JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 12(3), 203–213

Copyright © 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. E FFE CT SOF

P OSAVAC,
SE LE CT IVE
SANBONMATS
CONSID ERATI
U, HO
ON

The Effects of the Selective Consideration of Alternatives on

Consumer Choice and Attitude–Decision Consistency
Steven S. Posavac
Simon Graduate School of Business
University of Rochester

David M. Sanbonmatsu and Edward A. Ho

Department of Psychology
University of Utah

There are many instances of consumer decision making in which more consideration is given to
1 brand than to others in the choice set. This research explored how selective consideration of a
brand affects attitudes toward the brand, relative standing of the focal brand within the choice
category, and decision making. Experiment 1 demonstrated that when participants were
prompted to consider a randomly determined focal alternative, that alternative was more likely
to be chosen than nonfocal alternatives. Moreover, willingness to pay for an alternative was
higher if it was the focus of consideration. Attitudinal data suggest that the selective consider-
ation effect occurred because attitudes toward the focal alternative became more positive com-
pared to those toward other alternatives in the choice set. Experiment 2 elucidated this attitudi-
nal effect by demonstrating that selective consideration could cause the extremity of
consumers’ attitudes toward a focal brand to become more positive. Experiment 3 explored the
potential of the selective consideration of a focal alternative to influence the consistency be-
tween consumers’ attitudes and decisions and established that the initial attitude toward a focal
alternative moderated the selective consideration effect.

Making the best possible consumer choice requires careful
consideration of all the attributes of all the possible alterna-
tives that might satisfy a need. Indeed, Payne, Bettman, and
Johnson (1993) forwarded the weighted additive decision
rule, in which the expected utility of each alternative is calcu-
lated based on attribute levels and importance weights, as the
normative prescription for rational choice behavior. How-
ever, there are clearly many instances in which consumers
give more consideration to some alternatives than to others.
For example, seeing an ad, hearing about a brand from a friend,
or being drawn to a particularly salient brand in a store may all
facilitate the selective consideration of a particular brand.
In this research, we examined the possibility that simply
selectively focusing on one brand from a choice set may have
implications for product judgments and subsequent choice
from the set. Specifically, we investigated how selective fo-
cus on a choice alternative may make attitudes toward the fo-
Requests for reprints should be sent to Steven S. Posavac, Simon Gradu-
ate School of Business, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
E-mail: posavac@simon.rochester.ed u
cal alternative more extreme, which in turn may lead to more
favorable judgments and increased purchase likelihood of the
focal alternative. We also explored the implications of the se-
lective consideration of alternatives for the consistency be-
tween consumers’ attitudes and decisions.
SELECTIVE VERSUS COMPARATIVE
PROCESSING
The results of recent research in marketing and psychology
suggests that in many cases, in contrast to normative prescrip-
tions, individuals do not give consideration to a large set of
competing options prior to making a judgment or choice (e.g.,
Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Kardes,
Kalyanaram, Chandrashekaren, & Dornoff, 1993; Lehman &
Pan, 1994; Lynch, Marmorstein, & Weigold, 1988;
Nedungadi, 1990; Shapiro, Macinnis, & Heckler, 1997). In-
stead, individuals often engage in selective hypothesis testing
of the merit of alternatives (Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes,
& Mantel, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 1996). A hypothesis was
204 POSAVAC, SANBONMATSU, HO
defined broadly by Sanbonmatsu et al. to include possible es-
timations, interpretations, evaluations, explanations, rules, or
solutions when judgments are made under uncertainty. Selec-
tive hypothesis testing refers to the tendency of individuals to
evaluate competing hypotheses one at a time. Rather than
search for evidence for multiple hypotheses and compare the
evidence for the various alternatives, individuals tend to fo-
cus on the evidence for one hypothesis (i.e., the focal hypoth-
esis; Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 1999; Dhar & Simonson,
1992). If evidence for the focal hypothesis is readily obtained,
individuals often conclude that it is true or is the best hypothe-
sis. If evidence supporting the focal hypothesis is difficult to
come by, typically the hypothesis is rejected, and the individ-
ual considers another hypothesis. Of course, a confident as-
sessment of which hypothesis is best requires the consider-
ation of the evidence for all of the competing hypotheses.
This bias in evidence gathering and biases in the subsequent
interpretation and assimilation of evidence often result in the
focal hypothesis appearing particularly attractive. That is,
had other hypotheses been considered, the individual may
have concluded that a different hypothesis was correct.
Consumer researchers have delineated a variety of exam-
ples of judgmental errors that result from the selective consid-
eration of a focal option. For example, Houghton and Kardes
(1998) reported that consumers asked to estimate the market
share enjoyed by a particular company tended to (a) focus on
attributes of the focal company, (b) neglect consideration of
attributes of competing companies, and accordingly, (c) dra-
matically overestimate the market share held by the focal
company. Other consequences of selective hypothesis testing
include overestimations of the utility of a focal solution to a
managerial problem (Kardes & Cronley, 2000) and the
positivity of traits of a focally considered individual (Klar &
Giladi, 1997). Moreover, Sanbonmatsu et al. (1998) sug-
gested that diverse judgmental errors, such as biases in causal
attribution, the hindsight bias, probability overestimation,
overconfidence, illusory correlation, and the fundamental at-
tribution error, may result from individuals’ tendency to en-
gage in selective hypothesis testing. In each of these cases, a
focal alternative is judged to be superior to competitors be-
cause evidence supporting the focal alternative receives more
consideration than evidence for other possibilities.
HOW THE SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION
OF A FOCAL BRAND MAY INFLUENCE
ATTITUDES
What implications might the tendency to selectively consider
alternatives have for consumers’ attitudes toward choice op-
tions? In the same way that judgment requires the integration
of evidence relevant to the truth or likelihood of hypotheses,
consumer choice requires the gathering and integration of in-
formation about the various choice alternatives. Judgments
are typically most accurate when information about all judg-
mental alternatives is considered. In much the same way,
choices may be best when all information about all the choice
alternatives is considered. We suggest here that the selective
consideration of a focal choice alternative may have effects
similar to the selective consideration of a judgmental alterna-
tive. If consumers focus on one choice alternative from a set,
the selective consideration of the attributes of the focal alter-
native may lead consumers to develop an attitude toward the
alternative that is both more positive than the attitude was
prior to consideration and more positive in relation to atti-
tudes toward other alternatives in the set.
Work on attitude polarization supports the notion that se-
lectively focusing on an object may have implications for
subsequent attitudes toward the object (e.g., Leone, 1984;
Tesser, 1976; Tesser & Cowan, 1975; Tesser & Leone, 1977;
for a review, see Tybout & Artz, 1994). Attitude polarization
refers to the phenomenon whereby merely thinking about an
object results in attitudes toward the object becoming more
extreme, or polarized, in the initial direction of the attitude
(i.e., positive or negative; see also Judd & Brauer, 1995). For
example, Sadler and Tesser (1973) found that asking individ-
uals to think about a liked other caused subsequent evalua-
tions of the other to become more positive.
Initial conceptions of, attitudes toward, or hypotheses
about an object may bias consumers’ thinking about it. Rather
than thinking about how the object compares with alterna-
tives, consumers may tend to focus on the evidence for the ob-
ject that is the focus of consideration. Much of this evidence, of
course, is consistent with the initial attitude. Moreover, the
processing of evidence tends to be biased, as consumers may
interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner that is consistent
with the initial attitude. In addition, inferences about missing
or unknown attributes tend to be consistent with initial con-
ceptions, and evidence that is inconsistent with the initial atti-
tude may be likely to be discounted. All of these processes and
tendencies may lead to attitudes that are more extreme than
was the case prior to focal consideration of the alternative. It
should be noted that selective consideration of an alternative
does not necessarily lead to attitudes that are more positive. In-
stead, the attitude after selective consideration will be more
extreme than the initial evaluation of the alternative but will
likely be in the same direction as the initial attitude.
HOW SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION
MAY AFFECT CHOICE
The tendency to consider objects selectively may have impli-
cations for consumers’ choices if attitudes toward the focal
brand are influenced by selective consideration. If a con-
sumer focuses on one brand in a category to the exclusion of
other brands, the attitude toward the focal brand may come to
be more favorable than it was prior to consideration. More-
over, if nonfocal brands are not given consideration, the focal
option may gain in relative standing within the choice cate-

gory. An interesting implication of this reasoning is that any
number of different alternatives within a particular choice
category may benefit from selective consideration effects and
become relatively more preferred compared to other alterna-
tives that are not the focus of consideration.
If these hypothesized effects of selective consideration on
attitudes toward objects within a choice category are correct,
consumers’ choices are likely to be influenced by selective
consideration. Specifically, if attitudes toward a focally con-
sidered choice option become more positive relative to other
choice options in the category, choice from the category may
be biased in favor of the focally considered alternative.
Research on the mere measurement effect supports the no-
tion that focusing on particular products or consumer catego-
ries can influence consumers’ buying behavior (Feldman &
Lynch, 1988; Fitzsimons & Morwitz, 1996; Morwitz, John-
son, & Schmittlein, 1993). For example, Fitzsimons and
Morwitz reported that asking automobile owners which
brand they would purchase if in the market for a new car in-
creased the likelihood of a future purchase of the brand cur-
rently owned by the respondent. Ostensibly, measurement
strengthened the existing positive attitudes owners held to-
ward their current brand, and these attitudes became more
likely to guide subsequent choice (see also Fazio, 1995). Con-
sistent with this notion, Fitzsimons and Morwitz also found
that measuring intent increased the consistency between
stated preferences and purchase behavior.
Interestingly, our logic suggests that the consistency be-
tween attitudes and decisions may be either increased or di-
minished by selective consideration of an alternative. If an
option that an individual likes best at the time of initial atti-
tude measurement is selectively considered, attitude–deci-
sion consistency may increase because the considered option
may be particularly likely to be chosen. In contrast, consider
an option that is liked but not the most liked option in a choice
category. If such an option receives selective consideration,
attitude–decision consistency may decrease because the like-
lihood of the focal option being chosen may increase, and ac-
cordingly, the likelihood of choice of the previously most
preferred option would decrease.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS
Three experiments were conducted to explore how selective
consideration of a brand affects attitudes toward the brand,
relative standing of the focal brand within the choice cate-
gory, and decision making. Moreover, in this research, we at-
tempted to elucidate the attitudinal processes that may under-
lie the effects of selective consideration on choice, when
selective consideration affects choice, and how selective con-
sideration affects the likelihood that choice will be consistent
with attitudes. Experiment 1 explored the consequences of
the selective consideration of a focal alternative on choice,
willingness to pay, and attitudes toward brands belonging to a
EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION 205
particular choice category. Experiment 2 clarified how selec-
tive consideration influenced attitudes. Specifically, the
purpose of this experiment was to demonstrate that selective
consideration changed attitudes themselves versus merely in-
creasing the accessibility of the attitude toward the focal al-
ternative. Experiment 3 explored the potential of selective
consideration to decrease attitude–decision consistency and
demonstrated that the initial attitude toward a focally consid-
ered choice option was a moderator of the selective consider-
ation effect.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 explored the effects of selectively considering
one option from a choice set on decision making from the set.
We predicted that the brand that was the focus of consider-
ation would be more likely to be chosen than nonfocal brands
and that participants would report a higher willingness to pay
for the focal brand. The experiment also explored the process
by which selective consideration may influence choice. Spe-
cifically, we expected that selective consideration would
have implications for relative attitudes toward category alter-
natives such that the focal option would be evaluated more fa-
vorably than nonfocal brands. The hypotheses (H1, H2, and
H3) tested in this experiment, then, were the following:
H1: Participants will be more likely to choose a focally
considered alternative than nonfocal alternatives.
H2: Participants will be willing to pay more for a focally
considered alternative than nonfocal alternatives.
H3: Attitudes toward a focally considered alternative will
be more positive than attitudes toward nonfocal alter-
natives.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five undergraduates participated
in exchange for extra course credit. Students participated in-
dividually and were randomly assigned to an experimental
condition.
Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants
were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate con-
sumers’ attitudes toward charitable organizations and their
decisions when they decide to give to a charity. Participants
were told that their first task would be to rate one charity that
would be randomly selected. The experimenter relayed that
one purpose of the study was to obtain specific ratings of sev-
eral charities but that each participant would rate only one
charity in the interest of time. After receiving these initial in-
structions, participants were shown a spinner board that con-
tained the names of four charities that each were previously
206 POSAVAC, SANBONMATSU, HO
determined in a pilot study to be regarded favorably. Partici-
pants then spun the spinner to select a charity to rate. Partici-
pants’ use of the spinner to randomly select their focal charity
precluded any possibility that participants would perceive
that there was anything unique from the experimenters’ per-
spective about the focal charity compared to the nonfocal
charities. Accordingly, the use of a spinner reduced the likeli-
hood of demand characteristics in participants’ responses.
The experimenter then asked participants to provide several
ratings of the focal charity (e.g., “As a whole, how important
are the functions served by the [focal charity]?” “What is your
attitude towards the [focal charity]?”).
After the selective consideration manipulation, partici-
pants’ relative attitudes toward each of the charities were
measured. Participants were given a list of the four charities
and asked to rank order their preferences after reading
through the entire list. Participants were asked to read through
the list so that a consideration-sets explanation of the results
would be untenable (i.e., because all four options would have
been present in the consideration set). Next, the experimenter
asked the participants to suppose that they were going to
make a donation to one of the four charities they previously
rated and to indicate their choice. To increase the realism of
the choice task, participants were instructed that the charity
chosen most by participants would receive a donation (we did
make a charitable donation of $150 after the completion of
data collection). Finally, participants were asked to imagine
that they were going to give a donation to charity and to indi-
cate how much they personally would be willing to pay to
each of the four charities on the list.
After the dependent variables were collected, participants
were probed for suspicion, debriefed, given extra credit, and
excused.
Results and Discussion
The primary analysis of this experiment explored whether the
focal option was more likely to be chosen than nonfocal op-
tions. A goodness-of-fi t test demonstrated that more partici-
pants chose the focal option (12 chose the focal option, 13
chose a nonfocal option) than would be expected by chance
(i.e., 6.25 choices of the focal option, 18.75 choices of the
nonfocal option), c2(1, N = 25) = 7.05, p = .008. Thus, H1 was
supported. Next, we calculated the percentage of partici-
pants’ intended contributions allocated to the focal charity
compared to their total contribution intention. H2 was sup-
ported, as the percentage of the total contribution that was al-
located to the focal charity (39.44%) was greater than ex-
pected if the manipulation was ineffectual (i.e., 100%/4, or
25%), t(24) = 2.65, p = .014.
We expected that selective focus on a charity would bias
choice in its favor because attitudes toward the focal charity
would be more favorable than attitudes toward nonfocal op-
tions. To explore the potential of selective consideration to in-
crease the relative positivity of attitudes toward the focal op-
tion, we compared the average attitude toward the focal
option with the expected attitude if the focus manipulation
was ineffectual. Because there were four charities on the list,
the expected ranked attitude toward a randomly selected
charity would be 2.5 if the manipulation did not influence atti-
tudes. The average attitude toward the focal option was 1.76,
which was significantly more favorable than 2.5, t(24) = 4.00,
p < .001.
Taken together, the results of this experiment clearly dem-
onstrate that simply thinking about a focal brand may bias
choice in its favor. Moreover, willingness to pay for a focal al-
ternative may be higher than willingness to pay for nonfocal
alternatives. The data suggest that these choice effects occur
because the structure of preference within the category may
change if one brand receives selective consideration. Spe-
cifically, attitudes toward the focal brand may become more
positive relative to other choice options that do not receive
such consideration.
A limitation of this experiment regards the rank-order atti-
tude measure. Although the focal option was ranked higher
than nonfocal options, there are two competing explanations
for this effect. The mechanism we would like to suggest is
that thinking about a focal option causes consumers to orga-
nize information in memory regarding that option, thereby
leading to a polarization of attitudes. In turn, the resulting atti-
tude becomes more positive than attitudes toward nonfocal
options, which influences choices in the favor of the focal op-
tion. The competing explanation is that thinking about a focal
object simply increases the accessibility of the attitude to-
ward the focal option but that the attitude itself does not
change (i.e., the extremity of the attitude stays the same). If
the accessibility of the attitude toward the focal option is in-
creased, the attitude may be more likely to direct decision
making, which is consistent with the results we obtained (cf.
Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989). We conducted a second
experiment to explore this question.
EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to more fully understand
the process by which selective consideration influences atti-
tudes. More specifically, Experiment 2 was conducted to
demonstrate that the attitude toward a focal brand actually be-
comes more favorable, versus simply becoming more acces-
sible, as a result of selective consideration. Some have argued
that thought is equivalent to rehearsal of an attitude (Judd &
Brauer, 1995), rehearsal has been shown to increase the ac-
cessibility of an attitude (Fazio, 1995), and highly accessible
attitudes are more likely to guide behavior than less accessi-
ble attitudes (Fazio, 1995; Fazio et al., 1989). Although selec-
tive consideration of an alternative may indeed make atti-
tudes toward it more accessible, we expected that selective
consideration would lead the attitude toward a focal alterna-

tive to actually become more positive. As discussed earlier,
consumers’ initial conceptions of an object may bias subse-
quent thinking about it because evidence consistent with the
initial attitude is likely to be generated, ambiguous informa-
tion is likely to be perceived to be consistent with the initial
attitude, and information inconsistent with the initial attitude
may be discounted. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the
extremity of the attitude toward a focally considered brand
would increase following a manipulation of selective focus:
H4: Attitudes toward a focally considered alternative will
become more extreme as a result of focal consider-
ation.
A secondary goal of the study was to replicate the selective
consideration effect on attitudes within a different product
category.
Method
Participants. Eighty-nine students in an introductory
marketing class participated in exchange for extra credit. Stu-
dents participated in large group administrations.
Procedure. This experiment took place in two sessions
that were separated by a week. The purpose of the first session
was to measure participants’ attitudes toward four fast food
restaurants and four charities. The alternatives included in
this experiment were generally popular, well-known, and
liked brands. Participants were given lists of objects belong-
ing to a variety of categories, including the two categories of
interest, and were asked to indicate their attitudes on 9-point
Likert-type scales ranging from –4 (dislike very much) to 4
(like very much). After indicating their attitudes toward the
items in each product category, participants were excused.
In the second session, participants were told that the exper-
imenter was interested in more specific evaluations of some
of the items they rated in the first session. Participants were
further told that in the interests of saving time (the experiment
was conducted in a class), they would each be asked to evalu-
ate only one restaurant and one charity that would be ran-
domly determined. The experimenter relayed that the
questionnaires about to be passed out to students contained
different items to be rated and that although only one exem-
plar from each category would be rated by each student, all
the exemplars would be rated by some students. These in-
structions minimized the possibility that participants would
respond in accordance with experimental demand. The
packet given to participants contained the name of one restau-
rant and one charity. Participants were asked to think about
the service, the food items, and the overall experience of eat-
ing at the focal restaurant. Participants were asked to think
about the focal charity in the same way they did in Experi-
EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION 207
ment 1. Following rating attributes of the focal charity and
restaurant, participants completed an attitude measure similar
to the one they completed in the first experimental session.
After responding to the attitude measure, participants were
debriefed and excused.
Results and Discussion
Analyses focused on exploration of the hypothesis that selec-
tive focus on an alternative would increase the positivity of
participants’ attitudes toward the focal alternative. The mean
attitudes toward the focal alternative and nonfocal alterna-
tives considered together are presented in Table 1.
For both of the product categories, we conducted 2 × 2
completely within-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
of average attitudes. Focus (focal alternative vs. nonfocal al-
ternatives) and time (premanipulation vs. postmanipulation)
served as the independent variables. The ANOVA of the res-
taurant data revealed a significant effect of time such that atti-
tudes were more positive after the selective focus
manipulation, F(1, 86) = 12.63, p = .001. There was no main
effect of focus, F(1, 86) < 1. Importantly and consistent with
predictions, the interaction between focus and time was sig-
nificant, F(1, 86) = 6.27, p = .014. To explore the nature of the
interaction, a contrast was calculated that directly assessed
whether attitudes toward the focal alternative became more
positive as a result of the selective focus manipulation. This
contrast was a within-subjects t test that compared the change
in attitudes between Time 1 and Time 2 as a function of focus.
This analysis showed that attitudes toward the focal option
became more positive over time than did attitudes toward
nonfocal options, t(86) = 2.50, p = .014.
Results for the charities closely mirrored the restaurant re-
sults. The ANOVA of the charity data revealed a significant
effect of time such that attitudes were more positive after the
selective focus manipulation, F(1, 85) = 55.65, p < .001. There
was no main effect of focus, F(1, 85) < 1. As expected, there
was a significant interaction between focus and time, F(1, 85)
= 8.17, p = .005. A contrast demonstrated that attitudes toward
the focal option became more positive over time than did atti-
tudes toward nonfocal options, t(85) = 2.86, p = .005.
Taken together, the results for charities and restaurants
clearly demonstrate that the attitude toward an alternative can
TABLE 1
Mean Attitudes Toward Focal and Nonfocal Alternatives
Premanipulation and Postmanipulation: Experiment 2
Premanipulation Postmanipulation
Restaurants
Focal 0.57 1.23
Nonfocal 0.68 0.91
Charities
Focal 1.71 2.69
Nonfocal 1.90 2.48
208 POSAVAC, SANBONMATSU, HO
change as a result of selective consideration. Although selec-
tive focus may indeed increase the accessibility of an attitude,
the extremity of the attitude (i.e., the attitude itself) also
changes when consumers selectively consider a focal option.
These findings also clarify where the “action” is in the se-
lective consideration effect. The selective consideration ef-
fect occurs because attitudes toward the focal brand become
more positive, not because attitudes toward nonfocal alterna-
tives become more moderate.
EXPERIMENT 3
The first aim of Experiment 3 was to explore the potential of
selective consideration to influence attitude–decision consis-
tency. If a consumer is prompted to consider an alternative
that he or she likes best, the likelihood of choice of the most
favored option may increase, and accordingly, attitude–deci-
sion consistency may also be higher. Thus
H5: Selective focus on the alternative from a set that a par-
ticipant likes best will increase the likelihood of that
option being chosen and increase attitude–decision
consistency.
If consumers focally consider an option that is liked but is
initially not the most preferred option within a choice cate-
gory, attitude–decision consistency may be disrupted if the
consumer becomes more likely to choose the focal option. If
an option that is not the most preferred but is nevertheless
liked is focally considered, consumers may come to prefer
that option after the cognitive organization of evaluative in-
formation that focal consideration engenders. In this case, a
decision made after focal consideration may be inconsistent
with a consumer’s attitudes measured before focal consider-
ation. Accordingly, we expected that the following hypothe-
sis would bear true:
H6: Selective focus on a preferred but not most preferred
option will lead to an increase in the likelihood of the
focal option being chosen and will accordingly reduce
attitude–decision consistency because the previously
most preferred option will be less likely to be chosen.
The second purpose of the experiment was the exploration
of the potential of the initial attitude toward a focally consid-
ered option to bound the selective consideration effect. If the
initial attitude toward a subsequently considered focal option
is negative, focal consideration will result in the organization
of the negative evaluative beliefs and experiences that con-
tributed to the initial overall negative attitude. Accordingly,
focally considering an initially disliked option should not in-
crease the likelihood of that option being chosen. This analy-
sis suggests the following hypothesis:
H7: The selective consideration effect will not obtain
when the initial attitude toward the focal option is
negative.
A final purpose of Experiment 3 was to show effects of se-
lective consideration on choice in a different product category
than charities (i.e., vs. attitudes alone as in Experiment 2).
Method
Participants.
One hundred two students participated in the experiment in
exchange for extra course credit and the promise of a $1 res-
taurant coupon to be given after completion of the experi-
ment. Students participated individually and were randomly
assigned to condition.
Procedure. The experiment took place in two experi-
mental sessions separated by a week. On arrival at the first ex-
perimental session, participants were instructed that they
would be asked to complete several questionnaires regarding
demographic information and consumer preferences. The
first questionnaire contained basic demographic items and
items asking whether or not participants owned particular
products. Participants were also asked to indicate to which
media sources they were routinely exposed. The purpose of
this questionnaire was to distract participants from the true
nature of the experiment. After completing these items, par-
ticipants were asked to rank order their attitudes toward ob-
jects belonging to a variety of categories. The category of in-
terest in this experiment was fast food restaurants, and the
restaurants included were Arby’s, McDonald’s, Kentucky
Fried Chicken, and Burger King. Other categories included as
distractors included long-distance phone companies, laundry
detergents, local TV stations, soda pop, and automobiles. Af-
ter completing all the attitude measures, participants were
asked to complete a bogus consumer preferences survey. Af-
ter this survey was completed, a second experimental session
was scheduled, and participants were excused.
On arrival at the second experimental session, participants
completed additional bogus questionnaires and were then
told that the experimenters were interested in participants’
evaluations of the attributes of either fast food restaurants (the
selective consideration conditions) or soft drinks (the control
condition). In the selective consideration conditions, partici-
pants were asked to think about and rate several attributes of
one fast food restaurant. In the control condition, participants
rated attributes of a soft drink. A computer program was writ-
ten that ostensibly randomly determined which restaurant or
soft drink each participant would rate. Participants pressed a
key on a computer, and the phrase “Randomizing, please wait
a moment” appeared on the monitor. Then, the names of all of
the options (i.e., restaurants or soft drinks) scrolled quickly

across a box in the center of the monitor. After a few seconds,
the computer stopped scrolling and listed the name of the res-
taurant or soft drink the participant would be asked to rate.
This procedure was done to give participants the idea that the
determination of object to rate was truly random, thus reduc-
ing the possibility of demand effects. In actuality, the specific
object rated by participants was determined prior to their ar-
rival. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four
conditions. In the selective consideration conditions, partici-
pants were randomly assigned to consider either the restau-
rant they rated first, second, or fourth in the initial attitude
measurement. Participants were then asked to think about at-
tributes of the selected restaurant read by the experimenter
and then to indicate their perception of each attribute. For ex-
ample, participants were asked to think about the food options
offered by the focal restaurant and issues such as the quality
of service and so on. Participants in the control condition
were not asked to rate a restaurant but instead were asked to
rate a soft drink. The selection of the soft drink was also done
by computer, and although the selection process appeared
random to the participants, in actuality the computer was pro-
grammed to select 7-UP for each control participant.
After participants considered the attributes of a focal res-
taurant or soft drink, the experimenter announced that the ex-
periment was over but offered to give participants a $1
coupon to the fast food restaurant of their choice as a token of
the experimenter’s gratitude for the participant’s time. The
experimenter then handed out a sheet that contained the
names of four restaurants for which coupons were available.
This list contained the four restaurants previously rank or-
dered by participants in the first session of the experiment.
Each participant relayed his or her coupon choice, which was
noted by the experimenter. Because we had difficulty obtain-
ing $1 coupons from each of the four restaurants, we simply
gave participants $1 and explained that we did not have a cou-
pon for their selected restaurant.
After indicating their choice, participants were given extra
credit, probed for suspicion, debriefed, and excused.
Results and Discussion
The first analysis explored whether attitudes were related to
choice across the conditions (see Table 2). We compared the
average attitude to what the expected value of the attitude
would be if attitudes and choice were unrelated. If attitudes
and choice were unrelated, the average attitude toward the
chosen restaurant would be 2.5 (i.e., the average of the ranks
of the four restaurants). Analysis revealed a strong tendency
for participants to choose a preferred option, as the average
attitude toward the chosen restaurant (M = 1.3) was more fa-
vorable than 2.5, t(101) = 20.95, p < .001.
We expected that focal consideration of the previously
most preferred restaurant would result in an increased likeli-
hood that it would be chosen. However, this effect did not ob-
EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION 209
tain because of a strong ceiling effect in choice; participants
in the control condition and those who selectively considered
the most preferred restaurant demonstrated a strong tendency
to choose their most preferred option. Accordingly, there was
not a significant difference between these conditions, c2(1, N
= 52) = .13, ns, and H5 was not supported. We would have
liked to have obtained results supportive of the notion that se-
lective focus on a most preferred option would increase the
likelihood of its being chosen. Without this result, we cannot
make a strong statement about the potential of selective focus
to increase attitude–decision consistency.
The most important analysis in this experiment explored
the proposition that selectively considering the second most
preferred option would sway choice in favor of that option
and away from the option that initially was most preferred.
Consistent with expectations, participants who selectively
considered their second most preferred option were over
three times more likely to select it versus the control condi-
tion. This difference was significant, c2(1, N = 53) = 4.65, p =
.031. Unsurprisingly, these participants were also more likely
to choose their second most preferred option than participants
who were prompted to consider their most preferred option,
c2(1, N = 53) = 4.65, p = .031. These results, then, provide
substantial support for H6.
This finding is important because it speaks to the ubiquity
of the selective consideration effect. Participants’ decision
was an easy one; there were only four alternatives, which
were all present at both the time of initial attitude measure-
ment and the time of decision speaking. When no selective
consideration was prompted, participants were extremely
likely to choose the alternative they previously indicated they
preferred most. However, when the second-rated restaurant
was selectively considered, choice was strongly swayed in its
favor. Accordingly, our data demonstrate a strong selective
consideration effect, which is striking because the experi-
mental manipulation was relatively subtle.
The other implication of H6 is that selective focus on a
liked option other than the most preferred option can re-
duce the likelihood of choosing the most preferred option.
Consistent with H6, participants who selectively consid-
ered their second most preferred option appeared to be less
likely to choose their previously most preferred option
than participants in the control condition, although this
TABLE 2
Chocie Incidence as a Function of the Attitude Toward the Focal
Restaurant: Experiment 3
Attitude Rank of Focal Restaurant
Preference Rank of Choice 1 2 4 Control
1 21 17 16 22
2 3 10 6 3
3 1 0 1 0
4 1 0 0 1
n 26 27 23 26
210 POSAVAC, SANBONMATSU, HO
trend was only marginally significant, c2(1, N = 53) =
3.20, p = .07.
Finally, we predicted that the initial attitude toward the fo-
cal option would bound the selective consideration effect.
Consistent with H7, consideration of the worst alternative in
the choice set (in this case, the restaurant rated fourth) did not
increase the likelihood of choosing it (no participants in this
condition chose the focal option) and had no disruptive ef-
fects on the probability that the most preferred option would
be chosen, c2(1, N = 49) = 1.58, ns.
In sum, the results of the third experiment show that (a) se-
lective consideration of a focal alternative can reduce atti-
tude–decision consistency if the focal option is relatively
inferior but nevertheless liked and (b) an important boundary
condition of the selective consideration effect is the initial atti-
tude toward the focal option. It should be noted that our discus-
sion of attitude–decision consistency is based on a comparison
of choice to the attitude measures taken during the first experi-
mental session. This is not to say that participants who consid-
ered the option they ranked second exhibited
attitude–decision inconsistency with respect to their attitudes
after the manipulation. Indeed, it is our contention that these
effects obtained because attitudes changed as a result of the
manipulation and that choice was commensurate with restau-
rant attitudes participants held after the manipulation.
Importantly, the findings of Experiment 3 rule out a de-
mand effect explanation. If demand characteristics were
guiding choice, selective consideration of the least pre-
ferred option would have increased the likelihood of it be-
ing chosen.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the three experiments clearly show that
simply focusing on one alternative from a category can
lead to changes in subsequent choice behavior because the
evaluation of the focal alternative becomes more extreme.
When consumers selectively consider one focal alternative
from a set of alternatives belonging to some product cate-
gory, they may be more likely to choose the focal alterna-
tive (Experiments 1 and 3) and be willing to allocate more
money to the focal alternative (Experiment 1) compared to
nonfocal alternatives. These choice effects occur because
consumers may perceive the focal alternative to be more at-
tractive compared to other alternatives in the decision cate-
gory following selective consideration (Experiment 1), in
part because attitudes toward the focal alternative may be-
come more positive (Experiment 2). It should be noted that
these attitudinal effects do not result from the consumer
learning any new information about the focal brand. In-
stead, the act of simply considering a brand may invoke
judgmental and inferential processes that result in an ini-
tially held attitude becoming more extreme following se-
lective consideration.
The selective consideration effect is likely to obtain only
when the initial attitude toward the focal alternative is suffi-
ciently positive. Indeed, if a focal alternative is initially per-
ceived to be among the worst in the choice set, selective
consideration is unlikely to result in more favorable attitudes
toward and choice of the focal alternative (Experiment 3). We
suggest, however, that in most product categories selective
consideration is likely to be advantageous for most brands be-
cause most consumer products on the market are favorably
evaluated (or they would not remain on the market long).
Numerous studies in marketing and psychology have
shown that attitudes are typically good predictors of con-
sumer behavior (e.g., Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979; Fazio et
al., 1989; Netemeyer & Bearden, 1992). This research shows,
however, that in some cases, selective consideration may re-
duce the consistency between attitudes and decisions (Exper-
iment 3). Specifically, if a consumer selectively considers an
option that is liked but is not the most preferred option in the
choice category, the likelihood that it will be chosen in-
creases, and the likelihood of the previously most preferred
option being chosen decreases. This finding is important be-
cause it delineates a situation in which measured preferences
may not be reflected in actual choice.
Marketers promoting the best liked brand in a category
should take pause from these results. It is often assumed
that if consumers have relatively more favorable attitudes
toward one brand than others in the choice category, all
other things being equal (e.g., distribution, sales promo-
tion), this brand will be the most purchased brand. How-
ever, this research shows that a brand that is not the most
preferred may come to be the most preferred simply as a re-
sult of receiving selective consideration. Accordingly, the
usual attitude-to-behavior process, whereby the most pre-
ferred brand is chosen, may be interrupted if consumers
give selective consideration to a competitor. It may be im-
portant for marketers of the most liked brand to encourage
consideration of their brand and to discourage selective
consideration of competitors. Of course, this is one benefit
of advertising: It encourages the selective consideration of
the target brand.
In contrast to this note of caution to those promoting
top-rated brands, this research suggests an opportunity for
marketers of brands that are liked but are not the most liked
brand in the choice category. Marketers of such a brand may
typically assume that product refinement or aggressive pro-
motion is necessary to increase purchase likelihood. How-
ever, this research suggests the far simpler intervention of
encouraging selective consideration of the target brand. Con-
sumers may be capable of “confirming” that they like any one
of a number of brands within a choice category “best.” Sim-
ply being led to consider the attributes of one brand from a
category can lead to more positive attitudes toward the focal
brand, a more favorable ordinal position for the focal brand
with respect to preference within the choice category, and an
increased likelihood of choice of the focal brand.

It may be the case that consideration of the most preferred
brand within a category can increase the likelihood that it will
be chosen and, accordingly, increase attitude–decision con-
sistency. Unfortunately, there was a strong ceiling effect in
the Experiment 3 data such that nearly all participants in the
control condition chose the restaurant they rated as most pre-
ferred. Accordingly, it was impossible to determine if selec-
tively considering the most preferred brand might increase
the likelihood of it being chosen.
Given that selective consideration can have significant ef-
fects on attitudes and choice, it is important to consider when
selective consideration is likely to occur. Prior research sug-
gests that selective (vs. comparative) processing is common;
rather than consider all possible information and alternatives,
people routinely selectively process information because
such processing is easier and quicker compared to compara-
tive processing. Nevertheless, consumers clearly sometimes
do engage in comparative processing. If consumers are
highly involved in the decision and have ample opportunity to
engage in careful decision making, they may be likely to en-
gage in comparative processing. Moreover, consumers with
expertise within a product category may be less likely than
novice consumers to selectively consider choice options.
Our data are the first to show how selective consideration
of a brand can affect choice by changing consumers’ attitudes
toward decision options within a category. Specifically, we
focused on the process by which selective consideration in-
fluences decision making by increasing the relative
favorability of attitudes toward the focal brand compared to
other brands in the choice set. There may be other mecha-
nisms through which the selective consideration of a brand
can affect choice. For example, in a memory-based decision
context, selective consideration of a focal brand may affect
choice by increasing the likelihood that the brand will be gen-
erated from memory prior to decision making.
An alternate account of the choice results of Experiments 1
and 3 is that selective consideration of a focal alternative in-
creased the likelihood that it would be included in the consid-
eration set and that it would be subsequently chosen (vs.
attitude change as the driver of the obtained results; cf.
Nedungadi, 1990; Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 1985). Several
aspects of the methodology and design of the experiments un-
dermine the viability of this possibility. In both Experiments
1 and 3, four options were clearly specified and salient in the
choice context (i.e., participants chose from uncluttered lists),
thus reducing the likelihood that consideration sets were
smaller than the set of presented options. Moreover, in Exper-
iment 1, participants were explicitly asked to review all the
charities before making a decision. The most compelling evi-
dence countering the consideration sets account is the Experi-
ment 3 finding that selectively considering the second most
preferred restaurant increased the likelihood of it being cho-
sen. Nedungadi made the important point that the presence of
an inferior brand in the consideration set was not sufficient to
cause the brand to be chosen if a superior brand was also pres-
EFFECTS OF SELECTIVE CONSIDERATION 211
ent in the set. In Experiment 3, the restaurant that participants
rated first was conspicuous in the decision context, but many
participants who selectively considered their second most
preferred option chose it instead. Accordingly, in this case, at-
titudes within the category must have changed in favor of the
option previously rated second.
It is also important to note that demand characteristics can-
not plausibly account for the choice and attitudinal effects re-
ported in this study. Although it is not clear that participants
would have guessed the direction of the hypotheses even if
they perceived that particular options were selected by the ex-
perimenters to be focal, several aspects of the methodology
and results are strongly indicative that demand characteristics
were not operating. In Experiment, 1 participants themselves
randomly determined which option would be the focus of
consideration through the use of a spinner board. In Experi-
ment 2, participants were informed that each option from both
product categories would be rated by some of the students in
the class. Accordingly, these participants would not have per-
ceived that there was anything special about the focal options
in their packets compared to nonfocal options because each
option was focal for some students. In Experiment 3, we ex-
pected that the computerized selection procedure would lead
participants to conclude that the option selected to be the fo-
cus of comparison was determined randomly. The finding
that the restaurant rated last in the first session was not chosen
in the second experimental session when it was the focal op-
tion confirms our notions about the utility of the computer-
ized selection procedure and the absence of demand
characteristics.
Which Brands Are Likely to Receive
Consideration and How to Encourage
Selective Consideration of a Brand
The optimal strategy for encouraging selective consideration
of a target brand may vary as a function of whether the brand
is typically chosen in a context that contains or does not con-
tain specified alternatives and whether the purchase inten-
tion is set before or while the consumer is at the location in
which purchase is made. If alternatives are not specified in
context or the purchase intention is set prior to the consumer
visiting the store, an important determinant of whether or not
a brand will be considered is how strongly it is linked to the
superordinate category in the consumer’ minds (Posavac,
Sanbonmatsu, & Fazio, 1997). To the extent that the ob-
ject–category association is strong, the object is likely to be
highly accessible and easily generated from memory and to
receive consideration. Strong object–category associations
may be developed through repetition of the association be-
tween the target brand and the category, for example, with
branded merchandise, the utilization of memorable taglines
or jingles and an increase in ad volume. Another strategy is
the use of mystery ads, which have been shown to engender
212 POSAVAC, SANBONMATSU, HO
strong object–category associations (Fazio, Herr, & Powell,
1992).
When the choice intention is set in the presence of many
alternatives (e.g., in a store or online), the salience of brands
will help determine the set of brands that are given consider-
ation. Well-researched variables such as brand name and the
packaging of the brand can be used to attract consumers’ at-
tention. Moreover, this research suggests that marketers’ ef-
forts to secure prime shelf space for their brands may be well
rewarded if consumers are likely to quickly notice the desired
brands while shopping.
It bears repeating that regardless of the specifics of the
purchase context, the effects of selective consideration de-
scribed in this article will only obtain if thinking about a fo-
cal brand leads to a more favorable brand attitude. If
consumers do not have sufficient brand knowledge or if
their knowledge regarding a brand is negatively valenced,
encouraging selective consideration is unlikely to convey
competitive advantage. If, however, consumers do favor-
ably regard a brand, encouraging selective consideration
may help raise the brand above the competitive clutter and
increase purchase likelihood.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The first two authors contributed equally to this study. Re-
search funding provided by the Simon School of Business is
gratefully acknowledged. The authors wish to thank Dawn
Iacobucci, Eric Johnson, and an anonymous reviewer for
their helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to Eric Ander-
son, Rachel Barnes, Amber Eastburn, and Ashley Hodder for
assistance in data collection.
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