Krivenko vs Register of Deeds: It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the

Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, finally, on
June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly
agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the
sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a
legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that
private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure
would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also
permissible under the Constitution.

International Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs University of the Philippines: When it ceded
and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from
the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license
of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and
title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the
absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer
of the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it.
The foregoing disposes of the contention of petitioner that R.A. No. 3990 does not grant the UP
the authority to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of its concession insofar
as the property of the UP within it is concerned. Its argument that it has acquired vested rights
to operate its concession under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry is
preposterous. The grant under R.A. No. 3990 is transfer of absolute, full and entire ownership
which leaves no room for a strict interpretation against the grantee, the UP. The reservation
therein made is in favor of the private party pursuant to the license, which is nevertheless
protected. It is the concession in favor of the petitioner which should, on the contrary, be bound
by the rule.

Republic vs Alconaba: Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since 12 June 1945. We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject
property was classified as within the alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981,
and hence, possession by respondents' predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be
considered. As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on September 28, 1981"
could not have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 September
1981. That date obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was
certified. Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Project No.
23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December 1925 by
the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable as early as of
that date. There is nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is the date of the
approval of such project or the date of the classification of the subject property as disposable
and alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of
land must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence. In a nutshell, the respondents did
not have in their favor an imperfect title over the land subject of the application at the time MTC
LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court. They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12
June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12
June 1945 or earlier.

Acap vs CA: No, the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights relied upon by respondent
was not mode of acquiring ownership. An asserted right or claim to ownership over a thing
arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership
over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law.
Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. In other
words, possession of title is not sufficient to claim ownership. The thing must have been
acquired by some mode.

Estate of Rodriguez vs Republic: We upheld such provision in De Luna v. Abrigo as it is in the

nature of an agreement granting a party to rescind a contract in case of breach, without need of
going to court; "upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance with the
conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect." However, if the donee challenges the propriety thereof, the Court can
conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not.39 The judicial intervention is not for
the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by reason of the parties' agreement but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that all actions upon a written contract shall be
brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Petitioner's complaint for
revocation of the donation therefore has not yet prescribed since the cause of action accrued
only upon the alleged failure of the Republic to comply with any or all of the conditions of the
donation. Hence, the estate's complaint filed in 2007 is well within the prescriptive period, which
is 10 years from the lapse of the period within which the Republic could file a motion for revival
of judgment of Civil Case No. P-86 in 2005. As correctly ruled by the CA, the cause of action
accrued only from the time of the alleged violation of the Republic, that is, its failure to comply
with its obligation to not lease, let, encumber or dispose any portion of the donated property,
i.e., its failure to move for execution or revival of judgment of Civil Case No. P-86, which
resulted in the continuous occupation of the informal settlers on a portion of the donated
property.

In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of conditional donation did not ppressly state a
period of restriction on the Republic's right to dispose of the donated property. It simply stated
that the Republic could not lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the donated property
without the prior and express knowledge of the donor as it was the latter's intention to devote
the use of the donated property exclusively for the mental hospital. Applying by analogy the
Roman Catholic Archbishop case, the donor could not unduly restrict the right of the donee to
dispose the donated property perpetually or for an unreasonable period of time. The prohibition
in the deed of donation that the Republic cannot lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the
donated property without specifying the duration of the restriction should be declared as an
illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code as it is
contrary to public policy. Although the parties did not agree on the period of validity of the
restriction as in Roman Catholic Archbishop, the same may be viewed as perpetual or
permanent which constitutes undue restriction for unreasonable period of time.

Patenia-Kinatac-an vs Patenia Decena: Whether or not a defective notarization would render

the donation void? We note that the prevailing law at the time of notarization was the Revised
Administrative Code which mandate a notary-public to record in his notarial register the
necessary information regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. There is nothing in
the law that obligates the parties to a notarized document to sign the notarial register. This
requirement was subsequently included only in Section 3, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. The present deed of donation, however, was executed and acknowledged before the
notary public on January 18, 2002, when there is no rule yet that requires the parties to sign the
notarial register. Indeed, the new rules cannot be given retroactive effect if they would work
injustice or impair vested rights. In sum, the deed of donation between Spouses Ramiro and
Amada Patenia and the respondents is valid and compliant with the solemnities in Article 749 of
the Civil Code.

NAPOCOR vs Delta: The Court adheres to the findings of fact consistent with both the RTC
and the CA that the debit made by NAPOCOR was unilaterally done, and that NAPOCOR's
supply of fuel to Delta P was an act of gratuity. Even if the Court would rely on its own perusal of
the records, it is clear that NAPOCOR's motivation for supplying the fuel was the power crisis in
Palawan and the request of the local government to intervene. While this may not be as
absolute an act of liberality as NAPOCOR had a personal agenda for doing so, such reason
does not take away from the fact that the supplying of fuel was done without the annexing of
any condition to be complied with by Delta P. There was not even an annotation in any
document that Delta P would have to pay any amount back, nor any indication whatsoever that
the supply was a mere loan. Absent any these, for whatever reason, the Court agrees to the
finding that the supplying of fuel was a donation. NAPOCOR's grant was not forced, did not
arise from any compulsion exerted upon it, and was not impelled by any mandate. Even arguing
that NAPOCOR was constrained to supply the fuel at the request of the local government, there
was nothing to hinder it from annotating or stating even in brief terms that this payment would
be a loan meant to be paid back once Delta P reaches financial stability.

Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Assoociation, Inc vs Province of Camarines

Sur: The provision clearly imposes a burden on the donee which is onerous or burdensome in
character — CASTEA should use the donated property for the construction of a building to be
owned and to be constructed within one year from September 28, 1966 (date of execution of the
Deed of Donation) by CASTEA to house the office to be used by it, in connection with its
functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association. The prestation to construct a building is
undoubtedly modal in nature as it imposed a prestation or obligation on CASTEA. Thus, the
donation to CASTEA can properly be classified as a modal donation (because of CASTEA's
obligation to construct the required building) with a prestation not to alienate/encumber and an
automatic revocation clause. The donation may also be classified as an onerous donation
because there is a burden imposed on the donee in the absence of proof that the burden or
charge (cost of the building) is superior or greater than the value of the donated 600 square
meters lot at the time of the donation in September 1966. Given the foregoing disquisition on
Article 764 and the pertinent provisions on obligations and contracts, the Court takes the
position that the violation of CASTEA in entering into the 20-year lease with Bodega Glassware
should not be taken in isolation with the other prestations and conditions in the Deed of
Donation, especially the purpose of the donation. While under Article 764, a single violation or
non-fulfillment is sufficient to revoke a donation based on the phrase "any of the conditions," its
application must be circumscribed within the rules on obligations and contracts wherein
substantial and fundamental breach as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement and substantial compliance are given due recognition and importance. Thus, a blind
literal application of Article 764 without due consideration and regard to the peculiar
circumstances of the donation at issue, bearing in mind the specific intention or purpose of the
donor vis-a-vis the tangible benefits of the donation to the donee, is not adopted, bearing in
mind the harshness of the consequence of revocation. Thus, the perceived single violation by
CASTEA when weighed against its substantial compliance of the other "conditions" or
prestations of the donation and the avowed purpose of the donation is, as it should be,
considered insignificant to trigger the application of the automatic revocation clause.

Clemente vs Republic of the Philippines: We find that this action is not premature, and has
not been barred by prescription or laches. An action for reconveyance based on a violation of a
condition in a Deed of Donation should be instituted within ten (10) years from the time of such
violation. Moreover, an action to revoke a donation based on non-compliance of the condition
prescribes after four (4) years from such non-compliance. Thus, in both cases, to be able to
determine whether the action has prescribed, the time of non-compliance must first be
determined. This is because the failure to comply with the condition imposed will give rise to the
cause of action against the obligor-donee, which is also the starting point of when to count the
prescriptive period. It is imperative to determine the period within which the donee has to
comply with the condition to construct a government hospital and use the site solely as a
hospital site, because it is only after such time that it can be determined with certainty that there
was a failure to comply with the condition. Without such determination, there is no way to
determine whether the donee failed to comply with its obligation, and consequently, whether the
prescriptive period to file an action has started to run. Prescription cannot set in if the period to
comply with the obligation cannot be determined with certainty. In this case, the Deed of
Donation is bereft of any period within which the donee should have complied with the condition
of constructing a government hospital. Thus, the action has not yet prescribed.

The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima vs Alzona: Was the donation to a non-existent
corporation validly made? Yes, this is because the donation was made to a corporation by
estoppel. According to Section 21 of the Corporation Code, one who assumes an obligation to
an ostensible corporation as such cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there
was in fact no corporation.

Province of Camarines Sur vs Bodega Glassware: he records show that CASTEA never
contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered
the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was
automatic and immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its
finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the
doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders nugatory the very essence of an
automatic revocation clause. Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner.

De Luna vs Abrigo: While Article 764 provides that actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
the provision does not apply to onerous contracts that provide for an automatic reversion
clause. In this case, the Deed provides for the automatic reversion of the donated area in case
of non-compliance with its conditions. This stipulation is a valid as it is not contrary to law,
moral, public order or policy (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1306). The stipulation is in the character of a
resolutory condition which cancels and rescinds the contract without need for judicial action.
Where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, judicial action is not for the purposes
of rescinding the contract but for the purposes of determining whether the extrajudicial
rescission had been proper. Thus, there is no need for judicial action for revocation under Article
764 in order to revoke the donation subject to this case. Being a written contract, the action to
enforce its terms prescribes in 10 years as provided under Article 1144[1].

Reyes vs Mosqueda: The trial court did not err in holding that the deed entitled “Donation
Mortis Causa” is in fact a donation inter vivos. These requisites are not present with respect to
Ursula’s deed. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the death of the
donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for himself to
maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately
after execution of the deed of donation. Thus, the donation is in fact in the nature of a donation
inter vivos.

Liguez vs CA: A donation with illegal cause may be given legal effect. Without question, the
donation was proven and established to have been based on an illegal cause. However, the
lower courts erred in holding that the in pari delicto rule applies as the rule presupposes equal
guilt. The facts however are more suggestive of seduction than of immoral bargaining. First,
Salvador was a man advanced in years and mature experience, while Conchita was only 16
when the donation was made. Second, the CA did not find that she was fully aware of the terms
of the bargain entered into by her parents. Third, her acceptance of the deed does not imply
knowledge of conditions and terms not set forth therein. Lastly, witnesses testified that it was
Conchita’s parents who insisted on the donation. That being said, only Salvador was barred
from raising illegality as a cause for revoking the donation. Since he is barred from raising said
cause of action, so are his heirs and assigns barred from raising illegality as basis to revoke the
donation made in favor of Conchita. Thus, the donation must be upheld as valid and effectual as
the deed itself is valid on its face.

Pershing Tan Queto vs CA: It was not proven that Restituta acquired the property by donation.
An oral donation inter vivos of land is void and without effect. Nor was there a donation mortis
causa as the formalities therefor were not complied with. Nor can it be sustained that Restituta’s
mother had contractually conveyed the same to her as part of Restituta’s hereditary share of the
estate because contractual transmission of future inheritance is forbidden.

Pijarillo vs IAC: Strict compliance with the formalities required by law should not be enjoined by
the Court if it would tend to work injustice. It is true that the third paragraph of Art. 633 (now
Article 749) provides that “If the acceptance is made, by separate public instrument, authentic
notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments.”
A strict interpretation of Article 633 (now Article 749) can lead to no other conclusion than the
annulment of the donation for being defective in form as urged by the petitioners. This would be
in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However, we find that
under the circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law
might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. In the
case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact
confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by
Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation
ineffective solely because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's
acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also
disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate
instrument dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.

Cruz vs CA: No, the donation should not be revoked. In case of the subsequent adoption of a
minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor
may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four years from the date of
adoption if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate
of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child (Civil Code, Articles 760, 761 and 763). The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements
prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be
adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment of donation does not
allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no
indication at all of the total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs CA: The donor cannot impose a restriction on
alienation or disposition of the donated property for 100 years as it is an undue restriction on the
donee’s ownership rights. Once a donation (inter vivos) is made, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in
the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy. A prohibition on the disposition of the donated property for 100 years is an
unreasonable restriction on an indispensable attribute of ownership. A condition prohibiting
disposition of the donated property cannot be perpetual or be for an unreasonable amount of
time

Eduarte vs CA: Crimes which are not classified as crimes against persons under the Revised
Penal Code may also be acts of ingratitude and form the basis of revocation of a donation. All
crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Any attempt to
categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is
unwarranted considering that crimes like illegal detention, threats, and coercion are considered
as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes
against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.

Quilala vs Alcantara: No. The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary
public does not render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another
part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in
its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public
in the acknowledgment is of no moment. The donee’s acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on
the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was therefore also made in a public instrument.

Hemedes vs CA: The Kasunduan made in favor of Enrique Hemedes is null and void because
the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of execution, having already been
transferred to his sister. Enrique failed to produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to
overcome the positive value of the “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion” – a notarized document. The mere denial of its execution by the donor will not
suffice for the purpose. Thus, the “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by
Reversion” made in favor of Maxima must be deemed to have transferred the property to
Maxima. Consequently, when Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what
she had earlier transferred to Maxima, she was no longer the owner thereof. Therefore, Enrique,
and his transferee Dominium, acquired no rights over the subject property.

Siguan vs Lim: In the instant case, the alleged debt of Lim in favor of Siguan was incurred in
August 1990, while the deed of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Siguan
cannot, therefore, be said to have been prejudiced or defrauded by such alienation. The Court is
not convinced with the allegation of the petitioner that the questioned deed was antedated to
make it appear that it was made prior to petitioner's credit. Notably, that deed is a public
document, it having been acknowledged before a notary public. As such, it is evidence of the
fact which gave rise to its execution and of its date, pursuant to Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, since the requirements for the rescission of a gratuitous contract
are not present in this case, petitioner's action must fail.

Noceda vs CA: Yes, a crime against the donor is sufficient to constitute an act of ingratitude,
including crimes againt the property of the donor, and is grounds for revoking a donation made.
It was established that Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by Directo but he
also fenced the whole area of the lot which belongs to Directo. Thus petitioners act of occupying
the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent
is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as
an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the
donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Heirs of Cesario Velasquez vs CA: The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino
spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10)
years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and
was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance
of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the
second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other
causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the
deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia
(Leoncia’s sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of
donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious. In view
of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties
sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and
therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no
co-ownership exists between private respondents and petitioners, we find no reason to discuss
the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition

Gonzales vs CA: Should the property subject of the deed of donation, which was not registered
when P.D. No. 27 took effect, be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer? No, the property
should not be excluded from the Option Land Transfer despite the fact that it was not registered.
It may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary
for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected, as in the case at bar.

Imperial vs CA: The ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious
donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of
Mateo vs. Lagua (29 SCRA 864), which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation
propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. Thus, the action prescribed
in January 8, 1972. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate
this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.

Republic vs Silim: No. The donation was properly accepted by the petitioner. Contrary to the
arguments of the respondents, it was already settled in Pajarillo v. IAC that the requirement that
the acceptance made in a separate instrument be noted on the original deed is not
indispensable when it is proven that the donor was made aware of such acceptance in another
manner. In this case, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was
executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the
donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan.
This knowledge already fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the
donee be communicated to the donor. Finally, BPS District Supervisor Gregorio Buendia did not
need a special power of attorney from the Republic of the Philippines to accept the donation
because he is expressly authorized to do so under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code
which provides that “Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the
Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever
demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
prohibited by law.

Gestapo vs CA: Being a valid donation inter vivos, it cannot be revoked without cause. The
conditions placed on the donation did not make it a donation mortis causa. In ascertaining the
intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The establishment of a
life-time usufruct in favor of the donor and the imposition of a restriction on the disposition of the
naked ownership during the lifetime of the donor-usufructuaries does not militate against the
transfer of ownership of the land to Mercedes in a donation inter vivos. These conditions show
that the donor intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties despite reserving
sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society. A valid
donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by
the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-
spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of revocation. While alleged, there is
no showing that Mercedes prohibited the donors from gathering coconuts. Even assuming that
Mercedes prevented the donor from gathering coconuts, this could hardly be considered an act
of ingratitude under Article 765 of the Civil Code. Nor does the filing of the petition for quieting of
title constitute ingratitude as she is merely asserting what she believed was her right under the
law.

Carinan vs Spouses Cueto: Esperanza sought financial assistance from her brother Gavino
Cueto, herein respondent. Thus, Gavino paid the obligations of Esperanza out of the conjugal
funds of the Sps. Cueto amounting to almost P1.3 Million. The Sps. Cueto alleged that Gavino
and Esperanza agreed that in exchange for Gavino’s help, she would execute a deed of sale
with pacto de retro in favor of the Sps. Cueto to guarantee her repayment of the substantial
financial assistance. As a result of Gavino’s help, the title to the property was transferred from
the GSIS to Esperana Carinan. Did the Sps. Cueto donate to Esperanza? No, the existence of a
donation is not proven. There was a clear agreement that Esperanza would return the amounts
which the Sps. Cueto spent for the acquisition, transfer, and renovation of the subject property.
The Sps. Cueto then reasonably expected to get their money back from Esperanza.
Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous
remained unsupported by records. In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money
paid by the respondents was actually a donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in
court a copy of a written deed of donation or a contract evincing such agreement.

Calanasan vs Spouses Dolorito: May the donation made in favor of Evelyn be revoked? No. It
may not be revoked. First, the Court must correct the Court of Appeals in that the donation is
not entirely onerous. The amount paid by Evelyn to redeem the property (P15,000.00) is far less
than the value of the property. Thus, it is only onerous to the extent of P15,000.00 but is
gratuitous as to the rest. Consequently, the CA erred in ruling that Article 765 is not applicable.
The donation may still be revoked on the ground of ingratitude as to the gratuitous portion. In
any event, the trial court is correct in holding that there was no ground for revocation as the
ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee but by her husband. Also, the allegedly
ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the person of the donor but to her sister.

Victoria vs Pidlaoan: There is a relatively simulated contract of sale. In this case, the facts
showed that Eufemia and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the
ownership of the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. The contents of
the "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad" evidence an unconditional sale of
property between Elma and Normita. Contrary to the petitioner’s arguments, there is no
evidence of any intention that the transfer of the lot was merely intended to secure a debt or to
grant a right to repurchase. Hence, there is no equitable mortgage on the property as
contemplated in Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Elma sold the entire property to Normita.

Heirs of Gozo vs Philippine Union Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist Church:
No, the Deed of Donation is not valid but not because of a lack of acceptance but because the
Sps. Gozo were not the owners of the property at the time of the donation. At the time of the
donation, the subject property was part of the inalienable public domain. It was only almost after
two decades later or on 5 October 1953 that the State ceded its right over the land in favor of
the Sps. Gozo. Thus, prior to such conferment of title, the Sps. Gozo possessed no right to
dispose the land which, by all intents and purposes, belongs to the State. It is an established
principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. It is true that
gratuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or a right but the term right must be
understood in a “proprietary” sense over which the possessor has jus disponendi. This is
because in true donations there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution
of his assets. Hence, the donation of the subject property which took place before October 5,
1953 is null and void
Municipality of Dasmariñas vs Campos: There is no question that Dr. Campos properly filed
the action for Revocation of Donation within the allowable time under the law. The first donation
between Dr. Campos and the NHA was a donation of an onerous nature, as it contained the
stipulation to build the 36-m-wide access road. Jurisprudence, including the C-J Yulo & Sons,
Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. case cited by the petitioners themselves, is
clear that donations of an onerous type are governed by the law on contracts, and not by the
law on donations. Being as such, under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, all actions upon a
written contract shall be brought within 10 years from accrual of the right of action, and herein,
the respondents-heirs' right of action only accrued when the NHA donated the subject property
to the Municipality of Dasmariñas, as this transfer effectively removed not only NHA's ability to
complete the access road based on the stipulation, but also precluded any move on the part of
the NHA to compel the transferee to finish the same.

Cardenas vs The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc.:
Neither can it be argued that CAMACOP has acquired the right to possess the subject property
by virtue of prescription or laches. According to Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
1529, "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession."

Tomakin vs Navares: Respondents Navares, having been in possession of and exercising acts
of dominion over the subject property as found by the CA, cannot be deemed to be guilty of
laches because they cannot be said to have omitted or neglected to assert and exercise their
rights as owner thereof.

James Eurem Realty Development Corp: No, the period for filing of Civil Case 5877 has not
yet prescribed. The Court notes that the RTC’s dismissal was triggered by the defenses raised
by the respondent in its answer. There was yet to be a trial on the merits but the RTC merely
relied on the averments in the complaint and answer and forthwith dismissed the case. On this
point, the Court has already ruled that the “affirmative defense of prescription does not
automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint. While trial courts have authority and
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may only do so when the parties’
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred. If the issue of prescription is
one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be
determined in a motion to dismiss.