2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan
PS9-1
Protection of fuel storage tanks against
lightning - Experimental developments and risk
analysis
Hélio E. Sueta, Luís E. Caires, Vinícius Teixeira, Miltom Shigihara and Geraldo F. Burani
Abstract- This paper presents a study regarding the
protection of fuel tanks against direct lightning discharges. This
study includes: laboratory experiments in order to verify the hot
spots inside the plates used in tanks; an analysis of the
temperature values obtained was compared with the auto
ignition temperature of some types of fuel; development of a
spreadsheet for risk analysis specific to this type of installation
and some recommendations for the protection of fuel storage
tanks against lightning.
Keywords—Fuel tanks, hot spot, lightning protection, risk
management.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper presents a summary of a study to fuel tanks to
protect against the effects of lightning damage including
development of a risk analysis worksheet and the results of
tests on steel sheet used in fuel storage tanks.
Lightning discharges to earth may be hazardous to
structures, individuals and also to services such as electricity
supply, wired telephone, wired computer networks, gas and
water metallic pipes, industrial activities, processes involving
oil and other types of fuel, etc.
The dangers to a structure can result in damage to it and its
contents, electronics systems failure and damage to life in or
near the structure.
The effects from damage and failure may extend to the area
near of the structure or affect the environment.
Dangers to services can result in damage to itself and
failures of electronic equipment’s associated.
If a lightning strikes fuel tanks, explosions may occur as
well as onset of fire. Then, the harm can be irreparable,
beyond environmental problems such as the risk of life
nearby.
As examples in Brazil on January 2013, two ethanol
storage fuel tanks had exploded after being struck by
H.E. Sueta is with the Institute of Energy and Environment of University
of São Paulo, Brazil (sueta@iee.usp.br).
L.E. Caires is with the Institute of Energy and Environment of University
of São Paulo, Brazil (luis@iee.usp.br).
V. Teixeira is with the Institute of Energy and Environment of University
of São Paulo, Brazil (vinicius.mpt@gmail.com).
M. Shigihara is with Institute of Energy and Environment of University of
São Paulo, Brazil (mshigi@iee.usp.br)
G.F. Burani is with the Institute of Energy and Environment of University
of São Paulo, Brazil (burani@iee.usp.br).
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lightning: São Luiz plant in Ourinhos, in the state of São
Paulo on Jan/6th and Rio Claro plant, in the state of Goiás on
Jan/16th.
This work presents a specific risk analysis for these types
of tanks, considering the results of tests with direct-current
pulses (simulating continuing currents) performed directly on
metal plates and a system to measure the local temperature
inside hot face for analysis.
II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. Types of protection for fuel tanks
Regarding the fuel tank protection against lightning we
must study the effects of lightning in three different
situations: a direct lightning strike to the tank roof or shell; a
strike near the tank area; and a lightning discharge on sensors
or any electrical wire connected to accessory equipment.
When a lightning strike hits directly a storage tank, the
following effects may occur:
• Lightning current will be conducted by metal parts
of the tank (including parts of the protection system)
without causing any damage;
• Melting points may cause punctures in the metal
sheet and result in fire or explosion;
• A hot spot without perforation of the metal sheet can
ignite the fuel inside the tank;
• Flashover in critical points of the tank, due to the
potential difference arising from the current flow or
induced voltage, initiate fire and/or explosion;
• The plasma temperature of the lightning channel
reaches very high temperatures and therefore turn it
into a major risk of ignition for explosive
environments;
In cases when lightning strikes areas near the tank or hitting
sensors or its wires, it may not cause any flaws on equipment,
but it can start a fire or explosions mainly because of
flashovers at critical points of the tank. If the lightning current
(in air) flows through inflammable areas, it may be an ignition
source, causing fire or explosions that will inevitably reach
nearby tanks.
For protection against indirect effects of lightning,
especially against flashover at critical points, the surge
 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan
protection measures (SPM) must be taken, mainly on
equipotential bonding, grounding system and surge protection
devices (SPD) properly and coordinately installed.
In order to avoid problems related to direct-strike lightning,
the main types of protection are described below.
A.1 Self-protected and self-grounded tanks
Tanks having a metallic body structure (roof and shell), and
plates with minimum thickness to support lightning currents
safely (without causing any punctures or hot spots) are
considered self-protected and grounded. Also, the diameter of
the tank bottom in contact with the soil must have sufficient
area to ensure a good grounding, varying according to the soil
type (Fig. 1). This concept of self-grounded is allowed in
some technical standards, including the latest version of
ABNT NBR 5419/2005 [1], but this concept will cease in a
future revision of this standard (ABNT NBR 5419-3) that will
based on international standard IEC 62305-3/2010 [2]. Then,
the earth-termination system will be required in this case.
Fig. 1. Self-protected and self-grounded tank
A.2 Self-protected tanks with earth-termination system
Tanks considered self-protected with earth-termination
system (Fig. 2) are those which have metal plate’s thickness
equal or greater than the minimum safety values, electrically
bonded at an earth-termination system. A suitable
earth-termination system should be designed and installed
according to standards, which describe techniques using, for
example, grounding rods, grounding ring, grid or mesh
protection, for a single tank or a storage park.
Fig. 2. Self-protected with earth-termination system tank
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A.3 External Non-Isolated Protection System
In the Non-Isolated system (Fig. 3), the protection is
provided by lightning rods electrically bonded to the tank
roof, in order to avoid the strike to hit directly to the tank, but
the current will still flow through the metallic body of the tank
to the ground. Existing and permanent metal parts of the tank
can eventually be used as part of the protection system, such
as metal guardrails properly welded to the tank and with
appropriate dimensions. The air-termination rod should be set
on the tank roof in a way that it may have a large surface
contact with the plate, ensuring that the lightning current will
not cause any damage, corrosion or hot spots in that interface,
when the current flows through it. The design of the rod
structure taking into account its size and position should be
made using the Rolling Sphere Method.
Fig. 3. External Protection Non-isolated
A.4 External Isolated Protection System
The external isolated system (Fig. 4), provides a most
likely point to the lightning attachment, but also directs the
total current to the ground through a new path, removing the
tanks parts from it. This type of protection comprises towers
sized according to the Rolling Sphere Method spaced at least
2 meters from the tank shell. These towers have to be
connected on the top by properly sized metallic wires (as
standardized) and, must be connected to the earth-termination
system at the bottom. This protection should be adopted when
the thicknesses of the tank does not prevent either perforation
or the formation of hazardous hot spots when a direct
lightning hit the tank. Furthermore, the lightning current
through the tanks parts may cause dangerous increase of
gradient temperature and/or flashover at points that can
initiate fire or explosion.
 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan

Current pulses were applied to upper side of new metal

sheets with different thicknesses (Fig. 6).

Electrode

Fig. 4. External protection isolated

GAP
These types of tanks protection were considered in the
development of risk analysis worksheet.

II. EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENTS

This work focused its experimental part on one of the
possible types of damage which occur when the lightning
directly strikes a storage tank of fuel and generates hot spots
in the stroke point of impact.
The main goal of these tests was to determine the critical
temperature points, such as the holes on metal plates were
subject to previous investigations, and tanks used for storage
of fuels have plate’s thickness enough to avoiding such
perforations. These temperature values may be compared
with those reference auto ignition values of several fuel types
Fig. 6. Device under test (Metallic plate)
typically stored in these tanks. In order to verify these thermal
effects it is important to evaluate the continuing current
On underside of the metal plate (Fig. 7), the hot spot
component. This type of current occurs between successive
temperatures were measured through two different methods:
strokes in a flash.
thermocouples and thermal imaging.
The continuing current was simulated from pulses of direct
For this work, the plates used were often used in the
current obtained from a rectifier bridge adjusted to obtain a
construction of tanks, but without any covering or painting. In
pulse of 600 A and variable duration up to 500 ms, thereby
future work, tests using painted and small air termination rods
obtaining pulses of 100, 200 and 300 C. Figure 5 shows an
will be performed.
example of oscillogram obtained in the tests.

Plate under test

Fig. 7. Bottom view of the plate (thermocouple attached with adhesive).

Fig.5. Pulse DC Oscillogram.

The test results are described below.

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 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan

A.1 Simulations from the model. Some preliminary applications were made to adjust the
Due to the impossibility of obtaining the real phenomenon measurement system. Regarding temperature, two different
(lightning) data in a controlled laboratory, it is necessary to systems were used: the first one with thermocouples and the
perform simulations in order to obtain results to compare with second with thermal imaging.
observations from the field. In this process it was found that the time for the occurrence
In this case it is imperative to taking into account the value of this event is too short, remaining below the time response
of the temperature rise in an internal point of the plate and of the set type K thermocouple / multimeter YEW TY530,
based on the assumptions previously deducted, it is possible whose time constant is about 300 ms. The stability condition
to establish the initial conditions. according to the response time of thermocouple would be
Therefore, we could draw up a spreadsheet to assist on the about 900 ms.
results evaluation. Thermal images (Fig. 9) showed higher values compared to
The test should be done with direct-current pulses to the system with thermocouples. Table I shows the results of
simulate the component of the lightning known as continuing tests on the plate of 2.75 mm thick with the maximum
current. temperature values obtained by thermography.
Due to the relative low voltage applied in the laboratory TABLE I
between the electrode tip (central rod) and the plate (negative TESTS ON THE PLATE WITH THICKNESS: 2,75 mm
electrode), a copper wire was installed in order to start the U [V] I [A] Q [C] P [W] t [ms] Tmáx [ºC]
electric arc (Fig. 8). Arc
voltage
98 716 111 69839 155 254
94 731 210 68767 288 465
92 742 335 68416 452 >670(*)
(*) Note: It exceeded the scale of the instrument.

igniter-wire The following tables II and III show the results for plates of
4.8 mm and 6.35 mm.
TABLE II
TESTS ON THE PLATE WITH THICKNESS: 4,8 mm
U [V] I [A] Q [C] P [W] t [ms] Tmáx [ºC]
Arc voltage
81 731 114 59254 155 156
85 764 218 65248 286 251
Fig. 8. Copper wire used to start the electric arc.
85 773 305 65903 394 424
In the first series of tests, the positive electrode was used as TABLE III
the central rod and the negative on the plate. TESTS ON THE PLATE WITH THICKNESS: 6,35 mm
Fixing the current value and varying the time of exposure U [V] I [A] Q [C] P [W] t [ms] Tmáx [ºC]
to arc, it is possible to estimate the influence of time on the Arc voltage
phenomenon. We define the current I as 600 A (300 C in 85 729 100 61719 137 111
0.5s). 86 759 235 65040 310 201
The charges Q are defined as 100, 200 and 300 C (values 77 778 430 59779 553 316
tabulated in IEC). In these applications the value of maximum temperature
The device used for thermal imaging was set to shoot the was consistent with the expected which is proportional to
applications and thus to obtain the maximum instantaneous applied charge.
observed. The value of the considered arc voltage was particularly
important and varied depending on thickness of the plate. The
importance of this parameter is meaningful, since it
determines the energy that was transferred or dissipated in the
process. Therefore it is deducted that not all thermal energy of
the arc was used in the concerned phenomenon to determine
the risk of excessive temperature rise. From the empirical data
it was possible to obtain an approximate expression for arc
voltage which was used as input data in a spreadsheet
calculation.
With these values it was possible to improve the model in
order to create a spreadsheet that enables more data to review.
In this case, extrapolation was critical because it is necessary
to determine a critical charge profile according to the auto
ignition temperature of the materials involved. A summary of
Fig.9. Thermal image of application by the backside of the plate

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 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan

measured values compared to calculated values is showed in and detailed application of electrical and thermodynamics
Table IV below. theory.
TABLE IV In order to apply the data analysis to practical experience
COMPARISON BETWEEN MEASURED AND CALCULATED VALUES showed that the best results could be performed with different
Plate Current Conduction Charge Maximum Calculated Difference materials and methods. Sheet material samples with greater
thickness [A] Time [ms] [C] Temp.[°C] Maximum [°C] variation in thickness could be tested, otherwise only a few
[mm] Temp. defined thicknesses were tested according the ones used in the
[°C] tanks. For example, in order to obtain a temperature gradient
2,75 716,19 155 111 254 257 -3 it would be ideally to test plates increasing their thickness of 1
2,75 730,91 287,5 210 465 493 -28 in 1 mm. Regarding the methods it should be made a larger
2,75 741,57 452,1 335 >670 782 ???? number of samples per plate to obtain a statistical evaluation
4,8 731,53 155,2 114 156 155 1 of dispersion measures.
4,8 763,64 285,8 218 251 276 -25
It became clear that it is required to obtain functional
relationships between plate thickness and critical
4,8 773,43 393,8 305 424 373 51
temperature, which was in the last instance performed
6,35 728,81 136,6 100 111 114 -3
through a simple mathematical model that was applied in a
6,35 758,83 309,8 235 201 243 -42
spreadsheet.
6,35 777,8 553,2 430 316 424 -108
For the purpose to make it practical for the application, the
In the Table IV, concerning the column “difference”, in results of this experiment need additional statistical
particular the negative values indicate that the spreadsheet has evaluation that correlates the critical charge value to the
calculated higher values than the observed ones in
probability of it be exceeded. This limit can be found
experiments, which is positive to safety. In most evaluations
researching on atmospheric discharges parameters [3].
this case prevails.
The final goal was to obtain the value of maximum charge Based on the results obtained in the tests, the developed
that a plate with certain thickness can absorb so that its spreadsheets and simplified simulations, it was possible to
temperature reaches the critical value depending on stored customize the risk analysis worksheet for the specific case of
fuel. fuel storage tanks.
Table V below shows these values for plate thickness from
1 mm to 10 mm for three types of fuels: gasoline, diesel and III. DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ANALYSIS PROGRAM APPLIED
ethanol. TO A FUEL TANKS
TABLE V A specific risk analysis was carried out for fuel tanks and a
MAXIMUM CHARGE DEPENDING ON THE THICKNESS OF PLATE spreadsheet based on IEC 62305-2 / 2010 [4]
AND FUEL recommendations was developed to adapt the analysis to the
PRODUCT GASOLINE DIESEL ETHANOL fuel tanks with several modifications.
Auto ignition
The spreadsheet developed was so-called "Tupã (version
temperature [°C]
246 210 363 for tanks)". To facilitate the use of the spreadsheet, many
specific parameters for tanks were fixed, however they are not
THICKNESS [mm] Charge [C] Charge [C] Charge [C]
shown in the spreadsheet, i.e., their values are used, but only
1 6 5 9 the parameters that can vary from the tank to the tank are in it.
2 50 40 80 With this spreadsheet, we can estimate how each tank is in
3 120 100 180 a particular plant to the risks and which are the main
4 170 140 250 protective measures to be taken to ensure that these risks are
within tolerable standard values as described. In addition, we
5 200 170 300
can compare the risks of different tanks and sort them in order
6 230 200 350 of priority for maintenance and refurbishment.
7 260 220 380 In this study we verified the relationship of the parameters
8 280 240 430 indicated in the risk management standard (IEC 62305-2 /
9 310 260 470 2010) [4] and we detail some of the changes made in
10 330 280 510 customization. We also present a customized spreadsheet that
Due to the work of evaluating the results based on their got quite simplified since only specific to parameters for
application, it was observed that the final goal for laboratory tanks with the possibility of variations were presented to
facilitate understanding and handling of the spreadsheet.
tests is to provide a consistent model to describe a critical
The standard IEC62305-2 [4] provides a method for risk
charge profile of lightning discharge, depending on the plate
assessment that includes areas with risk of explosion. Being a
thickness used in fuel storage tank. Such a model need to be generic and comprehensive method and considering that in
better draw up, however to immediate purpose we have to use these areas the risk of economic loss, personal and
a lot of simplification. environmental value is higher, it would be wise to establish
Moreover, even this simplified model pointed variables some method to guide the risk analysis.
and their relations underlining the importance of further Such method should consider the particularities of these
development aiming sedimentary concepts through stricter risk areas as well as the calculation premises recommended

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 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan
by the standard, aligning these two points of view. For
example, in the standard the reduction risk factor rf of an
explosion hazardous area (zone 0, 20) is a thousand times
larger than an area with less risk of explosion (Zone 2, 22).
Also the usually area of fuel storage tanks is very large, which
makes the collection area have a very high value. These
associated factors can lead to a risk value which no protective
measure would be enough to ensure the safety of the site.
Because the standard is a generic method for risk assessment,
the variable analysis may lead to outrageous values for not
adequately address the installation details. For example, the
thickness of the side parts and tank roof plating sets whether it
can be regarded as self-protected, but it is not considered in
the standard evaluation. This input data is specific to this
worksheet and the calculation was based on studies and
results of laboratory tests and analysis of the fuels used.
The risk component considering the presence of an
explosive atmosphere shall not increase the risk since the
project installation contains the appropriate protection
measures. The risk assessment is related to this premise, that
is, if there is a failure in the protection method it will increase
the risk.
Based on this, the study of the standard can be used by
adding the effect of an explosive gas, or rather the probability
that this occurs according to the exposure time.
The other variables determine whether the protection
systems operate properly and therefore can be used in the
evaluation. Thus, the aim of this work is to adapt the standard
method for applying in fuel storage tanks.
Among these adaptations we have include the automatic
determination of a collection area for tanks by introducing the
height and diameter of the tanks; or by including external
towers, in case of isolated external protective; and also
including the type of stored fuel and the plate thickness of the
tank roof.
These new data influencing the risks were taking into
account the generation of hazardous hot spots, according to
the characteristics of the tank and stored fuel.
The main input data are: tank height, body guard height
installed in the tank cover, tank diameter, type of LPS used,
towers characteristics to be used in the LPS, fire or explosion
risks, attributes of connected lines, SPD used, the tank
location factor, density of lightning to earth, soil or floor type,
fuel type and thickness of the roof.
Below is an example of the spreadsheet screen into two
parts (Fig. 10a and b).
Fig. 10a. Risk analysis for tanks - spreadsheet screen – superior part
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Fig. 10b. Risk analysis for tanks - spreadsheet screen – inferior part.
.
IV. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE TANKS PROTECTION
In this section we will present the main recommendations
for the protection of fuel storage tanks as follows: first we will
present general recommendations valid for both new and
existing tanks; then we will present specific recommendations
for tanks in operation, and finally the specific
recommendations for new tanks yet to be applied in the
design phase and deployment.
These recommendations were based on studies of various
standards, technical papers and results of tests performed.
It is very important to mention that the phenomenon of
lightning is quite complex and there is no 100% safe
protection. In this way, even taking 100% of the
recommendations described below it cannot be assured with
absolute certainty that a discharge when reaching a tank or its
surroundings cannot bring any kind of damage.
A.1 General Recommendations
• The standard for lightning protection recommended for
tanks installed in Brazil is, at present, the IEC 62305/2010 [2]
and, from 2015 (probable year of entry into force of the new
Brazilian standard), the new version of ABNT NBR 5419,
both published in 4 parts. This way it is recommended that all
fuel storage tanks meet, at least these standards and may also
meet some additional recommendations outlined in
international standards such as the specific rules for these
structures as American ones.
• We recommend that all sensors and / or other devices in the
tank (or yet to be installed in the same), that have electrical
power cords and/or signal cables should be protected against
surges through Surge Protection Measures (SPM) mainly
through the SPD (Surge Protection Devices) proper and
coordinated, and, when necessary, specific for risk of
explosion areas.
• We recommend that all tanks should be checked in order to
verify the electrical continuity between the roofs (whether
fixed or mobile), the plating and the grounding system,
avoiding insulating parts susceptible to flashover that can
 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan
cause sparkover. For new tanks, set this continuity in design
and realize the implementation.
• Earth-termination system consists of a grounding grid and
the number of interconnections between the tanks and the
mesh according to the standards is defined as the dimensions
of it.
• Section D.5.5.2 of ABNT NBR 5419-3 of future Brazilian
standard describes important points about the protection of
fuel storage tanks. In this section, the future standard
indicates that for some structures used to storage liquids
which may produce flammable vapor or used to storage gas
are considered self-protected and do not require additional
protection as long as they are metal contained completely
within, continuous container with a wall thickness greater
than 5 mm steel or 7 mm aluminum, without the spaces that
permit arcing. The standard also indicates that tanks in direct
contact with soil and pipe lines do not require air-termination
systems. Electrical components and instrumentation used in
such equipment must be certified for this type of application.
Measures for lightning protection should be taken as the type
of construction.
Individual metallic tanks or containers must be bonded to the
grounding electrode according to their horizontal dimensions
(diameter or length) as described in Section 5 of the standard:
a) up to 20 m: at least two interconnections, arranged
equidistantly on perimeter;
b) over 20 m: two interconnections plus an additional
interconnection at every 10 m perimeter, arranged
equidistantly.
For tanks grouped in yards, as refineries and storage,
grounding one point in each tank is sufficient, regardless of
greater horizontal dimension. When arranged in courtyards,
the tanks must be interconnected. As shown in Tables 7 and 8
of future NBR 5419-3, in addition the connection, the pipes
that are electrically connected may also be considered
interconnection according to section 5.3.5 of the standard. In
the case of floating roof tanks, roof should be connected to the
main housing of the tank effectively. The design of junctions
and seals, and their relative locations need to be carefully
considered so that any possible risk of ignition of explosive
mixture by a spark is reduced to the lowest possible level.
When a mobile ladder is installed, equipotential bonding
cables, flexible (#35 mm²), must be connected at the hinges of
the stairs, between the ladder and the top of the tank and
between the ladder and the floating roof. When a mobile
ladder is not installed in the floating roof tank, one or more
equipotential bonding flexible conductors (#35 mm²) must be
connected to the main structure of the tank and the floating
roof considering the dimensions of the tank. Equipotential
bonding conductors must follow the ceiling or be installed in
such a way they do not form loops resulting from its
movement. In floating roof tanks, there must be multiple
connections at intervals of 1.5 m between the periphery of the
floating roof and the tank wall. The material selection is given
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by the stored product in the tank and/or environmental
requirements. The alternatives to provide an adequate
connection between floating roof and tank wall regarding the
conduction of impulse currents associated with lightning will
only be permitted if this is successfully demonstrated in tests
and the procedures are used to ensure the reliability of the
connection.
• It is necessary to make a risk analysis for lightning
protection in design phase, after tank installation, during the
most critical maintenance and whenever there is any change
in the original tank design project.
A.2 Specific recommendations for existing and running
tanks
• Never carry out supply operations or emptying of fuel
during periods of storms.
• Never perform maintenance and / or measuring in the tank
or close operations during storm periods.
• Check the thicknesses of tanks and compare the values
found with the design values and normalized ones.
• Check the status of interconnections between tanks and
earth-termination system, compare the amount of
interconnections with standard values and verify electrical
continuity between all conductors that make up this system.
• For tank protection purpose against lightning, it is
considered that all possible outputs for pressure of explosive
gases, are equipped with special valves so that any external
spark may never penetrate to interior of the tank.
• It is necessary to include in the tanks Maintenance Plan,
specific findings based on the LPS including checking the
continuity of the earth-termination grid, coverage of
air-termination system, thickness of the plates (especially
roof tanks), electrical continuity between air-termination
system and earth-termination system, functionality of Surge
Protection Devices installed, functionality of pressure relief
systems, among others.
A.3 Specific recommendations for new tanks still to be
applied in the design phase and deployment
• Checking if the plate’s thicknesses of the design are
specified according to the standard thicknesses reported
(greater than 5 mm for steel).
• For the design of earth-termination system, before
performing the soil stratification onsite of tanks deployment
to check the resistivity and calculate required mesh for
earth-termination system. All interconnections to the tank and
details must be indicated in the design.
• Provide all sensors and measuring systems with the
appropriate Surge Protection Measures (SPM) suitable for
explosive areas.
 2015 Asia-Pacific International Conference on Lightning (APL), Nagoya, Japan
V. CONCLUSIONS
This study has addressed various aspects related to
protection of flammable liquid storage tanks against the
damaging effects of lightning. Because of this, the findings
presented here refer to the fuel tanks of protection in general,
based not only on the data presented here as well as in studies
of standards and technical work on the subject.
From analysis and studies carried out, we found that the
main focus of the study should be the direct strokes to the tank
and the effect of hot spot on the inside surface of the plate. In
the study it was also observed that the thicknesses normally
used in tanks exceed the thicknesses that could be perforated
by lightning. Other possible types of damage such as, for
example, flashover insulating parts or sensors in tank and the
damage caused from the passages of lightning by explosive
vapors contaminated areas were also addressed and
considered in risk analysis and protection measures listed are
traditional and standardized, such as surge protection
measures and recommendation use of special valves that
prevent the penetration of any flames into the tank.
As for the case of the impact of hot spots inside the plates,
having regard to the little literature available on the subject
and the diversity of fuel types, it is necessary further study.
Therefore, tests performed in laboratory where been directed
to this subject and, from these results, studies and specific
worksheets were developed in order to verify the impact of
critical temperatures in relation to total transferred charges
from long stroke arcs. Assays were performed for various
sheet metal thicknesses used in tanks and calculations of
critical charges for each fuel type studied.
This particular study allowed us to create the spreadsheet
"Risk Analysis" to fuel tanks, one of this study product that
has become more prominent throughout the project. This
worksheet assists in organizing priorities for protection of
existing tanks and design considering the damaging effects of
lightning. On this point it should be noted that the risk
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estimation does not exclude the need for careful analysis of
the design and execution based on standards. The spreadsheet
is not intended to define the protection system to be used, but
guides you through the data reasonably approximate for a risk
assessment showing systems with better or worse protection.
Finally, although the phenomenon of lightning is quite
complex and comprehensive, and a 100% reliable protection
is not possible, this study addresses the various types of
injuries and accidents related to lightning in the fuel tanks,
indicating some key measures of protection. It is always
important to emphasize that the recommendations of
standards and specifications should always be followed to
protect people and facilities in Power Plants and Terminals,
and also to protect of the environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank the High Current
Laboratory of IEE-USP staff, especially Ivan Bueno Raposo
for the development of the testing device and carrying out the
tests on plates. Also thanks to Raizen Combustíveis S.A. to
fund part of this study and provide important technical data,
especially the engineers Paulo Sérgio Lopes Soares de
Almeida and José Giliard Ansiero.
REFERENCES
[1] ABNT- ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE NORMAS TÉCNICAS –
ABNT NBR 5419, Proteção de estruturas contra descargas
atmosféricas, 2005, in portuguese.
[2] IEC – INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION –
IEC 62305 -3, Second edition, Protection against lightning – Part 3:
Physical damage to structures and life hazard, 2010.
[3] LIGHTNING AND INSULATOR SUBCOMMITEE OF THE T&D
COMMITTEE - “Parameters of Lightning Strokes”. IEEE Transactions
on Power Delivery, vol. 20, pp 346-358, Jan. 2005.
[4] IEC – INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION –
IEC 62305 -2, Second edition, Protection against lightning – Part 2:
Risk Management, 2010.