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Mind-body theories and the emotions

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CHAPTER I
Mind-Body Theories and the Emotiorus
William Jaworski
Problems for an Ontology of Emotions
Emotions are reckoned to have a variery of characteristics (Goldie zooo).
Among other things we feel them, and our feelings have intentionality or
directedness: I am afraid Cro*ething; I am angry aboutsomething; I long
for somethirg. But what exacdy are the states that have these character-
istics?.When an individual experiences an emotion, what is that emotional
state? Is it a physical occurrence or not? If it is, how is the psychological
description of it related to the physical description of it? Does 'anger'
always refer to the same type of physical state, or can it refer to different
types of physical states under different circumstances? Is it possible to give
an exhaustive account of the emotion in purely physical terms? If not, if the
experience is not a physical occurrence, how is it related to the physical
occurrences that seem to accompany it * to events in the limbic system of
the brain, for instance? In what follows I'll survey some representative
answers.
One way to understand various positions on the ontology of emotions is
to see them as responses to mind-body problems - persistent problems in
understanding how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phe-
nomena fit into the universe as described by our best science. To many
philosophers and scientists it seems plausible that the behavior of every-
thing in the universe can be described and explained exhaustively by
physics. Yet we evidently have capacities, such as our capacities to think,
feel, and perceive, that it is difficult to imagine could ever be described and
cxplained by physics alone. Mind-body problems are expressions of this
difficulry. One example is the problem of emergence.
'l-he problem of emergence is the problem of explainirg how lower-level
physical or physiological occurrences can generate or produce higher-level
rncntal phenomena such as conscious emotional experienccs. C<lnsciousncss
did not always exist in the physical universe. Neither docs conscir)usnc.ss
cxist in all parts of the universe. Many philo.sophcr.s irrrcl .scir:tttist.s tal<c tltc.sc:
olr.se rvation.s to inclicatc that vcry .spccifir: physit::rl contlit iorr.s trrtrst hr: irr
l,f
Mirud-Bod.y Theories and. the Emotions r5
place in order ro cause or produce conscious phenomena. But what condi-
iionr are those, and how do they do it? How is it that, so/, the movements of
tiny panicles in my brain can give rise to the rich emotional experiences I
have? The followirg claims make it difficult to see how:
(r) 'We
have conscious emotional experiences.
(z) 'We are composed of physical particles.
b) The properties of acomposite whole are determined by the proPerties
of the particles that compose it.
(+) Physical particles do not have conscious emotional expericnccs.
(:) No nurnber of nonconscious particles could combine to produce
conscious emotional experiences.
Each of these claims is plausible on its face.It seems obvious that we have
conscious emotional experiences as claim (r) says. Claim (z), morcovcr,
seems well supported empiri cally we seem to be composed of the samc
materials as everythirg else in the physical universe, and our best physics
suggests that those materials are microscopic particles. M*y examples
r..* to illusrrare claim (l). I have the mass I have, for instance, because I
am composed of physical particles with smaller masses that collectively add
up ro my bigger mass. Likewise, I have the position and velociry I do
becaur. ih* particles composing me are located in such-and-such a place
and are morrirg with such-and-such a velocity. Change their position and
velociry and you succeed in changing mine. Given the range of properties
that are like this, ir's not implausible to suppose that all the properties of
composite wholes are determined by the properties of the particles com-
posing them. It seems, moreover, that the behavior of those particles can be
'$7e
J*r.ribed and explained exhaustively by physics. don't need to invoke a
psychological or even a biologicat vocabul^ry to describe and explain what
ih.y ,r. what they can do. This lends some support to claim (+). There
"rrd
are also, ir seems, good reasons to endorse claim (r).Ote particle by itself
does nor have the po*.r ro produce conscious experiences. If it did, then
consciousness would have emerged much earlier in the universe's history
than we think it did, and it would also be more widespread - even rocks
and tables could be conscious. But if one particle by itself does not have the
power ro produce conscious experiences, then it is difficult to see how any
number of nonconscious particles could combine to produce conscious
experiences.
'Each
oFthe foregoirg claims (t)*(, is fierefore plausible. Yet claims (r)-(l)
arc joinrly inconsistent. Claim (r) implies fiat we have conscious emotional
t6 \r/I LLIAM JA\trO RS KI
experiences, yet claims (z)-(l) i*ply fiat we do lrot. The claims cannot all be
,r.r"; at least one of them must be false, but it is not clear which.
Eliminative Physicalism, Substance Dudisrnr and Panpsychism
Mind-body theories offer ro solve mind-body problems in various \Mays.
Eliminative physicalists, for instance, look to resolve the problem of.emer-
gence by rejecrirrg claim (r). A psychological vocabulary is the by-product of
I d.f..iirr. wry o? trying ro describe and explain human behavior, one that
wi[} evenrualh be displaced by a complete physical description of that
behavior. fu a result, it is false to say that we have conscious emodonal
experiences. There are no such things. Substance dualists, on the other hand,
look to reject claim (z). Accordirg to them, we are nonphysical beings that
are only contingendy attached to bodies; we are not bodies ourselves. Hence,
we are nor .o-posed of physical particles or stuffs. Panpsychists, for their
parr, reject claim (+). They claim that fundamental physical particles are
endowed with rhoughts and feelings j*t as we are. As a result, there is no
question of how those particles might come together to produce conscious
emotional experiences. Conscious emotional experiences exist everywhere in
the universe, right down to the fundamental physical level.
Eliminativism, substance dualism, and panpsychism are nevertheless
marginal posidons. Eliminativism is marginalized because it denies what
seems ro many people to be the manifest fact that we experience anger, iry,
sadness, and oifr.i emorions. Substance dualism, on the other hand, is
marginalized because it doesn't do justice to the phenomenol oW of emo-
\X/illiam James
tional experience its visceral character in particular.
described that character in a well-known passage:
\Xfirat kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of
:::5; T*r5 ixr, ::, fl :H?;::n:T H, :? *;;:l mHtx:
present, it is quite impossible to think. (r88+ | 191-4)
If James is right, then emotions are essenti"llX embodied; it is impossible
foi *6 ro expoi.n.. them apart from particular bodily changes, and if that
is the case, then one of subsrance dualism's cenual claims about mental
phenomena cannor be true of the emotions: they can_not exist apart from a
body. Descartes himself,, it seems, felt the pressure of thi.s obscrvation, and
posited a third class of properties to try to account for thc visccral phcnom-
.rolory of emotional experience. In addition to trtt'tttrtl l)r()pcrtic.s rtnd
physical properties, he said, therc wcr(: also l)t'()lx't'r it's pt't'rlining ttt th.'
,*.
ft
Mirud-Body Theories and the Emotions rT
union of mind and body - properties that included the emotions (Coningham
rgSt).
Panpsychism is mar ginalized for its part because it is so counterintuitive
ro think that quarks, leptons, and other fundamental physical particles
might have mental lives as rich as our own. Our best empirical accounts of
these particles do not invoke a psychological vocabulary; we can describe,
explain, and predict their behavior without positing thoughts or feelings.
In what follows I will focus on views that deny either claim (l) ot claim
(l).Views that deny (l) can be divided into three categories: physicalist
theories, dual-attribute theories, and neutral monist theories. Views that
reject fu) include hylomorphism.
Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism
Physicalism claims that everythirg is physical; everythirg can be exhaustively
described and explained by the most empirically adequate theories in current
or future physics (Lewis 1983; Jaworski zou, zo16). Phyeicalism has been the
most popular framework for addressing mind-body problems since the mid-
twentieth cenul{y. If we put to one side eliminativist theories, physicalist
accounts of the emotions fall into two categories: reductive and nonreduc-
rive. The paradigmatic reductivist theory is the psychophysical identity
theory.' ft claims that mental states are identical to physical states and that
we will discover these identities empiri cafiy in something analogous to the
way we discovered that water is HrO (kwis 1966, t97z; Armstrong ry68,
D7a; Jaworski zon). \flater might initially have been defined as, so/, the
drinkable stuff that filled rivers and lakes. By studying that stuff empirically,
scientists were able to discover that it was HrO. Th.y were thus able to
conclude that water was identical to HrO. Accordirg to idendty theorists,
somethirg analogous will be true of the emotions. Mental states in general
might be defined initially by their typical causes and effects. Anger, fot
instance, might be defined as the smte that is rypicdly caused by suffering
injustice and that qfpically causes such-and-such feelings and physiological
changes. According to identiry theorists, it is possible in principle to discover
what the state with these rfpi.*l causes and effects is. It is fius possible in
principle to identift anger and any other emotion with some rype ofphysical
state.
One influential challenge to the identity theory has been the multiple
realizabiliry argument (Putnam ry67; Block and Fodor t97z; Fodor rg74;
' Ilt'lrlviorisrn i.s rlrr'orlrt'r kin<l o{'rcclrrctivc physicalism flaworski zoll: ro3-rr).
I8 \TILLIAM JA\TO RS KI
for discussion see Jaworski 2orr: ri,rl).' The argument claims fiat it is
possible for a mental state, such as anger, to be correlated with more than
one type of physical state. If anger can be correlated with brain state B in
humans and with a different rype of physical state in Martians, then anger
cannor be identical to brain state B. A thing cannot exist without itself, so if
anger can exist in a Martian who doesn't have brain state B, then anger
cannor be identical to brain state B. Identity theorists have responded to
this argumenr in a number of ways (Kim $7z;; Lewis r98o; for discussion
see Jaworski zorri $4-6). The most popular line of response claims that
our currenr mxonomy of mental and physical states will undergo a revision
in the future. Even though our current taxonomy posits a single fype
of state that goes by the name 'anger', that term instead can refer to
multiple different types of states: anger-in-humans, anger'in-Martians,
anger-in-robots, and so on. By analogl, people once took 'jade' to refer
to i single rype of mineral, but over time they came to reco gnize that it
referred to multiple different rypes of minerals such as jadeite and nephrite.
It is thus a mistake to speak of jade in general, and in the same way it is a
mistake to speak of anger in general. There are instead many different types
of states which have been grouped under the one confused heading of
anger, and each of these species- or kind-specific rypes of smtes is identical
ro a physical smte: anger-in-humans = physical state A, anger-in-Martians =
physical state B, anger-in-robots = physical sute C, and so ott,
Far and away the most popular way of accommodating multiple realiz-
abiliry, however, has not been to rehabilitate the identity theory but to
abandon it in favor of some kind of nonreductive physicalism. The most
popular fieories of this sort combine physicalism with functionalism
(Putnam tg67; Block and Fodor rg1z; Fodor $74; for discussion see
Jaworski zorr: ryG49). Funcdonalism claims that psychological descriptions
are absffacr descriptions that ignore the physical details of aqFstem and focus
simply on inputs to it, outputs from it, and internal smtes that correlate the
rwo. When we say that Eleanor is enjoying the play, we are saylng that she is
in some internal state that correlates certain sensory inputs to her with certain
behavioral outputs from her. The psychological description does not specift
what that internal smte is; that's what makes the description abstract. This
abstractness allows functionalists to accommodate the possibiliry that a single
kind of mental srare might be correlated with different kinds oF physical
' For a dctailcd survcy of the litcrarure on multiplc rr:aliz,abiliry :rrr<l t't'tltt,'t iortist r'('.\lx)n.\('s to it, s('(' ttry
'Mirrd ancl Mrrltiplc I{c:aliz.ability'in thc Ir)tcrncr llrrt'yt:kr1,,',li:r.rl l'lril,,*,,1,1ry (www.it'p.rttttt..',lrr/
rrrrrlt -r'c:r/) .
t
}
Mind-Body Theories and the Emotiorts Ir)
t
ffi
states. A human like Eleanor might differ physically fiorn :r M:rrri;rrr lilit.
$
V
Gabriel, but the phyricd differences between them nccdn't :rl)l)(';rr rrr ;rn
'li
abstract psychological level of description. At that lcvcl, llk';ur.r' ;rrrtl
Gabriel might be indistinguishable; both might correlate input.s with ,rutl)rrr.\
in awaywe would describe as enjoying th. pLay. Consequently, tlrt' .s:un(' ryl).'
of emotional state, enjopng fie play, could be correlated with rlillt'r't'rrr rylrcs
of physical states: one qfpe ofphysical state in a human, and a clif fcrt'nr rypt' ,I
physical state in a Mardan.
Nonreductive physicalism of the aforementioned sort has fac.'tl .st'vcr,rl
challenges (|aworski zor::, 14g-6+). Some of these have targcrcd lrlrysit:rl
ism, others functionalism, and yet others the combination o['tht'rwo.
\When it comes to the emotions specifically, physicalist theories havc' firc:t'tl
chafienges accommodating both the intentionality of emotional statc.s unrl
their felt qualities. Physicalists have rypically tried to account fbr inrcn-
tionaliry in terms of theories of mental representation (Fodor g87; f)rcr.skc:
1988; Jaworski zorr: 9o-r). The simplest theories of this sort claim thar
mental representation consists in causal covariation between features of thc
environment and internal states of the organism or representing systenr.
Suppose that my nervous system has a component, c, that is capable of
being in two states, ON and OFF, and that these states covary with thc
presence of somethirg red: f, turns ON when it encounters somethi^g red,
and it is OFF otherwise. Because r's ONIOFF smte covaries with the
presence of redness, it indicates the presence of redness in something
analogous to the way smoke indicates the presence of fire. Because firc
reliably causes smoke, the presence of smoke rypically conveys the infor-
mation that there is fire. Similarly, because redness reliably causes c to bc
ON, is being ON rypicaJly conveys the information that somethirg in thc
environment is red. To have an internal representation of redness is thus to
have an internal component that is activated if and only if something in the
environment is red.
Simple covariation theories nevertheless have difficulties accounting for
the specificiry of intentional content - for what makes a representation oF
or about this particular object, property, or event as opposed to some othe r
(Fodor ry82). This is especially clear in the case of more sophisticatcd
mental states such as emotions. Anger, let us suppose, is rypic"lly triggcrcd
by somethirg insulting. Accorditg to a simple covariation theory, nry
anger should be reliably caused by insulting episodes. If I'm an irasciblc
pcrson, however, my anger might also be reliably caused by.pisodc.s rh:rt
arcn't in.sulting at all. t}That is it, then, that makes my angcr e statc that is
rthorrt itrsults irrstt':r<l of u .state that i.s ahout in.sutts-or-r'lon-irr.sults? Sirnplt'
&
 #
Mirud-Body Theories arud the Emotions zt
20 \TTLLIAM JAITORSKI

covariation theories do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question.

your duplicate's anger might not have any qualitative dimension at all. If
qualia were physical, qualia theorists argue, then necess arily you and your
As a result mosr physicalists endorse more sophisticated theories of mental
duplicate would have to have the sarne qualia, for you and your duplicate
representation such as Fred Dretske's (1988).
have all the same physical characteristics. But since it is possible for you and
Dretske's theory of mental representation combines causal covariation
your duplicate to have difFerent qualia, it follows that qualia must not be
with designed or naturally selected functions. On Dretske's view, the
physical; they cannot be accommodated within a physicalist framework.r
componenrs of a system perform various jobs or functions within it. In
the case of ardfacts, those functions are determined by * designer, someone
A different challenge to providirg a physicalist account of the emotions
targets the combination of physicalism and functionalism. It claims that a
who consrructs the system with an eye to having its components contribute
theory of this sort ends up evacuating psychological discourse of any real
ro an overall msk. In the case of natural systems such as human organisms,
explanatory content (Ki* 1998; Jaworski 2orr: t6r*4, 169-76). If this is
the functions performed by various components are determined by natural
true, nonreductive physicalism implies that the real reasons why we behave
selection. It plays a role in the development of organisms analogous to the
as we do have nothirg to do with our emodonal states. To appreciate the
role of a designer in the production of artifacts. Natural selection has
argument, consider an analogy. Let us suppose that the behavior of
assigned to various sensory organs or subsystems the functions of supplylng
fundamental physical particles can be exhaustively described and explained
organisms with information about the external environment and their
by physics. Suppose, however, that we decide to call particles 'J-particles'
other internal states functions they perform by having internal smtes
exactly if I'm giving a thumbs-up. In an instant I can transform every
that covary with features of the environment and with other internal
particle into aJ-particle simply by raisi^g my thumb, and conversely, I can
srares.3 Physicalists argue that the causal relations connecting states of the
transform every J*particle into a non-J-particle simply by putting my
nervous system to features of fie environment, as well as the natural selective
mechanisms that determine something's function, can all be given an
thumb down. These so-called transformations, however, are not real. In
bringing it about that every particle is a J-particle, I do not alter in any way
exhaustive physical description and explanation. If they are right, then
how those particles behave or the reasons why they behave as they do. The
mental representation can be exhaustively described and explained in prin-
exhaustive account of their behavior and the reasons for it continue to
ciple by physics, and if intentionaliry can be understood in terms of mental
belong to physics alone; it has nothing to do with J-particle discourse. The
representation, then it too can be accommodated within a physicalist
worry about nonreducdve physicalism is that it implies something analo-
framework.
gous about psychological discourse: if it is true, psychological discourse has
Qualia-based objections to physicalism argue that physicalism cannot
no bearing on what things do and why they do it. If physicalism is true,
account for the qualitative aspects of experience, or qualia (]ackson rg86;
Chalm ers 1996, zool; Jaworski zorr: 8f-8). According to qualia theorists,
then everphirg can be exhaustively described and explained using the
vocabul^ry of physics. It is possible to describe the same physical things
there is something it's like to feel anger or fear or jealous/, and what it's like
using a different vocabul^ry, includirg an absffact psychological one, just
ro experience one of these emotions is different from what it's like to
as it is possible to call the same pardcles 'J-particles'. But whatever voca-
experience another.a This what-it's-likeness, say qualia theorists, cannot be
bulary onb chooses to describe physical things, if physicalism is true, the
physical. One reason, they sn/, is that it seems possible for nlro physically
exhaustive account of what those things do and why they do it is still given
indistinguishable individuds to have different qualia. \[hat it's like for you
ro experience anger might be different from what it's like for an exact
physical duplicate ofyou to experience anger. \7hen your duplicate experi- t Physicalism have rCIponded to the qualia challenge in several ways. Some deny that qualia exist. Dennett
(rggz), for instance, argues that the very concept of qualia is incoherent (|aworski zon: ztg*z9). Others,
ences anger, it might feel to him or her the way enjoyment feels to you. Or
such as Heil (Chapter z, this volume), argue against the possibiliry ofphysical duplicates having different
possibly when your duplicate experiences anger it might feel like nothing; qualitative experiences. Yet others argue that even though qualia fieorism insist that qualia consdrute fie
raw data of experience, qualia are in fact posits ofa dubious theoretical framework that fails to capture the
1 Prinz (zoo+) defends phcn<rmcnology of lived perceptual experience (Noe and O'Reg^n zooz; No€ zoo4). Other physicalists
a theory of the emotions along thc.sc lincs.
a Not all theories of emotions havc challcngcd thc claim that qudia cannot be accommodated within a physicalist framework. Dretske
agree on this. Thcoric.s likc Jamc.s I{tr.s.sc'll's (zooi) t'l:rirrr tlr:rt I.'t'lirr1',s :rn'
(,y.)s), lor irrst:rrrr:c, urgucs that it is possible to give an account of qualia in terrrrs o[ mcntal
not intrin.sicallyemotional. Fcclings arc instcad ncutrel c:llisorlt's tlt:tt r:ut lr.'ttt.'t'('ln()(,.1.,,t'llt:tl t;ttt
r'('l)t'(:s('t rI :rt iot r.
bc componcnt.s o[ cmotion.s i[.stritably clirt'ctctl.

ft
 il Mirud-Body Theories arud the Emotions 23
22 \rI LLrAM JA\r/o RS KI
to laws governi*g purely physical interactions. Consequently, the world just
by physics alone. Pqychological discourse thus seems to be as irrelevant
it is bereft of any real description or is a place in which physical events produce mental events in accordance
thai accounr as J-particle Jiscourse;
with basic laws. Critics argue, however, that psychophysical laws do not
explanarory *ral,r.. In fact, the problem looks even worse for nonreductive
really address the problem (Strawson zoo6; Jaworski zorri zu41i,).
phyri.alists. They insist, ,ft*i all, that the categories of psychological^
of Knowirg that there is a psychophysical law linking pain to brain state B
discourse do nor correspond in a straightforward way to the categories
could correspond might explain why this or that instance of pain is correlated with this or
physical theory. A rype of psychological state like anger
that instance of B, but it does not explain *hy there is a correlation
io ,rrrry diffei*rr, rypes of physical states. But if the physical categories are
between instances of pain and instances of B in the first place. It does
the orr., that give * ,r, .*hr,.rutive accorJnt of realiry, and psychological
not explain how the rapid vibrations of countless tiny physical particles can
caregories donit correspond to those, then it is difficult to see how
psycho-
to reality at all. If nonreductive generate the felt qualities of fear or anger; it simply says that the gencrating
togiJal caregories .o.rld correspold -phy-
happens in a regular, lawlike way. According to critics, however, some
sicalism is tlue, therefore, ir is difficult to see how talk of thoughts, feelings,
human explanation is needed for why there would be laws connecting things as
perceprions, and the like could provide any kind of explanation for
different as brain states and qualitative experiences. \flithout such an
behavior.
explanation pqychophysical laws are every bit as mysterious as the psycho-
physical correlations they are introduced to explain.
Dual-Attribute Theories and Neutral Monism Dual-attribute theorists are also free to endorse panpsychism: mental
phenomena such as conscious emotional experiences are present at every
Like mosr physicalist theories, dual-attribute theories claim that noncon-
level of realiqy, includirg the fundamental physical level. As we've seen,
scious p"rti.ll, could combine ro produce conscious emotional experi-
of how
_
however, panpsychism is a marginal position because it is so counter-
ences, b.r, unlike physicalist theories, they deny that the account
can be givgn exhaustively in physical intuitive to think that fundamental physical particles have mental srates
the production happens .terms.
like our own. To soften the counterintuitive implications of panpsychisffr,
R tt *r, when corrdiiions are right, physical things produce nonphysical
some dual-attribute theorists endorse panprotopsychism, the claim that
attribures or properries, ones ,hr, cannot be described purely in terms of
fundamental physical particles do not have mental states like ours, but
physics.6
rather protomental states - simpler precursors of the mental states we have
The most popular dual-attribute theories are varieties of emergentism or
epipherro*.r*iir*. Both claim that physical states Produce nonphysical
(Chalmers ry96: rr1-J; zooz z67t). According to panprotopsychists,
when fundamental physicaJpanicles combine to form atoms or molecules,
mental ones; they differ over whether those nonphysical states can exert
they give rise to protomental states that are more sophisticated, and when
any causal infuence orrer physical states in turn. Emergentists say they can;
atoms and molecules combine to form neural dssues or different parts of
.piph.nomenalists say thry can't. \7hat concerns us here, however, is the
the brain, they give rise to mental states that are more sophisticated still,
,iri* they share, namely that physical states prodt.. nonphysical mental and so the combinatorial process goes until combinations of lower-level
oles. How exactly is this r,rppor*d to happen? Critics argue that dual-
items eventu*lly give rise to the rich, sophisdcated mental sates that
attribute theorists have no satisfactory answer.
constitute our own mental lives.
Some dual-attribure theorisrs, for instance, posit brute psychophysical
Critics argue, however, that panprotopsychism only solves the problem of
laws. There are laws of emergence, they say, that are every bit as basic as the
emergence by replacing it with a different problem: the problem of sayrng
what protomental states are and how they combine to produce more
n D,r*l-rttribute theories are sometimes called forms of properry dualism to contrast thctn with
firrlns sophisticated mental states. \ile know what thoughts, emodons, and percep-
rnislcaclitrg sitrcc sttbstrtttt't'
of substance dualism. But this use of the rerm 'Gproperry d,rnlir-' can bc tions xr€, but what are protothoughts, protoemotions, and protoperceptions
dualists are committed ro properry dualism as *"li (Ri-strong v.26[l:
rl). I.ikt'wist', tlrt'l:rlrcl 'tltt:rl
been ur.dlnria"d of 'dual-attribute', but this r(x) (':ltl lrt'rrri.slt':rtlirr1l sitttt":r'sPt'tl' supposed to be? Panprotopsychists can respond that protomental states are
aspecr'has also
,,rgg"r*that,accordingtodu:rl-attributethcorics,thcrncntul plrysit:rl tli.stilrttiotti'sttrt'r't'ly;ltrr:rll('t' theoreticel postulates, that they are precisely fie states of lower-level thirrg.s
tt'tllll"('ol tlrt'
of 6.w t6i.gs appcar r.r,,r.'l'lrc tcrnr'attributc cxl)rcsr.'*,t,,r,i.',1,',rrly lltt'.,lrrolr'1',it:rl that in conrlrinltion produce familiar mental states. But how exactly i.s lny
rlrr,rlisnr rlr:rt dtr:rl-:rtr rihtrtc rlrcorists t'lttlorst'.

ru
 il
24 \Ur'I LLIAM JA\rO RS KI Mirud-Bod,y Theories and the Emotions 25

that role. If neutral monists cannot supply a definition that enables us to do

such combination supposed to work? Panprotopsychism assumes that pro-
this, then neutral monism does not offer a clear solution to the problem of
tomental properties ,i. aggregative properties like mass OWimsatt 1985).
Clearly ff;has a mass i[g andy h* a mass of r kg, ,!.rL x and yhave a
emergence,
"f A final way that dual-attribute theorists can approach the problem of
coll..ii r* mass of L Lg, but it is unclear how mental Properties or
emergence appeals to the notion of spatial organization or arrangement.
proromental properties - can manage to be aggregative in this *aI: Unless
There is more to emergence than physical particles themselves. A tree trunk
i6. foregoi"s issues are resolved, say critics, panprotopsychism does not
off.t a solution to the problem of emergence. and a human brain are composed of the same kinds of fundamental
really
physical particles; the reason one gives rise to conscious states and the
Asimilar problem confrorrr, rr.,rtral monist theories (PoPper and Eccles
other doesn't is that in one but not the other the particles are organized or
rg77: r99;Strawson r99 4: 9T; Nagel zooo: zro; for discussion, see Jaworski
arranged in the right kind of way. Spati aJ" arrungement is thus the key to
2orr: 257-62). Neutral monism claims that the fundamental entities are in
emergence. Critics nevertheless insist that this appeal to spatial o rganiza-
themselves neither menral nor physical but neutral; they can be accurately
described as mental or physicJ if they satisfi, certain extrinsic condidons.
tion does no bemer than the appeal to brute psychophysical laws. How,
after all, is spatial arrangement supposed to explain the emergencc of
Some of these conditions qualift neutral events as mental, others qudiry
mental states? Suppose a certain number of fundamental physical particles
them as physical, and it is- possible for the same neutral event to satisft
conditions of both sorrs. Bui events needn't be described in either menta-
do not generate any mental states. We then reposition the particles in
space. How is this repositioning supposed to explain the emergence of
listic or physicalistic rerms ar all since they can all be exhaustively described
mental states? If the particles do not give rise to consciousness in the first
and e*plained in rerms of a neutral conceptual framework, one that is
place, how could changing their spatial relations make any difference? \Vhy
neithei *.tt.alistic nof physicalistic (Russell rgzr).
perhaps the biggest .fi*tienge facing neutral monists is to.proYide a clear should one spatial arrangement be more apt for producing mental states
than another? There doesn't seem to be any principled answer. Accordi.g
accoun, tf what neurral entitLs are. Th.y are supposed to be entities that
are in themselves neither menrd nor physical but that qualift as mental or
to critics, then, both the appeal to spatial arrangement and the appeal to
psychophysical laws attach a label to a mystery without doing anything ro
physical if they satisfy certain conditions. Some neutral monists say little
solve it.
more than this. They r*y, for instance, that neutral entities are the ones that
can factor into both pirysical and psychological laws. The problem with
definitions like these is that they fail to provide an adequate means of Hylomorphism
identiftirg which entities in the world the neuual entities are, or of
So far I've focused on some popular ways of understandirg how mental
determiniig whether neutral entities even exist. By analogl, imagine that
phenomena in general, and emotions in particular, are related to physical
we arrir,e tJgether at ameeting of an org anrzatioo, and you want to know
phenomena. I now want to focus on a different approach to the ontolo W of
from me vit i.ft person in th. room is the organization's president. I
emotions, one based on hylomorphism, a metaphysical framework that
respond: 'Obviorrity the president is the person in the room who sets the
Aristode used to afticulate an account of the emotions in antiquity and that
*..tirrg's agenda, who organizes the annual fundraiser, who was elected by
has gained an increasing arnount of attention from metaphysicians over the
the ,rr.Lb.Irftip last January, who . . .' I might give an exhaustive descrip-
past decade (Fine rggg, zooS; Johnston 2006; Oderberg zoo7t Koslicki zooS;
tion of the ,.lriions that define the role of the,president, but I would still
fall short of telling you what you want to know. The reason is that nothing Jaworski zorr , zorz, zor4, zot6; Rea zorr; Marmodoro zor1;; Koons zat$.
I've told you .rJi.s you to pick out which person in the room actually Aristode's approach to the emotions is encapsulated in the following
occupi., ih. presiderrtld role, and that's what you want. Attempts to de finc Passage:
,r.rrrr*l entities simply in terms of their relations to mcntal atrcl phy.sical In fact, the affecdons of the soul all seem to be with a body: excitement,
entities seem to ha* ,rt analogous shortcoming: tht:y tlc.scrilrc rhc rolc calmness, fear, piry, courage, also joy, and both loving and hating, for
neutral entities are supposed to play within ncutrrrl lll()tlisttt, bttt thcy tltr whctrcvcr w<: have them the body is in some way affected . . . If this i.s thc
not enable us to pick,rr, which cntiric.s itt tltc'worltl, il':ttty., rtt'lrrllly pllry

ia'

ft
 t Mind,-Body Theories and the Emotions
26 lTI LLIAM JA\('O RS KI
case, then clearly the affections are enmattered forms (logoi enhuhi). Hence,
their definitions wilt be for instance, 'anger is a certain movement of such-
.
and-such a body (or a parr or power of itlby this for the sake of that' . . tT]
(De
he affections ofsoul ,r. irrr.parable from the natural maffer of animals-
Animabook I, chapter r: 4a3ar6*r9, zt7; 4o1bry-r8)7
Accordi.g to Aristode, when we experie_nce an emodon, the activities of
our phyrilal componenffi are coordinated in a way that unifies them into a
singie lrr.rr,. Th; upshot is a view that is both antireductive and natur-
alistic. Because the ioordinarion or form is not somethi*g inherent in the
physical componenrs, the emorion cannot be identified with the sum of the
activities of ihose componenrs. fu a result, it is not possible to give an
exhaustive accounr of the emorions by appeal to the activities of our
physical parrs; we cannor reduce our descriptions and explanations of
emotions ro descripdons and explanations in neuroscience or biology or
'ho*.,,.r,
chemis try. Form, cannot exist apart- from _something that's
informej. A form musr be the form of something. Consequently, an
emorion cannot exis t apart.from the physical components whose activities
it unifies. Emodons *re th.rs essentially embodied in the physical comPo-
nenrs we have; they are all 'with a body,' as Aristode says, 'inseparable
from
the natural *rrr.i of animals,' yet it is not possible to give a reductive
explanation of them.
A hylomorphic account of emotion is what Prinz (zoo4: ro) categotizes as
, hybrid theory, or. that takes emotions to comprise a_range of contributing
factors: some f.lr, some cognitive, some physiological. To appreciate what
makes the hylomorphic account distinctive we need to consider the hyl"-
moqphic frameworkin greater detail. Since this chapter concerns mind-body
th.ori.r, I will focus on the way hylomorphism understands the relation
berween emotions and the physiological states that embody them'
At its core, hylomorphism claims that form or structure, as I'll rypically
refer to it (or org aniz.ation, order, coordination, or configuration) is a basic
ontological ,rrd".*planatory principle. Some individuals, paradigmatically
living ihir,g, , arecompor*d of *rririals that are structured or organized in
v:rriou, *r!r. You ,ri I are nor mere quantitiep of physical materials; we
ilrc quantities of physical materials with a certain organization or structure.
'l'hal srrucrure is responsible for us being and persisti.g as humans, and it is
responsible for us having the particular developmental, metabolic, rcPro-
tluctive, perceptive, and cognitive capacities we have.
/ (f ;rwor.ski ,,or.r, .,()rr,) rlilli:rs fr"<lrn thcirs in ways that will bccrlrnc cvitlt:rrt :rs I pr,,t,'t'tl.
St't'rtl.so /)r' Anirna 43't'4-6-
ft
27
$7e can illustrate the hylomorphic notion of structure with a simple
example. Suppose we put Howard in a very sffong brg - strong enough to
ensure that nothing leala out when we squash him with several tons of
force. Before squashing, the contents of the b*g include one human being;
after squashing, they include none. In addition, before squashing, the
contents of the brg can think, feel, and act, but after squashing, they
can't. \ilZhat explains these differences in the contents of the brg pre-
squashirg and post-squashing? It cannot be the physical materials, for
those remain the sarne - none of them leaked out. \flhat changed was
rather the way those materials were organized or sffuctured. That structure
was responsible for there being a human before squashing, and for that
human having the capacities it had. Once that structure was destroyed,
there was no longer a human with those capacities. Structure is thus a basic
ontological principle (it concerns what things there are) and a basic
explanatory principle (it concerns what things can do). Suucture also
operates as a principle of composition and unity. It unifies diverse things
in a single thing. Paradigmatic"lly, it unifies diverse physical materials into
a single composite whole.
\7e can express the theoretical roles hylomorphic structrre is supposed
to play using some slogans:
Structure matters: it operates as an irreducible ontological principle, one
that accounts at least in part for what things essentially are.
Structure makes a fifference: it operates as an ireducible explanatory
principle, one that accounts at least in part for what things can do, the
powers they have.
Structure counts: it explains the unity of composite things, including the
persistence of one and the same living individual through the dynamic
influx and effiux of mamer and energy that charact erize many of its interac-
tions with the wider world.
to define hylomorphic structure,s which in
These theoretical roles serve
turn underwrites a general account of composition encompassing both
composite individuals and composite even$. Emotional experiences are
included among the latter, so understanding a hylomorphic account of
emotion requires understanding hylomorphic composition. \7e can start
by rryrng more about exactly what structures are.
t 'l'hir is not the only account ofhylomorphic structure on offer. Other accounts that havc appc:rrctl in
thc litcraturc include Kit Finc (tggg), Mark Johnston (zoo5), I)avid Odcrbcrg (z<><>7\, K:rtlrrirr
Koslicki (zootl), rrrrrl Michacl l{ca (zorr). Thc account I dcvclop hcrc and in grcatcr tlt:l;ril t'ls.'wlr,'r,'

28 \TI LLIAM JA\TO RS KI
Accordirg ro traditional hylomorphists like Aristotle as well as some
conremporary hylomorphists such as Mike Rea (zou) and myself (2oru,
Lor4, zot6), structures are powers.e There are seyeral competing theories of
powers in the literature. One is defended by C. B. Martin (t996*b, tgg7,
zooT), John Heil (zoo1, zooj, Chap ter z, this volume), and Martin and
Heil (rg98, rggil. \fle can call it the identity theory ofpowers.It. claims that
every properry is essenti*lly dispositional; each essenti*lly empowers its
indivii,rJ possessor ro interact with other individuals in various kinds of
ways. A diamond's hardness empowers the diamond to do a varieqF of
things - ro scratch glass, for instance. It is essential to the hardness that it
empowers the diamond to do these things; it plays this power-conferring
'S7e describe this role in a
role in every possible world in which it exists.
'We
variery of ways. say that the diamond is able (or has the power or
porenrial or capaciry) to scratch glass, or that the diamond would scratch
ih", mirror if raked across its surface, but we also say that the diamond has
a tetrahedral arrangemenr of carbon atoms. Accordi^g to the identity
theory of powers, rhese descriptions are of numerically one and the same
properry.The diamond's hardness = the diamond's power to scratch glass =
it * diamond's having a tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms. These
descriptions simply bring our different theoretical roles that the one
properqy plays. Dispositional descriptions such as 'The diamond would
icratch that mirror if raked across its surface' bring out the roles it plays as a
power. Nondispositional descriptions such as 'The diamond has a tetra-
hedral arrangemenr of carbon atoms' bring out its role as a stable mani-
festation of a power possessed by the carbon atoms, namely the power to be
arranged t.trrh.drJly. The one property is thus simultaneously both a
stable manifestation of a power and a power itself, both an actu and a
^lity
potentialiry.
One imporranr feature of powers is that they are essentially directed
toward their manifesradons. This directedness has led some philosophers
to draw analogies berween dispositionaliry and intentionaliry (Martin and
Pfeifer ry86; PIr.. ry96a*b; Molnar zoq). Just as my desire is essentially a
desirepr something, and my fear is essentially a fear ,/to*ething, so too a
power is essentia[ly for various exercises or manifestatiolls. Moreover, just
,r *y desire can remain unfulfilled and my fear unrealized, so too a rypical
e The hylomorphic framework I describe here is committed to a substancc-rrttrilrut(' ()nlology irr wlriclr
'l'lrt'orrly
propeitier ,r. sparse, not abundant in Lewis' (rl8;) sense (faworski zor4, z<tr6).
ihai exist are or.r that empower individuals to entcr into cau.s:tl rt:l:rtiolts.'l'lrt'li':rrrr('w(,r'k :tlst,
compriseseventsorstatesofaffairs,whichare individrrals h:rvirrg l)r()l)('t'lit's ot st;trttlirrl', ilr tt'l:rtirltt.\:rl
times.
il
Mind-Body Theories and. the Emotiorus L9
power can remain unmanifested. A q*antiry of table salt has the power to
dissolve in water, yet that power might never actually manifest itself, It is
possible that the salt might remain forever undissolved (Marti n t9g6a).
Hylomorphic structures are powers to configure (or organize, order, or
coordinate) things. \flhat sets structures apart from other powers is that
they cannot exist unmanifested; they are manifested essentially. Structured
individuals are essentirlly and continuously engaged in configuring the
materials that compose them. I essendally and continuously configure the
materials that compose rrr€, and you essentially and continuously configure
the materials that compose you. Biologist J. Z.Young describes orgeniza-
tion in similar terms as a complex activiry in which living things cngagc:
The essenceof a living thing is that it consists of atoms ... caught up int<r
the living sysrem and made parr of it for a while. The living activiry tal<c.s
them up and organizes them in its characteristic way. The life of a nrirn
consists essenrially in the activiry he imposes upon that sruff. (Young ry7t:
s6-t)
Consider likewise neurophysiologist Jonathan Miller:
[T]he physical universe tends towards a state of uniform disorder ... [T]he
survival of form depends on . . . [either] the intrinsic stabiliry of the materials
from which the object is made, or the energetic replenishment and reorgani-
sation of the material .. . The configuration of a fountain . . . is intrinsically
unstable, and it can retain its shape only by endlessly renewing the material
which constitutes it; that is, by organising and imposing structure on the
lTTfi }:*:X,sffm."ffi I;;l?ifr [ffi1'::?:ilffi'ffi'il
configurarion only by flowing through a system which is capable of reorganis-
ing and renewing the configuration from one moment to the next. (Miller
1978: r4o-r)
The foregoirg remarks should make evident that hylomorphic structure is
nor a mere set of static spatial relations among something's parts. In this
sense the hylomorphic notion of structure differs from the nodon of mere
spatial arrangement discussed in connection with dual-attribute theories.
The srrucrures that distinguish living things from nonlivitg ones are
dynamic patterns of environmental interaction what Mark Johnston
(zoo6) calls 'dynamic principles of uniry,' or what Kit Fine (rggg: 68*g)
calls 'principles of variable embodiment'. They comprise programmatic
sequences of changes over time, and often involve different kinds of:
1rt'o1rcl'tit'.s
changes under different kinds of conditions. It is because of thcir clytt:ttnir'
structr.rrcs, thcir abiliry to 'impose' those structurcs on incrlrrritrg tIt:tt l('t
 il
30
'sr'I LLrAM JA\XZO RS KI
and energy, as Miller puts it, that complex individuals (paradigmatically
living things) persist through the constant infux and effiux of matter and
enery that characterize their interactions with the wider world.'o
Describing the characteristic way each sffuctured individual configures
the materials composing it is somethirg that hylomorphists say is an
empirical undertrkirg * in the human case, one left largely to biology,
biochemistry, neuroscience, and other biological subdisciplines.
Accordirg to hylomorphists, composition occurs when and only when
an individual configures materials. Composite individuals are emerynt
individuals on the hylomorphic view. There are empirically describable
conditions that are sufficient to bring into existence new sffuctured indi-
viduals where previously no such individuals existed. Once a sffuctured
individual comes into existence, it is essentially and continuously engaged
in configuring materials. The materials it configures are precisely those that
compose ir. An individual living thing does not configure exactly the same
materials for very long since those materials are in constant flux, yet despite
this, the individual maintains itself one and the same through all the
changes on account of its ongoing configuring activity. That activiqy is
what unifies various materials into a single individual, both synchronically
and diachronically.
But individuals are not the only composite entities on the hylomorphic
view; there are composite events as well. The structures discussed so far are
indiuidual-making structures, the kinds of things medieval hylomorphists
called 'substantial forms'; they make individuals what they are. But the
activities in which sffucrured individuals engage have sffuctures as well -
actiu i
4t - m a k ing s truc tur es .
The idea that there are activity-making structures is based on the
observation that the activities of sffuctured individuals involve coord.inated
manifestations of the powers of the parts that compose them. \flhen we
walk, talk, sing, dance, run, j**p, and engage in the various other activities
we do, we impose an order on the ways our parts manifest their powers. My
parts needn't manifest their powers in an ordered \^ray. It is possible for my
neurons to fire or my muscles to contract in ways that d.o not compose an
acriviry of throwing a baseball or playlng an instrument. Fatigue, injury,
insufHcient training, and many other factors can result in uncoordinatccl
manifestations of the powers of my parts. But when I succced in throwitrg
ro Hylomorphic structures arc similar to what Pctcr van Inw:ll',('n (t,1.1o) ..rlls'liv,'s'. lly'.r li{<'' v,rrr
Inwagen takcs himsclf to mcan whar bi<ll<lgi.srs <l<l: tlrt' liv.'s ol <ont tr't('()rt',.rnisrrrs (v:ttt lnw.rl',('n
r99o: 81).
Mind-Bod,y Theories and. the Emotions 3r
or ptaying, I succeed in imposing a sffucture on thc way my parts manifest
their powers; I structure their manifesmtions throwing- or playing-wise. In
some cases the sffucturing is conscious and intentional a.s in throwing a
baseball or producing the precise limb movements in a clancc. But in many
cases the sffucturing is neither conscious nor intenti<lnal as in digesting
food or increasing blood flow to the legs in response to.sonrcrhing fearful.
In whatever way it occurs, whether consciously and intcntionrtlly or not,
the result of this structuring is not a new individual but rathcr an activity,
anorher manifestation of the power sffuctured individuals havc of inrpos-
irg order on things.
Activiry-making structures unift diverse events in something attalogous
to the way individual-making structures unift the physical matcrial.s t:onr-
posing individuals. My parts and the surrounding materials ncedn't tlriln-
ifest their powers throwing-a-baseball-wise. The very same musclc fibcrs
that contract in my shoulder when I throw a baseball might also contract
when I experience an uncontrolled muscle spasm, or when a physical
therapist stimulates them electrically. What unifies the contractions of
the muscle fibers, what coordinates the manifesmtions of their powt: rs, is
what I do when I try to make an out, or try to knock down cans at thc
counry fair, or try ro accomplish whatever I try to do when I throw a
baseball. In undertrkirg these activities I impose a unified order on the way
my parrs and the surrounding materials manifest their powers.
On the hylomorphic view, structured activities include emotional
experiences. \Wlhen I experience an emotion I am engaging in an activiry
in which various parts of my nervous system and various objects in the
environmenr manifcst their powers in a coordinated way that unifies them
into a single event. It is possible to describe the unifting role of acdviry-
making srructures in terms of a nodon ofacdvity composition analogous to
the notion of composition for individuals. Just as physical materials
compose an individual exactly if they have the right kind of individual-
making structure, likewise various events compose an activity exactly if
they have the right kind of activiry-making structure. Suppose that a is a
srrucrured individual with the power to engage in activity ,F. Suppose,
moreover, that b, br,. . ., bnareindividuals, and that a subset of the bs are
proper parrs of a. Suppose, finally, that each b;has the power to engage in
an acrivity, Gt: brhas the power to G, brhas the power to G, and so on.
We can then define a notion of activity composition as follows:
Activity composition: Necess arily, a's F-ing at, is composed of b,'s G,-ing
rr( /, , h;', (;.,-ing at tr, . .. and br', Gr-ingat tnexactly if b,'s G,-ingat t,, l);'s

LLIAM
12 TUTI
JAW O RS
G;ing at tr,. . . and bn', Gn-ing at tn are structured Ilwise, where time
includes the times t7, tz, . - -,tn-
In other words, a in the activity of lting exactly if a's parts and
engages
surrounding materiali manifest their powers Fwise. I throw a baseball
exacdy if my parrs and surrounding materials manifest their powers throw-
inga-basebali-wise. Simila rly, I experience anger or enjoyment exactly
my par$ and surrounding materials manifest their powers anger- or
enjoyment-wise.
'Givel
reasonable assumptions, -activity composition implies that the
behaviors of strucrured individuals never violate the laws governirg their
fundamenral physical constituents. According to hylomorphitT, the activ-
ities of stru.t.rr.d wholes are composed of the sffuctured manifestadons of
the powers of their lower-level constituents and surrounding materials. If
those constituents or materials were to lose their powers, or were to become
incapable of manifesting them, they would become incapable of compos-
irg ilt. acriviries of sffucrured wholes. Those activities depend on lower-
te*t items retaining and manifesting the powers they have. By analogl, it is
only because bricks and timbers retain fieir shapes under compression that
they can be recruited as components of buildings. Similarly, it is only
because lower-level materials retain their distinctive powers that structured
individuals can recruit them as components for their own activities. This is
one thing that sers the hylomorphic view apart from many emergentist
theorie, Jr"r claim that higher-level powers trump or nullify the powers of
lower-level things (Sperry ry84).
This definition also makes it clear that a structured individual has the
power ro engage in various activities on account of its parts. Those parts
ior* * subsei of the individuals with powers whose coordinated manifesm-
tions compose its activities. \fle can express this idea by t"yrng _that a
srrucrr.Iredlndividual's parrs embody its powers. My visual system embodies
my power ro see; your circularory system embodies your power to bring
oxygenated blood ro various parts of yourself; Gabriel's limbic system
.mbodies his power to experience emotions, and so orl.
According to the hylomorphic theory I've'' been describing, all the
powers of structured individuals are essenti illy embodied in their parts;
itr. activities in which they engage are essentially composed of the coordi-
nated manifestations of the powers of their parts and surrounding materi-
als. It is impossible, nor just nomologically but metaphysically, for nrc to
engage in the activiry of throwing a baseball urrlcss nry l)ilrts rl'rilnifcst thcir
po*.6 in the right coordinated way.Likcwi.sc, it i.s irrrpo.ssiblc',, ltot itr.st
#
Mind-Bod.y Theories and the Emotions
33
tr nomologically but metaphysically, for Gabriel to experience anger or
enjoyment unless his parm manifest their powers in the right coordinated
way."
On the hylomorphic view, then, emotions are essentially embodied in
the physiological mechanisms that compose us, yet it is not possible to
reduce descriptions and explanations of them to descriptions and explana-
if
tions of physiological mechanisms." The reason is that there is more to
these activities on the hylomorphic view than the operations of physiolo-
gical mechanisms; there is also the way those operations are coordinated or
structured, and sffucture in general is something different from things that
are structured. It is possible for pafts of our nervous systems to be activated
in the ways they are when we are experiencing a particular emotion even
though we are not experiencing the emotion in fact. Patients with pseu-
dobulbar affect, for instance, suddenly and unpredictably cry or laugh in
ways that are indistinguishable from the ways they would if they were
experiencing sadness or mirth, and yet they do not feel sad or amused
(Parvisi et al. zoo6). Parts of their nervous systems are activated in the ways
they would be durirg a real emotional episode, and yet their activation fails
to be coordinated in the way necessary to compose an emotion. The
hylomorphic view is thus robustly antireductive despite its commitment
to essential physical embodiment.
Based on what's been said, it's possible to appreciate how hylomorphists
approach mind-body problerrs, includitg the problem of emergence.
Hylomorphic srrucrure carves out distinctive individuals from the other-
wise undifferentiated sea of mafter and energf described by our best
physics, and it confers on those individuals distinctive powers. If hylo-
morphic structure exists, then the physical universe is punctuated with
pockets of org anized change and stabiliry - composite physical objects
(paradigmati."lly living things) whose structures are powers that distin-
guish what they can do from what unstructured materials can do. Those
rr M*y hylomorphists of the past have denied *rat all our powers are essentially embodied in the
powers of our parts. Aristotle himself appears to deny it in De Anima III.a where he appears to argue
that understandin gor nous, th. power to grasp the essences of things, has no organ and is in general
unmixed (amige) with a body (4zgarc*2il. I commitment to the essential embodiment of our
capacities is nevertheless the default position for hylomorphists. In fact, Aristotle treats embodiment
as the default position as well (4opr6*rg, L4*7;4o7bry-r8), and as we have seen, erren he claims that
the emotions are essentially embodied (4o3at6*rg, ?-4*7; 4o7bt7*r8; cf. 4t1a4*6).
'' The term 'reduction' is used in a variery of ways in philosophy and the sciences. The notion of
rcduction that interesm us here is inter-theoretic reduction (Churchland ry86: zl8*g). Inter-
rlrcorcric rcduction is a synchronic relation bemreen theories or conceptual frameworks in which
onr: o('tlrr.rrr, rlrc rcducing theory or framework, is able to take over the descriptive and explanatory
rok's pl;ry.'rl by tlr,'otlrcr, thc rcduccd theory or framework.
ry
 il
34 s7 I LLrAM JA\Ur O RS Kr
powers include the powers to think, feel, perceive, and act. The other
approaches ro mental phenomena we've considered reject hylomorphic
structure. As a result, they are committed to a worldview that lacks a basic
principle that distinguishes the parm of the physical universe that can
think, feel, perceive, and act from those that can't. As a result, the existence
of those po\^rers in the natural world can begin to look inexplicable and
mysrerious in a way that was highlighted by the problem of emergence.
If there is nothing built into the basic fabric of the universe that explains
why ZoneA has powers that Zone B lacfts - lf nothing explains why lou,
sn/, have the power to think, feel, and perceive, while the materials
surrounding you do not * then the options for understanding the existence
of those powers in the natural world become constrained: either those
powers must be identified with the powers of physical materials taken by
themselves or in combination (as panpsychists and many physicalists
claim), or fieir existence must be taken as an inexplicable matter of fact
(as many emergentists and epiphenomenalists claim), or their existence in
the natural world must be denied altogether (as substance dualists and
eliminative physicalists claim).
\[ith hylomorphic structure, however, the options are no longer con-
strained in the foregoirg way.Distinctive powers like yours and mine exist
in the natural world because sffucture exists in the natural world. Moreover,
because srructure is a basic principle on the hylomorphic view, this does not
simply push the demand for an explanation back a step. A framework's basic
principles stand in need ofno further explanation. Structures and things that
ger srrucrured are both basic on the hylomorphic view. Nothing must
explain why the former exist any more than somethirg must explain why
the latter do. fu a result, the view leaves it unmycterious why and how
thought, feeling, and perception exist in the natural world.
Consider now how hylomorphists solve the problem of emergence in
particular. They target claim b); they deny that all of our properties are
determined by the properties of our parts. Although properties like the
mass, location, and position of a complex whole may be determined by the
masses, locations, and positions of the particles composing it, this is not
ffue of all properties, for some of them depend on structure. In addition,
hylomorphism spot an ambiguiry in claim (l). It is true that no nutnbcr o[
particles can produce conscious experiences by them.sclvcs, lrut iF rhclsc
particles compose somethirg with the right structr.Irc, if tlrc:y nralti['c'.st tht'ir
powers in the right coordinated waf, then thcrct i.s a scn.s(' in wlrich :l
number of nonconscious particles can colrl[rirrc lo 1rr.,tlu('(' il ('()ttsr'iotts
whole. For on thc hylonlorphic vicw, ir c()ns('irlu.s ('xl)('t'it'nrt'is ('()ttl1r,,s.'..1
Mind-Body Theories arud the Emotions 35
of the coordinated manifestation of the powers of something's parm and
surrounding materials. Consequently, there is a sense in which hylomorph-
ists can reject claim (l) a.t well.
Critics might still demand that hylomorphists explain exactly how the
movemenrs of tiny particles in my brain can give rise to the rich qualitative
experiences I have. But hylomorphists argue that this demand is illegiti-
mare. It is legitimate ro demand an explanation of how p happens only ff p
happens in fact. Yet accordirg to hylomorphists, lower-level physical
"l'he latter
occurrences do not produce thoughts, feelings, and perceptions.
are instead ways in which lower-level occurrences are structurcd, and
strucrures in general are not generated or produced by the things they
srrucrure. The srructure that makes somethitg a piano is not produced by
pieces ofwood and metal; it is instead somethirg imposed on the wood and
meral by the piano maker. Likewise, say hylomorphists, brains do not
generare or produce thoughts, feelings, and percepdons. The latter are
instead manifestations of the powers of brains and odrer organic subsys-
rems that are coordinated by us, sometimes consciously as when we
imagine or remember, sometimes unconsciously as when we feel fear,
surprise, or disgust. Our powers to think, feel, and perceive might be
embodied in muscular conffactions, neural firings, and other physiological
occurrences, but they are not generated or produced by those occurrences,
for strufiured things are not in general causal by-products of the lower-
level things they structure. Consequendy, demanding an explanation for
how brains produce consciousness implicidy begs the question against
hylomorphists, for it assumes the existence of a kind of occurrence that
hylomorphists deny exists. On hylomorphists' own terms, it is not legit-
imate to demand an explanation of lower-level generation any more than it
is legitimate to demand that a meteorologist explain how the will of Zeus
produces rain.
Critics might persist and demand an explanation for the emergence of
srrucrure itself on the hylomorphic view. Structural phenomena did not
always exist in the universe. Xflhat, then, were the lower-level physical
conditions thar were responsible for bringing them about? Hylomorphists
do not deny that we can ask how particular structures came to be in place.
My distinctively human structure came to inform various biotic materials
on accounr of the reproductive activiry of my parents. Likewise, we can ask
how the first living things emerged, how the first living structures came to
inform prebiotic materials. \il'hat we cannot ask, accordirg to hylomorph-
isrs, is what is responsible for continually generating the sffuctures that I
and orlrcr livirrg rhirrgs have. My structure is not somethirg continually
 )6 IuT ILLTAM JA\r/ O RS KI

generated by some external source or by the materials that compose me; it

is instead a self-maintainirg configuring activity in which I continuously
and essenti*lly engage. There is no sense, then, in which hylomorphists'
refusal to answer a demand to explain the emergence of structure can count
as a strike against their view, at least not without beggitg the question and
assuming from the outset that the hylomorphic view is false. It is possible
to reject the hylomorphic worldview and with it the claim that structure is
basic. But to demand that hylomorphists explain how structure emerges is
ro request something that hylomorphism implies cannot be done.

Conclusion
Mind-body problems place constraints on the shape that an ontology of
the emotions can take. For the past fifry years, the theories that have
occupied center stage in discussions of mind-body problems have been
antireductive and naturalistic. They claim, on the one hand, that we are
physical beings whose emotional capacities are essentially tied to, realized
by, or embodied in the physical materials that compose us. On the other
hand, they claim that this essential dependence on physical materials does
not sanction psychophysical reduction; it does not imply that physical
theory can in pri"cipie irt . over the descriptive and erplanatory tol.t that
psychological discourse currently plays. The most popular theories of this
sort have been forms of nonreductive physicalism, emergentism, and
epiphenomenalism. They face a variery of well-rehearsed difficulties.
Hylomorphism provides a framework that promises to avoid these diffi-
culties. It posits structures as basic powers on a pff with those of funda-
mental physical materials. Whether it provides a workable alternative to
standard approaches to the emotions in the long run depends on the
workabiliry of its underlying metaphysics.

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