food items with some of the highest ecological impacts in terms of
land degradation, water depletion, biodiversity loss, carbon emissions and chemical pol-
lution (e.g. Foley et al. 2011; Garnett 2013; Nepstad, Stickler, and Almeida 2006).
These two strands of critique – food as much more than an economic commodity, and
the internal contradictions of trade theory – emerged through somewhat separate literatures
and different lines of argumentation, but share scepticism about economic efficiency as por-
trayed in the dominant narrative, as well as a prioritization of ecological over economic con-
cerns. It is important to point out, however, that these critics of trade liberalization are not
calling for an end to food trade and a reversion to complete self-sufficiency. Indeed, many
critics accept trade under certain conditions (Burnett and Murphy 2014). But they do make
the case that the promised economic gains coming from the dominant narrative are in no
way guaranteed, and that food trade in many cases is counterproductive in ecological
terms. As such, they question the full-scale liberalization of trade and investment in the agri-
cultural sector because it constrains the ability of states and local communities to promote
measures that foster more diverse, small-scale, and agroecological production at local and
national scales that is both biophysically and socially sustainable.

Implications for sustainability initiatives in global food governance

Despite critics’ articulation of its weaknesses, the dominant narrative linking trade as a
delivery mechanism for food sustainability has prevailed in global governance arrange-
ments, with little policy space for the promotion of alternative food system models.
What explains the persistent influence of the dominant narrative in these settings, despite
its weaknesses? Outcomes in global environmental and food governance arenas are typi-
cally explained in the literature as a product of at least one of three forces: powerful material
interests that shape governance arrangements in ways that serve global capital; the influence
of norms and ideas that have gained legitimacy in global governance settings; and the inter-
play among different governance institutions and arrangements at the global level. As out-
lined below, each of these forces points to potential explanations for why the trade narrative
12 J. Clapp

dominates the sustainability agenda in global governance. Each of these forces is important,
and they interact with and reinforce each other in ways that lock in the dominant approach,
with significant consequences for the transformative capacity of sustainability initiatives
within global food and environmental governance.
From a critical standpoint, power and material interests play a key role in the persistence
of the dominant narrative in global governance arrangements for food sustainability. As
critical scholars have shown in other contexts, the material interests of states and transna-
tional corporations play important roles in determining global food and environmental gov-
ernance outcomes (Friedmann and McMichael 1989; Levy and Newell 2005; McKeon
2015). Governance structures in both the food and environmental arenas are seen by
many scholars to be mechanisms that reinforce opportunities for the accumulation of
capital, thus reinforcing the power of certain players in the international system (McMichael
2009, 2011; Newell 2012). Powerful actors, for example, can exert structural power in the
broader economic system, which can be made apparent through threats to exit governance
arenas if the rules do not suit them appropriately (Strange 1989; Fuchs 2005). The exercise
of structural power often takes place at the time of agenda-setting in new governance
arrangements, but can also take the form of ‘forum shifting’ where powerful actors seek
out new governance arrangements that better suit their needs (Margulis 2015). Powerful
actors also employ other tools to exert influence over governance outcomes, such as lobby-
ing in rule-setting arenas and the use of discursive framing around key issues (Clapp and
Fuchs 2009). From a critical perspective, the dominance of the trade narrative in food sus-
tainability governance is not surprising, given the structural power of trade-promoting states
and corporations that influence governance processes.
Constructivist scholars can explain the persistence of the dominant narrative as a
product of normative developments and compromises around notions of sustainability
and trade. Constructivist studies have stressed the importance of norms and ideas in
explaining the shape of global governance outcomes (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Bern-
stein 2001), including global food and agriculture governance (Margulis 2013; Clapp
2015). As noted above, powerful actors often deliberately attempt to shape discourses in
an attempt to give legitimacy to their own ideas about how to address global problems.
Ideas and discourses shape political processes in broader ways that lock in certain
approaches to governing issue areas that in turn can preclude different ways of conceptua-
lizing those issues. The notion of ‘sustainable development’, for example, was a powerful
idea that emerged out of the Brundtland Commission in the late 1980s, and in effect was a
‘merger’ of what were previously seen as competing ideas of economic growth and
environmental protection. This ‘compromise of liberal environmentalism’ (Bernstein
2001) prioritizes economic efficiency and promotes market-based governance mechanisms.
Widely applied since the late 1980s, liberal environmentalism has become institutionalized
in governance frameworks for addressing major environmental issues, from climate change,
to biodiversity, to voluntary sustainability initiatives. The result is that trade liberalization
tends to remain a dominant norm in the governance of a range of environmental issues
(Zelli, Gupta, and Van Asselt 2013). For constructivist scholars, then, the dominance of
a trade liberalization narrative for food sustainability can be explained as simply the carry-
over of the compromise of liberal environmentalism to the food governance arena.
From an institutionalist perspective, the continued prominence of the pro-trade agenda
for food sustainability can be explained by institutional dynamics in the food governance
arena. As institutionalist analysts have shown, many issue areas in the global arena lack
a singular governing body, and instead are governed by a range of institutions in a
‘regime complex’, that is often characterized by fragmentation among the different
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 13

governance arrangements within that issue area (Biermann et al. 2009; Zelli and van Asselt
2013). Complex and fragmented governance arenas can have diverse effects, depending on
their dynamics. On one hand, fragmented governance within a given issue area can promote
positive synergies, and can lead to greater cooperation. On the other hand, fragmentation
can lead to conflict and dysfunction when governance arrangements contradict one
another (Biermann et al. 2009). The WTO is often identified in the literature as an institution
that conflicts with those in the environmental sphere, yet which nonetheless overpowers
environmental institutions due to its strong institutional structure that includes binding
rules and a dispute-resolution mechanism (Biermann 2001; Eckersley 2004). Other govern-
ance arenas are often portrayed as being ‘in the shadow’ of the WTO as a result (Newell and
Mackenzie 2004). The internal decision-making processes of institutions also matter, where
organizations that are closed and driven by power politics, such as the WTO, are less open
to new ideas and approaches than institutions that are more open and participatory and that
include a role for civil society input, such as the CFS (McKeon 2015). From this perspec-
tive, it is hardly surprising that the narrative as put forward by the institutionally strong,
closed WTO dominates across a fragmented, weaker and more open institutional landscape
for food governance.
Each of these approaches offers important insights into political outcomes. Considering
them together helps to show how they interact with one another in complex ways within the
arenas of global governance and political economy (e.g. Cox 1981; Williams 2005; Clapp
2012; Margulis and Porter 2013). In this case, the institutional fragmentation for food gov-
ernance is accompanied by a power imbalance across the food regime complex, with econ-
omic institutions holding more clout – not just because the WTO has an institutional
structure that includes binding rules – but also because it is an ideationally coherent insti-
tution in its embrace of neoclassical trade theory. By contrast, the ideas that form the basis
of the institutions in the global environmental and food arenas are much more diverse and
softer in legal terms, giving institutions such as the CFS less weight in shaping global
norms. The existence of the pre-existing norms of trade liberalization and a liberal interpret-
ation of environmentalism in the WTO, as well as in certain international environmental
agreements in which the pairing of these norms was embedded over the past 20 years,
also prepared the ground for liberal environmentalism to transfer effortlessly to global
food governance arrangements.
This context has made it relatively easy for powerful actors to reinforce the legitimacy
and ideas of the WTO in global governance settings that address food sustainability. Indeed,
the texts that have recently been adopted in the governance arenas outlined above reinforce
the WTO’s legitimacy and authority on questions of trade. This identification of the WTO
as the preeminent institution on these matters has emerged despite the fact that the WTO is
neither an environmental organization nor a food security organization. Moreover, the
WTO as an institution has been in paralysis for much of the past 15 years as it struggles
to reach agreement on the Doha Round. This prioritization of the WTO as a decision-
making body on these matters leaves little room for less powerful actors, such as civil
society groups and developing country governments, to suggest new governance
approaches that challenge the dominant norms or institutions within the regime complex.

Conclusion
This contribution has shown that a dominant narrative has emerged in recent decades across
a range of global governance forums that promotes trade liberalization as a central ingredi-
ent to achieving a more sustainable and resilient food system. It suggests that the promotion
14 J. Clapp

of this narrative has effectively ‘trade-ified’ the food sustainability agenda in global govern-
ance arrangements. The rationale behind linking trade and food sustainability draws on
long-standing economic trade theory and economic notions of efficiency. This harkening
back to classical trade theory is itself interesting because its advocates have only articulated
the narrative relatively recently with the rise of both agricultural trade liberalization and a
liberal interpretation of sustainability as prominent international norms over the last 25
years. Critics have challenged the dominant narrative, not only by providing alternative
models for food system sustainability that do not rely extensively on trade, but also by
demonstrating that the narrative itself suffers from internal inconsistencies, thereby
raising questions about its ability to deliver what it promises. Although many governance
settings have adopted some of the key terms and concepts of the critics, such as ‘resilience’,
‘ecosystem services’ and ‘agroecology’, these new ideas have not, at least yet, shifted the
substantive thrust of the dominant narrative. Instead, these concepts have become
embedded within the dominant narrative, which has remained locked in a framework of
a liberal and open trade regime. The persistence of the dominant narrative, even in the
face of its weaknesses, is the product of the dynamics around ideas, institutions and material
interests in governance arenas.
The current dominance of the pro-trade sustainability agenda presents a dilemma for
critical advocates of food system sustainability. The food sovereignty movement, for
example, has rejected the legitimacy of the WTO and has opted not to engage with it
directly, focusing on building local, sustainable food systems instead. Building sustainable
food systems at the local level is an important task. But this effort will continue to face chal-
lenges if the structures of the global economy are pushing in the other direction. At the same
time, it is important to recognize that international norms are not static or monolithic, as
even the cases of agricultural trade liberalization and food sustainability have illustrated.
Rather, they are the products of contestation and shifts in other norms that reshape them
over time. Norms linking a liberal and open trade system to food sustainability have pre-
vailed in global governance arenas for the past 25 years, but there may be signs that the
ground is starting to shift. The recent food crisis, paralysis at the WTO, and even the
recent calling into question of the neoliberal economic model by some staff members of
the International Monetary Fund (Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri 2016), could potentially
signal an opening for critical narratives to gain ground and shift the norms that guide
global governance rules and institutions. In this context, global-level advocacy can help
to reshape the norms and rules that govern trade in ways that at least move in a direction
that supports more transformative change towards sustainable food systems, including
food systems that involve some international trade.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Eric Helleiner, Adam Sneyd, and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Rachel McQuail for editorial assistance.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This research was supported by grants from the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada and
the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.
 The Journal of Peasant Studies 15

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 The Journal of Peasant Studies 19

Jennifer Clapp is a Canada Research Chair in Global Food Security and Sustainability and professor
in the School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability at the University of Waterloo. She cur-
rently holds a Trudeau Fellowship. Her most recent books include Hunger in the balance: The new
politics of international food aid (Cornell University Press, 2012), Food (Polity, 2nd ed., 2016), The
global food crisis: Governance challenges and opportunities (co-edited with Marc Cohen, WLU
Press, 2009), and Corporate power in global agrifood governance (co-edited with Doris Fuchs,
MIT Press, 2009). Email: jclapp@uwaterloo.ca