Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) vs.

Drilon
[G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]

FACTS: Petitioner PASEI is a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female for overseas placement challenges the constitutional validity of Department
Order No. Series of 1988, of DOLE which provides for the temporary suspension of the
deployment of Filipino Domestic Workers.

According to the petitioner, the said order tantamount to discrimination against males or females
and that it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills and violative of the right to travel. Moreover, they argued that it is an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative and not executive in character.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the POEA filed a comment informing the Court that the respondent Labor
Secretary already lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland and counter argued that the
guidelines in question partakes the police power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the assailed Department Order is a valid exercise of police power
of the State.

RULING: YES, in deciding so the Court has extensively discussed the concept of police power in
this jurisdiction.

The Court in many cases has defined the concept police power as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. However, the Court emphasized that since the concept of
police power is dynamic, it is not capable of having an exact definition hence, it has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

Despite the extensive sweep of this power, this is not without any limitations. Settled in our
jurisprudence that the police power of the state may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. To rule otherwise will defeat the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good.

In the case at bar, while the said order applies only to female contract workers, it does not make
undue discrimination between sexes as when the Constitution provides for the “Equality before
the law,” the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women.
Certainly, it admits of classifications, provided that: (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

Here, the Court is satisfied that the classifications rests on substantial distinctions. The Court
recognized and is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic workers, amid exploitative working conditions such cases which
purports physical and personal abuse. And that there are many cases of maltreatment of Filipino
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, as confirmed by the testimonies of repatriated
workers. This prompted the Court to upheld the effort of the Government to protect the victims of
exploitation.

The same, however, cannot be said to our male workers. First, there is no evidence, except in
isolated cases, of any identical predicament. The Court stressed that there is simply no evidence to
justify that the same thing can be inference to our male workers. Simply put, the Court is content
that distinctions are borne by the evidence.

The classification is also germane to the purpose behind the measure which is to enhance the
protection for Filipino Female Overseas Workers. The order, likewise, does not narrowly apply to
existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist.
Lastly, the Court ruled that the guidelines applies to all female domestic overseas workers and had
the ban be given universal applicability, it would have been reasonable and arbitrary. This is
because the what the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of
persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.